THE CHITRAL TRIANGLE

Rise and Decline of trans-montane Central Asian Trade, 1895–1935

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The discussion of socio-economic transformation in peripheral regions – among which remote high mountain areas occupy a prominent position - often centres around the project of modernization and its impact on regional development, i.e., the introduction of motorized vehicle transport on tarred surface roads and subsequent growth-related effects in infrastructure extension and commercial enterprises. Consequently, according to this concept development efforts in these regions are initiated from outside. It takes external interventions to modernize backward and stagnant “traditional” societies.

The analysis of historical developments and transformations in the Inner Asian interface shows us that trans-mountainous trade links across the Hindukush have played varying roles prior to the closure of international boundaries and the introduction of modern traffic infrastructure. Trade via the Hindukush connected the southern foothills and lowlands of the subcontinent with the urban oases of Central Asia. Certain principalities participated in long-distance exchange directly and indirectly as highland entrepots. In this context the Chitral route in conjunction with the Wakhan route played an important role placing Chitral bazaar in the centre of gravity in a trade triangle.

The effects of trans-montane trade via Chitral are investigated from the internal and external perspective. The composition of trade commodities, the local extraction of tolls from travellers and the provision of porterage for traders are presented on the basis of historical evidence from archival sources as well as colonial considerations related to international exchange and interference in trade patterns. Thus, the uneven structure of participation in trans-montane trade is emphasized on. Finally, under the changed circumstances of present-day Central Asia the prospects of future trade links along traditional lines are briefly highlighted.

Keywords: Central Asia; Chitral; Pakistan; Inner-Asian trade routes and their development; colonial trade and its impact on local conditions; the emergence of opium trade and hashish production in Chitral.
1. INTRODUCTION

Discussing Chitral's communication and traffic links contemporary observers are prone to mention the cul-de-sac situation of one of the largest districts of Pakistan as there is only one road connecting Chitral with Peshawar. This fact becomes especially prominent during the cold season from October to May when the Lowari Top (3118 m) is practically impassable. On the other hand, there are a number of enterprises linked with modern traffic infrastructure: the Kunar Valley road through Afghan territory posing an alternative access from the south, plans for a tunnel underneath Lowari, road networks in Lutkho using the Dorah Pass for the supplies of Afghan Mujaheddin or the upgrading of the Shandur Pass road are all existing projects under construction.

The Hindukush-Karakoram-Himalayan arc is one of the mountain systems in the world which has experienced enormous efforts of road building in recent years (Kreutzmann 1991). Strategic considerations governed the decision-making processes of domestic or multi-lateral road projects. It appears that Chitral has been exempted from these planning exercises, probably mainly because of its strategic position within international boundaries contiguous to neighbours of different political alliances.

The end of the Cold War and the process of globalization has changed this setup. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) has promoted as a result of its 1992 Teheran meeting the restau ration of a Trans-Asian Highway and the linkage of road networks between Central and South Asia.¹ Recently, the railway lines between Turkmenistan and Iran were connected furnishing the first track between formerly separated blocks. For road communication only the Karakoram Highway links the Grand Trunk Road cities of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent with the urban Inner Asian oases of the ancient Silk Route.² A trade protocol between Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan laid the foundation for growing exchange and commerce among these neighbours. Do those future plans affect the communication situation in Chitral at all? This question should be discussed in the perspective of former trade links and modes of communication as the re-establishment of earlier transport lines is intended.

During the 19th century the modern traffic was planned along railway lines. Russian colonization and introduction of physical infra-
structure in Central Asia followed an approach similar to that of British railway networks in India. Railways connected commercial and population centres with seaports and industrial cities. In both empires railheads ended at the foot-hills leaving in between a mountain barrier. This transition zone gained significance in respect of territorial control and commercial tariffs. Where trade and communication followed mule tracks transport costs and travelling time significantly increased. The constraints of access frequently resulted in the judgement that Chitral among other mountain societies has been a classic cul-de-sac without substantial exchange relations. In this paper it is attempted to highlight the importance of trade along these routes for Chitral prior to the closure of international boundaries and the introduction of motorized traffic.

2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN TRADE

In Central Asia the Great Game resulted in the demarcation of international boundaries separating the spheres of influence of the super powers of the time. Besides executing direct control and domination in the core areas of their empires Great Britain and Russia had created buffer states at the periphery such as Persia and Afghanistan. In their negotiations they had excluded Kashgaria or Eastern Turkestan which nominally was under Chinese administration. Trade between South and Central Asia was affected by this constellation and a rivalry had developed since British commercial interests entered this sector in 1874.\(^3\)

Both super powers competed for dominance on the markets in the urban oases of the Silk Road such as Kashgar and Yarkand. Russia had some advantage as access was easier.\(^4\) From the railhead at Andijan which was linked to the Middle Asian Railway in 1899 the distance to Kashgar (554 km) could be covered in twelve marches via Osh, Irkeshtam, and Ulugchat by crossing only one major pass, Terek Dawan (3870 m). On the other hand trade caravans from British India had to follow either of three trans-montane passages\(^5\) – the Leh, Gilgit, and Chitral routes – which were much longer and more difficult (Fig. 1).

The competition for the Central Asian markets have continued after the October Revolution which caused the closure of the Russian/ Soviet
Consulate in Kashgar from 1920–1925. This event affected the Soviet commerce with Kashgaria detrimentally while the British share soared. Overall trade significantly declined due to the disturbances in Chinese Turkestan after 1935 and later due to World War II and the Chinese Revolution. Central Asian trade (Fig. 2) became an important factor in cross-boundary relations affecting the economies in the regions traversed for a period of forty years. The total volume of Indo-Xinjiang commercial exchange surpassed the 2 million Rs level for most of the era between 1895 and 1934. At the end of the 19th century George Macartney the British Consul-General in Kashgar had summarized the situation: "The demand for Russian goods is without doubt ever increasing. Cotton prints of Moscow manufacture, as cheap as they are varied and pretty, are very largely imported. The bazaars of every town are overstocked with them, as well as with a multitude of other articles, amongst the most important of which may be mentioned lamps, candles, soap, petroleum, honey, sugar, sweetmeats, porcelain cups, tumblers, enameled iron plates, matches, knives and silks. These articles, with few exceptions, could, but for the competition, be supplied from India. But we have gradually had to relinquish our position in favour of Russia, until at last our trade has to confine itself chiefly to articles of which we are the sole producers and in which there is no competition." British interests in securing a substantial share in this commercial exchange governed their imperial designs and had an impact on the mountain societies involved. At the turn of the century Ladakh and Baltistan were dominated by the Maharaja of Kashmir, Gilgit had become an agency (re-established in 1899) under the joint administration of a British Political Agent and a Kashmiri Wazir-i-Wazarat. Principalities such as Hunza and Nagar were affiliated after their defeat in 1891 encounters which were fought under the pretext of opening the Gilgit route for commercial purposes. At the same time the Mehtar of Chitral transferred his sovereignty in external affairs to a British Agent and was remunerated with an annual subsidy and a supply of arms. A peaceful collaboration commenced after the siege of Chitral in 1895, the installation of Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk (1895–1936) and administrative reforms linking Chitral to the newly-created North-West Frontier Province. In this period following the demarcation of the "Northern Frontier", i.e., the Durand Line and the Pamir Boundary, major road works and the construction of
suspension bridges at Mastuj, Sonoghor, Chitral, Drosh and Noghor improved the transport conditions along the Chitral route.

