CHINA'S BETRAYAL OF INDIA

BACKGROUND TO THE INVASION

PUBLICATIONS DIVISION
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MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
The traditional relations of friendship between India and China have been rudely shattered by the expansionist policy of the Chinese Government which culminated in the invasion of India's northern border on October 20, 1962. This booklet tells the story of how India offered its goodwill and active friendship to the People's Republic of China and espoused its cause in the councils of the world, and how the Chinese Government has betrayed this friendship.
# CONTENTS

| I. 2,000 Years of Goodwill | .. | .. | .. | 1 |
| II. Tibet: The First Rebuff | .. | .. | .. | 4 |
| III. The Agreement of 1954 | .. | .. | .. | 6 |
| IV. Insidious Encroachments | .. | .. | .. | 9 |
| V. The Mask is Off | .. | .. | .. | 14 |
| VI. Facts about the Border | .. | .. | .. | 24 |
| VII. Naked Aggression | .. | .. | .. | 35 |
I. 2,000 YEARS OF GOODWILL

So old is the history of contact between India and China that a survey of relations between the two countries should properly begin from before the Christian era. No attempt at such a comprehensive survey is made in this booklet, whose aim is only to trace the salient features of the relations between the Government of independent India which came into being in August 1947 and the Government of the People’s Republic of China which was formed in October 1949.

It will suffice here to recall that from the earliest times the commerce between India and China by land and by sea embraced ideas as well as merchandise. There was a regular stream of Buddhist missionaries from India to China, beginning in 65 A.D. with Kashyapa Matanga who was followed by such scholars as Kumarajiva, Dharma Kshema and Paramartha. In the other direction, the movement of scholars brought numerous Chinese visitors to India. Of these the best known are Fa Hien, Hiuan-tsang and I-tsing, whose records of travel form an important part of the source material of India’s social and political history.

Owing to political vicissitudes in both countries, these contacts between India and China became less frequent after the 11th century. However, India’s relations with Tibet, which adjoins the greater length of the northern frontier, continued uninterrupted. Border trade with India across the Himalayan mountain passes was important for the Tibetan economy. There was also a considerable pilgrimage traffic. Mount Kailas and Lake Manasarovar in Tibet have through the ages been among the holiest places of pilgrimage for Hindus. Likewise Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi were sacred places of pilgrimage for Buddhists from Tibet.
Relations between India and China became more active again early in this century, with the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911 and the growth of the nationalist movement in India. Rabindranath Tagore's visit to China in 1924 was symbolic of this renewed relationship, which had its basis not only in shared cultural values but also in a common resistance to foreign imperialism. When the Chinese Hall of Visva-Bharati, the university founded by Tagore at Santiniketan, was inaugurated in April 1937, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru greeted "the great ceremony, great in the memories of the long past that it invokes, great also in the promise of future comradeship and the forging of new links to bring China and India nearer to each other. What a long past that has been, of friendly contacts and mutual influences, untroubled by political conflict and aggression! We have traded in ideas, in art, in culture, and grown richer in our own inheritance by the other's offering."

Following the full-scale invasion of China by Japan, the Indian National Congress gave concrete expression to its solidarity with the Chinese people by sending a medical mission to China. Nationalist opinion in India took no sides in the dispute between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. But there was a sympathetic understanding of the social aims of the Chinese Communists, and the hope was entertained that both sides would co-operate to expel the aggressor and usher in a democratic and progressive system after the war.

When the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists broke up after the war and the Communists overthrew the Chiang Kai-shek Government, India was among the first countries of the world to recognise the new Government of the People's Republic of China. As Shri Nehru explained subsequently, "When the revolution came within two or three years of our independence, we discussed
this matter with our Ambassador there and others concerned. It was clear that this was no palace revolution but a basic revolution involving millions and millions of human beings. It was a stable revolution with strength behind it and popularity behind it at that time, whatever might have happened later. It produced a perfectly stable government, entrenched strongly enough, and popular. That has nothing to do with our liking it or disliking it. Naturally, we came to the decision that this Government should be recognised, and within two or three months we did recognise it.”

India’s leaders did not allow their policy to be influenced by the fact that Prime Minister Nehru and his colleagues had been bitterly attacked by the new leaders of China as “running dogs of imperialism”, and that the Central Government’s police action in 1948 to control lawlessness in Hyderabad had been described as an act of aggression against the exploited masses. The Indian Government believed that the new leaders of China were out of touch with developments in Asia, and hoped that, given time, they would secure a true understanding of events. India’s leaders were not only eager to revive the friendly contacts between the two peoples that went back to antiquity; they believed that Sino-Indian friendship was necessary for peace in Asia and the world. India’s attitude towards China after the Communist revolution was thus a continuation of the goodwill that had prevailed between the two countries for over 2,000 years.
11. TIBET: THE FIRST REBUFF

On January 1, 1950, Chairman Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the “liberation of three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression” as a basic task of the People’s Liberation Army of China. This showed that the Government of China meant to enforce its authority in the vast and rugged territory lying between India and China proper. Without denying or challenging the suzerainty of China over Tibet, the Indian Government expressed the hope that the matter would be settled peacefully and that Tibet would be able to maintain the autonomy which it had enjoyed for at least the last forty years. On August 13, 1950, the Government of India formally represented to the Government of China that they were concerned about the possibility of unsettled conditions across their border.

On August 21 the Government of China declared their willingness to solve the problem of Tibet by peaceful and friendly measures and their desire to “stabilise the China-India border”. The Government of India expressed their appreciation of the intentions of the Government of China regarding Tibet, and added that “the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate”.

