RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF KASHMIR

By DAVID E. LOCKWOOD

The intricate web of conflicting interests and influences involving the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir can best be characterized as the "problem of Kashmir." Its origins lie in the dispute between India and Pakistan which began in 1947 when the two nations obtained independence from Great Britain. Almost all of the 562 princely states of British India chose to accede to either India or Pakistan at the time of British withdrawal. But Jammu and Kashmir, or "Kashmir," as the state is commonly called, was one of the few whose large size and outlying location enabled it to consider the alternatives between independence or separate dominion status. Prospects for independence were enhanced by the principles laid down by the British for transfer of power. According to British stipulations, the princely ruler could decide personally whether to accede either to India or Pakistan, or to seek independence.

In the summer of 1957 Maharaja Hari Singh, the autocratic Hindu ruler of Kashmir, did not favor incorporation with either Muslim Pakistan or socialist India. His hand was forced, however, by a revolt against his rule in the northern district of Gilgit and by an invasion of well-armed Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan. In October he decided to accede all of Kashmir to India in return for military aid. Undeclared war soon ensued between India and Pakistan. Indian troops were able to save Srinagar, the capital, and to clear the invaders from the Valley of Kashmir, the most heavily populated and politically important area of Kashmir. However, Gilgit in the north and Azad Kashmir, the heavily Moslem district in the west, were not reconquered. These western and northern regions of Kashmir have been under the control of Pakistan since the 1949 cease-fire.

The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 resulted in further loss of territory by Kashmir. A large part of eastern Kashmir comprising all of Aksai Chin and much of Ladakh was conquered by China during the Himalayan Border War. A cease-fire line now separates Indian-controlled from Chinese-controlled Kashmir.

Though Kashmir has been divided into three parts by her neighbors, the section controlled by India (now called Jammu and Kashmir State) is
by far the most important in terms of both area and population. A large portion of the former princely state’s population of four million people resides in this area. Included is Kashmir’s most coveted and controversial feature, the Valley of Kashmir. An elongated oval measuring approximately 30 miles wide and 70 miles long, the “Vale of Kashmir” has for centuries been a prized object of conquest for neighboring rulers.

The problem of Kashmir in the 1970s results from conflicting views over how Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir State should be ruled. Not only do the governments of India and Pakistan disagree, but differing points of view are held by the inhabitants of Kashmir itself. There are vocal sections in the predominantly Hindu Jammu province in the south which would prefer to have Jammu and Kashmir State completely integrated within the federal structure of India, thereby establishing it on a par with the other Indian states. Among the Muslim population, however, there are many who not only oppose such a suggestion but who favor greater autonomy within the federal framework. In fact, a significant proportion of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State advocate complete separation from India, with independence or accession to Pakistan as the two favored alternatives.

**Proponents of Self-Determination**

One very important political group centered in the Valley of Kashmir demands the right of self-determination. Members of this group would like the people themselves to decide whether Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan, or whether it should become an independent state. In the event that accession to one of the two countries would be favored by the electorate, the self-determination group would like to exert a decisive influence in defining the conditions of the state-federal relationship.

The widely-recognized leader of the self-determination group is Sheikh Mohammed Adullah, the “Lion of Kashmir.” Over the years no one had been more closely identified with political developments in the state than Sheikh Abdullah. Since the early 1950s his repeated demands for self-determination have made him an exceedingly controversial figure throughout the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. His outspokenness has provoked the Indian government on many occasions, and it has responded to his challenges by placing him in preventive detention for prolonged periods of time. The most recent of these confinements extended from May 1965 to January 1968.

