SETTLING THE FRONTIER
Land, Law, and Society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500-1900

Robert Nichols
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Appendices</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Maps</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Peshawar Valley and the Idea of a Frontier</em></td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. History, Anthropology, and the Eighteenth Century</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Genealogy as Ideology</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Politics, Poetics, and Economy of the Land</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Narratives of Continuity and Domination</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Millenarianism: Religion, Class, and Resistance</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Social Geographies</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Settling the Frontier</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Colonizing Institutions</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Anglo-Pakhtun Society</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Interpreting Resistance, the ‘Fanatic’, and the Subaltern</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion: Settlement as Metaphor</strong></td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendices (Tables, commentary)</strong></td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Glossary</strong></td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Bibliography</strong></td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Index</strong></td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF APPENDICES

1. Typhus epidemic of 1853 263
   • Typhus in Akerpoora village
   • Villages affected by typhus
   • Typhus in Toru and local villages
2. 1855 Census data 266
3. 1873 village data 268
4. James Settlement data 270
   • Durrani revenue
   • Sikh revenue
   • Sikh revenue assignment
   • Revenue assessment
5. Yusufzai assessments and *mowajibs* 276
6. ‘Eusofzie Levies’ 1857 277
7. ‘Mutiny’ service awards 278
8. 1852 Education Statistics 280
10. Agrarian and Tenancy statistics 282
11. Yusufzai villages 283
12. ‘Baizai’ village statistics 1868 and 1891 Censuses 285
13. ‘Baizai’ village revenue 286
14. ‘Tribes and Castes’ 287
15. Appendix, F.C.R. Sec. 40 289
16. Akhund Darweza’s genealogical narrative 289
LIST OF MAPS

(Between pp. 50 and 51)

1. Peshawar District, Swat, Buner
2. General Tribal Map
3. Swat, Buner, and Bajaur
4. Distribution of Tribes
5. Assessment Circles
6. Peshawar District Survey Map
Some years ago, while doing research on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, I examined very different bodies of literature explaining regional society and history. Religious tracts, colonial reports of ethnic intractability, and post-colonial texts of national resistance seemed to have little in common with a growing development and scholarly, mainly anthropological, literature that inevitably created an overly normative, even static impression of Pakhtun, especially ‘independent’ or ‘tribal’ communities. The following study arose from a sense that an important perspective, that of long term socio-economic and political processes within the settled, agricultural Peshawar valley, was still needed to fully illuminate local twentieth century history. The task became challenging, yet imaginable, with the realization that each of the different, often controversial or disputed, earlier texts and studies of the region remained important sources of insight, detail, and opinion upon relevant issues.

To research a range of materials in diverse languages from several generations of local and imperial sources, I have studied Persian, the language of Mughal and pre-British elites, and Pashtu (Pashto), an Indo-Iranian language of the Pashtuns heavily influenced by Persian and north Indian languages. The local dialect, where a letter pronounced to the west as sh becomes kh, has led to ‘Pakhtu’ and the name Pakhtun. I have also benefited from some Urdu training. Rather than attempt any system of transliteration for literally generations of authors and texts I have often simply used and acknowledged previous efforts. My spellings of manuscript titles and of author’s names often conform to those in the noted editions; Dorn’s text for his History of the Afghans translation, 1829-36 (Karachi: 1976) of

Many more people need to be thanked than can be acknowledged here. Professionally, the South Asia Centre at Penn invested FLAS Fellowships in my South Asia Regional Studies MA programme and Pashtu and Urdu language study. Penn’s Middle East Centre supported a summer of intensive Persian language training, a study that continued during a year-long Teaching Assistant Fellowship provided by the Penn Department of History. My overseas archival research in 1995-6 was funded by both the American Institute of Pakistan Studies and the Joint Committee on South Asia of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, funded by the US Near and Middle East Research and Training Act. A History Department Mellon Dissertation Fellowship supported my write-up work.

Personally, my language instructors need to be thanked, if only for their patience; Benedicte Grima (Pashtu), Surendra Gambhir and Farooq Hamid (Hindi-Urdu), Soheila Amirsoleimani, Kamran Talattof, and T. Assefi-Shirazi (Persian).

The staffs of the major archives and libraries need thanks, especially a series of research officers, including Muhammad Abbas in the Punjab Archives in Lahore and Zahir Ullah Khan in Peshawar. The National Archives of India in New Delhi was a productive stop, memorable for quiet and extended hours. The National Documentation Centre in Islamabad was an island of efficiency and air conditioning. Director Jelali of the N.W.F.P. Library and Archives, the librarians, and the Records Office staff under Muqarrab Khan were always courteous and supportive. Raj Wali Shah Khattak, Director of the Pashto Academy at Peshawar University, Abdul Hamid, Chief Librarian of Islamia College, Peshawar University as well as the librarians
of the University Central Library and the History Library were uniformly interested, professional, and helpful.

It was a personal pleasure as well as useful to talk about my work with Professor Lal Baha and the students and faculty of the Peshawar University History Department. Azmat Hayat Khan and the faculty and students of the Area Studies Centre (Central Asia) allowed me to enlarge my horizons beyond piles of archive files. Rukshana Iqbal, journalist and school director, helped me make sense of obscure verse, while Khudadad, my research associate, spent many hours with me considering texts and exploring old bookstores.

Scholars deserving thanks for input, criticism, and support include Lee Cassanelli, Margaret Mills, Beshara Doumani, David Ludden, Ayesha Jalal, David Gilmartin and a cohort of Penn colleagues.
The Peshawar Valley and the Idea of a Frontier

During the sixteenth century the village of Peshawar experienced new growth as a trade centre, as a market-place, and as an imperial outpost. Located in a large agricultural valley northwest of the upper Indus river, Peshawar was positioned beneath the mountains and passes leading to Kabul, Persia, and Central Asia. As a garrison town Peshawar served as a transit stop for Mughal armies and trade caravans that followed the emperor Akbar’s high road built through the Khyber Pass. Imperial authorities raised revenues from local irrigated landholdings, and tried to incorporate or manage the dozens of remote villages scattered across the dry, rolling plains of the greater Peshawar valley. Across these plains, livestock grazed, and scattered fields depended upon sparse rains, seasonal watercourses, and numerous wells to water often rich alluvial soils.

This work explores the question of social transformation within the Peshawar valley from the sixteenth through the nineteenth century, an extended period when regional villagers and pastoralists experienced and interacted with the demands of evolving imperial and cultural ideas and institutions. For its Mughal rulers the valley was a political frontier to tame for stability and revenue extraction. Islamic scholars and proselytizers regarded the valley as a spiritual frontier of flawed tribal believers in need of guidance. Later, the British presented the area as one on the frontier of modernity, and so as one requiring new systems and technologies. Through this history, outside perceptions treated the region as a cultural frontier in need of the values and resources of neighbouring, imperial civilizations. Locally such influences were modified to produce a social history composed of complex degrees of change and apparent continuity.
In the decades before 1526, when the first Mughal emperor Babur came down from Kabul to conquer Hindustan, the Peshawar valley served as a settler’s frontier for pastoral clans from Afghan tribal confederacies migrating from the west. These clans occupied the region between the Khyber Pass and the Indus river by displacing or dominating local rulers and agriculturists. These Afghans, styling themselves as Pakhtuns, divided the plains and the highland valleys north of the Peshawar valley among their main families and confederate allies. The division followed a system of lineage-based land tenure designed to ensure equitable shares in agricultural potential.\(^2\)

This study explores the processes of contact, integration, and confrontation that occurred across multiple social and agrarian frontiers as successive imperial systems of order and political hierarchy encountered Pakhtun ‘tribal’ practices shaped by settlement, lineage dynamics, and local interpretations of Islamic doctrine.\(^3\) Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries settled-district Pakhtun social relations were fragmented by political and economic innovations and challenged by alternative hierarchical models. But evidence of clan continuity and adaptation revealed Pakhtun cultural and social resiliency. Over this period, imperial control of land policies and legal regimes structured elite forms of patronage while institutionalizing economic and social inequalities. Because the legacy of the imperial system in place by 1900 shaped inequities that continued to be experienced decades after the formal end of the colonial era, this history offers an insight for those concerned with twentieth-century issues of colonialism, nationalism, and social justice.

Research on the social history of the clans of this region, apparently marginalized on the fringe of well-studied empires, brings into focus a sense of the complex ‘settled district’ cultural and material interests generally bypassed in studies of independent Afghan clans,\(^4\) or in studies of the competition between the regional imperial elite and greater state structures.\(^5\) Yet, in the end, it was the aggregate resources of apparently marginal provinces and districts such as the Peshawar valley
which provided the tax base, soldiers, and labourers needed to fully extend and manage the authority of far reaching empires. A broad structural question raised throughout this work is precisely to what extent imperial contact, recruitment, and exploitation led to regional integration, subordination, and even 'underdevelopment' in relation to wider imperial and global processes.  

As residents of a revenue unit of the Kabul province of the Mughal empire, then later of a similar district for Afghan, Sikh, and British rulers, Peshawar valley residents demonstrated cultural, social, and archival continuities that inform a regional study. Clan territorial stability, especially during the long occupation by Yusufzai and Mandanr lineages of the Yusufzai illaqa or sub-division of the north-eastern Peshawar valley, also nurtured a wealth of oral traditions and textual materials that contribute to a local, historical sensibility.

The Scholarly Context

A detailed study of Peshawar's agrarian-based society adds complexity to past scholarly images of the area populations as occupants of a socio-politically fragmented 'shatter-zone' between Persian and South Asian civilizations. If lacking the larger population and accumulated wealth of major imperial urban centres, the Peshawar region experienced many of the same economic relations, political linkages, and conflicts over authority which characterized districts closer to state cores. This regional history has been conceptualized as a dynamic, contingent process occurring 'outside' commonly accepted ideas of essentially cultural or religious South Asian or Middle Eastern 'civilizations'.

Politically, imperial-local interaction and contest, especially during the British era, reflected both the strategies and limits of state initiatives and the adaptations of local social agendas and hierarchies. Culturally, economically, and socially, the area remained an imperial-local 'contact zone' of contingent power
relations. Here peripatetic traders, Islamic scholars, pilgrims, warriors, and nomads constantly rested, studied, or transacted business. This made the Peshawar valley less a site of timeless village communities than a home or temporary base for diverse, frequently mobile, and often contentious social actors. Heavily taxed irrigated fields around Peshawar fed imperial troops and supported a local court society anxious to expand control over the land. Well known religious scholars and madrasas in villages around the valley attracted students from as far away as Central Asia. Villagers subjected to hierarchies led by Pakhtun landowners tilled the land, wove textiles for local markets and for export, and practised the skills and trades needed to maintain village standards of living.

Evidence suggests that by degrees many Peshawar valley producers and village merchants participated in the local and broader networks of limited market agriculture, credit, and commerce that characterized northern India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia in the era before direct European conquest. Pakhtun migration east from the Peshawar area was continuous. Within the ebb and flow of broader processes, the Peshawar area possessed the cultural, geographical, and ecological continuities considered by scholars to be important in defining an analytically useful region for study within the South Asian subcontinent. With the exception of the local court elite in Peshawar town, the valley remained a cultural arena dominated by the Pakhtu language, the Islamic religion, Persian literary influences, and social codes based on Afghan lineage practices. Hindu and Sikh traders and merchants lived protected throughout the region, tolerated as necessary to village commerce.

Topographically a valley of the far eastern foothills of the high, dry Iranian plateau, the unirrigated portions of the Peshawar basin were vulnerable to drought. Still, the valley endured as a steady producer in the north-western Punjab wheat belt. For much of each year, until seasonal rains fell, large cultivable tracts of the valley appeared to be dry, untillable wasteland. Pakhtun clans had settled to the east on the left bank of the Indus river. But, east of the Indus, many clans exposed in
lowland areas experienced degrees of subordination, including linguistic, to a predominantly Punjabi society.

Better to illuminate this regional history, this study bridges the early modern-modern periodization of South Asian historiography that has divided eras, issues, and scholarship over what could be complementary approaches to Mughal history and what falls within the purview of British colonial studies. Histories of the region that begin with the 1849 British occupation of the Punjab and the Peshawar valley may too arbitrarily dismiss the previous century of post-Mughal events. Such histories risk reading evidence of long-term change or processes simply as being derived from the British encounter. Examining land-related initiatives and state-local relations over several generations of Peshawar valley history diffuses teleologies of inevitable change. Processes generating, shaping, and resisting change may be recognized and placed in a long-term context. Indeed, familiar imperial strategies of dominance and village strategies of resistance were often reused, modified, and resurrected as needed in different eras and circumstances. The systematic failure of broader imperial strategies of legitimacy and control periodically preceded the rise of a new dominant political authority.

Histories of the decline of the Mughal empire emphasize the role of weak emperors, court factionalism, and the emergence of alternative provincial power centres. But any political 'decline' was probably not a direct consequence of disruptions or dramatic changes in agrarian productivity. Early eighteenth century events in the Peshawar valley reveal at the micro-political level how factional competitors were tied to imperial networks of patronage, but could often successfully transfer loyalties when shifts in power balances made change inevitable. Locally, any dramatic dynastic activity often had less impact on regional social relations than did gradual developments such as the slow extension of Peshawar valley irrigation systems and increased state control over agriculture.

To understand the recurring role of Islamic leadership and moral vision in Peshawar valley events, including confrontations
with the state, this study ventures across academic area study boundaries that traditionally divide Islamic scholarship between Middle Eastern and South Asian fields of interest. In answer to the question of whether ‘Is it Islamic political movements? Or social movements in Islamic societies?’ it will be seen that Islamic activists operated within a sociological context of historically specific economic, social, and political influences.

A regional history able to cross temporal and spatial bounds of historiographic inquiry also contributes to a richer insight into theoretical and wide-ranging discussions of the nineteenth century European encounters with colonized, often South Asian ‘others’. If the European colonial presence brought cultural imperialism and new levels of technological or administrative sophistication, actual European conquest was often only the final stage of long periods introducing economic, material, and political innovations. For years before the British conquest of the trans-Indus region Sikh governors deployed European tactics, weapons, and even officers in confrontations with Pakhtun villagers.

As well, forms and idioms of indigenous resistance were not necessarily unique effects of European colonial activity. Early nineteenth century sources suggest that Peshawar valley clan and Islamic opposition to pre-European imperialism (in this case Sikh expansion) might have much in common with other resistance studied as ‘millenarian’ upheaval against a specifically European colonial expansion and ideology.

The long history of Peshawar valley contact between Pakhtun society and central authorities makes a useful contribution to studies conceptualizing the interplay between imperial states and ‘subaltern’, or nationalist, resistance to authority. Over centuries, imperial networks provided the patronage and protection needed to expand the agrarian tax base and to increase control, order, and legitimacy. Pakhtun initiatives and reactions recorded themselves along a socio-political continuum of interaction with imperial authority that covered the spectrum of collaboration, coercion, avoidance, resistance, and open rebellion. A fragmentation of interests was continually noted
between and among independent and settled area Pakhtuns, the
imperially patronized Pakhtun elite and common landholders,
and the Pakhtun ruling elite and non-Pakhtun village herders,
tillers, craftsmen, and labourers. This complicates, perhaps
beyond viability, common perceptions of pre-twentieth century
proto-nationalist unity and resistance, or other theories of
dominator-dominated, binary opposition that view particular
historical events and relationships as comparable examples of
subaltern resistance to sources of power.19

The set of relationships formed before 1900 continued to
influence the new political world order emerging with the
twentieth century. The 1901 separation of a North-West Frontier
Province from the greater Punjab, the rise of a ‘public arena’ of
popular press and political assembly during the Punjab agrarian
unrest of 1907,20 and the pan-British-Indian religious and
nationalist activism that arose in the region after 1918
contributed to a new political and economic context that
reshaped regional social relations. Before 1900 the Peshawar
valley experienced direct political constraints that caused the
region to lag behind in forming the urban, issue-oriented
communities of interest that developed during the late nineteenth
century in other provinces. The set of relationships established
before 1900 within the Peshawar valley between provincial
authorities and Pakhtun landed clients more directly exhibited
the collaboration, vested interest, and high level competition
that post-1947 ‘Cambridge school’ historians would too neatly
document as the decisive aspect of provincial politics.21

Though the late nineteenth century British-Indian
administration introduced ever more sophisticated systems of
land control, law codes, and corresponding ideologies, the
political and economic domination of the Peshawar valley never
translated into the direct socio-cultural hegemony needed to
ensure the uncontested authority of the government. A constant
movement of trade, ideas, and people from independent
territories outside ‘settled’ imperial districts reinforced
traditional practices and offered competing views to the valley
residents. Of comparative interest for related South Asian
scholarship was the local deployment from the mid-nineteenth century of particular land and judicial policies. Post-1849 Punjab and specific Peshawar District initiatives marked the latest British colonial efforts to balance the contradictions of imperial policies that simultaneously embraced the rule of law, markets, and private property, while attempting to ensure political stability, support an intermediary class of indigenous landed elite, and maintain an idealized paternalism over a broad layer of village landowners, the ‘agricultural tribes’ regarded as the base for social stability.

Peshawar colonial land settlement policies conformed to an established Punjab model. Some comparable social impact was experienced. Yet the unique ‘frontier’ situation gave Pakhtuns, especially those in foothill villages, many opportunities to modify official intentions and rulings. Continuing government efforts to ‘settle’ the Pakhtuns involved both land revenue control and the implementation of a new judicial regime. Legal reform was deemed necessary to establish moral authority and to reform and civilize a tribal society.

To fully understand the role of imperial concepts of authority and criminality in British India, Sandria Freitag has suggested:

…it would be necessary to discuss at once (1) culture- and concept-specific definitions of criminality and their relation to concepts of the state; (2) evolving methods of crime control as they related to changing ideological and practical concerns of both Raj and ruled; and (3) the relationship of changes in Indian social structure and economic organization to the definitions of authority and perceptions of legitimacy of collective criminal and protest activities. Most important, all three levels of analysis must be seen as dynamic, part of a process of change in which they interacted with each other and in which all three changed over time.

Though not designed as such to address this full agenda, the following Peshawar history details Pakhtun and Islamic definitions of unacceptable social behaviour, including the role of rulers in maintaining authority. Over centuries, especially under the British, imperial methods of crime control reflected
particular colonial interests and administrative concerns. And in a dynamic socio-economic environment, late nineteenth century Peshawar authorities imposed their own politically useful definition of ‘criminal’ upon activities that were locally legitimate expressions of collective mobilization and militant protest. By 1900 the discourses arising from conflicting and overlapping norms of legitimate rule, justice, and social behaviour mapped the irregular, variable conditions of social interaction in the zone of imperial contact.

This work foreshadows the socio-economic dynamics found underlying twentieth century NWFP ethnic and nationalist political mobilization. By the early twentieth century, British rule had caused ‘profound economic and social changes’ benefiting a ‘Khani elite’. This elite used government patronage to discard old patron-client ties and differentiate themselves in status and wealth from ‘lower class non-Pakhtuns’ and a growing ‘large body of Pakhtun tenants and labourers whose inferior status ran counter to their egalitarian traditions and history of landownership’. Related, complex Pakhtun and nationalist political activism and competition spanning the 1919-47 period was fundamentally shaped by such earlier dynamics. The work of Rittenberg and Jansson traces the political legacies of imperial policies and social processes discussed here.

Sources

Sources for this study indicate that the periodization of much South Asian research has been encouraged by linguistic differences in documentation. During and after Mughal rule Persian served as the language of official record and of much elite literary production. In the Mughal era in the Peshawar valley and the surrounding region the small literate population, mostly elite clan families and Islamic scholars, wrote and recorded from oral sources local histories, genealogies, poetry, and religious and instructional texts. One history written in both the Persian and Pakhtu languages, the Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, was
apparently based on at least one near contemporary local narrative of fifteenth and sixteenth century Pakhtun migration and conquest. It remains a definitive text, if difficult to corroborate.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the emergence of polemical Islamic theological literature in the Pakhtu language reflected the efforts of opponents in a socio-religious conflict between orthodox and heterodox interpretations to appeal directly to local populations for support. *Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar*, a text, by Akhund Darweza (d. 1638), an activist Sunni scholar, specifically integrated Pakhtun lineage stories into a broader plea for clan social reform and proper religious observance. Regional literature also included clan histories, individual collections of verse (*diwans*), and scholarly texts derived from Arabic and Persian literary, scientific, and religious canons.

The present study has drawn upon Afghan histories, clan genealogies, and religious texts in Persian, Pakhtu, and in translation to interpret the multiple socio-political interests and conflicts of the Mughal and later periods. Local cultural materials, including verse from the *diwans* of famous Pakhtun poets, particularly the renowned Rahman Baba, and from collections of anonymous popular couplets, *landeys* or *tapas*, have been incorporated into efforts to comprehend the preoccupations, desires, and social consciousness of a predominantly non-literate population. The verse of Rahman Baba, translated in *The Nightingale of Peshawar* by Jens Enevoldsen in the broadest manner, remains of unique interest to later students of agrarian conditions. The thousands of *landeys* collected by Salma Shaheen in *Rohi Sandarai* remain undated, yet evocative sources of clan wisdom as well as provide an insight into local culture and the human condition.

Textual materials were found on the shelves of the Northwest Frontier Province Library and the Islamia College and History Department libraries of Peshawar University. Key sources of materials included publications efforts of the Pashto Academy of Peshawar University and the small bookshops in the bazaars.
of Peshawar, where editions of sixteenth and seventeenth century religious literature remain in print and for sale. While the complete editorial history of the manuscripts or previous editions used in preparing the consulted texts has gone unacknowledged in several works, the main texts utilized, viz., the *Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani* and the *Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar* remain local literary authorities in useful conventional editions. The *Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, published by the Pashto Academy of Peshawar University, has an excellent introduction by now retired Academy Director Muhammad Nawaz Tair noting that the British Museum manuscript consulted by the Pashto Academy remained unchecked by earlier British Orientalists who simply assumed the text was only in Persian.

Other sources included documents from the Mughal period and from later networks of news writers who periodically dispatched Persian language newsletters to superiors. By the early nineteenth century British agents around the Punjab also began sending and receiving similar reports on local politics and events. Collections of newsletters dating from the late eighteenth century have been consulted in various libraries and archives, especially the Punjab Archives in Lahore.

An increase in English language correspondence and reports about the region followed the growth of British influence in the area that culminated in the 1849 'annexation' of the Punjab and the Peshawar valley. Elphinstone's two volumes on the 'Kingdom of Caubul' date from an 1809 diplomatic and intelligence-gathering visit to Peshawar. From 1847, voluminous correspondence was exchanged between local colonial agents in Peshawar and officials in Lahore and Calcutta. These sources record historical 'facts', but also the evolution of imperial attitudes, strategies, and contemporary conventional wisdom about their empire and the Pakhtun society under their control.

Sets of archival documents define imperial structures and position the Peshawar valley in local, provincial, and British-Indian contexts. The Records Office of the NWFP Archives in Peshawar holds thousands of post-1849 files that originated in the work of the Deputy Commissioner's office which
administered the Peshawar District, essentially the main valley, and in the Peshawar Division office that supervised Peshawar and several other districts, and handled affairs related to the tribal borders. These records reveal the problems and agendas of local officials trying to understand and influence settled district affairs.

In the Peshawar Archives, and also in volumes of correspondence and records in Islamabad, Lahore, New Delhi, and London, are found the standard bureaucratic collections of regional land assessment and settlement reports, periodic financial and judicial reports, and the files that formed a specific Peshawar archive of colonial knowledge. In these volumes there are letters about immediate issues, including emergency situations, that revealed the differences between local, provincial, and central perceptions and concerns. All these official studies, analyses, proposals, and initiatives simultaneously represent rich mines of statistical and first hand historical data and colonial 'texts' likely to conceal, reveal, or confuse a range of personal or imperial judgements or agendas. In addition, a genre of colonial and post-colonial memoirs and histories contributes to an archive of secondary literature that helps to illuminate the colonial period. The Pathans, originally published in 1958 by Olaf Caroe, remains a definitive secondary text that this work periodically comments upon. The last of the colonial administrators to turn local scholar, Caroe, brought an undeniable level of local empathy and knowledge to his text, yet retained a British and an imperial perspective until the last.

The body of post-1947 anthropological literature on tribal and Pakhtun society is extensive. Pakhtuns, as a ‘tribal’ society, attracted interest from scholars modelling non-state social formations and patterns of social transformation in the wake of earlier such studies in Africa and the Iranian plateau. As anthropologists studying the Pakhtuns critiqued earlier works, wrote new arguments, and in turn were critiqued, differing themes of social organization within the discipline were debated. I periodically comment upon this considerable body of Pakhtun-related studies that emphasized consecutively the crucial social
roles of individual motivation, segmentary dynamics, economic difference, and psychological equilibrium. Akbar Ahmed, a 1970s tribal area government official and anthropologist, became another in the long line of administrator-authors tied to their subject in multiple ways.

As this work tries to expand creatively the temporal frame of historical studies of ‘tribal’ and agrarian societies, it offers understanding of an important world community, the Pakhtuns, and their place within a society shaped over centuries by imagined and actual social, religious, and economic frontiers. It provides a historical context from which to view continuing regional and national debates, especially in Pakistan, centred on local culture, Islam, the state, and the rule of law.

A determined effort has been made in the research period available to assemble the conventional documentary and textual sources of historical study. Both pre-1849 and British era texts and documents have been scrutinized as potential historical sources that may well represent the biased views of less than objective sources. Methods of examining colonial rhetoric for the ‘prose of counter-insurgency’, and awareness of the nationalist and elite bias of much of the historiography of colonial India have aided a self-reflexive use of source material. Problems confronted, never to be completely resolved, included the veracity of ‘first hand’ reports, the fundamental accuracy of politically motivated censuses and tables of statistics, and the reliability of making even the simplest of assumptions about under-documented events and relationships.

This study was written from texts and documents, and within a scholarly discipline, shaped by the trope of the ‘narrative’. On a broad level, since 1947 historical perspectives on subcontinental history and society have been framed within narratives serving subjective interpretations of historical truth, socio-economic theory, and national identities. A critical sensibility must be applied to ensure that the processes of migration, agrarian settlement, and ‘state’ formation conceptualized for earlier periods, even earlier millennia, have not been too readily
absorbed in later works or coloured narratives of tribal conquest or assimilation. Recent narratives linking shifting frontiers, agrarian expansion, and religious change continue to be used as a vehicle to advance very powerful historical arguments. As well, on a documentary level this history recognizes the complex nature of texts and that narratives, written and oral, may contain allegorical references to other events and, in Pakhtun narratives especially, may represent visions of ‘non-institutional moral authority and autonomy’.

Two points emphasized in conceptualizing Central Asian history are relevant to the region in question. First, similar to ‘barbarian’ Central Asians, stereotyped images of ‘savage tribesmen’ long filled literature on the Pakhtuns and the British ‘frontier’. But ‘even when many people were nomadic pastoralists, they were no more “barbarian” or “savage” than many of their sedentary “civilized” neighbours’. Second, pastoral nomadism:

was not a ‘transitional stage’ from hunting and gathering to agriculture to urbanization. On the contrary, much nomadic and highly specialized pastoralism was probably the adaptive reaction to ecological, climatic and economic exigencies by agricultural peoples who had once been settled.

Other historical perspectives revolving around long term agrarian continuity and contemporary social science insight have presented alternatives to the personal and national histories typical in South Asian historiography. By the 1990s ‘subaltern’ theorists were questioning all deterministic and nation-state narratives, viewing them as western constructions, designed to reduce South Asian and world histories to mere adjuncts of western economic and ideological narratives. Yet, neither have subaltern theorists or others with ideas of alternative, ‘de-centred’ cultural and historical perceptions to any great extent achieved independence from the resources and institutions that have long authorized and ultimately diffuse such narratives.
This study appreciates the merit of 'subaltern' methodology, but also recognizes the 'western' influences that permeate all considerations of social history and theory. Stylistically, this history, as it pursues a chronological sequence, breaks free from the narrative form to pursue thematic interests. In an era coloured by an increasingly universal 'free market' view of history, this work intends to remind that no perspective can fully succeed that ignores legacies of socially and politically created inequality, of state institutions compromised by asymmetrical power relations, and of local cultures able to contest for power and preserve dynamic social identities.

Scholarship recognizing the dual roles of communication and social interaction in the traditions of literary texts, oral traditions, and historical compilations supports an effort to sift information relevant to social history from a diverse archive of textual and oral cultural materials. Without treating the 'information' in a village proverb any less critically than village census data, such non-traditional sources may be assumed to offer vital clues about social relations, attitudes towards the land and authority, and personal sensibilities. A consideration of the oral 'texts' of largely non-literate societies can help in understanding problems of time and bias, while accepting that oral tradition is a creative process, and that 'the message is a social product'.

In considering Pakhtun society as it existed outside the direct experience of imperial contact, including the period during the pre-nineteenth century, available, conventional historical tools have been supplemented with critical assessment of social science research on the nature of Pakhtun and 'tribal' social organization. The anthropological literature on the Punjab and Peshawar region Pakhtuns, including studies and debates on Swat valley society, is helpful in visualizing vanished village lives that arguably existed within the bounds of general social relations ordered by broadly familiar economic and political environments. This effort traces the various attempts to gain scholarly insight into Pakhtun social potential, while noting the vulnerability of the entire project of anthropological inquiry.
Consistent with Richard Fox’s sense of social dynamism, Pakhtun society was ‘not the result of a structure of cultural values or essences’, but the product of an ongoing historical process, in which ‘social action is constituted neither by an inertial and stable weight of tradition nor by individual maximizing strategies. It is an outcome, instead, of individual and group confrontations, placed within a field of domination and inequality’. While exploring this theme an effort has been made to recognize whether and when earlier ethnographic studies read as constructed texts. Ethnographic representations and rhetorical structures are no longer accepted as patently objective or transparent in meaning. An awareness of the possibility of narrative tropes, allegorical references, exclusions, suspect claims to authority, and unacknowledged linkages to local systems of domination implicitly accepts that often exceptional studies remain written texts able to supply only a ‘partial’ sense of ethnographic truth.

This regional material is drawn upon to support a broader argument against assumptions that general ‘settled district’ social tranquillity and conformity were brought about by colonial political and economic domination. Narratives incorporating this assumption have tended to ignore analysis of the settled areas completely or have simply absorbed complex scholarship of Pakhtun society depicting differences between settled district clans, ‘characterized by an often detribalizing stratification’, and unencapsulated ‘independent’ Afghan clans. Settled district Pakhtuns, through proximity and personal initiative, experienced different levels of imperial influence and maintained complex levels of socio-political interaction simultaneously with both colonial and lineage-based structures and institutions. At particular times, involving specific issues there might be minor or major differences between varying settled and independent area perspectives and interests. Shifting ‘frontiers’ of political, religious, agrarian, and cultural expansion and movement influenced Pakhtun villages and clans in varying degrees from the Indus river country to regions far to the north and west of the Peshawar valley.
Finally, it is time to rewrite much of the analysis of regional religious activism presented in imperial reports and post-colonial scholarship. Ideas of local, archaic ‘fanaticism’ and concepts of ‘millenarian’ movements against modernity are examined from the perspective that ‘Sacred authority is one kind of authority among others. It is not predicated on the indivisibility of religion and politics because not all authority is based on religion.’ Over centuries, Islamic activists in the Peshawar valley often saw themselves as religious missionaries on a spiritual frontier ruled by lineage or imperial ideologies. But their involvement, often as leaders, in complex periods of social and political mobilization is best interpreted as reflecting a full and contingent participation in the politics and political economy of that moment.

Settled for millennia by tillers, herders, and traders, then for centuries by Pakhtuns, from a local perspective the Peshawar valley was no more a ‘frontier’ than any other region of agrarian-pastoral society. That notions of a frontier were perceived, constructed, and projected onto the valley and surrounding areas, hint at the ironies implicit in this work’s title.

The following chapters incorporate the ‘facts’ of a historical narrative into discussions of tribal identity and ideology, agricultural practice, imperial and Islamic texts and activism, and the impact of evolving, especially British, land policies and state institutions of social control. The history closes with a sense of the complex late nineteenth century ‘transcultural’ society produced in the Peshawar valley, and a final chapter questioning both the achievement of any lasting British hegemony and any facile conclusion that all regional protest and revolt were undifferentiated ‘subaltern’ responses to imperialism.

The chapters form three loose parts. Chapters 1-4 discuss early valley society and economy and the Mughal era state-local dynamics that set many patterns for future interaction. Chapters 5-7 explore the issues and strategies involved as state institutions of control and social knowledge expanded and asserted new claims to authority. Chapters 8-10 discuss the
processes involved as a mature colonial presence both reshaped old structures of education, lineage relations, and land control and instituted innovations in systems of revenue, criminal and civil law, employment, and patronage.

Chapter 1 offers a sense of the social organization of seventeenth and eighteenth century Pakhtun clans and discusses the utility of anthropological modelling in understanding clan political organization and village hierarchies.

Chapter 2 discusses the role of family and mythic genealogies in unifying Afghan society and argues that textual representations of these genealogies protected clan identities against imperial culture and domination. A particular religious interpretation of the local genealogical narrative was written specifically to transform individual behaviour and ‘reform’ clan social relations.

Chapter 3 discusses the impact of imperial influence in the Peshawar valley, including long-term effects on agrarian practice and clan authority in state controlled irrigated tracts. Insights into related past socio-economic preoccupations and emotional concerns are derived from Pakhtun literature and popular verse.

Chapter 4 explores how family and imperial narratives shaped historical interpretations and created the textual authority for particular claims to local influence, patronage, and the control of resources and policies.

Chapter 5 examines the position of Islam as an agent in the context of clan and state competition during the early nineteenth century. Imperial assertions about fanaticism and clan claims about social interference served to preserve established socio-political hierarchies and to limit the long-term effectiveness of religious appeals to clan or Islamic unity against foreign domination.

Chapter 6 details the social and demographic impact upon Peshawar valley populations of physical, biological, and imperial geographies. Such geographical constraints determined settlement, the flow of travel, the impact of epidemics, and proximity to state authority. Desert tracts, poor roads, and lack of medical expertise were modified over time and, especially in
the British period, colonial knowledge slowly integrated aspects of village society into a bureaucratic context of records, statistics, and objectification.

Chapter 7 gives a historical slant to the process of colonial land administration, arguing that a flawed, incomplete early revenue process achieved certain goals of political control at the expense of delegating much socio-economic authority to local systems of hierarchy. Colonial expediency and social analysis led to the revitalizing and entrenchment of clan elite who were able to influence the development of revenue and legal regimes.

Chapter 8 details the colonial process of influencing local social institutions while gradually introducing new systems of police, judicial, and land administration. While political and revenue control was attained, the compromises struck with local social practices and an inability to control ‘criminal’ behaviour indicated the constraints of the ‘Limited Raj’ established in the Peshawar valley. Consolidating the borders of a political frontier did not mean other cultural or social frontiers had been, or could be, sealed.

Chapter 9 explores how the late nineteenth century valley social relations blurred the dichotomy between dominator and dominated. State-sponsored clan elite frustrated local officials while knowledgeable colonial functionaries used personal talents better to confront local agendas. During this period the arrival of ‘modernity’, with a railroad and state irrigation works, led to accelerating market and capitalist economic influences (from increased wage labour to cash cropping) that had specific local consequences within the Peshawar valley and the surrounding area. As in other parts of British India these consequences included ‘tribal’ migration for wage labour and related, state protected subordination and exploitation.52

Chapter 10 continues discussion of the relationship between clan, empire, Islam, and inequality through a history of the Pakhtun revolt of 1897. Documents of legal cases instituted against individuals and villages in the Yusufzai sub-division of the valley support an argument that the revolt was evidence not so much of religious millenarianism as of a socio-political event
that used common religious idioms and, in the absence of co-opted clan leadership, had a nominal religious leadership. The intricate social circumstances surrounding the revolt and its aftermath confuse any scholarly judgement that a unified ‘subaltern’ or ‘national’ consciousness sustained or survived the protest. Colonial reports, treated as ‘texts’, reveal both irreconcilable perspectives and the inability of the British regime to fully ‘settle’ even their political ‘frontier’.

The conclusion summarizes that for centuries religious interests, lineage relations, and colonial theories and agendas continued to be in ideological and material competition. But, importantly, it was a complex series of social interactions that prevailed rather than simple opposition between absolute partisans of Islam, the state, or Pakhtun society. Competing, contested, and compromised values and opportunities affected and divided villages, families, and individuals. In the end, neither clan autonomy nor colonial authority survived intact within the Peshawar valley.

NOTES

1. The political geography of the Mughal Kabul province (subah) has been mapped and discussed in Irfan Habib’s An Atlas of the Mughal Empire (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982).

2. Both local histories, such as the seventeenth-century Pir Mu‘azzam Shah, Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani (Pashto Academy, Peshawar, 1987) and scholarly studies, particularly Joseph Arlinghaus, ‘The Transformation of Afghan Tribal Society’ (Ph.D. thesis Duke University, 1988), detail this migration. Pakhtuns have been studied as Pashtuns, ‘Pathans’, etc. ‘Afghan’ is a Persian name for Pakhtun, see Arlinghaus, p. 14.


INTRODUCTION


7. See essays in *Pakistan’s Western Borderlands. The Transformation of a Political Order* A. T. Embree, ed., (Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1979) and Bernard Cohn, ‘Regions Subjective and Objective: Their Relation to the Study of Modern Indian History and Society’ in *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992), pp. 100-35.

8. See David Ludden, ‘History Outside Civilization and the Mobility of South Asia’, *South Asia* 17.1, pp. 1-23.


c. 1710-1780 (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1995) positions the Peshawar valley in a network of migration, especially for soldiering and trade, particularly in horses, that ranged from Central Asia to Rohilkhand in northern India, and beyond.


Insurgency in Colonial India (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1983), and Peasant Resistance in India 1858-1914, David Hardiman, ed., (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993).

20. See N. Gerald Barrier, 'The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: The response of the British Government in India to agrarian unrest', in the Hardiman collection mentioned above for evidence of press mobilization and the role of organized public meetings in events. Little of the often symbolic political and cultural competition discerned by Freitag in South Asian urban ‘public arenas’ was found in the Peshawar valley until the post-1918 nationalist campaigns, see Sandria Freitag, Collective Action and Community (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989). Earlier, public rallies for imperial assemblies and World War I support reflected direct organization by local authorities and Pakhtun elites.


27. See related discussion in Chapter 1.

28. Akhund Darweza Ningrahari, Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar (Maktaba Islamia, Peshawar, n. d.)


32. Scholars pursuing these four themes include, on individualism, Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership among Swat Pathans (Athlone Press, New Jersey, 1965); on segmentary dynamics, Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakhtun


34. Hayden White, The Content of the Form (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1987) has usefully theorized the effects of the narrative form of communication, especially for historians.


40. David Ludden, Peasant History in South India (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989).

41. Burton Stein, Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1980) used anthropological ideas of the segmentary state to conceptualize the development of early South Indian society.

42. See articles by Frederick Cooper, Florencia Mallon, and Gyan Prakash in the American Historical Review V. 99, No. 5, December 1994, including Prakash’s ‘Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism’ pp. 1475-90.

43. If direct references to the work of E. P. Thompson, French Annales historians, Eric Wolf, and western scholars of peasant society are limited, themes and methods derived from such work influence this study.


46. The works of F. Barth, A. Ahmed, C. Lindholm and the contributions of other anthropologists have studied various Pakhtun clans, compared them from differing theoretical perspectives, and provided something of a disciplinary genealogy of evolving and contending social theories.


Important among the physical and social geographies of the Yusufzai settlement region west of the Indus river was the north-eastern portion of the Peshawar valley settled by Yusufzai and Mandanr lineages. Later understanding of the apparent continuity over centuries of ‘tribal’ social relations can be approached through consideration of both sixteenth and seventeenth century regional literature and twentieth century anthropological studies. Nevertheless, clan narratives and particular models of lineage dynamics never completely explain historically complex social hierarchies and relations between clans, Islamic perspectives, and the imperial Mughal state.

From the sixteenth through the nineteenth century, norms and codes regulating personal behaviour and responsibilities to the group were derived from both lineage and religious perspectives to shape the bounds of Pakhtun identities. As modern anthropologists have used data from research to acquire insights into contemporary Pakhtun culture and socio-political organization, this chapter uses historical evidence to predicate on the possible dynamics of Pakhtun society in earlier centuries.

The close identification of one particular Pakhtun confederacy with a delimited territory has been clear to observers, including those attempting to define precisely generalized perceptions:

Yusufzai is the name of a large and powerful tribe of Afghans. It is also used by them to designate the country they live in; but by us the term is only applied to that plain portion of their country now under British rule.
The true Yusufzai country comprises all that territory contained between the Laorai and Laspisar mountains on the north, and the river Indus on the south, and bounded by Bajawar and the terminal portion of the Swat river on the west, and the Kohistan of Ghorband and Yassan on the east.

The major portion of the tract thus limited, is a rough mountain region throughout, and is drained to the Indus by direct and indirect channels. The separate courses of these give to the country its peculiar physical formation and natural divisions into districts.

The lesser, or south-western portion of the Yusufzai country, is an extensive and open plain, forming a part of the great Peshawar basin, but separated from the rest of its extent by terminal portions of the Swat and Kabul rivers...

The plain, or samah of Yusufzai, as it is generally styled, occupies the eastern portion of the Peshawar valley, and is bounded as follows, viz:-

On the north, by a continuous and lofty range of mountains, which, extending east and west, separate it from Swat...

On the south, the boundary is formed by the Indus from Mahaban to Attak, and from that point up to the junction of the Swat and Kabul rivers by the united streams of both. The first portion of this boundary separates the plain from the Hazara country, and the latter from that of the Khattaks.

The western boundary is formed by the Swat river from Nisattah, where it joins the Kabul stream, up to Abazai, where it passes into the Hatmankhail hills.

The Yusufzai plain...extends between 33 degrees 55' and 34 degrees 35' north latitude, and 71 degrees 40' and 72 degrees 45' of east longitude. In its greatest length it is 64 miles from south-east to north-west; and in its greatest breadth from north to south, it is 46 miles. Its area, including the tract at the foot of the hills, is about 3200 square miles... The country is an unbroken plain, with an undulating surface gently sloping to the south. It comprises the following local divisions or districts, viz. Ranizai, Lunkhwar, Mandar, Gadun, Khattak, and Hashtnaggar.¹

Around the year 1700, Utman Khel Pakhtuns constructed a new village in the rising, broken 'tract at the foot of the hills', beneath the peaks blocking the way north to the Swat valley.² The new village of Barmoul spread along one of the many hill
tracks leading from the plains to passes into the northern mountains. Homes, built of stone and mud, with timbered door frames and flat roof beams, housed related families which patiently began constructing terraced fields on surrounding hillsides. Sparse rainfall and run-off from mountain ravines provided water. The village was situated on one of the northern branches of the minor river draining the hills ringing the Peshawar valley, the Kalpani nullah. Running north to south, the Kalpani collected branch water from numerous side valleys before emptying into the Kabul river near Nowshera. This ecological and geographical setting represented a certain ‘framework of organization’ influencing Utman Khel society.

The Utman Khel of Barmoul raised sheep and goats on high hillsides that rarely experienced the harsh, snowbound winters found at higher elevations. Water buffalo and cows provided dairy products and meat. Bullocks pulled field implements and hauled trade goods. Traders carried timber, rice, ghee, and honey from Swat to the Peshawar valley villages, while salt, textiles, and other goods travelled north.

For almost two centuries comparatively small numbers of Utman Khel had settled in the Peshawar valley amidst an ever-growing population belonging to Yusufzai and Mandanr lineages. The Utman Khel and other Pakhtun clans, the Muhammadzai and Gadun, had migrated to the valley with the Yusufzai and Mandanr, but with a dependent status as ‘hamsayas or clients’. Around 1525, they had joined forces with Malik Ahmad to help defeat the Dilazak Afghans near the village of Katlang. In the mid-sixteenth century they were among the clans gathered by the Mandanr leader Khan Kaju before the important battle with the Ghoriah Khel confederacy at Shaikh Tapur. All considered themselves ‘Afghans’ sharing a common culture, religion, and language. Across their new territories the Afghan conquerors established themselves as a ruling elite at the top of a stratified society of dependent farm labourers, herders, craftsmen, and low status village servants.

Within the growing village of Barmoul an established system of Afghan social relations reproduced itself. Families united by
lineage kinship and affinity built neighbouring homes. The men’s lives centred on their shares (bakhras) of village fields, livestock, trade, and on the guest-house (hujra) of each neighbourhood’s leading figure, a man of esteem and influence designated as lineage headman (malik). Women’s activities and personal contacts, revolving around the home and family, were restricted by the constraints of a closely observed moral-social code of behaviour. The moral and spiritual authority of Islam was represented by the building of the first village mosque.

No formally structured political authority regulated individual actions. Maliks offered leadership based on wisdom, persuasion, and personal ability, but this applied more to external village contacts than to supervision of personal behaviour. Maliks competed with each other in an ongoing rivalry for local influence. Political power was measured daily by the number of neighbourhood shareholders and dependants gathered together in a malik’s hujra to eat their patron’s food and discuss the day’s news.

Acts of violence, theft, or immorality, proscribed by both custom and religion, were periodically judged and punished by the whole community. Disputes between Pakhtuns over land or family matters might be arbitrated by a council (jirga) of shareholders. More often, individuals and families redressed perceived injuries according to the rigorous demands of a social code defined by honour, hospitality, sanctuary, and revenge. Conflicting interpretations of justified assaults or killings meant that many of the men moving to the new village of Barmoul were involved in long-standing personal or family feuds that might date back for decades. This patriarchal, male-dominated society demanded the appearance of strict female circumspection and morality, in large part because any divergence reflected on the honour of the involved male.

By 1700, after several generations of regional settlement, this Pakhtun social ideology, Pakhtunwali, still generally regulated Utman Khel, Yusufzai, and Mandanr personal behaviour. This contrasted with the social and political hierarchies of the Mughal empire to the east, hierarchies replicated in the imperial
provincial centres in Peshawar and Kabul. Islamic social guidance grounded in the shari‘a and the Koran complemented and competed with Pakhtunwali. Religious injunctions often had little influence on specific customs such as inheritance exclusively by male heirs. Figures of high sanctity, sayyids, claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and Mians, descendants of holy men, were considered social equals of the land-owning Pakhtuns. Other men pursuing and studying religious truth, shaikhs and murids, might eventually hope to earn the saintly renown of a pir. Local mullas, preaching and teaching in village mosques, often had less education and sophistication than other religious figures, though they also might earn high reputations for piety.

Though influenced for over a century by migratory settlement, Islamic missionary efforts, and sporadic imperial interference, social life in 1700 for the Utman Khel villagers of Barmoul, as well as for the Yusufzai of Swat and most of the Mandanr Yusufzai of the Peshawar valley, still exhibited many of the characteristics of what have been called ‘acephelous segmentary lineage societies’. Conquering Pakhtun clans, linked by kinship and political ties, pursued an agrarian-pastoral livelihood involving simultaneous cooperation and competition with other Pakhtun lineages. Instead of complex hierarchies, this elite society balanced itself in ‘a genealogical ordering of political alliances based on the principle of complementary opposition’. Cross-cousin marriage and an equal inheritance among male heirs kept land tightly held in family units, but also generated often fierce competition between male cousins over their grandfather’s legacy. Yet, closely nurtured memories of patrilineal descent allowed otherwise competing family and village factions to recognize common links and unify when outside competitors threatened all local interests.

The historical evidence about this Pakhtun ruling population closely follows political patterns modelled by Lindholm for such a system. By 1700, much of the elite population of the Peshawar valley continued to be politically centred in segmentary lineages that articulated both an ideology of personal conduct,
Pakhtunwali, and an ideology of politics based on genealogy that validated and balanced ever-shifting political alliances.

Though over the centuries almost all observers of Pakhtun society have recorded similar impressions of lineage dynamics, of ‘doing Pakhtu’, no historical work can unequivocally and arbitrarily project back into the eighteenth century ethnographic observations made in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is important in a study arguing a contingent Pakhtun social environment to understand the perceivable processes of long-term social continuity and consensus. Useful for this is the effort of Richard Fox to explain cultural production and social change in the Punjab. Taking issue with earlier theories of social innovation, from Barthian notions of individual initiative and contract (transactional analysis) to the ideas of Geertz and others about ‘organismic’ webs of structuring cultural patterns and essences, Fox argued for recognizing historical process and accepting that individual and collective competition continually generated socio-cultural reality.

To Fox, apparent social continuity and stability over time, within a dynamic of social action, was explained by ‘...looking at dominant groups or classes and the interested social actions they must constantly undertake to preserve position and privilege. These interested social actions can develop into a relatively unreflective and consensual understanding of the world, a culture that is also a hegemony based on domination. Thus, a culture, no matter how structured and doxic it may appear, is nothing more than the sum and state of social confrontations at the particular moment or the moment just past.’ Putting aside the particularities of Fox’s analysis of hegemony and the work of Bourdieu and others, apparent social continuity reflected a constantly self-correcting, contingent set of relations that emerged from, and were adaptable to, the material environment (including ecology and technology), individual and group consciousness, and actions devoted to protecting perceived interests.

Critiques of segmentary lineage society theory and anthropological modelling in general have noted that non-
historical, static frameworks may lack the flexibility to reveal change over time, hierarchy and class, individual initiative, and ecological imperatives. Even if, at certain historical moments, many Yusufzai clans in the Peshawar valley acted in ways consistent with segmentary lineage theory, no conclusion is possible without further analysis. In fact, within a historical process constrained by cultural, ecological, and personal bounds, many Pakhtun individuals and clans did enter into new social relations necessitated by subordination to, and conflict with, first imperial politico-economic and then socio-cultural influences. As well, non-Pakhtun dependants in the region experienced similar exposure to new influences that could be variously welcomed, opposed, or subverted, but could rarely be ignored.

Village life, as expressed in moral codes and behaviour, reflected a complex diversity. This included continued compromise between customs evolved over generations of pastoral-agrarian experience and values based on Islamic interpretations. The society that faced Mughal and later imperial influences was not homogeneous. It was composed of individuals and groups with different valuations of the emphasis to be placed on custom, religion, independence, and cooperation with the wider world. Throughout this period, landholding Pakhtun proprietors represented only the dominant part of ‘shallow hierarchies of the village’; hierarchies that included Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun tenants, subordinated families of skilled craftsmen, and Hindu and Sikh merchants and shopkeepers.

The first chapters of the Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani describe the late fifteenth century movement of the Yusufzai from Nushki and Garah, near Kandahar, to the Kabul region, and then to the Peshawar valley. Rather than representing successful tribal ‘predatory expansion’, the migrations followed losses in the Kandahar area in conflicts with the Pakhtun Ghoriah Khel clans and the murder of Yusufzai leaders in a famous banquet massacre staged by Ulugh Beg, the Chaghatai Turk ruler of Kabul and uncle of Babur.
Granted refuge in the Peshawar valley by dominant landholding Afghans, the Dilazaks, the Yusufzai and Mandanr clans prospered. Reinforced by allied clans, including the Utman Khel and Muhammadzai, the Yusufzai survived two or three generations of competition with earlier Peshawar valley residents, Afghan and non-Afghan clans forced to settle east of the Indus, and with other migrating Afghans, including the Mohmand, Khalil, and Daudzai clans of the Ghoriah Khel confederation.

This era of Peshawar valley change, the first half of the sixteenth century, illustrated the theorized expansionary political phase of a segmentary lineage society. Nominally leaderless, with each household head asserting equality, lineage clans at war could and did unite under the banner of a competent, successful chief able to deliver the anticipated fruits of victory, especially land.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, much of the lands of Swat, Bajaur, Buner, and the \textit{samah}, or eastern plains, occupied by the Yusufzai by 1700, were won under the notable leadership of Malik Ahmad and his successor Khan Kaju. The \textit{tarikh}, chronicle or history, of Hafiz Rahmat Khani details how Malik Ahmad, a youthful survivor of the Kabul massacre, led the Yusufzai, the Mandanr, and their allies to victory against the Dilazaks in the battle of Katlang. It then tells how, about 1550, Khan Kaju directed victory against the Ghoriah Khel at the battle of Shaikh Tapur.\textsuperscript{15}

By the mid-sixteenth century the Yusufzai had consolidated their settlements in the Peshawar region as expansion ended in the face of external opposition. After decades of Afghan rivalry, as Caroe pointed out,\textsuperscript{16} the best river-irrigated lands of the Peshawar valley, the Doaba tract between the Kabul and Swat rivers and the Hashtnagar region just to the east, were actually occupied respectively by Gigiani (later Pakhtun migrants) and Muhammadzai clans. If the Yusufzai had succeeded in conquering the temperate, agriculturally productive Swat river valley, they had also been forced to settle for the sparsely watered \textit{samah} region east of the Hashtnagar district, north of the Kabul river. Drained by creeks and \textit{nullahs} rather than rivers,
this area offered only dry sandy soil for farming. Marginal rainfall, the need for well-irrigation, and seasonal water flow in many of the drainages meant that agricultural production was more difficult than to the west. Much of the maira, or uncultivated acreage, remained grazing land for herds. Pakhtun proprietors held their own exclusive shares of village cultivated land, while pasture lands in the surrounding maira remained in common use.

From the earliest days of their consolidation in the Peshawar valley, another competitor also constrained and influenced Yusufzai society. In 1519 the ruler of Kabul, Babur, a Chaghatai Turk and nephew of Ulugh Beg, swept through Bajaur and the Peshawar valley to assert his authority before advancing eastward in pursuit of the conquest of Hindustan. In several earlier seasonal military campaigns through Afghan areas east and south of the Khyber Pass, Babur had ruthlessly killed those who opposed him. In 1519 he tried conciliatory tactics with the Yusufzai, who had yet to complete their conquest of the highland valleys, but were by then well established in the Peshawar plains. Malik Shah Mansur, cousin of Malik Ahmad, served as an envoy to Babur. He was present in Bajaur in January 1519 when Babur captured a fortress of non-Yusufzai Bajauris and put up to 3000 men to the sword. In part, the massacre was intended as a message of intimidation to the Yusufzai. In his memoirs, Babur said, about Malik Mansur, that after the conquest of the Bajaur fort, ‘We allowed him to leave after putting a coat (tun) on him and after writing orders with threats to the Yusuf-zai’.17

With his eye on Hindustan, Babur soon left the Peshawar valley. But his passage had set the pattern for the future. Babur had entered the area with Dilazak scouts and supporters who saw the external, imperial power of Babur as a weapon against their local enemies. Babur, noting the strongest opponents he might face, attempted an alliance with the Yusufzai. He asked for and received a daughter of Malik Mansur as a wife. From 1519 Yusufzai clans would be both tempted by the gifts and intimidated by the threats of a developing Mughal dynasty. Yusufzai maliks now had an alternate, non-lineage source of
honours and worldly success. Malik Mansur’s son, Mir Jamal, ‘rose to honour under Babur, Humayun and Akbar’.18

Babur’s 1519 effort at conquest and domination in Bajaur and the Peshawar valley was not unique in the long history of this region. But it did introduce a two-century period of direct contact between an increasingly wealthy and powerful Mughal empire and the Afghans of the trans-Indus region controlling important routes to Kabul.

By the reign of Babur’s grandson, Akbar, a second form of segmentary lineage leadership became apparent among regional clans. Charismatic religious figures rallied fractious Afghans against Mughal incursions even as more mainstream religious and secular personalities remained neutral or espoused the Mughal cause.

In the 1580s, the Mughal emperor, Akbar, sent armies to accomplish the simultaneous annexation of the Khyber Pass valleys, Kashmir, and the Yusufzai-held plains and highlands. The town of Peshawar and the immediate surrounding districts were now either under direct imperial control or were held as land assignments by Mughal jagirdar appointees responsible for order and revenue collection. Many individuals and regional segmentary Pakhtun lineages, unwilling to defer to one lineage’s leadership, responded to this Mughal consolidation by rallying behind Jalala, son of Bayazid Ansari, founder of the Roshaniyya religious movement.

If theologically more complex than merely a ‘Sufi mendicant’, Bayazid and the following two important generations of his descendants did assert a unifying ‘charismatic power’.19 Their careers were historical confirmation of a second paradigm of Lindholm’s theory of segmentary lineage, religious figures raised, at least temporarily, to leadership in response to ‘external threat’.20

But spectacular Mughal defeats in the mountain passes west of the Indus in the 1580s only briefly obscured a longer term process of Mughal oppression and consolidation in the Peshawar region. And historical complexity must question the statement that, ‘Predictably, this invasion stimulated a great surge of
religious revivalism among the Yusufzai, who managed to defeat Akbar in 1586'. At one time Bayazid had certainly attracted many Yusufzai followers. But his religious doctrines were opposed by many Yusufzai adherents of the disciples of the late, revered Pir Baba. And after Bayazid’s death (c. 1572) his son Umar’s attempt to levy the Islamic tithe (ushr) and tribute (kharaj) quickly fragmented support from Yusufzai leaders. Two of Bayazid’s sons were killed by Yusufzai opponents. Bayazid and his son Jalala fought the Mughals from the Khyber Pass region where they had migrated and become accepted. Any premise that only a religious figure could unify the Yusufzai or other Afghans against ‘external threat’ must be modified to acknowledge the possibility of pragmatic, communal resistance, without specific charismatic religious inspiration.

The Yusufzai’s communal resistance to Akbar hinted at a third theorized form of segmentary lineage political organization. After the death of Khan Kaju, sometime after 1550, with their own expansionist ambitions curtailed and Akbar’s external threat still in the future, the Yusufzai and allied clans had failed to accept a single new political leader. ‘Cleavages and internal fragmentation occurred’, matching the ‘state of dissidence’ described as typical of an unthreatened association of lineage groups. Political factionalism would also be characteristic of the period after the unifying invasions of the 1580s.

When Akbar arrived at the Indus river in 1586 intending to attack the Yusufzai, he was welcomed not only by Peshawar valley Khalil and Mohmand maliks eager to see their neighbours weakened, but by some of the Yusufzai maliks who had chosen cooperation over conflict. The main Mughal road to Kabul passed westward from the Indus at Attock along the south bank of the Kabul river. Yusufzai’ proximity to this Mughal highway and their competition with non-Yusufzai neighbours led Akbar to devise a three-part containment strategy: Khattak clans were given official patronage with land grants and toll-collecting privileges to protect the road. To support Mughal campaigns into the highland valleys that continued into the 1590s and to blockade the plains, a series of Mughal forts were erected across
the lower part of the valley plain. More importantly, the Mughals cultivated a rudimentary network of Yusufzai allies to guide troops, influence local villagers, and serve as permanent agents responsible for a developing revenue and local order.

In 1588, Akbar issued a decree (farman) to Muhammad Khan of Hoti rewarding him for 'devoted services in connection with the Yusufzai expedition'. The farman granting the 'entire Malguzari (Land Revenue) of the Yusufzai Pargana permanently and appointing you the Independent Hakim (Ruler) of the said Pargana' was given, in part, 'to induce others to render such like distinguished services'. The farman enjoined Muhammad Khan to 'exert to guard our Imperial Domains, adjoining the said Pargana of Yusafzai, from the inroads of the Yusafzai people and our trust in this matter should be faithfully discharged'. The village of Hoti, on the Kalpani drainage in the southern part of the plain, was just a few miles north of Nowshera, a 'new city' built on the Kabul river by the general commanding Akbar's Yusufzai campaigns.

The dovetailing of fragmented Pakhtun interests with Mughal 'divide and rule' policies was justified by claims that Allahdad Khan, the father of Muhammad Khan, had fought alongside the Mughal Babur at the 1526 battle of Panipat, though Baku Khan, the uncle of Muhammad Khan, had led the 'great victory of Karakar mountain resulting in the annihilation of 40000 Moghul Troops under Raja Birbal and Hakim Abdul Fatah'.

Such local leaders as the Khan of Hoti now relied less on the legitimacy validated by ability, character, and clan consensus than on the authority derived from imperial patronage, new sources of revenue, and increasingly non-egalitarian patron-client relationships with fellow clansmen. Imperial diplomacy would fail as often as it would succeed. The Yusufzai leader, Kalu, travelled to Akbar's court before his Yusufzai expedition. Undecided, Kalu 'fled' the court. Detained and brought back, he escaped again, rejecting Mughal inducements. Local histories now increasingly detailed the successes and failures of Yusufzai clan leaders in opposing, avoiding, or embracing Mughal overtures.
Before 1700, Yusufzai clans experienced periods of organization that closely, but not completely, corresponded to Lindholm’s patterns for segmentary lineage societies. A more nuanced history would recognize secular leadership in times of expansion. But charismatic religious authority participated in, rather than monopolized, leadership in times of threat. A leaderless, ‘ordered anarchy’ of complementary opposition may have characterized most Yusufzai clans after the death of Khan Kaju, but the success of the late sixteenth century Mughal effort to co-opt Yusufzai *khans* indicated the grand reality that regional lineages might lose political autonomy even as their structures continued to frame social activity.

A ‘rising’ of the Yusufzai Afghans against Mughal posts in 1667 represented perhaps a complementary alliance between leadership types, demonstrating the difficulties of reducing complex events to preconceived norms. A contemporary Mughal observer, the Mughal emperor’s official historian, blamed the resistance on the Yusufzai ‘...exalting as their commander a silly beggar under the name of Muhammad Shah, the disturbances caused by the exertions of that deceitful impostor the wicked Mulla Chalak, and the leadership of the black-faced Bhagu’.27 Blaming individual ‘rebels’ and deceitful religious charlatans, rather than the generalized unrest caused by unwanted interference, was a recurring imperialist response to instability. The last unsuccessful Mughal military effort in the 1670s to subdue the Afghan clans of the trans-Indus region showed that most Yusufzai were still able to assert political independence in the absence of direct military coercion.

Through the late seventeenth century, the Yusufzai plains villages existed under the shadow of Mughal forts, harassed by confident Khattaks, and increasingly dominated by favoured Yusufzai *jagirdars* and *maliks*. Village society showed signs of the stresses beginning to affect the lives of both leaders and the common man. The degree of literal, subaltern regimentation that could be achieved was demonstrated in 1646 when an estimated five thousand men and a cavalry regiment were recruited through Shahbaz Khan, Khan of Hoti, to supplement a
Mughal army in transit to Balkh, north of the Hindu Kush. Yet by 1700 the social life of most Yusufzai, even perhaps a majority in the plains, still continued in accordance with familiar patterns of political organization.

In the Peshawar valley, political divisions (tappas) remained defined by the territory held by dominant lineages. In the plains east of the Swat river, the Hashtnagar tappa, settled mainly by Muhammadzai and other non-Yusufzai clans, included a large area east of the Swat river extending down to the Kabul river. In 1700, the river-irrigated villages of this tappa remained divided from the eastern part of the plains by the dry, thinly settled tract named the maira. The Ranizai tappa, north and east of Hashtnagar, ranged from Pakhtun Ranizai lineage villages in the southern Swat valley to settlements dispersed in the adjoining foothills and the very northern Yusufzai plains. The main tappa of the northern part of the plain, Lunkhwar, often referred to as 'Baizai’, was settled by Baizai Yusufzai. Scattered Khattak and Utman Khel villages, competitors, or perhaps allies invited to populate a buffer zone area, were established in the highest plains and foothills east of the Ranizai ridges, north and east of Lunkhwar. A ridge line separated Lunkhwar from the largest plains tappa, that of the Mandanr lineages. The Mandanr region covered the remaining plains eastward to the Mahaban mountain on the Indus and southward to the Sar-i Maira ridge along the Kabul river.

Through the seventeenth century, the Sar-i Maira ridge represented the contested border divide between Yusufzai claims and Khattak encroachments from south of the Kabul river. Mughal strategy to protect the Attock-Peshawar section of the Kabul highway supported the Khattak as Indus ferry toll contractors and as jagirdar holders required to patrol the highway. Enriched and encouraged by this Mughal patronage, expansionary Khattak ambitions conflicted with Yusufzai interests. By 1670, the grandfather and father of the leading Khattak khan, Khushal Khan, had died fighting the Yusufzai. In time, a shift in Mughal policy brought an end to Khattak concessions. Khushal Khan would begin his virulent anti-
Mughal crusade expressed in armed resistance and militant, ideological verse. When Mughal diplomacy set various Afghan clans in opposition to each other, manipulating internal clan factions, it reflected a divide-and-rule policy designed to ensure ‘that Pakhtun will hit Pakhtun’.

**Pakhtun Society**

Early eighteenth century social life in most Yusufzai villages variously reflected the effects of the regional ecology, the pervasive spirit of competition engendered by the Pakhtun ideology of equality, and the status differentiation between the elite and their dependents that was sustained by the Pakhtun monopoly over coercive force and land. Endemic diseases, especially malaria, smallpox, and tuberculosis, blighted and shortened lives. Epidemic diseases, including typhus and cholera, often recurred on an annual, seasonal basis. Sparse rainfall led to intense competition for control of scarce sources of irrigation. Variable soil conditions and terrain meant that agricultural productivity varied even within a single village. Yet the temperate, seasonably hot climates of the Swat and Peshawar valleys and river irrigation did lead to successful cropping, population increase, and consequently further land competition.

The link between ecological constraints and socio-political development in ‘tribal’, ‘Middle Eastern’, Islamic, and pastoral-agrarian societies has generated much debate. The Afghan lineage system and the accompanying ideology of highly competitive equality, Pakhtunwali, appear to be associated with highly contingent, materially difficult lives. One tentative explanation is that ‘the symmetry and diffusion of power does seem to be a kind of base-line for which the society seems destined by the nature or poverty of its means of coercion’.

The struggle for survival, based in a refusal to be dominated and in efforts to ensure the success of one’s own lineage, continued between Afghan confederacies as well as within Yusufzai clans, villages, neighbourhoods, and families. One
result was the *dala* pattern, in which first-cousin rivalries temporarily allied themselves with larger factional rivalries that, when pressed, might divide villages and whole regions in ‘two bloc’ political factionalism. The tenuous nature of such alliances meant that ideologically autonomous Afghan and Yusufzai individuals pursued or abandoned such linkages whenever it suited them. Villages and village factions competed over disputed rights to land and water, claims to wives, and control of the strategic position of village *malik*. Successful village *maliks*, through ties of patronage and obligation (*talgeri*), might, at least temporarily, unify most of the shareholders and dependants living in their neighbourhood. The Utman Khel in Barmoul and its neighbouring villages had to defend their claims to high pastures against villagers living across the northern passes and had to resist the efforts of assertive *maliks* to levy tolls or fees on trade visits to Swat.

The family home apparently offered little defence against the hard scrabble of this competitive life. The lineage system, in which the family patriarch defined all rights and power relations, meant that wives taken into a family might be seen as representatives of rivals, while seeing themselves as defenders of their own lineage’s honour and pre-eminence. Marriages could become a competition for dominance. Children were raised in an environment of parental argument and fighting. Wife-beating and verbal abuse of husbands marked Pakhtun households in which the *Pakhtunwali* ideals of pride and aggression, of strength and domination were pursued by both parents.

