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This is an extraordinarily difficult subject because several times I have had to think again during the last week, if not during the last day, about what I was going to say, but, in fact, what it amounts to is an analysis which has been overtaken by events. As our Chairman has said, I think I have a bird’s eye view, not only of the North-West Frontier, where I used to be, but also of the North-East Frontier and, in fact, of the whole of India’s perimeter. I dealt with these questions over a period of about ten years between 1936 and 1947, and hope to have kept up-to-date more or less since, going back to the Sub-Continent. I thought perhaps the best way of dealing with this question, this enormous question which has overtaken us now, would be to show you a number of maps, with a few pictures to give you an idea of the sort of terrain involved. I will go through the maps, explaining them as I go, and then when I have finished I shall put up a sort of general map and try and pick up the threads towards the end.

Part of my talk, I think rightly, ought to be historical in some sense, so as to give you the background of this tremendous question. Before I start showing maps I would like to say this: I imagine that there is not a single person in this room who does not feel deep concern over this assault on the integrity of India, not one. All of us, I think, feel deeply as if we were Indians, or Pakistanis for that matter. I think it is also worth saying that any assault on the perimeter of the Sub-Continent must be a matter which interests both the successor States of the British Hukumat, or Raj if you prefer to call it—it depends whether you are an Indian or a Pakistani. I think we all feel that.

Let us start by going through the slides. The first slide is a very general orographical picture of the Sub-Continent. It has got the external political frontiers in it; they are not very clear on this map because it is orographical—a pedantic word showing the mountains and the plains in colour. It is a Royal Geographical Society map, of pre-1914 vintage before the McMahon Line was drawn, but it does more or less show the frontier in this area according to the McMahon Line, proving that even before

* This talk was illustrated with a large number of maps presented on slides. It, therefore, contains a number of references to maps which it is impossible to reproduce in full in this transcript. The two maps published cannot fully cover all the references made, but an endeavour has been made to include in it the more significant place-names.
1914 the general attitude of British cartographers, at any rate, was that on that frontier, as indeed elsewhere in the Indian world, the frontier of India lies on the crest of the Himalaya. All of us, I think, as children—even as children—knew that the Sub-Continent of India and Pakistan was divided from the rest of Asia by the crest of this great mountain range—it is the greatest in the world—and we had that sort of general idea. We knew that on the other side Tibet was the country that was marked in our maps. Whether Tibet was part of China we certainly were not sure, but I think it is worth while making this point, namely, that everybody in this country from their earliest geography lesson has always thought of the Sub-Continent as divided from the rest of Asia by the Himalaya and, of course, up in the north it goes farther than the Himalaya up to the Karakoram and almost to the Kuen Lun.

The next slide is not orographical and is also a Royal Geographical Society map of 1912, that is, before the McMahon Line was drawn and it shows the frontier, not right down on the Assam plains, but starting from the north-east corner of Bhutan near Tawang, thence going along up on the mountains, very nearly up into the big bend of the Brahmaputra (called the Tsangpo in Tibet). It also shows this great belt, what is known as the Aksai Chin bulge, which China is now claiming and into which China has advanced.

The third slide is a map published by the Government of India in an atlas they produced not very many years ago showing the north of the Sub-Continent on a larger scale. You will see here certain shaded areas representing the claims of the Chinese. Here there is a tiny shaded area in what is still called the U.P.—we called it the United Provinces, now Uttar Pradesh—one or two little bits of shadow where the Chinese have also got claims and the enormous area between what came to be known as the McMahon Line (the external frontier) and the line at the foothills along the Brahmaputra river in the valley of Assam. The whole of that area represents a Chinese claim. (I shall put this map back on the screen when I have finished the slides).

**FIRST ENCROACHMENTS**

The first areas of encroachment, curiously enough, were in the little areas, Barahoti and another place called Nilang—I know this area, I have walked about in it—and there are a lot of passes between where the Sutlej breaks through the hills near Simla and the corner of Nepal, where the Chinese claim that Tibet used to extend south of the passes and they have certain claims in that region. And that, interestingly enough, is the part where the first encroachments—looked at from the Indian
point of view—took place in 1955 and 1956. The next encroachments took place when the Chinese built a road across from Sinkiang into Tibet; some of them came that way before they had built a proper road when they over-ran Tibet in 1950. Not only did they come from China proper, but they entered from the north also. Later they built a road on this alignment, probably starting it about 1956 or 1957, and very little got out about it. This is very high terrain, from 15,000 to 17,000 feet above the sea and practically uninhabited, but it has always been shown—as I will demonstrate later—on old maps as part of the dependencies of Kashmir which became part of India a long time ago.

Before I leave this map, I would like to make one other point, and that is that this frontier question is best conceived in four parts. First come the frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir, the northern frontier facing towards Sinkiang and the eastern frontier facing towards Tibet. A large part of the northern frontier as far as the Karakoram Pass is the frontier of Gilgit and Baltistan, and is in Pakistan occupation, in fact, regarded by the Pakistanis as part of Pakistan. This is area I. Then you get the part which is along the frontier of what we used to call the Simla Hill States, the Punjab and the U.P. (Himachal Pradesh is the old Simla Hill States). Then come the districts of Garwhal and Almora of the U.P. which run up to the part, as I said before, where the first encroachments took place in 1956. So that is Area II.

