CONFIDENTIAL.

Collection of Papers

relating to the

KHYBER,

1896—98.
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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—F.

Progs., August 1896, Nos. 344—345.

Administration of the frontier districts of the Punjab and the management of the trans-frontier tribes.
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**BRIEF SUBJECT.**

Administration of the frontier districts of the Punjab and the management of the trans-frontier tribes.

**LIST OF PAPERS.**

No. 344.—To the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 2197 F., dated the 14th Aug. 1895—Administration of the frontier districts of the Punjab and the management of the frontier tribes. Decision not to separate from the Punjab the districts of Peshawar and Kohat and the trans-frontier tracts from the Indus to the Gomal. Suggestion that the Abbottabad border should be managed from Rawalpindi, and that the frontier from the Gomal to the Panjkora river should be placed under the Commr. of Peshawar, with the charge of the Bannu district in place of Abbottabad. Desirability of separating the control of trans-frontier districts from the charge of Frontier Deputy Commissrs., and placing Pol. Officers in charge of the tribes directly under the orders of Commissrs.

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K. W. No. 1.


PRIVATE SECRETARY TO VICE-ROY.

I submit the papers about a Frontier Province which His Excellency wishes to see. I would venture to refer to paragraphs (iv) and (v) of my note of 18th July 1889. I am still very strongly of opinion that one Province comprising the whole frontier would be a mistake, and if we are to take the frontier away from the Punjab, the best arrangement would be to have two Agents to the Governor-General corresponding direct with the Government of India, that is to say to leave Baluchistan as it is, and to create a new Agent to the Governor-Generalship for the frontier from the Gomal to Chitral, including the two Punjab Districts of Peshawar and Kohat, but no others.

Baluchistan has five District and Political charges under the Agent to the Governor-General, viz.:

South-East Baluchistan.
Kalat.
Thal-Chotiali and Sibi.
Quetta-Pishin.
Zhob.

The Peshawar Province would have about the same number, viz.:

Waziristan.
Kurram.
Kohat.
Peshawar.
Dir and Chitral.

The Agent to the Governor-General would require a Revenue and Judicial Commissioner, as in Baluchistan, to manage the revenue and judicial administration, and in a populous district like Peshawar, a District and Sessions Judge would also be needed. There would besides be the five Political or District charges as above. The increase of expense would be small, if indeed there would be any, as the Commissioner of Peshawar would be turned with a slight increase of pay into the Agent to the Governor-General and all the other officers required are employed already. No other scheme that I know of will enable us to take away from the Punjab just what we want, and no more, viz., the frontier tribes. To make one frontier province we should have to separate from the Punjab everything trans-Indus in order to give easy communication from one end to the other. This would mean greater opposition from the Punjab, and worse still would weight the head of the new province with an amount of internal administrative work, which would ruin his usefulness as a frontier officer.

It might be possible in time to unite the two Agents to the Governor-General under one big officer, when the frontier is settled and peaceable. But for the work we want done now, the two small charges are infinitely more effective, and I speak from long personal experience of administration in Baluchistan.

You will see that Sir Andrew Scoble and Sir George Chesney also thought two Agents to the Governor-General better than one frontier province.

29th April 1896.

H. S. BARNES.

We deferred† our consideration of the political arrangements of the future in Gilgit and Chitral until the reliefs had been sent to Chitral. This is perhaps scarcely the opportunity for saying much about that operation, but its success materially affects the decisions we have now to make, and it is impossible for me to refrain from a word of congratulation, not so much to ourselves on the vindication of our policy: as to those who have carried it out, and specially to Major Deane, whose power of influencing the tribes and whose judicious exercise of that power have done more than anything else to make success possible.

One result follows inevitably from this circumstance, and is agreed in by all, i.e., the severance of the political management of Chitral from the Gilgit Agency. I had occasion to mention this to Council a few weeks ago and I have since caused a semi-official communication to be made to Sir G. Robertson on the subject, and have also myself informed him that the natural consequence will be his relinquishment of the Gilgit Agency.

† Paragraph 10 of our Secret despatch No. 35, Frontier, dated 19th February 1896 (No. 216, Secret F., April 1896, Nos. 190–231.)
Before, however, I proceed to further details, I must refer to the larger question which is raised in some of the notes, and which, whatever their determination may be, ought I think to be fairly placed before Hon'ble Members, i.e., the general question of the management of our relations with the tribes on our North-West Frontier. I do not feel it to be necessary to write at length—for the whole case has been most exhaustively discussed on previous occasions, I refer especially to Proceedings, Secret F., October 1889, Nos. 133-138, and more particularly so to the admirable note in that collection written by Sir M. Durand on August 25th, 1889. The object aimed at is unity of policy and administration, and it appeared then, and I confess it still appears to me, that though a certain amount of centralisation was necessary to attain that object, there are limits to the amount of centralisation that is desirable. After all it is the Government of India that must determine the general policy, and I fail to see that it can do so much more effectually by having only one officer in direct communication with itself on the west side of the Indus. On the other hand, looking at it from the administrative point of view, the province described, as extending from the Hindu Kush to the sea, would, in my opinion, be quite unmanageable, while the evidence that the different circumstances and characteristics of the numerous tribes require great variety in handling seems to me overwhelming. At all events for the purposes of this note, I propose to follow the former decision, and to set aside Baluchistan on the one hand, and Kashmir and its dependencies on the other, dealing only with the tribes bordering on the Punjab, but including of course Chitral.

In considering this question in the light of former discussions, we must not however forget to bring the facts up to date. Sir James Lyall in combating the assertion that the Punjab policy was a close policy relied very much in his confidential note of 17th October* 1889, and still more in that of 23rd August† 1890 on the necessity of avoiding offence to "the Amir's susceptibilities by anything resembling encroachment or interference with tracts or tribes to which he may consider that he has a claim." It is to be noticed also that the latter note was written subsequently to the letter to Sir J. Browne, dated 19th June‡ 1890, in which, while declaring against an active trans-frontier policy, "in respect to Afghan tribes and Afghan chiefs, whom we choose to consider beyond the Amir's sphere of influence", he admits that such a policy, if adopted, loads up to a separate Frontier Administration.

All this has of course been altered by our agreement with the Amir as to spheres of influence, and the actual facts, i.e., our increased control of the Waziri country by the establishment of posts at Wano and in the Tochi, and our opening up of the road to Chitral through Swat and Dir. These changes affect both sides of the argument—for, while the agreement with the Amir has removed the principal reason given by the Lieutenant-Governor for non-interference, the facts referred to have necessitated interference, and indeed in justice to the Punjab officers, Mr. Bruce and Mr. Anderson on the Waziris, and Major Deane on the Dir side, it must be admitted that they have been restrained from carrying their interference further by the direct orders of the Government of India.

The arguments for and against detaching the political management of the tribes from the Punjab Government are fairly discussed by Sir Mortimer Durand in the 29th and following paragraphs of his note, and the map prepared to accompany that note shows the country with which he dealt. I am bound to say that it seems to me clear that the tract, coloured blue in this map, would be more easily managed if it was extended by the inclusion of the two Punjab districts of Peshawar and Kohat as suggested in the last note on the 9th by Mr. Barnes, and I also agree with Mr. Barnes in deprecating the inclusion of any of the other settled districts of the Punjab. On the other hand I see great force in the objections to the separation of the administration of the frontier districts from the political management of the frontier tribes stated in paragraph 31 by Sir Mortimer-Durand. I am pretty certain that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick would hold this opinion very strongly; and I feel a good deal of sympathy with it. What we desire to do is to extend peace and order through the tribal country not by force or annexation, but by personal influences, partly of individual officers, partly by ocular demonstration and gradual experience of the advantages of a peaceful life. There is a danger, if the tribal country is placed under an entirely separate authority, that these influences, which can only filter into it by degrees, may be checked in their flow from the settled country adjoining, even if we do not find the actual friction which Sir M. Durand apprehended, and of which I fear there has been some evidence in the relations between the Baluchistan Agency and the Punjab. It must be remembered that the limits of the extension of our influence are now fixed, and looking again at the map I find that the blue tract where it represents the Waziri country means a strip at no part I suppose much more than 60 miles broad in a straight line, and at one part, near Thal, something like 10 miles. I may be sanguine, but I see no impossibility in the comparatively rapid spread of more settled methods through this country. Already our arrangements with the Dawaris have introduced the first form of a settlement in the Tochi valley, and I think Major Deane has told us that if allowed he could introduce it in Swat.
There is a good deal that is tempting in the idea of separating the management of the frontier tribes from the Punjab. It cannot be denied that the present system leads too often to excessive delay, and that the passing of everything through the Punjab Government increases the amount of correspondence. At the same time I believe it to be a mistake to suppose that there is not something on the other side. The Punjab Government must save us from a mass of detail, which, if not stopped somewhere, would otherwise fall on the devoted head of the Foreign Department. I believe that if we were to form a new jurisdiction under a new Agent to the Governor-General, we should for a time run a considerable risk of being overwhelmed, and I say so from my experience of Baluchistan, where I would fain hope that we may soon emerge into greater order and regularity. Hesitating therefore, as I do for the other reasons stated above, to propose the separation of Waziristan from the Punjab (in which case it would be difficult to suggest the abstraction of the Peshawar and Kohat Districts), I would like to enquire whether we could not do something to improve the system, without radical alteration. Mr. Barnett in one of his former notes suggested that a Political Secretary might be added to the Punjab Secretariat, and possibly this might reduce delays. It occurs to me also as a possibility that the Commissionership of Peshawar, without being separated from the Punjab, might be raised to a somewhat exceptional position, in some such way as the Commissioner in Sind is differentiated from the other Commissioners under the Bombay Government, and have under him the greater part of the blue tracts on the map already referred to. I know there is a great difficulty in a man serving two masters, and I am not aware of any exact precedent; the nearest illustration I can give is the position occupied by Mr. Bruce during the continuance of the Waziristan Expedition when he corresponded with us direct, but sent copies to the Punjab Government; but if it could be arranged with the Punjab Government that this Commissioner should correspond direct with the Government of India on matters relating exclusively to tribal affairs within his jurisdiction, I think we should have secured most of the advantages of a separate province, while avoiding the difficulties inseparable from dividing the tribes from the settled districts that adjoin them.

At all events, I am personally more induced to attempt some arrangement with the Punjab Government than to face what, with the example of the Sind case before me on this file, I cannot but think would be the far-reaching difficulties which a proposal to cut down the Punjab Province would call forth. I think I am right in saying that in the more recent arrangements in Waziristan, the principle has been adopted of making the Political Officer in the tribal country independent of the Deputy Commissioner, and of placing him directly under the Commissioner. A system of that kind might remove many of the difficulties mentioned as arising from the attempt to combine under one management duties inside and outside the borders of British India.

There is another consideration which induces me to at least postpone again any definite severance of the frontier tribes from the Punjab. I doubt whether in finding a man to undertake the work we are much better off now than when Sir M. Durand said that he could suggest no one except Mr. Udny (paragraph 37). But I do not think any one will deny that it is most important to retain in something like his present position on the route to Chitral, the Agent who has served us so well during the past year. I should hesitate to support any proposal that would prevent Major Deane from continuing his work for the next year or two on the same lines. And the dilemma is this. If Major Deane was placed under a Commissioner at Peshawar, however sympathetic, I fear there would be a danger of crippling his freedom of action. While even if he were sufficiently senior to act as Commissioner himself, which I think is scarcely the case, to put him in that position would be to remove him from the close supervision of that particular piece of country in which we wish to retain his services.

On the whole I am disposed to suggest that we should continue for a further period, which we need not too closely define, the present arrangement by which the Political Officer in this part of the country is in direct relations with the Government of India. But if we make this arrangement to this extent more permanent, and if we ask Major Deane to remain under it, we must not overlook anything that affects his interests. Now I know from Major Deane himself that he felt some hesitation in abandoning the very favourable position he had attained in the Punjab for a situation which led to nothing. We met his objections to some extent by increasing the pecuniary emoluments of the post; but now if we wish to continue the term of service and add to it the responsibility of Chitral, we ought to do one of two things. Either we ought to make it a special agency, such as Gilgit has been, or we ought to give the officer who holds it a place on the list of the Political Department and so provide a future for him. In both cases we can certainly not decrease the pay of Major Deane if he retains his duties (Rs. 2,000 per annum). That is the scale of pay of a 1st Class Resident, but I am inclined to think that it would be preferable, if Major Deane was to be brought on to the list of the Political Department, that he should rank as a Political Agent, 1st class, drawing the Rs. 1,500 per mensem usual in that grade and a personal allowance. He would then have prospects of promotion in the grade of 2nd Class Residents, and I could conceive circumstances in which he would prove a very valuable addition to the list of the Political Department. On the other hand, there is a good deal to be said for keeping this appointment off the list for the present. There are many possibilities of change, and it may be better to be able to alter the character of the post with equal ease. At all events, this can be decided at a later stage.
It would be necessary of course that Major Deane as Political Agent in charge of Chitral should have two Assistants under him, instead of one as at present. There may be some question as to the best place for his own head-quarters. I have reason to believe that, personally, he would prefer to be nearer the Khan of Dir, but we are, I think, pledged for the present not to advance any post beyond the Malakand and Chakdara, and we could not of course send our Political Agent without a considerable guard. I should be prepared to consider the propriety of removing, so far as he is concerned, the prohibition against use of the road which we have enforced during the past year. I know that here again Major Deane is anxious to show confidence and remove restrictions, and I quite recognise the force of his arguments. But the Government of India is bound to take a wider view of the question than its local officers are likely to take. A policy is at stake for which Her Majesty's Government as well as the Government of India have assumed responsibilities; and I am strongly of opinion that it will be safer for another year at all events to be very strict about any permission to use the road.

With regard to Gilgit, I agree generally with the views of Mr. Barnes as expressed in paragraph 15 of his letter of 9th March. I think it is desirable in every way to maintain the close connection between Kashmir and Gilgit, and that the proper position for the Political Officer at Gilgit is as a subordinate of the Resident in Kashmir. On the other hand, I do not agree with Sir G. Robertson in wishing to extend the functions of the Resident of Kashmir to Chitral, Dir, &c., while we have such a man as the present Maharaja to deal with, it is essential that the Resident should be constantly on the spot, and able to exert a personal influence, and this is incompatible with the charge of such distant places as Chitral and Dir.

I think the time has come when the Agency at Gilgit should be regularised and brought on to the Political Department. I should propose that it should now be a second class Political Agency. The usual salary of such a post (Rs. 1,200 per mensem), with the present travelling allowance of Rs. 300, would enable us to get a man of sufficient standing. It may be possible after a year or two to reduce it a little further, perhaps to the rank of a third class Political Agency at Rs. 1,000 per mensem, but it must be remembered that though subordinate to Kashmir, this officer will always be far off and have a good deal of responsibility. At any rate, for the meantime, while the military and political arrangements are all being reorganised, we shall do very well in the matter of economy if we reduce the Agent's pay by Rs. 500, especially as we shall also effect a considerable saving in the number of his Assistants, as pointed out both by Sir G. Robertson and by Mr. Barnes.

I regret that after all I have written a good deal more than I intended, but big questions of policy when combined with a considerable mass of detail cannot be disposed of very briefly.

I sum up my conclusions thus:—

I.—It is inexpedient to form one large frontier province.

II.—As regards the Punjab, it is desirable to maintain for the present the general system, though we may perhaps ask the Lieutenant-Governor to consider if it can be improved, e.g., by a larger Commissionership at Peshawar.

III.—That Major Deane should be continued as Political Agent for Swat and Dir in direct connection with the Government of India, and that Chitral should be added to his Agency. Two forms for his Agency are suggested.

IV.—That the Gilgit Agency should be placed on the list of the Political Department as a Political Agency of the second class, subordinate to the Resident in Kashmir: the area of the Agency to be confined to the country east of the Shandur Pass.

The Secretary of State has desired me to submit our scheme of political arrangements to him, and we should do so as soon as convenient.

3rd June 1896.

I know so little of India, and frontier policy, that I would rather not express any opinion on the main points at issue until I have heard them discussed in Council.

I do not know how postal arrangements go in these frontier districts, but probably they are not rapid. It seems important therefore that, for the present, the frontier officers should be able to communicate direct with the Government of India, without having to send their communications through other officers.

It is clearly right that an officer, who has rendered such good service as Major Deane, should have his future career efficiently protected.

May I suggest that, for the discussion in Council, we should be provided with rough maps of the country to be considered.

7th June 1896.

M. D. CLAIRMERS.
The only point, on which I had doubt on reading His Excellency’s note, was the suggestion that the Commissioner of Peshawar should be given the powers of the Commissioner of Sind. The Sind Commissioner has long had powers to act of his own authority in matters, in which other Commissioners of the Bombay Presidency have to take the orders of the Government. But he reports his actions, and I was not aware that he had any authority to correspond direct with the Government of India. It appears, however, from the papers in this file that in 1876 he did so correspond in regard to political affairs in Baluchistan. In that year he was relieved of all political connection with Baluchistan, and I cannot make out whether he now conducts any direct correspondence with the Government of India. The experience of the relations of this Government with the Commissioner of Sind will be useful in showing whether a system of direct correspondence with an officer engaged in important administrative work of other kinds can be maintained for any length of time without friction with the local Government. Prima facie, it is doubtful for reasons given by Sir M. Durand whether it could be so maintained, but if it was successfully carried out in Sind, it could be equally carried out in Peshawar.

This however His Excellency does not describe as an essential part of his proposals, and is a detail on which perhaps the Foreign Secretary could give further information in Council.

Upon the general scheme I think, so far as my information goes, that His Excellency’s opinion is clearly the right one to make no organic change for the present. But the papers in the file do not show how far the policy of the letter of October 1889 to the Punjab has been successful. I gather from Sir James Brown’s note of June 1890 that the frontier tribes were coming rapidly under control, but we have had the Waziristan Expedition since, and it seems so plainly necessary that the objects in view in 1889 should be attained somehow or other, that if the plan of reaching them through the Punjab Government is not working well, the alternative plan of a frontier province would have stronger reasons for it than before.

9th June 1896. J. WOODBURN.

I agree that it will be necessary, now or very soon, to address ourselves again to the question of the permanent arrangements for the administration of the North-West Frontier. It is very remarkable how far each part of the question of frontier policy alluded to in Sir M. Durand’s note of 1889 has “ripened” during the intermediate interval. He mentions in succession the Gomal, the Waziri country, the Tochi valley, the Kurram, and the Dir and Chitral road as matters of unsettlement, whereas they are all now the subjects of a fixed and definite policy.

I am inclined to think that the enlargement of the authority and powers of the Commissioner of Peshawar, while keeping him subordinate to the Government of the Punjab, affords the best practical means of providing the future machinery of management. The Commissioner of Peshawar is the officer to whom many of these tribes have for a long time looked as the adjacent representative of British authority, so that in such an arrangement we start as it were with something to our credit. Moreover I think that the immediate representative of our authority must, in the eyes of the tribes, be an officer wielding some actual territorial authority in India. It is not the bestowal of a big title of Agent to the Governor-General or the assignment of a big salary, which will give an officer influence among our neighbours, but the fact that he is seen to be clothed with and to exercise high functions in British India. In fact we have the Commissioner of Peshawar made to our hands for the purpose, and he is the natural officer to use. He would of course have a special Political Officer, as he has at the present moment in Major Deane, who would have the same relation to him as his District Officers, but in the Commissioner we would have that link between the administration of things beyond, and the administration of things within, the frontier, which is alluded to in His Excellency’s note as necessary to prevent friction.

I do not see any occasion—rather the contrary—to remove the Commissioner in these matters from his subordination to the Punjab Government. The practical difficulties in the way of that removal seem to me insuperable. The Commissioner certainly cannot serve two masters—he cannot be under the Government of India in his political dealings, and under the Government of the Punjab in his ordinary administration; the two sets of functions would clash every day, and the Government of India and the Punjab would be brought into mutual relations which would be intolerable. The Hon’ble Mr. Woodburn is under an erroneous impression in thinking that the position of the Commissioner in Sind affords any example of a situation of the kind. That officer has no relations with India, but is solely an officer of the Government of Bombay, a Commissioner endowed with bigger powers than the others, and the only peculiarity of his correspondence is that he addresses His Excellency the Governor in Council, while other Commissioners address the Secretary to the Government of Bombay. But he does not address the Government of India.

The choice therefore lies between separating off a province for the Commissioner of Peshawar, and establishing him under the Government of India, or keeping him under the Punjab Government. The first proposal burdens the Government of India with a new province under its direct administration; for, as I have said above, the Commissioner must not be
one in name only, but must be the actual possessor of authority in British India. Now, whatever may be said for the direct administration of the Government of India on political matters, its direct administration on revenue matters cannot be compared, for efficiency, with that of a local Government. Moreover, if Peshawar and the frontier are taken away from the Punjab, the Lieutenant-Governorship is reduced in dimensions and importance to a mere Chief Commissionership—a change which cannot be for the advantage of the Government of India.

Nor is the work of the Foreign Office, or of any other department of Government so light, that it can afford to dispense with the assistance of the Government of the Punjab, or take up details of administration which can conveniently be left to that Government. I see a fear expressed lest the delay involved in the interposition of the Punjab Government may be a greater evil than its assistance is an advantage. But I am not sure that that Government has had a fair chance; a definite policy has not been laid down, and in many respects it has not been possible to lay down a definite policy, until now. What the Punjab Government has been able to do during a period in which it may be said that the Government of India did not quite know its own mind, or at least hesitated whether it would be allowed to do what it wished and thought proper, may be no measure of what it may do when a definite line of policy has been shaped out for it, and it knows clearly on what lines to shape its action.

I do not enter into the personal questions mentioned in His Excellency's note; but as bearing upon this I may note that the proposed enhancement of the Commissionership of Peshawar would, it seems to me, give some security for continuity of policy on the part of the Government of the Punjab. In practice indeed, I fancy, the Commissionership would very often be a mere step to the Lieutenant-Governorship, just as the Commissionership of Sind is to the Bombay Council—a consideration which would enhance the influence of the appointment in the direction of continuity and efficiency in the direction of frontier policy.

11th June 1896.

J. W(ESTLAND).

I am quite in accord with the view that it is inexpedient to form one large frontier province, and that we should, for the present, confine ourselves to doing what is possible to remove defects in existing arrangements for establishing and maintaining the necessary control over the tribes beyond our frontier. I also concur with Sir J. Westland that the necessary control can best be exercised through officers in visible authority on our own side of the border. I am a little doubtful of the advisability of giving special political powers over the whole Punjab frontier to the Commissioner at Peshawar. It would be more in accord, with the policy last stated, to leave the political control of the tribes adjoining the Banu and Dera Ismail districts in the hands of the Commissioner of Derajat, and to provide for the necessary unity of policy by giving effect to the suggestion made some years back by Mr. Barnes, that the Punjab Government should be strengthened by attaching to it a Political Secretary of special experience and ability in dealing with frontier problems. But this point, as well as other questions of detail, such as the comparative advantages of putting the trans-frontier tribes under special Political Officers directly subordinate to the Commissioners, or leaving them to be dealt with by the Deputy Commissioners of adjoining British districts, relieving the latter of their ordinary administrative work to such extent as might be necessary by giving them additional assistants, would no doubt be matter for discussion with the Punjab Government before any final decision is arrived at.

As regards points III and IV of the summary at the end of His Excellency the Viceroy's note, I accept His Excellency's conclusions.

12th June 1896.

A. C. T(REVOR).

I am opposed to the idea of one frontier province, and am in full accord with what His Excellency the Viceroy has written on this point at the top of page 2 of the printed notes. I am convinced that an attempt at any such centralization would result in an increase of all the real difficulties that have hitherto existed under the Punjab and Baluchistain administrations, and would add to them the evils that must attend on any attempt to introduce official centralization and control over territory where geographical and ethnological segregation obtain to an extent unknown under any subordinate Government in the world. The territories over which the Punjab Government now rules have the advantages of being comparatively compactly placed. Lahore is a geographical centre from which railways radiate towards all the more remote quarters of the province. If we consider the marches of a trans-Indus province extending from Mekran to the Hindu Kush, we find ourselves in presence of a long narrow strip of territory extending some 1,400 miles, or about as far from London to St. Petersburgh, with no natural geographical capital and populated by tribes whose history, customs and sympathies are as diverse as it is possible to imagine. It has been proved by experience that the warlike propensities of our frontier subjects decrease in proportion to the time they have lived under the influence of our peace-compelling rule. One long and lean province, such as has been proposed, would group under one system of treatment populations who have long enjoyed the doubtful advantages of English law, together with such recent additions to our responsibilities as the Dawaris of the Tochi; in fact, people in every stage of civilization from the most advanced who lean on the decrees of a Chief Court to those who settle their suits by the ordeal of the jezail and the Afghan knife.
Again, I think that the selection of an Agent to the Governor-General of such a province would, at the present time, be a most difficult task, and the names that would suggest themselves would probably be those of officers in the running for the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab.

The idea of separating the ordinary civil administration of a district from the political charge seems to me Secretariat theory. Such a system would inevitably lead to friction amongst the officers themselves, as they would have to treat the people from different stand points. It would also cause a want of finality in settlements of cases. Suits would go backwards and forwards from the civil authority to the political authority, hoping that a later interview or petition might bring about a ruling more acceptable to them. The theory is that the Political Officer would be the medium of influence, and that, divorced from more routine civil duties, he would have leisure to push that influence. But influence over border men is not an abstract political entity; it is closely concreted with the incidents and conditions of their daily life, such as the settlement of their quarrels, the management of their land, disputed rights to water, grazing claims, love intrigues and the numerous domestic incidents that make up life on the frontier, and which, when settled under normal conditions, lead to violence and blood-feuds. I have known Pathans buried away in cellars afraid to emerge into the light lest they might be shot down at sight. A Pathan does not like being shot down at his own door more than more civilized races; and it is in the settlement of disputes that would result in bloodshed if left to tribal custom, that our frontier officers, if of the right sort, get openings for spreading their influence. If a frontier man wants to describe his model of a frontier officer he says of him—"He knows all our affairs." Such influence and such knowledge will not bear breaking up into different elements of paternal government—one political and the other civil.

I think, I am indebted to our Officiating Foreign Secretary for the valuable aphorism—

"Impersonal Government will not do for the frontier tribes."

In the case we are now considering, the success of the policy will depend almost entirely on the promptitude and intelligence of the individual officer who has to carry it out. Our true policy therefore is to select special men for special posts, to give them the widest powers possible, and to free them in every manner practicable from having to show hesitation or delay in their dealings with the tribesmen on account of the necessity of references. Major Deane could not have spread his influence as he has done, with such happy results, if he had had to refer every question to the Commissioner of Peshawar, and perhaps have further had to await a second reference to the Punjab Government. I would advocate that the Government of India should give expression to its wish that the Political Officers on the frontier be considered apart from the ordinary civil officers of settled districts, and be instructed and encouraged to exercise strong duties, he would have leisure to push that influence. But influence over border men is not an abstract political entity; it is closely concreted with the incidents and conditions of their daily life, such as the settlement of their quarrels, the management of their land, disputed rights to water, grazing claims, love intrigues and the numerous domestic incidents that make up life on the frontier, and which, when settled under normal conditions, lead to violence and blood-feuds. I have known Pathans buried away in cellars afraid to emerge into the light lest they might be shot down at sight. A Pathan does not like being shot down at his own door more than more civilized races; and it is in the settlement of disputes that would result in bloodshed if left to tribal custom, that our frontier officers, if of the right sort, get openings for spreading their influence. If a frontier man wants to describe his model of a frontier officer he says of him—"He knows all our affairs." Such influence and such knowledge will not bear breaking up into different elements of paternal government—one political and the other civil.

I can endorse with the deepest conviction what His Excellency the Vicereuly has written regarding the advantage of retaining the services of Major Deane as Chief Political Officer from Jalala to Chitral. I have had good opportunities of judging of his methods and their results, and I cannot too gratefully acknowledge what the military authorities owe to his quiet strength, great insight into Pathan character and intention; and resolute action. It is but due to him to own that the rapid and successful "Relief of Chitral" and the relief of the Chitral garrison just completed without a shot having been fired, the troops marching from Chakdara to the Lowari Pass over roads and bridges kept in repair by tribal labour, is mainly owing to the successful way in which he has managed the people. If Major Deane is rewarded in proportion to the value of his services to Her Majesty's Government and to the Government of India, he will be placed in high position. To make so good a frontier Political Officer contented and anxious to retain his position is not only politically sound but it is also economical.

When the question of a trans-Indus province was so exhaustively and so ably discussed in 1889, there were certain definite and urgent aims to be pursued in furtherance of the general policy. The advocates of a radical change of administration thought these could not be attained under the system then pursued by the Punjab Government. It may not be without profit in the present connection to examine how far results have justified these forebodings. The points, where a more forward policy was declared most necessary, were

(1) Zhob.
(2) The Gomal.
(3) Waziristan.
(4) The Tochi.
(5) Dir-Chitral post road.
With regard to (1) Zhob has been brought under our protection; the long dreaded Sherani hills including the Tahkt-i-Suleiman, at which the Punjab Frontier Force had been looking for 40 years since the annexation of the Punjab, have been turned and the tribes, who formerly found safe sanctuary in their fastnesses, have been dominated and brought under control: (2) the Gomal has been traversed by our troops from Domandi to its eastern gate, and has since been rendered safe by (3) the conquest and occupation of Waziristan: (4) the Tochi has been annexed and direct communication opened between it and Bannu: (5) the Dir-Chitral route has not only been opened as a tribal postal route to Chitral, but a British right of way has been established and British forces have moved from the Peshawar valley to Chitral, and from Chitral to the Peshawar valley along roads held in our interests by tribal levies. In addition to these schemes which have been so fully accomplished, we have (6) opened the road from Abbottabad via the Kagan valley and the Babusar Pass to Chilas, which is bordered throughout its length by the formidable Indus valley tribes, and yet it is now traversed by small parties of British without let or hindrance: (7) the Durand Mission has settled a line of influence between Afghanistan and India, and it now remains to us but to safeguard the interests thus secured to us against Afghan repudiation of a bargain which entailed on us the payment of an extra subsidy of six lakhs a year, besides gifts of arms and numerous other benefits.

This is no story of masterful inactivity. It tells of progress quite sufficiently rapid. If therefore there has been obstruction it has not been altogether without useful tendencies.

I understand that the frontier policy enunciated by Lord Lansdowne's government in 1889 is that which the present Government of India wish to carry out. I quote Lord Lansdowne's words for clearer reference:

"The Government of India has, I assume, made up its mind that, throughout this portion of the frontier region, we are no longer content to find ourselves face to face with an impregnable wall of hostile tribesmen, but that we desired to increase our hold upon those, to know what is passing within the region which they inhabit and beyond it, to improve our frontier communications, to encourage the tribes to supply us with recruits under ordinary circumstances, and to look towards us and not towards the invader in the event of foreign aggression; and that we should like to remove the obstacles by which we are now prevented from acquiring a more intimate knowledge of, and establishing better relations with, the important Ghilzai tribes which stretch along the eastern flank of the Afghan nation."

I cannot see why we should not insist upon the Punjab Government, dealing with its frontier provinces, as so to give effect to this policy uniformly and consistently. If it is considered by the Government of India impossible or inadvisable to detach any

...
1. This question of a frontier administration separated from the Punjab proper is one with which I have been familiar for many years, and I must own that the idea of a frontier province has always been as attractive to me as it has been to many others. That "one Government, one policy and one command should watch over the frontier from the seashore to Peshawar" (Sir Henry Durand, 1867) seemed to me to be the best and most reasonable plan to support. And when men, differing so much in experience and characteristics, as the late Sir Charles Aitchison, and Lord Roberts, held the decided opinion that the time had come (1886) to consolidate the whole civil and political control of the frontier, from Peshawar to the sea, under one authority, in direct subordination to the Government of India, I shall, I am sure, be pardoned for not accepting, in its entirety, the condemnation which has been passed in some of the foregoing notes upon a plan accepted by many high authorities, although at the same time I am bound to recognize the disadvantages which have been so forcibly put forward by His Excellency the Viceroy and by the Commander-in-Chief. Whether we should not have been in a better position years ago, but for the difficulties caused by the interposition of the Punjab Government by their pursuance of the "close border" policy and by their opposition to the policy of the Government of India; whether such success as has been achieved has been gained in spite of the local Government, and, in contradiction of their views, must I think be considered open questions. At all events I think I may say that, during the last twenty years since the days of Lord Lytton, there has been, from time to time, a chorus of condemnation raised by members of the Government of India against the present system, which is once again to have a fresh lease of life.

2. At the same time it must be admitted that circumstances have considerably changed of late years. The direct control of the Governor-General in Council over the enormous area embraced by British Baluchistan, and in the jurisdiction of the Baluchistan Political Agency, has now been established, while the measures taken in recent years to bring under British influence the independent tribes between British Baluchistan and the Punjab, and to dominate Waziristan and the Gomal, and the Tochi and Kurram valleys, together with the possession of the Khelbars already combined to render the situation very different to that which was presented to those who considered this important question twenty years ago. Admitting that circumstances have changed, it seems to me that the changes are mostly in favour of the plan of separating the trans-frontier districts from the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, and combining the political control of the frontier tribes within the line of British influence, with the administration of the present trans-frontier districts. The northern part of the Baluchistan Agency i.e., the valleys of the Barkan, Bori, and Zhob, inhabited by Khetrans, Kakars, the Musa Khel, and the Mando Khel, with the Sheranis of the Takhit-i-Suliman, now completely over-shadow the Derajat from Rajanpur to Dera Ismail Khan. East of the Suliman, the Boddars and the Kusran, and the lowland portion of the Sheranis remain under the Punjab Government, but the territory under the Baluchistan Agency now blocks nearly half the trans-Indus Punjab frontier, so that in the narrow strip of country or what used to be called the "frontier" between Baluchistan and the Punjab, we have two systems of tribal management at work; and two distinct authorities reporting to the Governments of India. The very addition of the Bori and Zhob country to British Baluchistan proves, it seems to me, the reasonableness of taking away from the Punjab, instead of adding to, the responsibilities of that Government. And in the last twenty years the burden of civil administration has increased, both to the district officers and to the central authority, the business of Government has become more complex, and great problems connected with a settled administration, and the effect of our laws upon the peasantry of a vast area, have to be dealt with.

3. These burdens will be very considerably added to if the political control of the Pathan tribes within the advanced and new frontier of British influence is to be confided to the already overburdened Punjab Government. We are only at the commencement of this new chapter of frontier history, our influence over many of the Pathan tribes is only beginning to be felt, and although I have always advocated a cautious and gradual advance, I cannot but feel that we must prepare to exercise political control, and step by step bring the tribes under the salutary suzerainty of British power. This is a great work and I do not think the Punjab Government is a suitable agency for it.

4. The danger of "centralization" has been urged. No one is more alive than I am to this danger in administration, and I have ever been a consistent opponent of centralization. But surely the great and beneficent work which was begun when Sandeman was cut free from Sind and the Punjab, cannot be quoted as an example of centralization. It will be a far more striking example of centralization to hand over the political control of a large region, now to be brought under British influence, to a distant Central Government at Lahore, or Simla—so Government already sufficiently tasked with its ordinary business of the civil administration of a large province—and which has not proved itself to be a suitable Agency in the past for the conduct of limited political and frontier affairs—a result due, I think, to the fact that its provincial work was more than sufficient to occupy its attention, quite as much as to the stubborn adherence to a policy on the frontier which has, for many years, been considered out of date.

It would be, I am aware, in vain for me—in face of the powerful opinions that have been expressed—to plead in favour of a great frontier province, and I must content myself with
expressing my opinion that as time goes on, and as development takes place in our relations
with Afghanistan and its powerful northern
neighbour, the need will be felt for some central
agency to direct the control of the tribes to the
utmost frontier of British influence, from
Chitral to the sea, in direct subordination to the
Foreign Department.*

5. For the present, however, I agree that we cannot consider the establishment of such a
frontier province or Lieutenant-Governorship, and that the immediate question is whether any,
and what, change is to be made in the general system under which the primary control of
certain of the tribes on and beyond the old frontier (the
Punjab Government,

6. For the reasons given in His Excellency the Viceroy's note, Gilgit must remain
under Kashmir, while it is advisable to keep the Political Agency of Swat and Dir directly under
the Foreign Department, and to add Chitral to that agency.

7. The question is then narrowed—Baluchistan remaining as at present—to the trans-
Indus districts from the southern limits of the Punjab trans-Indus to Peshawar, and the tribes
across the old frontier up to the limit of the Durand line.

8. The Commander-in-Chief is opposed—to what he terms a mere secretariat theory—the
proposal to separate the "political" from the "civil" element in the management of the frontier
tribes. The model of a frontier officer is the man who "knows all our affairs." That is
absolutely true, and was to a large extent the secret of Sandeman's success, but can the
Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan know all the affairs of the Waziris? or the
Deputy Commissioner of Bannu be intimately acquainted with the incidents, so graphically
described by Sir George White, which make up the daily life of the Turis?

No doubt when the frontier lay a morning's ride, or less, beyond the frontier station, and
when "crossing the frontier" meant a dangerous exploit in disobedience of orders, it was
quite possible for the Deputy Commissioner to deal with frontier affairs as well as the usual
civil business of the district. As for "relations" with the tribesmen, these were very nearly
non-existent, and there was plenty of work in the district itself—the border was a hard
and fast line, extension beyond it was rigidly forbidden—the specially selected officers, generally
military men, governed on patriarchal lines, and the "complicated system of civil and legal
administration" which the Commander-in-Chief would keep far off from the frontier, had
not yet approached. But a change has gradually been wrought and it is inevitable. Even at
remote outposts (and I have visited every one from Draband lying under the Takht to
the Doaba outposts of Peshawar), there were signs of respect for settled government which were
very marked, and which showed at least a tendency—and this was many years ago—to appreciate
the benefits of civilization of the kind we then possessed on the frontier. We see precisely the
same change going on in Baluchistan, only there the change is being more rapidly
effecting. The great point all will agree in is to give to the frontier tribes the
benefits, without the drawbacks, of our system; to win their confidence, and gradually, though more slowly, to bring the tribes as far as the Durand line into the conditions in which Sandeman brought many of the Pathan
tribes beyond the actual limits of British Baluchistan.

9. To carry on this work you need, as the Commander-in-Chief points out, to give selected
men "the widest powers possible." Will the Punjab Government give their officers such
powers? Will they agree in considering the Political Officers on the frontier as apart from
the ordinary civil officers of settled districts, as suggested by Sir George White—and will
they be allowed to exercise "strong and independent personal influence" over the tribes?

10. "Impersonal Government will not do for frontier tribes," but will personal Govern-
ment be permitted by the Punjab Government? And the "necessity of references" be
abolished? The example of Major Deane's work seems to me to give a striking illustration of
what can be done by an officer set free from the trammels of "civil" administration and
the bonds of the Punjab Government, and by no means to support the objection to
the divorce of "civil" from "political" functions. But the fact is that the Political Officer
must, although not perhaps at first, exercise rough and ready "civil" functions in a
limited way, whenever the region of which he is in charge emerges from the first stage of
"British influence." I do not understand whether His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief
desires to see the Deputy Commissioners of the trans-Indus districts concerned with the
political charge of the tribes across the old frontier. I gather that he does not advocate this,
but that the Political Officers should be directly under the Commissioners. And if the present
system is to continue, this seems undoubtedly to be the best arrangement.

11. At the present time we have the following state of things: what is called the political
administration of the Punjab frontier, i.e., the frontier of British India is not separated from
the revenue and civil administration of the bither side of that frontier, except at certain points.
There are the Khaibar, Kurram, the Tochi, and the Gomal, including Wano, and for the present
a small bit of country adjoining the Malakand, which is under Major Deane. These are long
strips of country, in what the Punjab Government would term "foreign territory," resting on
narrow bases in British India. The Political Officers in charge are not under the Deputy
Commissioners of the adjacent Punjab Districts, but under the Commissioner.
12. The Political staff is as follows:

   (1) Khyber ... ...
     1 Political Officer.
     1 Commandant, Khyber Rifles.
     1 Native Assistant.
   (2) Kurram ... ...
     1 Officer on special duty.
     1 Commandant of Militia.
     1 Adjutant.
   (3) Tochi ...
     1 Political Officer.
     1 Native Assistant (Assistant District Superintendent of Police).
   (4) Wano ...
     1 Political Officer.
     1 European Assistant (Assistant District Superintendent of Police).

The Commissioner of the Derajat, for instance, is over both the Political Officer at Wano and the Deputy Commissioner at Dera Ismail Khan, and has to keep things straight between them. We have therefore the Deputy Commissioner exercising "political" functions on and within the old frontier, and the "Political Officer" exercising such functions beyond it.

13. It may be admitted that an arrangement of this kind might work fairly well, if great tact were exercised on both sides, but I cannot help thinking that even with the limited areas hitherto to be dealt with, the separation of control, when so many tribes are a choral the old frontier, must have an injurious effect on the frontier tribesmen. They may hear of the Commissioner, but the man on the spot, is their man to whom they necessarily look in all their troubles. But is it intended to follow this arrangement when the extension of British influence is gradually pushed up to the Durand line? And will the agency I have described be a suitable one? I cannot think that such an agency is sufficiently powerful, or that divided control on the frontier of British India, with separate political authorities reporting to a distant local authority, already overlaid with civil and revenue work, with this authority again reporting to a local government charged with the high and arduous responsibilities of governing a great province, can form a good machinery for carrying on the work which is before us, and which has been so clearly described in the Commander-in-Chief's note?

14. For the reasons which I have ventured to put forward, I am in favour of (i) detaching the trans-Indus districts from the Punjab Government, and placing them, together with the political control of the tribes beyond the frontier of British India, up to the frontier line of British influence, under a Chief Commissioner and Governor-General's Agent to exercise civil and political functions, just as those are exercised in Baluchistan. His jurisdiction would be bounded on the south by the Derajat, on the north by Bajaur and Swat, on the east by the Indus, and on the west by "the frontier of British influence" (the Durand line).

(2) Transferrence of the Derajat and the tribes between the old frontier and the Suleiman range to the Baluchistan Chief Commissionership and Agency.

15. It is of some political importance that the Baluchis of the Derajat should be under the administration of Baluchistan. I have always advocated that, despite apparent failures, we should go on trying to enlist Baluchis, so as to afford a counterpoise to the Pathan element in our army. And this arrangement would assist another which I hope may be feasible ere long, viz., the getting rid of the overlapping of the Punjab Frontier Force by the troops of other commands, and its employment in positions towards the new frontier instead of behind the old one.

16. It is of even greater political importance that the administration which rules in Baluchistan should hold the passes and highways which lead into that region, and should manage their tribes under the system it has hitherto employed with success.

17. With the exception of Major Deane's political charge, and finally some special arrangement which might be necessary for the Hazara frontier, there would be two high officials charged with control, under the Foreign Department, of the whole of the trans-Indus territory except Sind, right up to the outer frontier, the frontier of British influence. To prevent the possibility of the Foreign Office being overburdened with detail, exceptional powers could be given to the Chief Commissioner, and in his turn should confer wide powers on his subordinate officers.

18. This is the solution of the problem as it appears to me, but it is unnecessary to enter into details. I gather too that my colleagues are generally in favour of leaving things pretty much as they are. If this be so, I do not desire to press my views against the weight of their opinion, and will accept the conclusions which may be arrived at, believing however with the Hon'ble Sir James Westland that it will be necessary "to address ourselves again to the question of the permanent arrangements of the North-Western Frontier at no distant date."

19. I will only add that I am entirely in accord with the Commander-in-Chief in his appreciation of Major Deane's services, and in his desire to see specially selected officers employed on political work beyond the frontier of British India.

21st June 1896.

For orders.

I put up immediately below two reports from Major Deane recently received. One reporting on the Relief operations, the other on the future arrangements for maintaining the Dir-Chitral road. These reports will be dealt with separately, the second one raising some important questions. Spare copies only are placed with these papers. Mr. Cunningham’s note on the Frontier Province question is in K. W. page 5 of Secret F., Proceedings, June 1896, Nos. 33-54.

23rd June 1896.

H. S. Barnes.

This case may be discussed in Council next week. I understand that there is general concurrence in conclusions III and IV of my previous note, and I shall therefore propose that these should be dealt with separately and the department instructed to work out the details. Major Deane’s reports referred to in Mr. Barnes’ last note have a bearing on No. III, and will be best considered on that file.

25th June 1896.

E.
[13]

Order in Council.

(i) That Major Deane be continued as Political Agent for Swat and Dir in direct subordination to the Government of India, and that Chitral be added to his Agency.

(ii) That Major Deane's appointment and that of his Assistant be added to the list of the Political Department—the Assistant in Chitral, who is already borne on this political list, being also placed under his orders.

(iii) That the Gilgit Agency be placed on the list of the Political Department as a Political Agency of the 2nd Class with frontier allowance subordinate to the Resident in Kashmir, the area of the Agency being confined to the country east of the Shandur Pass.

(iv) That as regards the remainder of the Punjab frontier, a letter be addressed to the Punjab Government, reiterating the policy laid down in Foreign Department letter No. 1593 E., dated 17th October 1889, and inviting suggestions for further regulating and strengthening the administration of the border, in order to give full effect to that policy.

2nd July 1896.

E.

Note.—(i), (ii) and (iii) will be dealt with separately on another copy of these notes.

His Excellency.

I put up a draft to the Punjab Government in accordance with paragraph (iv) of the Council Order of the 2nd July.

I have drafted very fully because it is easy to cut out anything that may be deemed superfluous. The important paragraphs are paragraphs 3 to 6. I think these contain a correct statement of the policy of the Government of India as I understand it. They are strictly in accordance with the two letters to the Punjab Government and the despatch to the Secretary of State, mentioned in paragraph 1 of the draft (all of which were drafted by me), though they amplify in details the policy therein described. I feel pretty sure that, if the instructions contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft are communicated to the Punjab Government, they will be heartily welcomed by all frontier officers and will be productive of much good.

2. Captain McMahon has often told me the story how our letter of 17th October 1889 was sent round to all the Punjab Frontier Deputy Commissioners of the indignation with which it was received, and how he himself and every other officer consulted reported that the Baluchistan system was impossible on the Punjab frontier, and could not be applied to Pathans. Captain McMahon afterwards entered the Political Department, and went to Zhob and became an ardent convert. Since then too the Punjab officers have to some extent learnt what can be accomplished by levy service, and by dealing direct with the tribes without the intervention of middlemen. The time has therefore come when they may be given a freer hand and within certain limits the wider the discretion given to them the more successful they are likely to be.

3. In the final paragraph I have detailed the various suggestions made, and have referred to the proposal to make a Northern Agent to the Governor-Generalship as in Baluchistan. This gives point to the suggestion that it would be a good thing to place the frontier from the Gumal to the Panjkora under the Peshawar Commissioner. But if it is thought better that all the suggestions in this paragraph should be omitted from the official letter and made demi-officially, this can easily be done.

4. I have alluded briefly to the Largha-Sherani difficulty. There is a separate file about this, and we shall have to address the Punjab Government more in detail on this subject. The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan wants the Largha country transferred to him, as Sir Robert Sandeman wished in 1890, and the Punjab will have to improve their control, if this is to be avoided. This, however, is not a very important matter, and can be dealt with separately. The only suggestion I have not touched on is whether the Government of India should not have some voice in the selection of the Commissioner of Peshawar, if the frontier is put under him. This perhaps we can consider later on.

6th August 1896.

H. S. Barnes.

This letter is an important one and I have considered the draft very carefully. As a whole it appears to me to lay the case clearly and well before the Punjab Government. But there are two main points on which I have introduced modifications. The first is that it is more than hinted several times that the Punjab system is unsatisfactory especially in the number of references required. Now, I am not going to argue about the fact, but the Punjab Government denies it: the Lieutenant-Governor has assured me personally that there is some misunderstanding. We shall only defeat our own object if we insist on a point of this kind where the Local Government is necessarily sensitive. What we want is a proper amount of discretion in the future—the past can take care of itself.
The second point is connected with the first, but my objection is a wider one. Generalisations are always dangerous and the declaration about “Impersonal Government” in paragraph 5, while striking as a phrase, is I think doubtful as the exposition of a policy. I could not myself accept it as applicable to the question under discussion without a great deal of definition. I do not dispute the necessity of bringing to bear on wild tribes the influence of the personal characteristics of individual officers: but this argument can be pushed too far. I can only say that it is my distinct conviction, based on my own experience, that the best of our frontier officers want behind them—and pretty close behind them—the control of Impersonal Government. To use this expression in the present letter would, in my opinion, give undue prominence to what is only one side of a Political Officer’s duty, i.e., his relations with the tribesmen. His relations with his superiors are at least as important.

I have modified paragraph 5 accordingly and also given it more the form of a suggestion and less of an order. For the latter reason I have also altered the form of some sentences in paragraph 6. It is far better to get these proposals from the Lieutenant-Governor first if we can.

I am unable to approve the suggestion in paragraph 7 to remove certain districts from the judicial control of the High Court. There might be some convenience in doing so, but, as I said before, I consider it impossible to go back in a case of this kind.

Of minor alterations. In paragraph 2 I do not quite understand the two sentences about the Gomal and Tochi, the first saying they are guarded by levies, the second that they are occupied by troops. In fact both are true: and it seems to me that, unless there is some meaning I do not appreciate, the two sentences should be run together and the words in brackets omitted.

In paragraph 3 I do not wish to say so comprehensively that we desire to control the whole of the tribes, the gradual extension of influence and control is quite enough to affirm.

The Shirani country need not be put forward more than once, and it comes better in paragraph 8 than in paragraph 4.

Finally, I have put the last sentence in a way that I have reason to think will be more likely to commend itself to the Lieutenant-Governor.

The draft should be reprinted as altered. I do not think it necessary to again circulate the case, but I propose to mention it in Council on Thursday, and copies of the draft letter had better be sent to Hon’ble Members beforehand.

E.

The draft letter to the Punjab Government was seen and approved in Council to-day.

Issue.

13th August 1896.

H. S. Barnes.

(Progs. Nos. 344-345.)—(To Punjab Government and endorsements to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 2197-2199 F., dated the 14th August 1896.)

This should go home, with reference to Secretary of State’s despatch No. 40, dated 26th December 1890. Orders are requested as to how the despatch should run.

A. C.—15th August 1896.

It will perhaps be better to await reply from Punjab Government before reporting to Secretary of State. If any of the suggestions involving increased expenditure are accepted by Punjab, Secretary of State’s sanction would be required: and one despatch would do. Meanwhile, perhaps His Excellency would like to send a copy of the letter to Punjab Government, privately to Lord George Hamilton.

15th August 1896.

I have spoken to His Excellency. Give me a copy* of the letter for His Excellency to send home privately.

E. H. S. Clarke.

19th August 1896.

H. S. Barnes.

(K. W. No. 2.)—Demi-official from the Hon’ble Sir D. Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab (to Secretary), dated and received the 19th August 1896.

Makes certain enquiries in regard to Foreign Department letter No. 2197 F., dated the 14th August, regarding frontier administration.
His Excellency.

Two days ago I received the letter put up from Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick about our 'frontier policy' letter. I have drafted a reply for Your Excellency's consideration which gives my idea of explanation which might be given. It is of course easy to anticipate all sorts of dire results from the wider discretion we propose to give. But experience I think shows, *e.g.*, in Major Deane's case, that these results do not as a matter of fact follow.

I told Sir Dennis that I should have to show his letter to Your Excellency, and that I hoped to be able to send him a reply in a few days.

21st August 1896.

H. S. Barnes.

I have spoken to Secretary and explained my object in the alteration and additional paragraph I have drafted.

26th August 1896.

E.

(K. W. No. 2.)—(Demi-official to Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., dated the 28th August 1896.)

Recorded and indexed by G. S. Reed.

Recording and indexing examined by A. C.

Note.—A copy of the letter to the Punjab Government, No. 2197 F., dated the 14th August 1896, and of the demi-official correspondence with Sir D. Fitzpatrick was sent by His Excellency the Viceroy to the Secretary of State on the 1st September 1896.
[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Simla, the 28th August 1896.

From—H. S. Barnes, Esq., Offg. Foreign Secretary,
To—Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

I have received your demi-official letter of the 19th and have shown it to His Excellency the Viceroy.

You ask for a further explanation of the meaning of certain passages which you quote from paragraph 5 of our No. 2197 of 14th instant and which you say seem to imply either—

1. that the Political Officer should be left to determine for himself whether in any given tract of country, he should attempt to maintain internal order or not, or

2. that every Political Officer should endeavour to establish internal peace throughout his area of control, but that he should set about it gradually, interfering authoritatively only in those cases in which he thought he could get the award enforced.

You add that you can hardly suppose that either of these things is meant.

2. Before replying it is necessary to make a preliminary observation. The policy to be followed in dealing with powerful and bigotted tribes must, as you point out, be the policy of the Government of India, and it is for the Government of India to determine, with the assistance of the Local Government, what instructions are necessary for the officers who act as their representatives with these tribes. In determining these instructions, the first consideration must be what limitations are imposed upon us by the nature of our relations with each particular tribe. In one case it may be a matter of prudence or expediency, in another of positive agreement, in a third of restrictions placed upon our action by the Secretary of State. For instance, in the case of Waziristan the Secretary of State has sanctioned the posting of Political Officers at Wano and in the Tochi valley. But his distinct instructions are that we are not to interfere with the internal affairs of the tribes more than is necessary. There is therefore no question of the Government of India setting about to “authoritatively establish the peace” in Waziristan as a whole, and in determining the instructions to the Political Officers in Waziristan, it follows that we should not include the whole of Southern Waziristan within the “area of control” of the officer stationed at Wano in the sense that his powers would be the same throughout the tract so called. Within certain limits he would be instructed always to interfere authoritatively; within certain other limits, necessarily somewhat indefinite, he would be allowed a discretion, but beyond certain limits he ought certainly not to interfere authoritatively if at all without obtaining permission. The whole policy of the Government of India and of the Secretary of State is involved in interference with the internal affairs of the remoter sections of the tribe, and while there can be no harm in a Political Officer using any personal influence which he may acquire in the way of friendly advice or suggestion, his duty in these matters is, on the one hand, to make the tribes clearly understand that, if they do not choose to follow his advice, they must take their own course, and, on the other hand, to keep the Government fully informed of any sign of disturbance. There is no shrinking into the shell in an attitude of this kind firmly and consistently maintained. Take for instance Deane’s case. Though the general lines to be followed are prescribed by Government, in details he is left entirely to himself, so much so that, excluding his weekly diaries, we rarely receive a report or issue an order. He is trusted and left alone, and I think Deane will tell you that he could not have succeeded under any other system. He has no authority to interfere off the road in Dir and Swat and Nawagai and Jandol. But hitherto his advice has almost always been taken. If he is doubtful of success, he does
not give advice, but tells the people to settle matters for themselves, with the result that they will generally come in in the end and ask for his assistance. Deane's charge is much larger and more risky and more fanatical than that of the Political Officer in Waziristan.

The object in view in mentioning the various tribes in the latter part of paragraph 6 of our letter was to elicit the opinion of the Local Government in regard to any possible modification of the instructions under which the several officers now work—in the hope no doubt of increasing the "area of control" within which the restrictions placed upon officers might be relaxed, but obviously with no intention of doing away with limitations altogether.

3. The intention therefore of the Government of India is correctly expressed in the second of the alternatives you mention, subject to the general instructions in the first part of paragraph 6 of our letter, and to the proviso that Political Officers must be careful not to go beyond his instructions, or involve the Government in active hostilities with the tribes. In paragraph 5 it is expressly stated that it is impossible to generalise, because in different parts of the frontier circumstances will differ according to the character of the tribes, the extent to which the Political Officer is supported by troops, and the completeness of the levy system introduced. And in paragraph 6 it is further explained that, where our troops are stationed, as in Wano, the Tochi and the Kurram, the Political Officer should as a rule invariably interfere authoritatively to forbid bloodshed, because there, at any rate, it is obvious he can interfere with success. If they are read along with these parts of our letter, the meaning of the passages you quote from the 5th paragraph seems to His Excellency to be quite clear, viz:—

(i) In the neighbourhood of our cantonments the Political Officer must insist on the peace being kept; and

(ii) Elsewhere he must use all his influence to keep the peace so far as he possibly can.

4. How easy it is to insist with success in places like Wano is shown by the recent dispute between the Toji Khels and Zalli Khels. The same may probably be said of the Shuhur route where we have troops at either end, and levies along the road in-between, in which case Grant's recent action in offering to protect the Shuhur people from a raid by Mulla Powindah would be quite in accordance with the views of Government. He was apparently sure of success, and, if so, was right to promise support, though it should be remembered that where possible levies rather than troops should be employed for these purposes. Between places and cases of this kind and cases where at present it is impossible or useless to interfere there are many gradations, and only the Political Officer on the spot can really tell how far he can go without failure. It is all a question of personal influence and local knowledge, and of the extent of the hold we possess by means of the levy system. In the hundred and one petty disputes, which must daily come to a Political Officer's notice, in many of which the Malikfs will themselves ask for help, the Political Officer alone can say what is best to be done. And if he is to gain any influence it is hopeless in these small matters to try and regulate his action in each individual case from Head-quarters. In some cases he will only offer advice, in others he will use his levies to support the Malik's authority, in others again he will accept the people's offer, and appoint a jirga to consider and decide the quarrel. In others he will threaten to withhold allowances or support, unless his advice is listened to. For example, in the Khaisera where we have no levies, but where the Malikfs have allowances and the Political Officer and the troops are close at hand, the Political Officer, if a persona grata with the tribesmen, will probably always get his own way. Further afield, e.g., in Kanigoram, he would not interfere at all, unless specially requested to do so, and until he has asked and received permission from Government. But experience shows that day by day the Political Officer's influence will grow and extend, and year by year, as the people learn to know him and to appreciate the advantages of a quiet life, the applications for the Political Officer's help will increase until, as the
old generation dies out, the custom of fighting about every trifle will die out also. And the sooner the people learn that we don't interfere with their customs, and that they are permitted to settle their cases in their own way, the quicker the change will take place.

5. Subject therefore to the general instructions given, and to the order that where supported by troops he must insist on peace, it is the wish of the Government of India to leave the local officer ample discretion when and how to interfere in the area which is recognised as under his control, because it is recognised that speedy decisions are necessary, and that the local officer alone can judge of the extent of his own influence. Experience too has shown that no other course is so likely to be successful. These frontier tribesmen are very like children, and it has been constantly found that, while they would fight if left to themselves, they will almost invariably ask for the Political Officer's help and advice if one is at hand. The majority after all are glad of a quiet life, and will welcome any excuse which will secure it to them. It is easy at a distance to anticipate that awkward results may follow from the wide discretion given, but in practice it is found that they don't follow, and that if the Political Officers are given a fairly free hand, they are as a rule successful. Of course mistakes will occur, and definite advice or orders given will sometimes be disregarded. But there is no humiliation in this, at any rate nothing like the humiliations of the old system, where we imposed on a tribe a fine which we could not realise except by a blockade or a punitive expedition. The Political Officer, if he is at too great distance or has too little influence to interfere authoritatively and his advice is not accepted, will simply say, 'Very well, fight it out, but here am I ready to help you to settle your dispute, whenever you have had enough of it,' and in the end his influence has generally its proper effect. The whole question is one of time and of patience. But all our experience shows that once a Political Officer with troops is settled in the country, we have only to select the officer carefully, and give him large powers and impress on him the importance of encouraging the tribesmen to settle their own cases, and we may be sure in the end not only that the country will settle down, but that it will do so far more rapidly than a priori we have apparently any right to expect.

6. His Excellency does not think that, after our recent experience in Dir and Swat, the business of gradually establishing internal peace among these tribes, though an anxious, is necessarily an "appallingly formidable task." We don't want to do it all at once. Let the good work be pushed on where we have got our footing among the Shiranis and the Waziris and the Kurram, and in a few years the border from Drazand to Thal will be quiet. If Deane is equally successful in Swat, Nawagai and Dir, it may be hoped that the remaining tribes also will gradually and surely yield to the same civilising influences.
FROM

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

TO

THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF THE PUNJAB.

No. 2197 F.

SIMLA, the 14th August 1896.

SIR,

I am desired to refer you to the letters from the Government of India marked in the margin, on the subject of the administration of the frontier districts of the Punjab and the management of the trans-frontier tribes. The policy which in these letters the Government of India desired to substitute for what has been called the "close border" system previously in force on the Punjab frontier, is very clearly stated in paragraph 6 of the letter of the 17th October 1889, and in the final paragraph of the letter of the 16th June 1890. The methods by which that policy should be carried out are also described in these letters and are briefly summed up in paragraph 4 of the Government of India's despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 124, dated the 7th October 1890, of which a copy is enclosed for His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's information.

2. Since these letters were written, the progress made in the direction desired by the Government of India has been sufficiently rapid. The definition in 1893 by the Durand Convention of the boundary of the spheres of influence of the Government of India and the Amir has removed the chief objection urged by Sir James Lyall to the proposed change of policy, viz., the danger of rousing the jealousy of the Amir of Afghanistan, and it has also given to the Government of India on their side of the line the "free hand" to which the late Lieutenant-Governor was inclined to ascribe much of the success, which had attended the new policy in the southern and northern divisions of the frontier. Moreover the policy itself during the last six years has achieved very notable results. Since 1889, the Zhob district has been brought under administration; the Shirani Hills, including the Takht-i-Suleiman, have been turned, and the Shirani tribes have been given service allowances and brought under some control. The Gumal and the Tochi passes have been explored; Wano and the Tochi valley have been occupied by troops, and service allowances have been granted to the turbulent Waziri tribesmen. The Kurram valley has been brought into good order by a system of tribal management, and since the Miranzei expeditions of 1890 and 1891, a limited levy service has been given to the Orakzai clans for the protection of the Kohat border. On the Mardan border the road to the Malakand is guarded by Ranizais who are in the pay of the British Government, and the Dir-Chitral route has not only been opened as a postal road to Chitral, but a British right of way has been established, and British forces have moved from the Peshawar valley to Chitral, and from Chitral to Peshawar along roads held in our interest by tribal levies. In addition to these schemes, which have been so fully accomplished, the road from Abbottabad by the Khagan valley to Chilas, which is bordered throughout its length by the formidable Indus valley tribes, has been opened to traffic, and can now be traversed by small parties without serious risk. These achievements have fully justified the hope expressed by the
Government of India in 1889, that with patience and care the policy and the methods, which had proved successful elsewhere, might be expected to produce similar results on the Punjab portion of the frontier.

3. Nevertheless it appears to the Government of India that it is desirable at this juncture to call attention again to the objects desired by the Government of India, as stated in the correspondence of 1889 and 1890, and to add some further explanation as to the means by which those objects can be best attained, and as to the extent of the interference with the tribes which the Government have in view. It is not necessary to repeat here the statements of policy, which are given in the correspondence alluded to in the first paragraph of this letter, to which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor may be referred. It will be sufficient to add that, while there is no desire to interfere with the independence of Afghanistan, or to meddle in any way with tribes within the Amir's sphere of influence, it is the wish and the intention of the Government to take every opportunity that offers to establish friendly relations with the whole of the so-called independent tribes, who inhabit the country lying between the frontier of British India and the line of influence defined by the Durand Convention of 1893. The object of gradually extending our influence and control over these tribes is to prevent outrages within our own territory, to put an end once for all to the punitive frontier expeditions which have been so common in the past, to obtain full control over the passes, which form the main lines of communication with Afghanistan; and in the event of any military operations beyond the frontier, which may be occasioned by foreign aggression, to ensure not only that the tribes on our side of the border may be friendly, but that their aid may be actively enlisted on the side of Government. On the Punjab border south of the Gomal it is now very unlikely that any serious frontier expedition will again be required. The chief lines of communication are held by the tribesmen in our interest, and the entire resources of the country are at our disposal. It is hoped that before long it may be possible to say the same of the country between the Gomal and the Kurram, and it is desired gradually to establish a similar state of things all along the frontier.

4. In carrying out this policy the principles laid down by the Government of India are—

(i) that annexation is neither necessary nor desired,

(ii) that so far as is possible the independence of the tribes should not be interfered with, and

(iii) that by means of tribal allowances in payment for service rendered, and by cordially supporting the legitimate influence of the headmen, a friendly and responsible authority may be established in each tribe, on which the Government of India can rely for the preservation of peace and order.

In certain portions of the trans-frontier territory, where the country is open, or where troops are stationed, and where the position occupied by the Government is that of the protector of a comparatively peaceful population from their wilder neighbours, it has been found expedient to collect a light revenue in return for the levy service given and the other benefits conferred. This has been the case in Zhob and in the Kurram and the Tochi valleys, and a similar course may be found desirable in the Wano plain immediately surrounding the cantonment. But in all these cases annexation has been avoided; such administration as is necessary is of a rough and ready character, and so far as is possible the tribesmen are encouraged to settle their disputes themselves according to tribal custom. In the more hilly portions of the border and with the wilder tribes, no form of administration is desired or should be attempted. The object should be to strengthen the authority of the headmen by the grant of levy service, to give employment by the same means to the more unruly members of the tribe, to hold the headmen responsible for the maintenance of order, and to leave the tribesmen to govern themselves, subject only to such influence as the Political Officer may be able to exert.
Experience has shown that in every Pathan tribe, however democratic, there are responsible headmen, who are capable of maintaining order if they are properly supported. Without our aid these men, in order to preserve such authority as they possess, have generally to follow where the wilder spirits lead. But with the introduction of the levy system, and the grant to the headmen of allowances with which to maintain armed followers of their own, the position is at once changed, and it is found that the headmen in such circumstances both can and will exert themselves to maintain their authority, and will usually employ it in the interest and on the side of Government. This, in the opinion of the Government of India, is one explanation of the rapidity with which these border tracts settle down wherever the levy system has been introduced. The principle underlying the grant of levy service is that it is unreasonable to expect frontier tribesmen to exert themselves in maintaining order on our behalf unless they are paid for doing so, and the payments made should be regarded as payments for service rendered, and should be withheld unless the work is done.

5. To what extent Political Officers should be permitted to interfere, to maintain the authority of the headmen, and to insist on the peaceable settlement by jirga of tribal disputes is one on which several references have been received from time to time from the Punjab Government. It may be assumed as a general rule that Political Officers should be encouraged to make friends with the headmen, and to extend their influence and authority by every means in their power, so long as they can do so without involving the Government in active hostilities with the tribes. But beyond this it is not possible to generalise or to lay down definite rules. In different parts of the frontier, the circumstances will also differ according to the character of the tribes, the extent to which the Political Officer is supported by troops, and the completeness of the levy system introduced. This much however may be said that serious disputes between Pathan tribes are usually settled by an appeal to arms, and it is not likely, especially at the beginning, that Pathan pride will be satisfied with any other form of arbitration, unless there is the excuse that the Political Officer forbids bloodshed and insists on a peaceful settlement. This implies that Political Officers should be permitted to interfere promptly to this extent whenever their influence is sufficient to enable them to do so with success. Such powers can only be entrusted to carefully selected officers, but given such officers, it appears to the Government of India that it ought to be practicable to uphold their authority with the tribes by giving them a wide discretion, so as to free them from having to show hesitation or delay in their dealings with the tribesmen. Provided that the financial control is strict, and that the Local Government is kept fully informed of all that is going on, the constant necessity for references to head-quarters may well be avoided; the powers given to the local officers in their dealings with the tribes may be of a very liberal character, and they should be judged by the results which they achieve.

6. It is admitted that different parts of the frontier are in different states of development, and that it may not be possible to push on everywhere with equal rapidity or equal zeal. In the Shirani country, it is probable imperative that revenue should be collected and some stronger form of control introduced. In Wano and the Tochi valley, where our troops are cantoned, it is obvious that the Political Officer must be responsible for keeping the peace; we cannot permit tribal disturbances in the immediate neighbourhood of our cantonments. In the Waziri Hills the levy system has been so widely introduced that our officers, subject to the proviso already stated, may be freely encouraged to extend their friendly influence by all the means in their power. The same course may be followed in the Kurram, and the Government of India would be glad if His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor would consider whether an attempt might not be made to adopt a similar policy in the Jowaki country and with the Afridis of the Kohat Pass. With the Orakzais, the Afridis of the Khyber and the Mohmands greater caution will no doubt be necessary. It would be highly desirable if among the Orakzais the levy system could with prudence be so extended, as to permit of British officers freely visiting their country and to
obviate the necessity for holding the Samana with troops. The question of allowances to the Mohmands is, as you are aware, under separate consideration, and the possibility at the earliest opportunity of giving the officer in charge of the Khyber a wider discretion to extend our influence among the Afridis should not be lost sight of.

7. With this explanation of the policy and the methods desired by the Government of India, I am directed to invite the suggestions of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor for further regulating and improving the administration of the border in order to give full effect to this policy. It has been suggested, with a view to the introduction of that personal element, which is so important in the government of the frontier tribes, that the districts of Peshawar and Kohat, and the whole of the trans-frontier sphere of influence from the Indus to the Gomal should be separated from the Punjab, and placed under an Agent to the Governor-General of the rank and with the powers of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. This scheme would probably provide very efficiently for the administration of the frontier, but it would involve a curtailment of the authority and jurisdiction of the Punjab Government, which is neither necessary nor desirable. The Governor-General in Council does not desire to limit the authority of the Punjab Government in the manner proposed, and there appears to be no reason why the existing system of management should not be improved without any such radical alteration. Excluding the Abbottabad border which might be managed from Rawalpindi, the charge of the Political Officer in Dir and Swat which is directly under the orders of the Government of India, and the Baluch and Shirani borders, which with the Baluchistan Agency behind them can never give much trouble, the important part of the frontier under the Punjab Government extends from the Gomal to the Panjkora river. It is open to consideration whether the whole of this portion of the border might not be placed under the Commissioner of Peshawar, who might be given charge of the Bannu district in lieu of Abbottabad, and directed to establish his summer head-quarters at some suitable place, trans-frontier, whence he could conveniently control the work of his subordinate officers. This would at any rate ensure unity of policy and control along the whole of the Pathan border and the personal influence of a Commissioner usually resident beyond the frontier would be of value. Whether this is practicable or not, it appears to the Government of India that, wherever possible, the control of the trans-frontier tracts should be separated from the charge of the Deputy Commissioners of the frontier districts, and that the Political Officers placed in charge of the tribes should be directly under the Commissioner's orders. The time of the Deputy Commissioners is irresistibly monopolised by their administrative work, and they have probably neither the leisure nor the local knowledge to obtain that personal influence over the trans-frontier tribes which is at the root of successful tribal management. A beginning in this direction has been made in placing the Political Officers in Wano and the Kurram directly under the Commissioners of Peshawar and the Derajat, but I am to suggest, for His Honour's consideration, that this practice might be extended, where convenient, so as to dissociate the political charges from the control of the hard-worked Deputy Commissioners of the frontier districts. Another proposal, which is also perhaps deserving of some consideration, is that a Political or Frontier Secretary or Under-Secretary should be added to the Punjab Secretariat, who might with advantage be selected from the officers serving in trans-Indus districts. These are merely some of the suggestions which have been brought from time to time to the notice of the Government of India. They are mentioned here as suggestions only, and the Government of India leave it entirely to Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick to consider whether any or all of them are practicable and commend themselves to his judgment.

8. The Government of India have endeavoured in this letter to set forth the general policy which commends itself to them in precise and unambiguous terms, and they have indicated that they attach importance on the one hand to there being so far as possible unity of control along the Pathan border, and on the
other to the Political Officers having, under the Commissioner’s orders, a large measure of discretion in dealing with purely tribal matters. But having determined that the Punjab Government is the proper authority to administer these tracts, they recognise that it is for that Government to say how those principles may be best applied, and what modifications, if any, of the existing system are required. There is no wish to generalise unduly, and the proposals of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, which will no doubt be based on a consideration of the separate circumstances of different parts of the frontier, will be awaited.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) H. S. Barnes,

Offg. Secretary to the Govt. of India.

Confidential.

Foreign Office Press—No. 915—14-8-96—69.
Note by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., on the general policy to be adopted in dealing with the tribes on the North-Western frontier of the Punjab.
FRONTIER A.

AUGUST.

REFERENCES TO LATER CASES.

Branch, date, and Nos.  

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KEEP-WITHS PRINTED.

(1) Notes on the case.
(2) Demi-official correspondence.

KEEP-WITHS NOT PRINTED,
List of papers restored to Records.

Exd.—P. K. B.
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Note by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., on the general policy to be adopted in dealing with the tribes on the North-Western frontier of the Punjab.

FRONTIER 8, AUGUST 1896.
Nos. 36-40.

K. W. No. 1.


With reference to our letter No. 2197 F., dated the 14th August 1896, forwards a note by the Lieutenant-Governor containing proposals for giving effect to the policy of the Government of India regarding the management of the North-Western frontier tribes.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Secretary has taken two copies of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's note into camp, and intends giving one to His Excellency the Viceroy. I put up the official letter from the Punjab Government, with the more important pp. referred to.

*They were merely suggestions thrown out for the Lieutenant-Governor's consideration.

Before referring to frontier officers on the various matters of detail referred to in his note, His Honour asks for orders on two leading points. The first of these is a proposal to provide certain Political Officers with a small fixed escort, and to give such officers full discretion to act as they think fit, where they feel a reasonable degree of confidence that they could with the help of the escort, or with the aid of levies, do what is needed to support the Maliks, without risk of their action leading to the necessity for employing any larger body of troops.

As to the localities where things should be put on this footing, the Lieutenant-Governor would take the opinion of local officers later on before submitting final proposals; but meantime (in paragraph 25) he suggests certain tracts in which the proposal might be adopted.

It seems undesirable to consider this latter part of the question until the Lieutenant-Governor's views are definitely placed before Government. If the general proposal commends itself to the Government of India, and it seems to be in accord with the lines of policy laid down, the question of providing the escort will require consideration in the Military Department.

The second leading point on which His Honour asks orders is as to interfering authoritatively to establish internal peace and order between sections of tribes and individual tribesmen. Briefly Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, while he would encourage our officers to do all in their power by unauthoritative action, to preserve the peace, seems nervous about giving officers discretion to authoritatively interfere. He would not object to an officer so acting, or even forcibly preventing people from fighting once in a way, when a special opportunity presents itself, "just as a passer-by in the street might interfere to stop a fight;" but beyond this he fears we cannot go in any tract unless we make up our minds to keep the peace in that tract all round; and His Honour considers that the question whether the circumstances are such as to make it expedient for us to set about authoritatively establishing internal peace in a given tract is of such immense magnitude and difficulty that it should be left in every case for the decision of the Government of India.

I venture to think it is not clear why the Lieutenant-Governor considers that we cannot interfere in any tract just as it suits us, without being thereby bound to keep the peace in that tract all round. It might be politic and desirable to interfere to-day, and equally impolitic and undesirable to do so next year. But with regard to His Honour's proposal that the Government of India should decide in what tracts our officers are to be authorized.
to interfere authoritatively—or as the Lieutenant-Governor puts it, "to interfere authoritatively to establish internal peace and order between sections of tribes and individual tribesmen"—this may perhaps be approved.

In Secretary's demi-official letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, dated 28th August 1896, when referring to the Political Officers in Waziristan, it was said:

"Within certain limits he would be instructed always to interfere authoritatively; within certain other limits, necessarily somewhat indefinite, he would be allowed a discretion; but beyond certain limits he ought certainly not to interfere authoritatively, if at all, without obtaining permission."

The Lieutenant-Governor is going to address us, after consulting his officers, as to the tracts in which effect may at once be given to the views of the Government of India. When the tracts have been suggested and approved, it is only right that, before our officers start giving effect to the Government of India's views in any other tracts in which it is not now considered advisable to interfere, the sanction of the Government of India should be obtained.

6th November 1896.

E. H. S. Clarke.

His Excellency.

I submit a draft to the Punjab dealing with the two points in Sir D. Fitzpatrick's note upon which His Honour desires present orders.

If Your Excellency approves the draft, I would suggest sending it to the Military Department for concurrence (and consultation if necessary with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief) before issuing, as it proposes to agree in allowing selected Political Officers an escort of troops after the manner of the Baluchistan Agency.

18th November 1896.

W. J. Cunningham.

His Honour was good enough to send me an advance copy of his letter, and I had therefore an opportunity of discussing the two points on which he desires orders with him at Delhi. After consulting with Mr. Barnes, I told the Lieutenant-Governor that I concurred in his views on these points, I therefore approve the draft, but it may be seen in the Military Department as proposed.

17th December 1896.

Military Department unofficially.

18th December 1896.

W. J. Cunningham.


Measures to be taken for carrying out the policy sketched by the Government of India for dealing with the tribes on the North-Western boundary of the Punjab.

Proposal to allow selected Political Officers an escort of troops after the manner of the Baluchistan Agency.

S. C. R.—19th December 1896.

Deputy Secretary.

P. A. Buckland.

Secretary.

M. J. King-Harman.

Hon'ble Member.

I am sorry I have kept this file so long.

It may be sent to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, through the Adjutant-General, for any remarks His Excellency may wish to offer?

9th January 1897.

P. J. Mainland.
1. I have read this note with the greatest interest, but I am afraid I have also kept the papers too long.

2. On the question of "escort" to Political Officers, Sir R. Sandeman was no doubt allowed an escort of regular troops at different times of his career, for particular purposes, and these "escorts" were furnished for long periods so as to be quasi-permanent.

3. But even this degree of permanency did not reach that contemplated by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, which, with certain limitations, involves "a free discretion to employ force" being given to the Political Officer in certain parts of the frontier.

4. To give Political Officers in certain positions escorts of regular troops, as a permanent arrangement, with full discretion to use them as they think fit in support of the Malik (after reference to the Commissioner when time admitted), does not commend itself to me. It means locking up a body of troops, and removing them from the command of their superior officers. There is no indication that the Commanding Officer of the troops is to be consulted as to what may develop into a military operation. I think there are strong objections to the proposal, which might, if carried out, land us in considerable difficulties.

5. My opinion is (1) that "escorts" of regular troops should be allowed on particular occasions for particular work, (2) that permanent escorts should consist of border police, militia, or levies as the case may be.

Adjutant-General unofficially for submission to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
23rd January 1897.

E. H. H. C(Ollen).

Commander-in-Chief.

Submitted.
5th February 1897.

G. DcC. Morton.

I am very sorry to have to express dissent from the proposal in the Lieutenant-Governor's paragraph 24. I think there is a middle course between binding down Political Officers to confine their intercourse with the tribes within the narrowest and most distant limits, and putting at their disposal an armed force of regular troops with authority to use it at discretion for the enforcement of their will.

It does not appear to me necessary to put such authority into the hands of Political Officers. The cases in which armed interference would be advisable are few and far between, and with the facilities of communication which now exist, the occasions on which anything would be gained by action so immediate as not to admit of telegraphic orders are still fewer. An expedition so hurriedly organized would in all probability partake of the nature of a surprise or even of a counter-raid from which the withdrawal would have to be as precipitate as the advance. I do not think this system of operations is a wise one, and an escort so withdrawn is probably exposed to the fire of the tribesmen from the adjoining hills and stragglers are cut off.

I have had some experience in Baluchistan from which province the proposal has been adopted, and I cannot recall a single instance within, say, the last eight years in which the escort of the Agent to the Governor-General has been used under circumstances that would not admit time for reference. In fact, if one tries to realise the conditions under which an escort would be ordered to act at once, they are probably such as would arise from the irritation, very likely justly aroused, of a frontier officer, and the delay incident to a reference may be looked upon as more conducive to calmer consideration and wiser afterthought than to failure from neglected opportunity.

The service, too, is a very trying and unpopular one with troops. Political Officers in wild districts like to have their escorts with them, as the presence of troops enhances their power and they are sometimes unreasonable as to the length of the marches they expect them to make. The Political Officer rides rapidly from point to point, sometimes 20 to 25 miles, and expects his escort to march to his camp. I am further afraid that escorts under the system proposed might be used in an executive military sense in a manner that would not be altogether military and well-advised. The distribution of the troops would also be awkward.

8th February 1897.

G. S. W(HITE).

9th February 1897.

G. DcC. Morton.

Secretary, Military Department, unofficially.
FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL IN INDIA, UNOFFICIAL NO. 317 (CAMP), DATED THE 9TH FEBRUARY 1897.

Submitted. Please see from page 3.
S. C. R.—9th February 1897.
G. W. DERREP.—10th February 1897.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

10th February 1897.

SECRETARY.

10th February 1897.

HON’BLE MEMBER.

13th February 1897.
16th February 1897.

To Foreign Department unofficially.

Submitted. Both the Hon’ble Military Member and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief are opposed to the proposal to give small personal escorts of troops to Political Officers in certain tracts.

17th February 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

P. A. BUCKLAND.

M. J. KING-HARMAN.

P. J. MAITLAND.

E. H. H. COLLEN. 
His Excellency.

I kept this case back meaning to speak to the Commander-in-Chief and Hon'ble Military Member, but the opportunity has not arisen, and it can well wait till we meet in Simla. Perhaps in the meantime the office might be able to state how the matter of escorts stands in Baluchistan. My impression is that the Agent to the Governor-General alone has a fixed escort of regular troops, and that he seldom uses it—at all events to the full extent. I think Mr. Barnes told me that the other officers relied in the first instance on levies or police: and it was on an understanding of this sort that I was prepared to act, though it has not been brought out with sufficient distinctness.

21st March 1897.

E.

[PROB. NO. 40.] FROM THE PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, No. 282, DATED THE 5TH (RECEIVED 8TH) MARCH 1897.

With reference to paragraph 59 of the note forwarded with Punjab letter No. 14-C., dated the 25th October 1896, submits observations by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, regarding certain administrative arrangements suggested in connection with the scheme for the management of the tribes on the North-Western Frontier.

19th March 1897.

His Excellency.

This can also wait for Simla, see note on main file.

21st March 1897.

E.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

I put up a draft demi-official to Mr. Barnes, asking how the matter of escorts stands in Baluchistan.

25th March 1897.

25th March 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

H. DALY.

[K. W. No. 2.] [Demi-official to H. S. Barnes, Esq., dated the 26th March 1897.]

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Quetta, the 14th April 1897.

FROM—F. MACDONALD, Esq.,

TO—CAPTAIN H. DALY, C.I.E.

Your demi-official letter,* dated the 26th March 1897, regarding escorts to Political Officers in Baluchistan. Mr. Barnes desires me to say that he hopes to write to you from camp. He left Quetta this morning.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

In a demi-official letter,† dated the 27th April, Mr. Barnes said that he expected to return to Quetta on the 4th May, and would then submit a report on the Suleiman Khel arrangement, but he said nothing on the subject of the above demi-official letter.

A. S.—14TH MAY 1897.

Issue the demi-official telegram below.

16th May 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

[K. W. No. 2.] [Demi-official telegram to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, dated the 15th May 1897.]

F—36-40—Aug.
Demi-official from H. S. Barnes, Esq., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan (to Deputy Secretary), dated the 17th (received 20th) May 1897.

In reply to demi-official letter, dated the 26th March 1897, reports on the practice followed in Baluchistan in the matter of escorts.

Deputy Secretary.

The case may now be re-submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy.

26th May 1897. E. H. S. Clarke.

1st June 1897. H. Daly.

Secretary.

His Excellency.

Mr. Barnes in his demi-official letter of the 17th May describes the Baluchistan custom of escorts. There is, I believe, no real difference between that and the custom now in vogue in Waziristan which Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick described in paragraph 24 of his note thus:

"Our Political Officers are allowed escorts when they have occasion to go anywhere where an escort is needed, but those escorts are understood to be given only for their personal protection."

In a case like that of Sir R. Sandeman's first visit to Mina Bazar and Appozai, which is cited by Mr. Barnes, the visit would be submitted to the Government of India and approved and the escort would go for the Political Officers' personal protection. Mr. Gee's visit to Maziar shows that the Political Officer in the Tochi is able on occasions demanding it to obtain a strong escort.

15th June 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

I may perhaps be partly to blame for some misunderstanding in this case. The proposal arose out of a difficulty Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick had in defining the limits within which a Political Officer might be authorised to interfere and stop a quarrel.

In an interview with me I remember his saying at last "I should not object at all if the Political Officer going about the country found a quarrel and a fight beginning and by galloping up with the sowars of his usual escort was able to stop it peremptorily." When, therefore, he put forward now under discussion, I fear I did not appreciate altogether that it might be read as necessary the permanent locking up of regular troops, which, I quite agree, would be injudicious. What I had in my mind was the system described by Mr. Barnes in his letter of 17th May, according to which the ordinary escort of the Political Officer would be his own police or levies, and I agree with Mr. Barnes that the letter * from the Military Department of 10th February 1897 meets all requirements.

The fact is an answer to the Punjab letter of 28th October is now unnecessary, especially as Sir Dennis has left the country, and it will be sufficient, I think, to record these papers. But before doing so the Hon'ble Military Member and the Commander-in-Chief should see again.

10th July 1897.

10th July 1897.

To Military Department unofficially.

14th July 1897.

Deputy Secretary.

Secretary.

His Excellency the Viceroy has directed the submission of this file for the information of the Hon'ble Member and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

15th July 1897.

E. G. Barrow.

Please send to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and I will afterwards submit to the Hon'ble Member.

19th July 1897.

P. J. Mainland.

To Adjutant-General in India unofficially.
Submitted.
19th July 1897.

Seen.
21st July 1897.

Noted and returned.
21st July 1897.

To Secretary, Military Department, unofficially

26th July 1897.
Deputy Secretary.

26th July 1897.
Secretary.

29th July 1897.
Hon’ble Member.

Seen.
30th July 1897.

To Foreign Department unofficially.

Recorded and indexed by T. G. B.
Recording and indexing examined by W. S.
K. W. No. 2.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL]

Dated Fort William, the 26th March 1897.

From—CAPTAIN H. DALY, C.I.E.,
To—H. S. BARNES, C.S.

A suggestion has been made that certain Punjab Political Officers on the frontier should be provided with fixed escorts of regular troops. The question is to be decided in Simla. Will you kindly let us know how the matter of escorts stands in Baluchistan? It is understood that the Agent to the Governor-General seldom uses an escort of regular troops, and that the other Political Officers rely mainly, if not entirely, on levies and police.

Telegram, dated the 15th May 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta.

Demi official. Your promised report regarding escorts to Political Officers in Baluchistan is awaited.

Telegram, dated the 17th May 1897.

From—The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta,
To—CAPTAIN H. DALY, C.I.E.

Demi-official letter about Political Agent's escort despatched to-day.

[DEMI-OFFICIALS.]

Dated Quetta, the 17th May 1897.

From—H. S. BARNES, Esq.,
To—CAPTAIN H. DALY, C.I.E.

I must apologise for not answering sooner your letter of 26th March about escorts to Political Officers. I was starting on tour when the file was put up to me, and I was travelling so fast that I had little leisure en route.

The only fixed escorts sanctioned in this Agency appear to be the following—

For the Agent to the Governor-General—
160 Infantry.
50 Cavalry.
2 Guns.

For the Political Agent, Zhob—
80 Infantry.
60 Cavalry.

For the Political Agent, Kalat—
19 Infantry.
12 Cavalry.

The Agent to the Governor-General's escort is of course only used on emergencies, or very formal occasions, and, as Sir James Browne never went into camp, I don't think the full escort has been used once since Sir Robert's death. It is very useful on occasion, as for instance, on Sir Robert's first trip to Mina Bazar and Appozai, and in the event, for example, of a serious row between the Marris and Bugtis, the Agent to the Governor-General's power of proceeding at once to the spot with a small body of troops is very valuable. Ordinarily the Agent to the Governor-General only asks for what is necessary, e.g., on my recent Zhob tour I took only 14 sabres. If I toured in Pishin, I should take police and levies only; if I went to Kalat or Kakar Khomassan, I should take a few infantry and perhaps 25 sabres; in the case of Kalat more for ceremonial purposes than for any other reason, en route.

3. The Political Agents as you suppose rely mainly on police and levies, almost entirely so far as their own districts are concerned. The chief exception is the Political Agent, Kalat, who always has with him a small standing escort of 14 sabres of regular cavalry. This is less than his sanctioned escort, and is needed because, being in charge of a Native State, he has no police outside the Bolan and no levies.

F—36-40—Aug.
The Political Agents in Thal-Chotiali and Quetta-Pishin never use military escorts in their ordinary tours. They take police and levies only. If the Political Agent, Quetta, went on a tour along the new Afghan border beyond Toba, I should recommend his taking a small camp guard of, say, a dozen native infantry, because there are a lot of rough tribes on the Amir's side of the frontier, but on no other occasion would he ask for or need a military escort. In Zhob also, our latest acquisition, the Political Agent uses police and levies only in his tours in the Zhob Valley and Bori. The only occasions on which Archer asks for a military escort are the following:

(i) if he goes to Khajuri Kach, he usually takes 50 cavalry sowars;
(ii) if he goes on the border of the Lorgha Sherani country, he would take 15 or 20;
(iii) if he goes into Kakar Khorasan, he would take the same.

If he travels in the Bargha Sherani country, he would take police and levies only. The military escorts are needed in the case of Khajuri Kach, because of the Waziris, in the case of the Largha Sherani country because of the lax control over the Larghas by the Punjab Government, and in the case of Kakar Khorasan, because it is a wild piece of country recently included in our border with many nomad Ghizais from Afghanistan roaming in the neighbourhood. The large escort sanctioned for the Political Agent, Zhob, was given him when we first went to Zhob. It is not used now, and is not likely to be ever wanted again, except in the case of a serious tribal row.

The Political Officers in Waziristan and the Kurrum are no doubt in the position, in which we were when we first occupied Zhob and Thal-Chotiali, and till the levy system is fairly established and the country has settled down, I think it is as well they should be allowed to call for small military escorts when going to out-of-the-way places. They seem to be able to do so at present, as Archer tells me Grant met him at Khajuri Kach with 100 rifles and some cavalry. Whether it is necessary to sanction any fixed escort seems doubtful. The orders contained in Military Department letter to the Punjab Government, No. 411-B., dated 10th February 1897, seem to meet all requirements. I think a Political Officer should certainly be able to ask for and get a small escort of 15—20 or 25 sabres or infantry in emergencies or when visiting out-of-the-way places. But the orders referred to seem to admit of this.

Every year as the people get more accustomed to levy service, and more used to having their disputes amicably settled, the necessity for occasional military escorts will diminish. When we first went to Zhob no one would take levy service, and officers were bound to take cavalry escorts. Now every one clamours for service, and Archer wanders about every where with only his police and levies escort except in the places above mentioned.

Exd.—J. P. K.
No. 14 C.

FROM

L. W. DANE, ESQUIRE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,
Punjab and its Dependencies,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Dated Simla, 28th October 1896.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2197, dated 14th August 1896, in which the Government of India set forth the general principles which in their opinion should be followed in dealing with the tribes on the North-West boundary of the Punjab, and invite the Lieutenant-Governor to submit proposals for giving effect to those principles. In reply, I am to submit a copy of a Note by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, dated the 26th instant, in which His Honor has explained the existing position in some detail and put forward such proposals as it seems to him it may be possible to adopt at the present moment or in the immediate future towards carrying out the policy sketched out by the Government of India.

2. I am to say that on the measures to be taken in the Largha Sherani country (paragraph 10 of the Note) and in the Darwesh Khel country in the neighbourhood of the Tochi (paragraph 38 of the note) His Honor is about to address the Government of India separately, and at this moment he would ask for orders only on the general proposal put forward in paragraph 24 of the Note for giving support to the Maliks and on the suggestions made in paragraph 34 as to the mode in which the question as to interfering authoritatively to establish internal peace and order between sections of tribes and individual tribesmen should be dealt with.

When His Honor is in possession of the views of the Government of India on these two leading points he will at once address the Commissioners concerned on the various matters of detail referred to in his Note, and he trusts that before leaving the country he will be in a position to submit to the Government of India some further proposals for giving effect to those views.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

L. W. DANE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

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Note by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, on the letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, No. 2197, dated 14th August 1896, regarding our relations with the tribes on the North-West Frontier,—dated Simla, 28th October 1896.

[Parts of this Note were written soon after the receipt of the Government of India letter, but its completion has been delayed owing to the necessity of referring to numerous records and getting information on certain points.]

In this letter the Government of India set forth the general principles which in their opinion should be followed in dealing with the tribes on the north-western boundary of the Punjab, and invite an expression of my opinion as to how those principles can be best applied and what modifications, if any, of the existing system are required.

A.—Remarks on the general policy to be adopted in dealing with the tribes on the North-Western frontier of the Punjab.

2. On the general policy enunciated in this letter I desire to say but little. I have had many opportunities within the last four years-and-a-half of stating my views to the Government of India on this important subject, and it would be scarcely becoming in me when the Government of India have after full consideration announced their own views to set about discussing at large the principles they have laid down. I shall accordingly restrict myself to saying no more than is necessary to make my own position with regard to this matter clear.

3. In a note dated the 17th October 1899, written at the time the delimitation between us and the Amir came under consideration, and which I may be allowed to quote, first, because it explains my attitude in regard to the frontier question generally, and secondly, because it shows my view as to what the line of demarcation between us and the Amir should be understood to mean, I wrote speaking of that line as follows:

"2. I think it is of the highest importance that it should be simply understood to be a line on our side of which the Amir's interference, except when we allow him to chastise a tribe, shall be absolutely excluded—that is to say, I would leave the question, as to what our relations with the territory or tribes on our side of the line would be entirely open and untouched in our settlement or agreement with the Amir.

I think if the agreement between us and the Amir were treated as amounting to anything like a partition of territory, it would have a bad effect, and though I see it must practically involve something like a partition of what Mr. Tupper calls the "sphere of influence," I think it would be unwise to put it expressly in that way.*

I think anything having the appearance of a partition of territory or of the sphere of influence or sphere of protection is objectionable for two reasons, viz.—

1st, because it might, at some points of the line, cast on us obligations of a very onerous nature without any commensurate advantage; and

2nd, because it might alarm the tribes and set them against us.

3. As regards the former point, I think it well to guard myself against being misunderstood, especially as Mr. Tupper has, in his very excellent note, spoken of the "views of this Government." I wish to say that, though, in forming my views on frontier questions as well as on all other questions of administration, I always pay the greatest regard to the opinions of the able men who have gone before me, and the able men who are now serving under me, my own views as an individual are the only "views of this Government:" and I belong neither to the close border school nor to the forward school. I say "a plague on both your schools," for I fear that between the two there is a serious risk of our making a mess some time or other of our frontier policy.

If you set about generalizing as the schools do, you must come to grief one way or the other. The only safe method of proceeding is to abandon "the high a priori line" and examining each bit of the frontier separately, consider what you have to gain by getting a

* The phrase "sphere of influence" was ultimately used in the Durand Convention, but taking it as it stands in the context there I do not think it is open to serious objection.
greater hold on the tribes, and interfering more in their affairs, and what the cost of it is likely to be, and then make up your mind as to what you will do, always bearing in mind that, however serious the emergency will be, you will never have more than a very limited amount of force at your disposal, and that to fritter it away over a large area means ruin."

My opinion is still the same as it was when I wrote that. Even assuming, as the views of the Military authorities and of the Government of India require me to do, that we must in certain eventualities be prepared to take up certain advanced positions as e.g., on the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line, I still believe that there are some parts of our frontier where any attempt to tighten our control over the tribes would cost us far more than the value of any advantage we should gain by it.

4. The view of the Government of India as expressed in this letter is, on the contrary, that we should endeavour to extend our control everywhere over these tribes up to the Durand line, that we should aim everywhere at establishing peace not only between us and them as we do at present, but also among them between themselves, and that we should everywhere exert ourselves more actively than we have hitherto been doing. I quite see that this policy is to be pushed on gradually and with caution, but it is to be pushed on everywhere. Now this is in general accordance with what was said in the Foreign Secretary's letters of 1889-90 to which the Government of India now refer me, but it seems to me to go somewhat further than was contemplated by the Government of India in the year 1892 when they came to deal with an important practical question, that of Lord Roberts' deputation for the purpose of settling the delimitation between us and the Amir. The highest authorities seemed then to accept the view that, though we should prevent the Amir from occupying any of the territory on our side of the line that was to be demarcated, we should not ourselves attempt to establish any considerable control over the whole of that territory, that there would be places in which for a long time to come we should not attempt to establish internal peace or prevent the tribes from fighting among themselves and places like the Afridi country where it would be difficult for us to prevent the tribes from raiding on the Amir's territory and in which accordingly we should in a proper case have to allow the Amir to counter-raid, though on the understanding that he would not take permanent possession.*

5. Now I am of course quite ready to admit that a state of things like that then contemplated could not last for ever, at least if there continued to be a strong ruler in Afghanistan who made his power fully felt up to his side of the line and insisted on our preventing raiding from our side. I quite see that, whatever course we take, it is in all probability our ultimate destiny to establish a full and close control over all the territory up to the Durand line; but, as I have more than once said, it rests to a large extent with ourselves to determine the pace at which we shall advance towards that consummation, and my own opinion is that it is wiser for us not to do anything to accelerate the pace—indeed it seems to me a question, having regard to the rate at which we have been advancing for the last six or seven years (see paragraph 2 of the Government of India's letter) and the further business already in hand, especially in connection with the Mohmand country, I say it seems to me a question whether, except of course where we have some special object to gain, we ought not rather to put on the break.

* I have just read the following remarks in a letter from one who stands high as an authority on such matters and they seem to me to be so much in point that I may well quote them here:

"As I understand the term 'sphere of influence,' it has merely a negative meaning. It implies an engagement between two European States that one of them will abstain from interfering or exercising influence within certain territories which as between the contracting parties are reserved for the operations of the other. Such an engagement does not involve the exercise of any powers or the assumption of any responsibility by either party to pass into a protectorate just as a protectorate tends to pass into complete sovereignty. The chief and to obviate the necessity for effective occupation as a bar to annexation or encroachment by a competing State, a sphere of influence is a possible protectorate and use of establishing a sphere of influence is probably to minimise the risk of war arising from scrambles for territory. The passage I have marked A would need qualification in a case like that between us and the Amir where two rest the extract is exactly applicable to the position established by the Durand line."
I am of this opinion chiefly because the more I see of such matters the more convinced I am that we cannot as a rule establish over any of these tribes the sort of control the Government of India aim at without incurring a considerable amount of expenditure, and worse still, without frittering away the small military force at our disposal by locking up troops that we need elsewhere, and without increasing the difficulties of recruiting by condemning large numbers of men to serve in out-of-the-way places and thus rendering our service less attractive.

6. These tribes have come now pretty well to understand that they must abstain from attacking us and must fall in with such arrangements as we may think necessary for preventing raids on our territory, for delivering up persons who commit offences against us, and for the payment of compensation for injuries done to us. They also pretty well understand the sort of control the Government of India aim at without increasing the difficulties of recruiting by condemning large numbers of men to serve.

The feeling of the tribes.

The people of the Black Mountain and its neighbourhood, the Bonerwals, the Mohmands and the Afridis, with whom I may couple the Orakzais, are not, I fear, to be won by the blandishments of Political Officers—indeed it is probable that the more persistent a Political Officer was in forcing his attentions on them the more their suspicions would be aroused and the more they would stiffen themselves into opposition against the establishment of any such larger degree of control as the Government of India have in view. It would, I fear, be of little avail to explain to them that we desire to maintain their independence as far as possible, that we mean to let them govern themselves under our control, and so on. They know just as well as we do what it must all come to in the end. We might perhaps succeed in inducing many of the leading men who would look to getting allowances from us and to rising to a higher position under our auspices, to accept our control, but as I shall presently explain it would by no means follow that they would carry the body of the tribe with them, especially where the Mulla influence was strong.
8. It is for these reasons, and because I think pushing on matters more actively in some places is likely to lead to military expeditions and ultimately to the locking up of further bodies of troops, that I am averse to urging our frontier officers to greater activity, except in those parts where after a full consideration of all the circumstances we come to the conclusion that we have some special object to gain which is worth what the attainment of it is likely to cost. I may add that even if I believed that a more forward policy was expedient everywhere, I should be averse to issuing any orders which might seem to our officers to sound the advance along the whole line, at a moment like this when we are not yet out of the wood in Waziristan and on the Chitral road, when we have the great Mohmand business impending, and when the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Punjab is already crying out that the force under his command is insufficient to meet the demands made on it by the forward movements we have already made. At the same time I feel bound to acknowledge the very full manner in which the Government of India in their present letter recognize the wide differences between the conditions that prevail on different parts of our frontier and the anxiety displayed throughout to enjoin moderation and caution, and I have in consequence every hope that when we come to discussing matters in detail it will turn out that there is really far less difference between my view and theirs than might at first sight be supposed. I have only to add that, however this may be, I shall, during the short time that remains to me here, exert myself to give effect to the views of the Government of India, whatever they may be, exactly as if they were my own.

B.—The present position—what has already been done and what further may be done generally to carry out the policy of the Government of India.

9. Having thus said all that I think it permissible to say on the question of the general policy, I will next give a short account of what already has been done and is being done in the directions indicated by the Government of India. I need say little of tracts like the Kurram Valley and Daur, which we have taken into our possession and in which we have established some sort of administration. We have not "annexed"* these tracts in the technical sense of the word, but we collect revenue from them, administer justice in them, and discharge most of the functions of government in them which we discharge in British India, though in a more primitive sort of way and to a large extent with the aid of tribal jirgas. Wana, including Spin and Zarmelan, I understand is now to be placed in this category except as regards the collection of land revenue. This is what I have for some time advocated, and indeed I understood that it had been settled, but in their letter No. 3650, dated 25th September 1895, the Government of India directed us to confine ourselves there to keeping order on the roads we had opened, and I was thus compelled in this office No. 1845, dated 29th November 1895, to urge the necessity of a more forward policy. No reply has been received to that letter, but I gather from the present communication that my view has been accepted.†

10. It is, I may add, not unlikely that the Largha Sherani country referred to by the Government of India in their 6th paragraph will also be placed in the same category. I have for some time felt, as the Government of India do, that it is imperative that some stronger form of control should be introduced in a narrow strip of country like this interposed between our district border on the one side and the territory administered by the Baluchistan Agency on the other. The Largha Sherani country no doubt is, owing to its physical difficulties and previous history, a very different country to deal with from the Bargha Sherani country which is under the Baluchistan authorities, and there is besides

* I think it well to convey a warning about the use of the word "annex" in dealing with the subject now under consideration. When we say we do not intend to "annex" territory, we mean no more than that we do not intend to make it part of "British India" in the technical sense; but there is a great risk that persons not familiar with our system may imagine that we have no idea of taking it into our possession at all.

† A reply has been received since this was written, and I am glad to find that it is in the sense I anticipated.
a treaty or agreement in our way, but I have no doubt that we shall be able to put things there on a satisfactory footing. When I recently opened this subject to the Commissioners, he made certain proposals for getting the treaty revised in consideration of additional tribal allowances, and, as I was disposed to think they went beyond what was absolutely necessary, I referred the matter back to him for further consideration; but looking at the case again in the light of what is said in the Government of India's letter, I think it will probably be advisable to accept something like what the Commissioner proposes. I am writing to him to this effect, and I will address the Government of India separately on the matter.

11. Passing from the consideration of tracts in which we have established or will establish a system of administration or something approaching to it, and turning to the question of our position along the rest of the frontier, I think I may say that, except in one particular of the first magnitude to which I shall have presently to refer at some length, we have been proceeding as nearly as possible—indeed I think I may say exactly—on the lines indicated in the Government of India letter. Friendly relations have been established between our officers and the tribes; we have introduced the system of tribal allowances on a most extensive scale, and the plan of dealing with the tribes through their leading men is everywhere adopted. Raids in any force to speak of across the frontier of British India which were formerly so common are now practically unknown, and we have to deal only with crime of the type which always does and must prevail even in British India where we have to do with turbulent people. Furtive expeditions properly so called have here, as on the northern frontier of Assam, practically done their work and have now almost ceased to be necessary; we have full control of all the passes and routes (the Gomal, the Tochi and the Khabar Passes and the Babu-ar route†), which so far as I know the military authorities have up to this declared to be of importance, and the leading men along these routes would, I feel sure, render us useful aid on the occasion of any military expedition, at least so long as our own action, or (as in the case of the Marris in Baluchistan in 1880) the course of events, does not put too great a strain on the bonds by which we hold them.

12. As regards supplies, I believe that along the routes which we have opened up, such supplies as these trans-frontier tracts yield—in most places only sheep and goats, firewood and forage—would be always, as they are now, at our command; but I take it that when the Government of India mention as one of their objects that of having “the entire resources of the country” at our disposal, they refer chiefly to obtaining recruits for our army—a matter that was specially mentioned in the letter of 1889, and upon this I would say a few words. I have ventured more than once to utter a note of warning against any very extended employment on or beyond the frontier of troops recruited from these tribes; but it has always seemed to me desirable, both in our own interest and in the interests of the tribes, to recruit as many men from among them as we can for service in the interior of India. I am glad to see that Lieutenant Horaby has lately got some 50 Waziris to enlist in the 24th Bombay Infantry, and that the question of procuring Waziri recruits for that and 26th Bombay Infantry has been taken up by the higher Military authorities; but at the same time I would observe that the readiness of a tribe to enlist does not seem to depend, to any considerable extent, on the closeness of the relations established between them and us. There are few tribes that hold more aloof from us than the Afridis and Orakzais, and yet there is no trans-frontier tribe the members of which enlist in our army to anything like the same extent.†

* This statement needs qualification as regards the Bonerwals, who, though they generally settle up border disputes, for the rest seem to hold aloof from our officers.
† The only punitive expeditions properly so called that have been undertaken within the last fifteen years, i.e., since we settled down after the second Afghan war, are the first Sansana expedition and the first Black Mountain expedition—that is to say those were the only two expeditions that were necessitated by spontaneous aggressiveness on the part of the tribes. The other expeditions that have taken place during the period referred to have been connected with some forward movement or demonstration on our part.
‡ I do not mention the Chitral road because that has been opened by officers acting directly under the Government of India.
same extent. According to the last caste return there were no less than 2,150 of these men in the Bengal Army and Punjab Frontier Force. On the other hand, the Baluchis are the tribe with which we are on the closest and most friendly footing, and yet they are most averse to enlisting in our army. The truth is that the extent to which any tribe is willing to enlist depends on a great variety of circumstances, among which that of their having a friendly or unfriendly feeling towards us as a nation seems to count for little.

At the same time no one would deny that if we are to have large numbers of trans-frontier men in our army, it is desirable to be on as friendly a footing as possible with the tribes to which they belong; but whether we would get on a more friendly footing with these tribes by bringing them under closer control is another question.

13. As regards one of the matters mentioned in the last two paragraphs, viz., the introduction of the tribal allowance system and the plan of making the leading men of a tribe responsible for the tribe, it is necessary for me to enter into more detailed explanations.

The tribal allowance and service system.

Mr. Bruce, the late Commissioner of the Derajat, constantly dwelt on the immense sums paid by the officers of the Baluchistan Agency to the tribes with which they had to deal, and complained that the Government had not been equally liberal in the Punjab. How exactly we stand in this respect as compared with Baluchistan I cannot say, but that we have pushed the system of service and tribal allowances a long way will be seen from the tabular statement annexed to this Note showing the details of the allowances now paid to the Punjab frontier tribes excluding those dealt with by Major Deane directly under the Government of India. From that statement it will be seen that we are already paying on account of such allowances Rs 5,64,000 odd per annum besides assignments of land revenue, frontier remissions, jagirs and Tumandari allowances which come to about a lakh and-a-half more and certain portions of the pay of the Border Police which goes to tribal leaders under the Sillahdari system. It may be that there are parts of the frontier where we might spend more money in this way with advantage, and the views of the Government of India will be borne in mind, but generally speaking, there is, I should say, no need to put on much pressure so far as this matter is concerned. Our officers are only too ready to propose as much in the way of allowances as they think the Government of India are likely to sanction, and the Maliks as a rule are only too glad to take all they can get—in fact the cases in which they are unwilling to accept allowances are rare. There was some demur about accepting service from us on the Black Mountain and on the Samana, and the amusing incident that occurred on our occupation of the Kurram, when Chikkal of Chinarak after taking some money from our Political Officer wrote to the Amir saying that he thought it politic to take it, but regarded it as “the dung of the donkey of Antichrist,” will be in the recollection of the Government of India. When people have been disposed thus to stand aloof from us and despise our money, we have not pressed it on them, and this is obviously the best course. In this as in other matters Major Deane since he has been on the Malakand has shown his wisdom. He has repeatedly said that he would not seek out the people, but would let them come to him if they chose. In his last note he says: “nothing will induce a Pathan to give trouble more surely than allowing him to think one is anxious to conciliate him. Over-eagerness in pressing these people to enter our service and accept our money would be very apt to defeat its own object.”

14. But as I say we have not hitherto been much troubled with difficulties of this sort. The Maliks are usually like a set of Italian beggars with their hands always out; the more you give them the more they want, and I may add that they are apt to show themselves very sturdy and insolent beggars at times. The freedom with which we grant allowances has led some of the tribes to imagine that if they only misbehave themselves grossly enough we will pay them to keep quiet. The Para Chamkannis have been raiding on the Kurram Valley above Sadia for the last two years in the hope of extorting allowances from us, and as I said, and not for the first time, in my letter to the Government...
of India, No. 1073 of the 21st August 1896, I don't think they will stop till we go into their hills and chastise them. We have had the Darwesh Khels of the Tochi Valley attacking our posts in the direction of Sherani with a similar object, and we have at this moment pending a correspondence in which our officers and the Zhob officers jointly propose tribal allowances for a certain section of the Suleiman Khels, who with a like object recently behaved with outrageous insolence at Gul Kach. In this last instance it seemed to me that the case lay too far within the penumbra which separates service allowances from black-mail, and I demurred to granting the allowance, but I have now sent on the papers for the orders of the Government of India.

15. In short, I am inclined to think that the danger is not so much that we shall not grant allowances freely enough, but that we may grant them too freely. However, as I have already said, there may be cases in which it would be well to do more in this way, and I shall not lose sight of the matter.

16. Next as to the results to be hoped for from the system of granting allowances to the Maliks and their followers, and looking to them to control the tribe, it must not be supposed from what I have said that I underrate the advantages of that system when judiciously employed; indeed I think that if we wish to get control over the tribes it is the only system to adopt unless we are prepared to go in for a series of Geok Teppes. But we must guard ourselves against becoming so enamoured of this system as to suppose that it will be equally effectual everywhere and for all purposes. It has on the whole succeeded well on the Punjab frontier so far as the attainment of the results mentioned in paragraph 11 above is concerned; but it is as well, especially if it is desired to use it to attain further results, which would put a much severer strain on it, to make a careful study of its weak points, and in particular to remember that its efficiency depends chiefly on the constitution of the tribe and the position held in it by the leading men through whom we have to work.

17. Now the difference in this respect between the Biluch tribes along our Dera Ghazi Khan frontier and the Waziris and other Pathan tribes further north is immense. A Biluch tribe has at the head of it a single leader, a Tumandar, a man whose family have occupied the same position for generations, a man of wealth and high position and dignity whose word is law among his people. I see signs of incipient decay in the Tumandarship, but up to this it has maintained its ground, and as long as it does so we can by holding the Tumandar hold the tribe.

When we come to the Waziri country,* we find a totally different state of things. We find that instead of having a single powerful leader to deal with, we have brought up before us a score or more of squalid hungry men who we are told may be taken to represent a certain section of the tribe. We shall, however, further be told that the claim of these men to represent the tribe is not uncontested, that a great many more men wanted to come in, but that their claims to be leaders are weaker, and that as the saying is the jirga before us is "as good a jirga as can be got." We shall probably hear more of some of the other men who wanted to join the jirga. They will perhaps petition us saying that they are the real leaders of the section, and that the men we have been interviewing are mere nobodies and so on. Now I have the most complete confidence in the judgment exercised by our officers in recognizing men as Maliks. I have no doubt that the 280 Maliks recently recognized by Mr. Bruce for the purposes of service and allowances in the Mahsud country and the 254 Maliks recognized by Mr. Anderson in the Darwesh Khel country on the Tochi side are as near an approach to being representatives of their respective sections as it would be possible to find, but it is evident from what I have said that their influence over the tribe is likely to be somewhat limited, and I may add that the mere fact of our taking them into our service does not always tend to increase that influence, but sometimes has the opposite

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* In some tribes higher up the frontier Khans are to be found, but they are very weak Khans.
effect. Their weakness is partly the result of their being so very numerous a body, and consequently being apt to split up into factions, and partly the result of the unwillingness of these tribes to submit permanently and regularly, except to a certain limited extent, to any superior and above all to a superior backed up from without. They are disposed to say, as I heard of some tribe saving not long ago, "we have no Maliks among us," or again "we are all Maliks." The same characteristic is observable among Pathan tribes even within our own border. As I mentioned to the Government of India in a letter the other day, they resent any one of their number being placed by us in a position of authority over the rest.

18. I pointed out the difficulties we were likely to have from the weakness of the Waziri Maliks in paragraphs 29 to 31 of my note of the 14th March 1894 on the demarcation of the Durand line along the Waziri border. We have had many illustrations of this since, and recently we have seen signs of such difficulties increasing both in the case of the Darwesh Khels of the Tochi and in that of the Mahsuds.

From the Tochi it is reported by the Commissioner that since we withdrew our troops from the upper part of the valley the Maliks have been growing weaker, and have no control over the bad characters, that they are unable to procure the surrender of the persons suspected of having murdered our Post Munshi, and that they beg of us to advance our troops as far as Datta Khel.

From the Gomal side the news comes that the bigger Mahsud Maliks represent that from the time we gave them allowances their tribesmen have been against them, that the Mulla Powindah (the same that instigated the attack on our Camp at Wana) has gained great influence in the country, has raised up much ill-feeling against them and has ordered that no funeral ceremonies shall be performed at the death of any one receiving allowances from our Government, that until we enter the Mahsud country and hold and govern it with posts at Kunigoram, Makin, &c., &c., their tribesmen will as heretofore be always against them and work against them and there will be no peace.

Now as I stated in reporting these matters to the Government of India, I suspect in both cases the Maliks are exaggerating their difficulties for purposes of their own. In spite of what I have said above I can not, seeing the large number of Maliks and their dependents we have in our pay, and the large amount we give them, believe that they can be as weak as they would make out; but at the same time as I then said I believe that their difficulties are real and serious, and may force us before long to do much more than we desire to do. This would not matter so much in the Tochi where we have a force ready at hand and within striking distance to support us in doing anything that we may be called upon to do, but it would be nothing less than a disaster to us to have to undertake the internal control of the Mahsud country, as for this purpose a large additional force of regular troops would be needed for an indefinite time to come. I trust that with judicious management we may be able for a good while to avoid anything of this sort, but I fear the Mahsud Maliks are not far wrong when they say "we are moreover convinced that Government will some day enter our country and hold it."

19. Now here again it must not be supposed from my dwelling at such length on all this that I am opposed to the system of working through Maliks. I quite see that even weak Maliks may render us important assistance, and all I desire to point out is that on our Pathan frontier they are apt to prove weak, and that before making any new departure or assuming fresh responsibilities, which we count on the Maliks to aid us in discharging, we should carefully take the measure of the Maliks we shall have to work through.

20. I see it is said, in the Government of India letter that "experience has shown that in every Pathan tribe, however democratic, there are responsible headmen who are capable of maintaining order, if they are properly

* This has now been done.
supported." Now this is perfectly true in a certain sense, but it does not help us much. A set of Maliks may be able to do most things if we give them sufficient support, but the question we have to consider in each case is what sort of support and how much of it shall we have to give them—for if it comes to keeping a military force constantly at their very elbows we may almost be said to be doing their work for them.

21. In the 5th paragraph of their letter the Government of India discuss the question as to how far a Political Officer should be permitted to interfere to maintain the authority of the Maliks or headmen, and the answer given to it is that he should have a free hand in regard to this matter so long as he can maintain the authority of the Maliks "without involving the Government in active hostilities with the tribes." Now I think that, taking it with certain limitations, this proposal is in the right direction.

I have all along had even a stronger feeling of our obligation to support the Maliks than the Government of India. In the one or two cases where there has been any difference of opinion on this point it was owing to my being anxious to go further than the Government of India were prepared to go. I think that when we find in any particular instance that the Maliks are really and bona fide unable, owing to the opposition they meet with, to discharge their duty as such, we ought to assist them in whatever manner and to whatever extent may be necessary to ensure what is required being done or to punish those who oppose its being done. Again, I think that if Maliks come to trouble for discharging their duty to us, as for example happened immediately after the conclusion of Kelly's murder case when two of the Maliks, who acted on the jirga under the superintendent of the Commissioner and convicted the prisoners, were assassinated, we should make the quarrel our own. It seems to me that if we shrink from supporting the authority of the Maliks in such cases the whole system must collapse. Of course there is at times a difficulty in deciding whether the Maliks are really as powerless as they say they are—whether they are not merely shrinking from the discharge of an unpopular task, and again we have had cases in which it was pretended that Maliks or others had suffered or were in danger of suffering merely because they had discharged their duty to us, but in which as a matter of fact they had suffered or were in danger owing to something totally distinct, but putting such cases aside and speaking only of cases where the Maliks have done their best and failed, or where they have really suffered or are in danger in consequence of having done their duty, we must come to their aid.*

22. Then as regards the particular question referred to by the Gov-
ernment of India as to the discretion which we should allow our Political Officer to interfere without reference to us in order to support the authority of the Maliks, the understanding hitherto has, I think, been that the Political Officer has a perfectly free hand so long as he can do what is required without using force or threatening force or committing himself to anything which would be likely to necessitate the use of force, but that otherwise he must, except in a case of great urgency, refer to his superiors, and the matter must go up to the Government of India. The recent references in such cases and in the other cases mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Government of India letter which the Government of India now desire to reduce in number have, I may observe, proceeded exclusively from the country between Thal and the Gomal where we have lately broken fresh ground, and they have been necessi- nated partly by the Government of India's policy in those parts having not yet been completely settled, and partly by the feeling, which the Lieutenant-Governor

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* This perhaps requires some qualification. I have since it was written, read some observations by one of our most experienced frontier officers in which he expresses the opinion that if the power of the Maliks is on the wane we can do little towards propping them up. He seems inclined to think that in such a case we had better drop them and turn over to their rivals. As he puts it "it does not matter to us who is in and who is out." But what I should fear is, that in most cases there would be no other party strong enough to "come in," and when that is so the choice lies between propping up the old Maliks and taking the whole responsibility directly on our own shoulders.
23. I understand now that the Government of India are prepared to relax this strictness of control and to allow the Political Officer on the spot a discretion to act without previous reference to the Government, notwithstanding that he may have to use force or a threat of force, or incur a risk of having to use force, provided only he can do so “without involving the Government in active hostilities with the tribes,” by which I take it is meant without running the risk of bringing on military operations on some considerable scale. Now I am quite prepared to give effect to this view subject to certain limitations which I have no doubt will commend themselves to the Government of India. I think that if it was seen that the Political Officer had a free discretion to employ force when he thought necessary, this in itself would often suffice to ensure obedience to his orders, and that in the long run it would tend to diminish the occasions on which it would be necessary actually to employ force; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that if we give a Political Officer this discretion, we must be prepared to support his authority at whatever cost, except in those rare cases in which his action might be so objectionable that we should feel bound to throw him over. and this being so, I think it would be desirable, in the first place, to put some sort of general limit to the discretion we would give him, and in the second place, to determine on what parts of the frontier we should give him this discretion and on what parts we should not.

24. As regards the former point, I think it might well be settled in the way in which I have heard it was settled in the case of Sir R. Sandeman in Biluchistan. I have heard that Sir R. Sandeman’s success in Biluchistan was in a great measure attributable to his being allowed a personal escort which he could make use of to enforce his orders without reference to the Government. Our Political Officers are allowed escorts when they have occasion to go anywhere where an escort is needed, but those escorts are understood to be given only for their personal protection. Now, what I would suggest is that we should fix for each Political Officer, to whom we would entrust the discretion proposed, a small escort which would be known as his ordinary escort, and should tell him that, where he felt a reasonable degree of confidence that he could do what was needed to support the Malikis merely with the aid of levies or with the aid of this escort and without a risk of his action leading to the employment of any larger body of troops, he would have full discretion (perhaps it would be well to say, after reference to the Commissioner where time admitted of this) to do what he thought fit, but that otherwise a reference must be made to the Government.

25. Then, as to the places where we should put things on this footing, I should of course have to take the opinions of local officers before submitting any final proposals on this point, but meantime I may make the following remarks subject to reconsideration later on. I think we might put things on this footing in Daur and Wana (including Spin and Zarmelan), and also in the Largha Sherani country when we establish there the closer control now proposed. I am inclined to think that we might also put things on this footing in the Darwesh Khel country round the Tochi Valley and up to Thal, where I am coming more and more to think that our control must be closer than we originally contemplated making it, and where we have troops at hand to support us in anything we wish to do; but this matter I propose to refer separately to the Government of India. Possibly we might put things on this footing also in the Khaisera Valley, where we could, I take it, do whatever we wanted with such a force as Wana could send out. In regard to the Mahsud country north of the Shahur Valley road, I should be reluctant to give the Political Officer discretion to employ force or any threat of force or to do anything which would be likely to commit us to the employment of force without referring
to me, and I should always feel bound, on such a case arising there, to refer to the Government of India, for I feel pretty sure that if we got ourselves committed to employing force at any distance to speak of within the Mahsud country the Military authorities would say that it was necessary to call up reinforcements from some of our frontier stations.

This disposes of all the principal tracts south of Thal, and I do not think we need at present trouble ourselves in this connection about the frontier round from that to the Black Mountain, where the question of supporting Malik has not so far as I know yet arisen.

C.—The question of establishing internal peace among the tribes and preventing them fighting among themselves.

26. In all that I have said up to this I have proceeded on the assumption that we would not along the frontier generally take upon ourselves any responsibilities different in kind from those that we have hitherto assumed, and that we would put no fresh strain on our system of tribal allowance and service; but, as I said above (paragraph 11), there is one particular of the first magnitude in which we have hitherto made practically no attempt to carry out the policy now formulated by the Government of India, except indeed in tracts like the Kurram and Daur, where we have taken possession of the country and set up some sort of administration. I refer to the proposal that we should attempt authoritatively to establish internal peace and order prevent the tribesmen fighting and raiding among themselves, and compel them to submit their disputes to jirgas sitting under our auspices. I say "authoritatively," because in order to get any clear idea of our position with reference to this very large and difficult question it is necessary to mark, and never for a moment to lose sight of, the distinction between authoritative and unauthoritative interference in regard to quarrels within a tribe or section of a tribe or between one tribe or section of a tribe and another.

27. The Political Officer in charge of our relations with a tribe often has opportunities of interfering unauthoritatively to settle such quarrels either by giving advice or by acting as arbitrator. Sometimes both parties may appeal to him, sometimes one may appeal to him and the other when referred to may also be willing to submit the matter in dispute to him for decision. Sometimes he may of his own motion call both parties to him and may find both willing that he should decide between them. In such cases their submission to him is voluntary, and his decision, though it may be of much greater weight, carries no authority different in kind from that of any other worthy man by whose judgment the tribesmen might be willing to be bound. The extent to which an individual officer may have opportunities of interfering in this way must depend on many circumstances, and above all on his personal influence, but I need not say that I entirely agree that the more an officer can do in this way the better. It is, however, most essential that when an officer undertakes to settle a dispute in this way there should be no mistake as to the footing upon which he is proceeding. It should be clearly understood that he is acting in a purely unauthoritative way, and that if either party fails to act up to his decision he will not be expected to take steps to compel obedience, and that the only result will be that the party so failing will forfeit the good opinion of his neighbours and the favour of Government officers in this world, and suffer whatever penalties may be in store for faithless persons in the next. There is nothing, as we have found on several occasions, which tends to bring about a more awkward state of things and to place us in a more false position than for one of our officers to undertake to settle a dispute leaving it in doubt whether the settlement is one which is to be enforced by us or not. Subject to these remarks I go completely with the view of the Government of India so far as unauthoritative interference of our officers to settle disputes and keep the peace is concerned.

* Mr. Bruce and Mr. King laid stress on this point at the time they induced the Mahsuds and Darwsh Khels to enter into the Peshawar convention, but it turned out afterwards that the position of the Government in regard to that matter had not been made sufficiently clear; and we have recently had a case before us in which our officers differed as to whether we were bound to enforce a certain agreement regarding lands in Wazir.
28. But except under peculiar circumstances unauthoritative interference will not do very much. As is justly observed in paragraph 5 of the Government of India letter, “disputes between Pathan tribes are usually settled by an appeal to arms, and it is not likely, especially at the beginning, that Pathan pride will be satisfied with any other form of arbitration unless there is the excuse that the Political Officer forbids bloodshed and insists on a peaceful settlement.” This brings us to the only question raised by the Government of India letter, regarding the treatment of which any serious difficulty is likely to arise. That question is as follows. How far can we and how far ought we authoritatively to command members of the frontier tribes to abstain from fighting among themselves in cases where their fighting does not affect us?

29. Now as to this neither the relations hitherto established between us and the tribes nor the Durand delimitation impose upon us any obligation whatever to keep these people at peace between themselves. Further, any attempt to do this would be in most places a very formidable undertaking. If we authoritatively forbid these people to fight we must provide some means of punishing those who disobey our order, we must provide some sort of tribunals (they would doubtless be jirgas) for settling all their disputes and some means of compelling attendance before these tribunals and of enforcing their awards: further, the quarrels we should have to stop would not be merely isolated quarrels between individuals; they would constantly be quarrels on a vast scale, of long standing and with all sorts of ramifications between large sections of tribes. Lastly, it would be somewhat difficult especially in dealing with wild people like these to adopt a punitive system pure and simple. We could hardly in cases like those that recently occurred in Wana let people fight and then punish them for fighting. We should have to adopt preventive measures, and for this again it would be necessary to provide a certain amount of force which could be at once brought to bear when required. On the other hand, it must be admitted that if we could get over whatever difficulties may stand in the way of doing all this and could establish some sort of system of justice in these frontier tracts, working under our control and backed by our power, we should have accomplished what beyond anything else that could be conceived would bring the tribes completely under us. As Mr. Merk observed to me the other day when I discussed this matter with him, “hukumat” or the giving of orders—the deciding of disputes authoritatively—is one of the two things, the collection of revenue being the other, which in the eyes of these people, and as a matter of fact, reduce a tribe from the “yaghi” to the “raiyat,” position, i.e., from being independent to being subject. The establishment of such a system would bring us into far closer contact with the tribes than we have ever hitherto been, our officers would have to be constantly moving about among them, we should have always to be interfering to prevent fighting, and either directly or indirectly enforcing orders and inflicting punishments, with the result that every one would be at our feet.

30. So far the authoritative order to abstain from fighting, and what would necessarily follow from it, would seem calculated to accomplish what the Government of India contemplate, or perhaps I should say more than they contemplate; but the idea of interfering in the internal affairs of the tribes generally in any such way involves a new departure. We of course keep the peace, administer justice, and otherwise control the internal affairs of a tribe when we have taken possession of their territory as we have done in the Kurram and in Daur; but the only other case in which, so far as I remember,

* Individually or sections who receive allowances are of course to, a certain extent under our power as we can stop their all-wages or deduct something from them; but this helps us only to a very limited extent, as though the aggregate of the allowances is large the amount received by each individual or section is small and is, moreover, apt at times to be entirely absorbed in deductions made on account of offences committed against ourselves, thus leaving no margin available for punishing offences or compensating for wrongs committed by one individual or section against another.

† I do not propose to go into the question as to the possibility of collecting land revenue, because I have hitherto found that the Government of India have been ready to waive this matter when we showed good reason for doing so. I will only observe that it is usually a very difficult thing to get a tribe that has never paid revenue to any one to agree to pay it to us. Moreover, we have in some cases bound ourselves not to take revenue.
we thought of interfering in the internal affairs of a tribe, was that of the Black Mountain, in which it was considered (see the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 1245, dated 31st August 1891) that our aim should be "to acquire beyond the border in this region an influence by which it may be possible to exercise control over the clans from India and to obtain their co-operation in managing their affairs according to our views," and in that case the policy does not seem to have been carried far; for the first attempt to establish control even of the ordinary kind was sufficient to raise up a party in favour of Hashim Ali, to encourage him to return, and to bring on the last Black Mountain Expedition (see this office letter No. 535, dated 4th July 1892).

On the more recent occasions on which we have set about establishing or extending our influence over tribes without acquiring possession of their territory, the view of the Government of India has been that we should abstain from interference with their internal affairs,* and even in the case of Wana, where it seemed to me that it was absolutely essential for us to prevent fighting throughout the whole tract and provide for the decision of all disputes, I was told that we should restrict ourselves to the protection of the routes we had opened.

Now, on the contrary, it is proposed that we should aim at establishing wherever possible a sort of interference with the internal affairs of the tribe which when once started must from its very nature become of all others the most close and systematic.

31. There are some sentences in the Government of India letter which seem to suggest that we might, when we set about establishing internal peace in any tract, proceed by slow degrees, interfering to keep the peace and settle disputes only in those cases in which we saw a prospect of doing so without any risk of getting committed to bringing any serious amount of force to bear; but I do not think it is meant to suggest this, and it would, I fear, be impossible to adopt such a plan. It is true that our officers have at times, when they saw an opportunity of doing so, authoritatively interfered to stop fighting and force parties to submit to an amicable settlement in individual cases in tracts where they would not think of attempting to insist on the peace being kept all round; but there would be serious objections to doing this in any save a very rare and exceptional case now and again. If we interfered in any number of cases to speak of in a given tract where interference seemed easy and then abstained from interfering in other cases where interference seemed difficult or likely to carry us far, the people would at once perceive that we shrank from interfering when there was likely to be much difficulty or opposition, we should be terribly lowered in their eyes and we should find our authority constantly set at defiance by every one who thought he could frighten us. Moreover, as Mr. Merk, with whom I discussed this point lately, said, it would create in the minds of the tribesman a strong sense of injustice, and I may add that it would actually be an unjust thing to do in many of those instances where there are feuds of long standing with many entanglements and ramifications, and where our interference on a single occasion might unfairly disturb whatever rough balance the course of events establishes in such cases. To give an illustration: when Mani Khan, the well-known Darwesh Khel leader, was in 1882 contemplating a great "tora" or expedition against the Mahsuds in prosecution of the long-standing feud between them and the Darwesh Khels, I set about discussing the matter with him and two or three other leading men of both tribes. Mani Khan is a man completely in our power, and who we might hope would be afraid to disobey any order from us, but I found on going into the matter that it would be a downright piece of injustice to order him to abstain from attacking the Mahsuds unless we were prepared to undertake the permanent protection of the Darwesh Khels, and this we could have done only by establishing ourselves in considerable force in the heart of the country. Hence I was compelled to restrict myself to preaching moderation. I think if we propose to attempt to authoritatively establish peace in any given tract we must be prepared

* In some cases I think it will be found that we have in some way pledged ourselves not to interfere with the internal affairs of the tribe, and this would have to be looked to before taking action in any particular case; but it is more convenient at this moment to discuss the matter on the assumption that we either have a free hand or shall ultimately get a free hand everywhere.
to establish it all round there, punishing every one who breaks it and providing for the doing of justice to all persons there without fear or favour and at whatever cost to ourselves.

32. There is indeed one way in which it might perhaps be possible to make the extension of our interference to a certain extent a gradual process, and that is by resolving not to interfere of our own motion, but only in cases in which some one applied to us to interfere Mr. Merk, to whom I suggested this plan, said he thought it would not carry us far. He thinks that very few members of the more independent tribes would dare to appeal to us for redress, and that if they did they would probably be killed when they returned to their homes. But however this may be, it is obvious that this plan would at starting bring us no cases except those that would prove the toughest to deal with. The people that would appeal to us at first would be chiefly the Shirmakis or persons who have been turned out, the weak people who are getting the worst of it in their quarrels with their powerful neighbours and such like. We should not therefore make matters much easier for ourselves by trying this plan of interfering only on some one’s application, but the idea of trying it may be further considered when I consult the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners on this subject.

33. There is one other point on which I desire to say a word. Wherever we might determine authoritatively to keep the peace and administer justice we would of course, as we at present do in the Kurram Valley, spare no pains to put the system on as popular a basis as possible. We would almost invariably work through tribal jirgas, and we would as far as possible allow those jirgas to decide in accordance with tribal customs and ideas; but, do what we might, the system would be regarded by the mass of the people as to a considerable extent a foreign system thrust on them by us. A jirga convened under it would never be quite the same thing as the indigenous jirga which sits simply by the consent of the tribe. It would be convened by our officer, and, as we know by experience, he would often have to watch its proceedings closely and to a certain extent direct them. It is not possible for us altogether to escape responsibility for the acts of a jirga convened under our auspices, and, especially as a jirga convened in this way is to a certain extent freed from the restraints to which a purely indigenous jirga is subject, it is often difficult for our officer to leave it entirely to itself. He has often to interpose to keep it straight and to guide it to a fair decision, sometimes encouraging the weak members and sometimes threatening the strong, and thus our jirga is to a certain extent a different thing from the purely indigenous and popular jirga. Again, though we would always allow the decision to be as far as possible in accordance with tribal customs and ideas, there is a certain class of cases in which we cannot allow this, and it so happens that this class of cases is for the most part the very class of cases in regard to which the people most dislike having our ideas thrust upon them—I mean cases involving questions as to rights over women and the punishment of offences connected with women. The Turi Maliks, when I was in the Kurram, made some strong representations to me on this point; but as they were glad to accept our rule at almost any cost there was no difficulty in settling the matter. Again it was partly from an apprehension of the difficulties we might have in this respect in the Largha Sherani country that I was unwilling at first, as I have already mentioned (supra paragraph 10), to accept the full measure of interference proposed by the Commissioner. The difficulty I felt, and in regard to which the Government of India agreed with me, as to bodily handing over Mussammat Lohani, the Helen of the Sheranis, to her husband is another illustration of the same thing. I don’t want to make much of such difficulties; we have got over them before and we could get over them again, but they must be borne in mind when considering how far the idea of our undertaking to keep the peace and provide for the administration of justice is likely to be acceptable to the tribes.
34. To sum up what I have said in regard to this branch of the subject.

Summary of the foregoing remarks.

I would encourage our officers to do all they possibly can to keep internal peace among these tribesmen by unauthoritative action wherever they find the tribesmen willing to accept them as friendly arbitrators, and I would allow them the freest hand in doing so, merely warning them to take care that all parties thoroughly understand that their interference is purely unauthoritative. As regards authoritative interference, I would not object to an officer interfering authoritatively or even forcibly to prevent people fighting once in a way, when some special opportunity presented itself for doing so, just as a passer-by in the street might interfere to stop a fight; but beyond this I fear we cannot go in any tract unless we make up our minds to keep the peace in that tract all round, whatever it may cost us to do so, and this seems to me so serious an undertaking that I would not allow a Political Officer to issue a general order prohibiting fighting in any tract, or to make it his regular business to interfere authoritatively to prevent fighting or settle internal quarrels in any tract without the special permission not only of the Local Government, but also of the Government of India; and in every case where it was proposed that we should take this very weighty responsibility on ourselves, I would require a full report on the whole position, showing how far the tribes concerned are likely to accept our interference, or what amount of force would be needed to compel them to submit to it, what is the position and power of the Malikis, and how far we could reckon on them to compel the attendance of accused persons or defendants and to enforce awards without assistance from us, and above all whether we could hope to carry on the system without providing any additional military force. I trust I shall have the Government of India with me in this. I see in paragraph 5 of their letter they fully recognize the fact that whether the Political Officer should interfere authoritatively to establish internal peace in a given tract must depend on a variety of circumstances, prominent among which is the extent to which he is supported by troops, and all I venture to urge is that the question as to whether the circumstances are such as to make it expedient for us to set about authoritatively establishing internal peace in a given tract is one of such immense magnitude and difficulty that it should in every case be decided by the Government of India and should in no case be left to the Political Officer to decide, as some sentences in the Government of India letter might lead one to suppose was intended.

35. As regards the places in which we might now at once give effect to the views of the Government of India to establish internal peace, and authorize our Political Officers authoritatively to forbid fighting and insist on all quarrels and disputes being settled in a peaceable manner, we have of course done this in the Kurrum Valley and in Dar as part of our administration of those tracts, and I would certainly do it in Wana, including Spin and Zarmian. I should be inclined to do it also in the Lurga Sherani country and in the Darwesh Khel country round the Tochi Valley and up to Thal, and possibly also, though I have much doubt about this, in Khaisera,* but I should be opposed to attempting it in the Mahsul country north of the Shahur Valley road for reasons similar to those stated in paragraph 25 above. Looking to the northern part of the frontier I don't know exactly what Major Deane is at present doing in the Ranizai tract, but Mr. Merk tells me that there and in the Gadun and Khudu Khel tracts the Deputy Commissioner has occasionally stopped fighting, and I understood him to say that among these small tribes there would be no difficulty in doing it systematically if we wished to do so. The only doubt is whether, seeing that these tribes are already completely under our control, it is worth our while doing it. On the other hand, I should be averse to interfering with fighting such as has recently been going on on the right bank of the Indus above Torbela, as there is no object whatever in doing so, and the attempts to do so might bring us into conflict with some of the Black Mountain tribes or the Bonerwals. As regards the Afridi and Orakzai country—Tirah and its neighbourhood is a perfect pandemonium in a

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* Paragraph 5 of the Government of India letter No. 146 dated 19th July 1866, seems to point to our restricting ourselves in Khaisera to unauthoritative interpositions.
cul de-sac, and the longer we can leave it alone the better. We could of course stop the fighting that occasionally goes on about Kadam up the stream from Jaurud and even at the village of Jam itself, and perhaps some of the fighting that goes on in other places not far from the Khaibar road; but such fighting is always managed so as not to interfere with our road or our arrangements, and there is a danger that any display of aggressiveness on our part even on the outer fringe of the A'ridi country might have wider results than we should desire and might detrimentally affect our Khaibar arrangements.

The above will suffice to convey to the Government of India an idea of the sort of places in which I think it will be possible just now to give effect to their wishes so far as the authoritative maintenance of internal peace among the tribes is concerned, but I would of course wish to refer to the local officers before submitting any final proposals regarding this matter.

D.—Detailed suggestions regarding the tracts specially referred to in paragraph 6 of the Government of India's letter.

36. Having thus stated the ways in which and the extent to which it seems to me possible at once to give effect to the policy of the Government of India, it remains for me to add a few details regarding some of the particular portions of the border line mentioned in paragraph 6 of the letter. The portions so mentioned are—

(1). The Largha Sherani country.
(2). Wana.
(3). The Tochi Valley.
(4). The Waziri hills.
(5). The Kurram.
(6). The Samana.
(7). The Orakzai country.
(8). The Jowaki country.
(9). The Kohat Pass.
(10). The Khaibar.
(11). The Mohmand country.

37. Of Nos. (1), (2) and (11) I need say little here. As I have already stated, I am in complete accord with the views of the Government of India with regard to the Largha Sherani country and will immediately put before them a scheme for fully giving effect to their views. There may be some difficulties with the tribe, but if so, they will have to be overcome. As regards Wana, we have up to this been in difficulties because it turned out that the Government of India had not made up its mind to the forward policy which I had proposed and which we all supposed they had accepted, but now that the Government of India have finally accepted that policy our course will be simple and clear. The question of the Mohmand country is under separate consideration and will probably be dealt with by the Government of India direct, and so I need say nothing regarding it.

38. As regards No. (3), I presume the Government of India include in the expression "Tochi Valley" not merely the Darwesh Khels in and round the Tochi Valley. Daur of which we have taken complete possession and the road up to Sherani, but also the hilly country round the valley proper and up to That inhabited by the Darwesh Khels. On this also I am, as already stated (paragraph 25), about to address the Government of India separately, and I have no doubt my views will be found to be in accord with theirs. The view originally taken was that we should abstain from authoritative
interference in quarrels among these Darwesh Khels themselves or between them and the Mahsuds when such quarrels in no way affected our arrangements. This was the view put forward in paragraphs 26—29 of Mr. Anderson's letter No. 404 C., dated 6th September 1895, accepted by me with little reservation and approved in the Government of India's No. 3989, dated 18th October 1895; but I confess that, as is always to be apprehended in such cases, we seem likely to be forced sooner than we expected into going further than I at least should have desired to go, and as the Government of India now favour more active interference I propose to reconsider the position.

39. As regards No. (4), which I take to refer to the Waziri hills further south, that is to the Mahsud country and to the Khaisera and Shakai Valleys, I have already pointed out the difficulties attending any attempt to interfere authoritatively with their internal affairs with a view to keeping the peace between the tribes or otherwise, but I am entirely with the Government of India in thinking that our officers "may be freely encouraged to extend their friendly influence by all means in their power in these tracts."

40. As regards No. (5), we already are in possession of and govern what is ordinarily called "the Kurram," and I presume that when the Government of India say they desire that "the same course may be followed in the Kurram," they mean that we should encourage our officers to extend their friendly influence over the tribes whose settlements lie immediately to the north-east of the Kurram Valley—the Chamkannis, Massuzaiks, Alisherzais and Zaimushts.

41. In regard to the Chamkannis it is absolutely impossible for us to do more than we are doing at present. Their Khani Khel jirga, as stated by Mr. Merk in his note of the 8th February 1894, never came in to any former ruler of Kurram nor would they come in to him, and they have as above stated (paragraph 14) been raiding on our people for the last two years in the hope of extorting allowances from us. Once in 1895 a jirga did come in, we were very conciliatory—indeed it would now seem over-conciliatory—in dealing with them, and there was a prospect of having peace with them, but the raiding has recently begun again, and I doubt, as I have already said, whether we can get any good of them until we inflict chastiement on them. Our Political Officer is, however, doing his best to induce them to submit peaceably to us and restore the property they have carried away or pay compensation, and if he succeeds in his attempt and the tribe behave themselves properly for some time, the question of granting them tribal allowances in the manner desired by the Government of India can be considered, but at this moment anything of the kind is obviously out of the question.

42. The Zaimushts are now completely in our grip, as we hold them along their front in Upper Miranzzai and have taken them in the flank from Thal to Sadda. Some of them own lands in the Kurram Valley, we have about 100 of them in the Kurram Militia, and all of them have been behaving well since we took possession of Kurram. Chikkai of Chinarak, about the greatest scoundrel in Asia, who headed the Sunni persecution of the Turis, which forced us to occupy the Kurram, is the most prominent man among them, and though he spoke of our money as the "dung of the donkey of Antichrist" he has from the first behaved towards us in a satisfactory and even friendly manner. He has on one or two occasions shown hospitality to officers who have gone through his country on their way from the Kurram to Miranzzai, and when he came in to meet me at Kuchi on my way down the Kurram Valley he was in an ostentatiously submissive mood. When Mr. Merk first entered the Kurram and the road from Thal to Alizai was unsafe, it was proposed to open an alternative route from Hadmela in the Miranzzai Valley through the Zaimusht country to somewhere in the neighbourhood of Alizai, for protecting which the Zaimushts were to have had an allowance of Rs. 1,500 a year, but ultimately the idea of opening this road for ordinary traffic, and with it the proposal for granting
the allowance, was dropped. It might perhaps be possible to start this matter again now and the Commissioner will be addressed on the subject.

43. The Massuzai and Alisherzai are sections of the Orakzais lying between
the Zaimushts and the Chamkannis and some of them own land about Sadda.

The Massuzai and Alisherzai.

Doubts have been felt as to how they would behave in the event of our having
to attack the Chamkannis, but their conduct towards us has hitherto been
excellent. Whether we should endeavour to enter into closer relations with them
seems to me to depend a good deal on what the views of the Government of
India are with reference to Tirah. If it is to be part of our programme to
devour to bring Tirah under our control, then it would undoubtedly be an
advantage to get a hold on the Massuzai and Alisherzai tracts which stretch up
to the watershed between the Kurram and Tirah. If, on the other hand, as I
venture to think, it would be absolute folly to get ourselves mixed up in any way
with Tirah and we ought to keep studiously clear of it as long as ever we can,
then it would be wiser to leave these Massuzai and Alisherzai tracts alone and
let them remain as a barrier between us and Tirah.

44. But whatever we do we should be careful to avoid anything like a
display of over-eagerness to establish closer relations with tribes.

Danger of over-eagerness to establish closer relations with tribes.

that would be calculated not only to excite their suspicions of us, but also to give
them an inconveniently great idea of their own importance. On this point
Mr. Merk, in his Kurram note already referred to, writes very much in the same
strain as Major Deane. His views may need some qualification with reference to
the policy now laid down by the Government of India, but they convey to us a
warning against over-eagerness which it is necessary to bear in mind.

45. Next as to No. (6) the Samana, I would beg to draw attention to the
fact that the possibility of withdrawing the
military garrison from the Samana was
very fully considered in the year 1893, when the Military authorities proposed
that we should either hold the position by Border Police or abandon it altogether.
I then went into the question in all its bearings on the spot in consultation with
the local officers, and came to the conclusion that having once established
ourselves there it was impossible to abandon the place, and that it would be
necessary to keep a strong military force there for some years to come. This
conclusion was accepted by the Government of India, and there things rested.
Having now further considered the matter I think that though it may later on be
safe to hold the forts by Border Police, at least during peace time, it would be
unwise to withdraw the troops yet, and Mr. Merk, whose opinion I lately asked
on the point, is of the same opinion. I may add that if we were as now
proposed to attempt to establish closer relations with the Orakzais and make
special arrangements for our officers freely visiting their country, the necessity for
keeping the military force on the Samana would, for some time at least, be
greater, not less.

46. As to whether it would be expedient just now to attempt to establish
closer relations with the Orakzais [No. (7)]

extend the levy system so as to
permit of British officers freely visiting the country, I may mention that we have
already established a levy system to the extent shown in the table annexed to this
note, and my own inclination would be to attempt no more for some time to come
unless some convenient opportunity should present itself for extending the levy
system. I have already (supra paragraph 35) said something about the Orakzais and
the Afridis who to a certain extent hang together. They would be more difficult
to get hold of to the extent desired by the Government of India than most of the
other tribes to whom I have just been referring, and greater caution is, as observed
by the Government of India, necessary in dealing with them, especially as our
taking up our present position on the Samana, whatever good it may have done in
certain ways, excited much resentment and apprehension in their minds.

As a man of some importance in those parts told me when I went there in 1888,
there is a saying that the Samana is the "oorbal" (some sort of ornament worn by women) on the forehead of Tirah, and he added that people said that having laid our hand on the woman's head we would not stop there. I saw Makhmaldin and some of the other leading Orakzaiz a second time when I was last at Hangu, and they seemed submissive enough. We may hope that the irritation caused by our occupation of the Samana will in time die down, but any greater activity on our part along that portion of the frontier would, I feel sure, tend to produce a recrudescence of it.

47. As to our officers visiting the Orakzai country, the tribes or some of them at least are expressly bound by their agreements to escort officers going to shoot, our officers do go across the border to a certain extent in that neighbourhood, and doubtless as time goes on they will do so more and more; but I think it would be unwise to make anything like a new departure in this respect either by broaching to the tribes the idea of our officers more freely visiting their country or by exhorting our officers to visit it more freely. A notion seems to prevail that the difficulty in the way of our officers moving freely about the tracts occupied by such tribes is simply like the difficulty about approaching an untamed animal; that there is merely a certain unreasonable strangeness or shyness to be overcome, which would disappear as the people became more accustomed to us. Now there is a certain amount of truth in this, but the difficulty is not mainly one of that sort—neither is it prejudice or personal dislike of us, though there is of course a very great deal more of that in the tracts to which I am now referring than there is among the Biltuch tribes further south who seem almost completely free from it. It must be remembered that, with the exception of the Bonerwals and a very few other tribes, all these people are constantly in the most friendly communication with our officers on this side of the border. They are constantly back and forward between their own country and our districts, and many thousands of them live for several months of the year in our districts. As a rule therefore we have very little in the way of strangeness or personal antipathy to contend with. The real reason why they dislike our officers visiting their territory is a very sensible and practical one, namely that they have a pretty shrewd suspicion that we are aiming at bringing them under control, and that they regard the visits of our officers as the thin end of the wedge. * Under these circumstances there could be no greater mistake, and no mistake more calculated to defeat the objects the Government of India have in view, than for our officers to force their visits on a tribe among whom they are unwelcome, and knowing our officers as I do, seeing their spirit of adventure and their tendency to better their instructions in such cases, there is, I fear, a very great danger of this mistake being committed if we set about making a point of our officers freely visiting the tribes in their homes.

48. As regards the Kohat Pass Afridis and the Jowaki Afridis [Nos. (8) and (9)] I need not say that I entirely accept the view of the Government of India that our officers "should be freely encouraged to extend their friendly influence (over these tribes) by all the means in their power," and as it is commonly understood that these tribes stand somewhat detached from the great body of the Afridis, it may be that we could, without risk of exciting the

* We have an express statement of the views of a tribe regarding this matter in the answer given to Hashim All by the 8th clans in 1887, when he asked them whether they wished him to retire in favour of Ibrahim Khan, whom we had put in in his place. "Our chief object," they said, "is to prevent not only the occupation of our country by the Sirkar, but the establishment of any control over us or power of interference. The Khanship of Ibrahim Khan means the maintenance of roads along the crest from Pabli (call to Jal pass along which British officials travel unharmed : this alone is proof of our subordination and loss of independence; with Border Police posts at Panj Galli and Karachi which officials visit. If Hashim Ali Khan is restored, this will cease, and the road fall into disrepair; the Border Police will go, and officials of the Sirkar no more come near us." (See Deputy Commissioner's letter No. 5 N., dated 19th June 1887.)

† There is a feeling apt to be at work here against which, however worthy of respect it may be from some points of view he, we have to be on our guard. I mean the feeling that an Englishman ought to be free to go everywhere, and ought not to be afraid to go anywhere. There is sometimes even a feeling that he ought to be able to go without an escort. In speaking to a very young Biltuchian officer some time ago about Kelly's murder I said, "see what a slap in the face we expose ourselves to and what troubles we bring on ourselves by letting a man go about in that way without an escort." His reply was, "but is it not a slap in the face to us not to be able to go about without an escort?"; and I have known others in higher positions express themselves in almost identical terms.
suspicion and resentment of the Afridis generally, propose something more definite than this towards carrying out the policy of the Government of India. On this point I shall refer to the local officers, but meantime I may state what our present relations with these tribes are.

49. We are concerned with the Kohat Pass Afridis chiefly in connection with the Pass. Our present position in regard to the Kohat Pass is fully open to us, and open in a sense in which the Khaibar is not open. I mean that any day of the week an officer can go through it without any previous arrangement and attended only by a single orderly as if he was in British territory. The tribesmen are most friendly and attentive to travellers, indeed the only trouble is from the excess of their attention in insisting on one partaking of grilled dumas' tails and the vilest tea that ever was brewed. Troops are always marched that way, and the only thing the people object to is anything on our part, such as an attempt to construct a road or send out surveying parties, which might be taken as an exercise of dominion. Their objection to this is constantly spoken of as if it were a piece of insolence and as if it were an indication that we had not the tribes sufficiently under control, but to my mind it is the most natural and excusable thing in the world, and it really causes us no inconvenience to speak of, as the road within the territory of the tribe, though not a regularly made one and not suitable for wheeled traffic—as for that matter our portion of the road over the Kohat Kotal is not—is good enough for all our purposes, and as a matter of fact the last time I came through we were followed by a tonga which got along all right with a little assistance from the people at some places.

50. In other respects our relations with the Pass Afridis are most satisfactory, and it is a remarkable evidence of the hold we have got over them of late that, whereas some years ago a very small enhancement of the salt duty led them to assume a defiant attitude, the immense enhancement lately introduced has not up to this evoked the smallest sign of resistance. It may be that if the Government of India attach importance to our constructing a made road through the Pass, our officers would be able to arrange for it being done with the consent of the tribes, or they might be able to arrange that the tribes should engage for a consideration to construct the road themselves. I have sometimes heard the opinion expressed that in their hearts they do not object to the road being made as strongly as they pretend and that they are making the most of the matter merely to secure more favourable terms for themselves, but however this may be I would advise that this matter should be postponed for a few months more until all possibility of any irritation arising from the enhancement of the salt tax has passed away.

51. As regards the Jowakis, we arranged four years ago to give them subsidies for holding certain posts and we have for a long time past had no trouble whatever with them. Babri died the other day, and his son is the manager of the tonga dák from Kohat to Khushalgarh. Malik Mushki, who is now an old man, has learned his lesson, and I was able in November 1893 to release him from jail and let him return to his home. Our officers are entitled under the agreements we made in 1892 to move freely about the country, and they visit it occasionally, but it is already fully mapped and they have little occasion to go there. There is thus not much more to be done unless we were to undertake to interfere authoritatively to prevent the tribes fighting among themselves; and as regards this I may mention that our officers have been making friendly efforts to put an end to the great standing feud between the Jowakis and the Hassan Khels. They have not succeeded as yet and do not seem very hopeful of doing so immediately, but they may in time.

52. The suggestion for "giving the officer in charge of the Khaibar [No.(10)] a wider discretion to extend our influence among the Afridis" remains, and as to this I would observe that, taking the words in the sense in which they would ordinarily be understood, that officer has the very fullest discretion already to do this, and as a matter of fact he is in constant communication with the leading
men, except at the season of the year when most of them are away in Tirah, and exercises considerable influence over them. It is true that he cannot go into the country south of the Khaibar beyond a very short distance, and that, except under very special circumstances, he does not attempt to interfere authoritatively to stop fighting among the tribesmen; but for the reasons I have already given I am most strongly of opinion that it would be unwise for him to attempt to do such things at present. The case seems to me to be pre-eminently one in which it is best to leave well alone.

53. I do not mean to say that our present Khaibar arrangements are absolutely proof against disturbance. We had a little trouble three years ago, when Amin Khan came down to Shadi Bagiar and made a demonstration against Fort Maude, but the traffic in the Pass was not stopped for a single day. Again, we had, not long ago, to shift the Zakka Khel company of the Khaibar Rifles owing to the quarrels between Khawas and his brother, but we can manage to tide over small matters of that sort, and I feel confident, having regard to the immense stake the Afridis have in the arrangement (their pay and allowances aggregate Rs. 1,90,000 per annum), that we can count on keeping the road open and safe for ordinary traffic for an indefinite time to come as we have hitherto done. More than this I do not pretend we can do. Some people have occasionally written as if in the event of our having to march a force up the Khaibar in time of trouble we could trust to the Khaibar Rifles to hold the communications behind it, or at least as if we might hope to do so if our relations with the tribes were improved, and of course there is no saying what we might be able to do if we completely subdued the Afridis and had held their country for a generation or two with a strong military force. But no such extension of our control over the tribes as the Government of India seem to contemplate would enable us to trust them to this extent. If we did so we should be liable to have a repetition of the Marri business of 1880, when a tribe which the Baluchistan authorities had been subsidising very heavily for years took the first favourable opportunity to turn on us and massacre our people and loot our convoys. As I wrote to Lord Roberts when he was out here, any General who marched up the Khaibar without holding his communications behind him in strength would be next door to a mad man, and, do what we will, that must continue to be the position until the day comes, as I fear it eventually will, when we shall hold the entire Afridi country with a military force. The Khaibar Rifles would, as I wrote to Lord Roberts, be extremely useful to us in the event of war, as we could, I believe, trust them broken up in detachments among the regular troops to do a great deal of guard and convoy duty and thus relieve our army of much drudgery. We could also, I think, count on the leading tribesmen to help us in various ways; but more than that we cannot hope for.

54. This is the position now, and I do not think we are likely to improve it by attempting to bring the tribes under closer control and in particular by endeavouring as it is said "to lift their purdah" and to interfere in their internal affairs by authoritatively insisting on their abstaining from fighting with one another or otherwise. On the contrary, my fear is that if we attempted such things we should run a serious risk of breaking up our present Khaibar arrangement and getting involved in troubles with the Afridis which could be ended only by our undertaking a large military expedition and occupying the Afridi country permanently in force at a terrible cost to ourselves.

E.—Concluding remarks.

55. I am sorry that in this first step towards working out in detail the scheme of policy sketched in outline in the Government of India letter, I should have had to speak so much of the difficulties of the position. It is not pleasant to have to dwell much on difficulties under such circumstances, but I have felt bound to state the difficulties fully, first, because I believe that to get a clear idea of our difficulties is the first step towards overcoming them, and secondly, because if our difficulties are not fully understood there may be a tendency on-
the part of persons reading this correspondence both to under-rate what has hitherto been accomplished and to expect us to advance in future at a more rapid pace than we can with prudence do.

56. There is another observation I desire to make which, so far as a Local Government can be considered to have a personality, may be said to be of the year of a personal explanation. There are some passages in the Government of India letter which might create an impression that it has been the general practice of the Government of the Punjab to hold its frontier officers tightly in bantam strings, allowing them little discretion and requiring them to refer every individual case for orders. I think, if an examination of our proceedings for some years back were made, it would be found that this is very far from being the case. It would, I think, be found that the references made to the Punjab Government from most parts of the frontier are remarkably few, and that the cases in which they have been numerous all under one or other of the following classes, viz:—

(1) Cases occurring on sections of the frontier where, owing to new depatures having been recently made, the general lines of our policy are still unsettled.

(2) Cases in which it is necessary to use force, or a threat of force, or to take some step which may commit us to the use of force, and in which, having regard to the extreme reluctance of the Government of India to use force, it is thought necessary to refer for orders.

(3) Cases touching our relations with the Amir.

(4) Cases in which the Biluchistan Agency, which is directly under the Government of India, is concerned.

In cases of these classes the Local Government does keep a tight hold over its officers and require them to refer for orders; but this is not because the Local Government wants to deal with the cases itself, but because, from the very nature of the position, it has been hitherto necessary to refer them for orders to the Government of India. I have every hope, however, that it will now be possible, by working on the lines of the Government of India letter in some such manner as I have above indicated, to give our local officers sufficiently definite general instructions to enable them to dispose of far more individual cases at their own discretion and thus cut down the number of references made by them to their superiors.

57. But for this it is essential that our general instructions should have a certain degree of definiteness. There may now and again be a frontier tract, over which it is manifestly desirable to establish a close control rapidly and at whatever cost, and in the case of which we may consider that the simplest plan is to appoint a strong and reliable officer and leave him to take his own course without hampering him with any definite instructions, merely throwing the reins on his neck and letting him carry us along as seems best to him; but these would be rare and exceptional cases, and for any Government to take such a course generally along an extensive line of frontier or to any large extent would be simply to abdicate its most important functions and to incur risks the extent of which it would be impossible to estimate.

58. One word more. I believe, as I have said above (paragraph 8), that when we descend from the discussion of general principles to the discussion of the lines upon which we should proceed in dealing with particular frontier tracts, it will be found that there is practically little or no difference of opinion. But should there be any difference of opinion, I suspect it will be found to arise from the fact that I incline to the view that in order to carry out the scheme of the Government of India a freer use of military force will be needed than they anticipate. I am far from going the lengths some of my military friends do on this point. I have a considerable belief in the powers of a strong and prudent Political
Office, especially if he goes with a well-filled money bag in his hand, but it must be remembered that all peace and order must rest on force, and though when peace and order have been long established the force may be kept well in the background, it is otherwise when we are attempting to lay the first foundations of peace and order among tribes of the c[es]s with which we have to deal along most of the Punjab border. When we are attempting to do that we must have the force close at hand, well en evidence and ready for immediate use, and further, if we desire to reduce the actual use of it to a minimum, we must show people that, when an occasion calling for its use arises, we shall have no hesitation about using it freely. I think it is the more necessary to bear this in mind in considering any scheme of frontier policy, because for many years past the Government of India, though on certain great occasions it has acted with striking promptness and vigour, has, owing to what a legal dissertation would call “parliamentary reasons,” shown itself more and more reluctant to use force on a small scale in support of ordinary frontier administration.

59. This note has already extended itself to such an inordinate length that I think it will be best to reserve the proposals regarding certain administrative arrangements contained in paragraph 7 of the Government of India letter for separate treatment*. But there is one matter arising out of that paragraph on which I may be pardoned for saying a word. A person reading that paragraph and taking it in connection with other parts of the letter would be likely to receive the impression which I am sure the Government of India never meant to convey, that our Punjab frontier officers have shown themselves deficient in that “personal element”—that “influence over the trans-frontier tribes which is at the root of successful tribal management,” and the importance of which is rightly insisted on by the Government of India—and that the only apology for them is that they have been too much absorbed in work of other descriptions. Now I have never myself served as a District Officer on the frontier, and if the mind I brought to bear on frontier questions when I assumed charge of this Government was in some respects an ill-furnished one, it was at all events an open and unprejudiced one, and I must say that if there was one thing which struck me more than another when I came to see something of the frontier work and was brought into close contact with our frontier officers when marching through their charge[s], it was the great strength of the “personal element” among them and the strong influence they had established over the tribes. I speak, it will be observed, not of the frontier officers who have passed away and some of whose names may be said to have become historical, but of men like Mr. Udney, Mr. Bruce, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Merk, Mr. King and Major Deane,† whose work has been daily before me, and who have repeatedly earned the highest commendation not only from myself and my predecessors, but also from the Government of India. I had seen something of work on the north-eastern frontier of India before I had to do with the north-western frontier, and I had some most excellent officers serving under me there, but men who have done their work better than those I have named I say without hesitation it would be difficult to find—and if they have not done more in the past in the direction indicated by the Government of India that is not their fault. Some of them, Mr. Bruce in particular, hold views on frontier policy far in advance of any ever held by the Government of India, and all of them would be ready loyally and zealously to carry out any policy laid down for them. If they have not pushed forward more, it is simply owing to this that, whatever principles may have been enunciated in the course of general discussions, they have, as a rule, when it came to dealing in the concrete with some particular tract, received little encouragement to do so from their superiors, under which term I include the Government of India as well as the Local

* Perhaps in order to prevent misapprehension it is well not to state here that, notwithstanding the division of authority and government weakness which results from having a frontier district under the Deputy Commissioner and the Civil and Military under an officer in the highest grade subordinate only to the Commissioner, I entirely agree with the Government of India that when things have advanced to a certain point this is the only feasible arrangement. It will be understood that this is well that provision is made by the Government of India that this arrangement should be adopted for the Kollur, for the Koch, and for the Kurram.

† I may mention that except Mr. King, who had been my assistant in Mysore, all these officers were practically strangers to me when I returned to the Punjab in 1902.
Government. There has been a want of instructions sufficiently definite to enable an officer to judge how far he is likely to be supported in any proposed action, and there has been, moreover, the impression—a not unnatural one under all the circumstances—that whatever desire more or less definite there might be in some quarters to adopt an advanced policy, the principle that was to be taken as overriding all others in ordinary frontier administration was "anything for a quiet life." It may be expected that these difficulties will now be removed or diminished, but their existence in the past must as a matter of fairness and justice be borne in mind.

Simla:

26th October 1896.

D. FITZPATRICK.
STATEMENT OF ALLOWANCES, INAMS, &c., GRANTED ON THE PUNJAB BORDER.
### Statement of Allowances, Inams, &c., granted on the Punjab Border.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of tribe, section or individual</th>
<th>Annual Amount of Allowances</th>
<th>Nature of allowances</th>
<th>Data on which granted</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>Tribal allowances</td>
<td>Additional allowances, jagirs, frontier remissions, &amp;c.</td>
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*Notes:*
- On account of tribal towns and posts.
- Cost of force.
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**Khairbar.**

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<td>Khaibar Rifles</td>
<td>1,06,760</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,00,360</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kurrum.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Tribal Allowance</th>
<th>Cost of Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massuzai</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurrum Militia</td>
<td>1,41,706</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inans</td>
<td>10,786</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mowajibs</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madsa</td>
<td>1,07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,42,266</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for Peshawar Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,77,180</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,45,161</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rs. 24,789 is also spent annually on the entertainment of jirgas in the Peshawar Division.
Statement of Allowances, Inams, &c., granted on the Punjab Border—continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of tribe, section or individual</th>
<th>Additional allowances, jagirs, frontier remissions, &amp;c.</th>
<th>Nature of allowances</th>
<th>Date on which granted</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BANNU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannu Border Military Police</td>
<td>29,772 0 0</td>
<td>Cost of force</td>
<td>Jay 1892</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malik Durani Khan, Takhti Khel</td>
<td>50 0 0</td>
<td>Services in connection with the</td>
<td>20th September 1895</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsin Khan and sons of Akbar Khan, Barakzai</td>
<td>50 0 0</td>
<td>Wanistan Delimitation Commission and Mahsud operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malik Mani Khan, Jepejai</td>
<td>2,200 0 0</td>
<td>Political allowance</td>
<td>1st December 1881 and 11th July 1896</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waziris</td>
<td>820 0 0</td>
<td>Langi inams</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darwesh Khel Waziris, Eastern and Western</td>
<td>8,226 0 0</td>
<td>Frontier remissions of revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannochis</td>
<td>763 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marwals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bistannis—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circle Pakka</td>
<td>3,986 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,575 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| TOCHI                                |                                                          |                     |                      |         |
| Utmanzais                            | 39,714 0 0                                              | Malik and tribal service allowances | 1st September 1895 |         |
| Ahmedzais                            | 5,165 0 0                                               |                     |                      |         |
| Journis                              | 15,864 0 0                                              |                     |                      |         |
| Total                                | 60,743 0 0                                              |                     |                      |         |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maliki and tribal service</td>
<td>12,414</td>
<td>May 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of force</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>August 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal service</td>
<td>46,740</td>
<td>May 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Border Military Police at Chittarwatta</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>May 1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagir to Alam Khan, Kundu, for life</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>June 1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash assignment to Asim Khan, son of Shadi Khan, up to age of 21 years</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>May 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash assignment to Muhammad Aziz, son of Allahdad, up to age of 21 years</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>May 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-fourth revenue of 8 villages Dhana, Tatta and Warga-pun to Bhattanwals</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>January 1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-fourth Khan Tabil to Khaned Khan and Ransam Khan</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>December 1889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue assignment to Mahbud Waziris for 5 years</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>September 1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,773</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maliki and tribal service</td>
<td>61,543</td>
<td>1st May 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of force</td>
<td>17,830</td>
<td>1st November 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal service</td>
<td>3,612</td>
<td>1st May 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service at Kashmir Kar</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>1st May 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maliki</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>March 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal service</td>
<td>12,204</td>
<td>May 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99,024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Statement of Allowances, Inams, &c., granted on the Punjab Border—concluded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of tribe, section or individual.</th>
<th>Annual Amount of Allowances</th>
<th>Nature of allowances</th>
<th>Date on which granted</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasuri</td>
<td>Rs. 500 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begars</td>
<td>Rs. 4,888 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorchani</td>
<td>Rs. 1,700 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masari</td>
<td>Rs. 300 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khosa</td>
<td>Rs. 1,800 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghari</td>
<td>Rs. 1,300 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rozi Lunds</td>
<td>Rs. 200 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barkhun Rind</td>
<td>Rs. 100 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukanias</td>
<td>Rs. 480 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Service allowance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Junior Secretary to Government, Insta letter No 1106, dated 5th May 1884, to Government, Punjab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haddlains</td>
<td>Rs. 1,440 A. P.</td>
<td>Pension</td>
<td></td>
<td>Junior Under-Secretary, Foreign Department, No. 774 G., dated 20th September 1882.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawab Muhammad Khan, Lzgbari</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Additions to allowances, pensions, frontier remissions, &c.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of tribe, section or individual.</th>
<th>Annual Amount of Allowances</th>
<th>Nature of allowances</th>
<th>Date on which granted</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mazari Tumandar</td>
<td>Rs. 10,000 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leghari</td>
<td>Rs. 12,000 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khosa</td>
<td>Rs. 8,700 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rozi Lunds</td>
<td>Rs. 4,000 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorchani</td>
<td>Rs. 3,000 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jirishak</td>
<td>Rs. 3,217 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karani</td>
<td>Rs. 1,200 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibbi Lunds</td>
<td>Rs. 800 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan Border Military Police</td>
<td>Rs. 56,732 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Rs. 11,162 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs. 96,649 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Derajat Division</td>
<td>Rs. 1,86,684 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>Rs. 4,68,684 A. P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total cost of Border Military Police in Peshawar Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ditto</th>
<th>Rs. A. P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan</td>
<td>1,49,189 A. P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>1,32,344 A. P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>42,595 A. P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>12,683 A. P.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. 282.

FROM

L. W. DANE, ESQUIRE,
Ofg. Chief Secretary to Government,
Punjab and its Dependencies,

TO

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Dated Lahore, 5th March 1897.

Foreign.
Frontier.
Sir,

I am desired to draw your attention to paragraph 59 of the note forwarded to the Government of India with this office letter No. 14 C., dated 28th October 1896, where the Lieutenant-Governor intimated that he would reserve for separate consideration certain administrative arrangements suggested in paragraph 7 of the Government of India letter No. 2197, dated 14th August 1896, and on those proposed arrangements Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick now desires to make the following observations.

2. I am to take first the suggestion that the Deputy Commissioner of a frontier district has not the leisure or the local knowledge to obtain that personal influence over the tribes beyond his border which is at the root of successful tribal management, and that accordingly it is desirable that wherever possible the control of the trans-frontier tracts should be separated from the charge of the Deputy Commissioner.

Now, as to the suggestion that our frontier Deputy Commissioners are deficient in local knowledge or personal influence, I am to observe that His Honor has said all he had to say in the note referred to, and there is no need to go over the ground again. It is enough now to say that he recognizes as fully as the Government of India do that when we make any important forward move and assume control over a tract extending to a considerable distance beyond the frontier of British India it becomes necessary to place the tract beyond the border under the charge of a Political Officer independent of the Deputy Commissioner, looking to the Commissioner to whom that officer would be subordinate to settle all differences of opinion that may arise between him and the Deputy Commissioner. It will be remembered that the Lieutenant-Governor was himself the first to propose to the Government of India that that arrangement should be adopted for the Gomal, for the Tochi and for the Kurram; but it must be borne in mind that there are certain drawbacks to that arrangement, as, even though the Deputy Commissioner and the Political Officer are under the control of the same Commissioner, conflicts of authority are apt at times to arise which must lead to weakness of administration; and accordingly where the work of managing the tribesmen living on the border of a district is not too much for the Deputy Commissioner to undertake His Honor is decidedly of opinion that it is best to leave it in his hands. It must, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks, be remembered that in most cases these tribesmen have very close connections with the district on the border of which they live;—some of them,
would probably own land in the district; many of them would come down for part of the year to cultivate or graze their flocks there; many of them would carry on trade in the district; and many too would come down to commit offences. Hence even when they are placed under a separate Political Officer the Deputy Commissioner must have a great deal to do with them, and any one who knows the way these people try to play off one authority against another will see the great advantage there is in having only one officer to deal with them both within and beyond the border.

3. The next suggestion of the Government of India which His Honor desires to notice is to the effect that to ensure unity of policy and control along the whole of the Pathan border there should be a redistribution of the districts among the Commissionerships, "Abbott-abad" or "the Abbott-abad border," by which it is presumed is meant the Hazara District with the tribes managed from it, being transferred to the Commissioner of Rawalpindi and Bannu being made over in lieu of it to the Commissioner of Peshawar. Now Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick agrees that it is of very great importance to have under one and the same Commissioner Pathan tribes that are closely connected with one another, but he does not think there would be any advantage worth speaking of in getting the whole of the Pathan border under one Commissioner, as, though there may on occasions be a certain sympathy or community of feeling between Pathan tribes living at a great distance from one another, the connection between them is extremely slight. But, however this may be, I am to point out that the re-arrangement proposed, instead of promoting any object of the sort referred to, would have the very opposite effect; for it would in the first place put the Black Mountain tribes under one Commissioner and the Bonerwals and others with which they are closely connected under another, and in the second place it would put the Tochi and the Northern Darwesh Khel Waziris and the northern face of the Mahsud country under one Commissioner and the Gomal and the Southern Darwesh Khel Waziris and the southern face of the Mahsud country under another. And if we were to attempt to set this last matter right by putting the Political Officer at Wana under the Commissioner of Peshawar we should have the highly inconvenient result that the Gomal and its dependencies, which are so intimately connected with the Dera Ismail Khan District, would be under one Commissioner and the Dera Ismail Khan District under another. It is perhaps hardly necessary for His Honor to say more, but I am to add that it would in his opinion never do to put the Hazara frontier, which may at any time be a troublesome one to manage, under the Commissioner of Rawalpindi; for the Rawalpindi Division is from certain points of view of internal administration, such as the administration of the land and the question of agricultural indebtedness, a most difficult charge, and we ought always to select for it a Commissioner who was an expert in internal administration, and especially in revenue work, and the probabilities would be very great against such a man having the qualifications for dealing with frontier tribes.

4. There remains the suggestion "that a Political or Frontier Secretary or Under-Secretary should be added to the Punjab Secretariat who might with advantage be selected from the officers serving in the trans-Indus districts." This suggestion is, His Honor thinks, in the right direction. The Punjab Secretariat is very short handed, and when an officer of some frontier experience suitable in other respects for Secretariat work could be found he would be a desirable acquisition to the office; but Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick does not think it would be wise to encourage the idea that the appointment of such an officer was of such importance one way or the other as to form part and parcel of a scheme of frontier policy. The person who is responsible for the government of a small province like the Punjab, and one in which there is so much camping and moving about, is in a very different position from those who are charged with the duties of administration in more extensive spheres. He is in close and constant communication with his Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Political Officers, especially during the cold weather, when they live in his camp and march with him daily, occasionally even for several weeks at a time;
it is to these officers, and not to the officers employed in the Secretariat, that he
looks for information and advice, and it would be in many ways most undesirable
to give any countenance to the idea that there was to be any change in this
respect.

I have the honor to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient Servant,

L. W. DANE,

Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
FRONTIER EXPEDITIONS.
Despatch to the Secretary of State giving a history of the frontier of India, of our relations with the tribes, and of expeditions taken against them in past years.
REFERENCES TO FORMER CASES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch, date, and Nos.</th>
<th>Brief title of file.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret F., Aug. 1896, No. 344-345</td>
<td>Administration of the frontier districts of the Punjab, and the management of the trans-frontier tribes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GOVT. OF INDIA. 1898 FOREIGN DEPT.

FRONTIER A.

JANUARY.

No. 77.

BRIEF SUBJECT.

FRONTIER EXPEDITIONS.

Despatch to the Secretary of State giving a history of the frontier of India, of our relations with the tribes, and of expeditions taken against them in past years.

LIST OF PAPERS.

No. 77.—Despatch to the Secy. of State, No. 3 (Front.), dated the 18th Jan. 1898—Gives a history of the frontier of India, of our relations with the tribes, and of expeditions taken against them in past years.

(Copy forwarded to the Mily. Dept. and Intelligence Branch, under endorsements Nos. 804-806-P., dated the 15th Jan. 1898.)

KEEP-WITHS PRINTED.

1. Notes on the case—Parts I and II.
2. Semi-official correspondence.
3. List of expeditions taken against frontier tribes.

KEEP-WITHS NOT PRINTED.

List of papers restored to Records, proofs of despatch, and routine matters.

Exd.—W. G. B.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch, date, and Nos.</th>
<th>Brief title of file</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
K. W.
FRONTIER A, JANUARY 1898.
No. 77.

FRONTIER EXPEDITIONS.

Despatch to the Secretary of State giving a history of the frontier of India, of our relations with the tribes, and of expeditions taken against them in past years.

K. W. No. 1—Part I.

His Excellency.

I submit, for consideration and orders, a proof of a despatch on North-West Frontier expeditions and advances.

The earlier proof, which Your Excellency has already seen, is attached for reference if wanted.

31st December 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

The Secretary of State so long ago as September 30th, 1897, indicated to me his wish that we should prepare a despatch, setting forth in a historical form the inherent difficulties on the frontier—the action which had been rendered necessary from time to time—and the results of that action. He was of opinion that the public was very ignorant in these matters, and he thought that it would be desirable that we should get this off the stocks before we discussed with him the future arrangements with the tribes. Later on he has continually referred to this proposal, and has pressed us to let him have the despatch by the middle of January, in order that Her Majesty's Government may have accepted our views before Parliament meets.

It has, however, been a work of some magnitude. Mr. Clarke has collected a vast amount of valuable information, and the difficulty has been to compress it within reasonable bounds. The despatch now drafted follows the lines arranged in various conferences between the Secretary and myself.

I imagine that Hon'ble Members will be willing to leave to the Foreign Department the statement of the historical narrative of which the despatch consists up to paragraph 47, and I hope and believe they will find nothing to object to in the manner in which it is presented. It will be observed that the consideration of all questions arising out of the present operations and any modifications of our arrangements which may be the result of them are carefully reserved. That is in accordance with the wish of the Secretary of State and is of course absolutely necessary, for we are not yet in a position to state any conclusions. It will, however, I think be recognised that the general denial in the last paragraph that our policy has broken down, and that we must evolve a new one, is consistent with the whole argument of the despatch and ought to be emphatically stated at the earliest opportunity. This is quite in accord with the views of the Secretary of State in his recent speech at Acton. The able Minute of Sir J. Strachey on the administration of Lord Mayo can be used with all the more effect that Lord Mayo's is not a name which has been used by controversialists in this connection.

The Secretary of State has been telegraphing for this despatch, and I had hoped to get it off by the next mail. But though mainly historical it is a document of importance, or may become so, and I think my Hon'ble Colleagues should have more opportunity of examining it than if it came to them only in circulation for signature. There is no file that can be circulated—for the papers embrace the archives of Foreign Department in frontier matters for the last 50 years. I think it will best suit Hon'ble Members' convenience if they are furnished with copies of the despatch and the subject is mentioned in Council on Friday—not, I hope, with a view to any minute examination of the drafting, which would be endless, but for discussion of any specific point which any Hon'ble Member may desire to raise.
If in the meantime any suggestion occurs to any one, it would be very convenient if it could be communicated to the Secretary that it may be considered before Council meets.

3rd January 1898.

* K. W., Part II.

4th January 1898.

Copy of the proof, with a copy of Mr. Clarke’s note from which it has been condensed, and Secret F., August 1898, Nos. 344-345, forwarded to each Hon’ble Member.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

[DEMI-OFFICIALS.]

Dated Calcutta, the 8th January 1898.

From—H. BABBINGTON SMITH, Esq., C.S.I.,
To—Sir W. J. CUNINGHAM, K.C.S.I.

I enclose a letter from Chalmers about the Despatch. His Excellency thinks the proposals good; except that (4) seems of doubtful possibility and there is something to be said against (5) as well as for it.

Will you send me another copy of the draft? His Excellency wishes to send it in advance to Secretary of State by this mail.

J. S.

† Sent.

Dated Calcutta, the 6th January 1898.

From—The Hon'ble Mr. M. D. CHALMERS,
To—H. BABBINGTON SMITH, Esq., C.S.I.

I see His Excellency invites suggestions on the draft Frontier Despatch just circulated.

I have no formal suggestion to send in, but, perhaps, he would consider the following points:

1. I would annex to the despatch a skeleton map of the whole frontier, showing in different colours—Afghan territory, British territory, and Tribal territory.

2. The map should show all the places mentioned in the despatch.

3. It should show clearly the Durand line, the undemarcated part being shown by dots.

4. I would show by red dots (very roughly) the routes taken by the various expeditions mentioned in the despatch. Each line of dots might have a number, and a footnote with corresponding numbers would show the date of the expedition.

5. I would add a paragraph or a line summing up the number of the expeditions mentioned. People at home forget that the past has not been an era of peace.

6. I think every now and again we use terms familiar to us, but not familiar to people at home, which an interpolated word would often explain. These are only suggestions from an Englishman in case the Despatch is to be published.

Order in Council.

The draft despatch dealing with past expeditions on the North-West Frontier of India may issue.

7th January 1898.

[To Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, No. 3 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Should copies of this despatch go officially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, please?

J. S.—14th January 1898.

Yes.

14th January 1898.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

[To the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 304-305-F., dated the 16th January 1898.]

Recorded and indexed by T. G. B.

Recording and indexing examined by J. S.
Baluchistan is an expression of political geography. It comprises the Baluchistan territory bounded by the borders of Sind and the lower Derajat on the east, the Arabian sea on the south, Persia on the west, and Afghanistan on the north. The most important divisions of Baluchistan are as follows:—

Kalat proper, or the territory under the immediate rule of His Highness the Khan of Kalat;
Sarawan and Jhalawan, or the tracts belonging to the two leading Brahui clans and their Chiefs;
British Baluchistan;
The assigned districts of Quetta and the Bolan;
Bori and Zhob;
The country inhabited by Baluch tribes, such as the Marris and Bugtis along the Punjab and Sind borders;
The Chiefship of Las Bela;
The Chiefship of Kharan.
Mekran, including Kej and Panjgur.

With the last three, we are not here concerned.

With the exception of British Baluchistan and Bori and Zhob, which have been incorporated in Baluchistan in recent years, the rest of the country has been for a long time under the suzerainty of the Khans of Kalat, who have nominally been the Ruling Chiefs of Baluchistan, though for many years the allegiance of the outlying provinces had been merely nominal, until the time when Sir R. Sandeman effected a settlement of the disputes between the Khan and the Sirdars at Mastung in 1876.

Our relations with the Khan of Kalat date from before the first Afghan War. When the expedition of 1838 for the restoration of Shah Shuja was determined on, a British officer, Lieutenant Leech, was sent to Kalat to secure the co-operation of Mehrab Khan, then Ruler of Kalat, through whose territories the armies had to march. Owing to the treachery and duplicity of the Khan's Minister, Mulla Muhammad Hasan Khan, Lieutenant Leech had to leave Kalat without attaining his object. Sir Alexander Burnes was eventually deputed to Kalat to negotiate a treaty with the Khan. The treaty was signed, though contrary to the secret wishes of Mulla Muhammad Hasan, on the 28th of March 1839. By it the Khan engaged to pay homage to Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk and to continue in friendship with the British nation.

The Khan agreed to proceed to Quetta to pay his respects to Shah Suja. Sir A. Burnes preceded him. On the way Mulla Muhammad Hasan caused him to be robbed of the draft treaty which the Khan had signed. The belief that this was done at the instigation of the Khan was studiously imposed on the British Government, and the Khan himself was prevented from going to Quetta by Mulla Muhammad Hasan. The proofs of the Khan's supposed hostility were now apparently complete, and it was resolved to punish him when a fitting opportunity occurred. Accordingly, when General Wiltshire's brigade was returning from Kabul in 1839, a detachment was sent to Kalat to punish the Khan. The town was taken by storm on the 13th of November. Mehrab Khan fell in the assault, and his son Husain Khan fled. From the papers discovered in the fort the treachery of Mulla Muhammad Hasan was fully proved, and he was made a prisoner. A youth of fourteen named Shah Nawaz was then set up by the British Government as Khan of Kalat. Shortly after his accession, a revolution broke out, headed by Mehrab Khan's son, who had assumed the name of Nasir Khan. Shah Nawaz Khan was deposed; the British representative at Kalat was murdered, and there was open war between Nasir Khan and the British Government. As the only means of quieting the country and doing tardy justice to the memory of the unfortunate Mehrab Khan, the British Government reversed its policy, and established Nasir Khan
in power. A treaty was concluded with him on the 6th October 1841. The main features of the treaty were that Kalat was recognized as a dependency of Kabul, and it was stipulated that the Khan, his heirs and successors, should always be guided by the advice of the British officer residing at his Court, and that the Honourable Company would have the right to station troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, whenever deemed necessary.

After the withdrawal of the British army from Kabul, this treaty became a dead letter. In 1854, however, when war between England and Russia was threatened, a new treaty was concluded with the Khan. This abrogated the treaty of 1841, renewed the obligations of the Khan to oppose all enemies of the British Government, to act in subordination to the British Government, to enter into no negotiations with other States without its consent, and to receive British troops into his country if such a measure should be deemed necessary. By this treaty also the British Government granted to the Khan an annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000 on condition of his preventing his subjects from committing outrages within or near British territory, of his protecting merchants, and permitting no exactions on trade beyond certain specified duties. Nasir Khan died in 1857. There were three claimants for the succession, one of whom, a youth named Khudadad Khan, was selected by the Chiefs of the country. He, however, soon embroiled himself with the Chiefs, and moreover had to contend against the pretensions of Fateh Khan, one of the other claimants, who was supported by the Khan of Karan.

But for the countenance and support of the British Government Khudadad Khan could not have maintained himself in power. In 1862 the Khan signed an agreement, by which the boundary between Sind and Kalat was defined. Shortly afterwards the leading Chiefs of Kalat conspired against Khudadad Khan, and on the 17th March 1863 proclaimed his cousin Sherdil Khan as their ruler. Sherdil was murdered in May 1864, and Khudadad Khan was re-elected as Chief of the State. The historian of Kalat after the restoration of Khudadad Khan was marked by constant conflicts between the Khan and his turbulent people. Finding himself unable to coerce his subjects, Khudadad Khan implored British aid, and delegated to the Commissioner in Sind full powers to mediate a settlement. The malcontents were summoned to Jacobabad, and an arrangement was effected. The opportunity was taken to impress upon the Sardars the duty of obedience to the legitimate authority of the Khan, and to warn His Highness that he would not be countenanced in high-handed interference with the rights of his subjects.

It soon transpired that the settlement arrived at was distasteful to the Khan. He came under the influence of unworthy favourites, quarrelled with his Minister, the Shahgasi Wali Muhammad Khan; and it was not until the Political Agent, whose appointment, after remaining in abeyance since 1864, had been recently revived, was on the point of leaving Kalat, that he consented to restore the Minister to his former position and dismiss his favourites. Finding his efforts to procure the recall of these men unavailing, the Khan ceased to attend to the administration of his State, took no steps to remedy the disorder which prevailed in Las Bela, or to compensate merchants for the plunder of their caravans, and surrendered himself to fresh favourites. In March 1873, the Political Agent, accompanied by Wali Muhammad, withdrew from Kalat territory; the payment of the annual subsidy was withheld; and Khudadad Khan was warned that his obligations under the treaty to protect trade and secure the peace of the frontier remained unaltered, and that, in the event of disturbances occurring on the frontier, the British Government would be compelled to take its own measures for preserving order. The winter of 1875 saw among other disturbances the violation by armed Brahuis of British territory. Direct application to the Khan produced little effect. At length the state of anarchy prevailing on the frontier became so intolerable that the Government of India decided in 1875 to depute a special agent to effect, if possible, some settlement between the Khan and his Sardars and to report on the general relations between the Khan's Government and the Marri and Bugti tribes who had for some time past been causing trouble on the border. Captain Sandeman was the officer selected for this duty. Although the mission did not effect all that had been hoped of it, he convinced himself that a modus vivendi could be
arranged between the contending parties through the mediation of the British Government. The result of his labours was considered so far satisfactory that in the spring of the following year he was again deputed to Baluchistan; and at a Darbar held at Mastung in July 1876, he effected a formal reconciliation between the Khan and the leading Brahui Chiefs.

In December of the same year His Highness the Khan met Lord Lytton at Jacobabad, and a new treaty was concluded on the 8th of that month. It affirmed and supplemented the engagements made in 1854, providing among other things for the location of troops in, and the construction of railway and telegraph lines through, Kalat territory; Political Officers with suitable escorts were to be posted in the Khan's dominions, and the British Government undertook to pay His Highness an annual subsidy of one lakh of rupees, which was to be supplemented by a contribution of Rs. 20,500 per annum for the development of traffic on the trade routes running through his country.

This treaty was the foundation of the Baluchistan Agency, and was the outcome of constant raids and depredations on the British border by the frontier tribes owing nominal suzerainty to the Khan of Kalat as well as of the anarchy which had for many years past prevailed throughout Baluchistan. Under the terms of the treaty, Major Sandeman was on the 21st February 1877 appointed Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, with three Assistants. His head-quarters were fixed at Quetta, and British troops were cantoned at Quetta and Mittri. Subsequently the territories under the political control of the Agent to the Governor-General were divided into distinct agencies of which Kalat forms one. During the Afghan War His Highness the Khan loyally acted up to his engagements, and proved his willingness to assist the British Government. In 1879 it was arranged that the district immediately surrounding Quetta should be administered by British officers, any surplus revenue being made over to the Khan. In 1883, in order to meet the wishes of the Khan, a fresh agreement was entered into by which he leased the Quetta District to the British Government for an annual rent of Rs. 25,000, and in consideration of a yearly payment of Rs. 30,000 he at the same time surrendered his right to collect tolls on the trade passing through the Bolan pass. In 1880 the Khan made over to the British Government with full jurisdiction the lands on which the Kandahar State Railway had been constructed.

Khudadad Khan's rule was always tyrannical and cruel, and our intervention became necessary when in March 1893 he barbarously put to death his Wazir and the Wazir’s father and son; other heirs to the Wazir’s property had been imprisoned, and, with the approval of the Government of India, the Agent to the Governor-General, fearing for the lives of the prisoners, called upon the Khan to surrender them, failing which he was told that troops would be sent to enforce the demand. His Highness was also summoned to appear and explain his conduct. The Khan surrendered the prisoners on the 5th and arrived at Quetta on the 15th April. Soon afterwards, on the assurance of the Agent to the Governor-General that he had received positive information of the Khan’s intention to escape to Afghanistan, and pending a decision on the case, the Khan was placed under surveillance. In explanation of his conduct the Khan declared that his Wazir had attempted to shoot him, and that in consequence as a punishment he had put to death his Wazir, his son, a boy of 19 or 20, and his father. The last was a bed-ridden cripple of nearly 94 years of age. During the course of the enquiry held by the Agent to the Governor-General further instances of the Khan’s gross cruelty were substantiated: The Agent to the Governor-General invited the opinion of the Baluch Sardars, who recorded that they could never expect any good from the Khan, and recommended that he should be deposed and replaced by his son Mir Mahmud Khan. The Khan meanwhile had voluntarily tendered his resignation, and, instead of deposing him, the Government of India preferred to accede to his request to be allowed to abdicate. The acceptance of his abdication was notified on the 19th August 1893. Mir Mahmud Khan was duly recognised as Khan of Kalat in succession to his father, and it was clearly announced that he succeeded to all his father’s rights and privileges.
We may now proceed to give a brief sketch of the territories known as British Baluchistan. The frontier districts of Pishin and Sibi, with their dependencies Shorarud, Thal Chotiali and Harnai, are under the administration of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. Till 1878 they formed part of the dominions of the Amir of Afghanistan. When war with Afghanistan was declared in that year, Pishin and Sibi were occupied at the end of November by the British force advancing on Kandahar. The occupation was an act of war, and the country was held in virtue of it till the treaty of Gandamak was signed on the 26th May 1879. By article 9 of that treaty Amir Yakub Khan agreed that the districts of Pishin and Sibi should remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government, being treated not as permanently severed from the Afghan kingdom, but as assigned districts of which the surplus revenue would be paid to the Amir. The renewal of war against Afghanistan shortly after and the abdication of Yakub Khan prevented the provisions of the treaty being carried out, and when subsequently Afghanistan was made over to the present Amir, he was distinctly informed that Pishin and Sibi were retained in British possession. The circumstances connected with the occupation and retention of Shorarud are different. This tract joins on to the south-west border of Pishin; it is bounded on the west by the Sarlat range, which separates it from the Afghan district of Shorawak, and on the south and east by portions of the Kalat State. Shorarud was not occupied or assigned as part of Pishin. It came with Shorawak under British influence during the occupation of Kandahar, owing to the military arrangements for the collection of supplies. When Amir Abdur Rahman Khan had taken possession of Kandahar, the Governor of that province was informed that the British Government did not desire to interfere with the exercise of His Highness's authority in Shorawak, but having regard to the position of Shorarud, adjacent to Pishin, Quetta and Kalat territory, Lord Kipon's Government came to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient on military and political grounds to allow Afghan rule to extend to that tract. Steps were accordingly taken in July 1882 to mark the continuance of the British connection with Shorarud, which has since been administered as part of the Pishin district by the officers of the Baluchistan Agency. Pishin and Sibi remained until the year 1887 in the anomalous position of districts "assigned" by Afghanistan under an act of assignment which had long ceased to have any force or validity. Meanwhile, with the progress of the railway and the occupation of these districts by garrisons, there had been an influx of European British subjects, and it became necessary to extend a more elaborate judicial machinery to these tracts than had hitherto been found sufficient. In January 1887, a European British subject was charged with murder said to have been perpetrated at the Nari Gorge Railway Station in the Sibi District; and it was found that there was no tribunal in India competent to try the accused, and that no tribunal could be created until the legal position of Sibi had been determined. To avoid the recurrence of difficulties of this nature, the Government of India, considering these districts to be part of Her Majesty's dominions in India, proposed to consolidate the position by forming them into a Chief Commissionership combined with the Baluchistan Agency and bringing them under the operation of the Scheduled Districts Act by means of a resolution by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council. These proposals were approved by the Secretary of State, and from the 1st November 1887, the districts known as Pishin, Shorarud, Kach, Kuwar, Harnai, Sibi, and Thal Chotiali, have been formed into the Chief Commissionership of British Baluchistan, and brought into the regular system of British India.

To the north of Harnai and Thal Chotiali lie the valleys of Bori and Zhob. The Zhob valley extends from the watershed of the Pishin valley to the junction of the Zhob river with the Gomal at Kajuri Kach. The tribes inhabiting the valley are Saran Kakars, who ever since the occupation of Baluchistan had been troublesome and a source of danger to the peace of the neighbouring districts. During 1888 and the early part of 1889, a series of outrages against the British Government, its subjects and its servants, had been committed by the Kakar and Musakhel tribes residing to the north of the Thal Chotiali plain, and on the 21st April 1889, the tribesmen very seriously committed themselves, attacking a camp of coolies employed on the
works in progress in the cantonment of Duki. Seven coolies were killed and several were wounded. There was little doubt that the attack had been instigated by Shah Jehan, the leading Chief of Zhob. Again on the 25th April, a workman was murdered near Chaphar rift, and some further robberies were committed by Zhobis. As there was a danger of the railway works on the Harman route being threatened, orders were issued for the movement of troops into the Zhob valley. Owing to difficulties in the way of obtaining transport and supplies, the expedition had to be postponed till the autumn. In September 1884, the troops marched from Quetta, and there was a skirmish in which the Zhobwals were taught a sharp lesson. By the end of October every Zhob Chief of note, except Shah Jehan and one or two others, had come into the camp of the Governor-General's Agent. Shah Jehan came in and tendered his submission in the following January: he was deposed, and a relation, Sardar Shahbaz Khan, appointed in his stead. An agreement was taken from the Malikis of Zhob, Bori and the Musa Khel by which they undertook to put a stop to raiding into British territory, to prevent Shah Jehan and his Chief adherent, Saifulla Khan, from returning to Zhob, to pay a fine of Rs. 22,000, and to render no opposition to the location in Zhob and Bori of British troops. In 1887, a British force was stationed at Loralai on the Bori valley for the protection of the frontier road from Dera Gazi Khan to Pishin.

With the ultimate object of bringing the whole country between Pishin and the Gomal under British influence, Sir Robert Sandeman was permitted in November 1888 to visit Mina Bazar, an important village in Lower Zhob, and the neighbouring country. This tour was successful. Sir Robert Sandeman reported that "the whole of the Chiefs and people of Zhob were found perfectly friendly, and anxious to be taken under our protection." The headmen of the tribes in the Zhob valley petitioned that Zhob as well as Bori might be brought under more direct British control, so that they might enjoy the security which results from this control. The occupation of Zhob was accordingly sanctioned, and a Political Agent was appointed to take charge of the district, in which were included Bori and the country of the Khetrans, Khzais and Musa Khels. Small posts have been built at important points on the Zhob and Gomal rivers, and are occupied by troops and local levies. Since our occupation of the country, the tribes have, upon the whole, behaved satisfactorily; but in the autumn of 1890, owing principally to the turbulence of the Khidarzais, a section of the Sherani tribe, it was considered desirable to bring the whole Sherani tribe under submission, and accordingly in October of that year an expeditionary force under the command of Major-General Sir George White, with Sir Robert Sandeman as Chief Political Officer, was despatched against them. The desired object was satisfactorily attained, while at the same time advantage was taken of the presence of the troops to explore and map the country lying between the Zhob and Kundar rivers, and endeavours were made to capture a noted outlaw, Dost Muhammad Khan, who, with his son Bangal Khan, had retreated to Tanishpa and was at the head of a band of marauders and outlaws. Their capture was not effected, but much useful knowledge was acquired. Dost Muhammad Khan and his son, however, shortly afterwards submitted to the Political Agent, the band dispersed, and Bangal, once a notorious outlaw, has settled down in Zhob, and is now described by the Agent to the Governor-General a peaceable and one of the most useful men in the district. In the spring of 1891 it was decided that the Gomal river between Kundar Domandi and Kajuri Kach should be considered to be the boundary between the Baluchistan Agency and the tribal country which is under the political supervision of the Punjab Government. Appozai was selected as the head-quarter station in the Zhob District, and is now known as Fort Sandeman.

In December 1889, the Government of India sanctioned the enlistment of a tribal levy to keep order in Zhob, and to protect the tract between Pishin and the Gomal. On the 12th April 1890 a Committee assembled at Appozai to make proposals as to the raising of the corps. These proposals were submitted to Government and finally approved in September 1890. The constitution of the corps was fixed at four squadrons of cavalry, and five companies of infantry. A British officer was appointed as Commandant, and
the Zhob Levy Corps, which is now thoroughly well equipped and disciplined, has for some years past been recognized as one of the principal factors in the preservation of order on this part of the frontier.

After the occupation of Zhob it was decided to open up the Gomal pass in the interests of trade as well as to maintain communications between the Punjab and Zhob, and through Zhob with Quetta. The Gomal Pass is a main trade route, largely used by the wandering Powinda clans in their annual migration to British territory. Before the opening of the pass the numerous kasfas which used to pass through it annually always suffered owing to the bad state of the road and its insecurity; and British troops moving from Quetta, or from the Zhob and Bori valley, towards Dera Ismail Khan and other stations had to make a long and circuitous journey by Shikarpore and the valley of the Indus.

The opening up of this trade route necessitated our entering into arrangements with the Waziri and Shirani tribes, through whose country the route lies.

Waziris.