Children grew up unpampered, expected to master those skills needed to survive and prosper. Gender roles were quickly learned. Simply, the ‘girl is trained to wait on men, whereas the boy is trained to expect service’. Girls were married off near the age of puberty. Boys were favoured by fathers for extending the lineage and by mothers for being potential allies in competition against the father. With status and concepts of manhood tied to land ownership, older sons were impatient to inherit or be given control of their share of the father’s estate. Children learned ‘to
be tough and fearless, to accept violence as normal, and to be essentially aggressive and self-seeking in their dealings with others.\textsuperscript{36}

Yet social life involved more than just male-oriented patterns of clan behaviour. Women interacted with other women in a separate culture maintained through narrative expressions of moral and emotional states that defined a particular, gender-based notion of honour and social position.\textsuperscript{37} Pakhtun customs (\textit{rawaj}) and Islamic strictures undoubtedly coexisted in daily affairs. Grima recorded one woman’s description of such social synthesis:

The event itself is \textit{shariʿat} but what we do with it is \textit{rawaj}. The \textit{nikah} (religious ceremony of a wedding), for instance, is \textit{shariʿat}, but our celebration with guns and drums and singing and dancing is \textit{rawaj}. Death and funeral rites are \textit{shariʿat}, but our weeping and lamenting is our own custom, quite against the law in Islam. Going to visit the sick is \textit{shariʿat}, but the practice whereby only the elders can go is \textit{rawaj}.\textsuperscript{38}

The relations of subordinated dependants to the Afghans and the Yusufzai of the Peshawar region varied with village agrarian conditions (irrigated or unirrigated land), agricultural production relations (tenancy, simple farm labour), and service requirements (the need for a tailor, oil presser, weaver, muleteer, or shopkeeper). Pakhtun elite hegemony reflected as much the reality of conquest as any ‘caste’ role in a system of ‘secular status and rank’.\textsuperscript{39} Barth perhaps de-emphasized the role of power and dominance in relating notions of caste hierarchy to the Pakhtun social system and he completely hedged his definition of ‘caste’. Barth himself opined that there is ‘no ritual occasion or idiom by which all groups are ordered in a linear hierarchy’ and there are only ‘conceptually endogamous’ marriage relations. The ‘castes do not form localized communities’ and do reveal a ‘slow process’ of occupational mobility.\textsuperscript{40} Analytically, the society observed might be better described as simply hereditary occupational groups politically
and economically subordinated by elite, militarized clans able to manipulate them through a monopoly on coercive force and productive assets (land).

The tensions and contradictions inherent in such a social arrangement were clear to the Afghans. In the sixteenth century, Malik Ahmad faced the dilemma of how to balance the various Yusufzai land claims on the new territories around Peshawar. He turned to a religious figure of extreme piety to make an equitable distribution. Shaikh Mali not only allocated shares to each clan but, to guarantee that no group would gain any undue advantage due to better soil, climate, or access to water, decreed that at set periods, often ten years, neighbouring, related clans would mutually exchange lands and villages. This redistribution policy (wesh) was legitimized by the religious authority of Shaikh Mali, and also by his social role as a neutral, consensus-building figure outside the controversial political sphere of the maliks.

By 1700 the aggressive, contentious elements of Yusufzai society in the Peshawar region were also constrained by the imposition of a more complex set of moral-judicial regulations attributed to Shaikh Mali and the disciples of Sayyid Ali Shah Tarmezi, Pir Baba. Pakhtunwali required that injury or murder be avenged by blood. Adultery, elopement, or the kidnapping of married women or young girls might be punished by a death sentence or be compensated by a sum of money or another female. Shaikh Mali attempted to bring the punishment for such felonies into conformity with the Shari‘a. He also attempted to regularize the detection and punishment of misdemeanours such as gambling, drunkenness, female immodesty, and inattention to prayers through closer surveillance and the enforcement of traditional punishments.

In each tappa and village Shaikh Mali assigned ulema and figures of hereditary sanctity (stanadars) to maintain public order. During one month of each year the morality of the whole tribe (ulus) was reviewed. Punishments appropriate to each infraction were ordered. It is unknown to what extent the penalties prescribed by Shaikh Mali were enforced in particular
villages in the Yusufzai country in 1700. But it might be fair to say that acts defined as infractions and regulations labelled as 'rules of morality' do describe an ideal moral universe intended to guide the Yusufzai from at least the mid-sixteenth century. The punishments prescribed revealed the degree to which public humiliation was considered a primary deterrent to socially abhorrent behaviour.

One punishment involved the carrying of a criminal slung from a long pole through the bazaars and streets of the village. Children, shaikhs, and religious students (taliban) followed behind in procession with some chanting the Islamic profession of faith, the kalimah. Here and there the procession stopped to make the criminal's fate an exemplary lesson to the public.43

A second punishment involved seating the criminal, placed backwards, on a female donkey, and then leading it through the streets trailed by a crowd. Musicians followed playing horns and drums, sarnay and naghary. Shaikhs followed, reciting the kalimah. In squares and markets (chowks) ulema exhorted the people to guard themselves against committing the evil acts of the convict.

'Face blackening' with soot from a mosque lamp was considered a more extreme punishment. Occasionally the criminal's trousers were wrapped round his head as a turban (patkay), then decorated with the feathers of an impure cock or crow. With a necklace of old bones hung around his neck and musicians following, the criminal might then be ridden through the streets on a donkey. To complete his humiliation, the convict might be showered with horse manure and cow dung. Head-shaving was a punishment 'commonly' awarded to 'bad acting' women.

Whipping was described as one of the lawful 'of the book' punishments prescribed by the canons of Islamic jurisprudence. Often given to men and women for misconduct, the limits to this punishment were listed. On rare occasions stoning was invoked. Each man of the community passed by the criminal, being required to cast three stones. The appeal and durability of these punishments continued into later centuries.44
Sheikh Mali's local interpretation of Shari'a derived from the same Islamic canon nominally used to guide Mughal justice. With no written, civil, or criminal code, Mughal emperors delegated degrees of authority to local officials, including judges (qadis). Individual emperors and officials invoked often arbitrary judgements. In 1672, Aurangzeb issued more specific guidelines to his governor in Gujarat that later scholars would term as Aurangzeb's 'Penal Code'. Punishments prescribed by the Shari'a to shape Mughal sentences were familiar. Punishments were of four kinds:

1. Qisas, i.e. retaliation applied in cases of killing.
2. Diya or compensation paid by one who had committed homicide.
3. Hadd, i.e. the fixed punishment prescribed by the Canon law, e.g. 
   (a) stoning for illicit intercourse.
   (b) cutting of hands for theft, etc.
4. Tazir: the punishment inflicted by a Qazi according to his estimation.

Later state officials, attempting to understand lineage social and land relations, recorded specific customs, transgressions, and punishments. Discussing the Khyber Pass Afridi clans, a nineteenth-century British land settlement officer said that 'Most of the tribes set apart one of their families as the hereditary preservers of their local customs, styled the 'Serishtah', which is distinct from the family in which the 'Mullikee' or Chiefship is vested'. Criminal penalties, obligations of defence, and other common matters were decided by the serishtah. Murderers received death sentences. A man shirking battle obligations paid a fine (nagah) and had his house burnt. Adultery was punished with the execution of the woman and then the man. After a murder a jirga might arrange a compromise in which a fine was paid to forestall a cycle of revenge.

Later government officials saw these 'customs' as archaic and fast vanishing. The origins of practices such as land exchange were vague, now to be reclaimed from tribal folklore. One late compilation of tribal 'Laws and Usages', intended to
be a last record of doomed institutions, saw *wesh* as ‘coming into existence when nomadic life gave way to settled agricultural life’. It was a system ‘inherited from ancient Arya tribes, for in the time of Alexander the Great, it was in force over a vast area’. Shaikh Mali apparently institutionalized a ten-year cycle of land exchanges. Supposedly, the preservation of *wesh* was a ‘main purpose’ of the Roshaniyya movement against the Mughals.\(^4\) The Marxist publishers of this last study faced the same problems of establishing legitimate authority with alternative codes and values that the Mughals had faced four centuries earlier.

### NOTES


2. Barmoul was noted as ‘being a very old village (some 150 years it is said)’, in a letter from Asst. Commissioner, Peshawar District to Comm. and Supt., Peshawar Division, dated 14 February 1866, p. 4. Peshawar Commissioner Office Records, Bundle No. 53, File S. No. 1310. See Map 3 ‘Swat’.

3. One source listed twenty-three passes through the northern rim of the Peshawar valley between the Swat River to the west and the last mountains before the Indus on the east. Bellew, 1994, pp. 7-14.


5. Pir Mauzam Shah, *Tarikh-i-Hafiz Rahmat Khani* (Pashto Academy, Peshawar, 1987), p. 159. This history, written in Persian and Pashtu, was a revised draft, with simplified rhetoric, of an earlier *History of the Afghans* probably written in 1623-24 by Khwaja Malezai. See the introduction of the 1987 edition by Muhammad Nawaz Tair. The clans were described as ‘*hamsayas* or clients’ by Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 175.


20. Lindholm, 'Models', 1985, pp. 24-5. Arlinghaus argues that 'The fact that the Afghans looked to charismatic religious leaders rather than to their natural lineage heads', indicated 'how much Afghan tribal society had changed during the sixteenth century', Arlinghaus, p. 330. Evidence from the 1590s in the Akbarnama suggests that religious leadership was often followed 'in addition to' and in alliance with tribal heads in opposition to the Mughals, thus revealing an aspect of social complexity that had evolved by, or continued into, the late sixteenth century.


22. See Arlinghaus, *Transformation*, 1988, pp. 304-8, for details. For chronology see Tariq Ahmed, 1982 Ahmed's claim, p. 51, that the Roshaniyyas were responsible for the famous Mughal defeat in 1586 in Swat-Buner which cost Akbar an army and the life of his friend Birbal, seems unsubstantiated by Abu-I Fazl, who clearly differentiates (Chapter LXXXV) in the Akbarnama between efforts against the Yusufzai and
against the ‘Tarikis’, then in the Khyber region. Supporters saw Bayazid as a Pir of Light (Roshan), detractors as a Pir of Darkness (Tarik).


24. History of the Hoti Family, no date (c. 1944), no place of publication. Published, apparently by the family, during the life of Muhammad Akbar Khan, Khan of Hoti from 1914, p. 19.


28. See farman of Prince Murad, son of Shahjehan, to Shahbaz Khan in History of the Hoti Family, p. 19. Shahbaz Khan’s younger brother and most of the troops were lost in the campaign.

29. See Afzal Khan, Tarikh-i Murassa. (University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1984). Afzal Khan was a grandson of the famous poet, Khushal Khan.

30. For detailed period history see Bahadur Shah Zafar, Pahtana Da Tarikh Pa Ranha Key (University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1965), pp. 599-640. Also see Dost M. Kamil, ‘On a Foreign Approach to Khusal’ and Kuliyat-i Khusal Khan Khatak (Pashtu).

31. Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, introduction, p. 16.


34. See Barth, Political Leadership, 1965, Chapter 5.

35. This ethnography of Pakhtun family life was described by C. Lindholm in 1982 in the Swat valley and may be representative of family life among Yusufzai villagers living with the tensions inherent in even a partial lineage system shaped by Pakhtunwali. See Cherry Lindholm, ‘The Swat Pakhtun Family as a Political Training Ground’, in Anthropology in Pakistan, Louis Pastner and L. Flam, eds. (Indus Publications, Karachi, 1985).


40. Barth, Political Leadership, 1965, pp. 16-22.

41. So devout was he reputed to be that it was said a helper followed him wherever he went carrying a pot of water for proper ablutions before prayers. Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, p. 145.

43. This section derives from *Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, introduction by Muhammad Nawaz Tair, pp. 29-31, from my translation.


GENEALOGY AS IDEOLOGY

Islamic, imperial, and clan literary texts narrating Afghan history and genealogies constructed particular scriptural, dynastic, or lineage interpretations of stories living on in the popular, oral domain. By 1700 the core Pakhtun social identity, clan membership in a network of linked, nominally egalitarian lineage relationships, had been partially formalized in literary productions that might criticize or glorify indigenous society, but always recognized the sustaining power of the genealogical idiom in Pakhtun imaginations and ideas of autonomy. These narratives presented conflicting views on the desired role of political hierarchies and religious authority. At least one clan narrative revealed the complex relationship between local political rivalries and the larger interests and strategies of the Mughal empire.

In the first decades of the eighteenth century, Afghans west of the Indus, including the Yusufzai and Mandanr of the Peshawar valley, maintained a heightened self-awareness, a specific cultural identity that served as a bulwark against both recent external challenges and continuing social stresses. This evolving ‘imagined community’ expressed itself in the definition and practice of the tenets of proper behaviour, Pakhtunwali, and in an identification with an ideology of equality based on lineage genealogies.

Pakhtunwali, the Pakhtun social system regulating behaviour, has long been a popular subject of study as a ‘tribal’ ethos based on exchange/revenge (badal), sanctuary (nanawati), hospitality (melmastia), and notions of shame/honour (nang), especially in matters concerning women. Broadly considered
as ‘law, customs, manners, or mind-set’, Pakhtunwali provided ‘criminal, civil, or social’ guidance for the punishment of injury and immorality, the transfer of property, and the ‘standards for everyday behaviour’. The ‘ethnocentric’ practice of Pakhtunwali may have become more formalized in the early seventeenth century as an alternative to the mores and culture of the encroaching Mughal empire. This also presupposes that this period perhaps fostered the reshaping and elaboration of other markers of socio-cultural identity, including literary histories and genealogies.

In fact, during the seventeenth century diverse manuscripts recording centuries of lineage genealogies, dynastic histories, and chronicles of Islamic expansion and conquest were gathered, arranged, and given narrative shape to create new texts re-inventing Islamic, Afghan, and local identities. Though much of the literary production of this era occurred under the patronage of various Afghan and South Asian Islamic rulers, regional and religious interests soon recognized the possibilities of the historical narrative genre. Within a generation, in the early seventeenth century, numerous synthesizing works were written. Though the dating of individual manuscripts remains problematic, apparently some works influenced others.

If ‘Muslims...always have shown a liking and aptitude for the writing of professed histories, so that every Muslim dynasty in Asia has found its chronicler’, the exemplary chronicle of this era may be the Akbarnama by Abu-l Fazl. The Akbarnama and the Ain-i Akbari, also by Abu-l Fazl, were hagiographic texts memorializing the long career of Babur’s grandson, Akbar (reigned 1556-1605). These manuscripts were only the best known of several histories compiled in the period, generally under imperial patronage, glorifying a patron’s rule and projecting his virtues. For our purpose, the important works of the period were the Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, original draft finished about 1623; The History of the Afghans or Makhzen Afghani, written about 1613 at the court of Akbar’s son Jehangir; the History of the Rise of the Mohamedan Power in India by Muhammad Kasim Hindu Shah (Ferishta), finished about 1612
at the court of the Bijapur monarch Ibrahim Adil Shah II; and
the *Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar* of Ahkund Darweza, dated to
1612-13.  

The comprehensive history by Ferishta, the Afghan history *Makhzen Afghani* attributed by Dorn to ‘Neamet Ullah’, Akhund Darweza’s work, and the Yusufzai history *Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, all emerged within a few years of each other. Lengthy manuscripts taking months and even years to research and write, these works appear to be the products of a similar intellectual and cultural environment grounded in historical awareness and dedicated scholarly production. Ferishta’s work lists thirty-four texts as sources and mentions another twenty. A version of his history was said to have been presented to his patron monarch in 1609/1018 AH, though another source notes the work as completed in 1612. Dorn dates the unrevised *Makhzen Afghani* to the period 1609-1611/1018-1020 AH, while Raverty gives the date as 1613/1021 AH. The *Makhzen Afghani* revealed a typical sequence of original author’s compilations from various sources, including simple copying, later revisions, and then a confusion of original author, later revisers, and relevant dates.

The vitality and interrelated nature of the early seventeenth century Muslim court literary scene was clearly apparent. Dorn noted that the *History of the Afghans* was begun ‘in the same year when Ferishta finished his work; but he is nowhere mentioned’. More importantly, ‘The identity of the sources they used ... is evident, from the extreme, often verbal, coincidence of the style and thread of the history of the reigns of the Lodi race and the family of Sheer Shah’. If the degree of mutual influence or contact between the era’s authors may never be fully established, the texts themselves reveal common efforts to legitimize contemporary political authority through claims to notable ancestors and the selective interpretations of narratives alive in the public domain. These interpretations justified ruling strategies, religious hegemony, and the moral pre-eminence of certain codes of behaviour.

Framed by specific sets of socio-political perspectives, these manuscripts reflected ideologies naturalizing images of divine
light radiating from Akbar’s forehead or the teleology of the inevitable expansion of Islam. If the question remained unanswered as to why an early seventeenth century scholar at the court of Akbar’s son, Jehangir, would write a History of the Afghans, so the inspiration for the style and method of his effort also remained undocumented. Still, the elite court culture of seventeenth-century South Asian Islamic kingdoms was a limited world and it is known that in 1606, Ferishta visited Jehangir’s capital.¹²

Mughal expansion, court historiography, and the threat of heterodox religious belief were the parameters that framed both the conception and writing of the Yusufzai history and the socio-political perspective of Akhund Darweza’s text. These latter two works repeated familiar narratives of Afghan origins, but origins now rooted in competing logics. One logic derived from an ideology of genealogy being at the heart of the egalitarian lineage structure. The other logic embraced an ideological interpretation of Islam that used lineage stories to create useful religious polemics.

Readers of Caroe’s chapter on genealogy in The Pathans, or of the full-blown Afghan history found in Dorn’s translation, are familiar with the historical narrative in which Pashtu-speaking Afghans from Herat to the Indus river claim common genealogical links within a comprehensive kinship system. This elaborate family tree tied all lineages to a common conversion to Islam in the seventh century AD and, even further back, to a common Afghan ancestor descended from the earliest Biblical prophets. The speculations of generations of scholars, and of English colonial officials, on the credibility of specific claims to descent from variously the Bani Israel, lost Jewish tribes, or particular Asian dynasties have been exhaustive and, perhaps, exhausted. Of more local interest may be a comparison of the use of genealogy in the Yusufzai history with such use in Akhund Darweza’s text. Written during the era of great court histories that justified centralization under imperial authority, these two less cosmopolitan works differed from each other in their description and sensibility of descent narratives. The
differences reveal competing values within regional mentalities that coexisted in the seventeenth century and continued to influence socio-religious thought after 1700.

Long before the works of Abu-l Fazl, Asian imperial and religious biographies asserted claims to distinguished ancestry and an early conversion to Islam. The Central Asian ruler Timur (d.1405/807 AH) claimed ancestry 'extending to Tumuneh Khan, whose genealogy is carried back in history to Japhet, the son of Noah'. Prominent near the tomb in Buner of Sayyid Ali Shah Tirmizi, known as Pir Baba, erected after his death in 1575, was a family genealogy (shajarah nasab) listing thirty-two generations that separated Pir Baba from Islam's Prophet. As the idiom of descent had long conferred a sense of historically grounded authority and legitimacy, so the regional narratives of Afghan and Yusufzai origins employed the same idiom to legitimate roots and socio-political relations.

The Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, a simple narrative of Yusufzai migration and conquest, traced without recourse to ancient linkages the several generations that left Afghanistan and consolidated their hold over territories west of the Indus river. Near the manuscript’s conclusion, just before narrating the victory of Khan Kaju and the Yusufzai over the Ghoria Khel in the battle of Shaikh Tapur, the author recorded the deaths of Malik Ahmad and Shaikh Mali and listed their political heirs and prominent descendants.

Drawing from Akhund Darweza's Tazkirat al-Abrar, the author(s) recorded the final thoughts of the dying Shaikh Mali. He declared that he had been generous and helpful to needy people without any personal expectations and that he had worked only for the sake of God. Pursuing the theme of group solidarity, the narrative noted that the land settlement of Shaikh Mali and the resulting stability continued to the present, with his descendants living in both the Yusufzai region and Hindustan.

However, averred the Yusufzai history, if another 'glorious conqueror' was found in Khan Kaju, the sibling jealousy between Malik Ahmad’s most notable sons, Al-hoda and Ismail,
led to factionalism within the clan (Khan khel) that had produced leaders. ‘Uncles and cousins’ fought and died and the family eventually lost its established claim to leadership, even if, as of 1623/1033 AH, one family member, Sauda, remained an honoured malik.\(^\text{16}\) The prevalence of factionalism in periods of tranquillity seemed apparent, while a final contemporary observation revealed the new place of imperial patronage in supporting established families: ‘And (a few of the) children of Shah Mansoor, cousin of Alam Malik Ahmad, also in this time...are in Hindustan in the service of...(the Mughal emperor) Jehangir...’\(^\text{17}\)

The Yusufzai narrative detailed the course of events of a close set of allied clans over a relatively limited time frame. An active Yusufzai historical consciousness may have caused them to record names and events linked to political success as early as the fifteenth century.\(^\text{18}\) The authority conferred by such written histories may well have influenced the creation of similar or competing narratives.

The author of the nineteenth century *Hayat-i-Afghan* \(^\text{19}\) (Afghan Life) attributed the motivation of the Afghan author of the *Makhzen Afghani* as an attempt to establish Afghan legitimacy to counter contemporary imperial claims to prominence. As ‘naively set forth...in an introductory account, which,...has been in many editions suppressed...’, the story went that at Jehangir’s court the Persian ambassador once mocked the Afghans with a fantastic tale of their origins:

Books of authority, he said, recounted that once King Zuhak, hearing of a race of beautiful women that lived in some far-off Western country, sent an army thither; which army was defeated by the beautiful women, but afterwards, a stronger expedition being sent under Nariman, they were reduced to sue for peace and gave tribute of a thousand virgins when, on its return march, the army was one night encamped close to a wild mountainous country, there suddenly came down upon it a phantom of terrific aspect, smote and scattered the troops in all directions, and then, in the one night, ravished all the thousand virgins. In due time all became pregnant, and when Zuhak learned this, he gave orders that the women should
be kept in the remote deserts and plains, lest the unnatural offspring should breed strife and tumult in the cities. This offspring was the race of the Afghans. This gibing taunt would seem to have touched the jealous self-conceit of the Afghan, and he tells us that he then and there determined to write the book *Makhzen-i-Afghani*.20

The *Makhzen Afghani*, translated by Dorn, disposed of any questions regarding ‘unnatural’ parentage or geographic origin by beginning with Adam then tracing Afghan lineages through King Talut (Saul) and religious orthodoxy through Khalid bin Walid, companion of the Prophet (PBUH). This comprehensive narrative detailed the early prophets, the spread of Islam, the Afghan Lodi and Suri rulers in India, and the extensive genealogical connections said to link the numerous Afghan clans to Kais, renamed Abd al-Rashid, a contemporary of the Prophet (PBUH). Kais’ ‘pedigree ascends in a series of thirty-seven degrees to Talut, of forty-five to Ibrahim, and of six hundred and three to Adam.’21 A broad synthesis incorporating the finest details of traditional Afghan folklore, the work connected the ancient with the contemporary, prophetic lineages with the founders of Islam. The unifying power of shared origin to create a distinguished Afghan identity, one able to stand against imperial Persian or Mughal cultural claims, was apparent to the patron of the *Makhzen Afghani*, Khan Jahan Lodi, and to at least one later observer:

Ferishta mentions that Kyse, the son of Haushem, and Huneef, the son of Kyse, were two of the earliest Arab commanders in Khorassaun (*Brigg's Ferishta*, Vol. 1, p. 3). He also states that Khauled, *the son of Abdoollah*, being afraid to return to Arabia, settled in the hills of Solimaun, and gave his daughter to a converted Afghan chief (p. 5). It was probably by these facts that the names of Kyse and Khauled were suggested to the Afghan author, who first thought of ennobling his nation by connecting it with that of the Prophet.22

From the late sixteenth century a religious figure in the Yusufzai territory, Akhund Darweza, appropriated Afghan
history and the Afghan genealogical idiom to serve another purpose, the promotion of Islamic norms and values. The son of another religious figure from the Ningrahar region, just east of Kabul, Akhund Darweza, literally a ‘mendicant teacher’, lived in the Buner valley and in the Peshawar area. A disciple of Sayyid Ali Shah Tirmizi, Pir Baba was engaged in early, face-to-face debates with Bayazid Ansari and claimed credit for renaming the self-styled Pir-i Roshan (Pir of Light) as the Pir-i Tarik (Pir of Darkness). Of Turk-Tajik descent on his father’s side, Akhund Darweza turned a non-Pakhtun, reformist eye on local society and waged an intensely personal theological battle against the Roshaniyyas. The tolerance shown by the Mughal emperor Akbar in a 1581 meeting with Bayazid Ansari’s son, Jalal al-Din, then leader of the Roshaniyya movement, added fuel to the ongoing struggle of Akhund Darweza and other regional proponents of mainstream Sunni Islam to influence the Mughal court (especially the eclectic Akbar) and suppress less orthodox religious interpretations.

From the late sixteenth and well into the seventeenth century, Akhund Darweza (d. 1638-39/1048 AH) and his descendants wrote and revised a number of works devoted to this struggle. About 1612-13/1021 AH, Akhund Darweza completed one of several versions of the Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar (loosely, ‘History of the Pious and Evil’), in which he delineated and critiqued the faults of Afghan society. In one section he retold the Afghan descent story, now supplemented with interpretive commentary elaborating on the failures of Afghan society and pointing the way to ideal, Islamic norms of behaviour. Intended to recall straying Yusufzai and other Pakhtuns to the teachings of Pir Baba and the Shari‘a, this genealogical narrative revealed Akhund Darweza’s reliance upon state influence to ensure a proper status for religion in the social hierarchy. His text also hinted at the extent to which Pakhtun society gave precedence to established lineage practices over those shaped by strict religious interpretation and convention:
On the origins of Afghan genealogies and clans, understand beloved son that it is said that they are of the lineage of Mehtar Yaqub, named Israel...Once in an age of prosperity, peace, wellness, security, and stability the people had complete kindness for clans, dependants, and the poor. They sacrificed lives for even the small affair of a dependant (faqir) who had settled in their shadow, to the point a brother would draw a sword against a brother.\textsuperscript{27}

But in time, trouble, the decline of the Afghans, disorder, and confusion in the tribe (ulus), (they) dragged down and destroyed all dependants and the poor. They (the Afghans) took away their property from them (the dependants and poor) and sold their families. They (the Afghans) even sold their own wives and children among one another and they, in times of security, have also made daughter selling (dukhtar-furush) their custom. These are the affairs and circumstances of Afghans from Kandahar to the boundary of Swat and Buner, that is Yusufzai country, that I observed. But Afghans who are in other areas are not with these characteristics, those people having a Muslim ruler.

Now I will state the origin of families and their circumstances, by the grace of God...derived from the perfect commentary, etc. Understand, precious one, that Abraham, the Friend of God, had a son, Ismael. The Arabs were from his lineage and there were no prophets in his line except Mustafa, upon him be peace, last of the prophets. He had another son named Ishaq, and Ishaq had a son, Yaqub, and Yaqub had twelve sons. From these sons one was Levi. Prophecy was in his family. There was another son named Yahuda. Kingship (maliki) was in his family. Often in the Bani Israel there was a (separate) prophet (and) a (separate) malik. The army and fighting were in the hands of the ruler (malik) and the ruler was under the order of the prophet (nabi). Whatever the order of Almighty God was, the prophet brought to the ruler and the ruler brought to the people (qaum).

The Bani Israel had an ark (tabut, chest, also Pashtu for coffin) that was taken forward when they entered into war. In this way the Bani Israel had victory and success and enemy soldiers were defeated. Until a time came of lawbreaking and sinfulness and the abandoning of rulers of the orders (farman) of the prophets. The Bani Israel were defeated, their sons killed, wives and girls and property taken and the ark seized.
The prophet prayed to God for help. He was answered by God who accepted his prayer, sending a staff. The prophet said whoever matches this staff (in height) will be ruler. But none measured up to the staff. Then one day a man named Talut of the sons of Bani Amin came to the city seeking a lost donkey and passed the house of the prophet. A servant said, ‘Let us enter the prophet’s house and visit to find the donkey through his prayers’. When the prophet saw Talut’s height he measured him on the staff. The prophet said to the Bani Israel, ‘This is your malik.’

Surprised, the Bani Israel asked, ‘What were his qualifications for malik? He is not from a lineage of maliks and he has no wealth to give the army.’ The prophet said, ‘Almighty God makes him malik over you. If he does not have noble lineage, he is strong of body and has knowledge of warfare.’

And this custom (sunnat) is continuing among Afghans until our day. Whoever of them is full of strength and is skilled in war, although he has no wealth, they take him as badshah and khan.

When questioned as to how Talut had been proved, the prophet said that he would bring back the ark. Jalut (who had overthrown the Bani Israel and seized the ark) had placed their ark in a temple. But every day those coming to the temple found the other idols overturned. Others, while asleep, were devoured by animals. The next day the catastrophe was blamed on the ark. It was tied to a bullock cart and driven towards the Bani Israel. An angel drove the bull to the Bani Israel and so the rule of Malik Talut was accepted.*

Akhund Darweza’s version of the Afghan descent narrative and origins indiscriminately mixed a basic genealogical listing with critical commentary elaborating on social relations, a nomadic history, and decentralized politics. Afghan society was said to have declined from its earlier ideal state of peace and security under a Muslim ruler. After a fall, venality and the exploitation of dependants replaced justice, and even daughters were sold. In Akhund Darweza’s interpretation, ‘bride price’ played no economic or symbolic role in Pakhtun society.

In interpreting the saga of Talut, Akhund Darweza passed judgement on Afghan honesty, compassion, and respect for piety.

* See Appendix 16 for excerpts from Akund Darweza’s genealogical narrative.
Talut's experience was used to explain why Afghan political leadership was not passed down through wealthy, noble lineages. Competitive, lineage politics were attributed to ancient tribal customs that encouraged ignorance, selfishness, and arrogance. Environmental constraints, socio-economic circumstances, and the stresses of imperial domination were ignored.

Akhund Darweza's historical vision produced an interpretive 'text' similar in form and function to other oral and written histories. Such histories may be considered analytically by examining the processing and content of the 'narratives' used to build each historical text. Ahkund Darweza's genealogical story, apparently derived from oral, manuscript, and personal sources, was a 'display text' of familiar themes both giving information and asserting a 'tellibility' to draw the author and his audience into a common dialogue. The narrative, portraying and interpreting Pakhtun history and society, invited the audience to evaluate his evidence and approve his judgements.

The power of core prophetical narratives to retain significance over centuries is demonstrated in the tale of the wooden tabut, or ark, carried into battle before the Bani Israel. After the death of Bayazid Ansari and the threatened desecration of his grave, his sons and followers literally carried his bones around in a chest before their assemblies.

Akhund Darweza tied a popular narrative of Afghan conversion to Islam to a subsequent curse by the Prophet (PBUH) that Afghan political fragmentation would doom them to a dispersed life of unenlightened pastoral nomadism. Afghans were required to subordinate themselves to an Islamic rule asserting both religious and political supremacy. Islam was equated with hierarchical authority and knowledge. While declaring that the Afghans followed improper religious principles and practice, Akhund Darweza delicately ascribed it to pious ignorance, since they knew no better. More sympathetically, the story of the supplicant Mahmud of Ghazni linked the grand narrative of Islamic conquest to Afghan agency and custom while paying tribute to Afghan valour, hospitality, honour, and expansion.
The general polemic against Afghan customs and traditions turned virulent as the genealogy interpolated commentary on lineages accused of apostasy. The 'mountain kafirs', Roshaniyya disciples, were 'absolute infidels'. Religious precedents dictated killing such men, capturing their women, and seizing their property. The utter intolerance of this rhetoric left little incentive for Roshaniyya restraint. Even later scholars, not hesitating to refer to Roshaniyya 'brigandage' and 'plunder operations', saw little equivalence in Roshaniyya religious arguments justifying their own seizure of property.

Akhund Darweza’s narrative contained considerable details of personal, family, and general material life, such as the fact that hill dwellers subsisted on rain-fed millet crops, wore woollen clothes, and, barefoot and bareheaded, gathered grass and wood from forests. Minute observations, for instance that Afghans lived among the Tajiks in Ningrahar, indicated close personal knowledge of the region.

Akhund Darweza ignored the fictive potential of the extended genealogical narrative nominally to unify all Afghan clans, including through the recognizing of second or third wives and through adoptions. Instead, the story of Sheikhi taking his wife’s sister, Basu, into his household was described as a typically irreligious Afghan custom. With the concurrent marrying of two sisters proscribed in the Koran, Akhund Darweza used this to accuse the whole community involved of religious infidelity. He undoubtedly saw the descendants of Tark, the son of Basu, being followers of Bayazid Ansari as no mere coincidence.

Akhund Darweza saved his most shocked reactions for his commentary on Afghan family relations. Widows married a brother of their deceased husband, though a saying of the Prophet valued a widow’s loyalty to her dead husband ‘to the time of dying’. According to Akhund Darweza’s interpretation of the Shari’a, parents were to be honoured. Fathers having absolute control over the disposition of their property, sons had to earn their daily bread and anything produced from the father’s resources remained his. Through characterizations of how the sons of Yusuf treated their parents, Akhund Darweza described,
as well as condemned, an apparently customary, sensitive Afghan practice of property and inheritance in which sons, upon maturity, divided their parents’ property among themselves in equal shares. The Afghan morality tale cursing Badi for abusing his mother indicated that if respect for elders was given due importance, property, the prime marker of Pakhtun status, would be distributed to anxious sons.

Akhund Darweza’s genealogy represented a particular interpretation of a fairly standard narrative of local lineages. The soft pronunciations (Sherbun rather than Kharshbun, Jamand rather than Zamand, Sheikhi rather than Khakhay), possibly reflected a soft-toned, Persian reference source used by Akhund Darweza, or indicated his own preference for Persian. In later manuscripts and histories, the hard Pahktun letters, representing local Yusufzai pronunciation, were used.

The comprehensive History of the Afghans mentioned that the three sons of Abd al-Rashid (‘Sarbanni, Batni, and Ghurghust’) left behind ‘three hundred and ninety-five tribes’. But Akhund Darweza quickly narrowed his focus to the line that produced Abd al-Rashid, Sarbanni, Sherbun, Kand, Sheikhi, Mundi (Mand), and his sons Umar and Yusuf. From Yusuf and from Umar’s son Mandanr, according to this narrative, came most of the Pakhtun clans occupying Swat and the north-eastern Peshawar valley.

In the early eighteenth century, with the aid of genealogies such as that of Akhund Darweza, each individual in every Pakhtun clan in the northern valleys and the relevant Peshawar valley tappas, could link himself to one of the descendants of Mandanr or Yusuf. Individuals required such ties to claim a share of a village’s landholdings, just as lineages needed links to claim a share in periodic land redistributions within a tappa. If by 1700 the exact name and number of forefathers that tied an individual to Yusuf or Mandanr might be debatable, this sense of common ancestry, along with the reality of land possession and a commitment to the set of relations known as Pakhtunwali, validated and established Afghan identities. As indicated, this ideology of genealogy was adaptive and flexible.
Weaker or disreputable individuals or lineages were skipped or absorbed in a process of compression and omission. As well, peripheral clans might assert more respectable ancestry as fortunes rose. The framework of lineage genealogy provided an opportunity for specific families and individuals to stake claims to leadership and resources, especially when these claims began to extend beyond the bounds of egalitarian social practice.

Later, such legitimating features of Akhund Darweza's narratives ‘developed into an indispensable ingredient of eighteenth-century Indo-Afghan identity’ as Rohilla commanders of diverse migrant Pakhtun soldiers, including many Mandanr and Yusufzai, attempted to forge political loyalty out of a common religio-cultural heritage.35

Akhund Darweza’s ideological narrative of ghazis and conquest evoked the thesis of Lindner suggesting a lack of contemporary evidence for later histories of ghazi-driven ‘jihad’ being responsible for spreading the early Ottoman empire. It seemed to fit the ‘historiographic pattern’ discussed by Eaton in which later polemical writers, and European scholars, attributed a ‘holy war ethic’ to Ottoman expansion and the spread of Islam in Bengal.36 Akhund Darweza did not hesitate to justify violence in his era through references to the past. Though Mahmud of Ghazni’s many incursions into the subcontinent were apparently quite violent, both Lindner and Eaton made the case that it took generations of population movement and settlement to establish permanent new Islamic communities. Such histories of mobile pastoralists turning to a more stable agrarian livelihood might find a convenient parallel with the Pakhtun experience in the Peshawar valley.

Akhund Darweza’s polemic joined the mix of regional cultural voices in an effort to consolidate a recurring Islamic perspective. As a lineage ‘history’ it combined narrative, verse, personal anecdote, and a moral theme that structured both content and analysis. The preoccupation with the heritage of Bayazid Ansari ensured that Akhund Darweza’s narrative would be helpful in recreating a specific Islamic sensibility, ‘in writing the history of that for which they are events in and of
themselves—the history of images and representations of the past..."}

**Lineage narratives**

In 1645 the Mughal expedition north of the Hindu Kush to Balkh and Badakhshan included followers not only of the Yusufzai *jagirdar*, but also of the regional Khattak *jagirdar*, Khushal Khan.\(^{38}\) The account of the life of the warrior-poet Khushal Khan remains one of the most renowned of many elite Afghan personal histories shaped by the interaction of lineage and Mughal politics. Patronized by the emperor Shah Jehan, then suspected and imprisoned by his son Aurangzeb, Khushal Khan spent years, during the 1670s, organizing anti-Mughal Pakhtun coalitions. These coalitions failed, in part from a lack of Yusufzai support, and also because of a reward-oriented Mughal diplomacy. Unable directly to defeat and subordinate the various Afghan districts west of the Indus, the Mughals reduced their confrontational approach and maintained access to Kabul and the west with a policy, long found along imperial borders, that combined 'coercion' (military threat) with 'seduction', that is 'gifts, trade opportunities, and pledges of political support'.\(^{39}\) The success of this policy fragmented support for Khushal Khan, even among his sons.\(^{40}\)

Through the mid-to-late seventeenth century, political competition within the Peshawar valley remained intimately linked to imperially influenced lineage feuds and to factional rivalries within the Mughal ruling leadership. Akbar's sixteenth-century creation of a Khattak *jagir* to protect the imperial road between Attock and Peshawar began a generations-long struggle pitting the Khattak lineages against the Yusufzai and Mandanr clans, especially as expansion-minded Khattak *khans* pushed north of the Kabul river to seize land and establish villages. The great-grandfather, grandfather, and father of Khushal Khan all died in conflicts with the Yusufzai. In each generation, Mughal divide-and-rule tactics attempted to weaken threatening, usually
Yusufzai, Afghan clans. As Caroe has detailed, seventeenth-century lineage heads, including Khushal Khan, nurtured alliances among particular Mughal provincial and court factions in an ongoing competition to increase the number of villages in a *jagir* or to eliminate subsidies received by opponents.\(^{41}\)

In the early eighteenth century, during a period of relative stability within the Peshawar valley, Afzal Khan, grandson of Khushal Khan and chief of the Khattak clan, wrote a new history of the Afghans that gave prominence to his lineage and, correspondingly, denigrated the Yusufzai and Mandanr clans. Established Afghan histories and genealogies, previously used either to confirm an Afghan identity or serve as a vehicle for religious exhortation, now were used to document or invent traditions of valour as well as to stake claims to territory and imperial patronage.

Afzal Khan’s *Tarikh-i Murassa* (Bejeweled History) began with a Pashtu translation of the same *Makhzen Afghani* later translated by Dorn. To this he added narratives of Afghan migrations, Khattak genealogy, and Khattak history drawn from Akhund Darweza’s *Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar* and other sources.\(^{42}\)

Afzal Khan related that Khushal Khan recorded ‘in his own handwriting’ the tradition that there were ‘twenty generations between Karlan and our family’. Karlanri was the putative forefather of the fourth branch of the Afghan *shajarah*, a branch that neatly absorbed the various Pakhtun hill clans, from Afridis to Wazirs, not tied to the three sons of Kais. A story revealing the flexibility and the unifying potential of the genealogical idiom held that Karlanri had been a foundling, discovered and raised by sons of Urmar, an adopted son of Sarbanni’s son Sharkbun.

The first great Khattak, Malik Ako, had received his *jagir* from Akbar, but rather than a noble title preferred, and was given, an imperial grant to collect ‘a transit duty on cattle’. Soon enough, his descendants would drop the title ‘malik’ for ‘khan’, while rights to collect various duties and fees remained important for the wealth and the prestige involved. Certainly, in
the early 1680s, when Aurangzeb’s standing policy of ending internal tolls justified provincial officials in abolishing the politically sensitive Indus ferry toll concession of the Khattaks, Khushal Khan may well have wondered how that would affect the local balance of power.43

As Afzal Khan detailed the century of Khattak conflict with the neighbouring Yusufzai and Mandanr clans, he portrayed an elite history where heroic Khattak khans faced, and usually defeated, opposing village headmen. From Akora, the main Khattak village south of the Kabul river, Khattaks led by Khushal’s grandfather, Yahiya, crossed the Kabul river and captured the village of Misri-kot. There, ‘several chiefs of note amongst the Yusufzai fell, while Yahiya Khan killed Mamo Khan’. ‘After the murder of Yahiya Khan, Shahbaz Khan’ (Khushal’s father) ‘levied tribute from the Mandanrs and the Akozais and subjected the whole of the Mandanr tribe with the sword’.44

Yet, the triumphal narrative also highlighted the political factionalism that so often eroded Afghan and Yusufzai lineage unity and opened the door to external interests. Afzal Khan described how two feuding Mandanr clans, the Utmanzai and Sadozai (an Utmanzai sub-lineage), intensified their conflict. The Utmanzai attracted allies from other Mandanr clans, the Razzar, Kamalzai, and Amazai. The Sadozai, whose khan was friendly with Shahbaz Khan, approached the Khattaks for help. In the end, Shahbaz Khan helped the Sadozai by burning a few Utmanzai villages. He then appointed his own choice, Bhaku Khan, as Sadozai leader. But soon Bhaku Khan turned on the Khattaks, attacked their villages north of the Kabul river, and fought several battles with Shahbaz Khan.45 This shifting pattern of alliance and fission, involving sub-lineages, tappa level lineages, and regional clans (ulus to Afzal Khan), was less natural ‘anarchy’ than the condition that occurred when lineage conflicts, intensified by a sedentary existence, operated in a context of imperial jagirdars playing for higher stakes and greater potential rewards.
This elite Khattak history had little interest in detailing the effects of such feuding upon daily village life. One minor insight came from Afzal Khan’s description of Khushal Khan’s raid on an Akozai village in 1640. The raid was to avenge his father, Shahbaz Khan, dead from wounds suffered in a cattle raid. It was recorded that Khushal Khan ordered, ‘Put to death whatever you come across, dogs or men’ and ‘Accordingly, whatever they came across, cattle, men, women, children, nothing did they spare but killed them, and deluged their households with blood…’ Such fighting and raiding, involving horsemen, swordsmen, and archers, characterized the annals of elite khans, though the retreat from Khushal’s assault revealed something of the social classes and technology involved in seventeenth-century local warfare. ‘When the Khataks had crossed the Balar they halted. It was now near evening prayer-time. In the interval one Basai, a minstrel, received a gun-shot wound; and came home and died.’

The impact of the introduction to the region of firearms appears to have been mixed. Perhaps used by Babur’s troops in the 1519 campaign, matchlocks are known to have supported the Mughal army trapped and destroyed in 1586 in the passes of Buner and were undoubtedly carried by Aurangzeb’s armies defeated in area passes in the 1670s. It might be imagined that the Mughals carefully guarded the control of firearms and that such weapons were more effective used in numbers in the open plains than in mountainous terrain. It is not known whether the Peshawar valley jagirdars were armed by the Mughals. Little evidence documents the steady spread of matchlocks throughout the region. Into the early eighteenth century firearms appeared to have complemented rather than radically transformed imperial and clan military tactics.

The regional socio-economic impact of firearms was incremental but apparently pervasive. New trade links and manufacturing skills developed to meet a growing demand for guns, powder, and shot. And more and more weapon-conscious Afghans acquired and carried matchlocks, whether to guard against enemies or project authority and status.
In the early eighteenth century, in the context of greater regional political and cultural pressures, comprehensive Afghan histories, regional histories of important clans, and finely detailed genealogical *shajarah nasabs* equated Pakhtun clans with other, often imperial, interests legitimized by textual authority. Lineages, families, and individuals were positioned in exact relation to common ancestors and rival clans. The example of imperial hagiographers and a need to counter competing ideologies spurred the production of regional texts and new histories chronicling the events and concerns of local, Pakhtun society.

The poetic and literary legacy of the Khattak *khans* revealed the ability of a ‘tribal’ society to absorb, adapt and customize the conventions of Persian verse, Islamic historiography, and imperial polemics. As well, the didactic Akhund Darweza utilized the historical and genealogical genres to comment upon Pakhtun social failings and to promote the cause of Islamic-based social transformation. Though literacy among Afghans was limited to a handful, the customary reading of these texts to congregations and villagers and the oral re-transmission of these reconstituted narratives had gained them a far wider audience. Thus, by the early decades of the eighteenth-century, stories of family lineage and Pakhtun history, orally passed from generation to generation over family cooking fires and by *hujra* storytellers, were increasingly based on regularized narratives shaped by the seventeenth-century effusion of literary production.
Akhund Darweza’s Genealogy

(Kais/Abd al-Rashid)

(Sarbanni)               (Batni)               (Ghurghust)

Sherbun

Kand        Jamand

Sheikhi

Mundi       Muk       Tark

Daulatyar   Khalil   Ziran   Chamkani

Umar

Mandanr

Mamu       Hazar     Rajar    Mazad

Hasan      Yaqub     Aka      Elias

Dawlat     Chaghar   Aba      Essau

Natu       Taji       Salar    Mami

Khawaji     Bazid      Aba      Shadak

Hilam       Hatman
NOTES

1. Benedict Anderson’s theme in *Imagined Communities* (Verso, London, 1983) of ‘national’ consciousness arising from the effects of mass, commercialized literacy and industrial transformation on groups linked by language, culture, and geography, cannot be pressed too far in this case. The twentieth-century ‘Pakhtunistan’ national movement might offer a better case with which to consider Anderson’s arguments.


14. Date of death, p. 32, and genealogy found in the Urdu booklet, Sayid Ali Ghous Tirmizi, no date, distributed at shrine in Pir Baba, Buner, 1996.
15. Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, p. 146.
16. Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, p. 147.
17. Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, p. 148. See Mohammad Nawaz Tair’s preface, p. 7, discussing the dating of the writing of this history.

18. Raverty attributes a History of his tribe and their conquests in the Peshawar Valley, and in the Sama’h or Plain, on the northern bank of the Landdaey Sind or Kabul River to Shaikh Mali, written in 1417, and another history in Pashtu to Khan Kaju, dated 1494. The existence or loss of these histories and any possible influence on the later histories remain subjects of speculation. See H. G. Raverty, A Dictionary of the Pukhto or Pushto Language of the Afghans, 1860 (Indus Publications, Karachi, 1980), Introductory Remarks, pp. xv-xvi.


27. Author’s translation, after many hours of discussion and language work with my Peshawar ‘ustad’ Khudadad, aiming to capture spirit of the original and a sense of its style, rather than any absolute exactness. Parentheses hold interpretive suggestions and English transcriptions of manuscript terms as found in F. Steingass, Persian-English Dictionary (Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, 1981).


29. The idea of the ‘display text’ is described in Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 1977, p. 136.


32. ‘You are also forbidden to take in marriage two sisters at one and the same time...’ Koran, Dawood trans., 1994, p. 63.


43. Quotations from the *Tarikh-i Murassa* are from excerpts included in the *Kalid-i Afghani*, English translation by T. C. Plowden (Central Jail Press, Lahore, 1875) taken from the Pashtu version edited by T. P. Hughes in 1872. The above quotations are from Plowden, pp. 184 and 197.

44. Plowden, *Kalid-i Afghani*, 1875, pp. 200-1. The Akozai mentioned were a Mandanr sub-clan.


By the eighteenth century, contrasting approaches towards the control of agricultural land and its produce became clearer as imperial Mughal and Pakhtun confrontation and compromise continued. Oral and textual sources, representing a remembered traditional ‘corpus of images, plots, figures, and forms of narration’, recorded differences. Revealing ‘certain constant elements’ of social interaction and production, these sources illuminated the psychological and emotional aspects of Pakhtun agrarian social formations. Imperial irrigation and revenue priorities spreading out from Peshawar town slowly eroded Pakhtun hegemony over village land use, while daily preoccupations with weather, household needs, defence, and the small hypocrisies of life informed oral popular culture. Archives of oral legends and written texts offer evidence of the stresses caused by changing agrarian structures and of the complex ‘practices of remembering, transmitting, and performing these constant elements’ of the eighteenth-century Peshawar valley history.

For over a century, a limited group of Pakhtun jagirdars and clan leaders used Mughal patronage to consolidate personal claims to lineage leadership and to exert political authority over agricultural tracts. In 1694, after his father died in Mughal custody, Afzal Khan assumed the Khattak khanship. He survived several decades of internal clan competition influenced by periodic swings in Mughal support between contending factions. Characteristically, the final event described in Afzal Khan’s
history was of his fighting in July 1724/1136 AH for control of the Khattak districts.

By the early eighteenth century, Mughal Kabul province policies had degenerated, in part due to the centre being distracted by imperial court factionalism and the rising Sikh militancy in the Punjab. Kabul provincial officials used divide-and-rule tactics to extort exorbitant tribute (peshkash) from jagirdars, threatening them with replacement by clan rivals. In 1724, with the Kabul governorship temporarily vacant, Afzal Khan was challenged by an uprising in southern Khattak territories led by the descendant of a line of well-known Shaikhs, and fled to the Yusufzai country north of the Kabul river. The contingent political scene was revealed by the fact that, encouraged by the Mughal governor (subahdar) in distant Lahore, Afzal Khan was able to recruit allies from ‘some of the Mandanr and Yusufzi clans nearby, the Kamalzis, Amanzis, and Radzars, and others’ and defeat ‘the forces of the Mullas, Talibs, and Darweshes’, and of allied clans. Afzal Khan claimed 3000 supporters against 7000-8000 opponents, who suffered ‘upwards of 600 killed, 140 of whom were in mail and plate armour’. The scale and the intensity of the violence evoked memories of the Roshaniyya challenge to the authority of traditional lineage headmen and highlighted the readiness of clan rivals to unify in defence of the political and social status quo.

Reflecting the slow dissipation of Mughal imperial vision and authority, the political ineptness of the Peshawar region elite had become apparent as early as 1701. In that year, neglected units of the Mughal garrison in Kabul approached the emperor’s son, then resident in Kabul, for arrears of pay. The rejection of their demand precipitated a confrontation and the massacre of five hundred garrison members. Within the Peshawar valley, elite relationships, long structured and supported by the empire, continued efforts to consolidate local control, maintain a flow of resources, and accommodate local interests less and less intimidated by threats of imperial retaliation. In the heavily irrigated clan holdings (tappas) near Peshawar town, influential lineage leaders, elevated and
entrenched by the Mughals, used ties to what remained of local imperial coercive powers to manipulate access to water resources and collect revenue dues on agricultural produce. During Aurangzeb's reign, a leading Mohmand, Muhhib Khan, served as overseer (nazir) of the new Shaikh-ka-katha canal constructed by the Peshawar ruler Shaikh Usman. Over the Mughal period, the ambitions of Khalil and Mohmand maliks had surpassed pretensions even to the title of Khan. In the seventeenth century, a leading Khalil khan was first awarded the title of Arbab (lord or master) by a grant (sanad) of the emperor Shah Jehan. Senior Peshawar valley Mohmand khans, not to be outdone, soon adopted the title.7

The presence of powerful arbabs and khans in the heavily irrigated tappas around Peshawar town illustrated the Mughal determination to maximize revenues from rich lands. It also represented the social stratification that since the time of Akbar had separated leading Khalil, Mohmand, Daudzai, and other khans from village maliks and ordinary share (bakhra) holders. Within these irrigated districts, this period of rising political and economic hierarchies coincided with a change in shareholder land relations. This may have included the disappearance of wesh land redistribution among affected Afghan lineage members.

While Malik Ahmad had originally parcelled out all the conquered lands to the Yusufzai and their allied clans, Shaikh Mali had apparently surveyed and distributed only the Yusufzai territory.8 While acknowledging a lack of evidence on the existence of wesh in the irrigated tappas around Peshawar from the sixteenth century, and that any detailed evidence on wesh is difficult to find,9 it seems apparent that originally wesh was regionally widespread. It lasted into the nineteenth century among the Yusufzai of Swat, the Utman Khel, the Mandanr of the Peshawar plains, the Muhammadzai of Hashtnagar, some Orakzai clans, and the Marwats of the Bannu region.10 More isolated regions retained wesh the longest, including areas of Bannu up to the late nineteenth century, Swat into the twentieth century, and isolated villages in the Hazara District and the
2. General Tribal Map

From H. C. Wylly

*From the Black Mountain to Waziristan* (London: Macmillan, 1912)
3. Swat

From H. C. Wyly

*From the Black Mountain to Waziristan* (London: Macmillan, 1912)
4. Distribution of Tribes (Including selected references for the Mardan Area)

Peshawar District Settlement
Map from 2nd Regular Settlement, dated 1896.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References-Mardan Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yusafzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusafzai Kamalzai-Misharanizai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusafzai Kamalzai-Kisharanizai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanzai-Daulatzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanzai-Ismailzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razzar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utmanzai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddozai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utman Khel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(spellings from Dane map, 1896)
5. "Assessment Circles" (Showing newly consolidated circles in block type)

6. Peshawar District Survey Map

Map from 2nd Regular Settlement, dated 1896.
Printed by Nasir Ahmed: Islamic Press, 1898.
Khurram Agency as late as 1960. This suggests that direct imperial and state domination, and proximity to markets, contributed to the transformation of land relations near towns and along major routes.

Mohmand khans in the hill districts west of the Peshawar valley were patronized by Mughal emperors to protect trade routes to Kabul. The presence of these hereditary jagirdars, also supported by the post-Mughal empires, perhaps explained the late nineteenth-century observation that, while western Mohmand and Yusufzai 'social and domestic customs differ in no material respect...', 'It is noticeable, however, that the Vaish, the periodical re-distribution of tribal lands, has entirely ceased throughout the Mohmand tribe'.

Around the town of Peshawar powerful lineage heads secured imperial patronage and drew upon Mughal forces stationed in the Peshawar garrison to help them increase the lands under their personal control and to consolidate political and economic influence. This does not suggest that historically the Peshawar valley had never seen asymmetrical power relations reflected in land tenures and revenue demands. But at least since the time of Akbar formal grants authorising the collection of revenue and the exercise of political authority eroded the egalitarian consensus and competition motivating and regulating Pakhtun lineage land politics since the sixteenth-century conquest and settlement of the Peshawar valley.

The process of eroding the fact and ideal of wesh and its impact on Pakhtun egalitarianism began around Peshawar town and would take several more generations to encompass the entire Peshawar valley. With landholding the central marker of Pakhtun identity, those unable to retain their land would be relegated to an inferior status. Opportunities would grow for some productive non-Pakhtuns to turn tenancies into degrees of proprietorship with de facto claims to social status.

The seventeenth-century Pakhtun cultural production encompassed the complex and contradictory social role of land and the changing land relations. In this period a contrast was noted between older modes of life and production which centred
on lands held in outlying, non-irrigated villages in the Peshawar valley, and those experienced by shareholders and dependants competing for irrigation water rights from the Swat, Kabul, and Bara rivers.

Indirect evidence has been presented of the late seventeenth-century survival of wesh in the Mohmand villages near Peshawar. To explain the discrepancy between the birth of the son of a notable Mohmand lineage in Bahadur Kili village, a few miles south-west of Peshawar, in 1653/1064 AH, and his burial immediately south of Peshawar in Hazarkhani village, in 1711/1123 AH, it has been speculated that the man, Abdur Rahman, had moved to Hazarkhani in a wesh exchange.13

Educated in fikh and tasawwuf by Mulla Muhammad Yusuf Yusufzai, Abdur Rahman turned his back on worldly matters to absorb folk, literary, and mystical traditions. He produced a body (diwan) of verse that embodied the non-orthodox, yet devout, spiritual longings permeating Afghan culture. Abdur Rahman, remembered as Rahman Baba, wrote of personal anguish, devotion, and love of God. He never aspired to, nor achieved, a high position among the ulema or in Sufi orders.

Within the poetry of Abdur Rahman an occasional contemporary sensibility stood out from the emotion of mystical experience. One work in particular reads like an oral tradition offering insights into Peshawar social formation of the period. Oral and textual genealogical traditions, including such as those recorded by Akhund Darweza, carried a potential risk. Distortions could emerge from inaccuracies of time framing and the need to adapt tradition to the realities of the narrator’s social ‘present’. There was also always the possibility of feedback from textual sources into the oral domain. Yet, the oral genealogical tradition, as in other ‘tradition’, was valued for being able to ‘testify then to opinions and values held, to mentalities...not as a testimony of fact’.14 Similarly, the work of Abdur Rahman contained integral historical ‘messages’ about the attitudes, norms, and socio-political dynamics of his time.

His verse, meant for recitation, derived themes from real life experience as well as from Islamic and Persian literary sources
such as the *diwans* of Sa’adi and Hafiz. He, and others, consciously writing from an Afghan cultural perspective, adapted Persian verse form to the rhythm of the Pashtu language.\(^{15}\) In one *ghazal* of linked couplets, Abdur Rahman, seeing no irony in aristocratic, land-owning Pakhtuns being subordinated, revealed something of the stresses of agrarian life, challenges to identity, and the social transformation occurring in the irrigated Pakhtun villages near Peshawar:

The man whose *crops* depend on *rain*
Is passing all his days in pain ................................................................. 2
The *land* without a *water main*
Its *tiller* hardly can sustain ............................................................... 4
His eyes are glued to heaven in distress
Will it send rain upon the waterless? .................................................... 6

He burns like fish in cooking oil
Into kabab he’ll slowly broil ............................................................... 8
Will rain upon his thirsty soil
Soon grace his labour and his toil? ....................................................... 10
He day and night will make the same request:
O God, have mercy on the waterless! .................................................... 12

The sound of rain is music sweet
To him, more than the guitar’s beat, .................................................... 14
If rain should fall for years replete
It could not calm his body’s heat ......................................................... 16
The heat and light has made him so obsessed
That even moonlight scares the waterless .............................................. 18

So priceless is each tiny drink
That all his wooden vessels stink, ....................................................... 20
Of clean and unclean he can’t think
From urine even he won’t shrink, ....................................................... 22
When he goes out to steal a pint or less
No sacred place deters the waterless .................................................. 24

*By distribution* he must cheat
Though he be learned and can read, .................................................... 26
He can't afford the gracious deed
That would assure him heavenly meed, ........................................... 28
If always walking in a cloud, still less
Will dare to trust in God the waterless ............................................ 30

For flushing dirt he has no power
He holds less liquid than a flower .................................................... 32
Don't ask if he has had a shower
When gold cannot one drop recover .................................................. 34
Since he with sand ablutions must redress
It's mixed with stubbles from the waterless ....................................... 36

The tiller of this aridness
Forever remains waterless ............................................................... 38
But irrigated land no less
Can cause a similar distress .............................................................. 40
The wretched farmer in backwaterland
Forever suffers from his fellow-man ................................................. 42

His relatives will him abuse
He never gets what he can use .......................................................... 44
He has no strength to tell the truth,
Like beaten snakes he twists and screws ............................................. 46
For his own right he can’t afford to stand
He’s tied by shame to his backwaterland .......................................... 48

Shall he endure, this wretched one
Must feud and enmity he shun .......................................................... 50
If he should slip an evil pun
Against himself it will be spun .......................................................... 52
Unpunished, lowborn people taunt him can
That only happens in backwaterland .................................................. 54

Into Pathans his workers rise
Though they be low caste otherwise ................................................. 56
Soft words will take him with surprise
His dignity is shrunk in size ............................................................... 58
You think that in appearance he's a man
But he's a bastard of backwaterland ............................................... 60
His evil habits he’ll enhance
Drunk in the wine of ignorance .......................................................... 62
When nobles fall into such hands
Of their release there is no chance .................................................. 64
God save us from a future of the brand
That flows in drops into backwaterland .......................................... 66

Than such a serf he’s better, who
Regards all water as taboo, .................................................................. 68
To serve a dog would rather do
Though as nawab himself he view .................................................... 70
RAHMAN prefers the men of arid land
If soon he has to leave backwaterland ............................................. 72

The English translation of this ghazal captures the pain and struggle of Pakhtun shareholders in both heavily irrigated, imperially dominated tappas and in poorly irrigated, dry land areas. The Pashtu and Persian vocabulary used in this verse form a glossary of local terms differentiating types of agricultural land, levels of social hierarchy, and ideals of Pakhtun behaviour. Crop land (kisht) was dependant on rain (baran) or on rain-or runoff-induced seasonal flooding (sailab land) (line 1). Land (mulk) irrigated from a nearby river (sind) or stream (rod) (line 3) sustained cultivators (dihqan) (line 4). Water (oba), when available for irrigation, was distributed by share (wesh) (line 25). Rain-fed crops (lalmi) (line 37) in the dry lands (khushk) (line 71) or irrigated fields (abi) (line 39) sustained villages (kalaey) (line 40), including those in the riverine area (do-ab) (line 60) and in the other revenue (jama) (line 72) tappas. The social and occupational, categories mentioned included arbab (line 42), dependant (hamsaya) and farm servant (charekars) (line 55), leather worker (mochi) and butcher (kassab) (line 56), noble (ashraf) (line 63), farmer (zamindar) (line 67), servant (naukar) (line 68, 69), and unbeliever (kafir) (line 68). Shame (sharm) (line 48), enmity (badi) (line 50), and modesty (hijab) (line 58) marked Pakhtun self-consciousness.
Abdur Rahman contrasted two opposite, difficult ways of life. The unirrigated fields of the maira and dry land villages were worked by cultivators obsessed with the sky and the weather. Using occasional wells they grew wheat, barley, and lesser food and fodder crops. Competition over surface water distributions precluded acts of generosity that might bring future reward (sawab) (line 28). But villagers forced to use sand for their ablutions (line 35) were yet more fortunate than those suffering under Pakhtuns who had risen to become masters (arbabs).

A Pakhtun shareholder in the imperially policed revenue villages around Peshawar, still bound by ties of honour to his land, was confronted by competing sets of values and social pressures. The Pakhtun family patriarch, used to a code of independence, revenge, and domination over non-Pakhtuns, faced petty humiliations from gossip and enemies he could not attack. Instead, he watched productive dependents turn subsistence patches of land into tenancies and achieve degrees of independence.

The deviation of social reality from the Pakhtun ideal was interpreted not as agrarian transformation but as moral decline. Such a reduced Pakhtun, literally translated, had no shame or modesty (honour) in his heart (line 58). The English translation by a Scandinavian missionary diplomatically elided one of Abdur Rahman’s closing metaphors referring to a ‘...servant of a mad black kafir..’ (line 68), but his preference remained clear, and nostalgic, for the people (qawm) of the dry lands over the new society of the irrigated revenue lands. Both lifestyles reflected the extent to which a nomadic, lineage-based social structure had changed since the time of the sixteenth-century conquests. Pakhtunwali would not be eliminated, but would be subjected to other, often dominating, forms of social control. And, if the reality of wesh declined, the consciousness of it remained, arguably, ‘...as a mechanism to preserve the mythology of territorial rights based on tribal conquests that underlies Yusufzai brotherhood and equality...’

16
The effects of the decline of *wesh* in the Peshawar valley *jagirs* may have been similar to the process of change analysed in the later formation of a Pakhtun state structure in the Swat valley. Under Mohmand and Khalil *arbabs*, then perhaps Khattak and Mandanr *jagirdars*, the elimination of *wesh* meant that ‘as a result shifting and ephemeral land ownership became permanent and a feudal, hierarchical stratification began to emerge,...’ Also, ‘permanent settlement implies the beginning of the end of the socio-political utility of the descent segment’. If lineage position once guaranteed a share in common lands, a trend to settled status foreshadowed private land control and ownership that obviated the need to maintain lineage identities. Perhaps a demystifying awareness of hierarchies clarified that, ‘The ...Pukhtun is no longer a mythical figure inherently superior and ordained by descent to rule the land. He becomes a landlord...’

In the early eighteenth century, as imperially structured agrarian relations near Peshawar challenged and reshaped local Pakhtun society, the north-eastern Peshawar valley experienced political consolidation by elite Mandanr *khans*. These *khans* acted as intermediaries between village-based clans under *maliks* and imperial administrators seeking trade route security, military recruits, and nominal revenue obligations that were largely remitted as *jagir* and service awards.

In the Yusufzai plains districts, especially the Mandanr *tappas* held by the Kamalzai, Amazai, Razar, Utmanzai, and Khudu Khel clans, ground-level agricultural practice saw most shareholders maintaining familiar patterns of production relations and land distribution. But some privileged *khans* used imperial patents and patronage to establish elevated levels of legitimacy and control beyond the expectations of local lineage dynamics. Through the period of the final dissolution of Mughal hegemony and the rise of Persian and Afghan political authority, the mid-eighteenth century Mandanr elite of the plains struggled to avoid the degree of subordination experienced by the elite settled in proximity to Peshawar, even as they attempted to use extra-lineage coercion and income as leverage to make transcendent
positions permanent and hereditary. Self-perpetuating practices included maintaining forces of armed retainers and claiming from dependants a growing list of produce fees and labour services. But no Mandanr khan could yet fundamentally challenge set practices of land distribution and control that defined an idealized, egalitarian Pakhtun socio-political order.

Several Mandanr clans occupied the lands east of Hashtnagar that stretched to the Indus river. Geographically and politically the Kamalzai Pakhtuns were the most prominently situated. Through the eighteenth century, holding shares based on Shaikh Mali’s settlement, they continued to control lineage lands despite increasing elite khan interests. As in the other Mandanr tappas, the Kamalzai genealogical table (shajarah nasab) translated almost directly into territorial blocks of land possession. The two main divisions of the Kamalzai tappa were the senior (mashar) branch, the Mishranzai, with holdings (daftar) around the village of Toru, and the junior (kashar) wing, the Kishranzai, located around Hoti and Mardan. These settlements mapped Shaikh Mali’s original division of four hundred shares of productive land for the Kamalzai tappa, the southern half (two hundred shares) to the Mishranzai and the northern half to the Kishranzai.18

Around these villages, tracts (wand) of arable land had been measured by rope lengths and divided into sections determined by the configurations of internal clan lineages. Wands often encompassed fields of similar soil quality and productivity (sandy, hilly, irrigated, poorly drained, etc.) with eligible clan segments receiving equal shares in each field. The Kishranzai split their lands, one hundred shares apiece, equally between the clans of Hoti and Mardan. The final allocation of the Mardan shares illustrated the social composition of the ruling Pakhtun population.

The one hundred Mardan shares were divided among three Kishranzai clans, a clan of dependent allies, and a number of religious lineages. After reserving twelve shares for Sayyids and other religious figures, termed sairai, land not subject to revenue claims or wesh exchanges, another sixteen shares went to allied
Manduri lineages. The three Kishranzai ‘khails’ (khels) at Mardan then each took twenty-four shares (bakhras). These were then further segmented into family lots, typically described as a fraction (third, sixth, twelfth) of the share.