Chinese troops finally did enter Tibet on October 7, 1950. The Government of India drew the attention of the Government of China to the harmful effects of resorting to military action, as it meant postponement of the admission of the People’s Government to the U.N. as well as unrest and disturbances on India’s borders. India had at that time initiated the effort, which she has persistently continued, to secure representation for the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. India was of the view, as indeed she continues to be, that unless the U.N. included representatives of the effective Government of such a large segment
of the world's population, it would be difficult for the world organisation to ensure stability and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Peking's answer was to accuse India of "having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet". Shri Nehru expressed surprise at this unwarranted allegation, and reiterated the "well-meant advice by a friendly foreign government which has a natural interest in the solution of problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful means." Speaking in the Indian Parliament on December 7, he said: "It is not right for any country to talk about its sovereignty or suzerainty over an area outside its own immediate range. That is to say, since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail, and not any legal or constitutional arguments. That, I think, is a valid point. Whether the people of Tibet are strong enough to assert their rights or not is another matter. Whether we are strong enough or any other country is strong enough to see that this is done is also another matter. But it is a right and proper thing to say, and I see no difficulty in saying to the Chinese Government, that whether they have suzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Tibet, surely, according to any principles, the principles they proclaim and the principles I uphold, the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else."

Events were to turn out quite otherwise. Tibetan leaders had to agree to Peking's terms, and they signed an agreement on May 23, 1951. Within eight years the Dalai Lama was to flee Lhasa and seek political asylum in India.
III. THE AGREEMENT OF 1954

India did not allow her policy of friendship to be altered because of the suspicious and intemperate attitude of China on the Tibetan issue. This friendship was prominently displayed during the Korean crisis, which developed in 1950. India had voted in favour of United Nations action against North Korea, but when China entered the Korean War at the end of the year, India resisted the condemnation of her as an aggressor by the General Assembly of the U.N. in order not to enlarge the area of hostilities. In her efforts to bring about a settlement, India served as a channel of communication of Chinese intentions and requirements to the outside world, and pressed vigorously for the recognition of the People's Government as the rightful representative of China in the United Nations. In September 1951, India declined to attend the Conference at San Francisco for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan because, among other reasons, China was not a party to it.

Mid-1953 saw the end of the Korean crisis and the establishment of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, with India as Chairman, to deal with prisoners of the Korean War. On the last day of the year, on the initiative of the Government of India, negotiations began at Peking on the relations between India and Tibet. India hoped that friendship and co-operation with China would be strengthened by settling all outstanding issues which had been inherited from the past.

A Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet and India was signed on April 29, 1954, and ratified on June 3. Under this Agreement, India gave up all the extraterritorial rights enjoyed in Tibet by the British Government of India and recognised that Tibet was a region
of China. The Agreement, which was to be in force for eight years, specified trade agencies, markets and pilgrim routes and laid down regulations for trade and intercourse across the common border. Moreover, in the Preamble of the Agreement the two countries affirmed that they would abide by the Five Principles of (i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) mutual non-aggression; (iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and (v) peaceful co-existence. An exchange of notes dealt with matters relating to the withdrawal of Indian military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyantse and the transfer at a nominal price of the post, telegraph and telephone services and the rest-houses belonging to the Government of India in Tibet to the Government of China.

The way was now clear for the promotion of cordial relations between India and China. The Five Principles presumed that there were no problems pending between the two countries, and that such issues as might arise thereafter would be settled on the basis of mutual goodwill. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai, was given a warm reception when he visited Delhi in June 1954 at the invitation of the Government of India.

In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of their talks, the two Prime Ministers re-affirmed the Five Principles and declared: "If these Principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence....The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in the friendship between India and China which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as the other countries of Asia."
Events were to show very shortly that while India took the Five Principles or the *Panch Sheel* seriously as a code of international morality, to China they were but a temporary device of diplomacy.
IV. INSIDIOUS ENCROACHMENTS

Within a few weeks of Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to India, on July 17, 1954, the Chinese lodged a protest against the presence of Indian troops in Barahoti (which they called Wu-Je) in the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh. This was the first time that the Government of China had laid claim to any part of Indian territory. The Indian Government did not then know that this was only the beginning of China's fantastic territorial claims, and that the territorial claims beginning with Barahoti would become the cover for aggression against India.

The frontier between India and China (including the frontiers of Sikkim and Bhutan which are attached to India by special treaties and whose external relations are the responsibility of the Government of India) extends over 2,640 miles. The entire length of this border has been long recognised by custom, and the greater part of it has also been defined by treaty. The boundary follows the geographical principle of the watershed, which is in most places the crest of the Himalayan mountains. Because of the very high altitude and inhospitable climate the areas along this vast frontier are very sparsely or not at all inhabited. India's administrative system, including tax collection and the enforcement of law and order, has extended right up to the border; but it has naturally taken the form appropriate to the geographical terrain and to the population, many of whom, particularly on the eastern frontier, are tribal people with whose way of life the Indian Central Government have not wished to interfere unduly.

In the western sector the boundary runs for about 1,100 miles from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan, marking off the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir from Sinkiang and Tibet. Two-thirds of the
frontier in this sector is between Tibet and the Ladakh area of Kashmir. The Ladakh-Tibet frontier was recognised by a treaty signed in 1842 by the representatives of Kashmir on the one hand and of the Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China on the other.

In the middle sector the natural boundary marks off the Indian States of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh from Tibet. The boundary is formed by water-sheds, and has been well recognised by custom and usage. Part of the alignment of the boundary was implicitly described in the India-China Agreement of April 1954 which specified six border passes between Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh on the one hand and Tibet on the other.

The natural boundary between Sikkim and Tibet (about 140 miles), which lies along the crest of a watershed, was confirmed by a Convention signed by Britain and China at Calcutta in March 1890, and was later jointly demarcated on the ground. The Bhutan-Tibet boundary (about 300 miles) is a natural and traditional one, following the crest of the Himalayan range.

In the eastern sector, the traditional boundary which runs east from Bhutan to the tri-junction of the China-Burma-India borders, was formalised at a Tripartite Conference held at Simla in 1913-14 and attended by the Plenipotentiaries of the Government of India, Tibet and China. The borderline, which was delineated on a large-scale map, came to be known as the McMahon Line after the name of the British Indian representative at the Simla Conference. It is the frontier between Tibet and the North East Frontier Agency of India.