The Indian government released its most famous political prisoner on January 2, 1968. Among the reasons why New Delhi freed Abdullah were the scheduled lapse later that same month of the Preventive Detention Act and a general feeling of embarrassment at having to adopt such extraordinary measures to isolate the Kashmiri leader from his following. As soon as the news of his release reached Srinagar, preparations were
begun for a lavish reception. However, Abdullah remained in New Delhi and postponed his return to the Valley for over two months. Part of the reason for the delay was to be found in adverse weather conditions. Kashmir was experiencing one of its worst winters in recent years and Sheikh Abdullah decided to schedule his homecoming for the early spring when the countryside would no longer be blocked by snow. A more compelling reason for his stay in New Delhi, however, was his strong desire to initiate talks with Indian government leaders on the Kashmir problem.³

In his first major interview with the press Abdullah expressed the view that the Kashmir problem and Indo-Pakistani hostility were inextricably linked together. The key to reconciliation between the two countries was a settlement of the Kashmir dispute; and a settlement of the Kashmir dispute required a more flexible and understanding response from the two governments. He went on to indicate his willingness to sit down with the leaders of India and Pakistan in order to break the impasse that had settled over the Kashmir issue. In this regard, he said, he would like to resume the mission he had undertaken for Jawaharlal Nehru in the spring of 1964, but which had been interrupted by the Indian Prime Minister’s death.⁴

During the last days of his life Nehru had agreed to let Abdullah visit Pakistan in an effort to arrange a discussion among the leaders of India, Pakistan, and Kashmir. It is reported that Nehru felt a strong desire to settle the Kashmir problem, a hurdle he had not been able to overcome successfully. His strong and sentimental attachment to the land of his forebears undoubtedly made his failure in this area all the more difficult to bear. Abdullah had concluded a meeting with President Ayub Khan and was preparing to meet with the leaders of Azad Kashmir for further discussions when news reached him of Nehru’s final collapse. As a longstanding personal friend of the Indian Prime Minister, Abdullah immediately cut short his mission and flew back to New Delhi.

Lal Bahadur Shastri, the new Prime Minister, did not share Nehru’s friendship with Abdullah nor his tolerant and permissive attitude toward the Kashmiri leader. Abdullah was not allowed to resume his special mission in Pakistan. Indeed, a little more than a year later he was arrested and placed in preventive detention because of his outspoken criticism of the Indian government. He was taken into custody in May 1965 and removed to southern India where he remained for a greater part of the next two-and-a-half years.⁵

On the occasion of his release on January 2, 1968, Abdullah was hopeful that Mrs. Gandhi—who had succeeded Shastri as Prime Minister—would permit him to undertake a role similar to the one interrupted by her father’s death. During his meeting with newsmen on January 4, 1968, he said:
I am quite sure that Indiraji knows the wishes of her father and I hope that she will pick up the threads. If there is the desire to settle this problem amicably, my services are at her disposal to achieve that end.6

Abdullah was to be greatly disappointed by the response of Mrs. Gandhi and other prominent leaders of the central government. Although they received him courteously and listened to his views, the Kashmiri leader was given no encouragement. The 1965 summer war between India and Pakistan had produced a hardening of positions on Kashmir, and the Indian leaders were unwilling to recognize Pakistan as having a legitimate or constructive role to play. There was no question of Abdullah’s being permitted to travel to Pakistan again. There was firm opposition to any form of negotiation with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue until other, less contentious issues had been cleared away.7

All of this was sufficient reason for discouragement. Abdullah was particularly disturbed, however, by the Indian government’s refusal to engage in serious discussions until Indian control of Jammu and Kashmir State was accepted as final and irrevocable. This condition struck at the very roots of the principle of self-determination for which Abdullah had spent almost fourteen years in prison. He was bound to reject it. Unable to persuade the leaders in New Delhi to adopt a more flexible approach to the Kashmir problem, Abdullah broke off the discussions and flew to Srinagar on March 4, 1968.

The reception for Abdullah was an emotional and triumphal event, as thousands of cheering Kashmiris lined the road from the airport to the city.8 During the next several weeks the Kashmiri leader spoke often to large and enthusiastic gatherings. His speeches reflected the frustration and anger of his experience in New Delhi combined with the elation of knowing that he still commanded a large and faithful following in the Valley. He defiantly reiterated his longstanding demand for the right of self-determination for the people of the state. He told his audiences that the government in New Delhi was following a policy of drift and indecision, that the Indian leaders wanted to ignore the Kashmir problem. The only answer, he declared, was for the people of Jammu and Kashmir to take the initiative into their own hands.