Any original ideal of equal share division among lineages did not translate into an exact, per capita equity in acreage distribution. The three Mardan Kishranzai clans, each receiving twenty-four shares, included the ‘Khankhail’, in which one family ‘owns as its share the whole of the original twenty-four lots undivided’, the ‘Rustamkhail’, and the ‘Badakhankhail’. The Rustam khel lands were equally divided by the Bahadur khel (five families) and the Bamo khel (ten families) sub-clans. The Badakhan khel share was split into three main sections, each of which was further divided by sub-lineages into smaller holdings.

The apparently disproportionate area of land allotted to the khan khel family in the Kishranzai distribution of land shares seemed to contradict any past or current egalitarian ideal that a leading khan ‘...has, by right, no larger share in the inheritance than any other individual’. Still, the inexact knowledge possessed of the demography of the khan khel, and the extent to which Pakhtun khan khels, historically, were given shares equal to other clan khels, precludes any hasty assumption that the 1864 narrative of Kishranzai distribution was an elite version created especially to be given to a British colonial observer to consolidate mid-nineteenth century claims.

The distribution, and wesh-related redistribution, of subsidiary lineage shares within a wand was accomplished fortuitously. A white-bearded elder (spin giray) randomly tossed on to sections tokens representing the concerned clans. If population increases saw numerous sons sub-dividing family lands beyond the point of subsistence, the village jirga had the option to share out, among all the original shareholders, an arable portion of the common grazing lands. In general, the common use of grazing lands around a village remained intact if the majority had adequate harvests for subsistence.
The differential sizes of individual plots, determined within each clan’s shares by the number of lineages and, over time, by the number of eligible sons, meant an ongoing process of division continued in which some sons, unable to survive on ever-decreasing holdings, might lease their land to a relative or leave the land for foreign, often military, employment. Other sons, especially those of non-Pakhtun tenants or labourers, might join with yet others in establishing a satellite community (banda) on unused land within the clan tappa. The banda land, with proportionate shares being held by the tappa’s Pakhtun khels, was farmed by the Pakhtun shareholders or, more typically, by non-Pakhtun tenants paying a quarter to a third of crop yields as rent. Bandas often grew near the borders of Peshawar valley tappas, serving as a buffer against territorial encroachments or armed raiders.

The farming methodology of the eighteenth-century Peshawar valley was determined by local soil conditions. Specific farming techniques and crop selection and yields reflected the sources of water available for fields. Irrigated fields were usually manured and double cropped. Barani, or rain-fed, lands were often of lighter, sandy soils able to be broken up with a basic plough. One slightly later observer recorded of the Peshawar valley that ‘The inhabitants are excellent farmers but use the same kind of plough as in Hindoostan’. Bullocks tied to a six-piece wooden yoke pulled the apparently simple wooden plough (yiwa). The plough itself included ten major components: three for the shaft, two for the handle, and five for the plough blade structure. Appropriate shovels, rakes, winnowing forks, axes, scythes, levelling drags, and baskets served as functional tools for crop tending, ditch cleaning, and field preparation. The levels of woodworking skills, mechanical knowledge, and continuing maintenance required to keep farm implements in good repair might be judged by the bullock-operated Persian wheels that used various combinations of over forty different wood, rope, and pottery components to raise water to fields from wells or streams.
Superior Mandanr khans who never touched a plough had a very different experience of agrarian life from Utman Khel Pakhtuns on fringe, dry land fields or Mandanr tappa tenants and labourers who actually tilled the soil and gathered the wheat, barley, corn, and other crops. Corn or maize may have been introduced as a food crop in the Peshawar valley during the 1600-1650 period in which the American crop quickly spread within the Mughal empire. The experience of an agricultural existence, often one of meagre resources and limited expectations, survived in Afghan oral tradition. Anonymous short, two-line verses, called landey or tappa, preserved folk sentiments and sensibilities that were passed down generation by generation. Thousands of landey served as a cultural archive of past and present experience:

I don’t need a kingdom’s throne
My beloved will reap, I will gather corn.

Poverty is not a disgrace, beloved
At cock’s crow I will grind grain for you.

Sky, make a good rainfall
So that the lalni of my friend becomes green.

Claimed by many as a women’s genre, Grima argues that ‘landeys are generally created by men to represent an idealized woman’s voice, and then called anonymous’. The related observation that landeys were better known and more publicly recited by men offered an insight into the moral guidance and emotional release contained in many landeys. Imposed norms of proper female behaviour and male fantasies of female passion might have accounted for many landeys, even as the verse form surely expressed female consciousness, defiance, and desire:

Every plant along the stream is a cure
The hems of young maidens have touched them.
Come in the morning of Akhtar
I will come to you with blackened eyes and reddened hands.\(^\text{31}\)

For God’s sake, *mulla*, call the *azan*
My lover has worn hollows in the tip of my chin.\(^\text{32}\)

Isn’t there a single daring man in this village?
My flame coloured pants are burning my thighs.\(^\text{33}\)

The mountain songs (*rohi sandarai*) were undatable, yet their preoccupations and imagery were cogent expressions of complex folk mentalities. For a historian they were oral sources that helped to ‘tell us which questions to pursue. They set forth basic hypotheses that must be addressed first’.\(^\text{34}\) The *landey* and popular verse revealed hidden emotion, social complexity, and gender-based values, while being suggestive of the intensity of ideologies and ideals concerned with homeland, honour, and God:

Pakhtuns uncover heads before God
That he supports he who is honourable and brave.\(^\text{35}\)

I prefer the bitter fruit of my country
To the flowers of another land.\(^\text{36}\)

...Father has gone to war
A well sharpened sword by his side
He will give his head for honour
To the country comes the *Farang*

You are the grandson of Khalid
And the son of Ghori
So have a brave heart.\(^\text{37}\)

Afghan oral popular culture complemented over a century of more formal, and more exclusive, Peshawar valley literary production. One nineteenth-century listing recorded dozens of
works written in Pakhtu and in Persian on theology, religious practice, the Pakhtu language, and Afghan history. Poetic diwans and Pakhtu translations of classic Persian and Hindu texts and stories circulated among the Peshawar town elite and the families of the most cosmopolitan local khans. Of the two dozen Peshawar valley literary figures identifiable in the period before 1750, most were members of the Pakhtun clans, Mohmand, Khalil, and Khattak, in closest contact with the cultured Mughal elite found in Kabul, Peshawar, and Lahore.

The affluent elite of the Pakhtun clans, including a few wives and daughters, as well as some religious figures certainly had the education and leisure necessary to create an extensive local literature, one heavily influenced by Arabic and Persian stylistic and thematic conventions. In addition to writing a large poetic diwan, Khushal Khan translated texts from Arabic and wrote on the care of hawks, on medicine, and on numerous other subjects. At least five sons of Khushal Khan wrote diwans and translated works such as the Gulistan, Bustan, and Tutinama along with such folk tales as ‘Khusrau and Shirin’ and ‘Yusuf and Zulikha’. The long history written by Afzal Khan was but a small portion of his family’s literary production. The poet Kazim Khan, great-grandson of Khushal Khan, continued to produce verse as late as 1740.

In addition, a structured if limited educational regime for boys and girls extended into many villages. Local mullas acted as teachers of the alphabet and of a sequence of rote readings that included the Koran, in often poorly comprehended Arabic, and vernacular religious commentaries and lessons. Akhund Darweza was only one of the many clerical scholars who made the Peshawar valley an important Islamic centre. In 1713/1125 AH Akhund Kasim, a Khalil, and the leading religious figure in the Peshawar-Hashtnagar region, wrote his commentary on Islamic law, Fawayad-ush-shariiat. One later observer remarked that the region ‘in those days, rivalled Bokhara itself, in learning’. One indication of the relative place of Yusufzai scholarship in this context was that the list of seventy-nine authors of over one hundred works found in the mentioned
bibliography of Pakhtu and Persian texts included, apart from Shaikh Mali and Khan Kaju, only three Yusufzai authors.

**Imperial Political Economy**

The period after 1700 saw a relative eclipse of Khattak cohesiveness and political weight and the corresponding rise of Mandanr, specifically Kamalzai, fortunes. When the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb died in the spring of 1707, one of his three sons, Muazzam Shah-i Alam, was serving as Kabul governor. Before marching east to fight his brothers for the throne, the future emperor Bahadur Shah attempted to persuade Afzal Khan to accompany him with offers that included the rank (mansab) of 4000 horse. Also mistrustful of the sincerity of the Mughal's promises, Afzal Khan's refusal to leave his district seemed more directly related to his fears of factional Khattak rivals. In the *Tarikh-i Murassa* he wrote, ‘...and in case I went away, there were certain parties among my tribe only too ready to carry out their own designs, and the tribe would be ruined, the territory become desolated, and I should in consequence, acquire an evil name’. Nazoh Khan, the Mandanr and Kamalzai Khan of Hoti (between 1707-1747), did not miss an opportunity. A farman from the new emperor, Bahadur Shah, dated 20 April 1707/ 28 Muharam-ul-Haram 1119 AH, thanked Nazoh Khan for providing an escort of five thousand footmen and cavalry for his march to near Lahore, where he formally proclaimed himself emperor.

In the following generation, Mughal political in-fighting and regional challenges weakened imperial authority and interrupted revenue flows to the centre. The revenue system had long been based on the effective administration of the formal zabt system in which mansab and jagir revenue awards from surveyed and registered lands went to a closely supervised cadre of loyal Mughal retainers. If in this period, especially in the northern Mughal provinces, ‘Rising production and monetization of the rural economy put more resources at the disposal of both
zamindars and peasants’, political instability at the centre also allowed the increased assertion of politico-economic interests by local Pakhtun elite and clan groups willing to risk conflict to gain a greater degree of political autonomy. In the Peshawar valley, subsidized khans maintained imperial ties, yet at the same time consolidated their positions as semi-autonomous heads of clans of marginal interest to Mughal authorities increasingly preoccupied with a series of regional Sikh, Rajput, Maratha, and other revolts.

The ascending official revenue assignments recorded in the Hoti family history may indicate ‘rising productivity and monetization’, or the partial effect of those factors in combination with possible increases in territory under the Yusufzai Malguzari or increases in internal village, especially banda, settlements. According to the Hoti history, the first Khan of Hoti, Mahdud Khan (Khan from 1440-1509) was appointed by Malik Ahmed Khan himself. His grandson, Muhammad Khan (1550-1590), was given the Yusufzai Malguzari by Akbar as a perpetual jagir, an award ‘estimated from Rs 1000-6000’. Khadi Khan’s (1590-1636) revenue was about Rs 10000 per year. Shahbaz Khan (1639-1685), who sent followers north of the Hindu Kush to help conquer Balkh, saw his annual revenue increase from Rs 12000 to Rs 50000, an amount that remained stable into the time of Nazoh Khan.

Since the early sixteenth century regime of Sher Shah Suri, north India had experienced a varied implementation of sophisticated revenue techniques that could involve payments in cash rather than produce rent, based on market-valued crop assessments calculated from surveys of productive land and actual crop yields. In the Yusufzai Malguzari, limited written comments about the perpetual jagir award preclude any detailed knowledge of the district’s revenue regime. But undoubtedly, during the early eighteenth century, predecessors of the Hindu and Sikh grain dealers and merchants mentioned in later records collected an unknown percentage of crop production in the villages of the Peshawar plain and the Mandanr tappas for the market in Peshawar.
A later revenue official related an anecdote that by the mid-sixteenth century, 'The Khuleels, Momunds and Daodzais being now seated in the plain and exposed to attack, became the frequent victims of the local governors; a treatment which finally effected a change in their character and habits,...' Again he noted, during Akbar's attempt to subordinate the Afghans, that 'The local records of this period are full of the burnings, expulsions, and massacres by the Moguls amongst the tribes occupying the plain, whom they compelled to pay tribute'. Based on the combined evidence of Nadir Shah's later demand that tribute in *tappas* near Peshawar be paid through local *arbabs*, the fact that 'Yusufzai, the Khattaks, and the hill tribes remained independent and paid no tribute', and similar early nineteenth century imperial revenue demands calling for a flat cash rate per Mandanr *tappa* to be delivered through leading *khans*, it appears that much or most of the Peshawar valley, including the north-east Yusufzai plain, may never have been subject to any systematic cropland or harvest measurements and may not have delivered any direct payments to Mughal officials. No local revenue statistics were included in such conventional sources as the writings of Akbar's historian Abu-l Fazl.

In the late Mughal period the function of the perpetual Yusufzai Malguzari *jagir* may have been simply that of a typical *jagir*, to keep the 'revenue', claimed in produce or cash, in the hands of the Khan of Hoti as a service award for the expenses of maintaining armed retainers and for redistribution to allied *maliks* within the Mandanr and plains *tappas*. The degree of influence of the Khan of Hoti, who was a Kamalzai *khan*, on *khans* and *maliks* in other Yusufzai plain *tappas*, including the Mandanr *tappas*, must have varied with physical distance, personal relationship, and lineage affinity. Utman Khel villagers in distant Barmoul would have had different ties with the Khan of Hoti from those of Mandanr villagers living directly adjacent to the Kamalzai *tappa*. The vast majority of the 'revenue' may simply have been redistributed to allied *maliks*, some of whom undoubtedly traded degrees of subordination for levels of support.
In any case, the record of escalating awards to the Hoti *khan* indicated a certain continuity of agricultural productivity under a stable, locally legitimate polity, neither pastorally egalitarian nor imperially stratified on the Mughal model, that had evolved from generations of imperial and ‘tribal’ interaction. It may be argued that this interaction produced a historically particular ‘tribal society’ that would later be noted in the Yusufzai plains by other imperial observers.

The record of conflict and interaction between the empire and local clans gave several indications as to how the process transformed and reconstituted local clan dynamics and changed perceptions of Pakhtun society. Mughal patronage undoubtedly protected the Khattak settlers who occupied portions of the Lunkhwar *tappa* at the foot of the Malakand Pass into Swat. This settlement may have been related to the Mughal need to secure the early imperial road, Babur’s first route, to Kabul, running from the Peshawar valley into lower Swat and through the Bajaur valley.

James’ relation of an old narrative as to why at some point the greater Yusufzai clan divided, politically and territorially, into the Yusufzai lineages of Swat and Buner and the Mandanr *khels* of the Peshawar valley (still called the Yusufzai plains) also hinted at imperial machinations. Historically, two related lineages lived side by side, ‘The two divisions remained for some time together, but quarrels ensued, which were enhanced by the confusion caused by the oustings and intrigues of the Moguls.’\(^{50}\) Finally the Yusufzai in the northern valleys expelled the Mandanr clans and the Mandanr retaliated by expelling Yusufzai families from the Peshawar valley. Only a few Baizai Yusufzai remained in the Lunkhwar valley under the Swat passes.

Was this separation\(^{51}\) simply a natural process that occurred over generations as the dominant Yusufzai in the north and the Mandanr in the Peshawar valley slowly absorbed and realigned minority identities? Did the division come about because the Mandanr and Yusufzai were tired of making long distance *wesh* exchanges between hill valleys and the plains? Or did the
Mughals, attempting to consolidate the authority of an allied Mandanr jagirdar, engage in familiar divide-and-rule tactics, including, perhaps, the ‘oustings’ from the Peshawar valley of antagonistic, especially Yusufzai, maliks and villagers? That the relocation of clans figured prominently in regional imperial strategic considerations was observable in the Mughal reaction to the disruptions caused by a Daudzai malik. It ‘was on this occasion that Akbar endeavoured to make the Eusufzai change seats with the Khuleels, Momunds and Daodzai, but the attempt was not successful’.

Similar considerations informed one later explanation for the presence of the Khattak and Utman Khel villagers along the northern Peshawar valley foothills, that ‘the last two tribes were called in by the Baizais to strengthen themselves...’ in the Lunkhwar valley against Mandanr clans.

Ferguson and Whitehead refer to the unencapsulated ‘area continuously affected by the proximity of a state, but not under state administration’, as the ‘tribal zone’. Similar in conceptualization to Pratt’s socio-cultural ‘contact zone’ of overlapping imperial and indigenous interests, Ferguson and Whitehead argue that within this region, ‘the wider consequence of the presence of the state is the radical transformation of extant socio-political formations, often resulting in “tribalization”, the genesis of new tribes’.

Not arguing for any definition of tribe, imperial contact within the Peshawar valley throughout the Mughal period did contribute to new political and territorial alignments among regional Pakhtun clans as well as new levels of social differentiation and hierarchy within clans. Imperial dynamics may well have had some bearing on the new formation of separate Yusufzai and Mandanr economic and political interests that would be later seen as evidence of two separate ‘tribes’.
NOTES

1. The idea of social formation, rather than 'society', emphasizes the lack of 'inherent unity of economy, polity or culture within a historical ensemble, when in fact this unity and identity does not exist', an argument of Perry Anderson elaborated upon by Mustapha Kamal Pasha, *Colonial Political Economy* (Oxford University Press, Karachi), p. 22 n. 16, see Chapter 3. Quotes from Prakash, footnote 2.


4. The quotations are Raverty's, from his sections of *Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan* derived from Afzal Khan's writings. See Raverty, 1982, pp. 415-21.


11. In his field work c. 1960 Dichter noted the survival of local land redistributions in 'the more remote parts' of the Hazara district just east of the Peshawar valley and in Jullandar village in the Kurram Agency south-west of Peshawar. See David Dichter, *The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan, A Study in Regional Geography* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967), pp. 81, 141.


15. Enevoldsen, *Nightingale*, p. 26. For the following verse from Rahman Baba's *diwan*, translated by Enevoldsen and titled 'Thirst,' see *Nightingale*, pp. 143-47.
25. The *landey* form, like *haiku*, required a set number of syllables per line, nine in the first line, thirteen in the second. ‘*Landey*’s follow a stress meter, with three degrees of stress strength used in a consistent pattern in almost all *landeys*,’ see Grima, 1993, p. 148.
26. Rohi Sandarai, compiled by Salma Shaheen (Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, 1984), vol. 1, p. 81. English translations of Pashto *landeys*, after discussions with locals, are my final responsibility.
27. Rohi Sandarai, p. 624.
28. Rohi Sandarai, p. 68.
30. Rohi Sandarai, p. 343.
32. Rohi Sandarai, p. 604.
35. Rohi Sandarai, p. 113.
36. Rohi Sandarai, p. 358.
42. Translated by Raverty, Notes, 1982, p. 416.
43. History of the Hiti Family, p. 15. See pp. 19-20 for translations and reproductions of the different Mughal farmans.
44. Richards, The Mughal Empire, 1993, pp. 79-86, 290-07.
48. James, Settlement, 1865, p. 33.
50. James, Settlement, 1865, p. 34.
52. James, 1865, p. 33.
The eighteenth-century transition from a Mughal to an Afghan imperial presence in the Peshawar valley displayed the empire-wide processes of commercial activity, delicate negotiation, and implicit violence that incrementally weaned old political loyalties and economic interests away from the Mughal centre. The history of one elite family written in the classical form of a *tazkirat* (biographical dictionary) detailed the successful political transition of one increasingly influential Pakhtun lineage. Other personal journals from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century mapped the mosaic of Peshawar valley clan settlements and the complex, subtle role of status and hierarchy in Pakhtun social formations. Local Pakhtun society, according to Talal Asad, appeared heavily marked by broad 'horizontal' cleavages between groups or classes possessing asymmetrical levels of power and resources. This persisted despite continuing factional competition between groups or blocks led by the Pakhtun elite.

The political events surrounding the early eighteenth century dissolution of the Mughal and Safavid empires and the subsequent rise of the empires of Nadir Shah and the following Afghan Durrani dynasty provided the drama and the characters for numerous narratives of the regional history of this period, an important context forced even upon those concerned with sparsely documented events in the Peshawar valley. But at least two narratives offered insight into local events and the subjective nature of historical perspective.
One narrative, the *History of the Hoti Family*,² condensed the eighteenth century history of the Yusufzai plains into the lives of the era’s three important Khans of Hoti. The family genealogy recorded Nazar Bahadur Shah, known as Nazoh Khan (Khan 1707-1747), as nineteenth in descent from Kais, and one hundred and nineteenth in line from Adam. Following him were Fateh Khan (Khan 1748-1780), and Lashkar Khan (Khan 1790-1820), who succeeded to the position after the death of two older brothers. The lineage represented the Kishranzai branch of the Mandanr Kamalzai.³ As empires fell and rose, the Hoti Khans manoeuvred for personal and clan pre-eminence.

Explanations for the longevity of the Mughal empire have noted the constant flow into northern India of Persian and Central Asian warriors, administrators, and artisans. Welcomed as allies from a common religious and, often, socio-political background, these immigrants effectively served the Mughal cause in regional struggles to displace and subordinate older Afghan and indigenous rulers. But this common Islamic cultural terrain, often ruled with similar courtly idioms and ideologies, meant that migration could as easily be out of, as into, the region. Around 1691, after an argument with an uncle, the eighteen-year-old Nazoh Khan left the Peshawar valley for Kabul, Persia, and then Baghdad. He joined the Ottoman army and served for sixteen years, including ‘under the command of Mustafa Afzal in his campaigns in Europe’.⁴ Returning to Hoti in 1707, Nazoh Khan succeeded almost immediately to the khanship, after which he provided an escort to Bahadur Shah during his return to the Punjab. Nazoh Khan’s long rule became a local metaphor for the subcontinental reality that long-established imperial agents in the provinces suffered little, and might often benefit, when central disarray weakened imperial ties.⁵

*Kabul subah* events now offered perspective on the problems besetting the Mughal system. Financially, at the moment of Bahadur Shah’s success, imperial revenue flows and accumulated resources remained at a high level. The Agra treasury alone held coined and unminted precious metals worth
perhaps Rs 240 million.\textsuperscript{6} Mid-seventeenth century revenue from the Kabul \textit{subah}, according to one eighteenth-century source equal to fifteen crore \textit{dams}, climbed to over sixteen crore \textit{dams} during Aurangzeb’s reign.\textsuperscript{7} Yet within twenty-five years, shifting trade patterns and political competition and factionalism fragmented the loyalties of regional Mughal agents.

Gommans has traced how the Mughal centre was challenged by regional claimants on agrarian revenues, including Marathas, Sikhs, and the East India Company, and by a ‘commercial circumvention of the Mughal heartland of Lahore, Delhi and Agra’ as Afghan and Central Asian trade networks found alternate routes to the rich Rohilla kingdoms north-east of Delhi and realigned north Indian financial and political interests and loyalties.\textsuperscript{8}

By the mid-1730s Mughal allowances to Afghan clans, able to disrupt the passes between Kabul and Peshawar, had stopped.\textsuperscript{9} By the summer of 1738, when Nasir Khan, Mughal \textit{subahdar} of Kabul, wrote to Delhi for resources to prepare defences against the approach of Nadir Shah, he particularly complained that his personal income was now five years in arrears.\textsuperscript{10} Though a private letter written from Delhi in January 1739 declared that ‘About forty Lacks by Bills at different times were remitted to Navob Nacir Khan, Soubahdar of Peishor, that he, joining with the Afghans of that Quarter, might make Head against Nadir Shah,...’,\textsuperscript{11} the belated effort, and the absence of a relieving army from Delhi gave Nadir Shah an advantage.

Mughal failures to ensure the loyalties of key players in the Kabul \textit{subah} derived less from imperial material bankruptcy than from a mutually reinforcing cycle of increasingly irreconcilable assertions of regional and central self-interest and imperial factionalism, inertia, and diplomatic negligence. One near contemporary report mentioned that on capturing Kabul in June 1738, ‘Nadir Shah found Treasure, Jewels, Arms, etc. to a great Value, which since the Great Moghol Babr’s Time, had been shut up in vaults’.\textsuperscript{12} Nadir Shah’s ability to coerce and then co-opt trans-Indus Afghans and Mughal-appointed authorities quickly overcame early resistance by the Afghans of
the mountain passes, and by the Mughal subahdar, supported by many Yusufzai levies. He swept into Peshawar in December 1738.

After victories in India, Nadir Shah forced a treaty that annexed the Kabul province and the Peshawar valley to his empire. A continuity of imperial and local vested interests ensured the quick stabilization of the Peshawar region. The former Mughal subahdar, Nasir Khan, became the new governor for the Persian empire. As mentioned, the Afghans of the Khalil, Mohmand, Daudzai, Gigiani, and Muhammadzai tappas near Peshawar generally ‘submitted to the local governors, and were forced to pay tribute through their chiefs’. Whether or not this simply continued established local Mughal revenue practice, the payment of peshkash tribute through arbabs revealed the inability or unwillingness of Nadir Shah’s Peshawar administrators to directly subordinate individual Afghan maliks and cultivators.

Before leaving Peshawar on his drive to conquer India Nadir Shah attempted to establish dominion across the rest of the Peshawar valley. While Lockhart briefly stated that he ‘dispatched a strong force to ravage the country between Peshawar and the Indus...’, the Hoti family history documented a high-risk strategy often pursued by Pakhtuns of the Yusufzai plain when confronted with attack by passing imperial armies. Nazoh Khan withdrew with his followers to hill passes where he defeated the first Persian force sent against him. Though Nazoh Khan lost a second battle at ‘Chinglai and Shahkote’, the potential for continued instability on a vital route led the Persian leader to open negotiations. Nazoh Khan offered his loyalty and presented his son as a hostage. In return he was appointed ‘Muajibdar for the Yusafzai Illaqa, yielding a revenue of Rs 70000 a year’. Soon, with or following behind Nadir Shah’s army, large numbers of Pakhtuns, ‘most of them Yusufzais and other Afghans from the Peshawar valley’, migrated to the east, especially to the Rohilla states.

The almost pro forma resistance, then accommodation displayed by the Mughal governor and the Peshawar valley
arbabs and khans illustrated an elite political etiquette in which contending imperial powers revealed just enough of their potential for dominance or weakness to trigger the defections and new alliances that preserved the interests of the ruling elite without destroying the established hierarchies and relationships that controlled agrarian productivity and revenue flows. This method of producing new coalitions had been pursued in the many Mughal era succession struggles, only to be discarded after the death of Aurangzeb when vindictive, murderous political competition fractured a basic Mughal elite ruling interest.

The Hoti family history integrated these imperial events with regional history to produce a lineage hagiography. Long generations of Yusufzai competition with Khattak clans became a victorious narrative, in which ‘...there were constant inter-tribal skirmishes between the two clans generally resulting in the defeat and rout of the latter at the hands of the former’. Another family hagiography, the Tarikh-i Murassa, written in 1640/1050 AH, described the skirmish in which Khushal Khan’s father received his mortal wounds as a Khattak raid on Mandanr cattle to collect overdue tribute from the Akakhel Kamalzai. In contrast, the Hoti narrative, perhaps conflating an unrelated sequence of events, said, ‘In a battle...the leader of the Khattaks Shahbaz Khan...was slain and their capital Akora sacked and ruined by the victorious Yusafzais’. Such irreconcilable historical interpretation was interspersed with simple statements of ‘fact’ about the life of Nazoh Khan, including that, ‘During his time the second sack of Akora, the capital of the Khattaks, took place in the year 1158 AH corresponding to 1745 AD’.

Given in hostage to Nadir Shah for his father’s good behaviour, in 1739 Fateh Khan accompanied Nadir Shah back to Persia as a commander of Afghan troops. Upon the killing of Nadir Shah in 1747, ‘Fateh Khan made the Afghan Troops consent to the submission of Ahmed Shah Abdali’. He followed the Abdali clan Afghan ruler to Kandahar, and then returned to the Peshawar valley to assume the Hoti khanship in 1748.
The long subordination of much of the Peshawar valley to Mughal governors had been punctuated by periodic resistance from clan leaders and religious figures able to rally both the alienated and the ideologically driven. The Durrani empire’s late eighteenth century domination of the old Kabul subah was a different, yet familiar experience for Peshawar valley residents. Local ruling administrators and garrison commanders now looked to Kandahar or Kabul to a leadership quite cognizant of lineage politics and Afghan culture. But familiarity did not always exactly connote sympathy. At the death of Ahmed Shah, his son, Timur Shah, a Persianized courtier with many years in Herat, moved his capital from Kandahar to Kabul to escape local lineage political pressures and attempt to build a ruling elite more loyal to him than to clan identities.

The fortunes of the elite Mandanr Khans of Hoti peaked in this era, especially during the career of Fateh Khan. In 1761, Fateh Khan, leading five hundred horsemen, joined Ahmed Shah Durrani’s invasion of northern India. At the third major historical battle at Panipat, it was claimed that Fateh Khan killed ‘...the Marhatta General Sivadas Rao Bhao (commonly called ‘the Bhao’) with his own hand’.24 A fourth imperial farman, issued in 1763/1176 AH, rewarded the family with a new perpetual jagir of ten villages in Hashtnagar worth Rs 12000 annually. This supplemented the revenue of the Malguzari of Yusufzai, which ‘in those days is said to have amounted up to Rs 96000 annually’. Clearly the Peshawar valley coming under Afghan rule did not signify any return to a distant pastoral ideal of non-hierarchical, egalitarian Pakhtun social relations. Instead the Afghan polity attempted to link a nascent central authority to the established legitimacy of dominant regional lineage chiefs.

Before his death in 1780, and decades after Afzal Khan’s Khattak history ended with events in 1725, Fateh Khan apparently left a manuscript as a legacy intended to influence the historical annals of his family and the Peshawar valley. This text ‘was meant for the advice and future guidance of all the members of Fateh Khan’s family and deals with the history of Yusufzai clan,...’25 This historical ‘memo’ may have been the
source for a family history written in 1832/1248 AH, that in turn may have been the chief document contributing to the History of the Hoti Family referred to in this study, published after December 1944.

The Hoti family historian(s) used the narrative literary form to give specific socio-cultural and political importance to the life experience of each eighteenth-century Khan of Hoti.26 Through the use of the narrative genre, the history used contingent acts of ongoing inter-clan warfare to promote an interpretation of continuous victory and clan superiority.27 In the Mandanr history, specific acts of the khan khel lineage of the Kishranzai branch of the Kamalzai, were visualized as the socio-political focus of regional events and described in a style able to 'charge them with ethical or moral significance'.28 This validation and significance in turn justified an increasingly rigid Pakhtun social hierarchy and a continuing elite family claim to political legitimacy. The detailed Afghan and family genealogy, in part derived from ‘...the Shajra-i-Kalan Ghoria compiled by Imam-Fakkar-ud-Din Razi, Chief Justice of the Ghories in 12th Century,...’,29 was a clan marker fully developed to establish legitimacy. A sedentary lifestyle and even social stratification did not mean a decline in the social utility of lineage awareness. The manipulation and redeployment of lineage genealogies and cultural traits served elite political and other purposes long after lineage standing no longer guaranteed a definitive material or social share in the Peshawar valley.

In the Sikh era, during the British colonial period, and on the verge of partition in 1947, the Hoti narrative of continuity and service supported family claims to social prominence and a share of political power. More pragmatically, it substantiated specific claims to subsidies, local influence, and rights over land and revenues. Shortly, it will be seen how this history supported an effort to identify and fix control over resources threatened after Durrani rule.

The narrative form and its ability to shape and manipulate historical experience also framed texts describing Pakhtun 'tribal' or 'frontier' society. Few authors remained content
simply to recognize regional patterns of the kinds of symbiotic relationships that had existed for centuries across the Islamic and Asian social landscape between settled agriculturists and pastoralists and between the hierarchies of cities and empires and the diffused authority of rural lineages. Centuries earlier, Ibn Khaldun had extolled the virtues of ‘cities and sedentary people’ over the Bedouin who, in his teleology of the progressive nature of civilization, were prior to, and beneath, the urbane and educated. Akhund Darweza had adapted this ethnographic narrative with its ‘dominant story’ of tribal anarchy and inferiority to fit his vision in which Afghans could be redeemed by appropriate rulers and, especially, proper religious observance. These elite narratives were consonant with a style of communication and storytelling in which the narrator, verbally or textually, employed perceptions common to his audience in a fluid process involving mutual evaluation and response, in which all participants ‘contemplate, explore, interpret, and evaluate, seeking pleasure and interactive consensus’.

A second narrative illuminating eighteenth-century Pakhtun society would not completely avoid being influenced by this notion of elite consensus about tribal society, even as it ranged further afield to try and understand Afghan and non-Afghan social differences through comparisons with foreign examples. During the reign of Timur Shah (1772-93), Ghulam Muhammad passed through the Peshawar valley and recorded his observations, including details of the stages of his journey. His journal elaborated on current regional social geography and the residue of two centuries of imperial efforts to protect the Shah’s road (Shahrah) to Kabul. Passing the Attock Fort built by Akbar, he crossed the Indus to Khairabad and described the stone fort erected by Nadir Shah. Khairabad had been a dynamic centre when the Khattaks received maximum imperial patronage, ‘but now, with the exception of a few Hindu grocers’ shops, all is desolate and deserted…’

To Afghans the Kabul river was the ‘Landey Sin’, the little river, or the ‘Nil-ab’, the blue water. At Khairabad the clear water of the Kabul river merged with the muddy water of the
Indus, the ‘Aba Sin’ or father river. From Khairabad the land route continued west to ‘Nara’i’ then Shaidu, then ‘Akorah’. ‘The fort of Akorah, which is not devoid of strength, lies on the opposite bank of the river, north of the town. North of the fort again is a long hill running east and west, rising abruptly from the plain, and under it, on the Akorah side, is the village of Misri or Misri Banda’h.’ Here travellers crossed the Kabul river for the road north to the Doaba, Hashtnagar, Shabkadr, Buner, and Swat. A dozen miles west of Akora was situated the village of Shahbaz Khan. ‘From Atak to this place the rule of the Khataks extends. They are subject and pay obedience to Timur Shah, Sadozi, Badshah of Kabul.’ Further west the road came to the river ford at Nowshera. The ‘Noh-s’hahra’h-i Khalisa’h’ south of the Kabul river was a ‘Tajzik’ village, while the ‘Noh-s’hahra’h-i-Hasht Nagar’ north of the river was a ‘Muhammadzi’ village. A few miles west of Nowshera, still south of the Kabul river, the road passed through ‘Pir-pae’ of the ‘Da’udzi Afghans’, then through Azi Khel, Dagi, Bani ‘Banda’h’, and ‘Pabbian’, where the Do-bandi ferry crossed the Kabul river. After Chamkani, ‘a good sized town called after the small Afghan tribe of that name’, came Peshawar. ‘This is a large city of Afghanistan under the rule of Timur Shah, Sadozi, and here all the precious and useful commodities of various countries are disposed of, and hither come the merchants of Iran, Turan, and Hind, to buy and sell.’

Ghulam Muhammad observed the extensive irrigation canals bringing water from the Kabul river to fields around Peshawar, including a new branch extended by Timur Shah to near Chamkani. The Shah’s canal (Nahr-i Shahi), and one from the Bara river south-west of Peshawar, had an appointed administrator (daroghah) and produced water use fees for the government. ‘Wherever a fall of water can be obtained, the people here cut canals, and convey the water to the lands, and the revenue derived from them goes to the State.’

Ghulam Muhammad observed that traders and travellers bypassed the Yusufzai plains and used routes going north through the Hashtnagar region or west via the road south of the
Kabul river. Ghulam Muhammad, a sayyid, made two or three journeys to the court of Timur Shah, the second in 1786/1201 AH. His minute observations of distances, terrain, and inhabitants created an early ethnographic record of regional society. His journal became integral to a developing system of knowledge of indigenous regions and populations being assembled by other successful conquerors who, like Timur Shah, were attempting to metamorphose the rule of arms into the legitimacy of a state. Ghulam Muhammad’s first mission to Timur Shah involved carrying messages for Warren Hastings, governor of the British colony based in Calcutta. His last mission to Afghanistan was in the service of a later Governor-General, Cornwallis.  

In 1809, the English authorities despatched a higher official to Peshawar. He visited a region disrupted by a ruling family civil war over which heir to the throne would rule. Elphinstone’s mission spent three months in Peshawar but proceeded no further west. He assembled most of the information included in his two-volume account during a two-year process of reaching Peshawar, returning, visiting Afghan colonies in northern India, and reporting. His information came from ‘numerous natives’ who travelled to Bombay with him after his mission and from the ‘accidental circumstances (that) brought a number of Afghauns from the parts of the country with which I was last acquainted to Bombay and Poona...’

The English diplomatic initiative, to negotiate an alliance with the Afghan ruler against threatened French interference in Persia, lost its urgency with changes in the Persian situation and with the quick loss of Peshawar and the dissipation of the political power of Elphinstone’s host, Shah Shuja. But the mission’s political-military intelligence project succeeded. After an early phase of acquiring general information about the region, ‘during the remainder a precise plan was arranged among the party, and a particular branch of the investigation assigned to every gentleman who took a share in it’. East India Company employees and army officers compiled information about ‘geography’ (Lt. Macartney, a surveyor, and Captain Raper), ‘climate, soil, produce, and husbandry’ (Lt. Irvine), ‘trade and
revenue' (Richard Strachey), 'history' (Robert Alexander), and 'government and the manners of the people' (Elphinstone). Elphinstone, encouraged to publish results and using some of the various reports, wrote the two volumes published in 1815.

Elphinstone portrayed the wide socio-political diversity of the numerous regions and populations subsumed within the 'Kingdom of Caubul', from Persian-speaking farming communities to autocratic local Afghan rulers able to suppress lineage politics. One of Macartney's notebooks conveyed a sense of the distinctiveness and separation of the Mandanr plains and the Yusufzai hill valleys: 'The roads thro' this country are excessively difficult and few of them practicable for a horse. Few travellers ever pass thro' it.'42 'It is said no traveller can go thro' their country unless he has a Mollah or Priest with him.' Politically, 'The Yoosufzyes do not acknowledge any particular Chief: every zemindar is master of his own village and acknowledges no superior. There are sometimes three or four in a village all equal. They do not pay tribute to the king or furnish troops. They have no regular army or commanders, but turn out in the general course and fight as they like...'43

Elphinstone's chapters combined first-and second-hand knowledge with shrewd observations and conventional wisdom about less understood regions and Afghan clans. The conceptions of educated Englishmen coloured interpretations of the Afghans. Khushal Khan was 'a far superior poet to Rehmaun'44 for if frequently rude and 'often intolerably flat and prosaic', his verses often 'inspired with the unconquerable spirit of their author; and glow with the noblest sentiment of liberty and independence'.

The Afghan historical experience was compared to that found in Europe, in the British Isles, and, especially, in Scotland. Some 'Eusofzyes', including those in the Panjkora hill valley west of Swat, were 'under a more aristocratic government', but most remained 'democratic', in one of their 'little republics'. 'I have got the names of at least thirty of them'.45 Khushal Khan was compared to William Wallace, '...sometimes succeeding in destroying royal armies, and sometimes wandering almost alone
through the mountains'.

The imagery of Afghans as crude, violent, anarchic tribesmen needing nothing so much as external civilizing influences and, as Scotland, eventual integration into a state-structured polity was reminiscent of Akhund Darweza, of the ‘wild Pathans’ of a later anthropologist, and of a more subtle assimilationist narrative traceable in other regional anthropological literature.

The British imperial archive also received tentative statistics from the Elphinstone reports. Akhund Darweza had credited Shaikh Mali with carrying out a census of the Yusufzai, before making his land divisions. The Akozai, Isazai, Malizai, and Iliaszai clans had been estimated to each total three thousand men, women, and children, while the Mandanr clans together equalled another twelve thousand people. These twenty-four thousand descendants of Yusuf and Mandanr had divided the mountain valleys and north-eastern Peshawar plains between them. Allied Afghan clans and conquered and dependent populations, perhaps equal in number to, or more than, the Yusufzai clans went uncounted. Now, from sources just as impossible to confirm, Macartney wrote that, ‘In the reign of Timour Shah it is said the country contained sixty thousand houses, three lacks of souls’. In his considered opinion, Elphinstone downplayed the ‘nine hundred thousand spears’ once said to be under the authority of Khan Kajutsl to ‘conjecture that their numbers, including all their Fakeers and dependants, did not exceed 700000 souls’.

Elphinstone described, in familiar analogies, the social hierarchies of the region. He saw the condition of the subordinated Swatis remaining in the northern valley as being ‘reduced to the condition of villains, or as the Eusofzyes call them Fakeers.’ If Elphinstone too readily accepted many elite perspectives, a criticism levelled against Barth, also at the expense of not recognizing such forces as ‘the underlying class tension and conflict situation’, he did write an early description of the subaltern classes in Yusufzai society.

‘The Fakeers are much more numerous than the Eusofzyes.’ Most were ‘Swautees’, plus ‘Deggauns’, ‘Hindkees’,
'Cashmeerees' ‘Hindoos’, and stray, non-Yusufzai Afghans. Some ‘Hindkees’ (Muslims of north Indian heritage) had fled famine in the Punjab. Kashmiris and Hindus were led there ‘by the desire for gain’, while some migrant Afghans had come ‘in circumstances which have degraded them to the rank of Fakeers’. Most fakirs (faqirs) worked the land or herded animals on hillsides.

‘The Fakeers have no land, they are not considered as members of the commonwealth, nor allowed to be present at Jeergas’. A fakir was ‘subject’ to his ‘Khawund or master’, to whom he paid a ‘tax’, and provided free labour, ‘like the villains in Europe’. The fakir could be beaten or killed, but would usually be protected as an asset. The fakir could follow a trade, work for profit, or ‘rent land as a Buzgur or Metayer’ (tenant). He would owe the ‘established tax’, customary fees, and some labour. Elphinstone noted the ability of an oppressed dependant to flee to another Yusufzai shareholder, ‘a right which he can always exercise’, due to ‘a great competition for Fakeers’.

‘The masters have not the power of extorting money from their Fakeers.’ Dependants paid to shareholders fees and fines for settlement on the land, marriages, and for compensation for personal injuries, but only to the extent of customary rates. More ‘would be reckoned gross oppression’. Fakirs included the village masons, weavers, dyers, and artisans. Blacksmiths, carpenters, barbers, and drummers had a dependant, but different status. Affiliated with specific neighbourhoods, ‘Cundies’, they received some land in return for services and ‘work gratis for the Cundy, which they follow when it changes its residence’. Unknown Afghans had to accept the status of fakirs, while migrant Yusufzais were ‘received as equals’, though not ‘consulted on public affairs’. For military services some ‘Deggauns’ received lands to work ‘under chiefs of their own’. The status of fakirs and the existence or rates of ‘tax’ or fees varied from Yusufzai clan to clan.

Elphinstone saw a living society undergoing the processes of transition and change. Migration, commerce, and contingent events characterized the life histories of the dependant
population. Dependant Swatis, in the northern valley still toiled for others. Kashmiri and Hindu shopkeepers and moneylenders pursued trade. Ecological events, including famine, caused short-term social effects. The relative mobility of the fakir population was apparently less of a threat to Yusufzai shareholders than the group movement of Pakhtun clans or others perceived as imperial agents. The ability of fakirs to negotiate their status, to exercise at least half of the dependant agriculturist’s classic ‘fight or flight’ strategy, reflected something of the process of continuous interaction that may have reproduced, but, at this time, still limited degrees of elite domination.

Elphinstone compared the situation to a ‘commonwealth’, where a Yusufzai shareholder, a ‘master’, had a ‘subject’, the fakir who paid a ‘tax’, gave a percentage of the crop, and provided forced labour (begar), somewhat like a subordinated European farmer, called a ‘villain’. The terms of agricultural practice were only hinted at in the reference to rented land. A fakir tenant might simply rent land on his own responsibility or might receive seed, etc. in exchange for an agreed share of the crop.

Any sense of a finely stratified, caste-like social order seemed inappropriate. Elite Yusufzai shareholders clearly dominated, but the subordinated population seemed to be more simply categorized as either general village servants or affiliated artisans and service providers, perhaps more skilled and valuable, in service to specific village lineages. The sense derived from Elphinstone of the Yusufzai regional social order, is consistent with a later critique of Barth’s analysis of the relative importance of elite competition organized through blocs centred on the social environment of the hujra. The critique, by Talal Asad, as also discussed by Ahmed, was in reference to a twentieth-century analysis of a rapidly changing post-1947 economic and political environment. But Asad’s argument illuminates a historical inability fully to recover subaltern histories. ‘I have been arguing, against Barth, that horizontal cleavages into asymmetric classes are more important than vertical ones into homologous blocs’. If Barth’s ‘Khan’s eye-view of the world’ has survived in Yusufzai perspectives, often the only surviving
view, any elitist discourse must be recognized for what it is, especially when encountered in later colonial and scholarly documents.

By the second half of the eighteenth century, around Peshawar, Pakhtun shareholders were increasingly subordinated to Pakhtun *arbabs* and *khans* who had developed as an elite class tied to imperial destinies. In the Yusufzai country the development of *khans* able to impose dependence on other Pakhtuns remained limited to specific locations such as the Panjkora valley and certain *tappas* in the plains under chiefs such as the Khan of Hoti. But Yusufzai *fakirs*, though still able to gain advantage from surplus land and labour shortages, already suffered to the full the tensions and frustrations generated by political and economic domination. Such social tension would find relief, including in socio-religious reaction to new imperial activity.

NOTES

1. Caroe, in *The Pathans*, moved from Khushal Khan, at the end of his Chapter XV, to 1793 in the fifteen pages of his Chapter XVI, titled 'Ahmad Shah'.

2. The *History of the Hoti Family*, no date (c. 1944), no place of publication. Published, apparently by the family, during the life of Muhammad Akbar Khan, Khan of Hoti from 1914.

3. See the Kamalzai genealogical table in Henry Priestley's translation of the *Hayat-i Afghan* by Muhammad Hayat Khan, c.1865, published as *Afghanistan and its Inhabitants*, 1874 (Sang-e-Meel, Lahore, 1981), p. 94. The close correspondence between sections of the translation of the extensively, if imperfectly, researched *Hayat-i Afghan* and Bellew's shorter *A General Report on the Yusufzai*, 1864 indicated that wholesale, uncredited transposition was not just a flaw of earlier, pre-British era writers.


5. See a similar process in the Ottoman context in Dina Khoury's work on the Mosul province.


7. James Fraser, *The History of Nadir Shah* (A. Millar, London, 1742) pp. 27 and 34. One *crore* was equal to ten million, forty *dams* one rupee.
11. Fraser, *History*, p. 145. From ‘A Translation of a Letter wrote by Sirbullind Khan’s Secretary at Dehli, to Mirza Moghol, Son to Ali Mahommed Khan, at Ahmedabad...’
30. See Brian Spooner, *The Cultural Ecology of Pastoral Nomads* (Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1973) for a sense of such symbiotic co-existence.
34. Raverty, *Notes*, 1982, vol. 1, p. 33. Raverty’s sources were often vaguely and only occasionally referred to, but the writings of Ghulam Muhammad apparently were gathered in a text named *Sair-ul-Bilad*. See reference, Raverty, *Notes*, vol. 1, p. 38. The following transliterations in quotation marks are examples of Raverty’s rigorous grammatical precision, an accuracy that, to his great frustration, could not be ingrained in the maps and writings of his countrymen.
35. Raverty, *Notes*, vol. 1, p. 34.
37. Raverty, *Notes*, vol. 1, p. 35. Ghulam Muhammad measured his stages by the ‘*kuroh*’, the term used between Attock and Kabul for the Hindustani ‘*kos*’. Distances varied regionally, commonly a *kuroh* or *kos* was about two-to-two and one half miles. See Raverty, *Notes*, vol. 1, p. 1 f.n. and Fraser, *History*, 1742, p. 20, f.n., ‘A Coss is the measure they commonly go by in India, in computing distances; they are of two sorts. *Jeribi*, or measured, which are 4000 English yards each; and *Rismi* or computed, which are from 2000 to 2500 yards, according to the different Provinces...’
38. Raverty, *Notes*, vol. 1, p. 35.
49. See Raverty’s longer discussion of Swat, *Notes on Afghanistan*, vol. 1, pp. 194-214, including this census, p. 207.
50. Macartney, *Memoir*, c. 1809, p. 141. One *lakh* was equal to 100000.
51. Noted in *History*, Dorn trans., part 2, p. 44.
52. Elphinstone, *An Account*, vol. 1, p. 27.
In Peshawar the transition from Afghan to Sikh state authority preceded the rise of British colonial interest in the trans-Indus region. Authoritative interpretations shaped a growing accumulation of colonial knowledge about local populations, including interpretations characterizing complex socio-political movements as reflecting fundamental religious identities. Though religious authority claimed the indivisibility of *din wadawla*, religion and state, such authority operated within a broader social context in which all politics, including that of religion, existed 'as the contest over the interpretation of symbols and as the setting of and negotiation over boundaries between spheres of social activity and institutions'.

In the early nineteenth century an era of anti-Sikh activism reflected divergent clan and Islamic interests. This divergence complicated theories of religiously inspired unity against foreign invasion and challenged ideas of ephemeral, emotional social mobilization based on concepts of 'jihad' or 'millenarian' upheaval. Reported observations from an 1840 journey offered a rare, partially alternative thesis to later reductionist histories. Pakhtuns were seen as complex social actors possessing legitimate political authority, fragmented religious voices, and differing perceptions of impending British colonial influence.

The Mandars are a very large and powerful tribe of the Afghan nation, computed to number about one hundred thousand families in all. They are descended from the same common ancestor as the
Yusufzai tribe...The Mandars are not now subject to the authority of a single chief, as in former times, nor are they taxed by the Afghan sovereign, Timur Shah. In time of war a few of the Muhammadan 'ulama or clergy are despatched, by the Badshah's command to rouse their patriotism, and by this means a small force can always be raised among them as a contingent to the Badshah's forces...

The tract of country held by the Mandars is known as the Sama'h...²

Any late eighteenth century political and economic autonomy in the north-eastern Peshawar valley could not deny the historical interaction between the Afghan amirs in Kabul and the residents of the Peshawar valley. Peshawar often served as Timur Shah's winter residence and his sons, by a Yusufzai wife, Zaman and Shuja, became central characters in the succession conflicts that followed Timur Shah's death in 1793.

Valley events reflected the changing fortunes of the Afghan emirate and the nascent Sikh kingdom in the Punjab. Yusufzai recruits joined the winter 1778-9 campaign to capture Multan, after which a caravan with, '...the heads of several thousand Sikhs laden on camels, was sent to Peshawar as trophies, and exhibited there to the terror and astonishment of the people'.³ Local soldiers accompanied Shah Zaman on his increasingly fruitless invasions of the western Punjab in 1793 and 1795. His forces last reached Lahore in 1797 and 1798. By 1801 an Afghan civil war raged. Shuja marched from Peshawar to Kabul with Yusufzai and Afridi supporters against his half-brother Mahmud who had deposed and blinded Shah Zaman.⁴

This Afghan fraternal conflict meant that a useful Sikh leader left by Shah Zaman in control of Lahore in 1799 slowly consolidated his authority across the Punjab. Ranjit Singh captured the Attock fort on the Indus in 1813. He occupied Multan in 1818, entered Peshawar for the first time the same year, and occupied Kashmir in 1819. In Peshawar he left the Afghan governor nominally in charge and withdrew to the Indus where the Sikhs built another fort at Khairabad.

The Afghan-Sikh rivalry for influence in the Peshawar valley resolved itself in March 1823 in a battle north of the Kabul
river at Nowshera. A Sikh army that included Gurkhas from Nepal fought the Afghan *amir*s coalition, composed of a Kabul army, Khattak and Yusufzai clansmen, and at least one Sikh opponent of Ranjit Singh. The Afghan army, located on the south bank of the Kabul river, watched unchallenged as the main Sikh force confronted several thousand regional Pakhtuns. Many hundreds died in a day-long struggle. The next day the stalemated battle ended in defeat as the Afghan *amir*s army retreated to Kabul without fighting. A British colonial writer interpreted it as a clash of religions rather than a defence of homeland and the politics of power:

...The Moosulmans, however, also felt their battle to be a religious one, and met the fanatic Sikhs with corresponding zeal and bigotry;... There were not more of the *Moosulmans* engaged on this occasion, than between four and five thousand men, and these were mere mountaineers and villagers, who turned out for the Ghazee, that is, to fight the religious battle against the infidel Sikhs. Disciplined professional soldiers there were none amongst them, yet they did resist for a whole day the entire army of Runjeet Singh, who had in the field against them not less than 24000 men, and all his best troops. There were upwards of 1000 men (Captain Wade says 2000) killed and wounded on the side of the Sikhs...⁵

Caroe narrated a complex story of empires in transition. For locals, ‘*Jehad* had been preached’ and the ‘*lashkars* of Yusufzai and Khatak tribesmen had now gathered to the number of 20000 under the leadership of a well-known *Sayyid*, Akbar Shah, of the family of Pir Baba in Buner’.⁶ While the Afghan army observed, ‘tribal Ghazis’ fought ‘Sikh Akalis’, the ‘Amritsar fanatics’. Caroe wrote of the ‘utmost gallantry’ of Yusufzai and Khattak, of an ‘exultant tribal advance’, and ‘tribal valour’.⁷ Of interest was the facile use within the history of a kind of religious imagery that would be applied, contemporaneously or in hindsight, to every regional movement of large scale Afghan resistance to Sikh and then British imperial activity through the nineteenth century.
From the 1820s the common Islamic idioms employed by the Afghan elite and by clans opposed to Sikh, then British, imperialists coloured the descriptive and analytic language used by outsiders to discuss regional social mobilization. Colonial views of Islamic 'fanatics', irrational tribesmen thirsting for martyrdom, and of manipulative religious leaders became a justification for conquest, repression, and, often, the indiscriminate destruction of villages and communities. If in Timur Shah's time during offensive operations the ulema had only been able to use religion to recruit 'a small force', and then only as a component of a larger army, might religion have been only one motivating factor within a larger context in later moments of war and crisis? Perhaps it might not have been required of a later religious figure, Akbar Shah, to provide any extraordinary 'leadership', against an invading Sikh army, beyond the general commitment of the community.

Over time outside observers viewed Pakhtun culture and religious expression in absolute, binary opposition to rational, technologically superior imperial states vying for authority in the Peshawar valley. The notion that religious sensibilities were the primary Pakhtun motivation became entrenched in a body of authoritative imagery and analysis. In discussions of indigenous and religious reactions to imperial expansion, this conventional wisdom would be absorbed into colonial and post-colonial history and scholarship and would colour opinions of tribal leadership and 'millenarian' religious movements. This lingering colonial supposition too often obscured the genuine Islamic dimensions of Afghan anti-imperial activism. This perspective diffused any accurate assessment of the web of socio-economic and political relationships that underpinned a complex regional social movement of anti-imperial resistance persisting through the nineteenth century.

The imperial history of this period was recorded in letters and reports sent to British authorities who had news writers and political agents scattered across the Punjab and in territories under the rule of Kabul. One agent reported that on 21 April 1793 as Timur Shah left Peshawar for Kabul his 'horse started,
His Majesty’s crown fell to the ground and he immediately observed that the throne would now fall to the lot of another. Apparently already ill, Timur Shah died within a month.

By the 1820s in Delhi a British ‘resident’ of the expanding East India Company empire received translated summaries of regular Sikh newsletters (akhbar). His informant was a British officer stationed in Ludhiana in the Punjab. In March 1822 the ‘Lahore Akhbar’ reported the arrival of two foreigners dressed in Persian clothes wearing long beards. Their names were recorded as ‘Ulur’ and ‘Wuntoor’. In June 1822 rumour had it that Ranjit Singh hoped to use these two men (French officers named Allard and Ventura) to seize Peshawar and Kabul. And by March 1827 the British agent in Ludhiana wrote of disturbances near Attock caused by a ‘Mahomedan Fanatic’ whose followers had clashed with Sikh forces. News reports of the period revealed the convergence of interests between the anti-Sikh feelings of an outside Islamic reformer and of local Pakhtun clans:

...The Rajah’s attention has lately been particularly drawn to the appearances of a large body of men in the vicinity of the Atok, under a Mahomedan Fanatic, who has for sometime past been exhorting the people in that part of the country to liberate themselves from a foreign yoke and join him in the prosecution of a religious war. The man who is engaged in exciting the commotion made himself notorious about two years ago by attempting to promote similar designs in Hindostan from which I believe he was ordered by Government to desist or leave the country. He availed himself of the last alternative and proceeded to Scind—whence he made his way into Khorassan, visiting Candahar, Cabul and Peshaur and working on the religious prejudices of his sect wherever he went, until he has succeeded in gaining a host of enthusiasts.

It is stated by many that his present adherents amount to nearly 100000 men. I am not aware of the exact number and tho I am inclined to think that statement considerably exaggerated, there can be no doubt that a very numerous Party is assembled under his banners and that the minds of men have been strongly moved by the spirit of Martyrdom he is endeavouring to diffuse.
His name is Sied Ahmed Shah, a native of Barreilly...\textsuperscript{11}

...it would appear that Raja Ranjit Singh estimates the amount of the Insurgents on the Atok at 40 000 men. Their numbers have... been greatly increased by the Eusufzies who were already in a state of Insurrection.\textsuperscript{12}

The noticeable distinction between a comprehensive, anti-Sikh, conservative religious reform movement and a regional, clan-based reaction to Sikh advances complicated any imperial stereotyping of Peshawar valley resistance. Any simple assumption of segmentary lineage unity for defence solely through the ‘...elevation of a Sufi mendicant, who holds the clans together through his assertion of charismatic power,’\textsuperscript{13} does not fully explain the complexity of the social resistance that soon involved local orthodox religious figures, clan \textit{khans} and shareholders, non-Pakhtun agriculturists and dependants, and the followers of an Islamic reformer from the Punjab.

A realization of the ideas and interests that coalesced and clashed during this period presented a counter to nineteenth-century imperial observers who would gladly have dismissed manifestations of a decades-long movement as spontaneous, emotional, transitory expressions of a depoliticized ‘fanaticism’. This complex history also created complications for later scholars tempted to adopt insightful, but not uniformly applicable analyses of ‘charismatic’ Pakhtun religious figures or other anti-colonial ‘prophets of rebellion’.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{Resistance and Reform}

After 1823 the Sikhs allowed the Durrani governors of Peshawar, several brothers, to remain in charge once they had acknowledged and accepted the new imperial reality. Mobile Sikh military units forcibly ensured revenue flows, especially during annual sweeps through villages distant from Peshawar.

In 1824, a militant resistance against the Sikhs was launched by Akbar Shah, the Utmanzai Mandanr clans, and others living
in tappas east and west of the Indus river. Though a sayyid and a descendant of Pir Baba, Akbar Shah was not simply a unifying Islamic figurehead. Eighteenth-century Mughals had granted his grandfather a jagir in the Hazara region just east of the Indus. Thus Akbar Shah also represented the kind of locally legitimate, intermediary authority that had, through alternate diplomacy and violence, long negotiated or rejected new imperial demands through changing eras. Akbar Shah settled in Sitana village in the hills north-east of the plains, just west of the Indus.

The Islamic challenge to an expanding Sikh empire gained momentum in late 1826 when Sayyid Ahmad Shah arrived in the Peshawar valley. He was accompanied by numerous disciples and supported by a highly developed network of personal friends and partisans spread across northern India organized to recruit and despatch men and financial aid. Sayyid Ahmad was a direct spiritual descendant of the Delhi Sufi scholar Shah Waliullah (1703-1762), through his disciple Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824). Before he died fighting the Sikhs in May 1831 Sayyid Ahmad institutionalized a form of self-renewing Islamic resistance to continuing non-Islamic governments in the Peshawar valley. His successes and failures revealed the various conflicting interests and the contradictions that fragmented the anti-imperialist coalition. His story illustrated how in this era even popular religious idealism could not supersede Peshawar valley elite political networks linked to imperial patronage and able to appeal, across class and power divides, to customary social practice and ethnic ties.

A reformer, Sayyid Ahmad believed in the religious and social agenda that had come down to him through his spiritual lineage (silsilah). Seeking a return to an imagined original Islamic purity, Sayyid Ahmad preached adherence to the Shari'a rather than mystical union with God. He rejected the compromises of faith discernable in established ulema. He rejected the idea of saintly shrines or saintly intervention as intermediary steps to God. He defended monotheism (tauhid) and denied innovation (bid'at). Personal reasoning (ijtihad) was necessary to deal with new and unforeseen events. Importantly,
Sayyid Ahmad had been exposed to Shah Waliullah’s interpretations of the nature of society and the relation between religion and the state.

The Islamic state was to be organized by a ‘Khilafat-i Khassa’ and a ‘Khilafat Amma’, the ‘former is conceived as a spiritual super-authority regulating the affairs of the latter, which may be equated with temporal rulers and chiefs’. Society was composed of various occupational groups, ‘soldiers, artisans, traders and agriculturists as well as the Ulama, Sufia and members of the aristocracy’, whose performance of their duty kept society in equilibrium. Disrupting this equilibrium would lead to disorder. This disruption had occurred. Monarchy, ‘as opposed to the early elective tradition of Islam and the cessation of Ijtihad had much to do with the prevailing state of affairs’. Dogma had replaced initiative. The resulting moral decay and political decline could only be reversed by a spiritual renewal broadly embraced across society.

Before his journey to the Peshawar region, Sayyid Ahmad had served in a military unit of Amir Khan of Tonk. He had performed the Hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca with many supporters and spent two years organizing popular and material support for his Peshawar campaign. Arriving in the Peshawar valley in late 1826, Sayyid Ahmad and perhaps one thousand followers first made their base at Charsadda village in Hashtnagar. The history of the next five years, until Sayyid Ahmad’s death, saw a repetition of much of the political and social mobilization and fractiousness that had marked previous generations and would continue to confuse interpretations of later events.

In December 1826 Sayyid Ahmad and his followers clashed with Sikh troops at Akora. Many Sikhs died, but with no decisive result. A Mandanr malik, Khadi Khan, allied himself with Sayyid Ahmad in Hund village, ‘which became the first organized centre’ of the group. The inability of Sayyid Ahmad to shape local Pakhtun villagers into a disciplined and effective military force led to an 1827 decision consistent with his sense of the proper relationship between religious and secular leadership. ‘It was accordingly decided by all those present at
the time, faithful followers, Sayyids, learned doctors of law, nobles and generality of Muslims that the successful establishment of jihad and the dispelling of disbelief and disorder could not be achieved without the election of an Imam.\textsuperscript{21}

This moment of religiously inspired unity attracted the allegiance of maliks, shareholders, and apparently even the governors of Peshawar. But the illusion of commonality of political interest was shattered when, during the next clash with Sikh troops, at Shaidu south of Akora, the Peshawar rulers withdrew. Sayyid Ahmad and his followers were forced out of Hund. They retreated to a new base in Panjtar, another village secure in the hills north of the Peshawar plains. By 1828 the religious fervour generated by Sayyid Ahmad had dissipated to the point that his movement could be perceived as a finite regional faction unable to count on the loyalty of alliance partners. In an 1828 encounter at Usmanzai, the Durrani rulers of Peshawar, now acting in their role as Sikh tributaries, lost to the followers of Sayyid Ahmad. But ‘the advance on Peshawar had to be abandoned due, once again, to the defection of the tribesmen who were expected to help’.\textsuperscript{22}

In their fine details, the events of these years revealed a fragmented Yusufzai and Mandanr support for Sayyid Ahmad’s movement. Social concerns, and a combination of pressure and support from Sikh generals and Peshawar governors, forced a range of local decisions while presenting new opportunities. In 1829 at a large meeting organized in Panjtar Sayyid Ahmad, at the peak of his local influence, obtained agreement that the khans and others present ‘...would administer their principalities according to the laws of the Shariat and would give up the “customary” practices, such as family feuds, usury, polygamy, distribution of a deceased man’s wife and children among his brothers, etc’.\textsuperscript{23} In August 1829 Khadi Khan was charged by the followers of Sayyid Ahmad with conspiring with the Sikhs to disrupt communications with India. Khadi Khan died in an attack on Hund. In September 1829 a force composed of clan relatives of Khadi Khan and of troops led by a governor of Peshawar
suffered defeat at Zaida village. The governor, Yar Muhammad, perished.

The decisive moment for Sayyid Ahmad, and for any hope of establishing a legitimate political authority consistent with his vision of Islamic rule, came in 1830. In addition to the stated social agenda, Sayyid Ahmad also attempted to collect the Islamic tithe (ushr) of ten per cent of crop yields. In coercing reluctant *khans* to pay, Sayyid Ahmad antagonized the ‘chief of Hoti Mardan,’ who then formed a power alliance with Sultan Muhammad, governor of Peshawar. This union was defeated in fighting at Mayar village and the Islamic reformers finally occupied Peshawar.

Over several months during the autumn of 1830 Sayyid Ahmad tried, but failed to conciliate established power hierarchies. The Peshawar *ulema*, who had earlier declared Sayyid Ahmad a non-believer (*kafir*), were granted forgiveness. Sultan Muhammad was restored to his rule with the stipulation that *ushr* would be collected and Islamic judges (*qazis*), including one in Peshawar, would be appointed and would preside. But before the end of 1830 an organised uprising occurred; the agents of Sayyid Ahmad in Peshawar and in the plains villages were murdered and the movement retreated to the hills. Contemporary and later writers analysed the failure of this supposedly broad-based religious movement to reform elite political relations or displace entrenched socio-economic practices.

In October 1830 the British political assistant in Ludhiana wrote to Delhi that Sayyid Ahmad had withdrawn from Peshawar due to the approach of Sikh troops sent ‘towards the Attok for the coercion of the Fanatics’. On 17 November the agent wrote that the old Peshawar authorities had regained control of the city. ‘It is also reported that the Eusefzies alarmed at the consequences which were likely to follow their adhesion to the Syed have made indiscriminate slaughter of everyone belonging to them who happened to be residing in their villages in the plains between Peshaur and the Attok.’

---

124
Slightly later another observer recorded that 'The Governor consented to allow free passage to men and money proceeding to join the reformer—to place the administration of Peshawur in the hands of a Kazee, and officers of the reformed faith and principles, and to pay monthly to the Seyud the sum of 3000 rupees.' But soon, '...the Kazee and two Moolvees' were slain 'in a popular tumult' as Sayyid Ahmad was rejected by Yusufzais offended 'at innovation he desired to introduce into the marriage ceremony' and by the ushr demanded 'for religious and state purposes'.

The scholar Qeyamuddin Ahmad attempted to vindicate Sayyid Ahmad's declaration of the Imamat, 'The decision was criticized by some as unjustified and as an assumption of dictatorial power. But it was a necessary step if the movement was not to be lost in a welter of petty skirmishes'. While explaining the movement's end he noted that, 'Certain religious charges were fabricated against the Wahhabis, and some of the measures enforced by them were utilized for inciting the people'. Caroe wrote that the trouble came when Sayyid Ahmad spoke against the bride price given at marriage and then advocated the marriage of all single women of marriageable age. Caroe added, 'And when Ahmad was accused, as many say unjustly, of assigning maidens one by one to his needy Hindustani followers, the people were greatly incensed and made a conspiracy against him'.