**ISOLATION ATTEMPTS**

Then you get Area III, the frontiers of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Nepal, of course, is an independent State, but it is part of the Indian world, its rulers and most of its people are Hindus, though there are Buddhists, including people of Tibetan stock in the upper valleys, known as Bhotias. But it is a majority Hindu State and it is certainly part of the Indian world, of which the frontier has always been regarded as running more or less along the crest of the Himalaya. There are one or two deviations which I have not got time to go into now. Sikkim used to be one of the Indian States, as they were called, in the time of British rule. These, as you all know, were absorbed after the renaissance of the new India in 1947. But Sikkim, being a frontier State, still retains a certain status which is not unlike the old status of the Indian State in the British period. It is part of India, but it has a certain kind of local autonomy and it still has a Maharaja. Then there is Bhutan, which is in special treaty relations. It was in special treaty relations with the British during the time of British rule and that treaty was renewed by the Government of India after 1947, and roughly speaking the position is that Bhutan is a protected State.
In these sketch maps the areas of Chinese claims are roughly indicated by shading. The frontier is divided into four sectors. Above: Sectors I and II. Right: Sectors III and IV. Sector III includes Nepal, an independent state but part of the Indian world.
its defence and foreign relations are an Indian responsibility. I will not be going to deal much with Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, so I want to say now that they occupy a very special relationship to this question because the Chinese have made a great point of fixing with Nepal a frontier which roughly corresponds with the traditional frontier, as it always has been known in this region, along the crest of Himalaya. They have made a very special point of doing that. In the case of Sikkim and Bhutan, when there was a joint committee of Chinese and Indian officials set up in 1960 and 1961, to see if there was any common ground between the different standpoints, the Chinese refused to discuss, in this committee, the frontier of Sikkim and Bhutan; they absolutely refused to do it. And, as you know, there have been negotiations between the Chinese and the Government of Pakistan for fixing the frontier of what we might call Pakistan-held Kashmir with Sinkiang, and the effect has been to isolate India. You see they refused to negotiate over Sikkim and Bhutan, they fixed a frontier with Nepal and Burma, and are trying to negotiate one with Pakistan, isolating India. As for Burma, the McMahon Line covers its northern frontier so that the Chinese have been quite inconsistent in their treatment of Burma as regards the frontier as compared with their treatment of the north-east frontier with India. The effect has been to isolate India, and I leave it to you to draw your conclusions over that.

A MISLEADING MAP

Area IV of this frontier is the McMahon Line along the north-east frontier where this very heavy fighting has been going on. Before I go any further I must take exception to a map which appeared in The Times on November 21st, which in my view is extremely misleading. The map, which was on the middle page, had the caption “Tibetan Frontiers before 1914.” It showed the line at the foothills as the frontier of Tibet before 1914. Now it looks to me as though The Times has been indoctrinated by China. Of all the National dailies that appeared today—some of them have rather good maps, particularly the Daily Mail—not one of them repeated this error. Why on earth The Times, which has always prided itself on being so well informed on foreign correspondence, should publish a thing which definitely supports Chinese claims against a member of the Commonwealth, I think I must leave it to the audience to judge. The paper actually shows the frontier before 1914 down here; it never was. The Tibetans never penetrated this area, except for one or two monasteries right up in the north of it (Tawang was one of them), where monks levied certain monastic dues. The fact of the matter is that this area was a tribal, sort of semi-autonomous, area on the frontier of Assam, very much like,
An aerial view of a forward area near Bomdila in NEFA, showing the difficult mountainous terrain mantled by dense forests. The road on the right was made by the Border Road Organization.

in some respects, the tribal belt which I have so much cause to know about on the North-West Frontier where the Khyber Pass and so on are situated. The truth is really that it is only quite recently that the European, the Western, idea of a precise definition of frontiers has begun to correspond at all to actualities in Asia. There were right through the nineteenth century and even later areas which were not administered by one empire or another, one kingdom or another kingdom, a lot of tribal areas which maintained a factual independence to a large extent over which, as it was, only the shadow of the neighbouring imperial power extended. Such was the tribal belt on the North-West Frontier of pre-partition India and the frontier here. At the same time they were shown politically in British times as under British political control and represented by shading in maps.

This is a Chinese map and I put it in particularly because it is supposed to depict the maximum extent of China in the days of the Ching dynasty (that is the Manchus) who fell in 1911, the last of the Chinese dynasties before the revolution. This shows Nepal here as part of China. But even
this does not on the other hand extend China’s frontier beyond the crest in the north-east. You see it runs along the crest of the Himalaya roughly, so that they cannot support their present claim to Nepal.

I think I ought to say something more about Nepal here because you cannot round off the picture without bringing in Nepal. In 1792 the Gurkha rulers of Nepal invaded Tibet and sacked a monastery called Tashilumpo near Shigatse, not far from Lhasa. The Tibetan Government of the time asked the Chinese to help and the Emperor of China sent a force which made a most remarkable march. It was mostly composed of Tibetans, and succeeded in crossing the Himalaya over a pass called Kirong near Katmandu and got down on the Nepalese side, after which the Nepalese made peace. This was before our war with the Nepalese—this was in 1792, our war was in 1815. They made peace with the Chinese and as a result of that the Nepalese Government every five years sent a mission with tribute to Peking which went on until the last mission in 1908. The Nepalese refused to go on sending it any longer after the fall of the Manchus in 1911. But the Chinese, basing their claim on this tributary mission, from time to time tried to imagine that Nepal was part of China. I think that is worth remembering in the current situation.

Here is another Chinese map and it is interesting because Kashmir is here and this is Tibet and this is Sinkiang. It shows roughly the Aksai Chin area, the great bulge over which the Chinese have advanced over the last six or seven years. There is the Pangong Lake, this river is the Indus and this is the Shyok, and this is the Chang Chenmo valley into which the Chinese have penetrated also. Chushul, the main Indian base is here, but it is interesting that this is an old Chinese map which itself shows the Aksai Chin area as part of Kashmir. Now the Chinese have started a new line, which is that Aksai Chin was really part of Sinkiang and not part of Tibet at all, because it has got certain Turki names in it. So they have started drawing an enormous bulge in Sinkiang to include most of Aksai Chin. The old Chinese maps do not show that; hence it is quite a new claim.