3. EXAMINATION OF TRADE ROUTES BETWEEN BRITISH INDIA AND KASHGARIA

From the perspective of imperial domination so-called “pacified” conditions characterized all three routes within British India at the turn of the century. All the same they were quite different in distance, physical conditions, and trade volume. In a report of 1938 the disadvantages and advantages are summarized:

Chitral route [Kashgar – Wakhan – Chitral – Chakdarra – Peshawar 1169 km]: “Statistics show that until the last two or three years there has been a regular though small flow of trade along this route. ...It is not clear whether its almost complete cessation during the last two years is due to action by the Sinkiang authorities or to Afghan exactions and restrictions, in Wakhan, but the latter is possibly the chief cause.”

Gilgit route [Kashgar/Yarkand – Gilgit – Burzil – Srinagar – Rawalpindi 1335 km]: “The Gilgit route presents probably even greater physical difficulties than the Chitral route, but has the advantage of avoiding Afghan territory and goods pass direct from Sinkiang to India and vice versa. The total value of imports and exports by this route during 1936 was however, less than one Lakh [=100,000 Rs], and any large expenditure on improving it from the point of view of this trade alone would clearly be unjustified. The Government of India propose, however, to consider the possibility of carrying out small improvements on the communication between Gilgit and British India and between Gilgit and the frontier as much from the point of view fo the needs of the Agency as from that of Indo-Sinkiang trade.”

Leh route [Kashgar – Yarkand – Leh – Srinagar – Rawalpindi 1706 km]: “The Government of India accept the view which is borne out by statistics that Leh route is the most important of the three routes. ...The physical difficulties are enormous. It is impossible, for instance, to alter the Sasir, bridle the Shyok, and place serais beyond Panamik. The Government of India propose, however, to see if anything can be done to improve amenities of this route at small expense provided the
assumption by the Sinkiang Provincial authorities of control over Khotan does not lead to this route being closed indefinitely... 

The latter route is characterized by the greatest physical difficulties and involves at least 50 marches starting in Srinagar and reaching Yarkand after a total distance of 1170 km. Besides the notorious Zoji La (3530 m), Namika La (3900 m) and Fatu La (4100 m) between Srinagar and Leh there are in addition five passes above 5300 m which had to be crossed between Leh and Karghalik (Fig. 1) such as Khardung La (5300 m), Saser Pass (5330 m), Karakoram Pass (5575 m), Suget Pass (5346 m) and Kilian Pass (5463 m). Several rivers and torrents had to be forded and huge losses in pack animals and goods were caused by these obstacles. For 14 consecutive marches food and supplies for traders and transport animals had to be carried along. The route was marked by the corpses of travellers and pack animals having lost their lives due to ubiquitous dangers and hazards during their journey. Nevertheless this route remained through the whole period the most important line for British trade and communication (Fig. 3). Although by far the longest route most of the goods (Tab. I) were exchanged via Leh.

The Gilgit route was almost a quarter of the distance shorter in its mountain section where caravans required pack animals and human (coolie) porterage. On 29 marches between Gilgit and Kashgar it involved less climbing up and descending of high passes (Mintaka 4709 m, Ulugh Robat (Subash-Pass) 3900 m) than the other routes. But the Hunza Valley posed enormous difficulties because of its narrow gorge. Difficult passages over hanging paths (parii, perien) allowed transport by porters only instead of pack animals thus increasing the cost per unit. Numerous river crossing restricted the volume of trade and confined trade caravans to certain seasons. The bad reputation of the former Hunza caravan raiders may have stigmatized this route as well, but more important were the high demands of the hereditary rulers of Hunza and Nagar for transit dues such as toll taxes and grazing fees (Tab. II). Between 1892 and 1896 the Mir of Hunza (61%), the wazir (33%), the tax collector (2%), and the village headmen (4%) of Ghujal (arbab) extracted a total of 2,099 Rs from transit traders while the total income of the Mir of Nagar accrued to 571 Rs. Although defeated in the Hunza Campaign of 1891 these rulers who were installed by the colonial administration had managed to secure this
additional income and affect the prospects of trade detrimentally. In an assessment five years after the so-called “pacification” the Political Agent in Gilgit, S. H. Godfrey, stated the potential for trade: “... received numerous petitions from traders of British India, the Indus Valley, and Yarkand, requesting that arrangements may be made to free the Yarkand route, through Hunza and Gilgit from the obstacles, fiscal and physical, which at present prevent any free flow of commerce, and the establishment of a more extended market in Chinese Turkistan for British and Indian goods. ... principal object is the abolition of local taxes levied by the Mir of Hunza, and the Raja of Nagar in their countries. If arrangements could be made to effect this, the chief obstacle to the development of British Indian trade with Chinese Turkistan through Gilgit will have been removed. ... Traders here, as in Ladakh, have assured me that if the Gilgit road were opened, British, not Russian, goods would flow into Yarkand. At present there is unfortunately an actual reflux of Russian trade back into Hunza and Gilgit from Yarkand, owing to the Burzil route being monopolized by the Commissariat Department, and the Babusar road not yet fully opened. The few traders who have come down from Yarkand to Hunza this year have brought down Russian cloth and cotton goods exclusively ... Moscow, and not Bombay, supply the limited requirements of the Kanjut [Hunza and Nagar] country, and to some extent of Gilgit also. ... There are absolutely no British-made goods of any sort of kind procurable in Hunza and Nagar, ... if we exclude a few packages of matches and mirrors brought up by Koliwal traders from the Chilas bazar.”

Great expectations were connected to the Gilgit route. Although this thoroughfare could not live up to the vision and projections of Martin Conway\(^\text{13}\) trade between Kashmir and Central Asia via the Hunza valley developed around the British-Kashmir military headquarter in Gilgit. In 1890 a gazetteer remarked: “... there is no regular bazár, or any large collection of houses. There are ... a few shops close to the fort which supply the wants of the garrison.” (Barrow 1890: 327) But by the 1920s the small bazaar of Gilgit had grown and a variety of commercial enterprises were established: “Traders from the Indus Valley districts of Koli and Palas bring up their goods form village to village for sale. The chief articles of their trade are cotton fabrics of white and grey colours, salt in considerable quantity, and also tea, sugar, tobacco and spices. In return for these and in lieu of cash
they take grain, gold, ghi and pattu cloths. Pathan traders from Bajaur also bring goods into the Agency via Chitral and the Shandur Pass. Musalman merchants from Kashmir established a few shops here and there about 40 years ago, importing their goods from Kashmir, and about 11 years ago [= 1916] these were followed by some Hindu shopkeepers from the Punjab, who opened their shops in Gilgit and whose numbers are slowly increasing. Russian chintz is brought by traders from Yarkand, ... while in Yasin and Ishkoman the Wakhis from Wakhan sell ponies, harness, numdas and a little coarse salt in return for grain.” (General Staff India 1928a: 31–32) Gilgit bazaar was regarded by Schomberg (1935:18) as “the best outside the valley of Kashmir” when dual administration in the Gilgit wazarat was terminated and the territory solely leased to the British authorities by the Maharaja of Kashmir in 1935.

