CURATORS of
the BUDDHA

THE STUDY OF BUDDHISM UNDER COLONIALISM

EDITED BY
Donald S. Lopez, Jr.
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Introduction
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The essays in this volume could be seen as six chapters in a cultural history of the study of Buddhism in the west, a history that remains to be written. In different ways, each essay contributes to that history of Buddhist Studies by offering a genealogy of a particular idée reçue: that Zen Buddhism is, above all, an experience; that Tibetan Buddhism is polluted, or that it is pristine; that the Buddha image is of Greek, or Roman, origin; that the Asian is an introvert; that the classical source supersedes the vernacular; that the manuscript supersedes the informant. The essays detail the historical conditions that led to the formation of these enduring ideas. Taken together, they offer new insights into the processes that have led to the construction of Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline by excavating the contested grounds upon which it was built.

The essays focus on some of the most important "curators of the Buddha," those figures who played an important role in the creation and maintenance of Buddhism as an object of study and scholarly inquiry in the west, figures such as Thomas W. Rhys Davids, Giuseppe Tucci, C. G. Jung, Aurel Stein, L. Austine Waddell, and D. T. Suzuki. All of these scholars wrote during the period when the European colonial powers dominated much of Buddhist Asia. The
subtitle of the volume, “The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism,” however, is intended less to signal the obvious fact that Buddhist Studies was created and thrived under the influence of this colonialism, than to suggest the importance of understanding the history of Buddhist Studies in the west under the larger categories of colonial and postcolonial cultural studies, to see the emergence of the academic study of Buddhism in Europe and America within the context of the ideologies of empire.

Buddhism was born as an object of western knowledge rather late in the Oriental Renaissance (which Schwab dates from 1680 to 1880). The sustained study of Buddhist texts did not really begin in Europe until the delivery of Brian Hodgson’s package of Sanskrit manuscripts into the hands of Eugène Burnouf in 1837. By this time Friedrich Schlegel had already proclaimed that “everything, yes, everything without exception has its origin in India.”1 But Buddhism remained largely excluded from the enthusiasm for Indian wisdom, occasioned by Wilkins’s 1784 translation of the Gītā into English and Anquetil’s 1786 translation of four Ouñpek’hat (Upaniṣad) from the Persian. Burnouf would not publish his Introduction à l’histoire du Buddhisisme indien until 1844; his translation of the Lotus Sūtra did not appear until 1852, the year of his death. By the time these and other works gained currency, the wave of enthusiasm for things Indian had largely passed, especially in Britain and France, although it continued in Germany into the present century.2 The brief period during which India replaced Egypt as the putative source of civilization was over; by the middle of the nineteenth century, both had been demoted in favor of Greece. Buddhist Studies, then, began as a latecomer to Romantic Orientalism, an offshoot of Indology at a time when India was no longer in vogue. Indeed, the portrayals of China and India as abodes of reason and spirit, respectively, which had been popular during the Enlightenment and the Romantic period, had begun to be displaced by 1800, before the Opium War of 1839 and the Indian Mutiny of 1857.3 India and China were now considered to be corrupt and effete civilizations, precisely at the time the European powers were undertaking their conquest. It was in this milieu that “Buddhism” was created in Europe.

Some of the elements at play in its creation come more clearly into focus through a brief examination of the career of Brian Houghton Hodgson (1800–94). In 1862, Max Müller wrote that “the real beginning of an historical and critical study of the doctrine of Buddha dates from the year 1824. In that year Mr. Hodgson announced the fact that the original documents of the Buddhist canon
had been preserved in Sanskrit in the monasteries of Nepal.”

Although Müller may overstate the case, it is true that the historical formation of Buddhist Studies occurred, in important ways, under the progressively fading influence of Hodgson. Today he is remembered only for his initial gift to Europe, the hundreds of Sanskrit and Tibetan manuscripts he gathered in Nepal. It was the 147 manuscripts he dispatched to Burnouf in Paris that would provide the basis for Burnouf’s still remarkable *Introduction à l’histoire du Bouddhisme indien*. The story of Hodgson’s research bears examination for its illustration of the ways in which the history of Buddhist Studies flows into colonial history. It also demonstrates that the problem that distinguishes Buddhist Studies from other, apparently parallel disciplines (such as Classics or Egyptology) has been present from its outset, namely: how to deal with the native, who also lays claim to the text.

Hodgson, while serving as the Assistant Resident for Great Britain at the Court of Nepal, devoted much of his time to acquiring Sanskrit manuscripts. His inquiries concerning the location of Buddhist scriptures led him eventually to an “old Bauddha” (Buddhist) in the city of Patan, who became his guide in locating manuscripts. In 1828, he published an article entitled, “A Sketch of Buddhism, derived from Bauddha Writings of Nepal.” At the outset, he relates his procedure:

Meanwhile, as the Patna Bauddha seemed very intelligent, and my curiosity was excited, I proposed to him (about 1823) a set of questions, which I desired he would answer from his books. He did so; and these questions and answers form the text of this paper. Having in his answers quoted sundry *slokas* in proof of his statements; and many of the scriptures whence these were taken being now in my possession, I was tempted to try the truth of his quotation. Of that, my research gave me in general satisfactory proof. But the question of the books led to questions respecting the relative age and authority; and, tried by this test, the Bauddha’s quotations were not always so satisfactory. Thus, one step led to another, until I conceived the idea of drawing up, with the aid of my old friend and his books, a sketch of the terminology and general dispositions of the external parts of Buddhism, in the belief that such a sketch, though but imperfectly executed, would be of some assistance to such of my countrymen as, with the books before them, might be disposed to enter into a full and accurate investigation of this almost unknown subject.

We see here the ambivalence of trust and suspicion of the native that would come to characterize the study of Buddhism in the west. Hodgson finds himself in a dilemma that would be repeated by future
generations. He is reluctant to place his trust in the authority of the native scholar, yet he cannot read the text without him. The native is thus portrayed as merely a supplement to the text whose answers must be checked against the original, access to which is provided initially by the native. Hodgson judges his informant is reliable enough on questions of doctrine, but he is of no help in dating the texts.

In his essays from this period, Hodgson portrays himself as merely a collector of texts, who distributed 423 Sanskrit manuscripts to libraries in Calcutta, London, Oxford, and Paris; he does not care to decipher the Sanskrit manuscripts, even if he had possessed the philological requisites. At the same time, Hodgson reacted with unveiled rancor when the significance of his essays on Buddhism was not sufficiently acknowledged by European scholars. In spite of his ambivalence, Hodgson defended his method of consulting native scholars against those who remained cloistered in their libraries with their manuscripts. By the mid-nineteenth century, the work of professional Orientalists in the academies of Europe had come to claim authority over the mere reportage of the traveler. Hodgson derisively referred to such scholars (his specific referent is Abel-Rémusat) as “closet students.” In the course of his self-defense, Hodgson damned his informant with the faintest of praise: “Let the closet student, then, give reasonable faith to the traveller, even upon this subject; and, whatever may be the general intellectual inferiority of the orientals of our day, or the plastic facility of change peculiar to every form of polytheism, let him not suppose that the living followers of Buddha cannot be profitably interrogated touching the creed they live and die in.” Yet Hodgson remained convinced after years of checking the sources that the answers of the old Buddhist (whose name was Amrtânanda) were more accurate and complete than the information gathered by the most distinguished scholars of Europe and “almost looked back with a sigh to the tolerably full and tolerably accurate account of Buddhism which I had obtained so long ago, and with little comparative labour, from my old friend’s answers to my queries.” But even Hodgson’s weary compliment of his old friend would eventually be called into question. This was one of the last moments in the history of Buddhist Studies (until the Tibetan diaspora of the 1960s) in which a “direct encounter with the human” was valued above the text, if only because Hodgson’s Sanskrit was inadequate to the task.

For a short time at least, Hodgson’s defense of his method seems to have been unnecessary. His essays on Buddhism were widely acclaimed by scholars of his generation. Sir G. Haughton wrote to
him that “a world of Chinese and Mongolian enigmas have been solved by means of your general and consistent outline of the *system*, but for which outline the said enigmas would have continued to defy all the Continental Oedipuses.”

Eugène Burnouf dedicated his translation of the *Lotus Sūtra* to Hodgson (who had provided him with the Sanskrit manuscript): “À Monsieur Brian Houghton Hodgson, membre du service civil de la Compagnie des Indes, comme au fondateur de la véritable étude du Bouddhisme par les textes et les monuments.”

Upon his death in 1894, *The Times* wrote, “To him the world still owes the materials for a knowledge of the great proselytizing faith which was the one civilising influence in Central Asia.”

But European scholars’ estimation of Hodgson’s work and Hodgson’s estimation of his old friend have not survived intact. He is mentioned today only in passing, warranting a single sentence or phrase in which he is credited with sending the manuscripts to Burnouf. And it is not simply that Hodgson’s role has been reduced to that of a collector and dispatcher of materials, as he also sometimes saw himself. In his *Buddhist Iconography*, Lokesh Chandra laments that Hodgson’s outdated formulations, “have unfortunately continued to sway the minds of historians of Buddhist art to our day” and notes the “ingenious creations of Amritananda” whose “fabrications have percolated down to our day.”

Perhaps most damning, Hodgson’s detailed elaboration of the four philosophical schools of Buddhism, the *system* which others so highly praised, has been shown to bear no relation to any historical schools of Buddhist thought, being instead the result of Amrtananda’s error. Hodgson appears not to have heeded the warning of Sir William Jones, who wrote that “it was found highly dangerous to employ natives as interpreters, upon whose fidelity they could not depend.”

Even Hodgson himself, in collecting his essays almost twenty years after his first interviews with the Nepali master, seemed to disavow the value of his own scholarship, with the footnote, “The case is altered materially now; because my original authorities, which stand far less in need of living interpreters, are generally accessible.” That is, once the texts have been gathered and the languages deciphered, the native interpreter is superfluous. Thus, Hodgson is remembered, when he is remembered at all, as a dispatcher, as the person who sent the parcels of Sanskrit and Tibetan manuscripts from Nepal, parcels which reached their destinations in the libraries and archives of Britain and France. From that point on, Buddhism could be regarded as a vast but ultimately exhaustible world of texts.

By the mid-nineteenth century, much of the enthusiasm that
had been spawned by the suggestion that Sanskrit was the common ancestor of the languages of Europe had also dissipated and the new science of philology moved on to other questions. However, Schlegel's view that inflected languages, notably Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and German, were more advanced than the Semitic languages and Chinese persisted, especially among German scholars, a view that would eventually be linked to race theory. Despite the passing of the vogue for all things Indian that had swept Europe in the last decades of the eighteenth century, a certain affection for Indian civilization persisted into the late Victorian period, an affection not only for Europe's Aryan forebears—a fair-skinned race of conquerors whose exploits were now being repeated by their descendants—but also for their philosophy:

It took its rise among an advancing and conquering people full of pride in their colour and their race, in their achievements and their progress. It advocated a view in many respects far in advance of what had been reached and, for the matter of that, of what has now been reached by the average philosophic and religious mind. It made its first conquests in a great continent occupied by peoples of various races and holding widely different views; their leaders often, it is true, well trained in philosophic thought, but the mass of the folk entangled in multiform varieties of indiscriminating animism. And it soon spread over the frontiers among the nations, some of them more barbarous still than the then most uncultured Indians.

The "it" of this stirring statement is not the British Army, but Buddhism, as described by Rhys Davids in lectures delivered in the United States in 1894–95. It demonstrates the degree to which the early centuries of Buddhism in India were deployed to evince the vitality of classical Indian civilization, a vitality that had long since vanished in India and lately manifested itself in Europe. The Buddha was seen as the greatest philosopher of India's Aryan past. Buddhism had a complete philosophical and psychological system, based on reason and restraint, opposed to ritual, superstition, and sacerdotalism. This Buddhism could thus serve as a substitute self for Victorian Britain, a self present long ago in the very heart of the Orient. Standing in sharp contrast to the spiritual and sensuous exoticism of modern India, this Buddhism was also a fitting candidate for exaltation to the rank of the classical because, like the civilizations of Greece, Rome, and Egypt, and unlike Hinduism, the Buddhism of India was long dead. This classical Buddhism was known by many names: "original Buddhism," "primitive Buddhism," sometimes "pure Buddhism."

Under such circumstances, Buddhism, its texts deposited in the
libraries of Europe, could be constituted as an object that, as Philip Almond puts it, existed "over and against the various cultures which can now be perceived as instancing it, manifesting it, in an enormous variety of ways." Such a view could be supported by appealing to Buddhist texts with their representation of the dharma as a transcendent truth, which the Buddha was only the most recent to discover. Thus, Buddhism could be construed as a transhistorical and self-identical essence that had benevolently descended on various cultures over the course of history, its instantiations, however, always imperfect. This invention of an authentic Buddhism in Europe was then naturalized into a temporal element of a historical progression by the designation "classical." This hypostatized object, called "Buddhism," because it had been created by Europe, could also be controlled by it, and it was against this Buddhism that all of the Buddhism of the modern Orient were to be judged, and to be found lacking. Among these Buddhism, that of Tibet was seen as most degenerate and inauthentic, deserving not even to be called Buddhism or Tibetan Buddhism but, instead, "Lamaism." It would seem, however, that Buddhism, as constructed and understood in Europe, must have some referent in Asia, that it must possess a more stable ontological status than Hinduism, for example. There had been, after all, an historical figure called "the Buddha," he had followers who called themselves bauddha (Buddhist), and the teachings which those followers attributed to him were called buddhadharma, which could, under most circumstances, be safely rendered as "Buddhism." But the Buddhism that largely concerned European scholars was an historical projection derived exclusively from manuscripts and blockprints, texts devoted largely to a "philosophy," which had been produced and had circulated among a small circle of monastic elites. With rare exception, there was little interest in the ways in which such texts were understood by the Buddhists of Asia, less interest in the ways in which such texts were put to use in the service of various ritual functions. Buddhist Studies has thus been to a great degree a history of master texts, dominated by the scholastic categories it seeks to elucidate, what Said has called a "paradigmatic fossilisation" based upon "the finality and closure of antiquarian or curatorial knowledge." In the case of Buddhist Studies, a certain tradition of high textuality has been represented as the knowledge of a putatively unitary object called "Buddhism." Abstractions about Buddhism, derived from texts originating in a "classical period," were the objects upon which scholars tended to fix their gaze, objects generally not to be found among the modern
cultures of Buddhist Asia. As a result, much of the representation of Buddhism to the west, both by western scholars and Asian apologists, has centered on philosophical doctrines (often in the guise of an ancient wisdom) deserving their place in the history of ideas, with little attention directed to more difficult questions of the contexts of textual production and circulation. Indeed, Buddhism has typically been studied as a thing apart from the rest of the intellectual and cultural history of India (or China or Japan). In turn, Buddhist Studies itself, ever indebted to Indology, Sinology, philology, and archaeology, was also separate from them, that very separateness central to its identity and status as “an independent discipline.” Historians of India, China, and Japan, for example, generally regard Buddhism as an esoteric domain entered only by the initiate, and Buddhologists are often regarded, like Hodgson’s Nepali informant, as woefully ignorant of Asian history. In this and other ways, Buddhist Studies tends to replicate the practices, tropes, and conceits located in Buddhist texts and institutions, where Buddhism is represented as a self-identical dharma that has moved from one Asian culture to another, unchanged through the vicissitudes of time. The share of complicity of Buddhists and Buddhologists in this universalist vision remains to be apportioned. Buddhologists nonetheless regard Buddhist Studies as a profession and as a discipline, an assumption that rests on the permanence of something called “Buddhism” to serve as both the basis and the goal of the knowledge which Buddhologists produce.

This knowledge has, for the most part, been produced in the academy, but the institutional circumstances of its production have changed. As we have seen, Buddhist Studies in the west is very much a descendant of Indology, in the sense that prior to the Second World War, the study of Buddhism in the western academy was carried out largely by Sanskritists (or sometimes Sinologists) who also read Buddhist texts. However, the translations and studies produced by these scholars did not circulate only within a closed academic circle. Their translations of Buddhist scriptures were commodified by various groups in Europe, such as the Theosophical Society and the Buddhist Lodge in London, who drew their inspiration from the message of the Buddha, as they understood it. In Asia, the founders of Buddhist revival movements, such as Tai xu in China and Dharmapāla in Sri Lanka, in a standard move of the western-educated native elite of late colonialism, claimed to have in the Buddha a philosopher whose championing of ethics and reason both rivaled and preceded the great thinkers of Europe. This interaction of the “academic” and the “pop-
ular” would remain a constant component of the development of Buddhist Studies.

In the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, scholars such as Henry Clarke Warren and Eugene Burlingame translated Pāli texts, while enthusiasts like W. Y. Evans-Wentz and Dwight Goddard published, respectively, the Tibetan Book of the Dead (1927) and A Buddhist Bible (1938, which included the *Dao de jīng*). The American academy saw an enormous change during the decades after the Second World War, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, with the explosion of two fields: Area Studies devoted to Asia and Religious Studies. Area Studies provided federal funds (through the National Defense Education Act) for training in a wide range of Asian languages. At the same time, the study of religion moved from the seminary to the college and university, where departments of religion were formed, often on the model of the Christian seminary with faculty in Old Testament, New Testament, Church History, Modern Religious Thought, Ethics, and perhaps, “World Religions.”

The efflorescence of popular interest in Asian religions during the Vietnam era insured the permanence of “World Religions” (sometimes loosely construed as “History of Religions”) in the American university curriculum, with some departments designating a single faculty position to it, while others with sufficient resources expanded to include in their departments representative scholars for each of the non-Judeo-Christian world religions: Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. In either case, the market for scholars of Buddhism was large: as a scholar of the single “pan-Asian” religion, he (and, rarely, she) could speak with authority about the religions of India, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan, and hence was ideal for the single “World Religions” position in a given department.

The institutional base for such scholars was no longer confined to the Department of Oriental Languages. American programs in Religious Studies (such as at the University of Virginia) and divinity schools (as at the University of Chicago) expanded their graduate curricula to include training in Buddhist Studies. With the task of providing faculty for other departments of religion, the course of instruction also deviated from the European model. Because scholars of Buddhism were often expected to function also as scholars of “religion,” the standards of language learning changed (some would say, eroded). The competence in the four “canonical languages” (Sanskrit-Pāli, Tibetan, Chinese, Japanese) came to be regarded with
a certain awe as an attribute of the scholarly giants of the past. There was not enough time for that, when one was expected to read William James and Max Weber and Mircea Eliade. Owing in part to this shift in demand and in part to the rise of Area Studies, training in Buddhist Studies was bifurcated, with students usually learning Sanskrit and Pāli (sometimes with the addendum of Tibetan) or Chinese (often with the addendum of Japanese). Still, Sanskrit remained the lingua franca, at least for the technical lexicon, as students attempted to gain some mastery of the vast intertextual web of allusions in Buddhist texts, a mastery that would provide the measure of scholarly attainment as a Buddhologist, as professional students of Buddhism have come to call themselves.

The current generation of scholars of Buddhism, including the authors of the essays contained in this volume, has a particular life story and set of associations which require both acknowledgment and scrutiny. It was generally rare for the investments of language learning by the previous generation of European scholars of Buddhism (many of whom, like La Vallée Poussin and Lamotte, were devout Christians) to yield what is called “personal interest.” However, for North American scholars today, who were students during the Vietnam era, such interest was largely the rule. As these scholars, some of whom spent years as ordained Buddhist monks, enter their mature years, their personal interest has either waxed or waned, been confessed or repressed, yet its importance in the recent history of Buddhist Studies is not to be underestimated. The authors of the essays contained in this volume were all educated during this period, and their insights into the history of the discipline which produced them therefore take on a special significance, in part because they are able to historicize elements of a Buddhist tradition that have and, in many cases, continue to be represented as ahistorical in the popular imagination.

In discussing French colonial scholarship on Algeria, Pierre Bourdieu writes:

Those who nowadays set themselves up as judges and distribute praise and blame among the sociologists and ethnologists of the colonial past would be better occupied in trying to understand what it was that prevented the most lucid and the best intentioned of those they condemn from understanding things which are now self-evident for even the least lucid and sometimes the least well-intentioned observers: in what is unthinkable at a given time, there is not only everything that cannot be thought for lack of ethical or political dispositions which tend to bring it into consideration, but also everything
which cannot be thought for lack of instruments of thought such as problematics, concepts, methods and techniques.\textsuperscript{32}

This volume is not simply a revelation of heretofore unexamined or marginalized aspects of the lives of the forefathers, of Suzuki, Tucci, Rhys Davids, Jung, Aurel Stein, L. A. Waddell, in some fictional act of parricide. Nor do the essays seek to apportion praise and blame, condemning some for their Orientalism while praising others for their sympathy, judging the patriarchs against the standards of another time, beyond which we have all evolved. The question is not one of the ethics of scholarship but of the logics of representation, the question is not one of how knowledge is tainted but of how knowledge takes form. This volume, then, is the result of a moment of self-reflection on some key constituents of the identity of the Buddhologist, only some of which are self-evident, in an effort to expand the problematics by which we understand our history.

In this sense, the volume is admittedly a belated attempt to explore the intricate connection of Buddhist Studies to colonialism, to perhaps draw Buddhist Studies into the larger arena of postcolonial cultural studies, of which Edward Said's 1978 \textit{Orientalism} was the most celebrated harbinger. However, there are reasons not immediately to assume Said's critique in the case of Buddhist Studies. \textit{Orientalism} deals with European representations of the Islamic world of the Middle East; it does not consider the past and present cultures of Asia. An important element of Said's argument is that part of the fear and fascination that underlie Orientalism derives from the proximity of the Islamic world, a world that occupied the space immediately beyond the imaginary border between west and east, a border that had been violated by the Moors in Iberia and the Ottomans at the gates of Vienna.\textsuperscript{33} The Buddhist world was, in contrast, at the ends of the earth, representing no such threat.

The direct political role that Said describes for Orientalism in the nineteenth century, as the stereotypes of Oriental cultures were used by the European powers to colonize the Orient, is also not immediately evident in the case of Buddhist Studies. By the time that India became part of the British empire, Buddhism was long dead there, present only in the form of palm leaf manuscripts, stone inscriptions, statues, and monuments. (The situation was obviously different in Sri Lanka and Burma.) Scholars of Buddhism were, for the most part, antiquarians. Few of the major figures in Buddhist Studies during the nineteenth century visited Asia and fewer still, with such notable exceptions as Thomas W. Rhys Davids, served in
colonial administration. After the formation of the British Raj and of French Indochina, Buddhist scholarship on India was not confined to the British and Buddhist scholarship on China to the French. Indeed, scholars of Germany, Belgium, and Eastern Europe, none of which had direct colonial interests in Asia, continued to make major contributions to the field. It may be the case, as James Clifford notes with regard to German Orientalism, that Buddhist Studies was “too disinterested and thus atypical of a genealogy that defines the discourse as essentially colonialist.” Nonetheless, any general history of Orientalism (should such be possible) is both complemented and complicated by a cultural history of the study of Buddhism.

From the time of Hodgson’s dispatch, the European study of Buddhism remained for the most part an enterprise of the metropole, carried out in libraries, archives, universities, and private studies. Its contribution to Orientalism lies, therefore, not so much in the overt political domination of the peoples of Asia called “Buddhists” (this was accomplished by others), but in the creation of a reified entity called “Buddhism” and the writing of its history, as well as in the creation of a biography of the Buddha, who would come to be both exalted and condemned as the paradigm of an Oriental mentality. This “Buddhism” and this Buddha played a specific role in what Said calls “Romantic Orientalism,” with its fantasies of lost wisdom, its constructions of classical ages long past, its search for the languages of Eden, and its degradation of the Oriental modern.

There have been, of course, numerous criticisms of Said’s work, the most consequential of which identify Said’s shifting notion of representation and his persistent debt to a tradition of High Humanism. But of immediate interest for the concerns of this volume is the fact that Said generally fails to consider the networks of exchange that existed between the Orientalizer and the Orientalized, of the back-and-forth that occurred between Europeans and Asians in which Asians were also agents, of how, as Aijaz Ahmad notes, the:

textualities [about the non-West] might have been received, accepted, modified, challenged, overthrown or reproduced by the intelligentsias of the colonized countries: not as an undifferentiated mass but as social agents impelled by our own conflicts, contradictions, distinct political and social locations, of class, gender, region, religious affiliation, and so on.

To undertake a cultural analysis of the history of the study of Buddhism over the past century, it is necessary to consider the relationships operating among (1) the various Buddhist textual practices at work in specific times and places and their relations to non-Buddhist
textual practices, (2) the western knowledge about these practices and about the texts they produced, and (3) the modern reproductions of these various textualities in both Asia and the west. But, as Ahmad warns, these relationships have created "such a wilderness of mirrors that we need the most incisive of operations, and the most delicate of dialectics, to disaggregate their densities."37 One of the aims of this volume is to wander, some might judge blithely, into this wilderness, to consider some specific cases of such refraction.38

Charles Hallisey examines the rise and fall of vernacular literature as a medium for the European study of Buddhism in Southeast Asia. He notes the prominence given to vernacular biographies of the Buddha in Rhys Davids's 1876 Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on "Buddhism" and his virtual dismissal of the vernacular in Britannica entries on the same topic in 1910. For Hallisey, Rhys Davids's valuation of the ancient over the modern and the classical over the vernacular is consistent with the now familiar quest for origins and the attendant historicism of much of nineteenth-century European scholarship in which histories of Asian civilizations were written that identified their origins, their classical periods, and their decline. The last of these (also called "the modern period"), was marked by decay and impotence and inevitably occurred contemporaneously with, and hence was used to justify, European colonialism, one of whose products was knowledge. The Orientalist spoke for the Orient through a lineage of scholarship whose task it was to represent the Orient because the Orient was incapable of representing itself. In the case considered in Hallisey's essay, modern Buddhist communities were deemed incapable of writing an accurate biography of their founder, a task assumed by the European scholar. The positing of a classical-vernacular dichotomy was part of this process. With the increasing professionalization of training in Buddhist Studies, the vernacular texts and commentaries that had proved so crucial to the work of a previous generation of scholars became devalued.

Hallisey's essay demonstrates some of the ways in which modern Asian patterns of discourse (some, it argues, the result of colonial domination, some not) have marked European representations of Buddhism. It might be deemed programmatic in its call for a careful examination of the conditions of the production of knowledge in such a way that we transfer our expectations for the source of meaning away from the origins of the tradition to local circumstances, such as the technologies, practices, and institutions which made the production and persistence of a given text or ritual practice possible. These circumstances were something that the gifted amateurs of the
last century attended to, but from which professional Buddhology has since turned away.

Stanley Abe’s essay examines the controversy, dating back to the nineteenth century and persisting to the present, over the influence of Greek and Roman art on the production of the first Buddha images in India. The essay provides a genealogy of this concept of Greek influence, demonstrating how an apparently simple fact—that Hellenized peoples were present in the region of India where some of the early sculptures of the Buddha were produced—was implicated in notions of racial mixing, diffusion, degeneration, and possession of the origin. The theory was eventually put forward that not only were the Gandhāran Buddha images produced under Greek influence, but that these were the first Buddha images; the anthropomorphically representation of the Buddha was due to the power of Greek civilization. These Gandhāran images were seen by some as not only the first representations of the Buddha but the most perfect, with all subsequent Buddha images regarded as poor imitations, the products of a process of degeneration from the origin. Once set in motion, Greek influence moved eastward like the inexorable wheel of the cakravartin, being noted by Sir Aurel Stein as far east as Dunhuang in Chinese Central Asia, with some even arguing that Gandhāran art was the basis for all subsequent Buddhist art in Central and East Asia.

Robert Sharf examines the Zen of D. T. Suzuki in an effort to determine the genesis of the view widely held in the west that Zen is not a school of Buddhism or even a religion, but a transhistorical and unmediated experience. Knowledge of Zen was constructed not through the work of western philologists but through the interaction of various agencies in a politically volatile climate, including Zen apologists in Japan and Paul Carus, proponent of “The Religion of Science,” in America. The apologists, many of whom held only the most tangential ties to Zen monastic institutions in Japan, were concerned not only with the “transmission” of Zen to the west; their more important commitment was to rescue Zen from the Meiji condemnation of Buddhism as corrupt and outmoded superstition, and, perhaps more importantly, as of foreign origin. Buddhism was construed by its Japanese critics as an alien other for the purpose of constructing the self-identity of Japan, an identity that would be termed nihonjinron (Japaneseness) in the nativist ideology of the Meiji and post-Meiji periods. It was in response to this critique, Sharf argues, that the Zen that is known in the west was born. Rather than declaring that true Buddhism had disappeared irretrievably from Asia, as some Europeans claimed, the Buddhist apologists of Japan
contended that the true spirit of Buddhism, absent elsewhere in Asia, resided uniquely and exclusively in Japan. Such claims about the spirit of Buddhism, some of which were penned by Suzuki himself, appeared at precisely the moment that Japan itself became a colonial power, a power that declared its intention to restore the spirit of Buddhism (which Japan alone possessed) to its Asian neighbors via the establishment of a pan-Asian Japanese Empire.