Till July 1954 there had been no doubt raised as to what constituted the traditional boundaries of India, and the Government of China were well aware of them. In the Agreement of April 29, 1954, the Government of China, far from laying claim to any part of Indian territory, had given
a solemn undertaking to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India. In view of this, the Government of India concluded that the claim to Barahoti was made by the Chinese in ignorance, particularly as they did not seem to be aware of its exact location. India accordingly sent a note pointing out that there was no question of violation of Tibetan territory since Barahoti was south of the Niti Pass (one of the six border passes mentioned in the Agreement of April 1954) and inside Indian territory. India, on the other hand, protested against an attempt by Chinese officials to cross into Barahoti.

When Shri Nehru visited China in October 1954, he took up with the Chinese leaders the question of some maps recently published in China which had shown an incorrect boundary alignment between the two countries. These maps incorporated within China about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in the North East Frontier Agency and in Ladakh. Shri Nehru said that this was presumably by error; so far as India was concerned, her boundaries were clear and well known and not a matter of argument. Mr. Chou En-lai, in reply, sought to treat these Chinese maps as of little significance. He said they were merely a reproduction of old Kuomintang maps which the People’s Government had had no time to revise.

In the meanwhile the economic relations between India and China were strengthened by the conclusion of a trade agreement in October 1954. In the next few years there was a large-scale exchange of visits by business groups and by delegations of experts in various fields of development. From the Indian side there was a curiosity to know how China, facing problems largely similar to India’s in terms of a large population as well as industrial and technological backwardness, was tackling the problems of agricultural and industrial development.

In the international sphere, following the successful mediation in Korea, India made available her good offices to China
at the Conference on Indo-China which was held at Geneva in the summer of 1954. India's policy of friendship towards China found further expression at the 29-nation Asian-African Conference which met in April 1955 at Bandung in Indonesia. At this Conference, which was sponsored by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, Mr. Chou En-lai had the active sympathy of Mr. Nehru in developing contacts with other Asian and African leaders.

All this made no difference to Chinese expansionism. In June 1955, Chinese troops camped on Barahoti plain, and in September they even proceeded ten miles south of Niti Pass to Damzan. In April 1956 an armed Chinese party intruded into the Nilang area in Uttar Pradesh. In September there were two intrusions by Chinese forces across the Shipki Pass. Shipki was the first of the six border passes mentioned in the 1954 Agreement on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet. There was no question of the Chinese not knowing the limit of Indian territory here. The Government of India had constructed a road up to this point and had been maintaining it for years; and in 1954 the words "Hindustan-Tibet" were engraved on a rock flanking the pass on the left. On September 20, 1956, a Chinese patrol came up to Hupsang Khud, four miles from Shipki Pass on the Indian side. On encountering an Indian patrol, the Chinese party threatened to use arms.

The Indian Government lodged protests against each of these encroachments of 1955 and 1956 which all took place in the middle sector of the India-China border.

Mr. Chou En-lai visited Delhi again in the winter of 1956. During the talks which took place between the two Prime Ministers in November 1956 and again in January 1957, it was decided that while there were no disputes regarding the border, there were certain petty problems which should be settled amicably by the representatives of the two Governments. Mr. Chou En-lai told Shri Nehru that in the
case of Burma the Government of China had accepted the boundary defined in 1914 (when Burma was part of Britain’s Indian Empire), popularly known as the McMahon Line; he added that the Chinese Government proposed to recognise the McMahon Line in the case of India too, and that he would consult the Tibetan authorities in this regard. The indication given by the Chinese Prime Minister regarding the McMahon Line was satisfying to Shri Nehru since it meant that China recognised the traditional India-China border in the eastern sector. As far back as on November 20, 1950, Prime Minister Nehru had declared in the Indian Parliament, about India’s northern boundary in the eastern sector, “The McMahon Line is our boundary. We will not allow anybody to come across that boundary.” This definite declaration had not been questioned by the Chinese Government, and Mr. Chou En-lai’s statement to Shri Nehru came as a welcome acknowledgement of the Indian position.
V. THE MASK IS OFF

Nearly three years were to pass before the Chinese Prime Minister went back on his word and China finally dropped the mask of reasonableness and of desire for a friendly settlement of the border question.

Notwithstanding the indication given by Mr. Chou En-lai that China recognised the McMahon Line, a Chinese party intruded into Walong, in the Lohit Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency of India, in October 1957.

During 1957, the Chinese started constructing a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang which ran across the Aksai Chin region of north-east Ladakh which is Indian territory. In order to ascertain the exact alignment of the road before sending a protest to China, two reconnaissance parties were sent out in the summer of 1958, an army party towards the north and a police party towards the southern extremity of the road. It took some time for the police party to return, as the journey was a long and arduous one. The army party did not return, and it was suspected that they might have been arrested by the Chinese. In fact they had been arrested and were released some time later. From the police party it was learnt that a part of the Tibet-Sinkiang highway was definitely in Indian territory. The Indian Government thereupon lodged a formal protest, in October 1958, against the serious and continuous occupation of Indian territory which road-building implied.

On the initiative of the Government of India, talks were held in Delhi during April and May of 1958 between representatives of the two Governments on the question of Barahoti. The Government of India suggested that, pending a settlement, neither side should send armed or civilian personnel into the area. The Government of China agreed not
to send armed personnel, but refused to refrain from sending civilian personnel. The talks thus proved fruitless. But they did show that the Chinese did not even know what area they meant by Wu-Je: they pressed for a local enquiry, as that would enable them to know the area they were claiming. In July 1958 the fort of Khurnak in Ladakh was occupied by Chinese soldiers; subsequently there were intrusions into the Lohit Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency and Lapthal and Sangchamalla in Uttar Pradesh, while aircraft approaching from Tibet flew over the Spiti Valley in Punjab and Chini in Himachal Pradesh.