Now we get to the Assam side. I have put in this map because it is an old map before the 1914 McMahon Line was ever delineated. It is an 1883 British map, and it shows these tribal areas washed in yellow as they used to do on the N.W. Frontier in the old days. We had not got any precise external frontier in those days, but there were political relations with the Government of Assam and the tribes turned in this direction. They do all their shopping down on the Assam side and not in Lhasa, just as the Pathan tribes on the N.W. Frontier turn to Peshawar and Bannu and not to Kabul. So, long before 1914, this area appeared as part of the Indian set-up. The next is an extremely interesting map. I
would like to say something about the 1914 Convention between India, China and Tibet when the McMahon Line was drawn. There were three plenipotentiaries, one from China, one from India, and one from Tibet. It was during the British period, so the India representative was McMahon. The representative from Tibet was admitted also by the Chinese to be fully empowered and of equal status. The map of the Convention was initialled by all three, or rather in the case of the Chinese actually signed. Here you see the map that was attached to the Convention, signed by the representatives, A.H.M. are McMahon's initials. Here is Ivan Chen, the Chinese signature in full, and here the Tibetan Lönchen Shatra, written in Tibetan characters as he could not write in English. The idea of this Convention was to divide Tibet into two bits. Inner Tibet which is the part nearest to China and administered by China, and an autonomous Outer Tibet which is the part round Lhasa ruled by the Dalai Lama. Tibet’s outer frontier was shown by the red line, and the division of two Tibets was shown by the blue line. The red line was continued (this is
the same as the McMahon Line) to show the frontier of Tibet in the direction of India. The Chinese have recently tried to claim that all this was done behind their backs. But you can see from this map that this red line was actually revised, conceding one bit to China and agreeing that it was not part of Inner Tibet. At both ends of that revised line the signatures of the three plenipotentiaries are given. Ivan Chen is written at either end, so that Ivan Chen not only signed the thing, but he also signed alterations on the map, so he knew all about it.

**INCONSISTENCIES**

This is the same map, but the alteration that Mr. Ivan Chen wanted has been embodied on it. The Chinese, however, repudiated Ivan Chen’s signature and they also repudiated the Convention as a whole. But in doing so they never mentioned this line on the Indian side—the McMahon Line—as the reason in any sense for their repudiation of the Convention. What they emphasized then was that they were not in general agreement about frontiers, and what was under dispute was these two frontiers towards China. The frontier towards India was never under dispute at all.

As the Chinese refused to allow their plenipotentiary to proceed with signature, the Indian Government—the British-Indian Government—and the Tibetan Government agreed between themselves to sign the Convention bilaterally and here are their signatures, there is McMahon’s and there is Lönchen Shatra’s for Tibet with his seal, and the British Government seal, and this is the map that was attached to the Convention and on which the McMahon Line rests. China is quite right in saying that they did not agree to it, but I repeat that at that time they never gave this frontier as the ground for not agreeing to it at all. More recently China has been even more inconsistent. With one breath in the officials’ report she says that the Tibetans were quite incompetent to sign any frontier agreements and therefore the McMahon Line is invalid; in the next breath she talks about frontiers up here, which are not marked on this map, in the Barahoti region of the U.P. and in that region bases herself on Tibetan actions and Tibetan agreements. There is no arguing with so illogical an advocate as this.

The next map I show you is a map of the western part of the McMahon Line itself. Here is the tri-junction point between Bhutan, Tibet and what is now the N.E. Frontier Agency. This is the map on which we agreed, in detailed negotiations with the Tibetans at the Convention, to fix the McMahon Line, and it does show the terrain very well. This map covers only the western part of the McMahon Line and there are two places called Migyitun and Longju along by the river Subansiri, where there
was an early Chinese probe in 1959. Next we have the eastern part of the McMahon Line. This continues from the last map. Here is the Brahmaputra river coming round the big bend, and then Namcha Barwa, the great mountain nearly 26,000 feet high in the bend, rather like Nanga Parbat in the bend of the Indus at the other end of the Himalaya. The McMahon Line does not continue along the crest as far as Namcha Barwa; it leaves it and comes down and crosses the river called the Siang (this is called the Tsangpo in Tibet), it then becomes the Dihang down here, and joins the Brahmaputra. The line then goes along subsidiary crests and reaches the River Lohit, which people in Assam regard as the true Brahmaputra. There is a very sacred place called Brahmakund just where the Lohit comes out of the hills. As the Lohit is in a direct line with the Brahmaputra, the Assamese never thought of the Siang or Tsangpo as the Brahmaputra really. The Lohit is a tremendous river and Walong is just here. Near Walong there is the place called Menilkrai, and Rima is just a few miles across the McMahon Line. The McMahon Line goes on beyond quite a long way and forms the frontier of the northern part of Burma. It ends on a pass between the Irrawady and the Salween called the Isurazi. As I said before, the Chinese have agreed with the Burma Government to adopt the McMahon Line roughly speaking, with I think one deviation, as the northern frontier of Burma.

AN OLD INDIAN FRONTIER POST

One of the things I was going to say a week ago, if this war had not developed, was that it is quite false to imagine that the whole of this terrain is between 10,000 and 15,000 feet and, therefore, impossible to operate over in winter. Along here (indicating Walong) it is about only 4,000 feet above the sea, and I think when you cross the frontier it is less than 5,000 feet above the sea, so fighting here in this gorge—actually it opens out a bit in Walong—is possible at a reasonable altitude even in the winter. Another point worth mentioning is that there is another route from Tibet by a branch of the Lohit, called the Delai river, which comes from a place called Dre up in Tibet, and it might be very possible. I imagine, to cut the Lohit communications by coming down this way. I should add that there was a Sappers and Miners road built in 1912 before the McMahon Line up as far as Menilkrai, just short of Walong. The Assam Rifles post at Walong was occupied in 1944 when I was Lord Wavell’s Foreign Secretary and I had something to do with it. So there has been occupation up there for some time. Then came the 1950 earthquake. I do not know if any of you knew Kingdon Ward the botanist; he was up there at the time of the earthquake which shattered all the
communications, and there may be those among you who would be able to tell us more about the present state of these communications than I possibly can. But it is worth mentioning that there has been an Indian post right at this frontier for quite a long time.

Here is another Chinese map. You can see the frontier of Nepal, then there is the Chumbi Valley and through the Chumbi Valley the main communications from India to Lhasa run and it is south of the main watershed. It is one of the few places in which the old Tibetan frontier came south of the Himalayan watershed. Then there is Bhutan, giving Bhutan as India as it should be. Then we come right down to the plains and the Chinese show their frontier right along the foothills a few miles from the Brahmaputra. And here is yet another Chinese map on a larger scale showing the Chumbi Salient, then Sikkim and the corner of Nepal, and here is Bhutan and there again the map comes right down on to the line of the Brahmaputra in the foothills. For members of the audience from Pakistan I should like to say it is as if the Afghans were to show the frontier of Afghanistan at Jamrud at the Peshawar end of the Khyber Pass.