Sharf’s essay also examines the role of Paul Carus, Suzuki’s employer in La Salle, Illinois, from 1897 to 1909, in the formation of Suzuki’s Zen as a nondualistic teaching perfectly suited for the modern age. In subsequent years, Suzuki would attempt to downplay the importance of his time in La Salle and deny the influence of Carus, his dissimulation masking the strange intermingling of interests and agendas that would result in the production of what he would represent as a pure, and quintessentially Japanese, Zen.

It is the representation of the complex as the simple, of the mingled as the pure, that is a standard feature of the Orientalizing process. This is but one reason for including an essay on a Japanese Zen apologist in a volume on the place of the study of Buddhism in the colonial history of the west. Sharf’s essay does more than merely demonstrate the obvious point that racist, nativist, and supremacist ideologies also exist in Asia and that such ideologies have been directed toward the west. Instead, his essay traces the process whereby the production of self is also the production of others, and that in this process epistemic violence is the inevitable consequence, a violence that was used materially in the first half of the century by Japanese militarism against other parts of Asia. The ideology that was inextricable from the Zen of Suzuki and his contemporaries was more than the result of a supposed conflict between “tradition” and “modernity.” It is rather a case of colonial discourse being absorbed into a nativist ideology, made all the more potent when the Oriental returns from the west to his homeland as it begins its own colonial project.

The representation of Zen as pure experience, beyond all articulations of (western) philosophy and, in addition, an experience available only to the Japanese, stands as another moment in the history of late colonialism in which western-educated elites attempt to demonstrate the superiority of their own cultural products through recourse to the categories of the colonizer. That such representations are far too often uncritically embraced by the western audience for whom they are only sometimes intended is demonstrated with devastating effect in the essays of Sharf and Benavides.

Gustavo Benavides examines the work of the foremost Tibeto-
logist of the century, Giuseppe Tucci, focusing especially on his essays and lectures during the Mussolini regime. Many of these appeared in a periodical called *Yamato*, a monthly published between 1941 and 1943 devoted to strengthening the ties between Japan and Italy. These works, many of which rely heavily on Suzuki, display Tucci’s fascination with the Zen warrior creed as a response to the burdens of modernism. Benavides’s essay explores the tensions in Tucci’s work between the “scientific” observations of philology and the highly nostalgic pronouncements of Romantic Orientalism. The essay shows how this particular construction of the Orient was called to arm the Fascist offense against modernism; Tucci found the most perfect expression of the timeless realm, where life and death are the same, not in the Buddhisms of India or Tibet where his scholarly expertise lay, but in Zen, a Buddhism he learned from the writings of D. T. Suzuki and the ideologues of Japanese nationalism.

The essay sees Tucci not simply as a patriarch of Buddhist Studies and Tibetan Studies, but as a participant in a European scholarly discourse on religion in the first half of this century in which a nostalgia for an already disappeared agrarian world resulted in themes of artificiality and authenticity, where authenticity meant experience of the timeless. The Orient was the geographical counterpart of a timeless realm which Tucci sought to exploit in order to replenish an ideological arsenal in defense of the State.

In his essay, “Oriental Wisdom and the Cure of Souls: Jung and the Indian East,” Luis Gómez calls into question the popularly acknowledged “sympathy” of Carl Jung for the religions of Asia, particularly Buddhism, by exploring Jung’s extreme ambivalence toward a largely undifferentiated “East” (in which he seemed to include Africa and the Pueblo Indians). Jung was both heir and elaborator of nineteenth-century racial theories about the Eastern mind, theories which became standard components of the discourse of a feminized and silent Oriental. He saw the Easterner as having “never lost touch with the instinctual matrix” of the East, as endowed with a “collective introverted attitude,” as cultivating “the psychic aspect of primitivity,” as turning “back into the Maternal depths of nature.” As Gómez notes, Jung assumed “a special psychology for the Asian mind that places the Asian both beyond and below the limits of European normalcy.” In all this, Jung persistently speaks for the East. Yet Jung vacillated between identification and differentiation. He would sympathize with the predicament of the Buddha who, apparently like himself, tried to make people understand “that the enlightened man is even the teacher and redeemer of his gods.” At the same
time, he consistently described Asian religions as exotic and alien, repeatedly warning Europeans not to attempt the practice of a very vaguely defined "yoga."

Gómez's essay examines how Jung created his own colonial economy during his repeated ventures into translations of Asian texts. He judged the raw materials of Asian religion to be valuable, but unusable and even dangerous to the European in their unrefined form. He therefore removed them from their cultural and historical contexts and then manufactured theories from them for Europeans, to be used to remedy the deficiencies in their own souls, incorporating Asian materials into a collective unconscious which for the European could remain both exotic and intimate. In his writings he also exported Asian symbols (such as the maṇḍala) back to Asia, attempting to explain (in the sense of leveling) to Asians the true nature of their own symbols and psyches. Gómez's essay finds Jung ever undeterred by history or even by a close reading of the text. Throughout, true understanding rests only with Jung, who uses the authority of his Asian texts to claim a privileged access to a tradition, over which he then claims authority. The healing power of Asia can only heal when mediated through Jung's theories, with Jung serving as the intermediary between East and West, both as diagnostician and healer.

My essay examines four moments of urgency which took Tibetan Buddhism as its object. Ippolito Desideri, a Jesuit father living in Lhasa, concluded that in order to demonstrate to the Tibetan monks the errors of their dogma, it was essential that he gain an understanding of that which the Buddhist scholastics considered their most profound philosophical tenet. Alexander Csoma de Kőrösz set out east in fervent search of the original home of the Hungarian people and ended up on the borders of Tibet, writing a Tibetan grammar and dictionary. L. A. Waddell made a detailed study of Tibetan religion in Sikkim, but felt that certain secrets of the religion would remain hidden from him unless he was able to travel to the forbidden city of Lhasa. And in the later 1970s, as a graduate student in Buddhist Studies, I, like many other Buddhologists today, set off for India to study with Tibetan refugee lamas in an attempt to preserve an endangered Tibetan culture. By that time, the Victorian representation of Tibetan Buddhism as degenerate, the farthest removed of all Buddhist traditions from the simple ethical philosophy of the founder, had reached its antipodes, being represented instead as a vast preserve of untranslated Buddhist texts.39

This last moment of urgency came not so much from a need for such texts but from the need for the precious and endangered oral
tradition that supplemented them, a unique oral tradition of commentary and practice which, the Tibetans claimed, could be traced back to the Buddha himself. Thus, it was necessary to establish the kind of relationship with a native scholar that Hodgson had enjoyed, a relationship with an exiled lama authenticated by both western mythologies of the fieldwork encounter and Buddhist mythologies of the oral transmission, both of which claimed primacy for the spoken word. The experience of working with a native scholar who was made to serve as both informant and guru is one which many in the current generation of scholars of Asian religions have shared. If the use of the first-person narrative form in the essay is autobiographical or anecdotal, it also provides the most effective method of representing the ambivalence of looking Janus-faced toward two myths of the text, one Tibetan, one western, and of examining how the apparently living word of the lama became, as if it were not already, inevitably subject to textualization. This expression of ambivalence is not meant to suggest some alternative interpretation of Tibetan Buddhism beyond its characterizations as polluted or pure, but rather that a rhetoric of urgency that has shaped the representation of Tibet since the eighteenth century is still very much at play.

It is necessary also to consider the belatedness of this volume, to ask why it is, for example, that an examination of the significance of Said's critique for Buddhist Studies has not occurred some fifteen years after the publication of Orientalism. An answer often proffered by Buddhologists when questions of "method" are raised is that the consideration of such questions is not yet appropriate in Buddhist Studies. This passage from Edward Conze's 1959 essay, "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies," is often cited or paraphrased: "Numerically speaking, perhaps five per cent of the Mahayana Sutras have been reliably edited, and perhaps two per cent intelligibly translated. It is clear that inferences drawn from the scanty material at our disposal must remain extremely dubious."40 That is, unlike Biblical Studies or Classics, it is argued, where the foundation texts have long ago been reliably established and repeatedly translated, only a tiny fraction of Indian Mahāyāna sūtras, not to mention the vast autochthonous Buddhist literatures of China, Korea, Japan, Tibet, and Southeast Asia, have yet to be edited.41 At such a preliminary state of knowledge, it is asked, what can be said with any confidence about Buddhism? Is it not premature, therefore, to indulge in theoretical discussions about the formation of knowledge? Do we not lack the
luxury to ponder such questions until the task of properly digesting our materials has been accomplished?

This particular vision of the Buddhologist’s task recalls “The Library of Babel,” Jorge Luis Borges’s short story about a library built of interminable levels of hexagonal galleries. Apart from the shelves of books, each level provides two small rooms, one for sleeping erect and one for the disposal of digestive waste. The Library is filled with books of identical shape, size, and length and no two books are identical:

Everything is there: the minute history of the future, the autobiographies of the archangels, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and thousands of false catalogues, a demonstration of the fallacy of these catalogues, a demonstration of the fallacy of the true catalogue, the Gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary on this gospel, the commentary on the commentary of this gospel, the veridical account of your death, a version of each book in all languages, the interpolations of every book in all books.42

The revelation that the Library contained all books was initially met with great joy, but this elation was followed by despair, when the impossible odds of finding these books was calculated; it was intolerable to ponder the fact that the Library contained such precious books but that the books would remain inaccessible. This led some to try to eliminate useless works, resulting in the loss of millions of volumes. Yet those who lamented this loss failed to remember that although each book is unique and thus irreplaceable, “there are always several hundreds of thousands of imperfect facsimiles—of works which differ only by one letter or one comma.”43 The denizens of the galleries do not understand that “the Library is a sphere whose consummate center is any hexagon, and whose circumference is inaccessible.”

It is this fantasy of the library that seems at times to obsess the study of Buddhism, as if the aim were to edit and translate every text. But the bibliophilia of the Buddhologist, no matter how deeply ingrained, cannot serve as a reason for forever deferring questions of theory or for failing to reflect on the history of the field. This bibliophilia masks a teleology. It is at the providential moment when every text has been translated and digested that the Buddhologist can then explain to the world, and to Buddhists themselves, what Buddhism really is. It is only in the imaginary moment that follows this telos, presumably, that questions of theory, secondary to the maintenance and evaluation of data, could be addressed, at the very moment when those questions would have become irrelevant.
This is the sense in which Buddhologists are “curators of the Buddha.” First, we hold positions in western institutions where we are charged with maintaining Buddhism as an object of study and scholarly inquiry, under conditions of our superintendence and control. In this capacity, Buddhologists have often assumed an almost priestly function for themselves, as curates, more qualified than the Buddhist monks and scholars of Asia for the tasks of interpretation and preservation. We thus cure Buddhism, both in the sense of caring for it, as well as in the sense of freeing it, protecting it, and preserving it from what is harmful, often portrayed as the degenerations that have occurred in the modern period, restoring it to what it was in an ill-defined classical age. But the artifact was not without its effects on its curator, and Buddhism was to play its own role, suggested by several essays in this volume, in what Robert Young has called “a form of dislocation for the West.”

The scholars in Borges’s Library spend their lives in their searches and researches until they die, often succumbing to heart failure or committing suicide, their bodies tossed over the banister, falling forever in the bottomless empty space at the center of the Library, until they dissolve in the wind, leaving no relics. Rather than dooming Buddhist Studies to such a fate, in which “the fantastic is no longer a property of the heart . . . it evolves from the accuracy of knowledge, and its treasures lie dormant in documents,” it would perhaps be preferable to conceive of our domain not as a library but as an archive. The archive is not the repository of accumulated knowledge, but instead a domain of statements, the systems of statements made in accordance with specific rules and practices. The archive is both the law of what can be said and the system of its functioning; it determines how statements “are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities,” how statements are formed and transformed, how they survive and how they are modified. The description and analysis of an archive can only occur with retrospection; it is impossible to describe our own archive because it is what provides us with the rule under which we speak.

It is within this context that the question of the past and future of Buddhist Studies must be posed. There is little to be gained in morally acknowledging an Orientalist past as something that we don’t do any anymore while looking to a future in which Bakhtin’s dialogic or some notion of the “performative” provides a panacea to a diseased legacy. The former alternative rewrites the past, the latter looks hopefully to the future, both ignore the present. Nor is it enough to claim
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that it is time to “move on,” to “get back to work”; to do so merely reproduces the positivist rhetoric of a discipline's historical progression toward a goal that has been essential to Buddhist Studies. The question is not one of purging some contamination from our knowledge so that we might understand “Buddhism” better, that (to use a Buddhist metaphor) by removing a cataract from our eye our vision of Buddhism may correspond more closely to its truth, our image gradually approximating its reality.

If the kind of cultural analysis of the history of Buddhist Studies attempted by the essays in this volume is to be judged somehow premature, it is not because we have yet to translate every text. The question upon which the judgment rests is whether or not there is available to the Buddhologist a position of sufficient retrospect from which to describe the category of Buddhology within the larger archive which has been its abode, surrounded by philology, history, religion, and area studies. If there is no such position, it may suggest that the field of Buddhist Studies and its attendant construction of Buddhism are ineluctable components of a colonial inheritance. If this be the case, the question of the relation between colonialism and Buddhist Studies will have been deferred (and hence subject to deferred revision) because of the unassimilatable consequences of such a confrontation. That is, the question will have been repressed because the visitation of the past is too devastating. It is only in this sense that raising the question of the place of Buddhist Studies in Europe’s colonial past may be not belated but premature; we may not have yet emerged from the archive sufficiently to begin to describe it.  

This volume cannot describe the archive because that archive, as the essays demonstrate, is still the locus of the articulation of our identity. The volume is, more modestly, a collection of genealogies. Here, the attempt is to produce a narrative that responds to a particular question. The aim is to historicize certain statements and practices contained in the archive, not in order to establish their authenticity but to delegitimate their present transcendental status by tracing their past effects. The essays in this volume therefore in general demur at requests to offer “alternatives,” to look forward proleptically, to assume that there can be a post-Orientalist Buddhology and sketch what it might be like.

As it was for St. Anthony, so for the Buddhologist, fantastic dreams no longer take place in sleep; “The visionary experience arises from the black and white surface of printed signs, from the closed and dusty volume that opens with a flight of forgotten words;
fantasies are carefully deployed in the hushed library, with its columns of books, with its titles aligned on shelves to form a tight enclosure, but within the confines that also liberate impossible worlds. The imaginary now resides between the book and the lamp.”52 It is from this space that these essays attempt a critique “in which both theory and detailed historical material can be inflected towards the inversion of the dominant structures of knowledge and power without simply reproducing them.”53

NOTES

1. Cited in Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680–1880, trans. Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 71. He made this point in a more restrained manner in his influential 1808 essay, Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier: “The Renaissance of antiquity promptly rejuvenated all the sciences; we might add that it rejuvenated and transformed the world. We could even say that the effects of Indic studies, if these enterprises were taken up and introduced into learned circles with the same energy today, would be no less great and far-reaching” (cited in Schwab, Oriental Renaissance, p. 13). Schlegel’s essay was by no means an unqualified glorification of ancient India. He saw in Indian thought evidence of “the rise of error” resulting from the loss of original revelation. See Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 74–81.


5. Born in 1800, Hodgson had entered the East India Company’s training school for its officers, Haileybury College in Hertfordshire, in 1816. He studied there for two years, winning prizes in classics, Bengali, and political economy (from Malthus), before being sent to Calcutta to continue his education at the East India Company’s College of Fort William. There he studied Persian and Sanskrit for two years before a liver ailment forced him to leave Calcutta and take a hill-station appointment in Kumaon, where he assessed land taxes on the cultivated Himalayan hillsides. In 1820, he was appointed to the post of Assistant Resident at the Court of Nepal. He also
served as director of the Post Office before being promoted to the rank of Resident in 1833, a position he held until his retirement from the Indian service in 1843. His term is remembered for his success at frustrating attempts by the Court of Nepal to establish alliances with the so-called Native States of India (such as Jodhpur, Hyderabad, Udaipur, and the Sikhs) against the British and for thwarting those factions at the court who counseled war with the British. He is also credited with being the first to suggest that the Gurkhas be incorporated into the British army. For an adoring biography of Hodgson, see William Wilson Hunter, *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson, British Resident at the Court of Nepal* (London: 1896; reprint New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1991).


7. He writes, “[I]t is sufficient happiness for me to have discovered and placed within the reach of my countrymen the materials for more accurate investigation, by those who have the leisure, patience, and knowledge of languages for the undertaking; and who, with competent talents, will be kind enough to afford the world the benefit of so irksome an exercise of them.” See “A Sketch of Buddhism, derived form the Bauddha Writings of Nepal,” p. 65. He remarks elsewhere, “I had no purpose, nor have I, to meddle with the interminable sheer absurdities of the Bauddha philosophy or religion.” See Brian H. Hodgson, “European Speculation on Buddhism” in *Essays on the Languages, Literature, and Religion of Nepal and Tibet,* p. 99.

8. He writes:

Such insidious injustice compels me to avow in the face of the world my conviction that, whatever the Chinese and Mongolian works on Buddhism possessed by the French Savans may contain, no intelligible views were thence derived of the general subject before my essays appeared, or could have afterwards, but for the lights those essays afforded. I had access to the original Sanskrit scriptures of the Buddhists, and they were interpreted to me by learned natives, whose hopes hereafter depended upon a just understanding of their contents. No wonder, therefore, and little merit, if I discovered very many things inscrutably hidden from those who were reduced to consult barbarian translations from the most refined and copious of languages upon the most subtle and interminable of topics, and who had no living oracle ever at hand to expound to them the dark signification of the written word—to guide their first steps through the most labyrinthine of human mazes.

Brian H. Hodgson, “Further Remarks on M. Rémusat’s Review of Bud-
dhism” in *Essays on the Languages, Literature, and Religion of Nepal and Tibet*, p. 110.
9. Ibid.
16. He derived two schools (which he called the Svabhāvika and the Aśāvādika) from a misreading of a passage in the *Buddhacarita* in which two non-Buddhist schools are being described and derived two other schools (the Kārmika and Yātikika) by mistakenly reifying two pan-Buddhist doctrines into autonomous schools. For a discussion of Amṛṭānanda’s concoctions and their unquestioned acceptance by generations of European scholars, see David N. Gellner, “Hodgson’s Blind Alley? On the So-called Schools of Nepalese Buddhism,” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 13, no. 1 (1989): 7–19. Hodgson was aware that Amṛṭānanda had heuristically devised these schools and that they were not to be found by name in the Buddhist treatises. He was not, however, aware of his friend’s error: “In making these extracts we ought to reach the leading doctrines, and therein I think we succeeded.” See Brian H. Hodgson, “On the Languages, Literatures, and Religion of Nepaul and Tibet,” in *Essays on the Languages, Literature, and Religion of Nepal and Tibet*, p. 23, note.

Sanskrit scholars resident in India enjoy considerable advantages over those who devote themselves to the study of the ancient literature of the Brahmans in this country, or in France and Germany. . . . [T]here are few large towns in which we do not meet with some more or less learned natives. . . . These men, who formerly lived on the liberality of the Rajahs and on the superstition of the people, find it more and more difficult to make a living among their own countrymen, and are glad to be employed by any civilian or officier who takes an interest in their ancient lore. Though not scholars in our sense of the word, and therefore of little use as teachers of the language, they are extremely useful to more advanced students, who are able to set them to do that kind of work for which they are fit, and to check their labors by judicious supervision. All our great Sanskrit scholars, from Sir William Jones to H. H. Wilson, have fully acknowledged their obligations to their native assistants. They used to work in Calcutta, Be-
nares, and Bombay with a pandit at each elbow, instead of the grammar and dictionary which European scholars have to consult at every difficult passage. In fact, if it had not been for the assistance thus fully and freely rendered by native scholars, Sanskrit scholarship would never have made the rapid progress which, during less than a century, it has made, not only in India, but in almost every country in Europe.

See Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, 1:115–16.


23. On the later forms of Buddhism, Rhys Davids wrote, “But each of these beliefs breathes more or less of the spirit of the system out of which they all alike have grown, and most interesting it is to trace the causes which have produced out of it such different results” (*The History and Literature of Buddhism*, p. 126).


25. The term “Hindu” is derived from the Persian word for the Indus River. It was eventually used by Muslims to refer to the people of South Asia in general, and those South Asians who did not convert to Islam in particular. The term “Hinduism” only gained currency in the nineteenth century among the colonial British, who used it to refer to the religion of those Indians who were not Muslims, Jains, Parsis, or Christians. Only later did “Hindus” come to use the term to describe their religion.

26. See Gregory Schopen, “Archeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism,” *History of Religions* 31 (1991): 1–23. It is important to note that the current President of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, David Seyfort Ruegg, has recently written, “Buddhism is not only philosophy and/or religion, at least in the narrow senses of these terms, but also a way of living and being, a cultural and value system permitting Buddhists in vast areas of the world to construct so much of their mundane as well as spiritual lives.” See David Seyfort Ruegg, “Presidential Address: Some Observations on the Present and Future of Buddhist Studies,”
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 15, no. 1 (1992): 104. In the same address, Ruegg notes that “Orientalism and with it our own discipline, when not in a phase of antiquarianism and a rather unre- flective positivism, seem quite often to have found themselves being buffeted between exoticism and attempts at ‘relevance’ motivated either by sheer fashion or by considerations of trade and commerce with Asia” (p. 109).


30. In the case of Tibet, on the other hand, Buddhism has generally been represented as inseparable (if not identical) with Tibetan culture, a view often propounded by spokespersons for Tibetan culture, both ancient and modern. Although scholars of Buddhism have only recently begun to consider questions of the production and circulation of the texts they study, much has been learned about Buddhist practice from the work of anthropologists, especially those working in Southeast Asian societies. (One thinks immediately of the work of Stanley J. Tambiah.) Nonetheless, the work of such anthropologists has often been criticized by Buddhologists because of the anthropologists’ ignorance of classical Buddhist languages and of the doctrinal correlates of the practices they observe in the field. See, e.g., the exchange between Richard Gombrich (one of the few textual scholars of Buddhism to also do fieldwork) and Stanley Tambiah occasioned by Gombrich’s review of Tambiah’s The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), published in The Times Literary Supplement, no. 4278 (March 29, 1985), pp. 359-60.

31. This phrase is drawn from the first sentence of the “Constitution and By-Laws of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.”


33. As Ronald Inden writes, “The Ottoman was a dangerous Alter Ego of the European. His religion, Islam, was a false, fanatical cousin of Christianity and he continued to rule over parts of Eastern Europe. But the Chinaman and the Hindoo were the true Others.” See his “Orientalist Con- structions of India,” p. 424.


35. The most sophisticated of these critiques, in addition to noting Said’s essentializing of “Europe” and “the west,” call attention to his aban- donment late in the book of a Foucauldian critique of representation in favor of a High Humanism and a privileging of the category of experience, from which, for example, he chastises historians of Islam for failing to examine,
“its existential reality in the experience of its adherents.” Said writes also of how Orientalism “failed to identify with human experience,” and calls for the cultivation of the (very Buddhist) virtues of “the spiritual detachment and generosity necessary for true vision” (Orientalism, pp. 299, 328, 259). Useful critiques of Said’s descent into humanism are to be found in Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, pp. 255–76; Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 119–140; and Ahmad, In Theory, pp. 159–219.

36. Ahmad, In Theory, p. 172. It should be noted that Said takes up some of these issues in his more recent Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993). Sara Suleri makes a point similar to Ahmad’s when she argues that “this critical field would be better served if it sought to break down the fixity of the dividing lines between domination and subordination, and if it further questioned the psychic disempowerment signified by colonial encounter.” See her The Rhetoric of English India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 4. One might also note here Rhys Davids’s triumphant prophecy of 1895, “And I venture to think that the publication and translation of the Buddhist texts may possibly have no little influence among the more cultured of those Eastern peoples, who still call themselves Buddhists although they have wandered, in many respects, so far from the ancient faith.” See Rhys Davids, The History and Literature of Buddhism, p. 143. He goes on to say, “When Japanese students, for instance, come to our Western colleges and learn there to read their Pali and Sanskrit books under the guidance of professors trained in historical criticism, it is almost impossible that they can return to their country without the accuracy of their knowledge being greatly improved, and their ideas of Buddhism, to some extent at least, corrected and modified.”


38. There are scores of other reflections in the jewels of this Indra’s net, whose skein is yet to be carefully mapped, such as the role of the Theosophical Society in the popularization of Buddhism in the west; the role of British colonial rule in the origins of the vipassana movement in late nineteenth-century Burma; the deployment of the category “science” in late colonial Buddhist discourse; the work of German Buddhologists who (to use the anthropologist’s term) had “gone over the hill,” such a Nyanaponika Thera and Lama Govinda; the various agendas which the enterprise called “comparative philosophy” has been meant to serve; the influence of modern Japanese Buddhologists, often Zen and Pure Land priests trained in “western methods,” on contemporary European and North American scholarship; the conditions leading to the classification of Buddhism as a “world religion”; and the wedding of nineteenth-century missionary theory and the ideology of humanism in the present day “Buddhist-Christian dialogue.”

39. The Tibetans’ bibliophilia was something that had been evident even to Hodgson as he observed Tibetan pilgrims in Kathmandu. He expressed his surprise:

that literature of any kind should be so common in such a region as Tibet; and that it
should be so widely diffused as to reach persons covered with filth and possessed of not one of those grand luxuries which, at least in our ideas, go before the great luxury of books.

Printing is probably the chief cause of this great diffusion of books [in Tibet], nor can I account for it unless by supposing that the hordes of priests, secular and regular, with which the country swarms have been driven by the tedium of their life to these admirable uses of their time.


41. In 1974, J. W. de Jong wrote, “Buddhist studies, of course, embrace much more than philology but philology is of basic importance. Once texts have been properly edited, interpreted and translated it will become possible to study the development of religious and philosophical ideas.” See de Jong, *A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America*, p. 86.


43. Ibid., p. 85.

44. He goes on to observe, “If Orientalism involves a science of inclusion and incorporation of the East by the West, then that inclusion produces its own disruption: the creation of the Orient, if it does not really represent the East, signifies the West’s own dislocation from itself, something inside that is presented, narrativized, as being outside. . . . The Orient, we might say, operates as both poison and cure for Europe: it constitutes both the greatest threat to European civilization at the same time as it represents a therapeutic for the lost spiritual values of the West, offering hope for the regeneration of Europe by Asia” (Young, *White Mythologies*, pp. 139–40).


47. Ibid., p. 129.

48. For Foucault, the description of the archive, “deploys its possibilities (and the mastery of its possibilities) on the basis of the very discourses that have just ceased to be ours; its threshold of existence is established by the discontinuity that separates us from what we can no longer say, and from that which falls outside our discursive practice” (ibid., pp. 130–31).

49. The description of the archive, according to Foucault, “deprives us of our continuities; it dissipates that temporal identity in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish to exorcise the discontinuities of history; it breaks the thread of transcendental teleologies” (ibid., p. 131).

50. For Foucault, a genealogy is “a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness

51. Said, in his catalogue of the five attributes of Orientalist representation, says that one function of Orientalists is to provide their society “with what, at that moment, it seems most in need of.” See Said, *Orientalism*, p. 273.

It does not matter whether one generation applauds the previous generation or hisses it—in either event, it carries the previous generation within itself.

José Ortega y Gasset

1 Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravāda Buddhism

Charles Hallisey

My title alludes to an essay by Edward Said in which he engaged “in a useful exercise, by which one delineates the critical field in order to propose changes in it or lacks in it.” In a fundamental way, Said’s Orientalism was a similar exercise concerned as it was with the necessity for members of an academic community to struggle constantly for critical distance on their own work. As Said warned at the end of Orientalism, “Trouble sets in when the guild tradition of Orientalism [or any academic field] takes over the scholar who is not vigilant, whose individual consciousness as a scholar is not on guard against idées reçues all too easily handed down in the profession” (p. 326).