The Waziris are a large tribe of Pathans who inhabit the hill country to the west of the trans-Indus frontier, from Thal in Miranazai to the Gomal Pass. There are five great branches of the Waziris, divided into numerous sections and sub-sections.

The five branches are:

1. Lali or Lelai.
2. Gurbaz.
3. Utmanzai, or Darwesh Khel.
4. Ahmadzai.
5. Mahsud.

The fighting strength of the whole tribe is estimated at 44,000 men.

The Lali and Gurbaz are the most northerly branches of the tribe. The Utmanzais live chiefly on the right bank of the Kuram river and occupy the hills between that river and the valleys of Khost and Dwar. The Ahmadzais have two branches, the Shin Khel and the Kalu Khel. They are situated chiefly on the left bank of the Kuram river to the north of Bannu. They have also settlements to the south-west of the Mahsud Waziri country. Their fighting strength is about 9,800 men. Of the total Ahmadzai population about one-half reside in British territory. The Mahsud Waziris have their homes beyond the border in the northern Suliman hills between the Tochi and Gomal river. They are divided into three main branches, (1) the Bahlalzai, numbering 5,000 fighting men, (2) the Shaman Khel, with 2,200 fighting men, and (3) the Alizai, with 5,500 fighting men.

The Mahsud Waziris had for years remained hostile towards the British Government, and lawless bands, recruited from the sub-divisions of the tribe residing nearest to our border, had constantly plundered and harried the neighbouring British territory. Throughout 1879 and 1880 Mahsud raids were of constant occurrence. A rigorous blockade which had been maintained for two years proving of no avail, a military expedition was despatched into the Mahsud country in April 1881, and in July the Mahsuds submitted to the terms imposed by Government.

Up to the year 1889 our knowledge of the Gomal pass and its communications with Zhob and Afghanistan was very incomplete, and rested almost entirely on native reports. In 1887 the Government of India, with the approval of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, decided that a complete examination of the Gomal route as far as Domandi, the junction of the Kundar and Gomal rivers, should be undertaken. It was decided to carry out the exploration under tribal escort, an arrangement to which the Mahsuds agreed, on the promise of certain fixed rewards. On the 6th February 1888 the exploration party started from Dera Ismail Khan towards the frontier. The party consisted of four British officers, Mr. G. M. Ogilvie, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, being in charge of political arrangements.
A small body of police accompanied the party as a guard to the camp. The party arrived at Tank on the 8th February. Here many Waziris were found collected; their numbers eventually amounting to from two to three thousand armed men. The attitude of the tribe from the first was not satisfactory. However, on the 20th February the party crossed the frontier; during the night shots were fired into the camp at short range; on the following days, the demeanour of the Mahsud became worse instead of improving; and it seemed almost certain that tribal resistance was being organised, and that, even if the expedition proceeded, survey operations would be impossible. Mr. Ogilvie accordingly retired on the 24th February by the Sheranna pass, the Mahsuds being ordered to move off by the Gomal route, which order, after a few minutes of menacing hesitation, they obeyed. The failure of this expedition was attributed to various causes, the principal being the anarchical condition of the tribe, their poverty and the weakness of the expedition. The Commissioner of the Derajat, in reporting its failure, made certain recommendations for carrying out, with a military force, during the winter of 1888 the survey and permanent pacification of the Gomal pass; but the consideration of these proposals was postponed, and nothing further was done in the matter until 1889.

During the summer of that year Sir Robert Sandeman, the Governor-General’s Agent in Baluchistan, had, as previously stated, been invited to submit proposals for extending a British protectorate over Zhob and the country between the Gomal and Pishin. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab was at the same time invited to co-operate from the Punjab side in the important work of opening up the Gomal pass. The proposals asked for were submitted by Sir Robert Sandeman, and advantage was taken of Lord Lansdowne’s tour in the autumn of 1889 on the north-west frontier to discuss the whole question with the principal officers concerned, viz., the Commander-in-Chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. It was decided that Sir Robert Sandeman should proceed as early as possible on a tour through the Zhob valley and explore the country of the Mando Khel tribe down to the junction of the Zhob and Gomal rivers. It was also determined to use the opportunity to try and come to some arrangement with the Waziri tribe for the opening of the Gomal pass and also to effect some satisfactory tribal settlement with the Sheranis, who live on the Punjab frontier to the south of the Gomal.

On the 19th December 1889, Sir Robert Sandeman with a strong escort of all arms started from Loralai and on the 26th December reached Apozai. Here a halt was made and the jirgas of the Mahsuds, Zalli Khels, Dotanis and the Bargha division of the Sheranis came into camp, and after some negotiations they entered into arrangements with the British Government, and service grants and emoluments were allotted to them on condition that they should be responsible for the safety of the Gomal pass, and should keep it and the Zhob route open to traffic.

The negotiations with the tribes being completed and the agreements ratified, Sir Robert Sandeman, leaving behind at Apozai Captain I. MacIvor, Political Agent, with a suitable escort, started for the Gomal with the remainder of the troops. On the 25th January 1890, Kajuri Kach was reached, and on the 29th the party marched into Tank, where a darbar was held, and in consideration of the loyal conduct of the Mahsud Waziri maliks, Sir Robert Sandeman was authorised to announce to them the immediate suspension of the tax on their imports into British territory, which had been levied as a fine since the expedition of 1881.

After the successful termination of this march, orders were given for posts garrisoned by local levies to be established to protect the road through the Gomal, and for a military post to be built at Mir Ali Khel to be occupied by troops from Dera Ismail Khan. The Mahsud Waziris were given allowances amounting to Rs. 30,456 per annum in addition to their former allowances of Rs. 19,000, and in return for this undertook responsibility for the safety and protection of the road through the Gomal. The posts in the pass were located at Spinkai Kach, Nili Kach and Kajuri Kach, and to the south of its western end a post was established at Kashmir Kar. Allowances amounting to
Rs. 14,280 per annum were at the same time granted to the sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris inhabiting Wana, which dominates the western end of the Gomal.

During the cold weather of 1890-91 a railway survey was made through the Gomal Pass. The Mahsud Waziris acted fairly well up to their engagements, and supplied tribal escorts to public works and railway survey parties and convoys. The levy posts in the pass were also built; and road construction was carried on without interruption and without the loss of a single life. There was, however, a certain amount of jealousy in connection with the distribution of the new service pay and allowances.

During 1891 matters gradually settled down, and the state of affairs on this part of the border showed a very marked improvement.

In February 1892, however, reports were received that His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan was endeavouring to bring under effective control the Waziris and other clans occupying Wana, Spin, Gulkach and other places either within the limits of British political control or close to them. He sent troops to establish posts at certain points on this frontier and to remain there pending further orders from him. Some of his sowars encamped on the northern bank of the river, and claimed the territory in the vicinity as belonging to Afghanistan. A party of these sowars arrived at Gulkach, on the north bank of the river, about the end of February, and under orders of Government sixty sowars of the Zhob Levy Corps, under a native officer, were sent to occupy the southern bank at that spot. A letter was sent to the Afghan officer by the Political Officer in Zhob, requesting him not to interfere with tribes on the south side of the river, and as regards any claims he might have on the north side, he was referred to the officials of the Punjab Government. The Waziris, who had given in their allegiance to us and accepted service, were told that, if the Amir's officials made overtures to them, or tried to enter their country, they should say that they were in relation with the British Government and could have nothing to do with any other power. The position remained in this unsatisfactory condition for some time. The Amir's officials continued intriguing with the tribesmen, and with some success. The Waziris demanded assurances from us of support in the event of their rejecting the Amir's overtures and resisting his advance by force. An assurance was given them to the effect that, if they strictly confined themselves to their own recognised territory and committed no act of aggression or provocation, the Government of India would support them against the Amir's interference.

In May 1892, Wana was occupied by Afghan troops under Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, and the feeling of unrest among the Waziris became more pronounced. The Sardar commenced offering allowances on the part of the Amir to all who would come in to him, making them extravagant promises, and doing all in his power to induce them to sever their connection with the British Government and accept the Amir's suzerainty. Under these inducements, deputations of various sections went to Kabul and interviewed the Amir. On the 6th of July the Viceroy wrote to the Amir regarding his encroachments in Waziri country, and requesting him to order his officers to desist from all attempts to induce the tribe to accept His Highness's rule, pending a settlement of the British-Afghan boundary. The substance of the warning was conveyed to the Waziris and to the Amir's Agent in Wana.

As a consequence of the feeling of unrest caused by the intrigues of the Afghan officials, the Waziris began to raid upon territory under our control, and at the request of the Mahsud Maliks, a small force was sent to the Gomal to preserve order; and in a letter to the Amir, dated the 29th August 1892, the Viceroy insisted on the withdrawal of his agents and troops from the vicinity of Wana and Gulkach by the 1st October.

Meanwhile, Sardar Gul Muhammad had sent an agent to induce the Bhittani tribe to tender their allegiance to the Amir. The Bhittanis are practically British subjects, and they were told to expel the Afghan Agent and promised support. In view of this guarantee, and of the increasing aggressions of the Amir's agents, and the numerous outrages which had occurred, a small force was sent to occupy Jandola in the Bhittani country until affairs
improved, and Kajuri Kach was re-inforced. On receipt of the Viceroy's letter, demanding the evacuation of Wana and Gulkach, the Amir ordered Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan to retire to Wazikhwah, pending a settlement of outstanding frontier questions. This and the occupation of Jandola had, for a time, an excellent effect in quieting the country, and a general improvement was noticeable in the disposition of the tribe. They surrendered one of the men concerned in the murder of some levy sowars, restored the rifles and carbines which had been carried away, offered to help the Government to punish the murderers, and paid a heavy fine. Even the maliks who had visited Kabul submitted to the general tribal council.

Attempts by Afghan officials to induce the Dawar maliks to visit the Amir, and to make their submission to him, were continuously made throughout the year 1892; but though a few maliks visited the Governor of Khost, the intrigues of the Amir's officials only induced the Dawaris to repeat their wish to enter into relations with the British Government. Some of the maliks wrote asking if the Government of India were willing to take their country under protection, but it was not at the time considered desirable to accept the Dawaris' proposal; and the district officers were instructed to encourage friendly intercourse with the tribe, without giving any indication of a desire to extend protection over their country or to compete with the Amir for it.

In 1893, however, Afghan intrigues again raised some excitement in Waziristan. Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, though compelled to leave the Waziri country, continued to do his utmost to induce the maliks to acknowledge Afghan suzerainty, declaring that he would shortly return to Wana, and that the question of the future rule over Waziristan had been left open by consent of Government. The Waziris, however, were already beginning to understand that the Government of India was determined not to allow Afghan interference, and in February, the Kabul faction having asked to be allowed to resume friendly relations with us, the Government of India agreed to the restoration of allowances promised to the Wana Ahmadzais, and told them and the Mahsuds that the Amir was sending forces immediately into Waziristan; he also invited the Bhittanis to come and see him, and money was freely distributed. In June, a large deputation of the Kabul faction of the Wana Darwesh Khel Waziris visited Kabul.

Intrigues were continued in Dawar, the Governor of Khost threatening to invade the country unless the maliks came in to him and made submission. At first the only result was to induce the Dawaris to beg the British Government to take over their country without delay; but afterwards, on seeing that their overtures were not accepted, some of their maliks went to the Amir and offered to accept his rule, provided His Highness would give them a fixed annual allowance and guarantee them a light assessment and future good treatment.

During May Sardar Sherindil Khan, with an Afghan force, entered the Tani and Gurbaz country, situated in the south-western corner of the Khost valley, between Khost and Dawar and Waziristan, his object being to advance thence on Dawar. The Tanis asked the Deputy Commissioner of Bannu to interfere, and induce Sardar Sherindil Khan to withdraw, falling which they asked for funds and arms to enable them to resist by force. The Tanis subsequently made their peace with the Sardar. Fresh crimes by the Waziris were now of frequent occurrence. On the 21st February, and a few days later a sowar was wounded near Jandola. Nevertheless, the general improvement in the temper of the tribe was held sufficient to justify the reduction of the force at Kajuri Kach and Jandola before the hot weather set in. Vigorous intrigues on the part of the Afghans were carried on in March and April. Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan sent the allowances promised to the Wana Ahmadzais, and told them and the Mahsuds that the Amir was sending forces immediately into Waziristan; he also invited the Bhittanis to come and see him, and money was freely distributed. In June, a large deputation of the Kabul faction of the Wana Darwesh Khel Waziris visited Kabul.

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conclusion that the Amir would have no further connection with them, and that all were ready to come in and beg forgiveness.

Meanwhile on the 2nd October the mission under Sir Mortimer Durand had arrived at Kabul at the invitation of the Amir, and on the 12th November an agreement was signed under which, inter alia, His Highness undertook to relinquish all claim to Dawar and Waziristan, with the exception of Birmal.

In order to prepare the Waziris for the boundary demarcation in the autumn, we instructed the Punjab Government in June to announce to the tribe the terms of the settlement concluded with the Amir and to tell them that Joint Commissioners of the British and Afghan Governments would proceed in October to mark off the line on the ground, pending which the tribes must respect it. The important question of our future relations with the Waziri tribe was now forced on our serious consideration. For the very large number of grave outrages committed by Waziri raiders during the previous year, partial reparation had only been obtained in very few cases; and in some of the worst, the amount of punishment had been practically limited at the dictation of the Waziri maliks; in the majority of cases the offences remained unpunished altogether. The existing arrangements afforded no means of controlling the movements of bands of Waziris across the Gomal river, and gave little protection against their oft-occurring raids. The leading men among almost all sections of the tribe were willing to deal fairly with us, but they were helpless to coerce its turbulent members. We held that by reason of the agreement come to by Sir Mortimer Durand with the Amir, we had assumed a measure of responsibility which had not hitherto been ours, and which under present arrangements we had no adequate means of discharging, and we considered it incumbent on us to bring further under our influence the tribes whom the settlement concerned. In order to put an end to Waziri raiding, not only into the Zhob Agency, but also upon Powindah Kafilas using the Gomal route, and in order to be in a position to control raiding on the Amir's frontier, we considered that a strong military post should be held at some locality, perhaps in Spin or Wano, or in the country between, whichever might be decided to be the best for dominating the country through which the marauding bands approach the river. It was proposed therefore that, when the troops for the demarcation party entered the district in October, a Political Officer should be deputed to explain to the tribe the nature of the future relations which Government intended to establish with them, and to obtain, if possible, their consent to the establishment of a British post in or near Spin, on a permanent footing, after the conclusion of the work for which the Commission's escort had been provided. The new arrangements would necessitate the grant of increased service allowances to the headmen and the enlistment of inferior men for service in levy posts; and we proposed to instruct the Political Officer entrusted with the negotiations to draw up a scheme of this description. We submitted proposals on these lines for your Lordship's consideration on the 10th of July 1894.

During July and August, the Waziris committed several fresh offences, the most serious being the murder of three leading Mahsud maliks who had rendered service in obtaining the surrender and conviction of the murderers of Mr. Kelly. The Punjab Government wished to demand the surrender of the culprits under threat of a punitive expedition, but we declined to authorise this course, considering that it would almost certainly prevent the fulfilment of our obligations to the Amir in the matter of demarcating the Waziri border. The Commissioner of the Derajat was instructed to inform the tribe of our intentions, which had meanwhile received the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and to continue his negotiations with the jirgas in view to procuring the punishment or surrender of the maliks' murderers. A proclamation was issued to the tribes in August informing them of the line of boundary fixed upon by the Government of India and the Amir, and of the arrangements for its demarcation in detail. They were told that the British Government desired that they should respect the line laid down, that there was no intention to interfere in their internal affairs, but that we only desired to establish peace and hoped that they would cordially co-operate in the attainment of these objects. Large jirgas assembled for consultation with regard to this announcement, and the majority were in favour
of receiving the British Commission in a friendly spirit. Fresh offences, however, were reported during September; and raiding and counter-raiding between the Waziris and Kharotis, Suleman Khels and Nasirs were of frequent occurrence.

The British party deputed to carry out the programme of government in Waziristan consisted of Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., Mr. L. W. King, C.S., Mr. A. Anderson, C.S., Mr. A. J. Grant, C.S., and three survey officers. It was settled that the actual demarcation party should be accompanied by an escort of about 400 men, and that a force consisting of three regiments of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, a mountain battery and a company of sappers and miners should be encamped at Spin or Wano on a site to be determined by Mr. Bruce and the Officer Commanding the troops, in consultation. A brigade was also to be mobilised and held in readiness as a reserve. The force, under Brigadier-General Turner, marched from Dera Ismail Khan in three columns, and reached Wano unopposed on the 25th of October. The attitude of the Wano maliks appeared most friendly, and they exhibited an eager desire for the British occupation of Wano and for service under Government. On the 19th of October, Mr. Bruce interviewed a large jirga at Kajuri Kach. He informed them of the intended movements of the escort in view to carrying out the programme of delimitation agreed to by the Amir; that troops would be permanently stationed in the country at Wano or Spin, or such position as Government might deem best; that Spin and Wano and the adjacent tracts, through which the Powindah trade routes run, would in future be considered protected areas; and that strict reparation would be exacted for offences calculated to endanger the safety and peace of the country. He also impressed on them that raids across the boundary into Afghan territory were forbidden, and that, should the tribesmen have any complaint against the Amir's subjects, they must lay it before the British officers, and not take the law into their own hands. The jirga gave in a written paper fully acquiescing in the proposals of Government.

The escort reached Wano on the 25th of October unopposed. The Mahsuds, having begged to be summoned to Wano, met Mr. Bruce there on the day of his arrival. The attitude of both Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels continued to be generally friendly; but on the 28th of October, one Mullah Powindah was reported to have collected in the Khaisera Valley a thousand men belonging to the Shabi Khels and Abdullais. As a precautionary measure, an infantry battalion and two guns of the reserve brigade were moved up to Jandola to reinforce the post at that place. Mullah Powindah was advised to disperse his following, but made no attempt to do so, and while the question of despatching a flying column to Khaisera to break up the gathering was under consideration, the British camp at Wano was attacked at 5-30 A.M. on the 3rd of November. The attacking force, estimated to have numbered from 1,200 to 2,000, consisted entirely of Mahsuds, chiefly Shabi Khels and Abdullais of Makin, with a few Abdul Rahman Khels. Owing to the nature of the ground they were able to approach the camp through ravines, emerging from which the main body rushed past the pickets on to the left flank of the camp. Others attacked the rear. Favoured by the darkness some of the enemy succeeded in effecting an entrance into the camp and did considerable damage. After stubborn hand-to-hand fighting the camp was cleared of the enemy, who fled in the direction of Khaisera and Shakai, closely pursued by a force of cavalry, infantry and guns. The casualties on the British side were 1 British officer, 2 native officers and 18 men killed; 6 British officers (one of whom died of his wounds) and 88 native soldiers wounded. The followers also suffered severely, 23 being killed and 20 wounded. The enemy succeeded in carrying off 36 Martini rifles and carbines, 15 horses and 3,000 rupees in cash, besides killing and wounding numerous transport animals in the lines. The loss on the side of the tribesmen was very severe, being estimated at from 300 to 400 men killed and over 100 wounded.

General Turner's brigade was at once reinforced by a battalion of British infantry, but orders were issued that no aggressive movement was to be undertaken without the sanction of Government. Mr. Bruce was informed that he must carry out the spirit of his former instructions, and he was instructed.
to re-open negotiations, if possible, on the footing that the Mullah's act was disapproved by the majority of the tribal maliks. He was to demand the temporary banishment of Mullah Powindah, the surrender of certain leaders of the attack, the immediate return of every horse, rifle, and rupee stolen, or five hundred rupees for each horse or rifle; and, if after a reasonable interval there was no sign of submission, he was authorised to name the 1st of December as the date after which we should take action to enforce our demands. Nearly all the Mahsud maliks came in on the 18th November to Mr. Bruce, who explained to them the Government demands, and gave them till the 26th November within which to comply. The jirga started back forthwith to the hills, promising, in writing, to do everything in their power to enforce the Government terms, and in the event of failure to return to Wano with a full jirga by the 26th, and to co-operate with Government in punishing rebellious sections or individuals. At their own request, the names of five men were added to the list of those whose surrender was to be demanded.

On the 24th November, the Mahsud deputation returned to Wano, and stated that they could see their way to obtaining restitution of all Government property stolen, but not the surrender of the men demanded, or the banishment of the Mullah; they asked for further time, and they were allowed till the 26th November to give their final answer. At the end of the month, the Government terms had not been complied with, but the maliks engaged to fulfil all demands, if Government would give them up to the 12th of December. This further extension was agreed to, but arrangements were completed for an advance into the Waziri country of a strong force under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart from three separate points, viz., Wano, Jandola and Bannu, should the terms be still uncomplied with on the date fixed.

On the 10th of December the maliks sent in a letter asking for a still further extension, and, on this being refused, the friendly maliks came in to Mr. Bruce and admitted their inability to coerce the recalcitrant sections. On the 16th Sir William Lockhart issued a proclamation announcing that he was authorised to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British camp at Wano, to enforce the conditions demanded by Government, and any other terms which renewed opposition might necessitate; that it was his intention to secure the carrying out of the boundary demarcation; and that resistance or non-compliance with his demands might compel him to stay in the country longer than the Government had any desire that he should stay. Arrangements were made for the safety of well-disposed persons and their belongings, and everything possible was done to confine the operations to the offending sections, and to prevent the punitive expedition from developing into one against the whole tribe.

The force, which was divided into three columns, advanced on the 17th and 18th; a regiment of native infantry, two guns, and a few cavalry being left to hold Wano. The Jandola brigade reached Makin on the 21st December, destroying towers belonging to recalcitrant sections and Mullah Powindah's village en route. It experienced no real opposition, but the rear-guard was fired on, pickets were fired at at night, some camels killed, and a few followers wounded. The Bannu column reached Ranzmak on the 21st and Makin on the 22nd. It also had met with no opposition, though the camp and rear-guard had been fired on, and a sepoy and some followers wounded. The Wano column arrived at Kanigoram on the 21st. General Turner's experiences were similar to those of the others. Two of his sepoys were wounded by men on the line of march. While he was destroying the towers in the village of Karam on the 22nd, the tribesmen opened fire from a sangar, and wounded two officers and four sappers. On the 26th December, the force divided into six columns, and commenced to follow up the hostile party into the valleys round Pirghal, where they were said to have retreated. The columns returned on the 27th, having met with practically no opposition; and several head of cattle and some sheep were captured and numerous towers were destroyed. Mullah Powindah himself fled to Dawar.

During the month of January 1895, the troops were constantly on the move in the Mahsud country, and visited even the more inaccessible valleys.
The Waziris, though they refrained from anything like open opposition, continued to harass the British forces by firing at rear-guards and convoys, and cutting the telegraph line. Early in the month, Sir William Lockhart proposed in view of the opposition offered by the tribe and the delay in carrying out the Government conditions, to impose the following additional conditions: a fine of 50 breech-loading rifles, 200 matchlocks and 200 swords or knives; the actual payment of all outstanding fines; the opening up of the Shahur route from Jandola to Wano; the payment of a nominal tribute; the expulsion of Mullah Powindah until these terms had been carried out and demarcation completed. We generally approved these proposals, except the levy of tribute, which was rejected; and we instructed the General to place on the Mahsuds the obligation of keeping open the Shahur route, as the establishment of a military post on the route would be contrary to the policy of Government.

On the 21st January Sir William Lockhart received the Mahsud jirga at Kundivam. He announced to them the new terms, and gave them to the 1st of March within which to comply, informing them that, until they did comply, the troops would continue to occupy Mahsud country. At the end of January General Lockhart reported that considerable progress had been made. All the hostages demanded by Government, except three of minor importance, had been surrendered; Mullah Powindah had fled from Waziristan; almost all the rifles and Government horses and some of the money looted during the attack on Wano had been restored, and the tribesmen were bringing in arms in compliance with the terms demanded. The tribe showed every indication of complete submission, and it was thought probable that the terms would be complied with before the date fixed.

Preparations for delimitation were now commenced, and the work was satisfactorily concluded on the 5th April.

Meanwhile, the Mahsuds had continued to comply with the Government terms, and on the 4th of March, the three remaining Mahsud hostages who had found an asylum with the Darwesh Khel were surrendered and the terms of Government were thus fulfilled. By the 14th March, all the troops employed in the Waziristan expedition, with the exception of those left in Wano, Barwand, and the Tochi Valley, had returned to India, and Mr. Bruce resumed political charge in Waziristan.

On the completion of delimitation Mr. Anderson, who had demarcated the northern section, returned with his escort to the Tochi Valley, where it had been decided that the troops should remain pending the settlement of the question of the allowances to be granted to the Dawaris and Darwesh Khels. The whole of the maliks gave in a written paper expressing their willingness to remain under the British Government and requesting that the Tochi Valley should be permanently occupied. Messrs. Bruce and Anderson both expressed their belief that the mass of the tribesmen desired our intervention, and would welcome any system that would afford security and open up their country. In a despatch, dated the 15th of May, we urged on Her Majesty's Government the desirability of extending military protection to the Tochi tribes. We pointed out that the maliks and people appeared to be genuinely in favour of the proposal, and that circumstances required a more decided measure of protection than could be afforded by the introduction of militia or levy posts. The knowledge of the country gained during Sir William Lockhart's operations tended to show that a post at or near Wano would protect the Gomal and prevent Waziri raids into Zhob, but would not be well placed for the exercise of an effective control over the Waziris as a whole. We accordingly proposed to establish a small post at Wano and a stronger one in upper Darw; and thence to exert a restraining influence over the Waziris generally, and fulfil the obligations extended by our arrangements with Afghanistan. The permanent force proposed was: at Wano, 1 squadron of native cavalry, 4 guns of a native mountain battery, and 1 battalion of native infantry; in the Tochi, 1 squadron of native cavalry, 1 mountain battery, and 2 battalions of native infantry; with small connecting posts at Shinkai Kotal, Idak, and Mumammad Khel, which might hereafter be held by local levies.

During May there was a series of murderous attacks on individuals in Waziristan, chiefly in the Tochi; and towards the end of the month,
Mr. Anderson reported that there were symptoms of growing discontent among the Dawaris, especially among the lower orders and Talib-ul-ilms.

In June the distribution of a sum of ten thousand rupees to the Darwesh Khel and Dawar tribes was sanctioned, as an earnest of our intention to presently grant them service allowances, and the valley was reported to have again quieted down. The maliks all assured Mr. Anderson that the occupation of the valley was not displeasing to them; all services demanded were freely rendered; where offences had been committed by Dawaris, the offenders had at once been surrendered, and the maliks had quite recently asked that fines might be imposed in addition to the compensation awarded by jirgas in criminal cases. Shortly afterwards, we sanctioned the proposals of Mr. Bruce and the Punjab Government regarding the new scale of allowances to be distributed to the Mahsud Waziris. The financial effect of this was to raise the former annual total of Rs. 51,228 to Rs. 61,543. Temporary arrangements for the grant of service allowances to certain sub-sections among the Tochi tribes were also sanctioned, pending settlement of the general question.

During the month of August we had under consideration the result of the trial by jirga of five Shakaiwals suspected of having murdered several sepoys and levies in 1894. The Shakai jirgas, with the exception of the Shadakais and Malik-shahis, declined to take the oath of innocence; this is tantamount to pronouncing the guilt of the accused, and the prisoners were sentenced by Mr. Bruce to seven years' imprisonment each. We confirmed Mr. Bruce's proceedings. The local authorities reported that there were good grounds to apprehend that the leading maliks who declined to take the oath of innocence would be in personal danger at the hands of the friends of the accused, and the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that Mr. Bruce should be permitted to announce to the Shakai jirga, if he found it necessary, that anything done to the maliks, in retaliation for their share in the conviction, would be treated by Government as if done to their own servants. We declined to agree to a general announcement as to the action which would be taken if violence were offered to a malik for assisting the local British officers in and on the borders of Waziristan; but while refusing to permit a public proclamation, we had no objection to the local officers taking opportunities to let the tribes know that any outrage arising from the part played in a jirga by one of the members would be an offence for which the Government of India would be entitled to call the tribe concerned to account under the condition of the arrangement made with them, which provides for the surrender for trial and punishment of offenders against the State, or against persons working for Government. Threats were said to have been openly uttered by certain persons to injure one of the maliks concerned, and we directed that the tribal maliks should be encouraged to arrest or take security from men who used such language; the local officers were authorized to support the maliks in this and, if necessary, to arrange for the confinement or surveillance of persons suspected of contemplating recourse to violence. These instructions were acted upon with satisfactory results.

The sanction of Her Majesty's Government to the permanent location of a military force in the upper Tochi valley was received in August 1893, and orders were issued in October regarding the future policy in this direction. The offer of the Dawaris that their country should remain under the British Government was accepted, and it was decided that some light revenue would be taken from them at once, in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter. A simple form of administration was to be introduced, but limited to the country of the Dawaris, including any small Darwesh Khel patches that might be found within it. The tract, which is commonly known as Upper and Lower Dawar, lies along the road from Hyder Khel on the east to Pai Khel near Kanirogha on the west. The Darwesh Khel territory outside the Tochi was to be subject only to the "political control" extended to Waziristan generally. We recognized that it would be necessary to maintain a somewhat close relation with the tribesmen in the 16 or 17 miles of the Tochi valley beyond Kanirogha, through which the road runs, but even here there was to be nothing of the nature of direct administration. Allowances aggregating
Rs. 47,872 a year were granted to the Darwesh Khel, and Rs. 15,864 to the Dawaris, subject, in the case of the former, to the same conditions* as those attached to the allowances granted to the Mahsud Waziris, and to the further condition that they would refrain from and prevent raids and other offences across the Afghan frontier. The allowances of the Dawaris are subject to the condition of good behaviour on the part of the tribe and of all individual recipients.

The construction of thirteen posts for occupation by levies in the Tochi at a cost of Rs. 45,000 was also sanctioned. This practically disposed of the question of the redistribution of the allowances to the tribes of Waziristan. Besides the general redistribution of the allowances of the Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, and the grant to the Dawaris, a sum of Rs. 6,840 a year had been added to the Rs. 10,980 formerly enjoyed by the Wano Ahmadzais, and Rs. 8,612 a year had been given to the Shakaiwals.

On the 31st of October, Mr. Anderson announced to the jirgas of Upper and Lower Dawar the decision of Government as above defined. He further explained to them that they would not be allowed to levy fees from the Powindahs and others using the route, but that Government would demand grazing dues from the Powindahs and would grant a share to the villagers. The jirga represented that they were unaware what the total cultivated area of the country was, but they offered to pay for three years a sum of Rs. 6,000 a year in commutation of the Government right to revenue, and they agreed to the measurement of their lands thereafter and to revenue being assessed in kind at the rate of one-tenth of the gross produce. The jirga further offered to contribute a sum of two thousand rupees annually by way of remuneration to certain subordinates of the leading maliks who were to be employed in collecting the revenue and rendering village service. The announcement of the allowances sanctioned for the Dawaris was received with every sign of satisfaction, and the attitude of the tribe then and since, and their readiness to meet the wishes of Government, are a convincing proof that their offer to remain under the British Government was spontaneous and unanimous.

The force at Wano was reduced, on the 15th November, to the permanent sanctioned strength, † the rest of the troops returning to India by the Shahur route through Kundiwam, Barwand and Jandola. A wing of Native Infantry was ordered to be detained at Barwand until the completion of the tribal levy posts on the Shahur route.

In January 1896 we felt justified in ordering the reduction of the garrison in the Tochi valley to the permanent sanctioned strength, viz.:—

4 mountain and 2 maxim guns,
1 squadron of native cavalry,
2 battalions of native infantry.

Sanction was accorded to political establishments, etc., costing Rs. 31,026 a year for the Tochi valley, and Rs. 88,681 for the Gomal and Southern Waziris, including the salary of the two Political Officers specially appointed to the tracts in question.

An important question of principle concerning our position in Waziristan came under consideration in the spring of 1896, in connection with the establishment of levy posts on the Shahur route from Jandola to Wano. This route affords the shortest means of communication between Wano and the Punjab. A military post had been maintained at Barwand (sarwekai) ever since the punitive operation undertaken by Sir William Lockhart in December 1894, but this was regarded as a temporary measure, and it had always been our intention to withdraw it after negotiations with the tribe were concluded and levy posts constructed. The local Political Officers advocated the permanent retention of the military garrison at Sarwekai, and the establishment of levy posts between Sarwekai and Wano through the Khaiserah valley, in order

* (1) General good behaviour.
(2) Prevention of raids and other offences across the boundary of British India or in protected areas.
(3) Surrender for trial and punishment of tribesmen guilty of offences against us or those acting under or in support of our authority.
(4) Furnishing tribal escorts to officers visiting any part of their country under the orders of Government.
(5) Rendering the service for which they receive allowances in any part of their country most convenient to Government.

† 1 Battalion Native Infantry.
1 Squadron Native Cavalry.
4 Guns, Native Mountain Battery.

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An important question of principle concerning our position in Waziristan came under consideration in the spring of 1896, in connection with the establishment of levy posts on the Shahur route from Jandola to Wano. This route affords the shortest means of communication between Wano and the Punjab. A military post had been maintained at Barwand (sarwekai) ever since the punitive operation undertaken by Sir William Lockhart in December 1894, but this was regarded as a temporary measure, and it had always been our intention to withdraw it after negotiations with the tribe were concluded and levy posts constructed. The local Political Officers advocated the permanent retention of the military garrison at Sarwekai, and the establishment of levy posts between Sarwekai and Wano through the Khaiserah valley, in order
to obtain a commanding influence in the country inhabited by the more unruly sections of the Mahsuds, and to support well-disposed maliks against malcontent factions. The Lieutenant-Governor preferred the adoption of a shorter line turning west from Sarwekai by Karabkot, which, in his opinion, without establishing an internal control, would interpose a barrier between the Mahsud country on the one side and the Gomal and Wano on the other, and would check raiding by the Mahsuds on the Gomal and caravan routes through Wano. As regards the military garrison at Sarwekai, the Lieutenant-Governor said he was always glad to see tribal arrangements supported by as strong a backing as possible of regular troops, and he thought it would be a decided advantage to retain it permanently, if the troops could be spared. Your Lordship, to whom we referred the question, replied (8th May) that, until levy posts had been established in the Shahur valley and the arrangements tested by sufficient experience, you would leave it to us to decide whether the military post at Sarwekai should be retained until further orders. You agreed with the Lieutenant Governor that the objects of Government could be attained without locating posts in the Khaiserah valley, and stated that the larger issues of policy would be determined after you had received a report of the total cost of the cantonments in Wano and the Tochi valley and of the military posts in the Shahur valley. Your Lordship also requested us to consider whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment was so necessary as to justify the expenditure. We decided to retain the military post at Sarwekai, informed the Punjab Government accordingly, and authorized the construction of a levy post or posts on the route recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor. As regards the Khaiserah valley, up to Torwam, we pointed out to the Punjab Government that, although no levies were to be placed in it, the Political Officers should be able to exercise considerable influence over it through the service allowances given to the Alizai maliks, and that, with the military and levy posts at Sarwekai so close to the head of the valley, it should not be difficult to give the well-disposed maliks all the encouragement necessary for the maintenance of order. The Lieutenant-Governor was requested to instruct the Political Officers that they should lose no opportunity of extending their personal influence throughout the valley, and that, while carefully abstaining from making themselves or the Government of India responsible for the actual administration of the country, they should endeavour to establish cordial and friendly relations with the headmen, and should give them the support which was usually so necessary at first to ensure the proper recognition of their authority.

At the end of June 1896 a dispute arose between the Tapi Khel and Zalli Khel Waziris, regarding certain land in the centre of the Wano valley, about three miles from the cantonment: both sides took up arms and serious disturbance appeared imminent. It was impossible to allow fighting in this locality, and we directed the Political Officer, Wano, to interfere authoritatively and to insist upon the settlement of the disputes by a jirga of the headmen if possible and, failing this, by the appointment of arbitrators. The result fully justified expectations, and a satisfactory settlement was promptly arrived at in the presence of the Political Officer. Permission was similarly given to the Political Officer to interfere and insist on a peaceable settlement of a land dispute between the Giga Khel and Nekzan Khel Mahsuds on the one side, and two sub-sections of the Toji Khel Ahmadzais of Wano on the other. We held that, throughout the Wano plain, the Political Officer was responsible for the maintenance of peace and order, and that, while in all cases tribal machinery should be used for the settlement of disputes in accordance with tribal custom, he should authoritatively forbid bloodshed and any attempt to enforce supposed rights by an appeal to arms. It is not intended that the Political Officer should himself administer the tract, or should himself decide any disputes, but it is his duty to see that the tribal machinery works and is worked properly: he must insist on all disputes being referred to and decided by arbitration or tribal jirga, and if possible by mutual consent, and should support the authority of the headmen by assisting them with the levies to enforce their decisions, when necessary.

During the early summer of 1896, the proceedings of Mullah Powindah again began to be productive of some uneasiness. He gathered round himself a
band of 200 men, whom he sent to the different sections demanding a contribution of two rupees from each man. His object was said to be to get the maliks of all sections to join him and supply him with funds, and after thus demonstrating tribal consolidation, to obtain the formal recognition of the complete independence of Mahsud country beyond Shahur. He sent one party of 25 men to Wano to collect contributions, but on the Wano maliks objecting, the Political Officer ordered the party to leave Wano, and they went away. The Mullah next demanded contributions from the Shahur Shaman Khels, threatening to loot them if they hesitated about paying. Mr. Grant informed the Shahur Shaman Khel maliks that they were at liberty to contribute religious alms to the Mullah, but that, if they were unwilling to do so, Government would not permit the Mullah to injure them in Shahur. About the middle of July, a letter was received by the Political Officer at Wano from all the principal Mahsud maliks, asking for permission to make an urgent representation to Government, as Mullah Powindah had openly claimed the rulership (Badshahi) of the Mohmand country, and declared that no maliks or other persons who receive pay from Government should have funeral ceremonies performed over them by Mahsud Mullahs or even be buried in Mahsud country. The maliks said they feared a serious outbreak might take place which would bring them into disrepute, and they prayed that Mullah Powindah should be compelled to leave Mahsud territory, and that Government would occupy the rest of their country. At the end of July, the Mullah started for Kabul and arrived there early in August, with a large following. According to a report from the British Agent at Kabul, the party offered their allegiance to the Amir, and asked for help to fight the British. His Highness told them that he had a firm friendship with the British, and reminded them that, when he wished to enter into relations with the Waziris in years gone by, they refused to come to him, whereas now that they were in difficulties they asked for help. The Amir himself addressed the Government of India about the arrival of the Waziris, and forwarded a petition, which they presented to him. In this they described themselves as duly authorized representatives of all the Mahsud and Dawari tribesmen, stated that they had determined to migrate from their country into Afghanistan, and begged that British officials should not interfere with them or their tribesmen, so that they might "come to the country of Islam," and that the British Government should be asked to pay them the price of their lands and property in Waziristan. The Amir asked for advice as to the answer he should give and was told in reply that the British Government had no objection to Mullah Powindah and the maliks with him migrating to Afghanistan, that British officers would not be allowed to interfere with those who wished to leave their country, and that the tribesmen could make any arrangements they pleased with their fellow-tribesmen for the disposal of their lands and houses in Waziristan. The Amir's treatment of the Mullah was not such as to encourage others to follow his example. The barest subsistence allowance was granted to the party, and before the reply of the Government of India to the Amir's reference reached Kabul, many of them had returned secretly to their homes. It was ascertained that the party who went to Kabul and signed the petition to the Amir were, with very few exceptions, men of no importance and were certainly in no sense representative of Mahsud tribal opinion. On the Mullah's arrival at his home on the 2nd October, he at once summoned the Waziri and Dawar maliks to meet him for a general consultation. Very few attended, and he appeared to be generally discredited, the maliks refusing to have anything to do with him. He wrote, however, to the Political Officer at Wano that the people of Islam had been much inspired and encouraged by the boldness of the Amir, and that, "if a move is made by Government to take up a fresh position, perhaps disturbances will occur between the Musalmans and the British."

Throughout the year, the state of affairs in Waziristan and the Tochi was not altogether satisfactory. Intrigues against the maliks were at work, and the control of the maliks over the turbulent characters of their sections relaxed. Several murders and other offences on the roads for which we are responsible were committed, and the murderers escaped; and raids and counter-raids between Waziris and their Afghan neighbours became frequent on the frontier, causing more than one complaint to be made by the Amir. Consequently on this
unsatisfactory condition of affairs, the head-quarters of the Tochi force was
moved temporarily to the vicinity of Datta Khel in the Upper Tochi. The
site for the new cantonment has not yet been definitely decided upon.

The spring of 1897 saw no improvement. Besides the raids across the
frontier, above referred to, a great many offences were reported as between
different sections of the Waziri tribes and also against Government. Amongst
the latter may be noticed the murder of a cavalry soldier on the 21st March
near the Datta Khel camp; on the 25th March the cavalry ration party was
fired at near Jandola and a horse killed; on the 28th and 29th March, Com-
missariat camels and camelmen were carried off by Mahsuds from Karkan;
and on the 5th April the mail cart was stopped three miles above Idak by a band of
robbers, who killed the driver and wounded one passenger and robbed the
others and the mail bags; on the 11th April a convoy from Datta Khel cutting
brush-wood was fired at, and a search party was fired at on the following day;
and on the 16th April the Munshi of the Nagandi Obs post and a levy guard sent
by the Political Officer to Spin to enquire into a dispute between Zali Khel
cultivators and Powindahs were roughly handled and robbed of their weapons
and uniform; on the 21st May, some shots were fired at a grass-cutting party
two miles from Datta Khel; and on the same date six Commissariat camels,
while grazing on the lower slopes of the Vezhda Sir range, were stolen by
Mahsuds; on the night of the 29th May, a sentry of the 1st Punjah Infantry
was shot and three men wounded at Datta Khel by a fanatic; on the nights
of the 1st and 2nd June, shots were fired into the convoy enclosure at Saidgai
and some animals stolen.

A far more serious outrage than any of the foregoing remains to be re-
corded. On the 10th June, Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in the Tochi, pro-
ceeded with an escort of 800 rifles, two guns and twelve sabres under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Bunny, from Datta Khel to Sheranna and Maiziar, for the purpose
of fixing a site for a post and realizing a fine which had been imposed for the
murder of the Mohurrir of the Sheranna post last year. It had been Mr. Gee’s
intention to go to Maizar the previous day, but the visit was postponed owing to
rain, and his intended visit was known to all the Sheranna and Maizair maliks.
On arrival at Maizar, Mr. Gee visited Dotoi with some of the maliks and the
cavalry, leaving Sadda Khan and Alambe, two of the most influential of the
Sheranna maliks, with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, the infantry and guns at
Maizar. On Mr. Gee’s return, Sadda Khan produced food for the Muham-
madans of the party and the British officers, who numbered seven all told.
About 2 p.m., when lunch had just been finished, and without the slightest
warning, fire was opened on the British officers from the buildings close by.
With the exception of Mr. Gee, all were almost immediately hit, and the Brit-
ish force was compelled to retire over the hills to Sheranna, followed by a
gathering of tribesmen which rapidly increased to over 1,000. The retirement
was made deliberately and in excellent order, the tribesmen being kept at a
distance. Reinforcements from Datta Khel then joined the retreating party,
and the tribesmen dispersed. On the British side, the casualties were Lieu-
tenant-Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs, Captain J. F. Brown, R.A., and Lieu-
tenant H. A. Cruickshank, R.A., killed; Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson and
Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cassidy of the 1st Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant C. L. S.
Seton-Browne of the 1st Punjab Infantry wounded. Dr. Cassidy subsequently
died of his wound. One native officer and 21 rank and file were killed, and
24 rank and file wounded. Several horses and mules were also killed and
wounded. The enemy’s losses were estimated at about one hundred killed,
including some maliks of importance, and many wounded.

The Mada Khels fled to the hills leaving Sheranna and Maizair deserted.
An advance in force to Maizair and Sheranna to destroy the fortified kots was
immediately ordered. The Field Force entrusted with carrying out the orders
of Government comprised two brigades under Brigadier-Generals Egerton
and Symons, the whole under the command of Major-General G. C. Corrie
Bird, C.B.

Reports of the proceedings of the Field Force have been so recently placed
in detail before your Lordship that we do not propose to recapitulate them.
Suffice it to say that after much tedious waiting, during which our troops
suffered greatly from the effects of the climate in the Tochi Valley, the Madda Khels have made their submission to General Bird, some of the ringleaders have been surrendered, and the punitive terms demanded have been complied with. It is satisfactory to note that, in spite of the local excitement naturally caused by this sudden outburst of the Madda Khels, no other sections joined them in their open opposition to Government, and though, as was to be expected, numerous instances occurred of offences, such as raiding of convoys, firing on detached parties, cutting of the telegraph wire, there have been no large gatherings or attacks on strength in British posts either in the Tochi or Mahsud territory, and the Waziris generally and the Mahsuds in particular have not allowed themselves to be drawn into the fanatical outbreak which has made the year 1887 so memorable an one in the history of our north-west frontier.

The Marris are a Baluch tribe occupying the country from the Nari river and the outskirts of the Bolan on the west as far as the Sham plain close to the Punjab boundary on the east and between Thal Chotiiali on the north and the Bugti tribe on the south.

The Bugtis hold the low hills to the south and south-east of the Marris, and the Sind and Punjab borders.

The two tribes are intimately connected in all their relations, both external and internal. In all their predatory incursions, whether into the plains of the Punjab, Sind or Kalat or against the neighbouring tribes in the hills amongst whom they used to spread desolation and terror, they worked in concert and shared in the spoils. They had long been noted for their predatory habits. The distracted state of affairs in Baluchistan which followed the accession of Khudadad Khan was their special opportunity. Their position in a knot of difficult hills lying within the geographical limits of Baluchistan enabled them to carry on for years almost with impunity a system of raids on the British border. All attempts to coerce them through the Khan of Kalat, their nominal ruler, having proved ineffectual owing to his weakness, it became necessary in about 1871 to adopt a new policy towards the tribes, and accordingly since that year the British Government has dealt with them directly.

When the treaty of 1876 with the Khan of Kalat was signed, it was decided that the British Government would continue to deal with the tribes independently of the Khan, for although nominally they were the subjects of Kalat, no Khan had ever been able to bring them under effective control, and it was also considered advisable to continue the service which had been already granted to them and to encourage them to take additional service under the British Government. By these means it was hoped that the protection of the lives and property of our own subjects would be secured as well as the safety of communications.

Soon after the disaster at Maiwand on the 27th of July 1880, the attitude of the Marri tribe became decidedly hostile. A convoy carrying treasure was attacked on the road, and several coolies were killed. Some European subordinates, who were in rear of the column, were attacked at the same time and killed. This raid was followed up by depredations on the line of communication. In consequence of these serious instances of misconduct a military expedition was sent into the Marri country under the command of Brigadier-General C. M. MacGregor. The Marris soon submitted and accepted the terms imposed by Government. Only a portion of the tribe had been implicated in the outrages, and when the negotiations were concluded, the Marri Chief and the principal headmen, with a number of their followers, were again enlisted in our service and posts of Marri levies were re-established on the borders and along the main lines of communication.

In 1881, a number of disputes occurred in which the Bugtis and several other tribes were concerned. They led to a course of mutual retaliation and murders, and threatened generally the peace of the Sind Punjab frontier. The disputes were satisfactorily settled by Colonel Reynold's. At the same time, the terms on which service and pay had been given to the Bugtis were revised. The principle on which the revision of service was based was that payments should be only made in return for service actually performed. The scheme also provided for the general submission of the tribe to the British Government.
In June 1882 hostilities again broke out between the Bozdiars and the Bugtis. Through the intervention of our officers, a settlement was effected upon the basis of renunciation of mutual demands by the tribes at enmity.

In 1888, quarrels which had arisen between the Marris and Bugtis assumed a serious aspect, and it was apprehended that the dispute would result in a disturbance of the whole frontier from Jacobabad to Dera Ghazi Khan. The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan visited the Marri hills and succeeded in settling the disputes.

For the next three years, the conduct of the Marris and Bugtis was fairly satisfactory; but on the 14th October 1896, a serious outrage was committed by a few individual members of the Marri tribe at the Sunari Railway Station, Northern-Western Railway. About daylight, six or seven Tingiani and Shaheja Marris, armed with breech-loaders, attacked the station, and murdered the entire railway staff there employed. A Hindu shop-keeper was also killed and his shop burnt over his body. The gang on the following day fired a hut occupied by railway workmen near Dalu Jal, and killed four of the occupants, afterwards firing at a train, and then making for the hills. The attitude of the tribe generally was at first somewhat doubtful, and there were rumours of a general rising being imminent. After a day or two, affairs improved, and on the 24th October, three of the gang, including two of the leaders, were captured. They were tried under the Murderous Outrages Act, sentenced to death and executed on the 2nd of November. The three remaining members of the gang were arrested and surrendered by the Marri tribesmen. They were similarly tried and convicted. Two were sentenced to death and executed, the third to transportation for life. The outrages were the result of sudden and isolated fanaticism, and the Marri tribe, as a whole, was not concerned. A fine of 6,000 rupees was inflicted and paid and precautions taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar outbreak. During the past year, the Marris have given no trouble.

Kurram.

Nowhere along the Punjab frontier can we regard with greater feelings of satisfaction the results of our policy than we can in Kurram. For many years the position in the Kurram valley had been an exceedingly difficult one. When we retired from the valley at the end of the Afghan war in 1880, we caused the Turis to be informed by Major-General Watson, who was commanding the British forces in Kurram, that we should recognize their independence, and would regard their country as having no connection with Kabul so long as they desired it. In return for our recognition and support, they were to conform in all respects with our advice. This position was not unnaturally resented by the Amir, who constantly complained, with more or less reason, of the misdeeds of the Turis. Raids and counter raids by Turis and Afghan subjects were of constant occurrence, and the internal condition of Turi affairs was equally subject of anxiety. To introduce a scheme of self-government among people who have always been accustomed to be ruled is everywhere a hazardous experiment. In Kurram it was premeditated under the conditions of Turi society. It failed within a year and then every man did what was right in his own eyes and there was no judge in the country. At the end of 1884, the Punjab Government deputed Shabzada Sultan Jan, an Extra Assistant Commissioner, to try and settle the disputes in conjunction with an Afghan Commissioner and a Turi delegate. They effected for the time being a settlement which was understood to be satisfactory to all concerned. The tribe, owing to its numerous factions and factional disputes, was unable to choose a ruler from among themselves and constantly invited us to appoint a Governor over them; this was not considered feasible, but it was arranged that an Assistant Commissioner should be posted at Thal to advise the Turis, whenever required, to enquire into and deal with all complaints against the Turis, and to move freely about the valley and try to enforce some slight approach to order. The experiment, however, was not a success; the Afghan complaints did not cease; the Turis, relying on our protection continued to behave in an aggravating manner, the Amir wrote that he could no longer restrain the Afghans from taking into their own hands the law against their Turi neighbours, and the internal condition of the valley was becoming more and more disorderly. It was therefore thought advisable to appoint another joint Commission to institute
an enquiry into the claims against the Turis, and it was decided that the awards passed by the Joint Commissioners should be duly executed before their escorts left the valley. Mr. Udny, Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, was appointed the British representative, and proceeded to the valley in September 1888, accompanied by a sufficiently strong escort to prevent any sudden attack from the ill-disposed members of the tribe. The Afghan Commissioner, Sardar Sherindil Khan, the Amir's Governor of Khost, was attended by an escort of equal strength. The Commissioner met at Kharlachi on the 7th September, but it was soon seen that no common plan of action for the settlement of the claims of either side would be agreed to; a dead lock ensued, the Afghan Commissioner showing no real desire to effect a settlement, and the British Commissioner was withdrawn.

During 1889, the condition of affairs in Kurram continued much as before, causing considerable annoyance to the Amir, who wrote to the Viceroy that, as the Government of India were indifferent whether the disputes were settled or not, he would remain the same, and would leave his subjects and the Turis to settle matters themselves, without any interference by His Highness's officials, the result of which state of affairs he left to the imagination of the Government of India. At intervals during the following year, complaints continued to be received from the Amir of Turi aggressions across the border, and eventually in September 1891, the Government of India offered to send into Kurram an independent English officer to enquire into and decide the several claims against and by the Turis if the Amir would agree to enforce payment of any fines and compensation awarded against Afghan subjects, the Government of India agreeing on their part to enforce all awards against the Turis.

Meanwhile affairs in Kurram had been going from bad to worse. Chikkai, a notorious Zaimusht outlaw, had been on a visit to Kabul, where the Amir received him in an unusually friendly manner, and immediately on his return, he seized Lower Kurram, aided by a gang of his own men, Khostwals, and others, and closed the road to British territory. Simultaneously Upper Kurram was attacked by Jajis, Mangals, and Makbis from Afghan territory. These proceedings were countenanced, if not instigated by the Government of Khost. Fighting continued to take place at intervals until late in the summer of 1892. In the autumn, lower Kurram was still held by 1,000 fighting men, Waziris, Zaimushts, Jajis of Maidan and Khostwals. Internal feuds prevented the Turis from combining against external attack, and in their difficulties they turned to the British Government and begged that a Governor might be sent to them supported by troops to administer the valley, failing which they declared they must make submission to Kabul. The Amir, who had been addressed regarding the proceedings of his subjects, denied all complicity in Chikkai's invasion, but admitted that he had given his "injured and suffering people permission to attack the Turis, because there was no other remedy for evil than evil". He at the same time accepted the Viceroy's proposal to send a British officer to Kurram to decide the several outstanding cases between British and Afghan subjects.

The position at this time being as unsatisfactory as it well could be, the Government of India decided that the officer they were about to send into Kurram should not only undertake the settlement of outstanding disputes, but should make some arrangement of a more lasting kind for the pacification of the country. Mr. W. E. H. Merk, C.S.I., was the officer selected for this duty, and he was accompanied by a force of two regiments of Native Infantry, two squadrons Native Cavalry, and four mountain guns. He left Kohat on the 12th October 1892, and reached Sadda on the 20th. A week before his departure warning was sent to Chikkai's men in Lower Kurram that, unless they evacuated the Turi lands, they would be forcibly expelled. The threat was sufficient; the invaders promptly retired, no opposition was sustained by the force, and on its march round Upper Kurram it was everywhere well received by the people, who saw in the arrival of the British forces their sole hope of a release from the unhappy condition of affairs to which they had so long been accustomed. A graphic passage from a letter written by Mr. Merk soon after his arrival in the valley may here be quoted. He says, "Lower
Kurrum has passed through a serious convulsion during the past few years. No less than 59 Turi villages were burnt and gutted and have only now been re-occupied by their owners, who, before they were expelled, burnt some 35 Bangash villages. Naturally passions and feelings are very bitter all round."

From this time forward, the history of events in Kurrum has been one steady record of peaceful and rapid improvement. A few raids by offenders on both sides of the border there have been, though these have generally been settled without much difficulty; and there have been disputes, now happily settled, about water-rights between Turi inhabitants of Kurrum and the Afghan residents of the opposite side of the border which was demarcated by joint British and Afghan Commissioners in 1894. With these, however, we have no concern here. We desire rather to depict the satisfactory results of our intervention in Kurrum, which, until the outbreak of the recent disturbances by the tribes on its confines, was as peaceful as a district in British India.

Immediately on his arrival in Kurrum, Mr. Merk set about raising a body of militia from the inhabitants of the valley. The Zaimushts freely enlisted, and moreover accepted responsibility for the safety of a road through their territory between Kurrum and the Kohat district by Alizai and Hadmela. This led up to the pardoning of Chikkai, who, in spite of his having coquetted with the Amir for some time after this, has on the whole behaved loyally since, and conspicuously so during the late disturbances. Of the Kurrum Militia it will suffice to say that they are at present a body of about 900 men, whose equipment and training compare not unfavourably with the Khyber Rifles. They volunteered en masse for service with the Tirah Expeditionary Force, and though we did not consider it desirable to send them forward to settle their differences among themselves as far as possible and to resort to the courts only in serious cases.

Mr. Merk's proposals for the future administration of Kurrum were received early in 1893, and after mature consideration we decided that, while it was undesirable to annex Kurrum to British territory, we should retain a Political Agent there to govern the valley. It is only necessary to enter very briefly into details of these arrangements; our proceedings were welcomed by the Turis, whose conduct since their introduction has been such as to show their appreciation of our intervention. All accounts between residents of Kurrum and independent tribes or Afghan subjects for offences prior to October 1892 were simply written off; a rough and ready system of law and justice has been introduced, and a revenue settlement introduced based on the old Durrani figures. The duties of the regular police as regards arrest, custody and escort are performed by the Kurrum militia, but the people are encouraged to settle their differences among themselves as far as possible and to resort to the courts only in serious cases.

Trade has increased in a striking manner, and the remarkable rise in the proceeds of the lease of the Kurrum tolls from Rs. 5,000 in 1892, when they were farmed for the first time, to Rs. 14,500 during 1895-96 is significant testimony to the thorough pacification of this once turbulent and unsafe tract and to the change which our rule has brought. A head-quarters station has been built at Para Chinar, which promises to become an important centre for trade; cultivation is extending, and irrigation channels and new villages have been constructed where before the prevailing insecurity had rendered such impossible. The Kurrum valley does not, and probably never will, pay all the expenses of its government; still the cessation of hostility and strife, and the peace, order and prosperity which have followed upon British control, more than repay the expenditure of one and a half lakh of rupees which the civil administration costs over and above the annual income of the valley. The strength of the permanent escort retained in Kurrum is one troop of Native Cavalry, 250 Native Infantry, and two Maxim guns.

The only independent frontier tribe which during the last few years has given trouble on the Kurrum border has been the Para Chamkannis, a small clan living to the west of the Masuzai Orakzai, in glens of the Safed Koh, drained by the Kurrum and Khurmana streams. The Khani Khel are
the worst behaved of this clan, and the Punjab Government has more than once urged the desirability of sending a punitive expedition against them. We did not consider this measure necessary or desirable, and during the summer of 1897, under the pressure of a blockade, the Khani Khels made their submission, and promised to mend their ways. Both they and the Kurram Masuzais, however, joined in the general disturbances in the autumn of last year, and have been duly punished by the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The Orakzais are a Pathan tribe inhabiting the mountains to the north and west of the Kohat district. They are bounded on the north and east by the Afridi country, on the south by the Miranzai valley, and on the west by the Zaimusht country and the Safed Koh. With the exception of the two valleys inhabited by Afridis, the whole of the tract called Tirah is occupied by the Orakzais. They are divided into five clans, the Daulatzai, Ismailzai, Lasharzai, Alizai and Masuzai; the incorporated alien tribes, or hamsayahs, are the Mishti, Malla Khel, Sheikh and Ali Khel. They jointly number from 25,000 to 30,000 fighting men.

For the purposes of this despatch, it is unnecessary to give any detailed account of our relations with the Orakzais prior to 1884. Suffice it to say that the conduct of the clans immediately bordering on British territory had been far from satisfactory, and many cases were outstanding against them which they evinced no disposition to settle. Our relations with the tribe were at this period carried on through the agency of a middleman, a system formerly much in vogue on the Punjab frontier, but which is now discredited and has practically ceased to exist. Unquestionably the troubles on the Miranzai border which necessitated the despatch of two costly expeditions were chiefly due to this faulty system of tribal management. In the present instance, the middleman was Muzaffar Khan, the Khan of Hangu, Chief of the Bangash tribe occupying the Miranzai valley, and Tahsildar for Miranzai.

The Miranzai valley is part of the tribal territory of the Bangash Pathans, who are our subjects. The old boundary of this territory to the north, from the point where the river of the Khanki valley enters Miranzai, to the border of the Zaimusht country is the watershed of the Samana range, and this was admitted by the Rabia Khels (Ismailzai) in an agreement entered into by them in September 1855.

During the course of years, the adjoining independent tribes had encroached on our side of the watershed and established grazing hamlets on the southern slopes, and within the valley itself were settled as proprietors or tenants, numerous Orakzai and Zaimusht Pathans, who were as much our subjects as the Bangash themselves, and had lost connection with the tribal life of the independent clans to which, by origin, they belonged. Among these settlers were certain Malla khel, who, on annexation, would naturally have accepted our rule with the rest of Miranzai, had not Muzaffar Khan invented a fiction of their independence, by which he contrived to keep them private vassals of his own, and to exclude them from our police jurisdiction. The anomalous position of the Malla khels made them a great obstacle to the good order and administration of the valley and a thorn in the side of neighbouring villages; they committed robberies and murders in our territory, harboured outlaws and acted as guides and spies for the robbers of clans behind them. During 1885, their conduct was worse than usual, and the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, having satisfied himself that their hamlets stood on land which had been measured up and assessed at settlement, informed their jirga that in future they would be treated as British subjects. The jirga protested against this decision, and the Khan Tahsildar intrigued against the Deputy Commissioner; while his eldest son, Baz Gul, actively aided and abetted bad characters among the Malla khel, Rabia Khel and other Samil clans in committing outrages in British territory.

For the next three or four years, the state of affairs went from bad to worse, and in July 1889, the condition of the Miranzai border was described by the Lieutenant-Governor (Sir James Lyall) as "a scandal and a source of much injury and alarm to British subjects and of trouble to the administration." Strong measures were required, and with the sanction of the Government of India, Baz Gul was deported from Hangu; the Khan Tahsildar was peremptorily
ordered to collect outstanding fines within a fixed period, under penalty of loss of office; and the Aka Khel jirga was called in and a stringent demand made for satisfaction on account of all offences proved against them. These measures resulted in no improvement. Muzaffar Khan and his other son, Sarwar Khan, continued to thwart the district officer, further offences were committed, and the fines continued to mount up. By the end of February 1890, over 10,000 rupees being due from certain sections of the Rabia Khel, and there being no prospect of a settlement, the Lieutenant-Governor recommended the despatch of an expedition to coerce these sections, and in the hope that a show of force would improve our unsatisfactory relations with all the clans on this part of the border.

While the proposal was still under the consideration of the Government of India, affairs appeared to take a favourable turn: the expedition was postponed; the Khan Tahsildar paid up Rs. 19,000 out of Rs. 24,885 due on account of fine money; some of the leading offenders made their submission to the Deputy Commissioner; the Malla Khel submitted and accepted the decision regarding jurisdiction in their villages up to the foot of the Samana, and the Akhel agreed to pay the fines due by them. Unfortunately, the improvement was not lasting; it became necessary, in consequence of disturbances instigated by Muzaffar Khan (who had been granted furlough on the understanding that he would thereafter be retired) to deport him and his second son from the frontier: the tribesmen showed signs that they would not accept the Khan's removal from office without a struggle; border outrages increased; and all five * Samil clans assumed a hostile attitude. A blockade was established, and a formal warning sent to the Samil clans that, if they did not submit and pay the fines, an expedition would be sent against them. In the end, all except the Malla Khel, whose exposed position made them afraid to resist, failed to pay, and border outrages recommenced. The continued misconduct of the tribes showed that all hopes of a peaceful settlement must be abandoned, and early in January 1891, the despatch of an expedition against the four contumacious Samil clans was sanctioned. The terms which it was decided to impose were the full and immediate payment of all outstanding fines; the location of posts on the Samana range; the payment of revenue to Government for all holdings and grazing on the south side of the Samana, and the acceptance of tribal responsibility for offences committed and of the principle that claims against the tribe should be settled by tribal jirga before the Deputy Commissioner. The clans were called upon to provide men for the posts, and were to be offered payment for tribal service; and everything was ordered to be done to minimise the risk of opposition by assuring the clans that Government had no wish to punish them severely if they submitted.

The expeditionary force crossed the borders on the 26th January; the clans practically made no opposition, and by the end of February the troops had returned to Kohat, having been wholly successful. The tribesmen accepted the Government terms, though the condition regarding the payment of revenue was reported to have given rise to some excitement. This condition was, however, no more than the Rabia Khel had agreed to in their original agreement of 1855, although the demand had, owing to the intrigues of Muzaffar Khan, not been enforced. Measures were taken for the completion of the roads and the construction of posts on the Samana, a small force being left for the protection of the workmen.

On the 4th April, the picquets covering the working parties were treacherously attacked by a gathering numbering many thousands, including Akhels, Ali Khels, Alisherzais, Rabia Khels, Mishtis and Afidis. Several men were killed, and the small British force was compelled to evacuate the Samana and was followed up by the enemy as far as Darband. Within a fortnight, the range was re-occupied, the enemy being driven off with great loss. The subsequent operations of the force were equally successful. The enemy were defeated and dispersed wherever they were met; the whole of the Khanki Valley was traversed, and all the tribes in it made submission; suitable punishment was inflicted on those sections who took part in the outbreak, and all Government
property stolen on the 4th April recovered. There was no unnecessary destruction of villages or property such as might be calculated to exasperate the clans uselessly, but their punishment was severe. As a proof of the salutary, if temporary, effect of this second expedition, it may be mentioned that the

Aftridis of the Khyber, who at the conclusion of the first expedition refused to accept service in any form, lest it should be regarded as signifying their acquiescence in the occupation of the Samana, agreed to build posts commanding the approaches to their country from the south, and to furnish men to hold them. The Akhel agreed to do the same, and both sections agreed to pay revenue for the lands they occupy on the southern slope of the range.

The service allowances granted to the Orakzais aggregated 8,948 rupees a year, and were distributed as follows:—Daulatzais, 2,400; Muhammad Khel 2,016; Sturi Khel 500; Sher Khan, Mishi, Rabia Khel and Akhel, 1,008 each.

Since 1891 the posts on the Samana have been held by British Indian troops, and from that time forward until their recent outbreak, the Orakzais have all behaved well. In 1894, the Bar-Muhammad Khel, a sub-section of the Daulatzais, applied to be taken under the protection of the British Government and offered to place their country under its suzerainty. Their request was refused.

The Afridis are a large tribe of Pathans, inhabiting the lower and easternmost slopes of the Safed Koh range to the west and south of the Peshawar district, including the valley of the Bara river and portions of those of Chura and Tirah. They are divided into eight clans, of which six, the Kuki Khel, Sipah Khel, Kamrai Khel, Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel and Zakka Khel may be styled the Afridis of the Khyber. The Aka Khel, though, like the others, their summer residence is in Tirah, migrate in the winter to the hills bordering on the Peshawar District between the Kohat pass and the Bara river, where they dwell in caves, grazing their cattle in the plains. They receive allowances from Government of Rs. 1,000 a year. The Adam Khel are the Afridis of the Kohat pass, and will be separately referred to. The fighting strength of the whole Afridi tribe is estimated at about 27,000; and they furnish our Native army with close upon 2,000 recruits of the best fighting class. Where the general interests of the tribe are concerned, the clans usually range themselves into the two great factions of Gar and Samil. The latter includes the Zakka, Malikdin, Sipah, Kamrai and Aka Khels; the former the Kambar and Kuki Khels. The Adam Khels belong to neither, but side with one or the other as their interests may dictate.

Holding as they do the main trade route between India and Kabul, the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the Afridis cannot be exaggerated. Their power for evil was experienced during the early stages of the Afghan War, 1878-79: they are born robbers, and some of the sections, notably the Zakka Khel, are notorious, even among the wild mountainiers themselves, for their savage cruelty. Closely allied with the Afridis in the control of the Khyber pass are the Mullagoris, Kam and Loi Shillman Mohmands and the Loargai Shinwaris, numbering respectively 500, 600 and 900 men. They are on the whole well-beloved, and give little trouble.

By article 9 of the treaty of Gandamak, 1879, it was stipulated that the British Government should retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber pass, and of all political relations with the independent tribes directly attached thereto. This arrangement was renewed the following year when Amir Abdur Rahman Khan accepted the Kabul throne, and from that time forward the pass throughout its entire length from the Punjab border to a short distance beyond Landi Khana has been under the control of the British Government.

Prior to 1879, the Afridis of the Khyber, while always asserting their independence, received from the Amir of Kabul allowances in consideration of keeping the pass open to trade. These allowances, irregularly paid at best, were often suspended for years together, and shortly before the war, the route was practically closed to commerce, or traders were only allowed to use it on payment of duties so heavy as to be almost prohibitive. On the transfer of the pass, arrangements were at once initiated for placing our relations with the Afridis on a satisfactory footing. The representatives of the tribes came in
and a conference was held in the autumn of 1880 at Peshawar. After protracted negotiations, a settlement was finally concluded in February 1881: the independence of the tribes was recognized, an annual subsidy of Rs. 87,540 was allotted in allowances to different sections of the tribes, and a body of Jezailchis under the charge and management of the tribal headmen was enlisted for the protection of the pass at a yearly cost to Government of Rs. 87,392. In consideration of these payments, the Afridis accepted entire and exclusive responsibility for the security of the road, and bound themselves to commit no offences in British territory. The British Government reserved the right, which has been since exercised, of levying tolls on traffic carried through the Khyber. In view of the fact that since the outbreak of the recent frontier disturbances, certain of the tribesmen have professed to have a grievance in regard to what they have termed our interference in the Khyber, we deem it well to quote verbatim clause 5 of the agreement subscribed to by the Afridis:—“Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops. It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the pass, or to withdraw them and to re-occupy at pleasure.”

The settlement above described has on the whole worked well, and we had every reason to be satisfied with it. During the seventeen years that it has been in force, the only material change has been in the constitution of the Jezailchi corps, which has gradually developed from the irregular band of Jezailchis, or match-lock men paid through the maliks, into the highly efficient well-armed rifle corps which volunteered for service, and actually was employed, on the Black Mountain Expedition of 1891. With the consent and assistance of the tribesmen, in 1888-89 a fortified serai was built at Landi Kotal, which was thenceforward held by the Khyber rifles until its destruction in August last. At the beginning of the year 1897, the Afridis received in pay and allowances the handsome sum of Rs. 1,90,000 a year.

The time has not yet arrived when we can decide the actual terms and conditions to which we shall require the Afridis to agree for the re-opening of the Khyber route; for the present we shall hold the pass with our troops: but we trust that after we have received the general submission of the Afridis, we shall be able to re-establish tribal managements not less satisfactory than those which have existed in the past.

The Adam Khel, the Afridis of the Kohat pass, are a large and important community completely distinct from the Afridis of the Khyber. They are divided into four sections, Galai, Hassan, Ashu and Jowaki, and can turn out between 3,500 and 4,000 fighting men. Located in the hills and glens westward of Jalala Sar, and in the glens on each side of the defile leading from the Peshawar valley to Kohat, they hold the entire pass in their grasp. The defile extends from near Ainal Chabutra in the Peshawar plain, for a distance of 12 miles; the road then winds over a mountain, the crest of which forms the boundary between the Galai Afridis and the Bangashes occupying the Kohat valley. From this crest to Kohat is a distance of about 7 miles, the greater part of which is a descent through mountain gorges unoccupied by any tribe.

As far back as 1849, we first entered into an agreement with the Galai Khel, by which the latter agreed to keep open the Kohat pass in consideration of an annual payment of Rs. 5,700. The arrangement did not last long; in 1850 they attacked some sappers engaged on the construction of a road 3 miles out of Kohat, and killed or wounded nearly all. A force was sent into the pass, the tribe was punished, a blockade established, and the following year, on the Galai Khels submitting, the old arrangement was renewed on condition of the tribe accepting responsibility for the security of the pass. In 1855 they again misbehaved, but finding themselves threatened by a strong force, they made submission, the old arrangement was once again re-established; and for the next twenty years they gave little trouble. In 1875 negotiations were opened with the Galais for the construction of a good road through the pass. The work had been desired for many years, and the tribe was bound by agreement to undertake it. They evaded compliance, and a blockade was imposed, which was followed by a certain amount of raiding in British territory. Other sections became involved and the blockade was extended to them; their cons
tumacy did not last long, and in 1877 the maliks came in and accepted the
Government terms, which were the improvement under Government supervi-
sion of the rocky portion of the road north of the Kotal, the surrender of all
plundered property belonging to British subjects and the payment of a fine of
Rs. 3,000. The road through the defile itself has remained unimproved to
tiis day and is impossible for wheeled traffic; though otherwise it meets our
purposes.

At the present time, as has been the case for many years past, the pass is
fully open to us, and open in a sense in which the Khyber is not open. An
European can go through it, without any previous arrangement and attended
only by a single orderly, as if he was in British territory; while during the last
few months, in spite of the almost universal state of fanatical excitement on
the border, the Kohat pass route has been freely used for the passage of troops
passing from Peshawar to Kohat, without a shot being fired. Our relations
with the Pass Afridis are indeed, most satisfactory, and it is a remarkable
evidence of the hold we have obtained over them in recent times, that whereas
some years ago a very small enhancement of the salt duty led them to assume
a defiant attitude, the large increase recently introduced has not evoked the
smallest sign of resistance from them, notwithstanding that they are more
largely interested than almost any other of the frontier tribes, from the fact
that they are extensive camel-owners and the principal carriers on this part of
the border. The allowances at present paid to the Adam Khel, exclusive of the
Jowakis, aggregate Rs. 5,040 a year.

The Jowaki section of the Adam Khels deserves a paragraph to itself. The Jowakis live to the east of the Kohat pass, in the strip of independent
territory running south from the Jowaki pass into the Kohat district,
approaching the main military road half way between Khushalgarh and Kohat.
They number about 1,200 fighting men. Our first agreement with them, under
which they accepted responsibility for crimes committed in British territory,
was in 1851. Two years later, the Jowaki village of Borí had attained such a
notoriety as the asylum of freebooters and outlaws who marauded thence into
British territory, that an expedition was sent against it, and the stronghold
destroyed. The Jowakis promptly submitted and entered into an agreement
to abstain from raids themselves and to eject within two months all fugitive
outlaws in their country. For many years afterwards they behaved well: but
in July 1877, they suddenly gave up their peaceful attitude, committed a series
of outrages against British territory, cut the telegraph wires on the Khushalgarh
line and attacked British subjects and villages with much audacity. So grave
were their offences, that in November 1877 a strong force entered their
country. After a long and stubborn resistance, the Jowakis at last gave in
and agreed to the Government terms, including a large fine, the restoration of
stolen property, surrender of hostages, withdrawal of their share of the Kohat
pass allowances, and the opening of communications through their country.
The terms also included the exile of four of the principal maliks, responsible
for the tribe's misconduct: they left for a while, but returned within a fort-
night of the withdrawal of the troops. Malik Mushki, brother of one of the
exiled maliks, continued for several years afterwards to raid on the Khushalgarh
road from his village of Shindand, until his career was cut short by a
surprise visit by troops from Kohat in November 1889. Since then, Jowaki
depedations in British territory have entirely ceased. The Jowakis enjoy an
annual allowance of Rs. 1,848 for the maintenance of certain posts within
their limits, and for several years past they have given no trouble. Malik
Babri, the leader of the troubles of 1877, is now dead, and his son is the
manager of the tongah service from Kohat to Khushalgarh.

The Mohmand tribe consists of four main divisions: the Tarakzai,
Halimzai, Baezai and Khwaezai. Their country may be roughly defined as
bounded on the west and south by the Kunar and Kabul rivers, on the east
and north-east by the British border from Fort Michni to Fort Abazai and the
Swat river to where it bends south after leaving the Swat valley, and on the north
by the hills of Bajaur. Their exceptionally favourable situation for harassing
simultaneously Ningrarah and the Peshawar plain, and the power they possessed
of closing several trade routes from Kabul to India, early induced former
Governments to confer upon the Mohmands and their leaders large and valuable jagirs and to give them permission to levy heavy tolls on road and river, as a sop to their marauding propensities. At annexation, greater part of the Mohmand jagirs in Peshawar were forfeited, nor were they restored, although the border was kept for years in excitement by the angry tribe.

During the last Afghan War the Mohmands on several occasions gave trouble, but, since its close and until the outbreak of the recent disturbances, collisions between us and the various sections of the tribe have been few and unimportant. In 1881 the Tarakzais held thirteen villages revenue-free in the Doaba Tahsil of the Peshawar District, and the Halimzai certain other villages in the same Tahsil. The entire tribe at the same time enjoyed very large grants from Kabul, which, however, in 1896 had diminished to about 62,000 rupees a year.

The Khan of Lalpura is the hereditary Chief of the Mohmand tribe. In January 1880, during the Afghan War, Sadik Khan, who had been appointed Khan by Amir Yakub Khan, revolted, and the British Government appointed his half-brother Akbar Khan in his place, a position which he continued to hold under Amir Abdur Rahman Khan until within the last few months. In 1883, the Khan proceeded to Michni to coerce the Michni Tarakzais, and on the latter taking refuge in British territory, the Government of India made it known that they declined to recognize the entire supremacy of the Amir or of the Khan of Lalpura over the Mohmands in the neighbourhood of Michni.

For several years the Amir contented himself with paying annual allowances to the Mohmands, avoiding anything like active interference in their affairs: the British Government on their side merely maintaining their right to deal direct with any of the sections with which they found it necessary to have dealings. In 1889, the Amir commenced to adopt more active measures. He sent an emissary to the Baezais proposing a treaty of alliance and subordination on their part, payment of tithes by them to him and an agreement to allow the establishment of an Afghan fort at Bedman and another at Mitai. The Baezaï objected and refused to draw their allowances; factions friendly and hostile to the Amir arose in Mitai; the Amir's Agents were sent throughout the country to push His Highness's interests and to endeavour to induce the tribe to declare themselves entirely under Afghan suzerainty, and a general feeling of unrest pervaded the whole of the Mohmand territory.

This was the position of affairs at the time of the departure of the Durand Mission to Kabul in September 1893. In connection with an incident which occurred in 1891, when some shots were fired at a British party engaged in surveying the Kabul river, by Halimzai Mohmands instigated by the notorious Mullah Khalil, the Government of India defined their policy in respect of the Mohmands in the following terms: "The Government of India have always abstained from recognizing the Khan's entire supremacy over these clans (the Tarakzais and Halimzais) on the ground that to do so would imply a recognition of the Amir's sovereignty. Such sovereignty the Government of India are not prepared to acknowledge." This declaration was borne in mind by Sir Mortimer Durand in his negotiations with the Amir. He had also to consider the strategical desirability of controlling the passes north of Peshawar leading westwards into Afghanistan on the flank of the high road from Badakshan into the Bashgul and Kunar valleys; and the extreme undesirability of having the Afghan frontier close on the Peshawar District. Consequently he drew the boundary line on the agreement map, which the Amir accepted, in such a way as to divide the Mohmands in two. The line runs from the Nawa Kotal through the Salala Sar peak and crosses the Kabul river at Palosi, leaving Palosi on the one side and Shinpokh on the other.

It is unnecessary here to detail the difficulties which arose when we sought to undertake the demarcation of the boundary in this direction. The Amir declared that Sir Mortimer Durand had conceded the whole of the Mohmands to him, and that the boundary map was wrong, and having occupied Mitai, a Baezaï village, claimed by the Khan of Nawagat, for a long time resisted the Government of India's demand for his withdrawal. Eventually, after a prolonged correspondence, in November 1896 we offered to concede to the Amir the Baezaï villages other than Mitai, and all the Khwaezaïs, while
maintaining that the country of the Halimezai, Tarakzai, Dawezai and Umanzai sections, including also the Kandahari and Safi villages and all the villages of the Musa Khel Baezais of Mitai, must necessarily remain under British control. The Amir reluctantly accepted our decision, and a meeting took place between the Sipah Salar and Mr. Udny at Landi Khana in March 1897 with a view to discussing the details of demarcation. It was found impossible, however, to come to any arrangements for demarcation of portions of the boundary on the ground; the mission broke up, and we proposed to the Amir that the sphere of influence of the two countries should be defined by a boundary described by tribal divisions, the actual territorial limits being those which the tribesmen themselves have been accustomed to observe. We insisted, however, on the withdrawal of the Afghan Khassadars from Mitai, as a preliminary to the continuance of negotiations. The Amir then withdrew his men from Mitai, but declined to agree to the formal recording of any settlement until the entire boundary line had been examined by the Commission. Here the matter, so far as demarcation is concerned, has for the time terminated.

Meanwhile, at the end of the year 1896, we arrived at arrangements with the Mohmand clans over which we had excluded the Amir's interference, which promised to be satisfactory. Representative jirgas met the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division in November 1896, their attitude was good, and they accepted the position that they were henceforth under the British Government; they were allowed to continue to receive river tolls, and allowances aggregating Rs. *16,800 a year were fixed for them in lieu of those heretofore paid, actually or nominally, by the Amir. In return for these allowances, they agreed to render such service as Government might require from them, and to be faithful and well conducted in their dealings with the British Government. Unfortunately, the Mohmands joined in the recent fanatical outburst on the border, and the arrangement above described may be regarded as cancelled. The Mohmands have, however, been severely punished by the force which visited their country; they have completely submitted to the terms imposed upon them, and we have no doubt that it will be an easy matter to reintroduce an arrangement in somewhat similar lines to the one they themselves violated whenever we choose to do so.

In order to allow of a correct appreciation of the policy of the Government of India which has led to the position which we now occupy in regard to Swat, Dir and Chitral, it is desirable to commence with a brief account of the relations of the Kashmir Darbar with the States on its north and north-west border.

Hunza and Nagar are Dard States, lying on the extreme west of the northern limits of Kashmir; towards the north they extend into the mountainous region adjoining the junction of the Hindu Kush and Mustagh ranges; towards the south they border on Gilgit. The Chitral State lies south of the Hindu Kush, which is its northern boundary; it is bounded on the south by the Indus, Kohistan, the Laspar range and the Kunar district; by Hunza and Gilgit on the east; Kafiristan on the west. The history of Chitral is closely connected with that of Gilgit, as will presently be seen. Gilgit had recently been conquered by the Sikhs when the treaty of Amritsar was concluded in 1846, and was transferred by that engagement to the Maharaja of Kashmir. In 1852, it was reconquered by Gauhar Aman, Chief of Yasin, and was held by him until 1860, when the Maharaja recovered it. Desultory hostilities continued till, in 1863, the Kashmir troops for a second time advanced into Yasin and subdued the district with great cruelty. In 1870, Gauhar Aman's second son, Mir Wali, obtained possession of Yasin, aided by Aman-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral, to whom he became subordinate. In 1872, Mir Wali was expelled by his brother, Pahlwan; Aman-ul-Mulk made Mastuj over to the latter, with whom his relations were intimate, and in 1875, Aman-ul-Mulk was firmly established in Lower Chitral and Pahlwan in Yasin and Mastuj.

By this time, these Chiefs had commenced making friendly overtures to the Maharaja of Kashmir, Aman-ul-Mulk also holding certain relations with

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Amir Sher Ali Khan of Kabul, who frequently asserted his own suzerainty over Chitral. The Government of India had for some period previously had under consideration the question of the policy to be adopted in regard to the external relations of the Kashmir State: rumours had been prevalent that the Russians were trying to establish themselves in Sarikol, the people of Dardistan were expressing concern at the increasing pressure from Afghanistan, and were tendering more or less surreptitiously their allegiance alternately to Kabul, Kashmir and China, doubting to which quarter they should look for the safest barter of their allegiance in return for protection by some paramount power. To the Chiefs of Hunza, Nagar and Chitral belonged the southern openings of the only passes which give direct passage through the mountain ranges to Sarikol and the Pamirs, and the Government of India accordingly determined to acquire, through the Maharaja of Kashmir, an efficient control over these passes, to bring the Chiefs under the Maharaja’s political control and suzerainty, and to make out, as definitely as the nature of the country would permit, the territorial limits up to which we should extend our indirect authority, and within which the encroachments of foreign influence should be anticipated.

In furtherance of this policy, it was decided to post a British Political Officer at Gilgit, and in September 1877, Captain J. Biddulph was selected for the post. Early in 1879, a formal agreement was concluded between the Maharaja of Kashmir and the ruler of Chitral, under which the latter gave in his allegiance to the Maharaja and agreed to pay tribute, while the former agreed to pay the Mehtar an annual stipend of Rs. 12,000 (raised in 1881 to Rs. 24,000). This was so far satisfactory: but local intrigues made Captain Biddulph’s position a difficult one; and at the end of 1880, these culminated in open warfare, and Captain Biddulph was compelled to shut himself up in Gilgit, in daily expectation of attack by a large force under Pahlwan, who had seized Gakuch, overrun Panyal and raised the whole countryside. The Mehtar of Chitral sent his son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, to the rescue: he attacked Yasin and Pahlwan fled; the rising subsided, and Yasin and Mastuj remained in possession of Chitral. These events afforded immediate reasons for examining the position of the British officer at Gilgit. Lord Ripon’s Government considered it clear that not even the personal safety of the British agent could be guaranteed efficiently either by the British Government or the Maharaja; all attempts to exercise direct influence over the Gilgit tribes had been met by suspicion and jealousy; and the rising of the Yasin Chief, who had previously been friendly, and whose motives were never understood, showed that the Political Agent had failed, through no fault of his own, to secure any solid or durable influence over the petty Chiefships with which he had had political relations. It was accordingly decided to withdraw the Gilgit Agency and to leave in the hands of the Kashmir Darbar the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State. Colonel Tauner, who had meanwhile relieved Captain Biddulph at Gilgit, was ordered to return to India in the summer of 1881, the Maharaja being given to understand that the withdrawal of the Agency should not be regarded as final, and that Government reserved full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit if this should hereafter seem desirable.

Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency, in reply to letters from Aman-ul-Mulk, in which he expressed fears regarding the intentions of the Amir of Afghanistan towards Chitral, a written assurance was given to him in 1882 that his engagements with Kashmir were recognized and upheld by the British Government, that he need have no concern with the affairs of Afghanistan, and that the Amir understood and would not interfere with the Mehtar’s relations with the British Government. The Amir was similarly addressed and His Highness replied disclaiming all intention of interfering with the Chitral State. The summer of 1883 saw Pahlwan a refugee in Darel, and Afzal-ul-Mulk, a son of the Mehtar, in charge of Yasin.

In 1885, the probability of the outbreak of war with Russia enforced the necessity of obtaining fuller information regarding the routes and resources of the country lying between Chitral and Faizabad in Badakhshan. It was
therefore determined to send a small mission to examine the country round Gilgit and Chitral, and if possible to visit Kafiristan. Colonel W. Lockhart (now General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.) was appointed to the command of the party. They left Srinagar about the beginning of July, and, before going into winter quarters at Gilgit, had obtained much useful information about Chitral. They had succeeded in making friends with the Chitralis, and had obtained a written engagement from the Mehtar that, in the event of an attack being made upon the British Government from the direction of his territory, he would resist such attack and would allow a passage to British troops. They succeeded in penetrating to the eastern part of the Kafir country, but were unable to traverse western Kafiristan because of intertribal feuds. After the winter, the party marched through Hunza to Wakhsh, but with this part of their journey we are not here concerned. After their return to India in the summer of 1886, Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk kept up an active and friendly correspondence with the Government of India, and early in 1888, sent his second son, Afzal-ul-Mulk, to visit the Viceroy at Calcutta.

As a result of the reports received from Colonel Lockhart's mission, Lord Dufferin's Government were induced to reconsider the policy to be observed in the direction of Chitral and Gilgit. It was felt that the time had come when affairs on the north-west frontier of Kashmir could no longer be left to the management of the local officials of the Darbar, and that it was essential to establish an effective political control which would enable us to watch the passes of the Hindu Kush and the country beyond, and that we should introduce a military organisation sufficient to control the Chiefships under Kashmir influence, and, in the event of war with Russia, to prevent any coup de main by a small body of troops acting across the passes. Recent events had shown that the Darbar had been unable to keep the States properly in check; the country round Gilgit was disturbed, and in February 1888, the Rajas of Hunza and Nagar had ejected the Kashmir sepoys from the outposts of Chalt and Chaprot, which were not re-occupied until after much delay. Circumstances had greatly changed since the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency in 1881, and in order to secure the results desired, it was thought that the Gilgit Agency must be restored. There was no intention of sending up British troops, but it was proposed to ask the Darbar to provide an efficient body of infantry and a properly equipped mountain battery for employment in the Gilgit district. Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) A. G. Durand was accordingly deputed to Gilgit in the summer of 1888 to watch events and report on the situation, and, if asked, to advise the Governor of Gilgit in his military difficulties. After spending a short time at Gilgit, Captain Durand accepted an invitation from Aman-ul-Mulk to visit Chitral, where he was most hospitably received, and returned to India at the end of the year.

In the following summer he returned to Gilgit as British Agent. Surgeon-Major G. Robertson (now Sir George Robertson, K.C.S.I.) accompanied him, and certain other officers were subsequently attached to the Agency. The decision to re-establish the Agency was communicated to the Darbar, with a proposal that the expense should be borne partly by the Government of India and partly by the State. The Darbar concurred in the proposed re-establishment of the Agency, and considering "it their paramount duty in view of the importance of defending the northern frontier of Kashmir to relieve the Government of India of the charge of the Gilgit Agency," they offered to defray the entire cost of the scheme. This loyal offer was not, however, accepted.

In the autumn of 1888, in compliance with invitations from the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar, Captain Durand visited those States, and negotiated agreements with the Rajas, according to which they undertook to put an end to raiding, to give free passage to British officers deputed to visit their country and to accept the British Agent's control. Subject to these conditions, the Government of India sanctioned for the Chiefs yearly allowances in addition to the subsidies already paid by Kashmir. The Rajas, however,
failed to act up to their engagements, and their attitude was generally unsatisfactory. In May 1891, a combined force from Hunza and Nagar threatened the Chalt fort, but dispersed on the arrival of reinforcements from Gilgit. Looking to the possibility of trouble, it was decided to strengthen Colonel Durand's hands: 200 Gurkhas, 2 guns of a Native Mountain Battery and a Gatling were added to the Agency guard, and the staff of European officers was increased. In November, on being informed that roads were about to be made to Chalt, and onwards into their country, the Chiefs refused to agree, insulted the British Agent's messenger, and assembled their tribesmen, blocking the paths into their valley. The Nagar Raja forced on a conflict by intimating that any attempt to build a bridge at Chalt would lead to war. Colonel Durand advanced to Chalt and sent a message requiring the tribes to desist from their attitude of hostility. They sent a defiant reply, and Colonel Durand thereupon moved against them, his force of 200 British Native troops and 700 men of the Kashmir Infantry capturing the fort at Nilt with great gallantry. After a check of 16 days before the almost impregnable position which the tribesmen had taken up on the cliffs above Nilt, an advance was made to Nagar and Hunza, both of which fell without further opposition. Colonel Durand was disabled during the attack on Nilt, and the further operations were effected under the leadership of Major Colin Mackenzie, of the Ross-shire Buffs, the direction of political affairs devolving on Dr. Robertson. Raja Jafir Khan of Nagar, who had been acting under the ascendancy of his turbulent eldest son, Uzr Khan, at once submitted and was subsequently reinstated by the Kashmir Durbar, with the approval of Government. Uzr Khan, with Safdar Ali Khan, Raja of Hunza, fled in the direction of the Pamirs; and in September 1892, Muhammad Nazim, a half-brother of Safdar Ali, was formally installed as Raja of Hunza. In March 1893, Raja Jafir Khan, whose behaviour had been bad since his installation, asked to be relieved of the trouble of ruling and to be allowed to place the executive in the hands of his son, Raja Sikandar Khan. This was agreed to, and the affairs of Hunza and Nagar have since progressed most satisfactorily. The splendid services of the levies of these two small States in the troublous times which were to follow in Chitral will be referred to later.

In 1892, scarcity of grain at Gilgit necessitated arrangements being made to send a regiment of the Imperial Service Troops to Skardo, and a British Commissariat Officer, Captain Yeilding, was deputed to Kashmir to introduce a practicable scheme for the future transport of supplies for the Gilgit garrison. This question was a difficult one, owing to the nature of the country over which the supplies had to be passed, and the operations entailed heavy expense. During the year, Captain Yeilding had over 8,000 transport animals at work, and threw over 50,000 mounds of grain into Gilgit; the system which he then introduced has been continued, with slight modifications in the interests of economy, to the present day. The cost is borne in the proportion of one-fourth by the Kashmir State, and three-fourths by the Government of India.

The complete success of the troops in Hunza and Nagar had the best effect in Chitral, though the Mehtar continued to intrigue in Bajaur against our advice. Aman-ul-Mulk died suddenly in his own Darbar on the 30th August 1892. Sirdar Nizam-ul-Mulk, the eldest son, was away at the time in Yasin, and the rulership was formally assumed by Afzal ul-Mulk, the son who had visited India in 1888. He put to death three of his brothers, and marched with a strong force against Nizam-ul-Mulk; the latter, deserted by most of his followers, fled to Gilgit and no fighting took place. Just at this time, the attitude of Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, was very threatening, and Afzal-ul-Mulk, fearing an attack from the south, begged that British officers might be sent to Chitral. Surgeon-Major Robertson was accordingly ordered to start from Gilgit at once to re-assure the new Mehtar, and, if possible, effect a settlement between him and Umra Khan. Before Dr. Robertson could start, Sher Afzal, an uncle of Afzal-ul-Mulk, long a refugee in Afghanistan, swept down on Chitral from Badakhshan, killed the Mehtar and seized the country. It was generally believed that the Amir approved of this act of aggression and indirectly aided Sher Afzal. Immediately on the news reaching Gilgit, Nizam-ul-Mulk set out with a large following, and occupied Mastuj without
difficulty: Drasan fell into his hands on the 1st December, and Sher Afzal fled to the Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar, whence he was sent to Kabul. There he was retainted under surveillance, the Amir promising that he should not again be allowed to disturb the peace in Chitral. How this promise was kept will be shortly seen. For some time, Umra Khan continued to play an active part in the southern district of Chitral; he attacked Drosh, but was unable to take the fort, and after several skirmishes withdrew to Dir, where his troops were soon engaged in conflict with the tribes inhabiting the Kohistan.

In January 1893, Dr. Robertson, accompanied by Captain F. Young-husband, started from Gilgit for Chitral. On behalf of Government he publicly recognized Nizam-ul-Mulk as Mehtar, and returned to Gilgit in May, leaving behind Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Gordon, with 50 men of the 15th Sikhs as an escort. Lord Lansdowne's Government decided that recent events did not call for any departure from the policy which had hitherto been adopted in regard to Chitral; that it should continue to be under the suzerainty of Kashmir and under British influence, a British officer remaining in the State for a time at least.

A review of the position on the Chitral frontier was placed before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in the summer of 1893, and Lord Kimberley agreed to the retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral as a temporary measure only, and pointed to three possible contingencies which would materially affect the general aspect of affairs in that region:—

(i) the abandonment by the Amir of all idea of bringing Chitral under his control;

(ii) the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract; and

(iii) the mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes.

At the close of the year, the first of the above contingencies had been attained by the agreement concluded between the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand, and the attitude of the tribes was fairly satisfactory. In these circumstances, orders were issued in January 1894 for the withdrawal of the Political Officer when the winter was over, if no fresh complications had meanwhile arisen. The events of the spring and early part of the summer of 1894 did not, however, tend to facilitate the execution of the policy thus projected; the actual demarcation of the Afghan frontier had not made any progress; and the situation on the southern border of Chitral was complicated by the aggressive proceedings of the Khan of Jandol. The moment was considered inopportune for taking a step which might be regarded as a definite withdrawal, and it was decided that the position in and towards Chitral must remain for another year on its existing footing. The Government of India, however, deprecated the policy of activity and extension advocated by Captain Younghusband and Colonel Bruce, the Officiating British Agent at Gilgit, and reminded them that there was no intention of permanently maintaining a British Officer in Chitral, and that the Mehtar should be taught, as soon as possible, to rely on and act for himself. At the same time, it was decided that the regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers) in the Gilgit Agency should not be withdrawn until an agreement had been concluded with Russia on the Pamir question.

At the end of 1894, Nizam-ul-Mulk had been Mehtar for two years; he had succeeded in holding his own, and had even obtained a certain degree of popularity. No dangerous opponents appeared to be left in the field. Sher Afzal was still interned in Kabul, and most of the sons of the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk had either been murdered or had fled the country. Of the latter, one was Amir-ul-Mulk, a youth of from 18 to 20 years of age, who, on the accession of Nizam-ul-Mulk, had fled to Bajaur, and taken refuge with Umra Khan. In May 1894, Amir-ul-Mulk returned to Chitral professing to have escaped from Umra Khan's hands, and was kindly received by Nizam-ul-Mulk. On the 1st January 1895, while the brothers were out hawking at Broz, a few miles from Chitral, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot dead by a follower of Amir-ul-Mulk. The latter promptly seized the Chitral Fort, and proclaimed himself Mehtar. Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant Political
Officer, was in Chitral when the murder took place, with an escort of 8 Sikhs. The nearest support of 100 men was at Mastuj, 63 miles north-east of Chitral. Fifty Sikhs from Mastuj were at once sent to Chitral upon Lieutenant Gurdon’s requisition, and Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men, and Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Gilgit, started about the middle of January 1895 for Chitral to report on the situation. Mr. Robertson was cautioned not to commit Government to any change of policy in regard to Chitral, and not to recognise any candidate to the Mehtarship, or to conclude any permanent arrangement, without reference to the Government of India.

The murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk is believed to have been brought about by an arrangement between the Sher Afzal party and Umra Khan of Jandol, the latter seeing an opportunity for his own aggrandisement in the disturbance which must necessarily follow in Chitral. Amir-ul-Mulk disclaimed all connection with Umra Khan, but was probably acting in collusion with him at the time he was projecting Nizam-ul-Mulk’s murder. He appears to have afterwards realised the danger of Umra Khan’s presence and to have become anxious to get rid of him. Be this as it may, immediately after the murder, Umra Khan advanced into the southern end of the Chitral Valley with a large force. He sent a letter to the Governor of Dosh, in which he announced his intention of starting a jeihad to punish the Kafirs, and requested that Amir-ul-Mulk would come to Ashreth to receive him. Amir-ul-Mulk did not fall in with his wishes, whereupon Umra Khan’s force occupied Ashreth, and proceeded to advance on Kila Darosh. Mr. Robertson was at Mastuj, 158 miles from a line of telegraph, when he heard that Umra Khan had invaded Chitral territory.

In his opinion, this effected a complete change in the situation. He knew that Lieutenant Gurdon could not withdraw from Chitral without help; and he determined to push on to his assistance. At the same time, he wrote to Umra Khan, on the 26th of January, demanding an explanation of the presence of his forces in Chitral territory, and advising him to at once retire, and so save himself from the consequences of the displeasure of Government. Under instructions from Government, Mr. Robertson further addressed Umra Khan early in February, demanding an explanation of his proceedings. Umra Khan replied on the 10th February that he had come to assist and strengthen Amir-ul-Mulk and to combine with him for an attack on the Kafirs; that Amir-ul-Mulk had acted in a hostile manner; but that he would leave Amir-ul-Mulk alone if he was willing to make peace, and that he hoped his friendship with the British Government would remain unbroken.

Mr. Robertson arrived in Chitral on the 1st February. He had with him 290 men, and sufficient supplies to the end of April had been collected. There were 200 men at Mastuj, whither 100 Sikhs of the British Agent’s escort had also been despatched from Gilgit. The Bajauris, estimated at 8,000 to 4,000 men, remained throughout February in the southern part of the Chitral Valley. The Chitrali forces opposing Umra Khan numbered about 3,000 men. On the 26th January, the Chitrals were driven from their position before Kila Darosh with some loss on both sides; they continued, however, to hold Kila Darosh itself until the 9th February, when it was surrendered to Umra Khan by arrangement, under which the lives of the defenders were spared, and many breech-loading rifles and matchlocks were given up to him. After the surrender of Kila Darosh, the Chitralis concentrated at Ghairat under Amir-ul-Mulk.

In order to prevent a general stampede of the inhabitants from Chitral proper, and to neutralize the open revolt of the Kushwakhtis against Amir-ul-Mulk, Mr. Robertson took over the Kushwakht country as a temporary measure; and, on his own responsibility without pledging Government to anything, he promised protection to the Kushwakht headmen, and appointed Kushwakht Governors to Mastuj and Laspur. At this time Amir-ul-Mulk was with Mr. Robertson in the Chitral Fort, and Mr. Robertson hoped that, by showing that he and Amir-ul-Mulk were working in thorough accord, he might succeed in restoring confidence.

Mr. Robertson’s situation was difficult. Before Kila Darosh was surrendered, he had reported that efforts were being made by the Chitralis to bring about a collision between himself and Umra Khan. He stated that the Chitralis had “no fight in them;” that they had undoubtedly called in Umra
Khan, but desired to escape the consequences of their own acts; and that their attitude was so doubtful that, if he were to move back one yard, he would be mobbed by a crowd of refugees; the whole country would be open to Umra Khan, and he would be harassed or permitted to retire according to the humour of Umra Khan and his fanatical following. In these circumstances it was evident that any further success would render Umra Khan a serious danger to the British representative. Mr. Robertson was accordingly authorized by telegram on the 19th February to give the Chitralis such material and moral support in turning Umra Khan out of Chitral territory as might be consistent with the safety of his own party, and to call up reinforcements if necessary. The situation now became seriously complicated by the appearance on the scene of the refugee Sher Afzal from Kabul; his first act was to send a confidential messenger to Mr. Robertson, demanding that he should at once retire to Mastuj. Sher Afzal promised friendship, but his promise was coupled with a threat that, if his terms were not accepted, Umra Khan would at once advance. Mr. Robertson replied that Chitral was under the suzerainty of Kashmir, and neither Umra Khan nor anyone else could impose a Mehtar on Chitral without the permission of Government; that Sher Afzal’s message was wanting in respect to the Government of India; that he was informing Government of Sher Afzal’s demands and would communicate their orders; and that, if in the meantime Sher Afzal attempted any overt acts of hostility, he must take the consequences on his own head.

At the end of February the Chitralis were still holding Ghairat, and Umra Khan was rapidly completing his preparations for the defence of Kila Drost against an attack from the Chitralis which he believed to be imminent. A few Chitralis of the lower class had gone over to Sher Afzal, but the Adamzadas, though suspected of being partizans of Sher Afzal, had not yet openly espoused his cause. Of the 700 Sniders given by Government to Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk, it was estimated that only 200 remained in Chitral, most of the others having found their way into the hands of Umra Khan. The strength of the force with Umra Khan at this time has been variously estimated at from 3,000 to 8,000 men. The Assistant British Agent at Gilgit had already arranged, at Mr. Robertson’s request, to send up 150 Hunza, Nagar and Pynal levies to reinforce Chitral; and he now called up 100 Kashmir troops from Chilas for duty in Gilgit.

Mr. Robertson, who had gone out with Amir-ul-Mulk to the Chitralt position of Ayun, on the river between Chitral and Drost, returned to Chitral on the 1st March with the whole of his escort. He sent a message to Gilgit that no anxiety need be felt if communication with him were interrupted. This was the last direct communication received from Chitral; it came from Lieutenant Gurdon and was dated the 1st March. Mr. Robertson had with him in Chitral a fairly strong force and plenty of supplies, while Gups, Ghizr, and Mastuj were also held by troops with British officers in each. It was clear, however, that, if communications with Gilgit were cut, Mr. Robertson’s position would be full of risk so long as Umra Khan was north of the Lowara Pass, and after a review of the situation, the Government of India decided that preparations should be made to operate against Umra Khan from Peshawar. On the 14th March, an ultimatum in the name of the Government of India was sent to Umra Khan through Mr. Udy, who was on frontier delimitation work in the Kunar Valley, and the Commissioner of Peshawar, and an attempt was also made to send a similar letter through the British officers in Chitral and Mastuj. The letter recounted the warnings given to him against interfering with Chitral affairs; mentioned his various acts of aggression; directed him to at once quit Chitral territory; and told him that, if by the 1st of April he had not withdrawn, the Government of India would compel him to do so. At the same time, a proclamation was issued to the people of Swat and others on the Peshawar frontier, in the following terms:—

“To all the people of Swat and the people in Bajaur who do not side with Umra Khan,—

Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned, that Umra Khan, the Chief of Jandol, in spite of his often repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from
interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected State under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral valley and attacked the Chitral people.

The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full warning that, unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st of April, corresponding with the 5th day of Shawal, 1312-H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose, they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march this force through Umra Khan’s territory towards Chitral.

The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and prevent any future, unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained, the force will be withdrawn.

The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan’s misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes; and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they, on their part, refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies and transport will be paid for, and all persons are at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect security.”

Orders were issued at the same time for the mobilisation of the Chitral Relief Force. Major Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, was appointed principal Political Officer with the force, which was under the orders of Sir Robert Low, who was given supreme political authority, as well as military command. Major Deane at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them.

Interruption of communications beyond Mastuj continued, and on the 17th March, the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, telegraphed that there was considerable local excitement, and that he had requested Colonel Kelly to bring up to Gilgit the half battalion of the 92nd Pioneers held in readiness in Chilas.

On the 21st March, news reached Gilgit of a serious affair between Mastuj and Chitral. On the 1st of March, a Subadar started from Mastuj for Chitral with 40 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles and sixty boxes of ammunition. He was compelled to halt at Buni, as the road was broken, and wrote to Mastuj that he expected to be attacked. On receipt of the Subadar’s letter, Lieutenant Moberley, Special Officer with the Kashmir troops at Mastuj, requested Captain C. R. Ross, Commanding the British Agent’s escort of 14th Sikhs, to make a night march in support of the Subadar. Captain Ross and Lieutenant H. J. Jones, with 50 men (25 of the 14th Sikhs and 25 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles), started on the evening of the 4th March. Finding the Subadar all right at Buni, and no enemy being visible, Captain Ross’s party returned on the 5th to Mastuj. Lieutenant J. S. Fowler and S. S. Edwardes, with 20 Sappers and Miners, who had arrived at Mastuj on the 4th, left the next day, and joined the ammunition escort; and all went on to Reshun on the 6th March. On the following morning, on the party attempting to march, they were attacked by a large force, and after fighting all day, and losing several men in killed and wounded, determined to occupy an adjacent village. Captain Ross, hearing on the 6th that Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes were in difficulties at Reshun, started with Lieutenant Jones and 60 Sikhs to their assistance. They reached the Karagh defile about noon and were there opposed by a strong body of the enemy; on trying to return, they found the road closed. As they had by this time lost 20 men, they took cover, holding out in caves all the next day. On the 10th, at 2 A.M., they started to cut their way back to Buni, where only Lieutenant Jones and 14 men arrived. Captain Ross, 46 of his men, 8 followers and a Hospital Assistant were killed. Lieutenant Jones and several of the survivors were wounded. In consequence of reports which had reached him, Lieutenant Moberley made a reconnoissance from Mastuj towards Buni with 150 Kashmir troops and 68 Punyal levies on the 16th March, and joined Lieutenant Jones at Buni the next day. Hearing that the enemy were preparing to cut the bridge and hold the defile behind him, and recognizing that any further attempt to advance would be useless, Lieutenant Moberley, after consultation with Lieutenant Jones, decided to retire at once to Mastuj. According to Lieutenant Jones’ information, there were some of Umra
Khan's men in Drasan at this time. The fate of the Subadar's party of the Sappers with Lieutenant Fowler and of Lieutenant Edwardes remained uncertain up to the end of March. After holding their own until the 15th of March, the two British officers were treacherously made prisoners during a truce by Muhammad Isa Khan, Sher Afzal's foster-brother, and were handed over to Umra Khan, along with a Jemadar, 8 Muhammadan sepoys, 2 Dogras, and a Sikh. The remainder of the party were killed.

The intelligence received from Gilgit during March showed that Umra Khan and Sher Afzal had actually waged war upon our troops. The necessity for relieving Mr. Robertson's force in Chitral became more imminent, while there was no longer any reason for giving Umra Khan a period of grace within which he might withdraw. Orders were therefore issued for the advance of the Relief Force at the earliest possible date. General Sir Robert Low with the Divisional Head-quarters and the second and third brigades arrived at Mardan on the 30th of March; and the Malakand Pass was forced on the 3rd of April. On the following day the 1st Brigade of the Relief Force advanced towards Khar, and dispersed a large hostile gathering. The upper Ranizais, who were defeated on the 3rd April, at once submitted and set about collecting supplies. The Khan of Dir, who had joined the British camp on the 2nd April, was well received by the people on his return to his country; the forts along the Panjikora river fell into his hands, he captured and disarmed a hundred of Umra Khan's men, and seized the family of Muhammad Shah Khan, Umra Khan's brother. Under orders from the Political Officer, he sent some of his headmen towards Chitral to render assistance to Mr. Robertson, if needed.

Everything possible had been done to secure the good-will of the tribes through whose country the Relief Force had to march. The Khan of Nawagai, on receipt of the Government proclamation, openly declared himself a friend of Government, and his Agents, who had come into British territory, produced a letter from the Khan in which he asked for permanent relations with the British Government. They were given a promise that the Khan should receive an allowance and arms and ammunition conditionally on the latter not being used against the Amir, and on good service. Muhammad Sharif Khan of Dir accompanied our troops to the Swat river, and gave valuable and loyal assistance throughout. The Mulla of Manki, the most influential Mulla on or within the Peshawar border, professed at first to intend to behave as a loyal subject, but he was afterwards reported to have advised the Swat jirga to oppose our force entering Swat. After the defeat and submission of the Swatis, the Mulla dismissed all deputations who attended on him with advice that they should not fight. On the whole, it may be said that Mulla influence succeeded in organising opposition to the entry of our troops into Swat, but failed to raise a general tribal gathering against us.

Umra Khan left Kila Drosh towards the end of March for Barwa or Jan-dol, but 500 of his picked men remained at Kila Drosh and Chitral under his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, and cousin, Abdul Majid Khan, respectively. Umra Khan took with him Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes and 10 sepoys who had been taken prisoners in Chitral. He treated the British officers with kindness, but was at the same time writing letters to the surrounding tribes calling on them to join in a jehad. The Swat river was forced on the 7th April, in the face of strong opposition from the enemy who crowned the opposite heights, under the command of Umra Khan's brother, Muhammad Shah Khan. The enemy were dispersed and pursued by the cavalry, who inflicted heavy loss. On the 8th April, news was received that Umra Khan had recalled the men he had left in Chitral, and on the 10th, six of the Sapper sepoys released by Umra Khan arrived in camp at Khar, and brought news of the safety of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler.

On the 12th of April, Lieutenant Edwardes arrived in General Low's camp, with a letter from Umra Khan, enquiring what conditions Government intended imposing on him. General Low, in reply, demanded the release of Lieutenant Fowler and the native prisoners safe and sound, the unopposed march of the troops to Chitral, assistance in regard to supplies, a pledge of non-interference in future in Chitral affairs and the acceptance of any further conditions which the Government of India might impose in regard to the maintenance
of a road to Chitral. If the Khan fulfilled these conditions and committed no
further act of hostility, General Low assured him that he would not be dis­
turbed in the possession of his hereditary country of Jandol, and that Govern­
ment would no longer be angry with him. We were unable to approve this
answer, as it was not in accord with instructions issued on the General's advice,
with a view to the best means of securing the safety of the prisoners; and it was
moreover considered undesirable to guarantee any terms to Umra Khan before
full information concerning his responsibility for events in Chitral had been re­
ceived. Sir Robert Low was accordingly instructed to cancel these terms if Umra
Khan delayed his answer, and to insist on the safe delivery of prisoners as an
essential preliminary to any discussion of terms. The General wrote to Umra
Khan accordingly on the 16th April. On learning that General Low had can­
celled his letter, we informed him that we were not prepared to offer to Umra
Khan any terms except upon his making unconditional surrender, when his
life would be guaranteed if all his prisoners were given up safe and sound.
Shortly after the despatch of the General's letter of the 15th April, a letter was
received from Lieutenant Fowler, saying that Umra Khan was anxious to
parley and wished the construction of the main bridge over the Panjkor, and
the advance of the troops stopped. A letter was also received from the Khan
practically admitting that, if the troops advanced through Jandol, he could not
control the tribesmen. The messenger was dismissed without a reply, and on the
16th of April, Lieutenant Fowler and all the other prisoners arrived safely
in camp at Sado. The bridge was completed the same day, and the advance
was continued on the next. On the 18th of April we directed General Low to
repeat to Umra Khan that the only terms he was authorised to offer were un­
conditional surrender, with an honourable asylum in India for Umra Khan
himself, his family and a reasonable number of his supporters. Umra Khan,
however, fled on the night of the 17th in the direction of the Asmar border.

On the 20th April, news reached General Low that on the 16th Mr. Robert­
son and his party in the Chitral Fort were very hard pressed, and General
Gatacre, who had reached Bar Baraul, was ordered to immediately push on with
a small force to the relief of the garrison. The details regarding the situation
in Chitral were subsequently shown to be correct; but fortune had already
changed, and within a few hours of the arrival of the alarming report, news
was received that the Chitral Fort had been relieved, and that Sher Afzal had
withdrawn. The relief had been effected by a force under Colonel Kelly, 32nd
Pioneers, who, when the advance of General Low's Force was ordered, had been
placed in charge of military operations in the Gilgit district.

The utmost good and loyal feeling was shown by the Mirs of Hunza and
Nagar. They both volunteered to furnish extra men for service; and when the
Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, enquired through the Political Officer
in Hunza if any more men were willing to enlist temporarily as levies in addition
to the 90 in Ghizr, the Mir of Hunza, Muhammad Nazim Khan, and Raja
Sikandar Khan of Nagar themselves immediately responded by arriving in
Gilgit with some 900 men of all ranks, ready to serve Government in any way
required. Each man brought a fortnight's supplies, in order to avoid giving
trouble. Some 400 were utilized and did valuable service.

Colonel Kelly with 200 Pioneers and 4 officers left Gilgit for Mastuj on
the 23rd March, and reached Gupis on the 25th; 200 more of the Pioneers,
with two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, started for Ghizr on the
24th. Another 200 Pioneers were called up to Gilgit from the Indus Valley,
and the remainder proceeded to Chilas, setting free 150 Kashmir troops to
strengthen the posts at Buner and Ramghat bridge. Unfortunately, just at
this time, heavy snow fell on the hills, and there was reported to be 44 feet
on the Shandur Pass. This seriously impeded Colonel Kelly's advance, but he
crossed the pass with two mountain guns which had in places to be carried by
hand. He arrived at Laspur with 200 Pioneers and the guns on the 5th April,
and a reconnaissance found the enemy in position about 3 miles beyond
Gasht. He advanced to Gasht on the 6th, and on the 9th of April, the little
force reached Mastuj after a sharp brush with a well-posted gathering of the
enemy, armed with breech-loaders, a few miles out of Gasht. On the 12th
April he reconnoitred to Nisagal, where the enemy were found in some strength,
The following day he advanced with 640 men, including some from the Mastuj garrison, and, after two hours' fighting, drove out the enemy, inflicting a loss of not less than 50 killed and many wounded. From Nisagal he made for Kila Drasan by a détour through the hills, the regular road having been broken. He found the fort empty and villages deserted. On the 20th of April, the force arrived at Chitral.

The following brief account of affairs in Chitral from the date of Mr. Robertson's arrival there, till the British party were relieved, is taken from a telegram, dated the 20th April, despatched by Mr. Robertson immediately communication was restored:

"Amir-ul-Mulk was merely temporarily and provisionally recognised as Mehtar of Chitral on the revolt of the Kushwakis. The agreement between us was that he would be responsible for the Katars, and I personally would be responsible for the Kushwakis. Government was pledged to nothing. This point was distinctively and repeatedly insisted upon. On 2nd March, Amir-ul-Mulk practically resigned the Mehtarship; at the same time he made overtures to Umra Khan, promising to induce us to retire towards Mastuj and to attack us on the road at the Baitaripari just this side of Kari. He has been in custody ever since. He is wanting in intellect, and was merely the tool of two young unscrupulous advisers who were exploiting him. On March 2nd, Shuja-ul-Mulk was made temporary and provisional Mehtar. It is absolutely necessary to have some nominal, though temporary, Mehtar to dissipate any fear in the minds of the Chitrals that we were annexing the country. Again it was most carefully explained to every one that the arrangement was temporary and provisional, and that the Government were not pledged to it in any way. Our position though very difficult was not hopeless until after the disaster of 3rd March. After that unfortunate event all Chitrals outside the fort were compelled from fear for their families to join Sher Afzal. They also believed he was supported by the Amir, and that Umra Khan, the Sipah Salar and Mohmands had joined in a religious war against us, and that our position was desperate, while they knew that, if in time we triumphed, they had still nothing to fear from us in the way of vengeance.

"3rd March 1895. Reconnaissance found Sher Afzal in strength; lost Captain Baird killed, Captain Campbell, C.I.H., wounded; General Baj Singh and Major Bhikam Sing of the Imperial Service Troops killed; 21 non-commissioned officers and sepoys of 4th Kashmir Rifles killed, and 25 wounded. 4th March, Siege commenced. 8th March, Enemy attempted to fire the water tower; fire extinguished. 14th March, Enemy attacked east side of fort, failed. 5th April, Enemy occupied summer-house in garden within 50 yards of gun-tower. 6th April, Enemy advanced sangar up to 40 yards from the main gate in the night. 7th April, Enemy attempted at 5 A.M. and set fire to gun-tower and made an attack on water way, failed; fire in tower extinguished. British Agent wounded and several men killed and wounded by enemy's riflemen. 8th April, Enemy attempted to fire the gun-tower for the second time. 11th April, Enemy made an attack on all sides of fort, failed. 17th April, Sortie, summer-house taken and enemy's mine blown up; our loss 8 killed and 15 wounded, of which Sikhs had 3 killed and 5 wounded, and 4th Kashmir Rifles had 5 killed and 8 wounded; enemy's loss about 60, of whom 35 were bayoneted. Summary of casualties: 101 wounded, 40 fatally. Sher Afzal, Abdul Majid Khan of Shina, Abdul Ghani Khan of Shaha, and large following retreated to Drosh last night (18th) abandoning siege of fort. Much sickness from bad food, excessive work and exposure; conduct of troops admirable; Campbell doing well as are all other wounded; Townshend, Gurdon, Harley and Whitchurch all well, in spite of excessive work and unceasing alarms. Our heavy casualty list due to wonderful marksmanship of enemy, to the fort being commanded on all sides, and to enemy's sangars being close up to walls. The discipline, devotion and fortitude displayed by all ranks under circumstances which required all those qualities, are beyond all praise. Chitral at present denuded of inhabitants who have fled to the hills from fear of reprisals."

On the news of the relief of the Chitral Fort being confirmed, we decided that the force under General Gafacre should continue to advance over the Lowaraal Pass, though there was no longer any necessity for haste. The troops
therefore marched more leisurely and constructed a road over the pass as they proceeded. The pass was crossed on the 26th April, the snow being then at places two feet deep. On the 28th April, Sher Afzal and 300 men, including two of Sher Afzal's brothers and several men of importance, who had been captured at Patrak by the Khan of Dir, were brought to the British camp. Sher Afzal, and some of the more important of his followers, also Amir-ul-Mulk, who was soon afterwards deported from Chitral by Mr. Robertson, have since been interned in India as State prisoners.

Throughout May and June, General Low's force continued to hold the country between the Malakand and the Chitral valley. Shots were frequently fired into the various camps, and several cases of attacks on camp-followers and sentries, and of cutting of the telegraph wire occurred. Fines were imposed on certain villages in the Jandol valley, and the general responsibility of the neighbourhood in which crimes were committed was enforced. Early in June, Sir Robert Low interviewed the jirgas of the Shamozi and lower and upper Salarzi; all promised to guard their own borders and prevent Mamunds and Chaharmungis from coming across to commit acts of hostility. They gave in writing an acknowledgment of their pledge. On the 10th June, the Khan of Nawagai, with his sons and the Shamozi, Salarzi, Mamund and Chaharmung jirgas, all came in, and the two latter also accepted responsibility for their borders. Finding there was a general impression that Government had determined to annex the country, disarm the people and impose revenue, Major Deane explained that there was no such intention; and at the special request of the jirgas he gave them written assurances that Government had no desire to interfere with their country, but added that, if the tribesmen failed to act up to their responsibilities, they would only have themselves to blame for whatever might befall them. The idea that Government intended annexation had been deliriously circulated with a view to stirring up hostility; there had undoubtedly been extensive intrigues with Nawagai and neighbouring tribes, and a combined outbreak was probably only averted by the action taken with the jirgas and the Nawagai Khan.

The state of affairs at Chitral soon after the relief of the garrison was, as might have been expected, unsatisfactory. The people were almost all in sympathy with Sher Afzal, and had acquired an extreme dislike of the British; but on hearing of the capture of Sher Afzal and his deportation to India, they soon began to settle down, and many of the Adamzadas came in to do homage to the young Mehtar, Shuja-ul-Mulk.

For some time after the relief of the fort, the force under Colonel Kelly remained halted at Chitral in an entrenched position on a ridge south of the fort. We did not consider this an adequate assertion of military supremacy, and General Gatacre was ordered to continue his march on Chitral, with one mountain battery, one British and two native battalions. Subsequently, on a warning from Mr. Robertson that a brigade visiting Chitral would endanger a famine by eating up the spring crops, it was decided only to send the 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment, and a mountain battery; and that this force should only stay a few days at Chitral, the rest of General Gatacre's brigade being distributed along the road from Ashreth to Drosh. General Gatacre reached Chitral on the 11th May. The troops belonging to the Gilgit Command were sent back to Mastuj and the Gilgit district, and the Chitral garrison and the escort of the Assistant Political Officer in Chitral were supplied by a wing of the 4th Gurkhas from the Relief Force.

Umra Khan, who had arrived at Asmar about the end of April, was detained there pending orders from the Amir; meanwhile he was treated with respect and friendship by the Sipah Salar. Some 500 rifles were taken from the men of his party and lodged in the Asmar Fort. Eventually the Sipah Salar sent him under guard to Kabul, where he arrived on the 11th of May. The Amir received him the next day. The British Agent reported that His Highness abused Umra Khan and reminded him of his unfriendly attitude towards His Highness in the past, but added that, as Umra Khan was now His Highness's guest, he would be well treated.

On the 80th March 1895, Your Lordship's predecessor telegraphed that the policy with regard to Chitral and the neighbourhood would have to be fully and
carefully reconsidered in the light of recent events as soon as the present trouble was over, and expressed a wish that our hands should meanwhile be kept perfectly free. We were requested, therefore, to take care that nothing should be said or done to commit Government either way with regard to making any road, occupation of new posts, or retention of posts already occupied. On the 15th April, after having given the question our most careful consideration, we informed Sir Henry Fowler (by telegraph) that we were agreed that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road from the Peshawar border, was a matter of the first importance; if a road were not opened from Peshawar we were not unanimous in regard to the expediency of occupying Chitral; but we were unanimous in asking permission to enter into negotiations with the tribes with the view to obtaining their consent to the opening of the road, when opportunity should arise, in connection with Sir Robert Low's advance, and in thinking it would be a serious mistake to lose this opportunity. On the 19th April, Sir Henry Fowler again addressed us by telegraph on the subject of the future policy, pointing out that recent events had shown the peril of maintaining a British officer with an escort in Chitral, so long as he could be supported only from Gilgit; while to arrange for his support by the shorter line of the Peshawar-Dir route involved questions, financial, political and military, of serious difficulty and importance. We were asked to consider whether the strategical and political importance of Chitral were such as to render desirable, in the face of these difficulties, the maintenance of the main objects of our past policy in Chitral, viz., to control its external affairs in a direction friendly to our interests, to secure an effective guardianship over its northern passes and to watch what goes on beyond them. We were further asked if we could suggest any method of securing these objects, less costly and less hazardous than that lately in force.

In reply, we referred the Secretary of State to our telegram of the 18th April which expressed our views as to the importance of Chitral, and added that we could not answer as to the extent of the political difficulty or cost of the Peshawar-Dir road, without entering into negotiations with the intervening tribes. On the 25th, we telegraphed that events indicated that the withdrawal from Chitral under the circumstances then existing was impossible, as it would leave the country to complete anarchy, and whatever the ultimate decision might be, would render a settlement more difficult. We urged that we should be allowed to keep open the road from Peshawar for some time, probably for at least three or four months. Before this telegram reached Sir Henry Fowler, he had telegraphed to us (25th April 1895) authorizing us to sound the tribes as to the terms and conditions on which they would consent to open up and maintain the road, should it be hereafter decided to keep it open, but he repeated his wish not to be committed to the policy of the military occupation of Chitral or permanently maintaining an officer there, with or without the support of the road, till Her Majesty's Government had had an opportunity of considering the detailed views and arguments of the Government of India.

In our despatch, dated the 8th of May 1895, we reviewed the whole situation as it presented itself to us. Our conclusions were that the maintenance of our influence in Chitral was a matter of the first importance, that to abandon it to the possibility of occupation by a foreign power involved a risk which we ought not to run, and that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir; we were convinced that we could never hope to again maintain British influence in Chitral without the presence of British troops, and while we were fully conscious that the cause we proposed might involve us in an expense which our finances could ill afford, and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on our north-western frontier which we would fain avoid, we recommended that Chitral should be held by a garrison of British Indian troops and direct communication established between it and Peshawar.

On the 14th June, we received a telegram from Sir Henry Fowler, declining to adopt our views, and announcing that Her Majesty's Government had decided that no military force or European Agent should be kept at Chitral, that Chitral should not be occupied, and that no road should be made between it and Peshawar; all positions beyond the frontier held in consequence of the
Chitral relief operations were to be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allowed, and we were asked to telegraph the arrangements as regards the Chitral State, which under these conditions, we would recommend for the future. Proposals on this basis were duly made, and were under consideration when the Marquess of Salisbury's ministry succeeded that of the Earl of Rosebery. We were thereupon instructed to suspend action while Her Majesty's Government considered the situation, and at our suggestion, we were authorized to announce that the occupation of the road would continue during the hot weather and September. In regard to Chitral, it was decided to divide Katur from Kushwakt country and restrict the authority of the Mehtar to Katur, and to maintain the suzerain rights of Kashmir over both Katur and Kushwakt country.

The Chitral Relief Force continued throughout July to hold the country between Malakand and the Chitral valley. During the month the Amir deported to Peshawar Mir Aziz Khan, Mir Haasan Khan, and Zain-ulla Khan, brothers of Umra Khan; his three nephews, Sher Zaman Khan, Bahraman Khan, and Subhan-ud-din Khan; his two cousins, Abdul Majid Khan and Abdul Ghani Khan, together with their families and servants; in all 114 persons. In a letter to the Commissioner, Peshawar, His Highness wrote that they had asked to be allowed to return to Bajaur, but that thinking this would create disturbances there, he had refused to agree and sent them to Peshawar. The whole party was sent on to the Officer Commanding the Chitral Relief Force in view to their settling down in Jandol, and we informed Sir Robert Low that we did not wish to impose these men, or any of them, on the Jandol valley, but that when the time came for withdrawing our troops, he should make over the lands to their settling down respectively assigned to them.

On the 10th August 1895, we received Your Lordship's telegram of the 9th idem, conveying the decision of Her Majesty's Government to retain a garrison in Chitral territory and to open up the road from Chitral to the Peshawar border. This decision was given on the understanding that it would necessitate no increase to the army, that the future garrison for both Gilgit and Chitral would be only one native regiment in addition to the troops previously stationed in the Gilgit Agency; that the head-quarters would be at Drosh, and that the road between Drosh and the Swat river would be held by tribal levies. Your Lordship further requested that nothing should be done in any way to infringe the terms of the proclamation issued before the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force.

The garrison which we decided to leave in Chitral consisted of two battalions of Native Infantry, two guns of a mountain battery, two Maxim guns and a company of sappers. Chitral itself is garrisoned by three companies of infantry, with one of the Maxims, one company is posted at Ghairat and the remainder at Kila Drosh.

The 32nd Pioneers were ordered to be withdrawn from Gilgit as soon as practicable, 200 men remaining at Gilgit as escort to the British Agent. It was decided that the Malakand should be held by a brigade and the crossing of the Swat river at Chakdarra by a regiment of Bengal Infantry and one squadron of Guides Cavalry, the road between the British frontier and Chakdarra and between the Swat river and Chitral territory to be held by levies. Sir Robert Low was at once authorised to arrange with the Ranizais, Swatis, and the Khan of Dir, the terms on which they would keep open and guard the road, and for keeping the forces proposed on the Malakand and at Chakdarra without departing from the terms of the Proclamation.

Sir George Robertson left Simla for Chitral on the 17th August, with instructions to formally instal Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir as his suzerain, and with the authority and approval of the Government of India. The Installation Darbar was held on the 2nd of September, and Sir George Robertson publicly enunciated the future policy of Government in regard to Chitral. The Mehtar's direct control was not to extend beyond the Katur country as hitherto understood. The British Agent at Gilgit would, on behalf of the Kashmir State, appoint and pay the Gov-
ernors and headmen of the Khushwakt country, and would maintain direct relations with them, except that as a matter of convenience the Governor of the Mastuj valley would, for the present, correspond with the Political Officer in Chitral. The internal administration of Chitral was to be left in the hands of the Mehtar and of his advisers, but as Shuja-ul-Mulk was a mere boy, we decided to leave at Chitral an experienced Political Officer, upon whom the Mehtar might always call for advice and assistance. Three persons, Raja Bahadur Khan, the Governor of Mastuj, Wazir Inayat Khan, and Aksakal Fateh Ali Shah were appointed to give the Mehtar help, instruction and advice in the management of his State and in the laws and customs of the people. Every Chitrali of position throughout the country west of the Shandur Pass attended the Darbar, and a general pardon was proclaimed for all political offences committed during the recent disturbances. Shuja-ul-Mulk was accorded a subsidy of Rs. 1,000 a month; and, in consideration of the loss of revenue arising from the separation of the Khushwakt country, an additional sum of Rs. 8,000 a year was allotted to him. Monthly st'pends were allotted to the Governors of Mastuj, Ghizr, the Koh district and Yasin, and to the three advisers of the Mehtar.

In announcing these arrangements, Sir George Robertson made it plain to all concerned that the Mehtar would be supported in dealing with crimes, such as murder and outrage, which constitute a public scandal, and that we would not countenance in a State under our protection an administration which permitted murderous outrages, such as had been frequent in Chitral and led directly to the late disturbances. It was also announced that traffic in slaves would not be allowed in future. The Kashmir Darbar expressed their cordial concurrence.

The withdrawal of the Chitral Relief Force commenced on the 20th September, and by the end of the month the last of the returning troops had re-crossed the frontier. On the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who personally visited the Malakand Pass and the crossing of the Swat river, we proposed to Her Majesty's Government to construct a strong post on the right bank of the river at Chakdarra, and to hold it with 200 Native Infantry and 25 Sabres, instead of with a regiment of Native Infantry and a squadron of cavalry, as originally proposed; the post to be armed with two Maxim guns and one smooth-bore, 9-pounder. We further proposed that at the Malakand Pass a strong post should be built for 200 Native Infantry; and that the rest of the force there should be encamped about 1,500 yards north of the post, to form a movable column ready for immediate action if required. These proposals were approved. Brigadier-General Waterfield assumed command of the Malakand Brigade on the 27th September. The tribes certainly showed no sign of regarding the occupation of the Malakand as an infringement of the proclamation issued on the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force. On the contrary, the Ranizais and Swatis and others from the Peshawar border to the Panjkora petitioned for the retention of troops in their country to protect them and help them in protecting the road, and to maintain internal peace. The Adinzais, who occupy the Uch valley, were so earnest that they asked to be allowed to represent their case at Simla, if the local officers were unable to grant their request. All were informed in reply that the Government Proclamation announced that there was no intention of interfering with their independence, and that Government had no desire to depart from that policy, though for a time at all events troops would be left to help the Swatis and Ranizais in maintaining the road through their country.

The following arrangements were concluded for the maintenance of the road. The Khan of Dir signed an agreement promising to keep open and repair the road in his territory, to make postal arrangements, to protect the telegraph line when put up, and to rent sites for the accommodation of troops on Laram or Dosha Khel, should Government wish this at any time. The Khan received, in addition to a present of 25,000 rupees for service and expenditure on our behalf during the previous six months, 400 Snider rifles with some ammunition, and he was granted an annual allowance of 10,000 rupees, and a like sum in commutation of his rights to collect tolls throughout his country.
60,000 rupees a year was sanctioned for levies in Dir, including allowances to the tribes. The levies were 310 in number, stationed in eight posts along the route. These posts were readily built by tribal labour. A separate sum of 1,100 rupees a month was allowed for postal arrangements from Chakdarra to Chitral. We also sanctioned a levy scheme for Swat and Ranizai, at an annual cost of 32,585 rupees. The allowances enjoyed in the past by the Khans of Swat were raised from 7,700 to 11,500 rupees a year; and we sanctioned a further annual sum of 10,000 rupees for distribution among them in commutation of their rights to levy tolls. Agreements were signed by the Khans accepting terms similar to those agreed to by the Khan of Dir.

Affairs in Swat progressed satisfactorily. The Khans of Thana and Allahdand showed themselves most friendly, and ready to receive the visits of British officers, who were able to move about under tribal escort with complete safety in this part of Swat. The Sam Ranizais built towers, for the protection of the road up the Malakand; the bridge over the Panjkora was well cared for, and the constant stream of traders and pack animals passing along the route proved that the new order of things was fully appreciated. The position was not, however, at first quite so promising in Dir, the weakness of character of the Khan making the carrying out of the recent settlement a matter of difficulty. None of the people had any confidence in the Khan, and all were desirous that the arrangements should be taken into our own hands.

On the whole, however, the experience of the first six months of the working of the arrangements for the opening up of the road from Peshawar to Chitral was generally satisfactory. The offences on the road as far as Chakdarra, or against British subjects, were four murders and one attempt to murder. A few shots were fired at night at sentries on the Malakand; there was an attack by thieves near the North Malakand Camp, in which one of the levies was wounded, and there were one or two small attacks on the levies between Chakdarra and Robat. The post worked exceedingly well and regularly, a considerable trade passed along the road, and only one report of interference with traders was received. Our relations with Nawagai, Jandol, the Utman Khels and Upper Swat were peaceful, confidence was encouraged by the free movements of officers within the lower part of the valley, and the Jandol Khans maintained the positions in which they were placed on our withdrawal from the Jandol valley. There was at first a strong impression amongst the tribesmen that Government intended to take over the country to the east of the Peshawar district and included in their scheme an expedition against Boner. Major Deane who had been appointed Political Officer for Dir and Swat, did everything in his power to reassure the people, and he reported an excellent correcting influence in Swat, where the feeling in favour of Government was very strong.

The first annual reliefs for the garrison in Chitral concentrated at Nowshera on the 23rd and 25th April 1896, and were to have left the Malakand on the 1st May. Unfortunately, on the 19th April, heavy floods swept away all the bridges above Dir and slightly damaged the bridge over the Panjokra river at Chutitana. Immediate steps were taken to repair the road and bridges, three thousand tribesmen being employed on the work, and the troops were able to march from Chakdarra on the 7th May, they reached Dir on the 12th of May, and crossed the Lowarai on the 14th. The relieved troops arrived at Chakdarra on the 31st. Supplies for the different stages and such heavy baggage as the reliefs did not require with them on the road, were sent up a few days ahead under levy escort; Major Deane's arrangements throughout worked admirably: and the relief of the Chitral garrison was carried out without any contretemps. His plans included not only tribal pickets within the territory in which the troops encamped, but on the other bank of the Panjokra river, and watching the passes from the Mamund and Salarzai country through Jandol. One of these distant pickets was attacked by a band of 40 or 50 men. Two men of the picket were wounded, but they succeeded in driving back the assailants.

As soon as the relieved Chitral garrison had reached British territory, the question of the future political arrangements in Gilgit and Chitral came under our consideration. We decided that Major Deane should be continued as
Political Agent for Swat and Dir in direct subordination to the Government of India, and that Chitral should be added to his charge; and that Gilgit should in future rank as a Political Agency of the 2nd class subordinate to the Resident in Kashmir, the western limit of the charge being fixed at the Shandur Pass.

The possibility of reducing the military expenditure in Gilgit, with a view to affording relief to the finances of the Kashmir State, had for some time been under consideration. The Kashmir troops had hitherto been distributed in numerous posts, most of which were merely connecting links on the lines of communication. In the autumn of 1895, the Hon'ble Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Brackenbury visited Kashmir to consider on the spot the reforms and economies possible in Gilgit and Kashmir.

The main conclusions arrived at were—

(i) that the troops should eventually be concentrated at Gilgit and other important points, the detachments on the lines of communications being withdrawn and replaced, wherever necessary, by levies;

(ii) that the six battalions of Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry, each 600 strong, should be reorganized in four battalions, each 700 strong, the two mountain batteries being retained as before;

(iii) that the garrison of the Gilgit Agency should be reduced to two battalions of Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry and one battery, the British Agent's escort of 200 rifles of Native Infantry from the regular army being retained.

It was calculated that the scheme, which was readily accepted by the Darbar, would immediately effect a saving to the Kashmir State of Rs. 84,000 a year, and relieve British Indian revenues of about Rs. 41,000 a year on account of charges for supply and transport, besides ultimately securing a considerable additional saving on the latter account, both to the Darbar and to the Government of India. The political separation of Chitral from Gilgit was expected not only to diminish the importance of the latter charge, but to admit of a very substantial saving through reduction in the number of officers employed in the Gilgit Agency.

In pursuance of this policy, we sanctioned, in April 1897, the introduction of a police levy scheme on the Gilgit-Chilas line. The scattered detachments of Imperial Service Troops on the line were withdrawn, and levy posts established at Gilgit, Leycher, Jalipur, Buner, Ges, Thak, Babusar, Kinaghar, Chilas, and Gichi. The service is popular, and the scheme promises to be entirely successful. In May a similar scheme for the whole of the Gilgit district was sanctioned, at an annual cost of about Rs. 86,000. The scheme was gladly accepted by Chiefs and people, and its adoption has allowed of a considerable measure of concentration of the Imperial Service Troops in the Agency.

During the half-year ending the 31st December 1896, the working of the arrangements for keeping open the Dir-Chitral road continued to run very smoothly. Major Deane was able to purchase locally almost all the grain required by the Chitral Garrison, in spite of the efforts of Mullahs and others to prevent the sale of supplies to the British Government. The safety of the road was never endangered, and traders travelled in perfect security. The levies settled down to their work and the service was popular. Trans-frontier trade by this route naturally increased enormously under the new order of things. During the six months which ended on the 30th September 1894, the value of imports and exports, respectively, totalled Rs. 2,22,744 and Rs. 2,91,920. During the corresponding period in 1896, the figures rose to Rs. 10,43,424 and Rs. 16,15,892, exclusive of all Government supplies and stores for Chitral and Malakand.

In June, Major Deane submitted certain proposals connected with future arrangements for the maintenance of the road. He expressed the opinion that, if we desired to extend our influence and obtain a stronger hold over the country, so as to ensure the certainty of control over Dir and the neighbouring
tribes, the troops forming the flying column at Malakand should be moved nearer Dir to the open country in the Adinzai valley at the foot of the Laram, the Laram itself being occupied during the summer. We declined to sanction the proposed advance, which would have constituted a departure from our declared policy of maintaining and securing the road by arrangements with the tribes. Those arrangements had so far worked well, and we saw no reason for desiring to alter them.

The question of the duration of the stay of the British garrison in Chitral came under consideration during the summer. On grounds of economy we thought it desirable that the force should be relieved every second year, but on political grounds it was eventually decided that the troops should be relieved in the spring of 1897 and that thereafter, if the movement of troops through Bajaur were effected as quietly as on the last occasion, it might be possible to allow the Chitral reliefs to take place biennially.

The reliefs in 1897 were again carried out without a hitch. Trade along the road continued to show a very satisfactory increase. During the six months which ended on the 31st March 1897, the exports from India totalled Rs. 17,70,684 and the imports into India Rs. 20,10,669. These figures speak well for the general security which had resulted from the opening of the road under the levy system inaugurated less than two years before.

The management of the affairs of the Chitral State was separated from the Gilgit Agency, and added to the charge of the Political Officer for Dir and Swat, with effect from the 1st March 1897. During Major Deane's short stay in Chitral in May, in connection with the Chitral reliefs, he had a discussion with the Mehtar and the Adamzadas on certain points connected with the administration of the country. It was no secret that the Mehtar himself, influenced by interested advisers, was at the root of much of our supposed unpopularity in the country. He had for some time past set himself against men who were known to render service to Government; he had consorted with and consulted men who acted against Government, and endeavoured to discourage all from visiting the Assistant Political Agent; and he had ignored the advisers appointed by Government. Major Deane remonstrated with him both in public and private; and insisted on the removal of the young Mehtar's ill-advisers. Writing on the 15th May, Major Deane says:—"Anything approaching the injustice and tyranny in regard to the land and houses of the poorer classes in Chitral which appears to have gone on for years past, I have never imagined possible. Every man, with a semblance of power as a headman, has seized the land of his poorer neighbours. Lieutenant Gurdon has done a good deal to improve matters, but he has not had the assistance of the Mehtar and his advisers that he should have had. Left to himself the Mehtar would not see his advisers, and the Assistant Political Agent has had a good deal to do in preventing those whom the Mehtar favoured from land grabbing in every direction. It is most important in the interests of the Mehtar and of Government that the existing state of affairs be changed, and I have to-day had a meeting with the Mehtar and his advisers, and pointed out to them that they must take the matter in hand, in the same way that we have led the Khans in Swat and Dir to do. I have directed them to meet regularly with Mr. Gurdon for three days a week and to take up the petitions of the cultivators, and to gradually settle them with some fixity of tenure, also to authoritatively stop any further oppression by headmen and Adamzadas in seizing land to which they have no right. This latter has been to a very great extent stopped already by Mr. Gurdon."

The effect of Major Deane's proceedings has been excellent. The young Mehtar expressed his regret, and promised to turn over a new leaf; and towards the end of June last, Lieutenant Gurdon reported that matters were improving and that he noticed a distinct change for the better in the tone of the Adamzadas. As Your Lordship is aware, throughout the recent disturbances on the frontier, the excitement has not spread to Chitral, and we have every reason to hope that the present peace in the State will be lasting.

On the 16th January 1897, a representative jirga of all the Bajaur tribes and the Shamozai Utman Khel came in to see the Political Officer. The Mamunds, Salarzai, Charmungi, Shinwari, Shamozai, Alizai and Mandal were all repre-
sented by their most influential men. Their object was to ascertain whether the Sipah Salar's statement that all the Mohmand tribes had been left to the Amir was true, or whether the Government intended to adhere to the Kabul agreement line; and whether the assurance given them that Government did not intend to annex their country still held good. They were told that those tribes, who fell on our side of the line as laid down by Mr. Udny, would certainly not be made over to the Amir, and that the Government proclamation was still in force. The Mamunds on the Bajaur side of the line then asked if they might cross over and help the sections of their tribe at Shurtan, who were being oppressed by the Amir. They were advised not to mix themselves up in conflicts with His Highness. All the tribes represented appeared to be well disposed and expressed their good-will to Government.

Major Deane, in summing up the situation after the satisfactory termination of the Chitral reliefs this year, wrote:—

"The fact of the tribes being left in enjoyment of their lands, revenue free, a privilege which, notwithstanding the proclamation before the expedition, they did not expect to be granted, owing to their not having fulfilled their share of the conditions of that proclamation, and the policy of not interfering with them except in so far as necessary to prevent disturbances, has created great confidence towards Government, which would enable us at the present time to raise an irregular force of 15,000 to 20,000 men, whom nothing would please better than to receive orders to perform service. * * * I do not now think it too sanguine to hope that these fanatical tribes may be converted into a powerful frontier defence. * * * Those who were most difficult and troublesome to deal with during the first year of working, viz., the Sam Rani­zais who were with difficulty prevented from forcing on direct annexation by misbehaviour and factional disputes are now most exemplary in their behaviour. A firm system of village and tribal community has been established—an excellent form of local self-Government and the backbone of frontier working—the factions have been suppressed, and there appears in their stead an honest desire to maintain peace and order. * * *"

"The position with Nawagai, the Utman Khels and other clans off the direct line of communications (not taking into account individual fanatics) is growing into an alliance which coupled with that of the Panjkola' clans may prove of great value to Government. It is useless to be sanguine in such matters, but the present position is far stronger than, with my knowledge of the Pathan tribes, I ever contemplated that it could become."

In June, however, Major Deane reported that persistent efforts had been and were being made to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism against us in Bajaur, Swat and Dir. The Adda Mulla, the Manki Mulla and the Palam Mulla were all working with this aim. The Khan of Dir had himself been sounded by Mullas, but had rejected all overtures, and had informed Major Deane that, when the reliefs were completed, he intended moving against the Palam Mulla, who had been trying to make the Dir levies desert and to prevent others from enlisting. The Khan also intended to assert himself against the fanatical party in Upper Swat. Major Deane feared that, unless the fanatical party were kept under control, there was risk of fanaticism spreading to the detriment of British interests, and told the Khan that he was responsible for maintaining the Chitral communications, and was at liberty to ensure success in the best manner he could.

Early in June, the Khan commenced to execute his plans. He apparently experienced little difficulty in entering Upper Swat, or in temporarily establishing his authority there, without employing in the operations any of the levies who are maintained at our cost.

On the 28th June Major Deane telegraphed that the Khan of Dir was bringing in a jirga of some 400 men of his faction of the Upper Swat clans on the right bank of the river, while the other faction, who had hitherto been with the Mian Guls, had also sent in a jirga of some 200 men and were in hopes that he would settle matters for the future between them and the Khan. Early in July, Major Deane received these jirgas at Chakdarra. The Shamozaiz, Nikpi Khel, Sebujane and Shamizai clans from the right bank, and the Musa Khels, who
live on the left bank of the Swat river, were represented. There were also present from the left bank the principal men of the Babuzai section, and a few of the Jink Khel clan. The Malikas numbered some 1,400 or 1,500. About one-third accompanied the Khan of Dir; the remainder came in direct. Major Deane reported that the jirgas accepted the fact of their being under Government influence in a good spirit, and looked to their country being placed on the same footing as that already under political control. They said that they wanted peace, they were ready to perform service if required, undertook to furnish fighting men for Government, if called on to do so, and declared that the friends of the Government should be their friends, and the enemies of Government their enemies. Their principal petition was that they might not be called on to perform unpaid labour, and that exiles, convicted by them of murder, might not be put back on the land against the wish of the jirga.

Major Deane explained to them that Government had no desire to interfere with their internal administration, but would assist them in settling their disputes if they brought them before the Political Officer; that Government did not intend to impose revenue on them, and all that Government wanted was to secure peace and order in Upper Swat, as in Lower Swat and Ranizai. The main regret expressed by the tribesmen was that they had not entered into friendly relations with us before, so as to have excluded any interference by the Khan of Dir, who had recently successfully invaded part of the country hostile to him.

The jirgas left on the understanding that the good intentions and friendly feelings, which they expressed, would be judged by their future actions, and that they would come in again later to settle disputes, etc., and to arrange any points that might be necessary.

Three weeks later we found ourselves face to face with an outburst of fanaticism as serious as it was sudden. We have already furnished Your Lordship with detailed particulars regarding the progress of events which followed this unfortunate outbreak, and we do not propose here to recapitulate them.

The review of our relations with the tribes on our border from Gilgit to the Swat valley, would not be complete without an account of our dealings with the Shinaki tribes under the Gilgit Agency. During the year 1892, the people of Chilas had been committing outrages on the Kashmir frontier and ill-treating the Kashmir news-writer; and the question as to how they should be dealt with was under consideration when some of the headmen of Gor came to Gilgit and expressed a wish to take Dr. Robertson back to Gor, in order to evince their friend-ship and discuss arrangements for pacifying the frontier. The Government of India agreed to his going and Dr. Robertson met with a friendly reception. The smallness of his escort, however, tempted the tribesmen, and Dr. Robertson received authentic information that the Shinaki tribes were about to attack him. His position was extremely dangerous; retreat was impossible, and his best chance was to get out into the open where his riflemen could make the best advantage of their arms. He accordingly advanced on Thalpen, which he surprised and occupied pending the arrival of reinforcements. While the latter were on their way, Dr. Robertson finding the Chilasis determined to fight, crossed the Indus, burnt Chilas and returned to Thalpen to prepare for the impending attack. The reinforcements on their way up were attacked by the tribesmen, but driven off with heavy loss. The destruction of Chilas had a good effect, and the vakils of the Thak valley professed a wish to pay their respects. Dr. Robertson sent five sepoys on a raft to bring them across the river; the raft was fired on, the sepoys killed, and Captain Wallace, who went to their assistance, was severely wounded. On the 30th November 1892, Chilas was occupied, and the end of the year saw a sufficiently strong force of Kashmir Imperial Service Troops holding the place. In March 1893, further and severe fighting took place. On the 5th, the Chilas Fort was attacked by over 1,200 tribesmen, the advanced party of a much larger force of Kohistanis. The attack was repulsed, but in the counter-attack, after heavy fighting, the troops were compelled to retire with heavy loss, including Major Daniell, the Officer in Command, killed; during the night the enemy, whose loss was estimated at 200, fled. Reinforcements were sent from Bunji and
Gilgit, but the tribesmen had retired down the Indus, and, in spite of rumours of their gathering again for a fresh attack, gave no further trouble.

With a view to decreasing the dangerous isolation of the Gilgit force, the Government of India now decided to establish an effective control over Chilas,—which had been tributary to Kashmir since its conquest by Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1851,—and open up a road through the Khagan valley over the Babusar pass from Abbottabad to Chilas. The 23rd Pioneers were detailed for this duty, after the conclusion of which they were employed in constructing a fort at Chilas, which has since been held by 400 Kashmir Imperial Service Troops. The Chilasis now give no trouble. The district is perfectly quiet, the people thoroughly understand that they are subjects of Kashmir, and with this peaceful state of things a much larger area has been brought under cultivation. During the past summer, we sanctioned the levy of a light tribute to Kashmir from Chilas, payable in cash in place of the former nominal tribute of gold dust. The total amount is assessed at about 2,676 rupees a year, to which will be added about 300 rupees more, on the restoration to the Chilasis of some land near the Chilas Fort, which they deserted after the fighting in 1893, and which has since been cultivated by our Commissariat Department. The Chilasis readily accepted the distribution of the tribute and paid up the first demand without any demur.

In regard to Tangir and Darel we have insisted on a policy of non-interference. A fairly representative jirga from Darel quite recently came in to Gilgit and asked that Raja Akbar Khan, of Punyal, might be made their ruler; we took the opportunity of impressing on our Resident in Kashmir the desirability of avoiding activity in connection with the tribes and communities of Shinaka and the Indus Kohistan, and directed that no opportunity should be lost of assuring and repeating to the Tangirs, Darelis and others that, provided they do not commit themselves beyond their own limits, we are quite content to leave them absolutely to themselves. If they choose to ask our officers for advice in their difficulties, friendly advice will be given, but the initiative must rest entirely with the tribesmen themselves.

The Indus valley people below Chilas are divided at present into two parties of about equal strength and influence, one friendly and the other hostile to Government. The hostile party wish to have no dealings of any kind with the Gilgit Agency; the other desire that more friendly relations should be established. The latter appear to be gaining ground, since Tangiris and Darelis are selling produce in Chilas, and taking employment on Government work. No interference of any kind is being exercised from Chilas, where all but known bad characters are free to come and go as they please.

There is little of interest to record in regard to our relations with the Buner. Bunerwals during the past twenty years; but in view of the fact that they are implicated in the recent attack on Chakdara and the Malakand, they may be referred to in their turn. The Bunerwals inhabit the Buner valley, on the border of the British district of Yusufzai. They comprise two main sections, the Hlazzai and Malizai divisions of the Yusufzai, and are subdivided into seven clans, Salarzai, Nurzai, Askazai, Gadaizai, Nasozai, Daulatzai and Chagurzai. There is no finer race on the frontier than the Bunerwals, and they probably number 8,000 fighting men. Generally speaking, they have always held aloof from intercourse with British officers.

Prior to the Ambela expedition in 1868, the Bunerwals had always been peaceable and never given us any trouble, and at the time of the expedition setting out, it was not anticipated that they would join the Hazara border tribes against us. They allowed themselves, however, to be drawn into the quarrel and played a very prominent part in the fighting which ensued. Eventually they made complete submission, themselves destroying Malka, the stronghold of the Hindustani fanatics, and, as was recorded at the time, "the spectacle of a tribe like the Bunerwals doing our bidding and destroying the stronghold of their own allies in the war, at a distant spot, naturally under the protection of other tribes of well known power and strength, with British witnesses looking on, must have been a thoroughly convincing proof to the surrounding country of the reality of our success, and of the indubitable pro-
stratification felt by the powerful Buner tribe which had been the foremost in opposing us.”

In 1868, a party of Salarzais came down and burnt the village of Pirzai, in the Sadum valley, in British territory, in the prosecution of a private feud. A blockade was established, but in April 1869 they came to terms, rebuilt the village and paid a fine. For the next nine years the Bunerwals behaved well, but in July 1877, they committed a serious raid on the border of the Sadum valley, burning villages and property and killing several British subjects. They were, however, so severely punished by the villagers, supported by the British police post, that they retired, with the loss of 21 killed, 30 wounded, and 14 prisoners. It was proved beyond doubt that the raid was instigated by Ajab Khan of Chargulai, who was at the time the middle-man for our dealings with Buner, and who hoped by producing complications to bring himself into the prominence. He was tried, sentenced to death and publicly executed. The Bunerwals were blockaded, but in consideration of the powerful instigation they had acted under and the severe handling they had received in the raid, the Government demand was limited to the restoration of the property carried off, and a settlement was concluded on this basis in April 1878.

During December 1878 and January 1879 great excitement prevailed in in Buner, owing to the fanatical preaching of certain Mulas, who were trying to create a jehad. At one time it was feared that nothing could prevent a disturbance on the border, and the Gudaizais and Salarzais actually sent their quota of men for an advance by the Malandri pass. The friendly attitude of certain Buner Chiefs, and the resolute behaviour of the Sadum villagers, prevented a rupture. Again in January 1880, reports were received that one faction of the Bunerwals was organizing an attack on Sadum; their intention was frustrated by the opposition of their enemies at home and by the prompt measures taken to reinforce the border.

At the beginning of 1885, it was found necessary to impose a blockade on the Asbazaiz, Salarzai and Nurazai sections in punishment of raids committed within the British frontier; at the end of the year the blockade was made general against the whole tribe. The British village of Malandri was at this time the resort of bad characters from independent Buner, bent on raiding, and the Officer in Command at Mardan was authorized to turn them out. Early in January 1886, the infantry of the Guides Corps and a detachment of the 13th Bengal Cavalry advanced for this purpose, and when close to Malandri, came during the night on a party of Bunerwals probably out on a cattle lifting expedition, shots were exchanged in the darkness and Colonel Hutchinson of the Guides and a sepoy were mortally wounded. This prevented the surprise of Malandri, the firing having warned the village. At daylight the troops drove back the Bunerwals, who had taken up a position on a hill, dispersed them and then retired to Rutlam. Finding that the jirga refuse to come in, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab recommended that preparations for a punitive expedition should at any rate be commenced, to show the Buneris that we were in earnest; the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, however, deprecated military action, as he thought the causes of offence were small, while an expedition would be a serious and expensive business. Lord Dufferin decided to postpone action at all events until the autumn; the blockade, in the meanwhile, was ordered to be strictly enforced; and a special militia to be entertained for the Sadum valley. In June 1886, fresh outrages were perpetrated, but success did not in every case attend the raiders, the Sadum villagers in some instances proving more than a match for their opponents. In August, three murders were committed in British territory by, or with the connivance of, certain Bunerwals, and a hostile demonstration was made by a body of Nurazais in the Sarkhavi valley, which proved unsuccessful. At the same time, another party of Bunerwals seized some cattle within our border, but were driven off with the loss of five men killed. These fruitless attempts to injure British territory, coupled with the effect of the blockade, seem to have taught the tribesmen a salutary lesson, and in January 1887 representatives to the number of 450 came in to Mardan, made complete submission and complied with the terms demanded. Fifty of the principal men subsequently went on to Peshawar, were interviewed by the Commissioner, and
begged for the forgiveness of Government, evincing a very satisfactory and respectful attitude.

During the course of the Black Mountain Expedition in March 1891 a force of Bunerwals collected at Baio, overlooking the Camp of the British Troops at Palosi, and it was suspected that they intended to join in the conflict. But, as has been stated elsewhere, the gathering broke up without entering into hostilities, and during the course of the 1891 expedition, and the Isaazai Expedition of October 1892, the Bunerwals showed no indications of unfriendliness on their southern border touching the Peshawar District, which remained exceptionally quiet.

For the next five or six years, the tribe gave no trouble; a few trifling offences have been settled by seizure of cattle, and for the rest, the Buner jirga has, as usual, held aloof from all dealings with our officers. During the fighting in Swat on the advance of the Chitrail Relief Force in 1884, a strong contingent of some of the Upper Buner clans was worked up by Mulas to move to Swat to join the opposition to our advance, but on finding the Swat people had been defeated and had given in, they returned, glad of a decent excuse to avoid committing themselves. They soon recovered from their temporary excitement and their behaviour since has been excellent, until they joined last summer the tribes fighting against us in the Swat valley. We have an account to settle with them in this connection, but have decided not yet to announce the terms which we intend to demand, until we can conveniently follow up such demand, if necessary, by the threat of an immediate advance into the Buner country.

During the last three decades, no tribes on our north-west frontier have earned a greater notoriety for their evil-doings than those occupying the Black Mountain and its neighbourhood on the border of the Hazara district. The country concerned is an irregular triangle bounded on the north by the high mountain of Kohistan, on the west by the river Indus, and on the east by the British frontier. Within this area are found three principal tribes, the Hassanzais, Akazai and Chigarzai, numbering, respectively, about 2,000, 700, and 3,800 fighting men. They occupy the western face of the mountain, a mass of precipitous wooded glens sloping down to the Indus, which at this point is a swift stream flowing in a rocky channel, about a hundred yards wide. On the eastern slopes of the mountain beyond our frontier, the inhabitants are chiefly Pathan inhabitants of Swat.

*These Swatis must not be confounded with the Pathan inhabitants of Swat.* The Allai valley, which forms the most northerly portion of this Swati country, is separated from the Black Mountain by a lofty, but not impassable, range.

Ever since the British occupation of the Punjab, until within the last three years, the tribes upon this section of the frontier have given us serious trouble, and on several occasions we have been forced by acts of aggression and violence on their part to inflict punishment upon them. In 1868, a large force was marched into the country, the highest peak of the Black Mountain was occupied, and the offenders compelled to come to terms. The effect of this expedition was very transitory; the terms imposed were lenient; the tribes were rather encouraged than intimidated by the rapid advance and retirement of our troops, and it was not long before raids and other offences began to recur. British subjects were murdered or kidnapped; British villages were harried and burnt; and offences were committed by almost every section and tribe from Allai to the southern point of the Black Mountain.

For twenty years these acts of hostility were endured without armed action being again taken to put an end to them; fines and blockades were from time to time imposed, and by these means and by reprisals we obtained reparation more or less complete for many of the offences against us. Our attitude was, however, misunderstood by the tribes; the tale of serious offences grew longer; a fine of Rs. 5,000 imposed on the Allaiwal headman in 1880 on account of serious raids was left unpaid and the Allaivals showed an attitude of defiance. The Akazais, Hassanzais and the Parari Saiyids gave still greater trouble, and on several occasions we had reason to fear that troops, and it was suspected that they intended to join in the conflict. But, as has been stated elsewhere, the gathering broke up without entering into hostilities, and during the course of the 1891 expedition, and the Isaazai Expedition of October 1892, the Bunerwals showed no indications of unfriendliness on their southern border touching the Peshawar District, which remained exceptionally quiet.

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and he was fined Rs. 2,000. He replied defiantly that he would not pay, and
would repeat the offence if he thought proper. Five years later, he again
raided a British village, murdered two of our subjects and carried off two more,
whom he threatened to kill unless we released one of his servants, a proclaimed
outlaw, who had been arrested in British territory. For some time longer, the
Government of India resisted the proposals of the Punjab Government for a
military expedition, preferring to try milder measures, and the tribe was put
under blockade. Such was the state of affairs when, on the 18th June 1888, a
party of British troops was attacked by the tribes within the British frontier, and
two English officers and four Gurkha soldiers were killed. In this affair, the
Khan Khel Hassanzai, under their leader Hashim Ali Khan, the Parari Saiyids
and some dependents of the Akazai were all engaged. Unsatisfactory replies
were sent to our demands for explanations; Hashim Ali Khan's reply was
openly defiant; and Lord Dufferin's Government was reluctantly forced to the
conclusion that to ensure the peace and order of the frontier, the despatch of a
military expedition to the Black Mountain was desirable and necessary.

The object of the expedition was declared to be the coercion into submis­
sion of the Akazai and the Khan Khel Hassanzais, and it was decided, in order
to reduce the scope of operations as much as possible, to first attempt a peace­
ful settlement with the Parari Saiyids and their Chigarzai tenants, and to assure
the Hassanzai that the expedition would be directed solely against the Khan
Khel and Akazais, unless the other sections took part against us.

At the end of September 1888, due warning was given by proclamation to
the tribes, specifying the terms on which the Government were prepared to
accept their submission, and allowing them till the 2nd October for compliance.
The period of grace having expired without any sign of the tribes submitting,
a force under Major-General McQueen crossed the frontier on the 3rd October.
The enemy, who were joined by large numbers of the Hindustani fanatics,
made a gallant resistance; the whole of their country was overrun by the
troops, the Hindustani fort and settlement across the Indus were burnt and the
colony dispersed, the chief Khan Khel villages were destroyed, and on the
19th October the Akazai jirga came into camp and accepted unconditionally all the
terms demanded, their example being followed at the end of the month by the
Hassanzais. Both tribes gave hostages for their future good conduct, paid
the fines of Rs. 4,000 and 7,000 demanded, and bound themselves not to injure
the roads which had been made in their country by the troops, and not to
molest in future any British officials or troops who might march anywhere on
the Black Mountain within British territory, or along the crest of the mountain
on the boundary between British and tribal limits. The punishment inflicted
on the Hassanzais and Akazais was very heavy, their losses in burnt villages,
free supplies, etc., being estimated at over half-a-lakh of rupees.

Meanwhile, the Parari Saiyids and the Tikariwals having made no attempt
to come to a peaceful settlement, the scope of the operations was extended; and
an advance to Thakot and into Alai was ordered. The Tikariwals promptly
submitted, almost before the troops entered their country: the Parari Saiyids
showed some resistance, some of their most inaccessible villages were
destroyed, and on the 3rd November their jirga came in and made com­
plete submission. Thakot was occupied on the 28th October, and Alai on the
1st November, good mule roads being constructed into the heart of those
hitherto unvisited tracts. The Alaiwals resisted, and were duly punished
by the troops; Pokal, the village of Arsala Khan, was destroyed, and a jirga
came into camp; it was not, however, fully representative and was dismissed
after being informed that all Alai would be held responsible for the hostile
action of any of its inhabitants, and that, unless the fine imposed were paid
within a reasonable time, a blockade would be reimposed.

The whole force was then withdrawn, without any further molestation on
the part of the enemy.

During the year following affairs on the Agror border remained quiet.
Police control over Agror was strengthened, and several criminals, who had
fled from justice in previous years, were brought to trial and punished. Among
the measures adopted for securing control for the future over these clans was
the construction of several roads from Agror to the crest of the range, which
formed our boundary; and in order to reap the benefit of these roads and to keep before the tribes the terms of their agreement, it was decided to send a small force to make a route march along the crest during the autumn of 1890, and the Hassanzais, Akazais, and Parari Saiyids were invited to arrange for the peaceable completion of the roads on the upper slopes of the mountain. They replied objecting to the construction of the roads and refusing the invitation, and, when subsequently warned to send in deputations to accompany the troops on their march along the crest, sent evasive replies. On an attempt being made to carry out the route march in October, the Hassanzais and the Akazais, instigated by Hashim Ali Khan, showed active opposition, and the intention of the tribes to evade their obligations having been established, the troops, in accordance with Government orders, retired, and notice was sent to the offenders that they would assuredly be punished for their contumacy in the spring.

In fulfilment of this threat, a force under Major-General W. K. Ellis entered the Black Mountain country in March 1891. The opposition was easily overcome, but at one time there appeared to be a prospect of an attack on the British force by a large gathering from Swat and Buner, which had assembled at Baio under the Mian Gul of Swat. The gathering, however, broke up and dispersed before the force recrossed the Indus. At the end of May, the Hassanzais and Akazais surrendered unconditionally and executed agreements providing for the perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan, the confiscation of his estate, and for his surrender if he should ever come within the power of the clans; they provided also for the protection of border roads and the roads within tribal territory, the march of British troops along the border when Government should see fit, the provision of escorts by the tribes for officers visiting their country, the prohibition of Hindustani settlements within the Black Mountain limits, responsibility for offences in British territory and for injury to British subjects in tribal territory, and the tribes accepted responsibility for the conduct of any Khan chosen by them. The Mada Khel, whom it was necessary to include in the settlement, because they, with the Hassanzais and Akazais together, made up the Isazai tribe of which Hashim Ali Khan was regarded as the nominal head, made a similar agreement later on, and most of the troops were withdrawn in June, though a brigade remained on the ridge until late in the autumn to ensure the fulfilment of the conditions accepted by the tribes.

With a view to increasing our control over the clans, to assist in the maintenance of peace and to secure the continued expulsion of Hashim Ali Khan, a small force of 200 Border Police was recruited from the independent clans and posted at suitable places on the frontier. Allowances aggregating Rs. 7,000 a year were granted to Hashim Ali Khan’s successor, and to the Hassanzai, Akazai, Madda Khels, Parari Saiyids, and Tikri maliks, on the usual conditions of friendship and good behaviour. Nevertheless, the condition of affairs remained unsatisfactory; Hashim Ali and his followers came to the right bank of the Indus and established himself in some Hassanazai and Madda Khel villages. The engagement entered into by the tribes after two punitive expeditions, was thus broken; the Madda Khels were blockaded, and in June 1892, the Isazai clans were warned that, unless Hashim Ali Khan were surrendered or expelled, a British force would again be sent across the border. Everything possible was done to avoid the necessity of another expedition, but without success, and at the end of September, a force under General Lockhart was concentrated at Darband to punish those villages which were known to have harboured Hashim Ali. The troops visited and destroyed the offending villages and returned to British territory by the 8th October, without having met with opposition. Hashim Ali however, remained at large, in spite of very favourable terms being offered to induce him to surrender himself.

In 1895 a bitter feud arose between the Madda Khels and Hassanzais, and still continues; the fighting has been more determined and the losses more severe than ever before known in the inter-tribal wars of these clans; but the effect has been to cause Hashim Ali Khan’s individuality to fall into the background, and he is now living in Buner limits.

346 F. D.
Since the operations of Sir William Lockhart's force in 1892, the peace of the Hazara border has been undisturbed. The year 1896-97 was one of exceptional tranquility along this part of the frontier, and the number of border offences committed during the year was excelled the smallest ever reported. We have noticed with satisfaction that the recent wave of fanaticism on the frontier has not spread to the Black Mountain country.
K. W. No. 2.

[DEMI-OFFICIALS.]
Dated Fort William, the 7th January 1898.

From—CAPTAIN H. DALY, C.I.E.,
To—MAJOR-GENERAL C. STAHAN, R.E.

It is desired to send home, by next mail, a map showing the frontier from Gilgit to * Distribution map of troops and levies on the Chaman, and containing the names shown in the accompanying list. A skeleton map something like the one* sent herewith would suffice. The rivers, roads, railways, etc., shown thereon might be shown. It should show both the administrative frontier, and the Durand line, the portion of the latter actually demarcated being marked with the dot-bar line; and the undemarcated portion, with a broken ribbon. You have all the material for this in your office, and if you can possibly let me have a proof by Monday or Tuesday, I should be very much obliged.

Dated Calcutta, the 8th January 1898.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL C. STAHAN, R.E.,
To—CAPTAIN H. DALY, C.I.E.

I very much doubt whether we shall be able to prepare such a map as you require in the time you ask for, but will do our best; unfortunately, the office is closed to-day, and I could not now get hold of draftsmen to start it.

I presume you want no more than the names you have mentioned in the list, and only the detail that is given on the specimen map forwarded by you, which we may accept as correct enough for the purpose. We might make a single copy of such a map in a rough manner by Tuesday evening, but you mention a proof. Do you want the map photo-zincographed and printed in any numbers? Or do you want only one copy to illustrate some report or despatch? Minute accuracy is not wanted, I suppose.

Dated Calcutta, the 13th January 1898.

From—SIR W. J. CUNNINGHAM, K.C.S.I.,
To—W. LEE-WARNER, Esq., C.S.I.

When the narrative despatch, which describes the several forward moves made by the Government of India on their North-Western Frontier, was under consideration of Council, a suggestion was made that it would increase the utility of the narrative if the despatch were illustrated with a skeleton map showing the administrative frontier of British India and the Durand line and containing the names of places mentioned in the despatch.

No such map being ready at the moment there was not time to prepare it and strike it off as an appendix to the report, but one copy has been done by hand which I enclose. His Excellency directed me to send it, so that if the Secretary of State wishes to use it for the purpose of illustration, and if there is time to have it printed, it can be made use of. As to the matter of time I conceive that you can turn out a map like this more quickly in London than we can in Calcutta, and if the map were held back here for another week, it would certainly be too late for the blue book.

I fear the despatch is rather late; but it was prepared as quickly as possible; too quickly I think for so important a document. I shall be very agreeably surprised if some big holes are not picked in it.
### Table of Expeditions undertaken against the Frontier Tribes from the Annexation of the Punjab to the 1st April 1864.

*(Page IV of the Preface and pages 654 and 655 of Mason's Record of Frontier Expeditions.)*

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### Expeditions mentioned in the Dispatch.

*(Those of 1897 are not entered in this list.)*

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F—77—Jan.  

Ex. — W. G. B.
No. 3 of 1898.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

FRONTIER.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, the 13th January 1898.

My Lord,

Your Lordship has asked that, when military operations on the north-western frontier are concluded, we should place our views before you on the subject of our future relations with the tribes. The time has not yet come when we can usefully discuss the policy of the future in detail; but a consideration of the questions which are involved will, we think, be facilitated by giving a short account of the different occasions in late years on which we have advanced into tribal country beyond our border. We shall endeavour to sketch the circumstances which called for each move of the kind, and to explain what was done in each case and what has been the effect. In presenting Your Lordship with this survey of the frontier, we shall proceed rather by geographical situation than by chronological order, beginning with Baluchistan in the south, and taking in succession Waziristan, the Kurram valley, Miranwai, Tirah, the Khyber and Kohat Passes and the Yusafzai border of Peshawar with Swat, Bajaur, Chitral and Gilgit.

2. Baluchistan, as the name is now applied, means the country under direct administration by the Governor-General's Agent at Quetta, as well as Kalat and its dependencies. Our relations with Kalat began with an attempt to secure the co-operation of Mehrab Khan, the ruler at the time, through whose territories it was intended to send the expedition of 1838 for the restoration of Shah Shuja in Afghanistan. Friendly dealings were frustrated by the treachery and duplicity of the Khan's Minister. A rupture was caused, Kalat was stormed and the Khan fell during the assault. A treaty was concluded with his successor, but after the withdrawal of the British from Kabul it remained inoperative.

3. The connection between India and Kalat was revived in 1854, when war between England and Russia was threatened. The treaty concluded with the Khan in that year required him to act in subordination to the British Government, to enter into no negotiations with other States without its consent, and to receive British troops into his country, if such a measure should be deemed necessary. By this treaty also the British Government granted to the Khan an annual subsidy, on condition of his preventing his subjects from committing outrages within or near British territory, of his protecting merchants, and permitting no exactions on trade beyond certain specified duties.
4. The history of Kalat, after the accession, in 1857, of Khodadad Khan, was marked by constant conflicts between the Khan and his turbulent people, by disorder and plunder within Kalat territories, and by violation of the British border. The Marri and Bugti tribes, who nominally owed allegiance to the Khan of Kalat, took advantage of the weakness of the Khan's Government and of their position in a knot of difficult hills, lying within the geographical limits of Baluchistan but jutting out into Sind and the Punjab, to carry on a series of raids on the British border. It was impossible to allow this state of anarchy to continue; and, in order to remedy it, it was necessary to revise our relations both with the Khan and with the tribes nominally subordinate to him.

5. This revision was effected gradually and as occasion arose. The first step was taken in 1871, when the attempt to coerce the Marri and Bugti tribes through the Khan of Kalat was abandoned, and it was decided to deal with them directly. In March 1873, the disorders prevailing in Kalat territory rendered it necessary to withdraw the Political Agent; the payment of the Khan's subsidy was withheld, and he was warned that his obligations under the treaty to protect trade and secure the peace of the frontier remained unaltered, and that, in the event of disturbances occurring on the frontier, the British Government would be compelled to take its own measures for preserving order. These warnings having proved ineffectual, Lord Northbrook's Government decided, in 1875, to depute Captain Sandeman as a special Agent to effect, if possible, some settlement between the Khan and his Sardars, and to report on the present relations between the Khan's Government and the Marri and Bugti tribes.

6. Captain Sandeman's mission did not effect all that had been hoped of it, but his labours were considered so far satisfactory that, in the spring of 1876, he was again deputed to Baluchistan; and at a Durbar held at Mastung in July, he effected a formal reconciliation between the Khan and the leading Brahui Chiefs. In December of the same year, His Highness the Khan met Lord Lytton at Jacobabad, and a new treaty was concluded. It affirmed and supplemented the engagements made in 1854, providing for the location of troops in, and the construction of railway and telegraph lines through, Kalat territory. British Agents with suitable escorts were to be posted in the Khan's dominions, and disputes between the Khan and his Sardars were to be submitted to the arbitration of the British Government, who undertook to pay His Highness an annual subsidy, which was to be supplemented by a contribution for the development of traffic on the trade routes running through his country. Major Sandeman was the officer entrusted with the duties entailed by this treaty. He became the first Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, and took up his residence at Quetta.

7. The treaty of 1876 forms the basis on which the Baluchistan Agency is founded; and it marks the final adoption of the policy of making British influence effective and paramount throughout Baluchistan,—a policy which has been steadily pursued, since that time, by the Government of India and carried into effect by Sir Robert Sandeman and his successors in the Baluchistan Agency. The direct and immediate cause which forced its adoption upon the Government was, as has been related, the anarchy which prevailed on Kalat and the serious injury caused to British territory and trade by the depredations of the tribes. But it was not these local considerations merely which determined the decision. Here, as in other parts of the frontier, it was essential to keep in view possible contingencies in Central Asia. The routes leading from Sind to Quetta, and from Quetta to Kandahar, are of the greatest strategical importance, and it was necessary that the Government of India should be in a position to control and protect them.

8. During the Afghan war, His Highness the Khan loyally acted up to his engagements, and proved his willingness to assist the British Government. Subsequently he leased the Quetta district to the British Government for an annual rent, and commuted his right to collect tolls on the trade passing
through the Bolan Pass. The Khan has also made over to the British Government with full jurisdiction the railway lands in his territory. The Marris and Bugtis have gradually quieted down, and being nearly surrounded by country which is under British administration, they have lost much of their old importance. They have, however, on several occasions, given trouble by quarrelling with their neighbours, and some of the Marris, in 1880, after Maiwand, assumed so hostile an attitude that the country had to be visited by a military force under the late Sir Charles MacGregor.

9. The Agent to the Governor-General is not only charged with conducting our relations with the Khan of Kalat, and with administering the Quetta district and other parts assigned to the British Government in the country of the Khan of Kalat, but he has at the same time under his direct administration territories which fall under two different categories, one comprising tribal country assigned to the British Government by the Chiefs but not formally annexed, and the other the territories known as British Baluchistan. The frontier districts of Pishin and Sibi formed part of the dominions of the Amir of Afghanistan. They were occupied during the Afghan war of 1878, and were placed, by the treaty of Gandamak, under the protection and administrative control of the British Government. When the present Amir was recognised as the ruler of Afghanistan, he was informed that they would be retained in British possession. They have remained, with the adjacent district of Shorarud, under British administration ever since, but it was not until 1887 that they were formally incorporated in British India. This was not so much any new development of policy as the formal recognition of existing facts, and the immediate cause for it was the difficulty of legally providing for the administration of justice. To the north, lie the valleys of Bori and Zhob, which comprise the country assigned to the British by the act of its Chiefs. As usual our attention was drawn to the tract by the aggressiveness of its people. The inhabitants of the Zhob valley had from the first been troublesome and a source of danger to the peace of the neighbouring districts. During 1883 and the early part of 1884, a series of outrages against the British Government, its subjects and its servants, culminating in an attack upon a camp of coolies, and threatening the railway works, led to the movement of troops into the Zhob valley. The Chief was deposed, and a relation appointed in his stead. An agreement was taken from the Maliks, or tribal headmen, by which they undertook to put a stop to raiding into British territory, to pay a fine, and to raise no opposition to the location in Zhob and Bori of British troops. In 1887, a British force was stationed in the Bori valley for the protection of the frontier road. The occupation of Zhob, in circumstances to be presently related, is the only other expansion of the Baluchistan Agency territories which need be noted. The history of the Agency has since been one of progressive civilisation and comparative quiet internally, the locality of disturbance and unrest being transferred to the border where Afghan territory, on one side, and Waziristan, on another, march with what is now the Zhob Political Agency. The Baluchistan Agency thus becomes connected with the Waziris and our dealings with them.

10. The Waziri tribe of Pathans inhabit the hill country to the west of the trans-Indus frontier of British India, from the Gomal Pass to Thal, north of Bannu. The two main branches of the Waziris are the Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khel. The Mahsuds were for years one of the most troublesome clans on the border, and constantly plundered and harried the neighbouring regularly administered districts. They were so bold that, in January 1879, they sacked and burnt the town of Tank. A severe blockade was imposed without effect; another British town was attacked, and after two years spent in endeavouring to effect a settlement, a military expedition was undertaken. The Mahsud country was easily and quickly traversed, and after some delay, caused by interference from Kabul, the Maliks made complete submission. In the immediately following years the conduct of the Mahsuds continued fairly good, but traders' caravans several times suffered severely at their hands in the Gomal Pass. The pass is a main route, largely used by the wandering Powindah clans in their annual
trading migrations from Afghanistan to British territory. In 1887, the Government of India were enjoined by Her Majesty’s Secretary of State to undertake a complete examination of the Gomal route in connection with the scheme of frontier defence which was then being carried out. The Mahsuds agreed, on the promise of certain fixed rewards, to furnish tribal escorts and the party started in February 1888. The attitude of the Mahsuds compelled an almost immediate return. In November 1888, in furtherance of the same policy, Sir Robert Sandeman was permitted to visit Lower Zhob. He reported that “the whole of the Chiefs and people of the Zhob were found perfectly friendly, and anxious to be taken under our protection.” The headmen petitioned that Zhob as well as Bori might be brought under more direct British control, so that they might enjoy security. The occupation of Zhob was sanctioned, and a Political Agent was appointed to the charge of the district. In December 1889, Sir Robert Sandeman received the jirgas and allotted to them service grants on condition that they should be responsible for the safety of the Gomal Pass, and should keep it and the Zhob route open to traffic.

11. After negotiations were complete, Sir Robert Sandeman proceeded through the Gomal Pass, and, in consideration of the loyal conduct of the Mahsud Waziri Maliks, he was authorized to announce to them the immediate suspension of the tax on their imports into British territory, which had been levied as a fine since the expedition of 1881. Posts garrisoned by local levies were then established to guard the road through the Gomal, for the protection of which the Mahsud Waziris were given allowances. Allowances were at the same time granted to the sections of the Darwesh Khel Waziris inhabiting Wano, which dominates the western end of the Gomal. These measures seemed to promise success, and in 1891 the border was quiet. In 1892, however, much disorder ensued on the Amir of Afghanistan endeavouring to bring under effective control the Waziris and other clans either within or close to the limits of British political control. His Highness sent troops to establish posts on this frontier. The negotiations of the Amir’s officials with the tribesmen met with some success. The Waziris demanded from us assurances of support in the event of their rejecting the Amir’s overtures and resisting his advance by force. An assurance was given them to the effect that, if they strictly confined themselves to their own recognised territory and committed no act of aggression or provocation, the Government of India would support them against the Amir’s interference. In May 1892, Wano was occupied by Afghan troops, and the unrest among the Waziris became more pronounced. The Amir’s Sardar commenced offering allowances to all who would come to him, making them extravagant promises, and doing all in his power to induce them to sever their connection with the British Government and accept the Amir’s suzerainty. Under these inducements, deputations of various sections went to Kabul and interviewed the Amir. Early in July, Lord Lansdowne wrote to the Amir regarding his encroachments in Waziri country, and requested him to order his officers to desist from all attempts to induce the tribe to accept His Highness’s rule, pending a settlement of the British-Afghan boundary. The substance of the warning was conveyed to the Waziris and to the Amir’s Agent in Wano. As a consequence of the unrest caused by the action of the Afghan officials, the Waziris began to raid upon territory under our control. At the request of the Mahsud Maliks, a small force was sent to the Gomal to preserve order; and at the end of August the Viceroy wrote to the Amir insisting on the withdrawal of his agents and troops from the vicinity of Wano and Gulkach by the 1st October. On receipt of the Viceroy’s letter, the Amir ordered his Sardar to retire, pending a settlement of outstanding frontier questions; but ineffectual attempts to draw the allegiance of other tribes on our border to Kabul continued to be made.

12. In 1893, Afghan interference again raised some excitement in Waziristan. The Amir’s officer, though compelled to leave the Waziri country, continued to do his utmost to induce the Maliks to acknowledge Afghan suzerainty, declaring that he would shortly return to Wano, and that the question of the future rule over Waziristan had been left open. The Sardar
sent the allowance promised to the tribesmen of Wano, and told them and the Mahsuds that the Amir was sending forces immediately into Waziristan. A delegation of the Kabul faction visited Kabul, and the endeavours of the Amir's officials to gain over the Waziris did not cease until the Wano Ahmadzais reported that the Kabul faction had come to the conclusion that the Amir would have no further connection with them, and that all were ready to come in and beg forgiveness. Afghan intrigues continued in Dawar, the Governor of Khost threatening to invade the country unless the Malikis came in to him and made submission. In the autumn of 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand proceeded to Kabul, and signed an agreement under which His Highness relinquished all claim to Dawar and Waziristan, with the exception of the western tract known as Birmal. The Waziris were informed in due course that a British and Afghan Commission would proceed in October 1894 to delimitate the Amir's frontier.

13. Mr. Bruce, who was entrusted with carrying into effect the political arrangements required in Waziristan, in consequence of the decision to demarcate the boundary, reached Wano at the end of October 1894. He was accompanied by a brigade of troops and was well received by the tribal jirgas. The fanatical element, however, led by a Mulla named Powindah, raised a numerous gathering and attacked the British camp at Wano. After much patient negotiation with the Waziris, it was found to be impossible for their Malikis, without the assistance of a British force, to induce the malcontents to make the reparation demanded of them. Sir William Lockhart, who was appointed to command, issued a proclamation announcing that he was authorised to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British camp at Wano, to enforce the conditions demanded by Government, and any other terms which renewed opposition might necessitate; that it was his intention to secure the carrying out of the boundary demarcation; and that resistance or non-compliance with his demands might compel him to stay in the country longer than the Government had any desire that he should stay. No direct opposition was offered, though the force was harassed in the style of guerilla warfare which is followed by these tribesmen on such occasions. By the month of March 1895 the terms imposed had been fully complied with, and the work of demarcating the boundary was able to proceed without further hindrance.

14. The Dawaris are a small tribe holding both banks of the Tochi river on the Bannu border from Haider Khel on the east to Pai Khel near Kanirogha on the west. Before we entered the Tochi they lived under the protection of the Darwesh Khel Waziris by whom they are practically surrounded. On the completion of delimitation Mr. Anderson, who had demarcated the northern section, returned with his escort to the Tochi valley, where it had been decided that the troops should remain pending the settlement of the allowances to be granted to the Dawaris and Darwesh Khel. The whole of the Dawari Malikis gave in a written paper expressing their willingness to remain under the British Government and requesting that the Tochi valley should be permanently occupied. The offer of the Dawaris that their country should remain under the British Government was accepted, and it was decided that a simple form of administration should be introduced and some light revenue, the amount of which was fixed by consent, should be taken from them at once, in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter. The attitude of the tribe since the settlement was made testifies to the reality of their desire to receive our protection.

15. The arrangements made with the Mahsud and Darwesh Khel Waziris include the grant of allowances to them conditional on—

(1) General good behaviour.

(2) Prevention of raids and other offences across the boundary of British India or in protected areas.

(3) Surrender for trial and punishment of tribesmen guilty of offences against us or against persons acting under or in support of our authority.
(4) Furnishing tribal escort to officers visiting any part of their country under the orders of Government.

(5) Rendering the service for which they receive allowances in any part of their country most convenient to Government.

Relations are carried on by Political Officers who are immediately subordinate to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division of the Punjab.

16. These arrangements have worked well hitherto, although the party of Mulla Powindah put them to a rather severe trial in 1896. The Mulla and his party repaired to Kabul, offered their allegiance to the Amir, and asked for help to fight the British. His Highness told them that he had a firm friendship with the British, and reminded them that, when he wished to enter into relations with the Waziris in years gone by, they refused to come to him, whereas now that they were in difficulties they asked for help. The Amir himself addressed the Government of India about the arrival of the Waziris, and forwarded a petition, which they presented to him. In this they asked for assistance and protection in the migration which they had determined to make into the “country of Islam.” The Amir was informed in reply that the British Government would not interfere with those who wished to leave Waziristan; but His Highness’s treatment of the Mulla and the Malik accompanying him, who were for the most part men of no importance, was so discouraging that they returned to their homes. It became evident that the Mulla was thoroughly discredited with the tribe, and up to the present time there has been no serious revival of his influence.

17. The disposition of our forces in Waziristan cannot be regarded as yet settled. We have maintained hitherto a small garrison of all arms in Wano and have kept up connecting posts between that place and the border of the Punjab. The Tochi valley has been held by a garrison which, originally placed at Miran Shah in Dawar, was moved to Datta Khel in the Darwesh Khel Waziri country during 1896 in consequence of raids which occurred between the Waziris and their Afghan neighbours and of offences committed in the Upper Tochi. It was when an escort taken from this garrison accompanied the Political Officer to Maizar, in connection with enquiries necessitated by the murder of a subordinate official, that the outbreak of the Madda Khel section occurred last June, leading to the occupation of the Tochi with a force of two Brigades.

18. Notwithstanding that grave occurrence, and the minor troubles to which we have referred, we are able to regard with some satisfaction the results of our action in Waziristan. At a time when the whole of the border to the north has been a scene of great turbulence, and when the Mullas have commanded an influence among the trans-border tribes sufficient to raise disturbances of unparalleled magnitude, Waziristan has remained generally quiet. The Mulla Powindah, if he tried, failed to move the people to rise against us. The Powindah caravans have, this autumn, come to India as usual, and without being molested.

19. The next tract of country to come under notice is the valley of the Kurram. Our obligations to the Turis of Kurram were incurred in the last Afghan war. At the request of the tribe, and in return for the assistance which they gave, it was announced to them that they should not again be subject to the Durani dynasty. For many years, however, we refrained from exercising any control. The state of the valley was deplorable. The Amir frequently complained, with more or less reason, of the misdeeds of the Turis. Raids and counter-raids by Turis and Afghan subjects were of constant occurrence, and the internal condition of Turi affairs was equally subject of anxiety. Every man did what was right in his own eyes, and there was no law in the country.

20. In 1884 and 1888, attempts were made to settle the disputes between the Turis and their neighbours by joint British and Afghan Commissioners;
but no improvement was effected. Affairs in Kurram culminated in 1892, when Sarwar Khan, best known as "Chikkai," a notorious Zaimusht outlaw, after a visit to Kabul, seized Lower Kurram, and closed the road to British territory. Simultaneously Upper Kurram was attacked by Jajis, Mangals and Makbils from Afghan territory. These proceedings were countenanced, if not instigated, by the Afghan Governor of Khost. Fighting continued at intervals until late in the summer of 1892. In the autumn, Lower Kurram was still held by Waziris, Zaimushts, Jajis and Khostwals. Internal feuds prevented the Turis from combining against external attack, and in their difficulties they turned to the British Government and begged that a Governor might be sent to them supported by troops to administer the valley, failing which they declared they must make submission to Kabul. The Amir, who had been addressed regarding the proceedings of his subjects, denied all complicity in Chikkai's invasion, but admitted that he had given his "injured and suffering people permission to attack the Turis, because there was no other remedy for evil than evil." He at the same time accepted the Viceroy's proposal to send a British officer to Kurram to decide the several outstanding cases between British and Afghan subjects. An officer was sent into Kurram to undertake the settlement of outstanding disputes, and make some arrangement of a more lasting kind for the pacification of the country. No opposition was offered, and he was everywhere well received by the people, who saw in the arrival of the British forces their sole hope of a release from the unhappy condition of affairs to which they had so long been accustomed.

21. From this time forward, the history of events in Kurram has been one of peaceful and rapid improvement. A few raids by offenders on both sides of the border there have been, though these have generally been settled without much difficulty; and there have been disputes, now happily settled, about water-rights between Turi inhabitants of Kurram and the Afghan residents of the opposite side of the border, which was demarcated by joint British and Afghan Commissioners in 1894. We have not annexed Kurram to British territory, but we retain a Political Agent there to govern the valley. A rough and ready system of law and justice has been introduced, and a revenue settlement which is based on the old Durani figures. The duties of regular police as regards arrest, custody and escort are performed by the Kurram militia, an efficient body of men who have done good service during the disturbances of this autumn. The people are encouraged to settle their differences among themselves as far as possible and to resort to the courts only in serious cases. Trade has increased in a striking manner, and is significant testimony to the thorough pacification of this once turbulent and unsafe tract and to the change which our rule has brought. A head-quarters station has been built at Para Chinar, cultivation is extending, and irrigation channels and new villages have been constructed. The Kurram valley does not, and probably never will, pay all the expenses of government; still the cessation of hostility and strife, and the peace, order and prosperity which have followed upon British control, more than repay the expenditure of one lakh and a half of rupees which the civil administration costs over and above the annual income of the valley.

22. The Para Chamkannis, a small tribe living in glens of the Safed Koh, drained by the Kharmana and other tributaries of the Kurram river, are now the Turis' most troublesome neighbours. The Khani Khel section particularly have so frequently raided and robbed in Kurram that we have several times been urged by the Punjab Government to undertake a punitive expedition against them. This we hoped by patience to avoid, but the Khani Khel threw in their lot with the Orakzais and have now received sharp punishment at the hands of Sir William Lockhart.

23. The Orakzais are a Pathan tribe inhabiting the country to the north and west of the Kohat district. Our relations with the tribe were at first carried on through tribal headmen, used as middlemen, a system formerly much in vogue on the Punjab frontier, but which is now discredited and has practically ceased to exist. The troubles on the Miranzai border, which culminated in the despatch
of two costly expeditions, were chiefly due to this system of tribal management. The Miranzai valley is part of the tribal territory of the Bangash Pathans, who are our subjects. The old boundary of this territory, to the north, is the watershed of the Samana range. This was admitted by the Rabia Khel Orakzais in an agreement entered into by them in September 1855. In subsequent years, the adjoining tribes established grazing hamlets on the southern slopes of the Samana, and within the valley itself were settled, as proprietors or tenants, numerous Pathans, who had lost connection with the tribes to which, by origin, they belonged. Among these settlers were certain Malla Khel, whom the middleman claimed as private vassals, and it was due to his instigation of their raiding and to his opposing the assessment of their hamlets, that the condition of the Miranzai border became so disturbed as to be described in 1889 by the Lieutenant-Governor (Sir James Lyall) as "a scandal and a source of much injury and alarm to British subjects and of trouble to the administration." Strong measures were required, and with the sanction of the Government of India, the middleman's son was deported; while he himself was peremptorily ordered to collect outstanding fines, which had been imposed for repeated outrages, under penalty of loss of office. No improvement resulted. Further offences were committed, fines continued to mount up, and there appeared no prospect of a settlement. The Lieutenant-Governor recommended, early in 1890, the despatch of an expedition in the hope that a show of force would improve our relations with all the clans on this part of the border. While the proposal was still under the consideration of the Government of India, affairs appeared to take a favourable turn; some of the leading offenders made submission to the Deputy Commissioner, the Malla Khel accepted the decision regarding jurisdiction in their villages up to the foot of the Samana, and one clan agreed to pay the fines due by them. Unfortunately, the improvement was not lasting; it became necessary to deport the obstructive middloman and his second son from the frontier: the tribesmen showed signs that they would not accept the Khan's removal from office without a struggle; border outrages increased; and all five* Samil clans of the Orakzai assumed a hostile attitude. A blockade was established, and a formal warning was sent to the Samil clans that, if they did not submit and pay the fines, an expedition would be sent against them. In the end, all except the Malla Khel, whose exposed position made them afraid to resist, failed to pay. The continued misconduct of the tribes showed that all hopes of a peaceful settlement must be abandoned, and early in January 1891, the despatch of an expedition against the four contumacious Samil clans was sanctioned. The force advanced at the end of January; the clans offered little opposition, and by the end of February the troops had returned to Kohat, the tribesmen having agreed to the location of posts on the Samana and to pay revenue for their holdings on its southern slopes. Measures were taken for the completion of the roads and the construction of posts on the Samana, a small force being left for the protection of the workmen.

24. Early in April, the picquets covering the working parties were attacked by a tribal gathering. Several men were killed, and the small British force was compelled to evacuate the Samana. Within a fortnight the range was re-occupied, and the enemy were driven off with great loss. The subsequent operations of the force were equally successful. The enemy were defeated and dispersed wherever they were met; the Khanki valley immediately north of the Samana range was traversed, and all the clans in it made submission. Since 1891, until their recent outbreak, the Orakzais have behaved well. In 1894, the Bar-Muhammad Khel, a subsection of the DaulatzaIs, applied to be taken under the protection of the British Government. Their request was refused.

25. The Afridis are a tribe of Pathans. There are eight clans. Six, known as the Khyster Afridis, inhabit the southern and eastern slopes of the Safed Koh mountain system to the west and south of the Peshawar district.
The Adam Khel hold the Kohat pass. They are a warlike tribe, and the fighting strength of the whole Afridi tribe is estimated at about 27,000. They furnish our Native army with 2,000 recruits of the best fighting class. Our earliest relations with the Afridis were brought about by the offences which they committed in British territory. They are inveterate thieves, and the facilities afforded by their position on the border, enabled the different clans to evade responsibility for raids while giving passage through their lands to the raiders. Agreements were made with several clans forty years ago with the view of putting a stop to these marauding practices. The Afridis also gave much trouble in 1878-79 in the early stages of the Afghan war. The Treaty of Gandamak in 1879 stipulated that the British Government should retain control of the Khyber pass, and of all political relations with the tribes along it. This arrangement was renewed in the following year when Abdur Rahman Khan became Amir.

26. Prior to 1879, the Afridis of the Khyber, while asserting their independence, received allowances from the Amir of Kabul for keeping the pass open to trade. These allowances, always irregularly paid, were often suspended for years together, and shortly before the war, the route was practically closed to commerce. On the transfer of the control of the pass, arrangements with the Afridis were, after protracted negotiations, concluded in February 1881: an annual subsidy was distributed in allowances to different sections of the tribes, and a body of Jezailchis, or match-lockmen, under the charge and management of the tribal headmen, was enlisted for the protection of the road. In consideration of these payments, the Afridis accepted entire and exclusive responsibility for the security of the road, and bound themselves to commit no offences in British territory. The British Government reserved the right, which has been since exercised, of levying tolls on traffic carried through the Khyber. The agreement subscribed by the Afridis stated:—“Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops. It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the pass, or to withdraw them and to re-occupy at pleasure.” The settlement on the whole worked well until August last. During seventeen years the only material change introduced was in the constitution of the Jezailchi corps, which was gradually developed from an irregular band of match-lockmen paid through the Maliks, into the efficient well-armed Khyber Rifles, who volunteered for service, and were actually employed, on the Black Mountain Expedition of 1891. With the consent and assistance of the tribesmen, a fortified serai was built in 1888-89 at Landi Kotal, which was thenceforward held by the Khyber Rifles until August last. The Afridis have latterly received in pay and allowances Rs. 1,90,000 a year. Our relations with the Afridis seemed to be most friendly, and we neither gave them cause for complaint nor received from them any indication of discontent. Suddenly and without warning they assembled their forces and attacked their co-tribesmen who were holding the posts in the Khyber pass.

27. The Adam Khel Afridis of the Kohat pass are distinct from the Afridis of the Khyber. They hold the entire Kohat pass from the Peshawar plain to Kohat. Our agreement with these Afridis, requiring them, in return for an annual allowance, to keep open the Pass dates from 1849. At times they have misbehaved and attacked us, but they have, on the whole, behaved well, and adhered to their engagement to keep the Pass open, although they have never complied with the requirement to improve the road. The Jowaki section provoked expeditions into their country in 1853 and 1877 by committing devastation in British territory. They also have of late years been quiet. Malik Babri, their leader in the troubles of 1877, is now dead, and his son is the manager of the tonga service from Kohat to Khushalgarh. All sections of the Kohat Pass Afridis remained quiet during the disturbances of last autumn.

28. The Mohmand country lies west of the Peshawar border and north of the Kabul River. Their exceptionally favourable situation for harassing simultaneously the Jalalabad district and the Peshawar plain, and the trade
routes from Kabul to India, enabled the Mohmands to secure, under former Governments, valuable jagirs and permission to levy tolls on road and river. At our annexation of the Punjab, the greater part of the Mohmand jagirs in the Peshawar district were forfeited, and were not restored, although the border was for years kept in a state of ferment by the angry tribe. During the last Afghan war the Mohmands on several occasions gave trouble; since then they have, till the present year, been generally well-behaved.

29. For several years after his accession the Amir contented himself with paying annual allowances to the Mohmands, avoiding anything like active interference in their affairs, the British Government on their side merely maintaining their right to deal direct with any of the sections. In 1889, the Amir commenced to adopt more active measures. Agents were sent through the country to push His Highness's interests and to endeavour to induce the tribe to declare themselves entirely under Afghan suzerainty, and a general feeling of unrest pervaded the whole Mohmand territory. This was the position of affairs at the time of the departure of the Durand Mission to Kabul in September 1893. Sir Mortimer Durand was guided in his negotiations by the fact that the Government of India had always abstained from recognising the Amir's sovereignty over the Tarakzai and Halimzai clans, and the extreme undesirability of having the Afghan frontier close to the Peshawar district. Consequently he drew the boundary line on the agreement map, which the Amir accepted, in such a way as to divide the Mohmands in two.