Clearly, Sayyid Ahmad's Islamic ideals presented challenges to local practices. Yet, Sayyid Ahmad had been prudent enough not to confront directly the Peshawar ulema or ruling structure. He undoubtedly was aware of the sensitive nature of his controversial social agenda, one quite similar in rhetoric to the sermons of Akhund Darweza. In the end it appears that Sayyid Ahmad faced accusations by detractors of demanding radical social innovations that were in direct conflict with Pakhtun notions of family privacy (parda) and of how women represented clan honour and shame. Certainly in an intense political struggle he might be charged with making demands that he probably would not have actually risked.
Caroe concluded with a benignly post-colonial rephrasing of colonial conventional wisdom. Sayyid Ahmad’s story:

typifies...the strength and weakness of the Pathan tribal system. A leader appears, and unites tribal sentiment in a surge of enthusiasm that carries all before it. For a while internal jealousies are laid aside, and an enthusiastic loyalty is forthcoming. Individuals are found ready to face death for a cause, and no one counts the cost. The idea of sacrifice is in the air. The crest of the wave bursts over the barrier, and the victory seems won. Then the leader gives way to vainglory, the stimulus which gave unity fails, envy and malice show their heads. The effort, steady and sustained, which is needed to maintain the position won proves to be beyond the tribal reach. The ground won is lost, and the leader forfeits confidence and is discarded.30

Caroe blamed Sayyid Ahmad’s failure on a typical ‘tribal system’ that could mobilize emotion for valour and sacrifice, but also at the same time for the vainglory, jealousy, envy, and malice that destroyed unity and success. Caroe’s narrative of the leader that appeared, generated an emotional ‘wave’, and then failed, when confronted with a steady and sustained imperial presence, recalled scholarly analysis of leaders of ‘millenarian protest movements against the European colonial order’.31 Little discussed was the role of considered, justifiable local political and economic self-interest.

Adas theorized a ‘number of common patterns’ in the lives of leaders of ‘millenarian’ movements, though he avoided any entanglements implicit in the use of Weber’s concept of charismatic leadership. From his case studies Adas perceived such leaders as being often both well educated and ‘extensively exposed to esoteric, magico-religious beliefs and healing techniques’. They had been ‘well-travelled individuals with extensive exposure to the agents of dominant alien groups’.32 They might have been soldiers or policemen in possession of colonial military knowledge and most probably began their activities ‘after severe personal setbacks’.33
Parallels exist between Adas’ profile, designed to study figures specifically motivated to confront the expanding empires of industrialized European nation-states, and the life of Sayyid Ahmad. Sayyid Ahmad had been fully aware of the dissatisfaction generated by legal and land-related uncertainties in the territories in northern India newly occupied by the East India Company. Arlinghaus also noted the applicability of Adas’ theory to Bayazid Ansari’s life. Just as the Roshaniyya movement threw down the gauntlet to not only the Mughals, but the established religious ulema and the role of clan lineage leaders, so the movement of Sayyid Ahmad challenged the authority of Sikh imperialists, the Peshawar ulema, and khans such as Khadi Khan of Hund.

But, if Akhund Darweza ‘...had lived among the Yusufzais and represented the Sunni religious establishment’, Sayyid Akbar, descended from Pir Baba, opposed the Sikhs and supported Sayyid Ahmad. As well, Sayyid Ahmad continued to be welcome in many, if not most, of the Yusufzai villages of the hills north of the Peshawar valley and east of the Indus. And, as in the Roshaniyya movement, there was, in reality, no spontaneous movement that peaked in an emotional wave and then disappeared. In a later ‘Brief Chronology of the Hindustani Fanatics’, the latest entry discussed events in February 1915.

It was neither a dysfunctional ‘tribal system’ nor the technology of a western, or non-western, imperial power that defeated the movement of Sayyid Ahmad. In actuality, even the appeal of Islamic reform combined with the appeal of an anti-Sikh jihad could not overcome the power relationships institutionalized at the local level where, as posited by Burke, ‘The pulling and tugging of factions, the pressures of political and economic exploitation at the level of everyday life, the influence of local political and religious figures shaped the responses of particular groups...’

Here, at the local political level, some insight might be gained into the fate of Sayyid Ahmad’s movement. The opinionated Bellew, who claimed that Sayyid Ahmad with the help of the future Akhund of Swat had treacherously lured and assassinated
Khadi Khan of Hund, recorded that after Sayyid Ahmad had removed to Panjtar, his policies were ignored in the ‘Hoti tappa’. In 1829, ‘...Hoti and Mardan, persisting in their obstinacy, were attacked, plundered, and burnt’.39 Bellew’s narrative of Sayyid Ahmad was laced with gossip and slander. He said, ‘the Sayad’s foreign agents’...had been... ‘forcibly taking the Afghan maidens as wives’.40 Still, the opposition offered by Hoti and Mardan raised questions as to whether there had been simply a general reaction against Sayyid Ahmad’s social policies or whether elite khans, including those protecting Hoti family interests, had attempted to secure old imperial ties by, perhaps, encouraging rumours about the reformer’s social policies.

The evidence was intriguing. Only thirty years later James wrote that Sayyid Ahmad, first, killed Khadi Khan, ‘but the principal Chief in Eusufzai at that time was Ahmud Khan of Hotee who shortly met with the same treatment at his hands’.41 Yet, the Hoti family history recorded that the ruling khan between 1820 and 1851 was Muhammad Khan, second son of Lashkar Khan. In the family history an Ahmed Khan, the eldest son of Lashkar Khan, had been struck out of the khanship. ‘Owing to the extravagance, debauchery, adultery, drinking and ease-loving habits of Ahmed Khan, his father Lashkar Khan disinherited him and deposed him from the Khanate of Hoti and banished him to Mardan, appointing Muhammad Khan to be the Khan of Hoti...’, vide his Disinheritance Deed dated the 21st Rajab-ul-Murrajjab 1230 AH corresponding to the 29 June 1815’.42 Whether or not Ahmad Khan was the principal Khan in 1829-30, or was even the Ahmud Khan mentioned by James, both Hoti and Mardan seem to have opposed Sayyid Ahmad. And yet in the Hoti family history there to no mention of Muhammad Khan opposing Sayyid Ahmad; he is only recorded as fighting the Sikhs in 1823, 1835, and 1843.

The key comment in the family history may be that ‘He (Mohamed Khan) as well as his father Lashkar Khan were opposed to the invasion of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the interest of their masters, the Mohamedzai Sardars of Barakzai clan, who were also related to them’.43 These Peshawar ‘Sardars’
served as Afghan governors of the district. Holding their *jagirs* in *Illaqa Yusufzai* and Hashtnagar at the pleasure of the Peshawar governors, it would seem only logical, based on their history, that when the former Durrani governors shifted their allegiance to the Sikhs, if only under coercive pressure, the Hoti family may have reconsidered any sympathy for Sayyid Ahmad. The fact remained that Sayyid Ahmad’s name is not mentioned in the Hoti family history, nor is Muhammad Khan listed as fighting the Sikhs between 1823 and 1835.

Unknown was the degree to which elite Pakhtun opposition to Sayyid Ahmad derived from his desire to eliminate the customary payment of bride price by prospective husbands. Sayyid Ahmad wished ‘that all Pathans should give their daughters in marriage at an early age, without receiving money, and if not then betrothed they might be claimed by their nearest relatives’. This directly threatened any ruling group continuity reinforced by the exchange of daughters among elite families whose status was also affirmed by marriage payments.

With Sayyid Ahmad defeated, the Hoti family holdings survived a few years longer. But the 1834 Sikh annexation of the Peshawar valley led to a May 1835 confrontation with the Afghan *Amir*, Dost Muhammad. In this confrontation the Hoti *khan* backed the losing Afghan side. Ranjit Singh struck a deal with the Peshawar governor Sultan Muhammad, who despite being Dost Muhammad’s brother, looked to his own interest. The Afghan *amir* retreated. The Hoti *khan* fled to Swat. Sultan Muhammad was awarded the Hoti Hashtnagar *jagir* and the Sikhs confiscated the Malguzari of Yusufzai. Only later would a smaller *jagir* be granted to Muhammad Khan, being progressively reduced from Rs 6000 to Rs 4000 to Rs 2000 in 1843.

The history of the movement of Sayyid Ahmad further illustrated that assumptions of Islamic or Pakhtun solidarity, whether ‘fanatical’ or ‘millenarian’, in the face of imperial invasion were too simplistic. In any single confrontation with the Sikhs the adversaries might have included Hindustani ideologues, Pakhtun shareholders and dependants defending their crops, and local elite gauging where their best interests lay. Any
religiously or ethnically inspired social movement for common defence could not withstand the forces of coercion and latent interests. 'The more we look, the more the micropolitics of protest appears an affair not of heroic poses and radical flourishes, but of bets artfully hedged, old grudges paid off in kind, and (sometimes) old solidarities reemphasized.'\textsuperscript{45} Skilled at the art of survival, the Hoti family emerged from the Sikh period to switch allegiance to new rulers:

In 1849, Mohamed Khan voluntarily submitted to the suzerainty of British Government, retaining his \textit{Jagir} and the position of Kamondar of Yusafzai.\textsuperscript{46}

\section*{Imperial Transition}

The Sikh polity, constrained to the east by the encroaching East India Company empire, reluctantly assumed direct administration of the Peshawar valley after the events of 1834-5. As with every empire that would occupy the valley the policing expenses involved in securing the district and subduing landowners exceeded local revenue collections. This made the area a perennial deficit region. Sikh Peshawar valley rule involved a more sophisticated military organization that included European officers, British colonial army deserters and veterans, cavalry, and mobile artillery. The Sikhs attempted to reduce the intermediary elite and lineage leaders to a historically unprecedented level. Sikh policy transformed the former once-powerful Durrani governors into revenue farmers responsible for districts near Peshawar. A Sikh post north of the Kabul river at Jehangira menaced the plains of the north-eastern valley. A body of Sikh cavalry annually patrolled the north-east region on revenue collection forays.

Correspondence sent to Ludhiana by a rising British officer traced the progression of the East India Company interest in the region. A letter dated 21 September 1831 recorded work on a bridge of boats being built over the Sutlej river at Rupar. In
April 1833 the lieutenant was in Bahawalpur negotiating terms for British navigation on the Indus. In June 1837 he scheduled a meeting with Captain Burnes at Dera Ismail Khan to assist him in his 'commercial' mission to Kabul. On 8 November 1837, the officer acknowledged a letter from Ludhiana, ‘...directing him to stay at Peshawar or in its vicinity for a short time, and pointing out the objects to which his attention should be directed while there’.47

From Peshawar the officer would forward reports on local revenue and political conditions. Later that winter, from Lahore, he wrote of the repressive nature of a Sikh regime maintaining authority through sheer violence. Sikh coercion had raised the Peshawar valley revenue from the nine or ten lakh rupees of the time of the Durrani to thirteen lakh rupees for 1836. In May 1837 the twelve hundred Sikh troops sent to ‘Isafzai’ undoubtedly were a contributory cause of the agrarian disruptions that led in January 1838 to a Peshawar grain shortage or ‘famine’. Because of food shortages Ranjit Singh then remitted octroi taxes to encourage Lahore traders to provision Peshawar.48 In January 1838 the Sikh-appointed governor of Peshawar, an Italian officer named Avitabile, executed three men charged with theft, quartered their bodies, and hung the pieces from town gates. ‘Another person who had been caught throwing oranges from a garden was deprived of a hand and ear, and thus mutilated, after being paraded through the streets, was turned out of Peshawar.’49

The judicial regime instituted by the Sikh governor seemed based upon religious or customary punishments, though distorted in a remarkable exhibition of terror and the implied symbolic control of Afghan bodies. By 1838 the Sikh-appointed governor was negotiating with the Ludhiana British agent for the reimbursement of one hundred thousand rupees advanced in 1837 to the British officers. In an effort to repatriate funds safely for a retirement in Europe the governor requested ‘...the amount due to him to be invested in Government securities’.50 And also in 1838 the Peshawar valley would become enmeshed in a greater imperial competition pitting a Russian and Persian
alliance against the British-Indian empire. The Tripartite Treaty signed in June 1838 allied the East India Company, the Sikh state, and the long-deposed Afghan Amir, Shah Shuja, in an agreement to restore Shuja to power in Kabul. The intent was that Shuja would regain his throne, the British would secure a firm buffer against any Russian-backed Persian advances against Herat or Kandahar, and Ranjit Singh would render assistance in return for being formally ceded all former Durrani lands east of the Khyber Pass.

The failure of the British policy, their defeat in the Anglo-Afghan war of 1839-42, the death of Ranjit Singh, the fragmentation of the Sikh empire, the two British-Sikh wars, and the British imperial annexation of the Sikh territories, including Peshawar in 1849, have been well covered elsewhere. Of particular interest to the history of the Peshawar valley in this period were minor journeys and now forgotten reports illuminating the status of the north-eastern Peshawar valley, the greater Yusufzai country, and certain other issues under discussion. These reports revealed a threshold of uncertainty, in which village institutions showed the stress and disrupting effects of imperial British and Sikh contact and competition.

In 1840, after the signing of the Tripartite Treaty and the installation of Shah Shuja in Kabul by a British-Indian army, the British resident in Kabul reasserted territorial claims of the Afghan monarch to areas around Peshawar not specifically defined in the treaty as Sikh possessions. A lack of accurate maps and precise geographic knowledge of the region had led to a vague statement in the treaty’s first article, in Persian:

It speaks of Peshawar with the Eusoofzai ‘wo Ghaira, wo Khattak, wo Hasht Nagar, wo saie, towali Peshawar, ta had-i-Khaibar.’ The words ‘wo Ghaira’ may be construed to mean Swat and Booner, or any other places, but the word ‘towali’ concluding the sentence, and confining its sense, cannot apply to places that are not actually dependant on, and under the rule of Peshawar, at the present time.
The British political agent in Peshawar, quoted above, accepted Sikh authority over the ‘Eusoofzais of the plains’, though the word ‘wo Ghaira’, literally ‘etc.’, was definitely vague. He noted that for five years troops sent north ‘across the river’ had collected from thirty to seventy thousand rupees in revenue and that two years before the region had been ‘farmed’ out to one of the Peshawar ‘Sirdars’ for thirty thousand rupees. Currently ‘Arsala Khan the Eusoofzai, Chief of Zeda is the person through whom the Sikhs now hold the country, and whom they assist with troops to collect the revenue’.\(^5\) The Sikhs now manned forts at Hund, ‘formerly held by Amir Khan a rival of Arsala Khan’, and at Jehangira, north of the Kabul river near Attock.

In January and February 1840 Edward Conolly, another British lieutenant, traversed the north-eastern section of the Peshawar valley to map the region. He was to contact local khans, including those in the northern valleys, in an attempt to counter local Sikh diplomacy and win over the ‘Munders’ and the ‘Eusofzyes’ to the cause of Shah Shuja. His reports ended up in secret files, their importance quickly overtaken by the dramatic events of the 1840s. But they were significant for revealing a rare, short-lived British colonial perspective in which the Afghans of the Peshawar region were viewed sympathetically as potential subjects of Shah Shuja in Kabul and as potential allies in looming confrontation with the Sikhs.

Conolly apologized for the inaccuracies of his map, which he ascribed to the fact that ‘our every action was regarded with so much suspicion, that we only took bearings by stealth...I do not however fear any material error, and hereafter propose forwarding a complete map of all the Eusoofzye, accompanied by a more comprehensive report on the productions and resources of the country’\(^5\).\(^4\) He noted that the Mandanrs because of their vulnerability to invaders, ‘seem...to have early sought the protection of, and willingly to have submitted to, some one chief, of their own clan, though their peculiar democratic institutions prevented their acknowledging obedience to any minor authorities’.\(^5\)\(^5\) Conolly reported that the Mandanr ‘Chieftainship has been in the family of Pungtar, since the days
of Aurungzebe, whose letters patent it still possesses'; that is, since the days of 'Bagho Khan'. His analysis was that since 'the dismemberment of the monarchy' other 'chiefs' had risen to 'limited authority' in the 'Sum', but all, obedient or not, acknowledged the rank of the family.

During two months of travelling through the plains and hill country Conolly was denied admission into Buner and Swat. He and his party received advice from the 'Mir' of the Sudhum valley and 'Ahmed Khan of Hoti-Murdan'. Conolly's politically oriented perspective crystallized during a journey into the north-eastern hills where he visited Panjtar village, sixteen miles from the Sudhum valley, then Sitana, Gandaf, and Amb village near the Indus river.

He commented that the 'Bareezyes' (Baizais) or Khattaks of the northern plains 'are always spoken of as the richest people in the country, and many of the Hindoos, settled among them, are said to possess great wealth. This is not improbable, as the principal road from Swat to the south passes through their country'.

He discerned the political insecurity of the Yusufzai tappas menaced by Sikh cavalry and divided by personal enmity. The Mir could not accompany Conolly into the hills, due to a feud with the next village. Only a local Sayyid acting as a guide could ease their passage past well guarded communities. At one village, 'Mistaking us for their enemies, hardly less than a thousand men, turned out in 10 or 12 bodies, each having a flag'. He described villages organized in a confederation, a 'goond' against other villages. It was an environment of wariness, not desolation, 'Such is the state of the Eusofzyes throughout...In spite of this the country is one sheet of cultivation, the villages are numerous and large (some of them having from 2 to 3000 houses) and have an appearance of comfort about them, which is seldom seen in western Afghanistan...'

Conolly emphasized the role of 'Futteh Khan sixth in descent from Bagho Khan,' in the success achieved by the movement of Sayyid Ahmad. 'It was during the short but brilliant reign of
Syud Ahmud, whose principal supporter he was, and to whom he may have been said to have given the crown, that Fatteh Khan attained his greatest power...’ Though the Sikhs practised divide-and-rule strategies and threatened to defeat the ‘disunited Mundurs’, ‘one man alone prevented this. As his physical resources and apparent means of resistance grew less, the courage, the moral influence, and it may be almost said, the actual strength of Fatteh Khan increased’.

Conolly wrote that, though offered ‘a jageer of three lacks, and the khanship of all the Eusofzyes’ by Ranjit Singh, if he would only render a token object or gift, Fatteh Khan responded, ‘Horses and hawks are found with rich nobles at the courts of kings; I a poor zemindar, have nothing of the kind, but I can send you a fat cow if you please’.

Conolly’s agenda was transparent. In other pages, he expressed the hope that one day the authority of Shah Shuja would be ‘distinctly proclaimed’ in the region, that a son of Shah Zaman or Shah Shuja would be sent to the area as a governor for Kabul, and that the ‘residence of the Prince (since the most fit place Peshawur is out of the question) might for a time be Punjtar...’ ‘As respects the chiefs, it should be our policy to increase their power and to support their authority. In the Sum, the restoration of Muqurrab Khan to his hereditary rights, as Lord of the Mundurs would ensure the steady obedience of his tribe.’

Conolly pursued his superiors’ mission of recruiting regional Afghans to support the Amir in Kabul. The Islamic ‘superstition and bigotry of the Eusofzyes’ would be a ‘most powerful engine’ to aid Shah Shuja, though an engine to be handled cautiously. Conolly repeated a Mandanr history that seemed straight from the mouth of his Panjtar host Muqarrab Khan, son of the late Fatteh Khan. He was told that when a Sikh army finally attacked and burned Panjtar an unbowed Fatteh Khan had to be carried off the battlefield by his own supporters. Conolly emphasized the secular authority of local khans in influencing clan decisions about forming an alliance against the Sikhs. Only later would the English wish to decry the political authority of established lineage leadership, including the khans of Panjtar, and, by
shifting the focus of their discourse, denigrate any manifestations of resistance to imperialism as the irrational, transitory eruptions of religious fanaticism.

In his confidential report Conolly advised, 'The main principle to guide our conduct should be that everything (in appearance at least) remain on the same footing, as in the days of Ahmed Shah, and no innovation should be attempted, but with great caution and gradually. Above all the interference of Europeans should be studiously veiled.'

Hints of regional political economy and social relations could be glimpsed in the details of Conolly's narrative of Sikh and Pakhtun power struggles. For instance, Muqarrab Khan's actual authority over the Samah was limited to 'about 70 villages' from which, Conolly noted, he collected ushr, the 'jizua (or tax on the Hindoos)', and 'the tax on the Fakeers'. His standing body of fifteen hundred foot soldiers at Panjtar received three rupees a month. To Conolly, the Hindu community in the Kakar village of Gandaf in the hills appeared the largest and the most affluent in the region. Every man was a soldier. All answered the call of the alarm drum (nakara), gathering with matchlocks and spears, a few in chain armour or with bows and arrows.

Conolly's correspondence with Arsala Khan of Zaida village, the only Pakhtun khan to collaborate with the Sikhs, revealed the historic, micropolitical process in which local khans kept their options open, playing both sides in any imperial competition. One message received by Conolly from Arsala Khan's son said 'that circumstances alone seduced him to the disgrace of seeking the support of image worshippers; that he was devoted, body and soul, to His Majesty; and that if I would only say the word, he would at once renounce a connection which he detested'.

In Panjtar village Conolly described Muqarrab Khan's appearance, demeanour, and dress in disparaging terms, but excused all this as 'owing to a narrow or rather an absence of education'. He praised him as 'generous to a fault'. Fatteh Khan had died sixteen days before Conolly reached Panjtar and, at that point, the number of visiting Afghans paying their respects
averaged six hundred a day. Conolly interpreted expressions of religious piety as insincere. He thought Muqarrab Khan affected piety to gain 'popularity'. 'The people of Panjtar all affect the strictness of morals, preached to them by their favourite saint, the Syed king.' Many came to visit him, including to 'get cured of every description of disease'.

Travel in the hills was uncertain and stressful. Sergeant Cameron, who kept survey bearings in his papers, did not go beyond Panjtar due to ill health. On their return the party was delayed in Panjtar for ten days by winter rains. On a journey east from Panjtar to the Tanawal region along the Indus, another religious figure, Sayyid Hussain, facilitated the party's passage. A 'scion of one of the best (saintly) families of Peshawar he has received an excellent education...His conversation is a string of quotations, Hindoostanee, Persian, and Arabic....' He was blunt, well respected, and described by Conolly as 'demi-saint, demi-mad'. Conolly thought him greedy and avaricious, and noted that he occasionally condescended 'to relieve some grey senior of his rheumatism by the infallible process of rubbing the affected part with his hands, muttering a few words, and blowing on it'.

When Conolly reached Sitana he met 'a Syud (mentioned in my public report) named Akbur Syud....,' descended from 'Peer Baba'. 'We had to converse by interpreters, for he speaks a confused dialect one half Pooshtoo, one half the barbarous Hindee peculiar to Tanawul, having never I believe stirred more than a few miles from his home. Persian is seldom spoken, unless a broken sentence by some Moollah...Ahmed Khan alone, of the chiefs I had met, could carry on a conversation in it, and to him it was difficult, and he had frequent recourse to Pooshtoo.'

Indeed, Sayyid Akbar of Sitana may not have been an impressive 'charismatic' or 'millenarian' figure. But he was representative of the reality that many religious figures, local and outsider, survived dramatic moments of crisis and continued to hold, as did many khans, shareholders, and fakirs, an unencapsulated perspective. This perspective, more than any figurehead leader, remained the prime basis for periodic bouts of violent resistance against imperial domination. Such
resistance was triggered by historically specific stresses caused by socio-political and economic change and conflict. In describing the Buner jirga negotiations that would decide whether or not Conolly would be allowed to visit the valley, his Buner contact, ‘Syud Russool’, told of the split opinion within the jirga and the social context limiting religious influence. ‘Wait said Syud Russool, the approaching change, the moment the scale turns, we can interfere, and confirm the wavering—but our power is of a peculiar kind, it is lost in these tumults: we can lead, but not drive...'68

Conolly represented one extreme of the Englishmen who would work in the region over the next century. There were many like him who served for a short time, made arbitrary judgements about people and issues they little understood, used these judgements to shape policies, and then left the consequences for others to resolve. Other, more experienced, English officials stayed in the region for longer periods. One example was Mackeson, who built bridges on the Sutlej in 1831, and in 1849 became the first Peshawar Commissioner. In 1852 he died at the hands of an Afghan opposed to imperialists.

Conolly’s venture offered a rare window into a period of common interest between some regional Afghans and the English. He travelled openly and undisguised to villages that remained unvisited in the future except by assaulting armies. Unmolested on his journey, he even visited the mosque in Panjtar. There he talked with a noted Islamic judge (Qazi) whom the next day he amused with the playing of a small music box.69

Conolly recognized the need to end Sikh violence in the plains, but his agenda also involved ensuring the population fulfilled their obligations as tax-paying residents of a state. In passing, Conolly noted that in December 1839 a ‘Hadji Abdoolla’ arrived in Sitana with one follower. He was then joined by a dozen ‘Hindoostanis’ and ‘1000 others were said to be coming’. Conolly ridiculed his prospects of continuing the Islamic movement, but noticed that he received funding from India ‘and since his arrival, had received a hoondee’70 from Peshawur’. In the end, Conolly decried him as a ‘weak minded fanatic’.
## Genealogy of the Munders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eusof</th>
<th>Omar Munder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aman, zye</td>
<td>Kumal, zye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruzur</td>
<td>Mamoo, zye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kudur, zye</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullick, kheil</td>
<td>Mano, kheil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman</td>
<td>Othman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumul, zye</td>
<td>Ama, zye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudo</td>
<td>Ali Kaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dooroo, zye</td>
<td>Zulo, zye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bezat kheil</td>
<td>Mir Ahmed kheil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koodoo kheil</td>
<td>Abba Omur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali kheil</td>
<td>Burra kheil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman kheil</td>
<td>Nusrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boorne Mudjit Mudar</td>
<td>Beri kheil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Hybu</td>
<td>Bagho Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Dewan</td>
<td>Ashruf Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Ismael Khan</td>
<td>Mubulla Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of Killah But)</td>
<td>(time of Aurungzebe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>(of Zaidah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>(of Hound)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Zynooodeen Khan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Aehmat Khan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Namdar Khan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Alif Khan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Futteh Khan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Mokurrib Khan (of Punjar)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conolly’s ‘Genealogy of the Munders’ attached to Letter No. 200 in *Foreign Department (Secret) Consultation 4 May 1840*, National Archives and Library, New Delhi.
NOTES

2. Raverty, Notes on Afghanistan, vol. 1, p. 215. An unattributed quotation that appears to be of a style and period similar to the route description material previously quoted from Ghulam Muhammad.
9. Calendar of Persian Correspondence, vol. 10 (Punjab Govt., Lahore, n.d.), p. 320, item 1569. 'paper of intelligence from Kabul from 10 Ramazan (21 April) to 3 Zul-qada (12 June 1793)'.
11. Punjab Archives, Lahore, Records Book 95, Letter S. No. 69, p. 70, dated 3 March 1827, from Captain Wade, Ludhiana, to Metcalfe, Resident, Delhi. Sayyid Ahmad was from Rai Bareli in Awadh.
12. Punjab Archives, Lahore, Records Book 95, Letter S. No. 70, dated 5 March 1827.
14. Akbar S. Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma, 1976, Chapter 6 discusses the historically specific case of the Akhund of Swat, while Michael Adas, Prophets of Rebellion, 1987 models millenarian protest specifically against the 'European Colonial Order'.
31. The sub-title of Michael Adas’ *Prophets of Rebellion*.
35. See Arlinghaus, *Transformation*, 1988, Chapter VI.
37. V. Vivian, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence, ‘Brief Chronology of the Hindustani Fanatics,’ undated, microfilm, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad.
41. James, *Settlement*, 1865, p. 44. Repeated in the *Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98*.
42. *History of the Hoti Family*, pp. 16-17.
44. James, *Settlement*, 1865, p. 46.
52. National Archives and Library, New Delhi, *Foreign Department (Secret) Consultation 4 May 1840*, Letter No. 197, dated 7 February 1840, from Mackeson to W. H. Macnaughten.


54. Letter No. 198, dated 28 February 1840, p. 1, in same file of correspondence as Letters No. 197-200 above and below.


56. Letter No. 200, p. 1, p. 17 of sequence beginning with No. 199.


58. According to Conolly, each flag marked a neighbourhood group drawn from a *hujra* association, No. 199, p. 7.


60. Letter No. 199, p. 2.

61. Letter No. 199, p. 3.

62. Letter No. 199, p. 16.

63. In 1837 Burnes, perhaps reflecting Sikh sources in Peshawar, wrote that Fatteh Khan 'has sent horses and hawks to the Sikhs, but pays no regular tribute'. India National Archives, New Delhi, *Foreign Department (Political) 1837, Consultation 20 October*, Letter No. 72, p. 3.

64. Letter No. 199, p. 15.


66. 'Massage of the manual therapy/chiropractic type is practiced by religious persons in most village areas. Primarily, patients suffering back pain and troublesome joints seek this type of treatment.' In Hans Husum, *The Other Side of the Border* (Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, Peshawar, no date), p. 34.

67. Letter No. 200, p. 6, p. 22 of running sequence from Letter No. 199.

68. Letter No. 200, p. 18, p. 34 of sequence running from Letter No. 199.

69. Letter No. 200, p. 5, p. 21 of sequence.

70. A *hundi* was a financial draft that indicated the continued existence of the mentioned network of finance and communication.
Peshawar valley social formations were forged by natural events, disease, and the shifting fortunes of local and imperial political competition. Early British administrators confronted local social practices that might structure the course of a typhus epidemic or claim customary rights to redress grievances. Local communities only grudgingly acknowledged colonial claims to authority or state efforts to gather detailed knowledge about village and family populations and agrarian practice. The initial British presence in Peshawar reflected continuities in imperial political and economic interaction with local clans. Future efforts to impose systematic British management and control policies inevitably were challenged by relations of state and clan shaped by long-term processes of assertion, resistance, and compromise.

Physical geography played a role in shaping Peshawar society. Settlement occurred along watercourses, on routes to high passes, and along defensible imperial highways. As in similar regions settled by pastoral communities, rivers acted as substantial boundaries to movement and clan expansion, perhaps more so than did mountain ranges. Discrete areas south of the Kabul river, in the doaba between the Kabul and Swat rivers, and north of the Kabul river east of the dry maira were each dominated by a major Afghan lineage.

Also evident was the ability of agrarian Pakhtun villagers ‘whether they are agnatically related or not...to reify their co-residence in the traditionally sanctioned idiom of patrilineal descent in order to express their group solidarity over and against
all outsiders'. At the same time, the close identification of local clan lineages with their place of settlement was apparent in the naming of particular sub-valleys and districts, including political sub-units, after the dominant clan. Razar, Kamalzai, and Amazai represented territories exactly equated with the authority of the equivalent lineage.

Human agency and natural occurrences also had dramatic short-term impact on social spaces. The shifting of imperial boundaries disrupted the hills and plains causing grain shortages and local displacements. In early 1840 'Every day news came in, of some Malik taken prisoner, some village burnt...the country was overrun with a horde (15000 it was said) of starving Tanawulees, turned out of their homes alike by their friends and enemies'.

In 1841 natural disaster added a new dimension to political disruption. The Indus river, dammed in a far northern valley by a glacial fall or a landslide, burst through at night to flood the lower Peshawar valley. It 'is estimated that between 5 and 6000 lives were lost: all the villages within several miles of the banks were washed away'. The flood destroyed the village of Hund and the Sikh fort at Nowshera. Whatever the social composition of Hund before the flood and the British conquest, these key events influenced the reality that thirty years later Hindus occupied three hundred out of three hundred and eighty-four village houses in Hund.

In 1842 a 'great earthquake' caused a decline in water flows from numerous springs feeding into the Yusufzai plains drainage system. In the summer of 1858 unusually low water in the Indus was a harbinger of another flood, one that finally came in August. The river at Attock rose ninety feet. Water flowed back up the Kabul river at the rate of four to five miles an hour for twelve hours. Eight villages were entirely destroyed and twenty damaged. Fortunately, because the flood occurred during daytime, human losses, were minimized, though cattle and property suffered.

The British displacement of the Sikh government in the Punjab and in the Peshawar valley during the 1840s illustrated
another kind of circumscribed regional geography. For years colonial administrators remained extremely constrained in both their areas of residence and their ability to influence local affairs. The British strategy of slowly infiltrating and gaining control over Punjab revenue and political affairs after the death of Ranjit Singh matched a pattern earlier perfected by the British in Bengal, Bihar, Awadh, and the Bombay Presidency. Even at the time, this process based on treaties and patron-clientism had been understood by local observers. The relevant broader political events of this period were reflected by the expanding authority acquired over time by the British agent in Lahore. In 1846, Henry Lawrence, as Agent to the Governor-General, was assigned charge of political relations with the Sikh court. He had support from a British garrison allowed by treaty after the first Anglo-Sikh war. After the December 1846 Treaty of Bhairowal, in which the Sikhs agreed to a ‘more direct supervision’ during the ‘minority of the Maharaja’, Lawrence served as Resident as well as Agent to the Governor-General for the North-West Frontier. On 6 March 1848 John Lawrence, replacing his ill brother, became Resident at Lahore and Chief Commissioner of the Cis- and Trans-Sutlej States. In April 1848 the second Sikh war began. After the Punjab’s formal annexation to the East India Company empire on 29 March 1849 it would be run by a three-man Board of Administration. The board included the two Lawrence brothers.

A third brother, George, served in Peshawar as Principal Assistant to the Lahore agent from February to November 1847. His political effectiveness was constrained by uncertain relations with the Sikh governor, poor lines of communications outside of Peshawar town, and an unfamiliar socio-political environment that neutralized colonial methods and systems.

In March 1847 Lawrence arrested several Sikh sepoy troops, called Ramgoles, who had deserted their post on the southern edge of the ‘Eusufzye’ country. They had returned to Peshawar to complain about pay arrears. The arrears, for perhaps five thousand men, covered the previous eight to eleven months. Lawrence noted the empty treasury. He had the Sikh governor
recall the troops from ‘the Eusufzye country, where they had been since September, nominally collecting revenue, but really realizing none’.11

The failure of Sikh diplomacy in the Peshawar valley surfaced in April when Lawrence secured the release of leading Mandanr maliks imprisoned in the Attock fort. Imprisoned khans included ‘Meer Khan of Sidoom’, ‘Meer Afzul Khan, Hotee’, and Bahram Khan, the son of Arsala Khan of Zaida. The Sikhs had attempted to suppress local political intermediaries and collect revenues directly. The suppression had succeeded, but no effective replacement mechanism secured agrarian or political stability and revenue flows. With Lawrence in Peshawar and many anticipating an impending British rule, old strategies and political networks were revived. In April, for instance, ‘...Sirdar Sultan Mahommed, Barukzye, returned to Peshawar with his family after a lapse of seven years...’

The British cultivated elite political contacts. The released Mandanr khans of the plains tappas, ‘...express themselves our slaves forever; that had it not been for us they would have lingered till death released them; that for the eleven months of their imprisonment, till I saw them, not a soul had ever inquired after them; that they are men risen from the grave’. Other khans came to visit, though ‘Mohomed Khan of Hotee declined going near the Governor till I told him he must’. Lawrence said of the Mandanr khans, ‘I hope to make a settlement for the revenue of their country through them’.12

Revenue collection, even in the more settled tappas in the Peshawar valley, remained difficult. Lawrence attempted to moderate violent Sikh tactics and introduce a more disciplined, systematic regime. Facing difficulties in attracting ‘contractors to take the farm of many villages,’ Lawrence suggested direct arrangements with ‘respectable zemindars’. He was told it would not work. Valley tillers and maliks often saw little material change in relations with Peshawar, in spite of Lawrence’s rhetoric. He said of the Yusufzai plains, that, ‘From all I can hear it has been shamefully treated, the people ground to dust; much is expected from us, and I trust we shall not disappoint
them'. Yet in early May when Lawrence sent a British lieutenant off to the north-eastern plains he fully relied upon the fear implicit in the presence of Sikh troops. Lieutenant Lumsden was accompanied by a Sikh colonel, Sikh cavalry and infantry, and ‘several of the khangs’.

The presence of a nominally neutral authority in the Yusufzai country attracted a rare outpouring of subaltern voices and concerns. Lumsden wrote back to Lawrence of being ‘besieged by thousands of complainants’, that, ‘it is impossible to say what has really been paid to government, taken by the Sirdar, plundered by the troops, or made away with by the khans’. The British were concerned less about suffering agriculturists, than with the evidence of local authority. Noting Lumsden’s report that ‘the khans keep large bands of horse, fed and equipped by the plunder of the people’, Lawrence recorded that, ‘I have written to Lt. Lumsden not to enter too minutely into all the cases of oppression brought before him, but only such as appear to require immediate attention’...and ‘to try and make the khans understand that the sooner they dismiss their bands of predatory horse the better’. ‘I have also told him not to press too hard on the khans...and that the zemindars must be led to hope more from the future than to expect redress for the past, etc.’

Lawrence’s August diary entries exposed the ambiguous political situation in the valley and the attempts of local villagers and maliks to take advantage of the collapse of central authority. The ‘Mulliks of Nowdeh and Kulloo in the Eusufzyes’ refused to pay the revenue demanded in a letter delivered by a government messenger. Troops armed with artillery rode out to force them into payment. Lumsden, accompanied by local cavalry under the son of Sultan Mahomed Khan, joined the main Sikh troops led by a European officer. In September, Lumsden wrote that he rode around area villages with artillery and, ‘by making them think we were going to blow them out of the world’, gradually began to collect revenue. Conolly had described this Sikh tactic in 1840. Lumsden settled a fixed rate revenue demand upon villages ‘which includes the khans’ and Mullicks’ allowances’. He ordered the khans to not take ‘beyond
what is in black and white’. The *maliks* of Nowdeh and Kuloo escaped the raid, but were forced to surrender after Lumsden seized their wives and children.\textsuperscript{15}

On 27 September 1847 Lawrence visited Toru village while on a tour of the north-eastern plains. He described the twelve-mile route north from Nowshera that crossed the low hills north of the Kabul river, then traversed the apparently rich but uncultivated dry land north of the hills. He passed villages with cultivated fields, including cotton and *bajra* (millet), and Persian wheels raising water from the ‘Culpanee’ stream. It was Lawrence’s objective to repopulate the plains with the villagers and *maliks* who had fled to the hills. He ‘stuck up’ a proclamation in village mosques giving agriculturists one month to return ‘on pain of forfeiture of land and rights’ and stating that ‘an equitable settlement of revenue to include all demands, government or their *khans*, was about to be made’. He wrote, ‘The *khans* are troubled and appear to think their reign at an end.’ ‘Ursulla Khan of Zedah called... he has evidently a high sense of his own importance which must be lessened ere long. He is shrewd and intelligent and professes great devotion to us.’\textsuperscript{16} In the diary entry for 11 October Lawrence recorded the basic technique used to persuade villages to pay ‘revenue’. That day Sikh troops, including four hundred and seventy cavalry, nine hundred and seventy-two infantry, and six pieces of artillery, gathered outside Babuzai village in the Sudhum valley. They attacked the village for refusing any communication with Peshawar. ‘The troops through the day behaved admirably; not an attempt was made to plunder or leave the ranks till I gave the order to fire the village, when I told them to help themselves.’\textsuperscript{17}

The colonial political geography of 1847 showed a limited authority confined to a presence in Peshawar town, a few forts, and forces in the field. Lumsden referred to the communities he coerced in the Mandanr plains as ‘*yaghee* villages’, that is, rebel or independent villages. Yaghistan or independent tribal areas would be labels later used to define Afghan districts outside the imperial settled districts. Within the town of Peshawar itself
British agents also confronted the complex regional social structure that presented hurdles to their increasing authority, but could not be repressed simply through force.

In July, Lawrence had removed the Peshawar Islamic judge (‘Cazee’) after charging him with laziness and poor decision making. From that point on Lawrence and his successors struggled with the consequences of attempting to concentrate civil as well as political authority in British hands. During efforts to impose a judicial regime based on British norms and previous colonial experience, British agents in 1847 encountered the very different interpretations of acceptable social behaviour existing among Pakhtuns. These not only contradicted British colonial judicial logic, but refused to be easily reducible to a single ‘Islamic’ or ‘customary’ Afghan perspective.

In his own 5 May 1847 diary entry of news from Peshawar, the British agent in Lahore logged the report that Lawrence had remitted some ‘customary taxes and fines’ for owners of homes damaged in a storm, ‘and secondly that a woman who poisoned her husband has been paraded through the city on an ass with her face blackened’.18

In November, a Lt. Taylor recorded a ‘cold-blooded murder’ committed ‘by a man who found his niece sleeping with a servant; he was accompanied by the father of the girl,…’ Because Lawrence had ordered that ‘blood must atone for blood’, Taylor held the man for execution. The rationale conveyed in the diary entry was less about the social ‘wrong’ committed by the lovers, than about who should have the authority to punish wrong-doing. It ‘seems to me just that when an individual has taken upon himself the office of executioner for an offence committed against himself, he should pay the penalty to the power in whom the right is really vested’.19 For the remainder of the British occupancy of the Peshawar valley, this colonial claim to be ‘really vested’ with the ‘power’ to decide innocence or guilt continued to be challenged, and often ignored, by Pakhtuns who never ‘conceded’ to the colonial state, through consensus or election, the legitimacy needed to validate such authority.
In the Mandanr plains, Lumsden struggled with the problems inherent in the November case. In a case in December in Zaida village he attempted to understand the complex logic of Pakhtun norms of justice. A man, suspicious of his wife, ‘at last caught her intriguing with a neighbour’. The Afghan killed the neighbour, then his wife. ‘It appears a rule among these Pathans that in these cases a man must first kill the woman before it is considered lawful to finish the adulterer.’ Though the ‘murderer’ was confined, the December case directly raised the issue of what was to be considered ‘lawful’ and by whose ‘rule’. If the ‘murderer’ were executed British authority would be diminished in the eyes of Pakhtun shareholders, though perhaps not in the eyes of lovers or those who felt oppressed by lineage and patriarchal hierarchies.

The problem of local practice versus colonial code also surfaced in less violent cases. In March 1848 Lawrence wrote of a village girl carried off by Afridis in the hills west of Peshawar who had been recovered ‘through another custom’. A person from the suspected Afridi village had been seized by locals and held hostage until her release. This tactic, used especially against hill dwellers who preyed on plains cattle or property, was called *barampta* and though a practice Lawrence originally ‘put a stop to’, he soon was under pressure from ‘the Urbabs’ and felt he would have to accept the practice.

With all judicial authority centralized in his hands, Lawrence changed the nature of punishments and restructured offences into criminal and civil spheres. The Sikhs had levied fines for lesser offences and avoided the expense of maintaining prisons. Lawrence now introduced an institutionalized punishment regime of confinement derived from the earlier Indian colonial experience and based on a European concept of penal practice. ‘Since I have discontinued fining for crime the prisoners have greatly increased; they now amount to 230.’ ‘I have classified them, keeping defaulters and debtors in the city, burglars and thieves at work on the roads in the Agency compound, and convicts and felons in the Fort of Shahmeer Ghur.’ It was the birth of the prison in Peshawar.
The fragile, anomalous nature of the British presence in Sikh Peshawar was made clear in 1848. In April, Lawrence reported that ‘the Khans of Eusufzaye are still debtors to the State to the amount of 45000 rupees of the revenue for the (Sikh) year 1904; this following so quickly the settlement...augurs ill for its permanency’. In May, Lawrence noted that the Yusufzai khans were still in default and keeping a close watch on the Sikh imperial disarray triggered by a revolt in Multan. These events preceded the final Anglo-Sikh war, local turmoil, and the October 1848 flight of Lawrence from Peshawar.

Returning in 1849, the British remained physically isolated as they focused on restoring political authority and revenue collections. They concentrated revenue flows by cutting out revenue farming and collections by the arbabs and khans. Yet, it was also integral to British policy to make use of these local figures of influence to build political stability, encourage agricultural production, and maintain civil peace.

### Disease and Knowledge

At first the British had little interest in learning details of life in the villages they ruled. This early distancing of themselves from local society and the unique Peshawar valley social geography grounded in networks of human movement and settlement became apparent in 1853. A typhus epidemic revealed the wide gulf between indigenous beliefs about health and illness and western medical notions of the body and a colonial interest in social order.

A geo-medical perspective on the Peshawar valley placed it within the bounds of a greater ‘Iranian-Turanian’ or arid Middle Eastern physical world, rather than the humid, riverine lowland regions of dense South Asian settlement. The geographic barriers of the Hindu Kush mountains to the west, and of the Sulaiman range just south of the Peshawar valley, served not only as geographic and climatic bounds but as ‘epidemiological barriers’ to the spread of disease. Low rainfall, high runoff and
irrigation, and hot summers all contributed to a particular Peshawar valley environment that created certain endemic health conditions and promoted or discouraged the spread of infectious diseases.

Seasonal diseases such as typhus or malaria or epidemic diseases such as smallpox or cholera were named and managed according to indigenous beliefs and practices. Yet causal mechanisms, including transient caravans and heavy irrigation, remained little understood. Strategies for disease prevention included wearing a talisman of a written prayer encased in a leather or silver container. Visits to the tomb of a holy personage could prevent or cure not only disease but ill fortune and other maladies. Pre-Islamic, ‘magic squares, constructed in accordance with the adjad number series’, were ‘drawn on the sick parts of the body’.24

More formally, local medical practitioners (hakims) had training in Persian and Indian concepts of health. The same notions of hot, cold, damp, and dry qualities were applied to food, medicine, and strategies for treating disease. Hakims understood the medicinal properties of numerous herbs and plants. Local ‘folk medicine’ used preparations called ‘dawa-i junani, i. e. ionic or Greek’ medications.25 Tales circulated of diseases caused by winds in body vessels or of cures effected by blood-letting. Then and later, ‘most male or female heads of families’ learned massage techniques, something practised as well by religious figures.26

The typhus (homaye lakadur) in the Peshawar valley in 1853 was an infection characterized by a high fever and transmitted among humans through the agency of body lice. A disease of the cold winter months, it spread when villagers huddled together indoors, often under a blanket draped over a table (sandali) above a charcoal brazier. In April 1853 a British assistant surgeon investigated a case of typhus in ‘Akurpoora’ village about nine miles east of Peshawar and found that typhus had been present in the village for three months. The proximity of the disease to Peshawar and the risk to British forces stationed there spurred quick survey visits around the valley. Reports
filed discussed the nearby outbreak, but also the typhus outbreak known to be occurring that winter 'in the Eusofzai'.

Near to Peshawar thirty per cent of the infected died. But 'Great as the mortality has been the character of the disease when I saw it was much less violent than that in the Eusofzai'. Villagers near Peshawar received little or no medical care and the death rate in the north-western plains was assumed to be even higher. Of one hundred and sixty-six cases in 'Akurpoora', forty-nine had died. In related observations the doctor's report presented what amounted to an early census of the village. He counted four hundred and sixty-six residents in eleven neighbourhoods he called 'muhillas'. Neighbourhoods were named after a leading malik, in Hindustani grammar and Pakhtu vocabulary, including 'Haji Ka Kundie' or 'Alie Shah Ka Kundie'.

Early in the winter of 1852-3 in the middle of the Mandanr plains in Yar Hussain village a member of the household of a mulla had fallen ill with typhus. Gradually the infection spread to neighbouring homes, 'until one or more of the people in almost every house in the neighbourhood of the Thana have had the complaint'. Yar Hussain, in the Razar tappa, was about fifteen miles east of the twin villages of Hoti-Mardan. The typhus affected villages close to Yar Hussain before spreading to Toru on the Kalpani river. It moved south along both banks of the Kalpani drainage, here more a large creek than a river. The typhus spread first to larger villages having the most frequent traffic with Toru. The typhus quickly reached Nowshera on the north bank of the Kabul river, carried from Yar Hussain by a member of one of several Yar Hussain families settled in a Nowshera neighborhood.

The typhus then spread west along the north bank of the Kabul river. It moved through Kheshgi village, then north into the main villages of the Hashtnagar region, all located on the eastern bank of the Swat river. Here again the typhus leapt ahead striking the larger village of Prang, then later moving in the reverse direction to infect smaller villages such as Nisatta. By April 1853, the disease had travelled north to Umarzai village.
and crossed to villages to the west over a fordable section of the Swat river. The typhus also finally crossed south of the Kabul river at the heavily ferried area at Nowshera.

The path of infection was observed to have been along waterways rather than across the uncultivated maira between the Kalpani and Hashtnagar, first striking larger villages along main travel and trade routes. Within a village the typhus was observed typically to spread from the first infected individual to the general village population in about a month. Within a village, typhus often 'occurred in distinct knots of houses separated in several instances by very considerable intervals of unaffected houses'. At least one plains village suggested they should be allowed to enforce an epidemic strategy practised by Buner and Swat, denying persons from an infected village access to a healthy one.

Cultural customs within individual households dictated the treatment and course of the typhus epidemic. In the Mandanr plains, though women cared for patients’ immediate physical needs, men might spend the whole day sitting at patients’ bedsides providing comfort and simple nursing to both men and women of the family. In consequence, such men faced more frequent exposure to infection than others.

By April 1853 the one thousand households of Toru had suffered hundreds of infections and over two hundred deaths. In April, about ten per cent of homes still had typhus in the compound. But each of the nine neighbourhoods of Toru, here recorded as lineage ‘kundas’ (kandis), suffered differently. Only one household of the seventy-eight in ‘Judi kheyl’ kandi was ‘now affected’, while thirty-six of the two hundred and seventy-six in the ‘Ahmood kheyl’ section had typhus. The substantial Hindu merchant community suffered in numerical proportion to the larger village, but of forty-five Hindu households recorded in Toru, only two suffered fatalities, six in one home and three in another. Speculations as to why only one Hindu was ill in April included the Hindus’ ‘more comfortable circumstances’, ‘more cleanly habits’, or their ‘exclusive mode of living’.
One observation noted that the spread of the disease was caused by ‘actual contact with the affected.’ Close relatives visiting the ill apparently carried the disease to their own homes. A woman ill for six days in Nowshera had been observed being moved to ‘Nowsutta’ (Nisatta) where, the report assumed, she would spread the typhus.30

The suffering of Hashtnagar and the north-eastern plains was aggravated in late April 1853 when the British stopped all but three ferries across the Kabul and Swat rivers. Those who crossed underwent a three-day quarantine and were given a health certificate before being allowed to proceed to Peshawar.31 British military authorities did not officially provide medical officers, supplies, training, or direct relief to the villagers of the Peshawar valley. A single ‘hukeem supplied by the civil authorities at Hotee and Mardan’ treated the Mandanr sick. Stopping or reducing the severity of the epidemic in the villages was not a British priority. One assistant surgeon suggested increasing the number of hakims or that ‘Mahomedan Native Doctors be sent into the villages’. British superiors in Lahore simply agreed ‘that all Hukeems willing to go into the country and attend the sick may be encouraged and invited to do so’. As well, rules for treatment and disinfection of infected sites should be translated into ‘Pushtoo’ and distributed. Ideas of ‘cleanliness both of person and habitation’ were stressed, though the agency transmitting typhus remained unknown.

East India Company military officers in Peshawar ordered and conducted the typhus surveys. They collected village data directly from local maliks and ‘kotwals’ responsible for the peace. Rudimentary statistical data about Akbarpura, thirteen Hashtnagar villages, Toru, and four other north-eastern plains villages, assembled in less than a two-week period in April, was included in the reports filed by the British medical officers.32 They counted houses, neighbourhoods, and families. But, admittedly, the accuracy of the numbers was doubtful. Able literally to name each male householder who had died, village maliks, ‘could with difficulty be got to include women and children in the account they gave’. The difference in the numbers
of sick and dead between one April report and an earlier report was explained as being due to *malik* 'exaggeration' or, perhaps, 'giving the numbers in the “Tuppah” of Toro, which includes several villages, instead (as I understood) confining themselves to their own particular village'.

In Toru, officials classified one hundred and sixteen of the one hundred and fifty-three sick in April as ‘zumeendars’. The others were listed craft and service occupations. But were the agriculturists (*zamindars*) Pakhtuns only, or a combination of Pakhtuns, *hamsayas*, and *fakirs*? In 1853, to a British officer, was a *zamindar* simply a farmer or a superior landlord, as were *zamindars* in Bengal? Were women and children included in the *zamindar* total? Such were the problems involved in analysing such statistics.

The typhus epidemic surveys marked the first British efforts to statistically understand the Peshawar valley. The process would continue among officials to map, quantify, and label districts and communities. Eventually, this knowledge would be used to ‘reorganize’ these social ‘facts’ into new frameworks and systems dedicated to introducing innovations in agricultural production, revenue collection, and civil authority.

Whether or not a result of the typhus epidemic, by December 1854 a dispensary to serve local people was authorized for the colonial military outpost at Mardan. The assistant surgeons mentioned earlier had been treating villagers for various problems. In late 1854, ‘the people still continue to apply, at the rate of between 50 and 60 per mensem’. A dresser, compounder, Muslim cook, Hindu cook, water carrier, and sweeper were budgeted for the dispensary at a cost of Rs 28 a month, plus sixteen rupees for native medicines and food for poor patients. Altruism, keeping revenue payers productive, and protecting the health of the colonial forces were diverse motivations that could not be disentangled.
NOTES

3. See Map 4, 'Distribution of Tribes'.
21. The practice was still used against the Afridis of the same area one hundred and fifty years later, this time by government political agents.
28. Probably today’s Akbarpura.
29. Letter No. 299, p. 3. The following narrative is drawn from Letters 299-300 by R. Lyell, Assistant Surgeon, dated 8 April 1853 and Letter No. 680 by T. Farquhar, Assistant Surgeon, parts dated 14 and 16 April 1853. All letters together in the above Foreign Department 1853 volume.
31. Letter No. 335, dated 27 April 1853, in same file as above correspondence.
32. For village typhus data see Statistical Appendices: Tables 1-3.
33. See 1855 Census data and ‘Yusufzai Division’ 1873 village data in Statistical Appendices 2 and 3.
SETTLING THE FRONTIER

After 1849 the British attempted to develop a systematic land policy able to guarantee steady cash revenues, eliminate political intermediaries, and assure Peshawar valley social stability. But these problematic land ‘settlements’ suffered from the unintended consequences of market-oriented policies and multiple forms of elite and village-level resistance. Policies of recording the fields and imposing the status of ‘proprietors’ and ‘tenants’ forced fixed socio-economic identities upon what earlier had been hierarchical, but less sharply defined local identities. Varying state relations with different Peshawar valley clans led to uneven degrees of conformity with district revenue agendas derived from Punjab and British-Indian models. Earlier colonial policies designed to suppress lineage heads as revenue intermediaries were transformed into strategies intended to patronize the ‘feudal’ leaders of ‘agricultural tribes’. Clan khans were enlisted as agents of social control within a structure of colonial hierarchies ranked by status and class.

After the 1849 occupation of the Punjab the first efforts of new colonial administrators were focused on regularizing the flow of land revenue that had so troubled the Sikh government. By 1849 the East India Company had accumulated over seventy-five years of experience in collecting an imperial share of agricultural produce in districts across Bengal and northern and southern India. The revenue regime introduced into the Punjab represented a collective wisdom distilled from the lessons learnt from a succession of approaches employed since Warren Hastings first used late eighteenth century revenue farmers to gather the ‘surplus’ of Bengal. Later strategies, including the
1793 Permanent Settlement of Bengal, the *ryotwari* settlements in the Madras Presidency, and the early village-based revenue agreements in northern India, were superficially designed to address imperial concerns about security and ease of collection. More broadly, these revenue policies reflected continuing European theories about agrarian development, the nature of the indigenous economy and society, and the need to use revenue and legal initiatives to encourage change in the status quo.¹

Problems with these earlier policies had been studied and by the 1840s were apparently redressed in revenue settlements made just east of the Punjab in the north-western provinces. Colonial managers attempted to minimize the 'sale of land for arrears of revenue and debt; privileges of superior landlords (*zamindars*); overassessments and consequent balances; and suffering resulting from former misgovernment'.² These aspects influenced the revenue settlements now required for the twenty-seven new districts of the Punjab. After determining the average district crop yields and prices for a number of years the Punjab settlements set a demand for an annual cash payment equal to 'one-half net produce', that is, half the average crop remaining after deducting all cultivation expenses. Considered to be a moderate demand, this rate was fixed for an extended term of up to thirty years. In theory this policy, which did not tax any additional, later productivity, would encourage investment in new wells and other agricultural improvements.

The intent was to create a body of prosperous, peaceful ‘proprietors’ motivated to expand production and able easily to pay the revenue. This involved the creation of private ownership in land and a class of self-motivated, industrious small-holders, protected in law. The British rationale was based on the logic that, historically, the Asian state had owned all rights to land and thus, nominally, was ‘entitled to the entire net produce. Until it limited its demand to a fixed proportion of the produce, to remain unchanged for an extended period of years, landed property, or preferably, landed properties, could not be said to exist.’³ Cash revenue demands and the ideal of private property were linked to British theories of increasing agrarian
productivity and prosperity through the development of a market economy and individual interest. When these policies were implemented, logical developments, such as the free sale of land and free market prices, had unintended, Punjab-wide consequences.

From 1849 the entire Punjab, including the region west of the Indus, was politically organized into a hierarchical chain of authority supervised by a Board of Commissioners. The Punjab was set up as a ‘non-regulation province’ in which ‘the Regulations in force in Bengal and the Northwestern Provinces were not automatically introduced into the Panjab; and judicial procedures were intended to be less complicated’. The twenty-seven districts, individually managed by Deputy Commissioners, administratively were grouped into seven divisions supervised by Commissioners. Deputy Commissioners, the key district executives, ‘combined the functions of Revenue Collector, Magistrate (chief of police), and Civil and Criminal Judge’. This centralization of authority implicitly meant that in the new colonial regime revenue defaulters would be characterized as lawbreakers, liable to the coercion of ‘police’ powers and ‘criminal’ sanctions. Rather than a check or balance, the law served as an adjunct to the Deputy Commissioner’s executive authority.

The Peshawar valley became the Peshawar District. Over time it acquired a full complement of executive, judicial, and revenue officials. Established colonial ideas of revenue administration came into conflict with entrenched local agrarian practices and interests. Colonial rule never would be threatened in a valley that soon contained one of the largest British military cantonments. But the multiple failures of early efforts to fix a suitable ‘demand’ in valley tappas permeated the very colonial reports chronicling apparently routine and successful revenue settlements. From the beginning, residents of the valley employed all the survival tactics learned over previous generations to avoid and mitigate the impact of the new regime. As in previous generations, expedient imperial compromises with local socio-political realities eased the initial conquest but
later presented stubborn obstacles to an absolute colonial domination of the Peshawar valley Pakhtun economy and society.

The first generation of British-local competition within the settled Peshawar district attracted little of the attention generated by British colonial conflict with Afghanistan or with the independent mountain tribes of British-India’s north-west ‘frontier’. Nevertheless a process of settled district confrontation and accommodation was fueled by the proximity of non-encapsulated clans and individuals who rarely acknowledged the validity of ‘settled’ district borders or regulations. Within the Peshawar valley contact zone, especially within the area soon to be known as the ‘Yusufzai sub-division,’ local authorities recognized this reality. Frequently, the rhetoric of imperial fiat and the fact of imperial power were watered down by pragmatic, often unacknowledged concessions and compromises. These compromises, often struck with those familiar figures of local authority, the khans, remained buried in the minutiae of revenue remissions and land title allocations. They underscored a dynamic process of continual struggle between colonial domination and local choices of cooperation or conflict.

Resistance to British revenue demands were a clear indication of the lack of local sympathy with new colonial notions of property, law, and legitimacy. This resistance meant that while, for example, authorities in Ludhiana district in the eastern Punjab completed an 1853 ‘Regular Settlement’ involving complete surveys of fields, lists of proprietary rights, and agreed allocations of revenue liabilities, officials eventually set aside an inadequate 1856 Peshawar District settlement. In hindsight, ‘it was held by Government in 1871 that Major James’ Settlement must be considered to have been summary only’, and the first Regular Settlement in the Peshawar District was not considered to be completed until 1876.

Initial or ‘summary’ land settlements in the far western districts of the Punjab were highly flawed experiments. If judged by the
simple criteria of creating a prosperous agricultural population easily able to pay the revenue, in several instances the settlements ended as initial failures in a long learning process. In the Multan district, ‘serious errors were committed in the crucial areas of revenue settlement and canal management’. Under pressure quickly to ‘settle’ the district after the 1849 conquest, Multan revenue officers did not measure fields or productivity, but made a demand based on an average of the previous four years of collections. Because officials cancelled all Sikh extra fees and charges, referred to as cesses, and made concessions for struggling villages, the settlement appeared lenient. Multan’s eighteen Sikh revenue areas (taluqas) were restructured into five sub-districts (tahsils) and the gross demand (jama) was reduced anywhere from ten to twenty-four per cent from the Sikh era.

The Multan settlement, completed by the end of 1849, was planned to last three years. In the Sikh era the revenue had been gathered in kind as a percentage of the crop. In bad crop years the governor made up the shortfall due the Lahore court from accumulated savings. After 1849, the set cash demand in Multan, and across the Punjab, forced crops on to a less than fully monetized market system. This lowered prices and forced agriculturists to assign a higher percentage of their crops to the market to meet the fixed charge. Many tillers were squeezed between the government failure to understand the economics of an inelastic demand for produce, determined in part by annual crop sizes, and unbalanced revenue demands caused by inadequate differentiation fields according to soil productivity and access to water. Many tillers failed to pay their dues. In 1852 one Multan tahsil received ‘remissions’ of ten to twenty per cent of the demand. Officials ordered a second ‘summary’ settlement of the district. Over the next few years a second tahsil had its demand lowered seventeen per cent. Revenue officials struggled to adjust differences in claims on villages and fields based on soil differences, access to wells and irrigation, and seasonal inundation.

The same pressures, and multiple ‘summary settlements’, confronted agriculturists in the neighbouring Muzaffargarh
District and in the Peshawar District. Sikh revenue collectors in the region had used tested old tactics adapting collections to the unpredictable harvests of rain-poor districts in which water-courses frequently shifted and disrupted even canal and inundation land yields. After 1849 this policy had been rejected with other aspects of a Sikh system labelled as oppressive and unscientific.

The need to ‘settle’ the many districts of the Punjab simultaneously so that not a single crop season passed unexploited meant that in the 1849-50 revenue cycle (equivalent to the Sikh Sambat year 1906) the new Peshawar District Deputy Commissioner, George Lawrence, simply continued to employ established methods of collection. In the Hashtnagar, Mohmand, Khalil, and Khalsa ‘perganahs’, revenue farmers, who might be arbabs, khans, maliks, or Hindu merchants, continued to act as agents collecting the government share. The cost associated with these revenue farmers was the price paid for their local knowledge and influence. In the Khattak pargana the plains region continued to be ‘farmed to cultivators’, while the directly administered villages in the Doaba and Daudzai parganas paid revenues without the use of intermediaries. The Yusufzai pargana continued to pay revenues through the khans of each lineage tappa.

Over the next four years the various sub-districts of the valley received summary settlements. A district-wide settlement was completed in 1856, though this included only one tappa of the Yusufzai pargana. In the period 1849-56 the Peshawar District became a political-military anchor of the Punjab and of British-India and home to the most famous of the ‘Punjab school’ of field-oriented administrators. Many of these warrior-officials acted out, or were assigned, roles as village-wise, rugged pragmatists in eternal competition with desk-and regulation-bound bureaucrats based in Lahore and Calcutta.

In this same period Peshawar District residents suffered from many of the same socio-economic problems generated in other districts by land settlements overly reliant on established models. Peshawar District and Punjab administrators reacted to the consequences of these problems with immediate concern for
political tranquillity. Often violent reactions to the new revenue regime heavily influenced official strategies for modifying indigenous society, including through revenue policy. Earlier colonial theories of property and society were used selectively to treat problems sparked by the new revenue regime and to rationalize unavoidable imperial compromises forced upon administrators. Political policies and rudimentary social engineering formally structured less definitive social hierarchies in a subtle process intended to ensure control over a poorly understood local population.

In the Peshawar District many ad hoc social policies and compromises with the indigenous political structure would be frozen after the momentous events of 1857. The great revolt silenced even the most fervent British proponents of the idea of forcibly reshaping the internal dynamics of Pakhtun society. Ironically, the perceived reality of the local ‘tribal’ society, apparently a world of rigid customs, religious intemperance, and lineage-based politics, became the basis for a broad Punjab strategy to legitimate colonial authority. Imperial authorities claimed to protect indigenous society, lineage-based ‘agricultural tribes’, even as these authorities restructured lineage leadership into an intermediary class patronized to facilitate the subordination of settled district populations into colonial political hierarchies.

The same junior officer responsible for the first Multan land settlements supervised the problematic Peshawar District summary settlements and the 1856 district-level settlement. Again the officer, Hugh James, apparently made modest demands. He eliminated Sikh surcharges (hububat) and the intermediary roles of arbabs and khans as tappa revenue farmers. But the same problems still emerged. In the Daudzai pargana of the district the Rs 127820 demand imposed during the Sikh rule was reduced in the 1851-52 (Sambat 1908) revenue year to Rs 102324, yet the ‘rates were, however, found to be too high with reference to the fall of grain prices’. A new three-year settlement instituted for the pargana in the next year asked only Rs 100144.
In the Khalil pargana the rate dropped from Rs 111307 to a first summary demand of Rs 89473 in 1851-52. Until the summary settlement the Khalil villages had paid their revenue through the agency of their own *arbabs* who acted as revenue farmers. These *arbabs*, in addition to their hereditary lands, also held insecure border areas as jagirs worth Rs 20000 of the nominal revenue. The ending of their revenue-farming roles directly challenged the authority and status of the *arbabs*. In the second year of the summary settlement 'the misconduct of the Arbabs led to their seizure and transportation to Lahore,...' The ‘great confusion’ this caused among the Khalil villagers meant that many village *maliks* could not guarantee that revenue obligations would be met. Such villages had to be directly managed by the government. Other villages, at first agreeable to forwarding their revenue, ‘broke down’. It ‘became evident that the revenue was greatly in excess of what might offer a remunerative return to the proprietors, now called on for the first time to pay their rent in cash’. A compromise to the confrontation was negotiated and the *arbabs* released. Their *jagirs* were ‘resumed’, but their hereditary lands continued to be exempt from revenue demands. James’ summary settlement essentially failed in the Khalil *pargana*, ‘where the annual balances consequently became large, and where everything presented the appearance of over taxation’.

The simple expedient of continuing the Sikh revenue demand, with minor reductions, and converting this demand into monetary terms did not work. Revised summary settlements now structured a series of lowered demands for revenue. Long held *jagirs* were usually continued, but the revenue-farming roles of local elite were eliminated as soon as possible. Colonial officials struggled to enroll village *maliks* as their intermediary collection agents. They attempted to acquire an understanding of local soil and water conditions to frame more realistic claims. Villagers took advantage of inadequate village censuses and land surveys. Officials faced numerous headaches in efforts to determine and respect traditional revenue exemptions of lands tied to religious institutions, the maintenance of village servants, and the personal
plots (inams) of Pakhtun share (daftar) holders. By the completion of his district-wide Report on the Settlement of the Peshawar District, which recommended rates for the five-year period from 1855-6 to 1860-1, James had learned some hard lessons about balancing the provincial need for maximum revenue with the district need for internal political stability. He also became familiar with the litany of excuses that revenue officers used to explain flawed settlements. He attributed the ‘large balances’ of past-due revenues in the Mohmand pargana to not only the fall in market prices for grain, but to the ‘characteristic improvidence’ of maliks, lineage factionalism (‘hostile relatives’), and to the government tahsildar, ‘Mahomed Ahsan Khan, who was too much in the hands of the leading men of the district’.12

The heavy hand of the colonial military establishment enforced demands on Peshawar valley villages, arbabs, and khans. The military settled a local dispute over access to river water in 1854 by seizing the jagir of Mohmand elite in the Daudzai pargana. The military attacked villages reluctant to pay revenue, including Palli and Sangao in the foothills between the north-eastern plains and Swat.

