THE SINO-INDIAN WAR

Its historical and international background and pre-conditions of victory

by

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REJECT THE CHINESE "PEACE OFFER" OUTRIGHT!

The Chinese cease-fire announcement is a clever attempt to demoralise the Indian people and disrupt their resistance; confuse the non-aligned; and make any pro-Indian initiative by the Russians virtually impossible.

The current speculation about the motives behind the Chinese proposals, therefore, is based on what to me seems to be an unwarranted assumption that these involve complete Chinese withdrawal from NEFA, that is something resembling the status quo as it existed on 8th September 1962.

After studying the Chinese note again and again one finds little evidence to support the assumption that the Chinese intend to pull out of NEFA completely.

The Chinese have always maintained that large territories south of the McMahon Line belonged to them. Now that they have wrested from our control not an inconsiderable portion of these territories, they have no intention of throwing away the fruits of their aggression and allowing the Indians to re-establish their military control right up to the McMahon Line. What in fact their proposals say is that while they would withdraw the bulk of their forces 20 kilometers to the north of their version of the McMahon Line, they would at the same time set up police check-posts in an undefined area between this so-called military withdrawal line and the line of administrative control that they might elect to establish to the south of it.

Not only this, if the Indian armed forces seek to advance into the occupied territory and further do not withdraw 20 kilometers south and west in the middle and western sectors, the Chinese have reserved their right to act in self-
defence, i.e., renew their offensive! This is nothing but a demand for surrender.

How can the Government and the people answer this "peace offer" by anything but an outright no? We must speed up total mobilisation of our resources, obtain such arms help as we can and resolve to fight till we have successfully cleared our entire border areas of Chinese aggressors.

No subtle analysis or learned speculation is called for to meet the latest Chinese diplomatic offensive but a singleness of purpose and cool determination to regain the occupied territories.

The danger, however, is that while our Government will reject the Chinese proposals theoretically, it might accept them practically by deciding not to take any effective steps to recover the lost territory! Against this danger all who love their country must now guard.

22nd November, 1962.
THE SINO-INDIAN WAR: THE ROAD TO VICTORY

At this critical hour in our nation's history we are called upon to make decisions of momentous significance whereby hang the issues of freedom and slavery.

A ruthless enemy, armed to the teeth, whom, in our infatuation, we wooed and courted ceaselessly these last many years, has now unbared its fangs and has launched a full-scale offensive against our motherland. The aging government of our country have been slow and reluctant to admit the seriousness of the threat, and, even now have not yet grasped the full significance of the Chinese designs.

The Prime Minister has, indeed, admitted that his government has so far been living in a world of unreality, of make-believe, and this world has now collapsed around him like a pack of cards.

Very tardily and unwillingly the government is adjusting itself to the terrible reality of the Chinese invasion of our country. After a little over two decades the patriotic emotions of the people have once again been roused, and the government, propelled by the pressure of public opinion, has begun to take certain halting steps to meet the grave situation. However there is something phoney about the utterances and actions of the ministers which cannot but cause deep disappointment to the people.

India's Parliament is collectively the embodiment of the nation's sovereign will. Its members have taken an oath to defend the constitution, to uphold the honour and integrity of our country.

For long, much too long, have our Parliament members allowed their affection and their loyalty for the person of Jawaharlal Nehru to still the voice of their conscience and let their "ayes" sustain him in his grave errors which
have brought the present disaster on our ancient and long-suffering land. No matter how Mr. Nehru's apologists try to explain away unpleasant facts and shift the responsibility on others, the verdict of history is clear.

Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, the darling of the people, who has presided over the government of free India continuously for 15 years and who has been the sole architect of our foreign policy in general and policy in relation to China in particular, has let his sentimentality and prejudice adversely affect the nation's preparedness to meet the Chinese aggression.

For years on end the Prime Minister has dinned into our ears certain historical "truths" about our 2,000-year-old friendly relations with China and our peaceful frontier with that country. He conveniently forgot that in the olden days, thanks to the difficulties of transportation and communications, the Chinese incursions into the remote territories of Sinkiang, Tibet and Mongolia could only be sporadic in character and that the central authority in China, no matter how aggressive, could not bring these areas under its effective control. In the mid-twentieth century when a ruthless government had come to power in China through a militarist revolution it was foolish to believe that such a regime after having smashed the liberty and autonomy of Tibet would allow our long northern frontier to remain peaceful. Yet Mr. Nehru based his entire China policy on this delusion.

The Chinese Communist government was formally established in 1949. Between 1949 and 1954 the new regime, true to its militarist origin, had engaged in forcible seizure of peaceful territories and a series of military adventures. It had hurled insults at the Government of Free India and had systematically started preparing for territorial expansion at India's expense. They started with cartography. But it should have been clear to the meanest intelligence that cartographic claims would soon be followed by military action.
In 1947 India had inherited in Tibet certain rights and privileges from the late British raj. It could have used them as a lever for initiating bold, new policies. China, considerably weakened by Japanese aggression and civil war, was in no position then to impose its imperialist authority on the sprawling Tibet. Tibet was enjoying virtual independence and had continued to do so for a little over two centuries. Even when the Chinese forced rebellious Tibet to acknowledge China's authority in the past, they could never make it effective and soon Tibet would revert to a state of virtual independence and would go on signing international agreements as if it were a sovereign state. Besides, while there were times when Tibet had to acknowledge China's authority, even if only theoretically, there was a period in history when Tibet lorded it over Peking.

Even a school boy with a smattering of history would have seen that Tibet was the key to Sino-Indian relations in general and the security of our northern borders in particular. Anyway no intelligent Prime Minister or Foreign Minister would have been so unmindful of his country's interests as to allow certain necessarily theoretical claims to decide questions involving the security and integrity of the state.

If he had wished to benefit by the example of other contemporary states he could have, with profit, turned the pages of the recent history of Sino-Soviet relations. He would have then discovered that Soviet Russia, in spite of its 1924 Treaty with China, which had acknowledged the latter's sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, had proclaimed the independence of that territory in order to protect its southern border and its Trans-Siberian railway. At Yalta, Stalin got Churchill and Roosevelt not only to recognise the status quo but obtained from the latter an undertaking that he would obtain the consent of the Chinese for the existing arrangements in Mongolia! The successors of Stalin have not only protected the Mongolian Republic from Chinese
encroachment but have got it admitted to the United Nations with the active support of the Peking regime!

In Tibet Mr. Nehru's task was simple. He did not have to fight a war to liberate that territory nor engineer a revolution there. The fact of independence was there already. What was required was to document it, to formalise it, so to say, and to obtain for it international sanction. Mr. Nehru did nothing of the kind but allowed himself to be deluded by the new regime's vague promises about the "peaceful" solution of the problem! When the Chinese ultimately decided to use force to obtain Tibet's submission, Mr. Nehru did nothing to stiffen Tibetan resistance, but only wailed over the fact that the Chinese had found it fit to use force to "solve" the problem! The Chinese response was instant and brutal! They accused Mr. Nehru of doing the work of the imperialists! The Prime Minister, however, swallowed this insult and turned a blind eye to all manifestations of Chinese expansionism and intolerance. The significance of Mao's 1949 article which said that a third way was an impossibility was lost on him.

In 1954 he signed the Panchasheela agreement with Mr. Chou En-lai. The five meaningless platitudes were proclaimed. Of course all men are brothers and the Chinese and the Indians are no exception. But the rulers of China were no friends of the Indian people. They had designs on our territory and had a long-term plan for our subjugation. They began to unfold it slowly and by stages. The Chinese agreed to nothing, conceded nothing. They only misled our diplomats and the Prime Minister. We had nothing concrete to show except the impressions of our diplomats and politicians who wanted nothing better than to believe that all was well with the Sino-Indian relations. They used to tell us:

"Kashmir? Yes, of course, the Chinese accept Kashmir's accession to India as final. Has not the Soviet Union acknowledged India's sovereignty over Kashmir in
the United Nations? How could the Chinese Communists then do otherwise?

"McMahon Line? The Chinese, indeed, did not like the name, but they certainly proposed to recognise the line as the border between India and China just as they had done in the case of Burma!"

As a matter of fact the Chinese had never stated that they accepted India's sovereignty over Kashmir or that they would recognise the McMahon Line. There was always a qualifying clause to anything and everything that they would say about the border which sounded like a friendly gesture or a concession to our country. The idea was to lull the other party to sleep, to persuade it to throw off the guard and then at the appropriate time to draw attention to the limiting clause which at the time appeared so innocuous or unimportant!

Here is a typical instance of the Chinese evasions and qualifying clauses:

"As you are aware, the 'McMahon Line' was product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically, too, it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been recognised by the Chinese Central government. Although related documents were signed by a representative of the local authorities of the Tibet Region of China, the Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn line. And I have also told you formally about their dissatisfaction. On the other hand, one cannot, of course, fail to take cognizance of the great and encouraging changes: India and Burma, which are concerned in this line, have attained independence successively and become states friendly with China. In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less
realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have mentioned to you on more than one occasion. However, we believe that, on account of the friendly relations between China and India, a friendly settlement can eventually be found for this section of the boundary line.”

[Chou En-lai's letter to Nehru, dated 23rd Jan. 1959]

From the above quotation it will be clear that without making any firm or specific commitments on the boundary question Mr. Chou En-lai managed to convey to the gullible Mr. Nehru the impression that China would reconcile itself to the existing position. The reference to the dissatisfaction of the Tibetan authorities was meaningful. Later Chou En-lai became more specific and referred to a telegram which the Tibetan authorities had sent to the Indian Government in October 1947, that is, after India had achieved national independence, in which the Tibetans had made fantastic claims against our country. Mr. Chou En-lai says:

“The Tibet local authorities themselves later also expressed their dissatisfaction with this line, and, following the independence of India in 1947, cabled Your Excellency asking India to return all the territory of the Tibet region of China south of this illegal line. This piece of territory corresponds in size to the Chekiang Province of China and is as big as ninety thousand square kilometres. Mr. Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line which would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself by selling out its territory—and such a large piece of territory as that?”

[Chou En-lai’s letter to Nehru, dated 8th Sept. 1959]

Mr. Chou En-lai’s technique was very simple. When it suited him he would clothe the Tibetan Government with
an international personality, with the right to make territorial claims on other sovereign states. But when the arrangements and treaties entered into by Tibet were such as to form a stumbling block in the Chinese expansionist designs he would promptly denounce them on the ground that the local Tibetan authorities had no treaty-making powers! Thus a Peking note to India warns:

"It is absolutely indisputable that the Tibet local authorities had no right to enter into talks and conclude treaties on its own with foreign countries. Tibet is part of Chinese territory. China has full sovereignty over Tibet. Without the authorization and consent of the Chinese Central Government, the Tibet local authorities had no right to hold talks and conclude treaties with foreign countries; even if these were done, they were illegal and null and void."

[Chinese Note to India, dated 3rd April 1960]

This has been the general approach of the Chinese throughout the history of the border conflict. Their attitude has not undergone any change after the present large-scale invasion in the Eastern and Western sectors got under way.