I will now try to pick up the threads. The only real occupation of Tibet that took place before 1950 by the Chinese was for two years between 1908 and 1910, when the Manchu Dynasty was just about to fall and Chao Erfeng, their general, occupied Lhasa by force. (The Chinese were turned out in 1911). Previous Chinese occupation of Lhasa had always been to help the Tibetans and they never interfered with the Tibetan way of life. Now, the Communists, as you know, have uprooted the Tibetan way of life and a large number of Tibetans have fled to India. Tibet appears on the maps, not as Tibet any longer, indeed it hardly appears at all. Even on this Indian Government map you see China, and there is no word Tibet at all on it, and I would like to say at this point that the Russians have followed the Chinese in showing the Chinese frontiers according to the Chinese claim. All the Russian maps agree with the Chinese-claimed frontier, so perhaps it is a little optimistic to hope that the Russians will be impartial in their attitude to this question since they have already committed themselves, cartographically anyway, to supporting the Chinese claim. That, however, was before the Chinese had taken physical steps to occupy any part of this territory.

In 1954, as a result of the occupation of Tibet, came the Panchshila Treaty between China and India. The actual subject of the treaty was comparatively unimportant. It dealt with the rights of Indian traders in going to Tibet, in what is now called the Tibetan region of China, and vice-versa of Chinese traders going in the other direction. But the treaty was important for two reasons: (1) that it enshrined the Panchshila, the
five principles, and (2) that it contained an admission by India that Tibet was part of China, a very important admission, never made by us.

As for the Panchshila itself—I find it so abstract that I can never commit it to memory—the first principle is Mutual Respect for Territorial Integrity; the second one is Mutual Non-Aggression; the third is Mutual Non-Interference in Internal Affairs; the fourth is Equality and Mutual Benefit; and the fifth one is Peaceful Co-Existence—a magnificent reduction to ideological terms of what the principles of international life ought to be, but perhaps not a very good guide for living in a dangerous world. I suppose you could say these principles were broken by both sides. Certainly there has not been mutual non-aggression on the Chinese side, and the Chinese argue that the giving of asylum to the Dalai Lama and to a large number of Tibetans in 1959 was a transgression of the principle which lays down that there shall be mutual non-interference in internal affairs. The Panchshila Treaty was not renewed after the first eight years; it lapsed in 1962, in this current year.

PRESSURES

In 1958 and 1959 probing operations started really seriously. The Chinese came a long way in the Aksai Chin area and there were many protests, but nothing really very much happened. In March, 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India and the Chinese attitude at once became very much tougher and sterner. They wrote an extremely rude letter in which they accused India of not observing the Panchshila and said that India must not be, as they termed it, double faced; either you follow the Panchshila or not. The acceptance of the Dalai Lama and many other Tibetans was, they maintained, a breach of the Panchshila, and perhaps more important than that, very important advances began to take place in the western area. There was bloodshed, Indian patrols were ambushed, I think ten jawans were killed and quite a lot captured, and Indian prisoners reported that they had been much ill-treated and a great many objections passed in both directions.

I would like to go back a little and say that when the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, came to talk to Mr. Nehru, he is on record, I think, as having stated in 1956—I may be open to correction—that there were a few small border troubles, but that China was probably going to accept this McMahon Line as the frontier with India as they were ready to accept it with Burma. However, in 1959 a long letter arrived in which they repudiated the whole thing and in effect advanced claims to the whole of these shaded areas and also they proceeded to do what I have already explained, to isolate India and make the settlements with the
other countries along the North Frontiers. There is a lot of interaction between the Western area and the Eastern area. In the West the Chinese had occupied a considerable bit, about 10,000 or 12,000 sq. miles; in the East except for a few little probes they had, before this last month, done very little—there was the probe at Longju opposite Migyetun and one at Khinzhemane, which is near the place where the Dalai Lama crossed the frontier. On the whole, before September, 1962 they had respected the McMahon Line, as they had not respected the frontier in Ladakh. The events of the last few days have rather confirmed my opinion that the Chinese underlying policy was to bring pressure on India to trade what they had lost up in Ladakh for a Chinese admission of the McMahon Line. I think there is a good deal to be said for that, and I rather think that this cease fire, in the way it has been put forward, tends to establish that point. There are other considerations too. One is undoubtedly that Chinese military success in this area is going to upset the nerves not only of India and of the Commonwealth as a whole and of America, but of all these other in-between areas here, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. If the Chinese really came down on to the plains of Assam, what would be the position of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan? I think there is very little doubt that that is a consideration which works in. I hesitate to make any prognostications, but my own feeling has been for some time, and I have not yet been upset in it, that the Chinese do not really wish at present to occupy any parts of the Sub-Continent beyond their claims in the Himalaya. They might, no doubt, wish to seize the whole of the areas shown shaded on the map, which would bring them right down to the plains of Assam. It is as if the Afghans, supported by the u.s.s.r., were to occupy the Khyber Pass and have their frontier post at Jamrud. That may be a consideration, but I have a feeling that it really is tactical, a combined tactical and military operation, somehow or other to expand the frontiers of China to what they think they ought to be.

People have often asked me why the Chinese wish to do this kind of thing. Why did they wish to occupy Tibet? Why do they wish to encroach on India? I do not know very much about China—I have read a certain amount—but I have a feeling that what Hugh Richardson says in his book about Tibet, a book very well worth reading, has a great deal of sense in it. What is the Chinese motivation? I think it is probably the profound regard of the Chinese for history, not history as a scientific study, but as a cult akin to ancestor worship, with a sort of ritual object of presenting the past, favourably touched up, as a model for current political action. So in spite of the adoption of Western political ideas, like Marxism and so on, the Communists continue to be influenced by the traditions of their ancestors. They have inherited the same peculiar historical perspective.
and they were the first Chinese for a very long time, many centuries indeed, to have the power to convert these atavistic theories into fact. In Tibet they saw their opportunity, calculated that no one was likely to oppose them and acted, and may it not be the same in their movement beyond what India claims as her frontiers? That, I think, is probably not at all a bad psychological description of what—based on Chinese history and on Chinese attitudes—may go some way to explain this extraordinary 'burst out,' as it were.