On December 14, 1958, Prime Minister Nehru addressed a comprehensive letter to Mr. Chou En-lai on the India-China border problem. Shri Nehru wrote inter alia: “Towards the end of 1956, you did us the honour of paying a visit to India and we had the pleasure of having you in our midst for many days. Part of this time you spent in visiting various parts of India. I had occasion to be with you both in Delhi and during some of your visits, notably to our great river valley project at Bhakra-Nangal. We had long talks and discussed many international issues which were then agitating people’s minds and I was happy to know what your views were about them. In the course of these talks you referred to the Sino-Burmese border. You told me about the talks you had with U Nu at Peking and your desire to settle this problem with the Burmese Government. I had received the same information from U Nu who had told me of your wish to settle this problem to the satisfaction of both countries. It was in this connection that you mentioned to me the Sino-Indian border, and more especially the so-called McMahon Line. This McMahon Line covered a part of the Sino-Burmese border and a large part of the Chinese border with India. I remember your telling me that you did not approve of this border being called the McMahon Line, and I replied that I did not like that name either. But for facility of reference we referred to it as such.
"You told me then that you had accepted this McMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so.

"Immediately after our talk, I had written a minute so that we might have a record of this talk for our personal and confidential use. I am giving below a quotation from this minute:

'Premier Chou referred to the McMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that Line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this Line, established by British Imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so.'

"... A few months ago, our attention was drawn again to a map of China published in the magazine China Pictorial, which indicated the border with India. A large part of our North East Frontier Agency as well as some other parts which are and have long been well recognised as parts of India, and been administered by India in the same way as other parts of our country, were shown to be part of Chinese territory. I could understand four years ago that the Chinese Government, being busy with major matters of national reconstruction, could not find time to revise old maps. But
you will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People’s Republic came into power, the continued issue of these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India.

“I am venturing to write to you on this subject as I feel that any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries should be removed as soon as possible. I am anxious, as I am sure you are, that the firm basis of our friendship should not only be maintained but should be strengthened.”

The reply from the Chinese Prime Minister came as a shock to India. Mr. Chou En-lai in his letter of January 23, 1959, admitted that the border question was not raised in 1954, but offered an ominous explanation: “This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question.” What was the purpose of the Chinese Government undertaking, under the 1954 Agreement, to respect India’s territorial integrity if they had had doubts as to what constituted the territorial limits of India? It is unknown to international law, and contrary to any form of friendly relations between States for a country to keep its territorial claims undisclosed, profess amity and harmony, and then at its own convenience bring forward claims when it regards them as “ripe for solution”.

The Chinese Prime Minister claimed that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and asserted: “On the maps currently published in our country, the Chinese boundaries are drawn in the way consistently followed in Chinese maps for the past several decades, if not longer. . . . With the settlement of the boundary question—which, as our Government has repeatedly pointed out, requires surveys and mutual consultations—the problem of drawing the boundary on the maps will also be solved.” In other words,
the Government of China repudiated the traditional boundary between the two countries which had been well recognised by both sides for centuries. Going back on all their assurances and violating the Agreement of 1954, they laid claim to an area of about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory which was being shown in their recent maps as belonging to China. The Government of India was expected to enter into ‘consultations’ about 50,000 square miles of its territory!

Mr. Chou En-lai did not deny what he had said to Shri Nehru about the McMahon Line during his last visit to Delhi. The brazen denial was to come a little later; for the time being, he temporised: “An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the question of the so-called McMahon Line. I discussed this with Your Excellency as well as with Prime Minister U Nu. I would now like to explain again the Chinese Government’s attitude. As you are aware, the McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically, too, it cannot be considered legal. . . . On the other hand, one cannot, of course, fail to take cognisance of the great and encouraging changes. India and Burma, which are concerned in this Line, have attained independence successively and become States friendly with China. In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand, finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter.”

In his reply of March 22, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru rebutted the claim that the Sino-Indian frontier had never been delimited or sanctioned by international agreements binding on China. Shri Nehru said it was true that this frontier had not been demarcated on the ground in all the
sectors, but pointed out that the traditional frontier, apart from the fact that it followed the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range, had also in most parts the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Government of India and the Central Government of China. Shri Nehru drew attention to the following agreements:

Sikkim: The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with Tibet was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.

The Ladakh region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir: A treaty of 1842 between Kashmir on the one hand and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa on the other confirmed the traditional boundary between Ladakh and Tibet. In 1847 the Chinese Government admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed.

The McMahon Line: This Line, which runs eastward from Bhutan and defines the boundary of China on the one hand and India and Burma on the other, was drawn at a Tripartite Conference held at Simla in 1913-14 between the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of China, Tibet and India. The boundary runs along the crest of the High Himalayan Range which forms the natural dividing line between the Tibetan plateau in the north and the sub-montane region in the south. At the time of acceptance of the delineation of this frontier, which was defined after full discussion, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, in letters exchanged, stated explicitly that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map appended to the Convention. Although the Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Conference objected to the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and between Tibet and China, he made no reservation in respect of the India-Tibet frontier either during the discussion or at the time of initialling the Convention.
After drawing attention to these facts, Shri Nehru reminded Prime Minister Chou En-lai of their discussion regarding the McMahon Line: “In our previous discussions and particularly during your visit to India in January 1957, we were gratified to note that you were prepared to accept this Line as representing the frontier between China and India in this region.”

Shri Nehru summed up the position in these words: “Thus, in these three different sectors covering much the larger part of our boundary with China, there is sufficient authority based on geography, tradition as well as treaties for the boundary as shown in our published maps. The remaining sector from the tri-junction of the Nepal, India and Tibet boundary up to Ladakh is also traditional and follows well-defined geographical features. Here, too, the boundary runs along well-defined watersheds between the river systems in the south and the west, on the one hand, and north and east, on the other. This delineation is confirmed by old revenue records and maps and by the exercise of Indian administrative authority up to the boundary line for centuries.”

The Chinese Prime Minister did not reply to this letter till September 8, 1959. Meanwhile the uprising in Tibet and its suppression by the Chinese authorities led to the Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa. When he crossed the frontier into India on March 31, 1959, and sought political asylum, the Indian Government granted the request but made it clear to the Dalai Lama that he should not indulge in political activity on Indian territory.

