THE PATHANS
550 B.C.—A.D. 1957

BY
OLAF CAROE

With an
EPILOGUE ON RUSSIA
By the Author

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KARACHI
TO MY FRIEND
ISKANDER MIRZA,
FIRST PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN
ONE OF THOSE
WHO, HAVING GRADUATED IN MARDAN
AMONG THE YUSUFZAI,
ARE ADMITTED TO A LIFE FELLOWSHIP
IN THE HONOURABLE COMPANY
OF PATHANS
FOREWORD

This is a book I was bound to write, at some time or the other, having had the fortune to spend half a lifetime among Pathans. But with the passage of time, from 1947, memories receded and the purpose weakened. That the purpose revived was owing to the initiative and courtesy of the then Government of Pakistan who made it possible for me, after nine years' absence, to revisit familiar scenes, meet old friends and make new ones, and put in order against the new foreground a store of knowledge and impressions acquired over more than thirty years. The result presented is wholly mine; the responsibility for each conclusion, for every emphasis, individual and unshared.

The voyage is long and the seas for the most part uncharted. For example, I have sought to cover more centuries before the Pathans embraced Islam than those which have since elapsed. If sometimes the touch may seem uncertain, the answer is that it is not easy for one navigator to encompass all the techniques, or indeed all the languages, needed to fit together a chart, or manage a crew, over a space of 2,500 years.

For the pre-Islamic period and the earlier Islamic centuries I enjoyed the devoted help of Dr. A.D.H. Bivar, formerly my aide-de-camp, sometime Scholar of Corpus, and lately Research Lecturer in Ancient History at Christ Church, Oxford. Without his enthusiasm and expert scholarship this part of the book could never have taken so distinct a shape. With his aid I was able to interpret many original texts, Greek, Arabic, and Persian, and to apply the results of specialized numismatic and epigraphical studies. But here too – he would wish me to affirm – the conclusions are my own and may not always stand up to academic assault. If that be so, I must plead the licence of the non-specialist and
a determination not to permit the wood to be obscured by the trees.

Much more than formal acknowledgement is due to my friends, Evelyn Howell, on whose earlier work hangs my picture of the tribes of Waziristan, Ralph Griffith, who knew the meaning of Pathan honour, and George Cunningham, ten years Governor in Peshawar, who read the whole work in manuscript and blessed it with the criticism which does not confound. From Pathans I received countless impressions of tradition and wisdom: memorable among these are Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah of Sitana, who died in 1956, and that grand old man, Muhammad Zaman Khan of Akora, descended from the most famous of Pathan poets.

To Mr. Zuberi, then Commissioner of Peshawar, and to Roger Bacon and his staff at Mardan, I am in debt for contributions to the study of that same poet, and to Mr. Ikramullah, then High Commissioner for Pakistan in London, both for light shed on some dark corners of history and for his unfailing encouragement in moments of doubt and difficulty.

In some sense this book was planned as the spark struck off by a century of clash and contact between Pathan and Englishman: though critics, some of them constructive, have not been wanting, it has brought me a satisfying succès d'estime, has been acclaimed both as a work of literature and of scholarship, and has won me both a Doctorate of Letters at my own University of Oxford and a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Literature. Although deeply grateful for these honours, I have been even more concerned to stimulate the further study of Pathan writers of their own origin and in this respect too my efforts have had some success though the fact that this book continues to retain its place as a standard work would seem to indicate that further efforts are required.

When it was first written, there was little in the procession of Pathan history over the centuries to indicate the imminence of Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet, from beyond the Oxus. Since publication the equipoise has been upset. The power and prestige of Britain in India, consolidating the strategic frontier established to the northwest by the Mughal Empire which preceded us, exists no longer, and the Afghan
State, only established by Ahmad Shah in 1747, may not survive. Moreover, the Pathans are tied to Afghanistan by bonds of race, religion, and language, and any disturbance of the balance will have an effect both on the North West Frontier itself and in the partitioned Subcontinent as a whole. The Frontier peoples and the Afghans too are perhaps now more conscious of their Islamic ties than ever before. And, finally, any disturbance of the balance in this strategic part of Asia will affect the stability not only of the Subcontinent itself but of South Asia as a whole. Oil and communications are under threat.

Mr. George Chowdharay-Best and myself have therefore sought to attempt a fresh assessment of these issues in an epilogue appended to this volume.

September 1980

O.C.
G.C.B.

NOTE

To those unfamiliar with the North-West Frontier the tribal pattern of the Pathans is hard to follow. A map showing tribal boundaries and locations will be found at the end of this book.

The names and dates of the many dynasties which bore upon this region are so little known to the European reader—and in pre-Islamic times to the Muslim reader also—that I have thought it well to include a Dynastic Framework as Appendix A.

To avoid a dusty look all diacritical marks are omitted from the text and notes, except in a few citations. Those who prefer a more accurate system of transliteration will find it in the Index. Popular literary forms are retained for well-known places, e.g. Attock, Delhi, Kandahar. Except in one place, where the reason for following the Greek is obvious, Greek names are Latinized. There is one more exception—Aornos—in memory of Sir Aurel Stein.

The medallion on the binding of the book is inspired by the reverse of the Indian General Service Medal and represents Fort Jamrud against the background of the Khaibar mountains.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a strange fascination in living among the Pathans. Many attempts have been made to catch and convey that feeling, but the spell is elusive. One secret of the hold of the North-West Frontier is to be sought in the tremendous scenic canvas against which the Pathan plays out his life, a canvas brought into vivid relief by sharp, cruel changes of climate. Sometimes the assault on the spirit is that of stark ugliness and discomfort — appalling heat, a dust-storm across the Peshawar plain, the eroded foot-hills of Khaibar or Waziristan; more often it is an impression of beauty indescribable in its clarity and contrast with the barren emptiness that went before. The weft and warp of this tapestry is woven into the souls and bodies of the men who move before it. Much is harsh, but all is drawn in strong tones that catch the breath, and at times bring tears, almost of pain.

'The life of a frontiersman is hard,' wrote Ronaldshay, 'and he treads it daily on the brink of eternity. Yet, despite its obvious drawbacks, the fact remains that these endless ranges of rugged rocks rising from lower levels do possess the power of inspiring in those whose lot is cast among them an extraordinary enthusiasm. . . . I do not suggest that the average warden of the marches habitually subjects his feelings to this kind of analysis, but the circumstances of his life are such that he frequently experiences the species of spiritual exaltation induced by solitude amid the grandeur of nature, and such experience is one of the factors that go to make the magic of the Frontier.'

But the land was made for the men in it, not men for the land. For the stranger who had eyes to see and ears to hear, always as he drove through the Margalla pass just north of Rawalpindi and went on to cross the great bridge at Attock, there was a lifting of the heart and a knowledge that, however hard the task and beset with danger, here was a people who looked him in the face and made him feel he had come home. Yet, after a hundred years and more of close contact, the Pathan remains to the world, and even
to himself, something of an enigma. Many have spoken and written of him and his country, but the surface has been scarcely scratched. There is need for a deeper ploughing.

In a word the truth is that the history of the Pathans has never been unrolled. There are tribal annals, there is legend, there is myth. There is also a wide and detailed record of brilliant achievement by Pathan captains and kings far from their own land, even to the rank of empire at Delhi. There is the uncertain Afghan Kingdom of the Durrani, but that was founded only two hundred years ago and is but an episode in a long story. Although the Pathans have stood for centuries in the corridors between Khurasan and the Indian sub-continent just at the very point where great civilizations have met and contended; although their mountain homes have been swept by conquering armies again and again, to rise like a breakwater from the sea; although the conquerors have passed on to found great empires—yet the Pathans who hold the gate have never been given a vision of their own story in perspective. In the modern sense there is no connected history of the Pathans in their own land, whether written by themselves or by any of those through the ages who passed by.

What, for instance, is the difference between Afghan and Pathan? Who and what are they, and what their origins? What has been their social and political organization through the centuries, and have they succeeded in establishing a State? What is their language and what their literature? And how have they stood to the uncounted powers and principalities which at various periods of history have pressed upon them? What in the past has been their influence on affairs, what are their auguries for the future? These and a host of questions remain unanswered.

I do not wish to anticipate conclusions here. Distinction and definition will emerge in due place as the story unfolds. But something should be said on the use I shall make of the terms Pathan and Afghan, often loosely employed by themselves as synonymous.

When we come to examine origins, it will be found that a clear distinction can be drawn between those who inhabit plains and open plateaux on the one hand and the highlanders on the other. The former have always been regarded as the senior branch of the race and peculiarly entitled to the Afghan name. They again can be broadly divided into (i) the Western Afghans, of whom much the most important are the Abdalis (now known as the Durrans)
and the Ghaljis (Ghilzais *modo Persico*), and (ii) the Eastern Afghans, namely the Yusufzais and other kindred tribes of the Peshawar plain and the valleys to the north of it.

The Western Afghans have been subject in history to certain Persian influences which have affected the Durranis even to their language. Their contacts and development lay with the Safawi Empire of Persia, and Herat and Kandahar were their cultural centres. The Eastern Afghans, whom Elphinstone and other early writers called ‘Berdooraunees’, are less amenable to the Persian tradition, partly because their contacts lay with the Mughal Empire which ruled from Delhi in Peshawar and Kabul. But both, Eastern and Western, are equally entitled to the Afghan name, which has a connotation far wider than that of a subject of the modern Afghan State, founded only in 1747.

In between the Eastern and the Western Afghans, and to some extent keeping them apart, are interposed the highlanders. These include most of the famous names of the North-West Frontier. Afridi, Khatak, Orakzai, Bangash, Wazir, Mahsud, Turi—all these strike a chord in countless memories. The dialects of these tribes have something in common, and all are presented in genealogical legend as descended from a foundling common ancestor named Karlanri, not in the true Afghan line. These are pre-eminently the Pakhtuns, or Pashtuns. They are the tribes who never fell under the effective sway of any recorded imperial authority and now form the backbone of the so-called tribal belt.

These hill Pathans—the appellation Pathan is the Indian variant of Pukhtanah, the plural of Pakhtun—that I write in this book, but without exclusion of

It is chiefly of these, the Eastern Afghans and the highland Pukhtanah, that I write in this book, but without exclusion of
their Afghan affinities. Sher Shah, Pathan emperor of Delhi in the sixteenth and the Khatak poet Khushhal in the seventeenth century, spoke of them as the men of Roh.

Yet another distinction is necessary at the start. Every student of current political jargon is confused by the variants Pakhtun and Pashtun. It is common and confusing practice to refer to the language Pashtu spoken by Pukhtanah in an imaginary Pashtunistan. There are two main variants of the language of the Pathans—and Afghans, when they are not Persian-speakers—the Pakhtu spoken by the north-eastern tribes, and the Pashtu by those to the south-west. (There are of course many other differences in the two main variants in addition to that of $kh$, $sh$.) The line of division between the two runs roughly east and west from the Indus just south of Attock through Kohat, up the Miranzai Valley to Thal, and thence south of the Kurram River to Hariob and the Shutargarh pass. North-east of that line the hard language is spoken. This is the tongue of all the Peshawar tribes, of Dir, Swat, Buner, and Bajaur, of the Afridis, Orakzais, Shinwaris, Bangash and Turis.

South-west of the line and speaking the soft variant are all the Durranis, almost all the Ghaljis except a few near Jalalabad, all the tribes in Khost and Waziristan, as well as the tribes of Bannu and the Derajat, many of them with Ghalji affinities. The Pathan tribes of Zhob and other parts of Baluchistan close to Kandahar also speak the soft variant.

One tribe only is split in half between the two, the Khataks. The main body of this tribe, living south of Kohat, speak Pashtu, but the Khataks of Akora and Mardan, round about Khushhal Khan’s time, became assimilated to the Yusufzais and now speak Pakhtu. Most texts of the poems of Khushhal Khan Khatak, the most renowned of Pathan poets, were edited and lithographed in Peshawar, and are therefore in Pakhtu. But his descendants affirm that Khushhal’s original script was in Pashtu—a tradition supported by the historical fact that his tribe’s encroachments into the Yusufzai country, and their assimilation to Yusufzai ways, took place no earlier than Mughal times. We may accept the Khataks’ own tradition that originally they were all Pushtanah, speaking the soft variant of the language. Nevertheless the later emergence of the northern Khataks as Pukhtanah is not without its significance as demonstrating the assimilative power of Pakhtu over Pashtu.

The geographical distribution of the two forms of the language
has resulted in a Peshawar predilection for Pakhtu — in fact the city is known as Pekhawar — while the Durrani, when they use the language, insist on Pashtu. There is some reason to hold that the Durrani preference for the soft variant may have unduly weighed in the scale of academic discussion as to the classical or older form of the language. Since the point has a bearing on the early history of the Pathans, it is important to keep it clearly in mind. And I propose in this book, seeing that Pakhtu is the language of Peshawar, to refer to it by that name unless the context demands otherwise.

There is a further tribal distinction, which almost follows the line of division between Pakhtu and Pashtu in the Karlanri hill-tribes. The Pakhtu-speakers wear their hair clipped short, often shaved; the Pashtu-speakers, except in the sophistication of towns, favour a chevelure falling around the ears, varying from the neatly combed and curled bob of the Khatak soldier to the ragged ringlets of the Mahsud or Wazir. This long bobbed style is known as the tsanrai, cut clean at the ear but shining and curled above it, parted in the middle and sometimes held in place with little wooden clips. And, for greater interest, it is the men of the long hair, the speakers of Pashtu, and they alone, who dance, the tsanrai spinning as they whirl around. Peter Mayne's recent book carries a haunting description of such a scene — the stir and throb of beating drums, the dust, the wild eyes, the flickering fire and flashing swords, the elation. Khataks, Mahsuds and the tribes of Khost are pastmasters at this art.

Geographically the Pathan country is hard to describe, even with a map. It is best seen as a long narrow fortification running parallel in two belts, first a moat and then a rampart, along the line of the Indus which here runs almost north and south, with a slight trend towards the west. Towards the south the rampart stands back much further from the river. Behind the rampart begins the great Iranian plateau which, except through the Sulaiman Mountains, has no drainage to the sea.

The first belt is made up of plains and valleys along the river; the second, standing over the valleys, is the great transept of the Sulaiman Mountains running southward from its apex in the mighty ranges of the Hindu Kush where they culminate on Tirich Mir. At many points this transept thrusts forward fingers towards
the Indus, fingers which even cross the river more than once. Nestling between the fingers are the valleys of which the most beautiful and fertile, as well as the largest, is the plain of Peshawar. Further south are other plains-lands, Kohat, Bannu-Marwat and the Derajat, sometimes known as the Daman. North of Peshawar are no more plains, but a tangle of alpine mountain and valley rising to the snows of the Hindu Kush.

The Sulaiman chain runs roughly north-east and south-west, but has many divagations. The most important of these is in its highest part, the Sufed Koh, where it rises in the Sikaram peak north of the Kurram to over 15,000 feet and, running due east and west, forms part of the Durand Line. This escarpment of the Sulaiman system is the geographical eastern front of the Iranian world, turned towards India. Across it there has been much ebb and flow, but in the result the Iranian scene, and Iranian man, have spilled beyond this eastern limit and prevail as far as the Indus, and even beyond — some would say up to Lahore. But to him who approaches from Lahore the unmistakable change of atmosphere is felt, as I have said, at Margalla, forty miles before the crossing of the Indus and close to the site of ancient Taxila. Here he will smell the scents of the home-land as a voyager putting out from France knows he is in England when he sights the cliffs of Dover. This is the Pakhtun Khwa, the land of the Pathans.

Later, after crossing the splendid river swirling through the gorge at Attock, he will find himself in a spreading vale, watered by many streams and surrounded by an unbroken girdle of mountains. The hills that stand around Peshawar not only look like a ring; they are actually set on the map in a circle, almost complete but for one segment in the south-east where the valley-lands slope to the banks of the Indus. This valley has four doors, one by which we have entered without need to cross a pass, and three of exit over the mountains. These three are the passes of Khaibar, Kohat and Malakand. The Khaibar lies straight ahead to the west, opening beneath the prominent cone of Laka Sar in the Tahtarra range. It leads to Moscow by Kabul. The Kohat pass — known always as the Darrah, or the Pass — is in the south-west. It crosses the knuckle of the finger which closes the ring to southward and carries the lateral road which gives access to the southern districts of the Frontier. The Malakand is to the north. It pierces the first range and opens the way into the paradise of Swat, leading thence
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by alpine forest and rushing torrent past Dir and Chitral on to the Pamirs and China.

Two great rivers, the Kabul and the Swat, cleave the western segment of the circling hills by gorges too narrow for roadways. On entering the valley the two rivers split into five channels, which reunite lower down to form the Landai — the Short River — and pour their Central Asian waters into the Indus just above Attock. The volume of the united stream is nearly as big as that of the Indus itself. The course of the Swat River presents a geographical phenomenon. Just north of Malakand, where it is separated from the Peshawar plain by only one low range, it flows from east to west. But, failing to break through here, it enters a series of deep gorges through which it runs in a U-curve, and after receiving the Panjkora in due course enters the plain from the west, flowing in an opposite direction. What nature failed to do man has done. The Malakand is pierced by a tunnel carrying the Swat water direct into the valley for irrigation and supplying water-power to run the Frontier industries.

In such a land the variations of climate and scene are extreme. In winter and spring nothing can be more delightful than the lower valleys and plains. The genial winter sun shines, the breeze blows clean and sharp from the snows, it is a joy to live. In a land of streams and rivers villages nestle half hidden in groves of sheltering trees. Broad stretches of verdant wheat, barley and clover, alternating as the seasons change with giant crops of sugar-cane and maize, spread a picture of rural plenty, to be equalled possibly but never surpassed in the length and breadth of Asia. There is an intimacy about these scenes which grows the more frequently they are visited.

In the north the great plain of the Yusufzai Samah, once arid waste, has been turned into fertile corn-lands watered by canals. Close under the hills, and side by side with canal-irrigation, the old indigenous well-cultivation proceeds, the shaded wells, the creaking wheels, the plodding oxen — dear, familiar places, lending the countryside the charm peculiar to this ancient form of husbandry.

The Khatak fringe of hills to the south is bare and rather commonplace, but provides a platform for what must be the most extensive mountain panorama in the world. Distance and perspective is given by the sixty miles of the Peshawar plain which, lying in the foreground like an Attic stage, leads the eye on to a vast back-
curtain of everlasting snow. Seen from Cherat in the cold, clear light of a winter day, the great plain with its converging rivers and rectilinear canals — both shot to silver here and there as the day revolves — this and the amphitheatre of surrounding hills, backed in the north by the chain of giant mountains, provide a prospect of splendour not easily forgotten. In the far north sprawls the mass of Tirich Mir; north-east, perhaps 120 miles away, the mighty breast of Nanga Parbat, stark and gleaming, challenges the sky.11

In summer, though still verdant with the crops of the season — maize, millet, rice and growing cane — the valleys swelter in a steamy heat as uncomfortable as any in the world. The unwatered tracts and the thorny half-deserts of the lower hills at that season provide a foretaste of the regions of the damned. Yet such is the sharpness and salt of contrast that at the very height of the hot weather a few hours’ journey will take the sufferer to forest glades and alpine pastures where he can find again the climate of an English summer.

For further contrast, in many tracts at certain times of the year there is a stark ugliness, well described in that same recent book12 as ‘a sullen hate, not the keen, glittering hate that everyone enjoys . . . mountains brown like snuff, ten-thousand foot mounds with the track snaking its way through for mile on heavy mile’. That was written of the road to Kabul, but it might apply equally to some journeys through Waziristan or in the desolation of Zhob. But then, suddenly, the landscape opens out — there is a trickle of water, a group of trees, a garden — and there comes a sense of rare fulfilment. To get that feeling a man should travel north from the burning boulder-strewn hills and torrent-beds of Thal in Lower Kurram. In a couple of hours he may find himself dreaming in paradise beside the planes and willows that line the streams tumbling with the noise of constant water from the snows of the mountain-wall above Parachinar.

The western of the two belts of territory making up this Frontier lies wholly in the mountains between the administered border and the political boundary known as the Durand Line. Part of it indeed overlaps the Durand Line. It starts with the escarpment mentioned and rises to highlands in some places carrying peaks from 10,000 to 16,000 feet in height. Almost everywhere the foothills are bleak and uninviting, hard and craggy,
splintered by frost and blistered by furnace heat according to the season. But tucked away in the mountain recesses are valleys of great beauty and fertility, vying in the north even with Kashmir. Through this territory go seven main routes, which figure in history as corridors of invasion and commerce between the Indus plains and Central Asia. Two of these, the Khaibar and the Malakand, we know. The others from north to south are the Gandab route through Mohmand country, the Bangash or Paiwar route by Kurram, the Gumal and Tochi routes through Waziristan, and the Bolan route by Quetta. All of these, except the last, though used by tribal caravans, are closed to regular international traffic. The Mohmand, Bangash, and Tochi routes are indeed served by roads from the plains which penetrate to points well up the valleys but do not cross into Afghanistan. Even the Malakand road, stretching as far as Chitral, cannot be regarded as an international highway; it is not passable by vehicles into Russia or China.

The authority of the various empires which claimed in the past to rule this Frontier really only extended to control over the plains and one or two of the passages through the mountains. Only the greater Mughals seem to have thought it worth their while to make a serious attempt to bring the hill-tribes under domination as subjects, and, as we shall see, they failed. Even passage by a main route through the mountains had often to be asserted by force and with difficulty against the refractory tribes which held the road in use at the time. An understanding of this fact explains the escape of this tribal belt as a whole from subjection to any external power — a freedom symbolized by the failure to impose in it any taxation. This, too, is the reason why a tribal form of society has persisted in a country which lay across the passage of countless invaders, including Alexander, Chingiz Khan and Tamerlane, the most famous conquerors in all history.

But there is another side to this medal. This very freedom, enjoyed over the centuries by the heart-lands of the Pathan, denies to the enquirer all the usual raw material of history. Until 1747 there was no local principality; therefore there are no records or coins except those of the empires on whose fringes the tribal belt lay. Even the language of the Pathans does not seem to have been reduced to writing until the fifteenth century, and there is no extant literary work known to be genuine earlier than the seventeenth. Therefore there are no chronicles available until relatively
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modern times. The Pathans did not build monuments or write inscriptions in their own country. Therefore there is no epigraphical material. It follows that the historian must rely on stray and chance material available in the records, inscriptions, literature, monuments and coins of the many dynasties and peoples whose path took them across the territories where the Afghans and Pathans now dwell, wherever possible adjusting the results of his labour to the record and tradition, often oral, of the Pathans themselves. The most he can hope to do is to blaze a trail which others, with growing knowledge, may follow and improve.

The prologue is spoken and the curtain goes up. I must not further delay the play. One thing only would I add here. The persistence of the Pathan tribal tradition has produced a society at all levels, starting from the nomad and herdsman, through the articulated tribe and the sponsors of an Asian dynastic principle, to the modern lawyer, engineer, doctor, administrator and politician. Standing over against the tribal village and the tents of the caravan are men for a century imbued with Western thought and now reaching forward to that synthesis of values which Pakistan strives to attain. All these stages of social and political development can be seen today, side by side and superimposed one on another, by anyone who cares to move in a twenty-mile radius around Peshawar. By so doing it is possible to enjoy daily a bodily translation into earlier phases of human society and life — a wonderful occasion for anyone endowed with historical instincts. We have here what John Morley called a congeries of peoples engaged in a long march through the centuries from the fifth to the twentieth. To be in a position to observe all this, relatively undisturbed by the influences of our complex life, is a vastly exciting experience.

It is a part of the magic of the Frontier.
PART I

THE ORIGINS

550 B.C.–A.D. 1000 (H. 391)
CHAPTER I

THE GENEALOGIES

There is no matter more earnestly debated wherever Pathans assemble, in the village bujra or the city sarai, in classroom or university, at meals or between companions on the road, than that of the origins of this people, and the relationship of the various tribes, or groups of tribes, one to another. Discussions are good-tempered but earnestly conducted. The debate ranges over two periods, the pre-Islamic, and the era which started with the Prophet's flight in A.D. 622 to Medina.

For the period before the Prophet, it is not surprising that among peoples so conscious of the Islamic tradition these debates, professedly historical, are apt to have a religious tinge in the sense that, like the Quran itself, they refer back to Judaic tradition. They seek to link obscure beginnings, in a manner half historical, half mythical, with the great figures of the Hebrews, Kings David and Solomon. Some centuries later in the story appears the name of Bakhtunnasar (Nebuchadnezzar), and the tradition runs that at the time of the dispersal the Jewish ancestors of the Afghans remained after the captivity in the east and did not return to Jerusalem. Some of them withdrew to the mountains of Ghor — the modern Hazarajat — and some of them to the neighbourhood of Mecca in Arabia. Both these colonies came to be known as Bani Israel or Bani Afghana.

The tradition must be set forth in greater detail. But, lest already the serious reader dismiss it as pure fable, I must here put some weight in the other scale. It is to be remembered, first, that with the exception of some modern Kabul writers, who at one time inclined to 'Nordic' theories under Hitlerian influence, the greater number of Afghan and Pathan commentators believe these traditions, the more so in relation to the tribal genealogies which grow out of the 'myth' when it reaches the Islamic era. The illustrious Elphinstone, who characterizes the earlier Biblical story as fable, is constrained to emphasize that, whatever doubts may be
entertained of the pedigree or even the existence of eponymous ancestors, it is to them that the tribal genealogies refer, and on those genealogies the whole of the divisions and interior government of the tribes still depend. Even the latest fascicule to the Encyclopedia of Islam\textsuperscript{2} admits the value of these genealogies as testimony to traditions current among the Pakhtu- and Pashtu-speaking peoples in the seventeenth century, when the earliest known to us were composed. And I should reinforce these reflections by observing that the alignments and divisions which a careful study of these tribal family-trees reveals can be shown to reflect an actual consciousness of differing origins among the people themselves. And even more than this — one who has lived many years among these tribes will be startled to find pointers in the genealogies to historical probabilities deducible from pre-Islamic Central Asian history, compiled from other than Afghan sources. Lastly, the genealogies frequently supply actual confirmation of observable differences today.

The main source of these traditions is a work entitled the Makhr\textsuperscript{3}zan-i-Afghani, written by one Nematullah, a scribe at the court of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir, and probably completed about A.D. 1612. It was translated into English by Bernhard Dorn, Professor of Oriental Literature at the Russian University of Kharkov, as long ago as 1829; even so, today we may expect to see a Soviet-sponsored book on the North-West Frontier tribes, the handiwork of a prospective doctor of Tashkent University, assigned the name of Pakhtunov. Nematullah’s material was re-issued later in many and various forms, including a work of the later eighteenth century entitled Khulasat-ul-Ansab (Genealogical Abstract). All these genealogies were the work of ‘Afghans’ who had taken service down in India with the Mughal emperors and had become to a large extent d\textsuperscript{eracin\textsuperscript{3}es. That this is so is clear from their ill-acquaintance with Pakhtu, even when they cite words or phrases in that language, and also from their lack of detailed knowledge of the Borderland, to which they usually refer as the land of Roh.\textsuperscript{4} And they write always in Persian, never in Pakhtu.

In spite of these limitations, the record of these traditions and tribal tables is often suggestive. To note one point, although the term ‘Afghan’ or ‘Pathan’ is used indiscriminately, it is not necessary to read far between the lines to discover that there was one senior branch of these peoples — as I shall show later, the so-
called Sarbanris — who are regarded as the Afghans proper, the real Bani Israel in contrast to other divisions of the nation.

I return to the tale of the tradition itself. It is a curious accretion to Biblical history. There is a prelude of Old Testament scripture, somewhat garbled, relating to the transactions of the Jews from the Patriarch Abraham down to King Saul, who is called Talut or Sarul. So far the narrative, though interspersed with fables, agrees generally with that given by other Muslims and does not differ essentially from Hebrew Scripture. But from the time of Saul down to the captivity new elements are introduced.

The Afghan historiographers maintain that Saul had a son named Irmia (Jeremiah), who again had a son named Afghana, neither of course known to the Hebrew scriptures. Irmia, dying about the time of Saul's death, his son Afghana was brought up by David, and in due course, in Solomon's reign, was promoted to the chief command of the army. There follows a gap of some four centuries to the time of the captivity. Since Bakhtunnasrar is mentioned, one must presume that the reference is to the second captivity early in the sixth century B.C., that of Judah from Jerusalem, and not the first captivity over one hundred years earlier, that of Israel by Shalmaneser, the Assyrian, from Samaria. If this is so, it rules out any suggestion, often made, that the Bani Israel, the sons of Afghana, are in any way connected with the lost ten tribes. Nevertheless the theory of the ten tribes has had its notable supporters. In its aid it was suggested, originally by Sir William Jones, pioneer of oriental studies in Warren Hastings' time, that the Afghans are the lost ten tribes of Israel mentioned by the prophet Esdras as having escaped from captivity and taken refuge in the country of Arsarah, supposed by that elegant scholar as identical with the modern Hazarajat, the Ghor of the Afghan historians. But the reference in the Afghan chronicles to Nebuchadnezzar makes nonsense of any identification with the ten tribes. The truth is that Muslim commentators of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not well up in the history of the Hebrews. They make no distinction between Israel and Judah, and do not seem even to be aware that there were two captivities.

Be this as it may — and Allah knoweth best — the sons of Afghana (it is written) withdrew after the captivity, some to the mountains of Ghor in the centre of what is now Afghanistan, and some to the neighbourhood of Mecca in Arabia. Elphinstone,
overlooking the inconsistency I have just stated, remarks that the account is by no means destitute of probability, for, as regards the Ghor immigrants it is known (says he) that ten of the twelve tribes remained in the east after their brethren’s return to Judea; and the supposition that the Afghans are their descendants explains easily and naturally both the disappearance of the one people, and the origin of the other. In regard to the men of Mecca he cites as confirmation the fact that ‘the Jews were very numerous in Arabia in the time of the Prophet, and that the principal division of them bore the appellation of Khyber, which is still the name of a district in Afghanistan, if not of an Afghan tribe’. But he goes on to say that the tradition, though plausible, is clouded with many inconsistencies and contradictions. When, for instance, let us ask, has a Jew, once a Jew, been known to forsake his Jewish faith? The theory would have us believe that the sons of Afghana who went to Mecca remained true to their faith: not so those who went to Ghor. Nobody has ever suggested that the Afghans of Ghor were practising Jews up to the time of their conversion to Islam, or indeed at any time after their arrival in those parts.

Elphinstone, it is clear, was more than doubtful. But there are other advocates on whom the debaters in the hujras of Peshawar and Mardan still rely, interpreters of Pathan lore though not themselves Pathans. The first is the ill-fated Alexander Burnes; a specious commentator, and one not distinguished for wisdom or judgment. The Afghans, he says — and this is true — entertain strong prejudices against the Jewish nation, a point which should at least show that they had no desire to claim, without a just cause, a descent from them. Since, he asks, echoing Elphinstone, some of the tribes of Israel came to the East, why should we not admit that the Afghans are their descendants, converted to Muhammedanism?

The last pleader for the Bani Israel tradition in English is the redoubtable Raverty. Referring to Cyrus, the first of the Persian Achaemenids, he notes that it was customary for the Great King to transport a whole tribe, and sometimes even a whole nation, from one country to another. The Jews were ever a stiff-necked race, and he asks for credence to the possibility that the most troublesome among them had been moved to the thinly peopled satrapies of the Persian Empire where they would be too far away to give trouble. ‘Is it not possible’, he asks, ‘that those Jews who could make their escape might have fled eastward, preferring a
wandering life in a mountainous country with independence to
the grinding tyranny of Cyrus' successors and their satraps? In fact
there was no other direction in which they could have fled...'

Burnes' argument really only re-echoes the persistence of the
tradition itself; it has no historical substance. As for Raverty, he is
a master of Pathan lore, and of an amazing accuracy in sorting out
that many-branching knowledge. But his mind is circumscribed
within this special field and forest, and he shuns any and every
light from without that might have helped him to see more
clearly through the thickets that he loves to analyse and dis-
entangle. In this particular case he omits to note that Jews remain
Jews, that all the Hebrew canons praise Cyrus and the Great
King's administration as markedly in their favour, and also that
the Afghan tradition names Nebuchadnezzar, and not Cyrus, as
having moved the Bani Israel to Ghor. The Great King by whose
favour Zerubbabel returned to Jerusalem would have been the
last to deport his fellow-countrymen to the mountain-wastes of
Ghor. Had he done so, we may be sure that the Hebrew historians
would not have remained silent in the face of such inconsistency.

There follows a gap of twelve hundred years, from the Baby-
lonian captivity to the rise of the sun of Muhammad's beauty, in
the chronicler's words. During all that time we have no word,
except that the deported Bani Israel in the countries around Ghor,
to which the chronicler now conveniently adds Kabul, Kandahar,
and Ghazni, continually increased in number and incessantly made
war on the infidels around them, most of whom they put to death.
Indeed we are told they maintained their dominion in these moun-
tainous regions until the time of Mahmud of Ghazni, nearly four
centuries after the rise of the Prophet. But that is to anticipate,
and there follows the story of the Afghan conversion to Islam.

The Afghan chroniclers would have it that Khalid bin Walid,
the most famous of the Prophet's Ansar (Companions) and the
first great Arab conqueror, belonged to the tribe of the descend-
ants of Afghana resident near Mecca. (All other Muslim tradition
states him to have been an Arab of the Makhsum family of the
Prophet's tribe of Quraish.) On conversion to Islam, while the
Prophet was still alive and before Khalid's conquest of Syria and
Iraq, Khalid either proceeded in person, or sent a letter, to his
kinsmen of the Bani Israel settled in Ghor, to bring them tidings
of the new faith and an invitation to join the Prophet's standard
There resulted a deputation of a number of representatives of the Afghans of Ghor, led by one Qais, which proceeded to meet the Prophet at Medina. This Qais is said to be descended from Saul in the thirty-seventh generation, an under-generous allowance for a period of some seventeen hundred years.

This Qais and his comrades then waged war most gallantly on the Prophet's behalf. The chronicle proceeds:

The Prophet lavished all sorts of blessings upon them; and having ascertained the name of each individual, and remarked that Qais was a Hebrew name, whereas they themselves were Arabs, he gave Qais the name of Abdurrashid and observed further to the rest that, they being the posterity of Malik Talut, it was quite proper and just that they should be called Malik likewise... and the Prophet predicted that God would make the issue of Qais so numerous that they would outvie all other people, that their attachment to the Faith would in strength be like the wood upon which they lay the keel when constructing a ship which seamen call Pahtan; on this account he conferred upon Abdurrashid the title of Pathan also.

Finally, for full measure, and divining that his new Pathans love a jest even turned against themselves, Muhammad opined that their language must be the language of the infernal regions, even as Arabic was most certainly that of heaven.

This is all great fun. But it smells of the Delhi lamp, the lamp of the courtier of Afghan ancestry but now speaking and writing only Persian, trained to raise a titter at the expense of an uncouth Pathan soldiery to amuse the Mughal court. Even the Delhi courtier who had forgotten his Pakhtu, one would think, would only identify the racial appellation 'Pathan' with an obscure Mediterranean Arab seafarer's word to make a pun and to amuse. Even he must have known that no Afghan or speaker of Pakhtu or Pashtu ever referred to himself as a 'Pathan', and that the word was an Indian usage. The corresponding word in the classical Pakhtu of the Peshawar Valley is Pakhtun, plural Pukhtanah, of which the Indian word Pathan (with a hard or cerebral 't') is a Hindi corruption. It is not even true that in the usage of the peoples of what is now Pakistan the honorific of malik is confined to Pathan notables. Malik is a common Arabic word denoting a king or prince, and, while admittedly it is in common use for elders throughout the Afghan tribes, it has been of wider application over many parts of the Central Asian world, including the Panjab.
We must return to Qais alias Abdurrashid alias Pathan — it is from his loins that the chroniclers derive the whole nation. It is narrated of him that, dismissed by the Prophet, he returned to Ghor successfully to propagate the new faith, and died there in the forty-first year of the Hijrat, aged eighty-seven, leaving three sons, the eldest, Sarbanr, the second Bitan (or Batni), the third Ghurghusht, these three being the ancestors of the various branches of the Pakhtu- and Pashtu-speaking peoples. At this point the chroniclers bring to an end their account of the pre-Islamic period, and it is time to examine the story a little further before embarking on the detail of the genealogies themselves.

The mythical character of the whole account is surely clear enough from what has been said. Even the story of the early conversion of Qais and his companions can be disproved, we shall see, from reliable Muslim sources, including the traveller Al-Biruni and the courtier Al-Utbi, both writing in the time of Mahmud of Ghazni early in the eleventh century A.D. These accounts establish that, four centuries later than the time of Qais, the province of Kabul had not been Islamized, and this was only achieved under the Ghaznawids. The Hindu Shahiya kingdom of Jaipal extended almost to Kabul, and Mahmud had to fight against infidel Afghans of the Sulaiman mountains. Even later than this, in the great war of A.D. 1192 between the Muslim invaders and the Hindu kingdom of northern India, when Muizzuddin Muhammad Ghori bin Sam defeated Prithwi Raj, the Hindu ruler had assembled a force of Afghan horsemen, and there were Afghans fighting on both sides. There is thus more than an indication that, even at the end of the twelfth century (the sixth Hijri), all Afghans had not been converted, though the legends represent them as rushing into the fold in the days of Khalid. Then there are the misconceptions of Hebrew history and the accretions thereto, evident from the confusion between the Assyr-ian and the Babylonian captivities and the invention of a son to Saul. And what are we to say of the immense gaps, extending to millennia, in the account? Elphinstone concludes that Afghan descent from the Jews is to be classed with that of the Romans or the British from the Trojans. As good a case, I think, has been made out by the British Israelites.

Yet, having written this, I remember an earnest discussion with a Pathan friend, also a Sayyid, Abdul Jabbar Shah of Sitana, a
village on the Indus right bank close to the spot where the great river breaks from the hills thirty miles or so above Attock. Sayyid Abdul Jabbar is a man of great learning and deep piety, versed in all Pathan story over the last two centuries. On the more ancient traditions I found him utterly convinced that, as he put it, the Afghan or Pathan races, however you call them, are of 'Semitic' and not of 'Aryan' origin. The language, Pakhtu, he freely admitted, was 'a sister of Persian', and, though blessed with a top-hamper of Arabic words (as is English with Latin), is at root an 'Aryan' tongue. But again, as he rightly said, language is no proof of ethnic origins, and the Semites who entered the Afghan country merely adopted the Iranian tongue they found there. Sound enough.

But, as the argument went to and fro, and the weakness and inconsistencies of the Bani Israel chronicle were emphasized, it seemed clear that the Sayyid's insistence on a Hebrew origin for his ancestors was bound up with the idea that the progenitors of good Pathans must surely have been monotheists; they could not have worshipped many gods. And the stress on the Semitic strain had something to do with a passionate conviction that a Sayyid's ancestors must have been of Arab stock. A congenital distaste for an evil and idolatrous generation, combined with a family pride claiming relationship and direct descent from the Prophet himself, lay behind the Bani Israel concept. We have no documentary testimony, but it is reasonable to assume that missionaries of the new Islam must have accompanied the Arab armies which overthrew the Sassanian dynasty of Persia in A.D. 642 at Nihawand, and went on to conquer and proselytize Transoxiana under the Arab general Qutaiba by the end of the seventh century. At that time in fact most of the Afghan country was by-passed and remained unconverted until some centuries later, but the tradition of the early missionaries lived on. Many of these would have been Arabs, some perhaps were of the Prophet's own family. The many groups in Pathan country claiming to be Sayyids or Quraish may have sprung from these. Of such stock doubtless are the men who still insist on their Semitic forebears, and, fervent for the taubid, seek to claim Hebrew affinities in a pre-Islamic existence. Under this interpretation even the Bani Israel story may reflect some part of the truth, and at least indicate a cause for a belief which, however unreasonable, it is hard to shake.
When all is said, this is a belief worthier than the Nordic theories which at one time issued from Kabul.

The chronicle has arrived at Qais alias Abdurrashid, the eponymous hero of the Pathans, and it is time to refer in some detail to the genealogies themselves. And here it is well to remember with Elphinstone and others that, however shrouded in myth may be the names and persons of the eponymous ancestors, these tribal tables, or shajras as they are called in Islamic lore, do represent something real. They in fact reflect what these tribes themselves still believe to be their origin and cousinship, one to another, and they sort out and categorize racial, and other, affinities and differences which can be traced today in the physical appearance, habit, dress, language, or history of the great congeries of Pathan societies living up and down the North-West Frontier, and in Afghanistan beyond. To Pathans shajras are as the breath of life; others may turn the page.

I have kept these family-trees within the smallest possible compass. It should be understood that they can quite easily be expanded, both in the introduction of further ramifications into the tables given, and, by one who has intimate knowledge, for each tribe, down to each family or house. It is indeed, doubtful whether there exists today elsewhere in the tribal world any organization so closely knit as is a Pathan tribe in the inter-connection and relationship of the various parts of the tree, down to the last twig. The details of these arrangements are known to all maliks and elders and, in so far as they affect individual families, to all adult male members of a tribe, and no doubt to the women also. The ancestral share in the tribal account of profit and loss is an essential part of this tribal lore, and is the tribal guide in peace and in war. More must be said elsewhere on this subject; here it is only necessary to explain that the comparative simplicity of the tables that follow is for a purpose. Family-trees only come to life when you know the family; otherwise they are best kept in a cupboard. But something must be listed here, if there is to be understanding.17

I have said already that by tradition Qais had three sons, Sarbanr, Bitan, and Ghurghusht. Thus there should be three main lines of his descendants. But there are really four, the ancestor of the fourth being one Karlanr or Karlanri.18 As Karlanr is the putative ancestor of most of the hill-tribes, he is of peculiar importance. In
Nematullah's Makhzan-i-Afghani his descendants are listed separately from the progeny of the other three, but Karlanr is linked with the Sarbanr branch as a foundling. Other genealogists link him with the Ghurghusht branch. Elphinstone alone speaks of the four sons of Qais, whom he calls Serrabun, Ghoorghoosht, Betnee, and Kurleh, in that order. Whatever the arrangement adopted, it will be noted that Karlanr's position in the genealogies is uncertain; it is as if he had a bar sinister in his pedigree. To this I shall return.

Sarbanr, the eldest son, had two sons named Sharkhbun (or in some records Sharkbun or Shakarbn or Sharjyun) and Kharshbun (or in some records Krishyun). Put briefly, Sharkhbun is the ancestor of the Western Afghans, namely the Abdalis — now known as the Durrani and kindred tribes — and Kharshbun of the Eastern Afghan tribes of the Peshawar Valley and the adjacent mountains to the north, namely the Yusufzais (including the Mandanr branch), the Mohmands, the Khalils, the Daudzais, and the Muhammadzais. The trees of the two branches of Sarbanr's sons go like this:

**Sarbanri I — Western Afghans**

- **Sharkbun (or Shakarbn or Sharjyun)**
  - Sherani
    - (from a Kakar woman, so went to join Ghurghusht branch, to which Kakars belong)
  - Tarin
    - Spin (white)
    - Tor (black)
    - Abdal
      - Urmars (adopted)
        - Urmars (Kaniguram, Logar, Peshawar)
        - Note. Urmars are not Pathans
      - Abdalis (Durrani) (Afghanistan)
        - Spin Tarins (Duki in Baluchistan)
        - Tor Tarins (Pishin B'tan)
  - Sherani (Sulaiman Mts.)
  - Abdalis or Durrani (Afghanistan)
    - Zirak
      - Papakzais (Afghanistan)
      - Alikzais (Afghanistan)
    - Barakzais (Afghanistan)
    - Abukzais (Pishin and Toba)
    - Namzais Alikzais Ishqzais
      - Nurzais Alikzais Ishqzais (Afghanistan, also 'Multan Pathans')
The un-Islamic flavour of the names of the two sons of Sarbanr, more particularly in the forms Sharjyun and Krishyun, will not escape notice. So it is not surprising to find a transformation into Muslim names: 'Sharfuddin whom the Afghans call Sharkbun, and Khairuddin, whom they call Kharshbun,' says the chronicler. Bellew takes a very different line. 'These are evidently transformations of the common Rajput proper names — Surjan and Krishan,' he writes, and in an earlier passage identifies the name Sarbanr itself with the Rajput Suryabans — the solar or royal race —, and his grandson Shirani with the Hindu Shiv Ram. We will return later to this idea, startling as it is and utterly opposed to all traditional Pathan genealogies.

In the trees above, all those tribes well known today are printed in italics, and their present seats are also given. It will be seen that
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not only the main tribe of what is now Afghanistan — the Abdalais or Durransis — but the leading tribes also of the Peshawar Valley and the adjacent mountains are held to be of the same stock, the progeny of Qais’ eldest son, Sarbanr. These are undoubtedly the leading tribes among the Afghan peoples as a whole. It is they who have kept alight the lantern of the race. Just as the Durransis, whether in the Saddozai or in the Muhammadzai dynasties, have supplied the royal house in Afghanistan for over two hundred years, so the Yusufzais of Mardan and to a lesser degree the Khalils, Mohmands and Muhammadzais of Peshawar, regard themselves, and indeed are regarded, as the truest and finest exponents of the Afghan way of life, in bravery in war, in dignity in counsel, in the use of a clear and undefiled Pakhtu tongue (note the spelling). Indeed in many respects the Yusufzais and other Peshawar tribes look down even on the Durransis (who are Pashtu-speakers) as half-Persianized, and would put themselves first in esteem. And many would admit their claim.

A Yusufzai or a Khalil, for instance, if he is asked who he is, will always reply, ‘I am an Afghan.’ A man of these tribes will not say, ‘I am a Pakhtun.’ He speaks Pakhtu, but his stock he regards as Afghan. He is, by tradition, a close relative of the Durrani; indeed, in his own estimation, he is better than the Pashtu-speaking Durrani. Further pressed on the subject of his stock, he will tell you that among the Pakhtu-speaking peoples — his is the ‘hard’ dialect, what he would claim as the best and the gentleman’s way of talking the language — he is the aristocrat, and he is the Afghan proper. The hill-tribes (he would opine), Khataks, Afridis, Wazirs and the rest, are good enough Pakhtuns or Pashtuns in their way, but their claim to be Afghans is doubtful. They are Karlanris, he will say. The Ghaljis — well, it is true they conquered Delhi and Iran once, but after all they carry their houses on their backs like snails, they are Khanab-ba-dosb, and have little claim to be in the true Afghan line. So he will speak, and all who have lived their lives in close contact with him and his peers will bear testimony to this consciousness of Afghan race among Sarbanr’s sons in the Kharshbun line. In other words, it is not correct, as so many do, to confine the appellation ‘Afghan’ to the western tribes within Afghanistan; it is claimed by the eastern Ghoriah Khel and Khakhay Khel as well. In the peoples’ own minds it is not a case of west or east; the root of the matter lies in a consciousness of descent.
The family tree of Bitan, Qais' second son, follows:

III. Bitan (or Batni or Bait)

Warshpun — Kajin — Bibi Mato = Shah Husain of Ghor

Bhitannis
(Bannu and Tank)

Mati tribes

Ghalzoë
(Conceived out of wedlock)

Ibrahim Lodi

All the Ghajji (Ghikai) tribes of Afghanistan

Niaz

Niazis
(Isa Khel and Mianwali)

Niaz

Siani

Dotan

Dotanis
(South Waziristan)

Prangay

Lodi dynasty
of Delhi
A.D. 1451-1526

Lodis and Bilas
(Paniala)

Ismail

Sur

Lohanis

Marwats
Daulat Khel
Babars etc.
Gandapers
Kundis etc.
(Bannu, Tank etc.)

The tree shows that the only tribe descended in the male line from Bitan is the Bhitannis, a well-known but small congregation on the eastern flank of Wazir and Mahsud country where the hills drop to the plains of Bannu and the Derajat. All the rest — and they include the largest Pashtu-speaking tribe of all, the Ghaljis, and also the progenitors of two Pathan dynasties in Delhi, the Lodis (A.D. 1451-1526) and the Surs (A.D. 1539-1555) — are said to be descended through the female line, and, in the case of the Ghaljis, on rather the wrong side of the blanket. This tale is best told in the chronicler's own words:
Batni, the son of Pathan (Qais), had by his devotion and austerity attained the degree of saint-ship, and was on that account called Shaikh Bait. God Almighty presented him with sons and with a daughter called Bibi Mato, whose children are called Matis. It must be known that there exists much difference with regard to the offspring of the Matis; but by the perusal of standard works the lineage of this lady has been found to run thus. . . .

The author here interposes an account of a Tajik family of note, resident in Ghor (the modern Hazarajat), which was known as Shansabani and had recently embraced Islam. This was the same family which many centuries later (A.D. 1192) conquered Northern India for Islam, defeating Prithwi Raj. It was descended from one Zohak. A scion of this family named Shah Husain, disgusted with certain transactions of his father, left his home and wandered eastward till he came to the neighbourhood of the Takht-i-Sulaiman mountain, where Shaikh Batni lived. The scribe proceeds:

The marks of felicity being engrossed on Husain’s forehead, Shaikh Batni allowed him to reside among his tribes, made him his friend, and evinced paternal affection towards him. Husain would not occupy himself with worldly affairs, but gave himself up to devotion, austerity and reading the Quran; by his integrity and prudence everything was well administered. Now the Shaikh had a daughter of a beauty surpassing. Destiny bringing on an eventual display of affairs, Shah Husain, conformably to human nature, youth and beauty, paid his addresses to this fair daughter, Mato by name; and matters gradually went so far that they by mutual consent, but without the sanction of father or mother, proceeded to such intimacy that, a short time after, the symptoms of pregnancy appeared and the case no longer admitted of concealment. The damsel’s mother becoming aware of it, first assailed her daughter with reproaches: then, perceiving that there was no remedy but by the adoption of a speedy resolution, in a propitious hour they married Bibi Mato to Shah Husain. After a short time Mato was delivered of a sweet and auspicious boy who, being the fruit of a clandestine amour, was called Ghilzai — Ghil in the Afghan language signifying thief, and zai born a son.39

Husain certainly enjoyed the best of both worlds. But there remains a postscript. The scribe proceeds:

Bibi Mato next had another son, whom they named Ibrahim Lodi. He came by the appellation Lodi on this wise. One year so much
snow fell on the hill where the Shaikh resided that he abandoned his home and moved lower down to a more favourable clime to pass the winter. When the snow and rainy season was over, he returned to his former abode and said to his wife, 'Pronounce Bismillah and fetch fire from the hearth!’ (The hearth had been four months without a fire.) The lady, doubtful but as ever obedient, stretched forth her hand, and lo! — a miracle — found live ashes. The Shaikh, upon that said to her, ‘The children, after such a journey, are hungry; bring me baked bread, for today I wish to distribute it myself, to see which of them is the most favoured by fortune.’ When the first loaf was baked, Ibrahim, a clever and active youth, brought it running to the Shaikh, who exclaimed, 'Ibrahim Lodi!' which signifies 'Ibrahim is the elder', Lodi in the Afghan tongue signifying ‘the elder’.

This tale, combining the simplicity of Alfred and the cakes with the ruses of Jacob against Esau, will be found on examination to confirm deductions from sources which may claim to be historical. Let us look below the surface.

The first obvious point is that early Afghan tradition, as here brought out, did not hold the Ghaljis to be of true Afghan stock. Not only is their supposed progenitor a foreigner, but he is the seducer of an Afghan maiden and the father of a child conceived out of wedlock — a crime punishable by death at the hands of the girl's family. Husain is made out to be of Tajik, that is of Iranian stock, but the narrator forgets that the Ghorids who under Muizzuddin Muhammad Ghori conquered Northern India for Islam in A.D. 1192 are by some, including Afghan historiographers, believed to have been Turks. They certainly led armies composed largely of Afghans, but no claim for Afghan ancestry is put forward on their behalf, and the slave-kings who followed them in Delhi were, every one, a Turk. On this showing Husain, an earlier prince of the same Ghorid blood, may have been a Turk, who irrupted into the Afghan family of Shaikh Batni. The story so becomes a mirror of an old tradition that the Ghaljis include a foreign stock, which forcibly imposed itself upon the Afghans, taking their women in marriage and in the process adopting Afghan custom and the Afghan language. This root-stock need not necessarily have been Turkish.

I shall show later that there exists historical evidence pointing to the truth of this belief. Here it is fair to say that it is one which aroused Raverty to a fury of invective and acrimony. Raverty is
tied literally to the story of Qais and his descendants as history, and invariably fails to distinguish the myth from the undertones of truth where, as often, these can be detected.

Secondly, the tale serves to illustrate what is a fact, accepted by the people, that the other clans of this branch of Pashtu-speakers, here called Lodis, are of the same stock as the Ghaljis of Afghanistan. The myth gives them the same parentage on both sides, but there is a scandal about the birth of the elder son. The present representatives of the younger son, Lohanis, Marwats, Niazis, Dotanis, Bilutses and so on, are merely settled Ghaljis — many or most of the Ghaljis are nomadic — living in the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts. They so regard themselves now, and by custom and by the dialect of Pashtu which they speak they can be recognized as such. The distinction which the genealogies draw between the Ghaljis proper and the Lodi and Lohani tribes has of course an obvious motive. The historiographers who drafted these genealogies were living at the courts of Delhi and Agra. It was in their interest to make it quite clear that the Lodi ancestors of the Lodi and Sur dynasties which ruled Northern India were no doubt of Ghalji stock, but in some way more legitimate than, and distinct from, other Ghaljis. Nematullah and other scribes were writing long before the Ghaljis proper under Mirwais took Kandahar from the Persians, and under his son and nephew went on to conquer Persia itself. Those events for him were in the womb of time: it was not his business to glorify the Ghaljis as a whole, but rather to show that those of their stock who had held Hindustan for a century in fee were somehow different from the rest.

Here arises yet another point of interest. Again, in spite of Raverty, the Lodis and the Surs were not the only dynasty of Ghalji stock to rule in Delhi. There were the rulers known to history as the Khalji or Khilji (A.D. 1290-1321), of whom the most famous was Alauddin, who has left memorials in stone beside the Qutb Minar of Delhi. Around this identification much scholastic fury has raged; I shall return to the argument, and dare only to say now that this identity has been widely accepted by the Pathans of the Frontier; and is borne out by one of the poems of Khushhal Khan Khatak, written three centuries ago.

The Ghaljis are probably the most numerous, and possibly the most valiant, of all Afghan tribes. And they figure more largely
than the Durrans on the stage of the North-West Frontier because from time immemorial great numbers of them have spent the winter months in what are now the plains of Pakistan, and indeed beyond that in India too, as far as Calcutta, and beyond, even to Australia. They will appear again.28

The family-tree of Ghurghusht, Qais’ third son, is shorter and less entertaining. It goes like this:

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IV. Ghurghusht

Danay

Babay

Mando

Mando Khel (Zhob)

Kakars
(All over northern Baluchistan)

Panri

Daway

Panris (Sibi)

Gaduns or Jaduns (Mardan and Hazara)

Musah Khel (Baluch border)

Safis (Peshawar and Bajaur border)
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The Kakars of Zhob, Loralai and parts of Sibi in Baluchistan are a very large tribe, but the country is poor and they have never been held high in the account, whether in war or peace. Being neighbours of the Baluch tribes they have imbibed some of the Baluch esteem for their chiefs, and are less anarchic than most Pathans.

The Gaduns — such of them as remember their Pakhtu — are a very small congregation on the southern slopes of the Mahaban mountain, close to Sitana and Topi, where the Indus issues from the hills. In Hazara, on the other (left) bank of the Indus, is a larger group of the same tribe, with name altered to Jadun, living in the Rash plain by Abbottabad and in the hills around. These have forgotten both the language and the ways of their ancestors and speak the form of Panjabi current in Hazara.

The Safis live in the recesses of the Bajaur dales between the hill Mohmands and the Tarklanris of Bajaur. They are chiefly not-
able for having probably been the last of the Afghan tribes to embrace Islam and for that reason are among the most fruitful in the production of fervent exponents of the faith, even in these latter days.

Some mention too is needed here of the Sheranis of the Takht-i-Sulaiman, generally regarded as of the Ghurgnusht branch, because Sherani — see Table I — left the Sarbanris and married a Kakar woman. It is contrary to Pathan custom to marry outside the tribe, or for any tribe to give a bride to an outsider. If and when this is done, the foreign bridegroom is expected to cast in his lot with his wife's tribe, as did the Sheranis who live next door to the Kakars.

Thus end the genealogies of the three sons of Qais. But where are such famous tribes as the Afridis, the Khataks, the Orakzais — names which the word Pathan conjures up even to the newcomer? Where are the Bangash; above all, where are the Mahsuds and the Wazirs? What of the Khaibar, and Waziristan, and the hills of Kohat, and the Khatak dancers, whirling, sword in hand, around the fire beneath the stars? Are these all forgotten?

The answer is that in the genealogies all these, perhaps the names best known to the world, are slipped in, almost as an afterthought. Their common appellation is Karlanri. The Delhi scribes knew little of them, except as the wild mountaineers of Roh, and with an ill grace and an uncertain hand found them an obscure place in a kind of postscript to the lists. Thus some, including Nemrutullah, call them Kerranis, and do not explain how, if at all, they are related to other branches. Others link them to the Ghurghusht branch by inventing another son to Ghurghusht named Burhan, and making him the father of Karlanr or Karlanri. But the more respectable mythical origin of the Karlanris is that:

Two brothers of Urmar's tribe went out into the field, and came to a place where an army had rested the night and moved on. One brother, who was childless, found an iron axe (some say a cooking-pot), the other a new-born babe. The finder of the axe — or the pot — said to the other, 'O brother, I am deprived of the blessing of a son; give me this boy and I will bring him up as my own child, and so will my name remain in this world. Do thou acquire merit, and my life long I shall be thy debtor. Take this axe (or cooking-pot), and give me the boy.' His brother did as he was asked. The word for an
axe (or pot) being in Pashtu something like Karbai, the child was called Karlanri. When he grew up his adoptive father gave him his daughter in marriage, all was happy, and a numerous progeny resulted. And this is their family-tree:

Here, then, with a shadowy ancestry and a foundling sire, are grouped together these illustrious tribes whose names resound
through the pages of a hundred and fifty years of English writing, names synonymous with wild deeds of daring, famed for their strange mingling of loyalties with impatience of control. With the exception of the Peshawar tribes the sons of Kharshbun (in Table II), and the settled Ghaljis (in Table III), the Karlanri group includes all the great names of the North-West Frontier. And it is notable that save only the Shitak branch (Daurs and Bannuchis) who inhabit fertile irrigated valleys — every one of these peoples is a hill-tribe. A few of them only, the Mangals, Muqbils, Zadrans and Jajis, live in Hariob and Khost in Afghanistan just beyond the Durand Line, but even these overlap into the Kurram Valley. The rest before 1947 owned British allegiance, and now admit allegiance to Pakistan.

It is broadly correct to say that the sons of Koday are northerners and speak the hard variety of Pakhtu; the sons of Kakay are southerners and speak the soft dialect of Pashtu. The former wear their hair short; the latter wear it long or bobbed. The exception to this is the Khataks of Kohat who (though sons of Koday) speak the soft variant and many of whom still wear their hair below the ear.

All of these, or such of them as are conscious of a wider than tribal patriotism, answer to the appellation Pakhtun (or Pashtun) rather than to Afghan. Among the Waziristan tribes, and even among the Afridis, the consciousness is narrower still. With them it is more usual to hear a tribesman invoke political loyalties by speaking of میش مہسید، مینگ آپریدئی، 'We Wazirs', 'We Mahsuds', 'We Afridis.' This is because, miraculously, their tribal cohesion has so far preserved them from subjection to any administration, whether Persian, Turk, Mughal, Afghan, Sikh or British — all have found it wise to deal with a light hand — and the tribes show this in their pride of speech and bearing.

Reading between the lines of the Karlanri family-tree, what do we deduce? We see the best-known tribal names, those of the clans which have escaped inclusion in empires and those most famous as mercenary soldiers of fortune, included as Afghans only as an afterthought. Urmar himself, their putative ancestor, is described in the genealogies as adopted only, and the Urmars of today do not claim to be Afghans. One of this Urmar’s tribe adopts a foundling. The story reflects a conviction that the hill Karlanris cannot claim affinity with the sons of Qais.
The reputed Urmar ancestry is highly suggestive. The Urmars are still found in these parts in three groups. The first group is in Kaniguram, the central town in the heart of the Waziristan mountains, the second in a location in the Logar Valley not far from Kabul, and the third in three large villages, Umar Bala, Umar Miana and Umar Payan, about ten miles south-east of Peshawar. Those in the impregnable Kaniguram Valley, the upper Baddar, are bi-lingual. They speak Pashtu when talking to Mahsuds or other non-Urmars, but at home, among themselves, have preserved their own Urmari, a quite distinct East Iranian language classified as a separate tongue and by no means a dialect. Their Logar and Peshawar cousins have lost their language. The Urmars near Peshawar, whom I know well, have merged with the surrounding Pathans, who are Bara Mohmands and Khataks of Akora, and speak only Pakhtu. They retain, however, a consciousness that they are not as other men, and claim to be of older stock than the tribes around them.

In Kaniguram the Urmars have 400 houses with a population of some 3,000. There are many Sayyids living among them, who also speak the Urmari language and are almost certainly their chief families despite the claim to be Sadat. This Umar group retain their separate culture and form the trading community of the area. They claim also kinship with the other groups here mentioned, as do those groups with them. Kaniguram is situated in one of the most inaccessible glens of all the Frontier hills, and the survival of this Umar group, right in the midst of the Pashtu-speaking Mahsuds and Wazirs, is a fact of very great import. Moreover, the wide spread of the three localities where Urmars are still found, Waziristan, Peshawar and Logar, suggests that formerly they were a people of notable significance. The claim of the genealogies that an Umar adopted and so fathered the Karlanri Pathans thus takes on an added interest. The tradition quite conceivably reflects a truth that the Karlanris are sprung from an indigenous stock which was not Pashtu-speaking and later became fused with or overlaid by Pashtu- and Pakhtu-speaking peoples, learning in the process to speak the language of the dominant race. At the least it illustrates a conviction that the Karlanris are not Afghans in the true line, and may be much older established.

However this may be, the Karlanri tribes of today, Wazirs,
Bannuchis, Khataks, Bangash, Orakzaís, Afridis and the rest, proudly own to the Pathan name; they, above all others, preserve the Pakhtunwali, the Pathan code. And this may be the reason why, unlike the Yusufzais, for instance, they prefer a Pathan to an Afghan nomenclature. Here then is support from tradition that Afghan and Pathan, while they speak variants of the same language and live mixed up together, represent widely different strains. The Afghan holds for the most part the fertile plains, Kandahar, Herat, Kabul (by conquest) and Peshawar; the Pathan is a hillman.36

And for a third strain there is the Ghalji with his non-Iranian memories. So much even the genealogies tell us. We have to see how far these deductions fit what little can be gleaned from the recorded history of the many peoples who have entered the Indus basin by the North-Western gates.
CHAPTER II

THE GREEK HISTORIANS

So far, in respect of the Afghans or Pathans in the pre-Islamic era, we have only examined the traditional sources recorded in a number of writings in Persian, drawn up at the Mughal court not earlier than the beginning of the seventeenth century. This examination has shown a well-marked consciousness that these people were of at least three different stocks which have come together in juxtaposition, all speaking varieties of the same language, but, owing to a predisposition for the tribes not to mix in marriage, preserving a large number of separate tribal cells within the hive. We have also learned much of the intertribal affinities, as these are known to the people themselves.

But with regard to ethnic origins it is difficult to avoid a conclusion that the traditions are little more than fairy-tales. Indeed a postulate that a group of peoples, so diversified as the Afghans and Pathans obviously are, represent a pure and unsullied stream issuing from a single Hebrew source at the time of the Babylonian captivity must carry its own refutation. From other and better-established records we are aware that the lands which are now Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier of Pakistan have seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed the world. Each horde, as it passed, will have left its mark on the inhabitants of the country, one way of life constantly overlaying another. And there is another point. Over long periods the line of the Indus, or the escarpment of the mountains west of it, has represented the boundary of kingdoms or empires constantly shifting. The resultant inhabitants of a borderland like this must inevitably bear the marks of mingling civilizations. Our next task, then, is to search the records of foreign historians and archaeology as these may bear on the terrain itself where the Pathan peoples now live, and to begin as near as possible to the beginning. On the Frontier the Pathans themselves left no early-contemporary literature, they built no monu-
ments, and we shall have to see how far coinage series minted or current in neighbouring areas elucidate the story. We must at least start by looking elsewhere.

The Afghan tradition ostensibly begins in the sixth century B.C. with the Babylonian captivity. Let us start at almost the same time with the establishment of the Achaemenian Empire of Persia by Cyrus the Great in 559 B.C. In that year Cyrus was enthroned, although he did not overcome Astyages of Media until 550 B.C., which may be taken as the real beginning of the Achaemenian era, lasting until the empire was overthrown by Alexander in 331 B.C. Over this period of more than two centuries Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier as far as the Indus, and after Darius parts of the Panjab also, were included in the confines of a tremendous Persian dominion.¹

Again and again, when moving in what may be called the Iranian world, I have been struck by the conviction that the influence of Persia over all these lands is a much deeper, older thing than anything which springs from Islam. Were it Islamic only, we should expect to find the Shia sectarianism of Persia reproduced among the Pathans: in fact the Pathan frontiersman, with few exceptions, is an orthodox Sunni of the Hanafi school. The fact that Persian sectarianism has not broken the ties which undoubtedly unite the Iranian world, so different from that of Arabia, shows that those ties have been forged by influences older and other than religious. There is indeed a sense in which all the upland in Asia from the Tigris to the Indus is one country. The spirit of Persia has breathed over it, bringing an awareness of one background, one culture, one way of expression, a unity of spirit felt as far away as Peshawar and Quetta. He who has caught that breath has won to the heart of a mystery, and he will not forget.

No one who enters, say, Peshawar or Bannu from the Panjab, or mounts the hills west of them, can fail to remark that he has left one region of the world for another, and he is on the verge of the Iranian plateau. To him the mountains are different, the plants burgeon, the seasons revolve, the willow, the plane, the cypress appear, the rivers flow bright and gay as if alive, the birds recall the west, the sun and wind have an uplifting keenness — the men are the men of Central Asia, not of the sub-continent he has left behind. The real message of Professor Ghirshman's recent book on Persia before Islam² is that he proves Persian civilization to be
far older and broader-based than the Islamic inspiration which it absorbed unconquered. He shows how profound and beneficent was the Achaemenian influence on the outlying provinces, particularly in Gandhara (the Peshawar Valley) and among the Scythians. Achaemenian art and architecture even persuaded the Maurya dynasty of India (circa 323–190 B.C.) to reproduce the glories of Persepolis in their palaces, while Kharoshthi, an early Indian alphabet, was developed from the official Aramaic, the alphabet of the Persian State. 'From contact between the Persian language and that of the peoples of the adjacent Indus Valley there arose for the use of the conqueror and conquered a sort of mixed dialect of the style of Urdu.’

Thus the fact that Transoxiana, Afghanistan, and Pakistan west of the Indus, are even now Khurasani in culture is due in the first instance not to Islamic conquests but to earlier Achaemenian, Parthian and Sassanian influences, spreading from Persia over those countries. The first and most overpowering of these Persian influences was the empire of Cyrus and Darius the Great. And for that period our records, almost if not quite contemporary, are the Greek historian Herodotus¹ and the inscriptions of Darius⁵ at Susa, at Bisitun (Behistan) and on his tomb at Naqsh-i-Rustam near Persepolis in the Persian province of Fars.

It is convenient to refer first to the inscriptions of Darius, recorded either on rocks or slabs of dressed stone. Among a number of recitations, instinct with a pride and vain-glory which read oddly in an inhibited age, are detailed lists of the satrapies of the empire. The eastern satrapies are given as Aria (Herat), Bactria (Balkh), Chorasmia (Khwarezm or Khiva), Sattagydia (uncertain), Sogdiana (between the Oxus and Jaxartes), Arachosia (Kandahar), Gandhara (Peshawar Valley), and India. The old Persian actually used for the three satrapies most relevant to our present enquiries is THATAGUSH (Sattagydia), GADARA (Gandhara) and HINDUSH (India). The Indian satrapy is not given in the Bisitun inscription, which was carved early in Darius' reign to commemorate the victories by which he attained power, but it is given in those in the palace at Persepolis and at Naqsh-i-Rustam on Darius' tomb, showing that 'India' was acquired during Darius' reign. The Gandhara, or Peshawar Valley, satrapy appears in all three inscriptions. It should be remarked here that there is no need to argue the identification of Gandhara with the
Peshawar Valley; it is one well attested throughout the Mauryan, Graeco-Bactrian, Kushan and later periods right up to the time of Al-Biruni, writing of Mahmud of Ghazni in the eleventh century A.D., and it is universally accepted. And, as we shall see, there is confirmation for it in Herodotus.

It is possible that Gandhara up to the Indus was a part of Cyrus' conquests at the opening of the Achaemenian era, and certain that, if it was not then included in the empire, its inclusion was confirmed as one of Darius' earliest acts. Cambyses, who was the Great King intervening between Cyrus and Darius, reigned only for seven years and did not come east. He was too fully occupied with his conquest of Egypt, his abortive expedition to Ethiopia and the planning of an assault on Carthage which never came off. We know also that Darius' conquest of 'India', by which is probably meant the Doab between the Indus and the Jihlam Rivers, was not undertaken until an exploring expedition under the Greek Scylax had been sent from Gandhara down the Indus to feel the way and learn the geography. This could not have been done until the ground was firm in Gandhara itself. Let us now see what Herodotus has to say in these matters.

There are many references in various English works to one or other passage of Herodotus which may have a bearing on the early history of the North-West Frontier. These range from the uncritical surmises of Bellew, who does not seem to have been able to read the Greek, to the withering contempt of Raverty, dismissing all references to the Father of History in this context as a farrago of 'Herodotus and Hindus'. Many later scholars, including Sir George Grierson, Sir Aur-ul Stein and Professor Morgenstierne, have contributed their views, and these will be referred to in what follows. I would claim that my analysis at least puts forward for the first time a reasoned study of all the Herodotean passages that are relevant, buttressed by epigraphical and other sources where these exist.

I give the passages in the order in which I propose to consider them (I have not Latinized the Greek here).

(i) Herodotus, Book 4, 44

'Of the greater part of Asia Dareios was the discoverer. Wishing to know where the River Indos — the only river save one producing crocodiles — emptied itself into the sea, he sent a number of men on whose truthfulness he could rely, and among them Skulax of Karu-
anda, to sail down the river. *These started from the city of Kaspaturos and the country of Paktuike,* and sailed down the river to the east and the sunrise to the sea. Here they turned westward, and after a voyage of thirty months arrived at the place from which the Egyptian King sent the Phoenicians to circumnavigate Libua (Africa). After the voyage was completed, Dareios conquered the Indians, and made use of the sea in those parts."

(ii) Herodotus, Book 3, 102

'In addition there are other Indians who border on the city of Kaspaturos and the country of Paktuike; these live to the north and in the direction of the north wind as compared with the remaining Indians, and their way of life is almost the same as that of the Baktrians. They are the most warlike of all the Indians....'

(iii) Herodotus, Book 3, 91. (In this and the two succeeding passages the historian is giving a list of the Achaemenian satrapies and their peoples.)

'The Sattagudai and the Gandarioi and the Dadikai and the Aparutai, who were all reckoned together, paid 170 talents. This was the 7th satrapy.'

(iv) Herodotus, Book 3, 93

'From Paktuike and the Armenians... the sum drawn was 400 talents. This was the 13th satrapy.'

(v) Herodotus, Book 3, 94

'The Indians who are more numerous than all the others we have seen paid more than any other people, namely 360 talents of gold dust (equivalent to 4,680 ordinary talents). This was the 20th satrapy.'

(vi) Herodotus, Book 7, 66-67. (Giving the roll-call of Xerxes' army.)

'The Gandarioi and the Dadikai had the Baktrian equipment in all respects... the Paktues wore cloaks of skin and carried the bow of their country and the dagger.'

(vii) Herodotus, Book 1, 123

'... The Sagartioi, who are nomads....'

(viii) Herodotus, Book 7, 85

'The nomad tribe known as Sagartioi — a people Persian in language, and in dress half Persian, half Paktuan, who furnished to the army as many as 8,000 horse.

It is remarkable that in the first two passages, in which the
author is considering quite different and unconnected points, he speaks of the city of Kaspaturos — the accent would fall on the prepenultimate syllable in the nominative case — and the country of Paktuike in the same breath; quite evidently he considers them together. The identification to which older scholars, including Grierson, author of the *Linguistic Survey of India*, have adhered is that in the Paktues and Paktuike of Herodotus we may see the prototype of the Pakhtuns. It should be said at once that later scholars, including Professors Morgenstierne of Oslo and Bailey of Cambridge, have come out strongly against this equation. I will attempt to state the case as I see it.

Leaving aside for the moment the identification of Paktuike, what and where was Kaspaturos? Fifty years ago no scholar had ventured an opinion. It was indeed accepted that Scylax, the Captain Cook of his day, since he started down the river going east, must have embarked on the River Kabul (known as the Landai in Peshawar District). This river runs almost due east from Kabul past Jalalabad, through the Khaibar hills a few miles north of the Pass itself, and then through the Peshawar Valley where, after joining the Swat River, it falls into the Indus near Attock, after which the Indus runs almost due south to the sea. The change of direction at Attock would not necessarily have been known to Herodotus, though to anyone who sailed down the river even in those days the topography makes it clear enough, and it would have been clear to Scylax. The point of substance is that the voyage started in the direction of the sunrise. But where was Kaspaturos? It could not have been Kabul for the river is not navigable at that point.

Here it is necessary to put in a word of local knowledge about the course of the Kabul River, and navigation on it. It is not navigable by boats of any size until it has reached its confluence with the Kunar close to Jalalabad, and even from that point it is not safe owing to the rapids in its passage from Lalpura to Warsak through the Khaibar hills. Rafts are floated down on this stretch, but real navigation does not begin until the river issues into the Peshawar plain by Warsak and Michni. At this point at the present day it divides into three main streams, reading from the north, the Sardariab, the Naguman, and the Shah Alam. There is also a small fourth branch, the Budni. The three main branches reunite at Nisatta just below Charsadda, the northerly stream hav-
Sketch map of Kabul (Landai) River branches

Scale of Miles

0 10 20 30 40

71° 72°
ing taken meanwhile the Swat confluence; the Budni rejoins the Shah Alam at Dilazak. Below the confluence the united stream is known as the Landai. The distance from Peshawar to the Nisatt'a confluence is sixteen miles, to the nearest point on the Shah Alam (the most southerly stream) seven miles, and to the Budni channel only one mile. It is well known that the course of all these channels has varied even in recent times, and in the Mughal period there were probably only two channels. Peshawar is not on the banks of the river, but all Peshawaris are conscious of 'the Landai' as their own river, and many of them still navigate it. One point is quite clear. Scylax could not have embarked on this river at any point much above the neighbourhood of Peshawar, and we should therefore look for Kaspapuros in that vicinity.

Is there any other mention of it? There is. It appears in a fragment of the geographer and chronicler Hecataeus of Miletus, writing in 500 B.C., even earlier than Herodotus, but in the form Κασπάπυρος (Kaspapuros). Moreover Hecataeus states that his Kaspapuros is in Gandhara, as Herodotus places his Kaspapuros in Paktuike—an interesting clue to the identity of Gandhara with Paktuike to which I shall return. From this point the suggestion is now put forward, brilliantly I think, by two scholars who do not always see eye to eye, that Kaspapuros is a scribal error of a common enough kind for Paskapuros, and that Paskapuros is Peshawar. This compares well with the Po-lu-sha-po-lu of the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsang, the Sanskrit Purushapura, and the early Muslim forms of Purushapur or Pushabur in Al-Biruni and others. The divergence between the Herodotean Kaspapuros and the Hecataean Kaspapuros is not substantial, and, were it not for one point, need not detain us.

This is the point. There is a passage in Al-Biruni, where that author tells us that Multan was originally known as Kasyapapura. From this the orientalists Henfeld and Foucher deduced that Multan may be the Kaspapuros from which Scylax sailed down the Indus to the ocean. But not even Herodotus, and certainly not a navigator like Scylax, can ever have imagined that he was sailing east when setting out down the Indus from Multan. Moreover this identification overlooks the location by Hecataeus of Kaspapuros in Gandhara, and by Herodotus in Paktuike. That apart, there has fortunately been preserved by Athenaeus (circa A.D. 200) a fragment of the original narrative of Scylax himself which
shows that in the course of his voyage 'a mountain ran alongside the river and in places it was high and covered with thick forest and thorn bushes'. This passage, ably dug out by two Belgian scholars, Honigman and Maricq, exactly describes the gorges below Attock past Shadipur and Kalabagh down to Bilot. It is inapplicable to a voyage starting at Multan in the midst of the Panjab plain. The Multan hypothesis may be ruled out.

There is a further piece of evidence supporting the emendation Paskapuros = Peshawar, this time epigraphical. At Naqsh-i-Rustam, by the rock-tombs of Darius and his line, American archaeologists of the Chicago Oriental Institute have recently uncovered a fascinating bilingual inscription in the name of Shapur I, the second emperor of the Sassanid line, who defeated and took captive the Roman emperor Valerian at the battle of Edessa in A.D. 260. This inscription, in Parthian and Greek, gives a place named Pshkbur/Paskiboura as the limit of the Sassanian Empire to the east. The correspondence of this place-name both with the emendation of Herodotus to Paskapuros, and with the Sanskrit Purushapura and the modern Peshawar, is surely close enough to rule out coincidence and to resolve philological doubt. Moreover the occurrence of this name in the Sassanian age, just halfway between the era of Herodotus and that of Al-Biruni, provides the very link that is required.

The sum of this argument is that we have excellent reason for identifying Herodotus' Kaspaturos with Peshawar. We then find that his story of Scylax' voyage and starting-place fits neatly into place. Peshawar is the town within a very few miles of the river, near the only obvious spot where Scylax could have embarked in order to sail eastward into the sunrise, and eventually down the Indus to the sea. The hypothesis also fits the other passage about 'the bravest and most warlike Indians living north of all the others and near Kaspaturos'. It is quite unnecessary to point to the present-day inhabitants of that country, though they, too, answer to that description. For, present days apart, the truth of Herodotus' assessment was demonstrated to Alexander when he invaded these regions a century and a half after Herodotus' time.

With this point fixed we may proceed to locate Paktuike, which, as I have said, Herodotus more than once couples with Kaspaturos. Paktuike then is the country in which the city of Kaspaturos/Peshawar was situated, and must therefore be Gandhara,
the Peshawar Valley, and its environment. Indeed Hecataeus' Kasnepuros is admittedly in Gandhara. So the equation Paktuike, Gandhara/Peshawar Valley is established.

Let us now refer to the third passage cited, in which Herodotus, without assigning a name to the satrapy, tells us that Darius' 7th Satrapy was inhabited by four tribes, the Sattagudai, the Gandarioi, the Dadikai, and the Aparutai. We are not surprised to find the Gandarioi among these tribes; obviously this 7th satrapy is Gandhara, the Gadara of the Darius inscriptions, and the Paktuike of Herodotus. We will leave identification of the other three tribes aside for the moment, and turn to the fourth passage quoted.

In that passage Herodotus, very surprisingly, speaks of another Paktuike which he couples with Armenia, and tells us is the 13th satrapy of the empire. It has hitherto been assumed that this is a different place from the Paktuike from which Scylax sailed. This interpretation seems to me almost certainly wrong. The Achaemenian inscriptions nowhere bracket any other country with Armenia, which is always shown as a separate satrapy. It is surely much more likely that, in writing down the names of Darius' satrapies, the historian, or his scribe, made a slip and misplaced the name Paktuike, which should have been given as that of the 7th satrapy where the Gandarioi, etc. lived, and not as that of the 13th. This supposition brings this reference into line with the other two Herodotean passages where Paktuike, as we have shown, is on the Kabul River and corresponds to Gandhara. The Paktuike from which Scylax sailed is mentioned only a couple of pages later in the history (3, 102); had there really been two countries in the Achaemenian Empire with this name — a strange enough idea in itself — Herodotus could hardly have failed to note and explain it. I conclude therefore that the name of the 7th satrapy in which the Gandarioi and three other tribes are said to have dwelt was variously Paktuike or Gandhara.

The fifth passage is only relevant as showing that Gandhara and India were quite separate satrapies, as indeed is proved by the Achaemenian inscriptions themselves. India was not conquered, as we know from the first passage, until after Scylax' voyage was completed from a Gandhara which was already a part of the Empire.

The eastern limit of Darius' Indian province is not accurately known, but we shall see that Alexander's campaigns suggest it
was the Jihlam River, and at the very furthest not beyond the present boundaries of West and East Panjab. It is interesting that the 'India' of Herodotus, and indeed of Alexander and the Greeks and Romans generally, was a part of what we now know as the Panjab and Sind. It was the valley of the Indus, and geographically comparable with West Pakistan of today, omitting the Frontier districts. In a setting of ancient history Pakistan has thus a better claim to be known as India than has the Bharat of post-partition days since 1947. Darius, Herodotus, Alexander, Pompey, Horace, Trajan, would certainly have thought of India in the geographical terms of what is now West Pakistan.

In the sixth passage the Paktues, obviously the inhabitants of Paktuike, are mentioned as part of Xerxes' army, and Herodotus tells us that they were armed with the bow and the dagger. It is perhaps worth noting that, until matchlocks came in, the bow was the weapon normally carried by the Pathan tribesmen of the historical period, and the dagger is still pre-eminently the weapon of all the hill-tribes. Afridis and Wazirs take particular pride in their long war-knives, as much a part of their characteristic equipment as is the kukri to the Gurkha.

Having fixed Kaspaturos as Peshawar, and Paktuike as the country around Peshawar, are we to suppose that the similarity of Paktuike and Paktues to the modern Pakhtun is purely fortuitous? Grierson accepted the identification, but it is frowned on by more recent, and very eminent, orientalists. The chief of these are Professors Bailey of Cambridge and Morgenstierne of Oslo. The latter in particular has much practical experience in this field, and very great weight must be given to his conclusions. Let us examine on what grounds the correspondence does not find favour.

Professor Bailey's reasons are set out in an article entitled 'Kusanica' in the Journal of the British School of Oriental and African Studies, and were formulated in 1952. His objection is founded on an assertion that for philological reasons Paktues (Πάκτυες) cannot be connected with Pakhtun. According to him the 'hard' pronunciation, Pakhtun, is comparatively new and dialectal. Later in the same article he admits that the Greeks used κτ for Iranian kbt (e.g. Baktra for Persian Bakhtris); it follows therefore that his argument stands solely on his firm rejection of the pronunciation Pakhtun. He goes on to suggest the identification of Paktues with the Patu in North Chitral, of whom few have heard.
Professor Morgenstierne's views are comprised in a very recent article contributed by him to the 4th fascicule of the new edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, article 'Afghan'. He also regards Pashtun as the classical variant, and refers, rightly of course, to Pakhtun as the north-eastern way of speaking. Like Bailey he, too, affirms that kht is a later dialectal form, and that sht could not have been rendered by Greek κτ. He therefore rejects the equation for the same reasons. He goes on to make a very interesting connection of Pashtun with Ptolemy's Parsyetae (*Παρσυντα*), 'a tribe inhabiting the Paropamisus.' My own reaction to this identification is that the Parsyetae, of which the ancient form is said to have been Parswana, are getting very close to the people of Pars or Fars, the Persians or Farsiwans, as the Pathans still call them. Farsiwan, or Parsiwan, is a very usual, and slightly pejorative, appellation for Persians, in use to describe Tajiks and other Persian-speakers whom the true Pathan affects to despise.

Morgenstierne does not tell us what has become of the Paktues.

Both these authorities, it will be seen, are definite in their statements that the orthodox linguist must regard the replacement of the digraph sh by kh as a modern dialectal development. I have seen it suggested that an example of this phonetic rule is to be found in the comparatively recent change from the equivalent of sb to the equivalent of kh in Castilian Spanish. It is also true that Afghan Government spokesmen from Kabul are very definite in their assertions that the 'soft' Pashtu of Kandahar, which employs the sb, is the original and classical variant of the language.

With great respect I differ. It seems probable that the predilection for Pashtu/Pashtun over Pakhtu/Pakhtun is not uninfluenced by views emanating from Kabul, prompted by the Durrani speakers of the language. The Paktues of Herodotus did not live around Kandahar where the Durranis come from, but in the Peshawar Valley. And I should require far more convincing proof to compel agreement to the proposition that the 'hard' pronunciation is quite new around Peshawar. There are further things to say. One who has lived many years with Pathans will tell you that the kh (ک) peculiar to the language shades into sb (ش) almost imperceptibly; it often seems to depend on how much phlegm is in the speaker's throat. The premise that the 'hard' variant is a recent dialect over looks the opinion of all the Pathans around Peshawar,
who regard the language as spoken by the Yusufzais of Mardan and Swabi as the best of all.

There is another neat piece of evidence to the antiquity of the hard \textit{kh}. Arrian — \textit{Anabasis} iv, 23 — speaks of the River Euaspla, probably the Kunar, as the place where Alexander met the Aspasii. Aristotle, Strabo and Quintus Curtius call this river the Khoaspes (Choaspes). Since \textit{w} in Greek means \textit{good}, Kho- is evidently a Greek transcription of the word \textit{good} in the language of the Aspasii, or at any rate in the Iranian usage of that part of the Persian Achaemenian Empire. It is the river of the good horse.

The Pakhtu word for \textit{good} is identical — \textit{kho} or \textit{khub}. Pashtu is \textit{sho} or \textit{shub}.

It is true that we know from Herodotus i, 188, and v, 49, 52, that the River Karun, on which Susa was situated, was also called in the Greek transcription the Khoaspes, and that there can be no question of the use of a prototype of Pakhtu in that case. It can also be argued that \textit{huwa} is the old Persian for \textit{good} and might conceivably be transliterated as \textit{kho} in Greek.

But the close correspondence of \textit{kho-} with the Pakhtu is so much more striking that a refusal to accept it as a pointer in this region amounts to a form of academic special pleading. At least it is established that in Alexander’s time there was in use in the Kunar district an Iranian language with an affinity for a ‘hard’ variant. In the following chapter I have sought to draw the skein tighter by pointing to a possible correspondence between the names of the Aspasii and the Isapzai (Yusufzai), the protagonists at the present time of the hard variant of the modern language.

In short, let us break a lance with the phoneticians, and, adopting the hard variant, boldly link Pakhtun with Paktues. It all fits too neatly to be as naive as Bailey thinks.

There are other equations yet to be made. One of the four tribes mentioned by Herodotus, \textit{ex hypothesi} resident in Paktuike or Gandhara, is the Aparutai. These have been identified by Grierson, Stein and other noted orientalists with the Afridis. In this case Morgenstierne admits that, phonetically at least, the correspondence is possible. The Afridis and many others among the Pathans even today habitually change \textit{f} into \textit{p}, and indeed this is a recognized phonetic transference.

It need hardly be said that acceptance of the equation Aparutai with Aparidai — for that is how the Afridis pronounce it — by
no means carries with it the conclusion that the Aparutai of Darius' 7th satrapy occupied the identical territory in Tirah, Bazar, and the Khaibar and Kohat Passes, now held by the Aparidai. But it is to be noted that the Aparutai are mentioned as a tribe inhabiting a territory in that satrapy near to, if not contiguous with, the Gandarioi, and there is no doubt whatever that the Gandarioi are the people of the Peshawar Valley. And, as we know, the Aparidais' home today is just there, next to the Peshawar Valley. Moreover the homes of the greater number of the Aparidai are situated in mountain eyries, hard of approach and leading nowhere but to alpine pastures in the Sufed Koh from 10,000 to 15,000 feet above the sea. It has never been worth while for any empire to occupy this territory.

The addition of the Aparutai/Aparidai correspondence helps to buttress the case for finding in Herodotus traces of names which carry through to the present day. Bellew has gone further and identified the Sattagudai with the famous Khatak tribe, and the Dadikai with an obscure branch of Kakars whom he calls Dadi.

Of the Dadi I have never heard. But Bellew's connection Sattagudai/Khatak is provocative of thought. Sattagudai is merely a Greek transcription of the old Persian Thatagush, which appears in the Achaemenian inscriptions as one of the satrapies of the Empire. Its exact location is uncertain, but that it was on the eastern confines seems clear enough, for in the lists it appears in the group India, Arachosia (Kandahar) and Gandhara. Ghirshman places it west of the Indus and south of Gandhara, that is to say roughly in the region of Kohat, Bannu, the Derajat and Waziristan in modern geography. This is a country in which the Khatak tribe still occupy large parts. According to their own tradition they once occupied the Tochi Valley, from which they were displaced by their cousins the Shitaks, a point which connects their name with an even wider territory than that which they now hold.

Neither Bellew nor Raverty were conversant with the Achaemenian inscriptions. Raverty sneers at Bellew's equation mainly on the ground that Bellew, in seeking to justify it, stated, incorrectly, that in Pashtu, as opposed to Pakhtu, the name of the tribe could be pronounced Shatak, approximating to Sattagudai. (On this point Raverty was right, for the initial letter of Khatak is خ, Khe, which is not susceptible of change. It is the letter خ, Khin, which in the soft dialects is changed to ش, Shin. The Khataks
never call themselves Shataks.) But both Raverty and Bellew had forgotten, or never knew of, the existence of another important Karlanri tribe, allied to the Khataks both in ancestry and in location, namely the Shitaks. Shitak is the appellation common to the tribes which now inhabit the Tochi Valley and the Bannu plain, known more popularly as the Daurs and Bannuchiis. Moreover, as mentioned, the Khataks say that they once held the lands now occupied by their Shitak cousins, and were later driven northeastward to their present locations in the Kohat and Peshawar districts.

Neither Khataks nor Shitaks appear by name until the period of publication of genealogies under the Mughals, and the time of Akbar’s dealings with the Khataks for the protection of the highway to Peshawar. Babur indeed in his memoirs mentions the Karranis (Karlanris) whom he encountered in 1505 around Bannu along with the Niazis and Isakhel. It is probable that this reference of his is to Khataks or Shitaks, or both, for both are Karlanri tribes, and the other Karlanris who live in that area, Wazirs and Bangash, Babur mentions by name when he comes to them. In any case we need not be disturbed by the absence of early nominal references; even the Abdalis, rulers of Afghanistan for the last two centuries, do not appear in any records until later than this, not indeed until the time of the Safawi Empire in the seventeenth century.

Taken together, the Khataks and the Shitaks, who now have a common boundary close to Bannu, cover a stretch of territory as large as that held by any Afghan or Pathan tribe, whether Yusufzai, Durrani or Ghalji. From the Khatak settlements around Lundkhwar, close to the Malakand Pass, to the Shitak villages in Upper Daur in the Tochi, the distance is over 200 miles. The wide extent of their present territory, their large population, and the association of both groups of tribes at one time or another with the rich oases of Bannu and the Tochi, suggest sufficiently their importance in this family of peoples. They did not spring from nowhere in the night. They are Karlanris, not of the true Sarbanri Afghan stock. Thatagush is evidently to be located somewhere around where they are now. It is a leap in the dark, but it is tempting to find in the Achaemenian Thatagush, and in the Herodotean Sattagudai, not only the phonetic but the actual archetype of great tribal congregations whose name has been written large in
Frontier history ever since in Mughal times the identification of individual tribes became possible.\textsuperscript{18}

The last two Herodotean passages quoted refer to a tribe of nomads called the Sagartioi, the chief cavalrymen of the state in Xerxes’ army, and ‘a people Persian in language and in dress half Persian and half Paktuan’.\textsuperscript{19} This is a description which might well fit the Abdali (Durrani) tribes as they have been known since they emerged from obscurity in the time of Nadir Shah a little more than two centuries ago. They are the Afghan people who live furthest to the west and closest to Persia, and since they first came to notice in the time of Shah Abbas the Great (1587–1629), and later in Nadir Shah’s time (1730–47), they have always been inclined, among the chiefs at least, to the Persian language in preference to Pashtu. They are also more deeply imbued with Persian culture than any Afghans, much more so for instance than the Ghaljis who ruled in Persia for fifteen years.

Of the Durrani Elphinstone gives a description highly relevant in this context.\textsuperscript{20} He writes that they understand Persian and that their dress, arms and habitations, while retaining their national peculiarities, approach to those of Persia. He also stresses the pastoral and nomadic character of this tribe, and the express condition on which in his time (1809) they held their country, namely that they should furnish a horseman for every plough. Alexander Burnes too, writing twenty years later,\textsuperscript{21} observes that all the Durrani in Kabul spoke Persian, and many of the higher classes had no Pashtu whatever—a phenomenon just as apparent today. In every respect the few words of Herodotus about the Sagartioi would fit the Durrani as they have come to be known during the last two centuries of our era.

Sagartia figures as a satrapy only on one of Darius’ inscriptions, that on the palace at Persepolis. Its absence from the others suggests that the Sagartioi may have rebelled, or been absorbed in other satrapies. The location of the satrapy is also in doubt; Ghirshman places it\textsuperscript{22} between Meshed and Herat, an area over which the Abdalalis were trying to assert supremacy when they were checked by Nadir Shah early in the eighteenth century.

When we were examining the genealogies it was mentioned that the name by which the ancestor of the Abdalalis is known is Sharkbun or Shakarbun, by the consonantal transposition so com-
mon in Pashtu. Is it just possible to suggest that Shakarbun may enshrine some faint memory of the Sagartioi?

Before leaving Herodotus it is fair to give Raverty the last word in deploying his case against what he terms the Herodotean myth. He writes:

The Afghans, though divided into numerous tribes, are undoubtedly one race and speak one original language. Had they been the aborigines of the country at present known as Afghanistan, we must have heard something of them from ancient writers, for we find that even in the time of Herodotus Darius sent an exploring expedition under Scylax of Caryanda and others as far as the Indus.

Having written the above he appends an illustrative footnote, giving a translation of Herodotus 4, 44 (the first passage cited in this chapter), namely, as Raverty gives it: ‘These, setting out from the city of Caspatyrus and the country of Pactyice, sailed down the river towards the east and sunrise to the sea.’

The inconsistency between these two italicized passages is glaring. Having stated in his text that nothing has been heard from the ancient writers concerning the very people about whose language he is writing a Pakhto (sic) Grammar, he proceeds to illustrate this negative finding by citing a passage in Herodotus specifically mentioning ‘Pactyice’. And he fails wholly to notice either the coincidence or the contradiction. He goes on from his premise to agree with the Afghan chroniciers’ theme of the Hebrew origin of the tribes.

My own reading is that, on the contrary, the string of passages in Herodotus, showing as they do so wide and so inter-connected a similarity of nomenclature both of place and tribal name and habit with what we can see today, cannot fairly be regarded as coincidental. There are too many coincidences for that. For consider. Here is Herodotus twice mentioning Paskapuros (a fair emendation surely) as the city of Paktuike, the Paktues whose chief weapon is the dagger, tribes in this region called the Aparutai and Gandarioi, a sail eastward down the river of Paktuike into the Indus, the tribe of the Sattagudai, and lastly the bravest of all Indians who lived to the north by the country of Paktuike — all connected in one complex of description of this corner of the world. It seems a not unreasonable conclusion to see in these the
city of Peshawar, capital of the province known as Pakhtun-land or Gandhara, inhabited by Gandarians — later to be known as Qandharis — and Afridis, and possibly Khataks, and a sail down the Kabul (Landai) River into the Indus to the sea.

That there is no hint in Herodotus of a prototype for Afghan is not surprising, and is what the genealogies would lead us to expect. We shall see later that after Achaemenian times this country was swept again and again by devastating invasions and migrations leading to the disintegration of old tribal units and the agglomeration of new ones. But this process would have taken place chiefly in the wide-open plains and valleys where the tribes who now regard themselves as in the true Afghan line now dwell. There is plenty of evidence after we reach the period of documented history to show that the hill-tribes have been little incommoded by empires and the passage of armies. They 'let the legions thunder past'. So the insistence of the genealogies on a non-Afghan origin for the hill-tribes, those like the Afridis and Khataks lumped together as Karlanris, can be held to reflect a knowledge that they represented a more aboriginal stock, which only later absorbed the characteristics of the invaders. In other words, it is not surprising that in looking for a prototype in the oldest recorded history bearing on this region we hit on the ancestor of the Pakhtun rather than on that of the Afghan.

This is not to assert that the ethnic or linguistic stock can be traced through to tribes of similar names today. The case would be rather that these were sub-stratum agglomerations of people who, through contact with later-comers, modified their language and were assimilated to later cultures, but retained in the more inaccessible places sufficient of their older inspirations to boast their original names. The theory does at least give a starting-point to Pathan history more reasoned, and let me add more exciting, than the stock belief in the Bani Israel.

Perhaps it would be fair to conclude the Herodotean argument with the words of Winston Churchill on Fair Rosamond:24 'Tiresome investigators have undermined this excellent tale, but it certainly should find a place in any history worthy of the name.' If Pathans themselves are in doubt, or hanker after more traditional forebears, let them remember that Herodotus was the first to call the people around Paktuike the bravest of all the people in those parts.
Sketch-map to illustrate tracks of the armies of ALEXANDER, BABUR, and AKBAR on the North-West Frontier

This map covers the geographical limits of "hard" Pakhtu

Scale of miles

Alexander's probable route
Hephaestion's
Tribes encountered by Alexander in **BOLD** type

LAGHMAN (Langhian)

NINGRAHAR

Sd Koh

Maidan

TIRAH

KHOST
The Achaemenian Empire of Persia fell to Alexander the Great in 331 B.C., when at Gaugamela near Arbela — the modern Erbil in the vicinity of Mosul — the armies of the last Achaemenid, Darius Codomannus, were overthrown by the conqueror. The battle was a stiff one and the Persian nobility fought with great courage. Darius fled to Agbatana — Hamadan — and, although resistance was maintained far into the night by Saka and Bactrian formations from Eastern Iran, and it took Alexander several years more to pacify the empire, this was the decisive battle and the war was over. Sir David Hogarth implies that Arrian’s list of the Persian array at Gaugamela includes ‘Pathans and hillmen from all the range of the Hindu Kush’. But unfortunately this is a statement to be set in the realm of constructive imagination, for a reference to the source in Arrian (Anabasis iii. 8) establishes only that the satrap of Arachosia had under him, among others, ‘the Indian Highlanders so-called’. We may conjecture that these included Gandarioi, Paktues, Aparutai and others mentioned by Herodotus, but that is all.

It was not until the spring of 327 B.C. that Alexander was ready to lead his armies down into the Indus Valley. The intervening four years were spent in those astonishing marches which took him first to Babylon, Susa and Persepolis, then across Persia in pursuit of Darius to the neighbourhood of modern Meshed, and thence by the route across what is now Afghanistan via Farah, Kandahar and Kabul — though none of these places, except possibly the last, had then been founded — to cross the Hindu Kush into Bactria, the modern Afghan Turkistan — and reach as far as the Jaxartes (the Syr Darya) beyond Samarqand. These marches are represented by the old historians as having been undertaken first in pursuit of the fugitive Darius, and then to track down Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, who had murdered the last representative of the Great Kings at Damghan and attempted to
set himself up as *de facto* ruler of the eastern satrapies of the empire. But in reality Alexander was engaged in consolidating his rule to the furthest eastern limits of the Persian Empire, and founding cities according to his set policy to that end. But this policy, while it succeeded in bequeathing to Alexander's successors in Asia— the Seleucid Diadochi—an empire over Syria and Babylonia which lasted 150 years, did not endure more than a few decades on the Persian plateau, while in Gandhara and India Alexander's invasion had no immediate administrative consequences whatever. His officers were driven out of the country on the Indus by the Mauryas after a few years, and when that Indian power established its rule in and around Gandhara, such memories as there remained of Persia were not of Alexander but of the long period of Iranian rule under the Achaemenids. The Maurya Empire of India itself, which finally drove Seleucus out of the North-West Frontier region in 305 B.C., was in no way the result of, or the reaction to, Alexander's splendid but transitory raid. Its monarchs, Chandragupta and Asoka, did not need Alexander's example to teach them what empire meant. They had had before them for two centuries the stately fabric of the Persian monarchy, and it was that empire which impressed their imagination and served as a model for their institutions.  

In his impact on Gandhara it is as a raider on the grand scale, and only indirectly as a spreader of Greek thought and culture, that Alexander must be seen. The later Graeco-Bactrian Kingdom, under which Hellenic influences did reach the Indus, was not his foundation, and its power did not extend to Gandhara until 150 years after his death. The total duration of Alexander's own stay on the Frontier from the time he left Bactria in the early summer of 327 B.C. to his crossing of the Indus early in the following year was less than twelve months, during the whole of which time he was engaged either in reducing fortresses or fighting his way forward. When he crossed the great river, he passes out of our picture; he was to go on as far as the Beas and then sail down the rivers to the sea. His was a one-way passage through Gandhara.  

It is often said now upon the Frontier that such-and-such a tribe, or even family, claims Grecian or Macedonian blood inherited from Alexander or his soldiers. The Afridis, for instance, have their tradition of an admixture of Greek blood. They point to their Grecian features, and indeed many a young Afridi might
stand as a model for Apollo, while the Afridi elder can display the gravity of Zeus. There are young Pathan warriors, not only among the Afridis, whose strong classical profile and eagle eye recall the features of Alexander himself. It is said that Alexander’s army in its passage through this country left behind deserters who mingled their blood with that of the people of Tirah and the Khaibar. But the fact is that there is no local written record, Indian or Achae- menian, inscriptional or other, of Alexander’s passage through the country; indeed there is no contemporary or even near-contempo- rary Asian reference to his Indian expedition at all. Were it not for Arrian and the other classical sources, Greek and Latin, the very memory of Alexander’s connection with Gandhara would have faded like a dream. These Afridi and other traditions almost cer- tainly have their origin in the body of western classical learning translated into Arabic in the days of the Abbasids of Baghdad, and are part of the Yunani or Greek lore which so largely in- fluenced Islamic *literae humaniores*. It was thus that the great deeds of Sikandar Zulqarnain — Alexander of the Two Horns — be- came a part of the folk-lore of the Muslim world. Until the corpus of Greek and Latin learning became available in such ways, the very existence of Alexander and his army had been long for- gotten in those parts of Eastern Iran and India through which he passed. And so short was the time he spent upon the Frontier that little could have been left behind.

Hellenic influence was to return later to these parts and to per- sist for some time under the Graeco-Bactrian kings. That period, laboriously reconstructed mainly from numismatic evidence, also left the faintest of memories in the lands where Graeco-Bactrians ruled, and no world-shaking names like that of Alexander. It seems likely that traditions which could more reasonably be con- nected with this subsequent Hellenism have invoked the great name of Alexander as soon as the Arab learning of Baghdad had given access to Greek history. But in truth in this region the Macedonian was a bird of passage, and himself made no per- manent impact on events on the eastern frontier of what had been the Persian Empire.

Arrian, our main authority, was a contemporary of the Roman emperors Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius, and served as consul under the second. He probably lived to *circa* A.D. 175, and was thus writing five hundred years after the events
he is recording, very unlike Herodotus who wrote only a generation after the culmination of his drama. Arrian's *Anabasis* (expedition) is in Greek. Other authorities of much less value are Quintus Curtius Rufus, in good Latin but rhetorical, and Plutarch, who wrote a series of comparative lives in Greek — both belonging to the first century of the Christian era. There are also a few geographical references in the works of Strabo (64 B.C.—A.D. 19) and of the Alexandrine astronomer Ptolemy (second century A.D.).

Arrian is generally admitted to be a first class military historian. There is no doubt that his work is based on contemporary records, now lost, including the diaries of Ptolemy I, Alexander's companion and founder of the Egyptian dynasty,⁵ and of Megasthenes, whom Seleucus, Alexander's general and successor in the east, sent as ambassador to the Mauryan court. His *Anabasis* abounds in material relating to the crossing of mountains and rivers, the details of sieges and engagements, the bravery of Alexander and his captains and indeed of those against whom they fought. His accounts of the sieges and storm of such places as Bazira and Aornos are fine examples of military writing, full of vivid strokes and careful descriptions of local topography, enabling archaeologists to recapture the events described on the ground today. But, as might be expected from the accounts of a military expedition resulting in no permanent conquest or government, his work is in other respects disappointing. It has little bearing on the composition, origins or languages of the peoples of the Frontier regions through which Alexander was passing. In this it is in strong contrast with Herodotus, and the reason is not far to seek.

Herodotus was drawing on material accumulated during the best part of one hundred years of Persian Achaemenian rule. The great fabric of that empire had sifted the ore and refined the gold in its administrative system. It still remained in vast strength when Herodotus wrote, even though Xerxes, the successor of Darius the Great, had failed to conquer Greece. And, as noted, Herodotus wrote when memories were fresh. Arrian and Alexander's other chroniclers on the other hand not only wrote many centuries after the event — distance might indeed have given them perspective — but were describing a series of actions which took place during the anarchy which succeeded the Achaemenian
collapse and, in Gandhara and India at least, were not destined to have a lasting effect. Moreover Herodotus, as Rawlinson points out, contrived to bring the whole known world into his story, glancing at the beginnings of States and Empires, and exhibiting before our eyes a panoramic view of history: Arrian, balanced and vivid though he is, merely wrote up the campaign of the world’s greatest soldier. The researches of Herodotus into matters relating to the eastern confines of the Persian Empire reflect something like the files and records of the Achaemenian imperial machine; those of Arrian the intelligence diaries of a campaign undertaken in a period of downfall of empire and consequent revolution. The additions made by Strabo and Ptolemy are mainly geographical in scope and add little to the story. Yet, since the world’s greatest captain before Chingiz Khan traversed the North-West Frontier, we are bound to follow him on his passage through it. It is even possible that the conqueror’s routes, and the place and tribal names mentioned, may afford some insight into our study of origins.

It will be easiest to start with a short summary of Arrian’s account, quoting the actual words in translation, where these seem relevant. When the spring (of 327 B.C.) was past, Alexander led his army from Bactria across the Hindu Kush to the Alexandria he had founded two years earlier in the land of the Parapamisidae. This Alexandria is now identified with Jabal Suraj, fifteen miles from Kapisa or Bagram7 in the Kuh-i-Daman north of Kabul. Ptolemy tells us the Parapamisidae — called by him Paropamisidae — consisted of five tribes, including the Parsyetae, whom, as we have seen, Morgenstierne is inclined to connect with the Pashtuns. (I have given reasons why a connection with Farsiwans, or Tajiks, seems to me more probable.) Thence Alexander proceeded to the River Cophen — called by Ptolemy the Coa — and to a place named Nicaea, the Victorious. The Cophen is clearly the Kabul River above its passage through the Khaibar hills, and Nicaea, though unidentifiable, must be somewhere either in Laghman or in the plain now known as that of Jalalabad, or Ningrahar. Arrian then proceeds:

Having reached Nicaea and sacrificed to the goddess Athena, he dispatched a herald to Taxiles, and to the chiefs on this side of the River Indus, directing them to meet him where it was most con-
venient for each. . . . He then divided his army and despatched Hephaestion and Perdiccas with the brigades of Gorgias, Cleitus, and Meleager, half the companion cavalry and the whole of the mercenary cavalry, to the land of Peucelaotis and the River Indus. He ordered them either to seize by force whatever places lay on their route or to accept their submission if they capitulated, and when they came to the Indus to make whatever preparations were necessary for the transport of the army across that river. They were accompanied on their march by Taxiles and the other chiefs, and on reaching the Indus they began to carry out the instructions they had received. One of the chiefs, however, Astes, satrap of the land of Peucelaotis, revolted but perished in the attempt.

In this account Taxiles, of course, is the ruler of Taxila, thirty-five miles east of, and beyond the Indus, famous as the seat of later Graeco-Bactrian, Saka and Kushan civilizations, and the site of archaeological research. Peucelaotis is universally accepted as identical with the Prakrit form Pukkalaoti of the Sanskrit Pushkalavati, fixed since the time of General Cunningham as the immense mound in the neighbourhood of Charsadda and Prang, eighteen miles north-east of Peshawar. ‘The land of Peucelaotis’ is therefore the Peshawar plain, or Gandhara. We hear nothing from Arrian of any Paskapuros or similar name, and we may conclude therefore that in the two hundred years that passed between the time of Scylax and that of Alexander, Charsadda had supplanted Peshawar as the capital of Gandhara. There has been no systematic excavation on the Charsadda site, but numerous casual finds of Indo-Greek coins and fascinating sculpture-reliefs of Roman-Alexandrine artistry attest that it later became the centre of Western influence in the Gandhara region.

It seems probable that Taxila had been the capital of the Achaemenian satrapy of India, just as first Paskapuros (Peshawar) and subsequently Peucelaotis (Charsadda) had been the chief city of the satrapy of Gandhara or Paktuike. The fact that Alexander so readily obtained the submission of the ruler of Taxila—Quintus Curtius gives us his proper name as Omphis—demonstrates that as the successor of Darius Codomannus he was held to be entitled to the loyalty of the Achaemenian Indian satrapy; it was not until he reached the Jihlam River, where he overstepped the eastern boundary of the Persian Empire, that he met with determined resistance from Porus, ruler of the Panjаб proper. Alexander was not the first or the last to be made to realize that
the real limit of the Iranian region is not the Khaibar pass, or even the River Indus, but a point near ancient Taxila where the modern road and railway run through the Margalla pass. Pathans still recognize when they pass it that they are leaving, or coming, home.

Peucelaotis and Taxila are the only two places in Arrian's account which can easily be fixed upon a modern map. It has been normal practice to assert that Hephaestion's route from Nicaea in Ningrahar into the Peshawar plain was through the Khaibar pass, but there is nothing in the texts to establish this assumption in any absolute manner. All that we know is that Alexander's flank-guard under this general marched from a place somewhere near Jalalabad to Charsadda. We have no place-names to connect with Peshawar. If Peshawar had been mentioned, it would be possible to fix with some certainty on the Khaibar route as that taken by Hephaestion, but no such reference exists. It is also a matter of some doubt whether in Alexander's time, with unbridged rivers, the Khaibar route would have been the easiest, or even the most direct, between the places named. Hephaestion may well have crossed the Kabul River in the neighbourhood of Kama or Lalpura, above or below its junction with the Kunar and before it enters the gorges north of the Khaibar. He would then have come down into the Peshawar plain by the Karappa and Gandab route through what is now Mohmand country, and entered the Doaba close to Shabqadr. Or he may have followed the river as closely as possible, either on the north bank where the Tarakzai Mohmands now dwell, or on the south bank through the Shilman valleys at the back of the Tahtarra peak. Before the Khaibar road was built, much traffic followed one or other of these routes, and it is wrong to suppose that the Khaibar is the only passage from the west into the Peshawar plain.

It remains to consider Alexander's own route. I give here a translation of the relevant portions of Arrian's text:

Alexander took command in person of the other division of the army and advanced into the country of the Aspasii and Guraei and Assaceni. The route which he followed was hilly and rugged and lay along the course of a river called the Choes, which he had difficulty in crossing...[later] he advanced to the river Euaspla where the chief of the Aspasii was...[and after operations] then
crossed the mountains, and came to a city at their base named Arigaion, where he found the inhabitants had burned the place and taken to flight. As this city seemed to occupy a very advantageous site, he commanded Craterus to fortify it strongly [and after further battles in which he defeated the Aspasii] he marched thence to invade the country of the Assaceni, Craterus, who had now finished the work of fortifying Arigaion, rejoining him with the hoplites and siege-engines. He passed through the country of the Guraei, where he had to cross the Guraeus, the river giving the name to that country. Alexander then marched first to attack Massaga which was the greatest city in those parts. [A long description of the siege follows, after which] Alexander took the city by storm and captured the mother and daughter of Assacenus.

He then dispatched Coenus to Bazira, convinced that the inhabitants would capitulate on learning that Massaga had fallen. He also sent Attalus, Alcetas and Demetrius to another city, Ora, instructing them to draw a rampart round it and to invest it against his own arrival. As regards Coenus matters did not go well for him at Bazira, for, as it stood on a very lofty eminence and was strongly fortified in every quarter, the people trusted to the strength of their position and made no proposals for surrender. . . . Alexander directed his march first to Ora, which he captured at the first assault. When the inhabitants of Bazira heard that Ora had fallen they regarded their case as desperate and at dead of night fled from their city to the Rock in that land named Aornos. . . . Alexander, seized with an ardent desire to capture this mountain also . . . made Ora and Massaga strongholds for bridling the districts around them and at the same time strengthened the defences of Bazira.

Meanwhile the division under Hephaestion . . . had marched on to the Indus, where they began preparing a bridge to span it in accordance with Alexander's orders. Alexander then first marched towards that river and received the submission of Peucelaotis, and then occupied himself in reducing other small towns situated near the Indus. . . . He then marched to the Rock of Aornos.

If it were not for a passage in Strabo (XV, 697), we should be in doubt how the route taken by Alexander lay with reference to that of Hephaestion. From Arrian's account as it stands it would be equally possible to select a route for the conqueror over the Sufed Koh and down into Kohat, for that is even more 'hilly and rugged' than the routes to the north. But Strabo makes it clear for us that Alexander took the northern route on hearing that it was more fertile, while that to the south was either waterless or
liable to flood, and thinking that the rivers would be easier to
cross towards their sources.

Given this certainty, and given also the whole trend of the ac-
count, which shows that he did not descend into the Peshawar
plain until after reducing the hill fortresses of Arigaion, Massaga,
Bazira and Ora, a knowledge of topography makes his general
route clear enough. The rivers he crossed were the Choes,
Euaspla13 and Guraeus, in that order. Between the Euaspla and
the Guraeus was a mountain divide. This can only have been
the Kunar—Panjikora watershed where the Durand Line now
runs, and the Choes would then be the Alishang and the Euaspla
the Kunar. The Guraeus is the Panjikora, which appears as the
Gauri in the Sanskrit of the sixth book of the Mahabharata.
Arigaion would then be Nawagai in Bajaur, which is in fact
situated in 'a very advantageous site', commanding the Bajaur
valleys. After crossing the Panjikora Alexander would necessarily
take the route through Talash in order to avoid the lower Panj-
kora and Swat gorges, and so cross the Katgala pass into Adinzai
and arrive on the banks of the Swat River at Chakdarra. There is
nothing to show by which route he left Swat to reach the Pesha-
war plain, and we have still to determine the location of Massaga,
Bazira and Ora.

This, and the fixing of the site of Aornos, is the theme of some
fascinating explorations undertaken in 1926 by Aurel Stein.14
The stir and the thrill comes, I think, from a sudden discovery
that, while no local record or memory remains of those far-off
events, it is still possible from the tactical accounts rendered by
Arrian and the others to recognize on the ground today some of
the actual strongholds which fell to the arms of the Macedonian.
In so doing we can see again the heavy-armed hoplites of Alexan-
der's phalanx and almost hear the headlong rush of his cavalry
carrying his standard up the broad and beautiful valley of Swat.

Stein makes no attempt to locate Massaga, saying only it should
be somewhere in Lower Swat, which he did not fully investigate.
We know from Arrian's account that it was east of the Panjikora
(the Guraeus), but he gives no clear topographical detail in this
case whereby a certain recognition can be made. An obvious
tactical centre in this region, held by the British and by the
Mughals before them, is Chakdarra, the point where the present-
day roads to Dir and Upper Swat diverge and on the bank of the
Swat River. But had Massaga been at this point, it is certain that Arrian would have mentioned its location on the bank of a great smoothly-running river. Such topographical details as we have of Massaga are to be found in Curtius, who calls it Mazaga and describes the site as 'barred on the east by an impetuous mountain stream with steep banks on both sides, while to the south and west nature, as if designing to form a rampart, had piled up gigantic rocks, at the base of which lay sloughs and yawning chasms'.

This description answers very closely to the topography of the Katgala pass between the valleys of Talash and Adinzai, about eight miles north of Chakdarra on the present road to Dir. Here, just below the pass, is a circumvallation of hills, and a stream, the Wuch Khwar, corresponding to Curtius' description and forming a natural moat on the east. There are also many deep ravines, and piles of ruins of ancient buildings marked 'Buddhist Ruins' on the map. As in most striking spots in these regions, there is also here the Ziyarat, or shrine, of a Muslim saint named Mujawar Baba, surrounded by a clump of large trees. The place is admirably sited to bar the only west-east road practicable for armies through these hills, and to command the rich surrounding corn-lands of Talash and Adinzai. There is no doubt that both Alexander and Babur, eighteen centuries later, came this way. Like Charsadda, these ruins have never been subjected to sys-
tematic digging, but there is every hope that they would yield a rich harvest.

There is a further feature on the ground which helps to identify the Katgala site with Massaga. While, as I have said, Arrian’s account of this siege lacks topographical detail, he mentions a little hill at some distance from the camp, onto which Alexander withdrew his men as a feint. An isolated small hill, as the sketch shows, is to be seen on the ground east of the pass and close to the road. It fits the description.

Before leaving Massaga I must record two details which bring the whole scene to life. Alexander, while superintending the erection of a mole to fill one of the ravines, was wounded by an arrow in the leg — Arrian says in the ankle, Curtius in the calf. ‘When the barb was extracted, he called for his horse, and, without so much as having his wound bandaged, continued with energy unabated to prosecute the work on hand. But when the injured limb was hanging without support, and the gradual cooling, as the blood dried, aggravated the pain, he is reported to have said that though he was called, as all knew, the son of Jupiter, this wound proclaimed him to be a man. And then, smiling magnificently, Alexander looked up to his surgeons on the Katgala pass and quoted Homer: “This, my friends, is blood: it is not the ichor which the blessed immortals shed.”’

The other incident is best told in Curtius’ own words. The people of Massaga, ‘giving up the defence as hopeless, withdrew into the citadel whence, as nothing but surrender was open, they sent down envoys to the king to sue for pardon. This being granted, the queen came with a great train of noble ladies who poured out libations of wine in golden bowls. The queen herself, having placed her son, a child, at Alexander’s knees, obtained not only pardon but permission to retain her former dignity, for she was styled queen, and some have believed that this indulgent treatment was accorded rather to the charms of her person than to pity for her misfortunes. At all events she afterwards gave birth to a son who received the name of Alexander whoever his father may have been.’

Bazira has been most convincingly identified by Stein with Birkot, now sometimes known as Barikot, in middle Swat, situated at the point where a branch road leaves the main valley to cross
the Karakar pass into Buner. Here there are extensive ruins crowning an acropolis at the most strategic point in the middle valley. Arrian's description of Bazira as 'a high mountain citied to the top' exactly suits the Birkot hill. Stein also stresses most convincingly the phonetic transference of Bazira to Bir — the termination -kot being a very usual and later addition meaning a castle or fortified place and applied to innumerable villages in these parts. The Greek zeta, says Stein, is commonly used to denote the palatal half-vowel y which does not exist in Greek. Bazira therefore represents Bayira, Baira, or Beira, and he points out that Beira is the name given by Curtius to this stronghold. The transition to Bir is an obvious one.