It is very difficult to see exactly what is going to come of the latest report of the Chinese cease-fire and all the rest of it, but I think there is one thing I must point out and it follows from what I have already said. They say they will withdraw not only from the McMahon Line, which they call the line of actual control before November, 1959, and that they will go 20 kilometres, which is roughly 12.5 miles behind it. They also say they will do the same in Ladakh, but you see in Ladkah the line of control is not the frontier claimed by India as it is with the McMahon Line, but is about here, more or less on the line that has been occupied. So that if India is going to accept this, it means that the Chinese are left in occupation of a large part of Ladakh. That I think is a very important consideration indeed.

I should like to finish by repeating what I said in the beginning, that we in this country, as the debate in Parliament shows, are united—all parties I think—in feeling the deepest concern for India over this. And it is quite obvious too from what is said that we feel it is very important that both India and Pakistan should recognize that this is a much greater thing than the admittedly large divisions of thought and practice within the Sub-Continent could ever be. It was nice to find Miss Jenny Lee and the Prime Minister saying the same thing in Parliament. Miss Jenny Lee said "Is it realized that Soviet Russia has a common interest with India and Britain in trying to see that China does not benefit one inch from their aggression?" and the Prime Minister said "Yes! What we want to do is to produce the result that an aggressive policy should once again be shown to be a failure. We (the British) have suffered a great deal in trying to enforce this policy in the past, but we must not shrink from it again." And, of course, that should apply to the rest of the Commonwealth, and there are lots of other things that can be done besides what is being done, I should imagine. For instance, I think Canada is sending a lot of grain to China and things of that kind, and there are trade pressures that could be brought to bear. But I am sure all of us here feel most anxious that we should, in this country, do something effective to assist India in her trouble.
The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute

Sir Olaf Caroe, KCSI, KCIE, addressed a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Over-Seas League on Wednesday, 21st November, 1962, at Over-Seas House, St. James's, S.W.1. The Rt. Hon. Lord Spens presided and introducing the speaker said: As usual when I preside at these meetings of this Association, I never have to say anything about the person who is going to lecture because he is, as a rule, far better known to all of you than he is personally to me. This time I hope to be able to claim to know our lecturer as well as anybody here. I never had the advantage of serving with him in India, although I have once or twice been entertained by him there, which perhaps is better than serving with him, but Sir Olaf Caroe needs absolutely no introduction to this audience at all. We are exceedingly fortunate at this particular moment to have got someone who knows the Frontier as well as he does, and who not only knows the Frontier physically, but has been in the history of the Frontier for a large number of recent years and knows a great deal about the negotiations, and the claims, and so forth. At this particular moment a talk from Sir Olaf, I believe, would have as great value as a talk from anybody who has appeared on the B.B.C. or anywhere else, or has written to The Times or any of our great newspapers.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Bramley: Referring to your remark that Canada is sending a lot of grain to China, surely it is a very good thing because if you feed the population rather than starve it they may not have an aggressive future. If you feed them and house them, then there will not be a revolution.

Sir Olaf Caroe: There has been a revolution already. I do not think I can answer that effectively. I do think it should be considered in Canada, at any rate, whether Canada should send grain.

Mr. Lionel Jardine: Is there any special significance in the date March 1962, which I think the Indian Government has adopted, rather than November, 1959.

Sir Olaf Caroe: I think it is September 8th, 1962, that was the beginning of the Chinese offensive on the McMahon Line. It started
really on September 8th, and what India said, in effect, was that the Chinese must vacate the gains made since then before India could talk. The difference is that the Indians cannot contemplate going back in what they regard as their territory, and the Chinese say that both sides must go back. As regards the McMahon Line, as I tried to show, this question does not only concern the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but also Ladakh. The two things act and interact the whole time and the Chinese would be left in occupation of even larger parts of Ladakh if the Indians were to accept this, even if it meant that the Chinese went back behind the McMahon Line.

Mr. H. H. Hood: Would Sir Olaf tell us a little more about the Ladakh area, which is featured a good deal in the newspapers? For instance, the total area and what would be the advantages to China by taking possession of that territory.

Sir Olaf Caroe: To take the last point first, the advantage to China is that the road from Sinkiang into Tibet crosses that territory. The territory itself, except for its value in communications, is almost completely valueless. If you want to know something about the history of why India is in Ladakh, it is roughly this. The Mughals, as you know, took Kashmir in the time of Akbar towards the end of the 16th century when Queen Elizabeth was on the throne here, but they never penetrated into Ladakh at that time. Ladakh appears in later local records in Aurangzeb’s time a century later as paying tribute to the Governor of Kashmir, about 1690. When the Mughal Empire began to break up on Nadir Shah’s capture of Delhi in 1739, the founder of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abduli, the Durrani, took Kashmir in 1752. The Durranis held it over 50 years, but they never got up into Ladakh. Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, conquered Ladakh again for India through his feudatory, the ancestor of the Marajahs of Kashmir. Gulab Singh was his agent in Kashmir, and one of his generals, his name was Zorawar Singh, took Baltistan and Ladakh and made them dependencies of Kashmir. Zorawar himself was killed when he invaded Tibet. Then there was an agreement in 1842 between the Sikh Government of the Punjab and the Chinese and Tibetans—the Tibetans were under a vague Chinese suzerainty—which laid down the frontiers of Ladakh between Kashmir and Tibet. That was in 1842, before the Sikh wars and before Kashmir came under British suzerainty. In 1847, after the first Sikh war, when the British became the suzerains of Kashmir, they asked the Chinese “What about this frontier between Ladakh and Tibet?” And the Chinese said: “We will stand on the 1842 agreement made with Ranjit Singh’s Government and the frontier is very well known and that shall be
the frontier.” That is roughly the position, and since then any one of you who has been in Kashmir—and some of you, no doubt, have been to Leh, the capital of Ladakh—will know that Ladakh was a dependency of Kashmir.

A Member: May I ask about a report I read in the British Press that the Chinese had an arrangement for building a road from Lhasa to Katmandu and that it was due to be completed in October. Is this a fact?