In these early years of the Punjab administration James struggled with the problems of inadequate land surveys. He felt that only comprehensive field surveys could guarantee accurate records of rights, fair revenue assessments, and proper justice in courts forced to award portions of a share in a land or inheritance dispute. James first hoped to train local Hindu grain merchants,13 who doubled as official weighmen, to fulfil new responsibilities as village field surveyors (patwaris). His efforts to train what he called ‘an ignorant class of Hindoos’ failed and he opened a school for field surveying in Peshawar that attracted men employed in villages by the Sikhs as revenue accountants (mohurrirs). For patwari work, the ‘Persian character’, ‘for the sake of neatness and uniformity’, was ‘adopted to the exclusion of Hindee’.

The colonial project of assembling local knowledge, including detailed topographical and agricultural land surveys, was not perceived as a neutral function of progress and science. In early
March 1852 a team of the Trigonometrical Survey preparing to map the north-eastern plains was attacked at Gujar Garhi village just east of Mardan by ‘about 180 sowars from Swate and Ranezai under Mokurrum Khan’, an angry clan leader. In the context of the ongoing coercion of khans, the forcible introduction into villages of police and revenue officials, and the region’s still fragile colonial authority, officials did not simply assume that the survey effort itself was being attacked. Still the nature and extent of colonial reactions to the attack exposed the sensitive position of the ‘frontier’. Reactions illustrated the dual roles that conciliation and coercion played in colonial debates on segregating the new ‘British territory’ from neighbouring areas occupied by clans with historic, complex ties with Peshawar valley affairs. The Secretary to the Punjab Board of Commissioners advised authorities in Calcutta that ‘...Until some of the Tribes bordering on Peshawar shall receive signal chastisement from a British Force, it cannot be hoped that they will learn to respect our Territory. There could not be a better season of the year for making reprisals than the present, when the crops are approaching maturity’. The Governor-General of India, Dalhousie, displayed a more moderate reaction, recalling his previous doubts about ‘the expediency of carrying on surveys in these quarters at present’. It was neither an appropriate ‘time nor a place’ to expose officers and small escorts to risk. He advised ‘the discontinuance of this survey under Lt. James until further order’. On 20 March 1852 a letter from Fort William, Bengal advised the military that villages ‘taken’ in any operations were not to be retained nor was the frontier to be extended. Another letter cancelled the survey.

The evolution of other post-1849 Peshawar District strategies of local control, through revenue policy and social engineering, was traceable in events and debates connected with the revenue settlement of the ‘Yusufzai District’. Ideas of eliminating the intermediary role of local elite for contacts with villages and of establishing agricultural entrepreneurship through developing private property and a market economy underwent a complete
metamorphosis after the early years of colonial-local interaction. An asymmetrical balance of interests developed within the Yusufzai tappas. The remainder of the nineteenth century would experience the conflicts generated by this uneven balance. Conflicting and intertwined claims of religion, custom, and personal choice continued to shape local survival strategies and political ambitions even as broader economic forces and imperial policies generated new social stresses and opportunities.

For some in the Mandanr tappas of the Peshawar valley the transition from Sikh to British rule proceeded incrementally and seamlessly. Local khans committed to collaboration with the government in power established relations with the British even before 1849. In October 1847 when Sikh troops led by George Lawrence attacked Babuzai village they received assistance from Mir Baba of Rustam village. Years before, Mir Baba had advised Conolly, Mir Baba had collected the Amazai tappa revenue for the Sikhs and become the Sudhum valley’s most powerful khan. In October 1848 Lawrence, attempting to forestall the impending revolt of local Sikh troops, had recruited twenty-six hundred local Afghans from valley and mountain clans. Before the troop revolt and his flight from Peshawar he had negotiated early local alliances, so that ‘from 2000 to 3000 Eusufzyes under their Khans are watching the movements of the rebels on the opposite side of the river...’

After the collapse of the Sikh state and the introduction of a new revenue regime, Mandanr villages and maliks, freed from the intermediation of khans in collecting the revenue, had to be patiently encouraged and frequently coerced into delivering the revenue demand. The British established a new imperial outpost in the region, this time at Mardan. From there locally recruited troops supported the settlement operations conducted in the area by Lt. Lumsden. His report, completed by the end of 1852, described his first administrative efforts and the early changes introduced into the region.

His first ‘summary settlement’ had come in the midst of the 1847 autumn harvest and simply involved Lumsden riding through the district, with a cannon or two, counting the ‘wells
and ploughs' liable to the demand in each village. The previous ideal Sikh demand, one hundred thousand rupees, 'was divided, by the consent of the khans, over the whole; taking irrigated lands at double the rate of unirrigated; the result was a uniform rate of Rs 5 a plough, and Rs 10 a well, throughout the country'. The elite khans in each tappa were eliminated as collection agents, but each leading khan was permitted the allowance (mowajib) granted by the Sikhs for revenue services. The continuation of the mowajib was politically motivated though nominally it subsidized the khans for maintaining the peace within their tappas. Each khan was 'bound to forward all offenders against the law to Peshawur for trial'.

In the early post-1849 period a deputy collector, Maulvi Abdul Haq, completed village revenue papers, while a non-English collector (tahsildar) was 'introduced' into the district as a 'check' on the khans. Police posts (thanas) were set up in Garhi Kapura and Swabi villages and a 'system' of village watchmen (chaukidars) was organized. The northern Lundkhwar tappa remained free (until the James district-wide settlement) of direct revenue settlement, paying a flat six thousand rupee demand through two Khattak maliks of Lundkhwar village.

Lumsden's settlement pursued the same goals set for the Peshawar area parganas. He managed to arrange collections through village maliks, though he was obstructed when he tried to ascertain the exact possession of village 'shares' held by village 'petty proprietors or biswadars'. He was 'opposed by the Lumberdars or heads of villages, who concealed shares, to obtain a light assessment, and who, having usurped many shares, not belonging to them, were opposed to the truth being laid bare'. However interpreted by Lumsden, this resistance by Pakhtun shareholders to the determining of personal holdings, and thus revenue liabilities, may have been related partially to the shareholder tactic of deflecting imperial revenue demands on to the harvests of village fakirs and other non-Pakhtun tillers.

Lumsden's observations reflected an agrarian knowledge and terminology derived from Punjabi rather than Pakhtun experience. He equated Pakhtun clan maliks with the village headmen or
lambardars of eastern Punjab districts. Regarding Pakhtun land tenures as equivalent to ‘Bhayachara’ village brotherhoods, also found in the eastern Punjab, seemed logical to an administrator attempting to define an apparently similar set of agrarian relationships. Yet this use of Punjab idioms marked the beginning of a colonial process that re-conceptualized the Peshawar valley and the nature of its society. Mandanr khels held a share (bukhra) of the clan land assignment (daftar). A shareholder (daftari) measured land by the jarib and tilled with a plough (yewa). When characterized as being within a greater Punjabi context, as biswadar25 in a brotherhood tilling acres or bighas with qulbas, it meant that residents were now perceived less as Pakhtuns, with unique and nuanced cultural and social relations and institutions, and more as colonial ‘subjects’, the same as those in other Punjab districts. Maliks regarded as lambardars would be expected to act the role of state agent. Villages viewed as ‘brotherhoods’ would naturally be assumed to take ‘joint responsibility’ for revenue payments. This process of transplanting colonial perceptions to new soil helped to restructure social roles and relationships, transforming shareholders into ‘land owning proprietors’ and locally defined hamsayas and fakirs into generic ‘occupancy tenants’.

In the short term, Lumsden’s settlements ended certain practices, including, after 1847, residual survivals of land and home exchanges between clans that continued among a few villages. Along with wesh, he abolished the eighty to one hundred rupee fee claimed by khans for each Hindu marriage. But even James, a few years later, remained cautious about forcing changes in Pakhtun relations with their dependants. James said that in ‘Eusufzae’ though Hindu traders and artisans had to contribute ‘...a share of the revenue, each house being reckoned as half a plough’ (share), ‘I deemed it imprudent at this stage of our proceedings entirely to free them’, with the exception of the most indigent.26

Lumsden noted differences between customary social practices and Islamic law, especially as related to land inheritance. A ‘kazee’ would rule that all sons by any number
of wives were entitled to equal shares of a shareholder’s estate. But, ‘Patan usage’ only gave equal shares to each wife, then to be distributed among her sons (four wives with sons divided the estate into four shares). Lumsden observed villages of slaves, ‘golams’ tied to the cultivation of a khan’s land. Others, ‘chorekars’, tilled the land for shareholders to pay off advances and debts. They received a quarter or less of the crops. Lumsden reported that the Sikhs had sold off the wives and daughters of revenue defaulters ‘on account of Government at auction in the bazaar’. These included young girls sold for eight to ten rupees. Outside traders brought other young women down from the ‘Kashtkar’ (Chitral) region in the far north. These sold for forty to three hundred rupees, providing servants for elite Pakhtun women. ‘Weavers, dhobees, carpenters, blacksmiths, graziers, Cashmeere labourers, and traders in salt, fill up the remaining portion of the Yusufzai population’.27

From the beginning, Lumsden’s settlement subtly pursued the intended or unintended social and political agenda evolving within colonial Punjab. His tacit acceptance of Malik refusals to list personal shares in village lands protected the secrecy and prevented true knowledge of Pakhtun holdings, including those of absentee shareholders. But this acceptance also eliminated any possibility of recognizing the de facto shareholding status of non-Pakhtuns.

In Peshawar area villages James noted that though generally fakirs (equal to hamsayas) were forced to meet village revenue demands, they were ‘in the actual possession of all proprietary rights, except that of sale or transfer’ and former service demands ‘had in the course of years, and the social changes created by successive governments, gradually become less definite, and may be said indeed to have depended solely on the power of the dulfuree to exact them. Everything tended to make their position one of independence; on the one hand, the proprietors were interested in retaining them on the estate; and on the other hand, the government farmers supported a class to which they mainly looked for profit’.28 Because in the Mandanr villages Lumsden did not immediately set aside the old
'primitive system,' fakirs continued to pay not only one-fourth of yields towards the government revenue, but also one-third to Pakhtun khans and maliks. Ironically, the Sikh 'oppression' that had reduced the status of Pakhtun elite to a considerable degree in the greater Peshawar valley had to an extent consolidated the status of non-shareholders, while the elite comparatively best able to resist Sikh demands, the Mandanr Pakhtuns, had better preserved established village internal relations of domination and inequality.

With Mandanr maliks monopolizing communications with the new government, colonial policies nominally designed to decide legal ownership rights in land and define the status of tenants tended to stratify and solidify customary social differences and threaten historic, slow processes of social mobility for non-Pakhtuns. Across the Punjab a British colonial shift in emphasis from village-level policies geared solely to basic revenue to new policies dedicated to 'extending the scope of the village record to cover all classes of village residents', served to define village relations of custom and lineage and formalize the 'rights' of dominant 'agricultural tribes'. Even in the Yusufzai subdivision, a 'turbulent' district in which socio-economic innovations were closely scrutinized, social stratification based on land-ownership or tenant status, as recorded in new surveys and land settlements, increasingly became a reified 'fact' of the colonial social landscape.

Lumsden, very conscious of the levelling of the Mandanr khans, thought the Sikhs had changed the khans 'at will' and invalidated their legitimacy. Village maliks were 'the real heads of the people'. But, 'It is not to be expected that this class of people, can, all at once, settle down, from being absolute rulers in their own division, to mere machines in our hands, however well we may remunerate them'.

Lumsden possessed a European consciousness of categorical social divisions. This sensibility emerged in the indigenous religious and caste categories detailed in colonial census operations that slowly evolved new forms of social and political awareness. Statistics assembled during and after the 1855 and
1868 Punjab censuses increasingly quantified local knowledge of regional 'castes', 'tribes', and social status. Also, as mentioned, land settlement operations simplified complex agrarian relations into specific categories directly catering to the needs of the colonial regime. Shareholders became landowning proprietors and landlords. Non-Pakhtuns became 'occupancy tenants' permanently barred from 'ownership' and the right to alienate or sell 'private property'. Less fortunate tillers, on the land for less than an arbitrary period, in the Peshawar valley twelve years, became 'tenants-at-will' liable to expulsion by 'landlords'. These categories had less meaning in 1850, but acquired greater significance in later decades as a growing market economy placed increasing value on property in land, wage labour, and contracts.

Lumsden's colonizer's consciousness of permanent social difference was more immediately reflected in his attitude towards recruiting local men to serve in the cavalry force stationed in Mardan, the Guides:

He would take no low caste men; he would have naught to say to the washermen, sweepers, and fiddlers' of the village...he would take only the highest, which in this land is the fighting caste. His argument was one which still holds good. It is not in reason to expect the classes which for hundreds of years have been hewers of wood and drawers of water, and for hundreds of years have been accustomed to receive the cuffs and kicks of their village superiors, to face readily the fighting classes in the day of battle. The prestige of the soldier would be wanting to them, and prestige counts for as much in the East as elsewhere.\textsuperscript{33}

It might be anticipated that if the British self-image required prestigious, warrior adversaries, it might also require suitably elite allies. In conjunction with pragmatic political expediency, this attitude helped to ensure that the 'highest' subjects, the Mandanr \textit{khans}, would soon find a place in the colonial hierarchy.

When James revisited the Yusufzai district a few years after Lumsden he gathered enough information to present a concise narrative of the recent past and the ongoing state of flux in the
local political economy. According to James, in the early Sikh period the governors in Peshawar had been able to gather a symbolic ‘nuzzurana’ or present that was ‘increased to a regular revenue of 10000 rupees per annum from each of thirteen Tuppahs, and 5000 from that of Loondkhor’. Two khans, Kadir Khan of Toru and Arsala Khan of Zaida, initially ‘engaged for the whole’, collecting the revenue from khans and maliks in the north-eastern tappas and forwarding it to Peshawar. This continued until local khans, resentful of the ‘apparent superiority’ conferred upon their peers, arranged direct payments to the Sikhs. Each leading khan deducted a mowajib payment from tappa gross revenues. Each tappa was allowed to gather the revenue in its own way, ‘it was not therefore separately assigned in villages’.

James wrote that the original position of ‘khan’ was old and hereditary from father to son, though ‘in many cases’ power determined succession among the relatives. The khans ‘were in fact the feudal chiefs of their several divisions, giving land to their retainers in lieu of pay, and receiving from them military and personal service’. No tax was charged or service taken from the ‘brotherhood’ of Pakhtun shareholders. On the original settlement in the valley, the khan received ‘something in excess of his ancestral share’ as ‘seree’ or ‘free gift’. The khan’s own lands were cultivated by ‘retainers’ for service only, ‘no share of produce being taken...’ Able to raise an armed force when needed and to offer the customary hospitality, khans were content with collecting ‘only a small fee at births and marriages’.

James described political changes occurring over time within different tappas. One of his examples dealt with the distribution of produce fees received from newly settled villages within tappa bounds. In ‘Dowlutzye, Ismaelzye, Loondkhor and other places’ new villages ‘were planted by the whole brotherhood’, who split fees of one-tenth to one-quarter of the harvests. In other tappas, including ‘Hotee, Tarooh and Sadoom’, new villages were initiated by powerful khans exercising an ‘assumed right.’
The ‘system was materially affected’ by the ability of the Sikhs to extort annual revenue payments, and the Yusufzai district ‘Pathans...endeavoured to cast the burden upon the cultivators.’ ‘It is now even difficult to explain to a Pathan proprietor that he cannot take a quarter of the produce and leave the revenue of the whole to be paid as before by the cultivators out of the remaining 3/4...’ James’ proposal to end this double taxation on non-shareholding tillers demonstrated the kind of compromise employed by local revenue officers afraid to enforce fully administrative conformity to a broader district or Punjab standard. He proposed, subject ‘to the revised settlement’, to declare that in ‘the whole of Eusufzye’, Pakhtun ‘proprietary right is acknowledged’, and ten per cent of the revenue given ‘as commutation’ for any service obligations or produce fees demanded from new villages. James was pressured not only by the elite, but by fakirs in new villages, who ‘paying the Government revenue now refuse to give such share to the proprietors’.

Revenue differentiation within the different Mandanr area tappas indicated how political hierarchies had evolved in a historically complex pattern created by the local interaction of empires, khans, maliks, shareholders, and fakirs. In one statement James listed the mowajibs that continued to be paid from tappa revenues. In seven tappas the khans alone were authorized to receive the payments. In five others, the allowance was distributed ‘amongst the brotherhood’. In a second statement James listed the ‘rent free lands’ and associated incomes received by the khans. Another table listed details of ‘their hereditary and acquired proprietary possession’ and related income. A final list tried to estimate the indirect income that khans received in kind from ‘household servants’ who took land rather than wages from the khans. From his percentage, the khan was responsible to make revenue payments on such land and, if agreed, for expenses for seed and draft animals. If the ‘servant’ agreed to pay all expenses and revenue the khan received no share of the harvest.

Rather than lobby to abolish the mowajib in general, James argued for eliminating only the allowances for the
‘brotherhoods’ as they were the cause of ‘continued jealousy, strife, and violence’ among claimants to a share. James wished to continue payments to the individual khans to uphold their prestige and ensure peace in the countryside. He explained that the mowajib was the largest source of elite khan income and its loss would result in ‘comparative poverty’. The khans had lost the ‘independent power’ of their position, lost their exemption of personal lands from revenue demands, and ‘are now incapable of guiding the people of their Tuppahs for either good or evil’. Continuing the mowajibs would allow the khans to ‘improve their estates and income’, and persuade them ‘to look to agriculture as to the source of wealth and influence’, especially ‘during the great social change which is necessarily taking place in the country’.37

James, as Lumsden before him, was drawn into a Hoti family feud that originated from a mowajib division between the sons of Lashkar Khan a generation earlier. The two sons, Ahmed Khan in Mardan and Muhammad Khan in Hoti, had divided the mowajib, then were succeeded by their respective sons, Mir Afzal Khan and Sirbuland Khan. On the death of Mir Afzal Khan, his share of the mowajib reverted to the government for allocation and was claimed by both his brother and his widow with an infant son. James proposed to restore the complete mowajib to Sirbuland Khan because the original division, done ‘immediately after annexation’, was improperly approved and was ‘not in accordance with Pathan custom’.38

The micro-politics of the Yusufzai sub-division spawned personal rivalries, family enmities, and appeals for imperial intervention and the support of independent clan allies. The Hoti family split was an example of the kind of colonial interaction in a complex lineage situation that might further polarize factions, increase the stakes involved, and lead to unintended consequences. Lumsden’s original division of the Hoti mowajib had been dictated by unknown ‘motives of policy’, setting the stage for James’ involvement in a dispute of lineage inheritance. In the mowajib correspondence was another reference, ‘that after Afzul Khan’s death quarrels ensued in the family; fostered by intrigues on the
part of our *Tahsildar*. The Hoti family competition continued for several decades more, emerging in new institutional arenas offered by the colonial state. Disputes over the control and inheritance of land were submitted to the colonial judicial system in numerous court cases, while Yusufzai sub-division British and local officials were subjected to the full range of imaginable pressures and influence.

Three years after James’ recommendations on Yusufzai district *mowajibs* Lumsden added his endorsement for continuing the allowances. They would compensate for the drain on *khans* still expected to maintain the hospitality of an open *hujra* and other social obligations, despite ‘the loss of power and position’. Lumsden detailed the usefulness of *khan* allies and collaborators, recalling how Ajab Khan, son of Mir Baba of Rustam, informed him of the hill path that allowed the military force to successfully outflank Babuzai ‘when the village was destroyed’ in 1847. Lumsden remembered how Ajab Khan had saved him from an ambush organized by men from Buner.39

The commitment of local administrators to elite interests was clearly demonstrated in particular land settlement decisions. In 1855 Sirbuland Khan benefited from a decision that lands around Hoti village ‘over and above those already partitioned are attached to the Khanship and are your property and all the men in Kandi Ghulaman cultivate your land and live in your Kandi Ghulaman, therefore they are exempt from *Sirkari Begar* and you are entitled to receive service from the people…’40

During the 1857-8 time of the ‘Indian Mutiny’ a final decision on the status of the Yusufzai district *khans* remained in abeyance. In the Peshawar District, north-eastern *khans* in addition to Ajab Khan took an active role in raising irregular levies. Such irregular forces helped subdue a Hindustani regiment that revolted at Nowshera and Mardan. The irregulars provided regional guards and joined the Punjab relief column sent to aid in the final capture of Delhi. The great revolt served as a turning point in opening colonial eyes to the advantages of co-opting not only local elites, but literally thousands of regional Pakhtuns into various types of government service.
Cooperation paid immediate dividends. On 21 May 1857 the Mardan garrison revolted and the British Assistant Commissioner took refuge with the Hoti Khan. Sirbuland Khan gathered loyalists, including followers of the khans of Zaida and Ismaila, to aid in the pursuit of the ‘mutineers’ into Swat. On 19 June 1857 a British parwana from the Assistant Commissioner’s court notified Sirbuland Khan that the lawsuit filed by Hoti ‘lambardars’ for an equitable partition of the Kandi Ghulaman neighbourhood and lands had been ‘dismissed for want of proof’.

In 1859 James’ original commander in Multan, H. B. Edwardes, now Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, made a case to the Punjab Financial Commissioner for continuing to patronize the ‘Khans of Yoosufzai’. Edwardes recommended that the mowajibs be declared hereditary, with the revenue still to be collected through the village maliks. Edwardes had the concomitant interests of local political stability and greater imperial security in mind as he offered his interpretation of local society. He thought it:

...deeply injurious to us on a Frontier to have a Native Aristocracy uncertain about their future. The border must necessarily remain in a feudal state; and these are the natural feudal chiefs...Experience has shown that it is not sufficient, even if it be just, to make the agricultural population prosperous. To preserve peace and lay up friends for war, we must keep the natural leaders of the country on our side, else ensues the strange phenomenon of a prosperous people led astray like sheep by a malcontent nobility. The expenditure involved in thus maintaining both our own and a native system forces us in the interior of the empire to a compromise; but on the outer frontier we had far better accept the difficulty.

Arguably, within the Peshawar valley the downward revisions of revenue settlements, the continuing patronage of local elite, including the Yusufzai Khans, and the expensive ‘difficulty’ of maintaining an extraordinary border situation all suggested that the early British colonial regime made pragmatic local compromises to Punjab and empire models of revenue
management and political consolidation. Valley residents, with different and with common interests, were encouraged by revenue and employment incentives to cooperate in the colonial project. In return they acquiesced in decisions leading to political subordination and economic integration. Khans and maliks in the Yusufzai district tappas received in total mowajib allowances slightly more than fifteen per cent of their subdivision’s revenue.

On a socio-cultural level, even before 1857, Peshawar colonial officials had carefully assessed the impact of their policies as violence around the valley fringes continually challenged claims to legitimacy. After 1857-8 in the Peshawar District, as across the newly created Indian empire, the post-‘Mutiny’ colonial state more consciously avoided the direct social interventions blamed by many for sparking the 1857 turmoil.

Events in the Peshawar valley in the decade before the ‘Mutiny’ suggest that immediate and salient relationships were in place, anticipating the post-1857 development in British India of an indirect, yet ranked colonial ‘social order...with the British crown seen as the centre of authority, and capable of ordering into a single hierarchy all its subjects, Indian and English’. In the Punjab, this hierarchy was structured around notions of ‘tribal’ social organization and ‘an indigenous ideological framework that would facilitate and legitimate the inclusion of rural intermediaries in an imperial administration’. It was an approach that appealed to imperialists unable to claim religious affinity and anxious to develop idioms of legitimacy other than those of Islamic solidarity. The difficulties encountered in eastern and central Punjab districts when administrators tried to define and manipulate actual ‘tribal’ dynamics of lineage, village organization, and land usage were also experienced in the Peshawar valley, including in the socially complex tappas around Peshawar city. But, while revenue officials would gradually succeed in transforming some main valley maliks into conventional lambardars and zaildars responsible for new ‘revenue circles’ (zails), to the extent of controlling appointments and dismissals, the khans and maliks of the
Yusufzai sub-division retained unique levels of control over the mechanics of revenue collection and village organization.

Across the Punjab selected aspects of ‘tribal’ leadership and influence were supported among a reconstituted class of local elite now useful as intermediaries and interpreters between the colonial state and village society. Simultaneously, modified models of ‘tribal’ social customs and institutions were promoted and deployed to achieve a degree of regulation over social behaviour that the British failed to understand or control. In the Peshawar District and the new Yusufzai sub-division a unique set of local and colonial initiatives and reactions guided the direction of events after the 1847-57 period, even as the larger dynamics of changing colonial and world economic structures slowly intruded into valley social relations.

NOTES

2. J. Royal Roseberry, *Imperial Rule in Punjab: The Conquest and Administration of Multan, 1818-81* (Manohar, New Delhi, 1987), p. 120. Roughly, the North-Western Provinces became the post-1947 Uttar Pradesh state.
6. *Gazetteer of the Peshawar District 1897-98*, p. 296. For Durrani, Sikh, and early British revenue figures from the James Settlement see Appendices 4 and 5.
8. Roseberry, *Imperial Rule*, p. 143. This Multan history follows Roseberry’s Chapter Eight.
9. James, *Settlement*, 1865, p. 120.
13. ‘In most villages there were two or three putwarees, attached to different factions, and remuneration was inadequate, consisting of fees in kind levied at the harvest.’ James, *Settlement*, 1865, p. 114.


18. MacGregor, *Central Asia*, vol. III, p. 390. Mir Baba was the ‘Meer Khan of Sidoom’ released in April 1847 by Lawrence from Sikh imprisonment.


25. One *biswa* was one-twentieth (*bis*, Urdu for twenty) of a *bigha*. A *bigha* was equal to one square *jarib*. Exact local dimensions may have varied. In Richard Saumarez Smith’s tables one *bigha* equals five-eighths of an acre (55 yards by 55 yards). The word *qulba* was a Persian word for plough used across northern Hindustan.


34. National Archives of India, New Delhi, *Foreign Department (Political) 1859 Consultation 15 July* Letter ‘No. 146’, dated 2 May 1856, p. 3. Letter from James, Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar to Edwardes, Peshawar Commissioner.
35. Letter No. 146, above, pp. 6-7.
39. Letter 'No. 4', dated 2 May 1856. This Lumsden note on James' letter No. 146 found with related correspondence under a cover letter dated 24 June 1859, all copied in above Foreign Department 1859 (Political) Consultation 15 July.
40. From British parwana dated 20 February 1855, printed in History of the Hoti Family, p. 27.
41. Parwana dated 19 June 1857, from Assistant Commissioner, Yusafzai. Copied in History of the Hoti Family, p. 29. For 'Mutiny' service and rewards see Appendices 6 and 7.
42. Letter 'No. 42 of 1859', dated 19 March 1859, assembled with related correspondence mentioned above under cover letter dated 24 June 1859.
COLONIZING INSTITUTIONS

Early British authority in the Peshawar valley exercised itself through governing idioms and relationships established by imperial predecessors. Over decades the British expanded and reconfigured local systems of education, land control, socio-political order, and taxation. Interactions with local social structures were guided by the special perspectives of a rising British-Indian imperial state. After 1857, subtle and aggressive new colonial policies were introduced, designed to consolidate state control over economic and political activity while nominally respecting Pakhtun family values and cultural autonomy. Administrative reports documented local schools and village landholdings, traditional agrarian practices, the creation of a bounded 'British territory', and the formalization of criminal law codes. Literally thousands of files provided a written record of the first fifty years in which indigenous institutions and social ties struggled to come to terms with the colonial presence while state initiatives were adapted to local realities. These processes involved ad hoc personal choices as well as increasingly formalized social relationships defined by colonial hierarchies, legal precedents, and an imperial milieu emphasizing western technology, thought, and culture.

In 1852, in addition to village lands, James had surveyed Peshawar valley schools. His report traced the intended and unintended social consequences of apparently simple land settlement operations. Observing that the majority of Muslim schoolteachers were mullas attached to village mosques, James recorded that he ‘brought on to the rent roll’ the average two to three bigahs of land dedicated by villages to maintaining each
mosque.\textsuperscript{1} Though village \textit{mullas} received fees at marriages, funerals, and other ceremonies, the only remuneration received from families of students consisted of a present, two to ten rupees, given when the student finished reading the Koran.

Village teachers not attached to a mosque received payment in grain, a plot of village land, or parental gifts. Some motivated by religious fervour taught without charge. Hindu teachers connected to \textit{dharmsalas} held ‘inheritable grants’, while Brahmin teachers tutoring in private homes generally earned two \textit{pice} a week per student, plus a two to four \textit{annas} monthly fee. These teachers also received presents on holidays and school leavings.

The British policy of eliminating intermediary revenue farmers sent the number of Hindu students enrolled in Muslim schools into decline. Though Hindu schools also taught commercial and agricultural accounting, many young men training to be revenue secretaries (\textit{munshis}) had attended Muslim schools to learn the Persian script and language. Now only forty-six Hindus studied in Muslim schools, where they read the Koran and Hindi texts translated into Persian by Kashmiri \textit{pandits}.\textsuperscript{2}

The Peshawar schools attracted students from many surrounding regions and offered a progression of studies. Young boys in Muslim schools began reading at five-and-a-half to six years of age and continued for five to seven years until they were able to read the Koran. James was of the opinion they understood little of the Arabic. The best students continued with Persian. At the age of sixteen or seventeen they might enter an exclusively Arabic language school to study ‘the Koran, two works on grammar, divinity, law, medicine, philosophy, rhetoric, astronomy, and mathematics’. Only students well versed in Persian read Pashtu texts. Persian schools taught the literary classics. Hindu schools taught ‘the Thakooree and Gurmookhee’. In Peshawar four schools for girls educated thirty to forty students. The proportion of young males in school to those of school age but not attending school remained higher in the region than in Delhi, 12.9\% to 10.9\%.\textsuperscript{3}
Colonial preconceptions about Islam affected education policies. Officials regarded student-scholars, ‘talib ilm’, with suspicion and reduced former levels of official support to them. Existing personal stipends were eliminated. The quality of the education received in Muslim schools was denigrated as tainted with ‘their religious prejudices’. Any hope for improvement in education through these schools seemed a ‘visionary project’, though at the moment vital government intervention seemed unlikely. ‘The style of their education, their teachers, the very place of their studies, are all eminently calculated to retard improvement and to confirm in the rising generation, the bigotry and ignorance of their fathers.’ After discussions with ‘several respectable natives’, James opined that an English language school would attract many students.

British policies of non-interference and fear of civil unrest restrained overt administrative control over mosques and Islamic education. Yet the imperial ability to manipulate the status of rent-free lands and subsidies and strategies to expel from the district religious figures charged with having no legitimate means of support helped constrain involvement in secular affairs by religious institutions.

In the 1850s Peshawar Commissioner Edwardes reversed an earlier decision banning Christian missionary activities west of the Indus. He personally patronized the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) in Peshawar. But Christian preachers in Peshawar bazaars daily faced intense arguments from Islamic partisans and were officially discouraged from travelling to villages outside the city. A CMS English language school at last opened and supporters erected a Christian church in the old city of Peshawar run by Punjabi missionaries. Edwardes viewed Christianity as the key to reforming Asian and local society. Medical missions and clinics eventually attracted thousands of patients. But Pakhtun family and clan resistance to missionary spiritual efforts, initiatives identified with imperial domination, allowed only the merest handful of local conversions.
Land as Property

The administrative regime consolidating in the Peshawar District was more directly involved in introducing colonial concepts of law and property into every village. Land tenures, revenue liabilities, and various agrarian ‘rights’ were categorized, assigned, and committed to paper. At first, settlement conflicts and decision appeals were resolved directly by revenue and district officers who possessed all executive and judicial authority. Over time, as a basic system of civil and criminal law evolved from local experience interacting with imported models, villagers and administrators mastered new codes and procedures. All parties also confronted the consequences of implicit philosophical contradictions contained within the general principles underlying established legal and revenue policies. In essence, the Peshawar District saw the rule of property subordinated to the rule of established practice, especially practice ingrained in hierarchies of power and influence.

In theory, the Permanent Settlement of Bengal established the rule of colonial law, supported by an independent judiciary, that would balance executive authority and act as the guarantor of personal economic rights. These rights included the ability to own and alienate property, especially land, and to enforce contracts. English and European economic theories of agrarian-based development, encouraging private gain through market forces, framed an approach in which ‘the revenue demand of the state on the land was limited, rights to ownership of the land were separated from rights to collect revenue on it and the role of the state in the economy was cut back to the simple preservation of law and order’.  

But almost from the beginning colonial moral legitimacy had been based also on respecting social and religious conventions, ‘customs’ that limited personal and economic autonomy. Individuals were now increasingly defined by revived ‘ancient’ law codes and ‘tradition’ as being bound by family and group obligations. Using early ideas of ‘Hindu law’, then of Muslim and ‘tribal’ customary practice, colonial authorities codified and
established norms to resolve unfamiliar family and social conflicts. This approach avoided the full-scale imposition of British legal concepts and structures and helped to validate a colonial social role as impartial arbiter. But the idea of encouraging private ownership of land did not coexist well with another colonial strategy of maintaining political tranquillity by accepting rather than challenging caste, lineage, or village practices, including established methods of land control. 'The public law rules concerning the validity of sale for value and the enforceability of debt contracts tended to stick fast on the question of hereditary ancestral landed property.'  

In the Peshawar valley, as much as or more than in any other district of the colonial empire, concepts of free alienation and contract enforcement foundered when a member of any non-landowning class staked a claim to village acreage and thus challenged clan possession. A Pakhtun shareholder leaving the Peshawar valley for service in Hindustan might mortgage his share in village fields to a brother or a relative. A Hindu shopkeeper might have a claim on crop harvests based on debts owed by a clan member. But even well after 1849 non-Pakhtuns in the Peshawar valley who aspired to outright ownership of land through the takeover of a defaulted mortgage or in lieu of unpaid advances or loans were deterred by a colonial system in which numerous layers of court proceedings and appeals protected colonial and lineage interests. 

During the 1857-8 period any lingering doubts about the permanency of the British colonial presence in the Peshawar valley were dispelled as the military institutionalized an absolute regional domination through force. During the great revolt, the unsettled political climate encouraged Islamic activists in Panjtar and Sitana. The British blamed these groups for corresponding with Hindustani regiments in the Peshawar area and for rallying dissident maliks and individuals in British-controlled villages of the north-eastern valley. In response, in the summer of 1857 British forces raided Narinji, a 'British' village, and in 1858 attacked and destroyed Panjtar and Sitana. Any fundamental political implications of these local conflicts were submerged in
colonial polemics condemning the 'most rancorous and seditious letters...intercepted from Muhammadan bigots in Patna and Thanesar...'; other correspondence regarding 'the fanatics in Swat and Sitana'; and unrest attributed to the 'red hot fanatic' from Kunar province in Afghanistan. Religion stirred emotion among many, but remained only one element influencing local politics. Support among border Mohmand clans for the 'fanatic' Sayyid from Kunar rapidly declined when the British compromised and restored to Mohmand arbabs subsidies that had been revoked in 1854.9

Through the 1860s the Peshawar District administration continued to perfect an internal structure of order and control. Successes in regularizing revenue processes and developing a court system encouraged attempts to draw fuller distinctions between the rights and obligations of villagers nominally within the extreme limits of settled district borders and those viewed as residents of independent territories. Illusions of having understood and controlled valley populations led colonial decision-makers to badly misjudge their ability to draw an absolute border or to permanently alter the behaviour of neighboring clans.

Internal administrative conformity to the greater Punjab model was evident by mid-1865 as the formal surveying and land-rights allocation process slowly revising James' Peshawar District settlement reached the Yusufzai sub-division. Issues outstanding for years, even decades, were closely considered. From 1849 Punjab officials had faced multiple revenue and land claims, including those based on official agreements dating to the Sikh era and earlier. A typical case involved a submission for renewal of a forty-rupee payment given by Ranjit Singh in lieu of a land grant. The claimant stated that the original sanad from Ranjit Singh had been given to Governor Avitabile in return for an order (pawana). This in turn had been submitted to officials early in the British period when such claims came under review. An 1855 decision said that with the pawana now missing and no existing deed of grant from the original grantee, the claimant's father, the award was 'resumeable' or ended.10
Such decisions now accumulated in the permanent institutional memory of the files of British records offices.

From the beginning, the general Punjab policy stated that because District Revenue and Civil courts had no documentary evidence on the basis of which to settle land disputes, revenue officers must simply assemble records of land possession until actual settlement operations put a settlement officer in a position to consider direct evidence of field and village land use. Only then could final ‘rights in the soil’ be assigned. And only then, after an initial decision, could cases be submitted to the Civil Court system. Early efforts to minimize disputes emphasized the arbitration skills of settlement officers. A policy to limit disputes to a revenue context included the decision that no claim ‘...shall be heard as a question of possession or right in any criminal court’.

A conservative approach was nominally taken, apparently securing the status of non-land-owning hereditary cultivators (hamsayas or fakirs). As ‘occupancy tenants’ they could not sell rights of cultivation, but could make ‘temporary’ arrangements leaving others to work the land. As long as such a tenant paid the ‘rent’ due he could not be evicted. But rules now defined ‘tenants’ in residence less than twelve years as tenants-at-will liable to arbitrary eviction.

The literal groundwork for the formal 1869-1876 Regular Settlement slowly proceeded in the mid-1860s. In May 1865 an Extra Assistant Commissioner, ‘Atta’ Muhammad Khan, with thirteen secretaries and assistants began taking exact measurements of one hundred and ninety-two villages in the Yusufzai sub-division. They adjudicated the range of possible land-related litigious disputes and prepared village ‘genealogical trees’ illustrating statements of village shares. Early work in the Yusufzai sub-division continued until December 1865. Details were summarized in a standard four-page printed report that contained fifty-four sub-headings detailing disputes, rent-free investigations, measurement and assessment details, and settlement expenses. Over the eight months the effort resulted in complete measurements of thirty-five villages, with the remainder ‘pending’.
In the past, in an era of abundant land and fixed shares, an indeterminate or disputed claim to a particular plot of family patrimony or land held by others had remained either a negligible issue or one not worth settling through confrontation and a potential feud. Now, with a permanent record being assembled, several claims were advanced, including some from the powerful and influential. Claimants filed twenty proprietary claims to entire villages, though only one such case was resolved in the early period.

The order symbolized by complex procedures and field reports could not disguise the human shortcomings of the revenue administration and local strategies of accommodation. At the end of 1867, officials unearthed 'defalcations' in the Yusufzai settlement office. 'Much of the settlement office' local staff were found guilty of stealing penalty funds paid into the department for village breaches of minor criminal or settlement-department regulations. Between eleven and twelve hundred rupees had disappeared.\textsuperscript{15} Low-level British officials, frequently transferred and rarely interested in the finer details of village documents first recorded in the Urdu language, never solved the problem of absolute internal controls. No comprehensive surveillance could be guaranteed over relations between \textit{tahsildars}, village revenue \textit{patwaris}, and villagers desiring to manipulate records of field maps and tenures.

After 1947, a retired official with decades of local experience, including duty as Assistant Commissioner in the Yusufzai Sub-division, remembered:

...and the richer people were in a very strong position to bribe the local recorder-er-to record more land or different land or the enemy's land or something of that kind, and the \textit{patwari} was very low paid and the corruption to some extent was inevitable, although there was a very good system of checks and balances and it was usually put right, but I think there was a good deal of corruption; also there was corruption in certain cases in the courts...in the-er-certainly in the Police and the...and the-er-lower ranks of the police in bringing cases to court and probably to some extent in the -um- in civil law, too.\textsuperscript{16}
The 1869-74 Regular Settlement, only completed in 1876, symbolized the full integration of the Peshawar District administration into the Punjabi and larger colonial pattern. Trained personnel freed from completed settlements in other Punjab districts arrived to revise and complete earlier Peshawar revenue work. By then, old political bounded areas based on clan settlement *tappas* had been reorganized into *tahsils*. The Mohmand and Khalil *tappas* now formed the Peshawar *Tahsil*. The Hashtnagar, ‘Naushahra’, and ‘Doaba Daudai’ *tahsils* completed the western valley. In 1872 officials divided the early Yusafzai *Tahsil*, considered ‘an unmanageably large one’, into the Yusafzai (Mardan) *Tahsil* and Utman Bolak *Tahsil*. For revenue purposes the new Yusufzai *tahsil* was internally split into eight ‘assessment circles’ (*chaklas*) that divided the area by soil types, access to water, and geography rather than original clan boundaries.

During the Regular Settlement one hundred and fifty-two *patwaris*, one hundred and thirty-four assistants, and three hundred and twenty-two ‘extra *amins*’ surveyed the Peshawar District. A local unit of measurement, the *karu*, equal to sixty-six inches, scaled all maps. Surveyors used plain tables, sixty-six foot-long chains, and rods one *karu* in length. Field maps (*shajras*) and ‘pedigree tables’ detailed and structured complex village holdings. Officials compared village genealogies with greater clan genealogies. It took twenty-two months to finish the measurement process, though ‘errors’ were assumed in data about border villages. In some border areas officials simply could not complete the process as, ‘the cultivation was generally in the hands of men of independent territory whose attendance at the same time with the proprietors was not always advisable or obtainable’.

The institutional policies of the revenue administration had potential social consequences in Peshawar as in the greater Punjab. The simple choice of the ‘village’ as the ‘unit of administration’ might begin fragmenting the familial and clan ties and obligations that linked diverse neighbouring settlements, including *bandas* and lineage offshoots.
The leeway given to early settlement officers meant that policy decisions could express personal views of local social conditions and how best to influence them. James continued *mowajibs* to elite north-eastern *khaus*, but recommended against continuing grants to non-hierarchical *tappas*. The bringing of mosque (*masjid*) *inam* lands on to the tax rolls symbolically subordinated Islam to the colonial state, though political considerations left the lands exempt from actual revenue demand. Early analysis of Peshawar 'feudal' society by James and Edwardes justified expedient political and revenue policies and exemplified local understandings recognizable in more sophisticated form in later Punjab policies.

The British rationalized applying the principle of collective responsibility for village revenues to Punjab districts and the Peshawar area as being consistent with maintaining the lineage bonds of 'bhaiachara' village organization. Yet the act of recording village genealogical 'pedigrees' could stifle social processes of lineage fragmentation while structuring divisions for future political competition. A Pakhtun sense of being one among proprietary shareholders unified by a common history of village settlement was contradicted by awareness of being considered among now jointly responsible 'owners' of personal pieces of land; ownership no longer secured by clan practice but regularized by settlement office records and court-based legal decisions. A steady increase in land-related cases in Peshawar courts was an indication of the extent to which resources, ambitions, and family futures realigned themselves to the authority of colonial institutions.

**Codifying Custom**

During the 1869-74 period the Settlement Officer, E. G. Hastings, asked settlement officials to compile a record of local customs about the inheritance and transfer of property. Officials gathered *tappa* and village-level responses about rights in
property and land, including the rights of widows and children, and listed whether particular rights originated in Islamic ‘law’ or clan ‘custom’. As Hindu law codes had been compiled and consulted by legal authorities to resolve personal and property disputes, officials codified Punjab ‘customary law’ to provide convenient, locally legitimate guidance.

Creating a record of local customs of property inheritance and transfer could be done only through the limited, elite contacts developed by colonial authorities. The method of gathering customs involved drafting questions that the settlement officers needed answered. Questions related to property rights were distributed to ‘leading men’ who were instructed to explain the questions ‘to all concerned within their circles’. On an agreed day the leading men ‘with representatives from all villages within the tahsil’ met with officials. Though the questions were later released for public comment, in essence, only khans, arbabs, maliks, and revenue lambardars considered the questions and provided the answers.

The methodology required the listing of precedents and exceptions. Officials compared personal statements to evidence revealed by genealogical tables and a ‘separate statement of customs for each village’. Implicit was the notion that unchanging village ‘custom’ existed and had only to be logged and elaborated. But such an artificial process contained the inherent risk that any ‘custom’ specific to the village level might represent as much recent family practice as any clan or tribal tradition. Officials actually recorded ‘New customs wished for the future’. Admittedly an unusual step, this occurred because the Financial Commissioner had not yet furnished officials with either ‘the definition of what was to be considered a custom’ or any idea of ‘what was necessary to be recorded’.

Clan leaders in each tappa were to provide an accurate view of the accepted ability of a proprietor to dispose of his property, of the inheritance shares of a childless widow, and of shares of sons, daughters, and their children. But a process that allowed the major stakeholders to consider their answers and weigh possible consequences inevitably produced a sanitized set of
responses. Specific Pakhtunwali practices differing from Islamic norms might be publicly associated with religious orthodoxy from motivations of piety or respectability despite being contrary to the facts. Pragmatic handling of family land by sons-in-law, daughters, widows, or others might not be practices clan leaders would want formalized for future reference.

When reviewing about the rights of a widow ‘whose husband has died childless’, officials decided that ‘in many cases’ in villages of the old Khattak, Khalsa, and Qasba areas the answer given, that ‘Muhammadan law’ was followed, ‘was nothing more than what they wished for the future’. In other words, widows without children despite having an Islamic claim to a share of their husband’s property did not receive it. The need to declare a definitive ‘answer’ inevitably discarded a range of practices favoured in different tappas. ‘Exceptions’ discussed indicated that, in fact, some widows might receive a share or a percentage of produce. Others might expect only maintenance for life. Yet others might be allowed a strong supervisory role over a husband’s land under the nominal protection of male relatives.

The ‘general custom’ recording how sons divided a father’s property hinted at the influence of hierarchies. The Islamic rule about equal division among sons was modified in tappas where clan internal stratification had occurred. Was it actual custom, elite respondents, or power that ignored an equitable distribution ideal dating to Sheikh Mali to insist that in the Khalil tappa ‘the share attaching to the arbabi is separate, and is the sole right of the successor to the arbabi or chiefship’? In the Doaba and Amanzai areas the eldest son of a malik or khan was entitled not only to his personal share but to the whole of the family inam. In the Yusufzai sub-division areas of Kamalzai, Razzar, and Utman Nama ‘the eldest son of the khan who succeeds to the khanship is said to be entitled to two shares’ of family property, ‘over and above the rights attaching to the khanship’.

Explaining ‘these modifications of the general custom’, in the Yusufzai region it was said ‘that the sons have not received equal shares, but this is usually traceable to the act of the father
during his lifetime distributing his land unequally among his sons'. That is, personal choices of elite khans dating back perhaps only a generation or two could create a 'custom' that now codified 'modification' and unequal distributions of clan shares. Shifting inequalities arising from fluid contests decided by power, personality, and imperial patronage were now frozen as precedents for future generations.

Genuine differences of property relations existed in the Peshawar valley. In the main valley sons by different mothers divided estate shares equally among themselves (pagri vesh). In the Yusufzai tappas shares were divided equally among sets of sons by different wives and were then subdivided among each wife's sons (parunai vesh). Widows and daughters in the Yusufzai tappas had the least apparent or proclaimed rights under 'custom'. In the Razzar tappa patriarchy dominated, especially for childless widows. 'The proprietors gave as their custom that the widow was only entitled to maintenance.' Unlike in other valley tappas, in Razzar proprietors could not gift land to daughters, as in occasional dowry gifts (dahez). In fact, 'Tappa Razzar does not under any circumstances allow property to go to the daughter'.

In valley tappas, excepting Razzar, proprietors could dispose of their land as they wished in their lifetime, disinheriting or giving inequable treatment to different sons. 'Custom' said that a verbal gift of land was sufficient to secure the possession of a son-in-law. But now that written records existed in which leading proprietors could define their own 'rights', 'For the future, all wish it to be obligatory to have a written deed, but that the son-in-law in possession be continued as a tenant with right of occupancy'. Sons-in-law and daughters who might have expected their sons, the original proprietor's grandchildren, to be recognized as shareholders, even without a deed of gift, now might see their sons defined by dominant lineages as 'tenants' and denied 'ownership'.

This last refinement, turning an inheritance matter earlier subject to acceptance or dispute among Pakhtun shareholders to the advantage of main lineages, previewed the way colonial
codes and policies narrowed previously contingent possibilities. In its details, the exercise in creating a body of knowledge about property relationships exposed how the powerful could conveniently define their actions as Islamic or ‘customary’ and literally write the precedents to be followed in future disputes.\textsuperscript{30} The colonial process of defining a body of landless tenants continued with the production of a customary code that did not recognize loose practices leading to social mobility and excluded non-shareholders from any stake in historic land devolution practices of apparent antiquity.

The Peshawar District customary law, assembled during the Regular Settlement, was printed in the final report and in a portion of a related Urdu volume\textsuperscript{31} written by Gopal Das, an experienced Punjab settlement officer. This early record preceded a formal district Customary Law Code published in 1899.\textsuperscript{32} The wide range of evidence gathered suggested that, historically, Pakhtun custom existed less in a normative sense than as a body of flexible practices adapted by clans, \textit{khels}, and individual families from broad patriarchal, lineage, and Islamic ideals. The effect of codifying this social practice was to turn locally negotiated, adaptive processes of family and lineage practice into formal lists of precedents to be picked over by magistrates and village rivals.\textsuperscript{33} Social identities were reduced to fixed economic relationships. Even at the time, one colonial observer analysed the way these codes diminished the moral authority of village councils, as courts appropriated the right to make ‘customary’ decisions.\textsuperscript{34} Colonial legal sanction derived from such customary law codes bypassed village councils, including Pakhtun \textit{jirgas}, even as it displaced religious injunction and authority as an imperial basis of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{35} In this way Edwardes’ idea of negotiating between two systems of authority in the colonial border area was partially realized.

David Gilmartin has argued that by using lineage custom to understand and control Punjab society British administrators attempted to marry colonial power to ‘an “ideology” of tribal organization’. This effort derived from expediency and a growing body of ethnographic and government analysis
visualizing the colonial empire as a guardian nurturing the less fortunate towards civilization. The patronage of customary practice became a key policy validating this colonial ambition. At the same time, this patronage neatly appropriated clan knowledge and authority into colonial institutions. Lineage and genealogy that had served as clan ideological armour against Mughal hierarchies now faced subordination within an imperial hierarchy headed by a queen-empress, Victoria.

**Constructing Boundaries**

After 1857-8, East India Company territories came under the direct rule of the English crown and the populations west of the Indus experienced the effects of intensified efforts to establish a morally legitimate colonial political authority. More than previous empires primarily concerned with influencing individuals, clans, and strategic locations the new power claimed absolute control over a spatially defined ‘British territory’ and its population. West of the Indus this involved creating both political differences and a recognized border between colonial districts and diverse ‘independent’ ‘tribal’ regions. Pursued through military coercion and the development of police, revenue, and judiciary systems, these institution-building activities represented themselves as socially beneficial and progressive.

A complementary achievement of this period was the development of a colonial archive of studies of local languages, history, and society. Reference to this archive further helped validate policies claimed to be based on a scientific foundation as opposed to indigenous despotism, fanaticism, and ignorance. Official reports presenting a singular, authoritative perspective now screened current local perspectives.

Between 1849 and 1878, one source listed twenty-two different ‘frontier expeditions against the Afghans on our borders’. Rarely could the British military decisively defeat foothill and independent highland clans able to withdraw into
mountain refuges and pursue endless irregular war. Peshawar authorities perfected the surprise punitive dawn raid in which villages were attacked, crops threatened, and concessions extorted from local maliks and khans, either before or after fighting. A dual imperial potential for ongoing ‘diplomatic’ communications and violent military action contributed to the polarizing effect upon internal Pakhtun political stability. During this process, the British attempted to create a body of separate British ‘subjects’, while asserting indirect influence over nominally independent neighbouring clans.

Episodes of colonial coercion traced the ambiguous relationship between power and colonial knowledge. In 1849 government troops assaulted Babuzai village and the adjacent Bazdurrah sub-valley in the foothills leading to Swat. An experienced linguist accompanying this expedition, Lt. H. G. Raverty, eventually wrote a Pashtu grammar and a dictionary. His translations of Persian and Pashtu manuscripts gradually gave to the west access to centuries of regional history and literature. But soon after 1849 he transferred with his regiment from the Peshawar valley. He remained unable to turn his local expertise to advantage either in a posting in Peshawar or a satisfying military career. His retirement, at a relatively young age, perhaps related to an uncompromising personality revealed in text footnotes, indicated the subordinate position that uncommitted scholarly knowledge had in the post-1857 colonial establishment. A large portion of his most exceptional historical research was actually published as filler in two volumes of route descriptions assembled for the use of units engaged in the second Anglo-Afghan war of 1878-82.

In 1852 the British continued efforts to extend their ‘frontier’ across the north of the Peshawar valley to the final passes into Swat. A letter of 18 May 1852 told how a force marched that morning ‘with a view to commence the destruction of all the villages in the Ranezai Valley’. ‘After burning Iskakot’, Dargai village was ‘completely destroyed’. At the time, Shergarh village seven or eight miles from Iskakot served as ‘our frontier village’. The schedule for the next day included orders ‘to proceed to burn other villages in Ranezai…'
The British forced the area into submission by making claims against specific villages, then using locally recruited troops, some in service since the 1839-42 first Anglo-Afghan war, to enforce compliance. These confrontations were not absolute imperial-local conflicts based on ethnicity or religion. Colonial patronage and power did offer alternative choices for villagers. The 1852 report, made after the first day of action, included the information that ‘...some other men of Captain Coke’s Regiment have lost relatives who were fighting against us, and many of our own subjects were doubtless arrayed against us, yet recruits flock to Captain Coke’s and Lt. Lumsden’s Regiments for service after as before the fight’.41

When Lawrence described his December 1849 attacks on several ‘Loonkhor’ villages of the northern foothill area, he wrote that ‘foreigners’ from Swat aided the defenders of Sangao, Palli, Zormandi, and Sher Khana. He said they were ‘driven like sheep’ back across the ‘frontier’ and that there nothing prevented a pursuit into ‘their country’ had it been wished ‘to add Swat to the British Dominions’.42 But by 1852 high casualties caused the British military commander ‘to be less than ever disposed to attempt to enter Swat...’

Imperial reasoning that included conceptions of subject, frontier, ‘their country’, and British dominion left little room for any historical understanding of regional culture and society, and even for scholarship like Raverty’s. Afghans defined as ‘subjects’ now were judged from the perspective of an imperial state in the process of consolidating its authority. Residents of the hill country between the Swat and Peshawar valleys had long histories of trade, grazing, and agrarian relations that followed established patterns of interaction and conflict resolution. As the British presence menaced the passes into Swat and Buner the mutually transforming effects of imperial state-tribal clan contact became apparent. The Peshawar administration, often requiring only token conformity to standards of revenue and order, nevertheless frequently polarized village opinions, creating new factions in dual opposition. This
fragmentation substantially contributed to a new ‘border’ sensibility. Between 1861 and 1866 the practice of sheer coercion peaked, giving this interactive dynamic a more prominent role.

The great security threat to imperial interests in the Peshawar valley had ended in 1858. The lesson learned seemed to be that properly deployed power would enforce the colonial will, not only within the imperial boundaries but in immediately surrounding territories. In 1858 the Islamic communities in Panjtar and Sitana villages had been displaced eastward to Malka village in the small Chamla valley south-east of Buner. The British exerted pressure on local clans declaring them proprietors of the Panjtar and Sitana lands and in return holding them responsible for enforcing a ban on the return of the Islamist ‘Mujahideen’. But the imperial need to impose its own standards on local village practices continued to involve Peshawar officials in less vital situations, especially along the northern border of the Yusufzai sub-division.

As the British slowly assimilated the Lundkhwar or Baizai region into the colonial mainstream, villagers of the adjacent Ranezai and Utman Khel foothill regions found their local activities redefined and subject to unfamiliar consequences. In the Bazdurrah valley of the Ranezai clan villages of Palli, Sher Khana, and Zormandi and in the nearby villages of three Utman Khel clans, British concepts of law and order encroached upon a borderless society in which ‘...political decisions, the conduct of law, and the protection of life and property (were) the responsibility of members of the local community, whose actions (were) governed by internal considerations’.

The hills and ridge lines dividing Swat, Bazdurrah, and the Utman Khel *tappa* channeled rather than blocked foot and pack-animal traffic. Peshawar valley and Utman Khel villagers travelled to Swat through the Bazdurrah valley to purchase rice, bullocks, and clarified butter (*ghee*). Feuding Utman Khel villagers took refuge in the Bazdurrah valley. Bazdurrah residents moved temporarily to Utman Khel villages for family or agrarian reasons. Some Palli residents tilled fields in the
Utman Khel *tappa*. Betrothals occurred and loans given and returned between residents of the different areas. Agreements existed over rights to cut grass for fodder, including on the hill dividing Palli from Kharkai. In Palli, transit tolls were levied with varying fees per bullock load of *ghee*, rice, iron, cloth, fruit, and indigo. Traders with mules travelled in one day from Qasmi village in Lundkhwar through the Bazdurrah valley to Tannah village in Swat. In one day loaded bullocks from Tannah could reach Palli or Gujar Baba village south of the Bazdurrah area.\(^{45}\)

Such normally benign behaviour experienced disruption when aggrieved parties attempted to recover defaulted loans, redress broken promises, and avenge perceived injuries. Individuals and families used ‘*bota barampta*’ to seize guilty persons, their cattle, or their produce to force payments or exact concessions. Individuals and property from the village of the accused were subject to capture. When such seizure was declared unlawful and when outright robbery occurred, revenge-seeking and feud resulted.

In 1861-2 numerous local incidents consistent with Pakhtun ideas of justice and honour occurred in the Bazdurrah and Utman Khel territories. A Zormandi villager named Kurram seized three head of cattle being led down from Swat by a resident of Katlang village as leverage to force agreement over a claim he had on a house in Katlang. Amirullah Khan of Palli seized thirteen rupees from a Kharkai resident because another Kharkai shareholder had gone to Hindustan without repaying a loan. The men of Palli held two men of Kharkai for cutting grass in the wrong place. Amirullah Khan was blamed for several seizures, including that of the agricultural implements of a passing tiller. The brother of a Palli woman who had eloped with Asaf, a Palli man, tracked the pair to Kharkai where he stabbed to death Asaf’s cousin in partial redressal of the family honour.\(^{46}\)

These commonplace details of Pakhtun life gained significance in 1861-2 because in this period the British claimed the Utman Khel villages as government territory, while Bazdurrah was still considered outside the ‘border’. Utman Khel
maliks appealed for action to local police authorities and to the office of the Assistant Commissioner in Mardan. The authorities compiled many of these acts on a ‘List of offences’ committed by the Ranezai clans. ‘Crimes’ defined as detainment, robbery, and murder now became the responsibility of British officers. Officials attributed nineteen offences from May 1861 to December 1862 valued at eighty-nine rupees to Sher Khana residents. Another forty-five rupees in losses were ascribed to ‘the Bazdurrah men’.

On investigation in late 1862, the Assistant Commissioner found the root of much conflict in an eight-year-old loan of two hundred and sixty rupees from Amirullah Khan to ‘Masom’ of Kharkai. Masom had gone to Hindustan while his brother, still tilling Masom’s share, ‘failed to make restitution’. Other trouble came from a twenty-year-old debt of thirty-three rupees, a six-year-old payment owed for the price of a buffalo, and small property and grazing disputes. Because of the death of Ghulam Shah, the Lundkhwar malik long responsible for collecting revenue and maintaining order, the Assistant Commissioner ‘appointed’ a jirga of northern village maliks to arbitrate the conflicts.

Political events in Swat and Bazdurrah precluded any immediate resolution of the cases, but proposed possible solutions included ‘enforcing compensation’, levying fines, making local maliks responsible for security, or blockading Bazdurrah and cutting it off from markets in the Peshawar valley. For neither the first time nor the last, it was clear that the mere ability to claim authority and define crimes and offences did not necessarily resolve the grievances or erase long standing socio-economic relationships. In the end, the exercise was ‘more to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for the future than retain redress for the past’ and to ‘convince’ Palli residents that they could not continue to harass ‘our people’.48

The patient processes of establishing communication, and of developing local knowledge and confidence in a new legal and political environment were little valued by many British military authorities who continued to supply the administrative cadre of
the Peshawar valley. When the Islamic activists of Malka, now in alliance with the late Sayyid Akbar Shah’s son Mubarik, continued agitation and, in late 1863, reasserted claims in the Sitana area, ‘the Government decided to make an effort to extirpate this centre of disaffection’. The Peshawar Division Commissioner was now Reynell Taylor, earlier a lieutenant under Lawrence in Peshawar in 1847.

Malka was in Amazai Mandanr country at the eastern end of the short Chamla valley south-east of Buner. To reach it from Rustam village in the Sudhum valley of the settled district, travellers went over the Ambela Pass then, instead of turning left into Buner, turned right into the Chamla valley. British authorities planned to march a column, quickly and unannounced, up the Sudhum valley, cross into the Chamla valley, and seize Malka. Authorities overestimated the actual threat of the Islamic figures and misjudged too the long approach valley and rugged terrain of the Ambela Pass. It took two days to assemble the attacking column on the pass. The decision not to notify the Swat and Buner clans of the expedition’s limited objective led thousands of men from different hill valleys to mass to stop the column. Hundreds of pages of colonial justification fail to conclude that this ultimate village raid was a fiasco second only to the loss of an entire colonial army in the 1839-42 first Anglo-Afghan war.

Opposition stopped the column in the rugged pass country. British prestige required reinforcements and some demonstration of success. In six weeks of heavy fighting from late October 1863 one source estimated that nine hundred colonial soldiers died. Another source listed two hundred and thirty-eight killed, with nineteen hundred and thirty-three wounded. The British marshalled their resources and succeeded in traversing the pass. But the column halted with clan reinforcements arriving and twenty-one miles left to reach Malka. Continued fighting threatened not only the independence of Buner and Swat but also several British careers. A compromise formula was devised that saved face on both sides with an agreement that a few British officers would be escorted to Malka. There Buner and
Swat *khans* would oversee the destruction of the village. Again the Islamic activists were symbolically dispersed to other hill villages. But the event ended for a generation any efforts at military coercion north of the Swat and Buner foothills.

By mid-November 1863 Hugh James had replaced Taylor as Commissioner. By August 1864 the Peshawar Division had a new Commissioner, the Peshawar District a new Deputy Commissioner, and the Yusufzai sub-division a new Assistant Commissioner. Colonial and post-colonial discourse diffused responsibility and softened judgements on British policy. Popular literature blamed fanaticism inspired by Swat’s pre-eminent spiritual leader Abdul Ghaffur, respectfully titled ‘Akhund’. In discussing Ambela, Caroe suggested that the Akhund of Swat eventually ‘came in’ against the British. Caroe speculated that Ajab Khan, the Amazai Mandanr *khan*, had incited opposition because he had not been consulted about the campaign. But, in fact, Ajab Khan was rewarded for his participation in the Ambela campaign and on 1 January 1877 was one of twenty-seven *khans* to receive a certificate commemorating the district ‘Imperial Assemblage’ celebrating the crowning of Queen Victoria as Empress of India. And though religious rhetoric did inspire clans fighting the British, the Akhund of Swat was probably neither present at Ambela nor acted as a political opponent organizing a religious war. A British overconfidence in the effectiveness of military solutions, derived from years of minor ‘frontier campaigns’ and increasingly condescending attitudes towards Afghan populations, led to a flawed analysis and mistaken policy. In discussing Ambela Caroe praised British *elan*, chivalry, manliness, and gallantry, but never once blamed British overreaching and distorted colonial mentalities.

The perceived role of the Akhund of Swat at Ambela was important in understanding the colonial substitution of fundamental political issues with images of individual Islamic fanaticism. The British demonized Abdul Ghaffur, an ascetic religious scholar who had left studies in the Peshawar valley to return to Swat during the Sikh period. Popular histories and
secondary official reports portrayed him as a constant conspirator against the British, as the power able to appoint a ‘king’ of Swat, and as the one personally responsible for the holy war at Ambela. In his near contemporary discussion of these claims Raverty demolished such orientalist constructions on an item-by-item basis. He analysed the complex secular and religious connotations of the title ‘Badshah’ conferred by the Akhund upon Sayyid Akbar Shah before the Sayyid’s death in 1857. And he also recorded the reaction of an old Buner acquaintance who had been present at Ambela. The Pakhtun scoffed at the idea that the Akhund, characterized by Raverty as a ‘poor decrepit old recluse’, had been there. Any later knowledgeable disagreement about the level of secular and spiritual authority actually possessed by the Akhund or by Sayyid Akbar Shah came long after reductive colonial annals that, for the rest of the nineteenth century, characterized clan resistance as springing from an outdated, irrational religion.

**Tribal Formation**

The aftermath of the Ambela events witnessed a series of local and imperial reactions typifying the process in which imperial contact altered clan and village socio-political structures. Residents of the Peshawar valley, especially from the Utman Khel tappa, had attacked the British army on the Ambela Pass. During the conflict James apparently intended ‘to make a severe example of their disloyalty’. But the expensive check to British military ambitions, the large number of villagers involved, and a wish to defuse ‘the excitement of what had been proclaimed as a Ghuzza or religious war’, induced a pragmatic, non-violent solution. In March 1864 officials summoned the Utman Khel ‘jirga’ and levied a fine of twenty-five hundred rupees.55

Bitter internal Utman Khel differences of opinion about the jirga summons meant that not all the leading maliks attended, though the fine was paid. Soon after, dissension, ‘stimulated by the incidence of the fine’, arose as those who had boycotted the
"jirga" abused those *maliks* who had attended. The three Utman Khel clans, the Ismail Khel, Daud Khel, and Sesadda, suffered internal splits. The Ismail Khel village of Barmoul, in the foothills, expelled Malik Bazgul who had favoured the *jirga* solution. Bazgul took refuge in the Ismail Khel village of Kui, located in the plains three miles below Barmoul. Malik ‘Summut’ of Kui, opposed to the *jirga* and payment of the fine, was expelled from Kui and moved up to Barmoul. The Daud Khel experienced the same split and interchange between the highland village of Mian Khan and the plains village of Pipul.

By July 1864 the two Utman Khel hill villages, joined by Sangao, a third hill village, confronted the plains villages, which now held ‘the majority of those disposed towards the Government’. In August the Ismail Khel villages fought, resulting in several fatalities. In late September fighting continued between the plains villages and Mian Khan and Sangao, now reinforced with supporters from Sher Khan and Zormandi in the Bazdurrah valley. Fighting continued into October 1864.

Commissioner James did not involve himself in the conflict, despite pleas for help from the plains villages to the Assistant Commissioner in Mardan. One official speculated that James felt that the villages all deserved a kind of self-inflicted punishment or perhaps that when the villages were finally exhausted they might be ‘more amenable to punishment and subjection’. A new Division Commissioner replaced James in late October 1864.56 After Ambela another military solution was not a serious option, yet events had moved beyond simply compiling another list of offences. Officials attempted a political solution. A new Deputy Commissioner called another *jirga* from all the involved villages, then immediately put twenty-one *maliks* in jail.

After variously considering punishing ‘the more influential and disloyal Mulliks’, imposing a heavy fine, or taking hostages, officials decided to pursue an old strategy recommended by area *khans* and *maliks* and used in Sangao village by Edwardes in 1855. The Bazdurrah valley villages were to provide temporary hostages. But the final answer was to move the Utman
Khel hill villages down to the plains, 'where they would be available and open to attack and control'. The earlier Sangao removal had failed due to a lack of surveillance during the 1857 emergency and the site had been reoccupied. Now officials prepared a detailed plan that considered water sources and logistics.