This theme of self-reliance received new force after Abdullah returned from a brief visit to New Delhi in early May 1968. He found the Indian leaders unreceptive and indifferent; it is reported that he had considerable difficulty making appointments during his stay. The effect of this official rebuff was immediately apparent on his return to Srinagar on May 8, 1968. Speaking to a crowd at the airport, he said that Kashmiris would have to take a determined stand as “nobody was going to offer them anything on the platter.” He also announced that he favored the idea of
convening a conference of all the leaders in the state to find a solution to the Kashmir problem.9

**Conflicting Viewpoints**

While Abdullah's emerging plan was undeniably attractive, it faced major obstacles, the most serious being the heterogeneous composition and conflicting views of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. The state is comprised of three distinctly different regions. Jammu province is in the south bordering India; the Valley of Kashmir is immediately to the north of Jammu; and in the east is the frontier area of Ladakh.

Jammu, the southern province of Jammu and Kashmir State covers the rolling scrub-covered foothills that rise from the northern plains of India toward the crest of the Pir Panjal range. Just beyond these mountains, which average almost 11,000 feet in height, lies the Valley of Kashmir. According to the Indian census of 1961 the total population of Jammu province slightly exceeded one-and-a-half million, of which 59 percent were Hindus, 38 percent Muslims, and 3 percent Sikhs.10 There has been a sharp reduction in the number of Jammu Muslims since the beginning of the Kashmir dispute. In the 1941 census, for example, the Muslims held a comfortable majority of 61 percent of the population.11 The marked decline between the two censuses reflected the following developments: First, there was the detachment of the predominantly Muslim eastern section of the province and its incorporation into Azad (Pakistani-held) Kashmir. Second, India's war with Pakistan over Kashmir (1947-1948) led to a general movement and redistribution of population as a result of communal tension.

The Hindu and Muslim communities in Jammu province do not maintain a particularly harmonious relationship with each other. One thing they share, however, is a feeling of common identity with the people—Hindus and Muslims—in the neighboring Indian state of Punjab. They are drawn in this direction because of ethnic, cultural, and historic ties to the region. For this reason, they both tend to look upon the other inhabitants of Kashmir as aliens. They are particularly sensitive about their relations with the Kashmiris who have come to dominate the state administration as a result of their greater numbers. This realignment of power has been most disturbing to the Jammu Hindus who find themselves in the uncomfortable position of being ruled by those over whom they once ruled.12

In light of these tensions, the most influential political party in Jammu province is the local branch of the highly sectarian Jan Sangh party. Under the leadership of Prem Nath Dogra, the party has pursued with great determination the goal of total integration within India. P. N. Dogra and his followers feel that the only way to protect the welfare and
rights of their community is to merge the state with the larger and predominantly Hindu federal unit.13

Valley of Kashmir

The famous Valley of Kashmir, a geographic depression which is 5,000 feet above sea level, is located just to the north of the Pir Panjal mountains. The Valley itself and the surrounding mountains have been renowned over the centuries for their natural beauty. The Kashmiris have seen the rise and fall of numerous dynasties, including Moghul, Afghan, Sikh, and, most recently, Dogra. The rulers or, in most cases, their governors and representatives not only neglected the welfare of the Kashmiris but pursued a conscious policy of persecution and exploitation.14

One of the few benefits of this succession of harsh regimes was the reinforcement of the feeling of community among Kashmiris, both Muslim and Hindu. In fact, visitors to the Valley have frequently commented on the remarkable harmony that exists between the two main religious groups. The overwhelming majority of the Valley’s population is Muslim. In the 1961 census Muslims constituted 94 percent of the total figure of 1,900,000. Only 4 to 5 percent were Hindu Pandits, the elite community of Kashmiri Brahmins to which Jawaharlal Nehru traced his ancestry.15

