CHINESE AGGRESSION IN MAPS

TEN MAPS, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. The India-China Boundary
2. Line separating Indian and Chinese forces on 7 September 1962 in Western sector
3. Chinese claim lines of 1956 and 1960 in Western sector
4. Roads constructed and posts set up illegally by Chinese since November 1959 in Western sector
5. Line of actual control in November 1959 and September 1962 in Western sector
6. Chinese advances before 8 September 1962 and after 8 September 1962 in Western sector, and area which they are prepared to demilitarise
7. Extent of Indian territory and Indian posts to be evacuated by Indian forces in Western and Middle sectors under China's three-point proposal
8. Line separating Indian and Chinese forces on 7 September 1962 in Eastern sector
9. The McMahon Line
10. Extent of Indian territory and Indian posts to be evacuated by Indian forces in Eastern sector under China's three-point proposal

PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

Price: 30 nP.
Indian territory through lent nature of the three-point proposal with which China launched a peace offensive after the large-scale invasion by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962; and the minimum condition which India has insisted on for the resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary question. Most of the maps also carry explanatory notes.

Falsehood and deception marked the Chinese Government's policy towards India till it culminated in the massive invasion of India's northern frontier, from Ladakh in the west to the North East Frontier Agency in the east, on October 20, 1962. A perusal of the maps printed in this brochure will make it clear that falsehood and deception are the warp and woof of the peace offensive with which China followed up its armed aggression.

India was among the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China which came into being on October 1, 1949. In August 1950 when the forces of the People's Republic of China came into Tibet, the Government of China declared their willingness to solve the problem of Tibet by peaceful and friendly measures and their desire to "stabilise the China-India border". On receipt of this communication, the Government of India expressed, their appreciation of the Chinese Government's intentions regarding Tibet and affirmed that "the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate".

Close and friendly relations developed between the Government of India and the People's Republic of China in the subsequent years and on 29th April, 1954, the two Governments concluded an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet and India under which India gave up all extra-territorial rights and privileges enjoyed in Tibet, and recognised Tibet as a region of China.

The question of Chinese maps which were showing an incorrect boundary alignment between India and China was raised by Prime Minister Nehru with Prime Minister Chou En-lai in October 1954 and again in November 1955. The Government of India were given to understand in October 1954 that the Chinese maps referred to by the Prime Minister of India were merely a reproduction of old Kuomintang maps and that the present Government had had no time to revise them. In November 1956, Prime Minister Chou En-lai told the Indian Prime Minister that in the case of Burma, the Government of China had accepted the formalisation of the boundary in 1914 (the McMahon Line) and proposed to recognise it with India also—that is the Eastern sector of the Indian alignment. Prime Minister Chou En-lai said he would consult the Tibetan authorities in this regard.

Surreptitious Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in Ladakh started in 1957. The clearing of the Aksai Chin Road was the first step. An Indian patrol party on its normal rounds was detained by the Chinese forces near Haji Langar in September 1958. The Government of India protested against this detention and also against the clearing of the motor road by the Government of China across the Aksai Chin area of Indian territory. These surreptitious intrusions continued in the Aksai Chin area and there were some other incidents between Indian patrols and the Chinese soldiers. The Government of India, in the belief that these were instances of irresponsible behaviour of the Chinese local authorities, lodged protests against these intrusions and incidents.

In September 1959, the Government of China, for the first time, laid a formal claim to 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and in the North East Frontier Agency. This led to exchange of communications at a high level, between the two Prime Ministers. The two Prime Ministers met in Delhi in 1960, and this was followed by the meeting between officials of the two sides in pursuance of the decision taken at the meeting of the two Prime Ministers. Further intrusions by the Chinese, however, continued. By 1961, the Government of India considered it necessary, in view of progressive Chinese intrusions, to take limited defence measures to contain these surreptitious Chinese advances into Indian territory.

Foiled in their attempt to take over further Indian territory in Ladakh, the Chinese started further aggression in the Eastern sector of the India-China boundary in the NEFA region on 8th September 1962. After a couple of probing attacks, Chinese forces mounted a carefully prepared and well-planned all-out attack on 20th October 1962 on Indian defence forces in the Eastern as well as Western sectors of the India-China border. Having acquired, as a result of their initial successes, a further slice of about 2,500 square miles of Indian territory, the Chinese Government started their first peace offensive—the Chinese three-point proposal—on 24th October. When India refused to accept the military dictates of the aggressor, the Chinese, after re-grouping and further preparations, mounted another massive offensive from 15th to 19th November, 1962. On the morning of 21st November, the Chinese started their second peace offensive with the same object of retaining the gains of their calculated and cold-blooded aggression—the so-called unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal proposals of 21st November, 1962.

The Government and people of India are, by their history and tradition, wedded to the ways of peace. They have always been and are in favour of peaceful settlement of differences between nations. Peace and peaceful settlements can, however, be pursued only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect. It would be fatal to compromise with aggression or submit to the military dictates of the aggressor. The first essential before we can revert to paths of peace and peaceful settlements is the undoing of all the consequences of aggression. This means that at least the status quo as it prevailed before the latest Chinese aggression started on 8th September, 1962, should be restored.
This map depicts the three lines which have figured most prominently in the correspondence between the Governments and Prime Ministers of India and China after the massive invasion of India which was launched by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962. The first line shows the disposition of Chinese posts in Ladakh in November 1959. It will be seen that at that time there was strictly speaking no "line of control" but only a series of Chinese posts on Indian territory. The November 1959 'line' would be one that joined the then Chinese posts at Spanggur Post, Khurnak Fort, Kongka Pass and Shamallungpa and ran northward, past Haji Langar, to the Aksai Chin Road.