The short section across the Hunza valley became the most expensive part of the whole journey between Rawalpindi and Kashgar. The transit dues were regarded by the traders as a form of payment for the right of passage (octroi) rather than a contribution to the maintenance of the route. These extra costs restricted the volume of trade besides physical features such as seasonality of passage, condition of track and river crossings. In addition the availability of supplies, porterage and pack animals was limited in the same way as fodder and fuel were scarce. The unit cost of caravan transport on the Gilgit route amounted to the highest of all routes, on the other hand, the stretch of time required to send goods from overseas or the subcontinent to Central Asia was significantly shorter (Tab. III).

This state of affairs remained similar for the whole period under consideration and numerous efforts were made to improve the routes and the conditions for potential traders. Between 1870 and 1931 the cost of transport was reduced on all routes by more than a third. All the same the mountain sector and the restrictions for motorized transport limited the efforts. In 1937, Vice-Consul M. C. Gillet investigated the commercial potential of both alternative routes and summarized in his report the achievements and advantages of the Leh route: “The Leh-Yarkand route is used for trade since the Central Asian trade has started and the British Government have done very much to improve this road. We are provided with ease and comfort and difficulties have been removed. Efforts are being made to start Sarikol-Gilgit route but that will harm us very much. ... some of the blessings of Leh route:
(i) Grain is stored in each stage between Srinagar and Saser and it is sold to the carriers for their ponies.

(ii) Sufficient transport can be had on both the sides and goods can be transported easily throughout the year, which is not the case on the other road [Gilgit route].

(iii) Duty paid at the post in India is refunded to us within 3 weeks of the arrival of the goods in Leh and can be utilized again but by the other route it will be paid in India after the goods have been inspected in Kashgar. This takes a long time.

(iv) Leh route has no danger to goods and lives...

(v) Goods via Leh pay 17 1/2 per cent. duty in Khotan area whereas goods via Gilgit for Khotan will have to pay 28 1/2 per cent. to Kashgar authorities.

(vi) The carrier who run on Leh route can take for themselves as much rations as they like but on the other route authorities allow hardly as much as is required for the way.

(vii) Goods for export in exchange of import are mostly produced and found in Khotan area. Yarkand produced only Charas [Hashish, Cannabis sativa] which has been prohibited by the Government. It is easy for the carriers to take Khotan goods to Leh but if the same goods are sent via Gilgit it will be a longer route and more costly.

(viii) Khotan goods exported to India pay 12 1/2 per cent. to Khotan authorities but when they are sent via Gilgit Kashgar authorities charge another 11 per cent.

(ix) About 2,000 ponies, 1,000 camels and 500 donkeys run on Leh route and this number cannot go by the other route and are not available too.

(x) Goods imported in this country via Leh are mostly brought to Leh via Kullu [Kulu] which is shorter even than Srinagar route and cheaper.

(xi) The export from Turkestan via Leh is consumed in Leh, Kullu, Simla and Lasa [Lhasa], but if they are transported to these markets by the Gilgit route goods will not be then so cheaper hence not paying.

(xii) Goods via Leh are sold in Leh in a great quantity and provide us with money for onward journey hire but Gilgit is not so good a market.
(xiii) Goods via Leh do not pay any duty on way up to Turkestan whereas duty is charged on the other route in two places.

(xiv) Leh route is so wide that camels can go easily on it with bulky bundles of felts but Gilgit route is very narrow for this purpose."

Hitherto the discussion has focused only on two of the three routes. The colonial administration favoured the Leh route as trade logistics had been considerably improved, taxation seemed to be lowest in this sector, and substantial quantities of goods originated from the Yarkand-Khotan region which is closer to Ladakh than to the other routes. The volume of trade and the infrastructural requirements of pack animals, fodder, fuel and supplies could favourable be managed only on the Leh route in the opinion of the Consul-General at Kashgar.

4. THE CHITRAL ROUTE: ASSETS AND CONSTRAINTS FOR CENTRAL ASIAN TRADE

The Chitral route appeared to be faster than the Gilgit and Leh routes by a span of two days to nearly three weeks (Tab. III). In contrast to the other two lines of communication traders on this route had to make a transit through Afghan territory. From Baroghil Pass (3807 m) the caravans left Chitral for Sarhad-i-Wakhan and proceeded through the Pamir-e Khurd (Little Pamir) and Kirghiz grazing grounds towards the Wakhjir Pass (4923 m) where they entered the Taghdumbash Pamir and Chinese territory. There the Chitral route joined the one from Gilgit at Mintaka Aghzi in the Kara Chukur valley and continued via Tashkurgan to Kashgar and Yarkand respectively. The Wakhan corridor and the Taghdumbash Pamir separated the Russian/Soviet and British spheres of influence. This narrow sector posed a vulnerable trading route depending on favourable political relations with Afghanistan. Between 1897 and 1904 the Afghan Government attempted to deviate the trade via Chitral. After Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s conquest of Kafiristan (nowadays Nuristan) territorial control should be demonstrated by leading a trade route from Faizabad to Parun, Asmar, and Bajaur which involved 29 stages without major obstacles (Holzwarth 1990: 199). During the period under consideration Anglo-Afghan relations deteriorated with a culmination in the 1919 war which was a
struggle to terminate British domination and finally led to Afghan sovereignty. Although Chitral militia supported British forces during this war the Afghan Government kept an interest in continuing trade via Badakhshan and officially acknowledged the Chitral route in 1920. The political developments, additional custom duties, and the insecurity of trade – as much in the so-called tribal areas of Dir and Bajaur as across the boundaries – counterbalanced the timesaving aspect and the lower unit costs (cf. Tab. III) on this route which was only seasonally open in the summers.

All the same the trade via Chitral fluctuated during this period (Figs. 4 and 5) in a manner that Chitral had once (1932) a share of 34.6% in the total Central Asian trade volume and four years later gained only 0.2%. Another regional peculiarity is connected with the commodities exchanged. While in the overall Central Asian trade the import of Xinjiang charas (Hashish, Cannabis sativa) ranged around a fifth of the total (Fig. 6) the charas trade via Chitral accounted for more than three quarters in the 1920s (Tab. IV). Besides officially accepted drug trade by licensed dealers a certain share was smuggled in order to avoid the payment of taxes and custom duties to Chinese, Afghan and British authorities. In this connection the Chitral route had some advantages juxtapositional to others. A comparison of charges and transport costs for 1931 reveals that the charas import to British India via Chitral was about 19% cheaper than via Leh. This calculation includes all transport charges, taxes and customs duties. The difference is significant for charas, felts and animal skins while the import of silk was cheaper via Leh.