Trouble can set in even for those of us who seek to extend the insights of Orientalism; it is all too easy to reproduce unwittingly a kind of “latent Orientalism” as can be seen in Philip Almond’s The British Discovery of Buddhism. As if he were taking as his premise Said’s trenchant comment that if “Orientalism makes sense at all [it] depends more on the West than on the Orient,” Almond builds on Said’s basic argument that Orientalist discourse is a system of representations which is primarily embedded in European culture. But
Almond's own careful analysis of the emergence of this discourse leads him to move beyond the "principles" of Orientalism to the "many concerns of the Victorian age":

Victorian interpretations of Buddhism, whether of its founder, its doctrines, its ethics, its social practices, or its truth and value, in constructing Buddhism, reveal the world in which such constructing took place. . . . Discourse about Buddhism provides a mirror in which is reflected an image not only of the Orient, but of the Victorian world also.

It is worth noting, however, that while Almond refers to an image of the Orient, he makes no attempt to reconstruct Buddhist thought and practice in nineteenth-century Asia. Although this omission would seem to make good sense for a project concerned with "the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient," it has the unintended consequence of once again hypostatizing and reifying an absolute divide between "the West" and "the Orient"—a basic premise of Orientalist constructions of knowledge—by proceeding as if a genealogy of the West's account of Buddhism could be made without any reference to the people and places from which it is imagined to emanate. Moreover, this omission has the ironic effect of once more denying any voice to "Orientals" in the Western apprehension of what they are about even as it makes us more aware of the historicity of our concepts of Buddhism.

Said himself was uneasy about positing an absolute divide between the West and the Orient, as is clear at the end of Orientalism when he reiterates a question that runs throughout his book: "Is the notion of the distinct culture (or race, or religion, or civilization) a useful one?"

The notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically "different" inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is . . . a highly debatable idea.

Said indicated which side of this debate he was on by showing that it is impossible to define the modern West without reference to the Orient. Referring to the work of Raymond Schwab, he says that "his thesis in La Renaissance orientale is a simple one: Romanticism cannot be understood unless some account is taken of the great textual and linguistic discoveries made about the Orient during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." Said's suggestions of this sort can help us to see that his basic concern is, as James Clifford has
noted, "not so much to undermine the notion of a substantial Orient as it is to make problematic "the Occident." This rearrangement of received notions about the constitution of the modern West has been continued by many others in recent years, and "detailing the process by which the West became itself by confronting the Rest is one of the . . . important steps forward in postorientalist intellectual history." But although significant progress has been made in displaying how the self-image of the West in the nineteenth century depended on projecting onto others the negation or inversion of what was taken to be distinctive of "European-ness," this line of inquiry can still paradoxically leave the West-Orient divide in place as a paradigm instead of problematizing it or removing it altogether.

Where can we begin to develop more nuanced accounts of the interaction between Europeans and non-Europeans, ones which are able to avoid a Manichaean division between East and West and remind us that cultures are not only different but also connected? One way of at least making space for accounts of this kind is to show the heterogeneity of interests within those communities called "Europe" and "the Orient" as they encountered each other, and especially among Orientalists themselves.

We might also address our task more directly and look for relations between "the West" and "the Orient" that are not characterized by negation or inversion, but instead seem to represent a kind of "intercultural mimesis." That is, we should consider occasions where it seems that aspects of a culture of a subjectified people influenced the investigator to represent that culture in a certain manner. Such an exercise would not challenge but rather would nuance Said's argument that the links between knowledge and inequalities of power provided some basic conditions of Orientalist discourse.

In the rest of this chapter I will explore some diverse examples of this kind of "intercultural mimesis." It can be found in the work of T. W. Rhys Davids, whose career as a student of Buddhism represents a crucial stage in the study of Buddhism in Europe, but in order to recognize it we will also have to examine the work of some lesser-known contemporaries of Rhys Davids: R. Spence Hardy, Paul Bigandet, and Adhémard Leclère. An awareness of these patterns of mimesis not only will help us to appreciate critically the legacy of Orientalism inherited by contemporary students of Buddhism, but will also suggest a strategy, from within that legacy, for passing beyond it. We will see that a road rarely, if at all, taken in the study of Theravāda Buddhism is indeed a viable option for us.
T. W. Rhys Davids and the Biography of the Buddha

The name of T. W. Rhys Davids (1843–1922) is well known to all students of Buddhism. This “great orientalist,” according to Richard Gombrich, “did more than anyone else to introduce [Buddhism] to the English-speaking public, influencing even English-speaking Sinhalese Buddhists,” and thus “serious students of Buddhism will never allow [his] name to die.” But Rhys Davids is not only a figure of historical interest. He is what Said calls an “inaugural hero,” someone who “carved . . . out a field of study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for general prestige.” And as an inaugural hero, Rhys Davids has recently been subjected to scorn for promulgating a “Pali Text Society mentality” which “essentialized Buddhism in terms of its ‘pristine’ teachings.” Still, we cannot ignore the fact that he produced tools, such as a Pali-English Dictionary and editions of Pali texts, which remain to this day unsurpassed and indispensable for research. His efforts resulted in the creation of institutions, such as the Pali Text Society and the School of Oriental and African Studies, from which all students of Buddhism still benefit, either directly or indirectly. Moreover, many of his ideas continue to be reproduced unacknowledged in the writings of others, an indication of the extent to which his ideas have been naturalized within the tradition of Buddhist Studies.

Among Rhys Davids’s lesser writings are two encyclopedia entries, “Buddhism” and “Buddha,” which he wrote for the Encyclopaedia Britannica at different points in his scholarly career. They are among his more minor and ephemeral writings, and their specific contents are of little interest to us here. They are still useful to us, however, because by the nature of their genre, they give an indication of the scholarly resources available to Rhys Davids at the time they were written, and it is these resources which will draw our attention to an aspect of Rhys Davids’s practice as a scholar in which we can see an instance of intercultural mimesis.

In his first entry on “Buddhism,” written in 1876, Rhys Davids was limited to four “authorities on the life of Buddha,” which he could recommend to his readers. These were R. Spence Hardy’s A Manual of Buddhism, which collected biographical narratives drawn from medieval Sinhala literature; Bishop P. Bigandet’s The Life or Legend of Gaudama the Buddha of the Burmese, a translation of an early modern Burmese text; Fausboll’s edition of the Pali biography
found in the Jātaka commentary from the fifth century C.E.; and Foucaux's French translation of a Tibetan translation of the Lalitavistara, a Sanskrit text composed early in the common era. By the time Rhys Davids revised this entry a quarter of a century later, European students of Buddhism had gathered enough material that Rhys Davids was able to add a second entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which focused on the life of the Buddha alone. The difference between the two entries, however, is not only the quantity of sources available but the interpretative frameworks in which Rhys Davids ordered his sources. In the first entry, two of the four sources were in vernacular languages, Sinhala and Burmese, and two were in the “classical” languages of Pali and Sanskrit. By the time of the second entry in 1910, the number of resources in the classical languages had increased dramatically. This was especially true of the canonical Pali sources which were of unique importance to Rhys Davids. In addition, he was also to make use of the Mahāvastu and Buddhacarita, two Sanskrit sources, as well as Rockhill's translations from the Tibetan (which themselves were almost exclusively translations from Sanskrit) in The Life of the Buddha. In contrast, the resources from vernacular languages had hardly increased at all and Rhys Davids only added Adhēmard Leclère's French translation of the Khmer text Pathama Sambodhian in Livres sacrés du Cambodge to his bibliographies. Unlike the earlier entry, where no distinctions were made among the four works cited, in the later article, Rhys Davids created two distinct categories: one for “modern works,” which grouped Leclère and Rockwell together with Hardy and Bigandet, and a second for the accounts of the life of the Buddha, which he considered more authoritative. The assumptions behind this distinction are clear in the contents of the entry: Rhys Davids limited his attention to the numerous, albeit fragmentary, accounts of the Buddha’s life in the Pali canon which had been edited and published in the meantime by the Pali Text Society. This approach to the biography of the Buddha is an aspect of Rhys Davids's scholarship for which he is still remembered, although it is taken as an approach appreciated more for historical interest, and most students of Buddhism are confident that they have moved beyond it.

In one respect, however, there is a remarkable unanimity between Rhys Davids’s approach to the biography of the Buddha and current scholarly consensus. A student interested in the Buddha's biography today is in a better position than Rhys Davids to consider its early development, having the benefit of research by scholars as diverse as E. J. Thomas, Jean Filliozat, Alfred Foucher, Erich
Frauwallner, Étienne Lamotte, and André Bareau. Furthermore, the field of Buddhist Studies has collectively benefited from the discussions which have surrounded the work of such scholars, just as it is currently benefiting from exchanges on the date of the historical Buddha—a direct product of that earlier scholarship. But with respect to later biographies of the Buddha, especially those written in the vernacular languages of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, the contemporary student of Theravāda Buddhism has no more access to translations eighty years later than did Rhys Davids.

This neglect of texts written in vernacular languages as sources for the study of Theravāda Buddhism can be explained in a number of ways. The most immediate explanation comes from Rhys Davids himself. Indeed, indifference to vernacular literature seems a natural consequence of Rhys Davids’s approach to the study of the biographies of the Buddha:

[The vernacular texts] are not historical biographies. Milton’s Paradise Regained is of value not for what it tells us about the life of its hero, but for the literary ability with which it has recast a story derived entirely from older documents. The historical value of those documents must be determined by a criticism which will, of course, take no notice of the later poetical version. A corresponding argument ought to hold good with respect to these Pali and Sanskrit poems, and a fortiori with respect to the Chinese and Tibetan reproductions of the Sanskrit ones. They are literary not historical documents, and such historical value as they have is the very instructive way in which they show how far the older beliefs about the life of the Buddha had been, at the time when these books were composed, developed (or rather corrupted) by the inevitable hero-worship of the followers of his religion.

The approach outlined here, with its split between older and later sources and its positivist concerns for origins, is typical of the historicism which permeated almost all nineteenth-century scholarship in Europe and North America. This historicism aimed to rescue texts from conditions of misunderstanding and reveal their objective meaning for the first time by applying the critical methods of "scientific history" which could disclose the intentions of their author. Thus, knowing the biography of the Buddha was an essential part of any attempt to understand Buddhist texts which were attributed to him. The historian using this historicist approach could safely ignore the later biographies written in Sinhala, Burmese, or Khmer because they could—self-evidently—contribute little to any effort to uncover the origins of Buddhism. It was obvious to everyone that, as Rhys Davids wrote, “the only proper course is to go back, behind these
later . . . documents, to the actual text of the Three Pitakas themselves, to collect there whatever is said incidentally about the life, family, and personal surroundings of the Buddha, and to piece them together into a connected whole.” Once this was done, the “objective” meaning of the later biographies would also be clear: common and all-too-common expressions of hero worship.\(^{34}\)

It is worth keeping in mind that there is nothing particularly “Orientalist” about this historicist approach, although it is obvious that it did assume political significance in the colonial contexts in which it was pursued. But we can also see in Rhys Davids’s statement the kind of cultural hegemony which was always an absolute presupposition of Orientalism. As Said said, “In a quite constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand.”\(^{35}\) Buddhist biographies of the Buddha thus were never taken as examples of common interests between Buddhist and European scholars. Instead they were always distinguished from European biographies and turned into evidence of the inability of later Buddhist communities to know the facts of their own origins. George Coedès, for example, traced the existence of the unusually full biography of the Buddha found in a text composed in Thailand to the likelihood that because the “Buddhist peoples of Indochina [are] perhaps less familiar with the Scriptures and their biographical facts, [they] seem to be particularly interested in complete biographies of the Buddha.”\(^{36}\) It would seem that if we changed the subject of Coedès’s sentence from “Buddhist peoples of Indochina” to “European scholars,” the sentence would remain equally cogent.

The historicist approach advocated by Rhys Davids is also shaped by another general process which definitively shaped the study of Buddhism in particular and Orientalism in general throughout the nineteenth century. Building on Said’s notion of “textual attitude,” Almond has described this process as “textualization” in which “the essence of Buddhism came to be seen as expressed not ‘out there’ in the Orient, but in the West through the control of Buddhism’s own textual past.”\(^{37}\) This process of textualization confirmed the claims of Rhys Davids’s historicist approach to the biography of the Buddha: an objective biography of the Buddha was something that the Buddhist communities themselves lacked, and were unable to recover for themselves, but European scholars could reconstruct this biography through their textual scholarship. Europeans were thus able to lay claim to the life of “the founder,” and
hence, in their eyes, to the very origins of the religion. Their apparent success in this task reinforced their impression that the Buddhism they saw around them was the result of a long process of decay.

Asian Assumptions in European Minds

After Said's Orientalism, any interpretation of Rhys Davids's approach to the life of the Buddha as exemplifying nineteenth-century historiography may seem to obfuscate more than it illuminates, but there is benefit to limiting any further Orientalist critique of Rhys Davids. Indeed, an Orientalist critique also obfuscates and prevents us from recognizing the impact that Buddhist texts had on his representations of Buddhism. We will be able to delineate one aspect of this impact more clearly if we look more carefully at the sources which Rhys Davids recommended in his second Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on "Buddha." Among those, we will only consider the three modern sources from the Theravāda Buddhist tradition which he recommended, setting aside Rockwell's translations from the Tibetan, which Rhys Davids also included in his category "modern sources." I omit the latter book here for only the most superficial of reasons, on the grounds that it represents material from Tibet and not from the Theravādin world, yet its inclusion among Rhys Davids's modern sources raises an important point. As we will soon see, the other books included in Rhys Davids's modern sources are, like Rockwell's Tibetan tales, translations of translations. Translation was an ever-present cultural practice in South Asian Buddhism, with material constantly flowing between various languages for various reasons. Yet when Rhys Davids groups, without distinction, material using a highly artificial literary Tibetan (which was employed largely for the purposes of translating Sanskrit texts) with material from Khmer (which stays closer to ordinary speech for the purposes of preaching), he obscures the specifics of translation as a cultural practice within the various Buddhist communities. Instead he merely assumes a dichotomy between classical and vernacular texts—perhaps reflecting the distinction between "the classics" and "modern languages" found in university curricula since the nineteenth century—which has no exact counterpart in Buddhist history. Obviously, this distinction should not be taken for granted in the interpretation of Buddhist cultural history, but as we shall see below, it does point to an alternative road for our studies of Buddhism.

Rhys Davids's other modern translators all had extensive expo-
sure to Theravāda Buddhism in situ. R. Spence Hardy (1803–68), who was included in the bibliography in both of Rhys Davids’s entries for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, served as a “Wesleyan” missionary in Sri Lanka and played an important role in missionary efforts to “disestablish” Buddhism. After his return to England, he published two anthologies of selections from medieval and early modern Sinhala literature. Although he presented his books as mere translations from various Sinhala texts, in effect, he created new works with no real counterparts in the Sinhala Buddhist literary tradition. His anthologies were arranged by topic, with chapters on cosmology and the “various orders of sentient existence” preceding material about the Buddha. As one would expect given the general nineteenth-century interest in the origins of Buddhism, Hardy includes a biography of the Buddha in his Manual. But in contrast to Rhys Davids’s attempt to reconstruct the life of the historical Buddha, Hardy’s Manual begins with accounts of previous buddhas, then proceeds to a narration of the Buddha’s previous births, followed by a biography of Gotama from his birth to death. Hardy also included biographical narratives about “the dignity, virtues, and powers of Buddha” although they clearly offended his sensibilities. He justified their inclusion on the grounds that even though they did not add any worthwhile information about the Buddha, they illustrated the workings of “the mind of heathendom.” Such comments make Hardy’s hostility to Buddhism only too obvious, and consequently his work has received if not continuing criticism then what is thought to be a well-deserved neglect.

Despite the apparent liberties that Hardy took in choosing his material, selecting from a variety of texts rather than translating just one, his collection roughly imitates the manner in which his sources treated their sources: Hardy generally used medieval Sinhala translations of older Pali commentaries which also freely chose material from diverse texts to create new compositions. Moreover, his emphasis on cosmography in the Buddha-biography mirrors the central place it occupied in traditional Theravāda Buddhism. In this respect, Hardy’s biography contrasts sharply with modern introductions to Theravādin thought which are notable in comparison with medieval literature for their absence of any discussion of cosmology. While his presentation of the biography of the Buddha mirrors traditional material quite closely too, Hardy’s biography is dissimilar in that he cobbled together a sequential biography that was absent in the Sinhala compilations. The Sinhala texts clearly assume a relatively consistent biographical structure, but they also rearrange the
biographical material for a variety of purposes. Rather than noting these purposes, however, Hardy felt frustration:

I have not met with any eastern work that is exclusively confined to the biography of Gotama, or that professes to present it in its completeness. The incidents of his early life are repeated again and again, in nearly the same order, and with little variety of expression; but after he has assumed the high office of Budha [sic], the consecutiveness of the narrative ceases; and in the arrangement of the preceding legends, I have had to exercise my own judgment as to the order in which they ought to appear.\(^{46}\)

We can see in this passage something of Hardy’s divided loyalties. He clearly wanted his work to find acceptance among scholars like Rhys Davids and thus he was willing to try to arrange the Sinhala material in a manner that might match some of the conventions of biography in nineteenth-century Europe, such as narrative sequence. But he apparently was unwilling to go as far as Rhys Davids and abandon the structure of the Sinhala texts altogether, and as a result, we see more of the imprint of Hardy’s sources in his work than we do in the work of Rhys Davids.

Another of Rhys Davids’s modern sources was the *Life of Gaudama* by Paul Bigandet (1813–94), the Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.\(^{47}\) As Hardy did with his Sinhala materials, Bigandet seems to have followed the creative example of the Burmese sources in his translations more than he adhered to their contents. Bigandet’s *Life of Gaudama* is a more structured biography than Hardy’s *Manual*, which never became more than an anthology. This reflects an important difference between Buddhist literary patterns in Sri Lanka and those in Burma. Complete—or extended—biographies of the Buddha were composed in Burma and the rest of Southeast Asia from the late medieval period onwards in both Pali and different vernaculars.\(^{48}\) In 1858, Bigandet translated and published one example of these complete biographies, the *Malālankāravatthu* (“The Collection [of Stories that is] like an Ornament of Garlands”), which was popular in nineteenth-century Burma, under the title *Life or Legend of Gaudama the Buddha of the Burmese*.\(^{49}\) He published a second edition of it in 1866, although this time he actually created a new composite text by incorporating portions of another Burmese biographical work called the *Tathāgata-udāna* (“The Praise of the Lord”) or *Tathāgata-udānadīpani* (“The Lamp on the Praise of the Lord”).\(^{50}\) In this, Bigandet effectively mirrored the style of the Burmese texts that he translated, insofar as both he and they created new works in the guise of translation.\(^{51}\)

Adhémard Leclère (1853–1917),\(^{52}\) an administrator in the
French protectorate of Cambodia who rose to the position of “Résident de France” at Kratie, seems to have been more alert than Bigandet to the liberties that translators might take with their sources. This awareness stemmed from his recognition that the text which he translated, the *Prêas Pathama Samphothian*, was apparently a Khmer version of a text which existed in Thai, the *Pathama-Sambodhiyah*, and which had already been translated by Henry Alabaster. Referring to the monks who produced Burmese and Thai biographies of the Buddha as “*adaptateurs*,” he praised the Cambodian “*traducteur*” who “followed the original more closely for the facts, and [unlike the Burmese and Siamese authors] put in his translation the least he could of himself and nothing of his literature.” Here too, Leclère seems to have been inspired by the sources he translated, for he claimed to have followed the Khmer original as closely as possible, retaining even what he saw as its defects, saying, “I wanted to be as exact, as impersonal as possible in this translation.” But in saying this, Leclère may have been addressing a problem which he shared with Hardy and Bigandet as a researcher seeking a place in the larger field of Orientalism.

It is important to remember that Hardy, Bigandet, and Leclère all worked as students of Buddhism in a context in which research in Oriental Studies, like other academic fields, had already been rigorously organized in a manner which left little room for “*amateurs*.” We can see the pressures on them as outsiders to the university-based guild in their ready apologies for the limitations of their work, and in the reviews of their publications by academics. In such a context, it was necessary for researchers like Hardy, Bigandet, and Leclère to find a way of legitimating their work and giving it some authority within this professionalized context. One way that all three did this was to stress the close relation of their own work to the originals which they were translating. As Leclère did when he spoke of his desire to remain impersonal in his translation, Hardy hid his presence as an author when he spoke of his translation work:

In confining myself, almost exclusively, to translation, I have chosen the humblest form in which to re-appear as an author. I might have written an extended essay upon the system, as it presents a rich mine, comparatively unexplored; or have attempted to make the subject popular, by leaving out its extravagances, and weaving its more interesting portions into a continuous narrative; but neither of these modes would have fulfilled my intention. They would have enabled me only to give expression to an opinion; when I wish to present an authority.
It is striking, however, that this rhetorical strategy of authorial transparency was one that was found in the texts which these European scholars translated. Each of the vernacular texts translated by Hardy, Bigandet, and Leclère portrays itself as a translation of another text, their authors employing strategies to attract legitimacy by association with a decentered authority that are identical to those which the Europeans later used. For example, the Saddharmaratnāvaliya ("Garland of Jewels of the Doctrine"), a fourteenth-century Sinhala narrative collection based on the Dhammapada commentary, begins with a similar claim to authorial transparency and decentered authority:

We have abandoned the Pali method and taken only the themes in composing this work. It may have faults and stylistic short-comings, but (you the reader should) ignore them. Be like swans who separate milk from water even though the milk and water be mixed together, or like those who acquire learning and skills even from a teacher of low caste, because it is only acquisition of knowledge not the teacher's status with which they are concerned.59

The author of the above quotation is clearly implying that the authority of a translation comes not from itself, but from the relation claimed to an absent text. Attention is thus deflected to this absent work but, at the same time, the accuracy of this relationship cannot usually be verified by those who find it necessary to use the translation. This of course could be exploited, as in the case of Buddhist texts composed in Chinese which present themselves as translations from the Sanskrit.60

But because the translations claim authority by suggesting or displaying a relation to an absent text, the student of Buddhism following the approach we have already seen with Rhys Davids naturally begins to look for the original which can legitimate these claims. I have already quoted a statement by Leclère which exemplifies this expectation, but when read in context it shows as well that he assumes a posture of someone who has no automatic right to speak as a scholar within the professional field of Orientalism:

It is now necessary to say my feeling, I do not say my opinion, on the source from which the Cambodians have derived this text. It seems to me that it is Pali, Sinhalese, the same one that inspired the Burmese and Siamese adaptateurs, but that the Cambodian traducteur—always summarizing, more than the Burmese and the Siamese—followed the original more closely for the facts, and put in his translation the least he could of himself and nothing of his literature. . . . There are some small details which are found in the Burmese text and not elsewhere which indicate a common source. But what is the text which the Burmese, Cambodian, and Siamese translators have
adapted? That I cannot say. That is for a specialist who is capable of indicating the first sources of this vast propaganda which extends throughout all of Indianized Southeast Asia [l'Indo-Chine aryenne].

We can interpret such comments as further evidence of the reigning paradigm of positivist historiography which consistently privileged earlier texts in all studies of culture in the nineteenth century. At the same time we should also keep in mind that Theravāda Buddhists themselves subscribed, at least at times, to a similar “metaphysics of origins.” This conception of tradition, historicist in its own way, provided the ideological context for the most common genres in Theravādin literature (commentaries, translations, and anthologies), all of which tended to claim authority and purpose from other texts, usually those known by the generic name “Pāli.” In this view, commentaries and translations were not the record of the growing understanding of a text, of the accumulation of evolving interpretation over the centuries; instead they were signposts for those in the present to recover accurately the meaning that had already been promulgated in the past. They were instrumentally valuable, but were without interest in their own right.

This suggests that there was something like a productive “elective affinity” between the positivist historiography of European Orientalism and Buddhist styles of self-representation. Most importantly for our understanding of Buddhist Studies as a product of Orientalism, this elective affinity shaped the manner in which research in Buddhist Studies “became a regular activity [in which] there was a regulated exchange of information, and agreement on what the problems were as well as consensus on the appropriate paradigms for research and its results.” Originally, and of necessity, European pioneers in the field had imitated traditional Buddhist pedagogical patterns in their investigations, and used vernacular commentarial literature as an aid and guide to the meanings of the more authoritative canonical texts. For example, Eugène Burnouf, “the brilliant founder of the study of Buddhism,” left at his death a number of massive studies of Burmese commentarial texts (nissaya) which he had used as aids in his researches on Pali material. In this he was not unusual. The use of vernacular commentarial material was routine for the first generations of students of Buddhism. This included Rhys Davids, who used the knowledge of Sinhala which he gained as a colonial civil servant in Sri Lanka throughout his career in his translations from Pali. For instance, in the footnotes to his translations of the Questions of King Milinda and the Dialogues of the Buddha, we see
evidence of his use of Sinhala translations for assistance in deciphering a difficult passage in the Pali. But, perhaps most importantly, the self-presentation of these commentaries and translations, in which attention is drawn away from the present to the past, encourages their users to approach them as provisional entrées to the “more authoritative” texts of the Pali canon.

The effects of this elective affinity fell quickly into place, as can be seen in almost every program of Buddhist Studies in European and North American universities. The study of the Theravāda became equated with the study of the Pali canon, and it is still common for a student to finish a graduate program in Buddhist Studies without ever having read a Theravādin commentarial text.

It was scholars like Bigandet and Leclère who, recognizing their second-class status among Orientalists as students of vernacular texts, began to articulate a paradigm for research which made commentaries and translations into proper subjects for study. Bigandet, for example, said that:

the surest way perhaps of coming to at least an exact and accurate knowledge of the history and doctrines of Buddhism would be to give a translation of the Legends of Buddha, such as they are to be met with in all countries where Buddhism has established its sway, and to accompany these translations with an exposition of the various doctrinal points, such as they are held, understood, and believed by these various nations. This has already been done by eminent Orientalists, on Thibetan, Sanscrit, Cingalese, and Chinese originals. A similar work, executed by competent persons among the Shans, Siamese, Cambodians, and Cochin Chinese, would considerably help the savants in Europe, who have assumed the difficult task of expounding the Buddhist system in its complex and multifarious forms, to give a full, general, and comprehensive view of that great religious creed with all its variations.66

Before considering the implications of this paradigm of research, let us look at another instance where it seems that a kind of intercultural mimesis again shaped Rhys Davids’s own understanding of Buddhism.

Rhys Davids and Ritual

In addition to being remembered for his approach to the study of the Buddha-biography, Rhys Davids is also well known for his portrayal of early Buddhism as being largely free of ritual. It is thus no surprise that Rhys Davids did not mention in his encyclopedia entries the translations of Buddhist ritual works available to him and his readers
at the time. The first Theravādin works to become known in Europe, however, were from various “paracanonical” anthologies of ordination texts (kammavācā). These were translated into Italian as early as 1776 and subsequently into Latin, French, German, and English. But after this initial interest in the ordination texts, which intriguingly are an example of a genre of authoritative literature without clear canonical status, very little attention has been paid to the kammavācā texts. Only recently have they received the attention they deserve as historical sources in François Bizot’s Les traditions de la pabbajja en Asie du Sud-Est.

As with Rhys Davids’s approach to the biography of the Buddha, there are a variety of ways of explaining his vision of early Buddhism as being free of ritual. One explanation relates generally to patterns in nineteenth-century European culture, one is more specifically Orientalist, and one points to aspects of nineteenth-century Buddhism itself which enabled Rhys Davids to represent Buddhism in the manner that he did. As I suggested above, the self-definition of the Modern West in the nineteenth century often involved “a play of projections, doublings, idealizations, and rejections of a complex, shifting otherness.” This complex process, which involved defining distinct cultures located spatially and making comparisons between them, did not always result “in self-congratulation or hostility and aggression.” Although inversions and negations between European and non-European cultures depended on the highly suspect assumption that basic patterns and features of human life—rationality, most notoriously—could be completely absent among particular peoples, they did sometimes provide the European observer with an opportunity to cultivate and enlarge an imagined vision of human life alternative to what was then in place in Europe. The idea of early Buddhism was used in just this way: its definition as an agnostic, rationalist, ethical movement inspired those Europeans anxious to find alternatives to religion as a foundation for morality in everyday life. Furthermore, the image of the Buddha produced by European scholarship also served as a heroic exemplar for those concerned about the proper relationship between the rational individual and received tradition. Thus, as Richard Gombrich has said, even though “Rhys Davids was an excellent scholar, . . . he naturally stressed the rationalist elements in Buddhism, because they formed the most striking contrast both to Christian, and . . . to other Indian traditions [and perhaps because] he found them the most sympathetic.”