Sir Olaf Caroe: I would not know the details. I do not know whether any of our Indian friends here, or anyone from Nepal, can give us actual information on the state of that, but certainly the work on the road has been begun and it is part of the understanding between China and Nepal reached as a result of their frontier demarcation. The Nepal situation is very interesting because when the Ranas who ruled Nepal for over 100 years were pushed out in 1950, the watch-word was representative Government rather on the lines of India, and the King was the person under whom it was expected that this result would be attained. But as we have all seen, once the King had got his power back—during the time of the Ranas he was only a puppet—it was not very long before the King himself got rid of representative Government in Nepal and he is strongly supported by the Chinese and by the Russians. You have the very odd situation of a King being supported against his people by the Communist Powers.

Sir Cyril Jones: A big question mark which some of us feel in trying to interpret what lies behind recent Chinese actions is whether they are indicative of a deliberate policy of expansionism on the part of China, or whether it is, as the Chinese have persistently maintained, a question of frontier rectification. The encroachment into Northern Assam seems to indicate a deliberate policy of expansion. Would it be legitimate to assume from this recent Chinese withdrawal offer, which I think Sir Olaf said indicates a willingness on the part of the Chinese to trade in recognition of the McMahon Line on the East with securing a position in Ladakh on the West, that the latest of their actions is in fact frontier rectification and not a policy of expansionism?

Sir Olaf Caroe: I wish I knew China better. I spent 34 years in India and two days in China, but I think Sir Cyril Jones’s questions are so pertinent that I feel he could probably give you a much better answer than I can. I still feel that what I tried to describe as a certain atavistic attitude to history is probably at the root of Chinese minds, and it may be good tactics at the moment to persuade the world, especially India, that this is only frontier rectification and that all that the Chinese really want is the chunk of Ladakh where their road is.
But I would not put it past them, when they have won the first round, to work for a resuscitation of all the shaded areas on the map—all the shaded areas together are about the size of England—that surely must be termed expansionism.

Mr. W. E. R. Gurney: You told us that China may well be playing a diplomatic game in attacking India through Assam, and she might well be willing to recognize the McMahon Line in exchange for the chunk of Ladakh which includes Aksai Chin. Apart from that, you have also said that this is a much greater question, which it obviously is, and I would like to ask: If you get a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, would Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s suggestion that Pakistan and India have a common defence policy for the Northern Frontier help things along? In that case medical supplies could go through Pakistan, and so on. Also the question arises whether this part of Ladakh is of very much use to India. The United Nations proposal is that there should be a plebiscite in Kashmir. If there was a plebiscite it is quite possible that the Ladakhis who, I gather, are ethnically Tibetans, Buddhist by religion and speak Tibetan, might very well elect almost unanimously—if they were allowed to make the choice—to go to Tibet, in which case Mr. Nehru would not have to give a portion of India away to China, but would make a virtue of self-determination.

Sir Olaf Caroe: I have never heard anyone else suggest that there should be a plebiscite in any part of Kashmir to allow any part of Kashmir to go out of the Sub-Continent altogether. It is quite a new idea, and I would have said it was an idea which neither India nor Pakistan would look at for a moment. If you will forgive me, I do not propose to get into a discussion on the Kashmir question or a settlement of it. I would like to put forward one constructive idea, if I may, on the frontiers generally which springs out of this premise that any assault on the perimeter of the Sub-Continent is a matter of equal interest to both States. That is that. If India could say that the frontiers on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line are as vital to India as they are to Pakistan, in fact vital to the security and survival of both States, and Pakistan in return could say that the McMahon Line is of equal importance to them as it is to India, then they could be as one absolutely on the sacrosanctity of the frontiers of the Sub-Continent. I believe that is an approach which would be really constructive.

Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Hutton: I have only two points to make, on one of which I feel rather strongly. I have met a few people—I am sure there are none of them here today—who have been very critical of India in regard to its policy in the past of non-alignment, neutrality or whatever you like to call it. They
have said almost, in so many words, “It serves them right!” I would ask if you meet any people like that to ask them to read certain memoirs which are now appearing in *The Times*, to visit, if they like, Grosvenor Square and see the ‘Ban the Bomb’ people, or else, if they are of my age, to cast their minds back to the peace campaign which was so fervent in this country between the wars. We have also gone through our period of neutrality and non-alignment and we paid the penalty, and we ought not be critical of other people with similar ideals.

Finally, I want to do my duty quickly and to pay a tribute—with which I am sure you will all agree—to our speaker’s amazing knowledge of this subject. I do not think I could stand up and remember even one of those names, let alone numbers of them. He has made the whole thing extremely clear to us, he has shown that he has an encyclopedic knowledge of it, and I am sure we have enjoyed his talk today as much, if not more, than anything we have ever heard.

**A Visit to India after the Chinese Invasion**

Mr. John Tilney, MP, TD, spoke at a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Overseas League on Tuesday, 8th January, 1963, at Over-Seas House.

St. James’s, s.w.1. The Rt. Hon. Lord Spens, KBE, presided.

**DISCUSSION**

Dr. Bramley: You passed through Russia. Now all this is very serious not only for the West, but I think for Russia. Do you think that the Russian Government will acquiesce if the Chinese Government think it fit to do what they like to do? Do you not think that perhaps the great Comintern of Russia will help in the freedom of the world?

Mr. Tilney: I wish I knew. But I am reminded that when I was in Moscow, when I was asking questions about China, the conversation was immediately turned to something else, and when I was in Peking and asking about Russia, again the conversation was immediately altered.

Dr. Bramley: It seems extraordinary that the Indian Government did not have enough military intelligence to know what the Chinese were about to do, and they seek aid and arms at the last moment, when it is almost too late nearly. Why did they not fortify themselves a year before to be ready for this catastrophe?

Mr. Tilney: I imagine that it is not all that easy to know what is going on in China and certainly up in Tibet. There had, of course, been the Tibetan refugees, but that was a little time ago, and that is the
great strength unfortunately of Communist tyranny; they stop people from finding out. I know in our Embassy in Peking, if anyone wanted to go anywhere—outside the great Wall, the Ming Tombs, Tienbin or more than about eight miles outside Peking—they had to give about three weeks or a month’s notice as to where they wanted to go, so everyone is aware of exactly where they go. It is not all that easy. Whereas in India anyone can go wherever they like. It is one of the disadvantages of democracy.

Mr. Radcliff: I would like to ask Mr. Tilney how he thinks India could improve her public image in certain countries that feel that they have been victims of Indian military attack. For example how can India convince the Portuguese that she is a victim of military force and a friend in Rhodesia tells me that India has a very bad public image and also in Katanga. How can India improve her public image in those countries?