In recent years the Kashmiri Muslims have come to dominate the government of Jammu and Kashmir State by virtue of their superior numbers. This was not the case in generations past when they were persecuted and abused by a succession of alien regimes. The degrading impact of that experience is reflected in the unflattering view of them held by outsiders less than fifty years ago. To call a man a “Kashmiri” was to intimate that he was cowardly, ignorant, deceitful, and completely devoid of self-respect. One of the great intellectuals of modern Islam, Sir Mohammed Iqbal, himself of Kashmiri descent, wrote of the plight of his people with a mingling of shame and sorrow: “The Kashmiri has come to hug slavery to his bosom . . . and is a stranger to the dignity of self, ashamed of his ego.”16

This humiliating legacy is central to an understanding of Sheikh Abdullah and the widespread respect and devotion he commands among the Kashmiris today. His mission, and the goal of the political movement directed by him since the early 1930s, has been to restore the dignity and self-respect of the Valley’s inhabitants. The political party most closely identified with Abdullah and his viewpoint is the Pleiscite Front. The Kashmiri leader is not an official member of the party because of his desire to project a nonpartisan image as the spokesman for all the people in the state. However, the leader of the Pleiscite Front is Mirza Afzal
Beg, who is one of Abdullah’s long-standing and very close political associates.

Not all Kashmiri Muslims support Abdullah and his program for achieving self-determination. There are extremists in the community who unequivocally demand accession to Pakistan. On the other hand, there is a small but influential group of Muslims who are just as determined to maintain the present relationship with India. In this latter group is G. M. Sadiq, the leader of the local branch of the Congress Party and currently the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State.

The third distinctive region of Jammu and Kashmir State is the frontier area known as Ladakh. It is a high, arid, and vast expense that is sparsely inhabited by only about 90,000 people. The Ladakhis have long been dominated by the Buddhist church and its leaders whose religious and cultural orientation has been toward Tibet. With the takeover of Tibet, Aksai Chin, and Eastern Ladakh by the Communist Chinese, the Ladakhi leaders have looked to the government of India for protection. Like their counterparts in Jammu province, they dislike being dominated by a Jammu and Kashmir State administration under Kashmiri Muslim leadership. Therefore, Kushok Bakula and other Ladakhi leaders have joined the Jan Sangh party in Jammu in the effort to reduce the State government’s influence by pressing for further integration into the Indian Union.

The political tension generated by the Buddhist-Muslim rivalry has increased in the last two years because of the impact of the shifting population ratio in Ladakh. At the time of the last census—1961—there were nine Buddhists to every eight Muslim Ladakhis. The next census slated to be completed in 1971 will almost certainly reveal a Muslim majority in the frontier area. This change is predictable on the basis of a higher rate of population growth among Muslim Ladakhis.

State People’s Convention

The challenge facing Sheikh Abdullah in the summer of 1968 was to reconcile the different and often conflicting viewpoints held by various groups within Jammu and Kashmir State regarding the future of Kashmir. In keeping with his call to the people to take the initiative in solving the problem, he decided to organize the All Jammu and Kashmir State People’s Convention. To help implement the plan, Abdullah appointed a 12-man Steering Committee over which he presided as Chairman. A broadly representative group, the Committee issued invitations to leaders and distinguished men from all regions and communities of the former princely state of Kashmir as well as India and Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi and other high-ranking members of the Indian central government were invited to attend as observers. The Indian government not only declined
the invitation, but also refused to permit the delegates from the Pakistan-controlled area of Kashmir to cross the cease-fire line and participate in the Convention.

The State People's Convention met on October 10, 1968, and was attended by over 250 delegates. In addition to those mentioned above, other non-participants included local branches of the Indian Congress party and the Jan Sangh party. In statements issued prior to the meeting, these two groups declared that accession to India of Jammu and Kashmir State was final and irrevocable. Chief Minister G. M. Sadiq described the Convention as "not only wholly misconceived, but also an exercise in futility."20 Local political organizations, however, were well represented. Among those who sent delegates to the Convention were the Plebiscite Front, the National Conference, the Political Conference, the Awami Action Committee, the Jammu Autonomy Forum, and the Communist Party of India.