Gombrich’s reference to other Indian traditions invites a more specifically Orientalist explanation of the exclusion of ritual from
early Buddhism. The contrast between Buddhism and Hinduism on the basis of the relative prominence of ritual mirrored an Orientalist contempt for Hindu religiousness, in which Hindu social activity was belittled as inherently irrational and politically ineffective. Moreover, Orientalist claims of having recovered a rational and practical aspect of India’s past, but one which was now absent from the present, served to justify the paternalistic imagery through which colonial rule was presented and understood.

The exclusion of ritual from early Buddhism and thus, within the essentialist assumptions of the day, from the very nature of Buddhism, was also key to Orientalist claims regarding their ability to recover the Buddha’s true message. The first texts which Europeans were given in their encounter with the Buddhist world, ritual texts for the ordination of monks, however, indicate that whoever gave those texts thought that ritual was key for understanding the Buddha’s message. The very capacity for knowledge depended on ritual preparation, and in Theravāda Buddhist communities this generally presupposed ordination. Before modern times, some of the most distinctive ideas of Buddhist thought, such as the denial of an enduring self to an individual, were not usually seen as relevant to the lives of laypeople. The Orientalist understanding of truth rested, of course, on completely different criteria. It was based on the premise that objectivity was both possible and desirable: who it was that knew something did not matter, only what was known. By emphasizing those aspects of Buddhist ideology, especially those which were polemically directed against Hindus, it was possible for Orientalists like Rhys Davids to make it appear that this rationalism was uncovered in Buddhism, rather than projected onto it. The appearances of uncovering the rationalist core of Buddhism were strategically supported by comparisons to Protestant and Catholic Christianity, always of course from the perspective of a Protestant representation of Catholicism as a degenerate form of Christianity.

There is a legacy of this contrast between Hinduism and Buddhism in the contemporary study of Buddhism. It remains typical for Buddhism in South Asia to be studied as a thing apart from the rest of the intellectual and cultural history of India, although it is becoming increasingly apparent how artificial this separation is, especially with respect to the study of ritual. Not only does all Buddhist ritual including early Buddhist ritual appear thoroughly Indian, as we see when we compare Buddhist ordination and consecration rituals with Hindu initiation rituals and image preparation ceremonies, but much of India appears very “Buddhist.” This becomes apparent when we
consider the patterns associated with worship (*pūjā*) in the various Hindu devotional movements, as well as when we consider the more philosophical ideas associated with Hindu schools of thought like Advaita Vedānta.\(^7\)

Even though it remains necessary for future research to integrate the history of Buddhism into the broader currents of South Asian history, an important truth about modern Theravāda Buddhism may be revealed by Rhys Davids's neglect of ritual in his portrayal of the religion. For it appears that Rhys Davids's representation of early Buddhism as rationalist and free of ritual was prompted not only by his own sympathies and Orientalist expectations but by the views and examples of the monks he met while in Sri Lanka, especially the Ven. Waskaduwe Subhuti and Ven. Yataramulle Unnanse. These monks served as teachers to Rhys Davids in his first studies of Pali, but they were also images for him of the ideal Buddhist monk. They were scholarly, aloof from lay life, and thus uninvolved in the rituals of the Buddhist community in which laypeople and monks commonly met. These rituals, such as life-cycle ceremonies and merit making, were ones which Rhys Davids as a layman would have been able to witness; those rituals of the monastic community in which they may have continued to participate were open only to monks. We know very little today about the details of the monastic careers of Subhuti and Yataramulle, but because of the obvious impression they made on Rhys Davids (and also on R. C. Childers, another great Pali scholar of the nineteenth century) further study of their scholarly and monastic careers is desirable. From what we do know, however, they seem to fit into the general patterns of Buddhist modernism as it emerged throughout the Theravādin world in the mid-nineteenth century.

It has become common in the study of Buddhism in Sri Lanka to assume that its modern developments are due to the impact of Western culture and Christianity. As Gananath Obeyesekere has said, “One of the fascinating problems in the history of modern Theravāda Buddhism is the manner in which the Western scholarly definition of that religion has been appropriated, albeit with a variety of modifications, by the Buddhists of Sri Lanka.” The result of this appropriation has been described as “Protestant Buddhism,” and it has been the subject of a considerable body of literature.\(^7\) Most of it has focused on the ways in which protests against the British in general and against Protestant Christian missionaries in particular assumed the characteristics of Protestant Christianity and turned into a protest against traditional Theravāda Buddhism as well.
But this explanation, rooted as it is in the circumstances of modern Sri Lankan history, seems incomplete when viewed from the perspective of events in Thailand. Developments quite similar to those which shaped modern Sinhala Buddhism also transformed Thai Buddhism, but without the element of colonial domination or a sharp confrontation between Buddhists and Christian missionaries so visible in Sri Lanka. Beginning in the eighteenth century and continuing throughout the nineteenth century, there was a radical shift in the interpretation of Buddhist thought, a process of reformation which was encouraged by leading members of the Buddhist monastic order, and supported by the authority of the Siamese throne. This reformation began after the fall of Ayutthaya as part of the restructuring of Thai society by King Rama I in what Wyatt has called a “subtle revolution”:

All of Rama I’s innovations . . . involved a change in focus that brought rational man clearly to the center of the stage of history, mentally in control of his own world through the exercise of his critical faculties. Though it was more a shift in degree than an absolute change, man began increasingly to self-consciously and critically examine the rules by which he lived and constantly gauge them against his improving understanding of the eternal truths of Buddhism.

This process of reinterpretation included a reform of the Buddhist monastic order, an insistence on strict ritual, canonical fundamentalism, and purity of ordination, and unlike in Sri Lanka, it seemed only coincident with the arrival of Westerners in Thailand. The whole process crystallized in the religious reforms instituted by King Mongkut who sought to eliminate many traditional practices in Thai Buddhism as “accretions obscuring the true message of Buddhism.” Mongkut’s vision of “true Buddhism” “entailed a shift from viewing the world in cosmological terms to viewing it psychologically” and he also effected a “shift from practice centered on communal rituals to practice centered on self-cultivation.” The representations of Buddhism articulated by Rama I and Mongkut are in many remarkable ways identical to the representation of early Buddhism constructed by Rhys Davids, especially with respect to their common neglect of cosmology and ritual in favor of individual rationality and morality.

The fact that the Thai developments were clearly not determined by the presence of antagonistic Westerners provides a useful reminder that we should avoid attributing too much force to the “West” (or Christianity, or Protestant assumptions, or Orientalism)
in the changes to Theravāda Buddhism which occurred in the nine-
teenth century. These developments also open up the possibility that, just as there may have been a productive "elective affinity" between the positive historiography of European Orientalism and some Buddhist styles of self-representation which shaped the manner in which research in Buddhist Studies became organized, so there may have been an equally productive elective affinity between some European and some Theravādin responses to modernity, in which an attempt was made to both accommodate and contain the instrumental rationality of modernity, which had proven successful in its agility to predict, control, and explain the world, by emphasizing the rationalist and ethical aspects of the Buddhist heritage. This was necessarily done at the expense of cosmology and ritual, but it was a process that occurred throughout the Theravādin world.

From Orientalism to the Local Production of Meaning

The comparison of certain aspects of the scholarly work of Rhys Davids, Hardy, Bigandet, and Leclère with some parallels in the Theravādin world that they encountered which I have presented here is no more than suggestive. The actual depth of these productive elective affinities and the extent of the intercultural mimesis suggested by their writings will only be confirmed by more detailed examination of the cultural politics of the Theravāda as they existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There are limited resources for going further in this direction in the existing scholarly literature, a reminder that the later history of Theravāda Buddhism is ignored within the paradigm of historiography that still dominates Buddhist Studies. One direction for future studies would be to begin to examine the subcommentaries and translations that were in use in various parts of Asia at the time of the first steps in Buddhist Studies, and which were consistently utilized by pioneers in the field. Their use by scholars who inaugurated the field of Buddhist Studies makes it likely that an investigation of them will enhance our understanding of the interaction between Europeans and non-Europeans in the modern period and thus help us to make a better estimation of the extent to which modern Asian patterns left a mark on European representations of Buddhism.

Thus, this kind of research on the history of the study of Buddhism has an important contribution to make towards extending the history of Orientalism beyond Said. Based on what little we already
know, we can see that it will make it more difficult, albeit in a small
sphere, to discuss “the West” and “the Orient” as radically distinct
entities. But, more importantly, such investigations may make the
basic assumption of Said’s critique of Orientalist representations
problematic itself, by making it difficult to interpret Orientalist rep-
resentations as being primarily embedded in European culture.

More research on later Theravādin literature will, of course,
show the inadequacy of the work by Hardy, Bigandet, and Leclère,
and eventually replace it. But returning to their translations now can
also make an immediate contribution to the ongoing field of Bud-
dhist Studies—as distinct from the study of Orientalism—by encour-
aging us to articulate a completely different historical paradigm for
our research. We noted above that, within the context of professional
Orientalism, translators of vernacular texts apparently had to find
ways of justifying their scholarly work. One way that they did this
was to challenge in their annotations and prefaces the more official
representations of Buddhism. This usually was done indirectly, as
when a translation of a vernacular text was justified on the grounds
that accounts of Buddhism based on texts in the past were not ade-
quate representations of “real” Buddhism. Leclère, for example, in-
troduces his work on *Le Buddhisme au Cambodge* by saying:

This book is not a study of Buddhism in general, still less is it a history of
Buddhism in Cambodia. It is a simple inquiry into Cambodian Buddhism. I
thought that alongside the admirable and learned works of our Indologists,
whose purpose has been to make known Sanskrit, Pali Sinhalese, Tibetan,
Chinese, Mongol, and Japanese texts, and to make a synthesis of them, there
is a place for some works which are less learned and less general, and that it
would not be useless to investigate what Buddhist doctrine has become
among the masses of people and what place it occupies in their
consciousness.83

In a similar vein, Eugène Burnouf explained his interest in the Bur-
mese commentaries of the stories about the previous lives of Buddha
by saying that “these little treatises of the Lives of the Buddha, al-
though historically useless, have an interest for me because of the
values which they represent.”84 But these apologies of Leclère and
Burnouf have a value for us because we see in them the beginnings of
an alternative historical paradigm which will encourage us to expect
meaning to be produced in local circumstances rather than in the ori-
gins of the tradition. These apologies create a space for the study of
the full range of Buddhist literature.

The texts which Hardy, Bigandet, and Leclère translated can
still give evidence for local productions of meaning, but not directly.
The Sinhala works translated by Hardy in his *Manual of Buddhism* have largely fallen into disuse in modern Sri Lanka. Although they were among the first books to be printed in Sri Lanka, most are no longer in print, and the few that are reprinted are for use as literature texts in university classes rather than for use as religious documents. The texts used by Bigandet have apparently suffered a similar fate. The *Tathāgata-udāna*, one of the two texts used in Bigandet’s *Life of Gaudama*, has lost whatever authority it had, to the extent that we are not even sure if a manuscript copy of it survives today.86 The social and political conditions in Cambodia make it impossible to even determine whether the text translated by Leclère has survived, but at the same time we can be reasonably certain that, if it does still survive, it does not have the significance that it once had. The production of the vernacular texts which were utilized in the nineteenth century by Hardy, Bigandet, and Leclère, together with their neglect or disappearance in the late twentieth century, forces us to ask, “What is it that maintains texts inside reality? What keeps some of them current while others disappear?”87

This question is the inverse of the one more commonly asked by students of Buddhism. We tend to assume that it is a given that texts should be preserved, especially in religious traditions as conservative as the Theravāda. But once we turn the question around and ask what conditions are necessary for the preservation of a text, a range of other historical questions immediately opens out. If the survival of any particular text is not self-explanatory, but in fact it is normally the case that texts fade in their significance as social change occurs, then we need to discover how those texts which do endure are maintained.88 In part, this will require us to look at the manner in which texts were circulated—the technology, practices, and institutions which made their survival possible—but especially the processes by which certain texts were singled out as worth preserving. Discovering answers to such questions will require investigations about the extent to which the production and survival of a text is both dependent and independent of the audiences which receive it. In the course of doing all of this we will inevitably end up having to rethink our conceptualizations of Buddhism as a translocal tradition with a long and self-consciously distinct history but which is at the same time a tradition dependent on local conditions for the production of meaning. This is one of the most pressing problems for a postorientalist study of Buddhism: theoretically, we will need to reconceptualize the Buddhist tradition in comparison with other transcultural phenomena, and practically, we will have
to retrieve and reorganize our scholarly heritage in Buddhist Studies in the light of that reconceptualization.

We can conclude by drawing one final lesson from Leclère about an important limit to any representations of the Buddhist tradition which we may construct in the future. In an evocative passage, he described the occasions when he heard the text he translated read aloud:

Two times I have heard it read in the Temple, in the presence of the assembled faithful, themselves silent, by a priest seated in a preaching chair, his legs ritually folded, the satra of palmleaves placed on his knees. His voice was raised high, clear, almost singsong, like that of the priests when they say the gathas or read the holy books. He pronounced carefully the words of Pali origin with which the text is sprinkled. . . . One felt that he knew that the Khmer letters have another value when they reproduce a word of the holy language.

One thing surprised me, the silence of those assembled, observant, the attention of each faithful person was held, even the children. One felt that for these very believing people, very religious, observant in their religious practices, that it really was the life of the Master, the Teacher . . . the Savior of Beings, that they were hearing. One old woman, at each of the words of the Saint, raised her joined hands to the top of her head and bowed; another leaned to the ground on her fore-arms, hands joined, staying immobile, her face placed on her wrists; one young girl followed the reading and, from time to time, her glance went from the preacher to an enormous statue of the Saint who amidst the smoke and incense, showed a smile of perfect peace. I felt that she was living a little of this Great Being and that, taken by her faith, she would not have been surprised to hear him speak, or to see him move his lips and eyes.89

Leclère’s close attention to the scene, to the circumstances of the preaching and reception of a text as well as to the individuals involved, can be taken as a good model for any investigation which would be attentive to the production of meaning in local contexts, but his distance as an observer is instructive as well. As we attempt to restructure our understandings of Buddhism in a manner that will enable us to overcome the distortions of our scholarly inheritance, we should perhaps keep in mind that our new representations also will keep us at a distance from what we hope to understand. We need to keep in mind, like the preacher with the Khmer letters, that the meanings produced in local contexts may also have a transhistorical value to those who produce and receive those meanings. If we are able to do so, we may be able to avoid the mistakes of our predecessors in the study of Buddhism, who we can now see were too quick and too arro-
gant when they vouchsafed to themselves the right to speak for Buddhism.

NOTES

I would like to thank Tara Doyle, Donald Lopez, Rachel McDermott, Sheldon Pollock, and Jonathan Spencer for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.


3. Said, Orientalism, p. 206, makes "the distinction . . . between an almost unconscious (and certainly untouchable) positivity, which [he calls] latent Orientalism, and the various stated views about oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which [he calls] manifest Orientalism. Whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively in manifest Orientalism: the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant."


5. Said, Orientalism, pp. 21–22 (quote on p. 22); see also pp. 5, 12.

6. Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism, p. 5. In the same vein are Thomas Tweed's The American Encounter with Buddhism, 1844–1912 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); and Andrew Tuck's Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Tweed, a historian of American religion, concludes that "nineteenth-century Euro-American Buddhist sympathizers had more in common with their mainline Protestant contemporaries" than with their Asian contemporaries (p. 155). Andrew Tuck, a historian of philosophy, argues that Western philosophic ideas influenced the interpretation of Madhyamaka to such an extent that there has been a "sequence of distinct interpretive fashions" dictated more by trends in Western philosophy than anything in Buddhist thought (p. v).


9. Ibid., 2, 43.

10. Said, in fact, criticizes this move at the outset of Orientalism (p. 5): "It would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was essentially an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality."

11. These points were made to me by Jonathan Spencer, personal communication, May 9, 1993.

17. This suggestion was made to me by Jonathan Spencer, personal communication, May 9, 1993.
20. Richard Gombrich has said that the publication of Rhys Davids’s book, *Buddhism*, “first published in 1877 and many times reprinted, may be said to mark the close of the pioneer period of Buddhist studies” (*Buddhist Precept and Practice* [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991], p. 61).
also shifts critical attention from a specific emphasis on a certain body of texts to a vaguer morality.

25. For example, a comparison of T. W. Rhys Davids's Buddhist India (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903) with analogous sections in Romila Thapar's A History of India, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966) shows a great deal of close, unacknowledged overlap between the two historical accounts. Of course, Rhys Davids's ideas are still explicitly preserved and defended in scholarship; see Richard Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 92.


34. Rhys Davids, Buddhism, quote on p. 89, and Lectures on the Ori-
gin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism (Hibbert lectures, 1882), pp. 122, 128.


37. Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism, p. 3; see also pp. 24, 37:

By the 1850’s, the textual analysis of Buddhism was perceived to be the major scholarly task. Through the West’s progressive possession of the texts of Buddhism, it becomes, so to say, materially owned by the West; and by virtue of this ownership, ideologically controlled by it. . . . Thus, during the nineteenth century as a whole, we can discern clearly the process of the textualization of Buddhism.

Buddhism had become by the middle of the nineteenth century a textual object based in Western institutions. Buddhism as it came to be ideally spoken of through the editing, translating, and studying of its ancient texts could then be compared with its contemporary appearance in the Orient. And Buddhism, as could be seen in the East, compared unfavourably with its ideal textual exemplifications contained in the libraries, universities, colonial offices, and missionary societies of the West. It was possible then, as a result of this, to combine, a positive evaluation of a Buddhism textually located in the West with a negative evaluation of its Eastern instances.


40. This genre of literature, a major one in the history of Sinhala literature, organizes the life of the Buddha not by a natural life course, from birth to death, but by a structure found in the traditional lists of the virtues of the Buddha; examples of the genre are Amāvatura, Butsarana, and Pūjāvaliya. This genre is not limited to the Sinhala literary tradition. The Tathāgataudāna, one of the texts used by Bigandet in his The Life of Gaudama, apparently was similar in scope; see Paul Bigandet, The Life or Legend of Gaudama The Buddha of the Burmese, 4th ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1911).

41. R. Spence Hardy, Manual of Modern Buddhism, p. 360.

42. Alabaster, writing only three years after Hardy’s death, commented obliquely on Hardy’s translations that “to translate agreeably, one must to a certain extent sympathize with the feelings of the author one translates from, and not serve up our glowing Oriental feasts with a cold chill on them” (Henry Alabaster, trans. The Wheel of the Law [London: Trübner, 1871], p. xxvi.) Wickremeratne, the biographer of Rhys Davids, frequently
suggests Rhys Davids’s “impartiality” by comparisons with Hardy; see Wickremeratne, *Genesis of an Orientalist*, pp. 146, 147, 182, 184–85.

43. Wickremeratne, however, traces Hardy’s arrangement of his material to his hostility towards Buddhism: “Spence Hardy, the Wesleyan missionary in Ceylon, had devoted as many as seven chapters to a detailed exposition of the legendary elements in the life of Buddha which Rhys Davids, in his own treatise on Buddhism, deftly dealt with in a few lucid paragraphs. The result was that in Spence Hardy’s work (a typical example) the metaphysical and ethical aspects of Buddhism—the more worthwhile field of inquiry—had received inadequate attention” (Ibid., p. 182). Wickremeratne also says that “to Rhys Davids Buddhist cosmological notions were irrelevant because he had a clear grasp of what was centrally important in Buddhism. . . . Writers like Spence Hardy, however, saw the matter in a different light. Buddhist ideas concerning cosmogony were to be highlighted as part of a simple and effective strategy designed to show the absurdity of Buddhism, especially as the ideas seemed to be derived from the Buddha’s own opinion of the cosmic order” (p. 185).


47. In addition to his translations found in the *Life of Gaudama*, Bigandet translated some monastic ritual texts (*kammavācā*). He also published an article on “Principaux points du système bouddhiste” in the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 27 (1843).


50. The results of this composite can be somewhat misleading as Heinz Braun has pointed out: “When comparing Bigandet’s translation with the Burmese text of *Malālāṅkāra-vatthu* in the manuscripts and printed editions, the reader will not discover a single date in the Burmese original at passages where Bigandet gives detailed information such as “on the full
moon of Katsun, on a Tuesday,” and with regard to the *Parinirvana*, e.g., Bigandet has taken these “exact dates from the *Tathāgataudāna(dipani)* without clearly distinguishing the two texts in his translation.” (Heinz Braun, “The Buddhist Era in the Malālaṅkāravatthu,” in Heinz Bechert, ed., *The Dating of the Historical Buddha*, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), pp. 47-48.

51. See Braun, “Buddhist Era,” pp. 46–47: “Bigandet was of the opinion that both texts . . . are Burmese translations of Pali works. Of course, the Burmese authors had translated portions of the relevant canonical and post-canonical Pali texts but actually they had created Burmese prose works sometimes with Pali verses interspersed and explained in the usual way by means of a *nissaya*, i.e. a word for word translation into Burmese.”


53. Alabaster (d. 1884) was “interpreter of Her Majesty’s Consulate General in Siam.” Exactly which work Alabaster translated remains unclear, and it is likely that, like Hardy and Bigandet, he took some liberties with actual structure of the text. The *Pathama-Sambodhi* itself awaits careful study. It enjoyed popularity in a variety of versions in nineteenth-century Thailand, although the version by H. R. H. Paramanuchitchinorot has attained the status of a classic in Thai literature; see Frank E. Reynolds, “Many Lives of Buddha,” p. 53. For a discussion of the composition and contents of a Pali version of the *Pathama-Sambodhi*, see Coedes, “Une vie Indochinoise du Buddha.” Coedes takes the Pali as the source of the various Thai versions, but this is far from certain.


56. R. Spence Hardy, for example, complains, “Throughout the whole course of my investigations, I have had to exercise a laborious ministry; with the exception of one brief interval, I have been at a distance from any public library; I have received no assistance from any society, literary or religious, though that assistance has not been unasked; my acquaintance with the lore of Europe is limited; and I have had little or no access to recent publications on subjects of Asiatic literature. I have been charged by my friends, with great temerity in risking, unaided, the publication of the present work” (Hardy, *Manual of Modern Buddhism*, pp. ix–x). For similar statements, see Alabaster, p. lviii; Bigandet, p. 2.151; Leclère, p. 9.

57. See, e.g., the reviews of Leclère’s books by Finot, Huber, and Co-


67. See de Jong, “A Brief History of Buddhist Studies,” pp. 14–16, for a useful account of the first translations of the kammavāca texts. Given that we have just seen how Pali came to be privileged over vernacular literature in the professionalized Buddhist Studies in a way that hid the role that this literature played in the pioneering stages of the field, it is significant that these early translators did not always find it necessary even to indicate whether they were working from a Pali or vernacular text.

68. They are relegated to anthologies of Buddhist literature (e.g., the translation by E. J. Thomas in *Buddhist Scriptures* 58 [1935]: 211–16) and textbooks for instruction in Pali (e.g., O. Frankfurter, *Handbook of Pali* (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1883), pp. 141–50.

69. François Bizot, *Les traditions de la pabbajja en Asie de Sud-Est* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988). Bizot summarizes his argument in a manner generally reminiscent of the research paradigm articulated by Bigandet above: “Observation of the usages and study of the manuals (i.e. *kammavāca*) reveal the existence of distinct traditions of the *pabbajja* and show that the introduction of Sinhalese Buddhism to the Peninsula has not been either sudden or simple” (p. 136).

70. Clifford, review of *Orientalism*, p. 220.


74. The similarities between Buddhism and Advaita are well known,
stemming from accusations made against Śāṅkara that he was a “crypto-
Buddhist.” For discussions of Buddhist backgrounds to Hindu devotional
patterns, see Friedhelm Hardy, Viraha-Bhakti (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1983); and Steven Hopkins, “Vedāntadeśīka: The Bell of Tirupati:
Hymns of a Śrīvaisnava Philosopher and Poet” (unpublished thesis, Harvard
University, 1994).

75. Gananath Obeyesekere, “Buddhism and Conscience,” Daedalus
120 (1991): 219. See, in addition, his earlier work which introduced the
term “Protestant Buddhism”: “Religious Symbolism and Political Change in
Ceylon,” in Two Wheels of Dhamma, ed. Bardwell Smith, AAR Monograph
Series, no. 3 (Chambersburg, 1972), pp. 58–78. See as well Kitsiri Mal-
algoda, Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750–1900 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976); Stephen Prothero, “Henry Steel Olcott (1832–
1907) and the Construction of ‘Protestant Buddhism’” (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University, 1990); Richard Gombrich and Gananath Ob-
eyesekere, Buddhism Transformed; John Holt, “Protestant Buddhism?” Re-

76. Charles F. Keyes, “Buddhist Politics and Their Revolutionary Or-

77. David K. Wyatt, “The ‘Subtle Revolution’ of King Rama I of Siam,” in Moral Order and the Question of Change: Essays on Southeast
Asian Thought, ed. David K. Wyatt and Alexander Wordside, Yale University

78. Craig Reynolds, “Buddhist Cosmography in Thai History,”
p. 212.


80. Craig Reynolds, “Buddhist Cosmography in Thai History,” says (p. 212): “These two circumstances—the presence of Westerners willing to
discuss comparative culture, and a reform monastic order critical of monas-
tic culture—combined to force on more and more Siamese a new awareness
of themselves and their past.”

81. Kitsiri Malagoda has shown with respect to Sri Lanka that much
of what occurred in the nineteenth century had already begun to take place
in the pre-British period; see Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750–1900.

82. In this regard, we would have to mention the development of the
vipassanā meditation movements as participating in the same general trends.
See Gustaaf Houtman, “Traditions of Buddhist Practice in Burma” (un-

83. Leclère, Le Buddhisme au Cambodge. See as well Alabaster, The
Wheel of the Law, p. lviii.

84. Choix de lettres d’Eugène Burnouf conservés à la Bibliothèque Na-
papers at his death were a 520-page manuscript translating the Burmese com-
mentary (nissaya) on the Bhūridatta Jātaka, a 416-page manuscript on the
Nemi Jātaka, and a 449-page manuscript on the Suvannasāmā Jātaka. These
studies were never published but their scope has not yet been matched.
85. Ranjini Obeyesekere has made this point in an autobiographical comment (Dharmasena Thera, Jewels of the Doctrine, p. x):

Looking back on my childhood, I realize that we were never given religious instruction as such, either in school or at home. We participated in Buddhist rituals and ceremonies, mostly with the extended kin group, went to temple on full moon days (that, too, mainly during vacations), and listened to many, many Buddhist stories. That was how we learned to be Buddhists.

The stories of the Saddharmaratnāvaliya and the Jātaka Tales have, I think, always performed this function, ever since they were translated into Sinhala. They have been central to the dissemination of Buddhist values and doctrine, copied and recopied by monks, and passed on from generation to generation. In recent years their role has diminished. Buddhism is taught as a subject in schools, in Sunday schools, or Daham pasāl, that have sprung up all over the country, and children study doctrinal texts and understandably, are extremely bored with them. Ours was a much more exciting way to come to the Teachings.

