THE FALL OF GILGIT

THE UNTOLD STORY OF INDO-PAK AFFAIRS FROM JINNAH TO BHUTTO
(1947 to July 1977)

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Difficult, indeed, has been the process of bringing Pakistan and India closer to each other after the fall of Gilgit, the northernmost outpost of the Indian subcontinent, in November 1947. Notwithstanding the oft-repeated statement of the Indian leaders that New Delhi has been anxious for bringing about an improvement in its relations with the neighbouring countries, the realities of the dispute between India and Pakistan cannot be concealed inasmuch as many Pakistanis, especially in Sind and Panjab, are ostensibly in favour of the existence of the rift between the two countries.

Being a keen analyst of Indo-Pak affairs, I have given an interesting account of the developments which culminated in the occupation of the Gilgit Agency by Pakistan, of political events before and after Jinnah’s death, of bitter controversies between India and Pakistan from time to time since 1947, of Pakistan’s emphasis on the military build-up after the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict, of China’s involvement in the northern territory, and of Pakistan’s efforts to cultivate different foreign sources.

The book provides a significant study of Peking’s intentions after China occupied Tibet and Sinkiang, of the Dalai Lama’s abated anger against China, of China’s strategic aims in the region, including Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma, with a view to isolating India in order to make it difficult for her to assume leadership of South-East Asia, of Pakistan’s desire to produce nuclear arms, and of New Delhi’s unabated interest in watching the developments across the borders.
The 13-chapter book also brings to the fore several untold stories regarding Indo-Pak affairs from 1947 to the month of July 1977, when the Pakistan Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, was deposed and the army took over the civil administration in the country. It traces the first signs of the formation of a strong body of opinion in Pakistan against Bhutto and goes on to give the inside story of the army take over and of the desire of some foreign missions, based in Pakistan, to enable Bhutto to play another round.

August, 1977

Author
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Backward! Only eight letters....six consonants and two vowels...put together, have produced this word. How and when it came into being, has no interest for them. In reality, all those persons, who continue to be backward, are not interested in knowing the number of vowels and consonants or accent and pronunciation or etymology and phonetic scheme for the word. Reason: height of backward economic and social conditions in the mountain-girt valleys, across the 13,500-feet-high Burzil Pass, appears to the majority of the population there almost equal to a group of majestic peaks, including K 2 or Mount Godwin Austen, Gasherbrum and Masherbrum, which tower over and feed the vast Boltoro glacier.

The Boltoro and some other glaciers, and streams and rivers meandering down the mountains, are always fed easily. But uneasy are the people who have yet to be provided with what the economists have described as "a satisfactory economic situation". Economists discussing anti-scarcity strategy have rarely been so modest and tentative; several seem confident only in proclaiming that their colleagues' ideas will not work. Modesty is advisable: inflation and scarcity of essential items of daily use are, in fact, the most torturingly complex problems.
Most of the people feel that the economy is cheating them of the rewards of hard work and thrift. These people inhabit the backward areas in the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan. In the fastnesses, scattered throughout the length and breadth of the rugged hills, almost lost to the sight, are many small valleys and sparsely-populated villages with moribund economy and industrial black-out.

Of the five caste divisions—Yashkun, Shein, Ronu, Kremin and Dum—in the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan, the people belonging to the Yashkun caste form an overwhelming majority, followed by the Sheins. Unlike the proud freedom loving pathans of the tribal belt of Pakistan, the people of Baltistan are meek and submissive. They are peace-loving people and lack in that impetuosity of character which invariably stimulates violent reaction to the slightest provocation in an inhabitant of the rugged land of the North-West. Their culture represents a mixture of three civilizations—Iranian, Chinese and Buddhist. But their architecture is distinctly Chinese in design and conception.

Domes and minarets do not adorn many a mosque in Baltistan and Gilgit Agency. It is somewhat difficult to distinguish a place of worship from an ordinary dwelling. People of the Gilgit Agency are renowned for their hardihood. They are bodily tough, but they are temperamentally gentle. Many north-west Pakistanis have fair complexion but the Gilgitis, by and large, are like north Europeans—robust and red and handsome.

They were far behind. Their economic condition, until, 1952, was indisputably worse. Those were the days when the grim spectre of appaling poverty stalked every home and hearth. The three-lakh inhabitants, then, frequently verged on destitution. During winter, the whole population remained indoors herded up in their comfortless tiny huts built of mud and stones. Generally a whole family, as revealed by a Pakistani newsman in the Pakistan Times in 1949, shared “a single blanket—men, women and children creeping close to one another in order to keep warm”.
True, the people—not all of them—are now what they were not two and a half decades ago when the majority of them, under the stress of want, changed their faith every six months. An American mission yearly bringing them tinned food-stuffs and other necessaries found them all Christians during summer which faith they renounced as soon as the mission quitted that area at the approach of winter. The Gilgit Agency and Baltistan have undergone a change since 1952—that is about five years after Pakistan established itself in the strategically important territories. But the winds of change have yet to blow across the mountain-locked country as swiftly as those that lash it physically every afternoon.

While the steep and stark rocks present a forbidding sight, the brooding, inert mountains are silent witnesses to ravages wrought by crazily fluctuating temperatures. The Gilgit Agency and Baltistan lack vital resources like coal, dependable irrigation and manpower. Although laced with rushing rivers and streams and a super abundance of mountains, many parts are strikingly bare of vegetation. True, in some parts of the Gilgit valley, the streams are harnessed into numerous irrigation channels through fields and gardens. But the difficulty persists in the rest of the territory simply because of the absence of wind mills to lift water to irrigate vast areas.

Power-driven vehicles on a few routes do not intrigue the Gilgitis and Baltis inasmuch as ponies are still the only transport they know and use. In 1974 and, later, in 1976, I was told by three Pakistani officials at Srinagar that the perennials lack of reliable communications, shortage of trained personnel, meagre irrigation facilities, soil erosion and limited arable area in Gilgit and Baltistan territories—had been high on Islamabad's list. The officials, who did not want to be identified in spite of the fact that they visited Kashmir on valid travel documents, had no reservations when they commented on the difficult economic situation in the land of the Yashkuns and Sheins.

Educationally and politically, the land of the Yashkuns and Sheins is still backward. Its geographical position and physical features have deprived it from contact with world forces making
for advancement and progress. The century-old Dogra raj had to its credit in the field of educational advancement only the opening of a few primary schools. The overall British political sovereignty also did little to help the common man. The total number of primary schools in the whole of Gilgit Agency until August 1949 was sixty; besides there was two middle schools and a lower-high school. The only girls’ primary school was in Gilgit proper.

A spectacular rise in the number of educational institutions during the last two and a half decades can hardly answer people's hopes. The mountain-locked country has not much to show by way of development. A sizable chunk of allocations for the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan is disbursed as salaries among officials, most of whom are from Pakistan. Funds earmarked for development often lapse. One of the reasons for the non-utilization or under-utilization of grants is the fact that information regarding their sanction reaches Gilgit and Skardu only in late July. As winter season usually commences towards end of October, the Gilgitis and Baltis do not get the required time to go like clockwork. The elevated villages remain cut off for at least six months a year. The mobility of the villagers is drastically curtailed by snow. They survive on whatever they are able to stock in summer.

Whatever the nature and number of Islamabad's statements and statistics, fact remains that the moistureless land of barren steeps is, by no means, self-supporting. The mainstay of the economy in the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan territory is essentially agriculture but like every feudal society most of the cultivable land has been appropriated by Mirs, Rajas and Jagirdars. The peasant-owner class which constitutes the majority, own uneconomic small land holdings. Habitual sluggishness and primitive methods of agriculture do not allow a peasant family to fully exploit its tiny land-holding ranging from four to six kanals.

The Government of Pakistan has already established hospitals and dispensaries and introduced the V-Aid programme in some parts. But these hospitals and dispensaries do not come
up to proper medical standards. Lack of supervision, of equipment, often of accommodation, and inadequate staff are some of the reasons for poor medical care at such centres. A medical practitioner of Lahore, who visited his brother and aged mother in Kashmir in 1975, was at pains to explain at an informal get-together in Srinagar that Gilgit and Baltistan territories could not expect better medical facilities as, in the first place, in Pakistan, too, hospitals plus a string of smaller hospitals and dispensaries presented a dismal picture—unclean casualty and emergency wards, inadequate equipment and latrine facilities for outdoor and indoor patients and lack of proper supervision—and, secondly, the problem of shortage of trained personnel had been made worse by the unwillingness of doctors and nurses to move to the far-flung areas of Gilgit and Baltistan.

Medical inspection rooms, set up by the Pakistani troops at several places in the Gilgit valley, do much to serve many a people there. But the situation in the Baltistan territory is different altogether. Baltistan, crowded as it is with overflowing population, is inhabited mostly by the Shia sect of Muslims. The influence of the Aghas and the Sheikhs on the Shia society is so strong that the majority of people would rather die than discard the spiritual remedies. Allopathic treatment is sought only when the sick or wounded persons become hopeless. Deeply rooted in the past are the Shia women. They still wear dark dress and, invariably, hide their hands and faces from sunlight. This habit, coupled with poor nutrition and poorer hygienic sense, drastically lower their resistance to TB. While the incidence of TB is high all over the region, post-natal or pre-natal care is unheard of. The Aghas and the Sheikhs continue to profit by the people’s blissful ignorance. Some of these “demigods” are materially prosperous while quite a few spiritual mentors take advantage of “mutta” with any hesitation. The old Muslim practice of “mutta” (temporary marriage) is common in the region. Some of the Aghas have 30 to 50 wives each. The Aghas’ opposition to the education of women has not died down; the Aghas, who call themselves as “descendants” of the Prophet, favour only religious education for women, and that too to be provided in “maktabs”—small centres run by the Aghas.
Hemmed in for miles on every side by some of the highest mountains in the world bordering on Afghanistan, Russia and China, Gilgit is situated on the azure waters of the river Gilgit that runs within the confines of a narrow precipitous valley. The length of the course of the Gilgit river, which is roughly 120 miles, has been divided to make the Yasin river 60-mile long, the Punial river 25-mile long and Gilgit river 35-mile long. And known for being the northernmost outpost of the Indian subcontinent, Gilgit commands all passes over the Hindu Kush from Shimshal in the east to those around the Yasin river-head in the west. Four passes—Shimshal, Khunjerab, Mintaka and Kilik—are considerably important. Height of these passes is between 15,000 and 15,540 feet.

To its east and south, Gilgit dominates approach-routes to Ladakh and Kashmir and the Indus valley leading to north-west of the Indian subcontinent. The British policy in north-western India, until 1876, was one of putting barriers between its Indian possessions and the advancing Czardom. It was with this object that the British helped Maharaja Gulab Singh to carve out a kingdom for himself. Maharaja Gulab Singh, the great Dogra soldier-statesman of Lahore Court, had every reason to exult in his palace soon after Gilgit came to him as much by
the Treaty of Amritsar (1846) as by right of conquest later. An orgy of bloodshed and arson and intrigue went on in Lahore between 1839 and 1846. The Maharaja ceded the territories in the plains between the Sutlej and Beas and in the hills between the Beas and the Indus by the Treaty signed on 9 March 1845. Hashmir and Hazara were made over to Gulab Singh for a payment of Rs. 75 lakhs.

Gilgit frontier was divided into a congeries of warring tribal States after Gulab Singh secured Kashmir territories from the Sikhs. These States were: Yasin and Punial, Nagar, Hunza, Chilas and Gilgit. Gilgit was conquered by the Sikh rulers of Kashmir as far ago as 1842—that is, nearly four years prior to the extension of British authority over Kashmir. The Sikhs had found themselves quite secure only in Gilgit where they maintained a garrison. While Yasin and Punial had remained under a vague suzerainty of the Mehtar or chief of Chitral, the Sikhs failed to enlist reliable allegiance to their rule in Hunza and Nagar, where Thums, also known as Mirs, ruled the roost.

Although Gulab Singh campaigned for years in the truculent territory succeeding in subduing Chilas that secured Kashmir’s road communications with Gilgit from the marauding Chilasis, he was not strong across the Indus. The Indus river was his boundary after 1852. And although Gulab Singh’s men replaced the Sikh troops in Astor and Gilgit, the Dogra authority was established in Gilgit frontier by his son Maharaja Ranbir Singh. Before his death in 1857, Maharaja Gulab Singh had made himself the ruler of Bhaderwah and Kishtwar in Jammu region and Ladakh and Baltistan in about two decades.

The Dogra flag was carried into Yasin on the borders of Chitral by General Devi Singh during his campaign in 1857. This development was followed by unrest in some areas for about two years. But the anti-Dogra activity, especially in Yasin, was crushed soon after Maharaja Ranbir Singh’s troops recovered Gilgit in 1860. The troops were led by General Hushiara Singh.
The Fall of Gilgit

Darel, situated at a distance of 57 miles from Gilgit, was subjugated in 1866. By 1870 Ranbir Singh had brought under his control the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar, who reaffirmed their subordination to Kashmir, promised to pay their tributes regularly to the Maharaja and keep hostages at Gilgit for their good conduct. A guarantee was also given by the Mirs for the safety of trade passing through their states and, in case of loss, payment of compensation was assured. The Mirs were in return paid subsidies by the Kashmir Darbar. The Maharaja took over the direction of external affairs and defence of Hunza and Nagar by the Treaty of 1870.

The prestige and power of the Dogras in the Gilgit frontier assumed significance in Chitral, too in 1870s when its Mehtar submitted to the Dogra supremacy. The Mehtar, who was hard pressed by the Amir of Afghanistan, took the stick from a different end: he acknowledged Ranbir Singh as his overlord by the Treaty of 1878. In bringing the Mehtar under his protection Ranbir Singh was also influenced by Lord Lytton, the then Governor-General and Viceroy of India. In his letter to Ranbir Singh, Lord Lytton emphasized the need for the protection of "your feudatory" and pointed out that "the British Government, if need be, would afford you countenance and material aid." As the British Government at Calcutta (India) was fully conscious of the two developments—first, of course, was its unstable relations with Afghanistan, and second was the fact that the Russians were near the Indian borders and intriguing at Kabul—Lord Lytton wrote another letter to Ranbir Singh on 2 August 1877 to assure the Maharaja of all help if he agreed to take the Khan of Dir under his suzerainty.

A shift in the British policy on the Indian frontiers was precipitated following the movement of some Russians in 1877. It was after the Maharaja agreed to the posting of a British observer, officially designated as officer on the special duty, at Gilgit in 1876 that the British sought direct control of the border regions, including Gilgit. Posting of the British officer was more as a precaution against the Afghans than in fear of the Russians.
Gilgit, south of the Pamirs over which expanding Russia had secured vantage points by 1885 with their occupation of the Afghan territory of Panjdeh, witnessed stirring events following the death of Ranbir Singh in 1885. First, his death led to the installation of a Resident in violation of Treaty commitments. Secondly, four years later, Ranbir Singh’s son and successor, Maharaja Pratap Singh, was deposed to pave the way for the Resident to control the State. Thirdly, as part of the strategy to secure their ends in Kashmir and Gilgit, the British had inspired fabrication of letters alleged to have been written by Partap Singh to Russia. Fourthly, after the relations between the British Government and Russia were strained in 1885, Grum-Grijmado explored the region of the Pamirs up to Hunza and the upper valley of the Yarkand river. In 1888 Captain Grombtchey entered Hunza and, later, explored the country up to Shahidula.

The British got a good chance to make their presence felt in the frontier territory following the deposition of Pratap Singh. The British brought about changes in the relations of Gilgit tribes with Kashmir Government. Political Agency, which was appointed by the British Government, took over military and political administration of the tribal region. Backed by the Resident, the British political Agency was the dominant force.

Quick, indeed, was the process to draw an arbitrary distinction between “settled” and “unsettled” districts in the region. While “settled” districts constituted Gilgit valley and Bunji on the Indus, “unsettled” districts consisted of Hunza, Nagar, Punial, Chilas, Koh-Ghizar and Ishkoman. Although Punial was a jagir granted by Maharaja Ranbir Singh to Isa Bhadur for service rendered during the State army’s campaigns in Yasin in 1860, the British gave a ruling to draw a clear line between the “unsettled” districts and Kashmir territory. The ruling was unilateral; it was not even communicated to the Kashmir Darbar until 1905. The Kashmir Darbar was intrigued when the ruling was conveyed in a casual manner.
Maharaja Partap Singh, who had refused to submit to the British bullying on Gilgit, received much help and cooperation from his brother, Raja Amar Singh. Amar Singh played an important part in Kashmir affairs. From 1887 to 1905 the administration was run by a small council, of which the Maharaja was President and Amar Singh Vice-President after 1891. The council was abolished in 1905.

The British had full administrative control of the Political Agency despite the fact that it was an establishment of the State Government. The Agency was maintained with yearly budgets by the State. The situation kept changing as a result of politically-motivated method of procedure adopted by the British. While in the beginning all the correspondence was carried on by the Agent with the Maharaja, the State was completely eliminated later on from the frontier affairs except in regard to securing its concurrence in appointment of Governors for the districts and such related unimportant matters. Forts and defence installations all over Gilgit were manned by Kashmir forces—in spite of the distinction between “settled” and “unsettled” areas. But State civil servants were not easily allowed to enter the “unsettled” districts. Permission was granted only when they were required to open hospitals and schools and build roads and canals. Difficulties were created for the Wazir of Gilgit with constant interference by the British in the administration of even the “settled” districts, which had been left to the care of the State. Not only that, the State flag all over the “unsettled” areas, except in Chilas, was pulled down and only the Union Jack was permitted to fly. While the Agency guided all the relations between the tribal chiefs and Mirs and Kashmir Darbar, money was used to encourage the tribal people to look to the British.

And when they found the tinkle of money caused ears to pick up in many parts of the region, the British for their own reasons started rearming the tribals by creating an armed force, the Gilgit Scouts. The local chiefs were coaxed with lavish subsidies and favoured with junior appointments in the Scouts. They were recruited in a manner that permitted the British to please their more ardent supporters with bigger
contingents as against others at any period. While the service tenure of the levies was short, ranging up to five years, the top appointments in the force were reserved for selected British officers. This led the British to employ the local troublesome war talent on the one hand and pose a serious challenge, on the other, to the authority of the Maharaja. Fearing that this might be advanced as an argument of his having no rights over Gilgit, Pratap Singh volunteered to finance the Scouts.

Pratap Singh, who died in 1925, had endeavoured to maintain the legal hold of the State over Gilgit. But his efforts involved immense cost to the State.

A change in the situation occurred following the death of Pratap Singh. When the English-educated Hari Singh became the Maharaja in 1925, he began asserting his position in Gilgit, and, indeed, all over Kashmir. As Foreign and Political Minister during his uncle's rule, Hari Singh had his own assessment of Gilgit. And when he ascended the Gadi, he insisted on the complete withdrawal of the British from the Gilgit territory.

While the struggle for ascendency in Gilgit was raging, Communist Russia started demonstrations of her military power with flights of the aircraft to impress the tribals. It was with the approval of Hari Singh that the British established airstrips at Gilgit and Chilas to counter the Russian moves. This was followed by a significant development. In 1929 the Resident submitted a memorandum to His Highness which inter alia committed the British Government to:

1. abolition of the Gilgit Political Agency;
2. bringing of "unsettled" or political districts under the full administrative control of Kashmir;
3. recognition of the supremacy of the Maharaja of Kashmir in his relations with the frontier tribes and their chiefs. In effect, the memorandum sought to restore the Maharaja of Kashmir to exactly the same
position and dignity as was enjoyed by Ranbir Singh at any rate in Gilgit.

During his negotiations with the British, Maharaja Hari Singh came to be regarded as "very bold" when he insisted that only the State flag should fly over the frontier territory. The Maharaja could have created difficult problems for the British. But his attention and energy got engaged in Kashmir where situation changed with rapidity during and after the political disturbances of 1931. After the Maharaja's resistance was considerable lowered by the British in about four years, the British Prime Minister of Kashmir, Colonel Colvin, handed over the entire Gilgit region to the British Government on lease of 60 years around 1935-36.

The British advocated the idea of lease primarily to build pressures on the Maharaja and secure merger of Gilgit with the North-Western Frontier Province. The British wanted the merger to ensure smooth and unsplit military and political control in the N.W.F.P., Chitral and Gilgit. The merger did not take place in spite of the efforts of the British Political Department. But the lease was the major blow to the Maharaja's influence in Gilgit and also to the territorial integrity of Jammu and Kashmir.

Whatever the commitments of the British in Gilgit negotiations of 1920s, it cannot be disputed that the British Indian Political Department was pleased to learn that whatever little influence the Maharaja manoeuvred to maintain in Gilgit ended with the lease. The British had, in the Gilgit negotiations, committed themselves to the Maharaja of Kashmir having the sole indisputable territorial rights over Gilgit frontier.

With the passage of time—indeed, about twelve years after the lease—complete withdrawal of the British from all over the Indian subcontinent also compelled them to retire from Gilgit. Colonel Bacon formally handed over the Gilgit Agency to Brigadier Ghansar Singh in 1947.
Earlier, when Ghansar Singh was appointed Governor of Gilgit by Maharaja Hari Singh, the British divided the region in two camps, the Hunza faction and the Punial group. Former consisted of Hunza, Nagar and Yasin and the latter composed besides the Raja of Punial of Ishkoman and Koh-Ghizar Governors. On 19 July 1947, Ghansar Singh received his orders of appointment as Governor of Gilgit. He was called by R.C. Kak, the then Prime Minister, to be ready to fly to Gilgit to take over on 1 August. Prior to his departure for Gilgit, Ghansar Singh was informed that all officers of the British Government had opted to serve Pakistan. The State officials, who had to replace them, had not till then been drafted. Under such circumstances, Ghansar Singh had to carry on the administration in the frontier illaqa almost single-handed.

Brigadier Ghansar Singh was accompanied by Major-General H.L. Scott, the chief of the Jammu and Kashmir Forces. The Political Agent of Gilgit was Colonel Bacon. He was assisted by three or four British officers in the administration. The general impression was that the British officers did not like the changeover. Although Major Brown, Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts, came to pay his respects to the new Governor, some of the officers had told Ghansar Singh that they wanted to serve Pakistan. Ghansar Singh did understand that British officer's instigation and conspiracy had led to non-cooperation by civil, employees and Gilgit Scouts.

Before giving up his charge of Gilgit, Colonel Bacon had arrested some leading men of Yasin, who had been in revolt against the Governor, a relation of the Mir of Nagar. Within 100 days of the transfer of power at Gilgit, Major Brown staged a coup d'état with the aid of the Agency staff and some units of the State forces. Ghansar Singh was imprisoned in October 1947 (and released from captivity after 16 months). Major Brown established a provisional government after the coup in Gilgit and adjoining areas. The government consisted of Major Brown, Captain Ihsan Ali, Captain Sayeed and Wazir Walayat Ali. It was under the instructions of the provisional government that Captain Matheson, second British officer at Chilas post, stormed and captured Bunji massacring the
garrison stationed there.

The British officers were surprised by the reluctance of Mirs of Hunza and Nagar and the district Governors to accept the provisional government. The Mirs of Hunza and Nagar had pledged all support to the Maharaja in maintaining the territorial integrity of the State in face of external danger. Even the Mehtar of Chitral, who was a feudatory of Kashmir, had written to Lord Mountbatten in June 1947 expressing his decision to accede to India.

But with the partition of India came the fateful day soon after the month of October ran out. November 3, 1947, came to occupy an important place in the chequered history of Gilgit. On November 3, Major Brown hoisted the Pakistan flag over Gilgit. And two weeks later, a Pakistani Pathan officer, Sardar Mohammed Alam, flew into Gilgit and took over the Political Agency on behalf of Pakistan Government. Thus was Pakistan established in Gilgit and adjoining areas.
Choice of operations employed by the British only a fortnight before the Pakistan flag was hoisted over Gilgit was a success. Designed to suit their "honourable friend"—an idiomatic term considered as the name of M.A. Jinnah by some of his critics after the partition of India—the British strategy did not fail to bring about the dismemberment of Gilgit from Kashmir State; in fact, the British Political Department made the going for Pakistan easy after November 3.

The 1,000-strong Gilgit Scouts, raised by the British much before the dismemberment of Gilgit from Kashmir State, were adequately financed and projected as sons of Islam as part of the plan to draw more and more men to join the paramilitary formation. Pakistan rushed a sizable quantity of consumer articles, including kerosene and edible oil, salt and sugar, powdered milk and cloth, to Gilgit with the instructions to its Political Agent to "endeavour to help our people" in cooperation with all departments in Gilgit Agency. The Prime Minister of Pakistan detailed a team of officers from the Home and Defence Departments to Gilgit on 25 November 1947 to take stock of the situation and give a promise of help to the people of the region. The development took place 22 days after a company of the First Kumaon Regiment went out on a
flying patrol to Badgam, near the Srinagar airfield, shortly afternoon on November 3.