Stein identifies Ora with a place now called Raja Gira's castle above the village of Udegram, a few miles higher up the Swat valley above Birkot. The termination -gram is merely a common Prakrit form for a village, the same as gaon in modern Hindi; and Ude with a cerebral d, as Stein points out, can be derived from Ora or Ura with a cerebral r. The site he selects is situated on the ridge which separates the main valley from the side valley of Saidu, and is again marked by a saint's shrine and thick groves of trees. It is just above a favourite shooting-ground of the Swat rulers and has natural advantages as a strongpoint.

I do not myself feel that this identification can be accepted as final. After reducing Ora Alexander left garrisons and himself went off to join Hephaestion in the Peshawar plain, where he accepted the surrender of Peucelaotis (Charsadda) and proceeded to secure his position on the Indus crossings before attempting to reduce Aornos. How did he reach the plains from Birkot (Bazira) situated well up the Swat Valley?

We have no hint at all in the sources. He may of course have retraced his steps down the valley and crossed into the plain either by the Malakand or by one or more of the lesser passes, the Shahkot, Charat and Morah, a little further to the east. But it seems more probable that, having gone up Swat as far as Birkot, he would have turned south from there and crossed the Karakar into Buner, whence he would issue into the plain by the Malandrai and Ambela passes, one or both. This is the route which the Mughal army sought to take in 1586 and, less capably commanded, met with disaster. If Alexander did not intend to march this way, there would have been little point in capturing Birkot, the im-
portance of which lies in the fact that it commands this route. For these reasons, I think, we should look for the site of Ora in Buner, and not in Swat, possibly close to Daggar, the strategic point in the Buner complex of valleys.

Stein’s most fascinating work in this region is his identification of the Rock of Aornos with a place still called Urna or Unra (with a cerebral ŋr) on the Pirsar spur high up the Indus right bank, above the side valleys of Kana and Ghorband. The grounds on which he bases his identification, topographical and phonetic, are extraordinarily convincing, but must be read in his own words. Here it need only be said that the Pirsar Rock is on the very outside edge of Pathan country, though now included in Swat State. Stein’s work establishes firmly the extraordinary accuracy of Arrian’s military descriptions of country; it does little to embroider the story of the Pathans.

There remain the names of the tribes, the Aspasii, the Guraei and the Assaceni, whom Alexander overcame in the country between Kunar and Swat. From what has been said it is clear that the Aspasii lived on both sides of the divide which now carries the Durand Line, both in Kunar and in Bajaur, the Guraei in what is now Lower Dir on the Panjkora, and the Assaceni—in whose territory Massaga, Bazira and Ora were situated—in Talash and the Swat Valley.

The Guraei suggest no affinities other than the mention of their river in the Sanskrit epic, already referred to.

To the identity of the Aspasii there is an interesting clue in Strabo, who calls them Hippasii. Now the Avestan Persian for a horse is aspa, the modern Persian asb, and the Pakhtu as, aspa (horse, mare). The fact that Strabo translated the name of this tribe into Hippasii proves that he was aware of its etymological signification. Clearly we have here something both horsy and Iranian.

In the course of recent discussions on the origins of Yusufzais it was remarked to me, without any reference whatever to Arrian’s tribal names, that the ordinary Yusufzai villager never refers to himself as Yusufzai, but as Isapzai or even Asapzai. My interlocutor, one of the Khans of Hoti, added that it seemed probable to him that, with the advent of Islam, his ancestors decided to assimilate an old word to the scriptures, with the result that Asap or Isap became Yusuf (Joseph).
Long years in court spent listening to Yusufzai witnesses confirm this phonetic transference—another instance of the Afridi’s $p$ for $f$. The equation cannot be proved, but it is attractive to see in the Aspasii of Arrian and the Hippasii of Strabo the prototype of the Isapzai of today. As will appear later, the fact that the Aspasii in Alexander’s time lived in the Kunar and Bajaur valleys, further to the west than the Yusufzais today, need not unduly upset us. Even the Yusufzai tradition states that the tribe took over its present territories in the fifteenth century, coming from the direction of Kabul.

The fact also that the Yusufzais hold tenaciously to the hard form of Pakhtu may have some significance. In the last chapter we have used the argument that the alternative names of the river identified with the Kunar—Euaspla or Choaspes—helps to establish that a form of Iranian tongue using the hard pronunciation was current in Kunar as long ago as the time of Aristotle and Alexander. The Aspasii, it seems, talked a hard variant of Iranian tongue, just as the Yusufzai do today. Nor is it without interest that both the tribe and the river on which they dwelt should have something to do with the Iranian word for a horse.

The Assaceni of Swat, no less than the Aspasii of Kunar and Bajaur, have a name derived from chivalry. The Sanskrit word for a horse is *asa*, and a tribe named the Asvaka is mentioned in the Mahabharata as the barbarous denizens of the far north. The Sanskrit *Asvaka* would become *Assaka* in Prakrit, leading directly to the Greek transcription *Aσσακηνοι*. So here we have Indian in place of Persian horses—most suitable, for just as the Aspasii, a Persian tribe, lived in Kunar and Bajaur, so the Assaceni, an Indian tribe, dwelt in Talash and Swat. As we would expect at that time, the dividing line between Iran and India would have been somewhere between the Kunar and the Swat Rivers, possibly on the Guraeus or Panjkora River. Later records establish that the inhabitants of Swat and the regions east of Panjkora had Indian affinities until the time of the Pathan occupation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

The intrusions of Greek and Latin writers onto the North-West Frontier are now at an end. The establishment of the seventh satrapy of Darius the Great (late sixth century B.C.) and the famous raid of Alexander (late fourth century B.C.) took place many hundreds of years before any evidence appears of the emer-
gence of Afghans, and it has been usual for the people of these parts not to look further back than the advent of Islam, or, when they do so, like good Muslims to turn to the Hebrew scriptures. I contend here that this kind of consideration by no means rules out far earlier evidence of the appellation Pakhtun, or the existence of tribal names used in this locality 2,500 years ago, traces of which can still be found today. For Herodotus and Arrian are real history; theirs were not dark ages. If we can follow in Scylax’ and Alexander’s wake to the Indus, and still recognize the topography, let us not dismiss too readily evidence of similarity in place and tribal names.

If there be those who would deride the idea that over so long a period names and traces may still remain, the answer is that in these remote valleys, even more than on Hadrian’s wall in Britain, a thousand years pass as a dream. Could one awake in Talash to see Alexander or Babur pass with their clatter of arms, the waker, likely as not, would find the men of the villages much as he knows them now: Until only the other day it has been but the fashion of arms that changes; Lee-Enfield going back to carbine, carbine to jezail, and jezail to the bows and arrows of those most warlike men who, more than two thousand years ago, dwelt upon the borders of Paktuike.
CHAPTER IV

THE BIRTH OF PAKHTU

With the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. the bright lantern that for a short spell illumines the North-West Frontier scene is put out, and history becomes a laborious reconstruction, pieced together mainly from coins and inscriptions, on the documentary side supported only by occasional gleams shed by the fragmentary records that have come down to us in the works of envoys and geographers. One such envoy was Megas-thenes, Seleucus' ambassador to the Maurya Court, and the geographers Strabo and Ptolemy have already been mentioned. For two thousand years the name of the Paktues disappears, while the name of Afghan does not clearly emerge until the Islamic era is almost with us. Later, in the fifth and seventh centuries interesting Chinese travellers, Fa-Hien (A.D. 399-414) and Hiuen-Tsang (A.D. 629-645) do something to lift the veil, and we shall see that the geographical names of Gandhara and of its city Paskapuros, survive. The period of over one thousand years between Alexander's death and the beginnings of Islam in these parts is one of many invasions by swarm after swarm from the north, a period during which the mastery over the frontier between India and Iran changed hands in a continual see-saw, in which sometimes the Iranian power and sometimes the ruler of the Indus Valley prevailed.

The researches of the learned into all this confusion tend to be restricted to reconstructions either of early Indian history, or of the history of the western Iranian plateau. Vincent Smith¹ provides an example of the first, Ghirshman² of the second, trend. Recently, too, attempts have been made to look at this long era in the perspective of the Central Asian plains, that is from the vast area most compendiously known to later ages as Turkistan. This is the theme of McGovern.³ None of these writers focus on Gandhara or the Frontier, or even on Afghanistan, and none are written with any design of tracing Pathan or Afghan origins as such
through the ages. The position is very much that deplored by Elphinstone in quite another context, when he wrote that in the formulation of Indian history it is only at the points where other nations come into contact with the Hindus that we are able to settle any details accurately. Problems of this kind face the enquirer into the Pathan story at every point.

Yet, however meagre the results, we must apply ourselves to construct some sort of framework of dynastic annals of the rulers who during this long period claimed to exercise authority over the North-West Frontier people. In the very absence of detailed tribal mention or statistic we may perhaps detect indications of what was, I believe, the fact, namely that at no time after the downfall of the Achaemenian Empire was there a very close administrative control over the tribal groups inhabiting the pockets of these hills.

Since the story which follows cannot be understood without mention of the Sakas, it is appropriate, before closing Herodotus to recall that, as usual, that remarkable man has a shaft of light to shed even in this quarter. He is speaking again of the contingents to Xerxes' army (480 B.C.). The Sakai, he says, were clad in trousers and had on their heads tall, peaked caps rising to a point. They carried the bow of their country and daggers, and also an axe called sagaris. They were really Amurgian Scyths, he adds, but were called Sakai, for the Persians called all Scyths by that name. Herodotus' statement is borne out by the Achaemenian inscriptions, both of Darius and Xerxes, in which the appellation 'Amurgian' appears more than once, probably meaning those Sakas who dwelt on the Amu Darya, the River Oxus. Like their cousins the Parthians, further west, they were of Iranian stock speaking a language now held to be the ancestor of Pakhtu and established as having belonged to the eastern Iranian group and closer to the Iranian than to the Indian branch of the Indo-European language classification. They will appear again.

It is not possible to follow the shifts of empire across the borders of Iran and India without some knowledge of the classical names applied to those regions.

Gandhara, as we know, corresponds to Herodotus' Paktuike, and is the Peshawar Valley. From time to time it probably included certain surrounding tracts to east and west. Arachosia corresponds roughly to Ghazni and Kandahar, Drangiana is Sis-
tan, and Aria is Herat — Gedrosia is the Baluch country south of Arachosia to the sea. Bactria is the present Afghan province of Turkistan, south of the Oxus, and Parthia lies west of Bactria towards the Caspian Sea. East of Bactria is Sogdiana, roughly the same as the valley of the Zarafshan, which waters Samarqand and Bukhara. North of Parthia, Bactria and Sogdiana was the country of the Sakas. In Achaemenian times all these countries north of the Hindu Kush were inhabited by Iranian peoples, speaking Iranian tongues, and all, including some of the Sakas, were subject to Achaemenian rule. As to the vernacular language of Gandhara at this time we have no positive information, but it is difficult to believe that a satrapy subject to the Achaemenians for nearly two hundred years did not speak dialects influenced by the Iranian group, though no doubt owing to proximity to India admitting Indian affinities also. No Huns or Turks had yet appeared upon the scene.

Alexander's death resulted in a scramble for power between his generals, with the result that almost the whole of the Asian portion of Darius' empire which he had conquered fell to Seleucus. The Seleucid dynasty lasted in Syria and Babylon for over a century, but proved unable to hold the positions gained by Alexander on the eastern confines of the empire. The Macedonian officers were driven out of India and Gandhara after a very few years, and an advance by Seleucus in person in 305 B.C. in an attempt to consolidate his power to the Indus resulted in his defeat at the hands of a newly-arisen power in India and a treaty by which in return for a gift of 500 elephants he surrendered not only Gandhara, but Arachosia and Gedrosia to his Indian rival.

That rival was Chandragupta, in Greek Sandrakottos, founder of the Maurya dynasty in 323 B.C., and grandfather of Asoka (264-227 B.C.). After Asoka the Maurya Empire broke up. But for about one hundred years the Mauryas ruled the Peshawar Valley, the Frontier region and beyond, probably as far as Laghan in the upper Kabul River Valley. Asoka was the great apostle of Buddhism, and his rock-edicts at Shahbazgarha near Mardan and above Mansehra, with inscriptions at Taxila and in Laghan, attest both his faith and the tolerant humanity of his rule. The idols of Bamian in the recesses of the Hindu Kush, and many traditions as far north as Bukhara, show that the Buddhist influence radiating from India once captured much of what had
been eastern Iran. But the Asoka inscriptions tell us little or nothing of the ways or the affinities of the people of the borderland over whom Asoka ruled. And, like diplomats after him, Megasthenes, the Seleucid envoy at the Maurya Court, was too involved in the round of the capital to place an ear to the ground in the Frontier provinces.

The ruins of Buddhist monasteries on the hillocks of the Peshawar Valley occupy the most delicious sites, enjoying in every case a prospect wide and diversified, and displaying even today something of the spirit and imagination of the pious men who planned and built them. Many, if not all, are known to be of much later date than Asoka, and the Gandhara school of sculptural embellishment is now believed to be contemporary with the Kushans and Rome, and not with the Mauryas and Graeco-Macedonian influence. Yet it was Asoka who was the first great temporal interpreter of the Buddhist way, and it is to him that the Buddhist era in the north owed its inspiration. But in some strange manner the atmosphere was too rarified for the people of these parts; that age passed like a vision and left no memory. Some hold that the only reflection of those times left to the Pathans today is the division of the Karlanri tribes into two factions known as Gar and Samil. The people cannot explain the origin of a cleavage which now has small significance, political or other, except that it is as impossible for a tribesman to change from one to the other as for an Oxford or Cambridge man to sport the wrong blue on the occasion of an athletic contest. The distinction is said to be expressive of a pre-Islamic religious affiliation, some of the people adhering to the older Persian faith, that of Zoroaster, and others to the Buddhist Vehicle spread by the missionary effort of Asoka and later dynasties. According to this interpretation the Gar faction remembers the Magian Gabr of the Persians; the Samil the Buddhist Sraman. Whatever the truth of this provocative thought, it symbolizes an actual contest that must have taken place in a country like Gandhara, subjected for centuries first to rulers professing the religion of Ahuramazda and Ahriman, and then to the Buddhist Vehicle.

Of the tribes themselves the Maurya inscriptions tell us no word. But it must be remembered that for a whole century these tribes were within the confines of an Indian empire. Even if administrative writ did not run within their mountain fast
the inhabitants of the plains quite definitely adopted an Indian culture, overlaying that learned in Achaemenian times. The inclusion in Pakhtu, a mainly Iranian language, of wide borrowings from the Indo-Aryan may not unreasonably be traced to the powerful cultural influences that must have spread over Gandhara in the time of Chandragupta and Asoka.

Some three centuries elapsed between the fall of the Maurya Empire shortly after the death of Asoka (227 B.C.) and the establishment of the Kushan Empire of the Indo-Scythians, probably about A.D. 75. During that period the Graeco-Bactrians, the Sakas, and an Indo-Parthian dynasty ruled successively in Gandhara, thus by a shifting of the scale restoring the Frontier regions to the dominance of a people who came from Central Asia. To understand these shifts it is necessary to go back a few years before the Maurya decadence and describe what had happened to the Seleucid power on the Iranian plateau.

About 250 B.C., while Asoka was still alive, there occurred a double diminution of the Seleucid power, in the East a falling away of the Bactrian satrapy, and a revolt of the Parthians in the west.

The establishment of an independent Bactrian kingdom, later extended to most of northern India, was the result of a steady drift to autonomy under the Seleucid satraps Diodotus I and II. The story, brilliantly told by Sir William Tarn, is far more notable as a part of the history of Hellenism under Alexander's successors than as a contribution to any record of what went on in the Gandhara region. The second Diodotus and his son-in-law Euthydemus, were able to establish Bactrian independence even in the face of determined efforts by Antiochus the Great to reduce Bactria to its Seleucid allegiance in 206 B.C. Round about 185 B.C., under Euthydemus' son, Demetrius, the Bactrians invaded and conquered Gandhara and the Panjab, establishing their power on the ruins of the Maurya Empire at Taxila.

There followed a Seleucid-inspired attempt to regain control of the eastern marches under a prince named Eucratides, who defeated and slew Demetrius and for a time occupied Gandhara as far as the Indus. But Eucratides in his turn was forced out of Gandhara by Menander who, originally Demetrius' army commander, succeeded to the Bactrian power in northern India which, as general, he had done the most to create. This internecine war between Greek and Greek led not only to the severance of Gand-
hara from Bactria, but was fatal to any ultimate hope of establishing a lasting Hellenic civilization in what is now Afghanistan and the Indus Valley region. Nevertheless these rulers, with capital first at Taxila and later at Sakala (Sialkot), left some of the finest coinage ever struck and, according to Tarn, a tradition in art which in the later Gandhara sculptures typifies the change from Hinayana to Mahayana Buddhism — the Lesser to the Greater Vehicle — by the representation of the Buddha as a god.

The Graeco-Bactrians ruled in Gandhara for about a century (185–90 B.C.) until, torn apart by the fratricidal jealousies inseparable from political systems of Greek inspiration, their kingdom disintegrated into a group of petty States ruled by princelings and was unable to stand up against a fresh deluge, that of the Sakas advancing both up the Indus from the direction of Baluchistan and from the north. It is reasonably certain that under the Graeco-Bactrians the population of all this area was Iranian and continued to speak East Iranian Bactrian or Sogdian dialects. But the Hellenized upper classes, the remnants of Alexander’s colonists or those influenced by them, had managed to impart a Grecian veneer to the country by the occupation of the higher posts, by the fact that Greek or Macedonian soldiers were needed to guard the frontier marches against the Saka nomads, and by the planning of cities on a Hellenic model. Even so, might we say, a British veneer has been left on Peshawar today. It is probable that the remoteness of this advanced Greek post was one factor which enabled Iranians and Greeks, as it later enabled Pathans and British in not dissimilar surroundings, to establish an understanding which should stand the test of time.

Whatever the reason, the Greek element in the Bactrian culture was transmitted to Gandhara. Attempts have often been made to see in the appearance or the tradition of the Pathan some far-off memory or debt, reaching back to this Hellenic civilization which endured for a century on the Peshawar plain, its power radiating from Taxila. As already suggested, traditions such as that of the Afridis claiming a Greek ancestry must be ascribed to this time rather than to the brief months of Alexander’s passage. But proof there is none. Except for a very tenacious script, a splendid coinage, and a few sculptural relics, there is little to catch hold of. According to the latest authorities the great mass of Gandhara sculpture does not belong to this period at all, but to that of the
Kushans two centuries later.\textsuperscript{10} It is not now held to be the artistic expression of Graeco-Bactrian rulers. That little trace remains is to be ascribed partly to the fact that Bactrian rule in this region was in essence Iranian in inspiration with a Greek top-dressing only, and partly to the shattering effect of the many invasions which passed this way in later centuries.\textsuperscript{11}

The Graeco-Bactrian Kingdom of Taxila and Sakala gave way to a Saka invasion which started \textit{circa} 97 B.C. But before examining the Saka credentials it is necessary to go back to the second revolt against Alexander's Successors, that of the Parthians in 249 B.C. Unlike the Bactrians the Parthians had no Grecian veneer of culture; they were hardy Iranians of Scythic nomadic stock, akin to the Sakas, and located in the steppes between the Caspian and Aral Seas, where Soviet Turkmenistan now stands. Their rule over Persia, finally established after some fifty years' warfare, was destined to endure for nearly five centuries. The leadership was in the hands of a Parthian clan of the Parni tribe, the chief of which, Arsakes, gave his name to the Arsacid dynasty which ruled Persia until overthrown by the Sassanians in the third century of the Christian era. During that long period the Hellenic elements in the culture of Western Iran were gradually absorbed, not the last occasion in history on which Persia has taken captivity captive. The Arsacid dynasty, aided by the famous horse-bowmen shooting over their shoulders as they rode away, resisted all comers, even the legionaries of Rome. In western story they are chiefly redoubtable for the overwhelming defeat they inflicted on the triumvir Crassus, killed and his army annihilated at the battle of Carrhae in 53 B.C.\textsuperscript{12}

The Achaemenian province of Parthia was roughly conterminous with the modern Persian Khurasan, that is the province of Meshed, but the Parni were nomads from further north, and though of Iranian stock, were really Scythians closely allied to the Sakas who subsequently defeated the Graeco-Bactrians and overran Gandhara. The point to grasp is that in both cases they were nomads conquering a sedentary people and of much the same Iranian origin. Both advances, that of the Parthians into Persia, and of the Sakas into Gandhara, were part of a vast southern movement of Scythic tribes which both in Persia and in Bactria put an end to the Hellenism which under the Seleucids and the Graeco-Bactrians had been imposed upon the Iranian world. But
the Parthian invasion of Persia took place more than a century earlier than that of the Sakas further east; it was a precursor, and its leaders had already embraced the Persian civilization by the time the Sakas moved on the settled lands. It so came about that the Parthians were ready to resist Saka incursions in the direction of Persia, and did so with effect. In the result the Sakas were forced south-eastward, overran Bactria and moved thence some towards Gandhara and some towards Sind. Throughout they remained closely linked politically and culturally with the Parthians; for instance the form of Iranian tongue which they spoke had elements in common with that of the nomadic Parthian tribes.

It is to this period of history that we are told we must assign the first beginnings of the language of the Pathans, which according to the latest authorities is probably a Saka dialect introduced from the north. Before proceeding further with dynastic annals let us examine the grounds of this theory. This language, whether Pakhtu or Pashtu, is the most obvious symbol today of Pathan identity and the measure of Pathan pride. If it can be shown with some degree of probability that its prototype came in with the Sakas, another stone will have been laid in our foundations.

There is a passage in Justin, a Latin writer of date uncertain but possibly the late second century A.D., describing the Parthian language as half way between Median and Scythian, and a mix-up of both. This is not a bad description of a rough Iranian tongue, such as might have been the precursor of the language of the Pathans. In the article on Pashtu — or Pakhtu — in his Linguistic Survey of India, Grierson, quoting Darmesteter, holds it to be conclusively proved that this language belongs to the eastern group of the Iranian family. He admits that it has borrowed extensively from north-western India, but affirms that its parentage is the Avesta with its so-called Zend commentaries. Just as modern Persian is the principal example of the western Iranian group descended from the old Persian of the Achaemenians, so Pakhtu, together with Baluchi and various Pamir languages, can be related to the eastern Avesta. The Avesta and the Zend are the Zoroastrian scriptures. Zoroaster, a prophet of disputed date but certainly before the later Achaemenians who seem to have followed his teaching, spread his gospel from Sogdiana and the eastern part of the Iranian world. This, according to Grier-
son, is the undoubted ancestry of the Pakhtu and the Pashtu. Morgenstierne, the most up-to-date authority, is better acquainted with the Pathans in the field than any who have written with authority on their language. The candle in his tent burns as clearly as the lamp in his study. In origin, he says, Pashtu, or Pakhtu, is probably a Saka dialect from the north, but it is not possible to define its relationship more closely. As such, it is both in origin and structure an Iranian language, which however has borrowed freely from the Indo-Aryan group. Of these borrowings, mainly morphological, he gives important examples to which I shall return. He adduces a number of examples of sound changes of which a knowledge enables a comparison of Pashtu and Persian words to be made. And, lastly, he refers to the two striking 'isoglosses', the first the separation of the hard and soft variants of the language, and the second, cutting across that line of division, another which encircles (most significantly) all the Karlanri tribes. This is the change of ā into broad ō, of ō into ō or e, and of u into i.

We have to see how all this bears on the Sakas. One of the most obvious and regular phonetic changes to be observed in relating cognates in the Persian and Pakhtu is to be seen in the Persian d which becomes the Pakhtu l. A few common words will serve to illustrate the point:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persian</th>
<th>Pakhtu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>pidar</em>, father</td>
<td><em>pilar</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>didan</em>, to see</td>
<td><em>lidal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>daram</em>, I have</td>
<td><em>laram</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>dah</em>, ten</td>
<td><em>las</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>dukhtar</em>, daughter</td>
<td><em>lur</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>dast</em>, hand</td>
<td><em>las</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>diwaneb</em>, mad</td>
<td><em>lewanay</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now the names of the Saka rulers of Gandhara are known from coins, and a number of titles and technical terms are to be found in Kharoshthi inscriptions. All these names are transparently Iranian, and of the eastern group. Examples are; *spalagadama* (*spada* = army, *ga* diminutive, *dama* = leader, cf. Latin *dominus*); *spala hura* (*spada* = army, *abura* = spirit, god, cf. *Aburamazda*); *cbastana* (cf. Pashtu *chashtan*, Pakhtu *tsakhtan* = master, husband). In a number of these will be observed the feature of *l* for *d*, a sign-manual of the Pakhtu and Pashtu language.
It is also noteworthy that these east Iranian names and titles are not limited to the Sakas, but continue into the later period of the Kushans, who succeeded them in Gandhara. The Kushans, even if they were not themselves Sakas, had many Saka subjects. The bringing in of this comparative material from Scythian coins and inscriptions seems to establish at least one strain in the Pakhtu language.

But it is not to be forgotten that the Saka nomadic invaders entered upon a Gandhara which had already for the better part of two centuries been Iranized by the Achaemenians, for a century had been Indianized by the Mauryas, and for another century Hellenized by the Graeco-Bactrians. Not only had great civilizations held sway in this land, but it had been alternately pressed by forces from opposite sides. It lay then, as it was to lie again, on the borderland of Iran and India. It is therefore not surprising to find many elements of Indian influence deep in the roots of the language spoken by the Pathans today. The most obvious of these are the so-called cerebral sounds, not known to the Iranian group but a feature of Indian languages, the presence of two genders, again an Indian feature, and, perhaps most significant of all, the syntactical phenomenon of the so-called agentive construction in past tenses, so characteristic of the Indian languages.

A further caveat is worth while. The Saka language, and no doubt the Kushan language also, were nomad's talk brought into a region where there were not only wide and fertile plains, the homes of civilized men, but also mountain recesses, such as Tirah and Waziristan, very difficult of access. These plains had already for centuries been dominated by great empires, while the hill tracts must even then have valued the protection, in common phrase the purdah, afforded by their natural isolation. Both would have been tenacious of their own linguistic habit, and it is not impossible that the tongues of the irrupting horsemen from the north may have been trained and twisted to adopt the language which they found in and around Gandhara. As the conquered had been for centuries in an Iranian world subject to Indian influences, and the conquerors had by hypothesis an eastern Iranian tongue themselves, the effort should not have been a too difficult one. On this showing, while Pakhtu and Pashtu owe much to the Sakas, it has been argued that there may well be earlier East Iranian influences in its root-stock. The fascinating problem of
Urmar origins, when it is solved, may provide further illumination of this point.  

In short, the more closely the language of the Pathans is studied, the more obvious it becomes that it represents just what one would expect from its geographical interposition between the Iranian and the Indian world, a language which has strong features of both groups of the Indo-Iranian section, with the Iranian predominating. These features are to be seen not only in the etymological relationship of words and derivatives, but, more interestingly, in the actual structure of the syntax. In a word Pakhtu and Pashtu are perfect examples of a medial tongue.  

What is said here must be read with reference only to the root-stock of the language, verbs, numerals, family and household relationships, thoughts of sun and moon and stars, night and day, heaven and earth, and not to the top-hamper of abstract notions which came in with Islam. In common with all other languages spoken by Muslims north of Arabia, Pakhtu has a large vocabulary taken from the Arabic through Persian, or from Persian itself. But that is a top-dressing, paralleled for instance in Turkish, and easily comparable with the Latin and Greek components of English. It has nothing to do with the root-stock. The later words are borrowed as they are without undergoing etymological change. It is true that they are often pronounced in the manner favoured by Pathans, just as French words, borrowed whole, are pronounced and used in an English way. The distinction I seek to draw can be illustrated by comparing un — deux — trois with one — two — three, and then sympathie with sympathy. In the first case we have cognates, in the second an adoption.  

I mention this Persian and Arabic top-hamper here, for on it much loose thought is sometimes based. The top-hamper in Pakhtu extends to the adoption of scriptural personal names such as Ibrahim, Isa, Musa, Ayub, Yahya, Yaqub, Yusuf, Ishaq and so on, linked to the Hebrew canon in the anglicized forms of Abraham, Jesus (or Esau), Moses, Job, John, Jacob, Joseph, Isaac. Serious argument has been advanced that these borrowings support the Bani Israel thesis. The fact is, of course, that all peoples who embraced Islam, and not only the Pathans, took over this set of names. It is part of the heritage of Islam and not peculiar to Pathans. A certain prevalence of prophets’ names in Pathan usage may be explicable by the fact that, relatively to the peoples of the
Middle Sea and Persia, their adoption of the Faith, as we shall see, was considerably delayed. The more recent convert is not seldom the most tenacious of tradition.

The evidence is notoriously thin, but on the more general question I conclude that, while there is good evidence of affinity between the Saka dialect, in so far as it is known to us, and the language of the Pathans, and while both clearly belong to the same East Iranian group, there is something to be said for holding that the origins of Pakhtu-Pashtu go further back into an older Iranian past, even as far as Achaemenian times. This conclusion draws strength from the existence in Pakhtu of a deeply-embedded Indo-Iranian element, itself clearly of older than Saka origin. So, following the best authorities, with the Sakas at the latest we can begin to think of people in Gandhara talking a language from which the present Pathan language has come down.
CHAPTER V

SAKAS, KUSHANS AND PERSIANS

The Sakas, diverted by their Parthian cousins from Iran, are shown by numismatic study to have arrived in Gandhara at the beginning of the first century B.C. and to have ruled for about a hundred years up to A.D. 5. Coins show the names of four Saka rulers, Maves, Azes I, Azilises and Azes II — the Greek ζητα, as in Bazira, standing for a й. The Saka irruption seems to have passed through the gap in the east-west ranges where Herat is situated to occupy the former Achaemenian satrapies of Drangiana and Arachosia, to the first of which they gave the name of Sakastan. Their presence in Arachosia as far north as Ghazni is attested by numerous coins, and coins indicate also their entry onto the plains of what is now Pakistan by way of the Gumal, Tochi and Paiwar routes. Some of them reached Gandhara from the south, coming up the Indus from the direction of Baluchistan and Sind, into which they had penetrated after their defeat at Parthian hands further west.

The thrust towards the Panjab was led by Maves between 97 and 77 B.C. Their dramatic progress was no doubt aided by their pioneering of a new form of warfare, based upon an armoured cavalry force, whose chief weapon was a long lance known to the Romans as the contus. Saka methods of war were indeed known much earlier than this; Arrian describes how their shock tactics first came to notice on the Persian side at Gaugamela, where all Alexander’s prowess was needed to turn the fortunes of the day.

Maves established his capital at Taxila, where the Graeco-Bactrians had been before him. After his death there was an interval during which various Saka tribes contended for the mastery for some twenty years, and no leader emerged until Azes I in 58 B.C. re-established authority and inaugurated the Saka era which begins in that year. This contest between lesser men when the great man dies demonstrates the tribal inability to co-ordinate effective action in the absence of a trusted leader, and has many
parallels in later Pathan history. We may well surmise that the Saka heritage in these parts is not confined to the linguistic.

Azes I established a flourishing and powerful Kingdom, distinguished by a numerous silver coinage betokening a long reign. He was succeeded by his son and grandson, Azilises and Azes II, the coinage becoming debased about A.D. 5 when a new dynasty, the Parthians, succeeded to power in this region.

From Greek historians and Persian inscriptions we know that, like their Parthian cousins, the Sakas were splendid horsemen and had a great repute as dashing warriors. Greek vases represent them as hairy men with heavy, bushy beards. A Roman commentator describes the Alanni, one of the Scythian clans, as men of great stature and beauty and of a fair colour. The important part which they played in the Persian army is clear from Herodotus and Arrian and numerous coins minted after their conquests in Sistan (Sistan), the Frontier region and north-western India illustrate both their panoply and their tactics as fighting men. The inscription on the Lion-capital from Mathura in India (now in the British Museum) indicates their veneration for a leader in whom they trusted; it seems to have been carved in commemoration of the funeral ceremonies of a King, possibly Maves. It may generally be said that theirs is a history peculiarly dependent on the results of numismatic effort, for the dates of their kings and the course of the movements of their armies are deducible mainly from coin discoveries of different mints.

The so-called Indo-Parthian Kingdom which for a short seventy years attained to power on the Frontier after the Sakas represented a shift of emphasis rather than a conquest. For these Parthians, like their Saka cousins, were of Central Asian nomadic stock, and their accession meant only a stronger assertion of Parthian power from the west. By the year A.D. 5 the Arsacid Parthian dynasty of Ctesiphon had attained to the summit of its power, and the extension of its authority to the Indus at this period was no doubt prompted by a determination to re-establish Persian imperial rule to the furthest limits of the former Achaemenian dominion. This operation appears to have been conducted by the Sakistan (Sistan) route, and is associated with the name of the Suren family, the mightiest of all the Arsacid feudatory chiefs. By A.D. 19 one Gondophares, a member of this family, is shown by an inscription at Takht-i-Bahi to be ruling
over Gandhara and the northern Panjab. It is probable that Gondophares enjoyed some measure of local autonomy while acknowledging the suzerainty of the Arsacids in their far-away capital of Ctesiphon on the Tigris. This is the King mentioned by name in an apocryphal Acts of the Apostles describing the missionary endeavours of the apostle Thomas in the Indus region. We cannot here turn to examine the truth of that tale, but it is interesting that the dates fit—Gondophares died in A.D. 48—and there can be no possible collusion between a Takht-i-Bahi inscription and an apocryphal Christian book.

These Parthians of the Suren family were men of great splendour. If indeed, along with their Saka cousins, they contributed to the Pathan make-up, they bequeathed something magnificent. The feudal lords furnished the heavy cavalry with iron armour, known as cataphracti, and the lesser nobility the light cavalry, the sagitarii, for which the Parthian armies were famous. The undaunted Parthian with his arrows and swift progress are celebrated in the Odes of Horace, and the picture of the horseman shooting over his shoulder as he retired is familiar. Greek and Roman descriptions of the battle of Carrhae in 53 B.C. give a fine account of the cloud of dust on the horizon, opening to reveal the Suren bodyguard of a thousand mailed horsemen which charged down on the Roman infantry, unused to shock tactics from heavy armed cavalry. The new arm is described with the awe accorded in our day to the invention of armoured vehicles. The legions were cut to pieces and Roman ambitions beyond the Euphrates perished, not to rise again. Carrhae was one of the world's decisive battles and it was won by men whose grandsons established themselves on the North-West Frontier. It is worth noting too that the Suren family survived the fall of the Arsacid dynasty and the rise of the Sassanians of Persia under Ardashir about A.D. 225.

But the Parthian dynasty on the eastern frontier failed to make good and fell about A.D. 73 to yet another horde from beyond the Oxus, the Kushans. These defeated Gondophares' successor in a fierce battle right under the walls of Taxila, of which recent excavations afford good evidence. Archaeologists have traced a breach in the walls of Surkap, the Taxila city, and many arrow-heads. It seems that from this date Taxila was destroyed as a city; the later sculptural and other artistry discovered there comes not
from Surkap but from the Buddhist monasteries in the foothills north and east of the city.

On their way south the Kushans had attacked and greatly weakened the Parthian Empire of the Arsacids, which was under simultaneous pressure from the Rome of the Caesars in the west. Their first conquest was Bactria south of the Oxus, whence under their first ruler of note, Kujula Kadphises, they organized advances to south, east and west which in due course gave them an immense empire covering not only the whole of what was then Eastern Iran (modern Afghanistan and Pakistan as far east as the Indus) but the Panjab and the India of the Ganges Valley as far as Allahabad or Benares. It is probable that Kujula himself, having first made himself master of the Kabul Valley, annexed Gandhara as far as the Indus about A.D. 60, conquering it from the successor of the Parthian Gondophares. The decisive battle giving him the mastery of what was then northern India was the siege and storm of Taxila some fifteen years later, the victor being either a nameless successor or Kadphises II, known from the coins as Wima Kadphises. The sway of Wima extended to the mouth of the Indus, and he profited from the weakness of the Parthians, engaged with Rome, to seize the whole of modern Afghanistan, the then Aria, Sakistan, and Arachosia. Wima was succeeded by the greatest of the Kushan monarchs, the famous Kanishka, whose succession starts a new era. Under Kanishka the Kushan Empire was extended far into the Ganges Valley, and a capital city of the Indian province established at Mathura. The actual date of his succession is disputed between wide variants, the latest scholars fixing the Kanishka era as starting in the second quarter of the second Christian century, possibly A.D. 128, some five hundred years before the Hijrat. His northern capital was at the central point of the empire, Purushapura or Peshawar. So once again we have come home.

The ethnic stock of the Kushans is in some dispute, and a considerable body of opinion has maintained that, while their subjects were Iranian in the western part of their dominion, and Indian in the east, they themselves were an early wave of Hun or Turk affinity. Others including Ghirshman and McGovern, are firm in holding them to be yet another horde of Scythians, and therefore akin both to the Sakas and the Parthians, and this I accept as the more authoritative view. They are known to Chinese
records as the Yueh-chi, of whom the Guei-shang, or Kushan were the leading clan.

Excavation and numismatic study reveal that the original religious background of the Kushans was a Mazdean fire-worship of which traces remain even in the monuments they left in their new homes along the Indus. But when they reached the Indus Valley, they became subject to many religious influences, the first effect of which was to produce a syncretism so tolerant that its niches received deities as varied as Heracles, Hephaestus, Mithras, Shiv, and finally the Lord Buddha. It was down this broad path of eclectic experiment that the great Kushan king Kanishka proceeded, to find in the end that Buddhist revelation which caused him to displace the other gods from their pedestals and to offer devotion to the form of worship now associated with Gandhara and the Kushan age.

Kanishka having chosen Gandhara, with its capital Peshawar, as the nodal point of his empire, the state which he ruled has come to be known as the Kingdom of Gandhara. And since Kanishka, following in the footsteps of Asoka, four centuries earlier, had embraced or at least greatly encouraged Buddhism, and Gandhara under his leadership became the centre of an important civilization especially as regards art, the name has come to be used in designation of the significant art forms which spread outward from Peshawar to many other parts of Asia. It was because under Kanishka there had developed a golden age of Buddhism that the Chinese pilgrims, Fa-Hien and Hiuen-Tsang, later made it one of the bournes of their pilgrimage. Outside the Ganj gate of the modern Peshawar City was discovered in 1909 the remarkable relic casket of Kanishka now deposited in the Peshawar Museum. The site of these excavations is now locally known as Sbabji ki dberi, the King’s mound.

The difficulty of reconstructing Kushan history arises from the fact that their main contacts extended to the inhabitants of India, the least imbued with an historical sense of any ancient civilization in the world. Relatively to the size and scope of the Empire little contemporary evidence is available, and though the later Chinese Buddhist literature records legends of Kanishka, these books do not fill in accurate historical detail and are largely repetitions of Indian religious speculation. Moreover the records which do exist throw little light on the tribes and people in the
Gandhara region over whom Kanishka and his successors ruled. Coins and works of art are innumerable, and from them the dynastic over-tones may be painted in. But, for the identity, or way of life, or language, of the ruled we look in vain. Only the name of the capital is known; of the Paktues, the Aparutai, the Gandarioi, and their successors we have no word. We do not even know for certain of what stock the rulers themselves claimed to be. This is a pity, for it is only under the Kushans that Peshawar attained the dignity of an imperial capital.

It was under the Kushans that the channels of trade between the Roman world and further Asia were at last unblocked. Ever since the Seleucids had yielded power to the Arsacids on the Iranian plateau, the State described by Sir Mortimer Wheeler as 'the implacable barrier of Parthia' had stood astride these routes, 'often at war with Rome and closing the Orient trade by extortionate levy or actual veto.' But the rise of the Kushan power on her eastern flank involved Parthia in a war on two fronts; Iran, as Ghirshman observes, had become a much reduced central state sandwiched between Rome and a new empire based on Gandhara. The Kushans and the Romans had a common interest both in politics and in commerce; the Kushans now holding stretches of the east-west trade-routes were able to divert merchandise to avoid Parthian territory. And it was from this time that the Parthian period of decadence set in.

We may follow Tarn in his conviction that Gandhara art would never have been brought to birth had not Greek kings ruled in that country in the second and first centuries B.C. But it is now more generally held that it is to this age, the age of Kanishka (A.D. 128–51), two hundred years later, that we must attribute the full flowering of the famous Gandhara art in sculpture in stone, bronze and stucco, in coffers, plaques, bowls and objets d'art of all descriptions. This astonishing mass of material represents according to Wheeler, not a Greek influence as such but 'the most penetrating and enduring impact of the Roman upon the Eastern world'. The craftsmen may often have been Greeks but the source of this plethora of art treasures has been traced to Roman Alexandria. By the absorption of the Western modes of expression, in the representation of figure statuary and so on, the face of Buddhism was changed. The Hinayana, or lesser Vehicle, expanded into the Mahayana, or Greater Vehicle. Under the former the
Buddha was never represented; he was not a god but a sage. Under the Mahayana, a persuasion which first took shape under Kanishka and is represented by the art of Gandhara, the Buddha has become divine and is the focus of every composition. The Roman heroic and funerary art is indeed transmuted by the oriental craftsmen and given a Buddhist context, but, as Wheeler points out, both iconographically and aesthetically the change was revolutionary, and represents a synthesis of the utmost interest and importance.11

As to the controversy on the point whether this new effulgence should be linked with Greece or with Rome, it is possible to hold that in this region it is perhaps unreal to make a distinction between the two sources of influence. It is generally agreed that the fountainhead of inspiration was Alexandria, the centre of neo-Platonism and Hellenistic art whether under the Graecized Ptolemies or the Romans who succeeded them. Admitting that Gandhara art was the outcome of Kushan commerce bringing in the craftsmanship of the Roman Empire, it is worth remembering that the time now assigned for it coincided with the reign of the Emperor Hadrian (A.D. 117–138), a devotee of esoteric cults and the arts who spoke Greek better than Latin. It is certain too that the craftsmen employed stood for an Eastern Mediterranean rather than a Latin tradition. We may follow Tarn at least so far in believing that the earlier Graeco-Bactrian kingdom in Gandhara had paved the way for this development.

In King Kanishka’s later days, when he had become a fervent Buddhist, he created a great relic tower — probably just outside the Ganj Gate of Peshawar at Shahji ki Dheri — with a superstructure of carved wood rising in thirteen storeys to a height of some 400 feet, and surmounted by an iron pinnacle. Vincent Smith tells us how it was visited by Sung-yun, a Chinese pilgrim, at the beginning of the sixth century, by which time it had thrice been destroyed by fire and as often rebuilt by pious kings. A monastery of exceptional magnificence was still flourishing here as a place of Buddhist education as late as the ninth century when it was visited by Vira Deva, an eminent Buddhist scholar. But the Brahminical revival which began in the later Kushan period frowned on Buddhist piety, and what was left by the Brahmins seems to have been finally destroyed by Mahmud of Ghazni and his successors in the eleventh century.

It is a strange reflection that Peshawar, the seat of learning
which gave birth to a religion that gloried in the portrayal of life in pictorial art, later became one of the spiritual centres of the Faith which is distinguished for iconoclasm. We have collected evidence to suggest that tribes bearing names which have come down to the present day were already living in the neighbourhood of Peshawar many centuries before the Kushan renascence of Buddhism, and that the ancestor of the language now spoken in this region had already come in certainly no later than the Saka horsemen. The Kushans themselves, a fresh wave of Saka invaders of Iranian stock, must have spoken a language not so very different from that of the Sakas. In a word, there is evidence that the Pakhtu-speakers of today, or their progenitors, were beginning to emerge when Kanishka was King. How could our ancestors have been followers of the image of Buddha? — a Pathan of today would ask.

It is not difficult to supply some sort of answer. A new wind may blow, and ancient fragrances grow stale. The very strength of a Pathan's reaction against the sensuous rituals of the older creeds may be indicative of his ancestors' feeling for those rituals in their day. 'Guftagū-yi-kufr-wa-din ākhir bi-kuja mikashad? Khwāb yāk khwāb ast, bāshad mukhtalif tābirhā... This chatter of heathendom and faith, where does it lead in the end? The dream is one dream, though many and various be the interpretations.'

After the Kushans there is yet one more Iranian dynasty which ruled in Gandhara before the advent of fresh hordes from Central Asia. This was the Sassanians.

On the latest reckoning Kanishka, Emperor of the Kushans, died about A.D. 151 and was succeeded by three of his line, Vasishka, Huvishka and Vasudeva, whose reign terminated about A.D. 225. The evidence of sculpture and coins shows that until near the end the influence of Buddhism went deep, but the strongly Hindu flavour of the last King's name — Vasu is a variant of Vishnu, and Deva speaks for itself — indicates a beginning, or possibly a revival, of Brahminical influence over the court. There is a contemporary passage in the Agni Purana indicating that Hindu ideologists of the time saw in Kushan conversion to Buddhism a danger to the survival of the State. A creed such as Buddhism, advocating non-violence and self-negation, could hardly ensure the power of a military people like the Kushans,
ruling by right of conquest, and was bound to have far-reaching political repercussions. The passage quoted thinly veils a sneer at invaders whose military prowess had been so undermined, and it is probable that the acceptance of Hinduism by the last recorded Kushan was a belated endeavour to return to the Brahminical fold. There can be little doubt that, as with the Mauryas, an over-fervent Buddhism contributed to the military failure of the Kushans in the third century. Conversion to a more realistic Brahminism had come too late.

The overthrow of the Kushans was brought about by the new and great power which had arisen in Persia proper, the Sassanians. Not for the first or the last time it is impossible to understand the history of Gandhara, so often an eastern frontier of Persia, without turning to the fountain-head in Persia itself. Ardashir, the grandson of Sassan, a temple dignitary at Stakhr, was a true Persian of Fars or Persis, regarding himself as in the legitimate line from the Achaemenians, more than five centuries before. Uniting the minor princes of Fars under his rule, he overcame Artabanus (Ardavan), the last Arsacid of the Parthian line, and was crowned King in A.D. 226. In A.D. 240 he was succeeded by his son Shapur, who as Crown-prince had worked in double harness with his father. Between them Ardashir and Shapur made the power of Persia feared as it had not been since the days of Carrhae. They turned their attention first to the destruction of the Kushan Empire, which in collusion with Rome had been such a menace to Persia under the Arsacids. Subsequently Shapur moved against Rome, and defeated and captured the Roman Emperor Valerian himself on the field of Edessa (A.D. 260).

This is the King Shapur whose inscription we have already noticed, engraved on the walls of the fire-temple at Naqsh-i-Rustam near Persepolis — the inscription recording Paskiboura or Peshawar as the eastern limit of the Persian Empire. It was engraved at some date between A.D. 260, the Edessa victory which it commemorates, and A.D. 273, the date of Shapur’s death. Kanishka’s Kushan dynasty was replaced by a line of princes recognizing Persian suzerainty and ruling over a greatly reduced kingdom which may have been confined to the Kabul Valley and Gandhara. The precise date of the supersession of the Kushans by the Sassanians in Gandhara is not clear, but the last Vasudeva inscription is assigned to A.D. 226, agreeing exactly with the date
of commencement of the Sassanian era. It seems likely then that Peshawar was captured by Ardashir about A.D. 230, before the succession of Shapur.

Like the Arsacids before them the Sassanian dynasty of Persia endured for over four centuries. It did not give way until the last Shahinshah, Yazdgird III, was overcome by the Arabs at Niha-wand in A.D. 642 and, like Darius Codomannus, the last Achae-menian, fled eastward to Merv to meet death at the hand of an assassin. His empire crumbled as had that of Darius, and its western portions were absorbed in the Caliphate. But that is to anticipate, and we must look again to Peshawar and the east.

The eastern boundary of the Sássanian empire did not extend beyond the Indus. The Panjab and the Gangetic portions of the Kushan Kingdom remained for a time under Kushan rulers and eventually, in the larger part, were absorbed in the Hindu Kingdom of the Guptas.¹⁵ That portion of the Kushan Kingdom which fell to the Sassanians embraced Gandhara, the Derajat and Sind, as well as large parts of Afghanistan, and was known as Kushanshahr. Its ruler was always the leading Sassanian noble after the Shahinshah himself with the title of Kushanshah, much as after Victoria the British sovereign was entitled Emperor of India. There is reason to believe that the first Kushanshah was Shapur I, himself, as heir-apparent to his father Ardashir and during his father’s lifetime. More than one of the later rulers of the Sassanian eastern frontier was the Crown-prince in person. This arrangement continued until about A.D. 365 when the Sassanian eastern provinces temporarily collapsed under fresh pressures from the north, brought about by the movements of the White Huns.

With one exception there is no reference under the Sassanids, any more than under their predecessors, to the ethnic or linguistic make-up, or the state of civilization, of the peoples on their eastern frontier. The one pointer is the first apparent use of the designation Afghan. Significantly enough this, like the reference to Paskiboura, appears in the inscription of Shapur I at Naqsh-i-Rustam, which mentions a certain Γουνδιφερ Αβγαν Ρισμάωδ — Goundifer Abgan Rismaud.¹⁶ The second word can hardly be other than an early form of Afghan, an identification which can be supported by the reflection that the Shahinshah must have had many East Iranian retainers. According to Sprengling a similar
name, Apakan, occurs as the designation of the later Sassanian Emperor Shapur III who reigned for seventy years (A.D. 309–79). Phonetically, the evolution Abgan, Apakan, Afghan is normal enough, and it is tempting to see in these Sassanian chiefs ancestors of the Afghan tribes proper, the Yusufzai or the Durrani.

The Sassanians are not yet finished, but it took them the best part of two hundred years to stage a come-back to Gandhara. There was now to occur a new and much more overwhelming invasion, compared to which previous struggles for power fade into the background and seem little more than dynastic rivalry.
CHAPTER VI

THE WHITE HUNS

Up to the end of the fourth century A.D. all the invaders of Gandhara after Achaemenian times, with the single exception of Alexander himself, had been Iranians, either from metropolitan Persia, or from nomadic peoples such as Parthians, Sakas and Kushans dwelling on the fringe of the Iranian world. Even the Graeco-Bactrians were Iranians with an Hellenic veneer. But there now starts a great migration of wild barbaric tribes from the heart of the Asian continent. These are the so-called White Huns, referred to in the Greek and Roman writers as Ephthalites or Chionites. These pedantic names they obtain from Greek transcriptions of the Chinese Ye-ti-i-li-do and of the Middle Persian Khion for a Hun. In old Arabic and Persian chroniclers and geographers they are referred to as the Haytal or Hayatila.1

The only sources regarding the early movements of the Ephthalites or White Huns are Chinese, and it is not until they crossed the Hindu Kush on their southward migrations that they are mentioned by classical or Arab and Persian writers.2 Although Vincent Smith equates them with the Huns of Attila, the Chinese carefully distinguish the Ye-ti-i-li-do or Ephthalites from the Hiung-nu or Huns proper. Procopius, a contemporary, states in his De bello Persico that they were entirely different from the Huns as known to the Romans, in being the only Huns to have white skins and regular features. The Chinese sources suggest that they did not speak either Mongolian or Turkish, so differing linguistically from the Hunnish groups occupying Zungaria, whence both Huns proper and Ephthalites came. One Chinese authority, according to McGovern, describes them as ultimately of the same origin as the Yueh-chi or Kushans, but this seems doubtful.

The best conclusion to be drawn from these contradictions would seem to be that the Ephthalites’ close proximity to the true Huns of Turkic stock must have led to much ethnic and linguistic
intermingling, and may even have caused them to take pride in belonging to the Hunnish family. At the same time, in their position in northern Turkistan on the fringe of Turan and Iran, they represented a nomadic stock open to both influences and possibly may even have been bi-lingual. A Turco-Iranian compound is more than possible; indeed the civilization of Bukhara and Samarqand before the Russians came represents a standing example of it. We need look no further than the Emperor Babur himself, and Akbar, his grandson, for its most renowned representatives in history. More often than not, a conclusion of this sort is nearer the truth than any clear-cut assumption of racial purity: it is the sort of conclusion we shall inevitably arrive at in the case of the Afghans and Pathans themselves.

The Ephthalites are first heard of as the vassals and auxiliaries of the Avars who established an empire with its centre in Mongolia during the fourth century A.D. The Avars probably spoke a Mongol language and their ruler assumed the title of Khagan or Khan, a title which the Ephthalites brought with them on their travels from Central Asia. While they borrowed the main features of their tribal organization from their Avar overlords, it is certain that they were a separate people with a different linguistic and cultural background, and that their migrations were prompted by a desire to escape from a too exacting Avar domination. They overran both Kashgharia — the modern Sinkiang — and Sogdia — the modern Samarqand — and turned southward about A.D. 360 to attack the Kushans of Bactria. The Kushan rulers put up a desperate resistance, but, after vainly appealing for aid to Sassanian Persia, were forced south-eastward under a leader named Kidara into Gandhara, where, as we know, their Kushan cousins had for long ruled but were now subject to Sassanian overlords. These Kidarites, sometimes known as the Little Kushans, have not infrequently been regarded as the first wave of White Hun conquest from the north, and referred to as the Chionites. But it seems fairly certain that Kidara and his successors were Kushans of the true Scythian stock evicted by the Ephthalites from Bactria. Kidara succeeded in wrestling the control over Gandhara and adjacent regions from the last of the Sassanian Kushanshahs who died about A.D. 365. He himself assumed the title of Kushanshah, possibly even enjoying Sassanian recognition. The duration of Kidarite rule in Gandhara is uncertain, but the evidence of coins,
which show—more than one ruler of this name, suggests that it may have been as much as one hundred years. The whole region was then finally overwhelmed by an irresistible surge of the Ephthalites or White Huns proper which in the east flooded right across Northern India, and in the west came within an ace of destroying the Sassanian Empire of Persia itself.

The Ephthalites completed their occupation of Bactria in about A.D. 425, and from that centre proceeded to raid heavily both towards Persia in the south-west and south-east in the direction of the Kabul Valley and Gandhara. Their first forays against Persia were stayed in A.D. 427 by the renowned Sassanian ruler Bahram V,3 surnamed Gur, hunter, lover and minstrel. Bahram Gur, feigning to buy them off with gold, lay in ambush and destroyed the Ephthalite army to a man. This check was effective for a generation. But on the succession of Bahram’s grandson, Firuz, after the middle of the fifth century, the tide turned. Firuz had called in the Ephthalites as King-makers to unseat a younger brother, and mutual dissatisfaction led to war. In a series of heavy battles he was first made captive, and in the end, in A.D. 484, met his death. The pride of Sassanian Persia was humbled, and she came to occupy a tributary position to the Ephthalite ruler which lasted well on into the sixth century. But the Ephthalites were too closely occupied elsewhere to administer to Persia the final coup de grâce.

The slackening of their pressure on the Sassanians was undoubtedly due, at least in part, to their having become deeply involved in what seemed to them a more profitable adventure in the direction of India. This they began by the invasion of Gandhara, where they overcame Kidara’s successors about A.D. 455. They were accompanied on this incursion by a sort of vassal or helot group of tribes named the Gurjaras. In Gandhara they appointed a Tagin or Viceroy, nominally subordinate to the Ephthalite supreme ruler in Bactria. This Viceroy, or possibly his successor, is identifiable with the Toramana of the Indian Gupta inscriptions. Before long Toramana and his son Mihiragula,4 both known to legend as infamous and bloodthirsty tyrants, had overrun the Panjab, destroyed the Gupta Empire of the Hindus, and become the paramount rulers of all northern and central India. They established their capital at Sakala, the modern Sialkot.5

The cruelties of Mihiragula are recounted not only in Hindu
story but by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Sung-yun and by a Byzantine monk who visited the north at this period. In the end his oppression led to rebellion and the defeat of the Ephthalites, who only with difficulty retained a small footing in the north. Mihiragula took refuge in Kashmir where he inaugurated another reign of terror which lasted until his death in A.D. 542. The Kashmiris have a legend that he delighted in pitching elephants over a cliff and watching their death-agonies. The scene of this carnage is still shown on the southern side of the Pir Panjal pass close to the summit, on the road followed by the Mughals in their annual visits to Kashmir more than a thousand years later.

The main body of the Ephthalites who had remained in Bactria did not long survive the breaking of their power in the Indus Valley. In about the middle of the sixth century the Turks, who had succeeded the Ephthalites as vassals of the Avars, rose in rebellion against their overlords and made themselves masters of northern Turkistan. There followed strained relations between the victorious Turks and the Ephthalites of Bactria, leading to hostilities. At this time Khusrau I Anushirvan, the Just, had begun his long reign (531–79) in Sassanian Persia, and, although checked by Belisarius on the Euphrates, had succeeded in the course of warfare with Roman Byzantium under the great Justinian in doing something to revive the repute of Persian arms. The rise of Turkish power on the other side of the Bactrian Ephthalites gave Khusrau his opportunity to deal finally with those who had humbled Persia for three generations. Sassanians and Turks made a joint attack on the Ephthalite kingdom and destroyed it in a decisive battle in Sogdiana, dated by Menander Protector, the Byzantine historian, in A.D. 568. The episode is described in the section of the Shahnameh of the Persian poet Firdausi, devoted to Khusrau Anushirvan. Firdausi names the Ephthalites Haytal.

Once again then the Sassanian power could be extended, at least nominally, to the Indus, and all eastern Iran — the modern Afghanistan — passed into their hands.

But the Ephthalites themselves did not disappear with their empire. It is probable that among other legacies they left the title of Khan, now a hallmark not only among Pathans but all over the Panjab and beyond where there persists any consciousness of a Central Asian origin. It seems likely, too, that certain terms originating in Mongolia and carried southward by Turkic migrations
into Pathan usage date from this time. Such are the word *ulus* for the tribe, *baramta* for a raid on an enemy's person or flocks to indemnify oneself for a wrong, *bashar* for a helping party of friends at harvest time — all words in common use in Pakhtu but not of Iranian origin. With the Ephthalites moreover, as all agree, came in the Gurjaras, and when the Ephthalite power fell the Gujur people remained. And it has been asserted that the Jats of the Panjab, the main stream from whom the rural Sikhs are drawn, and even many of the proud Rajput clans, are descended from these invading White Huns. If this is so, it would indeed be strange if the Ephthalites had left no traces in the population of the Peshawar plain.

The origin of the Rajputs may well be germane to our present problem, and Vincent Smith has much to say that is of interest. After recalling that before the Muslim invasions the three main irruptions of foreigners through the north-western passes were the Sakas, the Kushans and the White Huns, he points out that the real difference between the ancient and the medieval periods of Indian history is that at some period the living tradition was broken. There is in fact no tradition concerning the ancient period; the Mauryas, the Sakas, the Kushans, belong to a dead and buried past, known only from inscriptions and coins. The tradition of the Rajput clans on the other hand is very much alive, and they still form influential sections of the people.

The break came, Vincent Smith believes, with the third irruption, the White Hun invasions of the fifth century. This incursion was so overwhelming that it destroyed all memory of descent from the first and second swarms, the Sakas and Kushans. It was like the Anglo-Saxon invasion of Britain, creating a Dark Age. He goes on:

Who were these Rajputs, and why do they and their affairs make such a stir during the centuries before the Muhammadan conquest? Their dominance is the conspicuous fact differentiating the medieval from the ancient period in the history of North India, and the mind craves for an explanation.

It seems to be clearly established that the Hun group of tribes and hordes made their principal settlements in Rajputana and the Panjab. The most important element in the group after the Huns themselves was that of the Gurjaras whose name survives in the form of Gujar as the designation of a widely diffused class in north-
west India. The Jâts or Jats, more exclusively agricultural — the Gujars are a pastoral people — are universally recognized as akin to the Gujars.

The discovery that the Rajas of Kanauj (Parihars) from 800 to 1018, some of whom enjoyed the rank of paramount sovereign of North India, really were the descendants of foreign immigrants of the fifth and sixth centuries and cousins of the Gujars, though recognized as high-class Rajputs, is one of the most notable additions made to Indian historical knowledge for many years past. A fair presumption arises that many of the Rajput clans were of similar origin. The truth seems to be that, when a foreign clan became Hinduized, the ruling families were readily recognized as Kshatryias or Rajputs, while the rank and file of the strangers became Gujars and other castes ranking lower in the scale of precedence.

Now let us see how this line of argument bears on the origin of the Pathans. Gandhara, the Peshawar Valley, was the point d'appui of the White Huns or Ephthalites in their invasion of North India. There are literally thousands of Gujars in the villages of Swat, Dir, and Mardan today; one of the largest of all villages in the Yusufzai Samah of Mardan is named Gujar Garhi. Many of the villages under the northern hills of Sudhum which separate the Samah from Buner are populated entirely by Gujars, save only that the Khan and his family are Pathans, having the Gujars under them as tenants just as the Gurjaras served the Ephthalites. The appellation Khan is claimed by every Pathan as of right. It is inconceivable that a conquering race such as the Ephthalites, which left proved descendants down in India among the Rajputs, did not contribute also to the blood of the peoples of Gandhara, which was one of their headquarters. It is to be remembered too that, as we shall see, after the collapse of the Ephthalites, followed shortly after by the fall of the Sassanian Empire before Islam, Gandhara and its environs came under Hindu rule for some four centuries. During that long period there were no successful invasions from the north-west and the people had time to settle down. Nor need we forget that these White Huns, in Procopius' phrase, were fine-looking men with white skins and regular features.

Long before these discoveries of Ephthalites and Gurjaras had been co-ordinated, Bellew had pointed to what he calls a very remarkable similarity between the national character and customs of the Afghans and of the Rajputs. He mentions the rigid law of
hospitality, the protection given to the refugee, the jealousy of female honour, the warlike spirit and insufferance of control, the pride of race, the jealousy of national honour and personal dignity, the spirit that loves to domineer. He finds also facial resemblances, and most who know both peoples would agree. The two peoples, he concludes, are now parted more by Islam and Brahminism than by territorial distance or personality. And here is a quotation to bear this out:

'In many ways the Rajput bears such a strong resemblance to the Highlanders of Scotland that one might seem to be reading one of Walter Scott's stories, with some trifling differences of names and costumes. They had the same reckless daring, the same loyalty to a chief they trusted, the same love of sport, the same readiness to take offence and quarrel among themselves when they could find no enemy to give them employment. After all these centuries the Rajput bearing remains what it was in their heroic age, something that marks him out from all other races; the poorest is by birth a gentleman, and therefore the equal of the greatest. To see a Rajput on horseback clattering through the streets that his ancestors cleared with the sword is to realize a scene from the legends when Prithwi Raj went forth at the time of year when Kings go to battle.' Substitute Afghan for Rajput, and Ahmad Shah for Prithwi Raj, and the picture fits exactly.

We have seen possible prototypes of Pathan clan names emerging hundreds of years before the Ephthalite incursions. We have noted also that the best linguists believe the ancestor of the Pakhtu language to have come in not later than the Sakas, four centuries before the Ephthalites arrived. But it seems to me certain that, whatever the underlying strata, the White Hun dominance must have contributed another layer to the composition of the people of these parts. Just as the Gurjaras, the helots of the White Huns, are still to be seen as Gujars in thousands in this very region, so their overlords, the Ephthalites, must be among the Khans. My conviction is that many of the Khankhel of tribes such as the Yusufzais could claim Ephthalite forebears. It is probable that Ephthalite blood is to be found among the Afghans of the plains such as the Yusufzais rather than among the Pathans of the hills; in other words, in terms of the genealogies, such traces should be looked for among the sons of Sarbanr, rather than among the Karlanris. And here will be remembered Bellew's speculation that the Sar-
banri genealogies suggest Rajput affinities, as for instance Sarbanr derived from Suryabans, Sharjyun from Surjan, and Krishyun from Krishen.\(^{10}\)

It is not surprising to find that, with the few exceptional words I have already noted, the language of the Pathans shows no Turkic affinities and remains an East Iranian tongue with borrowings from the Indian group. In cultural matters, including language, the Hunnish conquerors evidently adopted the ways of the conquered, an Iranian heritage from many hundreds of years of civilization.

There are further grounds for supposing that the Ephthalites became an important element in the amalgam which constitutes the Afghan world. As we know from the genealogies, the Ghaljis are held to be the sons of Bitan, in the line of Qais, only on the female side through his daughter Bibi Mato, who was seduced by a foreign prince, Husain. Clearly this story expresses in mythical form a tradition of foreign invaders who by force or guile seized the women of the country as brides. We noted also a belief, held by some commentators, that this mythical prince might have been Turkish. At least he was admittedly not Afghan.

There has been much discussion on a possible Turkish admixture in the origin of the Ghaljis. Mainly going on the opinion of Mahmud Kashghari, writing in Baghdad in the eleventh century, the Russian orientalist Barthold\(^{11}\) identified the Ghaljis as the Turkish Khalaj, who made up two of the twenty-four clans of the tribal confederacy of the Oghuz (Ghuzz) Turks, the first wave of whom moved south of the Oxus in the tenth century and formed an important part of Mahmud of Ghazni's armies. It is supposed that they gradually adopted the Afghan language and customs. Another Russian orientalist, Reisner, is inclined to endorse this view, which is broadly followed by the *Cambridge History of India*,\(^ {12}\) and by myself in an earlier book.\(^ {13}\)

I propose for the present to leave aside the identification of the Khalaj with the Ghalji, considering that point later when we come to the invasions of India by Khalaj mercenaries. Let us now see only who the forerunners of the Khalaj themselves were. If the Khalaj were indeed of Turkish stock so recently assimilated to Afghan ways at the time of the Ghaznawids in the tenth and eleventh centuries — a period for which there exists a large body of contemporary and locally written commentary in Arabic — I
think, upon reflection, that statements to that effect could not have failed to appear in the works of the Ghaznavid and later chroniclers. We must go further back and look for a clue to Khalaj origins in earlier waves of conquest. Could they have been descendants of the Ephthalites, a people in a much more distant past than the Ghuzz Turks? It appeared improbable that such a theory could be established by documentary or epigraphical evidence, for, as far as it is known, the Ephthalites themselves had no literature and they do not seem to have gone in for inscriptions or monuments. Nevertheless the surmise seemed to bring the whole story to life and to be at least as attractive, and surely as reasonable, as Vincent Smith’s assignment of an Ephthalite origin to the lordly Rajput.

And now light breaks. It will not be forgotten that the Arabic and Persian name for the Ephthalites is Haytal or Hayatila, and they are so mentioned by Firdausi in his Shahnameh. In his commentary on the Hudud-al-Alam Professor Minorsky quotes two early passages from Arab chroniclers which would appear to resolve all doubt. They are:

(a) From the Mafatih-al-ulum of Al-Khwarezmi written probably in A.D. 975 (H. 365): ‘The Hayatila are a tribe of men who had enjoyed grandeur and possessed the country of Tukharistan; the Turks called Khalukh, or Khalaj, are their descendants.’

(b) From the Kitab-al-masalik of Istakhti, written about A.D. 933 (H. 321): ‘The Khalaj are a kind of Turks who in the days of old came to the country between Hind and the districts of Sijistan (Sistan) behind Ghor. They are cattle-breeders of Turkish appearance, dress and language.’

With regard to the first passage there is continual confusion in the texts between Khalaj and Khalukh, for in Arabic the words only differ in one point (ك and خ). There seems no doubt that Khalaj is here meant. Tukharistan is what is now north-eastern Afghanistan, around Baghlan. The two passages, taken together, fit the Ephthalite geographical conquests, and identify them with the Khalaj. They take the Khalaj back some five centuries before the Ghuzz migrations, making their ancestors the White Huns, the same as the ancestors of so many other dominant people in the north of what was then India.
I should perhaps anticipate conclusions here by remarking that the later identification of the Khalaj with the Ghaljis is, I think, established beyond any doubt. The detailed argument must wait for its proper place in the chronological record.16

There is one more possible connection to be mentioned before leaving the Ephthalites. Writing as much as a century ago, the traveller Masson16 identifies the Durrans also with the Ephthalites. He says: 'The Duranis are known both in India and Persia as Abdálli or Avdáll, and when we find that the White Huns of ancient history, the Euthalites of classical authors, were named Hepthals by Armenian authors, we might infer that the Abdálli or modern Duranis are no other than descendants of that powerful people. The Siaposh Kafrs remember that their ancestors were driven into the hills from the plains by the Odals — a term they still apply to the inhabitants of the low countries.'

Phonetically the transference Ephthalites – Avdáll seems fair enough, but much more research is needed to establish this link. As it is, the origins of the Abdalis are obscure, and they do not emerge from darkness until the time of Shah Abbas the Great early in the seventeenth century.

However this may be — and Allah knoweth best — by the end of the sixth century A.D. there emerges a group of tribes with an Iranian background and language, but made up of successive hordes overlaid at the last by a Hunnish conquest, and with a centre of historical attraction in Gandhara or the Peshawar Valley. The later hordes of White Huns had gone for the wide open plains and reached far down into India, leaving the indigenous groups in the less accessible hill country. A pattern something like that in the genealogies begins to be recognizable. The skein is being drawn together and we approach the Hijri era, the rise of the sun of Muhammad's beauty, as the Afghan chronicler has it.
CHAPTER VII

ARAB EXPANSION

After the defeat of the Ephthalites or Haytal by Sassanian Persia, aided by the Turks, in the year A.D. 568 the North-West Frontier region, as far as the Indus and including Gandhara, had become once more an appendage of the Sassanians. For eleven centuries, from the time of Darius onward, it had been the outpost of Persia towards India, successively under Achae menian, Parthian and Sassanian rulers, while the nomadic invaders also, the Bactrians, Sakas and Kushans, are to be counted as having been of Iranian stock. More recently it had been overrun by the barbarian Ephthalites from the further north; these, like the invaders before them, abode their destined hour and went their way as Sultans, but left a deep mark on the population. And even these Ephthalites seem to have been subject to Iranian influence and were unable to impose their language on the people.

This inclusion in the Iranian world for a millennium before the advent of Islam is an historical fact of the deepest significance. Persian civilization is much older than Islamic or indeed Christian influences, and is moreover of a notable endurance. It is not surprising, therefore, that Islam, as it reached the non-Arab countries, from Anatolia to the Oxus and Indus Valleys, passed through a Persian prism. It overcame and gradually submerged those northern lands, but was not able entirely to assimilate them, or perhaps it would be nearer the truth to say that the ancient culture radiating from Khurasan — not a desert civilization — turned the new thought into well-worn channels. The Iranian spirit and atmosphere that is still so evident around Peshawar is thus attributable to influences far older than Islamic, influences brought to bear by many kings and courts over more than a thousand years.

But this had been the Persian frontier towards the East, and as such has been continuously exposed to Indian influences also. For one century in this millennium, the century after the passing of Alexander, the region had formed a part of the Mauryan Em-
pire of India (323–190 B.C.), and had become a well-known centre of the Buddhist cult. Later, in the second century after Christ, Kanishka, the Kushan Emperor, gave new life to the Buddhist faith, and made possible the great Buddhist renascence which produced not only Gandhara art but even the Mahayana, the Greater Vehicle, itself. And, as the name Vasudeva shows, the last monarchs of the Kushan dynasty had yielded to Brahminism. It may well have been this reversion to Indian influences that spurred the first Sassanian Kings, Ardashir and Shapur, to re-assert the sway of Persia, and Persian ideas, in this frontier region, thus anticipating the later missionary zeal of the first Muslims.

At the end of the sixth Christian century it seemed that the Persian influence had returned in triumph. The smashing of the Ephthalite power by Khusrau Anushirvan in 568 was followed by what seemed even more startling successes under Khusrau II (590–628), who captured Antioch, Damascus and Jerusalem, marched and countermarched through Egypt, and in the north took Ankara (Ancyra) and even reached the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. Under this monarch the Persian State was repeating Achaemenian triumphs, and must have appeared to Byzantine Rome quite as formidable as had Darius or Xerxes to the Greeks.

But it was the false brightness before storm. Under Heraclius the Byzantines were able to launch a vigorous counter-attack. Asia Minor and Armenia were liberated from the Persian yoke, and Heraclius in his turn appeared before the Persian winter capital at Ctesiphon. Khusrau II fell, assassinated by his own son, born of a Byzantine princess. The date was 628, six years after the Hijrat, the flight of the Prophet Muhammad to Medina, and four years before the Prophet’s death.

This war shook Sassanian Persia to its foundations. During the fourteen years between the death of Khusrau II and the accession of the last Sassanian, Yazdgard III, no less than a dozen kings succeeded one another on the throne. The army got out of hand, and the royal princes became pawns, crowned only to be assassinated. Military leaders attempted to seize the throne, and almost all the Sassanids themselves were exterminated. When a new king was needed, a prince of the royal blood had to be brought out of hiding at Stakhr. But it was too late. The generals acted like the independent Satraps of the later Achaemenids; the empire crumbled and became a collection of petty states. No effective organiza-
tion existed capable of opposing the Arab advance when it came a few years later. The Arab storm swept up. Ctesiphon fell after defeats in Mesopotamia. And in 642, the 21st Muslim year, in the plain of Nihawand south of Hamadan, the final victory went to the Arabs. Yazdgard, like Darius Codomannus before him, fled to the east and met his death near Merv in 651.

Arab, Turk, and Mongol were to walk as conquerors across the soil of western and eastern Iran, and some centuries were to pass before any part of this country was again to follow rulers not of foreign stock. But the ancient Iranian culture, rooted in the millennium that had passed, survived and profoundly influenced its conquerors. The impact of Islam, when it reached the Indus and the Oxus Valleys, can only be understood against this background. Iran was able to take captivity captive.

The effect of the overthrow of the Sassanids on the eastern borderlands was in one sense more profound, and certainly more complex, than the fate which befell the metropolitan provinces of the Persian Empire. Much is slurred over, for the Arab writers do not allude in detail to reverses, or to regions where the Arab onrush met a barrier, or by-passed difficult ground. Given the rise of Islam, the expectation would be that our sources would forthwith multiply and the picture clear. That hope is belied, and in fact the four centuries between the disappearance of the White Huns and the rise of the Ghaznawids under Sabuktagin are among the darkest of all ages upon the Frontier. Such early chronicles as exist are on the whole well borne out by coins, and the best are given in a footnote. Identifications on the whole are few, the reason being that, quite contrary to the general impression and in direct refutation of Pathan legend, the advent of Islam to our region was actually delayed for about four centuries, and was very slow and halting even in the mountain massif of what is now called Afghanistan. When in the early centuries the Arabs did break into the Kabul Valley or towards the Indus, it was only as ephemeral raiders, fighting against native princes who are either referred to as idolators or specified as Hindus. Even Kabul was not conquered by Muslim leaders till late in the ninth century, while Gandhara and the plains districts along the Indus remained under the Hindushahiya dynasty until the time of Mahmud of Ghazni early in the eleventh century. Vincent Smith briefly sums up what happened by saying simply that, after the White Huns,
there was no effective invasion of India for five hundred years.³

To this broad truth there is one qualification, the Arab con-
quest of Sind early in the eighth century A.D., but that is outside
this story.

There are many summaries of the conquests of Islam which
give an impression so simplified as to be utterly misleading. An
eexample now before me⁴ describes what is now Afghanistan as
having been divided between the Umayyids and local chiefs be-
tween 661 and 749, after which it was loosely held by the Abba-
sids until 869, when the Saffarids took over. ‘Afghanistan’, this
survey adds, ‘was converted very early.’ As we shall see, it is not
so, even as regards Afghanistan, much less Gandhara. In fact, the
native princes, who were not Muslims in the east or north-east,
enjoyed a firmer, longer and less precarious tenure than the local
representatives of the various Muslim dynasties which claimed the
allegiance of the Eastern Iranian provinces up to the time of
Mahmud of Ghazni. Even when we reach Mahmud, it will be
found that as late as the eleventh century, four hundred years after
the Prophet, the Afghans, who had by then appeared clearly in the
record, are not by any means all of the Muslim faith. In a word,
the real picture differs entirely from that painted by the genealo-
gists to portray the conversion of the Afghans in the time of the
Prophet. For greater comfort let it be understood that it is seldom
the earliest converts who are the most devoted to a faith.

The earliest authentic visitor to Gandhara of whom we have
record after the beginning of the Islamic era is the Chinese pilgrim
Hiuen-Tsang who toured Peshawar and Swat in 644, and found
Buddhism on the wane and Brahminism in the ascendant. This is
two years after the decisive victory which the Arab armies won
over Sassanian Persia at Nihawand, but there is no sign or men-
tion of the new wind in the record of the Chinese pilgrim. What
had happened in the Eastern confines of the Sassanian Empire
was the replacement of a centralized Persian domination by a
reassertion of Brahminism from India. And this is one reason
why we know so little of what happened in the next four cen-
turies; the Hindus wrote no history and cared nothing for chron-
ology. We are driven back on coins, eked out with references by
early Arab chroniclers to sporadic raids.

Having destroyed the Sassanian central administration in Persia
the Arabs set about the reduction of the Persian provinces to the
east and north-east along two axes, operating from Fars by way of Kirman. The first axis was through Nishapur to Herat, Merv and Balkh (Bactria), the second by way of Sistan, then known as Sijistan, to the Helmand and Bust, now ruined, at the confluence of the Helmand and the Arghandab. Kandahar, the city, does not appear in any of the old chronicles and is known to have been a later foundation. I will deal with the two lines of Arab advance separately.

The first axis never reached south of the main wall of the Hindu Kush. Kabul and the central Afghan massif, now the Hazarajat and then called Ghor, remained untouched by it. Because this advance resulted in the conquest of Persian Khurasan and Mawaraunnahr (Transoxiana), it has sometimes been wrongly assumed that it was by this way that the Arabs reached the headwaters of the Indus Valley. The sequence of events was in fact quite different.

Operating from Kirman in Persia Abdallah ibn Amr entered Persian Khurasan across the desert of the Dasht-i-Lut and from a headquarters at Nishapur in 650 (H. 30) or soon after captured Herat, Merv and Balkh. Five years later occurred the murder of the Caliph Uthman and the civil strife among the Arabs associated with Ali's Caliphate. Ali sent a number of governors to represent him in Khurasan, but disorder continued until Muawiyah succeeded in establishing the Umayyid dynasty at Damascus in 661 (H. 41). A succession of undistinguished Umayyid governors followed, few of them lasting more than a year or two and all mainly interested in carrying the arms of Islam across the Oxus. Not one ventured east from Herat or south from Balkh. In 680 (H. 61) began a ten-year strife between the Umayyid representative Salm and one Abdallah ibn Khazim, who supported the anti-Caliph Abdallah ibn Zubair. The conflict within the Caliphate, reflected in Khurasan, was not resolved until the succession of the great Caliph Abdal Malik, 685–705 (H. 66–86), under whom Ibn Khazim was killed in battle near Merv in 691 (H. 72). In 705 (H. 86) came the appointment of the memorable governor Qutaiba ibn Muslim, who effected the conquest of Transoxiana as far as Khwarezm and Samarqand. But he too came to grief after the accession of the Caliph Sulaiman in 714 (H. 96). He had been a personal enemy of Sulaiman's before that Caliph's accession, and plotted to rebel. His Arab troops rose against him and he was
killed in 715 (H. 97). All his successors were ephemeral, until in 750 (H. 133) the Umayyids gave way to the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad.

The Arab conquest of Khurasan, Balkh and Mawaraunnahr (Transoxiana) on this northern axis did not directly touch on our region: but it has some bearing on the Sulaiman Mountains and the Indus in so far as the Arabs, by providing a northern Muslim base, opened the way for the influx of the Turkish chieftains, slaves and soldiers who bulk so large in the history of India right up to the time of the Mughal Empire. Under the Samanids — an Islamized dynasty of Iranian origin from Balkh which succeeded to the Abbasid power on the Oxus and ruled in the third and fourth Islamic centuries (874–999) — Turkish slaves established the Ghaznavid dynasty which under Sabuktagin and his son Mahmud opened the Panjab to Muslim invasion and control. But this was to come centuries later. The Arabs did not effectively subjugate either Kabul or Ghazni, much less any part of the Sulaiman Mountain area.

Such penetration as was effected under Arab command towards the Indus Valley was on the other axis through Sistan. It is to be described as in the order of raiding only, though at times the raids were formidable and on a considerable scale.

When Abdallah ibn Amr reached Kirman on his way from Fars towards Khurasan, as already related, he detached a force under Al-Rabi ibn Ziyad against Sijistan. In 651 (H. 31) Ibn Ziyad entered Zaranj, situated on the lower Helmand near its entry into the inland Hamun which forms that river’s debouchment, and then the chief city of the region. Here he made his headquarters on a site which had probably been the Zranka of the Achaemenian inscriptions and was later to become one of the Ghaznavid citadels in the west of their empire. It is situated just within modern Afghan territory at a place now known as Nad Ali on the Helmand delta.

After two years Ibn Ziyad was displaced and the Arab conquest wavered, the new provinces like Khurasan remaining in an unsettled state owing to the succession disputes within Iraq arising over the Caliphate of Ali. With the establishment of the Umayyid Caliphate under Muawiyyah in 661 (H. 41) there came a notable advance. The new governor, Abdarrahman ibn Samurah, took Bust, the then great city at the junction of the Helmand and
Arghandab, together with Zamindawar, the fertile open valley north of Bust on the southern skirts of the mountain massif of Ghor. Bust, like Zaranj, is now a ruin and has been replaced by Girishk, twenty-five miles distant. But Zamindawar remains as the metropolitan district of the Abdalis (Durranis) just as the northern part of the Peshawar plain is that of the Yusufzais. It is interesting that neither at this time nor indeed for another thousand years is there any mention of the great Abdali tribe.

Having taken Bust, Ibn Samurah and his successor Ibn Ziyad (who had also been his predecessor) went on to make expeditions to 'Zabul, Kabul and Ar-Rukhaj'. Kabul we know. Ar-Rukhaj corresponds to the classical Arachosia and covers more or less the province of Kandahar. Zabul has varied interpretations. The early Arab chroniclers seem to mean by it the region which is now the Lower Hazarajat between the Helmand, Arghandab and Tarnak Rivers, but Babur describes it as the country south of Ghazni towards Mukur. In this period there were two rulers against whom the Arabs from Sijistan were pitted, the first an hereditary line known by the title Rutbil or Zunbile and the second 'the Kabul Shah'. Both are clearly unbelievers and both remain unsubdued, although the chroniclers record temporary successes against them.

Ibn Samurah is said to have fought his way into Kabul in 663 (H. 43), but three years later Ibn Ziyad arrived in Zaranj to find both the Kabul Shah and the Rutbil in open revolt and in control of the country as far south as Bust. Inconclusive fighting followed with Rutbil and a treaty was made. In 664 (H. 44) occurs what is to us much the most interesting item in a barren narrative. In that year Al-Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra, a lieutenant of Ibn Samurah, raided as far as 'Bannah and Al-Ahwar, towns between Al-Multan and Kabul, where he was attacked by eighteen Turkish Knights'.

This is the earliest reference in any Muslim record to localities on the Frontier which are identifiable today. We shall not be rash in equating Bannah with Bannu, situated directly between Multan and Kabul and, after Peshawar, the most fertile tract below the Sulaiman Mountains and the most worth raiding. Al-Ahwar is even more interesting.

One manuscript of Al-Baladhuri reads Lahor for Al-Ahwar, a trifling variation in the Arabic script. There can be no doubt, I think, that the reference is to the site near the present village of
Lahor, in the neighbourhood of Hund in the Yusufzai Samah of Peshawar. This village, which I know well, is four miles inland from the Indus at the Hund ford, and is surrounded by five very large mounds, one of which stands fifty feet above the plain. There are also four or five other mounds, almost as large, two miles distant and south of the next village of Jalsai. This surely is the place to be equated with this early Arab raid. It can be described as lying on one road from Kabul to Multan via the Peshawar Valley. I think it very possible also that this Lahor, and not the Panjab city, was the one mentioned by Farishta in the introduction to his history as the capital of Jaipal, the Hindushahiya ruler defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni, and even that the Ohind or Waihind, to which the Hindushahis at one time removed, was not at the present Hund. Hund is right on the river bank and is built within a small fort; it is too exposed to have ever been a capital and must have served as a strongpoint at the ford-head. There are no big mounds there to show the ruins of an old city. The capital itself would have been at a point secure from floods, four miles inland from the river and situated where the great mounds stand around Lahor. It is even conceivable that the greater Lahore on the Ravi was named after this now obscure village near the Indus.

The ‘eighteen Turkish Knights’ of Lahor would have been Haytal, the Ephthalite ancestors of the present Khans of Hund and Zaida. There can be no doubt that systematic excavation of the mounds around this site will add a rich harvest to our knowledge of this period.

A few years later another Sijistan Arab governor Abbad ibn Ziyad ‘raided the frontier of Al-Hind and crossed the desert to Al-Qandhar, where he put the inhabitants to flight but incurred heavy casualties’. This was in 672 (H. 33). The Qandhar mentioned is not the city now written Kandahar — that city was not at that time known at any rate by this name — but Gandhara. That this is so is made clear by later references in Al-Biruni, writing in the time of Mahmud of Ghazni in the eleventh century. Al-Biruni speaks of Hindu Kings who ruled in Kabul and Qandhar with its capital at Waihind (the modern Hund, or, as I interpret here, Lahor close to Hund). The identity of this earlier Qandhar of the Arab writers is clinched by yet another passage in Al-Biruni who, quoting an itinerary from the Panjab to Kabul, writes: ‘And to
Jihlam on the west of the water of Biyata (the Jihlam River) is 8 farsakhs, and to Waihind the capital of Qandhar on the west of the water of Sindh (the Indus) is 20 farsakhs, and to Purushawar (Peshawar) is 14 farsakhs.' This early entry into Qandhar, the Peshawar Valley, was but a raid and of no permanent significance.

A little later three-cornered strife broke out between the Umayyid Caliphs of Damascus, the Zubairids of Arabia and Iraq, and the Kharijites who held for a while both coasts of the Persian Gulf. All fought against all, the Zubairids and the Kharijites setting up 'anti-Caliphs'. Sides were changed and even the lieutenants of the main parties rebelled against their chiefs. During this time, which lasted from circa 685 (H. 66) to the fall of the Umayyids in 740 (H. 119), the energies, even of the great Umayyid Caliph Abdal Malik (685-701) were too much turned towards the maintenance of the dynasty against rival claimants to make possible any planned extension of Muslim domination beyond Sijistan to the east. In 681 'Rutbil', or Ranthel, is strong enough to confine the Arab governor to the citadel of Zaranj. This Rutbil is killed but succeeded by an equally formidable ruler of the same designation. A Sijistan governor is defeated by him and consequently dismissed by Abdal Malik. Another, Obaidallah, made an attack on Kabul in 698 (H. 79), ending in a disaster and his death. He was followed by Abdarrahman ibn Muhammad in the next year. Abdarrahman began by making some progress against Rutbil but quarrelled with his superior Al-Hajjaj and rebelled. It has been common form to speak of this Abdarrahman as having captured Kabul in 699; what actually took place is that after defeat at the hands of Al-Hajjaj, from whom he had rebelled, he was driven to take refuge in Kabul with Rutbil, by whom he was put to death in 704 (H. 85) in consequence of a demand by Al-Hajjaj. Al-Hajjaj himself seems to have been able for a while to exact an uncertain tribute from this Rutbil but embarked on no decisive campaign against him. With the gradual decline in the power of the dynasty after the death of the Caliph Abdal Malik the later Umayyid governors were able only to retain a precarious hold on Zaranj itself.

The Abbasids of Baghdad who succeeded them were no more successful in this direction than their Umayyid predecessors, if anything less so. Under Al-Mamun who acceded in 813 (H. 198) we hear that even Sijistan was still unsubdued, though prior to
that date there is a record that Al-Mamun, apparently before his accession while he was governor in Khurasan, had extended postal services across the Hindu Kush from the north as far as Kabul. But the Kabul Shahs remained undisturbed, and Muslim rule did not become effective or direct in this region until after the rise of the Saffarids in the ninth century of our era.

I have given this somewhat bald recital from original Muslim sources to establish how completely untrue it is to suppose that the people of Gandhara and the surrounding mountain regions were swept into the Muslim fold at an early period of the Islamic era. The general picture on the contrary is that during the first two Islamic centuries Arab control, except in Sind, was never effectively extended over any part of what had been the eastern provinces of the Sassanian Empire. South of the Hindu Kush the Arab frontier was never much further advanced than Herat and Bust, and even there was confined to the main lines of communication, tenuous and often intermittent. Considerable kingdoms under non-Muslim rulers maintained at any rate a de facto independence in Zabulistan and Kabul, into which Arab penetration was confined to raids and occasional demands for tribute. Coins assignable to these kingdoms are known, although they have not been satisfactorily interpreted. The Arabs reached the Kabul area and even at an early period the banks of the Indus near Lahor in Gandhara. They also once raided Bannu. But east of the Helmand there was no occupation. The two arms of the Arab advance, the northerly axis towards Samarqand and the southerly axis through Sijistan, left central Afghanistan, and to a large extent the Kabul-Ghazni area, almost untouched. Their inhabitants, variously referred to as Turks or Haytal, were at most vaguely tributary and certainly not fully converted.

In Kabul and Zabulistan resided non-Muslim Kings whose line more than once defeated Arab attacks and took Arab governors prisoner. The identity of the constantly recurring and enigmatic Rutbil, Zunbil or Ranthel presents a challenge. At different times he is presented as King of Ar-Rukhaj (the modern Kandahar), of Zabulistan (from Ghazni south and westward) and even of Kabul. The Muslim chroniclers invariably look on their opponents in this region as Turks or Haytal, and as we have seen there are good grounds for connecting the Haytal with the Khalaj. It is tempting by a process of induction to see in this Rutbil a forerunner of
Mirwais, leader of the great Ghalji confederacy of the eighteenth century.

In the upper Kabul Valley itself there exists no documentary evidence, and at present no identifiable coinage, to establish the exact affinities of the Shahs who ruled there during the first two Islamic centuries. Vincent Smith speaks of the Turki Shahiya Kings, a cadet branch of the Kushans, as ruling over both Kabul and Gandhara until the rise of the Saffarids in the ninth century. Thereafter they seem to have shifted their capital from Kabul, which was captured by the first Saffarid and moved to Waihind on the Indus, the site I have identified with the Gandharan Lahor. Here they appear as the Hindushahiya dynasty, of whom there is more to say.

The religion of these non-Muslim potentates seems to have been originally Buddhism, but fast reverting to Hinduism. That Buddhism was powerful in the valleys of the Hindu Kush long after Kanishka is known from the Bamian idols, but it is probable that, much as in modern Nepal, it was fighting a losing battle against the Brahmins, finding its adherents pushed further and further back into the mountains. Nearer to India, as in Gandhara, we know from Hiuen-Tsang that rulers and people were fast reverting to Hinduism as early as 644. Long before the time of the Ghaznavids (from 960 on) the ruling creed, at any rate around Peshawar, had become a strict Brahminical Hinduism.

It remains to notice one important aspect of the gradual Arab expansion eastward before the time when Muslim rulers could overcome the local Iranian or Kushan dynasties who had adopted Buddhism or Hinduism. It is obvious that, as the Muslim power and influence gradually spread from Sijistan and Balkh, considerable colonies of Arabs and other Muslims from Arabia, Iraq, Syria and no doubt Persia also, settled themselves, or were settled by the governors, among the indigenous peoples. The Arabs of the Hejaz of course carried the greatest prestige among the exponents of the new religion.

While discussing the Bani Israel theory we noticed the existence of groups of Sayyids and others to whom there still attaches a reputation for past or present sanctity or piety. There are many such, up and down the Frontier region. At least five groups of Sayyid families reside in Peshawar itself, there is another well-known Sayyid family at Ismaila in the Yusufzai Samah, another at
Batgram in the Doaba, another connected with the Pir Baba shrine in Buner, another at the village of Jarman near Kohat, yet another at Paniala under the Shaikh Budin hill in the north of the Derajat. Nor are these the only ones. The claim is that all Sadat are descended from the Prophet by the union of his daughter Fatima with Ali. Whether any or all of these groups can actually establish so noble an ancestry may be uncertain. But this, I think, is beyond dispute. These people, whether or not they are of the blood of the Prophet himself, are certainly the descendants of Arab colonists or missionaries who came to these parts in the early Islamic centuries, partly to propagate the Faith and partly to assist in the onward march of conquest.

In addition to the Sadat there are many others, Mians, Akhundzadas, Sahibzadas, Quraish and so on, the descendants of pious men of repute. Except for the Quraish who claim to belong to the Prophet's tribe, there is no reason to suppose that the ancestors of these others were Arabs. Many of them, if not all, must have been of Persian, Turki or Pathan origin. Any of them who were Arab quickly lost their Arabic as a living tongue, though no doubt they preserved it for intoning the Quran. They took wives from among the families in the indigenous population who embraced the new faith, and became in a very real sense the spokesmen and leaders of the people. They constitute a notable strain in the origins of the population of these parts. Even today their prestige is a living thing, and people will reverently kiss a Sayyid's hand.

Yet, however genuine the claim to Arab forebears, it remains true that Islam, as it reached the countries previously subjected to Iranian influence, passed through a Persian prism. In their effort to assimilate the people of the Frontier to Islamic thought and idea these Sadat had themselves to become adapted to that older Persian culture which their converts had known for a thousand years and more before the coming of Islam.
By the end of the second century of the Islamic era the strength of the Arab thrust towards the east was spent. Spiritually, the appeal of Islam continued to spread and win new converts throughout the Iranian and Turkish worlds, but in the east the Arab as conqueror had shot his bolt. From now on the sword and the Quran were to be entrusted to other hands. The new impetus came from Sijistan. It appeared first in sectarian form under the Kharijites, but in reality it was a rallying of Iranian consciousness, spurred to new life by the message from the Arabian desert but impatient of Arab control and seeking its own forms of expression and action.

Sijistan is far from Gandhara and the Sulaiman Mountains, and its inhabitants, though East Iranian, are not Afghan. But it is necessary to bring events on the Helmand into the account for two reasons. The first is that the new impetus given to the cause of Islam from the centre of Zaranj was the force that carried its banners forward to the eastern limits of the old Sassanian Empire and into the Indus Valley; the second that it was under the Saffarids, a Sijistan dynasty, that we first hear of Khalji mercenaries.

For this period, there is a source of capital importance entitled Tarikh-i-Sistan (History of Sistan), discovered and edited in Tehran about the year 1930. It is a composite chronicle showing three different styles, the earliest by internal evidence written in the time of the Saffarid dynasty in the ninth century (third Hijri century). It bears every evidence of authenticity and, being in Persian, is in much fuller detail than any of the Arab chronicles which deal with events on the eastern confines of the Abbasid Caliphate.

The Arab power in the east was brought down by the Kharijite rebellion, which had its chief rallying-ground in the Sijistan region. The Kharijites were Quranic fundamentalists, opposed to all the more orthodox elements in the Muslim world, Sunni and
Shia alike. Later they adopted many bizarre doctrines, among them that merit was the only true qualification for leadership. Their leader adopted the title of Amir-ul-Muminin (Commander of the Faithful), and incorporated in his formula the slogan *Wa lā bukma illā lʾillāh* — there is no order but of God. They lived in mountain and desert as bandits, appointed ‘anti-Caliphs’, and succeeded at times in defeating Abbasid armies in pitched battles. It was due to their prowess that the Arab governors of Sijistan were unable to control anything outside Zaranj and Bust without taking armies into the field.

In Sijistan they assumed the character of a national and popular movement directed against Arab domination and taxation. The people of the country regarded them with sympathy, provided that they directed their atrocities against Arabs or non-Muslims. The climax was reached in 797 (H. 181) when the Kharijite Hamza not only drove the Caliph’s forces into the garrison cities but declared the abolition of the tribute and land-revenue and put to death the Abbasid revenue agents. This was the end of regular payment of tribute to Baghdad. The *Tarikh* quotes verbatim an obviously authentic exchange of letters between the Caliph Harun-ar-Rashid and Hamza in which the Caliph rebukes the rebel for un-Muslim behaviour and Hamza sends a conciliatory yet dignified reply citing in conclusion the slogan I have given above.

This *Tarikh* also remarks that Hamza founded the town of Gardez, a point confirmed in the tenth century *Hudud-al-Alam* which says: ‘The inhabitants of Gardez are Kharijites.’ Gardez is the chief centre of the Zurmat Valley, only a few miles west of Kurram and Khost and not far from the Durand Line on the Afghan side. Kharijite connections with this part of the Pathan country not only show that Hamza extended his authority far to the east of Sijistan, but may help to explain certain religious deviations from orthodoxy which we shall later have occasion to notice in the Turis and other Karlanri Pathan tribes in that neighbourhood.

By the beginning of the third Islamic century, say about A.D. 850, the governorate of Sijistan, weakened by the Kharijite revolt, had become a mere outpost of the Baghdad Caliphate in which the central government’s authority was very remote. The Rutbil was still ruling the territory east of Bust. He and the Kabul Shah sometimes paid a nominal tribute to Zaranj but they were virtually
independent, and they remained unconverted. As for the mountain areas of the Sulaiman massif the degree of Muslim penetration is revealed in an interesting manner by one of the oldest of all inscriptions of the Muslim era, discovered in 1907 in the Tochi Valley and now in the Peshawar Museum. Its chief interest lies in the date which is quite clear (H. 243, A.D. 857) and in the fact that it is bilingual in Sanskrit and Arabic. The scripts used are the Sarada, an early form of Nagri, for Sanskrit, and the Kufic for Arabic. The inscription records the construction of a building by a person whose name is preserved in the Arabic text but was apparently not an Arab, for the form is unfamiliar and cannot be read. Although the full details cannot be deciphered, the interest lies in the proof afforded that both Sanskrit and Arabic were current in the Tochi in the last years of the Abbasid Caliphate in Sijistan and just before the emergence of Yaqub-i-Lais, the first of the Saffarids.

Yaqub-i-Lais the Saffar (coppersmith or brazier) was born in a Sijistan village and served an apprenticeship in the trade after which he was nicknamed. For a time he took to the roads as a highwayman and later joined the service of Salih ibn al-Nasr who, in recognition of the opposition he showed to the Kharijites, was acknowledged by Baghdad in 852 (H. 238). Six years later Al-Nasr’s brother, who had succeeded him, abdicated in favour of Yaqub who had become commander of the army, and in 861 (H. 247) Yaqub was proclaimed Amir of Sijistan. In the course of the next few years he campaigned successfully against the Kharijites of Kirman, against Herat, and — much more important from our point of view — against Rutbil of Ar-Rukhaj and the Shah of Kabul. The Tarikh informs us that during this campaign Yaqub founded the city of Ghazni, as Hamza had founded Gardez before him. In 870 (H. 257) he captured the city of Kabul, and sent as presents to the Caliph at Baghdad an idol he had taken from the great temple there, together with other trophies from Bamian. In 872 (H. 259) he crossed the Hindu Kush from the south and seized Balkh, returning apparently by Persian Khurasan and putting an end to a dynasty of Tahirids in Nishapur. For the first time the northern and the southern axis of advance had been joined, and not by an Arab. For the first time Kabul was fairly reduced and held by Muslim arms, and the Ghazni area brought under administration and a city built. For the first time too the
Khalaj, to be called in Persian the Khaljis, were successfully brought under subjection and enlisted in Yaqub's armies as mercenaries. One of them, named Subkari, we are told held high military command in Persia, only to contribute subsequently to the downfall of Yaqub's successors by deserting their cause for that of the Caliphate.

Yaqub’s capture of Kabul in 870 must have been the event that caused the Shahiya kings to shift their capital from that city to Waihind, or, as I suggest, Lahor on the Indus. But, most unfortunately for the present purpose, very little is available from the sources to throw light on his eastern campaigns. His success in perambulating the circumference of modern Afghanistan aroused in him ambitions for the supreme command. He became hostile to the Caliph and in 875 (H. 262) he marched on Baghdad with a formidable army. It was this dramatic march that caught the attention of the faithful, and caused his other campaigns to be overlooked and underrated. He reached within a few miles of the capital where he was defeated and forced to retreat, dying near Ahwaz in Khuzistan in 879 (H. 266).

That Yaqub was an Iranian, not an Arab, is clear from a striking passage in the Tarih. On a convivial occasion after one of his victories an Arabic poem was read to him. The Amir protested, asking what was the use of reciting something he could not understand, whereupon his secretary began to recite in Persian. The passage proceeds: 'This was the first time after the Arab conquest that poems were recited in Persian among Persians since the days when the Persians had intoned after the manner of the Sassanians. When the Persians were overthrown by the Arabs, it was the custom always to recite in Arabic.' The author then gives an example of the verse recited, of which the first couplet runs:

The Lord has made Mecca the sanctuary for the Arabs,
Yet thy covenant has established a sanctuary in Iran. . . .

The lines are attributed to a Kharijite who accepted an amnesty offered by Yaqub and joined his army. From another source comes an even more amusing anecdote representing one of the troopers in Yaqub’s army speaking to his horse in Persian, though the narrative in this case is in Arabic.

When Yaqub first rose to prominence, his enemies decried him as a Kharijite, on the ground that he was self-made, had not been
appointed by the Caliph, and was not an Arab. He was at much pains to deny this charge, evidently a sore point with him. It is true that he fought more than one battle against the Kharijites, but he did enlist them in his armies, and his attitude seems to have been equivocal. The fact probably is that he was ready to weld together all unorthodox and local forces prepared to support his autonomy against the orthodox Arabism of Baghdad.

In 879 (H. 266) Yaqub was succeeded by his brother Amr, who in spite of some temporary successes was unable to consolidate the Saffarid conquests in the east, for the Hindushahis seem to have recovered Kabul and certainly held Ningrahar and Logar. Amr did, however, maintain the dynasty’s position in Sijistan and Fars for over twenty years. In the year 900 (H. 287) he undertook an expedition against the Samanids, the other Iranian dynasty which had succeeded to the Abbasid power north of the Hindu Kush in 874 (H. 261). He was defeated and captured near Balkh and sent in chains to Baghdad, where the Caliph put him to death. The Samanids then attempted to occupy the Saffarid possessions, but were resisted with some success by another member of Yaqub’s family, Tahir, who continued to control parts of Fars and Sijistan, and even struck coins in Oman across the Gulin But he was imprisoned by his enemies in 908 (H. 296), and like Amr sent to Baghdad. Other members of the family maintained themselves in parts of Sijistan for a number of years and seem to have commanded the people’s devotion. The region of Ghazni came under a loose and uncertain Samanid control.

The career of Yaqub-i-Lais is notable as that of the first Muslim ruler to make the power of Islam effectively felt on the eastern frontier of what had been the Sassanian Empire. He is also probably the first to have enlisted Afghan tribesmen on a large scale in his army, made up mainly of Khalji and others from the region around Ghazni. Many stories are current of his iron discipline, his rough-and-ready justice which won the affection of uncouth followers from the periphery, and his unfailing alertness in the field. Finally he is the first to be entitled to speak with justifiable pride of the successful propagation of his faith among the peoples on the eastern frontier whose religion then included the portrayal of the divine idea in human form. Details are lacking, but the character of Yaqub himself and the path of his conquests indicate that in his time many converts were won for Islam in the Kabul and
Ghazni area. Indeed in almost every respect Yaqub the Saffarid anticipated the career of Mahmud of Ghazni, whose activities were directed on very similar lines. The main difference is that Yaqub got no further to the east than Kabul, and his conquests, though they disturbed the Hindu rulers of those parts, failed to destroy the principalities themselves. Nevertheless, the Saffarid dynasty played a decisive part in the assimilation of the Afghans and Pathans to the Muslim world, and is for that reason perhaps more deserving of remembrance than the more famous Mahmud who built on foundations already laid.

It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had Yaqub taken Baghdad as he so nearly did, and so secured control of the Caliphate. The Abbasids would have come under tutelage from eastern Iran, Ghaljis and Afghans might have taken the place of Turks as soldiers, and the culture of Baghdad might have developed under some influence from the Pashtu language.

The Shahiya dynasty, from whom Yaqub-i-Lais took Kabul in 870, appears under many names, sometimes merely 'as Kabul Shahs, again as the Turki Shahiya line, again as the Hindushahiya line of Waihind, and in Al-Biruni even as Tibetan (by this he meant Turk or Kushan, which he did not distinguish). It is important to our story if only as the last non-Muslim line of rulers in Gandhara. The fact that these Kings were able to maintain great splendour and dignity in the Peshawar Valley until the opening decade of the eleventh century, four hundred years after the Hijrat, sufficiently disposes of the uncritical tradition that Islam came early to these parts.

Little is known of these Kings until on Yaqub's capture of Kabul the capital of the State was apparently transferred to Waihind in Gandhara beside the Indus, which for reasons given I take to be the site by the present village of Lahor. It is not entirely clear whether the Kabul Shah overcome by Yaqub was of the same line as the founder of the Hindushahis of Waihind, and the change of capital may reflect a change of rulers also. The main documentary evidence to the point is a somewhat confused account given by Al-Biruni, which runs as follows:

The last King of this race was Lagaturman and his Wazir was Kallar, a Brahmin. The latter had been fortunate, insofar as he had found by accident hidden treasures which gave him much influence
and power. In consequence the last king of this Tibetan (sic) house, after it had held royal power for so long a period, let it by degrees slip from his hands. Besides, Lagaturman had bad manners and a worse behaviour, on account of which people complained of him greatly to the Wazir. Now the Wazir put him in chains and imprisoned him for correction, but, himself finding ruling sweet, his riches enabled him to carry out his plans, and so he occupied the royal throne. After him ruled the Brahmin Kings Samand, Kamalu, Bhim, Jaipala, Anandapala, Tarojanapala. The last was killed in H. 412 (1021), and his son Bhimpala five years later.

This Hindushahiya dynasty is now extinct, and of the whole house there is no longer the slightest remnant in existence. We must say that in all their grandeur they never slackened in the ardent desire of doing that which is good and right; that they were men of noble sentiment and noble bearing.

There are a number of interesting points about this passage, of which the first and most notable is that Al-Biruni was a contemporary writer. He was born in 973, visited India after it had been opened up by the campaigns of Mahmud of Ghazni in 1000–1026, and may even have met Jaipal and Anandpal after their defeats at Mahmud's hands. The second point is that the change of dynasty, explained by a very common legend of eastern story as the supplanting of a king by his minister, may possibly mark the new era caused by the shift of the capital from Kabul to Waihind (Lahor). The passage does at least show that there was a degree of continuity in the history of the dynasty and that the forerunners of the first Hindushahi King, Kallar, were outside the Muslim fold. Lastly, although the beginning of Al-Biruni's version bears the mark of folk-lore, as he approaches his own day he inspires more confidence, and he is capable of a fine chivalry in admiring these Kings who fought so gallantly against the conqueror of his own faith. There are other touches in the same key, to be noted later when we come to the time of Mahmud.

There is, however, another source enabling us to date these Shahs with greater accuracy. When Amr-i-Lais, Yaqub's brother, was endeavouring to maintain the Saffarid conquests on the eastern frontier, his deputy at Ghazni or Gardez, named Fardghan, burned a Hindu 'idol-temple' at a place called Sakawand on the divide between the Logar and the Zurmat Valleys close to the Altimur pass. The source states that on receiving news of the fall of Sakawand 'Kamlu, the Rai of Hindustan, collected a large
force and marched towards Zabulistan'. This is evidently Kamalu, the third in order of Al-Biruni’s list of Hindushahiya monarchs, who is now seen to have been contemporary with Amr the Safarid (879–900). It follows from this that the first of these Kings, called by Al-Biruni Kallar, must have been reigning in Kabul before Yaqub-i-Lais captured that city in 870.

The evidence of coins is partly confirmatory of Al-Biruni, and partly at variance. There are many of them, found mostly in the Peshawar Valley and chiefly around the site of Waihind, which we have placed in the neighbourhood of Hund and Lahor close to the Indus. They are mostly small silver pieces bearing upon the obverse an armed horseman, on the reverse a sitting bull. There exist also copper coins with a lion on the obverse and on the reverse an elephant. There is also one gold coin showing two Kings, Bhimadeva on the obverse and Samantadeva on the reverse, interpreted by Mr. Ajit Ghose as issued in Bhima’s reign but commemorating his predecessor who, it is suggested, may have abdicated in his favour. But this interpretation ignores the interposition of Kamalu between Samanta and Bhima, and it is more probable that Samanta was regarded as the tutelary genius of the dynasty.

The names on all these coins appear in Nagri (Hindu) script, and the chronological series is as follows:

1. Spalapati Deva (coins common)
2. Samanta Deva (coins extremely common)
3. Bhima Deva (coins rare)
4. Vakka Deva (copper coins common)
5. Khamarayaka (coins very rare — seems to have been converted to Islam).

Spalapati (spada = army in old Persian) means ‘army commander’, and the use of l for d follows the linguistic change we have noted already in comparing the Pakhtu with the Persian.

Of these five it will be seen on comparison that only the second and the third, namely Samand and Bhim (incidentally being the two on the gold coin mentioned), correspond to Al-Biruni’s list of Hindushahi Kings. It is particularly strange that there are no coins yet found giving the names of Jaipal and Anandpal, authenticated and historical personages who fought battles of known date against Sabuktagin and Mahmud of Ghazni. Conversely, the
silence of the literary sources in respect of the first putative Shahi King after the change of dynasty, Spalapati, is extremely puzzling. It can only be assumed that the Brahmin Kallar, mentioned by Al-Biruni, took the name of Spalapati on accession.

It is interesting that the coins bearing Spalapati’s name in Nagri often bear also a similar inscription in the Kushan cursive script, indicating that the first Hindushahi was in some sense the inheritor of the Kushan-Ephthalite chancery tradition, and had brought in a more Hinduized form with the change of dynasty and possibly — though this is uncertain — with the change of capital. This disagreement between contemporary chronicler and coin constitutes what may be called ‘the Hindushahiya question’, a classic source of controversy which has never been satisfactorily solved. The coins of Samand, the second of the line (mentioned both by chronicle and coinage) are to be found in large numbers, and the explanation may lie in the fact that his successors continued to issue coins in his name without troubling to mint new ones. The gold coin mentioned tends to bear out this hypothesis.

There is the further surprising fact, never explained, that the Abbasid Caliph, Al-Muqtadir, issued coins of the pattern and with the types of these Shahi Kings in Baghdad about the year 908 (H. 295), only superimposing his own name in Arabic. This unparalleled behaviour at least indicates the importance of the Hindushahis and the quality of their coinage in Muslim eyes. It suggests too, by a comparison of dates, that the first of the line must have been on the throne at the time of, or very shortly after, Yaqub’s capture of Kabul in 870 (H. 257).

There is nothing in what has come down to us in coin or document on the Hindu side which can be said to bear in any way upon the tribes over whom this dynasty ruled. We know that even after the loss of Kabul to the Saffarids this dynasty held Ningrahur west of the Khaibar and also Logar where, it seems, they were crowned. They themselves and their officials must have been intimately acquainted with all the routes, and the tribes on them, between Kabul and Peshawar, whether direct by the Khaibar, by the southern Kurram route, or by the northern route by way of Kunar, Bajaur, Talash and Swat. The fact that they ruled in Swat is proved, and incidentally the existence of Jaipal himself is also established (if it were in doubt) by the discovery at Birkot in Swat of an inscription in Sanskrit, written in the Sarada character,
beginning with the words: ‘In the reign of the supreme sovereign superior King of great Kings and supreme lord, Sri Jayapaladeva. . . .’ But in face of all this no hint is given of the condition, or even the identity, of the subjects of the State. It is broadly true to say that from the time of Alexander to that of Babur, no clear picture emerges of the social history or development of the people across whose territory so many invaders passed in the eighteen centuries that intervened. There can be no other populated region from the earliest recorded times a boundary between two ancient forms of culture, in respect of which we have to mark so astonishing a gap in knowledge.

One shaft of light indeed there is. We have seen the probable earliest reference to the existence of Afghans in the 'Abγav (Abgan) of the third-century Sassanian inscription. Afghans are first referred to within India by the Indian astronomer Varaha Mihira in his Brhat-Samhita written in the sixth century. Hiuen-Tsang, the Chinese pilgrim, also mentions a people whom he calls A-po-Kien in the northern part of the Sulaiman Mountains, who can be no other than Afghans. Hiuen-Tsang’s journeyings to southern Asia took place in the years 629-45, and he was in Gandhara in 644, some twenty years before the first Arab raiders reached Al-Ahwar (Lahor). The first Muslim references to Afghans are to be found in the Hudud-al-Alam of 982 (H. 372). This speaks of a village named Saul near Gardez as inhabited by Afghans, and of the region of Ninhar — obviously Ningrahar, the modern Jalalabad district — as a place of which the King makes a show of conversion to Islam, but has over thirty Muslim, Afghan and Hindu wives. The distinction between Muslim and Afghan in this passage is not without significance. Al-Utbi, the historian of the Ghaznawids and writing early in the eleventh century, speaks of Afghans as included in Mahmud’s army, and the next succeeding Ghaznavid, Masud, sent his son into the hills near Ghazni to subdue Afghans.

But far the most convincing references are contained in Al-Biruni’s Tarikh-al-Hind (History of India). As we have seen from his accounts of the Hindushahi Kings, Al-Biruni was an observer with a broad mind and a shrewd pen. ‘In the mountains to the west of India,’ he writes (and he is speaking of the period about A.D. 1000), ‘there live various tribes of the Afghans which extend up to the neighbourhood of the valley of the Sindh (Indus).’ And
in a rather earlier passage he speaks of these tribes as rebellious, savage races occupying the frontiers of India towards the west and extending as far as its furthest limits, which elsewhere he places at Kabul. Furthermore, he designates these tribes as Hindus. He says also that the Indians had previously had kings in Kabul, but the capital in his time was at Waihind. He has a large number of references to Gandhara — the Peshawar Valley — which he calls Qandhar. He refers also to Peshawar which he names Parushawur.¹²

It will be seen that the Afghan tribes are by this time established just where they are today, east of Kabul and in the mountains as far as the Indus. They are not yet converted, and they are impatient of control. The nomenclature Pakhtun or Pashtun does not appear — for that we must wait several more centuries. But almost, we feel, Al-Biruni is another Herodotus; for the first time for nearly 1500 years we are granted a glimpse of the people behind the trappings of the dynastic annals. Unfortunately he gives no names of these rebellious, savage, Afghan tribes; for that we have to wait another five centuries for Babur. But we may surmise they would not have been so very different from what they were in Babur's time, and, as we shall see, in Babur's time most of the tribes occupied the ground they do today. At least from Al-Biruni we know that by the time of the early Ghaznawids the Afghans have appeared upon the stage, in the very regions where they now dwell.

It had taken many centuries for an organized Muslim power to become established in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, and at the end of the tenth century there is still a Hindu King ruling on both sides of the Khaibar Pass.
PART II

THE MUSLIM MIDDLE AGES
A.D. 1000–1707 (H. 391–1119)
CHAPTER IX

MAHMUD AND THE KHALJIS

With the resumption of inroads from the north in the time of Mahmud after five hundred years of relative stability on the Indus frontier, we enter on a period full of complexity and confusion. This era starts with the rise of the Turkish dynasty in Ghazni about 960, and ends with the overthrow of the Afghan Lodi dynasty of Delhi by the Mughal, Babur, in 1526. And since the Sur dynasty of Sher Shah and his successors (1539–55) was really a revival of the power of the Lodis, that also must be brought in to round off the picture.

The period is marked as one of Afghan appearance as a force in world affairs, of Afghan conversion to Islam, and finally of Afghan empire, but empire in Hindustan, not in the homelands. It falls roughly into two main periods, the first running from Sabuktigin’s accession to power in Ghazni (977) to the death of the Ghorid Sultan, Muizzuddin Muhammad, after his establishment of the Muslim power in Delhi (1206), and the second from the fall of the Ghorids under the impact of forces from Central Asia (circa 1215–20) to the arrival of Babur in Kabul in 1504. The first two centuries have a focus in Ghazni, the capital of Ghaznavids and the later Ghorids alike, and situated in the very midst of the Afghan country. The beginning of these years is moreover covered by the contemporary writings of Al-Biruni, already mentioned, and also of Al-Utbi, historiographer at the court of Mahmud in Ghazni. In the last three centuries before the coming of Babur the centre of gravity shifts from the Afghan highlands to Delhi and other Indian centres in which Muslim power was established. This second period was punctuated by the terrible devastations wrought by the Mongol scourge under Chingiz Khan (1218–27) and by the conquests of Timur or Tamerlane (1380–1400). The former did not greatly affect India but completely shattered ordered government in the territories now known as Afghanistan until it was restored later in the fifteenth century by Timur’s successors.
During both periods Afghan and Pathan tribesmen formed the spearhead of the Muslim penetration and conquest of India, first as soldiers of fortune and later as powerful kings, even as sultans and emperors. But, by a strange paradox, during all these centuries most of their own homeland remained unpenetrated and subject to no organized government, whether exercised by the powers around them or by themselves. The country of Roh, as it now came to be called in India, remained a welter of warlike tribes, its only importance that it was the inexhaustible spring from which mercenary armies could be drawn.

I have mentioned Al-Biruni’s reference to the Afghans as the name of the warlike tribes, obviously only beginning to embrace Islam, who at the end of the tenth century inhabited the plains and mountains on the borders of India between the Indus and Kabul. With their location thus defined as more or less that which it still is, with the beginnings in Mahmud’s time of a mass conversion to Islam, and with the advent of contemporary and intelligent Arab chroniclers, we should expect to find that from this date starts the detailed history of the tribes from whose ranks so many of these armies were drawn. The reality is very different. With the exception of what Al-Biruni has to say, and one incidental passage by the fourteenth-century traveller Ibn Batuta, it is broadly true to affirm that the histories of these five centuries are barren of any detailed reference to these ‘savage, rebellious races’ in their homeland. The only tribal names to which an Afghan context can be assigned are those of the Khaljis and Lodis, the names of dynasties which actually ruled in Delhi. This blindness persists all through the Middle Ages; its measure can be taken from the fact that Al-Biruni and Al-Utbi, writing about 1015, make the last substantial reference to Peshawar, until Babur writing 500 years later. Yet Peshawar’s importance as a key point is clear enough from what all three authors have to say.

The conclusion must be that, Al-Biruni excepted, the writers during the intervening period were little more than arm-chair chroniclers of dynastic achievements. We are driven to the surprising conclusion that over this long period much more is known of the achievements of Afghan soldiers of fortune in India than of the developments in their homeland. For one approaching these years with an eye directed on Peshawar and its surrounding mountains, the best that can be done is to notice as
we pass such images of tribal attitudes and inspirations as may be reflected in the mirror of these dynastic annals.

Ghazni was a fief of the Samanid Empire of Bukhara, which had succeeded to the Saffarid conquests in Khurasan on the defeat of Amr-i-Lais before Balkh in the year 900. The Samanids, like the Saffarids, were themselves of Iranian stock, but ruled through Turkish mamluks, originally prisoners-of-war and in due course purchased for their military qualities in the slave-market. The best of these were subsequently manumitted and placed in governorships and army commands in the key posts of their master’s dominions. From the year 950 the Ghazni province had been in charge of mamluks named Alptagin, Balktagin and Pirai successively, with the title of Wali or governor. Ghazni was the frontier province of the Samanids to the south-east, confronted by the powerful Hindushahiya kingdom in the Kabul Valley and by difficult, refractory, tribes in the mountains around it who were only beginning to feel the attractions of Islam. In 977, Pirai proving a bad ruler, Sabuktagin, who had been Alptagin’s slave and had married his daughter, seized the office, and, obtaining the confirmation of the Samanid suzerain in Bukhara, became the founder of the Ghaznawid dynasty. At the time of his accession the Samanid Empire was breaking up — it fell in A.D. 999 — so that this confirmation did little but afford a legal title which cleared the way for his son Mahmud, to make of Ghazni the capital of a dominion of greater power and fame than that of the suzerain from whom his father had taken office.