Speaking in the Indian Parliament on April 27, 1959, on the uprising in Tibet, Shri Nehru said: “To say that a number of ‘upper strata reactionaries’ in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extra-ordinary simplification of a complicated situation.” He recalled in this con-
nection the conversation which he had had with Prime Minister Chou En-lai during the latter’s visit in the winter of 1956, when the Dalai Lama was also in India to participate in the observance of the 2,500th anniversary of the Mahaparinirvana of the Buddha:

“When Premier Chou En-lai came here two or three years ago, he was good enough to discuss Tibet with me at considerable length. We had a frank and full talk. He told me that while Tibet had long been a part of the Chinese State, they did not consider Tibet as a Province of China. The people were different from the people of China proper, just as in other autonomous regions of the Chinese State the people were different, even though they formed part of that State. Therefore, they considered Tibet as an autonomous region which would enjoy autonomy. He told me further that it was absurd for anyone to imagine that China was going to force communism on Tibet. Communism could not be enforced in this way on a very backward country and they had no wish to do so even though they would like reforms to come in progressively. Even these reforms they proposed to postpone for a considerable time.

“About that time, the Dalai Lama was also here and I had long talks with him then. I told him of Premier Chou En-lai’s friendly approach and of his assurance that he would respect the autonomy of Tibet. I suggested to him that he should accept these assurances in good faith and co-operate in maintaining that autonomy and bringing about certain reforms in Tibet. The Dalai Lama agreed that his country, though, according to him, advanced spiritually, was very backward socially and economically and reforms were needed.

“It is not for us to say how far these friendly intentions and approaches materialised.”

Unbecoming attacks were made by responsible persons in China on the Government of India for granting asylum
to the Dalai Lama. In May the Chinese Government complained against the widespread expression of sympathy with the Tibetan cause by public opinion in India. The Indian Government pointed out in reply that "in India, unlike China, the law recognises many parties and gives protection to the expression of differing opinions."

China's attitude to India was becoming openly hostile. In July 1959 the Government of India was constrained to protest against the difficulties placed in the way of the functioning of Indian officials in Tibet as also of Indian traders and pilgrims. During the same month a Chinese armed detachment intruded into the region of the Western Pangong Lake in Ladakh, arrested six Indian policemen and established a camp at Spanggur. Early in August an armed Chinese patrol crossed into Khinzemane in the eastern sector and pushed back an Indian patrol. On August 25 a large Chinese detachment crossed the frontier in the Subansiri Division of the North East Frontier Agency and occupied the Indian frontier post at Longju after opening fire on the small Indian garrison and outflanking it.

The openly aggressive actions were accompanied by a brazen repudiation of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and a re-assertion of territorial claims in the middle and western sectors. In his leisurely reply of September 8, 1959, to Shri Nehru's letter of March, Mr. Chou En-lai said: "The Chinese Government absolutely does not recognise the so-called McMahon Line... In view of the fact that my former explanation of this point to Your Excellency is obviously misunderstood in Your Excellency's latest two letters to me, I have deemed it necessary once again to make the above explanation clearly." It is significant that the Chinese Government woke up to the 'misunderstanding' only nine months after Shri Nehru quoted the Chinese Prime Minister in his letter of December 1958, and more than five months after Shri Nehru referred to the matter again in his letter of March 1959.
The Chinese Prime Minister did more than go back on his word regarding the McMahon Line. Chinese maps had shown sizable areas of Bhutan as part of China and the Indian Government had already protested to China against certain encroachments on Bhutan’s rights. Ignoring the fact that Sikkim and Bhutan are attached to India by special treaties which make India responsible for the external relations of the two States, Mr. Chou En-lai said: “In Your Excellency’s letter you also referred to the boundary between China and Sikkim. Like the boundary between China and Bhutan, this question does not fall within the scope of our present discussion.”

The mask was off. China’s expansionist policy stood fully revealed. In October 1959, Chinese military forces advanced forty miles into Indian territory in the Chang Chenmo valley in southern Ladakh. Encountering an Indian patrol party near Kongka Pass, they opened fire, killing nine Indians. Ten other members of the Indian party were taken into captivity and subjected to harsh and inhuman treatment. ‘Confessions’ were extorted from the captured men before they were released.
VI. FACTS ABOUT THE BORDER

Though the Chinese converted a frontier which had for centuries been an undisturbed frontier of peace into a scene of tension, and though the Chinese Prime Minister's letter of September 8, 1959, came as a great shock, the Government of India did not give up the effort to reach a friendly settlement through patient explanation of the facts about the India-China border. These facts were set out in Shri Nehru's letter of September 26, 1959, to Mr. Chou En-lai, as well as in an official note of November 4, 1959.

Since the Chinese Prime Minister had sought to shift the blame on to India for the tension between India and China on the border issue, Shri Nehru in his letter pointed out how restrained the Indian Government had been in this matter. The Government had not given publicity till very recently to the information which it had about many encroachments by the Chinese on Indian soil, including the construction of the road across Indian territory in Ladakh and the arrest and detention of Indian personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958, "in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides. In fact our failure to do so has now resulted in sharp but legitimate criticism of the Government both in Parliament and in the Press in our country."

India's conciliatory and restrained attitude was in complete contrast to the Chinese intrusions, actual and threatened. "Reports have reached us," Shri Nehru told the Chinese Prime Minister, "that some Chinese officers in Tibet have repeatedly proclaimed that the Chinese authorities will before long take possession of Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and our North East Frontier Agency. I do not know what authority they had to make these remarks, but I would like to draw
Your Excellency's attention to them as these remarks have naturally added to the tension on the frontier."

In his reply of November 7, 1959, the Chinese Prime Minister made the cynical proposal that, in order to maintain the status quo, ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for talks, "the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometers at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west". Mr. Chou En-lai also proposed in this letter that the Indian Prime Minister and he should "hold talks in the immediate future".