In January 1866 soldiers evacuated Sangao, Mian Khan, and Barmoul, then levelled every building in the villages. Elephants were used to flatten walls. Labour drafted from local villages built new homes in selected locations in the plains. Officials relocated Barmoul residents at Kui. A 14 February letter reported 'the perfect re-establishment of the new' villages. After inspecting the old village sites the Assistant Commissioner wrote of the 'striking and impressive' change. At the old site of Mian Khan he felt 'staggered for a moment'. It gave the appearance 'uncultivated ground', it being easier to walk over the ruins than to search for the old lanes. Odd wall sections survived, none over three feet high. He wrote that,

...as regards the perfect demolition the same remarks apply to Sunghao and Burmoul, except that the latter being a very old village (some 150 years it is said) and built in a succession of terraces gave it, after seeing Mian Khan and Sungao a somewhat less desolate appearance, still here I walked without difficulty over the ruins; one or two trees left on this old site will be cut down and the facings of the terraces broken up, this will be completed in the course of two or three days...

Referring to the new houses hurriedly constructed, he said,

I see no great difference between the present erections and those of other villages, and it must be borne in mind that the speed itself was necessarily an important element in the plan, which could only be effectually carried out at once while the punishment was still fresh and the impression of the power of government irresistible, leaving alone the important fact that delay would have caused extensive injury to well grown crops and possibly to the gathering of the harvest.
Codifying Authority

By the 1870s, this kind of border-making had framed areas of a tentative settled district. Internal Punjab and Peshawar valley legal innovations had defined and secured occupancy rights for non-Pakhtun tenants, used codified custom and appointed jirgas to resolve sensitive family and civil disputes, and protected the position of elite landowners. Such new laws included the Encumbered Estates and Court of Wards Acts that placed the land of bankrupt khans under court supervision rather than letting it fall into the hands of moneylenders or outside suppliers of capital. With Peshawar valley security and stability the priority, this last measure permitted the displacing of a disfavoured khan, then the eventual restoration of the property to a relative in a manner that kept the estate in an important lineage.

Through the rest of the nineteenth century legal mechanisms allowed the Peshawar government to withstand the pressures of social or market forces when politically expedient. If the ‘attitude of the colonial state towards a hypothetical capitalist transformation was notoriously ambiguous’, Pakhtun clan control over land ownership and official patronage of elite landowners negated the market mechanism in Peshawar more than in other Punjab or imperial districts. Because of the tight control of land, the growing Punjab debt foreclosure ‘problem’ that led to land being transferred to non-agrarian mortgage and debt holders was a minor factor in the nineteenth century Peshawar valley and insignificant within the Yusufzai subdivision.

Within this context of avoiding obvious politically sensitive moves, a pragmatic judicial regime developed. Punjab administrators demanded that Peshawar District authorities increase convictions and reduce perceived high crime rates. One tool approved for the trans-Indus districts was a second legal code to deal with ‘tribal’ and ‘border’ crimes not properly covered by the Indian Penal Code. The Punjab Frontier Crime
Regulations, first instituted in 1872, allowed cases without enough evidence for an English judge to convict to be assigned to a locally selected panel of elders, an official *jirga*, for consideration. On a judgement of culpability, British officials then decided the punishment. This appropriation of the key village political idiom, the *jirga* council, was intended to increase convictions in cases regarding honour, enmity, land, and women where clan testimony could not be sorted out by English judges.

The growth of the colonial legal system in Peshawar courts complemented an effort to convert military dominance into a socio-cultural legitimacy that, at the very least, might reduce security expenses. Acts of political and religious 'disaffection' and colonially induced social unrest were now labelled as violations of the Indian Penal Code or the Frontier Crime Regulations. Cattle lifting or poisoning and haystack burning remained characterized as traditional crimes related to feuds and old enmities. If such incidents occurred on the estates of the Mandanr *khans*, officials never regarded them as signs of political resistance, social protest, or opposition to elite Pakhtuns. The ability of Punjab officials to deploy legal codes, define crimes, and produce a 'prose of counter insurgency', blurred any realization that acts of violence and property damage in the Peshawar District resembled other types of British-Indian 'dacoities' that 'often occupied the ill-defined borderland between individual, localized crime and collective defiance of state authority'.

Rigorous codes of etiquette accompanied the emblems and ceremonies of imperialism. In the Peshawar valley, the 1 January 1877 celebration of Victoria's proclamation as Empress of India marked the symbolic integration of the district into a global empire. Officials released prisoners and troops paraded. At an evening 'Divisional Durbar', civil officers, 'about 100 *khans* and native gentlemen (*Durbaris*), and fifteen hundred Hindu and Muslim 'Lambardars and other influential persons' heard speeches and witnessed the distribution of commemorative certificates. Colonial hierarchies ranked district and divisional
notables strictly by number in lists ordering ceremonial precedence during courtly rituals of submission and reward. ‘Khawja Mohammad Khan—Khan Kumalzai of Hoti’ ranked number ten among the twenty-seven certificate recipients.

That evening the colonial infrastructure literally glowed. Oil lamps illuminated government buildings in Peshawar city, the cantonment, and all ‘the Thanas and Tahsils as well as the Nowshera bridge of boats and the police outposts and other civil buildings’ in the district. This form of regal display was reminiscent of Mughal era celebrations. The fireworks, rockets, and ‘bombs’ launched in Peshawar were copied in at least one Yusufzai sub-division outpost that now challenged the authority of old khans and clan leaders. A ‘special display of fireworks’ was launched from the police thana in Rustam village in the Sudhum valley, Ajab Khan’s hereditary tappa. Ajab Khan rated number six on the list of certificate recipients.

In 1877, only months after he attended the Imperial Assemblage in Peshawar, officials charged Ajab Khan with disrupting the Buner border over an inheritance dispute. Rumour had it that he was causing unrest in order to act in his role as mediator with the Buner clans and thus increase his prestige with the British. Blamed for organizing a July 1877 attack on ‘British villages’ that caused several deaths, Ajab Khan was imprisoned. The authorities debated whether to treat his deeds as a political matter, often penalized with a period of exile, or as a criminal offence decided under statutes of the Indian Penal Code. In 1878, charged and convicted as a criminal offender, after decades of imperial service, Ajab Khan was executed by hanging.

British initiatives to establish authority and refine a system of law on the ‘frontier’ also involved less coercive measures, including those intended for degrees of social ‘reform’. The earliest administrators and settlement officers visualized the creation of a peaceful, industrious, civilized peasantry that above all would display loyalty to the empire in gratitude for maintaining law, order, and agrarian prosperity. However pragmatic or ineffective some local policies became, the ideal of a progressive mission at least partially influenced the Punjab administration as it reviewed and adjusted earlier policies.
The Frontier Crimes Regulations, written to help control local society, were revised in a changing colonial intellectual environment. From the 1870s, a new generation of careerists chosen by competitive examination entered the administrative ranks eager to apply the latest principles and trends of western thought to colonial policy. A general western "historicist reaction against classical political economy and analytic jurisprudence" spurred a new view that progressive stages of social evolution structured human organization. It was thought that proper understanding of this process, including as found in British-Indian institutions such as the village or tribe, would explain not only European history but how to accelerate the development of "backward" colonial societies.

Settlement officers now wrote reports coloured by "the historicists' great organizing idea", that the evolution of societies depended on the extent to which traditions of collective land use "evolved" towards recognition of individual rights in land and property. Histories now recorded evidence of early land tenures and apparent changes induced by colonial revenue, legal, and market policies. In nineteenth-century British India, this sense of inevitable development allowed officials to recognize a process of change, yet not feel obligated to press indigenous institutions to alter faster than the process of historical evolution.

This mixed sensibility shaped discussions about law and order in the valley. Incidents of killing and other violence, including conflicts involving "independent" clans, had not declined and by the mid-1880s Punjab administrators debated a third revision of the original Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1872. Accepting that full district accountability to colonial courts and the Indian Penal Code would have to be delayed, the Frontier regulations had originally codified various ad hoc regional policies taken from precedent and current practice. Different sections regulated "Councils of Elders", the fining or blockading (including seizures) of clans considered hostile or uncooperative, the construction or removal of border villages, the taking of
security bonds for peaceful behaviour from individuals or families involved in feuds or disputes, and the exile from the district of noted troublemakers.

But adaptations of the *jirga* institution or *barampta* seizure did not reduce the number of incidents or build a common acceptance of norms inscribed in legal codes. Tension developed between various perspectives on how to achieve ‘reform’. When the inconsistency between high ‘murder’ totals and low conviction rates led one Peshawar official to suggest ending the appeals process in Peshawar cases, the progressive voice triumphed. Punjab officials saw the step as ‘retrograde’, defeating ‘the object...to gradually train and win over popular sentiment to the side of civilized administration...’ Far superior to beliefs derived from ‘primitive social conditions’ was ‘a regular system founded on the application of scientifically framed laws’. Such a system, even imperfectly implemented, served as ‘an instrument of popular education’. Appeals would not be eliminated. Until indigenous thinking changed, the use of appointed *jirgas* to increase conviction rates would continue.

Debate on revisions focused on finer details. Elaboration of the official *jirga* process included listing the punishments that could be awarded by British officials after a *jirga* finding of guilt. Sentences included fines, imprisonment, or ‘transportation’ for up to seven years. Because of political concerns and the lower standards of evidence only a maximum of seven years imprisonment could be awarded for a jirga finding of murder.

An analysis of the murder rate noted that judgements in the immediate post-1849 period had been quicker and more effective. Then, one man held both police and magisterial duties. More flexible standards of evidence and testimony had existed with no appeal process. The imposition of the 1861 Indian Penal Code and 1872 Punjab Frontier Regulations did not have the intended effect. ‘With the greater elaboration of the judicial machinery the number of murders actually increased.’ In 1886, the Peshawar crime rate remained ‘appalling’. The decade 1875-84 recorded six hundred and seventy-six murders and one hundred and nine culpable homicides. Regular courts obtained
only one hundred and sixty-seven convictions. One hundred
and seventy-eight cases handed to jirgas resulted in mere fines.
One official lamented that 'no more than 80 of the offenders
have been hanged'.70 With these statistics came an admission
by the Peshawar Deputy Commissioner that only one of six
'murderers' was punished and that 'perhaps 2000 murderers'
lived free in the district.

Such numbers indicated that attempts to remold Peshawar
valley society and judicially subordinate the practice of
Pakhtunwali flagged as colonial courts and codes struggled with
limited resources and little acceptance of their legitimacy. With
local police, as across British-India, 'entangled in the networks
of local level rural powers'71 and with colonial priorities directed
towards maintaining local hierarchies, British standards of
justice in the Peshawar valley remained contested, illusive, and
neglected in both theory and practice.

NOTES

1. Peshawar Archives, Deputy Commissioner Office Records, Bundle
No. 14, File Serial No. 271, Hugh James, 'Report on the state of education
in the District', dated 1 October 1852, p. 25.
3. File Serial No. 271, p. 31. For 1852 Peshawar District Education figures
see Appendix 8.
5. See Peshawar related sections of Henry Martyn Clark, Robert Clark of
the Panjab (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1907) and Robert Clark, The
Missions of the Church Missionary Society and the Church of England
Zenana Missionary Society in the Punjab and Sindh (Church Missionary
6. D. A. Washbrook, 'Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India',
7. Social codes, such as the Laws of Manu, could be translated and valorized
by British officials themselves.
10. File S. No. 271, p. 157. Letter No. 400, dated 23 April 1855, from
Edwardes to James, p. 7.
11. Peshawar Archives, Deputy Commissioner Records, Bundle No. 14, File S. No. 269. Circular No. 122, dated 30 May 1849, from Christian, Sec. to the Board of Administration, Lahore to D.C. Peshawar, pp. 3-5.
12. File S. No. 269, p. 5.
20. The Regular Settlement found that few of 1400 village mosque exemptions (inams or muafis) covering 7047 acres had even been subject to inquiry. All were continued, subject to government approval, Peshawar Gazetteer, 1897-98, p. 338.
21. See Kessinger, Vilyatpur, p. 79. Evidence from the early Yusufzai area settlements indicated that gathering revenue through village representatives (‘collective responsibility’) was as much a pragmatic recognition of political reality as any sociologically based strategy.
25. 1878 Settlement Report, p. 263.
27. Terms used in 1878 Settlement Report, p. 264: Pagri wesh, shares per pagri or turban. Parunai wesh or ‘sheet distribution’, connoting a woman’s head covering. (Hastings’ definition).
30. This right of self-definition, the symbolic nature of Islam, and a local refusal to respect the colonial accumulation of knowledge combined in a 1929 reaction against officers revising the 1899 Code. Rural Muslims ‘in all tahsils refused to make any statement regarding their customs, stating
practically unanimously that they would in future be bound by Muslim Law and not by custom.’ Acheson, *Customary Law...in the Peshawar District*, 1934 edition, preface, p. 1.


34. See comments of Henry Maine in Kessinger, *Vilyatpur*, p. 82.


38. See Bibliography for selected titles.


41. File S. No. 1313, p. 5.


43. The Utman Khel villages included Kui, Barmoul, Pipal, Mian Khan, Sangao, and Kharkai.


45. Peshawar Commissioner Records, Bundle 53, File S. No. 1310, letter dated 15 December 1873, p. 9 detailed the tolls and travel times.

46. Peshawar Commissioner Records, Bundle 53, File S. No. 1310, ‘Memo by Lt. Shortt’ and attached ‘List of offenses...’ detailed the cases, undated, but last offence recorded on 10 December 1862, while Shortt’s final term as Peshawar Deputy Commissioner ended 21 November 1862.

47. ‘Memo by Lt. Shortt’, p. 5.


52. See Raverty, *Notes on Afghanistan*, vol. 1, pp. 251-3 footnotes.
55. Peshawar Commissioner Records, Bundle 53, File S. No. 1310, undated draft letter, by Peshawar Commissioner Becher written in early 1865, p. 4. Quotes were Becher's understanding of James' intentions.
56. The previous discussion was derived from Becher's draft letter; pp. 4-11.
58. Ommanney letter, 14 February 1866, pp. 3-4.
59. Ommanney letter, 14 February 1866, p. 6.
62. The day's events were described in Peshawar Commissioner Records, Bundle No. 14, File No. 523, Letter No. 13, pp. 1-3, with an attached list of Darbar certificate recipients, dated 19 January 1877.
63. Peshawar Deputy Commissioner Records, Bundle No. 52, File S. No. 1462, Letter No. 195, dated 18 October 1877 and others in File No. 12A, 1877 'Prosecution of Ajab Khan'.
66. The *Gazetteer of the Bannu District 1883-84* included a 19-page appendix about 'vesh' written by the district Settlement Officer, S.S. Thornburn.
69. Peshawar Commissioner Records, Bundle No. 78, File S. No. 2268, Letter No. 176, dated 15 February 1886, p. 6. From W. Young, Secretary to Punjab Govt., to R. Nisbet, Peshawar Division Commissioner.
70. Letter No. 176, dated 15 February 1886, p. 2.
ANGLO-PAKHTUN SOCIETY

Peshawar society in the last quarter of the nineteenth century displayed aspects of a larger colonial Punjab and British-Indian canvas. On a social and economic level new systems of development and knowledge, of ‘colonial empiricism’, reordered agrarian spaces and crop production. Local elite political assertiveness and law court-centred rivalries marked the rising ambitions of a class of great khans who would later oppose post-1918 nationalist agitation and be prominent in post-1947 regional political competition and debates over privilege, land reform, and inequality. But any ‘Cambridge school’ analysis emphasizing the importance of ‘big khan’ factional competition over the spoils of colonial and post-colonial systems gave little importance to the role of other fragmented social forces being transformed by the effects of colonial state capitalism. The great khans monopolized the fruits of new irrigation and market connections. But the rise of new populations of tenants and agricultural labourers, often migrants from neighbouring territories, alongside socio-cultural continuities observed in less commercially oriented Pakhtun villages revealed both the multiple ‘horizontal’ social forces subject to elite factional domination and the competitive claims to such authority. These changing social relations to the land and livelihood were the cause of much of the twentieth-century agrarian unrest that characterized a later uniquely ‘Pakhtun’ nationalist political militancy.

From the 1870s to 1900 a literal second generation of British-Pakhtun relations produced a contact zone history not simply of conquest and domination but of ‘interactive, improvisational
dimensions' comprised 'copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power'. Long familiar aspects of imperial-local relations were transformed and accentuated by a European colonialism now operating on a global scale of perspective and technology. Yet as transportation, trade, and ruling ideologies integrated the trans-Indus region into larger Punjab networks, political concerns denied to the western districts participation in early phases of political devolution and in the full development of public spheres in the press and mass organizations. Still other political concerns made revised land settlement procedures an exercise in compromise and concession.

As agrarian transformation in the core Peshawar valley dry tracts took place through previously established relations of unequal power and status, fringe valley villagers and clans of the 'independent territory' accepted or contested imperial obligations, often selectively participating in a new colonial economy. Yet, apart from these direct political and economic agendas colonial interest in village society, including initiatives to improve local conditions, remained limited.

In the 1870s the British political debate on the pros and cons of imperial conservatism versus aggressiveness, especially in regard to an expanding Russian empire in Central Asia, shifted to a revised 'Forward Policy' on Afghanistan. Some British politicians hoped to check Russian advances by exerting greater influence on the Afghan Amir, including through the installation of a British mission in Kabul and the appointment of an envoy. Many administrators and soldiers in Britain and in British India advocated the establishment of a 'scientific frontier' for the Indian empire sited along a line of bases from Kandahar to Kabul. Some openly called for the integration of Afghanistan into the empire as the next logical step in the British imperial advance.

On 21 September 1878 the British attempted to force a diplomatic mission on the Afghans to counter a series of Russian diplomatic initiatives. A delegation, which included the
Peshawar Deputy Commissioner as second in command, was turned back at the foot of the Khyber Pass. Having suffered an ‘insult’ to imperial prestige the British-Indian viceroy launched an invasion of Afghanistan in late November. Events replicated a sequence of conquest, disaster, and final withdrawal that showed little had been learned from the lessons of the 1839-42 period. The war lasted until the final British withdrawal from Kandahar in April 1881 and signalled an accelerated transformation of the Peshawar valley.

Many in the valley prospered from the war effort. Within two weeks of the 21 September rejection of the British mission the British press detailed the military arrangements and strategies for the anticipated war. Others raised political, military, and moral objections to an invasion. Outspoken in opposition was John Lawrence of the original Punjab Board of Control and Governor-General of India in the 1860s. The delay of the invasion until 21 November was occasioned by logistics rather than politics. Troops, provisions, transport animals, and munitions had to be assembled for three columns leaving from Quetta, the Kurram valley, and Peshawar, involving perhaps thirty thousand men and six thousand camels. Grain dealers and speculators, livestock suppliers, and Khattak transporters busied themselves. One paper reported that in the south the Khan of Khelat supplied twenty thousand maunds (each eighty pounds) of wheat to the Quetta military at market prices, offering all the camels in his territory for the effort. The same report said that Peshawar required stores and transport for twenty thousand men.

Many Peshawar valley residents in military service served in Afghanistan, some as low level officers of ‘native’ troops. From 1873 the Punjab government encouraged ‘...the gradual introduction of young men of family and of war like races into the Native Army with direct commissions’. Only those ‘...duly qualified by rank, education, character and physique’ were to be inducted. Others who served in Afghanistan had risen through infantry regiments or Guides units to retire at non-commissioned ranks of ressaldar, subedar major, or jamadar. Ressaldar

The military culture that developed around the small cantonment at Mardan had a more personal scale than the massive base and thousands of troops stationed in Peshawar. In Peshawar military and civil officials struggled to insulate the one thousand or more British troops from locals, especially in 1880 from the ninety-two registered prostitutes in the bazaars of the cantonment, the two hundred and eighteen recorded prostitutes in the old city, others characterized as ‘bazaar’ or ‘coolie’ women, and at least twenty-two men, all of whom offered sexual services in an urban, cantonment political economy in sharp contrast with British and Pakhtun norms of propriety.13

The families of many Pakhtun soldiers lived in Hoti village across the Kalpani nullah from the Mardan cantonment. A verse from Hoti written during the First World War captured the ambivalence of a hybrid, colonial military life vulnerable to sudden deployments anywhere in the empire. The later context might have been changed, with the difference of a word, to a lament over other wars, including the second Anglo-Afghan war campaigns in Afghanistan:

\[
de gham bugle puh key ghalegi wa platoon lari ronegi
jana ke jaree alokan basrah te zena tse^{14}
\]

The sad notes of the bugle can be heard and a platoon goes far
The young women cry, the young men go to Basra.

After the second Anglo-Afghan war the government erected a large memorial arch in typical Victorian style in a park in the Mardan cantonment. It listed the names of seventy-seven Guides troops based in Mardan who died in September 1879 in Kabul
when the British mission, installed by force and headed by Cavagnari, the deputy commissioner turned envoy, was killed to a man. No imperial monument was dedicated to the nine hundred and seventy-one British and ‘Indian’ soldiers and three hundred and thirty-one ‘camp-followers’ killed in a battle near Kandahar in July 1880.15 Frederick Roberts, a soldier who had been in Peshawar in 1857 and Ambela in 1863, eventually salvaged the situation for the British. He installed a puppet Afghan Amir in Kabul and withdrew the colonial armies from Afghanistan. The expense, inconclusive results, and adverse home opinions ended the Forward Policy. The political mess resulted in the replacement of the British-Indian viceroy and the British prime minister. Roberts became an imperial icon and in the 1890s led colonial armies in South Africa.

Peshawar valley Pakhtuns, who had joined imperial armies for centuries, became peripheral figures in a late nineteenth century colonial strategy of identifying, creating, and recruiting indigenous ‘martial races’. Sikh soldiers, categorized since 1857 by colonial recruiters and ideologues as martial, loyal ‘Singhs’, personified the British cultural sense of a ‘biological determinism’ that decreed only certain eastern populations were physically or morally able to serve as warriors.16 Sikhs served in the ill-fated Guides contingent at Kabul, while sketches of Gurkha units marching into Afghanistan commonly illustrated the London popular press. The army enrolled Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi Muslims, and carefully screened ‘Pathans’ in ‘class’ companies and regiments organized by caste, religion, or ‘tribe’. Printed military rolls often recorded Peshawar valley residents under the column of ‘caste’ as ‘Pathan Eusafzai’.

Though by the 1890s officials dispatched military recruiting parties into the independent areas surrounding the Peshawar district,17 family and clan networks within the settled tahsil provided the most reliable supply of new Pakhtun soldiers. One ‘probably not exhaustive’ late nineteenth century survey of the Yusufzai sub-division counted 1616 residents from 128 villages on the military payroll, with 232 retired military personnel receiving pensions. There was ‘scarcely a family in the northern
and eastern portions of the Sub-division which has not one or more of its members in the Native army, so that the earnings of these men in cash are more than sufficient to pay off the whole revenue of the household’. Annual pay, averaging about Rs 200, and pension earnings totalled Rs 366420.\(^{18}\)

In addition to military employment, liberal revenue policy helped increase Pakhtun sympathies with the empire. In 1870 during the Regular Settlement authorities instituted a policy of ‘new favourable assessments’ for proprietors of villages ‘near the border’ and ‘hitherto enjoyed free’. Pakhtun shareholders obtained low revenue assessments as fringe villages were formally encompassed in the land settlement process. Twenty-two villages in the Mardan tahsil received Rs 5380 in ‘revenue excused’, while seventeen villages in the Utman Bolak tahsil had Rs 5055 remitted.\(^{19}\) In the reconfigured tahsils noted in the 1893-6 second Regular Settlement, ‘frontier remissions’ for ‘a portion of the total assessment’ were listed for thirty-eight villages in Mardan tahsil and sixteen villages in Swabi. The remissions rewarded peaceful villagers, nominally on guard against independent-area raiders, while cancelling many of the difficult-to-collect dues responsible for much colonial-village conflict. This compromise of revenue and state authority consciously attempted to minimize differences between ‘British’ villages and those in adjacent, non-encapsulated tracts. The ‘remissions’ in effect before the second settlement totalled Rs 6452 in the Mardan tahsil and Rs 5255 in the Swabi tahsil, over a third of the Rs 32125 given in district-wide frontier reductions.\(^{20}\)

The second Anglo-Afghan war of 1879-81 brought prosperity to some and misery to others. Contractors supplying the colonial armies did well. Ishar and Sarup Singh, liquor dealers and merchants in the Nowshera Cantonment, obtained a licence to retail spirits and stores in army camps from the Khyber Pass to Kabul. Selling wine and brandy to officers and opium and charas to non-British troops, the brothers were considered reputable merchants who never sold alcohol to ‘unauthorized buyers’, that is, common British soldiers.\(^{21}\)
The problem of supply affected Peshawar valley markets as military purchasing exhausted stocks and drove up prices. Grain, usually plentiful for independent villages or urban residents, went to the army commissariat. The single road connecting Peshawar to Attock and the Punjab could not carry supplies of grain sufficient to ease shortages. The lingering dearth caused by a north-west Indian famine also disrupted Punjab food supplies. Proprietors, grain dealers and speculators prospered, while others, such as Yusufzai sub-division tenants who paid in-kind (batai) crop percentages as rent, gained nothing from the higher prices.

Military-related employment, ongoing canal construction work, and the building of a railway line into the valley led to a labour shortage. Wages rose as did migration into the valley from surrounding regions, including from independent clan areas and Afghanistan. Agricultural wage labourers, only a few thousand in the valley, who had earned Rs 5 per month in 1877-8, by mid-1879 earned Rs 7. The earnings of horse keepers or syces, originally Rs 5 to Rs 5/8 annas, jumped to Rs 7/8 annas by mid-1879. A skilled tradesman, a 'common mason, carpenter, or blacksmith' earning in the Rs 15-17 range per month in 1877-8 saw wages rise to Rs 26/4 annas by late 1880.22

Though few valley residents outside Peshawar town were solely dependant on markets for subsistence supplies, the doubling and tripling of grain prices in the valley certainly had severe implications for the poorest and those most tied to bazaar purchases. Wheat prices that had averaged 25.96 seers of weight per rupee in 1877 (19.81 seers per rupee in Delhi) soared to a mere 6.98 seers per rupee in 1880 (17.50 seers in Delhi).23 The war inflation peaked in Peshawar in late September, early October 1879, when one rupee bought only 5.62 seers of wheat in the market.24 Subsistence statistics drawn from the Famine Report of 1879 indicated that at typical consumption rates the wages of an agricultural labourer during this period purchased just enough grain for personal survival. Only a skilled tradesman earned enough to support the model family of five.
The various effects of the war, including crops diverted to military use, probably contributed to ‘the famine and distress in the hills’ mentioned as a push factor for migration into the valley in 1881. Only in May 1882 did Peshawar and Delhi wheat prices equalize at slightly over 17 seers per rupee. It was in 1882 that the Punjab railway system passing through Khairabad finally reached Peshawar.

The dynamics generated by the increased integration of the Peshawar valley into a greater Punjab, colonial, and international context after 1882 were often shaped and directed by established socio-political conditions. And by the mid-1870s the clear dichotomy that had existed between colonizer and colonized, between British rulers and ‘native’ society now became blurred at times, in institutions and individuals of trans-cultural, ‘British-Indian’ ambiguity and synthesis.

Peshawar valley landowners and elite increasingly ensured family futures by enrolling sons in English-medium schools teaching the skills needed in imperial bureaucracies. From 1855 the Edwardes Collegiate (Mission) School in Peshawar run by the Christian Church Missionary Society prepared students for the Calcutta and Punjab Universities. One later report about the hostel for the Edwardes Church Mission High School mentioned that occupants ‘are for the most part sons of Afghan gentlemen residing in Yusafzai’.

One young Pakhtun who had received a good education by the time of the Regular Settlement was Khwaja Muhammad, who in 1872 at age twenty succeeded to the Hoti khanship. Testimonials from Peshawar officials in the 1870s acknowledged his talents. He reduced crime in his village, gathered information from Swat, and proved ‘useful in deciding cases under the Frontier Rules’. He gave ‘very great assistance’ during the Regular Settlement period, learning the entire revenue system and procedures. Having mastered the revenue process and ‘the details of it more thoroughly than almost any of our leading men’, he was also considered ‘one of the most go-ahead improvers of property in the District’. His secular pursuits and sense of place in the colonial hierarchy led to one observer’s perception of his relative social distinction:
He is one of the very few among our Khans who are not bigoted and this freedom from superstitious bigotry, combined with a superior education, rather isolates him among his neighbours. Further he does not attempt that lavish hospitality which, while it makes Khans popular so often, ruins them.30

A Mardan clan leader, Shad Muhammad Khan, exhibited quite a different aspect of the privileged and protected status of local elite. An extravagant lifestyle turned personal debts to moneylenders of Rs 370 in 1870 into Rs 20000 of debt by 1877. His retainers so harassed tenants in his villages for grain and money that they began to migrate to lands under other khans. The khan requested help from the Mardan Assistant Commissioner, who agreed to manage his property. The khan was put on an allowance and five villages under his control were temporarily auctioned to revenue farmers. Though the debt was reduced to Rs 5278 by 1882 his continuing financial problems finally led in that year to the khan’s property being placed under the management of the Court of Wards.31

The Assistant Commissioner in Mardan in 1877 embodied another dimension of the mixed cultural terrain emerging in the mature British era. Robert Warburton was the son of a British artillery officer who in Kabul during the first Anglo-Afghan war married a niece of the deposed Afghan ruler Dost Muhammad. The family had survived the war tragedies and the son became an effective, if rare, British officer at ease in two cultures, fluent in Persian and Pakhtu. Warburton’s presence in Mardan contributed to the insecurities of Pakhtun elite as he bypassed settled district intermediaries such as Ajab Khan and communicated directly with independent area clans. Evidence gathered by Warburton, including testimony from Ajab Khan’s retainers, helped to convict Ajab Khan. The Assistant Commissioner’s position often served as a stepping stone for talented British officers who might become Deputy Commissioner, then perhaps Division Commissioner and even a member of the Punjab provincial government. In 1879 Warburton became Political Officer for the Khyber Pass region.
A man of rare ability, he finished his career in the Khyber position, becoming something of a celebrity of the British ‘frontier’ experience. But in his memoirs he never recorded whether this career path reflected personal intention or the closed doors of a racist imperial bureaucracy.

In 1883 a set of correspondence captured the ambiguities of the colonial experience, revealing that local personages could exploit the contradictions between colonial moral ideology and the hegemonic systems designed to ensure control. The court system proved to be an arena in which to pursue old rivalries and to exploit inequitable power relations. Colonial attitudes viewing the British as inherently superior to ‘natives’ were challenged as elite class nobles demanded that symbolic tokens of privilege be recognized as meaningful signifiers of status.

A petition dated 26 March 1883 was sent to the Punjab Lieutenant Governor: Khwaja Muhammad, Khan of Hoti, complained that he had been insulted in open court by the Peshawar Division Civil and Sessions Judge. His petition quoted the offensive remarks:

The principal witness in this case, he may be called the prosecutor, is Khwajah Muhammed Khan, the Khan of Hoti in Usafzai. He is an educated Afghan. With his education he has unfortunately lost all the good and retained all the bad qualities of his race. He is cowardly and meanspirited, treacherous, with the cunning and chicanery of a low hanger-on about our Courts.32

Over the next three months letters passed between district, division, and provincial courts and political authorities. The letters offered an insight into the institutional environment structuring land relations and colonial civil and political authority. The case in question involved a charge ‘punishable with death’ filed by Khwaja Muhammad against his maternal uncle, Ghazzan Khan of Hoti. The Sessions Judge defended his statement as reflecting a necessary judgement of character needed to weigh evidence confined to opposed testimony. The judge noted that in 1878 Muhammad Khan had filed a charge of
attempted murder against Ghazzan Khan for allegedly firing at him near Peshawar, a charge denied and rebutted by Ghazzan Khan as false and an attempt to use the courts to resolve a personal enmity. In his testimony Ghazzan Khan characterized Khwaja Muhammad as an old enemy who had deprived him of his lands through manipulation of the legal system.

Officials submitted letters that now described Khwaja Muhammad as a much disliked khan, a ‘land grabber’ who ‘spares nobody’. If he claimed to be the largest landholder in the district, he was also the ‘greatest litigant’ who had used the land settlement process for ‘acquiring a large amount of property by litigation. It is said he never lost a case in the lower courts, and that his cases were numerous and his tactics not altogether creditable.’

Khwaja Muhammad had been fined Rs 1000 in 1871 for ‘assaulting and resisting the Police in the search for stolen property’ hidden by his retainers. In 1877 he had ordered the beating of Behram Khan of Hoti, a brother-in-law and rival, then had used his influence with the Deputy Commissioner to secure the release of thirteen men convicted of the assault. One comment recorded on an 1877 case file in a dispute over twenty-one acres of land between Khwaja Muhammad and Sher Muhammad Khan read, ‘The tendency has been to give the khan all his own way in cases of this sort.’

Beyond an unrelenting pursuit of his interests, officials charged Khwaja Muhammad with manipulating and corrupting the revenue and court system. Before the resolution of a five-year process of judgements and appeals over Sher Muhammad’s land, decided in Sher Muhammad’s favour, one source alleged that Khwaja Muhammad had acted ‘in collusion’ with his opponent’s agent and ‘the Registry Office official at Mardan’ to manipulate the agent’s power of attorney and win an appeal. In his remarks on the petition, the Sessions Judge noted that two cases involving Khwaja Muhammad currently were pending before his court, and ‘I find that the patwari furnished the plaintiffs with incorrect copies of the settlement record and the Naib Tahsildar furnished an incorrect report and plan of the
land both favouring Khwaja Muhammad’s interests in the cases and it is natural to suppose at his instigation’.36

Warburton had transferred from Mardan in 1879. But he was drawn into the ongoing correspondence as Khwaja Muhammad filed another petition, this time making claims for the villages of Shad Muhammad Khan of Mardan, formerly auctioned to revenue farmers in 1877 and 1879. Warburton detailed how Khwaja Muhammad and partners had originally won the 1877 bidding, but then withdrawn from the process a few days later. In his letter summarizing past events, Warburton wrote of being unable to find the original document submitted by Khwaja Muhammad. He assumed that it had been ‘taken out of the file and destroyed’ after he left Mardan. Other documents had existed on the leases (ijaras), their rates and revenues, but ‘in spite of repeated efforts I have been unable to obtain them from the district’.37

In the 1883 correspondence, the issues of using or abusing the legal system framed an extraordinary personal attack on Khwaja Muhammad’s ‘character’. This attack showed as much concern about colonial concepts of hierarchy, class, and race as concern about the integrity of the legal system. Warburton limited his character judgement simply to ‘there is no man to whom greater favour has been shown than to Khwaja Mohamed, and the result has been nil’.38 Jenkins was of the opinion that Khwaja Muhammad manipulated not only the law but also the legitimating ideals of the empire:

He is also a perfect comedian and knows well how to talk to the white gentlemen about reform, progress, and all the rest of it. He has a splendid collection of certificates and testimonials and this is, so you will probably find, the most useful part of his stock in trade…39

Johnstone repeated every bit of local gossip he had acquired. Khwaja Muhammad, the son of Sirbuland Khan, was son ‘by a wife who was a dancing girl of the Peshawar City’. If Khwaja Muhammad claimed the Sessions Judge’s comments had
damaged his ‘influence’ over his ‘tribe’ and tenants, the rebuttal said that Khwaja Muhammad was so disliked that he ‘had to get the Hindus of his own village bound over to keep the peace. I never heard of an Afghan Chief who feared his Hindus and could not manage them’.  

The Peshawar civil and judicial authorities perceived Khwaja Muhammad as a *khan* who was simply not subservient enough in his assigned role as a dependant. He did not seem to recognize that his personal *inam* and other financial and political benefits had been bestowed in return for kindness to tenants and not being too litigious in the courts. Instead, Khwaja Muhammad found the legal system to be an effective avenue to pursue lineage factional politics and ‘intrigues’, and to gain an edge in competition for the highest measure of status, land. Admonished by local officials, in his petition he quoted from provincial statutes:

> In the law passed by Government in 1874-75 under 33 Vic. Cap. 3 in regard to maintaining the respectability of the Khans of the Frontier, which is referred to at pages 11 and 12 of the General Administration Report of the Punjab for 1874-75, it is clearly stated that the authority and dignity of the Khans of the frontier should be maintained.  

Shad Muhammad Khan, the head of the Mardan faction of the Hoti family that had split away two generations earlier, became a perennial target of Khwaja Muhammad. In his petition to the Punjab Lieutenant Governor Khwaja Muhammad did not hesitate to term himself as not only the largest ‘landed proprietor’ in the district but also the ‘heir to the Mardan estates’. Additionally Khwaja Muhammad had filed his case over Shad Muhammad’s villages to pre-empt another rival for the village leases, Ibrahim Khan of Mardan. For service in the recent Afghan war Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khan had been rewarded with an assignment of land revenue worth Rs. 1800. Now Assistant District Superintendent of Police, Ibrahim Khan was the son of a ‘respectable yeoman’ and exemplified the social
mobility of talented and ambitious Pakhtuns attempting to translate imperial service into landed proprietor status.

This elite Pakhtun scramble for land and honours thrived in a colonial system that favoured a core group of entrenched, increasingly aristocratic lineages. The ironies of a ‘native’ manipulating the British system to his own advantage or of a trilingual Assistant Commissioner being more than a match for clan politics were subtleties that little disguised the solidifying relations of economic and political inequity shaping the remainder of nineteenth-century Peshawar valley social history. Shad Muhammad, apparently mentally impaired, lost control of his holdings to the Court of Wards in 1882. By the 1890s, Ibrahim Khan had a jagir of a dozen villages worth Rs 2539 annually. Khwaja Muhammad Khan survived the criticisms of lower level British administrators with tactics such as his direct appeal to provincial leaders more concerned with a broader perspective. He continued to fulfil a fundamental role ensuring a stable, loyal clan leadership. Neither his inam nor other privileges were challenged, though no record was found either of any compliance with the original petition’s request ‘that the sessions Judge may be compelled to withdraw in toto those defamatory remarks regarding my character’. Khwaja Muhammad had to wait until his participation in the 1895 Chitral military campaign, before finally receiving the title of Khan Bahadur.42

The legal system that offered a new field for elite competition also fulfilled the task of preserving social order and hierarchies. The ability of Khwaja Muhammad to have his Hindu dependants ‘bound over’ for good behaviour was apparently gained through the use of the Frontier Crimes Regulation Section 40 allowing the courts to ‘take security’ from potential offenders as a guarantee to preserve the peace. Financial bonds could be demanded from those merely suspected of being potential lawbreakers.43 Quite possibly the court orders against Khwaja Muhammad’s Hindu dependants were intended to repress protests, perhaps against the collection of excessive fees or legally abolished ‘traditional dues’. Khwaja Muhammad had a
reputation for using his mastery of colonial legal and revenue codes 'to exact the uttermost farthing of his rights, from a tenantry who have been unable to oppose either his knowledge or his interests'. In 1877 even the visiting Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab told Warburton of hearing that Khwaja Muhammad was 'the most exacting landlord in Yusufzai'. Pejorative stereotypes of Hindu shopkeepers and grain merchants as ruinous moneylenders obviated colonial concerns about the abuse of non-Muslim village servants.

Even when the judiciary decided in favour of tenants and dependants against the interests of a Peshawar valley khan, 'political' considerations often overruled the court order. Khans learned to appeal unfavourable judgements up the levels of district, divisional, and provincial executive authority. In 1880 the Punjab chief court ruled that Khwaja Muhammad could no longer collect previously payable haqq tora dues. Khwaja Muhammad spent the better part of the next two years soliciting and obtaining reports from Peshawar civil commissioners who agreed with his contention that the loss of the dues would affect his ‘influence’ over his ‘tribe’. In 1882 government orders restored his right to collect the fees.

Colonial endeavours to reinforce moral legitimacy included attempts to win over the indigenous population to the imperial criminal justice system's normative codes of personal behaviour. Belief in a system of authority based on equity in law was to replace lineage loyalties. But the attempts failed to achieve any decisive degree of local acceptance or compliance with state authority and ideology. In Peshawar, especially in areas such as the Yusufzai sub-division, a history of direct power relations and official patron-client ties thwarted any new system based on naturalized, hegemonic social treatises and controls. Evidence of this showed in the failure to reduce violent social ‘crime’ and the refusal of elite khans to follow the colonizers’ rules of the game.

In colonial Peshawar, as in British India and in the post-colonial society described by Fida Muhammad, the judicial system was not an autonomous arbiter. In the Peshawar courts
'equality before the law...is neither a description of reality nor an ideal but rather an institutional ideology—an ideology that functions as the major rationalization for class domination'.\(^{47}\) The legitimacy of such a system remained constantly in question.

By the late nineteenth century circumstances forced Peshawar officials to consider increasing fines and doubling the maximum prison term allowed under Sections 13 and 14 of the Frontier Crimes Regulations. These cases involved the worst crimes tried by appointed *jirgas*. But valley residents increasingly deprecated the process. After a conviction for homicide and a top sentence of seven years, typically served in an Andaman Islands prison, a prisoner leaving one court said to friends, 'It is all right. My enemy dead. Seven years imprisonment and so much fine.'\(^{48}\)

The reality for the British judicial system was that Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun recognition of political domination and economic exploitation did not lead to any widespread social or ideological 'acceptance' of 'the institutions and values that cause their subordination'.\(^{49}\) Multiple, if asymmetrically empowered, centres of social and political influence required the imperial system continually to negotiate and debate the terms of its domination.

Particular results of this politicized context of revenue, land, and judicial structures and relationships emerged in the late 1880s. Increasingly, decisions and strategies were based on new economic dynamics that represented a larger colonial and global process of integration into a market economy.

Richard Fox described the conflict between a conservative colonial Punjab philosophy of 'underdevelopment', collecting a maximum of land revenue 'with the minimum transformation in agrarian production and labour systems', and a second approach advocating an aggressive development strategy based on agrarian investment and market participation.\(^{50}\) Larger economic and political considerations led to massive late nineteenth and early twentieth century projects of irrigation-canal building and canal-colony settlement in central and western Punjab districts, with 'revolutionary' implications for production and labour systems.
But such considerations did not weigh significantly in earlier canal-building projects, including one in the Peshawar District.

By 1885 a ‘development’ approach to subcontinental resources encouraged capital-intensive investments, especially in railroads and Punjab canal systems, able to contribute to international commerce and export earnings. But the interpretation of British-Indian capital investment, especially as related to Punjab canal development and agrarian transformation, was inconsistent with a simple world systems or dependency interpretation of peripheral subordination to a financial centre. Fox mentioned the ‘historically concrete social forces that directed, impeded or facilitated’ the penetration of capital into ‘particular third-world societies’. Such forces included the dependant population’s relations to production, in the Punjab case ‘peasants under tributary political economies’, and related awareness and agency. Another social dynamic deflecting the direct impact of larger market forces was the colonial process itself, the colonial state’s ‘own autonomy and its own imperatives of solvency, military security, and cheap governance’. As state capitalism embraced British India, regional differences in production, labour involvement, and imperial policy produced contingent realities of local reaction and accommodation, including in the Peshawar valley.

The first British plans to irrigate the dry maira country east of Hashtnagar dated to Henry Lawrence, first head of the Punjab Board of Administration. He valued a canal as a political asset in tribal relations. A September 1871 budget proposed a twenty-five mile canal stretching east from the Swat river to the Kalpani drainage near Mardan. A twelve-mile wide region of low rainfall would be irrigated by branch channels sloping southward towards the Kabul river. Planners noticed remnants of centuries-old irrigation works in the proposed development area.

Revised plans and budgets were submitted in 1874 and approved in 1876. Revenue officials, noting the ‘present sparseness of population’ in the tract, thought it would take fifteen years after the canal opened to develop the system fully. Builders incurred large unanticipated expenses in constructing
culverts, aqueducts, and waterways across the southern-flowing gullies and creek beds of the area’s drainage system. By 1885 the completed canal contained nine main distribution branches at a total cost of Rs 3725000.

 Officials considered the expensive project still worthwhile, especially as an incentive ‘inducing the border tribes to settle down to agricultural pursuits’. The canal was not considered a ‘productive public work’, but an ordinary project classified in 1881 as a ‘Famine Relief Protective Public Work’.

 In terms of spurring agricultural production and revenue the canal succeeded. So ‘rapid was the growth that in the third year after opening the canal the irrigated area amounted to over 96000 acres and in the fourth year to over 100000’ (combined summer and winter areas). It was so successful that the Settlement Officer revising the Regular Settlement insisted upon a further fourteen-mile extension of the canal. The extension crossed the Kalpani stream to end at the Makam drainage near Shahbazgarhi and irrigated another 23461 acres (again combining annual summer and winter acreage).

 The Swat canal meant that barani land, at best good for a single yearly crop, now could be double cropped (do fasli). With the railroad, a valley able to produce a slight surplus, mostly grown for or by ‘independent area’ residents within the settled district to take to their homes, now produced cash crops for extra-provincial export.

 Change induced by the events and innovations of the 1880s attracted comment in the 1891 Census Report. Administrators partially credited district population growth, from 450099 in 1855, to 523152 in 1868, to 592674 in 1881, and 703768 in 1891, to ‘greater care’ in the counting process, especially of females. District-wide gains were attributed to the money and work generated by the Afghan war, the railroad, ‘greater peace and security’, and the Swat River Canal. The canal seemed responsible for the ‘greater part’ of the gains in the Hashtnagar and Mardan tahsil. In addition, a large increase in well construction added to the irrigated acreage in the non-canal areas of the Yusufzai region.
Census figures from 1891 confirmed the lure of the Peshawar valley. Some 96618 of 703768 residents were born outside the Peshawar District, while only 12042 district-born individuals lived in other Punjab districts. Males migrated for work, especially agrarian labour. The 96618 immigrants included 65355 males and only 31263 females. North-Indian born immigrants to the Peshawar District were concentrated in the military, urban, and cantonment areas. A total of 18135 ‘Afghan natives’ in the district included mainly single male winter season labourers and seasonal Mohmand ‘carriers’, the transient herders and traders called Kochis. Only the Mohmands travelled with their families. One estimate counted a ‘preponderance’ of 5000 males among Afghan immigrants from territories claimed by the Afghan amir. 

With a supply of inexpensive labour ‘the key to the growth of commodity production’ in this era, ‘the movements of Indian labour in the nineteenth century that resulted became not merely an effect, but an accurate index, of the development of capitalist relations of production’. Afghans steadily moved from non-British regions to the new canal tracts. Seasonal agricultural work attracted pastoralists who might, or might not, continue to haul trade goods east and west during migrations between low winter pastures around the Indus and high summer pastures in the Afghan mountains. Surplus labour in independent hill areas, historically a consequence of water limitations, non-arable terrain, and generational divisions of land shares, now had an alternative to military service or other settled area work.

The Swat Canal lands attracted Mohmands and Bajauris. But the total of other ‘independent territory’ migrants to canal lands was less than anticipated. Still, in the district ‘immigrants from independent territory constitute one third of the total immigration and with the Afghan more than half’. This meant that half the 96618 immigrants, say at least 48309, were independent Afghans or under the Afghan amir’s rule. Subtracting the 18135 ‘state’ Afghans, perhaps 30174 independent area residents worked or lived in the valley. This included perhaps 8000 more men than women and many seasonal, winter labourers.
The reluctance of many independent territory residents to head straight to the Swat Canal fields indicated that other district employment, including established canal land work in other *tahsil*, proved equally or more attractive than terms of employment or tenancy on the new canal lands. The irrigated *maira* tracts, long part of Mandanr clan holdings, offered the vast majority of outsiders work only as tenants or labourers. As in other areas coming under commodity production few occupancy tenancies were awarded. Tenants typically paid half the produce as rent.

Not only did many independent area Afghans work as seasonal labourers, but also many working as ‘cultivators’ on Swat Canal fields would ‘leave their families at home and only temporarily visit their canal hamlets’. Between 1881 and 1891, the new tillers on the Swat Canal lands drove the 36 per cent population increase in the Mardan *tahsil*. New wells contributed to a 22 per cent population increase in the Swabi *tahsil*. The potential for continued growth showed in the 1891 variance in population density between the old irrigated areas around Peshawar, 700 per cultivated square mile, against still only 250 ‘in the northern and central portions of the district’.

A pattern developed in the Yusufzai sub-division of growing maize, ‘the staple winter food’, in the summer on irrigated lands, with *jowar* for fodder and other lesser crops planted on *barani* and marginal lands. The autumn sowing for spring *rabi* harvests included barley for local consumption in rotation after maize on well and canal lands, plus wheat, often for ‘export’, often grown on Swabi *barani* lands. Punitive revenue charges discouraged rice cultivation, a practice seen as water-intensive and risking waterlogging.

Officials combined three Mardan plains revenue ‘assessment circles’ into one ‘*Maira* circle’ with 46205 acres of canal irrigation. The circle basically comprised the seventy new and established villages watered by the Swat Canal. The 1895 Assessment Report counted 133 villages in Mardan *tahsil* and 101 in Swabi. The subdivision of large ‘unwieldy villages’ in Lundkhwar and the transfer of villages between revenue circles
and *tahsils* now made direct statistical comparisons between censuses and assessment reports increasingly difficult.

The social consequences of the new irrigation system related to local agrarian and political relationships solidified in the generation before 1885. Those previously able to understand and actively participate in colonial revenue, judicial, and political systems, and read canal proposals, gained the most. The system introduced new land surveys and records. ‘The *maira* at Settlement had been recorded as the property of the *khans* or as village common land, and after the canal was opened it became necessary to more accurately determine the rights of individual shares.’ Colonial officials persuaded Pakhtun shareholders in the new canal lands to end the practice of dividing shares among different blocks of land and accept single sections of squarely surveyed fields. Such fixing of shares in the Hashtnagar and Mardan *tahsils* ended centuries of clan land use patterns, drew shareholders into standard administrative formats, and apparently ‘checked the spoliation of the weaker sharers which had been in active progress’. The defining metaphor for the new regime of restructured agrarian spaces and relationships became the common survey base line laid down for the district from January 1893, during the revision of the Regular Settlement. A common grid of squares oriented to the cardinal directions now subsumed individual field and village maps.

Yusufzai sub-division *khans* whose families had asserted a dominant influence in their *tappas* continued to control many villages and much acreage. In the non-canal irrigated Sudhum valley the descendants of Mir Baba were proprietors of eleven villages in revenue ‘estates’ covering 13315 acres or 43 per cent of the Koh Daman Sadum Assessment Circle. The elite also prevailed in the newly irrigated lands of the Mardan *Maira* circle. Sher Ali of Hoti controlled 2000 acres of canal land. Shad Muhammad Khan of Mardan held two newly irrigated villages and 3,305 watered acres. Muhabbat Khan of Toru found six of his eleven villages, about 6000 acres, serviced by the new canal. Khwaja Muhammad Khan of Hoti controlled ten villages and 11532 acres within the Swat Canal zone.
The 1895 Assessment Report detailed the relationship between Yusufzai sub-division irrigation, proprietary ownership, and social organization. Rain-fed revenue circles remained cultivated mainly by smallholding ‘owners’, with few tenants. Circles with large individual holdings were mainly tilled by rent-paying tenants. The Mardan Maira circle had the highest level of land concentration and of tenant tillage with 49.8 per cent of the land under tenant cultivation. In this circle the population had increased 72 per cent, wells 64.7 per cent, and total irrigation 1038.4 per cent since the Regular Settlement. Here the transformation of khan into landlord occurred to the extent that revenue farmers now engaged to lease parcels of land from the khans (including 20087 of the 23751 acres under tenancy), manage the estates, pay the land revenue, and remit cash rent to the khans.

Statistics of agrarian labour, debt, and land sales told of the extent of both the entrenched elite Pakhtun interests and the larger market penetration into the valley. In 1901 the number of Peshawar District agricultural labourers, 5542 males and 708 females, was double the total of 2854 labourers recorded in the 1879 Famine report. Cash loans at 1-3 per cent a month interest from shopkeepers did not initially result in excessive mortgages or forced land sales in the Yusufzai sub-division, though officials in the Peshawar and Hashtnagar tahsil worried about land sales, especially to non-agriculturists. Records kept from 1885 showed land sales of only 4.3 per cent of the fields of the Yusufzai sub-division. Only in 1922, after speculative investments accelerated on newly irrigated Upper Swat Canal lands, did officials enact in the Peshawar District the 1900 Punjab Land Alienation Act restricting land sales to non-agriculturists.

Reports traced the growing importance of outside markets to Peshawar valley agriculture. Rail imports and exports from district stations for the period 1 January 1891 to 30 June 1895 indicated that despite the importation of an extra 139000 maunds of wheat, other grains, and flour to support the 1895 Chitral military expedition, ‘...even so there is a large balance of 179911 maunds in favour of exports over imports’ of district-
produced wheat, other grains, sugar, and tobacco. Adding the 139000 maunds subtracted due to the one-time, military-related importation, back to the net 112658 maunds figure of wheat and ‘other grains’ surplus, a total export potential existed for the period of 251658 maunds of wheat, other grains, and flour surplus. At 80 pounds a maund, this was about 10066 tons of surplus over the four-and-a-half years or 2236 tons of surplus grains a year. A metalled road from Mardan to Nowshera facilitated the use of carts to carry produce to the Nowshera railway station.

The Swabi tahsil experienced a boom in tobacco cultivation. Requiring intensive cultivation and processing, tobacco thrived in the local soil and climate. Acreage devoted to tobacco increased from 1754 in Swabi and 266 in Mardan in 1891 to a total of 7394 acres in 1895. Owners ‘as a rule’ hired a gardener who often ‘keeps a boy to weed and water’ the plants. The owner paid expenses, including for manure, and the gardener received a third of the crop. With the railroad much of the tobacco was exported, ‘even to distant Calcutta’. Estimating a yield of 40 maunds an acre, a recent three-year average of 3476 acres of tobacco in Swabi, and 139040 maunds of production worth Rs 3 per maund, the assessment officer calculated that a gross income of Rs 417120 (after deducting gardener’s shares of 139040 and Rs 28 per acre expenses) left proprietor profits of Rs 180752. He noted that the entire revenue assessment of Swabi was only Rs 120079. In the mentioned 1891-95 period of rail exports, a net of 48475 maunds of tobacco were exported from the district, including 28901 from Nowshera station and 13795 from Jehangira station.

As in other districts the rise in crop prices after the original Peshawar Settlement, approximately 53 per cent over the twenty-year period between assessments, meant that fixed cash-revenue demands consumed a smaller annual percentage of average crop yields. Some sources said that prices had moderated after the second Anglo-Afghan war, but wages had remained high. Dane, the Assessment and Settlement Officer in the 1893-96 period, adamantly insisted upon enhancing the Yusufzai sub-division to
the level of the revenue rates imposed on the rest of the Peshawar and other Punjab districts, even to the ideal 'half net assets' demand. He felt previous revenue work had been inexact, with Hastings intentionally setting low charges, many at 10 per cent below official rates.

Dane's assessment report constantly noted the prosperity of the Yusufzai sub-division and recommended that even if rates were not raised to the exact half net assets value, they could be radically increased with little burden on the proprietors. He asserted that the present Mardan assessment of Rs 85217 was considerably less than the theoretical half assets demand of Rs 283303. In Swabi the current Rs 120859 ought to be Rs 369733. But even Dane compromised with a subsequent recommendation to make only a 'full collection' of the old rates plus another 20 per cent to compensate for price rises. The Punjab Financial Commissioner, not accepting the characterization of Peshawar as now just another Punjab district, suggested modifications and a lesser demand.

The Peshawar Division Commissioner, long in Peshawar, responded that 'we have to bear in mind that we are dealing with a frontier population which in the tract now under treatment has been accustomed to great leniency in the matter of their land revenue assessments'. A comment that possible half assets rates tables had been assembled by 'a possibly too sanguine observer', was an indication of the polite bureaucratic competition between political and revenue perspectives.

The Peshawar Commissioner proposed lowering Dane's Mardan recommendation from Rs 164384 to Rs 152383 and in Swabi from Rs 199320 to Rs 188297, only about 52 per cent of Dane's theoretical half assets demand. The Punjab government approved the lower rates.

Frontier remissions, personal inams and revenue reductions, jagirs, low rates set on the newly opened Swat Canal areas, military employment and pensions, and a low revenue demand rewarded the cooperation of Pakhtun khans and shareholders in the Yusufzai sub-division. Unlike other areas in the Punjab or even in the Peshawar valley, new irrigation opportunities in the
Yusufzai sub-division initiated agrarian reaction to wider market forces without immediate challenges from outsiders to established patterns of land control. Smallholders with well irrigation, especially Swabi tobacco-growers, became petty commodity producers. But in the core area of new irrigation, the *Maira* circle of the Mardan *tahsil*, an economy comprised landlords, managing intermediaries, and growing numbers of tenants-at-will replicated the region’s heritage of imperially supported social hierarchies at the expense of what remained of small shareholder proprietorship and affiliated, often only nominally dependent, *hamsayas* and *fakirs*.

The core irrigated village circles within the Yusufzai sub-division created a growing socio-economic gap between not only neighbouring independent areas and the settled district, but between irrigated and non-irrigated areas within the sub-division. Cultural and demographic innovations followed as large numbers of Mohmand Pakhtuns migrated from independent and settled district villages to become Charsadda and Mardan tenants. The elite treated these migrants as low status producers of less concern than traditional dependants. The 1901 Census counted 47032 Mohmands in the settled district, with 19206 in the Charsadda *tahsil*, 9803 in Mardan, and only 74 in Swabi.

The irrigation process itself also had a negative influence on the quality of life in the Peshawar valley. Malaria became a serious health problem as the Swat River Canal and other valley irrigation projects increased the amount of moisture standing in fields, ditches, and waterways. In the five years 1877-81 annual deaths in the district from ‘fever’ averaged 6944 (about 1.1 per cent of pop.). In the six years 1885-90 annual deaths averaged 7958. In the ten years 1891-1900 deaths averaged 13394 (about 1.78 per cent of pop.), including 21437 in 1892 alone. Malaria seemed to be a wetlands disease of swampy soil and humid seasons, especially during the autumn in the Yusufzai sub-division. Observers recognized that irrigation contributed to the incidence of malaria. ‘The best recruits are therefore generally to be found in the non-irrigated areas where the land is poorer and the evidence of malaria is less, i.e. under the hills to the
North-east of the Mardan and Swabi *Tahsil*. Yusufzais are enrolled for all arms of the services.'

NOTES

3. David Hardiman, 'The Indian Faction', *Subaltern Studies 1* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1981). Hardiman argues against the permanence of factional ties across diverse lines of social class and interests.
4. Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns*, 1988 notes social tensions from the 1920s, accelerated by the Depression. See also Jansson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?*, 1981 for a sense of the evolution of Peshawar valley anti-colonial politics from the Khilafat movement, c. 1920, from local social reform movements, and from ties to the Indian National Congress Party.
12. Peshawar Deputy Commissioner Records, Bundle No. 8, File S. No. 165, pp. 22, 27, 72. Each listed in personal ‘Roll of a retired native officer entitled to be present in durbars’, recorded in 1898.
13. Peshawar C. O. Records, Bundle No. 11, File S. No. 424, Letter No. 427, dated 30 November 1880. From Civil Surgeon, Peshawar, to Peshawar Deputy Commissioner. Letter No. 55 in the same file noted hospital admission totals for venereal disease by British troops in Peshawar along with average annual troop strengths. For the period 1876-1879 admission percentages in these years were as high as 11.82%, 17.91%, 22.06%, and 12.16%, though British soldiers were kept out of the city.
14. A verse about the dispatch of Mardan troops to Basra, Iraq in World War I repeated by a Hoti village woman of the period to her granddaughter, as remembered by the granddaughter in 1996.
17. Peshawar C. O. Records, Bundle No. 6, File S. No. 220, contains 1898 correspondence about sending recruiting parties to Adam Khel Afridi country in the Kohat region, and to the Mohmand and Buner areas. The latter efforts, pursued by recruit-hungry regiments, were debated by political officers as being too soon after the 1897 troubles.
22. From *Prices and Wages in India* (Statistical Branch of the Department of Finance and Commerce, Calcutta, 1885), Part II, Wages of Skilled and Unskilled Labour (1873-1884), Peshawar District Average Monthly Wages.
23. One seer was equal to a little more than two pounds, 40 seer was one maund or about 80 pounds. The non-standard weights and measures in the district included a general grain measure by unit of weight. The ‘Peshawar ser’ was equal to the weight of Rs 104 of British coinage, the ‘Government ser’ to Rs 80. In the Razzar and Utman-nama tappas of the Yusufzai sub-division a unit of capacity, the odi or ogi was used, see *Peshawar Gazetteer*, 1897-98, pp. 242-44. Fox, *Lions of the Punjab*, 1985, p. 36 listed the maund at 82.28 lbs. The kuru distance of sixty-six inches mentioned in the Regular Settlement was called the karam in the 1897-98 Gazetteer.
24. Grain prices from *Prices of Food-Grains and Salt throughout India, 1861-1883* (Statistical Branch of Department of Finance and Commerce, Calcutta, 1884).
28. In a letter from E. G. Hastings, Settlement Officer, dated 30 April 1875, reprinted in Hoti family history, p. 32.
29. In a letter from D. C. Macnabb, Peshawar Commissioner, dated 22 March 1874, reprinted in Hoti history, pp. 31-2.
30. In a letter from H. Robinson, Peshawar Commissioner, dated 18 February 1882, reprinted in Hoti history, p. 34.
36. Comments from Johnstone’s Letter No. 175, pp. 1-11.
39. From a letter dated 5 June 1883, Jenkins to Johnstone.
40. Johnstone Letter No. 175, pp. 3 and 9.
41. ‘Petition of Khwaja Muhamed Khan of Hoti.’, p. 4.
43. Sections 39 through 46 of the F. C. R. 1887 code dealt with ‘Security for Good Behavior’. See attached text of Section 40, in Appendix 15. As revised in the late twentieth century, Section 40 was still a notorious and widely debated ‘tribal area’ legal instrument.
44. Peshawar C. O. Records, Bundle No. 73, File S. No. 2037, Letter No. 18, dated 11 January 1884, pp. 9 and 12. Warburton to Peshawar Commissioner.
45. Noted in Khwaja Muhammad’s petition to the Punjab Lt. Governor, p. 3.
46. See Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 1971, for his sense of hegemonic control as being evolved from complex power relationships reflected in cultural and political discourses.
49. See Fida Muhammad, ibid.


60. By 1895 Yusufzai sub-division cultivated land was 28.6 per cent compared to 78 per cent in Charsadda. Cultivated areas per holding averaged 27.6 acres in Mardan against 10.7 acres in Swabi. See *1895 Dane Report*, pp. 37 and 54.

61. *1895 Dane Report*, pp. 77 and 47. For agrarian and tenancy data see Appendices 10 and 11.


63. *1895 Dane Report*, pp. 54-55.


For a century after the events occurred, differing historical perspectives have scrutinized the late nineteenth century non-western and South Asian contact with European imperialism and the British empire. The nature of indigenous resistance to foreign domination has been continuously analysed. Colonial narratives dismissed various suppressed uprisings as the triumph of order over anarchy. Nationalist chronologies, on the other hand, appropriated disparate revolts as events anticipating the day the people would come into their own. Political economists and radical historians traced conflict to changing structures of class, caste, and economy. Post-independence, state oriented scholars wrote modernizing teleologies in which resistance developed as consolidating governments confronted and absorbed traditional societies and cultures. More recently, 'subaltern' and post-colonial narratives interpreted colonial era unrest as continuing conflict between domineering western knowledge-power and communitarian consciousness and agency.

Post-1947 historical scholarship on anti-colonial politics and resistance further refined analysis of emerging nationalism, especially in relation to Islamic identities. Here, in considering the social context of one late nineteenth century moment of indigenous revolt, colonial history and religiously influenced social mobilization remain best understood by drawing upon methods under-utilized in studies focused on the state. Close attention to details of Peshawar valley village social, economic,
and political relations reveals the heterogeneous nature of both colonial and ‘native’ responses to the violence of 1897. The use of ‘subaltern studies’ approaches, including reading colonial documents ‘against the grain’ of official discourse, has helped to recover details of a ‘history from below’. But this leads to questions about the viability of particular subaltern studies concepts such as generalized ‘peasant communal consciousness’ or the existence of truly autonomous domains separating subaltern and elite politics and power relations.³

The revolt of 1897 involved the popular mobilization in, and official repression of, several Pakhtun villages on the border between the settled, government-controlled Peshawar district and the lower Swat valley just to the north, scene of the initial uprising. The uprising of 1897 did not reflect simple ‘tribal fanaticism’ or proto-national consciousness. Nor was it merely a product of either economic structural transformation or pure ‘subaltern’ agency. This challenges imperial, national, and academic historical theories that have compared and contrasted 1897 fanaticism with holy war, imperialism with patriotism, and religious millenarianism with secular progress. Rather than seeking to hypothesize some apparent, yet elusive, common anti-colonial ‘consciousness’, this study demonstrates the extent to which participants in the events of 1897, though acting as individuals in particular decisions, remained integral parts of complex networks of power and local culture. Lineage relations, religious beliefs, economic and social status, and links to colonial authority all influenced the nature of individual and clan mobilization at the outbreak of resistance and the degree of accommodation and compromise that quickly followed during the suppression of the revolt.

In the late nineteenth century the several hundred villages of the Peshawar valley experienced a period of settled district agrarian expansion and local Pakhtun elite consolidated their authority and control of resources. Despite a growing colonial presence centred in Peshawar city and the influence of revenue and judicial regimes, regional Pakhtun clans continued to pursue many indigenous practices and initiatives. Village social life continued to be heavily dominated by a patriarchal set of gender and lineage relations.
The social hierarchies and political stability developing in central canal-irrigated lands remained less evident around the periphery of the ‘settled’ Peshawar valley. In ‘border’ villages old concerns about imperial expansion and maintaining a competitive local power balance resurfaced during the 1897-8 period of extended political instability.

The late nineteenth century British-Indian imperial activism expanded degrees of control over surrounding territories. In 1886 a boundary commission resolved with the Russians a northern border for the Afghan buffer state. In 1893 a British-Afghan agreement formalized the Durand Line, dividing spheres of influence between the Afghan amir and British India. By 1895 a familiar imperial sequence of regional observation, influence, interference, and occupation repeated itself in the Chitral valley north of the Yusufzai clan areas of the Peshawar and Swat valleys. The colonial government involved itself in Chitral politics and military force was used to control and direct local authority.

Using concerns about Russian influence and British prestige as a pretext, the colonial occupation of Chitral required the construction of a road through the Malakand Pass just north of the Peshawar valley. The road traversed lower Swat and Chakdara village, then cut west and north across the Yusufzai territory of Dir. Yusufzai clans opposing the advance over the Malakand Pass were defeated. The British established posts at the top of the Malakand Pass and at a bridge over the Swat river at Chakdara. In an age of worldwide European imperial expansion and conquest, especially against diverse Islamic communities, after decades of incremental British advances along the entire Afghan border region, colonizers viewed the opening of a road across lower Swat as an inevitable event. The newly covered territories were indirectly controlled through local leaders and administered as the Agency of Dir, Swat, and Chitral, or simply the Malakand Agency.

An imperial narrative justified this latest phase of expansion with a rationale that for many remained fully legitimate well into the post-colonial period. With regard to the late nineteenth
century British treaties and advances along the Afghan border it was said:

...all this was regarded as a deliberate menace to a long cherished independence. A menace indeed it was, but not deliberate. Every move had been forced upon authority either by tribal depredations or by the need to oppose disruptive influences...