It was Sabuktagin, and not his son Mahmud, who decided that the main objective must be the expulsion of the Hindus from the Kabul Valley and Peshawar, then still known as Gandhara, or in the Arabic form Qandhar. The Ghaznawid historian Al-Utbi, tells us that ‘he expanded the recruitment of his armies, and there submitted to him the Afghans and the Khalaj: and, when he wished it, he admitted thousands of them to his service — thus they expended their souls and lives in assisting him’. With these armies he twice defeated the Hindushahi King Jaipal in Laghman and Ningrahar, and drove him out of the upper Kabul Valley, capturing immense booty and up to two hundred elephants.

In 997 Sabuktagin was succeeded by his eldest son, Ismail, who proved a faînêant, and after two years gave way to the second son, Mahmud. Mahmud vowed not only to expel the Hindus from
Gandhara, where they were now concentrated, but to carry the war beyond the great River Sindh into Hindustan. He campaigned west to Persia, north to Balkh, east to Peshawar in Gandhara and onward into the heart of the Panjab and Upper Sind, which he ravaged at least twelve times between 999 and 1026. Everywhere his arms were victorious. By the end of his life he ruled over a territory comprising a good slice of modern Persia, and in the east the Panjab and the valleys of what is now the North-West Frontier. To the north his influence extended beyond the Oxus, where he defeated the Turkish Karakhanids who had succeeded to the power of the Samanids in Bukhara. The core of his empire consisted of the present Ghalji country between Kabul and Kandahar (not then founded). The capital at Ghazni was adorned with the most magnificent buildings of the age, and Mahmud attracted to his court many famous scholars and poets, including the Persian Homer, Firdausi. Known, according to the point of view of the reader, as the Image-breaker or the Scourge of India, for us his chief interest lies not so much in the fact that by him Hindu power and influence were finally extinguished west of the Indus as in his success in setting up a standard under which the Afghan tribes could rally, embrace Islam, and embark as mercenaries on conquests far afield. His policies were continued by his son, Masud.

Mahmud was a Turk. But the impression he made on the frontiersmen of Roh can be gauged by the fact that he still figures in folk-lore and story as their first national hero. And this, in spite of the fact that we are told by contemporary and later writers how he made inroads on the tribes in the Sulaiman Mountains, how he left a testament to his son to beware of these dangerous tribes so close to the capital, and how that son despatched a force into the Koh-payah, the Piedmont, of Ghazni ‘in which direction the contumacious Afghans are located, with orders to see to that part of the territory so that no disorder may arise in that difficult quarter.’ In just such words might a present-day Pakistan government admonish an officer deputed to deal with refractory Afridis or Mahsuds.

Mahmud’s posthumous rank as an honorary Pathan is attributable, first, to the impact of conquests achieved largely with levies raised from among the Frontier tribes, whose homes were so close to Ghazni, and secondly to the memory that in his time so many of his tribal followers were stimulated to embrace the new faith.
Many perhaps had already in the armies of the Saffarids discovered that the challenge of Islam, offering glory in this world and repose in the next, was the answer to their inner promptings, but there can be no doubt that it was in Mahmud’s time that a mass conversion began to take place in this quarter. That it had not taken place before is clear from the passages already quoted from the contemporary writer, Al-Biruni; that it became so widespread at this time must be due not only to Mahmud’s astonishing capacity for waging successful warfare but to the proximity of his capital city to the Pathan homeland. As with his father Sabuktagin, we are told by Al-Utbi that Khalaj and Afghans formed part of Mahmud’s army on his expedition to Balkh, and it is a fair deduction that they followed him into India also. With him started that tide of Pathan infiltration into every part of the Indian peninsula reached by Muslim arms.

The decisive battle in which Mahmud defeated the Hindushahi Jaipal was fought on a field unknown but close to Peshawar in the year 1000 (H. 391). A few years later, in 1008 (H. 399) the struggle was renewed under Anandpal, Jaipal’s successor, who summoned to his aid a great array of warriors from all over northern India. ‘Since the Hindus’, writes the Pakhtu chronicler, ‘regarded a war against Muslims as a meritorious act, all the Rajas gathered, and even from as far afield as Ujjain, and from Gwalior, and from Kalinjar, and from Kanauj, and from Dihli, and from Ajmir, all, all, summoned their array, and came on with Anandpal to the field of Peshawar.’

But it was in vain, and once more the Rajput chivalry went down. We are not told, but there can be small doubt that many of the vanquished were dwellers in the Peshawar Valley, the people of Gandhara, and must have numbered in their ranks the unconverted Afghans of that day. The passages quoted from Al-Biruni leave us to conclude so much. We know, too, that at this time thousands, formerly Hindus, embraced Islam. It is probable that many of the conquered joined Mahmud’s armies and went on into India.

Al-Biruni has a fine passage, which serves both as an epitaph to the last of these chivalrous Hindu Kings and as a proof of his own tolerance. ‘I admire’, he writes, ‘the following passage in a letter of Anandapala which he wrote to the prince Mahmud when relations between them were strained to the uttermost — “I have
learned that the Turks have rebelled against you and are spreading in Khurasan. If you wish, I shall come to you with 5,000 horsemen, 10,000 foot-soldiers and 100 elephants, or, if you wish, I shall send you my son with double that number. In acting thus I do not speculate on the impression which this will make on you. I have been conquered by you, and therefore I do not wish that another man should conquer you.”

Mahmud died in 1030. His son, Masud, maintained the Ghaznavid ascendancy in Hind, but fell victim to an assassin. After his death the Ghaznavid power began to decline under pressures from the north and west, and we enter on a period of great confusion. The Seljuks, a branch of the Ghuzz Turks, moved down from beyond the Oxus and had conquered Persia by 1050, establishing themselves first at Merv, then at Isfahan (1063) and eventually at Baghdad itself (1091). Alp Arslan, the greatest Seljuk Sultan (1063–72), advanced from Herat against Ghazni and reduced its ruler to tributary status within the Seljuk kingdom. The last Ghaznavid of any fame was Bahram Shah (1118–59). Having married a Seljuk princess, he was able to enlist the aid of Sultan Sanjar, the last Seljuk of note, and to replace his brother as the tributary. But Bahram’s reign saw the end of Mahmud’s dynasty, and the first sack of Ghazni, as terrible as any of the later devastations of Chingiz Khan.

The weakening of the Ghaznavids under Seljuk pressures led to the rise of the Shansabani princes of Ghor, who under Mahmud had been tributaries of Ghazni. The Ghor chiefs were not Afghans. Some of the old historians, who knew no Pashtu, confused Ghor, the name of the central mountain massif of Eastern Iran, with the Pashtu word for a mountain, ghar, and so wrongly refer to the Ghorids as Afghans. Ghor is the old name of the territory now known as the Hazarajat, since Mongol times inhabited by people called Hazaras, colonists left in that region by Chingiz Khan’s successors; in the twelfth century, the period of which I am now speaking, it was probably inhabited by an eastern Iranian people conveniently known to both Afghans and Turks as Tajiks. But we cannot exclude a possibility that the princes themselves may have had a strain of Turkish blood, even if they were not out-and-out Turks. All the other dynasties carved out of the Samanid Empire, and surrounding Ghor, whether Seljuk, Ghaznavid, or Karakhanid, were Turks; in such a milieu the
Ghor princes would have found it hard to preserve their Iranian blood undiluted. Finally, and this is interesting, these Shansabani chiefs came of the very family to which the genealogists have allotted the mythical Husain, the fortunate lover of Bibi Mato and putative ancestor of the Ghaljis and the Lodis. It should be added that this attribution was made by persons writing in India much later, after the princes of Ghor had entered the roll of sovereigns of Hindustan.

The Ghorids came to power in India by way of Ghazni. Early in Bahram Shah’s reign one Saifuddin Suri, Malik of Ghor, rebelled, and for a time drove the Ghaznavid ruler in flight to India. Bahram Shah, however, was able to stage a successful return; he attacked Ghazni by night and, effecting a surprise, succeeded in capturing the usurper, who with his Wazir, a Sayyid, was paraded through the streets on a lean camel, gibbeted, and his headless trunk hung from a bridge over the Ghazni River: A terrible vengeance was in store.

In the year 1150, Saifuddin’s brother Alauddin, known to history as Jahansoz, the World-Burner, collected all the levies of the Ghor country, defeated Bahram’s army under the walls of Ghazni and, having taken the city by storm, gave it up to plunder and massacre and set fire to it. The scribes seek to convey some message of the dreadful carnage that went on by employing a mystic number; the fire raged for seven nights and seven days and 70,000 persons are said to have perished by the sword or in the flames. The tombs of the Sultans were broken open and their contents burnt, all except that of Mahmud himself. Not content with these barbarities, Alauddin marched on to Bust, the old capital of Ar-Rukhaj and the second city in the Ghaznavid dominion, and there destroyed the great walls, palaces and public buildings, ‘the like of which’, says the scribe, ‘are not to be found, at least in this world. What chronicles perished when Alauddin, the Shansabani Ghori burnt Ghazni and Bust, who shall say?’ And indeed, had Al-Biruni’s travels been supplemented by the records of a great empire with its capital in the very centre of the Afghan country, it is probable that the history of the tribes of Roh would have begun four centuries before the advent of Babur.

A year later Alauddin paid the penalty of arrogance. Overcome with pride, he refused to pay tribute to the Seljuk Sultan Sanjar, was overthrown and made captive in a battle near Herat. This is
followed by a permutation typical of Muslim dynastic history. Two years later, in 1153, Sanjar himself fell before a new wave of invading Ghuzz Turks from the north, this time the Turkmens, so that almost at the same time the might of two great empires, the Ghaznavid and the Seljuk, had passed away. The way was clear for the princes of Ghor.

But before the Ghorid house could establish itself, these Turkmens settled in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, the Kurram Valley and Gardez, and for a short interregnum of ten years or so were able to control the devastated Ghazni capital itself. There is a theory, supported by Raverty, that the group of Karlanri Pathan tribes which occupy upper Bangash, namely the Turis, Mangals, Muqbils and Jajis, as well as the Khugianis of Ningrahar, may be descended from these Turkmens. It is justified mainly by pointing to the similarity of the tribal name Turi and the appellation Turani, being the generic term used by the poet Firdausi and Persian writers over a wide field to distinguish Turkish lands and peoples from the Persian Iran. Perhaps more reasonably, it is argued that for a period Turkmens are known to have occupied the upper Kurram, and that there remain traces of Turkish place names in that and neighbouring regions. Peshbulak, the Five Springs, in Ningrahar is an obvious instance.

To me the theory seems of doubtful validity. The Turis and their neighbours occupy a mid-way position between the other Karlanri Pathans, having Afridis and Orakzais to their north-east, and Khataks, Bangash and Wazirs to their south and south-west. They stand in the centre of all the Karlanris. The Turis live in a broad and fertile valley, but the others are hill-tribes much more like Orakzais or Wazirs in character and appearance. It would be equally reasonable to posit a Turkmen origin for all the Karlanri Pathans. It is more probable that the inclusion of the Turis and Mangals in the Karlanri genealogy is affirmatory of a well-founded belief that they, like the other Karlanris, belong to the large and contiguous group of hill Pathans who have been less disturbed by movements and migrations than any of the other peoples of Roh. But perhaps the best reason for not agreeing with the theory of a Turkish ancestry for the Turis is that, unlike the Ghajis, they have have no appearance of Turkish antecedents.

On the disappearance of Alauddin Jahansoz, and with the Ghaznavid and Seljuk power broken, authority in Ghor devolved upon
Alauddin's two nephews, the brothers Ghiasuddin and Muizzuddin. Both are known also as Muhammad son of Sam, and the long unfamiliar names are further confused by occasional and tiresome references to Muizzuddin as Shahabuddin. In India Muizzuddin is known by the much simpler appellation Muhammad Ghori, and I propose to refer to him by that name.

The two brothers succeeded in taking Ghazni in 1173, the elder conferring it in fief on Muhammad Ghori, while he remained as ruler of Ghor itself with capital at Firoz Koh. It is from Ghazni that the Muslim power in India was established, and Muhammad Ghori was its founder with armies largely, if not wholly, made up of Khalaj and Afghans. In 1178 he crossed the Indus and possessed himself of Uchh near Multan. In 1182 he led an army into lower Sind and took over the territory along the sea-coast, returning thence to Ghazni to prepare for his main effort, a thrust at Delhi, the heart of Hindu power in northern India.

As with Babur in a much later age, Muhammad Ghori's advance to Delhi was preceded by the capture in 1186 of the key city of Lahore. Here he found Khusrau, the last surviving representative of the Ghaznawids and son of Bahram Shah, whom he imprisoned and duly removed. With his Muslim rivals out of the way, the road was clear for the real venture, the conquest of Hindustan.

His first attempt on Delhi in 1190 failed. On the field of Narain close to Karnal, seventy miles north of Delhi, Rai Pithora, better known as Prithwi Raj, gave Khaljis and Afghans their first experience of a Rajput charge delivered in flat and open country. Muhammad Ghori himself was wounded, and was only saved by the prompt intervention of a young Khalji trooper. Mad to retrieve this disaster, he tried again a year later, once more meeting the Chauhan Raja, Prithwi Raj, on the same battleground near Karnal. A bitter struggle followed, both sides displaying a gallantry which has come down in story. Prithwi Raj fell, and with him the pride of Hindu chivalry in India. Save in the hills and deserts of Rajputana there was to be no Hindu ruler in the north until the rise of Ranjit Singh at the opening of the nineteenth century. It is significant that the conquest was achieved mainly with the aid of Khalji and Afghan mercenaries. Apart from the allusions in the sources, the ubiquity of these people right through the Muslim annals of the Delhi crown makes it clear that this was so.
Muhammad Ghori reigned till 1206, when he was assassinated in his tent on the bank of the Indus. After his conquest of Delhi he had endangered his whole position by engaging in a too ambitious venture against the Khwarezm power, which in Seljuk times had become established on the lower Oxus close to where Khiva now stands. In later centuries the Russians were to find that the oasis of Khiva — once Khwarezm — is ringed round on all sides by the desert and the Aral Sea, the passage of which is rendered hard by winter blizzards and intolerable summer heats. Behind this 'hushed Chorasmian waste', and entrenched in a fertile network of canals, had risen to power the hereditary governorate of the Shahs of Khwarezm, a segment of the Seljuk Empire representing an intellectual life of a high order. Its representative in Muhammad Ghori's time was the last effective Sultan, Muhammad Shah. He and his son Jalaluddin were destined before long to go down before the annihilating arms of Chingiz Khan the Mongol, but his power was more than enough for the Ghorids. Muhammad Ghori was driven back with his army shattered, to find rebellion rife in the Panjab and to fall to an assassin's dagger. He left no son. In Delhi his power was inherited by his Turkish mamluk, Qutbuddin Aybek, and in Ghazni by another mamluk, Ayyaldiz. The slave-king successors of Qutbuddin lasted in Delhi until the year 1290, when the power was seized by the Khaljis; in Ghazni in 1215, Ayyaldiz lost the capital and all his trans-Indus possessions to Muhammad Shah of Khwarezm, the same who had repelled Muhammad Ghori's invasion ten years earlier.

These two Turkish mamluks, Qutbuddin and Ayyaldiz, are memorable for reasons other than their short-lived dominion and their slave origin. The great Qutb Minar, that red sandstone tower ten miles south of Delhi, was planned, and its construction started, by the one; the other's name, meaning in Turkish 'the Moon and Star', is an early example of the Ottoman flag, the Star and Crescent, adopted in various forms by almost every Islamic State that exists today.

The country of Roh at this period was about to be engulfed in the cataclysm brought about by the Mongol invasions, and we must turn aside to trace the activities and examine the credentials of the Khalaj, or Khaljis, who become more and more prominent as the record of Muslim conquests in Hindustan is advanced.
Whatever the ancestry of the Ghorid princes themselves, they relied entirely on Turkish slaves and Khalaj mercenaries for their administration and their armies. We find too that the Khalaj, or Khaljis, are frequently coupled with Afghans, and that the latter form of the word is adopted when Persian replaces the older Arabic compilations.

From the start there appears a distinction between the role of the Turkish slaves or mamluks on the one hand, and that of the Khaljis and Afghans on the other. The Turks were purchased slaves of the Sultan, like the Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire chosen by him and his agents, and employed as household troops. They were responsible only to the ruler. The receipt of pay was not an essential part of their service, although a wise ruler saw to it that his personal bodyguard was satisfied and well provided for. Their position also offered substantial perquisites, and there was a fine prospect of promotion to high office. Thus on Muhammad Ghori's death he was succeeded on the Delhi throne by Qutbuddin Aybek, his favourite Turkish slave, and Qutbuddin was followed by a succession of Turkish slave-kings lasting for nearly a century. The great virtue of these mamluks was the fidelity and efficiency for which the Turks were always noted. Their great weakness, as in the case of all mamluk dynasties, came with the demise of the Sultan who had been their master. By tradition they had all been equals under the Sultan; when his controlling hand was removed, their personal loyalty to him availed no longer. Unless one of them was strongly marked as leader, they would fall out among themselves. The new Sultan would have his own favourites, who would remember grudges against the old praetorians. Often they were driven by fear to desperate expedients which endangered not only their own safety, but that of the state.

By contrast the Khaljis, with whom the Afghans are constantly coupled in various contexts, seem to have served strictly as mercenaries. They acknowledged no strong personal tie to any individual Sultan, but served any who could pay them, or afford opportunities for plunder, for so long as money was forthcoming. Though their tribal esprit de corps made them dangerous as slaves, as hirelings it enhanced their dependability. For it was based, as seems clear from the texts, on tribal kinship and loyalty to their own chief or malik. Thus their organization was not disrupted like that of the Turkish mamluks by the death of the ruler; their
power was much broader based and was to endure for much longer than that of their rivals. It appears, too, that, while the Turks constituted a relatively small and trusted elite, the Khaljis and Afghans were substantially more numerous, though from the point of view of the state less closely organized.

From the time of Muhammad Ghori, Khaljis became more and more prominent in Indian history. An example is Muhammad Bakhtiar, who acted as head of the Conscription Department in Ghazni in the time of Muhammad Ghori. The post he filled is in itself sufficient commentary on the importance of Khalji recruitment to the Ghorid armies, and its location at Ghazni, the exact centre of the present Ghalji tribes, is significant in its indications. Bakhtiar, dissatisfied with prospects of promotion, proceeded to Delhi, where he was allotted a jagir in Oudh and employed in forays against the surviving Hindu States of Bihar. The noise of his prowess and his plunder attracted a large body of his Khalji fellow-tribesmen, and he succeeded in achieving the conquest of the whole of Bihar and north Bengal. He captured the capital of one Hindu ruler by entering the city in disguise and almost alone, giving the cue to Sher Shah who three centuries later was to repeat a similar exploit. He ruled his new Kingdom as a sort of Count Palatine in only nominal dependence on the Delhi sultanate, and he saw to it that all the important posts in his province were occupied by Khaljis. He ruled for three years only (1202–5) and was succeeded by two other Khalji chiefs, the last of whom was suppressed in 1226 by Iltutmish (Altamsh), Qutbuddin's successor on the Delhi throne. Thus the first quasi-independent Khalji state had a life of twenty-five years. There is no doubt that the presence in Bihar of a strong Khalji advance-guard acted as a magnet for further Khalji immigration all through the Middle Ages, and it was no accident that in due course Sher Shah was able to draw his main strength in opposing the Mughals from that region. There was, in fact, a Khalji and Afghan pre-history, both in Bihar and in Rohilkand, going back far beyond Mughal times.

To complete the tale of the Khaljis we must anticipate the narrative a little. The other two Khalji kingdoms in Hindustan were the famous Delhi dynasty, of whom Alauddin Khalji (1296–1316) is the best known, and the Khaljis of Malwa (1435–1510) with their glorious capital of Mandu, the ruins of which still stand majestically on a spur overlooking the Narbadda Valley.
The Khalji dynasty at the capital marked the predominance of mercenary over mamluk. The last of the Delhi slave-kings who retained any power worth the name was Balban. He relied on Khalji and Afghan garrisons, and appointed one Jalaluddin Khalji as Inspector of Forces. Balban died in 1287 and was succeeded by his grandson Kaikubad, sickly and incapable. The account proceeds: 'Sultan Kaikubad was lying sick and powerless at his country residence Kilugarhi near Delhi, attended by his doctors. At the same time Jalaluddin, who was Muster-Master-General, had gone to Baharpur, where he held an inspection of the forces. He came of a race different from the Turks, so that he had no confidence in them, nor would the Turks own him as belonging to the number of their friends.' The year was A.D. 1290.

The distinction made here between Khalji and Turk is to be marked, as also is the fact that Jalaluddin the Khalji, like Bakhtiar the Khalji before him, held an office concerned with the recruitment and mustering of the army, establishing beyond doubt the importance of Khaljis in that sphere, and reinforcing the deductions made from the other texts that the Khaljis formed the spearhead of the Muslim armies in India. The account proceeds: 'Friends and opponents now came to terms with Jalaluddin who was escorted from Baharpur by a large body of horse and seated on the throne at Kilugarhi. The majority of the people of Delhi were opposed to him, and through fear of the populace some time elapsed before he ventured into the city, or before the people ventured to Kilugarhi to offer congratulations. They hated the Khalji maliks, and would not look upon them. By the death of Sultan Kaikubad the Turks lost the empire.'

Jalaluddin Khalji took the title Firoz Shah and reigned only six years, when he was murdered at the instigation of his nephew Alauddin Khalji, a merciless despot, but one of the most powerful sovereigns that ever ruled in Hind. Alauddin Khalji probably controlled a greater area of the peninsula than any before him or after him, Hindu, Buddhist or Muslim, Maurya or Mughal, until the uniting of the whole sub-continent under the British. He also laid the foundation of an administrative and revenue system later perfected by Sher Shah and by Akbar. Like Akbar, too, he allowed his vanity to be flattered by a scheme to establish throughout his empire one universal and syncretic religion to be formulated and controlled by himself. But, unlike Akbar, he was fortunate enough
to find among his councillors a man with a name very like his own, Alaulmulk, who was wise and courageous enough to offer reasoned opposition to a project so blasphemous. He was told that the prophetic office does not appertain to Kings, and he had the sense to bow his head and listen.

The Khalji dynasty of Delhi was brought to an end in 1321, when Alauddin’s son and successor, Mubarik Shah, was murdered by his favourite, a converted Hindu named Khusrau Khan.

The Khalji dynasty of Malwa did not arise until 1435, more than a hundred years after the fall of the Delhi Khaljis. Apart from its monuments at Mandu it left no particular mark. The best known of its princes is one Mahmud, a wazir who contrived to poison his master and usurp the Kingdom in its mid-career. Of him the record remarks that his origin was from the Khalji Turks of Turkistan, so reverting to the tradition of the Turkish root-stock in these people.

Who then were these Khaljis?

Reasons, I think conclusive, have been given in an earlier chapter for tracing back the origin of the Khaljis to the White Huns or Ephthalites, known to Muslim chronicles as the Hayatila or Haytal. We know that the Hayatila entered the area of the Sulaiman Mountains many centuries before the Ghuzz invasions of early medieval times, and that they represented a much older Turco-Iranian stock from the north. It seems to me certain that the Khalaj could not have been Ghuzz Turks, whether Seljuks or Turkmens, for these came to Ghazni in and after Ghaznawid times when the Khalaj, who had fought with Mahmud, were already established there. The equation Khalaj with Hayatila is documented, it accounts for their Turkish root-stock, and it explains how they came to be established in the Ghazni area before it had been fully exposed to the influences of Islam.

That the Khalaj are the same as the Khaljis of the dynasties in India there is no doubt. ‘Khalji’ is merely the Persianized form used by the later chroniclers for the Khalaj of Al-Khwarezmi and others. Even Raverty who pours scorn on the identification of the Khalaj with Ghaljis is prepared to go so far. There remain the points whether the Khaljis were Afghans, and whether they can properly be regarded as identical with the great Ghalji tribe of Afghanistan. It is these identifications that Raverty will not have.” According to him, the Ghalzis, as he calls them, were at this time
a small tribe near the Takht-i-Sulaiman. While admitting that their name is commonly pronounced Ghalji, he discounts this as a false etymology perpetrated by ‘those who know nothing of the Khalaj Turks or their antecedents’. Finally, displaying what I take to be the real weakness of a scholar with an encyclopedic knowledge of Arabic and Persian texts, he falls back on the fables of the genealogies, and, failing to sort grain from chaff, affirms as historical truth the descent of the ‘Ghalzis’ from Bibi Mato and Shah Husain of Ghor.

The Cambridge History of India has already refuted this view, remarking that the people of Delhi at that time undoubtedly believed the Khaljis to be akin to Afghans and not to Turks, and also that it is hard to say what became of the Khaljis if we are not to regard the Ghaljis as their modern representatives. But I think the case for identification is still stronger than that.

The present-day Ghalji tribe is the largest of all the Afghan tribes. It could never have been a small sept hidden away in the Sulaiman Mountains. Secondly, all the Ghaljis themselves refer to their tribe by that pronunciation, as do other Pathans. ‘Ghalji’ and ‘Khalji’ are almost the same word. The form Ghilzai is a literary Persian production, probably coined in obedience to the myth of the Ghalzoi, the thief’s son. Next, the sources make it quite clear that the Khaljis were no longer Turks when they entered India, and they are, whatever their root-stock, frequently bracketed with Afghans. Finally, and I think conclusively, there is a clear identification of Khalji with Ghalji in a couplet from the Pathan national poet Khushhal Khan, specifically referring to the accession of this same Jalaluddin Khalji as Sovereign of Delhi. In a poem narrating the order and qualities of the Muslim Sultans of Hind, Khushhal writes:

*Bis Sultán Jalaluddin puh sarir kkhënást,*  
*Chib puh asi/kkhe Ghalji da wiłayat wub.*

Then Sultan Jalaluddin took seat upon the throne,  
Who by race was of the Ghalji country.

Khushhal at least, writing in 1650, and before these controversies blew up, had no doubt that the Khaljis were Ghaljis.

There could hardly be a stronger case for the belief that ‘Khalji’ is nothing but an earlier form of ‘Ghalji’. I conclude that
the Khalji identity with the Ghalji tribes is established, and further that these tribes, who both show in their physical appearance, and set forth in their own tradition, a memory of a Turkish root-stock, are descended from the Khalaj, a branch of the White Huns or Ephthalites, who entered the Afghan highlands in the fifth century of our era. By living for centuries next door to the Pushtanah, they adopted the Pathan habit and language, but with a difference which can be seen to the present day.

The authors of the Delhi chronicles had no knowledge of the Borderlands, and took no interest in the tribal background of the mercenary soldiers who rose to king’s estate. They were concerned mainly with the flattery of a throne or the detraction of a rival or a predecessor. There is no hint anywhere, for instance, of the language spoken by Sultan Jalaluddin Khalji. Was it Khalji Turkish, was it Persian, was it Pashtu? There is no suggestion of antecedents, affinities, or disparities, except that the Khaljis were not Turks and are bracketed with Afghans. The bracket with Afghans does indeed suggest a further possibility. It seems very probable that the usage ‘Khalji’ by the medieval historians is meant to cover all kinds of Afghans, such as Yusufzais, Orakzais, or Bangash, all of which tribes are known to have established colonies in India still preserving a memory of their origin. These tribal names were not known to the chroniclers, who lumped them all together as ‘Khaljis and Afghans’.

There is another reason for this digression into medieval Indian history. As the spearhead of the Muslim conquest of India the Ghaljis and Pathans, unable at that time to forge any coherent state of their own in their own country, in the land of their conquest rose to the very top, to the throne of Delhi and to the command of other powerful principalities. These colonists from the north-west were augmented by fresh arrivals in later centuries. The Lodis (1451–1526) and the Surs (1539–55) were themselves Ghaljis and attracted many frontiersmen to their banners. Even the Mughals, not least Babur, depended on Afghan mercenaries. All this started with the conquests of Mahmud of Ghazni and Muhammad Ghori. The Turks were a small band of chosen favourites; the soldiers, and later the rulers, were Ghaljis or Pathans. It was a veritable Afghan expansion.

The pride of later Pathans in these achievements comes out in the verses of Khushhal Khan:
I hear the story of Bahlol and Sher Shah
That in days gone by Pathans were Kings in Hind;
For six or seven generations theirs was the Kingdom,
And all the world wondered at them!\textsuperscript{11}
CHAPTER X

SHER SHAH SUR

Following after the success of Afghan soldiers of fortune in India, we have arrived at the Khaljis (1290-1321), and almost forgotten Ghazni. That city was seized in 1215 by the Khwarezm Shah, who unseated the Turkish mamluk Ayyaldiz, established there after the death of Muhammad Ghori. The Khwarezm Shah sent his son Jalaluddin to take charge of his new province in the south. But just as the Seljuks had conquered only to disappear two years later, so the Khwarezm Shahs, their remnant, were only to enjoy a few brief years of authority before they too were swept away in the tumult of Chingiz Khan’s world-shattering conquests. Jalaluddin was to hold Ghazni for no more than five years, but he enters the story not only because he passed across the Frontier stage but for having brought down in his train yet another band of Khaljis or Ghaljis. It is due to him, too, that the terrible scourge of Chingiz did not pass effectively beyond the Indus.

Muhammad Shah of Khwarezm had not only defeated the Ghorids and mastered Ghazni; he had also taken Bukhara from a Chinese house known as the Kara Kitai, and by reason of this and other victories had been encouraged to a show of self-esteem. He affected to pose as Caliph, and arrogated to himself the name and titles of the last Seljuk and even of Alexander the Great. Just at this time Chingiz Khan, the great Mongol, who had risen to power in Mongolia in 1205, overran China and took Peking. While doing this, Chingiz left his eldest son, Juchi, in command on his western frontier, and there occurred clashes between Juchi’s troops and the Khwarezm border guards. Muhammad Shah, seeing himself as the champion of Islam and dreaming of the conquest of China itself, held the intervening Mongols in contempt. Embassies passed between Chingiz and Muhammad Shah; finally, with a total disregard of good faith or the consequences, a caravan sent by Chingiz was treacherously slaughtered by the Shah’s order near the frontier town of Otrar.
This brought the Mongol down on Khwarezm in 1219. Leaving Juchi to storm Otrar, he himself took Bukhara and Samarqand, sacked and burned them, and slaughtered the populations. The Shah fled to a Caspian island where he died; his son, Jalaluddin, putting up a gallant fight, retired on his fief of Ghazni, closely pursued by Chingiz Khan in person. He was thrust in retreat through the hills, probably by the Tochi route, and forced back on the Indus, near to Kalabagh. Here, after a last desperate battle, in which he is described as performing prodigies of valour, he swam the Indus to safety in full view of the Mongol who admired the deed. It is probable that the resistance put up by Jalaluddin deterred Chingiz from coming further into India than the Indus Valley, but it did not prevent him from sacking Ghazni yet once again. Jalaluddin himself, after some inconclusive fighting with Iltutmish, the slave-king successor of Qutbuddin at Delhi, passed out of India by the Sind route. These events took place in the years 1221-2.

When Jalaluddin left India, there remained behind a strong body of Khaljis whose chief, Malik Khan, had held land close to Bust and had led his clan to join the Khwarezm army in their capture of Ghazni in 1215. These men saw better hope in joining up with their brethren in the service of the Delhi Kings than in further peregrinations of Central Asia, pursued by Chingiz Khan. They had remained behind in Upper Sind when Jalaluddin left, and made their way to join Iltutmish at Delhi, subsequently helping him to gain possession of Uchh and Multan. Malik Khan, their leader, perished in one of these engagements, but there is reason to believe that the Khalji dynasty of Delhi may have been descended from this particular band of adventurers.

The passage of Chingiz through the Kabul-Ghazni area left behind it utter confusion. Ghazni had now been sacked twice in seventy years, and hardly one stone was left upon another. Since the time of Mahmud there had been at Ghazni a cultural centre to which the peoples of the Borderland could look; now all that was gone, King, court, caravans, and trade had disappeared. In 1222 Chingiz himself had departed to deal with affairs elsewhere in his vast domain, and he died in 1227. On his death-bed he bequeathed these provinces to his second son Chaghatai, but except for raids, one of which penetrated in 1240 as far as Lahore and destroyed it, Chaghatai and his successors — Chaghatai died in 1241 — seem to
have thought the country too poor and difficult, and made little endeavour to occupy or administer it. With the exception of the settlement of large numbers of Mongols as military colonists in the central Ghor massif, no real attempt was made to clamp Mongol power onto these parts of the empire. These Mongol colonists are the people now known as Hazaras, the name being derived from the Persian hazar for one thousand, a translation of Mongol ming, or Turkish bin. They have since mingled with the autochthonous Iranian people and, while there are still groups who speak an archaic Mongolian dialect, most of them now express themselves in a rustic form of Persian. The country of Roh, the Pathan homeland, seems to have escaped Mongol penetration, and there is no reason to believe that this time saw any reduction of the recruits passing to service of the various principalities in India.

The only ordered administration set up in our region — and that far to the west of Roh — was that of the Karts of Herat, Tajiks from Ghor, established as Mongol vassals in the year 1245. The nearest the Karts ever got to the Afghan country was in their capture of Kandahar — here mentioned for the first time — in the year 1281. The circumstances of this city’s foundation are obscure, but it seems to have grown up after the destruction of Bust by Alauddin Jahansoz more than a hundred years earlier; traditions that it was established by tribes migrating from Gandhara will be discussed when we arrive at the Yusufzai period. We hear nothing at this time of the Abdalis or other tribes later prominent in the Kandahar region, very little of Kabul, and less than nothing of Peshawar. The Kart dynasty lasted till 1379 when Herat capitulated to the new scourge from Central Asia, Timur or Tamerlane. It may truly be said that from the time of Chingiz Khan in 1220 to the emergence of Timur in 1369, and indeed until later, the history of the Afghans lies in India and not in their homeland. During all this time the only mention they receive at home is from the pen of the Moroccan traveller, Ibn Batuta, who in 1333 passed through Ghazni, and thence by the Bangash route to cross the Indus on his way to Delhi. He tells how on passage through a narrow defile between Ghazni and the Kurram, possibly in Hariob, he and his party were assailed by a tiresome band of highwaymen whom he designates as Afghans. Ghazni, he notes, ‘the city of the warrior Mahmud, son of Sabuktigin, was once a great city, but is now mostly in ruins.'
Timur, born in 1335, usurped the Chaghatai power in Transoxiana in 1369. He belonged to the Barlas tribe of Turcized Mongols, resident at Kesh south of Samarqand, and it was Samarqand that he made his capital and beautified by the splendid architecture that bears his name. He is the ancestor of Babur and the Mughal dynasty of Hindustan, and he and they, though really Turks, are referred to as Chaghatais and Mughals (Mongols), being the successors in power to that part of Chingiz's empire. As Chingiz's successor Timur proceeded between 1379 and 1383 to capture Herat, Sistan and Kandahar. He then did what even Chingiz had not done before him, attacked the Afghan tribes in their mountains, and in 1398, when he determined on the invasion of India, was able to call on Lodis and Sheranis, now heard of for the first time, to furnish him with contingents. Timur penetrated into India as far as the Ganges at Hardwar, upset the Turkish dynasty of Tughlak which had succeeded to the Khaljis in Delhi, and replaced them with a Viceroy of his own, a Sayyid named Khizr, who with his successors ruled as weak deputies to the Timurid power, until in 1451 the Delhi throne once more fell to an Afghan house, this time the house of Lodi. The Lodis too are Ghaljis.

The government of the Lodi Sultanate of Delhi is of no great interest to the student of Frontier developments in itself. There were three Sultans, Bahlol, Sikandar, and Ibrahim, none of them outstanding personalities as was Sher Shah in the Lodi restoration. The best memorial they left behind them is their massive group of square-cut tombs, three miles south of Delhi. The dynasty endured seventy-five years (1451–1526), at the end of which Ibrahim Lodi was overthrown by Babur at Panipat, losing his life on the field of battle. The power of the Lodi kings did not reach beyond the Indus, and extended uncertainly even to the Doab between the Indus and Jihlam Rivers; west of the Indus authority remained in the hands of Timurid princes. It might be supposed that the advent of another Ghalji house to power in Delhi so late as the fifteenth and early sixteenth century would have shed light on developments on the Pathan Frontier. But no records of the kind appear, and with one exception we search in vain.

The exception is the encouragement given to the Border tribes to take service in Delhi. Large numbers flocked down in response to a firman issued by Bahlol, the first Lodi, stating that, 'Hindu-
stan can best be held by somebody who rules over a nation with tribes. Let every Afghan tribesman bring his relatives leading a life of indigence, let them come and take up estates in Hind, relieving themselves from straitened circumstances, and supporting the State against powerful enemies.'

This firman is given in the history of Sher Shah, written by Abbas Sarwani in Akbar’s time. A list of tribes answering the appeal is given. As we might expect, the Lodos themselves being Ghajjis, most of those who came down were drawn from Ghajji sections, namely Lodi, Lohani, Niazi, Marwat, Bhitanni, but we are also told that there were some Sarbanris and some Karlanris of sections unspecified. A later knowledge of the tribal origins of various Pathan colonies in India suggests that the Sarbanris may have been Mandanr Yusufzais, and the Karlanris Bangash and Orakzais. Among the tribesmen answering the call was one Ibrahim of the Sur sub-section of the Lodi tribe, the grandfather of Sher Shah.

During this period the trans-Indus territory was for most of the time divided between two branches of the house of Timur, the most powerful representative of the first branch being Mirza Abu Said, Babur’s grandfather, who held Samarkand and its dependencies including Kabul and Ghazni, and Mirza Husain Baiqara who held Herat and later Kandahar. Abu Said conferred the government of Kabul and Ghazni on Mirza Ulugh Beg, one of his sons and Babur’s uncle, who held it until his death in 1501. It was this that provided Babur with his ground for advancing on Kabul when he was driven out of Samarkand. Moreover, his claim to the Delhi throne was based on his Timurid ancestry, and he affected to regard the Lodos as usurpers.

Between the fall of the Lodos (1526) and the seizure of power by Sher Shah (1539) there intervene the four short years that remained to Babur after his conquest of Delhi, and the nine uneasy years during which Babur’s son Humayun strove, but failed, to establish the Mughal authority against the power of the Afghan nobles and soldiery left over from Lodi times. It is well to realize that the Afghans in India naturally regarded Babur and Humayun as nothing but interlopers; Afghans had been prominent in India for three hundred years, and for a third of that time had actually ruled as Sultans; the seizure of the throne by Sher Shah was in their eyes a justifiable restoration of a normal and rightful author-
ity, and not an interruption, as with hindsight it may seem to us. It would perhaps be more accurate to treat Babur and Humayun as usurpers, and the Mughal period as really only starting with Akbar. For this reason I propose to anticipate, and, passing over Babur for the moment, to regard the Sur period of Sher Shah and his successors as the last chapter of the first volume of the Muslim story in Hindustan.

But here there is presented a paradox. As we shall see, with the arrival of Babur light breaks on the homelands of the Pathans. On the other hand with the Lodis and the Surs, those ‘Pathan Kings’, the heavy clouds still shroud the northern mountains, which are only lit by an occasional fitful gleam of reflected light. The reason is that Babur, in order to win a way through from Central Asia to Delhi, had first to consolidate his position among the Pathan tribes on their own ground; Sher Shah at his strongest never extended his sway northward of the Margalla Pass, a few miles beyond Rawalpindi. Further south, his kingdom just touched the Indus in the Niazi country close to Kalabagh; elsewhere the Jhilm was really his boundary, with the great Rohtas fort, ten miles north of that river, as his frontier outpost. Nevertheless, Sher Shah, who reigned hardly six years, was the most illustrious Afghan in history, greater even than Ahmad Shah, founder of the Durrani Kingdom two centuries later. So, although he rose to greatness outside the country of his ancestors, or perhaps because he did, we must pause awhile and examine him.

Sher Shah’s original name was Farid. His grandfather Ibrahim was the first of his family to come to India, and, like Kipling’s Mahbub Ali and many Ghajjis before and after him, had laid the foundation of the family fortunes as a dealer in horses between Ghazni and Hindustan. His father Hasan entered the service of Sikandar, the second Lodi sovereign, and was allotted a jagir at Sahsaram in Bihar, on ground familiar to men of his race since the time of the ‘Khalji’ Bakhtiar in the days of Muhammad Ghori three hundred years before. Here Farid grew up. Legend has omitted nothing to glorify his youth; like King David he overcame a lion — or was it a tiger? — in single combat, winning thereby the name Sher Khan. And in due course, in spite of the usual squabbles with his father over favouritism shown to younger half-brothers, he was entrusted with the management of the family estates when Hasan went on active service with the Sultan.
The historian makes much of the young Khan's astonishing energy and success as land-agent on his father's jagir, an experience on which it has been said that the whole land-revenue system of northern India is based. Admirers of Sher Shah attribute to him the principles and practice of land administration on which Akbar's able Hindu Revenue Minister, Todar Mal, later built. That, I think, is an exaggeration. The short years of Sher Shah's reign were too occupied with struggles to control his new domain, and were in any case too brief, to permit of the elaboration of detailed measures such as those described in Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari,* and in any case foundations had been laid long before in the reign of Alauddin Khalji. But there is no doubt that Sher Shah, by a display of energy and grasp, did succeed in putting an edge on the blunt instruments of his time, so establishing an order which won respect and has been long remembered. His methods are sufficiently described in the record of a speech delivered to his tenants at Sahsaram on the occasion of his taking over the estate:

My father having committed to my disposal the administration of your concerns, it is incumbent on me to pay all possible attention to population, the principles of agriculture, the actual cultivation, and the welfare of the tenants, in order that all may enjoy a state of tranquillity and comfort, and that my time may be characterized by the removal of the hand of oppression from the neck of the weak. I will connive at times past, but henceforward I shall grant no pardons.

He then addressed the revenue collectors and the cultivators separately. He told the surveyors and collectors that the welfare of the land depended entirely on the peasantry, and the result of imposing unfair burdens was the desolation of the countryside. He added that he himself would visit each village and call before him collector and tenants, enquiring minutely into the execution of his orders. 'The best collector,' he said, 'is he who, being minute in realizing the revenues, does not allow the expenses to exceed them. Should any one of you have extorted a farthing too much from any person, I shall inflict punishment on the headman of the village.' The cultivator's share of the produce is not mentioned, and the reader gains the impression that Sher Shah's methods, however just and forceful, were in the nature of judgments delivered from the saddle and lacked the patience and skill of the professional administrator.
But he knew how to deal with the refractory; without fear or favour he went straight for the tallest poppies. Against his counsellors’ advice, and without waiting for reinforcements from his father, he attacked the forts of the most prominent defaulters. The narrative proceeds:

The rebels, witnesses his exertions and skill, were seized with panic, and broke out in humiliation and lamentations. But Farid observed that it was customary with Hindus⁶ first to show themselves seditious against their governor, and on proving victorious, to refuse due taxes and obedience; but on the governor’s maintaining his superiority and overcoming them, to submit with pusillanimity and adulations, and to continue paying tribute, though watching the while a new opportunity for the execution of their plans. In accordance with this custom they were crouching before him at present; but since from the beginning he had addressed to them abundant exhortations, though always without success, their submission could be of no avail.

Condign punishment followed, with the result that the lesson was learned, the cultivators, secure in their holdings and protected against exactions, worked with a will, and Hasan, arriving to inspect his estates, found everything flourishing and places that formerly lay waste highly cultivated.

Pathan administrators still delight in references to Sher Shah’s principles and methods. What they chiefly admire is his determination to go to the spot, see things for himself, issue firm orders, and mark that they are obeyed. And, although there is not here enough room for the refinements and accuracy essential to administrative efficiency, and too little appreciation that the secret of success in such matters lies in a carefully regulated delegation of authority, there are those who know what wonders can still be achieved in Asia by the personal touch and superintendence that to Sher Shah was second nature. He had in him the root of the matter; he was always available, and he did not falter.

I once asked Dr. Khan Sahib, my Chief Minister, to tell me who was his hero in the history of the Sub-continent, half expecting that he would designate Akbar, with his tolerance for other creeds. ‘Sher Shah,’ came the reply, ‘and why? Because he was such a true Pathan, he went straight to the point without equivocation, and he always visited the spot in person, when action was required.’ My friend, the Doctor, followed his example.
After Babur had won through to Delhi, Sher Khan, as he then was, had occasion to visit the capital and pay his allegiance to the conqueror. One day he was summoned to a banquet, at which he was served with a plateful of some solid Uzbek dish, not known in his country. Embarrassed as to the manner of eating it, he decided to dispense with ceremony, drew his dagger, hacked the meat to pieces, and began to ladle the gobbets into his mouth with a large spoon. Babur happened to look his way and, astonished at his guest’s uncouth table manners, remarked to his Wazir that many Afghan chiefs and elders had repaired to his service, yet never had he seen such rough and careless initiative, so little observation of etiquette and regard to good breeding. He was put out of humour, and felt a presentiment that such men were dangerous, Sher Khan had better be secured. The Wazir countered by saying that the offender’s military resources were too meagre to make him dangerous; he only behaved as a stranger who did not understand courtly ways. Babur turned away to other things. But Sher Khan had observed his searching look, and the exchange of whispers with his courtiers, and left forthwith, without leave, for Sahsaram. Later he remarked that during his attendance at court he had had occasion to acquire full insight into the manners and habits of the Mughal usurpers; it would be an easy matter, he thought, to expel them from Hindustan.

And this he did some ten years later, employing methods of skilfully directed force not unmixed with guile, the whole informed by a determination that was not to be gainsaid, comparable in many respects with the statecraft of his nation’s adversary in a later century, the Sikh Ranjit Singh. Everywhere he was sedulous to unite Afghan and Pathan malcontents against the new regime, employing every means to attach them to his service. To the nobles left over from the Lodi period he was able to speak as a Lodi himself, and to appeal to that quality of Afghan pride and honour, their nang, which had condemned them to a life of inaction and retirement since the defeat of Ibrahim at Panipat. To potential new recruits he held out the bait of a life of adventure and profit. And the rich he squeezed, unmercifully.

Thus the base of his strategy in his mobilization of manpower was to win and keep Afghan loyalty; in the matter of geography and the sinews of war he was careful to pivot his operations on the rich province of Bihar which he knew so well. To this end he
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employed every artifice to secure possession from its Hindu governor of the strong Bihar fort of Rohtas. This Rohtas of Bihar is not to be confused with the great fortress of that name which Sher Shah later caused to be constructed in the north and by a fancy called by the same name. Remembering no doubt the exploits of Bakhtiar Khalji before him, he captured this Bihar fort by the ruse of seating a number of his doughtiest warriors in palanquins disguised as women; these secured entry, surprised the garrison, killed the Raja and obtained possession of an essential base of operations. In 1539 after much manoeuvring Sher Khan decisively defeated Humayun in two pitched battles, the first at Chausa on the Ganges below Benares, and the second near Kanauj, also on the Ganges, but much higher up the river. Humayun was driven back on Lahore, whence, failing to reach an accommodation with his younger brother Kamran, who held Kabul and Ghazni, he was forced out of India into Persia by the Sind and Kandahar route. He was not to return for sixteen years.

The course and tactics of these Indian battles need not detain us. But the Chausa battle was the scene of one incident typical of the Afghan warrior at his best. Humayun, always brave but shiftless, was having his bath when the alarm was given. ‘He had not finished his ablutions when Sher Khan attacked and his troops were thrown into disorder. He, therefore, after performing his toilette, hastened to rally his bodyguard and plunged into the fray. But he was forced back from the standard and had to lend his thoughts to save his person, overcome with grief that to save his favourite lady, with all the other beauties, had become impossible.’ So he sent his musahib, or aide-de-camp, to conduct the queen from this distressful situation, while he himself, finding the bridge over the Ganges broken by a throng of fugitives, plunged his horse into the river and was only rescued from drowning by a faithful adherent. Meanwhile the Pathans had captured the imperial tent, with all the ladies and families, and brought them before the victor. Sher Khan alighted from his horse and bowed profoundly. After showing the queen and her frightened attendants every deference he directed that they should be permitted to return to the tent, around which he posted a strong guard with strict orders that no single member of the party should be molested or carried off by his victorious troops. The next day they were sent off in charge of one Husain Khan, ‘a discreet, kindly man.
well advanced in years — a nice touch this — and lodged in the Bihar Rohtas, where they were supplied with the necessary competence and eventually released.

It is in the tradition of Afghan tribal warfare not to molest the women or children of the enemy.

After these victories, Sher Khan seized Delhi and assumed title as Sher Shah. The feeble Kamran, firm only in opposition to his brother Humayun, was driven out of the Panjab, for the defence of which he had scorned to make common cause for the Mughal name, and retired west of the Indus. Sher Shah, advancing to the Jihlam, gave orders for the construction of the new fortress of Rohtas, and took occasion to meet his kinsmen from the north. We are told that thousands of the tribesmen of Roh presented themselves to the conqueror at a camp at Khushab on the Jihlam bank just below the Salt Range, the jirgas flocking to his presence from as far afield as Kabul and Kandahar, and even from the banks of the Helmand River. Among them was Shaikh Bayazid Sarwani, the son of Shaikh Katal, one of the most venerated saints of Roh, and the grandfather of the author of the History of Sher Shah. It was usual for Afghan rulers, when greeting a holy man or Sayyid, to advance a few paces to greet him and take his hand, and on the visitor’s taking leave to accompany him for a short distance. But on Bayazid’s arrival, Sher Shah called to him heartily in Pashtu, ‘Come, O Shaikh, let us embrace.’ He knew the strength and appeal of his native tongue, as a bond of loyalty and good cheer.

It was when Sher Shah was at Khushab that he received a visit from three Baluch chiefs of the Hit tribe, Ismail Khan, Fateh Khan, and Ghazi Khan, the founders of the three Deras, or abiding-places, on the Indus right bank, at that time all in exclusive Baluch possession and known collectively as the Derajat. He confirmed them in their holdings. Further north, as we have seen, he was checked by the existence of Kamran’s organized government and by the depredations of Panjabi tribes in the hills north of Rawalpindi, and had not been able to extend his power as far as the Indus. But his confirmation of the holdings of these Baluch chiefs along the Indus to the south shows in which direction he had hoped to extend his power westward, had he lived. His initial efforts were directed against the Niazis, a settled tribe of Ghaljis living on both banks of the Indus in the neighbourhood of Kalabagh, in the area now called Isa Khel and named after one of
the Niazi sections. The subjection of the Niazis should have been easy enough, seeing that this tribe had supplied large numbers of men to swell Sher Shah’s armies, and Haibat Khan, his most trusted general, was a Niazi himself.

Haibat Khan was Sher Shah’s governor of the Panjab, including Multan. Under him Sher Shah nominated his own nephew Mubarik Khan, his brother’s son by a slave-girl, to the charge of the Niazi area. There follows a story very illustrative of Pathan manners and attitudes.

The main sections of the Niazis are the Isa Khel and the Sumbal. It so happened that a Sumbal freeholder named Allahdad had a daughter of unequalled beauty, whose good looks were the theme of general talk. ‘Her lashes’ arrow she had pulled on the bow of her eye-brows, her cheeks were a living flame, and her long tresses as the smoke that rises from the fire.’ Mubarik, the local governor, saw her once only and became enamoured of her. Forgetting the pride of race among the people of Roh, he despatched a confidential messenger to Allahdad to ask his daughter’s hand in marriage. Allahdad presented his duty to the governor, but answered with all respect that the Khan, holding as he did the authority, must have in his harem many noble ladies and beautiful slave-girls. Moreover the Khan, who had been brought up in Hind, possessed a refined taste, while his poor child was of a rustic temperament and had only the qualities of Roh. In short, the inequality between them was so great that a marriage could not be thought of.

Mubarik, frustrated, turned to molest the Sumbal clan, thinking to force Allahdad’s hand. A jirga of three notables then waited upon him. While agreeing that there had been previous instances of alliances between Niazis and Surs, they observed that these had been between equal and equal, the free-born with the free-born, the slave with the slave, falcon with falcon, pigeon with pigeon. One of them had a daughter by a slave-girl, and the Khan could have her. Let him in any case refrain from oppressing the clan; Allahdad was free-born, and would never consent to the alliance proposed, even at cost of his life.

But Mubarik, full of the pride of authority, refused to listen, and thinking to teach the clan a lesson, plundered one of the Sumbal villages and carried off a slave-girl. The jirga of the whole tribe then proceeded in a body to his presence, protesting that the
honour of their women and dependants was to them the same as the honour of his to himself; they requested him, still with respect, to give up the girl. But, getting only a sharp answer, they opened their minds and said, 'You were born in Hind and know not the ways of the Afghans. Hitherto the heron has not dared to play the tyrant over the falcon. Out of respect for your uncle, the Shah, we have shown respect to you, the son of a bondwoman. Leave us alone, oppress us not, and let this woman go.' 'You prate of honour,' replied Mubarik in a fury, 'but I measure honour by the fulness of my house. I will keep this girl, and what is more, will take Allahdad's daughter from him by force.' The maliks answered fiercely that if he valued his life, he would keep his eyes and hands off their women, whereupon Mubarik ordered his men to drive them out with rods. Their anger roused, the tribesmen, though they had by custom left their weapons outside the audience chamber, fell on the governor with their bare hands, and killed him and every one of his attendants.

When this got to Sher Shah's ears, he wrote to Haibat Khan, saying that the tribe of Sur, his own, was few in number. If every other Afghan should slay a Sur, not one of them would be left. The Sumbals were of Haibat Khan's own tribe; let him deal with them and punish them in such a way that others might not get into the bad habit of killing governors.

The Sumbals withdrew into the hills whither Haibat could not follow them, for Sher Shah's writ did not run so far. So, a Niazi himself, he resorted to finesse. Pretending that, if they came in on safe-conduct he would arrange a composition and emphasizing that they could trust him as a fellow-tribesman, he induced nine hundred of them to come in with their families. The men he slaughtered and sent in the women to the presence of Sher Shah. The emperor disapproved most strongly, saying that, as between tribesmen, so base an act had never before been committed. 'At least,' he added, 'Haibat Khan evidently nourishes no thoughts of sovereignty himself, since he has slain so many of his own tribe; if he did, he could never have forgotten his Pashtu so far as to shed the blood of his people unjustly.' On this Sher Shah meditated the removal of Haibat Khan from the Panjab, but shortly after this event, in 1545, he died. He was killed by an accidental explosion of gunpowder at the siege of a fortress at Kalinjar in the Bundelkand hills south-west of Prayag.
Sher Shah was a tremendous man. The Mughals were formidable adversaries, in their veins the fresh blood of Central Asia, not enervated by long residence in a torrid climate; but Sher Shah, their equal in courage, was far greater in the sweep of his genius and the concentration of his abilities, and he drummed them out of India. Except for his unfortunate passage with the Niazis, he never ruled upon the Frontier, but he gave an example for all time of what a Pathan could do both in welding together his own countrymen as mercenaries in a foreign land, and in reducing a continent to order within five short years. Ruthless to the upstart, the rebel and the peculator, he showed mercy to the poor and needy, and he cherished the cultivator. He built roads and caravanserais up and down the country. But, above all, his greatness is to be seen reflected in his buildings. The mighty gates and battlements of his Old Citadel at Delhi give the measure of the man; those formidable bastions make the Red Fort of Shah Jahan, three miles away to the north, look like the puny castellations of a child, neatly put together from a box of bricks. Sher Shah’s mosque within his citadel has a simple, noble grace all its own, more in harmony surely with the true inspirations of Islam than any of those pearly caskets built by the Mughals to the glory of God.

But to reach to the heart, the inner significance, of Sher Shah, it is best to visit his vast frontier fortress at Rohtas. There it stands, sprawling across a low rocky hill a few miles north of Jihlam, its great ramparts growing from the cliff like a Wall of China, looking north across a sandy stream-bed to the low hills of the Salt Range and, beyond them, to the snows of the Pir Panjal. As befits a work of military fortification, these overpowering gates and bastions do not carry the embellishments added to the Royal Citadel at Delhi, but the ashlar is finely jointed, and the proportions fill the eye. The circumference is large enough easily to hold a couple of divisions of troops. It seems impossible that so vast a monument of power could have been raised within Sher Shah’s short reign. Shahamat Ali, who inspected Rohtas on his way to Kabul with Wade in 1839, wrote that it took over ten years to build; if so, it could not have been finished until the middle of the next reign.

But the conception was Sher Shah’s, and in these walls he lives again. The binding quality of the mortar used is such that, a symbol of the founder’s coercive power, it holds together like
fallen rocks the masses that, with time, have toppled from the structure. Even so, remembering Sher Shah, the fragmented pieces of Pathan society which remain look for a leader of his stature to give the cohesion, lacking which they do not attain their due place in the history of nations.

Hear an excellent tale of Sher Shah. One day he was observed to draw grievous sighs and sob repeatedly, whereupon one of the courtiers remarked: 'The affairs of state, the organization of the finances of the kingdom, the army, the subjects of the realm, and the laws and regulations having, in so short a period, been reduced to such order by you as had not been done by any other sovereign, what can be the reason of your grief?' To which Sher Shah gave no answer, but when they pressed him the more, he said: 'You are right; but four wishes rest in my heart, which I could not accomplish, and must take with me to the grave.' On their enquiring what these were, the monarch continued: 'First, I wished to lay waste the territory of Roh, and settle its inhabitants in the plains-lands extending from the Nilab to Lahore, that they might observe any attempt at invasion by the Mughals, nor allow anyone to come from the direction of Kabul to India. Such settlement would serve the additional purpose of bringing the mountaineers within the checks and restraints of a civilized life. Secondly, I desired to desolate Lahore, lest so extensive a city should furnish means to an invader from the north to enter it and equip himself. Next, I have long harboured a wish to establish on the road to Mecca fifty solid edifices, so that pilgrims might go and come at full ease upon their journeys to the Holy Place. Fourth and last, I designed to raise a tomb to Sultan Ibrahim at Panipat, but on condition that opposite it another should be erected to the Chaghatai Sultan Babur, who rendered him a martyr. This act would have won me the applause of friends and foes alike, and my name would have been spoken to the Day of Resurrection. These wishes, so close to my heart, I now take with me to the grave.'

In this surprising passage, Sher Shah is made to reveal something of the inner springs of the policies that brought him success in so short a time. He speaks of course the rough language of that day; his reference to the devastation of Lahore is prompted by the recollection that first Muhammad Ghori, and later Babur, as we shall see, made of that city a point d'appui for the conquest of India.
Sher Shah is really only saying that he who holds the Panjab is in a fair way to the dominance of India. His third and fourth wishes are an expression of his greatness as a builder and engineer, and give some hint of his inspirations. He built not for the day only, but *ad majorem Dei gloriam*. In his first and most striking design for the Frontier tribes he is pursuing the train of thought which made him think of Lahore. He had realized the strength and the weakness of the mountaineers of Roh. From them he had drawn the soldiers in whose company he had marched to the throne of Delhi, but he knew only too well that the disorganized tribal societies in their homelands, rent with faction and the blood-feud, provided no adequate shield for the protection of the kingdom against further invasion. Indeed the mercenaries of one commander would readily turn to another; their allegiance was not to a system, but to a man. In some way, Sher Shah was great enough to see, the *elan* and hardihood of these tribes could be turned to the advantage of the State on whose borders they live. He divined also that the Pathan future lay with the Indus Valley region, and not with the vague and shifting principalities in the direction of Central Asia.

Appropriately, Sher Shah is buried in Bihar, at Sahsaram where he grew up and first attained fame. His tomb stands on a stone terrace in the middle of a large tank, a not unworthy memorial of his greatness. But his real monuments are the Old Citadel at Delhi and the Fortress of Rohtas, looking north beyond the Jihlam.

Sher Shah’s death led to the inevitable struggle for the succession. The man who won through was Sher Shah’s younger son Jalal Khan, who took title as Salim or Islam Shah. The elder son, Adil Khan, was absent from the capital when his father died and so unable to win the support of Haibat Khan and the other nobles, mostly Ni`azis, although these later changed sides, finding Islam Shah too exacting a master. These events are too remote from the Frontier to make it worth while to follow them in detail; it is enough to say that fratricidal strife, reflected in factional struggles among the nobles, led inevitably to the fall of the Sur dynasty when Islam Shah died at Gwalior in 1554. The throne was then contested between three claimants of the house of Sur, and Humayun was able to make good the restoration of Mughal power.
The story of the Sur dynasty illustrates very forcibly the strength and weakness of Pathan character. A leader arises, great enough to gather men around him and make them forget their personal factiousness for one crowded hour of glory. He dies, and with him dies his inspiration. In the absence of the man who commanded trust, tribal jealousies are reasserted, everything that was gained falls away,

And enterprises of great pith and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action.
The first genuine and historical glimpse of the Afghan and Pathan peoples in their own country is given to us in the inimitable Baburnama, the Memoirs of Babur, the first Mughal Emperor (1482–1530). No longer need we rely on the stray references of Arab or Persian geographers and travellers, or on a confined tribal tradition such as that of the Yusufzais. It is true that, before the coming of Babur to Hindustan, there had been more than one Afghan dynasty passing across the Delhi stage; the Khaljis and the Lodis had spread the terror of Afghan arms, and had left those splendid monuments of their glory which are to be seen in tomb and battlement strewn around the Indian capital today. The chroniclers of Hindustan recorded their pomp, their battles and their massacres, and there is little but intrigue and slaughter in it all. But although these kings and their nobles had encouraged the recruitment of a constant stream of soldiers of fortune from the mountains of the north, the scribes who wrote of them knew little and thought less of the Afghan and Pathan homelands. In all those scribings there is scarcely a mention of individual tribes; the names Khalji and Lodi are all that have come down to us.

When we come to Babur everything changes. Babur was among the most illustrious princes ever to sit upon a throne in Asia. In his character as the founder of a powerful and enduring empire it is not surprising to find a union of the qualities of statesman and general. But he was more than that. A lively good sense, and an enquiring mind, make him the perfect example of the practical extravert of his age, and there was no region of art or nature, as revealed to the man of action of that day, that escaped the activity of his research. His well-known slavery to the excesses of carousal appears as an ebullition of natural gaiety, and is easy to forgive: openly confessed, and even at times repented, his sins make him more human and more lovable. From his earliest years he had cultivated the art of poetry in his own Turki and in
Persian, and had attained a high repute among the poets of his country. But for us his fame rests on his autobiography, composed in the Chaghatai form of Turki and bearing every mark of an ingenious and intelligent mind.

The Baburnama has been twice translated into English, by Erskine and Leyden in 1829, and by Mrs. Beveridge, the mother of Lord Beveridge, in 1922. Both translations are excellent, and that by Mrs. Beveridge must be pronounced more scholarly, since she was better acquainted with Chaghatai than the earlier translators, who worked originally on a Persian text prepared in Akbar's time. But Leyden and Erskine's earlier work is, I think, more lively and in the most recent edition — two small volumes edited by King in 1921 — is much easier to handle. Most of the work was done by Erskine, inspired and encouraged by Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was responsible for bringing to European notice for the first time a copy of the work in the original Chaghatai, given him on the occasion of his visit to Shah Shuja's court at Peshawar in 1809.

The accuracy and clearness of Babur's geographical descriptions are so arresting that even today no better general introduction can be sought to unravel the tangled territories lying between the plains of the Oxus and the Indus. This precision in terms of space is carried through into his chronology; the clarity of his narrative of events is the measure of his importance as an historian. And, as a leader who had learned in the hard school of defeat and victory, he was pre-eminently a man dependent on the kindness and understanding of other men. He can laugh and he can weep, he can sin and repent, and good humour and charity well up in him. He notices everything, the flowers, the trees, the birds, the harsh hills and smiling valleys, the bright skies, the rain and snow and tempests, the names of men and tribes, his friends and enemies, what they did and how they behaved beneath the all-powerful shadow of the one God in whom he trusted. Suddenly the curtain rises; the footlights go up on an Afghan scene that up to that moment has been shrouded in darkness.

Of course, Babur was not a Pathan; he was a Turk. On his father's side he was descended from Timur Lang (Tamerlane) in the fifth generation; his mother was in the thirteenth generation from Chingiz Khan through the great Mongol's second son, Chaghatai. He thus combined the Barlas and the Chaghatai ances-
try, both acknowledging distant Mongol antecedents, but thoroughly Turcized by the time of Babur’s birth. Moreover, the process of assimilation to Turkdom in the regions of southern Turkistan where Babur lived the first part of his life, included an inoculation with Persian thought and manners, and no doubt with Persian blood also. All these strains, Mongol, Turk and Persian, were present in Babur’s make-up; in this respect he and some of his men may not have been unlike those Ephthalites who had preceded them on similar ventures to the same lands more than a thousand years before. But, although Babur could battle just as fiercely as any of his precursors, unlike them he cultivated a chivalry which goes far to redeem the barbarities that always accompany conquest.

Kabul was Babur’s stepping-stone on his way to the conquest of the Indus and Ganges Valleys. He was not the first to conquer it for his family. It had been part of the vast dominion left by his ancestor Timur on his death in 1404, and had descended to his uncle Ulugh Beg. This Ulugh Beg is the ruler whom, as we shall see, the Yusufzais accuse of having murdered their Malik at a banquet, and is not to be confused with the more famous prince of that name, grandson of Timur, ruler of Samarkand and astronomer. That Ulugh Beg was first cousin to the grandfather of this Ulugh Beg, Babur’s uncle. Babur’s uncle died in 1501, and a ministerial intervention against his son opened the way for Babur, who crossed the Hindu Kush and obtained the surrender of Kabul without a battle in 1504, only three years later. Babur always loved Kabul, and gives ecstatic descriptions of the scene and the peace of heart he knew there. In climate he thought it had no peer, and he speaks with delight of its many gardens threaded by perennial streams, on their banks chenars1 yielding a grateful shade. It was in such a spot that he arranged for his body to be laid, and his tomb is to be seen there today, an evening’s stroll from the city, upon a gentle eminence sloping down till it merges imperceptibly in the green and spreading landscape, laced with poplar-lined avenues which lead the eye to the traceries of the distant Paghman snows. Nothing grandiose — a modest marble shrine set in a delicious spot, shadowed by chenars and the arghwan3 trees Babur describes with such contentment: ‘At the time when the arghwan blossom begins to blow, I do not know that any place in the world is to be compared with it.’
On his way from Kabul to the conquest of Hindustan Babur had to fight two Afghan wars, each a war against a type of polity on a level differing from the other. His second and final struggle ended in the defeat of the Lodi dynasty and the seizure of the throne of Delhi, the centre of an Afghan empire since 1451, when Sultan Bahlol Lodi established his rule on the ruins of the Sayyid dynasty that preceded him. This empire, as Babur tells us, extended from the Jihlam River to Bihar, but its writ did not run effectively west of the Indus, and it had no control over the Afghan or Pathan homelands from which its rulers had originally come. It was a pompous and formidable adversary, ruled at the time of Babur’s arrival in Kabul by Sultan Sikandar, son of the founder and second of the line. Babur says the Lodi King could put half a million men in the field.

His first and less tangible Afghan adversaries were the tribesmen on their own home ground. These stood on the lines of communication which any prospective conqueror of Hindustan, who starts from Central Asia, must secure and maintain through the hill country intervening between Kabul and the Jihlam River. Many years were to elapse before Babur could do this, and, reading between the lines of his story, we can see very clearly that he was in a continual state of anxiety and annoyance over difficulties which in fact he was never able entirely to resolve. Later emperors of his line were no more successful in achieving enduring solutions.

Babur’s final and decisive expedition, resulting in the conquest of Hindustan, took place in 1525–6. Before that, there had been five others in this direction, undertaken with the object of establishing, so far as might be, his authority over the intervening tribes. In addition to those five there were expeditions against the Ghaljis around Ghazni, and almost annual invasions of Kandahar territory to secure possession of that city, a possession not decisively achieved until 1522. His descriptions of the champaign are so precise that we are able to trace his line of progress with an accuracy far greater than is possible when examining the movements of Alexander or any other invader of the north-west. And it is here, when he reads Babur’s detailed accounts of his operations on the Frontier, that for the first time a Pathan can begin to feel that the darkness has broken and the light is flooding in. Here, at last, appear the familiar names of tribes we know.
First and most prominent are the Yusufzais, partly for the reason that in their country the conqueror spent more time, but more, I think, because he married a Yusufzai girl. After the Yusufzais ring out the well-known names — Afridis, Orakzais, Bangash, Turis, Dilazaks, Mohmands, Gigianis, Muhammadzais, Lohanis, Niazis, Isa Khel, even Ghalijs (by that name) and Wazirs — all take their due place in the picture. Parshawar, Bajaur, Sawad, Kohat, Angu, the Gorkhatri, the Khaibar with Ali Masjid and Jam, the rushes near Swabi holding rhinoceros where tobacco grows today, Katlang beneath the spurs of Pajja, and the little Mukam stream flowing out of Sudhum — all suddenly come to life. Even more interesting, while some of these tribes were then on different ground from that occupied today, the narrative shows that the majority have not moved since Babur’s time. The Afridis were even then in the Khaibar, the Yusufzais in Swat and the Sarnah, the Muhammadzais in Hashtnagar, the Bangash round Hangu, the Lohanis in the Daman, the Ghalijs round Ghazni — where they are today. The only major Pathan tribes later to attain fame, and not mentioned by Babur, are the Khataks and the Khalils. In face of this recital, so modern, so circumstantial, we begin to wonder how true can be the stories of migration enshrined in such productions as the Yusufzai histories of the Afghan settlement of the Peshawar Valley and Swat, reputedly overlapping in date with Babur’s incursions.

The negative evidence from Babur’s omissions is as interesting as the positive detail that he gives. For instance, although he specifies so many Pathan tribal names, nowhere does he mention Pathans, Pakhtuns or Pashtuns. The nearest he comes to it is in speaking of Karlanri tribesmen cultivating around Bannu. Always when he does not specify the tribal name, and sometimes when he does, he writes Afghans. Even the language, given in a list of eleven spoken in Kabul, is called by him Afghani. This again is probably due to the fact that for reasons stated the tribe best known to him was the Yusufzais. This tribe, as we know, always claims the appellation Afghan, never Pathan. The second omission — the most significant of all, given the great number of tribal designations which do appear in the Baburnama — is the absence of any reference to the Abdalis. The only tribe Babur mentions as inhabiting territory roughly between Kandahar and Herat (where the Abdalis were when first they appear in history)
are the Nukdaris. These, mentioned in the same breath as the Hazaras, were not Afghans at all. Babur does mention his conquest of Zamindawar, a central Abdali possession, but says nothing to identify its inhabitants. The omission, to say the least, is strange.

It is worth while to examine in some detail the tribal actors passing across Babur’s stage. In a general way we may conclude that the very need for all these penetrations into the tribal territory between Kabul and the Indus proves that the tribes then enjoyed an independence sufficient seriously to embarrass any who sought a way-leave to Hindustan from the north-west. Indeed, for better measure, Babur admits that all the tribal area which he specifies as ‘Bajaur, Sawad, Parshawar and Ashnaghar’, although it had once been part of the dominion of Kabul, ‘had now been entirely occupied by Afghan tribes and was no longer the seat of any government.’ The general picture is confirmed by his recital of the course he took through the territories, the time consumed in subduing the tribes to the conqueror’s will, and the writer’s own comments on the characteristics of his more impudent adversaries.

Babur’s first expedition was undertaken in the opening of 1503, very shortly after he had occupied Kabul. It was with the definite design of ‘making an irruption into Hindustan’. After forcing the Khaibar, Babur arrived at Peshawar (called in this context Bagram) where, after a visit to the stupendous banyan tree then standing—a typical touch—he decided in consultation with his officers to give up his original idea of crossing the Sind (the Indus) and to proceed to Kohat instead. He had heard Kohat was a wealthy place and likely to yield plunder, his information coming apparently from the Gigianis who then, as now, lived close to Peshawar. After falling upon and plundering Kohat ‘about luncheon-time’, and a few days’ rest, it was decided to turn again westward and ravage the lands of the Afghan tribes in Bangash and Bannu, returning by way of Birmal, called by Babur Farmul. There follows a vivid description of an action against the Bangash near Hangu, in a glen so closely described that it is still possible to recognize the gorge, between the villages of Ustarzai and Raisan. Babur here describes the old Pathan custom, observed by him for the first time, whereby tribesmen made captive and suing for mercy appeared with grass in their teeth, exclaiming ‘I am your ox’. After this action the army marched by Thal to Bannu, which he correctly describes as fertile, level countryside, with hills to the
north and the ‘Bangash’ (Kurram) River running through it. Among the names he gives to the tribes cultivating between Bannu and the Indus he mentions the Karlanris, corrupted to Karranis, and also the Lodi tribes, Niazi and Isakhel. The Karlanri tribes now inhabiting the neighbourhood of Bannu are the Khataks and that branch of their cousins the Shitaks known popularly as Ban-nuchis. The Niazi and Isakhel are still where they were then, and the ‘Karranis’ of Babur must have been Khatak or Shitak, or both.

At this point the army decided once more to alter the planned itinerary, and the onward march was made by the Largi Valley to the Dasht (by which he means the Daman or Derajat), and thence, following the skirt of the Takht-i-Sulaiman, back to Ghazni by way of Duki — now a subdivision of the Loralai District of Baluchistan — and the Ab-i-Istadah lake. Part of the army followed the right bank of the Indus as far as Sakhi Sarwar, where Babur accurately describes the shrine, still a place of pilgrimage today. But they did not cross. One gallant man only, Babur’s cup-bearer, swam his horse across in face of an enemy who were insultingly waving swords on the bank, thinking they were safe. When the horse got footing, this man, Bayazid, ‘stopped as long as it takes milk to boil, and having made up his mind and seeing nobody following to support him, and having no hopes of assistance, rushed with great speed on the enemy upon the bank. These discharged arrows at him, but durst not stand their ground and fled. Alone,’ says Babur, ‘on an unarmed horse, devoid of all support, to swim across such a river as the Sind, to put the enemy to flight and occupy their ground, was a stout and manly feat.’ On this occasion only Bayazid of all the army made the crossing of the river.

Babur has much to say of the Bangash country, and in that context mentions the Turis, one of the most important tribes who still occupy a part of this territory. He includes in Bangash all the lands bounded on the north by the Sufed Koh (which he specifies) down as far as Bannu, so covering the country now occupied by the Khataks of Teri. That he never mastered this area is clear from his comment: ‘The tribes of Bangash lie out of the way, and do not willingly pay taxes. Being occupied by many affairs of superior importance, such as the conquest of Kandahar, Balkh, Badakhshan and Hindustan, I never found leisure to apply myself to the settlement of Bangash. But if Almighty God prosper my wishes, my
first moments of leisure shall be devoted to the settlement of that
district, and of its plundering neighbours.' And of another tribe
which, four centuries later, has not changed character, Babur
writes: 'The Wazir Afghans had been very irregular in paying
their taxes... they now brought in three hundred sheep as
tribute.'

Babur's hopes were not fulfilled. It was left to other hands to
bring Bangash and Turis into line, and the Wazirs do not pay
taxes even in 1557.

Babur was not able to resume his ambitions towards Hindustan
until 1519. In 1507 he was occupied in a foray against the Ghaljis,
then as now occupying the upland plain of Kattawaz. He gives a
wonderfully true description of a Ghalji caravan on the move—
'a blackness, either owing to the Ghaljis being in motion, or to
smoke.' We are reminded of the Ghalji maiden's love-song:

Beloved, look well, look well upon my face today,
Tomorrow 'twill be hidden in the caravan's whirling dust.

So true and vivid is Babur. But he tells us nothing of the many
and varied clans of the Ghaljis, and he seems quite unaware that
the Lodi Emperor, whom he unseated, was himself of Ghalji de-
cent. He speaks too of a Lohani, 'the most eminent of the Afghan
merchants,' whose head was cut off and brought to him some-
where near Tank (where the Lohanis still live), without realizing
that the Lohanis too are of Ghalji blood.

Between 1508 and 1519 there is a gap in the Memoirs. Little is
known of Babur's activities in these years, except for his ill-starred
alliance with Shah Ismail, the first Safawi King of Persia. He was
also occupied in annual invasions of the Kandahar territory, and
it is clear that he thought it well to secure his base on the Kabul-
Kandahar line before attempting further incursions towards India.
When the Memoirs reopen in January 1519, we find Babur already
in Bajaur, engaged in the siege of what he calls the fort of that
country. Owing to this gap we do not have Babur's own account
of his reasons for entering Bajaur, but the Yusufzai tradition is
that he had been negotiating with Malik Ahmad, the chief Yusuf-
zai Malik, and was outraged by that Malik's refusal to attend his
court in Kabul a second time. The Yusufzais at that time occupied
Swat and much of the plain (Samah) south of Malakand, as they
do now. Ahmad sent in his place Malik Shah Mansur, his cousin
and the son of Malik Sulaiman, the Yusufzai Malik killed according to Yusufzai tradition by Babur’s uncle, Ulugh Beg. Babur therefore determined to invade Swat and chastise the Yusufzais. He chose to proceed by the Bajaur route; wishing also to punish its non-Afghan Gibari ruler who had been insolent to Ulugh Beg.

This story, dressed up in traditional garb, is only a way of conveying what was clearly Babur’s intention, to reduce the powerful Yusufzai tribes living in Swat and to the north of the Peshawar Valley before he could safely give rein to his real and ultimate ambition, the invasion of Hindustan. That this was so is clear enough from Babur’s programme and his own comment. For after subduing Bajaur, and reaching an accommodation with the Yusufzais, he went on to cross the Indus for the first time and to conquer the Salt Range country down as far as Bhira on the Jhelum River. ‘When we left Bajaur,’ he writes, ‘we did it with the intention of attacking Bhira before we returned to Kabul. We were always full of the idea of invading Hindustan.’

In due course Babur stormed the castle of Malik Haidar Ali, the Gibari ruler in Bajaur, and moved on through Jandul to cross the Panjkora near the point where it unites with the Bajaur River (probably not far from Timalgarha, where the bridge now stands). He must then have entered Talash (now in Dir) with the idea of crossing the Katgala pass near the villages of Uch in the tracks of Alexander, and so moving on into Swat. But it is quite clear from his own account that he did not pursue this venture; instead, turning south, his army re-entered the Peshawar District through Ambahar, and, passing somewhere close to Takht-i-Bahi, reached Katlang and then the Mukam stream near Shahbazgarha. From the narrative it is likely that the change of plan was due to negotiations between Babur and Malik Shah Mansur Yusufzai, negotiations which ended in Babur taking the Malik’s daughter in marriage. The girl’s name was Bibi Mubarikah.

By his own account Babur’s union with this Yusufzai lady was a marriage of convenience: ‘Shah Mansur,’ he writes, ‘the son of Malik Sulaiman Shah, had come from the Yusufzai Afghans with professions of submission and of attachment to my interests. In order to conciliate the Yusufzais I asked his daughter in marriage.’ This is given some colour by the fact that Mubarikah had no children (Babur’s son Humayun was born of another wife), and
lived on without any particular honour until the reign of Akbar. It is true also that nowhere in his Memoirs does Babur reveal much more than respect for the women who shared his life. Of his first wife, Aisha Sultan, whom he married when he was seventeen, he says that his modesty kept him from her, and he gives an amusing description of his mother's tantrums whenever he failed to visit his zanana as often as that lady thought fitting. Of another wife, Masumah, he admits that she was in love with him, but says nothing of his own feelings.

But Babur was not a man whose actions were prompted only by convenience, and the frequency of his references to Mubarikah's father suggests that his mind was on the girl, and tells rather a different story. Even among Afghans the Yusufzais are notoriously unwilling to permit any of their daughters to marry outside the tribe. A man may have a hundred good friends among them, yet for years he will never see, much less speak with, a single daughter or sister of his friends. Partly for this reason — to raise the bidding, as it were — there is a romantic tale current in the Yusufzai hujras of how the prince met Mubarikah by a spring on the summit of the Morah Pass, dressed in disguise as a qalandar or holy man. The story is one of love at first sight against a pretty background of hills and flowers, trees and flowing water, followed by a reconciliation between the prince and the tribal chiefs effected by the pleadings of the maiden. However this may be, it must have been largely through Mubarikah that Babur learned so much of Afghan attitudes, and it was probably her influence as a Yusufzai lady that led him to speak of all these tribes as Afghans, and of their language as Afghani. His very wide knowledge of so many of the names and stamping-grounds of so many of the Frontier tribes must have owed something to this consort.

It should be mentioned here that Babur, like the men of Hellas, at least in his earlier years, suffered his greatest agonies of heart over a boy. His Alexis was a youth called Baburi, and the lover remarks with a wry sentiment on the similarity of name. In this he was like so many of the men of Central Asia, who, despite more than one warning in the Quran on the theme of Lot and the city of Sodom, have felt the stirrings of a passion by no means in their case wholly sensual, and partaking of an element of delicate companionship sometimes absent from the relations of man with woman in societies where woman is secluded. Babur's revelation
has nothing gross or degrading about it; like his other sins, this passion stirs him to a tumult of body and spirit, well expressed in his own words: 'I used to stroll bareheaded and bare-foot, through lane and street, garden and orchard, neglecting the attentions due to friend and stranger. Sometimes like a man distraught I roamed alone over mountain and desert; sometimes I wandered from street to street in the city, in search of a mansion or a garden where I might abide. I could neither sit nor go, I could neither stand nor walk.'

The story is a reflection of an experience common among Afghans and Pathans also, at any rate in early manhood. Like the love of David and Jonathan it does not always degrade. Despite the fulminations of the Shaikhs and censors, few of them guiltless in their own lives, such affections have even been known to find a sublimation.

Bibi Mubarikah, loved or unloved, was left in the Bajaur fort, while the prince went on to cross the passes into the Peshawar Valley, apparently by Ambahar, to plunder the Samah. He speaks here of the plains Yusufzais — the Mandar — and the Muhammadzais of 'Ashnaghar'. He then went by way of Katlang to the valley of the Mukam, which is the little stream running from Sudhum past Shahbazgarha where Asoka's rock-hewn edict stands, down to join the Kalpanri below Mardan and flow into the Landai River by Nowshera. Babur goes on: 'At the abrupt termination of the hill of Mukam there is a small hillock overlooking all the Samah, the plains country. The spot is extremely beautiful, commanding a prospect as far as the eye can reach. Upon the hill stood the tomb of Shahbaz Qalandar. I visited it, and it struck me as improper that so charming and delightful a spot should be occupied by the tomb of an unbeliever. I therefore gave orders that it should be pulled down. As the situation was fine, both for climate and beauty — it was in February — I took a mājaun and continued there for some time.'

'The hill of Mukam' must be one of the two spurs above Shahbazgarha, probably the one to the north just above the stream. On the other stands Asoka's inscription. Who Shahbaz was I have no idea, but Babur's identification of him with unbelievers suggests some faint memory of Asoka and Buddhist times. Moreover, the gentle pass between the two spurs, over which the main road to Swabi now passes, is still known as Kafirdarra, the pass of the
pagans, and a neighbouring hamlet is called Budserai, or the halting place of Buddha.

From this picnic Babur went on to the neighbourhood of Swabi — the name in the record is misspelled Swati — to hunt the rhinoceros. The scene of this exploit may have been the Razzar reed-beds, now largely cleared, lying south of Yar Husain, or brushwood areas under the low hills of Topi towards the River Indus. From there he went on to cross the Indus by the old and well-known ford close to the village of Hund, the only place it can be forded, and that only at low flood in wintertime. Horses and camels used the ford, infantry and impedimenta were floated across on rafts.

Babur was beyond the Indus for just over a month, and on this occasion did not pass beyond the Jihlam. He recrossed the Indus on boats at a point much lower down, below the junction of that river with the Kabul River, and some miles below Attock. Attock Fort was not then built. It was now the end of March, and Babur grows ecstatic over the beauties of the flower-gardens on the road to Peshawar: 'I took my seat on rising ground near the camp to enjoy a view of all the flower-plots ... on one side were yellow flowers; on another purple, laid out in sextuple beds. As far as the eye could reach were flower-gardens of a similar kind. In the neighbourhood of Peshawar in spring-tide, the flowers are exquisitely lovely.'

That beauty remains to this day, and has been made more beautiful by the licence once more given to the cultivation of the opium-poppy. It is as if great fields of multi-coloured tulips bestrewed the land.

A few days later Babur returned to Kabul and the second expedition was over. He signalized his arrival by presentation of robes of honour on Shah Mansur, and other Yusufzai notables who had accompanied him. It is clear that the importance of the Yusufzais had not slipped his memory. And Mubarikah's father surely deserved a khillat.

Later the same year, in the autumn of 1519, Babur made a third expedition through the Khaibar and into the Peshawar Valley. It appears that the Swat Yusufzais had not lived up to their engagements in spite of Bibi Mubarikah, and the King gives as the chief objective of his advance the need to check them. But he never got so far. Indeed, as says Elphinstone, it is clear enough
that Babur never made a real impression on this tribe; they always found a secure retreat among their hills. He was advised by the Dilazaks to plunder the clans in easier Hashtnagar, and to use the plunder for storing forts on lines of communication, both in 'Parshawar' and 'Ashnaghar'. The Hashtnagar foray proved disappointing — there were then no Swat canals — and on the way a fresh resolution was formed to plunder the Afridis — the first and almost the last time anybody seems to have turned the tables on these famous plunderers. A march was made to Ali Masjid with this object, but this new plan also failed, for, as in the case of the Bangash, bad news arrived from Badakhshan, and Babur had to return to Kabul. It was on the way that he dealt with the Khizr Khel, apparently a branch of the Shinwaris, 'who had been extremely licentious in their conduct,' and compelled the Wazir tribes to pay in some sheep in tribute. This expedition was no doubt effective in spreading the fear of Babur's name among the Afridis, Shinwaris and Peshawar tribes on the direct route towards Hindustan through the Khaibar Pass.

The fourth expedition took place in 1520, a year later, but the date falls in another gap in the Memoirs, so we know little of it. Babur went as far as Sialkot, and spent his time-inflicting punishment on those who had joined him but subsequently turned their coats and expelled his officers. We know nothing of his routes or his dealings with the Frontier tribes on the way. He was forced to return by bad news about Kandahar, which he finally reduced in 1522.

The fifth and final preparatory expedition took him in 1524 to the capture of Lahore and as far as Sirhind. His operations on the way were concerned with the reduction of Panjabi tribes in the hill country of southern Hazara close to Hasan Abdal and not with any Afghan tribe, and, directed as they were against sympathizers with the Lodi Empire of Delhi, fall really outside the scope of this story. He had to fight a large army led by Afghan Amirs of the Lodi régime to gain possession of Lahore, but was aided in his plans, though destined to be thwarted later, by the adherence of the Lodi feudatory of the Panjab, Daulat Khan, who with his sons Ghazi and Dilawar, decided it was safer to join the invader than continue in subjection to Ibrahim who had succeeded his father Sikandar on the Lodi throne of Delhi in 1517. Ibrahim's haughty temper, joined to the impolitic arrogance with
which he treated the Afghan nobles who had raised his family to the throne, had succeeded in alienating all the most important supporters on whom he should have been able to rely. But Daulat Khan, who had affected to plead for Babur’s aid against his sovereign, was in truth set on carving out for himself a private dominion in the Panjab, and after various vicissitudes, during which he was ignominiously seized and imprisoned by Babur, succeeded in taking shelter in the Eastern Panjab hills. Babur managed to induce the Emperor’s brother, Alauddin, to join him, but his position in the Panjab was not yet strong enough to enable him to advance against Delhi. He fell back on Lahore and eventually to Kabul.

It was not until the following year, 1525, that he was able to set on foot the final and triumphant campaign which led to the defeat and death of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat in April 1526, and so to the inauguration of the Mughal Empire. The only events on this historic march that really concern the Frontier are a reverie which Babur enjoyed at Ali Masjid, and a second rhinoceros hunt, this time more successful than at Swabi, in the neighbourhood of Peshawar, probably in the Zakhi reed-jungles, in my time become a haunt of outlaws. At Ali Masjid: ‘As the encamping ground was small, I took up my quarters on an adjoining eminence, from which I could view the blaze from the camp-fires below, wonderfully brilliant and beautiful. It was certainly owing to this circumstance that every time I halted here I took wine.’ On the hunt he amused himself by pitting an elephant against a rhinoceros, wishing to see how they would behave. The rhinoceros ran away, and Babur took it for good augury. His Afghan audience must have enjoyed the fun.

In all these expeditions there is no doubt that Babur’s armies were greatly strengthened by tribal contingents supplied by the Yusufzais and other tribes with whom he contended or negotiated around Peshawar. Of this one clear instance can be given. The so-called Kasuria Pathans who inhabit the country on both banks of the Sutlej south of Lahore are of the Khweshgi section of Muhammadzais. They have a clear tradition that they marched from Peshawar in Babur’s armies, and were granted lands in the Central Panjab in jagir as a reward for their services to the conqueror. The Khweshgi — see Table II, Chapter I — are cousins of the Muhammadzai of Hashtnagar, and there is a well-known
village of their name north of the Kabul River, between Charsadda and Nowshera.

Still more indicative of what Pathans themselves think in the matter of Babur’s debt to them are the lines of Khushhal Khan, reciting a list of the Kings who ruled at Delhi:

_Biya lah pasa da Dihli badshah Babur shuh,_
_Chib ye kahr da Pukhtanah pub barkat wuh. . . ._

After him was Babur King of Delhi,
Who owed his place to the Pathans. . . .

Babur certainly dispels the darkness, and under his hand the whole of the Afghan frontier begins to take shape. Indeed, never again, not till British times more than three centuries later, do we get so detailed and universal a list of the tribes living from Swat to the Daman. From his account it is quite clear that it is the Yusufzai and Bangash tribes (Bangash being an area rather than a tribal name, but with tribes still identifiable on the ground), whom he considers to have been the keys to the pacification of the tribal belt between Kabul and the Indus. Although he was equally interested in getting control of Kandahar during this period, he does not appear to have met with tribal opposition in that quarter and the absence of any reference to the Abdalis is remarkable. It is clear that in Babur’s time both the nomadic and the settled Ghajjis were living more or less where they are now, namely around the Ghazni-Kattawaz area and in the Daman, and he mentions both them and their settled Lohani kinsmen. Then where are the Abdalis? At least they were obviously not in a position to embarrass Babur in his designs on Hindustan.

There are three tribes mentioned by Babur who were clearly not then where they are now. These are the Dilazaks, the Gigianis and the Mohmands. The Dilazaks evidently still held a position of some importance in the Hashtnagar area and probably in the Doaba, where the Muhammadzais and Gigianis now are. Now they have almost disappeared, submerged beneath the newcomers near Peshawar. The Gigianis seem to have been around Peshawar itself where the Peshawar Mohmands and the Khalils now are. They are now in the Doaba. And, lastly, the Mohmands were met by Babur in what is now Ghali country around Mukur southwest of Ghazni and had not then arrived in Peshawar. All this
tends to confirm tribal tradition. The fact that the Ghoriah Khel tribes other than the Mohmands, namely the Khalils and Daudzais, are not mentioned by Babur at all still further confirms their tradition that the Ghoriah Khel had not reached the Peshawar Valley in Babur's time. But the much more powerful impression from Babur's chronicles is that so many of the tribes were evidently even then on the ground which they still occupy.

I believe that tribal movements have been very greatly exaggerated in the tribal traditions. We get accounts of long migrations of whole tribes over distances of 500 miles or so, ending in a struggle for existence between the indigènes and the invaders, and the killing-off, expulsion or serfdom of the conquered tribe. In my time I have seen a process of replacement of one tribe by another, going peacefully on over a period of a generation in the Yusufzai and Muhammadzai territory known as the maira in the north of the Samah. This was brought under irrigation about 1910, and has been ‘invaded’ by thousands of hill Mohmands and Utman-khel, originally coming in as tenants, and then as lease-holders under the Yusufzai and Muhammadzai proprietors. Gradually, as they obtained wealth and made good, they have taken lands on mortgage and later have bought in on proprietary right. Much better cultivators and fresher blood than the old proprietors, they are displacing, and have in many areas displaced, the original tribes, and it may fairly be said that most of the maira has now become an accretion to the Mohmand tribe. I think it probable that in many cases the process of tribal change in the past followed this pattern rather than that of downright genocide or expulsion of the original inhabitants. During such periods of encroachment blood would become mixed and tribal distinctions sometimes blurred.

Such would be the tendency in the easy, fertile plains. In the mountain glens I believe that in most areas the tribes who now occupy must have been there centuries before records are available, some of them, identifiable at least by name, for centuries before the advent of Islam. It is interesting that all the tribes, about which there exist clear traditions of migration are the Eastern Afghan tribes proper, that is the Sarbanris of the Karshbun line, the Ghoriah Khel and Khakhay Khel. These migratory traditions are not to be found in the case of such tribes as the Afridis, Orakzais, Bangash, Khataks or Wazirs, that is the Pathan
tribes of the Karlanri line. When these did move, as in the case of
the Khataks, it was much later and in historical times.

Babur's recitals support this conclusion. The only exception is
the Dilazaks, reputed in the genealogies to be Karlanris, and they
have disappeared. Many do not believe them to have been Af-
ghans at all, but Babur does not support this. Judging by place-
names, they are probably merged in the Ghoria Khel tribes,
Khalils, Mohmands and Daudzais, who occupy the lands around
Peshawar now.

In other words, Babur's evidence, taken on a broad view, does
not conflict with the suggestions for Afghan and Pathan origins
set out in the earlier chapters of this book.
CHAPTER XII

THE PESHAWAR TRIBES

At some time between the era of Mahmud of Ghazni and the arrival of Babur on the Frontier the Afghans of Al-Biruni, 'those rebellious, savage races', who occupied even in Al-Biruni's time the furthest frontier of India towards Kabul, have grown into the Yusufzais and other tribes whom we know today. At some time, too, during this same five hundred years the Qandhar of Al-Biruni, by which he meant Gandhara or the Peshawar Valley, has been matched by another Qandhar, five hundred miles away, which we know as Kandahar, the southern city of modern Afghanistan. Yet, although these five centuries between the arrival of Mahmud to shatter Hindu dominion in Gandhara and the Panjab and that of Babur to secure his communications (A.D. 1001 to 1505) are well on in the Islamic era — they constitute indeed the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth Islamic centuries — there is tantalizingly little material from any source, even Muslim, to show us what were the movements and what the developments bearing on these same Frontier tribes. Ghaznavids and Ghorids traversed the Frontier passes on their way to and from India, taking with them armies composed of Afghan and Ghalji tribesmen of identity unknown and unspecified; Ghaljis and Lodis, tribesmen from the more southerly Sulaiman Mountains, founded dynasties in Delhi in the Afghan name; the Khwarezm Shah, Chingiz Khan and Timur Lang, each for a short while, held sway over the main routes through these mountains; but of the detail of the Frontier tribes themselves there is hardly a word. Not until Babur. Then the lineaments appear, suddenly, as Athena from the head of Zeus.

It is to this moment of history, and unfortunately not to anything earlier, that written Muslim chronicles, ostensibly founded on contemporary material in Pakhtu, also refer. There are several compilations purporting to be histories of the Yusufzais and kindred tribes, the best known of which, cited by Mountstuart
Elphinstone and Bernhard Dorn, the Russian professor who was Elphinstone's contemporary, is known as the Tarikh-i-Hafiz Rahmat Khani. It was written in Persian in the Hijri year 1184 (A.D. 1771), and according to Raverty is based on much older non-extant prose writings in Pakhtu by Shaikh Mali and Khan Kajju, Yusufzai notables of the first half of the sixteenth century whose place in the record will appear as the story unfolds. Whether Shaikh Mali or Khan Kajju, contemporaries of Babur and Humayun, really did write these works is uncertain. Assuming that they did, it is a point not without interest that no native detailed record of the Peshawar tribes should appear until after Babur had taken the stage and himself begun, as it were, to write up the tribes. It is as if the tribal chroniclers were only brought to self-realization by the arrival of the great Mughal.

The starting-point of all these chronicles is more or less the same. It is related that the Yusufzais, as the leading sept in the Khakhay tribal confederacy, arrived in the Peshawar Valley having set out from the neighbourhood of Kandahar and journeyed by way of Kabul. Their rivals, the Khalils and Mohmands of the Ghoriah Khel confederacy, according to tradition, came also from much the same neighbourhood, north of Kandahar. The actual starting-points given are Nushki, Mukur and Garah, said to have been their original habitats in the neighbourhood of Kandahar. According to Raverty, this Nushki is not the place we know today in Baluchistan close to Kalat, but a locality now named Mashaki, some thirty miles south of Ghazni. However that may be, there is no doubt that Yusufzai tradition still links that tribe with an original seat, held up to the beginning of the fourteenth century (eighth Hijri century) in the neighbourhood of Kandahar. It is surely a strange coincidence that the Khakhay and Ghoriah Khel tribes, the present inhabitants of the older Gandhara (Qandhar), should affirm that they came from another-and much later Qandhar. How did Qandhar (Kandahar), the city and province in the south of the present Afghan State, receive that name?

There is not the slightest doubt that the Qandhar of Al-Biruni, writing in the time of Mahmud of Ghazni in the eleventh century, is Gandhara, the modern Peshawar Valley. It is not Kandahar city, and there is nothing in Muslim writings or elsewhere to show that Kandahar, as a city of note, had become prominent at that time, even if it existed. Bellew believes¹ that Kandahar was founded by
emigrants from Gandhara, fleeing from one of the invasions, and that these emigrants, the Gandarioi of Herodotus, gave their name to their new country. The invaders from whom they fled he calls 'Scythic', and he gives the date of the emigration as the fifth or early sixth Christian century, from which it will be seen that he refers to the White Hun invasions — indeed his 'Scyths' are described as the progenitors of the Jats and Gujars. According to him these emigrants not only gave the name of Gandhara to their new colony but actually, some ten centuries later, sent a powerful colony back to their original home. Those who returned had been changed by their conversion to Islam during their exile and had forgotten their original home. But the ease with which the returning Khakhay and Ghoriah Khel assimilated the populations they found in and around the Peshawar Valley Bellew takes as confirmatory of his theory.

Bellew's asseverations, stated as historical fact, cannot be accepted as definite history. The earlier supposed emigration is unsupported by document, coin or inscription, and the theory rests mainly on the exact correspondence of the names of the two Qandhars. But that he may well have suggested a tenable theory for further investigation is admitted by the Encyclopedia of Islam. The article on Kandahar in that compilation dismisses an earlier assumption that the town was founded by Alexander and named Alexandria Arachosia. The evidence for this does not exist, and it is improbable that Kandahar can be phonetically derived from Alexandria. The article proceeds:

Its identity with the name Gandhara, the ancient Indian kingdom occupying the valley of the Lower Kabul River, on the other hand, appears to be well established. Kandahar (كندهار) was the form used by the Arab chroniclers for Gandhara; the Kandahar of Masudi and Biruni has nothing to do with the modern Kandahar. There seems good ground for accepting Bellew's theory that the name was brought to Arachosia by emigrants from Gandhara. The most probable period for such an emigration is the fifth century, when the Ephthalites conquered Gandhara, as related by the Chinese pilgrim Sung-yun who visited Gandhara about A.D. 520. Buddha's begging-bowl, still preserved in the shrine of Sultan Wais outside Kandahar, was probably brought there by refugee Buddhist monks.

Bellew has more to say about this begging-bowl, which he himself saw in 1872. It is now in the Kabul Museum. This relic, a
huge bowl some seven feet in diameter, carved out of a solid block of dark-coloured serpentine, was lying, when Bellew saw it, in the shrine of Sultan Wais (Uwais) outside the present city, a few hundred paces from the old city to the west, destroyed by Nadir Shah. There was still the tradition at that time that it had been brought there by Buddhists who had come from the neighbourhood of Peshawar before the Islamic age. The bowl has since been covered round the outside with a long inscription in Naskh script, by the style written about 1600. In 1872 it was lying unrecognized and uncared for in an obscure corner, its detailed history and purpose forgotten in an age to which the memorials of earlier times had little significance. But ancient Gandhara had been one of the greatest centres of the Buddhist faith, and the very existence of this relic gives point to the theory that Kandahar city may owe its existence to a pre-Islamic connection with the Peshawar Valley.

In Islamic times Kandahar is not mentioned by the Arab historians who record the onward march of Islam from the centre established at Zaranj in Sijistan. The conquest of Arachosia, equivalent to modern Kandahar and called by the Arabs Ar-Rukhaj, centred round the ancient capital at Bust, which was also a mint-town of the Saffarid dynasty in the ninth Christian century. Kandahar does not even appear in the Ghaznavid records — indeed, as we know, the Qandhar of Al-Biruni is still Gandhara — and it is not until after the destruction of Bust by Alauddin Ghoris Jehansoz in 1150 that the new Kandahar begins to rise into importance. It is mentioned during the Chaghtai Chingizid period as having been taken in 1281 by a ruler of the Kart dynasty of Herat, feudatories of the Mongols. It was conquered by Timur Lang and bestowed upon his grandson Pir Muhammad. Later it formed part of the Kingdom of Husain Baiqara of Herat (1438-1505), another Timurid and a cousin of Babur's, and it is in his reign that the name Kandahar first appears on coins. After his death it was in the hands of feudatories of the Timurid house, and a three-cornered contest ensued, the Uzbek Shaibani Khan (who had driven Babur out of Transoxiana), the first Safawi monarch, Shah Ismail, and Babur, all having ambitions towards it. Babur, as we know, had taken Kabul in 1504, and spent the next twenty years both in preparing the way for his contemplated invasion of India and in securing his bases before he finally made the Indian venture. To hold Kandahar seemed to him essential, and in the intervals of his
Frontier expeditions he made many efforts to achieve that end, eventually succeeding in his object in 1522. Indeed it may justly be said that Babur’s main efforts during the two decades intervening between his capture of Kabul and his conquest of India were directed to fixing firmly his control over both the Qandhars, the ancient Gandhara and the new city in the far south-west. His concern with both of them over so large a span of his life is not without some bearing on the story of the Khakhay Khel and Ghoriah Khel Afghans as they themselves tell it.

A reference to the second table in the chapter on genealogies will show who the Khakhay and Ghoriah Khel are, and how they conceive themselves to be related. For the present purpose the important tribes among the Khakhay are the Yusufzais (including the Mandanr Yusufzais) and the Gigianis, among the Ghoriah Khel the Khalils and the Mohmands. Closely related to all these, but not themselves Khakhay or Ghoriah in ancestry, are the Muhammadzais. The present locations of all these tribes are given in the table and can be seen upon the map. All of them are Sarbanris, and thus relatives, though of a different branch, of the Tarins and Abdalis. All regard themselves as belonging to the true Afghan line, and all have their present habitations either within the Peshawar Valley or in the mountains of Swat, Dir and Bajaur to the north. None of them are Karlanris or hill-tribes in the narrower sense. Of all it may be said that they inhabit either the spreading open plains and valleys or broad vales such as those of Swat, Panjkora and Bajaur. Some of the Yusufzais and some of the Mohmands live in hill-countries; but these are peculiarly fertile tracts, or situated on lines of communication, they are not inaccessible eyries like Tirah or Waziristan.

**Khakhay Khel**

The traditional record is as follows. As already related, the seats of both Khakhay and Ghoriah Khel are said to have been around Mukur, both in the Ghazni River basin leading to the inland water Ab-i-istadah and in the upper Tarnak Valley, northeast of Kandahar. (All this is now Ghalji country.) Early in the fourteenth century — the date is largely surmise but is cited by Elphinstone — quarrels arose either between the Khakhay and the Ghoriah sections, or, according to the Akhund Darwezah, between the Khakhays and the Tarins (the ancestors and present
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The cousins of the Durranis, which led to the uprooting of the whole of the Khakhays and their departure in a northerly direction towards Kabul. (Nothing, it is to be noted, is here said about any of these tribes being on a return journey, or having originally come from the direction of Peshawar.) There follows the not unusual gap of a century or so, and we next hear of the Khakhay tribes as having settled in the neighbourhood of Kabul, where they supported the cause of Mirza Ulugh Beg, son of Abu Said of the house of Timur. Abu Said was the most powerful of the Timurid princes in the middle of the fifteenth century, and Babur's grandfather. He is thus the direct ancestor of the Mughal house of Delhi. In 1469 (H. 874) he conferred on his son, Ulugh Beg, the territories which Timur Lang had conquered towards the Indus, namely Kabul, Ghazni, and their dependencies. These, with capital at Kabul, Ulugh Beg was able to hold until his death in 1501, and, as we know, three years later his nephew Babur succeeded in mastering this heritage.

Many writers confuse this Ulugh Beg with the renowned Ulugh Beg, builder, scientist and astronomer, son of Shahrukh and grandson of Timur Lang, ruler for a brief two years in Samarqand, and assassinated in 1449 (H. 813). He and Babur's uncle are of the same Timurid family but they are different persons, and two generations part them. The astronomer was a close friend of his namesake's grandfather, his first cousin, and was kind to the young Abu Said, his friend's son. The story goes that Abu Said in due course named his son in memory of the astronomer, Ulugh Beg.

At any rate it was to Ulugh Beg II that the Yusufzais and other Khakhay clans paid their addresses in Kabul. No dates are given in the tribal chronicle, but the bracket covers the years 1469-1501, during which Ulugh Beg II was ruler of the city, and we may assign 1470 as the approximate year, especially as the story goes that the Yusufzais were largely instrumental in raising him to the throne, and supporting him in his sovereignty over a difficult country. On first accession Ulugh Beg treated these tribes with marked distinction; he was indeed dependent on their assistance for the support of his throne, but (in the words of Elphinstone) "the turbulent independence of the Eusofzyes was not suited to an intimate connection with a sovereign, and, their insolence increasing with their prosperity, they insulted Ulugh Beg's authority,
plundered his villages, and even filled his capital with tumult and confusion'. Ulugh Beg, whose power was now strengthened by the accession of many Chaghatai Turks who flocked to his standard, resolved to rid himself of these turbulent allies; he began by fomenting dissensions between Yusufzais and their less powerful Khakhay cousins, the Gigianis, and attacked them at the head of that tribe and his own army. The battle is known as Ghwarah Marghah, aptly describing the locality and the bloodshed. In this battle Ulugh Beg suffered defeat, and was constrained to conclude an insidious peace, signalized by a banquet to which he invited all the maliks of the Yusufzai, to the number of seven hundred.

From that famous banquet none but six came out alive; the rest were massacred to a man. After the holocaust Ulugh Beg commanded that the bodies be taken outside the city and buried. This was done at a place three arrow-flights from Kabul to the northeast and under the hill of Siah Sang. The burial ground still bears the name of the Shahidan or Martyrs, and it is said that there also may be seen the tomb of Shaikh Usman of the Malizai (Dir) branch of the Yusufzai, to whose resting-place until recently pilgrimages were made. Chief among the slain was Malik Sulaiman, the leading malik of the tribe and father of Malik Shah Mansur who later gave his daughter in marriage to Babur. Malik Ahmad, Sulaiman's nephew, then a young man and later the Yusufzai leader, was one of the fortunate six.

The date of this massacre is not given in the sources, but having regard to the reign of Ulugh Beg II in Kabul, we may set it between 1480 and 1490, about the time of Babur's birth. It was ordered by a Chaghatai Turk, and not by an Afghan. But it must be recorded that Afghan annals are not free from such stains, and there is a contrast in morals drawn between the sanctity of private hospitality to the guest and the exploitation of social occasions to further statecraft or private vengeance. Ulugh Beg's evil example was followed by the Ghalji Mir Mahmud when he massacred the Persian notables at Isfahan in 1722. He, it is said, was mad. There are more recent examples of this barbarity. Only a generation back a certain Mohmand malik, whom I knew, called a banquet in Gandab to signalize a reconciliation with fellow-tribesmen who had killed his father and all his relatives, leaving only himself, a child they pitied and found too young to kill. When he grew to man's estate, with a fine show of bonhomie he invited them all
beneath his roof and, when they were inside, he and his retainers shot them, every one. Even the laws of hospitality will go down before the calculated enmity bequeathed by a blood-feud.

It is for reasons of this kind that once, in 1947, sitting down to a feast in this same Gandab with some two hundred tribesmen, I found myself the only man unarmed. Every malik, as he sat at meat, carried his rifle slung on his shoulder, and on asking to see the magazines I found every weapon loaded. This did not spoil the jokes and jollity; indeed it was then I heard the story of the massacre in Gandab a generation back and afterwards confirmed it.5

In the course of their travels the Yusufzais had been joined by the Muhammadzais — not Khakhay in family but sons of Kharsh-bun like them — and by the Utman Khel and the Gaduns. The last two tribes are not Sarbanri Afghans at all, but Karlanri and Ghurghusht respectively, and came as hamsayas or clients. After the massacre the Yusufzais, accompanied by their clients but for the moment leaving the Muhammadzais, proceeded in extreme distress towards Peshawar by the Khaibar route. The Gigianis, who had taken Ulugh Beg’s part, also for the time remained in Ningrahar.6

In the Peshawar Valley and Bajaur, so states the chronicle, the Yusufzais found the Dilazaks in possession of almost the whole region, together with some people called Dehqans — but dehgan means only a villager or tenant — in occupation of Hashtnagar. Raverty tells us the Dehqans were subject to the Jahangiri Sultans of Swat, with capital at Manglaur, the last of whom, Sultan Awes,7 entered into some negotiations with Babur, and was eventually driven across the Indus into Hazara. No authority has suggested that these were of Afghan or Pathan stock. The Dilazaks remain a mystery.

In the genealogies the Dilazaks appear as Karlanris, and brothers of the Orakzais and Utman Khels. Babur refers to them more than once and he calls them Afghans. Today, as an organized tribe, they have disappeared, though there is more than one village called after their name in the Daudzai tract just north of Peshawar — a name well known in the annals of the Peshawar Vale Hounds. They are said by Bellew and others to have embraced Islam in the time of Mahmud of Ghazni and to have sent strong contingents with him on his Indian expeditions to Somnath and elsewhere. The Dilazaks themselves, according to these
chronicles, had moved into Peshawar from Ningrahah and the west, some centuries before. The most circumstantial evidence to their claim to be Afghans is the story in the chronicles relating the romance of Khan Kajju, Ahmad's successor in the chiefship of the Yusufzais after the latter had defeated the Dilazaks. Kajju, like Babur, was handsome, and was sent as a young man, accompanying Ahmad, as an envoy to the Dilazaks. There he was captivated by the daughter of the Dilazak chief. After the battle in which the Dilazaks were overthrown Kajju was in command of the vanguard of the pursuit, and came up with the Dilazak chief and his family on the Indus bank, endeavouring to get across. Seeing Khan Kajju, the Dilazak implored him to keep back his men to allow the women to get across — failing that he said they would all throw themselves in the water and perish rather than be made captives. The young man's chivalry was touched; taking pity on the Dilazaks and their plight, he cried out to his clansmen: 'Give over, comrades; let them alone. Do not harm them, for they are Afghans like ourselves.' The ladies crossed, the men laughed, and Khan Kajju won his bride. And it is true to say that in their tribal fighting it is the understood thing among Pathans not to molest or interfere with the women or children of your opponent, or to harm the guests within his gate, or to injure his dependants or faqirs.

It should be remembered that all these tribal chronicles are quite unscientific, and it is far from certain that all these migrations in mass ever took place at all. There is no reason to suppose from what has been said in this work up to this time that the people of the Peshawar Valley were of markedly different stock, or culture, or language, from other tribes with whom at this time it was their fortune, or misfortune, to contend. Again the genealogies may help us. The invading Khakhays were all Sarbanris of the best Afghan line; the Dilazaks appear as Karlanris, brothers of the hill-tribes who prefer to call themselves Pathan. Amid the uncertainties one point stands out — that Babur recognized the Dilazaks as not differing essentially from Yusufzais or others whom he names. And this, I think, we must accept.

When the Yusufzais reached Peshawar, broken, fatigued and powerless after the massacre, they tell us in their chronicle — again no date is given — that they applied to their brother Afghans and Musalmans, the Dilazaks, for help, and a place
wherein to take up their residence. With a generosity unknown to later tribal story the Dilazaks assigned to them the Doaba, that fertile tract in the triangle between the foothills and the junction formed by the Kabul and Swat Rivers — where Shabqadr now stands. Malik Ahmad, their new chief, on the part of his people, expressed gratitude, but characteristically pointed out that the Doaba was but a small district and numbers of his people remained behind, intending to rejoin their kinsfolk as soon as they should find a home. Was there no other land?

The Doaba is among the most favoured tracts in all the Frontier, so the Yusufzais were bidding high. But the Dilazaks it seems were still of generous mind. They told Ahmad that, if the Doaba was not large enough, there were the valleys of Danish Kol and Ambahar as far as Bajaur, which they might occupy. And even more — there was still Ashnaghar (Hashtnagar) which they could win by the sword from the Dehqans, subjects of the Jahan-giri Swat Sultans. This was not in the gift of the generous Dilazaks, but it is to be supposed that they expected a share of it on conquest.

The Yusufzais and Mandanrs — Malik Ahmad himself was a Mandanr — then took up the Doaba as offered, and soon after were joined by their families and flocks and those who had been away as nomads and traders when the Kabul massacre took place. A number of these, pushing up by Ambahar and Danish Kol, advanced right into Bajaur and sought to occupy its main southern valley, Lashora, where the town of Khar now stands. They went on still further right into Jandul, and approached the Panjkora River. At the same time the main body pushed out from the Doaba, started to take over Hashtnagar from the Dehqans, and began to encroach on Dilazak land in the main Samah, east of modern Charsadda, and towards the Kalpanri of Hoti and Mardan.

Meanwhile the Gigianis who, it will be remembered, had sided with Ulugh Beg against their Yusufzai kinsmen and were in some sense the cause of the trouble, had remained behind in Ningrahar with the Muhammadzais. And now a new development took place. The other main Kharshbun clan, the Ghoriah Khel, of which the main sections are the Khalils, Mohmands and Daudzais, had themselves found things too hot in the Mukur-Kandahar area. The rule of the Timurid house was breaking down, and local power was passing to the Tarins. At this period the Abdalis (Dur-
ranis) counted as Tarins — a glance at Table I in the genealogical chapter will show the reason. The Ghoriah Khel moved north in the footsteps of the Khakhays, and some of them pushed into Ningrahar where they came in conflict with the Gigianis, the Tarklanris (another Khakhay tribe) and the Muhammadzais. The Tarklanris settled first in Lamghan (Laghman) between Kabul and Ningrahar, but had their eyes on Bajaur where they soon sent an advance party. The Gigianis too, finding the Mohmands too much for them, tried ineffectually to gain a footing in Bajaur but were turned back by the Tarklanris. They then sent their elders with halters round their necks and grass in their teeth to beg forgiveness of the Yusufzais, and besought Malik Ahmad and other notables, as their Khakhay kinsmen, to assign them lands upon which to dwell. Thinking to strengthen the Khakhay confederacy, Malik Ahmad with the consent of the tribes assigned them the Doaba itself; and very soon, family by family, they came across by the Karappa route and down Gandab to settle in that fertile district. Shortly afterwards the Dehqans under one Mir Hinda were driven out, and Hashtnagar was assigned to the Muhammadzais, while the Yusufzais themselves, their forces strengthened by the newcomers, were pushing steadily eastward towards the Indus and northward towards Swat and Bajaur.

The tribal pattern was thus beginning to assume the shape which it holds today, for the Gigianis are now in the Doaba, the Muhammadzais in Hashtnagar, and with few exceptions the Yusufzais — now the Mandanr section of them only — hold the rest of the Samah Valley north of the Landai River. It is very hard to believe in the truth of this tradition. In those days the Samah proper had no irrigation; it was a great dry tract, in many parts sandy, scored by ravines such as the Bagiari, Kalpanri, and Lund Khwar, with at best scattered cultivation from wells where the water table allowed it. The Doaba and Hashtnagar on the other hand are level lands beside the Kabul and Swat affluents, and it is almost certain that even then they enjoyed irrigation by inundation. The Yusufzais by their own account ruled the roost: why should they have allotted the finest land to the Gigianis who had been disloyal to the tribal nexus, and to the Muhammadzais who were not even of the Khakhay brotherhood? The story becomes even harder to credit when it is remembered that the original owners of the whole valley, the Dilazaks, were not yet disposed
of. Indeed we are told that the Gigianis on first arrival acted in such a contumacious way in their dealings with the Dilazaks that Malik Ahmad left them to their own devices. It was at this time, it appears, that Babur arrived on his third Frontier expedition, late in 1519, and the Dilazaks, to serve their own interest and hoping, perhaps, to snatch Hashtnagar for themselves in return for their losses, took his part. As a result the Gigianis attacked them after Babur's departure, but were defeated at Gulbela in what is now the Daudzai country.

According to the chronicle this defeat caused Malik Ahmad and the Yusufzais to face about, and adopt a new policy. Forgetful of the generosity of the Dilazaks, whom the Yusufzais now regarded as inclined to arrogance as a result of their victory over the Gigianis, Ahmad decided to form a Khakhay confederacy and go to war with them under pretence first of their undue severity to the Gigianis and secondly of contumacy displayed in the Samah against the encroaching Yusufzais. For this purpose Ahmad was able to muster the whole of the Yusufzais and Mandans, together with their hamsayas, the Utman Khels and Gaduns and the Muhammadzais, who were promised confirmation in their claim to Hashtnagar. A great battle took place between Katlang and Shahbazgarha, the fiercest part of the engagement being in the bed of the Gadar streamlet in which large bodies of the Dilazaks were ambushed and slain. The Dilazaks were overthrown, and, unable to retreat to their kinsmen south of the Kabul River, were forced across the Indus into Chachh Hazara. It was when their rearguard was attempting the Indus crossing that the young Malik Kajju, blooded in this battle, won his Dilazak bride.

The date of the Katlang battle is unknown, and I can call to mind no present memory of it. On internal evidence it probably fell some time between Babur's second expedition into this region (1519), when he too was at Katlang, and his final conquest of Delhi (1526). If we are to accept these chronicles at their face value, it can hardly be believed that Babur, who had previously enjoyed many contacts with all these tribes, would not have recorded the disastrous Dilazak defeat at Katlang, if that defeat had taken place before he reached that same place in 1519. On this ground, I think, the battle must be dated after 1519, say 1525.

At some time before this battle — again the dates are missing — the Yusufzais succeeded in occupying most of Lower Swat. It will
be remembered that the Hashtnagar Dehqans owed allegiance to the Jahangiri King of Swat. After their defeat and expulsion from Hashtnagar they are said to have retired to Swat by way of the Morah Pass leading to Tanra, where the lands of Mir Hinda, their leader, were situated. They left a force on guard in the Morah, the scene of Babur's meeting with Bibi Mubarikah, and also occupied the Malakand, and probably the Shahkot and Charat Passes between the two. Sultan Awes, the ruler of Swat at Manglaur, had sought insurance against Yusufzai ambitions by contracting a marriage with Malik Ahmad's sister, but the lady had died and not without reason he feared invasion by the grasping Khakhays. He had not long to wait. The Yusufzais and Mandanrs, poverty-stricken in the first days of the Doaba grant, had sought a livelihood by trading into Swat, and had spied out the beauty and fertility of the land. Indeed the chronicle does not acquit Ahmad of arranging a political marriage for his sister with the clear object of gaining a footing in Swat. As soon as opportunity offered, the Yusufzais assembled their forces and endeavoured to enter Swat by the Morah Pass which several times they tried to force without success. After two months spent in fruitless effort they sent a party to reconnoitre the Malakand, further to the west, and received a report that the garrison there located, under Sultan Awes himself, was negligent and could easily be surprised.