88. It is unclear at this point just how long religious literature endures as compared with literature in general. Robert Escarpit has observed that people at any given time generally know about as many contemporary books as books of the past, which suggests a continuous recession of literary works in the cultural memory into oblivion. He has computed that, within one year, 90 percent of the new books on the market have become unsalable, and, in the course of time, another 90 percent of the remainder disappear (Jeffrey Sammons, Literary Sociology and Practical Criticism [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978], p. 98).
89. Leclère, Livres sacrés, p. 10.
2 Inside the Wonder House: Buddhist Art and the West

STANLEY K. ABE

The influence of Greek visual forms on the Buddhist sculpture of Gandhāra, in the far northwest of ancient India, has been discussed and debated for a century and a half.\(^1\) Gandhāran images, carved from schist or molded out of stucco, are quite distinct in style from those found at central Indian sites such as Mathura. From the time of its discovery, this art was understood by many Western scholars as derivative of the classical forms of Greece and was identified as “Greco-Buddhist art,” or a hybrid of Western and Eastern forms. While some kind of Western influence is understood by virtually all scholars in the field, the specifics of such influence, its extent, source, and transmission, continue to be disputed and a definitive accounting of this elusive issue has yet to be produced.\(^2\) In short, art history has been unable to fix the history of Western influence on Gandhāran Buddhist art.\(^3\)

The difficulties of Gandhāran art are not limited to the source or transmission of classical influence. There are questions as to the geographical limits of the Gandhāran style, the range of styles that may be subsumed under the term, the provenance of many works, and the particularly vexed problem of their dating.\(^4\) This chapter offers no solutions to these questions. My interest is in a different
direction—to explore the ways in which a concept such as Western influence is deployed and empowered, that is, the genealogy of the concept of Greek and Western influence on the art of Gandhāra.5

The study of Gandhāran art developed from the middle of the nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries. In India this was the period of the Raj or direct British rule and, not surprisingly, aspects of colonial policy as well as colonial discursive practices are imbricated upon Greco-Buddhist art.6 Before turning to the issue of Greek influence, however, I would like to examine a text, a section of Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim (1901), in which the author produces a tableau vivant of considerable relevance to Greco-Buddhist art from the subject position of an Anglo-Indian, the term of self-designation employed by members of the British community in India.7

The Wonder House

He sat, in defiance of the municipal orders, astride the gun Zam-Zammah on her brick platform opposite the old Ajaib-Gher—the Wonder House, as the natives call the Lahore Museum. Who hold Zam-Zammah, the “fire-breathing dragon,” hold the Punjab, for the great green-bronze piece is always first of the conqueror’s loot.8

Kim opens with the young protagonist perched on a cannon facing the Lahore Museum, an evocative image that juxtaposes a symbol of colonial power with that of the Western archive.9 Soon Kim dismounts “Zam-Zammah”10 to befriend an elderly lama from Tibet and lead the Buddhist pilgrim into the “Wonder House”:

Kim clicked round the self-registering turnstile; the old man followed and halted amazed. In the entrance-hall stood the larger figures of the Greco-Buddhist sculptures done, savants know how long since, by forgotten workmen whose hands were feeling, and not unskillfully, for the mysteriously transmitted Grecian touch. There were hundreds of pieces, friezes of figures in relief, fragments of statues and slabs crowded with figures that had encrusted the brick walls of the Buddhist stupas and viharas of the North Country and now, dug up and labelled, made the pride of the Museum. (P. 54)

The “Wonder House,” the term applied to the museum by the “natives” of Lahore, can be read in multiple ways. It first connotes awe for an edifice, constructed by the colonial rulers, that is beyond native experience or expertise. Within the museum is housed Greco-Buddhist sculpture for the most part collected, as we will see, for colonial officials with a taste for the art of the classical West. The con-
tents of this building, the wonders that the natives come to view, are available solely through the effort of the colonial administration who collected and preserved the art in the museum. These works of art from the distant past are also wonders in that they are superior to what natives are capable of producing in the present. Buddhist art thus serves to mark the cultural heights of the past against the impoverishment of the present colony.

There is a magical quality to the Wonder House because it collects fragments of whole works, elides their original context, and re-casts the art in the organizational structure of the Western archival institution, the museum.\footnote{11} It is a place of supernatural transformation in which bits and pieces of sculpture, a head here and a fragment of a narrative relief there, are reconstituted by hierarchical lineages of chronology and style. The Wonder House appropriates remnants of Buddhist art into a Western taxonomy of order that is meant to make the art understandable to Western as well as contemporary Indian viewers. As a museum, the Wonder House serves as a “crystallized image of the comprehensive knowledge upon which English hegemony rests.”\footnote{12}

Stopping before a relief of Šākyamuni, the lama is overcome with emotion: “He is here! The Most Excellent Law is here also! My pilgrimage is well begun. And what work! What work!” (p. 55). He then introduces himself to the Curator, a “white-bearded Englishman,” whose response is: “Welcome, then, O lama from Tibet. Here be the images, and I am here to gather knowledge” (p. 55). The Curator leads the lama through the collection of Buddhist art “with the reverence of a devotee and the appreciative instinct of a craftsman” (p. 56). Where a Greek convention puzzles the lama, the Curator assists the pilgrim’s decipherment of the works through reference to a “mound of books—French and German, with photographs and reproductions” (p. 56). The lama asks if there are translations of the records of the Chinese travelers Fa Xian and Xuan Zang and in response the works of the Western scholars Samuel Beal and Stanislas Julien are produced and parts translated into Urdu for the amazed pilgrim.\footnote{13}

For the first time he heard of the labours of European scholars, who by the help of these and a hundred other documents have identified the Holy Places of Buddhism. Then he was shown a mighty map, spotted and traced with yellow. The brown finger followed the Curator’s pencil from point to point. Here was Kapilavastu, here the Middle Kingdom, and here Mahabodi, the Mecca of Buddhism; and here was Kusinagara, sad place of the Holy One’s death. The old man bowed his head over the sheets in silence for a while, and the Curator lit another pipe. (Pp. 56–57)
After contemplating these accomplishments of Western scholarship, the lama explains the goal of his pilgrimage: to locate a river, created when an arrow shot by the young Śākyamuni fell to earth, in which all sins are washed away. While unable to provide the location of the river for the lama, the Curator offers material support: “Suffer me now to acquire merit. We be craftsmen together, thou and I. Here is a new book of white English paper: here be sharpened pencils two and three—thick and thin, all good for a scribe” (p. 59). The Curator then asks to inspect the lama’s heavily scratched spectacles, finds their power to be close to his own, and offers his pair to the lama, who is delighted with their light weight and clarity. “They be bilaure-crystal,” explains the Curator, “and will never scratch. May they help thee to thy River, for they are thine” (p. 60). In return, the lama presents the Curator with his pen case, “a piece of ancient design, Chinese, of an iron that is not smelted these days; and the collector’s heart in the Curator’s bosom had gone out to it from the first” (p. 60).

In the meeting of the Tibetan monk and the English scholar, one can discern the position of Buddhist art, its study and collection, within British colonial discourse at the end of the nineteenth century. The setting of a museum, the Western institution whose purpose is to order works of art, is crucial as the site from which knowledge of Buddhist art will be produced. The Curator, a character closely related to Kipling’s father, Lockwood, is a paragon of the learned European art historian: reverent as a devotee, appreciative as a craftsman, fluent in the native language, and an authority on all aspects of the field. Soon after their meeting the Curator realizes that the lama, in contrast to other native religious adherents, was “no mere bead-telling mendicant, but a scholar of parts” (p. 56). This is an important distinction in the West, where scholarship, grounded in notions of scientific objectivity that require critical distance, is juxtaposed to subjective expressions such as religious faith. The lama is marked as exceptional, different from the ubiquitous mendicants outside the doors of the museum, because the Curator recognizes him as something of a (Western) scholar. Such a move is necessary in order to place the lama and the Curator within the same imaginary space of (Western) scholarship, the only place in which they can interact as almost equals. Without such a move, a sympathetic relationship between the erudite British scholar and a Tibetan lama, in the context of late nineteenth-century European understandings of Tibetan lamaism as a degenerate and corrupt form of Bud-
Scholarship is thus posited as privileged ground for understanding between cultures, a universalist ideal that is firmly grounded in the liberal tradition of the West.¹⁸

Kipling provides in the childlike character of the lama a wonderfully crafted foil for the intelligent and sympathetic Curator. The lama is available for tutoring in his own religion by Western scholars such as the Curator and, most important, he is grateful. While the lama is ostensibly from Tibet, he is also a kind of composite pilgrim-scholar-artist (he is a painter of mandalas), an ideal, imaginary figure who stands in for the no-longer-extant (native) Indian Buddhist. He is innocent of Western understandings of Buddhism as well as the political realities of colonialism. The lama is made completely unaware and unconcerned with long-standing British interests in penetrating Tibet, the culmination of which would be the Younghusband expedition’s occupation of Lhasa in 1904.¹⁹ While an Anglo-Indian scholar such as the Curator would have been fully cognizant of the intrigues involving the British and Tibet, Kipling carefully brackets political issues out of their relationship.²⁰

It is also possible to locate in this encounter some of the mechanisms of knowledge construction under the colonial administration. Immediately after meeting the Curator, the lama is invited to the Curator’s office. There a huge book is produced and he is shown a photo of his own monastery. His reply is surprise and wonder: “Ay, Ay! . . . Here is the little door through which we bring wood before winter. And thou—the English—know of these things?” (p. 55). One is reminded of Bentham’s Panopticon, that ultimate structure of surveillance and discipline, in the manner in which the English have penetrated and recorded the abode of the lama without his knowledge.²¹ The display of the photographic evidence now makes it impossible for the lama to disregard the possibility of English knowledge and presence anywhere in his world.²²

The photographic techniques that captured the lama’s monastery were also utilized, in the form of the lantern slide, to display Buddhist sculpture in the West as a reproducible artifact available to art history. Here the realm of surveillance, through cognate procedures of knowledge, was extended to capture the Buddhist image as well as the colonial subject. Another related technological development was cartography, which in the form of the “mighty map” was a method by which the Curator displayed his mastery of Śākyamuni’s life by locating the “Holy Places of Buddhism” for the Buddhist. The sci-
ence of cartography, essential for the surveillance of the colony, here serves scholarship as a technique of fixing the Western understanding of Buddhism within the archival project of the museum.  

These developments occur in a period marked by a phenomenal increase in the objectification of India through projects such as the organized census and the systematic mapping of the subcontinent by the Great Trigonometric Survey.  

The techniques of photography and cartography displayed in Kim are indicative of the important role of Western technology in the colonial production of knowledge about India at the end of the nineteenth century.

Implements of knowledge are central to the gifts the Curator chooses for the lama: the tools of recording (white English paper and sharpened pencils) and a superior tool for seeing, the English spectacles.  

The colonizer assists the lama in his search by providing the Western technology necessary to obtain truth. The lama is thus given instruction in the superior methods, that is, those of modernity and the West, for discovering and recording facts. His joyful acceptance of this gift of sight reproduces a fundamental ideological construct of colonialism, namely, that the colonial relationship provides the colonized with what they cannot produce themselves: Western rationality and technology—the tools with which to modernize. The lama reciprocates with a gift of the object that the Curator most desires, the pen case, an article of antiquity about which the Curator can produce knowledge. The Curator’s gifts, modern and utilitarian, point to their deployment as tools of the future, while the pen case of the lama, emptied of the traditional implements of writing, is a barren artifact of the past, valuable only through the special training and mediation of the Curator.

In the idealized world of the Wonder House, Buddhist images are by definition alien and different, yet under certain circumstances, that is, through appropriate interpretative and disciplinary techniques, they are totally knowable. The Curator, in possession of the material remains of Buddhist art, the stacks of European books, and the training of an art historian, directs the process through which the incommensurable, Buddhist art, is transformed and rendered recuperable to the West as a version of the known. Such an appropriation is only possible, however, through the meticulous control and, when necessary, exclusion of the native presence, their history and their voice, from the discourse of art history. In one respect, this procedure must delete certain traces of otherness in order to possess Buddhist art as the other. In another respect, the difference that necessarily marks Buddhist art as alien must be maintained even as art history
seeks to incorporate Buddhist art into Western knowledge. This is the operation of colonial discourse as an apparatus of power "that turns on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences." The ambivalence at the core of this recognition/disavowal dynamic creates an unstable splitting that will mark the discourse of Greco-Buddhist art.

Greco-Buddhist Art

*Thus traces of the storyteller cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter cling to the clay vessel.—Walter Benjamin*

The wonders of the Lahore Museum that so awed the lama in *Kim* were works from Gandhāra done, in Kipling’s words, by the hands of workmen feeling “for the mysteriously transmitted Grecian touch.” What was this Greco-Buddhist art and where did it come from? The source of Greek inspiration has been identified with the Eastern conquests of Alexander the Great and the far-flung Hellenistic outposts that were established as far as the border of India. One such outpost, Bactria, was known to have been located in the region to the northwest of Gandhāra and it was the Bactrians who carried on Hellenistic traditions into the first century before the current era.

Evidence of the Bactrian kingdoms from Greek and Latin historical sources was substantiated by ancient coins collected from various parts of India in the early part of the nineteenth century. The area of Bactria, only recently accessible to outsiders, was then attracting antiquarians wishing to trace Alexander’s footsteps and identify ancient ruins with places named in the classical records. Such activity led James Prinsep to declare that from Bactria “we may confidently expect a multitude of Grecian antiquities gradually to be developed.” Prinsep saw his own role as guiding and encouraging the process: “It is principally to instigate those who have opportunities of forming collections in the upper provinces, that I have drawn up these notes, and I cannot adduce a more powerful motive for studying and searching, than, the example and success of that indefatigable investigator of history and antiquity, Major Tod.” The reference is to the report of Bactrian coins made to the royal Asiatic Society in 1825 by James Tod, a Lieutenant-Colonel and Political Agent to the Rajput states who amassed some 20,000 coins during twelve years of collecting. Prinsep and other scholars were successful in stimulating archaeological investigations in the northwest, especially by those with
an interest in classical antiquity. From 1830 onward a number of “topes,” thought by some excavators to be royal tombs, were opened by colonial and military officials. Most of these would turn out to be Buddhist stupas, although the primary interest of the excavators was the coins, imprinted with profiles of Bactrian kings and Greek inscriptions, that provided indisputable proof of Greek rule in the area adjacent to Gandhāra.

The enthusiasm with which colonial officials explored ancient sites and collected antiquities can be understood as the extension into India of the rise of classical archaeology as a modern mode of scientific inquiry and the concomitant neoclassical revival of the late eighteenth century in Europe. As we will see, the romanticism and fervent Philhellenism of Winckelmann and his followers would also mark the search for material evidence of Greek presence in India. It was the positivist approach of classical archaeology combined with the aesthetic concerns of art history that would inform the scholarship on Greco-Buddhist art in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The role of Greece and classical antiquity in the development of archaeological explorations in the northwest region was particularly appropriate in the colonial context. In addition to the status accorded Greece as an ancient civilization, the classical tradition had long been associated with political authority and power in the West:

It has to do with the development of a particular kind of naturalism in fifth century Greece and that this kind of naturalism is able to make one believe that the authority of this art is grounded in nature... What should be better for a power in place than to make us believe that it is not simply there by an act of force, but that its authority is inscribed in nature herself?

As we will see, such a self-evident and natural power would be summoned in order to deploy a discourse that “discovers” an unknown, naturally blank object, Gandhāran art, and inscribes it with the signature of the classical Greek episteme of the West while, in the same motion, effacing all trace of authorship.

It was not until 1852, soon after the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849, that examples of sculpture from Gandhāra were described as exhibiting Greek attributes. A brief report by W. Jackson, Vice-President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, concerned two stucco heads found near Peshawar and brought to the attention of the Society by a Major Baker. Jackson was scrupulous in his examination and attentive to detail. He noted, for example, that breakage at the top and back of the second head indicated that it was originally attached to a wall and that the lack of ornamental work on one side was evi-
dence that the head was turned and meant to be seen from the side. The balance of the report concerned the differences between the two heads. The first was described as “Boodhistic” with heavy eyelids, the eyes barely open and “sloping upwards towards the ears”; the nose was flat and thick as were the lips; the mouth was large and the expression stolid and heavy; the earlobes were drawn down to a “hideous extent”; the workmanship was coarse and the modeling of the head was incorrect. The second head was found to be superior in every respect. The nose was well formed and the lips, with a short upper lip, were well defined; the mouth bore an intellectual expression; the hair was sharply executed; the countenance was handsome and pleasing. The author stated that the second was evidently not a “Hindu” head. Rather, it resembled those on Bactrian coins with expressions “somewhat of a Greek cast. . . but not a pure Greek countenance.” Further investigation into the find spot of the second head was urged while the first was described as “common enough” with “no connection with the other.”

Jackson’s focus on the physiognomy of the sculpture, particularly the facial characteristic, and the values placed on such attributes is striking. The assumption appears to be that sculpture was mimetic, that a sculpted head could be read transparently as a human countenance. It then follows that physical traits such as the thickness of lips, expressive characteristics such as stolidness, and the accuracy of anatomical renderings or the quality of execution can be integrated into an analysis of sculpture. The superior character attributed to the head with Greek influence punctuates a descriptive analysis in which the work of sculpture is inscribed with the racial and ideological discourses of the West. “Greekness” in this early case serves to designate the aesthetic superiority of the European colonial.

Later in 1852 a large group of sculpture from Gandhāra was identified as having Greek as well as Buddhist characteristics. In his report, E. C. Bayley faced the problem neatly avoided by Jackson, that is, reconciling the purity of the Greek influence in these works with their Buddhistic character. The dilemma was grounded, as Bayley’s tortuous argument demonstrates, in the “purity” of the Greek style. Based on numismatic evidence, there was general agreement that purely Greek styles in the northwest were of a relatively early date and were followed by a gradual debasement as the Greek elements were integrated with the Indian. Within this scheme, a pure Greek style in a Buddhist context was an anomaly that did not suggest to Bayley the possibility of any Greek/Buddhist combination. Such a position also agrees with the theory of some European scholars that
different races produced unique and indigenous cultures that were essentially incompatible. In terms of the possible classical influence on Indian art, this understanding was best expressed by Gustave Le Bon: “The two races were too different, their thoughts too dissimilar, their artistic genius too incompatible to have exerted any influence on each other.” Here we can discern something of the ambivalence in the discourse of Greco-Buddhist art in which representations of difference, that which sustains the distinction between Greek and Indian art, encounter those of commensurability embedded in the concept of “influence.”

These early reports generated little response from Anglo-Indian or European scholars. This situation was to change in 1870 when G. W. Leitner, an educational administrator and archaeological enthusiast from Lahore, brought a collection of Gandhāran sculpture to Europe and coined the term “Graeco-Buddhist” for these works. Various works from his collection were inspected by scholars and the discovery of Greco-Buddhist art was hailed by many as opening a new page in the history of Greek art. Leitner’s introduction of the term “Graeco-Buddhist” to the European scholarly community was crucial because the term unambiguously secured the source of Western influence in the discourse of Greece and Hellenism. These works, however, would prove difficult to consolidate into Greek art.

One problem was that the presence of Greece in Gandhāran Buddhist art was not self-evident to all nineteenth-century scholars. William Vaux, for example, wrote in 1875:

It has become a fashion recently to extend a Greek influence to districts east of Bactria, for which I venture to think there is really but little evidence. Thus we are told that certain Buddhistic figures, chiefly in slate, procured by Dr. Leitner and others to the north-east of Peshawar, exhibit on them manifest traces of Greek art. I am sorry to say that I cannot perceive anything of the kind.

Vaux sounds a theme that will reappear in the criticism of the Greco-Buddhist theory. The issue was one of perception and categories—what was visually “Greek” and what kind of works could be subsumed under such a stylistic definition? At what point did Greece end and something non-Greek begin? What were the limits of Hellenistic diffusion? These were “facts” not easily determined by empirical methods despite the invocation of visual evidence from all sides.

The incredulity of scholars such as Vaux was dismissed by others, for example Vincent Smith: “The Greek influence on the
Gandhāra sculptures... is so obvious to other critics, that a formal refutation of his ill-founded scepticism would now be superfluous.49 A more serious matter for the concept of Greco-Buddhist art was the distance, temporal as well as geographical, that separated Greek art from that of Gandhāra and the necessary mediation of intermediaries such as Bactria in the diffusion of Greek influence to Gandhāra. The issue was how to organize the scattered remains of material evidence with the historical records in order to produce a coherent scheme of Greek influence.

The earliest sustained attempt to negotiate this distance was in the 1889 article of Smith, whose conception of Greek influence was not as straightforward as his retort to William Vaux would indicate. Smith proposed two periods of Western influence on Gandhāra: one early and essentially Greek followed by the main school of Buddhist art that was Roman in inspiration, “probably founded by a foreign colony.” At the same time, his understanding of Roman art maintained the primacy of Greece: “The name Graeco-Buddhist proposed by Dr. Leitner cannot be asserted to be incorrect, all Roman being only a modification of Greek art, but the term Romano-Buddhist would be much more appropriate.”50 Smith was here the first to propose that Rome was the mediator of Greek influence on Gandhāra.

Smith’s formulation of Western influence was effective at least in part due to an elasticity that allowed for examples of both Greek and Roman art to be used in his discursive scheme. For example, he could suggest the “legend” of the birth of Śākyamuni descended, “like the sculptures that express it,” from a Greek original with particular affinities to the myth of Apollo’s birth at Delos,51 and declare that depictions of the parinirvana, “certainly an importation from the west,” were based on Greek banquet scenes imitated on Roman sarcophagi. Smith also acknowledged the possible influences on Gandhāran art of other intermediaries such as Palmyra and was particularly struck by relationships to the contemporary Christian art of the Roman empire: “Roman or Christian subjects have been made to serve Buddhist purposes, but have been transferred bodily to India with little change, save that of name.”52 There is a profusion of hyphenated terms employed in his discussion of Gandhāran art including Indo-Hellenic, Indo-Greek, Indo-Roman, Graeco-Roman, and Romano-Buddhist. The plurality of these and other neologisms is an indication of the ambivalence of a colonial discourse in which knowledge of Western influence was both “always ‘in place,’ already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated.”53

The foregoing argument can be understood as Smith’s version
of Gandhāran art as a “new page in the history of Greek art.” There was a problem with such an appropriation, however, in that Smith also understood Gandhāran sculptors to be incapable of imbuing their work with the aesthetic value of the classical originals. Gandhāran imitations were “devoid of life or elegance, and far inferior to the worst Graeco-Roman example.” This was because they were “only echoes of the second rate Roman art of the third and fourth centuries.”54 The result was that Gandhāran art was self-evidently an extension of the tradition of Greek art, that is, a part of the West, and simultaneously never Greek enough in its inability to match the achievements of the classical West.

For Smith, there were few areas of Indian civilization not touched by the creative and “undying spirit of Hellas.” The numerous references in his article to scholarly discussions of Hellenistic influences on Indian drama, literature, mythology, science, philosophy, and religion remind us that the discovery of Greco-Buddhist art was only one aspect of a larger discourse of Western power and authority that incorporated the aesthetic and cultural into the ideology of late nineteenth-century European colonialism. Scholarship such as this, as Smith himself pointed out, was a corrective to the naïveté of early Orientalists who had “lent a ready ear to the extravagant tales of the pandits, and were willing to attribute the most venerable antiquity and almost absolute originality to the strange civilization and vast literature suddenly brought within their ken.” Smith goes on to extol the “modern historical and literary criticism” that had been “steadily engaged in the task of exposing the falsity of Brahmanical tradition or pseudo-tradition, the ‘lying gabble of Brahmans.’” The result was that (Western) scholars had been forced to acknowledge that the “civilization of ancient India was not so indigenous and self-contained as, at first sight, it seemed to be.”55 The fixing of such terms as “Greco” or “Romano” to “Buddhist” can be understood as one act by which India and its “pandits” were returned to their proper place within the sphere of Western civilization and world history.

Although Leitner acknowledged in 1894 that Smith’s essay was “by far the most accurate and scholarly on the subject,” he was not daunted by assertions of Roman or Christian influence. Rather, Leitner chastised the remaining skeptics among European scholars in describing the scope of this new field of study: “Only those who combined Greek with Oriental Scholarship, in a more than usual degree, were ready to admit that the word ‘Graeco-buddhistic’ designated a period not only in the History of Art, but also in that of Religion and
in General History.” Most importantly, the problematic amalgamation of “pure” Greek influence and Buddhist art that had confronted E. C. Bayley was recast by Leitner into the triumph of universalism:

Dr. L. A. Waddell has shown that even modern Lamaism cannot be thoroughly understood without some reference to a Greek influence, and, indeed, Buddhism, as a whole, must not be confounded with the one-sided interpretations of those who are mainly acquainted with its Ceylon School and has to be studied on the broader basis of Universal History, in which the first attempt—through the Greeks—of the West to carry its Law and civilization to the East from which it had received its Light, forms an important epoch.  

The extent of Greek influence is here dramatically expanded to incorporate Buddhism as a whole and Leitner positions such influence as a natural part of a Universal History in which East-West exchange was symmetrical and mutually beneficial. The reversal in the direction of influence that Leitner identifies, however, is of no small significance. Early Orientalist scholars going back to William Jones had understood cultural influences in the main as flowing out of India. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, India was to be increasingly represented as the recipient of foreign influence. While Smith and Leitner evaluated the art of Gandhāra very differently, they shared the understanding that the discovery of Western influence was an important moment in the incorporation of India into the schemes of Western knowledge and history.

By far the most sustained scholarly effort on behalf of Greco-Buddhist art was that of Alfred Foucher. Beginning with publications as early as 1900 and culminating in his monumental *L’art greco-bouddhique du Gandhāra,* Foucher demonstrated a breadth of art historical scholarship joined with an erudition in Buddhist textual studies that was unrivaled in the field. Foucher also carried the torch of Philhellenism as is clear in his description of the standing Buddha from Hoti Mardan, one of the most famous of the “Western” Gandhāran images:

Look at it at leisure. Without doubt you will appreciate its dreamy, and even somewhat effeminate, beauty; but at the same time you cannot fail to be struck by its Hellenic character. . . . Your European eyes have in this case no need of the help of any Indianist, in order to appreciate with full knowledge the orb of the nimbus, the waves of the hair, the straightness of the profile, the classical shape of the eyes, the sinuous bow of the mouth, the supple and hol-
low folds of the draperies. All these technical details, and still more perhaps the harmony of the whole, indicate in a material, palpable and striking manner the hand of an artist from some Greek studio. . . . Thus the statue of Mardan, with all its congeners, appears to us as a kind of compromise, a hybrid work, which would not in any language have a name, had not the no less heteroclite term of “Greco-Buddhist” been forthwith invented for it. 59

For Foucher, this Buddha was a work that was obviously familiar to the Western viewer. Yet, it was an object that had no name until the Western scholar gave it an identity. Not coincidentally, this discussion of Buddhist art reproduced the discourse of Western colonial discovery—the perception that “native” lands were in fact empty, unclaimed, and available for appropriation exactly because they were unknown and unnamed to the West. It is the act of naming that appropriates the work and (re)produces it not as something “Other,” but as something the West can now know, a work that European eyes can appreciate.

The manifest Grecian quality of this sculpture was, according to Foucher, evidence that the work was one of the earliest made in Gandhāra. In this case the assumption that the “purity” of Greek influence was indicative of a relatively early date of execution was assimilated into Foucher’s analysis with none of the previously noted ambivalence. Foucher’s understanding of Gandhāran sculpture was premised on the maintenance of Hellenistic culture in the northwest region through colonies such as Bactria from the time of Alexander down to the first century B.C.E. Artists working in Hellenistic colonies in Gandhāra would have produced early works such as the Hoti Mardan Buddha that corresponded most closely to Greek prototypes. This initial phase of the school was followed by a flourishing phase in which the Hellenistic and Indian elements were more thoroughly fused. While influences from Rome were acknowledged in the second phase of the school, these were understood as degenerate forms of Greek art. A third and final phase was basically empty and imitative, unable to create new forms. 60 Recognizable in such a construction of stylistic development is a teleology in which the Greek element was absorbed by Buddhist art in a scheme of gradual decline.

Foucher developed the assumptions of earlier scholars with considerable sophistication. For example, the above reading of “Hellenic” racial features in Buddhist sculpture was far more subtle than in the case of Jackson; the fusion of Greek and Buddhist elements could be celebrated while the hierarchical relationship between Indian and Western art was maintained most tellingly in the formula-
tion of the decline or "Indianization" of Gandhāran art; and, as we will see below, Foucher was to make his own significant contribution towards incorporating Greco-Buddhist art into the Universal History of Leitner. In 1852 E. C. Bayley was confronted with the incommensurability of the Buddhist and Greek heads; for Foucher some half a century later, East and West were joined in the encounter between the "isms" of the Buddha and Hellas.

The Origin of the Buddha Image

*We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts, have their root in Greece. But for Greece—Rome, the instructor, the conqueror, or the metropolis of our ancestors, would have spread no illumination with her arms, and we might still have been savages and idolaters; or, what is worse, might have arrived at such a stagnant and miserable state of social institution as China and Japan possess.*

The human form and the human mind attained to a perfection in Greece which has impressed its image on those faultless productions, whose very fragments are the despair of modern art, and has propagated impulses which cannot cease, through a thousand channels of manifest or imperceptible operation, to ennoble and delight mankind until the extinction of the race.—Percy Bysshe Shelly

The publication of the first volume of *L'art greco-bouddhique* in 1905 marks the culmination of over half a century of scholarship on Gandhāran Buddhist art, the effect of which was to largely overcome resistance to the concept of Greek influence. Having confirmed the "facts" of a Hellenistic presence in Gandhāran art, there was a shift in the concerns of the discourse onto the significance of Western influence. The scholarship of Foucher and others increasingly addressed the question of the role of Hellenism in the development of Indian Buddhist art and a key issue was the origin of the Buddha image.