The Chinese proposal for mutual withdrawal meant that, in return for a Chinese evacuation of Longju, the only area actually occupied by them south of the Indian border in the eastern sector, Indian forces would have to withdraw within their own territory over the whole of this sector, while the Chinese would be left in continued possession of a vast portion of the territory illegally occupied by them in Ladakh where they had penetrated much more than 20 kilometers at many points. Shri Nehru, in his letter of November 16, 1959, proposed instead that in the eastern and middle sectors, both sides should refrain from sending out patrols and thus avoid the possibility of border clashes; the Chinese should withdraw from Longju and Indian forces on their part would not re-occupy it. As for the western sector, Shri Nehru proposed as an interim measure that the Government of India should withdraw their troops to the line which China claimed as the boundary, and Chinese troops should withdraw behind the traditional alignment shown on official Indian maps. This would eliminate the risk of border clashes. As regards Mr. Chou En-lai's proposal for an immediate meeting of the Prime Ministers, Shri Nehru said: "I am always ready to meet and discuss with Your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore avenues of friendly
settlement. It is our common desire that such a meeting should bear fruit. The nature of the discussion at our meeting should, therefore, be such that we do not lose ourselves in a forest of data.” He therefore suggested that preliminary steps should be taken and the foundation laid for discussion at the Prime Ministers’ level, to avoid the “danger of the meeting not leading to a successful result, which we so much desire, and disappointing the hopes of millions of people in our two countries.”

No attempt was made from the Chinese side to answer the array of facts presented by India regarding the traditional India-China boundary, clearly known and respected for several decades. In a letter of December 17, the Chinese Prime Minister rejected India’s proposal for the mutual withdrawal of forces in the Ladakh area and proceeded to ask peremptorily for a meeting between himself and Shri Nehru within ten days, on December 26, either in China or at Rangoon. Shri Nehru in reply pointedly asked: “How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts? I would therefore prefer to wait for your promised reply to my letter of September 26, and our Note of November 4, before we discuss what should be the next step.”

It was only on December 26, 1959, that the Chinese Government sent a Note in which it mustered such arguments as it could in an attempt to counter the formidable volume of factual Indian evidence in support of the accepted traditional boundary between India and China. The Chinese Note asserted, in the face of all the facts, that the entire boundary between India and China had never been delimited. Since further reiterations of each other’s position would lead nowhere, Shri Nehru wrote to Mr. Chou En-lai on February 5, 1960, suggesting that they might meet and discuss the problem at an early date. But he pointed out that there could be no negotiations on the basis of the position taken in the
Chinese Note, namely that the entire frontier had never been delimited; minor rectifications of the border in some places were perhaps required, and the Government of India were willing to have discussions for that purpose.

The meeting between the two Prime Ministers took place in Delhi in April 1960. Though the talks lasted six days, the meeting only confirmed the fear expressed by Shri Nehru earlier that there could be no agreement on principles when the basic facts were disputed. It was announced at the conclusion of the talks that the two Prime Ministers had not succeeded in resolving their differences; but they had agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet to examine all relevant documents in support of the stands of the two Governments and report, and that meantime every effort should be made to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas.

Official teams from the two sides accordingly met in three sessions at Peking, Delhi and Rangoon between June and December 1960. During this period, however, Chinese forces continued to violate India's territory, in contravention of the understanding between the Prime Ministers. In June, a large Chinese party moved into Taktsang Gompa, five miles within Indian territory in the Kameng Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency. Violations of Indian air space increased, and in August the Government of India brought to the notice of the Government of China fifty-two instances of such violation since March 1960 by aircraft flying from Tibet. In September a Chinese armed patrol crossed into Sikkim near the Jelepla Pass, and in October an armed Chinese party visited the vicinity of Hot Springs in the western sector.

Meanwhile, at the official-level talks, the Chinese side refused to discuss the alignment in the western sector west of the Karakoram Pass, marking the boundary with China of
that portion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which is at present under the unlawful occupation of Pakistan. Thus the Chinese Government, for the first time, questioned the legality of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. Later, in May 1962, it was announced that the Governments of China and Pakistan had agreed to enter into negotiations to locate and align the portion of the India-China boundary west of the Karakoram Pass. India immediately informed China that sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir vested solely in the Indian Union and that any agreement reached with Pakistan over any sector of the boundary of Kashmir would therefore have no legal validity.

At the conclusion of the Sino-Indian talks at official level, each side wrote its own report in December 1960. The Indian Government, having nothing to hide, published in full the report of the Indian officials, along with the English translation of the Chinese report as supplied by the Chinese side, in February 1961. The Government of China, on the other hand, did not for long even acknowledge the existence of the report. It finally published the report as late as in April 1962.

The Report of the Officials of India and China on the Boundary Question is a document which establishes beyond doubt that the true traditional boundary between the two countries is that shown by India; that China kept undisclosed till September 1959 claims to 50,000 square miles of Indian territory; and that China was already, at the time of the Report in December 1960, in unlawful occupation of 12,000 square miles of Indian territory.

During the discussions, the Indian side furnished a vast and varied amount of material and fully established that the long traditional boundary shown on current Indian maps was clear and precise, conformed to unchanging natural features,
had support in tradition and custom as well as in the exercise of administrative jurisdiction right up to it, and had been recognised for centuries and also confirmed in agreements. On the other hand, the Chinese side provided evidence which was scanty, imprecise, of very recent date and entirely inconsistent both in facts and arguments. The two sides discussed the evidence relating to each sector of the India-China boundary under various heads: legal basis (treaties and agreements); basis in tradition and custom; and basis in administration and jurisdiction. The following statistical analysis, which is based on a commonly applied index, of the evidence furnished by the two sides is revealing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indian Evidence</th>
<th>Chinese Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal basis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sector</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Sector</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Sector</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional basis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sector</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Sector</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sector</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Sector</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Sector</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The qualitative superiority of the evidence produced by the Indian side was even greater than the quantitative superiority. The Indian evidence contained definite references to the alignment and to the areas in dispute, and provided the strongest possible proof to establish that these areas up to the boundary were traditionally parts of India. There was consistency in fact and argument, cementing the entire fabric of the Indian evidence. The quality of the Chinese evidence was the opposite.