November 3, 1947, came only a week after the Governor-General of India accepted the Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir. The Instrument, signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on 26 October, led the Governor-General to announce on 27 October that his Government had decided to "accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India".

This development, followed by the swift operations in Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian troops and India’s telegram to Pakistan informing her of the accession of Kashmir, played the deuce with Pakistan’s calculations and expectations. M.A. Jinnah and a band of Muslim League, who had waited in Abbottabad to ride in triumph into Kashmir, found it difficult to reap where they had not sown. Attitude of Pakistani politicians and rulers towards arson and pillage and plunder committed by the Pakistani tribesmen in Jammu and Kashmir was based on the politically-motivated expression—"Kashmir Banayga Pakistan" (Kashmir will be part of Pakistan). This was conclusively proved by the expression and activity of some Pakistani rulers, including Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister, after the meeting between Lord Mountbatten and Jinnah at Lahore on 1 November 1947 on certain issues thrown up by the tribal invasion. The absence of sorrow at the destruction caused by the tribesmen in many areas of Jammu and Kashmir, was noticed in the length and breadth of Pakistan on November 3 when, following the hoisting of the Pakistan flag over Gilgit, crackers were fired and lamps lit with speed.

It was soon after 1947 ran out that Pakistan formulated a new scheme to draw a new line of battle. Motivated by the desire to occupy a sizable chunk of the Kashmir territory, Pakistani raiders sought new adventures in the remote districts of Baltistan and Ladakh following their failure to pierce the Indian troops’ steel ring in the west of Uri in Kashmir and in the south-west of Jammu. Jinnah, who lived as a Pakistani for 393 days and spent most of his time at Ziarat in Baluchistan, knew well the march of events after the
scheme was prepared. He also knew that senior men, including Chief Minister of North-West Frontier Province, Sind's Minister of Health and Major General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan army, had organised the armed raiders.

Neither Jinnah nor other functionaries allowed themselves to be assailed by any fear after the capture of the Baltistan territory by Pakistan. Jinnah, who died ten days after the Pakistan army captured the Baltistan territory, was first informed by his sister, Fatima, of the hoisting of the Pakistan flag over the captured region. Fatima conveyed the news to Jinnah on 2 September 1948. The 15-month gruelling battle between Indian and Pakistani troops was brought to a close 111 days after Jinnah’s death. But the cease-fire, which came into force a minute before midnight on the first day of the year 1949, did not upset the Pakistan army in the Baltistan region; in fact, Pakistan launched a concerted drive to establish herself firmly in Baltistan and Gilgit territories following the cease-fire.

Although the heavy snow and biting cold from January to the middle of March 1949 in many parts of the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan had drastically affected the mobility of the local inhabitants, Pakistan managed to circulate thousands of posters and pamphlets among the people in the frontier region. Loaded with anti-India sentiment, Pakistani literature was carried to the region by a group of Pathans from Rawalpindi. Ebullient Pathans also carried boxes, filled with grenades, mortars, sweets and biscuits, for the Pakistani troops. The Pathans spent a fortnight at Skardu before returning to Pakistan in July, 1949.

Skardu is not a scattered collection of houses and hamlets: it is the principal town of Baltistan. The district of Baltistan is bounded by Shigar on the north, by Kiris and Parkuta on the east, by Tilail on the south, and by Astor and Rondu on the west. The district is known for the enormous mountain-chains or masses of mountains. Skardu was linked with Kashmir Valley and Ladakh before the occupation of the territory by Pakistan. Four roads were used from Kashmir to reach Skardu.
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First was by the Zojila through Dras down the Indus to Skardu, whereas the second route was by Suru and Kargil and then to Kirtichu and Skardu. The third was by the head of the Tilail valley joining the Zojila route at Dras and the fourth road was by the Stakpila over the Deosai plains. Communications between Ladakh and Skardu were provided by four routes. They were by the Shyok, by the Chorbatla and Khapalu, by the Indus, and by the Fotula, Kargil and Lotti.

People of Baltistan are known as Baltis. The Baltis are wiry. But they move slower with their weights. Wearing “posteens” and boots, which are made of thick felt that reaches up to the knee, the men are a picturesque sight. Most of the women in Skardu and other parts of Baltistan do not use coloured clothes like the womenfolk of Gilgit. The Baltis are passionately fond of polo. Barring the young, the very old and the women, the whole population of Baltistan and Gilgit Agency is devoted to polo. This is so thoroughly the national game of the Baltis and the Gilgitis that almost every village has its polo ground. Many Baltis are not fond of horse-riding. Horse-riding is in the Gilgitis’ blood. An elegant horse with a woman sitting in front, and the rider sitting behind holding the reins, is a common sight in Gilgit.

Flat-roofed house, made of stone and mud, provide an enchanting view in summer-time when one sees the roofs all strewn with apricots, which are spread out to dry in the sun. The abundance of fruit in Baltistan and Gilgit makes up in a great measure for the scarceness of the pasture and the consequent small amount of livestock that can be reared. The frontier region is known for the abundance of apricots, peaches, apples, pears, grapes and melons. The fruit trees of almonds, cherries, pomegranates, mulberries and quince have also been grown in some areas in Baltistan and Gilgit Agency. Crops of wheat, barley, maize, millet, pulse and buck wheat are grown. The territory of Baltistan is not fertile for cultivation of paddy. But in the Gilgit village, which is highly cultivated, rice is grown in some fields falling in terraces from the hill-side to the river.
Mechanized cultivation being practically unknown throughout the region, livestock is the only source of power available for the various agricultural operations in some parts of the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan. But the livestock does not play any important role in the agricultural economy and the country. The people have failed to improve the quality and increase the number of the livestock in the absence of effective measures by the governmental agencies to create dependable fodder resources and control contagious diseases of livestock. The chief diseases are glanders and surra in equines, and rinderpest, foot and mouth disease, haemorrhagic septicaemia, black quarter and anthrax in ruminants.

Small units in some parts of Baltistan, which had engaged a number of people in weaving pashmina, were adversely affected following the cessation of trade between Ladakh and Skardu in 1948-49. Those who were occupied in weaving pashmina, had to depend on the supply of pasham wool from Ladakh. Some measures were initiated by Pakistan to rear ibexes (wild goats) in a few places of Baltistan between 1952 and 1956. Strongly built, these stocky goats wear beneath their long ordinary hair a second coat of very short, soft and thick hair called pasham. Their main problem has, however, been that of survival, for hardly any effort was made between 1960 and 1975 to raise the number of wild goats, provide adequate medical facilities and food and erect shelters for them to be secured against snow and other storms which hit the area almost at regular intervals. No wonder that the number of the goats has not shown any increase between 1950 and 1975. In Gilgit, Ibex is used for a different purpose. Ibex-shooting in the Gilgit valley is profitable. In autumn and winter, the wild goats and "shapu" (wild ram) are easy to get.

It would be difficult to imagine a country more ground down by the burden of debts than Baltistan; the extraordinary feature is that the rate of interest (18 per cent) is the highest. A creditor, if more astute, does not hesitate to contrive more interest from an illiterate and ignorant person. The problem of agricultural indebtedness is a source of anxiety for many a people. Neither panchayats and cooperative societies nor the agriculture
and revenue departments have been able to find a solution to the problem.

Although the cooperative movement was started in the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan in 1959, only a smaller number of villages in the territory were brought within the ambit of the movement until 1974. The need for raising the number of cooperative societies to provide more banking facilities to the people, was stressed during 1974-75 when a batch of farmers approached Rawalpindi to seek the financial help from the Government to bring more areas within the ambit of the cooperative movement and to undertake land development programme for cultivation of improved fodder crops in the frontier region.

The velocity of winds that sweep across the region is so great that the thick sand is blown from one place to another. There can be no effective check on the spread of the desert. Lack of forests, especially in the Baltistan territory, has been responsible for acute shortage of fuel. The people have, however, succeeded in growing some species of trees. Poplar, willow and hypopia have been acclimatised in some areas, though their growth has been rather slow. Forest area is found mainly in the Gilgit valley where on some of the hill-sides, 7,000 feet high, extensive woods of juniper and fir abound.

As during winter, which covers a period of about six months, there is hardly any activity to engage people, an estimated number of 8,000 persons move out of the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan every year in search of livelihood immediately after the middle of October. An off-hand survey conducted in 1975 revealed that more than 7,000 persons migrated to some parts of Pakistan in the winter of 1973-74 to seek employment as construction workers or luggage carriers or ordinary labourers in rice, atta and condiment mills. The migratory labour gets an average daily wage of Rs. 5 though those working in mills are paid Rs. 7 to 8 per head per day.
Chapter 4

The elements of conflict between the two attitudes came out in the open in March 1949 when India and Pakistan stated their viewpoints before the Truce Subcommitteee of the UNCIP. And although an agreement was reached between the two sides during military talks in Karachi from 18 to 27 July 1949 that there would be no increase in forces, it became clear by the end of December 1949 that the two governments were eager to consolidate and strengthen their troops on either side of the line which divided the territory of Jammu and Kashmir into two parts following the tribal invasion on the State by Pakistan.

While India did not appreciate the formula submitted by General McNaughton of Canada after he was named by the Security Council as the Informal Mediator on December 17, 1949, Pakistan had a reason to be satisfied with the formula; for it was a distinct gain to Pakistan and tended, once again, to equate India and Pakistan as parties in a dispute. The McNaughton formula proposed that (1) there should be an agreed programme of progressive reduction of armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line by withdrawal, disbandment, and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear to the people on either side of the cease-fire line; (2) the programme of demi-
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Demilitarization should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of regular forces of Pakistan, and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for the purposes of security and for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the cease-fire line; also the reduction by disbanding local forces and militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other the Azad forces; (3) administration of the northern area should, subject to United Nations supervision, be continued by the existing local authorities; (4) when the agreed programme of demilitarization preparatory to the plebiscite has been accomplished to the satisfaction of the United Nations representative, the Plebiscite Administrator should proceed forthwith to exercise the functions assigned to him under the terms of the UNCIP RESOLUTION of 5 January 1949; (5) a United Nations representative should be appointed by the Secretary-General of the U.N. to supervise the execution of demilitarization and to (a) interpret the agreements reached by the parties and (b) determine the implementation of the demilitarization plan; (6) the U.N. representative should be authorised to make any suggestions to the governments of India and Pakistan which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the Kashmir question, and place his good offices at their disposal.

The McNaughton formula found favour with the majority of the members of the Security Council. But India’s position in the Security Council toughened as a result of the impatience of and pressure from powerful elements in the Western countries to get the formula accepted by India. Several newspapers in India opposed the formula in January and February 1950. The strongest reaction was in Kashmir itself. Two Ministers in Sheikh Abdullah’s Cabinet got the needle when the New York Times wrote: “India seized Hyderabad because it was racially an overwhelmingly Hindu State with a Muslim prince; she is claiming Kashmir, an overwhelming Mohammedan State racially, because the Hindu ruler signed an instrument of accession to India. It looks like getting best of both the worlds..... If India is in good faith she will accept U.N. mediation.” While Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed declared that “so long as a single Kashmiri is alive the McNaughton formula will not be
accepted”, Mirza Mohammed Afzal Beg said that “India will lose the friendship of Kashmir if she were to bow down before the pressure of the Anglo-American bloc and accept, in any shape or form, the McNaughton formula which equated the aggressor and the aggrieved”.

Pakistan’s political leadership had not shown any respect for the accessionists on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. Pakistani press launched a campaign against Sheikh Abdullah following his statement in early November 1947 that “we realised that Pakistan would not allow us any time, that we had either to suffer the fate of our kith and kin of Muzaffarabad, Baramulla and other towns and villages or to seek help from some outside authority. Under these circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir requested the Government of India to accept our accession.” The campaign was intensified between February 1948 and October 1951. Pakistan’s ruling politicians sharply criticised the Sheikh for his speech in the Security Council, his statement on the occupation of Gilgit and Skardu by Pakistan, and his utterances in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on Pakistan’s definition of the Kashmir problem. The Sheikh told the Council on 5 February 1948 that “we would prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India and Pakistan has no right to question that accession.” The Sheikh warmed up on 16 September 1950 over the “illegal” occupation of Gilgit and Skardu by Pakistan and said: “Any bargaining over Gilgit would be violation of territorial integrity of the State and a clear breach of the international law. Gilgit is a part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, but is at present in the illegal possession of Pakistan.” In October 1951 when the Kashmir Constituent Assembly first met, Sheikh Abdullah said: “The most powerful argument which can be advanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a Muslim State, and, a big majority of our people being Muslims, the State must accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim State is of course only a camouflage. It is screen to dupe the common man, so that he may not see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal State, in which a clique is trying by these methods to remain
Encouraged by a scathing attack on Sheikh Abdullah's Government in Kashmir by Sir Owen Dixon, the Australian jurist, Pakistani rulers, backed by anti-India groups, organised anti-Abdullah demonstrations and rallies in several towns and villages, including Gilgit and Skardu. Dixon's report had, among other things, painted the common people as living under a terror regime. The report said: "It was not easy to exclude the danger that the inhabitants of the valley of Kashmir would vote under fear and apprehension of consequences and other improper influences. They are not a high-spirited people of an independent or resolute temper. For the most part, they are illiterate. There were large number of regular soldiers of the Indian army as well as of the State militia and police, and under arms. The State government was exercising wide powers of arbitrary arrest." Sir Owen Dixon, who arrived on the subcontinent on 27 May, 1950, was to negotiate demilitarization on the basis of the McNaughton formula which India had rejected. Dixon had a long stay in Jammu and Kashmir from 7 June to 12 July 1950. In Kashmir, his purpose was to obtain a knowledge of the country, the people, the geographical features, the cease-fire line, the general disposition of the armed force of either side of the cease-fire line and other conditions and circumstances existing in the State. His talks with Sheikh Abdullah were followed by the circulation of reports not only in Kashmir but also in Pakistan that the Kashmir leader had favoured the division of the State and creation of an independent Kashmir.

Earlier, too, on 12 May 1949, the Sheikh was reported to have preferred such a solution in an interview with a correspondent of the Observer, London. But after a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Deputy Prime Minisier, Sardar Patel, the Sheikh clarified his statement on 17 May and totally denied having said anything of the kind; independence, he said, was a charming but meaningless idea and Kashmir no longer thought of any alternative to accession to India.
While the Indian press reaction to the Dixon report was one of the strong resentment, reaction in Pakistan was even more critical. On 21 September 1950, the Dawn, an English daily of Pakistan, wrote; “Sir Owen Dixon’s poisoned pen has pricked as it were a mere bubble the belief that in the larger world Pakistan is in the company of well-wishers, not to speak of friends... The report of Sir Owen Dixon is like a syllogism in which the conclusion has nothing whatsoever to do with either the major premise of the minor premise.” The resentment was brought out sharply when a debate was held in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 5 October 1950. While the Prime Minister called the recommendation for direct negotiations “a counsel of despair”, the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Nurul Amin, said that the U.N. could rise to the occasion only when big-power interest demanded it. The Sind leader, M.A. Khuro, said that the Security Council offered no security to Pakistan whereas Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan wanted to serve an ultimatum to the United Nations: if they did not solve the problem in ten days, Pakistan would break connections with them. While Maulana Akram Khan said that the last of all arguments was the sword. Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Minister for Kashmir Affairs, told the Constituent Assembly that Dixon did not realize that “by throwing sponge he was creating a dangerous void inasmuch as he was appointed a substitute for the United Nations Commission on Pakistan and India which had wider terms of reference than merely the settlement of Kashmir dispute”.

It was clear from the movement of Pakistan troops in the occupied areas, including Muzaffarabad, Poonch, Gilgit and Skardu, Three months before the session of the Constituent Assembly was held that the interest in ensuring a purposeful strength in Pakistani Kashmir had greatly increased in Karachi, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar. Groups of political workers organised meetings at these places of focus the authorities’ attention on the Kashmir question and to stress the need for granting right of self-determination to the people residing on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. The troops’ movement followed two significant developments: first, of course, was the military training imparted to nearly 10,000 able-
bodied men in the centres opened for the purpose at Karachi, Quetta, Lyallpur, Multan, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Chitral Gilgit and Skardu between February 1949 and July 1950, and secondly, the hurried consultations between Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime Minister, and some field commanders of the Pakistan army at Karachi in the beginning of July 1950.

Involvement of some Pakistani rulers in selling the idea of jehad (Mohammedan war against unbelievers) to different sections of people became clear in September 1950 when Governor-general Nazimuddin told a tribal meeting in Gilgit that the liberation of Kashmir “is a cardinal belief of every Pakistani”. Nazimuddin also said: “It is an integral part of the Pakistani resolution and Pakistan would remain incomplete until the whole of Kashmir has been liberated.” Less than two months later, Sardar Ibrahim Khan, a leader of Pakistan-held Kashmir, said: “The only solution now lies in the revival of our war of liberation.” Again, about two months after Ibrahim statement, Liaqat Ali Khan said at a press conference: “There were only two courses open to Pakistan to settle the issue: one was to pursue the matter in the Security Council. The second I would not tell you.”

As the news of arrival of additional brigades of the Indian army in Kashmir reached Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan deputed a team of officers to Washington in April 1951 to procure modern weapons for Pakistan’s ground formations. The team left Rawalpindi within a month after the Rawalpindi conspiracy in which a group of army officers and some members of the Communist Party were alleged to have planned for a commotion in the country and for subverting the loyalty of defence forces was unearthed on March 1951. Among those who were said to be responsible for this was Major-General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan army, who had commanded the Kashmir invaders as General Tariq.

Following an attempt by Pakistan in early 1951 to have the Kashmir issue discussed at the Commonwealth, anti-India sentiment sharpened in several parts of Pakistan as the Indian and Pakistan delegates crossed swords on 9 March in the
Security Council. The Frontier Premier, Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, said that if India was not agreeable to having a free plebiscite, there was no other alternative "except war". The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said on 13 June 1951: "India has now over several months taken up the attitude with regard to Kashmir which deliberately blocks progress about peaceful lines. What does India desire? It has no right to complain if it gets something else." While poems and articles in some Pakistani newspapers held out the vision of recapturing Delhi and compared Kashmir to Karbala, the popular English daily Dawn, wrote on 8 June 1951: "Here is the brigand (Nehru) who has robbed the Kashmiris of their freedom and placed them under the heels of his troops. Here is the plunderer.... There is no longer any time to waste in idle arguments. We suggest that our Foreign Minister should proceed to the USA forthwith and that the Security Council immediately denounce Bharat as an aggressor and issue to it clear and strong directions providing for sanctions in case of disobedience. He should tell the Security Council that unless it acts Pakistan must."

Pakistan’s attitude towards the Indian "policy of repression" in Kashmir hardened soon after Sheikh Abdullah was deposed and imprisoned in the Indian Kashmir in August 1953. For days after the Sheikh’s arrest at the hands of his erstwhile confidant and lieutenant Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed who became the second National Conference Premier, huge crowds of people roamed the streets in Pakistan and Pakistan-held territories, including Gilgit and Skardu, chanted pro-Abdullah slogans and condemned the "armoury of coercion" in the Indian Kashmir. Top politicians, like Qayum Khan and Shahabuddin, took an active part in organising anti-India demonstrations. Passions were roused at public meetings and the people were asked to get ready for liberating Kashmir. While Karachi observed a complete hartal, the Government of Pakistan announced the cancellation of all Independence Day celebrations. A Public meeting in Karachi on 16 August, addressed by Fatima Jinnah, Qayum Khan and Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas, demanded jehad against India on Kashmir.

About two months after Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister
of India, and Mohammed Ali, Premier of Pakistan, issued a joint communique on 20 August 1953 on their talks in Delhi, clenched fists against India were raised at a meeting of the Muslim League in Karachi as, towards the end of October, some political circles in Pakistan had been given to understand that the team of officers, deputed to Washington in April 1951 to seek the US military assistance, had attained success. Reports of a deal between Washington and Rawalpindi came to be circulated by the end of 1953. But the formal announcement of the Military assistance from the USA to Pakistan was made by Mohammed Ali on 22 February 1954—three days after Pakistan and Turkey had signed a bilateral pact. The area of disagreement between Pakistan and India became wider following Mohammed Ali's announcement and exchange of letters between the two Premiers. A climate of conflict was created by a relentless press campaign in the two countries and above all by India-Pakistan clashes on matters of foreign policy at a conference of the Asian Premiers at Colombo.

The atmosphere, further vitiated by Pakistan's decision to join the SEATO in September 1954, proved conducive to Rawalpindi's attempt at building military strength. Pakistan began to move closer to the West by the end of 1954. A new situation emerged when Pakistan announced her decision to enter the Baghdad Pact on 30 June 1955—barely a day before the Prime Minister of Pakistan disclosed that Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan had decided to cooperate in each other's security and defence. Unceremonious exit of Mohammed Ali in August 1955 did not bring about a healthy change in Pakistan's attitude towards India in Kashmir. The new Prime Minister, Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, addressed a press conference on 2 September when he explained: "We are pledged to secure for the people of Kashmir the exercise of their right to decide by a free and impartial plebiscite whether to accede to India or Pakistan. We shall endeavour by every means in our power to honour our pledge to the people of Kashmir." Before the All-parties Conference on Kashmir was held on 26 November, the movement of additional battalions of Pakistan forces from Karachi and Rawalpindi to areas like Muzaffarabad, Poonch, Gilgit and Baltistan was reported towards the middle of August
when in the wake of a new trend of opinion in the Islamic country, some Pakistanis contemplated satyagraha in Kashmir. And after a general discussion on the Kashmir issue at the All-Parties Conference, a resolution was drafted to denounce India for her “intransigence”, to express disappointment at the Security Council to act and to urge the Government of Pakistan to “intensify and integrate on the national basis all efforts to secure for the people of Jammu and Kashmir the right of self-determination.”

With the introduction of the cold war in the Kashmir situation following Pakistan’s decision to become a full-fledge member of the SEATO and to enter the Turco-Iraqi Pact, known as the Baghdad Pact, an opportunity was provided to Pakistan to raise her military strength. The Minister of Defence General Ayub Khan, and Foreign Minister, Hamidul Huq Chaudhari, functioned in close alliance to ensure proper utilisation of funds, received quietly from the USA, Turkey and Iraq, and fill various arms and ammunition depots in the country with abundant stocks of equipment from different quarters. General Ayub Khan, who undertook a hurricane trip to some areas in the occupied territory, including the Gilgit valley, after Pakistan became a member of the SEATO, urged the troops to be vigilant and said: “We want you to strengthen your position wherever you are stationed.” A plan to train razakars in larger numbers was put into operation in different parts of Pakistan and Pakistan-held “Azad Kashmir” following pro-India views expressed in Srinagar by the Russian leaders, Bulganin and Krushchov, in December 1955. Pakistan resented the Soviet leaders’ sentiments while Bulganin talked of Kashmir as the “northern part of India” Krushchov said: “The question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir.” The cold war was further carried into Kashmir when on 8 March 1956, the SEATO Council affirmed the need for “an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the U.N. or by direct negotiations”.

With the announcement of her intention of wooing, with flattery and material aid, the people and Government of Pakistan following the Communist coup in Sinkiang in September 1942, China began her calculated attempt to gain a foothold in the strategically-situated small state of Hunza across the frontier region of Ladakh in 1951 when a Chinese delegation toured the area with a view to influencing the behaviour of the people. Members of the delegation announced during their talks with the Mir of Hunza and his associates that China had decided to provide material aid to Pakistan to enable her to improve the economy in Hunza and its neighbouring areas. Pro-Peking sentiment came to be noticed among the inhabitants of Hunza and Nagar, a neighbouring state, for the first time in 1952 when Chinese goods, including silk, green tea, cloth, transistors and cameras, were sold in the region at throwaway prices.

Following the two important developments—Krushchov’s presentation in considered words of a “fact” during 1955-56 that Russia’s interest in Asia was no less than China’s and the resentment by Pakistani press and politicians against the Soviet leaders statements in support of India in Kashmir towards the end of 1955—China found it easy to develop friendly relations
with Pakistan. Po Yi-Po, Chairman of the Chinese Economic Commission, arranged a trip for a team of Chinese officials to Pakistan and Hunza and Gilgit valley in August 1957 to find out the requirements of the territories in the economic sphere. This was followed by the opening of two centres by Peking in Hunza and Gilgit for promoting what was described as "good feeling" between China and Pakistan.