Licensed drug dealers involved in this profitable enterprise originated mainly from Hoshiarpur (Punjab) and Shikarpur (Sind). In addition, these Hindu traders were engaged in money-lending and controlled a trans-border network of financial institutions along all trade routes. When a new bazaar was built in Chitral in 1904, the British Political Agent “... advised the Mehtar to set aside a certain number of shops for Hindus. There is at present only one shop owned by a Hindu in Chitral, and the introduction of some competition of this sort would tend to break the ring of Bajauri Parachas [small merchants] who at present have matters too much their own way.” Like other enterprises this trade was interrupted due to the disturbances in Xinjiang in the 1930s as well. After difficult negotiations an agreement was reached in
1937 that "... traders have been given permission to export from Yarkand to India five hundred and twenty pony loads [1 pony load = 2.5 maunds = 93.3 kg] of charas, on payment of 60% ad valorem duty. The price of charas has been fixed at 60 taels per jing (approximately 1 1/4 pounds)." New difficulties arose in 1938 when the Secretary of the "New Central Asian and Charas Dealers' Association, Hoshiarpur" complained with the colonial administration: "At present, lot of our investment made to Sinkiang and import, i.e., Charas, Silk and Namdas [felts], etc., in transit between Leh and Yarkand are in great danger of being looted and destroyed as the caravans and traders are not allowed to travel in order to trace out their goods left on the road."

But at this time Chitral was already out of licensed charas trade as the transit corridor through Afghanistan was no longer feasible. All Xinjiang charas entered British India via Leh, the little that was left before the closure of the borders and the expulsion of traders.

In the other direction (South-North) about 30% of all export via Chitral (Tab. IV) was commanded by opium (teryok, Papaver somniferum). This cash crop gained in importance as an export commodity of Badakhshan in the beginning of the 20th century. Holzwarth (1990: 206–214) attributes this development to two factors: First, in 1907 Anglo-Sino negotiations about opium trade had led to an agreement about the gradual reduction of exports to China; second, Xinjiang gained more detachment from core politics after the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Thus a power and economic vacuum furnished favourable conditions for opium sales to a continuing demand of Chinese users. As this trade was mainly dominated by Badakhshani and Pathans from Bajaur and the Malakand Agency the Chitral route played an important role. On the other hand, the production zone of charas lay far away from Chitral in the Yarkand and Khotan districts as well as in Russian/Soviet Turkestan. While in the latter region the export of charas was prohibited since the beginning of the 20th century Xinjiang experienced a similar declaration in 1909 in connection with the opium legislation of the Central Government in Beijing.

Besides these light-weight and valuable drugs other items such as woollen and cotton fabrics, dry fruit and livestock products constituted some of the commodities exchanged via Chitral bazaar. Here traders from Afghanistan and Central Asia met with those of the South. The
growing demand and commerce is reflected in the establishment of a new bazaar in Chitral under the auspices of Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk in 1904: "A wide road was constructed on both sides of which shops were constructed to serve as Bazar. Sentries were appointed for guarding the shops and officials posted for looking after the administration of the market. At the end of the bazar ... a huge building was constructed to serve as Mehman Serai (guest house). He gave lands ... to the Afghan traders to build their residential houses [in Rehankot]." Over time the seat of power became the regional commercial centre as well. The Norwegian linguist Georg Morgenstierne observed in 1929: "From beyond the Hindu Kush passes a constant stream of traders comes down to Chitral. The two most important passes are the Dorah in the north-western, and the Baroghil in the north-eastern corner of Chitral. But communication with the north is by no means restricted to these comparatively easy passes, and in spite of snow-blindness and dangers many lightly equipped travellers use the higher and much more difficult passes to the north of the Dorah in order to save a day or two. But these passes have scarcely ever been used by invaders.

Across the Baroghil came Wakhs, but chiefly traders bring blocks of reddish rock-salt and lapis lazuli [lazurite] from the mines belonging to the Afghan government, but exploited by the local population during the rebellion in 1929. Chitral is a local emporium of some importance in these regions. [p.31: There is no bazar in Chitral above the capital.] While several caravans from Badakhshan carrying rugs, Russian china etc. passed through Chitral on their way to Peshawar, the local traders from Munjan and neighbouring valleys rarely go further than Chitral, but dispose of their goods there." While several caravans from Badakhshan carrying rugs, Russian china etc. passed through Chitral on their way to Peshawar, the local traders from Munjan and neighbouring valleys rarely go further than Chitral, but dispose of their goods there.

These trade relations underpin the notion of Chitral's position in a certain segment of Central Asian goods exchange as the centre of gravity in a trade triangle which attracted specialized dealers and featured selected commodities. The local importance of this trade can be estimated by comparing the state income derived from this sector with other sources and by looking at the groups participating in it. As the only central place for these enterprises was located in Chitral proper it is not a surprising fact that the state authorities play an important role in it.
4.1. The Mehtar of Chitral’s revenue and income from trade

When the Lockhart and Woodthorpe mission visited Chitral in 1885 they estimated the sources of state revenue. According to their confidential report the ruling families played a significant role in the trade and had managed to monopolize certain activities:

“The Mehtar of Chitrál derives his income from the following sources:-

1. The sale of timber and orpiment [auripigment, As₂S₃] to foreign traders.
2. The sale of lead to Bajaurí traders, and of lead and gold-dust in the country.
4. Toll on horses and all pack animals passing through from Badakhshán to Dír, Bajaur, and Peshawar, and vice versa.
5. A fixed contribution of sheep, goats and grain, rugs, choqhas and tsadars from each province [regional sub-unit of Chitral].
6. Tribute from Káfrístán, and fines imposed on the subject Kalásh Káfirs, etc.
7. The Kashmir subsidy.

He also barters English piece-goods and other merchandise from Pesháwar, such as tea in Badakhshán for Yambús, or Yárkand ingots of silver. He further takes his pick of the horses brought from the north for the southern markets. The traders consequently have taken to hogging the manes of their best ponies, which disfigures them in Chitrál, but does not interfere with their sale in Pesháwar. ...

Tolls – These are numerous and vexatious to the traders passing through the Mehtar’s territory. He himself takes the proceeds of a few stations, but his sons and favoured officials are allowed to take toll at many others.

The rates fixed at Chitrál for horses, etc., laden or unladen, passing through from foreign countries and returning, are as follows:-

Per 1 horse – 2 Kábal rupees. Per 1 mule – 1 Kábal rupee. Per 3 asses – 1 Kábal rupee.”