Their proposals for settlement as defined in the note of 24th October, 1962 are in accord with their usual diplomatic practice.

They have introduced a new phrase "withdrawal from the actual line of control". It may mean several things at the same time. The actual line of control as on 7th November, 1959; the actual line of control as on 8th September 1962; and the actual line of control on any subsequent date. Then again the Chinese can always raise disputes as what these "actual lines of control" really were on the ground on these various dates. "The actual line of control as on 7th November 1962" itself can be and is projected ahead to include all the territories that the Chinese
have occupied subsequent to 1959. It is therefore impossible to have diplomatic talks with such cunning and shifty people. They only understand one language: the language of force.

Why then have the government not yet broken off diplomatic relations with such a ruthless enemy? Why are they allowing the Chinese embassy and consulates to operate in India, even in Kalimpong?

Why do they continue to write endlessly notes, letters, memoranda, when it has become clear that the sole aim behind the use of force by the Chinese is to overawe, humiliate and subdue India and then proceed to establish their mastery over the entire continent of Asia?

If the present clash over the whole length of our northern frontier is no ordinary border skirmish but something “qualitatively different,” if it be true that a state of war actually exists between India and China, why has the terrible reality not been formally proclaimed and brought home to our people? Why are we still maintaining the pretence of normal relations?

When the past experience has convinced even the purblind that the enemy is coldly calculating and merciless, that every concession to him is treated as a sign of weakness, of impotence, why do the government make offers which can only embolden the enemy and demoralise our ranks?

Having once said that no useful talks could be had till the Chinese vacated the aggression in Ladakh, where was the need for Mr. Nehru to suggest as he did in his letter of 16th November 1959 to the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai that India was prepared to negotiate on the basis that both withdraw their armed forces from all disputed territories on the Western sector of our border?

This was a very dangerous suggestion to make. And yet Mr. Nehru thoughtlessly made it. The wily Chinese Premier immediately rejected it, and asked as to why this
formula of withdrawal was not being applied in the East and why India was not showing any readiness to pull out its armed forces from Urvasiam (NEFA), which, he claimed was a "disputed" territory?

Now Mr. Chou En Lai has backed his suggestion by naked force and has started a large-scale invasion of our country. And how have we answered this violation of our nation's integrity? By saying that we shall resist as long as it is necessary and, more importantly, by sending them a new note saying that India is prepared to talk provided the Chinese forces return to their pre-8th September 1962 line!

Gone is the insistence on the liquidation of the Ladakh aggression! Gone is the proposal that both withdraw their armies from the entire "disputed" territory in the West!! Ladakh has been virtually sacrificed presumably to appease the hunger of the Chinese dragon. But China's appetite is insatiable. It grows on what it feeds on. This is not a manly answer to the violation of our sacred soil. This is the path of appeasement, of surrender and of ultimate disgrace.

We must therefore make a new beginning; we must sever diplomatic relations with China; formally declare war; help the Tibetans rise in revolt against the Chinese; bring arms from wherever we can get them; introduce the revolutionary, democratic principle of conscription by stages by calling up, first, age group 25-26 or any other group; order total mobilisation of resources; drastically curtail production of unessential articles and luxury goods; step up defence production and output of essential commodities; regulate prices on welfare principles; take steps to reduce inequalities; and enforce sacrifices in proportion to the capacity of the various classes to bear them. What is called for is not less planning and less socialism, but more effective planning and strong doses of economic equality. Non-alignment policy has so far meant defence unpreparedness, a house divided against itself, with different members pulling in different directions. There is no inte-
grated outlook. All this has to go. If the present patriotic upsurge is not to end in frustration, the Government must quickly reorient itself and place before the country an inspiring programme. Any talk of negotiations with the enemy can only weaken the nation's resolve to throw out the invaders.

1st November, 1962.
CHINESE AGGRESSION AND INDIA'S REACTION

The Chinese invasion of India's border areas is a milestone in Indian-Chinese relations. It has brought rude awakening to those who had let themselves be hypnotised by the cheap sentimentalism of Panchsheela, the supposed foundation of the relations between Free India and Communist China.

Theory of Expansionism

India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was the foremost votary of this Panchasheela sentimentalism. Today he is telling us that he always knew that a strong, centralised China had invariably displayed expansionist tendencies and that he fully expected her to do so again. He also added that this had nothing to do with the nature of international communism and that this expansionism was specifically Chinese. The Prime Minister said:

"We realised, we know this much of history, that a strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history, that has been the case. And we saw or we felt that the two factors taken together, the great push towards industrialisation of that country, plus the amazing pace of its population increase would create a most dangerous situation . . ."

This was the theme of his speech in the recent debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha.

With regard to the border trouble Mr. Nehru made some interesting statements in his reply to the Rajya Sabha debate on the same subject. He said that in 1950 itself they had anticipated this trouble and that they had deliberately not raised it in their discussions with the Chinese.
They had decided, “after the longest and fullest thinking and consultations between those who were concerned—our Ambassador, our Foreign Office, our Foreign Affairs Committee and others,” not to “hurl” the question of the frontier on the Chinese in the form of, “Recognise our position or...!” Justifying the failure to take up the matter with the Chinese Government in 1954 when the agreement on Tibet had been signed, he said:

“There they were sitting in Tibet. Our saying would not make any difference. They would not walk out or quit Tibet because we said something. It would be infantile to think so. But the result would have been that they would have achieved their dominance over Tibet completely. Only we would have quarrelled with them and come near breaking relations with China. And the trouble on the frontier would have come up immediately, not now, but two years back.”

So, if the frontier question or the question of maps had not been brought to a climax by India then, it was not for lack of foresight, but precisely because the foresight was there that they decided to buy time and face the “challenge” later, that is when “we would be in a much stronger position to face it.”

The Prime Minister has not obviously understood the implications of these statements, assuming them to have reflected the real state of his mind all these years, for they are damaging, in the extreme, to his reputation as a statesman.

Dictates of Wisdom

If the Prime Minister was aware in 1949-50 that the new, centralised regime in Peking, to which he had rightly extended diplomatic recognition, would, true to its historical tradition, begin to manifest expansionist designs as soon as it had consolidated its power, was it not his elementary duty as the captain of India’s ship of state to take
effective steps to check its expected southward drive be-
times? Mr. Nehru was not required to conjure this check out of nothing. The check to Chinese expansion in the direction of our Himalayan border was already in existence. It was the vast expanse of Tibet that lay between the new India and the force that had established itself in Peking. Tibet had very close, ancient, religious, cultural and commercial ties with India, and was then in enjoyment of a semi-independent status internationally and one of total independence in relation to China. The argument should therefore begin not from the fatal date of 1954 when China was already “sitting in Tibet”, but from 1947, when China was in the grip of civil war or in 1949 when the new authority had not yet stabilised itself. So then, if Mr. Nehru knew that Chinese aggressiveness was an ancient, historical phenomenon, that the new China, too, was bound to turn expansionist one day, and that the creation of a powerful, industrialised state across our Northern border was a historical turning point, and further if he and his ambassador, Mr. Panikkar, had been apprehensive from the start about the security and inviolability of India’s northern frontier (in view of the fact that the new regime had not repudiated the old maps which showed large chunks of Indian territory in Kashmir and tribal Assam as Chinese), did not wisdom dictate that the inevitable clash or “challenge” should be faced not in Ladakh and NEFA, but thousands of kilometers away from India’s international frontier? All that they had to do was to proclaim in 1947 or a little later the independence of Tibet, seek for it international recognition, as India has been doing for the new China in the United Nations, and help the Tibetans organise resistance should the Government of Mr. Chou En-lai seek to annex their land to the Chinese empire.

But this never happened. The Indian Prime Minister was committed to the concept of Chinese overlordship over Tibet. Tibet had to be sacrificed to satisfy the requirements of the Nehru-British theory of suzerainty or to ‘appease’ the new power that had arisen on the mainland of China.
It would simply not do for the Prime Minister to dismiss this argument as hind-sight. For at least one of our outstanding publicists, Rammanohar Lohia, had very early formulated his policy with regard to our relations with the Himalayan states. A perusal of the Parliament debate reveals that Acharyā Kripalani also had been very critical of Mr. Nehru's Tibet policy in 1950. But then Chinese armies had already started marching in.

It is a pity the Prime Minister did not heed the warning of these far-sighted people. Today his deputies in the External Affairs Ministry are quoting the Vedas and the Puranas in support of the fact that the Himalayas have been our traditional frontier. But if he and his advisers had not made a fetish of the British idea of suzerainty and had remembered only two words which are enshrined in the heart of every Indian, viz., "Kailas" and "Mansarovar" then, perhaps, the story of Tibet would have been different. Unfortunately Mr. Nehru had no vision of a grand Himalayan policy. He allied himself with the status quo forces in that region. He sought first to ignore the democratic revolution in Nepal, then "freeze" it and appropriate it for his purpose. Of socio-economic reforms there is not even a beginning in Sikkim and Bhutan, and as for the NEFA area it has been sealed off from the rest of India. The Chinese armymen can apparently roam freely in these vast uncharted regions, but to the modern missionaries of equality and democracy from among our own countrymen this is a prohibited area! No wonder to the borders people Communist propaganda is holding up China as a symbol of modernism and progress.

**Beginning of Border Troubles**

It is in this context that we have to view the happenings in the border areas and assess their likely consequences on India and other Asian countries. It is true that reports of Chinese incursions into Indian territory came like a thunderbolt in the middle of this year but in fact the
trouble had been brewing for quite some years. It has nothing to do with the Tibetan revolt, although it might have accelerated events to some extent. No sooner had the so-called Panchasheela treaty been signed (29th April, 1954) than China and India began to exchange protest notes about the violations of the border by each other. Allegations were made (the first note is dated 17th July, 1954), and they were answered by counter-allegations. But although China had deliberately and calculatedly intruded into our territory, they did not put forward a formal claim to large sectors of Indian territory in the initial stages. Meanwhile old maps continued to be issued in China, showing large Indian areas as falling within China. The Chinese had time enough for other big and small things, but not for revising the maps handed down by the ancien régime!

The Indian Prime Minister finally took up the matter of the maps and the question of India's border with China at the highest level. In his letter to Mr. Chou En-lai of 14th December, 1958 (four and half years after the Tibet agreement was signed and a little over eight years after China began “liberating” Tibet), Mr. Nehru set out India's position with regard to these matters of great importance to this country. Mr. Nehru stated that it was his impression that after the signing of the Tibet Agreement there was no outstanding dispute between the two countries. Of course there was that question of maps, but India was not much worried about it as “our boundaries were quite clear and were not matter of argument.” The Indian Prime Minister reminded Mr. Chou En-lai that he had told him at the time of Mr. Nehru's visit to China, in October, 1954, that these maps were only “reproductions of the pre-liberation maps” and that they had had no time to revise them. Further in the course of the Chinese Prime Minister's talks with Mr. Nehru in India in 1956 Mr. Chou En-lai had said that the so-called McMahon Line had been established by British Imperialism, but that “whatever might have happened long ago in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India you proposed to recognise this
border with India also". Finally while expressing his "puzzle" over China's evasive replies on the question of maps, the need for surveys, etc., the Prime Minister asked the Chinese Premier to "appreciate our difficulties" and take steps to remove "any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries" (White Paper I, pp. 48-51).