This British narrative of benign, justifiable expansion suggested the establishment and acceptance, if grudging and slow, of a final, hegemonic authority. This common imperial view asserted a monopoly on moral and political legitimacy.

In 1897 long-simmering Pakhtun concerns erupted into violence. The struggle was characterized in terms of archaic tribal opposition to the expanded colonial border and to a civilizing, progressive state. Colonial discourse ignored Islamic moral arguments, clan custom, and regional political motivations while laying all the blame on barbarism and a disruptive ‘fanaticism’ generated by a handful of outside, illegitimate religious figures.

Colonial state and post-colonial scholarly analysis concentrated on the ‘fanatical’ or ‘millenarian’ aspects of the 1897 Pakhtun revolts that soon spread along the British-Indian frontier. Once again British claims to an exclusive authority, ‘encompassing both power, in the sense of the ability...to coerce and effect change, and moral influence, in the sense of providing the ultimate source for norms...’ resulted in particular conclusions. Instances of nuanced, differentiated individual and clan involvement in events remained little understood or recalled. An over-developed perception of the role of legitimate Islamic cultural and moral appeals in regional resistance reduced any actuality of an evolving, complex history of clan, imperial, and religious relations to a moment of spontaneous, universal, and temporary revolt.

Contemporary colonial reports supported later scholarly theories of regional millenarianism and the moral discourses dividing Islam and the imperial state. But such colonial
documents, including files about settled district villagers charged with participating in the fighting, confirmed an argument for a specific rather than dominant role for religion in the anti-imperial struggle. Islamic identity would be emphasized by both the colonizers and their opponents to serve discrete goals, including obscuring the complex interpenetration of colonial systems with village systems of authority and power. In addition, colonial files, while exhibiting what Freitag called the British ‘conflation of power and authority’, also indirectly suggested the inadequacy of any ‘subaltern’ or post-colonial analysis viewing the events as simply a unified or ‘national’ revolt of the dominated against the imperial state.

Colonial histories of the events of 1897 were collections of rumours. In May 1897 imperial troops marched through the Malakand Agency to relieve units stationed in Chitral. Sometime ‘…during the march…rumors began to reach the Political Agent that persistent efforts were being made by mullas to arouse fanatical excitement in Swat, Bajaur, and Dir.’ As in previous areas occupied by the British, local figures had been retained in authority, awarded allowances, and delegated the responsibility of maintaining the peace. As in previous eras, anti-imperial political sentiments received no overt local elite encouragement while imperial patronage consolidated select elite ambitions. Whether the May rumours were accurate or not, the Yusufzai ruler of Dir, now tied to British approval and support, used the rumours successfully to attack enemies, including a local religious figure, the ‘Palam mulla’, and other ‘clans on the right bank of the Swat river’.

Around 18 July rumours reached the Malakand Political Agent of a ‘fakir’, a religious ascetic, who claimed miraculous powers and asserted that ‘with the aid of hosts of angels’ he would lead a jihad and defeat the British. On 26 July the fakir, named Saidullah, began marching towards Malakand from Landakai village in the Swat valley. With him went only ‘a few small boys with flags in their hands’.

After six miles he reached Thana, the village of the khan lineage (khel) of the Baizai branch of the Akozai clan of the Yusufzai. By then four hundred men
had joined him. Along the road leading towards Malakand and the side road to Chakdara the procession passed other villages and hundreds more joined. That evening both the Malakand and Chakdara imperial encampments suffered assaults from thousands of Yusufzai from numerous clans and villages.

The fortified camps survived despite many casualties. A 30 July telegram sent by the Political Agent at Malakand reported, ‘The Fakir who led the business has withdrawn to Jandalia wounded; his companion and supporter shot dead.’ The young ‘companion’ had been proclaimed as the heir to the Mughal throne. Despite this, until a relief column from the plains arrived on 2 August ‘fanatical attacks by relays of tribesmen’ continued on both Malakand and Chakdara. After 2 August British military columns would traverse the Swat and Buner areas and eventually end the local uprising. By then, a series of new border revolts to the south involving the Mohmands, Afridis, and others meant that troops and political agents would be kept busy into the next year.

The direct results of the 1897-98 clan uprisings along the frontier, costing thousands of casualties and millions of pounds, included an end to the latest period of colonial ‘Forward Policy’ and the 1901 decision to separate a new North-West Frontier Province from the Punjab. The new viceroy, Curzon, would later boast that during his term in office he spent almost nothing on frontier expeditions. Yet these political responses did not follow politically grounded understanding of the violence.

British discourse from 1897, including political agent reports filed from August 1897, matched the objective of a colonial journalist ‘to deny his enemy any claim to moral status by establishing the premise that he is fanatical…’ Churchill’s writings on the period fully elaborated a western moral certainty that the benefits of colonialism remained transparently unassailable. Indigenous opposition came from the irrational or self-serving response of opponents of modernity and civilization. ‘Were (the tribes) amenable to logical reasoning, the improvement in their condition and the strength of their adversaries would have convinced them of the folly of an
outbreak. But in a land of fanatics common sense does not exist.' Extending David Edward's comment that "Fanaticism" serves as the central trope of Churchill's polemic...", fanaticism served as the key trope of colonial frontier discourse.

One problem in later analysis of this trope was the sense of an underlying truth behind the extreme imagery. 'Fanaticism may be a biased term, but it still describes something real that must be deciphered if we are to understand the nature of religious authority and the reasons why the normally insular border tribes chose to follow religious leaders into battle.' But neither charisma nor millenarianism satisfactorily explains 'something real' about the complex interaction of clans, religion, and the state.

Miracles factored into the rhetoric of Saidullah, as they did in Churchill's critique of Pakhtun society. And observers noted the role of religious leadership in other revolts along the borderland in 1897, especially in the Mohmand country. Yet colonial representations of a spontaneous, universal movement inspired by miraculous religious visions, inevitably to be defeated after an impractical emotional outburst, need not be so closely replicated in analysing either the content or the character of the Malakand conflict.

History slanted in the nineteenth century to present a contrast between a rational colonial administration and an anarchic society continued loosely to shape later studies. If 'Swat was notorious as a den of sedition and crime', this appeared mainly in British colonial sources. When the Swat clan leaders (khans) and a privileged elite communicated with the British during the 1897 revolt, was it due to 'fearing political anarchy and the uncontrollable and unpredictable religious fanaticism of the "mullahs"'? Or was it because they feared political displacement by victorious religious leaders or alternatively punishment, even dismissal, by post-revolt British political agents?

Over seventy-five years later a modernization narrative continued to shape analysis, postulating that:
The ‘jihads’ in the colonial encounters of the nineteenth century were a last grand and futile gesture of the ‘traditionalist’ forces of Islam tilting against the most powerful nations on earth. The inevitability of the outcome merely underlines the conceptualization of the rationale contained in the ‘jihad’ by its participants: the struggle is more important than victory; the principle more important than the objective.12

Yet it may be argued that the Pakhtun struggle in 1897 conceptualized a rationale of victory over colonialism, one finally achieved in 1947 within Churchill’s lifetime. As well, later history demonstrated that pursuing the objective of a return to a pre-imperial, even ‘traditionalist’ context was not inevitably futile, if one considers the politics of 1990s post-Soviet Afghanistan, mid-1990s Chechnya, or even the Malakand Agency in the 1995-96 period.

Did the perception of the 1897 Yusufzai uprising in Swat as a millenarian reaction, ‘loosely’ defined as ‘a spontaneous, universal and historically short-lived, native reaction to economic or political stimulus, expressed through the presence of foreign troops and administrators’, simply devalue tactics learned through centuries of pastoral and agrarian resistance against imperial intrusions? Such resistance often included the temporary local use of religious imagery and symbols to highlight sharp differences between opponents in moments of extreme political conflict.

Khans opposed to the British in 1895, well aware of the repression of previous challengers, could not directly provide leadership in 1897. For many khans neutrality was the public stance. Three days after the uprising began, the Malakand political agent observed, ‘Inayat Khan of Thana with a few levy sowars (was the) only man loyal to us. He has taken refuge in Chakdarra.’14 But the ideology of jihad readily translated any elite and popular socio-political and religious-moral concerns into action. All khans would instantly reassert the previous status quo if the British were displaced, or could count on being supported by the victorious British if they attributed discontent solely to religious agitation.
How should historical process be interpreted? Was the expression of resentment building since 1895 ‘spontaneous’ revolt, after months of rumours of imminent jihad? In the Yusufzai country only Saidullah’s involvement seemed ‘short-lived’. Colonial armies spent weeks campaigning in the Yusufzai valleys and months in warfare against Mohmands and Afridis. Typical peace agreements were reached with regional clan councils (*jirgas*). Clans agreed to stop fighting and in return the British, confiscating some arms and levying fines, agreed to stop burning villages and to depart from occupied valleys. The colonial ability to define offences and administer often token punishments symbolically reasserted government authority. Yet documents preserving the process of judgement showed that, despite widespread unrest, there was far from ‘universal’ individual and clan involvement in the 1897-98 uprising.

Legal records on the settled villages of the northern Peshawar valley provided another perspective on the nature of village social relations, the fragility of imperial authority, and the negotiable terrain of colonial-clan relations. Evidence suggested the inherent weakness of an early subaltern studies theory that ‘all of subaltern protest can be written from two diametrically opposed points of view: the rebel’s and the darogah’s’.

Complex indigenous initiatives and strategies and different imperial reactions, locally and in Lahore, contradicted any sense of absolute imperial-tribal alienation and marked ‘the inadequacy of this (early subaltern studies) bipolar division of social life’.

Did the revolt represent a general, contingent ‘subaltern’ reaction against colonial dominance? If so, evidence linking local post-revolt initiatives and reactions to specific socio-economic contexts and power relations suggested the limits of any (late subaltern studies) claim of uniform peasant or community ‘consciousness’ or that ‘when a community acts collectively the fundamental political characteristics are the same everywhere’. Regardless, the history of 1897 dispelled imperial presumptions that colonial systems and authority had finally ‘settled’ the Peshawar District.
Despite decades of rhetoric of pacification and tranquillity, local authorities had few illusions about the extent of their writ in settled district villages along the northern border with Swat. On 27 July within hours of the initial uprising, the Assistant Commissioner of the Mardan tahsil of the eastern Peshawar valley sent warnings to village maliks ‘against joining the fanatical gathering’, especially maliks appointed as revenue agents (lambardars) in the Sadhum valley and in ‘Baizai’ sub-district (tappa) Utman Khel villages. On 28 July the Malakand political agent logged rumours of possible participation by residents of other valley villages, including from Hashtnagar, Nowshera, and Kui Barmoul. On 29 July the Peshawar Commissioner warned ‘lambardars and village chaukidars throughout the district’ to report, on the pain of severe punishment, ‘any man going across the border’ from their villages.18

If actual colonial control proved vulnerable, especially in the villages around the northern periphery of the settled district, the surveillance apparatus of the imperial regime recorded the extent of local involvement in the ‘jihad’. On 27 July Muhammad Yusuf, the touring deputy inspector of police and thanadar of the Katlang police post, visited the three northern ‘Swati’ Yusufzai villages of Matta, Shamozai, and Babozai followed by the neighbouring Utman Khel villages of Sangao, Mian Khan, Pipal, and Kui. In Matta he heard rumours that something had happened at Malakand. He decided to visit the other villages, before returning late in the day back through the Yusufzai villages to Katlang. He found Mian Khan ‘almost empty’, with no lambardars present. ‘In Pipal and Kui the people were few.’ Returning to Katlang, he observed ‘there were very few persons in Babozai’. He continued on, concerned about the security of the police thana itself, reaching Katlang village at three o’clock in the morning.

On the afternoon of the 28th officials dispatched Muhammad Yusuf on tour again. He delivered or sent government messages to lambardars in Babozai, Kui Barmoul, and Lundkhwar summoning them to the Assistant Commissioner in Mardan.
Muhammad Yusuf spent that night in Pipal. 'There was no one in Pipal that night. The hujra was empty. The lambardars had both gone to Mardan, and a few old men and women and children had been left behind.'

Over the next few days the inspector of police, Shahzada Shweb, came from Mardan to survey the area. Village lambardars received orders to assist in listing all villagers who had gone to Malakand and made ‘common cause with the enemy’. Initial village responses to the police inspector, including from lambardars, revealed the divisions between state, clan, and individual interests. On 30 July in Mian Khan the inspector found no lambardars present and few men in the village. ‘The people present said most of the men had gone up to the hills to get grass and wood.’ Villagers in Sangao, including Ghazan, a lambardar, asserted that the men had gone wood and grass collecting ‘and that none of them had gone to the fighting’.

It was decided to make an example of Mian Khan village. Dispatched on 1 August to Mian Khan, the inspector chose names from lists of missing men assembled by Muhammad Yusuf (twenty-five names) and by village lambardars (thirty-one names). But villagers defied the inspector’s attempt immediately to arrest six suspects and take them into custody. Most of the men named remained missing from the village, but six men had approached the inspector. Most stated they had not gone to Malakand. One claimed he had gone to Shamoza to collect a debt. Another said he had gone to Buner to buy a cow.

When the inspector held the men, then handcuffed them, ‘the villagers made a great uproar, and made as if to release them’. The lambardars, ordered to calm the crowd, said they were unable to do so. In the morning, as the inspector attempted to leave Mian Khan with his prisoners, the village lambardars approached the inspector to release the men ‘on security’. ‘As there was every likelihood of a breach of the peace…,’ the men were released ‘on bail’ while the inspector visited other villages. Finally, the deputy inspector Muhammad Yusuf collected the six from Mian Khan along with other suspects. On 4 August the inspector reached Mardan with eighteen prisoners.
While fighting continued the government initially desired to identify and punish individuals held responsible for attacking the Malakand posts. Outright denial and avoidance of responsibility by village leaders and individuals marked an apparent indigenous solidarity against state authority. But as the fighting ended and as interviews, interrogations, and inquiries accumulated into late 1897, it became clear that not all clans or villages along the northern border had joined the violence. Nor did colonial officials seem to care to implicate fully those individuals whose village or clan memberships made extended investigations impolitic or inconvenient to larger colonial purposes.

Such evidence raised one ‘dilemma’ of attempting to understand a colonial state-subaltern tribal conflict. ‘The question of (imperial) complicity, hierarchy, and surveillance within subaltern communities and subaltern cultures is a thorny one indeed.’ There would be no ‘pure and transparent’ subaltern identities maintained after the Malakand attacks, though arguably there had been for a time a familiar, historically constructed, ‘occasional, partial, contingent achievement of a measure of unity, collaboration, even solidarity’.21

Clearly evident to all, Baizai tappa Utman Khel villagers and ‘Swati’ Yusufzai villagers had gone to fight in Malakand. The wounding or death of particular individuals was common knowledge. But also in the Khattak Pakhtun villages of Lundkhwar and Mian Isa, when on 31 July the police inspector ‘enquired from the Hindus of the villages’, he received cautious responses ‘that undoubtedly many men had gone, but they could not say who’.22 Yet no Khattak villagers would be listed in the final table of fifty-eight men accused of fighting the British.

By November 1897 a clear pattern emerged to limit any charges and punishments in the Mardan tahsil or Yusufzai subdivision to the Baizai area villages. Statements now suggested that early reports ‘regarding the complicity of British subjects in the rising led by the Sartor Fakir were necessarily not altogether accurate, and I am glad to be able to report that the inhabitants of the Hashtnagar and Mardan Tahsil were not so
generally implicated as was the first impression'. Though, with the early reports at least partially accurate and with inhabitants implicated perhaps only to a lesser degree, yet no Pakhtun village shareholders from outside the nine Utman Khel and 'Swati' villages faced charges. Instead, only the Baizai residents faced punishment for disregarding warnings and for travelling ‘...a considerable distant, some 15 to 20 miles beyond the border...’ to join the fighting.

The Utman Khel earned particular condemnation for their long, distinctly non-millenarian history of anti-colonial resistance. ‘There is no excuse whatever for their conduct, and there is no doubt that the bulk of the Utman Khel left their homes en masse to range themselves with our enemies. These men or their fathers fought against us in the Ambeyla Campaign; they rose in the course of the settlement operations of 1870-1873; and they have ever been a turbulent set...’

During the fighting, police officials visiting noticeably deserted villages literally began to do a head count (partal), perhaps using village land or revenue records, to list the absent. In August 1897 officials called the Yusufzai village lambardars to Mardan to account for the missing men. The lambardars of Babozai made excuses for five absent villagers. ‘Mir Afzal had gone to fetch grass; Kebat to fetch wood; Hazrat Nur is an old man and had remained outside his village; Rahmat Gul had come to Mardan.’ The Babozai lambardars, Pakhtun maliks, did implicate Mazrupai, his son Painda Gul, Khani, and Khani’s son Ghundai. Any ideas of subaltern solidarity dissolved with the statement that, ‘Both Khane and Mazrube are lozars’ (low status blacksmiths). The five Babozai villagers, all non-shareholders, who were among the final fifty-eight charged, included Hazrat Nur, listed by ‘caste’ as a weaver; Ghundai, recorded as a lohar; Mazrupai, a carpenter; Khani, a lohar; and Painda Gul, a carpenter.

The only four men implicated by lambardars from Shamozai included three weavers and a Shilmani Afghan well-digger. Matta village counted eleven men missing during the partal. These included two ‘Swati’ Pakhtuns and a village washerman
(dhobi) who admitted having gone to Malakand. But a Matta leather worker (chamar) said he had travelled to Peshawar to sell skins. Three other Matta villagers stated they had been purchasing tobacco in Sheik Jana village. Two others asserted they were buying a cow in Paladheri village. A final two claimed to be in transit to the thanadar.25

The Utman Khel lambardar reports were equally distorted. Thirty-two men, all Utman Khel except one ‘Swati mulla’, made the list for leaving Mian Khan. But Pipal village sources named only one man, a wounded Utman Khel. The Pipal lambardars simply stated that no one else went to Malakand.26 The lambardars of Sangao, Kui Barmoul, and Ghazi Baba villages did not even come into Mardan in August to make statements. Instead, three similar petitions dated 21 September arrived at the Mardan assistant commissioner’s office. Each denied any involvement. The Sangao lambardars, ‘Shahdad, Nur Gul and Gazan’, wrote:

We beg to state that no inhabitant of our village went to Malakand to join the ‘jehad’. We would have informed you had any of them gone there, and he would have come back wounded! Besides this there exists enmity between us and the Bonerwals and we feared that the Bonerwals would plunder our villages on finding them empty, therefore we have been present in our village and kept a watch there. We are quite innocent and none of us has gone to Malakand to join the ‘Ghaza’; now it rests with you whether you impose a fine on us or not.

The Kui Barmoul lambardars said all ‘zamindars’ had been required to remain in the village because of ongoing revenue collections. Their petition ended, ‘We are not guilty, but it rests with you whether you realize fine from us or not.’ The Ghazi Baba village petition ended, ‘As I and my villagers are innocent, therefore we pray that our fine be remitted.’27

Statements taken from northern village government revenue employees (patwaris), Hindu and Muslim, long serving and recently appointed, denied any knowledge of local involvement. ‘Devi Dial’, Lundkhwar patwari since 1887, said, ‘I made no
mention of any fighting in my diary...I have not heard till to-day that anyone went from Lund Khwar or not.’ Bahadur Khan, Kharki village patwari for twenty-six years, said of the fighting, ‘I made no mention of it in my roznamcha...I was sitting in my Patwar Khana and know nothing. No one tells me anything...’ Saifulla, Kui Barmoul village patwari, stated he had no knowledge of men going to Malakand and had only been patwari for four months.

Safiulla, patwari of Lundkhwar Paian, a Khattak village, admitted, ‘Many people went. I don’t know the names...’ Firoz Khan, patwari of Sarote and Tazagaraon, other Khattak villages, and Ghazi Baba, a village of ‘Sheiks’, noted he was in Tazagaraon when the fighting began, ‘...some ‘Sherannis’ who had come from Swat went to fight. After that lots went. They said they were going to Lund Khwar...’ Muhammad Usman, patwari of Pipal, Mian Khan, and Sangao villages, said, ‘Lots of people went from Mian Khan, many armed, and boys with them...I went to Sangao on the 27th. People had gone from there. They said they had gone to tamasha...the Mian Khan Lambardars Mashal and Dowlat went...’

Statements from the wounded and the accused denied any culpability. Zard Ali of Pipal, shot in the neck, said under initial questioning, ‘I went to Boner, and on my way back at night some one fired at one and hit me in the neck.’ Zohrab of Mian Khan testified, ‘I have not been wounded by a bullet. I have had a boil on my leg, and this is the mark of it.’ Hazrat Nur, weaver, as well as Babozai chaukidar, explained, ‘The mark on my foot was caused by my falling down hill and striking my foot against a stone.’ Such explanations were not consistent with the British medical officer’s clinical descriptions of possible and certain bullet injuries.

Statements from the accused, most apparently recorded when they were in custody in the Mardan jail, offered insights into village internal organization, feuds, and class relations. Whether truth or dissimulation, they were credible stories derived from a social landscape familiar not only to Pakhtuns, but to colonial officials as well. If ‘Most narrators seek to confer coherence to
their stories by adhering to a (relatively) consistent principle or "mode" of selection: the sphere of politics; the life of the community; and personal experiences', those accused in 1897 grounded stories of their activities and the motives of others in the common details and relations of village life.

Kach Kol, 'age 40 years', a Pakhtun tiller and holder of a share in village lands (zamindar) in Mian Khan, said that during the partal he had been searching the plains (maira) for a lost animal. 'An ass of Mashal, Malak, trespassed into my field and I killed it, and this is the reason why he has given evidence against me. Khanai, barber, and Gudrat, blacksmith, are my witnesses.'

Pasand, 'age 50 years', a 'Pathan' and 'zamindar' of Mian Khan, said he had left only to accompany his cousin for a short distance into the hills, the cousin being havildar returning from leave to a post beyond Chakdara. Pasand complained of being implicated because, 'The Lambardars are our enemies. We petitioned against them to the Tahsildar that they had realized more on account of land revenue than what was actually due. Sadulla is my witness as well as Fazal Khan and Sin Khan of Pipal, who saw us both going together.'

Mir Afzal, a forty-year-old Mian Khan shareholder, said,

...I was present at the partal made by the Deputy Inspector and I was ploughing my field when the inspector of Police arrived. I was called from the hujra and arrested. Several zamindars and among them my brother Suhbat stated to the Tahsildar that the Lambardars had realized from them more on account of land revenue than what was actually due and they had to deny this on oath. Lal Gul, Wali, Hamaisha Malak of Pipal are my witnesses. They will give evidence that I did not leave the village. 31

Other Mian Khan zamindars, Khan Kudrat Shah, 'age 75 years', Naushirin, age 40, and Mir Alam, age 55, claimed they were listed because they had resisted previous excessive land revenue claims. Ghulam Mohi-ud-din of Mian Khan insisted that he had been in Buner, being charged only because the lambardar 'Mashal Malak sold a buffalo to me and I could not
pay the price’. Mansaf of Mian Khan said he had left for Sangao ‘to purchase an ox there for my plough...I purchased an ox for Rs 18 at Sangao from one Randula. My own Malak has not given evidence against me...’

On 13 August Zard Ali of Pipal gave his third, most elaborate explanation for his movements and wound. His narrative illustrated the potential mobility of Peshawar valley residents pursuing a livelihood. He said he reached Mardan on 27 July after buying ‘Rs 8 worth of cotton in Peshawar’. After a night on the road, he spent the next night in Pipal. He arrived in Tursak village in the Buner valley on the 29th. ‘I was praying at Khafftan in the mosque, and on someone’s marriage a gun went off. I was hit in the neck.’ He returned to Pipal on the 31st having disposed of the cotton in small parcels for a total of ten rupees. ‘I don’t know why the Lambardars say I went to fight.’

Rahmatulla of Matta, the son of a mulla, protested he was in Peshawar on the day of the partal. ‘...I went to get medicine, and I also bought a book. I don’t know who I bought it from, nor what bazaar the shop is in. I have never been to Peshawar before, nor have I ever bought medicines before. I stayed six nights in Peshawar in a market...Because I am alone and poor I have no witnesses except God.’

The accused village craftsmen and labourers had other seemingly credible stories. Samo Din, ‘aged 55 or more, weaver and zamindar of Shamozi’, stated, ‘I am Aziz’s brother. I don’t know where he is now. I didn’t go after him to Malakand. When the partal took place I was in my melon garden, outside the village. I have had a case with Zaman Shah about a field, and this is the reason they accused me of going to Malakand. I have witnesses...’ Jalal Din, ‘son of Samo Din (accused), Julaha, aged 22, zamindar of Shamozi’, said that, ‘...I did not either go to fight or look after Aziz. The Maliks are my enemies about a land case. I went to take bread to my father in his field at evening, when the Thanadar made his partal...’

The itinerant lives of many village servants and labourers left them without established patrons and made them vulnerable to these kind of charges. Fazal Ahmad, dhobi of Matta, denied he
had gone to fight. 'My wife has been living at Sarki for a year. I have got another wife who is living at Ismaila. Shamozai is my birthplace, but I lived at Matta before I came to Sarki two or three months ago. I lived at Matta for 14 or 15 years, but I have left the village because I cannot find work there. I have been continuously living at Sarki for the last two or three months. I don’t know why the Lambardars have given evidence against me.' Hayat Gul, a ‘Dehkan’ of a Lundkhwar lambardar, was investigated, though he reportedly had earlier departed Lundkhwar after the harvest of the rabi crop. He testified that he had ‘left Hakim’s service and went to Machal. I went nowhere else...I have relations in Machal; that’s why I went there. I don’t know why people said I went to fight.’ Hayat Gul did not become one of the fifty-eight accused.

Kutab, ‘son of Siraj Din, Baghban of Kasmai’, from Patai, a banda settlement of Jalala village, worked as an agricultural labourer. He testified that ten to twelve days before the fighting he had gone to Malakand, where he used to sell grass, in search of work. He said he was accidentally caught in the fighting and wounded. Afterwards, Kutab had taken refuge in Palli village in independent territory until his brother was pressured to bring him into custody. His brother, Lal Din, a ‘zamindar’ of Patai village, testified that Kutab:

...has no fixed abode and is always wandering in search of work. I went to Boner to visit the shrine of Pir Baba and thence I came to Kasime, and there I heard that my brother had been wounded at Malakand, and that he had been suspected of having joined the Ghazis, and my wife and children had been placed in custody on account of this suspicion...35

With this pattern of accusation, perhaps it was no surprise that the only men implicated in the greater Mardan tahsil south of the Baizai area were nine non-Yusufzai Mohmand tenants and labourers of landlord Ibrahim Khan of Mardan and two other landless Pakhtuns working in the Sadhum area. The nine Mohmands tilled village lands newly watered by the Swat river
canal. On hearing of the fighting Ibrahim Khan sent his supervisor (nazir) to check his villages for absentees. In his statement the nazir, Khan Mir, said, ‘I asked the boys and others where they were...The boys and others said they had gone to Malakand.’ One accused, Arsula, was a Mohmand from Bajaur working as a labourer in Bahlola village. Of the eight accused Mohmands working in Ahmadabad village, four were of sayyid lineages. Five Mohmands charged asserted they had gone to Bariband, a banda of Tangi village in the nearby Charsadda tahsil, to plough lands moistened by recent rain. Another claimed he had made a trip to Tangi, while two men maintained they had never left Ahmadabad and did not understand the reason for their arrest. The accused from the Sadhum area were two landless brothers living in Naodeh village in the Rustam thana. The brothers had originally come from the independent Chamla valley north-east of the Peshawar District. Both were implicated by lambardars and the one who returned after days of absence was arrested.

The fifty-eight men ultimately listed in a table as ‘...known to have joined in the recent fighting against the British...’ included thirty-two men from Mian Khan, all Utman Khel except for one ‘Swati Mulla’. There was one Utman Khel from Pipal, the wounded Zard Ali. The remaining twenty-five accused lived in three ‘Swati’ Yusufzai villages (twelve men), Kharki village (two men), Patai Banda (one man), Bahlola (one man), Ahmadabad (eight men), and Naodeh (one man). The last twenty-five accused included one ‘Afghan Shilmani’ and an Utman Khel. The rest were dependent fakirs, the landless, and labourers.

Essentially, the only settled district Pakhtun village shareholders charged, and even initially jailed, for joining the Malakand conflict were selected Utman Khel from Mian Khan village. Apparently singled out by officials, the village served as an example for others. Testimony suggested that some of those actually charged might have been victimized because of internal village factionalism, including disputes over revenue and land. The transparent tactic of village lambardars and clan
leaders (*maliks*) turning in low status village servants for charge and arrest indicated the enduring nature of Pakhtun dominance over non-Pakhtun dependants within a set pattern of asymmetrical village power relations. The colonial strategy not to contest this selective process, plus the decision simply to ignore any possible involvement by other settled district Khattak or Mandanr Pakhtun villagers, indicated the interplay of other colonial political agendas and accommodations and their effect upon a nominally impartial judicial process.

The apparent and complex class, clan, and political solidarities and divisions revealed in the reports of 1897-98 challenged any premise that the anti-imperial feelings that found expression at Malakand and Chakdara represented a timeless, transcendent ‘subaltern’ unity or consciousness. Ambiguities and contradictions occurred within individuals, families, and clans over the interpretation of such events and the response to be made. Such regional Pakhtun anti-imperial sentiments, if historically enduring, were highly contingent and never able to displace the military technology and material might of late nineteenth century British imperialism.

Colonial archives produced a material context for investigators. Official statistics from the 1891 census profiled the nine villages ‘suspected of complicity’. A general outline of social relations emerged from tables that divided the 9779 residents of the villages into ‘agricultural’ and ‘non-agricultural’ populations and specified the numbers of persons (shareholders and tenants) paying land revenue. Revenue statistics revealed different histories of local and imperial relations. Tables showed community ‘frontier remissions’ for the Utman Khel villages as opposed to individual *mafi* and *inam* exemptions in the Yusufzai villages (suggesting a separation between the obligations of Yusufzai village shareholders and their revenue-paying dependants). The differences between villages and between Pakhtun clans were a reminder that the complex social landscape of the ‘Yusufzai sub-division’ was not exclusively ‘Mandanr Yusufzai’.
Ghazi Baba was the smallest of the nine villages with thirty-nine houses and 241 people. It was the only village settled mainly by ‘Sheikhs’ or religious lineages. Ghazi Baba’s non-agricultural community consisted of sixteen men and fifteen women. The 210 agriculturists (119 men, 91 women) were nominally responsible for Rs 110 in revenue, but with Rs 32 remitted in ‘mafì’ exemptions there was an actual payment of Rs 78. Forty-one persons, male agricultural shareholders or tenants, paid this amount.

The three Yusufzai villages were larger. Matta, with 1023 residents, had 710 tillers and 313 others. Shamozaï’s population of 991 was divided into 698 agriculturists and 293 others. Babozai’s 1737 residents included 1349 tillers and 388 non-agriculturists. In Matta, with 215 houses, 194 persons were responsible for Rs 499 of revenue, with only another Re 1 exempted as a mafi grant. In Shamozaï, with 195 houses, an unknown number of agriculturists received Rs 22 mafi and paid Rs. 578 revenue (a nominal total demand of Rs 600). In Babozai, with 353 houses, 415 persons variously accounted for Rs 1200 in revenue, including those receiving Rs 125 in total mafi awards and Rs 250 in inam grants, and those paying Rs 825 in remaining demand.

The five Utman Khel villages totalled 5787 persons, including 2333 male agriculturists and about 1458 revenue payers. Sangao had 157 tillers paying revenue; Mian Khan 254; Pipal 200; ‘Kui’ 447; while Kharki, with 1678 persons slightly smaller than Kui Barmoul with 1811 residents, had 383 revenue payers.

It was difficult to judge the accuracy of quantified change in regional village demography between the censuses conducted in 1868 and 1891. Did the often large population increases evidence actual village growth, perhaps aided by the settlement of regional pastoralists? Did the more moderate growth in the number of houses in some villages indicate that 1868 human counts were often unreliable? Some degree of inaccuracy was certain. Were ‘villages’ in 1891 being defined as larger ‘estates’ that incorporated outlying households and bandas? In the final analysis, some degree of growth in the late nineteenth century seemed clear.
Within a generation censuses showed the local village population rising 61 per cent from 6079 to 9779. What did this signify for pressure on land and water resources, political stability, and social hierarchy? It was a young population. The nine-village total of 9779 in 1891 included approximately 3907 agricultural males. With 41.66 per cent of the district male population under 15 years old, Mian Khan, with 356 agricultural males, had perhaps 208 tillers 15 years or older, thirty-two of whom were accused of going to Malakand. Again, did more go from Mian Khan? If so, why were only some implicated? In 1891, there were approximately 2280 agricultural males in the nine villages aged 15 years or older. Of these perhaps thirty-four Pakhtun shareholders were charged with going to Malakand.

If the Mian Khan numbers were accurate and representative, something impossible to prove or disprove, and 15 per cent of those over age 15 participated, then 342 men could be extrapolated as going to Malakand. Of 1222 ‘non-agricultural’ males in the nine villages, perhaps 713 were 15 years or older, of whom thirteen were charged, still less than 2 per cent of the total group. The remaining eleven charged were agricultural labourers and tenants, of whom at least ten were Pakhtuns originally from outside the Yusufzai sub-division. The small number arrested and the credibility of the accusations made impossible any speculation about the ‘jihad’ being proportionately more appealing to poor, landless, and tenant populations than to Pakhtun shareholders.

The colonial process of investigation and punishment exposed the dynamic inter-relationships between indigenous unity, state pressure, and clan and class interests. From the state perspective village ‘lambardars’ failed to perform their obligations as imperial agents. Only in Mian Khan and Naodeh did lambardars cooperate by providing information. Yet in describing the police inspector’s visit to Mian Khan the Mardan Assistant Commissioner commented, ‘The conduct of the headmen of Mian Khan at this stage requires heavy punishment. They did all they could to prevent certain men being arrested...’ Describing the ‘Baizai ilaka’ in general, he said:
In no case either can the heads of these communities be considered to have offered the authorities any assistance. Certainly from fear of the consequences the *Lambardars* of Mian Khan gave evidence against many of their men as having gone to fight, but their evidence is virtually useless for conviction of any of these men. The *lambardars* of Kui and Sangao state that none of their villagers went to fight, but they cannot explain how their villages, when examined, bore an almost empty appearance.

The blanket denials failed to satisfy the government, which knew ‘it is a matter of common report in this part that whole bands of these men went to the Malakand and other parts to fight’. Pressure extracted names from village ‘headmen’, but, as in Babozai village, ‘...none of these men are Pathans,...and... I strongly suspect the *Lambardars* of having given us the names of some perfectly harmless individuals in order to save their own clansmen. The same thing occurs in Shamozai and Matta...’

The Assistant Commissioner summarized:

In conclusion, it may be noted that in no single case was any report given by any *Lambardar* as to the absence, death or being wounded of any man found to have joined in the fighting against us, with the two exceptions noted in the former letter; in all cases was it necessary to drag the statements from the *Lambardars* as to complicity or otherwise, and I consider the headmen have absolutely failed in their duty.38

Resistance existed to varying degrees. Many villagers from the more involved, and few from the less involved, lineages and clans went to Malakand, but many apparently went to observe rather than to fight. Most returned to their villages around 2 August less because of the collapse of spontaneous ‘fanaticism’ than as a consequence of high casualties and the arrival of overwhelming colonial army reinforcements from the Punjab. Perhaps only fanatics would have continued to fight so far from home after losing the advantages of surprise, superior numbers, and free movement.
The resistance of villagers and lambardars to excessive arrests in Mian Khan probably deterred similar attempts in other villages. Nevertheless, pressure that included standing threats of arrest or the loss of position and subsidies inevitably led village elite to make scapegoats of particular men, those at the bottom of the social ladder and, perhaps, others involved in feuds or factional enmity.

Responses from the accused included counter-allegations that some village maliks, empowered by imperial officials to act as lambadar, revenue collectors and 'headmen', used this privileged status to extort higher dues and to penalize fellow Pakhtuns who protested to authorities, in efforts to maintain internal clan power relations. Many statements of the accused were recorded in similar, almost formulaic patterns elaborating movements, denying culpability, and naming supporting witnesses. Interrogations were recorded in the vernacular, then translated. Often, on certain days numerous statements were taken in the Mardan jail. The effect may have been that the diverse narratives of the accused were reduced to an officially useful format of biography, explanation of whereabouts, and, uniformly, no admission of guilt.

The actions of suspects and the archive of statements illustrated classic examples of 'weapons of the weak'. The accused employed tactics of avoidance, non-communication, denial, and alternative stories, making no direct challenge to investigators or the powerful. With the exception of a unique situation involving the police inspector, the deputy inspector, and the three Mian Khan lambardars, disavowal of Pakhtun involvement was the rule. Many of the accused from Mian Khan at first simply remained in the hills away from the village. As of 15 August 1897 only twenty-nine of the accused were in custody. Injured villagers, including the wounded weaver Aziz from Shamozaiz, often recuperated away from police, in the Buner valley and other independent areas. The history of colonial awards of collective punishment in previous conflicts helped to explain personal denials as well as the three preemptive petitions from the Utman Khel villages, already
anticipating a collective punishment of fining. For the most vulnerable, including the young Mohmand tenants of the big landlord Ibrahim Khan, uniform narratives of trips to Bariband and protestations of innocence might have reflected individual naiveté, truth, or a credible excuse difficult to disprove.  

The Mohmand tenants and labourers, as compared to several Utman Khel shareholders of Mian Khan, did not apportion blame for their fate. Many of their answers seemed intended to ensure that their statements did not jeopardize even the low status they held in the settled district. Perhaps in response to direct questions, most denied having enemies. Seventeen-year-old Saidin Shah, Mohmand sayyid and tenant of Ahmadabad village, said, ‘Neither the Khan Bahadur nor any of his servants is our enemy.’ ‘Hyat Muhammad’, another Mohmand sayyid and Ahmadabad tenant said, ‘Ibrahim Khan called me to Mardan and I was arrested. I do not know why. The Khan is not my enemy nor his Nazir. The Malak of the village also is not my enemy.’

The intimidating imperial potential to investigate, arrest, charge, convict, imprison, and hang suspects was fully exploited in the weeks immediately after the Malakand attacks. But a major uprising of Mohmands on the Hashtnagar border, followed by an autumn and winter 1897-98 campaign against the Khyber Pass Afridis, reduced in proportion initial impressions of the Malakand trouble and deterred any unsettling degrees of retribution against now calm villages.

In the end, political considerations and the colonizer’s own rules restricted penalties against the accused from the Baizai region. The ongoing regional fighting made political tranquillity and economic stability in the settled district a priority over further arrests or coercive solutions. The fate of those arrested once again reflected the ‘frontier’ district’s liminal judicial environment, operating between a formal regime of criminal codes, police institutions, and exclusive authority and an ad hoc system of borderland expeditions, blockades, Frontier Crime Regulations, and contested hegemony. Co-opted, collaborating witnesses, ‘approvers’ were not used. Such witnesses were not
considered credible or usable, suggesting again, as across British India, ‘the inability of the Raj to make use of testimony from supposedly disinterested witnesses and victims’. After much effort and the production of many files, finally ‘...in no instance, not even in the case of men who bore marks of bullet wounds, was any sufficient judicial evidence forthcoming even a *prima facie* case under Section 121, Indian Penal Code, against any individual’.

The focus then shifted to ‘the complicity of village communities’ that might be chargeable under the Frontier Crimes Regulations. In autumn 1897 the nine Baizai villages were ‘...found guilty of having colluded with and screened members of their respective communities who had gone to fight against us, and of having combined together to suppress evidence against those individual members’. The Peshawar Deputy Commissioner recommended certain punishments. First, under Section 24, F. C. R., fines equalling a year’s revenue payments, a total of Rs 5518, were to be paid by ‘the agricultural portion of the communities only, for there is no doubt that they were the persons who chiefly went to the enemy’. A second proposed punishment, under Section 27, F. C. R., was a three-year suspension ‘of *mafis* and *inams*’ to individuals, costing Rs 664, and the permanent cancellation of frontier remissions of assigned revenue payments for the five Utman Khel villages.

In February 1898 the Punjab government responded to the proposals. Frontier remissions against Peshawar valley ‘Doaba’ villages involved in the Mohmand unrest had been suspended for only three years or, in one case, five years. The Punjab Lieutenant-Governor was of the opinion that a permanent end to the Utman Khel remissions meant, ‘there would be some inequality in dealing more severely with the Baizai villages’. A three-year suspension was recommended.

It was quite likely that hundreds of residents of the villages of the northern Peshawar District participated in or were present at the July-August 1897 Malakand ‘jihad’. In the secular colonial process designed to define and judge ‘criminality’ rather than political or religious motivations, discussion of Islam and the
role of Islamic leaders revolved around early, short dismissals of fanaticism. As well, 1897 documents contained no references to any participation by the small surviving community of Islamic activists descended from early nineteenth century leaders, labelled by the British ‘Hindustani fanatics’, who now lived in hill country villages between the Indus river and the Malakand Pass.

The narratives of the accused, whether read as plausible claims of innocence or fabricated evasions, did not contain references to or discussions of Saidullah, his message, or local perceptions of the influence of these factors in triggering or sustaining events commonly associated with *jihad* or ‘Ghaza’. As recorded, translated, and condensed by authorities trying to account for acts of treason and revolt against the Empress, the statements of the accused may have been cleansed of religious content.

But the internal colonial letters, reports, and orders of local authorities directly concerned with managing current and future village relations also did not refer to religious figures within the settled district villages or the role of village mosques, nor plan any strategy to counter the potential influence of Islamic activism or theology in generating future unrest. Did this represent a genuine sense that religion played only a nominal role in the sustained resistance? Was it a denial of any legitimate place for Islam in colonial perspectives? Saidullah, the ‘Sartor mulla’ (black-headed or bare-headed), was not discussed or analysed as representing any Sufi or non-orthodox Islamic perspective or having any potential following. Was his name or message left unmentioned in police interrogations because of clan perspectives, colonial editing, or the convenient condensing of harried policemen and magistrates? In the end the earlier colonial emphasis on fanatical Islam seemed, in part, an expedient use of a familiar device to define the stark contrast between modern, rational, legitimate authority and archaic, illegitimate opposition.

Villages, calm on 27 July during the deputy inspector’s morning visits, received news of the previous day’s fighting
against the British at the Malakand posts. Groups of men, leaving empty hujras behind, responded in an old pattern of unification against imperial intrusions. In hindsight, in written reports implicitly justifying why he had not anticipated or had intelligence of impending events, the Malakand political agent repeated rumours of promised miracles and discussed the irrational beliefs that by definition could neither be understood nor anticipated. In a modern era of railroads, irrigation canals, telegraphs, and advanced institutions of security and order, imperial perspectives denied the legitimacy of any non-fanatical Pakhtun political motivation or any mobilization, if only through rumours, that reacted to the initiatives of the imperial state and the occupation of the Malakand Pass.

Regional Yusufzai villagers, historically accustomed never to expect unconditional anti-imperial leadership from clan leaders as diverse as Ibrahim Khan of Mardan or the lambardars of Mian Khan, responded as individuals and lineages to culturally familiar idioms of warfare. Their reactions displayed attitudes that no more reified religious imagery and symbolism, or produced miraculous or even sustained ‘peasant-communal’ consciousness, than did attitudes present in any other aspect of Pakhtun life. Perhaps a realization that religion complemented rather than dominated all aspects of Pakhtun life might restore proportion to notions of fanatical Pakhtuns and ‘others’ that simplistically, but often purposefully, interpreted cultural elements, here religion, as phenomena in opposition to authoritative perspectives.

In March and April 1898 officials tied up the final loose ends of the Malakand uprising. The independent area clans had reached agreements. In February, an assistant or naib tahsildar, dispatched to the nine Baizai villages to collect the fines, ‘aggregating Rs 5518’, gathered the whole amount ‘in less than a week. The case against the village communities of Baizai may now be regarded as closed.’

Yet by March no individual punishments had been meted out. There was a lack of evidence and even ‘in the event of a conviction by jirga the only sentence which could be inflicted
is a fine'. Still, there were six wounded men who had 'notoriously taken part' and were now in custody, including three surrendered by the Buner jirga in January 1898.\textsuperscript{50} Peshawar officials decided, whether there was evidence or not, that the men, 'who if they got their desserts would be hanged', should be imprisoned for fourteen years under 'Regulation III of 1818'.\textsuperscript{51} Appropriate correspondence was forwarded to the Government of India about Zard Ali, Utman Khel of Pipal; Zohrab, Utman Khel of Mian Khan; Mazrupai, \textit{tarkhan} of Babozai; Khani, \textit{lohar} of Babozai; Nazrai, 'Mamandzai' of Kharki; and Kutab, \textit{baghban} of Patai Banda. In a restraining response the Punjab Lieutenant-Governor accepted the idea of some imprisonment in the Montgomery district jail, but did 'not, however, recommend that any period of detention be specified in the warrants'.\textsuperscript{52}

\section*{NOTES}


2. See Ayesha Jalal, including \textit{The Sole Spokesman, Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan} (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985).


the Afghan Frontier (University of California Press, Berkeley 1996) chapter 5.


12. The quotes in the preceding two paragraphs are from Akbar Ahmed, Millennium and Charisma, 1976, pp. 95, 109, 93.


17. Subaltern studies formulations of collective or communal ‘peasant’ consciousness are found in Guha, Elementary Aspects and Partha Chatterjee, ‘Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926-35’, Subaltern Studies I (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982), quote from p. 35. This critique derives from Sumit Sarkar’s essay ‘The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies’ in Sumit Sarkar, Writing Social History (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998), p. 82-108.


20. Malakand Reports, pp. 12-13, No. 169, including Police Inspector’s report dated 8 August 1897.


22. Malakand Reports, p. 12, No. 169.

25. Malakand Reports, p. 15, No. 172, dated 8 August 1897.
26. Malakand Reports, p. 16, Nos. 174 (Mian Khan lambardars), dated 10 August 1897 and 175 (Pipal lambardars), undated.
27. Malakand Reports, p. 17, translations of Nos. 177 (Sangao petition), 178 (Kui Barmoul petition), 179 (Ghazi Baba petition).
28. Malakand Reports, pp. 18-19, excerpts from patwari statements, Nos. 183, 185, 186, undated, 191-193 dated 16 September 1897.
29. Malakand Reports, p. 20, quotes from Nos. 195, 197, and 199, undated, respectively, medical opinions of these injuries in Nos. 196, dated 7 August 198, 200, undated.
31. Malakand Reports, p. 21, Nos. 205 (Kach Kol statement), 206 (Pasand statement), and 207 (Mir Afzal statement), all dated 13 August 1897. Statements taken by Rahim Bakhsh, Magistrate 1st Class.
32. Malakand Reports, p. 22, information from personal statements Nos. 208, 209, 212, 211, and 210 respectively, all dated 13 August 1897.
33. Malakand Reports, p. 23, Zard Ali statement (unnumbered) and No. 215 (Rahmatulla statement), both dated 13 August 1897.
34. Malakand Reports, p. 24, Nos. 219 and 221, dated 13 August 1897, statements taken by C. P. Down, Magistrate 1st Class (also Assistant Commissioner).
35. Malakand Reports, pp. 18, 24, 25, statements No. 222, dated 13 September 1897 (Fazal Ahmad), No. 223, dated 14 September (Hayat Gul), No. 224, dated 22 August (Kutab), No. 181 (Lal Din), dated 22 August 1897.
36. Malakand Reports, Nos. 225-238, dated 13 August 1897.
37. 1891 census statistics of the nine villages summarized in ‘Abstract of Villages...’ in Malakand Reports, pp. 6-11, No. 168, dated 28 October 1897. 1891 age distribution statistics from *Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98*, p. 97.
38. Assistant Commissioner C. P. Down quotations from Malakand Reports, pp. 3-4, No. 165, dated 27 September 1897.
41. Saidin Shah, aged 17; Syad Muhammad, 26; Arsula, 32; Raze Khan, 25; Miran Shah, 30; Syad Nazir, 28; Hyat Muhammad, 27; Mawaz, 19; Shah Munir, 19. Spellings from reports.
42. Malakand Reports, pp. 25-26, Nos. 227 and 233, both dated 13 August 1897.
Section 121. ‘Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India.’ *Indian Penal Code*, 1860, p. 31, 1996 edition.

Quotations from Malakand Reports, pp. 4-5, No. 167, Peshawar Deputy Commissioner C. Bunbury order, dated 28 October 1897.


Details in Malakand Records, pp. 6-11, No. 168, dated 28 October 1897. Ghazi Baba, a village of religious lineages was held ‘guilty in the same way’ as Sangao and Kui Barmoul, ‘but to a lesser degree’. The fine remained but the general three-year mafi suspension was shortened to one year.

Malakand Reports, (unnumbered p. 34), No. 243, dated 9 February 1898, from L. W. Dane, Secretary to Government, Punjab to Merk, Peshawar Commissioner.

Malakand Reports, no p. no., Letter No. 43, dated 12 February 1898.

Malakand Reports, Foreign Department, Frontier, April 1898, No. 659, dated 22 March 1898, from Peshawar D. C. Younghusband.

Malakand Reports, Foreign Department, Frontier, April 1898, No. 658, dated 7 April 1898, from Peshawar Commissioner to Govt. of Punjab.

Malakand Reports, Foreign Department, Frontier, April 1898, No. 661, dated 25 April 1898, from Peshawar Commissioner to Govt. of India.
CONCLUSION: SETTLEMENT AS METAPHOR

The idea of reducing to order the Pakhtun clans of an apparently anarchic, unproductive transit district exercised the minds of imperial rulers and states for centuries. From the time of the Mughal Babur in the early sixteenth-century, goals of regional subordination, generally through military conquest, evolved into complex clan-empire relations blending coercion, accommodation, alliance, and-divide-and-rule diplomacy. Mughal emperors and governors, Afghans, Sikhs, and the British pursued similar strategies to co-opt local allies and institutions, expand revenue and grain surpluses, and impose imperial standards of political hierarchy and social order.

But the imagery of a 'frontier' needing civilizing, a 'shatter zone' of relative insignificance between imperial domains, was an imperial creation derived from power dynamics and political competition. From Abu-l Fazl to Churchill the settlement of a troubled frontier served as a convenient metaphor justifying imperial dominion. Generations of regional Islamic scholarship and debate, elite and common Pakhtun literary production, and well ordered lineage-based social relations belied such claims. If high degrees of imperial economic settlement and control were gradually achieved, this study has explored the limits of other imperial efforts to introduce socio-political settlement and transformation into the area's diverse local religious, lineage, and personal perspectives.

In the sense that Pakhtun clans themselves conquered, divided, and settled the valleys around Peshawar, they were also imperialists. From around 1500 various Pakhtun clans and confederacies continuously held and managed the territory. Lineage dynamics were transformed as Pakhtuns settled to an
agrarian life. In much of the region Pakhtuns became a land-controlling elite holding sway over former tillers and non-agriculturists. Excess land was tilled by subordinate *hamsayas* and *fakirs*, slaves, debt labourers, and, in time, rent-paying tenants. Dependant village artisans, service providers, and labourers survived through a variety of patron-client inter-relationships that provided plots of land, payments in kind, advances, and the provision of a minimal subsistence.

Over centuries Pakhtuns living near imperial routes and towns were drawn into imperial socio-political hierarchies. A few became integrated, others faced challenges to personal status from successful non-Pakhtun revenue payers and Pakhtuns able to mobilize non-clan sources of wealth and influence. Other clans in distant, highland valleys retained degrees of autonomy from imperial dominion.

As state control of agrarian resources expanded from the irrigated fields around Peshawar town the exclusive authority of Pakhtun social norms was now confronted by differing modes of patronage and hierarchy. By the late nineteenth century even the most historically autonomous Peshawar valley clans, including those of the Yusufzai sub-division, were politically and economically tied to a continental and global imperial system.

British colonial statistics, if highly problematic, tracked this nineteenth-century agrarian expansion. Cultivation, increasingly oriented to market demands, grew from 643,540 acres in 1855 to 886,324 in 1900-01. The number of villages, ‘Mouzahs or townships’, increased in this period from 622 (618 of them less than 1000 persons) to 806, including 216 in the Yusufzai *tahsil*s. By 1896 71 square miles of the Mardan *tahsil*’s 410 cultivated square miles were irrigated by government canals, plus another 17 square miles by wells. Swabi *tahsil* ended the century with no government canal irrigation, but by then had developed 32 square miles of well irrigation. Between 1868 and 1891 the Yusufzai sub-division population grew 46.9 per cent, from 166,465 to 244,564 persons.
It remained a heavily rural society of mixed agrarian and pastoral livelihoods, with limited resources devoted to education or health. In 1900-01 the district contained an estimated 94479 'kine' (cattle, buffalo, oxen), 211331 sheep and goats, and 5240 camels. Statistics of village populations, rural males and females, and literacy rates (3.6 per cent for the district) allowed calculations that only about 7525 rural males (2.43 per cent) and 463 (0.17 per cent) rural females, less than one per village could read or write.

The census figures of 1901 presented an outline of the social composition of the district and the Yusufzai sub-division after centuries of Pakhtun settlement and fifty years of British domination. This colonial knowledge of the Peshawar District was built on the social categories of Punjab 'Races Castes and Tribes' formally detailed in work done for the 1881 census. The Peshawar District tables listed a mix of north Indian, Punjab, and Pakhtun social identities in an effort made to define precisely individuals whose histories of migration, employment, and social mobility made easy categorization impossible. One listing of 'Muhammadans' under the category of 'Brahman' indicated that other census numbers might reflect hereditary status as much as current reality.

The census fixed a series of colonially acknowledged social identities, hinted at migration, and recorded the growth of a capitalist merchant class. The Mandanr clans were subsumed under the 'Yusafzai' name. The fact of thousands of Mohmands settled in the Charsadda and Mardan tahsil and only a few dozen in Swabi suggested the specific pull of newly irrigated lands, if only for tenancies and labour. The growth of demand for cash revenues and of market cropping revealed itself in the growing numbers of intermediary brokers, shopkeepers, rural financiers, and traders. In the twenty years between 1881-1901 over 2000 Sikh 'Khatris' and over 4000 'Arora' traders, including almost 3000 Sikhs were added to the district. Within these and other statistics could be observed early evidence of the market-based economic changes that would lead to increased
CONCLUSION

debt, land transfers, and twentieth-century challenges to the status quo.

The 1901 census presented an impression that all agrarian identities reduced to a single occupation. Ibbetson's volume from 1881 census work\(^1\) defining occupation castes also tended to suggest a provincial homogeneity of professions rather than the historically diverse nature of roles in specific locales such as the Peshawar District. The 1901 census numbers were broad indicators of Peshawar District demography even as they raised questions. Several thousand agrarian workers (baghbans) were listed in Mardan tahsil, but none in Swabi. Several thousand tillers (maliars) were listed in Swabi tahsil, but none in Mardan tahsil. The baghban category had apparently been split after 1881. In 1901 both categories of these non-Pakhtun Muslim 'garden' agriculturists had members enumerated in other tahsils. Did this indicate a difference between canal and well irrigation, a difference in language communities (Pakhtu, Urdu, Hindko?) or between Pakhtun and 'Punjab' vocabularies? Again, leather workers were listed under mochi in Mardan tahsil and chamar in Swabi tahsil, yet other tahsils had numbers under both categories.

A numerically steady population of weavers (julahas) showed no sudden demise of local production of silk and cotton fabric for regional markets nor did it hint at possible income declines perceived as early as 1881. 'From the introduction of foreign cotton and cloth goods also, the trade of the weaver class has suffered, and that of the blacksmith for a similar reason.'\(^2\) Any census category, julaha or other village crafts and trades, obscured the reality of mixed employment. The sons of hereditary weavers, and other artisans might be part-time or full-time tenants or agrarian labourers. As mentioned, many 'village servants' also tilled small plots awarded for service.

In exploring such complex social realities, this study utilized and critiqued social science debate and social modelling of Pakhtun society to inform an historical understanding of the apparent generational continuity of aspects of Pakhtun behaviour that include lineage competition, Pakhtunwali concepts of
honour and gender roles, and elements of clan-empire contact. Historical detail and perspective were used to argue that such ‘continuity’, including inequities, was the continuously re-created product of a process of competition between differential centres of political power, control of economic assets, and claims to social prestige.

Social, political, and cultural competition and synthesis in the Peshawar valley zone of contact occurred in relations other than those between Pakhtun ‘tribes’ and successive imperial ‘states’. If Islamic interpretation, prescription, and proscription were integral elements of regional culture, the continuing ulema and Sufi Islamic criticism of Pakhtun society highlighted differences between more orthodox religious visions and local spiritual practice. The role of Islamic inspiration and leadership, especially in directly anti-imperial conflict and confrontation, always had a historically specific involvement outlining ongoing, but finite levels of Islamic influence.

Clan identities and interests coincided and conflicted with particular Islamic personalities and decisions. A common ground of Islamic idioms and heritage did not imply the existence of social or even linguistic commonalities with other Islamic movements and partisans. The ambiguity inherent in Pakhtun Islamic practice was revealed during a cease-fire to remove casualties in the 1863 Ambela conflict. One British officer recorded, ‘It was observed that both the wounded and dead bodies of the Hindustanis on this and subsequent occasions were left by their allies,...’

Religious injunction always continued to be subject to local practice. At the end of the twentieth century the tomb of Akhund Darweza on the southern fringe of Peshawar city symbolized the assimilation of a saint into local culture, a synthesis of popular and orthodox belief. The site attracted women who viewed the grave from a high vantage point outside. Young girls inside the tomb premises caressed and kissed rounded stones left on a ledge adjacent to the grave. Each visitor invoked the saint’s blessings in prayers for fertility, health, beauty, prosperity, and good results in examinations.
By the mid-nineteenth century a substantial, colonial bureaucratic presence had institutionalized local social hierarchies and used revenue and law codes to control and selectively transform Pakhtun society. But in the late nineteenth century political domination and economic integration into imperial systems did not guarantee political stability or a hegemonic acceptance of imperial socio-cultural norms. Successes reflected as much accommodation and negotiation as any imperial dictation. A constantly compromised system of colonial law and order struggled to impose its own definitions of criminal behaviour on locally legitimate standards of conduct. Quarterly reports of cases under the Frontier Crimes Regulations continued to document attempts to settle disputes between independent and settled area residents. By mid-1899, Pakhtun clans paying lip service to F. C. R. rules and punishments, including an increased reliance on fines, resisted authority in a quiet strategy of non-compliance. The second quarter report noted:

The opening balance of unrealized fines was Rupees 29995-2-6. Fresh fines to the extent of Rs 3,995/- were imposed during the quarter, and Rs 844/- were only realized. Rs 220/- have been struck off as absolutely irrecoverable, leaving an outstanding balance of Rs 32926-2-6 which is very large. The Deputy Commissioner was called upon for an explanation in regard to the large balance of fines unrealized at the end of the previous quarter, but no improvement seems to have taken place in this respect. More stringent measures appear to be necessary to ensure payment.4

Lines drawn in the Commissioner’s red ink crossed out the last sentence of this paragraph.

The settled district context established by 1900 was marked by increasing social hierarchy, economic differentiation, and colonial technological dominance. An imperial over-reliance upon local elite and an unwillingness to give meaningful content to colonial structures of representation and opportunity guaranteed a build-up of social tension. In the post-1918 period this tension found expression during the well documented
political activism of second-tier *khans*, Pakhtun shareholders, oppressed tenants, and a slowly developing segment of educated, urban nationalists. In the 1926 Assessment Report for the Mardan *tahsil* the author hinted at colonial complicity in exploitive practices originally planned for abolition by the confident settlement officers of the 1850s:

I have ignored a lot of curious payments which are usual in this *Tahsil*, especially on the estates of the big *khans*, e.g.-

i) *juganah*-a payment of Rs. 4 per plough recovered annually;
ii) *tukri*-a payment of 20 *seers* of wheat per plough set aside for the *khan* before the common heap is divided.

These with contributions exacted as pay for the *khan*’s *nazir* and seigniorial dues recovered on marriages, etc., amount to a considerable income, but as they are not universal, I have preferred to exclude them from the account altogether.

After the First World War the Peshawar valley socio-economic situation determined local responses to the political efforts of the Congress and Muslim League parties. As growing economic differentiation spread discontent, elite lineage factionalism began to separate the *khans* most closely tied to the British from junior kin, still often substantial landowners, who had been frozen out of any role in a region denied political liberalization. At this point, as ‘...political ideologies interacted with the patterns of elite competition and class conflict’, alienated second-tier *khans* allied themselves with the Pakhtun nationalist party of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The *Khudai Khidmatgar* (Servant of God) or Red Shirt movement of Ghaffar Khan demanded independence from the British and joined forces with the Congress during the 1930 civil disobedience campaign. Ghaffar Khan’s programme calling for reform and social justice mobilized the discontented. By the time the Muslim League turned to enrolling members in the NWFP, as late as 1936-7, only the opponents of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, the senior, British-allied *khans*, responded favourably.

Only after the late 1946 communal violence in British India did the Muslim League and its Islamic message finally
challenge, then displace the Frontier Congress as the dominant political party in the NWFP. After 1947 the Muslim League leadership in the NWFP used the Pakhtun nationalist demands for autonomy, even for some kind of Pakhtunistan, as a pretext to declare the party disloyal to the new state. It was suppressed and its leaders jailed. The government retained colonial era laws, including the Frontier Crimes Regulations, to support state authority. Precedents were set for future state intervention in processes of political representation. Land and social reforms in the name of social equity and the Islamic state were selective, incomplete, and had no effect on fundamental hierarchies of authority, privilege, and wealth. In the 1960s, just before the martial law land reforms ‘...a man like the Nawab of Hoti could own as much as 50000 acres of top quality land in the Basin’. Even after the land reforms, ‘By skillfully dividing the shares of land among all their family members’, the landlords were able to circumvent the new land laws ‘almost entirely’.

Fifty years after the end of British colonial rule the legacies of lineage dynamics, imperially created inequities, and structures of control developed by the colonial state continued to hinder the full implementation of twentieth-century nationalist ideals.

NOTES

5. See Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?, 1981 and Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns, 1988. This early twentieth century crisis in the agrarian ‘moral economy’, in which colonial policies (fixed rents) and market dynamics (debt and land sales) eliminated tenant and labour security and denied claims for a minimum subsistence, was contemporary with similarly caused colonial-agrarian conflicts in Burma and Vietnam. See Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, Rebellion
and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1976).


Appendix 1: Tables indicating the extent of sickness and mortality in selected villages from the Typhus epidemic of 1853

Table 1: Typhus in Akerpoora village

'Table showing the amount of sickness and mortality from Typhus Fever in the different *muhillas* in the village of Akerpoora about 9 miles east from Peshawar with a population of about 4500'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Mallahs</th>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>Inmates</th>
<th>Sick</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Recoveries</th>
<th>Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharkan Ka Kundie</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alie Shah Ka Kundie</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khoaadad Ka Kundie</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Ka Kundie</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turdud(?) Ka Kundie</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tukue (?) Ka Kundie</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunjun (?) Ka Kundie</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghban Ka Kundie</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syud Ka Kundie</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukeer Shah Ka Kundie</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Khan Ka Kundie</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 58 481 162 51 99 17

Table 2: Villages affected by typhus

'...list of the affected villages in the Hushtnugur and the Districts on the north sides of the Swat and Cabool rivers to the west of Akarpura,...'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>Now Sick</th>
<th>Recovered</th>
<th>Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Omurzai</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turungzai</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otmanzai</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazliamud</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khasi kheyl</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chursudda</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prang</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakhi</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowsutta</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kheski</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shunaman</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouni (?)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geedur</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nussuron</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 68 38 183

From Letter No. 680, dated 14 April 1853, From: T. Farquhar, Assistant Surgeon. With correspondence referred to in Table 1.
Table 3: Typhus in Toru and local villages

'Toro'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Kundas</th>
<th>No. of Houses</th>
<th>No. of Houses now affected</th>
<th>No. of Sick</th>
<th>No. of Deaths</th>
<th>No. of families entirely carried off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmood kheyl</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judi kheyl</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buli kheyl</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mooli kheyl</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowani</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyt kheyl</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manduri</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mani kheyl</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumber (?) kheyl</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>979</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
<td><strong>153</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>235</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of the 153 sick and ailing inhabitants of Toru there were 74 men, 49 women, and 30 children. A further division by class and profession will show that out of 153, 116 belonged to the Zamindar class, of the others there were 4 bearers, 7 oilmen, 7 washermen, and 2 wrights. No records are available for the 17 remaining patients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Villages</th>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>Recovered</th>
<th>Now Sick</th>
<th>Dead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Bagoo Banda'</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Moni kheyl'</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Miaro'</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Hoti'</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Letter No. 680, referred to in Table 2, section dated ‘Nowshera 16 April’, pp. 9, 11. With Typhus epidemic correspondence noted in Table 1.
Appendix 2: 1855 Census data

On 1 January 1855 a census of the entire Punjab was conducted by East India Company officials. The census was claimed to be generally accurate due to a well thought out methodology and a system of double checking. One conclusion was that, in comparison to earlier, local level surveys, ‘...successive inquiries tend to enhance the known amount of the population’. ‘In the Peshawar District the rate of population per square mile was calculated in 1851, upon seemingly fair data, at 112; it is now proved to be at least 193.’

Administratively, the Punjab had been divided into Divisions, which then were subdivided into Districts. The Punjab was calculated to have 28,879 villages with 12,717,821 residents, yielding Rs. 17,010,210. The Peshawar Division was said to have 1891 villages, 847,695 inhabitants, 7588.5 square miles, and Rs. 951,646 in revenue assessment. ‘Umritsur’, with 122,184 residents, was seen to be in decline since annexation. Lahore had 94,143 counted, while Peshawar city, not including military cantonments, recorded 53,294. Peshawar town was ‘...flourishing both politically and commercially, and is likely to increase’.

Excerpts from Table ‘No. I’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Mouzahs or Townships</th>
<th>622</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area in Sq. British Statute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi. of 640 Acres</td>
<td>2324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area in Acres</td>
<td>14,87,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malgozaree or Assessed Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated Acres</td>
<td>643,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturable Acres</td>
<td>217,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minhaie or Unassessed Land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakhiraj Acres</td>
<td>94,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barren Acres</td>
<td>477,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Revenue Demand, 1854-55</td>
<td>Rs. 688,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoo, Agricultural, Male</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoo, Agricultural, Female</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoo, Non-Agricultural, Male</td>
<td>34,446 (total of 45,991=10.21% of pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindoo, Non-Agricultural, Female</td>
<td>11,545 and 19.6% of non-ag. pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahomedan and others not Hindoo, Agricultural Male-</td>
<td>115,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahomedan and others not Hindoo, Agricultural Female-</td>
<td>100,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahomedan and others not Hindoo, Non-Agricultural Male-</td>
<td>104,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahomedan and others not Hindoo, Non-Agricultural Female-</td>
<td>83,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total-</td>
<td>450,099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. per 640 acre sq. mile-193.67 persons (vs. 35.64 in the adjacent Kohat district)
No. of acres to each person-3.30 (in Punjab 4.01 acres)*

*(From 'Report on the Census', p. 31. My additions in parentheses.)