By the last quarter of the nineteenth century it was widely understood that there were no representations of the Buddha in human form in early Buddhist art; rather, the presence of Śākyamuni appeared to have been indicated by symbols such as his footprint or the wheel of Dharma. This type of Buddhist art was commonly designated as "aniconic." Interestingly, the concept of aniconism, namely, that there was a phase of Buddhist art during which the depiction of the Buddha in anthropomorphic form was eschewed, has become the recent focus of controversy.
The pressing issue for Western scholars was the seemingly sudden appearance of images of the Buddha. James Fergusson was one of the first to suggest that the idea of making a Buddha image in anthropomorphic form was inspired by the tradition of Greek image making. This hypothesis was endorsed with some caution by Vincent Smith: "Mr. Fergusson appears to have been right in holding that the worship of images of the founder of Buddhism was introduced from the North West; and it is probable that the development of sculpture, which was undoubtedly stimulated by Hellenic influence, gave encouragement to idolatrous practices."

The most indefatigable proponent of a Greek source for the Buddha image, however, was Alfred Foucher. In a lecture of 1912, Foucher led his audience on a search for the elusive origin of the Buddha image. After noting the lack of anthropomorphic depictions in the early Buddhist art of central India, Foucher turned to the Lahore Museum and the Gandharan sculptures of the "Wonder House":

All that I wish to insist upon to-day is that the oldest known Buddhas are those which we have encountered in the "House of Marvels," as the natives call the museum of Lahore. To complete the geographical part of our quest, it remains only to find out exactly whence these Buddhas come. The former keeper—whom many of us know from the fine portrait drawn by the filial piety of Rudyard Kipling at the Beginning of "Kim"—is no longer there to tell us; we regret to have heard last year of his death, and moreover he retired long ago. But his successor will answer you that all these carvings came originally from the district of Peshawar.

It was these Gandharan works, Greek in style and Buddhist in subject, that Foucher identified as the oldest images of the Buddha. Of these, it was the previously mentioned Buddha from Hoti Mardan which he chose to feature in a lantern slide and praise as "the most beautiful, and probably also the most ancient, of the Buddhas which it has even been granted to me to encounter" (p. 119).

Implicit in Foucher's thesis was the assumption that there was in the Indian tradition a reticence in representing the Buddha as a human. Foucher's reply to the question of why Indian artists did not create anthropomorphic images of the Buddha was "if they did not do it, it was because it was not the custom to do it." In this context, only outside (Greek) influence could have provided the necessary impetus for the invention of a new form. For Foucher, such a revolutionary innovation logically extended to the common iconographic features of the Buddha image such as his monastic robes or the uṣṇīṣa (cranial protuberance); these, too, were credited to the audacious cre-
ativity of the eclectic Gandhāran school (pp. 131–35). Originality and invention, paradigmatic of the modern West, were thus infused into the static Buddhist art of India by the Hellenistic tradition.

The discourse developed by Foucher and others over the origin of the Buddha image reproduced an important premise of colonialism embedded in the encounter of the Curator and the lama in *Kim*: that colonialism stimulates stagnant non-Western societies through the introduction of the inventions of Western civilization. Greek art similarly benefited Buddhist art by providing the (Western) idea, apparently lacking in India, of creating images of gods in anthropomorphic form. Colonial rule as well as Hellenistic influences were represented not as intrusive but as enlightening and altruistic. Conversely, the absence of classical influences was perceived as an unfortunate state of affairs for the natives, as evidenced in Foucher’s evaluation of the relief carving at Borobudur in Java:

The chief and most evident fault of these bas-reliefs is the persistent incapacity of their authors, in spite of their manual skill, to create figures having a characteristic individuality. Assuredly, it would be unfair to regard it as a crime on the part of the artists of those distant isles not to have reached a pinnacle of art which remained unknown to the Indian school and to which Greek art itself attained only at its best period.68

The “Indian” school that Foucher refers to is the “native” school in contrast to the Greco-Buddhist school of Gandhāra.

And who could have generated the first anthropomorphic image of the Buddha? Having eliminated the native Indian artist, there could be only one logical answer: “Thus must have been created under the industrious fingers of some *Graeculus* of more or less mixed descent—and perhaps, also, who knows? at the command of a Greek or Eurasian convert to Buddhism—the earliest of the images of Buddha” (p. 128). The manner in which earlier scholarship integrated theories of race, culture, and aesthetics into a representation of Greco-Buddhist art surfaces here in the assertion that Greek blood must be present for the originary power of Hellenistic art to be actualized.

It is important to note that Foucher was not insensitive to the role of Indian traditions in the development of Buddhist art.69 The intent of his scholarship was to develop an appreciation for Buddhist art in the West and to counter representations of Indian art as lacking merit. He understood himself to be deeply sympathetic to India. No where can this be better seen than in the conclusion of Foucher’s essay on the Greek origin of the Buddha image:
It was recently still the custom to triumph noisily over the artistic inferiority of the Indians, reduced to accepting ready made from the hands of others the concrete realization of their own religious ideal. At present, owing to aesthetic bias or to nationalist rancour, it is the fashion to make the school of Gandhāra pay for its manifest superiority by a systematic blackening of its noblest production. We for our part refuse in this connection to share either the unjustifiable contempt of the old criticism for native inspiration, or the ill-disguised spite of the new against foreign make. It is not the father or the mother who has formed the child; it is the father and the mother. The Indian mind has taken a part no less essential than has Greek genius in the elaboration of the model of the Monk-God. It is a case where the East and the West could have done nothing without each other. It would be childish to associate ourselves, in a partizan spirit and turnabout, with the exaltation or the contempt, whether of Europe or of Asia, when so fine an opportunity offers for saluting in the Eurasian prototype of Buddha one of the most sublime creations where-with their collaboration has enriched humanity. (pp. 136–37)

Foucher expresses here a humanistic, universal basis for his theory of the origin of the Buddha image, one that upheld the best of both East and West, a bold and liberal stance in a period when cultural mingling could only be understood by many Europeans as a prelude to debasement. His role in securing an originary position for Greece in the history of Buddhist art is therefore not easily reduced to Philhellenism or bias. Rather, Foucher was in his own way attempting to enhance the standing of Indian art by incorporating Greco-Buddhist art into the universal history of World Art.

However well intentioned, Foucher’s theory of the origin of the Buddha image was to elicit considerable opposition. An early adversary was Ernest Binfield Havell, who proceeded from the position that no proper evaluation of Indian art could be made without understanding Indian standards, intention, and especially spirituality. Havell, very much in the vein of antimaterialists such as John Ruskin and William Morris, believed that the value of Indian art lay in its ability to represent the subjective and spiritual attributes of Indian philosophy as opposed to the utilitarian and representational goals of Western art. In this sense it was the lack of Indian spirituality in Gandhāran art that demonstrated the impossibility of such a school originating an artistic form as fundamentally Indian in spirit as the Buddha image. Most importantly, Havell did not deny Hellenistic influences in the art of Gandhāra. He simply believed the school and its version of the Buddha image was an aberration:

The importance of the Gandhāran school in the evolution of Indian artistic
ideals has been immensely exaggerated by writers obsessed with the idea that everything Greek must be superior to everything Indian. Gandhāran art is decadent and lifeless, in so far as it is Greek or Roman; the more it becomes Indian, the more it becomes alive. To regard the Gandhāran school of sculpture as furnishing the model on which the Indian divine ideal was founded is to misapprehend entirely the philosophical basis and historical development of Indian art. Gandhāran sculpture is not a starting-point, but a late incident . . . which, excepting a few distinctive technical characteristics, left no permanent impression, and had no influence in shaping Indian ideals.72

Significantly, Havell reversed earlier models of Gandhāran art history that assumed an aesthetic decline with the lessening of Greek influence and, most importantly, he bracketed off Greek influence as marginal and inconsequential for the further development of Indian art.

The controversy over the relative place of Gandhāra in the development of Buddhist art became even more heated after the publication of the second fascicle of the second volume of Foucher’s L’art greco-bouddhique du Gandhāra in 1922. In his review, Victor Goloubew took Foucher to task for minimizing the role of the central Indian site of Mathura in the development of the Buddha image. Goloubew was the first to openly claim that extant images in central India predated those of Gandhāra.73

Nowhere was the contest over the Buddha image more forcefully joined, however, than by Ananda Coomaraswamy, who in 1927 declared “my object in discussing it [Foucher’s theory] here is not so much to continue the controversy as to dismiss it.” After a brief summary of Foucher’s argument, Coomaraswamy commented that “this view was put forward, as M. Foucher himself admits, in a manner best calculated to flatter the prejudices of European students and to offend the susceptibilities of Indians: the creative genius of Greece had provided a model which had later been barbarized and degraded by races devoid of true artistic instincts, to whom nothing deserving the name of fine art could be credited.” Coomaraswamy continued by asserting that when “doubts were expressed from various quarters external to the circle of orthodox scholarship,” Foucher “did not hesitate to suggest in his genial way that in the case of European students, these doubts were only the result of aesthetic prejudice, in the case of Indian students, of nationalist rancour.”74

Coomaraswamy’s thesis was that all of the necessary precedents for the Buddha image were available in pre-Gandhāran Indian artistic traditions including Jain and Buddhist art from sites such as Mathura. In addition, the style of Gandhāra and its Western influence, which he completely accepted, was “listless” in comparison to
the “affirmative force” of early Indian art.75 While inclined to support the primacy of Mathura in the invention of the Buddha image, he declared that the “evidence is not sufficiently precise to warrant us in forming a theory as to the priority of either school.”76 In his conclusion, however, Coomaraswamy maintained that there was little to support the position of Foucher and “it becomes impossible to treat the phrase ‘Greek origin of the Buddha image’ as representing anything more than a rhetorical misuse of language.”77

The confrontation of colonizer and colonized is clearly discernible behind the transparent discursive strategies employed by both scholars. The fact that Coomaraswamy was born in Sri Lanka and was part Asian, his father being Tamil and his mother British, has the effect of intensifying the already significant racial aspect of the confrontation over the Buddha image. It is ironic that Coomaraswamy’s parentage would qualify him as one of Foucher’s Hellenistic Eurasian artists or patrons. A further irony is that Coomaraswamy was raised in England after his father died when he was only two. During his life he would return to Sri Lanka for only one extended stay of five years.78 Although he would be known as a staunch defender of South Asian art, his intellectual interests and approaches appear, not surprisingly, to consistently reflect his education and life in the West.79 As Coomaraswamy himself pointed out, most of those who expressed doubts about Foucher’s theory of the origin of the Buddha image were of European descent while “Indian (and Japanese) scholars have shown a singular humility, and perhaps some timidity, in their ready acceptance of all the results of European scholarship.”80 The crucial point is that scholarly debates over stylistic influence were not only disputes over the interpretation of evidence but contestations over how the East would be represented in the West.

Coomaraswamy’s comments alert us to the pervasive strength of Western discourses of modern knowledge and their uncritical acceptance in the non-Western world, especially by intellectuals who received training in academic disciplines such as art history. One result was that the discourse around the origin of the Buddha image, highly charged with issues of colonialism and race, could not be ordered along the lines of racial classifications or national boundaries. Rather, there was a common space, that created by the discipline of art history, in which issues of Greco-Buddhist art were framed with the epistemological assumptions and concerns of the West.

In this sense, the conceptualization of a Greco-Buddhist school of art in Gandhāra was viable in so far as it addressed central con-
cerns of Western art historical scholarship. Greco-Buddhist art, for example, was of great assistance to European scholars who were struggling with the problem of how to evaluate in aesthetic terms the alien forms of Indian art and bring India into the fold of world art history. The discovery of a style of Indian art with origins in the Greek tradition provided scholars with a known quantity, both in terms of its characteristics and in its high level of achievement. Using Gandhāran art as a benchmark, scholars such as James Fergusson or Vincent Smith could not only produce order out of the confusion of Indian art, but “a descending scale of values could be formulated with Gandhāra at the apex, which would make the task of judging different Indian styles easier.” Such formulations as well as Foucher’s representation of the gradual decline of Gandhāran art served to juxtapose Western progress with Indian regression in art history and not incidentally reproduce a central binary in the colonial discourse: Western progress versus native stagnation.

The centrality of the West for these issues can be observed in the interests of scholars as disparate as Fergusson and Coomaraswamy. Fergusson was first of all a vocal critic of contemporary Western architecture, whose principles were “anomalous and abnormal.” In Indian architecture he found traditional principles that could serve as a model from which the West could learn. While he understood the present-day population of India to be hopelessly debased, there were architectural principles of true value still being practiced. Coomaraswamy, writing some thirty years later and operating from a very different subject position, was involved with William Morris in the critique of industrialization in Victorian England. Indian arts, especially in the area of design, held out for Coomaraswamy and others an antidote to the decadence they found in English industrial design. What needed to be defended, then, was a traditional society such as India in which the arts were nourished through their integration with religious and spiritual values. This is not to reduce the early study of Indian or Greco-Buddhist art to a simple exercise in attending to the concerns of the West; rather, there was a far more complex back-and-forth movement among a variety of issues that spanned art historical scholarship, colonialism, Philhellenism, nationalism, and works of Gandhāran Buddhist art.

What begins to emerge is the manner in which a discourse ostensibly producing knowledge about the art of Gandhāra simultaneously distributes internal concerns onto a representation of the Other.” Arguably the most prominent of such concerns at the end of the nineteenth century involved the debate over the origins of Eu-
ropean civilization. Since the previous century Greece had been recognized as the source of all that was noble in Western civilization. It was in the nineteenth century, however, that European scholars enacted a complex reversal of earlier knowledge in order to construct a classical Greek civilization of purely Aryan origin. A similar process of reversal was also applied to theories of Asian sources of European civilization, for example in undercutting the earlier understanding that Sanskrit, if not the original Indo-European language, was of the same linguistic family as Greek and Latin. In 1893 Salomon Reinach could declare:

When the history of the evolution of the historical sciences of the 19th century is told, it will be rightly emphasized that it was in the period from 1880 to 1890 that—timidly at first, but later with an assurance that was better and better justified by the facts—a reaction against the “mirage oriental” was set in motion; the revindication of the rights of Europe against the claims of Asia in the obscurity of the first civilizations.

The late nineteenth-century interest in claiming an originary role for the Greek tradition in early Buddhist art must, at least in part, be understood in the context of this larger European project to construct a cultural lineage back to a purely Aryan Greece. The erasure of the non-Aryan within the West was played out as the assertion of Greek (Aryan) influence onto Gandhâra. In this sense, the discovery of Greek influence in Gandhâra has as much to do with the need of the West to secure its own internal dislocations and self-representations as it does with works of Buddhist art.

In Pursuit of Greco-Buddhist Art

Stein was but one of a number of travellers who discovered and made known to the world the many lost centres of Buddhist art and culture along the various routes of the ancient Silk Road linking the West with China and East Asia, but he was the most indefatigable, and he published all of his finds in the most thorough and meticulous fashion.—Roderick Whitfield

The theory of the Greek origin of the Buddha image was important to establishing a Western presence in Buddhist art. The theory was vulnerable, however, to the line of criticism that we have seen developed by Havell, namely, that the classical element in the art of Gandhâra was of little significance because it did not exert influence on later In-
ian art. If Greco-Buddhist art did not extend its stamp beyond Gandhāra, there could be no claim for either its generative power or its significance in world art history.

It is in this context that I would like to situate the work of the archaeological explorer Aurel Stein, a contemporary of Foucher. One fact of colonialism was that it offered scholars affiliated with the colonial powers unrivaled access to the language, culture, and history of native peoples. We have already noted the expansion of archaeology in the region of Gandhāra after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 as well as the crucial contribution of archaeology to the formation of early Western understandings of Gandhāran Buddhist art.

Stein was arguably the most successful archaeologist to explore the vast region between Gandhāra and the borders of China. His first post in India was as registrar of Punjab University and principal of Oriental College at Lahore. He would live in Lahore until 1899, spending over ten formative years developing a keen interest in Indian archaeology and antiquities under the tutelage of the Curator of the Lahore Museum, Lockwood Kipling. Not surprisingly, he was intrigued with the Greco-Buddhist sculpture in the Lahore Museum and his early forays into the field would be in the nearby region of Gandhāra.

For example, in 1896 Stein and Alfred Foucher were allowed to visit the Swat district in the upper reaches of British rule. The arrangements were made by the commander of the region, Major Harold Deane, whom Stein described as “the most pleasant of hosts and also an interesting historical type: the frontier politico who knows how to keep half-barbarian tribes under control.”

Stein wrote in December 1896:

I feel I am on classical soil and enjoyed every minute. As extensive as are the sites, they have unfortunately suffered considerably from the barbaric digging for sculptures. In spite of Major Deane’s assurances, every officer with a taste for the classical products of the old sculpture of Udyana has people dig in the monasteries and around the stupas for statues and reliefs. You can imagine what unspeakable destruction accompanies these robberies. Foucher and I often felt like Jeremiah mourning the ruins of this modern vandalism.

The expression of joy at standing on “classical” soil was a sentiment that was shared by a number of European archaeologists who worked in Gandhāra. The passage also records something of the character of collecting in the region. One can now surmise how the Buddha from Hoti Mardan came to reside in the mess hall of a British frontier garrison, in the words of Foucher, “leaning against the wall of the dining-room and no longer inhaling any incense but the smoke
of cigars.” The type of random digging described by Stein destroyed the archaeological context of the images and made the relative dating and ordering of the works next to impossible. This was a fundamental problem that would both plague scholars such as Foucher and also offer them the latitude to suggest chronological schemes that supported their claim for a Greek origin of the Buddha image.

The following November Stein was again in Swat enjoying the hospitality of Major Deane and it was then that Deane confided in Stein the possibility of a military expedition into adjacent Buner to inflict punishment on those who had supported an uprising against the British in Swat. Deane suggested that Stein arrange to accompany the British forces since Buner, which held unknown quantities of Buddhist antiquities, had not been previously entered by any European. This fortuitous turn of events would enable Stein to investigate Buddhist inscriptions and sculpture heretofore unavailable to any European scholar. Unfortunately for Stein and Buddhist scholarship, the resistance to the British military was weak, as the “Buneriens” had no rifles, and the occupation was unexpectedly short. The result was explained by Stein:

The period of occupation has been cut to four or five days when the last troops will be back on British soil. This is what makes a thorough investigation of the numerous ruins impossible and forces me to work with greater haste. I regret that soon a thick veil will once again fall over this fascinating mountain region. Who can say when the Buddhist ruins will be visited again by a European?

These early explorations offer some sense of the casual intersection of colonialism, archaeology, and scholarship which marked the discovery of Buddhist art in Gandhāra.

Stein soon turned his attention to Chinese Central Asia where he would have more leisurely opportunities for exploration as an official British explorer. He would, however, need to negotiate an altogether more complex political situation in India and abroad before his scholarly interests could be achieved. At the turn of the century, China was crippled by internal divisions and a feeble central government and, like Buner, posed no major political or military difficulties for exploration. Burdened for many decades by unequal treaties and territorial concessions, even more territory along the country’s eastern coast had been recently annexed as “Spheres of Influence.” Chinese Central Asia, remote from the central provinces, lightly populated and vast, was available to explorers from some of the very same nations that were besieging China’s eastern coastline. This
isolated region was part of the vast territories in which Russia and Britain would play out the “Great Game.” Every expedition into that region, ostensibly launched as an archaeological or scientific venture, was regarded with great suspicion by the rival nations, each of whom was anxious to establish additional spheres of influence. It was in this highly charged political context that Stein and other Orientalist explorers sought to explore Chinese Central Asia.

Stein’s proposal to the British Indian government in 1898 for the funding of his first Central Asian expedition offers us a glimpse of the tangled relationship between scholarship and international politics that would mark his career in Central Asia. Stein outlined his plans for archaeological explorations around Khotan and noted that “since my plan was first formed, it has been announced that the Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences has arranged to send three savants for the exploration of Turfan (Southern Chinese Turkestan) where ancient manuscripts have been found. I am also informed that Dr. Sven Hedin’s explorations . . . are likely to be resumed.” As for the moral right to explore this region, the famous Sanskritist, Rudolph Hoernle, summarized the claim of British Orientalist scholars in his letter of support to Stein’s proposal: “Khotan and the Southern portion of Chinese-Turkestan seem to me distinctly the proper sphere for British exploration. It by right belongs to the British ‘sphere of influence,’ to use the modern term; and we should not allow others to secure the credit which ought to belong to ourselves.”

While there were insinuations that many of the explorers who entered Chinese Central Asia were also spies, most probably were no more officially committed to intelligence gathering than Stein, who was a responsible British subject. In this regard, we might consider the implications of the extensive cartographic work directed by Stein and carried out by a two-man team of native surveyors from the India Survey department on each of his expeditions. Mapping was central to the division and organization of colonial territories and the India Survey was charged with the task of transforming India as well as neighboring regions into “a cellular Cartesian network of quadrants.” The political implications of such knowledge were well understood and the work of surveying and mapping was often a dangerous and clandestine operation. For example, one nineteenth-century ruse developed by the British to map Tibet involved training “natives,” disguised as Buddhist monks, to record distances by counting uniform paces on a special Buddhist rosary of 100 rather than 108 beads. The written records of such “pundits,” as they were dubbed by the British, often replaced the prayers placed in the drum.
of a Tibetan prayer wheel. None of the work by the India Survey teams with Stein involved such covert operations, although the presence of the Survey in his expeditions could only reinforce suspicions of British espionage in Central Asia.

An incident at the beginning of the first expedition in 1900 is illustrative of the political context of Stein’s archaeological explorations. After barely five weeks of travel, Stein received news of the Boxer uprising; his response was to hasten on to Kashgar in order to deliver a consignment of pistols and ammunition to George Macartney, Britain’s sole diplomatic representative in Chinese Central Asia. Macartney’s home would become a familiar rest stop for Stein and the envoy would often be a valuable source of information on the plans and position of competing expeditions in the region.

Macartney also played other useful roles: “As Lockwood Kipling had introduced Stein to Greco-Buddhist iconography just so Macartney interpreted and instructed him in the niceties of Chinese officialdom.” In August, as the colonial powers including Britain entered and looted Beijing, Macartney, no doubt fortified by his shipment of munitions, was able to cajole the local Chinese administrator to approve Stein’s explorations south of Khotan.

One of Stein’s goals in entering Central Asia was to help secure Western authority over the texts and other antiquities that had been appearing in piecemeal fashion during the 1890s. There was a growing awareness, especially among scholars of Buddhist texts, of the dangers posed by native trickery in the form of forgery. In response, Stein proposed to validate “the casual search of native treasure-seekers whose statements require verification. It can safely be asserted that the antiquarian objects obtained in this manner will acquire additional value when their origin has been properly authenticated.” The verification required to increase the “value” (monetary, scholarly, or both?) of Central Asian antiquities was implicitly understood to be authentication by a properly trained Western scholar.

Stein was also spurred on by the specter of impending destruction and loss hovering over the Buddhist ruins of Central Asia: “The thought of the grave risks with which nature, and still more, human activity threaten all these relics of antiquity, was ever present to my mind, and formed an urgent incentive to unwearied execution, however trying the conditions of work might be.” Stein was aware of the efforts of Khotanese treasure hunters, which reminded him of the “irresponsible digging” often sponsored by British officers in Gandhāra; however, it is the loss of Buddhist art due to Islamic icono-
clasm that is the tragic representation that has been retained and reiter-erated in the West. In his popular history of the exploration of Central Asia, Peter Hopkirk, for example, highlights the outrage of an "eye-witness," the British Colonel Reginald Schomberg, to the wholesale destruction of Buddhist art. Schomberg described his feelings upon arriving at the Central Asian Buddhist cave site of Kizil, near Kucha, in 1928:

Most of the frescoes had been removed by Professor Von Le Coq—providentially so for nearly all the remaining ones had been shamefully defaced by the local Mohammedans, only those that were inaccessible having escaped damage. It cannot be too often emphasised that it is solely due to European archaeologists that any of the Buddhist treasures of Turkestan have been saved from Turki fanaticism and vandalism.

It is ironic in this light that portions of the wall paintings removed by the German expedition led by Albert von Le Coq, and so rescued according to Schomberg, were destroyed in the Allied bombing of Berlin during World War II. Recent publication of the Kizil caves confirms that they remain stunningly beautiful with many scars but none as obvious as the gaping, blank walls from which the Germans removed sections of paintings.

A most important question related to preservation was, who should receive the Central Asian antiquities for safekeeping? Rudolph Hoernle outlined the position shared by more than one Western scholar in 1899 in his letter supporting Stein’s proposal: “It should be born in mind that India is practically inaccessible to European savants, who alone, as a rule, study such things; and that a certain amount of precariousness is inseparable from deposits made in Indian Museums. For these reasons the bulk of any collection that may be made should, in my opinion, be transferred to the British Museum.” From Hoernle’s statement, one can abstract the prevailing attitude toward Central Asian materials. First, scholarly interest in such things was limited to Western “savants”; second, India was not accessible to such scholars; and third, there was a “precariousness” to Indian museums. The last problem can be understood at a number of levels including the inferior physical facilities of museums in India and their questionable ability to conserve the artifacts, the safety of the materials in terms of possible local insurrections and the potential loss of access if India were to become an independent political entity, and a generalized feeling of uncertainty and apprehension that informed the colonial discourse on India. The advantages of the British Museum as the archive for archaeological materials were, from the
subject position of the European savant, self-evident: no institution in India could remotely rival the British Museum for its accessibility and security; more importantly, no institution was as experienced in transforming loot from the colonized world into educational exhibits for the British public. Stein concurred and suggested a compromise: in light of funding for his venture from the colonial government, all proceeds should be handed over to the British Indian government for the British Museum.

The preference given to the British Museum, repository of many examples of Greek art such as the Elgin Marbles, as final destination for the collection was particularly appropriate in light of Stein’s own interest in classical influence: “For us still greater interest must attach to the convincing evidence disclosed as to the question how far into Central Asia the classical art of the West had penetrated during the first centuries of our era.” He would uncover evidence of classical art across Central Asia at sites such as Niya on his first expedition and Miran on his second; and Greco-Buddhist art remained the touchstone for Western influence, as we can see at Miran:

There can be here no possible doubt that the character of the subject is Buddhist, but none either that all the essential details of its presentation have been adapted from classical models just as they would be if we had before us this scene carved in a Graeco-Buddhist relievo from Gandhāra.

In a short inscription at Miran, Stein found the name of a painter, “Tita,” which he argued “is the very form which we should expect the name ‘Titus’ to assume in the Sanskrit or Prakrit adopted for official and clerical use in a Central-Asian region far beyond the Indian border.” Stein goes on to suggest an origin for Tita very much along the lines of Foucher:

It is as a sort of Roman Eurasian, largely Oriental by blood but brought up in Hellenistic traditions, that I should picture to myself this painter-decorator, whom his calling had carried, no doubt through the regions of Eastern Iran impregnated with Buddhism to the very confines of China.

As we have seen, issues arising from the intersection of culture and race were of compelling interest to many European scholars and Stein was no exception. These interests were pursued through the collection of detailed ethnological and anthropometrical data during his expeditions.

Stein was clearly exhilarated by his discovery of the work of Tita at Miran:

Looking at his work in the dado, I felt no need to ask myself what these gay
figures carrying and enlivening the festoon decoration meant. It was enough for Western eyes to perceive, and to be gladdened by, the beauty and joy of life pervading almost all of them.

It was scarcely surprising that while my eyes rested on the dado, I felt often tempted to believe myself rather among the ruins of a villa in Syria or some other North-Eastern province of the late Roman empire than among those of a Buddhist sanctuary on the very confines of the true land of the Seres.130

Once again there was genuine joy for the European explorer at encountering forms that appeared familiar “to Western eyes” in the wastes of Central Asia. Finally, at Dunhuang, which marked the far eastern end of Central Asia and the beginning of China proper, Stein would be struck by “the faithful preservation of the face, pose, and drapery as developed by Greco-Buddhist art,” and more importantly, the authority of the classical: “No local taste had presumed to transform the dignified serenity of the features, the simple yet impressive gestures, the graceful richness of folds with which classical art, as transplanted to the Indus, had endowed the bodily presence of the Tathagata and his many epiphanies.”131

Stein’s most important contribution to the discourse of Greco-Buddhist art was the documentation of its unbroken trail from Gandhāra to China. Even if the influence of Greco-Buddhist art on Indian art was minimized by some, scholars could deploy Stein’s work to argue that Gandhāran art was the basis for all subsequent Buddhist art in Central and East Asia. A prominent example of such a move can be found in Ernest Fenollosa’s early art history survey, Epochs of Chinese and Japanese Art, in which the Buddhist art of both China and Japan was designated as Greco-Buddhist.132 This claim of significance was crucial to early formulations of the generative power of Greco-Buddhist art.