Mr. Chou En-lai's reply came on 23rd January 1959 in which he made the following points:

That the McMahon Line was a product of British policy of aggression against Tibet; that juridically speaking, China had never recognised it; that the Tibet local authorities, although they had signed it, were in fact "dissatisfied with this unilaterally-drawn line". On the other hand he indicated that China cannot "fail to take cognizance of the great and encouraging changes" in the status of India and cannot fail to "take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line"; that, while acting with "prudence", China would "take time to deal with this matter". With regard to the maps he was again evasive and attributed the border incidents to the absence of a "formal delimitation" of the frontier, and suggested that the two Governments should "maintain the status quo."

The letter of the Chinese Premier was a typical piece of Chinese Communist diplomacy. Without yielding even an inch of the ground, he sought to utter soothing and reassuring words. Even the expressions "more or less realistic attitude to the McMahon Line" or "maintaining the status quo" had very different meanings in Chinese Communist dictionary. This became clear a few months later when the Chinese, instead of talking about old maps, put forward a formal claim to large slices of Indian territory.

The Indian Prime Minister replied on 22nd March 1959, arguing in details that India's border with Tibet in Ladakh and Sikkim and along the McMahon Line in the East were well established in terms of geography, treaty and usage,
and there could be no dispute over them. No reply came to this letter for nearly six months.

Meanwhile a revolt broke out in Tibet, leading to Dalai Lama's flight to India and the official relations between the two countries were embittered. Border incidents also continued, the Chinese Government becoming more and more intransigent.

During the time this was happening news trickled through the Iron Curtain raised by the Indian Government between the people of India and the real state of India's relations with China and the border aggressions. Till the Tibetan revolt and the angry words uttered by the Chinese authorities and newspapers, and for some time thereafter also, the official India led by Mr. Nehru continued to talk of China in sentimental terms, "2000 year-old ties between China and India untarnished by armed conflict," "eternal friendship between the two peoples", "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai" and so on. This Iron Curtain, so far covered by clouds of sentimentality, was ultimately raised in August 1959 and the people of India were for the first time face to face with the ugly reality of the naked aggression of China in Ladakh and along the other sectors of India's northern borders.

**Tibetan Revolt: A Missed Opportunity**

The Tibetan revolt deeply moved the politically conscious Indians, though it cannot be said that it stirred the great mass of the Indian people, but instead of using the occasion for reassessing the Indian-Chinese relations and debating the fundamentals of our foreign policy and educating the public in it, the Government reduced it to a sentimental drama centred around the personality of Dalai Lama. Thus the great issues of national freedom and voluntary social changes were befogged by the whipping up of low religiosity of which the most ridiculous expression was the mad demonstration of "Dalai Lama Zindabad" in the conference of a political party supposedly dedicated to freedom, secularism and socialism! The Communist Party
characterised the revolt as reactionary, and, while it was clearly out of step with the mind of political India, this bazar sentimentalism only strengthened its hands and provided it with fresh talking points about the indifference of India towards the plight of the oppressed people in the Himalayan region.

In September India's Parliament debated the border question on the basis of the White Paper I issued by the Government. Further developments followed in quick succession. Mr. Chou En-lai suddenly broke his several months' silence and answered the Prime Minister's communication of 22nd March 1959. Mr. Chou's reply, dated 8th September 1959, was a masterly essay in diplomacy. It was evident that the Chinese were not particularly anxious to vacate the territory they had already occupied, also they were in no great hurry to settle the border dispute finally and once for all either. They wanted to keep their large claim in being, without pushing it to the fore immediately. The atmosphere of uncertainty and fear suited them well. What they wished to do was to allay the fears their aggressiveness had aroused, sound sweetly reasonable and draw Mr. Nehru into a discussion with a view to extracting further concessions in return for the meaningless promise to keep the "status quo".

Mr. Nehru refused to be drawn into any across the table talks till the Chinese had "vacated" aggression and had created the right atmosphere for negotiations. (White Paper II, pp. 34-36.)

The Chinese answered Mr. Nehru's prayer for withdrawal with a most murderous attack on India's police party in Ladakh, killing seven and capturing several, who were treated in a most barbarous manner and were persistently interrogated.

This naturally produced great indignation in the country. Following the practice of alternately blowing hot and cold, Mr. Chou En-lai made a "gesture", suggesting that the
two countries should withdraw 20 kilometers from the frontier so as to avoid further incidents. (Letter of 9th November 1959.) The suggestion appeared "conciliatory" but the snag was that whereas the Chinese side of the frontier was a vast, high-altitude plateau, the Indian side was a steep rise, making withdrawal a suicidal operation, a virtual gift of the Himalayas to the Chinese.

Mr. Nehru rejected this suggestion and made a counter proposal, namely that the Chinese should withdraw from the positions they had occupied, and as a quid pro quo promised that India would not station her personnel in the area shown by the Chinese as theirs in their 1956 maps till the outcome of the negotiations was known.

This was actually a climb-down from India's early stand that there could be no talks till the Chinese had vacated their aggression. For the new proposal would have achieved demilitarisation of the occupied territory, but Chinese Civil Authority would have continued to function there and use the road which they had built in Ladakh on what was clearly Indian soil. It would also entail Indian withdrawal from all the areas claimed by the Chinese, pending a settlement.

The Chinese Design on India

The aggressive attitude of the new China in the current border dispute has created a sense of insecurity in the Northern parts of India where the Chinese fifth-column is active. The first draft of the icy winds from across the Himalayas has blown away the Panchasheela umbrella, and no one can say as to what the ultimate objective of China's southwardly march is. Is it only a few hundred square kilometers of "uninhabited", "undemarcated" hilly area in the Himalayan region? Or is it the domination of the entire NEFA, Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim? (Did not Mr. Chou En-lai state that they had always 'respected "proper relations" between the last two and India, reserving for China the right to define what propriety is?) And will the
Chinese stop there or march further South at the invitation of their brother Communists in Assam, Calcutta and the Punjab? The possibilities are all there, and no one can speak with authority about the real intentions of the Chinese. Even the Prime Minister was forced to give expression to his apprehensions about China's designs on these areas in his letter to Mr. Chou En-lai of 26th September 1959. Said Mr. Nehru: "Reports have reached us that some Chinese officers in Tibet have repeatedly proclaimed that the Chinese authorities will before long take possession of Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and our North-East Frontier Agency." (White Paper II, p. 43.)

Thus if there are, in fact, no limits to Chinese expansion and if the policy of appeasement, of yielding more ground only feeds their unbridled ambition, does not the question of national defence become one of supreme importance? How do we propose to proceed with the job?

The Prime Minister does not expect a full-scale invasion of the country in the immediate future nor does he visualise a quick solution of the border problem. He is viewing matters in a longer perspective, and sees in industrialisation and the building up of heavy industries the best means of defending the integrity of the country. He has no intention of using the army to expel the aggressors.

Now one need not dispute the necessity of industrialisation and the creation of defence industries, though one may express one's doubt about the appropriateness of the policies and programmes of the Government. Nor need one under-estimate the importance of national sentiment, and of arousing people's anger against the anti-national activities of the Indian Communists. However one cannot but remark that these solutions do not go to the root of the matter. The problem in India is not one of building a few industries or issuing flaming patriotic appeals, but one of fusing the 40 crores into a homogenous nation, into a new unity.
China's strength does not lie in the fact that it has a few more industries than us or even in that its rate of economic expansion is faster than ours. This is not the cause but the effect of two basic factors, namely that socially speaking, the Han people have always been a homogeneous people and that, by adopting communism as their new way of life, they have achieved economic equality also, thereby bringing into existence a tremendous, dynamic force which no mere incantations can stop.

India is a land split up into castes and communities, where the ruling classes are completely cut off from the masses because of their “high” birth, English education and western style of living. The bulk of the people have no stake in the state and the social order. Among them the adivasis and the harijans are the most submerged and I cannot see how mere appeals to patriotism are going to rouse their loyalty and enthusiasm. And it is largely these hill people that inhabit the areas adjoining the Chinese border, and unless something is done to raise them up, to make them one with the plains people, unless the entire backward mass is given special opportunities for advancement, I do not know how we are going to organise effective resistance to the aggression that is threatening us from the North.

It is an illusion to believe that mere anti-Chinese, anti-Communist speech-making can destroy the hold of communism on the people's mind or strengthen the defences of our country. Only in a recent bye-election in Assam, a top objective of Chinese aggressive designs, a Communist candidate defeated the Congress Party, making nonsense of the view that recent events have dealt a shattering blow to the Communists in India. When we talk of public opinion, we have the English-educated, middle class opinion in mind, and assessment of public opinion is not true in respect of this class also as far as Assam and West Bengal are concerned.

Mahatma Gandhi used to say that God would appear to the poor people in the guise of bread. It is as true to
say that Indian people would regard that person as his friend who would fight for them and die for them. Let the down-trodden masses of India have a vision of Mother India in the form of complete social equality, of special opportunities for advancement and of comparative equality in the matter of property and income, and then the forty crores will rise as one man to defend the nation from all outside attacks.

November 1959.
TIBET AND OUTER MONGOLIA—A STUDY IN CONTRAST

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA came into being in 1949 after the Communist armies won a definitive victory in the Chinese civil war and brought the entire mainland of China under the effective control of the central government. The emergence, after several centuries, of an effective national authority pushed to the fore the question of the relationship of this authority with (1) the outlying areas which at one time had vaguely formed part of the Chinese empire, and (2) the neighbouring states which were interested in a peaceful and friendly China.

The long period that intervened between the loss of effective central control and its re-emergence saw the increasingly aggressive attempts of foreign powers directed at the sovereign rights of China. The nationalist government secured during the war the abrogation of the most obnoxious symbol of foreign domination and Chinese impotence, namely the extra-territorial rights acquired by the foreign powers. The Communist government did not, however, inherit from Chiang Kai-shek a wholly sovereign and united Chinese empire, free from all traces of foreign domination. In the North-East detachment of Korea from the Chinese empire forced by the Japanese had come to stay. Independence of Korea had been conceded not only by the other big powers but China herself. The Yalta agreement legalised, so to say, the separation of Outer Mongolia from the Chinese empire, and even forced Chiang Kai-shek to accept limitations on Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. Hongkong and Macao continued to be under British and Portuguese rule, and Formosa remained in nationalist hands backed by America's armed strength in the Pacific. In the West, Tibet enjoyed virtual independence, and in Sinkiang Soviet influence had replaced Chinese power.
Two Choices before China

The new Communist regime was faced with the task of defining its attitude towards the question of empire: whether it was going in for a policy of restoring the old empire and reasserting control over the nations which had sought progressive loosening of the ties that had bound them to Peking or of turning the tables on foreign powers by coming to terms with the oppressed outlying countries on the basis of the principle of self-determination. Soviet Russia was faced with a similar choice in 1917; in those pristine days Lenin had unilaterally renounced imperialist privileges inherited from the Czarist times and had allowed Poland, Finland and the three Baltic states to declare their independence. During, the civil war when the Georgian Republic under Social Democratic influence was suppressed, Russian policy underwent a change, finally resulting in the re-annexation of the Baltic states in 1940. The ideology of the new Russia did not in any way alter her age-old policy with regard to empire and assimilation of other nations and regions into the Russian nation. The Red China made no pretence at following the early Leninist policy of self-determination. She openly embarked on a programme of resurrecting the old empire and modified it only when forced by superior might, basic policy and international strategy to do so.