The Convention, which lasted for eight days, was followed with interest by the press and public in both India and Pakistan. During the session, sixty-four participants spoke to the group and recommended solutions to the Kashmir problem. Insofar as they fell into broad categories, 30 speakers supported a plebiscite without pressing for a specific outcome, 18 stressed the need to find a solution within the framework of the Indian federation, 14 favored independence, and two called for the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to Pakistan.21

Due to the Convention's length and its lively, sometimes threatening exchanges, Abdullah and the Steering Committee decided to postpone the attempt to reach a final decision. They realized that there was little chance of consensus and that further time was needed to prepare the way. The Steering Committee, therefore, agreed to schedule a second session of the State People's Convention to complete the task. This decision was accepted by the delegates who, prior to their adjournment, unanimously passed a resolution instructing the Steering Committee to tabulate the material presented during the first session. These findings were to be submitted to the follow-up session of the Convention as early as possible "in order to pave the way for finding a peaceful, democratic, just, and realistic solution of the issue."22

The first State People's Convention did not leave an impression of great achievement or even the future promise of it. Indeed, the postponement of the final phase seemed to confirm the skepticism of many non-participants. It lent credence to doubts about there being any basis of common agreement and action among such a diversity of political opinion. The optimists, however, pointed out that the Convention had provided a forum for the free exchange of ideas and that the delegates appeared earnest in their desire to find a solution acceptable to all communities and regions.
The Steering Committee held four full-scale meetings during the year and a half that separated the first and second sessions of the State People’s Convention. Gathering twice in the city of Jammu and twice in Srinagar, the members of the Committee took three actions that deserve mention. The first of these was the classification of solutions to the Kashmir problem presented by the delegates of the first session.

Of greater interest was the Committee’s decision to draw up the outline of a new constitution for Jammu and Kashmir State.\textsuperscript{28} Contained in a five-page document, the plan envisaged an administrative structure of five tiers, consisting of state, unit, zone, block, and a local self-governing body. The state would consist of three major administrative units, namely, Jammu province, Kashmir province, and the frontier regions. These units would be divided into zones which would be demarcated over a period of time on the principles of language, culture, history, geography, and so on.

In an interview with newsmen on May 19, 1969, Sheikh Abdullah explained the need for redrawing the state’s constitution.\textsuperscript{24} The object, he stressed, was to provide the widest possible decentralization of power without undermining the integrity of Jammu and Kashmir State as a political entity. It would remove mutual suspicion and fear among the inhabitants of various regions and give the people a sense of belonging. With the elimination of distrust Abdullah felt that the people could then proceed to tackle the larger and more important problem concerning the future of the entire area of the former princely state of Kashmir vis-à-vis India and Pakistan.

The third achievement of the Steering Committee was the formulation of guidelines to be presented to the second session of the Convention. The future delegates were urged to present proposals for a peaceful, just, democratic, and realistic solution to the Kashmir problem. According to the guidelines, any formula should keep in view the interests of all regions of Jammu and Kashmir State. It was recommended also that the proposals aim at strengthening the secular and democratic forces and fostering communal harmony not only within the state, but throughout the whole subcontinent.\textsuperscript{26}

The second session of the State People’s Convention met in Srinagar on June 8, 1970. The attendance during the six days of meetings approximated that of the first session—250. The Indian government, following its own precedent, not only declined to participate, but once again refused to allow delegates from across the cease-fire line to attend the Convention. The local branches of the Congress party and the Jan Sangh party also chose to continue their boycott of the proceedings. As a general rule, there was little change in the representative character and composition of the delegates.

For those looking forward to the emergence of a consensus in the
second session, there was reason for disappointment. Little or no attention was paid to the Steering Committee's guidelines, the object of which had been to channel discussion toward the middle ground of compromise. The speeches and suggestions paralleled those heard during the first session and demonstrated an absence of flexibility in the thinking of the delegates.