It was determined therefore that, after the evening meal, the chief portion of the force should set out for the Malakand, leaving a small party in the old camp at the foot of the Morah to kindle watch-fires, and lead the Swatis to think the whole army was in camp as usual. The main force marched all night and at dawn rushed the Malakand, finding the garrison asleep. Sultan Awes fled to Tanra; Mir Hinda, who had defended the Morah so well, on hearing of the forcing of the Malakand, retired from his position with his forces and also made for Tanra to secure that important centre.

The Akhund Darwezah, an earlier authority than the 1771 compilation in Persian, tells us that it was the Shahkot Pass, a few miles only to the west, and not the Morah, before which the Afghans were encamped. They must have been threatening both, for both lead down to Palai, and the distinction is of little validity. But he adds a touch that brings the whole scene to life in describing how the Yusufzai women, left behind in the camp, began to
sing ballads boasting of the prowess of their lovers and the want of manhood of their opponents, and foretelling that the decisive attack would open with the dawn. The Swatis, hearing this, directed all their watchfulness to this point, and failed to guard the Malakand so carefully as before.

As usual, no date is given for this graphic event. That the tradition in this case records an historical occurrence I think there can be no doubt. While no memory seems to abide today of the reputed great battle near Katlang where the Yusufzais and their confederates are said to have finally overthrown the Dilazaks, any tribesman will tell you the story of the forcing of the passes into Swat. But again we can only fix a date by deduction, a deduction based in this case not on what Babur himself records but on the story of his love affair as told by the Yusufzais. It was on the Morah that he is said to have met his bride, and we can fix that year definitely at 1519. At that time the Yusufzais were in control of all that country; indeed Malik Shah Mansur, Ahmad's cousin and father of Mubarikah, was living actually in the Morah Pass. It follows that the Yusufzai occupation of Swat would have been effected before 1519, a few years earlier than the battle at Katlang. A date 1515 would not be far wrong.

It was after the Katlang battle, and the expulsion of the Dilazaks, that Ahmad undertook the first distribution of lands among the Yusufzais and associated tribes. This land settlement is still associated with the venerated name of Shaikh Mali. The records show that this survey and settlement took full account of the occupation of Swat, and indeed of Buner also, from which it is clear that the Yusufzai aggression into the northern mountain areas from the Samah had preceded their victory over the Dilazaks in the plains. The survey covered the whole of the Doaba, Ashnaghar (Hashtnagar), the Samah proper from Hashtnagar to the Indus in the east and the Kabul River to the south, and such portions of Swat, Buner and Bajaur as had been subdued by the Khakhay tribes and their confederates. Allotments were made not only to the Yusufzais proper and their brothers the Mandanr Yusufzais — Ahmad himself was a Mandan of the Razzar section — but to the Muhammadzais (not Khakhays but sons of Karshbun), and also to the Utman Khel and Gaduns, who were not Sarbanris at all. Finally, certain lands were distributed to Sayyids and other holy men who had accompanied the tribes in their
migrations and invoked the name of God upon their conquests. The land distributed to genuine Afghan tribesmen, sons of Sarbanr, was called *daftar*;\(^{10}\) that allotted to holy men *tsrangi*.\(^{11}\) By a most able dispensation it was always arranged that the *tsrangi* lands should intervene between the bulk allotment of *daftar* given to one tribal section and that given to another tribal section, so placing a pious *salis*,\(^{12}\) or arbitrator, permanently in position to defeat tendencies on the part of the aggressive to encroach. This arrangement, as indeed the body of Shaikh Mali’s settlement, remains the basis of tribal land tenures all over the country north of the Kabul River up to the present day.

Of the non-Yusufzai tribes the Gigianis, as we know, got the Doaba, the Muhammadzais Hashtnagar, and the Utman Khel and Gaduns, clients only, rough hill tracts to the north. All these are still located in these places, though there have been certain shifts in the case of the Utman Khel. Originally these were allotted not only Ambahar, where they now are, but a long tract of rough territory right across the north of the Samah intervening between Swat and the plains. Later Khatak irruptions in the sixteenth century disturbed this arrangement, leaving only five small villages of Utman Khel in the plains north of Katlang.

Since Shaikh Mali’s time there have also been certain changes in the distribution as between the Yusufzai proper and the Mandanr. The richest of all this territory at that time, before the perennial irrigation, was the Swat Valley. For that reason both Yusufzai and Mandanr originally received a share in Swat. That this was so is established by the existence of the tombs of both Malik Ahmad and Shaikh Mali in the Swat Valley, the first near Allahdand and the second at Ghorbandi. At Allahdand the graveyard is at the foot of the spur, just south of the village, with a glorious view up the Adinzai Valley to the north. Ahmad as we know, was a Mandanr of the Razzar ch; Shaikh Mali was his Chief Mulla, attached to his own clan and so to say, his Wazir. Khan Kajju, on the other hand, Ahmad’s successor, also a Mandanr, is buried in the Samah on the banks of the Badrai stream between Swabi and Maneri, looking across to a hillock on the Sar-i-maira,\(^{13}\) marked in the modern map as Gajju Ghundai. At some unrecorded time after Shaikh Mali’s survey there took place an internal redistribution as between the Yusuf and the Mandanr branches, whereby the former took Swat, Panjkora, Buner and all
the hill-country, and the latter were confined to the Samah. There are now no Mandanr settled in the hills, and only three Yusuf villages, and those three on the hill-skirts close to Swat and Buner, which are within the Samah. In old days the Yusuf clans did best, for the hills contain valleys like paradise; now, with irrigation, it is the Mandanr who are the richer, though they have to suffer the less temperate climate. Canals, with cane, tobacco and other cash crops, have made the Samah and Hashtnagar the finest agricultural areas in all the breadth of Pakistan. It is the Mandanr who enjoy most of this inheritance.

The date of Shaikh Mali's distribution is not accurately stated; we only know it took place after the battle of Katlang and apparently during Ahmad's lifetime. If we assume the battle was fought in 1525, and that survey was undertaken shortly afterwards, we may put 1530 (H. 937) as a possible date. This was the year of Babur's death after four years only as Badshah of Delhi. On the chronology here adopted, if we take the Kabul massacre at 1485, and assume that Malik Ahmad, who escaped from it as a youth was born about 1470, Ahmad in 1530 would have been a mature grey-beard aged sixty, just of the age and prestige needed to put through a settlement like that of Shaikh Mali. The great stretch of territory, with all its complications of mountain and valley, and Shaikh Mali's close definition of inter-tribal and inter-sectional boundaries, which persists today, suggest that the work must have occupied at least five and perhaps as much as ten years. The whole of the present Peshawar and Mardan districts north of the Kabul River, part of Bajaur, Panjkora, Swat, Buner, and the adjacent Indus Valley, were surveyed — a circle of territory about a hundred miles in diameter, including a tangle of mountains and valleys at elevations between 1,000 and 10,000 feet. The survey and distribution was a remarkable achievement, and its decisions have on the whole stood the test of time. It bears all the marks of careful thought and organization, down to the twigs in every tribal tree; and the strength of tribal tradition, together with all the evidence of the impress of a master-mind, leave no doubt that the event is an historical process which took place about the time claimed for it. Whether it was indeed preceded by all the tribal migrations, expulsions, and warfare of which we are told is much less certain. The rise of a strong chief and an able priest-administrator at the same moment could have suggested the need for a
land settlement without any necessary assumption that the Yusufzais and their associates were newcomers to this region.

*Ghoriah Khel*

In following the Khakhay clans to their allotted places we have almost forgotten their cousin Sarhnris, the Ghoriah Khel, whose hostility, together with that of the Tarins, was the prime cause of the alleged Khakhay migrations from their seat north of Kandahar. But it will be remembered that, not long after the Khakhay exodus — again the date is not given — their Ghoriah Khel relatives followed in their wake, driven perhaps by the tribal convulsions and the assertion of Tarin ambitions following on the waning of Timurid power in the Kandahar region. As we have seen, according to the chronicle the arrival of the Ghoriah Khel vanguard in Ningrahar caused both the Gigianis and the Tarklanris, Khakhays left behind after the Kabul massacre, to be once more disturbed and to move in their turn towards the east.

The sections of the Ghoriah Khel are the Khalils, Mohmands, Daudzais and Chamkannis. (Save for one well-known village known by their name, six miles from Peshawar, the Chamkannis do not figure in this context; they have lands adjacent to the Kurram Valley.) The only one of these mentioned by Babur is the Mohmands, and they, when he met them in a foray against the Ghaljis, were near Mukur, that is in their original seats. Thus on this point Babur confirms the tribal tradition of the Ghoriah Khel. Khalils he nowhere mentions, nor Daudzais.

As we know, some of the Yusufzai Khakhays, finding the Doaba too narrow for them, had gone on into Ambahar, and thence into Bajaur towards Jandul. The Dilazaks in the Samah had encouraged them to do so, without reckoning with their Bajaur host, Malik Haibu, who was chief of the Umr Khel section of Dilazaks inhabiting Bajaur. Nobody had asked him, and, true to character, he refused to give up any land to newcomers. The Yusufzais, looking around for aid, received it from a considerable Khalil section which had arrived in Ningrahar, and was quarrelling at the time with the rest of the Ghoriah Khel. Not wishing to be outdone by the Khalils, the other most powerful Ghoriah Khel tribe, the Mohmands, and the Tarklanris, the only Khakhay tribe still at this time remaining behind in Ningrahar, entered Bajaur ‘to offer their friendly intervention’ between Malik Haibu and his
Yusufzai and Khalil opponents. But Haibu stuck to his guns, and, believing that the newcomers would remain neutral in order to maintain a position as arbitrators, attacked the Yusufzais and Khalils. A battle ensued, in which the Mohmands and Tarklanris joined, and Haibu was defeated and killed by a sword blow struck by a Tarklanri named Burhan, severing his neck at one stroke. Haibu's armour, a valuable suit, was stripped from him by Mir Jamal, a Mandanr, and I remember hearing that for many years it had been the treasured heirloom of Mir Jamal's descendants at Sherdarra, a village situated in a valley under the Buner hills not far from the Ambela Pass.

The Yusufzais and Khalils then divided Bajaur between them, but soon fell out. The first battle went in favour of the Khalils, for the Yusufzais in the Samah still stood aloof and only those in Bajaur had been defeated. The Bajaur Yusufzais applied to Malik Ahmad, who determined that the Khakhay strength must be mobilized to resist further Ghoriah Khel aggression such as had been responsible in previous generations for the exodus of the Khakhay clans and their long sojourn in the wilderness. It was therefore determined to stage a two-pronged attack upon these tiresome Khalils. The Bajaur Yusufzais went in nanawatai to the sons of Malik Haibu, throwing themselves on Dilazak protection and asking for forgiveness. Not only did the Umr Khel forgive them, they sent a force to join them and a position was taken up in the main Bajaur valley not far from modern Khar. Meantime the plains Yusufzais advanced by Gandab and Pandiali, the present Lower Mohmand country, and crossed the Danish Kol towards Nawagai.

The battle which followed was fought close to Nawagai and went against the Khalils. The issue was decided largely by a diversion brought about by a force led by Mir Jamal, the spoiler of Haibu but now followed by Haibu's sons and retainers, the Umr Khel Dilazak contingent. These moved upon a Khalil sangar (breastwork), behind which they had placed their families and chattels for safety. The Khalils wavered and broke, the sangar and the women were captured, and the day was decided. After the battle Ahmad, Mir Jamal and Haibu's sons decided in council to set the captives free, and this was done on the condition that never again would the Khalils set foot in the northern hills. The bargain has been kept.
This irruption into Bajaur, dated by Raverty in 1517 (H. 923), was only the beginning of a Ghoriah Khel immigration in mass into the Peshawar Valley and its environs. After Babur's death in 1530 the new Mughal Empire was in effect divided, Humayun taking the Indian portion, while the provinces of Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar, with their dependencies as far as the Indus, went to his brother, Mirza Kamran. In theory Kamran was only a feudatory and Humayun the sovereign. But Kamran, like Hakim, Akbar's brother, in the next reign, had a boundless ambition, was determined to assert his independence, and did not stop short of fratricidal war in his effort to supplant his brother and King. During much of the time the cards were stacked against Humayun. Indeed from 1530, when he mounted the throne, until 1545 when (after losing Delhi to Sher Shah) Humayun succeeded in taking Kabul from Kamran, Humayun's writ did not run upon the Frontier. Even up to 1553, when after further fighting Kamran was eventually surrendered to him by Adam Khan, a chief of the north Panjab, and blinded, Humayun cannot be said to have been an effective ruler in the Peshawar region. During the twenty years from Babur's death to 1550 Kamran's policies and ambitions have an important bearing on what happened in these parts.

After the Khakhay settlement north of the Kabul River the Dilazaks are recorded to have been still in possession of all the Valley territory south of that river, extending from the Khaibar Pass as far as Khairabad on the Indus. There is no mention of the Khataks in the chronicle, and it has always been assumed that at this time they had not appeared. The Ghoriah Khel then, meaning in this context their most powerful sections, the Khalils and Mohmands, finding their ambitions blocked towards Bajaur, pushed into the Peshawar Valley from Ningrahar and, pursuing earlier Khakhay tactics, asked the Dilazaks for land. The Dilazaks had had their lesson and paid dearly for it, so refused. The Khalils and Mohmands then enlisted Kamran's sympathy. Kamran, eager to strengthen his frontiers against his brother and for this purpose to support encroaching tribes moving eastward to the Indus, lent them effective aid. With this aid, the record runs, they were able to complete the movements initiated by their Yusufzai cousins and drive the Dilazaks located south of the Kabul River in their turn across the Indus. They then occupied what lands they wanted towards Attock. No date is given, but the
part played by Kamran in the story provides us with a bracket — after 1530 and before 1545, when Humayun after wanderings in Persia recovered Kabul from Kamran.

It seems that the Khalils had entered by the Khaibar Pass. They have always maintained a close connection with the Afridis, not only, I think, because their lands adjoin. Their chiefs, known always as Arbabs or lords, have retained a close knowledge of Afridi ways and politics, and were used by the Sikhs and by the earlier British rulers as agents for the conduct of Afridi relations. The Mohmands on the other hand came down the Kabul River from Lalpura, and some of them by the Goshta and Bohai Dag routes leading into Gandab and the Doaba. Their chief places even now are around Lalpura, Kama and Goshta on the western side of the range dividing Peshawar from Ningrahar, and within modern Afghanistan. Leaving strong colonies in these hills, they pushed on towards Peshawar and eventually divided the Bara River lands16 with the Khalils. The movements of the Daudzais are uncertain. At one time they seem to have approached Khan Kajju and secured lands from the Yusufzais on the Kalpanri in the Southern Samah. Eventually they were placed north of Peshawar along the branches of the Kabul River, in that lovely irrigated belt so familiar to all who have ridden with the Peshawar Vale Hounds.

While this was happening, Malik Ahmad of the Yusufzais died, probably about 1535, and was succeeded by Khan Kajju. The Khalils and Mohmands, controlling as they now did the fruitful country round Peshawar, and the highway down to India, began to levy tolls and to become too rich and arrogant for Yusufzai stomachs. With their colony in the Mohmand hills they were also in a position to levy tolls on all users of Gandab and on the raft traffic down the river from Lalpura. They plundered Yusufzai caravans in Gandab, and raided freely into the Samah. For the time, Khan Kajju held his hand; he was not certain of Gigiani or Muhammadzai support if he attacked the newcomers, and so decided to bide his time. He had not long to wait. The Doaba and Hashtnagar were rich plums, and the Mohmands could harry them from two sides. They did so. And in so doing they murdered a Gigiani malik, who was looked upon as a saint. This man, on his way to Peshawar from the Doaba, entered a Khalil mosque and was killed in the act of saying his prayers.

This was the cause de guerre. But, in passing, let it be said that,
among Pathans bent on prosecuting a blood-feud, the sanctions of religion are no more effective than the sanctions of the law of hospitality in preventing the shedding of blood. I call to mind more than one case in court in which revenge was executed on a man engaged in prayer:

Now might I do it, pat, now he is praying;
And now I'll do it: — and so he goes to heaven;
And so I am revenged. . . .

I do not remember that those court cases involved the accused in any unusual opprobrium; the thought of counsel and parties followed much the lines that occurred to Hamlet's mind.

But for Khan Kajju this killing served its purpose. He mustered an army 100,000 strong,\(^\text{17}\) taken from all the Khakhay tribes and their allies, the Muhammadzais, Utman Khel and Gaduns. Even the Tarklanris, not yet effectively settled in Bajaur, furnished a quota of 200 cavalry. According to the chronicles the battle took place on the south side of the most southerly branch of the Kabul River, now known as the Shah Alam, somewhere near the present bridge, and is said to have resulted in the complete and final overthrow of the Ghoriah Khel. It is known as the Battle of Shaikh Tapur. The date is uncertain, but, by a complex set of arguments of no interest here, is assigned by Raverty to 1350 (H. 957). This battle is chiefly memorable for the chivalrous interchange of challenges which preceded it. On approaching the river, Khan Kajju saw the Ghoriah Khel drawn up on the other side. 'We must fight, cousins,'\(^\text{18}\) he called to them, 'and we cannot fight in the river, or merely shoot our arrows across it. The river will run red with blood, so our sisters can draw no water from it. Further it behoves a man to come hand to hand with his enemy. Do you then cross; I will withdraw my forces to give you passage.' But the Ghoriah Khel did not relish a fight with a river in their rear; they wished to keep their line of retreat open to Peshawar. So they countered with the same offer from their side. Some of the other Khakhays advised Kajju against this, saying he would have the river in bis rear, and should not be taken in by a ruse. But he would have none of it. He shouted his agreement across the river; then, seeing the Khalils withdraw, to his own men he said, 'See, they go back, and we forward, and so it will be when the day is done.' And so it was.
I find this traditional description of the Ghoriah Khel overthrow by the Khakhay Khel curiously unconvincing. In spite of their alleged defeat both Khalils and Mohmands remained on the lands they had chosen and from that day to this have been the richest and most notable tribes in the immediate neighbourhood of Peshawar. The Mohmands moreover retain a most formidable array in the hills, astride the Durand Line north-west of Shabqadr. They still overlap west of the mountains into Afghanistan, and in nuisance value alone are the peers, if not the superiors, of such famous tribes as the Afridis and the Mahsuds. Moreover, in the last forty years they have bought in on the richest irrigated land both of Muhammadzais and of Yusufzais, and are now in a fair way to becoming the wealthiest tribe upon the Frontier. It is very probable that what were in reality periods of tribal adjustment are misrepresented by the chronicles as years of desultory warfare punctuated by sharp and chivalrous engagements. The recent Mohmand encroachments in Peshawar and Mardan have been in the nature of economic, not military, penetration. I suspect that much the same happened in the sixteenth century, though at that time no doubt the lack of governmental control set a premium on a strong right arm. But, even so, these tribes as tribes, though not as individuals, are strangely apt to negotiation, and tribal wars are seldom carried à outrance.

We have also to review these traditions against the much more reliable background of Babur's Memoirs. Allowing scope for mistake, the tribal chronicle purports to tell the story of a mass exodus and settlement between Kabul and Peshawar — for the movements from Kandahar to Kabul are too uncertain — events said to have taken place over a period from about 1485 to 1550, some sixty-five years from the Kabul massacre perpetrated by Ulugh Beg to the defeat of the Ghoriah Khel at Shaikh Tapur. The most important events related by the chroniclers during that time are (i) the defeat of the Dilazaks by the Khakhays in the north about 1525, (ii) the occupation of Swat by the Khakhays, a little earlier, say 1515, (iii) Shaikh Mali's distribution, say 1530, (iv) the defeat of the Dilazaks by the Ghoriah Khel in the south about 1535, (v) the defeat of the Ghoriah Khel by the Khakhays about 1550. The core of the period falls in the few years 1515 to 1535. During that time Babur passed through this region four times; in
1519 he made a long stay in Swat, married Bibi Mubarikah Yusufzai, and passed through the Samah, which he remembers so well that he writes us a sort of guidebook on its beauty spots. He was also well acquainted with Peshawar and its environment. But there is very little in all that he says to support the stories of mass movements like those under Moses and Joshua, or destruction and expulsion of whole tribes. Clearly we must accept the story with reservations. It is hard to believe that all the tribes Babur mentions by name, most of them even then on their present ground, were only just in process of becoming established where he found them at the time that he passed through.

There is one passage of Babur’s, already quoted, which can be used as confirmatory of these alleged tribal movements. This is, when he speaks of Bajaur, Swat, Hashtnagar and Peshawar as having been once part of the Kabul dominion but now occupied by Afghan tribes and no longer the seat of any government. But surely we should read that passage not as suggesting that the tribes had only just moved to these regions, but as confirmatory of what is a well-known historical fact, namely that at the end of the fifteenth century the Timurid Empire was breaking up and no longer controlled the more powerful and less accessible tribal units.

A further speculation may arise from a comparison of Babur’s Memoirs with the tribal chronicle. Babur we know, was much concerned both with Kandahar city and with the Yusufzais, from whom he took a bride. What did he think of the Yusufzai claim to have come from Kandahar? We might even ask whether he ever heard that Kandahar was once the name of the Peshawar Valley, and was driven to reflect on the strangeness of the coincidence. On this there is no word; perhaps Bibi Mubarikah was not interested in tribal origins. But the argumentum ex silentio is not conclusive, and we must refrain from pressing the record too far.

Even those who accept these traditions at their face value are constrained to admit that the Dilazaks, whom the Yusufzais, Khalils and Mohmands affect to have driven out root and branch, were an Afghan tribe, though admittedly not of the Sarbanri line. They appear, as we know, as Karlanris, brothers of the Afridis, Orakzais, Khataks, Wazirs and so on. For the kind of reason already advanced I am no more convinced that a complete shift of population took place in Peshawar in Babur’s time than by the
story of the utter defeat of the Ghoriahs by the Khakhays at Shaikh Tapur. Neither idea holds water.

When we get down a few years later — to the time of Akbar to be exact — we suddenly discover a new tribe upon the scene, a tribe important enough for its chief to be employed by the emperor as guardian of the imperial route from the Indus crossing at Attock nearly up to Peshawar, a tribe moreover which stretched south as far as Bannu and was shortly to capture some of the sacrosanct lands of the renowned Yusufzais. Move on yet another few decades, and this unheard-of tribe produces the most famous poet-warrior in the whole of Pathan history. The tribe is the Khataks, and the poet is Khushhal Khan. The Khataks, we are asked to believe, also came from somewhere else; indeed there are traditions to the effect that they once held Bannu and the Tochi. But they are pretty firmly fixed round Akora by Akbar's time, and a tribe which covers 150 miles of territory from north to south does not spring from nowhere in the night. We are reminded of Darius' satrapy of the Thatagush.

If the Khalils and Mohmands really drove the Dilazaks right across the Indus, why then did they not occupy the country as far as Attock? It is far more likely that the Khataks are the people whom in this context the chronicles like to call Dilazaks. Like the Dilazaks they too are Karlanris, like them they too fought with the Yusufzais; indeed the Yusufzai-Khatak wars went on right up to Khushhal Khan's time (1613–89); his father, his grandfather and his great-grandfather Akoray were killed in those wars. I suggest that the chroniclers' account of Khakhay and Ghoriah wars against the Dilazaks is only a traditional and half-mythical version of tribal disagreements of the same importance and validity as the later Khatak-Yusufzai records have to show.

There is one more interesting reflection. About ten miles south-east of Peshawar, and between the Mohmand tappa and the country of the Khataks, are those three large villages, known as Upper, Middle and Nether Urmar, whose inhabitants, though they have forgotten their Urmari and now speak only Pakhtu, represent perhaps a parent stock. As we know, their ancestor is dragged into the genealogies under something like a bar sinister, and figures as an adopted Sarbanri who in his turn adopted a foundling as the progenitor of all the Karlanris. Their very presence indicates the hopelessness of predicating any purity of stock for
any of the tribes in this boiling cauldron, the Peshawar Valley.

That history has seen an infinite permutation and combination of stocks in this region we may be very sure. And that tribal movements have taken place is equally certain; after all, the nomadic idea is still alive among many Pathan tribes, and conqueror after conqueror with his armies has passed this way. But that the tribes, as we know them today, can ever have been picked up neatly like chessmen from Kandahar, or Ghazni, or Kabul, and as neatly deposited where they now are by some master of the game, this in the conditions of this Frontier I am not prepared to believe. Rather are they like the waters of the sea; the storm-waves pass and disturb the surface, bringing flotsam and jetsam with the wind and sending the froth flying; the water, the essential element, mixes and turns around, but in itself remains the same.
CHAPTER XIII

ORTHODOX AND HERETIC

The story of the tribal settlement of the Peshawar plain however high-lighted, at least makes it clear that down to Babur’s time the Timurids had been quite unable to organize any State in this region, even in the valleys or on the main lines of communication. Babur’s own memoirs confirm this deduction. He spent much time upon the Frontier endeavouring to secure a firm base for further operations into India, but he passed up and down the country, a raider on the grand scale rather like Alexander, and there is no suggestion that he fixed any firm administration upon the land. He found it expedient to negotiate with the more powerful tribes by means of alliances, matrimonial and other, but he was constantly diverted, as in the case of the Bangash, from effecting any real conquest of the people with whom he was dealing. ‘I never found leisure to apply myself to the settlement of that district — ’ is his excuse. He impressed the Pathans sufficiently to be able to take with him contingents to fight in his cause down in India, but very little more. And when he reached the throne of his ambition in 1526, he was granted only four more years of life, and those were spent elsewhere than in Peshawar, Kohat or Bannu.

As we have noted, with Babur’s death in 1530 his new kingdom was in effect divided between his sons, Humayun taking India, and his younger brother, Kamran, becoming lord of Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni and the dependencies of those places as far as the Indus. Kamran, nominally his brother’s vassal, proved his worst enemy. Far from doing anything to strengthen or consolidate the newly imposed Mughal rule, he used what influence he had with the Frontier tribes to render the position along the Indus uneasy, and indeed encroached into the Panjab itself. For his part Humayun sat on a troubled throne; the many Ghalji and Pathan soldiers of fortune left over from the days of the Lodi dynasty knew India far better than the usurping Mughal (as he then seemed) and waited for the man and the hour.
We have seen the man come in the person of the renowned Sher Shah, himself of Lodi descent, brave as Humayun but far-seeing where the other was shiftless. By 1539 Humayun had been defeated by his far abler rival and was in flight to Persia by way of Sind. His brother Kamran turned against him, denying him the roads to Kabul and Ghazni and even keeping him out of the Panjab. It was not until 1545 that Humayun with Persian help succeeded after many wanderings in winning back Kandahar and Kabul from his brother. Kamran had sought to support his cause largely on Ghoriah Khel levies, Khalils and Mohmands, whom he had helped to take their lands around Peshawar. As late as 1551 he was still in the field. In that year the Khalils and Mohmands under his orders staged a fierce night attack on Humayun's camp in Ningrahari, a swordsman's battle like the Mahsud swoop on Wana in 1594. The tribesmen penetrated into the camp, killed Humayun's other brother Hindal, slitting open his head from ear to ear, and were only beaten off by the steadiness of the Emperor himself who rushed from his tent and rallied his troops by taking up a position on horseback in the middle of the camp. After this engagement Kamran found himself unable to continue longer with his Afghan friends west of the Indus, and took refuge with Islam Shah, Sher Shah's son, at Lahore. Islam had succeeded to the Delhi throne in 1545, and Kamran, who had weakly surrendered the Panjab to Sher Shah without a struggle, hoped at least for sanctuary. But not meeting with the reception he expected, he made his escape and after more adventures took shelter with a chieftain of the north Panjab named Adam Khan. This chief, whose country had twice recently been ravaged by the Surs — the immense fortress of Rohtas had just been completed to hold the northern road and dominate those parts — was ready enough to betray his guest to Humayun in order to win the support of the rival dynasty.

At this time Humayun, having won the Kabul base from his brother, was busy, like Babur before him, in securing his communications through tribal territory with a view to an advance on India to recapture his throne. Uncertain of his capacity to deal with the Peshawar tribes, he first advanced by the Kurram-Bangash route, and it was after some difficult fighting near Darsamand that a message reached him from Adam Khan that Kamran was in his power and would be delivered up if the Badshah would
come into his territory. Humayun accordingly crossed the Indus and proceeded to the tryst. Kamran was surrendered and blinded. He was allowed to go to Mecca where, three years later, he died.

Vincent Smith\(^2\) gives the ghastly details of this event, so illustrative of the manners of the time, a queer mixture of cruelty, compassion, endurance and shame, and I will not repeat it here. The blinding of rivals was a barbaric custom common to many rulers of Turkish descent, unwilling to take life in cold blood but determined to brook no rivalry, more particularly from sons of their father by another mother. Some of the Safawis, Nadir Shah, and the Qajars, all of them Turks though rulers of Persia, made a practice of it. Shah Mahmud, the Saddozai Afghan, learned this horror when taking refuge in Bukhara and enjoyed the inflicting of it. Shah Zaman, his brother, was guilty of it to another brother he seized at Leiah in the Panjab, and as a penalty suffered the loss of his own eyes. But the infliction of deliberate torture for its own sake, or as a method of administration, has never been a Pathan failing; with them a smouldering resentment has had issue in a more manly, less feline, violence.

Kamran removed, and the Sur power having broken up in contentions after Islam Shah's death in 1554, Humayun went on to capture Delhi, to hold his throne for six months only, and, inconsequent as ever, in January 1556 to trip down his library staircase to his death. He was never an effective King, and like Babur his connection with the Frontier was limited to making passage through it. After the capture of Kamran in 1552 he did attempt to do something to control Peshawar and the Khaibar route, for he put the fort at Bagram (Peshawar) in repair, leaving a Kazak general, Sikandar, in command with a strong force intended to overawe the tribes. But no sooner had the Badshah left than Khan Kajju — it was still in his time — invested Bagram with a strong force and only drew off because he could not take it without artillery.

The point of substance is that during the twenty-five years that elapsed from the death of Babur to that of Humayun the whole of the trans-Indus area, including the Peshawar Valley and the plains as well as the hill tracts, was beyond Mughal control. Kamran, who had held Kabul, was only interested in enlisting the help of tribal levies in aid of his own schemes and to contest the throne against his brother. His authority in Peshawar was limited to what
the Khalils and Mohmands would allow him, and extended uncertainly only to the city and along the main lines of communication south of the Landai River. Even this was disputed by the Yusufzais under their great chief Kajju. Humayun himself did not pass this way until 1552, had found the Bangash route disordered, and had only been able to save Bagram (Peshawar) from tribal attack in the nick of time. The Kingdom of the Sur Shahs at Delhi touched the Indus only east of Bannu, where they succeeded after much trouble in extending their rule over the Niazzis in what is now Isakhel. Further north their limit was at the Margalla Pass, just west of Rawalpindi. The Sur frontier fortress was at Rohtas, and it was with Panjabi tribes, and not with Pathans, that they contended. All semblance of authority over Bannu and the Derajat had lapsed, and no ruler had attempted to possess himself of Tirah or Waziristan; Swat, Dir and Bajaur remained unpenetrated since Babur's time. The investment of Peshawar itself as soon as the Emperor's back was turned, is proof of the precarious character of the imperial rule. If more evidence were needed, it is supplied by the settlement of Shniikh Mali, conducted under tribal auspices and just at this time. There was in fact no Mughal Empire in the Pathan plains or hills in the days of Babur, Kamran or Humayun; the most these rulers did was to secure difficult passage, and for a consideration to win tribal contingents to aid them in their dynastic wars. Sher Shah, himself a Ghalji, failed to advance so far.

Such was the position when in 1556 Akbar, the greatest of all monarchs who have ruled in India or on the periphery since Asoka, succeeded to power at the age of fourteen. It is incredible, but it is true, that Humayun with all the experience of his wars with Kamran, imposed by special testament on his son Akbar exactly the same disability as that from which he had himself suffered. For he arranged that Kabul should be under the government of his younger son by another wife, Mirza Hakim, Akbar's half-brother. At the time of Humayun's death Hakim was barely three years old. It can only be supposed that, with Akbar himself also a youth, the father did not look ahead and, feckless as ever, thought of both as in the nursery. It remained true that the Kabul province, which included all the country down to the Indus, was officially regarded not as independent but subordinate to the Emperor at Delhi. But the pattern was exactly that which had already
led to civil war, and inevitably it ended in civil war again. In fact Akbar did not succeed to, or rule over, any territories west of the Indus until 1581, and not absolutely until his brother Hakim's death in 1585.

In the beginning a child of three, whatever his inheritance, did not count, and Munim Khan, one of Humayun's great nobles who had been Akbar's guardian, remained in administrative charge of the trans-Indus provinces. Four years later (1560), when the great protector, Bairam Khan, fell before the intrigues of a monstrous regiment of unscrupulous women, Munim Khan was summoned from Kabul to succeed him and became Khan-i-Khanan at Delhi in Bairam's place. The actual power in Kabul then devolved upon Mirza Hakim's maternal uncle, Faridun. The pattern is in exact accord with the tradition of dynastic tapestry in Asia. A King dies, leaving two sons by different wives. The mother of the younger, probably herself the younger and favourite queen, works every oracle she knows to place her own son before his elder half-brother, and in so attempting turns naturally to her own relatives to execute her schemes. In this way, during Hakim's minority, the real governors of Kabul and its dependencies were his mother and his mother's brother, Faridun.

The position on the Frontier in 1556 was extremely disordered. Kamran was dead, and Humayun had had no time to restore order. A state of tribal anarchy prevailed. Nor were things greatly improved during the second period of twenty-five years from 1556 to 1581 when Hakim, at first acting through Faridun, and later under his own authority, held the fief of Kabul. In the Peshawar Valley neither Faridun nor Hakim himself was able to extend authority north of the Landai River into Yusufzai country. Over the Doaba and Hashtnagar they exercised nominal sovereignty, but even close to Peshawar itself government was weak and depended on the number of troops from time to time available to enforce it. During the earlier years Akbar does not seem to have been disturbed; he was too busy consolidating his position and extending his power over the fat provinces of India to turn attention to the Frontier, and he was content to leave his half-brother's mentors to face their own problems with an intractable people. But when Hakim reached man's estate, there came a change, brought about in part by the Emperor's own policies more particularly in religious matters, and in part by the inevit-
able development of his younger brother's ambitions, but most
decisively of all, by a third factor, little discussed, the new wind
which began to blow upon the Frontier. The storm blew up before
Hakim decided to put his fortunes to the touch, and, not surpris-
ingly, had to do with religion.

In the time of Mirza Kamran and of Mirza Hakim after him
there arose two religious leaders upon the Frontier, the one
strictly orthodox in the straight Hanafi Sunni way, and the other
violently heretical. The first is Sayyid Ali Shah of Tarmez, still
known to countless pilgrims as Pir Baba, and the second is Baya-
zid (or Bazid) Ansari, the founder of the Roshaniyya movement,
who called himself Pir-i-Roshan, the apostle of light, and was by
his enemies parodied bitterly as Pir-i-Tarik, the apostle of dark-
ness. The orthodox still refer to his followers as Tarikis.

The origin of the Pir Baba is as follows. One Qambar Ali of
Tarmez on the Amu Darya (Oxus) came into India with his wife
and son, Ali, in the service of the Emperors Babur and Humayun.
The son, Ali, became a tālib-ul-'ilm, or searcher after the truth, and
when his parents left India and took the Sind route to Persia in
company with their deposed master in 1540, he stayed behind at
Gujrat in the Panjab and was later induced by two Gigiani mullas
to move to the Doaba, close to Peshawar, to combat the spread of
heresy in those parts. After some time among the Pathans he
became homesick and desired to return to Tarmez in the Uzbek
country to the home of Sayyid Ahmad, his grandfather, who had
brought him up and was the cause of his adopting the priesthood.
The Gigianis admired him and were loath to let him go, so a malik
named Daulat gave him his sister, Mariam, to wife and induced
him to remain for a time. Later the old longings returned, so,
leaving wife and family behind, he started for Tarmez. When
he got there he found his grandfather and father were dead, but
his mother had reached home by way of Persia and was still alive.
She was the sort of woman who would allow no nonsense, and,
finding her son had a wife and family, told him it was his duty to
return. He did so. But he felt the call to live in a more secluded
place than the busy Doaba, with its caravans passing and repas-
sing by the Gandab route, and such a place he found near a place
called Pacha in the recesses of Buner. There he settled and was
buried. He has left a name still deeply venerated, and over his
tomb stands what remains to this day the most hallowed shrine in all the Frontier country. Pilgrims of all sorts visit it; thirty years ago, in Mardan, perhaps the most usual opening to a recital of evidence in court was in the phrase — ‘When I was on my way to (or from) a pilgrimage to Pir Baba Ziarat...’

The shrine is beside a clear running stream beneath the great range that parts Buner from Swat, ten miles further east than the Karakar Pass. Another pass; just north of the shrine, takes the traveller direct to Saidu. The setting is secluded and lovely; the twin peaks of Dosirra and Ilam rise to east and west behind the village, majestic sentinels with forest-crowned spurs that close the valley to the north. There is a legend that the Buner tribes once fought on the issue of which mountain was the higher, and the argument still runs to and fro. The old shrine is a somewhat ramshackle structure of carved wood, containing the tombs of the Pir and a close disciple; some there are who still dispute, as over the mountains, as to which tomb is which. Beside the shrine the faithful of this day have constructed a new mosque and minars, all plastered and garnished, but not in keeping with the place. They would have done better to build in stone and carved rafter, as the old craftsmen of this country can still do. On the path to the shrine sit the crippled, the blind, the lepers, as they sat hopefully before the pool of Siloam. The village nearby is one of the only places in West Pakistan where Hindus, even Sikhs, may still ply their trade — a tribute to the tolerance shown where there exists a real feeling of holiness. This ground is holy ground, and unmistakable.

One of Pir Baba’s earliest disciples was the Akhund Darwezah, himself a Tajik from Ningrahar, who has become famous as the first extant writer in Pakhtu and the exponent of orthodoxy in refutation of the Roshaniyya doctrines which made so great a noise among the Frontier tribes in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. But this Akhund’s Makhzan-i-Afghani is in the nature of a doctrinal diatribe, packed with odium theologicum — such as that of the parody Pir-i-Tarik, which Darwezahinvented — and it must remain a matter of doubt whether the word so written would have prevailed against the heretics, unless the arguments used had been supported for political reasons by the arms of that arch-heretic, the Emperor Akbar himself. There is indeed, a marked contrast between the toleration which orthodox Islam so
often shows to other faiths, and the anger and impatience aroused by any form of sectarianism within the fold. The sectary, as with other faiths, is worse than the unbeliever; he is the real *mulhid*, the man to whom the light has been revealed and who should know better than to turn away.

Many of the direct descendants of Pir Baba have wielded great influence among the Yusufzais and other tribes in the north of the Pathan belt. The family is universally recognized as a line of true Sayyids, which the Akhund Darwezah, a disciple only and a Tajik, was not. Three centuries later, in the person of Sayyid Akbar Shah, we shall see them taking a great part in supplying the rallying-point for opposition to the Sikhs, and later to the British. And there are still among these Sayyids men who are esteemed.

Bayazid (contracted to Bazid) Ansari, the founder of the Roshan-iyya sect or ‘Illuminati’, was born in 1525 at Jullundur in the Panjab of parents whose home was at Kaniguram, that once mysterious town situated in the heart of Mahsud Waziristan, in the upper Baddar Valley at an elevation of nearly 7,000 feet. His father’s name was Abdullah. Shortly after his birth his parents returned to Kaniguram, where he was brought up. Kaniguram, as we know, is the one place left where a considerable Urmar population is still to be found among the Mahsuds, speaking the Urmari language. The Ansar were originally the people of Medina, the friends and companions of the Prophet, who took his side when he was compelled to fly from Mecca, and families who take the name *Ansari* do so because they set up a claim to be shaikhs descended from the original Arab Ansar. It is parallel with the title *Sayyid* taken by families who claim actual descent from the Prophet through his daughter’s union with Ali. This claim to true Ansari descent was made by Bazid himself, and has been maintained by others. In fact, I think, though for obvious reasons the Urmars deny it, there is very little doubt that Bazid was an Urmar.

Raverty, who is apt to find an exact fact in every tradition of this kind, says Bazid’s father, Abdullah, was an Ansari, but in the same breath admits he was a Tajik and that he lived among the Urmars; and, what is more, that he had formerly lived among those other Urmars resident in the Logar Valley. The designation *Tajik* in that country very often means little more than that the individual so called is no Pathan, and if Abdullah was not an
Urmar, why did he live among Urmars at more than one place? Much remains for investigation in this matter of Urmar origins, but it is likely that further study will indicate that the many families among the Urmars in Kaniguram still calling themselves Sayyid or Ansari are only Urmars of higher self-esteem, adopting those titles just as a Pathan will take the title Khan. The designation Ansari is just the cognomen to enhance the credit and assurance of the rising propounder of a new sect within the ranks of Islam. If Bazid and his father were not Urmars by race, they had at least lived, moved and had their being among that people, and in the very places where Urmars are still to be found. Bazid was most certainly an Urmar by background if not by descent. I think it probable he called himself Ansari merely to increase his own religious value and appeal.

Bazid, and his descendants for two generations, were men of genius, and must have carried a great emotional and personal appeal. They were able to assemble armies and to enter on regular contests with the government, and Bazid himself embodied his doctrines in considerable works of which the best known were the Khair-ul-Bayan and the Khurpun. These once enjoyed a wide vogue but, being heretical, were later banned by orthodox decree. I have heard hints that copies are still hidden away, but since they are regarded in many quarters almost as obscene literature, they have been placed upon an Islamic Index and are extremely difficult to come by. Bazid's doctrines were strictly personal to himself, but are said to be largely based on a pantheistic Sufism, to which he added a belief in the transmigration of souls, engrafting thereon various eclectic and syncretic features, of which the most notable, according to the critics, was that the complete manifestation of the Godhead was to be seen in the persons of holy men, more particularly in his own. There was also a welcome licence to his partisans to destroy those not in possession of the new knowledge and to seize their property, a great encouragement to his potential supporters among the tribes.

Raverty and the Encyclopedia of Islam are agreed in stating that Bazid's doctrines were founded on a version of the Ismaili heresy, which he had imbibed in Jullundur during his youth from the notorious Mulla Sulaiman who lived there. (An alternative version is that Bazid met Sulaiman on a visit to Samarqand, whither he had gone on a trading venture to buy horses.) The Ismaili sect,
now associated with the Agha Khan and representing some of the mildest of the Prophet's followers, was once known for the orgiastic mysteries of the Muhashishin, eaters of hashish, whose very name has given the word 'assassination' to the tongues of Europe. Its devotees are not regular Shias who believe in the twelve Imams, but split off with effect from the seventh of the line, whose descendant they now revere in the person of the Agha.

Raverty writes: 'The Karlanri Afghans, generally, were disciples of Pir-i-Roshan, alias Pir-i-Tarik, particularly those of the Bangash who even up to the present day, either openly or in secret, still follow his doctrines; hence English writers, unacquainted with the facts and the difference between the two doctrines, style them Shias, but the Shias regard them as heretics, though they are not so bitter against them as the Sunnis are. They may be styled Ismailis or Mulhahidah, for in many respects the tenets of Bayazid, the Ansari, have a manifest analogy to those of Hasan-i-Sabbah, the Mulhid; and Agha Khan, the Persian prince, who died lately in Bombay, was looked upon in his lifetime as their head.'

A more likely theory, perhaps, is that Bazid's doctrines were a revival of Kharijite schism. The Kharijite heresy, it will be remembered, had a great vogue in Sistan in the time of the Abbasids, from whom Hamza, the Kharijite anti-Caliph, rebelled about the year A.D. 800. We know too that this very Hamza founded the town of Gardez, situated on this border exactly between Logar and Kaniguram, with both of which places Bazid was familiar. The cap fits. But the strands that go to make up a heresy are for the theologian to disentangle; all that can here be said is that geographical, historical and doctrinal coincidences suggest a fascinating subject for fuller investigation of the origins of an interesting religious deviation.

Raverty affirms also that the so-called Shia Bangash, Shia Orakzais, and Turkis of the present day are concealed remnants of the Roshaniyya movement. I have had much to do at various times with the Orakzai and Bangash Shias, and never heard this identification publicly made. If the question were now openly put, the imputation would certainly be denied; Shias have their own Eleusinian mysteries and do not submit so readily as the orthodox Sunni to questions of doctrinal import or origins. Moreover the final discrediting of the Roshaniyya movement intro-
duced political reasons for covering up these matters, still operative to some extent today. Discounting these factors, I am inclined to hold with Raverty that the Roshaniyya movement had something to do with the beginnings of Shia sectarianism on the borders of Tirah. But whether or not the original inspiration was connected with the Kharijite or the Ismaili heresies, there is no communion today between the Shia beliefs professed in this region and either of these sects. Lastly, even if the suppressed Roshanis took cover as Shias in Mughal times, their descendants, forgetting their doctrinal origin, have tended more and more actually to merge with the general Shia confession.

Bazid's new doctrines were not looked on kindly by his father Abdullah. The two quarrelled violently, and came actually to blows. Bazid received a serious wound, and went off to live as a hermit in a cave in a cliff above Kaniguram. Suffering the usual loss of face of the prophet in his own country, he fled to the Mohmands in Ningrahar, and thence to the Khalils and Muhammadzais, among whom he made many converts in and around Peshawar and Hashtnagar. To begin with, his gospel was accepted by large groups among the Yusufzais also, but here he soon met with strong opposition from the followers of the Pir Baba in Buner, whose champion Akhund Darwezah entered the lists in defence of orthodoxy. Bazid then transferred his headquarters to Tirah, where Afridis, Orakzais, Khalils, Mohmands and Bangash flocked to his standard — for it had now become a battle-standard, and he was preparing to fight. In Tirah he conceived the idea of mobilizing the tribes to overthrow Akbar's empire, and actually issued drafts on the treasury of Hakim, the feudatory in Kabul. He was arrested by Faridun and tried in Kabul for heresy, but acquitted nominally for a consideration, really because the Kabul government feared his tribal supporters. Successful in many skirmishes, he was finally brought to battle by the Mughal general Muhsin Khan, and defeated with great slaughter at a place called Baro in Ningrahar. The date of his death is usually quoted as 1585, but for reasons which will appear it must have been earlier.

Bazid the Roshani left a great name, and, although the tribal tide had begun to go against him in Yusufzai territory, his sons and grandsons were able to mobilize strong tribal support in the hills and to maintain for years a spirit of independence which
defeated all the efforts of Akbar and Jahangir to control it. It is not too much to say, with Vincent Smith, that the sectarian fervour then aroused, though in its religious aspect destined to die down, was a main cause in preserving that vigorous tribal spirit which enabled the clans to maintain an autonomy to a great extent still enjoyed.
CHAPTER XIV

AKBAR AND THE TRIBES

In 1947 I was crossing the Karakar Pass between Swat and Buner, in company with the Miangul Gulshahzada Abdul Wadud, then the ruler of Swat State. The pass over which we were riding is a beautiful stretch of country leading up from Birkot, which we have seen as the probable site of Alexander’s Bazira. On the northern or Swat side is a long pine-strewn glen, up which the road winds along a stream tumbling between terraced fields and patches of forest, dominated by the kindlier northern shoulders of the great peak of Ilam to the left and east. At the summit breaks a sudden view of an abrupt fall to the south in massive, rocky ledges, with the same Ilam, the sentinel guarding the pass, falling like a gigantic wave in cliffs that drop into the basin of Buner. It is the scene of the first stages of the defeat of Akbar’s frontier armies by the Yusufzais of Swat and Buner in 1586 (H. 995).

I asked the Miangul if he could tell me anything of the battle and saw his eyes gleam. He knew the whole story, the very spurs down which the tribal ghazis charged, and the names of the leaders and sections engaged. He could reconstruct the tactics, and explain the reasons for victory and defeat. But, more than all this, one sentence sticks in the mind. ‘Never in all history,’ he said, ‘not even in the time of Akbar or Aurangzeb, much less under the Durranis, were the Yusufzais of this country the subjects of any empire.’

The claim can be made good. The people of Dir, Swat and Buner have never paid taxes to Delhi or Kabul. They have never had to yield obedience to any foreign law or administrative system. And the Miangul’s words provoke another thought — a feeling of wonder that the deeds and words of the past should be so close to the minds of men today. The reason for this nearness is to be found in the fact that among these people events are handed on by word of mouth so that a man will speak of
things long past as though he had heard them from his father.

It is worth while to examine the Mughal record to see on what this pride of autonomy is based. Partly, as we shall see, it arises from a long tradition of refusal to bow the knee, passed on from father to son. To some extent too it enshrines a memory of the defeat of Akbar's forces in Buner. But there is another memory that lives, the knowledge that the great emperor had forsaken orthodoxy and as a deviator was not entitled to claim the allegiance of the Yusufzais.

The Roshaniyya was not the only heresy of these times: Akbar himself tried to found a new religion, the conception which he entitled the Din Ilahi, the Divine Faith, a sort of political religion founded and formulated by himself.

In the early stages for reasons of policy Akbar concealed his aversion to the religion of his fathers, and claimed a sort of papal authority in Islam. His deviations were preceded by an Infallibility Decree, issued in 1579 and declaring the Emperor as the supreme arbiter in all causes, ecclesiastical and civil. By this instrument he had himself solemnly recognized as superior to any other interpreter of Muslim law, all the eminent doctors being induced or compelled to set their seals to a pronouncement which must have been abhorrent to their souls. Subsequently the Emperor went further than this, and forbade the use of the name of the Prophet in the public prayers. Akbar was not only a heretic; he had gone far to reject Islam.

All this led to smouldering anger in high places, breaking out in a serious revolt in 1580 in Bihar and Bengal. In the course of that year the rebels began to aim at more than a local insurrection. They sought for an orthodox sovereign, and plotted to replace the impious Akbar by his half-brother, Hakim. The rebels were at a disadvantage for, as in present-day Pakistan, Bengal was separated from the territories of Hakim by hundreds of miles of country under Akbar's effective control. But they planned a vigorous offensive in force from Kabul and the seduction of high officials in the capital. Vincent Smith writes: 'They were not troubled by the thought that the man whom they desired to substitute for their gifted monarch was a drunken sot, cowardly and irresolute, incapable of governing the empire acquired and consolidated by the genius of Akbar. It sufficed for them to know that Muhammad Hakim was reputed to be sound in doctrine.'
In the winter of 1580–81 Hakim made two incursions into the Panjab, the second under his personal command. At this time he was aged about twenty-seven years and the man behind his actions was still his mother’s brother, Faridun, who told him he had only to abstain from pillage and the whole country would rise in his favour. Hakim made overtures to the commander at Rohtas; finding these indignantly rejected, he went on to Lahore and camped in a garden outside the city, hoping that the gates would be opened to him. But the governor was Akbar’s great general, the Kachhwaha Rajput Man Singh, and he was faithful, as always, to his charge. The Panjab did not rise as Faridun had expected, and, hearing Akbar was moving against him, Hakim made off in indecent haste.

The rebels in Bengal were enjoying considerable success, and despite Hakim’s discomfiture, the position was critical for the Emperor. But Akbar, with his master-mind, knew the real danger lay in the north-west. He had resisted his advisers’ entreaties to proceed in person to scotch the rebels in the south-east, divining that a successful invasion from Kabul would threaten, and perhaps take, Delhi and Agra with their treasure, and so at one blow destroy the empire he had built up. But if that invasion should fail, he could deal at leisure with the rising in the east. Hakim had now given him his cue and he acted promptly. Akbar’s judgment on that occasion is not without its bearing on the strategic position in which the Pakistan of our day now stands. In February 1581 he marched from Fatehpur-Sikri, his new capital, on his Kabul campaign.

On reaching Sirhind he heard Hakim had withdrawn, and moved on, avoiding Lahore, to reach the Indus in early June 1581, where he gave orders for the construction of the famous fort which stands at Attock. This work Akbar entrusted to his Brahmin favourite Raja Birbal. True to character, and by his personal express command, Akbar was accompanied on this journey by the Jesuit Monserrate, with whom he enjoyed the evening diversion of discussions on comparative religion. Monserrate has left a Latin diary, more detailed than any of the Muslim chronicles, and with claims to be considered the primary authority for these events. By the time the army reached the Indus the great summer heats of those parts had set in and the normal floods rendered the construction of a bridge impracticable. The army was delayed for
fifty days at the most unpleasant time of year — in June and July the gorge at Attock is a furnace — and troops and even generals became mutinous, urging that Hakim had gone, the object of the campaign was achieved, and Akbar must return. More stalwart than Alexander at the Beas nineteen centuries before, Akbar refused to listen even to his Jesuit friend who, as a priest and man of peace, advised him not to press his quarrel with his brother to extremity. He smiled, amused his leisure with hunting urial in the hills nearby, and spent the night discussing with Monserrate theological problems after his own heart. The army was ferried across in boats, and Man Singh was despatched in advance to occupy Peshawar, which was found on arrival to have been burnt by Hakim before he evacuated it. Moving up himself, but leaving a strong detachment to get on with the building at Attock, Akbar then sent Man Singh with his own son Murad to take the Khaibar route to Kabul.

It was on this occasion that Akbar’s chief engineer, Qasim Khan, first built a road through the Khaibar that was practicable for vehicles. ‘A road hard to negotiate even by horses and camels,’ says Abul Fazl in the Ain-i-Akbari, ‘after Qasim Khan’s improvements could be passed with ease by wheeled carriages.’ Akbar was so pleased with the work that he made Qasim in due course Governor of the Kabul province. It was not till later that he was made to realize that the physical were the least of the difficulties on a route by which he and his successors could pass only by negotiation or force of arms.

Faridun staged two attacks on Man Singh’s troops close to Kabul, but was driven off after some close fighting. He and his nephew Hakim made off into the hills, and on 9th August, 1581, Akbar entered his grandfather’s capital. The season was advanced and, having demonstrated his power, he was determined to extricate his army before the winter. He therefore stayed only seven days. The Muslim chroniclers describe him as forgiving Hakim and restoring the Government to him. It is much more likely that Monserrate’s version is correct. This is that Hakim feared to come in to make his submission, and that the Emperor made over Kabul to his sister Bakht-un-Nisa. When asked, he told her contemptuously that he had no wish to hear Hakim’s name again, that he would take the province back again when he pleased, that he did not care whether his brother resided at Kabul
or not, and lastly that, should he again misbehave, there would be no more clemency forthcoming. When Akbar left, it seems that the lady tacitly allowed the Mirza to resume government. Akbar’s clemency seems due to his having taken his drunken brother’s measure; Hakim died four years later from the effects of chronic alcoholism and so enabled the Emperor quietly to absorb Kabul with no more said. Akbar was no doubt convinced that his brother’s constitution would not stand up long against such excesses. The contemptuous treatment dealt out to him would prevent his any more being used as the tool of the orthodox, or as a rival claimant to the throne.

After this successful demonstration of force Akbar returned majestically and without haste by the way he had come, reaching Fatehpur Sikri early in December 1581 and this time passing the Indus on a bridge of boats, the work of Qasim Khan. He noted the foundations of Attock Fort, well and truly laid, and while at Attock in a fit of magnanimity, due no doubt to a general sense of satisfaction, accorded his royal pardon to a youth who was brought into his presence as a dangerous schismatic and disturber of the peace. This youth was none other but Jalaluddin, known always to Pathans as Jalala, the fifth son of Bazid the Roshani or Tariki. The Roshanis, as we know, had at first made considerable headway among the Yusufzais, but that tribe had later turned against them, swayed to some extent by the orthodoxies of the Buner Sayyids, the followers of Pir Baba, but (on a deeper assessment) influenced by their constitutional inability to accept any authority for long, more particularly one that demanded from them any payment of tithes. Khan Kajju had died, leaving the tribe without any recognized head. Bazid’s sons found themselves in Akbar’s time in much the same predicament as was to befall Sayyid Ahmad of Bareli, three centuries later, threatened by jealous maliks determined to prevent any outsider from rising to pre-eminence and interested in preserving faction feeling within the tribe. Four of them, Shaikh Umar, Khairuddin, Nuruddin and Jalala came into conflict with an army of Indus Yusufzais, of the Akozai branch of the Isazais, under the command of Malik Hamza, and were overthrown in a battle at a village known as Bara, two miles north of Topi where the Indus issues from the hills. The two first fled over the river to Torbela, where they were put to death by the Utmanzai clan of Yusufzais; the third was
captured in Hashtnagar by Muhammadzais and put to death likewise. Jalala, still a boy, was badly wounded in the fight and tossed into the river. But his time was not come, and he escaped and fell into the hands of another Yusufzai clan, who spared him on account of his beauty and tender age and brought him before Akbar. The chroniclers do not say so, but there can be little doubt that Akbar's decision to spare the boy was prompted by the reflection that Jalala and his sectarians stood for an eclectic creed professing many points in common with the Emperor's own beliefs. At any rate he ordered that he be set at liberty. It was an act of clemency which involved not only Akbar himself, but his son and grandson, in disturbances which lasted for another fifty years.

At the same time stern measures were taken against the rest. As related, three of Jalala's brothers met their deaths in battle, the women and children of the Ansaris were captured, among them Bazid's widow who was given to the embraces of a minstrel, and Bazid's coffin, which his sons carried about with them, was broken open, the bones burnt, and the ashes cast into the Indus. This event, taking place in 1581, proves that Bazid himself must have died before 1585, and indeed before Akbar's expedition to Kabul. One interesting point regarding that expedition is that it appears to have aroused no tribal opposition in the Khaibar or elsewhere, and, except for the meeting with Jalala, to have impinged in no serious degree on the affairs of the Frontier tribes. As far as the Frontier itself is concerned, its sole lasting marks are Qasim's road through the Khaibar and the construction of the Attock Fort, completed by 1586, by the time Akbar was once more to arrive on this stage.

As had been expected for some time, Hakim died of drink at the age of thirty-two in July 1585, so finally freeing the Emperor of all anxiety concerning rival claims to the throne and enabling him quietly to incorporate the north-western provinces in his dominions. So was brought to an end the uneasy situation whereby, first under Kamran and then under Hakim, the trans-Indus territories, though regarded in theory as a dependency of the crown of India, had in practice for fifty-odd years been administered as an independent State. No question of formal annexation
arose, more particularly as the 1581 campaign had rendered the
dependence of the north-west more of a reality than it had ever
been in Muslim times. Nevertheless, Akbar determined once more
to tread the road to the north, not so much because he was doubt-
ful of his power to dominate Kabul, but for other and connected
reasons. First he had long wished to annex Kashmir, then under an
independent ruler, Sultan Yusuf Khan. Secondly — and this was
to give him infinitely greater trouble — he desired to penetrate
the tribal territory of the North-West Frontier and bring under his
direct rule all the tribes of the Peshawar Valley and the surround-
ing mountains, which had never admitted allegiance to Babur,
Kamran or Mirza Hakim, or indeed to any of the Muslim dynas-
ties which had hitherto ruled whether at Delhi or Kabul. His local
officers had told him that the backbone of tribal resistance was in
the Mandanr and Yusufzai country; that broken, it was thought
that all the other tribes would fall easily into the imperial net.

Akbar sent on Man Singh in advance to secure the position in
Kabul. He himself moved with a large army to Rawalpindi, and
thence to Attock, where he arrived in January 1586. By the time
he arrived at Attock, where the Fort built under the superintend-
ence of Raja Birbal was now nearing completion, he received the
welcome news that Man Singh had succeeded in occupying Kabul
without opposition and secured the surrender of Hakim’s sons
and, more important, of his tiresome uncle, Faridun. Faridun was
detained for a while under surveillance and then sent to Mecca,
a very usual sentence in those days. All seemed plain sailing. But
the Emperor had reckoned without the tribes; he did not know
how tough they were. He thought he could safely conduct opera-
tions against them concurrently with an invasion of Kashmir, and
in fact he tried to do so. He succeeded in annexing Kashmir; he
failed completely in his campaigns against the tribes, both against
the Yusufzais, and against the Afridis with Mohmand and Khalil
support in the Khaibar and Bazar Valleys. The resistance in the
Khaibar was organized by Bazid’s son Jalala whom Akbar had
pardoned in 1581.

It is at this point in history that we first hear of the Khataks.
When Akbar arrived in Attock, one of the Pathan Malik who
presented himself was a certain Akoray, whom Man Singh and
others mentioned to the Emperor as competent, if given encour-
gement, to protect the road from Attock onwards towards Peshar-
war. It was thought Akoray and his tribesmen would have an interest in warding off the continual forays of the powerful Yusufzais who made a habit of raiding caravans passing on the highway from Attock to the west. Akoray was summoned and agreed to this commission in return for a jagir of the country from a point a few miles south of where Attock bridge now stands as far as the modern cantonment of Nowshera. He received also the right to collect the tolls upon this road. Soon after this, to signalize his position and his fame, Akoray founded the small town of Akora, upon a bluff over the south bank of the Landai River, looking north at the low ranges of the Sar-i-maira which are the rampart of the Yusufzai Samah towards the south.

Akoray was the great-grandfather of Khushhal Khan Khatak. The records that have come down to us suggest that it was only at this time that his tribe came from the direction of Teri in the Kohat district (where Akoray himself had lands) to settle between Attock and Nowshera, a deduction no doubt made with the object of explaining why we hear of no Khataks before Akbar's time. The tribal chronicles, we know, speak only of Dilazaks in this region. But for reasons I have already advanced when discussing the developments of the early sixteenth century in the Peshawar Valley according to the tribal chronicles, it seems to me certain that, whatever Akoray's own origin, the Khataks as a tribe could have been no newcomers to this region when Akbar in 1586 enlisted their services as guardians of the King's highway. This was not a service which could be performed by tribesmen lacking local knowledge and with an uncertain title to the territories they were called upon to guard. It is much more likely that they were a long-established tribe, suffering no doubt from Yusufzai, Khalil and Mohmand aggression, and ready to accept an Emperor's commission which would enable them to resist further encroachments.

Soon after, Akbar found himself involved in a double-pronged tribal war. His first visitors when he reached Attock were a group of maliks in deputation from the Khalils, Mohmands and others — no doubt including Khataks, but for some reason they are not specified — with complaints against the Yusufzais and Mandan Yusufzais. This jirga told the Emperor that they were always being blamed for plundering and other actions which in truth were ascribable to Yusufzai raiding from across the river, and that, if he wished for peaceful conditions on the direct road to Kabul,
he should do what no ruler had done before and bring those marauders under his sway. The annexation of the Yusufzai and Mandanr country was among Akbar’s objectives, and he was ready enough to listen to their advice; indeed there must be some suspicion that he had arranged for the jirga in order to give shape to his plans. He determined to despatch Zain Khan, his best available general — Man Singh was busy in the direction of Kabul — with the object, as Abul Fazl states in his Ain, ‘of making inroads upon the Yusufzais and Mandanrs, which people dwell in Swat and Bajaur, and a number in the Dasht. Swat and Bajaur’, adds the commentator, with an eye to real motives, ‘are delightful tracts of territory containing pleasant meads and grassy slopes filling the heart with delight in their contemplation.’

But before this campaign could go forward, Akbar found himself involved in another, in the Khaibar. Bazid’s son, Jalala the Tariki, though aged only fourteen at the time of his liberation by Akbar in 1581, had lost no time in taking up the mantle of his father. He had escaped to Tirah, where he gathered a great following of Afridis, and won support also from many elements among the Khalils and Mohmands. He actually assumed the title of King of the Afghans nearly two centuries before any such potentate was due to appear in the history of those parts. Matters came to a head just at the time when Akbar decided to send Man Singh to Kabul to take over the administration after the death of Hakim. Even on his way up Man Singh found the route infested by the Tarikis, but they were not quite ready for him, and he succeeded in clearing it for the time. Once he was in Kabul they staged an attack on the citadel at Bagram (Peshawar) and killed the commandant, Sayyid Hamid, who had sallied out against them. It was clear that the time had come to take them seriously. Man Singh had been informed that the Afridis were the yeast of the disturbance but that they had many sympathizers in Khalil and Mohmand ranks around Peshawar. It was therefore arranged that he himself should march from Jalalabad towards Tirah while a second force detached by the Emperor from Attock, should move up and join him in the Khaibar, after securing the position in Peshawar.

Man Singh fell sick at Peshbulak in Ningarahar and the operations were delayed. The Mohmands and Khalils, after their success over Sayyid Hamid, showed great boldness and entered the Khaibar, where they threw up entrenchments and completely
closed the pass. Eventually, on his recovery, Man Singh, unable to force the main pass, entered Bazar, the next valley to the south, where he attacked the Afridis with some success. But it was only with great difficulty that he was able to force a passage through to Ali Masjid, Jalala and his Tarikis hanging obstinately on his flanks and rear. Man Singh was surrounded in camp at Ali Masjid and was only able to emerge on the Peshawar side of the Pass with the aid of the detachment from Attock and with heavy losses. Jalala's force dispersed as tribal forces always do, but very little had been done to establish the imperial communications on the Khaibar route or to scotch the rebels. The action of the Khalils and Mohmands in this fighting is an eloquent commentary on their sincerity in seeking Akbar's aid against the Yusufzais. Their real motive in so doing can hardly have been other than to divert the Emperor's attention from their own activities in support of the Tariki movement and turn it on a tribe which had always been their rival and had now, under Pir Baba's influence, forsaken the Tariki cause.

Akbar's operations against the Yusufzais and Mandans to the north were even more disastrous. As the last serious effort to subjugate the northern hills before 1895 the story is worth recording in some detail. It was not long before Zain Khan reported that, while he had been able to force an entry into Bajaur, he was powerless to proceed to the heart of the trouble in Swat until reinforcements reached him. These reinforcements must also harry and devastate the Mandan settlements in the Samah to prevent their aiding their brethren in the hills. Akbar agreed, and despatched two forces, one under his Brahmin favourite, Raja Birbal (Birbar, or the very courageous), and the other under another of his cronies, Hakim Abul Fateh. Neither of these men had ever commanded an army in the field, and it does not say much for Akbar's judgment of the fighting value of the tribes that he should have thought two of his favourites good enough for operations against them. Birbal's sole military qualification was that he had been in nominal charge of the construction of Attock Fort, the Hakim's that he had been Governor of Bengal. Birbal was poet laureate, a scholar and a wit — the Muslim chronicles call him Akbar's 'proud and pampered Brahmin' — the Hakim was an eloquent poet too, and a heretic withal, by some supposed
to have been responsible for leading his master from the straight path of orthodoxy. Zain Khan, on the other hand, the son of Akbar's first nurse and his foster-brother, was a tough warrior, a brave man, and a good commander, of the almost illiterate type able enough to have risen from the ranks. It is hard to think of three men so ill-assorted as were these.

At first Birbal's force failed even to make passage into the hills at any point. The Emperor then commanded his force to join that of Hakim Abul Fateh and make a combined effort. Zain Khan, relieved by the operations of these reinforcements in the Samah, had by this time found himself able to advance into Swat by way of Talash and to consolidate a position at the Chakdarra ford, where the bridge now stands. From this centre he occupied the Malakand Pass, enabling the combined force of Birbal and Abul Fateh to pass over into Swat. The whole army, with its three commanders, then assembled at Chakdarra, where a stormy council of war was held.

Birbal opened the ball by refusing the indignity of attendance at Zain Khan's quarters. He demanded that the council be held beneath the royal standard in the camp. Zain Khan swallowed his wrath and went to the Brahmin's tent, where Abul Fateh joined them. The meeting started with recriminations between the two newcomers. After this had been smoothed over, Zain Khan got down to business. He proposed a force should remain at Chakdarra to form a reserve and hold the central point, while another force should move around, particularly in the direction of Buner where the tribes had their chief strongpoint, and attack whenever possible. His idea was that the fresh troops should perform the latter duty; he with his own, who had endured much hard work, would hold Chakdarra. But, if his colleagues preferred, let them stay in Chakdarra; he would move towards the Karakar — the pass into Buner — and deal with 'the rebels' there.

But neither Birbal nor Abul Fateh would consent. According to them the orders were to harry the country, not to hold it; they should therefore march in one body towards the seat of disturbance in Karakar, punish the refractory there, and then return by that route to the Emperor's camp at Attock. Birbal added bitterly he did not know what would be the upshot of climbing mountains in that horrible country. It was enough for him that the Karakar lay south-east, towards Attock, and that seemed the less
circuitous way home. By the compass he was correct, but his topography was faulty.

Zain Khan protested. They should not abandon a position acquired with much trouble. But if they were determined to do so, let them march back by the easy road over the Malakand, where they knew the ground and there was footing for troops. It was madness to entangle the whole army in the difficult defiles leading to Buner, without a base. But his protest went unheeded, and, knowing that without him they were helpless, he thought it a soldier's duty to give way. He must also have reflected that to be saddled with one of the Emperor's favourites was bad enough; but two! It may be Akbar had believed that the two favourites would quarrel and so cancel out and let the soldier have his way. But it did not work like that, and doom closed round the army.

It is a dramatic scene. We can see the angry, arrogant Pandit, secure in his master's favour, subtle in argument, browbeating the rough Muslim soldier; the elegant Persian doctor and poet standing by to score a pretty point, suggesting to Zain Khan that he and Birbal had seen Akbar only the other day and knew his mind; and, third of the party, the bluff, hardened soldier, ruffled, uncertain of his ground before these courtiers, yet knowing he could not afford to sacrifice them. He knew in his bones that a progress through mountains held by warlike tribes, without a base, was a form of tactics which would give the enemy just the opportunity they needed. The tribesmen would regard the whole march as a retreat and harass the army unmercifully. But he was alone against two, and no match for a Pandit's pride, a poet's subtleties. So he submitted with an ill grace, showing his manliness by insisting on remaining with the rearguard. The Brahmin, anxious to get out of the mountain maze, set himself in the van.

On the second day out from Chakdarra, and after leaving Birkot, the army ran into heavy tribal opposition in the northern approaches to the Karakar. A whole day was spent in clearing the passage to the summit. When the vanguard under Birbal reached it, instead of waiting for the main body and the rear to close up, they hastened down the steep descent on the Buner side, so Zain Khan, after beating off determined attacks and killing four tribal leaders with his own matchlock, was constrained to follow suit. Great confusion ensued; the road down is very steep and almost impassable for elephants or heavy gear. A gallant Bhitanni,
named Hasan Khan, led Zain Khan's bodyguard, and kept the Yusufzais at bay. The whole of the next night and day was spent in beating off incessant attacks, but at last the army won through to flat ground on the Buner side, near Tursak, where a further council of war was held.

Zain Khan knew something of the country. With great difficulty and heavy losses the army had reached more open ground in the basin of Buner. Let them even now do what he had advised at Chakdarra; they had water and provisions and were at the moment uncommanded from the hills; let them sit down, reorganize, entrench, and then, basing themselves on the camp, undertake further operations against the tribes. Tribesmen could not hold the field for long: this was the only possible tactic that would succeed. He warned his colleagues that they were lucky to have got so far. The Karappa and Malandrai defiles in front of them were, if anything, more difficult and dangerous than the Karakar from which they had only emerged with fortune on their side.

It was of no avail. The others would not listen. Birbal, frightened now, cared only to put himself once more in the van in the hope of being the first to reach the plains. The march was resumed, Zain Khan as before bringing up the rear.

The Yusufzai opposition was greater than before. On reaching the Karappa crest just south of Daggar the troops imagined they had reached their goal, the Samah, only to meet with bitter disappointment. In front of them was yet another narrow dale, leading to the right by difficult ways up to the Malandrai Pass. Everything fell into confusion, the van and main body pushed on in disorder; only in the rearguard, under Zain Khan, was there any semblance of ordered array. The tribesmen lined both crests parallel with the track to the summit, and poured in volleys of arrows and stones on the harassed crowd. As night came on, the ranks became panic-stricken, and, the way unreconnoitred, were entangled in the mazes of the hills. In their anxiety to get forward many fell into pits or over precipices, and the route was blocked, elephants, horses and men mixed together in inextricable confusion and disarray.

In the mêlée which followed Birbal and 8,000 men of Akbar's army lost their lives, including the gallant Bhitanni, Hasan Khan. The poet, Abul Fateh, cowering beneath a bush, was picked up by Zain Khan, who pushed slowly on with the only force that held
together. After heavy fighting he and Abul Fateh reached a point near the crest of the Malandrai and bivouacked for the night. The Yusufzais, glutted with slaughter and spoil, drew off, and, three days later, Zain Khan with a sorry remnant reached Attock to report what had befallen.

For two days Akbar would not admit Zain Khan or Abul Fateh to his presence; he charged them with failure to bring in the body of Birbal to be burnt. On the third day news arrived that the Yusufzais and Mandanrs were advancing in strong force against Attock itself, and he had to receive them in order to make dispositions for defence. Once more Zain Khan, with Akbar's son the Prince Murad, was sent forward to fight, and he succeeded in beating off the counter-stroke. In the plains the tribesmen were no match for the imperial army, even after its defeat. Thereafter the imperial effort was limited to a series of harrying expeditions in the Samah, and a scheme to dominate what is now the Mardan district by the construction of small forts at strategic points. One of these was sited at the large village of Garhi Kapura, some six miles east of Hoti-Mardan, another at a place called Langarkot now vanished but close to Toru, and a third at or near Ohind or Hund, the Indus ford.

Akbar did not allow this resounding defeat to divert him from his purpose of subduing both the Yusufzais and the Tarikis under Jalala. Mutallab Khan was sent into the Bangash country in 1587 in an effort to take Tirah in flank, and Zain Khan himself returned to the charge, and fought campaigns up and down Bajaur and Swat in the five years from 1587 to 1592, but without any real or lasting success. Again and again the Mughal historians speak of 'severe chastisements' and 'conquests after desperate fighting'. 'The upshot was,' says one, 'that, with God's help, the rebels were entirely overcome and compelled to fly, and the country fell into the hands of the Mughal troops.' The Akhund Darwezah states that everywhere the tribesmen were being exterminated, and another chronicler mentions that the Yusufzais were dispersed after withstanding the Mughals for a period of twelve years. But all this is courtly hyperbole. Actually 'the rebels' were strong enough in 1593 to invest the Mughal commander in Peshawar itself, which was only relieved by a special effort on the part of Zain Khan. There is other, and even better, evidence as regards Swat, Buner and Bajaur, the hill tracts, showing that they never came
under imperial control. In his *Ain-i-Akbari*, Abul Fazl includes these areas in the Sarkar of Swat under the Kabul Province. Throughout the *Ain* there are ruled columns for particulars respecting the names of places, people and number of men available for service, and the amount of assessment. These, for the parts in question, are all blank. 'The fact is,' says Raverty, 'the Mughal rulers never obtained a permanent footing in these parts, notwithstanding the slaughter of the people and the devastation of their lands. They were never in a position for obtaining the particulars for the said columns to be filled up, and no copy of the *Ain-i-Akbari* will be found complete in this respect.' The Mughals were unable to hold an inch of ground in this difficult country without overwhelming forces, and even then their communications were continually interrupted.

The developments we have been recording all took place within the Peshawar Valley, or upon its mountain fringe. But it is of great interest to record at this point that Akbar's power had no more success in penetrating the more southerly Pathan districts. The plain of Bannu and the valleys of Daur and Isa Khel, like Swat, were a Sarkar of the Province of Kabul. In their case too the numbers of men they were required to furnish, and the revenue assessment imposed, fail to secure any mention in the *Ain-i-Akbari*. Little was known about them, and, again like Swat, they were in enjoyment of a *de facto* independence.

Akbar failed even to catch Jalala. After three abortive expeditions a final one in 1592 is said to have resulted in the capture of 14,000 Tarikis including Jalala's wives and children, but he himself escaped. His end was very different, and did not come in battling with the Emperor's armies. In 1599 he turned south and actually took Ghazni by a ruse and with the aid of some Lohani tribesmen from Bannu or the Derajat. The governor, Sharif Khan, was driven out, and the Tariki raiders captured a large booty. In endeavouring to secure it by stealth Jalala and his party fell in with a strong body of Hazaras and the man whom all the King's soldiers had failed to suppress was killed by a stray shot. He was succeeded as Tariki leader by his nephew, Ihdad.

After Akbar's time no serious endeavour was made by any of his successors, or indeed by the Durranis who followed, to bring Swat or any of the rest of the mountain regions under administrative subjection, and even in the Samah control was weak. But
there was one result that followed from Akbar’s devastations in the Samah. The Khataks, loyal Mughal vassals under Akoray and his immediate successors, not only overran a considerable tract of Yusufzai country north of the Kabul River and opposite Akora, but planted a colony under the hills, separating the Yusufzais and the Mandarins, in the area known as Baizai. That is the origin of the Khatak villages of Lundkhwar, Jamalgarhi and Katlang on the boundaries of Swat. In all the Mughal fighting against the Yusufzais the Khataks took a prominent part. Echoes of this rivalry can be heard in the poetry of Akoray’s descendant, Khushhal Khan.

In the scales of history the result was incommensurate with the effort put out. The might of Akbar had not prevailed in any decisive fashion against any of the tribes except those who found it to their interest, in return for consideration, to guard the King’s highway.
CHAPTER XV

KHUSHHAL KHAN AND AURANGZEB

With the death of Akbar in 1605 (H. 1014) we are approaching the period in Mughal annals covered by the voluminous works of Khushhal Khan (1613-89), chief of the Khatak tribe and great-grandson of Malik Akoray. Those of his works which have come down to us consist in the main of a very large corpus of Pakhtu poetry, of which the most famous odes are still on the lips of every Pathan. But he also wrote in prose on subjects ranging from religion and philosophy to sport and falconry, and including a great deal of contemporary history from the time of Akoray up to his own experiences. Some of this was in Persian, and a great deal of it is lost. But many of his thoughts and sayings are preserved in the form of quotations embodied in a volume entitled Tarikh-i-Murassa, 'a jewel-studded history', compiled by Khushhal's grandson Afzal Khan, and these are sufficient to admit us to scenes and descriptions which balance the highly-coloured vignettes so characteristic of his poetry. Although Khushhal himself did not succeed to the Khatak chiefship until 1641, and had not reached man's estate when Jahangir, Akbar's successor, died in 1627, his grandfather, Yahya Khan, and his father, Shahbaz Khan, were chiefs before him in Jahangir's time, and there are references in his works to what they did.

Events on the Frontier during the century from the death of Akbar (1605) to the death of Aurangzeb (1707) fall with some precision into two chapters, the first corresponding to the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan and the second to that of Aurangzeb. The first period was occupied with the aftermath of Akbar's frontier wars against the Yusufzais and the hillmen who followed the Roshaniyya heresy, and also with the struggle between the Mughals of Hindustan and the Safawis of Persia for possession of Kandahar. Much of the second half-century is covered by the crowded events of Khushhal's own life and the rebellion of a
section of the Khataks, previously Mughal vassals, and a number of other tribes against the Emperor Aurangzeb, a rebellion of which Khushhal himself was the life and soul.

The struggle for Kandahar, outside the normal geographical purview of this record, explains so much of the later affinities and distinctions between the various groups of Afghan and Pathan tribes that it is necessary to refer to it here in some detail. With it is bound up the story of the emergence of the Abdalis (later the Durranis), of whom we now hear for the first time. To understand it we must go back to the times of Humayun and Akbar. Babur, we know, after a few years' interregnum following on the death of his kinsman Husain Baiqara of Herat, had captured Kandahar in 1522. On Babur's death in 1530 it passed into the possession of Mirza Kamran, Humayun's younger brother, who held it, nominally in fief but in actual independence, until Humayun with Persian assistance, took it from him in 1545 as the first move in staging his return to Hindustan, not effected until 1555. Humayun made Kandahar the fief of his great coadjutor Bairam Khan, the Turkmen, later Akbar's guardian and mentor. But Humayun had only succeeded in taking it from Kamran with the aid of the Safawi Shah of Persia, with whom he made a compact at the time, solemnly pledging himself to hand the city and province to Persia in the event of his recovery of Hindustan.

Humayun himself died too soon after his return to Delhi to do anything to redeem this promise. He had left one Shah Muhammad in charge of the place as deputy to Bairam Khan, whose fief it was. On Humayun's death in 1556, the governor of the neighbouring Zamindawar region attacked the city, and Shah Muhammad, knowing that the young Akbar, with Bairam Khan in attendance, was far too fully occupied in establishing himself in Hindustan to spare forces for Kandahar, applied to the Shah of Persia for aid, citing the terms of the compact Humayun had made. The Shah despatched a strong force which drove off the besiegers and in due course signified his readiness to take over Kandahar as stipulated. But Shah Muhammad, having got what he wanted, declined to fulfil his side of the bargain. The Shah, greatly enraged, sat down to besiege the city in his turn.

The year was 1558, and Akbar, only sixteen years old, had plenty to occupy him. Moreover he was beginning to feel the trammels of the tutelage in which he was held by the great Regent,
Bairam Khan, and was probably not too unready to give away a point more likely in his youthful judgment to hurt his guardian than himself. At any rate strict orders were sent to Shah Muhammad to honour the compact made by Humayun, to deliver up Kandahar to the officers of the Shah of Persia, and having made apology for what had passed, to present himself at court. He did so, and Kandahar city and province remained a part of the Safawi Empire for the following thirty-seven years. It became the fief of the Persian prince, Sultan Husain Mirza, from him descending to his son Muzzaffar Mirza.

In 1587, the year after Raja Birbal’s death, Shah Abbas the Great ascended the Safawi throne at Isfahan. Kandahar was still a part of his dominions. Two years later Malik Saddo was chosen chief of the Abdalis living around Kandahar, his branch of the tribe becoming thereafter known as the Saddozais. This is the first historical reference to the Abdalis, though later tradition affirms that Abdal, the third son of Tarin, was contemporary with Mahmud of Ghazni, and Zirak, the progenitor of both the Popalzais (of whom the Saddozais are one branch) and the Barakzais, a contemporary of Timur Lang. Just as Malik Akoray accepted Akbar’s commission for policing the highroad to Peshawar from India, so did his contemporary, Malik Saddo, accept that of Shah Abbas for the safeguarding of portions of the road from Persia through Herat to Kandahar. In other words the Khataks and the Abdalis appear in history at almost the same moment, the former as Mughal vassals, the latter as Persian feudatories.

In 1595 Akbar succeeded in regaining possession of Kandahar, almost, it must be said, by treachery. He fomented disputes between Muzzaffar Mirza and his brothers, and succeeded in inducing one after the other to seek a comfortable and honourable refuge in India from the Uzbeks whom there is good reason to believe he was inciting to march on Kandahar. Muzzaffar was eventually manoeuvred into asking Akbar to depute an officer to take over charge. The Emperor, this time quite forgetful of his father’s compact with the Persians, complied with alacrity, and deputed one Shah Beg for the purpose, an officer who had been governor of Peshawar under his brother, Mirza Hakim. Kandahar then remained under the Mughals until 1622, when Jahangir once more lost it to Shah Abbas, who had never forgotten the disgrace of the city’s surrender to Akbar twenty-seven years before. Shah Abbas
died in 1629, and the Mughal, Shah Jahan, regained it in 1638 again by treachery (this time on the part of Ali Mardan Khan, the Safawi governor), but once more lost it in 1649. His sons Aurangzeb and Dara, during his reign, made strenuous efforts to bring Kandahar once more within the Mughal domain, but this time it had been lost for good. It is interesting that on both occasions the Mughals won by guile, and the Persian restorations were effected by force of arms.

The details of this up-and-down contest are beyond our pur-view. But a realization that the fortunes of Kandahar lay much more closely with Persia than with the Mughals goes far to explain the separate development of the Afghan tribes in the Kandahar area. The aggregate time during which the city was held by the Mughal emperors, Babur, Humayun, Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan, is only a little over fifty years; after 1649 it remained with Persia until the Ghalji rebellion of 1708. After a thirty years’ interlude, during which Kandahar was under a Ghalji ruler, it once more reverted to Persia under Nadir Shah.

During the time of Shah Abbas the Great, Malik Saddo not only guarded the Persian King’s highway but performed such outstanding service at the recapture of Kandahar from Jahangir in 1622 that he was honoured with the title Mir-i-Afaghinah. His tribe took sides throughout with the rulers of Isfahan against those of Delhi and Kabul, and were always well-treated by the Safawi rulers. It is curious that this should have been so, the Abdalis, like almost all Afghans, being Sunnis of the Hanafi school, as were the Mughals (when they were not, like Akbar, deviators), while the Persians were Shias. Raverty, I think, is right in assigning as one reason the fact that under the Safawis they were never subjected to what they regarded as the shame of having Hindu commanders set over them. They preferred a Shia overlord to a fellow-Hanafi who subjected them to such degradation.

We shall see that the connection thus set up between Malik Saddo and the Safawi dynasty of Persia over the struggle for Kandahar laid the foundation for the employment of the Abdalis a century later as the spearhead of Nadir Shah’s army. And when Nadir died, Ahmad Khan Abdali, Malik Saddo’s lineal descendant, was able to build for the first time an Afghan kingdom with a Persian bias on the ruins of Nadir’s conquests. This is not to say
that the ancestors of the Abdalis may not have had Persian affinities many centuries before the time of Shah Abbas the Great.\(^9\)

There is another offspring of this ding-dong struggle for Kandahar. During the short period from 1638 to 1649, when Shah Jahan for the last time obtained possession of the city for the Mughals by the treachery of Ali Mardan Khan, great efforts were made to build up a party of Mughal supporters among the Afghan tribes in the neighbourhood, mainly Abdalis. The opponents of Malik Saddo’s faction within the tribe, mainly of the Alizai section but including a few Saddozais, espoused the Mughal cause. On the city’s recapture in 1649 by Shah Abbas II, the Safawi, these supporters fled to join the army of the prince Aurangzeb, deputed by his father Shah Jahan to retake it. They took part in more than one attempt, first by Aurangzeb and later by his brother Dara Shukoh, made between 1649 and 1653 to effect yet one more change in fortune. On the final failure to recover Kandahar for Delhi this party among the Abdalis abandoned their country rather than submit to Persia. Aurangzeb, when he became emperor, showed his gratitude for their aid and fidelity by establishing them as a colony in Multan, where they were joined by many of their relations and dependants, and became well known as the Multani Afghans. The governorship of Multan, and that of the adjacent Derajat, was always in the hands of one of this colony, Saddozai or Alizai, throughout the Mughal period of decadence and until Multan and the Derajat were conquered by Ranjit Singh early in the nineteenth century. Descendants of these Multani Afghans are still prominent in politics and public office in West Pakistan today. Some have forgotten their Pashtu, but their ancestry and history is remembered with pride.

The struggle for Kandahar did not absolve Akbar’s successor from tribal troubles much nearer home. Jahangir’s first concern with the Frontier region was when in 1607, the third year of his reign, he visited Kabul and took occasion to cover the grave of Babur, his great-grandfather, with a slab of marble, and a trellised maqbara of the same material. Jahangir’s passion for gracious living did not prevent him from sparing some attention to affairs of state in these parts. The most successful of his father’s officers seemed to him to be Shah Beg who had taken possession of Kandahar twelve years earlier; so to him he accorded governance
over 'the whole and troublous Sarkar of Kabul, Tirah, Bangash, Swat and Bajaur, with entire control over the Afghans of these regions, an assignment of their territories in jagir, and the title of Khan-i-Dauran (Chief of the Age)'. The specification of Tirah and Bangash was not without reason; the Roshaniyya movement had raised its head again and was giving constant trouble.

After the death of Jalala, the headship of the Roshaniyya sect had gone to his nephew Ihdad, son of Bayazid's eldest son, Shaikh Umar. Ihdad had married Bibi Alai, Jalala's daughter, a woman of great beauty and character, 'beloved of all the Roshanis', says Khushhal Khan, as always stirred by a pretty face. Between them Ihdad and Alai had many followers among the Tirah tribes, Afridis, Orakzais and Bangash, and moved from one mountain stronghold to another. Shah Beg managed with great difficulty to avoid a test of strength, but in 1620 matters came to a head after he had been succeeded by Mahabat Khan as governor of Kabul. Mahabat Khan — the same who later turned against the Empress Nur Jahan, and sought to confine the Emperor himself on the banks of the Jihlam — employed much the same order of treatment in his dealings with the Roshanis. Hearing that Ihdad's chief supporters were to be found among the Orakzais of the Daulatzai branch, residing close to Kohat, he summoned them to an audience, and after feasting them and getting them to give up their arms under pretence of conferring honorary dresses on them, slaughtered them to the number of three hundred. Believing that he had broken the back of the resistance, he despatched a subordinate, Ghairat Khan, with orders to root out Ihdad and his remaining followers, who were then occupying a position in the upper Mastura Valley in Tirah.

The Mughal forces marched from Kohat and up the Khanki Valley to the Sampagga Pass, the easiest crossing from Khanki into the Mastura, by which the invading British troops entered Tirah after their capture of the Samana and Dargai heights in 1897. The pass is not a very difficult one in itself, and can be studied in its southern approaches from the opposing Samana range, but the ascent is long and exhausting, and the summit over 6,000 feet above the sea. The story of the battle is told both by Khushhal Khan and by Jahangir in his memoirs. The crest was held by Afridis and Orakzais, under Ihdad and an Orakzai Malik named Tor, the black. Ghairat Khan, the Mughal commander, pushed on
and led the advance to the crest, where hand-to-hand fighting broke out. The assaulting troops had climbed at least 3,000 feet from the valley below and were short of breath. A Firoz Khel Orakzai named Panju singled out Ghairat Khan, rushed forward and closed with him. Both fell, rolling one over the other. In Homeric fashion, Panju cried out to his clansmen: ‘Strike, kill me also, but let him not go!’ And so they did, and both were slain, locked in an embrace. A fierce battle followed, but the Mughals were at a disadvantage, not knowing the ground and weary with the ascent, and the tribesmen had their way. Says Jahangir: ‘Ghairat Khan, who was of the hottest temperament and ever ready to rush upon his foes, did not approve of counsels of prudence, and determined to attack forthwith. He began the ascent, and the Afghans, like ants and locusts, collecting from different parts, completely surrounded the attacking force. They hamstrung the horse of Ghairat Khan, and, having dismounted him, soon despatched him and his comrades. At the time when Ghairat made his attack upon the enemy, Jalal Khan, the Gakhar, who had sought to give Ghairat prudent counsel, and other servants of the state, fearing for their lives and unable to stand their ground and almost against their will, turned and fled from every part of the Kotal. The Afghans, crowding from different parts of the Kotal above, plied them with stones and arrows, surrounded the fugitives and slew the greater number of the troops most mercilessly. Among the slain was Jalal, as well as Ghairat; and all this loss was sustained through the rash and reckless zeal of Ghairat Khan.’

Six years after this victory, Ihdad met his death in fighting against Muzaffar Khan, son of a new governor, in a skirmish in the Lowaghahar hills in the south of the Kohat district. He was slain when moving from one stone Jangar to another, and his head, staff and signet ring were brought in and presented to Jahangir just before the Emperor started for Kabul in 1626. Ihdad’s followers gathered again in Tirah under the inspiration of his beautiful widow, by whose influence the leadership of the Roshaniyya came into the hands of his and her son, Abdul Qadir. A year later Jahangir died, and was succeeded by his son Shah Jahan.

Muzaffar Khan, the slayer of Ihdad, was raised as reward from the position of his father’s deputy to governorship of the province. In Shah Jahan’s first year Muzaffar Khan determined at once to march from Peshawar to Kabul, though strongly advised
to wait until the disturbances always attendant on the death of a sovereign had died down. He would not listen, and ran into heavy trouble in the Khaibar Pass where, as says the *Badshah-nama* of Shah Jahan: 'Suddenly the beast-of-prey-like Orakzais and Afridis, two branches of the many-branched, tumult-raising, Afaghinah of this mountainous tract, outwardly obedient servitors but inwardly delighting in disorder and ever-ready to plunder and molest, occupied the road in his front and began to plunder the baggage of his force. As he left no officer of experience to guard his rear, a deal of property was carried off; and he did nothing to remedy this disorder nor the loss and damage sustained by his troops or camp followers, and neither halted nor turned back to aid them.'

This attack was organized by Bibi Alai and her son Abdul Qadir. Muzaffar fled and even the beauties of his qanana fell into the hands of the tribes, only one lady being saved and ransomed by the efforts of the deputy governor of Kohat, Said Khan, a new name which now does something to redeem the unbroken tale of Mughal disaster in these lands.

Muzaffar Khan's ignominy led to a general rising under the Roshani Abdul Qadir, from which there stood aloof only the Khalils, Mohmands and Daudzais around Peshawar, and the main body of the Khataks under Shahbaz Khan, father of Khushhal and grandson of Malik Akoray. Afridis, Orakzais, Bangash, the hill Mohmands from Michni to Lalpura, Yusufzais, Muhammadzais, Gigianis and Tarklanris, even the tribes of Bannu and Daur and the Turis and the Jajis, gathered in a vast lashkar at Ilm Gudar, where the Bara River enters the Peshawar plain. This host prepared to invest the city of Peshawar itself. On 12th June, 1630, just as their successors were to do on another June day exactly three hundred years later, they surrounded the city walls, which they well knew were too extensive to be defended at every point by the forces then available.

Khushhal Khan's account is a warning to all who are anxious that the Pathans should take a place in history worthy of their talents and their courage. He proceeds: 'The Mughal garrison of Pekhawar had to throw themselves into the citadel, and the place was completely invested. At this time Said Khan, who was Faujdar of Bangash, prepared to march from Kohat to the relief of the garrison. At first Abdul Qadir and his forces undertook the invest-
ment alone, but when the other tribes assembled to aid him, with the usual stupidity and wrong-headedness of Pakhtuns, they became jealous of him whom they came to support, thinking that he was taking all the credit to himself. They began to speak in no friendly manner about him, and he, knowing therefrom that they would in all probability intrigue with the Mughals, feared lest they might betray him into Mughal hands. Such being the case, he decamped one night and retired into Tirah again, and the different tribes meditated upon dispersal. Said Khan from Kohat having now arrived upon the scene, and news of the partial dispersal of the investors having become known to the garrison, they issued from the citadel under Said Khan, attacked the Pakhtuns that remained, and slew a great number, many having been caught in the streets and lanes of the city unaware of the dispersal of the others. In this affair a great number of Yusufzais and Gigianis were also killed. After this affair, concludes Khushhal, 'the Mughal authority began to be recognized in the province.'

Shah Jahan was so pleased with Said Khan that he made him governor of Kabul, and raised him to the rank of commander of 3,000 horse. Nor was this all. Such was Said Khan's newly acquired prestige that he was able by a combination of tact and firmness to prevail on Bibi Alai and her son Abdul Qadir to surrender on safe-conduct. Said Khan was not only brave, he was a fair dealer and a just man. Abdul Qadir died of his hardships, but a natural death, a few months after his surrender. His mother, Alai, with one of her brothers, Rashid Khan, and a number of other Tarikis, the source of the rebel activities around Peshawar and Kohat, duly appeared before the Emperor in Delhi, where they were kindly treated and sent with rank and dignity to the Deccan provinces, where they were allowed to gather round them their adherents in the empire's service. All in all, the descendants of the Pir-i-Roshan, or Pir-i-Tarik, were well treated by Shah Jahan. Rashid Khan retired to a place near Farrukhabad on the Ganges, where he died in 1647. Another descendant, Mirza, the Ansari, the most mystical of Pakhtu poets, was killed in 1633, fighting for the Emperor in the Deccan. The faithful say that, before his death, Mirza Ansari forswore the tenets of his grandfather and embraced orthodoxy, and he is still greatly respected, not least by the orthodox. His poems, I think, show otherwise, for he writes:
From every saint who has set out on a mission
Some sign becomes manifest;
The doubts of Mirza are resolved and are no more,
And Mian Roshan speaks through his mouth.

And of his early death:
As the rose blooms, so also it fades away,
As the short life of the rose, so is mine counted;
Still is death better for me than life itself,
Since my soul I have abandoned for the love of
the beloved.

Of the Roshanis or Tarikis as an organized movement we hear
no more. But in Tirah they left followers who became champions,
Azar Mir, an Orakzai, and Yusuf, an Afridi, so valiant a swordsmen
that his deeds are acclaimed in ballads sung today. The sect
itself died, but the hold of the Afridis on the freedom of Tirah is a
tradition, still living, which the sect had done much to inspire.

Abdul Qadir's right hand in the investment of Peshawar was a
disciple named Kamaluddin, not of the Ansari family but a Pathan
whose father had been one of Jahangir's nobles. As an apostate
who did not belong to the family of the Roshaniyya leaders his
name has been subject to particular execration, and has been
coupled with that of Jalala himself, the first Khalifa after Bayazid.
There are two famous black rocks in the bed of the Indus, just
below its confluence with the Landai and near Attock Fort, known
to all as Jalaliya and Kamaliya. Upon them many boats are dashed
in flood time and broken up, just as the orthodox say that souls
were destroyed upon the doctrines of the Pir-i-Tarik himself.
There is also a hill — the highest in the Khatak range close to
Cherat — which bears the name of Jalala Sar, and commemorates
with less bigotry than the rocks the undoubted power and genius
of Bayazid, his sons, and grandsons. Whatever their doctrines,
history shows that the free Pathan spirit owes a debt to these men.
Even one of their achievements has more in it to stir the heart
than all the words of their opponent, the Akhund Darwezah.
Khushhal Khan, who makes a great point of his orthodoxy,
writes of Mirza Ansari, and Akhund Darwezah like this:
The art of Pakhtu poetry I have learned from no man;
The Mirza who wrote sweet verses is long since dead,
The book of Akhund Darwezah I have read from end to end,
And in it found no poetic measure for delight...
He is not far wrong. And this he writes in spite of his strong assertion of orthodoxy:

Those who are enemies of the Prophet’s companions and descendants
    I am ready to destroy, root and branch;
The masters of the true way are four in number, not five;
    A Hanafi of the Sunni faith am I...

Khushhal always speaks admiringly of the Emperors Jahangir and Shah Jahan. Jahangir, it is true, died before Khushhal came to manhood — he was about fourteen at the time — so his memories were no doubt reflections of what he had heard his father Shahbaz say, and his words may have been coloured by bright thoughts of his own youth when he wrote that, in Jahangir’s reign, Hind was like paradise. But Shah Jahan he knew personally, and served. He had walked more than once through the Khaibar by the Emperor’s litter and he admired him. He wrote of him as qadrđan Shah Jahān, Shah Jahan the discerning, and in more than one passage laments that his poverty of expression precludes him from offering the praise that the monarch deserved. In 1641 his father Shahbaz, like Akoray and Yahya Khan before him, was killed fighting against the Yusufzais, and Shah Jahan confirmed Khushhal as the Khatak chief and guardian of the King’s highway to Peshawar. He went to the Delhi court where he got himself attached to Amanat Khan and Asalat Khan, leading nobles, and in their train took part in various campaigns in Kangra, Balkh and Badakhshan, where he won considerable distinction.

But the story of Khushhal’s family must be seen against the background of the continual wars and forays which went on in the Peshawar Valley between the Yusufzais and the Khataks. It will be remembered that the Khataks had taken advantage of Akbar’s attempted suppression of the Yusufzais after the Birbal disaster to occupy parts of the Samah north of the Landai River. This led to a century-long tribal feud, in the course of which Khushhal’s great-grandfather, grandfather, and father all met what he describes as a martyr’s death. In fact from Akbar’s time to that of Aurangzeb the opposition to Mughal predominance was led by the Yusufzais, while the pro-Mughal party looked to Malik Akoray and his successors as its leaders. The Yusufzai-Khatak wars had, therefore, a family, tribal and state background.
In 1649–52 Khushhal, having become the Khatak chief and on return from his wars in foreign countries, decided to take the struggle against the Yusufzais on his home front to a further stage and succeeded in inducing Shah Jahan, who was still Emperor, to add certain Yusufzai villages north of the Landai River to his jagir. This was too much for the Yusufzais, who determined to see what could be done by offering at least a nominal submission to Delhi. Their chief, Bahaku Khan, appeared at court and succeeded in securing the protection of the emperor’s son, the ill-fated Dara Shukoh, who persuaded Shah Jahan to pardon the Yusufzais and withdraw the Yusufzai area from Khushhal’s jagir, conferring it on Bahaku. Thus rivalry between Yusufzai and Khatak was mixed with court intrigue, and was soon caught up in the struggle for the succession. During the war of succession, Bahaku, as in duty bound, supported Dara; Khushhal, who had been approached by Dara but had rebuffed him, prevented the Yusufzais from offering him asylum in the Samah by driving off a Yusufzai lashkar which was awaiting the fugitive on the river bank. When, therefore, Aurangzeb emerged successful from the struggle, he was at first favourably inclined to Khushhal Khan and confirmed him in his chieftainship.

At this time Mahabat Khan was Governor of Kabul. This is not the Mahabat Khan whose name figures so largely in the annals of Jahangir’s reign — he had died in the Deccan in 1634 — but another, the son of Ali Mardan Khan, the Safawi noble who had betrayed Kandahar to Shah Jahan. This is the Mahabat Khan commemorated in Peshawar in the name of the chief mosque of that city. He had been favourable to Khushhal Khan, but in 1661 Aurangzeb transferred him to the Deccan and appointed Sayyid Amir in his place, with one Abdurrahim as his deputy in Peshawar. The normal Mughal arrangement was for the Governors of Kabul to reside according to season in Kabul or Peshawar, with headquarters at the former place, but to retain a deputy who remained in Peshawar throughout the year and bore the heavy responsibilities of the winter capital during the summer residence of the Governor at Kabul.

Abdurrahim, it seems, favoured the Yusufzais in the person of Bahaku Khan and obtained an imperial mandate for the abolition of the collection of tolls for crossing the Indus. A general remission of tolls had been ordered shortly after Aurangzeb’s accession
but had not been extended to the Frontier, where special conditions prevailed. Since Akbar's time the collection of the Attock tolls was a right which had vested in Malik Akoray and his successors, and it follows that Khushhal was hard hit by the new orders and greatly resented what had been done. An endeavour was made to justify the measure as one of relief to the common man, but even if it is not to be attributed merely to Yusufzai envy and intrigue against an hereditary enemy, it is hard not to conclude it was prompted by influences which felt Khushhal and his Khataks had for too long enjoyed a monopoly of imperial favour at the cost of other and possibly even more difficult and dangerous tribes.

Khushhal did not proceed to overt action against the new measure. But in 1664 he was summoned to Peshawar by Sayyid Amir and at the age of fifty-one dispatched in chains and under escort to Delhi, whence he was sent forward to spend over two years as a prisoner in the Ranthambhor fortress. And even on release from Ranthambhor he remained under house arrest, and was not permitted to return to his country. Sayyid Amir remained as governor for seven years, but conditions were far from peaceful, particularly among the Yusufzais, and Khushhal was in due course released and according to his own account asked by the Emperor in person for his advice on the most suitable appointment to the Frontier. Sayyid Amir was removed in 1668 and Mahabat Khan returned to his old post. At Mahabat's special request Khushhal was set at liberty, and accompanied him. But shortly after, early in 1670, Mahabat was again relieved and replaced by Muhammad Amin Khan, who had been Governor of Lahore. Amin was the son of a diamond merchant from Golkonda in the Deccan, and a person to whom Aurangzeb had taken a fancy and raised to high office. He is represented as dissolute, and so overbearing that no one dared to oppose his wishes. It was not long before his arrogance was punished.

Some soldiers serving under Amin's subordinate in the Kunar Valley, one Husain Beg, had insulted a woman of the Safi tribe who lived in that neighbourhood. The Safis, a pugnacious lot, killed three of the soldiers, whereupon Husain Beg called on the Safi chiefs to seize and deliver those responsible. They refused. Other neighbouring tribes and vassals were called on to burn their villages. These attended under the term of service under
which they held jagirs, but secretly sent word to the Safis warning them of what was brewing and to tell them they considered they had acted like men. The attack was foiled, and tribal indignation aroused all over the area from Kunar to Tirah.

Husain Beg reported what had happened, with the result that Amin, the Governor, determined to march from Peshawar earlier than usual on the annual migration to Kabul, teaching the Safis a lesson on the way. The Mohmands and Safis formed a tribal confederacy with large numbers of Afridis and Shinwaris to oppose the passage of the royal troops, and took post for the purpose on the edge of the Loargai plateau, at the top of the Khaibar Pass, at the point between the modern Landi Kotal and Landi Khana where the road dips towards the valley on the side of Afghanistan. It is the scene of the attack on Pandit Nehru during his visit to the Khaibar Pass in the autumn of 1946.

Amin Khan set out in the early spring of 1672. He was accompanied by the Arbab of the Mohmand plainsmen near Peshawar, certain Orakzai chiefs, and an unwilling Khushhal Khan, who seems to have been present rather in the capacity of a hostage. Word had reached the Governor that the tribesmen had blocked the pass, so, while the army encamped at Jamrud on the Peshawar side, the Arbab was sent forward with a jirga to demand withdrawal and free passage. This was refused, and it was determined to force a way through. Amin reached Ali Masjid, and passed the narrows beyond it without serious molestation, but on arrival at Loargai found the Kotal closed by breastworks thrown right across the defile. The army was formed in battle array with the elephants in advance and an attack was ordered.

The tribal resistance had been organized mainly under the direction of two Afridi chiefs, Aimal Khan and Darya Khan, whose names appear constantly in Khushhal's poems and other works as the heroes of the Pakhtuns of those days. Stones and boulders had been piled up ready for use and were hurled down on the attackers. On both flanks the Mughal leaders were killed and the troops forced back with great loss. The tribesmen rushed in with the sword with great effect. Fighting continued all day, but the entrenchments remained and the pass could not be forced.

It was now represented to Amin Khan that the pass might be turned by way of the Tahtarra stream over the shoulder of the Tahtarra mountain where also water was procurable and in any
case a stand could be made. This was treachery, and the shattered force proceeding on the path to Tahtarra went only to destruction. On the way a tribesman in Amin’s confidence warned him that, if he went further by the Tahtarra route, he would be lost, and offered to guide him by secret paths back to Peshawar. It is related that Amin himself and four others were the sole survivors. Everything was lost — troops, treasure, elephants, families, including Amin’s own wife, mother, sister and daughters, and the wives and families of the nobles and officers serving under him. Later some of the women were ransomed, but his wife, from a high sense of honour — the reason is clear — refused to return and became a recluse. The tribesmen, through the mouth of Khushhal, claimed that they had inflicted a loss of 40,000 on the Mughal armies. What Khushhal himself did during the fighting is not clear; it is probable that he did not go beyond Jamrud.

There followed further disasters to Mughal arms, in 1673 in Gandab, and in 1674 in the Khapakh Pass, both in the Mohmand hill country, north-west of Shabqadr. Amin Khan had of course been removed, and once more was replaced by Mahabat Khan, on whom alone Aurangzeb thought he could rely for the governance of the refractory and dangerous tribes on his frontier. The Emperor himself in 1674 went north to superintend operations. After Amin Khan’s defeat in the Khaibar, Mahabat Khan had sought to prevail on Khushhal’s loyalty as a Khatak vassal, but the latter wrote that he had had enough of the Mughals and their ways and went into active opposition. In 1674 just before the overthrow of Aurangzeb’s forces at Khapakh, Khushhal and Aimal Khan, Afridi, staged a joint attack on the fort at Nowshera and carried it. He also resigned the chiefship of his tribe to his eldest son, Ashraf, regarding himself henceforth as a rebel and outlaw. The rest of his life is a confused patchwork of forays, journeys into various tribal areas to seek assistance, half-hearted reconciliations with the authorities, and quarrels with many of his own sons, more than one of whom, notably Bahram, turned against him and took the Mughal side. What the Emperor had failed to do by force of arms he later achieved to some extent with gold.

Khushhal himself died in 1689. His son Ashraf was in his turn imprisoned and sent in 1683 as a state prisoner to Bijapur where he died after ten years’ languishment in exile, bewailing his fate.
in a number of odes, for he too was a poet. Later annals, more particularly the writings of Afzal, Ashraf’s son, who acted as tribal aide to Shah Alam, the Emperor’s son who subsequently succeeded to the throne as Bahadur Shah, establish that, during the last ten years of Aurangzeb’s reign, no part of what are now the Kohat and Bannu districts was subject to effective Mughal domination. When news arrived in 1707 of Aurangzeb’s death, Afzal was with Shah Alam at Attock and was left in charge of his family’s old responsibility, the highway to Peshawar. For most of the years after that until Nadir’s invasion in 1739 the Kabul province, and Peshawar with it, was left without a governor to take care of itself, and it is no matter for surprise that, when Nadir arrived, he had so often to complain of what he attributed to the unwillingness, not the inability, of the Delhi ruler to restrain the hostility of tribes over whom, even in the zenith of their power, the Mughal hold was never secure. Raverty writes that as early as the middle of Aurangzeb’s reign — he might have gone back further, even to Akbar — Mughal control was nominal, and soon after almost ceased. It was on this account that Nadir Shah found it so easy to invade the Mughal Empire, for the only opposition he met with was from separate Frontier tribes. India itself was so rent with sedition, disaffection and disorder as to render the task of the invader easy.

Khushhal’s patriotic poems are inspired by two passions, the first his hatred and contempt for the Emperor Aurangzeb, the second his pride in what he calls the nang, the honour, of the Afghan or Pakhtun — he uses both designations without any attempt to discriminate between the names. The following are translations of typical specimens of what he wrote in this field.

The first poem — one which starts with the words Biā lah kuma rā paidā shuh dā bahār — I have tried to set in some form of English heroic rhymed couplet which shall give an idea of the spirit of the Pakhtu; the remainder are translations in vers libre, based on work done ninety and seventy years ago by Raverty and Biddulph, with some amendment to improve the sense. As Elphinstone remarks, the invocation to the spring in this first poem, which is a war ballad, is reminiscent of old English romances opening with a prelude of the same kind, unconnected with the subject of the poem.
O spring, O spring I love, whence hast thou come?
O fields that glow like rose-plots, glow and bloom!
O lily, O wind-flower, O daffodil,
Pomegranate, jasmine, herb of sweet basil,
O rainbow glory for a carpet spread,
With, brightest gem, the tulip glowing red!
See! every maid plucks roses for her breast,
And flowers adorn each youth's proud turban crest,
While quivering bow searches a melody
And each string throbs with long-drawn ecstasy.
Cup-bearer, fill the flagon, fill it high;
Khushhal shall sing of war in revelry!
Now blood has dyed the hands of Pakhtun youth,
The talons of the hawk that knows no ruth;
Rosier than tulips, redder than this wine,
Gleamed their bright swords with blood incarnadine;
Aimal and Darya Khan, those champions two,
Each emulous the other to outdo,
Have stained the cleft of Khaibar red with blood,
Over Karappa pours the raging flood;
Karappa to Bajaur the mountains shake,
Beneath the tramp of feet the valleys quake.
For full five years the tribal sword has flashed
Keen-edged and bright, since first the battle clashed
Upon Tahtarra's peak, where at one blow
Twice twenty thousand of the Mughal foe
Perished, wives, sisters, all that they held dear,
Fell captive to the all-conquering Afghan spear.
Next in Doaba smote we Husain Bek,
And crushed his unclean head, that venomous snake;
Then, at Nowshera, drunk with Mughal blood,
My Khataks washed their swords in Landai's flood;
The torrent of our war spilled o'er Gandaf,
Swept down their Rajput chivalry like chaff;
Afridi hearts in Khapakh's vale beat faster,
When Aimal sent Mukarram to disaster.
In all, our gain was glory, our glory gain;
Minstrels shall sing of us — 'Yeal these were men!'
Proud conquerors we, raise up, raise up the sword,
A sacrifice for favour of the Lord!
This year Aurang himself has pitched his tent
To fight us, haggard-eyed, disordered, spent;
Year after year we draw his nobles' sting.
Of all those hosts where is the reckoning?
And where, force failing, all the wealth of Hind,
Spread for our tempting? Blown upon the wind!
No limit is known to Aurang's ill intent,
His father's curse pursues him to the end,
False-faced and faithless, fraudulent, forsworn,
To him truth is lies, and honest men a scorn;
'Twixt him and us fair issue is there none,
If Mughal stand, then broken falls Pakhtun;
The time is now, if God will that we die;
The spheres of heaven revolve uncertainly,
Now blooms the rose, now sharply pricks the thorn,
Glory's the hazard, O man of woman born!
The very name Pakhtun spells honour and glory,
Lacking that honour what is the Afghan story?
In the sword alone lies our deliverance,
The sword wherein is our predominance,
Whereby in days long past we ruled in Hind,
But concord, we know not, and we have sinned.
Ah God! Grant honour, concord, sweet refrain,
And old Khushhal will rise, a youth again!
Sweeter to him is death than any life,
Missing the spur of honour, the thrill of strife;
In life, in death, let honour be his guide
So shall his memory in the grave abide!

This poem is a revelation of much that is admirable in the person of Khushhal himself and of the lights and shades in Pathan character generally, in its more inspired moments. Every word is instinct with fortitude and a simple manliness. There are no introspections here; Khushhal, like most Pathans, despised subtleties and saw life but as a clash of opposites, for God and friends a clean-cut loyalty, for the unworthy, the enemy, a hatred and an abomination.

The poet-warrior's deepest loathing and contempt was reserved for Aurangzeb, the Emperor. More than twenty of his compositions introduce this theme, coupled with that of Aurangzeb's imprisonment of his own father and murder of his brothers, and of what the poet regarded as the mask of religious hypocrisy beneath which a cold and calculating tyrant worked out policies, all evil to Khushhal. The bitterest of his attacks is contained in the poem which follows:
I know well Aurangzeb’s justice, his equity,  
His orthodoxy in the Faith, his fasts and penances;  
His own brothers, time after time, cruelly slain by the sword,  
His father overcome in battle and thrown in prison!  
Though a man strike his head on the ground a thousand times,  
Or by fastings bring his navel and spine together,  
Unless he desire in truth to act with goodness,  
His adorations, his devotions, are all false, and a lie.  
The way of whose tongue is one, and of his heart another,  
Let his very vitals be torn out and lacerated!  
Outwardly the serpent is handsome and well-formed,  
In the inward parts it is unclean and filled with venom.  
The true man’s deeds are many, but few his words,  
The recreant’s acts are few and ill, his boastsings many:  
Since Khushhal’s arm cannot reach the tyrant in this world,  
May God Almighty have no mercy on him in the day of doom!

There is a strong school of historians engaged on the rehabilitation of Aurangzeb, whom many admire for his orthodox piety and zeal, as contrasted with the deviations of Akbar, and the self-indulgence of Jahangir. He is offered as a saint who displayed upon the throne the austere virtues of primitive Islam, his fratricides committed according to the custom of the times in self-defence against brothers interested only to obtain the throne in order to indulge their profligacy. Others, like Khushhal, continue to regard him as the English Protestant has been taught to regard Philip II of Spain, a man of misguided religious zeal, narrowly conscientious and persistent in attention to detail, but in essence a monster of perfidy, concealing a sinister purpose behind every action. Here we are concerned not with an assessment of these contrasts, but with the impact of the Emperor’s actions on the minds of the Pathans in the empire’s Frontier Province.

In considering these it is fair to note two things. The first is that Khushhal had good reason for disliking a ruler who had deprived him of the ferry and highway tolls enjoyed by his forefathers since they were granted by Akbar to Akoray. Those who defend Aurangzeb point out that this deprivation was not peculiar to the Attock highway; it was part of a general act of remission of all the taxes collected on every highway, frontier and ferry throughout the empire; it was in fact one incident in a general policy designed to benefit the trader and the common man, and it can be represented as a wise act of statesmanship, resistance to
which on the part of Khushhal and others was self-interested and small-minded. The second point is that the alienation of Khushhal and his Khataks was bound up with the local tribal aversion of Khatak for Yusufzai; a rapprochement with the Yusufzais inevitably spelt the cold-shouldering of at least one faction, that of the chief, among the Khataks. And in all this no doubt the local officials, including Sayyid Amir, the Governor of the time, were able to find much that was intriguing and profitable to themselves. In other words, Khushhal should have poured the vials of his wrath not on the wise and well-meaning Emperor, whose only fault was that he decreed measures for the public good which impinged on private vested interests, but on the Yusufzais and the local officials whom they misled.

There is substance in this. But for Khushhal too there is this to be said. He did not resist the withdrawal of the right to collect tolls; he did not go into rebellion over it. Yet, despite twenty years' personal service to the monarchy, and the loyalty of father, grandsire, and great-grandsire to the empire's cause, in 1664 he was placed under arrest at Peshawar, sent to Delhi in chains, confined at Ranthambhor for over two years, and not released until 1668 on the special intervention of Mahabat Kahn. What of that, say Aurangzeb's partisans? Given the vitriolic attacks of the poet on his king, and knowing as we now do that Khushhal's release was a main factor leading to a dangerous rebellion on the empire's most difficult frontier in the course of which the imperial armies were defeated in six pitched battles, Khushhal was lucky to escape with four years' restraint. Aurangzeb would have been justified in cutting off his head, and the fact that he did not do so shows his magnanimity. In proof of Khushhal's treachery it is pointed out that Khushhal was with Amin before the battle in the Khaibar, but his poems show that he not only gloried in Amin's defeat, the defeat of his commander and patron, but straightway went into open rebellion against his king, and spent the rest of his life in that fashion.

Khushhal had certainly the defects of a race never constant in respect for authority as such, and never forgetting a slight put on himself, as he saw it. Such men can be held only in the bonds of a loyalty which is personal to him to whom it is offered, and it is hard to think of any such emotional bond between the cold-blooded Emperor and his headstrong vassal in the north. Even now the tribal spirit is so strong in them that Pathans will chafe
under authority; three hundred years ago the slightest affront would rouse the instinct of the tribesmen to get free, to strike off every bond, and be a law to himself, obeying only the nang, the honour, of the Pathan. Khushhal would have seen no wrong, after the Khaibar fight, in going into outlawry. The chilly logic of the Emperor would have seemed to him hypocrisy.

All said, we have to judge between two men. Which voice is the more authentic, that of the King who killed his brothers and imprisoned his father to reach the throne, and, with all his genius and persistence, led an empire to corruption and decay; or that of the warrior-poet whose words still kindle fire in the hearts of his compatriots? The lover of the Pathan will have no doubt. Nevertheless the Pathan is not seldom a tiresome and contumacious subordinate. Even Khushhal had to lament the tribal lack of discipline, the unreadiness to work with others, the imputation of personal motives. One thing is certain: a government which acts as did that of Aurangzeb will never command Pathan loyalty.