Hunza is a small territory in the heart of the Karakoram range. It lies on the ancient trade route to Sinkiang. Its topography presents strange and pleasant contrasts to the eye. Starting from a low level the terraced fields, covered with crops and orchards, rise gradually. In the season, the orchards abound in apricots, apples, pears, peaches, plums, cherries and grapes. The terraced fields and orchards are fed by irrigation channels laboriously dug along hard and vertical cliffs. Above the cultivable area, the middle reaches of the mountains, rugged and barren, reach upward to snow-covered peaks or sharp pinnacles.

At Hunza there are several glaciers and high peaks, the most magnificent being Rakaposhi (25,550 ft.) In some places, an abrupt rise of 18,000 feet of this beautiful mountain can be seen. When Alexander invaded Swat in 326 B.C., his warriors marched through the Hindu Kush and Gilgit and on to Hunza and Nagar.

The early history of Hunza is indistinct. The Hunza frontier provided a clear proof of the manner in which the British Government tended to subordinate the rights of Kashmir to the needs of policy and strategy before the occupation of Gilgit by Pakistan brought to an end 100-year old British intrigue in Gilgit. There are no facts available as proof of the Chinese ever having exercised any jurisdiction in the Raskam valley before 1890. The valley of the Raskam river, adjoining Hunza to the north-east, extends from the Taghdumbash Pamirs in the west to the Karakoram pass in the east. The Raskam valley is bounded on the north by the Kuenlen mountains and on the south by the Mustagli and the Aghil-Karakorams. The Mustagh-Karakoram mountains form the northern watershed of the Indus. The Mustagh chain from
the south-east, the Sarikol from the north-east, and the Hindu Kush from the south-west, meet at a point to the north of Hunza.

Although there is no evidence of the Chinese ever having invaded Hunza, they claimed that Hunza became a tributary of the Chinese empire in the 25th year of the reign of Chien Lung (1760 A. D.). It was noted as far ago as 1821 that Hunza was neither a vassal nor acted as a vassal of China. Hunza was an independent state and its rights over the Taghdumbash and Raskam areas were regularly exercised by the Mir of Hunza except during the period between 1865 and 1878 when Yaqub Beg ruled in Turkistan. The Mir of Hunza, who invaded and defeated the Kirghiz nomads of the Taghdumbash Pamirs, informed the Chinese that Hunza territory extended up to Dafdar in the Taghdumbash. The Mir received a present from the Chinese for having conquered their enemies and the Mir acknowledged it by a small gift of gold dust. While the exchange of presents became an annual feature, the Chinese began to talk of a tributary relationship. And encouraged by the reluctance of the British to accept responsibility for the trans-Mustagh region and their anxiety to see Chinese power effectively asserted there, the Chinese made it a basis for a territorial claim over Hunza. While the authority of the Mir of Hunza over the Taghdumbash and Raskam areas had received definite recognition, the authority of Kashmir over Hunza came to be established by 1869 when the Mir started paying tribute to the ruler of Kashmir.

The Chinese referred to their influence, if not control, over the people of Hunza even before the Sikh rulers of Kashmir had conquered Gilgit, as early as 1842. In 1891 campaigns of Colonel Durand in Gilgit, when Kashmir troops overran Hunza and Nagar, the Mir of Hunza, Safdar Ali, his Wazir, and the heir apparent of Nagar, Uzar Khan, escaped to China. Safdar Ali settled in his jagir granted to his ancestors by the Chinese in Yarkand in 1847. Although the 1891 campaigns brought Hunza completely under Kashmir—British influence, exchange of presents between Hunza and the Chinese authorities at Kashgar continued. This was necessary because Hunza
claimed territories of Raskam and Taghdumbash Pamirs, north of the Hindu Kush watershed, which was disputed by the Chinese.

The differences over these districts arose soon after 1891 campaigns. The Chinese later in regard to Raskam acknowledged the rights of Hunzukuts to till the land and, in 1899, they were actually permitted to engage in agricultural pursuits but subsequently were ejected from the area. Ejection of the farmers was brought about after the Chinese began patrolling the Taghdumbash area. The dispute continued till 1974 when British finally managed to settle it in favour of Hunza. In regard to Taghumbash Pamirs, the Hunza Mir was permitted to collect certain taxes from the Kieghiz shepherds with the consent and assistance of local Chinese authorities. The definite Chinese claims to Hunza territory related to these two areas. But following the dismemberment of Gilgit and Baltistan territories from the Kashmir State between November 1947 and September 1948, the Chinese put forth claims to all territory up to and including Kilik, Mintaka, Khunjerab and shimshal, all major passes between Sinking and Hunza. Consisting of about 20 villages, Aunza is situated at an altitude of about 8,000 feet. The villages in the north were rise gradually to about 1,000 feet higher, while those on the west descend gradually as much lower.

It was during the gruelling battle between Pakistan and India on the soil of Kashmir from October 1947 to the end of 1948 that Chinese troops began to concentrate on the borders of Hunza and inside Sinkiang—otherwise known as Eastern Turkistan. The Chinese occasionally visited some villages in Nagar and Hunza in 1948-49 in order to make clear by their presence that China continued to have claims of suzerainty over the territory. The Chinese avoided to be fast and furious in the territory in view of the sympathy expressed, in the initial stage, by the people of the Islamic country (Pakistan) for several hundred Turk Muslims who were either killed or forced to flee when the Chinese communists had established their rule in sinkiang and finished the Kuomintang regime in the region. China had no opposition against her gradual efforts to find
access into Hunza and its neighbouring areas as the Indian leaders and some Western countries had kept Pakistan busy with negotiations on the Kashmir problem in and outside the Security Council.

China found it easy to ensure unrestricted movement of the Chinese inside the valleys of Hunza and Gilgit after Pakistan's Prime Minister, Feroz Khan Noon, told the Pakistan National Assembly on 8 March 1958 that there would be no alternative for the people of Kashmir except to walk into the Communist Camp, if America and Europe failed to solve the problem. He also revealed that Pakistan had sent a delegation to the Chinese premier and tried to persuade the Russians to adopt a different attitude on Kashmir. And after the first serious development in the Sino-Soviet conflict occurred in 1958, China adopted a new line: to flatter the people and Government of Pakistan, to emphasize Peking's earnest desire to assist Pakistan in building her economic strength, to infiltrate into the student community and peasants and labour unions in some parts of Pakistan, Gilgit, Nagar and Hunza, and to encourage some circles to spread reports of massive land forces and armament industry in China.

Pakistan had no reason to doubt the reports of China's growing military strength inasmuch as the incendiary power play in Central Asia from the early 1940s to 1959 fully demonstrated the strength of the Chinese Communists during and after the fall of Sinkiang and Tibet. A caravan of sinkiang tribesmen, known as Kazaks, crossed into Kashmir via Ladakh in the early 1940s. The growing feeling those days for an independent Eastern Turkistan was a rocket, and Kazaks, Tungans and such other clans and tribes saw themselves as its war-head. But as the pressure from the Chinese increased, a few hundred of these warlike tributesmen, who in cooperation with like-minded Turks had hoped to ride to power on the coat-tails of their traditional nationalism, came over to Kashmir to seek asylum in India. The State authorities looked after these refugees and felt relieved when they were taken to Rawalpindi without being allowed to enter Srinagar city.
Half-Mongol, half-Turkish, the Kazaks did not accept the Russo-Chinese intrusion passively. Kazak means "man without a master," The Kazaks had, until 1946, a pastoral existence; They followed their sheep and cattle and camels down into the valley pastures in Sinkiang in winter and took them up to the hills in summer. When the Chinese Communists moved in, Kazak encampments were blasted by heavy machine guns mounted on lorries. The Chinese poured hundreds of their labourers into the lands thus emptied of their owners. After he Chinese killed a large number of the sturdy tribesmen (who had put up a fierce fight against the Communist troops for several days), the Kazaks gathered up their great herds of cattle, fatted sheep, camels and horses in some areas of Sinkiang and, began moving north and west, hoping somehow to reach Turkey, the home of their ancestors. Out of the 23,500-odd Kazaks who had attempted to flee the Communists in Sinkiang, less than 3,000 survived to make their way over land and sea to Istanbul.

The news of the Turk Muslims' resentment against the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang flew thick and fast in Kashmir when about 500 Turk Muslim refugees from Sinkiang crossed into Ladakh by October 1949. Isa Yusuf Alptekin, a former Secretary-General of the Sinkiang Government, and Mohammed Amin Bogra, a former Deputy Governor of Sinkiang, had also fled their homeland and crossed into Ladakh. Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who know both Mao-Tse-tung and General Chiang Kai-shek personally, explained in Srinagar that neither Tibet nor the borders of Ladakh could remain unaffected once the Chinese grip over Sinkiang became tight. A year later-in 1950- it was he who first informed some friends in Kashmir that Chinese troops had marched into Tibet.

Alptekin, who settled in Turkey in 1954 after staying in Kashmir for four years, said during his brief visit to Srinagar in 1970 that nearly five million Chinese had been settled in Sinkiang since it came under the occupation of China in 1949. Peking, he stated, planned to induct over ten million Chinese into Sinkiang in "years to come." Alptekin, who operated as President of the National Centre for the Liberation of
Eastern Turkistan and of Eastern Turkistan’s Refugee Association, told a press conference on 6 June that while the population of Turk Muslims in Sinkiang in 1949 was over eight million, thousands of them had been killed by the Chinese occupation forces. He said that while nearly 20,000 Turk Muslims had settled in the Soviet Union, over 10,000 refugees had sought asylum in Saudi Arabia. About 5,000 Muslimshad crossed into Turkey, while over 3,000 refugees had settled in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

While migration of the Hun population from the Chinese mainland to Sinkiang became known all over the world by April 1966, reports of the flow of over 10 lakh Chinese into different parts of Tibet came to be circulated by the middle of 1968. During his visit to the Nubra valley in Ladakh towards the end of 1970, the Dalai Lama told some Buddhist leaders, including Kushak Bakula, that China had divided Tibet in two parts—“Outer Tibet” and “Inner Tibet”. The former included Lhasa, Shigtse and Chamdo and the latter was the part nearer China, including Botang, Litang, Tachienlu and a large portion of eastern Tibet. The Dalai Lama said the Chinese had removed to Peking gold worth about Rs. 29 crores from the two palaces—Norpulingka and Potala—and gold images of the eleven dead Dalai Lamas, each weighing over 38 kilograms, and scores of gold stupas weighing between 10 and 80 kilograms. The two palaces possessed about 200 maunds of gold at the time of the Dalai Lama’s entry into India. One of these palaces and several monasteries in Tibet, the Dalai Lama stated, had been converted into recreation centres, like cinema houses, clubs and schools. He also said that while a large number of Tibetan girls had been forced to marry Chinese males, Tibetan males were not allowed to marry Chinese girls. But if any Chinese wanted to carry his Tibetan wife with him to the Chinese mainland, he was not allowed to do so.

Following his meeting with the Dalai Lama at Dharamsala in the middle of 1972, Kushak Bakula said in Srinagar that while about five million Chinese had been settled in Tibet since 1959 when the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees crossed into India, the Chinese troops had stepped up
their vigil along the Indo-Tibetan border as part of their "strategy to prevent Tibetans from crossing into India." The Kushak revealed that concentration camps in central and eastern Tibet had been set up to "deal with those Tibetans who were unwilling to undergo revolutionary transformation." He said that after destroying image of King Ke-sar in the Ke-sar temple at Lhasa, Mao's red Army had hoarded arms and ammunition in this religious place and in several other monasteries.

Trade with Tibet and Turkistan played an important part in Kashmir's economic life even in medieval times. Leh, the principal town of Ladakh, was the main commercial depot of Kashmir's import and export trade with Tibet, Turkistan and China. Much of Tibet's trade with China was conducted by the Kashmiris who had their establishments at Lhasa, capital of Tibet. Shawl-wool was imported from Rudok and Chanthorn, lying to the east and south-east of Tibet, and from Ladakh and Yarkand. Shawl-wool was important for Kashmir where weavers and prosperity of merchants largely depended on it. Tibet also exported gold and musk to Kashmir, while Ladakh exported woollen cloth which was brought and sold by Ladakhi merchants. Before the cessation of trade with Central Asia, Kashmir exported goods like saffron, silk, crystals, sugar, shawls, fruit, timber and horses to Central Asia, Tibet and China. Kashmir also exported articles obtained from other countries.

About a decade after the capture of the "Roof of the World"—Tibet—by the Chinese Communists, a section of the Buddhists, including the Dalai Lama, pressed their demand for independence of Tibet when Jayaprakash Narayan, a veteran leader of India, and twelve members of Indian Parliament issued a statement in Delhi in 1969, asking the Government of India to take diplomatic initiative for Tibetan independence and correct its "grievous blunder" of recognising Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. The Dalai Lama was not ignorant about the progress made in connection with the rehabilitation of over one lakh Tibetan refugees, the majority of them in India, who had fled Tibet in 1959-60. But his desire to see
Tibet free from the Communist control grew by the statement which was signed by Jayaprakash Narayan and twelve members, including A.B. Vajpayee, S.M. Joshi, Frank Anthony, Madhu Limaye, N.G. Ranga and Nath Pai. The statement, issued on 10 March to mark the tenth anniversary of the Tibetan national uprising, supported "liberation" of Tibet and warned that "even if the Chinese leave nothing but ashes in our sacred land, Tibet will rise from these as a free country even if it takes a long time to do so." Interest of these Indian leaders as well as of the Buddhists of Ladakh in the history and importance of Tibet was not without meaning inasmuch as they knew that the Kashmir State had the most diverse inhabitants as its neighbours. In the north across the mountains stand Russia and Sinkiang, in the east is Tibet, and in the west is Afghanistan.

With the passage of time, the Dalai Lama's resentment against the Chinese showed signs of abatement. Some of those who happened to know certain gains made on the economic front in Tibet under the administrative and political control of the Chinese came to contact the Dalai Lama at a time when Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Government was not prepared to pick up cudgels with Peking by raking up the question of independence for Tibet. The 14th spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet did not deem it necessary to press his demand after he was informed between 1973 and 1975 that warlike Khampas and Amdos, numbering about 20,000, had been fully controlled in Tibet by the Red Army's strong retaliatory measures against them. In early days of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, Khampas and Amdos used harassing tactics to frighten away the Chinese, especially in the Jyangthan highlands in the north of the territory. The Dalai Lama said in 1975 that Tibet "is to remain without fifteenth Dalai Lama" as the land of Tibetans might not find his "reincarnation" after his death. Born in a small village, Taktser in north-east of Tibet, in 1935, the Dalai Lama was recognised as fourteenth spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet in 1940. His enthronement on the "Lion Throne" followed the death of Thupten Gyatso (thirteenth Dalai Lama) in 1933.

First Dalai Lama of Tibet was born in 1391 of the Christian
era. He was said to be the incarnation of Chenresi (Buddha of Mercy) who made a vow to protect all living beings. The fourteenth Dalai Lama told me in Srinagar in August 1976 that he had been in India for a number of years "praying for the grant of peace and prosperity to Tibet." He did not conceal his desire to return to Tibet along with thousands of Tibetan refugees when he said: "I want to go back to see things myself in my homeland. I want to die in my own country. But I do not know how they (India and China) would react if and when I start to press for my return to the 'holy land' (Tibet)".
Chapter

6

The Month that was. In May 1959, a wave of enthusiasm swept several parts of Pakistan soon after an agreement was reached, quietly, for the first time between Rawalpindi and Peking on the flow of Chinese aid and assistance to Pakistan. And as the reports came to be circulated that the agreement with Peking would enable Pakistan to build her strength (without defining it) with the Chinese help, groups of people in Karanchi, Rawalpindi, Dacca and Mazaffarbad, capital of Pakistan-held “Azad Kashmir”, began to press for a direct action to seek “liberation” of Kashmir. General Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, told newsmen at Muzaffarabad on 8 June 1959 that those who had a stake in the “freedom of this part of the world” should assist in the resolution of the dispute of Kashmir which was a “powder keg.”

General Ayub’s views on the Kashmir issue were fast and furious; they set the Indian leaders thinking anew on more than one occasion. Hardly had the ink on the agreement (between Jawaharlal Nehru and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Feroz Khan Noon) dried when the military regime was installed in Pakistan following the ouster of Noon and abrogation of the country’s Constitution. On 10 October 1958, General Ayub told a press conference: “No Pakistani can forget Kashmir. We in the
Army feel it more because we recognize the significance of the
problem.” On 20 October, he said at a news conference in
Dacca: “The first thing to note about Kashmir is that, apart
from any other consideration, from the purely militray and
security point of view we have to continue the struggle for the
liberation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In no circum-
stances can we give up that struggle. We shall be infinitely
glad to have a settlement through peaceful means. But if we
are forced to adopt means other than peaceful, the blame will
surely lie at the door step of India”. While Nehru described
the new regime in Pakistan as a “naked military dictatorship”
and said on 7 November that “such a dictatorship always has
inherent in it risks and dangers of individuals acting on moods”,
General Ayub told a rally in Karachi on 25 December that
there “is a limit to our patience” and it might be difficult “for
us to observe in silence the tyrannies to which our brethren in
occupied Kashmir are being subjected.”

Earlier, the climax of the new situation was reached when
the fire was emitted by the Opposition leaders in Pakistan by
raising the war cry between March and May 1958. While
Mumtaz Daultana and Suhrawardy asked people to get in final
readiness, Chaudri Mohammed Ali, a former Premier, said that
war with India was inevitable and “sooner it came the better”.
Qayum Khan, president of the Muslim League, proclaimed
that “a war is the only solution to the Kashmir tangle.” While
Yusuf Mohammed, a member of Parliament, said that tribes
men were planning to march into Kashmir, Chaudhri Ghulam
Abbas a prominent leader of “Azad Kashmir”, urged the gover-
nment to allow the people to cross the cease-fire line. The
Opposition leaders used violent language against India after
Pakistan had increased the size of her ground formations and
succeeded in getting the requisite technical advisers from the
USA to ensure effective employment of artillery, tanks and
aircraft. Pakistan’s alliance with the United States came into
being in 1951 not merely as a result of the understandable
needs of the global strategy of the United States against the
Communist bloc of nations but also out of a growing exaspera-
tion in some circles of America with India. The American deci-
sion to supply military equipment to Pakistan was viewed with
concern in India. In a statement in the Lok Sabha on 23 December 1953, Nehru voiced India's concern at the American decision and provided an idea that the availability of modern arms and equipments to the defence forces of Pakistan free of cost had added considerably to India's burden.

Pakistan's Ministry of Defence arranged the distribution of several thousand copies of a book on infantry training and weapons for infantry platoons among the army personnel in September 1960. The 154-page book was in Urdu and meant for the army personnel in Pakistan. The book provided, among other things, necessary guidelines on sniping field firing and reading of "air photographs". Earlier, in February 1957, a book in Urdu was prepared for providing necessary knowledge on the use of two-inch mortars, smoke and signal bombs and HE bombs. The 62-page book was signed by Major-General M. Habib Ullah Khan, Chief of the General Staff. The book was secretly printed at Lahore seven years after the Defence Ministry introduced a book, known as "skill at Arms", in a number of ground units in the country.

Indo-Pakistan relations took a turn for the worse shortly after the joint communique was issued at the end of the talks in Pakistan between President Ayub Khan and Nehru on 23 September 1960. On 6 October 1960, President Ayub told a public meeting at Muzaffarabad that Pakistan could not trust India until the Kashmir question was settled and that the Pakistani army could "never afford to leave the Kashmir issue unresolved for an indefinite time". This statement came after the relations between India and America began to improve by the end of 1956. In December 1956, Nehru visited the United States and newspapers reported that his talks with President Eisenhower had been extremely "friendly and cordial". This process came to be followed by the expression of anti-American feelings in Pakistan. A clear indication of anti-American feelings was provided by the Dawn on 21, 23 and 29 May and 3 June 1961 while commenting on the Indo-American relations.

The Pakistani press coverage of the Bandung conference had appreciated the role of China in the conference. As the
development of friendly relations between Pakistan and China had taken place in the backdrop of Soviet support to India on the Kashmir question, the Chinese people’s Government began to assure the Government of Pakistan (soon after the Bandung conference) that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries which could imperil their friendly relations. One of the significant sidelights of the Indo-Pakistan relations after Nehru’s visit to the United States in 1960 was that Pakistan challenged India’s right to settle the boundaries between Ladakh and China. In January 1961, Pakistan sounded China informally regarding border settlement. But a diplomatic note asking Peking for the demarcation of the boundary was sent on 28 March 1961. The Chinese Government took long to reply to the Pakistani offer as Peking was awfully busy building her troops close to the borders of India as well as in reorganising groups of Chinese infiltrators around Hunza and Gilgit. China responded to the Pakistani proposal in February 1962 and on May 3, 1962, the two governments issued a joint statement in which they agreed to conduct negotiations “to locate and align their common border.”

Relations between India and China took a turn for the worse after the governments of Pakistan and China issued the joint communique. In May and June 1962, V. K. Krishna Menon, India’s Defence Minister, challenged Pakistan’s right to settle Kashmir’s boundaries with China. He told the Security Council on 22 June 1962: “Over and above all this then has occurred the situation in which Pakistan today not for any good reasons, but merely for nuisance value and as an instrument to put pressure on us—has entered into negotiations and, I believe, has concluded agreements with the Central Government of the people’s Republic of China. That agreement is in total violation of any rights of authority Pakistan may possess, for Pakistan has no sovereignty over this State; it is not Pakistan’s to trade away or to negotiate about.” Krishna Menon’s statement followed the protest notes sent by the Government of India to China and Pakistan on 10 May 1962.

India’s protest note to China started; “In lodging an emphatic protest which the government of the people’s Republic of
China for this interference with sovereignty of India over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India solemnly warns the Government of China that any change, provisional or otherwise, in the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir brought about by third parties which seek to submit certain parts of Indian territory to foreign jurisdiction will not be binding on the Government of India and that the Government of India firmly repudiate any agreements, provisional or otherwise, regarding her own territories arrived at between third parties who have no legal or constitutional locus standi of any kind. It is clear that the government of China are in this matter acting in furtherance of their aggressive designs and are seeking to exploit the troubled situation in Kashmir and India’s differences with Pakistan for their own advantage. The Government of India will hold the Government of China responsible for the consequences of their action."

On 31 May 1962, China sent her reply. The Chinese reply rejected India’s protest and said: The Chinese Government has already refrained from making any remarks on the historical background of the Kashmir question. Nevertheless, the Kashmir question is after all a dispute between two legal governments, those of India and of Pakistan. China has diplomatic relations with India and also with Pakistan, and India, too, has diplomatic relations with Pakistan. The Chinese Government only hopes that this dispute between India and Pakistan will be settled by them peacefully, and has always been against anyone taking advantage of it to sow discord in the relations between the two countries. So far as China is concerned, nothing would be better than a peaceful settlement of this dispute by India and Pakistan through negotiation. However, more than ten years have passed and despite the best wishes and expectations all along cherished by China, this dispute between India and Pakistan remains unsettled. In these circumstances, anyone with common sense can understand that the Chinese Government cannot leave unsettled indefinitely its boundary of several hundred kilometres with the areas the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan merely because there is a dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. It is entirely necessary, proper, legitimate, and in accordance with international
practice for the Chinese Government to agree with the Government of Pakistan to negotiate a provisional agreement concerning this boundary pending a final settlement of the Kashmir question.”

Pakistan, too, rejected India’s protest and said in her reply of 9 August 1962: “It is strange that the Government of India should first obstruct and frustrate the attempts of the United Nations and of Pakistan, over the past fourteen years, to settle by peaceful procedures the status of the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and then proceed to question the right of Pakistan to enter into negotiations with China to reach an understanding on the alignment of that portion of the territory for the defence of which Pakistan is responsible.”

While correspondence was in progress between China and India for a negotiated settlement, the Chinese regime resorted to arms to enforce its territorial claims, culminating in a massive attack on India on 20 October 1962. The Chinese attacked simultaneously in two places—NEFA and Ladakh. While fighting was in progress, Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) on 8 November 1962: “They go on saying that India attacked them and their frontier guards, as they are called, are merely defending themselves. I must confess that it is a complete perversion of facts and the attempt to make falsehood appear to be the truth and the truth to be the falsehood has amazed me because nothing can be more utterly baseless than what they have been saying.” On 10 December, Nehru said in a statement in the Lok Sabha: “They come to a place where they have never been, so far as I know of history, at any time of history...It is curious that acting in self-defence they have occupied another 20,000 square miles of Indian territory...I regret to say that I have been forced to the conclusion that the word of the Chinese Government cannot be relied upon.”