The quest for the outer limits of the classical tradition was never completed. It was perhaps an impossible goal because, for scholars such as Stein and Foucher there were no borders, geographical or temporal, to the West. Once situated as an originary ideal in the history of Buddhist art, Greco-Buddhist art would be perpetually reproduced in an infinite series of Buddha images stretching across Asia. In this sense, there was nothing for Stein to discover “out there” in Central Asia that had not already been predicated by the interests and needs of the West. His archaeological “spadework” can be understood as the culmination of the discourse of Greco-Buddhist art as begun by Leitner and developed in the work of Foucher. What was
created as a discursive procedure was realized as archaeological evidence.133

Epilogue

_The essential difference between a fake and an original is that one is false and the other true._ —Sherman Lee134

In 1985 a previously unknown work of Gandhāran sculpture, a statue of a standing bodhisattva figure, was included in an exhibition organized by the Cleveland Museum of Art. Two years later, the work was prominently featured in an exhibition of Buddhist art at the Nara National Museum.135 Questions were raised about the piece at that time, particularly concerning the large amount of gilding that remained on its surface, and opinion was divided as to whether the statue was an original antiquity or a modern forgery.136 The most persistent challenge to the authenticity of the image was mounted by a Japanese art historian, Tanabe Katsumi, on the basis of iconographic inconsistencies, technical analysis, and the anomalous gilding.137 William H. Wolff, the New York art dealer who purchased the work in 1979 in Peshawar, maintained that he was told the image was found near Mingora, Swat.138 Tanabe concluded that the work was a “forgery made around 1978 by the order of an antique dealer, Mr. Sardar Khan living in Peshawar. He made and sold many gilt fake Gandhāran Buddha and Bodhisattva images and they were scattered in the world, and more than ten pieces were brought to Japan around 1978 and are now kept as unique fakes in Japan.”139

What is of interest in this controversy is not simply whether the bodhisattva image, whose drapery folds are traced in the Cleveland catalog to “Greco-Roman prototypes,” is a forgery or not. Rather, this work of Gandhāran art (after all, the dispute is over when it was made, not where) is representative of a class of images produced in the relatively recent past in an ancient style and sold to art dealers for marketing to museums and private collections worldwide.140 Such images are a kind of simulacrum, “never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference.”141 What is suggested here is a class of images that relate to each other along a Möbius strip of self-referential gestures. As simulacra, such works, insofar as they are understood as representative of “real” antiquities, subvert the ontology of Gan-
dhāran sculpture and “loosen our hold on reality, deform and falsify our understanding of the past.”

The simulacrum represents the presence of the other side of the real that must be controlled, suppressed, and erased in order to produce the “regime of truth” that is Greco-Buddhist art. While reproductions of Buddhist art in the style of Gandhāra have been produced ever since “natives” recognized their value, the threat to the stability of Greco-Buddhist art as knowledge is not located in recent reproductions but in the potential of the unreal that was always present. Not incidentally, the phenomenon of the simulacrum recalls the specter of “native trickery” as well as the necessary responses of surveillance and discipline, although the confidence of scholars in their ability to discern the inauthentic antiquity is never equal to the anxiety that the simulacrum summons.

The irony is that the presence of the unreal in Gandhāran art is inextricable from the presence of the West. Reproductions of Gandhāran styles have little value without the demand/desire for Greco-Buddhist art and the pleasure generated by the discovery of the power and authority of the West in a remote corner of India. Western authority and presence, once confirmed in the history of Greek influence, continues to demonstrate both its allure and generative power in a wide range of contemporary scholarship. Yet, even as the discourse of Greco-Buddhist art is replicated as a universal reality, the simulacrum mimics, even mocks, such knowledge by never being what it is supposed to be, that is, the real of the classical (Western) episteme.

NOTES

I would like to thank Joanna Williams, Judith Farquhar, Robert Thorp, Tomoko Masuzawa, Donald Lopez, Louisa Schein, and Margaret Hattori for their comments and suggestions on various versions of this chapter.

1. The region is today a part of northern Pakistan.

2. For the concept of artistic influence, see Michael Baxandall, Patterns of Intention (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 58–62. Baxandall makes the point that arguments for influence are based on a theory of straightforward causality as in the image of one billiard ball striking another. As a result, “influence” implies the maker(s) of art is passive and dependent in relation to an active outside agent. The theory of influence, particularly in relation to diffusion theory and Buddhist art, deserves a thorough critique that is beyond the scope of this chapter.

3. For an extensive review of Western scholarship on Gandhāran art, see Rekha Morris, “Prolegomena to a Study of Gandhāra Art” (Ph.D. diss.,

4. The most important date is the commencement of the reign of the Kushan dynasty ruler, Kaniṣṭha, fixed by scholars as early as 78 C.E. and as late as the third century C.E. See A. L. Basham, ed., Papers on the Date of Kaniṣṭha (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968).

5. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 139–64. There are obvious difficulties involved in the use of terms as broad and ambiguous as “Western” or the “West.” Here, I can only borrow Dipesh Chakrabarty’s defense of his use of the similarly problematical term “Europe”:

Liberal-minded scholars would immediately protest that any idea of a homogeneous, uncontested “Europe” dissolves under analysis. True, but just as the phenomenon of orientalism does not disappear simply because some of us have now attained a critical awareness of it, similarly a certain version of “Europe,” reified and celebrated in the phenomenal world of everyday relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern, continues to dominate the discourse of history. Analysis does not make it go away. (“Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” Representations 37 [Winter 1992]: 1–2.)

6. While discursive practices are the central concern in this chapter, my intention is to stage the various ways in which a discourse is produced and empowered as a “totality which includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic” (Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism without Apologies,” New Left Review 166 [November–December 1987]: 82.


9. Today located in Pakistan, Lahore was the administrative center of the province of Punjab which had been annexed by the British in 1849. The principal collection of Gandhāran sculpture in the late nineteenth century was housed in the Lahore Museum, established in 1864 as the Industrial Art Museum of the Punjab, according to Vincent A. Smith, “Graeco-Roman Influence on the Civilization of Ancient India,” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 58 (1889): 114. Kipling’s father, Lockwood, was curator of the Lahore Museum from 1875–94.

10. In his notes, Said states that the cannon Zam-Zammah was constructed by Muslim invaders in 1757 from metal vases taken as a “tax” from each household in the city (Kipling, Kim, p. 340).


16. Although *Kim* was written with the assistance of the senior Kipling, the author specifically states that his “picture” of the Lahore Museum was solely his own. See Rudyard Kipling’s autobiography, *Something of Myself* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1937), pp. 149–50. Not incidentally, Lockwood Kipling had art historical connections as a close friend of Charles Eliot Norton, one of the most influential pioneers of the discipline of art history in the United States (Kipling, *Something of Myself*, p. 136). Norton, who taught courses in the “Fine Arts” at Harvard University as early as 1874, was instrumental in founding the Harvard art history program in 1890 and the Fogg Art Museum in 1895. See Donald Preziosi, “The Question of Art History,” *Critical Inquiry* 18, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 364–68.

17. For a brief summary of such views, see Almond, *The British Discovery of Buddhism*, p. 95. Also, see chap. 6 by Donald Lopez in this volume.

18. For an introduction to the problems posed by decolonization and particularism for the liberal discourse of universalism, see Wlad Godzich, “Foreword: The Further Possibility of Knowledge,” in Michel de Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*, trans. Brian Massumi, Theory and

19. A participant's account of the expedition can be found in L. Austine Waddell, *Lhasa and Its Mysteries* (London: John Murray, 1905). In his introduction Waddell mentions Kipling as well as the failure of an attempt to enter Lhasa in disguise in 1892.

20. The results of clandestine surveillance and mapping operations by British agents in Central Asia and Tibet were routinely reported in various official British publications and scholarly journals as early as the 1860s. See Derek Waller, *The Pundits: British Exploration of Tibet and Central Asia* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1990), pp. 33 ff. In a period when increasing opposition to colonial rule was being expressed in both India and Britain, it is striking that the writings of British in India consistently exclude references to Indian nationalism or discontent. For some examples, see Francis G. Hutchins, *The Illusion of Permanence* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 187; and John A. McClure, *Kipling and Conrad: The Colonial Fiction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 79–80.


22. Undoubtedly one of the most impressive aspects of Waddell's *Lhasa and Its Mysteries* was its visual documentation of Tibet: three color photographs, each identified as having been taken "from nature," 110 black-and-white photographs, and numerous drawings, maps, and charts.

23. Richards, "Archive and Utopia," is an extensive discussion of the project of mapping and the archive in relation to imperialism and Tibet.


25. For an overview of the multiple uses of technology in the development of Western imperialism, see Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). Special thanks to Robert Thorp for this reference.

26. In his introduction to *Kim*, Edward Said suggests that by having the Curator give his spectacles to the lama, Kipling symbolically places the lama within the "protective orbit of British rule in India" (Said, Introduction to *Kim*, p. 15). I am suggesting in addition that the spectacles along with English paper and pencils stand in a metonymic relationship to Western epistemology—ways of seeing, recording, and knowing truth.

27. The fact that the pencase is Chinese and not Tibetan is consistent with Kipling’s portrayal of the lama as an ideal type of Asiatic religious man.
In the context of the negative attitudes of the period towards Tibetan Buddhism, a Chinese antique is also more credible as an item the curator might desire.


31. Coins from various parts of the subcontinent identified as Bactrian were known as early as 1738: H. H. Wilson, Ariana Antiqua (London: East India Company, 1841), p. 3. Wilson’s opening chapter, “Account of the Progress of Bactro-Indian Numismatic and Antiquarian Discovery, and Observations on the Edifices, called Topes,” is a thorough account of early numismatic and archaeological activity in the region.


34. The report was published in James Tod, “An Account of Greek, Parthian and Hindu Medals, found in India,” Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society 1 (1827): 313–42.


37. The power implicit in the positioning of Greece at the apex of world civilization continues to be circulated in a diverse array of educational settings. For example, see the critical reading of the site of Greece in the American Museum of Natural History in Mieke Bal, “Telling, Showing, Showing Off,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 3 (Spring 1992): 569–71.


41. The measuring of skulls and the analysis of their shape as a method of determining racial differences and the relative intelligence of ra-

42. The report also foreshadows the Royal Asiatic Society's call in 1866 for the collecting of human crania for their museum's ethnological section. Since it was soon observed that many of the most interesting skulls were attached to living specimens, plans were put forward to hold an ethnological congress in which living specimens of "Aborigines" could be displayed in stalls for measurement, photography and the general advancement of science. See Prakash, "Science 'Gone Native,'" pp. 157–60.

43. E. C. Bayley, "Notes on some sculptures found in the district of Peshawar," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* 21 (1852): 606–31. These works, collected by a Colonel Lumsden and Lieutenant Stokes, were exhibited in the Crystal Palace and destroyed there in a fire according to Smith, "Graeco-Roman Influence," p. 120.


46. Technology, or more accurately the lack thereof, played a significant role according to Smith, who blames "the extreme rudeness of the illustrative plates" for the lack of interest in E. C. Bayley's report (Smith, "Graeco-Roman Influence," p. 120).

47. Smith, "Graeco-Roman Influence," p. 120. For a reprint of Leitner's 1871 article and additional comments, see G. W. Leitner, "Graeco-Buddhistic Sculpture," *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, n.s., 7, no. 13/14 (January and April 1894): 186–89. For an evaluation of a group of illustrated works from Leitner's collection, see "Dr. Leitner's Buddhistic Sculptures," *Indian Antiquary* 3 (June 1874): 158–60.

48. *Numismatic Chronicle* 15 (1875): 12, n. 7, as cited in Smith, "Graeco-Roman Influence," p. 120.

49. Smith, "Graeco-Roman Influence," p. 120. By the time of Smith's article in 1889, the scholarly bibliography on the Gandhâran "school" was considerable. See the extended footnote on pp. 113–14 which includes a Descriptive List of the Principal Buddhist Sculptures in the Lahore Museum "kindly supplied to me by the Curator." Smith also notes, "Mr Kipling, Curator of the Lahore Museum, informs me that he intends to arrange for the publication of a set of photographs of Indo-Hellenic art."

50. Ibid., p. 172.


52. Smith, "Graeco-Roman Influence," pp. 126, 190.

53. Bhabha, "The Other Question," p. 18, where Bhabha is referring to the colonial stereotype of the native.

62. This is not to say that dissenting opinions were not expressed. Okakura Kakuzo argued that the Mongolian origins of the Kushan rulers of Gandhāra were fundamental and that “a deeper and better-informed study of the works of Gandhāra itself will reveal a greater prominence of Chinese than of the so-called Greek characteristics” (Ideal of the East [London: John Murray, 1905], pp. 77–78). Vincent Smith’s response was: “It would not be worth while to notice Mr. Okakura’s rash assertions, but for the attention that his book has received in certain quarters for its attempted vindication of the claims of Asiatic as against European art ideals” (A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon [Oxford: Clarendon, 1911], p. 129). Arguments against theories of Greek and Western influence in Gandhāra, however, continued. For example, see H. Heras, “The Origin of the So-called Greco-Buddhist School of Sculpture of Gandhāra,” Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 12 (1936): 71–97; and, more recently, Ajit Ghosh, Gandhāra and Its Art Tradition (Calcutta: Mahua, 1978).
66. Foucher, “Greek Origin,” pp. 117–18. This is the publication of a
lecture given at the Mussée Guimet in 1912. Further citations appear in the text.


70. The humanist aspect of Foucher’s work is at least partly responsible for the strikingly sympathetic responses in recent scholarship, e.g., that of J. C. Harle: “Foucher’s disappointment at finding no Hellenistic remains whatsoever at Balkh makes poignant reading” (The Art and Architecture of the Indian Subcontinent [New York: Viking Penguin, 1986], p. 497, n. 36). Lolita Nehru explains that one of the main themes in her monograph “is an exposition, almost a vindication, of Foucher’s incisive understanding of, and insight into, the complex process of cultural and stylistic interaction” (Nehru, Origins of the Gandhāran Style, p. 8).


75. Ibid., p. 314.

76. Ibid., p. 323. Some sympathetic scholars such as Paul Mus would later develop Coomaraswamy’s position into one that suggested the simultaneous and independent development of the Buddha image in Gandhāra and Mathura. See Paul Mus, Barabudur (Hanoi: Imprimerie d’Extrême Orient 1935), p. 19.


79. Mitter, Much Maligned Monsters, p. 277. Coomaraswamy has also been criticized for an emphasis on terms such as “magical” or “vision” that reinforce Western stereotypes about the irrationality of Indian art. See Mary F. Linda, “The ‘Vision’ of Zimmer and Coomaraswamy,” Heinrich Zimmer: Coming into His Own, ed. Margaret Case (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

81. Mitter, *Much Maligned Monsters*, p. 258. Fergusson was instrumental in propagating the largely accepted thesis that Indian sculpture evolved not in the direction of progress as European art did, but in a pattern of continuous decline. See James Fergusson, *The History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (London: 1876), p. 36. Smith was one of the first to utilize classically influenced art as an ideal against which all of Indian art could be systematically measured. See Smith, “Graeco-Roman Influence,” esp. p. 173.


84. Robert Young puts it as follows at the conclusion of his discussion of Edward Said’s *Orientalism*: “If Orientalism involves a science of inclusion and incorporation of the East by the West, then that inclusion produces its own disruption: the creation of the Orient, if it does not really represent the East, signifies the West’s own dislocation from itself, something inside that is presented, narrativized, as being outside” (Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* [London: Routledge, 1990], p. 139).


86. Ibid., pp. 229, 372.


88. Not incidentally, “Ariana” was the early term, based on the “authority of classical writers,” used to designate the region between Iran and India that included Bactria (H. H. Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. vii).

89. Interest in the Aryan question was shared by a number of scholars involved in the study of Buddhist art. See, e.g., Ernest Binfield Havell, *The History of Aryan Rule in India* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1918); or L. Austine Waddell, *The Makers of Civilization in Race and History* (London: Luzac & Co., 1929), p. vi, where he declares: “For biologists have conclusively shown that civilization is fundamentally conditioned by a superior quality of race, and that in the classic Greek period civilization reached its zenith under the Aryan or Nordic Race (which still forms a leading element in the foremost European nations to-day).”


93. Stein's biography is marked with a sustained interest in the classical West. At an early age, he adopted Alexander the Great as a hero and focused on the study of Greek and Roman histories; later he bestowed the moniker "Buddhist Pausanias" on the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Xuan Zang (ibid., pp. 16–17).

94. From a letter by Stein written at Major Deane's house, December 27, 1897, as cited in ibid., pp. 70–71.

95. From a letter by Stein written at Fort Chakdarra, Swat, December 27, 1896, as cited in ibid., p. 68.

96. John Marshall, for instance, would declare: "It is upwards of forty years since I visited Taxila and I still remember the thrill I got from the sight of its buried cities. At that time I was a young man, fresh from archaeological excavations in Greece and filled with enthusiasm for anything Greek; and in that far-off corner of the Punjab it seemed as if I had lighted all of a sudden on a bit of Greece itself" (John Marshall, *Taxila*, 3 vols. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951], 1:xv, as cited in Chakrabarti, *History of Indian Archaeology*, p. 133).


98. For the background of the "tribal disturbances" involving Swat and Buner from a British "frontier hand's" point of view, see C. Collin Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 91–92.


101. For example, in 1895 Japan annexed Formosa; in 1896 Russia and France received concessions at Hankou; in 1897 Germany annexed Qingdao and Japan received concessions at Suzhou and Hangzhou; in 1898 Britain annexed the Weihai region in Shandong and Russia annexed Dalian and Lushun on the Liaodong Peninsula; in 1899 the French annexed the region of Zhanjiang and Japan received concessions at Xiamen. It should be noted that Britain had "secured" most of its concessions of Chinese territory much earlier, primarily in the period from 1840 into the 1860s. See summary tables in Jacques Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization*, trans. J. R. Foster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 584, 601.

102. These explorers included Sven Hedin of Sweden, Albert Grunwedel and Albert von Le Coq from Germany, the French Sinologist Paul Pelliot, the Russians Dmitri Klementz and Petr Koslov, Tachibana Zuicho and other members of the Otani missions from Japan, and Langdon Warner leading the Harvard expeditions. For a dramatic survey of these competing expeditions, see Peter Hopkirk, *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road* (London: John Murray, 1980).
103. "Great Game" denotes the political and military rivalry carried out between Russia and Britain in High Asia, the region between the Caucasus and India, throughout most of the nineteenth century. Sometimes attributed to Rudyard Kipling and *Kim*, the phrase was originated by a British military intelligence officer, Arthur Conolly, in 1831. See Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia* (London: John Murray, 1990), p. 123.

104. From Stein's proposal as cited in Mirsky, *Aurel Stein*, p. 79. Stein's denotation of Turfan, clearly located on the northern side of the region, as part of "Southern Chinese Turkestan" is notable as an example of the creative manipulations of geography necessary to include Turfan in the British "sphere of influence."

105. As cited in ibid., p. 84.

106. Stein, who was Hungarian by birth, would take British citizenship in 1904, a few years after his first Central Asian expedition. Stein's support for colonial rule appears to have been complete. See ibid., pp. 333-36. One must wonder, however, if Stein was being ironic in 1935 when he described part of a visit to the ruins of Pompeii: "I had the wonderful site almost to myself. . . . The order maintained now among the ruins is as impressive as that which prevails in Naples, once so noted for its beggars & dirt. Be praise to Mussolini for it all!" (ibid., p. 493).

107. Ibid., p. 31.


112. For example, see Macartney's reports summarized in a letter by Stein dated January 6, 1906, as cited in ibid., pp. 230–31.

113. Ibid., p. 137.


116. From Stein's proposal for his first expedition, dated September 10, 1898, as cited in Mirsky, *Aurel Stein*, p. 79.
118. Ibid., p. xx.
119. Hopkirk, *Foreign Devils*, p. 3.
123. As cited in Mirsky, *Aurel Stein*, p. 84.
125. From Stein’s proposal of September 10, 1898, as cited in Mirsky, *Aurel Stein*, p. 81. In the end the Stein material was divided between the British Museum and India.
128. Ibid., 1:530, 531.
133. Stein and his achievements continue to be heralded: “Who better exemplifies the interconnections between Western, Central and East Asia featured in the *Bulletin of the Asia Institute* than the dauntless Aurel Stein?” (“Report,” *Bulletin of the Asia Institute* 1993, 3:1.)
135. Stanislaw J. Czuma, *Kushan Sculpture: Images from Early India*


138. Tanabe, “Iconographical and Typological Investigation,” p. 99, n. 2. According to the respective catalogs, the work was owned by Mr. Wolff at the time of the Cleveland exhibition and had been sold into a private collection in Osaka when exhibited in Nara. See Czuma, *Kushan Sculpture*, p. 203; and Nara National Museum, *Bosatsu*, p. 12.


140. The ongoing creation of works in any number of ancient styles in India is widely acknowledged. For a discussion of the making of new works in old styles, including a stone head in Gandhāran style, see Joanna Williams, “A Forged Gupta Head,” in Linda, ed. *The Real, the Fake and the Masterpiece*, pp. 33–36.


145. “A complex process of reasoning is necessary in order to distinguish the fake . . . It is, ultimately, broad comparison with works whose authenticity cannot be doubted, either because their excavation is documented or because museums acquired them long ago and for very little money, that leads to some assurance. (We know of almost no forgeries before the twentieth century)” (emphasis added). (Williams, “Forged Gupta Head,” p. 35).

Zen has been touted as an iconoclastic and antinomian tradition which rejects scholastic learning and ritualism in favor of naturalness, spontaneity, and freedom. According to some enthusiasts, Zen is not, properly speaking, a religion at all, at least not in the sectarian or institutional sense of the word. Nor is it a philosophy, a doctrine, or even a spiritual technique. Rather, Zen is “pure experience” itself—the ahistorical, transcultural experience of “pure subjectivity” which utterly transcends discursive thought. The quintessential expression of Zen awakening, the kōan, is accordingly construed as an “illogical” or “nonrational” riddle designed to forestall intellection and bring about a realization of the “eternal present.” Furthermore, Zen, as the full and unmediated experience of life itself untainted by cultural accretions, is the ultimate source of all authentic religious teaching, both Eastern and Western. Zen is no more Buddhist than it is Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, and as such it is preeminently suited to serve as the foundation for interfaith dialogue.

Elsewhere I have argued that this popular conception of Zen is not only conceptually incoherent but also a woeful misreading of traditional Zen doctrine, altogether controverted by the lived contingencies of Zen monastic practice.¹ Classical Zen ranks among the
most ritualistic forms of Buddhist monasticism. Zen "enlightenment," far from being a transcultural and transhistorical subjective experience, is constituted in elaborately choreographed and eminently public ritual performances. The kōan genre, far from serving as a means to obviate reason, is a highly sophisticated form of scriptural exegesis: the manipulation or "solution" of a particular kōan traditionally demanded an extensive knowledge of canonical Buddhist doctrine and classical Zen literature.

I do not intend to belabor this issue here. Rather, I would like to focus on the genesis of the popular view: How was it that the West came to conceive of Zen in terms of a transcendent or "unmediated" personal experience? And why are Western intellectuals, scholars of religion, Christian theologians, and even Catholic monastics so eager to embrace this distortion in the face of extensive historical and ethnographic evidence to the contrary?

In order to arrive at a satisfactory answer to these questions it is necessary to recover the historical and ideological context of contemporary Zen discourse in the West. We must remember that Zen is a relative newcomer to the field of Buddhist studies, and that Zen entered the purview of Western academe primarily through the proselytizing activities of Japanese apologists. This was not the case with most other Buddhist traditions, which were typically introduced to scholarship through the efforts of dedicated Western historians and philologists who edited, translated, and interpreted Buddhist scriptures from classical languages. By the turn of the century, these Western scholars had produced a wealth of historical and textual studies on Buddhism, supplemented by field reports of Westerners who had lived in Asia and who had the opportunity to observe Buddhist communities firsthand. Yet virtually none of the studies available in the West prior to this century, whether textual or ethnographic, paid any serious attention to Zen.

Zen was introduced to Western scholarship not through the efforts of Western orientalists, but rather through the activities of an elite circle of internationally minded Japanese intellectuals and globe-trotting Zen priests, whose missionary zeal was often second only to their vexed fascination with Western culture. These Japanese Zen apologists emerged, in turn, out of the profound social and political turmoil engendered by the rapid Westernization and modernization of Japan in the Meiji period (1868–1912). Given the pedigree of these early Zen missionaries, one might have expected Western scholars of Buddhism to approach their high-minded pronounce-
ments with considerable caution, if not skepticism, but such has rarely been the case. Accordingly, we will begin with a brief look at the principal figures responsible for bringing Zen to the West, and at the social context out of which they emerged.

**Meiji Buddhism and the “Soul of Japan”**

The early years of the Meiji were trying times for Japanese Buddhists. Their religion had become the subject of a devastating critique and persecution known as *haibutsu kishaku* or “abolishing Buddhism and destroying [the teachings of] Śākyamuni.” Government ideologies succeeded for a time in censuring Buddhism as a corrupt, decadent, antisocial, parasitic, and superstitious creed, inimical to Japan’s need for scientific and technological advancement. At the same time, Buddhism was effectively rendered by its opponents as a foreign “other,” diametrically opposed to the cultural sensibility and innate spirituality of the Japanese.4

The Buddhist establishment in the early Meiji was left reeling not only by the success of anti-Buddhist government policies, but also by the dramatic social changes brought about by rapid modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. Buddhist temples had to cope with the expropriation of income-producing temple estates by government authorities. To make matters worse, government persecution, combined with rapid urbanization, led to the collapse of the *danka* (parishioner) system which had guaranteed Buddhist temples the financial support of affiliated “member families” throughout the Tokugawa period.

Rather than concede defeat, a vanguard of modern Buddhist leaders emerged to argue the Buddhist cause.5 These university-educated intellectuals readily admitted to the corruption, decay, and petty sectarian rivalries that characterized the late Tokugawa Buddhist establishment. But, at the same time, they insisted that such corruption merely indicated the degree to which Buddhism had strayed from its pure spiritual roots. Accordingly, the problem lay not in Buddhism itself, but rather in the institutional and sectarian trappings to which Buddhism had fallen prey. The solution lay not in continued persecution from without, but in reform from within.

In this defensive strategy one can readily discern the influence of the late nineteenth-century European zeitgeist that permeated university campuses in Meiji Japan. Japanese intellectuals, seeking to
bring their nation into the "modern world," were naturally drawn to the European critique of institutional religion—the legacy of the anticlericism and antiritualism of the Reformation, the rationalism and empiricism of the Enlightenment, the romanticism of figures such as Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and the existentialism of Nietzsche. Some Japanese Buddhist leaders went so far as to argue that the official suppression of Buddhism was in fact a purifying force that would purge Buddhism of its degenerate accretions and effect a return to the original essence of the Buddha's teachings. The result came to be known in Japan as the New Buddhism (shin \textit{bukkyo}), which was "modern," "cosmopolitan," "humanistic," and "socially responsible." This reconstructed Buddhism, under the guise of "true" or "pure" Buddhism, was conceived of as a "world religion" ready to take its rightful place alongside other universal creeds. True Buddhism was in no way opposed to reason; on the contrary, Buddhism, once purified of all superstitious accretions, was found to be uncompromisingly empirical and rational, and in full accord with the findings of modern science. According to its defenders, early Buddhism actually anticipated modern scientific discoveries in areas as diverse as physics, astronomy, and psychology.

In their spirited defense of their creed, Buddhist leaders actively appropriated the ideological agenda of government propagandists and the nativist movement. They became willing accomplices in the promulgation of \textit{kokutai} (national polity) ideology—the attempt to render Japan a culturally homogeneous and spiritually evolved nation politically unified under the divine rule of the emperor.\(^6\) Buddhist priests went so far as to don Shinto robes and preach national ethics under the auspices of the Ministry of Doctrine (\textit{kyōbusho}), all the while insisting that Buddhism was a repository for the sacred values of the Japanese people.\(^7\) With the emergence of Japan as a military and colonial power in Asia, the "foreignness" of Buddhism became an asset rather than a source of embarrassment: Buddhism's status as the cultural heritage of all Asia allowed the Japanese to affirm their cultural and spiritual solidarity with the peoples of the Asian continent, while at the same time claiming Japanese spiritual and moral superiority. In making their case, the intellectual leaders of the New Buddhism drew upon Darwinian evolutionary models of religion popular at the turn of the century, and argued that the Buddhism of Japan represents the most evolutionarily advanced form of the Buddha's teaching. Indeed, some Japanese went so far as to insist that pure Buddhism—the very fount of Asian spirituality—survives
only in Japan. Japan was thereby rendered the sole heir to the spiritual and ethical heritage of the East precisely at a time of heightened imperial ambitions and military adventurism.