We have seen that the feud between Khataks and Yusufzais had much to do with this estrangement. Since Akbar's time the Khataks had been encouraged by the empire as a makeweight against the Yusufzais, who had inflicted such heavy defeats on the imperial armies. It was a shift in the balance of power which had more to do than any other factor with the rebellion of Khushhal. And it must be noted here that not all his own tribe, not even all his own family, went into rebellion with him. A younger son, Bahram, consistently took the Mughal part, fought against his father, and even sought to secure his capture and surrender to the imperial authorities — an interesting side-light on Khushhal's laments over the lack of concord in his people. As for the Yusufzais, when Khushhal went into rebellion, he did all he could, forgetting the feuds of generations, to induce both the true Yusufzais of Swat and their brethren in the Samah to make common cause with him and his Khataks against the imperial power. As we know from his poem to spring, he had secured valiant assistance from the Afridis under their maliks Darya Khan and Aimal Khan, but with the Yusufzais he failed, and failed completely. And his failure was more or less inevitable; it was rooted in history. The Khataks had basked in Mughal smiles when the empire was fighting the Yusufzais; they had taken advantage of the imperial aid to occupy large slices of Yusufzai territory. Now that the Khataks were out
of favour, the Yusufzais saw no reason to help them — very much the reverse. Khushhal himself seemed unable to see this; he merely scorned the Yusufzais as cowards and opportunists. Some of the verses he wrote about them are amusing, but their colour has to be corrected with this in view. In Khushhal’s eyes they were double-dyed villains, first because they were hereditary foes and secondly because, when he approached them, they would not play. He writes:

I alone am concerned for my nation’s honour,  
The Yusufzais are at ease, tilling their fields. . . .

and again:

No great deed will be wrought by the Pathans,  
Heaven ordains that petty should be their achievement;  
I seek to set them straight, they straighten not;  
Crooked is the vision of the ill-intentioned.  
No regard have the Yusufzais for Pakhtu,  
Get you gone from these disgraced Pakhtuns, Khushhal!

During his wanderings in search of Yusufzai reinforcements he went as far as the Swat Valley — an unusual journey for a Khatak in those days, for the tribes were wont to keep to their own ranges. His descriptions of Swat are of great interest, both for what he says of the people, and even more because they introduce us to another marked trait in the poet’s character, his passion for the loveliness of nature’s settings, and particularly for flowers and verdure. In this he resembles Babur, and it may be said that every Pathan has in him something of the passion that haunted Wordsworth:

. . . Therefore am I still  
A lover of the meadows and the woods  
And mountains, and of all that we behold  
From this green earth. . . .

Of Swat, Khushhal writes:

In climate it is glorious, lovelier far than Kabul,  
Bleak is Kabul, Swat is mild and gentle,  
Its air and verdure are like unto Kashmir,  
Though it spreads not out so finely;  
In every home there are cascades and fountains,  
Fine cities there are, fine dwellings, and fair markets,
Khushhal Khan Khatak

The Emperor Aurangzeb

A Contrast
Such a country, with such a clime and such streams,
Wherein every place is by nature a garden of flowers,
Hath no homes, no gardens, no fragrance or freshness,
For the Yusufzais have made of it a desert.
Swat is meant to give kings gladness,
Every place in it befits a prince,
But the Yusufzais have no such feelings,
And have made of it a desolate hostel.

Contrast this with what the poet writes of his own country, the wild, desolate range of Khatak hills, running down to overshadow the confluence of the Indus and the Landai Rivers. It is the country for which he pined during the time of his imprisonment in Hindustan.

Blessings be on Akoray who chose Surai for his home,
Believe me, and well I know, it is of all places the place!
The dark mountain of Hodi runs straight up to Tirah,
The Nilablo and Landai rivers lie beneath its feet,
Along their banks runs the great highroad from Hind to Khurasan,
And there is the Attock ferry, at which prince and beggar tremble;
Every bounty that earth bears comes thither,
And when the rains fall, how lovely is the spring!
What of Swat, or Ashnagar or Pekhawar or other lands,
All bow down to it, and their bounty cometh thither.
On all sides is game, sport for falcon, hawk and hound,
Hail, hail, Kalapani, how ravishing the chase in thy paradise!
Stout and strong are its young men, nimble and active in all things,
Merry-eyed, fair and ruddy of countenance, tall in stature to behold;
May my sons, my grandsons, my family and all my tribe,
And all who dwell there, may they dwell in God's protection!
Woe is me! Fate has taken me from it. Whose arm can reach to heaven?
Never of his own will would Khushhal have left Surai.

There is another lament, written when the poet longed for his home:

O gentle morning breeze, shouldst thou pass by Khairabad,
Or should thy way lead thee by the side of Surai’s stream,
Whisper to them my greetings again, and yet again,
Salute them that I love so dearly,
To the mighty Aba-Sind\textsuperscript{10} cry out with a loud voice,
But whisper softly to the Landai\textsuperscript{11} stream!
It may be perchance that I shall again drink from thee,
Nor ever dwell beside the Ganga and the Jamna,
In Hind are no cool waters for refreshment,
God’s curse upon it, though it be full of luxury;
God grant that I may be one again with my beloved,
Not for ever will Khushhal remain in Hind.

Khushhal wrote many love lyrics, and indeed regarded himself as a very Bahram-Gur among lovers. He was the father of as many as thirty or more sons, and the number of his daughters is not recorded. One of his poems runs:

Two things do I love most in myself and in the world,
In myself mine eyes, and in the world fair women,
When I behold the beauty of the fair I feel I have found God,
Short is the distance ’twixt love sacred and profane. . . .

But love poetry does not come over easily from one tongue to another. Two of these poems are very well known, and less stereotyped than most verse based on the Persian tradition. One records in detail the physical charms of the Afridi girls in the Kohat Pass:

Fair and rosy are the Adam Khel maidens,
Among them are beauties of every type;
Large eyes they have, long lashes, and arched brows,
Sugar lips, flowered cheeks, and foreheads like the moon,
Tiny are their mouths as pouting rose-buds,
Their teeth are even and white,
Their skin so soft and glossy, and hairless as an egg-shell,
Their feet delicate, rounded the leg line and their hips magnificent,
Slender of belly, their breasts full and firm, and small waisted are they;
In stature straight as the letter Alif, and fair of colour —
Like the hawk has been my flight upon the mountains,
And many a plump pretty partridge has been my prey;
The hawk, young or old, seeks its quarry,
But the swoop of the old hawk errs not;
Love’s affairs are like fire, O Khushhal,
What though the flame be hidden, the smoke is seen!

The other is impossible to render into English. Each couplet ends with the chime of the Pakhtu phrase for \textit{n’est ce pas}, is it not? In
English there is no poetry in this; in Pakhtu it sounds like the challenge of a drum or a bell, and it is very effective.

The sword is sharpened for the blow, is it not?
The love-locks are curled for the beloved, are they not?
Why sayest thou to me, 'Look not on the fair'?
The eyes are given me for seeing, are they not?
Let the priest fast and pray, let the gallant take the flowing goblet,
Every man is created to fulfil his lot, is he not?
Saidst thou, 'My lips' kiss is like a healing draught,'
The draught I seek of thee is to heal my wound, is it not?
Thou drinkest my heart's blood, that is for thee alone,
My heart was made for thee so cruel, was it not?
Why dost thou weep over the black curls of thy beloved?
Thou didst seek those black tendrils of thine own self, didst thou not?
Here is wine, here is harp and flute, and thy beloved,
O Khushhal,
Thy tablets in hand, go into the garden, wilt thou not?

There is one little verse which is so exactly identical with Robert Bridges' triolet on the perversity of women that the best translation to give is in that poet laureate's own words:

All women born are so perverse,
No man need boast their love possessing,
If naught seem better, nothing's worse,
All women born are so perverse.
From Adam's wife, that proved a curse,
Though God had made her for a blessing,
All women born are so perverse
No man need boast their love possessing.

To go deeper, the thoughts of a fine and simple faith are ever present with Khushhal; his profane loves have not concealed from him the divine mercy for which he hopes:

Only one King I know, His orders I obey,
His yea, and His nay, alike, rule my life,
Aimal Khan and Darya Khan are present in His court,
Here am I, my God, I wait at Thy threshold!
One day will be heard the command, 'Come thou to Me',
Then eagerly will Thy slave run to Thee,
Though Thou dost rend the petitions I send Thee,
In words will I assail Thee in my prayers.
The Afridi chiefs whom he loved as doughty fighters on his side had gone before him, and he longed to be with them once more.

It is worth while to dwell at some length on Khushhal's life and thoughts, for he is a Pathan of Pathans. With all his weaknesses, with all his vainglory, there is something splendid about the man. He compels affection, and even love. And to understand him is the beginning of knowledge for him who would know Pathans.13 14

One day in the late spring of last year, on my way down from Peshawar to the Panjab, I went four miles off 'the great highroad from Khurasan to Hind' to visit the poet's grave. There are two hamlets just under the hills, the hamlets of Upper Surai — wrongly marked as Isori in the map — one named after a clear spring which rises in a little dale just above the grave. The graveyard looks north, and is high enough on the hill-skirts to command a view right across the Landai River and the great plain of the Samah to the splendid outline of the mountain ramparts of Buner and Swat, all land over which the poet had first fought, and later wandered, in search of the aid that never came from the Yusufzais. On the chosen evening the sun, which had just set over the plain, was still striking through spring storm-clouds over the mountains in shafts of light, and glimpses of the snow ranges in the further distance could still be seen. Over the Khatak hills to the south there was a deep quiet as before storm; there was no dust; the waters trickled from the spring in the glade behind the tomb, and a little later a muezzin called from the village mosque to prayer. The tomb is enclosed within a small gumbad or dome, erected by the pious of a much later generation. 'Why is it here, in so lonely a spot?' I asked the custodian. The answer came: 'The poet desired it, for he loved the countryside and flowers, and above all wished that in his resting-place he should not be disturbed by the clatter of the hooves of the Mughal cavalry, passing on the King's highway.'

The tomb is covered with a plain marble slab which bears the inscription:

*Da Afgān puṅ nang mi utarlab tūrah,*  
*Nang yāli da zamāne Khushhāl Khatak yam.*

I bound on the sword for the pride of the Afghan name,  
I am Khushhal Khatak, the proud man of this day.15
PART III

DURRANIS AND SIKHS

A.D. 1707-1849 (H. 1119-1266)
CHAPTER XVI

AHMAD SHAH

The Afghan drama, as it unrolls, offers incidents and spectacles hard to parallel in the history of other peoples. For we have seen what Elphinstone describes as a congeries of tribal commonwealths providing the military spearhead by whose thrust more than one conqueror has gained an empire, but unable in their own country to compose a State, much less a confederacy. Yet military adventurers drawn from these very tribes have found the strength to establish a government over most of northern Hindustan. Three times, under the Khalji, Lodi and Sur Kings, a Pathan dynasty had sat on the throne of Delhi, while the writ of Pathan princes had been obeyed from Mandu above the Narbadda to far-off Bengal. All those Delhi rulers, and most of the others were of Ghalji blood. Meanwhile, right through the centuries, the Eastern Afghan tribes, in the plains to some extent and in the hills absolutely, have resisted imperial encroachment of any durable kind, and still at the height of Mughal power in the seventeenth century continue to maintain a practical autonomy.

At the point we have reached, the beginning of the eighteenth century, Kabul remains attached to the Mughal Empire of Delhi, where Aurangzeb was still upon the throne. Kandahar, lost to the Safawis of Persia by Shah Jahan in 1649, stands in spite of every Mughal effort as the frontier city of the Shahinshah of Isfahan towards India. The vale of Peshawar, the mountains of Roh and all the low lands between the Sulaiman range and the Indus are still nominally within the Mughal frontiers, but Mughal writ runs uncertainly even in the plains and does not extend to the hill tracts. Even main lines of communication, such as that through the Khaibar, are continually subject to interruption, and regular administration, with all the detail of the Mughal revenue system, hardly reaches beyond the towns and lands adjacent to the highways. Peshawar itself is nominally part of the Mughal province of Kabul, under a Deputy Governor.
In 1707 Aurangzeb died. In 1708 perished Guru Govind, the tenth and last Guru of the Sikhs slain in revenge by the sons of a Pathan horse-dealer whom some years before Govind himself in a sudden passion had struck dead. In 1707 the Ghalji chief Mirwais rose against the Safawi Persians at Kandahar. These two years marked the beginning of the fall of both great Muslim empires, the Mughal and the Safawi, empires which between them had divided the eastern Iranian country for the last two hundred years. The border provinces of both these empires were torn away. In the interspace were to arise two new States, Afghanistan and the Kingdom of the Sikhs. At long last the Afghans were to found a State in their own country.

In far-off pre-Islamic times, metropolitan Persia or kindred Sakas and Kushans from the fringe had concentrated in their hands a power which was Iranian in origin and inspiration and included what is now Afghanistan. But after A.D. 1000 the whole country, from Herat to the Indus, had either formed part of Turkish or Turco-Mongol principalities, or had been split up between empires based on Persia and India. It was the rising of Mirwais in Kandahar which proved to be the first step in the revival of a separate East Iranian State. Again, as in the case of 'the Pathan Kings of Delhi', it was a Ghalji who trained and fired the fuse.

This is not the record of Persia. But just as in the earlier centuries before the coming of Islam we have found the Frontier's fate bound up with events in West Iran or even on the banks of the Tigris, so here, in the eighteenth century, the whole construction is dependent on a Persian foundation. For the story of Mirwais leads up to Nadir Shah, and Nadir, the usurper of the Persian throne, was in a very real sense the founder of the Durrani Empire of Afghanistan. Nor is this a chronicle of the Durranis, but the story of Roh cannot be understood without an account of the events whereby the Durranis were able for a period to include within their territory all the Afghan and Pathan peoples up to the Indus, and indeed beyond. The pressures which in that region affect international policies even today are partly the resultant of forces set in motion in the period which saw the fall of the Safawi and Mughal Empires of Persia and India in the eighteenth century.

Mirwais was a valiant warrior of the Hotak clan of the Ghaljis living close to Kandahar. He rose against the Persian governor of
the province, represented by the Afghan writers as a violent Georgian and known to them as Gurgin. The Afghan accounts suggest a character as ruthless and as good a hater as Stalin, but lacking Stalin's finesse. By a most able combination of flattery, craft and force Mirwais defeated and slew his Georgian opponent and became master of the city. On his way to power he visited the Safawi capital of Isfahan to ingratiate himself with the Safawi monarch, and it was during this period of preparation that the weakness and decadence of the Persian regime was revealed to him and his son Mir Mahmud. It is from this time that there begins a tradition which still holds — every Afghan regarding the Persian as degenerate, and every Persian looking on Afghans as rude and boorish.

After Mirwais' death in 1715 there was a struggle for ascendancy between his surviving brother, Abdul Aziz, and his son Mahmud, terminated by Mahmud's murder of his uncle in 1717.

After disposing of his uncle, Mahmud led his Ghaljis in a triumphant campaign against Persia. In 1720 he captured Kirman, and in 1722 besieged and took the Safawi capital Isfahan after appalling barbarities. Shah Tahmasp fell into his hands, and he re-enacted the famous scene of the banquet given to the Yusufzais at Kabul by Ulugh Beg II. Convinced that terror alone could restrain the Persians in obedience, he made an opportunity to hold a great festival. To this he invited all the leading Persian worthies of Isfahan who, anxious to please their new sovereign and entertaining no suspicion of his designs, arrived at the palace to the number of 114. Instead of a banquet they found the Ghaljis posted in the royal gardens and were butchered to a man.

The lust and power of slaughter affected Mahmud as it had Alauddin, Sultan of Delhi, another Ghalji four centuries earlier. He became a homicidal maniac and turned on his own tribesmen, prepared to suffer almost any bloody deed but treachery against themselves. That was his end, and his head was displayed as a trophy by his cousin Ashraf, who had his own father's murder to avenge and was now adopted by the invaders as their leader. Ashraf was a magnificent master of war, actually succeeding in vanquishing a powerful Ottoman army which sought to take advantage of the overthrow of the Safawis to invade Persia. The respect in which the Turks held Ashraf is shown by the fact that in 1727 the Porte acknowledged him as the legitimate Shah of Persia.
The Ghaljis could win battles, but they could not rule. They were utterly devoid of the statecraft needed to adapt their role as conquerors to one of the most ancient civilizations on earth. Nadir Quli Khan, himself another usurper and a Turkmen of the Afshar clan, arose and rallied Persia round him. By 1730 Ashraf had been defeated in two decisive battles, at Mihmandust and at Zarghun near Shiraz and — typical of Ghalji feud and violence to the end — was killed in flight by a force sent out by his cousin Husain Sultan. Husain remained in control of Kandahar until 1738, when Nadir, by that time Shah of Persia, captured it on his way to the invasion of India and brought the line of the ill-fated Ghalji usurpers to an end. Even Afghan historians do not dignify them as Shahs of Persia; they are known only as the Mirs.

While the Ghaljis were pursuing this erratic course, the other and more westerly great Afghan tribe, the Abdalis, were active in extending their tribal lands at the expense of an apparently decadent Persia in the country between Herat and Meshed. This tribe, almost equal in numbers and lands and probably superior in wealth to the Ghaljis, is first heard of in the time of Shah Abbas the Great (1587-1629), who made Malik Saddo its titular head in return for services around Kandahar. It now comes into prominence with the fall of the Safawis and the rise of Nadir Shah. As the most westerly of all Afghan tribes it was in the closest contact with Persia. For this reason its headmen had adopted much of the Persian manners and dress, and all leading Abdalis even then spoke their own somewhat uncouth Persian, though, like the Ghaljis, they affected to despise Persians as effeminate and decadent. Many of them probably even then, as today, had forgotten their Pashtu language — when they used it, they spoke the soft variant — and something of their Pashtu heritage. We have seen already how closely Elphinstone's description of the Abdalis he met in 1809 tallies with the old Herodotean reference to the Sagartioi. The position of the Sagartioi on the Achaemenian map is uncertain, but may have been near Herat in the satrapy of Aria, more or less where the Abdalis now are, on the southern skirts of the central massif on the line from Kandahar through Girishk and Farah to Herat. Like the Sagartioi of Herodotus the Abdalis are a people Persian in language and in dress half Persian, half Pakhtuan.

The Abdalis under Muhammad Zaman Khan and Haji Jamal at one time succeeded in taking Meshed from the Persians.
Nadir’s preoccupation with the Ghaljis further south made it hard for him to deal with them. But in 1729 after four hard-fought engagements he overcame them. Then, having finally defeated the Ghalji Ashraf near Shiraz, Nadir turned once more against the Abdalis and, after very hard fighting, during which more than once the issue was in doubt, drove them into Herat which he besieged and took in 1732. Three times an armistice was made, and three times the Abdalis, expecting reinforcements, went back on their pledged word and renewed the fighting. But despite their constant violation of pledges, Nadir treated them with marked clemency. He may have known how well their ancestors had served Shah Abbas a century earlier and noted their Persian affiliations. He realized their martial qualities and was determined to win them over by generous treatment to serve in his army. In the execution of this plan he showed great political ability. He succeeded in winning their confidence, and with their goodwill was able to finish the affair with the Ghaljis and go on to Kandahar, which in its turn he besieged and took in 1738 from Husain Sultan, the last of the Ghalji Mirs. There he found the sons of the Abdali Malik Muhammad Zaman Khan, Zulfiqar and his younger brother Ahmad, then a youth of some fifteen years, who had taken refuge with the Ghaljis. Impressed with their gallant bearing, he treated them generously and sent them off to exile in Mazandaran, whence Ahmad shortly after rejoined Nadir to serve as an officer in the new corps of Afghan mercenaries which the usurper was now raising.

This Afghan contingent became the corps d’élite of Nadir’s army, like the Immortals of the Achaemenians. The Abdalis formed the largest support, but Nadir had fought strenuous battles against the Ghaljis also, and they too were well represented. Estimates of the strength of this corps vary between 4,000 and 16,000, but whatever the strength, all accounts agree that the Afghan corps of horse formed Nadir’s bodyguard in whom alone he had complete reliance. They were commanded by eight Abdali and two Ghalji Maliks, the command-in-chief being in the first instance in the hands of an Abdali of the Alizai clan, Nur Muhammad Khan. This body of men accompanied Nadir to India and participated in all the dangers and successes of that campaign. The murder of a number of them by the Delhi mob set the conqueror at flashing point, and led him in his fury to order the
The frightful massacre which has given a word to the languages of Northern India. Perhaps the most signal service rendered by them was when they saved Nadir's army from complete destruction when, on his way through the Khaibar Pass on return from his conquest of India, he was beset by Afridi and other tribesmen in the gorges. On that occasion the Persian conqueror was in a most critical position, and was only able to extricate himself with the aid of the gallant front put up by his Afghan corps. Even then he did not win clear until he had paid a heavy toll in cash to the mountaineers who had closed the defiles against him. In the end the preference Nadir showed to his Afghan mercenaries led to great jealousies among his own Turkmens, the well-known Qizilbash or Red-heads, and became the main cause of his assassination by Muhammad Khan Qajar, the real founder of the dynasty which succeeded him on the throne of Persia.

Nadir was murdered in his tent in 1747, some years after his return from India. At this time the Abdali contingent of the Afghan corps was commanded by Ahmad Khan. Hearing a tumult, Ahmad and his men rushed towards the standard, thinking to protect their King. Their way was barred by strong forces of Qizilbash, greatly outnumbering the Afghans. But Ahmad Khan, bound in a loyal cause, hacked his way through and entered the royal tent, only to find Nadir's headless trunk lying in a pool of blood. The Abdali devotion to the King was real and they were overcome by mixed emotions, horror over the loss of a trusted chief and shame that they, whom he trusted, had failed him. They found the time to give expression to their grief, and then once more fought their way through, and, taking to horse, made off to Kandahar.

On his ride to Kandahar Ahmad Khan thought quickly. Nadir was dead. But Nadir, like Persian rulers before him, had extended the Persian Empire far to the east. Kandahar, it is true, had previously been included in the Persian dominion since it was taken from Shah Jahan a century ago, but until Nadir conquered it Kabul had been a Mughal province, and Peshawar was included with Kabul. Multan and the Derajat also had been part of the Mughal Empire, but Nadir had acquired them. For as the price of peace after his capture of Delhi Nadir had obtained not only the Peacock Throne and the most valuable of the Mughal treasure (including the Koh-i-nur diamond), but the cession to Persia of
all the trans-Indus districts including Peshawar. Moreover, Nadir had uncovered the pitiful weakness of the Delhi crown. Why not then, thought Ahmad, derive a title from the Persian conqueror, and succeed not only to the eastern portion of the Safawi Empire, but to the control of all the fertile Mughal provinces which had fallen to the Persian arms? In so thinking no doubt Ahmad had in mind the astonishing Ghalji success of a generation back, followed by the almost immediate Ghalji disaster. The first he could emulate; he had the finest troops in southern Asia. The second he would ward off by going east, not west. He would select the Afghan borderland with the Mughals, and not the heart of Persia as the focus and centre of his ambitions.

In his autobiography the Amir Abdurrahman gives a pretty picture of Ahmad’s election as Shah of Afghanistan, as recorded in the Kabul annals. The story runs that, after Nadir’s assassination, the chiefs of the various tribes, led by Haji Jamal Barakzai, gathered in council at the shrine of Sher Surkh near Kandahar to elect a King. Each in turn was asked his opinion and each insisted his own claims were to be preferred, refusing to submit himself to the rule of any other. Ahmad, the youngest, was asked last. He remained silent, saying not a word. Thereupon a holy man, Sabir Shah, took an ear of wheat in his hand and, placing it on Ahmad’s head, announced that he alone, having given no cause for dissen-
sion, was the proper ruler for the kingdom. The chiefs, noting Ahmad’s youth — he was but twenty-four — were inclined to mock. But a little reflection brought to mind that the clan of Saddozai, to which Ahmad belonged, was only a branch of the Popalzai and very weak, and therefore a King selected from the Saddozai could easily be dethroned if he did not act according to the counsel of the more powerful tribes. Agreeing on this, all took pieces of grass in their mouths as a token that they were his cattle and beasts of burden, and throwing pieces of cloth round their necks as a sign of willingness to be led, submitted to his rule and gave him powers of life and death.

A later gloss has been added to the effect that Haji Jamal, the leader of the most powerful Barakzai clan, secured an understand-
ing that the King’s Minister should be chosen from that clan.

Ahmad Khan was a born leader, and it is improbable that matters went in his favour so simply and without his prompting. Whatever the tale, he had himself crowned as Ahmad Shah in
Kandahar. He assumed the title Durr-i-Durran, Pearl of Pearls, because, it is said, it pleased him to wear an ear-ring fashioned of pearls. From that time his tribe, the Abdalis, have been known as the Durranis.

Ahmad was fortified in his determination by an event represented by the chroniclers as a piece of luck. On his way to Kandahar, we are told, he fell in with a caravan bringing up to Nadir more than a crore’s worth of loot and treasure, the fruit of the usurper’s Indian conquests. It is significant that this treasure included the Koh-i-nur diamond. This treasure-trove, seized by Ahmad, served as the foundation of his new Afghan State, and enabled the young warrior to pay for his coronation and furnish the royal treasury. It has never been said, but it is surely obvious, that Nadir’s treasure must have been under strong guard, and that guard could have been none other than his trusted Afghan corps. It is incredible that so avaricious a ruler would have allowed his crown jewels to wander about separately from his army and unescorted. Moreover, eight years had passed since the conquest of India. The whole incident is typical of tribal principle and method. Loyalty, to the point of love, will go to a forceful character. Win their devotion and these men will serve a leader to the death. As mercenaries Afghans have always been magnificent. But loyalty to a principle in conflict with short-term self-interest — no. Remove the leader, and the course which is seen as serving the immediate personal end will be followed. There is no real paradox here. Ahmad Shah’s action in seizing and turning to his own uses the treasure of the monarch he had served and loved at the time won applause as a fine act of statecraft. And, what is more, it led to success. There can be no doubt that his action was of deliberate policy, and not a mere instance of fortune favouring the brave.

In his reign of twenty-six years (1747–73) Ahmad Shah swept eight times across the Indus, and ravaged the Panjab as far as Delhi. His first two expeditions in the first two years of his reign were designed to obtain in his own name the Mughal Emperor’s confirmation of the cession of Peshawar and the other trans-Indus districts which had been made to Nadir. His expedition of 1752 was more ambitious. It was then that he annexed Lahore and Multan, incorporating all the West Panjab in his empire and fixing a boundary at Sirhind beyond the eastern limits of West Pakistan. And it was in this year that the Durranis became the masters of
Kashmir, which they conquered and held largely with the aid of Yusufzai and other tribesmen around Peshawar. From that time has come down that curious attachment which Pathans still feel today for this loveliest of lands. Western Afghans found it too far from home, and yearned for the more virile beauties of their Khurasan. But Eastern Afghans, and the Karlanri tribesmen, think of Kashmir as a mistress. Those who love her abide half-guiltily in the pleasures of her seduction, but in the very acknowledgment of her beauty their thoughts return to their own and more lawful home. The conflict of emotion is enshrined in a proverb: Unto every man his own country is Kashmir.10

In 1761, after months of patient manœuvre and skirmishing, Ahmad Shah defeated and shattered the great army of the Maratha confederacy on the field of Panipat, fifty miles north of Delhi. It has been usual to speak of this as one of the decisive battles of the world in that it saved the north from Maratha domination, paving the way for the gradual extension of British authority to Delhi and later to the Panjab. But it is now possible to see Ahmad Shah’s campaigns in a larger perspective. What they really did was, by hastening and completing the process of disintegration of the Mughal Empire begun by Nadir Shah, to throw the Panjab into a state of anarchy which made possible the emergence of a new power, the Sikhs. He also gave to Lahore and Multan, and of course to Peshawar and the Derajat, that contradiction in terms, a new orientation towards the west. They had had this before in pre-Muslim times, and under Mahmud of Ghazni, but for centuries before Ahmad Shah’s time they had come to look towards Delhi. It is certain that this attitude, below the conscious level of thinking though it be, is one of the emotional bases of the patriotism of West Pakistan today. In other words, in the west at least, the partition of 1947 was not the outcome only of differing attitudes to religion; it had an historical background also. But there was to be a long fight with the Sikhs before the issue was decided. It was a decision rooted in the history of two centuries.

It was after the Maratha defeat at Panipat, and Ahmad’s return to Kabul, that the Sikhs began to acquire temporal power. The state of unsettlement caused by the passing of armies had left the Panjab without regular administration, and a number of leaders of the Sikh _misl_11 began to erect forts in strong places and to defy
Ahmad’s lieutenants. Among these was Charat Singh, grand-
rather of Ranjit. Sikh anger had been turned into military channels
by the sack in 1757 of Amritsar, their holy place, by Ahmad’s son
Prince Timur, and Ahmad’s last three expeditions (1762–67) were
directed to bringing Sikh recalcitrance under control. They failed.
The Sikh temple at Amritsar was once more destroyed and pol-
luted in revenge for Sikh desecration of mosques. But Ahmad
himself could not stay: his health was failing, and the victorious
Sikhs followed up his last retreat, capturing Sher Shah’s great
fortress at Rohtas and occupying as far north as Rawalpindi.

During all these Indian expeditions Ahmad experienced much
trouble in and around Peshawar, and his communications through
the Passes were often subject to interruption, as had been those of
Nadir Shah. Elphinstone tells us¹² that Ahmad gave all the
Eastern tribes the name of ‘Berdooranies’, but this nomenclature,
if ever used, is never heard today. In dealing with these
tribes he enjoyed certain advantages. The prestige of his Afghan
origin, the new Afghan Kingdom he had built, above all his
enlistment and enrichment of the tribesmen by the grant of service
in his army, enabled him to surmount dangers which had threat-
tened to submerge even the armies of Nadir. But even he, the first
and most powerful of Afghan Kings, never sought to subject to
his administrative control the mountain tracts of the Karlanri
tribes, or even the valley of Swat. He was fain to adopt Babur’s
policy of matrimonial alliances with the daughters of tribal maliks.
And he continued the payment of tolls to the Afridis and Shin-
waris of the Khaibar, and distributed jagirs to many Yusufzai,
Orakzai, Khalil and Mohmand leaders. Moreover he caused each
tribe to assess its military strength on a rough census for his army.
To this day the only fact that any Wazir or Mahsud tribesman can
tell you of the past history of his tribe is Ahmad Shah’s military
assessment of the lashkar strength¹³ of Waziristan. The figures are
as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<td>Utmanzai Wazirs</td>
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Even today the weight of each tribe in war or council is apt to be assessed at this reckoning, though to arrive at a correct relative estimate, on present showing, the Mahsud power and population should probably be taken as nearly double the figures given.

In summing up Ahmad, Cunningham,14 historian of the Sikhs, echoes Tacitus’ epigram on the Roman Emperor Galba. He calls him the very ideal of the Afghan genius, hardy and enterprising, fitted for conquest yet incapable of empire, seeming but to exist for the sake of losing and recovering provinces. From the angle of the Panjab and the Sikh Khalsa the words are true. But Ahmad Shah was more than that. He founded an Afghan monarchy which endured, and still finds its royal house from Ahmad’s tribe, the Durransis, though it be from another clan. The fame of his house, the Saddozai sept of the Popalzai Durransis, still evokes an Afghan sense of loyalty which to some extent even crosses international frontiers. The memory of his exploits has done something to inspire the West Pakistan patriot of our day. Ahmad had a bold and commanding turn of natural genius. He was an adept in the difficult art of the management of men and tribes. Man of war indeed he was, but one disposed by nature to mildness and clemency, and prone to policies of conciliation, where the way lay open. He was a King who never lost the common touch; with his Durrani and Ghalji counsellors, Elphinstone tells us, he kept up the same equal and popular demeanour which was usual with their Khans before there was any question of royal dignity. He was himself a divine and he wrote poetry, and what is more, poetry not in Persian but in Pashtu. He would have wished to be accorded the character of a sahib.15

Even Sher Shah, the most illustrious of all Afghans, though he left a record more memorable in the sphere of effective governance and power, failed to display those human and endearing qualities for which the first of the Saddozai monarchs is so justly famed.

Ahmad was only fifty when he died. In his last years he suffered from a malady of the face, probably cancer, which gave him great pain. He died at Murgha in the Achakzai Toba hills, where he had gone to escape the summer heats of Kandahar. His tomb is at Kandahar, and is still respected as a sanctuary.

Ahmad was succeeded by Timur Shah, his favourite but not his eldest son, a very different sort of man. Like so many Durransis in high places in later days, Timur was never even reasonably
familiar with the Pashtu language; he was born in Persian Meshed in 1746; during much of his father’s lifetime he was stationed in the Panjab, one of his many wives being a Mughal princess, and later he was governor of Herat where Persian is the ruling tongue. His Persian affinities made him a man of great taste and culture in the contemporary idiom; he delighted in the arts and particularly in the embellishment of buildings and the lay-out of formal gardens. But he disliked the rough manners of the Durrani nobles, and in the choice of ministers his disposition inclined him to Persian scribes and munshis. He nominally retained the Khans in the dignities in which his father had placed them, but by instituting new offices and shifting the emphasis he duplicated the conduct of administration and threw the power into the hands of his dependants. The tribal levies he disbanded, keeping about his person only a bodyguard of Qizilbash known as the Ghulamishahs—the King's Slaves. Their devotion saved his person and maintained the tranquillity of the capital, but the remote provinces gradually threw off the submission offered to Ahmad, and the Kingdom began to disintegrate. The impetus given by the father’s greatness outlasted the twenty years of the son’s reign, but the decay which began under Timur became evident within a short time after his death in 1793.

By any standard Timur had a large family, twenty-three sons and daughters unnumbered, by a diversity of women. He pursued his father’s policy of alliance with the daughters of tribal chiefs, thereby seeking to attach the tribe to his person. One of the main clues to an understanding of tribal sympathy and alliance lies in a study of such marriages. Note always the princes who are born of the same mother, and those of other mothers. It is a rule absolute that the half-brothers in Eastern royal families are at enmity. Not only do the rivalries of the mothers set them against one another, but the sons of younger wives are apt to secure the royal attention. Conversely the sons of the same mother will usually be found on the same side in revolts or rebellions. There is yet another point. A tribal marriage does not do so much as Timur supposed to engage the tribe in the monarch’s own interest, but it does most strongly attract tribal affection for the son of that marriage, more particularly if, as often happens, he is put out to a tribal foster-mother to be suckled.

Thus of Timur’s many children the eldest, Humayun, was by a
mother of the royal Saddozai clan of the Popalzai. By birth and breeding he should have succeeded, but he was conveniently absent at Kandahar when his father died. Another, Mahmud, was also by a Popalzai mother — not Saddozai but of another clan — he was absent in Herat. Abbas, the next, of obscure parentage, was in Peshawar, but a man of small character and no influence. Then came Zaman and Shuja, the sons of one mother, a Yusufzai lady and Timur’s favourite queen. The period of *badshahgard*18 or palace revolutions, which followed Timur’s death, and the asylum later offered to Shah Shuja by more than one of the Peshawar tribes, are explicable in these terms, and in these terms alone.

Timur’s attachment to his Yusufzai queen was no doubt in some sense a reflection of the proud and privileged position held by that tribe in Durrani times no less than under the Mughals. In that way his preferences were not without a political flavour. Raverty quotes original sources17 which establish the fact that the Yusufzais proper, except a few dwelling in the Chachh east of the Indus, were entirely independent of the Durrani government, were under no obligation to furnish troops, and acknowledged no allegiance but to their own chiefs. As for the Mandanrs of the Samah, the same authority affirms that neither were they subject to Timur’s taxes, though in time of war the King would despatch a party of ‘ulema to rouse their patriotism and induce them to enlist a small force as a contingent to the royal army. More than once the Yusufzais and Mandanrs strove to sustain the failing cause of Timur’s sons, Zaman and Shuja, to whom through a Yusufzai mother their loyalty was due.

Ahmad’s capital had been at Kandahar. On his frequent expeditions he had occasionally used Kabul during the summer months, but he was too busy for sojourns of leisure. Peshawar he knew only as a staging-point for his invasions of the Panjab, and a place where difficult questions of tribal loyalties and backslidings had always to be faced. When he needed to be cooler in summer, Ahmad moved his camp to the Toba highlands between Kandahar and Quetta, to pass his days among the rude Achakzai tribesmen, Durranis too but poor relations, simple men in whose company the great King rejoiced.

Timur changed all this. He had Babur’s love for Kabul in summer and for the flower-strewn beauty of Peshawar in spring, and he made his summer and winter capitals in these places, mov-
ing with the seasons as Afghans love to do. In both he built palaces. Those in Kabul were standing at the time of the first Afghan war; they are well pictured in the admirable water-colours and prints of that period that have come down to us. The buildings were simple reproductions in carved wood of an excellent tradition in Muslim architecture; unfortunately they have been replaced by hybrids which pay no account to the old crafts and have failed to absorb the new. Timur’s beautiful palace and gardens in and below the Bala Hissar at Peshawar were destroyed by the Sikhs in 1823. This was the palace in which Mountstuart Elphinstone was received with such splendour by Shah Shuja in 1809; visited by Alexander Burnes in 1832, it was nothing but a heap of ruins. The Sikhs destroyed even the gardens for firewood; it is only in recent years that these ravages have been repaired and Peshawar has once more become a city of dreams, surrounded by gardens and pleasances as it was when first it burst on the eyes of those Europeans more than a century ago.

The memory of the Saddozai princes, with some respect for the Saddozai name, is still evident in the society of Peshawar. Many Saddozai noblemen followed Timur’s sons into exile when the first period of ḍadshahgardi began. But the memory goes back to his son Shah Shuja rather than to Timur himself. It is particularly vivid among the Yusufzais and the Afridis, the first because of Shuja’s mother, and the second because he sought and received asylum among them and won respect as their guest. Timur himself broke every rule of Afghan behaviour by handing over for execution the Mohmand Malik, Arsala Khan, who had surrendered on safe-conduct (‘itbar). Without regarding his voluntary surrender, Timur ordered him to be delivered to some of his tribe with whom he had a deadly feud and by them he was immediately put to death. There could be no action more contrary to the Pathan sense of honour, and the circumstance has left a stain on Timur’s memory. Arsala, it is true, had rebelled, but that was not the point. The King’s writ did not run in Mohmand tribal territory, any more than in more recent years. Pressure could, of course, be brought for the surrender of an outlaw. But, if he surrendered, the surrender would be on safe-conduct; penalties would be negotiated in accordance with tribal ideas and a death sentence would be out of the question. It was bad enough to put him to death and break the safe-conduct. For the sovereign to
inflict the death penalty by making use of a tribal feud to shift the burden from his own shoulders was regarded as the last word in dishonourable conduct. The logical plea that Arsala’s enemies had at least some share in the dishonour would not appeal to a Pathan.

Timur Shah was taken ill on his way up to Kabul from Peshawar, and died in the spring of 1793. He had loved Peshawar, but has left there no name of honour, for tribesmen still say of him that he was a Persian and no Pathan. Yet there is no doubt that his establishment of the Durrani winter capital at Peshawar was the beginning of a long story only now coming to an end. Modern Afghan irredentism is based on a history that goes back at least to this reign.

Zaman Mirza, son of Timur’s favourite Yusufzai wife, succeeded him as Shah Zaman.
CHAPTER XVII

THE SADDOZAIS AND MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE

During the reigns of Ahmad and Timur the followers of Guru Govind had been steadily gaining strength in the Panjab.

When Timur died in 1793, the position was that the nominal sovereignty of that province, as far as Sirhind, still vested in the Durrani Shah, with Lahore as capital of that part of his dominion. In fact Kabul writ did not extend much east of the Indus. Lahore and Rawalpindi were in Sikh hands, and the border chieftains of the Khalsa, led by Muha Singh, Ranjit's father, were in effective control as far as the Margalla Pass and Hasan Abdal. The Sikh dharmsala which stands by the stream below the frowning battlements of Rohtas bears witness to the extent of the Khalsa's power at this time in the Salt Range country. As yet there was no Sikh threat west of the Indus. Peshawar and the Derajat, as Afghan territories, still owned Durrani supremacy. Uneasy raid and counter-raid continued to ravage the fertile lands along the Haro stream. Ranjit Singh, a boy of thirteen, had already been blooded in this desultory warfare.

When Shah Zaman acceded to the Kabul throne, his courtiers were loud in exhortation that the easy way to glory lay through the Panjab in the steps of his grandfather. Ahmad Shah, they urged, had but proved himself a true warrior in the long line starting with Mahmud the Idol-breaker, but his great work was being destroyed by the new idolatry which had arisen round the temple at Amritsar. They did not stop to think, nor did they know, how great is the debt of Sikhdom to Islam, how it is permeated with the idea of the taubah, and guided by a sacred book. The Muslim princes of Hindustan, themselves under pressure from the Marathas, and led by Asaf-ud-Daula, Prince-wazir of Oudh, pressed on the new Durrani Shah that the time had come for him to act as their deliverer, a modern champion of the Faith.
Shah Zaman listened. But the position in the Indus Valley region was altered since the time of Ahmad Shah, and nothing was to be gained there but by long and uninterrupted operations. Zaman did not grasp the fact that Nadir had already stripped Delhi of all the treasure to be had, while his own grandfather’s eight Punjab invasions had scattered what remained of hoarded wealth in and around Lahore. What might indeed have been a more permanent objective — the reduction and holding of the Panjab — was not to be accomplished by a hasty incursion. The plan opposed by the Sikhs to Ahmad Shah, which was to evacuate their country on his approach and return when his army was withdrawn, would be repeated against his grandson. He failed to realize that it could be baffled only by keeping a force in the country, sufficient to retain possession. To succeed, such a policy would almost certainly have involved a firm decision by the Saddozai King to shift his capital and court, as had Babur, from the Kabul highlands, in this case to Lahore.

A policy so far-reaching was beyond the conception of such a man as Shah Zaman. He saw only the Sikhs, flaunting their yellow flags at Rohtas, and desecrating the holy name of Hasan Abdal. So, filled with idle hopes, he crossed the Indus in 1795.

On this first foray he contented himself with moving to Hasan Abdal, destroying the new Sikh holy places there, and sending a party forward to obtain the nominal surrender of Rohtas. He had then to return to Kabul, to suppress a movement against him initiated by his half-brother, Mahmud, from Herat. In 1797 he tried again, and again in 1798, on both occasions establishing his power in Lahore with the help of Nizamuddin Khan, the Khweshgi chief of Kasur. This Pathan he employed as his intermediary in dealing with the Sikh chieftains, including the youthful Ranjit Singh, who kept aloof. But Nizamuddin, employed to coerce the Sikhs, wisely saw no reason at the time why Zaman’s invasion should prove more permanent than his grandfather’s, and forbore to proceed to extremities against neighbours to whom he might soon be left a prey. The result is well explained by Cunningham:

Some restless skirmishing took place, but the designs of Mehmood, who had obtained the support of Persia, again withdrew the ill-fated King to the west, and he quitted Lahore in the beginning of 1799. During this second invasion the character of Runjeet Singh seems to have impressed itself, not only on the other Sikh leaders, but
on the Dooranee Shah. Runjeet coveted Lahore, which was associated in the minds of men with the possession of power. Zaman, unable to cross his heavy artillery over the flooded Jehlum, made it known to the aspiring chief that their transmission would be an acceptable service. As many pieces of cannon as could be readily extricated were sent after the Shah, and Runjeet Singh procured what he wanted, a royal investiture of the capital of the Punjab.

Thus, yielding to a display of force and finesse, not the last in Ranjit’s career, the ruler of Kabul had been induced to set up the Sikh as his Viceroy in Lahore, and thenceforward Panjab history centres more and more in Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Under his leadership the Sikhs were able not only to hold the line of the Indus; they had cut off the channels of communication and supply between Central Asia and the Muslim powers south of the Sutlej. This last and abortive expedition of Zaman Shah in 1798/99 closed nearly 800 years of history. During those long centuries the Muslim princes of Hindustan had been sustained by constant recruitment from the countries of their origin beyond the Sulaiman Mountains. The rise of the Sikh State established a barrier, and prevented the resuscitation of any new dynasty by new blood from the north upon the ruins of the old empire at Delhi or Lahore.

Shah Zaman’s ventures in the Panjab led also in a few years in his own country to the fall of the Saddozai branch of the Durranis and the eclipse of the Afghan monarchy as an imperial power. An era of palace revolutions, remarkable even in Central Asian annals, shook the Afghan State to its foundations. The complicated shifts of power which follow will be clearer if forecast here in a short analysis, picking up the details later, as we come to them, and noting that the Saddozai Kings themselves were to a large extent degraded to pawns in the hands of the powerful Barakzai nobles who turned the wheels of their fortunes.

Little more than a year after his return Zaman was deposed and blinded by his half-brother Mahmud. This semi-fraternal act, in the Turk not the Afghan tradition, failed to secure to the usurper an unchallenged tenure, for Mahmud’s first occupation of the throne lasted only three years. In 1803 he was forced to give way in Kabul to Zaman’s full brother Shuja. Shah Shuja, son of a Yusufzai mother, did not include the blinding of brothers among
ROYAL FAMILIES OF THE DURRANIS
1747-1937

I. First Dynasty - Saddozai Popalzai

Muhammad Zaman Khan

Zulfiqar

Ahmad Shah 1747-73

Timur Shah 1773-93

(2 sons)

Shah Zaman 1793-1803

Shah Shuja 1803-9

Tahir Mirza 1809-18

1st wife

2nd wife

Shah Mahmud 1800-3

Kamran Mirza

NOTE: These tables are selective, and merely identify the chief actors. Rulers of Afghanistan are shown in heavy type.

II. Second Dynasty - Muhammadzai Barakzai

Haji Jamal Khan

Painda Khan (22 sons)

Fateh Khan Wazir d. 1818

Muhammad Azem Khan d. 1823

Sultan Muhammad Khan (Peshawar Sardars - See II below)

Dost Muhammad Khan (Kabul Sardars 1826-63)

Kuhn Dil, Sher Dil, etc. (Kandahar Sardars)

Akbar d. 1847

Afzal 1865-67

Abdurrahman 1881-1901

Habibullah 1901-19

Inayatullah 1929 (5 days)

Amanullah 1919-28

Yaqub Khan 1878-79

Ayub Khan

Yahya Khan

Yusuf Khan

III. Third Dynasty - Muhammadzai Barakzai

Sultan Muhammad Khan (see II above) (50 sons)

Nadir Shah 1929-33

Zahir Shah 1935-

Muhammad Aziz

Hashim Khan

Shah Mahmud Khan

Shahwali Khan

Naim Khan

Daud Khan
the prerogatives of successful kings and, forgoing the meaner forms of revenge, first imprisoned Mahmud in the Bala Hisar, and later suffered him to depart once more to the west. Mahmud maintained himself around Herat until another shift of power enabled him six years later (1807) to oust Shah Shuja as he had already ousted Shah Zaman, and sit for the second time upon the throne of Kabul. There he did evil in the sight of the Lord until 1818. In that year, urged on by his mad and sadistic son Kamran, he tortured and killed his Barakzai Wazir, Fateh Khan, the man to whom he twice owed his throne, with a cruelty so abominable that men still writhe at the telling of it. The Barakzais rose in their anger under Fateh Khan’s twenty-one brothers of the Muhammadzai sept, known later as the Paindakhel. Mahmud had to take refuge once more in Herat, where he and his son Kamran remained in uneasy control as long as 1842. They were not again to see Kabul or Kandahar, much less Peshawar.

It will be seen that there were four changes of ruler, from Zaman to Mahmud, from Mahmud to Shuja, from Shuja back to Mahmud, and finally a shift of dynasty altogether from the Saddozais to the Barakzais. The Durrani Empire perished, and was succeeded by an Amirate. It was the shattering effect of these four changes in the first quarter of the nineteenth century that, more than anything else, enabled Ranjit Singh gradually to absorb all those portions of Ahmad Shah’s dominion which lay in the plains between the Sulaiman Mountains and the River Indus.

Haji Jamal, who appears at the head of all Barakzai genealogies, had taken a leading part in the Abdali struggles against Nadir. Elphinstone, writing on information gathered in 1809 some years before the Barakzais supplanted the Saddozais, speaks of the former as a far larger clan than the Popalzai (of whom the royal Saddozai were a small branch) and pre-eminent among all Afghan tribes. ‘They are a spirited and warlike clan, and, as Futteh Khaun is now their chief, they make a much more conspicuous figure than any other tribe among the Afghans. At present, the grand vizier, and almost all the great officers of state, are Baurikzyes, and they owe their elevation to the courage and attachment of their clan.’

A detailed study of Durrani tribal organization, its relationship to the Afghan ruler, and its power through the leading clan to bring about a change of King and even of dynasty, would lie outside the scope of this book. It is more proper to the evaluation of
the Afghan State as such, and bears only indirectly on the story of the Frontier tribes. But, like the later Saddozaïs, the Barakzai chiefs, and more particularly one branch of them, were closely connected with Peshawar, to which they formed a strong attachment. This attachment persists up to this day. For this reason it is necessary here to identify the chief characters of the Barakzai. We shall find that their influence on tribal sentiment persists into the years after the exercise of direct Durrani power was withdrawn from Peshawar and its environment.

Haji Jamal's son Painda Khan had been acknowledged chief of the Barakzais, and honoured by Timur with the title Sarafraz (the Eminent), for which reason Elphinstone and others somewhat confuse identities by referring to him as Sarafraz Khan. It was he whose interest was secured by Timur Shah's Yusufzai queen to raise Shah Zaman to the throne. Later Zaman listened to the insinuations of a fellow-Saddozaï of his own creation named Wafadar and, forgetting the story of Ahmad Shah's coronation, sought to overturn the power of Painda Khan and the great Barakzai nobles and surround himself with a more pliant court. In disgust, Painda lent his name to a party which sought to depose Zaman, get rid of Wafadar as Wazir, and place Zaman's brother Shuja on the throne. Painda had not in fact joined in an underground conspiracy; he had merely expressed disgust with the tendencies of Zaman's régime.

An officer was sent to apprehend him. On arrival this officer was met by Painda's eldest son, Fateh Khan, who, displaying the qualities for which he later became famous, showed no suspicion, apologized for his father's absence, and offered to go and call him. On repairing to Painda Khan, he told him a guard had come to seize him, and with the same decision and sudden resolve which he was often to display, proposed to kill the officer, seize the guards and fly from Kandahar. But Painda Khan would have none of it; as chief of the most powerful Durrani clan he was too proud and thought himself immune. He attended the officer to the King. Next morning he and the real conspirators were all beheaded.

On his father's death, Fateh Khan had fled to the family castle at Girishk, from which refuge, observing the state of men's minds in Barakzai country and animated with the spirit of revenge, he determined on a bold attempt to overthrow the government. Mahmud was in Herat, having spent the last five years in vainly
endeavouring to obtain Persian aid from the Qajars to secure for himself the throne of Kabul. Fateh Khan advised him to rely no longer on such a broken reed but to advance on Kandahar, and trust the Durranis to support his cause.

Mahmud set out from Herat with not more than fifty horsemen in his train. But Fateh Khan had not misjudged the feeling of the tribes. The Barakzai flocked to Mahmud’s standard and he was able to invest Kandahar. The siege was not immediately successful, and it was Fateh Khan’s deed of daring that finally opened the gates. He introduced himself one night, almost alone, into the city, and adopting the method of *nanawatai* threw himself on the honour of Abdullah Khan of the Nurzai branch of the Durranis, the Commander. This Pashtu worked, Abdullah declared for Mahmud, and the city was surrendered.

Zaman meanwhile was assiduously engaged at Peshawar in preparing yet another invasion of Hindustan. Roused from his infatuation by the news of the fate of Kandahar, he left his brother Shuja at Peshawar in command of a considerable force, and repaired to Kabul, reckoning easily to dispose of his half-brother as he had done before. Here the true state of affairs broke in on his mind, and the imperious sense of security which had hedged him in as the conqueror of the Panjab gave way to disquiet and alarm. At last he realized that an Afghan ruler rules only by the good-will of the most powerful Afghan tribes. Distrusting all Durranis he sought to gain the Ghaljis, but an appeal from terror to that tribe held no hope. The King’s resolution wavered and his distrust spread to the people. The army which he did lead to try the fortunes of battle went over to Mahmud, the allegiance of Ahmad Khan, commander of the vanguard, undermined by another of Fateh Khan’s stratagems. Fateh Khan seized Ahmad’s brother Abdullah — the same who had surrendered Kandahar to Mahmud — and threatened instant death if Ahmad did not come over. Abdullah had joined Mahmud in a crisis and his fidelity could not be doubted, but Fateh Khan knew Ahmad’s attachment to his brother and cared nothing for the justice of his measures, if they served the end in view.

Shah Zaman fled to join his brother in Peshawar and reached the fort of Mulla Ashiq, a dependant of his in Shinwari country, one march west of Khaibar. Ashiq made to receive him hospitably but took measures to prevent his onward journey, and sent a
messenger to Mahmud. Zaman, discovering he was under restraint, tried all means to persuade his captor to refrain from an action so full of disgrace as the betrayal of a guest who was at once his King and his benefactor; these arguments failing, he had recourse to force. That also failed, and he gave up, bearing his subsequent calamities with dignity and firmness. Mahmud’s messengers met him on his way to Kabul, and put out his eyes with a lancet. He was then carried to Kabul and lodged in the Bala Hissar.

Nine years later, Elphinstone met him at Rawalpindi. He had been released for the years of his brother’s reign, but had had again to fly when Shuja himself, in his turn, was compelled to yield to the power of Mahmud, once more directed by the King-maker, Fateh Khan. The description is worth quoting:

We were not a little interested by the sight of a Monarch, whose reputation at one time spread so wide both in Persia and India. We stood opposite him till he desired us to be seated: his dress was plain, but his appearance was very kingly. He had a fine face and person. His voice and manner strongly resembled Shah Shuja’s; but he was taller, and had a longer, more regular face, and a finer beard. He had by no means the appearance of a blind man: his eyes, though plainly injured, retained black enough to give vitality to his countenance, and he always turned them towards the person with whom he was conversing. He had, however, some appearance of dejection and melancholy. . . . He said reverses were the common portion of Kings; and mentioned historical accounts of astonishing revolutions. . . . Had he gone over all the history of Asia, he could scarcely have discovered a more remarkable instance of the mutability of fortune than he himself presented; blind, dethroned, and exiled, in a country which he had twice subdued.

The memory of the ill-fated Zaman, and his brother Shuja, still lives among many of the Eastern Afghans and the hill-tribes, especially the Afridis. The Yusufzais honour them because their mother was of that tribe, and both Zaman and Shuja are held to have been kingly men in the Pathan way, honouring those who did them honour in fair days, and patient in adversity. The Achakzai Durrani Malik, Gulistan Khan, who gave a name to Gulistan village beneath the Khoja Imran, lost his life fighting for Zaman and Shuja. Gulistan was well known for his talents, courage and fidelity, and is still remembered in Peshawar where he was once Shah Shuja’s governor. The Afridis more than once gave Shah
Shuja sanctuary at Chora in evil days, and twice put their whole tribe in motion in his support. The effort failed, but the memory of the Saddozai Kings served to stir Afridi loyalty when, nearly a century later, that tribe proved ready to follow the Saddozai who raised the Khaibar Rifles, Nawab Sir Aslam Khan.

Mahmud’s first reign lasted three years only. That it lasted so long was due entirely to the intrepidity of Fateh Khan, who not only routed a rebellion of the whole Ghalji tribe in three hard-fought battles but overcame an attempt by Shuja from Peshawar to take the field against the usurper. Shuja marched from Peshawar in 1801, in command of an army of ten thousand eastern tribesmen, mainly Yusufzai and Afridi. He met Fateh Khan on the Surkh Rud some miles west of Jalalabad. His arms were victorious in the beginning of the battle, his ‘Berdooraunee’ troops fighting with great clan. But, though accustomed to the battles of their clans, they were strangers to discipline and regular war and quitted their line as soon as they thought victory decided, eager to plunder the royal treasures. Fateh Khan profiting by the confusion, charged at the head of his Barakzais and decided the day. Shuja escaped to Afridi country where he took refuge at Chora.

A year later Shuja took the field once more at the head of twelve thousand Afridis, who attacked Peshawar, occupied by Mahmud after the Surkh Rud battle. This assault on Peshawar took place in midsummer and the Khaibar tribes were defeated with great slaughter, large numbers perishing from heat and thirst before they could regain their hill-retreats. Shuja was fortunate in regaining Chora, from which he is said to have gone on into the Maidan of Tirah. In 1930, at the height of the Red-Shirt movement, the Afridis twice attacked Peshawar city in the summer months, and twice were defeated with heavy casualties. I well remember discussing those affairs with some Maliks a few months later, and hearing them compared with Afridi efforts to support Shuja, more than a century earlier. The tribes had no written record, but the memory had come down.

After this Afridi defeat, Fateh Khan himself came down to Peshawar, heavily fined the city and surrounding tribes, and then, following exactly in the steps of Babur’s first expedition of 1503, proceeded through Kohat, Hangu, Thal and Bannu to the Daman, levying revenue as he went. He occupied a good deal of time in endeavouring to reduce the Wazirs between Thal and Bannu, but
was no more successful than has been any ruler, before or since. His progress left little in the way of permanent order, and he is better remembered in Peshawar for his laying out in these years (1802-3) of the garden south of the city, now known as the Wazir Bagh, so famous for its avenues of dark cypresses and a gathering-place of the clans, both for war and festival. It was here that Fateh Khan’s younger half-brother, Sultan Muhammad Khan, lived and maintained his private apartments and zanael during the many years that he held Peshawar.

Fateh Khan’s absence on these affairs left Mahmud rudderless. In the capital he relied on his Ghulamishahs, the Qizilbash guards who ‘not only joined the violence of their military habits to the natural licentiousness of their nation but openly professed the Sheeah religion’; so in the eyes of the orthodox of Kabul committing the most heinous sins. Mahmud’s dependence on his bodyguard laid him open to charges of apostasy carefully fostered for his own ends by a Durrani chief named Mukhtar-ud-Daula, who entered into a plot to invite Shuja to occupy the throne. The King would have been wise to wait for the return of Fateh Khan, now on his way back from Kandahar, but, failing in his sense of timing, thought his safety lay in the immediate seizure of the person of Mukhtar. That nobleman made good his escape, and went off to join Shuja.

Shuja had left Chora in 1802, finding the presence in Peshawar of so formidable an adversary as Fateh Khan rendered his refuge in the Afridi hills unsafe. He went by way of Zhob to Shal (Quetta), where with the help of Malik Gulistan and others he succeeded in once more putting himself in funds by compelling the leaders of a large caravan to lend him a large sum on account. (To his credit, be it said, Shuja repaid this loan after his accession.) He met Mukhtar on the borders of the Wazir country, and repaired to Kabul to find the city in uproar and Mahmud besieged in the Bala Hissar. He and Mukhtar wisely encamped without the town, and set their array to oppose Fateh Khan, who now drew near with an army of 10,000 men. Fateh Khan was at first successful, but the unpopularity of Mahmud’s cause led to desertions and the Barakzai’s usual fortune deserted him.

Next morning Shah Shuja was King. Mahmud, deserted by all, was led to confinement, but his eyes were spared. The new King’s first step was to release his blinded brother, Zaman, and the only
execution following the change of government was that of Mulla Ashiq, who suffered the penalty of his perfidy in betraying the former King. Shuja’s clemency in the hour of victory has raised this King’s repute high in the roll of Durrani rulers, but did not suffice to save his house. The savagery of others weighed too heavy in the scale.

Six years were to elapse before Shah Shuja was driven out of his kingdom by the same half-brother whom he had supplanted and who had once more placed his affairs in the hands of Fateh Khan Barakzai. It was at the end of that time that in the spring of 1809 Mountstuart Elphinstone arrived in Peshawar on his embassy to the ‘Kingdom of Caubul’, and an English statesman and scholar first made contact not only with a Durrani prince but with the tribes beyond the Indus. When Elphinstone arrived, the expansion of Sikh power to the west of the river had not begun, and indeed during the ten years that elapsed from Zaman’s deposition to 1809 no open clash had occurred between the Durrani Kingdom and the forces of the Sikh Maharaja. Ranjit Singh had been busy in the consolidation of his rule in the Panjab. By the summer of 1809, when Elphinstone was returning from Peshawar to India, he found the Sikh frontier between Hasan Abdal and Rawalpindi — probably on the Margalla Pass — and he reported that ‘the whole Punjaub belongs to Runjeet Sing who in 1805 was but one of many chiefs but who, when we passed, had acquired the sovereignty of all the Sikhs in the Punjaub and was assuming the title of King . . . he is busied in subjugating his weak neighbours by the same mixture of force and craft that he so successfully employed against the chiefs of his own nation’.

Ranjit’s first step after his recognition by Zaman had been to master Lahore and Amritsar from the incapable chiefs of the Bhangi Misl. This he did with the aid of the Kuneia and Ahluwalia Misls who held what is now Amritsar and Gurdaspur, although the Bhangis had the support of the Pathan Khan of Kasur, Nizamuddin. After forays towards Multan and reducing the country south of the Salt Range he decided finally to destroy the Kasur colony, now under Qutbuddin, and remove this Khweshgi Pathan stronghold which he regarded as too close to his capital to leave even as a feudatory. In 1807 Qutbuddin surrendered after a month’s siege and received for his maintenance a
tract of land south of the Sutlej, where he built a new town named Jalalabad, and became the founder of the Mamdot family. From this success Ranjit went on to capture the walled town of Multan but the citadel on this occasion resisted his efforts and bought him off with a considerable tribute. It was at this juncture that the British Government, now in possession of Delhi, was persuaded that the designs of Napoleon included an intention to carry the war into India, and it appeared to them expedient to send missions both to Shah Shuja and to Ranjit Singh to seek common ground for a defensive alliance.

Elphinstone was deputed to the Afghan court, and proceeded by way of Bahawalpur and Multan, thinking that it might be necessary to meet the King at Kandahar. Hearing late in December 1808 that Shah Shuja had started for Kabul, the mission turned north, crossed the Indus, ‘a noble object by its great name, by the interest it excites as the boundary of India, by its own extent and by the lofty hills which formed the background of the view,’ and reached Dera Ismail Khan in January 1809. Here Elphinstone received the news that Shah Shuja would meet him at Peshawar, then the winter capital. As escort the King had sent one of his courtiers, Mulla Jafar, under whose guidance the English party proceeded by Paharpur to Paniala.

Paniala is the home of the Biluts section of Lodis, whose chiefs have always been famous for the simple and traditional hospitality which they dispense. They claim a Sayyid descent, and Elphinstone well describes the charms of the oasis which is their home.

Our camp was pitched near the village of Puneealla, in a cheerful and beautiful spot, such as one would figure in a scene of Arabia Felix. It was a sandy valley, bounded by craggy hills, watered by a little stream, and interspersed with clumps of date-trees, and with patches of green corn. The village itself stood in a deep grove of date trees on the side of a hill from which many streams gushed through little caverns in the thickest part of the wood.

Happy with this scene, the party went on by Kalabagh where we are given another gem-like description of ‘earth, blood-red, and this, with the strange and beautiful spectacle of the salt rocks, and the Indus flowing in a deep and clear stream through lofty mountains past this extraordinary town’. Then on, over the tumbled Bhangi Khel hills, from whose summits they first saw
the snowy splendours of the Sufed Koh, and were shown behind them what seemed a little brook for the Indus, to Dodah and Kohat. 'Cohaut' was sheer delight; like so many who arrive in these parts for the first time, the envoy had a strange sense of having been there before; he felt that he had come home.

The hills in February around 'Cohaut' were varied and picturesque, those more distant beyond the town covered with snow. The plain was green and well-watered, and up and down its face were inviting little groves of trees. The climate was delightful; the fruits and flowers of all climes were said to be produced in this basin. And indeed in Kohat the apple bears fruit alongside the mango, the only productive mango-tree so far to the north. The town was clean and neat, with a little fort on an artificial mound and near it ran a stream as clear as 'crystal', issuing from three fountains — the Jangal Khel springs known to all who love Kohat. Here they found a garden which afforded them extreme joy, though perhaps a portion of its charms consisted in its abounding in English plants, from which they had long been estranged in the climate of India.

This garden, 'bright with sinuous rills,' was enclosed by a hedge, full of wild raspberry and blackberry bushes, and contained plum- and peach-trees in full blossom, weeping willows and plane-trees just coming into first leaf, together with apples and many others that could not be distinguished for having lost their foliage. There were also numerous fine vines twisted round the trees, as if they were wild. The walks were covered with green sod which looked the more English, because some withered grass was seen among the full, soft, and fresh verdure of the new year. There were also clover, chick-weed, plantains, rib-grass, dandelions, common dock, and many other English weeds. The beauty of the whole was augmented rather than diminished in the visitors' eyes by the trees being out of leaf, and putting forth new buds.

Here was seen a bird very like a goldfinch, and another of the same size, remarkable for the beauty of its plumage, which was of the finest crimson, except on the head and wings which were black. (They had made acquaintance with the scarlet minivet, a frequenter of the Kohat groves.) Some of the gentlemen thought they saw and heard thrushes and blackbirds. The celebrated 'Bedee-Mishk' was among the plants of this garden, and Elphinstone was delighted to find it was nothing but the form of willow
with sweet-scented yellow flowers beloved of bees, so well known to the English at home as palm.

On the banks of that stream now stands the domed house of the Deputy Commissioner, built by Cavagnaril on an Italian model, with a garden worthy of Elphinstone's gay words and, in season, violets so profuse they haunt the memory.

Three miles north of Kohat the party came to the foot of 'a tremendous cotul'. The road up, the old road up the eastern spur, was only a mile and a half long, but exceedingly steep and went over large pieces of rock. At the top the envoy's party were joined by some Bangash chiefs who proposed a picnic luncheon and produced a napkin with some fowls and bread of which all partook very sociably, sitting in a circle and eating with the hands. This is a spot familiar to every North-West Frontiersman—a neck of land crowned by a fort, to the south fifty miles of rolling Khatak hills stretching towards the Indus and the Bannu plain, to the north the dry confined valleys of the Adam Khel Afridis who make the tribal rifles. It is marked now by a fine monument in dressed stone, in memory of a famous commander of Constabulary, Handyside, a valiant man whose name was honoured equally by the men he led and the outlaws he hunted and by whom he met his death.

The picnic over, there followed the descent into the Bosti Khel Valley 'belonging to the predatory tribe of Kheiber', through which Molly Ellis was carried in 1923, having been kidnapped from Kohat. In Elphinstone's days tribal responsibility for guarding this famous pass, known as 'The Darrah', or The Pass, had not been fixed and heavy escorts were needed for safe passage. Elphinstone and his party saw many of the famous marauders, but their baggage was too well guarded for excitement, and the next night was passed at Zarghun Khel, where the rifle factories now are. On this march 'the hills were so high, and the valleys so deep that the surveyors could not see the sun to take an observation at noon-day'.

And so to the northern mouth of the Darrah whence 'a vast range of snowy mountains began to appear and soon disclosed a spectacle of unequalled magnificence, a part of the chain of Hindoo Coosh'. And onward to Peshawar, which was reached on 25th February, 1809. The date is worth remembering; it was the beginning of a long association, not ended yet.
The actors were worthy of the occasion:

It is a dull creature who can read or write of Mountstuart Elphinstone without affection... there is wit in his face and in all he wrote and said, but there is no cynicism or spite or self-seeking in the salt; he can be detached, humorous, resigned to the inevitable, and yet enthusiastic as a boy.\textsuperscript{13}

Shah Shuja, the King of Caubul, was a handsome man... the expression of his countenance was dignified and pleasing, and his address princely.... It will scarcely be believed how much he had the manners of a gentleman, or how well he preserved his dignity, while he seemed only anxious to please.\textsuperscript{14}

And of the Afghan character:

Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity and obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependants, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious and prudent; they are less disposed than the nations in their neighbourhood to falsehood, intrigue and deceit.\textsuperscript{15}

And of Mulla Jafar, Elphinstone's escort:

He was a grave old gentleman, shrewd, sensible, and good-humoured, but blunt, and somewhat passionate.\textsuperscript{16}

Elphinstone's Caubul is probably the most entertaining official record ever written in English. Finished in 1814, five years after his mission, when the author was in Poona, it is still the broadest, and at the same time the most precise and compassionate, appreciation of the Frontier scene and manners. This man has every locality right, every tribe in due place, he sets his scene in correct and convincing perspective. He sees the contrast of mountain and desert, of sand and verdure, of climate and season, as only a man who loves that land can see. King or noble, tradesman or merchant, priest or peasant—all seem to him men deserving of appraisal, even their faults are worth a smile and lovable. He met these men before they had become embittered by wars and expeditions, and he felt intuitively that there was a bond to be forged between them and us. If England had been represented on the Frontier by a succession of such men, much that was later lost would have been kept, and nothing that was won would ever have been lost. The righteousness of an Edwardes, the heroism of a Nicholson, the flamboyance of a Cavagnari, the cold grey eye of a Roos-Keppel, seem crude and insignificant beside the in-
stinctive grasp, the deep humanism, of Mountstuart Elphinstone.

Elphinstone spent less than six months (7th January to 20th June) beyond the Indus, of which less than four (25th February to 14th June) were in Peshawar. Yet he came away with a knowledge of the country and people which less gifted men have not gained in a lifetime on the Frontier. Though he did not go beyond Peshawar, his instinct and research gave him a balanced picture of the whole, of Kabul itself set in its valleys and gardens, of the Ghali uplands, of the tangled mountains of Afridis and Wazirs, of the northern parts of Baluchistan, even — I doubt not, though I have not seen them — of the Kandahar and Balkh of the time. Of his mission he himself said it cured him of ambition, and later he was to reject offers of the highest place, and honours — for they would have made him Governor-General — for the life of scholar and historian.

It is interesting that this fine, selfless, humorous mind should have been the first to be turned outward from Britain upon the Pathan scene. He learned Sanskrit and Persian in Calcutta, but was not bemused by their subtleties. He was no introvert. He would have agreed in the contrast drawn by the missionary Pencell17 between the vista of Christian and Muslim who both believe, or should believe, that ‘no man liveth to himself and no man dieth to himself’, and the inward looking of the Hindu, so intent on his own salvation within a concatenation of births that he forgets a man has a duty to those around him from which he cannot absolve himself. No people could have wished for a foreign interpreter more penetrating in his combination of analysis with understanding, discernment with humanity.10

Elphinstone’s saying on the duration of British rule in Asia was that for it the desirable death to die would be that the peoples themselves should reach such a standard that retention of the government by foreigners would become impossible. There can be small doubt that though the men he met in the north were not yet included in the bounds of our rule, his evaluation of their quality must have been a factor which led him to this saying.

As he had been the first, so he was the last Englishman to see Durrani government in action in Peshawar, uninfluenced by the proximity of Ranjit Singh. So let us halt awhile, and recapture that scene before it is swept away by the Sikh deluge.
The envoy’s description of Peshawar and its surroundings recalls the scene much as it is today, and is better far than any gazetteer or modern traveller’s tale. Like all those who came after him he was struck by the near approximation of the plain to a circle, and by the splendid mountain panorama which surrounds it, of which the range of the Hindu Kush on the north and the peak of the Sufed Koh on the west are the most conspicuous. When the mission arrived in February, the upper parts of the surrounding mountains were covered with snow, while the plain was clothed with the richest verdure, and the climate they found delicious. Most of the trees were bare, but enough were in leaf to give richness and variety to the prospect; and in the next ten days the English gentlemen were excited to mark the numerous gardens and scattered trees covered with a new foliage of a freshness and brilliancy never seen in the perpetual summer of India. Many streams ran through the plain, their banks fringed with willows and tamarisks. The orchards scattered over the country contained a profusion of plum, peach, pear, quince and pomegranate trees, affording a greater display of blossoms than the visitors had ever before witnessed; the uncultivated parts of the land were covered with a thick elastic sod that perhaps never was equalled but in England. The greater part of the plain they found to be highly cultivated, and irrigated by many water-courses and canals. The Bara canals, and the Juyi Shaikh and Juyi Zardad had been constructed long before Elphinstone’s time. The villages, then as now, were generally large, and remarkably clean and neat, almost all being set off with trees. There were pretty little bridges of Mughal brick over the streams. Many avenues of mulberry-trees could be seen, and here and there stood a lordly pipal or banyan (\textit{ficus religiosa} and \textit{ficus indica}). Except just north of the city there were few date-palms, for the Peshawar winter is too cold for dates to ripen, but the graveyards were covered with groves of tamarisk, dark and gloomy with their cypress-like leaves.

The town of Peshawar was already made up of houses built of unburnt brick in wooden frames, of three or more storeys in height. The streets were narrow and paved, the pavement sloping to the kennels, and making them slippery in wet weather. Two or three brooks ran through the city, even then skirted with willows and mulberry-trees. The streets were crowded with men of all nations and languages, in every variety of dress and appearance.
The shops, occupying the lower storey of the high houses, were full of life and bustle; dried fruits and nuts, bread, meat, sandals, saddlery, bales of cloth, hardware, copper utensils, books and posteens were displayed, each in its quarter. Among the handsomest shops were the fruiterers, where apples, melons, plums and oranges were mixed in piles with Indian fruits, and the cookshops, where everything was served in earthen dishes glazed to look like china.

With the hawkers crying their goods were mixed the people of the town in white turbans; Persians and Afghans in flowing mantles and caps of black sheepskin; Khyberees with sandals and the wild dress and air of their mountains; Hindus with the peculiar features of their nation often suited to the dress of the country; and Hazaras not more remarkable for their broad faces and little eyes than for their want of beard, the ornament of every other face in the city. Among these might be discovered a few women with long white veils that reached their feet, and even some of the King’s retinue. Sometimes a troop of armed horsemen clattered past, their appearance announced by the jingling of their bridles. Sometimes, when the King was going out, the streets were choked with horse and foot and dromedaries bearing swivels, and large, waving, red and green flags; and at all times loaded dromedaries, or heavy Bactrian camels covered with shaggy hair, made their way slowly through the streets; and mules, fastened together in circles of eight or ten, were seen going round and round to cool them after their labour, while their keepers were indulging in an eating-house, or enjoying the smoke of a hired ‘calleeaun’ in the street. Amidst all this throng the Faringis passed without any notice, except for a salam alaihm from a passenger, accompanied by a bow with the hands crossed in front, or an application from a beggar who would call out for relief, admonishing the almsgiver that life was short and the benefit of charity immortal.

In the countryside the roads were enlivened by groups on horse or afoot, one of whose number would charm the others with a Pakhtu song. Men would be seen with hawks on their fist and pointers at their heels; and often there was a party of fowlers catching quails among the wheat when the corn grew up. A net was fastened at one corner of the field, two men held each an end of a rope stretched across the opposite corner, and dragged it for-
ward so as to shake all the wheat and drive the quails before it into
the net, which was dropped as soon as they entered.

‘From the nature of the country,’ continues Elphinstone, ‘the
charms of which were heightened by novelty, and by the expecta-
tions we formed of the sights and incidents which we should meet
with among so wild and extraordinary a people, it may be sup-
posed that these morning expeditions were pleasing and interest-
ing. Our evening rides were not less delightful, when we went out
among the gardens round the city, and admired the richness and
repose of the landscape, contrasted with the gloomy magnificence
of the surrounding mountains, which were often involved in
clouds and tempests, while we enjoyed the quiet and sunshine of
the plain.’

All this has never been better told, and it remains with us for
those who have eyes to see. But in Elphinstone’s time there still
stood the Bala Hissar with the King’s palace within, all to be
wrecked by Ranjit Singh in 1823. And, below it, on the north
side, were the lovely Royal Gardens, also ravaged by the Sikhs
and cut to the last tree. The present Shahi Bagh stands where once
they stood, but how poor a replica it is!19

Read the envoy’s vivid description of his audience with His
Majesty:

At length the Chaous Baushee came to us: he had been labouring
hard at our names, and gave it up with the appearance of extreme
vexation, in despair of mastering such a collection of strange words.
He now explained the ceremonies to be observed in a very courteous
manner, and entreated us to whisper our names to him, when he
should touch us. He then conducted us up a sloping passage and
through a gate, after which we passed behind a sort of screen, and
suddenly issued into a large court, at the upper end of which we saw
the King in an elevated building.

The court was long and had high walls, painted with the figures of
cypresses. In the middle was a pond and fountains. The walls on each
side were lined with the King’s guards three deep, and at various
places in the court stood the officers of state, according to their
degree. At the end of the court was a high building ornamented with
false arches, but without doors or windows; over this was another
storey, the roof of which was supported by pillars and Moorish
arches, highly ornamented. In the centre arch sat the King on a very
large throne of gold or gilding. His appearance was magnificent and
royal: his crown and all his dress were one blaze of jewels — all was
silent and motionless. On coming in sight of the King, we all pulled off our hats and made a low bow: we then held up our hands towards heaven, as praying for the King, and afterwards advanced to the fountain where the Chaous Bashee repeated our names, without any title or addition of respect, ending, 'They have come from Europe as ambassadors to Your Majesty. May your misfortunes be turned upon me!' The King answered in a loud and sonorous voice, 'They are welcome', on which we prayed for him again, and repeated the ceremony once more.

How Shah Shuja's personality impressed Elphinstone has been said already. There follows a striking passage on the externals, and the envoy writes:

We thought at first the King had on armour of jewels, but, on close inspection, we found this to be a mistake, and his real dress to consist of a green tunic, with large flowers in gold, and precious stones, over which were a large breast-plate of diamonds, shaped like two fleurs-de-lis, large emerald bracelets on the arms (above the elbow), and many other jewels in different places. In one of the bracelets was the Cohi Noor, known to be one of the largest diamonds in the world. The crown was about nine inches high — the whole so complicated, and so dazzling that it was difficult to understand and impossible to describe. . . . The room was open all round. The centre was supported by four high pillars, in the midst of which was a marble fountain. The floor was covered with the richest carpets, and round the edges were strips of silk, embroidered with gold, for the Khauns to stand on. The view from the hall was beautiful. Immediately below was an extensive garden, full of cypresses and other trees, and beyond was a plain of the richest verdure: here and there were pieces of water and shining streams; and the whole was bounded with mountains, some dark and others covered with snow.

Such was Peshawar in the days of its royal glory. And of the garden:

It is called the garden of Shauh Lemaun. Its shape is oblong. Some handsome structures belonging to the Balla Hissaur form the southern side, and part of the hill on which that castle stands is included in the garden: the other sides are enclosed in walls. The northern part of the garden, which is cut off from the rest, is laid out irregularly, and is full of trees. The remainder forms a square, divided by avenues, which cross each other in the middle of the garden. That which runs from east to west is formed by stately rows
of alternate planes and cypresses; and contains three parallel walks, and two long beds of poppies. The space from north to south is also bordered by cypresses and planes, beneath which are bushes, planted very thick, of red, white, yellow, and China roses; white and yellow jasmine, flowering cistus, and other flowering shrubs, of which I have seen some in England and India, and others were new to me. At the north end of this opening is a pavilion. The space between the walks is filled up by six long ponds, close to each other; and so contrived that the water is continually falling in little cascades from one to another, and ending in a basin in the middle of the garden. In the centre of this basin is a summer-house, two stories high, surrounded by fountains; and there are fountains in a row up the middle of all the ponds; there are sixty-nine fountains altogether, which continued to play during the whole day we spent at the garden, and were extremely agreeable, as the summer was then far advanced. The rest of the garden was filled up with a profusion of fruit-trees, which I have mentioned, as growing at Peshawar. Some were so thick that the sun could not penetrate them at noon, when they afforded a dark, cool, and picturesque retreat... after our luncheon we retired to one of the pavilions which was spread with carpets. Here fruit was brought to us, and we spent our time in reading the numerous Persian verses written on the walls: most of them alluded to the instability of fortune, and some were very applicable to the King's actual condition. About three, we went out for a walk. The views up the east and west walks were beautiful, and each was closed by high mountains; but that of the space which runs from north to south far surpassed everything that I have seen in an Asiatic garden. We stood under the Balla Hissaur, which on this side is very handsome. The fountains were sparkling in the sun whose rays shone bright on the trees, shrubs, and flowers on one side, and made a fine contrast with the deep shade of the other. The buildings looked rich, light, and suited to a garden. The country beyond was green, and studded with clumps and single trees; and the mountains, which are there very high, gave a fine termination to the prospect, and being in several ranges, at different distances, displayed the greatest variety of tint and outline... we left the garden a little before sunset.

Every stone, every rafter, every tree, of all this beauty was destroyed by the Sikhs. The Peshawar Fort which now stands on the site of the Bala Hissar is a Sikh barrack affair, patched up by the military engineers of the British time. The modern Shahi Bagh, which covers part of the ground of the garden of 'Shauh Lemaun' lacks the magic touch and enjoys no vistas. But the English who
followed the Sikhashahi strove to make Peshawar once more a city of gardens, though with a suburban, not a stately, taste. Working as best they knew, they remade a tradition which Pakistan must have the will to preserve.

When Elphinstone left Peshawar, he looked back longingly. Three days out, he camped at a spot near the present cantonment of Nowshera, where the Kabul River approaches the highroad—a place he loved, covered with green turf, tree-shaded beside the broad stream, and looking westward to the Tahtarra peak that guards the Khaibar. A week passed, and the mission reached Hasan Abdal. Just as Pathans, returning north, feel their hearts lift as they open up that valley, so the Englishman, going south, recognized it as the last stage on the road India-ward where the Iranian atmosphere can be felt. The vale of Hasan Abdal recalled to him the beauties of the country he had left. It had been a resting-place, *farud-gah*, of the Mughals on their migrations to Kashmir; it had that peculiar sunny pleasure-dome dreaminess in the air, only to be felt in gardens with a Persian influence. He was reminded of that delicious pleasance he had seen in Kohat. The garden at nearby Wah, which he visited, was going to decay. It contained, as it still does, ‘basons filled with the pure water of these hills, some ruined buildings, one remarkably elegant, and here, for the last time, was to be seen the plane-tree which forms the favourite ornament of all the gardens of the West.’

To Elphinstone the lovely ruins of the Wah garden symbolized indeed the hope with which his mission had set out, the splendour of his reception, and the beauty of the Frontier scenic setting, against which he had laboured. But this last outpost of the land he had left was desolate and melancholy too. His thoughts turned to decay and the failure of effort, whether his own or Shah Shuja’s. Perhaps, in his depression, he had some comfort. He must have known he had lit a lamp, in the light of which others of his race could follow, if they would.
Elphinstone was still at Peshawar when in the late spring of 1809 the news arrived that Shah Shuja’s half-brother, Mahmud, whom he thought to have decisively defeated the previous year, was making yet another bid for the throne of Kabul, again with the active aid of Fateh Khan. Shuja was embarrassed by the loss of a large part of his forces in the defiles leading to Kashmir, where they had gone in an endeavour to stem a rebellion.

This reverse seriously affected the morale and prestige of the whole régime. At that very moment messengers rode in with authentic tidings of Mahmud’s capture of Kabul and imminent advance on Peshawar. On the strength of the mutual defence treaty under negotiation the King and those around him sought to derive from Elphinstone some assurance of British support in their internal affairs, but this the envoy was unable to give. His business was to treat with the de facto ruler of the Kingdom, not to take part in domestic strife or uphold one King against a rival claimant to the throne. He records the dignity with which his refusal was met in full council; he was not importuned, and the disappointment he was bound to give, to the very real credit of the King and his council, led to no diminution in the attention or hospitality accorded to the mission.

Strenuous endeavours were made under Elphinstone’s eye to remedy the Kashmir disaster and to prepare another army for war. The parties left Peshawar almost the same day, Shah Shuja with his army to fight for his throne, and Elphinstone with his mission for Hasan Abdal to await the outcome. It was when Elphinstone was in Hasan Abdal that he received the news of Shah Shuja’s defeat, and (as mentioned) a few days later, at Rawalpindi, found himself followed by the King’s blind brother, the deposed Shah
Zaman, bringing down the family effects and ladies of the court. The defensive treaty he had negotiated with a King facing a revolution was valueless, and it seemed the Mission had failed. In the longer term Elphinstone's nobility and bearing were remembered for many years, and more might have followed if the memory had not been clouded by smaller men. Yet, even now, in the minds of the men who live about Peshawar, there is a legend of the stature, moral and intellectual, to which one of English birth may rise; that consciousness I attribute to a faint memory that the first to come their way was Elphinstone.

The news of Shah Shuja's defeat reached Ranjit Singh at Wazirabad, where he was busy sequestering that district from the family of a deceased brother-Sikh. Shuja, he heard, had not yet lost control of Peshawar or its surroundings, and had crossed the Indus with the vague hope of procuring assistance from the British under the mutual defence treaty just negotiated. Anxious to keep a representative of Durrani power within his own grasp, Ranjit said he would himself proceed to meet the Shah to save him further journeying towards Hindustan. The two Kings met at Sahiwal, where Ranjit amused Shuja with inconclusive offers of co-operation in the recovery of Multan and Kashmir. No determinate arrangement was reached, for Shuja had received messages of loyalty from Yusufzais and other tribes in the Peshawar region, and, seeing some prospects of success, hesitated to go further with the Sikh whose sincerity he distrusted, and with reason.

The conferences were broken off, and Shuja went back to Attock, where he succeeded in mobilizing tribal aid, together with some reinforcement from Kashmir (whose Governor had not submitted to Mahmud), sufficient to enable him to make himself master of Peshawar in the spring of 1810. He retained possession of the city for the summer months, after which Muhammad Azem Khan, next brother to Fateh Khan in the roll of Painda's twenty-two sons, compelled him to retreat to the Derajat, whence he sought, but unsuccessfully, to gain over the Durrani governor of Multan. Here he was refused admittance and barely treated with courtesy, even when he encamped outside the gates. He again moved northward, and, finding his own adherents still numerous among the eastern tribes, succeeded once more in mastering Peshawar after two actions, one a reverse, the other a victory. But there were traitors around him, men who, like
Ranjit Singh, wished to possess his person, and in the course of 1812 he was seized in Peshawar by Jahandad Khan, governor of Attock, and removed first to that fort, and afterwards to Kashmir, where he remained for more than a year.

While Shuja was near Multan on this wandering, Shah Mahmud, his successful rival, came down to Peshawar for the only time and crossed the Indus with the avowed object of overawing the Governor of Kashmir, who had sided with his half-brother. Ranjit at the time was employed on the subjugation of the hill chiefs of Bhimbar, Rajauri and other places on the old Mughal road to Kashmir in the Pir Panjal foothills. He hastened north, ostensibly for a meeting of ceremony, but in reality to prevent the Durrani from forestalling him in Kashmir, which the Sikh designed for himself. The two princes met at Rawalpindi in March 1811. Nothing conclusive emerged, but Ranjit had a way of dealing with Durrani princes, a subtle flattery made up of offers of help and hints of allegiance, shot through with an inimitable panache, a sardonic insistence on the strength and ruthlessness of his own will.

He employed a two-fold technique which seldom failed to win a Durrani heart. In the first phase he chose to present himself as a lover of horses, a veritable Philippos among princes, to whom it would be fitting for his noble Durrani friend to make a gift of splendid horseflesh, suitably crested and caparisoned. The Afghan prince would think that at best he had placed the chivalric Sikh under an obligation, at worst that he had bought him off. Then, confidence established between gentlemen, there would follow the second gesture, an affectionate exchange of turbans, expressive of a brotherhood transcending creed or caste. This time it worked, and Mahmud went back.

Late in 1812 the ladies of the two deposed brother-Kings, Zaman and Shuja, arrived to take sanctuary in Lahore. Kashmir, though distant, was becoming unsafe for the enemies of Mahmud, and the redoubtable Fateh Khan was known to be meditating an expedition in person to settle affairs in his chosen sovereign's favour, once for all. Ranjit was not slow to seize his opportunity. He had been reducing the hill chiefs south of Kashmir with a view to subjugating the valley itself. 'As he always endeavoured to make success more complete and more easy by appearing to labor in the cause of others, he professed to the wife of Shah
Shuja that he would secure the governance of Kashmir for her husband, but hoped the distressed lady would show her gratitude by making the great diamond, the Koh-i-Noor, the reward of his chivalrous labors when they should be crowned with success.¹¹

Ranjit had two main objects at this stage, the annexation of Kashmir and the possession of Shuja’s person. Prospects for the first were opening up with the capture of Jamnu by his son, Kharak Singh. But at this point the skein was tangled by the arrival of Fateh Khan late in 1812, intent on carrying through in person what Shah Mahmud had failed to conclude in the preceding year. The antagonists were well matched, and the stakes seemed even. But, again, Ranjit was too wily, even for Fateh Khan. They met. No turbans passed. There was no talk of horses. Ranjit said he would bring to punishment the rebel governor of Attock who had detained Shuja, and also the governor of Multan, who had refused obedience either to Shuja or Mahmud. Fateh Khan, whose object was to take Kashmir, was ready to promise anything to secure that end without meeting with Ranjit’s opposition. Each hoped to use the other as his tool, and a joint Kashmir occupation was proposed. Neither succeeded entirely in his object. Kashmir was occupied in the spring of 1813, but the Durranis outstripped the Sikhs, and Fateh Khan maintained that, as he alone achieved the conquest, Ranjit could not share in the spoils. He had forgotten Shah Shuja. The ex-King preferred joining the Sikh army to the prospect of loss of his eyes, or even his life, to Mahmud in Kabul, and went with Ranjit to Lahore. Moreover, though this time Kashmir itself had slipped through the Sikh’s fingers, there was more to come, inclining the balance to Ranjit’s side. The rebel governor of Attock, alarmed by Fateh Khan’s success in Kashmir, and fearing to fall into his hands, was easily persuaded to yield Akbar’s famous fort to Ranjit Singh. In a fury Fateh Khan offered battle. On 13th July, 1813, on the Mansar plains north-east of the Fort, was fought the first pitched encounter between the Sikhs and the Durranis. Fateh Khan, unaided by the tribes, all of whom had espoused Shuja’s cause, was defeated by the Sikhs under Muhkam Chand. This battle of Attock is notable also for the first mention of Dost Muhammad Khan, the favourite younger brother of Fateh Khan and fifteenth in the list of Painda Khan’s sons, aged only eighteen at the time.
With Shah Shuja in his hands at Lahore, nominally as an honoured guest, Ranjit Singh had many cards to play. He intended to use him first to secure Kashmir. There is small doubt also that, knowing the devotion of the Peshawar tribes to the deposed Shah, he had already formed the ambition of ruling in Peshawar under cover of the Durrani name. Nor had he forgotten his craving to possess the Koh-i-nur, associated in all men's minds with the glory of the Mughal throne. The Sikh historians relate that Shah Shuja at first evaded compliance with all demands, and even rejected a cash offer as consideration, but at last the Maharaja visited the Shah in person, mutual friendship was declared, the famous exchange of turbans took place, the diamond was surrendered, and the Shah received the assignment of a jagir in the Panjab for his maintenance together with a promise of aid in the recovery of Kabul. The Afghan account is very different.

Amir Abdurrahman writes: 'Ranjit Singh treated Shah Shuja very cruelly and imprisoned him. He took by force the Koh-i-noor diamond now in the possession of Queen Victoria. Historians give a very impressive account, describing how the King in parting with this valuable stone turned pale and felt unhappy, while the other, who was receiving it at his hands, appeared joyful and cheered by the unexpected prize; which shows that in this world the griefs of one half its inhabitants are the pleasures of the other half. One side is delighted at having killed others in a battle, and rejoices in a victory, while the other side mourns the death of those who are killed, and its own defeat.'

Sikh apologists make out that the stone did not pass without consideration. Ranjit Singh, they say, did his best to keep his side of the bargain, never wearying in promoting Shah Shuja's return to the Kabul throne, not only in the conclusion of solemn treaties — in which in 1838 the British Government took part — but in actual assistance by troops and in the provision of secure bases and lines of communication. The answer to such a plea is that Ranjit coveted, and secured, the Afghan dominions between the mountains and the Indus, a cession quite outside the Koh-i-nur transaction. He also got Kashmir. When all is said, the picture of the host succeeding, even by cajolery, to the possession of his refugee guest's most valuable treasure is not one to hang in the host's guest chamber.

Beyond the Indus the transaction is still regarded as symbolic
of Sikh methods, extortionate and acquisitive, and it is not forgotten. This assessment was one destined to be confirmed in practice by the experiences of Sikh rule a few years later. Yet, with it all, there remains an unwilling acknowledgment of the qualities of guile and persistence which equipped Ranjit Singh to build a kingdom in the eastern territories of what had been the Durrani Empire.

Late in 1814, the chronicles tell us, Shah Shuja’s wife succeeded in escaping across the Sutlej to the British border station of Ludhiana. A few months later Shuja himself ‘escaped’. But Ranjit had already made what use he wanted of his captives, and these escapes were made with his knowledge and connivance. The ex-King went to the Kashmir foot-hills where, aided by a chivalrous Kishtwar chief, he almost succeeded in wresting Kashmir from the grasp of Muhammad Azem, the brother whom Fateh Khan had left in Srinagar as the Durrani governor. But in the end this too failed, and Shah Shuja passed through Kulu and close to where Simla now stands to join his family as a British pensioner at Ludhiana in the autumn of 1816. He had yet twenty-six adventurous years before him.

In 1815 Ranjit had himself tried, but failed, to take Kashmir. His troops crossed the Pir Panjal by the Mughal route from Gujrat by Bhimbar, and he succeeded in penetrating as far as Shupiyan, the first small town in the Vale on the hill-skirts north of the main chain. Here he was repulsed with loss, and compelled to a precipitate retreat. Azem on this occasion displayed gallantry, and even mercy towards the Sikh advanced guard, whom he spared out of consideration, so he said, for Muhkam Chand, the grandfather of its commander, victor of the fight at Attock two years earlier. Ranjit made up for this check in Kashmir by at last, in 1818, taking and holding Multan. He had now reached the Indus, on a north-south line, from Attock to the junction of the Five Rivers with the main stream below Multan.

East of the Indus the Durranis were now confined to Kashmir and some half-subdued hill territory in Hazara. For communication with Peshawar and Kabul they were compelled to use the fords and ferries north of Attock, where the fort was held by Ranjit Singh.

From the death of Timur Shah in 1793, up to 1818, Afghan
domestic history is a record of palace revolutions, of **bādshāhγardi**, as between the Saddozai brothers, descendants of Ahmad Shah. In 1818 **bādshāhγardi** assumes a shape more radical, and the Saddozai dynasty gives way to the dynasty of the Muhammadzai. Just as the Saddozai are a clan of the Popalzai, the Muhammadzai are a clan of the Barakzai Durranis. The most illustrious Muhammadzai family is the Painda Khel, descended from Haji Jamal, the leading Barakzai chief of the time of Nadir Shah of Persia and Ahmad Shah Abdali. The eldest of Painda Khan’s sons was Fateh Khan, Wazir.

Fateh Khan had been the actual ruler of the country since Shah Mahmud ascended the throne for the second time in 1809. Mahmud would retire for months into a life of brooding and dissolution, hating his mentor, and only emerging from time to time, besotted and unwilling, to issue brutal and erratic commands. He had spent much of his earlier life, seeking a throne, with the Turkish Qajars and at the medieval Bukharan Court, and from them, a willing pupil, he had learned the refinements of torture practised by those barbaric princes. He is known chiefly for the tortures he devised and his enjoyment of the sufferings he inflicted. His son, Kamran, more sadistic even than his father, had been appointed Governor of Herat. In 1818, the year that Ranjit took Multan, Fateh Khan had gone to Herat to repel one of the recurrent Persian attacks on that city. He took with him that favourite younger brother, Dost Muhammad, the same that had shared his defeat at Attock five years before. Fateh Khan succeeded in repelling the Persians and won applause for his measures. But he had found his purposes at Herat thwarted by the ill-will and inefficiency of Kamran, the prince-governor, who declined to open to him the contents of the local treasury. He therefore directed Dost Muhammad to enter the palace, by force if need be, and compel Kamran to disgorge. The younger brother proceeded on this task with the aid of Jai Singh, a Sikh chief of the village of Atari, near Amritsar, who had joined him out of discontent with Ranjit’s rule. So far west had the Sikhs penetrated at this time. Dost Muhammad and his Sikh adjutant effected their purpose without a nice regard for the person of a royal lady, on whom hands were laid too eagerly. So at least said Kamran, who made the affront offered to his sister the pretext for getting rid of the King-maker, Fateh Khan. Pretending that rewards were to
be showered on Fateh Khan as the saviour of Herat he induced him to visit his father’s court, then forced on his degenerate parent his demand that the Wazir be killed with the most exemplary tortures possible, in revenge for having countenanced the touching of a royal lady by an idolator. The story runs that Fateh Khan was flayed alive, then slowly hacked to pieces, in the presence of the King and his son. The most reliable account is probably that given by the Amir Abdurrahman, writing eighty years after the event.

‘In 1818,’ the Amir writes, ‘after the most loyal services, and keeping the throne for him, Mahmud, following the advice of his treacherous son Kamran, and others who were jealous of Wazir Fateh Khan’s influence and position, most cruelly tortured and blinded Fateh Khan who had twice placed him on the throne. Finally, on Fateh Khan refusing to betray his brothers, his limbs were cut off one by one, by the orders and in the presence of the King who had been made by him, and him alone. Thus died this remarkable man, the “Warwick of Afghanistan”. His talents and gallantry gave a certain ascendancy to whatever party he joined, and further, his reputation for bravery, liberality, and nobleness of character did a great deal to help his younger brother, Dost Muhammad Khan, in gaining the throne of Kabul.’

In Peshawar the Wazir Bagh was his creation, and its cypresses commemorate him. It is a sad place, lacking the restfulness of other gardens, haunted by the great Wazir’s unquiet spirit. Fateh Khan spent his life at war, and his garden has served as a mustering-place for the clans marching to battle.

This abominable murder was the signal for revolt by all the Painda Khel. Azem, now the senior of the family, hastened with his best troops from Kashmir, leaving another brother, Jabbar, in charge. In a few months he had driven Mahmud out of Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. Mahmud and his degenerate son were forced to withdraw to the Herat province, and sporadic fighting continued for many years. The Frontier tribes threw off such allegiance as they had given to the old régime, but would not admit a new one, and confusion reigned over the whole country for eight years. It was not till 1826, and after Azem’s death, that Dost Muhammad succeeded in consolidating his power in Kabul and confining Mahmud in Herat. More years were needed before he was able to control Kandahar.
Ranjit Singh was not the man to miss this chance. Before 1818 had closed, and on Azem's heels, he crossed the Indus above Attock and advanced as far as Peshawar, where he found Yar Muhammad Khan, another of the Pindia Khel brothers, installed as governor. The governor had no troops, all the regulars being with Azem, prosecuting the war against Mahmud, and was obliged to evacuate the city. But Ranjit was canny; he knew that even so his position was delicate, and he did not try his fortune too far. One clue to his successes is that he never rushed anything; he felt his way and laid his foundations with thought and care. In this instance it did not suit him to retain Peshawar and its surroundings; having spied out the land and seen that it was good, he retired and built a fort at Khairabad, opposite Attock. The breeze that blew by Khairabad, for which Khushhal had sighed, now fluttered a Sikh flag. From fort to fort, across the great river, flew the signals of the Sikh commanders.

Ranjit had retired from Peshawar to fulfil an engagement still nearer his heart, and Azem's departure to deal with his brother's murderers had another, and momentous, consequence. For in the following year, 1819, Ranjit, accompanied by Gulab Singh, at last secured Kashmir, driving out Azem's next brother, Jabbar Khan. Durrani rule in Kashmir had lasted sixty-seven years, Ahmad Shah having wrested the Valley from the Mughals in 1752. For nearly two hundred years before that Kashmir was a Mughal province, and before that it had been in Muslim hands since 1341. For nearly five centuries Afghans and Pathans had been prominent in the country, not only in office under the governor, but planted in colonies. It is not surprising that at the present time there should survive a lively interest in Kashmir and its fate among the people of the Frontier. That interest remains a factor to be reckoned with in any assessment of the future allegiance of the valley and its surroundings.

The Durranis were now stripped of all their dominions east of the Indus, and the Sikh had secured a bridgehead on the Afghan bank of the river. And in the next two years he further improved his position by adding to his territories both Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan, the latter in fief, and reducing the turbulent Hazara tribes north of Hasan Abdal who held one of the routes to Kashmir.
The challenge to Durrani rule had to be met. In 1822 Azem came down to Peshawar with the fugitive Sikh chief Jai Singh Atarwala, with the intention of attacking Khairabad and driving Ranjit across the Indus. Troubles nearer home recalled him before action could be taken, but his advance had brought up Ranjit post-haste to his frontier with a message to Yar Muhammad, Governor of Peshawar, demanding tribute. Yar Muhammad, who apprehended the designs of his brother Azem as much as he dreaded Ranjit, made the offer so acceptable to the Sikh, a gift of splendidly equipped and prancing horses. The Maharaja smiled and, feigning satisfaction, withdrew for a while to deal with a tiresome mother-in-law of his with whom he had a dispute over a fort on Sutlej-side. This settled, he came up once more to the Indus. He heard that Azem strongly disapproved of the gift of horses and was on his way back to Peshawar. The donor, Yar Muhammad, had fled to the Yusufzais in Swat rather than face his brother's wrath. Peshawar, it was evident, was an important stake. The scene was set for the famous Battle of Nowshera.

The month was March, 1823, and the spring rains were late, and the water in the Indus low. Ranjit decided to do what had been done before, possibly by Alexander, by Mahmud Ghaznawi more than once, and by Babur, to cross the great river by the historic ford near the village of Hund, the old Waihind or Ohand. Below Ghazi and Pihur, where the Indus breaks from the Hazara hills, and above Khairabad and the Landai River junction, where it enters the Attock gorge, the river spreads out in the wide plain between the Yusufzai Samah and the Chachh, forming three and sometimes four channels. In a favourable year it is fordable at this point by determined horsemen. Jehad had been preached, and groups of tribesmen lined the Yusufzai bank shouting their war-cries and taunting the Sikh horsemen. These in a fury rushed their horses into the stream, and got across half-swimming, half-wading, with the loss of a number of men and animals swept away. Ranjit then proceeded steadily with his main body, collecting boats and carrying the guns across on elephants. The lashkars of Yusufzai and Khatak tribesmen had now gathered to the number of 20,000 under the leadership of a well-known Sayyid, Akbar Shah, of the family of Pir Baba in Buner. They concentrated in a strong position based upon the small eminence of Pir Sabak, a landmark on the north (left) bank of the Landai River just east of
the present Risalpur. Their reinforcements occupied some other hillocks a mile further west, known to Pathans as Tarakai and to the British soldier as the Marble Rocks. Azem with his Kabul troops had by now advanced along the main road from Peshawar, but, distrustful of his influence over the tribal militia on the other bank, and doubting the fidelity of his brothers, took post, without crossing, upon the main road some three miles east of the present Nowshera Cantonment. The battle is named not of course after the cantonment, which did not then exist, but after the old village, almost a town, of Naukhar, upon the Landai River's north (left) bank. For the reason that its main fury raged round Pir Sabak hill, it is also sometimes referred to by that name. Thus the Durrani regulars under Azem were separated by the broad and deep Landai River from the massed levies of the tribesmen.

The Maharaja detached a small force to the right (south) river-bank to hold Azem in check and act as escort for his guns which he kept mobile upon the main road, running at this point right upon the river-bank. His main forces, both horse and foot, he deployed against the tribes whose standards waved on Pir Sabak hill and on the Tarakai hillocks behind it. He knew well enough which was the formidable enemy, and had taken the measure of the Durrani and his troops. The battle opened with a furious hand-to-hand struggle between the tribal Ghazis and the Sikh Akalis. The wild leader of the Amritsar fanatics, Phula Singh, was slain, and the Sikh horse could make no impression on tribal footmen, advantageously posted among the rocks of the hillocks that here strew the plain. The battle began to go against the Sikhs. Clouds of Yusufzai and Khatak warriors fell with the utmost gallantry on the drilled Sikh infantry and broke it up. An exultant tribal advance was then stayed on one flank by a single Gurkha battalion of the Maharaja's army, which took square and fired steadily at the advancing hordes. The Sikh artillery from the other bank made good play, and the advance was checked.

But the tribal valour was not spent. The levies retired again among the rocky hillocks, and three attempts were made by the rallying Sikhs to carry the key-position at Pir Sabak. All were repulsed. At the fourth effort the hill was carried, only through the presence and personal exhortations of Ranjit Singh himself at the head of the survivors of his Gurkhas and his bodyguard of
horse. Later, Ranjit admitted to Colonel Wade, the British agent at his court, that of his disciplined troops it was the Gurkhas alone who had stood firm under the assaults of the tribesmen.

In the meantime Azem on the other bank had been inactive. He did not seek to cross the river or even to neutralize the effect of the Sikh artillery, operated from the southern bank, where his army stood. That evening he retreated. He had scarcely even been engaged in the battle, and no valid excuse has been offered for his behaviour. Nine years later, Alexander Burnes heard in Peshawar that he feared for his treasure, or alternatively that his men were overcome by the shouts of the Akalis on the northern bank. Their exclamations were attributed to the arrival of fresh reinforcements.

The measure of tribal losses on this occasion can be taken by any visitor to the vast graveyards south of the Tarakai hillocks near Nowshera. These bear witness to a sacrifice that is still remembered. Despite the slaughter, the next morning the tribesmen rallied and declared their readiness to resume the struggle under their Pirzada, Akbar. But Azem had gone, and they were without countenance or support, and the day was Ranjit Singh's.

Azem, broken in heart but without a wound, died shortly after the battle. His record in this fight lives after him: no Yusufzai, Afridi or Khatak is anxious to rely on the word of a Muhammadzai Sardar, for it is doubtful if he will be there on the day. Shah Shuja, the Saddozai, with his regard for, and confidence in, the free Afridi or Yusufzai, and his unwearied efforts to attain his aim, has left a sweeter memory. The tribes hardly knew the evil Saddozais, Mahmud and his son, who did not pass their way.

With Azem expired all show of unanimity between the twenty surviving brothers of the Painda Khel. Dost Muhammad succeeded to Azem's position in Kabul, and Yar Muhammad in Peshawar. With Yar Muhammad were three others, the eldest Sultan Muhammad, of whom there is much to tell. A group of five other brothers, Purdil, Kohandil, Sherdil, Mehrdil and Rahtm-dil, sons of a Ghalji mother, held Kandahar. In Herat the Saddozai Mahmud, and his son Kamran, still exercised a precarious authority.

After the battle Ranjit Singh advanced to Peshawar, slaying and plundering as he went. He battered down the Bala Hissar and sacked the fair palace within, where fourteen years earlier
Shah Shuja had received Elphinstone so regally. He cut the cypresses and muddied the basins of the garden of Shah Leman below the Fort, and allowed his cavalry to ravage the square miles of delicious orchards, plum, peach, apricot and pear, the glory of Peshawar. The name of the Sikhashahi — the Sikh Rule — is a synonym for misgovernment and oppression in the mouths of teachers and children to this day. Even the mosque of Mahabat Khan, the chief mosque of the city, seems to have been dismantled. The building was erected by Aurangzeb’s governor about 1670, and the original is said to have been a smaller version of the great Badshahi Masjid in Lahore. The present stucco is a poor substitute for sandstone and marble, and is clearly a reconstruction of early British times, neat enough but commonplace. That Peshawar contains no architectural monuments of any value is due mainly to the devastations of 1823.

But Ranjit did not stay. He accepted Yar Muhammad’s tender of submission and went south. He must have felt the hatred blowing up around him.

Between the murder of Fateh Khan in 1818 and the Nowsherah battle of 1823, Shah Shuja made one of his restless attempts to regain his throne. In 1816 he had secured for himself an honoured repose in Ludhiana, but his thoughts still wandered to Kabul, or at least to Peshawar, and he discounted the British notion that he had sought asylum. At the outset Azem gave him some hope of support, but this was withdrawn, and Shuja tried his fortunes towards Sind and Dera Ghazi Khan. These held for a while and, proceeding thence north, he again reoccupied Peshawar for a few days, but was driven out and for the third time took refuge with the Afridis in the Khaibar hills. But once more Chora proved too close to the main road for safety, and back went the wanderer to Sind, where he resided for a year, only to be forced out by Azem’s pressure on the Haidarabad chiefs. By 1821 he was in residence again at Ludhiana.

Ranjit Singh had now succeeded in bringing Peshawar, with Kohat, Bannu and the Derajat under his nominal sway, but the complete reduction of this new province was never effected by the Sikhs. Ranjit’s forces were continually stretched in arduous warfare against the tribes, even where he had succeeded in obtaining the submission of Durrani governors. In the first years of his
occupation he was not even able to establish order in the cis-Indus tract stretching north-east from Attock and embracing what is now the lower portion of the Hazara district. In 1824, only a year after the Battle of Nowshera, the Yusufzai and other sections on both banks of the Indus above Attock rose in insurrection under the leadership of Sayyid Akbar Shah, their Pirzada.

This was the man who had been the chief organizer of the tribal resistance at Pir Sabak in the previous year. He belonged to that well-known family of Sayyids, whose ancestor, Sayyid Ali Tarmezi, known to all the Yusufzai country as Pir Baba, gave his name to the holiest shrine in all this tribal territory. A descendant of Pir Baba, Sayyid Zaman Shah, was recognized by the later Mughals as a leader of influence in Swat and Buner, and received a command and a jagir in Hazara to support it. This Akbar Shah was his grandson. The name and fame of this family is woven closely into the tapestry of events on the Swat-Buner border, from Ranjit's time right down into the twentieth century; they organized resistance to the Sikhs and later to the British, became the patrons of the Mujahidin colony — the so-called Hindustani Fanatics — and from time to time made their influence felt as religious and political leaders over the whole area from the borders of Dir to Pakhli in Hazara. Sayyid Akbar's great-nephew, Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah, is still living, with headquarters at Sitana on the Indus. Mindful of the family tradition, he has himself been a chief actor on the stage of tribal politics in Swat and Buner. The family is one which in a remarkable degree and over several generations has shown a capacity to combine the qualities of thinker and man of action, a combination that is able to command Pathan respect.

On the Sikh side was Hari Singh Nalwa, the ideal Sikh soldier, rough but dependable, gallant and genuine, and the most dashing of all Ranjit's generals. Ranjit had left him with the difficult and dangerous Peshawar command when he himself went back in 1823 to Lahore.

Sayyid Akbar's fort at Sitana was sited opposite Torbela, a few miles above the point where the Indus issues at long last from its mountain cradle and spills out in many channels between the Chachh and the flat lands of Swabi where Babur hunted the rhinoceros. The Utmanzai section of the Mandanr Yusufzais held then, and hold still, lands on both banks of the river, and under
Sayyid Akbar's leadership had been active in raising the levies which had so nearly defeated the Sikh regulars at Pir Sabak. Hari Singh, finding the military effort of holding the trans-Indus territory too great a strain in face of the bitter hostility of the population, concentrated on the subjugation of the Pathan and other tribes of lower Hazara. His communications were in constant peril from the Mashwanis, a *hamstaya* tribe of the Yusufzais who live in the fastnesses of the Gandghar Mountain above Torbela. To control them and their nominal overlords, the Yusufzais of Kalabhat, he constructed a fort near the present Haripur, which still bears his name. Sitana, barely fifteen miles from Haripur, but protected by the river, was able to hold out and became the nodal centre of tribal resistance. Hari Singh attacked the tribesmen at Nara at the gateway to the hills, and received a decided check, suffering heavy casualties and being himself wounded. Lying disabled on the hillside, he was only able to get back to Haripur by appealing to the chivalry of a Yusufzai who admired his courage. This brought Ranjit Singh by forced marches to his frontier, with the object of rooting out the Sayyid's headquarters at Sitana. He failed. The Indus at that point was too deep and rapid for an army to cross, and he had to content himself with a second demonstration of his power to force a passage, by swimming his cavalry across near the Pihur ferry in a very gallant operation under his French commander, General Allard. Thence he proceeded on a round march through Topi and Kotha, returning to Attock by way of Jahan-gira. His display of power was scarcely rewarded by Yar Muhammad's renewed protestations of allegiance from Peshawar.

This fighting brought to birth a new menace, a gathering enthusiasm. There arose one of those strange and formidable insurrections among the Pathans which from time to time sweep across the Frontier mountains like a forest fire, carrying all before them. As on a previous occasion there followed a reaction, but the fire is not wholly put out. It continues to smoulder dully until a fresh wind blows.

In some respects this new movement is reminiscent of the Roshaniyya of the Emperor Akbar's time. Both brought a new interpretation of Islam, both depended on the message of a reformer who was also an organizer of the tribes in arms, both met with initial success but ended with the death, or (as his followers would have it) the martyrdom, of the founder. But there
are great differences. Bayazid Ansari had fought the Mughal power; the Mughals were, nominally at least, orthodox Sunnis of the Hanafi school, and it followed that on its religious side his message could be, and was, represented as heresy. (The Emperor Akbar's own unorthodoxy, his Din Ilahi, is not in point here; it might have inclined him to sympathy with Bayazid, but his statecraft forbade, and on this voyage he sailed under orthodox colours.) The reformer who now arose was contending against the new-established Sikh power, and he was able to rally the faithful oppressed against the tyrant who was represented as an unbelieving idolator. He preached an extreme form of puritanical zealotism, by his critics regarded as Wahhabism. But by many, including among them some of the most orthodox, he has been accepted as a true mujaddid, one who, as the pious believe, is sent by God once in a century to reinterpret the Faith and guide the believer on the path of righteousness.

The name of this mujaddid was Sayyid Ahmad Shah. He is not to be confused with Sayyid Akbar Shah, already mentioned, though their stories are closely woven. Ahmad was a Hindustani born at Bareli, and for that reason the chroniclers refer to him as Ahmad Brelwi; Sayyid Akbar, as we know, was a descendant of Pir Baba of Buner, a family rooted among the Yusufzai for many years. Sayyid Ahmad Brelwi had been a follower of the notorious Amir Khan, a leader of mercenaries in the campaigns waged by the British against the freebooters in Central India known as the Pindaris. He lost his employment when Amir Khan's force was broken up at the end of the campaign, and Amir Khan was recognized as Chief of Tonk in Rajputana. He went to Delhi, where his religious zeal and piety quickly attracted a band of devoted followers, including a number of the learned. He set great emphasis on the doctrine of the unity of God, and, denouncing what he regarded as the corrupt forms of worship then prevalent, strove to go back to the Quran alone, without reference to the interpretations of the fathers. Many of the educated followed him, while among the humbler folk, the story runs, his exhortations were so efficacious that even the Delhi tailors were moved scrupulously to return remnants of cloth to their employers. A pilgrimage was preached as the proper beginning for all undertakings, and Ahmad's journey to Calcutta in 1822 for the purpose of embarkation was one of triumph. He was absent four years in
Arabia, and on return to Delhi called on the faithful to follow him in a war against unbelievers.

In 1826 he set out from Delhi, and, after a stay at the home of his old master Amir Khan at Tonk,\(^{11}\) went by way of Sind to Kandahar. Receiving no encouragement from Kohandil and the other Painda Khel brothers then in possession, he journeyed northward through Ghalji country till he reached Peshawar in 1827. There he seems to have been upset by the equivocations of Yar Muhammad Khan, the Painda Khel Barakzai governor, who had twice declared his allegiance to Ranjit Singh. But he found the spirit of revolt still burning fiercely in the Yusufzai plains and hills, and made his way across the Landai River and the Samah to Panjtar, the fort of Fateh Khan, a leading Yusufzai Malik in the Khudu Khel hills north of Swabi. Here he founded the colony of puritan zealots which later came to be called the Mujahidin, known to English writers as the Hindustani Fanatics.

The doctrine which commanded Ahmad's allegiance is in doubt. His detractors say that, when in Arabia, he had become a strict Wahhabi of the Hanbali School of the Sunnah, while his admirers claim for him that, as a Hanafi, he remained loyal to what is orthodoxy in these parts. The novelty of his message, these claim, consisted only in the reinterpretation expected of a true mujaddid. The argument is for the schoolmen and cannot be resolved. But, whatever the doctrine, it is clear that Ahmad's preaching fell on fertile ground. Tribes who boasted they had never within memory yielded more than a nominal and temporary submission even to Mughal or Durrani had actually suffered defeat in open battle at the hands of unbelievers. It was too much to be borne. Not without justice the tribesmen attributed their check to the supineness of the Barakzai chiefs with their Kabul troops. Their resentment was raised to fever heat by the raids and depredations of Hari Singh and the Sikh armies. A new message and a new leader were overdue. Sayyid Ahmad and his Ghazis were hailed as deliverers and won an immediate and enthusiastic response.

Animated by religious fervour and that notion of tribal patriotism which demands the expulsion of the intruder, numerous bands of ill-disciplined levies gathered round the new leader from all the villages of Yusufzai and Khatak. Ahmad's Hindustani disciples, now increased by recruits to nearly 1,000 men, formed the
nucleus round which the new army was organized. In addition he received secret, if uncertain, support from the Barakzai chiefs at Peshawar, who from being independent princes had been reduced by Ranjit Singh to the position of tributary governors.

His first effort was directed against a strong force of Sikhs which had been pushed forward to Akora under the command of Budh Singh Sindhanwalia. The Sikh commander had prudently entrenched a position near Shaidu, between Akora and Jahangira, and succeeded in beating off the tumultuous assault of the tribesmen, but with heavy losses including Budh Singh himself, who was slain at the crisis of the battle. Ahmad claimed a victory, and was able to extract an agreement from Yar Muhammad in Peshawar to respect the territories of the Yusufzai and exempt them from revenue-raising forays. A year later (1829) the Sayyid accused the Peshawar governor of attempting to poison him, and attacked Peshawar itself. Yar Muhammad was killed in the assault, and, but for the accidental presence of a Sikh force under the French general Ventura, Peshawar would not have been saved for his younger brother, Sultan Muhammad Khan. True to type, Ventura had come up to secure for Ranjit Singh a long-promised mare of famous breed named Leila, the match of a horse of equal renown named Kulhar, which the Maharaja had succeeded in obtaining from the Barakzai brothers in Peshawar.

The Sikhs then withdrew east of the Indus.

Ahmad now crossed the river into the Hazara hills, raising the mounaineers, and attacking a Sikh force under Hari Singh and another French general, Allard. Here he was beaten off. Nothing daunted, he recrossed the Indus and again attacked Peshawar; the Barakzai was defeated, and late in the summer of 1830 Peshawar was actually occupied for two months by Ahmad and his Ghazis. At this point Ahmad seems to have given way to folie de grandeur; he claimed sovereign powers, and struck a coin in the name of Ahmad the Just, Sword-glitterer, Defender of the Faith.

At first sight, it is surprising to find Sayyid Ahmad so able to impress himself upon the tribes, and more particularly upon the warlike Yusufzai. He was after all a man from down-country, what the Pathans a little contemptuously call a Hindki (the word means not a Hindu, but a Muslim from Hindustan, or even from the Panjab). It seemed improbable that he would be taken up by the wild hillmen of the Yusufzai, even if his creed appealed to the
Mandan Yusufzai of the Samah. How did he make the contact?

He owed his position almost entirely to the good-will of Sayyid Akbar of Sitana. Sayyid Akbar was not only a proved leader in tribal warfare, but, more important, a Sayyid of the house of Pir Baba, the Pirkhana of these tribes. This Hindustani had come with a reputation for piety and zeal, and armed with the credentials of four years’ residence in the Hejaz. He must have impressed Akbar with his sincerity. Akbar and he had no blood-relationship; the fact that they were both Sayyids meant little, and in other circumstances might well have led to rivalry. That it did not so is greatly to both men’s credit. The hatred of the Sikh terror, which they shared, no doubt helped them to sink all jealousies and work together for the common end. But there must have been some quality that each saw in the other, a selflessness that binds men in a cause.