On 8 September 1962, Chinese forces crossed the international border in the eastern sector (NEFA). The Chinese attacked the Indian frontier post at Dhola on September 21 and again on September 28. This post as well as two others in that area
fell to the Chinese under their massive attack of October 20. On October 22, the town of Kibitoo in the Lohit Frontier Division fell to the Chinese. The other two places overrun by the Chinese in NEFA from October 22 to November 19 were: Twang, Bumla, Walong, Sela and Comdila. In the western sector (Ladakh), the Chinese attacked Indian posts in the Damchok area on October 27. Indian troops withdrew from Daulat Beg Oldi on November 5. The Chinese shelled the Chushul area on November 17, and two Indian posts there fell on November 18.

China occupied a further area of 2,500 square miles in Ladakh, in addition to the 12,000 square miles occupied earlier through aggressive instructions. In the eastern sector (NEFA), the Chinese forces had advanced into another 20,000 square miles of Indian territory. Subsequently, the Chinese forces withdrew in NEFA under China's unilateral cease-fire declaration of November 21, 1962, up to the McMahon Line.

While fighting was going on between Indian and Chinese troops, Indian Military Intelligence department sent a message to New Delhi about the presence of a group of Chinese officials in Pakistan. The message also gave same details of the movements of Pakistani troops close to the borders of Kashmir. This development led the Ministry of defence to send instructions to the Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir, urging them to be on the alert. Strength of Indian troops in Uri, Tanghdhar, Kupwara and Bandipore in Kashmir and Poonch, Rajouri and Ranbir Singh Pora sectors in the Jammu region was raised by November 10.

After individual countries like Ghana, Tanganyika and United Arab Republic had failed in their efforts to persuade China to accept their respective proposals for a settlement of the Sino-Indian conflict, opinion among the Afro-Asian nations favoured the holding of a conference of non-aligned nations to promote direct negotiations between India and China. Eventually, at the invitation of Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, a conference of representatives of six non-aligned nations—Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Indonesia and UAR—was held in Colombo from December 10.
to 12, 1962. The conference concluded its deliberations on December 12, but decided that its proposals should first be presented to the Chinese and Indian Governments before they were published.

Five days before Mrs. Bandaranaike arrived in Peking on a nine--day visit to China, an announcement was made in Rawalpindi on 26 December 1962 that China and Pakistan had agreed in principle on the alignment of the border between Sinkiang and the occupied parts of Kashmir. Pakistani rulers had fully realized that it was beyond their control to eject groups of Chinese troops from the area close to the Hunza border. The Chinese, too, had known Pakistan's inability to displease China after her refusal to withdraw from the area and subsequent statement by the Chinese Government on 31 May 1962 in support of Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. On 2 March 1963, the agreement was signed in Peking by Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, on behalf of the Government of China. Pakistan claimed that she had gained an area of 750 square miles out of the agreement. But on 4 March 1963, the Indian Government got a report that Pakistan had ceded to China about 2,700 square miles of the territory of occupied Kashmir.

Prime Minister of India, Nehru, visited Kashmir in June 1953. On 18 June, he said in Srinagar: "Pakistan's alliance with USA and other members of this camp (which was strongly opposed to China) was directed specially against China. These countries helped build up Pakistan's armed might to serve as a bulwark against Communist China. Now all of a sudden Pakistan seems to have development a strange love for China. They signed a treaty with China giving away large chunks of Jammu and Kashmir territory which was under their illegal occupation. Not only that. In the dispute between India and China, Pakistan has been sympathising with China and supporting their actions...Their are many disputes between India and Pakistan. Of these, Kashmir is the major one. For the last few years, Pakistan has kept comparatively quiet about this matter. But now China's attack on India has given them an opportunity to revive this issue and to raise a hue and cry. The right
reaction on their part would have been to consider China's aggression as much a threat to their own freedom as to India's. But they refused to see the situation in this light and instead sided with China. Pakistani newspapers are full of praise for China... We are all interested in the solution of the Kashmir problem. We have thought a great deal about this problem, and have made every possible effort to find the way to a solution of this problem. We have failed. The problem is still there. In fact that Chinese invasion has made it even more difficult of solution. Pakistan is mistaken if it thinks that it can intimidate us because we are facing this threat from the Chinese”.

Existence of some kind of a military understanding between China and Pakistan was indicated by the Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, three and a half months after the border agreement was signed in Peking by the two countries. Speaking in the Pakistani Parliament on 17 July 1963, Bhutto said; “A conflict does not involve Pakistan alone. Attack from India on Pakistan today is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia and, therefore, this new element and this new factor that has been brought into the situation is a very important factor. I would not, at this stage, like to elucidate any further on this matter, but suffice it to say that the national interest of another State itself is involved in an attack on Pakistan because that State and other States have known India’s aggressive intentions and how India is capable of embarking on aggression against other countries. Therefore, a subjected Pakistan or a defeated Pakistan is not only a question of annihilation for us but also poses a serious threat to other countries in Asia and particularly to the largest State in Asia”.

The growing collaboration between China and Pakistan paved the way for anti-India feelings in Pakistan before Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, paid a visit to Pakistan in February 1964. On 14 January 1964, the Dawn stated: “The aim of the Government and the people of Pakistan must
necessarily be to contain Militant Hinduism and not Communism.... When Americans talk of containing Chinese Communism and "saving southeast Asia from Chinese expansionist designs", Pakistan just cannot understand what the Americans are talking about. To Pakistan, China has posed no threat. Pakistanis are beginning to think of China not only as a friendly neighbour but even as a likely protector and ally against Hindu Bharat ... Therefore, as between militant and murderous Bharati Hinduism and God-rejecting but otherwise friendly Chinese Communism, the Muslim of Pakistan, in the present state of their environments and increasing insecurity, must necessarily turns to China despite the ideological differences".
Warlike preparations, started by Pakistan soon after Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, endorsed Pakistan's viewpoint in regard to the Kashmir question during his visit to Pakistan in early 1964, suggested overtly that President Ayub Khan had kept in mind the decisive lesson of his career as a military commander that the pursuit of power was a mixture of politics and war, in which the strictly military aspects of the problem could not be underestimated.

Both the character of China's sympathy with Pakistan and the pattern of Indo-Pakistan relations indicated preoccupation of Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, with accelerating the build-up of the strictly military power of Pakistan at the cost of other objectives.

While Pakistan armed forces began to get adjusted from the beginning of April 1964, various training camps and centres for military personnel hummed with activity from June 1964 when, following a prolonged meeting between Ayub Khan and some field commanders headed by Central Mohammed Musa, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, a decision was taken to speed up the process of increasing the number of trained infiltrators. The decision came a few weeks
after President Ayub told a BBC correspondent that "the alternative solution of the Kashmir issue is war".

The demand for "liberation of Indian-held Kashmir" found a forceful expression when leaders and press of Pakistan launched a campaign against India from January 1965. Pakistan Times, Lahore, reported on January 1 that Maulvi Farid Ahmed had stated: "There is a great fund of goodwill for Kashmir is in North Africa and Middle-Eastern countries. Almost everywhere, the question being asked is when Pakistanis or Kashmiris will take up arms for the Valley's liberation. In fact the Defence Minister of one Muslim country had offered himself to participate in Jehad if Kashmiris and Pakistanis launched it". Mashriq, an Urdu paper of Lahore, said on 29 January: "To frustrate the Indian move to merge Kashmir with the Indian Union, more than one thousand freedom fighters will cross the cease-fire line after Id." Pakistan Times reported on 8 March that Abdul Hamid Khan, President of "Azad Kashmir", had stated: "If they (Kashmiris) failed to persuade India to adopt the path of reason and peace, we will not hesitate to resume the war of liberation". On 10 March, Dawn of Karachi quoted Hamid Khan as having said: "Kashmiris would be compelled to wage an open war against India if the United Nations did not take effective steps to get its resolutions on Kashmir implemented without any further delay". On 11 March, Dawn said: "We are not afraid of war and we will not hesitate to go to war when the time comes." On 18 March, Jang, an Urdu daily of Karachi, said: "We are sure that President Ayub would teach India a lesson which the Indian rulers would never forget".

While Dawn stressed the need of a Jehad and asked the President of Pakistan on 22 March to "hit now", Pakistan Times reported on 24 March that Ayub Khan had said in an address to the armed services that he was confident that "people of Pakistan, and especially the armed forces, are aware of the danger (from India) and realize their responsibilities". On 17 May 1965, Pakistan Times quoted Sardar Rahmatullah, State Councillor, as having said: "Thousands of Razakars are ready to break the ceasefire line and march into occupied Kashmir
to the rescue of their brothers”. Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, as reported by Dawn on 25 May, stated: “The Pakistan Government should renounce her obligations in regard to the cease-fire line and give a free hand to Kashmiris in reorganising themselves for launching a full-fledged Jehad”. Khyber Mail of Peshawar disclosed on 29 May that the “Azad Government of Jammu and Kashmir has ordered compulsory military training for students and people between the age of 16 and 45”. On 20 June, Dawn quoted President Ayub as having said: “We shall go full out, and smallar though we are than India, we shall hurt India beyond repair”. On 11 July, Pakistan Times threatened that in the event of war with India, Pakistani troops “would march up to Delhi, would occupy the Red Fort and hoist the Pakistan flag on it”.

India’s Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, visited Kashmir towards the end of July 1965 and held discussions with the field commanders on different aspects of the defence problem. Chavan had little knowledge of Pakistan’s design for sending armed infiltrators in Kashmir when he talked to newsmen at the Srinagar airport on 3 August shortly before his departure for Delhi. When asked if it was true that some Pakistani infiltrators had crossed into the Indian territory, Chavan said: “We have no reports about any intrusion. Our troops are quite vigilant”. Chavan’s statement was based on ignorance in spite of the fact that about a month before his visit to Kashmir a senior officer of the Indian Intelligence Bureau, Hamir Singh, had informed his principals in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Delhi, that some Pakistani infiltrators had entered into Kashmir. Hamir Singh’s message was based on a report (which was furnished by an influential Kashmiri newsman) that three Pakistani infiltrators had quietly got into touch with Maulana Masoodi and G.M. Karra, two associates of Sheikh Abdullah, in Srinagar and had requested them to arrange transport facilities for a group of armed Pakistanis from a Kashmir village to the city to enable them to capture Srinagar station of All India Radio and attack the automatic telephone exchange. Maulana Masoodi eluded them by a dodge when, according to Karra, he told them that while all vital installations were under army’s protection, Pakistani intruders would find it difficult to put up
a fight against the Indian troops whose number had “increased substantially during the past some years”.

On 5 August, Dr. Karan Singh, Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, had arranged a tea-party in the spacious lawn of his palace, overlooking the Dal Lake. A number of guests, including Ministers and high civil and military officers, were invited. As the guests were busy munching snacks and sweets, a message was rushed to the palace from the police control room to inform the State Home Minister about the presence of some armed intruders in Beeru in south-west of Srinagar. Two officers—D.N. Kaul, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, and Mohammed Sultan, Superintendent of Police—who were also invited by Karan Singh, had to be rushed to organise a company of policemen, besides some guides, for dealing with intruders.

That there was no logic in India’s definition of 5 August 1965 as the date of infiltration, became clear when three Pakistani infiltrators, captured by the Indian security forces, told newsmen in presence of some police officials in Srinagar on 7 September 1965 that a number of intruders, equipped with rifles and revolvers, guns, mortars and grenades, had crossed into Indian territory, beyond Gulmarg in Kashmir, in the beginning of July. Earlier, on 26 August, an official spokesman told newsmen at Baramulla that presence of “a big band of raiders” in a place near the Athamgali in north of Baramulla was reported by some villagers on 3 August—indeed, two days before the Indian army went into action.

A plan to raise infiltrators in Pakistan for creating subversion and chaos in Indian Kashmir was taken up for a detailed discussion for the first time on 16 August 1953—two days after Pakistan’s Independence Day and six years after India’s partition—when a high-level meeting of leaders from Pakistan and “Azad Kashmir” was held in Karachi under the chairmanship of Mohammed Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan. The meeting was organised to chalk out Pakistan’s plan of action in light of disturbances in Indian Kashmir following Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest. The meeting was attended by some leading men, including Aziz Ahmed, Cabinet Secretary, three former Presidents

And although Pakistan's Prime Minister tried to discuss Jawaharlal Nehru's desire for normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan, Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas changed the pattern of discussion when he got up to recommend to Mohammed Ali that Pakistan "should organise at least 20,000 armed infiltrators to be send to Indian Kashmir in civilian clothes for creating difficulties for India". About twelve years after Chaudhri Abbas's recommendation, Pakistani armed raiders infiltrated into Kashmir through unguarded routes. Pakistan had deployed armed Pathan soldiers on other side of the cease-fire line to ensure that no Pakistani infiltrators ran back. Some of the captured raiders told Indian military officers towards the end of August 1965 that infiltrators had been told by their masters that they would be killed if they returned to their camps in Pakistan.

On 15 September 1965, Chief Minister of Jamm and Kashmir, C.M. Sadiq, told the Legislative Assembly: "The raiders tried to converge on the city of Srinagar. It soon became apparent that the attack had larger and more serious dimensions as it was observed that trained personnel of the Pakistani army, equipped with modern weapons, had been inducted into our territory with ominous military object... In the course of the operations against the raiders, we captured a number of them along with large quantities of arms and ammunition. From the statements given to us by those captured by our security forces, it was confirmed that the Pakistani army officers had been training nearly 10,000 people in sabotages, terrorism and other subversive activities, even before the Kutch Agreement had been signed... In a swift bid to annex this part of our country by force, regular Pakistani army launched a massive attack in the Chhamb sector with the support of Patton tanks and Pakistan Air Force. The attack was calculated to disrupt the lines of communication of the State with the rest of the country with the ultimate object of over-
running this territory. This act of direct aggression naturally brought about material change in the situation. Aggression could not be allowed to have its way and consequently the defence forces of our country had to take recourse to counter measures for the purpose of attacking bases in Wast Pakistan from which this aggression was launched."

The Pakistan Government had endeavoured to create the myth—and this myth had been reiterated in President Ayub Khan’s broadcast on September 1—that the infiltrators were freedom fighters and that “there is an internal revolt in Kashmir.” Earlier, on 12 August, Baltimore Sun wrote: “There is no evidence in or near the Srinagar city to supports from Pakistan of a popular uprising against India nor ofpressive measures against the population.” On 14 August, the Washington Post said: “Reports from a variety of sources in Srinagar and the information gained from Kashmiri and Pakistani sources during visits to Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Karachi leave little doubt that at least fifteen hundred Pakistani-officered commandos have crossed the cease-fire line since August 5”. The New York Times (14 August) wrote: “On the basis of most reports thus far, the infiltrators appear to have been recruited mainly from among the people of Azad Kashmir. One sign is that most of the prisoners captured so far do not speak the Kashmiri dialect......they speak various Punjabi dialects normally used by the inhabitants of the extreme western sectors under Pakistani control”. On 22 August, the Daily Telegraph stated: “There can be little doubt that this was a military operation launched from Pakistan with official cognizance. The intruders are not numerous enough to be a serious menace to India and they cannot consolidate their success”.

On 4 September, Peking’s Foreign Minister Chen Yi stretched a brief stop in Karachi into a six-hour conference with Bhutto. The Chinese official gave oblique support but no concrete assurance to Pakistan in a statement backing the “just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provocation”. On 5 September, Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, General Musa, sent a message to his troops: “You have got your teeth into him.
Bite deeper and deeper until he is destroyed”.

On 22 September 1965, President Ayub made a broadcast in which he announced the acceptance, with conditions, of the U.N. Security Council’s resolution calling on Pakistan and India to stop fighting. Even as he was talking of the cease-fire, three F-86 Sabre jets and B-57 bombers of the Pakistan air force headed for Amritsar and dropped some 1000-pound bombs on Chhaharta, the busy industrial suburb of the city of the Golden Temple. Hostilities between India and Pakistan, which began with an invasion by infiltrators, came to an end on 23 September, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, said: “The cease-fire, as you know, was put off by 15 hours because Pakistan’s agreement to it was delayed. Although Pakistan’s reply was a belated one, we are nevertheless glad that it did come after all......There is the threat from no less a person than the President of Pakistan and also from his Foreign Minister. Both of them have talked of a wider conflagration in the future. I must state clearly that if Pakistan launches an attack again on the State of Jammu and Kashmir which is an integral part of India, or on any other part of our territories, we shall meet the challenge with full determination and full force”.

On 24 November 1965, India’s Defence Minister Chavan cautioned the country against being provoked by Chinese intrusions. He gave details of the three incidents on the Sikkim border between November 19 and 21, and the “latest” intrusion in Ladakh, in reply to a calling-attention motion in the Lok Sabha. From Sikkim, the Chinese withdrew within a few hours, he said. About Ladakh, he did not have full information, though there were reports of “some trucks having gone back”. Chavan was not sure about the Chinese intentions—perhaps they wanted to provoke India, perhaps they were probing the Indian defences, he said.

India honoured her brave jawans on 24 November in New Delhi. President Radhakrishnan pinned gallantry medals on officers and men who had gained distinction on battle-grounds as far apart as Poonch, Phillora, Burki, Dograi and Mahmoodpur. A few hours before the ceremony was
On 1 December 1965, President Ayub said in Rawalpindi that Pakistan sincerely hoped the Soviet attempt to help solve the Kashmir dispute would "bear fruit". In his broadcast over Pakistan Radio, he said that Pakistan had accepted the offer of good offices of the Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, in all sincerity. He stated that his Foreign Minister Bhutto had "very useful talks" in Moscow. The year, 1965, ran out. A conference was held at Tashkent. A joint declaration signed by the two leaders of India and Pakistan (Shastri and Ayub), was issued after a series of meetings between the two sides. But the people of Pakistan got confused, suspicious and divided over the Tashkent declaration, with the majority profoundly unhappy about the outcome. To them the declaration represented a betrayal. This standpoint was openly manifested by illegal demonstrations by students and members of the Opposition in Lahore, Sialkot, Rawalpindi, Karachi and other centres.

In Lahore the police actually opened fire and, officially, two students were killed. The Government closed all schools and colleges throughout the country indefinitely. The official attitude to the declaration was best exemplified in a broadcast by President Ayub on 14 January 1966 when he said: "Whatever steps your Government has taken or is talking they are four your good" This "Mother knows best" position was echoed by innumerable politicians, and indeed newspapers were daily almost filled with reports of this, that and the other country praising the declaration and with expressions of fulsome approval by numbers of Pakistani political nonentities.
Although it was frequently stated that what happened at Tashkent did not in any way alter Pakistan’s original determination to demand a United Nations-guaranteed right of self-determination for Kashmir and Jammu, there was a despairing feeling with many that the aim had once again been skillfully shelved by the Indians; that the sacrifices of the brief but bitter war in last September were in vain; that the people of the Valley of Kashmir had been deceived; and that the whole situation was back to precisely where it was, in square one. Bhutto was not entirely gratified, one sensed from a long statement he issued from his house at Larkana, by the results of Tashkent. It said he was fully aware of the misgivings felt by some sections of people. “No amount of platitudes or polemics”, it added, could substitute or detract from the imperative need for a permanent settlement of the “tragic dispute” over Jammu and Kashmir.

Those who favoured the declaration and those who opposed it were in agreement, however, that it was a hopeful sign that Russia had apparently abandoned her former rigidly pro-Indian policy on Kashmir. The end of the Tashkent talks came during Ramadan, a holy period of fasting for Muslims. This and the shock of the sudden death of Lal Bahadur Shastri to a certain extent allayed criticism of the declaration. But after Ramadan ended, voices (which had remained mute) were again raised in Pakistan.
In the initial stages, Pakistan leaned towards the Western powers in the hope that by assuming this posture she would be able to nibble away Kashmir. In the due course, however, her modus operandi assumed a definite shape: the Islamic State secured arms aid from the USA.

Later, the announcements regarding the Sino-Pakistan border agreement brought to light the dualism of Pakistan's policy. The agreement aimed at achieving two objectives. First, from the Pakistan side, it meant posing an indirect threat to the Western powers that if they did not bring pressure to bear upon India to part with Kashmir, she (Pakistan) might keep her second foot too on the Chinese shore, though, at the same time it induced Pakistan to be tough in dealing with India on the Kashmir issue. Secondly, it provided grist to Peking's propaganda mill inasmuch as China tried to claim that while she could solve her border question even with the pro-West country like Pakistan, India alone was recalcitrant. Conversely, it sought to create an impression that though Pakistan could solve her border question with a Communist country like China, India was adamant on the Kashmir problem.

After the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965 and signing of the
Tashkent declaration in early 1966, Pakistan did not take long to redesign her plan to secure military hardware and build ground formations. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan came to be pressurised by pro-Bhutto men in the administration and armed forces to take speedy steps to sharpen the country’s knife against India soon after the Tashkent declaration was signed. Ayub Khan, who visited some strategic areas of “Azad Kashmir”, including Haji Pir and Bagh and Palandri, towards the end of April 1967, was by no means ambiguous when he conveyed to the troops and members of “Azad Kashmir” Government Pakistan’s “earnest desire” for increasing the strength of the defence forces in the country. Ayub Khan’s invitation to able-bodied people to receive military training in various centres was full of meaning, Ayub Khan stressed the need for opening additional training centres for para-military formations after the two developments. First, of course, was the circulation of a report by some American diplomats in Rawalpindi towards the middle of 1966 about India’s plan to acquire modern weapons and increase the strength of the armed forces. Second was the two-day meeting held in Karachi by Pakistan’s top military leaders in October 1966 when the country’s defence requirements came under a detailed discussion.

Centres for imparting training in executing various forms of sabotage were revived by the “Azad Kashmir” Government at Hillan, Bagh and Palandri before Ayub Khan’s visit to Pakistan-held territory. The Hillan centre, located on the other side of the Uri sector in Kashmir, was smashed by the Indian security forces in August 1965. Premises of some educational institutions, especially in Sialkot and Bagh and Palandri areas, were used for imparting military training to old and new recruits soon after Ayub Khan’s visit to “Azad Kashmir”.

While the “Azad Kashmir” Government sanctioned creation of 30 companies of homeguards in May 1967, involvement of several Chinese military instructors in imparting training to armed detachments in Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Gilgit and Muzaffarabad became an open secret in April 1967 when a Chinese instructor was killed at a place in Gilgit during the course of ambush demonstrations. Some lovers of China in Pakistan
admired Z.A. Bhutto’s way of using Pakistan’s “friendliest power”—China—for holding out threats, one after another, over some outstanding problems between Pakistan and India following the conflict in 1965. Bhutto’s visit to some forward areas in 1967 was followed by the arrival of a group of Chinese officers in Hunza and Gilgit where they undertook the task of imparting training, both guerilla and snow-warfare, to hundreds of people.

The Indus Valley road along the Karakoram range was completed before the end of 1965 to Link Gilgit with Pakistan. The road was essentially a civil project designed to provide the land route between the settled areas and the northernmost regions of West Pakistan. The road provides a snow-free motor road to Gilgit through Swat and Hazara. The road starts at Karora, about 52 miles north-east of Saidu, and meets the Indus at Hesham, 9 miles from Karora, and follows the river almost till Gilgit. Another road from Abbottabad joins the Indus Valley road at Besham for the onward journey. The Indus Valley road also Links the northernmost part of Hunza with Rawalpindi.

An eleven-mile long wall was built by Pakistan in the Sialkot area, facing Suchetgarh in the Jammu region, after the Indian troops were ordered to walk back in the Sialkot sector under the Tashkent agreement. The wall, almost ten feet wide, was marked by concrete bunkers, helipads and emergency landing strips. It was reported in November 1967 that Pakistan had provided roads and modern lines of communication to Link the forward areas in the occupied territory with rear headquarters brought as near as Bagh across Poonch. Pakistani troops, who were stationed across the borders of Jammu and Kashmir, had been provided with modern weapons, mostly supplied by the USA.

A group of Indian newsmen visited some forward areas in the Jammu region in November 1967. The visit was arranged by the Border Security Force. No sooner did the newsmen reach the State Government-owned farm at Nandpur, very close to the border, than some armed Pakistani soldiers were seen
patrolling the area. They carried sten-guns and automatic rifles with belts of live cartridges tied round their waists. At another place in the Suchetgarh area, some Pakistani soldiers had long moustaches and peculiar head-dress which indicated that Pathans had also been deployed by Pakistan in the Sialkot sector. Sudans and Anans, numbering about 3,000, had been stationed at Kharian, 16 miles from Akhnoor. Roads, criss-crossed by bunkers, helipads and emergency landing strips, were built by Pakistani troops in areas across Akhnoor in the Jammu region by August 1967 when the operational aspect of Pakistani rangers in the Sialkot sector under the supervision of Major Shafqat Baluch of the Pakistan army was first reported in Jammu by a captured Pakistani spy.

Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly was officially told in August 1968 that 102 spy rings had been smashed in different parts of the State since early 1966. The State Chief Minister disclosed that 125 persons had been apprehended as against 875 persons involved. He said that, out of 625 persons, 495 were Indians and 130 were either from Pakistan or from Pakistan-held “Azad Kashmir”. Indian border guards and Kashmir’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) claimed to have liquidated 36 Pakistani spy rings in the State from September 1968 to the beginning of 1970 and seized from the captured Pakistanis small arms and hand grenades and maps and documents.

In 1969, Pakistan was in the grip of a series of scares. One concerned huge amounts of Chinese money having been pumped to influence political developments. The other related to the large-scale racket of “export” of human beings to the Arabian Gulf. China was accused of fomenting labour trouble in various parts of West Pakistan. Yusuf Shiraz, President of the Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said that he had authentic information that a great nation professing very friendly relations with Pakistan had been inciting labour troubles in the country. According to him, “the Embassy officials have been frequently contacting student and labour leaders to invite them to visit China”. He alleged that large sums of money had been distributed by the Chinese agents among various trade
The existence of an efficient Chinese network was also openly admitted in Dacca. In July 1969, Prof. Ghulam Azam, chief of the East Pakistan Jamat-i-Islami, accused the National Awami Party of receiving huge amounts of money from foreign sources through smuggling operations. Nawai Waqt, an Urdu daily, reported in October 1969 that the pro-Chinese elements in Dacca received money from Peking through the sale of Bengali, Urdu and English books printed in China. The President of the small-scale Dacca traders in a letter to the editor of the Bengali daily, Purbodesh, had complained that due to the smuggling of Chinese silks, fountain pens and various mechanical gadgets, goods manufactured in Pakistan had suffered heavily.

How serious the kidnapping and abduction had become was evident from the trial of Nissar Hussain Zaidi accused of abducting as many as 1,300 children in the two years. He confessed of having sold them both at home and abroad. He said that at home they were put either to forced labour or for begging at religious places; in the foreign markets, particularly in Africa and the Arabian Gulf, they were used for “nefarious purposes”. According to the Inspector-General of Police (West Pakistan), there were as many as 7,000 cases of abductions and kidnappings during 1968 and 1969. How the trade in “human cargo” was going was disclosed by the Karachi police who claimed to have unearthed a well organised racket of “human export” to countries in the Middle East. A police party captured a launch and a few motor boats during its operations and about 150 men and women on their way to the Arabian Gulf port of Dubai were taken into custody. The ring leader of the smugglers was said to be a Head Imam of a well-known Karachi mosque. Maulvi Karam Ali, the Head Imam, along with his two nephews and a number of other accomplices conducted the “trade in human cargo” for two years,

Signs of a sharp confrontation between the forces advocating a strong centre and those demanding complete autonomy for the provinces in Pakistan came to the fore in the
middle of 1969. The confrontation sharply cut across the traditional lines of the right or the left. Generally extremist and ultra-reactionary parties who stood for religious ideology were the champions of strong central authority. The Jamat-i-Islami, the Muslim League and the Pakistan Democratic Party were for a strong centre, while the Awami League and the two factions of the National Awami Party advocated maximum autonomy for the provinces.

There were strong moves for workable alliances among the parties who were fighting against the strong centre. G.M. Syed of the Sind United Front had, for example, declared that the six-point plan for autonomy of East Pakistan put forward by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was equally applicable for the protection of rights and privileges of people of western regions like Sind, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. Syed threatened to launch an agitation if Karachi was made a separate province under the Central Administration as demanded by some of the Urdu-speaking refugee leaders like Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared that at no cost the Pakhtoon people would agree to form part of the zonal federation of West Pakistani provinces, as proposed by some right-wing leaders. While talking to some newsmen including two Pakistani editors, the Pakhtoon leader rejected the idea of West Pakistani provinces being linked in a sub-federation after the break-up of one unit. In his comment over the internal situation in Pakistan, Ghaffar Khan categorically stated that "the minimum" to which Pakhtoon people would agree was complete internal autonomy for the province inside Pakistan. Any proposal which circumvented it would be resisted and could in fact lead to all the bitterness between the Pakhtoons and the Central Government of Pakistan.

The proposal to link Pakistani provinces into a zonal federation was mooted by parties like Jamat-i-Islami and the two Muslim Leagues. Lt.-General Atiquur Rehman, the Government of West Pakistan, and Nawabzoda Sher Ali Khan, the Central Minister for Information and National Guidance, had indicated that the military regime would favour such an idea.
Pakistani press and politicians did not take long to create anti-India feelings following the plea by Air Marshal Asghar Khan of Pakistan in February 1970 that “the only solution to the Kashmir problem is a guerilla war by Kashmiris”. Competent observers in the Indian Kashmir thought that it was possible he might have unwittingly revealed a fact which the Pakistani rulers had been reluctant to admit until then. It was that Chinese officers had made frantic efforts to raise guerilla units in “Azad Kashmir”. It was further indicated by his own vigorous advocacy of “best friendship with China” in the same breath.

In March 1970, Pakistan was reported to have begun probing possibilities with China of opening a consulate in Lhasa in Tibet. About a month later—on 4 April—China’s top armament experts flew into Pakistan for a first hand assessment of Islamabad’s requirements of military hardware. The two Chinese experts were: Yuan Hua-ping, Deputy Director of Equipment Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and Chang Shih-yi, Deputy Director of the Chinese Ministry of Defence. Pakistan had put in a fairly extensive list of military armour which it required from China. Though China’s capacity to provide military hardware to Pakistan was not considerable, it was in a position to supply it a few more squadrons of MIG-19 and IL-28 aircraft and some T-59 tanks.

Before the arrival of China’s armament experts in Rawalpindi, Pakistan had four to six squadrons of MIG-19 aircraft and about two squadrons of IL-28 bombers from China. The total number of T-59 tanks which it had obtained from Peking was stated to be about 130. An important aspect of discussions between Chinese and Pakistani military experts pertained to repair facilities of Chinese armour supplied to Pakistan and also spare parts. The defence officials of the two countries worked out modalities for repair facilities in China before Radio Pakistan disclosed on 9 April that China had agreed to build four big industrial projects in Pakistan under an agreement signed in Islamabad.
Peking's two defence experts were included in a high level economic team, led by Fang Yi, Minister of Commission for Economic Relations with foreign countries. Fang Yi was present at the opening of an ordnance factory in Ghazipur in East Pakistan on 6 April. Before their departure for Peking, the two defence experts—Yuan Hua-ping and Chang Shih-yi—and Fang Yi paid a brief visit to Gilgit where they went round some military centres and held talks with some Pakistani officers on what was described as "certain issues connected with the border trade between the two countries".
Chapter

The strategic road, linking Mor Khun in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir with Khunjerab on the Kashmir-Sinkiang border, was built by July 1970. About 12,000 troops of Mao’s Red Army were inducted there in 1968 for the construction of the road. Nearly 5,000 Chinese troops were present in the area near the border when, following the completion of the road, heavy armour was transported from Sinkiang and Tibet to “Azad Kashmir” in September 1970.

Khunjerab is already linked with Qilanbi, which is a vital point on the Kashghar-Lhasa highway across Sinkiang. Mor Khun is on the Kashghar-Gilgit road which was used by Peking in 1969 for transport of silks, carpets, transistors, came ras, fountain pens and green tea to Pak-occupied Kashmir.

Reports of a commando organisation formed in “Azad Kashmir” to carry out sabotage and subversive activities in Jammu and Kashmir reached the Government of India in March 1970 when it had also received information about supplies of French arms to Pakistan and an American Senator’s protest against the USA supplying Pakistan with an American submarine whose “only function would be to sink Indian ships”. The Government of India had received reports about
The formation of an organisation called “Al Burq” for sabotage and subversive activities in Jammu and Kashmir, the Defence Minister of India, Sardar Swaran Singh, told the Lok Sabha on 25 March. Replying to a question by Ram Kishan Gupta, the Defence Minister said that Pakistan had been arming and imparting training to a large number of irregular forces styled as Mujahids and other para-military forces in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in guerilla tactics, sabotage and other subversive activities.

The Pakistan Government was at the back of “Al Burq.” Sardar Swaran Singh also revealed towards the end of March 1970 that Government of India had received a report that a British ship “left a French port a few weeks ago carrying some military supplies for Pakistan”. The Government, he said, was aware of the supplies of military equipment including Mirage aircraft and submarines by France to Pakistan. Those were the days when the US-Turkey-Pakistan tank deal was raised in Washington by Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee, who accused the Government of “double-dealing” in regard to selling of tanks to Turkey and Pakistan.

Fulbright also protested against the US supplying Pakistan with an American submarine whose “only function would be to sink Indian ships”. The US Deputy Defence Secretary, David Packard, had said that a surplus submarine lent by the USA to Pakistan was not intended for harassment of Indian shipping; the submarine was being used for training.

Again, in March 1970, J.N. Hashia, Deputy Inspector-General of Police (CID), said in Jammu that two Pakistanis, Bashir Aslam and Asad Manzoor, who had been rounded up in the border area of Ramgarh, had provided evidence of plans across the border to intensify espionage activity in Jammu and Kashmir. Hashia disclosed that the two captured spies, who belonged to Sialkot, carried two time bombs, a spy camera, some Indian currency notes and “seditious” literature inciting Kashmiris to organise themselves to “hit India”. The two spies were employed by a Pakistani Government agency—Kash-
mir Staff—based in Sialkot. Arrest of the two spies and several Pakistani agents was followed by a statement from Kashmir's Chief Minister, G.M. Sadiq, that large quantities of arms and ammunition had been recovered from different areas since 1965 when a swarm of armed Pakistani infiltrators descended on the Kashmir State. These included over 86,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,550 pounds of explosives, 363 hand grenades, two-inch mortars numbering 53 and 397 rifles and guns. Police had also recovered 32 revolvers, 65 bayonets, 16 bombs, 77 detonators, 15 rifle magazines and 2 rocket launchers.

On 27 April, G.M. Sadiq told newsmen in Srinagar that various powers in the world had been trying to influence the political thinking in Kashmir since 1947 when Pakistan sent the tribal raiders to create chaos and crises in the State. Sadiq said it was a fact that from 1947 some powers, except Russia, had been trying to make Kashmir an arena of "international intrigue". When asked if it was true that Chinese military experts had been assisting Pakistan in raising guerilla units, Sadiq said that his Government had reports "which spoke of how the Chinese had been imparting training to Pakistani forces". "China is very much involved there", he added.

On 15 July 1970, Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, told a public meeting in Srinagar that the Kashmir issue had been settled and there would be no reopening of it. Accession of Kashmir to India was "a part of India's history and history cannot be reversed." She said that India desired friendship with all including those who had committed aggression on her. She warned that if any country dared to commit aggression on the frontiers of India, suitable answer would be given. "The country is much stronger than before and the Indian armed forces are ready to fight aggression and defend the country," she added. Indira Gandhi told newsmen shortly before her return to Delhi on 16 July that India was aware of the supply of arms from Russia and America to Pakistan and said: "It creates strong public opinion here. It does interfere with friendship. But the Government has to take a wider view."
The Fall of Gilgit

After the strengthening of Pakistani forces in Lahore, Wagah and Sialkot sectors along the international border by the beginning of September 1970, Pakistan moved two divisions of troops into Skardu and built some additional airstrips in that sector. The development was described by some Indian army commanders as a "threat" to India's vital military highway in the Himalayan frontier facing the Chinese troops in Tibet. Indian Military Intelligence had reports of how Pakistan had doubled its armed forces since October 1965. Pakistan had achieved this build-up in the regular forces and in "Azad Kashmir" forces by August 1970 when Pakistan was reported to have raised five divisions, three of them equipped with Chinese weapons.

Signs of a sharp confrontation between New Delhi and Islamabad came to the fore soon after a Fokker Friendship plane of the Indian Airlines was hijacked to Lahore on 30 January 1971. The plane carried 28 passengers and crew of four when it took off from the Srinagar airport. The plane was blown up at the Lahore airport, and 26 passengers and crew of four were permitted to return to India after 48 hours' stay in Pakistan. Two passengers, Mohammed Hashim Qureshi and Mohammed Ashraf, were rounded up at Lahore after they were identified as the hijackers. India accused Pakistan of having planned hijacking of the plane to Lahore, whereas Pakistan and some individuals in Kashmir accused India's Border Security Force of having organised the incident. Sheikh Abdullah, G.M. Sadiq, Ghulam Hassan Shah, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, and A.M. Watali (also from the Kashmir Police Department) had a reason to believe that the incident of hijacking was manipulated by the B.S.F. A.K. Patel Assistant Director (General), Border Security Force, had built friendship with Hashim Qureshi and Mohammed Ashraf long before the Indian plane was hijacked to Lahore. Soon after the incident of hijacking, Hashim Qureshi's father told a couple of newsmen in Srinagar that Patel had visited his house several times before the plane was hijacked to Pakistan.

Troops of the two countries were alerted on either side of the Indo-Pakistan border following hijacking of the Indian
plane to Lahore. And as Pakistani President Yahya Khan's troops caused a rampaging storm in East Pakistan by the beginning of April 1971, attention of America, Russia and China came to be attracted by the developments in the subcontinent. Military machine of West Pakistan went into action in East Pakistan after Yahya Khan's accusation that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his followers had committed treason by insisting on the implementation of the six-point programme. On 20 June, Indira Gandhi told newsmen in Srinagar that before any summit conference on Bangladesh was convened, the "butchery must be stopped there." Asked if India apprehended any immediate attack on her by Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi said: "I doubt. We are fully prepared to meet any challenge. I am not scared of China or any other Country."

Pakistan's unabated interest in imparting military training to more than 15,000 infiltrators was known in July 1971 when reports of creation of a strong force of 4,000 men by Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, President of "Azad Kashmir," were also received by the Government of India. Formation of the force followed a series of meetings between Qayum Khan and senior men of Pakistan's Ministry of Home Affairs. Two Mirage aircraft flew low over Kashmir Valley before flying out in south-westernly direction on 19 July. Another intrusion took place north of Jammu on 20 July. It was after these incidents that Indian Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, had to assure the Parliament that Indian air force had been ordered to shoot down intruding aircraft. On 6 September, two Pakistani planes intruded into Indian air space. The intruding aircraft which had flown in from north-westernly direction turned back from within only three miles on the Indian side of the cease-fire line after they were detected by the observation system.

Air violation by Pakistani planes heightened the apprehension expressed by various circles in India on the possible breach of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir. Reports were circulated by some circles that infiltration of 10,000 trained volunteers from across the border was "round the corner." These circles insisted that, notwithstanding the experience Pakistan had in 1965, Yahya Khan and his supporters in
"Azad Kashmir" were desperate about shifting world focus from Bangladesh to Kashmir.

A field commander of the Indian army told me during the course of an informal chat that the location of at least six bases of Pakistani infiltrators in "Azad Kashmir," was reported by four Pakistani intruders after they were arrested towards the end of August. India's preparedness in Kashmir, he said, was two-fold. First was strengthening of pickets and constant vigil against the movement of men and material across the border. Second was the setting up of the village vigilance committees in border areas to maintain close contact with the security forces in their respective areas and to provide information about intruders. This enabled the security forces to frustrate the first attempt at "mass infiltration" from across the border in Uri sector on 10 August. More than 100 armed infiltrators crossed the cease-fire line but had to beat a quick retreat when they found themselves almost encircled by the security forces near Uri.

Earlier, towards the end of July, Pakistani authorities evacuated civil population within five miles of the border in several parts of "Azad Kashmir". Idea behind the move was to facilitate movement of Pakistani troops in the border areas. In some of these areas military authorities ordered destruction of standing crops in order to leave the fields free for military operations. Security measures were tightened throughout Jammu and Kashmir following certain disclosures made by half a dozen Pakistani officials about the "menacing military build-up" across the border. The officials, who had defected from Pakistani army, announced their allegiance to Bangladesh soon after they crossed into the Indian side of the cease-fire line in the beginning of July.

In the beginning of August 1970, it was officially explained in Srinagar that if threat of war from Pakistan "matures any time in near future," India's policy was clear—to strike down attackers under closed space. Certain aspects of the defence problem came up for a prolonged discussion in Srinagar first at a meeting of senior security officials and, later, with Lt. Gen. Moti Sagar, Director General of Civil Defence. Air Marshal
M. Engineer, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, was also sent from Delhi to visit advance landing groups and forward posts in Jammu and Kashmir on 4 August. During his visit to Kashmir, Engineer had talks with Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Sartaj Singh, and other senior officers of the army and air force. He also met airmen and troops and was "highly impressed with their remarkable operation readiness and high morale." Visit to Kashmir by Air Marshal Engineer and Lt. Gen. Moti Sagar was regarded significant in the context of President Yahya Khan's threat of total war with India. Yahya Khan's threat followed strengthening of Pakistani troops and raising of over 5,000 commandos (belonging to Special Service Group) and additional squads of para-troopers to be used by Pakistan in the Indian territories.

On 27 September, India's Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, asked security officers in Kashmir not to take chances on the defence preparedness in the context of "hectic was preparations by Pakistan." In Srinagar, he discussed certain aspects of the defence preparedness with Lt. Gen. K. P. Candeth, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command and some army commanders. He also visited some forward areas in Ladakh to make a study of the Indian troops' state of preparedness. Several armed encounters took place along the cease-fire line in the Uri sector of Kashmir in October between Indian security forces and Pakistani troops. One of the encounters resulted in the death of about 35 Pak soldiers and 7 Indian border guards. Pakistani air force committed air space violation of the Indian territory when its jet fighter flew over Rajouri on 9 November. It was the fourth air space violation in this sector by Pakistani planes since the beginning of October.

Tension on the border mounted following serious skirmishes between Pakistani and Indian troops at some places in Uri and Tithwal in Kashmir and Poonch and Mendhar in Jammu province during the first two weeks of November. And after the violation of the cease-fire line by Pakistani troops in Kargil, Naushera, Chhamb and Akhnoor, Indian troops deeply entrenched themselves in these areas by the end of November. In addition, deployment of more troops in some areas in the
Baramulla district in Kashmir was ordered following the movement of Pakistan’s 26th reserve brigade near Pirkanthi, of first and fifth brigade at Muzaffarabad, of 16th “Azad Kashmir” battalion around Pandoo, of 22nd Frontier Force Rifles (FFR) at Chakotty, and of 6th “Azad Kashmir” battalion near Dhulli.

General Tikka Khan, was to undertake a four-day tour of Pak military bases from Poonch proper to Sialkot on the international border from 15 October 1971 was summoned to Rawalpindi on 8 October for what was described as “important consultations.” Tikka Khan’s meeting with Yahya Khan was followed by the Defence Ministry’s circular cancelling leave applications of Pakistani army personnel and asking ex-service men in the country and in “Azad Kashmir” to be ready. An official release issued in Srinagar on 12 October said that a number of steps had been taken to improve “overall efficiency” of the Indian air force. The release added that while integrated cells in the maintenance branch at the air headquarters had been formed to centralise all activities pertaining to maintenance of single aircraft or weapon, modern concepts of systems, analysis, evaluation and management were being employed.

On 4 November, it was officially stated in Kashmir that Pakistan had been trying to achieve local and temporary air situation in order to make execution of airborne operations feasible. Government of Pakistan had also endeavoured to form para-operations an integral part of the major ground plan Pakistan’s war lords had used armoured personnel carriers maritime reconnaissance aircraft, F-104 jet fighters and B-57 bombers during the course of air and ground exercises at some places in West Pakistan between June and November 1971. An Army Commander told reporters in Baramulla towards the end of November that the Indian army in Kashmir was under orders to hold fast in the event of a Pakistani attack and then make a deep thrust into “enemy” territory wherever possible. The commander explained with the help of a sand model of the terrain along 542-mile cease-fire line running through 14,000 to 16,000 feet high passes, the state of preparedness of the Indian forces and the hard time the “enemy would be in for if
she dares to transgress.” As an evidence he gave the instance of Pakistani “misbehaviour” on 9 November when an Indian post in the Uri sector was fired upon soon after it had been visited by the Kashmir Chief Minister, Sadiq. The commander said: “Our jawans retaliated and silenced them within minutes. They were seen carrying away their casualties”. Asked to comment on some press reports about Chinese hand behind training thousands of guerillas on other side of the border, the army commander remarked: “I would not doubt this inasmuch as Pakistan has been depending either on America or China for obvious reasons”.

Indian Military Intelligence reported on 1 December 1971 that an integrated secret plan had been drawn up by Pakistan’s Kashmir Staff, based in Sialkot, for carrying out espionage, sabotage and subversion on the Indian side of the cease-fire line and international border. Military Intelligence’s report came after the capture of six Pakistani nationals from a border area in the Jammu region. The captured Pakistanis had been sent in for collection of necessary material regarding the deployment of the Indian troops and location of vital bridges and army installations and for establishing local contacts to facilitate their inland travel. Identity of several officers of Pakistani army, who were responsible for having inducted the six-member group into the Indian side of the border, was established during the course of interrogation of the captured spies. The officers were: Major T. Hussain, Major Tariq, Major Shahzada and Major Bashir Salaria, all closely connected with the Kashmir Staff. These officers as well as ten others, namely Major Choudhary, Major S. Ullah, Major A. Khan, Major Saleem, Major Syed Ullah, Captain Hamid Gul, Captain Ayub, Subedar Rehman, Naik Aslam and Havildar Mohammed Alam were also responsible for having pushed about twenty Pak spies into the Jammu region for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Indian Kashmir in 1969.

Outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan immediately after an attempt was made by a few jet fighters of Pakistani air force to destroy the Srinagar airport on 3 December brought about a complete change; creation of Bangladesh after
it was separated from West Pakistan with the help of Indian troops, especially Border Security Force personnel, fall of Chhamb in the Jammu province in spite of India’s ground and air superiority, outer of President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, building of additional bridges between China and Pakistan for transportation of more military hardware to Rawalpindi, promotion of relations between India and Russia and emergence of a new pattern of differences between Russia and Peking.

End of the 14-day war between India and Pakistan was followed by the arrest of 16 Pakistani commandos in Poonch and Rajouri sectors soon after the first week of January 1972. The commandos divulged to the Indian authorities that there were features of Pakistan’s integrated plan for the Special Service Group. First, long before the Indo-Pak war in December 1971, Pakistani military leaders had raised one brigade of commandos, most of whom had been trained in the Chirhat centre near Peshawar in the use of various arms and ammunition for blowing up vital installations and doing away with important politicians and army personnel in Indian Kashmir. Second, Pakistan’s military leadership had decided to operate commandos company-wise from Poonch proper to Suchetgarh facing Sialkot. Soon after the outbreak of war in December, nearly 100 commandos managed to sneak into Poonch and Rajouri. Third, commandos had been instructed by their masters to operate in utmost secrecy before and after destroying bridges and some portions of the highway from Surankot to Poonch.

More than 100 incidents of firing on Indian pickets by Pakistani soldiers, stationed across the Tilail valley and Kupwara sector of Kashmir, took place from 2 January to 26 April 1972. Apart from the frequent use of mortars, Pakistani soldiers used guns and automatic rifles. Several casualties on both sides were reported. About 225 miles of Tilail valley, beyond Gurez, were captured by the Indian security forces after they made a deep thrust into Pakistan-held territory during the 14-day war. Following the arrest and interrogation of two Pakistanis near Kupwara in the middle of March, Indian authorities learnt that Northern Scouts, many of them stationed
in the cantonment area of Manimarg across Tilail valley, had been trained in the show-warfare technique with the help of Chinese instructors.

Reports of the imposition of restrictions on the movement of "unauthorised" persons in Sinkiang were first received in Kashmir in the beginning of April 1972. These restrictions followed Peking's intention of removing some vital thermo-nuclear installations from Sinkiang to central China in view of Russia's proximity to the Sinkiang border. Hundreds of Chinese soldiers were sent to some parts of Sinkiang to assist technicians and labourers in digging out uranium ore before its transportation to central China. For her initial nuclear programme, China relied on a Russian reactor using plutonium, or uranium 238 also supplied by the Soviets. In due course, by their own efforts, Chinese built a gaseous plant at Lanchow, on the upper reaches of the Yellow river, for producing enriched uranium 238 and grade reactors turning out plutonium 239. China could easily claim to have a modern gas-centrifuge plant that does the same work as the gaseous diffusion plant but more simply and efficiently. Some U.S. specialists considered that the Chinese must have put at least three billion dollars into these plants and used some 3,000 or more engineers and scientists in the process. Most of them were reported to have been among the 6,000 Chinese technicians and scientists who had received advanced training in Russia.