Right at the start, while the Indian side offered to exchange maps on the standard international scale of one to one million the Chinese side were unwilling to provide a
map of any scale larger than one to five million. Both sides sought clarification of the location and natural features of the boundary line claimed by each. The Chinese side put nearly 60 questions, to each of which the Indian side gave full and precise answers promptly. On the other hand, the Chinese side, although claiming initially that the alignment shown on the map furnished by them was precise and clear, were unable to provide accurate information regarding the points through which their alignment ran or even regarding the lie of particular stretches. Of the nearly 120 questions put to the Chinese side to ascertain the exact location of important points along the claimed alignment, half were met by blank silence. Of the 60 odd questions that were answered, the answers to many were far from precise or complete.

That the border alignment claimed by the Chinese was wholly arbitrary was also clear from the fact that, in addition to the inconsistencies already prevailing in Chinese maps, the alignment shown in the Chinese map officially given during the talks was quite different in the Ladakh area from the alignment shown in the 1956 map which Mr. Chou En-lai had endorsed in 1959. The new 1960 map covered some 2,000 square miles more of Indian territory in Ladakh.

In the discussions on the location and natural features of the boundary alignment, the Indian side demonstrated that the boundary shown by India was the natural dividing line between the two countries and conformed to the watershed principle. It is now a well-recognised principle of customary international law that when two countries are separated by a mountain range and there are no boundary treaties or specific agreements, the traditional boundary tends to take shape along the crest which divides the major volume of the waters flowing into the two countries. The innate logic of this principle is self-evident. The inhabitants of the two areas not only tend to settle up to the intervening barrier, but wish
and seek to retain control of the drainage basins. Normally where mountains exist, the highest range is also the watershed; but in a few cases where they diverge, the boundary tends to be the watershed range. This is precisely the case with the traditional boundary between India and China. It is significant that where the Indian and Chinese alignments coincided, it was along the Himalayan watershed line. Where the two alignments differed, it was because the Chinese line arbitrarily swung westwards and southwards away from the watershed line, always towards India and never towards Tibet.

Geographical principles, however, provide only the original basis of a traditional boundary. Both the Governments of India and China acknowledged that the boundary between them was in origin a traditional one. But there was a radical difference regarding the actual alignment of the traditional boundary. It was, therefore, necessary to ascertain whether it was the natural features along the alignment shown by the Indian Government, or along that claimed by the Chinese Government, which had been accepted for centuries as marking the traditional boundary. It would be necessary to establish that sovereign authority, in a form appropriate to the geographical terrain, had been exercised up to the claimed boundary, and particularly over the areas intervening between the two alignments. For this it should be shown that these areas were parts of administrative subdivisions and subject to the pattern of revenue collection prevalent in the contiguous territory, and that the State wielded the power of enforcing law and order. Finally, it should be established that legislative enactments had mentioned the area and were enforced therein. In short, a picture of a legally constituted and effective sovereign authority should emerge, exercising the normal and regular functions of an established Government, not intermittently but continuously, over what was claimed as a national territory. The Indian side produced abundant proof to establish this pattern.
For example, in the eastern sector where the Chinese had staked the claim to about 36,000 square miles in the North East Frontier Agency of India, the Indian side brought forward positive evidence to show that the southern limits of Tibet in this area had never extended south of the Himalayan crest, and that on the contrary, Indian political authority had always been exercised over the stretch of tribal territory between the foothills and the main Himalayan range. The British Indian Government inherited this political authority from the Ahom rulers, and exercised administrative control over these tribes in the same manner as over the other Indian tribes—those in the North West Frontier areas of undivided India as well as those in the tribal areas in the heart of India. The Indian side showed how subventions were paid, and homage realised, through the Political Officers responsible for these tracts, in acknowledgement of the controlling authority of the Indian Government. Details were given of numerous surveys and census operations which were conducted in the normal exercise of administrative authority over the area. There could be no better proof that the area had always belonged to India than its specific mention in Indian legislative enactments and administrative regulations of 1873, 1880, 1884, 1914, 1919, 1928 and 1929, in the Government of India Act of 1935 and in the Indian Constitution of 1950. In striking contrast, there was not a single Chinese law or administrative regulation which made a specific mention of any of the tribal areas that were claimed.

In the middle sector, virtually all of the meagre evidence that the Chinese side could bring forward was from Tibetan sources. This showed up the basic contradiction in the Chinese case as regards the status of Tibet. When it suited them the Chinese side asserted that Tibet was always a part of China and had had no right to have any dealings with other countries. At the same time they quoted disputes which showed Tibetan representatives holding negotiations in
attempts to resolve boundary differences, and even constituting an international commission, without any trace of Chinese presence or concurrence. The curious result was that the Chinese side referred to Indo-Tibetan boundary discussions, produced Tibetan documents and quoted Tibetan claims in frontier areas even while they vehemently asserted that Tibet never had any right to discuss these matters with her neighbours or to conclude boundary agreements.

In the western sector, the Chinese case consisted mostly of unsupported assertions. On the basis of some place names of Uighur origin, the Chinese side sought to prove that the Aksai Chin area formed part of Sinkiang. But the Indian side showed that if philological evidence was to be considered, the vast bulk of place names in this area were obviously derived from the Ladakhi language.

The Chinese side asserted that the Chinese army crossed the Aksai Chin area unhindered in 1950, conducted surveys there in 1954-55 and eventually constructed a highway across it. They claimed that all this supported their contention that the territory always formed part of China. The Indian side pointed out that trespass and present control did not confer a legitimate title to any area. The Chinese Government themselves accepted this position, as is shown by the statement in the Chinese official note of April 3, 1960, that—“Violation of the traditional customary line and expansion of the extent of occupation by unilateral occupation cannot constitute the legal basis for acquiring territory.”