In their list exchange relations with non-local traders figure prominently besides taxes levied in Chitral. This dual structure of state revenue emphasizes the importance of external relations and commercial
enterprises by the hereditary ruler of Chitral who had to satisfy the demands and needs of a growing number of relatives in different parts of his state. At that time, the Mehtar of Chitral received an annual subsidy from Kashmir to the value of 3,600 Rs on top of his income from these sources. His allowance was raised later on and in 1889 "... the Mehtar of Chitral was granted a subsidy of Rs 6,000 per annum and a large consignment of rifles. In 1891 the Government of India, with the intention of strengthening the position of the Mehtar, decided to double this subsidy on the condition that he accepted the advice of the British Agent in all matters relating to foreign policy and the defence of the frontier."

Compared to the British backing the Mehtar of Chitral derived a similar revenue from tolls on trade which accounted for 33,397 Rs averaging 6,679.4 Rs per annum between 1896 and 1901. Trade and commerce became an important source to generate state income. In order to reduce the seepage of funds the Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk reformed the procedures. Instead of levying tolls and octroi at the entering points at Drosh, Chitral, Broze, Shogore and Drosh he established a "full fledged Trade Department" in 1903, introduced revenue collection in a bureaucratic manner (with printed forms called *chungi*), and reduced the octroi posts to two (Chitral and Drosh). In 1906, "... Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk receives a subsidy of Rs 1,000 *per mensem* and an annual allowance of Rs 8,000 as compensation for the loss of the Mastuj and Laspur districts." From 1927 to 1936 the Mehtar of Chitral accrued 136,413 Rs import and export taxes from traders in Chitral, during the "good" years the contribution from trade dues amounted to 18,338 Rs per annum on average (cf. Tab. V). Although data are fragmentary it can be concluded that a substantial contribution to Chitral's state revenue was derived from exchange relations with entrepreneurs. This factor is often neglected when the political structure of Chitral is explained only on the basis of internal and land-related social hierarchies. The centre of power based its overall control of the state on its wealth extracted from the poor local farmers as much as from pecuniary resources supplied by traders. The predominantly non-local businessmen used Chitral as an important entrepot and exploited trade niches in the triangle constituted of Badakhshan, Xinjiang and the N.W.F.P. with Chitral in its centre.

The share of the local population in any surplus from trade and subsidies was limited. Their contact with traders was restricted to the
supply of porterage and some barter trade in fodder and food for consumer goods. In addition local residents had to be available as load-carriers (coolies) for the porterage of state goods and as labourers for the maintenance of tracks and bridges under the ubiquitous scheme of forced labour (kar-i-begar, rajakar) for the ruling class. This constellation is not restricted to the principality of Chitral. Similar structures could be observed in neighbouring mountain societies. Thus, a relationship developed in which the external resources such as subsidies, octroi and customs duties helped to stabilize the centre power. From the colonial perspective indirect rule in the form of installing and supporting a mehtar, raja or mir bad led to the direct transfer of state subsidies to loyal chiefs. Internal distribution and allocation of funds remained under their sole authority. In a similar manner revenue from trade was mainly accumulated at the seat of power where all supra-regional public functions were concentrated and controlled. From the perspective of the local population forced labour in the form of porterage, provision of supplies, infrastructure construction and maintenance was taken for granted or without remuneration, thus enhancing the wealth of the local rulers. Consequently, the socio-economic gap between centre and periphery within the mountain societies widened by providing a traffic infrastructure for external or imperial interests and non-local entrepreneurs.

4.2. Effects of trade decline

When trade was interrupted the mutual dependence was severely felt: The purchase of local grain and fodder by itinerant traders had provided a suitable local market for the mountain farmers in need of bartering for salt, tea, and other consumer goods such as kitchenware and cotton cloth. Luxury items were offered in Chitral Bazaar only for the well-to-do. Overall trade declined significantly in the mid-1930s after the Afghan Government’s decision to inflict an embargo on all trade with Chitral (Figs. 4, 5). Illegal import of charas into Afghanistan and uncontrolled export of gold and lapis lazuli gave the pretext for terminating exchange relations which cut off Chitral’s trade corridor with Xinjiang as well. The Mehtar of Chitral, Shuja-ul-Mulk, assessed the importance of exchange relations: “Our flourishing timber trade which was the chief source of income during my father’s time has been totally
prohibited. The Afghans are ... bent upon ruining our trade ... have been looking on us as a thorn in their side, and by imposing prohibitive taxes on the Sarhadi Wakhan, they have stopped the trade between this country [Chitral] and Yarkand ... This year they have practically closed all the Badakhshan routes to all the import and export trade with Chitral.” 37 The British Political Agent in Malakand reported to his superiors about the situation in Chitral and emphasized on the fiscal effects and the survival conditions for the local population: “...the country [Chitral] is being very hard hit by the restriction on trade over the Dorah and Baroghil Passes imposed by the Afghan Government. ... practically all trade has ceased between Chitral and Badakhshan and Wakhan. It is a very serious matter for the Chitral State revenues and also for the inhabitants of Northern Chitral the livelihood of many of whose inhabitants depended on this trade. Salt was a most important import from Badakhshan and its stoppage is causing great hardship. The Afghans of the provinces concerned must also be feeling the loss of their trade with Chitral. ... Afghanistan is trying to bring pressure on Chitral to use the Kunar valley route only with possible development of this route to facilitate traffic.” 38

The situation did not improve in the following months and in 1936 the trade performance had reached the bottom line. Income from trade contributed to Chitral’s state revenue only 3% of the value which was generated five years earlier (Tab. V). The entrepreneurs in Chitral trade filed a petition which was presented through British diplomatic channels: “The traders of Chitral wish to be allowed to import the following from Badakhshan: Pistachio nuts, caraway, almonds, salt, opium, dried cheese, lapis lazuli, carpets, namdahs, cloth (khaddar), cloth (silk), pattis and chogahs, skins and wild animals (stone marten, fox and panther), sulphur, wool, sheep and goats.” 39 A trade delegation was sent to Kabul in 1937 which succeeded in negotiating a permission to float timber on the Kunar river. But their efforts were in vain to restore bilateral exchange relations on a similar scale as before. 40 On a lower level some trade continued by smuggling goods across the border passes. 41 The unilateral Afghan termination of trade caravans across the Baroghil and Dorah passes was prolonged by the internal developments in Xinjiang which led to a significant decline of all trade between British India and Central Asia (cf. Fig. 3). The commencement of the Cold War and the subsequent Chinese Revolution
resulted in the closure of international boundaries and mountain passes. Central Asian trade via the Chitral route had come to an end already in 1935. This turning-point marks the beginning of a domestic response to the loss of goods exchange. Parallel to the trade decline and the growing restrictions of the Xinjiang authorities on the export of charas the cultivation of this valuable cash crop was promoted in Chitral as a new source of revenue generating and in order to serve the continuing demand in British India. After the Chinese borders were sealed in 1950/1951 and the superior quality products from Xinjiang ceased to be a competitive commodity on the market a further boost to charas cultivation in Upper Chitral materialized. Staley (1966: 234) measured the share of revenue accounted for by taxes on charas production in the order of one third of the total. The cultivation zones in Chitral range from 1,760 m to 3,350 m of altitude and are located in Lutkho, Turkho, Mulkho and Yarkhun. Licensed cultivation was permitted in Swat and Chitral while charas cultivation was prohibited in the Gilgit Agency. The total export of charas from Chitral was estimated as 500 maund (18,516 kg) in 1964. A state sales tax of Rs 5 per pound of charas was levied within Chitral while an additional export tax of Rs 11.5 per pound had to be paid on top of it when leaving the state.\textsuperscript{42} Other estimates highlighted its importance in the state’s trade balance by attributing 80\% of all exports to charas in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{43} The introduction of this cash crop can be perceived as a direct result of trade decline.