In a sense Akbar was the newcomer’s patron. But it is clear from what his descendants say that he, and a younger brother Umar Shah, sank all pride of place, and were ready to enrol themselves under Ahmad’s banner as his lieutenants. They were big enough to offer him their allegiance and loyalty, and to bring their disciples with them. He had come to deliver the oppressed from the new oppressor, and they must have seen in him a spark of the divine. So they followed and were glad.

For a while the cause prospered. But jealousies crept in, not between Akbar and Ahmad, but between the religious leaders and the tribal chiefs. Self-interest overcame faith, and the imprudence of Sayyid Ahmad gave umbrage to his tribal adherents. For the expenses of the campaign he had levied the normal usbar or tithe and at the outset this measure caused little dissatisfaction, for it agreed with tribal notions of the dues of a religious leader. But when Ahmad began to preach that all young women of marriageable age should at once be wedded, and that the Yusufzai should resign their custom, prevalent among the Khans, whereby daughters and sisters were only disposed of to the wealthy in return for large dowries, he cut across a peculiar maxim of the tribe. The Yusufzai custom in this matter is still notably strict, some say for reasons of avarice, but more because a tribal marriage, in some sense hard for an outsider to comprehend, is seen as exposing a family’s sense of shame and modesty. As we have seen in Babur’s case — the exception that proves the rule — a
Yusufzai will not usually marry his daughter or sister outside the tribe, or even outside a very narrow sept within the tribe, and it was the custom to demand a substantial dowry from the prospective husband's family. And when Ahmad was accused, as many say unjustly, of assigning maidens one by one to his needy Hindustani followers, the people were greatly incensed and made a conspiracy against him. In November 1830 he was constrained to relinquish Peshawar to Sultan Muhammad at a fixed tribute, and, followed by the few and faithful, he left for Hazara, where after a few months' desultory warfare he was surprised by the Sikhs and slain at Balakot at the bottom of the Kaghan Valley in May 1831.

This story has a macabre end. When he set out for Hazara, Sayyid Ahmad left his deputies in most of the Yusufzai villages. Rising from the midst of the Yusufzai Samah stands the pine-crowned isolated hill of Karamar. It can be seen through the great avenue of the Guides Mess garden at Mardan. It is a holy place, and for that reason the summit remains tree-clad and it is a sin for the faithful to cut the smallest branch. One night that winter, a beacon blazed upon this peak, and on that signal every single one of Sayyid Ahmad's agents was put to death. In Yusufzai thirty years ago a village poet, Aman Akhund, composed a ballad on this theme that I have heard recited — a strange mingling of pride and lamentation — in memory of this Sayyid Ahmad from whom the tribes had turned away after they had reverenced him. But the company of Mujahidin whom he founded have lingered on, and his own memory has been kept green by the family of Pir Baba Sayyids who were his leading disciples upon this border.

The story of Sayyid Ahmad's short ascendency typifies like that of Sher Shah and his successors the strength and weakness of the Pathan tribal system. A leader appears, and unites tribal sentiment in a surge of enthusiasm that carries all before it. For a while internal jealousies are laid aside, and an enthusiastic loyalty is forthcoming. Individuals are found ready to face death for a cause, and no one counts the cost. The idea of sacrifice is in the air. The crest of the wave bursts over the barrier, and the victory seems won. Then the leader gives way to vain-glory, the stimulus which gave unity fails, envy and malice show their heads. The effort, steady and sustained, which is needed to maintain the
position won proves to be beyond the tribal reach. The ground won is lost, and the leader forfeits confidence and is discarded.

In days gone by Pathans were Kings of Hind
And still in deeds the Mughal they outdo,
But concord they know not, and they have sinned
Against God's unity, so come to rue:
Ah God! Grant them but concord, sweet refrain,
And old Khushhal will rise, a youth again!
We have seen that on Yar Muhammad's death from wounds received in action against Sayyid Ahmad in 1829, his brother Sultan Muhammad Khan succeeded to the Chiefdom of Peshawar and its dependencies. With him were associated two younger brothers, Pir Muhammad and Said Muhammad, and these three Painda Khel Barakzais came to be called the Peshawar Sardars. It is convenient so to distinguish them from Dost Muhammad Khan who had by now established undisputed control of Kabul in place of Azem, and also from the sons of the Ghalji mother, Kohandil and the other 'Dils', in control of Kandahar. These Peshawar Sardars are also later known as the Musahiban family — the word musahib meaning an aide-de-camp or courtier — and still later as the Yahya Khel, from Yahya Khan, Sultan Muhammad's son. Sultan Muhammad is to be remembered not only for the part he played on the Peshawar stage in Sikh times, but for the fact that he is the ancestor of the present Afghan royal family. Nadir Khan, the first of the now-ruling dynasty and father of the present King of Afghanistan, was Sultan Muhammad's great-grandson. All the Peshawar and the Kandahar Sardars were older than Dost Muhammad Khan, who had overtaken them in securing control of the chief capital, Kabul, and had thereby occasioned great jealousies among his elder brothers. The Dost owed his success partly to the confidence which had been reposed in him by Fateh Khan, and partly to the support of the Qizilbash guards, the Dost's mother being a Qizilbash lady. On these advantages he built, but the strength of the structure lay in his own firmness of purpose as compared with his brothers' shiftiness.

The Dost had endeavoured to allay fraternal jealousy by carefully refraining from taking the title of Shah. He was content to take his example from the Mangit Chiefs of Bukhara and to name
himself, somewhat vaguely, Amir. But his elder brothers, and particularly those in Peshawar, saw matters differently. They were not ready, save unwillingly, to show him the submission to which as *de facto* ruler of Kabul he was entitled. Afghan memories are long. This envy was by no means without its influence on events a century later when Nadir Khan, Sultan Muhammad's descendant, succeeded to the throne vacated by Amanullah the last King of the Dost's line.

The assessments made by English writers of the character and attainments of Sultan Muhammad Khan are very various. The first to know him, and admire him, was Alexander Burnes, who now appears on the Afghan stage for the first time, on his way through Peshawar on a journey to Bukhara. Burnes spent a month in the 'winter capital' in the spring of 1832 as the guest of Sultan Muhammad Khan, and long passages of his book *Travels into Bokhara* are devoted to the delights of Peshawar society, the charms of the countryside, and praise of the jovial hospitality he received from the chief and his brothers. He amused himself by having a new seal cut after the manner of the country, bearing the name of Sikandar Burnes — سکندر برنس. He chatters gaily of the beauty and freshness of the scenery in spring, of being buried under nosegays of peach-blossom on a picnic, of the open, affable ways of his hosts, of the simplicity and freedom of Afghan manners generally — and it is all good reading. But, compared with Elphinstone, Burnes is immature, he lacks balance and background, and his *very* words and observations indicate the destiny that was awaiting his sanguine temperament. Of the ladies of Peshawar he writes: 'A veil covers the face, and many a lovely countenance is born to blush unseen . . . assassination follows suspicion,' and again, accompanying the chief on his assizes in a village: 'I felt my blood run cold as I looked at the mangled bodies and heard the husband justifying the murder of her who had borne him three children, nor was the summary justice of the chief, who happened to be passing, the least remarkable part of the dismal scene.'

The words are a premonition of the writer's own failings and the fate that was in store for him. Six years went by, and Masson² tells us how, when this Sikandar was on embassage to the Dost at Kabul, his revelries aroused the half-amused, half-angry contempt of men who, remembering the name and fame of Elphin-
stone, expected an English envoy to comport himself with dignity. In a city of dark jealousies this elchi filled his house with music and black-eyed damsels, unmindful of the shadows that a few years back had clouded his gaiety in Peshawar. And to orgies by night he added a false and cringing humility by day. In audience with the Dost he would assume an exaggerated posture of deference, joining hands together in obsequious attitudes and addressing the Amir always as gharibnawāz, cherisher of the poor. As Gharib Nawaz Khan, Burnes came to be known in the bazaars of the city. From servility he would turn to an angry petulance, so that his hearers wondered how such a man could be of the breed that then bestrode the world.

Sikandar Burnes never spoke with the authentic voice of his country, and his pathfinding led but to an Afghan war. Yet in the end even he was able to redeem the bill against him. For when the death he had feared came upon him, a nasty death at the hands of a mob which included his own cuckolds, he met it gallantly and without flinching, as became a bigger and better man.

Like Babur, Sikandar paints pretty scenes. He speaks of his elevation of mind as his party traversed the open plains between Pirpiai and Pabbi on their approach to Peshawar; thyme and violets perfumed the air, and the green sod and clover put him in mind of a distant country. The orchards close to Peshawar had by this time been destroyed by the ravaging Sikhs, but there were still pleasant places out by Naguman and in the Doaba. On the Nauroz or New Year — about 25th March — he was bidden to a party near Shabqadr, in a garden where all the trees were in blossom. Pir Muhammad, the chief's younger brother, received the guests under a bower of roses where carpets were spread and the boughs shaken before the party sat down, covering them with the variegated bloom of apricot and peach. There were performers who chanted to the rabap 'in Pooshtoo and in Parsee', and the chief's children, rioting amid the confectionery, played at a pitched battle with the flowers which they threw at each other like snow. 'I do not remember', says Sikandar, 'any place more delightful than Peshawar at this season; the climate, gardens and flowers delight the senses, and to all we have been so fortunate as to add the hospitality of the people.'

Of Sultan Muhammad, the Chief, he writes: 'He is of rather tall stature and dark complexion — not the illiterate Afghan whom I
THE PATHANS

expected to find, but an educated, well-bred gentleman whose open and affable manner made a lasting impression on me. He is a person more remarkable for his urbanity than his wisdom, but he transacts all his own business, he is a brave soldier. . . . But our residence at his house was not without inconvenience, and it required some consideration to devise a plan for our extrication with credit. Moreover the Chief was at enmity with his brother of Cabool, the Dost, and wished to persuade us to pass through that city by stealth, without seeing him.' And then — a very modern touch this — 'the talk turned on the Seiks, and the mild affability of Sooltan Muhammad delighted me. He spoke without reserve of Runjeet Sing, and sighed for some change that might relieve him from the disgrace of having his son a hostage in Lahore. The subject of the Russians was introduced, and a Persian in the party declared that his country was quite independent of Russia. The Chief with much good humour, remarked that their independence was something like his own with the Seiks, unable to resist and glad to compromise.'

Fifteen years later in 1847, when George Lawrence, elder brother of Henry and John, came up to Peshawar after the First Sikh War, he saw much of Sultan Muhammad Khan. Between the two Sikh Wars the Sikh State continued to exist, but as subordinate to the British government in India, with a Resident at the Maharaja's court in Lahore. Kashmir had been handed over to Gulab Singh of Jammu, the founder of the Dogra dynasty, in return for a money payment, while the North-West Frontier districts, which had been a proximate cause of the First Sikh War and where Afghan-Sikh feeling was still bitter, were left under the Sikh Durbar, but with British Assistants to the Resident in Lahore acting as agents for control and pacification. This was the time when George Lawrence, Abbott, Edwardes, Nicholson and the rest arrived among the Pathans. On reaching his post George Lawrence prevailed on the Sikh Durbar to permit Sultan Muhammad to return to Peshawar from Lahore, where he had spent most of the last seven years as a State hostage. In Peshawar the Chief then occupied the Wazir Bagh which his eldest brother Fateh Khan had laid out during his Wazirate before 1818, and in it he built a fine summer-house where he settled his women and his very large family. The remains of this pavilion still exist, but in a very dilapidated condition.
Sultan Muhammad was profuse in his professions of devotion to Lawrence. When the Second Sikh War was brought on by the murders of Agnew and Anderson in Multan in April 1848, he paid the Resident a long visit, affirming that there was nothing under the sun he would not do for the British government, who had secured his release from captivity. He only panted for an opportunity to prove in deeds, not words, his gratitude. Subsequently he entered into communication with the Sikh general in the north, Chattar Singh, and was instrumental in delivering George Lawrence into Sikh hands—for a price, the renewed grant to himself of the Peshawar province. Lawrence had trusted the Chief to the extent of asking him to secure the safe-conduct of his wife and family from Peshawar to India, but found that, having incurred this obligation, he was expected to regard himself as a debtor and Sultan Muhammad kept away from him. When he reminded him of his offers, he found the Chief as full as ever of professions; as Burnes had noted, he was nothing if not urbane. Moreover, the lady was not conducted to her destination, but brought back and handed over with her husband to the Sikhs. And in the end Sultan Muhammad himself went over to the Sikhs.

It is not a pretty story. Had Sultan Muhammad been playing a hand for his own Afghan people, his action might have been excusable as that of a patriot, according to the maxim that in war all is fair. But he was not. He thought the Sikhs held the winning cards and that his interests lay in playing up to them. It is not surprising that the tergiversations of the man and his younger brothers at Peshawar caused Abbott to record in his Hazara diary that the Durranis were detested more than the Sikhs. For their part the Pathan tribes felt it to be impossible to detect any sense of national fervour or patriotism in a family which at that time was notorious for regarding its own short-term interests rather than the overriding need. This, as Sayyid Ahmad Shah had seen, was the liberation of the land from the cruel grasp of Ranjit Singh and the Sikh armies. The fact is that the Peshawar Sardars were entirely ready to go along with the Sikhs if by so doing they should be enabled to maintain a position independent of their younger half-brother, the Dost, and even perhaps to displace him on the Kabul throne. So it came about that when the British arrived after the First Sikh War, and George Lawrence set himself to understand Pathan mentality and objectives, and to inject
a measure of fair dealing into the approach of government to people, this Chief, a cynic in the true sense, proceeded at the first sign of trouble to bite the hand he had professed to love.

The Dost has the last word in this matter. Though he too sought, as we shall see, to co-operate with the Sikhs in the Second Sikh War, the peculiar shape which Sultan Muhammad's actions had assumed aroused his disgust and contempt. 'Did you never hear', he thundered to his brother, 'that the Khugiani tribe drew their swords upon the great Ahmad Shah to defend the life of even an accursed boar which had taken refuge from the hounds among their tents?'

We must go back to 1832. At that time the strange state of affairs in Peshawar, consequent on Sayyid Ahmad's ascendancy, had aroused new hope in the sanguine breast of Shah Shuja, and caused him to open negotiations with Ranjit for aid in the recovery of his throne. But Ranjit had his own ideas, ideas relevant to Peshawar, and he merely kept the Shah in play with vain hopes until in 1832 one of the many Persian advances on Herat, together with an invitation from the Sind Amirs, caused the Shah to make a more definite proposal, more in accordance with the Sikh's designs. The Sind Amirs, disliking the approach of British envoys, expressed themselves as ready, as a counter, to accept the Shah as their titular Sovereign, and to give him passage towards Kandahar. So enamoured was Shah Shuja of this renewed opportunity to recover Kabul by way of Kandahar, as he believed, that he now actually offered to waive his right to Peshawar, and the other districts between the Indus and the hills, and also to give a quittance for the Koh-i-nur. All this he was ready to surrender to Ranjit Singh in return for assistance in men and money for the recovery of the Kabul throne. There followed in August 1833 a treaty of alliance by which the Shah formally ceded Peshawar and the other districts in Sikh possession, and in return was assured of Sikh good-will in his new venture. In 1833 he proceeded slowly towards Sind, crossed the Indus, defeated the Sind Amirs at Shikarpur — they had broken with him when he actually approached — and, having secured his base, went up the Bolan towards Kandahar. Here he maintained himself for a few months, but was in due course brought to battle by the Dost and defeated in July 1834. By the spring of 1835 he was back again once more
at Ludhiana, with no gains to his account to offset the heavy loss of the formal surrender of Peshawar.

Ranjit was not slow to take advantage of his new treaty. He had resolved to insure against a possible success by Shah Shuja, and to turn his suzerainty over Sultan Muhammad at Peshawar into an actual occupation. The moment was very propitious, for the Dost, having gone south to meet Shah Shuja before Kandahar, was not in a position to afford aid to his half-brothers, the Peshawar Sardars, even had he wished to do so. A large Sikh force under Hari Singh's command advanced from Khairabad, and Peshawar, which up to this time had been held by the Peshawar Sardars as tributaries, was formally annexed to the Sikh dominions in May 1834. Hari Singh became the first Sikh governor, Sultan Muhammad and his brothers being compelled unwillingly to take refuge with the Dost in Kabul. Hitherto known mainly as a daring cavalry leader along the Indus and in Hazara, the impetuous Sikh general now became a household word in and around Peshawar. Rāghe Hari Singh — Hari Singh is here — was the bogey called up by distraught Khalil and Mohmand mothers to quieten fractious children.

The annexation by the Sikhs of the city which had been Timur's and Shuja's winter capital was a bitter blow to Afghan pride. The Dost's first reaction was to grasp at British aid, and at one moment — before he had succeeded in defeating Shah Shuja before Kandahar — he actually tendered his submission as a dependant of the British crown. Having surmounted the contest with Shah Shuja, he asked the British government to assist him in recovering Peshawar, and sent his favourite nephew, the son of Jabbar Khan, to Ludhiana as a student and an unofficial envoy. But the British government had not yet thought of interference in Afghan affairs, and evaded a direct reply to the Dost's solicitations. The Dost and Ranjit were thus left to their own means.

Ranjit knew his man, and his man was Sultan Muhammad. He began by detaching him from the Dost, with whom Sultan Muhammad had taken refuge on the occupation of Peshawar by Hari Singh. As we know, Sultan Muhammad was jealous of his younger brother, and, apprehending that the defeat of the Sikhs would mean that the Dost would keep Peshawar for himself, listened to what Ranjit had to say. Dost Muhammad came down as far as Jamrud at the eastern mouth of the Khaibar, where Ranjit Singh
kept him in play with *pourparlers* until he had himself concentered his forces. On 11th May, 1835, the Amir was almost surrounded, and Ranjit had intended an attack on the following day. The Dost thought it prudent to retire, which he did with the loss of two guns and most of his prestige. A plan he had to carry off the Sikh envoys miscarried if only because he had entrusted its execution to Sultan Muhammad, who had by now decided, as firmly as was in him, to join Ranjit Singh. The Dost had hoped to use the envoys as hostages, but in the event Sultan Muhammad was able to pose to Ranjit as their rescuer. This favourable introduction secured for the crafty Sardar and his brothers considerable jagirs both in Peshawar and in Kohat. They did not, however, obtain the reversion of the province itself; its civil and military management was entrusted to Hari Singh.

The disgrace of this retreat rankled in the Dost's mind, but, a cautious man, he first tried a further approach to the British, and even to Ranjit. The British, as usual, were evasive. The Sikh gave the Amir some hope of obtaining Peshawar, but when he asked for some horses — a sure way, he thought, of leading others to think they had won his favour — he overplayed his hand. The Dost, anxious though he was to recover Peshawar, was shrewd enough to surmise that the presentation of horses would be declared by Ranjit as consideration for the retention of Kabul and not for the acquisition of the winter capital. Moreover, during all this temporizing, Hari Singh was known to be building a fort at Jamrud at the Khaibar entrance, and even to be meditating an advance on Jalalabad after securing the difficult defiles of the Pass against the Afridis. The Dost decided he must fight.

To this end he sent down his best troops under his eldest and most thrusting son, Akbar Khan. Only at this point does Akbar, the Dost's son, pass across the page of Frontier history. Later he was to be the protagonist in the opposition to the British occupation of Kabul, the slayer of Sir William Macnaghten, the British envoy, and the captor of the British women and children after the disasters at Jagdalak. He died in 1847, just after George Lawrence reached Peshawar. On the Frontier his memory is bound up with the Battle of Jamrud, in which he gained a victory but was denied its fruits.

Akbar arrived in the Khaibar in April 1837, and the battle followed on the last day of that month. The Afghan army attacked
the Jamrud fort. They were unable to carry the fort itself, but threw the supporting Sikh troops from Peshawar into disarray. Hari Singh, in command and in the forefront as always, feigned a retreat in order to draw his enemy further into the plains and away from the ravines, which enabled Afridi and Mallagori tribesmen to harass his flanks, while the Afghan army engaged his centre. During the withdrawal the Sikh commander emulating his master at Nowshera fourteen years before, was everywhere amid his retiring and rallying forces, striving to hearten them in the difficult operation. He fell, mortally wounded, near the spot where now stands the Islamia College and the University of Peshawar. The place of his death is still known as Burj Hari Singh — the tower of Hari Singh. Akbar too displayed great gallantry and dash, and captured two Sikh guns. He could with justice claim a victory in the field. But he was unable to master Peshawar, or even the Jamrud fort, which put up a stubborn resistance. After a few days' plundering of the villages, and particularly of Shaikhan on the Bara road, the Afghans were compelled to withdraw once more to Jalalabad.

Hari Singh was dead, but the end of the Sikhashahi was not yet. The tale goes that Ranjit Singh shed tears when he heard of the fall of the only genuine Sikh chief of his creation. Determined to vindicate his position on the Frontier, he filled the Peshawar Valley with his troops, while he himself, now ailing, pushed up as far as Rohtas and sent his Dogra favourite, Dhian Singh, hurrying forward with the flower of the Sikh army. Dhian Singh, elder brother of the Gulab Singh who subsequently ruled as Maharaja of Kashmir, set the example by working with his own hands on the construction of the fort at Jamrud which still stands, much as then erected, like a battleship guarding the eastern entry to the Khairar. As successor to Hari in the difficult governorate of Peshawar the Maharaja's choice fell on one of his European generals, the Italian Avitabile, whose rough judgments and summary methods are still recalled in the stories told in the hujras round the city. As 'Abutabela' his name is associated in the local legend with gibbets, and he is chiefly execrated for his habit of hanging the convicts of his summary trials from the minars of the Mahabat Khan mosque. He occupied as residence a new fort, which he caused to be erected around the Hindu shrines of Gorkhatri within the city wall, and where he was visited afterwards by
many Englishmen on their way to and from Kabul in the course of the First Afghan War. In later times the dignity of the Gorkhatri was diminished; it became the residence of the Assistant Police Superintendent in charge of the city police stations.

With the Battle of Jamrud we approach the period of the First Afghan War, and the changes brought about by the death of Ranjit Singh. The British force for the invasion of Afghanistan by way of the Bolan and Quetta had assembled in Firozpur by the end of 1838, and the Sikh force destined to force the Khaibar left Lahore in January 1839. The plan was for Shah Shuja to march with the former, following his favourite route and taking Kandahar on the way, while the force provided by Ranjit was to accompany Shuja’s son, Shahzada Timur, by the direct route to Kabul by Peshawar. The latter force was accompanied by Colonel Wade as the British representative, and by Shahamat Ali, a protégé of his, who has written an interesting diary of the expedition and its adventures.4

Ranjit Singh died in June of 1839, before any of these plans could be brought to fruition. With his death, the vital spirit of his race began to consume itself in domestic contentions, and there followed a series of palace convulsions beside which even the badshåhård of the Durranis pales into insignificance. These are outside Pathan story. But they are notable as furnishing a leading example of the fate that overtakes a régime nurtured in force and guile, and dominated by one man’s pre-eminence. Although it was the Sikh power which brought to an end long centuries of invasion from the north-west, it was left to others to build where they had ravaged, and for their ultimate successors to found a Muslim state, not based on war or feudalism but on new ways that had been learned in the century which succeeded to the Sikhashahi.

The policies which led to the First Afghan War, and the courses which it followed, are beyond the scope of this book, save in so far as they arose out of, or were influenced by, the pull of the Frontier regions, and particularly of Peshawar. It has never been sufficiently stressed that the desire to possess Peshawar, with the fair lairds surrounding it, was the real cause of this war, and was even of considerable significance as affecting the courses and results of the two wars between the British and Ranjit’s successors.
which followed it. We can go even further. The unfulfilled ambitions of that time are to be accounted as a potent cause of the Afghan irredentism of the present day.

Ranjit Singh had wrested from the Afghans their fairest provinces, not only those east of the Indus where the Kabul rulers could claim no racial affinity, but Peshawar itself, and Bannu, fertile gardens inhabited by proud peoples of Afghan and Pathan stock. He had taken the opportunity to unseat the Peshawar Sardars, half-brothers of the Dost, while the Kabul ruler’s back was turned to deal with the Saddozai claimant before Kandahar. The Dost had then resorted to arms to regain the winter capital; he had won a Pyrrhic victory but failed to occupy the key point, Peshawar city. Ranjit for his part had shown in no uncertain manner what value he himself set on its possession.

The new factor in this situation since the time of Elphinstone was that the British Government was now firmly established as the paramount power in the sub-continent, with an uneasy frontier on the Sutlej. As Russia recovered from the Napoleonic invasion, her outposts in Central Asia were moving slowly south. By the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 she had forced Persia to cede Transcaucasia, and eliminated her as a barrier against Russian expansion beyond the Caspian into Turkistan. At the time of Ranjit’s death (1839) Russia had begun to move southward between the Caspian and Aral Seas, and, east of Aral, to contend with Kine Sari and other Kazak chieftains for the mastery of northern Turkistan. Alexander Burnes’ travels in 1832 had demonstrated that between British India and Russian Asia there lay only on the Russian side the medieval amirates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, and, nearer home, the restless Kingdoms of the Durranis and the Sikhs. From Calcutta and Simla, already the Governor-General’s summer retreat, it seemed imperative to act the honest broker between Afghan and Sikh, and endeavour to negotiate a peace between the contestants which should be hailed as honourable by both parties. It was quite evident from the reports of Burnes, and from the events between the battles of Nowshera and Jamrud (1833–37), that the real bone of contention was the Peshawar Valley and those other fertile tracts claimed by the Durranis not only as their fairest jewels, but as inhabited by their near relations. The first thing then, thought the representative of the commercial empire, was to accredit to each of them
the agent or envoy each was most likely to hear and to respect. The wishes of Ranjit could no doubt be ascertained by Captain Claude Wade — he who was later to accompany Shahzada Timur to Kabul — while Captain Alexander Burnes, who had written so charmingly and with such sympathy of the Afghans in his recently published *Travels into Bokhara*, could do the same with the Dost.

But Lord Auckland, Governor-General since 1836 — was anxious to be fair. He had been impressed by the youth and sanguine temperament of Burnes, who had told him that Peshawar was not a place to which the Dost could be expected to resign all claim, and, believing in what would now be called self-determination, he was at that time inclined to be convinced. Neither he, nor it may be added Burnes himself, was sufficiently conversant with Pathan thought to realize that the Yusufzais, for instance, despised the Durrani almost as much as they hated the Sikh. In the scale of respect, indeed, they put the downright, brutal, Sikh above the fickle, self-seeking Durrani. So Auckland, lacking knowledge of the real determinants in his search for self-determination, rendered Wade's mission to Ranjit impossible of fulfilment by weighting the Peshawar scale in favour of the Durrani. And when Burnes reached Kabul to offer the British Government's mediation, his predilections led him to seize upon Auckland's admission and to encourage Dost Muhammad in his pretensions to Peshawar. What then happened is adequately described in Burnes' own correspondence, and in the writings of Masson, a contemporary observer in Afghanistan. From his vantage point behind the scenes in Kabul Masson takes all the trappings off and lays bare the real motives and meaning of this sordid page in our history. Burnes' own feelings and the Dost's hopes founded on them, are clear enough. In brief his advice was that the Peshawar city and province be taken from the Sikhs and handed to Dost Muhammad. There is also some suggestion, borne out by Masson, and reinforced by Munshi Mohan Lal, Burnes' Indian alter ego, that there existed some afterthought for the reversion of Peshawar to Sultan Muhammad rather than to the Dost. No doubt Sikandar Burnes remembered the pleasant parties and the posies in the Peshawar of six years earlier. An interesting footnote, revealing of Durrani character, is added to this suggestion by Mohan Lal's comment that the Amir believed the surrender of the province to his brother would be more prejudicial to his
interests than its retention by the Sikhs. So much for Durrani patriotism: the tribes were not bad judges.

This would not do at all. Ranjit was near and powerful, and in possession after all. He could hardly be displaced in favour of a mere vassal. So the negotiations broke down, and all over Peshawar. The honest broker had failed. What then? Auckland was piqued; was there no man among these quarrelsome princes who could display a larger view, no man who would bargain like a good Whig and man of commercial instinct? There was. There was one Durrani at least, not of the then ruling clan, it is true, who had shown willingness to cede Peshawar and all the districts between the Indus and the hills. This Durrani had even gone so far as to embody the cession in a treaty he had concluded in 1833 with Ranjit Singh. No matter that he belonged to a discarded dynasty. In desperation Burnes advised as a pis aller that this Durrani, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, should be set up once more upon the Kabul throne, so resolving the Peshawar impasse.

Auckland agreed. It was in this manner that the need for agreement as to the possession of Peshawar and the Frontier regions impelled the British Government to adopt a policy whereby Shah Shuja would sit again as a dependent prince upon his ancestral throne, and Ranjit keep the Frontier districts of his desire. This policy was embodied in the Tripartite Treaty, signed by the Governor-General, Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja at Simla on 25th June, 1838.

This remarkable document was entitled a ‘Treaty of Alliance and Friendship between Maharaja Runjeet Singh and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, with the approbation of, and in concert with, the British Government’. It reaffirmed the bilateral treaty between Ranjit and the Shah of five years earlier, with the British Government added as a sort of kindly aunt.

Under Article I the Shah surrendered all claim and title on the part of himself, his heirs and successors, and all the ‘Suddozies’ to Kashmir, Attock, Chachh, Hazara, Khabbal, Amb with its dependencies, Peshawar with the ‘Eusufzaee’ territory, the Khataks, Hashtnagar, Michni, Kohat, Hangu and all places dependent on Peshawar as far as the Khaiber Pass, Bannu, the ‘Vuzeeree’ territory, Daur-Tank, Gurang, Kalabagh and Khushhalgarh with their dependent districts, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan (under different names), ‘the three Kutches’ of Upper Sind, and
the province of Multan. Except for Kashmir and Multan — also of course once parts of the Durrani Empire — this list of names covers very comprehensively the trans-Indus Districts and cis-Indus Hazara (together with the Chachh and Attock) of Curzon's North-West Frontier Province. It also includes Dera Ghazi Khan and the Isa Khel sub-division of Mianwali west of the Indus, portions of the Panjab, and the Upper Sind districts on the road to the Bolan Pass.

The remaining articles of this treaty are more for amusement than for interest. The Shah was to send fifty-five horses of 'approved color and pleaasaut paces' to the Maharaja, who would send fifty-five shawls in return. The Shah solemnly bound himself to despatch the famous sardas, or musk-melons of Kabul 'by way of the Cabool River to Peshawur', in return for a promise by the Maharaja to pack and send to the Shah fifty-five loads of the best Bara rice, peculiar to Peshawar. And on no account was the slaughter of kine to take place when the armies of the two States were encamped in the same place.

As for the British Government, it scarcely figures in this document of eighteen articles, save as the genial well-wisher and mediator between two outwardly agreeing parties. There is one article, later invoked, which requires the Maharaja to station an army of 1,000 men, to be made up of his Muslim troops, within the limits of the Peshawar territory to support the Shah when the British and Sikh Governments in concert should deem it necessary. There is no engagement of which the British were entitled to claim the fulfilment on their own and undivided right. Of all the extraordinary questions that arise against those who planned the First Afghan War not the least pertinent is that of the responsibility for the advice which led Auckland to engage English soldiers 500 miles beyond his frontiers on the strength of a treaty such as this.

The events of the campaign, the occupation of Kabul, the restoration of Shah Shuja, the killing of the two envoys, Macnaghten and Burnes, the subsequent disasters of the 1841 retreat, the murder of the long-suffering Shuja by his own subjects near Kabul early in the following year, the reoccupation of Kabul later in 1842 by General Pollock — all these are outside this story, except for one interesting point. After more than one failure by others, Pollock forced the Khaibar Pass in April 1842, and he did
it by adopting a form of tactics then new to military science in Asia, namely the picketing of flank hills to protect a column on the march through the defiles of a mountainous terrain. It deserves a mention, for the Afridis still remember the occasion; it was only when Pollock adopted, as they say, their own tactics, and applied them to the movements of his troops, that he became successful. The tactics of outflanking and the crowning of heights come as second nature to these tribesmen. One who once watched a party of Mahsuds surprised in an encampment thirty years ago has related how at once they rushed to higher points of vantage and put themselves in a position to fight back and turn the tables against those who had caught them unprepared. The instinctive tactical reaction of the Pathan tribesman, fighting in his own hills, has been remarked by every commander who has been engaged against them.

This, coupled with the difficulty of the country and the tribal passion for liberty, is one of the main reasons why so large a portion of the tribal belt has never been subjected to a lasting administration by any of the empires whose armies have traversed the main routes leading through these mountains. It is not that these mountains are everywhere barren, not worth occupation; that is a misconception, widely published and utterly untrue. 'The hungry Pathan, in his barren hills, looking down on the fertile plains below him . . .'; this is the stock-in-trade of a familiar romance. In fact there are no tracts in the northern mountains, not even Kashmir, more smiling or of greater fertility than Swat, few granaries producing as fine a crop of wheat as the Bajaur valleys and the adjoining Upper Mohmand lands. Even Tirah and Waziristan contain within their limits first-rate pasturage for valuable flocks, and in their recesses splendid soft-wood forests, now in process of ruination by reason of the stoppage of the Kashmir timber trade. The Khatak hills between Teri and Shakardarra, or the unirrigated portions of the Derajat, all administered for decades, are far poorer, far more barren, than Swat or the uplands of Waziristan. The continued political freedom of the tribal belt is mainly owing to the love of liberty of the tribesman, his readiness to defend it, and his capacity as a fighter on his own ground. But the myth of the hungry Pathan dies hard.

The failure of the restoration policy, and the death of Shah
Shuja, caused the annulment of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838. But its provisions have had a permanent effect. For it afforded diplomatic endorsement of the Sikh occupation of Peshawar and other trans-Indus districts, so creating an atmosphere and an impression which endured until, after the Sikh Wars, which followed closely on these events, the British annexed the trans-Indus territory along with the Panjab. It acted as an influence on men's minds which in the event precluded the Barakzai rulers of the Afghan State from effectively preferring a claim which, having been forgone by the Saddozai, it was hard for them to maintain against the Sikh and his successors. In fact, of course, Peshawar and the trans-Indus region had been lost to Kabul since 1823, the date of Azem's defeat at Nowshera. Although the de jure confirmation of a transfer effected by force was annulled four years later, the very expression of the transfer in the terms of a treaty went far to consolidate a factual position in due course to be made final by the advent to the Frontier of the English power.

The rôle played by Peshawar in the power politics of the time was not yet concluded. When the British had succeeded in 1840-1841 in effecting the temporary restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul, and the Dost had surrendered and proceeded a captive to India—not to return until 1843, when the war was over—the English envoy, Sir William Macnaghten, cast about for means of making the new-gained throne of the Shah secure. The palace convulsions at Lahore, no part of this story, had seemed to make the Sikhs of no account, and, without even consulting his government, Macnaghten proposed to cancel Shuja's engagements, to declare the Tripartite Treaty at an end, and to bring Peshawar and the other territories ceded to the Sikhs under the sway of the very monarch who had renounced them. No doubt he was influenced by Burnes, who was still at Kabul. Calcutta, while rebuking the proposal as hasty, seemed still inclined to toy with it, but events moved too fast. The disasters to British arms and the violent deaths of Macnaghten and Burnes at the end of 1841, together with the need to use Peshawar as the base for the assembly of forces to retrieve the position, put an end to such notions, so far as the British were concerned. But it was well known to the Lahore Durbar that Burnes had wished to dismember their kingdom, in favour of the Dost, while Macnaghten entertained similar plans in favour of Shah Shuja; and the know-
ledge caused the Sikh army, mindful of Hari Singh and his contempt for Afghan claims and pretensions, to arrive at the conviction that the British Government were intriguing with an enemy they had once defeated to encircle and to weaken them. By every process of reasoning they believed themselves threatened, and they resorted to war. Once more, the lure of Peshawar was to be reckoned as a cause which demanded the arbitrament of violence. In a very real sense it led to the Sikh Wars.

The First Sikh War ended with Sobraon in February 1846. Ranjit's kingdom was reduced in size, Kashmir and the northern hill territories going to the Dogra chief Gulab Singh, while the British occupied the Jullundur Doab between the Sutlej and the Beas Rivers. The main body of the Sikh territory around Lahore and Multan remained as a Sikh State, but in subordination to the British Government, with an Agent to the Governor-General, or Resident, at the capital, Lahore. It is at this point that, in the brief two-year gap between the two Sikh Wars, those well-known English names, Abbott, Lawrence, Edwardes, Nicholson, Lumsden, first appear upon the Frontier. These men were not at first direct administrators, for the region had not yet been included in British India, as had already the Jullundur Doab. They were assistants to the British envoy at Lahore, and at least in nominal subordination to the Sikh Durbar. Their story falls in the British, rather than the Sikh, period. But there is yet one event to relate on this Frontier before in the Second Sikh War the Sikh temporal power goes down.

In April 1848 the killing of Agnew and Anderson in Multan gave the signal for the outbreak of that war. After much thought the Dost, now five years back on the Kabul throne, determined to seize the occasion and make yet one further bid for the control of Peshawar. Sultan Muhammad, as we have seen, had insured himself with the Sikhs by surrendering George Lawrence, and was back in his old seat. The Dost decided that the occasion was ripe for action which should not only present the Sikhs, busy in opposing the British on their eastern front, with a fait accompli, but at the same time remove his tiresome half-brothers once for all from a position in which they were always ready to seek Sikh aid and connivance in order to secure their own benefit and comfort. The Amir arrived in Peshawar in December 1848, took possession of the Fort, and overran the country south of the
Landai River. He left Yusufzai untouched. His half-brothers were sent packing to Kohat, ready, if necessary, to go further south to escape his clutches. He himself, after appointing as governor his grandson, the son of Akbar — Akbar himself had died in 1847 — went on to join the revolted Sikh general, Chattar Singh. By occupying Khairabad he prevented the Sikhs from themselves proceeding across the Indus and confined them to the Chachh bank and Attock, while dangling before Chattar Singh an undertaking to co-operate with him in the war against the English. To Abbott, then in sanctuary with his Mashwani friends at Srikot in the recesses of the Gandghar hill, he announced in a letter that he had come to take possession of Peshawar, the Derajat, and Hazara; after he had secured control, he would be happy to act as mediator between the English and the Sikhs. He was to carry his aid of Sikh arms further, for in the event he went so far as to send a strong force of cavalry which fought on the Sikh side at the Battle of Gujrat, at which Sikh resistance was finally broken. After the battle the Dost and his cavalry were hotly pursued over the Salt Range hills, past Margalla and Hasan Abdal, over the Indus and across the Peshawar plain, into the very mouth of the Khaibar Pass, up which they galloped, losing a few stragglers. They were the last Afghan troops to be seen in the Vale of Peshawar.

The advance of Russia across Central Asia, and the desire of the expanding British power to counteract it, may have been, as the histories tell us, the grand strategy behind the First Afghan War. But there can be no doubt that the name of the fair city and province of Peshawar was the local incentive working on the minds of both Sikhs and Durranis, and, through that channelling, on the consciousness of the British Government itself. Moreover, this bone of contention was also in some sense a cause of the First Sikh War, and led directly to the intervention of the Afghan Amir in the Second. In the upshot the Frontier districts fell to the British as the successors of the Sikhs. And, on the whole, events, as they unroll, disclose that the people of the Frontier themselves, who were not consulted, were inclined to echo Abbott's comment that the Durrani was detested by the tribes no less than the Sikh. Whether Saddozai or Barakzai, the Durrani had exploited them; indeed the Peshawar Sardars in particular had more than once sold them to the Sikh in order to gather their own tribute and to secure
their position. The incursions of Shah Shuja and the Dost had brought the tribes no advantage, but only war and restlessness.

The Sikhashahi had extended only, and that precariously, as far as the hill-skirts, whether in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, or the Dera-jat. Such relations as they found necessary with the hillmen of what was then known as Yaghistan — the land of rebels — the Sikhs conducted through Pathan middlemen, of whom the best known are the Khalil and Mohmand Arbabs around Peshawar. Arbab, the plural of the Arabic word rabb, a lord — the word is one also used for God — was a title of dignity in use at the Durrani, and probably the Mughal, Court, and in its special designation was applied to the hereditary chieftains of the plains tribes near the Khaibar Pass, through whom the Durranis and Sikhs found it convenient to deal with the Afridis and others whose language and methods even the Durrani could not understand. A number of families in Tahkal, Landi, and other villages close to Peshawar still value the title as an hereditary distinction. The Sikhs made no attempt to occupy the hill territories, or even to conduct direct relations with their inhabitants. They never entered Swat, Buner, Bajaur, the Kurram Valley or Waziristan. Direct political relations with the hill-tribesmen, and the fixing of a frontier with the ruler of Kabul, are stories which belong to the British period. Yet much of what followed, including the territorial limits of administration, has to be traced to its beginnings in the Sikh occupation of Peshawar.

Equally, there is to be found, in these events of the first half of the nineteenth century on the Frontier, the historical background to the eager irredentism of the present Kabul government. Peshawar had been the Durrani winter capital; the valley and certain other parts of the North-West Frontier plains were the fairest Durrani provinces. Many of the tribesmen, even if they cared nothing for the exploiting Barakzai brothers, had fought for the Saddozai. Neither Saddozai nor Barakzai had let Peshawar go without a struggle. The Musahiban family of Sultan Muhammad and his brothers had lived in Peshawar for many years and loved it. It is not surprising that, even after a century, their successors, the present rulers of Kabul, are ready and anxious to exploit changing political conditions to win back an ancient love. The Pakhtunistan theme of modern days must be seen against this background to be understood.
But those who support that theme must also remember, first, that in the century that passed from 1846 to 1947 the tribes had opened to them a wider horizon, a destiny more worth while, than the support of this or that dynasty to the Kabul throne, and, secondly, that the very tribes for whom the Durrani now professes to speak have little reason to be thankful to his ancestors who went before. So, while it is true that the present Afghan Premier, Sardar Daud Khan, is reviving an ancient claim, his credentials as a claimant are unlikely to be honoured in the very quarter to which he appeals.

The heroes of the Pathan struggle against the Sikhs are not the Durrani, not Shah Shuja, not the Dost, least of all Sultan Muhammad, although he lived so long at Peshawar and Kohat, and clearly cared for them. They are the reckless, feckless, Yusufzai and Khatak tribesmen, who did not count the cost, and came within an ace of shattering Ranjit's French-trained battalions at Pir Sabak. They are the leaders of those tribesmen, Sayyid Ahmad and Sayyid Akbar Shah. Sayyid Akbar's descendant put it eloquently to me: 'Sayyid Ahmad Brelwi came as a mujaddid (reformer), and our grandfathers flocked to him, and offered their allegiance. To us he had come to deliver the oppressed from the clutches of the Sikh tyrants. He himself had to pay the highest price, his life; but the world knows that the Sikhashahi also disappeared within fifteen years of the Sayyid's martyrdom.'
PART IV

THE BRITISH PERIOD AND AFTER
A.D. 1846–1957 (H. 1263–1377)
THE PALADINS

The arrival of the British in Peshawar in 1849, on the heels of the Dost’s cavalry, was hailed with enthusiasm as a deliverance from the hated Sikhashahi. The vanguard of the English army was led by Sir John Gilbert, and did not draw rein until the last of the Durrani horsemen had passed Jamrud and was seen galloping into the jaws of the Khaibar defile at Shadi Bagiar. It was the end of Sikh rule, the end also of Durrani rule, between the mountains and the Indus. There, at Shadi Bagiar, where Gilbert halted his squadrons, now issue the great double highway and the railroad that thread this most forbidding of all passes. The spot is marked by a solitary arch and a well, the Sahibzada’s Well, built to commemorate an association and an idea more lasting than any conceived by men who had passed that way before. The gateway of the Khaibar henceforward would admit influences more enriching than any bestowed by the passage of armies or marauders on the prowl; it was to become not only a corridor to Central Asia, but to him who passes eastward a vestibule to the Dar-ul-Ulum of the Frontier, the college of arts and sciences built against the background of the Tahtarra Mountain. But, as Gilbert’s horsemen then saw it, that dark defile marked the limit of Sikh rule, and there they halted.

Behind them came Gough’s army of the East India Company, with its leavening of English regiments of the line, to take over Peshawar and the other Frontier districts as part of the now annexed province of the Panjab. The north-western boundary of the new province was drawn along the foothills, as far as the line where the uncertain Sikhs had claimed conquest and revenue, and no further. No attempt was then made to advance into the highlands, or even to secure the main passages through the mountains such as the Khaibar Pass. As in the Peshawar Valley, so in Bannu and the Derajat; the line of administration stopped like a tide almost at the first contour of rough country; the Takht-i-Sulaiman
stood, a cliff untrodden, above the lowlands of the Daman, and the inlets into the mountain masses provided by the Kurram, Tochi and Gumal Rivers remained forbidden territory. Only in one district, the central one of Kohat, did the new rulers penetrate into the low Khatak hills, and edge forward along the Miranzai Valley to touch the Kurram River at Thal. And it was not long before they were compelled to enforce on the Adam Khel Afridis the right to passage along the short lateral route of only forty miles between Peshawar and Kohat, through the famous Darrah. Otherwise British rule stopped short at the first shadow of the hills, and, speaking generally, as it was then, so it is now. The administered border, fixed on the old Sikh limits, divides the settled districts from the tribal areas. It is like a Highland Line, drawn across the map of Central Asia.

Between the Indus and the high-tide, as it were, the British formed four districts from north to south, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. There was also Dera Ghazi Khan further to the south, bordering on the Baluch country; and still lower down the Upper Sind districts, also stopping short on the tidalline where the sands of the Kachhi-lap against the great bay in the southern Sulaiman Mountains on the road to Quetta and Kandahar, and Pathan tribes gave way to the Baluch and the Brahui. Sind had become a part of the Company's dominion in the 1842-1844 period before the Sikh wars, really as a result of the First Afghan War when the lines of communication to Kabul lay through Sukkur and the Bolan, by which Shah Shuja had marched into Afghanistan. The disasters in Kabul led to hostilities with the Sind Amirs, who, not unnaturally believing the British star to be setting, resisted Sir Charles Napier's demands for a treaty and had to submit to annexation after a gallant resistance at the battles of Miani and Haidarabad. But the Sind border was placed under the Bombay government, and it was not until much later (1876-80) that it was vitalized by Sandeman's penetration of the Brahui-Baluch highlands under arrangement with the Khan of Kalat. For the first thirty-odd years after annexation it was managed under an energetic system of close-border counter-raiding, associated with the name of John Jacob, founder of Jacobabad.

The five northern trans-Indus districts from Peshawar to Dera Ghazi, together with one cis-Indus district in the far north, Hazara, became the Frontier Districts of the new Panjabis province and were
organized in two Commissionerships, the Commissioner of Peshawar and the Commissioner of the Derajat. As elsewhere in the Panjab, each district became the charge of a Deputy Commissioner. The Panjab was what was in those days known as a non-regulation province, but the distinction came to mean very little. The District officer had more extensive criminal powers than in a regulation province; and later, when after the Mutiny the Crown took over from the Company, the superior officer cadre of the province was not confined to officers of the Indian Civil Service but included a number of military officers seconded to civil employ. This mixed cadre was known as the Panjab Commission, and continued to absorb a few military officers up to the year 1900.
The same principle of a mixed civil and military cadre was adopted for the Political Department, later known as the Political Service, which took over the administration of the North-West Frontier Province when in 1901 the Frontier districts were set up by Curzon as a separate administration. But in all matters of law, criminal and civil, revenue, police, public works, and all other details of administration, the Panjab of 1849 was much the same as any other part of British India; except that the Governor-General, Dalhousie, had selected for its service the officers whom he regarded as the cream of the men then available in India, there was no particular concession or endeavour made to ease or adjust the rigours of administrative machinery to fit the notions of the wild and war-like tribesmen of the north. A Chief Court was set up in Lahore and, equally with all others, the Pathans of the Frontier were expected to bring a society which sought redress through the blood-feud within the smug formalisms of the British Indian law. Lord Macaulay had by this time come and gone as the Government’s law-maker, and his great Indian Penal Code was on the anvil and was due for issue in 1860. Meanwhile its principles held good, while as for procedure an English legalism was held to be all-sufficient and above reproach.

Fortunately for the British name the men chosen to bring the tribes into this strait jacket were no narrow pedants. They were playing on a comparatively easy wicket, with everything in the beginning in their favour. They succeeded to a régime held by every Pathan in utter loathing and detestation, and they were hailed as deliverers. Moreover, the hatred of the Sikhs was accompanied by contempt for Durranis, such as Sultan Muhammad...
Khan and the other Peshawar Sardars who had for their own convenience played the Sikh game. Nor had the Dost's temporary irruption into Peshawar improved his stock, more particularly when he joined the Sikh armies and was ignominiously hunted up the Khaibar Pass. Next, the chosen band of officers sent up by Dalhousie had, one and all, already tried their hand out in dealing with Pathans between the two Sikh wars, and knew, and were known by, the men over whom they were set to rule. Lastly, and here was the trump-card as Elphinstone had divined, Englishmen and Pathans looked each other between the eyes, and there they found — a man. Sometimes the pledge they made was broken; there were wild men and fanatics, and on one side the assassin struck, on the other the avenger. But the pledge held, the respect, the affection, survived.

Making every allowance for the easy weather at the start, the Englishmen of these early days were indeed a splendid band of brothers. In the Victorian era the names of some of them became household words; John Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, Frederick Mackeson, James Abbott — all passed for heroes in their day. All these four have left a fame that was still remembered by the people thirty years ago. Old men would tell stories heard from their grandfathers and fathers, and in one case, to be related, I met an ancient Malik who had talked with Abbott.

Of these men Nicholson, an Ulsterman, is the one who most struck the popular imagination of his own countrymen at the time. For years he vied with Nelson and Wolfe for first place as the darling of the gods, a schoolboy hero who fell in his moment of triumph. He was called ‘the Lion of the Punjaub’, and it was said of him that a sect of ‘Nikalsainis’ had gathered in Hazara to worship him as their guru, and later to lament his death. A commanding figure and presence, a pale, stern face with dark imperious eyes and great, black, spade-like beard, a step vigorous and firm, a high, proud carriage of the head, a look half sorrowful and scarcely relaxing to a smile, proclaimed the dedicated man. He died at thirty-four, mortally wounded in the assault on the Kashmir Gate, which led to the storm of the key city of Delhi in the bitter fighting of 1857. The voices of his contemporaries reveal a veneration which places their hero in the rank of the demi-gods. They themselves stand forth as devotees of the cult he is said to have inspired. His friends, Herbert Edwardes and John Becher,
mourned his death in terms of flowing Victorian hyperbole — as a grand and glorious piece of handiwork, a meteor whose course flashed through a stormy sky. But the most telling tribute is that paid by Roberts, himself enrolled in the nation’s list of great commanders. In 1857, before the outbreak of the Mutiny, when Roberts was stationed at Peshawar, he was ordered to report on the suitability of the hilltop of Cherat, in the Khatak range south of Peshawar Valley, as a sanatorium for British soldiers. Roberts spent a day or two surveying the hill and searching for water in the neighbourhood. It was not safe to remain on the top at night, for Afridi marauders were close, so he was in the habit of returning each evening to the plain below, where his tent was pitched. On one occasion he found a camp had risen up during his absence, and discovered it belonged to John Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner, who invited him to come over and dine. Roberts proceeds: ‘His was a name to conjure with in the Punjab. I had heard it mentioned with an amount of respect — indeed, awe — which no other name could excite. He had only lately arrived in Peshawar, having been transferred from Bannu, a difficult and troublesome district ruled by him as it had never been ruled before. . . . Nicholson impressed me more profoundly than any man I had ever met before; or have ever met since. I have never seen anyone like him. He was the beau ideal of a soldier and a gentleman. His appearance was distinguished and commanding, with a sense of power about him which to my mind was the result of his having passed so much of his life amongst the wild and lawless tribesmen. . . . Had I never seen Nicholson again, I might have thought that the feelings with which he inspired me were to some extent the result of my imagination, excited by the astonishing stories I had heard of his power and influence: my admiration, however, for him was immeasurably strengthened when, a few weeks later, I served as his staff officer, and had opportunities of observing more closely his splendid qualities and the workings of his grand, simple mind.’

Fine words, coming from a man himself accounted heroic.

Roberts had put his finger on the secret of much of Nicholson’s influence: he owed it to his intercourse with proud tribesmen who by their own manliness had called forth the man in him, men who could issue a challenge and respond to a lead, men who worship daring when it commands success. Yet to my mind John Nichol-
son, with all his splendour and heroism, has about him something that repels, an air that reminds us of Achilles, angry in his tent. Imperious and intolerant, he was too arrogant to inspire an easy affection, he was hardly ready to submit even to reasonable control. He never married; he had a temper like a devil unchained. He is remembered in Bannu and Hasan Abdal — his orderly, Hayat Khan, came from Wah — not as the father of his people, but as a chieftain of indomitable will and ardent energy, just indeed, but terrible to those who crossed him.

There are many memorials to John Nicholson up and down India and Pakistan. One is a fine statue in bronze, in a garden 200 yards from the Kashmir Gate of Delhi, head proudly erect, hand on sword, eyes gazing steadfastly towards the breach in the city wall where the hero met his death. But the most striking monument is an obelisk erected in 1868 in a cleft of the Margalla Pass, sixteen miles north-west of Rawalpindi, and the true entrance to the Frontier country. This was the scene of a gallant exploit of Nicholson's when commanding levies in the field against Chattar Singh early in 1848 in the Second Sikh War. The obelisk stands well on a hillock in the defile, above both railway and Grand Trunk Road which thread it, and can be seen from twenty miles' distance on either side. On the road below is a baoli, or drinking fountain, carved out of the rock, with an inscription telling of the great man's exploits. When last I saw the spot, the water-supply to the fountain had failed.

The most touching memorial is the tablet which still stands in the little church at Bannu:

Gifted in mind and body,
He was brilliant in government as in arms.
The snows of Ghuznee attest his youthful fortitude;
The songs of the Punjaub his manly deeds;
The peace of this Frontier his strong rule.
The enemies of his country know
How terrible he was in battle,
And we, his friends,
Love to recall how gentle, generous, and true he was.

Herbert Edwardes was Nicholson's friend and his superior officer. Edwardes had preceded Nicholson at Bannu, and was Commissioner in Peshawar with Nicholson as his Deputy. He had something of Nicholson's panache, but he was more human, more
accessible, and he loved a jest. He has written it all down in his inimitable book,\(^8\) a compression of his contemporary diaries. These relate not to the post-1849 period when the Panjab had been taken over as a British Indian province, but to the year 1847–1848, the lull between the stormy gusts of the two Sikh Wars, when Edwardes and others came to the North-West Frontier as assistants to Henry Lawrence, Resident in Lahore, to do what the Sikhs could never do, win the confidence of the Pathan tribes and inject justice and fair dealing into the administration. The Sikhs raised revenue by sending armies to plunder, and never held but the local headquarters of each district; the new pioneers sought to arrive at settlements with the people, and, while raising levies from among those very people as a force in reserve, to secure the consent and good-will of the governed. In this task Edwardes was remarkably successful. In Bannu, where he first came, he found a population living in forts, and he left a smiling countryside. Partly by firmness, partly by cajolery, but most of all because he made himself liked and trusted by the people, he was able when the Second Sikh War broke out to raise an army from the Bannu region and march upon Multan. There, by his presence and his gallantry, he turned the scale.

Like Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes was a big man, heavily bearded and of commanding presence. Unlike his friend, he was heavy and thickset; he and Nicholson, walking on furlough arm-in-arm along Piccadilly, were noted as contrasting as markedly as the rival towers of Merton and Magdalen. After the mid-Victorian manner, he was a deeply pious Christian in the evangelical tradition; when he was in Peshawar, he introduced Christian missions to the Frontier, and founded the famous college in that city which bears his name and upholds his memory. Unlike Nicholson, he was a jolly man, easy of approach and tolerant of other men’s weaknesses. And for that reason his memory remains greener, if less extravagant, than that of the paladin who served under him. With him the atmosphere was never strained; he was notable for his good-fellowship.

We never hear from Nicholson of any individual Pathan who appealed to him. Demi-gods are not like that, and heroes make uncomfortable companions. With Edwardes it is very different. The Pathan he most admired in Bannu was the Sperkai Ahmazdai Wazir, Sowan Khan — Edwardes calls him Swahn Khan, Viz-
When the Englishman arrived in Bannu, one of his most difficult tasks was to settle with the Wazir immigrants who had been encroaching on the Bannu oasis by virtue of their greater fortitude and superior armaments as compared with the Shitak Bannuchis of the plain. His diaries contain a delightful account of his first meeting with this redoubtable Wazir chief.

Mullick Swahn Khan, chief man among the neighbouring tribe of the Vizeerees, came into camp by invitation to see me. He is a powerful chief, and his country boasts that it has never paid tribute to any sovereign, but exacted it in the shape of plunder from all tribes alike. Swahn Khan is just what one might picture the leader of such a people: an enormous man, with a head like a lion, and a hand like a polar bear. He had on thick boots laced with thongs and rings, and trod my carpets like a lord. The Hindostanee servants were struck dumb and expected the earth to open. With his dirty cotton clothes, half redeemed by a pink loongee over his broad breast, and a rich dark shawl intertwined into locks that had never known a comb, a more splendid specimen of human nature in the rough I never saw. He made no bow, but with a simple 'Salaam aleikoom' took his seat.

A very true picture of a Wazir malik. While admitting that he had no intention of entering Waziristan to subject the tribes to administration, Edwardes proceeded to make it quite clear to Sowan Khan that Wazirs who occupied lands in the Bamu plain would have to pay revenue. He noted too that to win Wazir confidence would help him greatly in the settlement of the Bannu district, for in the case of anything occurring to excite hostility during negotiations the Bannuchis would immediately have recourse to the stronger Wazirs and make them their sword-arm. The next day the Malik came to visit Edwardes again.

I told him I heard some of his countrymen had got hold of lands in Bunnoo; and if so they must pay to the Maharaja the same as the Bunnoochees do. 'Well, but listen to justice! What if we have bought the lands on agreement that we were to pay a round sum for them out and out, the seller to pay the revenue for ever?' 'Is that the case?' 'Am I a liar?' 'No, you are a Vizeeree, and Vizeerees never tell lies. So I will tell you how it shall be. I will come and see the lands, and hear both sides of the question, and then tell you what I think of it. After that, if you say it is justice that you should pay, I will make you pay; and if you say it is justice that you should not pay, I will give you a sunnud of exemption. But you are to be on your honor as a Vizeeree!' Swahn Khan hereupon stretched out his tremendous arm, grappled
my hand, and shook it till he nearly dislocated my shoulder. —
‘Agreed — agreed: that is insaf, justice!’ he roared.

In his book Edwardes writes that this rude chief, who possessed all the virtues with few of the vices of a savage people, never forgot this treatment. At a later visit to a village named Michan Khan: ‘I found myself locked in his giant arms and squeezed till I could have cried. It was he whose presence in our camp made us as secure in the winter pasture grounds of the Vizeerees as though we had been in the citadel of Lahore.’ And then he tells us what the secret is in dealing with Pathans. ‘He who reads these pages to a close will see how much faith I have had occasion to place in the rudest and wildest of these people, how nobly it was deserved, and how useless I should have been without it.’

Then comes a touch, which shows how well he understood the foibles of the men he dealt with, and lets us into his own mind.

‘Vizeeree manners!’ he writes. ‘Swahn Khan asked, today, for a few days leave, to go home and sleep with his wife. Bun-noochee manners! Ursulla Khan begged to be allowed to sit on the carpet and contemplate me, as he had fallen in love with me. The only way to take these things is philosophically. No offence is intended.’

The house in which both Edwardes and Nicholson lived when they were together in Peshawar was still standing when I was in charge of that district in 1930–32. It was a well-designed bungalow in mud-brick, white-washed, with fanlight windows and cool verandahs, standing amid wide lawns, shaded by great banyan trees. It bore a marble tablet recording that here Edwardes and Nicholson had lived. Some ten years before the British left the Frontier, some reformer pulled it down, and built in its place less worthily. The tablet from the old building has been preserved and affixed to the new one, giving the wrong impression, for the inscription claims the present house as the former residence of the great pioneers. The garden remains as beautiful as ever, but the spirit of the place has fled away.

Edwardes did not take over the Commissionership of Peshawar until 1853, his predecessor having been Frederick Mackeson, assassinated by a fanatic in that year. Mackeson was the oldest and most experienced of the early British officers; he had served on the Frontier all through the 1839–42 period of the First Afghan
War, when he had kept the Khaibar open and made a great name among the Afridis, who regarded him as the finest master of tactics in hill fighting they had ever known. It was largely by adopting the tactical manoeuvres advised by Mackeson, such as the establishment of flank pickets on hilltops on either side of a moving column in hill country, that Pollock succeeded in forcing the Khaibar in 1842.

Unlike Edwardes, Mackeson left no written monument; unlike Nicholson, he did not belong to a brotherhood in which the glory of the individual was undoubtedly enhanced by the quite genuine esteem in which each was held by his peers. But Mackeson's name and fame rest the more securely in the hearts of the people whom he served. Robert Warburton, also beloved of the Afridis, wrote this of him:11 'Wherever I have been, in every part of Peshawar, the Khyber, or Jalalabad, the name of Mackeson (known as Kishin Kaka12 by the elders) has been honoured and respected by all, above that of any other Englishman who has been on the Peshawar border. His untimely death occurred over forty-five years ago, so there must have been something in the character, deeds and life of this man to have kept his memory still so fresh and dear to the people of the Khyber Range.'

It is curious that in the writings of the brotherhood, Edwardes, Lawrence, Abbott and the rest, Mackeson is scarcely mentioned. Maybe he thought them a trifle flamboyant, he was an older man and preferred to work in less dramatic ways. But Warburton is right. In the twenties and thirties of this century the name of Kishin Kaka was on men's lips in the village hujras around Peshawar, where the others were forgotten; the gallant Handside13 was more than once described as Kishin Sani, Mackeson the Second.

No portrait of Mackeson has come down; his stature, his features, the look in his eye, are unknown to us today. But his memorial stands, an obelisk among the great trees of the Company Bagh in the heart of the Peshawar cantonment. The inscription is a fine and flowery piece of English, composed by Dalhousie himself. 'He was cool to conceive, brave to dare, and strong to do. The Indian Army was proud of his noble presence in its ranks — not without cause. On the dark page of the Afghan war the name of Mackeson shines brightly out; the frontier was his post, and the future his field. The defiles of the Khyber and the peaks of the
Old Deputy Commissioner's House at Peshawar: The Residence of Herbert Edwardes and John Nicholson
Black Mountain alike witness his exploits. Death found him in front. Unconquered enemies felt safer when he fell. . . . The loss of Colonel Mackeson's life would have dimmed a victory; to lose him thus is a misfortune of the heaviest gloom for the Government which counted him among its bravest and best.

Abbott is the last of this famous quadrumvirate. His work lay wholly in the cis-Indus district of Hazara, where the town of Abbottabad, the chief place in those parts, still bears his name. The people of central and lower Hazara are some of them Pathans, but most of these, including the Yusufzais, Jaduns, and Tarins, have adopted the ways and language of the northern Panjab. The so-called 'Swatis' of Mansehra in the north are descendants of the older inhabitants of Swat driven across the Indus when the Pathans conquered Swat just before Babur's time. The Hazara Yusufzais of Kalabhat and Torbela are true Pathans in blood, but their proximity to Panjabi tribes has caused them to lose their language and something of their Pakhtunwali. There remains, however, the client tribe of Mashwanis who had so much troubled Hari Singh, true Pathans living in the Gandghar Mountain between the Indus and the Hazara Valley. Their centre is at a group of villages named Srikot, tucked away in the recesses of this range of hills. Here these Mashwanis have preserved a picaresque Pathan life of their own, changing little over the decades and even the centuries. To visit Srikot is to reverse the process undergone by Rip Van Winkle, and to live again in the Pathan world of Babur's time. The traveller, struggling up one of the glens on a stumbling horse — there are no carriage-ways into Gandghar — will find himself greeted by a fusillade, and surrounded by groups of tribesmen who look like marauders, but are in fact pensioner subadars of the army. They are a lovable and a loyal folk.

In this fastness James Abbott took refuge when Chattar Singh and the Dost occupied Peshawar and Lower Hazara in the first year of the Second Sikh War (1848). From this sanctuary Abbott, with Nicholson's aid from the direction of Hasan Abdal, strove to prevent the Sikh troops from Pakhli (the Mansehra district) from uniting with Chattar Singh, but the Jaduns of Dhamtaur played him false and deserted in the field. Abbott was driven back to the Mashwani country, and with the help of his friends among that tribe was able to maintain his position until the battle of Gujrat had been won, and the remnant of the Sikh armies finally sur-
rendered on the green sunlit plain of Rawalpindi on 14th March, 1849. On that occasion James Abbott, leading his proud Mashwani levies, held the Margalla Pass on the road leading north from Rawalpindi, and acted as a roadblock which compelled the Sikh capitulation. His Mashwanis had sustained him unflinchingly in weather foul and fair. They did it because they loved him, and they have never forgotten.

James Abbott was a tiny, dapper man, wiry and slight-built, very different from the gigantic, imperious, bearded figures of Nicholson and Edwardes. His moustache bristled, and a pair of keen eyes looked out from between a hint of whiskers, rather a prototype of the Roberts we once knew so well, inspiring the same sort of affection. After 1849 Abbott became Hazara’s first Deputy Commissioner until, four years later, the best thing the government could think of for this leader of Frontiersmen was to send him off on transfer to — the Gun Foundry at Ishapur near Calcutta.

Abbott’s diaries are extant and give the picture of the man. ‘I was most anxious to start myself for the pass, but my people assure me it would be mistaken for flight.’ ‘I fancy I might persuade the corps to return to its duty could I be personally present.’ ‘At Nara, if anywhere, I may hope to be supported by the mountaineers in a stand against the Sikh army.’ (Nara is at the foot of the Gandghar Mountain, close to Haripur, where the main glen leading to Srikot opens out.) ‘Chuttar Singh’s camp is still halted at Hurripoor within sight of my position, which is at the foot of the Gundgurh mountain. I trust my people will fulfil their solemn promise of standing manfully. . . . Had I a single regiment here to lead the way, my people would follow. But they have no confidence in the plain against guns and cavalry.’ ‘I assembled my people of the Gundgurh mountain and after reminding them that my presence in Huzaura was solely for their protection, and assuring them that I would not remain an hour longer than they desired, put it to them whether I should make my seat here or retire to some other place. One and all implored me to remain. I replied that I would not remain to be dishonourered by the cowardice of my followers (as had happened at Dhamtaur), that if I staid and exposed my life for them, I expected them to stand by me to the death. They all solemnly vowed that they would do so, and I consented to remain. This mountain is a haunted spot: it
has been carried but once and then by treachery. If I fall, the loss to my country is one individual, the least worthy of her sons.' He and his Mashwanis successfully held the Gandghar against all alarms and assaults.

James Abbott not only founded the town that bears his name, he was the discoverer of the Murree and Gali hills, and more particularly of the twin summits Miranjani and Mokhspuri which stand sentinel over Nathiagali to the north, a well-remembered playground to the hundreds of British people who have sought solitude upon their fir-clad slopes. Among the people of Hazara he left a name which will not die. He was simple, brave, well-beloved. Warburton quotes the saying of a Hazara man half a century ago: 'Abbott Sahib was loved in the district, and the old people reverence his memory even now. His heart was like a faquir's; he was always thinking of and for his people.' My people... my people; the phrase rings like a bell through all that he wrote.

For a few months in 1927 I was in charge of the Hazara district, and had gone on tour to Torbela under Gandghar on the Indus left bank, in the country of the Utmanzai Mandans. This section of the Yusufzais also occupies two villages named Kaya and Khabbal on the Indus right bank, and at that time there was living a famous centenarian named Qasim Khan of Khabbal. He had just completed his hundredth year at the time; proof was afforded by his memories of the historic flood of the Indus in 1841, at which time he was a youth of some fourteen summers. Abbott arrived in Hazara in 1847 when Qasim Khan was twenty years old, so I asked the old man if he had met him. 'Yes,' he said, 'more than once, and I remember him well. He was a little man, with bristly hair on his face and kind eyes, and we loved him. He was hardly any taller than me (old Qasim was not much more than five feet in height!). I was in the jirga when he was asking us if we would stand and fight the Sikhs if he stood by us. We swore we would, and there were tears in our eyes, and a tear in Abbott Sahib's eye too. And we did! He was our father, and we were his children. There are no Angrez like Abbott Sahib now.'

Qasim died two years later, but the story he told will live, for a hundred years is as nothing in the folk-lore of Pathans.

Gilbert reached Peshawar on 21st March, 1849. Ten days later
Dalhousie issued the proclamation dethroning Dulip Singh and bringing the Sikhashahi finally to an end. All the trans-Indus districts and Hazara became a part of the Company's dominion along with the rest of the Panjab. Mackeson was the first Commissioner of Peshawar, and George Lawrence, who had been set free by Chattar Singh's son, Sher Singh, a few days earlier, was posted as the first Deputy Commissioner. Sir Colin Campbell, afterwards Lord Clyde and later famous as a commander in the Crimea and for the relief of Lucknow, came up to take over the command of the Frontier region, which then included Rawalpindi and all the country as far down as the Jihlam River. It was Colin Campbell who was responsible for the laying out of the Peshawar cantonment, to the north-west of the city towards the Khaibar. He crowded the troops, European and Company, into as small a space as possible in order more easily to protect the station from the raids of Afridis and other tribes. This is the reason why the barracks and guardrooms are all on the north-western perimeter and interspersed with residential houses. For half a century Peshawar had the reputation of being the unhealthiest station in all India; Peshawar ague was proverbial, and was attributed to overcrowding and 'the miasma which came up to the barracks from the marshy, irrigated country all around'. Reports, civil and military, written as late as 1900, and even later, show that the true cause of malaria was unknown. Thereafter, the fixing of the blame on the mosquito, and in the last two decades the success in destroying that plague, have changed everything. For eight months in the year Peshawar enjoys one of the most sparkling climates in the world. The other four months are more than tropical. From mid-May to mid-July the temperatures are among the highest in the world, but the heat is dry and burning and therefore not unhealthy; from then on to mid-September it is both hot and humid, and perhaps only surpassed for discomfort by the climate of the Persian Gulf.

The city of Peshawar remains much as it was in Elphinstone's time; no description today could be better. The cantonment at all seasons has a certain beauty. The great main road through it, known as the Mall, sweeps in easy curves through groves of fine trees shading the gardens of the houses on either side. The roads radiate from a central hub fixed at the old Company Bagh, where stands the Mackeson memorial, and around which, as any visitor
will notice, stand larger and thicker clusters of more ancient trees, pipals, banyans, pines and palms. These great trunks are the survivors of the famous garden of Ali Mardan Khan, with a garden house, mentioned by Elphinstone, part of which — one of the only two old buildings in the cantonment — is still in use as the Brigade headquarters. Many of the specimen trees and avenues around the cricket-ground and the Company Bagh probably date from that time.

The lateral roads forming ribs to the spine of the Mall afford vistas of the nearer mountains, violet-coloured, and at their most beautiful as the sun rises or sets. At the east end of the station stands a gracious government house on a knoll, looking out on a stately garden of spreading lawns. Outside the bounds there lies a rich and lovely irrigated cultivation, even as Elphinstone described it, hemmed in always by that glorious circle of jagged peaks, beyond which again and to the north float, even in midsummer in clear weather, the dream-mountains of everlasting snow.

The trees were smaller then, but this was the setting against which the first-comers from our country bent to their work over a hundred years ago. The pioneers, who arrived in Sikh times and before Colin Campbell, had already seen that regular troops alone would not suffice to fill the bill. In 1846, as soon as the First Sikh War was over, Henry Lawrence as Resident entrusted to Harry Lumsden the raising of an irregular corps to which was given the name of the Guides. The force was to consist of both horsemen and footmen, it was to be dressed for rough service and not for parade, and it was to be made up of trustworthy local men to act as the eyes and ears of regular troops in the field. Following this principle, the time-honoured scarlet was laid aside for the dust-coloured loose uniform which later, as khaki, became the fighting dress of the whole of the land forces of the Commonwealth. The first cadres were gathered in Peshawar at the end of 1846; a few years later the corps moved to Mardan, where both cavalry and infantry remained until the exigencies of reorganization between the two great wars led to a decision to break an association that had lasted for some eighty years. But there is no Guide, even today, who does not regard Mardan as his spiritual home. And the name of the Gad Paltan and Risala, as the Pathans call them, still calls up local associations not without an emotional value.
Too many English books dealing with the Frontier confine themselves to a record of the countless forays and expeditions which pass for Frontier history during the century of British rule, and I do not propose here to follow that treatment. But the Guides cannot be passed by, they are of the warp and woof of the Frontier fabric. Harry Lumsden, their Commandant until 1862, was the first Assistant Commissioner of the Yusufzai country in Mardan, and a great number of their first soldiers were drawn from the Yusufzais and Khataks who inhabit that part of the country. Lumsden, too, was in many ways quite as big a man as any of the early Frontier political officers of whom I have already made mention. The historian of the regiment writes: ‘Commanders of regiments come and go, and few leave their mark; but over the Guides the influence of Lumsden still burns bright and clear. To be alert and ready; to rise equal to the occasion, be the call small or great; to be not easily taken aback in a sudden emergency; to be a genial comrade and a good sportsman — such are the simple maxims left to his comrades by one of the finest soldiers who ever drew sword.’

Dilawar Khan was a Khatak of Jahangira, one of the Khatak villages north of the Landai River filched from the Yusufzais by Khushhal Khan’s family in the early seventeenth century. He was the Robin Hood of that part of the border; about all his exploits there was a touch of rough humour and justice, even of the courtesies of the highwayman. On his head was a price, and it was Lumsden’s duty to hunt him down. One evening, it occurred to Lumsden, sitting outside his tent and considering the reasons for his failure to catch Dilawar, that a man who knew every path and pass so intimately would be a useful Guide. So he sent Dilawar an offer to come in on safe-conduct, and this the outlaw did. When he came, Lumsden said in effect — ‘Either go back and I’ll catch you and then you’ll hang, or enlist, when with luck you will get a commission, a pension in due course, and as much fighting as a man can stomach. What do you say?’ Dilawar merely laughed and went off, but six weeks later walked calmly in, without safe-conduct this time, and said he would accept, but on one condition that he did not have to learn the slow march. But even that obstacle was got over, and with much chaffing and good humour the bargain was struck. Later, when he had reached the highest rank open to him, Dilawar told Lumsden he had thought him the
greatest fool he ever came across. He had only taken on to learn the tricks and ways of military life and had intended, as soon as he learned these things, to walk off whence he came. But he had learned something more, the meaning of straight, clean, manly dealing, and he had stayed on. Later, in 1869, he was sent on special survey duty to Chitral, many years before that State was included in the bounds of the then Indian Empire. The Mehtar of Chitral of the time captured him and ordered that he be stoned to death, for he was suspected of apostasy. But he got away, only to die in the snow of the passes between Chitral and Bajaur. ‘Go, tell the Commissioner at Peshawar,’ he said, ‘Dilawar Khan of the Guides is dead, faithful to his salt and happy in the occasion of his death. And let him pass the word to Lumsden.’

The Guides formed the nucleus of the civil forces raised after 1849 and known subsequently as the Panjab Frontier Force—the Piffers. For many years the Piffers served under the Panjab Lieutenant-Governor; in Kitchener’s reorganization they became a part of the regular Indian Army. But right down to 1930 the name of ‘Gad Paltan’ was one to conjure with in the Yusufzai country.

It may seem that this story of our early dealings with the Frontier is overfull of British paladins. It is true that the brotherhood was something of a mutual admiration society. Nevertheless, every one of the men here described did shine in his own way as a bright star through the murk, and they have all left names that are still remembered among Pathans. Such weaknesses as they had as governors I attribute to the fact that to a man they were soldiers before they were civil administrators, men of action rather than men of thought and plan. They lacked the subtler insight and grace of Elphinstone, who had gone before them. And let no one think that the Pathan despises a full man.

But such greatness as they had they owed in part to the challenge put out by the people with whom they were dealing. The manliness, the wit, the good-fellowship, the loyalty, even the heroism, were in some sense reflections of what they daily saw and felt and heard of the men over whom they were set to rule. One and all, George Lawrence, Mackeson, Edwardes, Nicholson, Abbott, yes and Roberts too, were more than half Pathans themselves.
CHAPTER XXI

THE CLOSE BORDER POLICY

We have seen what sort of men those pioneers were who, forty years after Elphinstone, crossed the Indus and set about the business of organizing a new frontier to a new province in a central Asian land which had no real affinities with India. How did they work? On what principles, and with what machinery, did they seek to establish out of chaos some sort of equilibrium which, however delicately poised, would at least enable the sub-continent to the south to work out its destiny?

The conditions were extraordinarily difficult. In the first place there was no tradition of any really firm order even in the plains, at least since Mughal times; in the neighbouring highlands there had never been control. Secondly there was no exact limit, such as that provided by a stable State up to which, and no further, the new authority could run. Thirdly, and this was certainly not adequately appreciated at the time, the Pathans were from almost every point of view, ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical, different even from the Muslims of the Panjab. At the very beginning there was one thing in the newcomers’ favour; they were at least better liked than the Sikhs. But that was a negative sentiment and could not be expected to endure for long.

The fundamental problem lay in the fact that the British were attempting to deal with the Pathans of the plains according to the standards of an imported European-type administration, while leaving their immediate neighbours, the Pathans of the hills, in a state of undiluted tribalism. Yet at the time the tribal nexus was strong on both sides of the border, coming and going was continual, and neither socially nor economically were the people to be seen as belonging to different strata. It is true that previous administrations, Mughal, Durrani and even Sikh, had already inured the plains tribes to the duties and the benefits of civilized life as understood by those dynasties. They had for instance required of them revenue payments and had in return built some
roads, forts and even towns. But this was a very different pressure from that which came in with the British with all their paraphernalia of judges and magistrates' courts, their police and their lawyers, their appellate system, their revenue collectors, their land administration and all the rest. And most difficult of all, they came armed with laws and regulations which had not necessarily, as seen by the people, any relevance whatever to the standards by which a Pathan society lived.

It should be understood that at the time of the British arrival the frontiers with the Afghan Kingdom of Dost Muhammad Khan were undetermined. At the beginning there were no regularly constituted Political Agencies, and there was no defined tribal belt between the high-tide line of administered territory at the foot of the hills and the Kingdom of Kabul. The tribal territory beyond our border was regarded as enjoying at least a factual independence, and was commonly referred to as ghairilaqa (unadministered territory) or Yaghistan (the land of rebels). 'Yaghistan' was common parlance not only with the British but with the rulers of Kabul also— the Amir Abdurrahman uses it in his autobiography. In other words, in those days the frontier of India was regarded as standing on the administered border. Beyond it was a belt of no-man's-land of unknown extent which acknowledged neither Kabul nor Calcutta as suzerain, however much ethnic or religious ties might incline its inhabitants to play in with the former. The Kabul ruler himself sometimes claimed tribal allegiance in name if not in deed, and—an important point—maintained at least a semblance of authority on the main passages through the tribal territory. The British in the beginning were not in occupation of the Khaibar, and the Upper Kurram Valley remained under a vague Afghan rule.

This factual position made it necessary for the new British authority in the trans-Indus districts, and in Hazara, to establish at least some machinery for dealing with the tribes beyond the border. Since no part of the trans-border territory had been occupied, it was necessary that this should be done by the Deputy Commissioners, each officer with the tribes on his own border. Even today this system has survived in certain sectors of the Frontier; for example up to the end of the British period the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar dealt with the important and powerful Mohmand tribe, the Kohat Deputy Commissioner still
deals with the Orakzais, Bannu with some of the Wazirs, Dera Ismail Khan with the Sheranis and Bhitannis, and so on. Originally — and to this I will return — our officers conducted relations with the trans-border tribesmen through intermediaries, who were always Khans or notables of border villages whose ancestors had for generations been brought into contact with the tribes of that part of Yaghistan adjacent to their homes. Examples are to be found in the Khalil and Mohmand Arbabs of the villages close to Peshawar who knew the Afridis, in the Khans of Hoti, Mardan and Sudhum who knew the Yusufzais of Dir, Swat and Buner, the Khans of Hangu who knew the Orakzais, the Nawab of Tank who knew the Mahsuds and had married a Mahsud wife, and many others. It was a system we had inherited from the Sikhs, who never attempted to speak the language of the Pathans, and from the Durranis, who expected their visitors to talk Persian and were often too idle to go deep into tribal grievances.

Since the trans-border tribes were armed to the teeth and were the most notorious raiders and plunderers in history, since also the gradual disarmament of the people in the districts was in accord with practice elsewhere and deemed to be the prerequisite of settled administration, it was clearly necessary to build up a force which should be more mobile than regular soldiers and act under the civil authority. The nucleus of such a force already existed in the Guides, and on this model a considerable militia was raised and eventually named the Panjab Irregular Force, or the Piffers. In the early days the Frontier Force operated behind a screen of so-called Border Police — better known under a later and honoured name as the Frontier Constabulary — who acted as its antennae and were not employed as policemen on the investigation or control of crime. In case of serious trouble it could, of course, rely on regular military support: the defence of the border was by no means always passive; indeed at certain times counter-raiding was a feature, and the military expedition into tribal territory as a punitive measure was the all-too-frequent panacea for tribal misbehaviour. There were no less than eleven military operations, ranking as expeditions, in the twenty years succeeding the Mutiny (1857–77) and twelve in the five years 1877–81. This appalling tally was to a large extent the direct result of a too rigid adherence to the close-border policy; it sprang from the refusal to attempt any sort of penetration of the territory
across the border. But, as I shall show, there were other causes, a surer grasp of which might have suggested the advantages of preventive measures in place of all these drastic purges.

The application of force by the army or civil power was the negative side of the coin, and our administrators were not without positive ideas. The most obvious of these were written agreements and allowances. During the first twenty years signed agreements were negotiated with every tribe up and down the Frontier and secured, on paper, everything that the government needed. A typical agreement would contain a number of clauses, one general clause declaring friendship and good-will, followed by a statement of the services required of the tribe such as the security of the border, control of raiders, protection of communications (if any), a clause binding the tribe to deny sanctuary to outlaws, and one guaranteeing an annual allowance contingent on good behaviour. The agreement would be reached in open jirga, and to it the maliks and elders of the tribe would affix their seals or, often enough, their thumb impressions. Jokes would pass, the first payment might be made, and the general atmosphere of good-will would seem to promise a perpetual peace. It was hardly ever so.

The allowances are known as *muwajib*, and, in the early days at least, were an important element in the system of management. In later years their importance faded; much larger economic benefits became available through other and more fruitful channels, such as service in the army, in civil irregular corps, or as tribal police. The system has frequently, but quite wrongly, been represented as blackmail. Not only do these tribes not pay revenue, as subjects should — so runs the argument — but they actually receive money inducements to behave! It is to be remembered that in those early days the tribes were in no sense subjects, no legal code was in force in their territories, and no writ ran. The object was to restrain them from depredations on their more settled neighbours, sometimes by threat of withdrawal of facilities for trade or employment, at others by payments. These payments might be in the form of compensation for roads through their country, or in recognition of some special service. A good example is that of the Khaibar Afridis, whose original allowances were granted in lieu of the tolls which the tribe itself formerly levied by force on all traffic through the pass. Subsequent increases were made to the
Afridi allowances as rewards for the signal service rendered by
the tribe in remaining staunch through World War I, and as
compensation for roads, railways and camps. Finally, those who
have objected to muwajib as blackmail never recognize that all
allowances, for whatever reason given, are conditional on good
behaviour and liable to suspension, or forfeiture, in part or in
whole, if the tribe breaks an agreement or commits offences. Such
suspension is one of the most effective weapons of retaliation upon
a lawless tribe, and the value of the allowance system is best shown
by government's comparative impotence in dealing with a tribe
not so subsidized.

The punitive expedition was by no means the only remedy for
controlling tribal depredation on the districts. Apart from the
stoppage of allowances there was blockade (bandish) and baramta.
Blockade is a means of exerting economic pressure by excluding a
tribe from markets, land, or grazing in the neighbouring district;
such pressure was sometimes effective but slow, and there were
always difficulties of enforcement, both along the border line it-
self and in the centres of trade. As between the people of the dis-
tricts and those of ghairilaqa, the administrative border was often
artificial in the sense that it meant little to the people on either
side, while all tribesmen enjoyed more or less close relations with
traders and others in the district towns and villages. Baramta is a
word of Central Asian Turki origin, meaning the seizure of per-
sons, animals or property belonging to a tribe or an individual at
fault, in order to bring pressure for restitution. All these systems
depend on the existence in the tribal society of a communal sense
of responsibility. In any tribe with a living tribalism the outstand-
ing feature is that the tribe as a whole, and every member of it, is
responsible for the misdeeds of any of its members, just as it and
they, are entitled to share in any benefit or advantage secured by
any member. It follows from this principle that an aggrieved
party can enforce his remedy against any tribesman on whom he
can lay his hands. That is the essence of tribal responsibility, a
system which admits the justice of baramta as an effective weapon
for securing rights and claims. The baramta weapon works best
when enforced against the tribal section actually responsible, or
to which the aggressors actually belong; the smaller the section on
which pressure can be brought, the more likely is restitution.

The juxtaposition of the two societies, the settled and the
tribal, posed in an acute form the problem of securing the surrender of criminals. Almost every tribal agreement includes an undertaking to refrain from the harbouring of outlaws from justice. But while the tribal leaders were ready to purchase an end of penal measures by yielding this point in debate, in fact the undertaking was never carried out, and for a very simple reason. The denial of sanctuary is impossible for one who would observe Pakhtu; it cannot be refused even to an enemy who makes an approach according to Nanawatai—a verbal noun carrying the meaning of ‘coming in’. This is an extension of the idea of Melmastia, hospitality, in an extreme form, stepped up to the highest degree. Under Nanawatai a person who has a favour to ask goes to the house or tent of the man on whom it depends and refuses to sit on his carpet, or partake of his hospitality, until he shall grant the boon required. The honour of the party solicited will incur a stain if he does not grant the favour asked. The giving of hospitality to the guest is a national point of honour, so much so that the reproach to an inhospitable man is that he is devoid of Pakhtu, a creature of contempt. It is the greatest of affronts to a Pathan to carry off his guest, and his indignation will be directed not against the guest who quits him but to the person who prevails on him to leave. This, or something like it, was the reception accorded to the outlaw from British justice who fled to the hills.

It was a problem which was never solved; on every magistrate’s table lay a list of fugitives from justice (mafrur or farari). It would happen like this. In pursuance of his own ideas of Pathan honour, expressed for example in killing the lover of his wife or sister, or in taking blood for blood, Muhammad Umar Khan of Shabqadr, we will say, would be brought into conflict with law as laid down in the Indian Penal Code. Or indeed, Umar might have been guilty of a crime not justified by Pakhtu, such as deliberate murder without cause, or robbery with violence, or dacoity. In either case the police would be after him. As his blood cooled, Umar would look from his courtyard, or across the fields, and there he would see, only a few miles away, the jagged outline of the hills rising from the plain, hills where no police could go and where the stupid British writ did not run. And that very night he would cross the border, and arrive as a suppliant at the hujra of Malik Mushki in the Tarakzai country of the Mohmands, a man he had often met when he came shopping in the Shabqadr bazaar and to
whom he had once done a small favour. Malik Mushki could not turn him away, and he would be hospitably entertained for a day or two, all food found and no expenses. During this time his story would come out.

Now Pathan hospitality, generous as it is, will not be extended for ever to mere parasites. If he wishes to stay on, Umar will be expected to earn his keep. He becomes in fact a hamsaya, a client, one who lives in the shadow of his naik, or protector. The protector will not give him up to a justice which in any case seems to him perverted, but if Umar chooses to inject himself into the tribal organization to which Mushki, his naik, belongs, he must do something for it. This he may do merely by performing menial tasks or cultivating land, or by exercising some skill or other that he may happen to possess. But not uncommonly he will do it by acting as a guide to raiding parties whom he conducts to harry his old haunts, and even to kill his old enemies; and the peace of the border is disturbed. The tally rises against a tribe which harbours sufficient of such outlaws, and failing their surrender there was in the old days nothing for it but blockade or military pressure.

At one time a system of conciliation jirgas was tried. If the outlaw's crime had been merely in pursuit of the usual Pathan vendetta, it was thought that a solution would be found by calling him in on safe-conduct to make a settlement by striking a balance of the blood-money due from both sides. The theory was sound enough, but again it is in most cases contrary to Pakhtu to accept blood-money in final settlement of a feud.

The fact is that, short of extradition — and that is impossible except between equals, for it must be mutual — there is no final solution of the outlaw problem when an administered society living under a twentieth-century system of law lies side by side with a tribal society coming of the same stock and speaking the same language, both societies believing in the principle that the private vendetta is the only sound sanction. Unless, indeed, the more advanced society, or its rulers, are prepared to adjust the rigours of the law to the real ideas of the people — and here we approach nearer to the root of the trouble.

The British judicial system, with its lawyers and its appeals and its European scale of crime values, was hopelessly out of accord with Pathan sentiment, not only in the tribal territory but within the districts also. The rigidity of police and magistracy emphasized
the advantages, in the eyes of many, of the freer life on the other side of an arbitrary border. The law frequently outraged strongly-held convictions. Where it imposed sanctions or penalties not justified by custom, there would be no hesitation in evading it by giving false evidence or by absconding; where the law of evidence secured the acquittal of persons whom everybody knew to be guilty there would be contempt for processes regarded as fussy, niggling and even unjust; lastly, where the law’s subtleties opened the road to harassment of an enemy, there would be many sly enough to misuse its technicalities. The whole thing, for years, was a garment that did not fit. In a belated return to sanity the realization dawned that the real remedy might lie within the districts.

In 1872 a positive attempt was made to relax this inelasticity by the introduction of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, authorizing settlement by customary methods of quarrels arising out of the blood-feud, of disputes about women, and questions generally affecting Pathan honour. The magistrates were given the power to withdraw such cases from the ordinary courts and submit them for arbitration by a jirga. In such case the jirga did not mean all the maliks and elders of a whole tribe, acting in conclave as a deliberative body, but a group of elders designated by the magistrate (and acceptable to both parties to a dispute) who were required to give a finding as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, in a criminal case, or on the points at issue in a civil dispute. In other words the jirga was a sort of tribal jury. It was not bound by the law of evidence, and it was expected to visit the place of the crime or dispute, and by its own methods and enquiries to state the facts and the solution. On conviction for murder the court could not sentence to death, fourteen year’s imprisonment being the maximum penalty. On the North-West Frontier the Regulation, as used in the districts, merely supplemented the action of the regular courts, and the tendency was to use it only when the processes of the ordinary law, resting upon the law of evidence and many procedural technicalities, were deemed to be unlikely to arrive at the facts of a case in the conditions of a Pathan society. It need scarcely be added that the Bar disliked the Regulation, for naturally the professional lawyer was excluded from jirga proceedings.

There is no doubt that, with the help of this Regulation, many
persons were brought to justice for violent crime who would otherwise have escaped. I think too that the cases in which a conviction was brought in against an innocent man were so rare as to be negligible. Nevertheless, as used on the North-West Frontier, that is as a supplement and not as a substitute for British Indian law, I believe the Regulation was a failure, for, as so operated, it satisfied neither the law nor the custom. It became merely an easy means of punishing crime as from the State, without being a recognition of the Pathan idea. It failed to administer custom on the basis of local tradition, and it fell between two stools.

The problem can be better understood if we consider the very different method of operation of the Frontier Crimes Regulation after the occupation of Baluchistan had become effective in about the year 1880. A similar use was established also on parts of the North-West Frontier after the forward policy had resulted in the imposition of a loose administration in certain tribal areas in the 'nineties. In these places the Regulation was operated not as a parallel system, to be applied when the ordinary process of law was expected to fail, but as the sole and substitute code, whenever the parties were tribesmen. It was indeed in these new territories regarded mainly as a means of adjudication on custom, and not as a procedure for enforcing the sanctions of the State. Thus in a criminal case penalties would ordinarily not exceed those imposed by custom, unless the crime had outraged both custom and the authority of the government.

A few examples will illustrate the point. Let us suppose that case A arises out of a blood-feud, and that Shirin Khan has shot and killed Anwar in revenge for the murder of Shirin's brother by Anwar's uncle. According to Pathan custom Shirin only did what honour requires. If Shirin were brought before the ordinary courts which administer a system of law repugnant and incomprehensible to him, knowing that his conviction would probably result in his going to the gallows for doing his duty, he would do everything he could to evade 'justice'. Among other things a host of perjured witnesses would be produced in his defence. But if brought before a jirga, at least in Baluchistan, he would proudly admit, indeed claim, that he had done what honour required. The business of the jirga would then be to arrive, if possible, at a settlement which will terminate the feud, either by payment of blood-money, or by giving of girls in marriage — a very common
method of composing a feud, the girl being known as a swara — or by some other expedient such as requiring Shirin and the rival party to enter into bonds to keep the peace, backed by substantial sureties. There would be no penalty enforced by the State.

In the other case, case B, we may imagine that Ashiq Jan has entered into an amour with the enticing wife of Fulan Khan, has killed Fulan and eloped with the lady. This would be a violation of every tenet of Pathan honour, an unjustifiable murder and adultery. In such a case custom would approve the killing of Ashiq by Fulan's relatives, and incidentally the killing of the woman also. That result however would almost certainly start a feud, and it was never thought right or wise to use any system of law introduced under British auspices to perpetuate the more extreme sanctions of custom. In case B, then, the jirga appointed under the Regulation, should it find Ashiq guilty, might recommend the highest possible term of imprisonment, fourteen years, and a heavy penalty of sharmana in addition.

We may suppose, if we like, a case C, in which there has been a murder of a levyman on duty. Here not only the relatives of the levyman, but the State also, would have an interest. Blood-money and possibly a term of imprisonment might be recommended by the jirga to satisfy the customary element in the case; the magistrate would impose an additional term of imprisonment as from the State.

The point to realize is this. Pathan custom requires the satisfaction of the aggrieved rather than the punishment of the aggressor. The law as we understand it concentrates against the aggressor, and compensation for the aggrieved hardly enters the picture. The Pathan in fact treats crime as a kind of tort.

How and when, and in what degree, it may become desirable to shift the emphasis in a Pathan society from law to custom, or from custom to law, is a matter more likely to be resolved by Pakistan than it ever was by ourselves. It is an obvious principle that the law should in some sense grow out of the society; it should be a projection of the common personality. The law of one civilization cannot be applied to a society with utterly different standards without the most dire results. On many years' experience I believe that, had the Peshawar administration of 1849 been moulded on less rigid lines, congenial to the people themselves, law and order would have been better preserved, the settled dis-
istricts would not have been severed from the tribal areas to the extent that they were, and advance at a later date would have been more harmonious. It may be that Pakistan will see its way to correcting some of the present anomalies in the manner provided by Section 198 of the Constitution, though, to effect this, recommendations would need to take account of custom as well as the Injunctions of Islam. It is probable that on the method from time to time adopted to resolve this very difficult question will depend success or failure in the absorption of the Pathan tribal belt in the State of Pakistan. The matter is of central importance, and cannot be evaded without disaster.

The group of officers who formed the brotherhood in the early British days triumphed over all these difficulties by sheer personality. 'I feel I am little fit for regulation work,' wrote Nicholson to Henry Lawrence, 'and I can never sacrifice common-sense or justice, or the interests of a people or country, to red tape.' And: 'Don't send up any more men to be hanged direct,' wrote John Lawrence to Nicholson, 'and when you do, send an abstract of the evidence in English, and send it through the Commissioner.' Nicholson's biographer tells how a friend found him in his office with a bundle of laws and regulations before him. 'This is the way I treat these things,' he remarked laughingly and proceeded to kick them across the floor.

After 1857 the conduct of the administration fell into the hands of lesser men. A big man like Edwardes could see the virtue of regular administration and adapt law to conditions with patience, seeking amendment where it should be needed. But in conditions as contradictory as those I have sought to describe here few officers were left long enough in Frontier posts to gain the experience which alone could weigh against the difficulties that beset them. Lahore was far away and seems to have treated the Frontier as something of a side-show; the service was undermanned, transfers, often to down-country districts, were too frequent, officers had not time enough to learn the Frontier language or the ways to the heart of the Pathan. The quality of the administration seems to have deteriorated.

It was largely owing to lack of experience that the system of middlemen for dealing with the tribes persisted for so long — and had such bad results. If a Deputy Commissioner could speak
the language well enough to hold fluent converse not only with his tribal visitors but with the jirga in full conclave — he needed for this purpose to be able to make speeches in it, and to take up a running argument — it was far better that he should deal direct, leaving detailed haggling to his official subordinates and not to local notables. In the last fifty years since 1901 the linguistic standard attained by British officers has been admitted by all Pathans to have been on the whole extremely high, and direct relations were possible. But this was a result which flowed from the creation of Curzon's separate Frontier province; in Panjab days there were of course exceptional men, but relations between governors and governed were generally more remote.

The change in this system came about largely on the initiative of Warburton, the first Political Agent in effect to hold political control of tribes beyond the border without responsibility in the district. Warburton was the son of a British army officer who had served in Shah Shuja's contingent in the First Afghan War and had married an Afghan lady, a niece of the Dost. He was therefore half Afghan by birth. After the Second Afghan War he was put in charge of the Khaibar and its tribes, taken over from the Afghan Government as a result of the war. There he remained for some sixteen years, to return later as Political Officer to the Tirah expeditionary force. In his book he states it as his solemn conviction that the majority of the wars and fights between the government and the tribes of the Panjab border were due entirely to the machinations of the Arbabs and others employed as middlemen in dealings across the border.

In illustration of his thesis he tells an intriguing story of the Buner incursion of 1877, when lashkars of Bunervals crossed the Malandrai and Ambela Passes into the district and sacked the border villages in Sudhum. Warburton had been in charge of this Yusufzai border before he went to the Khaibar and knew all the actors personally.

Sudhum is that part of the Samah up against the Buner hills, drained by the very Mukam stream that so delighted Babur. It is a valley formed by a northern horseshoe of mountains, dominated by the great saw-like peak of the Pajja mountain. The passes from Buner are concentric, crossing into the valley like the aisles in a theatre, while to the south, like a raised stage, rises the pine-crowned island hill of Karamar. All this is historic ground, Malan-
drai, where Akbar's host was destroyed, Ambela, the scene of one of the fiercest frontier wars, Karamar, where they lit the beacon which gave the signal for the slaughter of Sayyid Ahmad's followers.

The Khans of Sudhum belong to the Amazai branch of the Mandanr Yusufzais; the rest of the people in the valley and on the mountains that ring it are mainly Gujars, shepherds and herdsmen. The chief Pathan family is known as the Mir Babu Khel, from its progenitor, Mir Babu Khan. Mir Babu had known Sayyid Ahmad Shah Brelwi, and later, inconsistently enough, had farmed revenue for the Sikhs. When Lumsden arrived in the Yusufzai country, Mir Babu was ready to be helpful, and George Lawrence refers to him more than once as a good friend to the new régime. He and his sons, Ajab and Aziz, were employed as middlemen in dealings with the Buner and Chamla7 tribes beyond the border. Both Ajab and Aziz were connected by marriage with the Buner Khans; they also had dealings with the Hindustani colony left behind by Sayyid Ahmad, who had come to be known as the Mujahidin,8 or Warriors for the Faith.

Both Ajab and Aziz thought themselves slighted when not consulted over the Ambela campaign of 1863.9 Ajab wrote to his friends in Buner that, if they did not do something at once, the purdah of Buner would be lifted for ever. The phrase is a graphic one, constantly used by the tribes to emphasize the value they set on the inviolability of their country, to be preserved behind a veil as jealously as the modesty of a woman. After that fierce campaign Aziz died, and Ajab fled to Buner. Much faction feeling arose among the Mir Babu Khel, and it was always difficult to sift the truth from the recriminations of the various parties. Eventually in 1877, having previously returned to his home at Chargulai in Sudhum and in order, as he later admitted, to rehabilitate himself with the government, Ajab Khan organized an invasion of Sudhum in force by the Bunerwal tribes. The tribes poured in over all the passes, and burned the villages Baringan, Ali and Bazar, with the Khans of which Ajab was on bad terms. The invaders were only beaten off from Rustam, the headquarters of that border, with the greatest difficulty and after heavy losses had been suffered. Information was not slow to come in, and Ajab was placed on trial for making war against the Crown.

The trial was a cause célèbre, and resulted in Ajab's conviction
and sentence to death, on a Chief Court judgment said to have been the longest then extant. On hearing the result of his appeal Ajab confessed his guilt. The speech he made to the large assembly of headmen who attended when he suffered the extreme penalty was full of force and dignity and long quoted. Ajab Khan was a magnificent figure of a man, well over six feet in height, sparsely built, with fine features and long black beard. He carried always a silver tooth-pick, hanging by a cord from his neck, and the words he uttered were always softly delivered. Men still tell how, with quiet impressive voice and gently twirling his silver toy, he stood on the scaffold and advised his peers not to follow his example. 'I brought the raiders down,' he said, 'intending to head them off at the border, and in this way demonstrate my power, and regain the favour of the Government. I failed as I deserved to fail. That game is an old one, and my last word to you all is not to try to manufacture events which are in the hands of God.'

But Warburton had good reasons for distrusting the system of the local intermediary as a means of conducting relations with the tribes across the border. The close-border system had been tried and found wanting, and the time had come for bolder policies.
CHAPTER XXII

AMBELA

It is no part of this work to describe the long list of military operations, ranking as expeditions, undertaken on or from the Frontier. But there are two memorable affairs in the early days of much greater than military interest. The first is the reaction on the Frontier to the Mutiny of 1857, the second the Ambela campaign of 1863, and both are worth a record. The two are connected, for the remnants of down-country mutineers from the first provided the spark that lit the second. One shows how vital to the political stability of the whole sub-continent is the attitude of the Pathan tribes; the other is a milestone in Frontier history, partly because it linked backward with the Sayyids who opposed the Sikhs, and forward, through the Akhund, with present-day developments in Swat. But a more important reason is that the Ambela story displays a number of incidents so typical of Pathan courage and chivalry at its best that they deserve to be shown to a wider audience. Let us then turn aside from the main stream for a moment, and look again to the Yusufzai border.

In the beginning the paladins had a pretty free hand, and during the eight years that preceded the Mutiny laid the foundations of border control on the lines described in the last chapter. When the test came, the building stood, not so much because the system was sound as that the men themselves—and Sydney Cotton, the military commander at Peshawar no less than the others—acted with the verve and decision that the moment required. The Hindustani regiments were promptly disarmed often against the violent protests of their colonels—one commanding officer in Mardan committed suicide when the men he trusted failed him—and, of two regiments which did mutiny, one from Nowshera and Mardan was decimated in a ruthless pursuit by Nicholson and its remnants hunted down by the tribes in Swat, while the other, attempting in Peshawar to rush the magazine and regain its arms, was annihilated in a running battle on the Khaibar road.
The scale was turned. Help came flocking in from all directions, levies were raised and did good service down in India, the Guides had already been despatched on their memorable march from Mardan to Delhi — 580 miles in twenty-seven days, including five days campaigning on the road, at the height of the hot weather. As the Guides, after a final thirty-mile march, strode manfully into the Delhi camp on the morning of 9th June, 1857, "their stately height and martial bearing made all who saw them proud to have such aid. They came in as firm and light as if they had marched but a single mile." And in half an hour they were in action, and remained in the front line for the next three months until Delhi fell on 20th September of that year, when after a few months' desultory campaigning they returned to the Yusufzai border.

Thus in that hard time the Frontier not only stood firm, but helped materially in restoring the situation far to the south. The year 1857 is still remembered by the grandsons of those men as one of honour untarnished, and families who could not recall it by showing a ribbon or a letter used to feel there was something missing. It is fair to bear in mind that a material factor in bringing about this result was the attitude of the Amir, who stuck to his bond in spite of the lure of Peshawar and the fact that John Lawrence himself, the ruler of the Panjab, played with the idea of withdrawing to the Indus.

Sayyid Akbar Shah of Sitana, of the family of Pir Baba, will be remembered as the man who, in concert with Sayyid Ahmad Brelwi, led the opposition to the Sikhashahi. Sayyid Ahmad, as we know, died at Balakot in 1831 fighting against the Sikhs, but his surviving followers were given a home by Sayyid Akbar at his fort Sitana, the place which had defied Hari Singh and later Ranjit himself in 1824. This colony took to itself the name Mujahidin. Quiescent during the opening years of the new British dominion, the colony was soon stirred by the arrival of the remnants of the mutineers from Nowshera, together with others from around Delhi, bringing the message that the foundations of sovereignty were ill-laid and now was the time for a supreme effort.

Sayyid Akbar himself, their host at Sitana, had died in Swat on the very day in 1857, 11th May, when the news of the Mutiny reached Peshawar, but his place was taken by his brother Sayyid Umar, his son Mubarik and his nephew Mahmud, his brother...
Umar’s son. These proceeded in 1858 to raise the Yusufzai border against the British. But the Sitana Sayyids were not the only influential persons in Swat and Buner.

The position in Swat at this time was not lacking in interest. In 1784 — though the date is uncertain — there had been born in the village of Jabrai in Upper Swat one Abdul Ghafur, the son of a Safi shepherd who for one reason or another had left his own tribe and settled among the Yusufzais. The family belonged to the Qandhari section of the Safis, a name which may well be a link with the ancient Gandhara, so suggesting a reason why the Safis admit themselves to be relatively recent converts to Islam and therefore peculiarly fervent exponents of the Faith. Abdul Ghafur himself started life as a herdboy, wandering over the hills in charge of his father’s flocks, fasting, praying, and withdrawn. Hearing of a saintly teacher in the village of Beka on the Indus bank above the Landai confluence, he took his scrip, walked over the pass from Swat to Pir Baba in Buner, and thence down to the plains to Beka, where he lived always on a well, gently tending the animals and listening to the village talk. From there he moved to Hund and on to Salim Khan beneath the shadow of Mahaban. Here his refusal to equivocate involved him in a false charge of having been concerned in some way with the death of the Khan of Hund, contrived by Sayyid Ahmad Shah Brelwi, then newly arrived in the Yusufzai country. To escape recriminations Abdul Ghafur moved to Gujar Garhi, close to Mardan, and later to Torderh, a Khatak village near Akora. Wherever he went, his quiet smile and look of gentle resignation won devotion, earning him the title of burag, the local corruption of the Persian word burag, applied to a reverend elder. The Dost heard of him and besought his blessing in the struggle against the Sikhs. After the Sikh victory, unable to find the peace he needed in the turmoil, Abdul Ghafur went first to Sam Ranizai below the Malakand, and a little later to Batkhela in Lower Swat. But even here he was too close to the noise of the Sikh squadrons, and he eventually found sanctuary higher up the valley at Saidu, in a beautiful spot on the south side of the Swat River where a tributary stream, descending from the Ilam Mountain, opens into the main valley. Here he found rest, and here at long last at the age of ninety-three he was buried.

At Saidu he married a Yusufzai woman of the Nikpi Khel and
by her had two sons, the fathers of the Mianguls, the family from which the present Rulers of Swat are drawn. It has been remarked more than once that a man who marries into a tribe not his own always among Pathans casts in his lot with his wife’s people. It is unusual for the Yusufzais to admit strangers to marriage, and is only done (and that rarely) with Sayyids and holy men. Abdul Ghafur’s marriage into the Nikpi Khel explains how his descendants have been able to win acceptance in this Pathan society.

There is no doubt that, from the time of his arrival in Saidu, Abdul Ghafur was regarded as the leading man among the Swat Yusufzais. His authority was not absolute, but no man is called Akhund — a Persian word meaning a teacher with much the same connotation as Guru — unless he is greatly reverenced. Tales are still current of his sweetness and simplicity, of how, like Kim’s lama, he sat exalted in contemplation beneath the shade of a chenar, of a soul striving always to draw near to the Great Soul which is beyond all things. Like Mahbub in the same story, the Yusufzais who felt his spell, forgetting even their blood-lust, knew holiness when they saw it — ‘I may come to Paradise later — I have workings that way — great motions — and I owe them to thy simplicity.’

A shrine was raised over the Akhund’s grave, and became a place of pilgrimage for the devout, vying with that of Pir Baba, just across the pass in Buner. During his lifetime there was no question of his assuming any degree of temporal power, and in fact he himself suggested that temporal authority as ‘Badshah’ in Swat should be vested in Akbar Shah of Sitana, both because he was a Sayyid (which the Akhund was not) and in recognition of the part taken by him in the struggle against the Sikhs.

There have been many instances in the history of Swat when the tribes have agreed in time of crisis to set up a Sayyid or holy man as at least a temporary figure-head, combining under the banner of the Faith for a special purpose, and using the Quranic precept for the giving of alms to the pious as a means of furnishing the sinews of war. For a time Akbar Shah held this position, and was known as Badshah. There is a certain ambivalence about this title, for Sayyids as Sayyids, and quite apart from any question of temporal authority, are entitled to this kingly honorific. This equivocation makes it hard to tell what a Sayyid’s position in Swat really is, but there is no doubt that Akbar Shah was in
fact recognized for a time as ruler. When he died in 1857, there was much debate in Swat as to whether he should be succeeded as Badshah by his son Mubarik Shah. As the descendant of Pir Baba he belonged to the most respected family of Sayyids in the region. But after debate the people, under the Akhund's influence, rejected Mubarik. Mubarik in a huff went off to Panjtar, just across the border from Swabi, and from that centre, reinforced as related by mutineers from the district, raised the Chamla tribes against the British. That there was not more disturbance in that critical year was due mainly to the refusal of the Akhund to permit the Swat Yusufzais to be implicated.

Nevertheless, as the aftermath of the Mutiny there was a great deal of trouble in the area along the Yusufzai border from Sudhum to the Indus. During July and August 1858 parties of Mujahidin, backed by the local tribesmen, established a stronghold at Narinji, and vigorous action had to be taken by the Guides to restore the situation. Later the same year an attack was made on Mubarik Shah's fort at Sitana. This resulted in the expulsion of the Mujahidin from their stronghold, and an agreement by the neighbouring tribes that they would not be allowed to reoccupy that place. In this affray Umar Shah, the surviving brother of Akbar Shah, was killed and Mubarik Shah himself was wounded after a very gallant defence. Mubarik with the remnants of his Hindustani followers then moved to a less accessible spot named Malka, situated on a northern spur of the Mahaban mountain where it falls to the Chamla Valley.

From this refuge the Sayyids, using the Mujahidin as their sword-arm, recommenced the harassment of the Mardan and Swabi border. In their eyes at this time the British power seems to have been regarded as little better than the Sikhs; all were unbelievers and should be attacked on any and every opportunity.

In the autumn of 1863 the Government decided to make an effort finally to extirpate this centre of disaffection; and it was thought that this could be done without incurring the hostility of the Buner tribes who had been peaceful ever since the British arrival and whose spiritual head, the Akhund, had little sympathy either with the Sitana Sayyids or their Hindustani followers. But, as has been said, this assessment had been made without full consultation with Ajab and Aziz Khan of Sudhum — or so they thought and considered themselves slighted — with results that were un-
foreseen. One reason for their annoyance was that Malka is situated in Amazai country, the same section as that of the Sudhum Khans though separated from them.

It was decided to invade Chamla—a valley running due east and west just south of Buner and in which Malka is situated—with one strong force from the side of Mardan using the Ambela Pass. Another force was to occupy a holding position in the neighbourhood of Topi. On the political assessment made it was not considered necessary to warn the Buner or Chamla tribes of the column's intentions; indeed it was thought inadvisable to do so as it was important to keep the line of advance secret. It is probable that it was this omission which stirred Ajab Khan to wrath and caused him, when the news was out, to taunt the Bunerwals with the raising of their purdah.

The commander of the force was Neville Chamberlain, with Reynell Taylor, the last of the brotherhood, as his political officer. The approach to the Ambela Pass is by a narrow, snaky gorge about six miles long, traversed by a small stream tumbling over boulders, passable by men afoot, just practicable for ridden animals, and very difficult for laden beasts of burden. How any commander, having reconnoitred, hoped to get up easily is hard to say. The first échelons of troops entered the narrows early on 20th October and reached the Kotal by noon without any resistance to speak of, but not a single baggage animal except the ammunition mules got up that night. It took more than forty-eight hours for the convoy to come in and the rearguard to close up. By this time the element of surprise had been lost. What Roberts described as one of the strongest positions in the world was then occupied, with headquarters in the centre on the Kotal, between a rocky knoll on the right known later as the Crag Picket, and another on the left, the Eagle's Nest. To the front there is a fine field of fire down the Chamla Valley, and although the two picket positions on the flanking knolls are by no means the summits of the mountains to either side, they afford cover enough among their boulders, and so long as they are held the position is safe.

By this time the call had gone out, and the tribesmen were collecting in thousands. It was the first time since Akbar's day that a serious incursion had been made into the mountains which screen the rich and lovely valleys of the Yusufzai Pathans.
Mughals had failed and been cut to pieces at Malandrai, only a few miles from Ambela; the Durranis and Sikhs had never dared to penetrate so far. The drums were beaten and the lashkars formed. At first the Akhund stood aloof; Ambela led towards the Indus and the homes of the Sitana Sayyids, and the British had said they were interested only in Chamla and would not enter Buner, much less Swat. But when hostilities were prolonged he too came in, and in the eyes of the Sayyids usurped a credit which they claimed should have been theirs.

The fighting lasted much longer than is usually the case in tribal hostilities. The tribesman carries only enough food to sustain him for a few days, and there are usually no commissariat arrangements; he therefore melts away, the quicker if the first encounters fail and enthusiasm is lost. But here at Ambela daily attacks were made on the British position for nearly a month, and fierce desultory engagements continued for another month. Those who look for a fine piece of military writing will find it in Roberts' and Younghusband's books; some of the dauntless names in British military history appear — Brownlow, Keyes, Neville Chamberlain, Garvock, Roberts himself. But what needs emphasis here is the admission by all of the amazing gallantry of the tribal enemy. The force, over 6,000 strong, was pinned down on the summit of the pass and had to fight for its life. Furious attacks were made on the Crag Picket and the Eagle's Nest; the former being attacked four times, thrice captured and thrice recaptured. The troops had 900 killed, and the tribesmen, who exposed themselves recklessly, many more. Neville Chamberlain himself, who led one of the assaults on the Crag Picket, was severely wounded. The Crag Picket is still called the Qatlgah, or Place of Slaughter; around it a thousand men on both sides lost their lives. Roberts speaks of the magnificent courage of the tribesmen and Younghusband of their gallant bearing.

After one of the fiercest engagements — an attempt to carry the Eagle's Nest — arrangements were made for the tribesmen to come in under flag of truce and carry away their dead. Opportunity was taken to reason with them, and their leaders talked freely with Neville Chamberlain, the commander, and Reynell Taylor, the Commissioner with the force. The enemy met these advances with the utmost courtesy, but made it clear they thought themselves fighting for a freedom never yet lost. They would fight
with clean hands, but to the end. Nowhere in the story is there any hint of the barbarous cruelties that so disfigure later wars; with all the bitter fighting there were even jokes. Roberts tells how the tribesmen soon discovered how much better in outpost duty were the Pathans and Gurkhas with the force than the Sikhs or Europeans; when they saw Keyes’ men they would shout across and tell them they were Pathans and should go away—‘Give us the men in hats and red turbans [Europeans and Sikhs].’ These, though full of fight, were bad hill-climbers and could not keep their heads down.

After six weeks’ fighting the troops were reinforced and were able to issue at last into the Chamla Valley and pass to the offensive. After this the Buner tribes made their submission, and a decision had to be made whether a force strong enough to overcome all opposition should be sent to destroy the Malka settlement—another twenty-one miles beyond the point reached—or whether the work of destruction should be left to the tribes themselves under supervision. With astonishing rashness the latter course was adopted. The gamble came off, but hardly deserved to succeed. Roberts was one of a small band of officers detailed to accompany the Commissioner, Reynell Taylor, with an escort of the Guides and a lashkar of Bunerwals to see Malka destroyed. He tells the story in his book; the tale as I give it here is the version I heard from one of the Buner Khans, a descendant of the story’s hero, thirty years ago.

The people of Swat and Buner had been impressed both by the blan of the forces opposed to them, and by the chivalry and manliness with which the fighting was conducted. For instance, wounded tribesmen had been picked up and treated in the field hospitals and had been sent back cured. They had also noted that many Pathans, and particularly Khataks, Yusufzais and Afridis, had fought, and fought with determination, for the Government side, and that the bond between officers and men was remarkably strong. This was a very different business to fighting against the Sikhs. At the same time, however much they admired the new force, they were determined not to admit it into Swat and Buner. The tribesmen had suffered losses on a scale they had never known; let the Khans of Buner then make their submission and offer to save everybody’s face by conducting a small party of British to destroy Malka. If opposition were continued, the British would
march there with an army; they might even decide to enter Buner, and then Swat, and finally lift a veil that had not been raised since Akbar's armies had been driven out nearly three hundred years before.

The Akhund was in favour of this policy, fearing that further resistance by the core of the irreconcilable Mujahidin would only recoil on the tribes, who might lose their independence. No doubt too the Akhund reflected that the destruction of Malka would lower the prestige of the Sitana Sayyids, a result which would be likely to increase his own. For there was no doubt that the new place of pilgrimage to the Akhund at Saidu was beginning to gain in popularity at the expense of Pir Baba Ziarat in Buner, the shrine of the ancestor of Akbar and Mubarik Shah. The Buner Khans were induced to submit, and under the leadership of Zaidullah Khan of Daggar agreed to conduct the British Commissioner with a small escort to effect the destruction of Malka and the expulsion of the Mujahidin.

Seven officers, including Reynell Taylor, the Commissioner — Roberts was among the party — set off with a small escort of the Guides and a party of about one hundred Maliks and elders of Swat and Buner, of whom the chief was Zaidullah Khan, the leading Khan of the Buner Valley, of which Daggar on the little Barandu River is the central spot. Zaidullah was an old man who had lost an arm and an eye in previous wars, and he pledged himself he would see the business through. Malka, as we know, lay in the territory of the Amazai tribe of Yusufzais, and the whole road was beset by angry warriors, fully armed and scowling at the party. But the job was done, Zaidullah haranguing the tribesmen in the name of the Akhund. A great column of smoke rose from the burning village and caused further excited gatherings, vowing that the British party should never be allowed to return. They talked in loud tones, gesticulating and thronging round Reynell Taylor, who stood quite alone and self-possessed in the midst of an angry multitude. But again Zaidullah leapt fiercely forward to Taylor's side, his one eye glinting, shouting to those who threatened that the Buner jirga had given their word to destroy Malka and to bring the Englishmen back safe and sound. They meant to carry out their promise, and those who wished to interfere must first fight the united strength of Buner. Again and again, at the village itself and on the way back, the scene was repeated, until at
last the party won through, the gauntlet was run, and Ambela was seen again.

Among Afridis or Wazirs a transaction of this sort would have been impossible. No malik, or group of maliks, among those tribes would dream of making such a promise except as a lure and with the intention of breaking it. The Yusufzais, and the Khataks too, are men of firmer purpose; if they think an ultimate interest demands it, and still more if Pakhtu nang is held to be involved, they can be relied on to be more than time-servers. It is a fine picture — the old grey-beard, his single eye flashing, waving his one arm — seeing the thing through against all odds for the sake of the word that had been given.