30. Difficulties arose when we sought to undertake the demarcation of the boundary in this direction. The Amir declared that Sir Mortimer Durand had conceded the whole of the Mohmands to him, and that the boundary map was wrong, and he occupied Mitai, a Baezai village. Eventually the Amir withdrew his men, and in November 1896, after a prolonged correspondence, we offered a compromise to His Highness giving him the Baezai other than Mitai, and all the Khwaezais. At the end of 1896, we concluded arrangements which promised to be satisfactory with the clans over whom we had reserved exclusive control. Representative jirgas met the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division in November 1896; their attitude was good, and they accepted the position that they were henceforth under the British Government; they were allowed to continue to receive river tolls, and allowances were fixed for them in lieu of those heretofore paid, actually or nominally, by the Amir. In return for these allowances, they agreed to render such service as we might require from them, and to be faithful and well conducted in their dealings with the British Government. Our relations with them broke down under the strain of the Mulla of Hadda's influence. The clans lying nearest to Shabkadar were carried away by the gathering which swept through their country, but the Tarakzai clans, who were not subjected to the same pressure, did not as a body join the movement against us.

31. Bajaur is the name applied to the tribal territory immediately to the north and north-east of the Mohmand country. On the north-east of Bajaur lies Dir which marches with Chitral and Swat. Prior to the rise of Umra Khan of Jandol, whose history is sufficiently well known from the events connected with the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force, Nawagai was the most important division of Bajaur, and the Nawagai Khan was the head of all the Tarkani Chiefs. It was on the death, about eight years ago, of the then Khan of Dir that Umra Khan, after years of almost continual struggle with his neighbours, succeeded in establishing his authority over Dir and considerable tracts of adjoining tribal territory. The present Nawab of Dir, Muhammad Sharif Khan, fled to Swat in 1890.

32. To explain the policy which has led to the position we occupy in regard to Swat, Dir and Chitral, it is necessary to indicate the relations of the Kashmir Darbar with the States on its north-west border. Hunza and Nagar extend into the mountainous region at the junction of the Hindu Kush and
Mustagh ranges; to the south they border on Gilgit. The Chitral State lies south of the Hindu Kush, and marches with Hunza and Gilgit on the east and with Kafiristan on the south-west. The history of Chitral is closely connected with that of Gilgit. Gilgit had recently been conquered by the Sikhs when it was transferred by the Treaty of Amritsar to the Maharaja of Kashmir in 1846, but for a long time Gilgit was a bone of contention between Kashmir and the Chiefs who, at various times, established themselves in Chitral. The people of Hunza and Nagar were more or less surreptitiously tendering allegiance by turns to Kabul, Kashmir and China, doubting to which quarter they should look for the safest barter of their allegiance in return for protection by some paramount power. To the Chiefs of Hunza, Nagar and Chitral, belonging the southern openings of the only direct passes from Sarikol and the Pamirs, and the Government of India determined to acquire, through the Maharaja of Kashmir, an efficient control over these passes, to bring the Chief under the Maharaja’s political control and suzerainty, and to mark, as definitely as the nature of the country would permit, the territorial limits within which the encroachments of foreign influence should be anticipated.

33. In furtherance of this policy, a British Political Officer was sent to Gilgit. The different tribal Chiefs intrigued and fought amongst themselves. The British officer, who had only a personal guard of 14 Native Infantry, was not in a position to exercise authoritative control, and when affairs arrived at such a condition that he was shut up in daily expectation of attack by the Yasin Chief, who had raised the whole countryside, it was decided, in 1881, to withdraw the Gilgit Agency, leaving in the hands of the Kashmir Darbar, without immediate supervision, the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State.

34. In 1885, the risk of war with Russia turned attention to the question of obtaining fuller information regarding the routes and resources of the country lying between Chitral and Faizabad in Badakhshan. It was therefore determined to send a small mission to examine the country round Gilgit and Chitral, and it possible to visit Kafiristan. Colonel W. Lockhart (now General Sir William Lockhart) was appointed to the charge of the party. The mission obtained a written engagement from the Mehtar, as the ruler of Chitral is called, that, in the event of an attack being made upon the British Government from the direction of his territory, he would resist such attack and would allow a passage to British troops.

35. As a result of the reports received from Colonel Lockhart, the Gilgit Agency was re-established, in 1889, under Captain (now Colonel) A. G. Durand. He had, in 1888 on invitation from the Chiefs, visited Hunza and Nagar and negotiated agreements with the Rajas, according to which they undertook to put an end to raiding, to give free passage to British officers deputed to visit their country and to accept the British Agent’s control. Subject to these conditions, the Government of India sanctioned for the Chiefs small yearly allowances in addition to the subsidies already paid by Kashmir. The Rajas, however, failed to act up to their engagements; and forced a conflict during which Nagar and Hunza were occupied. These States are now definitely under the authority of the Kashmir Darbar, and their affairs have been quiet and satisfactory since the settlement which followed Colonel Durand’s brief campaign. In the subsequent Chitral troubles the people of Hunza and Nagar and the small Chiefships about Gilgit vied one with another in doing us service; and they were of the greatest use.

36. Aman-ul-Mulk, the old Mehtar of Chitral, died suddenly in August 1892; and then ensued a period of turbulence and murder characteristic of the methods by which successions are brought about in those wild regions. Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar’s eldest son, eventually established himself with the countenance, but without the active support of the British Agent at Gilgit. Our position and policy in Chitral were made the subject of careful review in correspondence with Lord Kimberley in 1893. Lord Lansdowne’s Government considered it essential for Chitral to remain under the suzerainty of Kashmir and under British influence; and the Secretary of State, concurring in these views, agreed to the temporary retention of an Assistant Political Agent
at Chitral to give our countenance and support to the Mehtar. By the end of 1894, when Nizam-ul-Mulk had ruled for two years, the time was considered to have come when our Assistant Political Agent could be withdrawn from Chitral, and our influence sufficiently maintained by his occasional visits. This was done, and it was during one of these visits that Nizam-ul-Mulk was, in his turn, murdered by an adherent of his younger brother, not without the countenance and aid of Umra Khan, the ambitious Chief of Jandol in Bajaur. Sir George Robertson had by this time succeeded Colonel Durand as British Agent at Gilgit, and he set out for Chitral about the middle of January to report on the situation. It is not necessary to go into the details of Umra Khan’s advance into Chitral, under the pretence of waging a religious war against the Kafirs, or the appearance on the scene of Sher Afzal, an uncle of the Mehtar, and a former aspirant to the country, who had been for several years interned by the Amir of Afghanistan in Kabul. These events, as is well known, to the people of Chitral turning against the British officers, who were besieged in the fort of Chitral, with their small band of devoted Indian and Kashmir soldiers; and to the rescue of Sir George Robertson and the garrison by the simultaneous advance of Sir Robert Low’s force through Swat and Dir, and of Colonel Kelly with a mixed force of Indian and Kashmir troops, and allies from the States with which we had been so short a time before embroiled.

37. The condition of Chitral, on the relief of the garrison, was one of disorder and difficulty. The Mehtar who had gained his position by murder was a prisoner in our hands. His little brother Shuja-ul-Mulk, a boy of 12, had been provisionally acknowledged as Mehtar with the view of dissipating any hopes or fears that the British would annex the State. Umra Khan and Sher Afzal were both fugitives soon to be interned, the one in Kabul and the other in India, and the sympathies of the people were decidedly alienated from us and inclined to Sher Afzal.

38. It was in circumstances such as these that the policy of the Government of India towards Chitral had to be determined. Events seemed to us to indicate that the withdrawal from Chitral under the circumstances then existing was impossible, as it would leave the country to complete anarchy, and whatever the ultimate decision might be, would render a settlement more difficult. Our conclusions were that to abandon Chitral to the possibility of occupation by a foreign power involved a risk which we ought not to run, and that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir; we were convinced that we could not hope to maintain British influence in Chitral without the presence of British troops, and while we were fully conscious that the course we proposed might involve us in an expense which our finances could ill afford, and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on our north-western frontier which we would fain have avoided, we recommended that Chitral should be held by a garrison of British Indian troops, and direct communication established between it and Peshawar. The eventual decision of Her Majesty’s Government was in accord with these views.

39. On the 2nd September 1895, Shuja-ul-Mulk was formally installed as Mehtar of Chitral in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir as his suzerain, and with the authority and approval of the Government of India. The internal administration of Chitral was left in the hands of the Mehtar and of his advisers, but as Shuja-ul-Mulk was a mere boy, a Political Officer remained in Chitral upon whom the Mehtar might always call for advice and assistance. A general pardon was proclaimed for all political offences committed during the recent disturbances. In announcing the arrangements, Sir George Robertson made it plain to all concerned that the Mehtar would be supported in dealing with crimes, such as murder and outrage, which constitute a public scandal, and that we would not countenance in a State under our protection an administration which permitted murderous outrages, such as had been frequent in Chitral and led directly to the late disturbances. It was also announced that traffic in slaves would not be allowed in future. The Kashmir Darbar expressed their cordial concurrence.
40. For the maintenance of communication with Chitral, agreements were entered into with the Khan of Dir and the Khans of the Lower Swat valley. The Khan of Dir undertook to keep open and repair the road in his territory, to make postal arrangements, to protect the telegraph line when put up, and to lease sites for the accommodation of troops on Laram or Dasha Khel, should Government wish this at any time. The Khan received, in addition to a present for service and expenditure on our behalf during the previous six months, an annual allowance of 10,000 rupees, and a like sum in commutation of his rights to collect tolls throughout his country. A sum of 60,000 rupees a year was sanctioned for levies in Dir, including allowances to the tribes. The levies were 310 in number, stationed in eight posts along the route. These posts were readily built by tribal labour. We also sanctioned a levy scheme for Swat and Ranizai. The allowances enjoyed in the past by the Khans of Swat were raised, and we sanctioned a further annual sum of 10,000 rupees for distribution among them in commutation of their rights to levy tolls. The political control of the affairs of Chitral as well as of the tribes between Chitral and India is in the hands of Major Deane, C.S.I. Until July 1897 these arrangements worked smoothly and well. The Chitral garrison was relieved in 1896, and again in 1897, without the slightest hitch, trade increased enormously and the countries lying immediately to the north of the Peshawar border seemed to have entered on a period of peace and prosperity such as had not been known in historical times. In the Gilgit Agency, as a direct consequence of the establishment of the garrison in Chitral, we have been able to introduce several measures by means of which economy and efficiency are at once promoted. With the exception of the Political Agent's escort, no British troops are now stationed in Gilgit. The Kashmir troops have been reduced in strength and concentrated in position, and by the introduction of a scheme of police levies a new employment is given to the people who have accepted it gladly.

41. The outbreak at Malakand on the night of the 26th July 1897 drew into the vortex many neighbouring clans with whom we had in no way interfered, such as the people of the Upper Swat valley, the Bunerwals and their neighbours on the west of the Indus where it emerges from the gorges of the Black Mountain. But on the other hand the Indus Kohistan, the Black Mountain itself and the tribes in the Gilgit Agency did not join the disturbance; and, most satisfactory of all, the agreement entered into with the Khan of Dir in 1895 stood the strain so effectually that postal communication with Chitral was only interrupted for the period when fighting was actually going on, and was resumed immediately after the relief of Chakdarra.

42. The Buner valley is held by Yusafzais, a tribe of Afghan race. The Bunerwals played a prominent part in opposing the Ambela expedition in 1863. Prior to that, they had generally been peaceful. The Ambela expedition was not directed against them, but against a colony of fanatical Muhammadans from India who, settled since 1824 in this part of the tribal territory, considered themselves divinely commissioned to wage a war of extermination against all non-Muhammadans. For some years after Ambela, the Buner people as a whole behaved fairly well, though a blockade had more than once to be imposed in consequence of raids and outrages committed by various sections. In these raids several British villages were burnt, British subjects were killed and much property was destroyed. In the winter of 1875-76 great excitement prevailed in Buner owing to the fanatical preaching of Mullas who endeavoured to raise a jihad. The danger was, however, averted. In 1885 and 1886 several outrages and murders were committed in British territory; but in January 1887 representatives of the tribe to the number of 450 came in to Mardan, made complete submission and complied with the terms demanded. During the Black Mountain Expedition in March 1891, a force of Bunerwals assembled near the British camp at Palosi, but the gathering broke up without entering into hostilities, and throughout these operations and the Isazai expedition of October 1892, the Bunerwals showed no indications of unfriendliness on
their southern border touching the Peshawar district, which remained exceptionally quiet. For the next five or six years, the tribe gave little trouble. During the advance of the Chitral Relief Force in 1895, a strong contingent from the Buner clans was worked up by Mulas to move to Swat to join the opposition to our advance, but on finding the Swat people had been defeated and had given in, they returned. Last summer the tribe joined in the fighting against us in the Swat valley.

43. During the last three decades, no tribes on the north-west frontier have earned a greater notoriety for evil-doing than those occupying the western slopes of Black Mountain and its neighbourhood on the border of the Hazara district. The country is an irregular triangle bounded on the north by the Indus Kohistan, on the west by the Indus, and on the east by the British Indian frontier. The inhabitants are chiefly Yusufs of the Isazai and Malizai tribes. Ever since the British occupation of the Punjab, until within the last few years, the tribes upon this section of the frontier have given us serious trouble, and on several occasions we have been forced by acts of aggression and violence on their part to inflict punishment upon them. In 1885, a large force was marched into the country, the highest peak of the Black Mountain was occupied, and the offenders compelled to come to terms. The effect of this expedition was transitory: the terms imposed were lenient; the tribes were rather encouraged than intimidated by the rapid retirement of the troops, and it was not long before raids and other offences began to recur. British subjects were murdered or kidnapped; British villages were harried and burnt; and offences were committed by almost every section and tribe from the southern point of the Black Mountain to the Alai valley on the north of the range.

44. For twenty years these acts of hostility were endured without armed action being again taken to put an end to them; fines and blockades were from time to time imposed, and by these means and by reprisals we obtained reparation more or less complete for some of the offences against us. Our attitude was, however, misunderstood by the tribes; the tale of serious offences grew longer; a fine imposed on the Alaiwal headman in 1880, on account of serious raids, was left unpaid, and the Alaiwals and some of their neighbours continued to cause trouble. In March 1883, Hashim Ali Khan, the Khan of the Isazais, made a night attack on a British village and murdered four British subjects. At the time it was thought unadvisable to attempt to enforce tribal responsibility, and he was fined. He replied defiantly that he would not pay and would repeat the offence if he thought proper. Five years later, he again raided a British village, murdered two of our subjects and carried off two more whom he threatened to kill unless we released one of his servants, a proclaimed outlaw, who had been arrested in British territory. For some time longer, the Government of India declined to sanction a military expedition, preferring to try milder measures, and the tribe was put under blockade. Such was the state of affairs when, on the 18th June 1888, a party of British troops was attacked within the British frontier, and two English officers and four Gurkha soldiers were killed. Unatisfactory replies were sent to demands for explanations; and Lord Dufferin's Government came reluctantly to the conclusion that, to ensure the peace and order of the frontier, a military expedition to the Black Mountain was indispensable.

45. At the end of September 1888, due warning was given specifying the terms on which the Government would accept submission, and allowing till the 2nd October for compliance. The period of grace having expired without any sign of submission, a force under Major-General McQueen advanced. The enemy, who were joined by large numbers of the Hindustani fanatics already alluded to, made a stubborn resistance. The country was overrun by the troops, the Hindustani colony was dispersed, and our terms were unconditionally accepted. The tribe gave hostages for future good conduct, paid the fines demanded, and bound themselves not to injure the roads which
had been made in their country and not to molest in future any British officials or troops who might march anywhere on the Black Mountain within British territory, or along the crest of the mountain on the boundary between British and tribal limits.

46. During the following year affairs on this border remained quiet, but, in 1890, difficulties again arose, and a force under Major-General W. K. Elles entered the Black Mountain country in March 1891. The Isazai tribe surrendered unconditionally and agreed to the perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan, his surrender if he should ever come within their power, the protection of roads, the march of British troops along the border, the provision of escorts for officers visiting the country, and the prohibition of Hindustani settlements within Black Mountain limits. They also accepted responsibility for offences in British territory and for injury to British subjects in tribal territory, and for the conduct of any Khan chosen by them.

47. With a view to increasing our control over the clans, to assist in the maintenance of peace and to secure the continued expulsion of Hashim Ali Khan, a small force of Border Police was recruited from the clans and posted at suitable places on the frontier. Allowances were granted to Hashim Ali Khan's successor, and to the tribesmen on the usual conditions of friendship and good behaviour. Nevertheless, the condition of affairs remained unsatisfactory; Hashim Ali and his followers established himself on the right bank of the Indus. The engagement entered into by the tribes after two punitive expeditions was thus broken. The Isazai clans were warned that, unless Hashim Ali Khan were surrendered or expelled, a British force would again be sent across the border. Everything possible was done to avoid the necessity of another expedition, but without success, and at the end of September, a force under General Lockhart was concentrated to punish those villages which were known to have harboured Hashim Ali. The troops visited and destroyed the offending villages and returned to British territory early in October, without having met with opposition. Hashim Ali, however, remained at large, in spite of very favourable terms being offered to induce him to surrender himself. Since the operations of Sir William Lockhart's force in 1892, the peace of the Hazara border has been undisturbed.

48. The foregoing account only professes to be a mere sketch. To write the history of the frontier fully would mean writing a volume too large for our purpose. What we have written is however, we believe, enough to show that the frontier tribes have been consistent only in causing trouble and the frontier has never been at peace. The Punjab Frontier Administration Report for 1896-97 indeed shows that the border was in that year as tranquil as it has ever been, and nowhere was the peaceful condition of affairs so marked as in that part of the border which was convulsed in the autumn of 1897. The frontier of the Peshawar district was 'absolutely tranquil'. The Afridis were also well behaved. "There have been seven cases against the Kuki Khels," the report states, "during the year, but in settling these the elders of the clan have rendered every assistance to the authorities. In one case indeed where one of their tribesmen had kidnapped a woman from British territory whom he refused to give up, they went so far as to attack him in order to compel him to restore her." And again, it is recorded that the numerous clans of the large Orakzai tribe all behaved well.

49. The Mulla Powindah of Waziristan had tried to arouse opposition to us in the previous year; and, as we have mentioned, had equally failed in enlisting the sympathy of the Amir of Afghanistan or in raising the people. The attack on our troops at Maizar was caused by local dissatisfaction with tribal arrangements, and had no connection with Mulla Powindah or the Mulla influence generally. The only note of warning we received was from Major Deane, who, at the time of carrying out the relief of the
Chitral garrison in May 1897, reported that persistent efforts were being made by the Mulla faction to work against us and our ally, the Nawab of Dir. The Mullahs of Bajaur seemed to be meeting with little success, when suddenly, and without any apparent cause, the 'mad fakir' of Buner set the Swat valley in a blaze. The great success which attended him and the movement of the Hadda Mulla among the Mohmands, followed by the Aka Khel Mulla, Saiyid Akbar Khan, among the Orakzais and Afridis, is one of the notable features of the outbreak.

50. There is a natural tendency, caused perhaps by the magnitude and proximity of the recent up-risings, to minimise the trouble which existed in days gone by on the Punjab border, and to contrast the success of the close border or 'Punjab system' with a supposed failure of present policy. In judging the merits of any criticism of the kind, it is useful to look to what was written at the time by responsible officers of the Punjab Government.

Sir R. Temple thus described the frontier tribes in 1855:—

"They have kept up old quarrels, or picked new ones with our subjects in the plains and valleys near the frontier; they have descended from the hills and fought these battles out in our territory; they have plundered and burnt our villages and slain our subjects; they have committed minor robberies and isolated murders without number; they have often levied blackmail from our villages; they have intrigued with the disaffected everywhere and tempted our loyal subjects to rebel; and they have for ages regarded the plain as their preserve, and its inhabitants their game and, when inclined for cruel sport, they sally forth to rob and murder, and occasionally to take prisoners into captivity for ransom. They have fired upon our allies or 'Punjab system' with a supposed failure of present policy. The hillmen could not understand that the state of the border was somewhat improved in comparison with what it had been in the period preceding annexation. Raiding in force was checked by our military efficiency. But all along the border our territory and our subjects were subjected to a series of punishments could overtake them. When the conduct of a tribe became quite intolerable, whatever."

More than 30 years afterwards, Mr. G. M. Ogilvie, a frontier officer of the Punjab Commission, whose employment, in 1888, in endeavouring, as already mentioned, to examine the Gomal Pass led him to review the results achieved by the "close border" system of dealing with the tribes, wrote:—

"It might have been successful if the hill tribes had been sufficiently civilised to appreciate the motives which dictated it; but the tribes being what they are, the system resulted in failure. The hillmen could not understand that our policy of forbearance could proceed from any other causes than timidity and weakness. It is true that the state of the border was somewhat improved in comparison with what it had been in the period preceding annexation. Raiding in force was checked by our military efficiency. But all along the border our territory and our subjects were subjected to a series of injuries and insults from the hillmen, who nearly invariably affected their escape before punishment could overtake them. When the conduct of a tribe became quite intolerable, a military expedition was undertaken. A record of these expeditions up to the year 1884 is published in an official volume, and in this brief note it is impossible to notice them in detail. But no annexation was permitted; fines when inflicted were realised not in cash, but by a mild form of taxation of imports; and whenever an offending tribe tendered its submission, it was joyfully received back into favour. The permanent effect of these military expeditions was therefore small. Our position under the close border system was generally undignified and sometimes humiliating; probably no other strong and civilised power would have shown equal forbearance."

51. The nature of the Pathan has not changed. If there be a marked difference one way or another now in the character of border offences, it is because of the border men's altered opportunities or altered interests. The efforts of Mullas to stir the people up against us are no new thing. Their work has had greater effect this past year than before, and many diverse reasons for that have been suggested. We are not in a position to pronounce which are right and which are wrong. It is perhaps unnecessary to formulate a definite reason. The success was so great that the people inclined generally to believe what the Mullas spared no pains to assert and to disseminate, namely, that the Amir of Afghanistan was the ruler who authorized the holy war they preached. These endeavours to implicate our ally have in no case been supported by any evidence except the
52. Whatever may once have been the advantage of leaving the Pathan absolutely alone, we conceive that the day has long passed when that plan can be tried with any hope of success. Interests reaching far beyond our immediate border led us, sixty years ago, to Kalat. The second Afghan war brought us into intimate relations with several tribes, and imposed upon us obligations which could not and cannot be ignored. Since Her Majesty's Government authorized Lord Ripon to guarantee the Amir of Afghanistan against unprovoked external aggression, our policy towards the frontier tribes has been definitely shaped by higher and more imperial objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British border. The dealings of the Amir with the Waziris, Mohmands and others and his advance into Bajaur forced upon the British Government the delimitation of his frontier, and the practice of remaining unconcerned with the actions of the tribes, provided only they did not molest us within the confines of British India, became impossible when Her Majesty's Government authorized Sir Mortimer Durand to negotiate with the Amir a treaty, defining the different tribes or clans who were thenceforth to be outside the pale of the Amir's interference, and for whose actions the Government of India were therefore made, in a measure, responsible. If there is material difference between the present methods and those of the 'close border,' it is to be found in the fact that a policy of cultivating friendly relations with the Pathan is not to be carried out by a practice of conciliation alone. For the Pathan will neither acknowledge power nor respect authority unless he fears the one and must obey the other. No intimate and friendly relations can be established with the border tribes, until they are first taught that their own interest lies in cultivating the friendship and in giving no cause for the enmity of the power which is willing to live at peace with them, but able to crush them in war.

53. We recently laid down, in correspondence with the Punjab Government, the main lines of our policy in dealing with the tribes on the Punjab frontier. We desired that, as far as possible, interference with the autonomy of the tribes should be avoided. We desired that, by means of tribal allowances in payment for services rendered, and by cordially supporting the legitimate influence of the headmen, a friendly and responsible authority should be established in each tribe. We desired that the Political Officers should lose no opportunity of extending their personal influence, and that, while carefully abstaining from making themselves or the Government of India responsible for the actual administration of tribal country, they should endeavour to establish cordial and friendly relations with the headmen, and should give them support to ensure the proper recognition of their authority. We do not wish to go beyond this in tribal country generally. There are some tracts in which circumstances have rendered it necessary that the Political Officer should be responsible for the maintenance of peace and order, and in which, although tribal machinery should be used, as elsewhere, for the settlement of disputes in accordance with tribal custom, he must authoritatively forbid bloodshed and any attempt to enforce supposed rights by an appeal to arms. In such tracts as these it is the Political Officer's duty to see that the tribal machinery works properly: he must insist on all disputes being referred to and decided by arbitration or tribal jirga, and if possible by mutual consent, and should support the authority of the headmen by assisting them to enforce their decisions, when necessary.

54. It has been said that the recent risings and the military expeditions which have thus been forced upon us prove that the frontier policy of the Government of India has broken down. We maintain that this is to entirely
misapprehend the situation. It is impossible to refuse to recognise the claim of frontier districts to protection from the wild fanatical marauders who haunt their borders, and we submit that the narrative of this despatch proves beyond dispute that by no exercise of patience or forbearance can the occasions for armed interference be altogether avoided. Nowhere has this fact been more clearly expressed than in the able Minute in which Sir J. Strachey summed up the policy of the Government of Lord Mayo, a Viceroy still remembered for his sympathetic appreciation of the feelings and sentiments of the Chiefs and races of India. It is there stated of Lord Mayo that—

"Having once satisfied himself that an expedition was unavoidable, he threw himself with all the energy of his nature into the measures necessary to make it a complete success. He was determined that there should be no repetition of previous mischievous failures. At the same time he was careful to prescribe that the expedition was not to be of measure of pure retaliation. The main end in view was to show the tribes that they are completely in our power; to establish friendly relations of a permanent character with them; to make them promise to receive in their villages, from time to time, Native agents of our own; to make travelling in their districts safe to all; to show them the advantages of trade and commerce; and to demonstrate to them effectually that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by placing themselves in a hostile position towards the British Government: in short, the expedition was to be preliminary to the adoption of general and wider measures of policy.

* * * * *

"While therefore Lord Mayo fully admitted the necessity for expeditions under certain circumstances, he trusted more to what he himself called a policy of 'vigilant, constant, and never-ceasing defence on all those parts of our frontier which are by their position liable to be attacked by foreign tribes'; by isolated petty raids by a flagrant and murderous attack upon a party of our soldiers. Lord Mayo preferred to inquire fully into, and as far as possible remedy, the grievances, many of them just which had driven the tribe to assume a hostile attitude; to invest the military officers on the frontier with full discretionary powers for the prompt punishment of border marauders; to hold them responsible for the prudent exercise of their powers; to assure them of hearty support in all reasonable measures which they might adopt for the chastisement of offenders; and above all he insisted on the frontier officers making themselves thoroughly accessible to the people, and acquiring a salutary personal influence over them and a hold upon their sympathies and affections. In a letter written by his orders to the Punjab Government on 7th November 1870, after reviewing the causes of the Mohammed Khelyl outrages, approving certain steps proposed by the Punjab Government for the punishment of the offenders, and suggesting measures for the improvement of the frontier administration generally, Lord Mayo added—"But the Governor-General in Council will not conceal from His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor his apprehension that this and all other palliatives will fail unless the frontier officers, from the Commissioner downwards, make it one of their first duties to acquire a thorough knowledge of their districts and to cultivate easy and friendly intercourse with the leading and influential men; unless they move freely and constantly about their districts in all seasons; unless they are easily accessible to all classes of the people and are well versed in the vernacular languages and local dialects; and unless they are taught to regard it to be their paramount duty to secure the confidence and affections of the people committed to their charge.'"

55. We have endeavoured in this despatch to make it plain that the particular measures to be adopted at any one moment cannot be prescribed beforehand, but must largely depend on the circumstances of the time. We have pointed out that engagements, deliberately entered into, have made it necessary to occupy strategic positions, and secure the command of means of communication, in order that obligations to which we are honourably bound may be punctually fulfilled. We do not pursue this subject on the present occasion, because it will be our duty, when military operations are over, to fully consider the whole position on the frontier and to endeavour to formulate proposals by which the resources at our disposal may be efficiently and economically utilised. Our recommendations will in due course be submitted to Your Lordship. We have every confidence that they will be found to be conceived in no spirit of aggression, with no desire for undue interference with the tribes or annexa-
motion of their territory, but in full accord with the policy of "vigilant, constant and never-ceasing defence," which we and our predecessors have professed and to which we unhesitatingly adhere.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.

" G. S. WHITE.

" J. WESTLAND.

" M. D. CHALMERS.

" E. H. H. COLLEN.

" A. C. TREVOR.

" C. M. RIVAZ.

Nos. 804-305-F., dated Fort William, the 15th January 1898.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Military Department and the Assistant Quartermaster-General in India, Intelligence Branch, for information.
1898.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—F.

Pres. February 1898, Nos. 604—854.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. Policy to be adopted towards the tribes who rose against Government on the North-West Frontier.
REFERENCES TO FORMER CASES.

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<td>Armament of the whole of the Khyber tribes with muskets.</td>
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<td>Secret P., October 1895, Nos. 133-142.</td>
<td>Proposed new arrangements for the administration of the North-West Frontier districts and management of the trans-frontier tribes.</td>
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<td>Secret P., February 1899, Nos. 655-1111.</td>
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KEEP-WITHS PRINTED.

1. Notes on the case (Part I.—Afridi Policy; Part III.—Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.)
2. Demi-official correspondence.

KEEP-WITHS NOT PRINTED.

GOVT. OF INDIA.

PRECIS-DOCKET.

1898. { FOREIGN DEPT.

SECRET—P. |

FEBRUARY.

Nos. 604—854. |

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. Policy to be adopted towards the tribes who rose against Government on the North-West Frontier.

LIST OF PAPERS.

No. 604.—Telegram P., from the Secretary of State, dated the 13th October 1897.—Refers to his telegram of the 6th instant, and thinks it desirable that a political settlement with the tribes should follow as quickly as possible on the termination of the military operations in the field. Indicates the points which should be kept in view in considering the matter.

No. 605.—From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1590, dated the 20th October 1897.—Refers to Foreign Department letter No. 3168-P., dated 8th September 1897, forwards copy of papers containing a full account of the Afridi rising in the Khyber Pass, and gives the Lieutenant-Governor’s recommendation in favour of reconstructing arrangements for re-opening the Khyber.

No. 606.—From the Office of the Foreign Secretary, No. 3168-P., dated the 29th October 1897.—Order in Council, dated the 29th October 1897.—Decision arrived at in regard to the policy to be adopted towards the Afridis.

No. 617.—Order in Council, dated the 8th September 1897.—Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 20th October 1897.—In reply to his telegram of the 15th October 1897, gives the conclusions arrived at in Council in regard to the policy to be adopted towards the Afridis.

(Copy of the foregoing telegram, and of Proceedings Nos. 616 and 617, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4356-4357-P., dated the 30th October 1897.)

No. 618.—Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 29th October 1897.—Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 29th October 1897.—In reply to his telegram of the 13th October 1897, gives the conclusions arrived at in Council in regard to the policy to be adopted towards the Afridis.

(Copy of the foregoing telegram, and of Proceedings Nos. 616 and 617, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4356-4357-P, dated the 30th October 1897.)

No. 619.—From the Military Department, No. 839-T-I, dated the 30th October 1897.—Forwards, for information, copy of two telegrams from General Lockhart, reporting the capture of the Sanphaga Pass on the 29th, and the death of Major deBatts, R. A.
No. 623.—Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 94, dated the 1st November 1897.—Advisability of settling with the Massuzai and Chamkannis now once for all by advancing the Kurram Movable Column into their country. Details as to proposed arrangements, lines, etc.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4396-4397-E, dated the 1st November 1897.)

No. 624.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 59-L.P., dated the 1st November 1897.—Raid by Zakha Khel near the Bara camp. Arrival of Lance Daffadar Khwas Khan, 9th Bengal Lancers, recently exchanged by the enemy for a Havildar of the Khyber Rifles.

No. 625.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. B-118, dated the 1st November 1897.—Reports all quiet. A leading Alisherzai Malik killed at Ramdad on the 23th. Total casualties among Alisherzais near Samana now reported as 16 killed.

No. 626.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 837-C., dated the 1st November 1897.—Rumoured presence at Uldan of 149 Tirah Orakzais with intent to raid. Movements of troops.

No. 627.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 830, dated the 1st November 1897.—Enquiry by a jirga of Hajji Khel Chamkannis as to whether Government were going to send troops into their country, etc. Informed that General Lockhart would decide, meanwhile that they could not be admitted to Kurram. Refusal of the Tur Shias to help the Tur Shias.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4401-4402-E, dated the 2nd November 1897.)

No. 628.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 25, dated the 1st November 1897.—Refers to Foreign Department letter No. 3493-E, dated the 4th October 1897, and to the last sentence of the semi-official letter of the 7th October 1897, regarding future relations with the Afridis, and asks for the precise meaning of the words "future relations" used therein.

No. 629.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 26, dated the 1st November 1897.—Gives the composition of the lashkar that assaulted the British force on the
### References to Later Cases—cont'd.

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**Nos. 630-631.**—Political Diaries of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. XIII and XIV from the 25th to the 30th October 1897.

(Copies of the above Diaries forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4528-4529-F., dated the 11th November 1897.)

No. 632.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 60-1 P., dated the 2nd November 1897.—Explains that the contractor referred to in his telegram No. 59-1 P. of the 1st is not under the Military or Commissariat authorities.

No. 633.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 906 T., dated the 2nd November 1897.—Reports casualties in connection with a visit paid to Bagh. Movement of Afidis with the intention of carrying off fodder and goods from the camp. Steps taken to stop these operations. Casualties in connection therewith. Piquet of 36th Sikhs attacked by enemy who were driven off. Casualties in connection therewith. Transport from Arhangala Pass coming into camp attacked by enemy. Casualties and loss of baggage in connection therewith.

No. 634.—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4492-F., dated the 2nd November 1897.—Gives the meaning of the words "future relations" asked for in Proceedings No. 628.

No. 635.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 659-C., dated the 3rd November 1897.—Arrangements made for forming an advance depôt at Mastura. Camel road to Mastura will probably be open by 5th or 6th. Offer of Adam Khel Maliks to send in 50 rifles looted from the Khyber whenever ordered to do so.

No. 636.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding Kurram Movable Column, No. B. 119, dated the 2nd November 1897.—Movements of troops to Para Chinar. Reconnaissance to point east of Totang and close to Murgan. Friendliness and hospitality displayed by Alisherzai villages. Hajji Khel Chamkani jirga's enquiry whether Government is sending troops...
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(Continuation of Precis-Docket.)

No. 637.—From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1613, dated the 2nd November 1897.—In reply to Foreign Department letter No. 4211-F., dated the 23rd October 1897, forward, for information, a copy of a telegram from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, containing his views as to the terms which should be imposed on the Loorgai Shinwaris, Shilmani Mohmams and the Mullagoris who wish to make their submission to Government. Say that the Lieutenant-Governor approves of the terms proposed by Mr. Mark, except that His Honour does not think it worth while to make the Loorgai Shinwaris responsible for stopping the Landi Kotal road to the Afridis.

No. 638.-639.—Enclosures.

No. 640.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 66-I., dated the 3rd November 1897.—Movements of troops. Steps taken to prevent firing into camp and robberies at night.

No. 641.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1014-T., dated the 3rd November 1897.—Addition to casualties already reported in his telegram No. 984-T., dated the 2nd November 1897, in connection with the attack made by the enemy on the transport going from Arhanga Pass to camp.

No. 642.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 915-T., dated the 3rd November 1897.—No casualties in reconnaissance of 3rd Brigade on 30th October. More on the 31st October of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, excepting 1st Brigade, from Mastura into Maidum. An account of the taking of the Arhanga Pass. Large numbers of Afridis observed making their way into the Bata valley over the Suransa Pass. Our casualties during the day.

No 643.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 27, dated the 3rd November 1897.—Points out a difficulty in prescribing terms of submission and protection by the Afridis. Proposes to submit his views and those of Sir R. Udny by telegraph.

No 644.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Mobile Column, dated the 3rd November 1897.—Report that Aressa Khan is believed to be inciting the Massauzais and Chambkannis to attack Sadda on the 5th, but Massauzais now anxious to come to terms, if possible.
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<th>Branch, date, and Nos.</th>
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<tr>
<td>No. 645.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 932, dated the 3rd November 1897.—Reports that some Massuzais sent in on the 3rd to Pailwan Shah, a Turi Saiyid, asking if he could make some arrangements for them with the Sarkar; and that he replied that he had no concern in their affairs. Rumour amongst tribes that the Afridis are quite broken up and are seeking refuge in every direction. (Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4431-4435-F., dated the 4th November 1897.)</td>
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<td>No. 646.—Telegram P., from the Secretary of State, dated the 3rd November 1897.—With reference to Proceedings No. 618, states that, after further consideration, he is advised that a system of tributes is open to certain specified objections. On the whole, is of opinion that the balance of considerations is against imposing tributes. Agrees that Sir W. Lockhart should consider the advisability of realigning and improving the present Khyber roads. Generally approves other conclusions, subject to a report of any proposed change of importance.</td>
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<td>No. 647.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 889-C., dated the 3rd November 1897.—Reports that shots were fired into convoy escort south of Saspagha on the 2nd instant without damage and that four hundred of the enemy were reported by the Border Police on the night of the 1st to be on hills close to Muhammadzai post.</td>
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<td>No. 648.—From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1621, dated the 3rd November 1897.—Submit, for information, a copy of correspondence regarding the feud between the Zakka Khel Maliks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nos. 649-658.—Enclosures. (Copies of the above letter, with enclosures, forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force and the Military Department, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4497-4498-F., dated the 8th November 1897.)</td>
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<td>No. 654.—Memorandum of events on the 1st November 1897, by Colonel R. Warburton, Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.</td>
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<td>Nos. 655—656.—Political Diaries of the Tirah Expeditionary Force Nos. XV and XVI for the 31st October and 1st November 1897.</td>
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(Continuation of Précis-Docket.)

(Copies of the above Memorandum of events and of the above diaries forwardeden to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 1508-1509-F., dated the 13th November 1897.)

No. 657.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 4th November 1897.—Reconnaissance by 3rd Brigade on 5th November to Tepri Kandha. Our casualties on 3rd November. Telegraph completed to Camp on 3rd November. Wire cut and carried away during the night near the Athanga Pass.

No. 658.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 244, dated the 4th November 1897.—Reports that the Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar again collected at Sultani in Kurramana Darr. Strength at present between two and three thousand. Attitude of the Khiari Kiel Chamkannis, Massuzais and Pitta Alsherziis. Movements of Mulla Khalifa of Tindah.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4140—1509-F., dated the 5th November 1897.)

No. 659.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 67-L.P., dated the 4th November 1897.—States that the inhabitants of Lower Bara valley are reported to be removing their families and cattle from villages. Disposal of the small lashkar which was watching the approaches to the valley.

No. 660.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. B-J27, dated the 5th November 1897.—Reports completion of the survey work commenced on the 2nd in the vicinity of Ghisinghars Bara, north of Kumb. Collection of Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar near Sultani, north end of Kurramana Darr. Application from Khieli Kiel Chamkannis to Assaila Khan for assistance. Request made by Massuzais to Afridi Khan to arrange for a line across which neither English nor Massuzais should pass.

No. 661.—Telegram P., to the Secretary of State, dated the 5th November 1897.—Asks whether Sir William Lockhart can be instructed to announce the terms, for the reasons given.
| No 662. | Telegram P., from the Secretary of State, dated the 4th November 1897.—Say, that instructions may be sent to Sir William Lockhart as suggested in the above telegram. |
| No 663. | Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 413-C., dated the 4th November 1897.—Reported dispersal of the small gathering of the enemy at the back of the Ublan Pass. Telegraph Office opened at Maidan. |
| No 664. | Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4138-F., dated the 5th November 1897.—Repeats Proceedings Nos. 618, 640, 661 and 662, and says his proposals are awaited. |
| No 665. | Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 245, dated the 5th November 1897.—Reports all quiet in Kurram. Desire of the Massauzas to make peace. Numerical strength of the lashka at Sultan. Despatch of their property to Makhmanghar and the Shaoukanri valley. |

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4467-4468-F., dated the 6th November 1897.)

| No 666 | Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 29, dated the 5th November 1897.—Submits, for consideration, remarks respecting our future relations with the Afridis. |
| No 667 | Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1694 T., dated the 5th November 1897.—Foraging and survey parties sent out on the 4th to north-east of camp. Enemy attempted opposition, but were driven off. Our casualties during the day. Camel-road finished to camp. |
| No 668 | Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 30, dated the 5th November 1897.—In continuation of Proceedings No. 666, submits Sir R. Udny’s views respecting our future relations with the Afridis. |
| No 669 | Endorsement to the Government of the Punjab, No. 4467-F., dated the 6th November 1897.—Forwards, for information, copy of Proceedings Nos. 604, 618, 628, 634, 643, 649, 661, 662, 664, 665, and 666. |
No. 687.—Telegram P., to the Secretary of State, dated the 7th November 1897.—Reports that Sir William Lockhart has summoned all sections of the Afridis and Orakzais to attend his camp and hear the terms.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, for information, under endorsement No. 4493-P., dated the 8th November 1897.)

No. 688.—Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Turah Expeditionary Force, No. 175-T., dated the 7th November 1897.—Foraging parties sent out on 6th east and west of camp. Latter heavily fired on. Our casualties. Enemy's loss unknown. Report from Mastura that pucca 2-1st Gurkhas killed eight of enemy who attacked convoy on 6th.

No. 689.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Turah Expeditionary Force, No. 40, dated the 7th November 1897.—Arrival in camp of jirgas of certain tribes. Non-appearance of Afridi jirgas. Foraging parties daily harassed. Capture by the enemy on the 6th November of 40 mules. Camp heavily fired into at night, and on the evening of the 6th one British officer killed and another severely wounded.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4517-4528-F., dated the 8th November 1897.)

No. 690.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Turah Expeditionary Force, No. 41, dated the 7th November 1897.—With reference to Proceedings No. 684, regarding our future relations on the North-West Frontier, comments on the decision arrived at by Government.

(Copies of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4510-4512-F., dated the 8th November 1897.)

No. 691.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Karachi, No. 243, dated the 7th November 1897.—Composition of enemy who opposed the reconnaissance on the 7th through the Khurmana defile. Discovery in Piroor village of the lance of a Duffadar, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, who was ambuscaded on the 1st October 1897.
REFERENCES TO LATER CASES—contd.

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(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4505-4506-E, dated the 8th November 1897.)

No. 692.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. 123-D., dated the 7th November 1897.—Reconnaissance made on 7th through Khurmana defile and good survey made of portion of Masuzai country. Enemy completely surprised. Road possible for cavalry. Discovery in Esor of arms, powder and grain. Attack made by enemy on retirement. Casualties on both sides.

No. 693.—Political Diary of the Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, from the 24th to the 31st October 1897.

No. 694.—Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No XX, for the 5th November 1897.

No. 695.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 246, dated the 8th November 1897.—Wish of Chuktai to sell his property in Chisarak to the Daudzai and to migrate with his family either to British territory or, if that is not allowed, to Arabia. Reply sent him.

No. 696.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 246, dated the 8th November 1897.—Advisability of remitting part of the fine in the case of the Tatang Alibuzai for services rendered and assistance given to Afridi Khan and survey parties.

(Copies of the above telegrams forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4517-4518-E, dated the 9th November 1897.)

No. 697.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 11941-T., dated the 8th November 1897.—Foraging party, with 3rd Brigade and No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, proceeded on the 7th west of camp, bringing in 100 mounds of grain. Enemy followed retirement. Casualties on both sides. Encounter on the morning of the 8th between 2-1st Gurkhas and the enemy south of Arhanga Pass. Enemy's casualties.

No. 698.—Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 102, dated the 8th November 1897.—Repeats a telegram from the Political Officer, Khyber, reporting that two elders of the Lorangee Shinwars have come in and represented that, owing to communications being stopped with Jalalabad and Peshawar, they are suffering from hunger.
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<td>No. 699.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 194, dated the 8th November 1897.—Appearance of the Malakand Fakir in the Khyber. Report that he is putting up with Malik Khwas Khan. Steps taken to obtain reliable information.</td>
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<td>No. 700.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 247, dated the 8th November 1897.—Composition of lashkar who attacked the reconnaissance force on the 7th. Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar reported in neighbourhood of Khurmana Darra on the 8th. Tirah refugees flocking to Massuzai and Chamkanni country. Refusal of the Alisherzai of Totang to receive them. Chikkai informed that if he allows refugees within his limits, he will be held responsible for their actions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. 701.</td>
<td>Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 1064-C., dated the 8th November 1897.—Fifty-four camels looted on 7th from beyond picquet limits Karapa and one sowar wounded. Recovery of 52 camels.</td>
</tr>
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<td>No. 702.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. B. 193, dated the 8th November 1897.—Loss of one Subadar and 35 rank and file of Kapurthala Infantry. Tirah refugees coming to Massuzais. Collection of a Chamkanni lashkar, 2,000 strong, in Darra, north of Janikot. Complaint from Chikkai regarding his difficult position owing to his friendly attitude towards the British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 703.</td>
<td>From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1856, dated the 8th November 1897.—With reference to Proceedings No. 623, submit, for orders, a copy of a letter received from the Commissioner of Peshawar, and of its enclosures, giving in detail the reasons for the proposal of the local officers that troops should enter the country of the Massuzais and Khani Khel Chamkannis and also of the Alisherzais, and enforce compliance with certain terms to be imposed upon them for their past offences in Kurram and participation in the recent disturbances on that frontier.</td>
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Nos. 704—705.—Enclosures.
### References to Later Cases—contd.

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(Copy of the foregoing letter, with enclosures, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4853-4854-F., dated the 13th November 1897.)

No. 706.—Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXI, for the 6th November 1897.

(Copies of the above diary and of Proceeding Nos. 693-694, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4914-4922-F., dated the 17th November 1897.)

No. 707.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 41, dated the 8th November 1897.—Deputation of Zalha Khal villages in the Mainan valley. Arrival on the evening of the 7th of the jirgas of Bazatis, Utman Khal and Matura Sturi Khal.

No. 708.—To the General Officer Commanding, Tirah I’s, editor’s Force, No. 4325-F., dated the 9th November 1897.—In reply to his telegram No. 15, dated the 24th October 1897, forwards, for information, copy of Proceeding Nos. 4-5-639, containing the Lieutenant Governor’s views as to the terms which should be imposed upon the Lurars Sahnwaris, Shuharani Mahmands and Mullagaris. Says the settlement with them may be deferred until he can undertake it in communication with the Commissioner of Peshawar; that no steps should be taken at present towards opening the Tartrara route; that the terms of punishment recommended to be undertaken against the above tribes appear none severer than the necessity, and perhaps the justice, of the case demands, as it is not established that any of them joined in the actual attack.

(Copy of the foregoing letter forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, for information of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor and for communication to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, under endorsement No. 4329-F., dated the 9th November 1897.)

(Copy of the foregoing letter, with enclosures, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, under endorsements Nos. 4830-4831-F., dated the 9th November 1897.)
No. 702.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tinah Expeditionary Force, No. 1246-T., dated the 9th November 1897.—Forging parties sent on 8th to north and east of camp collected large quantities of supplies and demolished Zakha Khel towers, from which camp had been fired into. Casualties on both sides. Casualties in affair reported by General Hart from Masturn. Captain Watson, Commissariat Department, killed. Reconnaissance made on 9th to crest of Saran Sar, 5 miles east of camp. Defences of a large number of Zakha Khel villages destroyed. Enemy suffered loss.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, for information, under endorsement No. 4544-P, dated the 10th November 1897.)

No. 710.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. 138-B., dated the 9th November 1897.—Corroborated of report that all men of Kapanthalia Infantry reported missing have been killed. Two Chamkannai Maliks killed. Combined lashkar reported to be still at Issar.

No. 711.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 248, dated the 9th November 1897.—Release of two Shergai Khel, who were taken prisoners by Khani Khel Chamkannis, on payment of ransom. Assembly at Issar of lashkar of all sections of Massuzais and Chamkannis. Distribution by enemy of rifles of Kapanthalia Infantry killed on the 8th. Shiah Chamkannis, of Gaolbarra accused by Massuzais and Chamkannis of having betrayed them and led British troops through Khurmanza Darra. Intention of the lashkar to burn Gaolbarra villages; inhabitants taking refuge in Shaka Darra. Bringing in of dead bodies of one Turi and one Gurkha by the Ali-sherzai Khans of Totang.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4542-4543-P., dated the 10th November 1897.)

No. 712.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 1107-C., dated the 9th November 1897.—Cutting of telegraph line between Shinamari and Kampan. Line repaired. Telegraph party fired on from spur at junction of Chagru and Khandi valley. Four men wounded.
REFERENCES TO LATER CASES—continued.

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(Continuation of Précis-Docket.)

No. 713.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 43, dated the 9th November 1897.—Arrival in camp of jurgas of certain Afridi clans. Attitude of Zakha Khel and Aka Khel Afridis. British officer killed on the evening of the 8th. Reconnaissance made on the 9th up the Saran Sar. Destruction of nearly forty more of Zakha Khel forts. Total number of their forts destroyed. Retirement followed by enemy on whom sharp punishment was inflicted by rear guard with but little loss to the latter.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4550-4557-F., dated the 11th November 1897.)

No. 714.—Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXII, for the 7th November 1897.

(Copy of the above diary forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4705-4706-F., dated the 17th November 1897.)

No. 715.—Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 108, dated the 10th November 1897.—Repeats a telegram from the Political Officer, Khyber, reporting news received about the arrival of seven Mullahs in the Khyber who are putting up with the Sultan Khel. Objective not known.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements, Nos. 4518-4519-F., dated the 10th November 1897.)

No. 716.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force No. 1254-F., dated the 10th November 1897.—Heavy loss inflicted by the enemy on the rear guard towards end of retinue from Saran Sar on the 9th. Foraging party of 3rd Sikhs to north of camp had one man wounded. Information regarding the detachment of Kapurthala Infantry killed by the enemy.

No. 717.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 76-I.P., dated the 10th November 1897.—Gathering of Ali Khels in the vicinity of Gundao Pass and Barkai.

No. 718.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. B-144, dated the 10th November 1897.—Movements of troops. Massauzi-Chaman last kar still in Khurmana Darra between Jankot and Khazima.
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<td>719</td>
<td>Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 1183-C, dated the 10th November 1897. Cutting of telegraph line on 9th between Mastum and Mudan. Segregation at Kat of 80 bullocks owing to outbreak of foot and mouth disease.</td>
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<td>720</td>
<td>Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXIII, for the 8th November 1897.</td>
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<tr>
<td>721</td>
<td>Memorandum by Colonel Warburton, Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 9th November 1897, on the Afridi jergas who came in. (Copies of the above memorandum and diary forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4757-4758-P, dated the 10th November 1897.)</td>
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<td>722</td>
<td>Memorandum showing that the papers specified therein have been forwarded to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department under cover of the Foreign Secretary's weekly mail letter, No. 3J-MJ, dated the 11th November 1897.</td>
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<td>723</td>
<td>Telegram to the Secretary of State, dated the 11th November 1897. Communicates information given in Proceedings No. 719. (Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, for information, under endorsement No. 4581-P, dated the 11th November 1897.)</td>
</tr>
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<td>724</td>
<td>Telegram from the Government of the Punjab, No. 844-P, dated the 11th November 1897. Recommended that to the terms already proposed to the Muzzafar and Chamkani the surrender of the 66 rifles captured from the Kapurthala Infantry should be added. (Copy of the above telegram and of Proceedings No. 707 forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4892-4893-P, dated the 12th November 1897.)</td>
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<td>725</td>
<td>Telegram to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1888-P, dated the 11th November 1897. Replies to Proceedings Nos. 665, 865 and 677, and refers to Proceedings No. 684 for orders as to permanent occupation of Tirah. Consists remarks regarding the construction of roads, the stay of the force in the Afridi and Orakzai country until terms are complied with, the number of rifles to be demanded and compensation for buildings destroyed.</td>
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<td>REFERENCES TO LATER CASES—contd.</td>
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(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4569-4571-F., dated the 11th November 1897.)

**No. 726.**—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Thibh Expeditionary Force, No. 1317-T., dated the 11th November 1897.—March to Saran Bar to complete survey, bring in forage and destroy defences of such Zakha Khel villages as could be reached. Object satisfactorily accomplished. Casualties on both sides.

**No. 727.**—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 1143-C., dated the 11th November 1897.—Water-piquet, south-west of Karappa camp, fired on from opposite side of Khauti. Destruction of defences of the village in vicinity of which firing had taken place. Telegraph wire again cut between Masurra and Maidan.

**No. 728.**—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Thibh Expeditionary Force, No. 1120., dated the 11th November 1897.—Reports arrival in camp of all sections of the Omkasis to hear the terms of Government, and asks for an urgent reply to his telegram No. 84 of the 9th November, enquiring whether he may announce that country will be occupied till demands are satisfied, and whether he may reduce the number of rifles to be surrendered.

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4594-4595-F., dated the 12th November 1897.)

**No. 729.**—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Thibh Expeditionary Force, No. 1191-F., dated the 11th November 1897.—Casualties amongst foraging party of the 10th to west of camp.

**No. 730.**—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. C-144, dated the 11th November 1897.—Steps taken by Masszul-Chamkani Inshkar, who are still in Khurmana Darra between Janikot and Khuzina, to be prepared for any sudden advance of our troops.

**No. 731.**—From the Military Department, No. 416-T.I., dated the 11th November 1897.—Forwards, for information, copy of papers regarding an attack made on the 27th October 1897 on the piquet north of the camp at Hari Singh.

Nos. 732—735.—Enclosures.
### References to Later Cases—contd.

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**No. 736.**—From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1674, dated the 11th November 1897.—Submit Political Diary No. 140, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, for the 22nd October 1897.

**Nos. 737—738.**—Enclosures.

(Copies of the above letter, with enclosures, and of the foregoing diaries, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4617-4648-F., dated the 16th November 1897.)

**No. 739.**—Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXIV, for the 9th November 1897.

**No. 740.**—Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXV, for the 10th November 1897.

**No. 741.**—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 47, dated the 12th November 1897.—With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 4565-F., dated the 11th November 1897, gives his reasons for proposing a reduction in the number of the rifles to be surrendered, and states the measures which should, in his opinion, be adopted to enforce compliance with the demand. Attitude of the Zakha Khel, Kuki Khel, Sipah, and Kamri Afridis. Steps which might have to be taken to coerce the Zakha Khels.

**No. 742.**—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1813-T, dated the 12th November 1897.—Visit to Zakha Khel villages east of camp. Destruction of defences of sixty-three houses. Foraging party on 12th to north-east of camp opposed by Zakha Khels. Our casualties. Announcement to Orakzai jirgas in camp of terms of Government. Proposed reconnaissance on the 13th of the Waran valley. Intention to punish villages of the Zyaudin section of the Zakha Khels.

**No. 743.**—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4587-F., dated the 12th November 1897.—In reply to Proceedings No. 741, says that if, in proposing to move down into winter quarters in lower Bara valley, he means a plan of operations by which he would hold posts in the Mastura, Bara, and Bazar valleys and re-open the Khyber route occupying posts there throughout the winter, the sanction of the Secretary of State would have to be obtained. Communicates the wish of Government in regard to the situation.
(Continuation of Precis-Docket.)

No. 744.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 78-I.P., dated the 12th November 1897.—Reported dispersal of the small lashkar at Palkrai and Barwan.

No. 745.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 257, dated the 12th November 1897.—Increase of Massuzi-Chamkami lashkar in Khurmana Dara, Execution by Massuzi’s of a Massuzi called Wazir who used to supply information. Bodies of three men of Kajur-thala Infantry killed on 7th brought in by Totang Ahslerzais.

No. 746.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Moveable Column, No. O.-147, dated the 12th November 1897.—Enemy still near Janjot. Composition of the lashkar.

No. 747.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 49, dated the 12th November 1897.—Announcement to the complete jirga of the Orakzai tribe of the terms of Government. Their reception of the terms announced. Measures to be adopted to coerce the Zakha Khel and other Airdi clans who are still opposing our troops.

No. 748.—From the Government of the Punjab, No. h.C., dated the 12th November 1897.—Submit, for information, a copy of correspondence which explains the circumstances under which the Sipayah jirga came to be summoned by the Political Officer, Khyber.

Nos. 749—752.—Enclosures.

No. 753.—Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXVI, for the 11th November 1897.
(Copies of the above diary and of Proceeding Nos. 735-740, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4765-4766-F, dated the 20th November 1897.)

No. 754.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 50, dated the 13th November 1897.—Reply to Foreign Department telegram No. 4587-F., dated the 12th November 1897, and submits his proposals regarding the adoption of measures for coercing the Afridis in the event of their not submitting to the terms of punishment imposed by Government within a reasonable period.

(Copies of the above telegram and of Proceedings No. 747 forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4600-4608-F., dated the 13th November 1897.)

No. 755.—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4609-F., dated the 12th November 1897.—States that the Government of India agree generally with Punjab letter No. 1636, dated the 8th November 1897, regarding the punishment of the Massuzais and Chamkannis, and think it desirable to deal with these tribes without delay, but await his views and any proposals which he may wish to make.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Government of the Punjab for information, under endorsements Nos. 4610-4612-F., dated the 13th November 1897.)

No. 756.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 262, dated the 13th November 1897.—Messages received by Chikkai from Tirah that his arrest has been ordered. Chikkai’s offer to sell Chinarak.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4650-4651-F., dated the 16th November 1897.)

No. 757.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 263, dated the 13th November 1897.—Massuzai-Chamkanni lashkar still at Janukot in Khurmana Darra.

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4642-4643-F., dated the 15th November 1897.)
No. 755.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Mounted Column, No. B. 260, dated the 13th November 1897.—General, for military reasons, of all survey of the site of increase in numbers of Kalmi in Kurram Dara.

No. 759.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 51, dated the 13th November 1897.—Departure of the Samil Oralzai Jirgas after settling among themselves shares in which they propose the surrender of rifles and to pay the money fine. No further news of Afridi jirgas.

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence, Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4640-4641-P., dated the 15th November 1897.)

No. 760.—Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1370-T., dated the 13th November 1897.—Collection of supplies north of camp without opposition. Steps being taken for the selection of alignment of road to Bagh. Casualties with General Westmacott’s foraging party reported in General Officer Commanding’s daily telegram of the 12th November. Departure of the 3rd Brigade for Waran. No opposition so far.

No. 761.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1372-T., dated the 14th November 1897.—Report by Brigadier-General Hart that a foraging party was attacked close to camp by enemy, but repulsed enemy and brought in forage. Departure of Mr. Donald to Mastura to investigate cause of this attack.

No. 762.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1573-P., dated the 14th November 1897.—Arrival of the 3rd Brigade at Waran without opposition. Supplies being collected from villages. House of Mulla Saljid Akbar destroyed.

No. 763.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1408-T., dated the 14th November 1897.—Reconnaissance to east of camp in Waran. Forage collected without opposition in the valley.

No. 764.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 55, dated the 14th November 1897.—Composition of enemy opposed to us in the fighting on the Saran Sar. Their casualties.
### References to Later Cases—contd.

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<td><strong>No. 754.</strong>—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 51, dated the 13th November 1897.—Repplies to Foreign Department telegram No. 4587-F., dated the 12th November 1897, and submits his proposals regarding the adoption of measures for coercing the Afridis in the event of their not submitting to the terms of punishment imposed by Government within a reasonable period.</td>
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<td><strong>No. 755.</strong>—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4589-F., dated the 13th November 1897.—States that the Government of India agree generally with Punjab letter No. 1656, dated the 8th November 1897, regarding the punishment of the Massauzais and Chamkannis, and think it desirable to deal with these tribes without delay, but await his views and any proposals which he may wish to make.</td>
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<td><strong>No. 756.</strong>—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 262, dated the 13th November 1897.—Messages received by Chikkai from Tirah that his arrest has been ordered, Chikkai’s offer to sell Chinarak.</td>
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<td><strong>No. 757.</strong>—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 263, dated the 13th November 1897.—Massauzai-Chamkanni lashkar still at Jamikot in Khurmana Darra.</td>
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No. 755.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Mobile Column, No. B-258, dated the 18th November 1897.—Cessation, for political reasons, of all survey operations. Increase in numbers of lash-kars in Khurma Darra.

No. 758.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 51, dated the 18th November 1897.—Departure of the Samil Orakzai jirgas after settling among themselves shares in which they propose the surrender of rifles and to pay the money fine. No further news of Afridi jirgas.

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4640-4641-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)

No. 760.—Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1370-T., dated the 13th November 1897.—Collection of supplies north of camp without opposition. Steps being taken for the selection of alignment of road to Bagh. Casualties with General Westmacott's foraging party reported in General Officer Commanding's daily telegram of the 13th November. Departure of the 3rd Brigade for Waran. No opposition so far.

No. 761.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1372-T., dated the 14th November 1897.—Report by Brigadier-General Hart that a foraging party was attacked close to camp by enemy, but repulsed enemy and brought in forage. Departure of Mr. Donald to Mastura to investigate cause of this attack.

No. 762.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1374-F., dated the 14th November 1897.—Arrival of the 3rd Brigade at Waran without opposition. Supplies being collected from villages. House of Mulla Saiyid Akbar destroyed.

No. 763.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1408-T., dated the 14th November 1897.—Reconnaissance to east of camp in Waran. Forage collected without opposition in the valley.

No. 764.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 52, dated the 14th November 1897.—Composition of enemy opposed to us in the fighting on the Saran Sar. Their casualties.
No. 765.—Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 117, dated the 14th November 1897.—His opinion regarding the service rendered by Chikkai and that he merits a substantial recognition. Requests authority to instruct the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to inform Chikkai that he will be well rewarded for his conduct during August and September, and that Government is confident he will by further service complete the claim he has earned for a recognition of his merit.

No. 766.—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4632-F., dated the 14th November 1897.—Enquires whether he supports the Commissioner's recommendation to reward Chikkai.

No. 767.—Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 118, dated the 14th November 1897.—Advice to the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to reassure Chikkai as to good faith of British Government and to induce him not to sell Chinarak. Inadvisability of putting pressure upon the Koedad Khel in order to prevent their buying Chinarak, except as a last resort.

No. 768.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 265, dated the 14th November 1897.—With reference to Proceedings No. 766, says that, if he is authorised to give Chikkai his personal assurance that Government has no intention of interfering with him or with internal affairs of his tribe, and that his services to Government since August will eventually receive suitable recognition, he (Officer on Special Duty, Kurram) will answer for keeping Chikkai straight.

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4638-4639-F., dated the 15th November 1897.)

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4634-4635-F., dated the 15th November 1897.)

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4632-4633-F., dated the 15th November 1897.)

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4636-4637-F., dated the 15th November 1897.)
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<td>No. 769.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Punjab Government, No. 13-C, dated the 14th November 1897. Reply to Foreign Department telegram No. 4615-P, dated 14th November 1897, to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and states that the Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to agree with the Commissioner of Peshawar that Chilkiar deserves well of us for refusing to join any combination against Government.</td>
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<td>No. 770.</td>
<td>Telegram P., to the Secretary, No. 4, dated the 14th November 1897. Announcement of terms to complete Orakzai jirgas. Time allowed for compliance.</td>
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<td>No. 771.</td>
<td>From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 47-P., dated the 14th November 1897. With reference to Punjab Government letter No. 1656, dated the 8th instant, points out that the Orakzai jirgas received by him on the 12th instant included deputations from the Massuzai and Alisherzai sections, and that the terms of Government then announced for the whole of the Orakzai tribe included the punishment of these sections. States what he proposes doing as soon as the fortnight’s grace allowed to the Orakzais has expired. Adds that, as Government do not propose demanding tribute elsewhere, he would make no exception in the case of the Alisherzai, and agrees that the lands of the Badama village should not be made over to the Turs. In the case of the Chamkannis, agrees that they should be called upon to pay a fine of 30 breech-loaders and Rs. 1,000 in cash or cattle, also that they should be required to restore all Government property.</td>
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<td>No. 772.</td>
<td>Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXVII, for the 12th November 1897.</td>
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| No. 778. Political Diary of the Expeditionary Force, No. XXVII, for the 14th November 1897. |
|---|---|
| (Copies of the above diaries forwarded to the Military Department, and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4866-4867-F., dated the 24th November 1897.) |

| No. 774. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 207, dated the 15th November 1897.—Says he received two letters from Chikkai, stating that, after receiving messages from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, he has decided to remain in Chinarrak, and that he holds the Officer on Special Duty responsible for his safety and honour. |
|---|---|
| (Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4653-4654-F., dated the 15th November 1897.) |

| No. 775. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 54, dated the 15th November 1897.—In reply to Foreign Department telegram No. 4613-F., dated the 14th November 1897, says that he supports the proposal made by the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to reward Chikkai for his services. |
|---|---|
| (Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4657-4659-F., dated the 15th November 1897.) |

| No. 776. Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshwar, No. 121, dated the 15th November 1897.—Refers to Punjab Government telegram No. 15-C., dated the 14th November 1897, and, under circumstances stated, recommends that Chakkai be secured as soon as possible. |
|---|---|
| (Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4651-4652-F., dated the 15th November 1897.) |

<p>| No. 777. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 54, dated the 15th November 1897.—Refers to Punjab Government letter No. 1058, dated the 8th November 1897, and gives his opinion on the subject of the punishment of the Musuzzais and Chakkais. |
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(Continuation of Precis-Locket.)

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4670-4671-F., dated the 16th November 1897.)

No. 778.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1458-T., dated the 15th November 1897.—Reconnaissances in the Waran valley and collection of fodder. Foraging party to west of Mastura on 14th met with slight opposition. Completion of good mule and camel road between Mastura and Maidan.

No. 779.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 55, dated the 15th November 1897.—Says that Proceedings No. 777 crossed Foreign Department telegram No. 4699-F., dated the 10th instant, which only reached him on the evening of the 15th.

No. 780.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No B-158, dated the 16th November 1897.—Rumours of intention of the Massuzai to attack Doda post. Steps taken to reinforce Thul. Chikkih expected at Mundur on the 16th to meet Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, who has gone there.

No. 781.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 271, dated the 16th November 1897.—Reports that Chikkih has been completely reassured and has definitely decided not to sell Chinarak. His desire to be used as an intermediary in bringing about a settlement with the tribes, especially with the Mamuzai and Alisherzai.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4693-4694-F., dated the 17th November 1897.)

No. 782.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1455-T., dated the 16th November 1897.—Movements of the troops under General Kempster in Waran. Capture of a wounded Aka Khel, who is reported to have been armed with a rifle of Kabul manufacture. Survey work completed to the junction of the Mastura and Waran valleys. Discovery of a broad road leading up valley towards Matri Pass into Bora valley. Treacherous conduct of Malikdin and Kambar Khels in connection with General Westmacott’s foraging parties. Our casualties. Return of General Kempster’s force from Waran. Move to Bagh on 17th of 2nd Brigade with Head-quarters and Divisional Troops, 1st Division. General attitude of tribes in the Maidan valley.
No. 783.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Moveable Column, No. 161-B., dated the 16th November 1897.—Arrival of troops at Sadda from Para Chinar en route to Thal. Mamuzis reported as likely to attack Dowlah. Message from Captain Roo-Keppel at Alizai regarding his interview with Chikkai.

No. 784.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 57, dated the 16th November 1897.—Attitude of the Afridis. Intention to announce terms to jirgas of the tribes now in camp after the camp has been moved to Bagh, and the road through the defile to Diva Toi in Bala valley has been commenced, and to inform the jirgas of other clans in writing.

(Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4696-4697-F., dated the 17th November 1897.)

No. 785.—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. 4685-F., dated the 16th November 1897.—With reference to Proceedings No. 775, approves of the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, giving Chikkai his personal assurance that Government have no intention of interfering with him or with the internal affairs of his tribe, and that his services to Government since August will eventually receive suitable recognition; but if the Officer on Special Duty is fully assured that the incident may be regarded as closed, by what passed at his interview as reported in Proceedings No. 781, no further promise need be given.

No. 786.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1907-T., dated the 17th November 1897.—Account of an attack by enemy on Brigadier-General Kempster’s column on the Saran Sar and the nearer heights on north of road, when returning on the 10th November from Waran.

No. 787.—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4698-F., dated the 17th November 1897.—Authorises him to announce term to the Chamkannis as proposed. Says the Government of India would prefer that the fine, which is to be levied in addition to the 30 breech-loaders, should be taken in other arms, and that the Chamkannis should not be given a longer time to comply than that allowed to the Orakzais.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, under endorsements Nos. 4699-. 4700-F., dated the 17th November 1897.)
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<td>No. 788.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 272, dated the 17th November 1897.—Refers to the Commissioner of Peshawar's telegram No. 121 and says that he has given Chikkai a personal assurance. Adds that if Government like to send him a formal promise, it would no doubt please him, but that he (Officer on Special Duty) does not think it is now required.</td>
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<td>No. 789.</td>
<td>Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1543-T., dated the 17th December 1897.—Reinforcement on the morning of the 17th sent towards Tseri Kandao to assist, if necessary, the return of the 15th and 36th Sikhs and two companies of the Dorsets. The return of the whole force to camp. Consequent postponement of the move to Bagh until the 18th.</td>
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<td>No. 790.</td>
<td>Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 58, dated the 17th November 1897.—Application from the Ali Khel (Gar Orakzais) for permission to pay up their share of rifles and money fine on 19th November at Mastura camp. Reply sent them. Despatch by post of translations of several curious letters from Adda Mulla and Afridi jirga at Kabul, which were found in the house of the Aka Khel Mulla, Saiyid Akbar, in Waran Valley. (Copy of above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4721-4722-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. 791.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 275, dated the 17th November 1897.—With reference to Foreign Department telegram No. 4693-F., states that he does not think that anything more can be said to Chikkai now, as he expressed himself thoroughly satisfied with the assurance given, and said that he asked for no more.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. 792.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 276, dated the 17th November 1897.—Refers to his telegram No. 271, and says that Arsalla Khan, Mamuzai, came to see Saiyid Shah at Chinarak, and promised to do his best to induce his tribe to agree to terms of Government. (Copies of the foregoing telegrams, and of Proceedings No. 788, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements No. 4719-4720-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)</td>
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No. 793.—Telegram P., to the Secretary of State, dated the 17th November 1897.—Reports that, though some Afridi jirgas have come to Sir William Lockhart's camp, the Zakka Khel, Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas are holding aloof. Proposals to move force down to the Lower Bara valley, if Afridis refuse to comply with demands, to within easy reach of Fort Bara from whence flying column can be organised; also to send troops into the Khybar to occupy posts there as a means of putting additional pressure on the Afridis.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, for information, under endorsement No. 4718-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)

No. 794.—Telegram P., to the Secretary of State, dated the 18th November 1897.—Communicates the report that the Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas are still holding aloof, and that the Zakka Khel seem irreconcilably hostile, and that General Lockhart is marching to Bagh where, if jirgas do not come in during the next few days, he will announce the Afridi terms by word of mouth to those present and in writing to others.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, for information, under endorsement No. 4719-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)

No. 795.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 60, dated the 18th November 1897.—Reports that the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, has been instructed to announce terms at once to the Chawkannis for compliance by the 26th instant.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4730-4732-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)

No. 796.—Telegram from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, No. 557, dated the 18th November 1897.—Surrender of rifles and of two sepoys of the Khyber Rifles by the Kalla Khel jirga. Enquires whether the remaining rifles to be brought in by the Kalla Khels should be received at Kohat, or the jirga be directed to take them to the camp in Maidan.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4739-4740-F., dated the 19th November 1897.)
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<td>No. 797. Memorandum showing that the papers specified therein have been forwarded to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department under cover of the Foreign Secretary's weekly mail letter No. 36-M., dated the 18th November 1897.</td>
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<td>No. 798. Telegram P., from the Secretary of State, dated the 18th November 1897.—Says that the newspapers of the 17th November published a report of documents which were discovered in Mulla Salyid Akbar's fort and said to implicate Afghan officials. Asks whether this is true, and the nature of the discovery.</td>
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<td>No. 799. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 280, dated the 18th November 1897.—Announcement of terms to Chamkannis. Action which he proposes taken in the matter.</td>
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<td>No. 800. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 281, dated the 18th November 1897.—Meeting of the Massuzai jirga to discuss terms announced to the Orakzai lashkar in Khurman Darra dispersed. Tereli and Janikot held in turn by picquets of Khani Khel Chamkannis and various sections of the Massuzai. Despatch of letter announcing terms to Khani Khel.</td>
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<td>No. 801. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 194-T., dated the 18th November 1897.—Move of the 2nd Brigade and the Head-quarters and Divisional Troops of the 1st Division to camp near Bagh. Opposition flown by enemy. Destruction of defences of offending villages belonging to Kambar and Zakha Khel Afrida.</td>
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<td>No. 802. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 289, dated the 18th November 1897.—Terms announced to Khani Khel.</td>
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(Copies of the above telegram and of proceedings Nos. 799-800, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4753-4753-F., dated the 19th November 1897.)

No. 803. Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Moveable Column, No. B-107, dated the 18th November 1897.—Dispersal of lashkar from Khurmana Darra on account of jirga held in Massuzai country to consider terms. Picquets of observation furnished by sections of each clan in turn at Janikot and Tereli.
No. 804.—Telegram from the Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 62, dated the 18th November 1897.—Instructions to Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, not to receive the Kella Kichir jirga in British territory, as they are under blockade for sending a contingent from Tirah with the Afridi lashkar which attacked the Khyber posts. Arrangements for bringing about their submission.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4750-4751-F, dated the 19th November 1897.)

No. 805.—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4749-F., dated the 19th November 1897.—States that the terms for the Afridi includes restoration of private property lost at Landi Kotal or its value when specific property cannot be recovered. Asks him to send Captain Barton's statement of his losses with a statement of recoveries.

No. 806.—Telegram P., from the Secretary of State, dated the 19th November 1897.—Approves of the measures proposed in the telegram of the 17th November 1897, if found necessary. Enquires (1) what it is proposed to do with the posts on the Samana Range during the winter, and (2) whether the protection of traffic is contemplated in suggesting the keeping of the Khyber open during the winter by troops.

No. 807.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1610-T., dated the 19th November 1897.—Movements of troops. Enemy to be seen in considerable numbers on high hills north of Camp Bagh.

No. 808.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 88-I.P., dated the 19th November 1897.—Move of camp on 19th to site ¼ mile north-west of village Ijam Gudar and 3 miles from Fort Bura. Improvement in condition of transport.

No. 809.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. H.-172, dated the 19th November 1897.—Report that Massuzais wish to ascertain the attitude of the Afridis before deciding on terms.

No. 810.—From the Government of the Punjab, No. 29-C., dated the 19th November 1897.—With reference to previous correspondence, submit, for information, a copy of letters received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, and of their enclosures, regarding Chikkai, the Zaimusht leader.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to Later Cases—contd.</th>
<th>Brief Title of File</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nos. 811—817.—Enclosures.</td>
<td>(Copy of the above letter, with enclosures, forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4790-4792-F., dated the 24th November 1897.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 818.—Telegram P., to the Secretary of State, dated the 20th November 1897.—In reply to Proceedings No. 798, states that General Lockhart telegraphed on the 17th that several curious papers had been found, and that he was posting translations, but that they contained nothing of grave importance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 819.—Telegram from the Punjab Government, No. 88-C., dated the 20th November 1897.—For reasons given, hope that, if possible, the whole tribe (Chambanies) may be treated as one body, leaving it to General Officer Commanding to apportion a larger share of the fine in money and guns, on the Khani Khel, if the sections cannot agree as to this amongst themselves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 820.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 280, dated the 20th November 1897.—Refers to the Punjab Government telegram No. 88-C., and gives reasons for not making a general settlement by which the weak sections of the Chambanies will be left at the mercy of the Khani Khels, who have played a much more important part in the various attacks by Massuzai in Kurram than the remainder of the tribe.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 820-A.—Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4797-4798-F., dated the 22nd November 1897.—Forwards, for information, copies of the above telegrams.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 821.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 65, dated the 20th November 1897.—With reference to his telegram No. 58 of the 17th, says that translations of the most important letters found in Mulla Saiyid Akbar’s house were forwarded by post on the 19th. Communicates the purport of one of them, and suggests that he be authorised to inform the Afridis distinctly that the British troops will not be withdrawn from their country until they comply with the Government terms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, for information, under endorsement No. 4307-F., dated the 22nd November 1897.)
### REFERENCES TO LATER CASES—contd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Brief title of file</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>822.</td>
<td>Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 64, dated the 20th November 1897 — Gives a statement of Captain Barton's losses as received from that officer. Losses amount to Rs. 12,391-8-0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>823.</td>
<td>Attack made on an empty convoy returning to Mastura from Maidan this side of the Arhanga Pass. Capture of enemy's position on heights north-east of Camp Bagh by 1/3rd Gurkhas. Casualties. Enemy seen moving from west to east towards the Bara valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>824.</td>
<td>Reports that there are only a few men now in the Ganda Pass to give warning of the approach of our troops, but that they do not intend opposing our advance on Barkai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>825.</td>
<td>Announcement of the terms of Government to the Afridis. A week's grace given them for compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>826.</td>
<td>Letter received from Massuzai and Khani Khel jirgas, asking to be allowed to go to Sadda to discuss terms. Reply sent them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch, date, and Nos.</td>
<td>Brief title of file</td>
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(Continuation of Precis-Docket.)

(Copies of the above telegram, and of Proceedings Nos. 825, forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4808-4809-F., dated the 22nd November 1897.)

No. 828.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Communications, No. 1430-C., dated the 21st November 1897.—Murder of a Sarwan. Enquiry instituted.

No. 829.—Telegram to the Secretary of State, dated the 21st November 1897.—Repeats telegram to sir William Lockhart about withdrawal of troops from Maidan, and asks for instructions. Says terms have been announced to certain sections and one week’s grace allowed for compliance.

No. 830.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1854-T., dated the 21st November 1897.—Movements of troops. Villages south-east of the camp visited and the defences of the enemy, who have shown continuous opposition, destroyed. Evacuation of Camp Maidan by 3rd Brigade. Jirga of Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, Aka Khel and Adam Khel Afridis received on the 21st November 1897 at Camp Bagh, and terms of Government announced to them.

No. 831.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 295, dated the 22nd November 1897.—Refers to his telegram No. 293 of the 21st, and says that the letter received from the Massuzai and Khani Khel jirgas only expressed desire for peace, and that the remainder of the message was sent verbally to Afridi Khan.

No. 832.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 92-I.P., dated the 22nd November 1897.—Party of about 50 Aka Khel raiders seen on 21st November near village Shin Kamar, 10 miles west of camp Ilam Gudar.

No. 833.—Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 296, dated the 22nd November 1897.—Letter received from Chikkai reporting all quiet in his direction.

(Copy of the above telegram and of Proceedings No. 831 forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4819-4820-F., dated the 23rd November 1897.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch, date, and No.</th>
<th>Brief title of file</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 834. —Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4794-F., dated the 22nd November 1897.—Refers to Proceedings Nos. 819 and 820, and says the Government of India leave in his hands the details of settlement with the Chambansis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 835.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1706-T., dated the 22nd November 1897.—Movements of troops. Piquet of King's Own Scottish Borderers fired on by some of the enemy. Report from Camp Mastura that reconnaissance was made on the morning of the 22nd up Bulashai valley and over Sangra Pass.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 836.—Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 486-F., dated the 23rd November 1897.—With reference to Proceedings No. 826, enquires whether he announced the terms to the Afridis in exact accordance with Foreign Department letter No. 3803-F., dated the 4th October 1897, or whether he reduced the demand for rifles, and, if so, to what number.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 837.—Telegram from the Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 13-C., dated the 23rd November 1897.—Partial compliance with terms of Government by Ali Khels; their promise to complete fine and rifles on 23rd November. Samil clans and Daulatzaies expected to give in their fines and rifles on the 24th November. Promise of the Mamozai Malik to complete their share within the stipulated time. Attitude of Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Adam Khel and Zailka Khel Afridis. Loss of enemy at the action on the Tseri Kandao on 16th November 1897.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 838.—Telegram F., to the Secretary of State, dated the 23rd November 1897.—In reply to Proceedings No. 806, states that the Samana will have to be held in strength during the winter, and that, if we occupy the Khyber, it would be expedient to re-open it for traffic, which would be the most effective mark of our political supremacy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 839.</td>
<td>Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 94-I.P., dated the 23rd November 1897.—States that Mulla Saiyid Akbar is reported to be collecting a lashkar of Aka Khel, Kamrai and Sipahs to harass our troops in Maidan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 840.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Assistant Adjutant-General, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1733-T, dated the 23rd November 1897.—Repeats a telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, from Dwatoi reporting his movements, giving a description of the country round about, and stating the casualties on the 22nd November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 841.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 26, dated the 23rd November 1897.—Reported movements of Mulla Saiyid Akbar. Return to Jamrud, with their rifles, of one Kambar Khel and five Malikdin sepoys of the Khyber Rifles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 842.</td>
<td>Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1761-T, dated the 23rd November 1897.—Convoy with ammunition proceeding from Mustura to Bagh fired on north of the Arhanga Pass on the evening of the 22nd November. Attack driven off by 3-4th Gurkhas. Casualties. Movements of troops. Selection of posts for protection of the Arhanga and road to Bagh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 843.</td>
<td>Office Memorandum to Military Department, No. 4849-F., dated the 24th November 1897.—Forwards, for issue of orders as to the immediate movement and disposition during the winter of the troops under Sir William Lockhart, copy of Proceedings Nos. 888 and 896.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 844.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 301, dated the 24th November 1897.—Answer of Khani Khel Chamkannis to the letter announcing terms of Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 845.</td>
<td>Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 142, dated the 24th November 1897.—Proposal to declare a blockade under section 23, Frontier Crimes Regulation, against the Afridis and Orakzais.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**REFERENCES OF LATER CASES—contd.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch, date, and No.</th>
<th>Brief title of fil.</th>
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</table>

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4901-4902-F, dated the 26th November 1897.)

No. 848.—Telegram from the Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 27, dated the 24th November 1897.—Reported location at Gandao of about 200 Aka Khel, Orakzai and Khasrogi Yakka Khel.

(Copy of the above telegram forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, for information, under endorsements Nos. 4897-4899-F, dated the 25th November 1897.)

Nos. 847—848.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 94-I. P., dated the 24th November 1897.—Completion of the road as far as Gandao, one and-a-half mile this side of pass. Reported location of about 300 Aka, Zakka and Sturi Khels at Magani.

No. 849.—Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. B.187, dated the 25th November 1897.—Refusal of Khani Khel Chamkuantis to comply with terms of proclamation sent to them on the 18th November.

No. 850.—Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1798-T., dated the 24th November 1897.—Events connected with the reconnaissance to Dwatoi on the 23rd November.

No. 851.—Memorandum showing that the papers specified therein have been forwarded to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department under cover of the Foreign Secretary's weekly mail letter No. 37-M., dated the 26th November 1897.

No. 852.—From the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, No. 54 (copy), dated the 26th November 1897.—Forwards, for information, copy of correspondence with the International Arbitration and Peace Association, regarding the military operations on the North-Western Frontier.

Nos. 853—854.—Enclosures.

**Note.**—For despatch forwarding these and later papers regarding the Afridi-Orakzai Expedition, see Secret F., February 1898, Nos. 855—1211.
K. W.
SECRET F., FEBRUARY 1898.
Nos. 604–854.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. Policy to be adopted towards the tribes who rose against Government on the North-West Frontier.

K. W. Part I.

AFRIDI POLICY.

Pros. No. 604.

TELEGRAM P., FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED THE 13TH (RECEIVED 14TH) OCTOBER 1897.

Refers to his telegram of the 6th instant, and thinks it desirable that a political settlement with the tribes should follow as quickly as possible on the termination of the military operations in the field. Indicates the points which should be kept in view in considering the matter.

SECRETARY.

On the 13th instant you gave notice to office that His Excellency wished the following subjects to be considered with regard to the settlement of future relations with the tribes who have risen against us:

(i) Rectification of the administrative boundary.
(ii) Disarmament.
(iii) Tribute.

Below are a set of papers bearing on these points which have been put together by office. Their submission has been expedited in consequence of the receipt, on the 14th instant, of the telegram from the Secretary of State as to the settlement to be made.

2. The Secretary of State promises that "no new responsibility should be undertaken, unless absolutely necessitated by actual strategic necessity and the protection of the British Indian Frontier."

He also thinks that "the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy."

He insists strongly on strict limitation of our interference with "independent tribes", and says "the question of disarmament, so far as it appears to imply protection," should be examined from the standpoint of "avoiding......gradual extension of administrative control over tribal territory."

Assuming that "our policy is to maintain permanently our position as it existed before these disturbances," the Secretary of State wishes to know "what posts and lines of communication the Government of India "regard as indispensable to this purpose." His Lordship's telegram closes by saying "our object should be to obtain clear and well-defined general plans on which local arrangements can be based."

3. The considerations involved are to such a great extent military that it is with much diffidence that I venture any suggestions, but it will clear the ground if this Department can in a measure, define the position as to the country beyond the British Indian Frontier so far as we are concerned. That frontier may, in connection with the present disturbances, be dealt with in two broad divisions:

I.—From Chilas to Peshawar.
II.—From Peshawar to the Gumal.

4. I place below proof copies of notes I have recently put together in which I have endeavoured to give, as briefly as possible, a connected sketch of the North-West Frontier Tribes, within and adjoining the Indo-Afghan border, from the vicinity of Chilas to Waziristan. The notes are in three sections:

(i) The first deals with the tribal territory between the Indo-Afghan border and the British Indian frontier from the Kabul river on the south to the southern limits of Chitral and the Gilgit Agency on the north, but so as to include Chilas and the connected settlements.
(ii) The second deals with tribal territory within our limits from the Kabul river down to the Gumaal.

(iii) The third deals with our neighbours all along this line.

5. From Chilas to the Kabul river, we have, I think, to look at six groups of tribes and tribal divisions:

(i) **Shina, Indus Kohistan and Yagnobistan.**—This is the group in which we have the least interest. So long as peace and order are maintained at and about Chilas, we have practically nothing of importance, I think, to gain by extending our influence westwards or south-westwards from Chilas. Our officers should not, of course, rebuff spontaneous advances of the tribesmen, but it should be made clear to them that, provided they do not commit themselves beyond their limits, we are quite content to leave them absolutely to themselves, though ready to aid them with advice if they desire to seek it. The one thing we have to look for in respect to this group appears to be an understanding with the cis-Indus communities which will provide for the safety of the Kaghan valley route to Chilas. This is a scarcely a matter which can be regarded as an important issue in the general politics of the North-West Frontier, but I am inclined to think it will continually become of more and more importance to the Gilgit Agency and that the Punjab Government should be moved to give it close attention.

(ii) **The Black Mountain, the Mohaban Mountain neighbourhood, the Chamla valley and Buner.**—I group these three together because, owing to inter tribal ties, any one division of this group would probably receive some measure of support from the other divisions in the event of complications. There is likely to be development soon in respect to our relations with Buner. The Black Mountain tribes have been quiet of late, and if the Bunerwals submit to terms or are compelled to do so, I do not think that this group should, in future, give cause for anxiety. We have a hold over some sections of the Bunerwals who own lands within the British Indian Frontier. The Punjab Government may have something to say as to rectification of the administrative frontier in this region.

(iii) **Swat and Dir.**—Here the important point seems to be to lose no opportunity of impressing on the tribesmen that the route to Chitral will be kept open at any cost. Our wish is to avoid advancing beyond our present positions and to abstain from any interference, except by way of advice at the request of the tribes, in their internal affairs. If we advance or adopt a more active policy, it will only be because the tribes compel us to do so.

(iv) **Bagliur.**—Here all we need say is that, if the tribesmen abstain from aggression on their neighbours and from interference with our line of communications with Chitral, we shall gladly leave to them the management of their own affairs.

(v) **Mohmands.**—In re-constructing our relations with the assured clans falling to our sphere what we have to demand from them is, I think,—

(a) non-interference with other tribes within our limits;
(b) absolute non-participation in the politics of Afghanistan; and
(c) fulfilment of their obligations as wardens of our marches.

(vi) **The Uman Khal remain.**—I am of opinion that, at any rate in respect to their territories east of the Swat, we should adopt a more thorough policy in the matter of disarmament than will probably be at present necessary or expedient in respect to any of the other tribal groups just named. The advantages would be—

(a) increased security for the British Indian frontier from Abazai to the Malakand road;
(b) increased security for the Malakand line of communications; and perhaps,
(c) the opening up of an alternative line of communications through Tota and Agra with Malakand and Chakdarra.

6. In respect, then, to the tribal region from the southern limits of the Gilgit Agency and of Chitral to the Kabul river, my conclusions are—

(i) that, given a satisfactory settlement with the Bunerwals, disarmament, beyond what has been effected or is contemplated, need not be attempted, but that the disarmament of the cis-Swat Uman * Khal should be as thorough as possible;

(ii) that the tribute question should nowhere be raised;

(iii) that in the matter of lines of communications, the only new steps to be taken are to endeavour to arrange for the security of the Kaghan route to Chilas; and

* These Uman Khal lie, as it were, under the lee of our positions at Malakand and Chakdarra, and disarmament need expose them to no risks, such as would operate to produce an ultimate extension of our administrative control.
perhaps to open up a new route through the cis-Swat Utman Khel country, but neither of these lines are, as yet, of the first importance; (iv) that, subject to the opinion of the Punjab Government, little or nothing is required in the way of rectification of the administrative frontier.

In short, as regards this region, the ‘general plan’ would simply be to hold fast on the Dir route to Chitral, and to prove to the tribes in every possible way that we have no desire to extend our sphere of administrative control or to interfere in any way in their affairs.

7. The second division of the frontier from the Kabul river to the Gumal, forming as it does our central exposed face and including the command of so many routes between points of the first importance both within and without the Indo-Afghan border, is much more difficult to deal with.

I have already* suggested the early construction of a line of railway through the Kohat district up the Kurram river to the neighbourhood of Kurram fort, and the more I examine the general position the greater seem to me the importance and advantage of such a line. There appears to be no reason to anticipate† serious physical difficulties.

The principal points to notice in respect to a railway up into Kurram seem to me—

(i) The manner in which it would enable us to command the Afridi and Orakzai country. Three and a-half years ago Mr. Merk † wrote—‘Our occupation of Kurram has practically taken in rear not only the Zaimushas, but the Afridis and Orakzais as well, especially the Afridis. By the Lozaka Pass from Sadda it is two days’ march by a mule road into Maidan; ditto from Sadda by the Murgan Kotal into Orakzai-Tirah. I do not think the Afridis and Orakzais have as yet at all realised this change in their strategic position.’

(ii) The advantages it would offer in respect to moves either northwards into the Jalalabad district, north-westward to Kabul or south-westward to the Ghazni-Kandahar line.

8. A march or two in advance of what would be the (temporary) terminus, within our border, of the railway we have the well known position of Ali Khel. From Ali Khel the following are approximate distances in air lines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Distance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jalalabad</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>. .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>. .</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. 55 miles (about N.-E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. 60 &quot; ( &quot; N.-W. )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. 80 &quot; ( &quot; S.-W. by W. )</td>
</tr>
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*There is no doubt that the construction and improvement of roads in and up to tribal territory is, naturally enough, a cause of apprehension to the tribesmen. We should probably be content to leave improved any routes in and near Tirah by which it is found that troops can already move without serious difficulty. Where improvements are essential I would, as far as possible, make the tribesmen carry them out themselves.

As regards routes to the north, north-west, west and south-west from the head of the Kurram valley, the Intelligence Branch could doubtless give much information. It appears to be clear that, though the passes may be high and at present difficult, there is direct communication into the Jalalabad district, and one or more fair routes into Khost and Zurmat. From Logar the route into Zurmat by the Allimur Pass is probably fairly easy.

The suggested railway line would, of course, be open to tribal attacks; but the risk of these would not, I think, be great. The Zaimushas, who occupy the hills south of the Samana between Thal and Sadda, have stood the strain of the recent excitement without giving us any trouble and may be expected to keep equally quiet in future. To the south-west of Thal, the position might be secured by opening out, as has been projected, a road through the Kabul Khel country to the Tochi valley.

As to command of the Afridis and Orakzais country, we should be in a better position to judge in a few weeks when the various passes have been explored; and the tribesmen might perhaps be made to work § out a part of their punishment by improving roads over passes on the more important lines.

† There are, I believe, about 100 of them in the Kurram Militia.

§ There are, of this neighbourhood, see No. 561, in Secret F., June 1895, Nos. 459-467.

‖ Mr. Donald’s Ride from Thal to Idak.”
10. As regards disarmament in the tribal territory from the Kabul river to the Gomal, it may be easier to arrive at conclusions when it is known what number of rifles Sir William Lockhart expects to recover from the Afridis and Orakzaís, and when we see the rate at which his demands in this respect are complied with. At present I do not see how it is possible to lay down any rule or plan upon this subject except that, whenever a tribe or clan transgresses, the punishment should include the maximum number of arms which can be demanded with reasonable prospect of compliance.

11. As to tribute you have suggested that, in order to mark the principle, some annual offering, e.g., of local products, might be demanded. The Secretary of State in his telegram speaks of 'independent tribes.' The word has perhaps slipped in by mistake. There may be autonomy, but there cannot surely be independence within our outermost limits. It appears to me, as I have suggested before, to be of great importance that their present position in this respect should be made clear to the Afridis and Orakzaís, especially as we should in future have to accept responsibility if they gave serious trouble to the Amir. The same remarks of course apply to the tribes north of the Kabul river, who border on Afghan territory; but the necessity for any specific explanation to the tribesmen in that region is, I think, doubtful. If the result of the present operations and of the consideration of a 'general plan' for the future is to show the tribesmen generally that, while we are not advancing our administrative border, we shall hereafter be in a better position than we have ever been in the past to repress and punish aggression and lawlessness, then I think that the tribute question may be allowed to rest.

12. It has already been determined that the Khyber is to be re-opened, under tribal arrangements if possible. The other measures of a 'general plan' between the Kabul river and the Gomal which I venture to suggest—

(i) Let the tribes know as promptly as possible of any slight modifications of the administrative frontier which it is determined to carry out. Declare at the same time that subject to the good behaviour of the tribes, the administrative line will otherwise remain unaltered.

(ii) Make a railway up the Kurram valley and establish good lateral communication between Thal and the Tochi valley.

(iii) Make it known to the tribes that, in case of further disturbances, disarmament will be vigorously pressed against those implicated and may be extended to the whole area.

(iv) Leave the tribute question alone.

13. The case only reached me with papers yesterday afternoon, and I have not had time to read up, as carefully as I could have wished, the voluminous literature on the various points involved. I shall, therefore, hope to be pardoned if I have unwittingly ventured suggestions which are barred by the dictates of high authority.

19th October 1897.

H. Daly.

His Excellency.

The Secretary of State wishes that the present opportunity should be taken for defining our permanent position and policy, and our object should be to obtain clear and well-defined general plans on which local arrangements can be based.

Our position may, I think, be defined as that of the only power with whom the tribes on this side of the Durand line can have any dealings, and the one to whom they should look as their political suzerain.

Our policy will be to leave these tribes as much to themselves as possible in all their internal affairs, to cultivate friendly relations with them, and generally as described in the letter to the Punjab of the 14th August 1896.

Circumstances alter the degree to which intercourse is wanted. The tribes up about Swar Kohistan need not be required to afford passage through their country, for none is wanted or likely to be wanted; the Lower Swatias must be required to afford it because we must have passage to Chitral. So also the Khyber Afridis must be required to afford us passage through their country, for it is wanted to keep open intercourse with Kabul; but in Tirah of the Afridis and Orakzaís no such evident need exists for passage, and if any exists, it is in connection with the military position. The policy, as I understand it, does not contemplate the assumption of any new responsibilities, "unless absolutely necessitated by actual strategic necessity and the protection of British Indian border."

I would suggest that, in every new agreement dealing with our future relations with the border tribes, we should require a definite acknowledgment of political dependence on the British Government; and, to mark this position, a promise to render an annual tribute offering of one kind or another as may be locally deemed to be suitable. The Government of India
would, on the other hand, guarantee the tribes against interference in the management of their own affairs.

With regard to tribal payments and tribal service, it is not, I think, possible to propose definite arrangements, but the guiding principle may be to give nothing that is not in return for actual service done, such as keeping open a road or guarding passes and boundaries.

Disarmament as it is being carried out now does not seem to me to imply protection. The arms in the hands of the border tribes have been used against us, and we are taking as many as we can out of their hands. They will accumulate again I have no doubt, and in the meantime the people who have been deprived of their arms may be open to attack and spoliation by their neighbours. The act of disarmament operates as a fine imposed in a manner which may be expected to be most severely felt, but it carries no responsibility with it upon us to save the punished tribes from the effect which that punishment brings on them.

No proposals for the rectification of administrative boundaries can be made except by the Punjab Government. I believe the Lieutenant-Governor has little or nothing to suggest on this point, but his Honour will no doubt be consulted; and he has already been asked for his views in regard to the disarmament of the frontier districts within the line of British India. In that case, indeed, the exemption of the people of frontier districts from the prohibitions of the Arms Act has been allowed as a matter of protection, but the arms which they are permitted to carry have been used in numbers against us, and there would seem to be no hardship in withdrawing privileges which have been abused.

There is one point which ought, I think, to be kept in view when tribal relations are being settled. It was insisted on by Major Dean at the end of the Chitral campaign when dealing with the Khan of Dir, and it will be still more appropriate when dealing with tribes who have been beaten in sight, and whose lands have been overrun. There should be no ‘negotiations’ or proposals put forward for the tribes to discuss with an option to refuse or modify. The terms which the British Government are willing to concede should be stated as things which the tribes have to accept or take the consequences.

10th October 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

[D.D.M.-OFFICIAL.]
Dated Simla, the 10th October 1897.
To—His Honour Sir W. MACKWORTH YOUNG, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

Although it is no doubt true that we cannot determine the form of the future settlement with the Afridi and other tribes concerned in the Tirah Expedition until we know what amount of opposition it meets, still I think we may well do all we can to pave the way for a prompt decision when the time comes, and there are one or two points on which I should like to have your opinion before I take action.

The Government of India have accepted your advice that, if possible, the Khyber route should be re-opened under some form of tribal arrangements. I think that in itself shuts out the idea of annexation, or what would amount to annexation, which has found favour in some places in the Press and elsewhere. It is certain that no policy of that kind could be carried out without a considerable addition to the army, and in my judgment it would be an unwise as well as an impracticable policy. But I felt that it was so essentially a matter of opposition it meets, still I think we may well do all we can to pave the way for a prompt decision when the time comes, and there are one or two points on which I should like to have your opinion before I take action.

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The word ‘materially’ was used by the Secretary of State because, in the course of the discussions which have taken place, my attention was drawn to the fact that the border near Peshawar was a very inconvenient one and increased the difficulties of the police arrangements. Accordingly, in my telegram to the Secretary of State, I said that I deprecated any material alteration (of present tribal limits); but, if the policing of the district adjacent to Peshawar, which is at present very difficult, could be improved by minor modifications, we might find the opportunity now. I have not yet consulted the Punjab Government on this subject."

The Secretary of State says he agrees with me "as to minor modifications;" and I should, therefore, be glad to know whether you think it would be worth while going into the question. At present all I have before me are casual remarks, with no information as to the nature of the difficulties or the possible remedies.

I may add that another suggestion I have heard is that we ought to take possession of the Kohat Pass, so as to secure better communication between Peshawar and Kohat. I am not sure that I follow how the nominal possession of the Kohat Pass would improve matters; and, if the proposal was to hold it in force, I think, in the first place, that this would be a "material" extension, and, in the second place, that the position at Kohat would be far better strengthened by a railway from Kushalgarh. I have not asked the opinion of any military authority; but, looking to the railway map, it strikes me that in that case Rawalpindi would be the centre from which Kohat would be reinforced, and, looking to the unhealthiness of Peshawar, there would be advantages in that being so.

I now proceed to another point, which has not occurred to me in this connection, but has been raised by the Secretary of State in the following words:—"Have you considered whether it is possible that tribes should be made, after defeat, to recognise that Government of India is supreme power, either by payment of nominal sum as annual tribute, or some other well-understood form? I do not wish this to involve any extension of district administration by your Government, or any interference with customs of the tribes."

The arguments for and against the imposition of tribute are well-known to you and have been often stated; the last time reference was made to them was, I think, in the case of the Madhe Khel. If my memory serves me, I then said that, if we were to take anything, "tribute" was preferable to "revenue," because it did not necessarily involve administration. It appears to me that the question largely depends on how far we are prepared to admit the claim of the tribes to independence; the imposition of tribute being advocated chiefly by those who wish to enforce the admission by the tribes that they are "our men." As a matter of fact it is only the admission which is now wanting; there is little meaning in the provisions of the Durand Convention, or in the assertion of our sphere of influence, within which we decline to allow the Amir to interfere, unless we thereby affirm our supremacy over these tribes. But, at the same time, we have not yet demanded a formal acknowledgment from any tribe on the Punjab frontier, though we have taken revenue in Baluchistan, and a new departure of this kind cannot fail to be important.

As regards the Afridis, I quite admit that there is a good case for something of the kind. Our quarrel with them is different from the usual cause of a frontier expedition. It is not only an outrage to be punished, it is the deliberate breach of a written agreement, and it would be perfectly justifiable for us to say that, as they have so wantonly violated the engagements on which we have paid them subsidies for 16 years, and as they have endeavoured to bring in the Amir to assist them, it is necessary for us both to show that we can dominate them by invading their territory, and for the future to have a permanent acknowledgment that they have no right of appeal to any other Power. I do not know how the allowances are paid to the Afridi Maliks, but a practical way of giving effect to the suggestion of the Secretary of State would be to fix a certain date on which the whole or a principal part of the payment was made to require the tribe to send a deputation to Peshawar to claim it and to bring with them the "tribute." The allowances would be paid when the tribute was received, and not otherwise. However, the first thing to decide is whether we are to adopt the plan of imposing tribute, the manner of levying it comes after. In connection with this subject, I should like to have your opinion whether the organisation of the Khyber Rifles should continue as hitherto, or become rather that of a militia like the men in Kurram. Looking to the good behaviour of the majority of the Rifles, I should be inclined myself to alter their organisation as little as possible.

A third point is mentioned by the Secretary of State when he asks me to give him my views "on the disarmament of the Afridis and Orakzaizs." Well, I think we have accepted the principle of disarmament in the case of all the tribes with which we have had to deal, and also in the terms to be imposed on the Afridis and Orakzaizs. I should be prepared to state the case in this way: So long as the tribes were exposed to attacks from Afghan territory, or tribes under the nominal control of the Amir, it was probably unfair to disarm them. Now we have prohibited the interference across the Durand line of the Amir or any of his subjects. Further, so long as we were in a position within our own sphere of influence to compel disarmament, on something like equal terms, it might be unfair to insist on a single tribe giving up its arms and leaving it exposed to the attacks of its neighbours. But the events of this autumn have compelled us to deal comprehensively with the tribes: we have enforced the principle of disarmament from Swat to the Kabul River, and I see no reason why the Afridis and Orakzaizs should be exempted.

There is a question, however, on which I should desire to have some information, and that is whether we have carried this principle of disarmament far enough in our own districts. Is there any reason why we should not enforce the Arms Act in the Peshawar district as in other parts of British India? I believe it is not so enforced at present. There was an entry in one of Deane's diaries the other day to the effect that the disarmament he was carrying out was of little use so long as shops were allowed in Peshawar, where the tribesmen could procure arms. I confess that seems to me a reasonable observation.

The Secretary of State asks me to let him know of my views of the general policy to be pursued after the Afridis are beaten. I hesitate to comply with this request without consultation with you, and I have, therefore, troubled you with these questions, and hope you will excuse the length at which I have written. I will only add that, if oral discussion would help, I should be only too glad to have an opportunity of talking these or any other points over with you.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Simla, the 18th October 1897.

From—His Honour Sir W. Mackworth Young, K.C.S.I.,
To—His Excellency the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, G.M.S.I., etc.

I reply to Your Excellency's letter of 10th October regarding the Tirah Afridis and Orakzaizs, having had the advantage of discussing some of the matters with you orally in the interview you were good enough to give me on Saturday.
I gather that Your Excellency is averse not only to the idea of annexation, but also of permanent occupation of Tirah in any form. I have scarcely had this subject out of my thoughts for the last four or five days, and I have tried to look at it in all its bearings. The result is that I find myself entirely in accord with Your Excellency's views. I am not surprised that, notwithstanding the obvious objections, politically and financially, to such an idea, and notwithstanding that not many days ago he designated it as beyond the scope of practical politics, the Commander-in-Chief has, as I understand, become an ardent advocate of some kind of permanent occupation. The position of Tirah is fascinating; it dominates the Khyber and the Durand Line for the most part, two or three miles of its power were firmly established there; Afridis and Orakzais, Chamkannis and Zaimkushis, Adam Khel and Jowakkis, should never again be a subject of trouble to us. And the behaviour of the two first mentioned, the Afridis and Orakzais, with very few exceptions, has been now such as to justify us in thoroughly dominating or even annexing their country, though for many years they have been quiet.

But when all this is admitted, it is after all not much in comparison with the expense and the force which would be locked up in the hills. We have an enormously long frontier to deal with, and we must not lose the sense of proportion. We cannot occupy and dominate completely the whole fringe of tribal territory up to the Durand line, though we may hope in time to establish our influence in it. And the forcible occupation of any part of this territory will never settle once for all our relations with the tribes immediately concerned, while it will rouse suspicion and opposition among all the others. And when the hour of need comes, when, for instance, we have to advance in strength on Kabul, or meet (procul abit uno) a sudden rising in the tribes, or in the streets, not having once Tirah, and made it a military cantonment. The fact is that in order to be prepared for an emergency, we must be prepared to forego what seems most advantageous in the individual case. The result of taking the strongest line with Afridis and Orakzais will be, I venture to think, a weakening of our power in the north of India generally. But probably I am flogging a dead horse.

I have no recommendation to make regarding any rectification of the border in the neighbourhood of Peshawar. In the course of the recent settlement, the line was laid down by Mr. L. W. Dane, Settlement Officer, and Major Deane, Deputy Commissioner, after Colonel Warburton had also been consulted, mainly with a view to administrative convenience. The line runs for the most part two or three miles from the foot of the hills, and a line in the open is better than one close to the hills which would favour raids and the speedy escape of the raiders. I write, however, without having consulted the Commissioner of Peshawar, which may be one reason why I do not adopt the line. The Fort of Janjua undoubtedly stands in a rather isolated position, and some minor modification may be desirable.

As regards the Kohat Pass, the present would, I think, be an unfortunate time to make any new demand on the tribes which have a direct interest in it, as they have remained staunch. Nor do I see the slightest advantage in obtaining possession of, or permanently occupying the Pass. When we need it we can use it, and there is no need to undertake its safeguarding. The extension of the railway from Kushtgalgarh to Kohat is most desirable and must follow soon, and I entirely concur with Your Excellency that Rawalpindi is the natural base for Kohat. I do not know how this idea will be viewed by the Military, but I should suppose there would be no objection, as Kohat is garrisoned by the Punjab Frontier Force, not by the Peshawar district.

I think, however, that, notwithstanding the fact that we have no quarrel with the Pass Afridis, we might very well call upon them to fulfil their treaty engagement made long ago, and re-affirmed after the Jowakki Expedition in 1877, and improve under Government supervision the rocky portion of the road north of the Kotal. They do not like doing this, and hitherto have stood out against doing it, but they are bound by their treaty, and the present is a good time to insist upon its fulfilment. I am in favour of the imposition of a tribute on the Afridis of the kind described by Your Excellency. Unless we annex, or are prepared to have an annual walk through Tirah, we can only levy such a tribute nominally, giving in the form of allowances more than we take in the form of tribute; but the result would be most satisfactory. The tribeman recognises an immense distinction between the tribe which pays and does not pay revenue or some due to Government. The one is "Rayat" or subject, and the other is "Yaghi" or independent, and the sentiment affects their conduct to a degree. I think the condition, although it must, in my opinion, depend upon the revival of allowances, should be added to the terms approved by the Government of India. It would be a token of submission, and, as such, should be associated with this punitive expedition. But I agree with Your Excellency in thinking that some latitude should be given to Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny regarding the initiation of this scheme, and that the whole of the damage done in the Khyber has been repaired, and an amount equivalent to the cost withheld.

The Orakzais receive no allowance, except those paid for the Kohat Pass and Samana, and I doubt the possibility of getting tribute out of them. But it is not nearly so important.

On this subject generally I would say that a tribute is just the form of acknowledgment which is suitable to all the tribes on this side of the Durand line, and that, as opportunity offers, it is good policy to initiate it, beginning with those with whom we have the closest relations and choosing such times as permit of our insisting upon its imposition. By this means we shall certainly attach them more to ourselves and detach them from Kabul.
I should like to see the Khyber route restored and guarded just as it was before the outbreak. I see no reason for supposing that there will be another breakdown in the arrangements. And I am of opinion that the restoration of the old order will have a better effect than anything new. The hopelessness of upsetting our arrangements will be more apparent thus: I am not even in favour of any change except such slight modifications as may be approved by the officers charged with making the arrangements, and may be approved by the Government. It must happen while we have barbarians to deal with. So, in regard to the Khyber I am not in favour of any change except such slight modifications as may commend themselves to the officers charged with making the arrangements, and may be approved by Government.

As regards the disarmament of British frontier districts, I have for some time had under consideration proposals for certain prohibitions which have been suggested by the large increase in murders. I have been waiting for Sir R. Udry's opinion, but must now formulate what I have to propose without waiting for him. I am in favour of going as far as we can, but the question depends a good deal on the disarming of trans-frontier tribes. I sincerely hope it will be found that our efforts in this respect have been successful, and especially that Sir W. Lockhart may succeed in squeezing all their breech-loaders out of the Afridis and Orakzais, but I fear the state of the tribes across our frontier will not be very different a few years hence. However this may be, I am entirely in favour of disarming the whole frontier so far as may be practicable, and I would make every shop, of which Major Deane writes, with a view to suppressing any trade in arms which may exist.

I sum up the conclusions which I have endeavoured, rather hurriedly I fear, to set forth in this letter:

(1) Annexation or permanent occupation of Tirah not to be contemplated.
(2) Kohat Pass not to be occupied, but the Pass Afridis to be called upon to fulfil their engagements and make a good road.
(3) Some small tribute (it might be in the form of the produce of the country) to be demanded from the Afridis in connection with the restoration of the pass allowances, and presented by them twice a year when they come in for the allowances. The policy of demanding tribute to be gradually introduced as regards other tribes, as opportunity may occur. The cost of repairing the buildings in the Khyber damaged by the tribesmen should be recovered before the allowances are wholly restored.
(4) The Khyber to be re-opened and safeguarded as in the past. The Khyber Rifles to be recruited by tribesmen belonging to the Pass and officered by their own tribesmen so as to preserve the tribal responsibility. British officers would inspect and supervise much in the same way as Inspecting Officers keep Imperial Service Troops up to the mark.
(5) The policy of disarming trans-frontier tribes to be steadily adhered to as opportunity offers. In future, perhaps all fines might be levied in terms of breech-loaders. Proposals will be shortly submitted for a measure of disarmament to be effected in British frontier districts.

I am afraid it is too late to levy tribute from the Mohmands, but I hope not.

Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State.
Dublin, 21st September 1897.

As you have, in answer to my note of the 8th instant, encouraged me to place my views on our frontier policy before you, I will not apologize for addressing you further in connection with a matter of such supreme importance to our position in the East.

Concerning the existing unrest and disturbance I have no alarm, believing, as I do, that so long as our native soldiers see that we are determined and ready to take the offensive, they will be true and loyal. The mobilization of a force large enough to adequately punish the offenders must cost much money, which India is at present peculiarly ill able to afford, as well
as many valuable lives; and what has become known as the “Forward Policy” is laid open to attack for the time being from prejudiced and uninformed people, who look on Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal as British forts, instead of defensible resting places for kafilas, protected by Afridi levies, as they are. But this is the extent of the mischief to be apprehended, always supposing that the present opportunity is taken full advantage of to improve our position on the North-West Frontier.

My real anxiety is regarding the measures which it would be wise to adopt when these risings are crushed, in order to prevent far more serious trouble in the future, to put our relations with the Amir and border tribes on a more satisfactory footing, and to turn the present revolt to our permanent advantage.

It seems to me that we have now arrived at a condition of affairs which will not admit of a continuance of a half-hearted policy by which we have been guided since the last Afghan War. This timid policy is fraught with ruinous consequences. Scarcely a year passes without alarms and their attendant mobilization demands, which cannot be met without a lavish expenditure of lives and money. What can a position be worth when a hint from a subsidized Amir, or an exhortation from a fanatic Mulla may compel us to spend millions in order to gain a mere temporary success, and enable us to return to the same unsatisfactory status quo?

The only course, carrying with it a fair promise of finality, is one which would dominate the robber-hunted no-man's land that lies on our immediate frontier, and carry our boundary right up to that of the responsible Ruler of Afghanistan, our nominal ally and vassal.

The question of our relations with the Amir and the border tribes, which had always possessed a peculiar interest for me, became my special study twenty years ago when the then Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, proposed to appoint me Governor-General's Agent for the administration of the trans-Indus districts, the separation of which from the Punjab Government had been agreed to by the Secretary of State for India, the Marquis of Salisbury.

Since those days the more I have thought over the subject the more satisfied I am that we ought to advance, on the first favourable opportunity, to the well-named "Scientific Frontier," clearly the best frontier available. It is much shorter than the line of the Indus, or than any of the other lines that could be occupied for the purpose of covering India on the north-west; it cannot be turned, having a desert on the south and practically impenetrable mountains to the north; there is no lateral communication which an enemy could pierce; and it can be brought into connection with the main railway system of India by comparatively short lines and without prohibitory expenses, thus enabling us to concentrate rapidly on either flank and to reach the only line (Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar) by which Afghanistan can be protected and our Indian Empire defended.

We cannot, I regret to think, prepare to occupy the scientific frontier along its whole length at present, on account of the peculiar and extremely unsatisfactory attitude of Abdur Rahman. The necessity, however, for our being able to move at short notice into Afghanistan should always be borne in mind, and meanwhile we should lose no opportunity of consolidating our power and extending our system of railways throughout the tract of country, which the Amir has admitted does not belong to him—up to, in fact, the boundary laid down by the Durand 'treaty.'

Abdur Rahman will, no doubt, object and complain that we are putting a pistol in his head (the expression he made use of when the Khojak tunnel was under construction), if we continue the line of railway beyond Peshawar or take it across the Indus in the direction of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. These extensions are essential to the scheme for the defence of India, and the answer to any remonstrance on the part of the Amir should be that we are at liberty to do what we please within our own territory, and that we are determined to carry out such arrangements as we consider necessary for the fulfilment of our engagement to protect his country, for the preservation of peace within our own border, and for the security of the Empire.

It ought to be carefully explained to Abdur Rahman that we have not the slightest wish or intention to go to war with him, and that nothing will induce us to enter Afghanistan again, except to quell a civil war or repel invasion by a foreign Power. But he should be made clearly to understand that matters cannot be allowed to go on as they have hitherto, and that any action on his part that would interfere with the measures, we think necessary to the carrying out of our policy will be met by a stoppage of his monthly allowances and the transport of munitions of war through our territory. This would, I feel confident, bring Abdur Rahman to his senses, and if it did not, we could afford to leave him alone altogether. It is infinitely better to have him an open enemy that a disloyal friend.

With regard to the extension of our railways—On the south or in front of Quetta, nothing more need be done (unless the Russians were to threaten to cross the Oxus) until the Amir dies, as the Sind-Fishin Railway is completed up to the Afghan boundary, and sufficient material is stowed at this point to carry it on to Kandahar. At the Amir’s death I hope that Afghanistan will be disintegrated, and arrangements entered into with whoever may be the Ruler of Kandahar for the extension of our railway to that city.

In the centre, it is most desirable that careful surveys should be made as to the best route by which the railway, now running along the left bank of the Indus, could be taken across that river and onwards through Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan towards Ghazni. As bridging...
the Indus at Kalabagh or establishing a steam ferry lower down the river will be a work of
time, early attention should be paid to this central line of communication.

But the most important extension is that

I do not understand this passage. If a railway to

Michni only is meant, I do not know that it has

much to recommend it except as the beginning of the

larger scheme. If the larger scheme of a railway to

the neighbourhood of Landi Kotal is meant, its cost

difficulties are greatly understated.

E.

river bank the only obstacle is rock; this

and the Engineer Officer, whom I directed to survey the ground, calculated that it would take

18 months to get through this portion of the work.

To facilitate these extensions of our railway system, it is essential that the border-tribesmen, who, with few exceptions, are still as turbulent and fanatical as when the Punjab

was annexed, should be brought under subjection. The tribesmen, like all semi-savage, until they have experienced the benefit of our rule, would, of course, like to be left alone and retain

t heir independence, but it is improbable they could be permitted to do so for any length of
time. The same irresistible force which impelled Great Britain to advance from the Bay of

Bengal to the Indus, and Russia from Orenburg to the Oxus, will assuredly compel both nations

onwards until they meet. The respective frontier posts are now little more than 400 miles

apart, and the next move must bring them into contact with each other. No one can say

when that move will take place, it may not be for years, but it may be within the next few

months. The death of the present Amir (who is known to be in a precarious state of health)

would be very likely to bring it about, or some serious complication with reference to the

Eastern question might do so. The Russians may not wish for closer proximity to us any

more than we wish for a nearer approach to them, but even the most firm believer in their

innocent intentions can scarcely think that the Russians would have so persistently struggled

towards India during the last 200 years, surmounting obstacles and difficulties compared to

which any now in front of them (if we hold aloof) would appear insuf ficient, unless they

looked forward to some substantial recompense. Twice during the last 60 years Russia has

compelled us to go to war with Afghanistan by sending her emissaries to Kabul. On the

first occasion, she could not possibly have backed up any diplomatic arrangement by force of

arms, on account of the distance that separated her from Afghanistan; and, on the

second occasion, although she had approached considerably nearer, and had actually prepared a

force for the purpose of assisting the Amir, it would have been difficult for her to have

collected an army of sufficient strength to oppose us; the Caspian Sea route was then unopened

and troops had to march all the way round by Orenburg.

Six years later (1885), when war was imminent between Russia and Afghanistan, as

Russian army could have reached Herat almost as quickly as we could have got to Kandahar.

Twelve years have elapsed since then, during which time Russia's position in Central Asia has

been on our side we could not, under existing conditions, place a force on the Hindu Kush line

powerful enough to cope with a Russian army, for the greater part of our army would be

required to keep open the 190 miles of communication between Peshawar and Kabul. Even in the

last Afghan war between 16,000 and 18,000 men were required for this purpose, and, as I

wrote to the Viceroy at the time, had there been two or three civilized emissaries to organize

and direct the tribesmen's combinations, this number would have had to be doubled. Then

the drain of carrying stores, baggage, and ammunition such a distance, mainly on pack animals,

would soon use up our transport, a matter of supreme importance, for every mule and camel

we could lay hands on would be required to render the army in the field mobile.

You will be told that the best chance of keeping the Amir friendly and the tribesmen from

opposing us is to leave them alone, and that in the time of trouble our aid will be eagerly

sought, and that our army will be made invincible by the large numbers of Afghan soldiers

and the 200,000 tribesmen who will join it.

I wish I could think that there were any chance of this happy solution of a very difficult

question, for there would then be no cause for anxiety as to internal disturbance; we could
implicitly rely upon the loyalty of our Native Army, and there would be no difficulty in check-
matng Russia. The frontier question might be left to settle itself, and you would not be
troubled with this letter.

But, I am sorry to say, my opinion is most strongly opposed to this idea. I hold that if
the Amir is not made to see that he must fall in with our views as to the best means of
protecting Afghanistan from invasion, and that any opposition to the extension of our railways
up to the Afghan boundary, or to our establishing friendly relations with the tribes, will be
looked upon as an act of hostility on his part, and punished by the withdrawal of our support,
his will be inflamed with the idea that his alliance is so important to us that we are afraid of
offending him, and that he will continue to give us trouble by intriguing with the tribesmen,
setting them against us, and generally thwarting us as he has hitherto persistently done.

As regards the tribes. If they are left alone I am convinced that, when trouble arises,
so far from our resources being increased by the addition of 200,000 of their number, we should
find this formidable force arrayed against us. The tribesmen would have nothing to fear from
us, and nothing to gain by siding with us; while they would be induced to fight against us
by the prestige an advancing force always carries with it, and by promises, which would be
freely given, that they should be sharers in the plunder of the riches of India.

The mere fact of Russian troops setting foot on Afghan soil would cause such a feeling of
unrest and uncertainty all over India, that the fidelity of our Native soldiers would be hardly
tried, and we could not venture to withdraw sufficient British troops from the country to form
a force large enough to undertake a move into Afghanistan.

No one can have more faith in the Native Army than I have; Sikhs and Gurkhas, Dogras
and Rajputs, and even Pathans, will, I feel confident, fight for us loyally and devotedly so
long as they believe in our power to prevent any encroachment on our possessions, but it would be
unreasonable of us to expect them to stand by us if they have the slightest suspicion that a
stronger power than ours is advancing towards India.

I do not without most serious thought take the responsibility of advising you to adopt a
policy to which many officers (Civil as well as Military) of long Indian experience are opposed;
an policy, moreover, which cannot be given effect to without a certain increase to the Army in
India and a considerable expenditure on unproductive railways; and I am led to do so only
because I am absolutely satisfied that in no other way can the defence of India be carried
out.

When the responsibility for supervising the details of this most important subject devolved
upon me as Commander-in-Chief in India, I never contemplated any defence being possible
along the frontier as marked on our maps by a red line. I pointed out to the Government, of
which I had the honour to be a Member, that money would be thrown away on fortifications
and entrenched positions along such a line, and that, after securing the safety of the two
frontier arsenals (Quetta and Rawalpindi) all our energies should be devoted to pushing on
roads and railways to enable the field army to advance rapidly and in strength to the only
line by which India can be really defended.

I never ceased at the same time to explain that this desirable extension of roads and
railways could not be carried out while the border tribes were hostile, and that, troublesome
as the task might be of getting them under our control, it would have to be faced. I now
submit that the time has arrived when this duty to ourselves and to India should be under-
taken. The tribes are all in arms against us, we have a sufficient force assembled to reduce
them to subjection, we have a Commander (Sir William Lockhart) on the spot who knows
how to deal with them, and, if his success is followed up by a firm and judicious policy, by
the enforcement of an Arms Act, by opening out communications in every direction, by the
administration of justice in a rough and ready form, and by a light taxation, the Afridis,
et hoc genus omne, will settle down and become as brave and loyal soldiers as the Sikhs,
Gurkhas, and other warlike races, who fought against us and are now in our ranks, have
proved themselves to be.

Pathans are like the rest of mankind equally susceptible to vigorous and sympathetic
treatment. The only difference between them and the dwellers in the plains of India is that
the difficult nature of their country has enabled them to maintain their independence for a
greater length of time. Difficulties will present themselves and have to be overcome, but one
thing is certain that, whatever the difficulties may be now, they will be tenfold greater if we
let this opportunity slip.

Roberts.

I prefix to this note copies of letters which have passed between the Lieutenant-Governor
and myself. Hon'ble Members will see that I wrote to obtain information in consequence of
suggestions from the Secretary of State, and that the Lieutenant-Governor wrote after we had
conferred together. It was soon apparent at our interview that on most essential points we
were in agreement, and where that is so, I need not repeat the arguments which he has stated.

Since I addressed the Lieutenant-Governor, we have received from the Secretary of State
the telegram of October 13th. Parts of this telegram are not so clear as could have been wished,
but I am in a position to say authoritatively that its ruling idea is that an extension of adminis-
trative control must, if possible, be avoided. The exception stated is if it is "absolutely
required by actual strategic necessity and the protection of British Indian borders." Now that
is a subject on which I know the Commander-in-Chief desires to submit his views, and I should wish to have those views before me in coming to any final conclusion. I do not, however, feel at liberty to pass over what I understand to be the alternative policy without remark at this stage, because the Secretary of State has sent me a letter, which Lord Roberts has addressed to him, and, as Lord G. Hamilton suggested that Hon’ble Members may see it I think it my duty to circulate it herewith, and to make a few remarks upon it.

Lord Roberts writes very clearly, but there is a want of sequence in his argument, a disassociation between cause and effect that greatly vitiates his conclusions. Our object is twofold, one to be attained as soon as it is possible, & c., the pacification, control and establishment of friendly relations with the tribes outside our own frontier, and secondly, out of relations so established, a secure passage for our troops and a means by which they should be called upon to protect the frontier that scientifically safeguards India from attack. If we fail in our first object, the difficulty of performing the second is enormously increased, and although Lord Roberts admits that the subjugation of the tribes, as he proposes it, would cost much life and money, he does not show that, at the conclusion of the operation, he would have achieved what is the foundation and starting point of object two. On page 11 Lord Roberts states that 15,000 to 16,000 men were in the last Afghan War required to keep open the lines of communications, and that under certain circumstances it might have been necessary to double that number. He fails entirely to show that the policy which he professes would diminish the calls upon us within any reasonable period of time. What that policy is he sketches in outline in the penultimate paragraph of his letter. He may do more to form an idea of the time and money required to carry that policy into effect. To establish roads and railways in every direction through the country of the Afridis, and he may very likely show that the public want the policy established, that is what we are asked to do I do not dispute the enormous cost of carrying out this policy at once and by force—and that is the assumption that must be made—we cannot in the time allowed realise the result which is the only justification for the effort, i.e., that “the Afridis, et hoc genus omne, will settle down and become brave and loyal soldiers.” There is no part of this letter which has surprised me so much as the hope expressed on page 10 that, at the Amir’s death, Afghanistan will be disintegrated. I have always understood that we were opposed to the disintegration of Afghanistan, because we could not fail to see that it must inevitably be followed by the establishment of a conterminous frontier between ourselves and Russia, the dangers and cost of which would be incalculable. But, however that may be, in all the papers on this subject that I have seen there has always seemed to be at least this one point of agreement, i.e., that the disintegration of Afghanistan would be the signal for the advance of Russia to Herat. What Lord Roberts’ view of that movement and its consequence would be is quite manifest from page 10. But then the only conclusion, I can come to, is that Lord Roberts not only expects, but hopes, that on the death of the Amir (whose precarious state of health he mentions), we shall find ourselves at war with Russia. If so, I defy him to protect his line of communications then by the policy towards the tribes which he has expounded in this letter. It is a work not of years, but of generations. I ought to add that I do not personally accept this view of the probability that at this time there is nothing to show that the Amir’s successor, whoever he may be, may not be able to assert to a greater degree the authority over the present Afghanistan, and I believe I am in accord with the best authorities in holding that the danger of a direct attack by Russia upon India yearly lessen, as Russia has larger fish to fry. Leaving now these more extreme opinions, I can understand it being argued of any particular position, e.g., Tirah, that its occupation is strategically desirable. It is not my business to define what is strategically desirable, but I am inclined to agree with opinion that in any forward movement the political objects to be gained must be rated even higher than the strategical. If we can conciliate and attach to us the tribes, then from a military point we are greatly the gainers. If we only make them more hostile, whatever benefit we gain theoretically in strategical by occupying their country, we more than lose tactically by the forces locked up in maintaining our posts. I am trespassing on the province of the Commander-in-Chief, and he may very likely show that I am wrong, but in the meantime I entertain a strong impression that, if we forcibly occupy Tirah now, and have within the next 10 years to invade Afghanistan, the force employed in protecting the line of communications, plus the garrison of Tirah, will not fall far short of the numbers given by Lord Roberts, while on the supposition he makes of the presence among the tribes of emissaries to organise and direct their combinations, which the experience of the Malakand rising shows may be brought about even by un-civilised agents, every post of containing the tribes on our frontiers, because it means a place that may be besieged and therefore has to be as efficiently guarded as the line of communications itself. The danger and inconvenience of the situation would be even more severely felt if it was an internal disturbance with which we had to cope, and as to which I can only echo the pious reflection of the Lieutenant-Governor.

The question which the Secretary of State desires us to answer comes really to this—What is the policy which can best be associated with the procedure likely to conciliate the tribes? I have reason to know that he thinks that the public want education in this matter, and that he would like us to give him some statement of policy which would lead them in the
right direction. What is wanted is a simple unbiased statement of the inherent difficulties of the situation on the frontier, which will show that neither a forward policy nor the reverse will get rid of these difficulties, they remain there and have to be solved. I agree with Sir W. Cunningham that in our letter to the Punjab Government of 14th August 1896, we have a good statement of our general policy. Hon'ble Members will remember that the subject was then very exhaustively discussed and that our conclusions were affirmed with, I think, practical unanimity.

We dealt with the frontier as a whole and with the more difficult points on the frontier individually. Our general object was, I suppose, to stimulate the Punjab Government to greater activity, and yet our propositions were stated with so much moderation that Sir D. Fitzpatrick himself admitted that in principle he could accept them, his difficulty was about the "pace," and there I think he wrote under some misunderstanding of our intentions. I understand that this letter has not been communicated to the Secretary of State. I propose that we now communicate it, or the material parts of it, as a statement of policy which we deliberately adopted before these troubles and which we now re-affirm.

I propose also that the Council accept (perhaps not verbatim but in substance) the five propositions as stated by the Lieutenant-Governor at the close of his letter. From these and the suggestions of Sir W. Cunningham's note with which I generally agree, I think our scheme of policy can be defined and a form of instructions in regard to the settlement of future relations with the tribes be drawn up, and if approved by the Secretary of State, communicated to Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udney for their guidance.

The man in the street, and some others, say that our policy has broken down. I am not disposed to admit this. Least of all am I inclined to do so if the alternative presented to me is one which to my mind clearly offends against all the criteria, political, financial, even as I think, military, which the Secretary of State has told us must determine the question. No one, I suppose, ever expected that we should never be attacked by the tribes in the process of realising our ultimate aim, which was described by Sir D. Fitzpatrick to be "a full and close control over all the territory up to the Durand line."

The attack has come in a manner not expected. I will not enquire here how it was that the attacks were made simultaneously—how much there was of concerted action between the leaders in the various parts of the country—how far reports of intrigue inside and outside our territories can be substantiated. That this course of events has put a very severe strain upon our arrangements there can be no doubt. But what is the result? Why, that we have advanced towards Sir D. Fitzpatrick's goal at a pace which he would last year have characterised as headlong. There was one main obstacle to the gradual extension of influence and control by peaceful means, and that was the inability of the tribes, especially of those more remote, to appreciate the irresistible strength we could use if we chose. They all know it now or will do so in a few days, and the lesson now learned will not easily be forgotten. And if in the prosecution of the policy we shall now be able to play upon their fears, we shall, I believe, increasingly appeal to the motive which comes next with a Pathan, and perhaps with other people, i.e., self-interest. Does any one doubt that the settlement in Upper Swat was easy, because the people had much to lose? I believe firmly that the quickest, perhaps the only, way to convert the owners of these richer valleys into the loyal subjects of Lord Roberts' letter is to give them opportunities for filling their purses. A great deal of nonsense is talked about their aversion to new roads. The opponents of progress headed by the Mullahs feel this aversion, I daresay, but without dwelling on the fact that the road to Chitral was preserved throughout and the whole communication was only interrupted on the two days of actual fighting at Malakand and Chakdarra, I may illustrate my contention by the bridge over the Panjkorra, which, on our withdrawing our troops from that part of the country in 1895, we left behind, because the people appreciated its usefulness and desired to retain it. Sir D. Fitzpatrick, in paragraph 6 of his note, states what I believe to be the feeling of the tribes about roads.

Nor is encouragement wanting from other parts of the country. The disturbance has been widespread, but it has had its limits, and those limits are significant. If it had occurred a few years ago, I suppose few districts would have been thought to be in greater danger than Chilas and Gilgit. Not a sound has come thence, or from the tribes of the Indus valley. So again in Waziristan. The Mahsuds with all the tempting opportunities of a force on the very edge of their hills have remained absolutely quiet. The memory of Lockhart and his men is still present to their minds. I have a firm conviction that the memories of the expedition of 1897 will live long enough among the tribes of the North-West Frontier to give time for the growth among them of new feelings that will make for peace and friendship, and not for renewed disturbance, if our officers do their duty in the way we prescribed last year. For ourselves, who know the circumstances of the day better than writers in newspapers or magazines, than men who left India 20 or 30 years ago, or even than political orators, I think it is our duty to abstain from what is always a temptation, i.e., the seizing upon a wave of popular sentiment to initiate something new and ambitious, but rather to persevere in the policy which a prudent regard for our own interests, no less than justice and moderation in our demands on our wilder neighbours, has proved to be the safest and best.

I do not wish to hurry the consideration of this most important case, but there might be some advantage in being able to address the Secretary of State in writing by the mail of next week, and we might do this by holding a special Council early in the week. I will mention this on Friday.
It may perhaps first be convenient to consider what our policy towards the frontier tribes has been in the past and what the results of that policy have been. I think I shall not be contradicted when I say that we have endeavored by every means in our power to respect their independence and to leave them alone. When we have interfered with them, that interference has been forced upon us by their wanton aggression, and in order to protect the lives and property of our subjects, who have a right to demand protection from us in return for their allegiance.

Our policy has been to bear all we can from the tribesmen, and when their murderous raids have gone beyond the limits of endurance to carry out at great expense and considerable sacrifice of life punitive expeditions. Then in the hope that the punishment inflicted will prevent the recurrence of the crime we have withdrawn our control and resumed the status quo ante. There have been some exceptions to this policy of withdrawal. The one that first suggests itself in recent Indian history is Baluchistan, and I may call attention to the very significant fact that the disturbances which have lately given us such trouble to deal with have stopped short at the Gomal, which is the boundary of Baluchistan.

Within that boundary are included the tribes on the Takht-i-Suleiman range and those who live in the territory beyond it which was formerly an Alsatia and which extend from the Sind border to Waziristan. Even in the presence of the fanatical risings of their independent co-religionists from the Gomal to the Indus, the people of Baluchistan have been as peaceful as the inhabitants of the Punjab proper or of the North-Western Provinces.

For over 40 years after the annexation of the Punjab, we looked out from our frontier posts in the Derajat towards the mountains of the Takht-i-Suleiman as we now regard the Afridi hills from Sammy, and the same arguments were adduced for letting the tribesmen alone to take the course that they ever have taken, and I venture to add ever will take as long as they are left to follow the instincts of their own fanaticism, viz., to break every treaty and to ignore every engagement, however favourable to themselves, and to carry fire and sword into British territory at the preaching of the first Mulla who works upon their credulity—no difficult task.

In the course of this discussion the long time necessary to produce any effect by direct administration has been brought forward as an objection to now entering upon such a policy in Tirah. I do not think experience establishes this delay. Nothing has been more marked than the extraordinary rapidity with which Baluchistan has settled down since we took over its direct administration, and the people knew that we had come to stay. Here we have an object lesson worthy of being studied. On one side 40 years of attempted influence without administration with what I submit are its invariable results, raids, murders and want of confidence along our borders followed by punitive expeditions. Then a return to the status quo ante for another period during which the rage of fanaticism works up another series of raids when every engagement is thrown to the winds. On the other hand, we have in Zhob seven or eight years of direct administration, at the end of which absolute peace prevails even under circumstances of religious excitement all round which invite to the resumption of their old lawlessness.

I would also call attention to the Punjab as an example of the beneficial change that can be worked on the attitude of the people under our administration in a very short time. The Sikhs and Punjabis fought us in 1848. We then annexed the Punjab, and in 1857, the Sikhs and the Punjabis saved India for us, and marched under our standards to Cawnpore and Lucknow in perfect confidence of the safety of their homes and families under the protection of the British Government. Our inability, under the system of influence, to afford any protection to the families of our Afridi soldiers or to inspire them with any confidence on this point has been a very painful and embarrassing consequence of the attitude we have had forced upon us by the Afridis as a tribe.

It may be urged that Sikhs and Afridis are very different, and this may be granted, but, as regards the question before us, we know that the hold-off policy that has obtained for 50 years has culminated in 1897 in the most dangerous and successful rising that the frontier tribes have ever made. While all the examples we can point to, whether over Sikh or over Pathan, have given us peace within our borders or the power of restoring it with very little effort.

The conquest of the Afridis is now an obligatory condition of the present situation. If it is followed up by direct Government, I believe that in a very short time the Afridis would be as valuable allies as now they are dangerous enemies. It is urged that after the Afridis' own practical proof of our irresistible power they will not forget the lesson. This is true to a certain extent. They will be cowed for a time. They will learn that it is a losing game to fight us when our hands are comparatively free, but from the very nature of the lesson they will watch and wait for the time when its restraining influences are of weaker application. Their complete isolation and independence enables them to nurse their fanaticism, and their
turbulent priests, unrestrained by any superior power, exercise complete power over them and will use it when opportunity offers in the same way as they have now used it. A policy such as this only tides us over the difficulty for the time we are in a position to cope with it to increase our liability to have to face it when our means are employed or required elsewhere. It is surely sounder to conclude that history will repeat itself, and that like conditions are calculated to reproduce results which have already followed on them, than that we can change the whole manner of a people by simply walking over their country and coming away again.

Within the last few months we have had to contend with a series of risings which, beginning with the attack on the Malakand, have since extended from the Indus to the Kurram. Not only has our complete want of control over the tribes and the danger of it been fully demonstrated, but the impossibility of obtaining any reliable information whatsoever under the existing system has been a most marked and paralysing feature of the situation. The risings have been of unprecedented magnitude, and there has been abundant evidence of efforts at combination amongst the tribes to an extent never before attempted.

It is clear that, if a leader generally acceptable to the tribes had been available, the insurrection, under the direction of one head, would have been much more formidable, and would very probably have been simultaneous along the whole frontier. This has happened, it is at least open to question whether we could have held our own until we had time to concentrate sufficient troops to cope with the situation. It has been said to me that the tribes never have submitted themselves to one leader, that it is opposed to their instincts and traditions, and that therefore the idea of simultaneity in their action need not be provided against. With reference to this, I would like to call attention to the views of the Amir to whom they have appealed to unite them.

"The right time will come for jehad, and when it comes it will be announced to you."

Again—

"If you behave yourselves courageously on that occasion, I shall be glad to call you religious leaders, but the first condition of a jehad is the co-operation of the King of Islam."

This is an unmistakable declaration on the part of a leader who could unite the tribes that the time may come when he will unite them, and under present conditions his influence is greater than ours, and I have little doubt they would follow him if he held up his finger to them. Further I am convinced that, with the military means he now possesses and the power he has of turning out war material, he could with the alliance of the tribes make himself so far master of the military situation as to prevent us with our present forces getting to Kabul.

This is a position we ought not to allow the Amir to occupy.

It is, however, the direct growth of the present system to which it is proposed that we should adhere. If our power within the Durand line is to be confined to what we can effect by influence, we shall find that the rule of the Mulla will make the influence of the "King of Islam" stronger than that of the Christian Government.

At the present time we have found it necessary to mobilize 66,855 men. Our field army numbers roughly some 70,000 men. We therefore have now only 3,145, whom we could employ beyond the Durand line. An enemy that can occupy nearly all our effective military strength is evidently one that must be seriously reckoned with.

Assuming as an axiom that our military strength in India must be sufficient to preserve internal order, to place a large army, if necessity arises, in Afghanistan, in fulfilment of our engagement with the Amir, and at the same time to prevent incursions of frontier tribes into our settled districts, a risk, the degree of which we have learnt from present experience, we now require an addition to our army of over 600 men. This appears to me to be a strong rejoinder to the argument that the annexation of Tirah would necessitate a large increase to the army. The necessity of that increase has been forced into prominence under the present frontier system, and the prohibitive extra expense is itself a condemnation of the policy under which such a necessity has arisen.

There appear to be two alternatives: The first is to abolish the Durand line with its responsibilities and risks and make over the tribes included within it but outside our jurisdiction to the Amir, so that we may be conterminous with a responsible government instead of with a congeries of robber tribes who are subject to no Government and who respect no engagements. This alternative, however, is outside the zone of practical consideration now. It was considered and thrown out. There remains only the second alternative, that of absorbing and controlling so much of the country within the Durand line as will for the time being suffice to protect us from raids of sufficient magnitude to be a serious Imperial danger.

The annexation of the Afridis and Orakzais would suffice for this purpose.

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab admits that Tirah dominates the Khyber and the Kurram as well as the Kukh Pass. He writes of Tirah, "if our power were firmly established there, Afridis and Orakzais, Chamkannis and Zaimushs, Adam Khel and Jowakakis, should never again be a subject of trouble to us. And the behaviour of the two first mentioned, the Afridis and Orakzais, with very few exceptions, has been now such as to justify us in thoroughly dominating or even annexing their country, though for many years they have been quiet."

Surely we have here on the highest authority the true value of the goal at which I aim and the justification for playing up to it. Where have we ever failed in establishing our power firmly when we have made the attempt thoroughly and whole heartedly? It is the shadow of influence without control that has brought us into our present trouble, and the way
out of it is to give up the pursuit of the Will o' the wisp "influence" and to introduce the substance of dominion so far as it may be necessary to re-establish the balance of our power.

After the Lieutenant-Governor has said what I have quoted above he goes on-

"But when all this is admitted, it is after all not much in comparison with the expense and the force that would be looked up in the hills. We have an enormous length of frontier to deal with, and we must not lose the sense of proportion. We cannot occupy and dominate completely the whole fringe of tribal territory up to the Durand line, though we may hope in time to establish our influence in it."

Now I believe this idea of peaceful influence to be a veritable Pandora's box even to the extent of having "hope" at the bottom of it. I cannot admit that by controlling and dominating the Afridis and Orakzais we lose our sense of proportion. On the contrary, I believe that in a very few years they would be thoroughly our men, that they would re-establish the proportion and that, armed and led by us and organized into our army, they would prove more than a counterpoise for all the tribes left outside our jurisdiction.

From the Kabul river to the Indus the tribes are not in a position by themselves to do us much harm. Many of them are too remote to make inroads on us. The Mohmands have recently justified their reputation as poor fighting material, and if the Afridis and Orakzais are quiet, we can dominate this front without serious difficulty, but if they join, the combination becomes one of great danger.

The Kabul and Kandahar line is accepted as the position we must occupy if Russia threatens the invasion of Northern Afghanistan. Our position on that line would be untenable if the Afridis closed the Khyber as they have now done.

We are employing some 30,000 men against them. If this necessity arose when we were engaged with Russian danger must result.

The remedy is complete disarmament. Without absorption, disarmament is impossible. If in the pending operations we could remove every stand of arms, the tribesmen would be re-armed in a year or two unless we are actually there to prevent it.

Tirah is reported to offer most favourable sites for cantonments, where our troops would be in high health and fit for any service. While living in their barracks, they would command the Khyber and the Kurram, and relieve us of the necessity of wasting the lives and the efficiency of our soldiers, British and Native, by keeping them in the fever-sticken Peshawar valley or in the Khyber where they become useless for service.

We have now to face a great difficulty in providing for the immediate support of the Khyber garrisons even if they are again made over to the Afridis. The Lieutenant-Governor would allow these garrisons to be again left to their own resources; but I cannot and it has been so viewed by our neighbours. The Khyber Rifles, as George Hamilton, on this file, I would here state that I do not join in his desire to hurry Khyber garrisons even if they are again made over to the Afridis. The Lieutenant-Governor sent conditions the day when we must stand face to face with Jamrud, taunted our soldiers, who turned out to cheer them, as poor comrades in arms.

If we lose the cities of Hindustan, and would throw their weight into the scale against us. The possession of the Afridi highlands would so far strengthen our position on the most important front of our frontier, and make access to Chitral by the Kunar route so much easier, that I would be prepared under cover of this advance to withdraw from Chitral, if it could be arranged politically. I would not withdraw from Chitral under any appearance of compulsion, but at present there could be no suspicion of such a motive.
The withdrawal from Chitral would clear the way for a withdrawal later from the Malakand. Burman has lately dispensed with the services of two Madras regiments. They might be reduced. The saving effected by the above measures would go far to meet the expenses of the occupation of Tirah, and our frontier would be held on infinitely sounder and more scientific lines.

22nd October 1897. G. S. W[hite].

I note on this important matter with some difidence, for it is not the kind of case with which I am accustomed to deal and I am reluctant to place my opinion in such matters alongside that of such officers as, for example, Lord Roberts. But his programme, I confess, frightens me—a career of conquest to be pursued over the most inaccessible country, and over tribes to whom the nature of the country gives such immense advantages, that merely to keep open a line of communication through them, when we were not at war with them, we had to lock-up one fighting man for every two they possess. The waste of life and of resources in such a struggle would be immense, and then at the end of it I can not see that we would be much better off than we now are; so far as concerns our meeting Russians in the field. The country is impenetrable and the inhabitants of it extremely resentful of interference; and the whole theory of Lord Roberts seems to me to be based upon the assumption that, though the country and its inhabitants persistently show these qualities to us, yet they are ready at the first touch to show exactly the opposite qualities to the Russians. We know the Afghans are ready to fight for their independence, and we know that the frontier tribes regard them as co-religionists and the Amir as in some measure a power over themselves, yet we assume that, when the Russians come to turn the Amir out of his kingdom, the Amir and the Afghans will be ready to side with the Russians at once and that the tribes, siding with them also, will be ready to give easy passage through their country to the nation which they will have learned to regard as a conquering and annexing foe. These anticipations seem to me far too unlikely ones upon which to base any line of policy; I do not think that the fear of consequences of the kind above sketched is sufficiently warranted to justify us in entering upon a course, which in itself is extremely costly and extremely dangerous, and which will be of no advantage to us, unless another extremely unlikely thing happens, namely, that by annexing the tribal country we make the tribes our willing and devoted subjects.

I think it may be added that Lord Roberts, if he had been acquainted with the recent attitude of the Amir, would have in some measure at least changed his views as to that potentate and the possibilities of his action. Not only is the Amir personally friendly, but it seems to me he has shown a certain dread of our hostility.

His Excellency Sir George White’s proposal to extend our dominion over Tirah and even give up Chitral for it, is a much more fascinating policy than that of Lord Roberts’, because it indicates a manner in which we might strengthen our military position by means that are now almost within our power. According to His Excellency it would not add much to our current military expenditure. But is the Commander-in-Chief really willing to give up our position in Chitral for that in Tirah! I always thought Chitral was necessary as a point of defence against possible routes of invasion from the Oxus; and if we give up Chitral on the ground that it is better to let the Russians come to us, than to go to meet them in that quarter, why should we, so far as they are concerned, adopt the contrary policy in respect of their possible approach by Kabul and Peshawar?

Then my difficulty is this. His Excellency’s plan is based on the assumption that the Afridis once dominated will become peaceful and loyal subjects,—unless this happens, I understand that the advantage, so far as strategical position is concerned, disappears. Now I confess I do not regard this issue as a probable one. The precedent of the Sikhs seems to me not to point. They were a plains race, settled in habitation, and above all accustomed to an organised government. They had been so for a very long time. It does not follow that because such a race accepted us as rulers, and settled down or rather continued their settled condition, under us, an uncivilised race of mountaineers, accustomed to personal freedom, and total absence of rule, will accept settled conditions under us. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in his note alludes to the difference in this respect between even the tribes south of the Gumal, and those north of it. The former, he says, have some system of central authority; the latter have merely tribal recognition of principal men, but so utterly uncentralised that it is difficult to find out which particular individuals are the principal men. I do not think that the chances of peace and of increase of military strength by the occupation of Tirah are at all considerable while the look-up of our forces is certain.

I am unable therefore to conclude that, so far as regards our position with reference to meeting a powerful enemy from beyond Afghanistan, our chances are improved by our attempting to subjugate the Afridis. I think it would be better even in that case if we could penetrate around the back of them by developing our position in the Kurram.

As regards the question of peace on the border, peace that is with the tribes themselves, I do not suppose that assured peace is ever possible, and therefore I do not regard the mere occurrence of an outbreak as proof of failure of our line of policy; if it were so, every policy in succession has failed and must fail. We have — or we shortly shall have — beaten the Afridis and entered their territory, and given them such an exhibition of our power that, so long as
the present generation of Afridis lasts, they are likely to remember it. All experience shows that with these races, the sense of our power to injure them is the only restraining motive to prevent their injuring us; and it seems to me that it is in this that our best chances of peace lie. They are not likely to attack us when they know that they are in our power, if we choose to exercise it. And if we can get peace in this way without occupying their country, I think it is better than planting up amid a rebellious and unruly people.

The notion of administering such country, if we can in any way avoid administering it, I regard as financially inadmissible.

For the reasons I have stated I fail to see that the policy of occupying Tirah and annexing the Afridi country, advances our ultimate interests, either in the way of enabling us to meet Russia, or in the way of securing peace on our border more than the policy recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor. I feel the importance of the decision that has now to be taken: but there seems to me no doubt that the policy of annexation involves a costly burden to India which we are not warranted undertaking, unless we are much surer of its advantageus results than I can find any ground for believing we can be.

22nd October 1897.

J. W[estland.]

1. I think it is to be regretted that so little time is afforded for the discussion of one of the most important matters that can be considered by the Government of India. The subject of the permanent positions and policy on the north-west frontier of India is one which has taxed the minds of many statesmen and eminent soldiers for many years past; and the most complete differences of opinion have existed, and will exist, as to the method we should follow in dealing with the tribes beyond the British Indian frontier. We are confronted to a great extent with a new development, and I venture to think that it would have been better to have awaited the termination of the present troubles and to have collected more evidence of the sources of these troubles. And I especially regret that we are not to await the termination of the present campaign in order to have the advantage of hearing what Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny have to say, in respect to the military and political situation on that part of the frontier. It is no doubt most expedient to commence to discuss these, and, assuming that the policy will be to maintain permanently our position as it existed by the Lieutenant-Governor. I feel the importance of the decision that has now to be taken: but there seems to me no doubt that the policy of annexation involves a costly burden to India which we are not warranted undertaking, unless we are much surer of its advantageus results than I can find any ground for believing we can be.

2. The Secretary of State, in his telegram of the 18th instant, has laid down apparently that no new responsibility should be undertaken, unless it is absolutely required by actual strategical necessity and the protection of the British Indian order. We may, he allows, take the present opportunity to define our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements will, he says, no doubt be necessary, especially with a view to the concentration of forces, but the policy which is indicated to us is to limit our sources of these troubles. And I especially regret that we are not to await the termination of the present generation of Afridis lasts, they are likely to remember it. All experience shows that with these races, the sense of our power to injure them is the only restraining motive to prevent their injuring us; and it seems to me that it is in this that our best chances of peace lie. They are not likely to attack us when they know that they are in our power, if we choose to exercise it. And if we can get peace in this way without occupying their country, I think it is better than planting up amid a rebellious and unruly people.

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(1) to what is possible with the existing military force;
(2) the financial situation;
(3) the political importance of avoiding any measures likely to cause discontent and consequently, a revival of disturbances.

Our object, the Secretary of State says, should be to obtain clear and well-defined general plans on which local arrangements can be based.

3. Although His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has alluded to this part of the subject, I think it is as well to recall clearly, though as briefly as possible, what was the state of things in the past, what has been the policy of the Government of India during recent years, and to set down what our position was before these disturbances began.

4. The state of things which existed in 1885 is graphically described by Sir Richard Temple, when he was Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, as follows:

"Such being their character, what has been their conduct towards us? They have kept up old quarrels, or picked new ones with our subjects in the plains and valleys near the frontier; they have descended from the hills and fought these battles out in our territory; they have plundered and burnt our villages and slain our subjects; they have committed minor robberies and isolated murders without number; they have often levied blackmail from our villages; they have intrigued with the disaffected everywhere and tempted our loyal subjects to rebel; and they have for ages regarded the plain as their preserve, and its inhabitants their game and, when inclined for cruel sport, they sally forth to rob and murder, and occasionally to take prisoners into captivity for ransom. They have fired upon our officers, and killed our officers in our own territories. They have given an asylum to
every malcontent or proclaimed criminal who can escape from British justice. They traverse at will our territories, enter our villages, trade in our markets; but few British subjects, and no servant of the British Government, would dare to enter their country on any account whatever.

"In return for this, what has been the conduct of the British Government towards them? It has recognised their independence, it has asserted no jurisdiction with regard to them, it has claimed no revenue from them and no tribute, except in one case and that as punishment. But it has confirmed what siefs they held within its territory, it has uniformly declared that it seeks no fiscal or territorial aggrandisement, and that it only wants and is resolved to have tranquillity on the frontier.

"It has never extended its jurisdiction one yard beyond the limits of the old Sikh dominions. Nothing has been annexed that was not a portion of the Punjab as we found it. Whatever revenue has been paid to the British Government was equally paid to its predecessors, only at a higher rate. In one solitary case has it accepted tribute in satisfaction for offences; in all other cases of misconduct it has avoided making any pecuniary demand on its own behalf. It has claimed no feudal or political ascendancy over the independent hill tribes; it has abstained from any interference in, or connection with, their affairs; it has taken no part in their contests and has never assisted either party; it has striven to prevent its own subjects from entering into disputes with them.

"Though permitting and encouraging its subjects to defend themselves at the time of attack, it has prevented them from retaliating afterwards and from making reprisals.

"Though granting refuge to men flying for their lives, it has never allowed armed bodies to seek protection in its territory nor to organise resistance or attack. It has freely permitted hill people to settle, to cultivate, to graze their herds, and to trade in its territories. It has accorded to such the same protection, rights, privileges, and conditions as its own subjects. Its courts have been available, and its officers accessible, to them; its markets have been thrown open to them, all restrictions on trade and transit, all duties, except one (the salt tax) which would be imposed by any Native Government, have been removed and remitted for them. It has freely admitted them to its hospitals and dispensaries; its medical officers have attended whatever, at will.

"What more can a civilized Government legitimately do for its rude neighbours than the above?"

5. The policy was followed for a great many years, and is described in another way in the following terms:—

"This is what was called the close border system. It might have been successful if the hill tribes had been sufficiently civilised to appreciate the motives which dictated it; but the tribes being what they are, the system resulted in failure. The hillmen could not understand that our policy of forbearance could proceed from any other causes than timidity and weakness. It is true that the state of the border was somewhat improved in comparison with what it had been in the period preceding annexation. Raiding in force was checked by our military efficiency. But all along the border our territory and our subjects were subjected to a series of injuries and insults from the hillmen, who nearly invariably effected their escape before punishment could overtake them. When the conduct of a tribe became quite insupportable, a military expedition was undertaken against them. A record of these expeditions up to the year 1884 is published in an official volume, and in this brief note, it is impossible to notice them in detail. But no annexation was permitted; fines when inflicted were realised not in cash, but by a mild form of taxation of imports; and whenever an offending tribe tendered its submission, it was joyfully received back into favor. The permanent effect of these military expeditions was therefore small. Our position under the close border system was generally undignified and sometimes humiliating; probably no other strong and civilised power would have shown equal forbearance." And again—"On the whole, therefore, the state of affairs on the border of the Upper Derajat cannot be considered satisfactory.

"Our victories in the Afghan War and the extension of our control over Baluchistan have certainly made an impression on all the frontier tribes, and their attitude is less turbulent than formerly. But commencing from the Shermis on the south, we have not hitherto succeeded in extending a civilising influence over the frontier tribes to any considerable degree. The passes through the country are still unsurfaced and closed to ourselves. Robberies and other offences are still of frequent occurrence on the border."

6. The new policy, as it may be termed, is stated as follows:—

"The Government of India cannot but hope that with patience and care the policy and methods which have proved successful elsewhere may be expected to produce similar results in the case of these tribes, and that the time has come when a new departure may be made in the policy adopted towards them. The Government of India considers that, throughout that portion of the frontier region which borders on the Punjab, it should no longer be content to find itself face to face with an almost impenetrable wall of hostile tribesmen. It desires on the contrary to cultivate more friendly
relations and more direct and frequent intercourse with them than at present exist, to increase its influence over them, to know what is passing within the region which they inhabit and beyond it, to improve the frontier communications, to encourage the tribes to supply the Indian Army with recruits under ordinary circumstances, and to look towards the British Government and not towards an invader in the event of foreign aggression. It would also welcome the removal of the obstacles which prevent the acquisition of a more intimate knowledge of the important Ghilzai tribe which stretch along the eastern flank of Afghanistan. In connection with this part of the object, it is considered of great importance that British control should be thoroughly established in the Kurram Valley, and that frontier lines of communication, such as the roads through Dir to Chitral and through the Tochi and the Gomal Passes, should be thoroughly explored. I am to explain that, in order to give effect to the policy which I have described, nothing in the way of annexation is required, or should be attempted, nor should any step be taken likely to lead to a collision. The aim should rather be to enlist the interests of the tribes on our side, as is done in Baluchistan, and, while securing for British officers complete freedom of movement amongst them, to entrust the guardianship and protection of the passes to the tribes themselves."

7. The changes which have brought about this new policy are well known and need not be entered upon in any detail. The policy has been initiated because of the great advance which has been made by Russia towards the British Indian frontier, and that we desire to hold the passes and lines along which we should advance in order to occupy the positions which have been chosen for the defence of Afghanistan and of India. If Russia were in the position she occupied 200 years ago, there would probably be no desire for an advance across the old British Indian frontier, further than was necessary to secure our own borders against the intrusions of the tribes on that frontier.

8. In 1899, in a memorandum on our policy in Central Asia and the defence of India, I wrote as follows:—

"The pursuance of an active policy with regard to the frontier tribes is one which commands itself to many people. We cannot afford to allow a veil of mountains inhabited by hostile tribes to remain in this condition; but before we commit ourselves to a vigorous policy in this direction, we should be able to say exactly what it is that we desire to attain. It is quite reasonable to say that we ought to be able to have good roads, and eventually railways, to the military position which we must occupy in advance, while it is in the highest degree expedient to have friendly relations with the tribes, and to be able to rely, to a certain extent, on their good-will. But, on the other hand, it is more than doubtful if we shall ever be able to capitalise the tribes for the purpose of advance against an external enemy. We may, of course, open out new recruiting grounds, but this could be done without any great effort, such as would be required to bring the whole of the tribes on the frontier under our direct control. It is of great importance that we should settle with the Amir the actual frontiers of his country towards India. This must be a matter of extreme difficulty; but we might make it clear to him that we do not wish to annex any portion which he can show us is an integral part of Afghanistan. Indeed, it may be supposed that all that we really want to do is to be able to move bodies of troops through the various passes leading to the uplands of Afghanistan, and that we do not desire at present to incorporate the tribes into the British empire. This last might be necessary hereafter; but an active policy which would have this for its object, would be productive, I venture to think, of a series of frontier campaigns, and we should defeat the object we have in view of making these tribes our friends. Their bitter and fanatical independence would be directed against us, and in any campaign against Russia we should probably have much difficulty with them. So long as we are strong and in military force, we may be able to enlist them in our army or to enrol them in levies, and to subject them to a certain amount of control; but their character and spirit of independence forbid us to think that we shall ever succeed in making them valuable allies in a great campaign against Russia. If we trust to them, we shall be bitterly disappointed. They would be of little use in an offensive campaign, and if we were acting on the defence, they would turn against us if they thought the Russians were stronger. The conclusion which appears reasonable to put forward is, therefore, that we should endeavour to settle amicably with the Amir, and proceed very gradually and with great caution in what has been called the active or forward policy with regard to the tribes, while at the same time we must impress them with our military strength."

9. Again, in 1899, in a note on the Malakand-Dir-Chitral road, and the military situation I proposed that we should be content, at all events for the present, to use that road for post and supplies only, holding it by levies, and only occupying the Malakand with troops, and I said "the Swat Valley may be peaceful at present, ** ** but there is no indication of any very friendly disposition being manifested by the tribes, and it would be very extraordinary and contrary to all our experience, to expect them to settle down, at least for some years to come, with our troops in practical occupation of the country." It will be seen from the above that I have always been on the side of caution in our frontier policy, and that I have no great faith in converting the frontier tribes speedily into useful allies in the event of war with Russia. I shall not stop to discuss which is the best policy. We have adopted a policy of endeavouring to bring the tribes under our control, and, in my opinion, we cannot rescind from that policy even if we would. But I shall have occasion, later on, to state my opinion that the conditions laid down in the Secretary of State's telegram are, so far as I can understand them, not entirely in accord with the policy which still finds favour with the Government of India.
10. Our position, before the present disturbances began, is shown by a glance at any military map of the frontier. Gilgit, far to the North; then the outpost of Chitral, connected with Gilgit by a precarious and difficult communication, not to be called a road; Chitral and Drosh, connected with the Malakand by a long and insecure route; the great strategic high-way to Afghanistan leading from our advanced frontier garrison, Peshawar, to the position of Landi Kotal, close to the Durand line, with posts built by us and garrisoned by the Khyber rides; a rough track through the country of the Adam Khel Afridis running through the Kohat Pass, between Peshawar and Kohat; then Tirah intervening between the Khyber and the salient of the Kurram with its isolated cantonment of Para Chinar; the Tocki Valley trending up close to the Durand line, and finally, Waziristan intervening between the Tocki and the Gomal route leading into Zhob, with our advanced post at Wana. The chief points which must strike any one are (1) the isolation of our advanced posts, (2) the distance of the old frontier cantonments and the want of communication between these positions; (3) the comparative smallness of the garrisons by which we hold this enormous line of frontier; (4) the nearness of our posts at several points to the Durand line; (5) and that putting aside the country from Peshawar to Chitral, the only territories practically in which we should have to establish ourselves would be Tirah and Waziristan, in order to complete our control up to the Durand line. On several occasions I have drawn attention to the necessity for the reconsideration of our position, not with any view to a further advance, but rather in the hope that we may redistribute our forces, and re-organise the frontier commands in accordance with the changed conditions of the present day. I have also drawn attention to the necessity for increasing the force on the frontier.

11. The first question asked by the Secretary of State is, practically, does actual strategical necessity and the protection of the British Indian frontier demand that we shall undertake any new responsibility? His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief replies that we should occupy Tirah while abandoning Chitral, the out-post on our right flank. As regards the occupation of Tirah, that has long been the desire of many who have looked at the frontier question from a military point of view, and from that point of view alone the advantages, put so forcibly by His Excellency, seem to me to be incontestable. But I cannot agree that Baluchistan affords an example of what is possible in the way of pacification on other parts of the frontier. It seems to me that the circumstances of the countries are in every way quite different; and that it would be rash to predicate that similar results would follow. I believe the occupation of Tirah would mean a great expenditure of money and a considerable increase to the army. If our exchequer were overflowing, I should be inclined to advocate the occupation of Tirah, looking at the question from the military point of view. I think it may eventually have to be done, but I am not prepared to advocate it at the present time. We shall not be able to convince the Afridis very soon that we can occupy their country, and they will be shrewd enough to surmise that if they break their engagements again there is at least a great probability that we shall occupy their country permanently. We seem bound by the terms of the proclamation to evacuate the country if they submit. I think it is a pity,—though it is no doubt useful to answer objections at home,—to introduce in these proclamations promises to evacuate the country we invade. We might find it necessary to make a road through part of the country, and to insist on it being kept up. I do not quite know to what His Excellency the Viceroy alludes when he speaks of the nonsense talked about the aversion of Pathans to new roads. "But I should be very glad, if it were possible, to see the approaches to Tirah improved, although I doubt whether there would not be a good deal of aversion on the part of the Afridis. But we know that to some people the making of a road is synonymous with annexation, and we have plenty of hostile critics ready enough to seize upon a passage in a proclamation publishing our intention not to annex a country. But even if we were not bound by the terms of the proclamation in a great measure, we could not occupy Tirah under the conditions stated in the Secretary of State's telegram.

12. I do not think it would be wise to propose the abandonment of Chitral even if Tirah were occupied, as apart from the fact that our policy has hitherto been to insist upon its value, and that to propose to abandon it would be a confession of want of perception, I cannot think the possession of Tirah would render less necessary the occupation of Chitral as a point of observation, as it is there the Russian frontier closely approaches our outer line, and it is there that a small force must necessarily exercise a great effect on the conditions of any question of the Kunar route in paragraphs 20 to 25 of my note on the Malakand-Dir-Chitral route and position. In remarking on these paragraphs the Commander-in-Chief said "The military occupation of Chitral will, I consider, cover in the best manner open to us this route. Any advance by Russia would Mandol or other pass southwest of the Dorah would put their troops in a very precarious position. I agree that the Kunar route is very important, and as its importance is realised, so will the necessity of the military occupation of Chitral be acknowledged. But I would emphasise the point that for political reasons the Kunar valley route can be of no practical use to us until we occupy Jellalabad. In this connection Russia is the aggressive power, and the initiative rests with her. She will not neglect a fine opportunity if she does not occupy Chitral, if we are not there to prevent her, and thus render it too late for us to use the Kunar Valley when we have got to Jellalabad."

13. I do not attach perhaps the same strategical importance to the possession of Tirah as the Commander-in-Chief does. I think it is of much local military importance, and that it would be of inestimable value as affording sites for excellent sanitoria. But I doubt whether
if we had to advance into Afghanistan, we should—especially after the present campaign—
find the Afridis arrayed against us. We should have the power of entering the Bazar Valley
from the Dakka side as we did during the last Afghan war; and that in itself would probably
be a strong deterrent.

14. The strategical necessities of the problem require us to hold Chitral, the Khyber
line, the Kurram route, the Tochi route to Ghuzni, the Gomal route, and the Bolan. These
routes should be undertaken, in the way of territorial annexation. I believe it must
be recognized that the “Durand line” is to be “a full and close control over all the territory up to the
Kurlam route, the Tochl route to Chitral, or such a
responsibility” as indicated in His Excellency the Viceroy’s
note. But I do not think we can undertake new responsibilities without a large increase to the army, and very heavy initial and
recurrent expenditure in many other ways. Expenditure on frontier railways seems to me to be
inevitable, in any case.

15. The second head of the subject is the “modifications of existing arrangements which
will no doubt be necessary, especially with a view to the concentration of forces.”

With this part of the subject we may group the consideration of “what posts and lines
of communication are indispensable” with due regard to—

(1) what is possible with the existing military force;
(2) the financial situation;
(3) the political importance of avoiding any measures likely to cause discontent, and
consequently a revival of disturbances.

16. The modification of existing arrangements necessary with a view to the concentration
of forces is a subject by itself, and I am certainly not prepared, at this moment, to suggest
even what modification is necessary. It would require much more time than we have at our
disposal, and the advice of the Commander-in-Chief would have to be sought on the whole
question. But generally speaking, it may be said that we require such a re-distribution of
our forces, as will enable us to concentrate more quickly than we can now do—aided by other
means which I shall presently allude to—and a recognition of the fact that our present
distribution of troops does not meet the circumstances of the time. I have brought this subject
to notice, on several occasions within recent years, because I have been deeply impressed by the
necessity for its early consideration, knowing well how long it takes to decide such questions,
but it was decided that the time had not yet arrived to consider the matter. I think the time
has certainly arrived now, and that the sooner we address ourselves to it, the better.

17. We are to consider the question with regard to what is possible with the existing
military forces. Now I must deprecate entirely to this condition. I am very strongly of opinion
that the military strength on the frontier—and this is an opinion I have expressed before—is
not sufficient for the enormous line of frontier to be kept in order, and for the greatly increased
responsibilities we have taken upon ourselves of recent years. I do not mean to assert that a
large increase to the army is necessary, but I must distinctly affirm that we are trying to do
too much with our attenuated army, and that some increase is necessary. I do not like the
plan of reducing Madras regiments, because I believe that the internal security of the country
requires we should possess an adequate force for the garrison of stations which are not
immediately in the Madras area—and I think that when we are doing all we can to
improve the Madras Army, the constant application of reduction to that army must
to defeat our object. But here again, in regard to the question of what is to be the
strength of the force on the frontier, we must seek the advice of the Commander-in-Chief,
and I feel sure that the matter would require lengthened consideration. I must, however,
ask permission to record my views on this question, if it is decided to accept the Secretary
of State’s condition.

18. We have also to consider what posts and lines of communication we require with due
regard to the financial situation and the political importance of avoiding any measures likely
to cause discontent and a revival of disturbances. It is hardly necessary to tell us this,
because I imagine we are all impressed with these two conditions. I certainly do not want to
propose the initiation of any measures likely to cause discontent. But I entirely agree
with the Commander-in-Chief in his estimate of the power possessed by the Mullahs over the
fanaticism of the tribes. Many people thought this power was lessening day by day. It is
evident that it is a very real danger, and it appears to me that we shall fail to profit by the
bitter lessons we have received, if we are ever again lulled into the slumber of a false security.
My own belief is that the victories of Islam have had something to do with the present
situation, that agitators from India, and certainly the Mullahs, have made use of this, and that
the fact of the Amir having posed as the King of Islam probably induced the Mullahs, and the
people through them, to think they could depend upon him for aid. Our most powerful
remedy against a recurrence of these risings is to be strong on the frontier. We are asked
what posts and lines of communication are indispensable. This is a very wide question, and I
hope no attempt will be made to answer it, except in the most general way, without the fullest
consideration. I do not find anything in the present telegram about the rectification of
administrative boundaries, alluded to in Sir W. Cuningham’s note. It may be in some other
telegram; it may possibly allude to the question of frontier administration.

19. As regards our frontier posts and communications, I will venture to offer a few
observations on that part of the subject, and we may, I presume, take it for granted that we shall
not withdraw one yard from our present position. In some cases we may even desire to advance some of our local posts (e.g., in the Tochi), but we cannot possibly decide on such matters until the frontier troubles have entirely subsided.

20. The position of Gilgit must be maintained, and we have now an alternative route, on the right flank of the northern portion of our frontier, through the Khagan valley in the Hazara district, over the Babusir Pass to Chilas. To the maintenance of this route I attach great importance; it links Yaghistan and Kohistan, and very probably the fact that we have had no troubles in that quarter, may be due in some measure to the existence of this road. Whether our posts on the western border of Hazara from Darband upwards are of sufficient strength, and whether our control over the tribes of the Black Mountain on the left bank of the Indus is sufficiently strong, is a matter which must be determined by local authorities. The bastion which the country of Buner and of the tribes to the south pushes down into our territory, and the great distance, means a main line of Railway communication to Peshawar, cannot be regarded as a satisfactory military position; but no one, I suppose, would desire at the present time to occupy the country.

21. Reverting for a moment to Gilgit, my predecessor laid great stress upon improving the line of communication between Gilgit and Chitral. Something has, I believe, been done, but I entirely agree with Sir Henry Brackenbury on the necessity of having as secure a line of communication as possible between these two important outposts on our northern frontier. Our main position south of Chitral is at Kila Drosh. That position has been reported as a most unsuitable one; I made certain enquiries lately, and the papers have recently reached me. I mention this to illustrate the fact that, even although we desire not to undertake fresh responsibilities, expenditure is necessary in the positions we have taken up. From a study of the reports, it appears to me that the position at Kila Drosh is not a tenable one, and that if our communications were interrupted in force between that point and the Malakand, even the troops that we have at Kila Drosh and Chitral might not be able to cope with a heavy attack. Impregnable fortifications, supplies, water, and ammunition, are required in these isolated positions.

22. As to the road between Kila Drosh and the Malakand via Dir, we must be content with such political measures as we are able to carry out with safety; we cannot ask for more military posts along this road, and although the attitude of the Nawab of Dir has of late certainly not been what Major Deane desires, and we may have trouble in the future, we cannot ask for an advance of our military position beyond Chakdara.

23. In Bajaur and the Mohmand country, we may hope that the lesson, which the inhabitants have received, will last for a considerable time, and that we shall be able to effect such a settlement with the Mohmands as will make them recognise distinctly that they are our men and have no connection with the Amir. I suppose there is little chance of any actual demarcation being effected, but the surveys which have been made will be very useful. A survey for a narrow gauge line is being undertaken between Nowshera and Dargai. I am strongly of opinion that the sooner this line, whether narrow or broad gauge, is carried out, the better it will be for our military position.

24. We next come to the question of the Khyber Pass—the great strategical highway towards Kabul. Among the conclusions of Sir Mackworth Young, which we are asked to accept, number (4) is that the Khyber should be reopened and safeguarded as in the past. I understood that we had come to the conclusion that it was desirable that the Khyber Pass should be safeguarded (a rather inappropriate term) or occupied under tribal management, if practicable; that this was communicated to Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny, and that we should not go further in the matter until we had learnt what their opinions were. To that conclusion I fear I must adhere. I think it would be most undesirable to pledge ourselves to one view of the question until we know precisely how matters stand after this campaign, and what the opinions of Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny are. I entirely agree with the Commander-in-Chief that the fall of the forts in the Khyber was a great blow to our prestige. It will be remembered that I pressed my view of this question in Council, and that I urged the necessity for retaking these posts at that time, and subsequently, in a separate memorandum. It seems to me that a very important point is yet undecided, as to when the Khyber is to be reopened and in what way the posts are to be rebuilt. That, however, is much too large a question to deal with here.

25. I cannot concur with Sir Mackworth Young that we should leave the Khyber Rifles to themselves if there were a rising, as on this occasion, unless perfectly convenient to send troops to occupy the pass, and that if there were another outbreak and the posts were again destroyed, we ought to act as on the present occasion. I was under the impression, though I have not got the papers to refer to here, that when the outbreak did take place, the Lieutenant-Governor said that if the Khyber Rifles remained staunch we should by all means strengthen their hands, and I do not understand his change of opinion in this matter. At all events, I agree with the Commander-in-Chief that it is a most dangerous, and I would say even disastrous, policy to think of ever allowing a future attack of the tribesmen to take place without going to the succour of the military body we have formed, disciplined, and placed in British forts built by ourselves. In our plans for the future "concentration of forces" we must, it appears to me, make provision for a rapid reinforcement of the Khyber posts, and for a sufficient force to hold Landi Kotal when necessary.
26. We have had from time to time a great deal of discussion in respect to the construction of a railway up the right bank of the Kabul river, and proposals have even been made to lay down a railway as far as Michni with a view to the construction of the greater work. I confess that I have never been a strong supporter of this project; it would cost a vast amount of money; to protect it we should most certainly have to annex a considerable strip of country on the left bank, i.e., the further bank of the river; it would be exceedingly difficult to find a suitable terminus site on this side of the Durand line, and we should certainly have to station British troops at the head of the line for its protection. This would be quite incompatible with the idea of entrusting the line of the Khyber to tribal management. Of course the military advantages of having such a railway in the event of our advance to Jalalabad or Kabul are very great, but I do not feel certain that we should not secure as great advantages by an improvement of the present military road (along which you can drive a dog-cart from Jamrud to Landi Kotal), and by a line of railway, in a less-exposed position on the Khyber route, which would be a matter of considerable difficulty. In the case of a railway on the Khyber line, I do not suppose we could leave it to the protection alone of the Khyber Rifles. We might go as far as making the railway bed for such a line.8

27. There is one other point which may be mentioned in connection with this part of the subject, that it will be recollected that part of the scheme of defence for this portion of the frontier was that we should have a fortified post at Chinar in the Bazar Valley. Under present circumstances I suppose it is useless to revive the proposal, but it is just as well to mention it.

28. I believe that I am responsible for having mentioned the subject of the Kohat Pass. I did so believing that at this time, when the whole of the frontier questions are under review, we should not neglect a single point which it may be necessary for us to deal with. I do not think I said that we should occupy it; but I did say that it was a subject that had been discussed in past years a good many times. The Lieutenant-Governor says that when we need it we can use it, and he adds that Pindi is the base for Kohat. I must point out that this is not an accurate description of the case. We have needed it in past times and we could not use it. I happened to have been at Kohat when the pass was closed and the hills were occupied by the Afghans of the Pass Afridis. I think we were not from that anxiety about the pass this time, but that the closing of the Khyber is a signal instance of what may happen when we entrust a line of military communication to frontier tribes, and practically pay them blackmail to keep it open.

29. Anyone looking at the map of the frontier will see how this tongue of land belonging to the Afridis juts forward between the Peshawar and Kohat positions, and that our route from Fort Macasson to Kohat is entirely at their mercy. It does not settle the question to say that when we want it we can use it, but we have not even insisted upon our rights in having a proper road through the pass, and we have had a good deal of trouble in the past with the Pass Afridis. They have fortunately separated themselves from the Tirah Afridis, but we are not at all certain that this may always be the case in the future; and although we have been at Peshawar and Kohat for more than half a century, yet it is a fact that these places, 40 miles apart, can be stopped at the will of the Afridis, and that we have to travel some 200 miles or so round by Rawal Pindi to reach Kohat. The completion of the Murri-Attock Railway is a work which is thoroughly necessary, and good progress is being made, but that railway will not remove the badness of the military position as regards the separation of the two great military cantonments by this tongue of Afridi country. Of course Rawal Pindi is the base for Kohat, but lateral communications between portions of military forces are at all times necessary.

30. However, I do not want to press this point now, but I may note that even Sir James Lyall said, in 1859, that a greater control over the Adam Khael Afridis was certainly desirable. It is absolutely necessary that the Kohat Pass should be made passable for wheeled carriage, and, whether we require to reinforce Kohat from Peshawar, or Peshawar from Kohat, we ought to be able to use this road at any time. It is no answer to say that we can go round by railway, for the difficulties of entraining and detraining large numbers of troops and transport, to say nothing of field artillery, forbid this being regarded as a sound military alternative to having a direct route connecting two important military stations on the frontier. The Pass Afridis are bound by treaty to maintain the road, and we should insist upon this duty being performed.

31. On the important question of the occupation of Tirah, I have already dwelt, and have come to the conclusion that we cannot press it at the present time. The cantonnement of Para Chinar is very isolated, and we shall require a strong garrison here. Here again the line of communication might be greatly improved by a line of railway from Kohat to Thal; and while I do not propose to have an alternative line, I suppose we shall maintain the Samana position and shall strengthen the position in front of the line of communication running from Kohat via Ustaran to Hangu and so onwards to Thal, and that here as in all other parts of the frontier, we should take warning by the lessons we have received and occupy the positions with strong posts capable of long defence, whether garrisoned by border police or regularly, as the case may be.

* Since writing the above a letter has been received in the Military Department from the Quartermaster-General advocating Sir Guilford Molesworth's proposed line following the Kambar stream from near Jamrud.
32. The question of the position of the military posts in the Tochi is coming under consideration and we are not yet in a position to make a final pronouncement on the subject. It may be that the local military and political authorities may advise the location of the chief post higher up than Miran Shah, and a strong military post at or near Sherani. From the Waziris we have little to fear. A Waziri expressed the situation by putting his thumb in his mouth and bringing his upper and lower teeth together upon it. As to the Gomal and its posts, I suppose we shall adhere to these, although they are terrible places for our troops to be in, and shall maintain the position of Wana. A few years ago the question of a railway up the Gomal was much discussed; surveys were made; and the matter dropped. It was not one of the supporters of the project, as the advantages to be gained seemed to me to be quite overpowered by the enormous cost, that we had other lines of railway to Peshin and that we required more railway exploration of other passes.

33. As to communications on the frontier from Khushalgarh and Kohat onwards to Dera Ismail Khan, I have already alluded to the desirability of pushing a line from Kohat to Thal, and we should certainly have a line of railway from Khushalgarh to Kohat. The completion of the Mari-Attock line will be a very important strengthening of our frontier, and we require lines from Kalabagh to Bannu, and from Dera Ismail Khan to the entrance of the Gomal. I trust that the broad gauge will be employed wherever that is possible. Of the great triangle of country between Dera Ismail Khan, Chaman and Sukkur, I do not think anything need be said at present. We have the Dera Ghazi Khan-Peshin road, and, although it cannot be said that we are in great military strength in that part of the country, yet with the line of communication by railway from Sukkur via Safari and the Mushkaf-Bolan Railway, to Quetta and Peshin, with the auxiliary Harrai railway, and the line of road from Dera Ghazi Khan via Loralai to Peshin, we are probably stronger in this tract than in any other part of the country.

34. Turning now to the more general and political considerations of the problem before us, it will be seen that it has been laid down in Foreign Department, No. 2197-F., dated the 14th August 1896,—

(i) annexation is neither necessary nor desired;
(ii) so far as is possible, the independence of the tribes should not be interfered with;
(iii) that by means of tribal allowances in payment for services rendered, and by cordially supporting the legitimate influence of the headmen, a friendly and responsible authority may be established in each tribe.

In the neighbourhood of our cantonments, i.e., Wano, Tochi, Kurram, the Political Officer must insist on peace being kept; elsewhere he must use all his influence to keep peace as far as he can.

35. According to the proposal in the Foreign Secretary's note, we are to make the tribes regard us as their "political suzerain"; to give nothing which is not in return for actual service; and to get them to pay an annual tribute. His Excellency the Viceroy approves these proposals, and says that if we decline to allow the Amir to interfere with the tribes, we must affirm our supremacy over them. In all this I entirely agree, merely noticing what may be said at present. We have the Dera Ghazi Khan-Peshin road, and, although it cannot be said that we are in great military strength in that part of the country, yet with the line of communication by railway from Sukkur via Safari and the Mushkaf-Bolan Railway, to Quetta and Peshin, with the auxiliary Harrai railway, and the line of road from Dera Ghazi Khan via Loralai to Peshin, we are probably stronger in this tract than in any other part of the country.

36. I have no very great belief in the power of conciliation and of attaching the tribes to us. As Major Deane says "nothing will induce a Pathan to give trouble more surely than allowing him to think one is anxious to conciliate him"; and Nicholson used to say it was better to be on hostile than on friendly terms with a Pathan, you knew what to expect. Our present successes have not been unbroken, and the tribes have learnt their power, even more than before, of giving trouble. If we have punished them, they have punished us, and I would not rely too greatly on the effect these campaigns may produce. I admit that we may gradually increase our influence, but I do not think it will be by a policy of conciliation, but rather by the policy of the strong hand, able and ready to strike when necessary. That policy does not forbid our doing all we can to "cultivate friendly relations," but it is not a policy of conciliation.

37. But how does the policy we have hitherto followed square with the Secretary of State's "limitation of interference," "avoidance of responsibility," and avoidance of "gradual extension of administrative control"? Our policy of 1896 is the avoidance of interference with the independence of the tribes as far as may be possible. Is "suzerainty" in this case compatible with "independence"? Can we affirm our "supremacy" over the tribes and yet strictly limit our interference; and can we avoid responsibility especially in relation to the Amir? For my part, I cannot but think that we must eventually accept our responsibilities and assume some sort of "administrative control" over the tribal territory up to the Durand line, if our ultimate aim is to be a full and close control over all the territory up to that line. As has been said, a "sphere of influence" tends to pass into a "protectorate" and a "protectorate" into a complete sovereignty. It seems to me therefore that we must make it very clear as to what our policy should be, for it does not appear to bear an absolute resemblance to that outlined by the Secretary of State. For my part I should like
to see a clear statement of the intention to have a full and close control over all the country up to the Durand line, and a recognition of the fact that we shall have eventually to accept the responsibilities of the position.

38. We are asked to define our permanent position and policy, and it is allowed that some modification of the existing arrangements will be necessary. I am and always have been strongly impressed with the necessity for revising our administrative arrangements. I will not repeat my views as they are given in my note of the 21st June 1896, in the Proceedings of August 1896, Nos. 844-845. If His Excellency would prefer that this question should not be raised now, I hope some other opportunity may be given me, for I am convinced that we can improve the administrative arrangements, and that much is required to make the agency for our control of the frontier tribes a more powerful instrument for the attainment of our ultimate aim.

39. I agree with His Excellency the Viceroy that it cannot be said our policy has broken down. In my opinion it has never yet had a fair trial. But it is very certain that a powerful attack has been made, and will be renewed, not only by newspaper men and magazine writers, but by men who are able and competent to judge of the "forward policy." They will notice fast enough that the tribes and the Amir have shrewdly put this in the forefront of their grievances, and I am certainly of opinion that our occupation of forward positions has had a good deal to do with the present risings. I quite agree also that neither a forward policy nor the reverse will get rid of the inherent difficulties of our position. These difficulties arise from the people we have to deal with and the nature of the country they inhabit. They existed before our occupation of the Punjab, and they are a part of the responsibilities we must accept.

40. As to disarmament, I agree that we should do whatever we can in this direction, within and beyond the British Indian frontier. But we cannot do a great deal in the latter case, without supporting our demand by force of arms; and the arms given up in the present campaign will very soon be replaced. If we deprive a tribe or our own villagers of arms, we must protect them from their tribal enemies. We must do all in our power to stop the trade in arms. It is all very well to say, disarm the whole frontier as far as may be possible, and adhere steadily to the policy of disarming trans-frontier tribes as opportunity offers. The difficulty is in carrying out such a policy.

41. I cannot agree with Lord Roberts as to the disintegration of Afghanistan. It may come, and we may have to take advantage of it; but I have always been opposed to the "partition of Afghanistan," and I hope the day for that operation may be far distant.

42. I am sorry that this note has extended to such a length, and I will now state the conclusions at which I have arrived and which I venture to place before His Excellency and my Hon'ble Colleagues—

(1) Actual strategical necessity, and the protection of the British Indian Frontier, do not absolutely demand that we should undertake any new responsibility, and therefore we should not propose to occupy Tirah. We should not abandon Chitral.

(2) A modification of existing arrangements with a view to the concentration of forces is necessary, but cannot be laid before the Secretary of State at the present time.

(3) The Military force normally maintained on the frontier is not sufficient, and a small increase to the army is necessary. This subject requires immediate examination.

(4) It cannot be stated in detail, without further examination of the subject, what posts and lines of communication are necessary.

(5) We should wait for the opinion of Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny before committing ourselves to a final opinion on the safe-guarding of the Khyber.

(6) We should have a survey made of the Kambar line for a railway on the Khyber route and prepare the bed for a railway. We should inform Secretary of State.

(7) We should always be prepared to reinforce the Khyber posts and to occupy Landi in Kotal.

(8) We should insist on a proper road through the Kohat pass, but need not seek to occupy the pass.

(9) We should review the whole question of frontier defence, in its various sections, and substitute strong posts capable of long defence, for numerous small posts, wherever this may be feasible.

(10) We should lay down, and carry out, as soon as possible, a policy of railway construction on the frontier.

(11) Necessity for examination of present policy in the light of the Secretary of State's telegram. We should make it very clear that we intend to work for a full and close control.

(12) Question of reconstruction of administrative arrangements should receive further consideration.

(13) Disarmament should be enforced where possible.
43. I only received these papers late on Friday night, and now pass them on, on Monday. There was no delay caused by the printing of this note, except that I had practically finished it on Sunday night, and if the Press had been open, the concluding portions might have been printed off. I informed the Private Secretary last night that the papers were with me, and that three Hon'ble Members had still to note.

25th October 1897.

E. H. H. C[ollen].

There are various minor points on which we are all agreed, such as that allowances should only be made in return for services, and that disarmament should be carried out to a considerable extent. These I need not discuss, but there are three main questions of permanent policy in the papers before us which have to be considered.

First, there are Lord Roberts' proposals which would carry the forward policy to its extreme conclusions. Many of his arguments are disputable, and, in the present state of Indian finances, his proposals seem to me to be altogether outside practical politics.

Secondly, we have the Lieutenant-Governor's proposals which substantially recommend the re-establishment of things as they were before the present outbreak. The objections to his proposals appear to be these. They offer no guarantees for finality or stability. As a peace policy, existing arrangements have broken down. If we re-establish the existing state of things we have every reason to believe that the arrangement will break down again. Next time the tribes attack us they will be better armed, and will fight better than this time. They are within our sphere of influence. We are bound to protect them, but they are not under our control.

On the other hand, there are strong reasons for reverting to the status quo ante. The beating we shall now give the tribesmen will probably keep them quiet until we have all left India, and the future is impossible to forecast. The policy would be easy to defend in England. We could say that before the war, we deliberately took up the positions we thought necessary, and that we do not intend to advance or recede from them. Further, the extent of the present outbreak, with the liability to future outbreaks, is a full justification for keeping up a sufficient and efficient army. We must always be prepared to cope with a similar outbreak in the future, and we must look to periodic attacks from the untamed tribes to keep our army up to the mark.

Thirdly, we have the policy put forward by Sir George White, namely, that we should occupy Tirah, and abandon Chitral, and other advanced posts which are a source of weakness to us by reason of their distance from our base. This proposition is a new one to me. At present I am by no means prepared to assent to it. But when it is deliberately put forward by Sir George White with all the weight of his great experience, I don't think it ought to be rejected until we have considered it in all its aspects. At present I do not see that we are in a position to judge the proposal on its merits, and I do not see how for some months yet to come we can get the necessary information.

The main question is what would it cost to occupy Tirah in force, and what could we set off against this expenditure by abandoning other posts. I can form no opinion on this point. Then there are many other questions which require to be answered, concerning which I can form no opinion. Could we safely leave our allies round Chitral, or would this be a breach of faith? What is the character of the Tirah country, what is its water-supply, how would its climate suit our troops in winter, and what force must we keep there? How far from our base should we have to occupy positions, and what force should we require to keep open the line of communications? Again what are the exits from Tirah towards the positions we should wish to dominate? I know nothing of these matters, all of which seem to require earnest consideration.

Then there is another point which must not be lost sight of. If plague goes on spreading in India we may in the near future be in great straits. Our financial resources will be imperilled, our foreign trade will be gravely threatened, and in taking energetic measures to stay the pestilence, we may require all our available troops in India itself.

25th October 1897.

M. D. C[HALMERS].

These papers have only just reached me, and I must pass them on at once, as the case has to be discussed in Council next Friday. I will, therefore, only remark that, in my opinion, there is a great deal to be said in favour of a permanent occupation of the Afridi and Orakzai country, as advocated by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as such a measure, supplemented by a railway through Kohat up the Kurram valley, would place us in a commanding position in regard to our two main lines of communication with Kabul, and would afford the only practicable means of enforcing any effectual disarmament of the two most important tribes on our North-Western Frontier.

26th October 1897.

C. M. R[IVAZ].

I have no great faith myself in the policy of outposts and influence, unaccompanied by administrative control as a practical solution of our difficulties. So far as I can judge that policy will inevitably lead in the end to the annexation of the whole country right up to the
Durand line on our side and to our inviting the Amir to follow the same course on his side, and I fear that till that consummation has been reached, we shall never have peace for long together on our borders. The terms of the Secretary of State's telegram seem to me to preclude consideration of the occupation of Tirah as a result of the present operations, unless indeed it should be forced on us by circumstances which are we unable now to foresee. But I should be disposed to let it be clearly understood when we withdraw that if we are again provoked, we shall come to stay, and to accept that declaration as the Key note of our future policy in our dealings with other tribes as well as the Afridis and Trakzaes. I would let it be known to every tribe that in future any serious molestation which is not promptly, and without resort to military operations, stoned for in such manner as the circumstances may seem to us to demand will be followed by annexation, and I would never resort to military operations except with a view to annexation, and after a specific demand for redress accompanied by a warning that failure to comply would result in annexation. I believe that by driving that lesson home by a few examples we should do more to secure peace for the time, and delay the ultimately inevitable onward movement of our administrative frontier, than by any number of expeditions ending, instead of beginning, with an announcement of terms, and a more or less tardy withdrawal. At the same time I do not underrate the value of the lesson that will be taught by even the temporary occupation of Tirah both as an immediate sedative and as an illustration of our absolute power to enforce such a policy as I describe, if it should be decided to adopt it. It ought to serve to keep things quiet for years to come without the need for any further demonstration. If that policy be adopted, I see no urgent need for anything more at present than a declaration of it, accompanied by a restoration of the status quo ante as soon as our terms have been complied with, and possibly some concentration of our small scattered posts. Whether the opportunity should not also be taken to prepare the ground for a railway up the Khyber, and possibly also up the Kurram, and to improve communications between our frontier posts and cantonments is however also a question for consideration.

26th October 1897.

A. C. T[REVOR].

[Pros. No. 617.]

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

Having regard to the existing military forces of India and to the financial and political situation, the Government of India do not contemplate the annexation or permanent occupation of Tirah as the basis of the present settlement with the Afridis which they have instructed Sir William Lockhart to endeavour to effect.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief dissents.

2. The Kohat Pass need not be occupied, and at the present time it is inexpedient to take steps to enforce the tribal engagements for the improvement of the road.

3. If after Sir William Lockhart has received the general submission of the tribes it appears to him to be advisable, he should be authorised to require some small tribute from them.

4. The policy of requiring tribute may be gradually introduced among other tribes as opportunity may offer, after local investigation in each case.

5. The question of the re-opening of the Khyber Pass has been dealt with in the instructions issued to Sir William Lockhart, and the Government of India have no further instructions to issue on this point at present, except that Sir William Lockhart should consider the advisability of securing in the agreement a right to the improvement and re-alignment of the road in the Pass.

6. The arms in the hands of the trans-border tribes have been used against the British Government, and as many as can be should be taken from them.

Disarmament, as thus carried out, does not seem to imply protection.

7. On the question of the concentration of forces and what posts and lines of communication are regarded as indispensable, it is impossible at present to give a definite answer to the Secretary of State. The definition of permanent position and policy should also be deferred until the close of military operations.

29th October 1897.

E.

Issue telegram to Secretary of State.

Send copy of it to Military with copy of Council Order.

A copy of the telegram may go demi-officially to Punjab, but no official orders can issue until it is answered, and the despatch which has been ordered will not go either until the telegram is answered.

29th October 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

([Telegram P. to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 29th October 1897.])
Assistant Secretary.

Endorsement and demi-official below for approval.

J. S.—30th October 1897.

Issue.

30th October 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

[Endorsement to Military Department and Intelligence Branch Nos. 4356-4357-F., dated the 30th October 1897.]

[Demi-official.]

Dated Simla, the 30th October 1897 (Confidential.)

From—Captain H. Daly, C.I.E.,

To—The Hon’ble Mr. L. W. Dane.

I enclose, for His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor’s information, copy of a telegram, from the Secretary of State about the permanent position and policy on the North-West Frontier, and a copy of the reply sent to the Secretary of State after yesterday’s Council meeting.

*From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1560, dated the 20th (received 21st) October 1897.

Refers to Foreign Department letter No. 3168-F., dated 8th September 1897, forwards copy of papers giving a full account of the Afridi rising in the Khyber Pass, and gives the Lieutenant-Governor’s recommendation in favour of reconstructing arrangements for re-opening the Khyber.

His Excellency.

This letter and its interesting enclosures may be circulated in continuation of the file sent yesterday on tribal relations, so that it may have been seen by Hon’ble Members before the case comes on in Council. It contains the Lieutenant-Governor’s definite recommendation in favour of constructing arrangements for re-opening the Khyber, they should be on the same basis of tribal responsibility as they have been hitherto.

There is a recommendation to recompense Captain Barton to the value of his property lost, but not restored by the Aftridis. This will need discussion with the Military and Finance Departments.

21st October 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

In meantime circulate for information in connection with case.

22nd October 1897.

Circulated.

22nd October 1897.

Seen.

Seen.

Seen.

E. H. H. C[ollenj].

A copy of this letter should be sent now, in usual course, to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, to Military Intelligence Branch.

Then put a spare copy, with necessary extracts from the notes, for consideration of the question of recompensing Captain Barton. This letter and these notes should be kept with the (separate) policy file.

30th October 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

*Office Memo. and endorsement to Military Department and Intelligence Branch and General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. 4356-4357-F., dated the 30th October 1897.*

*Copy of letter and the endorsement recorded also in Secret F., February 1898, Nos. 1-105.*

S F—604-616—Feb.
There is a recommendation to recompense Captain Barton to the value of his property lost but not restored by the Afridis. This will need discussion with the Military and Finance Departments.

21st October 1897.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

In a letter No. 3049-P.,* dated the 4th October 1897, to the Punjab Government, Sir Richard Udny wrote:

"However this may be, the result has been most unfortunate for Captain Barton himself, as I regret to say that he has lost a very large amount of private property to the value of something like £1,000 sterling, which was destroyed or looted at Landi Kotal. For this, I trust Government may be disposed to allow him compensation out of any fine that may be realised from the Afridis, and if this idea is approved, I will call upon him for a detailed estimate of his loss."

† Proceeding No. 605.

In paragraph 4 of Mr. Dan's letter No. 1560,+ dated the 20th October 1897, he writes:

"The Lieutenant-Governor would ask leave, as recommended by Sir Richard Udny, to call upon Captain Barton to give in a statement of his losses, with a view to compensation being paid him as soon as it is known what part of his property is not restored by the Afridis."

In the terms which it has been decided to demand from the Afridis, we include the restoration of the private property which was taken at Landi Kotal, the value as assessed by the British Government to be required when the specific property cannot be returned.

Under these circumstances, it seems desirable that Captain Barton's estimate of his losses should be in the hands of Sir W. Lockhart as soon as possible. From what I have seen in the public prints, I gather that a considerable part of Captain Barton's property consisted of things for which the Government of India could not be reasonably expected to pay compensation, and his only chance of getting any is by a demand on his account being expressly made from, and paid by, the Afridis.

At this stage, it seems hardly necessary to consult the Military or Finance Department. I suggest a telegram to Sir W. Lockhart, to be repeated to Punjab Government as in draft put up.

15th November 1897.

SECRETARY.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

18th November 1897.

H. DALY.

19th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

[**Pros. No.** Telegram to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4749-P., dated the 19th November 1897.]

(Repeated to Punjab Government.)

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**Telegram P. from the Secretary of State dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.**

With reference to the telegram from the Government of India, dated the 29th October 1897, states that, after further consideration, he is advised that a system of tributes is open to certain specified objections. On the whole, is of opinion that the balance of considerations is against imposing tributes. Agrees that Sir W. Lockhart should consider the advisability of re-aligning and improving the present Khyber roads. Generally approves other conclusions, subject to a report of any proposed change of importance.

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**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 25, dated the 1st (received 2nd) November 1897.**

The precise meaning of "future relations" referred to in the last sentence of the demi-official letter of the 7th October 1897.

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[**Pros. No.** Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4409-P., dated the 2nd November 1897.]
[Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 27, dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.]

**Future relations with the Afridis.** Points out a difficulty in prescribing terms of submission and reparation. Proposes to submit his views and those of Sir R. Udny by telegraph.

**His Excellency.**

The papers to refer to with this telegram from Sir W. Lockhart are No. 69 of the Tirah, *Secret F., February 1898*, Nos. 1-405. Series, *semi-official at page 6 of K. W. No. 2*.