The uranium ore required for the Lanchow plants was first found in Sinkiang province and later in Kwangtung and Kiangsi. The fruits of the Chinese nuclear power were first realized at Lop Nor, in the Sinkiang desert, on 16 October 1964 when a uranium-235 nuclear device, named "Mao 1", was successfully exploded. Beginning with this relatively crude device, China sent off another in 1965, dropped from an aeroplane. In mid-1966, a much more powerful bomb was detonated and then on 27 October 1966 the Chinese launched their 500-mile rocket over the remote Takla Makan desert in south Sinkiang. In the same year China began building missile launching pads in northwest China. In 1967, there were two rudimentary H-Bomb explosions followed by fullscale multi-megaton bursts in December 1968 and
September 1970. In the four years since China launched her first nuclear missile, intelligence specialists reported that she had developed a serviceable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). While China established her own “Strategic Artillery Command” for missile bombardment in 1967, she operated three missile test ranges in western China by 1970. For China’s immediate political and strategic purposes, her medium-range missiles can threaten such Russian centres as Irkutsk, Tashkent and Vladivostok.

Intelligence specialists reported in the beginning of May 1972 that Peking had decided to supply over 100 MIG-19 jet fighters and 200 T-59 tanks to Pakistan. Peking’s decision followed the two-day meeting in Islamabad between senior Pakistani officers and China’s top armament experts towards the end of April. After the Chinese expert visited the naval installations at Karachi and worked out arrangements for the border trade in the Gilgit Agency between China and Pakistan, it was reported that Pakistan had moved 20th reserve brigade to Pirkanthi across the truce line. Presence of three army divisions besides the inflated division (12) and three brigades of “Azad Kashmir” troops, in Pakistan-held territories was reported on 2 May. A division of troops was also formed from the detachments from military establishments in around Lahore, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Gujrat, Jhelum and Rawalpindi. This division, unlike all other divisions in Pakistan army, was not allotted any number.

Several hundred copies of two-colour maps, showing Gilgit and Mirpur as parts of Pakistani territory, were circulated in some parts of “Azad Kashmir” in April 1972 after they were prepared in Karachi. Mirpur which for years was the centre of activity for Kashmiris, became a place of added interest for Pakistan’s Ministry of Kashmir Affairs following the construction of the Mangla Dam. The construction of the Dam deprived the local population of a sizable area of rich cultivable lands that accounted for major production in “Azad Kashmir”.
On 14 May, an Indian official said in Jammu that Pakistani troops had stepped up cease-fire violations from Chhamb border to Mandi in Poonch sector. Indian troops, he revealed, repulsed Pakistani attacks on Indian posts in this sector where “concentration of Pakistani troops has greatly increased.” Pakistani troops suffered over a dozen casualties in Chhamb sector in their bid to capture two strategic hill posts—Lalyari and Mandala. On Indian side, the loss was said to be “negligible.” About twenty border clashes took place between the Indian and Pakistani troops close to Poonch, Rajouri and Uri and Tilail sectors from 10 June to 24 June.

Following the dramatic announcement of the Simla agreement on 2 July 1972, a situation was created to enable India and Pakistan to bring about normalisation of relations between the two countries. And although Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Z.A. Bhutto, President of Pakistan, did not make any reference, publicly to the unwritten understanding between them over the future of Jammu and Kashmir, some political circles in Pakistan and Kashmir sought immediate measures to get the people of Kashmir, too, associated with the Indo-Pak talks on the Kashmir issue. The unwritten understanding between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto favoured the arrangement permitting India to be in the Kashmir State and Pakistan to exercise political, defence, financial and administrative powers in “Azad Kashmir” after certain modifications here and there on the border in Jammu and Kashmir. In Pakistan, statements were issued by the Liberation League and Plebiscite front against “attempts” aimed at seeking a division of the Jammu and Kashmir State without ascertaining wishes of the people of Kashmir. In Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah pleaded for an “early settlement” of the Kashmir issue on the basis of wishes of the Kashmiris. He told a big public meeting at Sopore on 4 July that neither President Bhutto nor Mrs. Gandhi had the right to hammer out a solution of the Kashmir problem without associating the people of Kashmir with any kind of talks on the matter. That was the time when Abdullah-backed Plebiscite Front argued that one of the logical results from the Simla conference had been the acceptance of the Kashmir dispute by India and Pakistan.
The causes of the conflict between India and Pakistan came to be regarded as bigger than men during the course of talks between Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto at Simla. Tension mounted in the Indian and Pakistani camps at Simla when Mrs Gandhi refused to accept Bhutto’s suggestion for reduction of the number of Indian troops on the Indo-Pak border and for the stoppage of New Delhi’s search for sophisticated weapons until Pakistan was able to procure additional equipment to plug the gaps in Islamabad’s defence shield. Secret intervention by Russia saved the situation; arrival of a Russian emissary in Simla quietly with Kosygin’s messages for Bhutto and Indira Gandhi was followed by signing of an agreement by the two leaders.

It was within five days of signing of the Simla agreement that a threat was held out by Sardar Abdul Qayum, President of “Azad Kashmir”, to liberate Indian Kashmir. On 6 July 1972, he referred to the outcome of the Simla conference and asserted that the Kashmir problem “should be solved without getting it mixed up with other outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan.” Abdul Qayum said: “Kashmir problem must be resolved in accordance with the wishes of 60 lakh people of Jammu and Kashmir.” Later, several politicians in
the Pak-held Kashmir demanded, in separate statements, that the Kashmir issue should be settled in accordance with the U. N. Security Council resolutions. The demand assumed significance in the context of the Simla agreement that Kashmir and other problems between India and Pakistan would be solved through bilateral negotiations without third party intervention.

A feeling among political and official circles in India that Pakistan had not given up hope and its "past game of grabbing as much of Kashmir as it can by subterfuge or by an organised attack", was recorded soon after the incidents of firing, in November, by the patrols of the two countries for a day and a half in the Rajouri area of the Jammu region. And after the receipt of reports of feverish military build-up by Pakistan across the borders of Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi directed the Indian forces not to take chances on the defence preparedness in the State.

While Pakistani soldiers made about 20 attempts to occupy some portions on the Uri-Poonch bulge and across Tithwal, Gurez, Naushera and Rajouri areas from 12 September to 9 November 1972, Islamabad had managed to raise three divisions of army personnel from January to the middle of November 1972 to make up the deficiency created by the absence of nearly 39 battalions of regular troops who, in addition to armoured regiments, para-military formations and thousands of Ansars and Mujahids, were deployed in East Bengal before it achieved freedom and came to be known as Bangladesh. The three divisions had been fully equipped with weapons, mostly imported from America and China. Another significant feature of the post-war build-up by Pakistan was what was described as "further strengthening" of three well-known divisions—12th division based in "Azad Kashmir", fastmoving 14th division of Peshawar and mountain-warfare 14th division. Again, in November, India's Defence Ministry was informed about the movement of some Chinese T-59 tanks in the Sialkot sector and of Pakistani troops across Rajouri, Mendhar, Naushera, Poonch and Uri. Areas across Uri were: Agiwas, Hajipur Pass, Aliabad Sarai, Kahuta, Siran and Nurkot. Places across Rajouri, Mendhar and Naushera were: Kotli-Gurabial belt,
Dhanna forests, Baroh and Nihala.

Earlier, in April, Pakistan sought Peking's aid and advice for making available technical know-how and for training up small batches of Pakistani airmen either in Pakistan or in China. Bhutto had taken pains to justify his regime's increased budget allotment for defence (Rs 423 crores in 1972-73), which, he claimed, was absolutely necessary to make the Pakistani armed forces "one of the finest in the area". After the December 1971 war Bhutto left no stone unturned to procure arms from various sources. He had to depute the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, General Tikka Khan, to Peking to endeavour to get some fresh arms supply from China, considered to be Pakistan's closest ally and biggest supplier of arms since the 1965 war.

Pakistan has been the largest recipient of Chinese military aid in the non-Communist world. China signed its first economic aid programme with Pakistan in 1964, and its military assistance programme was extended to Pakistan in September 1965, in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan war. Between September 1965 and the end of 1970, China had supplied Pakistan with a substantial quantity of military equipment for four infantry divisions, about 350 T-59 tanks, 150 MIG aircraft and two squadrons of IL-28 bombers. China also supplied Pakistan with large numbers of artillery pieces and military vehicles besides substantial quantities of ammunition and essential spares for the tanks and aircraft. After the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, China sent military advisers to Pakistan in June to train Pakistani armed forces' personnel in handling of the Chinese equipment. Pakistani pilots also received training in the handling of MIG aircraft in China. Several Pakistani army officers received Chinese language training in Peking.

The line of actual control in Jammu and Kashmir, as approved by India and Pakistan, was delineated on the maps prepared by Islamabad and not on those designed by New Delhi. Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Minister for External Affairs, told the Lok Sabha on 12 December 1972 that the line of control had been delineated on 19 mosaic maps. He did not throw sufficient light on the mosaic maps as fact of the matter was that Pakistani maps had an edge over the
Indian cartographers on 7 December when the army chiefs of the two countries were finally able to overcome the Thako Chak dispute. No sooner did Lt. Gen. P. S. Bhagat and Lt. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan sign the agreement and initial the maps at the 20-minute formal ceremony at Suchetgarh on 11 December than a statement was issued from Rawalpindi by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed saying that the agreement appeared to be to Pakistan’s advantage and that the control line “is a temporary line and will remain so as long as the Kashmir dispute is not finally settled.” In the beginning of January 1973, Abdul Qayum Khan, President of “Azad Kashmir,” and Mohammed Iqbal Butt, Minister for Law and Health in the “Azad Kashmir” Government, said in Muzaffarabad that “liberation of Kashmir” is an article of faith with us as much as with any patriotic Kashmiri and, whenever liberation movement gains momentum, no control line or cease-fire line can stand in the way. We are not committed by the present line of control.”

China’s permission to Islamabad, in January 1973, enabling Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) to operate air service between Pakistan and Peking, followed the removal of some vital thermo-nuclear installations from Sinkiang to central China. One of the reasons for shifting of these installations was to prevent any kind of atomic spying by non-Chinese planes. A case of atomic spying by Pakistani aircraft flying over China had earlier forced Pakistani Government to appoint a commission of inquiry into circumstances in which gum tapes and electronic devices were used on some PIA flights to China in 1966 when President of Pakistan was Ayub Khan and PIA’s managing director was Air Marshal Asghar Khan. And after China’s permission to Islamabad, a PIA Boeing-707 touched down at Peking’s main airport on 20 January to inaugurate the first scheduled service to the Chinese capital by a non-Communist airline. The service reduced the flying time to 7 hours 20 minutes from 12 hours by the longer route via Ceylon.

Five days before the PIA Boeing touched down at Peking’s main airport, orders prohibiting taking of photographs of Chairman Mao’s bungalow and of Chinese soldiers and passing military vehicles were reinforced throughout China as part of
Peking’s policy to keep outsiders guessing. There was no Chinese objection to cameras, but it was not advisable to take pictures of soldiers, the entrance of Mao’s bungalow and passing military vehicles. A British journalist, Clare Hollingworth, cautioned non-Chinese that no one should go to China with the hope of doing business who had not gone through the little red book, “The Thoughts of Chairman Mao”. “Although this is not so fashionable now, it does help the Westerner to understand modern China as well as making him familiar with day-to-day jargon”, Hollingworth wrote on 17 January. Hollingworth pointed out that “if you want to do business, do not make a pass at the smiling lift girl or waitress”. Visitors to China should try to be careful as “many of the people you deal with in China may have suffered in the cultural revolution and they may not want to put anything into writing until a contract is authorised by a higher authority”.

On 28 January 1973, Kushak Bakula, a member of the Lok Sabha and Head Lama of Ladakh, told me that Chinese cartographers had not abandoned their old game of creating misunderstanding among the Ladakhis and Tibetans on the position of the trans-Himalayan region of Ladakh vis-a-vis Kashmir and the rest of India. He said that thousands of maps, showing Ladakh as a part of China, had been circulated by the pro-Peking agencies in Tibet. The Kushak revealed that some books meant for schools in Tibet had also contained material showing Ladakh as a part of the Chinese Tibet. He explained that whatever Peking’s attitude towards smaller nations, especially its neighbouring territories, there was no doubt about the fact—and historical evidence supported it—that Ladakh was an independent State, when Gulab Singh of Jammu conquered it in 1840. Later, when Kashmir was made over to Gulab Singh by the British in 1846, he became the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh. Ladakh became an integral part of modern Jammu and Kashmir by the right of Gulab Singh’s conquest and the agreements, which the then king of Ladakh entered into with His Highness. When in 1840 Ladakh finally chose to cast its lot with Kashmir, the frontier region was quite independent. There was an enclave in western Tibet—Menser—which continued to pay land revenue to Ladakh kings till 1840.
and to Kashmir rulers from that year onwards. In 1947, Jammu and Kashmir, of which Ladakh is one of the districts, acceded to India, and accordingly Ladakh became an “integral part of the Indian Union”, the Kushak said.

Pakistan’s tank strength was of the order of 1,800 by the end of April 1973 when a fresh consignment of about 150 T-59 tanks was received by Pakistan from China. Pakistan had 1,300 tanks after her debacle during the 14-day war with India in December 1971. The number of tanks rose to 1,650 by October 1972. They included 150 T-59 tanks and 200 Patton tanks from Iran and Turkey. In the beginning of March 1973, Indian Military Intelligence specialists reported the deployment of Corps (4) in the Lahore Sector, Corps (2) in the Sialkot sector, Corps (1) in Multan and of more than three army divisions in “Azad Kashmir”. Over two lakh “Al Mujahids”, fully trained and equipped, had also been raised in the Pak-held Kashmir, in addition to thousands of Razakars.

Fourteen Pakistani infiltrators and six Pakistani agents were rounded up in the Poonch sector by the Indian border guards between 18 April and 20 April. Captured infiltrators belonged to Pakistan’s commando formation, namely, Special Service Group, and six Pak agents were accused of having provided assistance to the commandos before they were tracked down. A Pakistani infiltrator, who posted himself as a local inhabitant, was dramatically lifted in Poonch on 19 April when Mir Qasim, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, addressed a public meeting. On 24 September, Mir Qasim told the Kashmir Legislative Assembly in Srinagar that 42 infiltrators—29 Pak nationals and 13 belonging to Pak-held Kashmir—had been rounded up by the Indian security forces in the border areas of Kathua, Jammu, Rajouri and Poonch from January 1972 to 20 September 1973. Qasim said that 82 Pakistani spies were also arrested during this period. Of these, 44 spies were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA).

Earlier, in May 1973, New Delhi received reports of Iran’s willingness to supply two squadrons of Sabre aircraft and F-5 supersonic bombers to Pakistan. Iran, these reports said, had
decided to provide Islamabad with this equipment on a "nominal" cost in view of Tehran's "growing interest in improving Pak-Iranian relations". Reports also said that while Saudi Arabia had conveyed her ability to Islamabad to supply several Sabre and F-5 fighters, Kuwait and Jordan had provided substantial financial aid to Pakistan to enable her to procure military hardware from various sources. Pakistan took several steps (from March to June 1973) to equip her air force with medium bombers like TU-16 and French Mirage fighters. Some Pakistani airmen engaged themselves during this period in imparting training to the air force personnel in Saudi Arabia and Jordan in order to enable Islamabad to earn huge sums of money from these countries.

In November 1973, Prime Minister Bhutto visited some parts of "Azad Kashmir". Efforts to widen the sphere of activity of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the Pak-held territories followed a prolonged meeting between Z.A. Bhutto and some selected members of Pakistani Intelligence Bureau and PPP one day before he concluded his five-day visit to "Azad Kashmir". Bhutto's desire to see "Azad Kashmir" as an "integral" part of Pakistan found an expression when he told a gathering of People and officers at Muzaffarabad that the need for bringing about "greater unity" between "Azad Kashmir" and the rest of Pakistan had increased. Some of his companions, who were either drawn from Intelligence Bureau or from the PPP, carried placards which proclaimed "People's Party Agay Baday Gee" (People's Party will march ahead) and "Kashmir Banay Ga Pakistan" (Kashmir will form part of Pakistan). Bhutto told Pakistani troops at Chhamb to be vigilant and fully prepared "as a country (India) across our borders has been sharpening knives to be used against us".

In January 1974, Washington was reported to have made diplomatic moves to bring about detente between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Although both Americans and Pakistanis classified talks between Dannel Mohnihan, American ambassador to India, and Prime Minister Bhutto in Hyderabad as "private and routine", there was little doubt that Mohnihan would have wanted to answer allegations of American bias towards India. It was reported from Karachi that Pakistan was
particularly concerned about American decision to resume installation of radar network which would give India a tremendous advantage over Pakistan. One view-point in political circles of Pakistan was that America had come to believe that the Russian influence in India could be weakened through Pakistan being made to feel that her future “lies in close collaboration with India”.

In February, New Delhi got reports of Pakistani’s search for three Atlantic Breguetic maritime reconnaissance aircraft, costing about Rs. 10 crores, from France. These aircraft were to be used as action device against submarines. France, according to these reports, had planned to supply to Islamabad some Crotail anti-aircraft missiles to serve as all weather interceptors of low-altitude targets. Certain developments since the beginning of December 1973 provided a new dimension to arms build-up in Pakistan. After his consultations with Prime Minister Bhutto and Pakistan’s Defence Secretary, Major-General Fazle Hakim, Jen De Lipkowsk, French Foreign Secretary, told newsmen on 9 December that he had, among other things assessed Pakistan’s arms requirements. This was followed by Bhutto’s discussions with Sheikh Isa Bin Suleman of Behreen 10 December before Pakistani Prime Minister explained in Islamabad on 16 December that contact had been brought about with France and Gulf States regarding the defence needs of “our area” as Pakistan had been denied arms by the USA.

Pakistan-controlled “Azad Kashmir” Radio in Muzaffarabad re-fashioned its programmes of pro-Peking comment and conversation following the 12-day visit to Pakistan in January 1974 by a Chinese military delegation which was led by the First Vice-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff, Gen. Chang-Tsai-Chien. “Azad Kashmir” Radio highlighted the importance of “promises and pledges” given to Islamabad by China. Some Pakistan commentators often referred to Peking’s promise to help Pakistan “in a big way to make it self sufficient in arms”. The visit of the Chinese delegation was described as “significant” inasmuch as the armament experts from Peking thoroughly assessed Pakistan’s requirements during the course of several rounds of meetings with General Tikka
Khan, the air and navy chiefs and the Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed. Apart from their talks with Bhutto, the Chinese armament experts visited several military, air and naval bases in Pakistan before a report from Rawalpindi indicated China's plan to collaborate in production of ground-to-air missiles in Pakistan. Indian Military Intelligence received a report from Islamabad towards the end of February about Pakistan's plan to have the capability by 1978 to keep the entire north-eastern Arabian Sea under 24-hours surveillance even without Iran's help; TU-16 medium bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles and submarines will enable it to neutralise much larger Indian fleet.

A vigorous scheme was launched by Pakistan in January 1974 to find homes for people rendered homeless in 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars. Five places were earmarked for displaced persons in Pakistan as well as in "Azad Kashmir". The scheme sought to rehabilitate more than 20,000 refugees in Chhamb, a border area to the west, of Jammu which was captured by Pakistani troops in the 1971 war. While the total number of displaced persons was placed well over 1,30,000, the Pakistani Government began to give preference to Punjabi-speaking "refugees" in Chhamb. Earlier, in June 1973, the "Azad Kashmir" Government indicated that they needed several million rupees to resettle the "refugess" and that they might seek the U.N. assistance for the purpose. From December 1972 to December 1973, 100 families were sent to Chhamb every five days. Pakistani army personnel assisted displaced persons in finding homes for them.

In the beginning of June 1974, ruling politicians in Pakistan-held Kashmir intensified their cry for the "liberation of Indian-held Kashmir" and demanded manufacture of an atom bomb by Pakistan. This followed India's successful nuclear explosion in Rajasthan in May. While two ruling politicians, Abdul Qayum Khan and Mohammed Iqbal Butt, threatened to launch a struggle to "liberate Kashmir", mass hysteria was whipped up in "Azad Kashmir" in support of a nuclear bomb and mood was "beg, borrow or steal". Four political parties in "Azad Kashmir"—Muslim conference, Kashmir Liberation League, People's
Party and Students’ Federation—organised meetings and demonstrations in support of a nuclear device. Pakistani newspapers, including Dawn, Nawai Waqt and Imroz, urged Prime Minister to divert all sources to produce a bomb.

Development of some sites for launching of missiles in Pakistan and “Azad Kashmir” was first known in July, when one such site was built in Chhamb. Massing of troops in Gilgit and Skardu following a 2 day tour of some forward bases across the Kashmir border by General Tikka Khan and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Aga Shahi, in the middle of July. Six incidents of firing by Pakistani troops on Indian patrols and pickets took place in Poonch, Mendhar and Naushera sectors from 19th July to 23 July. These incidents occurred in the wake of a propaganda drive through Pakistani press and radio against the talks between Sheikh Abdullah and New Delhi, which envisaged Kashmir’s permanent link with India.

On 3 August 1974, Indian authorities received reports of deployment of Baluch and Punjab regiments at several places across Poonch, Mendhar, Rajouri and Naushera in the Jammu province and across Keran, Kupwara and Tithwal in Kashmir. Massing of Pakistani troops was reported from Kel, Kinari, Shekh Bala and Dudhnial across Matsil, from Bugina and Chak Salkhala across Kupwara, from Bandi forests and Tura across Tithwal, from Nilam across Keran, from Siran, Nurkot, Kanas and Hajira across Poonch, from Guni Malni, Phagwari and Kotli across Mendhar, from Dhanan, Khuiratta and Gura Balial across Rajouri, and from Bhimber, Jarali, Bhindi, Parat and Baroh across Naushera. In the Sialkot sector, two areas—Sambrial and Kot Daska—had been selected for heavy concentration of combatant formations. A number of helicopters were made available by Pakistani air force at various places for the quick mobility of infiltrators. Some of these helicopters, produced in the USA, could carry field guns for the operational area of infiltrators.

Prime Minister Bhuttos’ dramatic announcement on 24 September about the merger of Hunza with Gilgit and Baltistan followed the circulation of posters proclaiming “Kashmir is
a part of Pakistan” and construction of two more airstrips in Gilgit and Skardu and formation of one more division of regular troops and para-military forces like Gilgit Scouts, Northern Scouts and Karakoram Scouts in the mountain-locked territory. While addressing a public meeting at Khaploo, 46 miles from Skardu, Z.A. Bhutto referred to the “importance” of abolition of the principality of Hunza and its merger with Gilgit and Baltistan and indicated Islamabad’s plan to bring about merger of “Azad Kashmir” with the rest of Pakistan. Bhutto also referred to the situation in the border areas and sought participation of women, too, in the defence activity in Gilgit, Skardu and other parts of Pakistan. He told public meetings at Skardu and Khaploo that, after his announcement in Gilgit about the merger of Hunza with Gilgit and Baltistan, he was contacted by the Mir of Hunza to know if he had committed any “mistake” which warranted Hunza’s merger with Gilgit. “I told him that it was not his mistake. Indeed, it was in accordance with our parliamentary system that we thought it necessary to merge Hunza with Pakistani Gilgit,” Bhutto said. Bhutto’s visit to Gilgit and Skardu came after the arrival of a team of Chinese technocrats in Gilgit for undertaking a survey of mineral deposits in about six places. Chinese technocrats visited Naltar, Hunza, Nagar, Punial, Gupis and Thaliche. Occurrence of borax, sulphur, semi-precious stones and copper had been reported from these places.

Soon after Bhutto’s announcement about Hunza’s merger with Gilgit, Indian Home Secretary contacted Kashmir’s Chief Secretary, S. Banerji, and suggested that the local Government in Srinagar should issue a statement on the subject. Banerji prepared a statement for Mir Qasim, Chief Minister, who took the floor in the Legislative Assembly on 28 September and said: “Radio Pakistan carried a report on 24th of this month relating to an announcement said to have been made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, to the effect that the principality of Hunza has been abolished and its area has been merged with the Northern areas to be administered by the Resident Commissioner of Gilgit and Baltistan. Government fully share the concern and indignation expressed in the House over this report. It is a fact of history that the Northern areas
of Jammu and Kashmir, which are under the illegal occupation of Pakistan, include the principality of Hunza. Hunza continues to be a part of Jammu and Kashmir. No action on the part of Pakistan, howsoever provocative or arbitrary, can alter that fact of history. Pakistan has through this action unilaterally brought about a material change in the situation regarding one of the Northern territories of this State for which it has no right or sanction. It has only added to its continuing physical aggression against some of the territory of this State, a glaring instance of illegal political aggression. By the act of abolition of the principality and its merger with areas which are to be administered by a Central officer of Pakistan, the Pak Government has once again shown scant regard for the wishes of the people of the area. Government join the House in deploring this action on the pars of Pak Government and will convey to the Government of India the sentiments expressed in the House on behalf of the people of this State."