A notable development was the clash between moderate and extremist leaders of the Muslim community. The crisis developed during the very first day when the Convention was preparing to ratify the Steering Committee's resolution on guidelines. Qari Saifuddin, head of the orthodox Jamaat-i-Islami, called for the deletion of the word "secular" from the resolution. The controversial word appeared in a sentence urging delegates to submit proposals that would "strengthen secular and democratic forces." In this seemingly innocuous sentence, the Muslim extremists saw a trap. They suspected that it might be used later as the basis for rejecting a solution involving accession to Pakistan.26

The resolution was tabled and returned to the Steering Committee for reconsideration in light of this objection. When the resolution was surfaced on the Convention's last day, an explanatory phrase had been attached. The amended sentence read: "A solution to the Kashmir problem should strengthen secular and democratic forces—that is, such forces as stand for equal rights to members of all religious persuasions."27

This attempt to allay the suspicions of Qari Saifuddin failed and, after a sharp exchange of words with Sheikh Abdullah, the extremist leader and several of his supporters walked out of the meeting. The Convention then proceeded without further delay to pass the resolution as amended.

The main significance of the dispute is that it revealed a sharply-divided Muslim community. Although the majority of Muslims subscribe to the moderate lead of Abdullah, a vocal and determined minority press for accession to Pakistan of all of Jammu and Kashmir State. For them it is a matter of faith and to accept anything less is a betrayal of their religion and community.

Even before the disruption during the last day's meeting, it was clear that the second session was not going to produce a final solution. Thus, the delegates were compelled once again to consider interim measures. They directed the Steering Committee to tabulate the papers presented at the second session. In a new and notable development, however, the delegates instructed the Committee to recommend a solution to the next, and third, session of the Convention to be held within a period of a year.28

Formula for Settlement

At the end of the second session of the State People's Convention, one of the delegates expressed his frustration by asking if a final solution
would be forthcoming in his lifetime.39 Although he tried to reassure the
delegate, Sheikh Abdullah could not have felt completely confident
himself. There are two major hurdles that must be cleared. The first of
these is an agreement by the Convention on a specific formula, and the
second is the acceptance of the Convention’s decision by the government
of India. It may be worthwhile discussing each of these in somewhat
greater detail.

Beginning with the first session and continuing up through the second,
Abdullah has worked to reach a consensus rather than a majority
decision. In theory this would place the moral weight of an overwhelming
part of the population of Jammu and Kashmir State behind a solution to
the Kashmir problem. As attractive as this may appear to Abdullah, it is
difficult to understand how it will be achieved. The local Congress party
and the Jan Sangh are determined to ignore any solution that would
loosen Jammu and Kashmir’s ties to India. Equally obstinate in their
outlook are the members of the extremist Muslim groups who advocate
accession to Pakistan. There is no middle ground of compromise for the
people holding these views. When Abdullah and the Steering Committee
present their recommendation to the third session of the Convention,
they will have to be ready to press for a majority decision rather than a
consensus—if they want a decision at all.

What formula is most likely to secure the support of a majority of the
Convention delegates? And, how will Abdullah and the Steering Com-
mittee see to it that the formula is accepted by India and otherwise
implemented? It is obvious that any attempt to answer these two
questions is a highly speculative venture. Only one formula, however,
seems to have a reasonable chance of receiving the approval of a majority
of delegates as well as overcoming the resistance of the Indian authori-
ties. The plan would involve retention of Jammu and Kashmir State’s link
with India, but it would, at the same time, increase the state’s autonomy
within the federal structure. In order to offset the fears of the non-Muslim
communities in Jammu province and Ladakh, the plan would also provide
for the decentralization of power within the state as well. In other words,
Jammu and Kashmir State would be transformed into a “federation within
a federation.”30

Such a plan for solving the Kashmir problem, however, must face a
number of realities. To begin with, the formula will not be accepted
automatically by the Indian government merely because it emerges from
the State People’s Convention. The leaders in New Delhi have made it
clear that the Convention has no legal or constitutional authority. It will
be necessary, therefore, for Abdullah to devise a scheme to establish the
formal validity of the plan. One possible method would be to link the
issue with the fifth general elections, which must be held no later than
February 1972. The Convention’s plan might be presented to the voters
in the direct manner of a formal referendum, or it could be handled in less direct fashion by making it the key issue in the forthcoming parliamentary election in the Jammu and Kashmir State.