Another thirty years and more were to pass before the purdah of Swat and Buner was lifted.
CHAPTER XXIII

BALUCHISTAN AND THE FORWARD POLICY

The fifty-odd years from the British annexation up to 1901 are best seen in two periods, the first from 1849 to the outbreak of the Second Afghan War in 1878, and the second from that date up to the severance of the Frontier districts from the Panjab by Curzon. On a broad view the first thirty years represent the testing-time of the so-called close-border policy (Chapter XXI). During those years there were innumerable military promenades through one or other part of tribal territory but no permanent occupation, and the most favoured tribal regions had not even been seen. It is strange to reflect for instance that, up to 1891, Swat remained an untrodden land of Erewhon, its beauties a legend and unseen by any European; until 1898 Buner too was behind the veil. The last twenty years are those of the development of the forward policy.

There was an overlap between the two periods. The first step forward in the new policy was taken in 1876, just before Lytton’s arrival as Viceroy and two years before the outbreak of the war with Afghanistan. This advance was made not on the North-West Frontier but from Upper Sind into the territory now known as Baluchistan. It was followed later by very important advances elsewhere, and consolidated by the establishment in 1893 of an agreed frontier with Afghanistan. And it was associated with the general policy of Disraeli’s government — he had become Prime Minister in 1874 — to build a strategic line of defence against Russian pressure in Central Asia.

Here we are concerned not with any strategic effects, but with the bearing of the new trends on the Pathans as a whole. And when we come to study that, it is important to bear in mind that, no more than with any other example of British political thinking or practice, is there observable here any logical and clear-cut division
between the two policies. All the features of the old close-border remained in evidence on most parts of the border, while on more than one occasion in the forward area among the tribes the order was two paces forward and one pace back. Moreover the degree of control exercised in the forward areas varied, and between wide limits.

The Dost had died in 1863, the year of the Ambela campaign, and the usual struggle for the Amirate followed. The Dost had designated a younger son, Sher Ali, as his successor on the ground that he was born of a Durrani wife, but it was not until 1869 that Sher Ali made good. For short periods between these two dates Afzal and Azem, elder sons but less nobly born, exercised authority in Kabul. During most of this period John Lawrence was Viceroy, and according to his principles a policy of strict non-intervention was pursued on the Frontier, which (it is to be noted) commonly remains undisturbed during periods of dynastic strife at Kabul. The years following Sher Ali’s consolidation of power — the Viceroyalties of Mayo and Northbrook, 1869–76 — saw little change upon the Frontier itself until the very end of the period, but much activity in negotiation with Persia and Russia on the location of the limits of the Afghan Kingdom to the west and north. Discontent over an award as between Afghan and Persian claims in Sistan, which Sher Ali regarded as unjust, was a chief cause leading to his estrangement from the British government. But there were other irritants more closely related to the position on his frontier towards India.

Ever since the occupation of Sind in the early 'forties the Upper Sind border had been protected without any real endeavours to come into close relations with the chiefs or tribes who occupied the hills and plateau which overhung it. Just to the north of the Sind border lay the Dera Ghazi Khan district, a long strip of riverain territory west of the Indus, a continuation southward of the Daman of Dera Ismail, and like it under the Panjab government at Lahore. The difference between Dera Ismail and Dera Ghazi was that the former was partly a Pathan district and overhung to the west by the mountains of Waziristan, holding some of the most formidable Pathan tribes, while the latter was held mainly by Baluch tribes, who also inhabited the extension of the Takht-i-Sulaiman mountains to the west. The Baluch tribes as compared with the Wazirs were much more amenable to pacify-
ing influences, much less well-armed, and always ready to follow their chiefs, known as tumandars. The Deputy Commissioner at Dera Ghazi maintained relations with the Baluch beyond his border in much the same way as did his brother officers with the Pathans further north. All of them, even the Marris and Bugtis who lived adjacent to the border, owed a vague allegiance to the Khan of Kalat. The name Kalat is common all over Persia and Afghanistan, and is given to a fortress; this particular one is situated on the plateau about seventy miles south of Quetta at an elevation of some 7,000 feet. Although there has been much inter-marriage, the ancestry of the Kalat Khan is Brahui, not Baluch. Brahui and Baluch tribes are much mingled in this region, and many of the leading chiefs of Kalat, like the Khan, are of Brahui stock.

It might appear that a digression into the Brahui and Baluch field is off the point and has nothing to do with Pathans; Baluchistan, if it means anything, should be the land of the Baluch. But Baluchistan is a misnomer.

The valley of Shal, about seventy miles north of Kalat and situated at 5,500 feet above sea-level at the head of the Bolan Pass, is exactly on the line of ethnic division. In the centre of it is the town of Quetta. All the country to the northward is a part of the Pathan belt and inhabited by Pathan tribes of which the Tarins, Achakzais, Kakars and Panris are the most important. To the south of Quetta all the people are Brahuis and Baluch. It is true that much the greater area of Baluchistan, so called, is held by Brahui and Baluch tribes, who cover the vast upland deserts stretching southward and westward from Quetta to the sea, but about half the total population is Pathan and is concentrated in the rather more fertile hills and valleys north and north-east of the capital. On a true assessment it is the Pathan tribes of this Baluchistan who count. But even these are few in number, considerably less than half a million souls in all. Nor with the possible exception of the Achakzais, who are Durranis, are they in any way formidable.

There are other reasons for bringing Baluchistan into the Afghan and Pathan context. Nasir Khan, the ancestor of the Khanate family of Kalat, was in loose feudal relations with Ahmad Shah, the founder of the Durrani Empire. The Brahui Nasir, chief of Mastung and Kalat, stood, as it were, at Ahmad Shah’s back door and was the most important chief on the main line of com-
Communications from Kandahar into India. The Khans of Kalat themselves have sought to establish that they enjoyed some sort of independence, and were not tributary to the Durrani but rather inferior participators in the division of the Persian Empire when Nadir died. But the claim cannot be established. Kalat had long before this time been tributary to Kandahar, and Ahmad Shah, on setting up his new kingdom in that city in 1747, enforced the submission of the Brahuis, and regarded his empire as extending almost to the sea. If any doubt were held to exist upon the point, it would be resolved by the fact that, in order to fix his new dependant’s loyalty, Ahmad Shah proceeded to the unprecedented lengths of bestowing upon him an Afghan district, the valley of Shal, in which Quetta is situated. The settlement of Brahuis in the villages just south of Quetta dates from that time.

It is to be remembered too that, although a close-border policy was followed on the Brahui and Baluch border both by the Bombay government, responsible for the Sind marches, and by the Panjab government, responsible for Dera Ghazi Khan, there was a great body of knowledge of the hinterland remaining over from the days of the First Afghan War. Our officers had marched with Shah Shuja’s contingent and its backing of British and Company’s troops up the Bolan and past Quetta on their way to Kandahar and Kabul. The admirable water-colours of Atkinsons depict vivid scenes in all this country, the camp at Dadur at the Bolan gateway, the valley of Shal, the troops crossing the Khojak Pass and many others. To men condemned to bake in the ovens of Jacobabad and Sibi the cool airs of the uplands beckoned, and the tribes were known to be well disposed.

In 1876, Northbrook’s last year and after Disraeli’s government had come to power but just before Lytton’s arrival as Viceroy, the Government of India were considering the rival views of the Bombay and the Panjab governments as to the control of this part of the border. Robert Sandeman, a Panjab Commission officer with much experience on the Dera Ghazi border, was pressing strongly proposals for an agreement with the Khan of Kalat which, while guaranteeing the authority of the Kalat State, should provide for the stationing of a British garrison on the Shal plateau at Quetta. The proposal was the subject of acrimonious debate between the two provinces, the Panjab backing Sandeman, and Bombay denouncing the whole project as ambitious and fantastic.
The Bombay government was inclined to regard the whole scheme as merely an ill-conceived notion for the securing of more peaceable conditions on the Sind border. But Sandeman, and the Government of India who supported his idea, approached the matter on much larger lines. They were thinking in terms of the defence of India, and were anxious with the help of the Khan of Kalat to occupy an outpost against Russian ambitions, and not wait to be attacked upon the Indus. It was the time of very rapid Tsarist expansion all along the southern frontier of Russia. The war with Turkey was imminent, Trans-Caucasia was being hammered into submission, Khiva, Bukhara and Farghana had been overcome. Unless the rulers of India mounted on their north-western breastwork, it seemed most probable that Kabul and Kandahar would go the way of Bukhara and Samarqand.

Negotiations with Kalat occupied 1876 and 1877, and Sandeman had his way. Under agreements made by him Quetta and its environs, together with the Bolan Pass leading to it, were leased to the British Government on a perpetual quit-rent, to remain under nominal Kalat sovereignty but to be administered by Calcutta in accordance with local custom. A British Indian force was cantoned at Quetta and Sandeman became the first Resident. There can be no doubt that, however nominal had been Kabul’s control of Kalat and the Quetta route since the days of Ahmad Shah, Sher Ali greatly resented and feared the advance of India’s frontier to Shal, and that this move, even more than the Sistan award, prompted his decision to play with the Russians and was therefore a cause of the Second Afghan War.

In 1878 Sher Ali proceeded to receive a Russian mission in Kabul and refused entry to a British mission which sought to proceed through the Khaibar Pass, then in Afghan occupation. Cavagnari, then Deputy Commissioner at Peshawar, had been appointed political officer to the mission under Neville Chamberlain, the same who had commanded at Ambela, and was sent forward to try out the way. He was stopped on the grassy plot just below the shrine of Ali Masjid, halfway up the pass, where the Afghan commander, Faiz Muhammad, met him. Faiz Muhammad was courteous but firm, saying that but for their personal friendship he would have fired on Cavagnari. And so began the Second Afghan War.

Its course, like that of the First Afghan War, is no part of this
story. Its importance for us lies not in the graphic tale of the massacre of Cavagnari and his escort of Guides at Kabul, not in Roberts’ battles at the Paiwar Kotal, Charasia and elsewhere, not even in the measures which resulted in the eventual setting up of Sher Ali’s nephew, Abdurrahman, as Amir, but rather in the impetus given by the events of that time to the forward policy. It is true that the first territorial result was the expulsion of Afghan forces from the Khaibar and the Kurram, but these were small nibbles compared to the accession of great tracts of Baluchistan.

The occupation of Quetta and the Bolan, as we have seen, preceded the outbreak of the war. But Sandeman was still surrounded by territory which, nominally at least, acknowledged Durrani sovereignty. With the success of the two-pronged advance by the Khaibar and the Kurram, and the abdication of Sher Ali, there was concluded with his son Yaqub Khan in 1879 the Treaty of Gandamak, ceding not only the Khaibar and Kurram but Pishin, Sibi and Loralai (Bori), the Pathan countries north and east of Quetta needed to round off the new province. This cession had the effect of carrying the frontier across the Khojak range to Chaman within a short distance of Kandahar, and during the next ten years the broad-gauge line was carried to the frontier at Chaman by tunnel through the hills. It was in Baluchistan that the new policy was first brought to life.

But there was still no lateral communication on the forward line between the older trans-Indus territories of the North-West Frontier and the new Baluchistan. Before Sandeman left he had in the 'eighties pushed forward from Pishin into the long and desolate Zhob Valley, where a headquarters was built at a place called Apozai, now known as Fort Sandeman. The Zhob River is a tributary of the Gumal, and it had long been a cherished scheme to open the Gumal Pass — much used by Ghalji caravans on their annual migrations — so providing an upland corridor which would connect also with Baluchistan, and supplement the rear line of communication through Multan. This scheme had first been aired by Macaulay, who had gone up the Gurhal from Dera Ismail Khan as long ago as 1878. Macaulay, perhaps the most influential of all frontier officers in the ‘between’ period, had not received enough support, and his ideas had lapsed. They were now revived by Sandeman, and pushed by Bruce, his pupil, who was convinced that what had been done in Baluchistan by his
chief could and should be done by himself in Waziristan, whither he had come on transfer. In 1889 Lansdowne, then Viceroy, was converted and action followed promptly. Allowances were sanctioned for the Gumal tribes, including those in Waziristan, and in January 1890 a great joint jirga of all the tribes was held by Sandeman at Apozai, at which Bruce also was present. The tribes were eager to finger the money and everything went beautifully. For one moment it looked as if Sandeman’s successes might be repeated further north. But it was not to be. The tribes of Waziristan were not the tribes of Quetta; they were much too hard a nut to crack. That story must wait for another chapter, but let it be said here that the Gumal never has been opened. It is still closed today.

High-sounding claims have been made for what is known as ‘the Sandeman system’, and assertions have been made that the adoption of similar methods by men as enlightened as Sandeman upon the North-West Frontier also would have changed the face of history. What then was this system, and what is the true assessment?

The Sandeman system rested on the occupation of central points in Kalat and tribal territory in considerable force, linking them together by fair-weather roads, and leaving the tribes to manage their own affairs according to their own customs and working through their chiefs and maliks. The maliks were required to enlist levies paid by government but regarded as tribal servants. Except in the cantonments where troops were stationed and there was an influx of shopkeepers and others from India, there were no regular courts and no police. In later African parlance the system would have been described as one of indirect rule. Custom was administered by the Political Agents through jirgas, using the instrument of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in the manner already described. Such a system, of course, involved the upholding of the authority of chiefs and maliks, if necessary by force, if their authority should be challenged. Without penetration, concentration of force and support of the maliks the Sandeman system is the merest junk.

Now I have already said that the use of the Frontier Crimes Regulation to administer Pathan custom and not merely to fill lacunae in the ordinary law does at least achieve some correspondence with the tribal mind. The requirements of the State are in
this way adjusted to the societies over which it rules. But this was not done in 1849 when the North-West Frontier was occupied. Instead a system of regular law was imposed. To suggest that a model adopted in 1880 in a virgin area such as Baluchistan could have been put into action in the settled districts of the North-West Frontier after thirty years' working of regular administration was to ask the impossible, at any rate of an alien government. This was true even of the method of applying the law; to do away with courts, police, and all the paraphernalia of regular administration would have been utterly out of the question. Yet the distinction between the two wings on the North-West Frontier was the root of most difficulties.

The advocate for Sandeman will reply that he must concede that point, but an attempt should have been made to apply principles learned in Baluchistan to the tribes of the North-West Frontier beyond the border, whose tribalism was not disintegrating under the influence of the administrator. The answer is that precisely this was in fact done in such areas as Kurram and the Malakand, to be noticed presently. Where it could not be done, it was not done because there existed quite different conditions.

Sandeman advanced into a country which is almost a desert; there just is hardly anybody in Baluchistan and the emptiness of that portal has to be seen to be believed. The Peshawar district alone (before Mardan was separated from it) has more inhabitants than the whole of Baluchistan right down to the sea, with perhaps one-thirtieth of the area. Should it be objected that Peshawar as a settled area is not comparable, it can be affirmed that Tirah or Waziristan probably each have about as many people in them as all the Pathan hills in Baluchistan. Sandeman dealt mainly with Brahui and Baluch tribes organized on an oligarchic basis with a great respect for their chiefs; when he turned to his Pathans — not quite so successfully, be it said — he found men such as the Kakars who had imbibed as neighbours something of the Brahui and Baluch tradition, and those who had not, as the Mando Khel in Lower Zhob, were unwarlike compared with their brethren further north. Contrast this with the Afridis or Mahsuds. Sandeman had a clean slate on which to write; there were many scribblings on the board recording our dealings with Yusufzais, Mohmands or Wazirs, and they could not all be wiped out overnight. Sandeman was able to adopt a broadly similar system all
over his new province; he did not have to deal with two societies, ethnically homogeneous but forced into different strata by the contrasts of administration under law and tribalism. There was no real parallel.

In Quetta Sandeman has become a legend, not so highly coloured or dramatic perhaps as the paladins of the North-West thirty years before him, but still a name. He was certainly a great pioneer who built with firmness and imagination, using the material to hand and applying a suitable and durable mortar. Roberts, himself a legend, and less impressionable than when he met Nicholson, was struck by Sandeman's command of his situation and the width of his influence and knowledge — 'he was intimately acquainted with every leading man, and there was not a village, however out of the way, which he had not visited.' His name is still in the people's mouths, but not, I think, with that afterthought of tenderness which follows on the mention of such a man as Abbott. His testing time was not so hard as that of the brotherhood, and there was much in the local circumstances to lead him to success.

If there is to be a criticism of the Sandeman system, it must be that it has proved too static; it did not inject new life into the societies, such as they were, that existed in the Baluchistan of 1880. For the Baluchistan of 1950 is scarcely distinguishable from that of seventy years before. The acceptance of the standards of a simple tribalism no doubt made for a general feeling of contentment, but failed to present a challenge. The Quetta Staff College, the regiments, the railway, are outside the tribal existence, of which they hardly touch the surface; in the village the pace of life and thought was scarcely quickened by seventy years of British rule. There is little leaven in the lump.

Elsewhere the Englishman can claim that in his dealings with the Pathan he has kindled a flame and posed a challenge. The spark more often than not has burst into a fire, but what of that? The fire gives light and heat, and is not dead.

In Baluchistan it is left to our successors to do much that we left undone.

The forward move in Baluchistan, the most notable result of the period of the Second Afghan War, was accompanied, as I have said, by a permanent advance into the Khaibar Pass and the exclu-
sion of the Afghans from the Kurram Valley (we did not occupy the Kurram until some years later). Up to that time relations with all the tribes, the Khaibar tribes included, had been conducted by Deputy Commissioners of districts, mostly through middlemen. But the Khaibar range, as it was called at first, was much too difficult and important for treatment on the old lines, and it was decided to make a special appointment for which Robert Warburton was selected. Warburton, born of an Afghan mother, we have met already. He had been trained under Cavagnari on the Yusufzai border, where he had learned to distrust the middleman system— it is from him that we have details of Ajab Khan’s activities with the Buner tribes—and he turned that lesson to good account in the Khaibar over nearly two decades, after his retirement recording his experiences in one of the best books ever written about the Pathan Frontier. What he has to say is revealing both of the true characteristics of a tribe usually supposed to be the least faithful of all Pathans and of the sensitivity of the man himself.

Warburton was able to open up the pass itself and to move freely under tribal escort to its western end. He was also admitted to the Mallagori and Shilman country between the pass and the Kabul River, and all over the Loargai plateau where Landi Kotal now stands. But he was never able to reach the highlands of Afridi Tirah until he went there with the army on the only occasion when any European has ever seen that forbidden land. As it was then, so it is still; the Afridis do not yet admit any stranger to their central fastnesses in Maidan, though the time for opening it must inevitably come. A bare thirty miles from Peshawar, from six to seven thousand feet above sea-level, overlooked by the pine-clad summits of the middle Sufed Koh— what a place for a summer retreat from the fury of the hot weather! All Afridis speak of their eyrie, and its extension Rajgal, as the rival of Kashmir, a beauty that cannot for ever remain behind the veil.

Warburton was fortunate in having Aslam Khan as his second-in-command. Aslam was the son of Muhammad Usman Khan, Saddozai, who had been Wazir to Shah Shuja, a great name still among the Afridis who gave him refuge more than once at Chora in the lower Bazar Valley. Usman had been forced out of Kabul by the Dost on his return to power in 1843 and took refuge in Peshawar, where he and his son were held in great respect. Aslam,
the son, was in a position to appeal to these old Afridi loyalties; he was moreover in his own person a man of commanding presence and a very great gentleman. It was he who under Warburton raised the corps first known as the Jazailchis and later as the Khaibar Rifles. Old Sir Aslam was the best-known figure in Peshawar in his day, and his portrait used to look down with eagle eye upon the revelries in the Peshawar Club. He was Warburton's other self and may well have been the predominant partner in the company.

For the next ten years no more happened, but in the 'nineties the forward moves were resumed, this time on the Kurram Line. The Kurram is reached by the long finger of the Miranzai Valley, stretching westward past Hangu to Thal, and Miranzai over much of its length is overlooked from the north by the great hog-backed and bare Samana ridge, behind which lies the Khanki Valley leading to Tirah. In 1891 the Samana was occupied and forts built along its crest, protecting Miranzai from flank attacks from that direction. In the following year it was at last decided to move beyond Thal into Kurram. Kurram had been occupied by Roberts as an advanced base in the Second Afghan War, he had stayed there for some time and even built a house at the beautiful village of Shalozan. He had assured the Turis, the leading tribe of the valley, that the Kurram River should run backwards to the Sufed Koh before they could return to an Afghan allegiance, and their valley had been ceded by Yaqub Khan under the Gandamak treaty of 1879. But it had been left unoccupied at the end of the war, since when chaos had reigned and the Turis were alternately guilty of aggression against their neighbours and sufferers from their retaliation. The fact that the Turis are Shias, and all their neighbours Sunnis, increased the strife which was often given a sectarian hue. Finally the Turis' own plea that the only alternative to occupation was their submission to Afghan rule led to the setting up of a loose form of administration, much on the Sandeman model, which has continued to the satisfaction of all parties to this day.

It was thus that Roos-Keppel came upon the stage, a player destined soon to act a star part. First as Adjutant of the Kurram Militia and then as Political Agent, he made it clear that the river of Kurram would not reverse its course.

These moves led to an historic act of state, no less than the
fixing of the famous frontier known as the Durand Line. The Amir Abdurrahman had been perturbed by the forward moves, more particularly by the completion of the Khojak tunnel and the construction of the railway as far as Chaman on the Baluchistan side, and also by the expulsion of a small Afghan garrison from Biland Khel which followed on the occupation of Kurram. The most revealing document bearing on these events is the Amir’s autobiography, which indicates both his reasons for agreeing to the despatch of the Durand mission and his attitude on the outcome of the negotiations. The extract which follows is typical of Abdurrahman’s suspicious yet practical mind.

Sir Mortimer Durand left Peshawar for Kabul on the 19th September 1893. The Mission was met by my General, Ghulam Haidar Khan Charkhi, on their entering Kabul, and I arranged the residence of my son, Habibullah Khan, for their residence. After the first ceremonial Durbar we soon started discussing matters. Durand being a very clever statesman as well as a good Persian scholar, all the discussions were soon put right; but to keep a record of every word which was uttered by Sir Mortimer Durand, myself, and other speakers of the Mission, I had arranged for Mir Munshi Sultan Muhammad Khan to sit behind a curtain without being seen or heard, or his presence known of by anyone else except myself, to write down every word they spoke to me, or among themselves, either in English or in Persian. He wrote in shorthand every word uttered by Durand and myself, and this conversation is all preserved in the record office. The short outcome of the conversation was this, that the boundary line was agreed upon from Chitral and Baroghil Pass up to Peshawar, and thence up to Koh-i-Malik Siyah [the trijunction of Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan] in this way that Wakhan Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura, and one portion of Waziristan [Birmal] came under my rule, and I renounced my claims from the railway-station of New Chaman, Chagai, the rest of Waziri, Biland Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Chitral.

The Mission left Kabul on the 14th November, having greatly enjoyed their visit. The misunderstandings and disputes which were arising about these Frontier matters were put to an end, and after the boundary had been marked out according to the above-mentioned agreements by the Commissioners of both governments a general peace and harmony reigned which I pray God may continue for ever.

The reader is here left with no doubt that the Amir was well
satisfied. Durand’s command of Persian — mark, not Pashtu — had pleased him, and for the moment all was well.

The details of this agreement, with the subsequent reaffirmation by later Afghan rulers, I have given in an appendix.\(^{13}\) It has of course an important bearing on the Pakhtunistan movement, for one argument advanced by Kabul is that the Durand Line cannot be represented as an international frontier and lapsed with the transfer of power in 1947. That is a question for foreign offices, and we have only to note here that in 1893 for the first time it became possible to think of, and refer to, a tribal belt under British control between Afghanistan and the administered border of India, a belt of which the limits were defined on both sides, east and west, and well known to all concerned. There was no longer a no-man’s-land of uncertain extent, and both authorities could now think and act with greater precision. It is true that the agreement did not describe the line as the boundary of India, but as the frontier of the Amir’s dominions and the line beyond which neither side would exercise interference. This was because the British Government did not intend to absorb the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the Amir’s, authority in the territory east and south of the line. In the international aspect this was of no account, for the Amir had renounced sovereignty beyond the line.

Something should be said here of a sector agreed on the map but never demarcated on the ground, from a point on the watershed between Kunar and Bajaur, through Mohmand country, across the west end of the Khaibar, and thence skirting the Bazar Valley up to the great range of the Sufed Koh, running westward to its culminating peak, Sikaram. Along the Sufed Koh the failure to demarcate is of no consequence, for the range summit is unmistakable, one of the most obvious natural features in all this country. West of the Khaibar the omission was rectified in 1919. But in the Mohmand country there has been difficulty.

The difficulty is due to the fact that geographical watersheds and tribal boundaries do not coincide in this sector. The Durand Line was conceived as following the Kunar-Bajaur watershed as far as that was defined towards the Kabul River, leaving Lalpura to Afghanistan (as stated by Abdurrahman), and reaching the river at Shinpokh. Even this line left all the Kama and Goshta Mohmands on the Afghan side, while it included on the side of
India a number of Upper Mohmand clans of the Baizai and Kha-wezai sections who were not in political relations with Peshawar and drew no allowances. In any case an international line that divides the allegiance of a tribe is a fertile cause of disturbance.

In consequence, a few years later, the Amir was offered a revised line through Mohmand country further to the east, an offer which, if accepted, would have had the effect of transferring a number of Upper Mohmand clans formally to his allegiance. The offer has never been taken up, but up to 1947 it was held open, and no attempt was made from Peshawar to enter into agreements with the clans between the two lines. More than once this uncertainty proved to be the cause of grave embarrassment to the British authorities, who were compelled to reserve a freedom of action to deal with these clans in the event of their using their Alsatia as a base of hostile action. Failing agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan it is certain that the last has not been heard of this anomaly.

The demarcation on the ground was carried along the frontier of Waziristan, but led to heavy fighting in that area. To that in due course we must turn separately; here it need be said only that in the result an attempt was made to control the Wazir country from within, the Tochi Valley and Wana were occupied, and the two Agencies formed that are now so prominent in Frontier annals, North and South Waziristan.

In 1895 there follows the most extensive advance of all, the formation of the Malakand Agency, or, more formally, the Agency of Dir, Swat and Chitral. In many respects, even as to great area covered, this move was quite as significant as the occupation of Baluchistan and Quetta; in every way it was more exciting. For it carried the frontiers of what is now Pakistan into the heart of some of the greatest mountains in the world, almost as far as the Upper Oxus and the Pamirs. It included in its limits some of the most interesting peoples in Asia, living amidst as fine an Alpine scenery and as lovely valleys as can be seen in the world. The scene includes the paradise of the Swat Valley, running north of Malakand at not much more than 2,000 feet above sea-level, and in contrast, rising above Chitral, is the mightiest of all Hindu Kush peaks, the 25,500-foot cone of Tirich Mir. In between, there stretches wave on wave of tumbled and surging
mountain, now bare, now forested, lifting to an immense horizon of perpetual snow, and threaded by hurrying waters which spread to fertilize wide and smiling vales. It is strange to think that, before 1893, most of this had never been revealed to any Englishman. Year after year men had walked and ridden across the Yusufzai Samah looking towards the first screen of hills to the north; they knew there was a bourne beyond, but even the nearest haven, the valley of Swat, was screened from view by the drop-scene of the outer range, rising only a few thousand feet from the plain. Those first hills were the same that Babur wandered over, when he found Mubarakah.

This last advance was brought about partly by the conduct of the tribes and partly as a counter-move to Russian advances in the Pamirs. Chitral in the far north is not a Pathan country; it is in the upper valley of the Kunar which runs down to join the Kabul River near Jalalabad in Afghanistan, the Kunar itself rising in glaciers close to the Baroghil Pass and separated from Russia on the Pamirs only by the few miles of the tongue of Wakhan. It had first been visited from the Gilgit side by William Lockhart, and subsequently the British Government had maintained friendly touch with Amal-ul-mulk, the ruler of the country. From 1892 onwards a struggle for the throne had brought unsettled conditions. In 1893 one of the claimants assisted by Umra Khan, the Pathan chief of Jandul (in Bajaur, but an hereditary part of Dir State), attacked Chitral and besieged the British Resident, Robertson, who had come from Gilgit to report on the situation on the spot.

Up to this time communication with Chitral had been carried on only from the Gilgit side, across the 12,000-foot Shandur Pass through country not inhabited by Pathan tribes. Very little was then known of the much shorter route by the Malakand into Swat, thence up the Panjora River to Dir, and thence over the 10,000-foot Lowarai pass into Chitral. All this as far as Lowarai was Yusufzai Pathan country, unpenetrated and to the British only known from hearsay and road reports. The Ambela campaign had shown how fiercely the hill Yusufzais were wont to resist the violation of their purdah. But the relief of Chitral was urgent, Russia was watching, and something had to be done, and done quickly. It was decided to take the risk and move on Chitral from two sides. A strong force would take the Malakand route through
Dir, while a small reinforcement would march from Gilgit and come in from the north.

This advance over the Malakand was strongly opposed, and there was heavy fighting for the pass, in which the Guides, along with the regiment which became the 54th, turned the scale by climbing and holding the heights, still called Guides Hill, which command the crest. For the first time since the days of Zain Khan, leader of Akbar's armies, a host from the south entered the green belt of the Swat Valley, and advanced to Chakdarra, the place of Zain Khan's stormy conference with Birbal.

Further advance raised entirely fresh political problems, and it became necessary to open up friendly relations with Muhammad Sharif, then ruler of Dir State, who held the whole country from Malakand to the borders of Chitral. There was no State of Swat in those days; the great Akhund had died in 1877 and his two sons a few years after him, and the spiritual succession was disputed among his four grandsons, known as the Mianguls. Dir State has always been unique in that there alone among Pathans the tribes acknowledge one of themselves not only as a Khan or malik, but as their hereditary ruler with power over their persons, indeed as a prince. The ruler is himself a Painda Khel, the Painda Khel being one of the four sections of the Malizai Yusufzais, all subjects together with certain other clans. There has been a chief in Dir for nine generations, the first of the line, Ismail Khan, having been contemporary with, but younger than, Khushhal Khan Khatak, whom he met.

The most powerful of this line are said to have been Qasim and Ghazan Khan. Of the former Elphinstone wrote: 'The whole of Kaussim Khaun's Ooloos are now completely at his devotion. He can imprison, inflict corporal punishment, and even put to death. He has extirpated domestic feuds, and has established a good police, so that his government is far from being unpopular even among his Eusofzye subjects. All the Fakeers in Punjcora now belong to him, and pay him a tax, but he derives no revenue from his clan.' Of Ghazan, Qasim's son, Raverty writes that he was chief of the 'Molizis' and far the most powerful ruler beyond the Indus. And of the next in succession that, if the clans were to combine, their supreme head would undoubtedly be Rahmatullah, the greatest chief in these parts, in counsel with their then spiritual guide. It should be added to this account that, although
the Pathan clansmen do not pay tax, they form the state’s army, and are reckoned a formidable force. In the 1947/48 fighting in Kashmir the Dir forces, despatched by Shah Jahan Khan, the present ruler, battled with great bravery, and were about the only tribesmen to give a good account of themselves. They then suffered heavy casualties, and graves of the Kashmir shahids, martyrs, are to be seen on many hilltops.

After the initial fighting at Malakand the Dir Ruler submitted, and the force was able to cross the Lowarai and relieve Chitral. Since that time the Ruler of Dir has faithfully observed his agreements and maintains a levy force paid by government to guard this important highway to the north. Dir was recognized as a State in treaty relations with the British Government, and for many years a biennial relief of regulars was sent through to garrison Chitral. In the thirties of the present century the regulars were withdrawn and Chitral is now garrisoned by a local militia. But the importance of the Chitral road remains, and passage is dependent on the stability of the old-established State of Dir. Shah Jahan Khan, the present Ruler, is a man after the fashion of the Yusufzai maliks of the old days, and will keep his word.

The first officer to be placed in charge of the new Malakand Agency was Harold Deane, later first Chief Commissioner on the formation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901. From the beginning this Agency was regarded as so important that it was placed under the direct control of the Central Government. The immediate environment of Malakand on both sides of the pass — up the Swat Valley as far as the big township of Tanra and along the Palai foothills on the Samah side where Babur had wandered — were brought under the same sort of loose administrative control that had already proved effective in Baluchistan and Kurram. Dir, as mentioned, became a treaty State; Swat, beyond Tanra, remained for the time in its chronic condition of tribal welter. The Bajaur valleys also to the north-west and toward Afghan Kunar were nominally included in the Agency, but nothing was done then, and nothing much has been done since,18 to make control effective. There is no road into Bajaur and, as far as I know, no officer, British or Pakistani, has ever been there, except when it was traversed by troops in 1897.

So were formed the five Agencies which still exist — from
north to south Malakand, Khaibar, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. (To those five a sixth has been added by Pakistan since 1947 — the Mohmand Agency.) They do not cover the whole tribal belt; important tribes, such as those on the Hazara border, the Orakzais and the Bhitannis, are still in relations with Deputy Commissioners of districts. The Adam Khel Afridis of the Kohat Pass are also managed jointly by the Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar and Kohat. The final pattern was more or less complete in 1895.

The tribes had watched all this penetration of their valleys with growing anxiety. The demarcation of the Durand Line, with its accompanying definition of spheres of influence, the setting up of the five Political Agencies, and, finally, the passage of troops in all directions through their territory and the garrisoning of those tracts which were not only strategically important, but the most fertile portions of the land — all this was regarded as a deliberate menace to a long-cherished independence. A menace indeed it was, but not deliberate. Every move had been forced upon authority either by tribal depredations or by the need to oppose disruptive influences. Be this as it may, in the presence of what they considered a common danger the tribes found some sort of union. Even then their traditions of separatism could not permit of any unified leadership or councils, but only a spark was needed to set the whole Frontier in a blaze. The war of 1897/98 was on.

The train was lit at Maizar, a Madda Khel Wazir village in the Upper Tochi, where in June 1897 the Political Agent had gone with a military escort to choose a site for a levy post. The visitors were at first hospitably received, but suddenly attacked. All their officers were killed or wounded, but the troops succeeded in executing a retirement which lives in Frontier history as a fine example of grit and steadiness. A fortnight later the tribes of the Malakand rose, and thousands surged round the garrisons on the pass and in Chakdarra. By August the blaze had spread to Mohmand country and Shabqadar was attacked; a fortnight later Afridi and Orakzai Tirah were alight (Warburton was on leave), and the Khaibar posts fell. The Samana forts had been attacked, the garrison in one case wiped out to a man, and the Kurram was threatened. The southward spread of the conflagration was checked by the fact that the first outbreak had occurred — prematurely from the point of view of the tribes — in the Tochi. Controlling opera-
tions were well under way there before Tirah rose, and the troops in Tochi were able to interpose a screen between Tirah and the Mahsuds, who indeed were in chastened mood after an expedition in 1894, three years before. The Mahsuds, the most formidable of all the tribes, were the only one of importance that did not rise in 1897.

Military operations were called for on a scale up to that time unprecedented on the Frontier. Upper Swat, Bajaur, Buner, the Mohmand country and Tirah were traversed from end to end for the first time, and by the spring of 1898 peace had been restored. The entry into Tirah led to the famous battle for the heights of Dargai on the flank of the Samana Range, and there was much other fighting which has passed into Pathan and British story. The beauty and fertility of the hidden glens of the Pathan country were at last revealed. The Khaibar was reoccupied, the Khaibar Rifles were re-established, and the building of new roads and more up-to-date forts was begun. The Frontier began to take on its present look. These developments which had led to the penetration of tribal territory, the consequent rising, and the magnitude of the problems which it in its turn brought about, led Curzon on his assumption of the Viceroyalty in the following year to approach the Frontier problem from a new angle. The birth of the North-West Frontier Province was at hand.

Every reader of Frontier history of the period 1860-1901 must notice how few names stand out from the page as compared with the decade of the brotherhood. In Afghanistan the formidable Amir Abdurrahman — grim and sardonic. Among Pathans, the Akhund perhaps and Aslam Khan — no others. Why so few of the English? It is hard to assign the reason, for the times were stirring enough.

Durand? — no. He was a political officer who went on missions and accompanied generals in the field — he was with Roberts in Kabul in 1879 — but he never knew Pathans and his name lives only on a map. An extremely successful diplomatist, he could turn a pretty verse in Persian, the French of the East, but he was a Secretariat man, a sort of successful Macnaghten. He aspired to the heights, and Simla was his home.

Of bold men in the field we can present Sandeman, but he moved on a restricted stage, and he does not stir the blood. In
the Derajat there was one man long remembered — Macaulay, seventeen years Deputy Commissioner, builder of a famous water-channel and so well respected among the Mahsuds that at least one of that troublesome clan was given the name Makalai Khan. Macaulay was a relative of the great jurist and historian, but more in the line of brave Horatius, the Captain of the gate, than that of the histories or the Indian Penal Code. He was a fine upstanding figure of a man, blue-eyed and fair-haired. Then there is Warburton, but him we know. And Cavagnari. Both, it is worth noting, and Macaulay, spent many years in one appointment; Cavagnari was in Kohat for more than a decade. Warburton was half-Afghan, and Cavagnari the son of Adolphe Cavagnari, one of Napoleon's generals, and christened Pierre Louis Napoléon himself. He was a picturesque, mercurial character, only thirty-eight when he was killed in Kabul, and remembered in Kohat and Peshawar for his tirelessness on horseback in pursuit of raiders and the quick phrases of his reporting. His best memorial is the fine residence he built at Kohat, nobly domed and spacious, worthy of the taste of his Savoyard ancestors.

These men passed and left the Frontier outwardly much as they found it, and much as it had been when taken over from the Sikhs. The railway had reached Peshawar in 1881, the Attock bridge was built, a gardened cantonment stood here or there, and a few roads and forts. Irrigation canals were beginning to make greener the Peshawar vale; otherwise in the villages people and dress and dwellings retained the familiar look of centuries, and, except for the ruin of the Durrani palaces, town and country still answered to Elphinstone's descriptions of 1809.
CHAPTER XXIV

WAZIRISTAN

We have reached the last turn of century before our own day and the time of birth of a Pathan province. Here, if the perspective is to be true and clearly seen, there is need to stand aside and look more closely at a vivid corner of the foreground, lacking which the picture fails of its full meaning. In so doing we shall find it possible to cross the gap between two centuries and systems, and foreshadow tendencies now becoming operative over the whole field.

Much of the story of the Pathans revolves around the Peshawar Valley. This is due partly to its fertility which has always acted as a magnet drawing both invader and defender within its attraction. Both east and west of the Khaibar hills the Kabul River is the largest affluent of the Indus from the side of the sunset, and on its banks is to be found the most extensive plains country nestling below the mountain spines which strike south from the Hindu Kush. More directly, it arises from the location of the vale of Peshawar on the routes between Kabul and the plains of the Panjab. For not only the Khaibar, geographically the most direct but until the nineteenth century the least used of these routes, but many others, through Bazar, Gandab, Bajaur and Swat, debouch on this Peshawar terrain. And for better measure there is the old Bangashat route, by the Kurram and Kohat. That too is almost a side-entrance to Peshawar; its passage involves some of the same tribes and raises similar political problems.

Further to the south, in the territory roughly comprised between the Kurram and the Gumal Rivers, we are face to face with quite another and a very different, tribal complex, that of Waziristan. From time to time various empires have sought to establish claims to include within their dominion the hill-tribes of Swat, Bajaur and even Tirah; both Mughal and Durrani committed forces to dominate them, with small success it is true, but yet the claim was made. But no empire of which we have any record has
ever succeeded in making subjects of the tribes of Waziristan.

The north-eastern Pathan tribes, as we know, are separated from their brethren, the south-western tribes, by the line of the Kurram River and the Miranzai Valley from Thal to Kohat. The tribes on this line, and those to the north-east of it, are speakers of the hard dialect of Pakhtu; south-west of it all speak the soft Pashtu, and many of them wear their hair long enough to hide the ear. The metropolis of the north-east is Peshawar; that of the south-west is Bannu, or sometimes Tank. The Khataks alone overlap into both areas and divide their cultural allegiance according to their location. The south-western tribes occupy a kind of natural geographical fortress, described by Raverty and others who believed the Pathans to have extended northward only in the sixteenth century, as the real Afghan homeland of the Sulaiman Mountains.

The territory of the south-western tribes can be thought of as a great irregular quadrilateral figure on the map, enclosed by boundary mountain walls which support a series of elevated valleys and table-lands. It is shaped something like a schooner’s mainsail. The mast side of the sail is to the east, running nearly north and south from Thal, or Hangu, down the wall of the Takht-i-Sulaiman to Fort Munro, in the latitude of Dera Ghazi Khan. The short upper spar side to the north is then the line of the Kurram River from Sikaram on the Sufed Koh to Thal. The longest and western side of the quadrilateral is conceived as the far outer ranges of the Sulaiman system where they drop to the Gardez, Ghazni and Kandahar plateaux; it runs from Sikaram, and more or less follows the Durand Line (but including Khost and Birmal) to the neighbourhood of Toba and Chaman. This western side, like the outer edge of a mainsail, diverges from the side next the mast. The lower or boom edge of the mainsail to the south, much broader than the upper spar edge, runs in a long sweep from Fort Munro past Quetta to Chaman, following the boundary line which parts the Pashtun from the Baluch tribes in that region. In its own way, like John of Gaunt’s England but with ramparts in place of a moat, this is a fortress built by nature for herself, guarded by mountains which serve it in the office of a wall. Along the southern side of this quadrilateral passes the highway from Khurasan into Sind by Kandahar and Quetta and down the Bolan Pass. That way, armies and trade have always passed. Zhob, too,
Bori and Duki, are easily entered, and both Mughals and Dur-ranis ruled there. But, further north, the tribes which inhabit the tangle of highlands between Kurram, Tochi and Gumal have defied all efforts to bring them decisively under the yoke; the nut has proved too hard for the crackers. Mahmud of Ghazni may have drawn from these tribes men for his hosts; Chingiz, Timur and others marched through the main alleys which flank their country; Ahmad Shah Durrani made a rough computation of their man-power as mercenaries; the British penetrated their every valley many times and established roads and forts in all directions; but none of these disarmed the inhabitants, or administered the country, or succeeded in imposing taxation. The heart and centre of this tract is what we now speak of as Waziristan.

The outer eastward mountains of this region are the home of the Bhitannis, according to the genealogies the lineal descendants of Shaikh Bitan in the male line before Bibi Mato came on the scene, and therefore akin to the Ghaljis. But the Bhitannis are a relatively small and tractable tribe. The rest of Waziristan is held by the most powerful of the Karlanri Pathans, the Darwesh Khel Wazirs and the Mahsuds. In earlier times scarcely known to the historians, in the last hundred years or so they have become famous as the doughtiest warriors of all the peoples of the Frontier. They are all Karlanris and, therefore, by our classification Pashtuns rather than Afghans. There is a vague tradition that they once came from Maimana, in Turkistan north of the Hindu Kush, but it is of a kind with the other chessboard theories of Pathan origins and deserving of no more credence than they. Their Karlanri classification, and their hill fastnesses, suggest that they may even represent the oldest and purest strain of any of the hill-tribes.

There is an ancestral link between Wazirs and Mahsuds, but for all present purposes the Mahsuds are a separate tribe. They live in the central block of mountains, the Keep, as it were, of Waziristan, surrounded by Darwesh Khel Wazirs to the north, west and south; on their eastern side are the Bhitannis. Their main centres of population are in the clusters of villages around Kaniguram and Makin on the skirts of the Preghal Mountain, which is 11,500 feet in height. They hold aloof, and are continually engaged in aggressive warfare against their Wazir cousins, at whose expense they have encroached to acquire new lands. And to those who know both tribes, they present a different appearance. Pass along
a road which is being used by *bahir* s, or caravans, of these tribesmen, and it is not so hard to distinguish one from the other, not by his dress, for that is much the same, but by something indefinable in his air and carriage. The nearest I can get to it is to liken the Mahsud to a wolf, the Wazir to a panther. Both are splendid creatures; the panther is slier, sleeker and has more grace, the wolf-pack is more purposeful, more united and more dangerous.

Among Wazirs too there is a cleavage, though all are known as Darwesh Khel. The Utmanzais live as neighbours to the Daurs around the Tochi and towards the Kurram in the north, the Ahmadzais in Wana and Shakai, and as far south as the Gumal. Both Utmanzais and Ahmadzais have small colonies on the fringes of the Bannu oasis. Musa Darwesh, the holy man whom both sections revere as their ancestor, is known as Musa Nikuh — Grandpa Musa — and his shrine is situated in the far west of the Ahmadzai country close to the Durand Line. It lies about a mile on the Pakistan side of that frontier, as demarcated after 1893, and has been the scene of attempted encroachment by Afghan authorities, anxious to secure control of a centre which attracts pilgrims from such important tribes.

But it is the Mahsuds who have left the deepest mark on Frontier story, a mark indelible, and it is them that we must follow to their hills, and in the best company, that of Evelyn Howell. They too, like the Wazirs, have their local place of pilgrimage, the shrine of Mubarik, their great-uncle, on the 9,000-foot crest of the mountain of Kundighar, rising like a camel’s hump above Sarwakai Fort. There is a story here. In Curzon’s time the experiment was made of raising militias from the local tribesmen to police their own country, only to fall down. Mahsud militiamen murdered Bowring, the Political Agent, and Harman, their own Commandant, all within a few months, and in February 1905 Howell had to take the grave decision to disarm and disband the Mahsud contingent. Two months later he went shooting on Kundighar, a Mahsud lad carrying his rifle, which had once belonged to his friend Harman. The party reached the fluttering flags by the shrine on the hilltop, and the gun-carrier was seen to turn and pray to the saint. ‘Oh, Nikuh Bonk, Grandpa Borak,’ the youth muttered, ‘grant me, I beseech thee, a rifle such as this, if I have to kill three men to get it.’ But Howell survived.

Until the ear is attuned, the Mahsud and Wazir way of talking
is very hard to follow. It is not only that their vocabulary is full of words not used by the Pathans of the broad, open plains; there is also what the linguists call an isogloss, changing a into o; o into e or ö; and e and u into i. Thus in normal Pashtu mor means one's mother, but when a Mahsud speaks of mor he means not his mother, but a snake (normal Pashtu mar). His mother would be mör, or even mer. A year ago I was enjoying a lively conversation with a phalanx of Utmanzai Wazir maliks at Miranshah, and the talk ran on current events. The word ris kept constantly cropping up. In Hindi ris means envy, jealousy, or possibly equality, and it seemed possible my friends, no respecters of persons, might be discussing egalitarianism. But no — it did not fit; what could it be? Suddenly the light broke: it was Rıs for Rus, the word for Russia, the least egalitarian of countries, but one constantly in the mind of the tribesmen of Waziristan. There are many such traps for the unwary.

Once understanding comes, the talk of these men can be full of salt. Not long ago there was an officer in the Tochi, and he was interviewing a jirga of the Tori Khel, a powerful branch of the Utmanzai Wazirs. The jirga's spokesman was a grey-beard named Shahzar, a man of great presence but with a twinkle in the eye, a man we all knew well. The jirga wanted something done; the presiding officer, as is often wise, gave a diplomatic answer which put off the evil day. Said Shahzar: 'Sahib, you remind me of a story I heard at my mother's knee. There was once upon a time a King, and of course the King had a Wazir and, seeing that the Kingdom was beside a river like our valley, there was also a fisherman in the realm. One day the fisherman caught — uff! — an enormous fish, and as in duty bound presented his catch to the King. But the Wazir, like all Wazirs, who expect perquisites, thought ill of this. The fish should have been presented through him and he was annoyed. So, thinking to get the fisherman into trouble, he said to the King: "Your Majesty, enquire of this fisherman if this fish is a male or a female." So the King laughed and said to the fisherman: "O fisherman, say, is this fish a male or a female?" But the fisherman saw the trap; whatever he said, male or female, he would be ordered to go and catch its mate, and this he would never be able to do, as it was the finest fish in the river, and he could never catch another worthy of it. So he replied: "Your Majesty, this fish is a hermaphrodite." And, Sahib,' con-
SKETCH MAP OF WAZIRISTAN

References:
- International Frontier
- Border of Administered Territory
- Boundary of Juchistan
- Boundaries of Districts and Agencies
- North Waziristan
- South Waziristan
- Road
- Narrow-gauge railway

Tribal names in BLOCK letters

Note: All these tribes talk soft Pashto, except the Turis and Bangash in the north-east.
eluded Shahzar, 'your answer to us reminds me of that fish.'

The earliest notice of the Wazirs in an original Muslim source comes from the time of Timur Shah Durrani about the year 1780. The writer did not at that time distinguish between panther and wolf, but what he says is generally applicable to both creatures. 'The Wazir Afghans', he says, 'are a great and powerful tribe numbering nearly 100,000 families, and they dwell in an extensive tract of difficult country. They are not much better than the animals, for save for eating and drinking, moving about their hills, seeking their prey on the highways, and dying, they know nought besides... This great tribe is wholly independent, and they have neither tax nor tribute to pay, and owe allegiance to no one. Being subdivided into a number of branches, they do not acknowledge the authority of an hereditary or single chief, but have numerous maliks who hold a little authority; and these are chosen with the consent of the branch to which they belong; but, when about to undertake a warlike expedition, a leader is selected whom all implicitly obey. There is no doubt but that very much less internal disagreement exists among the Wazirs than any other tribe, and the consequence is that, being more united, they are much more powerful. It is very certain that they know their own strength and are proud of it.'

The Mahsud or Wazir who heard that description today would recognize himself as he once was — he would certainly not take amiss the reference to the wolf-pack — but he would think the writer superficial and lacking in subtlety. He can find himself better represented in the striking picture drawn by Evelyn Howell, that same who as a young man visited the shrine on the crest of Kundighar, and turned to put in words that will live that mingled attraction and repulsion which makes itself felt to all who have had to do with this intractable people. His book Mi'zh is the most penetrating of all tribal studies; its title, the Mahsud Pashtu for we, gives the colour of his treatment. There is a sensitivity in all that Howell writes; he is in the true line from Elphinstone, and has 'the courtier's, soldier's, scholar's eye, tongue, sword'. What is here written is little more than a poor summary of his thought, often capturing his very phrases — for none could be better — and acknowledging at every point his inspiration. The Mahsuds have not forgotten him, and in his book they have their monument. It is a picture whose light is so shot through with darkness
that it must frighten while it fascinates; yet through the shadows there strikes a gleam of splendour, a pride and a manliness that command respect and have ensured the Mahsud survival, relatively untrammelled, to this day.

Howell writes more particularly of the Mahsuds, of *mizh drai Mabsit*, we three Mahsuds, as the tribesman loves to say, referring to the three main sections, the Alizai, Shamankhel and Bahlolzai. It is rather as if an inhabitant of Great Britain, more self-conscious than we are wont to be; were to refer to England, Scotland and Wales as the three partners in a shared patriotism, of which all boast while recognizing its limitations. Or, on a narrower field, the *mizh* of the Mahsuds, is not unlike the Scottish ‘oorsel’s’; appropriate enough for a people who have as ‘guid a conceit o’ theirsel’s’ as the Scots, or even a better. And indeed, like the Scots and other Pathans, the Mahsud can smile at his own weaknesses, indeed he seems at times to glory in them. *Mizh der bëitibora khalq yi, we are a very untrustworthy people*, remarks a Mahsud with a sly grin and an air almost conspiratorial, as he deplores the loss to his countrymen of military service by reason of misdemeanours which made their exclusion but an act of common prudence. Or he will justify a particularly heinous piece of equivocation by pleading that he has been caught on the horns of a Mahsud dilemma: *dale kasa prong, dale kasa kamr*, look this way, a leopard, look that way, a cliff, he will say. And again, when comparing his loose tribal organization with all the apparatus of the modern state, he will come out with the aphorism, *Tosi pökh diwol istai, mizh laka danga yi*, you are a cemented wall, we are like the loose-stone boundary of a field, a comparison that ought to be much truer than it really is. For the modern state, whether Britain or Pakistan, does not always display a unity of conception or a continuity of policy, nor can more primitive societies always be dismissed as barbarians. The intelligent Mahsud malik would protest that the end of any social or political system must be to produce a fine type of man, and, judged by this standard, the Mahsud system is the best. ‘Therefore let us keep our independence, and have none of your law and order and your other institutions, but stick to our customs and be men like our fathers before us.’

The period of British authority on the Frontier from Herbert Edwardes’ arrival in Bannu to the demission of power to Pakistan
in 1947 lasted exactly one hundred years. The record of that century shows that, of all the Pathan tribes up and down the North-West Frontier, the Mahsuds were without question the most intransigent. From 1860, when Mahsud country was first penetrated by a military column to hold the tribe to account for a raid on Tank by a lashkar 3,000 strong, to the hard-fought battles of 1919–21, when the Mahsuds were subjected to military occupation and roads and posts built throughout their country there were no fewer than six full-scale expeditions. Nor was even that the end. For in 1930, in 1933, and again in the period 1937 to 1940 there was constant trouble with the tribe. The operations of 1919–1921 were the aftermath of the Amanullah’s Third Afghan War. Unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over; in British times at least they were apt to produce an after-crop of tribal unrest, sedulously fostered by a Kabul government which has itself made a nominal peace but is only too willing to cause embarrassment to the former opponent by constant intrigue among the border tribes and by the affordance of asylum to groups of outlaws and refugees from justice on the other side. This is a tendency which has outlived the coming of Muslim government in Pakistan, for governments in Kabul play as jealously for tribal support against that country as they ever did against the British.

But the Mahsuds have never really been fanatical — they did not hate the British because we were not Muslims, indeed when we were tough enough, they respected and sometimes even rather liked us — and Mahsud opposition was not staged in sympathy with Kabul expansionism, or just because the government of Afghanistan was directed by Durranis who were both orthodox Sunnis of the Hanafi school and fellow-Afghans. That was not in any way the inspiration. The Mahsud effort was inspired by a deep-seated instinct which drove the tribe at all costs to resist subjection and to preserve their own peculiar way of life. To attain this end they were always prepared to make use of adventitious aids such as propaganda or finance from Kabul, or even appeals with a pan-Islamic flavour. Nevertheless, I do not think any Mahsud would regard it as other than truthful, and even flattering, to be told that he was a Mahsud first and a Muslim afterwards.

This is not to say that the government and officers of Pakistan
derive no advantage in their dealings with tribes such as the Mahsuds or the Afridis from the fact that they are brother-Muslims. On the contrary it gives them a very real advantage, and the British no doubt would have carried more weight if they had been able to claim a common religion. Nevertheless, just as Khushhal Khan hated and despised Aurangzeb, so the Mahsud requires far more than the appeal of Muslim brotherhood to command even his respect. As for his allegiance and his loyalty, hitherto these have been given only to his own conception, which is the preservation of the anarchical freedom of 'the Drai Mahsit'; if Pakistan can so handle him as to win these also, it will be an achievement in statecraft of a high order, in its own way a realization of the dream of Sher Shah that the tribes of Roh could be fashioned into an effective shield for the defence of the state. This is not an end to be attained through unfettered tribal levies such as those that went with Nadir Khan to Kabul in 1929 or to Kashmir in 1947; those were ventures which did not fall into the pattern of the grand design. The design must be to enable the tribes to take their due place in the greater Pakistan.

There has been more than one remarkable leader among the Mahsuds, both in war and in council. In war among the more notable was Jaggar of the Abdurrahman Khel section of the Bahlolzai, the captain who led a furious dawn assault by 2,000 swordsmen on Wana Camp in 1894. The story is interesting. The signing of the Durand Agreement with Amir Abdurrahman in 1893 coincided in time with the arrival of Bruce as Political Agent, bright with ideas for the conduct of relations on the Baluchistan model. A loyal disciple of Sandeman, Bruce believed that the principles applied from Quetta with great success — and applied by the way to the Pathans of Pishin, Zhob and Loralai as well as to the Baluch tribes — would be of equal efficacy in the conditions of Waziristan. The principle seemed simple and sage enough; if you want to get anything done in dealings with tribes, work through the tribal organization; let the tribal leaders produce the goods in their own way. In other words, it was the principle of indirect rule. So, 'Let there be maliks,' said Bruce, and maliks there were.

Since by the Durand Agreement the Mahsuds were clearly acknowledged as a tribe within the British sphere of influence, it
was decided to make efforts to introduce among them this system of indirect rule. At this time a Public Works Department officer named Kelly was murdered in Zhob, and a sowar and four sepoys were murdered near the Gwaleri Kotal in the Gumal Pass, and both crimes were traced to a gang of five Mahsuds, two Abdurrahman Khels and three Abdullahs. By prolonged negotiation, reinforced by baramta and personal influence, Bruce succeeded in securing surrender for trial by jirga of the five men actually wanted — a most remarkable achievement in dealing with Mahsuds. After surrender they were duly tried and convicted, receiving sentences up to seven years’ imprisonment. The success was illusory. The opposition among the Mahsuds saw that to bow the knee to the rule of law meant the beginning of the end of their licensed freedom and were determined such things should not be. Their leaders were Jaggar as executive, and as counsellor the Mulla Powinda, a Shabi Khel Mahsud who now became prominent for the first time and was undoubtedly the brain behind the resistance. Jaggar had been concerned in Kelly’s murder in Zhob, and under his leadership the maliks who had effected the surrender of the five wanted men were made to feel the full weight of the tribal resentment. Three were killed, two were hounded out of the country, the rest went in peril of their lives.

Indirect rule does not work in the absence of support, and if necessary protection, which must be afforded to the tribal authority expected to obtain the results desired by the government. The fiat that there should be maliks was not enough. In Baluchistan the Sandeman system had been accompanied by the construction of cantonments, forts and roads, making force available at tactical points for the support of the tribal authority. Baluchistan had been penetrated; Waziristan at that time was an almost pathless tangle of hills. Faced with Jaggar’s action, the Panjab Government, with a glimpse of insight into the essentials of the Sandeman system, recommended a punitive expedition to deal with the offenders. But the Government of India, more interested in the immediate aim of frontier demarcation arising out of the Durand Agreement, turned a deaf ear. Bruce was instructed ‘to continue his communications with the jirgas with the object of procuring the punishment of the murderers of the maliks by the tribes themselves’. Nothing came of that. So perished the endeavour to apply the Sandeman system to the Mahsuds.
With some inconsistency it was decided at the same time to embark on the permanent occupation of Wana. This is situated well outside Mahsud limits, in the territory of the Ahmadzai Wazirs. On his way up to Wana, Bruce received letters from the Mulla Powinda pressing for the release of the five convicts, and insisting that no troops be stationed at Wana. Bruce, noting no doubt that in any case Wana is not in Mahsud country, replied that he declined to communicate with anybody except through the maliks. There followed the night attack by 2,000 Mahsuds on the Wana camp. A strong party of swordsmen, led by Jaggar, penetrated to the heart of the camp and did great damage before they could be ejected after severe hand-to-hand fighting, Jaggar himself being wounded. After dawn the tables were turned, as cavalry were able to catch up with the retreating Mahsuds, ride them down and inflict many casualties. There followed the 1894/95 expedition, in the course of which Mahsud territory was traversed from end to end, and terms were exacted and fulfilled. One of the demands was for the exclusion of the Mulla Powinda until the demarcation of the Durand Line was complete. But no real redress had been obtained for the tribal vengeance taken on the maliks, and nothing was done to effect any permanent occupation of the Mahsud country.

Later, Jaggar condescended to make an uneasy truce with British officers, for some of whom, odd to relate, he had a considerable respect. ‘Let it be field,’ he said one day to Howell, ‘and blow us all up with cannon, or make all eighteen thousand of us Nawabs!’ Jaggar meant that all were equal, each as good as the other; there were only two ways, death or glory for the whole tribe. It was no use to suppose that a selected oligarchy could speak for the rest. Any young hothead could spoil that game. And that was the Mahsud leader in war. What of their leaders in council?

Without doubt the most striking was the Mulla Powinda. He was a Shabi Khel Alizai of the Astonai sub-section, for, unlike the Yusufzais, who do not themselves ‘take orders’, the Mahsud religieux are Mahsuds. He died as long ago as 1913, a year before the outbreak of World War I, but he is not forgotten. Things are changing now, but this Mulla’s son, Fazl Din, a pale shadow of himself, has been able to bank on his father’s memory, and to the end of the British time was regarded as the centre of opposition
to any form of closer relations with the government. In his day the Mulla Powinda was the leader of the party which went to Kabul and relied on funds and encouragement given by the then Amir’s brother, Nasrullah Khan, for the maintenance of a sanctuary free from British encroachment. Incitement to the killing of officers was not outside the Mulla’s prescriptions. On the other side let it be recorded in fairness that the treatment he received at British hands was so contrary, so vacillating, and so exactly calculated to humiliate by a mixture of cajolery and snubs, that any forceful and self-respecting opponent would have been bound to react violently. And in the eyes of the Mahsud no moral stigma attaches to assassination.

During the earlier years, as we have seen, the Mulla’s approaches were met with the rebuff that no direct communications could be held with him; he must say what he had to say through the maliks. What then happened we know. It then occurred to the government that the policy of ignoring the Mulla was a mistake; henceforth their local officers were to try sailing upon the opposite tack, and see whether they could not make a friend of him, and even induce him to accept an allowance. This, it was anticipated, would effectively draw his fangs. After a suitable period of hesitation and wooing the Mulla coyly intimated that an allowance would be welcome provided it was paid secretly. Even this was done, and the allowance sanctioned was more than three times that given to any other individual in the tribe at that time. A few years later a further slap in the face was given to the maliks, and, Merk having succeeded Bruce, a completely new orientation was given to the Government’s Mahsud policies. ‘The Government of India,’ sapiently wrote the Simla Secretariat, ‘will only observe that the best method of dealing with the Pathans of Waziristan appears to be still a matter for experiment.’ Proceeding on this truism — one can almost hear the Mulla’s chortlings when it came to his notice — the maliki system was scrapped out of hand, and it was decided to make allowances payable to the whole tribe, which was described as the tuman.

As a corollary to this, Merk’s idea was to deal with the whole tribe in mass, as it were assembled in parliament and euphoniously dubbed ‘the great jirga of the Mahsuds’. There was a vague idea that the Pathan, unlike the Baluch, prefers popular assemblies to rule by an oligarchy or a chief, and would respond to this demo-
cratic treatment. It was forgotten that 'the great jirga of the Mahsuds', a disorderly mob never less than 5,000 strong and sometimes double that number, would repeat the excesses of the Athenian agora, without the erudition of Athens, and with more than one Cleon to act as demagogue. There was no Lionel Curtis to tell Merk, or Curzon who approved Merk's fantastic plans, that in this age democracy had outgrown tribalism and could only be expected to work through a system of representative institutions. Neither Merk nor Curzon understood it, but maliks in some form were in fact essential to act as tribal attorneys, in dealings with the government.

So it came to pass that, three months only after Merk's departure, his doctrines were reported by Johnston to be unworkable, and his scheme perished, scarcely born. Not unnaturally all the leading men had held aloof from his settlement, and very little experience proved that it was not only expensive, but dangerous, to expect to conduct relations with a discordant array several thousand strong. It is true that the jirga tradition is all in favour of order at time of council, and jirgas can often give points to any parliament in matters of usage and decorum. But the arrival of a tribal levy of many thousand armed men at such a place as Tank raised acute problems of security; it was difficult enough to arrange for the customary and necessary deposit of weapons before jirga, and, even when that was done, inter-sectional bickering would lead to loss of temper and sometimes to bloodshed, even if feeling was not directed against authority. So the maliks were recreated. But by a strange lapse of sanity the Mulla Powinda, whose whole object in life it was to supplant and undermine the maliks, was asked to sit down with the Political Tahsildar and give his advice as to who those maliks should be.

Those who know the Mahsuds intimately are well aware that in point of fact the tribe possesses a very close and detailed organization based on heredity and known as nikat. The word itself is connected with the Pashtu for a grandparent, and means heredity, or, more closely, hereditaments. It has come to imply the whole body of what Howell calls the immutable or slowly changing law which fixes the share of each clan and sub-section, even of each family, in all tribal loss and gain. By this system, known also as the tribal sarrishta, benefits would be distributed and liabilities apportioned. Thus nikat would regulate shares in allow-
ances from government or booty from a raid, and equally the amount due in fine under any settlement either with the government or as between contending sections. Nor was the idea of nikat by any means exhausted by rules of profit and loss. It laid down a strict order of precedence based on heredity, and defined the exact position of the head of every Mahsud family, his relationship with section and sub-section, and the connection and standing of the whole to the parts, the parts to the whole. It was, and indeed remains, a tribal family tree, of which every main branch, every lateral and sub-lateral branch, is known to everyone down to the last twig and even to the last bud. Like a tree it grows and alters, puts forth new branches and throws off those that are old, dead or rotten, and the process has a slow and almost terrifying inevitability.

By nikat, whatever Mulas or governments may say, there are maliks, and it is impossible to wish them away. Merk’s successor found himself forced to restore them, and gradually through the years, the system was modified to take account of both maliks and tuman, representatives and commonalty. The later institution of Khassedars, or tribal police, was an attempt, not altogether unsuccessful, to allot benefits to the commonalty, under the supervision of maliks, in return for keeping order in the tribe within the framework of nikat. But here arose another difficulty. So fixed is the tribal notion of due shares according to their hereditary system that it has usually been found impracticable to go outside it, for instance in matters of promotion, reward for good service or penalties for misconduct. This was a main difficulty in the enlistment of Mahsuds for the regular army; any attempt to promote a deserving individual without reference to nikat would be met with a sullen resentment, ending perhaps in the desertion of the aggrieved, or even in bloodshed. Howell tells how from the earliest times our officers came up against this, and had to fall back defeated. ‘No matter how the political officer of the time has wished or tried to make what may be regarded as a proper distribution of the benefits in his gift, in the end he has always been forced to conform more or less closely to the tribal notion. So merit has often gone unrewarded, while iniquity has prospered.’

Nor was it only over the maliks that Government’s policy was subject to violent oscillations. They were not content to let their
local officers lead them, and upon occasions were anxious to play an active role. After the maliks had been recreated by Johnston, it was the Government who insisted upon taking the Mulla under their wing, and they who not only gave him a munificent allowance and sanctioned him a grant of land in order (so they said) to undermine his influence, but just at that very moment put the list of the proposed new maliks into his hands for revision. Subsequently there was yet another swing in policy, and all the Mulla's benefits were cancelled. And there were other changes — the withdrawal of regulars; the creation of militias; the elimination, restoration, and second elimination of the Mahsud elements in those militias; the occupation by regulars again; the creation of the new irregular force lacking a local element in their composition, known as Scouts; the introduction of the Khassedar. It is not surprising that amid all this opportunism no fixed point could be found, and confidence in authority tended to be slow and uncertain. Indeed it was only the character of the local officers and their assistants that kept the business running at all.

On the other side, during much of this formative period was a man who knew what he wanted, the Mulla Powinda. From the British point of view it is hard to see him as other than a wily scoundrel who did not shrink from the use of assassination as a weapon. But he was more than that. 'His character cannot be judged by any standards current among Englishmen,' says Howell. 'By those who have made allowances for the environment in which he lived, he cannot be denied some tribute of admiration as a determined and astute, though not altogether single-minded, patriot and champion of his tribe's independence. All officers who ever actually met him will agree that his forceful character, striking appearance and persuasive eloquence made a deep impression on those with whom he came into personal contact. A man who, without any inherited advantages and without education, could make so large an instalment of frontier history in effect but a series of chapters in his own biography, can have been no little man, and given more malleable material to work upon than Mahsuds have ever afforded, and a more fortunate setting in time and space, he might well have ranked with many who are accounted great men.'

In his farewell letter to his countrymen, read out to the Mahsuds in jirga after his death, the Mulla exhorted them to hold their
nationality intact, and allow neither the British Government nor the Amir to encroach upon their country, to compose their internal differences and to give up raiding so as to deprive Government of a convenient excuse for occupying Mahsud country. So might Khushhal Khan have written. Or, had the Mahsuds been possessed of the manners and decorum of Yusufzais, under such a leader they might have laid the foundations of a State as stable as the Swat of the Miangul.

The two occasions when the Mahsuds made the most striking impact on their neighbours were during the war of 1919-21 when the British Government finally took steps to occupy Razmak and other central points in Waziristan, and in 1929 when Nadir Khan with their aid took Kabul, ousted Bacha-i-Saqqao, and established himself as the first of a new dynasty. On both occasions the Mahsuds, while taking the leading part, were reinforced by considerable lashkars of Wazirs.

In the aftermath of the short Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 Waziristan was visited by an Afghan Brigadier named Shah Daula, who in the name of the Amir Amanullah gave the impression that the British Government were about to withdraw behind the Indus, and it behoved all good tribesmen to enlist under the Amir's banner, occupy evacuated posts, and generally make themselves as much of a nuisance as possible. The British had found it necessary during hostilities to evacuate Wana, where the tribesmen had captured no less than 1,200 new-model rifles and nearly a million rounds of small arms ammunition. It is no wonder that it seemed to the Mahsuds and others that they could choose their own way without hindrance. Over one hundred raids were made in six months on the adjacent districts and the tale of unrequited offences was growing higher. The position was intolerable and clamoured for counter-action.

The Government's plan, when they finally made up their minds, was to follow earlier precedents and advance up the Takki Zam Valley to the point where it is joined by the Baddar at Dwa Toi — meaning Watersmeet — and from that centre to dominate the central strongholds of the Mahsuds around Kaniguram and Makin, situated on the skirts of the Pre Ghal Mountain, and if need be to occupy the open Razmak plateau in the very heart of the mountain massif. The advance was opposed by the Mahsuds
in full force, aided by a strong contingent of Ahmadzai Wazirs from Wana. It was not until two months had passed that the objective was reached, and then only after such fighting as had never before been seen upon the Frontier. The gap between Government and tribal armaments had been greatly narrowed by successful tribal raids, including the looting of the Wana Fort, and full use was made on the tribal side of the new arms of precision. The battle for the narrows at Ahnai Tangi lasted five days, during which hand-to-hand encounters were frequent, and the Mahsuds not only demonstrated great skill in the tactical use of fire-power, but proved that the new weapons had not affected their traditional valour as swordsmen at close quarters. The force sustained over 2,000 casualties in killed, missing and wounded, including 43 officers killed, while the tribesmen estimated their losses at more than double that figure. On arrival at destination the force sat down to a blockade, resulting in due course and after many vicissitudes in the making of the peace which led (by negotiation with the Utmanzai Wazirs) to the occupation of Razmak and the construction of a network of roads over the country.

There followed the reoccupation of Wana, notable mainly for the light it throws on conceptions of tribal alliance. When the Wana Wazirs perceived their turn was coming, they applied to the Mahsuds for assistance in return for the help they had given them in their hour of need. To this appeal the Mahsuds gave a characteristic reply. They said that but for Wazir support they would have made peace before the great fight at Ahnai Tangi, and thus avoided much suffering and heavy losses. Therefore they owed the Wazirs no gratitude, but a grudge, and they refused all help. This answer was given, I believe, by Malik Mehrdil, of the Mal Khel section of the Manzai Alizai, now in his eighties and the first Mahsud representative in a Pakistan legislature. For all its cynicism, the answer is one that at the time won applause from the Mahsuds for whom Mehrdil spoke, and probably even wrung a wry smile from the Wazir deputation that heard it. It would be admired for what we might call a true sense of realism and timing.

In some respects the adventures of the Mahsud and Wazir contingents which accompanied Nadir to Kabul in 1929 present a picture even more significant. For on that occasion they were not defending their own country from occupation, but acting on the offensive within Afghanistan. The position was that after Ama-
nullah’s fall in 1928 power had fallen into the hands of a Tajik freebooter named Habibullah, known as Bacha-i-Saqao, and Nadir Khan had come from France in an attempt to recover the throne for the Muhammadzais. He and his brothers Hashim and Shahwali were acting in concert, and there was an assumption, shot through even then with some scepticism, that they were acting on Amanullah’s behalf. Nadir, like Amanullah, was a Muhammadzai of the Barakzai clan of the Durrans, and like him descended from Painda Khan. He was, however, only a collateral, not being descended from the Dost but from his brother, our old friend Sultan Muhammad Khan, whose great-grandson he was.

On arrival on the Frontier Nadir resorted to the Kurram whence he endeavoured to mobilize aid from among the Afridis and Orakzais, but found his efforts severely discouraged by the Government of India, who, occupying Kurram as they did, were able to prevent Tirah tribesmen from crossing into Afghan territory. He then turned his attention to the Mahsuds and Wazirs, some of whom, previously encouraged by Amanullah in hostility to the British Government, had lands on the Afghan side of the Durand Line. Here he met with success, and was joined by considerable lashkars, including numbers of both tribes living in Waziristan itself. There are also Wazirs whose permanent homes are on the Afghan side of the line, in Birmal and elsewhere. Those on the British side of the line went in defiance of warnings from the Government of India not to meddle in Afghan affairs. This lashkar formed the spear-head of Nadir’s advance; it was they who took Kabul for him and made it possible for a Durrani dynasty to be restored. They were in fact the King-makers of the day. Neither they nor others up and down the Frontier have forgotten the lesson. King-makers can as easily be King-breakers.

At the time of his capture of Kabul Nadir had no money and was unable to reward adequately those who had brought about his success. He was driven to connivance when the Mahsuds and Wazirs looted a considerable part of the city and to the rather empty grant of honorary rank in the Afghan army. The absence of reward annoyed those who were unable to obtain what they regarded as their due share of the loot, and these and others affected to have been deceived when at a later stage, yielding to solicitations from other quarters, Nadir occupied the throne for
himself and founded what was in effect a new dynasty. With
tongue in cheek they complained that they had won the throne
for Amanullah and not for Nadir, his cousin in the third degree
and once removed.

This attitude made both Mahsuds and Wazirs a useful weapon
for the blackmailer. The partisans of Amanullah, aiming at his
restoration, more than once played on both tribes to repeat the
success of 1929, go once more to Kabul, oust the Yahya Khel —
as Nadir’s dynasty was called after his grandfather, the son of
Sultan Muhammad Khan — put Amanullah, the rightful king,
back, and return to their homes, once more laden with loot. In
1933, while Nadir was still alive, a strong lashkar of both tribes
crossed the Durand Line and invested Matun in Khost. The
Government of India attempted to prevent the movement by
establishing a cordon of troops, but this proved ineffective, and it
was not till air action was taken by Delhi against the homes of
those who had joined the lashkar that it was broken up. Nadir
himself was assassinated later in 1933. In 1938 a still more danger-
osous situation had to be met.

In that year, when Hitler was preparing war, his agents in the
Middle East sought means to disturb Afghanistan, and with it
the North-West Frontier, with the notion of tying the hands of the
British Government in India, so compelling the British to retain
strong forces in that region. As we know, the people of the Front-
tier with few exceptions are orthodox Hanafis. As such they regard
the Gillani (or Jillani) shrine of Abdul Qadir at Baghdad with
particular reverence. The Gillani family also, of which the Naqib
of Baghdad is the titular head, receives the regard due to a Pir.
This family is spread all over the Middle East; there are Gillanis,
Geilanis, Keilanis or Jillanis in every Muslim country from Syria
to Pakistan. Hitler’s main agents appear to have been Hajj al
Amin Husaini, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, and a network of Gill-
anis and others under his control — it is significant that Rashid
Ali, the leader of the Iraq rebellion in 1941, was a Gillani. A young
Syrian Gillani was sent to Waziristan, first in an earlier year to
learn his way about, and later, in 1938, to prepare a movement in
favour of Amanullah’s restoration. He seems to have been armed
with plentiful supplies of cash, and he established himself near
Kaniguram, from which centre he began to preach. His exhorta-
tions soon took on a political note, and he succeeded in mobili-
ing large sections of Mahsuds, with some Wazirs, to march once more on Kabul. It was only by the most determined use of force combined with cajolery that the Government of India were able to secure the Pir’s surrender and removal, and the break-up of lashkars already on their way to Kabul.

The Pir himself was known to the tribes as ‘the Shami Pir’, the Holy Man from Syria. During his residence at Kaniguram he wore a Sayyid’s robes, a beard and a sanctimonious air. After his surrender he shaved the beard and donned his customary Levantine suit. Pictures of ‘the Shami Pir’ in his two incarnations showed a contrast so astonishing that it seemed impossible the man could be the same — in his western garb a youngish, plumpish, natty dweller on the Mediterranean coast, in his robes a sly ecclesiastic from Al-Azhar, stroking a flowing beard. The beard’s the thing. It certainly worked with the Mahsuds.

The Kabul Government will always need some sort of insurance against tribal blackmail, which, unaided, it is never quite strong enough to control. The Mahsuds and Wazirs do not forget the part they played in putting the present dynasty on the throne. Tribal ebullience will not yield to theories of Pashtunistan, and the time will come when Kabul will need the good-will of Karachi in keeping it within bounds. It is not healthy that the tribes should be used as pieces in the ancient game of chess known as bādsbārgardi.

The Mahsud is as redoubtable in council as he is in battle, as difficult to deal with on planes other than that of force as in the field. Only one who has spent a long day listening to the arguments of Mahsud visitors will understand the exhaustion which comes from resistance to his importunings, the effort required to meet his plausibility, even the struggle to cap his wit. Lastly — and it is remarkable that this quality should be combined alike with discipline in the field and the rigidity of the tribal sarrishta — there is always the chance of a rush of blood to the head, an utter recklessness of the consequences of individual action. And yet, outside the office, on the hillside or upon the road, there is no happier companion. Who does not remember those farewell tea-parties when men who have made your life a burden for months and years all at once crowd round with fervent hand-clasps, and, bidding you God-speed — could it be with a tear in the eye — make you half believe that after all the burden was worth carrying? The
sceptic will say the fellow is glad to be rid of you, but he would be wrong. Somewhere, somehow, there is a bond.

'A trans-border agency', writes Howell, 'is a charge which imposes upon the holder a heavy strain, physical, mental, and, we may perhaps add, moral. It is not every officer, even amongst members of a picked corps, who is fit or by temperament apt to carry the burden, and even amongst the few who are there are fewer still who can stand the strain for long at a time.' Hence perhaps the vacillations of policy, the accompaniment of Mahsud history.

In this respect of course the Pakistani officers who have succeeded us have many cards in their hands. Not all by any means are Pathans, but those who are, are equipped to follow even the Pashtu of Mahsuds and Wazirs — and very rough and difficult it is — without that concentration of thought and effort required of even the best foreign linguist. But the language of communication is a small thing. A Mahsud is seldom strictly orthodox in his creed, but at least his mental processes, his attractions and his repulsions, will be clearer and more comprehensible to a fellow-Muslim than ever they were to us. The Pakistanis claim that there has been a change of heart, for, say they, the tribes now regard the free government of Pakistan as their own. Moreover, and this is striking, they have enormously expanded the means to education; High Schools and Middle Schools are now dotted about all over the tribal regions, and there is no doubt of the tribesman's interest in them. We failed there, I think. But the boldest experiment of all is that for the provision of parliamentary representation for the tribes in the Central and Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan. Doubting voices have been raised, but it is already clear that the principle of this new departure is welcomed by the tribes themselves, who expect, even demand, a voice in the affairs of government. Representatives have already been chosen and have taken part in legislative proceedings. Nevertheless, electoral methods are at present in a very empirical stage, and it remains to be decided how they should crystallize. It is obvious enough that it is not easy to adapt the machinery of administered territory, with electoral rolls, polling-stations, ballot-boxes and all the rest, to people who have never yielded to the trammels of administrative control.

It is not hard to give examples of the sort of problems to be
faced. What, for instance, is to be the shape of the constituencies? In South Waziristan, where the Mahsuds and Wana Wazirs live, it was at first thought that the constituency should embrace the whole agency, and supply two members to the West Pakistan Assembly. In the result both members turned out to be Mahsuds, and no Wana Wazir was elected, for the simple reason that the Mahsuds are, as everyone should know, the stronger and more influential tribe. The Wana Wazirs did not welcome this result as philosophically as they heard Malik Mehrdil’s refusal to come to their aid against the British in 1920. It seems clear enough that parliamentary constituencies in tribal regions should be drawn as far as may be according to tribal boundaries, wherever the tribal spirit is alive. Further, what is to be the procedure for voting among tribes where there is no census, no procedure for making country-wide registers, no police (except Khassedars), and no impartial authorities for hearing claims and objections? And what should be the limits of the franchise? How to ensure an orderly selection among a population in which almost every adult male is armed to the teeth? On an imaginative solution of such practical questions everything will depend.

There is here an opportunity for wedding Pathan ideas of tribal organization with the western concept of representative institutions. Where the tribal system is still working, its instrument is the maliks and elders sitting in conclave, surrounded by as many of the younger warriors as may have presence and personality enough to be admitted without question. In major matters such a conclave may represent a whole tribe; when lesser issues are at stake, it will represent a clan, or sub-section, small or large. This is the jirga. The unwritten law is that the jirga takes decisions which in the end overbear opposition and are accepted as unanimous. Minority opinions will be given, but, unless the argument or personality is strong enough to sway the jirga, they are borne down by rude eloquence, by the personality of the most persuasive or forceful, and in the last resort by force or threat of force. The essential point is that everything takes place in the open and there is nothing like secret ballot.

A Mahsud jirga told to ballot at a police-station, or to decide between candidates by show of hands, will give the polling officer an anxious day. Nor would such procedure be in accord with tribal sentiment. I have no doubt that the solution is to be found
in a system which makes use of the tribe's own custom, and that means telling the tribe to go away and decide by its own methods whom it wishes to put forward as its representatives. Having reached its decision, it should return in full jirga and say, 'This is our man.' This, or something like it, was tried with the Mahsuds last year, and it seemed to work. Such a system will fix tribal responsibility, it will ensure that the tribe as a whole, and not only special elements in it, has had a say, and — not least important — will make it more likely that, if trouble is to be expected, it will be brewed in some place other than the hustings.

Despite all these dangers I believe that the idea of tribal representation has come to stay, and it is just in such matters that Karachi has such a pull over Kabul. It is inconceivable that any Afghan government will have either the vision or the ability to introduce such methods; the Loi Jirga of Afghanistan is a feudal body. The new conception is the child of the century-old marriage of eastern with western thought, made possible by the hundred years of British association with the Frontier people. For, however manfully tribes like the Mahsuds fought us, there remains on both sides a liking and a memory which abides and carries through into new times. On that Pakistan, and the Mahsuds, are able to build, adding from their own store, and working perhaps with a surer and easier touch than was possible for unbelievers.

In the task lying before them they can profit from the mistakes of their forerunners, avoiding that easy shift of policy which cares only for immediate advantage and takes no account of ulterior effect. 'Let it be reflected,' concludes Howell, 'how great a diversion of the ship follows from a slight deflection of the rudder.'
As we approach our own times, it becomes more difficult to see the picture in true perspective. For that reason, rather than leave the movements and tendencies of today to crowd on the mind all at once and in disordered array at the conclusion of the story, I have thought it better to relate them as effects to causes, as the tale went on. But there remains one supreme and final conception, already foreshadowed in these pages but not yet brought to an issue, namely the question of Pathan national consciousness and of the shape and form in which it may best be given its political expression.

In 1901 a separate Pathan province was brought to birth; in 1935 that province was once more merged in a larger unit. Against the background of this contrast we may be able to bring at least some isolated tendencies, events, and even personalities within the coherence of a larger design, and so see the picture of the last half-century whole.

Long before Curzon came out as Viceroy in 1899 it had been realized that there existed certain anomalies in the organization of the North-West Frontier as part of the Panjäb. For the trans-Indus area consisted not only of settled districts, where it could at least be argued that administration by a larger authority had certain advantages, but of tribal territory under a vague executive control, where a foot placed wrong might at any time attract the responsibility not only of the central government in India but of London itself. In the earlier days when relations with the tribes were conducted by district officers and the international frontier had not been defined, the anomaly was not so apparent. But even then, under pressure of the Russian advance in Central Asia, a scheme was propounded by Lytton in 1877 with a view to giving the central government a more direct control over Frontier administration and policy, and improving the relations of the districts with their trans-border neighbours. At one time Lytton even proposed
to create one immense Frontier province from Peshawar to the sea.

The Second Afghan War caused these ideas to be shelved. But when the occupation of Baluchistan became effective — from the beginning Quetta was under central control — and still more when Khairbar, Kurram, parts of Waziristan and Malakand were occupied, the disarray and lack of logic became obvious even to the British mind. Already, in 1895, the management of the States and tribes affected by the great move forward over the Malakand had been entrusted to an officer placed directly under the orders of the Government of India, and the experiences of the tribal risings of 1897-98 gave added point to the arguments of the logicians. In 1899 the strenuous, youthful mind of Curzon — only thirty-nine on his appointment — grappled with this problem, so long unresolved, and on the King’s birthday, 9th November, 1901, the North-West Frontier Province came into being. The four trans-Indus districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, with a fifth, Hazara (cis-Indus), were separated from the Panjab to form the province proper; adjacent to these and under the same hand were all the five Political Agencies together with other tribal territory managed by District Officers as far as the Durand Line. Like Baluchistan, the new administration was placed in charge of a Chief Commissioner who combined in his person the administrative charge of the districts with the political control of the tribal belt and was directly subordinate to the Central Government. The officer selected was Harold Deane, the builder of the Malakand Agency.

There is not much to show what the Pathans themselves thought of the change; for the British, the birth of the new province was no easy one. The position, as Curzon found it, was that after the troubles of 1897 the British Government had declared against the partition of the Panjab. They had decided that the Commissioners of Peshawar and the Derajat, while remaining under the Panjab government and taking their orders from that government in all matters of ordinary administration, should act directly under the Central Government in their dealings with the tribes beyond the administered border. Curzon was very doubtful of the wisdom of this compromise. In a series of letters to Whitehall, and finally in the most elaborate minute ever written by a Governor-General, he proceeded to demolish all arguments for the maintenance of the status quo.
Curzon developed his case in characteristic fashion. First came a siting shot, followed by sharp single shots on the bull’s-eye, culminating in a salvo of concentrated rapid fire. ‘The Viceroy is responsible for frontier policy,’ he writes on 5th April, 1899, ‘yet he has to conduct it not through the agency of officials directly under him, but through the elaborate machinery of a provincial government, to which the Frontier and its problems are necessarily something in the nature of side-shows, acting as an intermediary. The result is that in ordinary times the Panjab government does the Frontier work and dictates the policy without any interference from the supreme government at all, but that in extraordinary times the whole control is taken over by the Government of India acting through agents who are not its own; while the Panjab government, dispossessed and sulky, stands on one side, criticizing everything that is done.’

As Curzon developed his case, he met with strenuous opposition from Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab. In November 1899 he complains that he had told the head of that province precisely what he felt on certain Frontier problems and had believed the matter closed. Yet his subordinate had replied with a long and disputatious argument which had driven the Viceroy to despair. ‘I cannot work under this system,’ he writes bitterly, ‘I cannot spend hours in wordy argument with my Lieutenant-Governors as to the exact meaning, purport, scope, object, character, possible limitations, conceivable results, of each petty aspect of my Frontier policy. If they deliberately refuse to understand it, and haggle and boggle about carrying it out, I must get some fairly intelligent officer who will understand what I mean and do what I say.’ And again, ‘The Government of India, realizing its own ignorance, but not realizing that it was duplicating the danger, has placed between itself and the Frontier the Panjab government which often knows less and which for twenty years has been an instrument of procrastination and obstruction and weakness.’

And now we hear the roll of the full battery, the minute of 13th September, 1900. It is fine writing and worth a glance only for that. ‘I venture to affirm,’ ring out the sonorous phrases, ‘that there is not another country in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its foreign minister and his most important sphere of
activity the barrier, not of a subordinate official, but of a sub-
ordinate government, on the mere geographical plea that the
latter resides in closer proximity to the scene of action — a plea
which itself breaks down when it is remembered that for five
months in the year the supreme and local governments are both
located in the same spot, Simla.' And now the crescendo: 'The
system attenuates without diminishing the ultimate responsibility
of the Government of India. It protracts without strengthening
their action. It interposes between the Foreign Minister of India
and his subordinate agents not an ambassador or a minister or a
consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a local government and
the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant-Governor.
Worked as the system has been with unfailing loyalty and with
profound devotion to duty, it has yet been the source of friction,
of divided counsels, of vacillation, of exaggerated centralization,
of interminable delay.'

The British Government could not stand up to convictions
propounded with this eloquence. They yielded gracefully and
sanctioned the creation of the new Frontier Province. But Curzon
had not thought fit to consult the Panjab governor officially be-
fore submitting his proposals to the Secretary of State. As his
biographer relates, Curzon was curiously insensitive to the effect
that the process of 'utterly abolishing an opponent', as he liked to
call it, might have on a sensitive nature. With the patronage of
the grand seigneur he had described Mackworth Young as 'one
of the most honourable and high-minded of men, possessed of a
high sense of duty and gifted with admirable manners', but he did
not go to the pains of ascertaining the Governor's views and
placing them on the record. Mackworth Young was more than in-
censed at what he regarded as a studied affront; it was contrary to
all usage that so radical a proposal should go forward without
consultation with the head of the province affected. 'You have
not cared to consult me about forming a new Administration out
of the territory which I have received a commission from Her
Majesty to administer,' he wrote.

Even fifteen years later, when I first knew the Panjab, there
were many who still held strong views against Curzon in this
matter; at the actual time feeling was so stirred that one officer,
Fanshawe, the Commissioner of Delhi, resigned the service on the
ground that a grave public indignity had been thrust upon the
province, as unmerited as it was ungenerous. He felt called upon
to make this sacrifice of his own service in vicarious vindication
of his government's honour. Unkind critics hinted that he had
acted from motives less altruistic, but unjustly. There was a deep
and sincere feeling of outrage, to which the Commissioner gave
expression.

For us who remain the point is not so much that the incident
was a breach of official decorum, or that it should have led to a
personal wrangle between two men highly placed, but rather that
the real arguments were never fully developed in the records.
Briefly the case for the separatists was that the Frontier was too
important a matter to form merely a portion of the duty of a
provincial governor who frequently had no experience of its char-
acteristics or requirements, and that at best there was under the
then existing system delay in matters that brooked no delay. And
behind all this was the knowledge that the management of tribal
affairs is inextricably bound up with the conduct of foreign policy
and defence on a difficult and dangerous frontier. Mackworth
Young's case — somewhat blurred by the recriminations relating
to breach of official decorum — was in effect that the Frontier
administration would be expensive and inefficient for lack of
senior supervisors, and that there would be a tendency to sub-
ordinate the rights of the administered districts to considerations
of policy as regards the tribes or Afghanistan.

The arguments deployed from the Panjab were certainly exag-
gerrated. They proceed to some extent on the assumption that in
the matter of administration any severance from Panjab control
could not but be for the worse, and must involve a lowering of
standards — a somewhat arrogant position. It is true that the
cadres of the new administration were small. But this defect was
to some extent offset by including them in the general cadre of
the Political Service,4 and for the rest it is reasonable to hold that
the attractions of Frontier service drew some of the best men not
only from the Panjab but from other provinces and services in
India. Further, as has been said, those who made a name upon the
Frontier in Panjab days were the few who served there for long
periods and learned the ways and language of the people. Unlike
the Panjab, the new organization was now able to secure that all
the men with a flair for Frontier service could stay there for the
greater part, if not the whole, of their official lives. There is little
doubt that in the main this was an advantage which outweighed apprehensions in the matter of efficiency. In those days the Frontier was not so small as to become parochial, and I do not myself think the standard of the officers in central or provincial services was lower than the admittedly high level attained in the neighbouring province.

On the point which relates to subordination of district to tribal interests the answer is still clearer. We have seen already that the failure to weigh one against the other before 1900 was the prime cause of those tensions and unease of which the sole cure had proved to be the annual punitive expedition. Little attempt had been made to get at the root of the trouble by the use of preventive measures. In short, so far as the Frontier was concerned, there was no great cause for pride in the record of Lahore.

There is little doubt that in the circumstances then ruling Curzon was right. In the time of Harold Deane — the first seven years of the new province's existence — there were no expeditions except some counter-raids on the Mahsuds to wind up Merk's blockade. Under Roos-Keppel, who succeeded Deane and ruled for eleven years, the province stood firm throughout the trials of World War I, and that although Turkey, universally respected in the non-Arab Muslim world, entered the lists against us. Roos-Keppel did indeed start his tour of office with two small operations the scale of which is sufficiently shown by the fact that one of them was called the Week-end War. There was also a small and successful Waziristan expedition against the Mahsuds in 1917. But it is broadly true to say that it was not until 1919, when the Great War was over, that the Frontier was again subject to storm, and even those troubles, though the wind blew from the Afghan quarter, had been stirred by what was happening in the Panjab and in India generally. They were not of local origin. In this case the post hoc propter hoc argument is sound enough, and Curzon stands vindicated.

But despite the elaboration of argument in his minute his case was never fully stated, and there were reasons that in the light of history we can now see go deeper, reasons which might have been adduced even then in support of the change proposed and made. Any reader today of the documentation of that time will be struck by the omission to consider the bearing of the measures carried through on the populations to be affected by the change. In that
respect, when they spoke of the subordination of the rights of the people in the districts, the Panjab protagonists of opposition to change at least showed some glimmerings of perception of a very real issue — though they proceeded, I think, to wrong deductions. Curzon, concentrating on the overriding needs of foreign policy, was deaf to the still small voice that might have been heard by him that walked upon the Frontier mountains after the wind and the earthquake and the fire had died away. Only one who knew the people's hearts could have heard that voice, and then it might be hard to interpret it. The voice was the voice of Pathan pride — that conscious sense of Pathan identity which transcends the sectional loyalties of the tribe — and the statesman's task was to give that emotion direction in the interests of the larger State. A focal point was needed. The fact that the creation of the new province provided this focus was its greatest justification, greater even than the outward-seeming needs of defence and foreign policy. For only a people whose aspirations are reasonably free of frustration can provide the conditions in which a confident defence structure may be erected.

At every point in this book, whether in the genealogies, in the dealings of the Mughals with the tribes from Babur to Aurangzeb, in the poems of Khushhal, in the definitions and descriptions of Elphinstone, there keeps recurring a distinction between Durranis or Ghaljis on the one hand and on the other the tribes inhabiting the Sulaiman Mountains and the plains between those mountains and the Indus. Sometimes the distinction appears as one between the Western and the Eastern Afghans, at others between the sons of Karlanri — the hill-tribes of the Sufed Koh and Sulaiman Mountains — and all the rest, again between the tribesmen of the land of Roh and the Durranis or Ghaljis, again between the speakers of Pakhtu or Pashtu and those further west who are 'half Paktuan half Persian'. The distinction is not clear-cut between Afghan and Pathan, for the Yusufzais and other leading tribes of the Peshawar plain have as good, if not better, claims to the name Afghan as any Durrani or Ghalji chieftain. Often the distinction is blurred, and certainly it is not accurately defined by any geographical or political parting such as the Durand Line. But it existed long before the British came to draw most of the tribes east of the Sulaiman watershed within the orbit of their dominion. There was always more interchange, for instance, between the
Yusufzais of Swat or Dir and the Mandanr of the Samah, between the Khalils, the Mohmands and the Afridis, between the Khataks, Bannuchis and Wazirs, than between any of these tribes and the Durrani. They are the people of Roh; they have many interchanges of thought and commerce; they shop in the marts along the Indus; they have in short a conception of oneness, not always consciously expressed, and a common interest which transcends the tribal idea.

As I see it, the main purpose served by the creation and fifty-odd years' existence of the North-West Frontier Province was that it provided first an administrative, and later a political, soil in which this idea could take root, and, carefully nurtured, grow into active life. It laid out this area at a time when the allegiance of the Frontier people was uncertain and groping. Since the break-up of the Mughal Empire the whole region had become a sort of corridor for invasion and counter-stroke; Durrani and Sikh arms had passed over it in ebb and flow, and nothing had been held or fixed. And when these unstable forces had been replaced by British rulers, the tendency at first had been to treat the Pathans as though they were just an appanage of India, which they never were. Lodi and Sur, Yusufzai and Orakzai, had ruled in India — were they now to become unconsidered trifles on the margin of Panjáb?

The separation of the Frontier, then, satisfied this pride. At the same time, by arranging for a greater concentration of effort and expertise at the decisive point, it did something to draw together the districts and the tribal territory. Further, the very fact that the administration was subordinate to the Central Government stimulated in those early days a consciousness in the Pathan mind that his concerns and ambitions were of greater than provincial interest, so reviving a tendency, dating from Mughal times, to look to the east rather than to the west. Finally, in Peshawar he had once more a natural centre, one that was dear and familiar to him; no need now, except for pleasure, to travel to Lahore. Not entirely consciously, Curzon had provided a focus for Pathan self-esteem, and so done much to consolidate a firm frontier.

The ground had been laid for the final scene, the Pathan renascence of our times.
CHAPTER XXVI

THE PATHAN RENASCENCE

To work the transformation on the stage thus set a fresh band of pioneers was needed, men who could not only understand what Curzon meant and do what he said, but who would build with foresight and imagination, using their own knowledge and skill. These men were found. Three of them stand out, Harold Deane, George Roos-Keppel and — in some ways the greatest — Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum. All three have passed into history; all three, even Roos-Keppel after his manner, really gave their lives for their work. The time has come to raise them some memorial.

Harold Deane first made his mark as Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Yusufzai sub-division of the Peshawar district, with headquarters at Mardan. Many years later Mardan became a separate district; it was always notable as the centre and home of the leading families of the Mandan Yusufzais and it was the cantonment where the Guides were stationed. It can be claimed, I think, that those who were not themselves Pathans but in closest accord with the Pathan mind, those whom Pathans still remember, were, most of them, at one time or another in charge of this area.¹ To know and respect, and be known and liked by, the leaders of Yusufzai society means that a man has entered into a sort of Pathan freemasonry, and has reached a position in which the very quintessence of the Pathan spirit begins to be revealed to him. Deane was such a man.

In appearance he was imposing. Tall and spare, with a commanding presence and searching dark-blue eyes, he made just the impression of resolution and assurance that Pathans look for in a man. He was fearless and he stood firm. He had, too, a sardonic sense of humour for which he was long remembered. The Yusufzai Khans used to tell with relish the story of his tactics in persuading the then Khan of Hoti, Khwaja Muhammad Khan, to do something he was reluctant to do. Deane and the Khwaja set off
on a ten-mile walk, the latter wearing the black patent-leather shoes which were then the fashion. They walked and walked until the Khwaja's agony could no longer be endured and he was ready to offer the moon. Later, Deane was appointed Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar at a time when the revenue settlement of that district was being undertaken by Louis Dane, an officer of great distinction who in due course became Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, but whose lot lay always in pleasant places. Dane's spiritual home was in Simla and Lahore. One day a naïve young Khan in a Peshawar hujra, puzzled by the similarity of names, asked one of the Khalil Arbabs what was the difference between Din and Den. The answer came: 'The same as between Shir and Sher, only the other way round.' A pretty jest.

Deane did great work in the creation of the Malakand Agency, a finer achievement with a more intractable people than the much advertised occupation of Baluchistan by Sandeman. Curzon first met him when as a touring M.P. he passed through Peshawar on his way up to meet the Amir Abdurrahman in Kabul, and, having been greatly impressed, when he became Viceroy selected him over the heads of many of his seniors as the first Chief Commissioner of the new Province. As Chief Commissioner Deane was able to utilize the name he bore among Pathans to reverse the old policy of the punitive expedition by military forces. It was because the tribes knew him to be utterly fearless, firm, honest and resolute that he became the true peace-maker. He never prated peace when there was no peace; he spoke and acted, and he was believed. The strain was great, and his health had been undermined. Deane collapsed in harness, and died just after reaching home in 1908.

Roos-Keppel won his spurs in the Kurram and the Khaibar, in both of which he combined for a time the duties of Political Agent and Commandant of the local militia. Of mixed Dutch-Swedish-English blood, he was no more than Cavagnari a typical Englishman. Though he started his career in a British regiment of the line, he spent much of his youth in travel, was an accomplished linguist, and above all a cosmopolitan with a vivid sense of the dramatic. For the benefit of those who deny heredity as a transmitter of character Roos-Keppel can only be explained as a conscious poseur, determined to express in thought and action a behaviour studiously un-English. He loved to mingle sympathy with callousness, pride with an easy familiarity, generosity with
an ill-humour towards those who displeased him that could be vindictive. He was a man of strong character who stood above all those who surrounded him, a good friend, but a very dangerous enemy. A born ruler, he had a cynical appreciation of the weakness of human nature, and seldom gave others credit for any impulses of altruism. His person was huge, heavy and formidable, and his glare was likened, quite seriously, to that of the basilisk. In youth he had affected a great shaggy beard, but he relied in later years on the cross-bars of a heavy Edwardian moustache. He never married, and rather resented any of his more trusted officers marrying: 'No need to keep a cow to get your milk,' is one of his more familiar sayings, and by all accounts he had his light o' loves. Such a man did not inspire easy affection and he was often feared — never probably loved with tenderness. But he could, and did, inspire in many quarters a regard that fell not far short of adoration.

I saw him only twice, once when he growled at an officer on outpost duty near Peshawar City for not showing him prompt enough respect, and again when he was receiving at the Viceroy's hands the Grand Cross of his order of chivalry. There was about him an impression of grim and unrelenting power that could only be withstood at peril. This power did not spring solely from personal ambition; in the Pathan social and political scene he detected in some sense the realization in practice of a way of life that not only appealed to him but touched some inner spring of conviction, even of passion. He cared and worked for the Pathans, and he understood their every mood. A very fluent speaker of their language, he could turn a proverb, point a moral, quote a poet, make a domestic allusion in perfect timing and in communion with those who heard him. An actor on his chosen stage, he was able, as he who deals with a volatile people must be able, to turn at a moment's notice from dignity to geniality, from argument to threat, from command to appeal. Fearless of criticism, he had a genius for inspiring confidence in those he governed and he received their confidence in return. More than any Englishman, if such he was, he is remembered still; he has been claimed as a sort of malik in excelsis, a Pathan among Pathans. And this although among Pathans, at least between friends, a generous emotion comes easily; with Roos-Keppel the more spontaneous expressions were clamped down and hidden behind that grim austerity.
R-K, for so he was known, had his dreams, and the greatest of them, the Islamia College, saw the light of day. In this creative effort — perhaps his only labour of love — as in his paternal dealings with the Afridis in the Khaibar, he found an unfailing helper in Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum, his chosen interpreter and at one time almost his second self. In the second decade of this century to mention R-K was to call to mind A.Q. Yet neither was in any sense a shadow of the other; they were very different men, each supplying what the other lacked. Like his leader, A.Q. conveyed to all who knew him a sense of great power; unlike him he had unfailing courtesy. Together they created the Islamia College, now grown into the University of Peshawar. That is their joint and visible monument, the tribute to their foresight and wisdom. No man who was not great, whose imagination did not soar, would have founded a great place of learning on the very margin of the cultivated lands, overlooked by the black jaws of Khaibar, open maybe to raiders, on the very site of the furious battle between Akbar Khan and Hari Singh. Yet this is what they did, and they planned well. The white mosque, the centre of a cluster of russet buildings, proclaims a sanctuary that no raider dare violate. Since R-K’s day that mosque, once seen as soon as the traveller turns the last curve of Khaibar, has come to be embowered in groves of cypress and other trees, but it remains the symbol of an inspiration that has finally given birth to a university.

There is no doubt that R-K’s régime did much to enhance Pathan pride and consciousness. The tours, the jirgas, the durbars, the feeling of common effort during the war, the very existence of a Pathan administrative unit presided over by a figure so daemonic — all these things set new currents flowing and men began to look beyond the narrow limits of the tribe. And not the least of the new influences was that exerted by the Islamia College.

R-K’s weakness lay in his failure to realize that it is not enough for a government to plan, or even to realize, a scheme of higher education; a place must be found progressively for its products. His rule was more adapted to the feelings of the tribal areas than to those of the population within the districts. He clung to a belief in tribal custom undiluted, and he lacked an appreciation of the inevitable results of ordered government with a Western colour and bias. The proximity of the districts of the North-West Frontier to the Panjab, where the first steps toward representative
institutions had long been taken, inevitably raised comparisons unfavourable to him. For this he himself probably cared nothing, for he was always confident of his knowledge of what was good for the Pathan. His attitude to the propositions of the Montagu-Chelmsford ‘reforms’ as bearing on the Frontier was just that it is unwise to light matches in a powder magazine. Even Lionel Curtis, the harbinger and real architect of those reforms, was impressed despite himself, and, persuaded by R-K, announced oracularly that the Pathan was not ready for what was then becoming known for the first time in popular parlance as ‘responsible government’. That is how it came about that in 1920, when all India entered on the dyarchic experiment in the direction of responsible government, the North-West Frontier stood unchanged. No franchise for Pathans, no elections, no legislature, no ministry — not even elections to local bodies, for the Ripon reforms of the ’eighties had not been forced on the Frontier. R-K thought the whole system so much flummery; if challenged, his answer would have been that Pathans had their own methods of democracy, much more to their taste. He failed to weigh up the workings of the higher education on the Pathan mind, or to appreciate that, if Frontier pride was to be turned into new channels and harnessed in the service of a sub-continent, the people must be permitted, indeed encouraged, to keep up with the latest fashions. With one hand he was busy in imaginative action that broke down tribalism; he omitted to use the other to build a larger mansion to which the tribesmen could repair. The result, after he left, was disillusion.

R-K retired in 1919 and died soon after. A.Q. told me more than once how he had seen his chief lying ill in London, and of his belief that death had been hastened by R-K’s sense of emptiness in retirement and a feeling that severance from the people he had worked for had made his life meaningless. A.Q., his coadjutor, survived until 1937 to become the province’s first Minister in 1932. For the first twelve years after 1919, and under R-K’s successors, the province stood on a dead centre, its only representation being through two of its leading citizens, nominated, not elected, to the central legislature at Delhi. One of these was A.Q., the other Muhammad Akbar Khan of Hoti.

It is impossible to reflect on Yusufzai society between the wars without mention of these two Nawabs, Abdul Qayyum and Akbar
of Hoti. Much more far-seeing than R-K, A.Q. became the chief architect of that synthesis of Pathan with British practice which enabled a foundation to be laid for the political edifice within which the Frontier eventually took its place as the bastion of West Pakistan. In poise and dignity, both of spirit and demeanour, in his time he stood above all around him, whether in Peshawar, in Delhi, or when he attended the Round Table Conference in London. To look at he was magnificent. A head splendidly held; strong, clear features, heavily moustached; an eagle eye; a bodily presence and gait commanding deference; yet so perfect his manner and approach that he could charm the youngest into the proud belief that he spoke man to man, as to an equal. In breadth of vision and determination he had few rivals throughout India, and he it was who in the end extracted from the inertia of British governments two instalments of ‘reforms’ within a very few years.

His home was at Topi, in the far corner of the Mandanr Yusufzaï country close to the point where the Indus leaves the hills. His ancestry on the father’s side was from a line of Lodi Sahibzadas, not particularly distinguished, but his grandmother, his mother and his wife were all taken from the family of the Kotha Mulla. The Kotha Mulla had been a well-known Hazrat, or holy man, a contemporary of the Akhund’s, living in the next village to Topi. When A.Q. died in the last month of 1937, his funeral attracted the largest concourse ever known in that part of the country. A Muslim funeral is always impressive; dignity, restrained grief and simplicity all have their place and play their part. But this was not the keening of a family — for A.Q. had no children — nor the tribute of a village or even a tribe — for those limits had been overpassed — it was the sorrowing of a whole people who in their grief saw dimly that some force larger than they knew had been brought to birth, in death.

Akbar of Hoti — he died three years ago — was a very different sort of man. The son of the Khwaja — him whom Deane had walked to a stand-still — he was a Pathan Khan-i-Khanan, not unlike Bairam Khan, the mentor of the Emperor Akbar. No statesman he, rather a true-blue, ultra-conservative, hugely wealthy preserver of the land-owning tradition. Physically thick-set and powerful, a giant of a man who could lift a horse, with a fine heavy head, blue-grey eyes and cheeks in his prime of a ruddy glow, he despised the people he termed ‘holi-bolis’, the mulla
class, of whom he regarded A.Q. as the chief exemplar. 'Sir,' he would exclaim in his deep booming voice, 'the man is no Pathan! Did you ever see a real Pathan who was a Mulla? [Among the Yusufzais this was true.] Sayyids, what are Sayyids? Give me the Pathans!' 'But, Nawab Sahib,' you might answer, 'you and he are without doubt the leaders in the Yusufzai country. Surely, you could work together in public, whatever your private feelings?' 'Not I,' he would boom, 'nor he. We Pathans, let me tell you, carry our private dislikes into our public life, and are proud of it.' 'Well, but, Nawab Sahib,' you would protest, 'I have caught you out. So you admit Sir A.Q. is a Pathan after all?' And he would look at you with a sort of boyish squint, rather shyly, and burst into a roar of laughter like a bull. Nor was he all noise and thunder. A man of great learning in history and philosophy, Islamic and other, he was the possessor of what was probably the finest private library north of Delhi. And, although he seemed grasping and powerful, he kept open house as a real Khan was expected to do, and he often did unlooked-for kindnesses to the poor and needy, concealing his generosity from the public gaze. He was lovable for his weaknesses as A.Q. was venerated for the perfection of his Islamic deportment.

There is another, the contemporary of the two Nawabs but still with us now, the Miangul Gulshahzada, grandson of the Akhund and creator of the State of Swat. We have seen him already on the Karakar Pass, describing the defeat of Akbar's armies in 1586. In 1722, by a most remarkable exercise of statecraft, he at last succeeded in doing what many in that region had tried to do but had not been big enough to achieve; he used a very real spiritual ascendancy to inform and animate gifts of temporal leadership, far-seeing and ruthless enough to bring a welter of Yusufzai tribes into some shape of political coherence which has stood the test of changing times. Like the Emperor Akbar a past-master in the political management of men, one who knew to a nicety the moment to seize whether in council or in battle, resolute in action, devout yet free of all cant, again like Akbar illiterate but blessed with a prodigious memory, he set to all around him a pattern of leadership hard to equal in his own country and such as the annals of any land would be proud to boast.

It is a sign of the astonishing reverence paid by Pathans to
hereditary ability that the Miangul, himself the Akhund’s grandson, should have found himself in conflict and competition for the control of Swat with Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah, great-nephew of Sayyid Akbar Shah of Sitana. Akbar Shah, leader against the Sikhs and patron of Ahmad Shah Brelwi, had been accepted as ‘Badshah’ of Swat for a long period before his death in 1857 — an equivocal position resting on the spiritual pre-eminence of his family as that of the Pir Baba of Buner, but acknowledging also a certain, if limited, temporal authority. After his death, as we have seen, the tribes of Swat declined to accept his son as his successor, and there was a tendency, in Swat if not in Buner, for spiritual allegiance to be transferred to the Akhund. But after the Akhund’s death in 1877 the repute of the Sitana Sayyids rose again. In 1915 Akbar Shah’s great-nephew, this Abdul Jabbar Shah, was accepted by the people of Swat with the title of Badshah, and, encouraged by rival influences from Amb east of the Indus, was able to hold this position for two years. A man of wisdom and prudence, deeply learned in local history and affairs, he might at other times have succeeded in a difficult task. But he came from outside, he was supported by influences alien to the Yusufzais, and in the end he proved no match in the field for his opponent of the Akhund’s line.

For thirty years, years of great progress, the Miangul ruled Swat, opening it up, bringing peace to a land that had not known it for centuries, abolishing the old Pathan custom of wesh (the periodic redistribution of land among the tribesmen), building schools and hospitals everywhere. By his own will he spends his last years in seclusion, leaving his son to administer in his stead. His wisdom and skill have given security to the Yusufzai border, and a growing wealth to one of the most heavenly valleys in the world.

Nor was it only in Swat or other parts across the border that the face of the land and its people began to change in the new and more stimulating conditions afforded by the North-West Frontier Province. Everywhere the pace quickened; there was a different feeling in the air. All too eagerly for their phlegmatic rulers the Pathans leapt into life. An awakening had begun. It is still evident. Indeed there was no break, but rather a hastening, in the process after the transfer of power in 1947. A shape of things which had begun to be drawn from 1923 onward is still working itself out
uninterrupted. Contours of which a faint limning was discernible in those days are now blocked in and finished with form and colour under which the older outlines are still to be recognized.

The Pathan economy is sustained by agriculture and pasturage. As irrigation spread, wide plains, drinking the water that gives life, slowly took on an added richness and fertility; improved strains of cereals brought from Australia vied with cash-crops of sugar and tobacco for some of Asia’s finest land; fruit orchards, winter and summer, spread for mile on mile across fields once covered by thorn-bush fit only for goat and camel. Slowly the ravages of the Sikhs were made good, and more than made good; the land burgeoned as never before. In spring, groves of peach and apricot now shed their pink and ivory sprays and later flaunt their bright fruit; a month passes and the vřes are sweet with the scent of orange-blossom, to ripen in mid-winter to a glory of golden lamps as bright as the apples of the Hesperides. Peshawar, always famous for its sugar-cane, has been enriched with finer varieties which have turned the old village industry of gur into the great sugar-factories which now sustain the life of Pakistan. Tobacco, once grown only for snuff on the wells of Swabi and Hazro, has now spread far and wide over canal lands, and suffices to support a major industry. The farmer’s wealth has increased, and with a system of land tenures rooted in tribal equality and so favouring the peasant proprietor, is on the whole widely spread. The valleys of Peshawar, Swat, Bannu, and other favoured spots, are now the gardens of the north.

One man above all others helped on this process in the fields and should be remembered — a little, pawky Scot named Robertson-Brown, who for more than twenty years lived all alone on a farm miles out in the country, at Tarnab. There he never tired of showing the farmers the performance put up by the best varieties of cereal, fruit, and other strains, both crop and animal, devoting himself utterly to the work and with no thought but for the increased productivity of the land. He had one recreation only — cattle-shows and a performing bull which he loved to put through its paces over a hurdle on the farm. He leaves a memory green in every sense.

All this time a new élite was issuing from school and college. Both Edwardes and Islamia Colleges at Peshawar stood for a tradition, each in its own way. The greater self-consciousness of
Pathan nationhood, induced by memories of the Sahibzada and the challenge of the Islamia's location in the tongue of the Khairbar, was balanced by the more tolerant and eclectic syncretism taught in the classrooms which remembered Herbert Edwardes. It was no accident that most of the men who subsequently filled key-posts in the all-important Provincial Services were Islamia alumni, while Dr. Khan Sahib, with his all-India view and admiration for Sher Shah, owed allegiance to the older college. Both streams were needed, the one to supply the educational background for a local Pathan renascence, the other to suggest the place which the Pathan might fill in the development of a subcontinent.

To these two colleges were added others, with a network of High Schools, Middle Schools and Primary Schools right down the range. Bursaries and scholarships encouraged the sons of the trans-border tribes to share in the new learning. Year by year, as the leaver worked, the Pathans of the North-West Frontier became more conscious of a challenge, an uplifting, that called them to an expansion of the mind faintly dreamed of but never before realized. The eyes of youth turned to wider horizons of ambition and employment; they were outgrowing the trammels of tribalism, and began to look with contempt on the introversions of Kabul under Durrani feudal rule.

The renascence was on; the new wine would not for long be contained within the old bottles. This ferment, almost wholly healthy, had been stirred by many teachers in class-room and hall; it was in some sense the result of an English infusion into the Pathan mind. That these two streams are able to mingle we know, but Pathan aspirations were clearer to soldiers in the field and teachers in the school than to those responsible for planning steps of political advance. The British administrator was too slow to recognize all the signs of new-found pride in the Pathan. In the constitutional field progress was halted by counsels of prudence, while political ambitions were subordinated to considerations of all-India strategy and defence. Right up to the time of the Simon Commission (1929) the theory of the powder magazine was allowed to rule decisions. From 1920 to 1930 nothing was done to enlarge the political horizon, and resentment grew and flared.

In season and out, Abdul Qayyum pressed for recognition of
his point that the Pathan province, if to remain as part of an all-India polity, must share in the general measures for the extension of responsible government. He never tired of saying that, far from being behind other peoples in the sub-continent in their understanding of political and egalitarian concepts, they were in fact in advance. They had their own indigenous system by which they chose representatives and ordered their affairs. And when it was suggested, in London, that the province was too small for representative institutions, he replied in his inimitable way that a flea might be a small creature, but in his country they found it very inconvenient inside their trousers.

British immobility in conceding a measure of responsible government to the Frontier released other forces, without which even Abdul Qayyum might have found it difficult to convince Round Tables of the dangers of underrating a proud people. There arose a new political party in the villages, a party which, in the complete absence of the ballot-box or any form of expression by parliamentary means, was necessarily conceived first as a pressure group and subsequently as a mass movement for agitation against the established order. By a political paradox not uncommon in Asian affairs this party, aspiring to appeal to a population almost entirely Muslim, came to own an allegiance to the Congress Party of India, overwhelmingly Hindu (if professedly non-sectarian) in its leaders and its inspiration. But in the beginning its executive, organized territorially, was referred to on the Frontier as 'the Afghan Jirga', and its shock-troops, uniformed but unarmed, as the Khudai Khidmatgaran, or Servants of God. Since these were attired in garments dyed a dingy plum-colour, they soon acquired the sobriquet of Surkhposhan, or Red-shirts.

There emerged as leaders of this party two men destined to attain to fame on a wider stage than the Frontier, Dr. Khan Sahib and his younger brother Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The sons of a Muhammadzai Khan in the village of Utmanzai in the Hashtnagar area of the Peshawar district, they came of well-to-do land-owning stock, and were popularly known as the Khan brothers. Dr. Khan, the elder, took a medical degree in England, married an Englishwoman, and joined the Indian Medical Service; he was for a time the medical officer to a battalion of the Guides. His brother took a different line. He has affected all his life the traditional dress and habit of a Pathan villager of the old school. He understands but
The Indian Congress led by Gandhi and Nehru, stood, at least openly, against a communal platform based on religious differences, and had succeeded within India in winning to its counsels some Muslims from ancient centres of Muslim culture such as Delhi and Lucknow. But they were few. On the Frontier the story was different. There were many currents in the Red-Shirt movement, but its impetus came originally from the British failure to grant to the Pathans the system of representative institutions set up elsewhere in the sub-continent in 1920. So once more, as in the days of the Roshaniyya and the Mujahidin of Ahmad Shah Brelwi, the fire swept across the dry stubble. Once more frustrated, the Pathans turned to the only effective political organization at that time in the field — the Indian Congress. The Congress, working for a united India, seized the occasion with both hands. The enormous preponderance of Muslims in the Frontier population discounted any fears of Indian domination, and Congress could give what the Pathan needed, namely backing, organizational and financial, to fight the British for his rights. Thus, at first, communal fears did not arise, and the alliance was made.

Locally there was another strand in the new movement. All Pathan societies are subject to a double disability. There is, first, the envy caused by faction even within a family, much more upon a tribal or a national stage. The leading Khans had always their opponents even within their own class, ready to pull down their pretensions. The tendency is that so much deplored by Khushhal Khatak and enshrined in the proverb: A dog finds a bone and all the other dogs crowd round to snatch it. Second, there is the fact that in every village, below the Pathan landowners, is to be found a body of artisans and servants, hewers of wood and drawers of water, a kind of helot class, usually surviving from
earlier conquered populations, speaking the language and generally following the customs of the landowner but not his social equal. The new movement, led by smaller Khans in the Pathan family-tree, worked to organize the helots against the greater land-owners, and on that score it prospered with the coming of the vote and the consequent egalitarian result. For this reason, when in the end representative institutions with a wide franchise came to the Frontier, it was not long before Congress won the elections.