Mr. Tilney: I would not like to comment on that. I think that there are many in India who may now regret what happened in Goa, but it is not for me to comment or even to give advice.

Mrs. Zinkin: When you were in Delhi did you get the impression that the people in command, perhaps the President more than the other people, or the Defence Minister were considering the problems that face India on two borders: the possible Pakistani aggression in Kashmir and that forces would therefore not be available for defence in Ladakh. How seriously were they looking at it?

Mr. Tilney: I think they are well aware of that problem, and I think a lot of troops have been moved from the frontier south of Kashmir. Everyone is very well aware of the cost, in terms of military might and of actual economics, of what it means to be fighting on two fronts. The prizes of an agreement over Kashmir are very big indeed.

Dr. Bramley: Do you think it a good idea to send arms to Pakistan now that they seem to be worried that only India is getting arms?

Mr. Tilney: Surely what one wants really to do is eliminate the causes of friction between the two countries rather than to arm both, possibly against each other. That must be wrong. It is the causes of that friction that, I think, one wants to eliminate. But we have got to be awfully careful in giving advice. It is rather like interfering in a row between one’s own family; they may turn ultimately on you. It really is not our job to interfere unless we are asked by both sides to do so. I remember in my first election, if I may tell a short story, that there were a number of spoilt votes. One of the voting papers had noughts for all three candidates,
and another one in my favour had not one cross but two crosses against my name, and underneath my name was "Love from Olga." Unfortunately, that was disallowed too. The crosses showed that she wanted to do something badly, but you have got to be very careful how you do it!

A MEMBER: Has Mr. Tilney any comments to make on the Colombo proposals, particularly with regard to Mrs. Bandaranaike’s mission in relation to the Chinese and Indian agreement. And secondly would he like to make any comments on the historical background of the McMahon Line which does give a certain measure of support to perhaps the Chinese case or perhaps more a matter of argument than sometimes thought.

Mr. Tilney: In front of this audience, who must know far more about the McMahon Line than I do, I really do hesitate to make any comment on the second part. As regards Mrs. Bandaranaike’s mission and the proposals, these are not really yet known, and so one cannot make a comment on them.

Sir Olaf Caroe: I think we are agreed that we have had an extraordinary deep and far reaching talk from Mr. John Tilney. When I saw the picture of him and that he was going out to India, I said to my wife: "Good Lord! John Tilney will have a time, and he will have an awful lot of homework to do." It is frightfully difficult to even understand the beginnings of these lines, but I think that we are all agreed that we have heard reason to believe and think that this is far more than a border dispute. It is a tremendous thing, it is probably the biggest thing that has happened since 1950. this rivalry between India and China and whether, as Mr. Tilney said, India and indeed the sub-Continent can remain in the free world is really the issue. And I think that we all rise to the challenge of his last remarks: That this is a matter which demands statesmanship of the very highest order on the parts of everybody, in India, Pakistan, Gt. Britain in the United States and elsewhere. I think we will also agree that he has shown us the line to statesmanship.

Crisis in South Asia

Sir Percival Griffiths, C.H. addressed a joint-meeting of the East India Association, Pakistan Society, and the Royal Over-Seas League at Over-Seas House, St. James’s, s.w.1. on Tuesday, 22nd January, 1963.

Sir John Woodhead presided and introducing the speaker said: Sir Percival Griffiths is well known to you all and no introduction by me is necessary, but I would like to say one thing that this his last visit to India was the forty-eighth visit he has made to India to the sub-Continent since Independence: so
he should know something about India and Pakistan should he not?
And Sir Percival I am rather glad

Sir Percival Griffiths: I am afraid I cannot even guess that yet because I do not know the starting point. I have no idea what the Budget of defence would have to be for India until the strategists, or whatever the right word is, have worked out what they are going to need in the way of defence one does not know where to begin to start guessing about that; you will get perhaps a better idea in a few months time. I am sorry I cannot give an intelligent answer at the moment.

Mr. Zaman: You have said that China has already achieved its objective and that is why she stopped the war. Do you think that in view of this situation during the next Spring there will be no war?

Sir Percival Griffiths: I said that China had achieved her immediate objective. I have very little doubt that China's long term objective is to be the boss of Asia, but there may be many things to be done in the process of becoming that before a massive attack on India—she may find it necessary to get a position in Burma, she may find it necessary to occupy many parts of South Asia before she is ready to try any real crossing of swords with India. Well now if I were China that would be my line, but I am not China and I do not know. If you make me guess I would guess that there will not be a fresh attack in the Spring because I do not see what China has to gain by it yet,
but that is a very wild guess and I may have to confess to you next year that I was wrong. My guess would be no, not next Spring.

Mr. ISLAM: Does the Speaker think that the West should now bring more pressure to bear on India so that the negotiations will not fail?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: Well, I would disapprove of pressure being brought to bear on India and not on Pakistan, or on Pakistan and not on India. The job of the West is to say to both countries “You have jolly well got to find a settlement.”

Mr. H. A. MEDD: There was one thing that Sir Percival said that surprised me and I think may have surprised several other people and that was that in the Government of India as organized at present the fifteen or sixteen people who were extremely good at their own individual jobs, but they were not under any unitary rule from anybody. Now we have always been given to understand that is for some years that if ever there was a Prime Minister who has led pre-eminently that country it was Mr. Nehru, it seems then that this failure if it is a failure being evident does it date from before the time when you said that his reputation possibly suffered a setback due to the Chinese business or was it evident before that?

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: It was not very evident before that Sir, it began to be evident really when the China thing began to be the dominant factor, and I suspect that there are perhaps two reasons for it. One is that Mr. Nehru all his life has striven for peace with China and has had to see the collapse of his foreign policy. That by itself must have been a very undermining factor for him, and on top of that I think that it is over and over again the case in international affairs that the man who is pretty good at directing people in peace has not got quite the militant drive for directing them in war; I doubt whether Mr. Nehru could ever make a great war leader, could take quick decisions about the kind of thing that have to be decided in times of war.