Excerpts from Table 'No. II,'
'Statement showing the average rate of population per square mile, the percentage ...', Peshawar District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mouzahs</th>
<th>622</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enclosures</td>
<td>75,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>91,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>450,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Sq. Mile</td>
<td>193.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Mouzah</td>
<td>723.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Enclosure</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per House</td>
<td>4.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Area Acres</td>
<td>1487,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated Area Acres</td>
<td>643,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Cultivated</td>
<td>43.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>254,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>195,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Males</td>
<td>56.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Population</td>
<td>216,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural Population</td>
<td>233,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Agricultural Population</td>
<td>48.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acres to each Agriculturist</td>
<td>6.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated Acres to each Agriculturist</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

('Report on the Census', p. 32.)

Excerpt from Table ‘No. III’
'Classification of Townships and Villages', Peshawar District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less than 1000</th>
<th>618</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Total          | 622 ('Report on the Census', p. 33.)

'The rapid and great alternations of sparseness and density of population in the Punjab Districts is perhaps remarkable'. Only the 'sub-montane' Punjab,
about one-third, was considered fertile, '...the remainder is a wild tract, with exceptional strips of cultivation'.

('Report on the Census', p. 17.)

Any analysis of this census information suffered from the unreliability of the data. The British did not enter every home to count individuals. How accurate were the *maliks* and other informants concerned about tax collectors and other issues? How many females were not counted? What actual land survey work had been done by 1855? How many villages were simply estimated rather than entered, counted, and measured? Was an Afghan extended family compound, a *qala*, an enclosure, house, or village? How many *bandas* were counted, or not counted, as 'villages'? Was it possible to believe that over half the population was 'non-agriculturist'? What did the term mean? These problems continued to plague Peshawar administrators asked to make their understanding of the valley conform to the growing information requirements of the Punjab Province and the British colonial empire.

Appendix 3: Data of villages of the Yusafzai Division, 1873

The following village statistics for the 'Yusafzai Division' were most likely derived from the 1868 Punjab Census or perhaps from work done during the first Regular Settlement of the Peshawar District conducted over the 1869-74 period. Earlier partial settlements and assessments had served as temporary measures until the full survey, revenue, and statistical resources of the Punjab provincial government were deployed for a formal 'regular' settlement of landholding and water rights records and revenue liabilities.

Tables, from an 1873 publication, list the main one hundred and thirty-five villages of the Mandanr or 'Yusafzai' plains. The population of these villages totalled 146,919. For 1868, for the area, the same volume (pp. 286-87) measured a total of 192 villages with 152,392 residents (including 5,609 Hindus, 2,485 'Syads,' 81,012 'Yusafzais', 2,848 Khattaks, 50,081 'miscellaneous tribes', 8,020 Gujars, 1,908 Kashmiris, and others). 'The Mandan clan is reckoned at about 40,000 souls.' The breakdown of the 135 villages by size follows:
Population | No. of villages
---|---
0-100 | 1
100-250 | 8
250-500 | 38
500-1000 | 34
1000-1500 | 21
1500-2000 | 14
2000-2500 | 9 (20,225 total pop.)
2500-3000 | 3 (7,808 total)
3000-3500 | 5 (15,953 total)
3500-4000 | 2 (7,475 total)
4000-4500 | 1 (4,268)

Selected villages include:

**Hoti**—with 4268 people, 993 houses, 22 mosques, 58 shops with 27 horses and ponies, 1172 ‘Oxen and buffaloes’, 165 sheep and goats, 2 camels, and 1285 ‘Others’.

**Toru**—with 3330 people, 775 houses, 16 mosques, and 65 shops.

**Hund**—with 1434 people, 368 houses, 7 mosques, 6 shops, 77 horses and ponies, 453 oxen and buffaloes, and 17 sheep and goats.

‘**Kui Barmul**’ (On 1987 map—Khui Barmol)—with 1266 people, 237 houses, 5 mosques, 12 shops, and 260 oxen and buffaloes.

The chief villages (1987 map spellings) of selected regional **tappas** included:

**Kamalzai**: (Mishranzai branch) Toru, (Kishranzai) Hoti and Mardan

**Amazai**: (Daulatzai) Rustam, (Ismailzai) Garhi Kapura

**Razzar**: (Akokhel) Ismaila, (Malikzai) Yar Husain, (Manizai) Kalu Khan, (Khidarzai) Shewa, (Mamuzai) Nawe Kili

**Utmanzai**: (Sadozai) Kotah and Topi, (Zalozai) Zaida and Hund, (Dorazai) Kalabat

**Khudu Khel**: (Bisatkhel) Chinglai, (Bamkhel) Totallai (**tappa** outside British district)

**Gadun**: (Salar) Gandaf, (Mansur) Baisak (**tappa** outside British district, Kakar Pakhtuns)

**Lundkhwar** (Baizai): Landkhwar, Katlang, Palai, Kharkai (all Khattak villages)

**Khattak**: Nowshera, Jahangira

Appendix 4: Revenue tables from the James Settlement of the Peshawar District

The following tables list the different totals gathered by James for 'Average Revenues realized by the Dooranees from the Peshawur district', for six years of Sikh revenues ('Sumbut' (Sikh calendar year) 1893-1899 equivalent to the period 1836-7 to 1842-3), for Sikh revenue 'assignments' besides mowajib allowances, and for revenue and tappa statistics of the early British period in the district. The revenue figures were ideal demands that never reflected actual amounts received by imperial collectors. Jagirs to arbabs, mowajibs to khans, rent-free assignments of land to maliks, shareholders, and religious institutions, and other displacements of revenue were counted in gross figures though such quantities of cash or even equivalent values in kind probably never fully exchanged hands.

General observations include that while the Sikh governors increased gross demand and duties over time, the totals of 'assignments' in jagirs, etc. more than doubled from Sambat 1893/1836-7 to Sambat 1899/1842-3. Also, the annual totals of assigned revenue (Rs. 309,317 in 1899/1842-3) and mowajib allowances (averaging from Rs. 200000 to 250000) represented close to half of the theoretical demand. The fact that Sikh governors were chronically strapped to meet the pay of Sikh troops in Peshawar suggests that even if additional revenue towards the demand was realized from the tappas little of it passed up in government channels or reached the court in Lahore. Governor Avitabile's ability to act as a private bank for early British agents, then have the funds remitted as personal assets under British control indicates the inability of imperial controls to manage the revenue.

The British statistics offered Peshawar valley tappa population totals apparently gathered from the 1855 census. The annual fall in the gross revenue demand indicated the ending of miscellaneous fees, but also the strategic retreat needed to compensate for the effects of a cash demand and an inaccurate system of crop and soil type valuations. The number of rent-free 'bukhrah' or shares recorded in each tappa in comparison to the shares 'Remaining for assessment' gave a general sense of the proportion of Pakhtun maliks, shareholders, and religious figures and institutions able to claim a revenue-free status to the remaining agrarian population. Rent-free shares totalled 35,796, while 274,352 were liable for revenue. One share was not exactly equivalent
to one tiller. Rent-free holdings included the ‘proprietor’s’ exempt inam ‘and although a comparatively small share of this now remains to them, it is still absolutely large; in Khuleel it is one-fourth, in Momund one-sixteenth of the whole’.*


**Durrani revenue**

‘Average Revenues realized by the Dooranees from the Peshawur district’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Land revenue</th>
<th>Fees</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Momund</td>
<td>79,400</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>87,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuleel</td>
<td>87,580</td>
<td>22,750</td>
<td>110,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusbah</td>
<td>6,740</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doaba</td>
<td>102,300</td>
<td>25,100</td>
<td>127,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doadzie</td>
<td>76,870</td>
<td>18,235</td>
<td>95,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalsa</td>
<td>82,200</td>
<td>6,340</td>
<td>88,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuttuk</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hushtnuggur</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eusufzae</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>599,090</td>
<td>86,425</td>
<td>685,515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town Dues</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu Tax</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Mills</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Taxes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>92,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total** 599,090 86,425 777,515

Sikh revenue

‘Statement showing the Revenues under the Sikh administration of the Peshawur district’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Sumbut 1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1836-37</td>
<td>1837-38</td>
<td>1838-39</td>
<td>1839-40</td>
<td>1840-41</td>
<td>1842-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Momund</td>
<td>107,900</td>
<td>106,850</td>
<td>106,645</td>
<td>134,338</td>
<td>128,600</td>
<td>145,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuleel</td>
<td>98,566</td>
<td>96,500</td>
<td>89,347</td>
<td>117,578</td>
<td>105,480</td>
<td>115,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusbah</td>
<td>32,870</td>
<td>26,640</td>
<td>28,970</td>
<td>34,596</td>
<td>32,565</td>
<td>41,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doabah</td>
<td>110,654</td>
<td>110,250</td>
<td>109,830</td>
<td>137,984</td>
<td>138,422</td>
<td>122,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daodzai</td>
<td>86,596</td>
<td>81,740</td>
<td>78,800</td>
<td>99,570</td>
<td>98,480</td>
<td>118,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalsa</td>
<td>93,450</td>
<td>87,040</td>
<td>72,800</td>
<td>101,161</td>
<td>90,329</td>
<td>91,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuttuk</td>
<td>66,430</td>
<td>74,708</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hushtnuggur</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eusafzae</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of Land Revenue</strong></td>
<td><strong>717,466</strong></td>
<td><strong>723,728</strong></td>
<td><strong>704,392</strong></td>
<td><strong>883,227</strong></td>
<td><strong>888,876</strong></td>
<td><strong>996,944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town duties</td>
<td>97,900</td>
<td>85,600</td>
<td>82,300</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>131,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adalat</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mint</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Mills</td>
<td>8,820</td>
<td>8,980</td>
<td>6,320</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Taxes</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>108,460</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>122,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>124,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>171,031</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>838,866</strong></td>
<td><strong>832,188</strong></td>
<td><strong>804,992</strong></td>
<td><strong>1006,027</strong></td>
<td><strong>1013,276</strong></td>
<td><strong>1167,975</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Sikh revenue assignments

‘Statement showing the Sikh assignments from revenues exclusive of mowajib’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Momund</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>26,500</td>
<td>26,950</td>
<td>41,117</td>
<td>15,563</td>
<td>16,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuleel</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>7,450</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>8,564</td>
<td>9,597</td>
<td>13,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusbah</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>7,440</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>10,926</td>
<td>13,560</td>
<td>22,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doaba</td>
<td>32,518</td>
<td>64,160</td>
<td>59,200</td>
<td>59,760</td>
<td>88,865</td>
<td>40,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daodzie</td>
<td>5,360</td>
<td>28,450</td>
<td>28,700</td>
<td>39,143</td>
<td>31,790</td>
<td>21,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalsa</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>16,564</td>
<td>20,750</td>
<td>17,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuttuk</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>14,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hushtnuggur</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eusufzaie</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>141,545</td>
<td>249,960</td>
<td>238,880</td>
<td>313,074</td>
<td>317,125</td>
<td>289,767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Amount of Revenue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue</strong></td>
<td>717,466</td>
<td>723,728</td>
<td>704,392</td>
<td>883,227</td>
<td>888,876</td>
<td>996,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balance from</strong></td>
<td>575,921</td>
<td>473,768</td>
<td>465,512</td>
<td>570,153</td>
<td>571,751</td>
<td>707,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>land Revenue</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>12,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town dues</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adalat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mint</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Mills</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Taxes</td>
<td>142,145</td>
<td>253,260</td>
<td>243,170</td>
<td>322,233</td>
<td>325,925</td>
<td>309,317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source: James Settlement Report, 1865: ‘Part I. Appendix C.’

Note: ‘I am unable, from local records, to ascertain the exact amount of mowajib or service jagirs granted annually; but they must have been on an average from 2 to 2 1/2 lakhs’. 
Revenue assessment of the Peshawar District, 1912-1916 based on 1905-1911 average.

'Tabular Statement of Assessment of the Peshawar District, from 1912 to 1916 Exclusive of Eusufzie'. (Sumbut calendar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tahsil</th>
<th>Daoodzai</th>
<th>Dooaba</th>
<th>Khalsa-Khattak</th>
<th>Hazoor Peshawur</th>
<th>Hashtnagar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khalsa</td>
<td>Khattak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khuleel</td>
<td>Kusbah Begram</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Momund</td>
<td>Hasht</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tappa</strong></td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jama</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>127,820</td>
<td>146,099</td>
<td>96,988</td>
<td>49,591</td>
<td>111,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>137,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>147,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848-9</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>835,277</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>126,832</td>
<td>108,219</td>
<td>94,144</td>
<td>49,482</td>
<td>111,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>137,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>139,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849-50</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>781,955</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>107,514</td>
<td>101,332</td>
<td>77,914</td>
<td>36,699</td>
<td>95,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>114,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850-1</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>672,946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>102,324</td>
<td>91,335</td>
<td>73,753</td>
<td>30,805</td>
<td>89,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>115,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>107,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-2</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>629,484</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>100,144</td>
<td>80,250</td>
<td>65,872</td>
<td>29,641</td>
<td>89,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>105,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>107,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852-3</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>596,397</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>100,144</td>
<td>82,475</td>
<td>67,872</td>
<td>29,641</td>
<td>89,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>107,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>107,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853-4</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>603,011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>100,144</td>
<td>85,550</td>
<td>70,172</td>
<td>28,763</td>
<td>89,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>108,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>107,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854-5</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>600,787</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 yr Total</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Proposed 5 years</td>
<td>Area (sq. mi.)</td>
<td>Pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>764,923</td>
<td>109,274</td>
<td>90906</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>36641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>695,261</td>
<td>99,323</td>
<td>85425</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>34252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>546,715</td>
<td>78,102</td>
<td>60029</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>38074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>255,623</td>
<td>36,517</td>
<td>27209</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>36592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>675,071</td>
<td>96,530</td>
<td>58920</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>34241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>123,012</td>
<td>17,573</td>
<td>14828</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>827,680</td>
<td>118,240</td>
<td>97895</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>40005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>840,577</td>
<td>120,082</td>
<td>94035</td>
<td></td>
<td>49890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The five tahsils were composed of eight tappas. The Khalsa-Khattak Tahsil had the Khalsa and the Khattak Tappas. Tahsil Hazoor Peshawar had Tappas Khuleel, Kusbah Begram, and Momund.*
Appendix 5: Yusufzai assessments and *mowajibs*

'Showing the assessment of Eusufzye, with the present and proposed *Mowajib* of the *khans*'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th><em>Tuppah</em></th>
<th>Gross assessment</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
<th>Proposed in perpetuity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Otmanzye</td>
<td>34976</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>2000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Taroo</td>
<td>15500</td>
<td>5820</td>
<td>6820</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mahomedzye</td>
<td>14193</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>2670</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+5</td>
<td>Hotee</td>
<td>8255</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Manerzye</td>
<td>17600</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sadoon</td>
<td>7210</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>1280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hind</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Loondkhor</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dowlutzye</td>
<td>7965</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ismailzye</td>
<td>8495</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nurunjee</td>
<td>6200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>127994</strong></td>
<td><strong>19516</strong></td>
<td><strong>20820</strong></td>
<td><strong>11530</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 'reduced from 2670 at death'*

'Note - The amount of present *Mowajibs* is at the rate of about 15 1/4 per cent on the entire assessment, that of the proposed *Mowajibs*, about 15 1/2 per cent and that of the proposed hereditary *Mowajibs* about 9 per cent.'

(signed) Davies

Source: Statement included with James' Letter 'No. 146' in correspondence forwarded from F. Davies, Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to C. Beadon, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William, dated 24 June 1859. All letters copied in mentioned volume, *Foreign Department (Political) 1859 Consultation July 15*. 
Appendix 6: 'Eusofzie Levies' 1857

‘Eusofzie Levies’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horse</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kadir Khan of Toroo</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ameer Khan of Sudoom</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surbulund Khan of Hotee</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meer Aslam Khan of Murdan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ameer Khan of Shewa</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afzul Khan of Gurreekupooru</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khowadad Khan of Ismaila</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mousa Khan of Sheik Jana</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahdad Khan of Zeedah</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajjub Khan of Chargoilai</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Khan of (?)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullus Suddar, Goolam of Loondkhor</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassoorolla Khan of Gurree Ismail</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tudai Khan of Loondkhor</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Khan of Zeidah</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mollik Furrud of Gureekapooru</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullik — of Babo — (?)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Bahadoor of Khanda</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total | 155 | 208* |

Source: A letter from Lt. Horne at ‘Hotee Murdan’ dated 3 June 1857 to Deputy Commissioner Nicholson in Peshawar listed the initial forces gathered by local *khans* to support the British after the 21 May ‘Mutiny’ of Hindustani troops at Nowshera and Mardan, the 22 May disarming of East India Company Native Infantry regiments in Peshawar, and the 25 May chase into Swat of the opposed troops consolidated at Mardan’s cantonment.

(India Office Records, London, Mss. EUR E 211/4B. The handwriting of the manuscript letter, including numbers, was difficult to decipher, but familiar names are apparent.)

* Adds up to 308
Fear of the eight thousand Hindustani troops stationed in the Peshawar valley, against two thousand eight hundred Europeans, led Peshawar authorities to a Sikh-era tactic of recruiting local Afghan collaborators. In late May 1857, after a local regiment at Mardan and Nowshera disobeyed orders, ‘It was resolved to disarm the native troops’ (in Peshawar) ‘early the following morning, and to call in the aid of the mountaineers, to keep whom in order these very native troops had been maintained in the valley!’ In the end, infantry regiments were recruited, plus 2324 local ‘irregular levies’ and another 3343 from ‘the Derajat and Kohat’ to the south. Exactly 1807 were recorded as being ‘sent to Hindustan for general service’. (Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98, pp. 81, 87.)

Appendix 7: ‘Mutiny’ service awards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Chief... (document spellings)</th>
<th>Annual...present allowances (jagirs, rent-free land, cash) (value in rupees)</th>
<th>Proposed annual increase (value in rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boorhanodeen Mian of Eusufzai</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusseeroola Khan of Otmanzai</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futtih Khan*</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajub Khan of Sadoom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khwaedad Khan of Ismaila</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>1260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Shah of Ismaila</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Khan of Killabut</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Bahadoor of Jhundah</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akbar Shah of Baboozai</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Khan ‘A Mullik of Kotila’</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahdad Khan of Zeyda</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ameer Khan of Hoond</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Burhanuddin Mian, a ‘Kakakhail’, had been forced to give up the carrying trade because of his ‘notorious intimacy’ with the British. He aided the British in a raid on Narinji village in 1857, serving as an executioner for the British. ‘By associating himself with me on all occasions, even in the public execution of men of reputed sanctity, he
showed himself entirely on our side, and has of course procured many enemies thereby.’

(James’ comment in above statement. No numbered pages. Statement in Peshawar Archives, Commissioner’s Office Peshawar, Bundle No. 70, no file number.)

In support of giving Fatteh Khan village Jehangira as a jagir, Edwardes wrote in the statement, ‘It is wise especially on the frontier to create an aristocracy of our own; and not confine ourselves to upholding the grant of former rulers.’

* ‘Futtih Khan’ Khattak of Jehangira guarded the Attock crossing with local cavalry and was given the title of ‘Khan Bahadur’ by Governor-General Dalhousie.

Ajab Khan’s older brother received the Amazai mowajib. Ajab ‘was actively engaged in the operations against Naringee’.

When ‘Khwaedad Khan’ became tappa khan in 1854 Edwardes cut the local mowajib from Rs 2670 to Rs 1420. It was now recommended to restore the original amount. Edwardes said, ‘the example shows that these chiefs can be useful when they choose, and that the way to make them choose it, is to reward them for doing well, and reduce them for doing nothing. A healthy circulation will thus be kept up’.

When Arsala Khan of Zaida fled to the hills after the second Sikh war, his sons including Shahdad Khan remained behind to collect the government revenue and maintain local authority within the family. Amir Khan of Hund had a resumed jagir partially restored.
### Appendix 8: 1852 Education statistics, Peshawar District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Villages with schools</th>
<th>Villages Without schools</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Peshawar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohmund</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuleel</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hushtnaggur</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doabah</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daodzai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalsa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuttuk</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
<th>Schools in homes</th>
<th>Schools in 'temples'</th>
<th>Schools in Other places</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>3096</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools, Years, Operating</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peshawar city</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohmund</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuleel</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hushtnaggur</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doabah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daodzai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalsa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuttuk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Of the 345 Mohamedan schools—in 120 the formal reading of the Koran is taught: in 87 Arabic only: in 9 Persian only: and in 129 Arabic and Persian combined’.

From the (Peshawar D. C. Records, Bundle 14, File S. No. 271, ‘Report’, p. 26.)

Appendix 9: Yusufzai Sub-division ‘Pay and Pension.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Circle</th>
<th>Persons earning a) Pay b) Pensions</th>
<th>Villages with men a) In Service b) As Pensioners</th>
<th>Total Annual Earnings Pay Pension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tahsil Mardan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koh Daman Baizai</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koh Daman Sudhum</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maira</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>52,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Tahsil</strong></td>
<td><strong>464</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>88,596</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Tahsil Swabi      |                                    |                                               |                               |
| Bulaknama         | 180                                | 14                                            | 28,680                        | 2676                          |
| Kinara Darya      | 104                                | 8                                             | 23,844                        | 6756                          |
| Jabba             | 400                                | 16                                            | 95,148                        | 4104                          |
| Maira             | 458                                | 34                                            | 85,728                        | 5388                          |
| Koh Daman Sudhum  | 10                                 | -                                             | 2064                          | -                             |
| **Total Tahsil**  | **1152**                           | **76**                                        | **235,464**                   | **18,924**                    |

| Total Sub-division | 1616                              | 128                                           | 324,060                        | 42,360                        |

Source: (from Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98, p. 301)
Appendix 10: Agrarian and Tenancy statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wells</th>
<th>Ploughs</th>
<th>Well Acreage*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mardan Tahsil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883-4 Gazetteer</td>
<td>1206</td>
<td>6134 (Reg. Settlemt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895 Assessment Report</td>
<td>2032</td>
<td>15,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895 Circles: Baizai</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadum</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maira</td>
<td>1326</td>
<td>8879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swabi Tahsil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883-4 Gazetteer</td>
<td>2841</td>
<td>10,478 (Reg. Settlemt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895 Assessment Report</td>
<td>5864</td>
<td>15,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895 Circles: Bolaknama</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>2891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinara Darya</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabba</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>3023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maira</td>
<td>3936</td>
<td>8267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadum</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895 Yusufzai Sub-div.</td>
<td>7896</td>
<td>31,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Dane 1895 Report, p. 40)
* From Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98, p. 191.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1895 Number of jamabandi holdings</th>
<th>Sharers (deducting mortgages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mardan</td>
<td>9502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swabi</td>
<td>18,719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Dane Report, p. 40)

1895 Yusufzai Sub-division tenancies, percentage of land cultivated by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Circle</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Rent-free tenants</th>
<th>Occupancy tenants</th>
<th>Tenants at will</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mardan Tahsil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baizai</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadum (Rustam)*</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>45.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maira*</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>49.8*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Swabi Tahsil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Kam</th>
<th>Non-Kam</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolaknama</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinara Darya</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabba</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maira</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadum</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* large khan holdings

Source: Dane Reports, p. 43.

Appendix 11: Yusufzai villages and Tahsils by clan organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Yusufzai pargana'</th>
<th>Number of villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kamalzai tappa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanzai tappa</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razzar tappa</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utmanzai tappa</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baezai tappa</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (from *Peshawar Gazetteer 1883-4*, p. 106)

Tahsils by clan organization

Mardan Tahsil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main tribe</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Colonies of other Afghans</th>
<th>Mixed population</th>
<th>Total villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kamalzai</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Suddozai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanzai</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Utmanzai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusafzai Baizai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Khattak Utman Khel</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Misc. 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Swabi Tahsil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main tribe</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Colonies of other Afghans</th>
<th>Mixed population</th>
<th>Total villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Razzar</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Sayad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddozai</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Awan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utmanzai</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Khattak 9</td>
<td>Misc. 3</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gadun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (From *Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98*, p. 128)

Villages by Assessment Circle organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mardan Tahsil</th>
<th>Swabi Tahsil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koh Daman Baizai</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koh Daman Sudhum</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maira</td>
<td>70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 133 Total 101

Source: *Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98*, p. 303

* A discussion of revenue payment schedules noted ‘70 villages irrigated by Swat Canal’ in the Mardan tahsil. (*Peshawar Gazetteer 1897-98*, p. 335)

There was an 1897-98 Yusufzai Sub-division total of 234 villages. In addition to new villages opened after the 1870s Regular Settlement, villages or circles on *tahsil* boundaries were periodically transferred or split, including the 1872 transfer of sixteen villages in the Bolak *tappa* from the Nowshera to the Swabi *tahsil*. The *tahsil* name Utman Bolak created for the Regular Settlement was later changed for a neutral village name, Swabi, not indicating a particular clan. Direct comparisons between village totals in different reports have to consider the specific changes that occurred over particular decades. Still, growth was apparent. Around 1852, Lumsden had counted 141 villages, of which ‘8 or 9 were not assessed owing to their having been founded or enjoyed by Sayads’. (*Dane Report*, p. 13).
## Appendix 12: Baizai Village statistics from 1868 and 1891 Censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>Mosques</th>
<th>Shops</th>
<th>Oxen/</th>
<th>Sheep/</th>
<th>Goats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Agri-</td>
<td>Non-Ag.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cultural</td>
<td>Men/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men/</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamozi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babozai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1737</td>
<td>353</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazi Baba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mian Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>287</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kui Barmoul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1811</td>
<td>382</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundkhwar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>3673</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katlang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tazagiran</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics from village tables in MacGregor, *Central Asia*, 1873 and in Peshawar Commissioner Records, Bundle 57, File S. No. 1456 ('Malakand Reports' of 1898), pp. 6-11.
## Appendix 13: ‘Baizai’ village revenue.

‘Statement showing details of revenue, frontier remissions, etc’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Mafi</th>
<th>Inam</th>
<th>Jagir</th>
<th>Frontier Remissions</th>
<th>Khalsa</th>
<th>Total Revenue Payers</th>
<th>Lambardars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sangao</td>
<td>Rs. 3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mian Khan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipal</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kui</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babozai</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharki</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazi Baba</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamozai</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Totals)</strong></td>
<td>276</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td>3655</td>
<td>5560</td>
<td>2355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 14: ‘Tribes and Castes.’

### 'Pathan Sub-divisions’ (1901) (tahsils)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-divisions</th>
<th>Yusafzai</th>
<th>Khatkak</th>
<th>Mohmand</th>
<th>Utman Khel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>106,024</td>
<td>56,226</td>
<td>47,032</td>
<td>7908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>1513</td>
<td>2209</td>
<td>14,552</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charsadda</td>
<td>2713</td>
<td>2850</td>
<td>19,206</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowshera</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27,976</td>
<td>3397</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardan</td>
<td>43,234</td>
<td>15,838</td>
<td>9803</td>
<td>5511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swabi</td>
<td>58,553</td>
<td>7353</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Excerpts from tables in *Peshawar District Gazetteer 1904*, Part B.

### 'Tribes and Castes'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Peshawar 1881</th>
<th>Peshawar 1891</th>
<th>Peshawar 1901</th>
<th>Mardan (1901)</th>
<th>Swabi (1901)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Pathan'</td>
<td>276,647</td>
<td>339,069</td>
<td>402,258</td>
<td>86,170</td>
<td>77,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayad</td>
<td>4515</td>
<td>20,392</td>
<td>24,354</td>
<td>2593</td>
<td>3321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shekh</td>
<td>9574</td>
<td>6567</td>
<td>5081</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulema</td>
<td>2216</td>
<td>4403</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>3746</td>
<td>2916</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hindu)</td>
<td>3372</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3301</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sikhs)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arora</td>
<td>13,333</td>
<td>14,681</td>
<td>17,475</td>
<td>4102</td>
<td>3946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hindu)</td>
<td>12,872</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,056</td>
<td>3616</td>
<td>3548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sikh)</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3419</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khatri</strong></td>
<td>9578</td>
<td>11,102</td>
<td>12,730</td>
<td>1316</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hindu)</td>
<td>9212</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,368</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sikh)</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2362</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculturists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awan (M)</td>
<td>97,445</td>
<td>105,357</td>
<td>111,339</td>
<td>7623</td>
<td>9274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghban (M)</td>
<td>21,237</td>
<td>13,205</td>
<td>9420</td>
<td>5554</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujar (M)</td>
<td>13,513</td>
<td>14,343</td>
<td>15,818</td>
<td>6011</td>
<td>6631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maliar (M)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,320</td>
<td>18,319</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service-skill Providers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamar</td>
<td>4264</td>
<td>4942</td>
<td>2840</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhobi</td>
<td>5466</td>
<td>5689</td>
<td>8075</td>
<td>1326</td>
<td>2344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julaha</td>
<td>15,372</td>
<td>16,403</td>
<td>18,892</td>
<td>4078</td>
<td>5349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumhar</td>
<td>7582</td>
<td>8615</td>
<td>7513</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>2432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lohar</td>
<td>6521</td>
<td>8148</td>
<td>7999</td>
<td>2177</td>
<td>2561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirasi</td>
<td>3863</td>
<td>4064</td>
<td>4423</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mochi</td>
<td>3263</td>
<td>3921</td>
<td>5401</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musalli</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4402</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nai</td>
<td>5648</td>
<td>7153</td>
<td>8741</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassab</td>
<td>2636</td>
<td>3240</td>
<td>3900</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarkhan</td>
<td>12,504</td>
<td>13,275</td>
<td>15,934</td>
<td>2766</td>
<td>3883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teli</td>
<td>3250</td>
<td>3772</td>
<td>5166</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(M) = ‘Muhammadans’
Appendix 15:

Excerpt from the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1887:

Chapter V. ‘Preventive and other authority and jurisdiction’. Subhead. ‘Security for Good Behavior’.

Section. ‘40—Security from families when a blood-feud exists or is probable’.

‘40. When a blood-feud or other cause of quarrel likely to lead to bloodshed exists, or in the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner is likely to arise between two families, the Deputy Commissioner may, on the recommendation of a Council of Elders, or after inquiry as hereinafter provided, order all or any members of both families or of either family to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for their good behaviour during such period not exceeding three years as he may fix’.

From printed text of Regulation in Peshawar Commissioner’s Office Records, Bundle No. 77, File S. No. 2242.

Appendix 16: Akhund Darweza’s genealogical narrative

Akhund Darweza continued his narrative with the story of Talut testing the obedience of his thirsty army after a desert march on the way to confront the army of Jalut. Daud was one of only 313 soldiers that restrained themselves and drank slowly with one hand at the watering place, while:

those that disagreed and drank with mouths, as much as they drank, the thirstier they became. Thirst fell on their livers until they drank so much that their stomachs swelled and almost 70000 died.¹

In the confrontation, only Daud would volunteer to fight Jalut. Talut promised Daud his daughter’s hand in marriage and half his lands if he killed Jalut. In the end, after Daud slew Jalut with a stone from his sling, Talut gave Daud his daughter, but then reneged on the promise of land and even attempted to kill Daud. Daud eventually received both the gift of prophecy and Talut’s land, but Akhund
Darweza remarked, 'That is why, up to this day, the integrity of the Afghan people for keeping promises rarely exists'.

This narrative of genealogy and authority continued with the reign of Mehtar Sulieman and his raising of Talut’s sons, Asif and Afghan. Asif joined the government ministry (wazirat) and was raised to the rank (mansab) of the nobles (ashraf). But Sulieman imprisoned Afghan when ‘as a man of power and courage, the signs of power and fierceness were found in his forehead’.

That is why, until this point, delicacy and compassion in the hearts of Afghans is rare. On the other hand, whoever of them acquires goodwill and delicacy of religion, they come before him with laughter. They say he has lost his children, tribes (qaba’il), and wife. They say he has died. The story of these Afghan people, from ancient custom (rasm, a’in), was that from extreme ignorance and hardness of heart between each other they did not possess a kingdom...They have arrogance and selfishness (not knowing) how to admit weakness and submission in the presence of one’s own relatives, (or being able to admit) that one’s self is a servant and the other a king (badshah)...They (claim) equality...each of them small and large call themselves maliks...to themselves each is a malik...In addition, in the Holy Koran Almighty God has called Talut malik. From that time on all Afghans are called maliks. These Afghan clans were settled in the Sulieman mountains...After the prophecy (of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ)...Arabs and non-Arabs (ajam) individually arrived and embraced the faith. But seventy maliks of the Afghan people arrived assembled in a group. After that, the news of the prophecy of the last of the prophets reached their own tribes.

The narrative went on to say that the tribes embraced Islam. In times of war with unbelievers (kafirs), Afghan women were present on the battlefield, gathering arrows and giving water to the holy warriors (ghazis). But then, it was stated, the Prophet declared that the Afghans would be cast into hell:

When this saying (hadith) of the Prophet reached the ears of the Afghans all became aggrieved and sorrowful. They turned their faces to scholars, who wanted the anxious people to be without enmity to the Prophet until this news...reached the Prophet. The Prophet called all of them. He asked the cause of their concern and
considered their situation. The Afghans said, 'For the cause of religion we cross swords, not for the world. If it is so (going to hell), what is the necessity for us to cross swords?'

At that moment the Prophet said, 'I haven't addressed you, but your children after you will become ignorant because of little wanting to accept a kingdom (badshahi).'</p>

Implementing the religion of Muhammad (PBUH) is not possible without the government of an Islamic king. As he says, peace be upon him, 'Kingship (al-malik) and prophecy (al-nabwat) (are) twins.' Also, as he says, he who recites the couplet (beit):

'Beside the wise, sovereignty and prophecy
Are like two signets in one ring'

(The Prophet said:) 'All of your children will seek pastures and meadows. They will graze animals. Several houses (khana) ... will turn away and will scatter to all sides of the world. Scholars and knowledge will not be among them.'

Therefore gaining the religion of Muhammad, peace be upon him, without gaining knowledge and obedience to the rule (amir) of Islam is not possible. In that moment (they) will be suitable for hell. But then he (the Prophet) offered prayers to Almighty God for their children to keep them with his blessings steady on the straight path of Islam...That is why, up to this day, Afghans respect elevated people, everyone that might have read a selection from part of the Koran, and their words they accept with eyes and heart.

But, from ignorance, they don't know the limit between more and less education to differentiate a Sunni from an innovator (mubtada). That is why today among Afghans heresy (bid'at) and innovations are very prevalent, though they from extreme fondness of religion and love of the path of assurance (Islam) obey all scholars and good people until some bad scholars, from human desires, mislead them to destruction.

And that is why although Afghan people don't know the time (of praying) and (can't tell) Fateha from Ikhlas and don't understand distinguishing from each other standing in prayer, reading in prayer, bowing in prayer, and bowing to the ground in prayer and don't know the month of Ramazan from other months, still, they won't give up bowing down before the qibla or one month of fasting.

Akhund Darweza then tied Afghan history to the narrative of the Islamic conquest of India:
...It is said that in Hind eight persons had been enlightened by prophecy, not from their people but from people of other surrounding areas. But the Hindus did not accept any of them, some they killed and some they drove away. When Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH) ...remembered Hind, his bright mind often thought of great danger and war with the Hindus. But Jabril, by the order of the Lord of the Universe, arrived. He stopped him: 'The victory of those countries (bilad) is in the hand of one of your sultans, Mahmud.'

Akhund Darweza told of Mahmud of Ghazni coming to request help from the Afghans after his defeat in Hindustan:

...As it is Afghan tradition, whoever in a state of weakness enters into the houses of their maliks and places their cooking pot on their hearth, then all the tribe will sacrifice their lives and property until they solve that person’s difficulty. Sultan (Mahmud) also followed this custom. After that, from the Afghan tribes, 14000 horsemen and 14000 footmen became companions and a few women...That is a tradition for the Afghans. On a mission with women, of course, they would die rather than flee and, if the goal is achieved, there they settle. And the people of that place they drive out. Some they kill, some they make slaves, and some they make obedient subjects (ra'iyyat).

...with God’s favour, victory was achieved. After that, (some) Afghans stayed in Hind (and) after that Afghans from Kandahar dispersed. Some stayed in Kandahar, some went to Hind, and some scattered in other directions.

Now we come to the beginning of Yusufzai genealogy and an account of their arriving in these places. It is heard from ancestors of these people that an Afghan from the Kandahar region named Sherbun⁸ left two sons, one named Kand, the second Jamand. And from Kand, also, two sons...one named Sheikhi, the second Ghorı.⁹ From Ghorı four sons stayed behind. One (was) named Daulatyar. The people of Mohmand and Daudzai are from his lineage. The second (son of Ghorı) was named Khalil, the third named Ziran, the fourth named Chamkani.

It is heard from the ancestors (salaf) of these people that all four brothers killed and cooked a sheep and divided the meat between themselves. But in dividing the soup they forgot Chamkani and, displeased and upset, Chamkani left the company of his brothers and settled in the Safed Koh. Until our day, his children haven’t
joined the brothers and have dispersed around the world...Most tribes (qaba'il) call these people settled in the Safed Koh mountain kafirs. Their food and clothing are millet and wool. Most of their women walk about bareheaded and barefoot, some cloth hung around their necks. They go to the forests (jangalha) and bring wood and grass and they graze animals as the Khattak people have this custom (rawish). Most of these Chamkani people in the Safed Koh, assuredly all of them, besides most Afghans of the Safed Koh, have become in these days absolute kafirs since all of them have chosen obedience to Pir Tarik. Prayer, fasting, and charity (zakat) have left them and they have taken knowledge and scholars as enemies. The commands and prohibitions have become hidden. The divine Koran and hadith of the Prophet they burn and throw under foot and the scholars and other Muslims they kill with hope of reward. We take refuge with God from their unbelief. In sum, they are absolute infidels, so that whenever rulers (hukkam) of Islam reach hands on them, they kill their men and enslave (barida kardan) their women and legitimately take their property. It is in the commentary of Qaduri that Abu Bakr, the Amir of the Muslims, had done such to the apostates of Mecca and Medina.

The people of Zeran have also separated from the brothers. They spend life amidst the Tajik people of Ningahar so that most, not knowing, call them Tajiks. But these people of Zeran are religious and respectable ones that become townsmen and have seen the government of rulers.

Sheikhi left three sons. One named Mundi, the second Muk..., the third Tark. It is heard...that Sheikhi had a wife named Marjan, from whose womb are Mundi and Muk. But Marjan had another sister named Basu, without religion or piety, (who) also came and sat in the house of Sheikhi, intending marriage... From extreme ignorance (jahl) and error (zala'at) the woman was not left alone...causing the shame of infidelity, those keeping that woman themselves reaching the level of infidelity. Let us fly to God....

Afterwards, Sheikhi also made her (Basu) a wife. Tark was born from her womb. The Tarkiani are from his lineage. Also, these days most of these Tarkiani people follow Pir Tarik in following unlawful ways (haram), until lawful (halal) people with religion are little found among them.

...And Muk had a daughter named Kaki, who he married to his shepherd named Zeraki. The Kakiani people are from this lineage.
Because few sons of Muk came from this lineage, they are not known. However they are also called Kakiani... Also, Mundi had two sons, one Umar, the second Yusuf. It is said that Umar was a pious man. He went to the towns\textsuperscript{14} and took a wife descended from sayyids. His son Mandanr was born. In that place, Umar departed from this world to the everlasting world. After time, Yusuf went to the family of his brother to bring them back, but that woman of nobility refused, saying, 'I won't set foot in your house, because I have heard that Afghan people force and coerce wives of brothers into marriage. But I don't want to bring a new marriage on a previous marriage. As the saying of the Prophet (hadith) has, any woman on wedding her husband remains constant to the time of dying...' Then, (Yusuf) by promise and firm oaths brought that beloved (aziz) to his home. (He swore), 'Without your consent, no one will disturb your modesty.' At length Yusuf had five sons. One was named Uriya, that due to much arrogance and selfishness ('self-seen') was called Badi. Until our day it is still a rule (sanad) among Afghans that whoever has selfish and arrogant ways they call Badi. Now his children are called Badi Khel. Second (son of Yusuf) was Isa, third (son) Musa who was father of Elias. Among Afghans the rule (sanad) on this went that whenever a person is without mercy and generosity they omit his name from memoirs. Thus, the khel of Uriya are called by the name of his son or by the name of his wife. Fourth Mali, fifth Ako...\textsuperscript{15}

It is said from ancient years, that with the Afghans went a rule opposite to the Shari'at, that whenever sons reached knowledge and completion (adulthood) the brothers would divide between themselves the property of the mother and father. They would give the mother and father few things, only food to survive and the shroud for their burial. Let us fly to God from their evil and perverseness! In the Shari'at of Muhammad Mustafa (PBUH), a judgement (fatwa) on this was that after a son reaches maturity, his daily and nightly maintenance is not on the father and mother. Only if some become blind and lame, otherwise maintenance and food are gained from work (kasb). And, if a son works on his father's property and makes a successful effort in trade or agriculture, the fruits are not his, because the father is the head (ra'is) of property. Others cannot seize such property without permission. In any case, nothing of the father's property reaches the son by a claim, but
only if he has the father’s love and compassion. In that moment, no one has the right to prohibit this.

In that time, the sons of Yusuf were dividing their father’s property between themselves. Their mother said, ‘Also separate our share (hissa).’ The other sons were silent. From among them, the unlucky Badi pointed to his private parts, ‘This is your share.’ We seek refuge in God from such words...His mother prayed, ‘Your descendants will never be more than thirteen.’ Until this day, his descendants did not find their share and did not exceed thirteen persons. A few of them are among the Chagharzai.16

Elias left behind four sons. First, Natu, then Taji, father of Gadai. Third was Salar, fourth Mami, husband of Ayesha. Now his khel, after his wife, is named Ayeshazai. Ako had six sons. Four from one wife named Gohar. First Khawaji, second Bazid, third Aba, fourth Shadak. And two sons from another wife named Rani. First Hilam, second Hatman. Mali left behind four sons. Two from a wife named Wati, one being Dawlat, the second Chaghar. And two from another wife, Nuri; one named Aba, the second Isori. Isa (son of Yusuf) had eleven sons, until one day the Mughal people stole the Mandanr herd of horses. Isa rode (after them) with nine of his sons behind him, but because they arrived ahead of the gathering tribe (ulus), all of them became martyrs (shahid) by the hands of the Mughals. As the Prophet says, who dies saving his property is martyred. From that group two sons were left. One Hasan, the second Yaqub. Since the wife of Isa was pregnant, a son named Aka was born after his death. Mandanr had four sons, Mamu, Hazar, Rajar, and Mazad.

The narrative then continued, tracing the original clan migrations from southern Afghanistan to a familiar story of lineage relations and conflict over land:

The story is that when the Afghan people had divided the land of Kandahar between them the share of the Tareen people was lying between the people of Kand and Zamand. The two brothers were unable to support each other in the good and bad of life. Within the people of Kand, those of Sheikhi were the nearest to the Tareen. Their share was along the Arghastan river and that was near the land of the Tareen, until enmity broke out between the Sheikhi and Tareen. Finally, the Tareen overcame the Sheikh. Some were killed and some displaced. No one from the Zamand and Ghori reached them in support...17
NOTES

1. *Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar*, p. 82. The number of followers exactly equals and represents the symbolic power of the 313 with the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in AD 624 at the battle of Badr. See a similar use of the 'ideological drive' associated with the number in Eaton, 1993, p. 75.


5. The first and last surahs of the Koran.

6. Respectively, qiyam, qir'at, ruku, sujud.


9. In his annotations to the second part of the *History of the Afghans*, p. 124, Dorn quotes from another genealogical source, the 'Khulassat Ulansab': 'Gond had two sons: 1. Ghori, whose original name was Ibrahim; but from being born in Ghoristan, he became known by the name of Ghori. 2. Khak'hai, who first was called Sheikki, which in the course of time has been changed into Khak'hai.' Both Dorn and Caroe list a third son for Kharshbun, Kasi.


11. One named Mundi, the second Muk, 'both with the “zam” of “meem”', that is both names have the pesh (u or o) vowel marker with their first letter m or 'meem'. In other texts Mundi is known as Mand.


14. From *shahr*, city or town. To this day, Peshawar valley country people call a city dweller *shahri*.


GLOSSARY

Abi  Land irrigated by tanks or springs
Awan  Non-Pakhtun agriculturist
Arora  Hindu or Sikh traders found in Afghanistan and beyond
Baghban  Non-Pakhtun tiller of garden, vegetable, fruit plots
Bakhra  Share in land
Banda  Outlying hamlet tilled by faqirs, occasional Pakhtuns, liable for service or rent
Barani  Rain-dependent land
Orbushe  Barley
Chahi  Land irrigated by wells or Persian wheels (jhalars)
Chaj  Winnowing implement
Chamar  Leather worker
Charikar  Tiller working off debt, providing no inputs, receiving percentage 1/16 to 1/4
Daftari  Pakhtun shareholder
Dekhan  Name used in Yusufzai sub-division for charikar
Dharwai  Grain weighman
Dhobi  Washer man
Faqir  Non-shareholding tiller liable for service, hereditary cultivator, tenant (fakir)
Gujar  Non-Pakhtun herder and tiller
Hamsaya  Non-shareholding tiller liable for service, hereditary cultivator, tenant
Haq tora  Marriage fees paid to khan by non-shareholding dependants
Ijaradar  Revenue contractor, farmer
Inam  Exemption of shareholder personal land from revenue payment
Jagir  Revenue exempt land awarded for service
Julaha  Weaver
Kakha  Crop watchman (muhaftiz fasl)
Kama  Cattle feeder (pali)
Khatri  Hindu or Sikh shopkeeper, grain merchant, lender
Kishran  Juniors
Kumhar  Potter and brick kiln operator
Lohar  Blacksmith
Maira  Unirrigated, often uncultivated areas away from villages, ‘waste’ to the British
Makai  Corn
Mala  Wooden drag for field levelling
Maliar  Non-Pakhtun tiller of garden, vegetable, fruit plots
Mazdur  Crop weeder, cutter
Mirasi  Musician, singer *(Dum)*
Mishran  Elders
Mochi  Leather worker
Musalli  Grave digger, sweeper *(Shahi khel)*
Nadaf  Cotton cleaner, dresser
Nahri  Canal irrigated land *(Shah nahri, government canal-irrigated land)*
Nai  Barber, village messenger, intermediary
Qassab  Butcher
Sailab  Land irrigated by seasonal flooding
Shpun  Shepherd
Tarkhan  Carpenter, trade often combined with *lohar* skills
Teli  Oil presser
Qulba  Plough *(kulba)*
Ghanum  Wheat
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

Northwest Frontier Archives and Library, Peshawar
Pakistan Newspapers:
The Frontier Post
The News

Records Office of Northwest Frontier Province:
Peshawar District Deputy Commissioner Files. Revenue, Foreign, Frontier, Home, Political, Judicial, and Administrative subject reports and correspondence, c. 1850-1900.
Peshawar Division Commissioner Files. Revenue, Foreign, Frontier, Home, Political, Judicial, and Administrative subject reports and correspondence, c. 1850-1900.
Foreign Frontier Department Files. Received from Civil Secretariat, NWFP and Civil Secretariat, Punjab, 1890-1900.

National Documentation Centre, Islamabad
Peshawar Settlement Map Collection (Microfilm).

Punjab Archives, Anarkali’s Tomb, Civil Secretariat, Lahore

National Archives of India, New Delhi
Foreign Department (Secret) Reports and Correspondence, Misc. Consultations 1836, 1840, 1852.
Foreign Department (Political) Reports and Correspondence, Misc. Consultations, 1831, 1837, 1853, 1854, 1859.
India Office Library, London
Memoirs of Sir Olaf Caroe, Transcribed BBC Interview, MSS. Eur.C. 773/1-5.
John Macartney, ms. Memoir of a map of Caboul and the adjacent countries comprehending the space between 59°-50' and 78°-20' East Longitude and 24° and 40' North Latitude—In two parts, c. 1809. IOR X/3029/2.
Peshawar District Assessment and Settlement Reports.
Peshawar District Gazetteers, 1884-5, 1897-8, 1904, 1931.
Peshawar Settlement Maps, 1896.

Van Pelt Library, Philadelphia
Illustrated London News

Persian, Pashtu, and Urdu Sources
Darweza, Akhund, Makhzan, Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar (Pashtu), Peshawar, 1987.
Darweza Ningrahari, Akhund, Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar, Maktaba Islamia (Persian), Peshawar, n. d.
Das, Gopal, Tarikh-i Peshawar, Globe Publishers (Urdu), Lahore, n. d.


**Government Publications**


Prices and Wages in India, Statistical Branch of the Department of Finance and Commerce, Calcutta, 1885.

Prices of Food-Grains and Salt throughout India, 1861-1883, Statistical Branch of Department of Finance and Commerce, Calcutta, 1884.


Dane, L. W., Final Report on Settlement of the Peshawar District, 1898, Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1898.


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


English and European Books and Articles


*Copies of Testimonials of Ishar Singh & Sarup Singh, Contractors & General Merchants, Wine, Opium, Charus, etc. Peshawar, District, Commercial Press, Peshawar, 1900.*

Court, M. A., 'Extracts from a Memoir on a Map of Peshawar and the country comprised between the Indus and the Hydaspes, the Peucelaotis and Taxila of ancient geography', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 5 Aug. 1863.


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


*History of the Hoti Family*, printed in era of Mohammad Akbar Khan, c. 1944.


Lindner, Rudi Paul, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1983.


Macartney, John, *Memoir of a Map of Caboul and the adjacent countries comprehending the space between 59°-50° and 78°-20° East Longitude and 24° and 40° North Latitude*, India Office Library ms. X/3029/2; c. 1809, London.


Paget, W. H. and Mason, A. H. *Tribes of the North-West Frontier*, Gian Publications; Delhi, 1980, originally published as *A record of the expeditions against the North-West Frontier tribes, since the annexation of the Punjab*, Whiting, London, 1884.


Abdul Ghaffur, Akhund of Swat, 179
Abdur Rahman (Rahman Baba), 52-6
Abu-l Fazl, 26
Adas, Michael, 94, 100
Afghanistan, 163, 193, 196, 210
Afridis, 229, 245
Afzal Khan, Khattak, 40, 48, 63
Agra, 73
Agricultural tribes, xx, 133, 154
Agriculture, 53, 60, 81, 108, 122, 211, market 213-4, expansion 254
Ahmad Shah Abdali, 76
Ahmed Khan of Hoti, 102, 108
Ain-i Akbari, 26
Ajab Khan, 152, 179, 185, 200
Akbar (Mughal emperor), 10, 11, 32, 40, 65, 79
Akbar Ahmed, xxv, 85, 228
Akbarnama, 26
Akbarpura village, 127, 129
Akbar Shah (Sayyid), 91, 111, 180
Akbar (newsletters), 93
Akhbar Darweza, 27, 31, 32, 257, 289
Akora, 76, 80, 96
Akozai, 225
Allahdad Khan, 12
Amazai, 41, 178
Ambela pass, 1863 conflict 178
Amirullah Khan of Palli, 176
Arlinghaus, J., 101
Arsala Khan, Zaida, 107, 110, 120, 149
Atta Muhammad Khan, 164
Attok, 2, 79, 90, 98, 118
Aurangzeb (Mughal Emperor) (Penal Code) 20, 41, 42, 74
Avitabile, Sikh governor, 105, 163
Babur (Mughal emperor), xiv, 9, 74
Babuzai (Babozai) village, 122, 143, 173, 230
Badakhshan, 39
Bahadur Shah, 64, 73
Bahawalpur, 105
Baiza, 14, 67, 175, 225, 242, 230, 233, 246, 248
Bajaur, 9, 10, 67
Banda settlements, 60, 166, 239
Bani Israel, 33
Bengal, Permanent Settlement, 133, 161
Bhaku Khan, 41, 108
Balkh, 14, 39
Barampta, 124, 176, 187
Barani land, 60, 209
Barmoul, 2, 181
Barth, Fredrik, 17, 85
Bayazid Ansari, 10, 32
Bazdurrah valley, 175
Buner valley, 42, 67, 175
Cambridge school history, xix, 192
Caroe, Olaf, xxiv, 28, 40, 91, 99-100, 179, 224
Central Asia, xxvi, 39, trade 74
INDEX

Census data, analysis, (Shaikh Mali), 83, 130, 147, 209, 240, 242, 254

Chakdara, 223
Chamkani, 80
Chamla valley, 178, 239
Charsadda, 96, 216
Chitral, 205, 223, 225
Christian Missionary Society, 160, 199
Churchill, Winston, 226
Classes (economic and social), 57, 72, 84, 148, 192, 201, 207, 216, 240
Colonial contact, xv, xviii, 221
Colonial development, 207-8
Colonial ‘fanaticism’ discourse, 91, 92-3, 110, 112, 163, 179, 221-224, 226, 247
Conolly, Edward, 107-112
Court of Wards, 183, 200, 205
Courts (civil and revenue), 163-4, 184, 201-5, 207
Criminality, xx, xxi, 177, 184-8

D

Dalhousie, 142
Dane, L., 214
Dargai village, 173
Daud Khel, 181
Daudzai, 50, 66, 80, 138
Delhi, 74, 93, 152, 159
Dera Ismail Khan, 105
Dilazaks, 3, 7
Dir, 223, 225
Disease, 15, 111, 125
cholera, 126
dawa-i junani (Greek) care, 126 hakims, 126, 129
malaria, 126, 216
massage therapy, 111, 126
medical missions, 160
smallpox, 126
typhus epidemic, 125
Doaba, 8, 80, 117, 138

Dorn, Bernhard, 27, 31
Dost Muhammad, 200
Durrani dynasty, 72, 77

E

Eaton, Richard, 38
East India Company, 74, 81, 93, 104, 119, 129, 133
Education, 63, 158-60, 199, 255
Edwards, David, 227
Edwardes, Herbert B., 153, 160, 171
Elphinstone, Mountstuart, xxiii, 31, 81
Enevoldsen, Jens, xxii

F

Fakirs, 83-5, 150, 164
Fateh Khan of Hoti, 73, 76
Fatteh Khan of Panjtar, 108
Ferishta, 26, 31
Fida Muhammad, 206
Flooding, 118
Fox, Richard, xxviii, 6, 207
Freitag, Sandria, xx
Frontier (idea, bounds, policies, conflict), xiii, xx, xxviii, 122, 136, 153, 158, 172-7, 183, 193, 224, 253
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), 183, 186, (Section 40) 205, 207, 246, fines 258

G

Gadun, 2
Genealogies, 5, 28, (Pir Baba) 29, 31, 34, Peshawar 37, 38, 40, 43, 58, 73, 113, 166, 289
Geography, xvi, 81, 117
Ghazai Baba village, 241
Ghoriyah Khel, 7, 8
Ghulam Muhammad, 79
### INDEX

**Ghulam Shah, Lundkhwar, 177**
**Gigianis, 8**
**Gilmartin, David, 171**
**Gommans, J., 38, 74**
**Gopal Das (Tariikh-i Peshawar), 171**
**Grima, Benedicte 17, 61**
**Gujar Garhi village, 142**
**Gurkhas, 91, 196**

**H**

**Hamsayas, 3, 130, 146, 164**
**Haq tora dues, 206**
**Hashtnagar, 14, 58, 96, 127, 138**
**Hastings, E. G., 167**
**Hayat-i Afghani (Muhammad Hayat Khan), 30**
**Hazara district, fn 69, 95**
**Herat, 77**
**Hindustan/Hind, 60, 80, 292**
**Hindus, 65, 79, 110, 118, 128, 141, 145, 159, 204-5, 232**
**Historical narrative, xxv, 27, 35, 38, 48, 78-9, 221**
**Historical periodization, xvii**
**History of the Hoti Family, 73, 78**
**Hoti, 58, lineage politics 102-4, 149, 195**
**Humayun (Mughal emperor), 10**
**Hund village, 96, 97, 118**
**Hundi, financial draft, 112**

**I**

**Ibn Khaldun, 79**
**Ibrahim Khan of Mardan, 204**
**Ijara land, 203**
**Imperial Assemblage 1877, 179, 184**
**Inam land, 167, 204-5, 240**
**Indian Penal Code, 184, 187, 246**
**Indus river, 8, 11, 29, 80, 118**
**Inheritance, 37, 145, 167, 170**
**Iran, 80**
**Irrigation, canals 50, 54, Persian wheel 60, 80, 122, Swat river canal 207-9**
**Iskakot village, 173**
**Islamic scholarship, 63 Islamic social and political movements, xviii, 93-9, 111-2, 225**
**Ismail Khel, 181**

**J**

**Jagir land, awards, 64-5, 103**
**Jalal, Ayesha, fn 249**
**James, H. R., 136, 139, 179**
**Jansson, E., xxi**
**Jehangir (Mughal emperor), 28, 30**
**Jehangira village, 104**
**Jihad, 38, 89, 228, 246**
**Jirga, council, 20, 59, 171, 177, 180-1, 184, 186-7, 207, 229**

**K**

**Kabul, 49, 195**
**Kabul river, 2, 79-80, 118**
**Kadir Khan, Toru, 149**
**Kais (Abd al-Rashid), 31, 73**
**Kalpani nullah, 3, 122**
**Kalu Khan, 12**
**Kamalzai, 41, 58, 66, 73, 78, 169**
**Kandahar, 7, 33, 193-4, 292**
**Karlanri, 40**
**Kashmir, 84, 90**
**Kashtkar (Chitral), 146**
**Kasim, Akhund, 63**
**Katlang village, 8, 176, 230**
**Khadi Khan, 65**
**Khairabad, 79**
**Khalid bin Walid, 31**
**Khalil pargana, 140, 169**
**Khalils, 50, 57, 66**
**Khalsa pargana, 138, 169**
**Khan Jehan Lodi, 31**
**Khan Kaju, 3, 8, 29**
**Kharaj, 11**
Kharkai village, 176, 241
Khatri, 255
Khattak pargana, district, 2, 138, 169
Khattaks, 11, 14, 39, 67, 76, 80
Khawja Muhammad Khan of Hoti, 185, 199, 201, 205, 212
Khessgi village, 127
Khudu Khel, 57
Khushal Khan Khattak, 14, 39, 63, 82
Khyber pass, xiii, 9, 10, 194
Kishranzai, 58-9, 73, 78
Kohistan, 2
Kui village, 181
Kui Barmoul, 230, 241
Kunar province, 163

L

Lahore, 105
Lambardars, 144, 145, 153-4, 168, 230-1
Land, as property, 134, 161-2, 167, 186, 212
Land distribution, 59, 212
Land (revenue) settlements, 64, 75, 120, 133-5, revenue farming 138, Lumsden (1847) 143, Peshawar 139, 141, 150, 152, 163, Regular Settlement 166, Second Settlement 197, (1895) 213-215
Land records and administration, 164-5, 202
Land surveys, 50, 64, 163
Landey, 61-2
Lashkar Khan, 73, 102
Lawrence, George, 119, 143, 174
Legal codes, regimes
British colonial, 123, 188
Custom (rawaj), 17, 161
Customary law codes, 168-172
Sayyid Ahmad, 97
Sikh, 105, 124
see Pakhtunwali, Shari'a
Limited Raj, xxxi
Lindholm, Charles, 5, 13
Lindner, R. P., 38
Lineage (clan) dynamics, xiv
Literary works (diwans, etc.), 63
Ludhiana, 105, (district) 136
Lumsden, Lt., 121, 124, 143, 152, 174
Lunkhwar, 14, 67, 149, 174, 230, 232, 235
M

Macartney, John, 82
Mackeson, 104-5, 107, 112
Madras, ryotwari settlements, 134
Madrasas, xvi, 158
Mahdud Khan, 65
Mahmud of Ghazni, 35, 292
Maira, 9, 56, 117, 211-2
Maize, 61
Makhzen Afghani, 26, 30
Malakand Agency, 223
Malakand pass, 67, 223
Malakand revolt 1897, 222, police reports, 230-40
Malik Ahmad, 3, 8, 18, 50, 65
Malik Ako, Khattak, 40
Malik Shah Mansur, 9, 30
Malka village, 175, 178
Mandanr, 5, 57, 66, 89, 107, 127, 148
Mapping, fields, 166
Marathas, 74, 77
Mardan, 58, 143, 195, 214
Marriage, 103, 145, 176, 204
Martial race ideology, 196
Marwats, 50
Matta village, 230, 234, 241
Mian Isa village, 232
Mian Khan village, 182, 230, 239, 241
Migration, 3, 7, 28, 192, 199, 210, 216, 255
Military employment, 194-6, 216
Millenarianism, xviii, xxix, 89, 100, 103, 222, 224, 228
Mir Afzal Khan, 120, 151
Mir Baba of Rustam, 143, 152, 212
Mishranzai, 58
Modernization narrative, 227
Mohmands, 50, 51, 57, 66, 138, 163, 210, 216, tenants 238
Mowajib (revenue payment) 121, 143, 144, 149-51, 154
Mughal empire, xvii, 10, 13, 68, 72
Mughal farmans, 12, 64
Muhabbat Khan, Toru, 212
Muhammad Hayat Khan, 30
Muhammad Khan, 12, 65
Muhammad Khan of Hoti (Khan 1820-51), 102, 120
Muhammad Yusuf, 230
Muhammadzai, 8, 80
Muhibb Khan, Mohmand, 50
Multan, 90, 125, 137
Maqarrab Khan, 109
Muzaffargarh District, 137

N
Nadir Shah, 72, 74-5
Narinji village, 162
Nasir Khan, 74-5
Nazoh Khan, 64, 73, 75
Neamet Ullah (author of Makhzan), 27
Nisatta village, 127, 129
North-West Frontier Province, 226
Nowshera, 80, battle (1823) 91, 127

O
Orakzais, 50
Ottoman empire, 73

P
Orakzais, 50
Ottoman empire, 73

Pabbi, 80
Pakhtun nationalism, 192, 221, 259
Pakhtun society, 3, religious figures 5, 6-7, 14, conflict 41, 56, 67, 85, 101, 147, 171, 192, 222, 256
Pakhtunwali, 4, 15, 25, 56, 99
Pali village, 141, 174, 176
Panipat, 1761 battle, 77
Panjkora valley, 82
Panjtar village, 97, 107, 109, 162, 175
Pashto language (Pashtu, Pakhtu), 53, 63, 111, 159, 173
Pastoralism, xvi, 117, 174
Patwaris, 141, 165, 202, 234
Persia, xvi, 73, 77, 81
Persian language, 111, 159, 173
Peshawar, xiii, 80, 90, 105
Peshawar district, xx, 135, land settlement 138, 174, 181
Peshawar valley, 118, 143, 174
Pipal (Pipul) village, 181, 230, 241
Police administration and regulations, 144, 185, 230
Prang village, 127
Punishment, 19, 20, 105, 123-4, 140, 180-3, 187, 232, 239, 246, 258
Punjab, colonial administration, xx, 109, 119, 135, 138, 142, 147, 153, 166
Punjab land mortgage debt, 183, 213

Q
Qasba pargana, 169
Qazis (Islamic judges), 98-9, 112, 123, 145
Qeyamuddin Ahmad, 99

R
Rahman Baba (Abdur Rahman), 52-6
Railroads, 199, 209, 213-4
Ranizai valley, 14, 173, 175
Ranjit Singh, 90, 105
Raverty, H. G., 27, fn 45, 173, 180
Raz(z)ar, 41, 127, 169
Revenue farming, see ijara
Revenue remissions, 137, 197, 240
Revolt of 1857, 152-3
Rittenberg, S., xxi
Rohi sandarai (mountain songs), 62
Roshaniyyas, 10, 32, 36
Russia, 105-6, 193
Rustam village, 143, 152, 178, 185

S

Sadozai, 41
Safavids, 72
Saidullah, 225, 247
Salma Shaheen, xxii
Samah (plains), 2, 8, 90, 108, 110
Sangao village, 141, 174, 181, 241
Sarabani, 40
Sauda, 30
Sayyid Ahmad Shah, 94-103
Sayyid Ali Shah Tirmizi (Pir Baba), 29, 32
Sayyid Hussain, 111
Second Afghan War 1878-91, 173, 194, 197, grain prices 198, wages 198
Sairai land, 58
Sesadda, Utman Khel, 181
Shah Muhammad Khan, 200, 204, 212
Shahbaz Khan of Hoti, 13, 65
Shahbaz Khan, Khattak, 41
Shah Jehan (Mughal emperor), 50
Shah Shuja, 81, 106
Shah Waliullah, 95
Shahzada Shweb, 231
Shah Zaman, 90
Shaikh Mali, 18, 29, 50
Shaikh Tapur, 8
Shaikh Usman, 50
Shajra-i-Kalan Ghoria, 78
Shamozai village, 230, 241
Shari'a, 5, 17, 18, 20, 95, 97

S

Sardar, 116
Salma Shaheen, xxii
Sangao village, 141, 174, 181, 241
Sarabani, 40
Sauda, 30
Sayyid Ahmad Shah, 94-103
Sayyid Ali Shah Tirmizi (Pir Baba), 29, 32
Sayyid Hussain, 111
Second Afghan War 1878-91, 173, 194, 197, grain prices 198, wages 198
Sairai land, 58
Sesadda, Utman Khel, 181
Shah Muhammad Khan, 200, 204, 212
Shahbaz Khan of Hoti, 13, 65
Shahbaz Khan, Khattak, 41
Shah Jehan (Mughal emperor), 50
Shah Shuja, 81, 106
Shah Waliullah, 95
Shahzada Shweb, 231
Shah Zaman, 90
Shaikh Mali, 18, 29, 50
Shaikh Tapur, 8
Shaikh Usman, 50
Shajra-i-Kalan Ghoria, 78
Shamozai village, 230, 241
Shari'a, 5, 17, 18, 20, 95, 97

T

Tahsildars, 165, 202
Tajiks, 36
Talal Asad, 72, 85
Taliban, 19, 160
Talut, King, 31
Tapas, see landey
Tarikh-i Hafiz Rahmat Khani, xxi, 7, 27, 29
Tarikh-i Murassa, 40, 64, 76
Tazkirat al-Abrar wa al-Ashrar, xxii, 27
Tenancy, 164, 171, 183, 192, 206, 211, 238
Thana village, 225
Timur, 29
Timur Shah, 77, 81, 90
Tobacco, 214
Toru, 122, 128, 149
Trade, 3, arms 42, 74, 80, 175, 193-4, 197, 213-4, 255
Tribal scholarship, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii,  
1, tribalization process 68, 83, 100
Trigonometrical Survey, 142
Tripartite Treaty, 106

Widows, remarriage 36, inheritance  
rights, 168-70
Women, gender roles 16-17, idealized  
norms 61, 99, education, 159

U

_Ulema_, 18, 90, 95, 98-9
Urdu language, 165
_Ushr_, 11, 98, 110
Usmanzai village, 97
Utman Bolak _tahsil_, 166, 197
Utman Khel, 2, 14, 66, 175, 180, 233
Utman Nama, 169
Utmanzai, 41, 94

Y

Yacub, Mehtar, 33
Yar Hussain village, 127
Yar Muhammad, 98
Yusufi, Allah Bakhsh, _fn_ 47
Yusufzai _Malguzari_, 65
Yusufzais, 1, 7, (history) 29, 66
Yusufzai subdivision, 136, 142, 155
Yusufzai _tahsil_, 166

Z

Zaida village, 98
_Za'ildars_, 154
Zamindars, 82, 120, 130, 134, 234,  
236
Zard Ali, Pipal, 235, 237
Zormandi village, 174, 176
Zuhak, King, 30