A second factor gains importance in conjunction with the closure of the Chitral route. The development of transport infrastructure stagnated and Chitral was not properly linked to modern traffic for a long time. Prior to partition only the road between Ashret and Chitral Town was widened for motor vehicles which had been carried in pieces across the Lowari Top and reassembled at the location.\textsuperscript{44} The Lowari Pass remained a serious obstacle until 1947 when the first jeep managed to cross.\textsuperscript{45} A regular service between Dir and Chitral came into being during summer months after the road was widened in 1952.\textsuperscript{46} Considerable extensions of jeep tracks were commissioned after partition when Chitral State acceded to Pakistan. By the mid-60s the road network within the cul-de-sac of Chitral had increased five times.\textsuperscript{47} All these developments do not disguise the fact that the loss of Chitral’s function as highland entrepot for cross-boundary and trans-montane
trade affected the traffic situation detrimentally and was connected with a slow growth of infrastructure. The previously central position of Chitral in the above-mentioned trade triangle had been converted into a cul-de-sac position at the end of an exchange corridor. Henceforth Chitral's economic relations were totally directed south-wards which found its political expression by terminating its special status and in the abolition of the state in 1969.

5. FUTURE PROSPECTS

While the decline of trade coincided with the factual closure of all three routes dealt with perpetually plans existed to reopen the thoroughfares if political conditions permitted. The case of Chitral has been presented as an example for the termination of international trade. The cross-boundary exchange continued via Gilgit during World War II. British blueprints existed for the connection of Kashmir with Xinjiang in order to support the armed units of the Guomindang General Chiang Kai-shek. This strategic enterprise aimed at military support against Japanese occupation forces and Mao Zedong's Red Army. In addition, Soviet influences in Xinjiang should be controlled, thus a giant project involving 70,000 labourers and army staff was to be executed. Coinciding with the end of the war this project did not materialize which was calculated on the basis of nine million man-days within a span of one year for the section Gilgit to Kilik Pass alone.\textsuperscript{48} Half a century later this was the first serious attempt to realize the vision of Captain Medley uttered in 1896: "The road [Punjab-Khagan-Chilas-Gilgit-Hunza-Kilik Pass-Yarkand] will in fact become the Grand Trunk road form Central Asia to India."\textsuperscript{49} But it took another three decades until the Karakoram Highway (KKH) came into existence. This bilateral Pak-Chinese road project suited mutual strategic interests, on the other hand a trade route has been re-opened which was once regarded as the most expensive by unit costs (cf. Tab. III). Presently the Friendship Highway is the only road connection between Pakistan and Xinjiang and practically between South Asia and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{50} The end of the Cold War enhanced the goods exchange and leaves the KKH without competition. It appears that rail and road transport govern the lowlands while motor vehicles are the only
ones to cross the mountains. Despite numerous ECO plans for improving the trade links an undertaking such as the Friendship Highway seems to remain unique for the near future within the territory of Pakistan.

Besides its strategic value the KKH has amplified and intensified the exchange relations of the Northern Areas with down country Pakistan. The key factors are the possibility of all-year-round truck traffic and low transport costs. Thus, the availability and sale of consumer goods in the Gilgit District is much higher than in Chitral District (Tab. VI). All the same the demand for the import of rice, wheat flour and grain is quite substantial in Chitral, an area, where agriculture dominates economic activities. The import of these basic food stuffs across the Lowari Pass covers about three quarters of the value of all goods purchased. The still growing dependence of Chitral on external supplies involves high costs for carriage as the Lowari Pass remains a major physical obstacle and the Kunar Valley road insecure.

While in the beginning of this century different modes of transport were applied for sustaining international trade, the present technology of motor vehicles leaves little scope for alternative routes as the cost of road construction in mountain areas exceeds the allocation in public budgets by far. This fact is symbolized in the Lowari tunnel project, which was planned for two decades, which has been commenced in the 1970s and stopped soon after, and already several times its realization was promised the electorates to be completed in the near future.

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Notes

1. The recent activities of ECO in opening markets and plans for a “high-tech silk road” are described by de Cordier (1996).
2. The Salang Pass road of Afghanistan facilitates another connection which is presently without commercial value.
3. For the early period of British activities in establishing Central Asian trade cf. Forsyth 1875; Shaw 1870, 1871, for the overall imperial designs cf. Davis and Huttonback 1987.
4. Thiel (1934: 201–203) describes the available routes. Perceptions of the threat of Russian goods in newly developed markets vary and have been subject to controversies then and now. see below and cf. Khalifin 1987; Yapp 1987.
5. During the 19th century a fourth route was in use: the Muxtagh pass connecting Baltistan via the Muxtagh Pass with Yarkand. But since the middle of the 19th century this route was out of use. Contrary to the commonly known statement of Younghusband (1896) that the passage was destroyed by advancing glaciers Hermann Schlagintweit reported that since 1852 no caravans had crossed the pass because of Hunza raiders looting the traders and selling them into slavery (H. Schlagintweit 1872, Vol.3, quoted from personal communication by W. Kick 5.2.1996).
7. For detailed accounts on this period and Chitral cf. Cobb 1951; General Staff India 1928; Gurdon 1933, 1934; Harris 1971; Israr-ud-din 1979; Malleson 1909, Vol. 1, pp. 38–81; Younghusband 1895.
10. The Leh route was “... the most important and longest established of the routes from the point of view of British trade. Trade between India and Kashgar was encouraged by Yakub Beg ‘Badaulat’ as a makeweight of the Russian influence, and in 1873–74 we hear of ‘several large caravans’ of English muslins, chintzes, woolen webs, and long-cloths to the value of £100,000 reaching Yarkand. ... prior to the subjugation of Hunza and Nagar by Colonel Durand’s column in 1891, the trade between India and Kashgar was much harassed by raiders from those principalities, and it is only during the last thirty years that the Leh route has been safe, regularly used by traders, and to a certain extent organized by the Kashmir State.” Skrine (1925: 229).
11. IOR/2/1064/45: India Office Records: Crown Representative’s Records – India State Residencies: Kashmir Residency Files: Indo-Chinese Turkistan trade. Report by S. H. Godfrey, Political Agent Gilgit, to A.C. Talbot, Resident Kashmir, Gilgit 17.12.1896, p.4. The value of this income can be estimated when compared to two other sources of income. Prior to the colonial conquest the annual revenue derived from caravan raiding by the Hunzukuts was estimated at approximately 1,000 Rs (IOR/2/1079/251: India Office Library and Records: Crown Representative’s Records – Indian States Residencies – Gilgit, Chilas, Hunza and Nagar Files (Confidential): Hunza and Nagar Subsidies, p. 8). After their incorporation into the Pax Britannica the annual subsidies amounted to 3,000 Rs (paid again since 1894) equally paid by the Kashmir Durbar and the Government of India to the Mir of Hunza and Nager respectively (IOR/2/1083/284: India Office Library and Records: Crown Representative’s Records – Indian States Residencies – Gilgit, Chilas, Hunza and Nagar...