Pakistan's quick approval of a plan enabling China to operate air service, four days in a week, from Peking to Hunza and Gilgit, came a week after the merger of Hunza with Gilgit and Baltistan. Introduction of air service, linking Hunza and Gilgit areas with China, followed widening of the two airstrips in the mountain-girt areas with the help of Chinese technicians. These airstrips are in addition to six airfields built in the Gilgit Agency for military purposes.

In the beginning of October, the Pakistani Government issued instructions to its administrative wing in Gilgit not to allow visitors to the "restricted zones" in Gilgit and Baltistan areas without the "permission from the Ministry of Defence." A tourist or a traveller, who intended to undertake a trip to Gilgit, was required to contact either the sub-regional tourist office or executive engineer of public works department in Gilgit for reservation in rest-houses and huts. This procedure was not applicable to Chinese.

While one of the greatest attractions of Gilgit is hunting, the Pak authorities issue permits to anglers and hunters. Chinese know no restrictions; indeed, they can go to all game sanct-
uaries for shooting. Ibex, red bear, Ovis poli and horned Markhor abound in the mountains at the higher altitudes. Leopard is found in the valleys, while partridge and duck shooting is considered good, almost throughout the season. Gilgit is reached easily by plane from Rawalpindi. The plane follows the course of the Kunhar river as it winds through the narrow gorge of Kaghan, walled by majestic mountains. The flight also takes one over the lake of Saif-al-Muluk, where, according to legend, a fairy took away her mortal love, Prince Saif-ul-Muluk.
The discomfiture caused to Prime Minister Bhutto by the agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in February 1975 on the political set-up in Kashmir, was understandable. More so, because it was within the framework of the Indian Constitution that the settlement was achieved without, in any way, reopening the issue of accession which the Sheikh had publicly recognised as irrevocable.

Politicians and publicity media, including Government controlled radio in Pakistan-held Kashmir and Pakistan mounted propaganda offensive to denounce Sheikh Abdullah and his Plebiscite Front party. This followed Pakistani leaders’ criticism of the Sheikh’s “political settlement” with New Delhi bypassing Pakistan and their assurance of the “continued support to Kashmiris’ self-determination struggle”.

On 23 March 1975, Sheikh Abdullah, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, told a press conference in Jammu that the resumption of American arms aid to Pakistan and Prime Minister Bhutto’s tirade against him “should not cause undue concern”. “We are strong enough to meet these challenges”, he declared. The Sheikh said that Bhutto probably had his own compulsions like the situation in Sind and the emotional
involvement of the Punjabis with the Kashmir question. "We should not get unduly worried. I am not afraid of any threat from outside", he added.

A week after the installation of Sheikh Abdullah as Kashmir's Chief Minister on 25 February, about 25 Pakistani infiltrators were rounded up by the Indian security forces at two places near the line of actual control in the Poonch sector. A week before the Sheikh gravitated to power, a batch of 15 Pakistanis was pushed back near the control line in Poonch. Pakistanis' attempt to sneak into the Indian territory followed two incidents of firing near the Poonch border. Five incidents of Pakistani firing close to the control line in Poonch, Rajouri and Naushera took place between 20 and 26 March.

Earlier, a gun running racket was uncovered by the Border Security Force personnel following the arrest of three smugglers near the control line in Ranbir Singh Pora, Jammu. Members of the racket, it was officially stated in the middle of March, had secretly procured several hundred pistols and revolvers through Pakistani smugglers. Pistols, revolvers and pen-pistols, smuggled out from Pakistan, had been manufactured either in Multan or in Khyber Agency. Pakistani smugglers had managed to sell away pistols and revolvers to some Indian smugglers at the rate of Rs. 170 a piece. These arms later found their way to some parts of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab at the rate ranging from Rs. 250 to 600 a piece. Involvement of three women, two from Jammu and one from a Pandit family in Srinagar, in the gun running racket was also reported. Fair-looking Pandit lady had managed to procure diamonds worth Rs. 80,000 from Pakistan in 1974.

According to an officer of the Border Security Force, most pistols and revolvers, smuggled out from Pakistan, were manufactured in the gun factories in Darra, Landi Kotal and Bahra in the Khyber Agency. He disclosed in August that four gun running rackets were uncovered by the border guards in the Jammu province between March and July 1975. The rackets had clandestinely operated in Sialkot, Ranbir Singh Pora, Samba, Jammu and Poonch. The border guards also recovered arms from the
smugglers. Seized arms included over 100 rifles, recovered from a German national, and 38 revolvers and some pen-pistols from some persons in Rajasthan. Arms smuggled into Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan from Pakistan were: 155 rifles, 20 twelve-bore guns, 100 pistols and revolvers and 15 light machine guns and sten-guns.

Khyber Pass begins 11 miles from Peshawar and stretches up to the Pak-Afghan border at Torkham, 35 miles from Peshawar. In the little town of Darra, on the edge of tribal territory southeast of Khyber Pass, dozens of gun factories exist. Skilled craftsmen fashion all the parts of the pistols and rifles by hand in these factories. The guns on sale in the Khyber region, in fact, are without exception imitation models carefully copied and hand-made from the originals—and often sold internationally as "genuine" brands from big-name manufacturers. A few gun factories, hidden in tiny houses, are also found in Landi Kotal and Bahra. True, gun factories in the Khyber Agency do not provide modern automatic weapons, such as the American M-16 or the Soviet and Chinese AK-47. But they sell different kinds of arms, such as a British-style 303 or an Italian beretta pistol or a German luger or a beautiful double-barrelled shotgun or a pen-pistol—a single-shot .25 caliber piece that looks like a fountain pen but that can kill a man at 100 feet.

Pakistan's defence budget for the year 1975-76 showed an increase of 73 million dollars over the budgeted expenditure in 1974-75. Pakistan's defence budget increased by Rs. 4,198 million during the decade 1965-75 and its armed forces (excluding para-military forces) by 1,84,000 despite the loss of its eastern wing in 1971. The expenditure was disproportionately higher to its needs (in 1975) because with the slicing away of the eastern part, now Bangladesh, Pakistan's defence commitments had been considerably reduced. The expenditure did not reflect the free arms and equipment Pakistan had been receiving from China and "other friends".

According to the 1974-75 final estimates, the Pakistan army had 13 infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, two indepen-
dent armoured brigades, one air defence brigade, three squadrons army aviation, and its total army strength stood at 3,65,000 (including 25,000 Azad Kashmir troops). In addition, there were 500,000 reservists. Besides this Pakistan had also mobilised most of the 90,000 prisoners of war who went back in 1974. Since the war in December 1971, Pakistan navy had acquired two more destroyers and had added more Chinese-built Shanghai-class patrol boats to the fleet. Its total naval personnel strength, as reported in March 1975, was 10,000 in addition to 5,000 reservists. Pakistan’s air force had an effective strength of 283 combat aircraft, including French Mirages.

In September 1975, Pakistan deputed a team of her defence experts to France to finalise the question of delivery of French Mirages to Islamabad. This followed the signing of contract in Islamabad in July by Pakistan with a representative of the Mirage makers. In July, Pakistan ordered ten more Mirages from France in a deal worth about 33 million sterling. Although Pakistan had about 50 Mirage aircraft, Islamabad’s order was for the reconnaissance version known as Mirage 111 R.P. In August, a team of Chinese military and air force experts spent three days in Karachi to study the technique and mechanism of some American aircraft and spare parts. The experts’ visit followed the supply of about four TU-16 bombers from China to Pakistan in the beginning of August, when reports of supply of several thousand rifles and medium machine guns to Pakistan from China were also received by the Government of India.

Two mountain dogs of the Chinese army were flown from Ladakh to Delhi in the middle of September for what was officially described as “a detailed study” by the Indian experts. These dogs, nabbed by the Indian security forces near one of their posts in the Daulat Beg Oldi area of Ladakh, were left behind by a patrol party of the Chinese troops during the course of “routine night patrolling” at a place close to the border. Intensification of patrolling by the Chinese frontier guards along the border, especially in some places across Daulat Beg Oldi, followed the two-week field exercise by the Chinese troops in Tibet in August, when reports of the presence of more than
two lakh Chinese troops in Tibet were received by New Delhi.

Tibet lies between India on the south and west and China on the east. Tibet is the loftiest country in the world. More than three-fourths of its area lies over 10,000 feet above the sea level. For military purposes, China has divided Tibet into three parts: first, northern plains, second is southern Tibet which is usually called central Tibet and third is eastern Tibet. About 1,500 agricultural farms on the Pa-lha estates in southern Tibet have been converted into important strategic bases for Chinese troops. Ancient Pa-lha mansion at Drong-tse, about 10 miles from Gyantse, has been turned into a military centre. Lha-lu mansion, on the outskirts of Lhasa, has become the headquarters of a combatant military formation. Lha-lu mansion was reckoned by Chinese about half a century ago as one of the five beauties of Lhasa.

Large air bases have been set up by China at about twelve places in Tibet. Some of these places are near Galing village in Chumbi valley, Pa-lha, Shigtse, Re-ting tract, 60 miles north of Lhasa, Kong-po and Tak-po and in Gartok and Rudok in western Tibet. These air bases are in addition to about half a dozen airstrips built in central and western Tibet. At least two places in western Tibet, close to Ladakh, have been provided with powerful radar installations and centres for missile guiding and tracking.

Missiles with the range of 900 kilometres, 2,400 kilometres and 4,000 kilometres have been positioned in some part of Tibet. It was before the Chinese scientists exploded an unclear device near Lop Nor, not far from the Takla Makan desert in south Sinkiang, on 27 October 1975 that China began preparations for building sites in Sinkiang and Tibet for the missiles of the range of 4,800 and 9,600 kilometres. China’s Eighth Army, the oldest and most renowned of the Communist field formations, had moved into Lhasa by June 1975. This followed the outbreak of clashes between the Tibetans and Lolos. The Lolos and the Ngologs received support from the Chinese. Besides bringing about an increase in her military formations in
Kantze, Derge, JyeKundo, Lintong and Lingtsong in eastern Tibet, China positioned her frontier guards on the Lhasa road from Trashi Gumpa.

Chinese garrisons have been established at Tatsienlu, Batang and at key points along the road to Lhasa. All the temples in Kantze, which housed nearly 1,000 Buddhist monks before Chinese captured Tibet, have been taken over by the Chinese troops. Chinese have set up some centres for guerrilla and snow-warfare training in the fair-sized areas of Sharakoto, Siamdo, Yangtse and Yimen.

The Dalai Lama visited Darjeeling hill areas in May 1975. During his speeches at various functions he neither lost his temper nor spoke with vengeance against the Peking regime for the holocaust in Tibet. He gave a clear indication that the will of the Tibetan people would reign supreme. In other words, if refugees desired to return to Tibet, he would not come in the way. And when the Dalai Lama arrived in Srinagar on 24 August 1976, he refused to say a word against China. During the course of an informal chat with me, he made a passing reference to Indira Gandhi’s “arrogance” and lack of sympathy for the Tibetans’ genuine demand for a dialogue with Peking on the question of future of Tibet and her people. The Dalai Lama did not refer to Tibet’s independence. He said that if over one lakh Tibetan refugees living in exile in India, Nepal and Bhutan desired to return to their homeland (Tibet), he would not come in the way. “Some say that Peking has raised its military formations in Tibet after 1959. But, at the same time, some others have reported that many changes have been brought about in economic sphere, social system and political order in Tibet. It is no crime if I nurse a desire to return to my country to see how it looks now”. he added.

In May 1975, Pakistan received two big consignments of automatic weapons from America. Though both Washington and Islamabad were secretive on the US arms aid programme for Pakistan, it was reported to New Delhi that automatic weapons included American M-16. Pakistan’s shopping list
in American arms market included F-5 supersonic fighters, F-86 Sabres, M-60 tanks, artillery and specialised ammunition. Pakistan also wanted to procure anti-tank missiles and modified Hawk and red-eye surface-to-air missiles from America.

Earlier, on 18 April, threat of war to "liberate Indian-held Kashmir was renewed by the New President of "Azad Kashmir", Manzar Masood, in his policy statement. Masood, who took over as President of Pak-held Kashmir on 16 April after Sardar Qayum Khan was thrown out in the wake of huge pressure from the PPP on the Government of Pakistan, expressed his Government's determination to "continue the struggle for the liberation of Indian-held Kashmir." Masood was the tenth President of "Azad Kashmir" since 1948. He said: "Liberation of Kashmir and its merger with Pakistan is the basic goal of my Government." A supersonic aircraft of the Pakistani air force violated Indian air space on this side of Chhamb towards the end of April. The Pakistani aircraft hovered in the air for a few minutes. But it returned to Pakistan soon after it detected an Indian combat aircraft flying high.

Five points on the 540-mile line of actual control became live as a result of skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani troops in Poonch, Rajouri and Gurez sectors from 15 May to 20 May. One incident, which involved exchange of fire between patrols of the two countries, occurred in Poonch on 15 May as a Pakistani delegation, led by Aga Shahi, arrived in Delhi for talks with the Indian leaders. On 30 May, Government of India was informed by some intelligence specialists about the involvement of Chinese in the construction of two roads along Kilik and Baroghil mountain passes, beyond Hunza in the Gilgit Agency, for strengthening of Pakistan's defence land route from Dir and Chitral in Pakistan to Karghalik in Chinese Turkistan. Besides the movement of Pakistani men and material in five areas—Barkat, Machkiyal, Punsa, Marmak and Umbutung—across Kargil in the Ladakh district, construction of some roads from Skardu and Burzil Bai to Gultari, across Dras, came to be known by the Indian Defence Ministry before Aga Shahi's arrival in Delhi. Con-
centration of Pakistani combatants in Kaphen, Kresmathung, Gomba Skardu, Shagari, Khergon and Kuardo in the Skardu sector since the beginning of May 1975 was regarded significant by New Delhi as it took place in the wake of anti-India propaganda launched by Pakistani politicians in the occupied Kashmir. Indian Defence Ministry had also received reports of Pakistani build-up in Rattu, Kamri, Taobat and Dudgaikal across Dawar in the Bandipore sector and in Surjoil, Jura, Chak and Salkhala across Tithwal.

In the beginning of June, Pakistani combatant formations witnessed a change in some areas. Apart from the posting of Brigade (1) of the Pak army near Lippa valley across Tithwal, Pakistan moved Azad Kashmir Brigade (2) to Rawalakot across Poonch and Azad Kashmir Brigade (6) to the south of Jhelum. Pakistan's Brigade(80), deployed in the Lippa valley during the Indo-Pak war in December 1971, was moved to a place near Shinkiari across Poonch. Pakistani Corps(1) was stationed near Jhelum, whereas division(19) was based at Mangla near Mirpur.

Political infighting began within Z.A. Bhutto's ruling Pakistan People's Party in four principal areas of "Azad Kashmir"—Muzaffarabad, Rawalakot, Poonch and Mirpur—towards the middle of July. This development followed the highly disturbing infighting within the PPP in Panjab and Sind, the two most populous provinces which gave Bhutto an overwhelming majority in the 1970 general election. While power struggle went on openly for the control of provincial administration in Panjab and Sind, some political circles in Muzaffarabad, Rawalakot, Poonch and Mirpur expressed dissatisfaction over the installation of Abdul Hamid Khan as the Prime Minister of "Azad Kashmir."

Hamid Khan was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir on 29 June 1975. His installation was followed by the eruption of political violence in some parts of "Azad Kashmir." Armed troops had to be posted at important centres in the occupied Kashmir to prevent violence and clashes between supporters of different political
groups, and the local authorities there had to prohibit carrying, in public, of weapons like rifles, revolvers, pistols, axes, swords and sticks. Following the election of Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan as the President of "Azad Kashmir" in May 1975, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan and his Muslim Conference warned that many people might be forced to cross into the Indian Kashmir "because of indiscriminate arrest and repressive measures adopted by Pakistan People’s Party to harass their political opponents." Abdul Qayum Khan was ousted from the office of President of "Azad Kashmir" before the election was held on 18 May to the 42-member Legislative Assembly in the occupied territory.

In October, China’s top armament experts flew into Pakistan on an inspection tour of Chinese-guided industrial and defence units in that country. These experts also discussed with the officials of Pakistan’s Defence Ministry the question of Chinese assistance and guidance to Rawalpindi in the production of ground-to-air missiles in Pakistan. Later, Pakistan started negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the question of seeking military hardware and additional financial assistance from them. These negotiations followed the talks in Ankara, in November, between Pakistani defence experts and Turkey’s officials on the issue of finalising Shah of Iran’s proposal for joint production of arms by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan.

Involvement of the United States in the field of building Saudi Arabia militarily was borne out by two reports. First was the statement by a spokesman of the State Department in February 1975 on the Saudi contract to a private US company which would train four mechanised battalions of Saudi Arabian National Guards. Second, US Defence Department disclosed in March that it planned to help Saudi Arabia construct port and other facilities costing over 142 million dollars. Kuwait signed a contract worth 250 million dollars in 1974 for 36 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers with spare-parts, training and support-equipment. The contract was signed with the US FcDonald Douglas. Kuwait had also a deal with France for purchase of over a dozen Mirage jet fighters, helicopters and other equipment. The deal was worth 85 million dollars.
The Shah of Iran left Larkana for home on 27 February 1975 after a three-day private visit to Pakistan during which he had seven hours of talks with Bhutto. The two leaders reviewed the international situation. In the words of the Shah, they agreed there were “no differences of opinion between Pakistan and Iran on all problems discussed.” The US decision to lift its embargo on arms sales to Pakistan was reported to have enabled Bhutto and the Shah to envisage how Iran could resell to Pakistan some military equipment, which although second-hand would not be obsolete and would be cheaper.

A visit of India by a Soviet military delegation ended on 27 February with the Defence Ministers of the two countries, who led the two delegations at their discussions, expressing “grave anxiety at the actions taken by certain quarters to step up arms race” in the region. The two leaders did not specify the US move to supply arms to Pakistan but the joint communique issued at the end of Marshal Grechkov’s three-day visit, made it clear what they had in mind. The Soviet Union had agreed to expand the area of cooperation with India in the field of defence production. While these areas had been identified, the Soviet Union had agreed to make available more advanced technical know-how to enable India to produce an improved version of the MIG. The Soviet military delegation visited India in the wake of reports of differences between New Delhi and Moscow on defence and economic matters. The programme drawn up for Marshal Grechkov shuttled between New Delhi and Moscow half a dozen times because Delhi was reluctant to give him more than 30 minutes with Mrs. Gandhi although he had made it clear that he was keen on having long-ranging political discussions with the Prime Minister in his capacity as an important member of the Soviet Politburo. The request was finally granted. Grechkov could not have felt free to communicate with Mrs. Gandhi in the presence of an official when he was not having a business meeting to discuss India’s defence shopping list. The differing assessments of India’s strategic needs came to the force at formal talks with the Defence Minister and the three Service Chiefs, and Grechkov left the Indian side in no doubt about his country’s strategic aims in the region.
Construction work began on a 300-kilometre highway between the Pakistan border and Kerman in December 1975. This followed the signing of a contract with a British construction company to complete the road within three and a half years at a cost of about seven million rials. A team of Pakistan's defence experts returned to Rawalpindi in the beginning of January 1976 after negotiations in Tehran. Pakistani experts were reported to have finalised the question of procuring additional military hardware from Iran. Pakistan's preference was for (a) armoured pieces like heavy tanks fitted out with the latest model of guns and machine guns, (b) personal carriers and armoured cars, (c) field pieces including self-propelled 175 mm guns, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank missiles and (d) sophisticated equipment like electronic detection, jamming, and tracing devices which would miscredit "enemy" missiles, rockets and aircraft.

In the beginning of May, Pakistan deputed a team of scientists and technicians to Iran to study, among other things, the operational aspect of Iran's nuclear energy. Islamabad's interest in developing nuclear energy began to grow since India's successful experiment in this field. Pakistani Prime Minister and prominent scientists of Pak Atomic Energy Commission held a series of meetings on the subject with concerned quarters in Canada, Iran and America in 1975. Following the formation of a Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1955, Islamabad invested about Rs. 15 crores up to the end of 1975 on nuclear research, principally on exploring uranium and training scientists in nuclear research, both by sending scientists abroad and getting scientists trained within Pakistan by foreign trained scientists, Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan, chief of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, said in 1968 that huge quantities of uranium had been recovered between 1963 and 1965. was during this period when Pakistan entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to set up a 5 megawatt research reactor. This was followed by the setting up of nuclear power plant at Karachi with the help of Canadians.

Pakistan is running two nuclear plants. It is also building
with the Canadian aid a crucial nuclear fuel separation plant which, when completed, can enable scientists to separate plutonium from the used fuel rods of a nuclear power plant. It is this plutonium which is used for nuclear weapons. Pakistani and Canadian scientists have begun work on construction of a heavy water plant in Multan. Two big nuclear power and water deselination plants are planned for the coast of the Arabian Sea.

Pakistan entered into a secret pact with China during Bhutto’s visit to Peking in May 1976, when Pakistani Prime Minister was able to involve China in a deal to help Islamabad produce nuclear arms. In March 1979, a team of Chinese scientists visited the coast of Arabian Sea, Karachi, Gwadur Baluchistan and Chashma Barrage on the Chenab. Chinese scientists had six hours of talks with a team of Pak scientists in two days.

Pakistan plans to explode a nuclear device by the end of 1980. The United States, with its worldwide intelligence network, has listed Pakistan as one of the near-nuclear nations of the world, whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency has listed Pakistan as among the more advanced of the countries received assistance. And since China aims at isolating India in order to make it difficult for the latter to assume the leadership of South-East Asia, Peking’s move to help Islamabad produce nuclear arms is welcome to Pakistan.
The establishment of a trade link with China in May 1977 marked a step towards gradual restoration of normalcy in India’s relations with China. The development was quite in line with the expectations roused in 1976 when New Delhi and Peking exchanged Ambassadors. If New Delhi took the initiative of sending an Ambassador to China on a reciprocal basis, Peking took the initiative to pave the way for resumption of trade between the two countries, which remained closed for 15 years following the Sino-Indian hostilities in 1962.

The initial trade deal was not of much economic significance. But according to Indian officials, its importance as a boost to the process of normalisation of relations could not be missed. A contract was signed at the Canton fair for exchange of a limited range of goods between India and China, worth about 1.6 million dollars or about Rs. 1.5 crores.

Second important neighbour—Pakistan—began to show its interest in establishing friendship with India about a year before the fall of Indira Gandhi’s government in March 1977. Significantly, however, Pakistan began to describe China as its “closest friend extremely anxious to help and strengthen Pakistan” after the change of government in New Delhi with
Morarji Desai as India’s non-Congress Prime Minister. Pakistan’s assertion of the fact of “growing friendship” between Islamabad and Peking was not without any meaning; in fact, Pakistan emphasized the merits of Sino-Pak friendship as Prime Minister Bhutto and his associates began to feel that Morarji Desai wanted to build bridges between New Delhi and Washington on the one hand and, on the other, make the Soviet leaders realize that India was not bound to depend on Russia alone in spite of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, which assumed a definite shape in 1971.

Pakistani rulers, especially those trying to see China as a permanent threat to India, cannot be committed to the need for establishing lasting friendship between Pakistan and India inasmuch as a sizable section of the population, mainly in Panjab and Sind, seems to be of the opinion that Pakistan’s importance can be known and taken note of only when some sort of disputes are allowed to take place occasionally between Pakistan and India. And as China has succeeded in taking Pakistan out of the American net and in making her dependent largely on China’s aid and advice since September 1965, Peking will encourage Islamabad to build friendship with New Delhi and Moscow only to a point to suit China’s strategic aims in the region. While the attitude of Chinese Communists towards New Delhi’s unabated desire to see India as a powerful country in the whole of Asia cannot be sympathetic, Peking will make necessary efforts to ensure that, besides Pakistan, three countries—Nepal, Bhutan and Burma—do not quail before India’s military strength or nuclear threat.

Although Nepal, Bhutan and Burma are equally interested in maintaining their friendly association with India, they are apparently weak to face China’s displeasure. The result is that while ruling leaders of the three countries avoid to allow any difficulty to emerge in their relations with China, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma are somewhat hesitant to regard China as a meddling neighbour. While the influence, exercised by China in these three countries, is unerringly grater than India’s, the existence of an efficient Chinese network in various parts of Nepal, Bhutan and Burma will not easily permit India to gain
foothold in these territories, which are considered by Chinese leaders to be strategically important.