† Proceedings No. 685 in this collection. His telegram No. 25 of the 1st November, and my answer No. 4409-F., 2nd November.

As Sir W. Lockhart is telegraphing his and Sir R. Udny's views as to future relations, no answer need be sent until his telegram arrives; but I fear that he must be disappointed if he is counting upon receiving an immediate answer about future relations, and so being able at once to announce terms of present submission and future relations together.

I cannot think there is really much weight in what he now says about incurring imputation of bad faith if the terms of future relationship are not to the liking of the Ab'idis, because he has in the first place to exact from them submission and an agreement to accept, in regard to the Khyber, *any arrangements which the British Government may subsequently settle*.

It will probably be advisable to telegraph that the Government of India wish to adhere to the order of dealing with the tribes which has been denoted in the letter No. 3803 of the 4th October, and that the danger which he anticipates can be guarded against by making clear to them that submission means readiness to accept what the Government decide, and that he can give them no guarantee that the relations which are to be formed with them will be according to their choice or liking. I would, however, wait until Sir William Lockhart's promised telegram comes.

4th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

In view of the Foreign-Secret telegram of yesterday from the Secretary of State, I would telegraph to him as follows:—"Foreign Secret. Your Foreign—Secret telegram of 3rd November. Are we to understand that we can now instruct Lockhart in terms of our conclusions except as to tribute? He has urged inconvenience of deferring settlement of future relations; and the prior announcement of terms of submission which we directed in our letter to him of October 4th might hamper us hereafter, or lead to charges of breach of faith. Our conclusions cover main lines of future relations, and to announce them now might meet this difficulty."

4th November 1897.

E.

[Telegram P. to Secretary of State, dated the 4th November 1897.]

[Telegram P. from the Secretary of State, dated the 4th (received 5th) November 1897.]

Says that instructions may be sent to Sir William Lockhart as suggested in His Excellency the Viceroy's telegram, dated the 3rd (4th) November.

Repeat to Sir William Lockhart telegrams to and from the Secretary of State confidentially and add —

"Your proposals are awaited. If these conclusions modify them, and if they have crossed this, you will no doubt send further proposals."

6th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

[Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4409-F., dated the 6th November 1897.]

[Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 29, dated the 5th (received 6th) November 1897.]

Sir W. Lockhart's views respecting our future relations with the Afridis.
Sir R. Uday's views respecting our future relations with the Afridis.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Copies of necessary telegrams are being sent officially to Punjab, Military and Intelligence Branch.

J. S., 6th November 1897.

Sir William Lockhart's two telegrams were despatched on Friday afternoon, a short time before our No. 4458-P.* of the same date was sent to the telegraph office. We may expect a further communication from him shortly, and this will probably be awaited.

6th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARK.

[Endorsements to the Government of the Punjab, No. 4476-F., dated the 6th November 1897.]

[Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4477-4478-F., dated the 6th November 1897.]

[Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 31, dated the 5th (received 6th) November 1897.]

Issue on the 4th November 1897 of copies of the proclamation addressed to the Afridis and Orakzais. Manner in which the tribes have responded to the summons to attend camp.

[Telegram to the Secretary of State, dated the 7th November 1897.]

[Endorsement to the Military Department, No. 4490-F., dated the 8th November 1897.]

[Office Memo. to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4490-4491-F., dated the 8th November 1897.]
2. The following extracts from Sir Charles MacGregor's "Second Afghan War," Part II are of interest with reference to routes which would be within easy distance of such a cantonment:—

"On the 1st June (1879) General Roberts made a reconnaissance to the Kotal on the Lakarai Pass, where the road passes over the spur from the Safed Kuh, which forms the watershed on the Western side of the Hariab Valley... The primary object was to meet Major Stewart... whose departure from Gandamak by that route had been telegraphed by Colonel MacGregor. These officers however, did not succeed in getting through the Balar Ghilzai territory. The route was found difficult and indeed impassable for any army, unless considerable labour was expended in improving it."

"On the 2nd June, General Roberts marched to Dapussi" (7 south-west of Ali Khel) whence he visited the lower part of the Sirkai stream... and explored the range of hills above the left bank of the Sirkai... from which a good view of the surrounding country was obtained..."

"This view," says General Roberts, "was extremely interesting, for through the country lying at our feet will be found, as I believe, the easiest commercial and military route between Afghanistan and India. All the information which I have succeeded in obtaining regarding the road describes it as fairly level and capable of being made a good road for wheeled carriages without difficulty. It is said that the late Amir Sher Ali brought his bullock guns into Kurram by this route."

July 1879.—"The troops had now had good experience of the climate of the Kurram valley, and there was little doubt that at the stations above Thal the heat was never excessive, while at the Paiwar Kotal and in the Hariab valley, the climate is superior to any of our hill stations. At Shilozan it was quite cool at the end of July, so that Europeans could ride about the whole day without inconvenience."

"The General advocated the laying down of a tramway or light railway from Rawalpindi or Kohat to Kurram, as the gradients were easy and the construction would probably be economical. And he (the General) considered that the Kurram route from British India to Kabul was the natural line for the traffic to take."

3. I put up a skeleton map prepared in connection with my tribal notes, which shows Kabul, Ghasni, Jalalabad, the Kurram valley, etc.

8th November 1879.

H. Daly.

His Excellence.

From the telegrams which have been repeated to Sir William Lockhart, he knows that the Government of India have reserved their views on the posts and lines of communication to be maintained on the North-West Frontier and the location of troops.

He has been asked for his proposals, but given at the same time a clear indication of the limitations within which the re-arrangements must be made. I can read his telegram in two ways. It may be a protest and warning against limitations so strict that he understands them to leave to the Government of India nothing but a return to the status quo ante or it may be a proposal to make the Kabul river railway as an undertaking which is permissible within the limitations imposed.

In his telegram No. 29 of the 5th November, Sir William Lockhart has already given his opinion upon a simple return to the status quo ante. We should clearly in his opinion be worse off than before. In a military position which is in no way strengthened or improved without any guarantee for the better behaviour of the Afridis and Orakzais, we would face tribes who having interpreted our retirement as due to timidity rather than to leniency, would be confirmed in the belief that if they only give us sufficient trouble and annoyance we should be compelled to leave them alone.

Such is Sir William Lockhart's opinion of the policy of retiring altogether; and I do not desire to suggest any controversy, although the Afridis' and Orakzais' confirmed belief, as stated would be an unreasoning belief. The events of this year should show that the way to ensure their being let alone is to let us alone. Reason, however, they have shown, is not to be expected of them, and it is most probable that they will soon, if not immediately, believe that they turned us out of Tirah, and that our invasion was not a success.

Sir William Lockhart then, as I understand him, points to a means short of actual occupation by which the military position can be improved. "A railway up the valley of the Kabul river would, in my opinion, be most valuable." He does not say whether he regards this S.F.—604-594—Feb.
project as being within or without the limitations imposed by the Secretary of State. It could not be made without entering into closer relations with the Mohmands, and I trust it would not be made, unless the far end was to be protected by regular troops. This would certainly be incurring new responsibilities; and so far as the Mohmands themselves are concerned, they would, I think, be inconvenient responsibilities though possibly not onerous. I am sure that one result of this year's operations is to show that the only thing we need care to do with the poor and cowardly Mohmands is to leave them alone, and I believe that there is no keen desire on anyone's part to put troops into Landi Kotal.

It looks—but I speak without military knowledge—as if Tirah could be dominated better from Para Chinar than from Landi Kotal. Considerations other than military indicate the Kurram line as the one to work by rather than the Khyber line.

We are in Kurram by the wish and repeated invitation of the Turis. We are bound to protect the valley, and it was shown in the beginning of September that present arrangements for doing so are rather perilously weak. As mere matters of frontier watch and ward I presume that a railway from Kushalgarh to Kohat and a strengthening of our force in the Kurram must be seriously considered, and for some little time at any rate the Kohat and Samana garrisons must also be kept above their normal strength. It would be a development of these movements, and I believe it would have a very salutary effect on the Orakzaïs and Afridis, if the railway were continued through Thal to Para Chinar, and if the garrison of that place were increased and equipped with transport so as to have a flying column ready at any time to put down disturbances anywhere on the border.

The effect on the tribes would be two-fold, I think. They would see their country taken in rear and they would be given work on the line of railway; something to fear and something to do.

This plan will not entail, in order to put it into operation, the assumption of fresh responsibilities with any tribes. The line will run in British India and in country under British administration. It may be dangerously open to attack from Thal to Sadda, but the Zaimushts have kept quiet up till now and if given employment and pay—and a railway must afford many legitimate opportunities for employing and paying the neighbouring people—I think we can count on their working upon our side. Chikkai of Chinarak, who can at times speak contemptuously of British Government silver, shews nevertheless an inclination to make a bid for more of that dross. I hope that he will not be too coldly rebuffed, and that the Zaimushts may be used for guarding our roads, along two sides of whose country the route runs. Their position with the Samana range to the north and our country to the south-east and south-west of the triangle which they occupy, serves to throw them into our hands, and they have reason to know the weight of those hands when lifted against them.

I would venture to suggest a telegram to Sir William Lockhart acknowledging his No. 41 of the 7th November, and saying that although occupation of Tirah has been vetoed and no new responsibilities can be assumed without consulting the Secretary of State, the Government of India wish to consider the question of communications and distribution of troops for the better defence of the border and control of the trans border tribes. Sir William Lockhart's proposals in this matter may be invited; and I would like to ask him directly what he thought of a line to Kurram and cantonment at Para Chinar in preference to the line he recommends up the Kabul river.

9th November 1897.
Bring up in Calcutta.
24th November 1897.

Resubmitted.
J. S.—14th December 1897.

SECRETARY.

14th December 1897.

When military operations are concluded and the final report of Sir W. Lockhart is received.
1st January 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.
K. W. No. 1—Part II.

Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 94, dated (and received) the 1st November 1897.

Regarding the advisability of settling with the Massuzai and Chamkannis once and for all by advancing the Kurram Movable Column into their country. Details as to proposed arrangements, fines, etc.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Copy sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch. Usual informal distribution made. No orders. The Punjab Government will doubt submit proposals in regard to the contents of Commissioner’s telegram No. 94?

W. H.—1st November 1897.

If they don’t do so within the next three days, perhaps we may ask for their views.

J. S.—1st November 1897.

2nd November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Secretary.

When you opened the Peshawar Commissioner’s telegram 94 of the 1st November, you remarked that it was primarily for Sir W. Lockhart to make proposals as to dealing with the Chamkannis, etc. We may wait a bit till we hear from Sir William Lockhart as to his plans and proceedings.

2nd November 1897.

2nd November 1897.

H. Daly.

W. J. Cunningham.

(Office Memorandum to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4899-4897-F., dated the 1st November 1897.)

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 59-I. P., dated the 1st (received 2nd) November 1897.

Daily. Raiding by Zakha Khels near the Bara camp. Arrival of Lance Daffadar Khwas Khan, 9th Bengal Lancers, recently exchanged by the enemy for a Havildar of the Khyber Rifles.

Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, No. B.-115, dated the 1st (received 2nd) November 1897.

Daily. All quiet. A leading Alisherzai Malik killed at Ramadan on the 25th. Total casualties among Alisherzais near Samana now reported as 16 killed.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications, No. 827-C., dated the 1st (received 2nd) November 1897.

Daily. Rumoured presence at Ublan of 140 Tirah Orakzais with intent to raid. Movements of troops.

Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 230, dated the 1st (received 2nd) November 1897.

Enquiry by a jirga of Hajji Khel Chamkannis as to whether Government were going to send troops into their country, etc. Informed that General Lockhart would decide, meanwhile that they could not be admitted to Kurram. Refusal of the Turi Shiias to help the Turi Sunnis.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Copy sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch. Usual informal distribution made. No orders.

W. H.—2nd November 1897.

J. S.—2nd November 1897.
Wait till we hear from Sir William Lockhart or Punjab Government.

2nd November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

(Office Memorandum to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4401-4402-F., dated the 2nd November 1897.)

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Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, No. 60-I. P., dated and received 2nd November 1897.

Explains that the contractor referred to in his telegram No. 59-I. P. of the 1st is not under the Military or Commissariat authorities.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution made. No orders.

W. H.—2nd November 1897.

J. S.—2nd November 1897.

2nd November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

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Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 26, dated the 1st (received 2nd) November 1897.

Composition of the lashkar that opposed the British forces on the Arhanga Pass. Deserion of the Maidan Valley by the bulk of the inhabitants, etc.

No. E. H. S. CLARKE.

Telegram No. 26, dated the 2nd November 1897, has been sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch; and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—3rd November 1897.

J. S.—3rd November 1897.

3rd November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

(Office Memo. to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4123-4124-F., dated the 3rd November 1897.)

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Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan No. 966-T., dated the 2nd (received 3rd) November 1897.

Bagh visited on the 1st by our troops. Casualties in connection therewith. Movement of Afridis with the intention of carrying off fodder and goods from the camp. Steps taken to stop these operations. Casualties in connection therewith. Petquest of 36th Sikhs attacked by enemy who were driven off. Casualties in connection therewith. Transport from Arhanga Pass coming into camp attacked by enemy. Casualties and loss of baggage in connection therewith.

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Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications Shinawari, No. 859-C., dated the 2nd (received 3rd) November 1897.

Arrangements made for forming an advance det. at Mastura. Camel-road to Mastura will probably be open by 5th or 6th. Offer of Adam Khel Maliks to send in 50 rifles looted from the Khyber whenever ordered to do so.
Telegraph from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda, No. B. 119, dated the 2nd (received 3rd) November 1897.

Movements of troops to Para Chinar. Reconnaissance to point east of Totang and close to Murgan. Friendliness and hospitality displayed by Alisherzai villages. Haji Khel Chamkani jirga's enquiry whether Government is sending troops to their country, and if they can come into Kurram. Reply sent to jirga. Exertions of Arsalla Khan, Manuzai.

Usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—3rd November 1897.

No orders.

J. S.—3rd November 1897.

3rd November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegraph from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Bara, No. 66-L. P., dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.

Daily. Movements of troops. Steps taken to prevent firing into camp and robberies at night.

Telegraph from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1014-T., dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.

Addition to casualties already reported in his telegram No. 966-T., dated the 2nd November 1897, in connection with the attack made by the enemy on the transport going from Arhanga Pass to camp.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—4th November 1897.

J. S.—4th November 1897.

5th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegraph from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan, No. 945-T., dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.

No casualties in reconnaissance of 3rd Brigade on 31st October. Move on the 31st October of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, excepting 1st Brigade, from Mastura into Maidan. An account of the taking of the Arhanga Pass. Large numbers of Afridis observed making their way into the Bara valley over the Suransa Pass. Our casualties during the day.

Telegraph from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda, dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.

Arsalla Khan believed to be inciting the Massuzais and Chamkannis to attack Sadda on the 5th, but Massuzais now anxious to come to terms, if possible.

Telegraph from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, No. 232, dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.

Reports that some Massuzais sent in on the 3rd to Railwan Shah, a Turi Saiyid, asking if he could make some arrangements for them with the Sarkar; and that he replied that he had no concern in their affairs. Rumour amongst tribes that the Afridis are quite broken up and are seeking refuge in every direction.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made. No orders.

G. H.—4th November 1897.

J. S.—4th November 1897.

4th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Memo. to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4484-4485 F., dated the 4th November 1897.)

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications Shinawari, No. 889-C., dated the 3rd (received 4th) November 1897.

Shots fired into convoy escort south of Sanpagha on the 2nd instant without damage. Four hundred of the enemy reported by the Border Police on the night of the 1st to be on hills close to Muhammadzai post.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—4th November 1897.
J. S.—4th November 1897.

4th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, No. 234, dated (and received) 4th November 1897.

Collection of Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar at Sultani in Khurmana Darra. Strength at present between two and three thousand. Attitude of the Khani Khel Chamkanis, Massuzais and Pitaro Alisherzais. Movements of Mulla Khalifa, of Tindah.

Seen by Deputy Secretary and Secretary. Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch officially; and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—5th November 1897.
J. S.—5th November 1897.

5th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Office Memo. to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4449-4450-F., dated the 5th November 1897.)

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan, dated the 4th (received 5th) November 1897.

Reconnaissance by 3rd Brigade on 3rd November to Tseri Kandao. Our casualties on 3rd November. Telegraph completed to Camp on 3rd November. Wire cut and carried away during the night near the Arhanga Pass.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Bala, No. 67-L.P., dated the 4th (received 5th) November 1897.

Daily. Inhabitants of Lower Bara valley reported to be removing families and cattle from villages. Dispersion of the small lashkar which was watching the approaches to the valley.

Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda, No. B.-127, dated the 4th (received 5th) November 1897.

Completion of the survey work commenced on the 2nd in the vicinity of Ghwainghara Darra, north of Krumb. Collection of Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar near Sultani, north end of Khurmana Darra. Application from Khani Khel Glamkannis to Arasala Khan for assistance. Request made by Massuzais to Afridi Khan to arrange for a line across which neither English nor Massuzais should pass.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—5th November 1897.
J. S.—5th November 1897.

5th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinawari, No. 913 C., dated the 4th (received 5th) November 1897.

Reported dispersal of the small gathering of the enemy at the back of the Ublan Pass. Telegraph Office opened at Maidan.

Seen by Deputy Secretary. Assistant Secretary to see.
Usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—5th November 1897.

J. S.—5th November 1897.

5th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

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**Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadaa, No. 235, Dated the 5th (Received 6th) November 1897.**


Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies have been sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch officially, and the usual informal distribution has been made.

No orders.

G. H.—6th November 1897.

J. S.—6th November 1897.

6th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

(Office Memo. to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4467-4468-F, dated the 6th November 1897.)

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**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Bara, No. 67-L.P., Dated the 5th (Received 6th) November 1897.**

Reconnaissance on the 5th up the Gandao defile to within ½ mile of Kotal. Apparent desertion of the neighbourhood by the enemy. Road as far as Kotal narrow, easy and ascent slight.

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**Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadaa, No. B.-118, Dated the 5th (Received 6th) November 1897.**

Continuance of survey work on hills south of Marerina. Numerical strength of lashkar at Sultani. Property removed to Makhamgarh by enemy, who are reported anxious to make peace.

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**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinwari, No. 962-C., Dated the 5th (Received 6th) November 1897.**

Condition of the roads over the Sanpagha and Arhanga Passes. Appearance of foot and mouth disease, of a mild type, among transport cattle at Hangu.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
The usual informal distribution has been made. No orders.

G. H.—6th November 1897.

J. S.—6th November 1897.

6th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

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**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1094-T., Dated the 5th (Received 6th) November 1897.**

Foraging and survey parties sent out on the 4th to north-east of camp. Enemy attempted opposition, but were driven off. Our casualties during the day: camel-road finished to camp.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—6th November 1897.

J. S.—6th November 1897.

7th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.
In reply to Foreign Department letter No. 4211-F, dated the 23rd October 1897, forwards, for information, a copy of a telegram from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, containing his views as to the terms which should be imposed on the Loargai Shinwaris, Shilmanis Mohmands and the Mullagoris who wish to make their submission to Government. Says that the Lieutenant-Governor approves of the terms proposed by Mr. Merk, except that His Honour does not think it worth while to make the Loargai Shinwaris responsible for stopping the Landi Kotal road to the Afridis.

As the Lieutenant-Governor sees no objection to the settlement with these tribes being deferred until it can be carried into effect by the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, in communication with Sir W. Lockhart who is averse to isolated action being taken through the Commissioner in regard to the tribes in question, the draft telegram below may perhaps issue to Sir W. Lockhart, and a copy be sent to the Punjab Government with reference to their letter under consideration.

Military Department and Intelligence Branch may be supplied with a copy of the letter from the Punjab Government and of the orders which may issue thereon.

G. H.—5th November 1897.

Asstistant Secretary.

The terms which Mr. Merk proposes and which the Lieutenant-Governor approves are—

Mullagoris.—Must not permit outlaws to live in their villages and must return two missing rifles belonging to Mullagori Sepoys of the Khyber Rifles.

* * * a fine of Rs. 600 on Loe Shilman, and Rs. 1,000 on the murderer of a chowkidar who was killed by three persons living in Loe Shilman.

Shilmanis.—To be complied with within a week. A fine of Rs. 1,800* and the surrender of five breech-loaders.

Loargai Shinwaris.—To be complied with within ten days. Return of three rifles, restoration of all property looted; surrender of 20 breech-loaders, 40 Enfield rifles, 50 jazails, 100 swords and fine of Rs. 4,000 (British).

Mr. Merk also proposes to make the Loargai Shinwaris responsible for stopping the Landi Kotal road to the Afridis, but the Lieutenant-Governor does not agree.

I venture to put up a draft telegram to Sir William Lockhart, with endorsements.

J. S.—5th November 1897.

Deputy Secretary.

The draft telegram assumes that the settlement with the Mullagoris, Shilmanis and Loargai Shinwaris is to be carried out by the Commissioner, Peshawar, in communication with Sir W. Lockhart. I read Sir W. Lockhart's telegram No. 18 of the 24th October, as wishing the settlement to be carried out by his own Political Officer.

6th November 1897.

Secretary.

The situation has changed a good deal since we received Mr. Dane's letter of the 28th October. The Lieutenant-Governor sees no objection to the settlement being deferred until it can be carried out by the Peshawar Commissioner in communication with Sir William Lockhart. I think now that the whole matter had much better wait. I think this the more because Mr. Merk's proposals seem to me to have the appearance of being hastily made and I doubt whether they are suitable.

(i) Mullagoris.—The only order Mr. Merk proposes, except the exclusion of outlaws, is that they must return the two rifles which were in the hands of two Mullagori sepoys of the Khyber Rifles who are 'missing.' It appears that all the other Mullagoris in the Corps brought in their rifles. The obvious inference is that the Afridis have the two missing ones, and the question of the liability of the Mullagoris to make them good, does not press. Colonel Warburton tells us 'the Mullagoris can muster about 500 fighting men, but, being ill supplied with wealth, they have been unable to arm themselves with good weapons, and have, therefore, to depend solely on old flint and percussion rifles of an ancient date, swords and daggers.'
(ii) Shilman Mohmands.—Mr. Merk proposes that the Loi Shilmanis should be fined five breech-loaders and Rs. 800 and that another Rs. 1,000 should be taken from the murderers of the Chowdri.

It is worth remembering that the number of breech-loaders which Mr. Merk recovered when out with the Mohmand Field Force was twelve only. To take five from the Loi Shilmanis, who are only a portion of a sub-division of a sub-division of the two main sections of the Tarakzai clan, seems rather out of proportion! Colonel Warburton says the Shilmanis were very well off till 1878, as the Kabul Peshawar trade all passed through their country; but since 1878 (when the Khyber was opened) they have been ruined; he describes them as well-behaved.

Then I don’t like the suggestion that the three Shilmanis who ‘killed a Chowdri for loot’ should be let off so lightly. Mr. Merk says—

‘The principal lives in Kam Shilman and should pay five hundred rupees, and his two associates who live in Loi Shilman should pay five hundred.’

It looks to me as if these men should be surrendered and tried for their lives in accordance with whatever procedure obtains in such cases near Peshawar.

(iii) Loargai Shinwaris.—Their sepoys in the Khyber Rifles ‘have brought in all their rifles except three, but eight Shinwari sepoys, who ... are not under the control of the Loargai Maliks, have not brought in their rifles. The Shinwari sepoys ...... fought gallantly at Landi Kotal.’

Mr. Merk would demand ‘delivery of the three rifles not brought in, also restoration of all property looted, also surrender of twenty breech-loaders, forty Enfield rifles, fifty jezails, one hundred swords, payment of four thousand rupees British and closure of Landi Kotal road to Afridis.’ I think that, as in the case of the Mullagoris, the question of the lost three rifles of Khyber Rifles sepoys can wait. I also think that the other terms, specially in the matter of breech-loaders, are much too severe. We have to remember that the bulk of the Shinwaris live in the Jalalabad District. If we impose on our Shinwari terms with which they cannot comply, they would probably refer to their kinsfolk across the border and complications might arise. In respect to the Loargai Shinwaris, Colonel Warburton says—

‘My experience of them, ranging over 17 years, is that in general they are a well-behaved lot, ever willing to use us help to the best of their ability, and the numbers of their Maliks prevents them ever entering into a combination adverse to us.’

2. I think that everything points to the desirability of further consideration. I would send a copy of the Punjab letter, with enclosures, officially to General Lockhart and say that the settlement can wait till he can communicate with Mr. Merk. Punjab to be told officially of this action. I think too that a dem-official letter on the lines of the comments I have made might be written to Mr. Dane and a copy be sent to Sir William Lockhart.

6th November 1897.

H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

The Punjab letter may be sent to Sir W. Lockhart as proposed.

Payment for missing rifles issued to men of the Khyber Rifle Corps is provided for under the system on which the arms are granted on security. I would say so in sending on the letter, so as not to make the return of these rifles a new tribal account arising out of the Afridi depredations. The murder of the Chowdri ought, I think, to be disposed of as it would be independently of the recent disturbances, of which it appears to form no part or to which it is only accidentally connected.

Against the Shilmanis and Mullagoris, then, there appears to be no tribal score. Against the Loargai Shinwaris there is the participation of the clansmen (not maliks) in looting Landi Kotal. While I would leave to Sir William Lockhart the task of dealing with this, I would be much inclined to offer the opinion that Mr. Merk’s terms are unnecessary, if not unjustly severe.

6th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

I agree with Secretary.

We should also entirely agree with Lieutenant Governor that we cannot open the Tartara route.

6th November 1897.

S F—854-Feb.
I submit a draft to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, with endorsement to Punjab Government, Military, and Intelligence Branch.

8th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

SECRETARY.

8th November 1897.

8th November 1897.

Pros. No. (To General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and endorsement to Punjab Government, Military Department, and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4528-4531-E., dated the 8th November 1897.)


Submits, for information, a copy of correspondence regarding the feud between the Zakka Khel Maliks.

Copies may be sent to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and the Military Department?

Draft endorsement put up.

G. H.—6th November 1897.

J. S.—6th November 1897.

SECRETARY.

6th November 1897.

6th November 1897.

(E endorsements to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Military Department, Nos. 4497-4508-F., dated the 8th November 1897.)

His Excellency.

It is unnecessary to deal with the arguments for and against the permanent occupation of Tirah which are contained in Sir William Lockhart’s two telegrams of the 5th November, but there is one matter arising out of them and some others mentioned in his No. 34 of the 6th which require a reply:—

(1) The construction of a road to Maidan up the Bara Valley or partly up the Bara and partly up the Mastura, and of a road into Maidan from Shinawri over the Sanpagha and Arhanga passes.

(2) Authority to tell the jirgas that we shall stop in their country till our terms are complied with.

(3) Reduction of the number of rifles to be demanded to 800 from the Afridis and 500 from the Orakzais.

(4) Compensation for damage done to buildings to be dealt with when tribal relations are considered, and not to be made one of the terms of submission.

2. The first proposal about roads seems to need further elucidation. If it is intended to require the tribes to maintain the roads, the proposal seems to be open to the objections on account of which the Secretary of State has decided against imposing tribute. It would be difficult to keep the tribes to their engagement, and fresh complications would revive. If, on the other hand, the intention is merely to make the roads and leave them to their fate, they would not remain “as the most lasting reminder of our present invasion” or be in existence “to facilitate our operations if it should ever be found necessary to invade them again.”

At the same time a road has already been made into Maidan from Shinawri, and it is reported to-day that it will be fit for ordinarily laden camels immediately over the Sanpagha. No doubt roads will be made in the same way to facilitate present operations; and so far as they are made and are not destroyed, because they are reminders of the present invasion, they
will do good, but I think the answer to the proposal if it is meant merely to make roads and leave them to their fate, must be that only those roads which are of use to us in these operations are worth the expense of making.

3. It will I think be held that we should inconveniently tie our own hands by telling the jirgas that we shall stop in their country till our terms are complied with. It would be a disastrous job to keep a large force in the Afridis' winter quarters in the Bar- valley throughout the winter and to return in the spring to cut their crops and occupy the country throughout the summer. If the Afridis and Orakzais cannot be brought to submission and to the fulfilment of the terms this autumn, it is to be hoped that by imposing a winter blockade or other means than prolonging the campaign through the winter and summer they may be brought to reason. If not, it seems to me that the tribes will damage us more than we can damage them. Sir William Lockhart should retain his liberty to take any action he pleases if his terms are not at once complied with; but should not, I submit tie himself down by saying what that action will be. He might, perhaps, say that we do not want their country and will be glad to leave it, but if they force us to stay or return it will be all the worse for them.

4. Sir William Lockhart will, I presume, be given authority to reduce the number of rifles to be demanded. Doubt was felt lest the number had been pitched too low already, rather than too high.

5. Discretion was already given to Sir William Lockhart as to requiring compensation for destroyed buildings either as part of the terms, or as a thing to be arranged along with the settlement of future relations with the tribes; and as he prefers the latter plan that will, I think, be agreed to.

6. If these views are accepted a telegram may be sent to Sir William Lockhart, perhaps, to the following effect:

"Your telegrams 29 and 30 of the 5th and 34 of 6th November. As to occupation see my 4438 of the 5th which crossed yours. As to other points raised—

"1. Do you propose to require the tribes to maintain the roads into Maidan of which you recommend the construction or is your recommendation that they be merely made and left? In the former case, even if admissible at all after the decision that there is to be no permanent occupation, which is doubtful, it would be difficult in the same way as in the matter of tribute to keep the tribes to their engagement and fresh complications would revive. In the latter case the roads will soon fall into disrepair, even if not wilfully destroyed, and the Government of India think the expense of making them would be thrown away, but you will doubtless go on making any roads which are of use to the expedition as you have already made the one from Shinwari.

"2. The Government of India do not wish to tie their own hands by explicitly saying that the force will stop in the Orakzai and Afridi country till our terms are complied with, but there would be no objection to your saying that while we do not want their country and will be glad to leave it, the tribes will be the worse off if they force us to stay or to return.

"3. In leaving you discretion in the matter of the number of rifles to be demanded, the expectation was that you would be able to increase the demand. We desire to carry out disarmament as fully as possible, but we rely on your judgment, and if you are satisfied you cannot get more, you may reduce the demand for rifles as proposed.

"4. Compensation for buildings may be reserved for settlement with reconstruction of tribal relations, the tribes being told in the way you propose, so long as it is clearly brought home to them that the destruction of the Khyber post in violation of these agreements entitles us to demand their restitution."

7th November 1897. W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

Subject to the additions which I have made to the draft telegram, I agree throughout. But this is a matter of the highest importance and I should wish all Honourable Members to see, and to favour me with their opinions.

I do not think there will be much difference of opinion except on the question of the roads. Now I wish to say that if I had an absolutely free hand I would make these roads at once. I appreciate all the advantages which have been claimed for them, and some which have not. But we must consider what is practicable.

Sir W. Cunningham has put the two alternatives, and as to the post I have very little doubt. I feel absolutely certain in my own mind that the feeling at home on this subject (based, I agree, on misconceptions, but that does not unfortunately determine the result) is such that any formal proposition to require the tribes to make or maintain roads will be rejected. As an illustration I may mention that I had a telegram from the Secretary of State asking if I had considered whether the proposal that Sir W. Lockhart should endeavour to secure the right to realign the road in the Khyber was not ruled out as contrary to the notification. I replied that it was a job to the large force to be demanded. But a straw shows how the wind blows, and it is because I honestly desire to open up the country as much as I can that I deprecate our taking up the first alternative in the draft telegram.

And in the same way as to the second alternative. I do not believe for an instant that the India Council would sanction a large expenditure on roads which avowedly were to be maintained by the tribes. What I would impress on Honourable Members is that we can do all that is possible in this direction by simply holding our tongues. We have been informed that a camel-road is now open from Shinwari into Tirah, and so long as Sir W. Lockhart remains there, no one can complain of his improving his means of communication. In the
same way he will sooner or later move into the Bara valley and join hands with General Hammond. The road from both ends must be improved during these operations.

I am not speaking without experience. In May 1895 the Liberal Government, though they gave us no hint that our Proclamation was the obstacle which is now alleged, were very touchy about the making of roads, and, in consequence of some report which reached them, demanded to know what we were doing. On the authority of the Commander-in-Chief I replied that all we were doing was what was absolutely necessary for maintaining our communications. And that answer was literally true. But all the same, the roads so constructed have with very small additional cost, sufficed for the celebrated road to Chitral, which I think it was stated in the House of Commons would cost 1½ millions sterling, and is now the reputed cause of all our troubles.

I do not wish to be misunderstood. I am not advocating any concealment or underhand proceedings. I should be prepared to declare in the House of Commons that if a tribe compels us by their misconduct to send an expedition at great cost into their country, we shall not only make such roads as are necessary for our getting into the country, but we shall go to work in a manner that will make it easier for us to come back again if we again have cause. What I wish to avoid is any question of bargain with the tribe in the matter, and to my mind unless the roads are to be maintained there is no call whatever for a bargain.

I most entirely agree as to paragraph 2 of the draft telegram. Our experience in the Tochi shows how essential it is that we should be free to do exactly what is most convenient to ourselves.

Circulate urgently.
7th November 1897.

Circulated.
8th November 1897.

Considering the limits within which we have now to dictate terms to the Afridis, I agree in the amended draft telegram.
8th November 1897.

I agree in the telegram, and in two parts of the policy described.

(1) That we should be free, so far as any engagements arising out of our declarations to the tribes are concerned, to do or not to do anything we please.

(2) That during our present temporary occupation we should take such opportunities as we may of making and improving the roads into Tirah.

I trust also we are perfectly free to do at Chagra Kotal what we please. Our frontier, I understand, runs up to it, and it is in the same line of hills as Fort Lockhart and Fort Cavagnari and not far from them. Our approach to it is an important road which I presume can be preserved to us, without annexation.

9th November 1897.

I agree.
9th November 1897.

I agree. We have not a free hand, and I think the draft telegram goes as far as the Home authorities are likely to permit us to go.
9th November 1897.

I agree.
9th November 1897.

I agree in His Excellency the Viceroy's note, and in the draft telegram.
10th November 1897.

Issue the telegram?
10th November 1897.
10th November 1897.

Telegram to General Officer, Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4568-F, dated the 11th November 1897.

Endorsements to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, Nos. 4569—4571-F, dated the 11th November 1897.
TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, No. 1124-T., DATED THE 6TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Foraging parties sent out on 6th to north, east and west of camp. North party fired on. Casualties on both sides. Shots fired into Camp at night.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, PESHAWAR COLUMN, BARRA, No. 71-I. P., DATED THE 6TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Reported collection of lashkar of about 1,100 Aka and Zakha Khels and Sipah at Baran and Prakrai in Bara valley with intention of opposing advance of Peshawar column. Reported removal by Zakha, Aka and Kambar Khels of their families via Bukar, Halwai and Mangal Bagh passes towards Ningrarah.

TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER COMMANDING, KURRAM MAIDAN CAMP, SADDA, No. B. 131, DATED 6TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Departure of detachment, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, to Para Chinar for Kohat.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, COMMUNICATIONS, No. 1008-C., DATED THE 6TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Condition of road over the Sanpagha Pass.

TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, No. 1175-T., DATED 7TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.


Reconnassiance made on 7th through Khurmana defile and good survey made of portion of Massuzai country. Strength and position of defile. Enemy completely surprised. Road possible for cavalry. Discovery in Esor of arms, powder and grain. Attack made by enemy on retirement. Casualties on both sides.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. The usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—8th November 1897.
J. S.—8th November 1897.
8th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, No. 40, DATED THE 7TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Arrival in camp of jirgas of certain tribes. Non-appearance of Afridi jirgas. Foraging parties daily harassed. Capture by the enemy on the 6th November of 40 mules. Camp heavily fired into at night, and on the evening of the 6th one British officer killed and another severely wounded.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4507-4508-F., dated the 8th November 1897.)

S F—604.554—Feb.
Pros. No. 691. TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, KURRAM, SADDA, No. 243, DATED THE 7TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Composition of enemy who opposed the reconnaissance on the 7th through the Khurmana defile. Discovery in Esor village of the lance of Duffadar, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, who was ambuscaded on the 1st October 1897.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—8th November 1897.
J. S.—8th November 1897.
8th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4505-4506-F., dated the 8th November 1897.)

Pros. No. 695. TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, KURRAM, SADDA, No. 246, DATED (AND RECEIVED) 8TH NOVEMBER 1897.

Wish of Chikkai to sell his property in Chinarak to the Daudzai and migrate with his family either to British territory or, if that is not allowed, to Arabia. Reply sent him.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch officially; and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—9th November 1897.
J. S.—9th November 1897.
9th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4517-4518-F., dated the 9th November 1897.)

Pros. No. 702. TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER COMMANDING, KURRAM MOVABLE COLUMN, SADDA, No. B. 133, DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 9TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Loss of one Subadar and 55 rank and file of Kapurthala Infantry. Tirah refugees coming to Massuzaiz. Collection of a Chamaani lashkar, 2,000 strong, in Darra, north of Janikot. Complaint from Chikkai regarding his difficult position owing to his friendly attitude towards British.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—9th November 1897.
J. S.—9th November 1897.
9th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

(Memorandum to the India Office, No. 85-M., dated the 11th November 1897.)

Pros. No. 722. TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING COMMUNICATIONS SHIKAWARI, No. 1068-C., DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 9TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Fifty-four camels looted on 7th from beyond picquet limits Karappa and one sowar wounded. Recovery of 52 camels.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—9th November 1897.
J. S.—9th November 1897.
9th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.
Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 104, Dated the 8th (Received 9th) November 1897.

Appearance of the Malakand Fakir in the Khyber. Report that he is putting up with Malik Khwas Khan. Steps taken to obtain reliable information.

Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, No. 247, Dated the 8th (Received 9th) November 1897.

Composition of lashkär who attacked the reconnaissance force on the 7th. Massuzai Chamkanni lashkär reported in neighbourhood of Khurmana Darra on the 8th. Tirah refugees flocking to Massuzai and Chamkanni country. Refusal of the Alishanai of Totang to receive them. Chikkaï informed that if he allows refugees within his limits, he will be held responsible for their actions.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch; and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—9th November 1897.
J. S.—9th November 1897.

9th November 1897. E. H. S. Clarke.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4522-4523-F., dated the 9th November 1897.)

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan, No. 1196-T., Dated the 8th (Received 9th) November 1897.

Forging party, with 3rd Brigade and No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. A., proceeded on the 7th west of camp, bringing in 60 maunds of grain. Enemy followed retirement. Casualties on both sides. Shots fired into camp on the evening of the 7th. One man, 28th Bombay Pioneers, dangerously wounded. Encounter on the morning of the 8th between 2:1 Gurkhas and the enemy south of Arhanga Pass. Enemy's casualties.

Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 102, Dated the 8th (Received 9th) November 1897.

Repeats a telegram from the Political officer, Khyber, reporting that two elders of the Luargai Shinwaris have come in and represented that, owing to communications being stopped with Jalalabad and Peshawar, they are suffering from hunger.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Usual informal distribution has been made.

Copy of telegram No. 102 of the 8th November from the Commissioner of Peshawar sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch.

G. H.—9th November 1897.
J. S.—9th November 1897.

The statement of the Luargai Shinwaris contradicts the report we heard last month that the Amir had sent a firman to the Sartip of Dhalka withdrawing the prohibition of the export of grain from the Jalalabad district, in order that the tribesmen should not suffer from want of supplies in consequence of their breach of friendly relations with us.

9th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4520-4521-F., dated the 9th November 1897.)
Frps Nos, FROM THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, NO. 1640, DATED THE 6TH (RECEIVED 8TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Forwards, for information, a copy of a letter, and enclosures, received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, submitting a report by the Commandant of the Border Military Police of the Kohat District regarding the behaviour of the men who garrisoned the posts which were destroyed or taken possession of by the enemy on the 27th August last.

For information. A copy of the letter and enclosures may be sent to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch? Draft endorsement submitted,

G. H.—9th November 1897.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Yes. No remarks are called for in this Department.

J. S.—9th November 1897.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

F. H. S. CLARKE.

H. DALT.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

10th November 1897.

Issue. Secretary to see.

10th November 1897.

17th November 1897.

[Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4689-4690-F., dated the 17th November 1897.]

PROS. No. TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, NO. 1246-T., DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 10TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Foraging parties sent on 8th to north and east of camp collected large quantities of supplies and demolished Zakha Khel towers, from which camp had been fired into. Casualties on both sides. Casualties in affair reported by General Hart from Mastura. Shots fired into camp on the evening of the 8th. Captain Watson, Commissariat Department, killed. Reconnaissance made on 9th to crest of Saran Sar, 5 miles east of camp. Defences of a large number of Zakha Khel villages destroyed. Enemy suffered loss.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Usual informal distribution made, and copy sent officially to the Punjab Government.

G. H.—10th November 1897.

(Endorsement to the Government of the Punjab, No. 4544-F., dated the 10th November 1897.)

PROS. No. TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, KURRAM, SADDA, NO. 248, DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 10TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Release of two Shergai Khel, who were taken prisoners by Khani Khel Chamkannis last month, on payment of ransom. Assembly at Issar of lashkar of all sections of Massuzaiz and Chamkannis. Distribution by enemy of rifles of Kapurthala Infantry killed on the 8th. Shahi Chamkannis of Gaobarra accused by Massuzaiz and Chamkannis of having betrayed them and led British troops through Kurmanza Darra. Intention of the lashkar to burn Gaobarra villages; inhabitants taking refuge in Shaka Darra. Bringing in of dead bodies of one Turi and one Gurkha by the Alisherzai Khans of Tootang.

Seen by Deputy Secretary and Secretary.

Usual informal distribution made, and copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch.

G. H.—10th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4542-4543-F., dated the 10th November 1897.)
Corroboration of report that all men of Kapurthala Infantry reported missing have been killed. Two Chamikani Malik's killed. Enemy's casualties. Combined Iashkar reported still at issue.

Cutting of telegraph line between Shinawari and Karappa. Line repaired. Telegraph party fired on from spur at junction of Chagru and Khanki valley. Four men wounded.

Repeat a telegram from the Political Officer, Khyber, reporting news received about the arrival of seven Mulas in Khyber. Mulas putting up with Sultan Khels. Objective not known.

Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch; and usual informal distribution made.

Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch officially, and informally to Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Military Secretary to the Viceroy and Honourable Members.

With reference to the telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 94, dated the 1st November 1897, submits, for orders, a copy of a letter received from that officer, and of its enclosures, giving in detail the reasons for the proposal of the local officers that troops should enter the country of the Masseuzais and Khani Khel Chamkannis and also of the Alisherzais, and enforce compliance with certain terms to be imposed upon them for their past offences in Kurram and participation in the recent disturbances on that frontier.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY.
Copies sent officially to Military and Intelligence Branch.
G. H.—11th November 1897.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

When we received the telegram No. 94 of 1st November from Commissioner, Peshawar, the order passed was that we should wait a bit till we heard from Sir William Lockhart as to his plans and proceedings, as it was primarily for him to make proposals as to dealing with the Chamkannis, etc. We have not yet received proposals from the General Officer Commanding, and now Punjab Government has sent up a very strong case for at once taking in hand the Massuzais and Chamkannis. The list of offences against them is grave and to it must be added their combined attack on the reconnaissance party up the Kharmana defile on the 7th November, and the killing of the Kapurtbala Infantry pigoulet and capture of their rifles. Both Gar and Samil Massuzais and all sections of Chamkannis took part in this affair. Any terms imposed will, of course, now include the restoration of the Kapurtbala breech-loaders.

The Punjab Government has sent direct to Sir William Lockhart a copy of the present letter, and he should receive it to-day. The first thing to be done, it seems, is to obtain his views, and I venture to put up a draft telegram to him for consideration.

11th November 1897.

I have placed in the file a copy of the "Revised Report on the Chamkanni and some Adjacent Tribes" which we received from the Intelligence Branch in April last. It is interesting reading. The following passages may be quoted:

"It is the boast of the Chamkannis that they have been able to annoy every administration which has governed Kurram. During the late Afghan war, they, especially the Khani Khel, gave a good deal of trouble, and since our occupation of Kurram in October 1892 the Khani Khel have been guilty of several serious attacks upon kuria."

"Measures for making reprisals against this tribe would be a very simple affair if the Massuzais and their other neighbours could be induced to hold aloof."

The map at the end of the Report may be referred to.

2. The situation has changed since the Punjab Government drafted the letter under note. Sir William Lockhart is aware of the destruction of the Kapurtbala Picquet. I would not hurry him as to proposed action. If he thinks the moment opportune, he will doubtless wish to strike at once. The Chamkanni and Massuzai country is, however, a more or less isolated block; and it may be better to wait. When we do deal with the Chamkannis, we should, I think, carry out strict disarmament. Their position and isolation seems to render the measure would be specially desirable if we

11th November 1897.

(Hold endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4683-4694 F., dated the 12th November 1897.)

H. DALY.

His Excellency.

I agree that the Government of India should wait for Sir William Lockhart's proposals before coming to a conclusion as to the terms to be imposed on the Pass Chamkannis and the Petar Massuzais, and as to the method of dealing with them. I would tell Sir William Lockhart that the Government are waiting and the amended telegram below may, I think, issue.

18th November 1897.

This question was mentioned in Council yesterday by the Commander-in-Chief, who desires to take action from a military point of view and as affecting the general situation. Politically this is, I think, also desirable, and I have altered the telegram accordingly.

18th November 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and Government of the Punjab, Nos. 4610-4612 F., dated the 18th November 1897.

E.
PROS. NO. 707. 

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. CAMP MAIDAN, NO. 42, DATED THE 8TH (RECEIVED 12TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Destruction of Zakha Khel villages in the Maidan valley. Arrival on the evening of the 7th of the jirgas of Bazotis, Utman Khel and Mastura Sturi Khel.

PROS. NO. 724.


Recommends that to the terms to Massuzai and Chamkannis already proposed, the surrender of the 35 rifles captured from Kapurthala Infantry be added.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4592-4593 F., dated the 12th November 1897.)

PROS. NO. 713.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, NO. 43, DATED THE 9TH (RECEIVED 10TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Arrival in camp of jirgas of certain Afridi clans. Attitude of Zakha Khel and Aka Khel, Afridis. British officer killed on the evening of the 8th. Reconnaissance made on the 9th up the Saran Sar. Destruction of nearly forty more of Zakha Khel forts. Total number of their forts destroyed. Retirement followed by enemy on whom sharp punishment was inflicted by rear guard with but little loss to the latter.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—11th November 1897.
J. S.—11th November 1897.

SECRETARY.

Perhaps this telegram may be sent to Secretary of State.
10th November 1897. E. H. S. CLARKE.

10th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

10th November 1897.

E.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4556-4557 F., dated the 11th November 1897.)

[Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 11th November 1897.]

[Endorsement to Military Department No. 4551 F., dated the 11th November 1897.]

PROS. NO. 716.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. CAMP MAIDAN, NO. 1254-T., DATED THE 10TH (RECEIVED 11TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Heavy loss inflicted by the enemy on the rear guard towards end of retirement from Saran Sar on the 9th. Foraging party of 3rd Sikhs to north of camp had one man wounded. Cutting of telegraph line on night of 9th. Information regarding the detachment of Kapurthala Infantry killed by the enemy.

PROS. NO. 717.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, PESHAWAR COLUMN, BAZA, NO. 76-I.F., DATED THE 10TH (RECEIVED 11TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Gathering of Ali Khels in the vicinity of Gandao Pass and Barkai.

PROS. NO. 718.

TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER COMMANDING, KURRAM MOVEABLE COLUMN, SADDA, NO. B-144, DATED THE 10TH (RECEIVED 11TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Pro. Nos. 719. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinwari, No. 1133-C., dated the 10th (received 11th) November 1897.

Cutting of telegraph line on 9th between Mastura and Maidan. Segregation at Kai of 80 bullocks owing to outbreak of foot and mouth disease.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. The usual informal distribution has been made. No orders.

G. H.—11th November 1897.
J. S.—11th November 1897.

11th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Pro. No. 654. Endorsement from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, Nos. 17 and 18-P., dated the 3rd (received 10th) November 1897.

Memorandum of events on the 1st November 1897, by Colonel R. Warburton, Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Pro. Nos. 655-656. Endorsement from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, Nos. 19 and 20-P., dated the 3rd (received 10th) November 1897.

Political Diaries Nos. XV and XVI for the 31st October and 1st November 1897.

Copy sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch officially, and informally to Military Secretary to the Viceroy, Private Secretary to the Viceroy and Honourable Members.

G. H.—12th November 1897.
J. S.—12th November 1897.

12th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

H. Daly.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4598-4599-F., dated the 13th November 1897.)

Pro. No. 728. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 46, dated the 11th (received 12th) November 1897.

Reports arrival in camp of all sections of the Orakzais to hear the terms of Government and asks for an urgent reply to his telegram No. 34 of the 6th November, enquiring whether he may announce that country will be occupied till demands are satisfied, and whether he may reduce the number of rifles to be surrendered.

This (No. 46) has crossed my telegram.

11th November 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

Seen by Deputy Secretary. Copies have been sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—12th November 1897.
J. S.—12th November 1897.

12th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4594-4595-F., dated the 12th November 1897.)

Pro. No. 727. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinwari, No. 1142-C., dated the 11th (received 12th) November 1897.

Watch piquets, south-west of Karappa camp, fired on from opposite side of Khanki. Destruction of defences of the village in vicinity of which firing had taken place. Telegraph wire again cut between Mastura and Maidan.
Pros. No. 725. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1291-T., dated the 11th (received 12th) November 1897.
Casualties amongst foraging party of the 10th to west of camp.

Pros. No. 726. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1317-T., dated the 11th (received 12th) November 1897.
March to Saran Sar to complete survey, bring in forage and destroy defences of such Zakha Khel villages as could be reached. Object satisfactorily accomplished. Casualties on both sides.

Pros. No. 730. Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Moveable Column, Sada, No. O-144, dated the 11th (received 12th) November 1897.
Steps taken by Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar who are still in Khurmana Darra between Jaunikot and Khasina, to be prepared for any sudden advance of our troops.

Usual informal distribution made. Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.—No orders.
G. H.—12th November 1897.
J. S.—12th November 1897.
12th November 1897. E. H. S. Clarke.

Pros. No. 741. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 47, dated the 12th (received 13th) November 1897.
With reference to our telegram No. 4588-F., dated the 11th November 1897, gives his reasons for proposing a reduction in the number of the rifles to be surrendered, and states the measures which should, in his opinion, be adopted to enforce compliance with the demand. Attitude of the Zakha Khel, Kuki Khel, Sipah and Kamrai, Afridis. Steps which might have to be taken to coerce the Zakha Khels.

Pros. No. 749. [Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4587-F., dated the 12th November 1897.]
[Endorsements to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, Nos. 4588-4590-F., dated the 12th November 1897.]

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
G. H.—13th November 1897.
J. S.—13th November 1897.
13th November 1897. E. H. S. Clarke.

Pros. Nos. 731-735. Endorsement from the Military Department, No. 416-T. L., dated the 11th (received 12th) November 1897.
Forwards, for information, copy of papers regarding an attack made at 8 a.m. on the 27th October 1897, on the picket north of the camp at Hari Singh.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copy may be sent to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force?
Draft endorsement put up.
The Punjab Government have no doubt been informed by the local authorities.
G. H.—13th November 1897.

Assistant Secretary.

No orders. The Military Department has most probably sent to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and to the Punjab Government.

J. S.—18th November 1897.
13th November 1897. E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinab, No. 257, Dated the 12th (Received 13th) November 1897.

Increase of Massuzai-Chamkanni lashkar in Khurmana Darra. Execution by Massuzais of a Massuzai called Wazir who used to supply information. Bodies of three men of Kapurthala Infantry killed on 7th brought in by Totang Alisherzais.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch officially, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—18th November 1897.
J. S.—13th November 1897.

13th November 1897. E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan No. 1848-T., Dated the 12th (Received 13th) November 1897.


Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Bala, No. 78-J. P., Dated the 12th (Received 13th) November 1897.

Reported dispersal of the small lashkar at Paskrai and Barwan.

Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadra, No. O.-147, Dated the 12th (Received 13th) November 1897.

Enemy still near Janikot. Composition of the lashkar.

Assistant Secretary.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Usual informal distribution has been made. No orders.

G. H.—18th November 1897.

13th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 49, Dated the 12th (Received 13th) November 1897.

Announcement to the complete jirga of the Orakzai tribe of the terms of Government. Their reception of the terms announced. Measures to be adopted to coerce the Zakha Khel and other Afridi clans who are still opposing our troops.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan No. 50, Dated (and Received) 13th November 1897.

Replies to our telegram No. 4587-F., dated 12th November 1897, and submits his proposals regarding the adoption of measures for coercing the Afridis in the event of their not submitting to the terms of punishment imposed by Government within a reasonable period.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government Nos. 4605-4608-F., dated the 13th November 1897.)

[Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 14th November 1897.]

[Endorsement to the Military Department, No. 4618 F., dated the 15th November 1897.]
Copies of telegrams from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, sent officially to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—15th November 1897.

His Excellency.

If the Government accept Sir William Lockhart’s proposal for dealing with the Afridis—and the Orakzais, if necessary, for they may refuse to accept the terms announced to them—I understand that the Secretary of State must be consulted.

I suggest a telegram.

“Foreign-Secret.—Though some Afridi jirgas have come to Lockhart’s camp the Zakha-khel, Kukihel, Kamrai and Sipaj are holding aloof. Lockhart reports forage in Maidan and Upper Mastura will not last beyond end of this month and force cannot stay in those places beyond that. If Afridis still refuse to comply with our demands we propose to move Lockhart’s force down to Lower Bara valley within easy reach of Fort Bara whence flying columns can be organized to visit Rajgal and Bazar valleys and the Lower Mastura is easily accessible so that Orakzais can be dominated too, if necessary.

“This may involve troops being kept in tribal country all winter which we must face, if necessary.

“As a means of putting additional pressure on the Afridis we contemplate sending troops into the Khyber to occupy posts there and as a temporary expedient keep that road open during the winter by troops.

“We ask for sanction to adoption of these measures, if they prove necessary.”

14th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

I think this correctly summarises the situation. Let His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief see, and, if he concurs, let telegram issue.

14th November 1897.

E.

Military Department. (Please send to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.)

15th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

To Military Department, U. O.

Secretary.

May be sent to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

15th November 1897.

E. DE BRATH.

Yes. Then to the Honourable Member please.

16th November 1897.

P. J. MAITLAND.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, through Quarter-Master-General in India.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Draft telegram for concurrence.

16th November 1897.

A. R. Baddock.

I concur.

16th November 1897.

G. S. W[HITE].

To Military Department, U. O.

Hon’ble Member.

17th November 1897.

E. DE BRATH.

17th November 1897.

E. H. H. C[OLLEN].

To Foreign Department unofficially.
Pros. No. 753. [Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurrak, Sada, No. 253, dated the 13th (received 15th) November 1897.]

Massuzai-Chamkanni lashkar still at Janikot in Khurmana Darra.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4718-4764-P, dated the 15th November 1897.)

Pros. No. 754. [Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurrak Movable Column, Sada, No. E-253, dated the 13th (received 15th) November 1897.]

Cessation, for political reasons, of all survey operations. Increase in numbers of lashkar in Khurmana Darra.

(Endorsement to the Military Department, No. 4718-4764-P, dated the 18th November 1897.)

Pros. No. 755. [Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurrak Movable Column, Sada, No. E-253, dated the 13th (received 15th) November 1897.]

Collection of supplies north of camp without opposition. Steps being taken for the selection of alignment of road to Bagh. Casualties with General Westmacott's foraging party reported in General Officer Commanding's daily telegram of the 12th November. Departure of the 3rd Brigade for Waran. No opposition so far.

Pros. No. 756. [Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditory Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1370 T., dated the 13th (received 15th) November 1897.]

Report by Brigadier-General Hart that a foraging party were attacked close to camp by enemy, but repulsed enemy and brought in forage. Casualties. Departure of Mr. Donald to Mastura to investigate cause of this attack.

Pros. No. 757. [Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditory Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1374 T., dated the 14th (received 15th) November 1897.]

Arrival of the 3rd Brigade at Waran without opposition. Supplies being collected from villages. House of Mulla Saiyid Akbar destroyed.

Pros. No. 758. [Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditory Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1409 T., dated the 14th (received 15th) November 1897.]

Reconnaissance to east of camp in Waran. Forage collected without opposition in the valley.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Usual informal distribution has been made. No orders.

G. H.—15th November 1897.
J. S.—15th November 1897.
15th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Pros. No. 759. [Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditory Force, Camp Maidan, No. 51, dated the 13th (received 15th) November 1897.]

Departure from camp on the 13th of the Samil Orak Jirgas after settling among themselves shares in which they propose to surrender rifles and to pay the money fine. No further news of Afridi Jirgas.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4840-4841-P, dated the 15th November 1897.)
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 52, dated the 14th (received 15th) November 1897.

Composition of enemy opposed to us in the fighting on the Saran Sar. Their casualties.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

No orders.

G. H. — 15th November 1897.
J. S. — 15th November 1897.
15th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

No. 52, DATED THE 14TH (RECEIVED 15TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Composition of enemy opposed to us in the fighting on the Saran Sar. Their casualties.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

No orders.

G. H. — 15th November 1897.
J. S. — 15th November 1897.
15th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4638-4639-F, dated the 15th November 1897.)


Encloses a telegram from Major Scallon, Maidan, regarding the loss of the thirty-five men of the Kapurthala Infantry. Says that he does not hold with the opinion expressed therein.

I don't understand the responsible but not to blame. I hope we shall get a written report which will clear the matter up.

14th November 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

Assistant Secretary and Deputy Secretary to see.

G. H. — 16th November 1897.
J. S. — 16th November 1897.
16th November 1897.
16th November 1897.

H. Daly.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4667-4668-F., dated the 16th November 1897.)

Political Diaries Nos. XVII and XVIII for the 2nd and 3rd November 1897.

Political Diary No. XIX for the 4th November 1897.

F. FROM THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, No. 1678, DATED THE 11TH (RECEIVED 13TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Submits the Political Diary No. 146, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, for the 22nd October 1897.

Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and informally to Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Military Secretary to the Viceroy, and Hon'ble Members.

G. H. — 15th November 1897.
J. S. — 16th November 1897.
16th November 1897.
16th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

H. Daly.

Messages received by Chikkai from Tirah that his arrest has been ordered. Chikkai's offer to sell Chinarak.

Commissioner's opinion regarding the service rendered by Chikkai and that he merits a substantial recognition. Request for authority to instruct the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to inform Chikkai that he will be well rewarded for his conduct during August and September, and that Government is confident he will by further service complete the claim he has earned for a recognition of his merit.

Advice to the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to reassure Chikkai as to good faith of British Government and to induce him not to sell Chinarak. Inadvisability of putting pressure upon the Koedad Kbel in order to prevent their buying Chinarak except as a last resort.

With reference to Foreign Department * telegram No. 4613-F., dated the 14th November 1897, says that if he is authorised to give Chikkai his personal assurance that Government has no intention of interfering with him or with internal affairs of his tribe, and that his services to Government since August will eventually receive suitable recognition, he (Officer on Special Duty, Kurram) will answer for keeping Chikkai straight.

Two letters received from Chikkai stating that after receiving messages from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, he has decided to remain in Chinarak, and that he holds the Officer on Special Duty responsible for his safety and honour.

Replies to our telegram No. 4613-F., dated 14th November 1897, to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, enquiring whether he supports the recommendation of the Commissioner, Peshawar, that Chikkai be immediately informed that he will be rewarded for his services in August and September.

* To the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.
It seemed to me that the proposal to promise Chikkai a reward was going too far and that is why I consulted the General Officer Commanding.

The Lieutenant-Governor's opinion is the same, and the Officer on Special Duty's telegram No. 267 of 15th, indicates that what has been said is enough. But we will wait for the General Officer Commanding's answer.

15th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4655-4656-F., dated the 15th November 1897.)

**Telegrams**

**Press No. 775.**

**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan No. 58, dated the 15th November 1897.**

In reply to Foreign Department telegram No. 4613-F., dated the 14th November 1897, says that he supports the proposal made by the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, in his telegram No. 265, dated the 14th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 4657-4659-F., dated the 15th November 1897.)

**Press No. 776.**

**Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 121, dated (and received) the 15th November 1897.**

Refers to Punjab Government telegram No. 15-C., dated the 14th November 1897, and under circumstances stated, recommends that Chikkai be secured as soon as possible.

Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—15th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4651-4652-F., dated 15th November 1897.)

**Secretary.**

For orders as to the assurance to be given to Chikkai.

J. S.—15th November 1897.

His Excellency.

There have been a great many telegrams relating to the proper measures to be taken to reassure "Chikkai" and prevent his falling away and giving trouble.

I consulted Sir William Lockhart because the first telegrams from the Commissioner seemed to perhaps promise too much, which by showing anxiety would be dangerously likely to make Chikkai bid higher.

The Lieutenant-Governor appears to be of that way of thinking, but he makes a reservation in favour of following Sir William Lockhart's advice, and he goes a little further than the Lieutenant-Governor. I would therefore answer to Sir William Lockhart:

"Your 59, November 15th. The Government of India approve of the O. S. D., Kurram, giving Chikkai his personal assurance that Government has no intention of interfering with him or with internal affairs of his tribe and that his services to Government since August will eventually receive suitable recognition."

In issuing therefore add:

"But if the O. S. D. is fully assured that the incident may be regarded as closed by what passed at his interview as reported in telegram No. 271 of the 16th November, no further promise need be given."

and repeat to Punjab, Commissioner of Peshawar, and the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.

We shall, if all goes well, receive, later, recommendations as to the form which the suitable recognition should take.

15th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

The promise has the disadvantage of being very indefinite, but, as the General Officer Commanding supports it, I agree.

16th November 1897.

E.

I have heard of the Officer on Special Duty's interview in the meantime, and he reports Chikkai completely reassured.

16th November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

(Endorsements to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4686-F., dated the 16th November 1897.)

Repeated to Punjab Government, Commissioner Peshawar, and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.
Submits, for information, a copy of correspondence which explains the circumstances under which the Sipayah Jirga came to be summoned by the Political Officer, Khyber.

The correspondence shows that the Udredun Sipahs of Jhungde have remained friendly and taken no part in the recent hostile demonstrations against the British Government.

Copies may be sent to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Military Department, and Intelligence Branch?

Draft endorsement submitted.

G. H.—16th November 1897.

J. S.—16th November 1897.

[Endorsements to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Military Department, and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4702-4704-F., dated the 17th November 1897.]

**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1438-T., Dated the 15th (Received 16th) November 1897.**

Reconnaissances in the Waran valley and collection of fodder. No resistance offered so far. Foraging party to west of Mastura on 14th met with slight opposition. No casualties on our side. Enemy, two killed and two wounded. Completion of good mule and camel road between Mastura and Maidan.

**Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda, No. B.—158, Dated the 15th (Received 16th) November 1897.**

Rumoured intention of Massuzai to attack Doaba post. Steps taken to reinforce Thal. Chikkai expected at Munduri on the 16th to meet Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, who has gone there.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—16th November 1897.

J. S.—16th November 1897.

16th November 1897.

**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 54, Dated (and Received) the 15th November 1897.**

Refers to Punjab Government letter No. 1656 dated the 8th November 1897, and gives his opinion on the subject of punishment of Massuzais and Chamkannis.

Let me see with the letter and the telegram which went to Sir W. Lockhart on it.

15th November 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4870 4671-F., dated the 16th November 1897.)

**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 55, Dated the 15th (Received 16th) November 1897.**

Says that the above telegram has crossed our message No. 4609-F., dated the 13th instant which only reached him on the evening of the 15th.
Copies of telegram No. 54 have been sent officially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch; and the usual informal distribution has been made.

G. H.—16th November 1897.
J. S.—16th November 1897.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Please see the previous notes by Deputy Secretary, Secretary and His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 11th—13th November 1897.

The terms announced by Sir William Lockhart to the Orakzais, include the Kurram Massuzaizais and Alisherzais, and it is his intention to visit their country whether they settle up or not within the fortnight allowed them, and they have been so informed.

The General agrees to the terms for the Chamkannis proposed by the Commissioner Peshawar, and supported by the Lieutenant Governor, viz., surrender of 30 breech-loaders or fine of Rs. 1,000 in cash * or cattle, and restoration of all Government property (which would include the rifles taken from the Kapurthala Infantry). He asks authority to announce these terms to the Chamkannis through the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram, at once.

Unless Captain Daly's suggestion to insist upon strict disarmament in the case of the Chamkannis is to be pursued, perhaps the telegram drafted below may issue to Sir William Lockhart.

16th November 1897.

H. DALY.

SECRETARY.

You spoke about this and wish to submit it quickly to His Excellency. Mr. Merk estimated that the Chamkanni tribe had 60 to 70 breech-loaders and at the most 1,100 matchlocks. Mr. Donald thought they had not more than 25 breech-loaders.

2. As regards surrender of rifles, compare the beginning of Sir William Lockhart's telegram No. 47, dated the 12th November, with paragraph 3 of Mr. Merk's letter No. 8401.P. dated the 1st November, received with the Punjab letter No. 1656, dated the 8th November now under note.

16th November 1897.

H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

For approval of the telegram to which I have added a sentence designed to prevent the periods of "grace" allowed to the Orakzais and Chamkannis from differing.

The Chamkannis are in a stronger position than the Orakzais. They have not sent in a jirga to hear the terms. The Orakzais of the Kurram side appear to have sent in a jirga to hear the terms in Tirah, while their lashkar continued to threaten Sadda from the Kharmana. I can't help wishing that they had been told to disperse that lashkar within a shorter time than the fortnight of grace, on penalty of a hostile visit from Sir William Lockhart. The Chamkannis and Kurram Orakzais, even if they now accept and comply with the terms, will have received no additional punishment, and they inflicted a severe blow on us in the destruction of the Kapurthala picquet.

I wish it may not be suggested by the critics of the Indian Government that leniency has been shown to these sections because no great value is attached to thirty-six lives of men of a Native State army.

16th November 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

There is no saying what critics may say, but there would be no justification for anything of the kind.

16th November 1897.

E.

Pros. No. [Telegram§ to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4698-F., dated the 17th November 1897.]

(Endorsements to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4699-4700-F., dated the 17th November 1897.)§ Repeated to Punjab Government.

Prs. No. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Thal, No. 271, dated (and received) the 16th November 1897.

Chikkai reassured. Consequent decision not to sell Chinarak. His desire to be used as an intermediary in bringing about a settlement with the tribes, especially with the Manuzai and Alisheraiz.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies sent officially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—17th November 1897.

Assistant Secretary.
The Secretary has utilized this information in his telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4685-F., dated the 16th November 1897.

Please see his note dated the 16th.

J. S.—17th November 1897.

17th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Pro. No. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 1485-T., dated the 16th (received 17th) November 1897.

Movements of the troops under General Kempster in Waran. Capture of a wounded Aka Khel, who is reported to have been armed with a rifle of Kabul manufacture. Survey work completed to the junction of the Mastura and Waran valleys. Discovery of a broad road leading up valley towards Matri Pass into Bara valley. Treacherous conduct of Malikdin and Kambar Khels in connection with General Westmacott’s foraging parties west of camp. Our casualties. Return of General Kempster’s force from Waran. Move to Bagh”on 17th of 2nd Brigade, with Headquarters and Divisional Troops, 1st Division. General attitude of tribes in the Maidan valley.
PROS. NO. 783.

TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER COMMANDING, KURRAM MOVEABLE COLUMN, CAMP, SADDA, NO. B-161, DATED THE 15TH (RECEIVED 17TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Arrival of troops at Sadda from Para Chinar en route to Thal. Mamuzais reported as likely to attack Doaba. Message from Captain Roope-Keppel at Alizai regarding his interview with Chikka.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Usual informal distribution made. No orders.
G. H.—17th November 1897.
J. S.—17th November 1897.
17th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

PROS. NO. 784.

TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER COMMANDING, KURRAM MOVEABLE COLUMN, CAMP, SADDA, NO. B-161, DATED THE 16TH (RECEIVED 17TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

At the arrival of troops at Sadda from Para Chinar en route to Thal. Mamuzais reported as likely to attack Doaba. Message from Captain Roope-Keppel at Alizai regarding his interview with Chikka.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.
G. H.—17th November 1897.
J. S.—17th November 1897.
17th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.


Political Diary No. XXII of the Tirah Expeditionary Force for the 7th November 1897.

Copies sent officially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and informally to Military Secretary to Viceroy, Private Secretary to Viceroy, and Honourable Members.

G. H.—17th November 1897.
J. S.—17th November 1897.
18th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.
H. DALY.

PROS. NO. 785.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, NO. 1507-T., DATED THE 17TH (RECEIVED 18TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

An account of an attack by enemy on Brigadier-General Kempster's column on the Saran Sar and the nearer heights on north of road, when returning on the 16th November from Waran.

PROS. NO. 786.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, NO. 1543-T., DATED THE 17TH (RECEIVED 18TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Reinforcement on the morning of the 17th sent towards Tesri Kandao to assist, if necessary, the return of the 15th and 36th Sikhs and two companies of the Dorsets. The return of the whole force to camp. Consequent postponement of the move to Bagn until the 18th.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution made.
G. H.—18th November 1897.
J. S.—18th November 1897.
18th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.
Pros. No. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 58, Dated the 17th (Received 18th) November 1897.

Application from Ali Khel (Gar Orakzais) for permission to begin paying up their share of rifles and money fine on 19th November at Mastura Camp. Reply sent them. Despatch by post of translations of several curious letters from Adda Mulla and Afridi jirga at Kabul, which were found in the house of the Aka Khel Mulla, Saiyid Akbar, in Waran Valley.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Copies sent officially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—18th November 1897.
J. S.—18th November 1897.
18th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4721-4722-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)

Pros. No. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, No. 272, Dated the 17th (Received 18th) November 1897.

Refers to the Commissioner of Peshawar's telegram No. 121, and says that he has given Chikkai a personal assurance. Adds that if Government like to send him a formal promise, it would no doubt please him, but that he (Officer on Special Duty) does not think it is now required.

Pros. No. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, No. 273, Dated the 17th (Received 18th) November 1897.

With reference to our telegram No. 4686 F., states that he does not think that anything more can be said to Chikkai now, as he expressed himself thoroughly satisfied with the assurance given, and said that he asked for no more.

Pros. No. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, No. 276, Dated the 17th (Received 18th) November 1897.

Refers to his telegram No. 271, and says that Arsala Khan, Mamuzai, came to see Saiyid Shah at Chinarak and promised to do his best to induce his tribe to agree to terms of Government.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch officially, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—18th November 1897.
J. S.—18th November 1897.
18th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

[Office Memo. to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4719-4720-F., dated the 18th November 1897.]

Pros. No. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 68, Dated (and Received) 18th November 1897.

Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, instructed to announce terms at once to Chamkannis for compliance by 28th instant.

Seen by Deputy Secretary.

Copies sent officially to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—18th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 4780-4782-F., dated the 18th November 1897.)
Assistant Secretary.

The fine need not necessarily have been taken out in breech-loaders; 100 guns according to the Mound valuation would have been Rs. 800 I think.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Though Rs. 1,000 would only represent 5 Sniders or 3 Martinis, the arms would be more welcome than cash or cattle.

No orders.

J. S.—18th November 1897.

Deputy Secretary.

Perhaps Secretary of State should be informed. I put up a draft telegram for consideration.

18th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Secretary.

I doubt if we need telegraph. This is after all a comparatively small matter. Sufficient, I think, to send papers by post.

19th November 1897.

H. Daly.

No, we need not telegraph. The General Officer Commanding has curiously misread my telegram which said the Government of India would prefer that the fine which is to be levied in addition to 30 breech-loaders should be taken in other arms if feasible; but it can't be helped.

19th November 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

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PROS. No. 796. Telegram from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, No. 557, Dated (and received) 18th November 1897.

Bringing in of rifles by Kalla Khels. Surrender of two sepoy's of the Khyber Rifles by the jirga. Enquiry whether the remaining rifles to be brought in by the Kalla Khels should be received at Kohat, or the jirga be directed to take them to the camp in Maidan.

(Office Memo. to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4789-4740-F., dated the 19th November 1897.)

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PROS. No. 804. Telegram from the Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 62, Dated the 18th (Received 19th) November 1897.

Instructions to Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, regarding the reply to be given to the Kalla Khel jirga referred to in above telegram.

Seen by Deputy Secretary and Secretary.

Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—19th November 1897.

J. S.—19th November 1897.

19th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Office Memo. to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4750-4751-F., dated the 19th November 1897.)

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PROS. No. 720. Endorsement from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan Nos. 33-F., and 34-F., Dated the 10th (received 17th) November 1897.

Political Diary No. XXIII for the 8th November 1897.

S F 604-554-Feb.
PROS. NO. 721.

ENDORSEMENT FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, Nos. 35-P., and 36-P., DATED THE 10TH (RECEIVED 17TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Memorandum by Colonel Warburton, Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 9th November 1897.

Copies sent officially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and informally to Military Secretary to the Viceroy, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, and Honourable Members.

G. H.—19th November 1897.
J. S.—19th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4757-4758-P., dated the 19th November 1897.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

E. H. S. CLARKE.
H. DALY.

PROS. NO. 799.

TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, KURRAMP, SADDA, NO. 280, DATED THE 18TH (RECEIVED 19TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Announcement of terms to Chamkannis. Action which he proposes taken in the matter.

PROS. NO. 800.

TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, KURRAMP, SADDA, NO. 281, DATED THE 18TH (RECEIVED 19TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Reported meeting on 18th November of Massuzai Jirga to discuss terms announced to Orakzai. Lashkar in Khurmana Darra dispersed. Tereli and Janikut held in turn by picquets of Khani Khel Chamkanni and various sections of Massuzai. Despatch of letter announcing terms to Khani Khel.

PROS. NO. 801.

TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, NO. 1594-T., DATED THE 18TH (RECEIVED 19TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Move of the 2nd Brigade and the Head-quarters and Divisional Troops of the 1st Division to Camp near Bagh. Opposition shown by enemy. Destruction of defences of offending villages belonging to Kambar and Zakha Khel Afridis. Casualties.

PROS. NO. 802.

TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, KURRAMP, SADDA, NO. 282, DATED THE 18TH (RECEIVED 19TH) NOVEMBER 1897.

Terms announced to Khani Khel.

We shall probably hear what orders Sir W. Lockhart passes on the Officer on Special Duty's telegram No. 280.

19th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4752-4753-P., dated the 19th November 1897.)
Pros No. 803.

Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Moveable Column, Sadda, No. E.—187, dated the 18th (received 19th) November 1897.

Dispersal of lashkar from Khurmana Darra on account of jirga held in Massuzai country to consider terms. Piquets of observation furnished by sections of each clan in turn at Janikut and Tereli.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—19th November 1897.
J. S.—19th November 1897.
19th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Pros. No. 798.

Telegram P. from the Secretary of State, dated the 18th (received 19th) November 1897.

Says that the newspapers of the 17th November published a report of documents which were discovered in Mulla Saiyid Akbar’s fort and said to implicate Afghan officials. Asks whether this is true and the nature of the discovery.

Assistants Secretary.

Draft telegram below for approval.

J. S.—11th November 1897.

Deputy Secretary.

Sir William Lockhart’s telegram to us on this subject was only despatched at 9 p.m. on the 17th November, consequently for the information to have appeared in London papers of the 17th, it must have been telegraphed from the force direct.

If a reply is to issue to the Secretary of State at once, the one below will perhaps do. But the translations which the General Officer Commanding said, on the 17th, that he was sending by post will probably be here by Monday at latest, and it will perhaps be better to wait a couple of days and send a complete answer to His Lordship.

19th November 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Secretary.

The India Office are a little impatient. I think it would be sufficient to reply—

"Foreign-Office. Your telegram 18th November. Lockhart telegraphed 17th that several curious papers had been found and he was posting translations but that they contain nothing of grave importance.”

19th November 1897. H. Daly.

His Excellency.

It is as well, I think, to give in Sir W. Lockhart’s words all we know in the matter, as in the draft telegram below.

16th November 1897.

20th November 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

E.

(Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 20th November 1897.)

Pros No. 813.

Endorsement from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 37-P., dated the 11th (received 18th) November 1897.

Political Diary No. XXIV of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, for the 9th November 1897.

Pros No. 730.

Endorsement from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No. 87-P., dated the 11th (received 18th) November 1897.

Political Diary No. XXV of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, for the 10th November 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Ilam Gudar, No. 88-L-P., Dated the 19th (Received 20th) November 1897.

Move of camp on 19th to a site 1 mile north-west of village Ilam Gudar and 3 miles from Fort Bara. Improvement in condition of transport.

Telegram from the Officer Commanding, Kurram Moveable Column, Sadda, No. 172-B., Dated the 19th (Received 20th) November 1897.

Report that Massuzais wish to ascertain attitude of Afridis before deciding regarding terms.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Usual informal distribution made. No orders.

Telegram P. from the Secretary of State, Dated the 19th (Received 20th) November 1897.

Approves of the measures proposed in the telegram of the 17th November 1897, if found necessary. Enquires (1) what it is proposed to do with the posts on the Samana range during the winter, and (2) whether the protection of traffic is contemplated in suggesting the keeping of the Khyber open during the winter by troops.

Neither of the points raised by the Secretary of State has been discussed.

The occupation of the Khyber posts and the keeping of the road open by our troops would seem to imply the protection of traffic. A few traders' kailsas would be a small matter compared to the large convoys of supplies for the troops which would have to be protected.

The question as to the posts on the Samana is for the consideration of the Military authorities.
[69]

SECRETARY.


I suppose we may telegraph to Sir William:

"Your telegram No. 50, November 13th. You may arrange to move down, if this proves necessary, to some point in Lower Bara valley within easy reach of Feroz Bara. Government of India recognizes that this may involve keeping troops in tribal country all the winter. I will telegraph again about arrangements in the Khyber."

2. The Military Department and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should see.

3. The question of the Khyber arrangements may be taken up separately and referred presently to the Military Department with spare copies of the papers. It will, I suppose, be for the Commander-in-Chief to make proposals if any are required—as to the posts on the Samana.

20th November 1897.

H. DALY.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

Sir William Lockhart's movements being concerned chiefly with military considerations, I would communicate the telegrams to and from the Secretary of State to the Military Department, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and issue of directions as to immediate movements and disposition during the winter of Sir William Lockhart's force.

As to the other questions raised by the Secretary of State, I would answer if the Military Department and Commander-in-Chief consider that it is intended to protect traffic in the Khyber during the winter (we have enough Khyber Rifles to do it) and that it is intended to hold the Samana posts at such strength as the Commander-in-Chief thinks necessary.

20th November 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I most certainly did intend to open the Khyber for traffic; it is for that reason I suggested the holding it with troops, and I can imagine no better way of showing the Afridis that it is their interest to come in. I should not be surprised if the hesitation of the India Office was caused by the idea which so strongly prevails there that the Amir imports large stocks of war material and even distributes them to the tribes. We know there is no evidence of the latter and positive evidence to disprove the former, so far as the Khyber is concerned. My feeling is that the Amir has met our every challenge in, on the whole, a friendly spirit in this business and that if we re-open the Khyber we should open it on the old conditions so far as he is concerned. We promised in the Kabul convention to let him have arms, he has not exercised his rights in an extravagant way, and unless we are prepared to alter the terms of the Kabul Convention, in which case we should tell him so frankly, we are bound to give him proper facilities.

But if the Secretary of State takes a different view he has only to let Mr. Guthore know that we reserve our right to stop any goods of which we disapprove and we may be pretty sure nothing will come from England.

As to the Samana, I imagine it depends on whether the Orakzais accept the terms announced to them, what we do with the posts. But I should hope myself that we should concentrate at the principal posts for the winter at all events, and not have the anxiety of the small police posts hanging over us.

Sir William Lockhart does not, I believe, begin his new series of movements till the 26th so there is no special hurry to telegraph to him to-night and I should prefer that Military Department and Commander-in-Chief should record their views first.

20th November 1897.

Military Department.

21st November 1897.

File may first go to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for favour of an expression of his opinion.

21st November 1897.

To His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief unofficially.

I agree in His Excellency the Viceroy's note dated 20th November 1897. For the actual escort of the kafila traffic the Khyber Rifles might come in useful; but the troops would have to escort their own supplies.

22nd November 1897.

To Military Department unofficially.

Honourable Member.

22nd November 1897.

If we occupy the Khyber with troops during the winter, it shall be open for traffic on certain days, as usual.

As to the Samana posts they will no doubt be strongly held.

Foreign Department.
22nd November 1897.

To the Foreign Department, unofficially.

His Excellency.

The following reply may be sent to the Secretary of State:—

"Foreign Secret. Your Lordship’s telegram 19th November. We propose to hold the Samana posts in strength and to protect traffic through the Khyber."

22nd November 1897.

Telegraph as dictated by His Excellency.
23rd November 1897.

[Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 23rd November 1897.]

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

[Office Memo. to Military Department, No. 4849-F., dated the 24th November 1897.]

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Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bagh, No. 63, Dated (and received) the 20th November 1897.

With reference to his telegram No. 58 of the 17th, says that translations of the most important letters found in Mulla Saiyid Akbar’s house were forwarded by post on the 19th. Communicates the purport of one of them, and suggests that he be authorised to inform the Afridis distinctly that the British troops will not be withdrawn from their country until they comply with the Government terms.

His Excellency.

The previous discussion of the proposal to tell the Afridis that till they comply with the terms of Government the British force will not leave their country is at pages 50 to 51 of the notes and there is the further telegram of the 12th November (Proceedings No. 743).

I also submit linked the Military Department file containing Sir William Lockhart’s definite plan for moving after the Orakzais’ term of grace expires on the 26th, and for staying in the Bara valley during the winter.

As these proposals will no doubt be accepted, there is, I think, now no doubt that we shall not leave the Afridis’ country till they comply with our terms, and Sir William Lockhart may now say so? He also wishes to say that though we go to lower Bara for the Winter months we shall re-advance in the Spring. If it is absolutely certain it may be said; but I suppose there are other possible ways of making things intolerable for the Afridis, and I would still suggest it would be better to say “we shall do what seems best to us in the Spring” or any other form of words which contains as full a threat as those proposed, but does not feel action.

21st November 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

The announcement which Sir W. Lockhart again presses is practically a new notification leading up probably to a new expedition. It is quite clear we cannot authorise either without the concurrence of Secretary of State.

I think something like the following should issue:—

Foreign Secret. Lockhart telegraphed on November 6th asking that if he withdrew to winter quarters he might tell the Jirgas he intended to return in the Spring to cut their crops and to occupy their country during the Summer.

We replied, November 11th.

He now telegraphs—

Begin. There can be no doubt.
We solicit Your Lordship's instructions.
He has done so, telegram No. 65, November 21st, received since then.

21st November 1897.
Telegram written out for issue.
21st November 1897.

[Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 21st November 1897.]
(Endorsement to the Government of the Punjab, No. 4807-P., dated the 22nd November 1897.)

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TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDA., No. 65, DATED THE 21ST (RECEIVED 22ND) NOVEMBER 1897.

Announcement of the terms of Government to the Afridis. A week's grace given them for compliance.

[Endorsement to Military Department, No. 4804-P., dated the 22nd November 1897.]
(Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4821-P., dated the 23rd November 1897.)

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TELEGRAM FROM PUNJAB GOVERNMENT, CAMP, No. 38-C., DATED THE 20TH (RECEIVED 21ST) NOVEMBER 1897.

For reasons given, hopes that if possible the whole tribe (Chamkannis) may be treated as one body, leaving it to General Officer Commanding to apportion a larger share of the fine in money and guns, on the Khan Khel, if the sections cannot agree as to this among themselves.

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TELEGRAM FROM THE OFFICER ON SPECIAL DUTY, KURRAM, PARA CHINAR, No. 289, DATED THE 20TH (RECEIVED 21ST) NOVEMBER 1897.

Refers to Punjab Government telegram No. 38-C., and gives reasons for not making a general settlement by which the weak sections of the Chamkannis will be left at the mercy of the Khanis Khels, who have played a much more important part in the various attacks by Massuzais in Kurram than the remainder of the tribe.

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His Excellency,
The decision as to dealing with the Chamkannis will, I presume, be left to Sir William Lockhart.

There seems from the telegrams of the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to be good reason for not making a general settlement under which the strong and inaccessible Khanis Khels can squeeze an undue share of the fine out of the other sections whose country is more exposed to attack by us. I would telegraph to Sir William Lockhart:

"Reference Punjab telegram 38-C., November 20th, repeated to you and Reece-Koppel's 289, November 20th repeated to Udny. The Government of India leave in your hands the details of settlement with the Chamkannis. They recognize advantage of dealing with the tribe as a whole, but at the same time acknowledge that special circumstances exist and that a settlement which left the weak sections at the mercy of the Khanis Khel and which gave the Khanis Khel any room for considering themselves leniently treated in comparison with the others, would be unsatisfactory and unlikely to have permanent result for good.

Repeated Punjab, Commissioner of Peshawar and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram."

21st November 1897.
22nd November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

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Repeated Punjab, Commissioner of Peshawar and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram."

21st November 1897.
22nd November 1897.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.
Pros. No. Telegram from the Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Jam Gudar, No. 24, dated the 21st (received 22nd) November 1897.

Report that there are only a few men now in the Gandao Pass to give warning of the approach of our troops but that they do not intend opposing our advance on Barkai.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Copies sent officially to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—22nd November 1897.
J. S.—22nd November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 4799-4801-F., dated the 22nd November 1897.)

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Pros. No. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, No. 288, dated the 21st (received 22nd) November 1897.

Message from Massuzais and nearer Alisherzais to the effect that they wish to make a separate arrangement for themselves regarding the terms imposed by Government. Reply sent them.

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Pros. No. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, No. 293, dated the 21st (received 22nd) November 1897.

Letter received from Massuzai and Khanikhel jilgais, asking to be allowed to go to Sadda to discuss terms. Reply sent the jilgais.

Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—22nd November 1897.
J. S.—22nd November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4802-4803-F., dated the 22nd November 1897.)

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Pros. No. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh, No. 1610-T., dated the 19th (received 20th) November 1897.

Firing into camp near Bagh on the night of the 18th. Casualties during the fighting on the 18th. Movements of troops. Enemy to be seen in considerable numbers on high hills north of Camp Bagh.

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Pros. No. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh, No. 1661-T., dated the 20th (received 21st) November 1897.

Camp fired into on the night of the 19th. Casualties. Attack made on an empty convoy returning to Mastura from Maidan this side of the Arranga Pass. Casualties. Capture of enemy's position on heights north-east of Camp Bagh by 1-3 Gurkhas. Casualties Enemy seen moving from west to east towards the Bara valley.

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Pros. No. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinawari, No. 1430-C., dated the 21st (received 22nd) November 1897.

Murder of a Sarwan. Enquiry instituted.

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Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—22nd November 1897.
J. S.—22nd November 1897.
22nd November 1897.

**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh, No. 64, dated the 20th (received 22nd) November 1897.**

Gives a statement of Captain Barton's losses as received from that officer. Losses amount to Rs 12,391-8-0.

Please see the notes on pages 29 and 29a, and our telegram * No. 4749-F., dated the 19th November 1897.
† No. 4740-F., dated the 19th November 1897.

General Officer Commanding be awaited?
A draft endorsement is submitted accordingly.

G. H.—22nd November 1897.
J. S.—22nd November 1897.
23rd November 1897.

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**Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, No. 22-C., dated the 19th (received 20th) November 1897.**

With reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram No. 4835-F., dated the 16th November 1897, submits, for information, a copy of letters received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, and of their enclosures, regarding Chikkai, the Zaimusht leader.

The notes on this subject will be found at pages 58 and 59 of Part II of the K.-W.
Copy of Punjab Government letter and enclosures may be sent to Military Department—Intelligence Branch, and the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, for information. Draft endorsement put up.

G. H.—23rd November 1897.

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**Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, No 47-P., dated the 14th (received 22nd) November 1897.**

With reference to Punjab Government letter No. 1656, dated the 9th instant, points out that the Orakzai Jirgas received by him on the 12th instant, included deputations from the Masuzaai and Alisherzai sections, and that the terms of Government then announced for the whole of the Orakzai tribe included the punishment of these sections. States what he proposes doing as soon as the fortnight's grace allowed to the Orakzai has expired on the 26th November 1897. Adds that as Government do not propose demanding tribute elsewhere, he would make no exception in the case of the Alisherzai.
and agrees that the lands of the Badama village should not be made over to the Turis. In the case of the Charankanni, agrees that they should be called upon to pay a fine of 80 breech-loaders and Rs. 1,000 in cash or cattle, also that they should be required to restore all Government property.

Copies may be sent to Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government.

Draft endorsement submitted.

No other orders appear necessary as this letter is almost a repetition of General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, telegram No. 54, dated the 15th November 1897, which was disposed of by our telegram No. 4398-F., dated the 17th November 1897.

Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 60, dated the 18th November, may also be read,

G. H.—24th November 1897.
J. S.—24th November 1897.
24th November 1897.
24th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 4868-4970-F., dated the 24th November 1897.)

Pros. No. 830. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh. No. 1654-T., dated the 21st (received 23rd) November 1897.

Movements of troops. Villages south-east of the camp visited and the defences of the enemy, who have shown continuous opposition, destroyed. Evacuation of Camp Maidan by 3rd Brigade. Jirga of Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, Aka Khel and Adam Khel Afridis received on the 21st November 1897, at Camp Bagh, and terms of Government announced to them.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Usual informal distribution made. No orders.

G. H.—23rd November 1897.
J. S.—23rd November 1897.
24th November 1897.

Pros. No. 831. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, No. 295, dated (and received) the 22nd November 1897.

Refers to his telegram No. 293 of the 21st, and says that the letter received from the Massuzai and Khani Khel jirgas only expressed desire for peace, and that the remainder of the message was sent verbally to Afridi Khan.

Pros. No. 832. Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, No. 296, dated the 22nd (received 23rd) November 1897.

Letter received from Chikkai reporting all quiet in his direction.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—23rd November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4819-4820-F., dated the 23rd November 1897.)

Pros No. 833. Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Ilam Gudar, No. 92-I.P., dated the 22nd (received 23rd) November 1897.

Party of about 50 Aka Khel raiders seen on 21st November near village Shin Kamar, 10 miles west of camp Ilam Gudar.

Assistant Secretary.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—23rd November 1897.

23rd November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

ENDORSEMENT FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CAMP MAIDAN, Nos. 43-P. AND 44-P., DATED THE 14TH NOVEMBER 1897.

Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXVII for the 12th November 1897.


Political Diary of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. XXVIII for the 14th November 1897.

Copies sent officially to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and informally to Military Secretary to the Viceroy, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, and Honourable Members.

G. H.—24th November 1897.

J. S.—24th November 1897.

24th November 1897.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

H. DALY.

(Memorandum to the India Office, No. 37-M., dated the 25th November 1897.)

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bakh No. 1706-E., dated the 22nd (received 23rd) November 1897.

Movements of troops. Picquet of K. O. S. Bs. fired on by some of the enemy. Casualties. Report from Camp Mastura that reconnaissance was made on the morning of the 22nd up Badashai valley and over Sangra Pass.

Telegram from the Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Islam Gar, No. 25, dated the 23rd (received 24th), November 1897.

Reported movements of Mulla Saiyid Akbar. Return to Jamrud, with their rifles, of one Kambar Khel and five Malikdin sepoys of the Khyber Rifles.

Copies of telegram No. 26 from the Political Officer, Peshawar Column, sent to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government, and usual informal distribution of both the above telegrams made.

G. H.—24th November 1897.

J. S.—24th November 1897.

24th November 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, No. 301, dated (and received) 24th November 1897.

Answer of Khani Khel Chamkannis to the letter announcing terms of Government.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.
Copies sent officially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—25th November 1897.
J. S.—25th November 1897.

25th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 4807-4808-F., dated the 25th November 1897.)

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**Telegram from the Assistant Adjutant-General, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bagh, No. 1783-T., Dated the 23rd (Received 24th) November 1897.**

Repeats a telegram of the 23rd November, from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, from Dwatoi, reporting his movements, giving a description of the country round about and stating the casualties on the 22nd November.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—25th November 1897.

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**Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 142, Dated (and received) 24th November 1897.**

Proposal to declare a blockade under section 23, Frontier Crimes Regulation, against the Afridis and Orakzais.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Copies sent officially to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—25th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 4801-4802-F., dated the 25th November 1897.)

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**Telegram from L. White King, Esq., Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force Bagh, No. 13-C., Dated 23rd (Received 25th) November 1897.**

Partial compliance with terms of Government by Ali Khels; their promise to complete fine and rifles on 23rd November. Samil clan and Daulatzais expected to give in their fines and rifles on the 24th November. Promise of the Mamozai Malik to complete their share within the stipulated time. Attitude of Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Adam Khel and Zakka Khel Afridis. Loss of enemy at the action on the Tsari Kandao on 16th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 4803-4806-F., dated the 26th November 1897.)

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**Telegram from the Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force Ilam Gudar, No. 27, Dated (and received) 24th November 1897.**

Reported location at Gandao of about 200 Aka Khel Orakzai and Khasrogi Zakka Khel.

Seen by Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Copies sent officially to Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, and usual informal distribution made.

G. H.—25th November 1897.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 4807-4809-F., dated the 25th November 1897.)
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<td></td>
<td>States that Mulla Saiyid Akbar is reported to be collecting a lashkar of Aka Khel, Kamrai and Sipahs to harass our troops in Maidan.</td>
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<td>Completion on the 24th November of the road as far as Gandao, one and-a-half mile this side of Pass. Reported location of about 300 Aka, Zakka and Sturi Khels, at Magani.</td>
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For the information, copy of correspondence with the International Arbitration and Peace Association, regarding the military operations on the North-Western Frontier.

G. H.—27th December 1897.
J. S.—27th December 1897.
27th December 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Recorded and indexed by T. G. B.
Recording and indexing examined by J. S.

Note.—For despatch forwarding these and later papers regarding the Afridi-Orakzai expedition, see Secret F., February 1898, Nos. 855-871.
K. W. No. 2.

[Demi-official.]

Dated Simla, the 14th November 1897.

From—Colonel Sir H. Mellis, K.C.S.I.,
To—Sir W. J. Cunningham, K.C.S.I.

I enclose a telegram from Scallon, but I do not hold with it. In action and especially in a case of this sort, a British officer should always be alongside the Commandant. He is especially sent for this purpose.

---

Telegram No. 184, dated the 13th November 1897.

From—Major Scallon, Maidan.
To—The Inspector-General, Imperial Service Troops, Simla.

Kettlewell wires Commandant Narain Singh responsible, but not to blame, for reporting all present. Now believed whole picquet was killed one hour before retirement force.
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FEBRUARY 1898.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

No. 604.

Telegram P., dated the 13th October 1897.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Simla.

Please refer to my telegram of the 6th instant. I think it desirable that political settlement should follow as quickly as possible on termination of military operations in the field. You will agree with me that, in the present circumstances, external and internal, financial and political, no new responsibility should be undertaken, unless absolutely required by actual strategic necessity and the protection of British Indian borders. I also think that the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modification of the existing arrangements will be no doubt necessary, especially with a view to concentration of forces, but I understand you to be in favour of strictness sic (limitation?) of our interference with independent tribes, and thus avoiding serious eventual responsibility involved in gradual extension of administrative control over tribal territory. In this I concur entirely. The question of disarmament, so far as it appears to imply protection, should be examined from this point of view. Assuming that our policy is to maintain permanently our position as it existed before these disturbances, you will doubtless consider and let me know what posts and line of communication you regard as indispensable to this purpose, due regard being had to—(1) what is possible with existing military force, (2) financial situation, and (3) great importance, politically, of avoiding any measures likely to cause discontent among the tribes and consequently recurring disturbances. Our object should be to obtain clear and well defined general plans on which local arrangements can be based.

No. 605.

*No. 1560, dated Simla, the 20th October 1897.

From—L. W. Dane, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government, of the Punjab and its Dependencies,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with your letter No. 3163-F., dated 8th September 1897, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the papers marginally noted received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, giving a full account of the Afridi rising in the Khaibar Pass, and to convey the following remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor thereon.

2. The papers which are now forwarded place in a clear light the events of the 17th August and following days, during which, in the immediate prospect of an attack on the Khaibar posts by a large Afridi lashkar, it was decided—

(1) That troops from Peshawar could not be pushed up the Khaibar in support of the Khaibar Rifles.

(2) That Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khaibar Rifles, should be recalled from Landi Kotal to Jamrud.

(3) That the defence of the Khaibar posts should be left to the Khaibar Rifles under the command of their own Native officers, and that tribal responsibility should be fully insisted upon by calling upon the Pass Malik to go in person with a following of tribesmen, to reinforce the posts for the protection of which they would be held strictly responsible.
3. The decision on the first of these matters was, the Lieutenant-Governor understands, arrived at for military reasons, though Sir R. Udny agreed with General Elles in thinking it inadvisable. His Honour considers that it was unfortunate that both officers as well as Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, Political Officer, were unaware that Captain Barton had arranged for a water-supply of twelve days in Landi Kotal, but he believes it is doubtful whether this would have affected the decision. On the point generally it is not he considers his business to say much. Events seem to indicate that a comparatively small force might have had the effect of completely baffling the tribesmen, but even this cannot be confidently asserted, and in view of the position explained in this office letter No. 1056, dated 23rd August 1897, it was clearly in no sense incumbent upon us to send up troops.

4. In Sir R. Udny's reasons for recalling Captain Barton to Jamrud, Sir Mackworth Young fully concurs. That officer's indignation at being removed from the command of his corps at such a juncture does him credit, and it is not surprising that he has failed to grasp the political situation. His Honour does not consider that Captain Barton has any reason for complaint in having been kept in ignorance of the decision. Sir R. Udny's semi-official of 17th August clearly indicated that the Khaibar was to be safeguarded by tribal responsibility and not by British troops. At the same time Sir Mackworth Young feels great sympathy with him, and hopes that he may have further opportunity of exhibiting his capacity for dealing with the Khaibar Rifles. The Lieutenant-Governor would ask leave, as recommended by Sir R. Udny, to call upon Captain Barton to give in a statement of his losses with a view to compensation being paid him at once as soon as it is known what part of his property is not restored by the Afridis.

5. His Honour considers that the decision mentioned under the third head was right, especially in view of the circumstance that the Khaibar posts had been reinforced by the despatch of 200 more of the Khaibar Rifles from Jamrud, and that the Khaibar Maliks were instructed to strengthen the posts by levies of tribesmen. He makes no apology for having pointed out the doubts which he himself entertained as regards the best course to pursue under somewhat complicated conditions, and he disclaims any intention of prejudging the case by the remarks made in the letter from this office, No. 1144, dated 2nd September 1897. It is clear now that Subadar Mursil Khan was killed at Landi Kotal on 24th August, in a most loyal and courageous attempt to stem the torrent of tribal fanaticism, and proposals for rewarding this act by providing for his family, and also for rewarding Jamadar Jawas Khan, will be submitted separately. The telegram from this office, No. 240 E., dated 26th August, expressing the Lieutenant-Governor's regret that it had not been possible either to reinforce the Khaibar posts by British troops or to withdraw them completely was sent on receipt of Commissioner's telegram No. 435 of the same date, from which it appeared that after a gallant stand by the Khaibar Rifles an entrance had been effected into the Landi Kotal post and that much fighting ensued lasting two hours. Sir Mackworth Young thinks few will have read the story of the outbreak in the Khaibar of August 1897 as first reported without a feeling of regret that it was found necessary to leave the Khaibar Rifles whom we had to so great an extent converted into a British corps to bear the brunt of the tribal rising without support from our troops. But Sir R. Udny has conclusively shown that he was correct in his conclusion that there was no question of leaving the Khaibar Rifles to their fate or of abandoning them to wholesale massacre, and apart from such a consideration there was every reason for maintaining the tribal responsibility and, in pursuance of the agreement of 1881, treating the Khaibar Rifles as a tribal force. And after giving the subject the fullest consideration Sir Mackworth Young has come to the conclusion that when the Khaibar is re-opened and arrangements are again made for its safety, no better basis will be found than that which has subsisted for the last 16 years and during that period has been so eminently successful.
In reply to your No. 1145 of the 2nd ultimo, I have the honour to submit copy of a letter No. 607, dated the 16th ultimo, from Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, Officiating Political Officer, Khaibar, giving a full account of the Afridi rising in the Khaibar Pass. This report was prepared originally in vernacular by Colonel Aslam Khan himself, but, as unfortunately he does not know English, and his Head Clerk is unable to draft an English letter, the English version of it was so badly worded, and in some places so unintelligible, when it first reached me, that I have been obliged to re-write many passages myself. Its general form and arrangement, however, have been left unchanged, and minor alterations and additions have only been made after full discussion with the Political Officer.

2. As stated in my telegram No. 299 of the 7th August and my letter No. 254-C. of the 8th idem, a proclamation from the Adda Mullah to the Afridis passed through Dakka on the 4th August, which was probably received in Tirah on the 5th; and two or three days after the Shabkadar raid of the 7th August reports began to reach me that this proclamation was bearing fruit in the shape of attempts by the Afridi Mullahs to stir up their tribesmen to co-operate with the fanatical movement in Swat and the Mohmand country by attacking Jamrud and the posts held by garrisons of the Khaibar Rifles in the Khaibar Pass. Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khaibar Rifles, who, with the permission of Government, had been spending the hot weather at Landi Kotal, at once took steps in consultation with Colonel Aslam Khan to provision all these posts and to strengthen the garrisons, which were accordingly raised from their normal strength of 349 men in ordinary times to an aggregate of 554 men, only 260 men being retained at head-quarters at Jamrud; but, though uncertain rumours continued to come in that jirgas were being held and that efforts were being made to collect a lashkar, no news of serious or immediate import was received till 7.30 P.M. on the 17th August, when Colonel Aslam Khan brought to me Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, who had just arrived from Tirah with the information given in my telegram No. 361 of the same date. General Elles, Commanding the Peshawar District, happened to be with me at the time this news reached me, or else came in very shortly afterwards, so that I had the advantage of discussing the situation with him at once while Colonel Aslam Khan was also present.

3. The first question for immediate decision (as the Afridi "lashkar" was expected to make its appearance in the Khaibar next day) was whether Captain Barton should be recalled from Landi Kotal and the defence of that post left to its garrison of Khaibar Rifles under the command of their own native officers, or whether he should remain there to conduct its defence in person. No force of troops, it appeared, could be spared from Peshawar of sufficient strength to be pushed up the Khaibar for the support or relief of Landi Kotal, and I think we were all three agreed that, if it were only possible to withdraw Captain Barton, the least objectionable course under the circumstances would be to do so, and to leave the garrisons of the Khaibar Rifles in all their posts to make the best defence they could make (or might be inclined to make) without assistance. It is difficult to remember the exact tenor of our conversation, and I can only speak for myself; but my own view—though I cannot be quite sure how fully I stated this to General Elles—was that by recalling Captain Barton we should be removing what would otherwise be a very great incentive to a fanatical gathering to attack Landi Kotal, viz., the desire to capture a post commanded by a British officer, and that, if he were withdrawn, the Afridi "lashkar" might hesitate to make any attack in earnest upon this or other posts held only by their own tribesmen if the latter proved true to their salt and showed that they were prepared to defend them. Moreover,
even if the posts were attacked and the garrisons in spite of their resistance were overpowered by numbers, there was no reason, I thought, to fear that men who had assembled in the name of a *jehad* would harm Muhammadan fellow tribesmen after any actual fighting was over, so that there could be no question of "leaving the Khaibar Rifles to their fate" or of abandoning them to "wholesale massacre"; and in this respect subsequent events have shown that I judged correctly. Although, therefore, under clause 5 of the Khaibar Agreement there was nothing to prevent us from sending troops to re-occupy the Pass if they had been available, it seemed to me that it would be a mistake, on this the first occasion that the Khaibar arrangements had ever been seriously strained or tested, to relieve the Malik of their responsibilities under clauses (2), (5), (6) and (12)—for which it must be remembered that they had been very highly paid during a long course of years—by withdrawing their agents, the Khaibar Rifles, simply because we were not in a position to support them by military force.

4. General Elles, however, considered that as a point of military honour Captain Barton must remain where he was at all hazards, and for the moment I accepted this view. It was necessary, therefore, that measures should be taken at once to provide for his relief if he were attacked, and, since General Elles considered that once the Afridi "lashkar" had established itself in the Pass, it would be impossible to succour him by anything less than a strong infantry brigade with mountain guns, we agreed that General Elles should telegraph for reinforcements from down-country, and that meanwhile the following troops, which were all that could be spared from Peshawar, should move out at daybreak to strengthen Jamrud and to act as a demonstration against the Pass itself, viz.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery, Battery, Artillery</th>
<th>Men.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 guns “K” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Dragoon Guards</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 guns No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wing, Gordon Highlanders</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Gurkhas</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wing, 26th Punjab Infantry</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

but of this force it will be observed that only 1,400 were infantry who could be used for operations in the hills.

5. General Elles then left me, but my consultation with Colonel Aslam Khan lasted for several hours longer, and the result was that after very anxious consideration I decided, in spite of General Elles' opinion, to recall Captain Barton at once, as it seemed to me that, although it would have been impossible to withdraw a British Officer in command of a detachment of British troops without recalling his men as well, the case we had to deal with was quite a different one, and that I should be wrong in keeping Captain Barton at Landi Kotal with a Garrison of 350 Khaibar Rifles, not only because this number was insufficient to man the walls (of which the perimeter, I believe, is something like 1,000 yards), but because half of them were Afridis of the very clans which composed the approaching "lashkar," and, if these proved faithless, the rest of the garrison were certain to desert him too. While, therefore, his retention at Landi Kotal was likely to ensure an attack on that post in force, there was very little chance of his being able to hold out till relieved, which meant that his life would be uselessly sacrificed, though his men would have nothing to fear. Apart too from considerations of this kind, it seemed to me that Captain Barton's presence at Landi Kotal might hamper Government very seriously, by committing us to an advance up the Khaibar with an inadequate force which would probably at the best be unable to do more than bring him away, and would then be compelled to retire for 20 miles through a difficult defile before an enemy who would follow up till
our troops were clear of the hills—a result which would be infinitely worse than the mere capture of a post by the Afridi “lashkar” from their own tribesmen.

6. Having arrived at this decision, I wrote the same night to Captain Barton that he was to make over the command at Landi Kotal to the senior native officer of the Khaibar Rifles and to come down at once to Jamrud, picking up on the way and bringing along with him the Native Assistant Political Officer, Abdul Karim Khan, who was at Ali Masjid. With these two officers withdrawn, I understood from Colonel Aslam Khan that no one would be left in the Khaibar except the Khaibar Rifles themselves, including a few Peshawari Munshiis attached to the corps who were no more likely to be injured than the tribesmen; but in order to provide as far as possible for the safety of the posts and other Government property, I directed Colonel Aslam Khan on his own suggestion to send up the two Kuki Khel Maliks—Amin Khan and Kambar Khan—with 100 tribesmen each to strengthen Ali Masjid and Fort Maude, while orders were despatched to the two Zakha Khel Maliks—Khawas and Wali Muhammad—who live in the Khaibar three or four miles below Landi Kotal, to go up in person with contingents of their tribesmen to reinforce the latter post, for the protection of which they were told that they would be held strictly responsible. The Lwargai Shinwars, in whose limits the Landi Kotal Post stands, were also warned of their responsibility, but are too weak to offer resistance unaided to an Afridi coalition. With the exception of Bagiyari (Shadi Bagiyr) near the Jamrud entrance of the Pass and Fort Tytler at its western extremity beyond Landi Kotal neither of which can accommodate more than a few men, Fort Maude, Ali Masjid, and Landi Kotal are the only three posts that have any pretension to the name of fort, the others being little better than roadside “chaukis.” It will be seen, therefore, that short of sending troops into the Pass which could not be done, every possible arrangement was made to secure Government property; but in my telegram No. 361 (despatched about midnight on the 17th August), which summed up the results of our deliberations, I also asked that a full brigade might be moved up at once from Rawalpindi to provide against eventualities. This telegram, though addressed to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, was repeated to the Lieutenant-General Commanding in the Punjab as well as to yourself.

7. My decision to withdraw Captain Barton was communicated to General Elles early on the morning of the 18th August, upon which he expressed an opinion that, if Captain Barton reached Jamrud in safety, the best plan to clear the Khaibar of any Afridi gathering would be not by a frontal attack up the Pass from Jamrud, but by threatening Tirah from the Samana; and this opinion I quoted with my own complete concurrence (so far as a Civilian might venture to offer any comment upon what was really a military question) in my telegram No. 364 of the 18th August to the Foreign Secretary, reporting that Captain Barton and Abdul Karim Khan had arrived at Jamrud. This telegram was repeated not only to you, but to the Lieutenant-General Commanding in the Punjab, and your telegram No. 218-F., of the same date, informed me that His Honour the Lieutenant Governor approved the withdrawal of the two officers as well as our endeavour to enforce tribal responsibility for the maintenance of the Khaibar agreement.

8. The latter telegram, however, which reached me at 6 P.M. on the 18th August, also raised a further question, viz., whether to avoid the possible defection of the Khaibar Rifles with their arms and ammunition, they should not be called in to their head-quarters at Jamrud; and, as I was desired to consider this question in communication with General Elles, I wired at once to Colonel Aslam Khan at Jamrud to come in to me next day at 3 P.M., when we both went together to meet General Elles. The matter was then discussed at length, but, for the reasons stated in my telegram No. 388 of the 20th August, as well as for the reasons which I have explained above in

S F—604-584—Feb. 5
paragraph 3 of my present letter, we were all three unanimously opposed to withdrawing the Khaibar Rifles from the Pass, because it seemed to us that the disadvantages of such a step far outweighed the risk of their deserting with arms and ammunition, though we recognised the fact that this risk was by no means inconsiderable.

9. At the same conference the opportunity was also taken to consider again whether support could be given to the Khaibar posts by troops from Peshawar, but this is so much a military question that I feel some difficulty in writing about it, and, when I said in my telegram No. 388 of the 20th August* that General Elles and I were both disinclined to reinforce Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal with regular troops as Colonel Aslam Khan had suggested, what I meant to convey was that General Elles thought this inexpedient on military grounds, and that I saw the objections and difficulties so clearly myself that I was quite in accord with him and did not feel justified in pressing for the assistance of troops. Ali Masjid, I see, has been described in a Lahore newspaper as "about the strongest natural fort, it would be possible to find in the world," but in point of fact in these days of far-reaching arms of precision it is nothing of the kind, for, though perched on a hill, it is surrounded on all sides within easy ride range by much higher hills, and, unless these can be held too, I believe I am correct in saying that the fort itself is absolutely untenable. Besides this Ali Masjid has no water-supply beyond the stream in the gorge below. Landi Kotal is a much more defensible position, but here again the water-supply was a difficulty, † as General Elles and I understood from Colonel Aslam Khan that none existed inside the post, though Captain Barton has since reported in his letter No. 4 of the 9th September to the Political Officer that there was a masonry reservoir fed from the "Ulu" well two miles distant, which he had taken the precaution to fill, and which would have lasted a thousand men for twelve days. It was unfortunate that we did not know this at the time, but, even if we had been correctly informed, I am inclined to doubt whether it would have altered General Elles' decision, for although nearly 1,000 additional infantry had arrived in Peshawar on the 18th and 19th August, these reinforcements, if they had all been available for Jamrud—which I believe they were not—would only have raised the force of infantry there to 2,400 men, and, if a battalion and a half had been thrown into Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid as Colonel Aslam Khan proposed, no more than 1,500 men would have been left to move up the Khaibar in case of necessity to support the posts or to escort convoys of supplies. Moreover—which is perhaps the most important point of all—these troops were, I believe, without transport, and, though I speak with the greatest hesitation on what is a question for Military experts, I must confess that my own feeling throughout was a very strong one, that, however gallantly our men would no doubt succeed in driving the Afridi "lashkar" off the Khaibar hills at the first attack, they must be prepared to hold these hills to prevent the enemy from constantly re-occupying them, and that to launch troops into the Khaibar Pass without proper equipment to enable them to do this and maintain their position would be a very serious mistake, which might place Government in a very awkward position at a time when they were not fully prepared to deal with it, and might land us in difficulties far greater than any loss of prestige from the capture and destruction of posts held by garrisons of the Khaibar Rifles.

10. I have now brought my narrative of events up to the receipt of your telegram No. 218-F, on the evening of the 18th August, besides explaining the facts and reasons upon which I based my reply (No. 388) to this telegram on the 20th. Meanwhile, as stated in my telegrams No. 372 of the 19th August and No. 382 of the 20th, further information had been received which, instead of confirming the news brought in by Malik Amin Khan on the evening of the
17th, went to show that, if there were any Afridi gathering at all, it had not moved beyond the limits of the Bara Valley; and in your telegram No. 223-F. of the 21st (which was a reply to my No. 388) you informed me that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor accepted our opinion that the Khaibar Rifles should not be concentrated at Jamrud. This latter telegram, however, made no allusion either to the view expressed in the concluding portion of my No. 388 that the Khaibar Malik must be required to act up to their engagements without extraneous assistance, or to the report which I submitted in the same telegram that General Elles and myself were opposed to reinforcing Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid by regular troops and I would also point out that no reply of any kind was ever received to my telegram No. 361 of the 18th August conveying General Elles’s opinion that, if the Afridis attacked the Khaibar, our proper course was not to attempt to force the Pass, but to compel their retirement by threatening Tirah from the Samana.

11. After the receipt of your telegram No. 223-F. of the 21st August, I continued to keep you informed of the progress of events by my telegrams detailed in the margin, but with the exception of your telegram No. 231 of the 22nd August, in which His Honour suggested that a message might be sent to the Afridis, I heard nothing more from you till I received your telegram No. 280-F. of the 26th in reply to my No. 485 of the same date announcing that Landi Kotal had gone the way of all the other Khaibar posts and had been taken and burned by the Afridi "lashkar." From first to last, therefore, I had no reason to suppose that my action was not approved by Government as the best that could be taken under the circumstances.

12. In conclusion, I beg leave to offer the following remarks upon your letter No. 1144 of the 2nd ultimo to the Government of India:

Paragraph 3.—With reference to this paragraph I annex copy of a letter No. 600, dated 10th ultimo, from the Political Officer, Khaibar. The loss of the Afridi "Lashkar" in their attacks on Fort Maude, Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal will probably never be known with accuracy, and is no doubt very liable to be overestimated, but reports from all sources agreed in representing that they had suffered heavily, at Landi Kotal especially, and the figures given by Colonel Aslam Khan were not obtained from any of the Khaibar Maliks. In this connection I would invite your attention to another telegram from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, reporting on the authority of Mr. Donald that, though the Afridis admitted a loss of 120 men in the Khaibar, they claimed to have killed 800; and, since the correct figures for the latter are 17 killed and 7 wounded, it seems not unlikely that they may have under-stated their losses as they over-stated their successes. As regards Subadar Mursil Khan, it is true that he had been sent to Tirah to collect information, but he rejoined at Landi Kotal on the evening of the 17th in Captain Barton’s presence, and I venture to express my regret that in this as well as other instances during the recent disturbances a disposition has been shown to discredit the information of the local officers when at variance with reports obtained direct from irresponsible news-writers.

Paragraph 4.—As a matter of fact the Khaibar Rifles made a much better defence at Landi Kotal than at Fort Maude. At Ali Masjid no doubt they did badly, and the defence was a little more than a half-hearted show; but I have already explained that Ali Masjid is untenable by a small garrison which can not spare men to hold the adjacent hills.
Paragraph 5.—I desire to correct the impression that "the men (of the Khaibar Rifles) who chanced to be in the Pass were left there with their arms to act under the instructions of the Maliks, and the remainder composing the majority were retained at Jamrud." As stated in paragraph 2 of my present letter, the garrisons of the posts had been increased by over 200 men, and more than two-thirds of the total strength of the Khaibar Rifles were actually in the Pass when the Afridi "lashkar" made its appearance. Besides this, as reported in my telegram No. 361 of the 17th August and No. 364 of the 18th (see also paragraph 6 supra), detachments of 200 Kuki Khel tribesmen were sent up under their own Maliks to reinforce Fort Iaude and Ali Masjid, while Maliks Khawas and Wali Muhammad were directed to throw themselves into Landi Kotal with contingents of the Zakha Khel. It will be seen therefore that the Kuki Khel and Zakha Khel, who are the dominant clans on the Khaibar Pass road from Jamrud up to the Lwargai Shinwari.

† See page 3 of Colonel Warburton's "Notes on the Tribes of the Khaibar Range." Kotal,† were called upon to fulfil their engagements in every possible way, and the Maliks of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai, and Sepah were also warned of their responsibilities and obligations. Of the four latter clans, however, none live in the Khaibar, or nearer than the Bazar Valley at any time of the year, and in summer they are mostly located in the uplands of Tirah, so that their Maliks, if inclined to range themselves on the side of order, could be best employed by remaining with their tribesmen and using their influence in checking any advance towards the Khaibar from the Bora Valley.

No. 607.

No. 600, dated Jamrud, the 10th September 1897.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN, C.I.E., Political Officer, Khaibar,

To—the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

I have the honour to address you as follows with reference to letter No. 1144, dated the 2nd September 1897, from the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

The information furnished by me as to the loss of the enemy at Landi Kotal was received from various sources, and subsequently confirmed by men of the Khaibar Rifles belonging to different tribes who had managed to escape and joined headquarters. I received no reports from the Khaibar Maliks as to the conduct of the Khaibar Rifles, or the losses sustained by the enemy.

As to the account of the gallant defence and death of Subadar Mursil Khan, I can only repeat what I said before in my previous report, that the man was shot dead in the fighting that ensued in the defence of the fort which terminated in its capture by the enemy on the morning of the 25th August, after holding out for full 24 hours.

As the information contained in my reports was derived from men of different sects who were present on the occasion, and was based on reliable sources, I would respectfully request the favour of your removing the impression that the account of loss inflicted on the enemy was exaggerated, and that Mursil was killed before the Afridis came down to the Khaibar.

No. 608.

No. 607, dated Jamrud, the 16th September 1897.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN, C.I.E., Political Officer, Khaibar,

To—the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

In continuation of my No. 571, dated the 26th August last, and subsequent correspondence, I have the honour to submit a detailed report on the
recent attack by the Afridis on the Khaibar posts, the conduct of the Khaibar Rifle Corps and the Afridi Maliks, and other matters connected therewith.

2. During June last, some Mullahs of Tirah, with Mullah Gulandaz, Kambar Khel, paid a visit to the Mullah of Adda, who exhorted them to preach against the British Government and to excite the Afridis to side with the Waziris. Subsequently, in the beginning of August, some letters from the Adda Mullah and the fakir of Swat were sent to the Aka Khel Mullah, Said Akbar, and the Afridis through the Satirp of Dakka, Mullah Idris, Painai Zakha Khel, and Mullah Gulandaz, Kambar Khel, who are paid agents of the Amir, impressing on them the necessity of joining the jehd.

3. On the 13th August the Aka Khel Mullah Said Akbar collected a gathering of the Afridis to offer their Friday prayers in the mosque at Bagh in Maidan (Tirah), and held a jirga to decide upon their future procedure. At this meeting which seems to have been prearranged by the preaching of the Jalal-abad Mullahs that had gone to Tirah, Said Mir Basbar, Malikdin Khel, was unanimously nominated "Radsbah," and Mullah Said Akbar Akhunzada was invested with full executive powers.

4. On the 11th August, hearing that the Afridis were going to convene an Afridi conference at Bagh, and steps taken to thwart it. Subadar Mursil and Pay Havildar Gul Ahmad, of the Khaibar Rifles, with three others, to at once proceed to Tirah to try and prevent a combination of the tribes against the British Government. I also wrote to the Afridi Maliks warning them of their responsibility and ordering them to act up to their engagements.

5. On the 15th, on receipt of information that the Afridis had decided to collect a lashkar, I arranged through Captain Barton to increase the garrison of each post in the Khaibar, and to store a sufficient quantity of supplies and water.

6. On the evening of the 17th, having heard from Malik Amin Khan Kuki Khel (who suddenly arrived from Tirah), and having also received a report from Mursil Khan, Subadar, from Afridi lashkar towards the Khaibar, advancing towards the Khaibar, I, in company with Malik Amin Khan, proceeded at once to the Commissioner to talk over the matter, and we discussed the matter until late at night. In accordance with the Commissioner's wishes, orders * were at once sent to Captain Barton at Landi Kotal to retire to Jamrud at once, and the Zakha Khel Maliks were directed to proceed to Shinwaris. It is, however, to be regretted that the Maliks did not comply with my orders to arrange a truce among themselves. Early next morning (18th) I went out to Jamrud, and after a couple of hours saw Captain Barton coming in from Landi Kotal.

7. On my arrival at Jamrud I sent the Khaibar Maliks letters reminding them of their responsibility for the protection of the road and posts in their respective limits. In reply the Zakha Khel Maliks and Maliks Yar Muhammad and Darya Khan, Malikdin Khels, brought forward the plea that they were short of provisions and ammunition, and consequently unable to fight against the Afridi lashkar. However, on being warned again of their duties, Malik Darya Khan proceeded to Kutla Kushta with six of his tribesmen, Malik Khawas Khan to Gurgurra, and Malik Walli Muhammad Khan with thirty followers
to Landi Kotal. The Mullagori grey-beards with about fifty of their tribesmen also complied with orders to proceed to Landi Kotal.

8. Seeing that the Afridi Maliks were ill-disposed and quite incompetent to check the advance of the lashkar, it was deemed advisable to circulate a proclamation warning the tribes of the risk they were incurring by their conduct, and a copy of this is enclosed as Appendix I; but the agitation and excitement caused by the preaching of the fanatic Mullahs was so strong that the proclamation and all efforts to check the advance proved useless.

9. The Afridi lashkar reached Ali Masjid on the morning of the 23rd and consisted of all clans except the exception of the Mitha Khan Khel and Sikandar Khel sections of the Kuki Khel clan who held aloof, but the Abdal Khel Kuki Khel with some Orakzais accompanied the lashkar. On arriving at Ali Masjid this lashkar divided into two portions: one proceeding towards Fort Maude and Shudanai range, and the other towards Ali Masjid. The round towers lying towards the south-west of Ali Musjid which were each held by two sepoys of the Khaibar Rifles were evacuated, and they were then burnt by the enemy together with the house of Said Ali, Kuki Khel (Naik in the Khaibar Rifles), at Ali Musjid. After this the lashkar proceeded towards Fort Maude, which has held by Said Hassan, Jamadar, and 41 Kuki Khel Rifle sepoys of various clans and some 100 Kuki Khel tribesmen under Malik Kambar.

10. In the evening a battery of Royal Horse Artillery proceeded to Bagyari and shelled the enemy, driving them off towards the Shangai hills. The Khaibar Rifle garrison of Fort Maude also opened a heavy fire and fought well, but on the retirement of the battery to Jamrud, finding themselves outnum-bered, with no water, they evacuated the post and managed to escape. Said Hassan Jamadar, with his sepoys and the Kuki Khel tribesmen then retired to Jamrud bringing with them the garrisons of the Jehangiri and Bagyari posts which were also evacuated. Of the Fort Maude garrison, 11 Zakha Khels deserted with their rifles and joined the enemy. Of the Kuki Khel tribesmen in Fort Maude one Aslam, son of Hassan, was shot dead and Shirak, son of Wali, who was dangerously wounded, has since died. The enemy's loss here was estimated at 34 killed.

11. After burning these three posts, viz., Fort Maude, Bagyari and Jehangiri, the lashkar proceeded to attack Ali Masjid Fort, which was garrisoned by Balal Subedar, Paindai Zakha Khel and 55 sepoys with some 40 Kuki Khel tribesmen of Malik Amin Khan's.

The Mullahs tried to prevail upon Malik Amin Khan to give up the fort, but he would not do so, and fighting commenced. The garrison held out till 7. p.m., and, at last finding themselves outnumbered, evacuated the fort, which was burnt by the enemy. As a garrison was moving down a nullah towards the east, one Havildar Zeru, Zakha Khel, deserted with his own rifle and that of an invalid's which was also in his charge. Of the Khaibar Rifles one Durani, sepoy, son of Alla Mir, Kuki Khel, was shot dead, and fell into a deep "khud" with his rifle; and Mobarak Shah, another Kuki Khel sepoy, was slightly wounded. Amin Khan with the remainder of the garrison
retired by climbing up the Rohtas Hill and reached Jamrud vi’d Lashora on
the evening of the 25th. Naik Said Ali, Kuki Khel, who was at Ali Masjid
with a party of 24 men armed with their own rifles, also managed to escape
by way of the Rohtas Hill. The enemy was supposed to have lost 12 killed
at Ali Masjid.

12. After burning Ali Masjid the Afridi lashkar proposed to attack Landi
Kotal, thinking that the Zakha Khel and Shinwari would make common cause
and join them in the attack. They also discussed the question of advancing
on Jamrud and thence proceeding to the Mohmand and Khalil villages, and
finally attacking the Feshawar Cantonments, with the aid of the Muhamma-
dan population, who, they hoped, would join them. After passing the night
at Ali Masjid, however, they started for Landi Kotal on the morning of the
24th.

13. Malik Darya Khan and the Kutla Kushta and Gurgurra * guards
seeing the advance of the enemy evacuated these posts before the enemy reached
them as they were unable to defend themselves. The garrisons of these posts have
not yet returned, and it is, therefore, impossible to say what took place there.

14. Mursil Khan, Malikdin Khel, and Jawas Khan, Shinwari, Subadar,
who were bringing down the Kabul caravan from Landi Kotal, hearing
that the Afridi lashkar was advancing from Ali Masjid, took the
caravan back to Landi Kotal and commenced taking the neces-
sary precautions for defending
that post.

15. Malik Khawas Khan with his tribesmen joined the lashkar as it
moved up the Khaibar from Ali Masjid past his village, and immediately sent
word to Malik Wali Muhammad Khan at Landi Kotal to come out and join the
Ghazis with his tribesmen. Abdul Jabbar and Abdul Ghafur, the two sons
of the latter, also joined the Afridi lashkar as it passed their villages in the
Khaibar. The Landi Kotal Post itself was held by 354 rifles of the
Khaibar Rifles, but the Mullahori tribesmen, who had come there to
help the garrison, ran away on the arrival of the lashkar on account of their old enmity with the Zakha
Khels, and the guards over the
caravan serai and block-house had been removed by the order of Mir Akbar Khan, Subadar. 

† In the meantime while the lashkar was approaching Mursil Khan, Subadar,
was informed that a message had been sent to Mir Akbar, by his father Malik Khawas, that his tribesmen,
the Niki Khel and the Lal Khels, with the Afridi lashkar should be let into
the fort under the pretence that they were members of the jirga, and that then,
after making over to them all the ammunition, etc., he could lay hands on,
Subadar Mir Akbar was to come out and leave the post. Subadar Mursil
Khan, however, was not to be deceived, and made over the keys of the fort
gate to one of his own men, Tamash Khan, Malikdin Khel, while he kept the
keys of the magazine himself. Accordingly, when Mir Akbar Khan came and
asked Mursil Khan to hand over to him the keys of the gate and the magazine
so as to enable him to admit a jirga of his people, Mursil refused, saying that

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he would not let in any outsider, as at that moment he considered them all enemies, and saying this, he ordered his men to fire as soon as the lashkar appeared.

16. The sepoy soldiers seeing about forty of the enemy advancing towards the fort from the Khaibar fired and wounded some three men of the Zakha Khels of the Khaibar who were with the lashkar.

17. The enemy then moved towards the south and west of the fort and occupied the crest of the hills and the block-house, and after burning the caravan serai broke open the water-pipes which bring water into the post from what is known as the “Ulus” well in a village of the Sheikh Mal Khel Shinwaris, two or three miles north-east of the post. These pipes, though mostly under ground, are exposed at some points, and were broken open by the lashkar to obtain drinking water for their own use; and when it was found that the pipes were dry, the Sheikh Mal Khel villagers, by order of the lashkar, worked their well till water flowed through the pipes to the place where they had been broken.

18. While the fighting was going on a disciple of the Aka Khel Mullah was let in with a message. He warned the garrison to surrender, otherwise it would go hard with them. Mir Akbar said that they were all Ghazis, and asked him to wait a little, while Mursil asked for time to get orders from Jamrud. With this reply the disciple left the fort.

19. Mir Akbar Khan sent for Khaista Khan Jamadar, Zakha Khel, and told him it was no use wasting the ammunition, since the fort was to be surrendered; but the Jamadar scouted the idea of surrender and went back to his post. Mir Akbar did not move out of his house, though the fighting lasted throughout the night.

20. On the 25th a jirga was held between Maliks Khawas Khan, Wali Muhammad Khan, Zakha Khel, and the Lwargai Shinwaris, as to how they could get people of their own clans out of the fort. Khawas Khan sent his nephew Ain Khan to Mir Akbar Khan to ask him to come out of the fort with whatever he could lay hands on; and on receiving a similar message from their own tribesmen, the Shinwari rank and file of the garrison jumped down from the northern wall of the fort.

21. Ikram, Havildar, Zakha Khel, No. 1 Company, an intimate friend of Mir Akbar Khan, persuaded the sepoy soldiers not to fire, telling them that the cartridges could be better utilized for their own advantage. In the meantime some one called out outside the fort telling the garrison to cease fire and surrender, a safe conduct being offered to them. Thereupon Mir Akbar Khan at once sounded cease-firing, impressing on the men the uselessness of fighting, since Jamrud had been taken and the lashkar of Islam had reached the gates of Peshawar. He further ordered the men to pack up their baggage, as the fort was to be evacuated. Mursil, Subadar, insisted that before the evacuation of the post was carried out the lashkar must withdraw to the Khaibar. These terms of Mursil’s having been accepted, the lashkar moved towards the Khaibar; * but some of the Ghazis on the west closed up to the wall of the fort and tried to climb over.

22. Thereupon by Mursil’s order firing again commenced; but Mir Akbar Khan had the taps of the reservoir open to allow the water-supply to run away. Subadar Mursil hearing of this had the taps closed again and posted a guard over the reservoir. Mursil then told Mir Akbar that he (Mir Akbar) was from the outset behaving unfaithfully and disloyally and wished to have the garrison massacred, and that he (Mursil) had under him No. 4 and No. 6 companies and the Malikdin Khel sepoy soldiers, and if he (Mir Akbar) did not abstain from treachery, he (Mursil) would fight him first, and then see what he could do with the enemy afterwards. The warning had the desired effect on Mir
Akbar, who retired to own his quarters inside the post, but some Munshis and Peshawari sepoys who fled to him at these quarters for protection were plundered by him.

23. Meanwhile Mursil Khan became aware that some Zakha Khels of Burg and Ilacha and some Shinwaris of Lwargai had got into the fort by climbing up the walls of the north-eastern bastion, and had entered the rooms of the European officers' bungalow. He immediately with a small following ran towards the bungalow and fired on the enemy, two of whom were killed and two captured; but unfortunately he himself was shot dead, a bullet entering at his eye and passing out through the back of his head.

24. After Mursil's death Mir Akbar Khan got hold of the keys of the magazine (which Captain Barton had entrusted to Mursil) and opened the magazine. Out of 89 ammunition boxes which were there, he removed 28 to his own quarters, besides a lot of Captain Barton's property and furniture which had been entrusted to him for safe custody by Munshi Said Muhammad of the Khaibar Rifles. Mir Akbar now got an opportunity of releasing the two Zakha Khels (Lal Khel) of Karamna belonging to his own faction who had been taken prisoners in the attack on the European officers' quarters and had been placed in the custody of Mehr Jan, Lance Naik, Company 4, and three Malikdin Khel sepoys, who had given out that they were to be shot.

25. In the meantime Jawas, Shinwari Subadar, was also wounded in the right shoulder. It was now that Jamadar Kazi Nur Hassan, Malikdin Khel, after consultation with Mir Akbar Khan, called out for the Malikdin Khel standard to come close outside to the gate which was then unlocked and opened by the same Jamadar after taking the key from Tamash, Havidar, Malikdin Khel, in charge of the gate. Mursil Subadar's son, Mir Hassan, bore the standard of the Malikdin Khels, and the moment that the gate was opened the lashkar rushed in. The garrison to save their lives and rifles then went and stood under the standards of their respective tribes with the exception of the men of British territory, who were robbed by the Afridis of their rifles and belts. The sepoys who had taken shelter with Mir Akbar Khan were also at his instigation deprived of their rifles. The Afridis even stripped the Peshwaris and others of their clothes. Kadar, Subadar, with the surviving Mullagoris and Shilmanis of No. 6 Company, seeing this state of things, climbed down the northern wall of the fort and escaped. Jawas, Subadar, Shinwari, and Khaista Khan, Jamadar, Zakha Khel, also followed him. The Nikki Khels Zakha Khels of the Khaibar then flocked around Mir Akbar Khan, and putting the articles he had looted on charpoys covered them with a cloth and removed them as if they were dead bodies. The Afridis after capturing the post first deprived the aliens of their arms and accoutrements, then made them prisoners and plundered whatever they could lay their hands on, and lastly set fire to the buildings.

26. The Afridi lashkar after burning the post carried off their dead and wounded towards Tirah, much against the wishes of the Aka Khel Mullah who implored them to stay. Many of their dead, however, are said to have been abandoned on the hills owing to the intense heat, and some 27 men are reported to have died of heat apoplexy and thirst on the way home. The body of Mursil, Subadar, was taken to Tirah by his sons, Muhammad Hassan (a Lance Naik of the Khaibar Rifles) and Mir Hassan, and they also carried off his rifle with him. Mursil, Subadar, has another son, a sowar in the Khaibar Rifles, who has been granted leave to Tirah on account of his father's death. I reserve my remarks about the services rendered by Mursil, Subadar, pending the return of his son Muhammad Hasan, Lance Naik.
Out of the six sowars, who were at Landi Kotal, the three Kuki Khels and one Hindu Malikdin Khel have returned, but without their horses and rifles which they state were taken by the Afridi lashkar. One Adam Khel sowar has also since returned, one only remaining absent in Tirah.

27. The Landi Kotal post with Fort Tytler and the Gurgurra post was garrisoned by 504 men, of whom 21 being native officers, buglers, muskis, etc., as per detail below, had no rifles:

| Native officers | 7 |
| Buglers        | 3 |
| Writers        | 6 |
| Mistri and mochi | 2 |
| Orderlies of Malik Khawas Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan | 3 |

28. Up to date the following men of different tribes have returned with their rifles from Landi Kotal and other posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malikdin Khel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuki Khel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Khel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinwari</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shilmani</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullagori</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawari</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakha Khel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 136

The following have returned without their rifles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zaka Khel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malikdin Khel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuki Khel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aka Khel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Khel</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawari</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalalabadi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinwari</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullagori</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 79

Subadar Jawas Khan, Shinwari, with eighty Shinwari and Shilmani sepoys also returned to Jamrud with their rifles on the 14th September.

29. Many men of the other tribes are also anxious to return with their rifles, but are afraid to do so on account of the Mullahs.

* Since this was written 43 more rifles have been brought in, so that the number remaining to be recovered at the present date is 245. 3rd October 1897.

R. UNRY.

There are now 209 men absent, and 288 rifles and four revolvers are missing.

30. The following is a detail of the followers, etc. killed in the Landi Kotal Post, in addition to native officer and men shown in the statement attached as Appendix II:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweepers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweeper woman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kala, brother of Nawab, mistri</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Peshawari mason</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A bansia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobi of Captain Barton's</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A traveller in the Kabul caravan of the 23rd August who had taken shelter with Mir Akbar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 8
The enemy's loss here in killed and wounded was estimated at 250.

31. All the Afridi tribes took part in the hostile gathering which consisted of Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, Sepah, Kamrai, Zakha Khel Orakzi, the Abdal Khel section of the Kuki Khel and Adam Khel of Maidan (Tirah). The only Tirah Afridis who were not represented in the gathering were the Sikandar Khel and Mitha Khan Khel sections of the Kuki Khel. A separate lashkar, however, about five thousand strong, of the latter sections came down on the 26th August to Ali Masjid and occupied the Pass from Ali Masjid to Fort Maude, after the rest of the Afridi lashkar had returned to Tirah.* Malik Amin Khan's two brothers, Zaman Khan and Haidar Khan, were with this lashkar, and on the nights of the 27th and 28th August some Kuki Khels of the above two sections came to Jamrud and fire into the Fort there, killing a chankidar of the bhusa contractor who, contrary to orders, had remained outside of the Fort, and also cutting the telegraph wire.

32. Some four to five hundred Sangu Khel Shinwaris came up to Landi Kotal on the 26th August from the Amir's territory beyond Landi Khans and arranged a truce between themselves and the Lwargai Shinwaris and between different sections of the latter which was to remain in force until the next Shub-i-Barat, i.e., the 9th January 1898. The Sangu Khels were then fed by each section of the Lwargai Shinwaris. According to a Shinwari informer, named Raza Khan, while these Sangu Khels were at Landi Kotal, the Sartip of Dakka (Muhammad Hussain Khan) sent them an order on the 26th by Yusaf, Basid Khel of Khargallai, telling them to go and join the Kuki Khel lashkar at Ali Masjid, taking with them the Lwargai Shinwaris and Zakha Khel of the Khaibar; but the Shinwaris of Lwargai refused to go, and the Sangu Khels themselves were not very keen upon it. On the 28th August the Sangu Khels, hearing that the Kuki Khel lashkar had returned to Tirah, also went back to their homes in Kabul territory.

33. In conclusion, I think it will not be out of place to mention in this report the conduct of the Khaibar Rifles, and the part taken by each Afridi Malik in the rising and the burning of the Khaibar posts.

(a) Before I received the Commissioner's telegram of the 25th regarding the disbanding and disarming of the Khaibar Rifles,† I had issued orders to Captain Barton to arrest and to send to the Political Look-up at Peshawar all the sepoy at Jamrud who were related to the eleven Zakha Khels that had deserted with their arms from Fort Maude on the 23rd August, in the hope that this reprisal would bring about the recovery of the rifles thus carried off.

† This apparently refers to my telegram No. 431, dated the 25th August 1897, to the address of the Political Officer, Khaibar, at Jauzed.

† Apparently late on the night of the 25th August.

R. UDNY.

These sepoys were accordingly disarmed on the night of the 25th without any difficulty, but the Kuki Khels and Peshawaris were allowed to retain their arms. The Kuki Khels from the different posts had returned to headquarters with their arms, and could not be blamed in the least. For this and many other reasons, e.g., to retain their services for obtaining news, patrolling and helping in the water-supply, it was deemed advisable not to disarm them. The disarmed sepoys were given ten days' leave to go to their homes in Tirah and to try and induce their relations to rejoin with their rifles by telling them that I did not blame them, as they had only gone off after the posts were evacuated and captured by their own clansmen.
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(b) Almost all the Maliks were in correspondence with me, but they did nothing to prove their loyalty to Government, which showed that they were either unable to control their tribesmen or averse to checking them. Some of them on account of their secret intrigues with the Kabul Government purposely avoided taking any steps to restrain their men from taking part in the rising, especially Malik Khawas Khan, Zakha Khel, and Malik Feroz Khan, Malikdin Khel, who, I hear, are in correspondence with the Sartip of Dakka.

I must note here the names of the Afridi Chiefs that accompanied the lashkar and took part in the burning and sacking of the posts:

I.—Mahrban, and

II.—Jan Muhammad, Shilobar Kambar Khel, accompanied the lashkar from Tirah, but for some reason or other only came with them as far as Chora in the Bazar Valley, where they stayed behind while the lashkar came on to the Khaibar.

III.—Muhmammad Amir, and

IV.—Khair Muhammad, Kao Kambar Khels, are reported to have joined the Afridi lashkar.

V.—Maliks Khwas and Wali Muhammad, Zakha Khels, did not arrange a truce between themselves when ordered to do so, but of their own accord stopped their private feuds, and took part freely with the tribesmen in the sacking of the Landi Kotal Post. They also prevented sepoys from bringing back their rifles. Malik Wali Muhammad Khan, though he obeyed my orders by going up to Landi Kotal, did nothing to prove his loyalty.

VI.—Mir Akbar, son of Malik Khawas Khan, took a prominent part in the burning and looting of the Landi Kotal Post, and it was solely due to his disloyalty and misbehaviour that the post was not able to hold out longer.

VII.—The Shinwari grey-beards rendered no assistance, and their tribesmen joined in the loot of the Landi Kotal Post, though they themselves did not do so.

VIII.—The Mullagori tribe did well in carrying out orders.

IX.—Two or three days after the capture of Landi Kotal the Lohi Shilmanis, under fear of the Mullahs, sent down a party of 100 men with a standard to the entrance of the Tartarra route in front of the British village of Shahgai as if threatening an attack on the border, but these men did nothing and soon turned back to their homes on account of rain; and it is hoped that the Shilmani sepoys will return with their rifles.

X.—The Wudredunkai* Kuki Khels inhabit the villages of Jam, Kadam, Gudr, Lashora and Lala China. Those of Jam, Kadam, Gudr and Lashora behaved well and have helped to their utmost in the water-supply arrangements for the troops sent out to Jamrud; but the Kuki Khels of Lala China† joined the Ghazis, and took part with the Zakha Khels of Burg, Ilacha and Karamna in carrying off timber from the Ali Masjid Post. One Gultaraz of Lala China, a son of Mirwal Kuki Khel, late a Subadar of the Khaibar Rifles, with a few followers, joined the Ghazi lashkar when it advanced from Ali Masjid upon Landi Kotal, and Subadar-Major Mir Akbar gave him two of the rifles looted at Landi Kotal, besides which he is reported to have in his possession four other
Government rifles as well. Said Abbas of Shahi in the Peshawar District, an outlaw in Lala China, who was also with the Afridi lashkar at Ali Masjid, is reported to have secured two horses, two swords and one rifle of the Khaibar Rifles, besides a box of Captain Barton's containing some papers, seals, photographs, etc.

XI.—Malik Sher Muhammad, Sepah, with his son Shah Mard, joined the lashkar. Sher Muhammad had promised to do his utmost to check the rising, but failed.

XII.—Maliks Feroz, Darya Khan, and Said Raza, the younger brother of Malik Yar Muhammad, Malikdin Khel, also joined the lashkar.

XIII.—Maliks Hafiz Sumandar and Muhammad Azam, Kamrai, held aloof.

XIV.—The grey-beards of the Ziauddin section of the Zakha Khel took part with the lashkar.

XV.—Malik Yar Muhammad, Malikdin Khel, did not join, and it was through his influence that three of our men and Captain Barton's bearer, a Hindu Kahar, escaped to Jamrud.*

XVI.—Malik Feroz Khan, Malikdin Khel, has sent me in only one letter which was received the other day. Probably this is due to his annoyance at the division of his subsidy with his rival Darya Khan.

XVII.—Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, has worked hard for Government since he came in from Tirah on the 17th August, and has given every assistance in his power, but appears to be in a somewhat troubled state of mind.

(c) As to the conduct of the Khaibar Rifles, I have already submitted reports furnished to me by Captain Barton, Commanding the Corps. As soon as my enquiries about the heirs and relations of the deceased sepoys and others killed in the fighting are complete, I hope to submit proposals on the subject.

No. 609.

APPENDIX I.

Proclamation.

Be it known to all you, Afridis, that the Kuki Khels have not so far joined the present disturbances. The Afridi tribes, especially those that came down from Peshawar to Tirah Bazar, Ilacha, Karamna, Chora and Sara Ghal, with articles for sale, such as potatoes, mazari, wood, nuts, etc., and who take back other commodities for their own use, with a safe passage via Jamrud and Kajuri; and those Afridis who during the winter season, finding no pasturage in Tirah on account of the snow, come down and settle at Baghari, Kajuri, Dawar, Karawal, Bagourai and Uchogaro to graze their cattle; and those Kambar Khels, Malikdin Khels, and Sepahs who come down and find shelter and livelihood in the villages of the Peshawar District during the rigour of the winter months, be it engraved on their minds that, if they even attempt to take any part in the approaching outbreak, the result for them will not be good, and that they will reap the fruit of their rashness in a befitting manner. The (following) fact too should be borne in mind and well pondered over, viz., that every tribe includes a number of pensioners besides receiving allowances from Government, and that, if once any tribe's character is lost, their after repentance and apology will prove injurious instead of doing them any good.
<table>
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<th>Tribal composition</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Available for Duty</td>
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<td>Men who were not disarmed on the 25th August or who came in afterwards from captured posts</td>
<td>Men who, after being disarmed and sent on leave on the 25th August, returned on the expiration of their leave</td>
<td>Wounded</td>
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<td>Men who were not disarmed on the 25th August or who came in afterwards from captured posts</td>
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<td>With rifles</td>
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JAMRUD;
**DIX II**

*(including Native Officers) as it stood on the 16th September 1897.*

**SENTENCES.**

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**Remarks.**

- Out of the eight revolvers issued to Native Officers four are missing as per detail below—
  - Zakha Khel: 1
  - Malikdin Khel: 1
  - Peshawari: 1

- Of this number 120 men, viz., 92 Zakha Khel, 40 Kuki Khel, 1 Kambhar Khel, 2 Adam Khel, 2 Aka Khel, 2 Orakzai, 2 Mulagori, and 2 Shwarri were subsequently paid up to the 30th September and dismissed as not trustworthy enough to be given back their rifles.

MUHAMMAD ASLAM, Lieut.-Col.
No. 611.

No. 3042-P., dated Peshawar, the 4th October 1897.

From—Sir R. Udy, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,

To—The Officiating Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

In continuation of my letter No. 3028-P., dated the 3rd instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of Government, copies of the correspondence noted on the margin, together with a copy of a semi-official letter which I sent to Captain Barton on the night of the 17th August directing him to withdraw from Landi Kotal to Jamrud.

2. In the letter last mentioned my letter recalling Captain Barton was purposely worded in peremptory terms to ensure immediate compliance, because I was aware that Captain Barton is an exceedingly keen soldier, and I feared that any order less stringent might give rise to some demur or protest on his part which might delay his withdrawal till the road had been closed and it was too late. I did not know that Colonel Aslam Khan had already sent Captain Barton word that troops were on their way to Landi Kotal, or I should certainly have taken care to remove such an impression; and, as it was, I did not consider it necessary to discuss any question beyond the immediate one of Colonel Barton’s retirement, because Colonel Aslam Khan was going out the first thing next morning to stay at Jamrud, and it was natural to suppose that he would explain everything to Captain Barton when the latter joined him there. Colonel Aslam Khan, it will be seen, asserts that he did do this, and that he did not omit to give Captain Barton the fullest information of the course which had been decided upon; but Captain Barton evidently failed to realize the situation, though I must confess that I cannot understand how it was that he remained under such a misapprehension for over a week, during which he and Colonel Aslam Khan were together at Jamrud, and presumably in the closest and most constant communication.

However this may be, the result has been most unfortunate for Captain Barton himself, as I regret to say that he has lost a very large amount of private property to the value of something like one thousand pounds sterling which was destroyed or looted at Landi Kotal. For this I trust Government may be disposed to allow him compensation out of any fine that may be realized from the Afridis, and, if this idea is approved, I will call upon him for a detailed estimate of his loss.

No. 612.

No. 4, dated Jamrud, the 9th September 1897.

From—Captain F. J. H. Barton, Commandant, Khaibar Rifles,

To—The Political Officer, Khaibar.

In view of the sacking and burning of the Landi Kotal serai and fort, Ali Majsid and all the posts in the Khaibar, which were in my charge and garrisoned by the Khaibar Rifles, I have the honour to forward the following report of my action and the provision I made for their protection, which I beg may be laid before His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces in the Punjab.

2. On the 9th August I commenced preparations for defence, increasing the garrisons of the various posts and getting in a reserve of ammunition, rations and water. Landi Kotal being the most advanced post and practically dominating the whole Khaibar, I increased the garrison from about 200 to 354 rifles, and...
February 1898.

Afriidi-Orakzai Expedition.

S F 612

increased the reserve ammunition to over 50,000 rounds. I made the chaukidars of the "Ulus" well work extra hours raising water. On the 17th August there was 9 feet of water in the covered masonry tank in the fort; the daily waste for drinking, washing and garden irrigation, etc., with over 400 souls living in the fort, was only 3 inches. From this it will be seen that with care there would have been an ample supply for a garrison of a thousand men, for at least twelve days, and if limited to drinking purposes, would have lasted for a much longer period. I ordered the bawnis of two of the companies inside the fort to collect a month’s supply for 400 men and also wood for cooking.

I told off the different native officers and companies to their sections of the defence. My garrison of 35 rifles was much too weak to man the walls, which are some thousand yards in extent, and a reserve for any purpose was out of the question.

3. On the 17th August I received information that a force of Shinwaris of Ningrahal and Khugianis was advancing from Dakka to attack Landi Kotal, their object being to loot the caravan serai. This serai has only a small guard, and is distant about 800 yards from the fort, and out of sight, being built in the bed of a nullah. It is quite indefensible as it is commanded on three sides at close range (on two sides at under 100 yards). I therefore moved a company out on the low hills that command the caravan serai and the approaches to it and entrenched them there. I sent a picket of local Shinwaris to hold the Michni Kandao, about two miles from Landi Kotal, and directed them, by firing on and endeavouring to check the enemy, to give us warning of their approach. On the same day (17th August) having received information of a large Afridi gathering advancing to attack the Khaibar posts, I wrote to the Commissioner * and asked for a small reinforcement of regular troops. At about midnight on the 17th I received a telegram from the Political Officer to say that troops were on their way. At daybreak on the 18th August I despatched the demi official letter to the Commissioner, a copy of which is attached. At 6 A.M. I received a peremptory order from the Commissioner to repair at once to Jamrud to meet Colonel Aslam Khan, as my presence in the Khaibar was not only useless but very harmful. I was naturally much distressed at this order. I called all the native officers and men together, told them what had occurred, handed over the fort to them, said that I had asked the Commissioner for help, which of course would be granted and would return with the reinforcements.

4. On my arrival at Jamrud I hoped every day that reinforcements would be sent to Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid. It was only after both these forts had fallen, without any attempt at succour, that I incidentally saw the telegram from the Commissioner at Peshawar to the Punjab Government dated the 18th August, a copy of which is attached, in which it is decided not to attempt to relieve the Khaibar posts if attacked. I asked when Fort Maude was attacked if a force could not be sent to the relief of Landi Kotal via the Shilman country, and was told it could not be done.†

5. Had I known on the 18th when I received my orders to report myself at Jamrud that the forts and their garrisons were to be left without succour, I would on my own responsibility have marched down with all my men, baggage and ammunition and have saved a large quantity of rifles and ammunition from falling into the hands of the enemy, as although the Khaibar posts could have held out for a few days, they could not have done so for ever. During the five days that elapsed between my recall and the closing of the Khaibar Pass I should have had ample time to remove most of the valuable Government property left in the forts, have simply evacuated them and handed them over to the Malikis.

*S F—604-554—Feb.
6. In conclusion, I beg most respectfully to protest against my having been left in ignorance for five days of a decision to abandon the posts, for whose safety I was responsible, and the men under my command. Two of my servants have been massacred and everything I possess of value in the world has been irretrievably sacrificed, but the loss of my property is as nothing in my eyes compared to my having, however innocently, failed to redeem a promise made to my men.

No. 7-C, dated the 9th September 1897.

Endorsed by the Political Officer, Khaibar.

Forwarded, in original, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, in continuation of this office No. 6-C, of the 8th September 1897.

No. 613.

No. 339-C, dated the 13th September 1897.

From—Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,

To—The Political Officer, Khair.

In our conversation yesterday I discussed with you generally the matters referred to by Captain Barton in paragraphs 3 to 6 of his letter No. 4, dated the 9th instant, to your address, which I received under endorsement of the same date; and, as I understand that you have a copy of this letter in your own office, I shall be much obliged by your favouring me in writing with any remarks you may wish to offer on these paragraphs before I send on Captain Barton's letter to Government.

No. 614.

Telegram, dated the 18th August 1897.

From—The Commissioner, Peshawar,

To—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Simla.

Clear the line. No. 334. Now, however, that no officer remains in the Khaibar whom it would be necessary to succour or relieve, I entirely agree with General Elles that, if Landi Kotal or other posts are attacked or the road molested, the right course is not to attempt to force our way up the Khaibar, but to leave them alone in the Pass from this side and to threaten Tirah by assembling a force on the Samana of sufficient strength to advance, if necessary, through Orakzai country.

No. 615.

Dated Landi Kotal, the 18th August 1897 (Demi-official).

From—Captain F. J. H. Barton, Commandant, Khaibar Rifles,

To—Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

The night has passed without any disturbance. Information I received later than my letter to you yesterday evening was to the effect that the Khugianis and Shinwaris from Dakka meant, not to attack the fort, but to rush the Kafila arrived there in safety.

R. Udny.

Note.—This letter reached me at 12-30 P.M. on the 18th August almost simultaneously with a telegram from Colonel Aslam Khan at Jamrud announcing that Captain Barton and Abdul Karim Khan (Native Political Assistant) had arrived there in safety.
fire on any force advancing from Dakka which might check them, and in any case prepare us for their arrival.

Subadar Mursil, who arrived last night from Tirah, says the Afridi gathering cannot reach here before to-night at the earliest. I hope you do not think me an alarmist asking for troops, but my reasons were as follows:

1. The possibility of a large Afridi force attacking (Subadar Mursil states that all the clans of the Tirah Afridis have joined the movement) and their being helped by a flank attack from Dakka.

2. The fort is a big place to hold with the men I have got against a large force, and though I have much confidence in them and they seem most anxious to have a row even with their own people, still if they were surrounded by their own tribesmen it might be hard for them, especially as this business seems to be purely fanatical.

3. The bazar and Kasba serai could not possibly be defended with the numbers I have, from a large tribal force, being so badly placed, and so far from the fort.

4. The possibility of an Afghan attack. Subadar Mursil states that the Afridis received a letter from the Afghan Commandant of Kafila saying that if they wished help in the attack on the Khairbar he would give it them.

5. Even if the Afridi lashkar fizzles away into a small force, the Kasba guards will have to be much strengthened, and without help I could not well spare the men.

6. The presence of a few troops here will keep the Khairbar Zakha Khel from doing anything foolish.

I have just received a telegram from Colonel Aslam Khan that troops are coming up. I did not mention Ali Masjid in my letter last night, as I knew that if troops were sent here it would also be reinforced.

Of course I know nothing what is going on between the Government and the Amir, but it seems to me that the danger as regards this place is a possible coup de main from the Dakka direction, a force with guns, for instance coming up while the Afridis kept us employed.

I hope if I have said anything presumptuous you will forgive me, but I thought it right, being on the spot, to say all I knew and thought of the situation.

No. 615A.
Translation of a confidential letter No. 8, dated the 15th September 1897, from COLONEL MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN, Political Officer, Khairbar, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

In reply to your confidential letter No. 339, dated the 13th instant, asking my opinion on paragraphs 3 to 6 of Captain Barton's letter No. 4, dated 9th idem, I beg to send you the following reply:

Reply to paragraph 3.—Captain Barton writes that he received a telegram from the Political Officer, Khairbar, on the 17th August 1897 that troops had started. It was at sunset on the 17th August that I learnt from Malik Amin Khan, Khuk Khel, and from the letter of Subadar Mursil Khan's that the Afridi "lashkar" was about to attack the Khairbar Pass. I therefore at once thought it advisable to inform Captain Barton by telegram so that he might remain on the alert. I was under the impression at that time that our troops would advance, and so I wrote that the troops had started. In point of fact the troops were sent out, *by telegram to Jamrud and on from there by sowar.*

U. D. N. Malik Amin Khan with me to the Commissioner. General Elles was then also present. After a long discussion I came to know that there were several obstacles to the troops going to Landi Kotal,
and that their advance was limited to Jamrud. When at 12 midnight it was settled that no troops were to go to Landi Kotal, the Commissioner wrote a letter to Captain Barton summoning him back from Landi Kotal, which was at once conveyed to him there. On the 18th August 1897 British troops reached Jamrud, and I also arrived there at the same time.

About 10 A.M. Captain Barton and Abdul Karim Khan, Assistant Political Officer, arrived at Jamrud. I then informed Captain Barton of all the conversation that had taken place the previous night at the Commissioner's house. After a short while Captain Barton told me that he wished to send for two of his servants at Landi Kotal. I assented to this. I also told Captain Barton that it would be better if he sent for his property and office, but he said that it was not proper to send for them at that juncture, because it would create confusion among all the people. I replied that I agreed in this opinion.

Reply to paragraph 4.—Captain Barton writes that on his arrival at Jamrud he every day expected that reinforcements would be sent to Landi Kotal. My reply to this paragraph is that I never concealed anything from Captain Barton, in this respect to the best of my knowledge. I informed Captain Barton, or rather explained to him, that under the Afridi agreement the Afridis themselves were responsible for the safety of the Khaibar, that all their sepoys were present in their posts, and what could the Government do if they were unable to defend their own road. Captain Barton enquired why troops could not go to Landi Kotal. I said that a large number of troops were required for Jamrud and Ali Masjid and also for the safety of the road, that besides this, troops were wanted for fighting which it was very difficult to carry on at this hot season, and that sufficient arrangements for supplies and carriage could not be made.

Reply to paragraph 5.—Captain Barton writes that had he known that all the posts were to be left undefended, he would have saved all the property and sepoys by bringing them into Jamrud. I remember that Captton Barton went into Peshawar on the 18th August 1897. On his return he told me that he understood Government would call in the Khaibar Rifles to Jamrud. I told him that to visit him on the 19th August at 3 P.M., and I would then recommend he should be brought into Jamrud, and that he has been disgraced in this business. I believe firmly in the fidelity of the Khaibar Rifles. I went to Peshawar accordingly and interviewed the Commissioner (next day, i.e., 19th August) and accompanied the Commissioner to the subject there. The three of us were unanimous in the opinion that it would be preferable, even if the Khaibar Rifles (ultimately) proved faithless and deserted with their rifles, not to order them into Jamrud (till they had been put to the test), and that this was the time to prove the fidelity of the Khaibar Rifles. When I returned to Jamrud I thoroughly acquainted Captain Barton with the details of the discussion (which had been held at Peshawar).

Reply to paragraph 6.—I from time to time informed Captain Barton that troops could not go beyond (Jamrud), and verbally acquainted him with all the reasons for this decision. I think that as Captain Barton is a military officer he considers that he has been disgraced in this business. If it is remembered that Captain Barton had a great deal of private property at Landi Kotal because he had made arrangements for Mrs. Barton to reside there the whole of the hot weather, that two servants of his were killed, and that his valuable silver plate and other property was looted, it is no wonder if he is troubled for these reasons. In my opinion, as the Captain was recalled from Landi Kotal
by order of the Commissioner, no disgrace can be attached to his name. If possible, a notification should be published in the *Punjab Gazette* that Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khaibar Rifles, returned to Jamrud from Landi Kotal on the 18th August 1897 by order of the Commissioner.

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**No. 616.**

Dated Peshawar, the 17th August 1897 (Demiofficial).

From—Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,

To—Captain F. J. H. Barton, Commandant of the Khaibar Rifles.

I consider your remaining at Landi Kotal and Abdul Karim’s staying at Ali Masjid not only absolutely useless, but very harmful under present circumstances. On receipt therefore of this note, which I am sending you by express sowar, please make over charge at once to the senior native officer at Landi Kotal and come down to meet Colonel Aslam Khan at Jamrud as fast as your horse will carry you, picking up Abdul Karim Khan, the Assistant Political Officer at Ali Masjid, on the way, and bringing him along with you to Jamrud too. You have heard, I suppose, that Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, has come in here to me this evening with news that a very large Afridi lashkar with 1,500 Ningrarahis has left Tirah to attack the Khaibar road and the posts from Landi Kotal downwards. They are expected in the Khaibar to-morrow, and you must come away and get through before the road is closed. If your garrison could be relied upon, I would never recall you. As it is, the men on such an occasion are absolutely untrustworthy, and I consider it my duty to order you to come down to Jamrud at once, and it is your duty to obey this order. This should reach you by the early morning, and you should start the moment you receive it, only stopping for a few minutes at Ali Masjid to pick up Abdul Karim, whom I am ordering to stay there till you fetch him and to come away with you. I am sending orders to-night to Maliks Wali Muhammad and Khwas to proceed at once to Landi Kotal with all their men, and am telling them they will be held strictly responsible that no damage is done to the post. I am sending similar orders to the Shinwaris. But you are not to wait for the arrival of these Maliks at Landi Kotal or for the arrival of the Shinwaris, to whom you should tell the native officer of the post that you leave in charge to convey this warning.

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**No. 617.**

**Order in Council.**

Having regard to the existing military forces of India, and to the financial and political situation, the Government of India do not contemplate the annexation or permanent occupation of Tirah as the basis of the present settlement with the Afridis which they have instructed Sir William Lockhart to endeavour to effect.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief dissents.

2. The Kohat Pass need not be occupied, and at the present time it is inexpedient to take steps to enforce the tribal engagements for the improvement of the road.

3. If after Sir William Lockhart has received the general submission of the tribes it appears to him to be advisable he should be authorised to require some small tribute from them.

4. The Policy of requiring tribute may be gradually introduced among other tribes as opportunity may offer, after local investigation in each case.

5. The question of the re-opening of the Khyber Pass has been dealt with in the instructions issued to Sir William Lockhart, and the Government of India.

Letter No. 3903-F., dated the 4th October 1897.

have no further instructions to issue on this point at present, except that Sir William Lockhart should consider the advisability of securing in the agreement a right to the improvement and re-alignment of the road in the Pass.

6. The arms in the hands of the trans-border tribes have been used against the British Government, and as many as can be should be taken from them. Disarmament, as thus carried out, does not seem to imply protection.

7. On the question of the concentration of forces and what posts and lines of communication are regarded as indispensable, it is impossible at present to give a definite answer to the Secretary of State. The definition of permanent position and policy should also be deferred until the close of military operations.

29th October 1897.

No. 618

Telegram P, dated the 29th October 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Your Lordship’s telegram of October 13th, having been considered in Council, our conclusions are:

1. We do not contemplate as basis of settlement with the Afridis to be made by Sir William Lockhart the annexation or permanent occupation of Tirah.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief dissents from this.

2. We do not desire to occupy the Kohat Pass, and the present time is inexpedient for enforcing tribal engagement for the improvement of the road.

3. Sir William Lockhart should be authorized to require small tribute from the tribes, if after receiving submission he thinks it advisable.

4. The policy of requiring tribute as admission of suzerainty may be gradually introduced among the other tribes, as opportunity may offer after local investigation.

5. In dealing with the re-opening of the Khyber, please see my telegram of the 4th October last. Sir William Lockhart should consider the advisability of securing the right to improve and re-align the road.

6. The arms of trans-border tribes have been used against us, and as many as possible should be taken from them; disarmament as thus carried out does not seem to imply protection.

7. We cannot give a definite answer until after conclusion of military operations on the concentration of forces, indispensable posts and lines of communication, or definition of permanent position and policy.

Before communicating our conclusions to Sir William Lockhart we await Your Lordship’s approval.

Nos. 4356-4357-F., dated Simla, the 30th October 1897 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded to the Military Department and Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch, for information.

No. 619.

No. 339-T.I., dated Simla, the 30th October 1897.

Endorsed by Military Department.

Copy forwarded to the Foreign Department for information.
No. 620.

No. 1927-F., dated the 30th October 1897.

Memo. by the Adjutant-General in India.

The following is submitted for the information of the Government of India in the Military Department:

No. 621.

Telegram, dated the 29th October 1897.

From—GENERAL SIR W. LOCKHART, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.


No. 622.

Telegram, dated the 29th October 1897.

From—GENERAL SIR W. LOCKHART, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

Clear the line. I regret to report death of Major DeButts, who was dangerously wounded.

No. 623.

Telegram No. 94, dated the 1st November 1897.

From—The Commissioner of Peshawar, To—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, represents advisability of settling now once for all with the Massuzai and the Chamkannis by advance of Kurram movable column into their country. I strongly support his proposal and recommend the advance as soon as convenient after our forces have reached Maidan whence a column could co-operate. The terms I recommend are for the Massuzai permanent forfeiture of their Kurram allowance and restoration of all property looted in Kurram and fine of seven thousand rupees, and surrender of one hundred breech-loaders also of all Government arms carried off. For the Chamkannis Khani Khel clan surrender of 30 breech-loaders and fine of one thousand rupees or its equivalent in cattle. Officer on Special Duty reports that since last February the Massuzai have been guilty of twenty-two raids and attacks, carrying off property worth over eight thousand rupees, and that the Khani Khel have committed four raids. Addressed to Punjab; repeated Foreign; and General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

No. 4396-4397-F., dated Simla, the 1st November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty—Kurram, No. 226, dated 31st October 1897.
Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty—Kurram, No. 227, dated the 31st October 1897.
Telegram from the Commissioner, Peshawar, No. 98, dated the 31st October 1897.
Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 94, dated the 1st November 1897.

*Secret F., February 1898, Nos. 1-405.
No. 624.

Telegram No. 59-I.P., dated Bara, the 1st November 1897.

From—GENERAL HAMMOND, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. A party of about thirty Zakha Khels entered contractor's khoosa godowns half mile east of camp, last night, tied up all coolies, carried off chowkidar and his Snider rifle. On thieves passing Nasrullah Border Police station, garrison fired volley at them and caused them to relinquish chowkidar. Health of troops good. Lance Duffadar Khwas Khan, 9th Bengal Lancers, taken prisoner 15th October and exchanged for Havildar Said Amir, Khyber Rifles, came in to-night. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Chief of Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force; General Officer Commanding and Commissioner, Peshawar; and Major Deane.

No. 625.

Telegram No. B-115, dated Sadda, the 1st November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Three squadrons, 6th Bengal Cavalry, moved from Sultan to Para Chinar. All quiet Kurram. Leading Alisherzai Malik killed at Ramadan on 25th. Total casualties among Alisherzais near Samana now reported as sixteen killed. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.

No. 626.

Telegram No. 897-C., dated the 1st November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinawar,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Nothing of importance. Base Commandant wires rumour of 140 Tirah Orakzais being in the Ublan with intent to raid, but adds that Deputy Commissioner does not consider information reliable. Ninth Field Battery, Royal Artillery, left Kohat to-day for Khusbalgarh. Supplies going forward freely. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Chief of Staff; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Major Deane, Malakand; Commissioner, Peshawar; General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Movable Column; and Base Commandant.

No. 627.

Telegram No. 230, dated the 1st November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar,

To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

To Commissioner. All quite in Kurram. Hajji Khel Chamkanni jirga, sixty men headed by Iran Nazir, Badshah Gul and Mir Hussain, came to Para Chinar to-day. They asked through Sharbat Ali Khan of Bughakki, if Government looked upon them as friends or enemies, and if it was the intention of Government to send troops into their country. Also whether they might freely come into Kurram. I declined to see the jirga and informed them that Sir William Lockhart would decide whether or not troops should enter their country, that they would be treated according as they behaved, and until a settlement be arrived at Chamkannis could not be admitted to Kurram. Also that their jirga should not again come until sent for. Arsalla Khan, Mamozaiz, has sent a message to some Turi Maliks, saying that "although you are Shiahs still you
are Mussalmans, and it is proper that you should help in a war of Islam.” Turis replied “you, Sunnis, are and always have been our enemies, and we do not trust your word, besides the English did not take Kurram by force; but came at our invitation, why then should we quarrel with them?” Repeated Foreign; Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4401-4402-F., dated Simla., the 2nd November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the

Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 628.

Telegram No. 25, dated the 1st November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, Simla.

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Reference your official letter 3803 of 4th October and your demi-official letter of 7th idem. Am I to understand, as I read it, that the future relations referred to in the last sentence of your demi-official include the terms to be announced to the Afridis and Orakzais, and that I must therefore await the further orders of the Secretary of State before announcing these terms, or am I to understand, as Udny thinks, that the expression ‘future relations’ in your demi-official only refers to the same expression as used in paragraph 10 of your official letter? In the latter case I presume that I am intended to announce terms at once as directed in paragraphs 5 to 9 of your official letter, and that I should also announce the intention of Government to reopen the Khyber Pass road in such manner as they may consider desirable, so that the only questions to be reserved for the previous sanction of the Secretary of State, would be the arrangements for the Khyber Pass road and any other relations we may wish to construct with the tribes for the future.

No. 629.

Telegram No. 26, dated the 1st November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Mastura, Camp Maidan, Afridi Tirah, Simla.

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. The force opposed to us yesterday on the Arhanga Pass is believed not to have been more than four or five hundred men composed of Zakhia, Kambar and Kuki Khel Afridis with a few Malla Khel Orakzais from the villages at the foot of the pass in the Mastura valley. We are now encamped in Kambar Khel limits, three miles from the insignificant little mosque standing on a plot of ground known as Bagh which is the place of tribal meetings. This mosque has been visited to-day, and the trees round it ringed. This Maidan valley is extensive, well cultivated and thickly studded with villages, but, though a few men hang about the hills and return to their villages at night, the bulk of the inhabitants have fled with their families and cattle to Rajgal, preparatory probably to a further flight towards Ningrahar. Women and cattle have also been seen on the Sandapal hills to the north-eastward, apparently moving over into the Bara valley. Addressed Foreign;
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 629 Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; and Major Deane, Malakand.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4423-4424-F., dated Simla, the 3rd November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Military Department.
The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 26, dated the 1st November 1897.
27th October 1897.—(1) A Mishti spy reports that small parties of from 50 to 80 men from each of the following sections—Mishti, Shekhan, Malla Khel, Aka Khel, Firoz Khel and Bizoti—are picqueted on the hills to the north of the camp known as Marchaoghar. These are contingents from the lashkars at Chirgotang, Takhtak and Ghaudarrah. To the west of the camp are picquets of similar strength from the Ali Khel Orakzaís and the Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel and Zakha Khel Afrïdis. The drivers and European soldiers, who were cut up near the camp, were killed by some of the enemy posted on the Marchaoghar near Khangarbur. The Afrïdis have informed the Orakzaís that they have come here to their assistance, and that they are in distress for want of food. If therefore they agreed to feed them, they would stay on, but otherwise they must return to their own country. The Orakzaís thereupon undertook to supply them with food.

(2) Foraging parties from both Divisions went out to-day up the Akhel valley. The Akhel village of Torkhanai was burned by one of these parties in spite of orders to the contrary.

(3) Last night a Kalla Khel Adam Khel Afridí armed with a knife was arrested by a Gurkha picquet to the west of the camp. He wore a white turban and looked like a ghazi. I have asked that his case may be dealt with by a Military Commission.

(4) The Kabul Khel Wazirs have come down to Palosi and Dolragha. The Kabul Khel Malikds are said to have received a message from Mulla Powindah to the effect that the present would be a good opportunity to rise against the Sarkar. No reply has been sent, as the result of the Tirah Expedition is awaited.

28th October.—(1) The force marched to-day to Ghundaki. The enemy were observed in considerable numbers on the Sanpagha Pass and the hills to each side. I noticed 5 standards on the pass itself, 2 on the range above Takhtak and 4 on the hills to the west of the camp. As evening drew on, the enemy descended from the pass, and one standard at least was planted within a mile from the camp. There was a good deal of desultory firing during the evening from the direction of Sara Khuna, with the result that one man was killed and another wounded. About 9 P.M. a most determined attack was made on a Gurkha picquet posted on a hill to the west of our camp. The enemy who were probably Gar Orakzaís surrounded the picquet and came to close quarters with our men. Our casualties, however, were only one killed and two wounded.

(2) This morning a band of Samil Khel Orakzaís kidnapped two Hindus and four coolies with a donkey laden with goods near the Akhel Ziarat.

(3) A deputation of Tirah Mullas to Jalalabad have been sent back with the reply that the Amir is unable to assist them now as he is a friend of the British Government, and that they ought to have applied for his aid when he was their enemy. Each of the Mullas received a lungi and Rs. 10 as rukhsatana.

(4) (a) A party of 12 Gurkhas started yesterday with a pakhal mule to bring water from the Khwaja Khidar spring. On their return they were fired on, and three of their number including the mule-driver were wounded. The two wounded Gurkhas were left behind, but the mule-driver managed to reach camp later. The rifles and ammunition of the two Gurkhas were of course appropriated by the enemy. This was probably the work of a Samil Khel party.

(b) It is reported that a considerable section of Shinwâris have joined the enemy and have arrived in Malla Khel limits.

(c) It is also said that three days ago the Samil clans, owing to some insult offered to one of the important Mishî Malikds by the Afrïdis, had withdrawn from the rest of the hostile clans. Mulla Saiyid Akbar, however, has since intervened and effected an amicable settlement, so that now the Samil Khels are ready to oppose us.

NOTE.—I do not credit this.

(Sd.) L. W. KING.
29th October.—(1) The force advanced to-day to the Mastura valley after storming the Sanpagha Pass. The enemy holding the pass itself were not in force and failed to make a stubborn resistance. The baggage and Commissariat train continued coming into camp throughout the night, but no opposition whatever was offered by the enemy who seem to be thoroughly disheartened at the ease with which the formidable pass fell into our hands. The Malla Khels have set fire to as much of their fodder as they had time to do in their hurried flight. The villages were found to be quite deserted.

(2) Saidan Shah, a nephew of Malik Sarfaraz, Malla Khel, who was employed as a spy, has, it is said, been shot by the enemy for supplying us with information. Blood-money should be demanded from the offenders for this outrage when accounts come to be squared.

CAMP MASTURA, MALLA KHEL; The 29th October 1897. (Sd.) L. W. KING, Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.

Political Diary No. XIV of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

30th October 1897.—(1) The night passed quietly. In the morning foraging parties went out in different quarters, and found a good deal of fodder and grain. Two followers were cut up to the west of the camp this morning, which shows that a few of the enemy are still lurking in the neighbourhood. Some Ali Khels are very probably concealed in the Chappar Ali Khel range which is thickly wooded.

(2) In the forenoon a reconnaissance in force was made in the direction of the Arhanga Pass by the General Officer Commanding and his staff. Two standards were observed on the pass with probably 300 to 400 men. These were said to be Zakha Khels with a few Kambar Khels.

(3) The following intelligence has been received through my spies in regard to the action of yesterday. The disposition of the enemy on the morning of the 29th, as reported by them, is given below:

Alisherzai (5 standards) At Ramdan and the hills above it. These tribes took no part in the fighting.
Mamozaiz (5 standards) At Chappar Ali Khel and above Kandi Mishti. These sections were only slightly engaged at the end.
Kambar Khel (5 standards) In the neighbourhood of Chappar Malla Khel.
Kuki Khels (3 standards) At Khatang.
Ali Khels (5 standards) At Chirgotang.
Malla Khels (1 standard) Daulatzais (2 standards) Aka Khels (2 standards)
Zakha Khels (5 standards) Shekhans (3 standards) Mishtis (5 standards) Malla Khels (1 standard)
(2 standards) Aka Khels (2 standards) 2
Aka Khels (2 standards) At Ramdan and the hills above it. These tribes took no part in the fighting.
Kandi Mishti. These sections were only slightly engaged at the end.
Chappar Malla Khel.
On the Sanpagha Pass.
At Khatang.
At Chirgotang.
The last five sections were opposed to the troops that engaged in the turning movement by Sara Khuna and Nazeno. The brunt of the fight fell on the Ali Khel Orakzais and the Zakha Khel and Kuki Khel Afridis, especially the latter, as they held the last sangar. As regards the enemy’s casualties nothing can be said with any certainty, but their loss is estimated at 19 killed and 25 wounded. The body only of one man, Mamur Shah, an Ali Khel, was found on the pass. The Shekhs, some of the Mishtis and the Daulatzaiks, have fled to the Aka Khel country, and the remainder of the Mishtis, the Malla Khels and Ali Khels to Maidan. These tribes with the Afridis are busily engaged in removing their families and property to Rajgal and Ningrahar. The villages of Maidan are being deserted, and the Malla Khel and Ali Khel villages are almost empty. The Afridis have had no time to carry off their grain, which they are leaving behind. Mulla Saiyid Akbar has fled to the Aka Khel country.

The remainder of the Gar lashkar and that of the Kambar Khels and Malikdin Khels failed to come up in time to render effectual assistance to their allies. This was partly due to our early start and partly to the turning movement by Kandi Mishti, which led these sections to understand that we were advancing in their direction. That the loss of the enemy was not greater is owing to the fact that they made no stand, but were dispersed by the guns before infantry fire could be brought into play. The actual number of the enemy holding the pass itself could hardly have exceeded 2,000, but as I have shown above they extended over a wide front and a large number were doubtless collected on the further side of the pass, ready to come down and join in if we received a check. When we entered the Mastura valley, we found that the Malla Khels had fired most of their fodder. It was evident that they had only cleared out of their Garhis a short time before our arrival with their families, cattle and household property. The Garhis or fortified houses in Orakzai limits are the strongest and most solidly built constructions I have seen on the frontier. Some of the Malla Khel Garhis have been destroyed by fire. This was the work in some cases of camp followers,* though in others undoubtedly the owners are themselves to blame, as, in firing their fodder, the houses caught fire too.

* Very strict orders have been issued by the General Officer Commanding against this.

(Sd.) R. UDNY.

(4) During the fight near Ramdan on the 25th October, the following is reported to have been the loss of the enemy:—

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<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
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<tr>
<td>Massuzai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alisherzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamozai</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Kambar Khel Afridis</td>
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There was one Massuzai standard engaged. One Alisherzai Malik Subbat Khan and one Mamozai Malik Abdulla Khan were killed.

Three standards of Mani Khels and Abdul Aziz Khels (Muhammad Khel Shiah sections) are reported to have joined the Daulatzais in the night attack on the Karappa camp on the 25th instant.

(Sd.) L. W. KING,
Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.

Camp Mastura Valley.

These diaries for the 27th to the 30th October, both inclusive, were received by me as we were leaving our camp in the Mastura valley yesterday morning.
Forwarded for the information of the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Sd.) R. UDNY,  
Chief Political Officer,  
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The 1st November 1897.

Nos. 15 and 16 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 1st November 1897.  
Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4558-4559-F., dated Simla, the 11th November 1897 (Confidential).  
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,  
To—The Military Department,  
The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
No. 632.

Telegram No. F. 60-I.P., dated the 2nd November 1897.
From—General Hammond, Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

In continuation my daily, 1st November. The contractor is not under care of military or commissariat. He is a man of the country and established his godown, trusting to being well within the border, and under the Civil Regulations and care of the district. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Chief of Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force; General Officer Commanding and Commissioner, Peshawar; and Major Deane.

No. 633.

Telegram No. 966-T., dated the 2nd November 1897.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan (through Mastura),
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Transport coming into camp was attacked night thirty-first, and some kits of 15th Sikhs lost. Casualties—the three drivers killed and two wounded, already reported yesterday’s daily. Yesterday Bagh was visited; enemy fired on troops advancing, but were driven off by a few shells. Our casualties—officer, Captain Macaren, King’s Own Scottish Borderers, slightly wounded. 1st-3rd Gurkhas—killed one sepoy, severely wounded two, slightly wounded one. Afridis in considerable numbers were seen at 13 o’clock coming down from hills east of camp with bullocks to carry off fodder and goods. 2nd Brigade with Derajat Battery moved out to stop these operations returning to camp about 17 o’clock. Our casualties—officer, Yorks, severely wounded, Lieutenant E. G. Caffin. Picquet, 36th Sikhs, moving out to picquet post 18 o’clock was attacked and drove off enemy. Casualty—one man, 36th Sikhs, wounded. Transport from Arhanga Pass coming into camp about 19 o’clock was attacked and hand to hand fighting ensued. Our casualties—Queen’s West Surrey, British soldiers, killed three, wounded four. Northampton, wounded one. Transport followers, wounded three. Jeypur Transport, killed one, wounded two. Some baggage lost. Addressed and repeated as directed in the instructions on the subject.

No. 634.

Telegram No. 4409-F., dated the 2nd November 1897.
From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

4409-F. Your telegram 25, November 1st. The future relations referred to in my demi-official letter, October 7th, do not include the terms of submission and reparation which you are authorised to announce without further orders, if you do not wish to alter in any material respect those which were detailed in my letter 3803, October 4th. The expression “future relations” used in my demi-official refers to the same expression as used in paragraph 10 of my letter 3803. The questions reserved for previous sanction of Secretary of State are, as you understand, arrangements for Khyber Pass and any other relations we may wish to construct with tribes for future.

No. 635.

Telegram No. 859-C., dated the 2nd November 1897.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinwari,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Arrangements were made yesterday for forming an advance depot at Mastura; two days’ supplies for the army are now being passed over the SF—604.854-Feb.
Sanpagha daily. Three companies, 21st Madras Pioneers, and No. 1 company, Sappers and Miners, encamped at foot of Sanpagha for road-making. Camel-road to Mastura will probably be open by 5th or 6th. A few shots were fired into Kai last night, wounding a sentry. The Adam Khel Maliks have written offering to send in fifty rifles looted from the Khyber whenever ordered to do so. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Chief of Staff; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Major Deane, Malakand; Commissioner, Peshawar; General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Movable Column; and Base Commandant.

No. 636.

Telegram No. B. 119, dated the 2nd November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Two hundred rifles, 12th Bengal Infantry, moved from Sadda to Para Chinar. Reconnaissance made to-day to point east of Totang and close to Murgan, survey party accompanying. Alisherzai villages all showed great friendliness and hospitality; Murghan appears largest and most important village in Alisherzai territory. Haji Khel Chamkanni jirga enquires through Khan of Bughakki, if Government is sending troops to their country, and if they can come into Kurram. Jirga informed that Sir W. Lockhart will decide. Arsalla Khan, Mamuzai, trying to stir up some Turi Maliks, who have refused negotiations. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.
No. 1613.

FROM

L. W. DANE, ESQUIRE,

Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,

Punjab and its Dependencies,

TO

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Dated Lahore, 2nd November 1897.

Frontier.

SIR,

In reply to your letter No. 4211 F., dated 23rd ultimo, inviting the recommendations of the Lieutenant-Governor as to the terms which should be imposed on the Loargai Shinwaris, Shilmani Mohmands and the Mullagoris who wish to make their submission to Government, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a telegram received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, containing his views on the subject, and to say that the Lieutenant-Governor approves of the terms proposed by Mr. Merk except that he does not think it worth while to make the Loargai Shinwaris responsible for stopping the Landi Kotal road to the Afridis. We shall very shortly be reckoning with the Afridis and do not need the intervention of the Loargai Shinwaris in this matter.

2. As regards the proposal contained in the enclosed copy of a further telegram from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, No. 90, dated 29th October, to reopen a route to Kabul, Sir Mackworth Young thinks there is quite as much to be said for an attitude of inactivity as for the reverse. No doubt it is inconvenient to the mercantile community to find their dealings with Kabul obstructed, but that very obstruction is, His Honor considers, not without its advantages in so far as it causes inconvenience to the people of Kabul and their ruler, and though the opening of the Tartarra route would show the Afridis that we can do without the Khaibar, they know this already, and His Honor apprehends will be quite sufficiently willing, when they have been beaten, to resume the agreement formerly existing, which, as admitted by the Government of India, it is very desirable to restore. The opening of the Tartarra route is just what the other tribes in their turn desire. It involves the determination of several questions involving allowances and safe-guarding of the route. It will at any time be open to us to enter into negotiations with the tribes concerned with this object, but Sir Mackworth Young does not think the present at all a suitable time for doing this. It will be better he thinks to refrain from entering into any understanding with them until we have resumed relations with the Afridis and imposed our terms upon them both in respect of the Khaibar route and of their behaviour generally.

3. I am to add, with reference to the telegram from Sir William Lockhart received under cover of your endorsement No. 4300 F., dated 28th October 1897, that Sir Mackworth Young sees no objection to the settlement with the Loargai Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris being deferred until it can be carried into effect by the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, in communication with Sir William Lockhart. None of these tribes, however, are Afridis.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

L. W. DANE,

Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
No. 72. Your 331 F. The Mullagoris took no part whatever in the disturbances in the Khaibar Pass. On the contrary they sent a contingent promptly to help in holding the Landi Kotal Serai. The Mullagori sepoys of the Khaibar Rifles brought in their rifles except two men who are missing, and the tribe has behaved well throughout and there has been no rupture in our friendly relations with them. Accordingly propose no terms except that they must not permit outlaws to live in their villages and must return the two missing rifles. The Shilmanis are guilty of the following offences,—see report dated 16th September of Colonel Aslam Khan on Khaibar disturbances. Loi Shilman took out a standard on the 12th September as far as Kani Shilawari and then marched back again. In Kani Shilawari a Chaudhri escaping from Landi Kotal to Peshawar was killed by three men for loot about 30th August. The Shilmanis took no part in the Khaibar disturbances or looting. The Shilmani sepoys fought well at Landi Kotal and have all brought in their rifles. The terms I propose are as follows, to be complied with within a week:—A fine of eight hundred rupees and surrender of five breech-loaders on Loi Shilman and a fine of one thousand rupees on the murderers of the Chaudhri, of whom the principal lives in Kam Shilman and should pay five hundred rupees, and his two associates who live in Loi Shilman should pay five hundred. The Loargai Shinwaris are guilty of looting the Landi Kotal Serai. The Malik held aloof, but the clansmen joined in looting; but it is not established that they joined in the attack. They also stripped some of the water-pipes of the lead used for soldering the pipes. The Loargai Shinwari sepoys of the Khaibar Rifles have brought in all their rifles except three; but eight Shinwari sepoys, who do not live in Loargai and live with the Zakha Khel and are not under the control of the Loargai Malik, have not brought in their rifles. The Shinwari sepoys under Subedar Jawas Khan fought gallantly at Landi Kotal. The terms I propose are to be carried out in ten days: delivery of the three rifles not brought in; also restoration of all property looted; also surrender of twenty breech-loaders, forty Enfield rifles, fifty Jezails, one hundred swords, payment of four thousand rupees British fine, and closure of Landi Kotal road to Afridis. I have proposed a longer period than usual for Loargai because till the Afridis have been defeated and cowed it is quite possible that the lashkar now in the Bara Valley may on hearing that the Loargai men are complying with terms suddenly move to punish them and we should be unable to help. That danger will probably have disappeared by 30th. Kindly telegraph-orders as soon as possible.
No. 640.

Telegram No. 661-P., dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—GENERAL HAMMOND, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bara,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Marched out in direction Gandao Pass to-day with force of 2,000 men; reconnoitred pass from point two miles east; no signs of enemy until force was returning when a few men appeared on hills. There has been no firing into camp, nor have robberies occurred for last three nights, this is due to small detachments infantry sent out by night whilst sniping was going on to ambuscades and surprise raiders. Health of troops good. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Chief of Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force; General Officer Commanding and Commissioner, Peshawar; and Major Deane.

No. 641.

Telegram No. 1014-T., dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. In affair on night of first, in addition to casualties already reported, two ponies of Jeyapore transport were killed and 69 are missing with their loads. Losses include 12 boxes ammunition; the 2nd Queen's regimental treasure chest containing about Rs700; three hundred and twenty-three men's kits and other property. Baggage escort was ample, but, owing to sudden onslaught of enemy in darkness, mules stampeded and the enemy were able to drive them off with their loads. Nothing of importance occurred yesterday. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 642.

Telegram No. 945-T., dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan (through Karappa),

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Camp Maidan, Tirah, dated 31st October and 1st November. There were no casualties in reconnaissance of third Brigade on thirtieth October; yesterday, thirty-first October, the first and second divisions, excepting first Brigade, moved from Mastura into Maidan. Troops left camp at 6 A.M., fourth Brigade remained. Enemy held sangars on each side of pass and to some distance eastward; fourth Brigade advanced to Oonai village and opened fire at 8.30; Artillery came into action at Oonai, about 1,300 yards from pass; the second Brigade advanced up three spurs to turn the left of the pass which was reached, and enemy driven off at 10 A.M.; camp was pitched about three miles below pass on terraced fields; valley is about 4 miles wide by 9 long, all under cultivation and richly studded with villages; water good in streams. Dorsets held the Arhanga Pass during the night. On arrival in camp Maidan large numbers of the Afridis, with their cattle and families, were observed making their way into the Bara valley over the Suransa Pass. It was impossible to intercept them from this side, as they were already some six miles from camp, up a very steep ascent. Our casualties during the day—Officers severely wounded, Captain Searle, 86th Sikhs; one driver, No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, killed; one sepoy, 3rd Sikhs, severely wounded; mule drivers, three killed and two wounded last night. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 643-645 Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

No. 643.

Telegram No. 27, dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan, To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 4409-F. of second. While quite pleased to carry out the instructions of Government, I desire to point out that a difficulty arises in prescribing terms of submission and reparation while keeping the question of future relations for further consideration; for, if the above terms are complied with, the offences committed might reasonably be regarded by the tribesmen as disposed of by the punishment inflicted, whereas the future relations to be enforced between them and the Government of India, such, for example, as the permanent occupation by our troops of some part of the country, the construction of roads or railways, right of free entrance into Tirah or the like, might be held by the tribes to be equivalent to a further and lasting punishment. It seems to me that, if terms of submission and reparation are announced previous to a decision as to future relations being arrived at, we practically debar ourselves from formulating afterwards future relations which would be unacceptable to the tribes, otherwise we might incur the imputation of having acted in bad faith and should probably have to face a renewal of the present difficulty. I propose to submit my views and those of Sir Richard Udny in regard to our future relations by telegraph tomorrow.

No. 644.

Telegram, dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Two hundred rifles, 5th Gurkhas, left Para ChinaI' for Sadda. Arsalla Khan reported to be inciting Massuzais and Chamkannis to attack Sadda on fifth, but Massuzais anxious now to come to terms if possible. Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated ten addresses as directed.

No. 645.

Telegram No. 232, dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, To—The Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Some Massuzais sent in to-day to Pailwan Shah, a Turi Sayid, asking if he could make some arrangements for them with Sarkar; he replied that he had no concern in their affairs. Tribes round here say Afridis quite broken up and are seeking refuge in every direction. Addressed Commissioner; repeated Foreign; Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Commissioner; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4434-4435-F., dated Simla, the 4th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, To—The Military Department, The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
FEBRUARY 1898.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. S F 646-647

No. 646.

Telegram P., dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Simla.

Please refer to your telegram of the 29th October 1897. After further consideration I am advised that a system of tributes is open to the following objections:

1. The collection of money tribute is sure to be difficult; and, if payment is at any time withheld, fresh complications would revive.

2. Even if tributes were merely nominal or symbolical, the foregoing objection would not be removed, and such tributes would be hardly worth while in any case.

3. Stability of any arrangement in which tributes form a part would be hazardous.

On the whole I am of opinion that the balance of considerations is against imposing tributes. I agree that Sir William Lockhart should consider the advisability of re-aligning and improving the present Khyber roads. Other conclusions are generally approved, subject to the report of any proposed change of importance.

No. 647.

Telegram No. 889-C., dated the 3rd November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinawari,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. A few shots fired into convoy escort south of Sanpagha on 2nd instant; no damage done. On night of first 400 enemy were reported by Border Police to be on hills close to Muhammadzai post; all necessary precautions were taken by Base Commandant, Kohat. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Chief of Staff; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Major Deane, Malakand; Peshawar Commissioner; General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Column and Base Column.
No. 1621.

FROM

L. W. DANE, ESQUIRE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,
Punjab and its Dependencies,

TO

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Dated Lahore, 3rd November 1897.

Foreign.
Frontier.

Sir,

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the papers noted in the margin, regarding the feud between the Zakha Khel Maliks.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

L. W. DANE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
With reference to paragraph 28 of the Khaibar Political Diary for the period from 1st to 7th July 1897, regarding the feud between the Zakha Khel Maliks, I am directed to invite attention to clause 3 of the Khaibar Agreement, and to inquire if you think any action in regard to the Zakha Khel allowances generally is necessary to remind the Maliks of the existence of this portion of the agreement which they had apparently forgotten.

Extract paragraph 28 of the Khaibar Political Diary from 1st to 7th July 1897.

28. On the 27th June last, consequent on the expiry of the term of truce between Maliks Khawas and Walli Muhammad, exchange of fires commenced between the two rival factions, the Niki Khels and the Sultan Khels, in the Khaibar.

The Zakha Khel Maliks who were then at Peshawar were at once sent for and called upon to sign an agreement to the effect that they would stop firing at each other on caravan days.

Any party breaking the pledge would be liable to pay a fine which the Political Officer might deem fit to impose.
OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4497-4498-F., dated the 8th November 1891 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force,

The Military Department.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force and Military Department for information.

From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1621, dated the 3rd November 1897 with enclosures.
Memorandum of events on the 1st November 1897.

(1) A party consisting of detachments from the King's Own Scottish Borderers and Gurkhas, and 4 guns of a Mountain Battery under the command of Brigadier-General Nicholson, C.B., Chief of the Staff to Tirah Expeditionary Force, proceeded about 10 A.M. to inspect Bagh, which lies in the Malikdin Khel Afridi limits in the Maidan of Tirah. Mr. White King, Political Officer, Colonel R. Warburton, C.S.I., Political Officer, and most of the Head-quarter staff accompanied also.

(2) The direction of the advance was almost due west, crossing the Shalobar Toe, the path ascends, and, with hamlets and garhiks on either flank, leads to a tolerably level plateau of fields, which again descends gently to the Kao Toe. Here the Gurkhas were fired upon from the Landawar hill on the right, and had 4 men wounded, one of whom died during the day.

(3) A few shells from 2 mountain guns soon drove away the enemy, and we then advanced, crossing the Kao Toe, which has a fine volume of water, with many water-mills. Ascending its left bank and holding the villages, we came to Zara Kila, owned by a Hindu who had fled, which overlooks Bagh, some 200 yards distant, situated at the junction of the Shalobar and Kao streams, and some 15' above the water level at this period.

(4) A miserable mud hut, covered by a roof some 18'×15' with an entrance facing east, on a small plot of level ground, surrounded by about 14 trees, represents the famous mosque of Bagh, from which Mullahs have hatched mischief for years and years. From here Sayid Akbar, Aka Khel, and Kazi Nur Ahmad, Malikdin Khel, fanned that flame of fanaticism in August 1897, which has now brought such misery on both Afridis and Orakzais.

(5) As a detachment of the King's Own Scottish Borderers descended to the mosque, two shots were fired by the enemy from the Landawar hills, wounding an officer and soldier of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. A few shells drove the enemy away. The King's Own Scottish Borderers then ascended and held the hill to the north.

(6) All the work having been completed, our party returned to camp unmolested by 4 P.M.

(7) The total casualties during the day were—

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<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
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(Sd.) R. Warburton, Colonel,
Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Received 2nd November 1897 and forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The 3rd November 1897.

(Sd.) R. Udny,
Chief Political Officer,
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 17 P. and 18 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 3rd November 1897.
Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
Political Diary No. XV of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

31st October 1897.—1. The troops advanced to the assault of the Arhanga Pass this morning and it fell into our hands after a very feeble resistance. The number of the enemy, defending the pass, who are said to have been mostly Zakha Khels with a few Kambar Khels and Kuki Khels, could not have exceeded 300, though there may have been more in reserve on the other side of the ridge. The Arhanga Pass is a short, and, on the whole, an easy one, but the ascent near the summit is very steep. Our camp was fixed in the Kambar-Zakha Khel portion of Maidan to the east of the valley. Maidan is larger, more fertile and more thickly populated than I was led to believe. The villages, which are quite deserted, seem to be full of grain, fodder, potatoes, &c. Some Afridis, with their women and cattle, were observed ascending the Saran Sar Pass, which leads into the Bara valley. There was some firing into camp during the night, which shows that small bodies of the enemy are still lurking in the neighbourhood. The baggage guard, which did not reach camp till late, was fired at from a tower to the left of the road. Seven mule-drivers were killed or wounded.

2. (a) Two Hindus, one Bindraban of Kohat, and the other, Guli Ram of Lachi, who profess to have escaped from the enemy, have come in. They made a statement to the effect that about ten days ago, they were kidnapped between Hangu and Sumare, and brought into the Mastura valley by the Tak Tak route. For six days they were confined in the village of Mir Mulla belonging to one Sherulla, Darwe Khel (Mishti), at a short distance from the Mastura camp. One evening Sherulla returned and told them that he had killed five followers, and stolen two mules and other property. He gave them some tobacco, which he had stolen. He also had 8 bottles of liquor which he sold for Rs. 1. Until the 29th their captors seemed confident of success, but, when they heard the sound of the guns on the Sanpagha, they gave up all hope and made preparation for flight. The Hindus were forced to accompany the women, who left their homes with loads on their heads in the direction of Maidan. They were weeping and cursed the Mullas for bringing such troubles on them, and giving the "Kafirs" an excuse for entering their country. They also heard that some cattle had been taken for safety to the Shiah country. They effected their escape, while their male captors returned to their village for a second load of grain. The Hindus complain that they were robbed of Rs. 126-14 worth of property by Sherulla’s gang, which apparently consisted of 3 Mishtis and 5 Malla Khels.

(b) The lashkar defending the Arhanga Pass included some Malla Khel and Ali Khel Orakzais.

(c) Information has been received that the attack on the stragglers from a convoy near Karappa on the night of the 26th October, in which a man of the West Surrey Regiment and some followers were killed, was the work of Mishtis and Zakha Khel and Ziauddin Afridis. Of the boxes of ammunition (4,000 rounds) which were taken from a party of the 4th Gurkhas on the same night, one is now in the possession of Makhmad, son of Nasru, Darwe Khel Mishti of Bazar, another with Malik Mira Khan, Mishti of Sangra, and half a box with Ghulam Hyder, Hyder Khel Mishti, while the remaining 2½ boxes fell to the share of Zakha Khel and Ziauddin Afridis.

3. (a) After the first action at Dargai on the 18th October, two Gurkha sepoys (probably wounded men) were captured by Mamuzais, and subsequently shot dead at the Shadala Kotal.
At the action at Dargai on the 20th October, the following tribes are said to have been engaged:—

- Kambar Khels: 4 do.
- Malikdin Khels: 4 do.
- Zakha Khels: 2 do.
- Kalla Khels: 1 standard.

A few Mishtis and Sheikban to the number of 100, under the leadership of their Malik, Ali Sardar and Yar Muhammad, joined the lashkar towards the close of the action, and were the first to take to flight, abandoning their position at Sheik Kabar. The Mamuzais, Alisherzais and Massuzais do not appear to have been engaged on the 20th October. The Orakzals in this fight, as far as is known, lost 2 killed and 12 wounded, while the casualties among the Afridis were 18 killed and 55 wounded.