Basis of Sino-Russian alliance

The communist doctrine and practice as interpreted and moulded by Mao Tse-tung has become the instrument of Chinese national revival. For reasons of ideology China has to ally herself with Russia. From the point of view of international power politics, too, China cannot help seeking Soviet economic and technical assistance in order to achieve rapid economic development. To date no other European power or America has given any evidence of its willingness to aid backward Asian countries in the matter of building the heavy industrial base without which eco-
nomic development remains a mirage. It is no wonder, therefore, that China sets so much store by her friendship with Russia and her membership of the Soviet camp.

The Peking government has made the completest restoration of the old Chinese empire, including its hegemony over neighbouring states like Korea, Viet Nam, etc., its basic national objective. Only in relation to Russia, because of her great might and the considerations referred to above, does it accept something less than the restoration of the old imperial frontiers.

*Might is Right!*

Thus it does not challenge the existence of Korea and Viet Nam as separate sovereign states supported as they are by Russia. It has also acquiesced in the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia and has backed Russia's demand for her admission into the United Nations alongside of China.

In the determination of Chinese policy with regard to outlying countries or the time-table of their "liberation", factors such as the right of self-determination, treaty rights or obligations, international law, etc., do not enter. China unreservedly proclaims the doctrine of might is right.

*Sino-Russian Treaty of 1924*

China's attitude to Outer Mongolia and Russia on one hand and Tibet and India on the other provides an interesting contrast; it also illustrates the hard realism of Russian foreign policy and the hazy, confused, unoriginal approach of India under Mr. Nehru.

The year 1924 constitutes a turning point in China's relations with the outside world. The Chinese central government received, for the first time, recognition and equal treatment from a foreign power in the form of a treaty between Soviet Russia and itself. This treaty among other things recognised Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity and in a separate clause on Outer Mongolia explicitly stated:
“The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic recognises that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China’s sovereignty therein.”

In actual practice, however, Russia completely violated this treaty. In the next two decades of continuing decline of China’s central authority and Japanese aggression, Russia took Outer Mongolia under her own wings and set up a puppet regime there. Instead of returning it to China after Japan’s surrender Stalin finalised his plans for its permanent separation in the war-time Yalta agreement between the Big Three which *inter alia* stated:

“1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved;

“2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored (viz., Southern Sakhalin, Manchurian rail-roads, free port of Dairen and Russian naval base at Port Arthur).

“it is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and the rail-roads referred to above will require the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President (Roosevelt) will take measures to obtain this concurrence on the advice of Marshal Stalin.”

This secret treaty not only cancelled the treaty of 1924 but also revived Russia’s imperialist claims in Manchuria. Since America herself had undertaken to make its protegee, China, gulp all this, Chiang Kai-shek could not protest against this betrayal by his disinterested friend! It was the new Communist regime which recovered progressively the imperialist tribute levied by Stalin in Manchuria. But in relation to Outer Mongolia she could not do anything. She was unable to induce Russia to respect the treaty of 1924 which she had voluntarily entered into with China. Russia secured Red Chinese concurrence in Mongolia’s independence purely in the interest of the security of her own Siberian province. Unlike Tibet and India there was no cultural affinity between Russia and Mongolia.
Free India's lost opportunity

After 1946-47 independent India was free to pursue any policy it liked in regard to the neighbouring states. It should have cut itself off from the tradition and shackles of the British-imperial policy and put its international relations on a new footing. It should have liquidated the privileges that had been handed down from the old British days in Tibet and given de jure recognition to Tibet's virtual independence. It should have sought a tripartite treaty with China and Tibet based on Tibet's independence and neutrality. The idea of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was given legal status by the British in 1906-07 in order to mask their own real suzerainty over Lhasa and to keep the Russians out. India was in no way bound to accept this British concept of Chinese overlordship over Tibet, a country with whom she had very old cultural, religious and linguistic ties.

Mr. Nehru who considered himself the successor of the British did not bring a new outlook to bear on the question of India's relations with the northern neighbours, but took the easy way out by sticking to the old British forms and traditions which in the changed circumstances of the mid-twentieth century had lost all meaning.

This argument does not mean that Mr. Nehru should have made, a la Stalin, the establishment of Indian hegemony in the northern states and South-East Asia the arch of his new policy. Far from it, he should have pursued the creative policy of independence and neutrality of these states with faith and determination.

Mr. Nehru's failure to do this and his advance acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet exposed her to "liberation" at Chinese hands and ultimate destruction of her autonomy in 1959. Instead of a peaceful neighbour, we now have a long common frontier with a vigorous, militarising China. This does not exactly strengthen our security nor weaken our encirclement by forces allied to one or the other power bloc.

June, 1959.
THE SINO-SOVET DISPUTE WITHIN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

A new ideological dispute as momentous as the one between the revisionist and orthodox Marxist, the Menshevik and Bolshevik, Trotsky and Stalin, Yugoslavia and Russia is on between two groups of Communists centred around Peking and Moscow.

The three international gatherings of Communists in Peking (during the WFTU session in June), Bukharest (in connection with the Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party), and Moscow recently (on the occasion of the 43rd anniversary celebrations of the October revolution) have not in any way resolved the differences although statements reaffirming the solidarity of world communism and the "indestructible" friendship of the Russian and Chinese people have been dutifully made from time to time. What has been achieved is at best a temporary truce, a patched-up compromise.

Sino-Soviet Leadership Rivalry

One thing may be said about this conflict at once. And it is this that while there are certain features about it which are similar to the ones preceding it, there are also aspects which are unique to this controversy. For one thing this is not only a conflict of ideas within a movement; it is also a struggle between two states. The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, too, had this double aspect; and it was Tito's firm hold over the state apparatus which frustrated Stalin's efforts to subdue the Yugoslavs. However, the parties to this dispute were very unequal and it had no great impact on the world Communist movement. Yugoslavia was and is a very small state; its area and population is insignificant compared to that of the Soviet Union. In terms of industrial progress and military strength also the inequality is
great. But Russia's antagonist in the current conflict is of an altogether different calibre. In respect of population China is not only bigger than Russia but is by far the most populous nation in the world; its area also is considerable though not as large as that of the USSR. True it is industrially still undeveloped and is heavily dependent on Russian aid. True also that a large hungry population is not always an asset; in fact it can be a great liability. But the seven hundred million Chinese are no longer an amorphous mass: the alchemy of Communist revolution has transformed them into a gigantic dynamo. Just as after the initial birth-pangs catching up with the western countries became a matter of time for the U.S.S.R. so also catching up with Moscow is deemed a matter of time by Peking. It is this evenly matched strength of the parties that has endowed the new controversy with added significance. The industrially backward China enjoys one advantage in that over it holds unchallenged sway a man whose prestige is not only great within his own country but who also happens to be the most senior member of the international Communist hierarchy. The Russian leader though more exuberant is somewhat of an upstart; his dash for power is still fresh in people's memory, and so he cannot command the same respect that instinctively goes to the Chinese leader. While it is possible that the Chinese leader has some support within the ranks of each Communist Party, including that of the Soviet Union, it does not seem much likely that similar divisions exist within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. There has been nothing like a wholesale purge and destruction of leading Communist cadres such as weakened the Bolshevik Party under Stalin. Mr. Mao Tse-tung is a veritable father figure of Chinese communism. This is a factor whose importance it would be wrong to under-estimate.

**Carefully Prepared Campaign**

The ideological campaign launched by the Chinese has by no means been haphazard. It was carefully planned out
in advance, the intention being "education" not alone of the Chinese Communists but of the fraternal parties, including the Soviet party as well. Simultaneously with the publication of official policy documents the Chinese Foreign Languages Press issued a series of Lenin pamphlets and collection of "choice" quotations from his writings on the question of imperialism and proletarian revolution. This was published, significantly, in the Russian language also. Before the Moscow conference every effort was made to queer the pitch for the Russians: an agreement was entered into with Cuba's Castro and Ferhet Abbas of insurgent Algeria; the visit of the Albanian Communist delegation, too, was exploited for the same purpose. The Albanians are bitter foes of the Yugoslav Communists and they thoroughly disapproved the post-Stalin Soviet effort to reach reconciliation with Tito. They also belong to the extremist wing of world communism. *Peking Review*, in one of its numbers, quotes a speech of the Vice-Chairman of the Albanian Communist Party in which he expressed high appreciation of the Chinese endeavour to defend the "purity" of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its dogged struggle against revisionism and "all other anti-Marxist manifestations". On their part the Albanian Communists considered "revisionism" to be the "main danger" confronting international communism and did not even mention "dogmatism" as the Russians are wont to do. For it is now an open secret in the world Communist movement that "revisionism and other manifestations" is but a veiled reference to the policies of Nikita Khrushchev and "dogmatism" is an euphemistic way of describing the attitude of the Chinese party and their friends inside the C.P.S.U. That the Chinese do not propose to yield one bit in this controversy is evident from the fact that at a time when the assembly of world Communist parties was about to conclude, that is on November 28, 1960, the Chinese party leaders have published an article in *Peking Review* urging correct application of the Moscow declaration of 1957, i.e., its application in the directions desired by the Chinese.
But what is all this conflict about? Before we turn to the substance of the dispute it would be well to remember that it is being conducted in accordance with certain definite "rules" and within limitations tacitly agreed to by both parties. First of all the adversary whose views are being constantly refuted is never named; the world leadership of the Soviet Union is never challenged; the argument is carried on strictly within the framework of Marxism-Leninism; the weapons used are Leninist ideas and Leninist jargon. That should not, however, lead us to doubt the seriousness of the conflict.

Shorn of its verbiage this dispute is a struggle between a revolution which has arrived and a revolution which is still fresh and young. The really creative phase of the Russian revolution is now over; the accent is shifting from new creation to preservation of the gains already made. That does not mean that the Russian revolution has exhausted its dynamism. No, there is still open before Russian communism a broad vista of expansion and growth; it is not yet tied to the world as it was and is, to the same extent as the western nations, including America, are. Nevertheless the gap between Russia and America is narrowing. Maybe consumer needs do not receive the same generous attention as they do in the prosperous United States. But Russia is certainly more solicitous about public needs such as health and education. And we know that protest is being voiced against the neglect of public services ("public sector" as it is sometimes called) in affluent America by men like J. K. Galbraith. The Chinese revolution has on the contrary just embarked on the adventure of creation, on its industrial revolution. It is less concerned about preserving what is than about creating. It is full of explosive energy and dynamism and is impatient of cautious approach. It is sore that some of the mighty nations of the world are not reconciled to its existence, that they have not accepted the fact that the revolutionary regime
has come to stay and that there is no going back to the situation as it existed in China before 1949. It is in the background of this that the current controversy between the Russians and the Chinese should be viewed.