Chinese Communists will by no means feel unduly anxious or worried if Moscow and Washington widen the areas of cooperation and friendship with India and Bangladesh. Chinese leaders are not devoid of the capacity to change the attention of Russia and America if and when they find it necessary for maintaining their strategic aims in Asia and for creating a sense of reassuring effect in Pakistan that she (Pakistan) has no reason to get intimidated by India or any other country as long as she enjoys support of China. And inside Pakistan, China has so far ensured that her role in the country's progress, especially in the field of defence build up, has, besides exploding the myth that Pakistan could not survive without the help of Western countries, helped Chinese Communists maintain their foothold in the Islamic State.

Presence of thousands of Chinese Communists, including troops, close to the Hunza border and inside the mountain-locked Gilgit Agency is an open secret. Intervention by the Chinese soldiers in May 1977 to control warlike Kohistan tribes of the Gilgit Agency, proved useful to the Government of Pakistan in maintaining its link with Gilgit and adjoining areas in the northern sector. The Kohistani tribes, considered to be sympathetic to the grievances of the people of Baluchistan and Frontier Province against Bhutto and his Government, had damaged the Indus valley road at three places with the help of explosives. The Chinese intervened only when a company of Pakistani army personnel found it difficult to break the armed men from Kohistani tribes at Hesham, nine miles from Karora, on the Rawalpindi-Gilgit route, which is also known as the Indus valley road. Between 35 and 50 men from the Kohistani tribes were killed whereas the number of casualties on the side of the Chinese and Pakistani soldiers was placed at 20. The road along the Karakoram range was made functional within 48 hours after the Chinese soldiers intervened and assisted Pakistani troops and technicians in the area.

Earlier, Pakistani troops were alerted close to the Pak-
Afghanistan border in the third week of April in order to prevent external aid and influence from flowing in the crisis-afflicted Pakistan. Movement of Pakistani troops in some areas, close to the border with Afghanistan, followed a series of meetings between army chiefs and Prime Minister Bhutto at Islamabad on 13 and 14 April on various measures to control the worsening situation and to exercise an effective check on external forces, which also included unspecified number of Russians in Kabul. Movement of Pakistani forces also took place at some places across India's border with Pakistan. These places included Sialkot, Wagah, Lahore, Gujranwala, Chhamb, Rawalakot, Bagh and Palandri and Muzaffarabad.

A month later—in the middle of May—Government-owned Urdu daily of Pakistan, Mashriq, saw a clear possibility of Pakistan quitting the United States supported Central Treaty Organisation if its Western allies “do not change their attitude towards Pakistan”. In a strong criticism of the CENTO, Mashriq wrote that the Western military alliances were a Zionist instrument for keeping the eastern, particularly Muslim, countries weak and helpless. “Pakistan's association with CENTO and other military Pacts have been of no use to it”, the paper wrote adding that it had, instead, become a stumbling block in Pakistan’s efforts to improve relations with neighbouring powers.

Mashriq also carried a special story, “CIA is against Pakistan's integrity and sovereignty”, which said that the Government was collecting “solid” evidence to prove Prime Minister Bhutto’s charge against the US complicity in the “current agitation” in Pakistan. This evidence would be made public at an appropriate time, the paper wrote. American money was distributed in all the four provinces of Pakistan in 1975 when there was revolt in Baluchistan and the Frontier Province, the paper said. (At the time of the revolt Pakistan Government had blamed it on the Soviet Union and Afghanistan).

Chinese should normally be quite satisfied with the Pakistanis, many of home have been looking at Peking with hopeful eyes. There were no protestations when in some parts of Gilgit, Astor and Yasin in 1974 and 1975 some Chinese males were
found hungry to taste all the artistic pleasures they were denied at home. Women of Gilgit are better than those of Astor. Yasin has a greater reputation of female beauty. Small groups of Chinese can be found in Kilian, a town in Yarkand territory, in Shahidula, situated at a distance of 240 miles from Leh on the trade route to Yarkand, in Suget, nine miles above Shahidula on the Karakash river, in Tashkurgan on the Taghdumbash Pamirs, in Chalt on the road to Gilgit, in Pasu in Hunza, in valleys of Shigar, Braldu, Rondu, Katsura and Deosai and in Tarshing, Gurikot and Dashkin in Astor valley.

Astor which used to be the seat of a Dard Raja, is now a cantonment of Pakistani soldiers. Pakistani troops as well as formations of Gilgit Scouts, Northern Scouts and Karakoram Scouts have entrenched themselves in Gilgit, Se, Haramosh, Hasora, Punial, Nagar, Hunza, Ishkoman, Yasin, Chitral, Thalicha, Chilas, Koli and Palus. Chinese Communists played an important role in assisting the Pakistanis in the construction of good roads connecting Gilgit with Darel (57 miles), with Gakuch (40 miles), with Hunza (51 miles), with Nagar (55 miles), and with Skardu (162 miles).

Pro-Peking elements and groups not only in Nepal, Bhutan and Burma but also in Pakistan have already put out feelers to indicate China’s intention of altering the geographical map of Asia before end of this century. In other words, the effort to exploit possibilities for external expansion has not been abandoned by China; it is apparently part of her strategy for expansion to keep her men busy in Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma and to refer, though not always, to Ladakh being part of Chinese Tibet and to Sikkim’s "illegal" merger with the Indian Union.

A big increase in Chinese purchases of aluminium and other strategic metals since the beginning of 1975 has been noted in Peking, Brussels and Japan. The metals are mainly required for expansion of China's military and civil air industry. But there is also a demand for aluminium in the petroleum industry, which the Chinese are expanding as rapidly as their technical ability will permit. The Chinese Communists are shrewd
businessmen; they bought a large amount of metal in August and September 1975 from Switzerland and France to the estimated value of 85 million pounds; indeed, during these two months Peking bought more than 4 lakh million tons from firms in Europe, the USA and Australia.

Purchases from Britain for the first nine months of 1975 were valued at a total of just over 80 lakh pounds. In addition, Peking reached a long-term agreement with the Japanese firm (Mitsubishi) to supply 60,000 tons of aluminium a year and other metal purchases were made in Tokyo. And China has bought unspecified stocks of manganese and other nonferrous metals required for her defence industry. China is obviously buying metals in readiness for the construction of her next generation of fighter planes to replace the outdated MIG aircraft, which were initially bought from the Soviet Union and later manufactured in the People’s Republic. Peking expects that by 1980 Chinese production of crude oil will reach 400 million tons—the amount produced by Saudi Arabia in 1976.

"Let China sleep", Napoleon remarked in 1809, "when she awakes, the whole world will be sorry". Today, China is awake. China is a threat to many, including the Soviet Union. China has succeeded in adapting her industry to the situation created by the withdrawal of Soviet aid.
The existence of a strong body of opinion in Pakistan against Z.A. Bhutto had been apparent for some years. Indeed, the number of opponents of the Pakistan Prime Minister began to increase since November 1973, when the Pakistan People's Party workers assumed the duty of pacing up and down as sentries and talked about "ruthless action" against those who opposed Bhutto's Government and policies.

The extent and bitterness of the quarrel between Bhutto and his opponents became quite clear as numerous changes were brought about not only in the armed forces but also in the political and administrative set-up in the country until March 1976 to suit requirements and aims of the Pakistan Prime Minister. Political groups, especially in North-West Frontier Province, were discouraged, force was used against those who campaigned for grant of autonomy to some regions in the country, scores of people were arrested and leaders of student unions and youth federations in Lahore, Karachi, Hyderabad and Baluchistan were threatened with penalty if "they continue to incite the public opinion" against Bhutto's policies.

A wave of resentment against Bhutto began to blow when some army officers were dislodged and General Zia-ul-Haque
succeeded General Tikka Khan as army chief on March 1, 1976, superseding a number of senior officers. The appointment of General Tikka Khan as the Minister for Defence and National Security generated a mixed reaction. While political groups arrayed against the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) described him as a "cannibal", some of the associates of Bhutto, including Maulana Kausar Niazi, Religious Affairs Minister, Aziz Ahmed Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aga Shahi, Foreign Secretary, and Yusuf Buch, adviser to the Pakistan Prime Minister, had a reason to keep their fingers crossed inasmuch as they were conscious of the fact that several army officers, including General Zia-ul Haque, would find it difficult to control their bitter tongues against Tikka Khan. The PPP hailed Bhutto's step and regarded the appointment of Tikka Khan as quite suitable for the implementation of the party's programme against the "unhealthy manoeuvre of our enemy in and outside the country."

The appointment of Tikka Khan amid the political turmoil in Pakistan was regarded by some circles in India as "another big step backwards to the revival of military dominance over the country's politics." These circles felt that the political battle over the election result tended to grant a fresh lease of life to military overlordship. That Bhutto had failed to render the army harmless, became quite evident when General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, who had been sent to diplomatic exile by Bhutto, resigned from their posts. This had repercussions in the army necessitating the induction of General Tikka Khan in the Cabinet.

The Pakistan Prime Minister and his party, PPP, saw the rapid growth of their opponents before the country went to the poll in March 1977. And though Bhutto was unerringly confident of his party's victory in the elections, a section of the administration (supported by the Federal Security Force personnel and Pakistan's Intelligence Bureau) resorted to mal-practices in an attempt to secure an absolute majority for the PPP in the National Assembly. Federal Security Force, consisting of about 35,000 men, was set up by Bhutto and attached with the Interior Ministry. As the election results were coming
in, the nine-party Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) alleged large-scale rigging. The PNA boycotted the elections to the Provincial Assembly on March 10 and launched a countrywide agitation.

The real depth of the conflict, its range and bitterness, could not be obscured by Bhutto’s Government as violence and clashes between supporters of the PPP and PNA spread almost everywhere, especially in Lahore, Karachi, Hyderabad, West Panjab, Sind, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. While additional army units were rushed to Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. towards the end of March to suppress supporters of the PNA. Bhutto pressed into action several hundred personnel of the Federal Security Force for rendering assistance to the supporters and workers of the PPP in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad where anti-Bhutto demonstrations had assumed serious proportions by the middle of April. And as the street battles went on in these areas, feelers were put out to indicate Bhutto’s willingness to hold a new election. The Opposition PNA leaders refused to get swayed away by these feelers; they insisted on Bhutto’s resignation and Presidential rule in Pakistan before holding fresh elections.

The Pakistan Prime Minister retaliated by arresting PNA leaders and employing repressive measures against his opponents. At least 374 people died, 1,500 persons were wounded and 75 others reported missing in violence as the agitation spread from one city to another. It was in the teeth of General Tikka Khan’s advice tendered to him in Islamabad on April 19 that Bhutto imposed martial law in the major cities of Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad, the focal points of agitation, on April 21. General Zia-ul-Haque was not for the imposition of martial law as he was for the continuance of round-the-clock curfew clamped earlier in Karachi and Hyderabad. But his standpoint did not convince Bhutto inasmuch as the latter had seen eye with Tikka Khan’s advice.

The imposition of martial law came ahead of an Opposition call for a nation-wide strike and demonstrations on April 22 to demand the resignation of Bhutto. Demonstrations could
have been a fleshpoint for further violence and bloodshed. In Hyderabad, retired Major-General A.A.K. Niazi, a leader of PNA, was arrested a few hours before the imposition of martial law. He was detained under emergency regulations for making "objectionable" speeches. General Niazi signed the surrender documents at Dacca in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan which led to the emergence of Bangladesh. Niazi was arrested at the house of a retired army major, who was also detained.

Earlier on April 20, normal life in Karachi, largest city of Pakistan, got paralysed as a result of general strike called by trade unions supporting demands by PNA for Bhutto's resignation and holding of fresh elections. Shops, banks, markets and textile mills came to a standstill and railway traffic was seriously affected. The Times, London, said in a leading article that the crisis in Pakistan "may now be such that only army mediation will settle it". While comparing India and Pakistan, the paper felt that the Opposition in Pakistan had probably been encouraged by Mrs. Gandhi's defeat. "What is unhappily true of Pakistan is that its stability as a new State is still in question. Its politics are more regional than national. Instead of accepted irrigation channels through which the political waters flow, that country is liable to occasional disorderly floods. And the more the waters have risen the more Bhutto's attempts to command them have proved inadequate. The Opposition leaders have been spurred on by the desertions Bhutto has suffered from his own party." The paper said that the Opposition would hope that its ranks would first be inspected for a likely alternative to Bhutto. "In this respect Pakistan's Opposition alliance is very different from India's. No one of the calibre of Jayaprakash Narayan or Morarji Desai or Jagjivan Ram or even the Jana Sangh leaders will be found among Pakistan's Opposition groups. Nor are fresh elections likely to throw up a suitable candidate if Bhutto is finally forced to call them. Pakistan may have to soldier on with the best Prime Minister it has got", the paper added.

Stern measures taken soon after the imposition of martial law failed to curb the political turbulence. The Pir of Pagaro,
who had wholly identified himself with the PNA cause, was placed under detention at the International Hotel in Rawalpindi on April 30 as police fought running battles with hundreds of Opposition demonstrators demanding the resignation of the Pakistan Prime Minister. The Pir had played a central role in talks since April 26 among jailed PNA leaders at the Shihala detention centre near Islamabad. Situation in other parts, especially in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad, did not show signs of improvement in spite of the presence of the army personnel and steel-helmeted policemen. Hundreds of supporters of PNA indulged in violence and fought pitched battles in the streets of Karachi with police and PPP workers for two days in the beginning of May following the hurricane tour of the largest city by General Tikka Khan on May 2.

This development was followed by an hour-long meeting at Islamabad on May 5 between Tikka Khan and some Pakistani Ministers, including Maulana Kausar Niazi and Finance Minister, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada. Tikka Khan favoured what was described as “use of massive force” against opponents of the Government and opposed negotiations with PNA leaders. But as days rolled by, Bhutto valued the views earlier expressed by the President of Pakistan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed, General Zia and Yusuf Buch in favour of talks with PNA leaders. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada told the Associated Press of Pakistan on May 31 that Pakistan’s economic situation “is grim”. He said the 1977-78 financial year would be a “hard year” as 60 working days “have been lost so far and the decline in gross national production has been estimated at 400 to 500 million dollars”. The country had also lost about 400 million dollars in export earnings, he added.

A report from Paris said that following the two-hour meeting there between the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed, and the U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, the USA and Pakistan had agreed to restore relations to the friendly footing that existed before Bhutto accused Washington of backing an Opposition campaign to overthrow him. While Vance said that “we value greatly the long and close friendship we have with Pakistan”, Ahmed said: “The talks were very friendly
and constructive. In the end we agreed, irrespective of the differences that cropped up recently between our two countries, that both countries wish to restore their relationship to the former state of mutual friendship and confidence and would like to see them improve further."

While martial law, enforced in Pakistan's three cities was lifted on June 7 as a result of the "satisfactory progress" made in Government-Opposition negotiations, more than 13,000 prisoners were freed by Bhutto by June 13. During and after the visit to Kashmir by the Indian leaders—Charan Singh, Home Minister, Jagjivan Ram, Defence Minister, and Morarji Desai, Prime Minister—from June 19 to June 27, attempts were made by Bhutto and some of his associates, including Communications Minister, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, to divert the attention of the Opposition by raking up the Kashmir issue and "growing domination of militant Bharat in the Indian-held Kashmir". Earlier on June 20, Pakistani ruling politicians, including Aziz Ahmed and Tikka Khan, told two leaders of PNA—Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Vice-President, and Ghafoor Ahmed, Secretary-General—that they wanted the Opposition to cooperate with the Government in view of the movement of Indian army close to the border with Pakistan. Reference to the Indo-Pak border came soon after the sub-committee level talks between the PNA and Government regarding details of the accord on holding fresh elections fizzled out. Ghafoor Ahmed said in Islamabad that "differences exist not only in regard to the date of dissolution of the National Assembly but also about other matters of fundamental nature".

In order to change the pattern of "now or never" policy of PNA, an attempt was also made to caution leaders of the Opposition against what was described as "anti-Pakistan line" adopted by the Indian Prime Minister in his discussions with the French President and the Premier. Pakistan's diplomatic mission in Paris reported to Islamabad on June 19 and 20 that Morarji Desai's Paris visit and his talks with the French President and Premier were likely to have far-reaching implications in the context of Pakistan's acquisition of a French nuclear
reprocessing plant. Desai, these reports said, had achieved much success in convincing the French leaders of the dangers of a new nuclear race in the subcontinent if Pakistan acquires the plant.

The Indian Defence Ministry expressed its feeling on June 23 that despite welcome improvements in the political climate and in India’s relations with neighbours, the overall security environment “continues to cause anxiety as the threat to the country has not diminished.” In its annual report presented to the Parliament, the Ministry recorded that the situation on the border with Pakistan had remained peaceful except for a few local incidents of firing and intrusions and violations of airspace. The report said that even though the process of restoration of severed links and resumption of diplomatic relations during the year had resulted in a measure of normalisation of relations, Pakistan’s concerted efforts to procure military hardware from all possible sources caused a setback to the process of normalisation and “may lead to an arms race in the subcontinent.”

A few hours after his return from a five-day tour of some Muslim countries on June 23, Bhutto met Opposition leaders at Rawalpindi for two hours but without settling differences over the holding of new general elections. Opposition leaders paid little attention when the Pakistan Prime Minister talked of his tour of the Muslim countries and his proposal for a defence treaty embracing all Muslim States. PNA leaders looked determined to press for his resignation, for the dissolution of the National Assembly and for the holding of fresh elections in the country before taking up matters like Indo-Pakistan relations and formation of a defence alliance for all Muslim States. The Pakistan Opposition warned (on June 28) that it would resume a nation-wide agitation on July 1 unless the Government accepted its proposals to end the four-month-old political crisis. Ghafoor Ahmed accused the Finance Minister of “blocking the negotiation process.” It was on June 27 when the Finance Minister issued a communique on behalf of the Government making it clear that the authorities would not negotiate under duress and rejected all forms of
Z.A. Bhutto and leaders of PNA met at Rawalpindi on July 1 in a final effort to seek a formula to resolve the crisis. The talks started under a cloud of renewed violence in the Panjab province, where nine supporters of PNA were wounded, four of them seriously, when rival factions exchanged fire. PNA and the Government reached an agreement on all points on new general elections in Pakistan. This was jointly announced by the two sides at the end of their 10-hour nightlong session, which ended on Saturday (July 2). While the details of the accord were not disclosed, the withdrawal of troops from Baluchistan was among the issues discussed between the two sides. The Opposition at the talks was represented by PNA's President, Maulana Mufti Mahmud, the Vice-President and Secretary-General. Bhutto and two Ministers, Pirzada and Niazi, represented the Government.

As the PNA put forward ten new demands, some of them framed by Bhutto's strong opponent, Air Marshal Asghar Khan on July 3, the Pakistan Prime Minister told reporters in Islamabad on July 4 that he had "reached the limit" of what he could concede to the Opposition. Bhutto accused the Opposition of 'wanting to reopen negotiations that had been ended by an 'agreement'' and going back on its commitments. Bhutto said that for the first time "deep differences" had emerged within the Cabinet as to the necessity of continuing the talks with PNA. Differences had cropped up as a result of Tikka Khan's cry against negotiations with the Opposition leaders. Although Tikka Khan had felt extremely insulted by certain remarks made by the two leaders of PNA, Air Marshal Asghar Khan and General Niazi, against his inhuman behaviour in the course of handling the PNA supporters in Karachi and Lahore during the martial law, Bhutto did not agree with Tikka Khan's standpoint favouring closure of talks with the Opposition and ruthless measures against trouble-makers.

The day that was. Tuesday (July 5) brought unexpected state of affairs for the people of Pakistan; the army took over the civil administration in the country, imposed martial law and
promised “free and fair” elections in October in what it claimed to be a “necessary step” to check the country’s drift towards political chaos. About 17 hours after a predawn round-up of the country’s political leaders, including Z.A. Bhutto, the Pakistan army chief, General Zia-ul-Haque, announced in a broadcast that he would be the chief martial law administrator and that a four-member military council would “assist” the President, Fazal Elahi Choudhury, who had agreed to continue in office. National and provincial Assemblies were dissolved and all Ministers and Governors dismissed. All political activities were banned. General Zia said that the power of the judiciary “are not being curtailed except that it would have no authority to challenge the validity of martial law orders” he might issue from time to time.

Chief Justices of the provinces were appointed as the Governors of their States. Politicians in custody included Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Maulana Mufti Mahmud, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Governors of Sind, Panjab and North-West Frontier Province, General Tikka Khan and Maulana Kausar Niazi. Trade union activities were banned and strikes in educational institutions prohibited. Martial law orders issued in Islamabad on July 11 provided for death penalty for damaging public property and amputation of hands for theft, dacoity or looting.

Pakistan, a Muslim nation of 70 million, has been the only country other than Saudi Arabia to have introduced amputation, which is provided for in the Shariat Law. General Zia considered the introduction of the Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country. The 1973 Constitution envisaged the introduction of the Shariat Law within seven years.

The Lok Sabha in New Delhi was informed by the Minister for External Affairs, A. B. Vajpayee, about the army takeover in Pakistan on July 5. Vajpayee affirmed that “these developments are the internal affairs of Pakistan.” The Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, in the course of his reply to the debate on the demands of his Ministry, referred on passing to the matter and said that while this was undoubtedly an internal
matter, "sometimes internal matters have repercussions on us also" and that this had also to be taken into consideration. Ram's statement was followed by what was described as "urgent" instructions to the defence forces in the country to be vigilant. Pakistani troops, too, were ordered not to relax their defence preparedness. Both Islamabad and New Delhi had a reason to take this step as sources of tension and conflict between the two countries have not been resolved.

General Zia is more pro-west than Bhutto. But General Zia is not anti-Bhutto. According to some intelligence specialists, General Zia staged a bloodless coup to defeat General Tikka Khan's plan of taking over the civil administration in the country. General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, who had resigned from Pakistani ambassadorial posts in Athens and Madrid, had been in touch with General Zia during the political crisis in Pakistan. Although both of them had found it difficult to see eye to eye with Bhutto's politics and policies, General Gul and Air Marshal Rahim had, in recent years, developed aversion for some leaders, including Tikka Khan and Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.

A service group was formed by Tikka Khan to restrict the role and influence of those organisations, governmental and non-governmental, which were directly or indirectly opposed to him. This group, consisting of persons of widely varying talents and pursuits, had not been given any name or number. Spying on and keeping in check Tikka Khan's opponents and ruling party dissidents became its major concern during the four-month-old political turmoil in Pakistan. Tikka Khan's service group had also a special "interrogation cell". The intelligence specialists said that when General Zia learnt towards the end of June that some army officers had also hobnobbed with Tikka Khan is an attempt to strengthen him and spread disaffection among the members of the armed forces and civil services, the army chief and some of his closest associates were forced to keep a close watch on Tikka and his contacts. The army takeover followed the leakage of Tikka Khan's plan that he had intended to topple Bhutto's Government and take over the civil administration in the country.
General Zia’s remark (of July 8) that the army takeover had brought Bhutto down from the heavens to the earth was not made to denounce the deposed Premier but to deny speculation among certain circles that the military rule had been imposed at the secret promptings of Bhutto. Addressing a Friday prayer gathering at a mosque in Rawalpindi on July 8, General Zia said that he was saddened by a resolution passed by the congregation describing Bhutto a criminal and asking the martial law authorities to punish him. Later, in an interview to Newsweek Magazine published on July 10, Zia said Bhutto should run for office again. “He is very determined man with a great sense of history. He is also a very tenacious fighter and a great politician”, Zia added.

General Zia’s first secret meeting with Bhutto at Murree took place in the early hours of July 7—eight days before Pakistan’s chief martial law administrator held separate sessions with the deposed Premier and Maulana Mufti Mahmud, President of PNA, at the hill station. Intelligence reports said that while Mufti Mahmud told General Zia that a major point still to be resolved “is the provision of cast iron safeguards against rigging of elections”, Bhutto appeared considerably relaxed both on July 7 and July 15 as, following his talks with Zia, he felt that he is likely to play another round.

Happily for Bhutto, some diplomatic mission in Pakistan have begun to take steps, although in a secret manner, to help the Pakistan People’s Party build public opinion in favour of the deposed Prime Minister. These missions have been making unrestricted use of money to influence the public opinion in several parts of Pakistan in favour of Bhutto. Officials from Chinese, Iranian and Saudi Arabian missions are extremely eager to see Bhutto in power. British and American officials in Pakistan are also interested in Bhutto’s rise to the office of Premiership.

Significant, indeed, was the arrival of some Chinese observers in Islamabad from Peking on July 9 when a Chinese official posted at Karachi had an hour-long meeting with the wife of Bhutto before she visited her husband at Murree. As
Chinese are shrewed businessmen, they might not hesitate to employ different methods to help the PPP set the stage in support of Peking's friend—Bhutto—even if they require to wear artificial smile to satisfy members of American and Russian missions in Pakistan.