The second line shows the line of contact between Indian and Chinese forces immediately prior to September 8, 1962—the date on which Chinese forces invaded Indian territory in the Eastern sector also. India has made the reasonable proposal that there should be a restoration of the positions along this line as the minimum condition for resumption of negotiations with China.

The third line shows the limits of the further area occupied by Chinese forces after the massive aggression which they launched against India, both in the Western and Eastern sectors, on October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims that this was the line of actual control by Chinese forces in November 1959. Under the unilateral declaration of November 21, 1962, China has proposed that Indian and Chinese forces should withdraw 20 kilometres on either side of this line, which they claim as the November 1959 line but which was actually reached by them only after their latest aggression.

The area between the September 7, 1962, line and the 'line of actual control of 1959' as falsely claimed by China represents the further aggrandisement of Indian territory by China as a result of its latest aggression. India insists that this area of further aggression should be vacated by the Chinese and the position of the Indian and Chinese forces prior to 8th September restored, before there can be a resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary problem.
China kept its claims on Indian territory undisclosed till 1959 though it had already, in 1957, surreptitiously cleared a motor road across the uninhabited Aksai Chin area of Ladakh. Territorial claims were put forward for the first time by the Chinese Prime Minister in September 1959, based on a Chinese map published in 1956. In December 1959 he affirmed the boundary on this map as the correct boundary claimed by China. This claim was for about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and in the North East Frontier Agency. Since then the Chinese claim line has varied according to China's bargaining convenience and the progressively increasing extent of occupation of Indian territory through force.

The Chinese claim line of 1956 in the Western sector is shown in the above map. In 1960, during talks between officials of the two Governments, the Chinese advanced their claim line further into Indian territory. The 1960 claim line is also shown in the map. This line, which broadly corresponds to the line of present Chinese control shown in Map 2, was actually reached by the Chinese forces only after their latest massive aggression of October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims this as the line up to which it exercised actual control in November 1959.

The points up to which Indian police patrols went from time to time till 1958, in exercise of normal administrative functions, are shown in the above map. They reveal the preposterous nature of the 1956 Chinese claim line, let alone their latest claim line which cuts even deeper into Indian territory.
MAP 4
ROADS CONSTRUCTED AND POSTS SET UP ILLEGALLY BY CHINESE SINCE NOVEMBER 1959 IN WESTERN SECTOR
This map shows the area which China would have to demilitarise if Chinese forces are to go back to the true line of their actual control as of November 7, 1959. As the Indian Prime Minister pointed out in his letter of November 14, 1962, to Premier Chou En-lai: “If the Chinese Government really mean what they say regarding the restoration of 7th November, 1959 positions of their forces in all sectors of the boundary, their withdrawal to those positions and the restoration of the positions of the Indian forces as they were prior to 8th September 1962, would by and large meet the problem of disengagement as there will be enough distances between the positions of the forces of the two sides to prevent any risk of a clash.”
The areas in Ladakh illegally occupied by Chinese forces from time to time till September 8, 1962, totalled about 12,000 square miles. After that date, following the massive invasion of October 20, 1962, Chinese forces occupied a further area as indicated in the map.

The Chinese, under their declaration of November 21, 1962, proposed a mutual withdrawal of Chinese and Indian forces 20 kilometres from the line reached by Chinese forces as the result of the latest aggression. It will be seen from the map that at certain points the line up to which China has offered to withdraw its forces cuts deeper into Indian territory than the line of contact between Indian and Chinese forces on September 7, 1962. While it is true that at other points the line to which China has offered to withdraw its forces will take them to the east of the line of September 7, 1962, what is significant is that the arrangement will leave China in control of several Indian defensive posts which were overrun during the latest Chinese aggression. On the other hand, Indian forces would have to withdraw a further 20 kilometres within territory acknowledged even by China to belong to India (see also Map 7).
It will be seen that, under the Chinese proposal, all Indian defence posts in Indian territory claimed by China would be eliminated. Moreover, even posts in territory accepted by China as Indian (including such key posts as Daulat Beg Oldi, Murgo, Tsogtala, Chushul and Hanle) would be dismantled and eliminated.

In the Middle sector, i.e., on the borders of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, the Chinese have never been in actual control of any area south of the international border as shown on Indian maps. Nevertheless the Chinese now claim Barahoti, in Uttar Pradesh, as falling under Chinese control. Under this offer Indian forces are to withdraw 20 kilometres from the Barahoti area, as shown in the map.
This map shows the line separating the Indian and Chinese forces on September 7, 1962, in the Eastern sector. The line was the same as the natural and traditional border of India in this sector, which was formalised under the Simla Agreement of 1914 and came to be known as the McMahon Line. The map also shows the Chinese claim line in this sector.
This map brings out the difference between the highest Himalayan watershed line which the McMahon Line was intended to indicate, and the line as actually drawn on the Simla Convention Map of 1914. The coordinates on that map do not tally at some points with the actual positions on the ground as shown by later and more scientific surveys. The Chinese want to have it both ways. They want to follow the coordinates of the 1914 map at the western extremity of the boundary, i.e., the Bhutan-Tibet-India tri-junction. But they are not prepared to respect the coordinates of the 1914 map elsewhere along the line where adherence to them will mean that a good deal of territory now in Tibet would come to India.

The Chinese motive is obvious. They want to remain in command of the strategic passes leading into India (including the Thag La pass through which they launched the invasion on September 8, 1962). The withdrawal of Indian forces 20 kilometres to the south as envisaged by China (see Map 10), will leave the entire frontier defenceless and at the mercy of any fresh invasion.
MAP 10

EXTENT OF INDIAN TERRITORY AND INDIAN POSTS TO BE EVACUATED BY INDIAN FORCES IN EASTERN SECTOR UNDER CHINA'S THREE-POINT PROPOSAL