_Nightmare of Nuclear War_

To a dense and superficial mind which cannot grasp subtleties and nuances, this quarrel might appear to be a form of much ado about nothing or an exercise in theoretical hair-splitting devoid of deeper meaning. A hasty student, on the other hand, might jump to the conclusion that here we have at least a sharp division in the ranks of world communism and a clash of two diametrically opposite view-points, one pacifist, believing in the possibility and necessity of preventing war and achieving immediate disarmament, and the other regarding war not only unavoidable, but itching to rush into it at the slightest provocation. It would be crude, however, to paint Mr. Khrushchev as pacifism incarnate and Mr. Mao Tse-tung as an embodiment of brinkmanship. Mr. Khrushchov showed how tough he can be in Paris last May. And Mr. Mao Tse-tung, with all his war-like speeches, has not yet made war on the "imperialist paper tigers" in control of the Formosa straits. However, for reasons stated earlier the Chinese Communists are not much worried over the prospect of war. They appear not to care about the effect of atomic destruction a world war would entail. They blandly state:

"If on the contrary, we lose our vigilance against the danger of the imperialists launching a war, do not work to arouse the people of all countries to rise up against imperialism but tie the hands of the people, then imperialism can prepare for war just as it pleases and the inevitable result will be an increase in the danger of the imperialists launching a war and, once war breaks out, the people may not be able quickly to adopt a correct attitude towards it because of complete lack of preparation or inadequate preparation,
thus being unable to vigorously check the war. Of course, whether or not the imperialists will unleash a war is not determined by us; we are, after all, not chiefs-of-staff to the imperialists.

"But should the imperialists impose such sacrifices on the peoples of various countries, we believe that, just as the experience of the Russian revolution and the Chinese revolution shows, those sacrifices would be repaid. On the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create very swiftly a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves." (Peking Review, No. 17, April 17, 1960.)

This excerpt from an important policy declaration of the Chinese Communists is typical of their temperament and approach to world problems. They are hard-boiled realists and would not rashly jump into war, but they consider it an unpardonable sin for a Communist to compromise or in any way restrain struggles in areas like Algeria, Cuba or Congo in order to please the West. Being ideological purists, they do not look with great favour over the Russian policy of making too much fuss over neutrals like Mr. Nehru, Mr. Nasser and Mr. Sukarno. They regard them with suspicion mixed with total contempt. How can any Communist take a neutral stand, much less the side of these decadent capitalist leaders in a border dispute involving proletarian China? According to them those only are genuine nationalists who accept in their own lands the hegemony of the Communist party. Any aid given to neutral and bourgeois states is not only waste but harmful also. Besides it means so much less for China!

Chinese and Indian Foreign Policy

Because of the Chinese aggression on our northern borders the vision of educated Indians has become clouded and they are unable to think clearly about any matter connected with China. What they should have done is to preserve
mental clarity and at the same time develop a far more vigorous resistance to China's encroachments on our territory. But India lies supine on the northern frontier and vaguely hopes that Russia would come to its rescue and try to restrain its ally, China. The Indian revolution, though abortive and incomplete, has lost all dynamism and its aging leader has developed attitudes characteristic of over-mature and prosperous nations. Mr. Nehru speaks a language and educated India generally backs him in this—which it would be fitting for a West European to use, since the spectre of the thermo-nuclear devastation of his beautiful cities always haunts his mind. But it is strange that the Indian Prime Minister should take on the role of a peace-maker and international broker, that he should go all the way to New York to propose in the United Nations General Assembly nothing better than that the two mighties of the world should renew their contacts with a view to reducing world tension. Where India as the biggest victim of the most powerful imperialism was expected to lead the struggle against colonialism and western economic domination, we found our country luke-warm in the momentous colonial struggles of the post-war world: Kenya, Suez, Algeria. It cared more about the good opinion of the liberal West than about advancing the interests of the coloured half of humanity. In Congo, too, India's role has been passive and at times down-right reactionary. It has bungled its relations with South-East Asia; has brought disaster on itself in the Himalayan region and has failed to straighten out the Kashmir and other Indo-Pakistan problems. The importation of the welfare state phraseology in the context of unparalleled material poverty, craze for misplaced modernization, upper caste domination and foreign policy outlook of the prosperous, exhausted and vulnerable nations of the West have devitalised our country, making it a passive spectator of the Sino-Russian controversy. While the narrowly nationalist and aggressive manifestations of China are much to be condemned and must be combated there is no gainsaying the fact that the Chinese point of view on the problems of colonialism is much more fundamentally
revolutionary than the Indian. Unless we understand this fact we shall not be able to grasp the real issue that is involved in the current Sino-Russian conflict.

The conflict between the Chinese Communist party and the C.P.S.U. came out into the open with the publication of the series of articles and speeches by the Chinese leaders on the occasion of the Lenin anniversary in last April. The aim ostensibly was to demolish the arguments of the Yugoslav Communists and restate the fundamental truths of Marxism-Leninism. In actuality the fulminations against Belgrade were a smoke-screen; Tito was a convenient whipping boy and nothing more. What the Chinese really attempted to do was to mount an ideological offensive against the un-Leninist deviations of the parent Communist party, embodied in the decisions of the 20th and 21st Congress and directly inspired by Nikita Khrushchov. That not the Yugoslav Communist alone or even chiefly but the Russians themselves are the accused is clear from the following passage in the organ of the Chinese Communist Party, Hongqui:

“There are also some people who are not revisionist, but well-intentioned persons who sincerely want to be Marxists, but get confused in the face of certain new historical phenomena and thus have some incorrect ideas. For example, some of them say that the failure of the U.S. imperialists’ policy of atomic blackmail marks the end of violence. While thoroughly refuting the absurdities of the modern revisionists, we should also help these well-intentioned people to correct their erroneous idea”. (Peking Review, No. 17, April 17, 1960).

Who is the Real Leninist?

The Chinese ideological attack calls into question Khrushchov’s “erroneous ideas” on the possibility of preventing war under capitalism; of negotiations and agreement with the West; of peaceful transition to communism under the conditions of democracy; the attitude towards the
neutrals and Soviet aid for them; and the policy with regard to colonial peoples' struggle for national independence.

The editorial board of the Chinese theoretical organ, writing in April 1960, put the question of state power in the forefront of the struggle for communism. No communism without proletarian dictatorship in some form or other; no dictatorship without the smashing up of the bourgeois state machine; and no victory against the bourgeois state unless the class struggle is carried on persistently by means "both sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative", runs its argument. Analysing the changes in the world situation in the last 40 years it reaches the conclusion that "whichever way you look at it, none of the new techniques like atomic energy, rocketry and so on has changed, as alleged by the modern revisionists, the basic characteristics of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution pointed out by Lenin. The capitalist-imperialist system absolutely will not crumble of itself. It will be overthrown by proletarian revolution within the imperialist country concerned, and the national revolution in colonies and semi-colonies".

After reaffirming the Leninist thesis set out in State and Revolution, the Chinese assert that the changes in the international balance of forces, the new strength of the Soviet Union and the Soviet camp have in no way rendered obsolete Lenin's statement that capitalist-imperialism has an inherent propensity to resort to violence and war. And so wars, even modern wars, are continuation of the politics of definite classes by other means. "To attain their aim of plunder and oppression the imperialists always have two tactics: the tactics of war and the tactics of 'peace'; therefore the proletariat and the people of all countries must also use two tactics of thoroughly exposing the imperialists' peace fraud and striving energetically for a genuine world peace, and the tactics of preparing for a just war to end the imperialist unjust war when and if the imperialists should unleash it".
This emphasis on the “tactics of preparing for a just war” distinguish the Chinese approach to the question of war and co-existence. The Russians too emphasise the importance of defensive preparations, of “vigilance” against the “war mongers” but they would not go to the extent of acclaiming the tactic of “preparing for a just war”. Thus Mr. Khrushchov speaking before the Rumanian Communists and fraternal delegates at Bukharest brought out a different aspect by saying that under the new conditions the “calamities” of another war would be “incomparably more terrible. For millions of people might burn in the conflagration of hydrogen explosions and for some states a nuclear war would be literally a catastrophe”. That is why Marxist-Leninists have been “consistent champions of a reasonable peace-loving policy”. The Russian leader then turned to Lenin’s ideas on imperialism and said that they were as before a “lodestar” for them. “But it should not be forgotten”, he warned “that Lenin’s propositions on imperialism were advanced and developed tens of years ago when the world did not know many things that are now decisive for historical development”. Mr. Khrushchov then goes on to list the new factors: the strength of the Soviet Union, expansion of communism, disintegration of the colonial system and the peace aspirations of the people in capitalist countries themselves. “Besides comrades”, he continues, “one cannot mechanically repeat now on this question what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said many decades ago on imperialism and go on asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism triumphs throughout the world”. Resorting to reductio ad absurdum, Stalin’s successor asks: “History will possibly witness such a time when capitalism is preserved only in a small number of states, may be such small states as, for instance, a button on a coat. Well? And even in such a situation would one have to look up in a book what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin quite correctly said for his time, would one have just to repeat that wars are inevitable since capitalist countries exist”?

Instead of gratefully accepting the Chinese offer to
“help” him in “correcting” his “erroneous ideas”, the unrepentant Mr. Khrushchov chooses to read a lecture to them on how to apply Leninism to specific problems and situations. He says:

“Therefore, one cannot ignore the specific situation, the changes in the co-relation of forces in the world, and repeat what the great Lenin said in quite different historical conditions. If Lenin could rise from his grave, he would take such people, as one says, to task and would teach them how one must understand the essence of the matter.

“We live in a time when we have neither Marx, nor Engels, nor Lenin with us. If we act like children who studying the alphabet, compile words from letters, we shall not go very far. Marx, Engels and Lenin created their immortal works which will not fade away in centuries. They pointed to mankind the road to communism.

“And we confidently follow this road. On the basis of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism we must think ourselves, profoundly study life, analyse the present situation and draw the conclusions which benefit the common cause of communism.

“One must not only be able to read but also correctly understand what one has read and apply it in the specific conditions of the time in which we live, taking into consideration the obtaining situation, and the real balance of forces.

“A political leader acting in this manner shows that he not only can read but also can creatively apply the revolutionary teaching. If he does not do this, he resembles a man about whom people say: ‘He looks into a book but sees nothing’! . . . . .

“He who fails to understand this does not believe in the strength and creative abilities of the working class, under-estimates the power of the Socialist camp,
does not believe in the great attractive force of socialism, which has demonstrated its superiority over capitalism with utmost clarity." (New Age, July, 3, 1960).