Note.—The loss of the enemy is probably understated.

(Sd.) L. W. King,

1. In the morning I accompanied General Nicholson, Chief of the Staff, to Bagh, which is about 3 miles distant from camp, and is situated in Malikdin Khel territory in the angle between the Kohu and Shilobar streams. On the way the advance guard was fired on from a hill to the right, known as Landawar, where the enemy to the number of 50 or 60, and including a few women, had built a sangar. They were driven from this position by a few shells from the battery, but not before they had killed one and wounded 3 more of our men. They then moved down a spur of the Landawar range, and again took up a position in another sangar overlooking Bagh. They had to be dislodged again from this position by shell fire. On our way down from the Kambar Khel village of Zore Kili to Bagh, two shots were fired from the spur above mentioned, which wounded an officer and a man of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The mosque at Bagh, the centre of political life in Tirah, is a low, rough structure of wood, 18 paces long by 11 wide. It looks more like a cattle shed than a sacred edifice. It is surrounded by a dozen walnut, mulberry and poplar trees which were ringed by the General's orders. Particular care was taken to spare the mosque. The houses in this part of the valley were found to be full of fodder, grain, potatoes, walnuts, &c., which the owners in their hurried flight had neither time to carry off nor conceal. In one or two houses even postins were left behind. No opposition was encountered on our return to camp. I may mention that in one of the Kambar Khel villages a book of Captain Barton's was found, while in another our men came across some cups and saucers.

2. Some Tirah Hindus, who had come into camp, ostensibly to beg protection for their villages, but probably to act as spies as well, were flogged and expelled.

3. In the afternoon a large body of the enemy were seen descending the Saran Sar hill to the north-east of camp with the intention, it would seem, of replenishing their stock of food from their deserted villages. General Westmacott's Brigade attacked the enemy, who retired after suffering some...
One officer was severely wounded in this engagement. About dusk the enemy occupied a village to the south-east of camp, which is used by us as a picquet station at night. They were dislodged without difficulty by the 36th Sikhs, a detachment of which remained in the village during the night. About the same time a small party of the enemy, who had lain in ambush in a village close to, and due south of, camp, attacked a baggage guard of the 2nd Queen's Regiment sword in hand, and succeeded in killing 3 and wounding 5 of our men before they were released from their dangerous position by the Northamptons. Three Lee-Metfords, 13 boxes of ammunition and 70 ponies were carried off by this party. Some mule-drivers were also cut up the same night by the enemy higher up the road near the Arhanga Pass. Our total casualties yesterday were 22 in killed and wounded, including two officers. Considerable bodies of the enemy, mostly Zakha and Kambar Khels, are still hanging about the hills surrounding our camp to the east, north and south, ready to attack unarmed followers or small parties of our men, when they get the opportunity.

*Mulla Mir Afzal is a leading Mulla of the Kuki Khel Afridis. Muhammad Zaman was a Subadar of the 4th Punjab Infantry, who, on retiring from military service, was appointed Subedar-Major of the Kohat Border Police, but was afterwards transferred to the Khyber Rifles as a Subadar, and was dismissed from the Khyber Rifles about 8 years ago for being concerned in a Khyber Rifle man's deserting with his rifle. He is a Malikdin Khel Afridi by clan, and was reported at the time to be a prominent leader in the Afridi and Orakzai lashkar, which besieged the Saman forts on the 11th September. This report is now confirmed by the accidental finding of the present letter.

(Sd.) R. UDNY.

“It has been reported to us that the English forces have arrived at the village of Shadala. Send the Kuki Khel lashkar there soon, as now is the time for ‘ghaza’ and they are upon us. The Kambar Khel Afridis say that this is the time for brotherhood (=united action). The Akhels have suffered grievous insults. Taru Khan, Khojal Khel (Ali Khel), has come to take the Kambar Khel lashkar with him. He sends his salam.”

This letter was probably written on the 21st October, the day of our arrival at Karappa. It is uncertain who Mulla Mir Afzal is, but he is presumably a Kuki Khel Afridi. Malik Muhammad Zaman can be none other than the pensioned Subadar of the 4th Punjab Infantry.

CAMP TIRAH; } (Sd.) L. W. KING,

The 2nd November 1897. } Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.

Diaries for the 31st October and 1st November received to-day and forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Sd.) R. UDNY,

The 3rd November 1897. Chief Political Officer,

Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 19 P. and 20 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 3rd November 1897. Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, and Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, in continuation of this office Nos. 17 P. and 18 P., dated the 3rd instant.
No. 657.

Telegram, dated the 4th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Reconnaissance made yesterday by third Brigade to Tseri Kandao, four miles due east of camp, being Kotal between Maidan and Waran; good view of Waran valley obtained. Enemy retired as troops advanced. Enemy followed our retirement, but were easily driven off. Our casualties—1st-2nd Gurkhas, severely wounded, two men; slightly wounded one man. 15th Sikhs, slightly wounded, one man. Jhind Infantry, severely wounded, one. Foraging party sent north of camp; covering party ascended range north of valley and drove off enemy, killing two. Our casualty—2nd-4th Gurkhas, slightly wounded, one man. Telegraph completed to this camp yesterday. About one mile wire cut and carried away last night, this side of Arhanga. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 658.

Telegram No. 234, dated the 4th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda.
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

All quiet in Kurram. Massuzai Chamkani lashkar again collected at Sultani in Khurman Daara, strength at present between two and three thousand. A fine of five rupees imposed on each fighting man not joining lashkar. Khani Khel Chamkannis wrote to Arsaila Khan, Mamuzai, saying that, as they had formerly helped him, he should now help them. Massuzai sent a message to Afridi Khan, asking him to make an agreement for neither the English nor Massuzai to enter the other's country: no answer returned to this. Pitao Alisherzai jirga came to Sadda to-day to see me. I told them through Afridi Khan that I did not wish to see their jirga for the present. Pitao Alisherzai have refused asylum to Soorin Alisherzai who are reported to have lost heavily in recent fighting. Mulla Khalifa of Tirah, who went to Tirah, is reported to have made arrangements to fly to Khost and to be now in Zaimush country. News of entry of troops into Maidan readied Pitao Alisherzai night of 3rd instant. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to Foreign; Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4449-4450-F., dated Simla, the 5th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

No. 659.

Telegram No. 67-I.P., dated the 4th November 1897.

From—General Hammond, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bara.
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Inhabitants of Lower Bara valley reported to be removing families and cattle from villages. Small lashkar, which was watching approaches to
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 659-664 Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

valley, said to have dispersed leaving a few men for the purpose. Health of troops good. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Chief of Staff; General Officer Commanding and Commissioner, Peshawar; and Major Deane.

No. 660.

Telegram No. B.-127, dated the 4th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movahle Column, Sadda,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Two hundred rifles, 1st-5th Gurkhas, arrived Sadda. Survey party completed work commenced on second in vicinity of Ghwainghara Darra, north of Krumb; Alisherzais showing no objection to escort entering their limits. Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar again collected near Sultani, north end of Khurmana Darra; strength reported two thousand. Khani Khel Chamkanis have asked Arsala Khan to assist them. Massuzaís have sent message to Afridi Khan asking him to arrange for settlement line of demarcation across which neither English nor Massuzaís should pass. Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated ten addresses as directed.

No. 661.

Telegram P., dated the 4th November 1897.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Please see your Foreign Secret telegram, dated the 3rd November 1897. Are we to understand that we can now instruct Sir William Lockhart in the terms of our conclusions except as to tribute? He has urged the inconvenience of deferring the settlement of future relations, and that prior announcement of the terms of submission, which we directed in our letter of the 4th October to him, might hamper us hereafter and lead to charges of breach of faith. Our conclusions cover the main lines of future relations, and it might meet this difficulty to announce them now.

No. 662.

Telegram P., dated the 4th November 1897.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Simla.

You can instruct Lockhart as suggested in your telegram of the 3rd November.

No. 663.

Telegram No. 918-C, dated the 4th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinawari,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Small gathering of enemy at back of the Ublan Pass reported to have dispersed. Telegraph Office opened at Maidan. Addressed and repeated as directed in the instructions on the subject.

No. 664.

Telegram No. 4458-F., dated the 5th November 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan.

4458-F. Your No. 27, November 3rd. Following sent to Secretary of State on 29th October:—Brgns. (1) We do not contemplate • • • • •
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 664-666  Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

Your Lordship's approval. Ends. Secretary of State replied on 3rd as follows:—Begins. After further consideration I am advised * * * * proposed change of importance. Ends. Viceroy again telegraphed on 4th:—Begins. Are we to understand that we can now * * * * * * * * might meet this difficulty. Ends. Secretary of State replied same day:—Begins. You can instruct Lockhart as suggested. Ends.

Your proposals are awaited. If these conclusions modify them and if they have crossed this, you will no doubt send further proposals.

No. 665.

Telegram No. 235, dated the 5th November 1897.
From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

All quiet Kurram. Letter and messages received from Massuzais saying that they are willing to make peace. The lashkar at Sultani is said to number at present between three and four thousand men. They have for the last ten days been sending their property to Makhmangbar and to the Shaonkaili valley. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated Foreign; Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4467-4468-F., dated Simla, the 6th November 1897 (Confidential).
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 666.

Telegram No. 29, dated the 5th November 1897.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. I submit, for the Viceroy's consideration, the following remarks about our future relations with the Afridis:—The main point to consider is the reason why it was decided to bring the frontier tribes under our influence as a measure essential to the security of India on the North-West Frontier. The reason why was this: these tribes can produce a large number of well armed fighting men, and their attitude in the event of complications arising beyond our North-West Frontier is a matter of primary importance. The attitude might be friendly, neutral or hostile; if the first or second, they would not hamper our military operations for the control or reinforcement of Afghanistan; if the third, our available military resources would be absorbed to a very dangerous extent in holding them in check. In fact, it may safely be predicted that, under such a contingency, we should have to wait until the tribes had been dealt with before we could move a single battalion into Afghanistan. It was to surmount this difficulty, as well as to place our relations with the Amir on a more satisfactory footing, that the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government resolved to demarcate the frontier and to define the territorial limits of the British sphere of influence, and presumably it must have been intended that by the expression influence such an amount of control was implied as would enable us to ensure the friendliness or neutrality of the tribes in the event of trans-frontier operations having to be undertaken. Hitherto, though the frontier has been demarcated, no effective steps have been
taken to bring the tribes concerned into closer relations with the Government of India; that in fact our policy has irritated without dominating them is manifest by the unprovoked series of depredations and insults to which the Government of India has been subjected during the past summer. The Afridis in common with the other tribes have no grounds for complaint against us. They have been generously treated; they have not been interfered with in any way; and yet at the instigation of a few irresponsible and factional Mullahs, they have joined with their trans-border neighbours in setting the whole North-West Frontier in a blaze. Supposing that we punish the Afridis in the same way as we have punished refractory tribes before and then evacuate Tirah, what guarantee do we acquire of their better behaviour in future? In what respect is our military position improved or strengthened? Moreover, it must be noted that even at present the Afridis and Orakzais appear to be as well armed as our own native troops, they have ample supplies of ammunition, they shoot with remarkable accuracy and they are adepts in skirmishing and guerilla warfare. There are many pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers among them who doubtless impart the military training they have themselves acquired in the ranks of the Native Army. Under existing conditions it is not unreasonable to anticipate that, should we now leave Tirah after inflicting such punishment as be decided on, a more determined and more skilful resistance would on a future occasion be offered in the event or our being obliged to re-occupy the country. Moreover, I know that such a course would be interpreted by the tribes as an indication of timidity rather than of leniency on our part. They would be confirmed in the belief that, if they only give us sufficient trouble and annoyance, we should be compelled to leave them alone. Maidan is an elevated, healthy and fertile valley which would furnish an admirable cantonment for our British and Native soldiers, comparing most favourably with the Peshawar valley or almost any district in India, and within a comparatively short distance of the Peshawar Railway terminus. I believe that its permanent occupation would produce an excellent moral effect on the whole of the frontier tribes, and conduce most materially to the extension of our influence over them. I do not, however, advocate any needless interference with tribal customs or inter-tribal relations, although I am of opinion that a moderate tribute should be exacted from the tribes as a mark of our supremacy. Should this proposal commend itself to the Government of India, I recommend that the Maidan garrison should be located in a carefully selected and properly defended position. It should be amply strong enough to hold its own, and its transport should be so organized as to enable it to despatch a strong movable column in any direction at the shortest notice. A good road with strong posts along it at suitable intervals should also be constructed between the Maidan cantonment and Peshawar. Whether this road should follow the course of the Bara river or be aligned further south via Mamani, the Sapri or Uchpal Pass, the Mastura Toi and the Tseri Kandao Pass into Maidan is a matter for further investigation. I admit that the formation of a cantonment in Tirah could not perhaps be undertaken at this season of the year, as in a month's time the country may be under snow, and that it presents certain difficulties and will involve considerable expense; still it offers a better prospect of effecting the permanent pacification of the Afridis than any other course I know of. It would give us a foothold at the focus of tribal disturbances and a tangible return for the heavy expenditure of money and lives that has been forced upon us. To my mind there is no middle course; we must either leave the tribes within our sphere of influence entirely to themselves and thus stultify the carefully considered policy of the past ten years, or take steps to render our influence a fact instead of a fiction by insisting on our rights being respected and our orders obeyed. The bolder course would, in my opinion, prove the wiser and in the end the cheaper one; it is a contest between the forces of civilisation and barbarism, and if we vacillate or draw back we shall assuredly suffer for it in the end.
In connection with the foregoing proposals, I strongly advocate the extension of the railway from Peshawar along the valley of the Kabul river to the furthest point within the British zone; the power of concentrating troops north of the Khyber and of the Rajgal and Bazar valleys, while a strong and mobile force is quartered to the south of the same districts, would effectually control the whole Afridi country. Moreover, the value of such a railway as facilitating the movement of troops required to operate in the direction of Jalalabad or Kabul can hardly be over-estimated.

Another point to which I desire to draw special attention is the necessity for tribal disarmament, on the benefits of which it is superfluous to dilate. The possession of arms and ammunition is not only an incentive to raid within British territory, but encourages inter-tribal feuds which lay the country desolate and so impoverish the several classes that they are almost compelled to live on plunder. Everywhere from the Hangu-Shinawari line northwards, wide tracts are to be seen once cultivated and fertile but now lying waste. Nothing would conduce more effectually to the establishment of British control over the lawless tribes on our frontier than their disarmament. Instead of continually fighting with each other or with us, they would be obliged to refer their disputes or grievances to superior authority, and accept the impartial decision of the representative of the suzerain power. Although such a measure might at first be resented and difficult to carry into effect, I believe that its results would soon be appreciated by the tribesmen, and that increased prosperity and plenty would tend more than almost anything else to prevent them from quarrelling among themselves or embroiling themselves with us.

In conclusion I would refer to the strategical advantage of a military station in Tirah as flanking and dominating the lines of communication between Kabul and India via the Khyber and Kurram, and also to the effect likely to be produced on the Amir by a bold and resolute policy in this direction. I would also record my opinion that the argument frequently put forward in favour of non-interference on the ground that the less we meddle with the tribes the more friendly they become, is a fallacious one. It is refuted by the experience of the last forty years, by the successful management of the Khyber Afridis by Colonel Warburton, and also by the administration of such men as Nicholson and Edwards whose influence was proportionate to their intimate knowledge of, and association with, the men they had to deal with. The foregoing views, which are concurred in by Colonel Warburton and Mr. King, are dissented from by Sir R. Udny, whose remarks on the question under discussion will be submitted by me in a separate telegram.

No. 667.

Telegram No. 1094-T, dated the 5th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Foraging and survey parties sent out yesterday to north-east of camp. Enemy attempted opposition by skilfully working in nullas. Party of Yanks and Gurkha scouts drove them off. Scouts killing two. Our casualties during day 17th Bengal Cavalry severely wounded one Duffadar. Two mules killed, and one driver and six mules missing. Camel-road will be finished to this camp to-day. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on subject.

No. 668.

Telegram No. 30, dated the 5th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. In continuation of my 29, dated to-day, I submit verbatim Sir R. Udny’s views respecting our future relations with the Afridis:

Begin. I regret that I am unable to concur in the proposal to establish a permanent military station in the Maidan valley. It is quite true that
without occupying a station or, I should prefer to say, stations—for a single station in Maidan would not be sufficient to dominate the Afridis properly,—we have no guarantee that the tribesmen will not give trouble again, but I have heard from many sources that the fanatical movement started by the Mulla, which led to the recent outbreak, would never have made headway except for a belief that we could not reach Tirah or that we should not at any rate care to incur the expense of attempting to do so. This belief has now been dissipated; and if we are able to effect a satisfactory settlement with the Afridis for their recent misconduct, I think it exceedingly unlikely that they would listen again to the incitements of their Mallas, or run the risk of our invading the country a second time, probably to annex it altogether. The chance therefore of another outbreak seems to me so remote that, from a purely financial point of view, it would not be worth while to ensure ourselves against it by the enormous annual expenditure, which would be entailed not only by the establishment of a permanent military cantonment of not less than 8,000 men, besides the other smaller cantonments which I believe would be found necessary to dominate the tribesmen, but by keeping up transport for the permanent mobilisation of a considerable portion of this force and by the probable necessity of furnishing a large part of the supplies, both for men and animals, from Peshawar, 40 or 50 miles distance, with which we should have to maintain a line of communication.

As regards the probable attitude of the Afridis, in the event of our advancing to Jalalabad or Kabul, I admit that the presence of a large garrison in Maidan would do much to deter them from attacking our flank, but even without that, I think, we should be much less harassed than we were in the last Kabul war. Then we were not on the Samana, and they had never seen a British force in the heart of their country. Now they would feel that, if they gave trouble, we could easily invade them again from the Samana, and that with our troops in the valley of the Kabul river, they could not escape with their families and cattle in the latter direction, as they are credited with intending to do if driven to despair in the present campaign. Moreover if we establish a permanent military cantonment in these hills, however much we may depreciate interference with the internal affairs of the tribesmen, we are sure to find ourselves gradually more and more mixed up with these affairs, and occupation in any shape will inevitable land us sooner or later in what will practically be annexation of the whole Afridi country. Are we prepared to undertake this which, for a considerable time to come, would require a much larger force than the 8,000 men, who are considered sufficient for a single station? And, apart from the question of expense, could not the troops we should thus be locking up in Tirah be employed to greater advantage elsewhere? This, however, is a military question with which I am not competent to deal. But I suppose it will be admitted that even 8,000 men could not be spared from the Indian army as at present constituted, and though a re-organization of the army with a reduction of regular troops in Southern India might enable us to provide the number required for Tirah, this would take time, and meanwhile the strain on our resources would be very great. Neither is it likely that the necessary funds could be supplied from the Indian Exchequer; and it seems to me, apart from all other considerations, that the question of keeping a large force in Tirah can never assume a practical shape unless the Home Government are ready to help both with men and money.

Lastly, I think, from a political point of view, that it would be a mistake to leave troops in Tirah, for it would make every tribe along the northern frontier restless and suspicious that this was part of a scheme for gradually absorbing them all in turn, while the Afridis themselves would resent it bitterly. For some time to come we should probably have to contend with constant hostility on the part of one section or another, and, even when these quieted down, the tribesmen would always be on the look out for a favourable opportunity of rising against us, e.g., troubles in India or a war with Kabul or Russia. To speak of closer and friendlier relations with the trans-border tribes
is a contradiction in terms, and the more we interfere with them the more they hate us. They want nothing better in fact than to be left alone, and in the present case, now that the Afridis have had their eyes opened to our power of punishing them, I think the fear of bringing upon themselves another invasion would have a better effect on their conduct and render them less hostile to us than an occupation which they would never cease to loathe.

While, however, it appears to me that permanent occupation in any form is undesirable, I am strongly in favour of good roads being made through the country both of the Afridis and Orakzais as the most lasting reminder of our present invasion and to facilitate our operations, if it should ever be found necessary to invade them again. I entirely agree, therefore, in the proposal put forward by Sir William Lockhart for a road to be constructed to Maidan, either up the Bara river or partly up the Bara and partly up the Mastura valley from Fort Harra, which is already connected by a road 8 miles long with Peshawar Cantonment. The length of such a road would be about 40 miles, and to this I would add another road into Maidan from Shinawari over the Sanpagha and Arhanga Passes, a distance of only 25 miles. 

I am glad that Sir R. Udny agrees with me regarding the desirability of making roads into Maidan; the military and financial objections he urges against the formation of a cantonment in Maidan appear to me to be questions of general policy to be dealt with by the Government of India and the Home Government.

No. 669.

No. 4476-F., dated Simla, the 6th November 1897 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Telegram P. from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 13th October 1897.
Telegram P. to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 29th October 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 25, dated the 1st November 1897.
Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4400-F., dated the 2nd November 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 27, dated the 3rd November 1897.
Telegram from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 3rd November 1897.
Telegram P. from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 4th November 1897.
Telegram P. from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 4th November 1897.
Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4488-F., dated the 6th November 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force. No. 29, dated the 5th November 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 30, dated the 5th November 1897.

No. 670.

Nos. 4477-4478-F., dated Simla, the 6th November 1897 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 25, dated the 1st November 1897.
Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4400-F., dated the 2nd November 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 27, dated the 3rd November 1897.
Telegram from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 3rd November 1897.
Telegram P. to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 4th November 1897.
Telegram P. from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated the 4th November 1897.
Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4488-F., dated the 6th November 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 29, dated the 5th November 1897.
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 30, dated the 5th November 1897.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Government of the Punjab for information.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, Nos. 4356-4357-F., dated the 30th October 1897.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

No. 671.

Telegram No. 67-I.P., dated the 5th November 1897.

From—General Hammond, Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bala.

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. I made reconnaissance in force to-day up Gandao defile to within ¾ mile of Kotal. Nothing was seen of enemy, who appear to have deserted neighbourhood. Road as far as Kotal, though narrow, is easy and ascent is slight. Health of troops good. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Chief of Staff; General Officer Commanding, and Commissioner, Peshawar, and Major Deane.

No. 672.

Telegram No. 962-C., dated the 5th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinwari.

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Five hundred camels were started over Sanpagha on 4th with three-maund loads, of which 230 reached Mastura, remainder halting for night on Kotal. Road is now practicable for good camels with light loads, but not for regular camel convoys. Road over Arhanga reported fit for camels and convoy despatched to-day. Foot and mouth disease, of a mild type, has appeared among transport cattle at Hangu. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on subject.

No. 673.

Telegram No. B. 118, dated the 5th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadder.

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Survey party continued work to-day on hills south of Marerina. Lashkar at Sultani now reported to number three thousand. Enemy have removed property to Makhmanghar, but are said to be anxious to make peace. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.

No. 674.

Telegram No. 31, dated the 5th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan.

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. Copies of a proclamation addressed to the Afridis and Orakzaies were issued yesterday to all sections, summoning them to attend at this camp as quickly as possible without arms to hear the terms of Government by word of mouth. The jirgas of the Kumi (sic) Malikdin and Kamber Khel Afridis were reported to have started already of their own accord before issue of this proclamation, which will probably reach them on the road, and they are expected to-morrow or next day. The principal Malik of the Aka Khel has also written in to enquire the terms, and the only sections of Afridis about whose desire to submit nothing has yet been heard are the Zakha Khel Kamarai and Sipha, the two latter of whom live in the Bara valley some distance from here. The Samil orakzaies have sent a verbal reply to-day by the messenger, who carried the proclamation to them yesterday, that they will also be in to-morrow. From the Gar Orakzaies, who live further away, no answer has yet been received, but it will take two or three days for the proclamation to reach tribes like the Mamuzais and Massuzais. No shots were fired into camp or pickets last night. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; Major Deane; and Commissioner, Derajat.
OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4490-4491-F., dated Simla, the 8th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 31, dated the 5th November 1897.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
dislodged by shell-fire. A good view of the Waran valley to the meeting of the Bara and Mastura streams* was obtained from the top of the pass. The path through the Waran valley to the Bara is reported to be easy. The settlements of the Ziauddin Zakha Khels consist of a few small hamlets about \( \frac{1}{2} \) a mile below the top of the pass. Lower down the Waran valley come the Aka Khel villages, which appear to be large, well built and fairly numerous. All these villages, both Aka Khel and Ziauddin, seemed quite deserted. On the summit of the pass stands the tower of the noted Ziauddin raider, Mir Usman Khan, who was killed at Landi Kotal. On the retirement of the force, the rear guard was attacked by a considerable body of the enemy (presumably Zakha Khels and Aka Khels) and four of our men were wounded. At day-break a party of the Gurkha scouts ascended a high hill to the north of camp and coming across a picquet of the enemy accounted for two of them.

2. Information was received to-day through a Maidan Hindu that a jirga of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel and Kuki Khel Afridis might be expected in camp to-morrow or next day from Rajgal.

3. The following Afridi officers and non-commissioned officers came into camp to-day to pay their respects to General Sir William Lockhart, and to beg for the exemption of their villages from punishments:

MALIKDIN KHEL.
(a) Subadar Mirbat, 1st Punjab Infantry (pensioner).
(b) Subadar Ibadat Khan, 14th Bombay Infantry.
(c) Mihrabdin, Deputy Inspector, Police, Kangra.
(d) Bawal, Havildar, 26th Punjab Infantry (pensioner).

KAMBAR KHEL.
(e) Subadar Nurgul, 3rd Punjab Infantry (pensioner).
(f) Kajir, Havildar, 1st Sikhs (pensioner).
(g) Nur Alam, Havildar, 26th Punjab Infantry (pensioner).
(h) Allidad, Naik, 5th Punjab Infantry (pensioner).

They were led out of camp blind-folded, and warned that if they returned they would be severely dealt with. I may mention that there are some reasons for suspecting that Subadar Mirbat was implicated in the attack on the Samana Forts.

4. During the reconnaissance to the Seri Kandan, an old man, named Aziz Khan, was taken prisoner. On being questioned he stated that the territory of the free-booting sub-section of Ziauddins covers about two square miles in area and their settlements consist of only 7 or 8 huts. He added that, if a man started with a laden bullock from Seri Kandan at cock-crow, he would reach Bara by evening. The Aka Khel villages are situated about a mile to the east of the Ziauddin settlements. Mulla Saiyid Akbar's village, which was pointed out, seemed about 1\( \frac{1}{2} \) or 2 miles to the east of Seri Kandan.

Camp Tirah; 
The 4th November 1897. 
(Sd.) L. W. King, 
Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.
Diaries for the 2nd and 3rd November received to-day and forwarded for the information of the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

_The 5th November 1897._

(Sd.) R. UDNY,

*Chief Political Officer.*

Nos. 21P. and 22 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 5th November 1897.

Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, and Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
Telegram No. 677, dated the 6th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

*Clear the line.* In continuation of my telegram 29 of yesterday. If Government should be unwilling to accept my proposal for a permanent cantonment in Maidan, I would ask that I may be at least authorised to tell the jirgas that we shall stop in their country till our terms are compiled with, and in this Udny also concurs. This Maidan valley would be too cold to keep troops encamped in through the winter, and if delay occurs in satisfying our demands, I would move down to winter quarters in the Lower Bara Valley, but, if authorised as above, I should tell the jirgas that I intend to return in the spring to cut their crops and to occupy their country during the summer. As regards the terms to be now announced, the only alteration, I propose for sanction, is a reduction of the number of rifles to be surrendered from one thousand to eight hundred in the case of the Afridis, and from one thousand to five hundred in the case of the Orakzais, who are much less well-armed than the Afridis. I make this proposal on the recommendation of Udny and all other Political Officers. I desire to point out that, in the event either of permanent occupation of Tirah or of remaining in their country till our terms are satisfied, any demand for the surrender of hostages may become unnecessary. Lastly, Udny is of opinion, in which I concur, that the damage done to buildings particularly in the Khyber, represents so large a sum of money that it would be hopeless to expect to realise compensation for this if we added it on to the other terms of submission. I would therefore tell the jirgas simply that the question of compensation for damage done to buildings remains to be decided when tribal relations for the future are considered separately.

OFFICE MEMORANDA,
Nos. 4493-4495.F., dated Simla, the 8th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Government of the Punjab for information.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 54, dated the 6th November 1897.

No. 678.

Telegram No. 1124-T., dated the 6th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Foraging parties were sent out yesterday to the north, east and west of camp. The former were fired on; no casualties on our side. Enemy believed to have lost six. A few shots were fired into camp at night. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 679.

Telegram No. 71-I.P., dated the 6th November 1897.

From—General Hammond, Commanding, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bara,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Lashkar of about 1,100 Aka and Zakha Khels and Sipah reported to have collected at Bawan and Praikrai in Bara valley with intention of
opposing advance Peshawar Column. Zakha, Aka and Kambar Khel, reported to be removing families via Bukar Halwai and Mangal Bagh Passes towards Ningarahar. Health of troops good. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Punjab; Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab; Chief of Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force; General Officer Commanding and Commissioner, Peshawar, and Major Deane.

No. 680.

Telegram, No. B-181, dated the 6th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Detachment, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, at Para Chinar left for Kohat. No important news. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.

No. 681.

Telegram No. 1008-C., dated the 6th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinwari,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Lightly laden camels can now pass over the Sanpagha without difficulty and road will be so far complete on eighth that camels with normal loads will be sent over on ninth. Addressed and repeated according to instructions on the subject.
Political Diary No. XIX of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

4th November 1897.—1. In the morning a survey party ascended the hill to the north of camp (a peak of the Landawar range). A good view is said to have been obtained of the Rajgal valley. This party was subjected to a good deal of firing from the Zakha Khel picquets, but no damage was caused. A foraging party, which proceeded to the west of the valley, was also pressed hard on its retirement by a body of the enemy. In this affair we had 3 or 4 casualties. The telegraph wire was cut close to camp during the night and 3 poles removed, the work in all probability of Shan Khel Zakha Khels. A few shots were also fired into camp, but without result.

2. A proclamation in Persian summoning all the Afridi and Orakzai clans to his camp in Maidan was issued this morning by General Sir William Lockhart. A limited number of Maliks from each section were invited to attend in jirga as quickly as possible for the purpose of hearing by word of mouth the terms on which the submission of the tribes would be accepted. It was not thought advisable to send the tribes a written declaration of the terms, as these would probably only be misinterpreted by the Mullas. A copy of the proclamation is hereto appended for information.

3. (a) A band of 160 Alisherzais have entered Khadezai limits in the Khanki valley, their object being to harass the garrison at Karappa. The General Officer Commanding, Communications, has been warned.

(b) After the storming of the Sanpagha Pass, the Mani Khels and Abdul Aziz Khels are reported to have looted and turned out a number of Shiah Ali Khel families who had fled to them for refuge.

(c) The Afridis declared their intention of defending the Arhanga Pass without aid from the Orakzais. After their defeat at the Sanpagha, however, no real stand was contemplated at the Arhanga. Almost all those who were wounded by shell-fire at the Sanpagha fight are said to be in a dying state.

(d) The Mamozaïs and Ali Khels have taken their families for safety to Kamdarra, Torsmats, and Kahudarra, but they themselves have returned to their villages to await events. A contingent of 400 or 500 Mamozaïs have joined the Ali Khels to help them if there is any fighting. The Ali Khels and Mamozaïs have burned the fodder in their villages and the grass in their hills to prevent their falling into our hands. The Alisherzais are said only to have fired the fodder stored in their villages.

CAMP MAIDAN; }

The 5th November 1897. }

(Sd.) L. W. KING

Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.

PROCLAMATION.

From—General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force,

To—The Maliks of all the Afridi and Orakzai Clans.

You were informed in my proclamation, dated the 6th October 1897, that the British Government had determined to despatch a force under my command through the country of the Orakzai and Afridis, and to announce from the heart of their countries the final terms of the British Government. I
have now arrived in Maidan after marching through your countries, and am ready to announce the terms and conditions on which your submission will be accepted. You are, therefore, summoned to attend before me in jirga, as quickly as possible at my camp in Maidan, to hear by word of mouth the said terms and conditions referred to above. A deputation from each clan not exceeding the number named below will be received by me for this purpose on safe conduct, but they must attend without arms, and any arms found on a member of the deputation will be confiscated.

LIST OF JIRGAS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afridis 100 men—</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Zakha Khel</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Malikdin Khel</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>3. Kambar Khel</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>4. Kuki Khel</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>5. Sipah</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>6. Kamrai</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>7. Adam Khel</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>8. Aka Khel</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orakzais 100 men—</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Mishtis</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Sheikhs</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>3. Malla Khels</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afridis 100 men—</th>
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<tr>
<td>4. Bizotis</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Feroz Khels</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Utman Khels</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>7. Rabia Khels</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>8. Khadizai</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Daradar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Isa Khels</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Mamozaiz</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Alisherzai</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Massuzai</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Akhel</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Usturi Khels</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAMP MAIDAN;

The 4th November 1897.

(Sd.) L. W. King.

Received to-day and forwarded for the information of the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Sd.) R. Udny,

Chief Political Officer,

Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 23 P. and 24 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 6th November 1897.

Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
No. 683.

No. 3143-P., dated Peshawar, the 13th October 1897.

From—W. R. H. MERK, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,

To—The Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of Government, copy of an endorsement No. S l-Camp, dated 7th instant, from the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, submitting a report by the Commandant of the Kohat Border Military Police regarding the behaviour of the men under his command garrisoning the posts which were destroyed or taken possession of, by the enemy on the 27th August last.

No. 685.

Dated Fort Lockhart, the 2nd October 1897.

From—D. DONALD, Esq., Commandant, Border Military Police, Kohat,

To—The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat.

I have the honour to submit a report, for your information, of the facts which have come to my knowledge concerning the behaviour of the men of the Border Police garrisoning the different posts, which have fallen into the hands of the enemy and been destroyed, during the attacks made on them on the 27th August 1897. I was up at Fort Lockhart when these attacks commenced, and from this place I was in a position to judge of the strength of the enemy, and also of the many difficulties these handful of men quartered in the different posts had to overcome, opposing the enemy.

On the evening of the 26th August we saw the enemy passing down the Khanki stream in enormous strength with several standards in the direction of the Lakka and Saifal Darra Posts. This lashkar comprised the Mishti, Shikhan and Mulla Khels, whose total fighting strength is put down at 6,800 men, and from reports received it was calculated that they had come down in two-thirds of their fighting strength; it is therefore not presuming much to say that about 4,000 men went down to attack these posts. At the same time a report had been received that a lashkar of the Ali Khel, Mamuzais and Alisherzais was reported to have gone through Akhel country to attack the Shinawari Post. The fighting strength of the tribes is estimated at about 10,000 men, and allowing that two-thirds of this strength attacked, it is no exaggeration to say the lashkar consisted of 6,000 men. On the early morning of the 27th August firing was heard from Gulistan and also heavy firing from the Saifal Darra and Lakka direction. Colonel Haughton, Commanding 36th Sikhs, who could spare about one company from Fort Lockhart, marched out to Gulistan at about 7 A.M. I accompanied him. On arrival at Gulistan we found the hill to the west of Gulistan occupied by large numbers of the enemy. From a reconnaissance made by Major Des Voeux and Colonel Haughton it
was estimated that the enemy on the position numbered about 4,000 men. From enquiry it was ascertained that the Shinawari Post had engaged the enemy on the night of the 26th, and that heavy firing had been heard all night commencing from about 11 P.M., and ending in the repulse of the enemy about 3 A.M., on the morning of the 27th August. That morning the Ali Khels remained in the vicinity of Shinawari near Ghola China and gave out that they were preparing scaling ladders and sent the Alisherzai and Mamuzai to hold the Samana Sukh to prevent assistance from the Samana reaching Shinawari. So great was the strength of the enemy at this point that the few men of the 36th Sikhs could not advance against them beyond a point about 400 yards from the Gulistan Post. Two attempts were made, in one of which Lieutenant Blair, 36th Sikhs, was severely wounded. The Alisherzai and Mamuzai held this point till evening, when they retired down to the Chagru Kotal. Colonel Haughton in the evening went up to the Samana Sukh with a few men after the enemy had left it, and we saw large bodies of the enemy proceeding down in the direction of Shinawari and distinctly heard their drums beating. At about 8 p.m., the post was again attacked, and firing kept up till early morning of the 25th, the evening of which day it was evacuated. In retiring to Nariab the men were followed up by the enemy and had to fight their way back, with the result that one man, Shandi Gul, was killed, whose rifle fell into the hands of the enemy. On arrival at Nariab the men found the villagers of Nariab fully armed standing near the mosque outside the village looking on at the few without stirring a foot to help them. On reaching the village Muhammad Ishaq Khan, nephew of Khan Babadur Usman Khan, who was sent by the Assistant Commissioner, Hangu, to assist in Shinawari prior to the attack, found 10 boxes of ammunition lying in the village, which had been sent for Shinawari by Assistant Commissioner, but which the villagers had refused to escort to Shinawari. There was an escort of 10 Border Police sepoys with this ammunition, but these could not without the assistance of the village get the ammunition to Shinawari. If they had attempted it, I am quite certain that the attempt would have resulted in the boxes of ammunition falling into the hands of the enemy. Muhammad Ishaq Khan on hearing of the ammunition lying in Nariab at once decided to remove it to a place of safety, and, finding that the sympathies of the village of Nariab were with the enemy and not the Border Police, gave out that he was going to Soorozai, and started for the place, but after having gone a part of the way he turned off the road and went to Darsamand with the ammunition and most of the men. Results showed that he had not misjudged the antipathy of the village of Nariab to the Border Police, for the enemy that very night visited the village of Soorozai. Jamadar Usman Khan remained in Nariab the night of the 25th in the house of pensioned Jamadar Hazrat Shah, who did all in his power to help the Border Police. His defence for remaining behind and leaving his men is that, on return from Shinawari, he found these men missing and waited to ascertain what had become of them. One of these, Shandi Gul, was killed. On the morning of the 29th Jamadar Usman Khan also joined the men in Darsamand and from this place all got in safely into Thal. The following reasons are given for the evacuation of Shinawari, and I personally am prepared to look upon these reasons with due consideration:

(1) There were in all 50 men garrisoning a post which, according to the lowest computation, required at least 200 men to defend it efficiently.

(2) The men had 150 rounds of Snider ammunition each, whereas the men in similar posts held by the Military are allowed 300 and some 400 rounds each.

However, setting these considerations apart, the reasons given by the Border Police are as follows:

On the morning of the 27th Ghulam Khan, an Akhel sepoy, on the pretence of interviewing his mother, deserted to the enemy. This was reported
to the Jamadar Usman Khan by Saidan Shah, a Mullah from the village of Chapri. As the sepoy had not taken his rifle with him no importance was attached to the desertion. On the morning of the 28th this same Mullah was sent by Muhammad Ishaq Khan to bring in information as to the losses of the enemy. He returned in the evening and advised the garrison to evacuate as he said the enemy had made up their minds to make a more determined attack, having learnt from the deserter that the post had not sufficient ammunition to last out the night. Learning this about seven sepoys belonging to the village of Kahi became demoralized and threatened to desert unless the post was evacuated. Their example was followed by one or two men from Darsamand.

On this Jamadar Usman Khan and Ishaq Khan finding that it was useless to continue the struggle with a disheartened garrison determined to evacuate, in addition to this the garrison received no reply to several petitions made for reinforcements, which made them conclude that help was not at hand. The garrison in the fort was also ignorant of the fact that the ammunition was lying in Nariab.

I received a report from Usman Khan on the evening of the 28th which had been written that morning in which the attack on the night of the 27th was mentioned, and in which also reference was made to the fact that ammunition was running short, though nothing was said about evacuating. From this it is clear that the men had no intention of evacuating the post till they received the fatal, though probably well-meant, information from Mullah Saidan Shah of Chapri re the treacherous conduct of Sepoy Ghulam Khan. On receiving this report I sent an urgent Rabia Khel messenger to the Assistant Commissioner, Hangu, asking for reinforcements, but it was too late then, for about an hour after the messenger had started we saw volumes of smoke rising in the direction of the Shinawari Post, and a little after a lamp message from Gulistan informed us that Shinawari had fallen and was in flames. In the confusion of retirement from Shinawari several men were reported missing, most of these being British subjects from the village of Kahi, the men who had shown the white feather during the attack on the post. On the arrival of the troops in the Miranzai Valley and on receiving orders from me these men returned to duty at Gulistan, at which place they had been ordered to assemble by Assistant Commissioner, Hangu. Six men from Kahi and one from Balamian have returned without their ammunition, their defence being that they expended it on the enemy whilst returning from Shinawari. As their reason does not sufficiently explain the loss of their ammunition I have ordered the men to be arrested, and an enquiry is being made as to how the ammunition of these men has been disposed of.

With reference to the Lakka and Saiful Darra Posts, I have simply to observe that they were evacuated by the orders of the Officer Commanding the Relieving Column. The posts were a rough structure of wood and stone and could easily have been scaled if the enemy had been a little more determined and had made the attack in the night instead of in the day as they did. The men removed from these posts were by the orders of the Assistant Commissioner, Hangu, some of them kept in Hangu, others sent to reinforce Gandiour, and some sent to reinforce the Shahu Khel Border Police post against which an attack was threatened.

The Dhar Post was held during these attacks by a mixed garrison of the 36th Sikhs and Border Police under command of a Subadar of the 36th Regiment. Of the Border Police in the post several of the men were Mishtis and Mulla Khels and two Lara Afridis. Subadar Sunder Singh, who was in command, has, unsolicited, several times spoken in the most glowing terms of Havildar Nadir Ali, a Bosti Khel Pas Afridi, and the men under him during the time the post was attacked.

During these attacks the following men deserted:—

Ghulam Khan, an Akhel, without his rifle from Shinawari.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S P 685-688

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

Saidak and Fakir Shah, both Ali Khels, from Shinawari, after its
evacuation, with their rifles and 50 rounds each, on 3rd September 1897.

Hawas Khan, an Ali Khel, from Dhar on the 28th August with his rifle
and 70 rounds.

Zaidu, an Ali Khel sepoy, attached to Khan Bahadur Usman Khan's
political guard, also deserted on 3rd September 1897 with his rifle
and 50 rounds.

In conclusion, I would add that the men in withdrawing from Shinawari all
saved their rifles, and also carried away with them the rifles of the deserter
Ghulam Khan and of two other sepoys who were on leave when the attack on
the post commenced. They also brought away a treasure chest containing
Rs 700, the pay for July of men posted in Thal which happened to be in Shinawari
when the attack commenced. Under these circumstances I hope you will
agree with me that the defence and subsequent evacuation of Shinawari,
though not a very glorious affair, was by no means a discreditable one.

No. 686.

No. 81 Camp, dated the 7th October 1897.

Endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat.

Copy of the above forwarded to Sir Richard Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner
and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, with the remark that though the
defence of Shinawari cannot be described as by any means brilliant, still under
the circumstances represented by Mr. Donald, the charge of cowardice or wilful
neglect of duty cannot be substantiated against either the officers or men of the
garrison.

Nos. 4899-4900-F., dated Simla, the 17th November 1897.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Letter from the Officiating Chief Secretary to the
Government of the Punjab, No. 1640, dated the 6th
November 1897, with enclosures.

A copy of the paper noted in the
margin is forwarded to the Military
Department and Intelligence Branch
for information.

No. 687.

Telegram P., dated the 7th November 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Sir William Lockhart has summoned all sections of the Afridis and
Orakzais to attend his camp unarmed and to hear terms. He expected the
jirgas of clans nearest to camp to attend on 6th or 7th November 1897.

No. 4499-F., dated Simla, the 8th November 1897.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Military Department for
information.

No. 688.

Telegram No. 1175-T., dated the 7th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Foraging parties were sent out yesterday east and west of camp.
The latter were heavily fired on. Our casualties—15th Sikhs, killed, one
Jemadar, one sepoy. Severely wounded, five sepoys. 21st Madras Pioneers,
wounded, one sepoy. Forty-seven mules are reported killed or missing.
FEBRUARY 1898.

Afridl-Orakzai Expedition.

Enemy's loss unknown. Escort, 3rd Sikhs, conveying camels said to have wounded three of enemy. Camp fired into yesterday evening. Our casualties—Northamptons, killed Lieutenant C. I. Giffard; 36th Sikhs, severely wounded in the arm Captain E. L. Sullivan. No other casualties. Brigadier-General Hart reports from Mastura that picquet 2nd-1st Gurkhas killed 8 of enemy, who were attacking convoy yesterday. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 689.

Telegram, No. 40, dated the 7th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. Jirgas of all Samil Orakzai sections came into camp yesterday, evening, also jirga of Firoz Khel Daulatzais. Jirgas of Bizoti and Utmankhel Daulatzais and of Sturi Khels of Mastura, who were following behind, were fired at by picquets on Arhanga and turned back from fear, but are expected to-day. Of Gar Orakzais, Akhel jirga has also come in. No Afridi jirga has yet appeared, but Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel sent in a messenger yesterday to say they were on their way. Notwithstanding this, our foraging parties are daily harassed, generally suffering serious loss, and yesterday forty mules were captured by enemy. Our camp is also heavily fired into at night, and yesterday evening, one British officer was killed and another severely wounded. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; Major Deane, Malakand; and Commissioner, Derajat.

No. 690.

Telegram No. 41, dated the 7th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Your 4458-F. of 5th November. While loyally accepting decision of Government, I would venture to point out that the future relations prescribed seem purely negative, involving no annexation or occupation, no tribute, no acquisition or improvement of Kohat Pass, though this I believe was sanctioned by Secretary of State as long ago as 1885, but only the collection of as many arms as possible, and the re-alignment of the Khyber road, if found advisable. I doubt the necessity for re-aligning Khyber road as it is already an excellent one, but a railway up the valley of the Kabul river would, in my opinion, be most valuable. A railway could not be made up the Khyber except at prohibitive cost. The collection of arms is one of the terms of punishment, and can hardly be regarded as affecting our future relations unless we enforce a general and permanent disarmament, which we cannot do if we evacuate the country. While admitting that there is much to be said on both sides of the question, my fear is that, for the reasons already detailed by me, a reversion to the status quo ante may lead to greater danger and embarrassment hereafter.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4510-4512-F., dated Simla, the 8th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

{ The Military Department.

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

( The Government of the Punjab.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and the Government of the Punjab, for information.

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In conclusion, I would add that the men in withdrawing from Shinawari all saved their rifles, and also carried away with them the rifles of the deserter Ghulam Khan and of two other sepoys who were on leave when the attack on the post commenced. They also brought away a treasure chest containing Rs700, the pay for July of men posted in Thal which happened to be in Shinawari when the attack commenced. Under these circumstances I hope you will agree with me that the defence and subsequent evacuation of Shinawari, though not a very glorious affair, was by no means a discreditable one.

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Nos. 4639-4690-F., dated Simla, the 17th November 1897.

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Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. S F 688-69C

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OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4510-4512-F., dated Simla, the 8th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.
( The Government of the Punjab.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and the Government of the Punjab, for information.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

No. 4507-4508-F., dated Simla, the 8th November 1897 (Confidential).

From — The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To — The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 691.

Telegram No. 243, dated the 7th November 1897.

From — The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,

To — The Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Enemy opposed to us in to-day’s reconnaissance included both Gar and Samil Massuzai. We found in Issar village lance of Duffadar, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, ambuscaded on 1st October. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated Foreign; Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4505-4506-F., dated Simla, the 8th November 1897 (Confidential).

From — The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To — The Military Department.

Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 243, dated the 7th November 1897.

No. 692.

Telegram No. D. 183, dated the 7th November 1897.

From — The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,

To — The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. One hundred Rifles, 12th Bengal Infantry, left Thal en route for Sadda. Reconnaissance in force made to-day through Khurmana defile and good survey made of portion Massuzai country. Defile is seven miles long, and could be held by thousand men against any force, as river bed is commanded both sides within easy range throughout Darra. Enemy completely surprised, did not even hold stockade built across defile about six miles from Sadda. Road passable for cavalry; Central India Horse going through. Reached village Esor, 11 o’clock. In Esor discovered lance belonging Duffadar, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, killed near camp in September, also quantity arms, powder and grain; took away arms and cattle, but destroyed nothing. Retirement commenced 13 o’clock, when enemy collected in considerable force. Fifth Gurkhas as rear guard proceeded mile down Darra without trouble, but here difficulty occurred through delay in getting piquet, Kapurthala Infantry from heights above defile and Gurkhas delayed one hour. Meanwhile enemy advanced in force with standards flying, and here only casualties occurred, being; killed, 5th Gurkhas, one rifleman, Kurram Militia, one sepoy: dangerously wounded, 5th Gurkhas, one rifleman; severely wounded, Kapurthala Infantry, one sepoy; Kurram Militia, one sepoy: slightly wounded, 5th Gurkhas, two riflemen. Enemy lost heavily, and, though ground was suited to following tactics of Pathan, enemy did not continue attack; last five miles to camp being covered without a shot fired. Maxims and long range volleys of Royal Scots Fusiliers were most effective. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.
N. W. F.
D. No. 1891 F.

Political Diary, Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Sunday, 24th October 1897.—1. A gathering of Kuki Khel, Kamrai, Sipah and Zakha Khel of Bara was reported to-day to be at Mamani and Barkai. Native report fixed the strength of this lashkar at six or seven thousand, but it is very doubtful if their strength was even three thousand.

2. Last night a dhobi was wounded outside Bara Fort. There were a lot of dhobis belonging to the British troops, who, instead of returning to their lines, slept on the banks of a water-cut some two hundred yards outside the fort. They had the bundle of clothes which they were washing with them. Some thieves who were prowling round took the clothes away from the dhobis. The dhobis called out for help. On this the thieves shot one with a pistol, wounding him severely and injured two others with stones, and then made off with the clothes. Since then no followers are allowed to sleep outside camp and pickets go round at dusk to see that everyone is inside.

3. Two ordnance bullocks were stolen. These bullocks were tethered outside the fort.

Note.—It appears to me that these thieves who have been prowling round Para Fort and the Artillery Bazar are probably “badmashes” of the villages of Sarhand or Sangu. If they are Afridis, they have some friend with local knowledge to assist them.

Monday, 25th October.—4. The lashkar reported on the 21th has dispersed leaving some five hundred men to watch the Gandab and Shin Kamar Passes. This lashkar before going blocked the narrow parts of the road between Gandab and Mamani with stones and brushwood, and built many sangars commanding the approaches to the Gandab Pass.

5. The Bara people are said to be cutting all their crops, whether ripe or not.

Tuesday, 26th October.—6. News was received to-day that one sowar of the 9th Bengal Lancers, who was captured on the 18th instant, is with Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, Sipah, who intends to release him when he gets an opportunity to send him down.

Note.—With reference to the attack on the 9th Bengal Lancers on the 18th instant, the following account is given:

When the cavalry reached Mamani, there were eight Bara Sipahs watching them from the hills, but they considered themselves too few to fire at the cavalry. Shortly after when the cavalry were beyond Mamani, these Sipahs were joined by a party of Khusrogi raiders, who were returning from the Kohat road. They attacked the cavalry when the latter were returning. Towards the end of the affair they were joined by Orakzais from Barkai. The Khusrogis of China are said to have the following loot taken in this affair:

| Three horses, | Six swords, |
| Five saddles, | Three lances, |
| One carbine, | One bugle, |

and Lance Duffadar Khawas Khan, a prisoner.

7. The Baghdad Khel Sipahs of Kaddam, Bara, have five carbines, five saddles, five horses, five swords and one revolver.

8. The Ustari Khel Orakzais of Barkai have five carbines, six lances, two swords and one horse.
Wednesday, 27th October.—9. To-day the troops worked on the road to Gandab to within one mile of the low hills. No signs of the enemy were seen.

10. Two bullock cart-drivers, who arrived from Peshawar about 2 A.M., were wounded with knives outside camp and three bullocks were stolen.

Thursday, 28th October.—11. No news.

Friday, 29th October.—12. Some troops went out this morning in charge of a grass-cutting party about seven miles from camp on the Gandab road. About fifty of the enemy fired some shots at them from the low hills at extreme ranges. There were no casualties.

13. An informer reported to-day that Shakkar, the notorious thief of Hazaranao, had made the attack on the picquet of the 18th Bengal Infantry at Hari Singh. He was seen next day on the Shudanna Pass with some Zakha Khels. He had with him four rifles taken from the 8th Bengal Infantry, and also two horses which he had stolen.

Saturday, 30th October.—14. Sowar Sherulla Khan of the 9th Bengal Lancers, who was released by Malik Sher Muhammad Khan, Sipah, arrived in camp last night. He states that he was well treated by the Malik. On his way down to Jamrud, he was recaptured by one Lalbaz, Zakha Khel of China. Malik Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdin Khel of Chora, hearing of it sent and released him and escorted him safely to Jamrud.

15. A few shots were fired into the artillery camp near the fort last night, but did no harm.

Note.—Lance Duffadar Khawas Khan, 9th Bengal Lancers, is now the only prisoner in the affair of the 18th instant still in the hands of the Afridis.

7th November 1897. (Sd.) R. Udny.


No. 6, dated Bara, the 1st November 1897.

Forwarded to the Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Sd.) W. H. Barton, Captain,
Political Officer, Peshawar Column.

Received by post to-day and forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The 7th November 1897.

(Sd.) R. Udny,
Chief Political Officer,
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 25 P. and 26 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 7th November 1897.

Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
Political Diary No. XX of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

5th November 1897.—(1) A foraging party searched out the Kambar Khels' villages to the west of the valley, and returned with a large quantity of fodder and grain.

2. A Mishti spy came in to-day with the news that the jirgas of the Samil Khel and Daulatzai Orakzaiz were assembling and might be expected to-morrow or next day. A letter to me from the Samil Khels was received to-day. In it the Maliks begged for mercy from the Sarkar.

3. (a) Saiyid Asghar Mian of Killaia reports that the Mani Khels and Bar Muhammad Khels (Shiahs) have looted some 200 houses of the Samil Khels and Daulatzais, taking advantage of the latter's absence from their homes. This information has been corroborated from another source, though it seems probable that the number of houses that were looted has been exaggerated by Mir Asghar.

The Samil Khels have arranged to send one man in turn to each of their villages at night to protect them from the ravages of the Shiah clans.

The Mani Khels and Bar Muhammad Khels are also reported to have shot two Firoz Khels and a Shekhan, one Bar Muhammad Khel having been wounded in the affray.

(b) The Samil Khels and Daulatzais with a few Ali Khels are stated to have taken their families and cattle to Sandapal in Sipah Afridi limits and to Sarghar beyond the Barga stream. A few are also said to be in hiding on the slopes of Maulaghar. The Gar tribes have taken their families and property, some to Massuzai limits, and others to the Kuki Khel country. A large number of these refugees have been located in two Massuzai villages, known as Khwaja Ali and Zambu.

(c) Zarri Shah, Shekhan, confessed to a spy that he had shot a sepoy of the 36th Sikhs between Sartop and Fort Lockhart, and expressed his readiness to return the rifle he had taken and pay a fine in addition. This he declared was the only hostile act he or his family had committed against the Government.

(d) A Malla Khel, named Saiyid Abbas, and a Shekhan accompanied the tribal jirga to Kabul. It is believed here that the jirga has been detained by the Amir.

(e) The Ali Khels declare that it will be impossible to recover in kind the loot taken at Nariab.

(f) In the jirga of the Samil Khels and Daulatzais expected here shortly, all the clans, except the Malla Khels, are said to be represented by their principal Maliks. Malik Sarfaraz was the only influential Malla Khel Malik with the jirga, though it was expected that Malik Zaffar would join it to-morrow.

CAMP MAIDAN: 

The 6th November 1897. 

Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff, 

Tirah Expeditionary Force. 

(L.W. King)

Received to-day and forwarded for the information of the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The 7th November 1897.

(R. Udny)

Chief Political Officer, 

Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 27 P. and 28 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 7th November 1897.

Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
FEBRUARY 1908.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. S F 695-697

No. 695.

Telegram No. 245, dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadia,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Chikkai writes that owing to his not having joined in the war his existence has become insupportable, as his neighbours on every side have become his enemies. He wishes therefore to sell his property in Chinarak to the Daudzai, and to migrate with his family either to British territory or, if that is not allowed, to Arabia. I have replied advising him to do nothing in a hurry. Addressed Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated Foreign; Punjab; and Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

No. 696.

Telegram No. 246, dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your letter 3403-P. of 1st instant. It may be advisable to remit part of fine in case of Tatang Alisherzai, as since I wrote they have in several ways done service and have given considerable assistance to Afridi Khan and provided escorts to survey parties. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Punjab; and Foreign.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4517-4518-F., dated Simla, the 9th November 1897.

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department,

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 697.

Telegram No. 1196-T., dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Third Brigade under General Kempster with No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. A., proceeded yesterday with foraging party west of camp bringing 160 maunds grain. Enemy followed retirement. Our casualties—Dorsets, one killed, eight wounded, one of whom since dead. No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. A., one wounded. 1st-2nd Gurkhas, one wounded. Commissariat driver, one wounded. Two battery mules were killed. Over 20 of enemy were seen to fall. Shots were fired into camp yesterday evening, but enemy desisted on receiving a few volleys from picquets. 28th Bombay Pioneers, one man dangerously wounded. General Hart reports from Mastura 2nd-1st Gurkhas this morning encountered enemy south of Arhanga Pass. Enemy left five dead on the road; no doubt many others shot. Troops are proceeding to drive enemy off. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on subject.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

No. 698.

Telegram No. 102, dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,
To—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political Officer, Khyber, wires:—Begins. 208. Two elders of the Luargi Shinwaris have come in, and represent that, owing to communications being stopped with Jalalabad and Peshawar, they are suffering from hunger. Addressed Commissioner; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force. Ends. Addressed to Punjab; repeated Foreign.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4530-4531-F, dated Simla, the 9th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 699.

Telegram No. 104, dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,
To—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political Officer, Khyber, wires:—Begins. 210. News just received that the Malakand Fakir has reached Khyber and is putting up with Malik Khwas Khan. Two reliable messengers deputed to bring news separately; they are expected back to-morrow noon. Addressed Commissioner; repeated General Officer Commanding; Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar District; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; and Political Officer, Peshawar Column. Ends. Addressed to Punjab; repeated Foreign.

No. 700.

Telegram No. 247, dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. All quiet in Kurram. Lashkar of all sections of Chambanis joined Massuzais in attack on reconnaissance yesterday and large Massuzai Chambanni lashkar reported in neighbourhood of Khurmana Darra to-day. Refugees from Tirah are coming in considerable numbers to Massuzai and Chambanni country. Alisherzaai of Totang have refused to receive them, and Chikkai writes asking what he is to do about them; I have replied that if he allows refugees within his limits, he will be held responsible for their actions. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated Foreign; Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab.
OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4532-4523-F., dated Simla, the 9th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department,

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 701.

Telegram No. 106-C., dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinawari,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Fifty four camels grazing on 7th beyond picquet limits Karappa were looted and one sowar wounded. Transport Officer returning from Mastura at the time followed with two sowars and recovered 52 camels. Captain Shore, Section Commandant, with 50 rifles and some sowars followed up, but failed to recover remaining two animals. Head-quarters Rifle Brigade left Kohat last night. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on subject.

No. 702.

Telegram No. B, 135, dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. At nine-thirty o’clock to-day, Officer Commanding, Kapurthala Infantry, reported one Subadar and thirty-five rank and file of his regiment absent. These men were on picquet duty on heights above right bank of Khurmana Darra, north of its junction with Gao Darra during yesterday’s reconnaissance. As previously ordered, this picquet was directed to retire from heights, and join main body at Janikot. Picquet acknowledged receipt of signal and was seen to start down, but was shortly hidden from view from troops at Janikot through intervening ravines and scrub jungle. Before retirement commenced from Janikot which is at mouth of Gao Darra, and again on arrival in camp all troops were reported present. Retirement from Janikot commenced after enemy disappeared up Darra, and no firing took place between Janikot and camp, a distance of five miles. From information received by Political Officer twenty-one o’clock not yet corroborated, I fear all men missing are killed. Details will be wired to-morrow on receipt further particulars. Enemy opposed to us yesterday included Gar and Samil Massuzai and all sections Chamkannis, Refugees from Tirah coming to Massuzais. Chamkani Iashkar now numbering two thousand reported collected in Darra north of Janikot. Chikkai writes complaining of his difficult position owing to friendly attitude which he has adopted towards British. Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated ten addresses as directed.
No. 1556, dated Lahore, the 8th November 1897.

From—L. W. DANE, Esq., Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to the telegram from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, No. 94, dated 1st instant, which has been repeated to you, I am directed to submit, for the orders of the Government of India, a copy of a letter received from that officer, and of its enclosures, which gives in detail the reasons for the proposal of the local officers that troops should enter the country of the Massuzais and Khani Khel Chamkannis and also of the Alisherzais, and enforce compliance with certain terms to be imposed upon them for their past offences in Kurram and participation in the recent disturbances on that frontier.

2. In September last it was thought very likely that the Chamkannis would commit themselves and this they have now done. Mr. Merk speaks of the Khani Khel section only, but the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, refused to see the Haji Khel and Darya Khel jirgas as they were committed, and in his telegram No. 221, dated 25th ultimo, he reported that they had all joined the Massuzai lashkar. As regards the Massuzai and Alisherzais it was always contemplated that they should be punished along with the rest of the Orakzai tribes as suggested in paragraph 3 of my letter No. 1870, dated 24th September 1897. The apportionment of the fine in cash and rifles was left to the discretion of the officer in political control. We have since heard of three dead or wounded Alisherzais having been brought back after the fight at Dargai on the 20th October, and the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, reported in his telegram No. 210, dated 23rd idem, that 16 were killed on the Samana.

3. The foregoing remarks will show that the complicity of the tribes concerned has been sufficiently proved, and that the grounds for demanding reparation from them are stronger now than when my letter of 21st September was written. The list of offences committed by the Massuzais is, moreover, a serious one, and the Lieutenant-Governor concurs with the local officers in thinking that their country should be visited while our troops are in Maidan. A visit to the Para Chamkanni country will also, he thinks, be productive of much good and will probably have the effect of making them more observant of their engagements with the British Government in future. His Honour would, therefore, suggest that, if this has not already been done, the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, be asked to take such steps as he may consider desirable to adequately punish these tribes.

4. As regards the terms proposed, Sir Mackworth Young agrees generally with those recommended by Mr. Merk, except that he would not pronounce against the tribute proposed by the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to be taken from the Alisherzais, if tribute is taken elsewhere. His Honour also agrees with Mr. Merk that the lands of the Badama village should not be made over to the Turis.

5. I am to add that a copy of this letter has been sent direct to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, for information and also to save a lengthy telegraphic communication from the Government of India to him, if that Government accept the Lieutenant-Governor's suggestion.

No. 3401 P., dated the 1st November 1897.

From—The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To—The Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

In continuation of my telegram No. 94 of to-day, I have the honour to submit a copy of a letter No. 468 A., dated the 24th instant, from the Officer
on Special Duty in Kurram, regarding the punishment of the Massuzai and Khani Khel Chankannis. With our forces in Maidan they will be in a cleft stick if the Kurram Movable Column advances into their countries and if troops co-operate from the direction of Maidan. It is possible that the claps, when they realize their predicament, may comply without costing us much expenditure of blood and money.

2. It will be seen that I have somewhat varied in my recommendation from the terms proposed by the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram. I do not think there are 150 breech-loaders among the Massuzais who are the extreme western clan of the Orakzai and are not particularly wealthy. If there are not 150 breech-loaders in the country, it is no use asking for them. I think they should be made to give up all the property they have looted in the course of their persistent misconduct. No doubt it would be useful if Badama were held by Turis, but their presence there would be a constant sore to Massuzai, there would be incessant bickering much accentuated by the fact that it is another case of Shi'ahs and Sunnis, and I think we had better leave Badama with the Massuzai. Moreover, its deprivation will not hit the whole clan, if I am not mistaken, but only the owners of that particular village and our object is to act upon the whole of a clan. The terms I have recommended, plus free wood, grain and forage, will bring the Massuzai to their senses. Their country should, whether they comply or not, be visited from end to end.

3. As regards the Khani Khel Chamkannis they are a poor clan, but I consider that something more than 30 breech-loaders is required. The surrender of rifles is a blow to the wealthy families only and quite rightly so, because they are the social and political leaders, whereas a clan as a body should have its punishment brought home to it as well. Therefore I propose a fine of Rs. 1,000 in addition, this will fall principally (according to the usual domestic arrangements of a clan) upon those who do not own breech-loaders. The Khani Khel should, of course, supply wood, grain and fodder free, and their country, also that of the Haji Khel and Darya Khel sections of the Chamkannis, should be completely traversed.

4. I agree with the proposals of the Officer on Special Duty regarding the Alisherzai, except in respect of the annual tribute of ten sheep. I am not aware on what grounds this tribute would be demanded, and after our operations in Tirah have concluded, it will not matter whether the Alisherzai pay a petty tribute or not. It is a small matter and I would not take it up.

5. If the suggestion to deal now with the Massuzai and Khani Khel commends itself to His Honour, I would strongly urge that matters be set in train at once. Our forces will not stay long in all probability in Tirah, and it takes some time to make the necessary military arrangements. Once the troops have left Tirah, the chances will have passed away, and it would be in every way fortunate if these clans could be humbled thoroughly now, as they sure to be with troops in their front and behind them.

No. 468 A., dated Camp Sadda, the 24th October 1897.

From—Captain G. O. Roos Keppel, Officer on Special Duty, Kurram,
To—W. R. H. Merk, Esq., C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

I have the honour to forward herewith a list of raids and attacks by Massuzais and Chamkannis within Kurram limits for the last few months. From this you will see that, since the 17th August, the Massuzai have made 22 such attacks and raids and the Chamkannis 4, besides joining the Massuzai in several of the other more important committed by them.

In your No. 579 of 20th September and No. 584 of 21st September to Punjab, you mention the question of the punishment of the Massuzais and Alisherzais for their share in the recent disturbances. Since then the Chamkannis have again committed themselves and will have to be included.
I have the honour, therefore, to make, for your consideration, some suggestions as to the punishment of these tribes. I should point out that, in view of the defiant attitude of the Massuzais and their answer to Sir W. Lockhart’s proclamation, there is, I think, no chance of their paying any fine unless we invade their territory. I would suggest with regard to the Massuzai, therefore, that in addition to permanent forfeiture of their Kurram allowances and to the fine of Rs. 7,000 and 150 breech-loaders suggested in your No. 548, the lands of Badama village (now deserted and belonging to the Massuzais) should be forfeited and taken over by Turis. The lands are good and the Turis would gladly take them, and a strong Turi village at the mouth of the Khurmana Darra would effectually stop any future raiding in that direction.

The value of the land is between Rs. 3,000 and 4,000. If the force now in Kurram be, as I would most strongly urge that it may be, allowed to deal with the Massuzais, I see no difficulty in recovering these fines or their equivalent. After dealing with the Massuzais and surveying the basin of the Kurumana stream up to the Lozakka Pass, the force could deal with the Chamkannis.

It has been abundantly proved that it is useless to make agreement with the Chamkannis. Mr. Donald made one agreement, Mr. Hastings made another, but the Chamkannis respected neither for more than a few months.

The principal offenders are the Khani Khel, and I would suggest that the hamlets of Thabai should be destroyed and a fine of, say, 30 breech-loaders levied. The force could march out through the Hajji and Darya Khel limits near the Kirman, and the survey of country and the lifting their purdah should be a sufficient punishment for them if they do not resist our advance. With regard to the Alisherzai, this tribe has not dared to commit itself openly since the arrival of the force at Sadda, though there is little doubt that they are in sympathy with the Massuzai. I would recommend, with regard to them, that a fine of Rs. 1,000 should be imposed as a punishment for Hajji Khan of Totang’s joining the Tirah jirgas and proceeding to Jalalabad with the deputation from Tirah.

A fine of Rs. 500 for the support given to Khalifa of Tindoh and a fine of Rs. 500 for the support given to the Massuzais of Badama who were implicated in the attack on Sadda on 17th September and fled to Tindoh, when their village was burnt by Colonel Richardson’s column on September 20th. In addition the Khans of Totang should pay an annual tribute of, say, 10 sheep for their occupation of Totang, Kramb and Tindoh. For the future peace and security of Kurram, it is most necessary that punishment should be inflicted, and we shall never again be in so good a position to punish them as we are now.

**MASSUZAIS.**

11th February 1897.—Raid by 600 Massuzais led by Shubli and Shan (Mastu Khel Massuzais) above Makhizai in Lower Kurram carried off 2,000 sheep, 3 mules, 1 donkey and 3 guns and killed two men. Value of property carried off Rs. 6,340 and blood-money Rs. 720; total Rs. 7,060.

17th August 1897.—Raid by 120 Massuzai on Balish Khel in Upper Kurram. Villagers turned out and drove off raiders.

18th August.—Raiding party, strength unknown, attacked mail ekka near Durani Lower Kurram, wounded Kirpa Singh, Babu, of 36th Sikh Infantry.

19th August.—Raiding party, strength unknown, attacked dák sówar at Sheikh Mali Rogha in Lower Kurram killing his horse, value Rs. 120.

21st August.—Raiding party, strength unknown, attacked Mobin in Upper Kurram killing two men.

22nd August.—Raiding party carried off three posts and wire from telegraph between Ibrahimzai and Mobin, Upper Kurram.

24th August.—Raiding party cut telegraph wire near Balish Khel and attacked villagers guarding telegraph line near Ibrahimzai, Upper Kurram.
26th August.—Raiding party wounded a woman near Jakubi, Upper Kurram.

27th August.—Raiders carried off three telegraph posts and wire at Sheikh Mali Rogha, Lower Kurram.

31st August.—Lashkar attacked Sadda and Sultan Kot posts at night. Raiders carried off two buffaloes from Balyamin.

1st September 1897.—Lashkar, attacked Sultan Kot.

2nd September.—Lashkar about 600 strong, attacked Kurram Militia outpost at Balish Khel, Upper Kurram; they forced the door of the tower, but were beaten off having killed two men.

Raiders tried to force Shmak village, Lower Kurram, but were unsuccessful.

6th September.—Raiders carried off five telegraph posts and wire from near Sheikh Mali Rogha, Lower Kurram; telegraph wire cut at Ibrahimzai, Upper Kurram.

17th September.—Lashkar, 2,000 strong, attacked the camp of the Kurram Flying Column at Sadda, but were driven off. Our loss one killed, seven wounded; five animals killed, 13 wounded.

22nd September.—Raiding party of about 40 men attacked Shahbaz village, Lower Kurram, carried off Shahbaz and Rs. 1,000 worth of goods and cattle.

24th September.—Raiding party led by Khalu Bangi and Shubli Massuzais, 25 strong, attacked 18th Bengal Lancers patrol north of camp Sadda, killing one sowar and one horse; they carried off the sowar's arms and ammunition and set fire to his body.

28th September.—Raiders attacked Ibrahimzai, Upper Kurram, but were driven off by villagers.

1st October 1897.—About 150 men led by Khalu Bangi and Shubli Massuzais attacked patrol, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, about one mile north of camp Sadda, killing one Duffadar and one horse, and wounding one Duffadar and two horses; they carried off the dead Duffadar's arms and ammunition.

17th October.—Five hundred Massuzais and 35 Chamkannis attacked patrol, Kurram Militia, about a mile north of camp Sadda being reinforced by 25 more rifles. Kurram Militia drove them past Dum Khwar to their own limits.

22nd October.—Raiding party, 30 strong, killed a villager of Ibrahimzai, Upper Kurram, on road.

CHAMKANNIS.

20th September 1897.—Khani Khel Chamkannis carried off Saiyid Anwar of Gram, Upper Kurram.

4th October 1897.—Khani Khel Chamkannis killed one Ahmad of Zerai, Upper Kurram, and carried off a girl (afterwards released).

7th October.—Khani Khel killed one and carried off two Sherga Khel of Chaka Darra, Upper Kurram.

Khani Khel raiding sheep at Mulabagh, Upper Kurram, were attacked by shepherds. Two shepherds killed, one Khani Khel killed.

Khani Khel were also concerned in attack on camp Sadda on 17th September and on Kurram Militia patrol on 17th October.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4583-4584-F., dated Simla, the 12th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Military Department.

{The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
Political Diary No. XXI of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

6th November 1897.—1. Regimental foraging parties, which went out this morning to search the villages to the west of the camp, were attacked by about 200 of the enemy. Our casualties were considerable—one Jemadar, 15th Sikhs, and one sepoy being killed, and five sepoys and two drivers wounded. We also lost 39 mules which were driven off by the enemy. The camp was fired into last evening from 6-30 p.m. till 9 p.m. with the result that one officer was killed and another severely wounded.

The telegraph wire was also cut. All this was the work probably of Zakha Khels, though Kambar Khels may also have joined them. The former were heard shouting to the latter to help them in attacking the camp.

2. In the afternoon intimation was received that a jirga of 60 Malikdins, Kambar, and Kalla Khel Afridis were coming in, and arrangements were duly made for their reception in a village to the north of the camp, but they failed to put in an appearance. They are probably awaiting the arrival of the representatives of other sections before they come in. A deputation of Ali Khel and Mamozai Malikis are said to have joined the Afridi jirga in the upper part of the Maidan valley beyond Bagh.

3. Jirgas of the Mishtis, Shekhtans, Malla Khels, Akhels, Rabia Khels, Mamozai Daradar Isa Khels and Firoz Khel Daulatzaiks came into camp this evening and were located in a village to the south of the camp.

Jirgas of the Sturi Khels and the Bizoti and Utman Daulatzaiks also came as far as the Arhanga Pass, but, as they were behind the others who were accompanied by Jemadar Azad Khan, they were accidentally fired at by the Gurkha picquets and fled back to the Mastur valley. It is expected that they will attend to-morrow, and a Border Military Police official has been sent to bring them in.

When they arrive, the jirgas of the Samil Khel Orakzaiks and Daulatzaiks will be complete.

4. An attack was made yesterday on the baggage guard of the Head-quarters staff on its way from camp Mastura Malla Khel to Maidan, but fortunately no damage was done. This was the work probably of small bodies of Zakha Khels, who are still hanging about the hills in the neighbourhood of the Arhanga Pass. The attack was repulsed by the fire of the Gurkha picquets on the pass.

5. Bakhshu, a banya of Peshawar, reports that early this morning, while on his way from camp Mastura Malla Khel to Maidan, he was waylaid by a party of 70 of the enemy, who looted his 11 donkeys laden with goods for a shop-keeper at Maidan. The value of the donkeys is put down at Rs. 440 which seems an exaggerated estimate. The value of their loads is not yet known. The offenders were probably Zakha Khels. In a case of this kind when a man travels without a convoy, and, as a matter of private speculation, I do not think we are bound to award him compensation.6

*Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, and Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

**Received yesterday evening. Forwarded to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The 8th November 1897.

Nos. 29 P. and 30 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 8th November 1897.

Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.
No. 707.

Telegram No. 42, dated the 8th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. The recent heavy firing into camp at night has been principally, if not entirely, the work of Zakha Khel, whose villages in this Maidan valley lie along the foot of the hills to east and south-east of our present position. An example has, therefore, been made to-day by destroying the defences of twenty of these villages. Jirgas of Bazotsis, Utman Khel and Mastura Sturi Khel came in yesterday evening as expected. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; and Commissioner, Derajat.

No. 708.

No. 4528-F., dated Simla, the 9th November 1897.

From—Sir W. J. CUNINGHAM, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

I am directed to reply to your telegram No. 15, dated the 24th October 1897, regarding the proposed settlement with the Loargai Shinwaris, the Shilmahri Mohmands and Mullagoris.

2. I am to forward, for your information, a copy of a letter from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, conveying the Lieutenant-Governor's views as to the terms which should be imposed. The Governor-General in Council accepts your view that it is undesirable for the Commissioner of Peshawar to take isolated action in regard to these tribesmen, and the settlement with them may be deferred until you can undertake it in communication with the Commissioner.

3. The Governor-General in Council entirely agrees with Sir Mackworth Young that no steps should be taken at present towards opening the Tartarra route; but the terms of punishment recommended by Mr. Merk and approved by the Lieutenant-Governor appear more severe than the necessity, and perhaps the justice, of the case demands. Neither the Shilmahri Mohmands nor the Mullagoris appear to have taken part in the disturbances in the Khyber Pass; and, though the Loargai Shinwari tribesmen joined in the looting of the Landi Kotal serai, their Maliks are believed to have held aloof, and it is not established that any of them joined in the actual attack.

4. Payment for missing rifles issued to men of the Khyber Rifles is provided for by the system under which the arms were granted on tribal security. It seems undesirable to start a new tribal account in respect to the few missing rifles which were in the hands of the Mullagori and Loargai Shinwari members of the corps. In the same way, the Governor-General in Council considers that the murder of the Chowdri by certain Shilmahri Mohmands ought to be disposed of in ordinary course, independently of the recent disturbances, of which it appears to form no part, and with which it was only accidentally connected.

5. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, for information and communication to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

Afridi Orakzai Expedition.

Lieutenant-Governor and for communication to the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division.

Nos. 4530-4531-F.

A copy of the foregoing letter, with enclosures, is forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, in continuation of the endorsements from the Foreign Department, Nos. 4301-4302-F., dated the 20th October 1897.

No. 709.

Telegram No. 1246-T., dated the 9th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan.

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Yesterday foraging parties to north and east of camp collected large quantities of supplies and demolished Zakha Khel towers, from which camp had been fired into. Our casualties—killed, 4th Gurkhas one; 36th Sikhs one. Wounded, King’s Own Scottish Borderers one; 4th Gurkhas two; 36th Sikhs one. Enemy’s casualties reported by Gurkha scouts eight. In affair reported by General Hart, yesterday’s daily—Yorks and 1st Gurkhas killed fifteen of enemy; twelve bodies, with rifles, found. Our casualties—killed, Bheestie one. Wounded transport driver. A few shots fired into camp 12 o’clock; killed Captain Watson, Commissariat Department; all quiet during remainder of night. General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, made a reconnaissance to-day to crest of Saran Sar, five miles east of camp, height about eight thousand feet, whence Tirich Mir, north of Chitral, and hills bounding Bara valley on north, were seen; road steep, but capable of improvement, and apparently much used as direct track into Bara valley, some five or six miles distance. Defences of a large number of Zakha Khel villages destroyed. Enemy suffered loss, dead bodies of four being seen near path. Our casualties will be reported to-morrow. Sent Adjutant-General in India; repeated Quartermaster-General; Military; Foreign; Military Secretary to the Viceroy.

No. 4544-F., dated Simla, the 10th November 1897.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Government of the Punjab for information.

No. 710.

Telegram No. B.-138, dated the 9th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda.

From—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. One hundred Rifles, 12th K. I. G., arrived at Sadda from Thal Information received corroborates report that all men Kapurthala Infantry reported missing have been killed. They tried to return to bed of river by short cut, but got into ravine in which jungle fire was burning which cut off their line of retirement. Meanwhile Chamkanni lashkar appeared above them, hurled down rocks and eventually surrounding party, cut them down. Smoke of fire hid all these movements from view from Janikot, but there was no reason to suppose any of our men were in ravines or hills to north of fire as all were reported present. Chamkannis and Massuzais acknowledge to Alisherzais 13 casualties, but Alisherzais state they lost between 20 and 30. Combined lashkar reported still at Issar. Two Chamkanni Malik known to
have been killed. Addressed Adjutant-General in India and repeated ten other addresses as directed.

No. 711.

Telegram No. 248, dated the 9th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. All quiet in Kurram. Two Shirgai Khel, who were taken prisoners by Khani Khel Chamkannis last month, were released yesterday on payment of ransom. Lashkar of all sections of Massuzais and Chamkannis assembled at Issar on night of 7th-8th instant, and are reported still there this morning. Khani Khel Chamkannis got 32 rifles from Kapurthala, Massuzais getting balance. There is now no doubt that the whole party were killed; the enemy’s loss was considerable. Massuzais and Chamkannis accuse Shiah Chamkannis of Gaobara of having betrayed them and led troops through Khurmana Darra. It is rumoured that lashkar intends to burn Gaobara villages; inhabitants are taking refuge in Shaka Darra. Alisherzai Khans of Totang to-day at considerable risk brought in bodies of one Turi and one Gurkha killed on 7th instant above Janikot. Addressed Commissioner Peshawar; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Foreign; Punjab; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab; and Deputy Commissioner, Kohat.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4542-4543-F., dated Simla, the 10th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the
Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram, No. 248, dated the 9th November 1897.
Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 712.

Telegram No. 1107-C., dated Shinawari, the 9th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Telegraph line cut at about eighteen o’clock last evening between Shinawari and Karappa, but repaired early this morning. Telegraph party, under Lieutenant Garwood, R.E., with escort of Jhind Infantry, were fired on from spur, at junction of Chagru and Khanki Valley at 17.20, after road picquets had been withdrawn, and four men wounded. Addressed and repeated as ordered in the directions on the subject.

No. 713.

Telegram No. 43, dated Camp Maidan, the 9th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. Afridi jirgas of Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel and Tirah Adam Khel clans arrived in camp to-day. Kuki Khel, Kamral and Sipah jirgas have also sent in verbal messages, and are expected very shortly. The only Afridi
clans holding aloof are the Zakha Khel and Aka Khel, and the Zakha Khel are distinctly hostile. Their firing into camp still continues, and another British officer was killed yesterday evening. To-day I made a reconnaissance in force up hill east of camp marked Scandapal in Scott's map of Tirah, real name of which is Saran Sar, as far as watershed at altitude of eight thousand feet dividing Maidan from Bara Valley. I took this opportunity to inflict further punishment on Zakha Khel by burning nearly forty more of their forts at foot of Saran Sar range, belonging principally to Khasrogi section who are notoriously lawless. Enemy followed up retirement, and rear guard was able to inflict sharp punishment with but little loss to themselves. Eighty or ninety Zakha Khel forts have now been destroyed which represents damage probably to amount of twenty thousand rupees, in addition to large quantities of fodder and grain taken out of these forts. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; Major Deane, Malakand; and Commissioner, Derajat.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4556-4557-F., dated Simla, the 11th November 1897 (Confidential).
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
To—\{ The Military Department. \\
\{ The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
Political Diary No. XXII of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

7th November 1897.—(1) A foraging party that proceeded to-day to the west of the valley were attacked with great determination by the enemy, and lost 20 in killed and wounded, besides some mules and the axle of a mountain gun. The enemy’s loss is estimated at 24. It is possible that in this affair the Zakha Khels were joined by the Kambar Khels, and perhaps by some Malikdin Khels also. The telegraph line was again cut last night.

(2) At 12 to-day I interviewed a jirga of some 80 Samil Orakzais, Daulatzais and Akhels. The clans represented were the Mishtis, Shekhans, Malla Khels, Rabia Khels, Isa Khels, Mamoza Daradar Akhels and Firoz Khels.

They were informed that the terms of Government would be announced to them as soon as the whole Orakzai jirga had assembled (Gar and Samil), and that till then they would be entertained here at the Government expense. As the representatives of some of the clans were found to be in excess of the numbers entered in the proclamation, the jirga was told to reduce the deputation to the prescribed limits. The superfluous members of the deputation were sent back to their villages this evening.

Later in the day the representatives of the Bizoti and Utman Khel Daulatzais and the Sturi Khels came in. The jirgas of the Samil Orakzais and Daulatzais are, therefore, now complete.

The Akhels are the only representatives of the Gar tribes present. Arsalla Khan, the most influential of the Mamoza Maliks, is said to have fled with his family to Mangal territory.

None of the Afridi tribes have sent in their jirgas yet. Messengers have come in with the information that the jirgas of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel and Kalla Khel Afridis are ready to come in, if Resaldar-Major Kadam Khan and Subadar-Major Zaman Khan are sent to escort them to camp. It is probable that the constant skirmishes that are maintained with our foraging parties in the valley are deterring the Afridi jirgas from coming in.

CAMP MAIDAN;

The 8th November 1897. (Sd.) L. W. KING,

Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.

Received yesterday and forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The 9th November 1897. (Sd.) R. UDNY, Chief Political Officer.

Nos. 31 P. and 32 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 9th November 1897.

Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, and Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4705-4706-F., dated Simla, the 17th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.
FEBRUARY 1898.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. S F 718-718

No. 715.
Telegram No. 108, dated the 10th November 1897.
From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,
To—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government; repeated to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political Officer, Khyber, wires:—Begins. 211. My telegram 210 or yesterday. Messenger just returned from Khyber with the news that Mir Akbar, son of Malik Khwas Khan, with a disciple of the Adda Mulla and six other Mullas, reached Khyber from Dakka on the 7th with a green flag. The Mullas are putting up with the Sultan Khels; their objective not known. Addressed Commissioner; repeated General Officer Commanding and Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Political Officer, Peshawar Column. Ends. Addressed to Punjab; repeated Foreign.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.
Nos. 4548-4549-F., dated Simla, the 10th November 1897 (Confidential).
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the
Telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawar, Military Department and Intelligence
Branch for information.

No. 716.
Telegram No. 1254-T., dated the 10th November 1897.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Towards end of retirement yesterday from Saran Sar, enemy pressed closely on rear guard from all sides, inflicting heavy loss. The circumstances are being investigated and will form subject of separate telegram. Foraging party of third Sikhs to north of camp had one man wounded Telegraph line cut in several places last night. Officer Commanding, Kurram, Movable Column, reports that, in reconnaissance reported in his daily of 7th, a detachment of Kapurthala Infantry, consisting of one Subadar and 35 men, who formed a picquet about the mouth of the Goadarra, tried to rejoin main body by a short cut, but got into a ravine whence their retreat was cut off by a rapidly spreading fire of grass and jungle. The Chamkannis got about them gradually, surrounded them and eventually shot them all down. The party was not reported as missing to the Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, until the next morning. The above account of what occurred is from reports received by the Political Officer, Kurram. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 717.
Telegram No. 76-I.P., dated the 10th November 1897.
From—General Hammond, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bara,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. A body of about 300 Ali Khels is reported to be in vicinity of Gandao Pass and Barkai. Health of troops good. Addressed and repeated as laid down in instructions on the subject.

No. 718.
Telegram No. B.-144, dated the 10th November 1897.
From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. One squadron, Central India Horse, left Sadda for Para Chinar and head-quarters, and two squadrons, 6th Bengal Cavalry, left Para Chinar.
AFRIDI JIRGAS.

The following jirgas have come in this morning and have been located in the buildings close to the north-west picquet, at present held by the 1st-2nd Gurkhas. The Officer Commanding this picquet has been told of the numbers placed in his charge, and it has been explained when to permit these men to go out for purposes of prayers, &c. Sowar Jey Singh has been left as interpreter.

The Hindus who came with the jirga have been directed to arrange for the feeding of these men at a certain rate per head.

### Members of the Jirga.

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<th>Malikdin Khel—</th>
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<td>1. Nazrie</td>
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<td>2. Fakir</td>
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<td>3. Mir Alam</td>
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<td>4. Sherzulla</td>
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<td>5. Aligarm</td>
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<td>6. Mirak</td>
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<td>7. Haidar</td>
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<td>8. Akhtari</td>
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<td>9. Zabta Khan</td>
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<td>10. Mir Dost</td>
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<td>11. Umar Khan (Kazi)</td>
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<td>12. Salim</td>
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<td>13. Mir Kadir</td>
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<td>14. Sabz Ali</td>
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<td>15. Lala</td>
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<th>Kambar Khel—</th>
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<td>1. Nur Gul</td>
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<td>2. Ayaz</td>
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<td>3. Wali Khan</td>
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<td>4. Nurdad</td>
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<td>5. Mir Ghulam</td>
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<td>6. Azad Khan</td>
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<td>7. Samad</td>
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<td>8. Ata Gul</td>
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<td>9. Patoo</td>
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<td>10. Nur Ghulam</td>
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<td>11. Gul Ahmad</td>
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Karnal Sipah and Misri Khel.

The 12th man, Mir Mohmad, Banu Khel, has been sent back to bring the three remaining men of this jirga of fifteen.

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<th>Adam Khels (5)—</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Hyat Khan</td>
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<td>2. Lal Baz</td>
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<td>3. Shahnaz</td>
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<td>4. Hayat Sher</td>
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<td>5. Atahan</td>
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Five others (Subadars, Jemadars, Havildars, pensioners), who came with the above jirga, were sent back, and warned to tell the Karnal, Sipah and
Kuki Khels that, if they wished to come in, they must hurry up. A man who was sent in by the Kuki Khel with these jirgas to enquire what they were to do, was sent back with a verbal message referring them to Sir William Lockhart's last proclamation, summoning all jirgas to hear the terms of Government.

Maidan;  
*The 9th November 1897.*  
(Sd.) R. Warburton, Colonel,  
Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.  
(Sd.) R. Udny,  
Chief Political Officer,  
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 35 P. and 36 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 10th November 1897.  
Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, and Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4757-4758 F., dated Simla, the 19th November 1897 (Confidential).  
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,  
To—The Military Department,  
The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 35-M, dated the 11th November 1897.

No. 723.

Telegram P., dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,

To—The Secretary of State, London.

Jirgas of all Samil Orakzai and Feroz Khel Daulatzais, also Akhels in response to General Lockhart's summons arrived in camp on the 6th, the Malikdin, Kambar and Tirah Adam Khel jirgas arrived on the 9th, the Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas are expected very shortly. The Zakka Khel and Aka Khel still holding aloof, the former are distinctly hostile.

No. 4561-F.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department for information.

No. 724.

Telegram No. 344-F., dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Lahore,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Following telegram from Commissioner, Peshawar, repeated:—Lieutenant-Governor concurs in Commissioner's opinion:—Begins 107. Telegram 248 from Officer, Special Duty, Kurram. I recommend that to the terms to Massuzai and Chamkannis already proposed, the surrender of the 35 rifles captured from Kapurthala Infantry be added. To Punjab; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; and Officer, Special Duty, Kurram.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4592-4693-F., dated Simla, the 12th November 1897. (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Military Department.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 42, dated the 8th November 1897.

Telegram from the Government of Punjab, No. 344-F., dated the 11th November 1897.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 725.

Telegram No. 4568-F., dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.

4568-F. Your telegrams 29 and 30 of the 5th and 34 of 6th November. As to occupation see my 4458 of the 5th which crossed yours. As to other points raised—

1. Do you propose to require the tribes to maintain the roads into Maidan of which you recommend the construction, or is your recommendation that S F—604-854—Feb.
they be merely made and left? In the former case, even if admissible at all after the decision that there is to be no permanent occupation, which is doubtful, it would be difficult, in the same way as in the matter of tribute, to keep the tribes to their engagement, and fresh complications would revive. In the latter case the roads will soon fall into disrepair, even if not wilfully destroyed, and the Government of India think the expense of making them would be thrown away, but you will doubtless go on making any roads which are of use to the expedition, as you have already made the one from Shinawari.

2. The Government of India do not wish to tie their own hands by explicitly saying that the force will stop in the Orakzai and Afridi country till our terms are complied with, but there would be no objection to your saying that, while we do not want their country and will be glad to leave it, the tribes will be the worse off if they force us to stay or to return.

3. In leaving you discretion in the matter of the number of rifles to be demanded, the expectation was that you would be able to increase the demand. We desire to carry out disarmament as fully as possible, but we rely on your judgment, and if you are satisfied you cannot get more, you may reduce the demand for rifles as proposed.

4. Compensation for buildings may be reserved for settlement with reconstruction of tribal relations, the tribes being informed in the way you propose, so long as it is clearly brought home to them that the destruction of the Khyber post in violation of their agreements entitles us to demand their restitution.

Nos. 4569-4571-F. (Confidential).

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch, and Government of the Punjab, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the (Government of India in the) Foreign Department, Nos. 4510-4512-F., dated the 8th November 1897.

No. 726.

Telegram No. 1317-T., dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Continuation my 1291-T. Please note that Lieutenant G. E. G. Cameron, Gordons, is only slightly wounded and doing well, not severely. Second Brigade under Brigadier-General Gaselee with two Mountain Batteries and one Sapper Company proceeded this morning to Saran Sar, returning about 16 o'clock; I accompanied Brigade. Object was to complete survey, bring in forage and destroy defences of such Zakha Khel villages as could be reached; object satisfactorily accomplished, defences of about 40 villages being destroyed. Casualties on our side: slightly wounded, 2nd Lieutenant Wright, Queen's; killed one Private, Queen's; slightly wounded, one sepoy, Ist-3rd Gurkhas. Enemy's loss reported as considerable, at least 12 of enemy being killed and 30 wounded by rifle fire, and artillery fire being also effective. Three bodies, presumably of Northamptons killed on 9th, brought in, also one. Lee-Metford rifle. Large amount of forage was brought into camp. Addressed and repeated in accordance with the instructions on the subject.

No. 727.

Telegram No. 1142-C., dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinawari, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. The water picquet of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, south-west of Karappa camp, was fired on at about 7-15 a.m. on 10th from opposite side of
Afírdi-Orakzai Expedition.

FEBRUARY 1898.

Khaní; about fifteen or twenty shots fired. No casualties. Colonel Sturt, with 200 rifles, 2nd Punjab Infantry, two guns, Kashmir battery, and some lances, 18th Bengal Lancers, went out and destroyed the defences of the village in vicinity of which firing had taken place. Village found deserted and troops returned at noon: all well. Telegraph wire again cut between Mastura and Maidan last night. Except as above, all quiet on line of communications. Addressed and repeated as ordered in directions on the subject.

No. 728.

Telegram No. 46, dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Political. The jirgas of all the Gar sections of the Orakzais have arrived in camp today, including the Massuzai of the Kurram border. All sections of the Orakzais have, therefore, responded to my summons to hear the terms of Government, which it is now essential that I should announce to them without delay, but I cannot do so till I receive a reply to my clear the line telegram 3d of 6th instant, asking for authority to announce that we shall continue to occupy country till our demands are satisfied and requesting sanction for reduction in number of rifles to be surrendered. This reply is, therefore, most urgently required.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4594-4595-F., dated Simla, the 12th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 729.

Telegram No. 1291-T., dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Foraging party from 3rd Brigade went out yesterday west of camp. Our casualties—Gordons, severely wounded Lieutenant G. E. G. Cameron; dangerously wounded two men. Last night quiet night. Squadron 18th Bengal Lancers arrived in Camp Maidan this morning. Telegraph line cut last night. Addressed and repeated as usual.

No. 730.

Telegram No. 0.-144 dated the 11th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Massuzai-Chamkanni lashkar still remains in Khurmana Darra between Janikot and Khazina. They have made arrangements for food to be
brought to them, in order that they may be prepared to oppose any sudden advance. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.

No. 731.
No. 416-T.I., dated Simla, the 11th November 1897.

Endorsed by Military Department.

Copy forwarded to the Foreign Department for information.

No. 732.
Memorandum from the Adjutant-General in India, No. 2052-F., dated the 8th November 1897.

The following is submitted for the information of the Government of India in the Military Department:

No. 733.
Memo. No. 625-T., dated Camp Rawalpindi, the 1st November 1897.

From—The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab,
To—The Adjutant-General in India.

The following is forwarded for information, in continuation of Punjab Command telegram No. 583-T., dated the 30th October 1897:

No. 734.
No. 420, dated the 27th October 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding at Hari Singh,
To—The Assistant Adjutant-General, Peshawar District.

I have the honour to report that at 3 A.M. the picquet, which consists of 10 men of the 8th Bengal Infantry, on the ridge to the north of this camp, was attacked. About a dozen men crept in rear of the picquet between it and the camp. The sentry on the picquet challenged and was immediately shot down. The picquet sprang to their feet when a volley was fired into them, killing one man and wounding another. The attackers then rushed through the picquet, carrying off 4 Martini-Henry rifles and 70 rounds ammunition, 1 bayonet, 1 set of belts. The picquet was immediately reinforced by the support led by Jemadar Ram Sarikhan Singh of the 8th Punjab Infantry, who, I consider, behaved extremely well; they drove off the attackers who were struggling with the picquet. The enemy continued to fire single rounds on the picquet and one more man was wounded, but on two or three volleys being fired at them they dispersed. Some empty Snider cartridge cases have since been picked up where they were firing, and also a packet of Snider ammunition.

The casualties were—

No. 244, Naick Baijnath Singh, killed.
" 713, Sepoy Ramnarayan Singh II, severely wounded.
" 728 " Gagrup Singh
" 920 " Mahbir Singh II }, dangerously wounded.

Enemy's casualties, if any, unknown.

No. 735.
Memo. No. 5930, dated Peshawar, the 29th October 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Peshawar District,
To—The Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

Forwarded for information. This attack was a very bold thing—the men crept round between two picquets and tried to rush the picquet from the rear.
where a ramp led up into the entrenchment made for a field gun. The attackers evidently calculated on being mistaken for a patrol and also on not being fired on, as the fire of the picquet would have gone into camp.

The picquet was in a breastwork and had wire entanglement in front. I have since heard that the raiding party is led by a noted outlaw from our territory, one Shakkar of Hazarnao. As it is quite possible that people from our own villages have been in collusion with the raiders—without which one cannot account for their intimate knowledge of the ground and dispositions—the Commissioner has ordered village picquets to be placed round Hari Singh. The night was pitch dark.
No. 1678, dated Lahore, the 11th November 1897.

From—L. W. Dane, Esq., Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, No. 3305 P., dated 23rd October 1897, and enclosure, being the diary of Captain Barton, Political Officer attached to the Peshawar Column of the Tirah Expeditionary Force, and to add that apparently this diary should have been forwarded to the Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, for transmission through General Officer Commanding, to the Government of India, and not to the Commissioner, Peshawar.

No. 3306 P., dated Peshawar, the 23rd October 1897.

From—The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To—The Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I have the honour to forward, in original, the Political Diary, dated 22nd instant, received this morning from the Political Officer, Peshawar Column of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Political Diary No. 146, Peshawar Column, Tirah Field Force, Bara, Friday, the 22nd October 1897.

A lashkar of 500 Afridis of Bara is said to be collected above Gandao and at Shin Kamar. About 200 men were seen near Gandao by some officers of the force this morning.

2. A sowar of the 9th Bengal Lancers, named Faiz Muhammad, who was captured in the attack on the reconnaissance party on the 18th instant, returned to camp to-day. He had been taken some distance up the Bara river, to be brought before Mulla Saiyid Akbar. The Mulla, however, had gone to Samana, so the sowar was brought back to Barki; Yakut Khan, an uncle of Suyab Khan, Orakzai, living at Barki, sent the sowar under escort to Khwaja Khidar near Matanni where he was released.

3. An informer states that Lalbaz, Paindai Zakha Khel, living at China in Bazar, has three horses of the 9th Bengal Lancers, and also Lance Duffadar Khawas who was taken on the 18th instant. It is said that Lalbaz who is a relation of Havildar Saiyid Amir, Khyber Rifles, who is in the political jail at Peshawar, wishes to exchange the Lance Duffadar for Havildar Saiyid Amir. This Havildar was imprisoned by the Political Officer, Khyber, because sepoy Serbaz, a relation of his, deserted from Fort Maude on the 23rd of August 1897 with his rifle.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4667·4668-F., dated Simla, the 16th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. 21-P. and 22-P., dated the 6th November 1897.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. 23-P. and 24-P., dated the 6th November 1897.

From the Punjab Government, No. 1678, dated the 11th November 1897, and enclosures.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
Political Diary No. XXIV of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

9th November 1897.—1. This morning I accompanied Sir William Lockhart and staff on a reconnaissance in force to the Sarau Sal' Pass. This pass (800 feet) is situated some 4 miles from camp in a north-easterly direction. The path leading up the pass was steep, though fairly easy, and could be made into a good road without much trouble.

The enemy offered a feeble resistance, and the pass was occupied without much difficulty. Following their usual tactics, however, the enemy pressed our rear guard with the result that our casualties amounted to some 60 in killed and wounded, including 5 officers. This number includes an officer and 14 men of the Northamptons, who were reported missing. The enemy, many of whom were armed with Lee-Metfords, were most probably all Zakha Khels.*

Their loss cannot be estimated, but was probably considerable, as the batteries made excellent practice and a body of about 200 came within 150 yards of a company of the Northamptons, who are reported to have accounted for a good many. I saw three bodies myself as I went up the pass which the enemy had not had time to carry away. There was a magnificent view from the summit of the pass taking in the lofty peak of Tirich Mir and the mountains of Kafiristan. Several intervening ranges cut off the view from the Bara valley, which, however, could not be more than 5 or 6 miles distant.† A little distance below the Kotal was seen the celebrated village of Sandapal, which for so long remained a bone of contention between the Aka Khel and Sipah clans.

From 40 to 50 Zakha Khel forts were destroyed during our advance. In one, a Mulla's house near the Zakha Khel Ziarat, were found the quoit and blood besmeared hair of a Sikh, doubtless a trophy from Saragarhi. The villages visited to-day were mostly those of the Khasrogi sub-section of the Zakha Khels, who take rank next to the Ziauddins as robbers and raiders.

No foraging parties were sent out to-day to the west of the valley.

The wire was again cut last night beyond Karappa.

2. The jirgas of the Malikdín, Kambar and Kalla Khel Afridis came in to-day, and those of the Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah are expected shortly.

The Zakha Khels and Aka Khels at present show no signs of submission. The former have collected such a quantity of valuable loot in rifles, ammunition, mules, &c., that they must be very loath to part with it, and they know that the restoration of all stolen property is sure to be one of the terms of submission.

3. Subadar-Major Ghulam Sadik Khan returned from Mastura camp this morning. He reports that the party opposed to us near the Arhanga Pass on the 8th instant, consisted principally of Ali Khel Orakzais and Zakha Khel Afridis, though a few Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel Afridis, and one or two Sturi Khel Orakzais were also included among the enemy.

He saw three wounded men and three corpses. Of the wounded, one, said he, was a Sturi Khel, and another confessed to being a Malikdin Khel Afridi. The third was speechless, but appeared to be an Afridi. Of the dead bodies one was an Afridi, while the other two were Orakzais, probably Ali Khels.

4. (a) The families of the Afridi clans who took refuge in Margha and Shahzada Sultan Jan's Diary. Rajgal are said to travel back and forwards without fear to Koh-i-zangi, the range between the Malikdin Khel and Ali Khel territories.
(b) The Ali Khel and Mamozai declare their willingness to pay a fine to be assessed at the rate of Rs. 25 per household. It is not known if they are disposed to give up any rifles.

(c) The Zakha Khels thought we would not advance beyond the Khanki and that peace would be made there. They have no idea of paying a fine or giving up rifles. They imagined that they would be included in the general settlement with the tribes.

_CAMP MAIDAN;_  
_The 10th November 1897._  

(Sd.) L. W. King,  
_Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff,_  
_Tirah Expeditionary Force._

Forwarded to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Sd.) R. Udny,  
_Choice Political Officer._

_No. 37 P. and 38 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 11th November 1897._  
Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded for the information of the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, and Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, in continuation of this office endorsements Nos. 35 P. and 36 P. of the 10th instant.
Political Diary, No. XXV, of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

10th November 1897.—(1) Two parties went out this morning—one to the west of the valley for foraging purposes, and another to the east to recover the bodies of the officers and men of the Northamptons who had been reported missing.

In the former we had three casualties, viz., two men of the Gordons mortally wounded, and one officer wounded severely. The latter party succeeded in recovering the bodies of two officers and most of the men without any loss.

(2) A Mamozai and an Alisherzai came in this evening with the news that the jirgas of the Ali Khels, Mamozais, Alisherzais and Massozais (Gar Orakzaizs) had arrived at the Adam Khel Kandau, not far from camp, and might be expected to-morrow.

They, however, asked that an officer might be sent out to meet them and ensure their safe entry into camp. The men were assured that the jirgas might come in without fear, and that if necessary Subadar-Major Ghulam Sadik Khan would be sent out a short way from camp to meet them. It was at the same time arranged that the military picquet would be taken off the two Garhis assigned to the Orakzai jirgas for their residence, as they seemed to chafe under the restraint. The picquet in the Garhi immediately above these, however, was maintained, as it was thought advisable to maintain a watch over them, besides being necessary for military purposes. The messenger above referred to brought in letters from the Gar jirga, from Daulat Khan, son of the Mamozai Malik Arsalla Khan, and from Saiyid Muhammad, a pensioned Jemadar of the 26th Punjab Infantry. In the first, the Gar jirga state that they have arrived in Tirah in Adam Khel limits, and request that Mr. Donald or Subadar-Major Ghulam Sadik Khan may be sent to re-assure them and afford them safe conduct into camp. In the second, Daulat Khan declares his willingness to render service to Government.

It is significant that Painda Khan and the son of Arsalla Khan, the two chief Maliks of the Mamozai clan, are accompanying the jirga.

In the third letter which is addressed to Sir William Lockhart, Saiyid Muhammad says that he will try to bring his tribe to terms, and asks that favour may be shown to his own family as well as to Subadar Azimulla and Jemadar Shuaib of the 40th Pathans, and Subadar Muhammad Afzal of the 26th Punjab Infantry, whose villages are situated in the Mamozai country.

In conclusion he recounts his own services, and states that he has incurred the hatred of both Afridis and Orakzaizs by his devotion to Government, and that the reports current in regard to the disloyalty of Subadars Abdulla Khan and Azimulla Khan are quite false.

(3) Another wounded man as well as two bodies have since been found near the Arhanga. These belonged to the party of the enemy who were surprised by a Gurkha picquet near the pass on the 8th instant. The wounded man states that the enemy numbered 300, and that their intention was to attack a convoy on its passage across the pass.

Mr. Donald's Diary.

* Tabei is in Khani Khel Chamkani, not Massuazi limits. Enquiry has been made by telegraph from the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram about the truth of this report which seems to me doubtful.

(Sd.) R. UNNY, Chief Political Officer.

(4) Information has been received that Chikkai has sold Chinara for Rs. 30,000, and has retired to Tabbi * in the Massuazi country. The reason for this proceeding is not clearly understood.

CAMP MAIDAN;

The 11th November 1897.

(Sd.) L. W. KING, Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.
Bara valley, do you mean a plan of operations by which you would hold posts in the Mastura, Bara and Bazar valleys, and re-open the Khyber route occupying the posts there throughout the winter? If so, the Government of India will have to apply to the Secretary of State, and obtain his sanction before they can authorise this scheme. It was contemplated that if settlement was effected the troops would be withdrawn from tribal limits, and it is most desirable that if you see cause for modification of these anticipations, you should communicate detailed scheme without delay. What the Government of India desire is not to create a situation which might compel return of the forces. The Government of India leave the matter of rifles to your discretion, and please telegraph the exact terms in which you make announcement to tribes.

Copy, together with a copy of the telegram to which it is a reply, is forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Government of the Punjab, for information.

No. 744.

Telegram No. 78-L.P., dated the 12th November 1897.

From—General Hammond, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bara,
To—The Adjutant General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. The small lashkar reported at Praikrai and Barwan on 6th is said to have dispersed. Health of troops good. Addressed and repeated as laid down in instructions on subject.

No. 745.

Telegram No. 257, dated the 12th November 1897.

From—the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

To Commissioner. Daily. Afridi Khan reports that Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar has been steadily increasing in Khurmana Darra since seventh and now numbers five thousand. I do not think there can be more than three thousand at outside. Massuzais executed a Massuzai called Wazir who used to supply information. Totang Alisherzais brought in bodies of three men of Kapurthals killed on seventh. Repeated Foreign; Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

No. 4602-4603-F., dated Simla, the 13th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Military Department and Intelligence Kurram, No. 257, dated the 12th November 1897. Branch for information.

No. 746.

Telegram No. 0-147, dated the 12th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Enemy still remains near Janikot. Jirga was held by them to decide on action to be taken, but no decision arrived at. About one-third of
lashkar is composed of Kuki Khel and Kambar Khel Afridi hamsayas of the Massuzai. From information received, it appears that enemy on seventh were watching approaches via Abasikur Pass, expecting force to advance by that route, hence unguarded state of defile on that date. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.

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No. 747.

Telegram No. 49, dated the 12th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Political. To-day I received the complete jirga of the Orakzai tribe, numbering one hundred men, and announced to them the terms of Government, allowing them a fortnight for compliance; but, under the discretion allowed me, I reduce the demand for breech-loading rifles to five hundred. Their only reply in Darbar was that the burden put upon them should be one that they could bear, with special reference to the number of breech-loaders demanded, which they asserted to be more than they possessed, but they were told that this was a point upon which I could listen to no petition, and that the terms were final to take or leave as they liked. As the jirgas were leaving Darbar, they further begged that the rifles and money-fine might be apportioned among their various sections, as they said they should be unable to apportion the shares themselves, but subsequently after King and Donald had talked to the jirgas and suggested to them that the Gar and Samil factions should divide all demands between them equally half and half, the Maliks accepted this suggestion and undertook to make the further internal distribution without assistance from us. The Gar jirgas then left camp for their homes and the Samil follow to-morrow. The jirga of the Aka Khel Afridi clan came in this morning and disclaimed any share in opposing my reconnaissances to the Saran Sar. I am sending a brigade to-morrow over the Tseri Kandau Pass to visit the Waran valley, in which their settlements are situated, and Colonel Warburton accompanies as Political Officer, taking part of the Aka Khel jirga with him, while the rest of this jirga stays in my camp here. The first settlements met with after crossing the Tseri Kandau belong to the Ziauddin section of the Zakha Khel, and these I have ordered to be destroyed, but the settlement of the Aka Khel further on will be left unharmed, provided the troops are unmolested while in their country, and this has been clearly explained to the Aka Khel jirga. The enemy, who opposed my reconnaissance of yesterday to the Saran Sar, were as before Zakha Khel, assisted by Sipahs and Kamarais who live on the further side of this range, and some twenty or thirty more forts of the Zakha Khel at the foot of the bills on this side were burned, after we had emptied them of grain and fodder. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab and Commissioner, Peshawar.
N. W. F.
D. No. 1864 F.

No. 5 C., dated Camp, the 12th November 1897.

From—L. W. Dane, Esq., Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed by the Lieutenant-Governor to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted, explaining the circumstances under which the Sipayah jirga came to be summoned by the Political Officer, Khyber.

Punjab Government letter No. 1540, dated the 18th October 1897, and enclosure.
Commissioner, Peshawar's letter No. 3354 Pol., dated the 27th October 1897, and enclosure.

No. 1540, dated the 18th October 1897.

From—The Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,
To—The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

I am directed to invite attention to paragraph 28 of the Khyber Political Diary for the period from 14th to 21st September 1897, and to enquire why the Sipayah jirga was summoned by the Political Officer, Khyber, if as it is understood, their tribe was implicated in the recent disturbances.

Extract, paragraph 28, from the Khyber Political Diary for the period from 14th to 21st September 1897.

28. A Sipayah jirga, which was summoned to make arrangements for the construction of a new road between Jamrud and the Bara fort, and of a border road along the boundary between the British and independent territories, called on me to-day. After understanding the instructions given them, the jirga stated as follows:—

About eight days ago 5 European officers, 19 cavalry sowars and one sowar of the Border Military Police of Peshawar came towards Alam Guzar from the Bara fort, and, as they reached the former place, they expressed their intention of going further. We told them not to do so, but they said that they were to go up to 5 miles as they had been so ordered. Saying this they proceeded further and went as far as Shin Kamar in the limits of the Ziauddin Zakha Khels. As they returned and reached Barakai, Malik Sanjab and Yakub, Orakzai, received them amicably. The 5 officers went into Barakai with the Border Military Police sowars, while the cavalry sowars went off from Shin Kamar towards the Bara fort. The officers then started from Barakai in this direction, and, as they got near the shrine of Shahids, half a mile from Barakai, shots were fired on them. A horse of one of the officers, which belonged to the Border Military Police, was hit and fell (on the ground) and died. The officer who was mounted on it also fell. He mounted again on the horse of the Border Military Police sowar and proceeded towards the Bara fort. It is not certain who fired the shots, but it is said that they were fired by Jani, son of Yakub, Ustar Khel Orakzai, and his companions. Some people say that the shots were fired by Yakub's enemies, and that his name is mentioned with a view to "badnami" him. Whenever one or two officers go out further than Alam Guzar to take the air, we tell them not to go further, but they do not listen to us.
No. 3354 Pol., dated the 27th October 1897.

From—The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To—The Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

In reply to your letter No. 1540, dated 18th instant, I have the honour to forward copy of a letter No. 692, dated 24th idem, from the Political Officer, Khyber, explaining how the Sipayah jirga came to be summoned by him.

No. 692, dated the 24th October 1897.

From—The Political Officer, Khyber Pass,
To—The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division.

With reference to your No. 330 P., dated the 22nd instant, forwarding copy of Punjab Government letter No. 1540, dated the 18th October 1897, to your address, I have the honour to report that, on the 18th September 1897, a jirga of the Udredun Sipahs of Jhugudr was summoned by me to confer in connection with the construction of the new road from Fort Bara to Speir Sang. The Udredun Sipahs of Jhugudr have so far remained friendly and taken no part in the recent hostile demonstrations against the British Government, and are, therefore, regarded on the same footing as the Udredun Kuki Khels of Jam, Kadam and Lachora, &c., the villages in the neighbourhood of the Jamrud fort.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4702-4704-F, dated Simla, the 17th November 1897.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Military Department, and Intelligence Branch, for information.
Political Diary No. XXVI of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

11th November 1897.—(1) A reconnaissance in force, which Sir William Lockhart accompanied, again started this morning for the Saran Sar Pass.

The survey work was completed, and three more bodies of the missing men of the Northampton Regiment were recovered.

Our casualties were only one killed and two wounded (including an officer), while the enemy’s loss could not have been under 30 or 40. A quantity of fodder was brought into camp, and some 20 or 30 more of the Zakha Khel forts destroyed.

(2) In the evening the jirgas of the Gar Orakzai clans, Ali Khels, Mamozaids, Alisherzais and Massozais came into camp. These jirgas seem fairly representative of the sections concerned. Malik Paindah Khan and Daulat Khan, the son of Malik Arsalla, Mamozaid, however, turned back from the Adam Khel Kandao on some pretext or other. They are sufficiently represented, however, in the jirga by their relations.

The terms will probably be announced to the Orakzai jirga to-morrow.

(3) Chikkai is said to have sent all his household property into the Massozai country, but has not yet succeeded in securing a purchaser for Chinarak.*

Shahzada Sultan Jan's Diary.

His anxiety to abandon Chinarak is said to be due to the fear that, if his enemies, the Alisherzais, make peace with Government, his position will be a precarious one. He is also afraid that Afridi Khan, Naib Hakim of Kurram, may work him some harm.

CAMP MAIDAN; { The 12th November 1897. }
(Sd) L. W. KING,
(Chief Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.

Forwarded to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Sd.) R. UDNY,
The 12th November 1897.
(Chief Political Officer,
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 41 P. and 42 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 12th November 1897.
Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, for information, in continuation of this office Nos. 39 P. and 40 P. of 11th instant.

* A telegram received to-day from the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram (in reply to my enquiry of yesterday) discredits the report that Chikkai has removed any of his property from the Zeinushit country, or that he has any serious intention of disposing of his Chinarak lands, but he is no doubt on bad terms with Afridi Khan, who is, therefore, not employed for communicating with him, and it is believed that the Mullahs in Tirah have been trying to frighten him with tales of Government intending to annex his country.

(Sd.) R. UDNY.
OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4765-4766-F., dated Simla, the 20th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—{The Military Department,
The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expediency Force, Nos. 37-P., 38-P., 39-P., and 40-P., dated the 11th November 1897, and Nos. 41-P. and 42-P., dated the 12th November 1897.
FEBRUARY 1898.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition

No. 754.  
Telegram No 50, dated the 15th November 1897.  
From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,  
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Your 4587-F. of 12th November. It seems to me there are two alternatives to be kept in view—either the Afridis may submit to the terms of punishment imposed by Government within a reasonable period or they may not. In the latter contingency the question arises of enforcing the terms, and in either case it has to be considered how the transport animals with the main column are to be fed. The cultivated area in the Maidan and Upper Mastura valleys is restricted, and cannot provide an unlimited supply of forage for some fifteen thousand mules, ponies and donkeys. These animals can be fed on compressed forage so long as cart communication exists with the advanced depot; they can, therefore, be fed at Shinawari or at some suitable point in advance of Bara Fort up to which a cart-road might be constructed. At Shinawari we should cease to bring pressure to bear on the Afridis, but in the Lower Bara valley we should continue to bring strong pressure to bear on them, and should be in a position to organize flying columns to visit the Rajgal and Bazar valleys. There is, of course, the alternative of halting in Maidan and sending back the transport animals to Shinawari, but a stationary force without adequate shelter in such a climate as that of Maidan during the winter would not be in a satisfactory position, and the force would probably suffer severely without being able to coerce the tribes. So far as I can judge, the supplies of forage in Maidan and Upper Mastura will not last much longer than a fortnight from the present date, say, to the end of November. It appears to me that the proper course is to arrange for moving the force from Maidan and Mastura early in December to some point within easy reach of Bara fort. At this point we should remain masters of the situation, as the Afridis themselves must descend during the winter to their winter settlements or suffer heavily from exposure. If they comply with the demands of Government, we can withdraw from tribal limits; if they refuse to comply, coercive measures can be continued with a minimum of hardship and risk to our own troops. I may add that, though compressed forage has been collected at Shinawari, and might be brought to Maidan by camel transport, some five thousand additional camels would be needed for the purpose. These camels would themselves have to be fed owing to the absence of grazing beyond Karappa, and besides this, should snow fall, camels could not cross the Sanpagha and Arhanga Passes. It should also be remembered that, from a point near Bara Fort, the Lower Mastura valley is easily accessible, and that therefore we should dominate therefrom the Orakzaiz as well as the Afridis. As regards roads I understand the decision of Government to be that no permanent roads are to be made except such as may be indispensable for the prosecution of the present military operations. Under the foregoing proposals, the only road contemplated is a short cart-road from Bara fort to the advanced depot indicated above. The occupation of the Khyber by our troops appears to me to be a separate question the desirability of which must be decided by Government in connection with the general question of our future relations with the Afridis. The base for such an operation would be Jamrud. Sir R. Udy fully concurs in the above. With reference to the last sentence of your telegram under reply, please see my 49 of yesterday. With the exception of the reduction in the number of rifles demanded, the terms announced were exactly those laid down in your letter 3805 of 4th October.

OFFICE MEMORANDA AND ENDORSEMENT.

Nos. 4605-4609-F., dated Simla, the 13th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

The Military Department.

The Government of the Punjab.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government for information.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. 49 and 50, dated the 12th and 15th November 1897, respectively.

S F—601-554—Feb.
No. 755.

Telegram No. 4609-F., dated the 13th November 1897.
From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.

Government of India agree generally with Punjab Government letter No. 1656, November 8th, regarding Massuzais and Chamkannis, of which copy was sent you direct, and think it would be desirable to deal with these tribes without delay, but await your views and any proposals you wish to make. Any terms should now, of course, include restoration of all arms taken from Kapurthala Infantry on 7th.

Nos. 4610-4611-F.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign, Department, Nos. 4592-4593-F., dated the 12th November 1897.

No. 4612-F.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, for information, with reference to its telegram No. 344-F., dated the 11th November 1897.

No. 756.

Telegram No. 262, dated the 13th November 1897.
From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Chikkai has received messages from Tirah that orders have been given for his arrest. He held jirga at Chinarak yesterday of Koedad Khel and Wattizai Zaimushts and offered to sell Chinarak. Koedad Khels offered to buy, but Wattizai strongly opposed sale. Koedad Khel jirga left, but Wattizai are still there. I think Chikkai's offer to sell Chinarak is partly made with a view of drawing from me a definite statement of the intentions of Government regarding him. I shall be able to wire more fully to morrow, as Said Shah went to Chinarak to-day. Can you make Usman Khan use his influence with Koedad Khel to prevent their buying Chinarak? Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Foreign and Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4630-4631-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.
To—The Military Department,
The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 262, dated the 13th November 1897. Branch for information.

No. 757.

Telegram No. 263, dated the 18th November 1897.
From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. All quiet Kurram. Massuzai Chamkanni lashkar still at Janikot in Khurmana Darra. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Foreign; Punjab; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command; and Deputy Commissioner, Kohat.
OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4642-4643-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the
Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Military Department and Intelligence
Kurram, No. 265, dated the 13th November 1897. Branch for information.

No. 758.

Telegram No. B. 253, dated the 13th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. For political reasons all survey operations have ceased. Lashkar in Khurmana Darra reported largely increased in numbers through refugees from Tirah having joined it. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten addresses as directed.

No. 759.

Telegram No. 51, dated the 13th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. Samil Orakzai jirgas left camp to-day after settling among themselves shares in which they propose to surrender rifles and to pay the money fine. No further news of Afridi jirgas. The brigade which started this morning for the Waran valley, appears to have crossed the Tseri Kandau Kotal without opposition, but no reports yet received. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; and Commissioner, Peshawar.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4640-4641-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the
Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 51, dated the 18th November 1897. Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 760.

Telegram No. 1870-T., dated the 13th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan
(through Mastura),
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. A foraging party from the second Brigade proceeded north of camp this morning and collected supplies without opposition. General Broad- bent and Major O'Sullivan, with an escort of half battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers, and number three Bombay Sappers and Sirmur Sappers, proceeded this morning to select the alignment of a road to Bagh; they were met by villagers of Malikdin and Kambar Khel, who were collecting fodder for our force. The casualties with General Westmacott's foraging party reported yesterday's daily were:—No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, one native driver killed. King's Own Scottish Borderers, severely wounded one; slightly wounded one. Picquet 2-4th Gurkhas, killed three men approaching camp for purpose of firing into it last night. The third Brigade under General
Kempster, with No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, 4th Bombay Sappers, 4th Madras Sappers and 36th Sikhs left for Waran at 6-30 this morning; Colonel Warburton accompanied as Political Officer. Up to seventeen o’clock to-day no opposition has been reported. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 761.

Telegram No. 1372-T., dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Brigadier-General Hart reports 19 o’clock on 13th that a foraging party, consisting of one field troop, 18th Bengal Lancers, one company each Devon, Derbys, and Jhind Infantry, and two companies, 2nd-1st Gurkhas; the whole under command of Major Smith-Dorrien, Derbyshire Regiment, were attacked close to camp by enemy estimated several hundred strong. Troops being well handled, repulsed enemy and brought in forage. Casualties—Captain Bowman, Derbyshire, severely, but not dangerously, wounded in back and arm; Major Money, 18th Bengal Lancers, slightly wounded. Devons, No. 4041, Private William Acland, severely, and No. 4174, Private Joseph Collins, slightly wounded. Jhind Infantry, one Havildar severely and one sepoy slightly wounded. Enemy’s loss stated to be heavy, but exact number of killed and wounded not known. Donald, Political Officer, has been sent to Mastura and will investigate cause of his attack, in which Ali Khels were probably implicated. Jirga of Gar Orakzais left Maidan evening 12th and seemed disposed submit to terms of Government. Addressed and repeated as in daily telegrams.

No. 762.

Telegram No. 1374-T., dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Brigadier-General Kempster reports from Waran, nine o’clock, 14th, that he reached camp near Sher Khel in map without opposition at fourteen o’clock yesterday, 13th. Valley open and full of villages; it stretches eastward five or six miles to foot of Tor Ghor range. Supplies being collected to-day from adjacent villages. House of Mulla Saiyid Akuar is being destroyed. Addressed and repeated as in case of daily telegram.

No. 763.

Telegram No. 1409-T., dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force Camp, Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Events of yesterday are given in my numbers 1372-T. and 1374-T. of to-day’s date. General Kempster reports he is sending a reconnaissance to-day to the east of his camp in Waran. Forage has been collected to-day without opposition in this valley, although villagers failed to supply anything like amount required; the balance had, therefore, to be requisitioned under the superintendence of a Political Officer. Brigadier-General Hart reports all wounded doing well. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 764.

Telegram No. 52, dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. Nothing new to-day. The Political Officer with the Peshawar Column reports that, according to information received from Tirah on his side,
the enemy opposed to us in the fighting on the Saran Sar consisted of Zakha Khel, Kamrai, Sipah and Aka Khel, who lost fifty-five killed and eighty wounded. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; Major Deane; and Commissioner, Derażat.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4638-4639-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—{The Military Department,
{The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 52, dated the 14th November 1897.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 765.

Telegram No. 117, dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,
To—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My 118 of to-day. By remaining firm during August and September, Chikkai has done us a signal service, for if he had risen it is certain that the line of communications to Kurram would have been closed and most probably Para Chinar would have been gravely threatened, not to mention other complications, if Chikkai using his great influence had drawn Jajis, Khostwals and other Afghan subjects into the movement. For this service he certainly merits a substantial recognition. Officer on Special Duty telegraphed yesterday that Chikkai may possibly have been slightly implicated in petty Khoedad Khel disturbances, but I doubt this myself strongly. Even if he was, I suggest that it is politic to ignore such slight participation in view of the serious results if Chikkai were now to rise and to threaten the line from Hangu to Sadda. I venture to strongly recommend that I may be authorised by telegram to instruct the Officer on Special Duty to inform Chikkai that he will be well rewarded for his conduct during August and September, and that Government is confident he will by further service complete the claim he has earned for a recognition of his merit. The matter is urgent as if he is wavering it will be a question of a day or two, and if it is desired to influence him for good our action must be taken at once. Addressed Punjab; repeated Foreign; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.

No. 766.

Telegram No. 4613-F., dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.

Commissioner, Peshawar’s telegram 117, November 13th. Do you support the recommendation that Chikkai be immediately informed that he will be rewarded for his services in August and September? Addressed General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and repeated to Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 766-787 Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4634-4635-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—\{ The Military Department.
\{ The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

Telegram from the Commissioner, Peshawar, No. 117, dated the 14th November 1897.

Telegram to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4613-F., dated the 14th November 1897.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 767.

Telegram No. 115, dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,

To—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 263. These messages from Tirah are intended by embroiling Chikkai with us to create trouble on the line of communications to Kurram and to cause consequent diversion of troops. If there is nothing clearly proved against Chikkai in the way of participation in the recent disturbances, do your best to re-assure him. I presume you are sure that Sayid Shah is thoroughly trustworthy. Remind Chikkai that for the past five years Government has not interfered with him, because he has acted according to the wishes of Government, and that there is no intention whatever of any change in the attitude of Government, if he on his part continues to observe the satisfactory line of conduct which he has hitherto followed. Tell him that his firmness during last August and September is fully appreciated, and that his best course is to remain at Chinarak and not to listen to enemies, who desire to rouse groundless fears and thus to ruin him. Tell him from me personally that he will remember that in 1892 I told him that he was taking a wise step in promising to act in conformity with the wishes and interests of Government, and that he has had five years of peace and prosperity in consequence of taking the advice I then gave him. My advice now to him is to stand fast and rely upon the good faith of the British Government, and upon its known ability and readiness to reward its friends and those who are loyal, and that if he is wise he will now again take my advice and see what will happen. I think it would not do to put pressure upon the Koedad Khel not to buy Chinarak, because it would tend to show to every one that we are apprehensive of the consequences of Chikkai’s selling Chinarak, and it would not be desirable to give rise to such an impression. I would resort to this measure only in the last instance and only if you can be sure that it and it alone will give Chikkai to Chinarak (sic). Addressed to Officer on Special Duty; repeated to Punjab; Foreign, and Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4632-4633-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—\{ The Military Department.
\{ The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
No. 768.

Telegram No. 265, dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 4613.* If you authorise me to give Chikkai my personal assurance that Government has no intention of interfering with him or with internal affairs of his tribe, and that his services to Government since August will eventually receive suitable recognition, I will answer for keeping him straight, addressed Foreign; repeated to Punjab; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; and Commissioner, Peshawar.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4655-4656-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 265, dated the 14th November 1897.

No. 769.

Telegram No. 15-C., dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your No. 4613-F., dated 14th. Having referred to the telegrams received from the Kurram and from Kohat during August and September last relating to Chikkai, Lieutenant-Governor is inclined to agree with Commissioner that he was faithful to his engagement, and that he deserves well of us for refusing to join any combination against us, but His Honour thinks Merk's friendly message, of which he approves, goes far enough at present, unless General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, specially desires to secure him. Addressed Foreign; repeated Commissioner and General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force; and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4655-4656-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to Telegram from the Punjab Government, No. 15-C., dated the 14th November 1897.

No. 770.

Telegram P., dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

On the 12th General Lockhart received complete Tirah-Orakzai jirgas and announced the Government terms as in the Foreign Secretary's letter to him of October the 4th, except that the demand for breech-loaders was reduced to 500. Even this number the jirga say is more than they possess, but they were told that this term was final. A fortnight has been allowed for compliance. The jirgas decided to divide demand equally between the Gar and Samil factions, and undertook to make further internal distribution without
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 770-771 Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

assistance from us. The Aka Khel jirga has now come in and disclaimed any share in opposing reconnaissance to Saran Sar.

No. 4618-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 4606-F., dated the 13th November 1897.

No. 771.

No. 47-P., dated the 14th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to the letter No. 1656, dated the 8th instant, from the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, to your address, of which a copy (together with copies of its enclosures) reached me direct from the Punjab Government yesterday, I have the honour to point out that the Orakzai jirgas received by me on the 12th instant included deputations from the Massuzai and Alisherzai sections, and that the terms of Government then announced for the whole of the Orakzai tribe, viz., restoration of all Government property, the surrender of 500 breech-loaders, the payment of a fine of Rs30,000, and the forfeiture of all allowances, included the punishment of these sections; but the apportionment of the terms was left to the tribesmen to arrange among themselves, the only assistance given them in this respect being a suggestion (which they accepted) that the Gar and Samil factions should each bear half. At the same time the jirgas were also told that whether they complied with the terms or not, I intended to visit every part of their country, but that, if they complied, I should do so in a friendly manner, whereas in the event of their non-compliance my visit would be a punitive one. As soon, therefore, as the fortnight's grace allowed to the Orakzais has expired on the 26th instant, but not before, as that might lead to complications which would imperil peaceable compliance with our terms, I propose to send a strong brigade from my camp in Maidan over the Lozakka Pass into the head of the Khurmana valley in co-operation with the Kurram Movable Column advancing from Sadda, and this brigade, after visiting the territory of the Massuzais and Chamkannis, would return to Maidan over the Minjan Kotal, through the Mamuzai country at the head of the Khanki valley, and over the Singakh Pass, if necessary visiting the Alisherzai country also on the way.

2. As we do not propose demanding tribute elsewhere, I would make no exception in the case of the Alisherzai, and I agree that the lands of the Badama village should not be made over to the Turis.

3. In the case of the Chamkannis (who not being Orakzais were not included in the terms announced to the latter) I agree in thinking that they should be called upon to pay a fine of 30 breech-loaders and Rs1,000 in cash or cattle, but in addition to this they must also be required to restore all Government property, as I understand that they obtained a large share of the 35 rifles taken from the Kapurthala Infantry, who were killed in the reconnaissance from Sadda on the 7th instant.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4868-4870-F., dated Simla, the 24th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government for information.
Political Diary, No. XXVII, of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

12th November 1897.—1. A foraging party was sent out this morning to the north-east of the valley and inter alia destroyed the remainder of the Zakha Khel forts in Maidan. Some 150 of these have now been reduced to ashes. A tower on the summit of a hill to the north of camp, from which the enemy’s sharp shooters have constantly harassed our foraging and reconnaissance parties, was also blown up by this force. Our casualties did not exceed five or six in killed and wounded, including two mule-drivers who had strayed away from the main body and were cut up by a party of the enemy.

The Gurkhas, however, succeeded in killing two of this party before they reached cover. Only a few shots were fired into camp early in the evening. The telegraph line was also not cut last night, which speaks well for the bona fides of the Orakzais.

2. Sir William Lockhart interviewed the complete Orakzai jirga at noon to-day, and at his request Sir Richard Udny explained the terms of submission to the assembled Maliks, the period of a fortnight being allowed for compliance. On leaving camp they declared their inability to sub-divide the fine and rifles among the separate clans. I was averse to helping them in this matter if it could be avoided, and so after a little difficulty the Gar clans agreed upon the distribution themselves without assistance from us, and left in the afternoon for their homes. It was settled that the fine would be distributed “by the hearth” and the rifles “by the Kandi.”

The Gar clans, especially the Mamuzai and Massuzai, seemed inclined to comply with the terms. The Ali Khels are the only tribe who seemed disposed to raise difficulties; but this is only natural as they are in possession of most of the loot. The Samil Khel clans expressed a wish to stay here for a night and discuss the question of distribution. They seemed ready to comply with the terms as soon as possible.

On the whole, the attitude of the Orakzai jirga appeared very satisfactory. The Massuzai, the largest and most powerful of the Gar clans, even went so far as to ask whether the stolen property should be brought in here or to Kurram. They also demanded an engagement from us that the Kurram Column would not advance into their country during the period of grace. They were told that any such movement was most unlikely, but, as it depended on military considerations, no promise could be given.

3. The Aka Khel jirga came in this morning, and its attitude seemed submissive. They disclaimed all connection with the fighting on the Saran Sar Pass, and declared that the enemy there on the 9th and 11th were the Zakha Khels assisted by Sipahs and Kamrais. An effort is being made to get the Kambar Khels and Malikdin Khels to bring in fodder to some appointed place on payment.

A few members of the jirgas of each of these clans have left to bring about some arrangement of this kind. They have been informed that, if they bring in the fodder, they will be paid for it at reasonable rates, that if we have to arrange for its transport no payment will be made, and that if our foraging parties are fired on, the forts concerned will be destroyed.

4. An informer reports that a couple of sepoys on escort duty were cut up the other day near Karappa by Yar Muhammad Khan, Sheikhan of Khanigarbur. No official intimation has been received of this outrage, but if it occurred Yar Muhammad was most probably the offender.

Mr. Donald’s Diary.
The rifles of the two murdered men are also reported to have been carried off by Yar Muhammad. This man, as he is the leader of a gang of scoundrels who have recently committed several outrages, has found an asylum with the Tirahi Khels at Dhappa, who should be held responsible for his acts.

Note.—I have directed Mr. Donald to send for the jirga of the Dhappa Tirahis and take steps to enforce responsibility in regard to Yar Muhammad.

(Sd.) L. W. KING.

sub-section of the Bar Muhammad

CAMP MAIDAN;

The 13th November 1897.

(Sd.) L. W. KING,

Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff.

Forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Sd.) R. UDNY,

Chief Political Officer,

Tirah Expeditionary Force.

The 14th November 1897.

Nos. 43 P. and 44 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 14th November 1897.

Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded, for information, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and the Chief Secretary to the Government, Punjab, in continuation of this office Nos. 41 P. and 42 P. of the 12th instant.
N.-W. F.
D. No. 1990 F.

Political Diary, No. XXVIII, of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

13th November 1897.—1. In the morning, General Kempster's brigade, accompanied by Colonel Warburton as Political Officer, marched over the Tseri Kandao into the Waran valley. The force encamped about two miles below the pass in the middle of the Akhel settlements. Colonel Warburton took some of the Aka Khel Maliks with him, and it was, probably, on this account that the advance of General Kempster's force was unopposed. A foraging party visited some Kambar Khel villages to the north of camp to-day, and returned with a considerable quantity of fodder. Some slight opposition was offered to this party by a body of Kambar Khels on the hills above the villages, but there were no casualties.

2. The Samil Khel and Daulatzai jirgas came to a satisfactory agreement this morning regarding the distribution of the fine and rifles and have left for their homes. The following was their mode of distribution:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Fine, Rs.</th>
<th>Rifles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akhels</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabia Khels</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malla Khels</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamozai Daradar</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadizais</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issa Khels</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishtis</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shekhanis</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firoz Khels</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sturi Khels</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utman Khels</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bizotis</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>41½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Six</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under this arrangement the fines amount to Rs. 2,500 per share, and the rifles to 41½.

3. Information has been received that a foraging party from the Mastura camp was attacked on retirement to-day by some hundreds of the enemy. There were several casualties on our side including two officers wounded. It is not yet known of what tribes the enemy's force was composed, but most probably they were Ali Khels. The Gar jirgas had not had time to get back to their homes and re-assure their tribesmen, and the latter may have become irritated by our foraging operations while the jirgas were in camp. In any case it is desirable to have a Political Officer attached to General Hart's brigade, and Mr. Donald has accordingly been ordered to proceed to the Mastura camp to-morrow.

**Camp Maidan;**  
The 14th November 1897  
(Sd.) L. W. King,  
Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff,  
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Forwarded to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

**The 14th November 1897.**  
(Sd.) R. Udny,  
Chief Political Officer,  
Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Nos. 45 P. and 46 P., dated Camp Maidan, the 14th November 1897.
Endorsed by General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Copies forwarded, for information, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, in continuation of this office Nos. 43 P. and 44 P. of 14th instant.
OFFICE MEMORANDA.
Nos. 4866-4867-P., dated Simla, the 24th November 1897 (Confidential).
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. 43-P. and 44-P., dated the 14th November 1897.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Nos. 45-P. and 46-P., dated the 14th November 1897.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
FEBRUARY 1898.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. S F 774-775

No. 774.

Telegram No. 267, dated the 15th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,

To—The Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Chikkai sent me in two letters last night, one in answer to mine of 7th referred to in my telegram 245, and one in answer to my messages through Said Shah who arrived at Chinarak, 13th instant. He says that, owing to fear that Government did not appreciate his services and might be inclined to listen to his enemies who would try to fix blame on him, he had decided to sell Chinarak, realize all his property and fly, but on receipt of my messages and advice he was re-assured and would remain in Chinarak. He says he holds me responsible for his safety and honour, as he has changed his mind at my request, and again says he wishes to see me. I have written him a friendly letter accepting the responsibility, and am going to Manduri to give him a chance of coming to see me there if he likes. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Foreign and Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4653-1554-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

To—The Military Department.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 775.

Telegram No. 53, dated the 15th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan.

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Your telegram 4613 of yesterday referring to Commissioner, Peshawar, 117 of 13th about Chikkai. I support the proposal made by Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, in his telegram 265 of yesterday to your address, that he should be authorized to give Chikkai his personal assurance that Government have no intention of interfering with him or with internal affairs of his tribe, and that his services to Government since August will eventually receive suitable recognition. Addressed Foreign; repeated Commissioner, Peshawar; and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4657-4659 P., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government for information.
No. 776.  
Telegram No. 121, dated the 15th November 1897.  
From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,  
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.  

Reference telegram from Punjab, 15-C. Chikkaik knows the difference between a personal message from an officer and an authoritative communication to him on behalf of Government. I venture to suggest that such a communication even if in general terms will go much further towards reassuring him than anything that I or the Officer on Special Duty can say in our personal capacity. My messages to him were intended to gain time pending the receipt of the orders of Government. I submit that it is important to secure him both on account of the safety of the road to Kurram, and because if he should rise and leave that road alone, yet his presence and prestige and undoubted military talent and ability for leading and combining clans might render him a formidable opponent in Tirah. I therefore recommend that we secure him as soon as possible. Addressed to Foreign; repeated to Punjab; General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force; and Officer on Special Duty.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.  
Nos. 4651-4652-F., dated Simla, the 15th November 1897 (Confidential).  
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,  
To—| The Military Department.  
| The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch  

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 777.  
Telegram No. 54, dated the 15th November 1897.  
From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,  
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.  

Clear the line. Reference letter 1656, dated 8th instant, from Punjab to your address, about punishment of Massuzais, Alisherzais and Chamkannis, of which, with enclosures, Punjab has sent me a copy direct. The punishment of the Massuzais and Alisherzais was included in the terms announced by me on 12th instant to the Orakzai jirgas, which included deputations from both these sections. At the same time the Orakzais were also told that whether they complied with these terms or not, I intended to visit every part of their country, but that, if they complied, I should do so in a friendly manner, whereas, in the event of their non-compliance, my visit would be a punitive one. On the 27th instant, therefore, that is, as soon as the fortnight’s grace allowed to the Orakzais for compliance has expired, I propose to move a strong brigade from here over the Lazakka Pass into the head of the Khurmana valley to visit the country of the Massuzais and Chamkannis in co-operation with Kurram Movable Column advancing from Sadda. The Massuzais have already received the terms, but I think that our demands upon the Chamkannis should also be announced without delay, so that, if necessary, this brigade may deal with both Massuzais and Chamkannis simultaneously. I agree that terms for Chamkannis should be as proposed by Commissioner, Peshawar, namely, surrender of thirty breech-loaders and one thousand rupees in cash or cattle, but in addition to this they must also be required to restore all Government property as I understand that they obtained a large share of the thirty-five rifles taken from the Kapurthala Infantry killed in the reconnaissance from Sadda on the 7th instant. Please authorize me to announce these terms to Chamkannis through Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, at once. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab.
FEBRUARY 1898.

Afridi-Orakzai: Expedition. S F 777-780

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4670-4671-F., dated Simla, the 16th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, To—The Military Department.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 54, dated the 15th November 1897.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 778.

Telegram No. 1438-T., dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Requisitioning parties, accompanied by a Political Officer, were sent out this morning to Kambar Khel and Malikdin villages, west of this camp, and brought in about twelve hundred maunds of fodder and twenty maunds of grain; tribal parties were seen watching our movement, but no opposition was shown. A few shots were fired at short range into this camp last night. General Kempster reports from Waran that he proceeded yesterday, with Gordons, Dorsets and two guns, down the valley about three miles eastwards. The inhabitants retired to tops of hills on north side of the valley, but offered no resistance; abundant fodder and about 180 maunds of grain were obtained. He continues foraging to-day under cover of a reconnaissance towards Shahkot which has to proceed down the valley some distance to the eastward before a turn can be made towards Shahkot. General Hart reports from Mastura that a foraging party yesterday proceeded west of Mastura and met with very slight opposition; there were no casualties on our side. Two of the enemy were killed and two wounded. The ground covered was the same as on the previous day, but the troops did not advance as far as on the 13th. I visited Mastura camp to-day and found everything in excellent order. A good mule and camel road has been completed between Mastura and Maidan; ample supplies of forage were being collected under arrangements with tribesmen which were being made by Mr. Donald, Political Officer, No. 1 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and A 13 British Field Hospital moved to Mastura to-day. Addressed and repeated in accordance with the instructions on the subject.

No. 779.

Telegram No. 55, dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan, To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. My clear the line 54 of the morning has crossed your telegram 4009-F. of 13th, which only reached me this evening, on the subject of punishment of Massuzais and Chamkannis.

No. 780.

Telegram No. B-158, dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Following message just received from Officer Commanding, Doaba:—

Begins. 38-D. Lambardar of Surzai reports having been questioned by Massuzai in Chikkai's village as to garrison of Doaba, and reports that Chikkai says that the Massuzai intend to attack shortly the post. I have sent him to
find out particulars and to let me know if there is any truth in the rumour. 

Ends.

I consider Doaba quite secure, fully provisioned and with plenty of ammunition. I am sending two field guns to Thal, with a squadron of 6th Bengal Cavalry. But Chikkai is to be relied on; expect him at Manduri to-morrow where Roos Keppel has gone to-day. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated ten other addresses as directed.

No. 781.

Telegram No. 271, dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Thal, Camp, Manduri,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Chikkai spent last night here and has just left for Chinarak. He is completely reassured, and pledges himself to keep his tribe in hand and offers to do any service that may be required of him. He brought about 25 elders of his tribe with him, and they said that they agreed to whatever he might decide. Before starting from Chinarak, he gave orders to his people that they were to plough and sow their lands, and sent word to the Koedâd Khel that he had definitely decided not to sell Chinarak. He said that but for my message through Saiyid Shah and Saiyid Shah’s taking oath that the message was genuine and offering to hand his son over to Chikkai as a hostage he would have gone, as he heard on every side that Government had decided to take his country and had given orders for his arrest. He asked me particularly to say that, if he could in any way be used as an intermediary in bringing about a settlement with the tribes, especially with the Mamozai and Alisherzai, who are his nearest neighbours, it would be of great assistance to him later, as all tribes are now bitterly hostile to him for not joining them, and if it could appear that he was instrumental in making peace, it would mitigate their hostility. I told him that Government had no intention of changing the arrangement regarding him which had been in force for the last five years and had no wish to interfere with his liberty, property, or with the internal affairs of his tribe, and that Government is always ready to recognise and reward good and loyal service. Repeated to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Foreign; and Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4693-4694-F., dated Simla, the 17th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 782.

Telegram No. 1485-T., dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. This camp was fired into last night at short ranges at intervals from 19-30 to 22 o’clock; prowlers firing from different directions. The 5th Gurkha scouts surprised them and drove them off, killing seven and wounding others. Our casualties were—Yorks, one Private severely wounded; in camp 5th Gurkhas, one scout killed. General Kempster yesterday marched eastwards of his camp in Waran about three miles, and completed destruction
of Saiyid Akbar's house; enemy collected on ridges to the north and fired on a flag of truce at close range, killing one and wounding another Gurkha, the return to camp was followed up by enemy. Our total casualties reported as one killed and two wounded. A wounded man of the enemy was captured, who proved to be an Aka Khel; he is stated to have been armed with a rifle of Kabul manufacture. The Survey Officer reports he completed work to the junction of the Mastura and Waran valleys. A broad road was seen leading up valley towards Matri Pass into Bara valley. A few volleys were fired into General Kempster's camp last night; the enemy were dispersed by our fire under light of star shells. Our casualties believed to be three wounded, Foraging parties, under General Westmacott, went out to west of camp to-day and brought in requisite quantity of forage from Malikdin and Kambar Khel villages; enemy at first seemed friendly, but soon began firing on troops in spite of arrangement with jirga; unless military precautions had been taken, our loss would have been heavy, enemy persistently followed troops back to camp suffering considerable loss from rifle and artillery fire. Our casualties— one killed and six wounded. Details will be given later. Brigadier-General Kempster's force have been engaged with enemy while returning here from Waran to-day, but up to hour of despatching this telegram, 17 o'clock, no report has been received, as he has not yet reached camp. Second Brigade, with Head-quarters and Divisional Troops, First Division, move to Bagh to-morrow morning. General attitude of tribes in this valley is becoming increasingly hostile, and this I ascribe to the near approach of winter, and their belief that we shall be obliged to leave Maidan without compelling them to submit to the terms of Government. I propose now to adopt stringent measures of coercion. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 783.

Telegram No. B.-161, dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Camp, Sadda,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. One section, 3rd Field Battery, Royal Artillery, arrived Sadda from Para Chinar en route to Thal. Officer Commanding, Doaba, wires that the tribe reported as likely to attack Doaba is the Mamuzais; to do this they would have to pass Shinawari and Kai which would make it unlikely. Following message just received from Captain Roos Keppel at Alizai:—Begins. Chikkai spent last night here and has now returned home; had a most satisfactory interview with him and he is quite re-assured. Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated ten other addresses as directed.

No. 784.

Telegram No. 57, dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. As jirgas of Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel had come into my camp in response to my proclamation of 4th November summoning Afridis to hear the terms of Government, I offered to pay a moderate price for fodder and other supplies taken out of the villages of these two clans in Maidan on understanding that, if our foraging parties were fired upon, no payment would be made and their forts would be destroyed. Yesterday and the day before, this arrangement was worked with good promise of success, but to-day it broke down completely, the troops being treacherously fired upon while collecting supplies and, though full amount of supplies required was brought in, firing continued throughout the operations and retirement was followed up by enemy. Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas still hold aloof, and Zakka Khel seem
irreconcilably hostile. As it is important that the terms of Government should be announced to Afridis as far as possible collectively and by word of mouth, I am awaiting to give out these terms until I move camp to Bajh and commence making the road through defile to Diva Toi in Bara Valley, but if this does not bring in Kuki Khel, Sipah and Kamrai jirgas in the course of the next five or six days, it will be necessary to announce the terms without further delay to the jirgas now in camp, namely, Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Adam Khel and Aka Khel, and to inform the jirgas of the other clans in writing. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; Major Deane, Malakand; and Commissioner, Derajat.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4696-4697-F., dated Simla, the 17th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—{The Military Department.
The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 785. Telegram No. 4685-F., dated the 16th November 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.

No. 4685-F. Your 53, November 15th. The Government of India approve of the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, giving Chikkai his personal assurance that Government have no intention of interfering with him or with internal affairs of his tribe, and that his services to Government since August will eventually receive suitable recognition; but if the Officer on Special Duty is fully assured that the incident may be regarded as closed, by what passed at his interview as reported in telegram No. 271 of the 16th November, no further promise need be given.

Addressed General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated Punjab Government; Commissioner, Peshawar; and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.

No. 786. Telegram No. 1507-T., dated the 17th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Daily. In returning from Waran afternoon 16th November, Brigadier-General Kempster’s column was attacked in force by enemy, probably Zakha Khels, on Saran Sar and nearer heights on north of road. All baggage had arrived in camp by 15-30 o’clock. 15th Sikhs covering rear were so hardly pressed from woods near Kotal about four miles from camp at 16 o’clock that Brigadier-General Kempster sent back at 16-30 o’clock the 36th Sikhs and two companies, Dorsets, to re-inforce them, and with the remaining troops halted and took up positions on northern ridges to cover retirement until light failed. On its becoming dusk, these latter troops proceeded to camp with but few casualties during the whole day, the remainder, mainly 16th and 36th Sikhs, and two companies, Dorsets, remaining out for the night: unfortunately one company of the Dorsets appears to have lost touch with the other company and with the Sikhs, and to have wandered into a nulla where it was attacked by the enemy in overwhelming numbers. As both companies were
sent by Brigadier-General Kempster close to the 36th Sikhs, this mistake is quite unaccountable. On night falling the two Sikh regiments were attacked by enemy in great force and at close quarters. The 15th Sikhs report having killed by rifle fire and the bayonet at least one hundred and wounded many more of the enemy. The 36th Sikhs and the one company, Dorsets, estimate that they killed and wounded at least fifty; the 1st-2nd Gurkhas accounted for twenty-five. The above is in addition to the losses inflicted by the Gordons, the remainder of the Dorsets and the two Mountain Batteries. I regret to say that our own losses were considerable: Dorsets, killed, two attached officers, Lieutenant G. Brooke, Suffolk Regiment, and Lieutenant R. E. A. Hales, East Yorks, ten men; wounded eight men. Gordons nil. Fifteenth Sikhs; killed, Lieutenant N. A. Lewarne, ten men; wounded three native officers, ten men; slightly wounded Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott. Thirty-sixth Sikhs; killed six men; wounded Captain Custance, Lieutenant Munn, seven men. 1st-2nd Gurkhas, killed, Lieutenant G. M. Wylie, three men; wounded four men. Number eight Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, nil. Number five, Bombay Mountain Battery, wounded slightly one gunner. No. 4 Madras Sappers, nil. No. 4 Bombay Sappers, nil. I had a force in readiness at 3 P.M. to advance from camp to assist Brigadier-General Kempster in the retirement of his column, but, as he considered the force at his disposal sufficient to protect itself, he did not apply for reinforcements. In this opinion, I think, he was justified, his brigade fully holding its own, and the loss among the Dorsets being mainly due to the straggling of the rear company. Detailed report by Brigadier-General Kempster will be submitted as soon as possible. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 787.

Telegram No. 4698-F., dated the 17th November 1897.
From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.

No. 4698-F. Your telegrams 54 and 55, November 15th. You are authorized to announce terms to Chamkannis as proposed. Government of India would prefer that the fine, which is to be levied in addition to 30 breech-loaders, should be taken in other arms if you consider this feasible. It is of much importance that the Chamkannis should not be given a longer time within which to comply than the expiration of the fortnight's grace allowed to the Orakzais. Addressed General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to Punjab.

Nos. 4698-4700-F (Confidential.)

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, in continuation of the office memorandum from the Foreign Department, Nos. 4670-4671-F., dated the 16th November 1897.

No. 788.

Telegram No. 272, dated the 17th November 1897.
From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 121. I gave Chikkai a personal assurance as I believed that was what he wanted. If Government like to send him a formal promise, it would no doubt please him, but I do not think it is now required. Addressed Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated Foreign and Punjab.

No. 789.

Telegram No. 1543-T., dated the 17th November 1897.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily, In continuation of my 1507-T., of to-day's date. The 2nd Brigade and No. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery proceeded this morning towards Tseri.
Kandao to assist, if necessary, the return of the 15th and 36th Sikhs and two companies of the Dorsets; the whole force returned to camp about 9 o'clock. In consequence of above, the move of the 2nd Brigade, with head-quarters and Divisional troops 1st Division to Bagh, referred to in my yesterday's daily, has been postponed until to-morrow. All quiet to-day here and in Mastura valley, only three or four shots fired into camp last night. Casualty, one man Yorkshire severely wounded. Weather fine and troops exceptionally healthy in spite of great alterations in temperature. Addressed and repeated as usual.

No. 790.

Telegram No. 58, dated the 17th November 1897.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan, To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Political. Donald, who is Political Officer with brigade in Mastura valley, wires that Alikhel, who are Gar Orakzaies, have asked permission to begin paying up their share of rifles and money-fine on 19th instant at Mastura camp. He has been directed to tell them that any breech-loaders or money they may bring in will be accepted as an instalment of our demands from whole Orakzai tribe, but that we have no concern with distribution of shares among various sections. I am sending by post translations of several curious letters from Adda Mulla and Afridi jirga at Kabul, which were found in house of Aka Khel Mulla Saiyid Akbar in Waran Valley, but they contain nothing of grave importance. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; Major Deane, Malakand; and Commissioner, Derajat.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

No. 4721-4722-F., dated Simla, the 18th November 1897 (Confidential).
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 791.

Telegram No. 275, dated the 17th November 1897.
From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 4685-F. I do not think that anything more can be said to Chikka now. He expressed himself thoroughly satisfied with the assurance he received, and said that he asked for no more. Addressed Foreign; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Punjab; and Commissioner, Peshawar.

No. 792.

Telegram No. 276, dated the 17th November 1897.
From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda, To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My 271. Arsala Khan, Mamuzai, came to see Said Shah at Chinarak and told him he would do his best to induce his tribe to agree to terms of Government. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Foreign; and Punjab.
No. 793.

Telegram P., dated the 17th November 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Though some jirgas of the Afridis have come to Sir William Lockhart's camp, the Zakka Khel, Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas are holding aloof. Sir William Lockhart reports that forage in Maidan and Upper Mastura will not last beyond the end of this month, and that the force cannot stay in those places beyond that time. If the Afridis still refuse to comply with our demands, we propose to move Sir William Lockhart's force down to the Lower Bara valley to within easy reach of Fort Bara from whence flying columns can be organised to visit the Rajgel and Bazar valleys, and the Lower Mastura is easily accessible, so that the Orakzais can be dominated too if necessary. This may involve the troops being kept in tribal country all the winter which we must face if necessary.

As a means of putting additional pressure on the Afridis, we contemplate sending troops into the Khyber to occupy the posts there and as a temporary expedient to keep that road open during the winter by troops.

We ask for sanction to the adoption of these measures if they prove necessary.

No. 4718-F., dated Simla, the 18th November 1897.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from this Department, No. 4606-F., dated the 13th November 1897.

No. 794.

Telegram P., dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

General Lockhart reports under date 16th that the Kuki Khel, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas still hold aloof, and that the Zakka Khel seem irreconcilably hostile. He is marching to Bagh to-day, and if jirgas do not come in during the next few days, he will announce Afridi terms by word of mouth to those jirgas who have come in, and to others in writing.

No. 4713-F.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department for information.

No. 795.

Telegram No. 60, dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan, To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Reference your 4698 of yesterday sanctioning terms for Chamkannis. Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, has been directed by clear the line telegram S F—604-554-Feb.
to announce these terms at once for compliance by twenty-sixth instant. As
the fine would represent only five Sniders or three Martinis, I think its pay­
ment in cash or cattle would be a more tangible mark of submission, and
therefore under the discretion allowed me, I have not ordered it to be taken
in arms.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4780-4782-F., dated Simla, the 18th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To— { The Military Department.

{ The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

{ The Government of the Punjab.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military
Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government for information.

No. 796.

Telegram No. 557, dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat,

To—The Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to the Foreign
Secretary, Simla.

Yesterday a jirga of 14 Kalla Khels, accompanied by Ajmer Mishkar
and Malik Gaddia Khel, Malik of the pass, came into Kohat with nine Snider
rifles. They state their share of the rifles taken in the Khyber was 28, of
which these are nine; that of the remaining nineteen, they are ready to bring
in fifteen at once either to Aimal Chabutra or to General Sir William
Lockhart's camp, and that the balance of four is in the hands Tirah Jowakis,
and they ask that Akbar Khan of Babri Banda should be instructed to get
them sent in. The jirga have also brought with (them?) Fatteh, sepoy,
Khyber Rifles; another sepoy named Sultan, is sick at Aimal Chabutra. Both
sepoys are being sent under escort to Colonel Aslam Khan with their two rifles
which the jirga brought in addition to nine mentioned above. The jirga stay
here to-day. I should like to be informed whether the remaining fifteen rifles
should be received here, or should the jirga be directed to take them to the
camp in Maidan. Addressed Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary
Force; repeated Commissioner, Peshawar; Punjab; Lieutenant-General
Commanding; and Simla.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4739-4740-F., dated Simla, the 19th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To— { The Military Department.

{ The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to
the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 797.

MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary,
Proceedings Nos. 630-631, 648-656, 675-676, 682, 703-705, 707-713, 715-719, 723-738, 741-752,
754-770 and 774-781 of this Collection.

Political and Secret Department, India
Office, London, for the information of Her
Majesty's Secretary of State for India,
under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter No. 36-M., dated the 18th Novem-
ber 1897.
No. 798.

Telegram P., dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Simla.

The newspapers of the 17th November published a report of documents which were discovered in Mulla Sayid Akbar's fort said to implicate Afghan officials. Report whether this is true and the nature of the discovery please.

No. 799.

Telegram No. 280, dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,
To—The Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your clear the line 61. As Khani Khel have led and organised every Chamkanni raid and attack, I think punishment should fall on them to fair greater extent than on other sections, who, beyond sending foolish letters, have hardly moved. I am, therefore, only announcing terms to Khani Khel. Should they pay up by 26th, I propose to then call in jirgas of other Chamkanni sections, and tell them that the power of Government having been shown by the punishment of their powerful neighbours, they have been spared on account of their insignificance. Hajji Khel sent in to me again to-day asking for orders and offering to give hostages for good behaviour. Addressed Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated Commissioner; Foreign; and Punjab.

No. 800.

Telegram No. 281, dated Sadda, the 18th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. All quiet Kurram. Massuzai irjga reported meeting to-day to discuss terms announced to Orakzai. Lashkar in Khurmana Darra dispersed. Tereli and Janikot held by pickets of Khani Khel Chamkanni and various sections of Massuzai in turn. Letter announcing terms to Khani Khel despatched to-day 17 o'clock. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Foreign; Punjab; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; and Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab Command.

No. 801.

Telegram No. 1594-T., dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Maidan,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. The 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Gaselee, and the Head-quarters and Divisional troops of the 1st Division moved this morning to camp near Bagh; opposition was shown to the troops, while pitching camp, by sharpshooters in a semi-circle from the west, and from stragglers from the spurs of the hills north of the camp. Our casualties said to be one man wounded. Hostilities still proceeding at 4 o'clock. The 4th Brigade, under General Westmacott, foraged to-day to west of this camp; the troops were fired upon from the south and west, the enemy's attention on the north being occupied by the movement of the 3rd Brigade into camp near Bagh. One thousand mule-loads of forage were brought in. Our casualties were—1st-3rd Gurkhas, one man wounded; 36th Sikhs, one man wounded. This camp
was fired into last night at long intervals between 7 and 10 o’clock; one Private of the Yorkshire was wounded while proceeding with his company to take post on picquet duty; no other casualties. The 5th Gurkha scouts are reported to have killed three prowlers, and this morning destroyed defences of the offending villages belonging to Kambar and Zakha Khel Afridis. General Hart reports that during last night the picquet, held by the Jhind Infantry at Mastura camp, was attacked and one sepoy severely wounded. The defences of the offending villages were destroyed before reveille to-day. Addressed and repeated as usual.

No. 802.

Telegram No. 282, dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda,

To —The Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Terms have been announced to Khani Khel as, from Commissioner’s 94 of 1st November, they were originally intended to apply to them alone. Khani Khel are geographically rather a section of the Massuzais than of the Cham-kanni. In the event, therefore, of Khani Khel not complying with terms and of Massuzai complying, it will be necessary, if it is intended to punish Khani Khel, to explain to Massuzai that a force will go to Thabai. Addressed Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to Commissioner; Foreign; and Punjab.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4752-4753-F., dated Simla, the 19th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To — {The Military Department.

A copy of the papers noted in the Telegrams from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Nos. 280, 281 and 282, dated the 18th November 1897.

Telegram No. B.-167, dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,

To —The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Lashkar has left Khurmana Darra, as jirga is being held in Massuzai country to consider Sir William Lockhart’s terms. Section of each clan furnishes in turn daily pickets of observation at Janikot and Tereli. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated as directed.

No. 804.

Telegram No. 62, dated the 18th November 1897.

From—The Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Maidan,

To —The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 557 of to-day. No Kalla Khel jirga should be received in British territory, as this section of Adam Khel is under blockade for sending a contingent from Tirah with Afridi lashkar which attacked Khyber posts. Please, therefore, tell Kalla Khels, who have come in to you, that, if they come in
again before peace is concluded, they will be liable to arrest, and that all remaining rifles should be surrendered to Sir William Lockhart at his camp in Tirah, also that they must make their own arrangements for restoration of rifles in hands of Tirah Jawakis, as we are dealing with Tirah Adam Khels as a whole and do not recognise any distinction between Kalla Khels and Jawakis. Addressed Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; repeated Foreign; Punjab; and Commissioner, Peshawar.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4750-4751-F., dated Simla, the 19th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 805.

Telegram No. 4749-F., dated the 9th November 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.

No. 4749-F. Terms for Afridis includes restoration of private property lost at Landi Kotal or value of it when specific property cannot be recovered, and it is presumed that you have got from Captain Barton a statement of his losses and will hereafter send it and a statement of recoveries on this account to the Foreign Department. This must not be regarded as committing Government to recognition of his claim to compensation in event of failure to recover property or its value from Afridis. Addressed to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and repeated to Punjab with reference to paragraph 4 of letter 1560, dated 20th October.

No. 806.

Telegram P., dated the 19th November 1897.

From—The Secretary of State, London,
To—The Viceroy, Simla.

Please refer to your telegram, dated the 17th November 1897. I approve of measures proposed, if found necessary. What do you propose to do with the posts on the Saman range during the winter? As regards keeping the Khyber open during winter by troops, do you contemplate protection of traffic?

No. 807.

Telegram No. 1610-T., dated the 19th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Bagh,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. The enemy continued firing into camp near Bagh last night up to 21 o’clock. The following casualties during the fighting in the afternoon and evening are reported: fighting men killed four; wounded thirteen; followers killed one; wounded six. Force Head-quarters with the 4th brigade under General Westmacott, and the Head-quarters and Divisional troops, 2nd Division, excepting two batteries, moved to this camp to-day. The 3rd brigade with No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, and No. 5 Mountain Battery remain at camp Maidan under command of General Kempster. About five
thousand maunds from the advanced depot at camp Maidan were conveyed to-day to this camp, and about three thousand maunds are at camp Maidan. The 2nd brigade foraged north-west of this camp, and the 3rd brigade south-west of camp Maidan to-day. All was quiet at camp Maidan last night. One sepoy, 3rd Sikhs, dangerously wounded in Head-quarters camp Bagh at 14 o'clock to-day by Lee-Metford bullet. Enemy to be seen in considerable numbers on high hills north of camp Bagh. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 808.

Telegram No. 88-I.P., dated the 19th November 1897.

From—GENERAL HAMMOND, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Ilamgudr,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Column moved camp to-day to site quarter mile north-west of village Ilamgudr and three miles from Fort Bara. Great improvement noticed in condition of transport. No news of importance. Health of troops good. Addressed and repeated as laid down in instructions on subject.

No. 809.

Telegram No. B-172, dated the 19th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Information from Alizai points to Massuzais wishing to ascertain attitude of Afridis before deciding regarding terms. Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated as directed.
No. 29 C., dated Camp, the 19th November 1897.

From—L. W. DANE, Esq., Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram No. 4655 F., dated 16th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters marginally noted received from the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, and of their enclosures, regarding Chikkai, the Zaimusht leader.

No. 3566 P., dated the 13th November 1897.

From—The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To—The Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, a copy of the telegram from Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, No. 259, dated the 12th instant.

My telegram No. 114, dated the 12th November 1897.

My telegram No. 115 of to-day.

2. Since our occupation of Kurram in October 1892, his conduct has been irreproachable and he has faithfully observed the promise he made to me, then, that he would do nothing that was contrary to the interests and to the pleasure of Government. He is a man of a most determined and resolute character, a bold, daring, yet cautious, leader of men, and enjoys great influence with his own and the neighbouring tribes. It is fortunate that, when the wave of hostility against us passed along the Orakzai frontier, Chikkai remained steady, else the line of communications with Kurram would certainly have been closed; in all probability the small garrison of Para Chinar would have had to stand a siege; and since Chikkai is simply adored as the leader of the Sunnis in that part of the world, it is likely that the Jajis, Khostwals and other subjects of the Amir would have been irresistibly drawn into joining in the attack on Para Chinar which would have led to very serious complications. Happily, Chikkai’s firmness relieved us of the additional element of danger and trouble that would otherwise have materially inflamed the disturbances last August and September between the Samana and Sadda, and the Mallas and fanatical party were deprived of a tower of strength.

3. But even now it would be a very untoward occurrence if Chikkai were to rise. That he has many enemies, and that they and his former friends, the Mallas, should be greatly annoyed at his coming well out of the temptation to which he has been exposed will be readily understood. He has long been at bitter feud with the Alisherzai Khans; these men appear lately to have been doing service with the Kurram Movable Column, and it is quite possible that they or other enemies of Chikkai have started rumours intended to frighten him. Many years ago he dispossessed the Daudzai section (of the Zaimusht) of their village of Chinarak, in which he now lives himself. The Daudzai of course joined the Alisherzai Khans. Our policy since 1892 has been one of neutrality in respect of this feud; and it is not impossible that Chikkai is apprehensive of some change in this policy, or that he has been told, on what he thinks is good authority, that there may be a change. Perhaps he may be jealous of the Alisherzai Khans, and may wish to draw attention to the fact that by remaining steady during last August and September, he rendered us an exceedingly valuable service, which undoubtedly was the case.
4. Whatever be the cause of his unrest, it is important to us that he should keep quiet just now; indeed it is so important that I should be prepared to recommend that we overlook the slight complicity in the Khoedad Khel disturbances, of which the Officer on Special Duty thinks he may possibly be guilty. Personally, till good evidence to the contrary is produced, I think he had nothing to do with them, because the Khoedad Khel are Chikkai's enemies, and because the disturbances were of a petty character, whereas if Chikkai had been implicated from what I know of the man, I feel sure a fire would have been kindled such as we should have found it not easy to put out.

5. I trust the instructions which I have given to the Officer on Special Duty are approved by His Honour.

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Telegram, No. 114, dated the 12th November 1897.
From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,
To—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Sadda.

Please telegraph what is the precise difficulty that Chikkai feels, and how if at all you propose to relieve it.

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Telegram, No. 259, dated the 12th November 1897.
From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar,
To—The Commissioner of Peshawar.

Your 114. Chikkai is restless and uneasy, because he feels the day of reckoning for all neighbouring tribes has come, and he cannot find out Government's attitude towards himself. It is possible he may have been slightly implicated in early disturbances on Khoedad Khel border and fears consequences. Mulas have been sending him messages, saying that Government is going to annex Zaimusht country, and that Chinarak will be returned to Daudzai. I think we shall be able to keep him straight. Sayid Shah went to Manduri to-day to find out the true state of things, and on receipt of his report will wire you immediately. If necessary I shall go to Manduri and give Chikkai chance of coming to see me. If I would be informed what the intentions of Government regarding him are it would help me very much.

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Telegram, No. 115, dated the 13th November 1897.
From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,
To—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar.

Your 259. Chikkai must know that, if he is and remains friendly and loyal, Government will do him no harm, and that Government has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the Zaimusht tribe. You can tell him this from me if you think it advisable to re-assure him, and tell him too that his steadiness last August and September is fully appreciated. I doubt if he was even slightly implicated in petty disturbances of Khoedad Khel because they are his enemies, and because if he had been implicated the disturbances would have been of a very different character. The whole thing looks to me as if some intrigue were on foot by Chikkai's enemies to frighten him into flight and opposition to us, or else for some good reason of his own he wants an open sign of our friendship, possibly he is upset by the Alisherzai Khans' recent service and fears we may take their side. If you are satisfied that he is not implicated in the Khoedad Khel disturbances, and if you think that he is seriously alarmed or requires an acknowledgment of the service he did us last August and September by remaining steady, do your best to re-assure him, because it would much
...anger and embarrass the line of communications with Kurram if Chikkai were to break with us. Unless Chikkai has undoubtedly committed himself against us, there can be no reason for any change in the attitude of Government towards him, nor can Government have any intentions about him, and I do not quite understand what information you want about the intentions of Government regarding him. Keep me informed by telegram how the case stands with Chikkai.

No. 3575, dated Peshawar, the 13th November 1897.

From—The Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,
To—The Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

In continuation of this office No. 3506 P. of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward a copy with translation of a letter from Muhammad Sarwar Khan, alias Chikkai, to the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, and that officer's reply.

Translation of a petition from Muhammad Sarwar Khan, alias Chikkai, to the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, dated the 9th Jamadi-ul-Sani 1315 H. = 5th November 1897.

After con.3', c. etc.—At the time of writing this letter all is well with me. Let it be known to the British Government that it is now dangerous for me to live in this country, because for the reason of my offering no opposition to the British Government, I am much blamed (by the people here) and am also called names. My family and children are incapable (of doing anything for themselves), the latter being under age. All the people of Tirah are male-volently inimical to me. If the British Government takes possession (probably meaning does not take possession) of this country, it will be difficult for me to live here from the mischief of the people. I therefore inform the British Government that I shall sell my estate (here) to the Daudzai proprietors, or, if they could not afford to pay in cash, to some other tribe for a reasonable price, and then with my family shall settle in British territory and render services openly and fearlessly, or shall go on a pilgrimage to Arabia. Meanwhile please let me know if there is any service for me. I shall do it without inconvenience. I shall thereafter come into the British territory, so that everything may be settled by an interview with you.

Translation of a letter from the Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to Muhammad Sarwar Khan, alias Chikkai, No. 35, dated the 8th November 1897.

I perused your letter of the 9th Jamadi-ul-Sani 1315 H. = (5th November 1897), and became acquainted with its contents. You have written that it now being dangerous for you to live (in that country), you have intended to sell your estate, and after sale will settle in British territory, or will prepare to go to Arabia. Let it be known (to you) that it will be better for you to act after a reconsideration of the matter after the expedition, which is expected to come to an end shortly. Perhaps some other plan may then strike you, and you may no longer feel it necessary to quit your home. It is therefore written to you from friendship that, if you put off your intention for the present, it will be better for you in future. For the rest you are at liberty (to do what you like). The British Government have also been informed of the contents of your letter.

3
OFFICE MEMORANDA.
Nos. 4850-4852-F., dated Simla, the 24th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Military Department.

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
No. 818.

Telegram P., dated the 20th November 1897.

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Your Lordship's telegram of the 18th November. General Lockhart telegraphed on the 17th:—Begins. I am sending by post translations of several curious letters from the Adda Mulla and the Afridi jirga at Kabul, which were found in the house of Sayid Akbar, the Aka Khel Mulla in the Waran valley, but they contain nothing of grave importance. Ends. When the letters are received, I will telegraph again.

No. 819.

Telegram No. 38-C., dated the 20th November 1897.

From—The Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Reference telegrams 280 and 282, dated 18th, from Officer, Special Duty, Kurram, and Punjab Government letter No. 1656, dated 8th. As all sections were reported in Officer Commanding Movable Column's telegram B.-135, dated 8th, as concerned in the massacre of the Kapurthala picquet, and as it is desirable as in the case of the blockade to deal with the Chamkannis as a whole, Lieutenant-Governor hopes that if possible the whole tribe may be treated as one body, leaving it to General Officer Commanding to apportion a larger share of the fine, in money and guns, on the Khani Khel if the sections cannot agree as to this amongst themselves. Addressed Foreign; repeated General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Commissioner, Peshawar; and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.

No. 820.

Telegram No. 289, dated the 20th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar,
To—The Punjab Government; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 38. Kapurthala picquet were cut up by Khani Khel Chamkannis assisted by some Massuzai and a few refugee Afridis. Lashkars of other sections of Chamkannis came down during night of 7th, 8th, but arrived too late to take part in fighting. They probably came under impression that their country was being invaded. Part played by Khani Khels in various attacks by Massuzai in Kurram has been so large, and that by remainder of Chamkanni tribe so small, that to divide punishment among all sections would enable Khani Khel, who are strong and well armed to escape punishment by getting fines from other sections who are weak. Khani Khel live practically in Massuzai country, and their actions and politics are practically separate from other Chamkannis. Addressed Punjab, Lahore; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan; Foreign, Simla, and Commissioner, Peshawar.

No. 820A.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4797-4798-F., dated Simla, the 22nd November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

SF 821-822  Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

No. 821.

Telegram No. 63, dated the 20th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bagh,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Clear the line. Reference my telegram 58 of 17th. Translations of the most important letters found in Mulla Sayad Akbar's house were forwarded you by post yesterday. Among them is a letter from the Afridi jirga at Kabul, dated the 25th October, in which they say that a Hindustani attendant of the British Agent, whose name is not mentioned, at Kabul had told them as a fellow Muhammadan that the British were in great perplexity, that the Sultan of Turkey had taken Aden and the Suez Canal and made over the latter to Russia on lease, that British troops would, therefore, take six months to reach India instead of twenty days as before, that the Sultan and Germany, France and Russia, had all united to make war upon England, and that on this account orders had been given from London to the Viceroy and General Commanding that affairs in Tirah and the Khyber must be settled up in a fortnight to allow of the troops being recalled to meet urgent needs in Europe. In support of this story the same Hindustani drew the attention of the Afridi jirga to the Mohmand expedition, in which he said that the British had made peace for the surrender of only twenty-four rifles in order to be able to withdraw their troops quickly, whereas the loss inflicted by the Mohmands had been enormous, and the British would never have let them off so easily but for pressing need of troops elsewhere. His advice therefore was not to make submission, and the Afridi jirga in their letter to Mulla Sayad Akbar repeated this advice for his guidance. There can be no doubt that the Afridis are penetrated with the idea that, if they only hold out steadfastly, we shall withdraw from their country leaving them masters of the situation. The only remedy is to tell them distinctly, when we announce the terms of Government, that, till they comply with these terms, we shall not leave their country, and that though it may be necessary for us to move to the Lower Bara valley for the winter months, we shall re-advance in the spring. I would, therefore, again urge upon Government that it is essential that I should be authorised to make this announcement.

No. 4807-F., dated Simla, the 22nd November 1897.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Government of the Punjab for information.

No. 822.

Telegram No. 64, dated the 20th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 4749 of yesterday. I have received from Captain Barton a statement of his losses as follows:—Plate, uniform, books, saddlery, house furniture, etc., value rupees twelve thousand one hundred thirty-five, annas eight, and two hundred and fifty-six rupees in cash, but no further details have been given.

2
OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

No. 4806-F., dated Simla, the 22nd November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, To—The Assistant Quartermaster General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Intelligence Branch for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 4728-F., dated 18th November 1897.

No. 4811-F., dated Simla, the 23rd November 1897.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded to the Government of the Punjab for information, in continuation of the telegram from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 4749-F., dated the 20th November 1897.

No. 823.

Telegram No. 1661-T., dated the 20th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. This camp was fired into from 19 to 21 o'clock last night. Our casualties—one man 1st-3rd Gurkhas wounded; the small number of casualties was probably due to the measures taken for the defence of the camp. A large number of the enemy had been seen in the afternoon moving down the hills on the south towards camp, and a body of them at night came within three hundred yards of the camp and fired heavily into the entrenched lines of the 2nd Brigade, but were dispersed by the fire of the troops. Eight mules and four drivers, belonging to Mr. King, Political Officer, were carried off yesterday afternoon this side of the Arhanga Pass, and as a party of the enemy were reported to be in ambush, the mails and escort were not permitted to proceed beyond the Arhanga, and retired to Mastura. An empty convoy returning to Mastura from Maidan was attacked this side of the Arhanga Pass at 10-30 this morning, and one sowar, 12th Bengal Cavalry, killed, also two followers; a foraging party from the 3rd Brigade drove off the enemy. The 1st-3rd Gurkhas left camp at 4 A.M. this morning to occupy the high hill to north-east of this camp; they captured the enemy's advanced sangar at 6 o'clock and crowned all the heights by 7. Three companies have remained on the hill and entrenched themselves. Our casualties—one Gurkha killed. The body of one of the enemy was found. Under cover of this movement the 2nd and 4th Brigades foraged to the north and north-east of this camp; there were no casualties. Two of the enemy were killed and one wounded; a number of the enemy were seen moving from west to east towards the Bara valley. The remainder of the commissariat supplies at Maidan reached the camp to-day without opposition. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 824.

Telegram No. 24, dated the 21st November 1897.

From—The Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Ilam Gudar, To—The Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

There are said to be only a few men now in the Gandao Pass to give warning of our approach, and that they do not intend to oppose our advance on Barkai. Addressed Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Political Officer, Jamrud, and Foreign, Simla.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4799-4801-F., dated Simla, the 22nd November 1897 (Confidential.)

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, The Military Department.

To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch, The Government of the Punjab.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded contiguously to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, and Punjab Government for information.

No. 825.

Telegram No. 288, dated the 21st November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar.

To—The Assistant Secretary, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

At Massuzai jirga held on 18th, Massuzais and nearer Alisherzais sent word to remaining Orakzais that they considered themselves part of Kurram Ilaka, and would make special terms with Kurram leaving remainder to make settlement as ordered. They have sent me a message to effect that they wish to make a separate arrangement regarding themselves. I have replied that terms have been announced to whole of Orakzai tribe by Sir W. Lockhart, that they are portion of Orakzai, and that no special terms can be made with them. Also that in their reply to Sir W. Lockhart's original proclamation to tribes, they gave their answer as part of Orakzai and not as a separate tribe. Addressed Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to Foreign Secretary, Simla; Punjab, Lahore, and Commissioner, Peshawar.

No. 826.

Telegram No. 65, dated the 21st November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bagh, Camp Maidan.

To—The Assistant Secretary, Simla.

Reference latter part of my telegram 57 of 16th, explaining reason of delay in announcing terms to the Afidis. As the Zakka Khel, Kuki Khel, Sipah and Kamrai jirgas are still holding aloof, I announced the terms of Government to-day to the four jirgas present in my camp, namely, the Malikdin, Kambar, Aka and Adam Khel, after which they were dismissed. A week's grace was given them for compliance, and a written proclamation detailing the same terms, including the orders of Government contained in paragraphs ten and eleven of your letter 3893, dated 4th October, will also issue to-day to the absent clans, allowing them the same period of grace. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; Deputy Commissioner, Kohat; Officer on Special Duty, Kurram; Major Deane, Mala­kand, and Commissioner, Derajat.

No. 827.

Telegram No. 293, dated the 21st November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar.

To—The Assistant Secretary, Simla.

Letter received to-day from Massuzai and Khani Khel jirgas, signed by seven Malikts, asking to be allowed to come into Sadda to discuss terms. Have replied that I have nothing to say to Massuzai, who have already received their orders, and that no special terms separating them from Orakzai will be
grant them. To Khani Khel that they have received orders regarding their fate, and that unless they come in to bring the fine, they will gain nothing by coming to Sadda.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4302-4503-F., dated Simla, the 22nd November 1897 (Confidential).
From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 828.

Telegram No. 1430-C., dated the 21st November 1897.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Communications, Shinwari,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Body of a Sarwan was found this morning at junction of Khanki and Chagru nullas stabbed and burnt; he had apparently wandered out of Karappa last night in search of a strayed camel. Enquiry is being made. Addressed and repeated according to instructions.

No. 829.

Telegram P., dated the 21st November 1897.
From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Sir William Lockhart telegraphed on the 6th November, asking leave in event of leaving Maidan for winter quarters to tell the jirgas he would return in the spring to occupy their country during the summer. We replied on the 11th November:—“The Government of India do not wish to tie their own hands by explicitly saying force will stop in country till terms are complied with, but there is no objection to say while we don’t want country and will be glad to leave it, the tribes will be worse off if they force us to stay or return.”

Sir William Lockhart now telegraphs:—“There can be no doubt that the Afridis are penetrated with the idea that, if they only hold out steadfastly, we shall withdraw from their country leaving them masters of the situation. The only remedy is to tell them distinctly, when we announce the terms of Government, that, till they comply with these terms, we shall not leave their country, and that though it may be necessary for us to move to the Lower Bara valley for the winter months, we shall re-advance in the spring. I would, therefore, again urge upon Government that it is essential that I should be authorised to make this announcement.”

We solicit Your Lordship’s instructions. Sir William Lockhart has announced terms as in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the letter from the Foreign Secretary, No. 3893, dated the 4th October 1897, verbally in camp to the Malikdin, the Kambar, the Aka and the Adam Khels and to the Zakka, Kuki, Sipah and Kamrai in writing. One week’s grace for compliance has been allowed by him to all.

No. 4804-F., dated Simla, the 22nd November 1897. Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing and of the telegrams noted on the margin is forwarded to the Military Department for information, in continuation of the endorsement from this Department, No. 4721-F., dated the 18th November 1897.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 830-833 Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

N o. 830.

Telegram No. 1684-T., dated the 21st November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. In the attack on the empty convoy, north of the Arhanga, reported in my yesterday's daily, our troops crowned the heights north-east of the road and caught the enemy retiring across open ground; fifteen men were seen to fall, but thirty donkeys of the convoy are missing.

A half battalion of the Northamptons, proceeding to the Arhanga Pass yesterday afternoon, was fired on and one Sergeant and one Corporal killed and two men wounded.

This camp was fired into at intervals last night from 21 to 22 o'clock. Our casualties—No. 1 Kohat Mountain Battery, one driver wounded and three transport animals hit; two syces in the head-quarters camp were wounded.

The 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Gaselee visited the villages south-east of the camp from which enemy have shown continuous opposition; the defences were destroyed.

The 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kempster evacuated camp Maidan to-day; the transport of the brigade arrived in camp Bagh at 14-30, and the troops at about 16 o'clock. As the rear troops left camp Maidan, a body of the enemy of about four or five hundred came down from the hills to the north-east and commenced firing, but after our troops replied the firing of the enemy suddenly ceased, and no further opposition was encountered.

A jirga of the Kambar Khel, Malikdin Khel, Aka Khel and Adam Khel Afridis was received by me to-day at camp Bagh and the terms of Government announced to them. Addressed and repeated as usual.

No. 831.

Telegram No. 295, dated the 22nd November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My 203 of yesterday. Letter only expressed desire for peace. Remainder of message was sent verbally to Afridi Khan. Repeated Foreign; Punjab; Commissioner.

No. 832.

Telegram No. 92-I.P., dated the 22nd November 1897.

From—General Hammond, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Ilamgudri, To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. A party about fifty Aka Khel raiders was seen yesterday near village Shin Kamar, ten miles west of this camp. Health of troops good. Addressed and repeated as laid down in instructions on subject.

No. 833.

Telegram No. 296, dated the 22nd November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar, To—The Commissioner, Peshawar; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. All quiet Kurram. Letter received from ChikkaI, reporting all quiet in his direction. Addressed Commissioner; repeated Foreign; Punjab;
Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force; Deputy Adjutant-General, Punjab, and Deputy Commissioner, Kohat.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4819-4820, dated Simla, the 23rd November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—(1) The Military Department.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 834.

Telegram No. 4794-F., dated the 22nd November 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Maidan.

4794-F. Reference Punjab telegram 38-C, November 20th, repeated to you. Roos Keppel's 259, November 20th, repeated to Uday. The Government of India leave in your hands the details of settlement with the Chumkannis. They recognise advantage of dealing with the tribe as a whole, but at the same time acknowledge that special circumstances exist, and that a settlement which left the weak sections at the mercy of the Khani Khel any room for considering themselves leniently treated in comparison with the others would be unsatisfactory and unlikely to have permanent result for good. Addressed General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and repeated to Punjab; Commissioner, Peshawar; and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram.

Nos. 4795-4796.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 835.

Telegram No. 1706-T., dated the 22nd November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding at Bagh, Bagh,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Sir W. Lockhart and a portion of the Head-quarters staff proceeded this morning with the 4th Brigade under Brigadier-General Westmacott to Dwatoi, the Yorkshire regiment and 1st-2nd Gurkhas crowning the heights on each side of the defile. The Northamptons regiment remained on the Arhanga Pass, and for protection of the road from thence to Bagh. Only a few shots were fired into this camp last night; there were no casualties. The 5th Gurkha scouts came across a few prowlers, and are said to have wounded three of them. A picquet of the King's Own Scottish Borderers leaving camp to take post yesterday evening were fired on by some of the enemy who had apparently followed the move of the 3rd Brigade to Bagh. Our casualties were: King's Own Scottish Borderers one man killed; two wounded. General Hart reports from Mastura that successful foraging and reconnaissance was made this morning up Badashai valley and over Sangra Pass. The exact location of these places will be wired later, but it is believed they are north-east of Mastura camp. Orders are issuing for all tentage, heavy baggage, etc., in excess of light scale being sent back to Shinawari, leaving this between the 26th November and 4th
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

S F 835-838 Afridi-Orakzai Expedition.

December, and thence round to Peshawar. The greater part of the army staff will also move by the same route: the 18th Bengal Lancers to go back to Shinawari; the 50th Punjab Infantry, 21st Madras Pioneers, Nabar regiment will rejoin main column. The 21st Madras Pioneers will be temporarily attached to the 1st Division; the 28th Bombay Pioneers to the 2nd Division. Addressed and repeated as usual.

No. 836. Telegram No. 4821-F., dated the 23rd November 1897.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bagh.

4821-F. Your telegram No. 65, November 21st. Did you announce terms to Afridis in exact accordance with my letter No. 3803-F., October 4th, or did you reduce the demand for rifles? If so, please say what number you demanded.

No. 837. Telegram No. 13-C., dated the 23rd November 1897.

From—L. White King, Esq., Political Officer, Head-quarters Staff, Bagh,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

In absence of Chief Political Officer at Dotai, I submit following information:—Political Officer, Mastura, reports that Ali Khels have given in 18 rifles in good condition, and 1 211 Kabul and 180 British rupees, and promise to complete their fine and rifles to-day: 14 Martinis which they offered have been rejected as being undoubtedly of Pass manufacture. Samil clans and Daulatzaïs will probably give in their fines and rifles to-morrow, the 24th instant. The Mamozai Maliks have also promised to complete their share within the stipulated time. Attitude of Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel and Adam Khel Afridis appears satisfactory, that of the Zakha Khels unchanged. The loss of enemy at the action on the Tsari Kandao on 16th instant reported to be 293.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4894-4896-F., dated Simla, the 25th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Military Department.

Telegram from L. White King, Esq., Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bagh, No. 13-C., dated the 23rd November 1897. A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government for information.

No. 838. Telegram P., dated the 23rd November 1897.

From—The Viceroy, Simla,
To—The Secretary of State, London.

Please refer to your Lordship's telegram, dated the 19th November 1897. We shall no doubt have to hold the Samana in strength during the winter. The Commissioner of Peshawar has been pressed by merchants to arrange for re-opening the Khyber for traffic, and, if we occupy it, it would certainly be expedient to do this, which would also be the most effective mark of our political supremacy.
FEBRUARY 1897.

Afridi-Orakzai Expedition. S F 839-841

No. 839.

Telegram No. 94-I.P., dated the 23rd November 1897.

From—General Hammond, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Ilamgadr;
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Mulla Sayid Akbar is reported to be collecting a lashkar of Aka Khel, Kamrai and Sipahs to harass our forces in Maidan. Health of troops good. Addressed and repeated as laid down in instructions on subject.

No. 840.

Telegram No. 1733-T., dated the 23rd November 1897.

From—The Assistant Adjutant-General, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Bagh;
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Following from General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated Dvatoi, 23rd:—Begin. I reached Dvatoi 16 o'clock, 22nd. Road through defile extremely difficult and must be impassable when stream in flood. Rear guard and baggage not yet arrived at 10 o'clock, 23rd. I am taking steps to improve road and survey and reconnoitre Rajgul valley. Rajgul valley narrow, about 10 miles long, steep hills both sides, not much cultivation. Bara valley as seen from here open and easy. Casualties on 22nd, exclusive of rear guard and followers not yet arrived here: King's Own Scottish Borderers, one dangerously, two severely, one slightly wounded: Number five Mountain Battery, one driver severely wounded, one mule killed: First-second Gurkhas, two wounded: First-third Gurkhas, one slightly wounded: Twenty-eighth Bombay Pioneers, one killed; two severely, one slightly wounded: Number four Madras Sappers, one slightly wounded: one Commissariat follower killed. Addressed and repeated as usual.

No. 841.

Telegram No. 26, dated the 23rd November 1897.

From—The Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Ilamgadr;
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Informers reports that Mulla Sayid Akbar, Aka Khel, has assembled a lashkar of Akka and Kambar Khel and Usturi Khel, Orakzaized and Sipah to cut off weak foraging parties and convoys in Tirah. He has also sent to the tribes calling on them to fight the troops and not to raid Mussalman ryots. One Kambar Khel and five Malikdin sepoys of the Khyber Rifles, who were in the garrison at Lundi Kotal, have returned to Jamrud with their rifles. Addressed Foreign, Simla; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Commissioner, Peshawar, and Political Officer, Jamrud.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4860-4862-F., dated Simla, the 24th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—the Military Department,
To—the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch,
To—the Government of the Punjab.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, for information.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

No. 842.

Telegram No. 1761-T., dated the 23rd November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Bagh (by helio to Mastura),

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. In addition to events reported in Nos. 1733-T. and 1734-T. of this day’s date, the convoy with ammunition proceeding from Mastura to Bagh was fired on north of the Arhanga Pass yesterday evening; the attack was driven off by the second-fourth Gurkhas. Our casualties were: one man, second-fourth Gurkhas, and one Hospital Assistant, killed; and one driver and mule missing. The picquet of the second-fourth Gurkhas posted in an extemporised block-house covering the north exit of the Arhanga Pass was fired on at intervals last night for about one hour. The Northamptonshire regiment moved to camp Bagh to-day, the second-fourth Gurkhas taking the post for protection of the Arhanga and road to Bagh. These posts have been especially selected and fortified; this camp was fired into last night from 21 to 21:30; only one pony was hit. Officer Commanding Yorks reports that during operations protecting the right flank of the advance yesterday Lieutenant Jones was killed, Lieutenant Watson dangerously wounded, and one man Yorks severely wounded. Addressed and repeated as usual.

No. 843.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

No. 4849-F., dated Simla, the 24th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Military Department.

In continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 4718-F., dated the 18th November 1897, the undersigned is directed to forward a copy of the telegrams marked in the margin or communication to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with a view to the issue of directions as to the immediate movements and disposition during the winter of the troops under the Command of General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

No. 844.

Telegram No. 301, dated the 24th November 1897.

From—The Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, Para Chinar,

To—The Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Khani Khel have sent following answer to my letter of 18th, announcing terms of Government. Letter is in name of Mirak Shah and Khanka, Khani Khels. “We have no lost Government property; all loot obtained being held by Ash Khel, Mandu Khel, Dilmazai, Mastu Khel, and Massuzais. Some Khani Khel were concerned in affair of 7th, but got no loot. As we have done nothing wrong, why then should we pay any fine?” Repeated Foreign; Punjab; and Commissioner.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4907-4908-F., dated Simla, the 25th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Military Department.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.
No. 845.

Telegram No. 142, dated the 24th November 1897.

From—The Commissioner of Peshawar,
To—The Punjab Government; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

A caravan of sixty-five camels laden with salt owned by a British subject and presumably destined for Tirah, has been stopped by Political Officer, Khyber. If the measure commends itself to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, I apply for sanction under Punjab Government letter 58 of 6th February 1888 to declare a blockade under Section 23, Frontier Crimes Regulation, against the Afridis and Orakzais. If hostilities continue, it is probable that the deprivation of sources of supply of grain and salt from British territory will come to be felt by the Tirah tribes. If sanction is accorded, I propose to instruct Deputy Commissioners, Peshawar and Kohat, Political Officer, Khyber, and Officer on Special Duty, Kurram, to maintain a strict blockade. Addressed to Punjab; repeated to Foreign, and General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4901-4902-F., dated Simla, the 25th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch for information.

No. 846.

Telegram No. 27, dated the 24th November 1897.

From—The Political Officer, Peshawar Column, Ilamgudr,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

A raiding party of about 200 Akka Khel Orakzai and Khasrogi Zakka Khel are reported to be at Gandao. Yesterday, the twenty-third, a part of them lay in wait near Dora for the cavalry patrol, but did not get the chance of a volley at close quarters. They have only one day's rations left. Addressed Foreign with Viceroy; Foreign, Simla; Chief Political Officer, Tirah Expeditionary Force; Commissioner, Peshawar; and Political Officer, Jamrud.

OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 4897-4899-F., dated Simla, the 25th November 1897 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and the Government of the Punjab for information.

Nos. 847-848.

Telegram No. 94-I.P., dated the 24th November 1897.

From—General Hammond, Commanding Peshawar Column, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Ilamgudr,
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily. Road as far as Gandao, one and a half mile this side of pass completed to-day. Body of about three hundred Aka, Zakha and Sturi Khels reported to be at Magani. Health of troops good. Addressed and repeated as laid down in instructions on subject.
No. 849.

Telegram No. B.187, dated the 24th November 1897.

From—The Officer Commanding, Kurram Movable Column, Sadda.
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Daily, Officer Commanding Column and Staff moved to Sadda. Two guns, 3rd Field Battery, 50 sabres, 6th Bengal Cavalry, 50 sabres, Central India Horse, and 100 rifles, 12th Bengal Infantry, left Para Chinar en route for Sadda. Khani Khel Chamkannis, in reply to proclamation sent on 15th, decline to comply with terms. Addressed Adjutant-General in India; repeated as directed.

No. 850.

Telegram No. 179-T., dated the 24th November 1897.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp, Bagh.
To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Simla.

The events connected with the reconnaissance to Dwatoi, in continuation of my No. 1734-T. of yesterday, were that on the 23rd a survey party, covered by Gurkha scouts, visited a hill to north directly over the camp and was fired on by the enemy, who came up in considerable numbers from the Tozdarra, which is the valley indicated as Rajgal in the Tirah half-inch map, Rajgal lying further south. The two valleys are separated by the hill mentioned above. Four companies of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, under Colonel Dickson, went up the hill in the afternoon, and driving off the enemy and inflicting considerable loss, established picquets on the range. Our casualties were: two Privates of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers wounded. The camp was fired into at intervals during the night, and two sepoyis, 36th Sikhs, wounded. I wish to place on record the admirable spirit displayed by the troops, who encountered considerable hardships from the cold on the night of the 22nd. Owing to the extreme difficulty of the road, the transport did not reach camp that night, and the troops had to bivouac without their blankets or great coats. The route ran along the river which had to be waded continually, and, as the hour of arrival in camp was late, the men were unable to dry their clothes properly; these hardships were borne with great cheerfulness. I returned to camp Bagh to-day; the cold during the march in the early morning was excessive, the temperature being fifteen degrees Fahrenheit. This, however, is supposed to be exceptional, great cold having been experienced at Camp Bagh last night, where over eighteen degrees of frost were registered. The rear guard from Dwatoi sighted this camp at sixteen o’clock to-day. The enemy followed the troops to within about two miles of this camp. A body of above sixty of the enemy following into the defile were charged by a detachment of the 36th Sikhs, who killed five men, wounding at least twice that number, and capturing two Snider rifles. Our casualties during the day were: King’s Own Scottish Borderers, two Privates wounded; Captain Venour, 5th Punjab Infantry, slightly wounded. 36th Sikhs, two sepoys killed; thirteen wounded. The first-second Gurkhas who were protecting the crest of the defile were actively engaged, but, being skilfully handled, retired without any loss. Camp Bagh was not fired into last night; the wire was cut. Dwatoi is six miles from Bagh, longitude seventy degrees, forty-nine minutes, fifteen seconds; latitude thirty-three degrees, fifty-two minutes, fifteen seconds. Addressed and repeated as directed in instructions on the subject.

No. 851.

MEMORANDUM.

The papers specified in the margin were transmitted to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, for the information of Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary’s letter, No. 37-M., dated the 25th November 1897.
No. 852.

No. 54, dated India Office, London, the 26th November 1897 (Copy).
From—W. LEE-WARNER, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary, Political and Secret Department,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

† Details of papers forwarded:—

The Military Operations on the North-Western Frontier.
From International Arbitration and Peace Association, 8th November 1897, and enclosure.
To International Arbitration and Peace Association, 13th November 1897.

I forward herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy, copy of the papers * noted in the margin.

No. 853.

Dated 40 and 41 Outer Temple, Strand, W. C., the 8th November 1897.
From—J. F. GREEN, Esq., Secretary, International Arbitration and Peace Association,
To—The Secretary of State for India.

Referring to my letter of 8th September last enclosing a minute of our Committee regarding the war with the Afghan tribes beyond the British Indian frontier, and requesting further consideration thereof as left open by Your Lordship's acknowledgment, I am desired to forward the enclosed subsequent resolution on the subject. The recent successes of the military operations in those regions accompanied unhappily with grievous losses of many brave men, may, it is hoped, enable the Indian Government to renew, define and extend its offers of terms of pacification as briefly indicated in Sir William Lockhart's declaration upon entering on the present campaign in the Tirah mountain fastnesses.

Our Committee crave to be furnished with an authentical copy of that declaration, together with any similar documents that may indicate the Indian Government's proposals towards effecting plans of permanent reconciliation with the various tribal communities beyond the British Indian frontier.

Our Committee following the opinions held by those experienced Anglo-Indian officers most familiar with this painful and difficult subject, feel convinced that any renewed scheme of military occupation and domination of the sturdy dwellers in those foreign mountain regions can only result in renewal, at no distant period, of costly and disastrous expeditions similar to the present, the financial and political results of which have grievously increased the burdens on our impoverished Indian fellow-citizens, and prevented the British Government from fulfilling its primary obligation of promoting the internal well-being of Her Majesty's great Indian Empire.