The Chinese officials made a vain attempt to dismiss a vast wealth of evidence on the ground that it came from British sources and merely represented the ambitions of British Imperialism. In fact, the Chinese side themselves tried to seek support for their stand from British official and non-official records. In any case, no evidence was brought forward to show that the British had intended deliberately to push forward the traditional boundaries. The fact was, as the
Indian side pointed out, that during the years after 1880 the British Government were eager to buttress rather than to belittle the position and strength of China. This was because they were anxious to prevent Russia from obtaining a foothold or influence in Tibet. In the discussions that took place about a few minor disputes over the northern boundary, the policy of the British Indian authorities was to offer a compromise to Tibetan advantage, even though both sides recognised the traditional alignment, and thus to persuade Tibet to settle her political and territorial disputes with China in the north. During these years, therefore, it was the then Central Government of China which reaped the benefit of European imperialist rivalries in Central Asia.

It was inevitable that Indian evidence of the last three centuries, particularly of administration, should be largely British. But for every sector where British evidence had been mentioned, the Indian side also mentioned evidence recorded by persons of German, French or Italian origin. They could not have been impelled by the desire to support British imperialist policy, since at that time these other European powers were jealous of British hegemony and were rivals of Britain throughout the world. What was more, the Indian side brought forward evidence even from Chinese sources to confirm the alignment shown by India.
VII. NAKED AGGRESSION

The unabated intrusions by Chinese forces into Indian territory during and after the talks between officials of the two sides showed that the Chinese Government were not really interested in the territorial and historical facts about the traditional India-China border. The only territorial fact that they were interested in was the fact of actual possession by force.

In April 1961, Chinese personnel intruded into Sikkim near Jelepla Pass. In May there was an intrusion into Indian territory near Chushul in the western sector. In July a Chinese patrol crossed the eastern sector in the Kameng Division of the North East Frontier Agency. In August the Chinese forces in Ladakh established three new check-posts at Nyagzu and near Dambuguru. They also constructed roads linking these posts with rear bases.

In January 1962 some Chinese civil and military personnel crossed the border in the eastern sector near Longju and proceeded to Roi village, half a mile within India. In April and May there was aggressive advance patrolling by the Chinese forces who were in illegal occupation of the Chip Chap area of Ladakh. They established a new post in Indian territory about ten miles south-east of Spanggur.

A fresh move for relieving the growing tension and avoiding the danger of war was made by the Government of India in a note to the Chinese Government on May 14, 1962. The note urged the Chinese Government to give serious consideration to Prime Minister Nehru's proposal of November 1959 for the withdrawal of Indian forces in Ladakh to the west of the boundary line shown in the 1956 Chinese map, and of Chinese forces to the east of the international boundary shown in official Indian maps. It also
made an offer: "The Government of India are prepared, in the interest of a peaceful settlement, to permit, pending negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, the continued use of the Aksai Chin road for Chinese civilian traffic." The note quoted the Prime Minister's statement in the Indian Parliament on May 2, 1962, that "India does not want, and dislikes very much, a war with China; but that is not within India's control", and expressed the hope that the Chinese Government would, if it was earnest about maintaining peace, give serious consideration to India's proposal. China spurned it.

On June 2, 1962, the Agreement of 1954, which had been violated both in letter and in spirit by the Government of China by their harassing of Indian pilgrims, traders and nationals in Tibet and by their aggression on Indian territory, lapsed. The Indian Government pointed out that the atmosphere in which the Five Principles were first enunciated had to be restored before any new agreement could be considered.

Chinese forces continued to advance in the western sector. During June they cleared new roads through Indian territory and established more posts further south in the Chip Chap area. In July an Indian post in the Galwan Valley was encircled.

In the exchange of notes between the two Governments on these numerous incidents, the Indian Government consistently expressed its readiness to continue discussions on the boundary question, on the basis of the report of the officials of the two sides, provided that China would agree to the restoration of the status quo which prevailed prior to the alteration of the boundary by force. In a note of August 22, 1962, India said: "...an essential preliminary to the holding of further discussions on the basis of the report of the officials of the two sides with a view to resolv-
ing differences between the two Governments on the boundary question is a definition of measures that should be taken to restore the status quo of the boundary in this region (i.e. Ladakh) which has been altered by force during the last five years and to remove the current tensions in this area so as to create the appropriate climate for purposeful discussions. The Government of India would be glad to receive a representative of the Government of China to discuss these essential preliminary measures."

China’s answer was to launch aggression and create tension in the eastern region too. On September 20, 1962, Chinese forces which had hitherto made only isolated intrusions, crossed the established boundary of the North East Frontier Agency in the Thagla region.

India did not still abandon the effort to preserve peace with honour. In a note of October 6, 1962, the Chinese Government was informed that—"The Government of India are prepared to make necessary arrangements for starting discussions in Peking or in Delhi from a mutually convenient date as soon as the latest intrusion by Chinese forces in Indian territory south of the McMahon Line has been terminated as requested in the Government of India’s note of 25th September 1962 and the Chinese Government indicate their acceptance of the proposal made in that note, which is reproduced below for ready reference: ‘The Government of India are prepared to hold further discussions at the appropriate level to define measures to restore the status quo in the western sector which has been altered by force in the last few years and to remove the current tensions in that area. The implementation of such measures will create a climate of confidence between the two Governments which alone can make possible constructive discussions to resolve the differences between the two Governments on the boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials’.”
An India which never gave up the search for peace but stood firm on honour was subjected to a full-scale and wanton invasion in the early hours of October 20, 1962. Chinese forces, equipped with big artillery and heavy mortars, overwhelmed Indian positions at various points within India's boundary from the Chip Chap area of Ladakh in the western sector to Khinzemane and Dhola in the North East Frontier Agency.

The heroic resistance put up by Indian soldiers and the magnificent response of the people of all parts of India in all walks of life to Prime Minister Nehru's call for united effort for the defence of the country's freedom, are well known.

This, then, is the story of the Chinese betrayal of India's friendship. As Prime Minister Nehru said in a broadcast to his countrymen after China launched the aggression, perhaps there are not many instances in history where one country, that is India, has gone out of her way to be friendly and co-operative with the Government and people of another country, that is China, and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and then that Government returns evil for good.