The Russian leader then proceeds to give concrete cases of successful Soviet intervention in preventing an outbreak of war or bringing a local war to a speedy termination before it became a general war as, for instance, at the time of the joint Anglo-American occupation of Jordan and Lebanon and Anglo-French-Israeli armed attack on Egypt. Yet Khrushchov's confidence about the possibility of preventing war is not only grounded in the rocket power of the Soviet Union which is undoubtedly great. The Russian people and their leader know what war means; they hate to contemplate the picture of their big urban centres and mighty industries going up in smoke. Nearly two generations of Russians ceaselessly toiled to create this new world of which they are truly and justly proud. That London, Paris and New York, too, would be left heaps of rubble is little comfort to them. They cannot lightly say, as the Chinese do, that these "sacrifices would be repaid" and that a "civilization thousands of times higher" could be raised on the "debris" that Western Europe, America and Russia would unquestionably become at the end of an atomic war. No responsible Russian can regard the Chinese sentiments with anything but horror. They cannot much relish the idea of America and Russia engaging in mutual annihilation, leaving the surviving Chinese in their desert and mountain fastnesses to complete the Communist world revolution and inherit the partially radio-active earth.

Attitude to the Neutral States

With regard to transition to communism also the viewpoints of the Russian and Chinese leaderships diverge. But here again the basis of divergence is not Mr. Khrushchov's principled attachment to non-violence any more than his advocacy of the co-existence doctrine is rooted in Tolstoyan pacifism. The debate is on the level of correct tactics, on
how best to promote communism without inviting self-destruction. Mr. Khrushchov is more sophisticated in his outlook and flexible in his methods. He sees no prospect of an early violent Communist revolution in a relatively prosperous Europe. And so he prescribes peaceful means for West European Communists. In the interests of Russian foreign policy he makes friendly approaches to de Gaulle; stalls on the recognition of the rebel Algerian Government and advises French Communists to lie low. During the Stalin era, Russia held aloof from the newly-freed nations of the world. But having placed defeat of the American system of military pacts at the centre of his foreign policy, Mr. Khrushchov was bound to start wooing the neutrals assiduously. He did not even allow the neutral leaders' hostility to local Communists to come in the way of this courtship so long as these leaders kept away from the entanglements of an American alliance. Mr. Mao Tse-tung's party, on the contrary, sticks to its leader's 1949 declaration that between socialism and capitalism, (meaning thereby the Soviet and Atlantic camps respectively), there could be no neutrality. That is why the Chinese do not hesitate to attack fiercely Egypt, India, Yugoslavia and Indonesia. Russia would not like to take this course and drive the Afro-Asian nations into the embrace of America. His recent United Nations effort was mainly directed at African-Asian opinion. The Chinese, however, feel that for the very dubious advantages these tactics bring it would be wrong to make world communism suffer a serious weakening of local parties and the strengthening of bourgeois regimes. The argument is not devoid of substance. For it is common knowledge that "revisionism" has become rampant in western Communist parties and that parties like the Indian party have in large sectors of policy become a virtual tail of the ruling class. But in these countries the other policy could be equally disastrous. There is no easy way out of it. The Communists in these lands cannot develop any genuine national feeling; they take pride on being "internationalists", which they equated till now with unflinching loyalty for the Soviet Union. In addition to the contradictory pulls of
national interest and extra-territorial affiliation the old certainty which a Communist formerly felt has now disappeared. "Internationalism" yes, but which brand, Moscow or Peking? Apart from the pivotal role of Moscow, loyalty to Russia can today pass off in India as patriotism. But what about the claims of the revolution, of the struggle for power? The continuing schism between the Russians and the Chinese can only prolong the mental anguish of India's Communists.

What then is the likely outcome of this ideological conflict which is being conducted by both parties with such determination? First of all is it purely ideological or does it reflect deeper conflicts between the two great nations? The Chinese are the loudest in proclaiming their faith in "proletarian internationalism". But we know that the Bolshevik revolution, too, started with similar universalist pretensions and ended up by pursuing the same aims and objectives as propelled its imperialist predecessor. We also know how often in the name of defending the bastion of proletarian power the interests of the toiling masses of other countries were subordinated to the national interests of the Russian state. Is history repeating itself in the case of the Chinese revolution? It is. The new regime there has insisted on "liberating" all parts of the old Chinese empire and even on expanding in the southwardly direction at the expense of India. It has established its hegemony over North Korea and North Viet Nam and is trying to convert all South-east Asia into its sphere of influence. There is only one territory over which the Chinese have not yet staked their claim and that is Outer Mongolia, Russia's protegy. As a matter of fact out of respect for Russian strength the Chinese have accepted its sovereign independence and agreed to press for its seating in the United Nations. There is, however, reason to believe that the Chinese hope to supplant gradually the Soviet influence in Ulan Bator as they eventually did in Manchuria and Sinkiang. The region of lake Baïkal and the maritime province of Siberia are the potential fields of Chinese ambition, for these
areas were conquered by the Czarist colonisers from the Manchus and other barbarians not so very long ago. And these barbarians had been subject to the influence of Chinese civilization for a period running into several centuries. Mr. Mao Tse-tung and his Chinese Communist party look upon themselves as the special guardians of the colonial and ex-colonial people and sooner or later there is bound to be a clash between them and the Russians for the leadership of Afro-Asia and ultimately the world. Yet it would be incorrect to suppose that this is going to happen soon. There are other pastures for China to till; and in this vast area the Americans, the neutrals and India are the main obstacles to Chinese expansion. Inspite of the great mobilisation for productive effort, China is still in the stage of primary accumulation of skills and equipment and Russian economic assistance and technical knowhow is vital for Chinese development. As there is a tendency among Communists to give every difference of opinion and clash of material interests ideological garb, it would be logical to regard the Chinese as not wholly inspired by ideas. The Russians have given the Chinese experimental atomic reactors, probably some power stations also. But they have so far refused to pass on to them the knowhow and means of manufacturing atomic weapons. The Chinese must be very angry over this flagrant breach of fraternal duty. Is not the leading socialist state exhibiting the same narrow-minded secretiveness as that bourgeois American Senate is displaying? Can there be any secrets among socialist countries? Apart from the desire to seize the leadership of the colonial and ex-colonial countries, the ideological struggle is perhaps a means of putting pressure on the Russians for obtaining atomic secrets and atomic capability and also larger economic aid. The Chinese attacks on Mr. Tito, Mr. Nasser and Mr. Nehru are probably motivated by the desire to stop the leakage of Russian aid to these degenerate leaders of the neutral world.
China’s Next Target

All this does not exactly presage an early “mellowing” of the Chinese revolution as hoped for by the so-called progressives. It is a curious characteristic of such people that unable themselves to give a decisive turn to history they always trumpet their broad-mindedness and perspective thinking, which consists in doing nothing themselves and expecting time and others to solve their difficulties for them. Thus they hope that time and massive economic aid from America, Western Europe and Russia would help them tide over the crisis of economic growth; that time and African revolt against Portuguese colonialism would so weaken it as to induce it to deliver Goa into Indian hands like a ripe fruit; they hope again that time and Mr. Khrushchov would have a cooling effect on the Chinese bad temper, prodding them into co-existing with India and Nepal peacefully. Nothing could be more naive than this wishful thinking.

The Chinese have now become a future-oriented nation and have grandiose designs. They wish to become a mighty Pacific power by expelling the Americans from Formosa and reducing Japan to the position of a subordinate ally; they have plans to transform, by a policy of blackmail and internal revolt, the South-east Asian states into Chinese satellites. Half of Malaya is nearly Chinese and Singapore overwhelmingly so. With Singapore and Malaya firmly under Chinese control India, Pakistan and Ceylon would be invested simultaneously from the North, East and South. This is not all. As a Pacific power the Chinese intend to carry the fight against the Americans right into their Latin American closed preserve, a thing from which the Russians have so far refrained. The Chinese are convinced that the Americans cannot extricate themselves from the coils of western colonialism and that it would be possible to maintain throughout the world an atmosphere of uncertainty and crisis. Their hypothesis is not so far removed from the realities of the world as is the fond supposition of India’s “progressives” that all struggles ceased on 15th
August 1947 and that on that day opened a new era of tranquility and evolutionary development in international politics, and that is why the Chinese are confident that they would be able to prevent the Russians from adopting policies designed to let them settle into cozy affluence. I cannot see how Russians can escape paying this price if they are not to jeopardise their position by precipitating a break with China. Such a break would be of course fatal for China, but it would hurt Russia no less and both would therefore seek to avoid it. India must realise the fact that she stands almost alone face to face with China and that it would be idle for her to expect the Russians to pull their chestnuts out of fire. India can take advantage of these debates and mould Communist opinion only if she is internally strong, if she achieves social and economic equality and mobilises its entire manpower for economic reconstruction. And this economic reconstruction must not merely be a replica of Europe but should incorporate new ideas and new values. India had, in the distant past, radiated its influence through ideas, philosophy, religion and culture. Even today when the Indians are hated and derided everywhere, when India’s prestige is practically extinct over large parts of South-East Asia, Mahatma Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violent resistance is winning unexpected adherents in Africa and Southern United States. Can one doubt that it will be possible effectively to reverse the present trends if India shakes off its present torpor and braces itself up for another creative adventure?

November, 1960.
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: THE NEW PHASE

With 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the ideological conflict between the "moderate" wing led by the Russians and the "extremist" faction headed by the Chinese which had been temporarily patched up at the Moscow gathering of world Communists in November last year, has erupted with full force. It would be well to clarify the expressions "moderate" and "extremist" used in relation to Nikita Khrushchov and Mao Tse-tung. It is not suggested by these terms that one faction is on the verge of surrendering to the Atlantic camp and the other poised for a thermo-nuclear show-down with it. The agreement on ultimate aims continues, although immediate objectives may differ. The conflict essentially arises from the difference in the stage of development of the Russian and Chinese revolutions, the comparative youthfulness of China and its outlaw status in world affairs. There is also an element of power struggle, of leadership conflict and even of individual aversions, although both have sought to clothe their drive for power with ideological arguments.

Public Avowal of Friendship

The two giants have so far refrained from any direct recriminations; both swear by ever-lasting friendship between Russia and China. Thus in a special message to 22nd Soviet Congress Mao Tse-tung averred that the "unity and friendship between our two parties and people are eternal, long-tested and indestructive", a statement which, it was reported, was greeted by "warm applause". The Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, too, in his speech to the same Congress acknowledged the "support and assistance" received by China from the Soviet people and the Russian Communist Party and said amidst applause that "this great unity and
friendship of our two countries will flow on eternally like the Yangtse and the Volga.” (The Peking Review, 27th Oct. 1961). These sentiments were reciprocated by the Soviet leaders in their speeches at the Moscow Congress. On the occasion of the 44th anniversary of the Russian Revolution on 7th November again the message of the Chinese leaders swore by the existence of a “deep, kinsman-like friendship” between the two people and parties, a point which the Soviet representatives at the various rallies did not fail to emphasise. (The Peking Review, 10th Nov. 1961.)