The FRONTIER WAR in INDIA.

This Committee having again had its attention drawn to the destructive war against the Afghan tribes in which not only thousands of those brave mountaineers have been slain, but also hundreds of our own British and Indian troops are being sacrificed—

Resolved—That seeing many of the tribes have surrendered and several of the headmen of others have made definite proposals towards reconciliation, also that His Highness the Amir of Kabul has already preferred his mediation, this Committee would afresh urge on Her Majesty's Government that the Viceroy should be advised to take the earliest possible occasion to proffer and arrange for such definitive terms with the tribesmen and their leaders, as will be adapted to secure permanent peace between the Indian Government and all the Pathan and Beluch tribes beyond the frontiers of British India.
No. 854.

Dated India Office, London, the 13th November 1897.

From—Sir A. Godley, Under-Secretary of State for India,

To—The Secretary, International Arbitration and Peace Association, 40 and 41, Outer Temple, Strand, W. C.

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, forwarding a Resolution of the Committee of the International Arbitration and Peace Association on the subject of the pacification of the Pathan and Beluch tribes beyond the North-Western frontier of British India.

Papers on this subject will in due course be laid before Parliament. In the meantime His Lordship regrets that he cannot anticipate this information by acceding to the request contained in the second paragraph of your letter.
1898
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET F.

Pros. February 1898, Nos. 1225–1226.

PUNJAB FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION.
Despatch to Secretary of State forwarding correspondence relating to the administration of the Punjab Frontier and the management of the frontier tribes.
### REFERENCES TO FORMER CASES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch, date, and No.</th>
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<tr>
<td>A, Jan. 1898, No. 77.</td>
<td>Account of past expeditions on the North-West Frontier. Sir D. Fitzpatrick's note on the general policy to be adopted in dealing with the tribes on the North-West Frontier of the Punjab.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; Aug. 1897, Nos. 36-40.</td>
<td>Administration of the frontier districts of the Punjab and the management of the trans-frontier tribes.</td>
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<td>Secret F, Aug. 1896</td>
<td>Improvements of relations with the independent tribe between British India and Afghanistan. Punjab Frontier administration.</td>
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<td>A, Oct. 1890, Nos. 11-16.</td>
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### REFERENCES TO LATER CASES

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<td>1898 Feb. 1890, Nos. 38-41.</td>
<td>Improvement of relations with the independent tribes between British India and Afghanistan. Punjab Frontier administration.</td>
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### LIST OF PAPERS

**No. 1225—1226.**

**BRIEF SUBJECT.**

**PUNJAB FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION.**

Despatch to Secretary of State forwarding correspondence relating to the administration of the Punjab frontier and the management of the frontier tribes.

**LIST OF PAPERS.**

No. 1225.—Despatch to the Secy. of State, No. 166- (Secret-Frontier), dated the 16th Dec. 1897—Forwards copy of correspondence on the above subject.

No. 1226.—List of enclosures.
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K. W.

SECRET F., FEBRUARY 1898.

Nos. 1225-1226.

PUNJAB FRONTIER ADMINISTRATION.

Despatch to Secretary of State forwarding correspondence relating to the administration of the Punjab frontier and the management of the frontier tribes.

To CALCUTTA, (Frontier) —

His Excellency wishes the correspondence of last year with the Punjab Government relating to the frontier policy which should be adopted with the tribes on the North-West, to be sent to the Secretary of State in advance of the Government of India's declaration of future policy.

There are three things:

(1) to send the previous correspondence;

Frontier A, January 1898, No. 77.

(2) to send an account of past moves forward;

(3) to send an exposition of what should be done in the future.

Mr. Clarke is working on (2), and (3) will have to be discussed after His Excellency reaches Calcutta. What is wanted is a short despatch forwarding (1), the draft of which should be ready as soon as it can be after His Excellency arrives.

It can be said that the letter to the Punjab was not at once sent, because the Lieutenant-Governor did not answer fully until after some time.

6th December 1897.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

References put up.

Frontier A, October 1890, Nos. 11-16.

Secret F., " " " 33-41.

" February 1891, No. 59.

" August 1896, Nos. 344-345.

Frontier A, August 1897, 36-40.

Draft despatch submitted.

A. S.—8th December 1897.

J. S.—8th December 1897.

Deputy Secretary.

A draft despatch is submitted for consideration.

2. The papers which it is proposed to send are—

Secret F., August 1896, Nos. 344-345.

Frontier A, " 1897 " 36-40.

Frontier A, " 1897 " 36-40.

(i) Letter to Punjab, 2197-F., dated the 14th August 1896.

(ii) " from " 14-C., " 28th October 1896.

(iii) " from " 282, " 5th March 1897.

These papers, and the list of enclosures, are being printed in the Government Central Press, and proofs are expected on Saturday. The despatch can, therefore, probably issue next week.

3. A copy of the letter to the Punjab and of the demi-official correspondence with Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in Secret F., August 1896, Nos. 344-345, was sent by His Excellency to the Secretary of State on the 1st September 1896. The last paragraph of His Excellency's note

See page 15 of notes in that collection.
at page 6, K. W., Frontier A, August 1897, Nos. 36-40, may be read. This last collection should apparently have been recorded Secret. As it was recorded A, the official papers in it have gone home already in our Proceedings Volumes.

9th December 1897.

H. Daly.

His Excellency.

I submit a draft despatch sending to the Secretary of State the correspondence with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab about frontier policy.

11th December 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

The Secretary of State has asked me to have these papers forwarded.

12th December 1897.

E.

Issue.

13th December 1897.

W. J. Cunningham.

[To Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 166 (Secret-Frontier), dated the 16th December 1897.]

17th December 1897.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Recorded and indexed by T. G. B.

Recording and indexing examined by J. S., Supdt.
No. 136 of 1897.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

Frontier.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,  
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, the 16th December 1897.

MY LORD,

In his Secret despatch No. 40, dated the 26th December 1890, Lord Cross expressed concurrence in the view of Lord Lansdowne's Government that sufficient grounds existed to justify the adoption of measures for strengthening our position and extending our influence among the tribes lying between British India and Afghanistan. We now forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of correspondence, as marked in the accompanying list, regarding the development of that policy and the proposals and opinions of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, K.C.S.I., lately Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in respect to our relations with the tribes on the north-west frontier and the control of frontier tracts in the Punjab.

2. Our Foreign Secretary's letter of the 14th August 1896 was not communicated to Your Lordship at the time, because we awaited the views of the Lieutenant-Governor. We were not fully in possession of these until the spring of the current year. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick had then resigned charge of the Punjab, and no orders had been issued on the questions of detail which he had raised when events on the frontier occurred which made it desirable to hold further consideration of the matter in abeyance.

3. We shall address Your Lordship separately upon the arrangements which recent occurrences may render it advisable to adopt.

We have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.

" G. S. WHITE.
" J. WESTLAND.
" M. D. CHALMERS.
" E. H. H. COLLEN.
" A. C. TREVOR.
" C. M. RIVAZ.
List of enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 166 (Frontier), dated the 16th December 1897, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

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<td>1</td>
<td>No. 2197-F., dated the 14th August 1896—(Confidential).</td>
<td>To the Government of the Punjab.</td>
<td>Administration of the frontier districts and dealings with the frontier tribes.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>No. 14-C., dated the 28th October 1896, with enclosures.</td>
<td>From the Government of the Punjab.</td>
<td>Note by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>No. 282, dated the 5th March 1897.</td>
<td>Ditto ditto</td>
<td>Further observations by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick.</td>
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H. DALY.

Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India.

Note.—For enclosures see Proceedings F. A., August 1897, Nos. 36-40.
Proceedings S. F., August 1896 " 314-343.
1898.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET—F.

Progs., April 1898, Nos. 214—215.

Disturbances on the N.-W. Frontier.
Despatches from Secretary of State regarding the policy on the N.-W. Frontier.
### References to Former Cases

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<td>Secret F, Aug. 1896, Nos. 844-845.</td>
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<td>Despatch from Secy. of State, No. 1 (Secret), dated the 28th Jan. 1898—Replies to the various Secret despatches received from time to time from the Govt. of India, regarding the disturbances on the N.-W. Frontier of India.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Copies of the above despatch forwarded to the Mily. Dept., Intelligence Branch, Genl. Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Govt. of the Punjab, for information, under endorsements Nos. 1103-1106 F., dated the 1st March 1898.)</td>
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<td>Despatch from Secy. of State, No. 3 (Secret), dated the 11th Feb. 1898—Replies to Secret despatch No. 3 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898, on the subject of the past and future relations with the tribes on the N.-W. Frontier of India.</td>
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### Keep-withs Printed

- Notes on the case.

### Keep-withs Not Printed

- List of papers restored to Records, and tels. exchanged between the Viceroy and Secy. of State.

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**GOVT. OF INDIA.**

**FOREIGN DEPT.**

**SECRET-F.**

**APRIL.**

**Nos. 214—215.**

**BRIEF SUBJECT.**

Disturbances on the N.-W. Frontier.

Despatches from Secretary of State regarding the policy on the N.-W. Frontier.

**LIST OF PAPERS.**

No. 214.—Despatch from the Secy. of State, No. 1 (Secret), dated the 28th Jan. 1898—Replies to the various Secret despatches received from time to time from the Govt. of India, regarding the disturbances on the N.-W. Frontier of India.

(Copies of the above despatch forwarded to the Mily. Dept., Intelligence Branch, Genl. Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Govt. of the Punjab, for information, under endorsements Nos. 1103-1106 F., dated the 1st March 1898.)

No. 215.—Despatch from the Secy. of State, No. 3 (Secret), dated the 11th Feb. 1898—Replies to Secret despatch No. 3 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898, on the subject of the past and future relations with the tribes on the N.-W. Frontier of India.
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K. W.
SECRET—F, APRIL 1898.
NOS. 214—215.

DISTURBANCES ON THE N.-W. FRONTIER.
DESPATCHES FROM SECRETARY OF STATE REGARDING THE POLICY ON THE N.-W. FRONTIER.

(FRGS. NO. 214.)—FROM HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, NO. 1 (SECRET), DATED THE 28TH JANUARY (RECEIVED 14TH FEBRUARY) 1898.

 Replies to the various despatches received from time to time from the Government of India, regarding the disturbances on the North-West Frontier of India.

14th February 1898.
Circulated.
14th February 1898.
16th February 1898.

 H. Daly.
W. J. Cunningham.
E.
G. S. White.
J. W. Woodburn.
M. D. Chalmers.
E. H. H. Collins.
A. C. Trevor.
C. M. Rivaz.

Send copy to Military Department, Intelligence Branch, General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Punjab Government.

1st March 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Endorsements to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Punjab Government, Nos. 1103-1106 F., dated the 1st March 1898.)

(FRGS. NO. 215.)—FROM HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, NO. 3 (SECRET), DATED THE 11TH (RECEIVED 28TH) FEBRUARY 1898.

 Replies to Secret despatch No. 3 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898, on the subject of past and future relations with the tribes on the North-West Frontier of India.

28th February 1898.
Circulated.
28th February 1898.
2nd March 1898.

 H. Daly.
W. J. Cunningham.
E.
G. S. White.
J. W. Woodburn.
M. D. Chalmers.
E. H. H. Collins.
A. C. Trevor.
A copy of this despatch may be sent to the Military Department and the Intelligence Branch. Then I understand that nothing further is to be done with this and despatch No. 1 (Secret), dated the 28th January 1898. Paragraph 20 of this last quoted despatch has been extracted and placed with the arms question which is now under consideration.

J. S.—18th March 1898.

14th March 1898.

No orders at present. These despatches might be recorded together.

5th April 1898.

Recorded and indexed by T. G. B.

Recording and indexing examined by J. S.
K.-W. No. 1.

Part II.

(K.-W. No. 2.) Semi-official from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I. (to Secretary), dated the 5th November (received 13th December) 1897.

With reference to this Department's Telegram No. 4384-F., dated 1st November 1897, writes regarding jirga arbitration and the levy of a tribute in Upper Swat.

N.-W. F.

D. No. 2291-F.

(K.-W. No. 2.) Semi-official from Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., (to Secretary) dated the 23rd November (received 13th December) 1897.

Writes further on the subject of tribute from Upper Swat.

(K.-W. No. 2.) Semi-official from Secretary to Major H. A. Deane, C.S.I., dated the 12th December 1897.

When the question of the policy of requiring tribute as admission of suzerainty was under consideration, the Secretary took the opportunity, offered by the friendly attitude of the Upper Swat jirga, as reported in Major Deane's telegram of the 30th October, of asking Major Deane whether he thought the Upper Swat people would be prepared to pay a nominal tribute. Major Deane thinks he could arrange for 100 blankets or something of the sort through the Mian Guls. But this is not now necessary as the Secretary of State has decided that it would be better not to impose tribute.

The Secretary has acknowledged Major Deane's letter of the 5th November and has said that he thinks the suggestion about tribute will not be pursued. No orders are required.

J. S. — 24-12-97.

N.-W. F.

D. No. 2463-F.

Extract from the diary of the Political Agent for Dir, Swat, and Chitral, from the 15th to the 28th November 1897.

The Question of tribute from Upper Swat.

Perhaps this had better be extracted and submitted separately. In view of the Secretary of State's objection to the general policy of tribal tribute, I do not think Major Deane should pursue his attempt to induce the Mian Guls to offer to pay annual tribute.

16-12-97.

E. H. S. Clarke.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Please see the Secretary's demi-official letter to Major Deane of the 12th December.

No orders.

J. S.—30-12-97.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

I do not know if you have seen these papers. Major Deane has been told demi-officially that the question as to taking tribute in Swat will probably not be pursued.

No action seems necessary, but it is just possible that the Secretary of State may lay hold of the report, in Major Deane's diary for the fortnight ending the 25th November 1897, that he had told the Mian Gul he could only refer a certain request of theirs to Government on receiving an offer of annual tribute as a mark of submission to, and direct connection with, Government.

31-12-97. E. H. S. Clarke.

SECRETARY.

No action seems necessary?

3-1-98. H. Daly.

No action. I have spoken to His Excellency.

4-1-98. W. J. Cunningham.

K.-W. No. 2.

Dated Malakand, the 5th November 1897 (Devi-official).

From—Major H. A. Drane, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral,

To—Sir W. J. Cunningham, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have been thinking over the subject of your telegram No. 4384-1. of the 1st: I find it difficult to make up my mind about it.

It is late in the day to raise the question of tribute. The tribes look on matters as practically settled. It might, however, be possible to try the experiment with Upper Swats. The question, though, requires a lot of consideration. What would Government consider appropriate nominal tribute? Say, we arranged on 2,000 maunds rice and 200 sheep from Upper Swat. This becomes what the people call ‘anshar,’ a title, and according to their view annexation.

The factions and feuds in Upper Swat are very strong and bitter. We should probably have to send a man of our own to help them to collect the tribute. Then some day we should probably be confronted with a refusal to pay. This would involve coercion and an increased hold on the country. Would annexation of this country really pay Government? The Swat Valley is, as far as it goes, a magnificent tract. But the whole area of Swat, Dir and Bajaur is in itself a very strong defence against any idea of Russian advance. My opinion is that the more we keep out of it the stronger that defence will remain.

The question arises, do Government look forward to being able some day to withdraw the troops from Chitral? to merely retain Chitral as a subsidized state with, perhaps, a Political Officer at Mastuj? If so, what can be gained by an increased hold on this country? If invasion of India at any time seriously threatens, we must hold Jellalabad, and from Jellalabad is the true line of support to Chitral. The only advantages in helping in the settlement of cases in Upper Swat could be in its leading us into an increased hold over Upper Swat. The cases would all be connected with the rights of individuals in land, etc. The difficulty does not lie in arriving at or announcing a just decision—it is in enforcing the decision. The point the jirga brought forward was: we can decide a case by custom or Shariat; but what is to be done in the case of those who will not act on this decision? There is only one method—to coerce them. But the factions are so strong and bitter that no jirga can agree to do this. This has been the case in Swat for generations. The old Akhund did a certain amount to minimize this trouble. But his method was to announce a decision in a case, and, if both parties did not agree to it, he sent them away to have another fight, telling them to come again when they were tired of it. This was described by the jirga at our meeting the other day.

As an illustration of our cases here, I enclose you a note of a typical one in Stallan.

We have been bothered with it for the last two years. What are we to do in such a case? If I enforced the decision, well and good. But I have had to be careful not to enforce such decisions except through jirgas. Direct interference has been forbidden by my instructions from Government, and, if I enforced one, I should have to enforce all. We have succeeded well where we have only ordinary village jirgas to deal with. A new man coming here would, however, probably find every case brought up again in some form or other.

To take the case noted on. If we do not punish Sharif Khan for the murder committed, the other party is not strong enough to do so. Their only chance is to wait till they get a strong faction and then to attack Sharif Khan. This would not mean a village riot; it would mean the whole valley fighting. This we cannot allow for our own sakes. It is not as if they would be content with sniping at each other from towers like the Afidis. If now I do nothing in the matter, the aggrieved party will call attention to themselves somehow—probably by ‘badmashi’ against us—or, if they give Sharif Khan much trouble, he will do the ‘badmashi,’ have one or two of our men cut up, and send in a report post haste saying that the other party have done it. I could take the line of sending up matters of this sort officially and of raising the question of administration generally. You would not thank me for that! Needless to say, I have done my best to avoid bothering you.

The difficulty of the position in these matters is that the people look to us to help them. If we cannot do so, we risk a state of disorder being produced which will force Government to take over the direct administration.

If I interfered now in any way in settling Upper Swat cases, I should receive at least 200 petitions a day! To take up their cases, as arbitrator with the jirga would mean that the jirga must come in every two or three months.

If after reading this you would like me to try something of the sort, I will see what I can do. But I should like a definite idea to work on as regards tribute. How would 100 Swat blankets do?

There is another idea. It is to have some one in Upper Swat as a Government representative, who might assist the jirgas with their cases. I know of only one man who would be
acceptable to the people. He is Amir Shah, a half-brother of Rahim Shah. But I do not think he would agree to take up the matter. In my presence he told the jirga they were a treacherous lot of scoundrels with whom he would have nothing to do. But I know that the jirga are constantly sending after him, and asking him to live in Swat. Many of them are offering him "anshar" as an inducement to go. Having a man of our own in Swat would possibly be the best way of working the scheme. We might recompense him by a maafi or small jagir, so as not to have a "Sarkari naukar" on regular pay. I do not think that Amir Shah would be prepared to face the "badnami" of having the family enemies, jealous Khans and others in the Peshawar District, trumping up falsehoods and sending in anonymous petitions against him. Our friend at Dir would certainly send in complaints against him. He is riled now at the Mian Guls having come in, and abuses Rahim Shah accordingly.

We might try it, but I could not undertake that such or any other plan would be a success though it might work for a time.

Feud among the Khans of Alladand.

Up to about a fortnight before the Chitral Relief Expedition, 1895, Saadat Khan was in power at Alladand having ousted Sharif Khan some two and-a-half years previously. He was in receipt of an allowance from Government for running the Chitral post, and was turned out by Shaikh Yamin and the fanatical party in Swat owing to his connection with Government, and Sharif Khan took his place. Sharif Khan, after the fight at Malakand, came to the Political Agent and asked to be recognized as Khan; but as Saadat Khan had equal if not superior rights, it was arranged that they should share the Kachu Khel lands equally, as had been the case in the time of their predecessors, Sohbet Khan, uncle of Saadat Khan, and Sherdil, father of Sharif Khan, and an allowance was fixed for each by Government. This arrangement was accepted, and would have worked well enough if Saadat Khan and Sharif Khan had done what is usual among Pathan Khans, namely, allowed a little land for the support of other members of the family. Of these Saifulla and Sherin are the leading men and began to give trouble, clamouring for their rights. A jirga of the Khans of Thana was asked to decide in the matter. They decided that each should get a small share of land from Saadat and Sharif, sufficient to support them and their families.

This was done, but the feud and intrigues remained as bad as ever, and there were several quarrels and murders between the followers of the two Khans.

After the late attack on Malakand, in which Sharif Khan and the sons of Saadat Khan took a very prominent part, another jirga consisting of Mullas chosen by all of the parties and the headmen of Alladand and Dheri was held and the following decision arrived at:—

One share of land to Sherin.
Two shares of land to Saadat Khan.
" " between Sharif Khan and his brother Mohkh.
" " Saifulla and Habibulla.

The Political Agent considered the finding a fair one, and that it should be given effect to.

Sherin on this tried to take possession of his share, and was murdered on the 3rd instant by Sharif Khan. Saadat Khan's two sons went off to the Mian Guls to try and get them to interfere, and have now come back and are preparing to shoot Sharif Khan if they get an opportunity.

The finding is based on Muhammadan law, but each one wants to keep his brother's property.

A genealogical tree attached shows the relationships and the murders in the family.

W. S. DAVIS,

The 6th November 1897. Assistant Political Agent.
Fa,nity tree of the Khans of Alladand.

INAYATULLA KHAN.

Hukmat.

Yakut.

Saidullah, murdered.

Na'rulla.

Sherdil, poisoned by Bakader Khan.

Sohbat, murdered by Sirdil.

Sandat Khan, now in power.

Salifulla.

Habibulla, murdered by Shafir Khan.

Saidullah, murdered.

Saidulla II, murdered.

Bakdar Khan, murdered by Shafir Khan.

Sa'idullaII, murdered.

Barifulla.

Sulman.

Harifulla.

4 small boys.

Habibulla.

Mubammad.

Mubammad.

Sirdilla.

Mubammad.

Mubammad.

Mubammad.

W. S. DAVIS,
Assistant Political Agent.
[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Malanand, Sirdar Mardan, the 23rd November 1897.

From—MAJOR H. A. DEANE, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral,

To—SIR W. J. CUNNINGHAM, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I think I can arrange for tribute from Upper Swat through the Mian Guls, whom we should then have to consider as our representative. Will this meet your views? I might fix 100 blankets or something of the sort. The Mian Guls are anxious to be recognised by Government, and to feel that through connection with Government no one else will interfere with them.

[Extract.]

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Calcutta, the 12th December 1897.

From—SIR W. J. CUNNINGHAM, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,

To—MAJOR H. A. DEANE, C.S.I., Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral.

I never answered your letter of the 5th November about tribute in Swat. I think the suggestion will not be pursued. It is all a terribly hard matter on which to arrive at any sure opinion. No half measures seem to have any lasting effect for peace, but a lasting effect on any bit of country only seems to move the centre of trouble a little further forward; and it may be that the trouble, which rises on there, is a bigger one than that which has been layed in the nearer bit.

[Extract from the Diary of the Political Agent for Dir, Swat and Chitral from 15th to 28th November 1897.]

The Mian Guls through this man also asked if they might have a written assurance that no Khan or any one else would be allowed to interfere in Swat. On this point I have replied that this would be a matter for Government decision, which I could only refer on receiving an offer of annual tribute as a mark of submission to, and direct connection with, Government which I could forward to Government and recommend their taking into consideration. Said Abbas had also been instructed to ask advice as to how the Mian Guls should settle affairs with the Nawab of Dir as concerning them of the right bank clans—Nekpikhel, Sebujni and Shamezai. I said that I considered in such matters the Mian Guls should send their own jirga to the Nawab. As a matter of fact, these clans will, sooner or later, quietly ignore the Nawab of Dir.

India Office,  
London, 28th January 1898.  

Secret.  
No. 1.  

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.  

My Lord,  

I have received from time to time various letters* from Your Excellency's Government, in which you have reported to me the progress of events on the Punjab frontier, and the success of the military operations which, during the past six months, you have been compelled to undertake against the tribes in arms against the British Government over a long tract of border land, extending from the valley of the Tochi to the country on the northern borders of the Feshawar district inhabited by the Bunerwals. Now that the active phase of these operations has almost closed, the time has arrived for briefly reviewing the narrative of events, in order to examine the causes of the late widespread outbreak and to indicate the policy which Her Majesty's Government desire to pursue in the future.  

2. The first of several violent outbreaks, which have thrown the extreme North-West borderland of India into confusion and disorder, entailing a series of actions that have been fought with the greatest gallantry and attended with heavy casualties, occurred on the 10th of June in the Tochi valley. It will be convenient here to give a short account of the circumstances under which Mr. Gee had proceeded from Datta Khel to Sheranna and Maiziar, when his escort was treacherously attacked. In 1894 Her Majesty's Government sanctioned a policy of more effective protection and closer relations with the headmen of the Waziri tribes; and in his despatch of the 24th of August, Mr. Fowler wrote: "Since I sanction with reluctance any assumption of fresh responsibilities, and any increase of the public expenditure, I do so in this instance on the understanding that your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan will be kept within the narrowest limits that are practicable." In the following year measures were taken to carry out the delimitation of the Afghan boundary as fixed by the Durand agreement of the 12th of November 1893. On the 6th of April 1895 the Malik, or Chiefs, of the Dawaris and of the Waziri tribes in the Tochi asked to be taken under British protection, and applied for service and allowances; and in reply to your letter dated the 15th of May 1895, I sanctioned your detailed proposals for giving effect to the policy laid down, in 1894, by my predecessor, on the clear understanding that your expenditure, both on Wano and Tochi, did not exceed the sum allowed for Wano alone. In my despatch of the 9th of August I reiterated the conditions which my predecessor had associated with his sanction of control over these tribes. In 1896 steps were taken to establish permanent military posts in the Tochi valley, and you reported for my information the outbreak of certain disturbances which occurred in February among the Madda Khel Waziris, and the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir of the Sheranna post, which happened on the 9th of June of that year. For these outrages you sanctioned the imposition of a fine of Rs. 3,000, which was subsequently reduced to Rs. 1,200. It was with the intention of collecting this fine, and of choosing a suitable site for a military post, that Mr. Gee proceeded in June last to Sheranna and Maiziar,
when his party were suddenly attacked as they finished a meal prepared for them by the Madda Khels, and only succeeded in making good their retreat after the loss of all their British officers killed or wounded, and other casualties.

3. At the time of the dastardly attack made by the tribesmen the British force in the Tochi valley consisted of 1,476 rifles and 120 sabres, with four maxim and four mountain guns distributed over the five posts of Miran Shah, Datta Khel, Boya, Idak, and Saidgai. The retreat of the small escort in the face of a large gathering of hostile tribesmen was conducted with great gallantry, in which the wounded British officers and the Native officers and men highly distinguished themselves. The Madda Khels upon the arrival of succour fled to the hills, and on the 21st of June Major-General Bird assumed command at Bannu of the punitive force which your Government collected for an advance to Maizar. On the 18th of July a proclamation was issued to the tribesmen announcing the terms of submission, and a few days later the British force reached Sheranna, encountering no difficulties other than those caused by the unhealthy season of the year and by the physical nature of the country traversed. It was not, however, until the receipt of your telegram dated 26th November that I learnt that Sadda Khan, his brother, and other headmen of the Madda Khels who were concerned in the attack at Maizar had surrendered, and that the tribe had finally given in and accepted the terms of submission ultimately demanded from them.

4. On the 26th of July, within a fortnight of the issue of the proclamation to the Madda Khels, an outburst of fanaticism, as serious as it was unexpected, broke the peace of the Swat valley which had been maintained without interruption since the close of the Chitral campaign. One Saidulla, known as "the mad fakir," also called the Sartor or bareheaded fakir, suddenly gained notoriety as a worker of miracles, and publicly announcing that he had been sent to lead a Jehad or religious war, prophesied that all British troops would be driven out of the country within eight days. His pretensions were at first disputed by the Mianguls of Swat and by other chiefs of the tribes, but the uncontrollable religious enthusiasm and superstition which his actions excited overbore all opposition on the part of the responsible tribal headmen or Yaliks, and in a few hours his supporters increased from a small gathering of boys and men to an army of well armed fanatics. The tribal levies in the locality fled, and the British positions on the Malakand and at Chakdara, held by about 4,000 men, were attacked with great fury on the night of the 26th July. Fighting continued without intermission, notwithstanding the severe losses inflicted upon the tribesmen, who were constantly replaced by fresh adherents to the cause of the mad fakir, until the 31st of July when reinforcements under Colonel Reid reached the Malakand; and on the 2nd of August a relief column detached by Major-General Sir Bindon Blood completed the relief of Chakdara. In the interval between the first attack and the final relief the mad fakir had withdrawn, but his followers were joined by tribesmen from the Utman Khels, the Bunerwals, the Bajaurs, Ranizais, Lower and Upper Swatis, and the Adinzais and Dush Khels. As soon as the first excitement subsided, those tribes with whom agreements had been made for the maintenance of the road to Chitral, between the Malakand and Chakdara, a distance of some ten miles, began to send in jirgas and to sue for peace, protesting that their tribesmen had been carried away by belief in the miraculous powers of the fakir, and by his call to a religious war. The Ranizais from Khar to the south were among the first to come in, followed by the Alladand jirgas, and by deputations from the Shamozaiz and other sections on the right bank of the Swat river. It is a significant fact that the disturbance did not extend northwards of the Panjkora river or affect the road or posts established on the way to Chitral, and that the Nawab of Dir resisted all pressure put upon him by the Akhundzadas, consistently refusing to break his agreement with the British Government.

5. I do not consider it necessary to follow minutely the course of the various operations which were undertaken by Sir Bindon Blood, who advanced to Saidu on the 12th of August, and rapidly succeeded in restoring tranquillity
and exacting compliance with the terms imposed upon the several tribes for their unprovoked attack upon the British posts established, under tribal agreements, for the maintenance of communication with Chitral. During the operations in upper Swat, a force was moved to Rustam to threaten Buner in the event of the Bunerwals rendering assistance to the Swatis and repeating the offence which they had committed at Malakand. The Bunerwals were in due course informed of the satisfaction which your Government demanded of them for their participation in the attack on the Malakand, and ample time was allowed to them for compliance. On the 24th of December you instructed the Government of the Punjab to announce the final terms of submission decided upon, and to give the tribe one week within which to comply with them. As they declined to avail themselves of this offer, you despatched a military expedition against them, and I have since been informed by your telegram, dated the 19th of January, that the Bunerwals have complied with your terms. Elsewhere the advance of British troops against the Swatis, Utman Khels and other tribes was uniformly successful, and from Your Excellency's letters and telegrams I have learnt that the terms imposed by you in the matter of fines, restitution of property, and surrender of arms have been generally complied with.

6. Five days after the relief of Chakdara, and while all available resources were being hurried to the north, the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, Najam-ud-din, who has for years past been active in intrigues and hostility against the British Government, arrived with a following of 5,000 men on the frontier of the district of Peshawar, and after burning the British village of Shankargarh attacked the frontier post of Shabkadar, which was garrisoned by Border Police, and which, for fifty years, has been incorporated in British territory. It appears that this attack was not so entirely unexpected as that made upon the Malakand, and the Commissioner of Peshawar, as well as the Hindu residents of the village, had been warned to expect it. But by the time that troops arrived from Peshawar the enemy were found in occupation of the low hills near Shabkadar, from which they were dislodged, with some loss on our part, on the 8th of August. The losses inflicted on the Adda Mulla's followers were very heavy, and these included not merely a number of Mohmands but also several Afghan subjects and levies from the country between Jalalabad and Dakka, as well as from Asmar. The Mulla withdrew to his home at Jarobi, which lies within the sphere of influence which you offered to recognise as belonging to the Amir, and when Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, advancing via Bajaur, effected a junction with a force advancing from Shabkadar, the Adda Mulla attacked the two forces and sustained a severe defeat. In September a brigade was detached to punish the Mamunds, and after the forcing of the Bedmanai pass on the 23rd of that month further resistance collapsed, and the terms imposed upon the various tribes and sections between the Swat valley and the Khyber pass were in due course exacted. From your telegram of the 7th of October I learnt that the Mohmand field force had been broken up.

7. It was inevitable that the popular disturbance caused by these events, of which the most exaggerated and erroneous accounts reached the tribes occupying the tract of country intervening between the Tochi valley and the Khybar pass, should react upon the powerful clans of Afridis and their neighbours the Orakzais. Reports were current, sometimes of an impending Afridi rising and sometimes of a coalition between them and the Orakzais. Sir Richard Udny was, however, not disposed to credit these rumours, and on the 20th of August you informed me by telegram that the reports which you had already transmitted to me appeared to be very much exaggerated. In a later telegram of the same date you reported a gathering of the Orakzais in the hills north of Sadda, but “no disturbance in the Khyber.” Two days after this reassuring news you informed me that a large hostile gathering of the Afridis was then approaching the Khyber, and on the 25th of August I learnt that Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were being attacked by them. Ali Masjid was
captured and burnt on that day, and on the 25th of the same month Lundi Kotal was wrested from its garrison of Khyber Rifles and the pass was completely closed for traffic. In Your Excellency's telegram of the 26th of August you referred to this unprovoked aggression as gravely affecting your position on the frontier, and asked my approval to an expedition against Tirah, which I sanctioned in my telegram, dated the 1st of September, on the express condition that all questions involving our future policy on the termination of the campaign must be referred for my consideration before any action should be taken. Further information respecting the treacherous attack upon Lundi Kotal only served to increase the gravity of the offence committed by the Afridis. They had entered into an agreement in 1881, undertaking to be responsible for the security of the road and the maintenance of all posts and buildings in the pass, and in particular for holding the fort of Ali Masjid. Liberal subsidies were paid to the tribesmen for these services, and the levies to which the custody of the Khyber was entrusted were mainly recruited from them. As observed in your letter dated the 14th of October 1897, "our relations with the Afridis, founded upon tribal subsidies and payment for tribal services, had stood the test, almost unbroken, of sixteen years' experience. Their country has not been touched, and they have been left to govern themselves undisturbed." Under such circumstances, I can hardly doubt that the letters which were found on the 17th of November in the house of the Akha Khel Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the Waran valley, addressed to him by the Adda Mulla of Jarobi, and calling on the Afridis to join in a religious war, supply the real explanation of an attack which you justly describe as "fanatical in its origin."

8. Whilst these events were taking place in the Khyber, the southern neighbours of the Afridis, the Orakzais, commenced to attack the British posts established on the Samana range for the safeguarding of British territory in the Miranzai valley of Kohat. In your telegram of the 16th of August you informed me of the preparations you were making, "owing to a report of a possible hostile combination of Orakzai and Afridi tribes." I observe that at the very outset the earliest information received by you associated the Adda Mulla with these disquieting rumours, but on the following day you reported that a Mulla, who was preaching a religious war in the Orakzai country, had returned to his village on receipt of a further letter from the Adda Mulla. On the 18th of August you learnt that the Orakzais were about to attack the forts on the Samana, at the very time that the Afridis were marching on the Khyber, and Para Chinar was simultaneously threatened by the Massuzai section of the Orakzais. On the 20th, however, you were led to believe that these reports were "exaggerated," but on that same night an attack was made upon a village near Sadda in the Kurram, and reports of further disturbances in the Orakzai country reached you simultaneously with the news of the fall of Ali Masjid. The tribes, however, still seemed somewhat half-hearted in their movements, and on the 8th of September you informed me that all was quiet in the Upper Kurram, and that confidence was fully restored. Two days later Fort Lockhart was vigorously attacked, and the gallant Sikh defenders of Saragari were killed to a man on the 12th of September. No time was lost in expelling the combined forces of the Orakzais and Afridis from the Samana range into the Khanki valley, but their open hostility left you no option but to carry out your preparations for the expedition into Tirah. As you state in your letter of the 14th of October, "we had given neither tribe any cause of offence. The Orakzais, since they were punished six years ago for raiding in the Miranzai valley, have been left undisturbed."

9. I do not propose to dwell at any length upon the details of that campaign, which was carried out with complete success by the 18th of December last, as regards the Orakzais, but which has not yet been brought to a final close against the Afridis. But there are a few satisfactory incidents to which I may here advert. Her Majesty's Government have learnt with gratification that the Kohat pass Afridis, who are under an engagement with the Govern-
ment of India to keep open the road through their country, and upon whom the main weight of the fiscal policy which led to the enhancement of the Kohat salt duty must have fallen, stood true to their engagements with your Government and resisted the pressure of the Mullas. In Tirah, owing to the inclemency of the season, and to the exceptional difficulties of the country traversed, consisting of a succession of rugged passes, intricate defiles, and swampy valleys, success could only be attained at the cost of severe hardship and numerous casualties. But the conduct of the troops employed has been excellent, and Her Majesty's Government have heard with the highest satisfaction, not only of the alacrity with which loyal offers of help were made by the Native Princes of India, but also of the conspicuous part taken by the Imperial Service Troops in the Tirah and other expeditions during the last six months. I desire to record my sympathy with His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala in the unfortunate catastrophe which overtook the Kapurthala infantry in the Kharmana defile on the 7th of November, when the retreat of a party was cut off by a jungle fire.

10. Passing from the narrative of the events which preceded and marked the course of the several risings of the Pathan tribes, to a consideration of their causes, I entirely agree with Your Excellency in Council in regarding fanaticism as the principal motive for an outbreak which has been unprecedented alike in the suddenness with which it broke out at each point, in the large extent of country affected, and in the simultaneous action of distinct tribes or sections of tribes. In referring to the outrage which had occurred in Tochi, you informed me on the 17th of June that the Commissioner regarded it as fanatical, and in your letter of the 21st of July you accepted the view that the attack was prearranged, but fuller information has led you to alter this opinion, and to attribute it to tribal quarrels. That religious excitement was not the predominant incentive in the Madda Khel rising, may be inferred from the inaction of the Waziri tribes when the news of the attacks on Malakand and Shabkadar reached them. But elsewhere fanaticism principally accounts for the proceedings of the Swatis, Uzman Khels, Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, and other Pathan tribes. Indeed there appears to be a remarkable unanimity of opinion on the part of your officers along the whole of the disturbed border that the outbreaks generally were fanatical in their origin. The proceedings of the tribes, the express statements of His Highness the Amir, and the correspondence discovered in the course of the subsequent military operations, all point to the same conclusion. Although the first attack on the Malakand was unexpected, still several indications of a religious movement had already attracted the serious notice of your Government. You were aware that Mullas were busily engaged in circulating on the country side two books which had been published in Kabul, of a tone and character that must inevitably have stimulated the fanatical spirit of wild and ignorant tribesmen. From your letter dated the 14th of July, I learnt that efforts had been persistently made by Mulas, for several months previously, to arouse and combine the tribes, not merely in the Swat country, but also in Tirah and other parts of the Afridi land. Upon ground thus carefully prepared Najam-ud-din, the Adda Mulla, found it easy to work, and the letters addressed by him to the Mianguls of Swat, and to the Afridi Mulla, Sayad Akbar, in the Waran valley, show the range of his preparations and intrigues. That he was also the moving spirit in other parts is evident from the reply made by the Khani Khel section of the Chamkannis, when they stated that they could not refuse to obey the Fakir of Swat or the Adda Mulla. His Highness the Amir, in addressing the Commissioner of Peshawar on the 18th of August last, described Mulla Najam-ud-din as the reputed prophet of the Mohmands and the people of Jalalabad and the mountain districts of Jalalabad, and he added:—"What calamities are there that his disciples have not suffered, and what blood is there that they have not shed by his senseless commands?" In writing to Your Excellency on the following day, His Highness enclosed for your information a proclamation written by the Adda Mulla to the people of Ningrahar, exaggerating the successes of the tribesmen, and calling upon the Afghans to join in a religious war. So late as the 2nd of
September last, the Mulla was endeavouring to rekindle the sparks which had died out in Swat, and was impudently promising external assistance in an early renewal of risings in that part of the country. At one time reference was made to the victories achieved by Muhammadans in Europe, and at another the active intervention of the Amir of Afghanistan was promised by this unscrupulous preacher and his fellow-workers. It is evident that in several places the tribal organisation was powerless to oppose this outbreak of fanatical fervour, and the Malik were reluctantly forced to follow where the Mullas or the fakirs led.

11. From the information which has reached me, it is evident that the necessary task of delimiting by marks and pillars, in accordance with the terms of the Durand Convention, the spheres of British and Afghan influence, furnished the religious preachers with material for stirring up alarm and jealousy among the tribes, who were thus persuaded to connect the delimitation with ulterior designs upon their independence that were in no way contemplated by your Government. The work of marking out a frontier line through hundreds of miles of wild tribal country could not fail to arouse such suspicions, notwithstanding the scrupulous observance by you of the conditions laid down by Her Majesty's Government in 1894 with a view to avoiding interference with the tribes. I have every reason to believe that your Government has carefully kept within the scope of the operations sanctioned by my predecessor in his Despatch of 24th August 1894, to enable “you adequately to fulfil your obligations in regard to your own territory and the trade routes which go through it, and to the Amir and to the well-affected amongst the tribesmen themselves.” Although it is probable that the steps taken by you to delimitate the frontier under the Kabul Agreement of 1893 gave to the Adda Mulla and others an opportunity for misrepresenting your policy by associating it with an intention of depriving the tribesmen of their existing independence, I do not think that this necessary work could have been carried out with greater circumspection and caution.

12. Amongst other reasons set forth to give some colour of justification for tribal unrest was the recent enhancement of the duty on Kohat salt from 8 annas to Rs. 2 for each Kohati maund. In your letter* of the 30th of September last, you explained to me your domestic reasons for raising the duty to a rate nearly approximating to that fixed for Cis-Indus salt, so as to allow of the abolition of the preventive customs line extending from the north of the Hazara district to the junction of the Indus with the Sutlej. I approved of your action in my Despatch† dated 25th of November 1897, and I have only to add here that, although the enhancement of the duty was skilfully used to excite dissatisfaction, I consider that, in the interests of your own subjects, it was justified as a measure of internal policy.

13. Having followed the course of the risings and discussed their causes, I proceed now to examine the stage which has been reached in the history of our frontier relations with the Pathan tribes, in order that I may indicate the direction which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, our future policy must take. Our frontier relations assume so many varying phases, and include or touch so many interests, both local and Imperial, that a comprehensive survey of the objects to be attained is a necessary preliminary to any general enunciation of policy. The duties imposed upon your Government by the advance of British influence and by consequent contact with the territory occupied by Pathan tribes may be roughly classified under three heads,—first, the police and administrative protection to be given to British districts in the immediate vicinity of the tribal country; secondly, the strict exclusion of extraneous interference from the tribal area that has been placed by a formal agreement within the British sphere of political influence; and, lastly, the fulfilment of our obligations towards Afghanistan and the safeguarding of the natural frontiers of India.

14. The events of recent years have necessarily enlarged the area of your responsibilities to British subjects, and the chances of collision with the tribes.
Commerce and trade between the tribal country and British India have grown to larger dimensions, intercourse for all purposes is more frequent, and the extension of cultivation and prosperity on the immediate borderland offers a greater temptation to lawless neighbours and enhances the need for protective measures. A rising which suddenly closes a main artery of commerce, like the Khyber pass, is not a matter merely affecting your foreign relations; it at once injures the interests of Indian trade. The tribes have learnt in your military service many lessons of war, and they are able to supply themselves with arms of precision and ammunition to a degree quite unknown in former days, when blockades and small punitive expeditions sufficed to bring them to terms. Their Mallas travel in India and proceed through India to Mecca, and on their return they propagate rumours and reports as to what is occurring in Europe and India of the wildest and most inaccurate character, but always appealing to the fanaticism of their entourage. A significant instance of this was afforded by the letter, dated 25th October 1897, which was found in the house of Mulla Sayad Akbar, and which contained the information that "Aden, a seaport which was in possession of the British, has been taken from them by the Sultan. The Suez Canal through which the British forces could easily reach India in 20 days has also been taken possession of by the Sultan, and has now been granted on lease to Russia. The British forces now require six months to reach India." Moreover, the utterances of British statesmen and of members of Parliament upon questions affecting the status and prospects of Islamism and its rulers are reproduced, distorted, and exaggerated. To these and other causes may be largely attributed the recent combination, under the instigation of their Mallas, of trans-frontier tribes which have hitherto acted disunitedly. Their fighting strength and their power to combine have simultaneously increased of late years. It must also be remembered that sections of these tribes have permanently settled down in the adjacent British districts, and as they are always in close intercourse with their fellow-tribesmen across the frontier, they are naturally affected, more or less, by the elements of disquietude and disaffection prevailing from time to time among them. Frequency and facilities of intercommunication have thus drawn together all sections, and incitements to Jehad on the common ground of religious fervour have gained adherents, not only from distant parts of the borderland, but even on both sides of the British frontier. To these influences may be attributed the participation of British subjects in the disturbances on and around the Malakand pass, and even in the Mohmand attack on Shabkadar; and they provide additional and substantial reasons why the state of the tribal country immediately outside our settled territory should have become a matter of much more serious concern than heretofore.

15. The above observations are almost equally applicable to the second branch of your responsibilities.

For the present I would direct my remarks to that section of tribal territory which is between British territory and Afghanistan, commencing with Waziristan and running up northwards to the Swat river. The character and internal government of the Baluchi tribes controlled from Quetta so differ from those of the northern Pathans that the arrangements working satisfactorily there need not now be reviewed, or criticised, as necessarily forming a foundation upon which to base our action elsewhere. The relations of the northern tribes with your Government vary greatly, graduating from those where a tribe has accepted our protection, as in the Dawari section of the Tochi valley, to the case of a tribe undertaking independent responsibility for specified duties, as in the Khyber pass. In some cases a light assessment is paid by a tribe, and in others it receives subsidies from the Government of India in return for military or police duties. Though the characteristics of the tribes and their normal attitude towards the British Government vary considerably, yet there are certain features in our relations with these which are common to all. In the first place, the fear of encroachment or attack upon their territory from Afghanistan has been removed by the Durand
Agreement. The influence of fear which formerly led a threatened tribe to seek our help, is no longer felt. Nevertheless, the arrangements and the delimitation effected by the Durand Agreement have made the protectorate an accomplished fact, and no interference from outside can be tolerated within the territory now distinctly recognized as belonging to the sphere of British influence. Mr. Fowler, in his Despatch, dated the 24th of August 1894, adverted to this subject, and expressed his opinion that the programme advocated in the minute of dissent appended to the letter from your Government would not meet the necessities of the case, "and that, in the existing state of our relations with Afghanistan and with the tribes, it is essential that your Government should be in a position to maintain, if necessary, an effective control over Wazistan."

The Waziri frontier was only one part of the line demarcated under the Durand Convention, and now that the sphere of British influence has been traced along almost the whole Afghan border, your responsibilities in connection with the territory thus delimited cannot be ignored or put on one side. Though the agreement made with the Amir of Afghanistan has relieved your Government from the constant friction which the undefined and debatable land lying between Afghanistan and British India produced between their respective Governments, in other respects it has not been an unmixed benefit, from the suspicions and misgivings it has aroused amongst certain of the tribes as to the ultimate intentions of your Government. To gradually allay these doubts should be one of the primary objects of our future action. As communications multiply so the tribes will mix more freely with British subjects; and this intercourse, becoming closer in the course of years, cannot fail to increase our responsibilities on the frontier by drawing the tribesmen out of their highlands into closer contact with their neighbours and with your officers. Whether the risks of collision will have been thereby augmented or diminished, remains to be seen. By care and foresight it may be possible to avoid actual conflict, and the effect of frequent intercourse may be to mitigate the lawless and predatory instincts of the hillmen, without interfering with the tribal system of self-government.

16. If your obligations inside your territories and the sphere of British influence have been increased, the case is not otherwise in respect to the Amir of Afghanistan and his country. The engagement with His Highness in July 1880, as set forth in the communication\* from the Marquis of Ripon, contained this clause,—"If any Foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of Your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that Your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations." These responsibilities were again confirmed but not extended, when Sir Mortimer Durand concluded the agreement† of the 12th of November 1893; and as a proof of the increased good-will existing between the two Governments, the subsidy of the Amir was at the same time increased by six lakhs. To the obligations thus contracted is added the ever present duty of watching over the frontier passes of the mountains into India, so as to maintain sufficient control over the main routes connecting Afghanistan with India, for the purpose of preventing the establishment of any political influence adverse to your Government in the higher plateaux which within Afghanistan dominate these passes.

17. Frontier questions ranging thus from the daily performance of a policeman's duties to the possible despatch of a large army present so many complications and entanglements that any set of precise instructions would prove to your Government a source of embarrassment rather than an assistance. The call for interference, or even for military help, may arise from different quarters and under conditions wholly distinct. You may be required suddenly

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† Printed in "East India (North-West Frontier), C. 8087," presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1896.
to fulfil your duties of protecting your own subjects, as recently at Shankar­gahr when it was attacked by the Mohmands, or perhaps to discharge your obligations to the Amir. In either of these cases the points attacked or threatened may be few or numerous. You may have to insist upon the stipulated performance of tribal service in a pass, or to punish treachery or attack upon your posts. It is conceivable that under certain circumstances you might have to fulfil all these obligations at one and the same time. It is obvious, therefore, that the steps which may have to be taken by your Government cannot be reduced to a formula, or your procedure mapped out on a pre-arranged plan. The extent of the demand made upon your resources, military and financial, cannot be foreseen until the occasion arises and has had time to develop itself. Any attempt to lay down a set of uniform rules for your guidance would be apt to defeat the main object of the general policy which Her Majesty’s Government desire to pursue, namely, to show that we are as determined to respect the rights of others as we are able to enforce our own.

18. At the same time, there are certain leading principles underlying our frontier policy to which Her Majesty’s Government have resolved to adhere, and to which I proceed to invite your attention. The extent and difficulty of this mountainous border render it expedient that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the fulfilment of the policy just indicated. In my telegram of the 18th of October, I addressed Your Excellency as follows:—“You will agree with me that in present circumstances, internal and external, political and financial, no new responsibility should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British-Indian border. I also think that the present opportunity should be used for defining our permanent position and policy. Some modifications of existing arrangements, especially with a view to concentration of force, will no doubt be necessary.” As a practical instance of the questions to which I desired to invite your attention, I would refer Your Excellency to my Despatch of the 9th of August 1895, in which I insisted on “the very great importance of keeping your interference with the tribes and your outlay of money in Waziristan within the narrowest limits;” and to my later Despatch, dated the 8th May 1896, in which, having regard to the extension of your military posts in the Tochi valley, I asked for a statement of your conclusions on “the question whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment is so necessary as to justify the expenditure.” Your Excellency was unable to supply me with this statement before the recent outbreak of fanaticism occurred, but my Inquiry in respect of the posts occupied in Waziristan is one which should be extended so as to apply to the whole of the affected frontier. The two main objects to be borne in mind were indicated in my telegram of the 13th October, namely, the best possible concentration of your military force so as to enable you to fulfil the several responsibilities to which I have adverted, and the limitation of your interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory. I anticipate that the question of the best location of our frontier posts, and the selection of the communications through the borderland which it is most necessary to maintain will require very careful thought, but it is an essential step towards arriving, as far as it is possible to do so, at a clear and well-defined plan upon which to base local arrangements. The experience gained in the past few months has suggested the inference that certain military posts such as Saragari were not sufficiently defensible, and it is probable that, without altering or diminishing the existing lines of communication, you may wish to modify the past arrangements for their maintenance. In any such modification of existing arrangements I wish to impress upon Your Excellency the advisability of establishing regular troops nowhere except in such posts or localities and under such conditions as will enable them to promptly repel any attacks upon them, and of making the local or tribal levies assume, as far as is possible, the aspect of a police rather than a military force. It will be necessary, in framing these arrangements, that an estimate of the cost of frontier defence, including charges for tribal services, should be prepared.
and transmitted to me, since full regard must be had to financial considerations. It is not sufficient that the measures proposed should be desirable; it is necessary that the gain should be commensurate with the expense.

19. The second principle upon which stress must be laid is the avoidance of any interference with the tribes which can be avoided with due regard to the interests already set forth. It was for this latter reason that, after full consideration, I was unable to give my consent to the imposition of tribute upon the Afridis and Orakzais. I recognise the force of the arguments used in favour of such a visible assertion of the responsibilities which you have incurred under the Durand Convention. It is not improbable that the regular payment of even a nominal tribute might strengthen the hands of the tribal leaders, the Malik, against the teachings of their Mullahs and against fanatical outbursts. The fear of an enhancement of the tribute might at times restrain the evil disposed amongst the tribesmen. But, on the other hand, it is desirable to avoid giving any countenance to the idea that your Government means to administer the tribal country or to inclose it within your provincial limits. Moreover, I apprehend that the imposition of even a nominal tribute might rankle in the minds of the Pathan tribes, furnish disaffected persons with material for imputing to the British Government designs which it does not contemplate, and above all, might enable the tribes to choose their own time for refusing payment, and thus for openly defying your authority. In such a case the only means of enforcing your demand, besides punitive expeditions and blockades, might be the imposition of direct administrative control, or, in the last resort, annexation of fresh tracts of country. But the extension of your direct administration across the border involves an increase of responsibilities which it has always been our policy to avoid; and annexation would imply a still larger addition to your civil and military establishments, with a very serious and growing burden upon your financial resources. On the other hand, the fear of occupation is undoubtedly a deterrent to the commission of acts of violence, and it may prove an influence on the side of order which should not be wholly thrown aside.

20. The next point to which I adverted in my telegram of the 13th of October, in connection with the subject of protection, was that of disarmament. I approve entirely of the imposition of terms of peace which require a tribe that has resorted to arms to surrender as large a number of arms as may reasonably be demanded. But any attempt to keep the tribal country, or even one section of it, permanently disarmed, involves serious consequences. In the lawless state of society which prevails across the British administrative frontier, a tribe could not exist without the means of defence. Unless we are prepared to wholly undertake their protection against their neighbours, some limit must necessarily be put on their deprivation of the means of self-defence. At the same time, Her Majesty's Government are alive to the importance of the fact disclosed by the recent operations—that the tribes have access to large quantities of arms of precision and ammunition. To control this traffic in arms and munitions of war is an object of the first importance, and I consider that a systematic inquiry as to the sources of supply, whether from your arsenals and factories or by means of illicit importation into India, should be instituted. I have dealt in a separate communication with one part of this subject. I have only to add here that, whenever the trade routes to Afghanistan are re-opened and the export of arms and ammunition for His Highness the Amir is resumed, special arrangements should be made to keep an account of the class of arms exported, with a view to future identification should occasion arise, and to prevent any of them passing into the hands of the tribes en route.

21. The maintenance of the Khyber pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of your obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects. It may be that, as a military route, others may be preferred to this pass, but under any circumstances the retention of an effective control over the Khyber is essential; and accordingly, in your letter of the 4th of October, addressed to
General Sir William Lockhart, you desired him to announce to the Afridis your intention to re-open the pass in such manner as you might consider most desirable. I approved of this intimation, and on the 3rd of November I authorised your consideration of any scheme for improving or re-aligning the present road, provided that any changes of importance should be reported to me. I have not yet received your report, but whilst I agree that the arrangements which have hitherto subsisted with the tribesmen have been cancelled by their own violent breach of them, I trust that it may still be possible to give the Afridis some share in your new scheme and thus to enlist their goodwill and assistance in the future protection of the road. But I do not consider that your Government is bound in any way by the engagements which the Afridis so deliberately broke. Whilst Her Majesty's Government, therefore, adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of your arrangements with the tribe.

22. The march of events in Central Asia and Afghanistan and the recent occurrences along our borders have tended to elucidate the problem to be solved. Facts have taken the place of surmise, and successive engagements or assurances have defined the legitimate spheres and responsibilities of the Governments interested. The recent outbreak of fanaticism, in response to the propaganda of the Mulas, has revealed a source of danger deeper-rooted and wider-spread than was suspected, whilst on the other hand the leniency of the terms of submission imposed upon the recalcitrant tribes, and the manifest reluctance of your Government to interfere with their independence or customs of self-government, cannot fail to gradually allay any suspicions they might previously have entertained of the intentions of the Indian Government. The immediate difficulty to be dealt with is not so much associated with apprehension of interference from without, as with that of restlessness within the area of our influence. Your Excellency will doubtless give full weight to this change in the situation, and devote your foremost attention to that portion of the question which has thus prominently asserted itself.

23. I desire in conclusion to express on the part of Her Majesty's Government their high approval of the manner in which Your Excellency's Government has met an arduous crisis, and of the success which has attended the various military operations conducted on the North-West frontier under conditions of extreme difficulty, upon which a separate communication will be made to you. Not only was the rising one of unprecedented extent and violence, which, moreover, occurred at the most trying season of the year, but your resources were already taxed to the utmost by the necessity for carrying on at the same time a campaign against widespread famine in India, and for dealing with the plague which had appeared in several parts of the empire. The contingency that frontier disturbances may arise at a time when attention is being devoted to other important affairs, must always have a certain weight in balancing the considerations which should determine your policy in that quarter. It adds weight to the conclusion that no new responsibility should be undertaken, unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the Indian border.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) George Hamilton.
Nos. 1103-1106 F., dated Fort William, the 1st March 1898.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing despatch is forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch, General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, and Government of the Punjab, for information.

No. 215.

India Office,
London, 11th February 1898.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord,

I have given my attentive consideration to Your Excellency's letter in the Foreign Department, No. 3 (Frontier), dated the 18th of January, on the subject of your past and future relations with the tribes on the North-West Frontier of India, together with the Secret letter* of the 16th of December last, to which you refer me.

2. In my Secret despatch No. 1, dated the 28th of January, which had issued before I received your letter of the 18th idem, I have anticipated most of the points raised in the letters just cited. Under these circumstances, I do not consider it necessary to discuss either the narrative of past history or the lines of policy which you set forth in the 52nd and 53rd paragraphs of the letter.

3. From the several principles for the guidance of your frontier policy, which I have laid down as approved by Her Majesty's Government, in paragraphs 18 to 22 of my despatch of the 28th of January, Your Excellency will infer that I am not able to accept without reserve the views and principles described in your Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 14th of August 1896, of which a copy has now reached me after so long an interval. But I do not gather that these proposals have been carried into effect, and I observe that you intend to give full consideration to the whole position, which has indeed materially changed in the course of the last eighteen months, and to formulate your recommendations for my approval.

4. I am therefore content to await their receipt, in the full confidence that Your Excellency's Government will frame your proposals in close accordance with the directions issued for your guidance.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

(Sd.) GEORGE HAMILTON.
Future arrangements for the control of the Khyber Pass.
## Secret-File

### Branch, date and Nos.

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### Map of Tirah and surrounding country—1' = 2 miles, April 1898. (Internal B, No. 1957 F, 1899.)

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## References to former cases.

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### Keep-withs printed.

1. Notes on the case.
2. D.o. correspondence.

### Keep-withs not printed.

No. 1. List of papers restored to Records, originals, proofs, &c.

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## Precis-Docket

### Govt. of India.

### 1898.

### Foreign Dept.

### July.

### Nos. 180–215.

## Brief Subject.

Future arrangements for the control of the Khyber Pass.

### List of papers.

No. 180.—From the Genl. Officer Comdg., Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 3rd Feb. 1898—Forwards a Memo. by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, submitting certain proposals for holding the Khyber. (Copy of the above forwarded to the Milly, Dept., for consideration, under endmt. No. 744 F, dated the 7th Feb. 1898.)

No. 182.—Order in Council, dated the 25th Feb. 1898—Directing that Sir William Lockhart be informed that the Govt. of India do not feel prepared to accept, without further investigation by himself and Sir R. Udny, the proposals contained in the above endmt., and asked to suggest any alternatives for holding the Pass by a militia under the analogy of the Kurram Militia, also that the Afridis should be told that the Khyber will be occupied for the present, and warned that the conduct of the tribes in the interval will be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision to the nature of the final arrangements.

No. 183.—Tel. to the Genl. Officer Comdg., Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1057 F, dated the 28th Feb. 1898—Conveys instructions as to the announcement to be made to the Afridis, and asks for his opinion urgently by tel.

No. 184.—Tel. from the Genl. Officer Comdg., Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. B, dated the 28th Feb. 1898—In reply, suggests that it would be premature to say anything to the Afridis at present about future arrangements for holding the Khyber, for the reasons given.
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(Continuation of Précis-Docket.)

No. 185.—To Genl. Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., No. 1098 F., dated the 1st March 1898—Asks for further investigation of the question as to the best way of securing the safety of the Khyber Pass, offers remarks and asks for an early reply.

(Copy of the above letter, together with a copy of the Order in Council, dated the 25th Feb., forwarded to the Mily. Dept., under endmt. No. 1098 F., dated the 1st March 1898.)


No. 187.—Tel. to the Secy. of State, dated the 1st March 1898—Asks for authority to issue orders for the occupation of the Khyber Pass for a time after the submission of the Afridis.

(Copy of the above tel., and of Progs. Nos. 188, 184 and 186, forwarded to the Mily. Dept., for information, under endmt. No. 1107 F., dated the 3rd March 1898.)

No. 188.—Endmt. to the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 1128 F., dated the 3rd March 1898—Forwards, for information, copies of the foregoing papers with the exception of Progs. Nos. 182 and 187.

No. 189.—Tel. from the Secy. of State, dated the 2nd March 1898—in reply to Progs. No. 187, approves the occupation of the Khyber Pass pending a settlement of future arrangements.

(Copy of the above tel., forwarded to the Mily. Dept., for information, under endmt. No. 1145 F., dated the 3rd March 1898.)

No. 190.—From the Genl. Officer Comdg., Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 5584 T., dated the 11th March 1898—Forwards a Memo, embodying his views on the holding of the Khyber.

No. 191.—Enclo.

No. 192.—From the Genl. Officer Comdg., Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 5572 T., dated the 16th March 1898—Forwards a Memo, embodying Sir R. Udny’s views on the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass.

No. 193.—Enclo.

No. 194.—Tel. to the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 1368 F., dated the 17th March 1898—Says the Secy. of State has sanctioned the continued occupation of the pass, pending completion of settlement of future arrangements. Asks for a very early expression of the Lieut.-Govr.’s opinion on Sir William Lockhart’s proposals to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber on certain conditions and to allow re-enlistment of Khyber Rifles.

No. 195.—Tel. from the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 118 C., dated the 19th March 1898—Communicates the Lieut.-Govr.’s views in regard to the re-opening of the Khyber Pass.

No. 196.—Tel. from the Genl. Officer Comdg., Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 2985 T., dated the 24th March 1898—Suggests certain tricky arrangements which, in the event of the Afridis settling up by the end of March, might then come into effect.
No. 197.—To Genl. Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., No. 1444 F., dated the 25th March 1898—States that, in the opinion of the Govr.-Genl. in Council, the Khyber Rifles may be continued on a temporary footing, but that the question of the restoration of tribal allowances to the Afridis must be reserved at present.

No. 198.—To the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 1472 F., dated the 28th March 1898—Forwards, for favour of the opinion of the Lieut.-Govr., a copy of correspondence with Sir William Lockhart on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of the Khyber Pass and in regard to certain suggested reductions in the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

(Copy of the above letter forwarded to the Milly. Dept., for information, under endstn. No. 1473 F., dated the 28th March 1898.)

No. 199.—From the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 329, dated the 1st April 1898—Views of the Lieut.-Govr. in regard to the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber.

No. 200.—From the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 338, dated the 2nd April 1898—in reply to Progs. No. 198, refer to the foregoing letter containing the Lieut.-Govr.’s views on the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber, and state that His Honour hopes very shortly to discuss fully the proposals contained in the letter under reply. Communicate Sir Mackworth Young’s satisfaction in regard to the restoration of tribal allowances to the Afridis.

No. 201.—From the Govt. of the Punjab, No. 398, dated the 16th April 1898—Forward copy of a letter from the Comr. of Peshawar and a Memo., in which Sir Mackworth Young has recorded his views on the general question of the control of the Khyber Pass.

Nos. 202-203.—Enclos.

No. 204.—From* Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., dated the 20th April 1898—Offers remarks on Sir William Lockhart’s comment on his proposal about the Khyber Rifles being encouraged to provide their own arms.

Nos. 205-208.—(See Nos. 153-154 and 156-157 in Secret F., July 1898, Nos. 146-161.)

No. 209.—From Major-Genl. W. P. Symons, C.B., Comdg. Khyber Force, No. 11 P.-F., dated the 7th May 1898—Suggests that the Comr. of the Khyber Rifles should also be Poltl. Officer in the Khyber.

No. 210.—Tel. P. from the Secy. of State, dated the 7th June 1898—Enquires when he may expect the final review of the result of the tribal settlement and proposed future arrangements.

No. 211.—Tel. P. to the Secy. of State, dated the 10th June 1898—Promises to send the proposals next week or the week following.

No. 212.—Minute of Dissent recorded by His Excellency Sir Charles Nairne, K.C.B., Commd.-in-Chief in India, dated the 16th June 1898.

* This was originally received as a demi-official letter bearing date the 18th March 1898, and noted on in the Udny-Barton case (D. No. 845 N.-W. F. of 1898). It was subsequently treated as an official and the date altered to the 20th April 1898.
No. 213.—Minute of Dissent recorded by Major-Genl. the Hon'ble Sir E. H. H. Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B., dated the 17th June 1898.

No. 214.—Despatch to the Secy. of State, No. 95 (Secret-Frontier), dated the 23rd June 1898—Forwards, with remarks, copy of the papers specified in the attached list, regarding the future arrangements for the control of the Khyber Pass.

No. 215.—List of enclos.

(Copy of the above despatch, with enclos., forwarded to the Mily. Dept., for information, under endmt. No. 2344 E., dated the 23rd June 1898.)
K. W.
SECRET—F., JULY 1898.
Nos. 180—215.

K. W. No. 1.
PART I.
FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONTROL OF THE KHYBER PASS.

(P⼿zs. Nos. 180-181.)

FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, TIRAH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, CALCUTTA, DATED THE 3RD (RECEIVED 5TH) FEBRUARY 1898.

With reference to the conference held on the 2nd February 1898 at Government House, forwards a memorandum drawn up by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, submitting certain proposals for the holding of the Khyber Pass.

Hrs EXCELLENCY.
This paper puts in writing what Brigadier-General Nicholson explained verbally to the conference on the 2nd instant.

The proposals are in the main military, but the situation which would be created by placing a military force in a fortified position at Landi Kotal cannot be considered apart from the political arrangements. General Nicholson's paper does also deal with the political arrangements to be made in the Khyber.

Landi Kotal is not in Afridi country, but in the country of the Shinwaris. It will be remembered therefore by the authorities, who deal with the military aspect of these proposals, that they involve no military occupation of Afridi country, but mean that a garrison of Indian troops will be placed at the far end of the Khyber pass, which pass will itself be held by a militia raised from the Afridis and other tribes concerned. The Khyber is not, however, the only means of getting at Landi Kotal, and the other routes to the north of the Khyber are outside the country of the Afridis.

General Nicholson says that his suggested arrangements need not involve more annexation or administration than exists now. I would rather avoid the use of the word annexation. It has an almost technical meaning, and administrative responsibility is really what is in question. It is true, I think, that a corps, organised as the Kurram Militia, need not materially alter our position in the Khyber, because the Khyber Rifles have come to be little different in fact, although their responsibility for them is different in theory; and if we have a body of men recruited, paid, armed, drilled and commanded by officers of the Indian Government (and except for appearance sake it does not matter whether these officers be British or Native, if they are Government officers) it is better, I believe, to acknowledge at once that the body is a British Militia regiment and no longer keep up what has become not much less than pretence, that it is a levy of tribes supplied and maintained under tribal responsibility. Such a militia need not entail British administration, but I believe that it will be very much to our advantage if the responsibility for the administration of the Khyber is also undertaken. I do not mean that it should be governed like a tehsil in British India, but that the power behind the men in authority being British, the acts of the men in authority, Maliks or whoever they be, shall be subordinated to our direction.

The chief difficulty in dealing with the Khyber under tribal management lies, I believe, in the fact that the Maliks who have any power over the clans must use that power against us instead of for us if they would, in times of difficulty, retain it. Sir Richard Udny has put this view before me very plainly, and the only remedy that I can think of is that, though we may leave the tribesmen to manage their own affairs in their own way in Tirah, we must manage the affairs of the Khyber in the way which will be best for our purposes.

The Secretary of State's despatch which is on its way appears, from the telegraphic summary of it, to uphold this method of dealing with the Khyber if it does not enjoin it. The safety of the Khyber pass is to be the paramount consideration. If so, it will override
the consideration which is mentioned of avoiding interference with the tribes; and that the administration of the Khyber is not contrary to the Secretary of State's views appears from His Lordship hoping that their good will and assistance will be enlisted in the Khyber arrangements which are to be made.

But this will all be clearer when the despatch comes.

I submit Brigadier-General Nicholson's paper in the meantime for information, but the only action on it which seems to me proper just now is to send copy to the Military Department for consideration.

5th February 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

Yes, this is the first step, but it should be treated urgently, for Sir W. Lockhart may require instructions soon if the tribes make submission, and we shall have to consult the Punjab Government and the Secretary of State besides our own deliberations.

In the meantime the subject is strictly confidential and should be marked and treated accordingly.

5th February 1898.

Send copy marked "Strictly confidential" to the Military Department and copy of these notes.

6th February 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

(Endorsement to Military Department, No. 741 F., dated the 7th February 1898.)

(NOTES IN THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT.)

FROM THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, No. 741 F., DATED AND RECEIVED 7TH FEBRUARY 1898.

Memorandum by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, containing proposals for the holding of the Khyber Pass.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

A copy of the memorandum may be sent to the Quarter-Master-General for His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's opinion.

I will only remark now that the location of troops at Landi Kotal is not open to the same objection as exists in the case of Chitral, Wano, the Tochi and other places beyond the frontier, because it is on a main line of advance, and must in any case be occupied if a campaign in Afghanistan becomes necessary. To permanently occupy Landi Kotal will not therefore lock up troops in the same sense as the occupation of places not on a line of advance, that is to say, the military forces available for operations in Afghanistan, or for obligatory garrisons in India, are in no way weakened.

The Commander-in-Chief will no doubt give his opinion on the practicability of relieving the garrison at Landi Kotal in event of an attack by the tribes such as took place last autumn, but I venture to think the chances of such an attack will be greatly reduced, if the administration of the Khyber tract is taken over, as contemplated in Sir W. J. Cumingham's note. If the work is properly constructed and armed and well supplied with water, food and ammunition, the garrison should be able to hold it a long time against tribal attack, several weeks at least.

Should relief be necessary, the actual forcing of the Khyber should not be a very difficult operation. Pollock's force in 1842 consisted of only seven battalions with 14 guns and 18 squadrons of cavalry. He had also 600 Jazailchis and some Mohmand auxiliaries led by Torabaz Khan of Lalpura. Of the seven battalions but one was British, and the Native regiments were certainly not equal to those we now have. Further, the enemy were distinctly better armed than our own men. The actual fighting on the 5th April fell to detachments whose aggregated strength amounted to about 40 companies (say, 5 of our battalions) and the Jazailchis, and they seem to have cleared the heights with little difficulty.

8th February 1898.

P. J. MAITLAND.

The proposal put forward by General Nicholson is identical with that I suggested for consideration during a discussion in Council which took place last session at Simla on frontier policy.
It is not recorded in the notes of the conference recently held, but it will be remembered that General Nicholson's proposal was the conclusion of a discussion we had on the subject of holding the Khyber, when I asked whether it was not a possible alternative to take over the Khyber altogether.

The course of the discussion had reference to the idea of holding the Khyber under tribal arrangements, and I asked what would become of our British forts. The reply was that there should be no British forts, but merely levy posts.

I then pointed out that the defence of the Landi Kotal position, the provision of water-supply, &c., was an integral part of the defence of the North-Western Frontier as propounded in 1885, and that if the above were accepted, it was a reversal of the policy of that and subsequent years.

Sir R. Udny said he should like to cut the Khyber off from the Afridis altogether.

I will not say anything more at this moment, but that there is a great deal to be said on both sides of the question there is no doubt.

Quarter-Master-General unofficially.

Brigadier-General Nicholson's proposals in which Sir William Lockhart concurs are:

1. that we should locate a battalion of Native Infantry and a detachment of gunners in a strong work to be built at Landi Kotal; and

2. that the pass should be kept open by the Khyber Rifles, who should be reorganised on a somewhat more regular basis, with British Officers in command.

I am opposed to the first of these suggestions and consider that its drawbacks far outweigh the advantages.

Brigadier-General Nicholson urges that "to meet military requirements...we ought to have an advanced post, capable of ready expansion into an advanced Military depôt, at the most commanding point in the pass, namely, at Landi Kotal; near that post an adequate supply of water is indispensable; and in view of recent occurrences, it would appear to be neither prudent nor conducive to our prestige to expose the defensive works' and water-supply which the Government of India may order to be constructed to the chance of being wrecked by a tribal outbreak," and that therefore our only cause is to hold them with our own troops. It is not claimed that the presence of troops at Landi Kotal is of any advantage except as protecting these preparations for an advance into Afghanistan.

In my opinion the value of Landi Kotal as a supply depôt during such an advance is quite uncertain and will entirely depend on the state of our communications when the time comes. I do not think that in any case the existence there of a fort capable of prolonged defence by a battalion, and which therefore must necessarily be small, would materially facilitate the formation of such a depôt. No doubt, it would be an advantage to be certain of finding our pipe line of water-supply intact, but it is not a matter of vital importance. We have marched troops through the Khyber before without such a supply and could do so again, while our recent experience has shown that, given the required material, any damage that the tribes can do to the supply can be very rapidly repaired.

On the other hand, the presence of an isolated force at Landi Kotal in ordinary times is open to the gravest objection. A battalion in such a position would be capable of no action beyond passive defence and would constitute a standing temptation to the tribes while, if a rising did occur, it could do nothing to make the forcing of the Khyber more easy, though it would materially add to our anxieties. Service there would be in the highest degree unpopular, for practically the men would have to be strictly confined to the limits of the fort, and whatever precautions were used there would be the constant risk of men being murdered either in the vicinity of the post itself or when traversing the pass whilst going on or returning from leave. Not only fanatics, but any tribesman with a grievance against his Malik to which he wished to call attention would think such an opportunity too good to let slip. Continual friction would thus be kept up between the tribes and ourselves and, even if no general rising occurred, it would be scarcely possible to avoid punitive expeditions. Our position would be entirely false and, in my opinion, undignified.

I must add that my objection to locating troops permanently in the Khyber would not be removed even if the force were much larger than that proposed by Brigadier-General Nicholson and were to hold the whole line from Jamrud to Landi Kotal. From a military point of view the attempt to hold a pass by placing troops in the pass itself, while the strong ground on either flank is in the hands of tribesmen, who may at any moment become hostile, and on whose support events have shown that we cannot rely, is indefensible and foredoomed to failure. The present position in the Khyber is an illustration of this. We have three brigades under a General of Division there and yet cannot even protect our telegraph wire which is habitually cut the moment the day picquets are withdrawn.

I support Brigadier-General Nicholson's proposals for the reorganisation of the Khyber Rifles on the lines of the Turi Militia and the appointment of a small number of British officers.
to this force on which the task of keeping the Khyber open to traffic must in ordinary times devolve. But we must in future keep a body of troops ready to move to their assistance, if they are seriously menaced, and we must give them a definite assurance that such assistance will be afforded.

Our communications through the pass must also be improved. I do not advise that a line of rail should be laid down, but I am greatly in favour of a road of which the curves, gradients and bridges, shall all be suitable for such a line should it ever become necessary to lay one, provided the report of engineer experts shows such an alignment to exist.

12th February 1898.

Military Department unofficially.

Hon'ble Member.

12th February 1898.

P. J. MAITLAND.

There appear to be three ways in which the Khyber can be held—first, by a force at Landi Kotal, as proposed in General Nicholson's letter, aided by an armed body such as the Khyber Rifles; secondly, by an organised militia force like the Kurram Militia with British officers; thirdly, by absolute tribal responsibility.

2. With regard to the first of these alternatives, it is necessary to look back to what was decided upon when the defence of the North-West Frontier was under consideration in 1885, and we may be sure that the Secretary of State would notice any omission to refer to the discussion of that year. The initiation of the measures for the defence of the North-West Frontier formed part of the military plans which were proposed in that year, when we were within measurable distance of war with Russia.

A memorandum was drawn up by the Defence Committee and that Committee recommended that a strong enclosed work should be thrown up at Landi Kotal. In despatch No. 112, dated 10th July 1885, to Secretary of State, the Government did not clearly endorse this proposal. They approved of forming an entrenched camp at Peshawar—see paragraphs 19, 20 and 21.

3. The Military Committee on the North-West Frontier Defences, held at the India Office, recorded their opinion that it would be unwise to establish works at Landi Kotal unless rendered imperative by a movement on Kabul, which guided Sir Charles MacGregor, then Quarter-Master-General, in advocating the Khyber route being blocked by a strong entrenched position. Lord Roberts and others recorded their opinions. The Defence Committee considered that an entrenched position was requisite at the mouths of the Khyber, and Lord Roberts in commenting on this said that the defence of the Khyber Pass depended more upon political than military considerations, and that we ought to hold both outlets, but that the main defence should be at the western end, i.e., at Landi Kotal. At page 18 of the same paper will be found the reasons which guided Sir Charles MacGregor, then Quarter-Master-General, in advocating the Khyber route being blocked by a strong entrenched position. Lord Roberts considered that we must block the Khyber by holding both outlets, but that the main defence must be at the western end; and that there the pass would have to be forced, as it could not be turned or masked like any ordinary fortress. He considered that the position could be made practically impregnable by having a couple of small forts, one at Landi Kotal, and the other at or about China in the Bazar Valley, with a good road connecting them.

4. In their despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 156, dated 4th October 1886, paragraph 15, the Government of India pointed out that the postponement of a decision on this question was apparently misunderstood by the Secretary of State. They referred to the
importance of including the Khyber in a scheme of defence, but were of opinion that it would be sufficient for the present if a capacious enclosed serai for the accommodation of travellers and caravans were built at Landi Kotal, so designed as to be readily capable of conversion into a redoubt. They thought that steps should be taken gradually to familiarise the neighbouring tribes with the idea of an eventual occupation of the western outlet of the Khyber, and that the earliest favourable opportunity should be taken for carrying out this defensive measure in its integrity. This decision was the conclusion of a conference held between Sir Charles Aitchison, Lord Roberts, Sir Theodore Hope and Sir George Chesney. A note of this conference, held in August 1886, will be found at the end of Progs. B, October 1886, Nos. 227-235.

6. The Secretary of State, in his despatch No. 24, dated 27th January 1887, paragraph 10, concurred with the Government of India in thinking that a large serai, capable of defence, would suffice for the present by way of an outpost at Landi Kotal. He said that the road between Peshawar and Landi Kotal should be kept in good order, and that the importance of being able rapidly to extend the railway from Peshawar to Jamrud should be borne in mind.

7. So far the whole question had in a great measure been considered with special reference to the defence of India from an invading army, but in later years the value of the offensive from a base in India came into greater prominence, and this led to the view that Landi Kotal would be a favourable position for a large depot in the event of an advance on Jalalabad or Kabul; a system of water-supply was accordingly carried out at an expenditure of some Rs. 75,000, and the defensive of the serai was constructed at Landi Kotal at an expenditure of Rs. 1,74,000. It may be useful to note in what way the actual construction of the defensible serai took place. The exact position and details were left to the Punjab Government and the Commander-in-Chief.

8. These proceedings are of much interest, and show how the site selected for a covered and defensive serai gave "universal satisfaction" to the tribesmen. There is also a good deal about the Bazar valley both in the correspondence and notes that merits attention. I was against sending Sappers to Landi Kotal at that time, but as Sir M. Durand said in his note of 24th June 1887, the Khyber tribes so far from objecting to the construction of the fortified serai seemed to be struck by the proposal as a means of making money. "The whole object of our frontier policy, as I understand it (writes Sir M. Durand), is to give us military predominance over Russia in case of a conflict."

9. Lord Roberts considered the design of the serai should be restricted to the purpose of giving shelter for stores, and of affording a defensible outpost which may be occupied by troops in the event of its being necessary to push forward beyond Jamrud.

10. The general project for the serai was approved in February 1888.

11. The whole of the details were laid before Government in 1888, and the works including the water-supply were sanctioned. The design of the serai does not differ very much from the old defensible serais built in the Punjab, but there are emplacements for guns in the towers at the angles, and officers' quarters and barracks for one company British troops and two companies Native troops.

12. When the Afridis took possession of the Khyber, I am free to confess that it appeared to me scarcely possible to revive the arrangements which previously existed, and I felt that we must hold the Khyber, i.e., Landi Kotal, by our own troops. There is no doubt that it would strengthen our prestige along the whole of the North-West Frontier if we said to the Afridis: "You have broken your obligations, we will now take the Khyber Pass into our own hands, and henceforth it shall be British territory, administered by our own officers."

13. As regards the military aspect of the question, while I fully recognise the disadvantages of the position, which the Commander-in-Chief has noticed, I cannot think that there would be any real risk in stationing a force, such as a Native regiment with guns, in a strong fort at Landi Kotal, provided there was, as we always contemplate when thinking of future arrangements, a sufficient force to advance to its relief in case the garrison was beleaguered. Even if Ali Masjid had to be held, it is a question whether it is more unhealthy than many of the places we hold by frontier troops. Frequent reliefs would be necessary. Again, although the present road passes through the Khyber, there are other routes to Landi Kotal. The Mullagori route, for example, was surveyed for a cart road, and it might be well to have those surveys re-examined and the reasons for abandoning the project investigated.

14. The difficulty of holding the Khyber Pass, while the hills on either flank may be in the hands of the tribesmen, is inseparable from an attempt to hold a road in any mountainous
country, and certainly would have to be faced if we advanced into Afghanistan; but it must be admitted that the position is not a perfectly good one from a military point of view, and the only question is whether there are reasons which make for the acceptance of this plan, taking the risk which accompanies it.

15. The Secretary of State’s despatch No. 1, dated 28th January 1898, tells us that the maintenance of Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of our obligations to the Amir, or from that of the protection of British subjects, and that, although other routes may be preferred to this pass as a military route, under any circumstances the retention of an effective control over the Khyber is essential. He trusts that may be peaceable means will be used to secure to the Afridis some recognition of our new scheme, and enlist their good-will and assistance in the future protection of the road. He does not consider (paragraph 21) that we are bound in any way by the engagements which the Afridis deliberately broke, and is of opinion that, although adhering to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisation or the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of our arrangements with the tribes.

16. Landi Kotal is not in Afridi territory, and of course it is possible that we could make some arrangement with the Afridis by which they would hold the pass between our cantonment at Landi Kotal and Peshawar, just as the Kohat Pass Afridis hold the road between Peshawar and Kohat. But it cannot be said that such an arrangement is likely to be quite satisfactory, although it might be a workable one for some time.

17. Then the question arises, if we have a cantonment, e., a strong fortified work, at Landi Kotal, containing a sufficient garrison, and the practical control of the Khyber valley, would it be well to occupy such a position without taking over the administration of the Khyber? No one, I suppose, can tell exactly what views the Afridis will take. They might consider that, after all, if the allowances were restored, they might give up this bone of contention so long as we did not lay our sacrilegious hands upon Tirah. On the other hand, they might regard it as a point of honour to continue to harass us in our occupation of the Khyber route, and, if so, it would be a very inconvenient and expensive frontier possession. And there is also the question of the susceptibility of the Amir to be considered, and whether he would not regard a military post garrisoned by regular troops at Landi Kotal as in some degree a menace just as he is supposed to regard the cantonment of Chaman.

18. The sanitary aspect of the question cannot be left out of consideration. Landi Kotal is 3,600 feet above sea level, and is a comparatively open position, but we had cholera there during the Afghan war; now that we have a good water-supply, there is very much less danger of a recurrence. It is certainly a great deal cooler than Peshawar in the hot weather, and Torsappar, which is about 1,500 feet higher, would furnish a site for a sanitarium. Torsappar is N. N. E. of Landi Kotal, and 7 or 8 miles distant with an easy path. It is on the edge of the Shinwari country.

19. If the Landi Kotal position had been maintained in strength after the Afghan war, it was intended to form a cantonment with one mountain battery, one regiment of British infantry, one regiment of Native infantry and one troop of Native cavalry. It will be recalled that it was under the Khyber by the treaty of Gandamak, but that this never became operative. In this connection too it must be remembered that, though paragraph 5 of the agreement of 1881 said (on behalf of the Afridis) : “Our responsibility for the security of the road is independent of aid from Government in the form of troops,” it was added: “It lies with Government to retain its troops in the pass or to withdraw them and re-occupy at pleasure.” One thing is certain that whatever may be the advantages of the plan—and there it seems to me great advantages—some considerable expense would be attached to carrying it out.

20. The second plan is to hold Landi Kotal and the Khyber by a militia with British officers. This is the plan favoured by the Commander-in-Chief and has its advantages, but I do not quite understand whether it is intended to ignore tribal responsibility, or to make an arrangement with the Afridis by which the Khyber Rifles can be developed into such a force. No great changes would be necessary. When I saw the Khyber Rifles last April, they were very anxious to become more akin to regular troops and to have a system of pensions, &c. In this case, I presume, we should maintain our forts as at present.

21. The third plan would be absolute tribal responsibility, i.e., making arrangements with the Afridis, for certain allowances, to keep the pass open and to furnish their own men without the assistance of any organised body under our control. I do not think we could accept a system of pure and simple tribal responsibility. I entirely agree with the Commander-in-Chief, as I have stated before, that we must make provision for the rapid reinforcement of the Khyber posts and for a sufficient force to hold Landi Kotal when necessary.

22. I have entered into the question at some length I am afraid, but I thought it advisable to refer to the earlier conclusions of the Government of India in 1885-86. The
whole thing seems to be a balance of advantages or disadvantages. There is considerable attraction in the bolder course of telling the Afriids that we shall take the Khyber in our own hands and be responsible for its safety, showing them that this is the price they must pay for their aggression, and that they have got off cheaply by our not annexing Tirah. It might cost us something, not only in money but in life, but it would be a lasting mark of our power.

23. Then the question at once forces itself to the front—is the possession of the Khyber worth the trouble and expense, and is it not better to run a certain amount of risk by adopting the second plan considering that we should only require the Khyber line when we were prepared to advance in force upon Jalalabad and Kabul, and that we should have time to prepare any defensive works we may require, supposing such a contingency were to happen as the advance towards Kabul by Russia without our being able to prevent her getting there?

24. I am afraid that at the present moment I must say that I do not feel I can express a decided opinion, but I recognise the advantages of the Khyber being held without the aid of regular troops, if this be practicable. I do not think we are in a position, without hearing what Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny have to say with regard to the temper and so forth of the Afriids, to arrive at an absolutely definite conclusion in the matter. But though we may not be able to arrive at a definite conclusion at once, we may be able to state the advantages and disadvantages of the various plans, so that Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny may be able to give us the benefit of their opinion, formed after a careful consideration of these and of the local politics. We should also have the best opinion, founded on past and present experience as to the suitability or otherwise of Landi Kotal for a cantonment.

16th February 1898. 


His Excellency the Viceroy.

I am not sure from what I learned of Sir W. Lockhart’s and Sir R. Udny’s opinions that we are likely to obtain without considerable delay any definite lead as to the disposition, &c., of the Afriids. On the other hand, the telegrams to-day point to the possibility of an early settlement. Under these circumstances, I am not sure that we shall not be forced to adopt the policy which Sir W. Lockhart suggested to me in conversation, i.e., to continue our occupation of the Khyber through the summer. If we do this, we shall show the tribes our power to hold it and the necessity of their remaining quiet, and we shall have time to determine deliberately what the permanent form of occupation should be. I should like to discuss this point in Council on Friday. This is a Foreign Office question, and I transfer the papers to that Department which will please circulate with their own file linked, and bring up in Council.

21st February 1898. 

Circulated. (The Military Department file is linked.) 

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

23rd February 1898.

I quite agree that, whatever may be decided as to the future holding of the Khyber, we cannot withdraw our troops from the pass, even after all sections have submitted, until arrangements have been made with the tribesmen for the guardianship of the Khyber route. These arrangements will take some time, but I do not think there need be much delay in settling the preliminaries. I therefore think it would be sufficient to decide at the present time that they shall stay until tribal arrangements for keeping open the pass without the help of our regular troops are completed.

With reference to my note of 12th February, I would like to make it clear that one of my main objections to holding the pass with troops is based on the supposition that we hold the line of the pass only. But it is possible that the suggestion made in these notes that we should take over the administration of the Khyber may have a wider significance than I can yet attribute to it with certainty. A strong post in the Bazar valley, say, at China, would go far to secure the Khyber against Afriidi aggression. It would of course use up a number of troops, but if our pledges to the tribes and the orders of Her Majesty’s Government do not preclude this course, I think it would put the occupation of the Khyber with regular troops on much sounder military grounds.

24th February 1898. 

G. S. W(hite).

24th February 1898. 


24th February 1898. 

A. C. T(revor).
ORDER IN COUNCIL.

Inform Sir William Lockhart, in reply to his letter of the 3rd February sending General Nicholson’s note, that the Government of India do not feel prepared to accept, without further investigation, proposals contained in it: and wish that they should be investigated by Sir William Lockhart and Sir R. Udny in greater detail, also the Government of India suggest an examination of any alternatives, such as His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief’s suggestion to hold the pass by a militia under the analogy of the Kurram militia.

In the meantime the Government of India are of opinion that the Afridis, when they have submitted, should be told that the Khyber will be occupied for the present. They should be warned that the conduct of the tribes in the interval will be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision as to the nature of the final arrangements which may be made for the safety of the pass.

The observations of Sir William Lockhart will be invited on this point and the sanction of the Secretary of State will be asked.

25th February 1898.

His Excellency.

Draft letter to Sir William Lockhart submitted.

I am doubtful whether it is desired to enter into the policy of the Government of India as regards the Khyber, and to say more of it in the spirit of the Hon’ble Military Member’s note, definitely declaring that a safe road and a military position are desired for the defence of India and for facility to advance in defence of the Kabul-Kandahar line, as well as a secure tradeway. Perhaps the third paragraph should be expanded in this sense.

26th February 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I am asking Sir E. Collen to communicate direct to Sir W. Lockhart the points which he mentioned in Council as requiring consideration. I learned yesterday that Sir William now hopes to leave by the mail of March 12th, and there is little time to spare, and to adjust the official letter might necessitate a reference to the Commander-in-Chief.

Telegraph the purport of paragraph 5 to Sir W. Lockhart and ask immediate reply. We can then apply to Secretary of State probably by Tuesday for his sanction.

27th February 1898.

E.

(Telegram to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1057 F., dated the 28th February 1898.)
Telegram from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, dated the 2nd (received 3rd) March 1898.

Approves of the occupation of the Khyber Pass pending a settlement of future arrangement.

Copy sent officially to Military Department.

G. H.—3rd March 1898.
Nothing else required.

J. S.—3rd March 1898.

4th March 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Peshawar, No. 5534 T., dated the 11th (received 14th) March 1898.

Forwards a memorandum containing his views on the best method for holding the Khyber Pass in future, and says that he hopes to forward on the 14th instant the paper which Sir R. Udny is drawing up on the subject.

We may await the paper which Sir Richard Udny is drawing up.

On reading over this paper, one is forced to the conclusion that Sir William Lockhart thinks the Khyber Rifles ought to have been supported by troops last August.

15th March 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

His Excellency.

I have telegraphed personally to Sir Richard Udny for the early submission of his views. The Government of the Punjab will have to be consulted and the Lieutenant-Governor will probably consult other frontier officers of experience as well. It would save time if Sir William Lockhart's memorandum were sent to the Punjab at once, provided Sir Richard Udny could let the Lieutenant-Governor have his papers direct. Sir William Lockhart's alone will probably not save time.

I presume that all political authorities will agree that, "in undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single pass, however important." I think it follows that, independently of the military objections to holding the whole of the Khyber with troops alone, that plan should be put out of consideration. The arrangements which are least exasperating in peace will be the strongest in time of trouble, and troops on an obligatory line of advance are not 'locked up,' unless the circumstances of their being in that position necessitate their being in greater numbers than the security of the line would have demanded if they had not been permanently placed there. The greatest importance therefore attaches to the opinion expressed that, "when the tribesmen see that their allowances are not to be forfeited and the Khyber Rifles are not to be disbanded, they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal, as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours."

Paragraph 6.

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Paragraph 7.

If that is right, it seems to follow that the plan of planting an advanced cantonment at Landi Kotal and employing the Khyberis in a militia to guard the pass, offers the best chance of permanent security. It is essential to that plan that means of access to the cantonment should be always maintained. What are the arrangements to be made for ensuring means of access is a question for military men. Sir William Lockhart does not say that the situation in August failed to afford such means of access, but I believe that
be the accepted military opinion. Nor does he say what is absolutely necessary for the future, but I understand him to think railway communication with Landi Kotal is a necessity.

I venture to say that public confidence will not be satisfied with less, and that a cantonment at Landi Kotal having its access with India by a road which is guarded by the Khyber Rifles will have too great a superficial resemblance to the situation in Chitral.

Safe means of access in order to support the posts all along the Khyber in time of trouble is an equal necessity for holding the pass by means of irregular troops alone; and if it were established that a cantonment at Landi Kotal would be a source of irritation and of weakness, that is the next plan to be considered for securing the safety of the pass. As a matter of initial cost therefore transport—be it railway or otherwise—has, I think, to be added to Sir William Lockhart's estimate in either contingency; and according to that estimate irregular troops alone will cost less in initial expenditure than the plan which he advocates by 4½ lakhs. The recurring expenditure of a cantonment will, of course, be considerable. I have not the means of calculating it.

It seems possible, the memorandum states, "had the Khyber Rifles been promptly reinforced by regular troops in August last, that, with few exceptions, they would have posts and the defensible serai and water-supply from destruction, and that the formidable tribal gathering would have melted away, as it did on a previous occasion, as soon as troops were moved up the pass in support."

In passing I would remark that, if the former occasion means Amin Khan's filibustering in 1892, the circumstances were dissimilar. The military demonstration in 1892 was supporting the majority of the tribe against a turbulent minority composed of a part only of one clan. A demonstration was all that was required. The vast majority of the tribe in 1897 was against a small minority on our side. A military demonstration was made and was ineffectual. The military authorities will say whether the force at Jamrud could have penetrated into the Khyber. I have always understood that the operation was considered to be too hazardous to be permitted.

The memorandum at the foot of page 3 seems to treat irregular corps and local levies as similar. In the way we use the terms, they are very different and the axiom of frontier policy there stated would apply, I think, to irregular corps only. When dealing with levies the leverage is through the self-interest of the men in authority in the tribe who supply and maintain the levies. Levies would be employed if the fourth method were to be tried. That, however, seems clearly incompatible with the Secretary of State's injunction that 'the safety of the pass must be the paramount consideration.'

I suggest that Sir William Lockhart's memorandum be sent to the Punjab Government for opinion, and that Sir R. Udny be asked to send his paper to the Punjab direct as soon as he sends it here; and that the Lieutenant-Governor be asked particularly for the best opinion he can give as to the feeling which would be aroused by putting a cantonment in Landi Kotal, while his attention would be drawn to the necessity which exists, in any arrangements for the safety of the pass, for ensuring prompt support to the posts in the pass. He could give his opinion on the best way of effecting this.

16th March 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I do not think we shall save time by referring this to the Punjab Government at this moment. Sir R. Udny's paper will, I have no doubt, represent very much the views of the Lieutenant-Governor, and at any rate there are certain distinctly debatable opinions in Sir W. Lockhart's paper which, if sent to the Punjab Government without remark, will cause irritation, delay and a mass of writing to encumber our discussion. What I should like to do is to submit the two papers to Council before we leave, and if the file is returned to me with Sir R. Udny's note as soon as it arrives, I will send it into circulation.

In the meantime, however, there is one paragraph (7) which deals with the more immediate future, and the proposal to re-establish the allowances at once is eminently one on which we must consult the Lieutenant-Governor. I would telegraph to him as follows:

"Government of India are considering future arrangements in Khyber and have received memorandum from Sir W. Lockhart, but Udny's opinion not yet received and further consideration necessary. In meantime continuation of occupation of pass, pending completion of settlement, has been sanctioned by Secretary of State. In this connection Sir W. Lockhart proposes:—Begins. As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic, subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. Ends. He thinks restoration of allowances and re-enlistment of Khyber Rifles will re-assure tribes and make them more willing to accept any arrangement we may hereafter adopt. Government of India desire very early expression of Lieutenant-Governor's opinion on this proposal."

17th March 1898.

E.

(Telegram to the Punjab Government, No. 1369 F., dated the 17th March 1898.)

N.-W. F.
D. No. 820 F.

Telegram from the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, No. 118 C., dated the 19th (received 21st) March 1898.

Specifies certain questions which, in His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, require full deliberation and discussion with the tribes, and says that allowances should not be granted until they are settled.

Secretary.

His Excellency the Viceroy wished this re-submitted to him as soon as Sir Richard Udny's note came in. The note having been received, the case is put up accordingly.

21st March 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

His Excellency.

It would delay this and render discussion in Council perhaps impossible if I were to note further now.

21st March 1898.

W. J. Cunningham.

Sir R. Udny's paper is much more in accord with Sir W. Lockhart than I had expected, and I think further reference to the Lieutenant-Governor will now become necessary, and at any rate the official letter promised in the telegram of March 19th, must be awaited. But in fact there is good deal still to be done before we are in a position to come to any determination on the permanent arrangements in the Khyber. I have communicated with the Hon'ble Military Member, and suggested certain enquiries to supplement the Memoranda of Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny, especially on the points raised by Hon'ble Member in his note of February 16th. Then we shall in Foreign Department also get up the case, communicating with the Punjab Government where necessary, and on this I have spoken to Secretary.

The points on which I desire the opinion of Council before we separate have to do with the temporary occupation of the Pass by our troops, while the permanent arrangements are being considered. Sir W. Lockhart some time ago stated that, so soon as the Afridi submission was complete, he would reduce the Tirah force first to a division and then to a strong brigade, the latter being sufficient to hold the Pass itself. I am of opinion that while this force is maintained, it will be advisable to retain the political relations under the Foreign Department, and if General Gascoole, who of the officers actually on the spot has, I believe, more capability for this work, can be put in command as Brigadier, I should be satisfied to name him as Chief Political Officer with Mr. Donald, whom the Lieutenant-Governor is willing to depute, as his Assistant. To this plan all whom I have consulted agree, except the Lieutenant-Governor, who not unnaturally urges that the political control shall now revert to the Punjab.

I shall be prepared to explain in detail when Council meets; in the meantime I abstain from writing at length.

The only other point I will notice now, and is the one referred to the Punjab Government in our telegram of the 17th, I confess on that point I am disposed to agree with the Lieutenant-Governor. I cannot but think that if we re-enlist the Khyber Rifles, and by so doing throw a considerable sum of money into the tribes, we ought not to be in a hurry in restoring the Maliki allowances, but, on the contrary, keep them in reserve till the tribes accept our permanent conditions. Our original intention was to do far more
and to confiscate the allowances, in whole or in part, until the cost of repairing the forts and posts in the Pass had been recouped. Even if we are not to insist upon that, and the point has not yet been decided, I doubt the expediency of showing too much willingness to condone the fault of the Malik.

I do not circulate these papers to give Hon'ble Members the trouble of recording written opinions, so much as to allow of a perusal of the papers. I think the current papers might be sent out to each Member at once, and there may then be time for the file itself to go round before Friday.

Copy of Sir W. Lockhart's No. 5534 T., dated the 11th March 1898, Foreign Department telegram No. 1356 F., dated the 17th March, General Officer Commanding's No. 5672 T., dated the 16th March, and Punjab Government telegram No. 118 C., dated the 19th March 1898, sent to Hon'ble Members.

22nd March 1898. E. H. S. Clarke.

22nd March 1898.

Seen.

23rd March 1898.

J. W. (Estland).

23rd March 1898.

J. W. (Oodburn).

23rd March 1898.

A. C. T. (Bever).

23rd March 1898.

M. D. C. (Halmeres).

24th March 1898.

E. H. H. (Colleen).

24th March 1898.

C. E. N. (Airne).

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

If the anticipations of Sir William Lockhart as to the settlement with the Afridis by the end of March are realized (see his telegram No. 2965 of the 24th March), the reduction of the Tirah Expeditionary Force to three brigades may be carried out.

2. Subject to Sir William Lockhart explaining the necessity or advantage of retaining one brigade at Maman, the distribution proposed is accepted.

3. A further reduction to one brigade will be made when practicable.

Sir William Lockhart to be informed that the Government of India are of opinion that, while the Khyber Rifles may be continued on a temporary footing, the whole question of the tribal allowances must be reserved, as it is inexpedient to renew the tribal allowances at any rate until the permanent arrangements for the Khyber have been discussed and settled, and that the whole subject, including his proposals, necessitates inquiries which will be taken up immediately, and orders cannot issue at present.

25th March 1898.

Communicate to the Military Department, for information and issue of necessary orders, Sir William Lockhart's—

No. 5534 T., dated 11th March, and enclosure;

Telegram to Punjab, No. 1356 F., dated 17th March;

Telegram from Punjab, No. 148 C., dated 16th March;

Sir William Lockhart's No. 5672 T., dated 16th March, and enclosure;

Order in Council, dated 25th March 1898;


A letter has to go to the Punjab referring for opinion the two memoranda and the letter now drafted to Sir William Lockhart and telling the Lieutenant-Governor the decision come to in first three paragraphs of the Council Order.

25th March 1898.

W. J. Cunningham.
Drafts to Punjab and Military Department put up.

25th March 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.


(Office-Memorandum, Military Department, No. 1445 F., dated the 25th March 1898.)

N.-W. F.

D. No. 863 F.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force (to the Adjutant-General in India), No. 2965 T., dated the 24th (received 25th) March 1898 (Confidential).

Suggests certain military arrangements which, in the event of the Afridis settling up by the end of March 1898, might then come into effect.

This telegram was considered in Council to-day and orders passed. A copy is going to Punjab with an official letter.

25th March 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

His Excellency.

I submit a draft letter to the Punjab Government regarding the future arrangements in the Khyber. The Lieutenant-Governor's official expression of opinions already demi-officially given to Your Excellency has not arrived yet.

26th March 1898.

W. J. Cunningham.

I think draft asks too much about the feelings of the tribes, for after all that must be ascertained by the officers in contact with them who are under our orders, and does not direct the Lieutenant-Governor's attention to the practical point, i.e., the difficulty of carrying on the tribal levy system for want of a Commandant. I cannot at all accept the statements in paragraph 3 of draft.

27th March 1898.

E.

(To the Government of the Punjab, No. 1473 F., dated the 28th March 1898)

* With copy of notes. (Endorsement to the Military Department, No. 1473 F., dated the 28th March 1898.)

N.-W. F.

D. No. 952 F.

From the Government of the Punjab, No. 329, dated the 1st (received 4th) April 1898.

In continuation of their telegram No. 118 C, of the 18th (19th?) March 1898, communicate in some detail the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in regard to the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber.
In reply to Foreign Department letter No. 1472 F., dated the 28th March 1898, refer to the above letter containing the Lieutenant-Governor's views on the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber, and state that His Honour hopes very shortly to discuss fully the proposals contained in the letter under reply. Communicate Sir Mackworth Young's satisfaction in regard to the restoration of the allowances of the Afridis.

Deputy Secretary.

The Viceroy has already informed Sir Mackworth Young that His Excellency has not overlooked his views "with regard to committing the reconstruction of Khyber arrangements to the Punjab Government, but that it is impossible to decide what share in the work can be so devolved till we determine the general lines of our policy."

Apparently we can only await the further letter promised by the Lieutenant-Governor in Mr. Dane's No. 838 of the 2nd April 1898. Meantime, perhaps, a copy of his letter No. 329, dated the 1st April, should be sent to General Symons for his information.

7th April 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

Secretary.

I am inclined to think we should do nothing till we get the further letter from the Punjab.

7th April 1898.

H. Daly.

Yes; I think so.

7th April 1898.

W. J. Cuningham.

As requested in our letter No. 1472 F., dated the 28th March 1898, forwards the views of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner, Peshawar, on the general question of the control of the Khyber Pass.

Secretary.

You wished to see this before His Excellency's arrival.

2. It appears to me that, as regards the Khyber, the question for consideration may be stated thus—

How can reasonably reliable arrangements for the safety of the pass be secured without avoidable interference with the tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, and without giving ground, among the North-Western Frontier tribes generally and the Afridis in particular, to restlessness and suspicion as to the intentions of Government?

3. Mr. Merk says—'Supposing two hostile sub-sections are fighting between Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal; if there are no troops at Landi Kotal, it does not matter to us what the belligerents do; it is easy to arrange that on the days the pass is open they abstain from interference with the road and caravans on it, and for the rest they can do what they like for all we care. But if there are troops at Landi Kotal, it is intolerable that there should be fighting and the risk of interruption on our line of communications; we must forbid it.'
You have given the opinion ‘that it will be very much to our advantage if the responsibility for the administration of the Khyber is also undertaken,’ and Sir E. Collen has noted that ‘Sir R. Udny said he should like to cut the Khyber off from the Afridis altogether.’ But the Lieutenant-Governor says—I have no hesitation in saying that the permanent occupation of Landi Kotal by a military force will never be accepted by the Afridis with complacency. I believe that the tribe would object as strongly to a military occupation of that point as they would to the location of a force at Ali Masjid or any other similar place within their own limits. They regard the pass as their property. Occupation to them would mean annexation, and ... I doubt if it could result in anything else. It would constitute a continuing disgrace which might at any future time supply the motive for hostilities. The tribal honour would be seriously affected and a deep-seated resentment would be engendered instead of the friendly attitude which Sir W. Lockhart considers of much greater moment than the absolute safety of the pass.’

As regards communications with Landi Khana, it might no doubt be possible to open up some line north of the Khyber, but for us to rely on such a line would, I submit, be regarded as a sign of weakness, unless the alternative route was distinctly advantageous on general grounds. No such alternative route can apparently be superior to the Khyber unless it is a railway up the Kabul river, and that, as His Excellency has noted, could not, for present purposes, be regarded as a substitute or alternative for the Khyber route, but rather as supplementary to it.

In paragraph 6 of his Minute the Lieutenant-Governor reiterates the opinion that a post at Landi Khana (Kotal?) would ‘greatly irritate and annoy’ the Amir. This will, I think, be admitted, though I do not know what grounds the Lieutenant-Governor says, and I don’t think we can agree, that it must be admitted that recent events have shown that the Amir ... at all events is not indisposed to back up the Afridis in their attitude of independence and defiance, when troubles arise between them and the British Government.

In paragraph 8 the Lieutenant-Governor writes—What is of primary importance is this, that the advance, which would possibly not be met by any overt opposition at the outset, would nevertheless constitute a grievance which would be nursed till the season of opportunity. If it is important that we should have the tribes friendly when we may have to march into Kabul, then we should avoid if possible doing that which will inevitably set them all against us.

4. The conclusions then to which the papers point seem to me to be—

(i) no advanced post at Landi Kotal or elsewhere;
(ii) hold the pass with militia organised on the same lines as the Kurram Militia;
(iii) make adequate arrangements for the prompt support of the militia at need.

Except in the matter of improved organisation of the tribal force in the pass, a decision as above would follow the decision of 1880-81 that no system of joint responsibility with the tribes should be attempted.

5. If the decision is against a post at Landi Kotal, I venture to suggest that our intentions and wants might be plainly stated to the Afridis, and stated in such a manner that the other tribes and the Amir should come to know of them. I would say that what we require is safety for our subjects and other traders when using the pass, and ability to use the pass without let or hindrance in the event of its ever becoming necessary to send troops into Afghanistan, in order to meet our engagements with the Amir. That the recent conduct of the Afridis has thrown such doubt upon their good faith that the Government have seriously considered the advisability of themselves holding and administering the pass. That the Government desire, however, to avoid, if possible, any advance of posts in this direction, and any measures which would necessitate interference in purely tribal affairs. That consequently, the Afridis will be given another chance of meeting the requirements of Government without our direct intervention; but that, if difficulties again occur, we shall not hesitate to take any measures which may appear advisable to secure to us the free use of the pass at any time.

6. Action as above might perhaps operate to lull suspicion and restlessness; and, with that end in view, it appears to me that there is much to be said for Mr. Merk’s suggestion to restore the Afridi allowances en bloc with the aim of re-assuring the Afridis that we mean by-gones to be by-gones, and that we have no ulterior designs. The restoration could, of course, be made with any necessary conditions, and subject to adjustment of any recoveries to be insisted on on account of losses of property or damages done which had not been made good.

7. Among the papers in this file are some notes as to lines of communication, &c., on which you suggested, on the 9th November, that Sir William Lockhart should be asked
directly, 'what he thought of a line to Kurram and Cantonment at Para Chinar in preference to the line he recommends up the Kabul river.' As far as I know, the question was never put, and I don’t think we have any express opinion by Sir William Lockhart; but the memorandum enclosed with his letter of the 11th March 1898, No. 5534/1, says—'The delay of a week or a fortnight in entering Afghan territory might involve momentous consequences in a political as well as a military sense.' From Para Chinar Afghan territory could be entered in a couple marches and Kabul is only 117 miles from Kurram Fort, while it is over 160 from Landi Kotal.

21st April 1898.

H. Daly.

**His Excellency.**

The materials now before the Government of India will probably be deemed to be sufficient to enable a decision to be taken as to the means to be employed for the future safety of the Khyber Pass, though there will, of course, be many matters of detail to be settled.

2. The objects to be aimed at may be shortly stated as keeping the pass continually open to peaceful trade and available for military operations; but there is, I think, a third one, which is to maintain and enforce the authority of the British Government upon its own border. There must be a strong feeling among the people on and about the border, and it will be shared by public opinion, that if, after all that has happened upon the North-Western Frontier, we revert to the same arrangements for managing the Khyber as were in force up to last August, the campaign cannot have been an unqualified success, and we have to be content with declaring the game to be drawn. The Lieutenant-Governor is of opinion that the restoration of the old order will in one respect have a better effect than anything new, in that it will clearly illustrate the hopelessness of attempting to upset our arrangements. That, however, refers to the effect upon the Afridis themselves. It may be questioned, perhaps, even in that limited aspect, but, as to the effect upon public opinion in India and at home, I venture to doubt that the Lieutenant-Governor’s view will be adopted.

While, however, I mention this consideration, I do not mean that it should control the action of the Government of India. What is before them is to adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, but to make the safety of the Khyber Pass the paramount consideration.

3. No one in these papers has put more strongly than Sir William Lockhart the necessity of carrying the Afridis with us in the arrangements which now have to be made. He says—

> "In undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes has been to the security of any single pass, however important." What we ought to tell the tribesmen is that, so long as they fulfill their engagements to us, and so long as their attitude towards each other does not bring them into conflict with us, or endanger the security of the road, we are perfectly content to leave them to manage their own affairs." The Lieutenant-Governor expresses it that "the best guarantee for permanence in the new arrangements will be a deliberate estimate of what they (the Afridis) are able and willing both to promise and to perform."

All military opinion is in favour of, or insists on the necessity of, securing the actual work of the Afridis in patrolling and picketing the pass, and all political opinion insists on the cooperation of the Afridis’ sentiment in concurring in the arrangements made for garrisoning and holding it. The difference of opinion which exists is in respect of the way in which the Afridis will regard the location of a cantonment of troops at Landi Kotal. Mr. Merk and the Lieutenant-Governor express very strong opinions on this important point, and Sir R. Udny, though he is not so insistent, thinks it probable that the Afridis would regard it as a threat to their independence. Sir William Lockhart, on the other hand, is of opinion that they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours. Their actions and their petitions have been against this conclusion. If it is not one which can be unhesitatingly accepted, the location of that post militates against Sir William Lockhart’s own estimate of the importance of securing the Afridis’ good-will. Unless the Lieutenant-Governor and the officers of the Punjab, who have had excellent opportunity of knowing the Afridi, are wrong in their conclusions, the military object which is before the Government of India will be best attained by not placing troops at the west end of the pass.

4. Except in regard to the question of troops or no troops in the pass, there is, I think, no essential difference in the views expressed in these papers. The Lieutenant-Governor does not give a decided preference for ‘militia’ over ‘levies,’ but he inclines to the former, and would
in any case attach British officers to the force. In that case the force cannot be a true levy
force, it cannot rest upon the responsibility of the tribe alone, and any reconstitution of the
force upon lines which are calculated to hide the fact that in the last resort the British
Government will be responsible to keep open the pass, is likely to lead in time of trouble to
uncertainty and vacillation. I understand the Lieutenant-Governor, therefore, to give his
opinion in favour of a militia without any regular troops.

5. Mr. Merk describes the Afridi-British partnership forcibly, and he is probably right in
his views of what must happen if the superior partner overshadows the whole arrangement by
stationing troops and British officers at Landi Kotal. At the same time, troops or no troops,
the British Government must have a position of a superior and not of an equal partner,
and when we intervene to prohibit an appeal to arms in the pass, whether it be on caravan
days or on every day, we must do so as the supreme authority. It may be that this will lead to
our administering justice; we have since 1880 done so under a notification of the Government
of India, giving magisterial powers to British
officers in the pass, and that fact has not led to
annexation. "Between administering justice and virtual annexation, the distinction," Mr. Merk
writes, "is fine, it is a hair's breadth," and this may be theoretically correct, but it does not
follow in practice that the hair is not broad enough. The British Government must be the
dominant partner and in the last resort what shall be and shall not be in the Khyber must be
determined by the British Government. It does not follow that we shall put ourselves in the
position of being constantly called on to assert our dominance. In respect to the final respon-
sibility for the pass arrangements, Mr. Merk says a local force is required, "raised, paid,
equipped, controlled and commanded completely by Government"; he would not revive the
de jure tribal and de facto Government Corps, which began in 1881 as Jezailchis and ended in
1897 as Khyber Rifles, but "with respect to that portion of the allowances which represents
the tribal subsidies, apart from the tolls, we shall have and shall enforce tribal responsibility,
and shall get our quid pro quo," and later on "a mixed system appears to be the only feasible
course." With this I agree as long as it is understood that the arrangements are to be backed
up by the British power and do not rest upon this tribal responsibility, and that it is made clear
that the final responsibility lies on the British Government.

6. Military dispositions would be required to support these pass arrangements, as to
which the Lieutenant-Governor and Mr. Merk both make specific proposals. These I do not
venture to criticise. If it is accepted that the force, transport and communications must be
such that, in the event of a breakdown like that of August 1897, the pass can be unquestion-
ably seized and held, the means of providing these is a military question into which I cannot
enter. It is enough to say that these arrangements would depend for their efficacy on these
military dispositions being adequate.

7. If the pass is to be held by a militia and under agreements—or arrangements—with the
Afridi clans, the restoration of allowances, both in commutation of rights to levy tolls, and in
respect of the subordinate responsibility placed upon the several clans of the Khyber Afridis,
must follow. I do not think it is established that the allowances should be restored just as
they used to exist. A late telegram from General Symons indicates that the clans profess
inability to carry out all the conditions upon which the Government of India have expressed
readiness to treat with them, and the security taken from them seems to be insufficient.
It is possible that, in the matter of exacting compensation for looted property, it may be
advisable to make conditions in the new tribal arrangements rather than to hold
aloof from entering into them until the clans have fully satisfied our demands. This is the
plan which has been suggested with regard to making good the value of the buildings
damaged or destroyed in the Khyber. The Commissioner of Peshawar estimates their value
at Rs. 2,50,000. It would take years to recover that sum from the Khyber Afridi clans.
In the new arrangements also it may be possible, and, if so, I venture to say it is desirable,
to make every payment correspond with a definite duty, and to give more towards employ-
ment in the Rifles and less in Malik. General Symons has proposed that Mr. Cunningham
and Sir R. Udney should come to Simla and discuss the situation, and I think it would be
advantageous if they did, in order to come to a clear knowledge as to how we stand with regard
to the completion by the Afridis of the payments and restorations required by Sir
William Lockhart's proclamation.

8. It is probably unnecessary to defer for this discussion a decision on the question
whether a force of regular troops is to be maintained permanently in the Khyber or not, nor
whether the allowances are to be restored, subject to modifications if feasible and desirable;
but the decision of what modifications should be arrived at might be deferred, and there are
details of the settlement which might be discussed with advantage.

9. The tribe will want the terms reduced to writing. It is for consideration whether
the form should be an agreement or sanad. I would like it to be a sanad, but that is also
a question on which it would be well to hear Mr. Cunningham, Sir R. Udney and the Lieutenant-
Governor.

10. It may be a good thing if the Aka Khel, who do not get any of the Khyber service
and allowances, were paid for keeping up the road which has been made from Bars to Manani,
and that could also be discussed at the same time.

23rd April 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.
In connection with the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass, proposes that the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should also be Political Officer in the Khyber.
1. I share with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the opinion that the two sides of this question, the political and the military, cannot be dissociated in our consideration of the subject. That they co-exist was admitted in what is practically the first paper in the discussion, i.e., the Memorandum prepared by General Nicholson. In it, and in the longer Memorandum submitted by Sir W. Lockhart on March 11th, it is not unnatural to find it stated that the military object is "undoubtedly the more important of the two;" but for the moment I pass that by, simply withholding my assent to the proposition. What I must point out is that in these Memoranda, and substantially in Sir R. Udny's also, the one object alone is considered. It is assumed that reasons exist for a military occupation of the Pass and a scheme is worked out for the military occupation. The only reference by Sir W. Lockhart to the political side of the question is in paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of March 11th, where he expresses the opinion that the military post at Lundi Kotal will restore the confidence of the tribes. This opinion is stoutly contested by the Lieutenant-Governor and Mr. Merk, and it does not strike me as a very strong link in the chain of argument. But whether correct or not, it is unaccompanied by any indication of the manner in which the political relations with the tribes and the arrangements of the trade route, the first in order of the two objects in the Memorandum, are to be regulated. "The Political Officer in the Khyber" is named in paragraph 6, but his position is wholly undefined, and, as I think I shall be able to show later, it is of the essence of any scheme that can be expected to work, to settle this difficult point. General Symons, like the soldier he is, cuts the Gordian knot, and proposes that the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should be Political Officer in the Khyber. It is somewhat material to recognise that until now there has been no military occupation of the Khyber Pass; on the contrary, the whole of the arrangements have been under the civil authority. The Punjab Government, therefore, in asking that it should be entrusted with the management for the future, asks for nothing new, but rather that it shall not be deprived of what it has always possessed.

Letter of May 7th.

2. It seems to me necessary to attempt in the first place to get a clear idea of what the interests are for which a military occupation is proposed. It is a subject often discussed, as Sir E. Collen tells us in his Note of February 16th, in the earlier paragraphs of which he summarises very effectively the course of those discussions, and points out how the issue has changed from that of the defence of India from an invading army to that of having an offensive base. As Sir W. Lockhart also confines his object to securing "ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary," I shall set aside all question of the more extensive proposals of 1885 and 1886 which I do not think could in any case come within the scope of the orders of the Secretary of State in the Despatch of January 28th.

3. I shall set aside also any idea of a larger military occupation than that proposed by Sir W. Lockhart. Mr. Merk's criticism of the smallness of the force loses a good deal if we remember that a supporting column is always to be held in readiness; though at the same time I do not think it could be
denied that this Lundi Kotal garrison would never have the controlling influence over the tribes that the posts at Wano, Malakand, and in Chitral were intended and ought to have.

4. So far as I can see there are two reasons only for the military occupation of Lundi Kotal:—one, that it will be required as a depot in the event of any advance, and that there must be no doubt of its being available; the other, that it is necessary to have reservoirs and other works for the improvement of the water-supply, and that we cannot afford to spend this money and not protect the works. Now I might refer to Sir G. White's opinion and say that neither of these things are essential; and so far as the first of them is concerned, I can see no chance of there being any hostile force that could prevent our occupying Lundi Kotal at any time that we contemplated an advance, as we have always done hitherto. I recognise, however, that our power to occupy this place without fighting, and to find there a good water-supply, are advantages that might under conceivable circumstances prove of value, and, if the Secretary of State takes that view, with his greater knowledge of the attitude of Russia and the consequent possibility of an advance being forced upon us, I should not be prepared to object, provided that we did all in our power to lessen the chances of friction, (a) with the tribes, (b) with the Amir, as the result of our establishing a fortified post in this particular position. I confess I am relieved to find that the Commander-in-Chief and the Hon'ble Military Member, though they differ in a detail of importance, concur in thinking it would be safe to rely upon Afridis for the safeguarding of the Pass, including the works at Lundi Kotal. It has always seemed to me that besides all other difficulties the objections stated in paragraph 4 of Sir G. White's Note of February 12th deserve much consideration. A small force of foreigners might get on fairly well amongst the comparatively quiet population of Chitral; but a single regiment surrounded by Afridis is a very different thing, and I am sure it is wise to avoid the risk if we can. I agree with the Hon'ble Member that though it may strike people at home as strange, it is not unreasonable to believe that if we entrust these posts to Afridis under conditions in which they will know that we shall support them against attack, they will keep them for us even from their own tribesmen. Personally I think we can argue this from what the Khyber Rifles actually did last year; but I also happened a few days ago to see a return of the number of Afridi deserters, and it seems to me altogether remarkable that, between September 1897 and May 1898 out of more than 750 Afridis in the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force only 18 deserted. I think it is a reasonable presumption that Afridis holding the Pass under the command of British officers carefully selected for the purpose might be relied upon.

5. As I have referred to the subject I may as well here make the admission that I think the force in the Khyber must for the future be commanded by British officers. I was unwilling to come to this, because in my judgment it shuts out the tribal levy properly so called. It would be convenient if the Government of India laid down some rule on the nomenclature in these cases, and I think it ought to be this. The "tribal levy" ought to be essentially dependant on tribal authority, employed, paid, summoned for any special duty, through tribal authority; and any contribution we make to their support should be regarded as made to co-operate in the assertion of the right and power of the tribe to restrain the budmarshes of their own and neighbouring territories. The better rule is not to supply arms, but to let them use the weapons of the country which are sufficient for police duties. Drill and discipline to enable them to act in large bodies are undesirable; and it follows therefore that British military officers in command, or even as inspectors, are out of place. But there are some cases, and may be more, in which greater efficiency becomes desirable. The Khyber Rifles have shown us that this can be to a large measure attained without British officers being in actual command; but I think it will be admitted that in Muhammad Aslam Khan we had an exceptional instrument, and also that a good deal must be attributed to the help and guidance of Colonel Warburton. Generally speaking, the direct
superintendence of British officers will in these circumstances become essential, and then it appears to me equally essential to recognise the force as a British not a tribal force; and to mark the distinction the term "Militia" as used in the Kurram is appropriate.

6. I have somewhat elaborated this distinction because I venture to hope that if it is accepted as the clear and universal rule for the future, we need not be called upon to discuss an incident of last year which has given rise to bitter personalities, and which could not have occurred if the rule I suggest had been in force. I am the more anxious for this, knowing that one at least of my colleagues does not share the views which I should be compelled to maintain if I was obliged to enter into details, and having reason to believe that the Secretary of State will not object to our disposing of the matter in this way.

7. I say then that I accept the proposition that the force in the Khyber should in future be a force under British officers. I do so for three reasons:—(i) because I am informed that a native officer qualified to hold the command cannot be found. The Lieutenant-Governor seemed to doubt this when I mentioned it to him, but I think it was the conclusion come to with the assent of Sir D. Fitzpatrick at the time Captain Barton was nominated, and at the Conference in Calcutta it was, I understood, the deliberate opinion of Sir W. Lockhart and all present; (ii) because, although the Khyber Rifles had attained a considerable efficiency, I think an Afridi Corps entrusted with the proposed works at Lundi Kotal ought to be under British officers; and (iii) because I think the placing of the Corps under British officers and the distinct affirmation of the rule I have advocated above, implying as it does that the troops necessary to support the posts in the Khyber must always be held in readiness, will re-establish the confidence of the Afridis in a far more re-assuring and satisfactory manner than the location at Lundi Kotal of the foreign element as proposed by Sir W. Lockhart, and will put beyond all dispute our intention for the future to maintain the posts in the Khyber against all comers. It will necessitate a distinct modification of our Agreement with the Afridis, as any one can see at a glance by looking at the Agreement itself and paragraph 5 of Sir A. Lyall's letter to the Punjab Government on the subject dated March 12th, 1881.

No. 470, Secret F., March 1881.

8. I must now make an appeal to the Hon'ble Military Member. He differs from the Commander-in-Chief in that he would enrol the force in the Khyber as a part of the Native Army. Surely the case before us is complicated enough already? The Hon'ble Member knows far better than I do the many discussions there have been in regard to the strength of the Army. It is inconceivable that the Secretary of State, and still more his Council, will accept a proposal for the addition of two regiments made in a paragraph of a despatch about the Khyber, and will not require from us a full examination of the whole subject and a statement of reasons to justify an increase of the army which in 1895 we at his instance agreed that we need not make. It will not be enough to narrate recent events. Other questions of intricacy and delicacy are involved, such e.g., as the proportion of Native to British troops, which Members of Council during my time have declared unsafe as it is; and an enquiry into the proposition which Lord Roberts once supported, and perhaps supports still, that while the army is too small on the North-West Frontier it is unnecessarily large in Madras. I only mention these things as illustrations to show that if we conjoin this proposal to our Khyber arrangements we shall introduce an element of delay, where delay is most certainly prejudicial.

9. And if this argument is not sufficient there is another in which I am personally concerned. I feel strongly that a big question like this ought not to be taken up in what one may call the closing days of an administration. I do not believe it possible, knowing the course of business in London between July and December, for orders to be received in a case dealing with an
increase of the army, even supposing we treated it here separately and with all speed, before the arrival of my successor. The Commander-in-Chief and the Hon’ble Finance Member are much in the same position as myself. I do not know what their feeling may be, but I should dislike very much to take up a question of this importance knowing that in all probability it would remain undecided on my departure, and yet might have reached a stage to commit my successor; and, on the other hand, the fact that the changes in the Government were impending would strengthen the hands of the opponents of the proposal.

10. I make these observations because I know the Hon’ble Member attaches great importance to the increase of the army, and I cannot suggest the postponement of any proposal of his on that subject without regret. But I am bound to add that if I have to argue the question in this particular instance, I should be prepared to do so on the merits, and I should begin by referring to Sir W. Lockhart’s opinion in paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of March 11th.—“The defile of the Khyber should in any case be guarded by irregular troops raised locally,”—and the reasons against regular troops towards the end of paragraph 3.

The political and civil aspects.

11. I have so far followed the order of the proposals on the Military Department file, and I hope my colleagues responsible for them will admit that I have shown no desire to under-rate their importance. But I wish now to refer, before I deal with the concluding part of their recommendation, to the other branch of the subject which was set aside by Sir W. Lockhart as of comparatively little importance. It is not unnatural that those who have seen the use of the Pass restricted, owing to the exactions and oppression by which the trade of Afghanistan has become a monopoly of the Amir, should out of dislike of the Amir’s methods and personality, think it no business of ours to facilitate his operations. I have seen expressions to this effect from Sir E. Udny. But that would be a lamentably short-sighted policy for the Government of India. We are looking forward to changes for the better on the death of the present Amir, and I should hope that one of them would be an improvement in the conditions of trade. And when that comes, the Khyber route, the one route from North-Western India to the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia free from snow blocks, will, I imagine, at once re-assert itself. Recently I myself found evidence in the Kangra Valley that Indian interests are affected by the present state of things. I need not argue the question, for it is “the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade” that the Secretary of State commends to us as “an essential measure.” It is our historical position on which the whole of the Agreement of 1881 rests.

12. If this is admitted, as I think it must be, I then proceed to maintain that, so far as the management of the trade is concerned, we have no reason to interfere with the arrangements that have existed for many years. They have become a system which is understood by the caravans and traders using the Pass. That system ought not to be disturbed except for very sufficient reason.

13. And besides these arrangements for the commerce of the Pass, there are the political relations with the tribes, both as to the Pass and generally, for it is impossible to dissociate the two. The question of the division of political work between the Government of India and the Local Government is a large one on which opinions differ, but which was debated and decided in its broader aspects so late as 1896. Personally I adhere to the opinions I then expressed, while I venture to think that if this wider question is to be raised again, which I distinctly deprecate, it will be in every way more convenient to take it as a separate case.
It is sufficient for me at this point to say that I do not think that the occurrences of the last year ought to obliterate the record of former services, or that we are at liberty to deny that the commendation bestowed by the Despatch of September 14th, 1880, has not been fairly earned by successive Lieutenant-Governors since.

14. At all events, and I am obliged to make the remark in connection with what I have next to say, I am strenuously opposed to any arrangement which would entrust the political relations in the Pass and with the tribes to any other than a Political Officer of experience, under arrangements at least as effective as hitherto for the control and supervision of his operations.

The application of these considerations to the proposals made.

15. It is in the light of these considerations that I now approach the remainder of the military proposals.

I have already indicated that I agree with the Commander-in-Chief, that the force in the Pass should consist of irregular troops, and so far as I am qualified to give an opinion, I approve of the organisation he suggests, subject perhaps to some reconsideration of the numbers, which I think ought not to exceed what is really required for the work. But there I am afraid my agreement ceases. I cannot accept the proposition that this force of irregulars should be under the command of the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar, and I must ask Hon'ble Members very seriously to consider what that means. I have shown that hitherto the management in the Pass has been under Civil Officers, and I have given my reasons for thinking that the objects in view have been, and must continue to be, largely, if not mainly, those with which Civil Officers are concerned. I have noted that a system of management has grown up that is as satisfactory to traders as circumstances admit.

16. What would be the result of the command of the successors of the Khyber Rifles being transferred to the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar? Why, that the whole system of management by Civil Officers collapses at a blow, and that every person in the Pass, except it may be a representative of the Political Service and his personal attendants comes under military orders and discipline. Indeed if General Symons' advice is followed, and the Commandant is appointed Political Officer, the authority of the General Officer Commanding becomes absolutely supreme: a somewhat remarkable result of a scheme which begins by a determination that the occupation of the Pass, in the only way in which it can as a military operation be safely occupied, shall not be undertaken.

17. Nor would the position be much improved supposing the Political Officer continued to be a Civil Officer. He might be directly under the Foreign Department of the Government of India; and I mention this first because I know it has found favour in some quarters. So far as I can speak for the Foreign Department I say without hesitation that we could not properly discharge this duty. We have not the machinery to enable us to deal with local routine work, of which the mass of the business would consist, and we could not afford to station there an officer of the standing and experience to be trusted in cases of importance and emergency. The district is too small for an expensive staff; too important for any other than a thoroughly reliable authority.

18. The Political Officer therefore in my judgment, if he is simply to co-exist alongside a Military Commandant of the forces in the Pass, must be a junior officer subordinated to the Commissioner of Peshawar, for the simple reason that no other means exist for obtaining the local knowledge and experience which we cannot do without. And indeed when it is suggested that we should take the political management of the Pass out of the hands of the Commissioner of Peshawar, I think it is forgotten that we have other relations with
the Afridis than those which arise in the Pass. The Afridis have shown
themselves by no means destitute of political acumen, and it would be to play
into their hands to entrust our political relations with them to two separate
and distinct authorities. The Commissioner of Peshawar is well understood
even by the Amir to be an official of the highest class, and already his, though
it does not seem generally known, direct relations with the Government of
India as well as through the Punjab Government. His position might be
made still more important, as suggested in paragraph 7 of our letter of August
14th, 1896, though I know Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thought that scheme unworkable; but I am quite
unable to suggest an efficient substitute if he is set aside. And, if so,
what then becomes of the position in the Pass under the proposals of the
Commander-in-Chief? A Commanding Officer of the Regiment and a junior
Political Assistant, independent of each other and reporting to two independent
chiefs resident in the same town a few miles off,—a system more certain to
produce friction I cannot conceive.

19. I oppose the transference of the command to the General Officer Com­
manding, because, if we make it, we shall not, as I stipulated earlier in this
note, do all we can to lessen the chances of friction. There will be divided
authority, and therefore a probability of friction, in our own management
in the Pass; there will be at least a chance of misunderstanding with the tribes;
and also I think with the Amir. The Amir would probably not like a military
authority in the Pass, but I do not rely only upon that alone. It must be
remembered that he has agents for his goods of various kinds in Peshawar City,
and the interposition of a new management in tribal territory might easily
become a source of misunderstanding, which perhaps the Amir might on
occasion not be sorry to find, but which we certainly ought to avoid.

20. While, however, I must support the retention of the system of control
by Civil Officers in the Pass, it is not at all impossible to meet what I conceive was
one of the principal objects of the introduction of the General Officer Com­
manding into the scheme, i.e., to secure the military efficiency of the troops.
It was only last year that the Government of India transferred to the Comman­
der-in-Chief various corps which in different parts of India had till then been
under civil authority. There is nothing to prevent the Khyber Corps being
placed, as some of these corps were, under the Commander-in-Chief (or perhaps
the Lieutenant-General of the Punjab Command) for purposes of discipline,
inspection, and the like. The system worked perfectly well, and some of the
regiments were admittedly equal to first-rate regiments of the regular army.
It seems to me that it is on some such lines as these that we should seek to
bring about the co-operation of the regular and irregular forces.

21. Indeed, I am not sure that the time has not come when we ought to
consider this co-operation over a wider area. I have confined myself hitherto
to the case of the Khyber; but the Military Department have under consi­
deration other parts of the frontier, and the Tochi case came to me while
I was writing this note. It raises issues which are foreign to this discussion,
and I do not circulate it now; but I have added to this file a copy of the
current notes, because they show that the Hon'ble Military Member in
his Note of May 17th has forestalled me in much of the argument I
have used above, when he puts the question,—"Could we organise better
levies for its protection?" I reply, "Yes; a militia under British officers
could, I believe, relieve the army of much work for which it is not best
fitted." I think he and I are pretty much at one in holding that advanced
military posts in tribal country ought not to be cantonments, but impregnable
fortresses with moderate garrisons, supported by moveable columns behind them.
To this system a well-organised militia might be a most valuable addition. It
could relieve the regular regiments of most, if not of all the duty on the lines
of communication, as, e.g., the small and unhealthy posts in the Gomal of
which we heard much in 1894, and which I then hoped might ere now have
been reduced. It could also relieve the army of escort duty, the objections
to which were strongly stated in the notes of the Hon'ble Member and Sir
Proeessings, Frontier, A. August G. White in February 1897; and it strikes me
that by the employment of militia in this manner in the tribal country between the Kabul and Gomal rivers we might save
something approaching to the two regiments it is herein suggested to add to
the army.

22. I cannot of course attempt to work out this idea in detail on the spur of
the moment, but I have looked enough into the matter to know two things:—
(i) that there are ample precedents in the history of the North-West. The
Punjab Frontier Force might be objected to on the ground that it was a
large force intended for the protection of the Province of the Punjab after its
annexation. But this cannot be said of two of the constituents of which
it was formed. The Corps of Guides was raised in 1846 and attached to the
Resident at Lahore, though available for general purposes; and the "Sikh
Local Corps," raised in 1847, consisted of about 3,000 men and was placed
under the orders of Colonel Lawrence, the Agent to the Governor-General.
"It was intended for police and general purposes, and was required ordinarily
to serve only in the country between the Jumna and the Beas, or the Sutlej
below its junction with the Beas. The men were, however, liable to be called
on to serve beyond these limits."

23. So much for the earlier times; but (ii) again on the transference of the
Punjab Frontier Force to the Commander-in-Chief I find that there was in
existence as subsidiary to that force a "militia" which performed duties such
Members to the very interesting letter of March 17th, 1886, signed on behalf of Sir Charles Aitchison by the present Lieute-
Governor of the Punjab. In it there is sketched a co-operation between
the civil and military authorities which I would fain see re-established.

24. All that I wish at present is to submit this idea for consideration. If
its principle was acceptable, it might perhaps be so stated in addressing the
Secretary of State; but I think that I would not propose more at the outset
than that we might place at the disposal of the Local Government an officer
with experience of the frontier and Pathans to assist in the organisation of
the Khyber Militia, and to report on the steps that could be taken to
develop similar local corps where required, either as separate units or as parts
of one irregular force. I have reason to think that the Lieutenant-Governor
would not object to some such proposal.

The Khyber Railway.

25. A copy of Captain Craster's report on the survey for a railway through
the Pass is below. The file did not contain all the information I desired, and
I ask the postponement of any orders on the subject. But for the purposes
of the present discussion we have enough in the fact that this report
undoubtedly shows that as an engineering project a railway up the Pass is
feasible. This being so, there are two questions which I should wish to put to
the Secretary of State before I could for myself offer any final opinion on the
construction of the line.

26. The first is the general question of the construction of railways outside
British India. I believe that we should here be taking a new departure, and
that we ought to be quite clear what we are about before we embark in railway
construction, not only outside our own territory, but in a country we decline
to administer, and yet which has no settled government.

27. The second question is the same that in paragraph 4 above I desired
to put as regards the works at Lundi Kotal. If the Secretary of State approved
of the works at Lundi Kotal for the reasons there suggested, I admit that it
could be strongly argued that he must approve also the idea of the railway, if
practicable, because to make it must be a work of time and difficulty which
could not be undertaken on the outbreak of hostilities. I do not carry that admission beyond the formation of the road bed, for Captain Craster reports that the laying of the permanent way could be done in a comparatively short time. My own inclination on my present information would be to finish and open the line to Jamrud, but beyond that point not do more than at most begin the formation, and order and store the permanent way material.

28. One other observation I must make on the railway question. The Hon'ble Member in sending me the file suggested a comparison by the Public Works Department of the Khyber and Kabul River routes. If I was considering, without any intention of taking action in either direction, what was the best route for railway communication with Afghanistan that is the first thing I should want, but it seems to me that the Kabul River route is absolutely outside the present question for the following reasons:

(1.) It means opening another and a new route; and for reasons I have given above it is the Khyber route only which we can practically entertain at present.

(2.) The Kabul River route does not lead to Lundi Kotal. On the contrary it is I think admitted that it must debouch from the gorge on the plain beyond the line of the Durand Convention Map. Its construction therefore involves negotiations with the Amir; and looking to our experiences at Chaman the prospect is the reverse of hopeful.

(3.) While the Kabul River route might turn out to be the preferable one, if we were taking up the question of a permanent line, I venture to think that as the report shows that for a military line the Pass is practicable, and as in the event of an advance on Kabul it is a military line only that could be pushed up behind our invading army, it is a military line that we should seek to obtain. I may remind Hon'ble Members that the Railway Conference of last year made a recommendation which, if adopted, would have the effect of supplementing any reserve of railway material which it may be considered desirable to form for military purposes by promoting the construction of light railways, of a type suitable for military use in difficult country, under conditions which would make their rolling stock at all events available in case of emergency.

29. We have still to consider how the adoption of these proposals affects our position with the Afridis, in regard both to former agreements and to any outstanding questions arising out of the recent disturbances. Speaking generally, we can of course proceed on the footing prescribed by the Secretary of State, that we are not "bound in any way by the engagements which the Afridis deliberately broke." But it appears to me that we should certainly be well advised to build upon the Agreement of 1881 so far as we can consistently with our present requirements. As I have said, we shall have to introduce any modifications that may be necessary to define the new position of the "Militia," and whether we proceed to the construction of the railway in whole or in part, I would certainly take an engagement from the tribes that they will in no wise oppose its construction if or when we choose to make it. Otherwise I should think the more the new Agreement followed the lines of the old the better. It will require very careful drafting; but upon that, and upon the question of form mentioned by Sir W. Cuningham I need not enter now.

Our position with the tribes.
30. As to outstanding questions I refer Hon'ble Members to the letter from General Symons, dated April 24th, with our reply dated April 30th, and also Mr. F. D. Cunningham's note forwarded by General Symons on April 29th. It will be seen that we should abandon the attempt to recover the arms lost by our troops. The Hon'ble Military Member, while concurring in the conclusions arrived at, wished to keep open the possibility of recovery as long as possible; but I have no doubt he will agree that the settlement we are now discussing should be as complete as we can make it, and I see nothing for it but to abandon this claim.

31. The other outstanding points refer to compensation for damage done to Government or private property during the rising. I should like much to maintain the position we originally took up that the tribes must be made to recognise their responsibility under these heads. But all who have been in actual contact with the Afridis seem to be agreed that it will be impossible to enforce these claims, and I am afraid we shall be obliged to admit that the sums involved are such as the tribes cannot or will not pay, unless we are prepared again to use force to compel their compliance. There is, however, one mode of recovery which I think was proposed at first by the Lieutenant-Governor, and to the principle of which I understand him still to adhere, i.e., by deductions from the allowances when restored. I have not formed a final opinion on that point. That it would be absolutely just, I think is undeniable; and we can of course make sure of recouping our losses, or such part of them as we choose. But on the other side comes the question of expediency. I have just said that this settlement ought to be as complete as possible, and I am not sure that it would be worth while to leave open a grievance, as it would certainly come to be considered by the tribes after they forgot the gravity of the offence, for the sake of recovering the money. That the allowances themselves must be restored we shall have to accept. The Lieutenant-Governor has pointed out to me that they represent, in part at least, old Kabul allowances which we took over when we excluded the interference of Amirs of Kabul; and I think now, as I thought of the similar Mohmand allowances last year, that it would be a grave political mistake to let the tribes think we did not intend to maintain them. I suppose they also in part might be said to represent a commutation of tolls which the Afridi tribes might fairly in accordance with the custom of the country levy in the Pass.

32. It has been suggested that if we restore the allowances we ought at any rate to try to see that they are not appropriated by Maliks who then turn against us. Though I sympathise with the desire, I deprecate doing anything to interfere with tribal customs of distribution, and at all events I hope this may be treated as a matter which must be entrusted to the discretion of the officers who are entrusted with the conclusion of the arrangements. I propose when the time comes to make it a sine qua non that the officer or officers should be specially selected for their fitness for the work by reason of local knowledge and experience as well other qualifications.

33. It will be observed that all officers on the spot, following the lead of Sir W. Lockhart, have been urging for some time an immediate announcement of our intention to restore the allowances. I was under the impression that the Lieutenant-Governor, who declared himself against the restoration of the allowances when Sir W. Lockhart proposed it, meant, as I did, that we must reserve that question altogether until the final settlement of future relations. I find, however, that his present attitude is that the time has come when we ought to commit ourselves, as he thinks we must inevitably in the
end, to giving these allowances. He argues that we cannot expect the tribes to settle down till we do, and that to announce our intention is the really effectual way of stopping the coquetting with Kabul which has been reported lately. All these arguments have great force, but I cannot help feeling that if we forestall the negotiations, to which we must look forward, by telling the tribes now that the allowances will be restored to them, even though we say this in general terms and with all possible reservations, we shall lose a great part of the little hold we still have on them. It is a point on which I should like to have the opinion of Council. I did not care to take the responsibility on myself of making the concession.

**Summary of the points for decision.**

34. I am sorry to inflict so long a note upon Hon’ble Members, but I have seldom, if ever, had to present a case to Council where the issues involved have been so many and various. I thought I should do most for the convenience of Hon’ble Members if I made an attempt to bring these issues within the compass of one discussion. I have tried to look at the different sides with impartiality, and I have had one object only before me, i. e., to provide for the complete and honourable safeguarding of our interests, local and imperial, with due regard to the economy and concentration of our resources which our own prudence, no less than the express injunction of the Secretary of State, compels us to observe.

35. The propositions on which I should ask a deliverance from Council are these:

1. — That on the assumption that it is desirable to make provision for a possible advance from India to maintain our interests in Afghanistan—a point on which we request the opinion of the Secretary of State—we approve generally of the scheme described in Sir W. Lockhart’s Memorandum, subject to the special modification next mentioned, and to such modifications of the works at Lundi Kotal as may follow thereon.

2. — That we recommend the employment in the Pass of irregular troops enlisted from the Afridis in the manner described by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in preference to the troops detailed in the scheme of Sir W. Lockhart.

3. — That these troops should be embodied in one or more regiments, and entitled the Khyber Militia, which shall be under the control of the Local Government, but for purposes of discipline and inspection under the orders of the Lieutenant-General, Punjab Command.

4. — That the employment of a militia is desirable on other parts of the frontier, and that we recommend the delegation of an officer of experience to advise the Punjab Government in the organisation of the Khyber Militia, and as to any possible extension of the system elsewhere.

5. — That the political relations with the tribes must remain in the hands of the Punjab Government.

6. — That the management of the trade of the Pass has been satisfactory in the past, and ought to be continued on the same lines.

7. — That on the same assumption as stated in No. 1 it is essential to secure in any settlement with the Afridis the right of constructing a railway through the Pass; and it may be desirable to proceed with the construction of a military railway, as shown by the recent survey to be practicable, in whole or in part.
8.—That the new Agreement with the Afridis, while making adequate provision for the railway and militia as above, may otherwise follow the old Agreement so far as convenient, and particularly may provide for the restoration of the allowances in whole or in part.

9.—That the payment of compensation for public or private property can only be enforced, if at all, by retaining a proportion of the said allowances for a stated period, and that this seems on the whole undesirable.

10.—That the demand for the restoration of the weapons lost by our troops during the operations be not pressed.

Circulate and Council.

E.,—27-5-98.
Circulated.
28th May 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

With regard to the 10 points on which His Excellency the Viceroy asks for opinions of the Council, it seems to me, if I may say so, that a reference to the Secretary of State regarding (1) will not help us much. It is in short only asking him whether the chances of our ever having to fight Russia in Afghanistan are sufficiently great to justify our spending money in preparations at Landi Kotal to facilitate our advance.

I would venture to suggest that, before any reference home is made, the Indian Government might come to a conclusion, whether, assuming that we have responsibilities towards Afghanistan which may compel us to advance for the protection of that country, preparations beforehand for such an advance are needed at Landi Kotal, and, if so, what they will cost. Having decided that the military advantages outweigh the financial drawbacks, the Secretary of State might be asked to sanction a definite scheme on definite grounds.

Regarding the rest of (1) I agree with His Excellency the Viceroy’s proposal.

(2) I naturally accept.

(3) So long as the Khyber Militia remains under the Local Government, I see no advantage in placing them for purposes of discipline under the Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab. It would indeed be a most unsuitable arrangement.

Such a corps must be ruled by a rough and ready justice, to be administered on the spot, and no distant authority such as a Lieutenant-General could profitably supervise this. The result would inevitably be that a demand would arise for the corps to be brought under the Indian Articles of War. These articles are unsuited to a regular militia, who should have no law but their Commandant’s will. Authority divided between the Commissioner of Peshawar and the Military Commander of the Punjab would be a sure cause of friction and probable inefficiency, would be unworkable in fact.

Nor would I give the Lieutenant-General Commanding the power of inspection. I am informed this question has previously been considered and negatived in connection with the Kurram Militia and the Zhob levy.

Proposition (4). I agree to. But when detailed proposals are put forward, they will require very careful consideration.

As regards (5) I understand that the former proposal for having a Special Agent to the Governor-General to manage the frontier is beyond discussion. If so, I concur with the proposition. And I agree that, as the Pass cannot be put under military control, one Agency must deal with the Afridis as a whole.

I concur with (6) and (7) except as regards the allusion to (1) which implies the reference to the Secretary of State. I would press for the railway being constructed.

In connection with this and the possibility of eventually continuing it to Kabul, I notice the recent survey is silent as to the possibility of extending it from Landi Kotal to Landi Khana. We knew from Sir Guildford Molesworth’s report that we could get the line to Landi Kotal without much difficulty, but the next 3 miles is the most important doubt. It may be possible still to get a report on this. At any rate if the civil authorities think they can protect the line, I recommend its construction. If not, let us have the road-bed and bridges complete and the rails, &c., at Jamrud ready to lay.

In proposition (8) I concur, but the old agreement of 1881 left far more of the management of the Pass to the tribes themselves than will be desirable now after recent occurrences.

And here I may say that I think, speaking generally, we should avoid as far as possible letting things fall into the old condition.

After the breach of agreement and general want of faith and their bad behaviour, I think, notwithstanding the Secretary of State’s desire to avoid more interference with the tribes, that we shall lose prestige and be misunderstood in the eyes of the natives all over the East, if our hold over the frontier is not somewhat tightened and our influence not emphasized with all the tribes, after the recent campaign against them.

It was chiefly to mark this, and also to prevent any possibility of the Khyber ever being closed against us again, that I advocated the placing it more immediately under military control for the future.

In this view I concur in proposition (9) with some reluctance, and am more in accord with Sir Mackworth Young’s recommendation, but I fear we have already allowed the time to pass when the matter could have been insisted on, and that now it is perhaps too late for any effectual insistence on the tribes paying for the damage they have done.

Regarding (10) I would not press for restitution of rifles taken in war from us, not only for the above reasons, but also because it is contrary to the ordinarily accepted rules of war.

1st June 1898.

C. E. N(AIRNE).
I do not think I can usefully contribute to the written discussion on these important papers. But I desire to note that the construction and occupation of a regular fortified post at Landi Kotal seems to me much more an element of danger than of safety; and that I am in favour of railways being laid down between our frontier stations and our frontier posts. For the purposes of a threat, the latter seems to me as useful as the former.

1st June 1898.

J. W(ESTLAND).

Subject to discussion in Council, I am disposed to concur generally in the views expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his note, dated 1st instant.

I may observe, however, that I do not clearly understand whether the adoption of the plan he accepts of holding the pass by the agency of a Khyber Militia under British officers, subject to the Punjab Government, is or is not intended to supersede the proposal for the construction of a strong fort in Suffolk Hill or elsewhere at Landi Kotal. It seems to me that, if the Pass is to be held by civil control, the fort is not a necessity as long as that control is efficient, and might become a source of danger if the control should break down.

It will rest, I presume, with the Punjab Government to formulate detailed proposals in accordance with the general policy that may now be laid down with regard to the terms on which and the extent to which and the date from which the tribal allowances are to be restored.

I think that, in restoring the allowances, a substantial deduction should be made by way of bringing home to the tribesmen the fact that they have as a matter of fact been forfeited, and that their restoration is not to be regarded as a matter of right or as a concession to their power of resistance, but purely as a matter of grace. I would not, however, object to their being told that they may look forward to a restoration in full at the end of five years, or such longer term as may be thought suitable, provided they give us no cause of complaint in the meantime. This would, I think, be better than to treat the allowances withheld as compensation for loss of Government property.

The terms should, I think, certainly provide for the immediate construction of a railway to Landi Kotal up to formation level, and for the rails being laid and stations built, &c., whenever they are wanted.

Payments should not be resumed till terms have been completely and satisfactorily settled, but the sooner that can be done the better.

2nd June 1898.

A. C. T(REVOR).

I hesitate to give any definite opinion on the "propositions" submitted by His Excellency until I have heard them discussed in Council. The issues are complicated by two considerations which introduce an element of uncertainty into our plans.

In the first place the arrangements which would be best for a long continued time of peace are not the best if the risk of war be imminent. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in his communication of 1st April, appears to assume that the late war was but a passing episode, and that we are about to revert to the old state of things and a long spell of peace. But he gives no reasons to justify his assumptions.

In the second place when war comes we don't know on which side the tribes will be fighting. We propose to improve the organisation of the Khyber Rifles, and to put them in strong defensible positions, but we do not know whether we are strengthening the hands of a friend or of an enemy.

I therefore only indicate certain points which occur to me concerning the propositions put forward for discussion by His Excellency, and would wish to reserve my opinion on them, till I have heard them discussed by those who can speak with authority as frontier and military experts:-

I. As to the first proposition the difficulties which occur to me are these. It is conceded that, when we next move troops into Afghanistan, we shall require a strong position at Landi Kotal which we can occupy at once. Will a garrison of Khyber Rifles fulfil these conditions? Might they not hold the position against us? Even if they stand by us, would the place be fit for occupation by a British force? Is it necessary that the position should be defended by guns, and if so, can that be provided for with only a Khyber Militia garrison? These are questions which I cannot answer. On the other hand, the presence of a small British force at Landi Kotal would be an effectual guarantee that we should not again abandon the Pass to its fate, and it would render the supervision of the road and works much easier. But it might (or might not) be a source of irritation to the tribes and the Amir.

II. Subject to the above doubts I agree with this proposition.

III. There seems to be great force in the Commander-in-Chief's criticisms on this point. But is our decision on this point in any way final? Whether the Khyber Militia is to be under civil or military control for purposes of inspection and discipline appears to me to be a question
of detail, on which we might change our policy as experience may suggest without affecting the
broad lines of policy now under discussion. Possibly the linking of the Khyber Militia to the
British army as suggested by His Excellency might have a moral effect on the enlisted tribes-
men, and make them feel themselves more as part of the British service and more bound to it.

IV. I imagine that on this point there will be but little controversy.

V. I suppose it is impossible to remove the political relations with the tribes from the
hands of the Punjab Government. If it were not so, I should like to urge again the reasons for
putting the Commissioner of Peshawar under the direct control of the Government of India.
At present he has to try to serve two masters. When any disturbance arises, we have to
assume the control and responsibility. The Punjab Government knows this well, and, instead
of helping us, at once assumes the rôle of the candid friend and criticises our action in the
same spirit of detachment as if it were the chorus in a Greek play.

VI. Must we not to some extent look forward to a time when a more enlightened policy
will be adopted by Afghanistan, and when the trade with that country will be by rail and not
by camel caravan. I take it that for trade purposes the Kabul River route is the only practi-
cable one, for the gradient below Landi Kotal is too steep for any prolongation of the Khyber
railway into Afghanistan. We can do nothing at present in the way of making the Kabul
River railway, but in our frontier arrangements we should bear in mind that some day that
railway will have to be made.

VII. I am inclined to think that the balance of expediency is in favour of pushing on
the military railway at once as far as Landi Kotal.

VIII, IX, & X. I almost think it is too late now to consider these propositions on their
abstract merits. In order to make peace with the tribesmen, we have gone more than half-
way to meet them, and we had better do graciously and at once what we may have to do
eventually unless we are prepared to enforce our demands by war.

3rd June 1898.

M. D. C(HALMERS).

As regards the first 3 propositions which are stated at the end of His Excellency's note,
I agree in the view that the Khyber Pass ought to be held in future by a force commanded
by British officers, and organised in the manner proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, and
that such force should be under the control of the Punjab Government.

The question whether Landi Kotal should be held by the Khyber Militia thus organized
or by British troops seems to me to depend mainly on what sort of a fortified post it may be
considered necessary to construct there. If it is to be on the scale suggested in General
Nicholson's memorandum of the 3rd February last, I should doubt whether it would
be expedient to entrust its custody to the Khyber Militia. If, however, a small post is
considered sufficient, then it might certainly be so garrisoned. I imagine there can be little
doubt that a British garrison at Landi Kotal would be regarded with suspicion by the Amir
and might very possibly cause friction with the Afridis.

I think that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief gives good reasons against placing
the Khyber Militia under the Lieutenant-General, Punjab Command, for purposes of discipline
and inspection.

I agree in His Excellency the Viceroy's 4th, 5th and 6th propositions.

As regards the 7th proposition, I would certainly secure in any settlement with the
Afridis the right of constructing a railway through the Khyber Pass. As regards proceeding
with the construction of such railway, I understand that engineering difficulties would prevent
the construction of a railway beyond Landi Kotal towards Kabul, and that if a railway is
ever made to Kabul, it will have to be by the Kabul River route. In these circumstances,
it seems to me that the question of constructing a military line of railway up the Khyber
Pass mainly depends on whether Landi Kotal is to be held by a British garrison or by the
Khyber Militia. If by the former, such line seems to me very desirable, but if by the latter,
I doubt its necessity or expediency.

I agree in the views expressed in His Excellency's 8th, 9th and 10th propositions, but
would certainly make no announcement to the tribes of the restoration of their allowances
until the settlement of our future relations with them has been concluded.

5th June 1898.

C. M. R(IVAZ).
I shall endeavour, in stating my conclusions on the questions placed before us, to deal with the subject under the heads into which His Excellency the Viceroy has divided it.

The Military side of the question.

2. It is not necessary to discuss whether the military or political side of the question is the most important, but I cannot help expressing a doubt whether there is not some risk of the military aspect of the case being overshadowed by civil and political considerations. If the military question were not of the highest importance, should we be reminded by the Secretary of State of our engagement with the Amir (paragraph 16 of despatch of 28th January) and (paragraph 17) that we may be called upon to discharge our obligations; should we be told that the retention of an effective control over the Khyber pass is essential, and that the safety of the pass must be the paramount consideration? This indeed is not a novel idea to those who have studied the subject of frontier defence from the higher Imperial standpoint. There are only two great military highways to Afghanistan, the Khyber and the Bolan. All others are subsidiary and secondary, and unless the statesmen and soldiers who have studied the question for years past are absolutely wrong, those are the routes we must have under our effective control if we are to ensure military predominance in the event of our having to advance to the strategic front—Kabul-Kandahar, if we are to fulfil the guarantee we have given for the integrity of Afghanistan, and are to be ready to help the successor of the present Amir in the way plainly indicated to us by Her Majesty's Government.

3. I venture to urge that we should not put aside all question of the proposals of 1885-86—proposals made by the Government of the day for the defence of the north-west frontier. The adequate fortification of Landi Kotal was an integral part of those proposals, and I abide by the opinion of the Government of Lord Dufferin—that the occupation and defence of the western outlet of the Khyber should be carried out in its integrity at the earliest favourable opportunity. That opportunity has now presented itself. It will be asked, why should Landi Kotal be fortified, if it is intended to occupy the strategic front of Kabul-Kandahar? The reply to that question is that a State does not usually neglect to fortify its frontier, because it may have to take the offensive, and to advance beyond that frontier. No extensive fortifications are proposed, but a work which, in case of necessity, could be strengthened and heavily armed, which would form the redoubt or keep of a larger system, while serving for the local defensive purposes contemplated, is, I submit, an addition of the highest importance to the defences of the north-west frontier. If a fortification is to be erected at Landi Kotal, it must, in my opinion, fulfil the larger as well as the lesser purposes.

4. The reasons for the military occupation of Landi Kotal are—

(a) that it will be required as a depot in case of an advance into Afghanistan;

(b) that the protection of the water-supply and reservoirs already constructed must be assured;

(c) that the position controls the Afridis;

(d) that the position is a necessary one in the scheme of the defence of the north-western frontier of India. Landi Kotal, commanding the west entrance of the Khyber, is a strategical position of importance on the main route from India to the capital of Afghanistan.
5. I cannot admit that (a) and (b) are not essential. As I pointed out in my note of 9th May 1898, Her Majesty's Government have agreed that we must be in a position to give material support if necessary to the successor of Abdul Rahman, and if that ever has to be given, our advance will be something more than a leisurely movement. We have also guaranteed, under certain conditions, the integrity of Afghanistan; eminent soldiers and statesmen recognised the military value of Landi Kotal, only a few years ago, and I think their opinion cannot be set aside.

6. I am therefore in favour of a military occupation of Landi Kotal. Sir William Lockhart held that opinion and that the garrison should be of regular troops. Sir Richard Udny said that to secure the Khyber route more effectually for military purposes as on the main line of advance into Afghanistan, but also to render it impossible for the Afridis to close the road and destroy our posts, we must hold the pass for ourselves in a military sense and by regular troops. Sir Richard Udny would keep up the Khyber Rifles in addition to regular troops. He declares that the former system broke down in August last, and alludes to the danger of relying on a special force such as a moveable column.

7. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his note of 6th May says: "I certainly think the strong post should be there," but proposed to reorganize the Khyber Rifles into two battalions officered on the irregular system to be under General Officer Commanding Peshawar, and not under the civil authorities.

8. The Commander-in-Chief also proposed to entrust the military responsibility for the posts in the pass to the General Officer Commanding Peshawar under the Lieutenant-General Commanding Punjab.

9. The proposal I put forward in my note* of 9th May (Military Department file) was to expand the Khyber Rifles into two battalions, to be enlisted for general service, but to be employed locally for the protection of the Khyber and Landi Kotal; to be officered on the irregular system and to be under the General Officer Commanding Peshawar.

10. My reasons for preferring the plan of these local battalions forming a part of the army are; that such a step is an important one towards utilizing the military strength of the Afridis, that they prefer enlistment as "soldiers" to enlistment in a corps of inferior status; that by this means more than any other we shall bind the Afridis to ourselves; the soldiers of the Queen are more to them than the militia men of a civil officer; the discipline would be better; they would be an integral part of the army; their honour and loyalty would be more fully pledged; we should have the best possible plan of enlisting the good-will and assistance of the Afridis for the protection of the Khyber; we should have the nucleus of a military force of value; and it would be a great advance in the policy of making the tribes our friends and not our enemies; and lastly, we should have a guarantee that the safety of the pass would be regarded as a paramount consideration.

11. My proposal would, in my opinion, make them 'our men'. We know from past experience how loyal they can be, we know what great effect the pension has, and it is a significant fact that the Malikdin-Khel who were the first to come in had the greatest number of pensioners. The invasion of Tirah tried the loyalty and self-interest of our Afridi soldiers almost to the breaking-point, but they stood the strain in a remarkable manner.

12. His Excellency the Viceroy makes an appeal to me not to complicate the question by my proposal to raise two regiments of Afridis. That is an appeal which I find it hard not to respond to at once. I would however venture to point out that the raising of two local regiments officered on the irregular system is not very far removed from the raising of two regiments of militia officered by British officers. The addition to the military or armed forces of the Empire is to the same extent, and I can hardly think that the proposal would require an extended examination of the whole subject of the proportion of Native to British
troops, or a revival of the question whether the Madras army should be further reduced. The large increase to the army of 1885 was dealt with and decided upon in a very short time. A proposal to raise three additional battalions of Gurkhas was practically accepted by the Secretary of State in twenty-four hours. In ten days, the orders for raising the battalions were issued. As to the agreement of 1895 not to increase the army, that was accepted because it was desired to maintain Chitral, and to occupy the Malakand, and was agreed to by the Commander-in-Chief and my predecessor, though they knew it would place a strain upon the army, in the hope that eventually a small garrison at the Malakand would suffice. In the interval, we were to make shift as best we could and use the costly expedient of bringing Madras troops up northwards. The whole thing was, I venture to think, decided upon political expediency rather than on military necessity. I hope I possess as much respectful deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government as my colleagues, but I do think that it is our duty to place before that Government a full expression of our views—even though they may not be in harmony with their pre-conceived ideas or conditions. I submit that the question whether the Khyber is to be held by two regiments of militia, or by two local regiments of the army organized in much the same way, is not really a large one, and that it will not take longer at home to discuss, or to carry into effect.

13. His Excellency has alluded to the importance I attach to the increase of the army. On this point I will only say that I consider that some small addition is required to cope with the extended responsibilities which have been thrown upon it on the north-west frontier in recent years. Sir W. Lockhart said the defile of the Khyber should, in any case, be guarded by irregular troops raised locally, but that was said in conjunction with the proposal that regular troops should hold Landi Kotal. The two battalions proposed by me would distinctly be "irregular troops raised locally," only they would form a part of the army instead of being a corps of men under civil authority.

The political and civil aspects.

14. The security of the Khyber for trade purposes is an important matter. But I venture to think it is not the guiding factor in our arrangements, and that were this alone to be considered, the safety of the route could be ensured by the payment of subsidies to the Afridis for the passage of caravans, in fact by a liberal payment of black-mail. I quite agree that our system must be one which caravans and traders understand, and I think they would comprehend a military control even better than a civil one.

15. I do not desire, at this moment, to raise the whole question of the management of frontier politics. In 1896 I differed from my colleagues and considered that an improvement in the agency could be effected. That opinion was founded on a long study of the question, and I do not stand alone. The views that were put forward in the letter of the 1st August 1896, were not accepted by the Secretary of State, but I do not know whether he referred to frontier policy or frontier management, or to both. Certain improvements in management were suggested in that letter, and I have not heard whether they have been seriously considered by the Punjab Government. However this may be I should ask leave to express my opinion that the Khyber affairs would be better managed under the Commissioner of Peshawar in direct communication with the Foreign Department. If the political affairs of the Khyber are to remain under the Punjab Government, I should wish to express my opinion that this should be a temporary arrangement, and should not preclude the consideration of the larger question, of which this forms a part.

The application of the various considerations to the proposals made.

16. General Symons and Mr. Cunningham, the Political Officer, concur in considering that the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should be the Political Officer of the Khyber. The Commander-in-Chief and I agreed that the Khyber Rifles or whatever military body is maintained, should be under military control, and that the safety of the pass should be entrusted to the legitimate military authority, the General Officer Commanding Peshawar.
17. I can see no reason why an arrangement of the kind should not work perfectly well. You would be adopting in peace time what you have to adopt in a state of war. The Commandant would be a selected officer, selected for his knowledge of Pathans in general, and Afridis in particular. A civil Political Officer cannot command the armed force to be maintained in the Khyber. Is it not infinitely better that the control and responsibility should be vested in one man than that there should be divided counsels and divided responsibility? I am convinced that everyone who knows the frontier tribes well will hear me out when I say that the Afridis or any other frontier tribe not only prefer such a system, which they thoroughly understand, but that they respect the man who has force at his command and who is a soldier by profession, and with whom their relations are far more close, in the nature of things, than with a civil Political Officer. Such a plan could be adapted to any administrative arrangement which may be created. The Commandant, whether of Khyber Rifles, or militia, or local irregular troops of the army, could report to the Commissioner of Peshawar in his political capacity, who in his turn would deal with the Punjab Government or the Government of India as the case may be. The military duties would be controlled by the Commandant, and for their performance and the military security of the pass, the General Officer Commanding would be responsible. This would not be to entrust political relations to two separate and distinct authorities, but would rather be to combine military and political functions in the one individual, and to practise in peace the system we adopt in war.

18. I now come to the question whether there is any inherent difficulty in the proposal to place the armed force of the Khyber under the military authorities. It is not so many years ago that the frontier militia were under the officers commanding the outposts, i.e., officers of the Punjab Frontier Force, under the general control of the officer in command of the frontier district. The system was more than one of co-operation, for the officer commanding the outposts was responsible for the militia in every way, but was naturally required to attend immediately to the requisitions of the Magistrate. Here the military and political functions could not be combined, because the Magistrate was the civil and revenue officer of a frontier district. But in the Khyber we have no revenue to collect, there is no civil district to administer, and we do not desire to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Afridis. I venture to submit therefore that there is nothing in the situation which would prevent (1) the union of political and military functions, (2) the militia, if that form of semi-military organisation be decided on, being placed under the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar.

19. I agree that the formation of militia corps might be useful in other parts of the frontier, but I would add the proviso that they should be, as before, under the frontier military authorities.

20. I also agree with His Excellency that advanced military posts in tribal country ought not to be in cantonments, but in impregnable fortresses with moderate garrisons supported by moveable columns behind them, and that to this system, a well-organised militia might be a most valuable addition. This indeed is a system which might be applied to Landi Kotal and the Khyber.

21. Landi Kotal could be garrisoned by an irregular Afridi regiment belonging to the army, and the defile itself would be held by militia. The objection to this plan might be held to be that there could be the possibility of friction between the regiment and the militia. But this did not happen to any great extent in the days of the frontier militia. They were well in hand of the officer commanding the out-posts and so long as the Military Commandant in the Khyber commands the whole, and is the one man to whom the Afridis would look, any chance of difficulty would be greatly reduced. But, on the whole, I prefer the duties of garrisoning Landi Kotal and the Khyber being performed by one corps of two battalions.

22. The great difference of opinion is whether the "Khyber Irregular Corps," or "Khyber Militia" should be placed under the civil or military authority. For the reasons I have given I consider it is essential that it should be a military corps placed under military authority. The officers should be picked men;
there are plenty of officers who like and understand Afridis. The Punjab Frontier Force had, and have, many such officers and there are several in the other Punjab regiments. Our object should be to fulfill the condition of things of which Sir Charles Aitchison wrote in 1886, and to train up officers to take an interest "in the language, habits, and history of the frontier tribes," and to "show great insight into the political relations of the British Government with the chiefs and tribes of both sides of the border." No better school could be furnished than these Khyber corps; but it is not in the interest of the officers or of the men they command that the former should be considered to be in "civil employ," that they should be deemed to be unfit to hold military command; and that they should be disassociated from their profession. Our whole effort should be to form a school of men combining the soldier and the political in sympathy with, and possessing the confidence of, the tribes. Her Majesty's Government have laid down that we are to avoid interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis. If that policy is followed our "political relation" with the Afridis will be simple. It is well known to every officer on the frontier how easily friendly relations are maintained and developed by the Commanding Officer of a regiment aided by his officers and native officers. Give that selected Commanding Officer in the Khyber such political powers as may be necessary, give him if you like an assistant for trade purposes, and I believe you will have a system of fulfilling in the best way the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The Khyber Railway.

23. With regard to the general question of the construction of railways outside British India, I am not quite sure that I appreciate the difference, from the political point of view, between an ordinary road and the rail-road. From the military point of view, there is the essential difference, that a rail-road if of great help in military operations, also offers a hostage to fortune. The Khyber railway could be easily interrupted by budmashes. In the present aspect of affairs, and from some time to come, I should be disposed to be content with the formation of a road bed, tunnelling, etc.

24. I should hope the engineers would be able to run this narrow gauge line down to Landi Khan, because a break between Landi Kotal and Landi Khan would be an almost fatal difficulty for a military line of railway.

25. I suggested the investigation of the respective merits of the Khyber and Kabul river routes for a railway, because I thought that the whole subject should be examined at this particular juncture.

26. If I may state what I conceive to be the military view of the question it is this. In the event of the occupation by the British forces of the strategic point Kabul-Kandahar, we shall require the railway system of India to be linked with Kabul and Kandahar. On the southern side, our railway terminus is only distant 70 miles from Kandahar. On the northern side there is still a distance of 110 miles to be covered. Any railway extension which reduces that distance is so much to the good, and the advocates of the Kabul river line have urged that this is the line to be followed, and that we should construct this portion of the line.

27. A terminus, inconvenient no doubt, might I think be found in the valley of the Kabul river on our side of the Durand line; and Lundi Kotal connected with that by road.

28. But there are many reasons why the construction of that line hardly comes within the limits of practical intention at the present time, and if a narrow gauge line can be constructed, or prepared for, from Peshawar to Lundi Kotal, that would be a great gain for the carriage of military stores, in the event of an advance into Afghanistan being necessary. Its advantage would be much increased by the possibility of eventual extension to Landi Khan, whence it will be pushed on to Jellalabad if we have to occupy that place.
29. On the whole, I am disposed to think we should construct the military railway to Landi Kotal and that the road-bed should be prepared, tunnels made, and the permanent-way stored for laying.

Our position with the tribes.

30. I agree that we may abandon the attempt to recover the arms lost by our troops.

31. As to the compensation for damage done to Government or private property during the rising, I should be inclined not to recommence the allowances until at least a part of the damage done is paid for, but I am quite content to leave this matter and the question of the restoration of the allowances for settlement, as His Excellency suggests. I certainly think that no definite announcement of restoration should be made until we are prepared to tell the Afridis what we want and what we must have.

32. It is with the greatest regret I feel unable to agree with some of the propositions which have been put forward; but I hope it will be believed that I have not done so without prolonged consideration. The conclusions I have formed are the result of a study of the subject extending over many years, and a careful consideration of both sides of the question and personal discussion with officers, civil and military, who are qualified to give valuable opinions on its merits,—

(1) I agree generally with the scheme described in Sir W. Lockhart's memorandum, subject to the special modification next mentioned. I consider the fort at Landi Kotal should be of the type proposed in paragraph 3 of my note. It does not seem to me to be necessary to enquire from the Secretary of State whether we ought to be prepared to advance into Afghanistan. All our military preparations have been made with this object.

(2) I recommend the employment in the pass and at Landi Kotal of irregular troops enlisted from Afridis.

(3) That these troops should be embodied in one or more regiments to be local regiments of the army; or, notwithstanding my preference for irregular regiments forming local regiments of the army, I would agree to a "Khyber militia" on the express condition that it should be under the General Officer Commanding Peshawar.

(4) I agree that the employment of a militia is desirable on other parts of the frontier, provided it is placed under selected frontier military officers.

(5) I consider that the control of the pass should be under an officer who would be Commandant of the Khyber Force regiments, or the Khyber militia, and also Political Officer of the Khyber, responsible to the General Officer Commanding for the military security of the pass and to the Commissioner, Peshawar, in Political matters.

(6) Believing that the political relations to the Afridi tribes, if the policy of Her Majesty's Government is carried out completely, will be of the simplest character, I consider the higher political control should be in the hands of the Commissioner of Peshawar, who should have very full powers, and exercise responsibility—referring to the Government of India only in matters of high importance.

If the proposition means more than this, and refers to the whole question discussed in 1896, and on previous occasions, I respectfully dissent.

(6) The management of the trade of the pass can be arranged for under any plan which may be determined on.

(7) It is essential to secure in any settlement with the Afridis, the right of constructing a railway through the pass, and it is desirable to proceed with the construction of the railway.
(8) The new agreement with the Afridis, while making adequate provision for the railway and the military occupation, might follow the old agreement so far as practicable, and may provide for the restriction of allowances in whole or in part, but it should, it is submitted, provide for a considerable change in the relations between Government and the tribe.

(9) Payment for compensation for damage to buildings.—I incline to the view that this should be deducted from allowance in whole or in part, but I agree to consider this undesirable.

(10) That the demand for the restoration of the weapons lost by our troops be not pressed.

9-6-98. 

PROGS. NO. 210.—TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED THE 7TH (RECEIVED 8TH) JUNE 1898.

With reference to paragraph 18 of his despatch No. 1, dated the 28th January 1898, enquires when he may expect a final review of the result of tribal settlement and proposed future arrangements.

9th June 1898.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

9th June 1898.

SECRETARY.

9th June 1898.

His Excellency.

I do not know what reply to propose now, but may be in a better position after the Khyber case has been in Council; or might we say—

"Foreign. Secret. Your telegram 7th. I hope to send proposals for Khyber next week or the following, and shall then be in a better position to estimate as to the rest."

9th June 1898.

9th June 1898.

H. DALY.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

That a despatch be drafted and sent to Hon’ble Members for consideration in Council next Friday.

13th June 1898.

E.

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

That the despatch as revised in Council be issued.

17th June 1898.

E.

PROGS. NO. 211.—(Telegram P. to the Secretary of State, dated the 10th June 1898.)

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

The Secret Frontier despatch on the Khyber (No. 95 of the 23rd June) was circulated for signature without the Minutes by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Hon’ble Sir Edwin Collen, as they were not ready.

Copy of each Minute is circulated herewith for the information of Hon’ble Members.

24th June 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

PART II.

(K. W. No. 2.)—DEMI-OFFICIAL LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL P. J. MAITLAND, C.B., SECRETARY, MILITARY DEPARTMENT (TO SECRETARY), DATED THE 16TH (RECEIVED 18TH) APRIL 1898.

Enquires if Jamrud is in "British India."

(K. W. No. 2.)—(Demi-official letter to Major-General P. J. Maitland, C.B., dated the 18th April 1898.)

Make printed K. W. of Khyber arrangements file.

J. S.

Recorded and indexed by T. G. B.

Recording and indexing examined by J. S.
K. W. No. 2.
[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]
Dated Simla, the 16th April 1898.
From—Major-General P. J. Maitland, C.B., Secretary, Military Department,
To—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

Is Jamrud in "British India?" I thought the actual boundary was this side of it. Bara, I think, is in "British India." I tried to get maps showing the boundary of British India, but we do not seem to have any available. Excuse my troubling you, but the point may be of some importance.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]
Dated Simla, the 18th April 1898.
From—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—Major-General P. J. Maitland, C.B., Secretary, Military Department.

The boundary of British India is between Peshawar and Jamrud, and yet the Jamrud Fort is in British India. The fort itself and the road from Hari Singh-ka-Burj and 100 yards on each side of it, not touching any Afridi cultivation, have all been declared to form part of the Peshawar district.

Bara is within the administrative boundary of the Peshawar district and is British territory.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]
Dated Simla, the 11th June 1898.
From—H. Babington Smith, Esq., C.S.I., Private Secretary to the Viceroy,
To—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

After Council on Monday it may perhaps be necessary to draft a despatch about the Khyber question with some expedition, and having that in view His Excellency thinks it may be desirable to begin considering now, not so much the substance of the despatch—for that can hardly be taken in hand until the decision of the Council is known—but what will be necessary in the way of introduction and prefatory matter. Probably something quite short will be sufficient to the effect that the Government of India have, in such and such despatches, quoted in the margin, kept His Lordship informed of the course of events in connection with the Khyber, that information necessary to supplement this is contained in the enclosures to the present despatch (which would be mainly the papers already prepared on the Udny-Barton incident), and that it now remains to consider the present position of affairs and the arrangements for the future.

As I say, His Excellency's general idea is that something of this sort may be sufficient; but he is not sure how far the history has been completely brought up to date in the despatches which have been sent from time to time, and it is possible that it may be necessary to supplement them by a little more history.

The file with the Udny-Barton papers is, as you know, with His Excellency.

We go to Mashobra this afternoon, returning on Monday morning in time for the Council.
Dated Simla, the 18th June 1898.

From—H. Babington Smith, Esq., C.S.I., Private Secretary to the Viceroy,
To—Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

On page 5 of Sir Edwin Collen’s dissent, he says that it is on record that the present Lieutenant-Governor considered that, if an attack on the Khyber occurred again, the Khyber posts should be again left to themselves.

His Excellency does not recollect, nor do I, when or where Sir Mackworth Young expressed this opinion, and it might be desirable to see whether the statement is correct. If it is not, perhaps you would communicate with Sir Edwin Collen, who will no doubt be anxious to correct it.

I also enclose an extract from a letter from the Secretary of State, which the Viceroy mentioned to you and wishes you to see. It refers to the question of what measures are necessary for identifying arms imported for Kabul.

Dated Simla, the 19th June 1898.

From—Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—The Hon’ble Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B.

Towards the end of your Minute on the Khyber arrangements (page 5, just after the quotation from the “Edinburgh Review”) you write—"It is on record that the present Lieutenant-Governor considered that, if an attack on the Khyber occurred again, such as happened last August, he would be inclined to pursue the same policy—to let the Khyber Rifles and the British posts take care of themselves, and not move troops into the pass unless it were entirely convenient."

The Lieutenant-Governor wrote that opinion in a demi-official letter to His Excellency which was circulated (with His Excellency’s note of the 20th October 1897) to Hon’ble Members. This demi-official letter is in my “Keep-withs.” An official telegram from the Punjab Government of the 18th March 1898 referred to it, and said the material parts of it and another "will now be put into official form and letter sent by post.” The official letter did not repeat the expression used in the demi-official—see paragraph 3 of No. 329, dated the 1st April, and paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Lieutenant-Governor’s memorandum of the 11th April.

His Excellency has drawn my attention to the passage in your Minute, and directed me to communicate with you about it.

I cannot think of any other expression of the Lieutenant-Governor’s views on record, and it doesn’t seem strictly correct to say that the view quoted in your Minute is "on record," while the Rules of Business preclude reference to ‘notes’ which have not been brought on to the record. If you agree, please alter the passage as you would wish it to run.

I enclose the proof of your Minute which you gave me after Council on Friday. I found few typographical errors to correct. The word ‘not’ in the 6th line from the end of the last paragraph but one should come out or be ‘but’? Please send back the Minute when you have revised, and say if it should bear the date 16th June as suggested on it.

Dated Simla, the 20th June 1898.

From—Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—H. Babington Smith, Esq., C.S.I., Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

I have written to Collen about that passage in his Minute to which His Excellency drew my attention. The opinion expressed by the Lieutenant-Governor which Collen writes of as ‘on record’ was given in a letter to His
Excellency of the 18th October 1897, which was circulated to Hon'ble Members with notes, but is not on record. I have indicated to Collen the recorded expression of His Honour's opinion. It differs from that written in the letter of October 18th.

The Commander-in-Chief's Minute of which I enclose a copy directly refers to Sir George White's opinion, expressed in an office note. This is against Rule XXXIX of the Rules of Business. After Council I understood the Commander-in-Chief to say to His Excellency that any alterations necessary to make his Minute conform to the rules might be made, and I think I may, without previous reference to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, strike out the words "in agreement with the opinion recorded by Sir George White" which occur in the second paragraph? They are not material.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL]

Dated Simla, the 21st June 1898.

From—The Hon'ble Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B.,
To—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

Yours 19th June. I have omitted the passage to which you refer. I see that the particular opinion is not "on record" in the strict sense, i.e., it is not on the "proceedings."

I have made a few alterations in my Minute. Your despatch does not quite follow the Council Order on list of propositions, so as my Minute was written on these, I have necessarily had to change it somewhat. There is no material alterations, but for example I have had to alter "irregular troops to be enlisted from the Afridis" into "local corps of Afridis" in paragraph 1 of Minute.

For the passage about Lieutenant-Governor omitted, I have substituted one, quoted from official documents.

I have sent revise to press, and have asked Mr. Woollam to send you 40 copies.

I see that you say the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion as originally quoted by me was referred to in an official telegram from the Punjab. That is rather curious and somewhat inconvenient I should say.

I have asked them to send you the proof with the fair copies, so that you may see what alterations I have made.

P.S.—I return your enclosures.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL]

Dated Moshabra, the 22nd June 1898.

From—The Hon'ble Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B.,
To—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

1. The copies of the Minute went direct to you, so I had no opportunity to sign one copy. That can go by next mail I suppose, and those with printed signature by this mail.

2. May I ask you to do me the favour of having a 'comma' inserted after "conditions," 4th line from bottom of paragraph 19?
Dated Simla, the 24th June 1898.

From—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—The Hon'ble Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, K.C.I.E., C.B.

I send herewith the copy of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's Minute which you asked me for.

All the copies which I received from the press of your own Minute have your name printed. I find that the signed copy does go home, and I am telegraphing through Bombay that the signed copy of your Minute will be sent next mail.

If the type is still standing, the press could give you a copy, without your printed name, for signature. If it is broken up, can you sign the copy enclosed?

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Telegram, dated the 24th June 1898.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—Sir William Lee-Warner, K.C.S.I., Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London.

Signed copies of the Minutes accompanying Secret despatch Frontier, 95, June 23rd, will be sent next mail to substitute for those enclosed in despatch, and please insert a comma after the word conditions in last line but three of Sir Edwin Collen's Minute, paragraph 19.
N.-W. F.
D. No. 445 F.

Dated Calcutta, the 3rd February 1898.


To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

With reference to the conference held yesterday at Government House, over which His Excellency the Viceroy presided, I have the honour to forward a memorandum drawn up by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, submitting certain proposals for the holding of the Khyber pass.

2. These proposals, in which I concur, may perhaps be found to offer a reasonable solution of the question which was under discussion yesterday.

MEMORANDUM.

In deciding on the agency by which the Khyber is to be held, there are two points to be kept in view. First, the Khyber is used as the principal trade route between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan; and, secondly, in the event of military operations having to be undertaken in Afghanistan, the most direct and easiest road to Kabul lies through the Khyber. To meet trade requirements it would, no doubt, suffice to hold the Khyber by tribal levies drawn mainly from the Afridi sections, whose custom it was in former days to exact tolls from caravans making use of this pass. But to meet military requirements such an arrangement seems hardly appropriate. We ought to have an advanced post capable of ready expansion into an advanced military depot at the most commanding point in the pass, namely, at Landi Kotal; near that post an adequate supply of water is indispensable; and, in view of recent occurrences, it would appear to be neither prudent nor conducive to our prestige to expose the defensive works and water-supply which the Government of India may order to be constructed to the chance of being wrecked by a tribal outbreak. The importance of the military aspect of this question has, I believe, been fully recognized by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government since the year 1885.

The following proposals are put forward as likely to meet the two requirements indicated above:

1. The Khyber to be held for trade purposes by the Khyber Rifles, drawn proportionately from the tribal sections concerned, and organized somewhat in the same way as the Kurram Militia. The men to be armed, clothed, equipped and trained by Government. The Head-quarters of the corps to be as heretofore at Jamrud, with a strong detachment at Landi Kotal, and the remainder distributed in suitable posts between Landi Kotal and Jamrud. The original Landi Kotal Serai to be remodelled so as to provide quarters for the detachment there, and the old posts along the line, including that at Ali Masjid, to be restored with such improvements as regards site and design as may seem necessary.

In the event of Government approving of the continuance of tribal allowances to the Afridi sections living in the Khyber, the pay and allowances of the Khyber Rifles to be taken into account as really constituting a tribal subsidy.

My own view is that Afridis much prefer to be commanded by British officers, and for this reason among others I am inclined to favour the appointment of one or more carefully selected British officers to the Khyber Rifles. But on this point I hesitate to express a decided opinion, although I doubt
whether, if a different policy be adopted, any Native officer well adapted for the command of the corps would be forthcoming. Aslam Khan has done well, but his qualifications are quite exceptional.

2. For military purposes a really strong work, armed with guns, should be constructed at Landi Kotal on a site which, if possible, would protect the water-supply. It is understood that such a site can be found near what is known as “the General’s Camp.” The normal garrison of this work might be fixed at one battalion of native infantry, with a detachment of gunners, and it may here be noted that Landi Kotal is a much more healthy station for troops than the Peshawar valley. The work should, however, be so designed as to be capable on an emergency of housing a larger garrison, while being thoroughly defensible when occupied by its normal garrison. There should be no difficulty about this, if suitable flanking arrangements are made. The work should provide storage for reserve ammunition and for at least one month’s supply of food and water for the normal garrison. The type of work and the armament should be such as to enable the defenders to withstand a powerful tribal combination without needing immediate re-inforcement.

In conclusion, I would observe that the foregoing proposals do not, so far as I can see, involve the annexation or administration by us of the Khyber to any greater extent than has hitherto been the case. The political arrangements and the Khyber Rifles would remain as before under the control of the Political Officer in charge of the pass, and the military garrison of Landi Kotal would be under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District. The latter would act in concert with the former in all matters in which the presence of the troops might affect the management of the pass and of its inhabitants.

CALCUTTA,  
3rd February 1898.  
(Sd.) W. G. NICHOLSON, Brig.-Genl.,  
Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force.

No. 741 F., dated Fort William, the 7th February 1898 (Strictly Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 3rd February 1898, with enclosure.

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CALCUTTA,  
3rd February 1898.  
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From the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, dated the 3rd February 1898, with enclosure.

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No. 1057 F. Your letter, 3rd February, sending memorandum by Chief of Staff on Khyber. Present military occupation must temporarily continue, and as each clan submits, it must be told that Khyber will continue to be occupied for present. If tribes apparently resent occupation and desire complete or considerable freedom from control, the Government of India contemplate telling them that their conduct in the interval, until final settlement, will be taken into consideration in arriving at decision as to nature of permanent arrangements, but Secretary of State’s sanction is necessary, before any announcement of this kind can be made. Please give your opinion by telegram urgently.

WASHINGTON,  
28th February 1898.  
(Sd.) W. W. F.

D. No. 650 F.

TELEGRAM, No. B, dated Peshawar, the 28th February 1898.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force,  
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Your 1057 F. of 28th February. I would suggest with due deference that it would be premature to say anything to Afridis at present about future
No. 182.

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

Inform Sir William Lockhart, in reply to his letter of the 3rd February sending General Nicholson’s note, that the Government of India do not feel prepared to accept, without further investigation, proposals contained in it: and wish that they should be investigated by Sir William Lockhart and Sir R. Udny in greater detail, also the Government of India suggest an examination of any alternatives, such as His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief’s suggestion to hold the pass by a militia under the analogy of the Kurram Militia.

In the meantime the Government of India are of opinion that the Afridis, when they have submitted, should be told that the Khyber will be occupied for the present. They should be warned that the conduct of the tribes in the interval will be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision as to the nature of the final arrangements which may be made for the safety of the pass.

The observations of Sir William Lockhart will be invited on this point and the sanction of the Secretary of State will be asked.

25th February 1898.
arrangements for holding Khyber. They do not apparently resent present occupation; indeed, their attitude is submissive; but Hastings reports rumour is current amongst Zakka Khel that we intend holding Khyber in future ourselves without tribal allowances. If this turns out to be true, I will ask permission hereafter to tell jirgas that tribal arrangements of some kind will probably be re-introduced, but that the nature of these will depend to a great extent on their conduct.

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1098 F.

FROM

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

TO


FOREIGN DEPT.

FORT WILLIAM, the 1st March 1898.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd February 1898, in which you forwarded a memorandum drawn up by the Chief of the Staff of the Tirah Expeditionary Force making proposals for holding the Khyber Pass.

2. These proposals, which meet with your concurrence, involve the holding of a strong work at Landi Kotal, with a garrison of one battalion of Native Infantry and a detachment of gunners, while the Khyber Pass itself would be guarded for trade purposes by a Militia recruited from the tribal sections concerned and organized somewhat in the same way as the Kurram Militia.

3. The scheme, of which this short description does not purport to be even a sketch, has been examined by the Government of India in the light of what has hitherto been the policy of the British Government, and the instructions of the Secretary of State conveyed in his despatch of January 28th, paragraph 21, bearing particularly on the present subject. The Governor-General in Council is not prepared to accept the plan without further investigation of the whole question of the best way in which to secure the safety of the Khyber Pass. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, wishes you and Sir Richard Udny to put before him, in greater detail, the plan of holding the pass which commends itself to you, and to discuss at the same time any alternative ways of doing so. It has, for instance, been suggested that a Militia, maintained on the analogy of the Kurram Militia, might guard the pass without the immediate presence and support, in time of peace, of any military force, if a body of troops is kept ready to move to the assistance of the tribal Militia, should they be seriously menaced, and if a definite assurance be given to them that such assistance will be afforded.

4. Some time may yet elapse before the Government of India can arrive at a final decision in this matter. That decision must be influenced by other than purely military considerations, and you may now be in a position to advise the Government of India on the disposition and temper of the Afridis showing how they would view a military occupation. Sir Richard Udny was understood, when you and he were personally consulted in Calcutta, to favour a system under which the whole responsibility for the administration, as well as the safety of the Khyber, would be taken entirely out of the hands of the Afridis. The Governor-General in Council would desire to know, if this is a correct description of Sir Richard Udny's views, how he would propose such an arrange-
ment would be worked out in detail, and what extent of country on either side of the road through the pass would be included in such arrangement. Still another plan which has been mentioned is to fall back upon tribal responsibility and tribal methods entirely, relaxing even what amount of British supervision and superimposed authority there has always been in the Khyber arrangements since 1881. The Government of India will await the expression of your views before coming to any conclusion as regards these suggestions.

5. It is in the opinion of the Government of India inevitable that the present military occupation of the Khyber must, at least temporarily, continue, and that, when all the clans submit, they must be told that the Khyber will continue to be occupied for the present. They will be warned at the same time, if they show any disposition to resent this military occupation and a desire to arrive at a state of relations under which they will have complete or considerable freedom from control, that their conduct in the interval between this and the settlement of the future will be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision as to the nature of the final arrangements which may be made for the safety of the pass. The sanction of the Secretary of State must be obtained before any announcement of this kind can be made.

6. I am to ask that your best consideration may be given to the several questions which have been put before you in this letter, and that your opinion may be expressed to the Government of India as early as you are able to reply. The points raised in paragraph 5 were referred to you by telegraph.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) W. J. CUNINGHAM,
Secretary to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

No. 1099 F.

Copy, with copy of an Order in Council passed on the 25th February 1898, is forwarded to the Military Department.

By Order, &c.,

FOREIGN DEPT.;

FORT WILLIAM,

The 1st March 1898.

(Sd.) E. H. S. CLARKE,

Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

TELEGRAM, No. 1110 F., dated the 1st March 1898. (Dispatched 5 p.m.)

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

No. 1110 F. Your B, February 28th. Government of India have no wish to press for telling Afridis anything at present about occupation of Khyber. You will find in official letter issuing to-day, it is proposed, when all clans submit, to make announcement regarding occupation for a time at least; the object being to put it in a form which would not prevent the occupation of military posts in the Khyber either in conjunction with or without tribal arrangements should such appear desirable.
Telegram P., No. 1117 F., dated the 1st March 1898. (Despatched—5 p.m.)

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta, To—The Secretary of State, London.

To permit discussion of future arrangements in the Khyber, it seems inevitable that the occupation of the pass should be continued for a time after the submission of Afridi tribe. I understand that I have authority to give orders accordingly.

Strictly Confidential.

No. 1127 F.

Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1057 F., dated the 28th February 1898.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. B., dated the 28th February 1898.

Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1110 F., dated the 1st March 1898.

A copy of the foregoing telegram, together with a copy of the telegrams marked in the margin, is forwarded to the Military Department, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 1099 F., dated the 1st March 1898.

Strictly Confidential.

No. 1128 F.

Telegram to the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1098 F., dated the 1st March 1898.

Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 1099 F., dated the 1st March 1898.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, for information.

By Order, &c.,

E. H. S. CLARKE,
Assistant Secy. to the Govt. of India.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

No. 1145 F., dated Fort William, the 3rd March 1898 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, To—The Military Department.

A copy of the telegram noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department for information.
No. 5534 T., dated Camp Peshawar, the 11th March 1898 (Confidential).

From—General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1098 F., dated 1st March 1898, calling for a report by Sir Richard Udny and myself on the method which appears to us to be the best for holding the Khyber Pass in future.

2. My views on the subject are embodied in the accompanying memorandum. In order to save time, I submit this at once without waiting for the paper which Sir R. Udny is drawing up on the subject, and which I hope to forward on the 14th instant.

MEMORANDUM.

The Khyber Pass has to be kept open by us with two objects and can be held in one of four ways. The objects are—first, to provide a direct and easy trade route between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan; and, secondly, to ensure ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary. The latter purpose is undoubtedly the more important of the two, both in connexion with the defence of Afghanistan and India against foreign aggression, and because the trade between those two countries is quite insignificant in amount and value. The temporary closing of such a trade route as the Khyber makes very little difference to the Government or people of India, but from the strategic standpoint it might be essential that the main road into Northern Afghanistan should be kept open in times of excitement and fanaticism on or beyond the frontier. The delay of a week or a fortnight in entering Afghan territory might involve momentous consequences in a political as well as a military sense. It will be seen, therefore, that the measures which would suffice for guarding a trade route might be quite inadequate for keeping open the line of military communication between the Punjab and Northern Afghanistan.

The ways in which the Khyber can be held are—first, by regular troops; secondly, by a force consisting partly of regular and partly of irregular troops; thirdly, by irregular troops alone; and, fourthly, by tribesmen under tribal management and responsibility.

2. As regards the first method of holding the Khyber, it may be objected that, in view of existing military requirements in the Punjab and elsewhere, the Khyber could not be held in adequate strength by troops alone without a proportionate addition to the Indian army; that permanently to lock up a considerable military force in a narrow pass is not the best way of guarding against the recurrence of a frontier rising; that for occupying the heights bordering the pass from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, local irregular troops or levies are more suitable and likely to be more efficient than regular troops; that during the summer the pass itself (except its highest point at Landi Kotal) is so hot and unhealthy that service therein would be intolerable for British soldiers, and extremely distasteful to native soldiers; and, finally, that to exclude the Khyber Afridis from any share in the custody of the pass, and the emoluments attaching thereto, would certainly create ill-feeling among them and incite them to mischief.

With reference to the first objection, I would remark that some increase in the army to meet the needs of an expanding empire seems inevitable. As matters stand, a large proportion of the troops quartered in the Punjab have of late years been almost continually on outpost duty on or across the frontier, or on field service.
With reference to the second objection, it may be urged that it is by no means obligatory to lock up in the valley of the Khyber the whole of the troops that might be required to secure the pass. The Bazar valley would furnish a strong strategical position, and, if a brigade were quartered at or near China, while a smaller force occupied a fort at Landi Kotal, the pass would be as safe as it could be made by purely military means. On the other hand, it is understood that the permanent occupation of Afridi territory in the Bazar valley would be opposed to the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and I am inclined to think that such a step might embitter our relations with some at least of the Afridi sections, and thus lead to their giving trouble whenever they imagined that our troops were fully occupied elsewhere.

However this may be, the last three objections are to my mind unanswerable, and dispose of the idea of holding the Khyber by regular troops alone. Picquet and patrol duties in the pass can best be performed by a local and irregular corps, the employment of which gives the Khyber Afridis their due interest and profit in the custody of the pass, and obviates any necessity for quartering troops between Landi Kotal and Jamrud.

2. As regards the second and third methods of holding the Khyber, which can best be discussed together, it may be said that for the past eighteen years the pass has been guarded by irregular troops alone, inasmuch as the tribal levies which were raised, trained, and paid by us under an agreement with the Afridi sections concerned have by degrees been assimilated more and more closely to an irregular frontier corps. This system has saved much trouble and expense in the past, and might, if properly controlled, have continued to work well in the future, but for the unfortunate occurrences in August last. However loyal and well-disciplined irregular native troops may be, they can hardly be expected to fight against overwhelming odds of their own kinsmen, after their British Commandant has been withdrawn, and they have been warned that no support or assistance is to be looked for. Under such trying conditions, the best mercenary troops in the world might be expected to waver, and I think it highly creditable to the Khyber Rifles that, when left to their own resources, they fought as well as they did.

The Kurram valley is held by the Kurram Militia under a British Commandant, and this force has done excellent service, even during the recent period of disturbance. But the local conditions in the Kurram and in the Khyber are wholly dissimilar. The Kurram Militia is mainly composed of Turis, a tribe of Shias which only flourishes under British protection, and is at continual enmity with the Sunni tribes surrounding it. Moreover, we have provided the necessary support or stiffening to the Militia by the regular garrison quartered in the Para Chinar Fort.

The holding of the Khyber was entrusted to a local force in some respects analogous in constitution to the Kurram Militia, but with these differences: First, the Khyber Riflemen were drawn from the Afridi sections which inhabited and bordered the pass, and consequently they had no traditional feeling of enmity against their neighbours to strengthen their loyalty towards us; and, secondly, the defensible serai at Landi Kotal had no garrison of regular troops like the fort at Para Chinar. It seems possible, however, had the Khyber Rifles been promptly re-inforced by regular troops in August last, that with few exceptions, they would have stood to their engagements, that the various posts and the defensible serai and water-supply works at Landi Kotal would have been saved from destruction, and that the formidable tribal gathering would have melted away, as it did on a previous occasion, as soon as troops were moved up the pass in support.