Mr. BRANDER: Would Sir Percival tell us something about that quarrel between Pakistan and Afghanistan, whether they settled it in any way because their trade was altogether stopped so perhaps they have come to some practical decision to let it go on again; it was stopping all the imports and exports.

Sir PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS: No, there has been no settlement so the quarrel continues and in a general way the embargo continues; there have been certain exceptions made with regard to cargoes of particular kinds, but there is no general resumption of trade there yet at all and feeling is still quite bad.
Mr. A. Reid: Does Sir Percival think that the proposals that Mrs. Banderanaike has brought to Delhi recently will succeed?

Sir Percival Griffiths: May we put it this way. If I were India I don’t think I would be very unhappy about them. They differ from what India had in mind in that they would not allow India to occupy the areas from which the Chinese had withdrawn. I think that if I were India I would say that does not really matter very much, that the areas are of no importance to anybody at all and what really matters to India is to buy time, and personally if I were the Prime Minister of India I would not be too unhappy about accepting them because that would give me time to build up my defences. What China’s reaction will be I have no idea at all, but I would not be worried about accepting them if I were the Prime Minister of India—I am very glad I am not!

Lady Stokes: Could Sir Percival tell us why India was so ill prepared for this Chinese invasion?

Sir Percival Griffiths: Well, I think there were several reasons for it. I do not think that until a relatively short time ago anybody took the Chinese danger seriously. Mr. Krishna Menon has been the scapegoat and I think perhaps rightly so, but in the same way in this country when we were not prepared either in the first or second war we had to find scapegoats. Really the fault here was the lack of will on the part of the people to be ready, and I think the same thing was true in India. That people were not willing to face up to the fact that there might in fact be a war. For one thing that many people in India had an entirely false idea of the protection afforded by the great Himalayan barrier. I remember talking to a very senior official about that as far back as 1951 or 1952 and telling him some of my anxieties and he brushed them all aside and said the Himalayas were a tremendous barrier, and no army could really operate across it. Well, of course, it is nonsense when you have seen thousands of mule men—I have said this in this room before—when you have seen thousands of mule men come down over those hills year by year you realize that where mule men can come armies can come too. A false idea of security was built up. Secondly, there is no doubt at all that Mr. Krishna Menon was to a great extent responsible by his political promotions in the Army, by his failure to provide the necessary equipment—it is a shocking thing that the Indian Army was sent to fight in those hills with no warm clothing of any kind at all. There were terrible failures of preparation for which you must blame entirely Mr. Krishna Menon; I suppose that Mr. Nehru must take some of the blame too, because he for a long time refused to recognize that China might be bellicose in her
intentions so you have to share the blame I think between Mr. Nehru, Mr. Krishna Menon and the public, just as we in this country had to take a great share of the blame for not being prepared for the last two wars.

Mr. Zaman: Do you not agree Sir Percival that they were prepared for the war. That they were prepared and were arming, but they thought that the fighting would be in the plains against some country in the plains—not China?

Sir Percival Griffiths: I would answer that by saying that I think if they had not been hypnotized by these fallacies and these false ideas they could not have failed to see that their fighting would have to be in the hills. China was obviously the enemy, and fighting China was going to be very, very largely in the hills, and I think they were blind just as we were blind in this country.

Mr. Alam: Did India take advantage of border clashes to cover up internal troubles?

Sir Percival Griffiths: With very great respect sir, I think that that is quite an unrealistic idea. I think to suggest that India can have arranged that the Chinese could have been in a position where they could have wiped out the North Indian tea industry, they could have wiped out Digboi, they could have taken away some of the biggest sources of India’s wealth, I think it is with very great respect utterly and completely unrealistic.

Mr. Alam: I suggest the whole took place at a time when, if you go back, it was at such a time that a large scale invasion was impossible. It was also at a time when the question of the United Nations was coming up, so in that respect, keeping in view, the question of military aid and keeping in view that they would have more aid for the Third Five Year Plan the whole incident was bolstered up to make it an international issue.

Sir Percival Griffiths: I am sorry but I can only repeat that that in my judgment is quite fantastic. A large scale military invasion at that time was impossible, but a complete annexation of Assam was a very, very practicable possibility indeed. And do you really seriously think that India would assist her Third Five Year Plan by losing the whole of her North Indian tea industry, by losing her Digboi oil, by losing some of the most fertile land in the country? With very great respect sir, I think that you are being led astray by your feelings into an error of judgment.

Sir Cyril Jones: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is just as unnecessary to propose a vote of thanks to Sir Percival Griffiths for his address as it is for our Chairman to introduce him to this audience. nonetheless it is a very pleasant
duty that falls to me because as you all know there is no person or very few people who by knowledge, experience access to people that matter out in South East Asia who can speak with a greater breadth of experience and authority than Sir Percival Griffiths. I think the East India Association and the Pakistan Society are extremely fortunate in having the benefit of Sir Percival's periodical addresses to us and the interest that they arouse is evident every time he comes by the size of the audience who comes to hear him. It is a very great pleasure for me to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Sir Percival for his most interesting, penetrating and informative address to us.

The Objects of the East India Association

(INDIA PAKISTAN AND BURMA)

In 1866, eight years after the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, the East India Association was formed with the object of "the promotion of the public interest and welfare of the inhabitants of India generally." This object was steadfastly pursued during the ensuing eighty-one years. The Independence of India and Pakistan attained in 1947, while modifying the original conception, has increased the need for strengthening the bonds of friendship and the importance of mutual understanding between the people of Britain and the inhabitants of the countries formerly comprising the India Empire—namely, India, Pakistan, and Burma. The Association therefore is continuing its work, with the assistance of all those who are interested in the welfare and progress of these countries, by the methods which have proved so helpful in the past, namely:

1. By lectures on current questions affecting those countries and publication of the same.
2. By providing opportunities for the free discussion of important questions affecting India, Pakistan, and Burma.
3. By promoting friendly contact between the peoples of these countries and of Britain through the medium of social and other gatherings.
4. Generally by the promulgation of reliable information regarding the countries named.

The Association is essentially non-official in character and has no connexion with any political party. It seeks to provide an open platform for the consideration of current problems relating to India, Pakistan, and Burma. It welcomes as members all those who are interested in their welfare and progress.

Papers are read and discussed throughout the year, except in the months of August and September. Members are entitled to invite friends to these meetings.