If such is the public avowal of mutual friendship, how could it be said that the Sino-Russian differences have taken an acute turn? The fact is that in the Communist system there is no free, public discussion; the debate is carried on behind the scene and even the fact of the existence of controversy is almost always denied. That is why when the differences reach a critical stage they come into the open with a terrific force. Such was the case with the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, the denunciation of Stalin, the Polish October, the “exposure” of the anti-party group and the latest acrimonious dispute over Albania. The Albanian conflict has wide ramifications, in fact wider than the Soviet—Yugoslav dispute, for it is a fight by proxy between the two giants of world communism, with their international following in the various national parties.

Political observers however need not remain in the dark till the disputants choose to raise the curtain and take their fight to the public. They can take hints, read between the lines, put two and two together and arrive at a fairly correct understanding of what is going on behind the facade of the “monolithic unity” of the “socialist camp” and the world Communist movement.

Similarity with Yugoslav Controversy

The present Sino-Russian controversy apparently dates from the aggressive Chinese pronouncements on the occasion of Lenin Day last year, but as a matter of fact the roots
of the conflict go back to 1948 when Stalin clashed with Tito and openly denounced the Yugoslav Communist Party. The Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, too, had developed along lines similar to the current fight with the Albanians, the Russians accusing the Yugoslavs of hostile, anti-Soviet attitude, of suppression of internal democracy, with the additional charge of Trotskyism thrown in. The Yugoslavs replied by charging the Russians with interference in internal affairs, of using the forum of the international workers' movement to browbeat the Yugoslavs into obedience, of stopping economic aid and disrupting their development programme.

Mr. Khrushchov has now made similar allegations against the Albanians except that the charge of Trotskyism is replaced by that of Stalinism, of the Stalinist cult, of Stalinist methods of running the party. The Albanian rejoinder sounds very much like an echo of the past Yugoslav replies to the Russians. The irony, however, is that the Albanians, who were then the bitterest opponents of the Yugoslavs and the most ardent supporters of Stalin's campaign against them, find themselves today the victims of a similar Russian attack against a brother party. It would not be far wrong to say that the main reason that has brought the Albanian Communists into a headlong conflict with the Russians is the excessive zeal they displayed in their fight with the Yugoslavs and their failure to adjust themselves with the new political set-up in Russia and support Khrushchov in his attempt to bring about a rapprochement with Tito in 1955 by putting the blame for the 1948 split—in which the Albanians were too deeply involved—solely at the door of Stalin.

The Post-Stalin Set-up

The events immediately after Stalin's death to the final emergence of Mr. Khrushchov both as the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers are still shrouded in mystery. The communique announcing the death of Stalin also con-
tained the news about the new troika arrangement whereby Malenkov became the Prime Minister and First Secretary, Molotov became the Foreign Secretary and Beria Minister for Internal Security. There was also a reconstruction of the Presidium of the CPSU—formerly the Politburo, in which the position of Khrushchov then was by no means pre-eminent. Then a gradual shift began: Malenkov handed over his charge as First Secretary to Khrushchov, Beria was accused and shot, and, two years later, Malenkov was relieved of his responsibility as Premier, yielding place to Bulganin. Thereafter Khrushchov began to function not only as the First Secretary of the Communist Party but also as the virtual head of the Government. In 1957 he overpowered the Presidium majority against him, presumably with the assistance of the armed forces, and then finally got rid of both Zhukov and Bulganin and combined in his own person the biggest offices in the party and the state.

It was sometime after he became First Secretary and before 20th Party Congress that Khrushchov associated himself with the process of what is known as de-Stalinisation. Stalin's death brought to an end an old era which had dragged on beyond its legitimate span of time. The ruling class of the mighty industrial nation which Stalin had created had become tired of the old ways of government and desired nothing better than a little relaxation. They wanted to remove the haunting fear of the midnight arrest, purge and concentration camp. There was virtual unanimity on this, although it was not essential for this process to be accompanied by de-canonisation of Stalin. However Khrushchov, who was not a whit less Stalinist than others while the old boss was alive, was not so near the seat of power as were the members of the so-called anti-party group and was less closely identified with the doings of the Stalin era than Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovitch. He must, have, therefore, shrewdly seen in phased de-Stalinisation the opportunity of his life time. By taking the lead in de-Stalinisation he could pose as a “liberal” communist and keep himself in tune with the mood of the people. By oppos-
ing the "conservative" wing he captured power inside the party, and after coming into power he used his control over the party and the government to further blacken the "conservative" bloc as the representatives of the "bad old times" and supporters of the methods of terror, confession and the firing squad. Nikita Khrushchov must have broken many a faithful heart and disillusioned thousands upon thousands of comrades by his icon-breaking, but that was the only way he could make himself the popular leader of the Soviet masses. Khrushchov may not be a feared and respected leader like Stalin but that his folksy ways are popular cannot be denied.

**International Repurcussions of de-Stalinisation**

The rapid changes in Russia did not, however, fail to produce complications in the sphere of international relations, inter-state and inter-party. Khrushchov defeated his Russian rivals with utmost speed, no doubt. But the change in Russian leadership broke the iron grip of the Soviet Party over the international Communist movement, a grip which had already been successfully challenged by the Yugoslavs in 1948. Stalin had realised that it was one thing to control and bend to his will the financially weak, persecuted parties in the capitalist countries; it was another to try to dominate a party which had achieved power in an independent sovereign state. There was no way of removing the united leadership of such a party except by recourse to war.

After the war Stalin was at the height of his power and his prestige throughout the Communist world was enormous. Even so the successful defiance of his authority by Tito produced reverberations in the countries of the "socialist camp". There were purge trials, and scores of Communists had their heads chopped off on charges of Titoism. In Poland Gomulka, who barely survived the purge, had himself been accused of the Titoist heresy.

It is no wonder the denunciation of Stalin produced an explosion. The Polish rebellion remained peaceful, thanks
to the moderation shown by Gomulka, the Chinese backing at the crucial hour and also the decision of the Russians to withdraw the more obnoxious of their controls and accept the accomplished fact gracefully. In Hungary it led to a bloody suppression of the people's uprising. In other countries of the Soviet bloc, too, the adjustment with the new set-up was far from smooth. It was difficult to remove all the old leaders, and in some of them they clung rather too tenaciously. Some "reconstructed" themselves readily, some tardily and some not at all.

Albanian Hatred for Yugoslavia

The Russian attempt to make up with the Yugoslavs particularly antagonised and frightened their inveterate enemies, the Albanians. They flatly refused to go along, and when the Hungarian events cast shadows on the Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the Albanians felt greatly relieved. They found in the Chinese condemnation of the Yugoslav attempt to split the international Communist movement into "liberals" and "die-hard Stalinists" a bright ray of hope. Then came the refusal of the Yugoslavs to sign the Moscow declaration of 1957 and formally join the Communist camp that fanned the embers of the Chinese antagonism towards the Yugoslavs which the subsequent publication of their new "revisionist" programme did nothing to mollify. Ever since the Albanians have remained the most ardent disciples of the Chinese, just as they were the most loyal barking dogs of Stalin in his original fight with Tito in 1948.

Khrushchov's iconoclastic attacks on Stalin, with whose authority and prestige the leadership of Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu is closely bound, his repeated efforts to placate Belgrade and his attempt to replace the existing Albanian leadership by one more pliable to his will has brought him into conflict with Albania.

Albania is a small country, with a little over a million inhabitants, but its rulers are a determined set of Communists and they propose to remain in the saddle whether
Khrushchov likes it or not. The Albanians are surely farseeing, for they had anticipated this clash a long time back and had prepared for all eventualities by carefully cultivating their Chinese friends. The "fraternal relations" between these two parties have become quite close during the last two years. The Albanians were, therefore, delighted when the Chinese started last year their campaign for the restoration of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine aimed at the "revisionism" of Khrushchov. No names were, however, mentioned. At the February 1960 meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Powers, the WFTU gathering at Peking in June the same year and the subsequent meeting of the Communist parties at Bucharest the Chinese gave expression to their views freely.

Now from what Khrushchov and Hoxha have told us it seems evident that these two parties openly clashed with each other at Bucharest itself. The Moscow conference did not heal the breach. For it was no fight between the giant Russia and the pigmy Albania. The Albanians had aligned themselves with the Chinese Party and were the spokesman of a powerful section of the Communist movement which had a following scattered over six continents and in many parties, including, perhaps, the Soviet Communist Party.

That the twenty-second Congress of the Soviet party which had been convened to discuss the new programme of communist construction should devote so much time to the exposures of the "anti-party group", four years after it was defeated, is significant. That this exposure of an internal faction should be taken up simultaneously with the excommunication of a 'fraternal party at a national—and not an international—Congress showed that the condemned Albanians and the "anti-party group" were all part of a world-wide heresy. Chou En-Lia's intervention in the debate and his public admonition to Khrushchov further brought out the international importance of the issues involved.
The Burcharest confabulations were held on the occasion of the national congress of the Rumanian Communist Party where Khrushchov tried to secure international backing for his foreign policy line. The Albanians were among those who refused to toe the Russian policy. Divergencies had become so serious, according to Khrushchov, that "as far back as August 1960, we proposed a meeting twice to the Albanian leaders but they evaded. They were just as stubborn in rejecting talks with us during the Moscow meeting of the fraternal parties in November, 1960. When a meeting was finally arranged at the insistence of the CCCPSU, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu disrupted it, and resorted to actions which we can only describe as provocative. The leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour ostentatiously withdrew from the November meeting, thus showing that they refused to take account of the collective opinion of the fraternal parties. They rudely turned down our subsequent proposals for getting together. They have long been assailing the course of the twentieth Congress. . . . It is no longer a secret to anyone that the Albanian leaders maintain their power by resorting to force and arbitrary rule". (Moscow News, 4th Nov. 1961).

That all along this "stubborn" and "provocative" attitude of the Albanians had the full backing of the Chinese will become clear when it is realised that the Chinese admiration for the Albanians grew exactly in proportion to the increase in Soviet hostility towards them. During the meeting of the Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960 the Chinese were so pleased with the Albanians' go-to-hell attitude towards Khrushchov that the 16th anniversary of Albania's liberation was celebrated with great fanfare in Peking on 29th November 1960. The reception held by the Albanian ambassador was attended by all the big people in China, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and Chou En-lai. The Chinese Premier showered lavish praise on the Albanian Party and called it a "militant Marxist—Leninist Party tempered through fiery revolutionary struggles". He mentioned its totally "uncompromising struggle against modern

Sino-Soviet Reactions to Albania

The reactions of the Russian and Chinese Communists to the 4th Congress of the Albanian Party held in February 1961 are also revealing. The CPSU representative, Pospelov, who attended this Congress, reported to 22nd Congress of the Soviet Party that the proceedings of the Albanian Communist Congress had produced a “painful impression”, that it was a “rowdy, noisy, obtrusive demonstration of the personality cult” and of “fantastic self-adulation’. During the Congress “we came across several glaring facts of direct anti-Soviet attacks launched by prominent Albanian executives, facts of humiliating and hostile attitude towards our specialists, our geologists and seamen”. Pospelov further said that on 20th February, 1961 the Soviet representatives gave a “warning” to the Albanian statesmen that if they did not stop their anti-Soviet acts these might entail “quite serious consequences’. (New Age, 19th Nov. 1961.)