It ought to be an axiom of frontier policy that, in using local levies or irregular corps to hold passes or outposts beyond the limits of British India, the one thing of essential importance is to inspire these levies or irregulars with the fullest confidence that, in time of emergency, they will be as fully and as promptly aided and reinforced by the army behind them as regular troops would be. Up to August last, I believe that the Khyber Rifles possessed that confidence, but for the time it has been weakened, if not destroyed, by their being left to themselves to hold the pass, and to defend the buildings and other
public property which had been entrusted to their care. According to the strict letter of the law, it is doubtless the case that our agreement with the Afridis did not oblige us to assist with our troops the representatives of the sections concerned, or the Khyber Rifles, in carrying out the duty for which these sections received allowances, and for which the Khyber Rifles had been organized. But these wild mountaineers are unacquainted with the niceties of political jurisprudence, they had for many years fulfilled their part of the agreement, some of them had been employed by us as irregular troops in frontier warfare elsewhere, and they may reasonably have hoped for the assistance which, technically speaking, they had no right to demand. One of my two main reasons for supporting the proposals put forward by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, is that their adoption will restore the confidence of the Khyber Rifles and the Afridis living in or near the Khyber Pass. These will know that, so long as a strong outpost at Landi Kotal is garrisoned by regular troops, there is no chance of our again leaving them to show the wave of tribal fanaticism unaided. There is of course the objection that on military grounds it may be hazardous to hold an advanced post with regular troops, while the road between this post and the base remains in the hands of locally-raised irregulars in whose fidelity we cannot place implicit reliance. I do not attach much weight to this objection, for Landi Kotal is at the top of the pass, and is therefore regarded by the Afridis as dominating the road between it and Jamrud. Moreover, as previously stated, the heights bordering the road are so inaccessable, and so devoid of water, that they could not be permanently held by regular troops, either British or Native, without involving a strain on our military resources quite out of proportion to any conceivable advantage to be derived from such a measure. The feasibility of covering the pass by means of a cantonment in the Bazar valley has already been discussed in paragraph 2 of this memorandum.

My other reason for supporting Brigadier-General Nicholson's proposals is that, without involving heavy outlay or alienating the sympathies of any section among the tribesmen, they are likely greatly to strengthen our hold over the Khyber, and to enable us to carry out such arrangements in the way of railway extension, water-works, and the like, as may be required to facilitate our access to Northern Afghanistan, should circumstances demand our intervention in that quarter.

4. As regards the fourth method, its practical effect would be that the Government of India would pay blackmail to the Khyber Afridis, instead of the latter imposing blackmail on the kafilas making use of the road. It would mean a reversion to the barbarous system which was condemned as intolerable at the beginning of the last Afghan war. Difficulties would be certain to arise regarding the repair of the road and the maintenance of the posts needed to protect it; the Landi Kotal water-supply would cease to exist; our prestige along the whole of the north-west frontier would suffer; in short, the fourth method of holding the Khyber has nothing to recommend it.

5. From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that I am in favour of the second method. The defile of the Khyber should in any case be guarded by irregular troops raised locally. As regards regular troops, it would no doubt strengthen our hold on the Khyber from a military point of view, if a strong force were permanently quartered in the Bazar valley at or near China, as well as a smaller force in a defensible post at Landi Kotal. From a political point of view, the permanent occupation of China might give rise to tribal ill-feeling, and thus cause us grave embarrassment; for it must be remembered that, in undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single pass, however important. If the attitude were friendly, the pass would be secure in any case. If the pass were secure, while the attitude was unfriendly, we should be harassed in other directions. I am, therefore, inclined to recommend the scheme sketched out by Brigadier-General Nicholson as offering the best prospect of a satisfactory settlement.
I consider that the organization of the Khyber Rifles might advantageously be strengthened by attaching to the corps three British officers instead of one, namely, a Commandant, 2nd-in-command and Adjutant, possibly also a medical officer. While drawn from the same local sources as heretofore, the corps might gradually be assimilated to one of the infantry regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force in matters of equipment, pay and pension.

6. I see no necessity whatever for instituting a civil administration over the Khyber. What we ought to tell the tribesmen is that, so long as they fulfil their engagements to us, and so long as their attitude towards each other does not bring them into conflict with us or endanger the security of the road, we are perfectly content to leave them to manage their own affairs. The Political Officer in charge of the Khyber would naturally exercise considerable influence over the tribesmen, but I doubt whether that influence would be increased by investing him with the functions of a civil administrator.

7. As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic—subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. When the tribesmen see that their allowances are not to be forfeited and that the Khyber Rifles are not to be disbanded, I am of opinion that they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal, as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours.

8. There are two other points to which a brief reference is necessary: First, the advisability or otherwise of constructing an alternative road to Landi Kotal from Peshawar through the Mullagod country. Such a road would be nearly twice as long as the Khyber route, and its cost would be some 9 lakhs, but the alignment is an easy one. If, as laid down by the Secretary of State, the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and trade is essential, it seems to me that it would be a waste of money to provide a second and much longer roadway which would never be used, unless the Khyber were closed—a condition of things which is not contemplated. Secondly, it may be convenient to mention that the cost of the defensive works, water-supply, &c., needed in the Khyber, if occupied in the manner suggested in Brigadier-General Nicholson's Memorandum, is roughly estimated by the Commanding Royal Engineer, Tirah Expeditionary Force, at 9½ lakhs, namely:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort on Suffolk Hill</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water-supply</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New post and tank at General's camp</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoring defensible serai</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockhouses, Upper Khyber</td>
<td>1½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cost of restoring the works which would be required if the Khyber were held by the third method, i.e., without a garrison of regular troops at Landi Kotal, may be taken at about 5 lakhs.

9. In conclusion, I would refer to the supreme importance of improving the communications between our frontier outposts and the supporting stations behind them. By this means alone can the due concentration of our forces and the rapid reinforcement of any threatened point be provided for. I advocate the immediate extension of the North-Western Railway system to Kohat and Bannu on the west, and to Landi Kotal and Dargai below Malakand on the north.

W. S. A. LOCKHART, General,
Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force.

CAMP PESHAWAR, The 4th March 1898.

Foreign Office Press—No. 276—15-3-98—94.
N.-W. F.
D. No. 811 F.

No. 5672 T., dated Camp Peshawar, the 16th March 1898 (Confidential).
From—General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force,
To—the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 5534 T., dated 11th March 1898, I have the honour to forward a Memorandum, dated 15th idem, embodying Sir Richard Udney's views on the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass.

2. The only remarks I have to make on this Memorandum, which I am gratified to find in substantial agreement with my own, are with regard to the following points:—

Paragraph 9.—I would first observe that, although Brigadier-General Elles concurred with the Commissioner of Peshawar in thinking it inexpedient last August to send troops into the Khyber, I am not aware that he represented such a movement to be a military impossibility. But in cases of local disturbance, the responsible military adviser is not the General Officer in local command, but the Lieutenant-General of the Command concerned, and in this instance the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, strongly urged on Army Head-quarters the desirability of re-inforcing the Khyber and supporting the Khyber Rifles with regular troops.*

Secondly.—I am doubtful about the necessity for keeping a fully equipped flying column at Peshawar in readiness to reinforce the Khyber. The correct principle to be followed in the military occupation of the frontier is to concentrate the troops needed to support the outlying garrisons in suitable and healthy positions, and to keep up the transport and equipment required to enable these troops to move at a moment's notice. Further, to perfect the means of rapid communication between the outposts and their supports by the construction of railways and the improvement of roads. To hold a long and exposed frontier with a moderate force, it is essential that the communications should be as complete as they can be made by civilized methods.

Thirdly.—I do not agree with Sir R. Udney about the Khyber Rifles being encouraged to provide their own arms. I can see no advantage in such a system, which would offer a premium on the theft of breech-loading rifles or their component parts from our troops or arsenals. I consider too that the Khyber Rifles should be as well armed as our Native Infantry Regiments.

Paragraph 10.—Admitting the existence last summer of a strong fanatical feeling along the north-west frontier, I doubt whether this feeling in the first instance took a firm hold on the majority of the Afridi tribesmen. They assembled, possibly in large numbers, to attack the Khyber posts, but their attitude was at first vacillating and half-hearted, and I cannot but think that, after having upheld their religious reputation among their neighbours by a skirmish with our troops, they would have been only too glad of an excuse to disperse to their homes. To me it is inconceivable that the Khyber Rifles would have attempted to hold out against their kinsmen, if the hostility of the latter towards the British Government had been as bitter and as fanatical as Sir R. Udney supposes. Apart from their Mullahs, the Afridis have always been on friendly terms with us. In fact, as a tribe they like us, and many of us like them; and it is well known that the Mullahs have less influence over the Afridis than over any other frontier tribe.

MEMORANDUM.

The management of the Khyber previous to the outbreak of last August was based upon an agreement made with the Shirwars of the Lwargai plateau round Landi Kotal.

* Telegrams No. 250 P., dated 18th August 1897, No. 259 P., dated 20th August 1897, and No. 431 P., dated 28th August 1897, from Lieutenant-General Commanding, Punjab, to the Quarter-Master-General in India.

† And the Shirwars of the Lwargai plateau round Landi Kotal.

B. Udney.

R. Udney

Khel, Zakka Khel, Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai and Sipah clans of
that tribe, for the Aka Khel and Tirah Adam Khel clans had no more to do with the Khyber than the sections of the Adam Khel Afridis, who inhabit the Kohat Pass and the wedge of independent territory adjoining that pass to the eastward. To prevent misconceptions as to the terms of this agreement, it should be read through carefully, but for present purposes it may be sufficient to say that the arrangements under it were as follows: On Tuesdays and Fridays in every week one caravan went up through the Khyber from Jamrud to Landi Kotal, a distance of 20 miles, while another came down from Landi Kotal to Jamrud, and these caravans were accompanied by guards of the Khyber Rifles which exchanged at the half-way post of Ali Masjid, the escort which had come down with the caravan from Landi Kotal returning there with the upward caravan from Jamrud, while the escort from Jamrud retraced its steps with the downward caravan. On these days too the heights which command the road through the defile were picquetted by Khyber Riflemen. On other days of the week the pass was closed to traffic, though special arrangements of the same kind were occasionally made on off-days for distinguished visitors, and special guards used to be provided for parties of coolies employed on the repair of the road or on such duties as the building of the fortified serial at Landi Kotal, the construction of the water-supply works near Landi Khana, &c., &c. Officials too connected with the pass, like the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber and the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles frequently travelled through it with small escorts of the latter corps on other than caravan days, though, according to the strict letter of the agreement (clause 13), they were bound to give sufficient notice of this to the tribesmen beforehand. From this it will be seen that the Khyber cannot be said to have been "held," except in a very modified sense even for purposes of trade, and that in a military sense it was not "held" at all, while the system in force was absolutely different from that prevailing in the Kohat Pass (through the country of the Adam Khel Afridis), which, in return for a comparatively very small subsidy, is open every day of the year and all day long, like any road in British India, for all travellers, whether European or Native, without any precautions of guards or picquets.

2. The question that Government now have to decide is whether we should content ourselves with regaining the same measure of control over the Khyber that we possessed in the past, or whether we should seek to obtain a larger measure not only in order to secure it more effectually for military purposes as our main line of advance into Afghanistan, but also to render it impossible for the Afridis to close the road and to destroy our posts in the pass as they did last August. I think there can be no doubt that this question must be answered in favour of the second alternative, and, as it seems to me that the objects in view under this alternative could only be completely attained by holding the pass for ourselves in a military sense and by regular troops, I said at the Conference which was held by His Excellency the Viceroy at Calcutta on the 2nd ultimo, that I should like to see this done in future if the military authorities considered it practicable. Although too I am absolutely averse as a general rule to any occupation or quasi-annexation of territory beyond the frontiers of British India when it can possibly be avoided, and I have always been strongly of opinion that we should refrain from interference with the tribes, unless it is necessary for the security of our own subjects and border, I think that in the special case of the Khyber the objects to be attained would justify us in making an exception, and that, however much the Afridis might dislike our occupation of the pass with the consequent forfeiture of their pass allowances,* the trans-border world could not fail to admit that it was a just and appropriate punishment, which they had brought upon themselves by an unprovoked outbreak and by showing us that we could place no lasting reliance on tribal agreements. But, even with

* In this connection I may note that, if we continued to pay them their old allowances, the Afridis could not object to our re-occupying the Khyber with troops or regard it as any breach of the 1881 Agreement, since this was specially provided for by clause 5 of that agreement, which reads as follows: "No Afrid is to be employed in the Khyber unless the said Khyber shall be in military occupation of the Khyber."
a military occupation of the Khyber, I would have kept up the Khyber Rifles—
as an auxiliary irregular corps on the model of the Kurram Militia and entirely
under our own control—for two reasons—

(i) as providing an opening for the Afridis, who would still feel that they
retained a considerable interest in the pass arrangements while
they had a local levy to enlist in;

(ii) to escort caravans and to furnish picquets on the hills during their
journey through the pass in times of peace, because such duties—
particularly hill top picquets—would be hara-sing for regular
troops, and could be performed satisfactorily by Khyber Rifle-
men in ordinary times as they have been during the past.

I had no intention, however, of proposing that we should undertake any
responsibility for the administration of the Khyber as well as for its safety, and
I would simply uphold the existing regulation published in Government of India
Notification No. 2135 E. P. of the 2nd July 1880 (as amended by Notifica-
tion 1085 F. of the 15th June 1886), which provides for the trial of criminal
offences in “the Khyber Pass and the lands immediately adjoining the pass on
either side of the roadway,” without attempting to interfere with the tribesmen
elsewhere. It will be observed too that this regulation in its concluding words
allows a discretion to the officers empowered under it to refrain from using it
unless the parties are all British subjects.

3. Sir William Lockhart in his Memorandum on future Khyber arrange-
ments is opposed to a purely military occupation of the pass by regular troops,
principally on the grounds—

(a) that irregular troops (i.e., local levies) are more suitable, and likely
to be more efficient, than regulars for occupying the heights
bordering the pass, which are so inaccessible and devoid of water
that they could not be permanently held by regular troops, either
British or Native, without an undue strain on our military
resources;

(b) that during the summer the pass itself is so hot and unhealthy that
service in it would be intolerable for British, and extremely
distasteful even for native soldiers;

(c) that the exclusion of the Afridis from a share in the custody
of the pass and the emoluments attaching thereto would create ill-feeling
and incite them to predatory action;

and also more of less because—

(d) a military occupation would involve an increase to the Indian army;
and

(e) to lock up a considerable military force in a narrow pass is not the
best way of guarding against the recurrence of a frontier rising.

4. Some of these objections to holding the Khyber entirely by regular
troops are so purely military that as a civilian I feel great diffidence in making
any remarks upon them at all, but in frontier questions political and military
considerations are so inseparably associated that it is impossible to refer to the
former without touching upon the latter. Perhaps therefore I may be per-
mitted to say that I fully recognise the force of (a), (b), (d) and (e); and as
regards (a), even if it were safe to allow local levies to hold permanent positions
upon the heights which command the pass, the difficulty of water is one which
it would still be probably impossible to overcome.

As for (c), I have already said that in my opinion the special objects to be
attained by a military occupation of the Khyber would justify us in disregarding
the natural dislike of the Afridis to such a measure; but their resentment
might no doubt lead to “predatory action,” and, if there is any question
whether such action could be adequately met by military precautions, this
certainly furnishes an unanswerable argument against attempting to dispense altogether with tribal arrangements. On the whole, therefore, I am quite content to accept the conclusion that, so long as we have only the pass itself to deal with, and are debarred from taking up covering positions in the country on either side of it, a purely military occupation of the Khyber is not practicable.

5. The alternative methods of holding the pass are stated by Sir William Lockhart in his Memorandum to be—

(i) partly by regular and partly by irregular troops (i.e., local levies);
(ii) by irregular troops alone;
(iii) by tribesmen under tribal management and responsibility;

and Sir William Lockhart thinks that the first and second of these methods can best be discussed together; but I should prefer to group (ii) with (iii) as in point of fact constituting a single method, for we may take it as certain that, if we are to use only local levies, it must be in combination, as hitherto, with tribal arrangements, while on the other hand in clause (6) of the Khyber Agreement of 1881, the tribesmen themselves said that the maintenance of some kind of Jezailchi Corps was “absolutely necessary to enable them to render the road secure.” This method, however, is the system which broke down in August last, and, if we reverted to it without special precautions, although the Afridis have since been taught a lesson which they are not likely to forget in a hurry, we should have no security against the recurrence of similar events in times of excitement on the border.

6. If it be said that this objection might be met by keeping up a permanent flying column at Peshawar of sufficient strength and complete with transport and commissariat, which would always be ready in case of necessity to support the Khyber Rifles, and to assist them in guarding the pass until the excitement had died away, I would reply that the primary object of a special force is always liable to be overlooked, as the events which led to its formation are gradually forgotten, and that in a time of stress elsewhere—the very time it must be remembered when excitement is most likely to spread to the Afridis—it would probably be utilised for other purposes. If for instance we had had a Khyber Flying Column in Peshawar when the rising occurred on the Malakand last July, no one, I think, will deny that in all probability it would have been despatched in that direction. While, however, I desire to point out the danger of relying upon a special force of this kind, I trust I may not be misunderstood as urging against the creation of such a force. The maintenance of a flying column at Peshawar is in fact one of the precautions I would urge upon Government in any case, whether we are to revert to the old system pur et simple, or whether we are to strengthen it by a post of regular troops at Landi Kotal as suggested by Brigadier-General Nicholson, which remains the only other alternative for discussion. All I would say is that a flying column at Peshawar is not enough alone, and that it should be supplemented by the establishment of a military fort at the further end of the pass, which might at least cover the post of Khyber Rifles at Landi Kotal, and would be able to hold out till relieved even if the flying column were not immediately available.

7. I concur therefore with Sir William Lockhart in supporting General Nicholson’s proposal that “a really strong work armed with guns should be constructed at Landi Kotal,” while the Khyber Rifles should be maintained as a local levy to guard the road, and for ordinary escort and picquet duties with caravans, &c. When the question of the Khyber was discussed many years ago (?) by the Defence Committee, I believe that the idea of guarding the pass by any mixed system of this kind was summarily dismissed, because it was thought that military principles forbade the location of troops in an advanced position if the line of communication with their base could only be held by levies. Prior therefore to the Conference at Calcutta on the 2nd ultimo, I had put this alternative aside as out of the question, under the
impression that it would never be accepted by the military authorities; and when I was asked my opinion about it at the Conference, I rejected it on this account as impracticable. But when General Nicholson propounded the present scheme, and I found that military opinion was not so opposed to it as I had imagined, the case assumed a different aspect, and I now entirely agree in the proposal for a fort at Landi Kotal as a considerable step towards the complete security of the Khyber, which would be obtained by a purely military occupation if that were practicable, while in some respects General Nicholson’s solution of the difficulty is preferable as avoiding the danger of Afridi discontent, which would arise if we held the pass for ourselves and deprived the tribesmen of their allowances. At the same time I doubt whether the Afridis would consider a military fort at Landi Kotal to “dominate” the pass, i.e., the twenty miles of road between Landi Kotal and Jamrud, which it is in contemplation to hold as before by posts of local levies, or whether, in other words, such a fort would effectually restrain them from attacking these posts and stopping the road as they did in August, unless its military garrison were large enough to send out a really strong column for operations in the pass itself; and, as I presume that Government would scarcely be prepared to keep up a permanent garrison of this size at Landi Kotal, I would insist upon the necessity for maintaining a flying column at Peshawar (which might be called the “Khyber Flying Column”), with every possible precaution to keep in memory the primary object for which it is intended, and to provide against it or its equipment being diverted to other purposes.

8. If the old system of guarding the road between Jamrud and Landi Kotal by a local levy is to be continued, it follows that tribal allowances for the pass must also be renewed, and I observe that Sir William Lockhart is disposed to hold the same view. The only question is whether they should be restored at the old rates, and at first I was inclined to think that, if the Afridis by their unprovoked outbreak compelled us to go to the expense of building a strong fort and maintaining a military garrison at Landi Kotal, it was only equitable that they should suffer some reduction in the amount they received, which, though to some extent a compensation for the tolls they used to realise on the Khyber road when they held it themselves, had originally been fixed on the understanding that they were responsible for guarding the pass without our assistance. On the other hand, though the site of the proposed fort would, as I understand, be in the limits of the Lwargi Shinwari, like the old Landi Kotal fortified serai, I cannot think that the Afridis would welcome its construction. It is more probable that they would regard it as a threat to their independence. * and, if at the same time we reduced their allowances, this would be an additional grievance which might greatly delay their settling down to the new régime. On the whole therefore I think that, if we are to restore the allowances at all, we should do so without altering them; but it should be made a condition of their restoration that we reserve to ourselves the right of running a railway through the pass, and of taking up the necessary sites for this purpose, without paying anything for the ground required (unless culturable) or increasing the allowances.

9. As to the Khyber Rifles, it seems advisable for me to note that they are the present form of the Jezailchi Corps, which originally consisted for the most part of men provided by the Malik under clause (6) of the 1881 Agreement and subject to their control, who were paid Rs. 7 a month if they carried matchlocks or Rs. 8 if they brought rifles. Gradually this corps became more and more “regularised,” the men were supplied with Sniders, the property of Government, while they were withdrawn by degrees from the control of the Malik, and a very material addition was made to the Government posts in their charge by the erection in 1888-89 of the fortified serai at Landi Kotal. From time to time the tribal Maliks still continued to assert their right of control, but these claims were steadily resisted by the Political Officer in charge of the
Khyber, and before the Afridi rising occurred last summer this control had practically disappeared, so that the Khyber Rifles were very similar in organisation to a regiment of the Native army, though until Captain Barton was appointed in 1896 the important element of British officers was entirely wanting. Whether this was a wise policy is, I think, very questionable, as it certainly tended to obscure the real footing upon which the corps subsisted, and if, as Sir William Lockhart believes, but I venture to doubt, it inspired the men with confidence that we should support them by regular troops in case of attack by their own tribesmen, I can only say that it was a great mistake to introduce such a policy without simultaneous arrangements to ensure this support being given, which, as I have explained in my letter No. 3029 of the 3rd October 1897 to the Punjab Government, was judged by the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar on the occasion of the outbreak in August to be a military impossibility. For the future, however, I agree that the Khyber Rifles should be maintained under our own control on the same system as the Kurram Militia, provided always that we have a properly equipped flying column in Peshawar ready to support them, and that we are holding the Landi Kotal end of the pass with regular troops in a fortified position. In order also, if possible, to reduce the number of Government rifles in their hands, I think a handsome increase of pay (say, Rs. 12 mouth instead of Rs. 9) might be offered to men who brought their own Sniders. I made a similar suggestion in the Conference at Calcutta, but I observe that, in the Notes of that Conference, I am represented by mistake to have said “buy” instead of “bring.”

10. There is one passage in paragraph 3 of Sir William Lockhart’s Memorandum about which I must say a word in conclusion, as I am glad to have this opportunity of clearing up a matter regarding which it would appear that a good deal of misconception exists. The passage I referred to is as follows:—“It seems possible, however, had the Khyber Rifles been promptly reinforced by regular troops in August last, that , and that the formidable tribal gathering would have melted away, as it did on a previous occasion, as soon as troops were moved up the pass in support.” The italics in this passage are my own, and, as the words thus italicised seem to allude to the attack made upon the Khyber by Malik Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, in July 1892, I desire to point out the important features in which that attack differed from the outbreak of last August. On the first occasion Amir Khan’s “lashkar,” probably numbered “four or six hundred men,” and did not, I believe, include even the whole clan of the Rajgal Kuki Khels, but was only a gathering of the men of that clan who belonged to Amin Khan’s own faction. The Mullas in Tirah combined to try and persuade other Afridi clans to join, but without success, and the direct motive of the attack was Amin Khan’s personal resentment at having been deprived of half his “maliki” allowance for previous misconduct. On the last occasion, on the other hand, the strength of the Afridi gathering, when it came down upon the Khyber, was estimated at ten or twelve thousand men, collected from all clans except, curiously enough, the Rajgal Kuki Khels who had supplied the “lashkar” in 1892; and the motive swaying this army was the irresistible wave of fanaticism which had spread throughout the tribe. On the first occasion again, Amin Khan’s “lashkar” occupied a hill above Shadi Bagiyar to the south of the entrance of the Khyber on the evening of the 4th July 1892, and during the ensuing night made attacks on the posts of Shadi Bagiyar, Jahanarga and Fort Maude just inside the pass; but the gathering retired and dispersed early on the morning of the 5th July, because (it was thought) they had heard of the arrival at Jamrud of re-inforcements from Peshawar, viz., 200 men of the 14th Sikhs, who reached Jamrud on the evening of the 4th July, and 100 of the Royal Scots Fusiliers with 2 field guns, who marched into Jamrud at 2 A.M. on the 5th. Not a man, however, of these reinforcements ever advanced a yard beyond Jamrud. In August last, on the other hand, the Afridi gathering attacked and took the same three forts on the 23rd of that month in spite of a British force of 1,400 infantry and a mountain battery (besides a regiment of British Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery), which
had been sent out to Jamrud five days previously, in the hope that it might act as a demonstration to overawe the tribesmen. I will not enter into the question whether or not such a “lashkar” of the whole Afridi tribe would possibly have melted away if the troops at Jamrud (all that were considered to be available from Peshawar) had been pushed forward into the pass; but I may remark that four months later, after we had overrun Tirah and when we had no one but the Zakka Khel left to oppose us in the Khyber, one brigade at Landi Kotal was found insufficient to hold that pass and the line of communication from Jamrud, and a second brigade had to be moved up from Jamrud to Ali Masjid, as stated in paragraph 36 of Sir William Lockhart’s Political despatch of the 3rd ultimo.

PESHAWAR; \{ 
\textit{The 15th March 1898.} \}

(Sd.) \textsc{R. Udny,} 
\textit{Chief Political Officer,} 
\textit{Tirah Expeditionary Force.}
No. 194.

TELEGRAM, No. 1356 F., dated the 17th March 1898.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp.

No. 1356 F. Government of India are considering future arrangements in Khyber and have received memorandum from Sir W. Lockhart, but Udny's opinion not yet received and further consideration necessary. In meantime continuation of occupation of pass, pending completion of settlement, has been sanctioned by Secretary of State. In this connection Sir W. Lockhart proposes:—Begins. As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic, subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. Ends. He thinks restoration of allowances and re-enlistment of Khyber Rifles will re-assure tribes and make them more willing to accept any arrangement we may hereafter adopt. Government of India desire very early expression of Lieutenant-Governor's opinion on this proposal.

No. 195.

Telegram, No. 118 C., dated Banda, the 19th March 1898.

From—The Chief Secretary, Punjab Government, Lieutenant-Governor's Camp,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Lieutenant-Governor's views in regard to re-opening of Khyber Pass have been given in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government's letter No. 1338, dated 21st September, and in two demi-official letters to the Viceroy, dated 18th October and 6th March, the material parts of which will now be put into official form and letter sent by post. To what he has already said, Lieutenant-Governor would add as follows:—First. It is very undesirable that we should show anxiety to restore allowances to Afridis before our objects regarding pass are defined and fully secured; such attitude would be misinterpreted and would make final settlement extremely difficult. There is no need for haste as pass is open, and military occupation must continue till sufficient guarantee for the permanency of arrangement is secured. Secondly. It is desirable, in view of reckless infringement of former agreement, that, as recommended in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter No. 1370, dated 24th September, cost of constructing buildings damaged in outbreak should be deducted by instalments from the allowances, and this question should be settled before allowances are restored. Thirdly. In regard to re-enlistment in Khyber Rifles, Lieutenant-Governor, as already intimated, thinks this desirable, provided Government reserve complete liberty of action in regard to constitution of force and its relation to tribal control. These are questions which, in Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, require full deliberation and discussion with the tribes, and allowances should not be granted until they are settled. Even if Government has framed its policy in regard to the Khyber, the tribes are hardly in a position to enter into definite engagements which must depend for their fulfilment on the concerted action of the several sections.

No. 196.

Telegram, No. 295 T. (Confidential), dated Peshawar, the 24th March 1898.

From—The General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India; repeated to the Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Having now strong hopes of settling with the Afridis by the end of March, I suggest the following military arrangements which, if my anticipations are
realised, might then come into effect:—The force to be reduced to three
brigades, namely, one brigade at Mamani with a Mountain Battery and Com­
pany of Sappers attached; two brigades of like strength on the Khyber line, also
34th Pioneers and at least two squadrons of Native Cavalry as divisional troops—
the whole force to be under Major-General Symons with Brigadier-Generals
Hart, Hammond and Gaselee as Brigadiers. If above is approved, the following
troops might be demobilized:—57th Field Battery, numbers one and nine
Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery, Derajat and Kohat Batteries, Derbyshire,
Yorkshire, Queen’s Gordon Highlanders, King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 30th
Punjab Infantry, 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkhas, 36th Sikhs, 1st Battalion, 3rd
Gurkhas, 21st Madras Pioneers, 28th Bombay Pioneers, No. 4 Company,
Madras Sappers and No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers. Regarding cavalry, if
early withdrawal of 9th Bengal Lancers is desired, I would suggest two squad­
rons of regiment at Nowshera or Peshawar being temporarily attached to the
Division.

By the end of April it might be possible to demobilize two more
brigades leaving only one brigade in the Khyber, composed of No. 3 Mountain
Battery, Royal Artillery, Sussex Regiment, Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 9th
Gurkhas, 34th Pioneers, No. 1 Company, Bengal Sappers. This brigade, for the
command of which I would suggest Brigadier-General Hart or Gaselee, would
have to remain throughout the summer; Landi Kotal Fort and water-supply
and defensible posts in Khyber being meanwhile pushed on. On completion
of these works the force could be reduced to the future normal strength, which I
have recommended to be one battalion of Native Infantry and a detachment of
garrison artillery to work the fort armament, perhaps also on account of the
guns it might be prudent to add a company of British Infantry from one of
the battalions at Peshawar. Addressed Adjutant-General; repeated Quarter-
Master-General; Military; Foreign; and Military Secretary to the Viceroy.
No. 1444 F., dated Fort William, the 25th March 1898 (Confidential).

From—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,


I am directed to address you with reference to the 7th paragraph of the memorandum on future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass which you forwarded with your letter No. 5534 T., dated the 11th March 1898. For convenience of reference the paragraph in question is here quoted in full:

"As soon as we are fully assured of the complete submission of every Afridi section, I should be disposed to renew the tribal allowances in the Khyber, subject to such re-adjustment as may seem equitable or politic—subject also to such conditions with respect to railway and road construction, and the acquisition of sites, as we may think fit to impose. When the tribesmen see that their allowances are not to be forfeited and that the Khyber Rifles are not to be disbanded, I am of opinion that they will welcome the construction of a strong post at Landi Kotal, as furnishing a tangible proof that, if they do their part to keep the pass open, we shall not fail in ours."

2. The Government of India have consulted His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on this point in advance of inviting His Honour's opinion upon the whole question of the management of the Khyber, as it is put before them by your letter above cited and by your farther letter No. 5672 T., dated the 16th March, and I am to inform you that the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that, while the Khyber Rifles may be continued on a temporary footing, the whole question of the restoration of tribal allowances to the Afridis must be reserved at present, as it is inexpedient to renew payment of them until at any rate the permanent arrangements for the Khyber have been discussed and settled. It is necessary, in order to arrive at a decision upon this matter of the permanent arrangements, to institute enquiries which will be taken up at once.
[CONFIDENTIAL.]  

No. 1472-F.

FROM  

SIR WILLIAM CUNINGHAM, K.C.S.I.,  

Secretary to the Government of India,  

TO  

THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF THE PUNJAB.

FOREIGN DEPT.  

FORT WILLIAM, the 28th March 1898.

SIR,

I am directed to forward, for the favour of the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, a copy of the correspondence cited in the margin, on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of the Khyber Pass.

1. I am further to enclose a copy of a telegram No. 2965 T., Confidential, dated the 24th March 1898, from General Sir William Lockhart, suggesting certain reductions in the Tirah Expeditionary Force, in the probable event of a settlement with the Afridis being effected by the end of March. Conditional on the realization of Sir William Lockhart’s anticipations, his proposals have been accepted; the force will be reduced to three brigades, and the distribution proposed is approved, subject to the General Officer Commanding explaining the necessity or advantage of retaining a brigade at Mannan. The further reduction of the force to one brigade will be made when practicable.

3. The Government of India have not yet received the official expression of His Honour’s opinion the despatch of which is referred to in your telegram No. 118 C., dated the 19th March. If that has been sent before the receipt of these papers, it is possible that a perusal of them may suggest further expression of the Lieutenant-Governor’s views.

4. His Honour will see that both Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udney favour the plan of holding the actual pass by irregular troops or militia raised from the Afridi and other neighbouring tribes, while the western outlet is garrisoned by troops. Sir Mackworth Young’s opinion already given on this question is in favour of holding the pass by tribal agreement and by a tribal force maintained on tribal responsibility. The primary difficulty, however, which has arisen is to find a Native officer to take the place long filled by Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan. It is essential that a tribal levy in the proper sense of the term should not be commanded by a British officer, and the fact that Captain Barton was in command of the Khyber Rifles last year has done much to complicate the questions involved. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that, where it is thought expedient to introduce British officers, it must be recognised that the force ceases to be a mere tribal levy and becomes an irregular force or militia. The distinction is one with which His Honour is well acquainted from the case of the Kurram Militia. Whether the Khyber Rifles will be more acceptable to the Afridis as irregular troops or militia than as a mere tribal force looking for support exclusively to their own tribal headmen is a point on which there is room for difference of opinion, and cannot be settled without careful enquiry into the feeling of the tribesmen themselves. It will be noticed that Sir W. Lockhart is of opinion
(paragraph 7) that the establishment of a military post at Landi Kotal and the consciousness that this means our supporting the Khyber Rifles themselves against hostile attack will do much to obviate opposition. Sir R. Udny does not concur in this anticipation, and I am instructed to point out that the establishment of the military post at Landi Kotal in the manner proposed by Sir W. Lockhart is itself still under consideration, and the Government of India have arrived at no conclusion in regard to it. But unless the Pass is to be held throughout by regular troops, the Khyber Rifles must be continued in some form, and I am to invite His Honour to consider whether the difficulties of a purely tribal organisation are not so serious that the time has come for the constitution of the force as a militia under British officers.

If the Afridi Rifles are to be maintained on the footing of irregular troops, the constitution of the corps as regards the proportion to be enlisted from the different clans may nevertheless be subject of tribal agreement.

5. My letter No. 1444 F., dated the 25th March, to General Sir William Lockhart, communicates the decision of the Government of India to the effect that the Afridi tribal allowances cannot at present be restored. They cannot be settled until the plan of holding the Khyber is determined. On this must depend not only the amount to be paid, but the purposes for which payment is to be made. The enlistment in the meanwhile of tribemen in the Khyber Rifles, under temporary conditions, which has been already permitted, puts a considerable sum of money into the hands of the tribe. The Government of India do not think there is any necessity to go further and to restore at the present time payment of any of the Afridis Maliki allowances. The Government of India had formed an intention not only to hold the allowances in reserve until the Afridis accept whatever conditions they are ready to grant, but to confiscate them, in whole or in part, until the cost of repairing the forts and posts in the Pass had been made good. This intention has not been abandoned. Even, however, if this reason did not exist, the Government of India, as a matter of expediency, would prefer not to display undue readiness to restore the allowances.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) W. J. CUNNINGHAM,

Secretary to the Government of India.

Confidential.

No. 1473 F.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Military Department, for information, in continuation of the Office Memorandum from the Foreign Department, No. 1445 F., dated the 25th March 1898.

By Order, &c.,

(Sd.) W. J. CUNNINGHAM,

Secretary to the Govt. of India.
No. 329.

FROM

L. W. DANE, ESQUIRE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,
Punjab and its Dependencies,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Dated Lahore, 1st April 1898.

Foreign,
Frontier,

SIR,

In continuation of my telegram No. 118 C, dated 18th March 1898, I am directed to communicate in some detail the views of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor so far as they are formed up to date in regard to the future policy to be adopted in the Khaibar.

2. It has already been decided that pending a complete settlement with the Afridis the Khaibar Pass will continue to be occupied by our troops, and orders have also been recently issued for the re-opening of the Pass to trade; but it is understood that as soon as we are assured of their complete submission, the Government of India are anxious to determine the details of the permanent settlement to be effected with the tribes and the manner in which the future arrangements should be carried out and our political relations with the tribes conducted.

In the first place Sir Mackworth Young would strongly deprecate the hasty acceptance of any cut and dried scheme for keeping open the Khaibar route, however feasible or simple the proposals might at first sight appear. The measures to be adopted must be carefully thought out and fully discussed by and with the tribes themselves, for the best guarantee for permanence in the new arrangements will be a deliberate estimate of what they are able and willing both to promise and to perform. In a matter of this kind there is the greatest danger in hurrying or patching a settlement, and His Honor thinks we should guard against doing this. Moreover, as the Pass is open and it is clear that a military occupation must continue till a sufficient guarantee for the permanence of the arrangements to be made is secured, there does not appear to be any necessity for haste in the matter.

3. In view of these considerations Sir Mackworth Young cannot propound at the present moment any matured scheme for the future maintenance of the Khaibar route, but he has always considered, as intimated in paragraph 5 of Punjab Government letter No. 1328, dated 21st September 1897, that the re-opening of this route must, for the present at any rate, form one of the main objects of our future policy, and, if possible, that it should be re-opened under arrangements for which in the first instance the tribes themselves should be responsible. He sees no reason for supposing that there will be
another breakdown in the arrangements if properly worked out, and he is of opinion that the restoration of the old order will in one respect have a better effect than anything new, in that it will clearly illustrate the hopelessness of attempting to upset our arrangements. He is not in favour of any change in the conditions which would impose the duty of maintaining the peace of the Khai bar in times of disturbance on the British Government. It is better that the tribesmen should bind themselves to keep the route open and safe, only looking to us to supply the supervising agency, without which it is impossible for them, owing to their feuds, to co-operate for the common object.

The Lieutenant-Governor thinks it will be desirable that the Corps should be officered as far as possible by members of the tribes responsible for the Pass, though one or more British officers will certainly be required to hold command, and to organize and supervise their discipline and distribution much in the same way as British Inspecting Officers do in respect of Imperial Service Troops. At the same time the Lieutenant-Governor thinks that we should again provide (as in clause 5 of the Khai bar Agreement) that we may at any time send troops into the Khai bar and occupy positions there without further payment, and that, having made this provision, we should ensure that a sufficient force is always kept ready mobilised at Peshawar or Nowshera to move into the Khai bar on the orders of the responsible political authorities, and that suitable positions for such a force to occupy are worked out and kept in readiness.

4. With reference to the question as to how the future settlement is to be made and who is to be primarily responsible for the conclusion of the agreement with the Afridis, the Lieutenant-Governor believes that the Government of India are in favour of retaining the political work in the Khai bar for the present under the direct control of the Foreign Department and of entrusting the reconstruction of the arrangements to the Brigadier-General in Command, assisted by a Civil officer of a standing that would give weight to his advice. Sir Mackworth Young feels bound to say plainly that he does not think this plan would prove a good one. If the Khai bar is again to come under the political control of the Punjab Government, His Honor thinks it is very desirable that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab should be in a position to regulate from the first and in detail the scheme which is laid before the Government of India for orders. To leave the Local Government out during the formation of proposals is to deprive the Government of India of the best experience available just at the time when it is most required. It is not the same thing to refer the proposals after they have been worked out to the Punjab Government for opinion. It may be too late then to give a turn to the proceedings. The same reasons apply against excluding the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, from the negotiations during the early stages. Sir Mackworth Young would therefore recommend that, as contemplated apparently in paragraph 4 of Foreign Department letter No. 3380 F, dated 15th September 1897, the reconstruction of the arrangements when the tribes have made submission be made over to the Punjab Government, and that the settlement be carried out by the Commissioner for the time being of the Peshawar Division under its direction. A Civil officer would also be required in the Khai bar to work out the arrangements under the orders of the Commissioner. In fact His Honor would employ the same machinery as was employed with marked success when the Khai bar Agreement of 1880 was effected, and he foresees serious difficulties if the Punjab officers are called upon to work any scheme for the maintenance of the Khai bar route with which they have not been closely associated from the beginning, though he can assure the Government of India of the most loyal co-operation on the part of all officers concerned in any policy which they may decide to adopt.

5. This brings His Honor to the consideration of certain proposals which have apparently been made with the object of reassuring the tribes and making them more willing to accept any arrangement we may hereafter adopt. Sir William Lockhart proposes in the memorandum forwarded with Foreign Department endorsement No. 1128 F., dated 3rd March 1898, that, as soon as the tribes have assured us of their complete submission, their tribal allowances
should be restored "subject to such readjustment as may seem equitable or politic, and subject also to such conditions with respect to Railway and road construction and the acquisition of sites as we may think fit to impose." He also favours the re-enlistment of the Khaibar Rifles. As regards the latter, the Lieutenant-Governor has already intimated in my letter No. 1264, dated 11th September 1897, that he considers the re-enlistment of the Khaibar Rifles desirable as a means of giving the men employment and keeping them out of mischief, provided this is expressly done subject to whatever measures are ultimately found necessary in regard to the Khaibar, when, if the former constitution of the Corps is to be altered, the men could be given the option of leaving or re-engaging. But as regards the renewal of the allowances, Sir Mackworth Young is of opinion that it is very undesirable that we should show anxiety to restore allowances to the Afridis of the Khaibar Pass before our objects regarding the Pass are defined and fully secured. Such an attitude would be misinterpreted and would make the final settlement extremely difficult. We have other means of inducing the tribe to make complete submission and to set about a future settlement in a reasonable frame of mind. Though the Lieutenant-Governor trusts no further advance of our troops will be necessary, it is still open to us to reimpose the blockade if the tribe is obstructive about the Pass question, and it seems neither necessary nor desirable to hold out the prospect of an immediate regrant of their old allowances as an inducement to them to comply with our wishes in this respect. Moreover, in view of the reckless infringement of their former agreement, it seems desirable that, as recommended in paragraph 5 of my letter No. 1370, dated 24th September 1897, and contemplated in paragraph 11 of Government of India letter No. 3803 P., dated 4th October 1897, to the address of Sir William Lockhart, the cost of reconstructing the buildings damaged in the outbreak should be deducted by instalments from the allowances, and this question should, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks, be settled before the tribal allowances are restored. The Government of India have just called upon this Government for a report as to the value of these buildings, and the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, has been asked to supply the information, but it will necessarily take some time before the information can be furnished.

6. If the views of the Lieutenant-Governor expressed in this letter meet with the approval of the Government of India, His Honor will endeavour to have a scheme for the future maintenance of the Khaibar worked out under his personal direction by the Commissioner and will submit this for their orders at as early a date as is possible under the circumstances of the case.

I have the honor to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient Servant,

L. W. DANE,

Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
No. 200.

No. 338, dated Lahore, the 2nd April 1898.

From—The Hon'ble Mr. L. W. Dane, Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1472 F., dated 28th March 1898, forwarding, for an expression of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion, a copy of the correspondence containing the views of Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of the Khyber Pass.

2. My letter No. 329, dated the 1st instant, was ready for despatch when your letter arrived, and, as Sir Mackworth Young was anxious that the Government of India should at once be in possession of his views as to the mode in which future negotiations for keeping open the Khyber Pass should be conducted, he has not kept it back, though he now hopes very shortly to discuss fully the proposals contained in your letter under reply, in continuation of paragraph 3 of that letter, which was written before receiving the proposals of General Sir W. Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny, and without consultation with the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division.

3. I am to add that Sir Mackworth Young observes with satisfaction that the Government of India have already adopted the view regarding the restoration of the allowances which was advocated in the telegram from this office, No. 118 C., dated 18th ultimo, and expounded more fully in paragraph 5 of my letter No. 329, dated 1st instant.
No. 398.

From

L. W. DANE, Esquire,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,
Punjab and its Dependencies,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

Dated Lahore, 16th April 1898.

Foreign.
Frontier.

Sir,

With reference to the request contained in Foreign Department letter No. 1472 F., dated 28th ultimo, that His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor will favour the Government of India with his opinion on the subject of the future arrangements for the control of the Khaibar Pass, I am desired, in continuation of my letter No. 338, dated 2nd instant, to forward a copy of a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawar, No. 68 C., dated 2nd instant, and a Memorandum in which Sir Mackworth Young has recorded his views on the general question of the control of the Pass, so far as he has been able to arrive at any definite conclusions on the subject.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,
Your most obedient Servant,

L. W. DANE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
No. 68 C., dated Peshawar, 2nd April, 1898.

From—W. R. H. M. R., Esquire, c. s., c. s. i., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division,

To—The Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement No. 270, dated the 18th Instant, enclosing for remarks a copy of correspondence on the subject of future arrangements in the Khaibar.

2. So far as I am able to judge there appear to be three distinct systems for consideration, and no more than three, and I will deal with each in succession.

The first plan would be to ourselves accept the whole responsibility for the administration as well as for the safety of the Pass, and to take it entirely out of the hands of the Afridis. This is annexation. Declared or virtual annexation will not matter; the tribes concerned will perfectly understand the drift of the measure. If we annex, whether expressly or by implication, the special consideration, vis. tribal responsibility for the safety of the Khaibar, in return for which we have been paying a part of the late handsome allowances to the Khaibar clans (the other part represents the tolls), disappears, and with it must go the allowances; unless indeed we consented to continue to pay what will then be naked blackmail; such a course would, however, be out of the question. Under these circumstances it is only too probable that we shall be compelled to hold the road with a strong military garrison, and that sooner or later we shall come again into collision with the Afridis. They look upon the Khaibar as their country, which it is, and upon the levy of tolls as their ancient and indefeasible right. It is unlikely that they will surrender either without a further determined struggle.

I have not a copy of the Secretary of State’s despatch of the 28th January with me, but I think I am not mistaken in believing that anything like annexation will be directly opposed to the policy therein indicated.

3. At the other end of the scale of systems is the plan of falling back upon tribal responsibility and tribal methods entirely, and of relaxing even that amount of British supervision which there has been in the Khaibar arrangements from 1881 to 1897. This plan will assuredly fail. It postulates a power of combination, of self-government and of self-restraint which is utterly wanting among the Afridis. Such a power exists among some other clans and tribes, but (and this a most important factor in border management) no two tribes are alike in individual character, and it does not follow that because one tribe can do a thing or bear a particular treatment the same will be the case with its neighbour or with another tribe further off. For instance, during all the time that the Khaibar has been shut, from the days of the Emperor Akbar down to 1878-79, the Mohmards were able to keep open the routes through their territory and to make a large income from the tolls that they imposed; but the Afridis, though anxious enough to secure the tolls, were incapable of uniting for the purpose of keeping the Khaibar open and safe, and consequently it remained closed for centuries. The Afridis have not changed their character, their unreflecting cupidity and their reckless greed; the intestine feuds and jealousies among them are as virulent as ever; cohesion is entirely wanting; and if purely tribal management ever does get a start, it will break down in six months. That is a just deduction from the history of centuries.

4. Neither of the above systems being possible, it seems to me that a partnership of Government and of the Afridis; a mixture of tribal management with such a quantity of outside authority as will be sufficient, and not more than sufficient, to correct the inherent weakness of a tribal system, is the course
plainly marked out to us, by the conditions of the case, as the only prudent and economical line to take. There are two phases in this partnership, which completes the list of the three systems. The two phases are: one with troops permanently stationed somewhere in the Khaibar, preferably at Landi Kotal, and the other without troops quartered in the Pass, but held ready in the background at Peshawar, always prepared to be slipped upon the Afridis. In one case the corrective authority, requisite for the purpose of steadying the tribal machinery, is, or is supposed to be, on the spot; in the other case it exists also, but is kept in reserve.

5. Before discussing the two classes of the system of joint management of the Khaibar, I would point out that first a local corps to work details which cannot admittedly so well be undertaken by any one else, and secondly the grant of allowances, are of the essence of the partnership. Unless the tribes receive allowances they cannot well be asked to assume responsibility for the road. Both these matters, the local corps and the allowances, I will discuss below; it is enough here to say that they are I think indispensable adjuncts to any system of joint management.

6. Reverting now to the question of partnership, I propose to consider it on purely political and administrative grounds, leaving aside military considerations on which I am not competent to submit an opinion except in so far as they are based upon matters which are within the scope of judgment of Civil Officers or of any man with ordinary common sense.

The crux of the whole position is this: Shall troops be permanently stationed at Landi Kotal or not? If they are so stationed, then with every intention and the most honest desire to maintain the political independence of the Khaibar (as distinguished from its municipal independence), it is quite certain that this political independence will shortly disappear, and subsequently also (more or less as the case may be) the municipal independence of the Khaibar. I do not mean the independence of Tirah, or of the Bara Valley, but of the Khaibar proper. That is the perfectly inevitable sequence of events trans-frontier, for wherever we plant power, in the shape of British bayonets, across the border among the tribes, one of two things must happen,—either we must withdraw that power or it must be supreme and must increase and widen as it remains. In connection with this most important consideration I venture to quote an extract from a note which I wrote for Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick in 1896: "It is quite impossible for ourselves or for the tribes to divest British officers of their attributes as the officers of an all-powerful State. All their acts and all their utterances have at their back this power. Unless this power is to be flaunted, what its agents wish and desire must be done; however platonic that wish or desire may be, once that it is expressed, it becomes a clear or veiled command, because it emanates from the source of authority; if it is disregarded then that authority is condemned. A British officer cannot among the tribes act as amicus curiae, being in truth the curia himself."

The presence or absence of troops at Landi Kotal will have a most profound effect upon the political situation in the Khaibar hereafter, for with the best will in the world, if there are troops permanently in the country, the situation will from the first day radically differ from what it will be if there are no troop in the Pass; and whatever we may say or wish the facts will be too strong for us, and we shall drift into a position which will, all but in name, be annexation with its attendant difficulties. Take a concrete case: supposing two hostile sub-sections are fighting between Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal; if there are no troops at Landi Kotal it does not matter to us what the belligerents do; it is easy to arrange that on the days the Pass is open they abstain from interference with the road and caravans on it, and for the rest they can do what they like for all we care. But if there are troops at Landi Kotal it is intolerable that there should be fighting and the risk of interruption on our line of communications; we must forbid it. If
we prohibit an appeal to arms, if we intervene as the supreme authority, it follows that the parties must, when they are not allowed to fight it out, appeal to us to settle their quarrel. We cannot refuse to interfere; if you deprive the people of one tribunal, *vis.* that of arms, you must substitute another; and we shall find ourselves called upon to undertake the administration of justice. Between that, between administering justice and virtual annexation, the distinction is fine, it is a hair's breadth. This is the difficulty that confronts us everywhere across the border—in Chitral, in Swat, in Waziristan. If we put the magnet among the iron filings, how are we to prevent the filings from crowding to it? We cannot possibly cantone troops beyond the border without sooner or later having to assume the civil administration of the country around them. Whenever we go over the border in force we must I think be prepared to assume an authoritative position; it must, by the nature of things, be authoritative; if not, it will be thrust upon us, not without the penalty which we must always pay for the neglect or disregard of natural laws.

7. Apart from military considerations, the question therefore is this: is this authoritative position necessary and expedient in the Khaibar or not? I venture to consider that it is neither necessary nor expedient. It is not necessary, for the system on which the Khaibar was managed for 17 years without such a position worked admirably, as has been repeatedly and publicly acknowledged in every possible quarter. It broke down, but under circumstances which would have smashed any plan except that of holding the Pass with troops. The authoritative position is not expedient because we have to adopt an arrangement which shall enlist the Afridis on our side and shall induce them to remain willingly in the partnership. That being so, anything that is likely to lead to virtual annexation is certain sooner or later to meet with the opposition of the Afridis and to terminate in a rupture of the partnership. An authoritative position in the Khaibar will assuredly lead to complications, for some day or other it will be resisted and then at all costs it must be asserted. And where are its limits to be drawn? It may be argued that the presence of troops at Landi Kotal does not at all mean the assumption of this authoritative position, but I venture to repeat that it does; that we cannot go there and then decline to be bound by the conditions of the case. Events will be too strong for us.

8. If we are to enter into partnership with the Afridis at all, any basis of the partnership which must end in the eventual absorption of the weaker partner will lead to the violent disruption of the bond. There are no two ways in the matter, for the Afridis will not consent to a peaceful absorption. That is their nature, we cannot change it, and we must reckon with it in our calculations. I therefore strongly recommend the second phase of the partnership, *vis.* management of the Pass without a permanent garrison of regular troops at Landi Kotal. For 17 years a system without troops in the Khaibar worked admirably as I have said. It broke down under unusual stress, but the ship has not been built that will weather every storm. For 17 years the Khaibar road was as safe as any highway in India; for 17 years the Afridis were amenable to our wishes and we were at peace with them. It is not to be supposed that the tremendous punishment they have just received will be without lasting effect, or, if they are not touched in what they prize perhaps more highly than anything on earth, their independence, that they will not be content to remain good friends with us, and to co-operate with us in the task of keeping open the Khaibar. They were content to do so from 1881 to 1897 without any previous punishment to speak of, without our power having been brought home to their very doors, and it is not likely that the case will be different now. If a storm were again to rage such as has recently swept along the frontier, then not even the proposed military garrison at Landi Kotal will avail, for a far stronger garrison on the Malakand did not avail, to keep the country quiet; and if so, because the presence of troops in the Khaibar will
as-ursely lead to a virtual annexation and to consequent complications, therefore, I say, better avoid these and have no troops which will be there only for the one eventuality when, troops or no troops, we shall have to fight it out.

I consider that all that is wanted for political and trade purposes can be attained by the employment of a local force, coupled with tribal allowances, and without a military garrison at Landi Kotal, provided that this local force is backed up by the presence at Peshawar of a moveable column ever fully equipped to go out at the shortest notice, and provided that the local force and that the Afridis know this.

These provisos are absolutely essential.

With these conditions maintained, it is possible to guarantee, as much as one can guarantee anything, that the Khaibar will not again be disturbed, to any appreciable extent.

o. Whether on grounds of Imperial policy it is necessary to have troops in the Pass it is not for me to say. But I venture to urge that, if it is decided to keep troops in the Khaibar, we be very careful of what we say now, or, since in the course of years the position of the major and of the minor partner in the Khaibar arrangement will have, perhaps imperceptibly but none the less inevitably, altered, an agreement now made may not faithfully reflect the changed conditions of the time, and this will give a handle five or ten years hence to agitators. Nor with Afridis will it be possible to modify agreements from time to time, except at the risk of misunderstandings and a rupture. A definition of the relations of the partners was made in the agreement of 1871. That agreement is abrogated by the recent hostilities, and we ought I think to take advantage of this fact in order to make a fresh start. The Afridis will no doubt clamour for some kind of writing, for without a tangible deed of partnership they will feel themselves insecure in the Khaibar business with so powerful a partner as Government. As His Honor is aware, these men are great lawyers, and sea lawyers to boot, and whatever we record now ought, if troops remain in the Pass, to be very carefully framed so as to be in accord not only with the present situation, but also with the situation as it will have developed in the future out of the beginning that is now made.

10 Assuming that troops are to be permanently stationed at Land Kotal for military reasons (although with deference I would note that the absence of an advanced post at Landi Kotal, capable of ready expansion into an advanced military depot, did not apparently hamper our advance in November 1878), on general grounds I would strongly suggest a larger garrison than one native regiment with a detachment of gunners. The chances of attack by Afghan troops are very remote. But where troops are permanently located a bazar and habitations invariably spring up; as the recent disturbances fade with the past and a sense of security revives, houses will be built, works undertaken, and gradually a position will be created which will become exceedingly embarrassing when danger threatens. And danger is much less likely to threaten if the visible force on the spot is strong enough to move out instantly on the offensive. Nothing encourages these clansmen more than the sight of troops cooped up in a fort and besieged. Weak outposts unable to hit out mean frontier risings. I am therefore greatly in favour, if an advanced post at Landi Kotal has to be held at all, to hold it in considerable strength. For these reasons I recommend that, if the water-supply permits, a British Regiment, two Native Regiments and a Mountain Battery be placed at Lanki Kotal, if troops are to be stationed there. The climate, moreover, is healthy there, although Ali Masjid is a fever hole, and a force at Landi Kotal may enable us to reduce the garrison of Peshawar.
11. But if, as I consider, it its neither necessary nor expedient to retain a permanent military garrison at Landi Kotal, and if it is best to rely upon a moveable column at Peshawar which will give the requisite stiffening to the Khaibar management, and will not commit us eventually to a virtual annexation of the Khaibar and to the risk of complications and collisions with the Afridis, in that case I recommend for consideration the suggestion to keep, all the year round, a brigade of troops and a Mountain Battery at Cherat. No better site can be found for climate, for opportunities to exercise the troops in hill work, and for proximity to the Khaibar.

12. Whatever system we take, short of annexation or purely tribal management, a local force is required, which I venture entirely to agree should be on the lines of the Kurram Militia, raised, paid, equipped, controlled and commanded completely by Government, but with this concession that, subject to the conditions of loyalty, good discipline, sufficiency of recruits and the pleasure of Government, a fixed proportion of the force (say ¼ or ⅕) shall consist of Khaibar Afridis drawn from the six clans, in numbers to be determined hereafter. This is practically the system of the Kurram Militia, where we have as nearly as possible a fixed number of Turis in the Corps, with their complement of native officers, enlisted from both factions of the Turis, the Drewandis and the Mian Murids. Owing to the existence of these factions we have not yet been able to appoint a Turi to be a Subedar-Major, but this will come in time. With Afridis most probably a good Subedar-Major could be found as Afridi society is not split into two great camps like the Turis. The Khaibar Militia ought I think to have a British Commandant and a British Adjutant. I would not recommend the revival of the de jure tribal de facto Government Corps which began in 188: as Jezailchis and ended in 1897 as Khaibar Rifles.

13. Coming now to the question of tribal allowances, I have, after much thought, arrived at the conclusion that on the whole it will be best to restore them en bloc. To begin, a considerable part of them represents the tolls of which the Afridis in 1881 surrendered the collection to us. No doubt, as an act of State and by way of punishment, we could appropriate the tolls. But compliance with the terms imposed upon the Afridis is intended to wipe out their guilt; they look upon the tolls as their private property; and the appropriation of the tolls would to them be an additional punishment for their past misconduct and be in their eyes tantamount to the annexation of the Khaibar. Of course we can say: "without us there would be no tolls at all; you Afridis were never able to levy them," to which the retort would naturally be that without Afridi co-operation we should find it an uncommonly expensive business to keep the Khaibar open and collect the tolls.

With respect to that portion of the allowances which represents the tribal subsidies, apart from the tolls, we shall have and shall enforce tribal responsibility and shall get our quid pro quo. If any permanent reduction is made in the allowances, then it should be made rateably all round, and favour shown or any difference made will probably lead to infinite trouble. But on the whole I think it will be best to restore things to their former footing; no particular principle is involved in reduction; we are precluded from adopting the reduction as a punishment; and a reversion to the old order of things in the matter of allowances will go far towards re-assuring the Afridis that we mean bygones to be bygones and that we have no ulterior designs. But I recommend that one condition to the grant of the allowances be that we may, within defined limits, make and keep in repair roads or railways as we please, and that the allowances are not to be increased on account of these roads or railways.

14. To sum up my suggestions: annexation or purely tribal management seem to be out of the case; a mixed system appears to be the only feasible course; whether we have troops at Landi Kotal or not, a local force like the Kurram Militia and the grant of allowances are essential conditions.
We ought I think to be most careful to what agreement or agreements we commit ourselves.

Lastly, I am bound to represent that we are much less likely to be entangled in complications if there are no troops at Landi Kotal. The point therefore is whether the military considerations outweigh the risk of complications and the certainty, if Landi Kotal has a permanent military garrison, of the absorption of the Khaibar with its attendant consequences. Since this absorption would be opposed to the policy of the Secretary of State's despatch and liable to lead to trouble, and since we get what we want, without risk, by means of a force held in reserve at Peshawar, I recommend a management of the Khaibar without troops in the Pass.
Memorandum by Sir Mackworth Young on the subject of the re-opening of the Khaibar.

General Sir W. Lockhart and Sir R. Udny are in favour of an advanced military post at Landi Kotal, the pass being guarded by tribal levies. Mr. Merk, who has not seen their opinions, but to whom I sent confidentially a copy of General Nicholson's memorandum of 3rd February 1898, with which Sir W. Lockhart's recommendations are in accord, is against any military occupation of the pass, which he thinks should be held by a tribal militia backed up by the presence of a moveable column at Peshawar.

2. I have already on more than one occasion expressed my opinion against a military occupation of the pass, but I have now to reconsider the subject in the light of the weighty opinions which are now before me.

3. It seems reasonable that after having quelled the disturbances raised almost simultaneously by nearly every frontier tribe on the Peshawar and Kohat borders from the Indus to the Kurram we should strengthen our position by occupying any military vantage ground in the tribal territory overrun by our troops, which is desirable for Imperial defence, or for pacification of the tribes. But the immediate cause for occupation will soon be forgotten, and in judging of its effect we should look forward some years and endeavour to gauge the ultimate position.

4. Now I have no hesitation in saying that the permanent occupation of Landi Kotal by a military force will never be accepted by the Afridis with complacency. It is true, as pointed out by Sir R. Udny, that in the agreement of 1881 there was a clause (5) which ran as follows: "It lies with the discretion of Government to retain its troops within the pass or to withdraw them and re-occupy at pleasure." But this must be read with the following passage from the Foreign Department letter No. 2930 E. P., dated 31st August 1880: "It may be explained to the tribes that, although our troops will remain for the present at their stations in the pass, they will in all probability be soon withdrawn; and it may also be of advantage to intimate that the British Government has no desire to station troops in the Khaibar so long as the pass is kept open under the independent and exclusive charge of the tribes, and so long as it is managed in accordance with the agreements that may be made with the British Government." This interpretation of the intentions of Government shows that what was reserved was the right to re-occupy the pass with troops for the purpose of restoring order and enforcing the agreement, and also no doubt for an advance to Kabul if necessary; but the tribes distinctly understood that the terms of the agreement involved no permanent military occupation, and notwithstanding that they appear to have been desirous of some assistance in formulating their scheme of watch and ward for the pass (see paragraphs 7 and 8 of Major Conolly's No. 978, dated 23rd September 1880—Punjab Government Proceedings, Foreign Department, No. 3, of March 1881), there is nothing to show that they contemplated asking for a permanent garrison of British troops. On the contrary, I believe that they were then, as I feel sure they would be now, totally averse to such a garrison. It may be urged that, as Landi Kotal belongs to the Luargi Shinwaris and does not lie within Afridi territory, what reason can the Afridis have for objection to a military force being stationed at that point? To this I would reply that the occupation of Landi Kotal to a great extent dominates the pass and is a standing menace to the integrity of the Afridi territory, and that I believe that the tribe would object as strongly to a military occupation of that point as they would, to the location of a force at Ali Masjid or any other similar place within their own limits. They regard the pass as their property. Occupation to them would mean annexation, and with reference to the remarks contained in paragraph 6 of Mr. Merk's letter to which I draw special attention, I doubt if it could result in anything else. It would constitute, as I said in paragraph 5 of this office No. 1338, dated 21st
September 1897, a continuing disgrace which might at any future time supply the motive for hostilities. Sir W. Lockhart assumes that whereas the quartering of a strong force in the Bazar Valley would give rise to tribal ill-feeling, the occupation of Landi Kotal would not have this effect. In this I cannot agree. The tribal honour would be seriously affected and a deep-seated resentment would be engendered instead of the friendly attitude which Sir W. Lockhart considers of much greater moment than the absolute safety of the pass.

5. In support of this view I might appeal to numerous documents in the literature of the frontier from 1876 down to the present time. There can be no doubt whatever that the tribes have the strongest objection to any extension of British authority over their territory. The advances which we have made during recent years coupled with the demarcation of a sphere of influence which to the tribal mind means ultimate annexation must be placed in the forefront of the causes which have contributed to the rising of 1897. This opinion I have arrived at after full consideration, and I may have to enlarge upon it in another connection. My immediate predecessor Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick alluded in paragraph 46 of his Confidential Memorandum of the 26th October 1896 to the effect on the Orakzais and Afridis of our taking up a position on the Samana. It is significant that in the somewhat insolent communication made by the Afridis just before they pillaged the Khaibar they referred to the occupation of the Samana and the Malakand, though both outside their territory, as an offence against the amicable relation of the British Government with the tribes. In their petition to the Amir which was reported on in this office No. 105, dated 20th January 1898, the Afridis dropped this grievance, but this was no doubt because it pertained more to the Orakzais than to themselves. The Orakzais referred to the occupation of the Samana in their petition. If the occupation of the Samana and the Malakand was an offence to the Afridis, it will readily be believed that the occupation of Landi Kotal will be bitterly resented by them.

6. Similarly, I may appeal to previous communications from the Punjab Government in support of the view that an advanced post on the borders of the Amir's territory will greatly irritate and annoy His Highness. It was said in the letter of the Foreign Department, No. 2197 F., dated 14th August 1896, that the definition in 1893 by the Durand Convention of the boundary of the spheres of influence of the Government of India and the Amir had removed the danger of rousing the jealousy of the Amir of Afghanistan. But I think it must be admitted that recent events have shown that the Amir's jealousy is not removed, and at all events that His Highness is not indisposed to back up the Afridis in their attitude of independence and defiance, when troubles arise between them and the British Government.

7. Thirdly, the effect of an advance in the Khaibar on other tribes must not be lost sight of. The demarcation of the spheres of British and Afghan influence has without doubt led to an impression that it is our object ultimately to secure complete control of the trans-border territory up to the Durand line, and this impression will be strengthened by the occupation of Landi Kotal.

8. I do not say that all this should not be faced in order to secure a substantial advantage, but it is my duty to represent the political drawbacks to the present proposal. And what is of primary importance is this, that the advance, which would possibly not be met by any overt opposition at the outset, would nevertheless constitute a grievance which would be nursed till the season of opportunity. If it is important that we should have the tribes friendly when we may have to march into Kabul, then we should avoid if possible doing that which will inevitably set them all against us.

9. Of the military aspect of the question I am not competent to speak. But I would venture to make the following remarks. If Sir R. Udny is right in thinking that the idea of guarding the pass by a mixed system, partly military and partly tribal, was rejected by the Defence Committee, no doubt the causes for such rejection will be examined before the proposal is revived. I incline to
Mr. Merk's view that a single regiment stationed at Landi Kotal would be a source of anxiety, not of strength, and that a larger force would have to be maintained. Landi Kotal would not I believe be of much use as a base of operations in case of an advance in force to Kabul; there is neither room nor water for a large force. With the tribes friendly we should have no difficulty in pushing troops through the Khaibar, at any time. If they are unfriendly, we should have to move up in overwhelming force, and I question if a fortified post at Landi Kotal on the line of advance will contribute much to our operations. In times of peace we should have a force locked up, 191 miles from Jamrud, in a place where service would be unpalatable to our troops. The expense which will be incurred apart from the 9½ lakhs for buildings would be very considerable, especially if a whole brigade were retained there. Whether any military advantage would be secured by occupying the post with troops appears to me very doubtful, unless a satisfactory reply can be given to the above remarks.

10. Further, I question whether the proposal harmonizes with the policy of the Secretary of State as enunciated in his Secret Despatch No. 1, dated 28th January 1898. One of the leading principles given in paragraph 18 of that despatch is the following: "The extent and difficulty of this mountainous border render it expedient that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the policy just indicated." The paragraph goes on to deprecate any new responsibilities not absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border. The limitation of our interference with the tribes so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory is also enjoined. The military occupation of Landi Kotal means practically the annexation of the whole of the Khaibar Pass with all the administrative responsibilities attaching thereto. I need not enlarge upon this question. I feel that the proposal can hardly be brought within the four corners of the Secretary of State's Despatch, paragraphs 18 and 21, unless for military reasons it is indispensable.

11. Whether the presence of a military force in the Khaibar is necessary in order to give stability to tribal arrangements is a question which I submit should not be judged by the fact that when in August last it was decided not to send a force up the pass to relieve the Khaibar Rifles the latter only afforded a slight resistance to the tribal lashkar. I do not see that anything else could be expected, especially when the European officer in command was withdrawn. I agree with Sir W. Lockhart in laying stress on the fact that the corps without its commandant made some stand, and I should conclude from this that it would be quite possible to make more of their agency in the future by affording them the necessary support. If, however, the experiment is repeated, it must be done on a definite plan, and the true character of the arrangement must not be lost sight of. Moreover, I think that it will be necessary for some little time to keep a military force in the Khaibar until the tribal arrangements are fairly started.

12. As to what those arrangements should be, the choice lies, if it is decided to abandon the idea of a military occupation, between tribal levies constituted and maintained on the basis of the old agreement and a militia recruited from the tribes and commanded by British officers. I should prefer not to give a final opinion at this stage between these two alternatives. Under sufficient safeguards I should be willing to accept either, and should wish to know what the tribes themselves propose, how effect could be given to their wishes, and what prospect there was of such an arrangement being permanent and satisfactory, before deciding to insist on an arrangement according to our own ideas of what is best. The corps should I think in any case be recruited, as before, mainly from the tribes which own the pass, and the Native officers might usually be similarly selected. If the force consisted of tribal levies as distinguished from a militia, some special agreement would be required as regards the position of the British officers attached to it, for I do not think it would be possible to do without British officers for the reasons given by Mr. Merk in paragraph 3 of his
letter. Upon the whole I am inclined to prefer the idea of a militia commanded by European officers, but I would direct the General Officer Commanding and Political Officer, to report on this subject after discussing the question with the tribal jirgas, and would await their report before finally deciding. It is above all things desirable that we should carry the tribes with us in any arrangement that is to be made.

13. If a corps for safeguarding the Khaibar is established on either basis as above sketched, I have no doubt that for some time at all events it will be necessary to hold troops in reserve at Peshawar or Cherat ready to support it, or even possibly to overawe it before it has acquired a status and proved satisfactory. I believe myself that the Afridis will avoid hostilities for at all events a generation, but this cannot be reckoned upon. A force should be kept ready-mobilised for some time to come, and Mr. Merk's suggestion that such a force should be stationed at Cherat in preference to Peshawar deserves consideration. The elevation is 4,500 feet and the climate is good; the conditions are similar to those under which the force would operate, if called upon to do so, in the hills. It is 23 miles by cart road and 19 by bridle road from the Pabbi Railway Station, and the troops could be in the Khaibar at two days' notice. There is a good and permanent water-supply at Chapri about 800 feet below the ridge, and the water could easily be pumped up into a service reservoir on the ridge.

14. In regard to the details of any agreement which may now be made with the tribes, the correspondence which preceded the agreement of 1881 and that agreement itself will doubtless be consulted. The position is different in this respect that we now have to deal with a tribe which has just felt the weight of our hand and submitted to our demands. With those who minimize the result of our recent operations I am unable to agree. I consider that the compliance with our demand, especially in the matter of surrendering breech-loaders, shows conclusively how hard pressed the different sections have been. But for their internal feuds and the difficulty they have in combining for any purpose except fanatical warfare, they would have satisfied our demands at a much earlier date. The lesson they have had will I believe last them for some time, and if they are properly managed they will enter into fresh negotiations with the British Government and be prepared to act up to their engagements at least as readily as in 1881. I would not agree to abandon a single provision of the agreement of that year which can in any way be serviceable. I would make such further demands founded upon our recent experience as may be deemed necessary for maintaining the new arrangements, but I do not think these need include the permanent occupation of Landi Kotal with troops, and I should expect that an arrangement founded on the consent of the tribes, without such occupation, would, if duly safeguarded and carefully worked out, prove efficient and lasting. Mr. A. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., who has been appointed by the Government of India to advise the General Officer Commanding in his negotiations, has complete knowledge of the Khaibar Afridis and was associated in the previous negotiations of 1881, and, subject to such general instructions as the Government of India may issue, is quite capable of working out the details of a satisfactory scheme.

15. I will only add that I have not in this memorandum alluded to the question of an alternative route to the Khaibar. Questions of Imperial policy may point to the construction of a railway to Kabul, in which case I believe the Kabul River route would be preferred to the Khaibar, though I understand that the feasibility of constructing a railway up the pass is still under consideration. The Kabul River route was surveyed and reported to be feasible for a railway in 1891-92. The gradients are easy; the northern flank is protected by the river; the line passes through the territory of weak tribes who did not rise against us in 1897, and would probably accept any arrangement accompanied by liberal allowances. But even if this or another railway is ultimately constructed, the Khaibar question cannot now be shelved, and should be settled with as little delay as possible. I would only suggest that when the allowances to the Khaibar Afridis are regranted, a condition should be attached
to their renewal, *viz.*, that in the event of the British Government making arrangements for opening any other route to Kabul they shall be subject to reconsideration. This would be in addition to the condition already agreed to by the Government of India that the allowances shall be liable to deductions on account of repairs to the forts and posts damaged in the recent outbreak. If the further condition I have now suggested is adopted, it might be well at the same time to give the Afridis the opportunity of engaging that they will improve the road or agree to the opening of a railway, should Government desire this at any time through the Khaibar. It will be to their interest to do so, if they can thereby postpone the opening of an alternative route and the consequent reduction of their allowances.

W. M. YOUNG,

*The 11th April 1898.*

 Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab.
No. 204.

*Dated Peshawar, the 20th April 1898.

From—Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., Commissioner, Peshawar Division,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

1. Sir W. Lockhart was good enough to give me a copy of his letter with which he forwarded my Khyber Memorandum to you on the 16th March. The only point on which I should like to say another word is his remark "Thirdly" with reference to my paragraph 9. The advantage of the system I suggested is, as I said, that it would tend to reduce the number of Government Sniders in possession of the Khyber Rifles, and therefore the number of breech-loaders that would be liable to fall into the hands of the Afridis in the case of another outbreak like that of August last, for, as I have explained in my memorandum, I do not believe that a fort with a military garrison at Landi Kotal could be relied upon to effectually prevent such an outbreak, unless the garrison were large enough to move out a force for the defence of the whole line of the pass, though I quite admit that, after the lesson the Afridis have now received, it would be very difficult for the Mullas to induce them to break out again.

2. My suggestion, it will be seen, does not include any proposal for taking away Sniders from the Afridis, and, if the offer of higher pay to men who, when they enlisted in the Khyber Rifles brought their own Sniders with them, had any practical effect as "a premium on the theft of breech-loading rifles or their component parts from our troops or arsenals," our troops and arsenals must indeed be in a parlous state! If this argument has any force at all against my proposal, surely it applies with ten-fold force to our present demands upon the Afridis and Orakzaís for the surrender of breech-loaders, and in fact to any attempt to disarm a trans-border tribe. Moreover, it must be remembered that our troops are armed either with Lee-Metfords or Henry-Martins. If, therefore, my proposal had the effect supposed, the Sniders that Afridis sought to obtain for the purpose of receiving higher pay with the Khyber Rifles would have to be acquired either from the Border Military Police (who, I am glad to say, scarcely ever lose a rifle) or from private sources Cis-Indus, which it should be easy to guard, as the ordinary Police, both Trans and Cis-Indus, have only short smooth-bore Sniders which would not be accepted for the Khyber Rifles. As for Sir William Lockhart's view that "the Khyber Rifles should be as well-armed as our Native Infantry Regiments," which means, I presume, that they should be given Henry-Martins, I can only say that to my mind such a policy would be simply suicidal. The Khyber Rifles have always performed their escort and picquet duties with caravans, &c., quite satisfactorily, no cause has ever been shown why they should require more perfect arms than Sniders for such duties which are their only legitimate ones, and at present I cannot conceive any possible reason why they should be given better weapons at the risk of these weapons falling on some future occasion into the hands of their fellow-tribesmen. If the Afridis have had their lesson, surely we have had ours too!

3. As regards the expression "military impossibility," to which Sir W. Lockhart takes exception in his first remark on my paragraph 9, perhaps the phrase was a little too strong; but at the same time I referred to my letter No. 3028 of the 3rd October, and I used it as practically summing up in two words what I had explained in full detail in that letter.

I am at a loss to understand what grounds Sir William Lockhart (who was in Europe at the time) has for asserting (vide his remarks on my paragraph 10) that the attitude of the Afridis when they attacked the Khyber last August

* For notes on this letter, see the Udny-Darton case, D. No. 845 N.-W. F. of 1898 (current).
"was at first vacillating and half-hearted." As I myself was on the spot at Peshawar and in receipt of the best information available, I think I am justified in asserting most emphatically that it was neither one nor the other. Again no one ever doubted the "desirability of reinforcing the Khyber and supporting the Khyber Rifles with regular troops" (vide Sir W. Lockhart's first remark on my paragraph 9). The point is that, in the opinion of the military authorities, a sufficient force for this purpose was not available in Peshawar.

Nos. 205-206.

No. 4, dated Camp Landi Kotal, the 29th April 1898.
From—Major-General W. P. Symons, C.B., Commanding the Khyber Force,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

(Vide Nos. 153-154 in Secret F., July 1898, Nos. 146-161.)

Nos. 207-208.

No. 6 P. F., dated Camp Landi Kotal, the 1st May 1898.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Khyber Force,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

(Vide Nos. 156-157 in Secret F., July 1898, Nos. 146-161.)
No. 11 P.-F., dated Peshawar, the 7th May 1898.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL W. P. SYMONS, C.B., General Officer Commanding the Khyber Force,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, a proposal connected with the future arrangements for holding the Khyber Pass, which may be deemed worthy of acceptance.

2. I have already forwarded to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India a memorandum, in which I have given my views regarding the reconstruction of the Khyber Rifles. In this memorandum I stated that I thought that it would be desirable to attach two more British officers, and four selected Native officers, to this corps.

3. My proposal now is that the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles should also be Political Officer in the Khyber.

4. This arrangement would centralise the control of the pass, and give the Commandant that influence and authority which, in my opinion, he does not at present sufficiently possess.

5. This proposal should not be entertained, unless two other British military officers are sent to do duty with the Khyber Rifles.

6. The present Commandant, Captain Barton of the Guides, might do well, but, from all that I have heard, Captain Roos-Reppel, on Special Duty, Kurram, would appear to be an officer peculiarly qualified for this new appointment.

7. I have spoken to Mr. Cunningham on this matter. He concurs in my proposal.

Telegram P., dated the 7th June 1898.
From—Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, London,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Please see paragraph 18 of my despatch, dated the 28th of January 1898, regarding frontier arrangements. When may I expect your final review of the result of tribal settlement and proposed future arrangements?

No. 211.

Telegram P., dated the 10th June 1898.
From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, London.

Please see your telegram of the 7th June 1898 regarding Khyber settlement. I hope to send proposals next week or the following, and I shall then be in a better position to estimate as to the rest.
Minute of dissent by His Excellency Sir Charles Nairne, K.C.B., dated the 16th June 1898.

The Secretary of State in his despatch of 28th January 1898 laid down that the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and trade was an essential measure whether viewed from the standpoint of our obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects. How such safety is to be achieved appears to me much more a military than a political question, for not only must the protection of the pass be based fundamentally on adequate military precautions, but one of the principal ends to be thereby attained, the power of fulfilling our obligations to the Amir, is essentially military.

Sir William Lockhart has proposed that a fortified post should be built at Landi Kotal, to be garrisoned by a regular regiment of Native Infantry and to be armed with guns, while the rest of the pass should be held by a local militia. While I concur in the construction of a fort, I am opposed to its occupation by regular troops which I believe would be a source of irritation both to the Afridis and to the Amir, would not overawe the surrounding tribes, but would be a constant source of friction. The expense of maintaining troops in such a locality would be great, and the service would be unpopular with our soldiers, while, in the event of serious friction with the Afridis, their communications would be insecure.

My view is that by suitable measures we can identify the Afridis with ourselves and with our military force to a much greater extent than has yet been attained, and that by so doing we can safely utilise them to hold both the fort at Landi Kotal and the pass itself, thus not only attaining the end aimed at by the Secretary of State, but arriving at it by the very means on which he lays stress, viz., by giving the Afridis the largest possible share in the scheme, and enlisting their good-will and assistance in the future protection of the road. I lay great stress on the Khyber Rifles (whether they retain that title or are termed militia is immaterial) being kept under the military authorities and being regarded as an essentially military body, the responsibility for their military control, discipline and efficiency being vested in the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District, for not only will their efficiency be thereby greatly increased, but such a step will be highly popular with the men themselves who will feel themselves much more bound to, and identified with, our interests, while their self-esteem and military pride will be gratified and enlisted on our side when considering themselves soldiers of the Queen, as it can never be, while their status is but that of mere civil levies or local police. Nor can we by any other means instil into their minds that full assurance of unfailing support in the event of disturbances which has been rendered necessary by the events of last August.

In the pass itself we cannot have two independent powers, one Civil and the other Military, for such a division of local authority would be fatal to our complete control. It seems to me therefore essential to the completeness of my proposal to make the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles ex-officio the Political Officer also. In this capacity he would report to, and act under, the Commissioner of Peshawar. There are many precedents for such a course. For instance, the Commandant of the Guides had always much political work entrusted to him, and also the Commandants of nearly all the Local Corps in Rajputana and Central India.

It is because I feel that the part of this scheme which has not been adopted is essential to its efficacy, that I am reluctantly obliged to dissent from the proposals of my Hon’ble Colleagues.
Closely connected with the safety of the pass is the much discussed subject of the policy for many years past of the Punjab Government in its dealings with the frontier tribes. Events of the past year add another proof of the failure of that policy, and I venture to record my dissent from reverting to it.

I carry back my memory to the days of Mackeson, Edwardes, Nicholson, James and other distinguished soldier civilians under Sir John Lawrence. Their vigorous and severe but sympathetic methods were well suited to the turbulent natures of the highland caterans with whom they had to deal, and I venture to think it is to a reversion to these methods we must look for success in our future dealings with the tribes. In conversations I have had with Afridis in the past, they have always expressed the utmost contempt for the fine and blockade system of the past 20 years. If we go among them and let our rule be felt, these frontier tribesmen will soon become, as all the military nations of India have become, our faithful friends, soldiers and allies, but with such people half-hearted and tender methods of repression lead to nothing but failure and loss of prestige. I therefore deprecate allowing the management of the Afridis and of the Khyber Pass to be assumed by an Agency which has failed in the past, as under such a system it was bound to fail, and which will fail again in the future.

In agreeing to the decision that the roadbed of the railway only should be laid through the pass, the rails being laid to Jamrud only, I wish to say that I consider this only permissible if the pass and Landi Kotal Fort is held by the Khyber Rifles. Should it be decided at any time to garrison Landi Kotal by regular troops, I consider it will be essential to complete the railway to that place at the same time.

(Sd.) C. E. NAIRNE.

I am constrained to record my dissent from the proposal that the local corps of Afridis, to be entitled the Khyber Militia, should be under the control of the Commissioner of Peshawar, and of the Government of the Punjab, and not under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District. While I concur in the proposal to investigate the question whether we cannot raise similar militia on other parts of the frontier, I consider these corps should be under the frontier military authorities. I am also opposed to the political control of the Khyber Pass remaining in the hands of the Punjab Government.

2. We have decided that we must provide for the possibility of an advance into Afghanistan to defend that country, and, consequently, we have approved generally of the plan described in Sir William Lockhart's memorandum of the 11th March 1898, with the modification that irregular troops shall form the garrison of Landi Kotal instead of that garrison being composed of an ordinary regiment of the native army of India. Under Sir William Lockhart's plan the Khyber defile itself would be held by the Khyber Rifles. Both Sir William Lockhart and Sir Richard Udny are in favour of the military occupation of Landi Kotal.

3. For many reasons I should prefer that two local battalions, instead of militia, should be enlisted from the Afridis, Shinwaris, etc., and should, though officered under the irregular system, form a part of the native army of India, and preferably of the Punjab Frontier Force. One battalion would hold Landi Kotal, and the other would garrison the Khyber itself. I believe that we should in this way utilise more fully the military strength of the Afridis; that they would prefer enlistment in these regiments to enlistment in any corps of inferior status; that we should bind the Afridis to ourselves; that their honour and loyalty would be more fully pledged; that, while making it plain that we intend to hold the Khyber against all comers, we should enlist their good-will and services for its protection; that this would be a great advance in the policy of making the tribes our friends; and that, lastly, by the employment of battalions belonging to the tribe we have a guarantee that the safety of the pass would be regarded as a paramount consideration.

4. It is a significant fact that the Malikdin Khel, who were the first of the sections to come in, had the greatest number of pensioners. The invasion of Tirah tried the loyalty and devotion to our service of the Afridi soldiers in an extraordinary degree, but they stood the strain in a remarkable manner.

5. There are objections to the employment of regiments of Sikhs or Gurkhas at Landi Kotal, but by the plan I proposed we should have regular troops there, recruited from the tribe we have defeated—as has happened over and over again in the history of India—men who would become soldiers in our army, just as loyal, just as devoted, as those we have already in our ranks.

6. The two battalions would perform all the garrison, convoy, and picquet duties of the pass in precisely the same way as that in which the militia would carry them out; but other considerations, such as the difficulty of adding to the strength of the Native Army at the present time, the possibility of opening up questions connected with the proportion of British to Native troops, etc., would cause me to waive my views in respect to the raising of two Afridi battalions of the army and to agree that these should be irregular troops raised as militia. I would agree to this on the distinct understanding that these corps should be under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Peshawar District.
7. The whole of the proposals in Sir William Lockhart's memorandum are based on the military importance of maintaining the security of the Khyber Pass and of the military occupation of Landi Kotal. The construction of a strong fort, the improvement of the water-supply, the construction of block-houses in the upper and lower Khyber, are all integral parts of that plan, and I cannot see how we can approve generally of the proposals in his memorandum if we take away the essence of the plan—the military control of Landi Kotal and the Khyber.

8. In my opinion the military question is of higher importance in this case than any question of civil and political policy. There are only two great military highways to Afghanistan—the Khyber and the Bolan. All others are subsidiary and secondary. These two great routes we must have under our effective control. We have secured the Bolan by a military occupation of that route; and if we are to ensure military predominance, in the case of our being forced to advance to the strategic front Kabul-Kandahar; if we are to fulfil the guarantee we have given for the integrity of Afghanistan; if we are to be ready to help the Amir or his successor in the way which has been indicated to us by Her Majesty's Government, we must have the Khyber route under effective control, and that cannot be obtained, in my opinion, by placing that great military highway under civil management.

9. In 1885-86 the whole question of the defence of the north-west frontier of India was discussed by the Government of India and by Her Majesty's Government. Field Marshal Sir Donald Stewart had pointed out in 1880 that Landi Kotal perfectly commanded the western entrance of the Khyber. Lord Roberts also considered that the main defence must be at the western end, i.e., at Landi Kotal, and at the conclusion of the discussion the Government of India, in their despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 156, dated 4th October 1886, admitted the great importance of including the Khyber in the scheme of defence of the north-west frontier. They proposed that an enclosed 'serai' should be built at Landi Kotal capable of conversion into a redoubt, and they considered that steps should be taken gradually to familiarise the neighbouring tribes with the idea of an eventual occupation of the western outlet of the Khyber, and that the earliest favorable opportunity should be taken for carrying out this defensive measure in its integrity.

10. The Secretary of State concurred with the Government of India that a large 'serai,' capable of defence, would, under the circumstances, suffice for the present. The favourable opportunity contemplated by the Government of Lord Dufferin has now presented itself, and I am strongly of opinion that a work should be built at Landi Kotal to fulfil the double purpose of resistance against tribal attack, and capable of being heavily armed when necessary, and of forming the centre of larger entrenchments should these eventually be required.

11. It does not seem to me that the possibility of having to advance, and to occupy for defensive-offensive purposes the strategic front Kabul-Kandahar, at all absolves us from the responsibility of fortifying the western outlet of this main military route, for it would be absurd to neglect to fortify our frontier because we might have to take the offensive and advance beyond it. And here I should like to say that I have been consistent in my belief that only the direst necessity should oblige us to advance to Kabul-Kandahar even as a temporary measure. The increase to the army which would be required, and the enormous amount of expenditure which would be necessary, not only on the army but on roads, railways, and defences, should make us postpone this day to the very latest date consistent with the integrity of Afghanistan and the honour of England. At the same time, it is absolutely necessary, as a military precaution, to be ready to advance into Afghanistan, and all our arrangements have been directed to that end. The Khyber route must therefore be occupied and controlled as far as the Durand line, and Landi Kotal is the strategic point which it is essential to occupy. We require it as a depot in case of an advance into Afghanistan; we must protect the water-supply...
and reservoirs already constructed; the position is a part of the scheme of
defence of the north-west frontier as commanding the western entrance of
the Khyber; and, bad as it is, the Bori-Kandao route gives us a short line
into the Buner Valley from Landi Kotal; our hold on the Khyber would be
immensely strengthened; and, lastly, the position controls the Afridis, and
would demonstrate to them and to all the frontier tribes that their outbreak had
led to this strengthening of our position.

12. It is essential, in my opinion, that the irregular troops maintained at
Landi Kotal and in the Khyber should be placed under military control, and
that the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar should be held absolutely
responsible for the security of the pass. If battalions of militia be formed
from the Khyber Rifles and officered by British officers as proposed, there
is not, I submit, any practical difficulty in placing the force under the mili-
tary authorities. Up to 1890 the Derajat frontier militia were under the
orders of the Officers Commanding the outposts of the Punjab Frontier Force.
In 1892 the militia were turned into border military police.

13. It is quite true that these militia, practically only horse and foot levies,
and not organised in battalions—were under the frontier military officers at a time
when the frontier force itself was under the Punjab Government, but there are
two special points of difference between that time and the present. In the first
place we were dealing then with the old frontier of British India running
along at the foot of the hills, and with the 'close border' system. Secondly,
the militia of those days were always police rather than a military body. At
the present time we are dealing with the tribes between our old frontier and
the Durand line or frontier of British influence, and we are contemplating
the formation of militia so organised as to be military bodies in every essen-
tial, with the exception that it is proposed to place them under civil and not
under military control, while their officers would be British officers drawn
from the army, but would be in "civil employ," and, by regulation, unfit to
hold military command. Undoubtedly, in the days of the frontier militia as
they were before 1890, the civil officer of the frontier district had a good deal
to say to the militia although they were not under his control. But in the
Khyber we have no revenue to collect nor any civil district to administer,
and we have been expressly told by Her Majesty's Government that interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of the Afridis is not desired. The civil power,
represented by the Commissioner of Peshawar, could at all times call upon
their services, and I cannot think that there are adequate civil or political
reasons which would render it necessary to place this corps under civil and not
under military control. In my opinion there would be no guarantee for the
safety of the pass, unless the proper officer, the General Officer Commanding
at Peshawar, whose head-quarters are only ten miles from the mouth of the
pass—Junrood Fort being actually in his command—is placed in a position
of full responsibility.

14. I am also compelled to differ from the majority of my colleagues in
the proposal that the political relations in the Khyber should remain under
the Punjab Government. I do not desire, at this moment, to raise the whole
question of the management of frontier politics, although I have long held
that an improvement in the agency could and should be effected, and have
expressed that opinion on various occasions. I would, therefore, simply say
that I consider the management of Khyber affairs should be removed from
the authority of the Punjab Government, and that they should be controlled by
the Commissioner of Peshawar in direct communication with the Foreign De-
partment of the Government of India.

15. In paragraph 19 of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 28th January
1898, the avoidance of interference with the tribes is impressed on us, and we
are told, especially as regards the Khyber, that we should avoid interference
with the independent tribal organisations or the domestic affairs of the Afridis. If
this policy be strictly followed, our political relations with the Afridis should be
very simple. They will be in receipt of allowances which were formerly
granted to them from Kabul and of those in commutation of the tolls
formerly exacted by them from caravans passing through the Khyber. The trade arrangements of the Khyber can be managed as they always have been, and I do not think there is the slightest fear, that were the Khyber under military instead of political, or civil, control,—the arrangements could not be carried out precisely as before. The expansion of trade with Afghanistan via the Khyber depends mainly on the fiscal policy of the Amir.

16. I venture to think, therefore, that when once we have come to an agreement with them, we ought to have no political dealings with the Afridis which cannot be managed by the Political Officer in the pass, unless occasional questions of importance should need a reference to the Foreign Department of the Government of India. The direct system is one which I should prefer, because I believe that any unnecessary link in the administrative chain is a source of weakness, more especially in our relations with the frontier tribes. But in order to meet any objection that the Foreign Department might be overburdened with Khyber political business, I would place the Political Officer in the Khyber under the Commissioner of Peshawar, who for these purposes would be in direct communication with the Government of India, just as he is now in respect to dealings with the Amir.

17. My proposal, which is also that of General Symons and Mr. Cunningham, lately Political Officer in the Khyber Pass, is that the commandant of the Khyber irregular troops or militia, should be the Political Officer of the Khyber. This arrangement would be exactly that which we adopt during a state of war, when the military and political functions are combined in the General Officer in command, but with this advantage, that the commandant of the Khyber troops would be a selected officer, selected for his knowledge of Pathans in general and of Afridis in particular, selected for his ability to manage Afridis with that firm but sympathetic treatment to which they are susceptible. The control of, and responsibility for, civil and military arrangements would be vested in one man; there would be no artificial distinctions between 'military' and 'political,' no divided counsels and divided responsibility. I am convinced that the Afridis or any other frontier tribe would understand and prefer such a system; every one who knows the frontier knows how easily friendly relations are created and maintained with the tribes by a Commanding Officer of a regiment aided by the officers and native officers; the Afridis would look to one authority with force at his command for they cannot recognise the nice distinction between civil and military control; they cannot serve two masters, but they can play off one against the other; but if that one authority is a man who likes them, a man of tact as well as strength, no better plan could be created either to fulfiIl the policy of Her Majesty's Government or to provide for the military security of the pass. I fully recognise, the ability, courage, and honesty of purpose of those statesmen who have been at the head of the Punjab Government, but it cannot be denied that the policy of the Punjab Government has not been the policy of the Government of India. Those who have studied frontier politics know very well how wide the differences of opinion have been as to what was the proper line to take.

18. Regarding this very question of the Khyber, a writer,* supposed by popular report to be a civilian of the highest political ability, experience, and standing, formerly under the Government of India, says:

"The Afridis and other tribes are said to have been treated by the Punjab Government with such exaggerated deference that they believed we were afraid of them and became intolerably aggressive and defiant. It is to this timidity of action that many attribute the recent risings, and certainly nothing could have been better calculated to foster the conceit of the ever-conceited Pathan than the condition in which the Kohat Pass, between two important military stations, has been allowed to remain for so many years. We did not even remove the stones and hankies which covered the track, and the tribesmen openly jeered about it. The system in the Khyber could hardly fail to have the same effect. That immortal demon, the Khyberas, as Alexander Burnes quaintly calls him, was paid a large yearly sum for keeping open the pass, but we had no control over the tribe, our officers being forbidden to go off the road; and the arrangements, though kept from breaking down for some years by the exertions of Colonel Warburton, loyally working on a system he knew to be wrong, ended at last in a sudden collapse under the circumstances described by Sir Lepel Griffin. In connexion with this point, we would again draw attention to the agreement of 1881 with the Afridis, and to the correspondence which preceded it. It will be seen that the Afridi headmen

then pressed us to exercise a larger measure of interference than we were disposed to exercise, and that the local officers were inclined to some extent to meet their wishes. The Afghans were, in fact, ripe for the application of the Sandeman system, and if it had been applied our hold on the Pass would, no doubt, have been much stronger than it was. There is, therefore, some ground for thinking that the loss and expense which we have lately incurred were due rather to a want of boldness in our treatment of the tribes than to the Forward Policy."

19. In 1896, the Government of India desired to give a wider discretion to the Political Officer of the Khyber. This view was combated by the Lieutenant-Governor of the day, who considered that the officer had already the fullest discretion, and that it would be unwise to extend it; and the opinions held by the present Lieutenant-Governor are well known. He was in favour of holding the pass by tribal agreement, and by a tribal force maintained on tribal responsibility (Foreign Department No. 1472-F, dated 28th March 1898, paragraph 4). He was not in favour of any change in the conditions, which would impose the duty of maintaining the peace of the Khyber in times of disturbance on the British Government (Punjab Government letter No. 329, dated 1st April 1898, paragraph 3).

20. The present and proposed system is fraught with embarrassment and delay; the officers chosen for the work are not, and would not be, the officers of the Government of India, but of the Punjab Government; the procedure is circumlocutory; while the fact that a moveable or flying column is to be maintained under the orders of the military authorities ready to advance up the Khyber, is no guarantee that the local civil authorities would ask for its services until too late; they would refer to the Government of the Punjab at Lahore or Simla, and the latter would refer to the Government of India in the Foreign Department at Simla or Calcutta; and that department would refer to the Government of India at Lahore or Simla, and the latter would refer to the Government of India in the Foreign Department at Simla or Calcutta; and that department would refer to the Commander-in-Chief. If the military security of the pass were to be entrusted to the proper authority, the commandant of the troops, under the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar, the responsibility would be fixed and absolute. "Time is everything in military operations" and prompt action would in the future, as has been the case repeatedly in the military history of India, nip any disturbance in the bud, where "fearful commenting, the leaden servitor of dull delay" would but lead to the worst and most disastrous results, however we might subsequently exact retribution or achieve victory. What may have been quite right when Jamrud was the frontier post, when the Khyber was sealed to us, when no officer dared to advance beyond that post, is not applicable now, when the Khyber route is recognised as the great highway to Afghanistan which should at all times be kept open.

21. The whole object of our frontier policy is to give us peace on the border and military predominance over Russia if a conflict should unhappily occur with that power. As Sir Dennis FitzPatrick said: "All peace and order on the frontier must rest on force;" and I submit, therefore, that Landi Kotal and the Khyber should be occupied in a military sense, that the military duties should be controlled by the commandant, that the General Officer Commanding at Peshawar should be responsible for the pass, and that the political work should be in the hands of the commandant, with such assistance as may be necessary.

EDWIN H. H. COLLEN,
Major-General.
No. 95 of 1898.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

Frontier.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, the 23rd June 1898.

MY LORD,

In Your Lordship's Secret despatch No. 1, dated the 28th January 1898, you invite our attention to leading principles underlying our frontier policy to which Her Majesty's Government have resolved to adhere. The two main objects to be borne in mind were stated to be the best possible concentration of our military forces, so as to enable us to fulfil the several responsibilities which rest upon us, and the limitation of our interference with the tribes, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory.

2. Your Lordship indicates that the maintenance of the Khyber Pass as a safe artery of communication and of trade is an essential measure, whether viewed from the standpoint of our obligations to the Amir or from that of the protection of British subjects; and you inform us that, whilst Her Majesty's Government adhere to the general policy of avoiding interference with the independent tribal organisations or with the domestic affairs of the Afridis, the safety of the Pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of our arrangements with the tribe.

3. We have from time to time reported the course of events on the North-West Frontier of India, and the two despatches marked on the margin, bring up to the present day the account of the situation with the Afridi tribe with which, in this despatch, we propose to deal. We have been in military occupation of the Khyber Pass since the end of December, the whole Afridi tribe have submitted to us and for some time past they have been quiet and peaceful. Even the turbulent and adventurous characters, who can seldom be relied upon in any trans-border tribe, have of late given singularly little annoyance.

4. In these circumstances, the time has come, in our opinion, to determine and make known the manner in which our relations with the Afridi tribe shall in future be carried on, and the means which shall be employed for keeping open.
the Khyber Pass. On this subject we have consulted His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart. We have been pressed to make an early announcement to the Afridis to the effect that the allowances which they received under the terms of our agreement with them of 1881 shall be restored to them. We do not deny that a period of suspense, between the termination of hostilities and the resumption of friendly relations, is a very trying time for those who have to deal locally with the tribesmen. The Afridis themselves are impatient. Some of them have been prevailed upon to turn to the Amir of Afghanistan in the hope of bettering their position with the British Government, and the Mulas and malcontents are too alert not to seize the opportunity for working upon their feelings. It must, however, be remembered that by their own acts the Afridis ruptured their engagements and forfeited their right to receive any allowances, that they have not made good and declare their inability to make good the loss and damage which they caused, not only to buildings in the Khyber, but by carrying off or destroying goods and chattels, and that they were told that the restoration of the latter, or the payment of their value was required of them before we could enter into any new arrangements for the future. In our opinion, therefore, a premature announcement of the restoration of their allowances would have appeared to them to be a bid for good-will, before we had shown that their submission could be enforced. Besides this, restoration of their allowances in their entirety would anticipate our decision as to the future, while an intimation of our intention to restore them, coupled with exceptions or reservations, would have been apt to tie our own hands without satisfying the tribesmen.

5. We have therefore decided to withhold for the present any indication of our intentions beyond a general expression to the effect that we would deal sympathetically with their case, and that their behaviour in the interval would not improbably influence the final decision. Of their behaviour we have little to complain. Even in turning, as some of them did, to Kabul they have strengthened rather than weakened our position; for the rebuff which their advances met at the hands of the Amir must have shown them that nothing to hope from not accepting our terms.

6. Sir William Lockhart has stated, in the memorandum embodying his views upon the best way of holding the Khyber Pass in the future, that the more important object we should have in view is to ensure a ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary. It is unnecessary to do more than allude to the prolonged discussions, extending over the years from 1885 to 1887, on the defence of the North-West Frontier, in order to point to two possible contingencies in which we might be called upon to take this grave step, namely, the attempted invasion of India, or the invasion of Afghanistan in circumstances calling for the advance of an army from India to occupy the Kabul-Kandahar line. There is also a third case, that in which on the demise of the present Amir the circumstances of that country might require us to give material support to His Highness's successor. If we are right in believing that it is now, as we understand it to have been in the past, the policy of Her Majesty's Government that in circumstances such as these an advance in force into Afghanistan might be required, and that we should therefore be prepared to make that advance, we agree that the plan put forward by Sir William Lockhart for the improvement and extension of the reservoirs and water-works, and for erecting a fort capable of protecting them, is one which has much to commend it, and that advantage may be taken of the opportunity which is now presented for carrying out this plan.
7. In giving to Sir William Lockhart's scheme our support, to the above extent, we do not, however, concur in thinking that the fort at Landi Kotal should be occupied by regular troops of the Indian army. We agree in the principle that a local tribal corps should be raised, for service in the Pass, and that it should be commanded by British officers. This distinguishes the local corps sharply from the original corps of Jezailchis dependent as it was, under the Agreement of 1881, on the responsibility of the tribal council; and, further developing the 'Khyber Rifles' as they came in late years to be constituted, it acknowledges the local force to be British; and the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the Pass is accepted as ours. Between a tribal levy and a local militia, there is an essential difference which is not always recognized. By a 'levy' we mean a body of men who are dependent on tribal authority, and, strictly speaking, are employed, paid, and summoned for any special duty, by tribal authority. Any contribution which the British Government makes towards their support is made in order to co-operate in the assertion of the right and power of the tribe to restrain the bad characters and 'young bloods' of their own and neighbouring territories. Drill and discipline are not wanted, and British officers in command or even as inspectors are out of place. When greater efficiency is desirable, the direct superintendence of British officers becomes essential, but it then equally becomes necessary to recognize the force as a British and not a tribal force. The ultimate responsibility for the actions of the force ceases to rest on the tribe. The proposal to place regular troops of the Indian army at Landi Kotal raises other questions. A battalion in such a position would be capable of no action beyond passive defence, and would constitute a standing temptation to the tribes, while, if a rising did occur, it could do nothing to make the forcing of the Khyber more easy, though it would materially add to our anxieties. Service at Landi Kotal would be unpopular, for the men would have to be practically confined to the limits of the fort, and even with the utmost precautions, there would be constant risk of men being murdered, and rifles stolen. Continual friction would thus be kept up between us and the Afridis. Moreover, the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor and of the officers acquainted with the frontier, whom His Honour has consulted, that the Afridis would strongly resent the placing of troops at the further end of the Pass. We believe that we should fail to enlist the good-will of the tribe on our side, and we should certainly excite the suspicion, if not the antagonism of the Amir of Afghanistan. Everyone agrees that the good-will of the Afridi tribe is essential to the smooth working of our arrangements in the Pass, and it seems to follow that the attempt to strengthen them by stationing troops at Landi Kotal would, in fact, prove to be a source of weakness.

8. The alternative which we propose to adopt is to hold the position at Landi Kotal by means of the local militia to which we have already alluded, increasing their numbers to a strength sufficient to enable the patrol and convoy work in the Pass itself, as well as the garrison duties at Landi Kotal, to be undertaken by them. It follows upon this qualification of Sir William Lockhart's scheme that no guns would be put into the Landi Kotal Fort, although it would be built with emplacement for guns to be brought up if required. The cost of building a strong fort on Suffolk Hill, at Landi Kotal, is now estimated at six and a half lakhs of rupees, and about two lakhs for water supply; and it will take two winter seasons to complete the works. The full estimate for the works in the Pass is given in the margin.

9. We have no reason to fear that a corps such as we contemplate would be untrustworthy in the hour of need. The history of our empire in India appears to teach the contrary. The conduct of the Khyber Rifles themselves
last year also points to the same conclusion. Had they been organized, officered and supported in the manner which we propose for the future, we have no reason to doubt that they would have remained true to us, as their fellow tribesmen in the regular regiments of the Indian army, with very few exceptions indeed, remained true. It must be borne in mind that it is an essential part of our plan that a moveable column of sufficient force shall be equipped with transport and ready to support the irregular force in the Khyber on the occurrence of any emergency calling for action of the kind. Your Lordship will be separately addressed regarding the details of our proposed military arrangements.

10. We think that the former management of trade affairs in the Pass has been satisfactory; and that, as far as can be, the future arrangements should reproduce them. The frequent kafilas went up and down the Khyber road in safety, and, if the volume of trade in late years contracted when we would have looked to it to expand, the reasons for that are not to be found in any deficiencies within the Pass, but in the fiscal policy which finds favour in Afghanistan. The Political Officer who directed the local arrangements has been a subordinate of the Commissioner of Peshawar. The control of political relations with the Afridis and their neighbours, as well as the control of the Khyber Rifles themselves, were in the same hands. The majority of us wish to continue this system. We think that it is essential to have one authority in the Pass, and that the only possible authority, under present conditions, is that of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. We therefore think that the control of the Political Officers and of the militia must be in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor. The militia should be officered by British officers, and the conditions of service should be such as to ensure its efficiency for the purposes for which it is intended, but we think that the authority over it should be the same as that which directs the political relations of the Punjab Frontier.

11. Three other courses are suggested. The officer entrusted with political dealing in the Khyber Pass might, it is suggested, be directly under the Government of India in the Foreign Department, or he might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, but the Commissioner himself be directly under the Government of India, or the Military Officer, who commands the Khyber Militia might also be the Political Officer in the Pass. These plans oust the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab from the Khyber Pass, and introduce a special system in a narrow wedge of country bordered on each side by, and having intimate relations with, country with which the Lieutenant-Governor conducts the political relations. The first plan would not be practicable. The organization of the Government of India is not such as is adapted for dealing with local routine work of which the mass of business would consist. We could not afford to station in the Khyber an officer of the standing and experience to be trusted in cases of importance and emergency. The district is too small for an expensive staff and too important for any other than a thoroughly reliable authority. The second plan would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer. The third plan would put the whole direction of affairs, political and military, in the hands of the military authorities over whom the Punjab Government which controls the political relations with the rest of the border would have no power. Our Hon'ble Colleagues, His Excellency Sir Charles Nairne and Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, dissent from our views in desiring to maintain the authority of the Local Government over the militia and the political relations with Afridis of the Khyber. Their Minutes are enclosed.

12. One most important consideration in dealing with the future arrangements in the Khyber is that of our communications with Landi Kotal. A good road now exists through the Pass, but, in the event of our having to make a
military advance in any of the circumstances discussed in the 6th paragraph, we are of opinion that it would be of the highest importance to have the use of a railway to Landi Kotal. A recent survey shows that a light railway on the two-foot gauge can be run from Peshawar to Landi Kotal independently of the present road, at an estimated cost of Rs. 36 lakhs. We think that we ought to secure, in the settlement which is about to be made with the Afridis, the right to construct and work a railway and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction upon it. We do not propose actually to lay the rails beyond Jamrud now, but we would make the railway bed ready for the laying of the permanent way when the time came for doing so. This, however, is a project for which we should desire to obtain an expression of the approval of Her Majesty's Government before we take any steps towards its inception. We have not yet in any case made a railway in tribal territory beyond the external boundaries of India, in territory where we have only exercised political influence as distinguished from the political control which, as the paramount power in India, we claim and exercise in Native States in India, under the suzerainty of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress.

13. In our new arrangement with the Afridis we must make adequate provision for the railway and for the exercise of jurisdiction upon railway lands, the trade road and within the militia posts, as well as for the constitution of the militia as a British force. We think, however, that our terms should be drawn, in some essentials, upon the same lines as the Agreement of 1881 followed, and this is the unanimous opinion of all who have been consulted; that is to say, first;—the Afridi clans who are connected with the Khyber should still be paid allowances for keeping the pass open and safe, and in commutation of their ancient rights in respect of tolls and otherwise; and second;—a local force should be raised from the Afridis themselves for service in the Pass in carrying out the objects with which we dominate it. The circumstances of the uprising against us, in contravention of the agreement under which the Afridis had for many years worked, constituted an absolute rupture of all relations, and the defeat and subjection of the tribe might, if we chose, be held to obliterate all rights. We decide in our own interests to enlist the good-will and the assistance of the Afridis, but we hold that we have a clear right to attain our ends in whatever way we please. We propose, then, to renew our former relations as much on the lines of the old agreement as is compatible with present aims, but where a departure from the old footing seems expedient, we think it should be made in a manner to leave us the utmost freedom in the future. The form itself of the new document may with advantage perhaps approach rather to that of a sanad than take again the appearance of a treaty. This is a matter for future decision, but, if it can be so arranged, we would rather make the document a statement of the terms which we grant to the Afridis with their acceptance recorded upon it. It may be necessary, as was done in our instructions to Sir William Lockhart, to leave a certain amount of discretion to the officer or officers to whom we entrust the duty of entering into communication with the tribe, and to be guided, as to the final form, by the reports we receive.

14. We have said that Sir William Lockhart required of the Afridis the payment of the value of public and private property looted by them in the Khyber, and that they have not made good this demand. The property has been valued at Rs. 28,600. We fear it must be accepted that it is impossible to enforce these claims, unless we are prepared to use force to compel compliance. In addition to this, the damage done to buildings in the Khyber has been assessed at two and a half lakhs of rupees. We reserved the question of requiring the Afridis to make good the cost of this damage for consideration when renewing relations with them. It is in our opinion useless to make any demand on that head now. Notwithstanding the terms of Sir William Lockhart's proclamation, we know that the Afridis regard themselves as having complied with what was required of them. We know that they have been put to many shifts and contrivances to enable them to comply to the extent to which
they have done so, and that they are unable to pay more now and do not admit their liability to pay more. Any renewed demand or even any deductions from their allowances spread over the future would, we believe, be thought by them to be an injustice, and it will detract much from the value of any settlement, if it is not cordially accepted by the tribe from the outset. We cannot readily agree, however, to wipe out this demand altogether, since it was deliberately made. We propose, therefore, to make the renewal of allowances date from the day on which the Afridis accept our new terms of settlement. The tribemen might, and they probably will, ask for the allowances to be paid from the date on which we made peace with them. We shall make them understand that we made peace with them without exacting the full terms originally imposed, and that their allowances cannot, therefore, be restored until the date on which a new settlement is arrived at.

15. In one matter we shall have to forego our demand altogether. The Afridis were told that they must restore the arms taken from troops during the campaign. This they have not done, alleging that it is not the custom of their country to restore arms taken in war, that they told Sir William Lockhart so, and that he gave them no definite reply. As many of these arms have been sold out of their country, they cannot comply in full with this demand, and, after full consideration, we have, with regret, come to the conclusion that we cannot press it.

16. We propose to reserve for other despatches an expression of our plans for dealing, on the principles stated by Your Lordship in the despatch cited at the beginning of this letter, with other sections of the North-West Frontier, such as the Kohat-Samana-Kurrum Frontier, Malakand, the Tochi Valley and Wano; there is, however, one consideration which we may mention here. We concur with Your Lordship in thinking that advanced posts in tribal country, held by regular troops, should be established under such conditions as will enable the garrisons to promptly repel any attacks made upon them. We think, however, that a well-organized militia might be a most valuable addition to this system, especially in relieving the regular troops of most, if not all the duty on the lines of communication, and in small and unhealthy posts. Before the transference of the Punjab Frontier Force to the Commander-in-Chief, there was in existence a force which bore the name of militia and which performed duties somewhat of this character. The manner in which the co-operation of the Civil and Military authorities was secured is described in the letter* from the Secretary to the Punjab Government, dated the 17th March 1886. In the Kurrum Militia we have a revival of that system. If the proposed organization of the Afridi Militia in the Khyber is accepted by Your Lordship, we would propose to place at the disposal of the Local Government an officer of experience of the frontier and with Pathans, who could not only act as Commandant of the Khyber Militia, but as an adviser in the matter of organizing other corps of militia where required.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.

" C. E. NAIRNE.

" J. WESTLAND.

" M. D. CHALMERS.

" E. H. H. COLLEN.

" A. C. TREVOR.

" C. M. RIVAZ.)
List of Enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 95 (Frontier), dated the 23rd June 1898, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

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<td>Forwards a memorandum by the Chief of the Staff, Tirah Expeditionary Force, submitting certain proposals for holding the Khyber Pass.</td>
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(Sd.) H. DALY,
Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India.
No. 2344 F., dated Simla, the 23rd June 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 95 (Frontier), dated the 23rd June 1898, with enclosures.

A copy of the foregoing despatch is forwarded to the Military Department, for information.
Replies to the various proposals for restoring and maintaining British control over the Khyber Pass which are contained in the despatch from the Government of India, No. 95 (Secret), dated the 23rd June 1898.

Her Majesty's Government accept in the main the proposals of the Government of India for restoring and maintaining British control over the Khyber Pass. They agree to the construction at Landi Kotal of a fort with emplacements for guns, but not armed with guns, to be supplied with reservoirs and water-channels. They agree to the organisation of a movable column at the British end of the Pass, for the express purpose of supporting the militia, and to the strengthening of the posts at Ali Masjid, Fort Maule and elsewhere (see paragraph 8 of our despatch of the 23rd June 1898). Subject to such further consideration as may be needed after fuller experience, they agree to the fort being occupied by a local militia recruited from the Afridi tribes and placed under British officers, and to the militia having charge of the Pass, as well as of the fort: at least, this is how I read the 5th paragraph of the despatch. At the same time, they observe that there is no necessity in communicating our intentions to the tribes to bind Government as to its action hereafter. The reconstruction of the works destroyed will take some months, "and the arguments both for, and against, the occupation of the fort by regular troops will receive additional weight according to the behaviour of the Afridis during the course of the next year. It is sufficient for me at present to convey to Your Excellency my general sanction to any expenditure that may be found necessary for the proper accommodation and defence of the garrison which you may eventually determine to place in the Khyber Pass."

2. This last part leaves some doubt in my mind whether the Secretary of State expects us to begin the enlistment of the militia just yet. It may be read as advising the Government of India to hold their hand until we have seen what the attitude of the Afridis is to be during the next year.

3. Her Majesty's Government approve the measures set forth in paragraph 12 of our despatch for extending railway communication, but, with reference to the marginally cited sentence of our despatch, they do not think it necessary for us to secure the right of working it, and of exercising jurisdiction by means of any agreement with the several sections of the Afridi tribes: they consider that it will be sufficient to intimate to the tribes our intentions for the future, and to retain the power now actually in our hands of carrying out our intentions.

4. Her Majesty's Government do not accept the proposal of the Government of India that the Punjab Government should retain its control over the Afridi militia and the Khyber Pass. While, however, the Secretary of State's criticisms of the proposal are chiefly aimed at the Government of India's contentions in favour of the control of the Khyber remaining under the Lieutenant-Governor, I think, after reading paragraphs 7 and 8 of the despatch,
it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government that their remarks should be held to apply to the whole Punjab frontier. Indeed, this is the only conclusion which one can come to, on reading the following sentence:

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

5. Her Majesty's Government apparently do not favour the creation of a Frontier Commissionership to hold separate charge of the Trans-Indus districts, as well as of our relations with the tribes beyond. They invite further consideration to the second of the alternative suggestions mentioned in paragraph 11 of our despatch, viz., that the officer entrusted with political matters in the Khyber should remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Commissioner himself being placed under the Government of India. Our objection to this plan was that "it would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters, and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer." The Secretary of State thinks these objections rather formal than substantial, and adds—

"in the management of the independent tribes upon the Punjab frontier, there has always been a certain distribution of powers between the Local and Imperial Governments, with a more immediate supervision than is exercised over the internal administration of the province. The Commissioner of Peshawar is, in fact, accustomed to this difference and its consequences, and in a large measure he even now serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances, he has corresponded direct with the Government of India. The policy therefore of directing the affairs of the Khyber Pass from the head-quarters of the Government of India through the Commissioner of Peshawar is not altogether an untried policy."

His Lordship then reminds us that the more important object we have in view in holding the Khyber, as stated in paragraph 6 of our despatch, is to ensure a ready access into Northern Afghanistan for our army, in the event of military intervention in that country becoming necessary, and he points out that the contingencies, in which this might become necessary, are all of them matters for which the Government of India are primarily responsible.

6. In view then of the foregoing considerations, the Secretary of State is inclined to hold that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and, through him, his several subordinates, who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India. In such a case, it would, in his opinion, be necessary that the Commissioner should be appointed by the Government of India, with special reference to the responsibility in respect of affairs on the frontier which will be placed upon him under the scheme now proposed. In respect of affairs beyond the frontier, it would suffice that he should send copies of his reports for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The officers entrusted with the duty of dealing with the trans-frontier tribes should have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials, nor should they be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial re-distribution or promotion. The Secretary of State adds that he has indicated some of the considerations which should be borne in mind in dealing with this question; but that the matter is too important for him to arrive at any final decision in respect to them without the fullest possible consideration, and he invites any further observations which His Excellency the Viceroy may desire to make.
7. In connection with the above, the following remarks are perhaps permissible. It is true that the Government of India have maintained a more immediate supervision of Punjab frontier work than is maintained over the internal affairs of the province. But the difference is not so great as may be supposed, and is, I submit, due rather to the hesitation of the Punjab Government to accept responsibility, than to any orders of ours, compelling the reference to Government of minor questions. But I do not think it is correct to say that the Commissioner, Peshawar, "in a large measure, even now, serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances, he has corresponded direct with the Government of India."

8. Taking the present time, as a time of peace, it is most exceptional for us to address the Commissioner direct, or for him to address us direct, except, in the perfectly formal letter which we issue to him with every kharita to the Amir, and the reply informing us that it has been duly despatched or, when to save time, we telegraph to him the draft of a letter which we require him to send on behalf of the Viceroy to His Highness. Nor in time of frontier disturbances do we correspond direct with the Commissioner, except very exceptionally, in matters of great urgency. The Peshawar Commissioner in time of disturbance would repeat to us all telegrams he sent to his own Government, but he would not telegraph to us for orders, unless expressly told to address us in a particular case. It certainly is incorrect to say that the policy "of directing the affairs of the Khyber Pass from the Head-quarters of the Government of India through the Commissioner, Peshawar, is not altogether an untried policy." It is a policy which has never been attempted.

9. The standing orders about direct correspondence with the Commissioner, Peshawar, will be found in Frontier A, March 1885, Nos. 94-96, and Frontier A, August 1896, Nos. 51-56. They hold good to this day, and it will be seen that the Commissioner is expressly ordered to address the Punjab Government in all matters concerning the Khyber.

10. In view of what is said in paragraph 4 above, I presume whatever is decided about direct relations between the Commissioner, Peshawar, and the Government of India will be applied equally to the Commissioner of the Deraigat.

11. The Secretary of State foresees that his suggestion will involve a change in the status of the Commissioner, Peshawar. If the Secretary of State's determination is to bring our relations with the tribes more directly than heretofore under the control of the Government of India, would it not be better to take all trans-frontier work from the hands of the Punjab Commissioners altogether, and divide the tribal country from the Black Mountain to the Deraigat into three separate charges, adding the Black Mountain, Buner and perhaps the Mohmands to Major Deane, and appointing under the Government of India a Special Officer for the Khyber, Kohat tribes and Kurram, and another for the Waziris and tribes between the Punjab and Baluchistan Agency?

12. The Secretary of State agrees that no further steps should be taken to enforce the restitution of arms captured by the tribes during the campaign. In regard, however, to the abandonment of the demand for payment by the tribe of the value of property looted by them in the Khyber, he considers that it would be well to make some further attempt to bring home to the Afridis their responsibility for the consequences of their flagrant breach of engagement. He enquires whether a portion of the liability could not be realized from the property of Maliks Wali Muhammad and Khwas Khan in British India, and how far it might be possible by other means, such as the threat of a blockade, to enforce the pecuniary satisfaction which was formally demanded from the tribe.

13. The position as regards the Malik's property in Peshawar is as follows. It was supposed to be worth, I think, about Rs. 80,000. We ordered it to be confiscated and sold, and, up to the 10th March 1898, Rs. 19,076 had been realized. Out of this, the sum of Rs. 9,600 was treated as the Zakka Khel
share of the general fine. I have telegraphed to the Deputy Commissioner asking if any further sums have been realized, or are likely to be realized. In any case, whatever sum has been obtained above the Rs. 9,600 will have been credited to Government, and it may, for form's sake, be regarded as a recovery against the value of property looted in the Khyber.

In paragraph 14 of our despatch, we explained how impossible it was to get anything more out of the tribes; and said that we could not readily wipe out the demand altogether, but that we proposed to make the renewal of allowances date from the day on which the Afridis accepted our new terms of settlement, instead of from the date on which we made peace with them. Mr. Cunningham practically told us in his note of the 26th April 1898, that it was hopeless to expect to get more money out of the tribe, whose attitude was rather one of expectation of fresh concessions or favours, than expectation of further demands from us, and he said that was also the deliberate opinion of Mr. Hastings and others on the spot. He thought, however, that we might restore the allowances and tell the tribesmen that by way of adjusting outstanding demands, we should deduct 10% from their restored allowances until we had recovered a sum of Rs. 50,000. General Symons agreed with him.

In our Secret despatch No. 122 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1898, we told the Secretary of State that it was considered impossible to induce the tribesmen to pay anything on account of Government or private property looted, or buildings destroyed, without further military operations.

I do not think that it would be any use asking the opinion of the local officers whether we could hope to enforce the balance of the pecuniary satisfaction originally demanded by a threat of blockade. I believe such a proposition would fill the officers with dismay, and that, if carried out, it would lead to the Afridis recommencing hostilities.

The concluding paragraph (10) of the Secretary of State's despatch may be regarded as sanctioning the restoration of allowances to the Afridis: but His Lordship presumes that they will not be renewed until the terms of our future relations with the clans have been settled—

"The acceptance of these allowances might suffice as a formal adhesion on their part to the terms which may be arranged. I do not consider that it is necessary to stipulate for 'their acceptance recorded upon' a sanad, or to base your reservation of the right to construct and work a railway upon their consent. The conduct of the Afridis has, as you observe, 'constituted an absolute rupture of all relations.' You have obtained actual and undisputed possession of the Pass, and it is sufficient to announce in clear terms to the tribes the rights which you reserve, and the relations which for the future you intend to maintain. Whether you should include in the announcement a formal declaration of your intention to make a railway and to assume jurisdiction within its limits, appears to me doubtful; at least until your survey is complete and you are prepared to begin the work. At any rate, I presume that great care will be taken to avoid the use of any language which may limit your powers or give rise to misunderstanding in the future; and I request that Your Excellency will be so good as to send me a summary of the new settlement before you communicate it to the tribes for their guidance."

All the officers, who have recently been responsible on the spot for our relations with the Afridis, have pressed on us the desirability of announcing the restoration of the allowances to the tribes with the least possible delay. I think I shall be right in describing them, one and all, as regarding the offer of allowances as our inducement to the tribes to accept the terms of our new relations with them. The Secretary of State's orders appear to not only require the renewal* of the allowances to be deferred till the terms of our future relations are settled, but as I read paragraph 10, he apparently wishes the

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*It is not clear to me whether these orders preclude us from announcing the intention to restore allowances, or whether they only apply to their payment.
allowances to be kept in the background, and that we should announce our
determination to do whatsoever may be considered desirable in the Khyber
by right of might and conquest, irrespective of tribal feeling. Having told
the Afridis what we mean to do, we are to leave them to accept allowances
or not, as they please; if they accept allowances, we may regard such accept-
ance as a formal adhesion on their part to our terms.

19. With the utmost deference, I submit that this is not the only indication
in the despatch that His Lordship believes the results of the campaign to be
much greater, and the temper of the Afridis to be much more submissive than
it really is. There are no indications that the spirit of the Afridis is so crushed
that we can make further demands from them under penalty of a blockade,
or that they will quietly accept a declaration of our intention to make a
railway, without a simultaneous promise of liberal allowances. I further
venture to think that a declaration of the intention in regard to the railway
should be one of the first announcements to be made to the Afridis. I believe
that it will in any case cause trouble; but unless the Afridis are told straight
out from the first, there is certain to be still greater trouble, and a charge of
breach of faith, if the announcement is made months after the new arrange-
ment has been introduced.

20. While the despatch is under consideration in this Department, a copy
of it had better be sent confidentially to the Military Department and Finance
Department.

24th August 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Telegram to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, No. 2997 E., dated the 23rd August 1898.)

SECRETARY.

I understand from the closing paragraph of the despatch that the new
settlement with the Afridis should be based on a clear declaration of the inten-
tions of Government, so far as it is considered advisable to promulgate them,
but that there must be nothing of the nature of an ‘agreement,’ which might
hereafter tie our hands. I understand also that, before any
announcement is
made to the tribes, a summary of what it is proposed to say must receive the
approval of the Secretary of State.

2. The Secretary of State agrees, I understand, to the commencement, as
early as possible, of the construction of the fort, with gun-emplacements,
reservoirs, &c., at Landi Kotal, to the ‘strengthening’ of the necessary linking posts
between Jamrud and Landi Kotal, and to the preparation of the railway bed beyond
Jamrud. If I am right on the latter point, the intention must be made
known whether the announcement to the tribes includes a ‘formal declaration’
on the point or not. For the present the Secretary of State accepts the view
that the fort at Landi Kotal should be garrisoned by militia who would also
have charge of the pass. The contemplated arrangement in respect to the
garrison of the fort is, however, to be subject to reconsideration, should the
behaviours of tribes while the works are in progress render this advisable.

3. The immediate point for consideration appears therefore to be the
drafting, for the approval of the Secretary of State, of a summary of the proposed
announcement.

The announcement would, I suppose, commence with a reference to the
‘absolute rupture’ by the Afridis ‘of all past relations’ and would then proceed
to state briefly the decision of Government, with reasons for it as far as it is
advisable to give them. I think we should say plainly that the pass has to
be and will be kept open not only for the encouragement of trade and the
safety of traders, but also in order that the British Government may be able,
if and when occasion arises, to promptly fulfil their obligations in assisting
the Amir. The works to be constructed at Landi Kotal and in the pass might
then be mentioned, and we might say that the conduct of the Afridis had rendered it a question whether these works should be placed in their hands or held by regular troops; but that, provided the attitude and behaviour of the tribe are in all respects satisfactory while the works are in progress, the intention is to withdraw all regular troops and place Landi Kotal and the pass in the hands of a tribal militia. The constitution of the proposed militia might be outlined in a few words and the fact stated that it would be under British officers and would have the near support of a movable column. The intention to prepare the railway-bed would have to be explained. We should, I suppose, reiterate a desire to refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of the tribe; but the tribal responsibility for the safety of the pass, or rather their responsibility for any offences committed in it by their clansmen, would have to be re-asserted. The announcement might conclude that allowances,* or their equivalent, will be restored, subject to good behaviour; but that payment will not be renewed until the works in the pass and at Landi Kotal are complete.

4. There is another point which should perhaps be included. By the Durand Agreement the Afridis are our men, and we could not deny a measure of responsibility if they committed unprovoked aggression on Afghan territory. Perhaps the announcement should contain a warning to the tribe upon this point.

5. Once the announcement has been made, there is no reason, as far as I can see, why the organisation of the militia should not at once be taken in hand; but the effect of the announcement would no doubt have to be watched before any actual steps were taken.

6. The facts as to the property of Maliks Khwas and Wali Muhammad will have to be made clear to the Secretary of State. His suggestion that ‘it would be well to make some further attempt to bring home to the Afridis their responsibility’ in respect to property looted in the Khyber is a difficult one to meet.

At the jirga proceedings† on the 18th April 1898, the tribal representatives said they could not pay for these properties.‡ They said that they had surrendered rifles and paid a large fine. That they understood that, when they had done this, Government had been kind enough to make peace with them. Also that, if Government fought them again and drove them out of their country, they could do no more. It was explained that the compensation under these two heads amounted to Rs. 28,600.* Under the circumstances it seems to me impossible, at this stage, to resort to any such action as a threat of a blockade. Something might, however, possibly be done in the way of making the Afridis supply a certain amount of unpaid labour in the construction and restoration of the works to be undertaken. I have an idea that an indication was given somewhere that the jirgas would be prepared for, and would comply with, a demand for free labour; but I can’t at present give a reference. It might be worth while to consult the local officers as to how a requisition for free labour would probably be received.

7. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the despatch will perhaps be for the present reserved and some communication with the Punjab will probably be necessary before ‘any further observations’ are made. It would seem that, if the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab Frontier is to be brought ‘more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India,’ there must be re-adjustment of divisional limits in the Punjab. The remarks of the Secretary of State apply, apparently, to the tribes on the borders of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts. If, therefore, his suggestions are to be carried through, the solution which will probably suggest itself is to transfer the Hazara district.

* I understand the value will be not less than was given before. If so, this would be stated.

† Secret F., July 1898, Nos. 1-87.
‡ Government properties, except buildings, looted or destroyed.
§ Private property taken at Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid.

Private properties taken at Landi Kotal and Ali Masjid.
to the Rawalpindi Division and add to the Peshawar Division the districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan; compensating the Derajat Commissionership by adjustments with the Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions. Of course the Local Government might show strong reasons against such re-arrangement. According to the last census report, the area and populations of the divisions likely to be affected by such re-adjustment* are, in round numbers, as under—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>1,423,000</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>1,765,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>4,560,000</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>4,387,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derajat</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>1,544,000</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>1,222,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>4,580,000</td>
<td>19,900</td>
<td>4,383,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Peshawar Division, as thus increased, would be a straggling, but not an inordinately large, charge, and if the Commissioner had a specially strong and selected staff, not liable to frequent moves, he might be able to look after it satisfactorily.

8. I have heard it suggested that it is very desirable to make an announcement to the Afridis at a very early date for the reason that the rice crops in the Bara valley would be harvested within a few weeks, and that a number of comparative idlers would then be tempted to restlessness. I was myself under the impression that these crops were got in just about now; and, if that were the case, the circumstance would be of importance, both on account of the suggested risk and also from the point of view of getting labour, whether paid or unpaid, from the Afridis. I find, however, that, according to the Gazetteer of the North-West Frontier, the Bara rice crops are reaped in November. It might be worth checking the point by enquiring from some one with local knowledge.

9. A copy of the despatch had better go at once to the Military Department. I have nothing else to add to Mr Clarke's note.

25th August 1898. H. Daly.

N.W. F.
D. No. 1615 F.

TELEGRAM FROM THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR, No. 166, DATED AND RECEIVED 25TH AUGUST 1898.

In reply to our telegram No. 2997 F., dated the 23rd August 1898, states that the amount realised by sale of Khwas Khan's property, except lot No. I in Peshawar, was Rs. 27,012, the whole of which has been recovered, and a net balance of Rs. 24,643, after deducting expenditure, has been paid into the treasury. Adds that Wali Muhammad's property realised Rs. 9,010, the whole of which has been realised and credited to Government.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

In paragraph 4 of the despatch which the Secretary of State is now answering, His Lordship was told that, in the opinion of the Government of India, the time had come to determine and make known the manner in which our relations with the Afridi tribe shall be carried on. I find it difficult to say what His Lordship's despatch permits in this respect, and I think I can best advance the case by writing out, for consideration, the draft of a telegram which might be sent to the Secretary of State, definitely proposing to announce specified articles of a settlement, and asking if they are in accordance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government.

The following is the draft I propose for consideration:—

"Your Lordship's Secret despatch 18, 5th August."
The following main heads of settlement we understand to be approved by Her Majesty's Government and we ask leave to explain them to the Afridis:

**First.**—Afridis by their own acts ruptured all agreements forfeited all allowances and forced British Government to take and hold the pass which is at disposal of British Government entirely.

**Second.**—Pass will be held and kept open for trade and to enable British Government to fulfil engagements with Amir. British Government will build fort at Landi Kotal and posts between that and Jamrud, will keep up a good road or roads, and if they want it a railway, and will exercise jurisdiction on road and railway in fort and posts and in neighbourhood where necessary for their purposes.

**Third.**—Afridis will have no dealings with any power but British. They will be left to manage their own affairs in their own country, but in Khyber Pass they are responsible to British Government that they will preserve order and security of life and property on roads or railway and within limits of pass.

**Fourth.**—The British Government will give allowances to Afridis for discharging this duty and will maintain a militia recruited from the Afridi and other tribes and commanded by British officers. The British Government do not undertake to always keep troops at Landi Kotal, but will make arrangements for supporting militia if circumstances require.

**Fifth.**—Arrangements for trade in the Khyber will be made by the British Government, and the militia will be used for guarding traders.

**Sixth.**—Allowances granted by the British Government are subject to withdrawal for misbehaviour in the pass, in British India or against friends or allies of Government. Announcement ends.

Money realized by Sale of Zakka Khel Maliks' property has in part been credited to Zakka Khel fine. Balance is in our hands. No objection to crediting balance to realization on account of damage done to property but this will be matter of indifference to Afridis. We do not recommend threat of blockade which would exasperate tribe and cost more than it realized; however, it may be possible to exact unpaid labour from them on fort and posts, and we presume we may do that if we find it feasible.

I do not now note on the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar. That may be taken up when it is known how we stand as to settling with the Afridis.

25th August 1898.

W. J. Cunningham.
When I mentioned this case in Council on Friday, I stated that the meaning of the despatch from the Secretary of State had seemed to me so doubtful on certain points that I had asked for explanations by telegraph. The telegrams below may be made keep-whits. I may explain that in my first reference to "Commissioners," I meant Special Commissioners for the definite purpose of making a settlement with the Afridis. The Lieutenant-Governor had asked whether Mr. F. D. Cunningham would be required after Sir R. Udny's return in September, and I requested that he should be kept for this special duty, intending to prepare a plan, which I believed would be agreeable to both officers, i.e., that he and General Egerton should be Joint Commissioners. It will be seen I had mentioned this idea to the Secretary of State so long ago as June 30th. In my second use of the word "Commissioner," I of course intoned the permanent official whose position is discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch.

I am afraid these telegrams do not enable me to give explanations which avoid a difficult position. The fundamental difficulty is this: the Secretary of State approaches the subject in a manner which, to me at all events, is wholly unexpected, and which, while it accepts to a large extent the substance of our proposals, is absolutely inconsistent with the means by which we sought to give effect to them. We ourselves in paragraph 13 of our despatch clearly indicated our intention that the new arrangement should both in substance and form reserve the fullest freedom for us in the future, and our avoidance of the word "negotiations" shows that we did not altogether concur with the Lieutenant-Governor, who, in his memorandum of April 11th, wished the various questions to be discussed with the tribal jirgas, and our decision to await the report then received. But, on the other hand, I imagine that we all agreed with the Lieutenant-Governor in the desire "that we should carry the tribes with us in any arrangement that is to be made" and personally I agreed, and agree still, that an arrangement "founded on the consent of the tribes and carefully worked out would prove efficient and lasting." That is to say that, although the point was not, so far as I can see, directly referred to in the notes, what was in our minds was a procedure which involved according to tribal custom the consultation and acceptance of the jirgas, but not "negotiations" which would admit of any material alteration in the nature of the conditions to be imposed, except so far as the arrangement of details might remove part at least of the objections of the tribesmen. Both in Waziristan in 1895 and in Afridi Tirah last year, we were in a position to impose terms, but this was the course pursued—and if we aim at re-establishing good relations with the tribes, I see no other course open.

The Secretary of State, however, does not understand why Commissioners are required where no negotiations are needed. He considers that the assent of the tribes is not necessary for the re-opening of the pass, or for questions of railways and conversion of the Khyber Rifles. I can only say that this seems to me to entirely misunderstand the present attitude of the tribe. Sir M. Young is undoubtedly right in saying that they have always regarded the pass as their property, and though with him I believe that the lesson they have had will not easily be forgotten, and will predispose them to the acceptance of conditions, which formerly they would have rejected, still I firmly believe also that to gain our objects, to enable us practically "to be free to do now and hereafter what we please," we must as far as possible avoid touching anything which the tribes would think implied a loss of izzat, or of pecuniary profit. I must frankly confess that I do not understand what position we are to hold in the pass under the scheme of the Secretary of State. To my assumption that he does not intend annexation; he replies that the Khyber Pass is quite exceptional; and whether that does, or does not, mean formal annexation, it seems to me that the attitude he prescribes is consistent only with an occupation which to the tribes would mean annexation. Moreover, it would be annexation in the most disadvantageous form. Sir W. Lockhart in his memorandum of March 11th, 1898, on the one hand, shows that to make the annexation of the Khyber effective, the Bazar
Valley also should be occupied (an opinion shared by Sir G. White), and on the other gives very cogent reasons why we should not attempt it. The Secretary of State does not provide for the first, and sets aside the second, without any attempt to meet the arguments. It appears to me that the difference between us may be described in this way. We here in India maintain that by the operations of last year we have taught the Afridis that we can at any time penetrate into their country and punish them for misdoings, and that they must acknowledge our supremacy. Further, that by occupying and continuing to occupy the Khyber, we have shown that we will not tolerate the pass being closed as it was last year, but mean to take measures to prevent any repetition of those occurrences. Beyond that, however, we are dealing with a tribe which we have not subdued, or have any desire to subdue, so as to make their territory a part of British India, but with whom we wish to re-establish friendly relations. Her Majesty's Government on the contrary write as if the whole tribe had been utterly broken and conquered, and would accept from us without a murmur any declaration of our will and pleasure which we issued for their guidance. I am quite unable to conjecture how they can have arrived at such a conclusion from any of the reports of the views and demeanour of the tribesmen received through us from officers on the spot. If they have any other sources of information, we ought to be told what they are. It is said that we have obtained "actual and undisputed possession of the pass." In the same way the Americans have possession of Santiago. In both cases the future right of possession must depend, I take it, on the terms on which peaceful relations are resumed, the formal method of expressing the terms may be different, but I feel strongly that the Afridis have proved themselves foes, who deserve at least as generous treatment as Spaniards.

I demur therefore to the attitude which the despatch of the Secretary of State imposes upon us on general grounds. I think if the details are examined, it will be found equally at fault. For instance, we are told that the conversion of the Khyber Rifles is not a matter for negotiation, but for our decision and declaration to the Afridis. That seems to me a somewhat remarkable proposition. Without entering into contentious topics, I may safely put it that we intend the re-organisation not to be one only in name, but to really alter the status of the corps. The opinions as to how the Afridis themselves will view the re-organisation are by no means unanimous. Some think they will enlist willingly, others think that they will regard the move with suspicion. So far as I can judge, I should anticipate success if the tribes are carefully and judiciously handled, but I imagine it would not be difficult to set them against the new system, and if it is not sympathetically explained to them, we know well we have plenty of enemies, Mulas and others, who are quite capable of painting our intentions in different colours. What is to happen then if we have made our declaration and cannot get our force?

Besides it must not be forgotten that the engagement and payment of the men in the Khyber Rifles is part of the pecuniary advantage which the tribes expect and will not be content without. And it seems to me futile to expect any settlement at all until the new arrangements in this respect are not only declared but accepted.

This latter observation applies also to the restoration of the allowances. I have resisted giving any promise of renewal hitherto, because I did not think it possible to restore them before the other terms were determined. But I am entirely in agreement with those who think that there is a risk in further delay, and I maintain that the promise to restore ought to be simultaneous with announcement of the terms. It does not follow that payment need be resumed at once—it certainly ought not to be resumed until the other terms are fully accepted—and it may be that some examination of the amount and distribution of the allowances themselves ought to be undertaken. If so, it can only be done with the jirgas, and is no light job as Mr. Merk found in the case of the Mohmands. Here again I cannot see how we can help the tribes to understand us, unless we follow tribal custom, and give opportunities for our proposals being heard and considered.
As to the damages, paragraph 9 of the despatch is not quite clear. If all that is meant is the amount of damages exclusive of buildings, it is not a very big matter. The estimate was Rs. 28,000. I see that the property of the two Maliks was valued at Rs. 30,000, and if that was realised, even after Rs. 9,000 is credited to the Zakka Khel fine, the balance outstanding is surely not enough to justify any idea of a blockade.

Sir W. Cuningham has submitted a draft telegram summarising the proposals we should wish to make to the Afridis. I agree that to send this summary is our first step, and that the draft will serve well as a basis for discussion. I have made some marginal notes, and I should like to compare the terms with the old agreement which is not on the file at present. But my object in writing as I have in this note is not only to indicate my opinion on some of the more important points, but to state clearly that in my judgment we must press upon the Secretary of State that it is inexpedient, imprudent, if not dangerous, to deal with the Afridis in the imperious manner of his despatch. I feel it very difficult to predict the result of refusing all conference with the tribes, and I should like to ask His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to consider whether the troops now available in the pass and at Peshawar would be sufficient to meet all the possible contingencies.

It would be very desirable to discuss this in Council on Friday.

Circulate and Council.

28th August 1898.

Circulated.

Received 6 p.m., 30th August.

I will not delay this case by noting, save that I agree with His Excellency in almost all he has noted. Until I have a copy of the despatch to study, I cannot answer the last paragraph of the note, but I can hardly think we should accept the principle of "no conference with defeated tribes" any more than we are likely to believe that the Afridis are defeated, or to be treated as such, in the usual acceptance of the term. There surely must be a great deal of conference and not a little "give and take" if we are to avoid further hostilities.

6-30 p.m., 30th August 1898.

C. E. N(AIRNE).

Seen.

31st August 1898.

A. C. T(REVOR).

Received last night and sent on 8 a.m.

31st August 1898.

J. W(ESTLAND).

Seen.

31st August 1898.

C. M. R(IYAZ).

Seen.

31st August 1898.

M. D. C(HALMERS).

Seen.

1st September 1898.

E. H. H. C(OLEN).

ORDER IN COUNCIL.

That the telegram as arranged in Council shall issue.

2nd September 1898.

E.

(Telegram P to the Secretary of State, No. 3073 P., dated the 3rd September 1898.)

* With copy of notes. (Endorsement to Military* Department, No. 3085 P., dated the 3rd September 1898.)
IN reply to His Excellency's telegram, dated 3rd September 1898, approves generally the terms of the proposed announcement to the Afridis, except that the reason given in the 2nd clause might be omitted. Leaves to His Excellency's discretion the arrangements for announcing the terms to the tribe.

SECRETARY.

I spoke to you about this and submit in proof, for consideration, drafts to the Punjab and to General Egerton.

2. The drafts are, I am afraid, very bald; but, without further instructions, I don't know how to better them. They will perhaps do, as a commencement, if Mr. Cunningham is to be shortly in Simla and to have opportunities of personal discussion with His Excellency and yourself.

3. Immediate points which seem to require attention are:

(i) Allowances.—For the previous payments, see your note at page 5, K. W., Secret F., February 1898, Nos. 1-405. The payments under 'Khyber Rifles' are more than half the total, and, as His Excellency has noted (page 10, current) 'the engagement and payment of the men in the Khyber Rifles is part of the pecuniary advantage which the tribes expect and will not be content without.' The manner in which the Afridis accept the condition as to the militia will, therefore, have a very special bearing on the question of allowances. The jirgas will probably at once want information as to terms of service in the militia and, as far as I know, these have not even been roughly sketched. Perhaps General Egerton might be separately asked to consider this at once.

The telegram to Secretary of State said (sixth term) that the allowances 'will commence from the date of adhesion.' This means, no doubt, 'commence to count.' Perhaps the jirgas should be told, at the outset, that the date on which payments will actually commence will depend on their attitude while the works at Landi Kotal and in the pass are in progress.

(ii) Garrison of Landi Kotal.—If it is admissible, would it not perhaps be well to give General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham discretion to warn the jirgas that the question whether we do or do not keep troops at Landi Khana, after the works are complete, depends largely on the behaviour and attitude of the tribesmen in the interval?

(iii) May the jirga be told at once that no further demands will be made for compensation for damages or for rifles captured during the operations?

4. It is unnecessary, * I understand, to say anything about the property of Khwas and Wali Muhammad.
5. I am uncertain whether General Egerton or Mr. Cunningham is to be considered the Chief Political authority, or whether they are to be regarded as vested with equal powers. It is not, however, perhaps necessary to say anything upon this point unless or until one or other of them raises it.

6. I have placed in the file a spare copy of a report (No. 57 C., dated 3rd September 1898) just received from Mr. King, containing information from Tirah. Mr. Donald's information (according to General Egerton's telegram of 4th September 1898) was that Saiyid Akbar was at his home in the Waran valley and taking no part in politics; that no Kabulis had recently been in Tirah, and that the question of the renewal of hostilities had not been discussed in the Afridi jirga.

7. If the despatches are sent to the Punjab and General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham as suggested, none of the enclosures to our despatch need, I think, be sent.

8th September 1898.

H. DALY.

Mr. Dane is going to let me know when Mr. Cunningham will arrive in Simla. He expects him probably on Sunday or soon after. I do not think that the letter of instructions to General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham had better issue until he has been seen. He will probably have useful suggestions to make.

Meanwhile, I submit the drafts for consideration.

It would be useful to be able to say now what the strength of the new militia is to be, but until the question of the garrison at Landi Kotal is settled that can hardly be fixed. For the present we might perhaps say that the militia should be composed of the same numbers enlisted from the same tribes as the Khyber Rifles contained. The rates of pay might be the same, but enlistment should be for service generally, although the ordinary peace station of the corps will be in the Khyber. As is the case with the Kurram Militia the men may earn good conduct pay, but not pension.

In sending the despatches to the Punjab all enclosures may be omitted, and the passage in the despatch to the Secretary of State which alludes to dissent may also be omitted.

9th September 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I annex redraft of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the letter to the Punjab Government, and this may now issue.

I do not think the time has come for a communication to General Egerton. The intention is that he and Mr. Cunningham should act jointly: and I will explain my reason to him personally. The proper time therefore for an official letter will be when we send instructions to both officers.

I fancy that there will be a good many details to settle before the instructions can be drafted. It is for this purpose that we require Mr. Cunningham, and I think Secretary should say demi-officially to Mr. Dane that it would be convenient, if the Lieutenant-Governor would first discuss matters with Mr. Cunningham and then let him come to see Secretary with the knowledge of His Honour's views. I am not sure that eventually it might not save much time if the Lieutenant-Governor would meet myself and other Members of the Government of India in conference, but we shall see that better when we know what the points for discussion are.

10th September 1898.

E.

(Letter to the Punjab Government, No. 3178 F., dated the 12th September 1898.)

(Demi-official letter to the Hon'ble Mr. L. W. Dane, dated the 12th September 1898.)
HIS EXCELLENCY.

The 7th and 8th paragraphs of the Secretary of State's despatch deal with the political management of the Khyber, and with the conduct of external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division—or possibly on the Punjab frontier generally—and require that a scheme should be considered according to which His Lordship's wishes can be carried out.

The circumstances of different parts of the border of the Peshawar Division differ considerably with regard to the extent to which tribesmen from the other side hold and cultivate land within the British district; and when we come to consider details of how to provide that "the officers who are entrusted with the delicate and difficult duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, should have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and should be able to devote much time and patience to these special objects," it seems essential that we should have the views of those who have a personal and intimate knowledge of the circumstances of the frontier.

Before proceeding, therefore, to discuss the questions put by the Secretary of State here, it seems desirable to invite the Lieutenant-Governor's attention specially to these two paragraphs, and ask His Honour in what way he thinks that the Secretary of State's wishes can be carried out. His Honour has been told that he would be separately addressed upon this question.

14th September 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I agree that a reference to the Punjab Government is necessary at this stage—and there is the more reason for making it without delay that the Lieutenant-Governor leaves Simla next month and we shall then lose the opportunity of conferring with him.

The chief difficulty in making this reference is to define sufficiently the nature of the information which we require, for the two paragraphs of the despatch of the Secretary of State range over a wide field. But if we examine them carefully, we find that at present Her Majesty's Government have not gone further than a declaration on one point, i.e., that they are of opinion "that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." The Secretary of State expressly adds that otherwise what he has done in the two paragraphs has been to indicate certain considerations which we are to bear in mind, and that he awaits further observations from us before coming to a final decision.

The first thing, therefore, is to draw the attention of the Punjab Government to the words I have quoted above, and ask them to consider in what way the external relations with the tribes can be regulated in the way desired by Her Majesty's Government, and what alterations on the present system this would entail.

By that, I think, we can, however, go one step further. The Secretary of State mentions two alternatives, but on the first, described in paragraph 7, he contents himself with an indication of various objections. I should not wish to shut the mouth of the Lieutenant-Governor on this subject, but if it has to be seriously considered it must be taken up by the Government of India, and it would only be after we had determined how we were to carve a new province out of the various districts affected, that we could usefully apply to the local authorities for detailed information. We may, therefore, say to the Punjab Government that without finally setting aside the consideration of the alternative in paragraph 7, we follow the Secretary of State in inviting his attention first to the second alternative indicated in paragraph 8, i.e., that of making the Commissioner of Peshawar and the Political Officers under him subordinate to the Government of India, and that what we should wish to have is His Honour's opinion as to the changes which would be requisite in order to give effect to this idea of the Secretary of State.

It would also, I think, be desirable to add that, though the words already quoted might indicate that Her Majesty's Government contemplated the extension of the same system to
other parts of the Punjab frontier, the remainder of paragraph 8 of the despatch deals exclusively with the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinates, and that we suggest that it may be convenient to consider the matter first from this point of view, and not to enter into the arrangements elsewhere further than the alteration of the present system in the Peshawar district rendered a reference to them necessary.

I should like to see a draft on the above lines, the object being not to initiate a long and controversial discussion, but to elicit facts, which will show how far the policy for which Her Majesty's Government have declared a preference can be carried out. They have at any rate for the time set aside the policy which I advocated, and still prefer, i.e., of leaving the control of these matters with the Local Government. It is no business of mine to cavil at this decision though I reserve my right of protesting, if I think fit, at the proper time. For the present what I have to do is to devise means whereby the changes desired can be accomplished, if this is feasible. If the Local Government will give us a simple and matter-of-fact statement in reply to the letter I now propose, I think we shall have made a step in advance; at any rate we shall discuss the subject ourselves with greater knowledge.

15th September 1898.

Endorsements to Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 3185-3186 F., dated the 14th September 1898.

Letter to the Punjab Government, No. 3243 F., dated the 19th September 1898.

His Excellency.

I have to-day talked over the Khyber question with Mr. F. D. Cunningham.

He thinks that the announcement to the Afridis set out in detail in our letter No. 3176 F. of the 12th September contains nothing that the Afridis will definitely refuse. He does not think that they will break with us over the announcement of the intention to make a railway if we please, as stated in the second clause. He does think that, if a railway is actually made and trains are run, we must increase allowances. Service to individuals would probably be given by enlisting tribesmen as linesmen, and that would put money into their hands, but he expects that, in addition to this, further tribal allowances (muwajibs) would be very desirable, so as to enlist tribal feeling on the side of the railway.

He alluded to the expression in the 4th clause—"The British Government do not undertake to always keep troops at Landi Kotal," and said that seemed to assume that the tribe wished the Government to do so. Such is not the case. The Afridis, he thought, would be excited if they thought that Landi Kotal was to be hereafter a British military station. He thought that the Afridis would be satisfied if the announcement were made in this form; "the Government of India have not determined to maintain regular troops permanently at Landi Kotal, but they claim the right, if they remove the troops from there, to re-occupy Landi Kotal or any other place in the Khyber, whenever they think it necessary to occupy such place with troops."

With reference to the question of allowances which is mentioned in the same clause, he asked attention to the amount of tribal allowance (muwajib) hitherto paid to the Kambar Khel. It is Rs. 600 a month. The Kambar Khel are a big clan and have as many dealings with the British Government as any other clan. They are certain, he says, to ask for an increase, and sensible as he is of the delicacy of increasing allowances after the tribesmen have been raising disturbances, he still thinks it would be desirable to authorise General Egerton and him to increase the Kambar Khel payment from Rs. 600 to 900. The extra expenditure of the Rs. 3,600 a year would, he thinks, be worth lakhs.

Mr. Cunningham thinks there will be no opportunity of re-distributing tribal allowances (muwajibs) by reducing the amount paid to one or more clans in order to raise the quota of another. Something might be done in the way of re-adjustment of payments to individual headmen (malik), and he would not give to the Maliks, if any, who take the place, in the Zakka Khel clan, of Malikis Wali Muhammad and Khwas Khan, as much as was given to them. At the same time, he says there is no one in the clan whose influence can be as great as theirs. If they petitioned to return he would advise their being allowed to do so. He does
not expect them to settle down quietly and permanently in the Amir’s country so close, as they are, to their own tribal lands; and he is very glad that the Government of India did not accede to the repeated applications to shut the door against them altogether.

I asked Mr. Cunningham if he would advise any tribal allowance being given to the Aka Khel in connection with the road up the Bara or otherwise. He said they have claimed to be Khyber Afridis and to participate in the allowances as such. He has said to them that, if other clans gave up shares of their muwajibs, he saw no objection to the shares thus resigned being allotted to the Aka Khel; but the other clans repudiate this claim and refuse to give up anything. The Aka Khel cannot give trouble in the Khybor, the other clans will not permit them. They may give trouble on the border between Jamrud and the north end of the Kohat pass, but he does not think their position or power require them to be given new allowances. They used to get Rs. 1,000 a month on account of the Kohat pass, and he would renew that when the Khyber allowances were renewed.

Mr. Cunningham then referred to the salt question. His opinion is that if the Afridis ask for a concession (as they certainly will) and if they would break with us over this question—which he does not expect—it would be worth considering whether any part of the muwajibs might be paid in the shape of free salt. He does not recommend any salt concession. He would rather not give it, but if there were danger of the arrangements being upset over this matter, he would suggest settling an amount of salt for each clan, which could be obtained at the mine, in the lump, at cost price. He would reduce the money allowance to the clan by the amount of the cost price of the salt so given.

(He compared this to the concession which the Amir gets by remission of customs duty on his imports, which is not exhibited in the accounts as an addition to His Highness’s subsidy.)

The tax thus remitted on these fixed grants of salt would be an additional concession to the Afridis. Mr. Cunningham made these remarks before I told him that something of the same sort had been suggested to me.

With reference to his own position with General Egerton, he said he had no doubt that, if they were left to arrange between them how to carry on the work with Mr. Donald and the Native Assistant, they could arrange it amicably, and I said I believed that would be what the Government wished.

17th September 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I have, as directed by Your Excellency, written a demi-official draft to Mr. Cunningham, sending him, for criticism, a preliminary draft of the instructions to General Egerton and him.

The latter draft will probably be considerably altered, but to make sure that I have not in it gone off the line which Your Excellency wished me to take, I submit these papers now.

The Punjab letter No. 1182 of the 21st September does not, I think, suggest alterations in the draft, except that I have made it clearer that the settlement is with the Khyber clans alone, not with the whole tribe.

I thought the Lieutenant-Governor would have made suggestions as to the manner of summoning the jirga. He has not, and I suppose that we may now instruct General Egerton to call the jirga in to Peshawar on a date sufficiently far ahead to make certain of time being allowed sufficient for all sections to attend and sufficient for the Government of India to settle before that date the instructions to him and Mr. Cunningham. The means of getting his summons to all the sections may be left to General Egerton, and he need tell the clans no more than that they are wanted in order to hear the final terms on which the Government of India are prepared to settle with them.

Copy of the orders thus issued to General Egerton may be furnished to Mr. Cunningham, so that he may communicate if he wishes with General Egerton on the wording and other details of the summons.

22nd September 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I think, as a merely preliminary draft to elicit Mr. Cunningham’s views, this is sufficient. I have added a few words to the demi-official.
Better ask Cunningham separately about the calling in of the jirga. I think what is suggested is the proper way, and the sooner it is done the better.

23rd September 1898.

E.

(Demi-official letters to F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., dated the 23rd September 1898.)

N.-W. F.

D. No. 1744 F.


Proposals in connection with the terms to be made with the Khyber Afridis.

His Excellency.

I propose to telegraph to General Egerton—

"The Government of India expect to be able to shortly issue to you and to Mr. Cunningham, who will be associated with you, instructions as to the terms on which the British Government is prepared to resume friendly relations with the Khyber Afridis, the payment of allowances and the management of the Khyber pass. Please summon the jirgas of Kuri, Kambar, Malikdin, Zakka, Sipah and Kamrai to meet you at Peshawar and to hear these terms and the orders of Government. Fix a suitable day in your own discretion, but it should not be earlier than the 20th October, so as to give all clans ample time to receive the notice and send in their jirgas, and to give the Government of India time to finally arrange your instructions in all necessary detail. [Please report so soon as summons issue.]"

I would give Mr. Cunningham a copy of this, so as to let him communicate if he wished with General Egerton, and it would be officially communicated to the Military Department and Punjab.

May I also give it to the Press?

25th September 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I think this is right. Would it not be as well to let General Egerton have time to receive and consider the telegram before giving it to the Press? He might want further instructions or explanations, and it would not do to let the Press get ahead of him in communications to the tribes.

25th September 1898.

E.

(Telegram to General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, and endorsements to Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Punjab Government, Nos. 3315-3318 F., dated the 26th September 1898.)

N.-W. F.

D. No. 1743 F.


For reasons given, asks for instructions as to the future policy to be adopted with regard to the Khyber Afridis.

His Excellency.

For information. I think the draft telegram submitted to-day to Your Excellency will be a sufficient reply to this.

25th September 1898.

25th September 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

E.

N.-W. F.

D. No. 1762 F.


In compliance with Secretary’s demi-official letter, dated the 23rd September 1898, encloses a note (1) of the few concessions which seem necessary to bring the Khyber clans to accept the orders of Government, (2) on the proposal to give subsidies in salt instead of silver, and (3) on the proposal to construct a railway in the Khyber.
Note on draft letter of instructions for announcement of orders of Government to the Khyber clans.

1. In offering the following remarks upon the draft letter of instructions as to the manner in which General Egerton and I are to announce to the Afridi clans the orders of Government, I wish to premise that I thoroughly understand they convey a final decision, and are not terms stated as a basis for negotiation.

The suggestions I have to make involve no modification of any essential condition laid down by the Secretary of State and the Government of India; my object is to explain what concessions, in minor points, are in my opinion necessary to secure the acceptance of these orders, and to prevent another rupture with the clans.

I do not underrate the power of Government to force its own way, or overrate the power of the Afridi to oppose us. He knows that he cannot for ever fight the rulers of India; he understands that if we elected to close the Pass, and to cease from all relations with him, the loss of trade and of service for one or two years would starve him into submission; but he knows also, and clause 2 of the announcement will emphasise it, that Government wish to keep the Khyber open for trade, and that this gives him great power of securing compensation.

It is clear that we can only control and safeguard the Pass in one of two ways, either with the good-will of the clans, or in defiance of them. If we want the former, we must be prepared to concede something; the “allowances” are of course the main consideration, and are, I believe, sufficient; but a concession, not covered by the wording of the instructions, is, in my opinion, necessary to secure the acquiescence of the Afridi.

If we fail to get that, the alternative is to hold the Pass by force and by ourselves; and if the tribesmen are not with us, they are certain to be against us.

If the Afridis are dissatisfied, the jirgas will simply run away, and their disappearance will shortly be followed by firing in the Khyber, and by attacks on our communications. To safeguard the Pass we should have to protect every yard of it, and by our own troops. It is an illusion to suppose that the Khyber Rifles are to be trusted, if the clan is hostile. Afridis may do good service in distant cantonments even when their clan is out on the war path, but the Afridi in the Khyber levy is merely a tribesman in our livery: serving close to his home, and therefore entirely under the influence of the feeling of his tribe. I do not doubt that our troops in strength could always force their way up or down the Khyber, whether the Afridi were friend or foe; but I am convinced that the attempt to keep the Pass safe for traffic and open for trade without their good-will would soon be found a task so troublesome that Government would be compelled to set about to buy their co-operation by larger concessions later on, or to undertake their complete and final subjugation by force of arms. The position in which the late Tirah Expedition left us suffices to show the cost and duration of the effort which that would involve. By this I mean that the small concessions now needed are a cheap price to pay as compared with the alternative of a definite rupture, and a renewal of hostility. To hold the Pass with the clansmen hostile means that we must picket the heights and guard the road with our own troops; every retirement of a picket towards evening would be a small rear guard action, in which Afridis with our own weapons would probably inflict on us the greater damage; from evening to morning the tribesmen would practically be in possession, the telegraph line would never be safe for 24 hours, and the troops would be worn out with
the incessant work of daily holding, and retiring from, all points that command a winding hill road of 20 miles, harassed by an active and well armed enemy.

2. Before describing the two concessions recommended, I venture to advise a slight modification of the wording of paragraph 4.

The words italicised in the margin mean that the clans must definitely accept the orders before their petitions can be listened to.

I respectfully submit that this language may reasonably be held by Government to its servants, or to any one wholly in its power. If it were open to us to say to the Afridi that the alternative to unconditional acceptance was the closure of the Pass and the end of all relations with them, we might perhaps speak in this tone. But as things stand I do not believe they will accept it. It is an easy matter to make them understand the terms, but if they are further told that they must finally and formally agree to them before another word can be heard, I shall be surprised if they do not reject them altogether. I am inclined to think that the jirgas would simply leave Peshawar to re-appear with rifles within safe distance of the Khyber road. I suggest that, while we should make it clear to them that the orders stated are final, that it is the fixed determination of Government to run the Khyber on these lines, and that the restoration of allowances and friendly relations depend upon their acceptance, they should be permitted to state their petitions before they are called on to give a solemn and definite acceptance.

If the concessions, which I suggest below, are made part of the announcement, it is possible that, after taking time to consider, the jirgas may give a reluctant assent; but we have to deal with free clansmen, and men unaccustomed to submit without being heard.

3. I come now to the concessions recommended, and premise that I advocate those only which

(1) do not violate or detract from the essential conditions laid down;
(2) seem necessary to prevent the rejection of the terms and a rupture with the clans.

Short of the "breaking point" I do not advise concessions at all, but to avoid renewal of hostilities, and the necessity of holding the Pass as a trade route under conditions of war, a state which must of a certainty force on us another, if not several more Tirah Expeditions, some concessions seem to me both cheap and reasonable.

The instructions lay down that allowances will be restored from the date on which the clans accept the orders. The Afridis are certain to press very strongly for something more, that is to say for "allowances" for the past. They will claim

(i) that there are unpaid subsidies due for varying terms between the last date of payment in 1897 and the date of the outbreak, money which they consider they earned;
(ii) that as the Pass has been open for trade for the past eight months, allowances are due for that period.

I admit at once that their petition may seem unjustifiable. They were told the subsidies were forfeited, and we may think a claim for back payment untenable. This may be a logical view, but to stick to it the letter is dangerous, and may involve the rejection of our terms and all the costly consequences of a rupture.

I do not suggest that we should take account of allowances "earned" in 1897, nor pay subsidies with back effect to last winter, but I earnestly suggest for consideration that the clansmen have practically co-operated with us in the past six months, April to September, and have materially helped to keep the Khyber safe and open.
I am convinced that if Government wants a settlement, if it wishes to avoid a renewal of hostilities leading inevitably to another Tirah Expedition, it is desirable, I might almost say necessary, to concede something in this way. It must be remembered that, if the Afridis go, it is morally certain that the Orakzais will follow suit.

The concession I advocate is merely one of money; I would tell the clans that Government recognises their good behaviour in the past six months, and that for assistance and co-operation given in the Khyber, is willing to pay 3 months' back allowances. Roughly speaking, this might amount to Rs. 15,000.

I believe this payment would at once be recouped in savings in cost of feeding and keeping jirgas in attendance; without this, proceedings will drag on for weeks longer, to end probably in the rejection of our terms by the clans, whereupon whatever may have been spent on their entertainment will be wasted.

In this connection it must be remembered that the Afridis as a tribe have not yet paid up the fine imposed. Half of it was realised from certain sureties or guarantors, and from a wealthy middleman or outsider. The individual men who borrowed half the fine from a local bank in Peshawar and paid up for the clans, are now endeavouring to get the money out of the clansmen. They are practically in straits for money—and this adds determination to their petition for back allowances. Say what we may, they look upon their claim as one for work done and money earned. We may reply that the subsidies were forfeited. This view may be logical, but to insist upon logic with clansmen whose ways are illogical, may cost us a hundred times the amount of the concession I advise.

4. The second concession recommended has been inserted, not yet finally, but for consideration in the draft letter. It is simply an increase in the subsidy of one clan, the Kambar Khel. The main ground for my proposal is that without it the Kambar Khel may reject the terms, and so prevent or endanger a stable settlement.

The other reason is that for grounds which are explicable from the past history of the case, but have ceased to be in agreement with existing facts, the allowance of this clan is not proportionate to its strength as compared with other sections.

The late subsidies were based on what Major (afterwards Sir) Louis Cavagnari gave in 1878; he framed his scale upon papers of Mackeson's time showing the allowances given in 1841, and they again were founded on old traditional grants of Moghal or Durrani kings.

Before 1878, except for a brief term of a few weeks when Amir Sher Ali opened the Khyber, and also for the period of the first Afghan War, the Pass had not been open within the memory of man; the Afridi claimed traders' tolls, or a king's subsidy as his heritage, but as the clans could not combine to keep the route safe, and no ruler had undertaken it, the Afridis for generations past had not profited by the Khyber. They were willing to take what they could get; they were not so well armed as now, and the Kambar Khel had little to do with us.

Now they are nearer to us on the Samana, they furnish as many recruits to the army as any clan except the Malikdin Khel; in other words, they have to be reckoned with more seriously than twenty years ago.

In number they are inferior only to the Zakka Khel; they are as powerful as the Kuki or Malikdin Khel, and much stronger than the Sipah.
As compared with those clans their allowance was as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Tribal subsidy or Muwajib</th>
<th>Headmen's allowances or Maliki</th>
<th>Total (monthly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zakka Khel</td>
<td>Rs. 1,300</td>
<td>Rs. 400</td>
<td>Rs. 1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuki Khel</td>
<td>Rs. 1,000</td>
<td>Rs. 300</td>
<td>Rs. 1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malikdin</td>
<td>Rs. 1,000</td>
<td>Rs. 300</td>
<td>Rs. 1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sipah</td>
<td>Rs. 900</td>
<td>Rs. 400</td>
<td>Rs. 1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambar Khel</td>
<td>Rs. 400</td>
<td>Rs. 100</td>
<td>Rs. 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may not have been contemplated to increase the subsidies in any way, but I still think that it would well repay Government to get the willing and contented adhesion of the Kambar Khel in the new position by putting them more on a level with the others. The cost of an additional Rs. 400 per mensem is little more than £300 per annum. Its value to us might be ten to a hundred times that.

**The Salt Duty Question.**

5. In connection with this I have read Colonel Dening's letters.

I cannot see that his arguments prove the need or the wisdom of giving the clans a subsidy in salt. If, as he says, native opinion holds that allowances are given out of fear, why should a gift of salt be regarded in another light? To give untaxed salt is only to give the equivalent of the duty foregone, with this additional feature that it would be a more marked and noticeable manner of giving, inasmuch as we grant it to no others, while we give cash subsidies to many. There may be some who talk of tribal allowances as Colonel Dening says, but all sensible men understand that Government, like past rulers in India, pays subsidies to independent clans as a cheap means of enlisting their co-operation to secure the safety of exposed tracts and roads, which it would cost ten times as much to guard entirely by our own servants, whether police or military.

It is true, as he says, that the cash subsidy spread over a clan may mean a few annas only to the individual; the same causes would give the same man only a few grains of salt. The bigger men get the larger share of the money, and would secure the larger helping of the salt.

A man may be Jemadar in a regiment, but that does not make him Jemadar in his clan. Yasin Khan, Subadar-Major of the 24th Punjab Infantry, whose name came much to the front lately, has little influence with his clan or in his country, in which he never lives. The arguments in Colonel Dening's letters seem to me inconclusive and to reflect rather the sepoys' than the clansman's view. The idea that only certain privileged men have access to the "Political," while a Commanding Officer of a regiment sees all sorts and conditions, is an illusion. There are four times as many Afridis in the Khyber Rifles as in any regiment, and the Political Officer, whether he be Brigadier-General Egerton, or Mr. Donald, or another, has far better opportunities of learning what the majority of a clan say or intend than any officer who only sees Afridis in the barracks or ranks of a regiment in cantonments far from the Khyber.

I have only discussed these letters because my opinion on them is asked.

There is no doubt that the Afridi will bring up the salt question, and will press
for a reduction of duty. I look on a concession in this matter as on a very different footing from the others which I have ventured to recommend, because

(i) I do not believe that the Afridi will break with us if this petition be refused;

(ii) it is a question of principle, not of detail.

I may note that I myself in conversation with a jirga many months before the date of Colonel Dening's letters, threw out this suggestion as the form or manner in which the Afridis, if they wished, might put their prayer; as I warned them that it was useless to demand the reduction of a tax imposed by Government in its own territory upon the produce of its own country.

I have no doubt that the clamour against the enhanced duty was an afterthought put forward as a suggestion of a cause of the outbreak. The tax had been in operation for months before the rising in August 1897, but I never heard that Colonel Warburton or the Political Officer of the time ever reported to Government that the Afridi would think it worth fighting about. Once they had risen they were willing to adduce this, or the grievance about run-away daughters, wives, or widows, as an excuse for their conduct.

I repeat that I do not think the Afridi will break with us on this point, and it seems to me unnecessary to make any concession here. But we are dealing with men and clansmen, not with machines; till we meet them, it is difficult to say for certain what they may do.

If it were apparent that the Afridis would reject the terms (which I do not now believe), and would rather fight than give way on this point, I think it might be expedient, on their humbly petitioning to this effect, to let them have, in part of their subsidies, a certain quantity of salt at the mines at the old rate of duty. But if we concede this to the Khyber Afridi, his cousin of the Kohat Pass, who has far more reason to feel the enhancement of the tax, as it affects his carrying trade, and all other clans on the border, would demand the same favour.

I do not, therefore, advise any concession in this direction, and think that all that is requisite is met by the instructions as they stand (paragraph 9).

6. With respect to the strength, constitution and payment of the Khyber militia, I have no suggestions to make at this stage. I do not know the grounds upon which it has been thought necessary to increase their strength: for the work they had to do before the outbreak they were sufficient. If the Pass is to be open daily instead of twice a week, a change not worth much expenditure, if more forts and posts are built, and are to be made over to them, if a railway line is actually opened and run, it will doubtless be necessary to enlist more men to meet increased duties.

It will of course be made clear, if it is not so already, that the entire control and management of the force will rest with Government, and that they are liable to service at any place in or near the Khyber.

As the old agreement has practically been torn up, there is nothing to tie the hands of Government in this matter, but I believe the present ‘Rifles’ understand the position, and that it is unnecessary to say anything to the clans about it.

One thing I venture to say is this, that an increase to the Rifles may, while the clans are friendly, strengthen the Police work of the Pass, may lessen the duties of the militia if they are found too heavy, or may enable us to keep the road open for caravans daily, a matter of no great advantage.

But you will not acquire greater control over the clans, nor make them more friendly or more loyal, by raising the number of men in the Khyber Rifles. If at any time from any cause, political or religious, the tribe as a body become hostile, or seriously dissatisfied, the increase in the number of Afridis in the corps will only mean an increase of deserters and a larger loss of rifles carried away.
Whether you have 700 or 7,000 they are not to be depended on if the clan of which they are part becomes hostile or untrustworthy. They go with the clan; if you double their numbers, you will not add to their fidelity in the time of trial; the only difference would be that, if ever the clan were ready to go against Government, the troops sent up to “support” the militia, to use the popular phrase, would find the larger body of men a more difficult factor to deal with.

**Railway.**

7. The jirgas will doubtless object, or profess objection, to the idea of a railway; I do not think they will be foolish enough on this ground to reject peace and allowances.

But I think, and venture to say strongly, that, if or when it comes to a question of actually working a railway as a running line, it will be necessary to raise the tribal allowances and the strength of the Khyber Rifles.

A railway line, with all that accompanies it, is clearly far more difficult to protect and more open to injury than a road; by making the line in the Khyber we should put it more in the power of the Afridi to do us damage at a thousand points, and we should have to pay additional insurance.

I therefore suggest for consideration as tending to get the good-will of the clans, which for peace and security in the Khyber is alone worth a brigade of troops, it would be wise to let them know now that, if hereafter Government should start working the railway, it will be ready to consider the justice of increasing the tribal subsidies.

8. About the absentee Zakka Khel Maliks it is unnecessary to say much here, as I understand the repeated decision of Government leaves it open to re-admit them to their old position if their clan desires it, and of course if they accept the orders of Government and the new situation.

But I venture to say that, in my opinion, it is most desirable they should be associated in the present settlement. No arrangement from which they are excluded will be so stable or so trustworthy as one in which they are parties; and so long as they remain in Afghanistan they would be tools ready to the hand of any one, Amir, Mulla, or discontented Malik, who might wish to create trouble in or near the Khyber. Their conduct was in no way worse than that of other Maliks, the only difference was that some of the others (not all) came back to us in December or later; these did not. There were special reasons for this which I need not mention here. The Amir showed his sense of their importance by the allowances he has given them, and the hopes held out of maintenance in Afghanistan.

This alone is proof of their present status. To say, as the newspapers do, that they are discredited and of no account in their clan is to assume that the Amir would waste his money upon men of straw.

If they are strong, and I know of no others of equal influence among the Zakka Khel, it is worth our while to have them back on our side with the rest of their clan.

**Simla;**

*The 26th September 1898.*

F. D. Cunningham.

**His Excellency.**

The simplest way to deal with this matter now, I thought, was to write out suggested additions and amendments to the draft instructions and attach them. This I have done, trying to carry out the recommendations made by Mr. Cunningham’s note.

I am not sure, however, that the payment of subsidies in arrears is not an encroachment on an essential condition. The telegram to the Secretary of State of the 3rd September proposed to make the allowances payable from the date of the adhesion by the tribe to the terms settled by Government, and to this His Lordship has agreed.
Raising the subsidy of the Kambhar Khel may be regarded in a similar light. The same telegram proposed to give ‘allowances as formerly,’ and the Secretary of State may hold that no authority has been given to increase them.

The indication also of readiness to increase the strength of the Afridi Militia, and the amount of the subsidies, if a railway is made, may also be deemed, if accepted by the Government of India, a point to which the Secretary of State’s approval is required.

Our position with the Afridis is weakened by the Secretary of State’s emphatic announcement of the paramount importance of keeping open the Khyber, though His Lordship, I do not doubt, meant by that to strengthen the position. The strongest thing that we could say to the jirga, if the representatives of the clans showed a disinclination to accept the Government terms, is that the Khyber Pass, the Afridi Militia, the tribal subsidies and the maliki allowances would all be thrown overboard, and the Government of India would make their trade route into Afghanistan by the Kabul river road. I venture to think it is worth while, even now, to consider whether the Governor-General in Council should not have the power of instructing General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham to hold out that threat, if matters are not progressing and they think it necessary. It seems a better alternative than holding and managing the Khyber by force, against the Afridis, would be.

30th September 1898.

W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

I cannot endorse the last suggestion. Secretary does not say whether he means that he would contemplate the closing of direct communications with Kabul, or means to propose an alternative route. The former, I think, is absolutely out of the question. The second I believe now, as I have always believed, would land us in quite as many difficulties as the Khyber. I think we are committed by our declarations, and by our political relations in every direction, to the keeping open of the Khyber Pass. It is possible that if the Afridis turn restless under the form of procedure prescribed by Her Majesty’s Government that we shall find ourselves compelled to publish the fact of the annexation of the Pass, which it seems to me in substance Her Majesty’s Government have already ordered. And it may further follow that, if this is done, we shall find ourselves compelled to occupy positions, e.g., in the Bazar Valley as proposed by Sir G. White, in order to make our command of the Pass absolute. But Her Majesty’s Government must be supposed to have foreseen such obvious considerations as these, and I can only add that, though I preferred our proposals, because I thought that difficulties of the kind would be then less likely, I concur with Her Majesty’s Government that the keeping open of the Pass is a paramount necessity: and I would rather face even annexation than abandon it.

I hope to see Mr. Cunningham, and at present I will only make one general observation on his note. I think that he over-rates the allegiance of the men enlisted in the Rifles to their clan. Even last year they made some stand against the lashkars, and it is certainly too broad a statement to say of their conduct ‘they will go with the clan.’ It is argued, and I think there is something to show for it, that if the Rifles are organised as a militia under British officers, and know that a column of British troops is ready to march at once to their support if attacked, they will not desert us, either collectively or individually. I daresay that it would be too strong to talk of their being loyal, but would Mr. Cunningham seriously allege that an Afridi is “loyal” to his tribe or even his clan?

The chief points on which Mr. Cunningham desires to modify the instructions are financial. I think there is a good deal to be said for our not refusing outright to consider the antedating of the allowances to the extent proposed.
There is no matter of principle involved in the actual date, and it is true that, as we have been paying some members of the tribe, there would be a *primâ facie* case for making it up to the others, seeing that all have kept quiet. I think the Secretary of State must be consulted, but I should recommend his giving us a discretion. Similarly, in the case of the Kambar Khel, I cannot dispute the political expediency of the increase. There would, no doubt, be something to say for making it a condition that the increase should be obtained by deductions from the allowances to other sections. But that would, in my opinion, be most unwise, and would cause more discontent than a refusal of the increase. I think I am right in supposing that the Kambar Khel have no connection, or very little, with the Khyber Pass itself. Therefore we should not be giving the increase to a section which was prominent in breaking through its obligations in the Pass last year.

I am glad to see the view Mr. Cunningham takes of the salt question. That Hon'ble Members may understand this, please attach the papers in Colonel Dening's letter to this file.

I think that the alteration proposed to paragraph 4 of the letter of instructions is an improvement. The Secretary of State might, indeed, object to the word "acquiesced" as we had used it. With the alteration the duty of our officers will be announced and explained the terms. There their duty ends in that connection, but they remain to hear any representations from the jirga, which may or may not arise out of the terms, but cannot affect the announcement.

As to paragraph 5, I am not sure that my Military Colleagues are prepared with a scheme, and I do not think it would be prudent to go so far into details or to commit ourselves to questions of numbers, &c. I suggest in the margin an alternative sentence which, while telling the tribes that we mean to make arrangements with them, leaves us free as to what those arrangements may be. I should think an assurance of this kind might suffice for the present.

I think it most inexpedient to make any promises about the railway, and it is, moreover, directly opposed to the orders of the Secretary of State.

I should like these instructions to be considered in Council next Friday, and as the "concessions" considered in Mr. Cunningham's note are financial (I include in this the salt concession, though he does not himself advocate it), perhaps the case had better go first to Sir J. Westland.

Circulate and Council.

1st October 1898.

E.

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**TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, KHYBER BRIGADE, No. 158 P., DATED THE 29TH (RECEIVED 30TH) SEPTEMBER 1898.**

In reply to telegram No. 3315 F., dated 26th September 1898, states that, after consulting Mr. Cunningham, he has summoned the jirgas mentioned therein to be at Peshawar on 22nd October, with a view to announcement of terms on the 24th.

30th September 1898.

E. H. S. CLARKE.
I am disposed to accept the scheme followed in the draft.

As regards salt, I think it shows too much readiness to yield. After what Mr. Cunningham writes in this connection, I adhere the more strongly to my previously recorded opinion against any concession.

I would make no objection to three months' arrears of muwajibs or to the increase of the Kambar Khel muwajibs. But this necessitates all the more the refusal to consider the salt question.

4th October 1898.

J. W(ESTLAND).

Seen.

4th October 1898.

A. C. T(REVOR).

Seen. I am not quite sure that I understand paragraph 4 of the draft. In consideration of the past 6 months' good behaviour, I would give the arrears suggested by Mr. Cunningham.

It may be that we should say nothing to the tribesmen about opening an alternative route if they refuse our terms, but might we not consider the advisability of doing this in the event of a rupture. We might hold the Khyber for the purpose of closing it, with much less force than would be required to keep it open for trade. I believe there is an easy route through Mohmand country. Would it be worth while to get more information on this point?

If we make a railway, we shall require an increased number of Khyber Rifles to guard it. I am not clear as to the reasons for keeping this back from the tribes.

4th October 1898.

M. D. C(HALMERS).

Seen.

5th October 1898.

C. M. R(IVAZ).

I entirely agree with His Excellency the Viceroy that it would be better to face definite annexation of the Khyber rather than abandon it. I cannot conceive a more fatal policy than that which would go back on our previous declarations, which would practically admit that they had beaten us and driven us out of the Khyber. I believe such a policy would be fraught with the utmost danger along the whole frontier.

If the Hon'ble Member alludes to my note, I may be permitted to say that what I proposed was to make a road by the route, which has been surveyed for a railway, along the Kabul river. I did not mean the old trade route, nor did I mean to give up the Landi Kotal position. It is not in Afridi country.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

2. There is no "Kabul river road," but probably the old trade route through the Shilmani and Mullagori country from Kam Dakka is meant. This is by no means an easy route, as it passes through the Shilmani Ghakka Pass, and over the very difficult Dabrai Kotal.

3. I cannot conceive it possible to give up the Khyber route and the position of Landi Kotal, but if reference be made to paragraph 15 of my note of 16th February 1898, it will be seen that, with regard to alternative communication with Landi Kotal, I pointed out that the route through the Mullagori country had been surveyed for a cart-road, and that it would be well to have these surveys re-examined. I quite agree that our information should be brought up to date.

Paragraph 4 of the draft. I would omit "and to say what they have to say about those terms."

Paragraph 5. I disagree with Mr. F. D. Cunningham altogether in his remarks about the Khyber Rifles, and I quite concur with the observations of His Excellency the Viceroy. Considering all things, I think the Khyber Rifles
stood remarkably well. We do not want "the Afridi in the Khyber Levy" to be "merely a tribesman in our livery." I hold very strongly to the opinion that I previously expressed that the Khyber Militia should be as nearly as possible a body of regular soldiers. I should prefer that they should be actually a regiment or regiments of the line, but it has been decided they should be "militia," and I hope we shall do everything in our power to make them a contented, loyal and efficient force under British officers. In this connection I advocate that they should receive pensions. They were anxious about this in April 1897, and I believe there is no measure which would do more in attaching them to us.

The Commander-in-Chief and I put forward proposals in regard to the strength of the Khyber Militia. From the beginning of the discussion it has been assumed, on the military side, that Landi Kotal would be garrisoned by a battalion, and that a battalion would be necessary for the Pass. In paragraph 8 of the despatch No. 95, dated 23rd June 1898, we said—"increasing their numbers to a strength sufficient to enable the patrol and convey work in the Pass itself, as well as the garrison duties at Landi Kotal to be undertaken by them." The despatch does not precisely say 2 battalions; and the Council accepted His Excellency's proposition for "one or more regiments."

We can, of course, put forward definite and detailed proposals regarding the organisation and strength of the Khyber Rifles. But I looked upon the question as one for the Foreign Office to deal with in the first instance at all events, and I think I mentioned this in one of the notes.

I would urge that some decision be arrived at in this matter, and would propose that the Afridis should be told that the Rifles will be increased for holding the fort at Landi Kotal, and for guarding its construction and for guarding the railway. If the roadbed is to be prepared, and bridges and tunnels made, we must have a larger strength of Khyber Rifles.

I advise also that the grant of pensions to the Khyber Militia be announced.

Paragraphs 6-7. I agree in the proposals as to allowances. I would go further and would increase these in the future, after a term of peace and good behaviour, in recompense for increased responsibilities, and what is practically annexation. I believe firmly it is an economical policy.

4. I am sorry that we have not got General Egerton's views on the various questions. I disagree with other points in Mr. Cunningham's note, but have no time to discuss these. As to the salt question I am inclined to think that it is a real grievance, and I always thought that we were too rigid and exacting in our decisions with respect to the frontier tribes in this matter. I would not give way now, but if anything can be done to lighten the burden, in the future, I would support such a policy.

5. In conclusion, I venture to point out that the Secretary of State has not dealt with the question of civil or military responsibility for the Khyber Pass and Khyber Militia. This is not a point for further discussion now, but it will need consideration before long.

6th October 1898.


ORDER IN COUNCIL.

That the draft instructions be issued as amended.

7th October 1898.

E.

(To the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, and endorsement to A. F. D. Cunningham, Esq., Nos. 3453-3454 F., dated the 7th October 1898.)
N.-W. F.
D. No. 1781 F.
FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, KHYBER BRIGADE, No. 163 P.,
DATED THE 3RD (RECEIVED 6TH) OCTOBER 1898.

In continuation of his telegram No. 158 P., dated 29th September 1898, forwards,
with remarks, a translation of the summons which has been issued to
the jirgas of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, Zakka
Khel, Sipah and Kamral sections of the Afridis, in accordance with
the telegram from the Government of India in the Foreign Department,
No. 3315 F., dated 26th September 1898.

For information.
R. C. A.—7th October 1898.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1809 F.
FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, KHYBER BRIGADE, No. 68 C.-P.,
DATED THE 11TH (RECEIVED 14TH) OCTOBER 1898.

Acknowledges receipt of Foreign Department letter No. 3453 F., dated the
7th October 1898. States that he fully understands the instructions
both as to the announcement of terms and the procedure to be adopted
in certain eventualities.

14th October 1898.
W. J. CUNNINGHAM.

For information only.
J. S.—14th October 1898.
14th October 1898.
E. H. S. CLARKE.
Announcement and explanation to the Khyber Afridis of the orders of the Government of India. Details as to attendance of jirgas, &c.

For information only. No orders. A copy was sent to Private Secretary to the Viceroy.

R. C. A.—25th October 1898.

Send copy to Military Department and Intelligence Branch?

J. S.—25th October 1898.

No need to telegraph to Secretary of State at present?

25th October 1898.

26th October 1898.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

H. DALY.

(To the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 3630-3631 F., dated the 27th October 1898.)

Result of interview with Afridi jirga. Unconditional acceptation of Government terms. Petitions presented by Mridis, and replies given to them.

Copies sent to Military Department and Intelligence Branch.

Usual informal distribution made.

R. C. A.—28th October 1898.

This is very satisfactory and may be reported by telegram to the Secretary of State. Draft below.

J. S.—28th October 1898.

His Excellency.

28th October 1898.

Telegram may issue. Also please convey my satisfaction and congratulations to General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham.

28th October 1898.

To General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham—

"Your telegram 6 P. reporting result of jirga on 27th. The Viceroy desires me to convey His Excellency's satisfaction and congratulations."

29th October 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

(Endorsements to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, Nos. 3654-3655 F., dated the 28th October 1898.)

(Telegram to the Secretary of State, London, No. 3662 F., dated the 29th October 1898.)

(Telegram to General C. C. Egerton, C.B., and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., No. 3663 F., dated the 29th October 1898.)
N.-W. F.
D. No. 1859 F.

TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL EGERTON AND MR. CUNNINGHAM, No. 8 P., DATED THE 30TH (RECEIVED 31ST) OCTOBER 1898.

Request that His Excellency the Viceroy may be thanked for his kind message.

PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE VICEROY.

30th October 1898.
1st November 1898.

N.-W. F.
D. Nos. 1873 & 1874 F.


Allowances for the Kambar Khel and other clans, and dates from which they should be paid.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

It will be desirable to agree at once to the proposals made in these telegrams. Orders by telegram are asked for in time to let the jirgas be paid up to-morrow. The orders to the Accountant-General to place Rs. 20,000 more at Mr. Cunningham’s credit can only go from the Finance Department, and the sanction of that Department should be obtained to the other two requests in telegram No. 9, viz., to make up, to those of the old Malik who are present and have done good service, the payment specially sanctioned for renewed service to the sum of three months’ of their former maliki; and to increase the maliki of the Kambar Khel by an amount not more than Rs. 100. The assent of the Finance Department may, however, be anticipated. I am sending a copy of this telegram to the Finance Department, and informing them that I am applying to Your Excellency for sanction to these two proposals.

The request made in telegram No. 10, i.e., that the restoration of allowances of the five clans who declared their adhesion to the new settlement on the 27th October may date from that day, and the payment of the Kambar Khel allowances may date from the day on which they declared their adhesion, may be accepted also, and this does not require reference to Finance.

I propose therefore, with Your Excellency’s approval, to telegraph in reply—

“Your telegram 9, November 3rd. You may make up to the amount of three months’ former maliki the payments made to those old Malik who are present and have done good service under sanction conveyed in my 2976 F., dated 22nd August.

“Secondly.—You may increase Kambar Khel maliki by a sum not exceeding one hundred rupees, provided increased muwajib and maliki together do not exceed amount sanctioned in paragraph 8 of my 2976 of seventh October.

“Thirdly.—Orders regarding extra credit of twenty thousand will be issued by Finance Department.

“Your telegram 10. Government of India approve of restoration of allowances dating from 27th October in the case of the five clans who declared their adhesion on that day to the new arrangements, and in case of Kambar Khel from the day when they declare their adhesion.”

3rd November 1898.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.

(E.

3rd November 1898.

(Telegram to Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., Commanding Khyber Brigade, and to D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., No. 3700 F., dated the 4th November 1898.)

Make a copy urgently of the telegram No. 9 of to-day’s date from General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham, and send it with this note to the Finance Department, submitting the original with my note to His Excellency.

I am asking His Excellency’s permission to telegraph approval of the requests made in this telegram.

W. J. CUNINGHAM.
Payment of 3 months’ maliki to the Maliks who have done good service has not been specifically sanctioned, but it is consonant with the spirit of the orders approved by the Finance Department to pay 3 months’ muwajib to the clans. As the Maliks have received some payment, what is now proposed is to pay them the difference between what they have received and the full amount of 3 months’ maliki.

The sanction given to increase the Kambar Khel’s muwajib did not contemplate increase of maliki, but the proposal keeps within the sanctioned expenditure.

The extra credit applied for is necessary, the earlier it is given, the less the expenditure will be. I have drafted for His Excellency’s approval a telegram, saying that orders on this head will be issued in the Finance Department.

3rd November 1898.

To Finance Department, dated the 3rd November 1898.

Hon’ble Member agrees. Wire urgent Accountant-General, Punjab, to place Rs. 20,000 more at credit of General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham, and inform Treasury Officer, Peshawar, that this has been done and that he may act on it.

4th November 1898.

H. Risley.

N.-W. F.

D. No. 1875 F.

ENDORSEMENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, NO. 4822 F., DATED AND RECEIVED 4TH NOVEMBER 1898.

Forward copies of telegrams addressed to the Accountant-General, Punjab, and the Treasury Officer, Peshawar, sanctioning a further sum of Rs. 20,000 being placed at the disposal of General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham.

In our telegram No. 3700 F. of to-day’s date, we told General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham that orders on this point would be issued by the Finance Department. Perhaps we had better now inform them of the action taken, or they will not be aware that the money has been placed at their disposal. The draft telegram below may issue?

R. C. A.—4th November 1898.

J. S.—4th November 1898.

Issue. General Egerton and Mr Cunningham may have heard from the Treasury Officer, but it will be better to be on the safe side.

4th November 1898.

E. H. S. Clarke.

(Telegram to General Egerton and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., No. 3714 F., dated the 4th November 1898.)

Telegram, No. 3 C., dated Allahabad, the 9th November 1898.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy’s Camp,
To—The Deputy Secretary, Foreign Department, Simla.

I am sending, semi-officially, to Leo-Warner the copy received in Camp of Cunningham and Egerton’s letter No. 17, dated 4th November, reporting details of Peshawar jirga proceedings. The letter, duplicate of which has been sent to you, is to be sent to the Secretary of State with simple covering despatch. Please get that signed and issued if you can in Simla; if you cannot issue, please send out to Camp to be signed and issued there.
Telegram, dated the 10th November 1898.

From—Foreign, Simla,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Viceroy's Camp.

Your telegram 3 C., November 9th. I assume I shall be right in sending to Secretary of State, in addition to Egerton and Cunningham's report on settlement, the previous papers not already sent, including their instructions and our letter to Punjab 3176 F., September 12th, and Punjab's reply. Am acting accordingly and will issue from here.

Under-Secretary.

The draft despatch to the Secretary of State in type below, with list and enclosures, may issue when we get the report by General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham.

J. S.—10th November 1898.

10th November 1898. E. H. S. Clarke.

N.—W. F.
D. No. 1894 F.

From General C. C. Egerton and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., No. 17, Dated the 4th (Received 12th) November 1898.

Report on the settlement effected with the Afridi clans of the Khyber for the future management of the Pass.

(Secret despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 212 (Frontier), dated the 17th November 1898.)

Under-Secretary.

A copy of the report on the settlement effected has been sent to Sir W. Lee-Warner from camp, and copies, with previous papers, have been sent to the Secretary of State. Copies may now be sent to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and the Punjab Government, for information. Endorsement is under issue.

J. S.—16th November 1898.

We have also to make a communication to the Finance Department. It would be very difficult for them to find out from any of the telegrams and reports in the file what the financial effect of the settlement is. We must get a statement from Mr. Cunningham, which we can send to Finance Department.

Issue the telegram below.

16th November 1898. E. H. S. Clarke.

(Telegram to A. F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., dated the 16th November 1898.)
Private. Khyber. Your Despatch, just received, may create a difficult position unless I can give explanations. I assume you maintain declaration against annexation; but if the Pass remains tribal territory, the early re-establishment of relations with the tribes is essential. A declaration of terms, without securing the assent of the jirgas, would prolong the unsettled condition which all local officers, civil and military, apprehend may result in disturbance when the harvest is over, unless the restoration of the allowances is announced. Urgent representations have been received lately. I consider further delay dangerous, and that the Commissioners, named in my letters of June 30th and August 11th, should now be appointed to interview the jirgas and announce the conditions imposed. These will be settled in Council, and a summary communicated as you direct, but I am personally convinced that they must include (1) the right to make and maintain a railway; (2) the conversion of the Khyber Rifles from a tribal levy to a militia under British officers, which is an essential part of any arrangement, whether they occupy Landi Kotal or not; (3) the final settlement of damages; (4) the restoration of the allowances. I agree that anything like negotiation is undesirable, but fear that the acceptance of the allowance would not sufficiently bind the tribe as a whole to secure peace. I understand that I have discretion to use a Sanad if so advised. The property of the two Malik referred to in your paragraph 9, already ordered to be sold and part credited to the fine by Lockhart. The local officers have reported that a blockade, though it would inflict further punishment, would not produce any substantial payment. Further demands would, therefore, irritate uselessly, and, in the present temper of the Afridis, I earnestly counsel a prompt settlement on broad lines. Your letter of August 5th says that on all points, except the Commissioner, you agree with us; but as the above proposals might appear beyond the authority conveyed by your Despatch, to save time I ask in advance of official reference if I can proceed on these lines.

Private. Khyber. Your private telegram of 24th August. Regarding your second sentence, please see my Foreign Secret telegram of 30th March, and paragraph 21 of my Despatch of 25th January. The Khyber Pass is quite exceptional, and the Afridis were informed, under the orders of 4th October to Lockhart, that the Pass would be re-opened in such manner as was considered desirable. Their assent is not therefore necessary, and questions of railway or of conversion of Khyber Rifles are not matters for negotiation, but for our decision and declaration to the Afridis. I do not think it will be possible to modify the terms of paragraph 10 of Despatch of 5th August, and I shall await a summary of your proposed declaration before it is made to the Afridis. There is no occasion for a Sanad, and I do not understand why Commissioners are required where no negotiations are needed. We want to be free to do now or hereafter what we please. Subject to that liberty, announcement of restoration of allowances can be made as soon as I have approved the terms of your decision and declaration to the tribes.
[Demi-official.]

Dated Simla, the 10th September 1898.

From—His Excellency the Earl of Elgin & Kincardine, G.M.S.I., &c.,
To—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Khyber Brigade.

I know that you and all officers on the spot have been anxious for a settlement with the Afridis, and you will, therefore, be glad to know that we hope immediately to issue instructions. It has been necessary to obtain the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and that has taken some time.

My object in writing to you now is that you should learn from me the manner in which we intend to proceed. We do not mean to open negotiations for a new agreement, but to declare the terms on which we resume peaceful relations. To these terms the Afridis must conform, and when we are satisfied of this, we shall restore their allowances. But although we cannot admit of "negotiations" on any essential points, we think it expedient that a full jirga should be assembled to hear the announcement and explanation of the terms. We propose to associate Mr. Cunningham with yourself for this duty. I knew from the letter you sent me on your first arrival in the Khyber that this would be agreeable to you, and I took it upon myself to say so. It is very desirable I think that at this meeting with the tribesmen the military and civil representatives should act jointly, and no opportunity be afforded to anyone to draw distinctions.

I do not see any reason for disturbing you in your present management of political affairs in the Pass. The business of the jirga can be treated separately and specially, and under the circumstances ought not to take very long.

I had already arranged with the Lieutenant-Governor that Mr. Cunningham should come here as soon as relieved by Sir R. Udny, and I understand that he will arrive in a day or two. We shall immediately proceed with the preparation of the instructions on which you will act. If there is any point likely to occur which you have not discussed sufficiently with him for him to be able to express your views, I hope you will communicate with me freely. In the meantime I think what I have said will indicate generally what is to be done. The papers, when ready, will supply you with all details, and I trust my proposals will be satisfactory to you personally.

[Demi-official.]

Dated Simla, the 12th September 1898.

From—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—The Hon'ble Mr. L. W. Dane, Officiating Chief Secretary, Punjab Government.

I am sending with this an official letter communicating the despatches on the Khyber question, and intimating the terms of the announcement which may be made to the Afridis.

You will see that the intention is that General Egerton and F. Cunningham should act jointly in communicating with a jirga or jirgas of the tribe, and further instructions to them will be necessary.