At one time the Frontier Congress established something very close to a parallel government in the districts and had to be brought under restraint, the Khan brothers suffering arrest and detention. But the leaven had done its work, and in 1932 the North-West Frontier was raised from a Chief-Commissionerate to a Governor’s province, with political rights and institutions equal to those available in the rest of the sub-continent. Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum became its first Minister. Subsequently in 1937 the Pathan province shared with all other provinces the further advance towards self-government under the 1935 Government of India Act. This second advance almost coincided in time with Abdul Qayyum’s death and the access to power on a much wider franchise of Dr. Khan Sahib, who became Chief Minister of the province. His brother, like Gandhi in India, remained outside, the recognized leader of the Frontier Congress in the villages. He had chosen the role of power without responsibility.

I have suggested certain reasons why important elements among the Pathans in the 1920-40 period were prepared to accept an alliance with the Indian Congress. Even so, it is hard to see how the Pathan tradition could reconcile itself for long to Hindu leadership, by so many regarded as smooth-faced, pharisaical and double-dealing. The Pathan never regarded himself as an Indian; he still spoke daily of going to, or coming from, Hindustan, a country that began vaguely somewhere the other side of the Margalla Pass. How then could he have associated himself with a party under Indian, even Brahmin, inspiration?

The answer is not in much doubt. There were the temporary advantages in an alliance with Congress, already detailed. But not even the Frontier Congress leaders could conceive of future conditions in which it would ever be possible for a Hindu-dominated government to tell the Pathans what to do or how to do it.
had sung Khushhal Khan. Sher Shah was the hero in history of all good Pathans, not only of Dr. Khan Sahib. In good time, when the British had gone, that predominance would come again; meanwhile what was the harm of using Congress money and Congress brains? So thought many, and lulled conscience to sleep.

The birth of an articulate Muslim movement in undivided India was slow and in its beginnings uncertain. Only when the British Government's move to bring British authority to an end acquired a momentum so unmistakable that even the unbelieving were compelled to read the signs, often against their will, only then was the two-nation theory translated into practical politics. The Pakistan idea appealed at first mainly to the Muslim populations down-country, where Muslims, though culturally well-established and proud of a long history, were numerically swamped by Hindus. Jinnah, though born in Karachi, had made his home in Bombay, and Liaquat Ali came from the heart of Hindustan, a district close to Delhi. For some years the Muslims of the Panjab, in a small majority in that province over Sikhs and Hindus combined, resisted the leadership of Jinnah and declined to join the Muslim League. On the Frontier, where Muslims formed 94 per cent of the population, Dr. Khan Sahib with his Congress affinities retained power even against the challenge of an election. The two-nation theory was in the balance, and its acceptance still uncertain.

During the war years the hand of British authority remained firm, and until 1943, when the tide of war turned against the Axis Powers, no man on the Frontier or in northern India dreamed that the end was so near. With victory, just as in 1919, the grip was loosened, a Government determined to disengage was elected in London, and a sense of general dissolution came to pervade the air. As the realization grew that the end of British authority was really planned, the Frontier leaders began to wonder where they stood. Could they afford upon the Frontier to play at feuds and factions, to angle for Hindu support, now that the barriers were coming down? They hesitated, and Nehru, the new Foreign Minister — the post he held carried conviction — came up to Peshawar to rally his supporters. It was a brave effort, but ill-conceived and bound to fail; it was also fatal to those who thought
in terms of a united India. The majority of Pathans thought they were witnessing the impossible about to happen — Afghan submission to direction and homily by a Brahmin, another Birbal, vastly arrogant. They would have none of it in plains or hills. The flags of Islam were unfurled and Jinnah had his way. Dr. Khan and his brother were swept from power. On 15th August, 1947, after a plebiscite, the Frontier Province, with every sign of enthusiasm, became a part of Pakistan. And in November of the same year this lead was followed by all the tribes up to the Durand Line and the Chiefs of the four Frontier States of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb, the former signifying their loyalty in open jirga, the latter their allegiance by means of Instruments of Accession.

It should not be supposed that the tribes or chiefs across the border had stood by uncaring, while thought was concentrated on political and constitutional development on the larger stage. They had not been impressed by the manoeuvres of the Frontier Congress, and spasmodic endeavour to gain a Congress following among them had met on the whole with small response. The tribal influence, such as it was, was cast on the side of Jinnah's forthright appeal to Islam in peril; Abdul Ghaffar Khan's ideas seemed to them at best equivocal and over-subtle, at worst disloyal to the Pathan canon which calls for at least some service to the idea of Muslim solidarity. Feelings of this kind strengthened within the districts also, and a new direction seemed overdue. This coincided with a dramatic move by the Kabul Government, and was a potent factor in bringing into the open the political theory which has come to be known as Pakhtunistan or the Land of the Pathans.

This Pakhtunistan, as viewed from Kabul and from Peshawar, has assumed very different shades of meaning. In his time the Durrani king, Amanullah, had worn Pathan dress and sought to address jirgas in Pashtu specially memorized for the occasion, Pashtu had been declared the national language of Afghanistan (though few in Kabul could speak or read it), and later Nadir and his successors both derived advantage, and suffered discomfort, from their relations with the tribes. It is never to be forgotten that the present ruling family are the direct descendants of the Peshawar Sardars; the present King, Zahir Shah, and his leading ministers are the great-great-grandsons of Sultan Muhammad Khan. The lure of Peshawar is a passion, deep in their hearts. Before the transfer of power in 1947 the Afghan Government
translated these desires into a formal claim that in the event of the demission of British authority the whole Pathan country as far as the Indus should revert to Afghan sovereignty.

Subsequently this claim has been dressed in new garments. In Afghan official pronouncements it now appears as one for the creation of a separate Pathan State, to be carved apparently out of Pakistan. While brotherly relations would exist between such a State and Kabul, there is no overt demand for political amalgamation. At the same time the Afghan Government affirms that the Durand Line has lapsed with the demission of British power, and, this being so, it is impossible to fix a western boundary for their assumed Pakhtunistan. Lastly, the real considerations behind the claim are revealed by complete silence on the part of Kabul as to the inclusion in this Pakhtunistan of any of the Pakhtu- or Pashtu-speaking areas in Afghanistan. A little reflection will make it clear that these points, taken together, disclose the Afghan case as one prompted by a veiled irredentism. The attitude of the Pakistan Government to these claims in their international bearing is to stand as the successor State on the rights and duties inherited from the British Government in India — an attitude in which the United Kingdom Government has expressed its public agreement.12

The case for a Pathan State within Pakistan, as put by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and others who support him is rather different. The picture is obscure, but it seems to be one of semi-autonomy, not playing into the hands of Kabul but realizing Pathan national consciousness as a force which calls for a separate organism to express it. Such a Pakhtunistan would no doubt be in relations with the country or countries to the east, possibly both Pakistan and India. Those who support this concept hardly pause to consider the viability of such a state; the Frontier has always required support, financial and other, from the larger unit to which it has formed the shield. But there should not be denied to them some tribute of respect for their sincerity; the sword of Sher Shah and the winged words of Khushhal stir them in an endeavour to achieve a separate destiny. And now not only has this picture faded like a dream; even that North-West Frontier Province, the limited stage on which heretofore they could walk, seems to them to have lost its identity, merged in a larger whole.13 To the passionate Pathan individualist the slogan ‘One-unit’ seems far from attractive.
Peshawar — Khar or the City, as they call it — is no longer a capital, and where stand the Pathans? To men like Abdul Ghaffar all this is bitterness. The raunag, the lustre, is dimmed, the glory departed.

Where, then, stand the Pathans? I have said that in 1900 Curzon was right. Lacking full vision, he succeeded in strengthening a common Pathan consciousness, and so did much to enlist a powerful force in the making of a sub-continent. But it does not follow that what Curzon did at that time should remain unaltered in the very different conditions that prevail half a century later. For one thing, the Pathans, and not only those in the districts, have now learned to look unmistakably to the east for education, service and all the higher things of life; the social, economic and political ideas of Durranis have become to them an anachronism. For them Kabul irredentism is empty of meaning; political amalgamation, should it ever come, would take a very different shape. Peshawar would absorb Kabul, not Kabul Peshawar. Moreover, however valuable as a focus of loyalty in the earlier days, this small province had become top-heavy with all the accretions of representative government. A parochial tinge was all too observable in its political life. And finally, Pathan genius has frequently shone most brilliantly away from home; as captains and kings in far-away lands Pathans have blazoned a name whose glory flashes back to their own mountains. There is more honour to be won by the ruler beyond the Indus than by the raider on the border. At least, so thought Dr. Khan, and on this issue broke with his brother.

The Pathan future is not in doubt; it lies, as it has always lain, with the people of the Indus Valley. The force of Pathan character, the bravery of the Pathan soldier, the shrewdness of Pathan assessments of political realism, once carried the forebears of this people to high positions of authority outside their own country. So it will be again, and the more easily in the light of the renascence in the home-land, to which in their hearts they return, however far away. They need have no fear that they cannot pull their weight in a larger organism; they are like the Scots in Great Britain. Like other Highlandmen, the Pathans of Pakistan will be found before long to be largely in control of the fortunes of their country. Dr. Khan Sahib's emergence as the first Premier of the new West Pakistan was their finest augury.

Yet, before it is too late, let it be remembered that every step
upon this Frontier, forward, sideways or back, attracts the ultimate responsibility of the Central Government for the safety of the State. Day-to-day business cannot be conducted with the tribes from Karachi or Lahore; they are too far away and they lack the Frontier atmosphere. Some measure of decentralization will be needed if Frontier problems are to be met resolutely and in time.

And there, after a course extending over more than two thousand years, I must leave the argument, happy in the conviction that the last batch of Englishmen who served this people 'got to know the tribes better and better, till at the end they knew them better than ever before'. Of these, as friends still living, I may not write, except to say that they were in very deed a band of brothers, each of whom carries away in his heart as much as he poured out, or more.

The last of them before the transfer of power was the writer of these pages, and this is his testimony.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION pp. xiii–xxii

1. The present Lord Zetland, India, a Bird's-eye View, 1924, p. 40 et seq.
2. British envoy to Court of Shah Shuja in 1809: Will appear again.
3. E.g., the change of ā to a rounded ō.
4. In the plural both syllables undergo a vowel change, and Pakhtun becomes Pakhtanah.
5. See Appendix B.
6. Originally a Multani and Baluch word for a mountain, applied by the people of Multan and the Derajat to the mountain wall of the Takht-i-Sulaiman, and so to the Pathan country.
7. The Narrow Smile, 1933, p. 97.
8. One of the world's great mountains, height 23,426 feet.
10. Samah, Pakhtu for Plain, is applied to that part of the Peshawar Valley north of the Landai River.
11. 26,620 feet, higher than Tirich Mir.
13. For certain works published in Kabul since 1940, and professing to be anthologies of much earlier verse, see article 'Afghan' by Morgenstierne in Encyclopedia of Islam, Fascicule 4, 1955, p. 220. Their authenticity is doubtful.

CHAPTER I pp. 3–24

1. Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, John Murray, 1815, p. 138. See Chapter XVII.
2. Vol. I, fasciculus 4, issued in 1915, article 'Afghan'.
3. Afghan Treasure-house or 'Magazine'. Dorn called his translation History of the Afghans.
4. Rob is not a Pakhtu or Pashtu word for 'mountain', as so many writers wrongly affirm. The Pakhtu word is ghar (ח). Rob is a Southern Panjabi word for mountain, used by the Panjabis and Jats of Multan and the Derajat, seeing the western mountain-wall of the Sulaimans from their plains. It is also used by the Derajat Baluch tribes. As usual, Elphinstone, the oldest writer on the subject in English, has got it right; p. 132, op. cit.
5. Assyriology establishes that Shalmaneser died before capture of Samaria, the actual conqueror having been Sargon II (722–705 B.C.). See also Isaiah xx, 1.
7. Elphinstone wrote his great work on 'Afghanistaun' in 1814 when the Khai-bar Pass was under Durrani Afghan sovereignty.
10. The Arabic form of Kish, and thus the same name as that of Saul's father. There is no mention of this Qais in any Arab historian.
THE PATHANS

11. E.g., among the Tiwana and Noon families of Shahpur in the Panjab. They are not Pathans. The use of kingly titles by ordinary notables is common in the Khurasani world. E.g., Badshah for Sayyids, and Mehtar (Prince) for Tajik notables. The title Khan itself, now usurped by all and sundry but originally used for the hereditary head of a tribe, is a case in point. The same applies to Shah and Sultan.


13. Author of the Kitab-al-Yamini, a history of Mahmud and his father, Sabuktagin.

14. The Sayyids are descended from the Prophet through the union of his daughter Fatima with Ali, the fourth Caliph. A few are genuine, all claim to be the progeny of some holy man of the past.

15. Abdul Jabbar Shah died on 21st November, 1956, after this was written.

16. The belief in one God.

17. The tables which follow should be examined with the tribal map.

18. The cerebral mr in Pakhtu and Pashtu, sometimes transliterated rn, is nasal and hard for a European to pronounce. An effort to vocalize mr through the nose gets somewhere near it.

19. Except that they are descended from Sarbanr, the Muhammedzais of Hashtnagar have nothing to do with those in Table I.

20. Khulasat-al-Ansab (Genealogical Summary), cited on p. 122 of the second part of Dorn’s History of the Afghans. See also Bellew, op. cit., p. 91.


22. Pace Raverty, the name here is spelt Ghalji, and not in the Persianized form Ghilzai, because it is as Ghalji that the tribes refer to themselves. Again, Elphinstone, calling them Ghiljies, gets it right.

23. The Pashtu words are Gbal (ج) = thief, with -zai = Mac in Gaelic. The corrupted words show the scribe’s ignorance of Pashtu, and of the tribe’s real name, Ghalji.

24. The suggestion is that Shaikh Bani exclaimed, ‘Ibrahim lojday’ (إيبرهم لرو دکی),’ which means literally ‘Ibrahim is great’, or ‘Ibrahim is grown-up’, not ‘Ibrahim is the elder’, which would be ‘Ibrahim masbhr day’. Again the scribe is not well up in Pashtu.


26. These are not Baluch, and must not be confused with them. They are accounted as Sayyids, and held in high esteem.

27. These events took place in 1707–29. See Chapter XVI.

28. No attempt will be made in this book to give the detail of the many clans and septs into which the great Ghalji tribe is divided. Those who are interested will find an accurate and elaborate treatment of the whole subject in J. A. Robinson’s Nomad Tribes of Eastern Afghanistan, a publication of the pre-1947 Government of India.

29. Corruption of Karlanris.


31. See Table I above. Urmar is the youngest of Sharbhubun’s sons, and adopted only at that. Some of his putative descendants today still have their own separate language.

32. Raverty (Notes on Afghanistan, pp. 381–2) gives numerous versions of this tale, treating each variant as if it were serious history. As usual, he is quite unable to separate the grain from the chaff.

33. The disappearance of the Dilzaks — see pp. 165 and 175.

34. Like the three Wallops in Hampshire, Upper, Middle and Nether Urmar.
35. Arabic plural of Sayyid.
36. The thesis that the appellation Pakhtun-Pashtun is in its origins more properly to be attributed to the highland tribes only, finds some etymological support in Morgenstierne's *Etymological Vocabulary of Pushtu*. He there suggests a connection with the Avestic *parsta*, 'back', used for a ridge or height. Compare also Raverty, *Notes*, p. 467, deriving Pushtun [sic] from the Tajik (Persian) *pusht*, 'back', with an attributed secondary meaning 'mountain-ridge'. This secondary meaning does not appear in the dictionaries, and may have been suggested to the etymologists by the Pusht-i-Kuh mountains of the Perso-Iraq border.

CHAPTER II pp. 25-42

1. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, p. 86, suggests that Gandhara had broken away from Persian rule under the later Achaemenids. There seems to be no positive proof to that effect.


4. Herodotus lived *circa* 486-426 B.C., and is supposed to have read his history to the Athenians in 446 B.C.

5. For the Achaemenian inscriptions see Kent, *Old Persian Grammar*, 1950.


7. *Notes on Afghanistan*, *passim*, and see particularly *p. 236 fn.*

8. The Greek of the italicized words is: οἱ δὲ ὀρμηθέντες έκ Κασπατύρων τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς Πακταύκης γῆς ... καὶ τῶν 'Ινδών Κασπατύρω τε πόλι καὶ τῆς Πακταύκης χώρη εἰς πρόσωπα τοὺς ...


10. The stress on the second syllable in the word Peshawar is very strong indeed. Possibly the position of the Greek accent in the word Paskápuros may be called in as additional evidence to the probability of the equation proposed.

11. Even two of the Herodotean manuscripts give Κασταύκυροι in the first passages cited in this chapter, showing (i) a correspondence with Hecataeus as regards the penultimate syllable, and (ii) a scribal transposition similar to that of Πασκάπυρος for Κασταύκυροι here proposed. For this point I am indebted to Mr. David Lewis, Classical Tutor at Christ Church, Oxford.


13. II, 70; Kaibel I, p. 165.


15. The text is as follows:

Parthian — HNPRSH 'L PSHKBUR
Greek — ιῶς εὐπροοθέν Πασκάπυρων (gen. neut. plur.).

Critics have doubted the identification with Peshawar for reasons which seem oversubtle and which introduce difficulties greater than those they set out to solve. The interpretation of the above must be: 'as far as in front of Paskiboura', i.e., presumably on the River Indus, which more than once marked the boundary of Persia and India. Yet Kramers and Maricq actually state, 'Peshawar is in no way fitted by its geographical position to serve as a frontier town.' To one who has served in a Frontier Province with capital at Peshawar such comments smell of the lamp.


18. There is another possible pointer to this equation. The tradition of the naming of the Khataks runs that Luqman, their progenitor, had bad luck in a lottery for four girls, having the ugliest allotted to him. His companions then mocked him, saying in Pashtu: "Luqmān puḥ khata kṣe lār, Luqman has put his foot in the mud. The tribal name Khatak is thus derived from the words khaṭa kṣe.

It will be observed that the second of these words Kṣe preserves the ṣb of the Achaemenian Thatagush. If a phonetic change of ṣb to Ḹb is possible, the words are identical. There is no Ḹb in Pakhtu/Pashtu, so the transference may not be so unreasonable. Compare Carthago, καρθαγόνων.

19. έδως μὲν Περσικὸν καὶ φωνῇ, ακεύην δὲ μεταξὺ ἔχουσιν πεποιημένην τῆς τε Περσικῆς καὶ τῆς Πακτικῆς.


21. Travels into Bokhara, 1834, p. 144.


CHAPTER III pp. 43-57

1. Hogarth, Philip and Alexander of Macedon, John Murray, 1897, p. 201. Old, but the most readable account of Alexander's campaigns.

2. Καὶ τοῖς ὅραιοις Ἰνδοῖς καλουμένους . . .

3. East of Tehran and close to the Caspian Gates. Called by the Greeks Hecatompylus.


7. Not to be confused with Bagram = Peshawar. For the remarkable archaeological discoveries at Kapisa-Bagram see Hackin, Nouvelles recherches archéologiques à Bagram, 1935. A popular treatment is given in Wheeler's Rome beyond the Imperial Frontiers, Pelican, 1935.

8. See p. 36 supra.

9. Alexander had killed Cleitus in Bactria, but the formation was still called by his name.

10. Since the first edition of this book was published, important excavations on the Bala Hissar site in Charsadda have been carried out under direction of Sir Mortimer Wheeler. Generally, they confirm Arrian's account of the siege of Peucelaotis.

11. E.g. Tarn, op. cit., p. 8, stating as a fact that the Khai bar was used.


13. Called the Khosapes by Aristotle, Strabo and Curtius. See p. 37 (last chapter).


15. As far as I know, I make this identification for the first time. It is, I think, quite as reasonable as Stein's identification of Bazir with Birkot.

16. This is taken from Plutarch's Alexander, 28, quoting the 5th Book of the Iliad, line 340:

'τούτο μὲν,' εἶπεν, ἦς φίλοι, τὸ ῥέον
ἀλμα καὶ οὖκ —
ιξύρ. οἷος πέρ ἐν ῥέσι μακάρεσοι θεοίσων.'

17. For Babur's wanderings in these passes, see Chapter X, p. 160.
18. The Khans of the Kana and Ghorband Valleys in this region are Yusufzais, but the population is Gujar.
19. Khur or kho is the Pakntu word for good = Greek eu. See p. 37.
20. Neither Hogarth nor Tarn attempts any identification of the Aspasii etc. After writing this chapter I have found similar identifications in M'Crindle's *Alexander's Invasion of India*, Constable, 1896.

**CHAPTER IV pp. 58-69**

4. See Appendix A.
5. vii, 64.
7. See McGovern, op. cit., Chapters II and III and Herodotus iii, 93.
10. Cf. Mortimer Wheeler, *Rome beyond the Imperial Frontiers*. An entirely opposite view is taken by Tarn, pp. 373 ff. op. cit., who believes the Buddha statue evolved in Gandhara must be dated to the time when Greek power in that region was a living thing. Wheeler admits, p. 198 op. cit., that the period of Graeco-Bactrian rule 'had prepared the way'.
11. Further investigations of sites, particularly Pushkalavati (Charsadda) might well throw more light.
12. Compare Horace, *Odes* iii, 5:

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milesne Crassi conjuge barbara
sur pis maritus vixit . . .
sub rege Medo Marsus et Apulus:
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lamenting the shame undergone by the Roman soldiers in captivity.
14. *Sermo his inter Scythicum Medicumque medius et strimique mixtus*, Justin, XLI.
15. This has already been discussed in Chapter II, pp. 35-7.
16. f, d, r, ́mr = φ - s - 4 - 4 in Pashtu-Pakhtu. The first three of these are pronounced rather as t, d, r in normal English. The last is very hard for an Englishman. An attempt to pronounce ́mr through the nose gets near it.
17. Modern Persian has no genders, and I have not been able to uncover positive evidence of genders in Old Persian. In Avestan and East Iranian dialects, e.g., Sogdian and Khotanese, there is evidence of genders, but this trend on the Indian periphery reinforces the argument.
18. Both in Pakhto-Pashto and in Hindi, in the past tenses of transitive verbs, the subject is placed in an oblique agentive case and the object may (in Pakhto-Pashto must) be in the nominative. In Pakhto-Pashto, moreover, the verb then agrees with the object in gender, number and person. Thus: 'I struck her (a woman)' appears as, 'By me she stricken,' she being nominative and the verb third person singular in the feminine. 'He struck us' would appear as, 'We by him stricken, we being nominative and stricken first person plural. This can be called a passive construction. It does not apply to present tenses; 'I strike you' standing with subject and object as in English.
20. As argued by F. W. Thomas, 'Sakastana', *J.R.A.S.*, 1906, p. 211. Cf. also the River Khosapes (Kunar), the river of the good horse, crossed by Alexander.
1. The Sarangai of Herodotus, cf. iii, 93 and vii, 67.
2. This changed to Sijistan, then Seistan, and now Sistan.
3. Eight miles north of Mardan, now well known as the site of a sugar-mill, but formerly for its Buddhist monasteries.
5. This ruler appears only as Soter Megas — the Great Deliverer.
6. The identification is not in doubt, and is based partly on references by the Chinese pilgrims Fa-Hien and Huien-Tsang to Po-lu-sha and Po-lu-sha-po-lu respectively. The correspondence with the Greek Paskapum and the later Sassanian Paskiborum is clear enough. It is of interest that, after destroying Taxila, the Kushans chose Peshawar, not Pushkalavati (Charsadda) for their capital.
7. Cf. McGovern, op. cit., p. 248. 'The Hindus were never able to produce a history of themselves, much less throw any light upon the alien peoples who invaded and conquered them.' Al-Biruni and Elphinstone had said it before him. Latter-day endeavours to put this right are more successful, e.g., Mr. Panikkar's Survey of Indian History, and many learned numismatic researches by distinguished Indian scholars.
10. Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 195 et seq., to which this summary is owing.
11. These treasures are not confined to representations of the Buddha or his life. They include Western mythology, e.g. a Trojan Horse relief discovered on a well near Hund in 1923.
12. Munshi Ghulam Hussain in his Riyaz-ut-Salatin. He was a Pathan writing in Bengal in the eighteenth century.
13. 'He in consequence was born as a deluder in the form of Buddha, the son of Jina. By him the Asuras were deceived, for, being induced to abandon the religion of Vedas, they lost all power as warriors.'
15. The Gupta dominion never extended to Gandhara or even to the Indus.

CHAPTER VI pp. 81–90

1. Hindal-al-Alam, V. Minorsky, Translation and Commentary, pp. 327, 347, 362. See also Note 14 below.
3. Cf. Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyam:
   And Bahram, that great Hunter — the wild Ass
   Stamps o'er his Head but cannot break his sleep.
4. Tora Khan and Mihr Gul are common Pathan names today.
5. The location of the various capitals in the north in pre-Muslim times, Purushapura (Paskapura), Taxila and Sakala, bears an interesting comparison with the present sites of Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Lahore.
7. Rightly he does not count Persians as foreigners.
NOTES

14. The *Hudud-al-Á¡am* (The Limits of the World) is an anonymous Persian geography written in A.D. 982, translated by V. Minorsky with a full commentary and issued by the Gibb Memorial Trustees in 1937. Minorsky's work, one may say humbly, is a compilation displaying the most astonishing erudition and scholarship. See pp. 347 and 362 of this work.
15. See Chapter IX, p. 130.
16. *Travels in Balochistan, etc.*, Preface to l. i, xiii, 1842.

CHAPTER I pp. 91-102

5. The site of Bust has been investigated in Schlumberger's recent excavations with striking results.
6. The form of this word is impossible to decipher; the pointing in the Arabic texts always varies. Raverty suggests it stands either for the Hindi Ratanpal or Ranthel, the Warthruster (on the analogy of Ranji, the war-victor). The 'Rutbil' was certainly no Muslim.
7. Raverty, *Notes on Afghanistan*, p. 319, has a long passage pouring his usual scorn on the identification with Lahore, and says it should be Ahwaz in Khuzistan close to Basrah. But he sustains his argument by assuming that Muhallab could never have got as far as Lahore, the present capital of West Pakistan. He seems to be unaware of the existence of the village of Lahor near the Indus in Gandhara.
8. See translation in Elliot and Dowson, Vol. VI, p. 568. Farishta's chronicles of these earlier periods are garbled and inaccurate.
10. See Chapter I, p. 10.
11. Arabic plural of Sayyid.

CHAPTER VIII pp. 103-113

1. The older Sakistan, the modern Sistan.
2. Tr. Minorsky, p. 91.
3. The discoverer was Steuart Pears, then Political Agent in the Tochi and afterwards Chief Commissioner N-W.F.P.
4. I use the Persian *izafah* for Yaqub son of Lais, not the Arabic *ibn*, to mark the fact that Yaqub was an Iranian.


9. Systematic excavation at Lahor village and Hund in the Swabi Tahsil of Mardan District might well resolve this puzzle.

10. Presented by Harold Deane about 1897, and now in the Lahore Museum. This Birkot is the place identified by Stein as Alexander’s Bazira — see Chapter III, p. 53.

11. Minorsky’s translation, p. 91. See fn. 14 to Chapter VI.

12. For these references see Sachau’s translation, 1910, i, 21–2, 199, 208, 259, 317, 320.

CHAPTER IX pp. 117–133

1. A search through the eight volumes of Elliot’s translations of original sources discloses only three stray references to Peshawar during all this period.


4. For the Khalji principalities see Elliot, vols. ii and iii. The original sources are the *Tabakat-i-Nasiri* and the *Tarikh-i-Firozshahi*.

5. Of course this Jalaluddin and Alauddin are in no way to be confounded with Jalaluddin Shah of Khwarezm and Alauddin Jahansoz, both of whom also figure in this chapter. The constant use of the same name for quite different individuals is one of the crosses of Muslim history.

6. Chapter VI.

7. Throughout his enormous work *Notes on Afghanistan* (published by the Secretary of State for India in 1888) Raverty constantly reverts to this subject. Specimens of his acrimony will be found on p. 52 fn. and pp. 346 and 669.

8. This myth is given historical colour on pp. 60 ff. of the Addendum to Raverty’s *Notes*.


10. See Minorsky, ‘The Turkish Dialect of the Khalaj’, *B.S.O.S.*, x, 417.

11. Da Bahlol ao da Sher Shah khabare awram
   Chih puh Hind kkhe Puukhtanah wu badshahab;
   Shpog owuh pirai ye hasi badshahi wab,
   Chih puh dwi pere dust khalq wu hairan!

CHAPTER X pp. 134–150

1. Not to be confused with Jalaluddin Khalji, in the last chapter.

2. Timur was lame, and therefore known as Timur Lang, hence Tamerlane.

3. A Delhi corruption of Sarbanri.

4. Abul Fazl was Akbar’s Secretary of State: the *Ain-i-Akbari* is his record of that emperor’s administration.

5. The natural target of the Pathan overlord in India. The stigma could as well be attached to other revenue defaulters.

6. The Hindu sacred city at the confluence of the Ganges and the Jamna. Allahabad, Akbar’s fort at this site, had not then been built. It is Mr. Nehru’s native place.

7. The Indus.

8. The last Lodi, defeated and slain at Panipat, 1526.
NOTES

CHAPTER XI pp. 151-167

1. The oriental plane, most splendid of all deciduous trees.
2. Cf. Elphinstone, op. cit., p. 434. A curious error has crept into the Encyclopedia of Islam, which, confusing Babur with Mahmud, says he was buried in Ghazni.
3. The Judas-tree. The word also means anemone.
4. See Chapter XII following.
5. The Abdalis, later from Ahmad Shah's time known as the Durrani, from whom, in various branches, have been drawn all the royal Afghan houses from 1747 to the present day. Since Ahmad Shah's time the Durrans have been regarded as the Afghan tribe par excellence.
6. Nan pub jir rāṣa ugora
   Sabāb būb pata sum da kado pub gardum.
7. See Table III in Chapter I, p. 13.
8. See Raverty, Notes, p. 128.
9. These three places are mentioned in the Memoirs.
11. In Pakhtu sar tor o hqpe ablab. These are the usual signs of the distraction of a lover among Pathans and others in these parts.
12. A mixed drug containing bhang among other ingredients.
13. Raverty says he was a notorious heretic who came from Khurasan, but this does not get us much further. Notes, p. 247.
14. Hazara District, north of Rawalpindi, not the Hazarajat.
15. See Table II, Chapter I, p. 13.

CHAPTER XII pp. 168-192

1. Races of Afghanistan, pp. 22-3.
2. Chapter I, p. 13. No attempt is made here to break down any of these tribes into their clans and septs. To do so would overload this book. For the Yusufzais clear tables will be found in McMahon's Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajaur. Shajras of all tribes appear in the relevant old Military Reports, now outdated in all other respects.
3. The Akhund Darwazeh, author of another Makhran-i-Afghani, the first extant Pakhtu work, contemporary of the Emperor Akbar (second half of sixteenth century) and the orthodox opponent of the Roshaniyya heresy.
4. Marghab is a plain covered with verdant grass used for lawns, known in Pakhtu as kabū (dub in India). Ghwarah signifies slippery — as butter or gur — with blood.
5. It is fair to say that never once except in pursuit of game did I ever go armed when moving among Pathans. It was better to display trust. It was also better in wild country to avoid walking always along the same route.
6. The present valley of Jalalabad.
7. Some, including Raverty, trace the ancestry of the present rulers of Chitral to this Jangirgiri line.
8. The landscape of the Samah before irrigation is well described in the Pakhtu saying:
   Samah da sbīg pey day; chēr jor bab nab sbi.
   The Samah is a bridge of sand; it can never be built up. During the British period it was built up into a remarkably fertile tract, and the proverb was belied.
9. See chapter on genealogies and Tables.
10. Daftar, a Persian word for register.
11. Tserai, a Pakhtu word meaning divided or allotted.
The Pathans

12. Arabic *thlib* for third party.

13. The *sar-i-maira* is a long low ridge, never more than a few hundred feet above the Samah, sweeping in an arc round its eastern and southern sides, and dividing it from the Indus and Landai rivers. At the Nowshera end of it took place the famous battle of 1823 against the Sikhs.

14. The three Yusuf villages in the plains are Babuzai, Shamozai, and Matta, above Katlang.

15. A form of deputation. For a description see Chapter XXI, p. 331.

16. The Bara is the small river, descending from Tirah, which irrigates the lands of the Mohmands and Khalils close to Peshawar. Owing to the manure-laden silt which it brings down from the heavily grazed Tirah mountains, its waters promote extraordinary fertility. It joins the Landai close to Pabbi.

17. We have it on Elphinstone's authority that the Yusufzais could muster 900,000 spears. This gross exaggeration is based on a Delhi抄ist's error, confusing the Pakhtu *nau* (one) with the Urdu *nau* (nine), the words in Persian script differing in a point only. At no time in history could the Yusufzais have put nearly a million men in the field.

18. In Pakhtu, and Pashtu, the word for cousin is also used for enemy. This story echoes the exchange of courtesies between Cyrus and Tomarys on the River Araxes (Herodotus i, 206-7).


**CHAPTER XIII** pp. 193-204

1. See Chapter XXIV, p. 400.


3. For the Karakar, see Chapter III, p. 53, and Chapter XIV, p. 205. For Saidu, later the capital of Swat State, see Chapter XXII, p. 362.

4. The surveyors have decided that Ilam is 9,200 feet, and Dosirra 10,000 feet, but that has not stopped the dispute.


**CHAPTER XIV** pp. 205-220

1. Unlike Swat, Buner drains directly to the Indus by a small stream, the Barandu, running eastward, in the opposite direction to the river of Swat. The geography is difficult.

2. Chapter III, p. 53.


6. For the geography of what follows see sketch-map at the beginning of Chapter III.

7, 8. Birbal, originally named Mahesh Das, was a poor Brahmin born in Kalpi (Benares) in 1528. Abul Fateh came from Gilan in Persia. He died three years after these events and is buried at Hasan Abdal.
9. Zain Khan subsequently rose to the position of commander of 5,000 and became governor of Kabul. He was a Turk from Herat. Akbar's son Salim, later the Emperor Jahangir, fell in love with and married his daughter (not Nur Jahan). Zain Khan died of drink in 1602.

10. These chronicles are full of words such as fanatics, rebels, brigands, applied to the tribesmen because they had resisted invasion and annexation. The Yusufzais had no allegiance, and were not rebels.


12. This is a different Karappa to that on the Gandab route in Mohmand country.


CHAPTER XV pp. 221-246

1. See Table I in Chapter I, p. 12.


4. Mughal chroniclers, not unlike some later English commentators, are always applying language of this sort to tribesmen fighting for their freedom. This is cited in fn. to Raverty's Notes, p. 394.

5. Lub châ nhub pub Pakhtu kkhe mà mezan mûndale na day,
Mirzâ pub da zâbân kub wayal kare day talâle,
Makhbân mi da A îhûnd pub tamâmi pub naar kkhekbod,
Pub da kkhe naah arûs shtab naah ye babr mà mûndale.

6. Chib dekhma ye da Ashâb o da Aulâd di
Pub wukkhub ye da bekho da tabâr yam;
Da Mazhab isakhtan isâlor di, pindzâb naâ di,
Hanafi Sunni mazhab da din pub kâr yam.

7. Not to be confused with Sayyid Amir, who confined Khushhal.

8. Raverty, Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans, 1867, and Biddulph, Afghan Poetry of the Seventeenth Century, 1890.

9. Here, as often, Pakhtu means not only the language, but the whole way of life and honour of Pathans.

10. The Indus. The word means Father River, Old Man River.

11. The Kabul River.

12. Da âhad bâshâb pub hukm shuam zub âghâb....

13. It is of interest to record that the present Khan of Akora, Khan Muhammad Zaman Khan, is descended direct from Khushhal in the seventh generation. An old man approaching ninety and now blind, he is renowned for the quiet and simple courtesy with which he maintains the style of his ancestors without a trace of ostentation, and winning the respect of all. His hujra is situated in a beautiful spot looking down the Landai River towards Attock. Like his ancestors he too is a poet who has published books of Pakhtu verse, of which the following is a short example:

Dâ misrâl day chib Kashmir jennat nazir day,
Lekin nan kho da dushman pub làr aîr day;
Dâ'ârzi jennat tab pâk kër la mathriko,
Haqiqi Jennat kub ghwaâre dâ tadbir day!

They say Kashmir is paradise enow —
Today the prisoner of an infidel foe —
Soldier, set free this paradise on earth,
If thou to very Paradise wouldst go!
14. There are a number of other Pathan poets of the older days, of whom the best known is Abdurrahman, called Rahman Baba, a Mohmand of Hazarkhan village, close to Peshawar, and a contemporary of Khushhal’s grandson, Afzal. His poems are tinged with Sufism and are mainly of a religious character. He is greatly esteemed.

15. For the timeless character of Khushhal’s poetry see Appendix E.

CHAPTER XVI pp. 249-263

1. In his struggle against the Mughal power Govind had engaged a number of Pathan soldiers of fortune and had been on good terms with them. As he lay dying, he is said to have recognized the justice of his fate and forgiven his assailants. But the incident symbolizes the antagonisms which followed.

2, 3. Muhammad Zaman, descendant of Malik Saddo, was the father of Ahmad Shah and so the progenitor of the Saddozai Kings; Haji Jamal was the father of Painda Khan and first of the Barakzai line.


5. A Nadirshahi means a brutal massacre or reign of terror. The phrase is in constant use in the Urdu of Delhi and Lucknow.


7. The Koh-i-nur is almost certainly the stone mentioned in Babur’s memoirs as one originally acquired by Alauddin Khalji (1296-1316), which came into the hands of the Hindu Rajas of Gwalior and was presented to Humayun by the family of Raja Bikramajit (killed at Panipat in 1526) as a token of gratitude for his protection. Humayun in turn offered it to Babur, who returned it to his son with his blessing. For the next 200 years it formed a part of the hereditary Mughal treasure, and was no doubt worn by Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. Nadir Shah seized it when he captured Delhi in 1739, and, as here related, Ahmad Shah Saddozai got possession of it in 1747 when he made off with Nadir’s treasure. The Saddozais held it until 1800, when the fugitive Shah Zaman secreted it in the wall of Mulla Ashiq’s fort in Shinwari country. Shah Shuja found it in its hiding-place and held it till 1819, when Ranjit Singh extorted it from him. When the British annexed the Panjab in 1849, it came into the hands of the East India Company, who presented it to Queen Victoria in the following year. It was seen by Elphinstone set in a bracelet which Shah Shuja was wearing when receiving the envoy in the Bala Hisar at Peshawar in 1849.

8. Life of Abdurrahman, 1900, i, p. 216.

9. Other authorities give the name Mastan Shah.


11. Originally the twelve hands or tribal confederacies in which the Sikhs organized themselves, each under a Sardar and distinguished by a village or chief’s name. The word misi in Urdu means anything placed in files or ranks, including an office file.


13. Lashkar or lakhir, a tribal armed array.


15. A holy man, or saint.

16. A most expressive term of Afghan Persian, meaning literally ‘King-turning’, or a period of dynastic strife. Afghan history teems with badshahgardi.


18. Some of the originals, painted by one Lieut. Atkinson and once hung in the corridors of the India Office, are now in the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations
offices. They were reproduced in prints, the best collection of which is in Government House, Peshawar. Two are reproduced in this book.

19. Raverty says Arsala was tied to the forelegs of an elephant and crushed to death. This is not what the Mohmands say.

CHAPTER XVII pp. 264–289

1. There is one God.
2. There is a shrine to a Muslim saint on the hill-top; the Sikhs built a holy place of their own, the Panja Sahib, at the hill-foot.
3. This Pathan colony of Khweshgi was settled near Lahore in Babur's time. See p. 164.
5. Cf. the inevitability of the decision that Lahore should become the capital of West Pakistan under 'one-unit' in 1955.
8. The mountain range dividing the plateau of Quetta-Pishin from Kandahar.
10. Elphinstone came of an ancient Scottish baronial family, whose ancestor, the first Baron, fell at Flodden. But, like other Scots in those days, he wrote of England and the English.
11. For Cavagnari see pp. 374 and 389.
12. 'The Pass' is never applied to the Khaibar, but always means the Kohat Pass. The Khaibar is always known by its bare name.
17. Dr. Pennell, Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier.
18. A Frontier officer with a long background of descent from the Durrani governors of Multan once said to me after reading Elphinstone’s Caubul that the older the English book on men and affairs in these parts, the more accurate, the more revealing, the better it is.
19. The Cunningham Bagh, laid out by the Governor, Sir George Cunningham, also occupies a portion of the ground of Shah Shuja’s garden. As it grows up, it will help to recreate a beauty long lost.
20. For the Koh-i-nur see fn. 7 to Chapter XVI.

CHAPTER XVIII pp. 286–306

2. Life of Abdurrahman, 1900, ii, 219.
3. See Tables I and II, Chapter I. The Muhammadzai Durranis are to be distinguished from the Muhammadzais of Hashtrnagar, mentioned by Babur.
4. The account that follows is based on descriptions of the battle by Shahamat Ali, Alexander Burnes, and Cunningham, supplemented by tribal tradition as told me by Yusufzais and Khatakis.
7. Abdul Jabbar Shah died in November 1956 just after this was written.
8. One of the villages on the north bank of the Landai, seized by the Khataks from the Yusufzais in Mughal times — see p. 220.
9. Rai Bareli in Oudh, not the better-known Bareilly in Rohilkhand.
10. Not to be confused with Tank on the Waziristan border.
11. See the first of Khushhal’s poems cited in Chapter XV. The Pakhtu runs:

Hara châr da Pukhtano tar Mughal khab dâb,
Itâfâq warr isakhâb nisbkhâb, der armân!
Da Bahalol ao da Sher Shâb khabare âwram
Chih pab Hind kkkhe Pukhtanâb wu bâdshâbân;
Kub taufiq da ittâfâq Pukhtânâb râmi,
Zor Khushbhâl hab dohârab shi pab dâ dzawân!

CHAPTER XIX pp. 307-326

1. John Murray, 1834.
2. Journeys in Baluchistan, Afghanistan, etc., 3 vols., 1842. Masson was a traveller and archaeologist, induced by Augkland against his better judgment to act as British news-writer in Kabul. He was much respected by the Dost and other Afghan notables, and his writings are revealing.
3. Lahore Political Diaries, 1846-49, iv, 485.
4. Ibid., iv, 278.
5. A small hamsaya tribe, originally holding under the Mohmands, and resident between the Kabul River gorges and the Khaibar around the Tahtara Mt.
6. Published in London in 1847 and given the portentous title: The Sikhs and Afghans, in connection with India and Persia, immediately before and after the death of Ranjeet Singh, from the journal of an expedition to Kabul through the Punjab and the Khyber Pass.
Mohan Lal, Life of Dost Muhammad, i, 257.
Burnes’ published letters of 5.10.1837 and 13.3.1839 with the Government’s replies of 20.1.1838 and 27.4.1839 (Parliamentary Papers, 1839).
9. The Sikhs never entered Waziristan. The reference is to the Sperkai and other Wazirs settled in Bannu.
10. Daur is the Tochi Valley. Tank is the Pathan Sub-division of Dera Ismail Khan towards the hills. There is no connection between the two save in the mind of the draftsman.
11. Gurang is an old name for the piedmont to the Takht-i-Sulaiman.
12. Lahore Political Diaries, iv, 273.

CHAPTER XX pp. 329-345

1. Sahibzada Sir Abdul Qayyum, Political Agent, Khaibar, under Roos-Keppel, co-founder of the Islamia College, and first Minister of the North-West Frontier Province.
2. In the early years Bannu and D.I. Khan were one district.
3. Cherat later became well-known in this way, and its rocks carry the crests of countless British regiments of the line. It is not to be confused with the Charat Pass leading to the Swat Valley, sixty miles further to the north.
4. Forty-one Years in India, 1898, p. 33.
5. Sardar Hayat Khan, C.S.I., ancestor of the well-known Wah family.
6. In 1961 this statue was removed from Delhi and re-erected in the grounds of the Royal Dungannon School in Tyrone, where in 1834-38 Nicholson was educated.
7. The village close to the Margalla monument is named Sang Jani, meaning 'the stone of Jan'. I had always believed that it took its name from John Nicholson’s monument close by. That this is not so is proved by an entry in George Lawrence’s diary dated 12th February, 1847 (Lahore Political Diaries, iv, 314), stating that he visited Sang Jani on that day, i.e. some months before Nicholson’s engagement in the Margalla, ten years before his death, and twenty-one years before the monument was erected! It is clear that Sang Jani is named after another Jan.
8. A Year on the Punjab Frontier.
9. Lahore Political Diaries, v, 49 et seq.
10. Sowan Khan’s son, also Chief of the Ahmadzai Wazirs, was Mani Khan, an immense man 6 feet 6 inches tall, with hands and feet like hams. His grandson, Mir Azem Khan, was known to me.
12. Means ‘Uncle Kishin’. Fort Mackeson, close to the Adam Khel Afridi hills, is still known as Kishingarh, Fort Kishin.
13a. President Ayub is one of these Tarins.
14. The flood is still talked of. Like a similar flood in 1929, it was almost certainly due to the breaking of a glacial dam on the upper river. It washed away Kaya, Khabbal, and Torbela, flooded back up the Landai River, and destroyed the then Sikh fort at Nowshera.
15. George Lawrence, it will be remembered, had been sold by Sultan Muhammad Khan to Chattar Singh. See p. 311. After 1849 Sultan Muhammad had no option, however unwillingly, but to take refuge in Kabul.
16. Campbellpur is named after him.
17. Op. cit., p. 59. This was not the Ali Mardin Khan who betrayed Kandahar to Shah Jahan in 1638 (see p. 224), or the Ali Mardin Khan, governor of Kabul in Shah Jahan’s reign and buried at Mughalpura, Lahore (d. 1657). He seems to have been a Durrani notable of that name in the reign of Timur Shah (1773–93). The other old building is a tomb, once used as a Mess by the Guides and subsequently as the headquarters of a C.M.S. Mission.

CHAPTER XXI pp. 346-359

1. Pakistan has now set up a Mohmand Political Agency.
2. This leniency might involve a departure from custom, but no British authority could take responsibility for infliction of a capital sentence on a trial outside the scope of British law.
5. Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1900, p. 36.
6. This prominent peak is also known as Sakkara.
7. Chamla, though across the border, is inhabited by Mandanr Yusufzais, akin to the Khans of Sudhum.
8, 9. See following Chapter on Ambela Campaign.
CHAPTER XXII pp. 360-369

1. See Chapter XVIII, p. 300.
2. The word is a derivation of the Arabic root *jabada* (*ايجاد*), to strive, and means Zealots or Warriors for the Faith.
3. The father of my friend, Sayyid Abdul Jabbar Shah.
4. Cf. Bellew, *op. cit.*, p. 70. It is a fact that very many talibs, or religious students, are Safis, and that more than one of these have attained repute for holiness. The correspondence Qandhari/Gandhara is suggestive, and the Safis perhaps preserve in this tribal name a memory of pre-Islamic days. This Qandhari has nothing to do with the city or province of Kandahar.
5. The saddle-back mountain overhanging Swabi from the north, at one time, but erroneously, supposed as the site of Alexander's Aornos.
6. The case of Babur, mentioned earlier, was probably the only example outside this rule, and quite exceptional.
7. Unfortunately, the old shrine of carved wood, in the pleasant style of the traditional village carpenter, has been pulled down and replaced by a new plaster structure in questionable taste.
8. The same ambivalence is observable over the present ruling family in Swat, who, although not Sayyids, are addressed as Badshah, meaning both ruler and spiritual guide. Raverty, *Notes*, p. 251, goes too far in saying a holy man can be given no temporal authority.
9. There is now a fine graded road going up the right-hand spur, 1,000 feet above the gorge, but this was built only twenty years ago. When I first knew the place, one had to struggle up the stream-bed, as did the troops in 1863.
10. *Forty-one Years*, pp. 280-93; and *Story of the Guides*, pp. 87-91.
11. Reynell Taylor, remarking on this campaign, said the crux was in the personal influence of officers. Pay and pensions would be cast to the winds when the honour of the Faith was in the scale, but to turn in his hour of need against the man whom he had proved to be just and worthy, whom he has noted in the hour of danger, and passed as a hero to his family — that is just what a Pathan will not do.

CHAPTER XXIII pp. 370-389

1. Afzal was the father of Abdurrahman, Amir 1881-1901.
2. The Brahui origins are quite uncertain. Their language is said to be Dravidian, and they are largely nomadic. The Baluch are Iranian in stock and language, and extend right into Persia. Both are quite separate from Pathans and Afghans.
3. This compares with about six million on the North-West Frontier.
4. The most compendious authority is Raverty, *Notes*, pp. 616-17. See also Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 449, 496 and 512.
5. For Atkinson's pictures see p. 262 and note 18 on p. 430. These scenes show the countryside to have been much the same in 1840 as it is today.
6. In this description I have confined myself to the Pathan portions of Baluchistan, which were outside Kalat State. The methods adopted in Kalat State were rather different, and are outside the scope of a book on Pathans.
7. *Eighteen Years in the Khyber*, 1900, particularly p. 342.
8. Aslam's son is Brigadier Hisamuddin Khan, so good a friend to so many over the last forty years upon the Frontier.
10. Biland Khel is just opposite Thal on the right bank of the Kurram River. Its occupation by Afghanistan made nonsense of the cession of the Kurram Valley above it and endangered the defences of Thal itself.


12. Durand was Lansdowne's Foreign Secretary. After leaving India he had a distinguished diplomatic career, being appointed Minister in Teheran and Ambassador in Madrid and Washington. At Washington he fell out with Theodore Roosevelt. It is amusing to speculate how far the assonance Durrani-Durand may have been regarded by the Amir as an augury inclining him to look favourably on this envoy.

13. See Appendix B.

14. In 1933, and again in 1935, Upper Mohmand clans from this area — the Bohai Dag — intervened actively against us.

15. See map bound with Chapter XXIV.

16. In 1961 Pakistan began to control Bajaur in co-operation with the Khan of Khar.

CHAPTER XXIV pp. 390-412

1. A glance at the Tribal Map will elucidate the figure used.

2. Author of Mīţh, a Monograph on the Mahsuds, 1931. Resident in Waziristan, 1924-26; Foreign Secretary to the Viceroy, 1929-32.

3. The full story is given in Appendix D and is worth reading.

4. Mahsud Pashtu for Mubarak. Among Pathans a great-uncle counts as a grandparent. For relationship see Table V, p. 21.

5. I don’t think Shahzar intended a pun here, but the correspondence of Wazir = Minister with Wazir, the name of his own tribe, is amusing, and gave the officer an opening which I fear he failed to take. The Pashtu for a hermaphrodite is narshaq.


8. ‘Field’ is good Mahsud Pashtu for war. 18,000 is Ahmad Shah’s computation of the strength of the Mahsud tribe in fighting men in 1760. The Mahsud manpower may be more like 30,000 now, but there has never been a census.

9. On this point Edwardes writes (Lahore Political Diaries, v, 43): ‘The Mullicks talked Pushtoo. The deliberate way in which each delivered his opinion, the expressive gestures with which they enforced it, and the courteous silence observed by all the rest while one was speaking, was a model for any deliberative assembly.’ All who have attended jirgas will testify to the truth of this picture. But jirgas should be confined to the maliks and elders of a tribe.

10. Sarrīshīta, a Persian word meaning literally a connecting thread, so a rule of affinity, a linking-up, and even a usage or a rite which pervades all things. The word has almost a mystical meaning.

11. Razmak was on the Wazir-Mahsud boundary, over which the Mahsuds were encroaching. This facilitated negotiation with the Wazirs.

12. See Tables II and III in Chapter XVII.

13. The cajolery included the payment of a large sum of cash to the Shami Pir. It was worth it, just before the Great War.

CHAPTER XXV pp. 413-420

1. The scheme was sanctioned by the British Government in December 1900. Nearly a year was occupied in putting through the administrative details for the separation.

2. Up to 1920 the only Governors in India were in Madras, Bombay and Bengal, and the head of the Panjāb was a Lieutenant-Governor. After that date the heads of
all major provinces, including the Panjab, became Governors. The Chief Commissioner of the N-W. Frontier Province was promoted to the rank of Governor in 1932.

3. Ronaldshay (now Marquess of Zetland), The Life of Lord Curzon, 1928, ii, p. 136, is a completely fair record.

4. The Indian Political Service was the Viceroy's diplomatic corps. It served in Indian States, on the N-W. Frontier and Baluchistan, in the Persian Gulf and in diplomatic and consular posts on the perimeter.

5. I venture to propound this conclusion, having served in both provinces.

CHAPTER XXVI pp. 421-438

1. A notable instance is General Iskander Mirza, first President of Pakistan.

2. A word is needed here for him who does not know Persian. *Shir* or *Sher* means a lion, pronounced in the Persian and the Afghan way. As we know, the Afghans despise the Persians as soft creatures. The jest is a good example of chiasmus.


3. Not to be confused with Abdul Qayyum Khan, Kashmiri, Premier N-W. Frontier Province for some years after 1947.

4. For the Akhund see Chapter on Ambela, p. 362.

5. See Chapter on Akbar, etc., p. 205.


7. The Chief of Amb and Tanawal resides at Darband in the Hazara district. Neither he nor the people of his tribe are Pathans, and they are therefore outside this story. The Chiefs of Amb, however, exercise authority over a small area below Mahaban west of the Indus, and have in the past wielded influence in Buner and among the Isazai Yusufzais of the Indus Valley.

8. Since 1947 the Pakistan Government has greatly developed the building of schools in tribal areas and the bursary system.

9. *Hadūkay chib spay mūmi, no nūr spī ṭol warta ādregī.*

10. Sir A. Q. was able to maintain his position under the new constitution only for six months, and died shortly after being replaced by Dr. Khan Sahib.

11. *Da Bahiol ū da Sher Šahē khabare āwram Chib jūb Hind ākhe Pukhtānab wu Bādshāhān...*  

12. See Appendix B.

13. In October 1955 all the provinces of the Indus basin, including the N-W.F.P., were merged in a single West Pakistan. It does not follow that the future will follow the exact pattern of the 1955 merger. There is Pathan pride to be considered.

14. Dr. Khan Sahib was assassinated in Lahore in May 1978 while the first edition of this book was in the press. A true Pathan, he held on to his assailant and before succumbing delivered him over to arrest.

15. Philip Woodruff The Guardians, p. 198, taken from Sir George Cunningham's words.
APPENDIX A

DYNASTIC FRAMEWORK

Note: This Table shows dynasties which controlled Gandhara (Peshawar Valley) or, in later years, had Afghan and Pathan subjects. Only those rulers known to have themselves influenced the course of history in this area are mentioned.

The Umayyid and Abbasid Caliphates never reached east of the Helmand and are therefore excluded. For similar reasons I exclude the Afghan dynasties of Delhi — Khalji, Lodi and Sur — which never controlled west of the Indus. Both Muhammadzai Barakzai dynasties are included, although they never controlled Peshawar.

(L = local capital)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynasty</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Date-bracket</th>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Iranian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Seleucus lived till 280 B.C. but was expelled from Gandhara in 305.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hellenic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In Bactria dynasty founded 236 B.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Indian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scythian nomads, akin to Parthians.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Iranian with Greek veneer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. White Hun (alias Ephthalite or Haytal (Turkish)</td>
<td>Bakh, L. Sakala (Sialkot)</td>
<td>A.D. 455–550</td>
<td>Toramena, Mihiragula.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. (a) Kabul Shahi. (b) Uncertain, but near Ghazni.</td>
<td>(b) Rutil or Zunbil (Turco-Iranian)</td>
<td>A.D. 650–870</td>
<td>(a) Spalapati? (Kallar). (b) Rutil, a title, name unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Hinduushahiya (as 12, but Indianized)</td>
<td>Ohind (Hund or Lahor on Indus in Gandhara)</td>
<td>A.D. 870–1021</td>
<td>Samand, Kamalu, Bhim, Jaipal, Anandpal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>Capital</td>
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<td>Rulers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delhi.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Muhd-i-Sam.</td>
<td>Controlled Ghazni.</td>
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<td>Delhi dynasties failed to control from their side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>Capital</td>
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<td>Rulers</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Sikh Shahi</td>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>A.D. 1823–46</td>
<td>Ranjit Singh, d. 1839</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Panjabi)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Durrani;</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>A.D. 1826–28</td>
<td>The Dost, Sher Ali,</td>
<td>Ranjit began ruling about 1800, but only took</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadzai,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abdur Rahman, Habibullah,</td>
<td>Peshawar in 1823.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barakzai I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amanullah, Nadir Shah,</td>
<td>These dynasties never held Peshawar, but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Afghan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zahir Shah.</td>
<td>ruled over about half the Afghans and Pathans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Barakzai II.</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>A.D. 1929–47</td>
<td>East India Co. to 1858,</td>
<td>Took over from Sikhs after Sikh Wars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Afghan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>thereafter the Crown.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Delhi, L.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Peshawar.</td>
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APPENDIX B

THE DURAND LINE

I. Extracts from Durand Agreement.
(Signed in Kabul by Amir Abdurrahman on 12th November, 1893.)

1. The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement.

2. The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown on the map attached to this agreement.

Note: The rest of the agreement comprises only details of the various tracts over which one or the other side will relinquish claims, e.g., the Amir agreed to cease interference in Swat, Bajaur and Chitral, also in Wazir and Daur country, and the British in Birmal. The agreement also increased the Amir's subsidy.

With two exceptions, and wherever accessible (in the north mountains prohibited), the line was demarcated on the ground, and boundary pillars were erected. These have now disappeared. The first omission, on the Chitral border, was rectified during World War II.

The second relates to the sector from Nawa Sar (on the dividing range between Kunar and Bajaur) and the Sikaram peak (at the western end of the Sufed Koh overhanging the Paiwar Kotal). This sector passes through (and divides) Mohmand country, and includes the Khaibar, and Afridi boundaries towards Afghanistan. A small piece of this at the western exit of the Khaibar Pass was demarcated in 1919 after the Third Afghan War. The rest of the sector has never been demarcated on the ground. This is not of great importance along the
great range of the Sufed Koh, 10,000 to 16,000 feet high and the admitted and obvious boundary between the Afridis and Afghanistan. But it has led to difficulties north of the Kabul River in Mohmand country, which it bisects.

In an endeavour to resolve these difficulties the Government of India offered the Amir an alternative boundary through Mohmand country further to the east, known as 'the presumptive line'. This would have left the Bohai Dag Valley to Afghanistan. The offer was not taken up.

II. Extract from Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905.
(Signed by Amir Habibullah in April 1905 with the mission led by Sir Louis Dane.)

His said Majesty does hereby agree to this that in the principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of the engagements which His Highness my late father [Abdurrahman] concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting, and will act upon the same agreements and compacts, and I will not contravene them in any dealing.

III. Extract from Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919.
(Signed on 8th August, 1919, by the Afghan peace mission sent to Rawalpindi to conclude the Third Afghan War.)

1. The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan Frontier accepted by the late Amir [Habibullah].

Note: This treaty also agreed to the small demarcation proposed at the western end of the Khaibar, and this demarcation was then carried out.

The words of the article infer that the Frontier laid down in the Durand Agreement, as reaffirmed in 1903, was accepted in 1919.

The Amir at this time was Amanullah.

IV. Extracts from Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921.
(Concluded by the Dobbs Mission in Kabul, 22nd November, 1921.)

2. The two high contracting parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan frontier as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article 5 of the treaty concluded on the 8th August, 1919.

11. The two high contracting parties, being mutually satisfied themselves each regarding the good will of the other and especially regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in future of any military operations of major importance which may
appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective spheres, before the commencement of such operations.

Supplementary letter from the British Representative to the Afghan Foreign Minister:

As the conditions of the frontier tribes of the two governments are of interest to the Government of Afghanistan, I inform you that the British Government entertains feelings of good will towards all the frontier tribes and has every intention of treating them generously, provided they abstain from outrages against the inhabitants of India. I hope this letter will cause you satisfaction.

Note: Amanullah was still Amir at this time, and subsequently took the title of King. Afghan Governments base their claim to speak for all the tribes on both sides of the Durand Line mainly on the terms of article 11 and the supplementary letter to the 1921 treaty.


(i) We have agreed that it is desirable, in view of the recent accession to the Afghan throne of His Majesty King Muhammad Nadir Shah, to reaffirm the validity of the Treaty concluded at Kabul on November 22nd, 1921... I accordingly have the honour to place on record that it is our understanding that these Treaties continue to have full force and effect.

(ii) I have the honour, in reply, also to place on record that it is our understanding that these two Treaties continue to have full force and effect.

VI. Extract from speech in House of Commons by Mr. Noel-Baker, H.M.'s Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, on 30th June, 1950.

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have seen with regret the disagreements which there have been between the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan about the status of the territories on the North-West Frontier. It is His Majesty’s Government’s view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India, and of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, in these territories, and that the Durand Line is the international frontier.

VII. Extract from Hansard dated 1st March, 1956.

(In answer to a question by Mr. Mott-Radclyffe.)

The Prime Minister: The view of Her Majesty’s Government, which was also the view of our predecessors in office, is as follows. In 1947,
Pakistan came into existence as a new, sovereign, independent member of the Commonwealth. Her Majesty’s Government regard her as having, with the full consent of the overwhelming majority of the Pashtu-speaking peoples concerned, both in the administered and non-administered areas, succeeded to the exercise of the powers formerly exercised by the Crown in India on the North-West Frontier of the sub-Continent. Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom fully support the Government of Pakistan in maintaining their sovereignty over the areas east of the Durand Line and in regarding this Line as the international frontier with Afghanistan. Her Majesty’s Government are confident that there is no outstanding question between Pakistan and Afghanistan which cannot be settled by peaceful means on the basis of the legal position as I have now stated it. They have throughout been in close consultation with the Government of Pakistan and are convinced that Pakistan is determined to seek a peaceful solution.

Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: May I ask my right hon. friend whether it is not a fact that after the transfer of power in 1947 the majority of the tribal leaders expressed the wish to be regarded as part and parcel of Pakistan, and to be administered, in a loose sense, by Pakistan?

The Prime Minister: I do not know about the last part of my hon. friend’s supplementary question, but according to my information there are no significant sections of the population of these areas which are in any way dissatisfied with the present status as Pakistan citizens. Indeed all the evidence that we have is the other way.

Mr. Gaitskell: Is the right hon. gentleman aware that it would be the desire of my right hon. and hon. friends to be associated with his statement, which, as he has said, accords with the policy of the Labour Government?

The Prime Minister: I am much obliged to the right hon. gentleman.

Note: These extracts show that every ruler of Afghanistan has accepted the Durand Line agreed between the British Government and Amir Abdurrahman, down to and including Nadir Shah who inaugurated a new (the present) dynasty in 1929. The only two corollaries to be mentioned are (i) an offer to revise the sector of the Line running through Mohmand country, which was not taken up, (ii) a neighbourly undertaking to give advance information of military operations close to the Line, and to look to the interests of the tribes in a spirit of good-will.

Extracts VI and VII show what have been the views of H.M.G. on the position of Pakistan in this regard as a successor state since 15th August, 1947.

The ‘interest’ of the Afghan Government in the tribes to the east and south of the Line is admitted in the letter attached to the 1921 Treaty.
APPENDIX C

HEADS OF THE N-W FRONTIER PROVINCE, 1901–47

Chief Commissioners:

Sir Harold Deane 1901–08
Sir George Roos-Keppel 1908–19
Sir Hamilton Grant 1919–21
Sir John Maffey (Lord Rugby) 1921–23
Sir Norman Bolton 1923–30
Sir Steuart Pears 1930–31
Sir Ralph Griffith 1931–32

Governors:

Sir Ralph Griffith 1932–37
Sir George Cunningham 1937–46
Sir Olaf Caroe 1946–47
APPENDIX D

ARMON

Reproduced, after revision by the author, from the Magazine of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, for which it was written by Sir Evelyn Howell.

This story recalls an occasion, in February 1901 in Waziristan, when the Mahsud Companies in the South Waziristan Militia, then newly raised, had to be disbanded. It is revealing of the times and has the quality of tragedy.

In September 1904 a young Mahsud in the South Waziristan Militia, for no apparent reason, murdered Captain Bowring, the Political Agent in South Waziristan, as he lay asleep by night in the post of Sarwakai. This Militia was at the time under the command of Lt.-Colonel Richard Harman, an officer of considerable distinction, who had been with them ever since the corps first began to be raised and knew the local tribes and dialects and conditions very thoroughly. Harman was actually in England on leave when this outrage was committed. On his return to duty a few weeks later, it was arranged that he should for a while carry on and do double duty as Commandant of the Militia and Political Agent in addition, until the officer whom the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province had selected as Bowring's permanent successor should be available. But a short experience of the double role convinced Harman that he had underrated the loquacity and persistence of the Mahsuds and Wazirs and he applied for another political officer to come and fill the gap.

Thus it fell out that early in January 1905 the writer of these pages, who was at the time a very junior political officer, was suddenly warned for temporary duty as Political Agent in South Waziristan two or three hundred miles away. Behold me, then, about a week later with my horses, kit and servants at Murtaza, in those days the entrance to South Waziristan. It stands in the plains at the point where the Gumal River comes out from the hills. The baggage has gone forward on camels with the servants on mules or ponies under protection of tribal guards, and we, the mounted escort of six Militia troopers and myself, are ready to follow. Our route lay along the valley for about ten miles and then turned right-handed up a long and steep ascent to Sarwakai, another
fifteen miles, where was the Militia post in which poor Bowring had been killed. The ascent from the Gumal Valley, a climb of over 3,000 feet along a rough bridle-path, was a task which took time and taxed the energies of man and beast. So it was well on in the afternoon before we crowned the top and encountered the Indian political subordinate whom Harman had sent out to welcome me with a bunch of Mahsuds and Wazir Maliks — headmen of sections of the local tribes — hawk-faced, trim-bearded, hard-bitten ruffians, but well-mannered and very pleasant-spoken. Introductions were speedily effected, and I remember that as the two leading Mahsuds were shaking hands with me — let it not be forgotten that it was a Mahsud who had killed poor Bowring only a few months before — one of them, with a charming smile, remarked, 'We are so glad that a new Political Agent has come. For when there is no Political Agent, we are as orphans!' However, they seemed to bear their affliction lightly, and, as all were on their best behaviour for the moment, we went on our way very companionably. Five or six miles of gentler descent through rugged country, where acacia, dwarf-palm, barbary and other desert plants maintained a scanty show of vegetation here and there, brought us just before sunset to the gates of the old fort at Sarwakai, which stood on the shoulder of a mighty mountain, whose summit was crowned with snow. Harman himself, with shot-gun and spaniel — for he had been out for an evening stroll to pick up a hill partridge or two — was standing by the gate, talking to the Post Commandant, a notable warrior who belonged to the Afridi tribe. In this setting he made an impressive figure. I dismounted and we shook hands, and made our way to the officers' quarters, in the upper storey of the main building. A cup of tea and an armchair before a roaring log fire soon made me forget the fatigues of the day. So I fell to asking what I hope were intelligent questions and trying to pick up from Harman's replies as much information about the local political situation as I could. It was a Gilbertian world to which I was introduced, dominated by a sinister figure called Mulla Powinda, of whom more anon; a world where blood and destruction seemed to be much in use; where the price of a man's life was considerably less than that of a Government rifle, and a woman or a Hindu counted as half a man; where brigandage appeared to be the prevailing industry, and the professional assassin was a respected member of society; where, when British officers played a game of golf, as they did at Wana, instead of fore-caddies they employed an advance guard of armed men in case there should be an ambuscade in the bunkers; where the raider of yesterday was the comrade-in-arms of today, and vice versa. I was soon utterly bewildered by unfamiliar names of men and places and perhaps felt a little relieved when the time came to bathe and change for dinner. When I re-entered the sitting-room, where the table had been laid dur-
ing our absence, Harman was already there, dressed in the mess kit of his regiment. I was wearing my old Lions’ dinner-jacket with its gaudy blazon on the pocket still comparatively unfaded. I saw that this caught his eye at once, as indeed very little escaped it. ‘I thought we should find a link before long,’ he said, ‘I’m an Emmanuel man too and was a Lion in my time.’ I suppose there is no need to tell how we passed the remainder of that evening or of what we talked.

Next day we went on to Wana in Wazir country. Wana stands on an open plain surrounded by great hills. Here was the headquarters of the Agency and of the Militia and of the other administrative departments represented in the Agency. A word or two about each will make things clear. First comes the Political Agent. He was responsible for the explanation and execution of Government’s policy in all tribal matters, for all dealings with the tribes and for securing reparation from them for all offences committed by them against the outside world. He was also responsible for keeping his superiors informed of their attitude and intentions. In short, it was his business to know everybody and everything, to be aware which way the cat was going to jump, before it left the ground, and to keep it from jumping on to forbidden soil. The Militia was the instrument by which he secured the execution of his orders, if force, in small measure, were required. It consisted of about 1,700 men, all Pathans and nearly half of local origin, organized by tribal companies, each with its Subedar and Jemadars, and a total of four British officers. Nearly two-thirds of the force were located in outlying posts, like Sarwakai, and the balance, including all recruits under training, at headquarters. A doctor attended to the medical needs of the political staff, the Militia and the local population, who gave him plenty of practice in the treatment of gunshot wounds. There was also an officer of the Royal Engineers in charge of roads and buildings. Of the Militia officers one or two were always away on tour among the outlying posts, and the Political Agent, the Agency Surgeon and the Engineer came and went as the needs of their respective duties required. At Wana we all lived in the fort, which consisted of a two-storeyed keep, built round a courtyard with a well in the centre. Here were the magazine, treasury, lock-ups and the Militia’s stores, under charge of a quarter-guard, always a composite body drawn from the different companies at headquarters, and one half-company taken en bloc in rotation. Access to the keep could only be obtained from the outer fort, a large walled enclosure with towers at each corner. In this were a number of separate huts containing the British officers’ mess and their quarters and the barracks of the men. The whole fort and everything in it, except the magazine, treasury and strong-rooms, was built of mud.

At this time a real driving road to Wana was being made. It did not

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1 The Crest of Emmanuel College is a lion rampart and the Lions is a College club.
go via Sarwakai but up the Gumal Valley, and an additional officer of
the Royal Engineers had been deputed to take charge of its construc-
tion. Of course this officer had to live on his work. This necessitated a
fortified camp at roadhead with a hundred Militiamen to protect it. The
strength at headquarters was consequently by that amount short, and
for night defence at Wana Harman had been compelled to reduce the
number of sentries and organize a system of internal patrols instead.

A few days after I reached Wana a cold snap set in. Heavy snow fell
and lay deep upon the ground. It was followed by grey sunless days
with an icy wind off the higher hills — Wana itself stands about 4,000
feet above sea-level — and one night we touched a minimum record of
13° below zero, forty-five degrees of frost. I was not inconsolable there-
fore to receive a telegram saying that the Chief Commissioner was com-
ing on tour to Tank, a small town in the plains at the foot of the Waziri-
stan hills, and would require the presence of Harman and myself to
confer with him as to the local situation and to advise him as to the
state of the Militia, which as an irregular force was under him and not
under the Commander-in-Chief. I shall never forget the cold of that
journey down; but we got through all right. Having reached Tank we
made our report. The key to the local political situation lay in the hands
of the remarkable man, to whom I have already alluded, known as
Mulla Powinda, who without any inherited advantages, by dint of a
forceful personality, some very meagre sacerdotal pretensions and re-
curring supplies of money from a source which I will not specify, had
made himself by far the most powerful man in the Mahsud tribe. Those
who opposed him openly in tribal politics were apt to come to a sud-
den end, and this had happened so often that opposition dwindled. He
kept round him a gang of cut-throats of whose character and exploits
he cannot well have been ignorant. Indeed, whenever any of them made
a successful coup he took a share in the proceeds. He had upon several
occasions taken the lead in armed opposition to the forces of Govern-
ment and had more than once been compelled to flee the country. But
when the clouds blew over he always came back. At this time peace was
upon his lips, and his secretary — for he was himself illiterate — used
from time to time to send the Political Agent polite letters, couched in
the vilest Persian, to express his master’s wishes, intentions and sugges-
tions. He was, I believe, according to his lights, a sincere if
unscrupu-
lous patriot, and he saw in Lord Curzon’s Militia scheme and the mak-
ing of the roads a menace to the traditional independence of his tribe.
He therefore set himself to wreck it. His methods were characteristically
tortuous. He did not openly denounce enlistment, but he encouraged
other Mulas to refuse the proper funeral rites to those who died or
were killed while in the service of Government. He secretly put for-
ward young zealots over whom he had acquired influence to enrol
THE PATHANS

themselves and at the same time sent letters of warning to the Political Agent, couched in general terms and therefore useless, urging him against putting too much trust in the Mahsuds who had been enlisted. This he had done shortly before Bowring's murder and had since claimed credit for the warning. Harman and I had frequently discussed this matter and were agreed that once Mahsuds were enlisted it was impossible to treat them differently from other classes or to do otherwise than seem to repose confidence in them. Still, we were not happy about it, and were working out a scheme by which all Mahsud recruits should be attested and sponsored by leading men in the tribe, whom we knew, or by their sections, jointly and severally. Meanwhile Harman was quietly weeding those whom we had, eliminating any whose record, so far as known, was in any way suspicious. Given time, these measures would, I think, have succeeded. Probably Mulla Powinda thought so and was taking action accordingly. We laid the whole situation very fully before Sir Harold Deane, the Chief Commissioner, who heard us sympathetically and approved our general line of action. After a few days' halt in Tank we started back, travelling by different routes. Harman went by the Gumal Valley to see the camp and as many posts as he could. I came by another and shorter route, normally closed to British officers. This I did under tribal safe conduct and was shepherded through without untoward incident. Consequently I reached Wana one day before Harman. It was, I remember, Friday, February 10, 1905, the date being fixed in my mind by subsequent events and because the 12th is my birthday. Next day, towards evening, I went out with a few men to get a shot at the duck which used to fly on the stream near the fort, and I well recall how in the bitter cold, with deep snow lying all round, against the glow in the western sky I saw Harman and his escort come clattering across the stony river-bed and heard their horses' hoofs crashing through the ice on its margin. I did not hurry to go in while the light held, though I wanted to see Harman. I thought that I should have plenty of time to talk to him that evening after dinner and next day.

Only four of us came to dinner that night — Harman, myself, Plant, the second-in-command of the Militia, and Turner, the Engineer. The doctor was also at Wana but, having an attack of malaria, had retired to bed early. The three military officers at mess were in uniform. I was in mufti, with my Lions' coat in place of a dinner-jacket. We were all unarmed in accordance with our policy of confidence. The meal pursued its normal pleasant course and we were just approaching dessert, with the accompanying ritual customary in all messes on Saturday nights, when suddenly there was a sharp tinkle of broken glass falling to the ground. I was seated at table with my left shoulder towards and in line with the door by which the serving-men came in and out from
the pantry beyond, which in turn gave access to the open air by a glazed door at either end. Harman was opposite me, Plant at the head of the table, facing the door, and Turner opposite Plant. I looked up at the sound and saw standing in the doorway a young Sepoy of the Militia, in uniform, with his belt over his coat — the regular kit of the internal patrols. In his hands was his rifle with the bayonet fixed and the muzzle sloped upwards. He stood still looking at me and I at him. After a second I rose to my feet. It may seem incredible, but is none the less a fact that I did not instantly grasp what his presence there meant. There floated through my mind a recollection of what someone had told me of a recruit who came into the mess ante-room one evening and explained, on enquiry, that he had come to see the tamasha (show). I thought that this lad was the victim of some similar hoax. As I stood by the table the man lowered his rifle barrel, but did not raise the butt to the shoulder. Probably all this really passed in a flash. The next thing that I saw was Harman dashing round the foot of the table towards the man, with Plant at his heels. Simultaneously the man stepped backwards into the comparative darkness of the pantry — this of course was the era of lamps and candles — closely followed by Harman and Plant. Turner and I tumbled after them. In the dim light of the pantry I saw Plant struggling with the Sepoy for the rifle and Harman standing by the opposite wall. Turner and I rushed to Plant's assistance. The Sepoy was quickly overpowered and disarmed and we began to truss him up hand and foot with his own turban. While we were doing this Harman called out, 'Is any one hurt?' I looked round at the others, and answered, 'No; are you, Colonel?' He said, 'I think I am,' and while speaking slowly collapsed on to his knees and sank to the ground. At this moment one of the mess servants put his head round the corner of the outer door. Someone told him to fetch the doctor. Turner and I then went over to Harman, while Plant took charge of the prisoner and sent the mess orderly, who had also turned up, for an armed guard, with whom he set off to take the man to the lock-up in the keep. The doctor came across at once in his dressing-gown and knelt down by Harman. Just as he did so Harman spoke again, for the last time, 'They've got me,' he said, 'I knew they would.' I could see from the doctor's face that he had no hope, but we sent for a mattress and carried Harman on it over to his own quarter, which was in the same hut with mine. The doctor then made a further examination and found that life was extinct. Harman had received a bayonet wound right through the heart and only his wonderful strength and courage enabled him to retain consciousness so long as he did. Leaving the doctor I padded my way under the moon along the frozen path between piled-up banks of snow to the mess and sat down to write a telegram to the Chief Commissioner to report what had happened. As I finished it and gave
it to a mess servant to take to the telegraph office, which adjoined the mess, Plant came in.

'The man was a Mahsud,' he said. 'I don’t want to force your hand. For it is your responsibility. But there is a Mahsud half-company — probably the one to which he belongs — on duty in the keep and I think that they will have to be disarmed.'

'Why?' I asked.

'Well, when we reached the big door into the keep with the prisoner and the quarter-guard opened the wicket for us, as soon as I entered the courtyard I saw about a dozen of them standing about, with their rifles and bayonets. It is not a night on which any sane man would loaf about outside when he might be in bed, unless he had some purpose in doing so. I called to them and when they heard my voice, they all bolted into their barrack. So I stowed my prisoner in the lock-up, warned the quarter-guard and came out. I have sent for the Subedar-Major and told him to come at once and bring with him what men he can from those warned for the internal patrol."

'Is the Subedar-Major here? I asked.

Almost immediately he came in — a gallant, grizzled old warrior he was, but in his nocturnal deshabille, with a greatcoat over it, rather a comical figure.

'Is the Colonel Sahib dead?' he asked.

'He is dead,' I answered. 'A Mahsud killed him. He has been arrested and is in the lock-up. Now what about the Mahsuds in the keep? Do you think that they should be disarmed?'

'They should be, but there will be trouble,' he replied. 'You must get the Chief Commissioner's sanction.'

'If it is going to be done at all, it has to be done at once,' said I, and turned to Plant, who chipped in —

'There are fifty Mahsuds in the keep, and the big door is bolted from the inside at night. They can overpower the quarter-guard, break open the lock-up, release the prisoner, seize the magazine and treasury without any one being able to get at them. And there is another full company of Mahsuds in one of the barracks in the outer fort. I am not sure yet to which lot the murderer belongs. But I am sure that, even if nothing worse happens meanwhile, when the other classes learn of Harman having been killed by a Mahsud, they will open fire on them. As you know, all the men have their rifles and a hundred rounds each at night.'

I saw that Plant was right, and we rapidly concerted our plan of action. Meanwhile the Subedar-Major brought up what men he had collected from companies other than Mahsud. 'We got together as many lanterns as we could lay hands on and started for the keep. I remember thinking my evening dress, especially the pumps on my feet,
a very unsuitable costume, but somehow I did not feel the cold. Turner begged to be allowed to come too, but I did not know what was going to happen inside the keep and thought it better that he should stay where he was. So I refused his request. The quarter-guard opened the wicket to us and we filed through one by one making little noise in the snow. All was quiet in the courtyard and there was nobody about. While Plant was making his dispositions a Mahsud orderly of mine, named Mawi, not in the Militia, came with the last man through the wicket and handed me my revolver which he had brought from my quarter. Meanwhile some of our men had been sent on to the roof on one side, whence they had a clear field of fire towards the barrack across the courtyard, and another party was drawn up aslant in the courtyard out of the way of the fire of the first party and also covering the barrack. They had their rifles loaded and were all ready. The lanterns were placed round the curb of the well, so that our men were in shadow and the light was thrown towards the barrack doors. It was all done surprisingly quickly. When all was ready, Plant, who with me had taken his place near the well, in the angle between the two firing parties, called out:

‘Jemadar Salim.’

Salim was the Jemadar in command of the Mahsud half-company and he had so far not put in an appearance.

There was no answer. Search was made in his quarter, a single room adjoining the barrack, and he emerged, looking rather sheepish.

‘Go and tell your men,’ said Plant, ‘that if they obey orders no immediate harm will befall them. They are to file out and fall in two deep outside the barrack. Failing compliance, they will be shot.’

The Jemadar saluted, walked across the courtyard and entered the barrack. A confused murmur arose within, but, for what seemed a long time, nothing happened. Then the Jemadar came out again, alone.

‘They will not listen to me,’ he said. ‘Perhaps if the Sahibs were to speak to them themselves ——’

It might very well have been a trap and I do not know how Plant felt about it. I have never liked anything less in my life than walking up to one door of the barrack while he went up to the other. We were in the moonlight, with lanterns behind us. Inside all was dark and still. As I drew near my door the same Mahsud orderly who had brought me my revolver and had since been fluttering about me like a hen, came and stood by me, almost shouldering me aside. The Subedar-Major and one other Pathan officer of the Militia were with Plant. ‘Come out!’ we both shouted, and repeated what Plant had already said to Jemadar Salim. A long pause followed. Then to my enormous relief the men began to file out. Once they were out, immediate difficulties were soon over. Their own Jemadar, under tuition, gave them their
orders and these were promptly obeyed. The men formed up in two lines, laid down their rifles on the snow, turned about and took four paces forward. The arms lying on the snow were at once scooped up by a party detailed for the purpose and were popped inside the magazine, under lock and sentry, with amazing celerity. The Mahsuds were marched back into their barrack and confined to it till morning, a portion of the roof party under a trustworthy Pathan officer being left in position to see that the order was observed. We then made a final round of the courtyard to see that nothing had been overlooked. As we drew near the magazine the Subedar-Major whispered rather audibly to Plant that the sentry over its door was a Wazir and should be changed, since Mahsuds and Wazirs are at bottom one tribe. He spoke in Pashtu, and the sentry heard him. All through that evening I had had frequent occasion to admire Plant's behaviour, but never more than at this moment. He threw a glance at the sentry and, fortunately, recognized him.

'A Wazir?' he repeated musingly, as if in doubt. 'So he is. But it is Sarbaz Khan. I'd trust him anywhere.'

The sentry at once threw a chest like a guardsman and began strutting up and down before the magazine, as if he were outside Buckingham Palace. So we felt that we could safely leave him and returned to the mess, where Turner and Cox, the doctor, were awaiting us.

Even now our position was none too easy. There was still a whole company of armed Mahsuds in the outer fort at Wana and not more than four hundred men all told of other classes, of whom at least a quarter were Wazirs. At several of the other posts and at the camp the position was the same. We had to decide what to do at headquarters and what orders to send to the posts. After some discussion we decided to attempt nothing more at Wana till daybreak and dismissed the little force which we had had with us in the keep. At daybreak, according to the established routine of the Militia, all rifles except those of men actually on duty during the day were always returned to the company piles of arms where they were kept under lock till nightfall. We agreed to allow the normal procedure to be followed. Then next morning when the arms had been returned the Mahsud element, wherever present, was to be suddenly paraded outside and sent off to their homes on a month's leave — all, that is, except the half-company in the keep, who were to be detained. Telegrams were accordingly despatched to all Post Commanders informing them of what had happened and telling them what to do. All concerned rose to the occasion like men and, to cut a long story short, the Mahsud element in the Militia, amounting to nearly a quarter of its strength, was everywhere disarmed and sent off without a shot being fired. Indeed nothing worse happened anywhere than that in one small isolated tower two Mahsuds got away with their rifles.
Even these two weapons, worth several hundred rupees each in Mahsud country, were brought back a few days later by a friendly Malik.

But of course we could not know that night that things were going to pan out so well. Nor could we know what effect our drastic action would have on the local political situation — how the Mahsuds would stomach the affront, nor what part the Wazirs, of whom we also had over two hundred in the corps, would play. It seemed quite on the cards that we should find ourselves, with greatly depleted strength everywhere besieged by swarms of infuriated tribesmen. So we thought proper to ask for a battalion of regulars to be sent back to Wana and for the Derajat Movable Column to be ready in support. There was of course much else to do, and it was near three o'clock in the morning, when, after swallowing some very stiff grog, Plant and I separated and went off to snatch a few hours' sleep.

All these things happened, as I have said, on the Saturday night. On the Monday a coffin containing the mortal remains of Richard Harman was sent off with all honour, under escort, to receive a military funeral at Dera Ismail Khan. I then, being the only magistrate in the Agency and having been duly authorized to do so, tried the murderer as dispassionately as I could. As regards accomplices he refused to make any statement, but was openly boastful of his own act. He declared that he had enlisted — he had barely three months' service — with no other object and had entered the mess 'Che ghund z'e markawam,' 'to kill them all,' and so have 'a finer song made upon him than Kabul' (the man who killed Bowring). He was hanged the same evening and met his death in a resolute spirit. Indeed he was exultant and spent his last half-hour in the cell blackening his eyelids with collyrium, as young bucks do amongst the Mahsuds, to adorn himself for the houris of Paradise.

He belonged to a tribal section nearly allied to that of Mulla Powinda and to the half-company in the keep. Further enquiry later on left no room for doubt but that he was a mere tool and that there was an elaborate plot behind him. He went into the mess with his rifle loaded expecting to shoot and the sound of shooting there was the signal for which his fellow-conspirators in the keep were waiting. They were at once to have attacked the quarter-guard, seized the magazine and treasure, and having killed all the British officers and let pandemonium loose (pretty much what actually happened at Wana in 1919 when Wazirs, not Mahsuds, were the chief culprits) turn the resultant situation to the best advantage. But of course it was not possible to get legally admissible evidence of all this, and the most that could be done was to convict about half a dozen men on comparatively minor charges. Against Jemadar Salim nothing could be proved, though no doubt he was cognisant of what was afoot. No tribal rising followed, and al-
though Lord Curzon was satisfied that the situation fully warranted all that had been done, he did not think the occasion opportune to break openly with Mulla Powinda — which would have meant yet another Mahsud expedition.

The murderer at his trial stated that he had pulled the trigger of his rifle and that the cartridge missed fire. This I can definitely assert to be incorrect. I myself removed the cartridge from the rifle — a Martini-Henry. The indicator was not down nor the cap dented. What, I think, actually happened was that on entering the pantry he took a wrong turning and made for the other glazed door at the opposite end through which he put his bayonet. Flustered by his mistake he turned back and entered the dining-room with his rifle pointing in the air. In his excitement, if he pulled anything, he must have pulled the trigger-guard when he lowered the muzzle. Had it not been so, somebody else might have told this story but not myself. That he got no chance to retrieve his mistake was entirely due to Harman's presence of mind and gallantry.

Some days later the old Subedar-Major pronounced a fitting epitaph on Harman. 'Ai, ai, armon, armon,'¹ he said, in conversation with Plant and myself, though rather talking to himself. 'That such a bahadur (gallant) Sahib should perish thus! If this Sahib [pointing to me] or that Sahib [pointing to Plant] were to be killed, Government could send another. But Harman Sahib — ai, ai, armon, armon.'

E. B. Howell

¹ A customary formula of lamentation and, of course, a play on words. 'Armon' means grief. It is the Karlanri Pathan pronunciation of the Persian arman.
APPENDIX E

CARPE DIEM
A POEM OF
KHUSHHAL KHAN KHATAK
(The English and Latin translations are by Sir Evelyn Howell)

Pashtu

Sāqi, rākra mā lah may,
Yo tso jāma payapay;
Dā ham zulm day, kuh goray,
Chih be mayo dzi psarlay.
Haghuh dzai chih gul o nal wi,
Wara’ tsuh kāndi saray?
Gora, tsuh wāyi pri, ghwag kṛa,
Chih āvaž kā chang o nay —
Biyā bah ter sa’ai rā nah shi,
Ahl armān, armān, hay hay!
Da dunya zhwandūn ham khuh day,
Kuh tar tala o hamesh wayl
Chih tar tala hamesh na day,
Nur ye u ganra lāshay.
Der mayyan ye wabla ter kṛal —
Falk nah lari zruhsiway.

English

Roses, wine, a friend to share —
Spring sans wine I will not bear,
Abstinence I do abhor,
Cup on cup, my Saqi,* pour.
Hark! the lute and pipe! Give ear!
What says music to our cheer?
Time once flown returneth never,
Idle moments gone for ever,
Wouldst recall them? Call in vain.
Life, our mortal life, hath sweetness,

* Saqi means Cup-bearer.
As its sweetness, so its fleetness,
Count it nothing, 'tis no gain.
Doth time tarry for thy prizing,
Or make speed for thy despising?
Time hath all young lovers slain,
Time is heedless, time is heartless —
Saqi, fill and fill again.

**Latin**

Sit mihi Albani veteris diota
Cum rosa multa, bonus adsit hospes,
Ver sine his odi, cito da, Minister,
Pocula siccis.

Tibiae mixtos citharaeque cantus
Audio. Quid nos trepidant docere?
Nescit exactos iterare cursus
Futilis hora;

Voce tu lapsam revocas inani?
Nil agis, vitae spatium fugacis
Quamlibet carum pariter caducum est,
Nec rediturum.

Num tibi urgenti properabit hora
Num retardenti pede lentiore
Cedet? Heu saevum precibusque inexor-
abile tempus!

Flore gaudentes tenero juventae
Quotquot arserunt pueri et puellae
Tempus occidit — Citius, Minister,
Pocula praebet!
GLOSSARY

A. Arabic, P. Persian, Pu. Pakhtu/Pashtu, T. Turki, H. Hindi
(All words here have been adopted into Pakhtu.)

Ab-i-istäda, P., standing water.
äkahänd, P., a religious teacher or saint.
arbäb, A., a chief (pl. of rabb, q.v.).
arghwän, P., the Judas-tree.
as, aspa, Pu., horse, mare.

bädshäb, P., King or Sayyid.
bädshähgardi, P., change of rulers.
bägh, P., garden.
bändish, P., blockade.
baramta, T., a raid to seize persons or property as indemnity for a wrong.
chäng, H., the hemp plant.
chenär, P., the oriental plane-tree.
daftar, P., register, office, registered land.
darräb, P., a mountain pass.
dehqän, P., a villager.

faräri, P. (from Arab root), an outlaw.
firmän, P., royal proclamation.
ghair‘iläqa, A., foreign territory.
ghal, Pu., thief.
ghär, Pu., mountain.
gharibnawäräku, A. and P. hybrid, cherisher of the poor.
ghärži, A., fighter for the Faith.

hamsäya, P., client (lit. one who shares shade).
hamün, P., inland lake or swamp.
bashar, T., helping-party at harvest.
büra, Pu. (in special sense), a village guest-house.
insäf, Pu., justice.
tibä, P., confidence, safe-conduct.
jägir, P., assignment of land or land revenue.
jebud, A., a holy war.
khaña-ba-dosb, P., house-on-back, nomad.
kbar, Pu., a city, or Peshawar.
kbarsädär, P., a tribal policeman.
kbiłla‘t, A., a robe of honour.
kbihe (fem. khba), Pu., good.
kbiwä, Pu., a direction, side, region.
kohn-i-nür, P., mountain of light.
kotał, P., the crest of a pass.
lashkar (Pu. lakhkar), P., a tribal array, army.
‘loongee’ (lugri), H., a cloth used as a wrap.

mafrur, A., an outlaw.
maira, Pu., a plain along a hill-skyrt.
malik, Pu., a headman (fr. A., king).
mamläk, A., one possessed, a slave.
maqbara, A., tomb.
mär, P., snake.
masjid, A., mosque.
melmastia, Pu., hospitality.
misfl, A., a file (of men or paper).
mizh, Pu., Waziri dialect for mussi = we.
mor, Pu., mother.
mujaddid, A., a renewer, reformer.
mujābidin, A., Islamic warriors (Crescentaders).
musāhib, A., a courtier, or aide-de-camp.
muwājib, A., allowances.
aik, H., a master or landlord.
ananwātai, Pu., a deputation (lit. entering in).
nang, P., personal honour and pride.
nikat, Pu., hereditaments.
pakhtunwālī, Pu., the Pathan code.
pir, P., a saint or holy man.
pirkhana, P., the abode of a saint.
pirzada, P., a saint’s descendant.
gadrān, A. and P. hybrid, an appraiser.
galandar, A., a mendicant.
rabāp, P., a viol.
rabb, A., a lord, also God.
raunag, A., lustre.
rob, Panjabi, a mountain.
salām alaikum, A., peace be on you.
śāliḥ, A., a pious man.
śālis, A., an arbitrator (fr. A., third).
sanad (summud), A., grant or certificate.
sangar, Pu., stone breastwork.
sarda, P., musk-melon.
sarrishta, P., thread or link.
sare, P., an inn.
shabid, A., a martyr.
shajra, A., tree, genealogical table.
sharmāna, P., money in compensation for deprivation of honour over a woman (sharm means shame).
sheer, P., lion or tiger.
shir, P., milk.
swara, Pu., girl given in marriage to compose a feud.
śālib-ul-ilm, A., searchers after knowledge, ordinand.
tappa, H., a small tract of country.
tārikh, A., a date, history.
tawhid, A., the doctrine of One God.
tsanrai, Pu., a side-curl, worn by a man.
tserai, Pu., land allotted to pious men.
tuman, T., the commonalty of a tribe (lit. 10,000).
‘ulema, A., learned men (pl. of ‘ālem).
ūlus, T., a tribe.
wesh, Pu., distribution, usually of land.
zanāna, P., women’s quarter, harem.

Note: Persian words, and Arabic words coming through the Persian, are in the Afghan and Pathan usage pronounced in an archaic manner, probably derived from the language of the Mughal court. The transliteration given here follows that usage and not that of modern Persian.
TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM ADOPTED FOR ARABIC, PERSIAN AND PAKHTU-PASHTU NAMES, PLACE-NAMES AND CITATIONS

Consonants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Be</th>
<th>Persian</th>
<th>Pashto</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ب</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>be</td>
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<tr>
<td>ر</td>
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<td>pe</td>
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<tr>
<td>ت</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>te</td>
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<tr>
<td>ت</td>
<td>te (cerebral). Pakhtu-Pashtu only</td>
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<tr>
<td>س</td>
<td>se. In Arabic this is sounded th, but this is not reproduced in Afghan Persian or Pakhtu-Pashtu</td>
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<td>ج</td>
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<td>ج</td>
<td>che. As in church</td>
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<tr>
<td>خ</td>
<td>ts or dz</td>
<td>tsIm or dzIm. Pakhtu-Pashtu only</td>
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<td>ح</td>
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<tr>
<td>خ</td>
<td>khe. As in loch</td>
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<td>د</td>
<td>däl</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>د</td>
<td>däl (cerebral). Pakhtu-Pashtu only</td>
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<tr>
<td>ز</td>
<td>zāl. The Arabic dh is not preserved in Persian or Pakhtu-Pashtu</td>
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<tr>
<td>ر</td>
<td>re (rolled)</td>
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<td>ر</td>
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<td>ز</td>
<td>ze</td>
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<td>ظ</td>
<td>zhe. As in azure</td>
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<tr>
<td>گ</td>
<td>ge in Pakhtu, zhe in Pashtu. Pakhtu-Pashtu only</td>
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<td>ش</td>
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<td>ش</td>
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<tr>
<td>خ</td>
<td>khin. Only used in Pakhtu. In Pashtu shin is sounded</td>
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<tr>
<td>ژ</td>
<td>swād</td>
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<tr>
<td>؛</td>
<td>zwād</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The reversed apostrophe is placed above the line, with an a, e, i or u to indicate the approximate vowel sound accompanying the glottal stop which ain signifies.

gh
ghain. Sounded rather like a French r

qāf. No u should accompany. e.g. Qais, Samarqand, not Quais, Samarquand

kāf

gāf. Always in Pakhtu-Pashtu

lām

mīm

nūn

nūnr. A cerebral sound peculiar to Pakhtu-Pashtu, e.g. Mandanr, gān (dense), kūn (deaf), Sarbanri (a Sarbanri)

wāo

h (medial) he

h (terminal) shewn as a short a, or sometimes ah

ye

In Pakhtu-Pashtu hamza appears over the line, most frequently with terminal ə and final ı (see vowels). It has the effect of deepening the vowel sound, e.g. ʃ (I), pronounced zuh, not zah, and ʃ (girl), pronounced jinai, a broad diphthong

Vowels:

- zabr. Persian and Arabic fatheh. Above the line
- zer. Persian and Arabic kasreheh. Below the line
- pesh. Persian and Arabic zammeh. Above the line
- alif. The madd (‘) only appears over initial alif, if long. Medial and final alif is always long
- wao. In Pakhtu-Pashtu, as in Afghan Persian, the Persian ʊ is often sounded ʊ
- ye. In Pakhtu-Pashtu, as in Afghan Persian, the Persian Є is often sounded Є
au  wao with zabr. Diphthong, much like French au
ay  ye with zabr. In Pakhtu-Pashtu this is a different sound from ye with hamza. Contrast saray (man) with jinai (girl). See note below
i  ye with zer

Note: The system adopted is the Hunterian, slightly modified.
Except in certain Arab names proper (of Arabs) the Arabic article is given as -ul- (or -ur-, -us-, -un-, etc.), not as -al-.
The Persian izafeh is given as -i-, or -yi- after a vowel.
The Roman vowel equivalents given are broadly identical with Italian pronunciation.
Zabr, zer and pesh, when used in the initial syllable of a word, appear over or under an alif, as the case may be. The vowel is then sounded short, according to the transliteration given.
To avoid a dusty look all diacritical marks are omitted in the text. To meet criticism they are included in the Index, which also makes use of the macron to indicate long a, u, o, i and e.
For certain well-known places popular Anglicized forms of spelling have been retained.
According to the above the well-known tribal ending -zai should strictly appear as -zay, and Khaibar as Khaybar. But that would upset a lifetime’s habit, and I plead exemption.
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EPILOGUE ON RUSSIA

This book was written shortly after we left India, at a time when, having served thirty years mostly among Pathans, and having been invited by Pathan and other friends to revisit the Frontier to renew old and dear associations, I attempted to survey Pathan (Pakhtun) history from the time of Alexander to the departure of the British from the Subcontinent. There is in it remarkably little reference to pressure from Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet, from beyond the Oxus, or to the stance of India and Pakistan in that context. This is partly because I was concentrating on the people and not on strategic issues, but it also follows from the fact that during my time (1914-47) the Pathans were protected from exterior buffets by able British and other diplomats on the Frontier and in Kabul who could win and sustain Afghan – and Pathan – confidence. The names of Roos-Keppel, Humphrys, Abdul Qayyum, Maconachie, the Miangul of Swat, Mahbub Ali, Cunningham, and Wylie come to mind. The roll-call of Vicerays of the time ran: Hardinge, Chelmsford, Reading, Halifax, Willingdon, Linlithgow, Wavell, and Mountbatten. All have now left us, but all were famous men, furnished with ability, and have left a name behind them. I knew also, having been admitted to the friendship of Hashim Khan, that great Durrani and custodian of the Afghan name and spirit in Kabul from 1933 to 1946, that with him at the helm, the Afghan ship would be firmly and wisely steered.

Now all is changed. The counterpoise has been removed; the Soviets have advanced into this vital and strategic region of Asia, the Durrans have fallen, and the balance is tilted. A fresh assessment is overdue. What is the Afghan and Pathan future now that the vital buttress is shaken and, it may be, destroyed?
No answer is possible lacking an appraisal of the external results of the 1947 partition of the Subcontinent, perhaps the inevitable concomitant of the transfer of power, and the British withdrawal from the scene. Surely the main British contribution to the stability of South Asia lay in our success in unifying the entire region for defence, from the Hindu Kush and the Himalaya in the north to the shores of the Indian Ocean. At the time of partition scant regard was paid to the standing of the two—now three—States on the map of Asia. The unity of concept was shattered to be succeeded by mutual enmity, suspicion, and hatred, leading to war. Lands and communities are now fragmented; no common purpose remains. Suspicion has replaced a shared watch-and-ward on the frontiers and beyond. A suggestion by President Ayub that the burden of defence should be shared by India and Pakistan was spurned by Pandit Nehru. A common defence gave way to a pale shadow of the Sino-Soviet left within the Subcontinent, India inclining towards Moscow and Pakistan to Peking. The inspiration of a shared Pakistan never had a chance to emerge if only because claim and counter-claim to Kashmir prevented it. More recently the Soviet advance to Kabul met with no clear disavowal from India: even Pakistan dithered and turned aside to appraise Arab-Israeli discords. In the time of crisis for Pakistan during the Bangladesh War (1971) India was able to rely on diplomatic support from Moscow even at the United Nations, and signed a treaty with Russia to strengthen her hand during the period leading to the break-up of Pakistan.

Meanwhile in NWFP itself Pakistan was embarrassed by the ‘Pakhtunistan’ issue, designed by Afghan patriots with a backlook to the Durrani Empire to weaken and dismember Pakistan further by pressing irredentist claims to Pathan lands along the Durand Line. India gave no sign that her rulers would regard the sanctity of that Line as being as essential to her own security as it is, or was, to that of Pakistan. Moreover, the Durand Line itself is to Pakistan a difficult bequest. It is perhaps the only ‘double frontier’ in the world, up to which neither State adjoining has secured full administrative control. In particular the Tribal Area between the
administered border and the Durand Line is in many sectors an Alsatia, strongly armed and of independent mind, from which dissidence may be encouraged, whether to east or west, to Kabul or to the Indus. This phenomenon enables those who wish to weaken Pakistan to claim that Islamabad uses that Alsatia as a point d'appui to interfere with Afghan—and Russian—ambitions. This is a factor that must be taken into account in any endeavour to assess outside claims that Pakistan territory is a base wherefrom resistance to Afghan—and Russian—encroachment may be organized.

There remains another vital factor. The attitude of the Pathan tribes—Afghan by race, religion, and language—is vital to Kabul. There are among them powerful forces, and individuals, able to influence minds and activities in Afghanistan. The most respected of these forces is, or was, to be found in the family of the Khan brothers, Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. To the first, once my Premier and, alas!, assassinated in 1958, I will return. The second, once known as 'the Frontier Gandhi' and greatly honoured in India also, is now nearly ninety years of age but is still active. He cannot do with the military regimes in Islamabad, and has spent much of the past ten years as an honoured guest in Afghanistan, mainly in Jalalabad. He has been reported as being in close association with Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham (Banner) Party in Kabul and the present Russian-backed purported ruler of the country. But his relations with the invading Soviet forces are unclear. Much may depend on any decision he may make as to ultimate allegiance. His son, Wali Khan, a splendid Pakhtun figure and a patriot—a man moreover with a more pragmatic attitude to current affairs and politics than his father,—may hold the key to this riddle. The West needs much more subtle intelligence on these allegiances. Instead of working to that end what have we done? We have closed the sources of our knowledge both in Peshawar and in Lahore. By so doing we have surrendered a priceless heritage.

This book is worthless if it has failed to convince those able to move mountains on the Frontier, and in Afghanistan, that once we knew the way to the heart of the Pathan. We have now lost contact and interest. This failure is perhaps
the main reason that we now see the Russians march into Afghanistan, threaten all South Asia, and find resistance, though stubborn, unavailing, confined as it is to unsupported guerrillas. Inaction may well put the whole Subcontinent and the adjoining Gulf at risk.

It is time to turn to more detailed reference to what has happened on the Frontier itself since this book was written more than twenty years ago. But before doing so, a couplet from the poet Saadi quoted by Maulana Zafar Ali in the New Delhi Legislative Assembly on 8 March 1940 may help to place the picture in perspective:

_Tawan be halq firu burd ustomkh-i-darusht_
_Walay shikam bedarad chun bigirad undar naf._

(You can swallow a rough bone; but once it is embedded in your bowels, it cuts up your bowels).

The Maulana was applying the saying to any power which seeks to subdue the Pathans; but it can equally be applied to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly, the quotation which I used in replying to the debate as External Affairs Secretary to the then Government of India may well be apt to the situation now as seen through Soviet eyes:

Those behind cried 'Forward!'
And those before cried 'Back!'³

When _The Pathans_ was first published, in 1958, Dr. Khan Sahib, my Premier when I was Governor of the NWFP in pre-Partition days, had become (on 14 October 1955) Chief Minister of unified West Pakistan under the One-Unit scheme. But in May 1958 he was tragically assassinated. This was a blow from which, it may be said, Pakistan has never wholly recovered. On the Frontier its implications were severe. Difficulties with Afghanistan over the 'Pakhtunistan' issue increased and, on 6 September 1961, diplomatic relations were broken off. They were not to be resumed until May 1963.⁴ Even then, the Afghan claim to the tribal areas south-east of the Durand Line and to parts both of the former North West Frontier Province proper and of Baluchistan and to certain of the States to the north (now incorporated in Pakistan proper) was not formally abandoned, and it has been suggested that the reason for the settlement at that time was primarily economic as Afghan trade with the out-
side world had been disrupted by the break-off in spite of the fact that Pakistan, for her part, had tried to keep the trade route open, and despite the substitution of other routes through the USSR and Iran together with Soviet aid.5

The hotting up of the 'Pakhtunistan' issue has been traced to two factors, first, the giving of United States military aid to Pakistan, which dates back to 1954, and, second, the decision to unify the provinces of West Pakistan. This latter was a response to growing discontent in what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and has been well described in President Ayub Khan's book.6 The One-Unit scheme has now been rescinded but its consequences remain with us today. Had Khan Sahib lived they might have been awaited, just as had Liaqat Ali Khan lived Pakistan might not have passed through the traumas leading to military rule. And though it is not within our scope to discuss these matters fully here, some consideration needs to be given to the geo-political factors which have resulted, as it were, in the Pathans being ground between the upper and the nether millstones.

In his Foreword to my friend Akbar S. Ahmed's Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas, 1972-1976 (1977), the Governor of the reconstituted NWFP, Major-General Nasir Ullah Khan Babar wrote that between 1947 and 1972 the Tribal Areas were 'left to their own devices'. This may be an over-statement but it is certainly true that troops were withdrawn from such places as Razmak and that otherwise things were managed very much as we had managed them, with Political Agents, allowances to the Tribes, and so on. The situation changed in 1972 with the advent to power of Mr. Bhutto in Pakistan and in response, it has been suggested, to developments in Afghanistan.7 The Razmak camp was re-activated, the Nahakki Pass crossed for the first time since 1935, the Mohmand Agency headquarters were shifted to Ghalanai, and the new Agencies of Orakzai and Bajaur were created, the first from part of the Kohat and Hangu Frontier Regions8 and the second from a Sub-division of the Mala-kand Agency. These last changes came into effect in December 1973 and were accompanied, states Ahmed, by economic activity 'on such a scale and at such a pace' as was previously unknown in the tribal areas. Why all this flurry of activity
and reorganization? For the answer we have to look, it seems to me, to events in Afghanistan.

After the 1963 resumption of diplomatic relations there were a number of events of importance in that country. In the first place, there was increasing Russian influence. Roads were built by the Russians from Qizil Qala on the Oxus and east through the Hindu Kush at Salang to Kabul and from Kushka on the border with Russian Turkestan down to the southeast city of Kandahar, these being supplemented by a link road built by the Americans between Kandahar and Kabul.9 Secondly, there was a new Constitution in Afghanistan.

In chapter 24 and also above I have mentioned Hashim Khan who was Nadir Shah's brother and Wazir-i-Azam (Prime Minister), and who after Nadir's murder in 1933 continued to act in this capacity to his nephew Zahir Shah. In 1946 Hashim was succeeded by his younger brother Shah Mahmud, and in 1953 their nephew, by another brother, Prince Mohammad Daud Khan took over. Daud it was who was responsible for the 1964 Constitution, a strange document in some ways, in that although it introduced for the first time universal adult suffrage into Afghanistan, it also provided that no member of the reigning family should hold public office.10 Dr. Mohammad Yusuf (a physics professor) became Prime Minister after an election in which, according to one account, there was a remarkably low turnout with less than 15 per cent of the population voting; and although there were no political parties as such, and the vast majority of the members of the new Ulasi Jirgah, or Lower House of the bicameral Shura, or Parliament, were traditionalist, devout Muslims, some fifteen of the two hundred and fifteen members were Marxist-Radicals and Socio-Democrats. It was at this stage that Karmal and Tarahki first sprang into prominence, the first because of what has been described as a smear campaign against certain of Dr. Yusuf's Ministers, and the second through the publication of his weekly Khalq which was banned after five issues because of its attacks on private property. Karmal was actually successful in bringing down the government, or so it has been suggested for, according to one account, in a demonstration
outside the Parliament building, on a day when there was a vote of confidence, three students of the Kabul University were killed and Dr. Yusuf, although he obtained his mandate, was so saddened and distressed that he resigned. Then, on 17 July 1973, after a confused succession of Ministries, and only three weeks after a visit by the Soviet President of Kabul, Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah, who was not only his first cousin but also married to his younger sister Humairah, and declared Afghanistan a Republic.

It was in the wake of this coup that, on the Pakistani side, abandoned cantonments were reoccupied and an elaborate road-building programme initiated. Ahmed tells us that by the end of 1976 the Yusaf Khel to Nawagai road through the Safi area had been completed, that the Kalaya road in Orakzai had gone to Kalat, and that the Kurram road had reached the Afridi Tirah border, fifteen and a half miles from Sadda. Old forts such as Datta Khel Ladha and Tiarza were reactivated as well as Razmak. Expenditure on roads increased manifold between 1971-2 and 1975-6, and overall there was a great increase with power and electrification schemes. There was said to have been a tenfold increase in agricultural expenditure and the crop acreage covered increased by over 60 per cent. Whatever his other faults, Bhutto must, I think, be given some credit for initiating these changes, which may well prove to have been, in the long term, of benefit to the Pathans, despite the fact that they are, at the time of writing, overshadowed by events across the border.

The narrative of these events must now be briefly resumed. Daud Khan’s declaration of a Republic in Afghanistan with the support of Babrak Karmal’s Parcham Party did not lead immediately to an increase in support by the Soviets though in June 1974 he received a mild endorsement of the Afghan position on the ‘Pakhtunistan’ issue during the course of a visit to Moscow. This was probably because, in the first place, the Russians were at that time seeking detente, and secondly because Daud, who had his conservative side, had eased out key members of his original junta from the Revolutionary Council and, in February 1977, actually replaced it with a civilian cabinet and promulgated a new Constitution. Never-
theless it remains a fact that, as stated by Z. Mustafa in an article in Pakistan Horizon, the USSR is the only government to have consistently supported Afghanistan on the 'Pakhtunistan' question and that this support dates back at least to Khrushchev's time.\(^{14}\)

Mustafa also points out that following the coup there was a marked shift in Afghanistan's foreign policy. The Soviets had, for more than twenty years, dominated the foreign aid scene in Kabul but in the seven-year plan, 1977-84, although such aid was to be increased from 45 per cent to 66 per cent and the USSR was to remain a major donor, it was to be closely followed by Iran, the United Nations, and Western Germany. The Iranian government, indeed, offered to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the 'Pakhtunistan' issue, as did the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, and Bhutto's July 1974 tour of the NWFP and Baluchistan ('One-Unit' had by then been unscrambled) included offers to Kabul of bilateral talks. Early in 1975 the two governments decided to meet at Foreign Secretary level, and although negotiations were held up or a\(\text{he}\) by the Pakistani decision to ban the National Awami Party, which through its battles for provincial autonomy had strengthened the case for 'Pakhtunistan' within Pakistan itself, Iranian mediation paved the way for a visit by Bhutto to Kabul in June 1976 which, contrary to expectations, was a success and led to a truce in the war of nerves.\(^{15}\) In August the same year Daud reciprocated by visiting Islamabad and a deal was struck providing for the release of the National Awami Party leaders in return for Kabul's recognition of the Durand Line as a permanent border. Its formal signature was, however, postponed to a later occasion in Kabul and, in the meantime, events took place in Pakistan which it is not our purpose here to describe in any detail but which had the effect of bringing foreign relations to a standstill. The National Democratic Party succeeded Wali Khan's National Awami Party and was active in opposing Bhutto. Daud backpedalled, insisting on a settlement with Pakhtun and Baluch leaders, and a brief visit by Bhutto to Kabul in June 1977 was concerned with other matters. In July 1977 the military government took over in Pakistan and elections were post-
poned. General Zia-ul-Haq’s visit to Kabul in October 1977 was not concerned with specifics but when, in March 1978, Daud came to Islamabad negotiations were resumed in earnest and Wali Khan and other leaders of the NAP were released. Mr. Bhutto, writing from the condemned cell, regarded this as a sign of surrender without the *quid pro quo* for which he had pressed and, from the outside, it is difficult to form a considered judgement on these events. Nevertheless, it remains true to say that when the *coup* of April 1978 took place, in Kabul, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations appeared to be on the verge of a break-through.

This 1978 *coup*, now known as the *Saur Revolution*, took place in Afghanistan following the reunification of the *Khalq* and *Parcham* parties. As we have seen, the second of these was formed by Babrak Karmal and his associates in the sixties and the first was formed by Nur Mohammad Tarahki, a former Afghan press attache in Washington who had founded the weekly *Khalq* (signifying masses). These two parties, of which the *Parcham* (Banner) was the most consistently pro-Moscow, at first joined to form the United People’s Democratic Party but split in 1970-1. In 1977 they reunited as the People’s Democratic Party and were responsible for the *Saur Revolution* which, there is little doubt, was carried out with Russian help.

Of non-Communist states, only India at first recognized the new regime, and although its leader, Tarahki, denied that his Party was Communist or Marxist-dominated, one of the leaders of the *coup*, Colonel Abdul Qadir, was alleged to have close connexions with the Russians. Despite protestations of non-alignment, twenty-five new agreements with the USSR on economic and social co-operation were signed within two months and every Afghan Ministry was guided by at least one Russian adviser.

On 5 May 1978 Pakistan accorded recognition to the new regime and on 7 May Tarahki met Abdul Ghaffar Khan declaring, on 9 May, that efforts would be made to resolve the problem of the ‘Pakhtuns and Baluchis’ peacefully through negotiations. In other words, a reactivation of the demand for ‘Pakhtunistan’ seemed in prospect.
In retrospect, it can be argued that the Russian support for 'Pakhtunistan' which has, as we have seen, been a consistent feature of Moscow's foreign policy, is the key to the whole question for Daud had a history of activism in this field and when, in the mid-seventies, he seemed on the verge of settling it with the Pakistanis, there was a clear motive for the Russians to intervene. Their interest in its reactivation lies in the fact that if 'Pakhtunistan' ever came into being it would mean a smaller Afghanistan and a smaller Pakistan — certainly the latter for some claims even include parts of the Punjab — and would therefore make it easier for the Soviets to dominate the region and prepare the way for a Communist takeover in Pakistan itself.

But, as we have seen, Tarahki's regime was at the outset, by its own account, 'non-aligned' and it is ironical that Pakistan was itself making moves towards non-alignment at this period, attending as a guest participant the July 1978 Conference at Belgrade. Karmal, more flamboyant and widely known than either Tarahki or Amin (the new Prime Minister) before 1978, was exiled with some of his close associates around this time to the post of an ambassador in Eastern Europe, being later alleged to have attempted a coup against Terahki. Here again, the Soviets clearly had an interest in supporting him since he was more pro-Communist than Tarahki whose professions of non-alignment may well have been, to some extent at least, genuine.

In September 1979 a coup against Tarahki was in fact successful: he was killed by his own Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, three weeks after his return from another non-aligned conference, this time at Havana; and three months after this Amin too was killed — 'the priest who slew the slayer, and shall himself be slain' — when the Russians crossed the Oxus on 27 December 1979. Babrak Karmal was recalled from exile and installed in office.

Of events since the end of 1979 it is difficult, at the time of writing, to form a clear picture but it is certain that the opposition in Afghanistan to Soviet rule is intense and will be prolonged. The Soviets are astute bargainers and excellent chess-players: they have attacked the West at a weak point and created a grave international crisis. It may still be
possible to avoid a Third World War, but probably at the
cost of further appeasement; and the Soviet aim is not merely
military and economic but political and psychological
domination over mankind. 'Be sober, be vigilant; because
your adversary . . . as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking
whom he may devour'.

The resistance of the West, and even of the Islamic world,
has been mainly verbal, and the Pathan and Afghan guerrillas
have enjoyed little practical support in their struggle against
the invaders. Mr. Carter, Mrs. Thatcher and others endeav-
oured to don a Churchillian mantle, but even the attempted
Olympic boycott of Moscow proved a damp squib. Much
will depend on the strength and quality of local tribal resis-
tance but what the West needs now is more and better in-
telligence of local influences and forces. On that, cohesive
advice and action could proceed. Babrak was well named.

NOTES
1. See Appendix B.
2. Karmal means a fellow-worker Kar (Kar) work and mal, short for mal-
garai means associate. It has nothing to do with perfection (Kamal and Kamil).
Babrak conveys the notion of a little lion or tiger.
3. See the official report of the debate, pp. 1083, 1114-7.
5. See also Hasan, Zubeida, 'Foreign Policy of Afghanistan', Pakistan Horizon
(1964) vol. 17, pp. 48-57.
7. Mustafa, Z., 'Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and Central Asian Politics',
8. A Frontier Region, as distinct from an Agency, is a smaller tribal pocket
attached to a settled District, with the Deputy Commissioner for the District
responsible for relations with its tribes rather than a Political Agent.
9. Kamlin, Muhammad, 'Russia in Afghanistan: "piercing a window", or
bursting the floodgates?' Asia Pacific Community (Tokyo), No. 8, pp. 67-93,
Spring 1980.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. See also the chapter by R. Magnus in Dupree and Albert (eds.) Afghanis-
tan in the 1970s (1974) and sources there cited.
13. See Mustafa, 2, op. cit.
15. See Mustafa, 2, op. cit.
16. Also spelled Taraki, Tarakhi, and Tarakki. His antecedents were discussed in
Dawn, 6 May 1978.
17. See Mustafa, 2, op. cit.
18. Interview with Hafizullah Amin cited from Economist 8 July 1978 in Musta-
tafa (note 7 supra).
ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP SHOWING AFGHAN & PATHAN AREAS

Density of dots indicates roughly density of population.

Authority: observations over forty years, and "Sovetskaya Etnografiya" for the Afghan portion.
TRIBAL LOCATIONS OF THE PATHANS

REFERENCES
- Demarcated Durand Line
- Undemarcated Durand Line
- Border Lines
- Approximate Tribal Boundary

MAHSUD
- Tribal Names
  - Eastern Afghans (Khush and Cherah and allied tribes)
  - Kizilbash Pathans
  - Ghurghusht Pathans
  - Settled Ghaji and Ladi etc. tribes
  - Western Afghans (Durrani and allied tribes)
  - Ghajis of Afghanistan

Figure of the Main Sail
(Chapter XXIV)