While the Russian Communists administered this bitter medicine to the Albanians, the Chinese Communist Party honoured them with a warm message from their central committee. In his speech to the Albanian Congress the Chinese fraternal delegate stressed the unity of the socialist camp and said that all Communist Parties are independent and have equal rights. He underlined the significance of the struggle against “revisionism” and the “important role” played by the Albanian Party in upholding the “purity of Marxism-Leninism”. (The Peking Review, 19th February, 1961). Not only this but within 48 hours of the rebuke to the Albanians from the Soviet Party the Chinese newspaper
Renmin Ribao, in its editorial of 22nd February 1961, called the Albanian Party a “glorious Party”, its leader Hoxha a “long-tested leader” and assured it of the Chinese people’s abiding friendship for Albania.

Chou’s Rebuke to Khrushchov

The Chinese Communist Party’s sympathy and support for the Albanian Communist did not wane after the Albanian Congress in February 1961. The relations between the USSR and Albania, both at the state and party level, increasingly became strained. The Russians abruptly discontinued aid to Albania and withdrew their technical and naval personnel. The pattern of the break-up of relations between Russia and Albania took the same form as that of the earlier estrangement with Yugoslavia under Stalin. The simmering differences ultimately came to the surface at 22nd Congress of the Soviet party when Khrushchev delivered his public attack on the Albanians and the anti-party group. The Chinese not only did not fall in line; they took the unusual step of criticising the mighty leader of the Soviet Party in its own homeland! Addressing the Soviet Congress Chon En-lai said:

“Any public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful to resolving problems. To bring a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries into the open in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. Such an attitude will only grieve those near and dear to us and gladden our enemies. The Communist Party of China sincerely hopes that fraternal parties which have disputes or differences between them will unite afresh on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and on the basis of mutual respect for independence and equality. This in my opinion, is the position which we Communists ought to take on this question.” (The Peking Review, 27th Oct. 1961.)

Chou’s speech did not have any effect on the delegates to the Soviet Congress. Speaker after speaker continued
to denounce Albania and the anti-party group, and many foreign Communists, including the representative of the Mongolian Republic, joined the chorus. However there were quite a few fraternal parties, mostly Asian, who did not take sides, some of them implicitly supporting the Chinese. After giving the Russians a piece of his mind, Chon En-lai hurled another defiance at Khrushchov by publicly laying a wreath at the corpse of the “great Marxist-Leninist” Stalin and then abruptly departed for Peking, where he was received in person by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and others. The Chinese left no doubt that Chou En-lai was expressing the sentiment of the Chinese Party as a whole when he disapproved the Soviet censure of Albania at 22nd Congress.

After Chou's departure the Soviet Congress drew to a climax passing a resolution on the removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin Mausoleum and deciding to put up in Moscow a memorial to the victims of the Stalin purges. That threw the world’s Communists again into disarray, and the Italian Communist leader Togliatti publicly moaned that Khrushchov had not thought it necessary to give the Communists an advance intimation of the staging of the second act of the de-Stalinisation drama.

Albania Hits Back

The proceedings of 22nd Congress brought no repentance to the Albanian leaders. In an outspoken speech to the Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour held about the same time, Enver Hoxha made a frontal assault on the ideological position of Khrushchov and criticised the tactics employed by him to “intimdate” the workers’ parties into submission and even to “liquidate” those who oppose him. This speech was fully reproduced by the Chinese People's Daily after a delay of 10 days.

Hoxha said that the Albanians are not opposed to the policy of peaceful co-existence. But they were not prepared to raise it to the status of the “general line” or the “main path” of progress towards communism as the new pro-
gramme of the CPSU had sought to do. The Albanian leader alleged that Khrushchov had “weakened vigilance” against the enemy and had “done a service to imperialism” by describing it as harmless.

Hoxha rejected the Soviet attacks on Stalin whom he called a “great Marxist” and an “outstanding revolutionary leader” of the world working class. He indicted Khrushchov for having tried to “dethrone Stalin” so that he could voice his “opportunist argument”. It was not the Albanian Party but Khrushchev who was the “culprit”, the splitter of the international unity of the Communist movement. Accusing the Russian leader of silencing those who do not support his “revisionism”, Hoxha said that Khrushchev was backsliding on the question of German Peace treaty and was attempting to “disarm a socialist country like Albania”, although it was subject to hostile capitalist encirclement.

Enver Hoxha asserted that Khrushchov has violated the principle of independence of fraternal parties and rushed fraternal parties into speaking against the Albanians without giving them time to reflect on the issues involved. He also accused Khrushchov of blatantly interfering in the internal affairs of the Albanian party, of discontinuing economic aid, of withdrawing Soviet personnel, sorely needed by Albania, of disrupting their development plans, and even stopping the scholarships of the Albanian students undergoing training in the Soviet Union. (From Hoxha’s speech in Observer, 12th Nov. 1961.)

The discontinuance of Soviet economic aid must have caused a great upset to the Albanian plans for this aid had risen to half a billion dollars in 1958-59. Of course the Chinese have provided some additional assistance but if all the East European parties are induced by the Russians into boycotting the Albanians, they would find themselves into a really tight corner.

There have been further developments in the Soviet-Albanian quarrel after 22nd Congress. At the anniversary
function of the Russian revolution in Peking the Albanians staged a walkout when the Russian ambassador made an attack on the Albanian Party. At the meeting of the COMECON, the Soviet aid club, the Albanians were conspicuous by their absence. They have been virtually read out of the Warsaw pact. But as long as the Albanians are sustained in their intransigence by the Chinese party and its allies—some nine parties sent a message to the Albanians notwithstanding the anathema pronounced by Khrushchov—it is unlikely that the Albanians will go to Canossa in sack cloth and ashes.

Khrushchov knows very well that the Chinese are behind the Albanians. In his reply to Chou En-lai at the Soviet Congress the Russian leader implied as much when he said that “if the Chinese comrades wish to apply their efforts towards normalising the relations between the Albanian party of Labour and the fraternal parties, there is hardly anyone who can help the solution of this problem better than the Communist Party of China”. (Moscow News, 4th Nov. 1961.)

Obviously prompted by Khrushchov, Walter Ulbricht of East Germany a little later asked the Chinese Communists to put their cards on the table and “define in one way or the other their attitude with regard to the anti-Soviet attacks and the violations of the Warsaw Pact committed by the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labour.” (The Times of India, 27th Nov. 1961.)

Contrasting Moods of Russia and China

This then is the present stage in the Sino-Soviet relations. Albania by itself is not important. It is the Chinese power and its ramifications throughout the world Communist movement that have endowed the dispute with deep significance. Of course, it does not indicate that a split is imminent. But it does suggest that the “monolithic unity” of the Soviet camp is likely to grow less and less monolithic.
Joseph Stalin ushered backward Russia into mid-twentieth century industrialism within less than 30 years. The high European and American living standards, to attain and surpass which has been the set goal of the Russian Communist policy since Lenin's day, are now within the realm of immediate and practical possibility. Russia has its new programme of Communist construction. It would like to realise it on schedule. It does not want to take undue risks, or go in for international adventures. The mental climate there is more in harmony with the one prevailing in Western Europe and North America. A gulf has opened up, more psychological and ideological than in the nature of a conflict of economic interests, between them and the Chinese. There is also a clash of national pride, of pre-eminence in leadership. The Chinese are rapidly building up their industries. They have reorganised their agriculture without repeating the Russian mistakes during the collectivisation drive. They are gradually building up a sphere of influence for themselves. After the great effort they put up in Korea, the North Korean regime has virtually come under their control. At the birth of North Viet Nam the Chinese had played the role of a midwife and so the Viet Namese remain closely attached to the Chinese. In the Japanese and South-East Asian Parties, the pro-Chinese wing is powerful. Even in India the Chinese wing is not without influence. The Mongol Republic was formerly a part of the Chinese-empire and was carved out into an independent state by the Russians. The Chinese have outwardly accepted its present status; but the Mongols are fearful and have moved closer to the Russians in recent days. If the prop of Russian support goes, the separate existence of the Mongol Republic will go up in smoke.

Impact on India

The Sino-Russian viewpoints on India also do not coincide. The Russians have been cultivating Mr. Nehru's friendship for the last many years. They do not consider India a member of the "socialist camp". But they do think
that it belongs to the "peace camp", as opposed to the enemy camp. They have extended it economic aid and are hoping for its peaceful evolution into the socialist camp. That is not the Chinese view. They have designs on Indian territory and India is a thorn in their side; it blocks the extension of its influence in the direction of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. The Chinese love to describe India as a virtual U.S. colony. They make a great play of its increasing dependence on western aid. They are thus laying the ideological groundwork for their offensive against India. By a series of calculated probes into India's northern territories China struck fear into the hearts of the South-East Asian states and told them that they were sadly mistaken if they thought that they could look to India for comfort and help in times of difficulty and danger. Better make up with China betimes and the Chinese would treat them generously.

China's anti-Indian complex has become so overpowering that it does not hesitate to make overtures to Pakistan which is linked with the Atlantic camp through two military alliances. The Chinese ambassador in Karachi recently emphasised the fact that unlike the Soviet Union China had never upheld India's claim to Kashmir and that until now it had done nothing to harm the interests of Pakistan. (The Indian Express, 9th Dec. 1961.)

And what has been India's reaction to all this? It has remained passive and inert. It has made no real effort to pull its economy from the ruts of stagnation, to fuse the disparate elements of its caste-ridden population into a new unity. It hopes that the Chinese would turn out to be not so bad after all, or that the Russians would restrain them, or that the fear of U.S. retaliation would dissuade them from starting full-scale operations against India. Lacking will and determination, its rulers talk endlessly about peace. Having agreed to partition before coming to power, the nation's honour and territorial integrity mean nothing to them. They have let Indian influence be push-
ed out from South-East Asia and have now reconciled themselves to the loss of the Himalayas. Mr. Nehru talks of preparations within two years. What preparations? Starting from the same point the Chinese have shot ahead of us in respect of the production of basic materials like coal and steel. India's plans hold no prospect of our catching up with the Chinese. The future seems to be dismal unless this ancient land wakes from its age-old slumber and starts marching.

Post-Script: After the above was written the Chinese People's Daily in an article again stressed the need for preserving the solidarity of the Communist camp on the basis of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the statement of November, 1960. It called for mutual consultations among fraternal parties, and by implication disapproved of any unilateral denunciation of any party or any unilateral action against a member of the “socialist block”. However the article said nothing about the merits or otherwise of the Soviet criticism of Albania. Khrushchov in his reply to the Chinese October anniversary message said that the Russian Party greatly valued the Chinese friendship. Within a few days, however, Soviet Russia withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Albania, sent the Albanians packing and cut off all diplomatic ties with that country. This has further strained Sino-Russian relations and the fiction of “eternal friendship” is now increasingly difficult to maintain. All these developments are as pregnant with possibilities as the great schism in the western Christian Church in the 16th century.