If the voters were to express their approval of the Convention plan, it would not only have a major impact on the thinking of the Indian government, but it would also fulfill a key requirement of any solution to the Kashmir problem, namely, endorsement by the people of Jammu and Kashmir State according to the principle of self-determination.

All this is very impressive, it may be argued, but the formula outlined above only solves one aspect of the so-called "Kashmir problem." It helps to settle the question of the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir State and the Indian Federal Union. What about the larger aspect of the problem involving India's and Pakistan's dispute over the divided territory? A formula that confirms accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to India is bound to meet strong opposition and resistance from Pakistan. The short-term impact of the formula, to be sure, almost certainly would be an increase in the level of Indo-Pakistani hostility possibly resulting in armed conflict. In the long run, however, the formula might very well have a stabilizing effect. The attitude of Pakistan's leaders toward the Kashmir issue is influenced, to a large extent, by political conditions within Jammu and Kashmir State, and particularly in the Valley of Kashmir. Evidence of division and dissent among the Muslim population has fed Pakistani ambitions and kept alive their hopes that some day the entire area would be part of Pakistan.

The Pakistani leaders have not stood idly by, however, waiting for a miracle to take place. In recent years they have concentrated on establishing a liberation movement patterned on the model of Al Fatah. This guerrilla organization, known as Al Burg, or "Lightning," numbers about 2,000 selected men. The men are being trained in Azad Kashmir to carry out their mission of sabotage and political infiltration across the cease-fire line.

As opposed to a conventional military effort, an insurgency depends heavily on the support of the people in the target area. To the extent, therefore, that the formula outlined above reduced political tension in the Valley and surrounding areas, it also reduces the chances for a successful guerrilla operation. In time it is likely that Pakistan's leaders would resign themselves to accepting the new arrangement. Although there would be a lingering residue of rancor and resentment, the danger of major confrontation between India and Pakistan would be reduced far below the present level.

The Indian leaders cannot ignore the potential advantages of the formula which seems most likely to emerge from further sessions of the State People's Convention. Acceptance of greater autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir State would require that India make relatively minor
concessions. In return a stable and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem very possibly would be secured.

NOTES

1. Sheikh Abdullah was one of several young Kashmiri Muslims educated in British India who, upon return to the Valley of Kashmir in the early 1930s, launched a struggle to free their people from the despotic rule of Maharaja Hari Singh.


5. Abdullah was first interned in Ootacamund and later transferred to Kodaikanal, both hill resorts in the state of Tamilnadu (Madras).

6. Abdullah, Speeches and Interviews: Series 1, op. cit., p. 5.

7. Tribune (Chandigarh), May 9, 1968, p. 6.


9. Tribune (Chandigarh), May 9, 1969, p. 6.


14. In describing the conditions under the Sikhs in 1822, William Moorcroft, the first English traveller to visit the Valley of Kashmir, wrote: "Everywhere the people are in the most abject condition, exorbitantly taxed by the Sikh government, and subjected to every kind of extortion and oppression by its officers." William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab . . . (London: John Murray, 1841), pp. 123-124.


17. Das Gupta, op. cit., p. 17.

18. Kushak Bakula established this position on the state's relationship with the Indian Union as early as the spring of 1953. See the report of an interview in: Hindustan Times (New Delhi), March 29, 1953, p. 5.

19. Tribune (Chandigarh), September 19, 1968, p. 3.

20. Tribune (Chandigarh), September 11, 1968, p. 3.


27. Times of India (New Delhi), June 14, 1970, p. 17.

28. Ibid.


30. This solution has been advocated for many years by Balraj Puri, President of the Jammu Autonomy Forum. A more recent convert to the formula has been the Moscow-oriented Communist Party of India.