13 His early report on the Gilgit Agency (from the perspective of a mountain climber) attributes a bright future to the developments in the communication sector: “... Gilgit must grow to be an important trade centre, and possibly, ... a railway junction on the line from India to Kashgar, where the Samarkand branch will turn off.” (Conway 1894: 144).

14 The mir of Hunza was responsible for the maintenance of the track between Baltit and Mintaka Pass for which we received an annual subsidy of 1,000 Rs (IOR/P&S/12/3246: 10).

15 Cf. for a detailed account of the development of transport costs Kazak (1937: 98).


17 An account from Chitral’s perspective is provided by Ghufran (1962: 208–217). The “new history of Chitral” highlights the Afghan attacks on Chitral and describes the combined efforts of local and imperial forces to protect the boundary.

18 On this route varying custom duties were levied on different commodities: export of pistachio nuts (50%), cumin (40%), sheep and opium (30%), woolen fabrics, animal skins and hides (10–20%). The import duties of consumer goods ranged between 100% for luxury items, 40% for tea, 15–22% for cotton and sugar (Ghani (1921: 250–261) quoted in Holzwarth (1990: 202)).

19 Skrine (1925: 234) observed in the 1920s: “... Chitrali and Badakhshi traders who smuggle Yarkand charas (hemp drug) into India and Afghanistan through Chitral, and Afghan opium into Kashgaria on their return journey”.


21 India Office Library and Records: IOR/P&S/7/165/1054: Chitral Diary 30.4.1904. The bazaar was constructed on the orders of the Mehtar Shuja-ul-Mulk who resettled the previous tenants at Rehankot (Ghufran 1962: 242).


24 India Office Library and Records: IOR/P&S/12/2358: Letter from H. H. Johnson, Consul-General Kashgar, to Government of India, Simla, dated Kashgar 15.8.1940: “The Sinkiang authorities have been making strenuous efforts during the past few years to eradicate the opium traffic and heavy penalties are imposed on Chinese subjects found to be in possession of opium. In the past, the opium traffic in South Sinkiang has been chiefly in the hands of Afghans and Pathans of Indian territory (especially of Bajaur and the states of the Malakand Agency) and the activities of these Pathans have to some extent been partly responsible for the anti British attitude of the Sinkiang authorities. These men have been making use of their status as ‘British protected persons’ to escape the consequences of being discovered in illegal
activities but they have persistently ignored orders and warnings issued from this Consulate-General forbidding British subjects to have any dealings in opium.”

25 India Office Library and Records: IOL/P&S/7/209/2238: Files relating to Indian states extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India for 1907. In this report the result of a Russian envoy’s findings are discussed regarding the possibilities of the import of charas from Kashgar into Russian Turkestan: “Mr. Levitov was of opinion that the Russian Government was making a mistake in prohibiting the export of this drug to Russian Turkestan. It was impossible to stop smuggling. Moreover, despite all official prohibitions, the charas plant was largely grown in Russian Turkestan itself. So extensively was the drug used there that probably 25 per cent. of the population might be considered as charas smokers. The Russian had also placed some futile prohibition of the import of opium from Persia.” The British interests focussed on the revenue derived from charas trade (Fraser 1907: 220–221). When the Chinese authorities tried to restrict its cultivation the Consul-General reported in 1909: “The Zamindars of Khanarik [Yarkand District], which is the chief charas growing district of Chinese Turkestan, petitioned to the Fu of the new city asking him to rescind the order prohibiting the growing of charas. They said they pressed oil out of its seeds and used it with their food. They also declared that the charas would only be exported to India in any quantity and that they will take care that it was not sold in the country.” Commenting on these developments, Consul-General A. R. B. Shuttleworth remarked: “... if they quietly grew their charas and sold it to the British traders of Yarkand nobody would be a bit wiser. It is being largely grown around Kashgar under the very noses of the several Ambans [Chinese office-bearers].” IOL/P&S/7/230/1163: India Office Library and Records: Files relating to Indian states extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India 1881–1911: Kashgar News-Report 10.6.1909.

26 IOL/P&S/7/240/923: India Office Library and Records: Files relating to Indian states extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India 1881–1911: Memorandum of information ... May 1910: The date given was 21.11.1909 for implementing this legislation. In the following year it was reported that this prohibition act had not immediately affected opium and charas cultivation at all (IOL/P&S/7/242/1367: India Office Library and Records: Files relating to Indian states extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India 1881–1911: Memorandum of information ... August 1910).


28 Morgenstierne 1932: 31–32. Faizi (1991: 188) mentions the establishment of a bonded ware-house in Baroghil (Yarkhun) in 1926 in order “... to check the illegal import of charas”.


30 Lockhart and Woodthorpe 1889: 268.

31 Malleson 1907: 43.

32 IOL/P&S/7/136/982: India Office Library and Records: Files relating to India States extracted from the Political and Secret Letters from India for 1908, Vol. 8.

33 Ghaftran 1962: 236.

34 Malleson 1907: 79.

35 Ghaftran (1962: 233) estimates 100 000 Rs as the total annual state income during the rule of Mehter Shuja-ul-Mulk in the mid-30s.

36 Cf. in this context the descriptions of Chitrals’s social structure and taxation system by Barth (1956: 80–83); Beg (1990: 7); Eggert 1990; Lorimer (1980: 224–229). Before the turn of the century Biddulph (1880: 66) already mentions the importance of trade for the state revenue of Chitral.

37 IOL/P&S/12/1753: India Office Library and Records: Department Papers: Political and Secret Internal Files and Collections 1931–1947: Afghanistan. Trade. Stoppage of trade between Chitral and Badakhshan: Rough translation of the Persian speech delivered by His Highness Sahib of Chitral ... in the Durbar held in Chitral on 6th
of October, 1935, pp. 94–96. The timber trade totally depended on the possibility to float the logs on the Chitral (Kunar) river downstream through Afghan territory as there was no road access to Chitral or any other outlet for the export of this valuable commodity.


41 Holzwarth 1990: 205 –206. Following the embargo substantial quantities of opium were annually smuggled into Chitral.

42 Data provided by the Chitral state revenue authorities, quoted from Staley (1966: 234).

43 Dichter (1967: 45). A significant share left the state as contraband; legal export was restricted to the so-called “tribal areas” alone.

44 The first “motor car” was brought to Chitral in September 1927 and in the aftermath some short roads were constructed for the convenience of the Mehtar within Chitral (Ghufran 1962: 227, 241).