There will be a good many details to be settled before these instructions can be drafted, and as Cunningham is coming up to Simla, the Viceroy desires me to suggest to you that it would be convenient if His Honour would first discuss matters with Cunningham and then let him come and see me with the knowledge of His Honour's views.

It may be convenient or necessary to have further conferences after that, but at any rate we shall in this way arrive at a knowledge of what the points for discussion are.
[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Simla, the 23rd September 1898.

From—SIR WILLIAM CUNINGHAM, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E., Simla.

I thought the official letter in reply about Khyber arrangements and the terms which are to be announced to the Khyber Afridi clans was going to say how the summons to the clans should be issued. His Excellency is anxious that this should not be delayed, and has told me therefore to write to you personally about it.

Will it be sufficient to send an order to Brigadier-General Egerton instructing him merely to fix a day for the meeting of the jirgas of the clans in Peshawar and to summon them to be there on that day, thus leaving to him the choice of the means by which the summons is to reach the different clans? All he need perhaps tell them is that their presence is required in order that they may hear the terms upon which the Government of India are prepared to renew friendly relations. The date of assembling will be fixed so far in advance as to give time for all the jirgas to come in to Peshawar, and for the Government of India to settle and communicate to Egerton and you the instructions as to how you are to deal with the jirgas there. (I am writing to you separately about the instructions.)

If a copy of what is said to Egerton is sent to you, you can communicate with him on any matters of detail.

Is there anything more you would like said or done?

[H. E.]

Dated Simla, the 23rd September 1898.

From—SIR WILLIAM CUNINGHAM, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E., Simla.

I enclose a draft letter of instructions intended for the guidance of yourself and General Egerton in dealing with the Afridi jirga. The letter is intended to issue after the jirga has been summoned. His Excellency wishes you to give me your criticism on the draft and any suggestions you may have to make either by way of amplification or alteration.

The paragraph about allowances is drafted as I understood by our conversation you would wish it to be. I am, however, to ask for your suggestions in particular as to this paragraph and for the reasons for desiring to increase the Kambar Khel allowances. The passage purporting to give authority to increase them has not received the sanction of the Government of India; indeed it was generally understood that there would be no increase. I have put it into the draft for the purpose of raising the question and getting a decision on it.

Would you wish something definite said as to the strength, constitution by clans, rates of pay and liability for general service if required of the militia?

Regarding the salt question, I enclose the letters from Colonel Denning, which I mentioned to you, and the Viceroy wishes you to write your views. One aspect of giving a fixed—however, limited—supply of free salt to the Khyber Afdris must be borne in mind. That is the effect it would have upon the loyal Pass Afridis, the Orakzais, Waziris and other border tribes and on the Amir himself.

His Excellency will be glad to see you and talk with you about the duty on which you are to be deputed, and bids me ask whether you yourself would rather speak with His Excellency before you have written your views in reply to this letter, or would rather send in your reply, and let it have been considered by His Excellency before the interview.
Dated Simla, the 24th September 1898.

From—F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E.,
To—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

So far as the preliminary step of securing the attendance of the Afridis is concerned, no more seems necessary than to tell Brigadier-General Egerton to issue summonses to the six Khyber clans* named in the margin of paragraph 1 of your draft letter of instructions.

The Aka Khel are sure to come into press their claim for an allowance as a clan of the Khyber, but we should certainly not invite them, nor recognise them as having any lot or share in the Pass. I think it will be sufficient as you proposed for Egerton to say that the jirgas are to come to Peshawar by a certain date that they may hear the orders of Government, and the terms upon which the Government of India are prepared to resume friendly relations. With regard to the date, I think, Egerton should give them at least three weeks' clear notice, so that all sections may arrange to be present and to be suitably represented.

It must be remembered that it is harvest time and it is useless to hurry them.

It is also desirable to give the Government of India time to consider the final form of its instructions to us, so that once they have been formulated, there may be no need for any modification or withdrawal.

With reference to those instructions acting upon your second demi-official letter I will submit a note. I am grateful to His Excellency for according me the honour of an interview, and feel it may save His Lordship's time if I put my suggestions briefly in writing, and submit them through you, before seeing the Viceroy. After His Excellency has considered them, I could explain them further in person.

There are two points in which, I think, a concession must be made if we are to avoid a rupture. Fortunately they are in matters of detail, not of principle, and will not conflict with any of the essential conditions laid down by Government.

Another reason for the length of notice, which I advise, is that through their friends in the clans news may reach the two Zakka Khel Maliks in the Amir's territory, so that they and any others who may be at Kabul or elsewhere may have time and opportunity to attend, or to be represented.

This is in accordance with the decision of the Government of India that these men should not be finally debarred from their old positions as headmen; and I am convinced it is expedient, for they are still the hereditary Chiefs, and no settlement from which they are excluded will be so stable or so satisfactory an one in which they are associated.

It is quite possible they may not come in; the Amir will probably affect indifference and tell them it is no concern of his, but his officials will certainly seek to prevent their coming into us; and if they are left out, any person or party hostile to Government will always have a tool to use against us, and there will always be a risk that arrangements now made may be upset, a risk we shall avoid if we secure the co-operation of these absentees.

I venture, therefore, to suggest that the clans should be summoned for a date not earlier than the 20th October.

General Egerton can, of course, be left to select his own means of sending the summonses to the clans; no doubt he will issue letters to all Maliks and leading men of different sections, and will probably deliver them by the hands of Afridis in the Khyber Rifles.
N.-W. F.
D. No. 1762 F.

[Demi-official.]

Dated Simla, the 28th September 1898.

From—A. F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E.,
To—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

In compliance with your demi-official of the 23rd, I enclose a note (1) of the few concessions which seem necessary to bring the Khyber clans to accept the orders of Government, and (2) on the proposal to give subsidies in salt instead of silver.

I do not suggest any modification of the essential conditions, but to prevent rejection of our terms, with its costly consequences, another or several more Tirah Expeditions, I advise—

(1) the grant of allowances for three months past—call it payment for co-operation given and service rendered;

(2) increase of the Kambar Khel allowance.

If a railway is ever opened and worked, it will undoubtedly be necessary to raise the subsidies, and I suggest, for consideration, that we should let the clans know now that, when that time comes, Government will be ready to consider the increased responsibility thrown upon the tribe.

[Demi-official.]

Dated Simla, the 7th October 1898.

From—Sir William Cunningham, K.C.S.I., Foreign Secretary,
To—F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., Simla.

The draft instructions have been passed, and I enclose an early copy for your information. They are confidential until you give them out in Peshawar.

His Excellency said if you wished to see him again he could arrange for to-morrow morning, and I said I would let you know, though I didn't think you wished to stay any more.

When the letter of instructions goes to General Egerton, a copy will go to you officially, and hereafter I shall address official correspondence to you both.
To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord,

I have given my most attentive consideration to the various proposals for restoring and maintaining British control over the Khyber Pass which are contained in Your Excellency's Letter No. 95 (Secret), dated the 23rd of June 1898.

2. The scheme which you recommend for the future management of affairs in this important artery of communication and commerce between Peshawar and Afghanistan consists of three main proposals. At Landi Kotal, the further end of the Pass, you contemplate the construction of a fort to be built with emplacements for guns, but not armed with guns, to be supplied with reservoirs and water-channels, and to be occupied by a local militia recruited from the Afridi tribes and placed under British officers. The militia will have charge of the Pass as well as of the fort. The second proposal is the organisation, at the British end of the Pass or in its neighbourhood, of a movable column of sufficient force, and equipped with transport for the express purpose of supporting the militia. Various posts at Ali Masjid, Fort Maude and elsewhere are to be strengthened, and preparations are to be made for extending to Landi Kotal, when necessary, a line of rail, which will be laid as far as Jamrud. Thirdly, you desire to leave with the Government of the Punjab its control over the Pass and the new militia. Besides these three proposals, there are other matters treated of in your letter, namely, the conclusion of a new agreement with the tribes, and the settlement of outstanding claims against them, to which I shall revert presently.

3. As to the first proposal of Your Excellency's Government, namely, the construction of a strong defensible post at Landi Kotal, with an adequate water-supply, I observe that military opinions generally concur in its necessity. It must be remembered that the Afridis, in the course of the late disturbances, wrought much havoc in the forts and posts entrusted to their charge, and the reconstruction of these works has been forced upon you. The work, in short, is one of restoration rather than one of fresh construction or advance. There is, however, a difference of opinion as to whether the fort, when built, should be occupied by regular troops, or left to the care of the Afridi Militia supported by a movable column at Peshawar and officered by British officers. That question is not exclusively a military one, it involves also important political issues.

4. It is convenient here to refer to two considerations which must be borne in mind in dealing with this and all other questions connected with the Khyber Pass. The Afridis have, as you observe, "by their own acts ruptured their engagements," and in the proclamation addressed to them, and on subsequent occasions, they have been given to understand that the Pass will be reopened under such terms as the British Government may consider necessary. No considerations of past agreements or of tribal rights stand in the way of the adoption by Your Excellency's Government of any military measures necessary for ensuring the permanent safety of the Pass, and for preventing a repetition of the late disturbances. At the same time, while your hands are perfectly free and should be kept so in any negotiations or communications that you may have to conduct with the Afridis, it has always been an axiom that the good will of the tribesmen affords the best guarantee for the success of a frontier policy. In his memorandum, dated 11th March 1898, General Sir William Lockhart remarked with equal force and truth that "from a
political point of view, the permanent occupation of China might give rise to tribal ill-feeling and thus cause us grave embarrassment; for it must be remembered that, in undertaking military operations in Afghanistan, the friendly attitude of the frontier tribes would be of much greater moment than the absolute safety of any single Pass, however important. If the attitude were friendly, the Pass would be secure in any case. If the Pass were secure, while the attitude was unfriendly, we should be harassed in other directions."

5. These observations apply equally to the immediate question of the occupation of the fort at Landi Kotal by regular troops. In the opinion of Your Excellency's Government, such a measure will necessarily strain the good will of the Afridis. Her Majesty's Government is therefore prepared to accept your view, subject to such further consideration as may be needed after fuller experience. At the same time there is no necessity, in communicating to the tribes your intentions, to bind your Government as to its action hereafter. The reconstruction of the works destroyed by the Afridis in breach of their agreements will take some months, and the arguments both for, and against, the occupation of the fort by regular troops will receive additional weight according to the behaviour of the Afridis during the course of the next year. It is sufficient for me at present to convey to Your Excellency my general sanction to any expenditure that may be necessary for the proper accommodation and defence of the garrison which you may eventually determine to place in the Khyber Pass.

6. I accept also your proposals for establishing a movable column, and I shall await the detailed report referred to at the end of paragraph 9 of Your Excellency's Letter. I approve, further, of your measures set forth in paragraph 12 for extending railway communication, but I do not think that it is necessary for you to secure the right of working it and of exercising jurisdiction by means of any agreement with the several sections of the Afridi tribes. The Pass is now in the occupation of your Government, and it will be sufficient to intimate to the tribes your intentions for the future, and to retain the power now actually in your hands of carrying out your intentions.

7. Your third proposal, under which the Government of the Punjab is to retain its control over the Afridi Militia and over the Khyber Pass, raises an important and more difficult question. Under the altered circumstances which have arisen, it is not desirable merely to restore the arrangements which were in force before the recent outbreak. On the other hand, you are evidently impressed with the difficulty of withdrawing entirely the existing jurisdiction of the Punjab Government on the British side of the frontier. Schemes have at various times been put forward for creating a Frontier Commissionership to hold separate charge of the Trans-Indus districts, as well as of our relations with the tribes beyond. They are open to the objection that they would have the effect of breaking up the established administrative units of British Indi, disturbing the revenue system already introduced, and entailing a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations. There is no part of India where the need of a strong administration, equipped with all the resources of Government and capable of resisting aggressions, is more likely to be felt than on the North-Western Frontier. It may also be inexpedient to deprive the Government of the Punjab, and thus also the Government of India, of a valuable opportunity of training officers for frontier service, and of gaining a knowledge of the feelings and habits of tribes which are constantly sending settlers into British districts. It is open to question whether it is altogether advisable to place in the hands of a single Commissioner the whole executive power on both sides of this most important section of the Empire's external frontier, without the restraint which a trained experience of financial and administrative responsibilities on a large scale imposes upon an authority charged with the Government of a first-class province.

8. It is not, however, clear to me that the objections, which you raise to the alternative courses indicated in paragraph 11 of your Despatch, are
entirely unsurmountable. I desire in particular to invite your further consideration to the second of these alternatives:—that, namely, in which it is assumed that the officer entrusted with political matters in the Khyber Pass, might remain under the Commissioner of Peshawar, the Commissioner himself being placed under the Government of India. This plan, you observe, "would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters, and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer." I confess that these objections appear to me to be rather formal than substantial. Your Excellency's Government already exercises direct control over the conduct of relations with Afghanistan; and in the management of the independent tribes upon the Punjab frontier, there has always been a certain distribution of powers between the Local and Imperial Governments, with a more immediate supervision than is exercised over the internal administration of the Province. The Commissioner of Peshawar is, in fact, accustomed to this difference and its consequences, and in a large measure he even now serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances he has corresponded direct with the Government of India. The policy therefore of directing the affairs of the Khyber Pass from the head-quarters of the Government of India, through the Commissioner of Peshawar, is not altogether an untried policy; and it must be borne in mind that the objects which you set forth in paragraph 6 of your letter are, all of them, matters for which Your Excellency's Government is primarily responsible, subject to a reference to Her Majesty's Government as laid down in my Despatch, Secret, No. 51, dated the 11th of December 1896, in the contingency there referred to. In view, then, of these several considerations, I am inclined to hold that it would be better that the Commissioner of Peshawar and through him, his several subordinates, who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India. In such a case it would, in my opinion, be necessary that the Commissioner should be appointed by the Government of India, with special reference to the responsibility in respect of affairs on the frontier which will be placed upon him under the scheme now proposed. In respect of affairs beyond the frontier, it would suffice that he should send copies of his reports for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

I am aware that any such alteration of system may require additional expenditure and some relaxation of the ordinary service regulations, and also that it will involve a change in the status of the office of Commissioner. There is one point, however, which I commend to your particular attention. It seems to me to be of the first importance that the officers who are entrusted with the delicate and difficult duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, should have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and should be able to devote much time and patience to these special objects. They can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials; nor will it, I think, be found convenient that they should be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion. I shall not object to the exercise by your Government of a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary for giving effect to these considerations, which appear to me to be very material to the success of any system introduced for the removal of the disadvantages indicated above.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India. I have indicated, in the two foregoing paragraphs, some of the considerations
which should be borne in mind in dealing with this question. But the matter is too important for me to arrive at any final decision in respect to them without giving to them the fullest possible consideration. I shall receive with interest any further observations which Your Excellency may desire to make on the suggestions of this Despatch.

9. The remaining portions of Your Excellency's letter deal with two subjects which are closely connected with each other, namely, the exaction of the terms of submission already announced to the Afridis, and the grant to them of a sanad declaring their future relations. I accept the conclusion stated, in the 15th paragraph of Your Excellency's letter, that no further steps should be taken to enforce the restitution of arms captured by the tribes during the campaign. In regard, however, to the abandonment of the demand for payment by the tribe of the value of property looted by them in the Khyber, I consider that it would be well to make some further attempt to bring home to the Afridis their responsibility for the consequences of their flagrant breach of engagement in this respect. I desire to be informed whether a portion of the liability could not be realized from the property of Maliks Wali Muhammad and Khwas Khan in British India, and how far it might be possible by other means, such as the threat of a blockade, to enforce the pecuniary satisfaction which was formally demanded by Your Excellency's Government from the tribe.

10. I presume that the allowances payable to the clans will not be renewed until you have settled the terms upon which your future relations will be conducted with them. The acceptance of these allowances might suffice as a formal adhesion on their part to the terms which may be arranged. I do not consider that it is necessary to stipulate for their "acceptance recorded upon" a sanad, or to base your reservation of the right to construct and work a railway upon their consent. The conduct of the Afridis has, as you observe, "constituted an absolute rupture of all relations." You have obtained actual and undisputed possession of the Pass, and it is sufficient to announce in clear terms to the tribes the rights which you reserve, and the relations which for the future you intend to maintain. Whether you should include in the announcement a formal declaration of your intention to make a railway and to assume jurisdiction within its limits, appears to me doubtful; at least until your survey is complete and you are prepared to begin the work. At any rate, I presume that great care will be taken to avoid the use of any language which may limit your powers or give rise to misunderstanding in the future; and I request that Your Excellency will be so good as to send me a summary of the new settlement before you communicate it to the tribes for their guidance.

I have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

(Sd.) GEORGE HAMILTON.
No. 3042 F., dated Simla, the 30th August 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing despatch is forwarded to the Military Department, Secret despatch from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 13, dated the 5th August 1898, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 2344 F., dated the 23rd June 1898.

Telegram, No. 2997 F., dated the 23rd August 1898.
From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar.

No. 2997 F. Your telegram No. 70, March 19th. Have any further sums been realized or are any expected by sale of Khwas and Wali Muhammad's property? I presume whole amount has been credited to Government.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1615 F.

Telegram, No. 166, dated the 25th August 1898.
From—The Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

Your 2997 F. of 23rd. The amount realized by sale of Khwas Khan's property, except lot No. 1 in Peshawar, was Rs. 27,012, the whole of which has been recovered and a net balance of Rs. 24,643, after deducting expenditure, has been paid into treasury. Wali Muhammad's property realized Rs. 9,010, the whole of which has been realized and credited to Government.

Telegram P., No. 3073 F., dated the 3rd September 1898.
From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—Her Majesty's Secretary of State, London.

Please refer to Your Lordship's Secret despatch No. 18, dated the 5th August 1898.

We understand the following main heads of settlement to be approved by Her Majesty's Government, and we ask leave to explain them to the Afridis:

First.—The Afridis by their own acts ruptured all agreements, forfeited all allowances, and forced the British Government to take and hold the Pass, which, as already announced by Sir William Lockhart, will be managed and controlled as the British Government think most desirable.

Second.—The Pass will be kept open for trade and to enable the British Government to fulfil their engagements with His Highness the Amir. The British Government will build a fort at Landi Kotal and posts between that and Jamrud, will keep up a good road or roads, and, if they want it, a railway, and will take such measures as they think fit to punish offences and preserve order on road and railway, in fort and posts, and in neighbourhood where necessary for their purposes.

Third.—The Afridis will have no dealings with any power but the British. They will be left to manage their own affairs in their own country, but, in the Khyber Pass, they are responsible to the British Government that they will co-operate to preserve order and security of life and property on roads or railway and within limits of the Pass.

Fourth.—The British Government will give allowances as formerly to the Afridis for discharging this duty, and will maintain a militia recruited from the Afridi and other tribes and commanded by British officers. The British Government do not undertake to always keep troops at Landi Kotal, but will make arrangements for supporting the militia if circumstances require.

Fifth.—Arrangements for trade in the Khyber will be made by the British Government, and the militia will be used for guarding traders.
Sixth.—Allowances granted by the British Government will commence from the date of the adhesion by the tribe to the terms settled by the Government of India, but they are subject to withdrawal for misbehaviour in the Pass, in British India, or against the friends or allies of Government. Announcement ends.

The sale of the two Zakka Khel Maliks’ property realized thirty-three thousand six hundred rupees, of which nine thousand six hundred was credited as the Zakka Khel fine. The balance is in our hands. No objection to crediting balance to realization on account of damage done to property, the amount of which it will almost cover; but this will be a matter of indifference to the Afridis. We could not recommend threat of blockade, which would exasperate the tribe and cost more than it realized.

In the above we have closely followed the instructions of Your Lordship’s despatch. It is our unanimous opinion that these conditions must be announced to the Afridis in accordance with tribal custom which they understand. We consider it essential that a jirga should be convened, and that our officers should personally communicate the nature of the terms. These should be set out in a document to be attested by the signatures of jirga representatives, not as indicating negotiations to which they have consented, but in order to secure obedience of all sections and the tribe collectively. We proposed a Sanad in substitution for agreement as being well suited to denote our claim to supremacy with significance widely understood along the frontier, but this would issue subsequently. To add to this impression we propose to depute to interview jirga General Egerton, Commanding Khyber Brigade, in association with Mr. Cunningham, who was specially chosen to take charge of political relations after Sir William Lockhart’s departure. They will listen to any representations and settle any details necessary for carrying out terms or distributing allowances, the latter an important consideration, but will not be authorised to hold out any hope of, still less to promise, any modification of essential conditions.

We submit that thus alone can we expect the tribes, whose spirit is by no means broken, to settle down, nor can we otherwise counteract the misrepresentations of our intentions, which according to all experience Mulas and other interested persons will immediately circulate. A more peremptory attitude might, in our judgment, be likely to cause renewed disturbances, and necessitate reconsideration of our military position in advance of Peshawar which would involve the mobilisation of another brigade. This step, however, would create general alarm, and must prove hindrance to the restoration of peaceful relations. Our proposals have, we believe, the concurrence of the officers on the spot, who have the largest experience of the character and the present attitude of the Afridis.

No. 3085 F., dated Simla, the 3rd September 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from Foreign Department, No. 3042 F., dated the 30th August 1898.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1669 F.

Telegram P., to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, dated the 3rd September 1898.

From—Her Majesty’s Secretary of State, London,
To—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla.

Please refer to your Foreign-Secret telegram of the 3rd September 1898. I approve generally the terms of your proposed announcement to the Afridis, except that you might omit the reason given in the second clause, namely, to enable the British Government to fulfil their engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan. I leave to your discretion the arrangements for announcing the terms to the tribe.
No. 3185 F., dated Simla, the 14th September 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing correspondence is forwarded to the Military Department, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Foreign Department, No. 3085 F., dated the 3rd September 1898.

No. 3186 F., dated Simla, the 14th September 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Intelligence Branch, for information.
FROM
L. W. DANE, ESQUIRE,
Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,
Punjab and its Dependencies,

To
THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Dated Sim'a, 21st September 1898.

Foreign.
Frontier.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 3176 F., dated 12th September 1898, forwarding copies of Despatches to and from the Secretary of State for India on the subject of the maintenance of British control over the Khairbar Pass and connected questions, and inviting from His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor any suggestions as to the means by which the objects as defined in the Secretary of State's Despatch No. 18, dated 5th August 1898, at which we are to aim in the future Khairbar arrangements, may be attained, and as to any directions in matters of detail which may be conveniently included in the instructions to the British representatives, Brigadier-General Egerton and Mr. F. D. Cunningham.

2. In reply, I am to intimate that the Lieutenant-Governor has not much to say regarding the matters dealt with in your letter. The instructions regarding the announcement to be made to the Afridis are sufficiently precise, and the Government of India having determined that the announcement shall be made to a fully representative jirga, the first step will be for the officers named in paragraph 5 of your letter to summon the jirga, and until the attitude of the tribe on learning the intentions of the Government has been ascertained, there is not much room for suggestion.

3. Sir Mackworth Young apprehends that the two officers will have some little difficulty in announcing the fourth clause of paragraph 2. The duty for which the allowances are now to be granted is not the duty of maintaining order in the Khairbar which the tribe undertook in the agreement of the 17th February 1831. This duty is now to be undertaken by the British Government as clearly set forth in the second and fifth clauses. The allowances are now to be granted on condition of the co-operation of the Afridis with the British Government. The words "as formerly" therefore, unless they refer to the amount of the allowances, appear to His Honor to be somewhat out of place. The announcement that the British Government do not "undertake" to always keep troops at Landi Kotal conveys the idea that in so far as troops are kept at Landi Kotal a favour is conferred on the Afridis. There is hardly any need to repeat that this is not the view of the Afridis.
4. The Lieutenant-Governor presumes that the sections of the Afridis to whom the announcement will be made will be the same as those with whom the agreement of 1881 was made, and that the Aka Khel for instance will not be summoned. Sir Mackworth Young knows of no reason for including in the arrangements relating to the Pass any sections which have not hitherto participated in those arrangements.

5. The Lieutenant-Governor entirely concurs in the view that there may be questions in respect of the distribution or even the amount of the allowances in regard to which considerable discretion should be allowed to the two officers, at all events in the matter of distribution. Three principles, however, seem to Sir Mackworth Young to be important in this respect. First, that the historical origin and proportion of the allowances should be borne in mind. Second, that there should be no general increase in consequence of the recent rupture and the present restoration of relations. Third, that such inequalities as may be palpable and may affect the permanence of the arrangement should be removed.

6. The Government of India will no doubt issue orders direct to the two officers concerned regarding their subordinate establishment, &c., after receiving their recommendations. His Honor gathers that the two officers themselves will be on an equality, though this is not quite clear from paragraph 5 of your letter. Brigadier-General Egerton will, His Honor understands, continue to perform his military duties without Mr. Cunningham's assistance, and he thinks it will be as well, in view of Mr. Cunningham's political experience, and of the possibility of the two officers being temporarily separated, that he should supervise the subordinate establishment and carry on the political correspondence, it being understood that the two officers act conjointly in all matters affecting the settlement with the Afridis, and that all important communications are submitted to General Egerton.

7. In conclusion, I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor has not given his opinion as to the probable result of the announcement which it has been decided to make to the Afridis, as this has not been asked, but that as the orders of Government are peremptory and not conditions or terms open to revision (for anything like negotiation is prohibited by the instructions of the Secretary of State), it is all the more necessary for Government to consider well what their effect is likely to be, lest it bind itself to a certain course, and when it is too late to withdraw find it may involve a renewal of hostilities. Sir Mackworth Young does not anticipate any serious difficulty in getting the clans to accept the wishes or orders of Government as a whole, but he thinks that if Government desires to restore peaceful relations without risk of trouble or possibly of further hostility Government should be prepared to consider concessions which may be found necessary for this purpose. He would remind the Government of India that not only is the blockade of the Afridis a difficult matter owing to their position, but that a blockade will almost inevitably result in violations of the British frontier for which it will be difficult to secure reparation without further hostilities.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

L. W. DANE,

Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
Telegram, No. 149 F., dated the 24th September 1898.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, Landi Kotal,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Donald reports that believed that jirga have collected all rifles outstanding, and if they are on board (summoned?) would doubtless surrender: they would, however, expect to be informed of future policy of Government of India, especially regarding restoration of subsidy. Under these circumstances, request instructions in the case of their voluntarily offering to come in.

Telegram, No. 3315 F., dated the 26th September 1898.
From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, Landi Kotal.

3315 F. The Government of India expect to be able to shortly issue to you and to Mr. Cunningham, who will be associated with you, instructions as to the terms on which the British Government is prepared to resume friendly relations with the Khyber Afridis, the payment of allowances and the management of the Khyber Pass. Please summon the jirgas of Kuki, Kambar, Malikdin, Zakka, Sipah and Kamrai to meet you at Peshawar, and to hear these terms and the orders of Government. Fix a suitable day in your own discretion, but it should not be earlier than the 20th October, so as to give all clans ample time to receive the notice and send in their jirgas, and to give the Government of India time to finally arrange your instructions in all necessary detail. Please report so soon as summons issue.

Nos. 3316-3318 F. (Confidential).

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department, Intelligence Branch and Government of the Punjab, for information.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1769 F.
Telegram, No. 158 P., dated Landi Kotal, the 29th September 1898. (Despatched 4-55 p.m.)
From—The General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your 3315 of 26th. After consulting with Mr. Cunningham, I have summoned the jirgas therein mentioned to be at Peshawar on the 22nd October, with a view to the announcement of terms on the 24th. I have summoned them two days beforehand, in order to admit of their surrendering rifles and for settlement of any outstanding cases with the Political Officer, Khyber.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1791 F.
No. 163 P., dated Landi Kotal, the 3rd October 1898.
From—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., Commanding Khyber Brigade,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram No. 158 P. of the 29th September, I have the honour to forward, for your information, a translation of the summons which has been issued to the jirgas of the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, Zakka Khel, Sipah and Kamrai sections of the Afridis, in accordance with your telegram No. 3315 F. of the 26th ultimo.

2. These summonses have been issued at a very opportune moment, as I am informed that the Malikdin Khel jirga was on the point of coming in
with a view to restoring rifles, and ascertaining the intentions of Government, as to future policy in the Khyber as foreshadowed in my telegram of the 24th ultimo.

Had this occurred before the issue of the summons, the situation might have been somewhat awkward and embarrassing.

3. The summonses have been issued in Urdu, Pushtu and Persian.

Translation of orders issued by D. Donald, Esq., Political Officer, Khyber, dated Peshawar, the 28th September 1898.

The Government of India being now prepared to announce to your clans the terms on which the British Government is prepared to resume friendly relations with you, the payment of allowances and the management of the Khyber Pass, I have been ordered by the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, to summon you to attend with a full and representative jirga of your clan to hear the same from him and Mr. Cunningham in Peshawar on Monday, the 24th October 1898, i.e., the 8th Jamadi-us-Sani 1316 H.

You are particularly to bear in mind that your jirga which attends must be a full and representative one.

As there are still claims for the restoration of some rifles outstanding against you, it would be as well if your jirgas came to Peshawar on Saturday, 22nd October, to settle these, before hearing the orders of Government on Monday, the 24th October.

You are accordingly summoned to attend on Saturday, the 22nd October, i.e., 6th Jamadi-us-Sani 1316 H.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

No. 3453 F.

FROM
SIR WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, K.C.S.I.,
Secretary to the Government of India,

TO
BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. C. EGERTON, A.-D.-C., C.B., D.S.O.,
Commanding the Khyber Brigade.

FOREIGN DEPT.

SIMLA, the 7th October 1898.

Sir,

The Governor-General in Council has decided to associate Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., C.S., with you for the purpose of communicating to the full jirga of the Afridi clans* with whom the Khyber agreement of the 17th February 1881 was concluded the terms upon which the Government of India have decided to renew friendly relations with them and to deal with the Khyber Pass.

2. The jirga has been summoned by you to assemble in Peshawar on the 24th October 1898, and I am now to convey instructions as to the manner in which you and your colleague will announce the Government terms and explain their nature and intention.

3. The announcement to be made is to the following effect:

First.—The Afridis by their own acts ruptured all agreements, forfeited all allowances, and forced the British Government to take and hold the Pass,
which, as already announced by Sir William Lockhart, will be managed and controlled as the British Government think most desirable.

Second.—The Pass will be kept open for trade. The British Government will build a fort at Landi Kotal and posts between that and Jamrud, will keep up a good road or roads, and, if they want it, a railway, and will take such measures as they think fit to punish offences and preserve order on road and railway, in the fort and posts, and in the neighbourhood where necessary for their purposes.

Third.—The Afridis will have no dealings with any power but the British. They will be left to manage their own affairs in their own country; but, in the Khyber Pass, they are responsible to the British Government that they will co-operate to preserve order and security of life and property on roads or railway and within the limits of the Pass.

Fourth.—The British Government will give allowances as formerly to the Khyber Afridi clans for discharging this duty, and will maintain a militia recruited from the Afridi and other tribes and commanded by British officers. The British Government do not undertake to always keep troops at Landi Kotal, but will make arrangements for supporting the militia if circumstances require.

Fifth.—Arrangements for trade in the Khyber will be made by the British Government, and the militia will be used for guarding traders.

Sixth.—The allowances granted by the British Government will commence to reckon from the date of the adhesion by the tribe to the terms settled by the Government of India; but they are subject to withdrawal for misbehaviour in the Pass, in British India, or against the friends or allies of Government.

4. It is to be expected that the jirga will desire to make certain representations, to ask perhaps for concessions, and to demand the redress of real or imaginary grievances. It is, however, essential that you and Mr. Cunningham should make it clear to them that the first duty of the jirga is to hear the terms and the meaning of them, so that the terms may be thoroughly understood. When all questions about the terms themselves have been answered, and the tribesmen have completely understood what has been told and explained to them, their representations may be listened to, and the jirga may be heard on their requests if they have any to make, but it is essential that the jirga proceedings should not in any way be taken to indicate the conclusion of negotiations to which the tribe has consented.

5. The jirga may ask what is the exact meaning of the expression in the 4th clause—"The British Government do not undertake to always keep troops at Landi Kotal." If so, it may be explained to them that the Government of India have not determined to maintain regular troops permanently at Landi Kotal, but they have the right, if they remove the troops from there, to re-occupy Landi Kotal or any other place in the Khyber whenever they think it necessary or desirable to occupy such place with troops. They may also be advised that their behaviour while troops are in the Pass may have an important bearing on the decision of this question. Care is, however, necessary not to word this so as to imply a promise that the troops will certainly be withdrawn if the Afridis do not misbehave. With regard to the strength, composition and status of the militia which is to take the place of the "Khyber Rifles," you may tell them that the intention of the Government of India is, at present, to make arrangements with the tribes for their recruitment in such manner and in such number as may appear suitable for the duties to be undertaken by them. They will be paid as before, but will be commanded by British officers, and will be a British force, entirely under the control and management of Government, and liable to service at any place in or near the Khyber.

6. There may be questions about the distribution and even the amount of the allowances. The intention generally of the Government of India is that the former allowances may be renewed, provided all sections of the Afridis
settle down and conform to the conditions which the Government now prescribe. It is not expected that the tribal payments (muwajib) will be capable of redistribution by decreasing the share of one clan and increasing that of another. It is possible that you will find it expedient even to increase the muwajib hitherto paid to the Kambar Khel, and the Government of India authorise you, if necessary, to fix Rs. 900 a month for that clan. In the case of maliki allowances there may be an opportunity of making some redistribution if there is not a possibility, in some instances, of making a reduction. In this the Government of India wish to leave to you and Mr. Cunningham ample discretion, provided that the total amount of the old maliki allowances is not exceeded.

7. An important point to settle is the date from which payment of these allowances may be resumed. It will be expedient to point out to the jirga that the Afridi tribe as a whole not only forfeited all claims to allowances by their misconduct last year, but have delayed the consideration of their renewal by their failure this spring to bring in the Government rifles in their possession, or make good the damage to Government and private property in the Khyber for which they were responsible. The Government have determined to allow the sum realised by the sale of the confiscated property of Khwas Khan and Wali Muhammad, late Maliks of the Zakka Khel, to be credited to the account for damage to movable property, and the amount of the allowances withheld since the outbreak of disturbances to be taken as discharging some part of the liability for damage done to Government buildings. On the footing that peaceful relations are restored—and on being satisfied that the Afridis honestly intend to abide by the obligations as now explained to them—the Government will be prepared to renew the allowances from the date of the conclusion of the jirga proceedings which mark the adhesion of the Khyber Afridi clans to the new arrangement made with them.

For some time past Afridi headmen, who have been working on the side of the British Government in managing the pass, have been paid for their services. The tribesmen have also been doing service under their headmen, but they have not been paid. The Governor-General in Council is ready to grant the tribal muwajib with effect from three months previous to the date on which the payment of both muwajibs and maliki allowances will, as just explained, recommence.

8. It will be convenient, as it is no doubt customary, that the jirga proceedings should be reduced to writing in order to form a record of the arrangements made, and these proceedings should be attested by the jirga representatives. In this way evidence of the adhesion of all the Khyber sections to what has been settled will be secured and will be a means of insisting hereafter on their obedience.

9. Two matters may be brought forward by the jirga. They are the protection afforded to runaway women and the salt tax. You will of course listen to their representations, but while your duty requires you to adjust details, remove apprehensions and promote friendly relations generally, you will have to let it be clearly understood that you are not authorized to entertain any proposal for a modification of the essential conditions laid down by the Government of India as the basis of the settlement with the Afridis. As regards the supposed grievance about their women, they know that the practice as to the protection of women has been uniform ever since the British Government had dealings with the Afridi tribe, and they may be at once told that it will not be changed.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) W. J. CUNINGHAM,

Secretary to the Government of India.
No. 3454 F.

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to A. F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., for information.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT;

SIMLA,

The 7th October 1898.

By Order, &c.,

(Sd.) E. H. S. CLARKE,
Asst. Secy. to the Govt. of India.

No. 3478 F., dated Simla, the 11th October 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

(1) Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, No. 149 F., dated the 24th September 1898.
(2) From the Government of the Punjab, No. 1182, dated the 21st September 1898.
(3) Telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, No. 158 F., dated the 29th September 1898.
(4) From the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, No. 163 F., dated the 3rd October 1898, with enclosure.
(5) To the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, No. 3453 F., dated the 7th October 1898.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

No. 3479 F., dated Simla, the 11th October 1898 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the papers noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Intelligence Branch, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 3317 F., dated the 26th September 1898.

No. 3480 F., dated Simla, the 11th October 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing correspondence is forwarded to the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 3318 F., dated the 26th September 1898.

MEMORANDUM.

The paper specified in the margin was transmitted to the Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office, London, for the information of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, under cover of the Foreign Secretary's letter, No. 39 M., dated the 13th October 1898.
N.-W. F.
D. No. 1809 F.

No. 68 C.-P., dated Landi Kotal, the 11th October 1898 (Confidential).

From—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commanding Khyber Brigade,

To—Sir William Cuningham, K.C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your No. 3453 F., dated the 7th October 1898, containing instructions as to the announcement to be made by Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., and myself to the Afridi clans at Peshawar on the 24th instant.

2. I have further the honour to inform you that I fully understand the instructions both as to the announcement of terms and the procedure to be adopted in certain eventualities.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1842 F.

Telegram, No. 3 P., dated Peshawar, the 24th October 1898. (Despatched 2-24 P.M.)

From—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commanding Khyber Brigade, and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E.,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

This morning the orders of Government as contained in paragraph 3 of Foreign Department 3453 F., dated 7th October, were announced and fully explained to jirgas of the Khyber Afridis. Representative jirgas of the following clans were present: Malikdin Khel, Kamrai, Sipah and Kuki Khel. Of the Zakka Khel clan, sections resident in Khyber were fully represented, also some Khusrogsis and others of Bazar and Bara. Only a few Kambar Khel were present. Cause of delay in their attendance not yet known for certain. It was arranged that the terms of Government should be lithographed and distributed in Pushtu. The jirgas will consult about it and will state their petitions or prayers on 27th, today’s jirga being more or less formal, and public proceedings were limited to announcement and explanation of orders of Government. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab.

Nos. 3630-3631 F., dated Simla, the 27th October 1898.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing telegram is forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, in continuation of the endorsements from the (Government of India in the) Foreign Department, Nos. 3478-3479 F., dated the 11th October 1898.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1858 F.

Telegram, No. 6 P., dated Peshawar, the 27th October 1898. (Despatched 8-10 P.M.)

From—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commanding Khyber Brigade, and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E.,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Jirga of over eleven hundred men representing all clans of Khyber except Kambar Khel interviewed today: of Kambar twenty men attended. Before presenting their petitions, the jirga stated the body of clansmen in Peshawar had selected and appointed some twenty or thirty deputies per clan.
to represent them, and state their answer. These men were then pointed out and accepted as deputies by each clan separately. They handed in written paper stating unconditionally their acceptance of the orders of Government as announced on the twenty-fourth. We do not regard this as final yet, as it is desirable that Kambar Khel jirga should formally join in acceptance, but it is satisfactory and may be assumed that Kambar Khel will certainly fall in with rest. Indeed the other clans declared their willingness to be responsible for Kambar Khel, and said they guaranteed Government could accept the Kambar Khel present as binding their clan. It appears that feud between two sections of Kambar delays their jirga. They are patching up truce, and will doubtless come as soon as that is arranged.

Jirga then presented written paper of petitions, ten in number, as follows:

First, for reduction of salt tax. In reply were informed we were not authorised to grant this, but, as they had already been frequently told, Government would act upon its own discretion in this matter upon consideration of the salt trade of India as a whole.

Second, for surrender of runaway women. They were told in reply that past practice in this respect could not be changed.

Third, for release of Sarwar Khan of Hangu. They were told in reply that reference would be made to Government.

Fourth, that certain former Khyber Maliks now in Afghanistan be permitted to return and be re-appointed headmen. In reply they were told such men might come to Khybor or to their country or to Peshawar and would not be arrested or touched, but that question of appointment or acceptance of such men as Maliks could not be considered in their absence. Their supporters stated they were detained in Kabul against their will.

Fifth, for restoration of muwajib from date of last payments made. Replied that Government was ready to grant tribal muwajib with effect from three months previous to date on which subsidies will be restored under sixth condition announced.

Sixth, Afridis to be fully represented in militia. Answered by reference to term number four with assurance that, whatever strength of militia might be, Afridis would of course have their fair share of appointments to rank and file and to Native officerships with other clans or classes.

Seventh, for compensation for mills destroyed at Ali Masjid during war. Were told in reply this could not be granted; it was a loss incidental to war. Similarly they had done damage to forts and buildings for which Government had not exacted satisfaction in full.

Eighth, compensation for any land that might be taken up for a railway. Answered that compensation would no doubt be granted according to value of land taken.

Ninth, that their women and Muhammadan women in general be not sent or allowed to go to Mission Hospital, Peshawar. Replied that Government sent no one there, they could please themselves.

Tenth, for increase of Kambar Khel subsidy. No reply given to that on ground that Kambar Khel were not properly represented.

Attitude of jirga on the whole satisfactory. A few of the baser sort here and there raised objections, but absolute unanimity not to be expected in any assembly of 1,100 men. Meanwhile, we consider the unconditional acceptance of orders of Government by the jirga as a whole, before they had even stated their prayers, is satisfactory and fulfils the wish of Government as to course which the proceedings should take as stated in paragraph 4 of Foreign Secretary's letter 345, dated seventh October. We believe that the assent of the jirgas present is practically sufficient, but to make sure have adjourned meeting for few days to allow Kambar Khel to come in. Fuller report will follow when papers presented have been carefully translated. Addressed Foreign; repeated Punjab.
OFFICE MEMORANDA.

Nos. 3654-3655 F., dated Simla, the 28th October 1898 (Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Intelligence Branch.

A copy of the paper noted in the margin is forwarded confidentially to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, in continuation of the endorsements from the (Government of India in the) Foreign Department,

Nos. 3630-3631 F., dated the 27th October 1898.

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Telegram, No. 3662 F., dated the 29th October 1898. (Despatched 3-15 p.m.)

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,

To—Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, London.

Foreign. On October 27th, jirga fully representing all Afridi clans except Kambar Khel, who were partially represented, gave in written and unconditional acceptance of orders of Government. They subsequently made certain requests, none of which present real difficulty. Kambar Khel reported to be engaged in settling inter-sectional quarrels.

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Telegram, No. 3663 F., dated the 29th October 1898. (Despatched 3-15 p.m.)

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,


3663 F. Your telegram 6P. reporting result of jirga on 27th. The Viceroy desires me to convey His Excellency’s satisfaction and congratulations. Repeated to Cunningham and Egerton.

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N.-W. F.
D. No. 1859 F.

Telegram, No. 8 P., dated the 30th October 1898. (Despatched 3-12 p.m.)

From—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., Commanding Khyber Brigade, and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., Peshawar,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please thank His Excellency for kind message in your telegram 3663 F.

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N.-W. F.
D. No. 1873 F.

Telegram, No. 9 P., dated Peshawar, the 3rd November 1898. (Despatched 2-42 p.m.)

From—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., Commanding Khyber Brigade, and F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E.,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Kambar Khel jirga has come. We propose to see the united jirgas to-morrow, so that acceptance of terms may be repeated and ratified in presence of representatives of all six clans. Meanwhile, we beg orders by wire on following points:

First.—It is desirable to pay the three months’ back subsidy and dismiss bulk of jirgas, as numbers yesterday reached sixteen hundred and
with arrival of Kambar will be more. Paragraph 7 of letter 3453 of seventh October sanctions payment of three months' back subsidy to tribes, and mentions fact that Maliks were already in receipt of payment for service rendered. This is correct. The monthly payments were sanctioned in your 2976 F., dated 22nd August, but, in case of some of the leading Maliks, these sums are considerably under their old Maliks' allowances. We think that of the old Maliks those who are present and have done good service should receive same treatment as clans, that is, get their old maliki allowance for the three past months in full, of course any sums already paid to them for those months under your letter quoted will be deducted, that is to say, no one will get more than his former allowance, and in the aggregate the sum thus paid will be much less than the total of old maliks.

Second.—Paragraph 6 of your letter 3453 gives us discretion as to Kambar Khel allowance. We do not propose to utilize it in full, but will probably announce increase two hundred only; this gives a saving. It is desirable for obvious reasons to increase proportionately maliki allowance of headmen of this clan which formerly like the tribal subsidy was much less than the maliki allowance of headmen of other clans. We, therefore, request permission to make small increase not more than rupees one hundred among Kambar Khel Maliks; the saving on tribal increase will more than cover this.

Third.—My estimate of expenditure letter No. 5, dated 15th October, did not include payment of subsidies three months past. Please send urgent telegram to Accountant-General directing him to put rupees twenty thousand more at credit, Peshawar treasury, and kindly repeat to Treasury Officer, as time is short. The sooner we can pay this, the sooner we can dismiss bulk of jirgas and save daily expenditure.

N.—W. F.
D. No. 1874 F.

Telegram, No. 10 P., dated Peshawar, the 3rd November 1898. (Despatched 3-52 P.M.)

From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. C. EGERTON, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., Commanding Khyber Brigade, and F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E.,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

We assume that, for the five clans who formally accepted terms on 27th October, restoration of allowances may be announced as from that date, and for Kambar Khel from to-morrow or whatever date they formally declare acceptance. We strongly recommend this to mark greater satisfaction with the five clans which attended punctually and accepted terms first, also to let Kambar Khel see delay has deprived them of some advantage.

Telegram, No. 3700 F., dated the 4th November 1898.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

No. 3700 F. Your telegram 9, November 3rd. You may make up to the amount of three months' former maliki the payments made to those old Maliks who are present and have done service under sanction conveyed in my 2976 F., dated 22nd August.

Secondly.—You may increase Kambar Khel maliki by a sum not exceeding one hundred rupees, provided increased muwajib and maliki together do not exceed amount sanctioned in paragraph 6 of my 3453 of seventh October.

Thirdly.—Orders regarding extra credit of twenty thousand will be issued by Finance Department.
Your telegram 10. Government of India approve of restoration of allowances dating from 27th October in the case of the five clans who declared their adhesion on that day to the new arrangements, and in case of Kambar Khel from the day when they declare their adhesion. Repeated to Cunningham and Egerton.

N.-W. F.
D. No. 1875 F.

Telegram, No. 4820 A., dated the 4th November 1898.

From—The Finance and Commerce Department, Simla,
To—The Accountant-General, Punjab, Lahore.

My 4198-Ex. of 26th September. Place further twenty thousand rupees at credit of Mr. Cunningham and General Egerton at Peshawar Treasury. Treasury Officer has been asked by telegram to pay in anticipation of your orders.

Telegram, No. 4821 A., dated the 4th November 1898.

From—The Finance and Commerce Department, Simla,
To—The Treasury Officer, Peshawar.

Accountant-General, Punjab, has been asked to authorise you to pay twenty thousand rupees to General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham on account of special political expenditure. Please pay the amount as soon as claimed.

No. 4822 A., dated the 4th November 1898.

Endorsed by Finance Department.

Ordered that copy be forwarded to the Foreign Department, for information.

Telegram, No. 3714 F., dated the 4th November 1898. (Despatched 5 p.m.)

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

No. 3714 F. My telegram 3700 F., 4th November. Orders issued placing further sum of twenty thousand at your disposal. Repeated to Cunningham and Egerton.

Telegram, No. 3726 F., dated the 6th November 1898. (Despatched 9-45 A.M.)

From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Simla,
To—Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Foreign. My telegram, October 29th. Fully representative Afridi jirga, including Kambar Khel and some Zakka Khel who were absent on 27th, formally and solemnly declared unconditional assent to Government terms on 4th November.

Telegram, No. 13 P., dated the 6th November 1898.

From—F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E.,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Letter with full report of proceedings up to final jirga despatched to-day to you, addressed camp with Viceroy, duplicate copy will be sent
to-morrow to Simla. When printed kindly send me some spare copies. General Egerton having left Peshawar yesterday morning, copy despatched to you is not signed by him, but he has approved the report, and a copy will be sent to him and submitted with his signature. Should I send copy of report to Punjab?

Telegram, No. 3727 F., dated the 7th November 1898.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—F. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., Peshawar.

No. 3727 F. Your telegram 13 P., November 6th. The report will be printed here and copy supplied to Punjab in print.
No. 17, dated Peshawar, the 4th November 1898.

From—BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. C. EGERTON, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., Commanding, Khyber Brigade, and F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E., Commissioner, on Special Duty,

To—the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of our telegrams noted in the margin, we have the honour to make the following report of the measures taken to announce and explain to the Afridi clans of the Khyber the terms on which the Government of India were prepared to renew friendly relations, and of the proceedings held to settle with the tribesmen the future management of the Pass upon the lines laid down in the instructions given in your letter No. 3453 F. of the 7th October 1898.

2. The “jirgas” were summoned to attend in Peshawar on the 24th; on that day a large gathering of over 850 men attended; this assembly represented fully the Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel, Sipah and Kamrai clans, and the Pakhai and Khusrogi sections of the Zakka Khel; the other sections came later. The Kambar Khel were practically absent, as the 20 men who joined the meeting included no leading representatives. It has since been ascertained that they were delayed by a feud between their two sections, the Kao and Shilobar, who had assembled their “lashkars” to fight; arrangements were made to get them to declare a truce and to settle their domestic quarrels later.

These jirgas were interviewed by us in presence of several English officers of the garrison and district; the meeting being to this extent more or less formal and public, proceedings were limited to the announcement of the orders of Government; an exact translation of the terms stated in paragraph 3 of your letter above quoted was twice read out in such a way that all could hear and understand, and clause by clause the orders were carefully explained. A request was made that the terms should be put in writing and given to them in the vernacular. This was agreed to, as any other course would have aroused suspicion; the Pushtu version was accordingly lithographed, and on the following day a sufficient number of copies were distributed to all leading men in the various sections or parties of the clan divisions. A copy* of the paper is enclosed; it is merely an exact reprint of the terms as announced without any addition or comment. The jirga was dismissed, and informed that any petitions they wished to present would be heard and considered on the 27th; at the same time it was carefully explained that the orders of Government were not a matter for negotiation, and that there could be no modification of any of the essential conditions stated in the orders just announced. The Afridis spent the following two days in discussing the terms among themselves, in large “jirgas,” in separate committees of the various sections and sub-sections of the clans, and in meetings of the followers of leading men of different parties and interests.

The political staff were meanwhile fully occupied interviewing all classes, factions and cliques; no exertion was spared to explain the terms, to remove unfounded fears, and to re-assure the clansmen of the real intention and policy of Government as announced. This was the more necessary, for, as soon as the jirgas came to Peshawar, it became clear that many busybodies were at work to create alarm, arouse suspicion, and to put off, if not prevent, a settlement. Speculators, agents for contractors for carriage and supplies, all who saw hope of profit in the assembly of another Field Force, grain dealers, even the zamindar and farmer of the surrounding villages, badmashes of the city, spies and

* Appendix No. I.
hangers-on of Kabul officials, *et hoc genus omne* filled the clansmen’s ears with warnings of the evil of a railway in the pass, of loss of independence when new forts had been built, and of better terms if they held out. These and such like stories seem senseless to us, and doubtless did not impress the Malik or elders, but they were the talk of the Bazar, and had their effect on the commoner lot who swelled the numbers of the jirgas, and in a democratic society like the Afridis are a factor to be reckoned with.

3. On the 27th October we again interviewed the united jirgas, whose numbers had now risen to nearly 1,200 men. In view of this, and of the difficulty of dealing with such a crowd, the whole gathering had selected certain elders and representative men to act as their deputies. These men were pointed out and were openly accepted by each clan in turn as their chosen nominees.

They then handed in a written paper* stating unconditionally their full acceptance of the terms of Government as announced on the 24th. This was read out, repeated in Pushtu and the whole assembly were asked if they assented. So far as we could judge, acceptance seemed practically unanimous. At any rate, at this stage no dissentient voices were raised; later on when their petitions had been stated and answered, some discontent was openly expressed among the smaller men at the refusal of their prayers, but so far as their acceptance of the orders of Government goes, we believe that it represented the vote of the overwhelming majority, if there was an opposition it was silent, and we have no doubt that the consensus of the assembly was sufficient to justify the broad statement that the terms were accepted. One section (the Anai) of the Zakka Khel were absent, they arrived within the next few days and it is known that they acquiesced in the action of their clan. The Kambar Khel as above noted were not included, as the 20 of their tribe who were present comprised no representative or leading men. On this ground we did not formally take the paper handed in as the final ratification of the terms, though the jirga assured us they would guarantee that the assent of the Kambar Khel present would bind their clan, and we believe that for all practical purposes it would have been safe to act upon this. It seemed, however, better to avoid any sign of being precipitate, and the jirga were therefore told that we should wait for the arrival of the Kambar Khel deputies, so that agreement might be solemnly repeated in the presence of all the Khyber clans.

4. The jirga were then invited to state their petitions, and a paper containing 10 requests was handed in. These and the replies given have already been reported in our telegram No. 6 P. of the 27th, but a few remarks will be useful to explain the real intention of one or two of the prayers. The paper was drawn up by their own writer, and the language here and there is vague or inexact,—that is to be expected,—and we may add that the common body of clansmen (Kishars) were careful to put the scribe to oath that he had written down their wishes truthfully.

To take first the request No. 5 on their list for restoration of the tribal subsidies from the date of forfeiture, in other words from the dates of the last payments made in the summer of 1897. They were told in reply that, in recognition of the fact that since the break up of the Tirah Expeditionary Force they had co-operated to keep the pass road open and safe, the Government would give them three months’ back subsidies counting from the date on which their allowances were to be restored under the sixth term. The request that they should be granted from the date of last payment was no doubt put in on the principle, on which these clans, like most Orientals, habitually deal, that if you ask for a whole loaf you may get a half; they would probably have been satisfied with payment from the date on which they paid up the tribal fine in April last. It would be wrong to say that they were happy with the grant of three months’ back allowances, but this concession certainly prevented discontent reaching a dangerous pitch, and assisted the leading and better disposed men to keep the more turbulent rank and file in order. Without
this we think that dissatisfaction would have been strong enough to lead to the withdrawal of large parties from the various jirgas, and, if not to a breach, at any rate to the postponement of a settlement.

In this connection it must be remembered that the greater part of the fine realised in April was paid with borrowed money; the Afridi looked to the allowances of past months to enable him to repay those who made the advance; and the knowledge that without this he could not start clear, added to the feeling that he has in some way earned the subsidy by actual service, makes the clan firm and united upon this claim.

5. The next petition to be referred to is that about the surrender of women who leave their clan and settle in British territory. We give this precedence because we were struck with the fact that, next to the request for payment of subsidies for the past, this prayer seemed the one which aroused the keenest interest and was pressed with most insistence, and its refusal appeared to excite the greatest clamour among the gathering at large. The real meaning of the petition may not be clear from the written text, but came out in the discussion which followed. It is not that married women, who run away with their paramours, or that girls who elope without consent of father or brother, should be surrendered, but that women who desert their home and settle in Peshawar of their own accord, when there is no man in the case, if that expression may be permitted, should be arrested and sent back to their male relations or, as the paper puts it, restored "to their owners." The Afridis here make a distinction between women who run away with a man, or by "aghwa" and those who merely leave their home in the hills in search of an easier life in Peshawar; and the foundation of the petition seems to be less the satisfaction of family honour, than the question of the available supply of women for the clan. That is to say, if a woman leaves her husband, or her father's house, the paramour or the man with whom she elopes will in most cases be an Afridi himself, her family can settle scores with his in their hills; and cases of this sort are at least counterbalanced by converse cases of British subjects who take other people's wives to Afridi land. But what affects the tribesmen more, in that there is no compensation for the loss, is that every year a number of women attracted by the prospect of an easier life in Peshawar, either run away, or, having come in with their friends to sell grass or wood conceal themselves in the city, preferring private service here to the drudgery of cutting grass or wood in Kajurai or Tirah. In this way the tribe annually lose some of their not too numerous women, and in addition to the irritation of offended honour, the family loses a chattel which it could dispose of for a consideration, for among Afridis, as among lower classes in and around Peshawar, woman is as much a marketable commodity as a rifle or a cow.

The jirga were told that they knew the past practice which was founded on the law of India and could not be altered. But we observe that the law permits and policy demands that such women, who are in danger of being murdered if caught near the border, should be removed and required to live outside the frontier districts. As a matter of fact action is ordinarily taken under the section quoted on report by the police that a runaway woman has settled in our territory, but the size and population of the Peshawar City make discovery more difficult; and perhaps increase the temptation which leads to this complaint. We think that much may properly be done to discourage conduct which outrages tribal feeling by careful and systematic exercise of the powers conferred by the law. While clearly announcing that no new practice would be introduced, and that in no case will women be surrendered, we have explained to the clansmen that, if they report such cases to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, direct or through their Political Officer, the Deputy Commissioner will have no doubt arrange to remove such emigré women from the frontier, and the clansmen are inclined to be satisfied with this as they expect that, if their discontented women are not permitted to settle in Peshawar, they will not be so ready to desert their homes for a slight
grievance, and the tendency to emigration will to some extent be checked. It will of course be understood that, before any woman is deported, she is given the option of returning home and is advised to do so; all that we refuse is forcible surrender.

This matter points to the importance of there being always the freest communication between the Political Officer in the Khyber and the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, in whose hands lies the disposal of cases under the Frontier Regulation; and is an instance of the dependence of these clans upon magisterial action within the adjoining district, for in the aggregate the treatment of these individual cases and claims is to the clan as important as matters affecting what are called political relations; and in parts of the frontier, where there is no special Political Officer, this may explain the power which the Deputy Commissioner can indirectly bring to bear upon the border tribes.

Further enquiry in this matter has disclosed another grievance which can doubtless be locally remedied. In a city like Peshawar there are always a number of runaway women; their safety demands that, until their cases are settled, they should be safeguarded in respectable custody. The practice is for the police to entrust them to the headmen of wards of the town (muhalladars). These men are often low born Kashmiris, and whether truly or not it is believed they make a livelihood out of the business. Whatever morals an emigree may have brought with her, her reputation does not improve by association with men of this stamp. It has been represented that they should be made over to the big Khans or Arbabs of villages outside for protection until their cases are settled. We believe that, when the Afridis understand that their runaway women will not be permitted to remain in Peshawar or on the Pathan side of the Indus, the tribesmen, if not content, will at least be satisfied that we have done all they can hope for and they have in fact expressed themselves to this effect.

6. Next in importance comes the petition for reduction of the duty on Kohat salt, No. 1 on the list. They were told in reply that this request could not be granted, that it was a matter of internal administration, that Government would at its discretion adopt such measures as might seem desirable “from a consideration of the salt trade as a whole.” This answer was based upon the telegram from the Foreign Department, No. 1917, dated 9th May, to General Officer Commanding, Khyber Force, and upon the instructions in your letter to General Officer Commanding, Tirah Expeditionary Force, No. 4343 F., dated 29th October 1897. It should be noted here that the jirga misrepresented the fact, when they say that they had not received answers to petitions submitted long ago. This statement of the orders of Government in regard to the salt duty was made by Mr. Cunningham to jirgas of the Zakka Khel, Sipah and Kambar Khel in May and June last and to many others.

It is satisfactory to be able to report that we have heard that even in their private discussions many Afridis pointed out that this was not a prayer likely to be successful, that, if it were a matter affecting them only, insistence on their part might win a point, but that it concerned the whole frontier and that Government could not be expected to lose many lakhs of rupees in order to benefit the Afridi to the extent of a few thousand.

7. It is unnecessary to discuss the other petitions in detail: they and the answers given were stated with sufficient fulness in our telegram No. 6 P., dated 27th October. But to make this report complete in itself, it may be complete to recapitulate them briefly:

(i) Petition on behalf of Sarwar Khan of Hangu (Kohat) now under surveillance at Lahore.

This is not a prayer in which the whole jirga or even any one clan are really interested; it was no doubt promoted by a section or party representing a small Afridi colony, mostly exiles, who live at Mirobak in Hangu, and their intercession was probably bought.
In former days half of the Orakzai tribe were managed through the Hangu Chief, and the relations of the family are rather with Orakzai than with Afridi. They were told that this question would be referred to Government, and have since been informed that it is contrary to usage to admit the intercession of trans-border men on behalf of British subjects arrested or detained by order of Government or under the laws of India, that this prayer therefore could not be granted at their instance, and that, in dealing with Sarwar Khan, Government would consider the condition of affairs on the Miranzai border.

8. (ii) Petition on behalf of the “Khyber Maliks.” This refers to Khwas Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, the Zakka Khel headmen, whose own section, the Pakhai Zakka Khel, occupy that section of the pass from which the whole takes its name. The wording of the request is significant, it is not merely that they should be allowed to return, but that they should be sent for; by this, as they explained, their clansmen mean not that Government should invite them, but that it should ask His Highness the Amir to permit them to leave Kabul. In reply the jirga were told that so far as we were concerned these Maliks were free to return, that they would be treated like the others, that there was no prohibition against their coming back to Afridi land, or to their restoration to their former positions if their clans approved of them, that absentees could not be appointed or accepted as “Maliks,” and that as they went of their own accord they must find their way back for themselves. This question will have to be further considered hereafter, meanwhile we both agree generally with the view expressed by Mr. Cunningham in his note, dated 26th September, paragraph 3. It is clear that the Pakhai Zakka Khel of the Khyber will accept no others as Maliks, unless of course the sons of these men in place of their fathers. The men themselves are known to be willing to return, and there is little doubt that they would come at once if they could get away, and if they felt sure of their old position. Clannish ties and love of country are strong with these people, and no honours they may have in Kabul will reconcile them to long exile from their people and their homes, even though home be the Khyber Pass. But hampered as they are with large families, they are not now masters of their own movements, and it is doubtful whether they will be able to extricate themselves from their present asylum in Afghanistan.

9. (iii) The petition that, if the “militia” were raised or enlarged, the Afridi clans should benefit was obviously answered by the assurance that they would get their fair share of service in the rank and file and of the superior appointments. Nothing was said to prevent Government from retaining a due proportion of British subjects as was done and is still maintained in the “Khyber Rifles.”

(iv) The seventh request on the list was for compensation for mills destroyed and for cultivation lost in the Khyber during the war. They were naturally told that this was a loss incidental to a state of hostilities, it may havefallen more heavily on individuals who were least guilty, but that could not be helped; and that Government itself had foregone satisfaction for its forts and buildings destroyed by the clans.

(v) The eighth petition was for compensation for any land that might be taken up if a railway were made in the pass: they were told that it would be given according to the fair value of the land.

We may here remark that this petition is significant in what it omits. There is no doubt that the clans came to Peshawar ready to object to the idea of a railway, and that many ill-disposed people encouraged them in this attitude. Every effort was made to prevent unfounded alarm spreading, and to explain to them that a railway in the Khyber would not threaten their independence, nor hazard the loss of their subsidies; that on the contrary, if it were ever made, the fact of both caravan road and railway line being in the Khyber
would be the best pledge they could have of the permanence of their allowances, while the construction would give great opportunities of profitable labour and service. They have been shrewd enough to see that it is possible to kill the bird with the golden eggs; that if the Government is determined to have a railway, it will make it somewhere, and that it can do them no good to drive it away from their own country, for if the line be taken by the river or by the Shalun route, Government may become independent of the Khyber and of the Afridis to boot. Hence, when the jirgas assembled on the 27th, there was no word of objection to the railway project.

10. The ninth petition on the list that Muhammadan women be not allowed to go to the Mission Hospital in Peshawar was probably inspired from the city where there is a good deal of feeling against this institution. They were told it was not a matter of compulsion, no one need go unless he or she liked.

The last request (No 10) is for the increase of the Kambar Khel and Kamrai allowances. This was put aside for the time with the obvious remark that the question could not be raised in the absence of the Kambar Khel.

11. These ten petitions are those which the jirgas elected to present as from the whole body. A number of others were separately given in either from individuals or from sections of clans touching for the most part personal claims; these need not be noticed here.

Possibly it may be necessary to report later upon one, the prayer of the Wudredunkai or settled Kuki Khel of the Jam villages for some special favour over and above the others in consideration of their neutral, if not friendly, attitude in August 1897 when, at the outbreak of disturbances, two of their men accompanying our soldiers were shot by the hostile clansmen.

12. We have said that, as regards acceptance of the terms, the jirga appeared practically unanimous; it would be wrong to suppose that the replies given to their petitions gave general satisfaction. On calmer reflection the leading men and cooler heads as noted above doubtless felt that the answers were as satisfactory as they could expect, but there was at the time considerable murmuring and openly expressed disappointment.

After proceedings were over and the jirga had been dismissed, the common men of one or two clans started a movement in favour of dispersing and leaving Peshawar in token of their dissatisfaction. That evening and night (27th) considerable anxiety was felt whether the morning would find the jirgas in hand and in their place. Fortunately the discontented slept over the discussions, the wiser counsels of the elders prevailed, the excitement which for a while threatened to be serious died out, and in the course of the next few days there grew up a general consensus among Malikas and commoners, grey-beards and youngsters, to accept the situation and acquiesce in the results of their petitions.

But for the reasons given above in paragraph 3, it was necessary to await the coming of the Kambar Khel in order that the formal acceptance of the terms by the whole body might be openly stated in presence of the united jirga of the six Khyber clans.

13. The Kambar Khel came on the 3rd November delayed by civil feud, and, as they allege, by efforts to collect the rifles of deserters still outstanding. Muhammad Amir Khan, their principal Malik, was not with them, he is said to be ill; Amin Khan, Kuki Khel, and Yar Muhammad Khan, Malikdlin, who have been deputed to help them to settle their tribal quarrel and to hasten their movements vouched for the truth of this report and declared that Muhammad Amir could not leave his bed. There is a suspicion that he has been influenced by letters from Afridis in Afghanistan, assuring him of an allowance from Kabul if he kept away from Peshawar. However that be, he sent his brother as his agent with his seal, and other leading men of both Upper and Lower Kambar Khel have come in, so that there is no doubt of their jirga being sufficiently representative. They were seen by Mr. Cunningham on
the 3rd, and he satisfied himself that they understood the terms which the other clans had accepted and knew the manner in which their petitions had been answered.

14. All sections being now represented in Peshawar, a general meeting was held on the 4th at which the chosen deputies of the five clans repeated and the Kambar Khel joined them in declaring their acceptance of the terms announced on the 24th. The seals and attestations of the Kambar Khel Maliks have accordingly been affixed to the document drawn up by the tribal representatives; and the assent of the Afridi clans to the terms laid down by Government for the renewal of friendly relations, and for the future management of the pass, has thus been completed.

The question at once arises how far this assent is unanimous and what security it gives for the future. It is early yet to prophecy; we can only say that we have no doubt the great majority of leading men have given free and honest assent, and mean to abide by it. The tribesmen to-day (4th November) assembled in Peshawar number over 1,800; efforts have been made to check the influx of useless men, but it must be remembered the clans were specially enjoined to send in full and thoroughly representative jirgas, and Afridi society is a very real democracy, wherein if fraternity be not always apparent, liberty and equality are never absent.

We have also felt the very largeness of the numbers assembled in Peshawar is not without its advantage; as the fuller the representation of the tribe on this occasion, the more effectual will be the assent of to-day, and the wider and deeper the foundation of the settlement now made with them. We trust, too, that the manner in which the assent of the Afridi clans was given, before even their petitions had been stated, will be held satisfactory; as it precluded all idea or appearance of negotiation, and fulfils the wishes of Government as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter No. 3453 F. of 7th October.

15. We believe this acquiescence has been secured mainly because the Afridi, who is as shrewd as suspicious, felt that the orders of Government are just, reasonable, and not too exacting; we trust that this feeling will endure and that its natural result will be the permanence and stability of the settlement we have endeavoured to bring about.

At the same time it would be wrong to imagine it has been arrived at without effort. We desire first to acknowledge the assistance rendered by Mr. D. Donald, Political Officer, Khyber, whose labours have been unremitting and invaluable.

Khan Bahadur Sahibzada Abdul Kaiyum Khan has thoroughly justified his recent appointment as Assistant Political Officer. He has shown tact and good judgment; honesty and impartiality give weight to his counsel, and his birth and family give him influence apart from official position.

We have also to acknowledge specially the excellent work done by Khan Sahib Arbab Muhammad Farid Khan, Commandant, Border Police, Hazara. This officer was specially selected both for his personal qualifications, and because his family have hereditary influence on this border. In former days dealings with Afridis were conducted through the Khalil Arbabs, and his father held the Jamrud Fort for Government. His tact and good conduct of affairs in Hazara has helped to maintain profound peace on that border, which even in a season of excitement like the year 1897 was undisturbed by a single raid or robbery. In the present business he has worked unremittingly; his influence, tact, good sense and loyalty have been conspicuous and beyond praise.

We have also to thank Khan Bahadur Miyan Sikandar Shah of Jarma, Kohat, and Sheikh Muhammad Akbar of Shekhan; they were employed during the Tirah Expedition, and partly for that reason it was appropriate to associate them with the final settlement. They have worked well and have given valuable assistance; they are not paid officials, and we shall therefore, at the close of this business, recommend them for cash khilats as a recognition of their time and trouble.
16. It only remains to add that, under the discretion given in paragraph 6 of your letter No. 3453 F., dated 7th October, we have announced to the Kambar Khel an increase of Rs. 200 per mensem in their tribal subsidy, which has hitherto borne no proportion to the strength of this clan, and was less than half the amount of the allowances drawn by other only equally powerful or even weaker clans. The conditions out of which this anomaly grew are stated in paragraph 4 of Mr. Cunningham’s note, dated 26th September; with the passing of years they have ceased to be in accord with existing relations and facts, and for the reasons given in that memorandum an increase in the Kambar Khel subsidy was no doubt politic and called for. It will be observed we have not fully utilised the discretion given to us. As the tribal subsidy has been raised, it will be desirable to increase proportionately the maliki allowance, which has hitherto been far less than that enjoyed by headmen of other clans. This can be arranged out of the saving effected by the grant of a portion only of the amount at our disposal, and has been sanctioned in your telegram No. 3700, dated 4th instant; for the present the Kambar Khel Maliks have merely been told they may hope for some favour. It is not desirable to hurry a decision of this matter; with the hope held out, the Kambar Khel Maliks will work all the more zealously to show their influence with their men, and this will assist to give the new arrangements a fair start at a critical season. Up to the time the jirga was held, no reply had been received to our telegram No. 10 P., dated 3rd instant, and nothing was said at the meeting as to the date from which subsidies would be restored. But in accordance with your telegram No. 3700, dated 4th, since received, the allowances of the five clans who assented to the terms on 27th October will be restored from that date, and the Kambar Khel subsidy from to-day, 4th November.

17. This completes and we trust satisfactorily the first and larger part of the business entrusted to us. There remain questions connected with the appointment of headmen in some of the clans, and the distribution of their milliki allowances, in which it is not expedient to hurry a decision.

There is, for instance, the representation of the Zakka Khels; for some time to come it will be desirable to keep open the door for the return of Maliks Khwas Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, who would doubtless enter to-morrow if they could find a way of escape from a protection which they have begun to find irksome. In Kabul, however, it may be thought that, under possible conditions, these men could be so useful that we do not feel sure the way will be smoothed for their departure.

At present there is no one to take their places in the clan, and in agreement with the opinion expressed in paragraph 8 of Mr. Cunningham’s memorandum of 26th September 1898, we think the settlement now made will be more secure if these Maliks can return and take their natural hereditary position in the Khyber.

Similarly of the Malikdin Khel one Chief, Firoz Khan, the man who probably has the larger following in this section, is away in Kabul. Yar Muhammad Khan, his rival, has been doing good work, and must be supported up to a certain point; his ambition is to pose as sole Malik of the clan, a claim which it is certain more than half of them would bitterly resent.

In the Kuki Khel it may be necessary to reconsider the positions of Muhammad Amin Khan and Kambar. The former was sole Malik, but was set aside for misconduct some years ago; he was subsequently reinstated but to a divided chiefship, and to half the allowance. He is not only one of the strongest men in Afridi land, for the whole of the Tirah Kuki Khel are with him, besides many sections in the plain round Jamrud, but he is one of the most sensible and best disposed; while Kambar Khan, who in 1897 drew half the headmen’s allowance, has comparatively little influence.

These and similar questions may well lie by for a few days or weeks, while matters quiet down, we shall then see better whom the clans accept, and can estimate more accurately the strength of the various parties.
There is also the general question, which may be described as that of Malik and tribesmen; how the tribal subsidies are to be paid hereafter, whether direct to a number of deputies of the clans, or into the hands of the Malik for distribution. This is not as simple a matter as it looks; it is true that the Malik is nobody without the clan at his back; and it is not our business to manufacture Chiefs, nor our policy to prop up weak men. At the same time we must have, and must find men to work through. The contentment of the clan must be studied first, but we must keep in hand the old Maliks or party leaders, even where they have not complete control; for if not strong enough to make their clan work for us or to guide it in times of excitement, any discontented Malik is always powerful enough to thwart us and to create trouble.

18. In conclusion, a note of warning may be suggested. It will not be surprising if, when this large assembly disperses, there should be rumours of dissatisfied sections or of malcontent cliques; but with a solid majority in favour of the arrangement arrived at, we have reason to hope that the tribe will adhere to its engagements, and that peaceful relations now restored will endure for years to come.
APPENDIX No. I.

(Pushtu translation of the terms announced, as stated in paragraph 3 of letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 3453 F., dated the 7th October 1898.)

F. D. CUNNINGHAM.

APPENDIX No. II.

Translation of written statement of acceptance of orders of Government handed in by Maliks, elders and representatives of the Khyber Afridis in full jirga.

To Mr. F. D. Cunningham, Commissioner.

SIR,

We, headmen, representatives, and men\(^*\) of the Afridi clans, Kuki Khel, Malikdin, Sipah, Zakka Khel, Kamrai and Kambar Khel represent that on the day of the Darbar;\(^{\dagger}\) six terms (or conditions) laid down by Government were read out to us, and after that copies of a Pushtu translation were given to us, we have thoroughly understood them; we now declare by this writing that we accept and acquiesce in these six terms unconditionally.

Dated 26th October 1898.

(Here follow seals and attestations of over 200 Maliks, elders and representative men.)

APPENDIX No. III.

STATEMENT OF PETITIONS.

To Mr. F. D. Cunningham, Commissioner.

SIR,

We humbly represent that before this we made certain petitions at \(\text{§}\) Name of place left blank. § to General Sir William Lockhart; as yet we have not been favoured with replies, we now repeat those petitions, and beg they may be accepted.

I.—In former days grey\(||\) salt sold at four maunds per rupee, then it became two maunds to the rupee, and we poor people managed to get on. Now it has become dearer, and on account of our poverty and want of means we can hardly afford it. We beg that its rate may be fixed as before, so that we may keep ourselves and our cattle with ease.

II.—Secondly. For some time past this practice has obtained that, whenever women run away\(\ddagger\) from British territory to independent territory, the Government, at the instance of their relatives, demands them back, whereas women of independent territory, who conceal themselves in Peshawar or among the subjects of Government or for their own pleasure stay behind in British territory.

\(*\) Kisharan, literally "small men."

\(\dagger\) i.e., 24th October.

\(\ddagger\) Literally "go in any way."

11
territory are not restored (to us). (We desire) that if a woman, married or
unmarried, is enticed away or elopes* to India, or comes to independent territory
from India, such women shall not be demanded on either side. But if a woman
goes from one territory to the other in any manner, both parties should agree to
restore her to her owners.

III.—We have ere this petitioned that Sarwar Khan, son of Muzaffar
Khan of Hangu, should be allowed to live in Kohat, now we again petition
that (Government) kindly permit him to return to his home.

IV.—The entire jirga now present in Peshawar request that the Maliks
of the Khyber† should by any means possible be sent for and reinstated in their
places for the management of their clan.

V.—With reference to the sixth of the printed terms, we beg that the
tribal subsidies be restored with effect from the date on which they were
stopped, because we paid a fine for our misconduct, and since then have been
guilty of no offence.

VI.—With reference to the fourth term, we beg that, when the militia
force is increased (or enlarged) in the Khyber, officers, non-commissioned officers‡
and men be recruited from the Afridi clans, so that their (local) knowledge
may (assist to) make the arrangements complete (satisfactory).

VII.—Since the war the Khyber mills and the cultivated fields and mills
at Ali Masjid have been waste and useless, we beg that compensation may be
given.

VIII.—Whenever a railway is built (or arrangements for a railway made),
we beg that compensation for the land taken up for the line may be given.

IX.—A Mission Hospital has been opened in Peshawar, with reference
to which we represent that the "honour" of Peshawari and Afridi is one
and the same, and in the winter our livelihood is practically half in Peshawar,
and for a woman to go (to this) hospital, no matter for what purpose§ she may go,
is strictly forbidden by our religion; and the religious feelings of all Muham-
madans are the same. Therefore we hope they (the women) may be excused
from going to hospital, or that they may be altogether prevented from going
there, or at least Muhammadan women may be exempted, because Govern-
ment never permits outside interference in religious matters.

X.—Before this all the Afridis jointly petitioned for an increase of the
subsidies of the Kambar Khels and of the Kamrai, so now, too, we beg that the
allowances of these clans may, by the kindness of Government, be increased.

Dated 26th October 1898.

† Refers specially to Khwas and Wali Muhammad Khan, Maliks of the Zakka Khel, whose section
lives in the Khyber Pass.
‡ Sardarun 'ubbdadarun wa sipahiyan.
§ Literally "in whatsoever manner she may go."

No. 212 of 1898.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

Frontier.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, the 17th November 1898.

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's telegram, dated the 7th September 1898, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers cited in the accompanying list regarding the settlement effected with the Khyber Pass Afridis.

We have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) W. S. A. LOCKHART,

" J. WESTLAND.

" M. D. CHALMERS.

" E. H. H. COLLEN.
List of Enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 212 (Frontier), dated the 17th November 1838, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>No. and date of paper</th>
<th>From whom, or to whom</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No. 3176 F., dated the 12th September 1838.</td>
<td>To the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.</td>
<td>Terms to be offered to the Afridis. Suggestions invited as to any directions in matters of detail which may be conveniently included in the instructions to Brigadier-General Egerton and Mr. P. D. Cunningham.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No. 1182, dated the 21st September 1838.</td>
<td>From ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Reply to the foregoing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Telegram, No. 8315 F., dated the 26th September 1838.</td>
<td>To the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade.</td>
<td>Authorises him to summon the jirgas to hear the terms of Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Telegram, No. 158 P., dated the 29th September 1838.</td>
<td>From ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Reports having summoned the jirgas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>No. 163 P., dated the 3rd October 1838, with enclosure.</td>
<td>From ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Translation of the summons issued to the Khyber Afridis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>No. 3453 F., dated the 7th October 1838.</td>
<td>To ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Terms to be announced to the Khyber Afridis, and instructions as to the manner in which their nature and intention should be explained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Telegram, No. 3 P., dated the 24th October 1838.</td>
<td>From the General Officer Commanding, Khyber Brigade, and P. D. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E.</td>
<td>Announcement and explanation of Government terms to the Khyber Afridis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Telegram, No. 6 P., dated the 27th October 1838.</td>
<td>From ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Unconditional acceptance of Government terms,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Telegram, No. 9 P., dated the 3rd November 1838.</td>
<td>From ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>) Allowances for the Kambar Khols and other clans, and dates from which they should be paid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Telegram, No. 10 P., dated the 3rd November 1838.</td>
<td>From ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Orders on Nos. 9 and 10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Telegram, No. 8700 F., dated the 4th November 1838.</td>
<td>To ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Detailed report of their proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>No. 17, dated the 4th November 1838.</td>
<td>From ditto ditto ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sd.) O. V. BOSANQUET,
Offg. Deputy Secy. to the Govt. of India.
Telegram, dated the 16th November 1898.

From—Foreign, Simla,
To—A. F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E., Peshawar.

Please furnish statement showing former Khyber allowances, scale now sanctioned, and amount actually paid in accordance with latter.

Nos. 3828-3829 F., dated Simla, the 17th November 1898 (Confidential).

A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Military Department and Intelligence Branch, for information, in continuation of the office memoranda from the Foreign Department, Nos. 3654-3655 F., dated the 28th October 1898.

No. 3830 F., dated Simla, the 17th November 1898 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing correspondence is forwarded to the Government of the Punjab, for information, in continuation of the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 3480 F., dated the 11th October 1898.
No. 3243 F.

FROM

SIR WILLIAM CUNINGHAM, K.C.S.I.,
Secretary to the Government of India,

To

THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE PUNJAB.

SIMLA, the 19th September 1898.

In my letter No. 3176, dated the 12th September, you were informed that a further communication would be made to you upon the question of the future position of the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division and other matters dealt with in the despatch which that letter forwarded.

2. In the 7th and 8th paragraphs Lord George Hamilton discusses alternative ways in which it has been proposed to carry on relations with the tribes on the Punjab border, and His Lordship states the decision at which Her Majesty's Government have arrived in these words—"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India."

3. Of the two plans, one is the creation of a Frontier Commissionership. Any discussion of this scheme could only be undertaken after careful consideration by the Government of India of the various objections indicated by the Secretary of State himself. The Governor-General in Council accordingly in this letter would primarily invite His Honour's attention to the alternative of making the Commissioner of Peshawar and, through him, his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes, directly subordinate, in respect of such matters, to the Government of India. The practicability of an arrangement of this nature must largely depend on local circumstances and conditions; and it cannot usefully be discussed without information which the Local Government alone can supply. The Governor-General in Council, therefore, desires to be favoured with the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme above indicated.

4. The conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government have come may contemplate the extension of this system of controlling tribal relations to the whole Punjab frontier, but as all the remainder of the paragraph from which the passage above is quoted deals exclusively with the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinates, it would, in the opinion of the Government of India, be convenient to consider this matter first from the point of view of
the Peshawar Commissionership only, and not to provide for re-arrangement of the duties and position of the frontier officers of the Punjab Commission on other parts of the border, further than alterations proposed in the Peshawar Commissionership rendered a reference to others necessary.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient servant,

(Sd.) W. J. CUNINGHAM,

Secretary to the Government of India.
No. 3 C., dated Camp, the 23rd October 1898 (Confidential).

From—The Hon’ble Mr. L. W. Dane, Offg. Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 3243 F., dated 19th ultimo, in which it is intimated that the Governor-General in Council desires to be favoured with the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border can be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government as set forth in the despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 18, dated 5th August 1898.

Punjab Government endorsements Nos. 1211 and 1212, dated the 29th September 1898, forwarding the papers to the Commissioners of the Peshawar and Derajat Divisions and to Mr. H. A. Anderson.

Letter from the Commissioner, Derajat, No. 462, dated the 7th October 1898.

Letter from Mr. H. A. Anderson, No. 1 C., dated the 17th October 1898.

Note by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, dated the 19th October 1898.

2. In compliance with these orders, I am now to submit copies of the documents noted on the margin, and to intimate that the opinions of Sir Richard Udney and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, who was consulted unofficially, will be forwarded on receipt.

Government of India letter No. 3243 F., dated the 19th September 1898.

Nos. 1211-1212, dated Simla, the 29th September 1898.

Endorsed by Punjab Government.

Copy forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, for favour of his very early opinion on the measures discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, Secret, No. 18, dated 5th August 1898, with special reference to the arrangement mentioned by the Government of India in this letter of making the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division directly subordinate to Government of India in regard to his political dealings with the trans-border tribes.

Copy, with copy of Secretary of State's despatch No. 18, dated 5th August 1898, forwarded to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, for favour of his opinion on the suggestions for the future management of the Punjab frontier contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the despatch from Secretary of State, Secret, No. 18, dated 5th August 1898.
[Confidential.]

No. 453, dated Dera Ismail Khan, 7th October 1898.

From—W. R. H. Merr, Esquire, C.S., C.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division,

To—The Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement No. 1212, dated the 29th ultimo, forwarding for opinion a copy of the Government of India, Foreign Department letter noted in the margin, with its enclosure, on the subject of the future management of the Punjab frontier.

2. The matters discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Secretary of State’s despatch No 18 Secret, dated the 5th August 1898, relate primarily to the frontier management of the Peshawar Division and not to that of the Derajat Division. My excuse for submitting an opinion regarding another Division than the one in which I am just at present holding office, is, that my connection with the Peshawar Division commenced 21 years ago, that in the course of that connection I have served in every district of the Division, in the Khaibar and in Kurram, and have occupied every post, from that of Junior Assistant Commissioner in the Division to that of Commissioner.

3. It may serve to explain the position as it at present stands, and help towards appreciating the probable effect of a change in the existing arrangements, if, even at the risk of unduly lengthening this letter, I proceed to give as brief an account as possible of the state of affairs that, with slight and unimportant local modifications which do not affect the question, obtains along the whole line of the Punjab frontier, from Hazara to the Quetta Agency. It is realized that the populations on either side of the boundary line are as closely interwoven and intermingled, socially, commercially and in all the matters of every day life, as are the inhabitants of Nancy and Metz or for the matter of that the people of Berwickshire and Northumberland. Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many thousands of the hillmen regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage, neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured for many generations. In short, there is no impassable gap, or gulf difficult to cross, between British and independent territory; the frontier is in reality only an arbitrary line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous population. That being so, it will be readily understood what an infinity of questions, of disputes and disagreements, of business, arises from the daily intercourse of these people. This business must be settled promptly and with justice, or the peace of the border is endangered; it is business which is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests, as such, are arrayed against each other. And upon the successful administration of the daily business of the frontier it chiefly depends whether, under ordinary circumstances, the border is heard of or not.

But the discharge of local or Imperial business on the border is not the sole duty that falls upon frontier officers by whom I mean Deputy Commissioners and Commissioners. The internal government of the frontier districts is a matter of great moment, and in some districts of exceptional difficulty. I say it is a matter of moment, because I believe that the prosperity and satisfaction of our trans-Indus subjects reacts strongly upon the men beyond the border, and that discontent within the frontier enhances the dislike of the clans to come under our control and influence and gives a handle to those who preach fanaticism and inculcate hostility. Of the six frontier districts in the Punjab: Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, the district of Peshawar is in some respects pre-eminently the most difficult to manage of all in the Province; the revenue and irrigation systems are exceedingly complex and intricate;
crime is of the gravest nature; and the population is exceptionally headstrong, fanatical, excitable and intractable. Next in degree with similar general features, comes Bannu. And, excluding Kohat, I think that the five frontier districts, leaving border matters for the moment out of consideration, call for administrative qualifications and capacity above the average which is requisite for Cis-Indus districts. This is undoubtedly so in the cases of Peshawar, Bannu, Hazara; and I think of Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan also.

4. Turning now to the machinery which works the external and internal business of the frontier divisions and districts, it will be seen that the whole of the Punjab border tribes are already in the immediate and direct charge of officers who have large liberty of action and perfect leisure for personal intercourse with them, who can devote all their time and energy to the specific end of tribal management. To look after one-half of the border clans, special officers exist, appointed ad hoc. The tribes of Swat and the Utman Khel are in charge of the Political Agent, Dir and Swat; the Political Officer in the Khairab attends to nearly the whole of the Afridi tribe, to the Mullagoris and some Mohmands; the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram deals with the Zinamshib tribe, with several clans of the Orakzais and with the Chamkannis; the Political Officers of Northern and Southern Waziristan between them administer the whole trans-frontier population from the Kohat to the Dera Ghazi Khan District. The fact is, if we exclude the Biluch tribes of the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier who are, as regards border management, in another category altogether from the Pathan tribes, two-thirds to three-fourths of the frontier is already in the hands of special officers who have no other functions, except perhaps the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram, than those of tribal management. These officers, excluding the Political Agent on the Malakand who reports direct to the Government of India, are directly subordinate to the Commissioners of their respective Divisions. In matters affecting districts they correspond with the Deputy Commissioners or with the Commandants of Border Military Police, as may be most convenient in each case. Where we have not crossed the boundary of British India, and consequently have not been obliged to create political charges that are independent of Deputy Commissioners, the maintenance of friendly relations with the border tribes, the exercise of such control over them as is feasible and expedient, and the settlement of the business, which I have sketched above, arising out of the daily intercourse and transactions of the people within and without the frontier line, is entrusted to the Commandants of Border Military Police, under the general control and supervision of Deputy Commissioners. These Commandants, one of whom is appointed to each one of the six frontier districts, who are European or Native Officers, as the case may be (generally European in the more important districts), have the fullest leisure and opportunity for cultivating relations with the clans and for managing the hill men. That is their métier. In the discharge of their duties they are served by, and make every use of, the large establishments of Border Military Police in each district whose work consists quite as much of intercourse with the tribes as of watch and ward on the border.

Important matters and questions which the Commandants cannot dispose of are referred to the Deputy Commissioners, under whose general orders, supervision and control are also the Border Military Police establishments; and similarly, whenever necessary by Deputy Commissioners and by the special Political Officers whom I have mentioned above, to Commissioners. And this is as it should be. I have explained how and why in the districts external control over them as is feasible and expedient, and the settlement of the business, which I have sketched above, arising out of the daily intercourse and transactions of the people within and without the frontier line, is entrusted to the Commandants of Border Military Police, under the general control and supervision of Deputy Commissioners. These Commandants, one of whom is appointed to each one of the six frontier districts, who are European or Native Officers, as the case may be (generally European in the more important districts), have the fullest leisure and opportunity for cultivating relations with the clans and for managing the hill men. That is their métier. In the discharge of their duties they are served by, and make every use of, the large establishments of Border Military Police in each district whose work consists quite as much of intercourse with the tribes as of watch and ward on the border.

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the rank of Commissioner, he is well known to, and has a thorough personal
knowledge and acquaintance with, the jirgas and clansmen, acquired during the
period when as Assistant Commissioner, or Political Officer, or in charge of the
Border Military Police, and as Deputy Commissioner, he has had constant and
daily dealings with them. To my mind, the present system ensures the requisite
amount of touch between the senior officers and the clans, without sacrificing
any of the respect and awe which the hillmen should entertain for relatively high
office. On the other hand, the officers actually in charge of them have nothing
else to do than to deal with them I cannot help thinking that the feeling that
officers are not now in touch with the clans as they were formerly is based on a
misconception. The officers in charge of the tribesmen are very much more in
touch with them than they were before or after the Mutiny. It will be
remembered that in the early days of the Punjab there were neither special
Political Officers nor Commandants of Border Military Police; the Deputy
Commissioners had to do everything themselves, and I find as early as 1850
Reynell Taylor, in a note regarding the Derajat frontier which he wrote for the
benefit of his successor Nicholson, lamenting the loss of opportunities for mixing
with the tribesmen, owing to increased work. Great as was the task accomplished
by those men, they tolerated and performed to tolerate a condition of things,
insecurity within the border and trouble upon it, at which we, of the present day,
would be horrified. This defect in the earlier administration has been recognized
and remedied by the appointment of special tribal officers, in every district of the
two frontier divisions and at five trans-frontier localities (Malakand, Khabar,
Kurram, Tochi, and Waia); that is to say of eleven officers whose sole duty is
frontier management.

5. Before considering the effect of the changes contemplated in the
system of frontier management, I would venture to point out, first, that all and
every matter, I think I am correct in saying, of Imperial interest on the border,
however small it may be, is instantly referred by the Punjab Government for the
information and orders of the Government of India; and that no measure or step
whatever which is of general bearing or of any importance in border policy, no
organic change of any kind, is undertaken by the Local Government without the
previous sanction and concurrence of the Supreme Government. This has been
so since 1882, if not from an earlier time. To all intents and purposes, therefore,
the Punjab frontier is as already as much under the Government of India as if
Commissioners reported on frontier matters direct to that Government. The
elimination of the Punjab Government will, however, have a profound effect in
other ways which I will submit further on.

The other point to which I would invite attention is that, save in matters
of the purest routine, the Commissioner of Peshawar can hardly be said to
correspond direct with the Government of India. So far as I know the affairs of
the Khabar Pass have never been directed by the Government of India through
the Commissioner omitting the Punjab Government. Since 1881, and I think
practically for the past 20 years, the duties of the Commissioner in connection
with the Government of India have consisted of reporting to that Government
(generally by the same telegram in which the Commissioner reports to the
Punjab Government) the occurrence of any serious border event; and of
transmitting to Kabul urgent communications intended for the Amir and
telegraphed to Peshawar, and similarly of telegraphing to the Government of India
the contents of urgent letters from the Amir. He also occasionally arranges for
the transit of employment or goods belonging to the Amir. In fact, so purely
ministerial is this branch of his duties that during his absence from Peshawar the
Deputy Commissioner performs them. His present position therefore in respect
of serving two masters, if it can be so described, is utterly different from that
which is contemplated for the future. I do not think he can be said ever to have
been under two masters. In the early days of the Punjab, the medium for the
execution of the Imperial policy in regard to Afghanistan was the Lieutenant-
Governor of the Punjab, who naturally employed the Commissioner of Peshawar,
e. g., in the negotiations and correspondence which preceded the Afghan treaty
of 1856, concluded by Sir J. Lawrence. Subsequently, the work of the Com-
misssioner in connection with the Government of India was confined to translating
and transmitting the Kabul correspondence and supplying news; I remember just before the Afghan war that this work devolved upon Sir L. Cavagnari, then Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar; and since then, the Commissioner's duty direct under the Supreme Government has been always purely ministerial it appears, and in no way administrative.

6. At first sight the proposed alterations in the system of frontier management seem to affect no appreciable change in the present arrangements: there are the special tribal officers already at hand: the frontier is already practically under the Government of India, the elimination of the Punjab Government will accelerate the transit of orders and the receipt of reports, and the whole difference in the conduct of affairs apparently will be almost nominal. But if we go into the matter, it seems to me that there are very great difficulties in the way; in practice if not in theory. These I will now submit:

7. It is not a question on which I can venture to offer an opinion, whether the Government of India ought or ought not to deprive itself of the weight, the experience, the knowledge, the long training, of the Punjab Government in matters concerning the border tribes. It is suggested that the Commissioner of Peshawar will send copies of his reports to the Local Government, and no doubt copies of letters from the Government of India to the Commissioner would similarly be communicated to the Local Government. But this is a very different thing from what obtains now; from the beginning the Lieutenant-Governor has personal knowledge of a case, if it is of any importance he has probably discussed it with the local officers, he has gathered information on all points which are obscure or have been neglected, in short he is in a position to form a full and carefully weighed judgment. Precluded from personal discussion with officers on the spot and from eliciting information, and confined to an opinion upon papers drawn up without the Lieutenant-Governor's intervention, it is inevitable that the views of the Local Government will not possibly have the great intrinsic value that they now possess, and that the Lieutenant-Governor will drift farther and farther from touch with the border. Yet, seeing that local officers can not avoid as a rule dealing with matters solely from a local point of view, that they are in the heat of a question with a dispassionate mind and yet to speak, the opinion and judgment of a high officer of State who approaches the consideration of a question with a dispassionate mind and yet with local knowledge, who looks at it from a broad standpoint that embraces the whole frontier and yet is not wholly centred in the frontier, and who moreover has full leisure and opportunity for going into these matters, on the spot, must be of inestimable value to the Supreme Government. Moreover, is it unavoidable that the local officers will be deprived of the benefit of personal communications with their Government. To this benefit I think due weight is not always given, it is a factor of great importance in administration. It is of course practicable for a Commissioner to visit Simla or Calcutta, but of necessity the occasions for doing so must be far more rare, and the meetings will be of a different character from those that take place when the Lieutenant-Governor marches along the frontier, or officers go to Lahore. The element of personal supervision on the spot and of personal influence on part of the governing authority must disappear, unless the Commissioner is raised to, or almost to, the position of the Lieutenant-Governor. But even then the Commissioner's views will necessarily be narrower and more circumscribed than those of the Local Government, possibly also less prudent and circumspect.

8. If the Commissioner of Peshawar is appointed by the Government of India, it is almost impossible that there should not be difficulty arising from the then divergent interests of the Supreme and of the Local Government. The Government of India will then want the best frontier officer it can get, on the other hand the Lieutenant-Governor must think of the internal administration of the frontier divisions of revenue, police, crime, &c., &c.; it does not follow that a good Political Officer has good administrative abilities, or vice versa; and it will not be easy for both Governments to unite upon the same choice. Moreover, the Commissioner is only one man, he can not work without his subordinate staff in each district, and the dual control will and must run through the whole
administrative establishment. The Commissioner will emphatically serve two
masters (which he does not do now) and where the head of the administration
is under dual control, the body must necessarily follow. I do not see how under
those circumstances, men being what they are, a break down can be escaped.

9. I have explained that there is a mass of daily business transacted in
connection with the border management of districts, with the political charges
and their administrations, with the border establishments, &c., this is all disposed
of by the local officers under the orders of the Local Government. What that
amounts to, a glance at the printed and manuscript Foreign Proceedings of the
Punjab Government will show. The whole, or very nearly the whole of this,
ever reaches the Government of India. If the Punjab Government is dissociated
from frontier management, it is plain that the Commissioner must be raised to
the position and powers of a Local Government, on the analogy of the Agent
Governor-General at Quetta, otherwise this burden of detail will devolve upon
the Supreme Government which would obviously be undesirable.

10. This brings me to the last difficulty. It is suggested that the tribal
officers should not be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under
the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion, it is evidently
anticipated that the rank and pay of the Commissioner may have to be raised (and
if my conclusions in the preceding paragraph are correct, they will have to be raised
very considerably), and concessions made to his subordinates. As a frontier
officer myself, I should welcome anything that adds to the inducements and
attractions of service on the frontier. Compared with what I remember 20 years
ago, there is a reluctance to cross the Indus among the junior officers. The
reasons are not far to seek. In former days rapid promotion compensated for the
responsibilities, hardships, discomfort, unhealthiness, solitude and actual danger
of frontier service which conditions still remain; but Mackeson, Ross, Edwardes,
Reynell Taylor, James, Becher, Pollock, Macnab, Monro were all substantive
Commissioners within 20 years of entering the Punjab Commission and often in
advance of their contemporaries Cis-Indus. Of later years, however, promotion
has gone in due course and men weighing their future, naturally, prefer to remain
where life is easier and where their chances of a Commissionership are equal, and
some of them may moreover rise to the higher appointments from which frontier
officers are in practice debarred; at any rate to which only two officers from the
frontier have attained in 50 years. But I am afraid nothing will reconcile officers
to spending their whole service at Wana, in the Tochi, in several of the worst
districts trans-Indus, or even in Kurram and on the Malakand, if that is what
is meant by men not being subject to removal. They are willing enough to
spend some years under arduous and trying conditions, but I do not think any
prospects we could hold out would tempt the stamp of man we want, to serve
permanently in some of these frontier charges. In the interests of Govern-
ment, it is not advisable to keep men too long in any particular post. The
majority of the frontier stations are far too unhealthy for prolonged residence,
save in cases of exceptional physique or adaptability to the climate. A change
from time to time is healthy to all concerned.

With a minute service, such as the proposed class of officers will be, it is
difficult to understand how it will be feasible to arrange for proper promotion.
If the Commissioner of Peshawar in future has higher pay and rank than other
Commissioners, say than the Financial Commissioner also, where is he to go to ?
Unless the Government of India are prepared to open high political appointments
for him, he must remain where he is till he retires since there is no further place
for him in the Punjab and a transfer to another Division will operate as a penalty.
It may so happen that an officer obtains the post at a comparatively early stage
in his career; if so, his juniors will be hopelessly blocked. Or the man next to
him may be a relatively young officer, in that case all below him must stagnate.
Ease in regulating promotion varies in proportion to the size of a service, and
with the dozen or at the most two dozen officers who will compose this special
frontier service, it is certain that very soon insuperable difficulties of promotion
will arise. Additions to pay will not suffice, for men want variety of work after
a time. Nor will it be possible to utilize them elsewhere, since after a man has
spent 10 to 15 of the best years of his life on special work, he becomes an expert in that particular line, and experts are rarely fit for other duty, than in their own sphere. Altogether, however desirable it is to attract and to retain the best type of officer for the difficult task of tribal management, on the principal that the best system of administration that can be devised, is made or marred by its personnel, I fear the specialization of the frontier service will result in grave difficulties, unless indeed all frontier officers are included in the political service, but this is apparently not intended and would be going far beyond the scope of the present scheme which is to place officers of the Punjab Commission jointly under the Supreme and the Punjab Government.

11. On the whole, I venture to conclude, that the scheme discussed in the Secretary of State's despatch virtually is already in existence, but without those obstacles to the successful working of the frontier administration which I apprehend from the modifications suggested. The frontier tribes are already under the Government of India and eleven special tribal officers are already at work everywhere. The recent frontier troubles were not, I submit, the consequence of the present arrangements. One might otherwise argue with equal justice that because they started in the Tochi and culminated on the Malakand and in the Khaibar, all of which are distinct political units under special officers, therefore it is a mistake to place officers in exclusive political charge of trans-frontier tribes, whereas the contrary is the case.
From—H. A. Anderson, Esq., Officiating Commissioner, Derajat Division (on leave),
To—The Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I have the honour to submit the opinion on the suggestions for the future management of the Punjab frontier contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the despatch of the Secretary of State, Secret, No. 18, dated August 5th, 1898, called for in your endorsement No. 1212, dated September 29th, 1898. The proposal contained in paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch is that the Commissioner, Peshawar, and through him his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India. The Government of India in forwarding the despatch ask for information as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme proposed by the Secretary of State.

2. I apprehend that practical suggestions for carrying the Secretary of State's proposal into effect are what is asked for in this reference. At the same time as the question is admittedly one of considerable practical difficulty, and as it is not easy to make suggestions for carrying the new scheme into effect without pointing out and considering the difficulties which are involved in the change in system, I consider myself justified in briefly indicating some of these difficulties. As a Punjab frontier officer who has spent his service under the old system, it is difficult to approach the question without prejudice, but I shall attempt to examine the question with impartiality.

3. The first point calling for remark in the Secretary of State's statement of the scheme contained in paragraph 8 of his despatch is the assumption that something similar to what is now proposed is already in existence, namely, that the Commissioner of Peshawar in a large measure serves two masters in times of peace. That the Commissioner of Peshawar discharges any administrative functions under the orders of the Government of India is, I believe, not the fact. He is the servant exclusively of the Punjab Government, through whom he receives the orders of the Government of India. He is the medium through whom a certain amount of urgent communications between the Government of India and the Amir of Kabul passes, but in this connection he is a translator and conveyer of letters only. The system which it is now proposed to introduce is an entirely new one. It has not been tried before, and it is not correct to claim for it the prestige of a tried and proved success.

4. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, as things now are, frequently visits and tours along the frontier. He is in close contact with frontier affairs and frontier officers. He is able to acquaint himself personally on the spot with what is passing on the frontier. At the same time he is by his experience, training and position as the head of the Punjab administration, able to form dispassionate judgments on difficult questions, and give invaluable advice on all questions of policy. There can be no doubt, I think, that one effect of the proposed change of system will be that the matured judgment and advice of the Lieutenant-Governor will not be so available on trans-frontier questions as it now is. This, I should think, will be a loss to the Government of India: it will certainly be a severe loss to the Commissioner of Peshawar.

5. A strong objection has been taken to the scheme under discussion on the ground that the Commissioner of Peshawar would be in the position of serving two masters, and the control of affairs on the British side of the border would be divorced from the control of affairs on the further side. No doubt it
is difficult for one man to serve two masters of equal status and authority, and the difficulty would be enormously enhanced if these two masters followed opposite or divergent policies. In the present case, however, the two masters stand in the relation of supreme and subordinate, and the policy of the latter must subordinate itself to the policy of the former. The proposed arrangement would no doubt give rise to difficulties, but it does not appear to me to be impracticable. As regards the divorce of control mentioned above, it is no doubt true that the population in parts of the border is homogeneous within and without; relations between cis-border and trans-border tribes are intimate and the spheres of control must cross at points. It is practicable, however, in most matters to draw a fixed line between trans-border and cis-border affairs and cases, and as one officer will have direct control of both, it is my opinion, though I state it with all deference, that the Commissioner of Peshawar being an officer of the Punjab Commission could, without serious difficulty, exercise his control over trans-border tribes under the direct orders of the Government of India, while at the same time administering cis-border tribes and districts under the direct orders of the Punjab Government.

6. It is suggested in connection with the new scheme that arrangements should be made, whereby officers who are entrusted with the duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes should have ample leisure for personal intercourse with them. This is no doubt most desirable, but there are now special Political Officers along the whole frontier who have the desired leisure for full and free intercourse with the tribes, and who are little encumbered with the regular work of district officials. So far as my experience goes, there is little left to be done now in this direction.

7. It is also suggested that the political staff which has to deal with trans-border tribes should not be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution. It has been the practice of the Punjab Government of recent years to keep its frontier staff on or across the frontier, to restrict the frontier Commissionerships to frontier officers, and to discourage transfers to non-frontier districts. Service, however, on and across the frontier is not generally popular for various reasons. It is difficult now to induce officers to serve for any length of time across the border. They will be still less willing to serve if they experience stagnation in promotion which will surely follow the introduction of the proposal now suggested. I do not think that the Government could go much further in this direction than the Punjab Government have gone in the past.

8. I pass now to the consideration of the advantages of the new scheme. The Commissioner of Peshawar in the first place as the only intermediate authority between the tribesmen and the Supreme Government will under the scheme gain a greatly enhanced status in the eyes of the former, and this will increase his power and influence with them and will render them more amenable to his control. The Pathans have an intimate acquaintance with our administrative grades, and will fully understand the difference between an officer who is in direct communication with and who acts directly under the orders of the Government of India, and an officer of the Provincial Government. They will have more respect for the former in virtue of his superior authority and more independent position. This seems to me a very important consideration when weighing the merits and demerits of the new scheme.

9. There can be no doubt, I think, that the new system will save much correspondence, as the Commissioner of Peshawar will correspond direct with the Government of India. It will also reduce discussion in the disposal of questions which are not of first-rate importance and accelerate the introduction of any changes which the Government of India may consider it desirable to introduce in prosecution of its present policy of extending our influence over the trans-border tribes. Moreover, it is obvious that under the proposed arrangement the Government of India will exercise a more direct control over the external relations of the trans-frontier tribes than it has hitherto
exercised. On the Peshawar border these relations are intimately involved with our relations with the Amir of Kabul and other Chiefs; it is an argument in favour of the new scheme that it will bring all these relations more directly under one Imperial control.

10. It will also be an advantage, I think, for the Commissioner to be directly under the Supreme Government in connection with other departments such, for example, as the Military Department. It will strengthen his hands in dealing with matters, such as the employment of the military forces in support of the Political Officers in checking raids and promoting peace and order. At present all such matters have to follow a very circuitous channel before anything is done, and it is desirable to shorten this channel.

11. It will be seen from the views expressed above that while the new scheme seems to me open to serious objections, it at the same time has certain advantages. The Secretary of State points out that, in giving practical effect to the scheme, it will be necessary to make a change in the status of the Commissioner of Peshawar. It will be necessary, I consider, to considerably enhance the status of the Commissioner as regards trans-frontier affairs. He must be empowered to dispose of many matters which he has now to refer for orders to the Punjab Government. To enable him to have as wide a view as possible of what is passing across the frontier of the division, it will be advisable to place under his control the Chitral and Dir Agency and the relations with the tribes under that Agency. His status would advantageously be raised to something like that of the Governor-General's Agent for Baluchistan as regards trans-frontier affairs. This arrangement need not, I think, interfere with his status as Commissioner under the Punjab Government as regards the districts and tribes of the Peshawar Division which may remain as it is. The position of the Commissioner of Peshawar will thus become one of great responsibility, and much additional work will be thrown on his shoulders. A considerable increase in his salary must accompany the enhancement of his status, and no doubt he will require the assistance of a Personal Assistant to assist him in the disposal of much of his routine work.
NOTE BY SIR MACKWORTH YOUNG, K.C.S.I., LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF THE PUNJAB.

I am asked for my opinion as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her Majesty's Government in the despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 18, dated 5th August 1898, and as to the changes in system which would be entailed by giving effect to the scheme therein indicated. The scheme is thus described in the despatch: "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." And, in directing my attention to this scheme, the Government of India further define it to consist in "making the Commissioner of Peshawar and, through him, his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes directly subordinate, in respect of such matters, to the Government of India."

2. The objection to such an arrangement put forward by the Government of India, viz., that it "would put the Commissioner of Peshawar in the position of serving two masters and would divorce the control of affairs on the British side of the border from the control of affairs on the further side, while the two directing authorities would work through the same officer," is held to be formal rather than substantial, and it is argued that the Commissioner of Peshawar even now serves two masters in times of peace, while on various occasions of frontier disturbances he has corresponded direct with the Government of India.

3. The main ground of dissatisfaction with the present system appears from the passages above quoted to be that the Punjab Government is interposed between the authority of the Government of India and that of the Political Officers on the Punjab frontier. Further grounds for this dissatisfaction appear to be based upon the opinion that the officers entrusted with the delicate and difficult duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes have not sufficient liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and cannot devote much time and patience to these special objects; that they can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials, and that it is inconvenient that they should be subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion.

4. It is above all things necessary in a question involving such important issues that the facts should be correctly understood, and before going any further I find it necessary to state, with the utmost deference, that the passages above quoted seem to me to indicate several misconceptions as to the facts. I may draw attention, with reference to this subject, to the opinions stated in an article of "The Times" of 23rd August last, for which high authority was claimed, but which have been shown to be based upon similar misconceptions. The most important of these opinions were traversed in an excellent letter signed "Expertus" which appeared in a later issue about 13th September. I regret that, owing to the necessity for replying at an early date to the reference from the Government of India, it has been impossible for me to obtain in time the opinions of several officers of extended frontier experience, but I have received an able letter from Mr. Merk, C.S.I., well known to the Government of India as a distinguished frontier officer who, though at present officiating as Commissioner of the Derajat Division, has been for 21 years almost continuously employed in the Peshawar Division, and who is intimately acquainted with the administration of that frontier and with the races, customs, languages and locations of its various inhabitants. I invite a careful perusal of his excellent paper, which also brings out several of the misconceptions to which I have alluded.
5. I shall now, in order to be as brief as possible, make definite statements relating to the matters on which, as it seems to me, misconception exists—

First.—The position which the Commissioner of Peshawar occupies or has from time to time occupied bears no resemblance to that which he would occupy under the present proposal. It is true that the Government of India communicate direct with the Commissioner of Peshawar in regard to matters relating to the Amir. I draw attention, however, to Mr. Merk’s remark that “so purely ministerial is this branch of his duties that during his absence from Peshawar the Deputy Commissioner performs them.” To this I may add that, except in regard to the collection and formulating of information regarding the affairs of Afghanistan—in fact, compiling his weekly diary—the duty performed by the Commissioner in this respect consists mainly of translating and forwarding letters between the Government of India and the Amir. But the most noteworthy fact in connection with this subject is that these duties have very little connection with the administration of the border, and do not involve the employment of the services of any other officer under the orders of the Punjab Government. The orders communicated direct to the Commissioner of Peshawar with reference to the Amir do not, as a matter of fact, relate to any questions with which the Punjab Government and the officers serving under it are directly concerned, and no possibility of conflict can arise so long as the Commissioner corresponds with the Government of India direct only on such matters. I shall show later on how different would be the effect of placing the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinates in direct relation with the Government of India in respect of border management. For the present it is sufficient to state that there is no analogy between the two cases, and that the employment of the Commissioner of Peshawar in the manner above described affords no precedent for the success of the proposal to control the trans-frontier tribes through officers under the orders of the Punjab Government without the intervention of that Government, unless it can be shown that the management of the trans-frontier tribes has no connection with the management of the British border. I deal with this question further on—(paragraphs 10–11).

6. Second.—It is not the fact that on various occasions of frontier disturbances the Commissioner of Peshawar has corresponded direct with the Government of India. I cannot find any instance of this. The Commissioner of Peshawar, as will be explained hereafter (paragraph 14), has to submit certain information on urgent matters direct to the Government of India; but I cannot discover that he has ever corresponded direct with the Government of India, otherwise than as provided in the orders on that subject.

7. Third.—Speaking generally, it is a fact that the frontier officers who are entrusted with the duty of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, have large liberty of action and leisure for personal intercourse with them, and are able to devote much time and patience to these special objects. It is notorious that the two frontier Commissionerships of Peshawar and the Derajat are far the lightest worked in the province. In the reorganisation scheme of 1884, when the number of cis-Indus Commissionerships was reduced, and the number of districts included in them increased, the Peshawar Commissionership, notwithstanding that the Commissioner was relieved of sessions work, was not enlarged, and only one district was added to the Derajat charge. The number of districts in each Commissionership is now as follows:—

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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Districts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derajat</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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Since 1884 the following outlying political charges have been added; Kurram in 1892 to Peshawar, and Tochi and Wano in 1895 to the Derajat, but this does not seriously affect the proposition that the two frontier Commissioners...
have ample leisure for political work. Their communications on the questions which arise in connection with border politics have always been full and well considered. From long experience of the subject, I maintain that no branch of work entrusted to Commissioners is more efficiently performed. Whenever their personal presence or supervision has been required for interviewing jirgas on special occasions or for watching the development of trans-frontier events, their services have been freely available. There is absolutely no ground for the idea that they have insufficient leisure for patient dealing with trans-frontier tribes, though it is by no means always desirable that an officer of the standing of a Commissioner should personally interview the jirgas. I am not sure that I understand the desire of the Secretary of State that Political Officers on the frontier should have large liberty of action, but I apprehend that what is meant is that they should not be hampered by other duties, not that their power of independent action should be increased. The latter would be quite inconsistent with the centralisation of authority implied in the present proposals. In the earlier days of Punjab Administration, Frontier Commissioners undoubtedly enjoyed large liberty of action, but trans-border politics having become matters of Imperial concern, this liberty has of necessity been curtailed.

8. Passing from Commissioners to Deputy Commissioners and Political Officers, there is perhaps something, though still very little, to be said for the position that local Political Officers have not always sufficient leisure for tribal management. As pointed out by Mr. Merk, two-thirds to three-fourths of the Punjab frontier is in the hands of officers who have nothing else to do. The Political Agent, Dir and Swat, already under the direct orders of the Government of India, is of course an instance of the system desired by the Secretary of State, and the remarks regarding want of leisure, &c., do not apply to him. But apart from him the Political Officer in the Khyber and the Political Officers in the Tochi and at Wano are solely engaged in tribal management, while the administrative duties of the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram are not so onerous as to hamper him in his discharge of the same duty. The creation of these appointments, all within the last 18 years and most of them within the last 8 years, has had the effect of reducing the responsibilities for tribal management attaching to the Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dora Ismail Khan. The power to appoint an additional District Magistrate for districts to which the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1887, applies, conferred upon the Local Government by Section 5 of that Regulation, was designed to lighten the work of the Deputy Commissioner and set him more free for political duties. With the same object the strength of the staff in frontier districts has from time to time been carefully revised by the Local Government, and special officers have been appointed to the command of the Border Military Police in several frontier districts. The Deputy Commissioners of Hazara and Kohat have ample leisure for their political duties. The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar has an onerous charge, but he has few political duties left. Buner, the Khudu Khel and Gaduns are managed by the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the sub-division of Yusufzai; Swat and the Utman Khel, except the Laman Utman Khel, a small section, are in the hands of the Political Agent for Dir and Swat; the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber corresponds direct with the Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner is not concerned with its political management; and the tribes of the Kohat Pass are managed by the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat. The only tribes which remain under the control of the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar are the Mohmands on the north-west, and on the south-west the Aka Khel Afridis and the Hassan Khel section and two other small sub-sections of the Adam Khel. As regards the Mohmands proposals have been made for transferring them to the Political Officer in charge of the Khyber, and probably this should be done when the Khyber settlement is completed. During recent years, while the settlement with the Mohmands was in progress, the work was largely done by the Commissioner in person. The charge of the Peshawar district is undoubtedly quite enough for one officer, and the attention of the Punjab Government has long been directed to the necessity
for relieving him of political work or of strengthening his hands in the district administration, so as to permit of his giving more time to such work. The measures taken have been to a great extent effectual. What remains to be done is only a matter of time and thought. It is possible that, if the political management of the Mohmands had last year been in the hands of an officer with more leisure than the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, he might have succeeded in persuading the Commissioner of Peshawar that a raid on Shabkadar was imminent, though I am not inclined to attribute our unpreparedness to his being overworked. Be this as it may, I am prepared to admit that the political management of the Mohmands is a matter which requires further consideration in connection with the settlement of the Khyber Pass, and any redistribution of political functions which may result from the present correspondence. And if the Secretary of State or the Government of India consider that the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar or any other frontier Deputy Commissioner requires further relief to enable him to bestow more time upon the management of the tribes on his border, I shall be quite prepared to make proposals with this object, but such proposals would necessarily involve considerable extra expense, which the Provincial Government would not be in a position to meet without assistance.

9. I do not enter into details regarding the districts of the Derajat, as this is not desired by the Government of India, but in regard to the Peshawar Commissionership I am decidedly of opinion that, with the exception perhaps of the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar whose onerous duties have long engaged and will continue to engage the attention of the Punjab Government, there is no foundation for the conclusion that the local Political Officers have not ample leisure for tribal management.

10. The fourth statement that I make is this—

The duty of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes is inseparable from that of managing the tracts within the British border. The grounds for this statement are so well put by Mr. Merk that I reproduce his words:

"Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many thousands of the hillmen regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half the year on this side and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage, neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured for many generations. In short, there is no impassable gap or gulf, difficult to cross, between British and independent territory; the frontier is in reality only an arbitrary line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous population. That being so, it will be readily understood what an infinity of questions, of disputes and disagreements, of business, arises from the daily intercourse of these people. This business must be settled promptly and with justice, or the peace of the border is endangered; it is business which is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests, as such, are arrayed against each other. And upon the successful administration of the daily business of the frontier it chiefly depends whether, under ordinary circumstances, the border is heard of or not."

11. There are tracts in regard to which separate political charges have been framed to which the above remarks apply only to a minor degree. But they apply with special force to the whole of the Peshawar and Kohat border from the Malakand to the Kurram, including the Khyber Pass and the Afridi and Orakzai tribes. The political management of the last named tribes is closely bound up with the management of the British border. And, although there are tracts in regard to which the position is less clear, this is more or less true all along the border. And Mr. Merk touches the point when he says that the business which arises in consequence of the close connection between the people on either side of the border is quite distinct from the Imperial questions in which British and independent interests are arrayed against each other. There are numerous references in regard to such matters in which a decision of the Local Government may be called for, but a pronouncement of the Foreign Department of the Government of India would be unnecessary and out of place. In short, a great deal of our management of the trans-boundary tribes is carried on in the daily course of border administration, and it is not expedient that it should be magnified into a Foreign Office
question. On the other hand, the separation of the trans-frontier aspect of many questions now disposed of by our frontier officers is impossible. This was fully realised by Lord Lytton when proposing the creation of a Frontier Chief Commissionership, in the words: * “Mixed up as are the tribes within and beyond our border, he (the Chief Commissioner) must evidently have charge of the immediate frontier districts as well as of all our trans-frontier relations. I confidently affirm the inseparable connection of portions of British territory with trans-frontier tracts and the necessity of entrusting the control of both to the same local officer.”

12. My fifth statement is—

That frontier officers in the Punjab have been much less liable to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion than other officers of the Punjab Commission; and that a special service constituted with the object of furnishing officers solely for controlling the trans-frontier tribes would be a failure. I do not suppose that the above proposition will be seriously challenged. The writer of the article in “The Times” of 23rd August, in support of his assertions that frontier officers are now frequently changed, that they are no longer specially selected for frontier work, and that the ablest of them look upon such work as to them an occupation 

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<td>Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I.</td>
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Those officers, all of them bearing the marks of approved service in the decorations they have earned, are undoubtedly the best men that the Punjab had to give for the office of Commissioner of Peshawar. That their names should have been cited by “The Times” writer in support of his extraordinary assertions seems to me singularly unfortunate for his argument. I should not have gone out of my way to deal with this instance, but that I am at a loss to find any ground for what is implied in the suggestion contained in the Secretary of State’s despatch that it will not be found convenient that the officers entrusted with the duties of maintaining friendly relations with, and control over, the trans-frontier tribes, should be “subject to removal or transfer to other appointments under the ordinary exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion.” The officers employed on the Punjab frontier are very rarely moved to charges in the interior of the province when they have once established their reputation as frontier officers. I think I may say that the only circumstances under which such transfers have been made are those which relate to the health of the officer or some other disqualification for frontier service. On the other hand, it will, I think, be readily admitted that a small service is difficult to man properly; that the pick of a large Commission is likely to be far superior to the best outturn of a limited number of specialists, and that a small corps of Punjab frontier politicals would not be in any respect a success. I am not arguing here against a Frontier Commission large enough to deal with a considerable tract of British territory added to the control of trans-frontier tribes, nor against a Department of the Foreign Office with a political contingent forming part of the political service; but a limited service of a dozen or even two dozen politicals recruited ad hoc to be retained ad hoc, and to be precluded from transfer otherwise than on promotion to higher spheres.
under the orders of the Government of India, would be a thorn in the side of the latter and is doomed to failure. And it may, I think, be confidently asserted that the best field for selecting Punjab frontier officers is the Punjab Commission, and that, while as hitherto it is desirable that transfers from the interior of the province to the frontier and vice versa in the higher grades of the Commission should be sparingly made, it would be undesirable to separate the two services in such a manner as to preclude transfers, where they are manifestly for the advantage of the public service.

13. I have thus endeavoured to clear away what I cannot but regard as misconceptions in respect of the existing state of affairs, and I now crave permission to say a few words regarding the Secretary of State's proposals. The first and most prominent feature of those proposals is the elimination of the Punjab Government in the chain of correspondence in regard to trans-frontier management between the Punjab local frontier officers and the Government of India. It is proposed to put the subordinates of the Local Government into direct communication with the Supreme Government on this subject. The advantage of this change is not stated, but I think I may assume that the main object is to get rid of what is rightly or wrongly held to be a good deal of time on the work of the Commission should be sparingly made, it would be undesirable to rate the two services in such a manner as to preclude transfers, where they are manifestly for the advantage of the public service.

I need not say much on the value of the opinion of an officer in the position of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on questions relating to the control of the trans-frontier tribes. It is for the Government of India to estimate the value of such an opinion. As remarked by "Expertus," the exclusion of the Punjab Government from all share in the frontier administration would undoubtedly simplify matters in two ways, viz., by abridging discussion and removing opposition to forward movements, and by doing away with the supervision and control which the Lieutenant-Governor, who spends a good deal of time on the frontier and is in close contact with frontier affairs, now exercises. Whether the results of this simplification would be good or bad, I leave others to say. Although these remarks were directed to the proposal to separate the frontier entirely from the Punjab Government, they deserve, I submit, respectful consideration with reference to the proposal to control the trans-frontier tribes without the advice of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

14. The second objection to the proposal is that as above stated the management of trans-frontier tribes is so much mixed up with that of the adjoining British frontier that their complete separation is impossible. Thus many matters will be reported direct to the Government of India which affect the responsibility of the Local Government, but in regard to which the Local Government will have no voice. This is to my mind absolutely fatal to the scheme. I do not think the inconvenience and impossibility of the arrangement would be fully apparent for some time, as the frontier officers of experience would retain for some time their old ideas of subordination to the Local Government, but a few years would, I feel sure, be sufficient to reveal its impossibility. The Lieutenant-Governor will find his authority over the frontier districts impaired and will be of little assistance to the Government of India in the task which will have devolved upon it. In support of this view I appeal to opinions held on previous occasions with reference to the same

* Foreign Department No. 1271 P., dated the 20th July 1870.
class to the Government of India direct were regarded by the late Sir Henry Durand as involving a radical change in the position and powers of the Local Government. He represented* that

*a very little consideration of practical working must convince any one acquainted with the system of the administration hitherto in force that subordinate officers, when they shall cease to be confined to direct communication with the Local Government, and shall acquire the practice of direct correspondence, both written and telegraphic, with the Government of India, will ipso facto be invested with a power of initiating through the superior Government their own views. These may or may not be consonant with those of the Local Government, and when opposed to them there will be no corrective. The superior Government acting on first impressions may find itself committed to the issue of instructions from which it may be difficult to recede, however little in harmony with the deliberate views of the Local Government, which can only reach subsequently. The latter would thus be fettered by the action of its nominal subordinates and be placed in a very false position.

"Besides the above element of weakness, there is the fact which obstructs itself upon general observation, and is already the subject of comment, namely, that there is no announcement that similar orders have been promulgated to the Bombay Government with regard to its officers on the Sind or Rajputana frontiers; nor to the Bengal Government with regard to its Assam and Arunnachal frontiers; nor to the Chief Commissioner of British Burma with regard to the Burmese, Karan, Shan and Siamese frontiers. The contrast is held to indicate a change of policy reflecting distrust of, and want of confidence in, the Punjab Government and its officers."

It will be observed that Sir Henry Durand's apprehensions were based merely upon the direct transmission of information. A division of responsibility in the actual management of frontier affairs was not contemplated by him as a possibility. An instance of the effect of the orders regarding direct reports to the Government of India will be found in the correspondence marginally noted. Sir Robert Egerton represented that direct communications not of the urgent character mentioned in the correspondence of 1870 between the Commissioner of Peshawar and the Government of India had resulted in different orders being communicated to the former by the latter and by the Punjab Government. He represented that such procedure was anomalous and might lead to confusion; that he knew "of no reason why the Commissioner of Peshawar should hold a position in regard to the Government of India independent of the Punjab Government." The Government of India entirely shared Sir R. Egerton's views "that the correspondence in question should be strictly limited to matters regarding which it is important that the Government of India should receive the earliest information," though it held the position of the Commissioner of Peshawar to be exceptional, as he was the sole agent of the Government of India for very important and usually urgent correspondence across the frontier, and that as regarded that correspondence it was unavoidable that he should continue to communicate direct with the Foreign Office. The correspondence for which the Commissioner of Peshawar was sole agent to the Government of India was of course correspondence with Kabul. It may, I think, be concluded that the Government of India on this occasion realised the justice of Sir Robert Egerton's contention that divided responsibility in the control of the Commissioner of Peshawar would result in confusion.

In 1892 there was some talk of separating off the political work of the Punjab Frontier Districts and placing it in the hands of officers who would be directly under the Government of India. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick denounced the proposal to Lord Lansdowne in very strong terms, and pronounced it simply out of the question. Lord Lansdowne replied that the existing arrangement was not without its drawbacks, but he would certainly not endeavour to improve it by placing the political work of the frontier in the hands of subordinate officers working directly under the Government of India. I appeal to universal experience in support of the view that the authority of the Punjab Government would be dangerously weakened by such a measure. Punjab frontier officers have larger opportunities of attracting the notice of the Government of India under existing conditions than other officers—these opportunities would be greatly increased by a definite portion of their work being specially controlled by the Government of India to the exclusion of the
Local Government, and human nature being what it is, the tendency to play to
the superior gallery would be irresistible.

15. The third objection to the proposal is that it will throw upon the
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India a mass of work with which the
Local Government is competent to deal, and the submission of which to the
Government of India is quite unnecessary. How would the distribution of
work be made in practice? I imagine by some such order as this, "all matters
affecting our relations with trans-frontier tribes which Commissioners are unable
to dispose of will be referred by them to the Government of India direct and not
to the Local Government." I cannot suggest any other distribution. It would
not do to say that all matters of importance should be so referred. The Local
Government might pass an order in the initial stage which would hamper
the Government of India later on. Nor would it do to say that all matters affecting
the peace of the border should be so referred. Many matters occur in frontier
administration which are unimportant at first, but assume importance as they
develop. There are numberless possibilities of the peace of the border being
affected by matters which are apparently totally unconnected with trans-
border tribes and which at first sight ought not to produce such an effect.
Half the causes of trans-frontier unrest might be embodied in correspondence
with the Local Government and that part of the correspondence which was
sent direct to the Government of India might be quite incomplete without it.
I am really quite unable to make any suggestion for defining what matters
should be referred to the Government of India which would not be open to
one of two serious objections, viz., that it would either swamp the Foreign
Office or afford insufficient material for forming an opinion. The only possible
method is that the reporting officer should be responsible for communicating
intelligence of importance in sufficient detail to enable the Government of
India to form an opinion. This is what the Local Government now does—and I
do not understand what advantage is gained by placing the responsibility on
a subordinate of the Local Government.

16. I have not been able to do what I was asked to do, viz., to give an
opinion as to the way in which the external relations with the tribes on the
Peshawar border could be regulated under the conditions desired by Her
Majesty's Government or to discuss the changes of system which would be
entailed by giving effect to the scheme above indicated. I do not think those
relations can be regulated in the precise manner indicated, without intro-
ducing chaos into the frontier administration. If what is desired is to eliminate
the Punjab Government from trans-frontier control, this can only be done by
removing the frontier districts or such portions of them as are closely connected
with trans-frontier tribes from the control of the Punjab Government, and
forming this tract into a separate administration under the direct orders of
the Government of India. I am not called upon to say anything on this
subject, as it has been negatived after the fullest consideration both by the
Government of India and Her Majesty's Government, and I entirely concur
in the reasons which have led to this conclusion. At the same time, it would
in my opinion be far better to encounter all the objections urged to that scheme
than to disintegrate the existing administration and introduce confusion where
there is at all events order and discipline.

17. As I am concluding these remarks, I have received a telegram from
Sir R. Udney and a letter from Mr. Anderson, both of which give a partial
assent to the Secretary of State's scheme. Sir R. Udney approves of the elimina-
tion of the intermediate responsibility of the Local Government, but adds that
there are minor points which have required a good deal of consideration. His
opinion will be forwarded when received. Mr. Anderson, while expressing his
opinion that the new scheme is open to serious objections, thinks that it has
certain advantages. I need not notice his objections, as they have been fully
stated in this note. The advantages he considers to be—

(1) That the status of the Commissioner will be enhanced in the eyes of
the tribesmen and they will thus be more amenable to his control.

(2) That correspondence will be saved and discussion reduced.
(3) That the relations of the trans-frontier tribes with the Amir of Kabul will thereby be brought under more direct control of the Government of India.

(4) It will be an advantage for Commissioners to be more directly under the Supreme Government in connection with other Departments, such, for example, as the Military Department.

I do not think the tribes will know the difference between a Commissioner who gets his orders direct from the Government of India or intermediately from the Local Government. But no doubt the status of the Commissioner would have to be raised if he were entrusted with more authority than at present. The question is whether the Government of India is prepared largely to raise his status and make him practically a Chief Commissioner. If so, I am afraid he will be difficult to control in regard to his other duties. The Financial Commissioner who is his superior officer in revenue matters holds a position only a little higher than that of Commissioner, as it is. I have dealt with (2) above. I think (3) is already fully provided for. Every item of news regarding Kabul is already sent to the Government of India, and the Local Government never attempts to decide questions affecting the Amir. No. 4 shows, I think, what complications are likely to arise. It is not contemplated, I presume, to allow Commissioners to correspond with the Military Department of the Government of India direct in regard to "the employment of the military forces in support of the Political Officers in checking raids and promoting peace and order."

18. In conclusion, I can only state my conviction that, unless and until Her Majesty's Government decide to separate the frontier and place it under a Chief Commissioner or other officer in direct subordination to the Government of India, the existing machinery cannot with any advantage be altered. The Local Government at present works in loyal subordination to the Government of India, and while, on the one hand, submitting for its orders, together with the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, all matters of importance in regard to trans-frontier matters as well as matters arising in other Departments, stems the tide of correspondence by assuming responsibility in regard to matters within its competence. Though the views of the Local Government have not always been in accord with those of the Government of India, I confidently assert that it has never failed in loyal co-operation with the declared policy of the latter. I am not aware that the Government of India has made any complaint in regard to this matter, and I appeal to the present correspondence to show that, as regards the former management of trade affairs in the Pass, the Government of India considered the Punjab management satisfactory and desired that it should be reproduced. If the Punjab Government has in the past practically acted as a drag on the suggestions or proposals of the forward school of frontier politicians, the most strenuous advocates of which will be found in military ranks, I venture to suggest that the elimination of its counsels will not strengthen the position of the Government of India with whom rests the responsibility of deciding between conflicting views according to the best interests of the Empire, and to whom the views of the Head of the Local Administration can hardly be a matter of indifference. But the view which under a strong sense of duty I feel bound to urge in connection with the present case, is that to place the Commissioner of Peshawar and District Officers in the Peshawar Division in respect of trans-frontier matters under the direct control of the Government of India would indicate a want of confidence in the Government of the Punjab and would introduce confusion into its administration.

19th October 1898.

(Sd.) W. M. YOUNG.
No. 1446.

FROM

L. W. DANE, ESQUIRE,

Offg. Chief Secretary to Government,

Punjab and its Dependencies,

To

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Foreign.

Frontier.

SIR,

In continuation of my letter No. 3 C., dated 23rd October (Confidential), I am desired to submit the letters noted on the margin which contain the opinions of Sir R. Udny, K.C.S.I., and Mr. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E., on the question of the future administration of the Punjab Frontier and to convey the following remarks.

2. As regards the first four paragraphs of Sir R. Udny's letter the Lieutenant-Governor has nothing to add. He proposes a distribution of the work, but does not deal with any of the objections to a dual system of frontier management which Sir Mackworth Young has endeavoured to explain in his memorandum dated 19th October 1898.

The remainder of his letter is a plea for—

(a) A specially selected body of Civil Officers for service in districts on the Afghan border.

(b) A largely increased staff of European assistants in the same districts.

3. Sir R. Udny's scheme for (a) is practically what has for some years been accepted by the Punjab Government with the exception (1) that the inducements for frontier service in the shape of extra emoluments consist in the extra allowances for political charges, for the outposts of Mardan, Thal, Tank, Rajanpur, Mianwali and Bhakkar, and the Pashtu and Biluchi allowances, and it has not been found necessary to ask for salaries graduated with reference to contemporaries Cis-Indus; (2) that the demarcation between service Trans-Indus and Cis-Indus has not been quite so final or distinct as Sir R. Udny wishes, for the reason that officers sometimes develop special aptitude for frontier service after a longer period than three years, and as in the case of the judicial and executive separation, it is better for the service that there should not be such finality at an early stage of an officer's career. Sir R. Udny's list of officers serving on the frontier does not include the names of several officers who have served on the frontier, and who might serve there again. Their removal has been due to various causes. Sometimes to health, sometimes to.
the desirability of giving the officer a training in the more regulated procedure of a Cis-Indus district, sometimes to the fact that an officer has been proved not sufficiently equipped for special work on the frontier, sometimes to the requirements of the Government of India, as in the case of Major Deane, C. S. I., and Major MacMahon, C. I. E., C. S. I., but rarely or never has the transfer been made in the interest of the Cis-Indus as contrasted with the Trans-Indus administration. Speaking generally, however, His Honor entirely concurs in the principles which Sir R. Udny advocates for regulating service on the frontier.

4. But the great difficulty with which we have had to contend of late, a difficulty which lies beneath all Sir R. Udny's strictures and the removal of which must be a work of time, is the paucity of officers of a certain standing in the Commission. The circumstances which led to this depletion have frequently been brought to the notice of the Government of India, and I am now to enclose for facility of reference a copy of paragraphs 13 to 15 of Mr. Tupper's letter No. 169 S., dated 1st July 1889, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, which will explain the state of affairs then existing. Up to 1878 the recruitment was fairly regular, but thereafter it fell off seriously. No less than seven junior civilians, who had been recruited under the new system by which candidates of the ages of 17 to 19 were admitted to the open competition, died also shortly after their arrival in the country and some of the Statutory civilians did not prove a success and left the service. The result is that between 1880 and 1884, a period of five years, there are now only nine officers in the Commission instead of about 31 which under the normal scheme of recruitment we should have obtained. A proposal to mend matters by drafting in competent men from other Branches of the Government service was not accepted by the Government of India, and in consequence for the past ten years the greatest difficulty has been experienced in manning the posts in the Province. The frontier has suffered least as it has always been recognised to be a matter of vital necessity to keep competent officers there, but elsewhere all sorts of expedients have been resorted to and the districts have been filled temporarily by Provincial Service men and officers of two and three years' service. Since 1893, however, the number of recruits has risen to 11 and 13 a year, and many of these are officers of great promise, so that in the near future it will be a simpler matter to adequately fill all the posts in the Province.

5. I am to point out that Sir R. Udny's second proposition in favour of a largely increased European staff on the frontier is nothing new. The question engrossed the attention of the Government of India and this Government in 1891, and the measures then taken are detailed in the Despatch No. 159, dated 23rd June 1891, from the Government of India, Department of Finance and Commerce, to the Secretary of State. The following extract paragraph 3 of Mr. Fanshawe's letter No. 642, dated 17th November 1891, to the Frontier Commissioners clearly explains the aims which the Punjab Government then held in view. These are almost identical with those of Sir R. Udny, and Sir Mackworth Young considers that they still embody all that is really necessary, and that when they are attained a fully efficient Frontier staff will always be available:

3. The strength of the staff of the districts of your Division will be in future as shown in the accompanying statements, in which also the personnel of the staff for the present cold weather is entered. For the reasons given in the notes annexed to my letter No. 129 of 20th March last, Sir James Lyall considers that this staff will be found sufficient in all cases, and will enable Deputy Commissioners to devote a proper share of their time to political and frontier work without detriment to their control and share of the general work of district administration. Deputy Commissioners will doubtless bear in mind that it is a necessary part of the revised scheme of frontier administration that they should trust all their subordinates specially appointed for this work with a good deal of responsibility and power. Unless this is done the relief which it is desired to give to District Officers themselves will be less than it should be. In particular the officers in charge of the Border
Military Police should, if proper use is made of their services, be able to relieve Deputy Commissioners of much unimportant work connected with border offences and tribal administration, and proposals should be submitted for investing them with the necessary magisterial powers for this work. A European Assistant will be attached to the headquarters of all frontier districts whose staff does not include one at present so soon as the recruitment of the Commission will permit of this, and it is hoped that this will be arranged for by the commencement of next hot weather at latest. Similarly, all outposts will as far as possible be held by a European officer in future.

6. That these results have not been fully realized up to the present is entirely due to the general depletion of the Commission explained above. When the Commission is properly manned it will be a comparatively easy thing to provide suitable officers for frontier service, and to increase the staff of European Assistants in Frontier districts. Meanwhile the Punjab Government has done its best to provide substitutes from other Branches of the service, and the names of Messrs. Hastings, Donald, Waterfield are not unknown to the Government of India as efficient Frontier officers. A scheme for securing the full training of Frontier Political Officers in the management of the Border tribes by placing junior officers of the Commission in command of the Border Military Police in Frontier districts is under consideration, and its submission to the Government of India is only delayed pending the development of the scheme for a Frontier Militia which has been referred to the Punjab Government for consideration. If so desired, a proposal to throw open the command of the Border Military Police to Assistant Commissioners as well as to the Assistant District Superintendents of Police and Tahsildars noted in the Government of India despatch above quoted can be submitted for sanction at once.

7. In conclusion, I am to intimate that the Lieutenant-Governor has no remarks to offer on Mr. Cunningham's letter, as all the subjects therein discussed have been already dealt with in this letter or in Sir Mackworth Young's note dated 19th October 1898.

I have the honor to be,

Sir
Your most obedient servant,

L. W. DANE,

Offg. Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.
In reply to your endorsement No. 1211 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honor to say that I am strongly in favour of the proposal "to make the Commissioner of Peshawar, and through him his several subordinates who are employed in conducting external relations with the tribes, directly subordinate in such matters to the Government of India"; and after much consideration I am unable to see why the carrying out of this proposal should entail any change in the existing system.

2. As far as purely external relations with the trans-frontier tribes are concerned, I think it would be a distinct advantage for the Commissioner to be in direct communication with the Government of India, and it seems to me that, on the border of the Peshawar Division at any rate, the elimination of the intermediate responsibility of the Local Government would give rise to no practical inconvenience, provided that copies of the correspondence were furnished simultaneously to the Lieutenant Governor in the few cases which might appear to affect the interests of our cis-border subjects, e.g. where residents of British India had been maltreated in independent territory. The sending of such copies might safely be left to the discretion of the Commissioner, and the Government of India would doubtless note the omission to send them in any case in which they considered it necessary that His Honor should have an opportunity of offering his opinion.

3. Our other relations with the tribesmen, which are not purely external, are generally in respect of one or other of the following matters:—

(i) Raids or other offences committed in British territory either by trans-border tribesmen themselves or by British outlaws residing with them;

(ii) Difficulties which occasionally arise in consequence of men who have homes on both sides of the border mixing themselves up with trans-frontier affairs or going across the border to commit offences there while residing in British territory, e.g. in the case of the Mohmands on the Shabkadar frontier and Wazirs in the Bannu District;

(iii) Offences committed upon trans-border men in independent territory by purely British subjects who return to our side of the border afterwards;

(iv) Disputes between cis and trans-border men about the boundary of British India; and

(v) Disputes arising out of civil transactions between men of independent territory which are not taken into the ordinary Civil Courts, but decided by jirga under Section 10 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation.

4. In serious offences of class (i), which under existing orders are already reported both to the Local and Supreme Governments, all correspondence should go in duplicate to both Governments, though the cases would be settled under the directions of the Government of India alone. Minor offences of this class are ordinarily disposed of by the local officers without any report to Government at all, but any periodical statements of such cases which at present go to the Punjab Government would, I presume, in future be submitted to the Government of India.
In cases under class (ii) it would generally be unnecessary to send the Punjab Government copies of the correspondence, as the men concerned, though sometimes resident in British territory, are in respect of such matters practically trans-border tribesmen.

Cases of classes (iii) and (iv) are very rare, but it would probably be advisable that any correspondence about them should be in duplicate, the final decision under class (iii) being left to the Local Government, and under class (iv) to the Government of India in communication with the Local Government, as would be done in disputes of the same kind between a Native State under the Foreign Department and the conterminous Local Administration in British India.

Statements of cases under class (v) might, if desired, go to the Government of India, though there seems no reason why they should not be submitted as they have been hitherto, to the Local Government along with the other quarterly statements under the Frontier Crimes Regulation.

I have not referred to cases of male or female refugees from independent territory because the only notice we take of them is to require such refugees under Section 35 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation to reside at a distance from the border if any attempt upon their lives is apprehended from across the frontier, and this is a matter of internal administration.

5. As the whole question of frontier management is now under discussion, there are two other points upon which I should like to take this opportunity of saying a word, viz.—

(a) the necessity of a specially selected body of Civil Officers for service in districts on the Afghan border; and

(b) the necessity of largely increasing the staff of European Assistants in the same districts.

6. As regards (a), I have always held the strongest opinion, and my views are still the same as I expressed semi-officially in 1891 or 1892, viz., that no officer should be sent to the frontier till he has received his full ordinary training—i.e., until he has passed all his Departmental Examinations and gone through the usual course of Settlement instructions—that all officers thus qualified should be allowed to volunteer for the frontier provided that they must do so while still under three years' service, and that only those volunteers should be accepted who appear likely, from their physique, strength of character, and power of associating with natives, to prove adapted for the work before them. Such volunteers should be enrolled on a special register, and warned that they are electing for permanent service on the frontier, where promotion must necessarily be slow because the body of officers will always be comparatively small, and because they will not be considered eligible for transfer to promotion cis-Indus; but I would make up for this to some extent by allowing Assistant Commissioners in border districts to draw higher pay when officers of their own standing in the Commission or junior to them were officiating as Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab, and the knowledge that they belonged to a "corps d'élite" with more interesting and responsible work and with greater possibilities of advancement and distinction than ordinarily fall to the lot of the cis-Indus official, should be sufficient to keep men who have voluntarily chosen this line of service fairly contented. Hitherto I believe junior officers have not unfrequently been sent trans-Indus, and again withdrawn to the Punjab, without regard to their own inclinations. The result has been in some cases that they have managed to return cis-Indus on the first opportunity, while in other cases men who would gladly have remained on the frontier have been recalled either for the Secretariat or because their turn had come for promotion to charge of districts elsewhere; but according to my idea no officer once selected for the frontier should ever be withdrawn except for proved unfitness or for neglect to pass the Pashtu Examination within a reasonable time.
7. In this connection I append a statement of all Civil Officers who are either serving on the Afghan frontier at present or who may be reckoned upon as available for work on this border though absent on furlough or (as in the case of Colonel Leigh) posted temporarily to a cis-Indus district; and by Afghan frontier I mean the five districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, where the trans-border tribesmen are of Afghan race, as distinguished from Dera Ghazi Khan, where the people are Biluch and the conditions are very different. From this statement it will be seen at once how irregularly the supply of frontier officers has been maintained, and that, if the six men of longest border experience (not counting myself as I am retiring immediately) were removed, we should have no one left of much more than six years’ frontier training, while the great majority are very junior. In the period of 13 years from February 1878 to February 1891 only five men were sent to the frontier who still remain there. From 1891 to 1895 we have one officer per year, and eight in 1896—1898, but under the existing system most of the latter would probably be recalled cis-Indus before long.

8. As regards the second point (b), it must be understood, as in the preceding paragraph, that I am speaking only of what (to use the old expression) may be called Covenanted Officers, i.e., Covenanted Civilians or Military Officers in Civil employ, for Uncovenanted Officers can never, save under very exceptional circumstances, be promoted to the charge of districts or divisions, and, however able they may be, their frontier experience can rarely be utilised in these higher posts. Except therefore for purely judicial work or the charge of treasuries, Uncovenanted Officers on the frontier fill positions which might otherwise be more usefully occupied by Covenanted men in training for higher service, and no Uncovenanted Officer (European or Native) should ever be placed in charge of a frontier sub-division, or in posts like those of the Political Officers in the Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi or Wana, which also afford excellent training for the political duties of a Deputy Commissioner. Yet at the present moment we find a European Extra Judicial Assistant (Mr. Homan) officiating as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, while a Native Extra Assistant Commissioner (Sardar Mahsul) is at Tank, the frontier sub-division of the same district, and a European Police Officer, Mr. Donald (though this is probably only a temporary arrangement), is in the Khaibar. Not long ago too we had Mr. Hastings (another Police Officer) in the Kurram, and at the time of the outbreak last year the Political Officer of the Khaibar was a Native. Lastly, there have been occasions within my recollection when the important sub-divisions of Mardan and Thal were held either by a European or Native Extra Assistant Commissioner, and all these instances have been due to the impossibility of providing officers of sufficient standing and experience from the Covenanted line. Even the posts of the Commandants of Border Police, who usually act as Political Assistants to their Deputy Commissioners, are valuable for frontier training, and I think that in future these too might be held with advantage by regular officers of the Commission; but such officers ought never to be left long enough in them to forget, or acquire a distaste for, the ordinary work of interior district administration, and this, I may add, is a remark which applies equally to the Political charges in the Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi and Wana.

9. If these views are accepted, it is evident that the number of Covenanted Assistants in the Afghan border districts must be largely increased. Even as it is the number is too small to allow of a fair proportion being always absent on furlough or leave. The result is that at the present moment three of the five districts are temporarily in charge of officers of less than two years’ frontier standing (Messrs. Mant, Down and Grant), while in another—Dera Ismail Khan—the Deputy Commissioner, as I have said already, is not a Covenanted officer at all. As regards Assistant Commissioners the case is still worse, for in four of the five districts there is no such officer at head-quarters, and in Peshawar, so notorious for its crime and lawlessness, there is but one (Mr. Gracey) who came up from cis-Indus two or three weeks ago. To remedy this state of things, and to secure a properly graduated service of trained men, there ought to be at least two Covenanted Assistants (or three, if one is to be Commandant,
of Bôrdor Police) at the head-quarters of every district, and four in Pêshawar; a corresponding diminution of course being made in the number of European and Native Extra Assistant Commissioners. The permanent Covenanted staff on the Afghan frontier would then be constituted as follows:

| Commissioners | ... | ... | 2 |
| Deputy Commissioners | ... | ... | 5 |
| Political Officers in Khaibar, Kurram, Tochi and Wana | ... | ... | 4 |
| Assistant Commissioners in charge of the Mardan, Thal and Tank Sub-Divisions | ... | ... | 3 |
| Commandants of Bôrdor Police in Pêshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan | ... | ... | 4 |
| Assistant Commissioners at head-quarters | ... | 12 |

Total ... 30

and this would allow of a reasonable number of officers being absent on furlough or leave without necessitating the constant bringing up of new and untrained men from cis-Indus which is at present unavoidable.

It may be urged that, if the number of subordinate officers is so much increased, and they are debarred from advancement cis-Indus, promotion to Officiating Deputy Commissionerships will be so slow that we shall have no men offering themselves for the frontier. This would no doubt be true if no steps were taken to remedy such a grievance, and it is therefore essential, as I have already pointed out, that a sliding scale of pay should be introduced giving an Assistant Commissioner the pay of a Deputy Commissioner whenever an officer junior to him is officiating in charge of a district cis-Indus.

It may also be said that to keep men out of the charge of districts and in subordinate positions for 7 or 8 years would tend to disgust them and to dwarf their power of accepting responsibility; but, though they would take some time to rise to Deputy Commissionerships, they would not be all this time mere Assistants; and it is a point of great importance to have men of a certain standing for Political charges like Kurram, &c., which on this account it has often been very difficult to fill from the Covenanted line. In the ordinary course an officer on first coming to the frontier should have two years of the usual work in Cutchery, which is the best of all schools for learning the language, and after that he might be put for a year in command of the Bôrdor Police. Then would come a term of two or three years in charge of a sub-division, followed by perhaps a year or two in an independent charge like the Khaibar or Kurram, by which time, if not before, a permanent district vacancy would probably be available. All this would give such ample variety of experience and responsibility that I think no man with a liking for border service would find it compare unfavourably with the life even of a Deputy Commissioner cis-Indus, and still less so with the duties of an Assistant Commissioner who is often little better than a Cutchery drudge.
Annexure of letter No. 254 Camp, dated 20th October 1898, from the Commissioner, Peshawar, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of entering Punjab Commission</th>
<th>Year of first posting to Afghan Frontier</th>
<th>Length of service on Afghan Frontier exclusive of furlough and long leave, but inclusive of privilege leave.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Udny</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>May 1871</td>
<td>11 7 5</td>
<td>Commissioner, Peshawar Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cunningham</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>June 1874</td>
<td>15 9 13</td>
<td>On special duty for Aftridi settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, H.</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>July 1877</td>
<td>18 1 18 (includes 2 years 6 months and 12 days on duty with the Orux Boundary Commission.)</td>
<td>Officiating Commissioner, Derajat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meik</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>January 1878</td>
<td>11 10 25</td>
<td>Officiating Commissioner, Derajat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>April 1883</td>
<td>8 11 29 (includes 2 years 6 months and 12 days on duty with the Orux Boundary Commission.)</td>
<td>At present Deputy Commissioner, Kohat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leigh</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>November 1881</td>
<td>11 2 27</td>
<td>Just returned from furlough and posted as Deputy Commissioner to Rawalpindi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younghusband</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>November 1895</td>
<td>2 10 22 (includes 2 years 6 months and 4 days in Dera Ghazi Khan).</td>
<td>A pteent Deputy Commissioner Peshawar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunbury</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>November 1895</td>
<td>8 4 23</td>
<td>On furlough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gee</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>December 1891</td>
<td>5 11 28 (includes 2 years 6 months and 4 days in Dera Ghazi Khan).</td>
<td>On furlough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant, A. J.</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>November 1890</td>
<td>5 5 27</td>
<td>On furlough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawlinson</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>March 1890</td>
<td>6 6 4</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorimer</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>August 1892</td>
<td>4 11 20</td>
<td>Political Officer, Tochi Valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunter</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>May 1893</td>
<td>3 7 15</td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kettlenwell</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>December 1894</td>
<td>3 7 22</td>
<td>Political Officer, Wana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterfield, B.</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>March 1896</td>
<td>1 8 20</td>
<td>On furlough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>January 1897</td>
<td>1 9 0</td>
<td>Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mant</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>February 1896</td>
<td>0 6 27</td>
<td>Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Hazara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blakeway</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>February 1896</td>
<td>2 7 23</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner, in charge of Mardan Sub-Division, Peshawar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant, A. H.</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>April 1897</td>
<td>1 5 19</td>
<td>Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rennie</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>September 1897</td>
<td>1 1 5</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner, in charge of Thal Sub Division, Kohat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roos-Keppel</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>September 1897</td>
<td>1 1 0</td>
<td>Political Officer, Kurram.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gracey</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>October 1898</td>
<td>Less than a month</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner, Peshawar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R. UDNY,
Commissioner and Superintendent,
Peshawar Division.

The 20th October 1898.

Extract paragraphs 13 to 15 of a letter No. 169 S., dated Simla, 1st July 1889, from C. L. Tupper, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.

13. Enclosed will be found a statement (Enclosure III) from which it will be perceived that, whereas according to the prescribed figure of recruitment, viz., 6'21 per annum, the Commission should have received 68'31 recruits in these years, the actual number of recruits was 52 only, and of these, owing to resignations, transfers to other Provinces and employments and to deaths, only 32 remain. In the years 1855-1856, as will be perceived from the same statement, the recruitment has been sufficient or fairly so.

14. The Lieutenant-Governor would take this opportunity to beg that the services of the following officers now employed away from the Punjab may be restored to this Province when practicable, viz. —

(1) Mr. R. G. Thomson, Officiating Postmaster-General, Punjab.

(2) and (3) Messrs. Drew and Cappel, transferred to Bombay in 1882.

(4) Mr. L. W. King, now serving under the Government of India in the Political Department and just at present on furlough.

The Lieutenant-Governor would like to add to this list the names of Mr. Hurry and Lieutenant Martindale, now serving in Burma, but he does not wish to press upon this point as he believes that it would be very difficult for the Chief Commissioner of Burma to spare their services. I am to add as additional reasons for this request that the European strength of the Punjab Commission is at a dangerously low ebb, and that undoubtedly one of the reasons for the defects in the criminal administration which are under discussion is the want of a sufficient number of European Magistrates.

15. It remains to consider the measures which should be adopted to keep the future strength of the Punjab Commission up to the mark. This matter has been very fully discussed in personal consultation with yourself, and the result is that it is now proposed to raise the number of charges to which recruitment should be adjusted from 104 to 119. The reasons for this change are very fully explained in the annexed memorandum (Enclosure IV) by the Secretary to this Government, showing in detail the results of the recent conference with yourself. In accordance with those proposals the figure of recruitment should be raised from 6'21 to 7'05. The Lieutenant-Governor hopes that this proposal will be sanctioned. He has also requested that the next supply of Covenanted Civilians may be five instead of four, the number previously intimated to you; and he thinks it would be an excellent thing if two Military recruits could be given to the Punjab as soon as possible.
No. 10, dated Peshawar, the 21st October 1898.

From—F. D. CUNNINGHAM, Esq., C.I.E., Commissioner (on Special Duty),
To—The Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of a copy of a letter from the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 3243 F., dated 19th September, about alterations proposed in the present system of managing relations with tribes beyond the Peshawar border, so as to bring the conduct of these affairs more directly under the control of the Government of India.

2. The despatch of the Secretary of State announces that generally "Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory," and that, with special reference to the Khyber, it is "not desirable merely to restore arrangements which were in force before the outbreak." Some change is, therefore, called for. There can be no question that of late, and especially in the year 1897, the fruits of the present system have not been all that could be wished; how far this is due to defects in the administrative system, and how far to difficulties inherent in recent frontier policy and to deep-rooted antagonism between feeling beyond the border and the aims of Government is a question well worthy of consideration, though its discussion here would be out of place.

The decision of Her Majesty's Government calls for a change in the administrative machine, and the immediate question is whether as regards the Peshawar border that direct control, which is desired, can be secured by removing the Commissioner and the officers below him from subordination to the Punjab Government in respect of political matters, and by placing them to that extent under the direct orders of the Government of India.

The proposal has the obvious objection of weakening the control of the Local Government over its principal Revenue Officers and Magistrates in the Division. I should be sorry to say it would be unworkable; Indian officials are accustomed to serve many masters; the Deputy Commissioner in the Punjab is controlled in some Departments by the Commissioner, in other by the Sessions Judge and Chief Court, and he is answerable to a variety of other authorities. It is said this dependence on many masters is practicable because all are under one head, the Local Government; so that the Deputy Commissioner cannot excuse deficiencies on one side by pleading press of work on another. To this it may be replied that, whatever other changes are introduced, assuming that the Deputy Commissioner is left in charge of the clans on his own border, as I hope to show he must and ought to be, he would still for both internal and external work be under the Commissioner; and though the Commissioner would serve two masters, yet ultimately all are under one supreme authority, the Government of India.

At the same time, though I think the proposal is not wholly unworkable, it has in it many tendencies to produce friction, and from the point of view of the Local Government may well be thought impracticable.

The Lieutenant-Governor would no longer look on officials in Peshawar as his servants, and it might happen that a transfer desired by him in the interest of the Revenue or Judicial administration would be vetoed by the Government of India. This again does not seem to me an insuperable objection, for analogous cases arise under the Provincial Government where Revenue and Judicial authorities take different views of the efficiency of the individual.

Nevertheless it is impossible to deny that the proposal has in it certain seeds of friction and will put the Local Government in a very difficult position. Moreover, it will not be easy in practice to define the two spheres. To distinguish on paper relations with border clans from district work is easy, but many questions affecting directly the ryots within our border may indirectly concern their trans-frontier cousins.
To go no further back than the last year the Kohat salt duty, the Agror Border Regulation, and matters connected with the Border Police are cases in point.

3. But from the concluding part of paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch, I gather that, coupled with this change in the position of the Commissioner, it is suggested that the District Officer should be divorced from the management of political business on his own border.

I do not know whether this is an essential part of the proposal under discussion; if it be, I venture to think the scheme needs careful reconsideration. Speaking with a long experience—nearly a quarter of a century—of frontier work, I make bold to say that, whatever changes may be introduced above, the fundamental principle of Border administration should be to retain in one hand executive control within, and the management of relations with clans on, the fringe of hills beyond the frontier. Any other system must involve immense loss of influence and waste of power.

The geographical line which marks the boundary is no barrier; in many parts the men beyond are of the same clan and race as our subjects within the border; in some they live on both sides, migrating with the seasons; in all parts foreigner and subject, whose villages and grazing-grounds adjoin, are closely connected by ties of interest, business, tenancy or marriage. Many trans-border clans have ‘jagirs’ in our districts; all down the frontier the great families have assignments or pensions representing allowances granted by former Rulers—Moghul, Durrani or Sikh—to secure their loyalty and assistance. Though the heads of these families are no longer regularly employed as middle-men, yet they still have influence, and take care to maintain it; in every frontier trouble they are called in to assist, and often do most valuable work.

All these and many similar conditions give to the officer who is Magistrate and Collector, who is locally supreme in matters connected with Police, Criminal Justice and the administration of the Land Revenue system, a power to get work out of Chiefs and Khans within our border, to check intrigues starting in our territory, and to influence clansmen on the immediate ‘hinterland’ of his district, such as no other official can exert.

Leisure to sit all day and every day with jirgas and men from across the border will not make up for want of power to decide their petitions about assessment of wells, suspension of revenue demand on lands owned by them in Peshawar, or to take action under the Frontier Crimes Regulation on their claims about debts due or broken engagements of betrothal and marriage.

These remarks refer to the clans who march with British territory; the further you go from our border the less does this argument apply. The fact that there are Political Agents in charge of Wano, Tochi, Dir and Swat, &c., and that they can manage those tracts successfully without having jurisdiction within our districts does not prove the contrary, as their charges include clans far removed from the border line, and in any case the Khans of Dera Ismail Khan or Bannu understand that they may some day see the officer who is now Political Agent in Wano or Tochi come back to be Deputy Commissioner in the adjoining district.

4. It seems, however, to be anticipated that, with the creation of a set of Political Agents, separate from the District Officers, there will be less change of personnel due to “removal or transfer to other appointments under the exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion.” This is possible; but at the same time it is probable that there is no part of any Indian province in which men have been kept longer within narrow limits than on the Punjab frontier. It is notorious that once on the frontier, always there. I have known men who did not wish to stay purposely neglect to learn Pashtu, on the ground that, if they once passed the examination, they would be kept for life in a part of the province from which they wished to escape. Take the Peshawar Division as an instance: the three officers* who have last held charge have been practically all their service on or beyond the frontier,
and have at least as much knowledge as the experience of a quarter of a century can give.

Of the changes of tenure of this office since 1891, when Sir R. Udny became Commissioner, not one has been due to “exigencies of provincial redistribution or promotion;” they have been caused solely by the removal of an officer to special political work outside, to furloughs, ill-health, or privilege leave. And under no system can changes for these causes be avoided.

5. It seems to me, however, very doubtful whether the control of the Government of India will be increased to the extent expected merely by eliminating the Punjab Government and by drawing the Commissioner, Peshawar, into direct relations. If the Punjab Government had any frontier policy of its own, or, having one, if it had authority to pursue it, if it had power to give orders in any but the most trivial matter, I could understand that by removing it from the chain the control of the Government of India would be increased in reality as well as in name. But I venture to think that whatever their position in constitutional theory may be, the Lahore Government have not for many years past given orders in any but the most petty matter, affecting trans-border clans or politics.

With the exception of a few years in the Secretariat, the whole of my service of 26 years has been passed on or beyond the North-West Frontier, and for the past 13 years in the Peshawar Division. Speaking of that part of the border, I cannot remember any question sufficiently important to be reported to the Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner, which in its turn the Local Government did not think necessary to refer to Calcutta. Under the present system the real authorities that issue orders are the Deputy Commissioner and the Government of India. The Deputy Commissioner as the local Political Officer disposes of many claims against trans-border men by reprisals or arrests in British territory, or by his influence with clans outside, and he settles these cases without report to the great advantage of Government. But when he thinks action on his part will not summarily dispose of a case, he may report it for orders, and in cases of this description I think that in practice the Commissioner and the Local Government give advice and not decisions; the final order even now comes from Calcutta.

The charge proposed will certainly eliminate one office, the function of which in these matters has become advisory rather than administrative, will so far tend to quicken despatch of business and the issue of orders, and will bring the Government of India nearer to the work to be done.

It is, however, clear that between the local officer on the spot and the Supreme Government there must be some authority interposed high enough to pass orders in small matters disposed of on general principles or in accordance with the declared policy of Government, and of experience and knowledge sufficient to give weight to his advice and conclusions.

If between the Deputy Commissioner and Government there is to be only the Commissioner, clearly his responsibility will be largely enhanced, and if the change is to work to advantage, his position must be raised, and he must be invested with powers beyond what he now ventures to assume.

6. To sum up, I am of opinion that the proposal to remove the Commissioner and his subordinates in political matters from the control of the Punjab Government and to place them directly under the Government of India is practicable and not unworkable, but that it has the grave disadvantages of risk of friction, and of impairing that control which is a condition of discipline and efficiency.

But I have no hesitation in saying that it would be a grievous mistake to divorce the Deputy Commissioner from the management of the border clans who march with his district.

Assuming that the reasons given in paragraph 3 are accepted, and that authority within and without the border is kept in one hand, it remains to be considered how the local Political Officer himself is to be directed and controlled.
That between him and the Supreme Government some authority must be interposed is evident, otherwise the Foreign Department of the Government of India which should deal with large questions, and with cases likely to cause complications, will be inundated with trivial business.

I venture to think that there are two solutions, and that either of them would in effect be better than that of making the Commissioner of Peshawar an official Janus with one face to Calcutta and one towards Lahore.

These are either—

(i) to give the Punjab Government real authority and power to issue final orders in respect to affairs with clans on the immediate border fringe, and in all but matters likely to lead to serious results or to hostilities on a large scale; or

(ii) to remove the frontier districts* from the Punjab Government, and to place in charge of them an officer with the powers of Chief Commissioner for the interior, and the position of Agent to the Governor-General for the clans and countries beyond.

The first of these two plans would work, but at this date it seems useless to suggest what would at once be ruled out of court as "retrograde," and, moreover, it does not fulfil the condition laid down by the Secretary of State, and is therefore out of the question.

The second would bring the management of the border under the Government of India in the most direct manner practicable. The population, revenue, trade and wealth of the province have so increased since the question of a separate Frontier Commissionership was mooted some 20 years ago under the Government of Lord Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat and a strip of the Derajat is still sufficient to constitute an administrative area of the first class.

Towns have grown, Municipalities have been created under new and complex laws, the whole machinery of Local Self-Government has been started, hundreds of miles of railway and canals have been opened, the cultivated, and, what is more important, the irrigated area has been enlarged by scores of thousands of acres,—in a word development in all directions has been so great that it is questionable whether there is not enough cis-Indus to occupy the full energies of a great administration.

I am writing without access to an office, and therefore do not attempt to give figures, but a comparison of the chief statistics of the province for 1878 with those of to-day would, I think, show that no "territorial rectifications or compensations" would be required, and that this supposed objection to the radical and effectual remedy does not in reality exist.

If, then, a strong administration directly under the Government of India is desired, in which frontier questions can be fully taken up on one consistent line without detriment to the needs and requirements of the greater part of a large province, this can best be secured by placing the frontier districts under a separate Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. The Punjab Government would benefit by being relieved of an incubus, by the gain of time and power to devote to the administration of a rapidly growing province, and it would be rescued from what to many has appeared the invi­dious position into which it has been relegated by the course of events in the past ten or twenty years in regard to affairs on the North-West Frontier.

7. While I believe that this would be the better alternative, I am not prepared to say that the other proposal put forward, to split the Commissioner of Peshawar into two persons, responsible to the Local Government in things internal, and to the Government of India in external matters, is unworkable. But there can be no doubt that it would make the position of the Punjab Government very difficult, and probably within a short time they would be
constrained to ask the Government of India to take over the entire responsibility for the frontier districts, and for officials over whom the Lieutenant-Governor would no longer have that full control which alone can secure discipline and efficiency.

Even if the other alternative be ultimately accepted, and the border districts be separated from the Punjab, there remains the question whether the unsatisfactory position of to-day on the North-West Frontier is wholly the result of the administrative system, and how far it may be caused in part at least by the natural opposition of tribesmen of independent territory to the policy of these later years. It is the duty of servants of Government to carry out the policy of Government whatever it be, not to criticise unless their views are asked, and I have no intention of suggesting criticism, for Government best knows its business and its ultimate aim. After all if difficulties exist they must be overcome; it is constant advance in spite of opposition which has created an Empire:

"Et dubitamus ad hue virtutem extendere factis"

"Aut metus Ausonii prohibet consistere terrâ"?

But when it is a question of condemning and altering an existing administrative system, it will surely not be out of place to note with proper deference that, in the policy which has led to the occupation and, as the tribesmen view it, to the practical annexation of Wano, Tochi and Malakand, there are elements so contrary to the feelings, traditions and aspirations of the clans thus conciliated, so likely to arouse their fear of loss of independence, that this alone would account for some at least of the difficulties experienced in carrying out the aims of Government on the North-West Frontier, besides any that may have been created by the machinery of administration, which no doubt is capable of reform and improvement.

As the discussion has arisen out of a despatch upon the management of the Khyber, it is specially appropriate to remember that the arrangements started under the Punjab Government, when I had the honour to be the first Political Officer in charge of the Pass, worked with success for nearly twenty years.

They broke down in the end, but under stress of a storm whose origin was unconnected with the Punjab or its Government. But twenty years is a long time in the history of any political system; the map of Europe rarely outlasts it unchanged; and the system to be reformed has at least this to its credit that during that time the Khyber Pass was kept as safe as any part of the Grand Trunk Road from Peshawar to Calcutta.
1. At the end of August we received from the Secretary of State his reply to the Despatch in which we communicated our proposals for the final settlement of outstanding questions with the Afridis, and for the future management of the Khyber Pass. The nature of the decision arrived at by Her Majesty's Government made it necessary for us to differentiate even more than before in our treatment of these two branches of the subject. So far as concerned the communication of the terms on which peaceful relations with the tribes might be re-established, we were authorised to act so soon as our definition of the terms had been approved by the Secretary of State. On the other hand, so far as future management was concerned, Her Majesty's Government came to no determination, but forwarded to us certain suggestions on which they invited our opinion.

2. Naturally the first branch of the subject, as the more pressing, first engaged our attention; but I am not dealing with it in this Minute, and it will suffice to record that on September 12th we were able to inform the Punjab Government of the nature of the terms, and of the manner in which we proposed to communicate them to the tribes. It was impossible to refer to future arrangements until this letter had gone; but a week later, i.e., on September 19th, it was followed by another in which we requested the Local Government to supply us with the information necessary to determine how far the suggested alterations in existing arrangements were practicable. I mention these dates to show that there was no delay on our part in taking action along both the lines indicated in the Despatch from the Secretary of State. Nor, in my opinion, has there been any undue delay on the part of the Local Government. It was essential that the Lieutenant-Governor should consult his officers who were actually in charge, or were well acquainted with the circumstances, of the frontier districts. He warned me at once that this must take time, and I am indebted to him for pressing his enquiries so energetically as to be able to submit his report within little more than a month. The propositions which he had to consider were calculated to affect the Province for which he is responsible in many ways, and it would have been unreasonable to expect an opinion upon them without full time for consultation and deliberation. It is not therefore on account of any delay, which could have been avoided, that a difficulty has arisen in our determining before we leave Simla the conclusions on which the further observations desired by the Secretary of State might be founded. It was only on one supposition that the short time at our disposal might have sufficed. If the Lieutenant-Governor had seen his way to make proposals by which the objects aimed at in paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's Despatch might be attained, it would perhaps have been just possible for the Government of India to consider those proposals and forward them with observations to the Secretary of State. But the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor is that he cannot suggest any alterations in the direction indicated; on the contrary, that, in his opinion they would introduce chaos into the frontier administration.

3. Under these circumstances we have nothing to work upon. The Government of India will now have to decide on one of two courses;—either to endorse the verdict of the Lieutenant-Governor, or to formulate proposals of its own. It can do neither hastily, and any attempt to arrive at a premature pronouncement without careful sifting of the information already available, or which may be collected, would be unfair to Hon. Members, and could not be expected to yield results of any value.
4. This, however, leaves me in a position which differs in one essential respect from that of my Colleagues. When the case comes before them hereafter, as it is bound to come, I shall not be in a position to offer any opinion. It appears to me that, while it is my duty to abstain from inviting any formal or final discussion at this moment, it is equally my duty not to shirk my responsibility, but to submit to the Government of India and the Secretary of State, in a form which can be used officially, a statement of the reasons which in my judgment justify the policy which I have advised, and which on my present information I should still recommend. But I desire to speak for myself alone and to make it clearly understood that the transmission of this Minute, and of the documents necessary to explain its argument to the Secretary of State, implies no approval by the Government of India of either it or them, but expressly reserves the whole case until it can be maturely and deliberately considered and determined.

5. Her Majesty's Government have affirmed that in their opinion "the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." Unfortunately very little is said of the grounds on which this opinion is based. When, after defining the duties of frontier officers in terms to which no exception can be taken, the Despatch proceeds to say—"They can hardly combine such duties with the regular work of district officials," the assumption of course is that under present arrangements this combination is the rule. The Lieutenant-Governor challenges this assertion, and shows (1) that on a large portion of the frontier the combination does not exist at all, there being political officers for the political work, separate and distinct from, indeed not even subordinate to, the district official, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner; (2) that where the combination does exist it is in parts of the country where the interests of the residents on the two sides of the border are so closely intertwined that it is impossible to deal with them separately; and (3) that where under the circumstances aforesaid the work becomes too heavy for the district official, assistance has been given, and can be given, and at any rate the political work is not allowed to suffer. In connection with this subject the Lieutenant-Governor has examined in detail the statements found in an article in The Times newspaper, an avowed and, so far as I know, the only formulated indictment of the present system which has yet appeared. I do not propose to follow him, and will content myself with saying that, so far as my own experience goes, it corroborates his presentation of the facts of the case, and that I feel bound to prefer the authority of the responsible head of the Province writing officially to that of any anonymous correspondent.

6. A similar argument might be used with regard to the sentence in the Despatch following next to that already quoted. The Lieutenant-Governor denies, and gives chapter and verse to show that it is not true, that frontier officials are transferred to other appointments in a manner that interferes with efficiency. There is nothing on the other side but assertion, and assertion by itself is not proof. Until therefore evidence to the contrary is adduced, it is but reasonable to believe that of the Lieutenant-Governor. But one is tempted to go a step further. Is it not possible to rate too highly the absence of removal or transfer? On the contrary, is there any worse evil in a service than stagnation? Mr. Anderson's remarks on this subject deserve consideration. Even Sir R. Udny, who avows himself a strong supporter of a special service for the frontier, clearly recognises that there would be difficulties, and proposes to meet them by arrangements, of which one thing is quite certain, i.e., that they will be very costly. This paper has come in late, and there has been no time to examine it in detail; but it must be remembered that a similar state of affairs to that brought out by the statement annexed is by no means unknown elsewhere in India, and that
one of the causes which contributes to it is a block in promotion, or, in other words, one of the phases of the stagnation to which I take objection; and one which would be still more likely to arise in a small special service. What is wanted on the frontier is personal influence, but not necessarily the influence of the individual. No doubt instances could easily be quoted where a strong and sympathetic individuality has dominated the ruder natures with which it has been brought in contact. But we cannot predicate characteristics like these for all frontier officers, and it is only too probable that an officer, set down in a remote district for the best years of his life, will imbibe prejudices from his surroundings, or perhaps tend to fossilize, at any rate lose the versatility of resource and promptitude of action on which success in dealing with Native races so much depends. We escape from much of this difficulty if we look to the service rather than the individual officer, and aim at a service so organised as to receive a constant supply of officers well equipped for the duties they have to perform, rather than the mere selection of special officers for special posts. People sometimes talk as if all we had to do was to find the man to fill the post. It is by no means to under-rate the initial difficulty to point out that it is often the smallest of the series; for once the post is established on certain lines, specially if the first incumbent is a man with special characteristics, the field of selection is still further limited in the case of his deputy or successor. Apart altogether from casualties or resignations, temporary vacancies must be comparatively numerous in an arduous service like that on the frontier, for it is impossible to deny men so placed opportunities of rest and relaxation. The difficulty therefore of replacing specially selected officers is no remote one, but may occur immediately, and recur constantly.

7. Leaving out of sight for the moment all question of the official who is to control the whole system, two classes of officers are required for frontier work. For the actual dealings with the tribes young men are wanted whose activity of mind and body predisposes them to a life which, if isolated and monotonous, has a spice of adventure and of danger, and, who are free from the ties which, e.g., for a married man, render residence in the wilds irksome and expensive. But as it is impossible to combine these qualities with a mature experience, it is necessary also to provide local supervision, or in other words, the presence at local centres of officers of sufficient standing and knowledge to be able to direct the junior officers on the spot in cases of difficulty, especially in those which must be disposed of promptly, and where reference to a distant authority is impracticable. In the long narrow strip of tribal country stretching along the Punjab frontier from the Gomal northwards, it would not be easy to find an agency so effective for this kind of local supervision as the men who attain to Commissionerships under the Punjab Government. The younger men might be recruited from the Staff Corps or elsewhere, though when that is advocated it is fair to remember that the Punjab Commission is already largely recruited from Staff Corps officers, the rule being that one Staff Corps officer is appointed to the Commission to every three of the Indian Civil Service. Two things seem perfectly evident——(1) that if a new Staff, separate and distinct from the Punjab Commission is to be established, it must at the outset consist principally, if not entirely, of officers drawn from that Commission, because in no other way can the local experience be obtained; and (2) that, even if hereafter it is sought to cut adrift from Punjab influences, the ultimate source of supply must be practically the same for the new service as for the old.

8. The geographical configuration of the tribal country to which reference has been made above has no doubt contributed to the formation of an administration such as that just described, and makes it difficult to suggest any workable alternative. In a compact tract of comparatively open country like Baluchistan, inhabited by a number of tribes which though differing from each other in some respects, are neither ‘fanatical nor strong, it is possible
to prescribe a general policy for the country as a whole. But that is not so
with the tribes along the Punjab frontier, and the fact was very clearly
brought out in the correspondence between the Government of India and the
Local Government in 1896. The attitude of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick was
that there ought to be no attempt to generalize where there is no room for
generalisation, but that the circumstances of each bit of the frontier must
be separately considered with reference to its peculiar circumstances.
The Government of India fully accepted the proposition that different parts of
the frontier were in different states of development,—vide paragraph 6 of
Mr. Barnes' letter of August 14th, 1896,—but Sir D. Fitzpatrick thought it so
important that he dealt with the whole subject in great elaboration and detail
in his reply dated October 26th, 1896.

9. If it be argued that, admitting the necessity of different treatment in
different tracts, some of the sub-division of the executive staff might be avoided
by making each tract self-contained, the answer is to be found in paragraph
11 of the Khyber Despatch of June 23rd. Of each one of the districts into
which the tribal country would divide itself could it be said, as of the Khyber,
that "we could not afford to station there an officer of the standing and
experience to be trusted in cases of importance and emergency. The district
is too small for an expensive staff, and too important for any other than a
thoroughly reliable authority." We cannot dispense with any of our out-
posts, Wano, Tochi, Kurram, Kohat, Khyber, and so on; each must be in
charge of a British officer; doubling up is impracticable, and without it the
cost of senior officers is prohibitive. It may be said that the conclusions of
Her Majesty's Government do not necessarily involve the displacement of
the subordinate machinery, but only the transfer of the control to the Govern-
ment of India. That may or may not be so; much depends on the working
out of details. But it seemed necessary to examine present arrangements
from the foundation, and to show that the guiding principles are intelligible
and practical; for, as pointed out, the language of the Despatch is vague
and general, and it is impossible from it to say for certain how far their
retention in whole or in part in a new system is contemplated, and the area
of controversy thereby restricted.

10. Proceeding now to the question of the transfer of control, it cannot be
said that the reasons which have influenced Her Majesty's Government here are
much more distinctly defined than their reasons for condemning the present system.
The objections stated in our Despatch to placing the Commissioner of Peshawar
under the Government of India are quoted,* and the comment is that these objections
appear more formal than real. But from what follows it is evident that there is
some misapprehension as to the true posi-
tion of the Commissioner of Peshawar. The Secretary of State maintains that
the policy he suggests is not an untried one, because the Commissioner of
Peshawar even now serves two masters in time of peace and corresponds direct
with the Government of India on the occurrence of disturbances. The
Lieutenant-Governor does not admit the correctness of this allegation, and he
is strongly supported by Mr. Merk. The events of the last five years have
again and again drawn my attention to the position of the Commissioner of
Peshawar, and it is right that I should record my personal opinion that it is a
mistake to suppose that the Government of India has exercised over him
any control which could differentiate him from other officers under the
Punjab Government. By arrangement they have made use of him for certain
purposes, e.g., in their correspondence with the Amir, but it would be most
misleading to represent him as in consequence in charge directly or indirectly
of any part of our relations with Afghanistan. It is true that at present
the Commissioner of Peshawar is the channel through whom certain com-
munications go to the Amir. He corresponds on local matters on his own
responsibility, and he forwards by messenger certain communications which we send to him by telegraph. But in the latter case he is not consulted, unless we see fit to do so, on the nature of the message; and we only use him at all to secure secrecy and despatch. It cannot be intended to give this officer, however much his importance may be increased, a right of corresponding independently with the Amir. We have never allowed the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to do so, and it would be most dangerous not to keep this correspondence entirely in the hands of the Foreign Department.

11. So again in regard to direct correspondence on the outbreak of disturbance. The object then is that stated in the letter from the Government of India of February 3rd, 1881, quoted by the Lieutenant-Governor, i.e., that the Government of India should receive the earliest information. It has always been recognised that so soon as military operations are undertaken or are even in prospect, it is necessary that the Government of India should obtain all important information direct, and the dual relation is then by no means confined to the Commissioner of Peshawar. It has been customary of late in the larger expeditions to entrust the chief political control to the General Officer Commanding, who thereupon corresponds with the Foreign Department as well as with his own military superiors, and the Chief Political Officer attached to the expedition acts under the orders of the General, though with a right reserved to him of submitting a statement of his individual opinion to the Government of India, should he think fit to do so on any special point. But the case of Mr. Bruce, who was Political Officer in Waziristan in 1894-95, is perhaps the best illustration. As an officer of the Punjab Government he began by sending information through the Local Government in the ordinary manner. The acute stage was reached while the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief were on tour, and Mr. Bruce was then instructed to correspond direct with the Foreign Department. Here, as in the case of the Commissioner of Peshawar, the object was that in urgent matters information should reach the Government of India by the speediest channel, and early information is so essential that the Government of India must reserve to itself the power of employing any officers of Government to supply it. But it is a wholly different matter to assume control of an official under a Local Government in his administrative action—or to consult him without reference to the Local Government on questions of policy. That has not been the practice with the Commissioner of Peshawar, and I can best show how strongly it was impressed on my mind by mentioning an incident which occurred last year. I deemed it expedient on a certain question of policy to make a communication to the officers on the frontier on whom we chiefly relied for political information. I had no difficulty in acting on my own initiative except in the case of the Commissioner of Peshawar, but in his case I thought it right to confer first with the Lieutenant-Governor, and explain what it was that I proposed to say. It need scarcely be added that the Lieutenant-Governor took no objection, and I addressed Sir R. Ddny accordingly; but in my judgment to obtain the previous concurrence of the Lieutenant-Governor was both technically correct and in itself advantageous.

12. It does not of course necessarily follow that because the Commissioner of Peshawar has not hitherto been under the control of two masters he might not be so placed for the future. It would be more of an experiment than the Secretary of State seems to imagine, but the experiment might be worth trying. Before, however, it is tried we must examine carefully its chances of success. And I confess it is a plan which has had attractions for me. In 1896, when we had the management of the frontier under consideration, I myself put forward the proposal for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Peshawar, which was suggested to the Lieutenant-Governor in paragraph 7 of Mr. Barnes' letter of August 14th, with the addition, which was not adopted, that "this Commissioner might perhaps correspond direct
with the Government of India on tribal affairs within his jurisdiction;” but I did so because I thought that thus “we should have secured most of the advantages of a separate province while avoiding the difficulties inseparable from dividing the tribes from the settled districts that adjoin them.” In the course of the discussion various arguments were adduced against the division between the different functions of the Commissioner of Peshawar. It was pointed out with great force that the idea of separating the ordinary civil administration of a district from the political charge would inevitably lead to friction amongst the officers themselves, as they would have to treat the people from different standpoints. It would also cause a want of finality in settlements of cases. Suitors would go backwards and forwards from the civil authority to the political authority, hoping that a later interview or petition might bring about a ruling more acceptable to them. The theory is that the political officer would be the medium of influence, and that, divorced from more routine civil duties, he would have leisure to push that influence. But influence over border men is not an abstract political entity; it is closely concreted with the incidents and conditions of their daily life, such as the settlement of their quarrels, the management of their land, disputed rights to water, grazing claims, love intrigues, and the numerous domestic incidents that make up life on the frontier, and which, when settled under normal conditions, lead to violence and blood feuds; and it is in the settlement of disputes that would result in bloodshed if left to tribal custom that our frontier officers, if of the right sort, get openings for spreading their influence. If a frontier man wants to describe his model of a frontier officer, he says of him—“He knows all our affairs.” Such influence and such knowledge will not bear breaking up into different elements of paternal government—one political and the other civil. Arguments such as these seemed fatal to the idea of placing the Commissioner in direct correspondence with the Government of India on tribal affairs only.

13. Now, again, the method which is suggested for bringing about a change is that the Commissioner of Peshawar and through him his several subordinates, who are employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India.

14. The Lieutenant-Governor in his Note shows, I think, so clearly that it would be vain to go over the ground again, that the Commissioner and the Government of India cannot deal thoroughly and conclusively with external relations with the tribes without including some administrative work within our border. What the extent of that must necessarily be has not been defined, because the Lieutenant-Governor pronounces against the practicability of the system proposed; but whatever its extent, administrative work dealt with directly between the Government of India and a Commissioner of Division would be something different from what is done in any part of India. In all India there is between the Government of India and the administration of the country a Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, or Chief Commissioner, and if this is necessary elsewhere no reason has been advanced for thinking that it will not be necessary on the frontier.

15. It is difficult to give instances of the sort of work which is referred to the Local Government in frontier matters, but which with a Local Government need not come to the Government of India; but, in order to give it as far as may be in detail,* an examination has been made of the Proceedings of the Punjab Government in the Foreign branch or section for the year 1896, that year being selected as an ordinary one, undisturbed by any special frontier rising.

* On the very first page of the B papers (Frontier) for January 1896 will be found five cases, dealt with by the Punjab Government, which, if frontier management were removed from the Lieutenant-Governor’s control, would presumably have come to the Government of India. The subjects of these cases were—
Complaints to Colonel Warburton against the Sartip of Dhakka.
16. It is more than doubtful whether the Secretary of State, in entrusting to the Government of India "a wide discretion in framing the arrangements, financial and executive, which may be found necessary," contemplated the separation from the Punjab Government of so much administrative work, or that the Commissioner should have the financial powers of a local Government. Granted that this is necessary, the question must sooner or later resolve itself into one whether it is better to have as an intermediate local Government the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, or a Commissioner who will be a Chief Commissioner on the Frontier.

17. Mr. Anderson thinks it possible for the Commissioner to be a Chief Commissioner as far as his duty lies directly under the Government of India and to remain a Commissioner of Division in his relations with the Punjab. To my mind his position has only to be so stated in order to show the impossibility of it. Sir R. Udny seems to contemplate an elaborate system of duplicate reports which would certainly end in confusion.

18. The Lieutenant-Governor as the responsible head of the Province declares that the changes suggested would introduce chaos into the administration. Having been for five years in charge of the Foreign Department of the Government of India, I think I am entitled to speak for it, and I do

Portion of land acquired for military purposes at Para Chinar allotted for building sites and other purposes.
Proposal to call one of the gates of the "City" of Para Chinar the Fitzpatrick Gate.
Petition to the Lieutenant-Governor from prisoners in the Kohat Jail.
Sanction granted to a Kurram Militia Drill Instructor to return to his regiment.

A further examination of the Frontier Proceedings shows numerous references disposed of by the Punjab Government. To cite a few of the different subjects of such references:—
Details connected with Khyber tolls.
Border Military Police establishment. Questions of their equipment, pay, allowances, &c.
Same class of questions as regards Kurram Militia and Khyber Rifles.
Reports on British military officers with such corps.
Correspondence between the Amir and Commissioner, Peshawar, on unimportant local matters. (There are occasionally such cases which the Punjab Government dispose of.)
Permits for rifles imported by British officers on the frontier.
Numerous petitions from tribesmen and Frontier Chiefs; also miscellaneous petitions relating to the frontier tracts, not one in twenty of which now comes before the Foreign Department.

Statements of cases decided under the Frontier Tribes Regulations.
Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara, Khyber, and Kurram monthly political contingent bills.
Expenditure from District Funds.
Reports of death of leading men in the frontier districts.
All questions of the grant of pensions to families of deserving jagirdars and such like. (At present the Foreign Department only gets these when the Local Government supports them. Under the proposed arrangement the Foreign Department would have to get all applications which the Commissioner supported.)

Questions relating to expenditure by frontier officers of an unusual nature. (Many such are within the competence of the Local Government to dispose of.)
Permission to Afghan refugees to visit Peshawar.
Payment of compensation to persons (other than Government servants) who suffer loss from petty tribal offences in cases where fine money is levied from offenders. At present Punjab Government has discretion.
Disputes between British and Afghan subjects at Peshawar.
Appeals from prisoners under sentence of death. The disposal of these has just been transferred to the Home Department. Would not these have to come back to the Foreign Department as local Government under the new arrangement?

Questions relating to leave, promotion, &c., of local native officers, such as Tahsildars, &c.
The Commissioner's budget for frontier expenditure would have to be taken up in this Department, and all questions connected with it. (This would mean a lot of trouble.)

All matters connected with the Mohmands, the Black Mountain, Buner, the Nawab of Amb, Kohat Pass Afridis, Orakzais, Afridis, Kurram.

Grant of kishtas.

The above headings have been taken from the Punjab Foreign Proceedings volumes for three months. The Home, Financial, and Revenue Proceedings have not been examined; but it is clear that all questions now referred to the Lieutenant-Governor under those heads would also have to come up to the Foreign Department unless the Commissioner's status were altered.
not hesitate to say that the consequences there would be equally serious. The Foreign Department, as things stand, has no reason to fear attack; it will bear comparison with any similar department in the ability and diligence of the officers by whom it is manned, the accuracy of its information, or the promptitude and prudence with which the varied and complicated mass of business is despatched; but the staff, from the Viceroy and Foreign Secretary downwards, are not chosen for knowledge of administrative details, and to employ them to deal with business of the kind described above would be a useless waste of their time. This is no theoretical opinion, for we have gained a considerable experience in Baluchistan. Matters are now on a more sound and regular footing in that Agency, and since the revenues have been in a manner provincialised the detailed work has decreased. But the Foreign Department used to be greatly occupied with details of revenue, police, and levy establishments, and I assert emphatically that the result was not satisfactory. If the Lieutenant-Governor is unable to suggest how the necessary changes can be effected on the frontier, I am equally unable to make any proposals for so reinforcing the Foreign Department as to enable it to cope with this addition to its labours. It is not merely a question of amount of work, for that might be overcome; but it is a class of work for which the organisation is absolutely unfitted. Recognising as I do the supreme importance of an efficient Foreign Department, I feel bound to deplore any step that would overweight it as I am sure the allotting of administrative work to it would do.

19. Sir Mackworth Young in paragraph 16 of his Note states that, while he entirely concurs in the reasons for rejecting the proposal to form a separate administration for the frontier districts, he would prefer even that scheme with all its disadvantages to the disintegration of the Punjab administration. Any support, therefore, which he gives to the idea of a separate administration is given from a consideration of provincial interests, and is given only if these interests cannot be preserved otherwise. But for the purposes of this Minute it is necessary to examine the question from the point of view of Imperial interests. No one of course can deny that occasions have arisen, and may arise again, when the formation of a new charge, or agency, or province, either becomes a necessity, or has overwhelming advantages. It may be necessitated by the increasing development or opening up of the country, which has made the burden too heavy for the shoulders on which it has hitherto rested, or by the adoption of a new and energetic policy which it is desired to push by the undivided attention of a special officer. It may be justified by the fact that the tract in question marks itself for separation by the physical features of the country, or by characteristics of its inhabitants which distinguish them from their neighbours and facilitate their collective treatment. It may come about by one of those accidents which bring us face to face with the hour and the man. Reasons like these could be found for placing Assam under a Chief Commissioner, or Baluchistan under an Agent to the Governor-General; I can find none in the circumstances of the tribal country on the Punjab frontier. The Punjab Government is a busy Government, as all Governments are in India, but it is not true that it is overburdened, and, if necessary, it could be strengthened by methods adopted elsewhere. There is no question of opening up the country, or inaugurating an active policy therein; such things are excluded by the Despatch of January 28th. As already pointed out, geographical conditions and the tribal characteristics and animosities unite to make combination impossible. I hesitate to say much of individuals, but with a full sense of responsibility I affirm that, having watched closely the events on the frontier during the last five years and the actors in them, I can select no one who in my judgment has by his experience, natural ability, standing, or performance, approved himself beyond dispute the right man in the right place if this difficult task has to be undertaken.
20. But it will be said that there is here a special reason in the traditional policy of the Punjab, the "close border" system of which so much has been written. It is not necessary to stir the embers of an ancient controversy, and to debate whether the cautious policy of former Lieutenant-Governors was right or wrong in the circumstances as they then existed. It should not be forgotten that those circumstances were not the circumstances of to-day, that our knowledge of the tribes, and their knowledge of us, was very different, and, above all, that the sphere of the Amir's interference was undefined and his attitude aggressive. It is perhaps not surprising to find that those who chafed at what they deemed a timid and ineffectual policy should have rooted in their minds the belief that officers under the Punjab Government must pursue the course and maintain the attitude which that policy imposed upon them, but it is none the less a mistaken belief. The officers serving under the Punjab Government are drawn from the same classes as other officers in India, and those from amongst them who rise to positions of authority, and the men who fill the post of Lieutenant-Governor, do so by the same process of selection which is in force throughout India, and which has made the British rule in India what it is. There is in reality one difference only between the training of a Punjab officer and that of his brethren elsewhere, and that is that he can, if he will, acquire a knowledge of the tribes living on the borders of his Province. I could give numerous instances from my own experience of Punjab officers who had no inclination to hang back, and I am prepared to endorse most emphatically the claim that the Local Government has loyally co-operated in the declared policy of the Government of India. The late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab once said to me, when discussing this subject, "you have only to lift your finger, and the break will be taken off in any place you think this desirable." That remark is more than an expression of personal loyalty; it contains in a few words a correct exposition of the only principle on which we can rest our arrangements, i.e., that it is the business of the Government of India, and the Government of India alone, to formulate and prescribe a policy outside the borders of British India. People sometimes talk as if it was for the Lieutenant-Governor, the Agent to the Governor-General, the Commissioner, the Political Agent, to manage the district assigned to him, and that he must be "given a free hand." Statements of this kind cannot be accepted without qualification. It is possible to limit too strictly the intercourse of political officers with the tribes, and our letter of 1896 was designed to show how more intimate relations were perfectly consistent with management by the Punjab Government. It is also very desirable to give each political officer full opportunities of expounding his views, which are the result of his local knowledge, and to follow his advice so far as that can be safely done. But it is essential that over all there should be the general control and the general policy of the Government of India, to which all officers alike must conform, whether they agree with it or not.

21. This seems so self-evident a proposition that when Her Majesty's Government declare "that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India," it is reasonable to suppose that there is no suggestion that the control is not now supervised by the Government of India, though it is exercised indirectly and through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. I pass therefore to the consideration of the comparison between a control exercised indirectly through the Lieutenant-Governor, and a similar control exercised through an Agent to the Governor-General. It may be admitted that in both cases the Foreign Department is relieved from a mass of administrative detail; but, as already stated, the relief is by no means as complete in the case of the Agent to the Governor-General as in that of the Lieutenant-Governor, for the simple reason that the full machinery of a Local Government is not available. The Baluchistan Agency was fairly on its legs before I knew it, and is still more firmly established now, and yet it affords overwhelming proof of this proposition. If so, one can only conjecture what would be the result of a new Agency on the Punjab Frontier. But besides this
there are two other matters on which it is my duty to speak frankly; and if it be thought that I magnify my office I can only say that I describe circumstances as I myself have found them. The closer supervision and control desired by Her Majesty's Government must be largely exercised by the Viceroy himself both in his capacity as head of the Government and as having charge of the Foreign Department. It is of the highest importance that the relations between the Viceroy and the officer who, under his supervision, directs the control of their external relations should be close and personal. The Agent to the Governor-General from the mere fact of his appointment is expected to reside in his district; he may be called to Simla or Calcutta, or the Viceroy may, during his five years, meet him once, perhaps twice, on tour, and that is all. The Lieutenant-Governor resides several months every year at Simla, and is in constant communication with the Viceroy. The Agent to the Governor-General of a district, such as that now under contemplation, would of course be a selected officer, deserving the fullest confidence, but the Lieutenant-Governor is an officer in the very highest grade, both by seniority and position. Now it is at the point where Imperial interests must override local considerations that the Viceroy's hand must be felt upon the reins. A certain course of action may be proposed which, looking to local circumstances, is beyond doubt the best; and yet Imperial policy may require that it should be abandoned. If at that moment the officer who must be overruled is one with whom there are opportunities of personal conference and consultation, the chances of friction and misunderstanding are infinitely less than if he is one with whom there can only be communication from a distance by letter, and who must on that account, and perhaps by reason of his standing, be addressed rather as a subordinate than as a colleague and friend.

22. It is probably only practical experience that can enable any one to realise the full advantage that can be secured, or the loss of influence that may result, from differences such as this in the arrangements whereby control is exercised. But there is one more difference between the Agent to the Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governor which is fundamental, and which vitally affects the question, which of them is to be preferred for the present purpose? It has been objected that the Lieutenant-Governor has too many interests outside his Province, and that it cannot be expected that he will be able to devote sufficient attention to affairs on and across the border. But is there not another side to that question? If we create this new post, choosing for it, as we are bound to do, a man of energy and ambition, what outlet is he to find for his activity? The career of a Sandeman, the creation of a new Baluchistan, is debarred to him; for the policy which he must carry out is essentially one of *quieta non movere*. It was a policy of non-annexation, of non-interference, which was declared by Her Majesty's Government in the Despatch of January 28th, and was expounded on their behalf by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, and the future Viceroy. It is a policy of which I heartily approve, and which I claim has been pursued during my administration. Expeditions have been undertaken, and our advanced posts have been still further advanced, the former having been sent, and the latter established, in consequence of obligations which, so far as I am concerned, were inherited. We have assumed the protection of the Dauris in the Tochi valley against their turbulent neighbours, at their own request long and urgently preferred, but no tribe or section of a tribe has been compelled against their will to surrender the local self-government which they formerly possessed, and which it is their desire to retain. It is because I wish to see this policy acted upon in the future, and because I regard it as the best hope of a peaceful and permanent settlement, that I deprecate the establishment on the frontier of an authority which from the nature of things must, in my judgment, endanger its continuance, and that I still prefer to rely on such an adaptation of the machinery we already possess as we proposed in our Despatch, believing that by so doing we can with less risk and greater efficiency secure the objects which Her Majesty's Government have in view.

*November 6th, 1898.*

(Sd.) ELGIN.
No. 207 of 1898.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

Frontier.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, the 10th November 1898.

MY LORD,

As soon as we received Your Lordship's despatch as marked in the margin, we referred to the Local Government the question of the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border. We have now received the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor, but, for reasons stated by His Excellency the Viceroy in a Minute which we enclose, we have been unable to give to the Lieutenant-Governor's memorandum sufficient consideration to enable us to state our views on the question at issue.

2. In the meantime we have the honour to forward, for information, the correspondence alluded to and the Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy.

We have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) ELGIN.

W. S. A. LOCKHART.

J. WESTLAND.

M. D. CHALMERS.

E. H. H. COLLEN.

A. C. TREVOR.

C. M. RIVAZ.
List of Enclosures in Secret Despatch No. 207 (Frontier), dated the 10th November 1898, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

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<td>1</td>
<td>No. 3243.F., dated the 19th September 1898.</td>
<td>To the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.</td>
<td>Opinion invited as to the management of external relations with the tribes on the Peshawar border.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>No. 3-C., dated the 23rd October 1898, with enclosures.</td>
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<td>Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy.</td>
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(Sd.) O. V. BOSANQUET,
Offg. Deputy Secy. to the Govt. of India.