45 Proulock 1947: 193–194. Cf. for the development of traffic conditions prior to partition Power 1948; Schomberg (1938: 24, 29); Staley (1966: 202). The road from Chitral via Mastuj to Sor Laspur was improved in a manner that motor cycles could ply between Chitral and the foot of the Shandur Pass (Power 1948: 70). A shuttle service was introduced between Drosh and Chitral where app. 40 vehicles were in use to link the two central places. Dichter (1967: 47) mentions that this shuttle included the connection of Chitral with the only airport at Drosh serviced twice a week since 1951 (Ghufran 1962: 268). In 1962, the Chitral Airport was transferred to the administrative headquarter and inaugurated with daily flights weather conditions permitting.

46 Ghufran 1962: 270.


FIGURE 1  Important trade routes between Central Asia and British India in 1935.
FIGURE 2  British Indian and Russian/Soviet trade with Kashgaria 1895–1934.
FIGURE 3  Trade between British India and Chinese Turkestan via Leh, Gilgit and Chitral 1926–1946.
FIGURE 4  Chitral-Yarkand trade via Baroghil Pass.

Source: data according to IOR/2/1076/232  
Design: H. Kreutzmann
FIGURE 5  Caravan trade via Baroghil and Dorah Pass.
Share of charas in total Xinjiang exports

FIGURE 6  Share of charas in total Xinjiang exports 1895–1934.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nager</th>
<th>Huntza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>transit dues</td>
<td>transit dues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amount (Rs)</td>
<td>amount (Rs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>horse for sale</td>
<td>horse for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loaded horse</td>
<td>loaded horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4+2²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>donkey</td>
<td>donkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2+1²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cow for sale</td>
<td>yak</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>sheep or goat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coolie load</td>
<td>coolie load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2+1²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The grazing tax in uncultivated land goes to the mir while that in village lands goes to the village.
² In addition to the mir's share the wazir receives his portion of the transit dues directly.

Notes: No taxes are levied by the Kashmir State on goods exported or imported. The rates received the approval of the Political Agent Gilgit in 1924 [16 una = 1 Rupee].

Each merchant gives a present worth Rs 4–5 to the mir of Hunza's eldest son, similarly a present worth Rs 3–5 to his second son in Gulmit. Each merchant pays to the headman (arbah) of Gircha, Khaiber, Pasu, Hussaini 1 Re each, to the headman of Misgar 1–3 Rs (according to size of merchandise), to the headman of Ghulkin 2 Rs and to the one in Gulmit 3 Rs.

Source: IOL/P&S/12/3246: 9–11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>trade route</th>
<th>mode of transport</th>
<th>distance</th>
<th>duration in days</th>
<th>cost of transport</th>
<th>unit cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chitral route: Karachi-Nowshera-Kashgar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Karachi-Dargai</td>
<td>railway</td>
<td>2851 km</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>59.60 Rs</td>
<td>2.24 Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dargai-Chitral-Kashgar</td>
<td>caravan</td>
<td>1689 km</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50.00 Rs</td>
<td>4.92 Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgit route: Karachi-Srinagar-Kashgar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Karachi-Rawalpindi</td>
<td>railway</td>
<td>2843 km</td>
<td>44–54</td>
<td>83.20 Rs</td>
<td>3.14 Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rawalpindi-Srinagar</td>
<td>motor car</td>
<td>1508 km</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.60 Rs</td>
<td>0.68 Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Srinagar-Gilgit-Kashgar</td>
<td>caravan</td>
<td>320 km</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.12 Rs</td>
<td>2.72 Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Srinagar-Leh-Kashgar</td>
<td></td>
<td>1015 km</td>
<td>40–50</td>
<td>65.00 Rs</td>
<td>6.86 Rs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leh route: Karachi-Karghalik-Khotan/Kashgar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Karachi-Rawalpindi</td>
<td>railway</td>
<td>3214 km</td>
<td>56–61</td>
<td>66.10 Rs–73.20 Rs</td>
<td>2.20–2.44 Rs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rawalpindi-Srinagar</td>
<td>motor car</td>
<td>1508 km</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.60 Rs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Srinagar-Leh-Kashgar</td>
<td>caravan</td>
<td>320 km</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.12 Rs</td>
<td>2.72 Rs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The cost of transport is given for one load carried by a pack horse equalling 2.5 *maund* (= 93.3 kg).
2 The unit cost is given for a quantity of 100 kg per 100 km of distance covered.

Source: own calculations based on data provided by General Staff India 1928, 1942; Kazak 1937:99.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IV</th>
<th>Trade via Chital 1920–1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>import from Xinjiang to British-India (in Rs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charas (Hashish)(^1)</td>
<td>13 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woolen and cotton fabrics</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dry fruit</td>
<td>2 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goats</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other items</td>
<td>1 840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total import</td>
<td>17 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage charas of total</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>export from British India to Xinjiang (in Rs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opium(^2)</td>
<td>24 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woolen and cotton fabrics</td>
<td>11 899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other items(^3)</td>
<td>2 948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total export</td>
<td>38 847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage opium of total</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) The value of one mauld (= 37.32 kg) of charas amounted to 200 Rs.
\(^2\) The value of one ser (= 0.933 kg) opium was given as 80 Rs.
\(^3\) Other items include commodities such as tea, sugar, salt, dry, fruit.

Source: calculations on the base of data from IOR/2/1076/232: 23.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chitral-Badakhshan (Dorah and Baroghil)</th>
<th>Chitral-Chinese Turkestan (Baroghil)</th>
<th>Trade revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>import</td>
<td>export</td>
<td>import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>13,269</td>
<td>6,240</td>
<td>1,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>8,868</td>
<td>5,620</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>7,736</td>
<td>5,985</td>
<td>1,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>6,703</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>5,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>3,418</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>3,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>4,193</td>
<td>5,297</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>4,977</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Σ 1927–1934</td>
<td>50,843</td>
<td>38,084</td>
<td>14,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>annual</td>
<td>7,263</td>
<td>5,441</td>
<td>2,089</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculations on the base of data from IOL/P&S/12/1753: 40–41.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Import via Lowari Top Road (in million Rs)</th>
<th>Import via Karakoram Highway (in million Rs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chitral District</td>
<td>Gilgit District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>absolute %</td>
<td>absolute %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour and grain</td>
<td>23.00 49.5</td>
<td>70.00 34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>13.00 28.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.00 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Vegetables</td>
<td>1.61 3.5</td>
<td>9.30 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Fruits</td>
<td>1.83 3.9</td>
<td>5.04 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef and Mutton</td>
<td>1.21 2.6</td>
<td>29.95 14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry Products</td>
<td>0.84 1.8</td>
<td>18.30 9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk Products</td>
<td>5.00 10.7</td>
<td>17.57 8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit Juices</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.25 0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene Oil</td>
<td>6.06 3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46.49 100.0</td>
<td>201.47 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Rs per capita)</td>
<td>172.2</td>
<td>738.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data compilation and calculation according to Khan and Khan (1992: 15) and Kreutzmann (1994. Fig. 7).