It is not surprising, then, that this successful Buddhist polemic is adopted and further refined by adherents of Japanese Zen. Zen, we are told, is immune to “Enlightenment” critiques of religion precisely because it is not a religion in the institutional sense at all; it is, rather, an uncompromisingly empirical, rational, and scientific mode of inquiry into the nature of things. At the same time, the emergent discourse of a reconstructed Zen is predicated upon, and inexorably enmeshed in, the nativist and imperialist ideology of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japan. Zen is touted as the very heart of Asian spirituality, the essence of Japanese culture, and the key to the unique qualities of the Japanese race.

As Japan experienced a series of stunning military victories in Asia, notably the defeat of the Chinese in 1895 and the Russians in 1905, and as Japan pushed farther into Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan, the military and cultural accomplishments of the Japanese nation came to be explained with reference to bushidō or “the way of the warrior.” This supposedly ancient “samurai code,” exemplified by the heroes of countless popular legends and myths, comprised an ethos of self-discipline, self-sacrifice, single-mindedness, unhesitating obedience to one’s lord, and utter fearlessness in the face of death. The proponents of kokutai proffered these qualities as the birthright of all Japanese—bushidō was the expression of “Japaneseess” itself. The fact that the term bushidō itself is rarely attested in premodern literature did not discourage Japanese intellectuals and propagandists from using the concept to explicate and celebrate the cultural and spiritual superiority of the Japanese.8

The Japanese were not the only ones subject to this romantic ennoblization of the Japanese character. The year 1900 saw the publication in English of Nitobe Inazo’s Bushido: The Soul of Japan, which, along with Okakura Kakuzō’s Book of Tea published in 1906, and Sugimoto’s Daughter of the Samurai published in 1925, introduced the English-speaking world to the vagaries of nihonjinron—theories concerning the purported uniqueness of the Japanese.9 Thus a generation of unsuspecting Europeans and Americans was subjected to Meiji caricatures of the lofty spirituality, the selflessness, and the refined aesthetic sensibilities of the Japanese race. And, most significant, it was during this period that Zen was first brought to the attention of the West at large. As we shall see, the first English-
language works on Zen emphasized precisely the close relationship between Zen and "the way of the samurai."

Zen and the Way of the Samurai

The first book to appear in English on the subject of Zen was published in 1906 under the title *Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot* by Shaku Sōen (1859–1919). Sōen Rōshi came to play a pivotal role in the export of Zen to the West, not only through his own efforts—his participation at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions, his subsequent lecture tour of America and Europe, and the English publication of his lectures—but also through the efforts of some of his students, notably D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966) and Nyogen Senzaki (1876–1958). Given Sōen’s role in the transmission of Zen to the West, it is important to note that Sōen was far from a typical Zen master or rōshi: he was a university-educated intellectual who traveled extensively through much of America, Europe, and Asia. Moreover, Sōen was an avowed religious reformer who devoted much of his mature career to training Buddhist laymen rather than Zen priests.

Sōen’s modernist outlook reflects in part the influence of his own teacher, Kösen Sōen (better known as Imagita [or Imakita] Kösen, 1816–92), the highly respected if somewhat unorthodox Rinzai leader who served as chief abbot (*kanchō*) of Engakuji from 1875 until his death in 1892. Kösen Rōshi was himself a widely educated man of letters interested in Chinese and Western philosophy, who served the Meiji government in a number of different capacities including that of “national evangelist” (*kyōdōshoku*) under the Ministry of Doctrine in the 1870s. Kösen was very much part of the early Meiji Buddhist reform movement briefly discussed above, and as such he was an enthusiastic advocate of “nonsectarian,” “universal,” and “socially engaged” Buddhism. Kösen actively encouraged lay participation in Buddhist practice, opening the newly constructed Zen hall at Engakuji to lay students wishing to practice Zen meditation.

Sōen had been ordained as a novice at the age of twelve, and had already studied Zen at Myōshinji in Kyoto and Sōgenji in Okayama before he came to train in Kamakura. In Kamakura Sōen finished his formal training under Kösen at Engakuji, and received *inka-shōmei* (certification of the seal [of dharma transmission]) at the remarkably young age of twenty-four. He then took the unusual step of entering the prestigious Keiō University in Tokyo, a university es-
tablished in 1866 primarily for the study of Western culture. Upon graduation in 1885, while still in his twenties, Sōen traveled to India and Ceylon to pursue his study of Buddhist languages. He returned to Japan after two years of Pāli studies in Ceylon (1887–89), and was installed as chief abbot of Engakuji following his master’s death in 1892. As abbot, Sōen continued his teacher’s practice of welcoming lay Zen practitioners into the monastery confines. Sōen also revived a zazen society in Tokyo established by Kösen exclusively for the training of lay men and women. D. T. Suzuki reports that “the number of people, monks and laymen alike, who came for sanzen [private instruction] with Sōen Rōshi during that time was amazing.”

In 1893 Sōen became the first Zen master to travel to America, where he made a favorable and lasting impression as the representative of the Zen school at the Chicago World Parliament of Religions. The English translation of Sōen’s address to the World Parliament had been prepared by the then unknown D. T. Suzuki (with the help of the writer Natsume Sōseki), and following the World Parliament Sōen arranged for Suzuki to travel to America to study with Paul Carus (1852–1919, see below). In retrospect, Suzuki may well have been Sōen’s greatest contribution to the spread of Zen in the West.

Sōen also made tours of the Japanese colonial territories on the Asian continent, traveling first to Manchuria during the early months of the Russo-Japanese war as a chaplain to the army. Following the Japanese victory he embarked on a circumambulation of the globe, lecturing on Buddhism and Zen in America, England, France, Germany, Italy, Ceylon, and India. Upon returning to Japan in 1906, Sōen refused to take up an abbot’s post for many years, choosing instead to devote his full energies to teaching Zen to laymen. Consequently, he spent several years traveling throughout Japan giving lectures and instruction in Zen practice. In 1912 Sōen traveled once again to Manchuria and Korea at the invitation of the Southern Manchurian Railways Company, where he lectured on Zen and Japanese culture to members of the Japanese colonial administration.

Sōen’s approach to Buddhism was typical of the new breed of cosmopolitan and intellectual religious leaders emerging in the Meiji period. His address to the World Parliament in 1893 was ecumenical in spirit, portraying Buddhism as a “universal religion” in harmony with other world faiths, as well as with science and philosophy. But the collection of sermons delivered during his second trip to America betrays Sōen’s sympathy for the nationalistic and xenophobic senti-
ments characteristic of the time. Indeed, the title of his 1912 series of lectures delivered in Korea and Manchuria—"The Spirit of the Yamato Race"—speaks for itself. Nor were his nationalist leanings kept secret from his Western admirers—the collection of essays published in *Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot* concludes with three short pieces that, while deploiring the grisly horrors of war, defend the honor and justice of Japanese military aggression in Manchuria:

War is not necessarily horrible, provided that it is fought for a just and honorable cause, that it is fought for the maintenance and realization of noble ideals, that it is fought for the upholding of humanity and civilization. Many material human bodies may be destroyed, many humane hearts be broken, but from a broader point of view these sacrifices are so many phoenixes consumed in the sacred fire of spirituality, which will arise from the smoldering ashes reanimated, ennobled, and glorified.¹⁸

In addition to Sōen's concern to justify Japanese military aggression, his Western lectures on Buddhism also reveal an interest in a quintessential *nihonjinron* theme, the difference between "Oriental" and "Occidental" mentalities. Westerners, we are told, are noisy, restless, boastful of their possessions, wasteful of their energies, and generally unsuited to the mystical teachings of the East. Orientals, on the other hand, are raised with a "strong emphasis placed upon the necessity of preserving the latent nervous energy and of keeping the source of spiritual strength well fed and nourished." The Oriental's ideal "is to be incomprehensible, immeasurable, and undemonstrative even as an absolute being itself," and thus, claims Sōen, the Oriental is naturally drawn to meditation.¹⁹ Sōen's musings on the Japanese ethnos are of a type with those of other early *nihonjinron* theorists, including Okakura Kakuzō (1862–1913), Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), Kuki Shūzo (1888–1941), D. T. Suzuki, and Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962). All these men were moved to extemporize on the gap between the Oriental and the Occidental during or following their sojourns in the West. I shall return to this point below.

The second English book to appear on Zen was entitled *Religion of the Samurai: A Study of Zen Philosophy and Discipline in China and Japan*, authored by Nukariya Kaiten (1867–1934), a Sōtō priest, university professor, and personal friend of D. T. Suzuki.²⁰ Nukariya wrote *Religion of the Samurai*, which appeared in 1913, while living and lecturing at Harvard University. Here we learn that only in Japan is Buddhism still alive; that Zen is an ancient, if not the most ancient, form of Buddhism (pp. xviii–xix); that "pure Zen" can be found only in Japan (p. 1); that the ideas of Zen are "in harmony
with those of the New Buddhists” (p. xix, n. 2); and that Zen is an ideal doctrine for a newly emergent martial Japan: “It is Zen that modern Japan, especially after the Russo-Japanese War, has acknowledged as an ideal doctrine for her rising generation” (p. xxii). Nukariya further argues that the spirit and ethic of Zen is essentially identical with that of the samurai (pp. 35–40), and he waxes poetic on the great generals of old Japan, whose “loyalty, wisdom, bravery, and prudence are not merely unique in the history of Japan, but perhaps in the history of man” (p. 43).

After the Restoration of the Mei-ji the popularity of Zen began to wane, and for some thirty years remained in inactivity; but since the Russo-Japanese War its revival has taken place. And now it is looked upon as an ideal faith, both for a nation full of hope and energy, and for a person who has to fight his own way in the strife of life. Bushidō, or the code of chivalry, should be observed not only by the soldier in the battle-field, but by every citizen in the struggle for existence. If a person be a person and not a beast, then he must be a Samurai—brave, generous, upright, faithful, and manly, full of self-respect and self-confidence, and at the same time full of the spirit of self-sacrifice. We can find an incarnation of Bushidō in the late General Nogi, the hero of Port Arthur, who, after the sacrifice of his two sons for the country in the Russo-Japanese War, gave up his own and his wife’s life for the sake of the deceased Emperor. He died not in vain, as some might think, because his simplicity, uprightness, loyalty, bravery, self-control, and self-sacrifice, all combined in his last act, surely inspire the rising generation with the spirit of the Samurai to give birth to hundreds of Nogis. (Pp. 50–51)

This eloquent eulogy to General Nogi, in an introductory book on Zen published in 1913, is telling indeed. Less than a year had passed since Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912), Japanese war hero and mentor to the future Showa Emperor, shocked the nation by committing seppuku with his wife during the funeral ceremonies for Emperor Meiji. Despite some praise in the foreign press for this spectacular display of bushidō spirit, news of Nogi’s suicide was met with considerable confusion and distress by intellectuals in Japan, who felt that the practice of junshi (following one’s lord into death) was outmoded, unduly theatrical, and an embarrassment to a nation seeking international recognition as a modern world power.21

Yet Nukariya, for one, does not hesitate to laud Nogi’s suicide. This should not surprise us. Nogi himself was known to have taken an interest in Zen practice, receiving instruction and kōan training from the celebrated master Nantenbō (1839–1925). In his personal remembrances, Nantenbō Rōshi, himself a staunch nationalist and
partisan to the Japanese military, recalls instructing Nogi on the meaning of Zen. The essence of Zen, explained Nantenbō, lies in the single word jiki (direct), which has three distinct but interrelated meanings: (1) going forward without hesitation, (2) direct mind-to-mind transmission, and (3) “the spirit of Japan” (yamatodamashii). It clearly served the interests of late Meiji Zen apologists to identify the “essence of Zen” with both the “spirit of bushidō” and the “spirit of Japan,” notions then replete with connotations of imperial conquest and unconditional obedience to the emperor.

D. T. Suzuki and the Religion of Science

The notion that Zen is somehow related to Japanese culture in general, and bushidō in particular, is familiar to Western students of Zen through the writings of D. T. Suzuki, no doubt the single most important figure in the spread of Zen in the West. But while Suzuki is frequently cast as a “man of Zen,” we must remember that he remained a layman throughout his life, and that most of his formal Zen training took place between the years of 1891 and 1897 while he was a university student in Tokyo. Suzuki’s Zen training was squeezed into weekends and school vacations, when he would commute to Kamakura to practice under the aforementioned Imagita Kōsen and Shaku Sōen. Suzuki is thus very much a product of Meiji New Buddhism—just a decade or so earlier it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a middle-class layman to receive the kind of instruction available to Suzuki at Engakuji, which included sanzen and kōan instruction.

A great deal has already been written on the life of D. T. Suzuki, and despite the fact that much of the writing is hagiographical in nature, I will confine myself to the briefest overview of his early career in order to focus on his Zen. Suzuki was born in Kanazawa (Ishikawa Prefecture) in 1870, and first became interested in Zen in high school through the influence of his mathematics teacher Hojo Tokiyuki (1858–1929), a lay disciple of Kōsen Roshi. Around the same time (i.e., 1887) Suzuki met Nishida Kitarō—a student at the same school—and the two would become lifelong friends. In 1889 Suzuki was forced leave school owing to financial difficulties, and after a stint as a primary school English teacher he entered Waseda University in 1891. Soon thereafter Suzuki transferred to Tokyo Imperial University, and at the same time began to commute to Engakuji to study first with Kōsen Rōshi, and, following Kōsen’s death, with Shaku Sōen. Suzuki reports that Sōen Rōshi started him on the mu
kōan, which he “passed” with a kenshō experience at rōhatsu sesshin (a week of intensive Zen practice commemorating the Buddha’s enlightenment) in 1896.

Suzuki’s life changed dramatically when, in 1897, he moved to La Salle, Illinois, to study with Paul Carus, editor of the journal The Open Court. He was to spend a total of eleven years in La Salle, earning his keep as a translator and proofreader at the Open Court Publishing Company. In addition, Suzuki took time off in 1905 in order to serve as Sōen Rōshi’s translator and assistant during the latter’s tour of America. The importance of Suzuki’s tenure in La Salle for his intellectual development cannot be underestimated—at the very least it should be noted that his tutelage under Carus was in many ways as intensive and as sustained as his formal Zen training in Japan. It would appear that historians of contemporary Zen have utterly neglected the extent and nature of Carus’s influence on the young D. T. Suzuki, an influence that began even before Suzuki left Japan. As we shall see below, this may be due in part to the fact that Suzuki himself, in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to understate his relationship with Carus, would later misrepresent the circumstances that led him to La Salle.

In order not to wander too far afield I will limit myself to the briefest sketch of Paul Carus. Carus was born in 1852 in Ilsenburg am Harz in Germany, the son of a prominent Reformed minister. He received an excellent German education, completing a Ph.D. in Tübingen in 1876 before emigrating to America in 1884. Carus, apparently attracted to America by the promise of religious and intellectual freedom, settled in La Salle, where he edited and wrote for two journals, The Open Court and The Monist. The former published its first issue in 1887, and was devoted to the Religion of Science, which included both “the scientific study of religion and the religious study of science.” The latter journal, which began publishing shortly thereafter, was intended to carry more philosophical and scholarly articles on the same theme.

The Religion of Science was promoted by Carus on the belief that there is no essential difference between scientific and religious truth, and religious “faith” is precisely trust in this unified truth. In the preface to The Religion of Science, the first volume in a series of the same name, Carus set out his agenda:

The work of The Open Court Publishing Company . . . is to propound, develop, and establish the Religion of Science. . . . In order to establish the Religion of Science it is by no means necessary to abolish the old religions, but
only to purify them and develop their highest possibilities, so that their mythologies shall be changed into strictly scientific conceptions. It is intended to preserve of the old religions all that is true and good, but to purify their faith by rejecting superstitions and irrational elements, and to discard, unrelentingly, their errors. (P. iii)

Carus elucidated the philosophical foundation of his Religion of Science under the rubric of "monism" or "positivism," by which he meant the essential oneness of the material and the immaterial, the phenomenal and the noumenal. All truth belongs to a unity that can be arrived at through rational scientific investigation, and the discovery of this truth will yield a solution to all human problems. But Carus was adamant in his rejection of the materialism, atheism, and agnosticism that had come to be associated with empiricism and positivism. Accordingly, Carus did not hesitate to speak of God, the soul, and immortality, and he insisted that only a religious approach to science would yield truth.

By the mid-1890s Carus had come to consider Buddhism the religious tradition closest in spirit to his Religion of Science. Buddhism was both essentially positivistic and scientific; it "propounded a consistent Monism . . . [which] radically ignored all metaphysical assumptions and philosophical postulates, founding . . . religion on a consideration of the pure facts of experience. . . . In Buddhism, theory is nothing, and facts are everything." The Buddha himself was, in Carus's view, "the first positivist, the first humanitarian, the first radical freethinker, the first iconoclast, and the first prophet of the Religion of Science." Carus's almost unbounded respect for Buddhism reflects in part the impact of the 1893 World Parliament of Religions, which he attended and celebrated in the pages of The Open Court. Carus actively befriended many of the Asian representatives to the parliament, and he spent the next decades trying in various ways to keep the spirit of the parliament alive. Shortly after the parliament Carus compiled The Gospel of Buddha, a selection of retranslations from available scholarly sources which was, much to Carus's consternation, panned by Buddhist scholars at the time. Nevertheless, The Gospel of Buddha, originally published in 1894 as number 14 of the Religion of Science Series, went through at least thirteen editions and was translated into Japanese (by Suzuki), Chinese, German, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Urdu, among other languages. It seems that Carus's presentation of Buddhism as a "religion which knows of no supernatural revelation," based "solely upon man's knowledge of the nature of things, upon provable
truth,” held a strong appeal to Buddhist modernists in general, and the Japanese proponents of New Buddhism in particular. Shaku Sōen himself praised Carus for presenting Buddhist nirvana “as relating to this life and as real, positive, altruistic, and rather optimistic,” and Sōen even suggested that Carus’s compilation was better suited for Japanese students of Buddhism than the Buddhist canon itself!

Carus also used the pages of his journal to propound a form of religious Darwinism: “The law of the survival of the fittest holds good also in the domain of spiritual institutions.” Carus thought missionary movements beneficial, as the rivalry between various proselytizing groups contributed to the health of religious institutions. “A competition between the different religions spurs their adherents on to develop the best qualities and to be watchful in their own conduct.” The outcome of competition would be religious unity, or, in other words, the Religion of Science.

Carus’s view of the evolutionary development of religion, the unity of religion and science, and the progressive nature of Buddhism would have been attractive to a young Japanese student of Western philosophy and Zen Buddhism such as D. T. Suzuki. Indeed, not long after Suzuki translated The Gospel of Buddha he wrote to Carus to introduce himself and to compliment Carus for “rightly comprehending the principles of Buddhism.” Carus sent Suzuki a reply on April 11, 1895, accompanied by copies of some of his books including The Religion of Science. Then, on December 17 of the same year, Sōen wrote to Carus on Suzuki’s behalf:

Now I have something to ask your kind consent relating to the person of Suzuki Teitaro, whom you know as the translator of your “The gospel of Buddha.” . . . He tells me that he has been so greatly inspired by your sound faith which is perceptible in your various works, that he earnestly desires to go abroad and to study under your personal guidance. If you will be kind enough to sympathise with his ambitious intention and to consent to take him under your patronage, he will willingly obey to do everything you may order him, as far as he can.

Carus responded to Sōen immediately, extending to Suzuki a most courteous invitation to come to the United States: “I hope that his visit will be profitable to him, and that thereby his services to religion and to the further development of Japan will become more effectual. I myself anticipate much pleasure from meeting him, and shall be glad to assist him in his studies whenever I can be of use to him.”

This account is seriously at odds with Suzuki’s version of events—dating to the late 1950s—in which Suzuki claims to have
been sent to America in response to Carus’s request for a translator of Chinese.\textsuperscript{45} It would seem that by the 1950s Suzuki was intent upon framing his mission in La Salle as that of collaborator to Paul Carus and resident authority on things Oriental at the Open Court Publishing Company, rather than as a young Japanese philosophy student traveling abroad to study the Religion of Science with a rather eccentric German-American essayist. Yet all evidence indicates that, in the words of Harold Henderson, “Suzuki was first drawn to the United States . . . not by a translating job, but by Paul Carus’s philosophy.”\textsuperscript{46}

In the small mining town of La Salle Suzuki earned his keep as general assistant and houseboy for Paul Carus, and we may assume that he continued to imbibe Carus’s philosophical monism, his belief in the essential unity of all religions, and his view of pure Buddhism as basically rational, empirical, and scientific. This ethnographically, historically, and philosophically naive characterization of Buddhism, coming from the pen of an eminent German doctor of philosophy living on the American frontier, was identical in many respects to the view advanced by proponents of Meiji New Buddhism. But this is, perhaps, not surprising: Carus, like his Meiji freethinking counterparts, could not accept the dogmatic truth claims of traditional religious systems, and yet recoiled from the specter of a godless relativistic universe. Holding to the promise of epistemological certainty attained through a thoroughgoing monism which dogmatically posits the unity of mind and matter—the unity of the realm of spirit and the realm of scientific truth—Carus hoped to usher in a new universal scientific religion which would unite the peoples of the world. And this was precisely the hope of the Meiji Buddhist intellectuals who touted “pure Buddhism” as the scientific and nondualistic teaching required for the modern age. There was, however, one important difference between the religious unity espoused by Carus and that espoused by the Meiji New Buddhists: for the Japanese, the notion of a “unity among peoples” all too readily translated into support for the ongoing military program to unite East Asia under the spiritually enlightened rule of the apotheosized Japanese emperor.

Upon returning to Japan in 1909, Suzuki held a series of lectureships in English at Gakushuin (1909–21) and Tokyo Imperial University (1909–14). In 1921 he moved to Kyoto to take a position of professor of Buddhist philosophy at Otani University, where he launched the journal \textit{Eastern Buddhist}. This journal was no doubt inspired, at least in part, by \textit{The Open Court} and \textit{The Monist}, as is evident from Suzuki’s editorial comment in the second issue: “Our
standpoint is that the Mahayana ought to be considered one whole, individual thing and no sects, especially no sectarian prejudices, to be recognized in it, except as so many phases or aspects of one fundamental truth. In this respect Buddhism and Christianity and all other religious beliefs are not more than variations of one single original Faith, deeply embedded in the human soul."

It would take us too far afield to chronicle Suzuki’s long and fascinating career, which included extended stays in Europe and America and the authorship of literally dozens of books in Japanese and English. It will suffice our purposes here to draw attention to the fact that Suzuki’s exegetical agenda—his strategy for presenting Zen to lay audiences in Japan and the West—was influenced as much by the Western currents of thought, to which he was exposed as a philosophy student in Tokyo and as assistant to Carus, as it was by his necessarily limited involvement in Zen training as a lay practitioner at Engakuji.

The Zen of D. T. Suzuki

Suzuki’s first English writing on Zen was an essay entitled “The Zen Sect of Buddhism,” which appeared in the Journal of the Pali Text Society in 1906, the same year that saw the publication of Sōen’s Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot. In fact, Suzuki’s essay contains long extracts from Sōen’s Sermons, in addition to selected translations from the Platform Sutra and other Ch’an sources. It also, as one might expect, includes an extended discussion of the relationship between Zen, Japanese culture, and bushidō:

The Lebensanschauung of Bushido is no more nor less than that of Zen. The calmness and even joyfulness of heart at the moment of death which is conspicuously observable in the Japanese; the intrepidity which is generally shown by the Japanese soldiers in the face of an overwhelming enemy; and the fairness of play to an opponent, so strongly taught by Bushido—all these come from the spirit of the Zen training, and not from any such blind, fatalistic conception as is sometimes thought to be a trait peculiar to Orientals. (P. 34)

The essay also contains some highly depreciatory comments on the state of Chinese Buddhism. While Suzuki admits that Zen is “thoroughly Chinese,” he goes on to say that Zen “as a living faith is as dead as everything else in that old tottering country” (p. 17). This would become a recurring theme in his later writing, to which I will return below.
Many other characteristics of his later presentation of Zen are seen in this early essay as well, including the notion that Zen is a "mystical" teaching about which only those with "inner spiritual enlightenment" may speak: "This sect is unique, not only in Buddhism itself, but, I believe, also in the history of religion generally. Its doctrines, broadly speaking, are those of a speculative mysticism, and they are so peculiarly—sometimes poetically and sometimes almost enigmatically—represented and demonstrated, that only those who have actually gained an insight into them and been trained in the system can see their ultimate signification" (pp. 8–9). But while Suzuki does stress the importance of "actual inner feeling, which might be called intuition or immediate knowledge, as Western philosophers would have it" (p. 27), and while the Ch'an anecdotes he relates do refer to moments of "understanding," there is only a single passing reference to "spiritual experience" (p. 13), and the term satori is nowhere to be found.

With the exception of this essay, most of Suzuki's output during this period was not concerned with Zen. More typical are polemical writings on Mahāyāna Buddhism, responses to the Western scholarship Suzuki encountered during his time in America. The early generation of European "Orientalist" scholars (in Said's polemical sense of the term) all too often held "true" or "pure" Buddhism to be "early Buddhism," which they implicitly or explicitly believed to be long dead in Asia. Specifically, early Buddhism was identified with the Buddhism of the Pāli Canon, and the prevailing tendency among Western scholars was to view the Mahāyāna of East Asia as degenerate, syncretic, and corrupt. Suzuki, who must have encountered this bias early on during his stay in America, devoted his energies in La Salle to the elucidation and defense of Mahāyāna.

Thus Suzuki's first major book in English, Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, published in 1907 as he was about to leave La Salle, makes no mention of Zen whatsoever, and places no particular emphasis on experience per se. (This absence of any discussion of religious experience is notable not only because the experience of satori would become the hallmark of Suzuki's later Buddhist exegesis, but also because Suzuki, according to his later recollections, had had a satori experience during his last rōhatsu sesshin at Engakuji shortly before he left for America.) What we find instead is a rambling and highly idealized introduction to Mahāyāna doctrine—a curious blend of scholarship and apologetics—that effectively renders Mahāyāna fully commensurate with Carus's Religion of Science. Like other exponents of Japanese New Buddhism, Suzuki insists that Bud-
Buddhism is not a dogmatic creed but rather a mysticism that responds to the deepest yearnings in man and yet remains in full accord with the findings of modern science: “It is wonderful that Buddhism clearly anticipated the outcome of modern psychological researches at the time when all other religious and philosophical systems were eagerly cherishing dogmatic superstitions concerning the nature of the ego” (p. 40). Not only is there no fundamental discord between Buddhism and science, but there is no ultimate conflict between the teachings of Christ and those of the Buddha: “My conviction is: If the Buddha and the Christ changed their accidental places of birth, Gautama might have been a Christ rising against the Jewish traditionalism, and Jesus a Buddha, perhaps propounding the doctrine of non-ego and nirvāṇa and Dharmakāya” (p. 29); and “Those who are free from sectarian biases will admit without hesitation that there is but one true religion which may assume various forms according to circumstances” (p. 365, n. 1). This profession of faith in the unity of religious truth, written at the end of Suzuki’s long apprenticeship with Carus, could have come from the pen of Carus himself.

Upon returning to Japan by way of Paris and the Tun-huang manuscript collection at the Bibliothèque Nationale, Suzuki became increasingly interested in Japanese Zen and Pure Land thought. Suzuki also began to publish a series of studies and translations of the works of Swedenborg in 1913, an interest that would continue over the next several years. This was in addition to his increasing output of apologetic works on Zen and Pure Land, philological studies on Zen-related scriptures such as the Laṅkāvatāra, and editions and studies of manuscripts recovered from Tun-huang bearing on early Ch’ān history. But several years would pass before Suzuki would elevate the “Zen experience” to the status it achieved in his later work. In fact, the emphasis on religious experience, which forms the basis of Suzuki’s later approach to everything from Buddhist prajñā (wisdom) to kōan literature, seems to have been largely inspired by the writings of Suzuki’s personal friend, Nishida Kitarō.

The publication in 1911 of Nishida’s first major work, Zen no kenkyū (A Study of the Good), was the beginning of a new phase in Japanese philosophy. Not only did it give rise to an indigenous Japanese philosophical movement drawing upon both Occidental and Asian resources (later known as Kyōto gakushū or the “Kyoto school”), but it also served as the foundation for a new mode of Japanese Buddhist exegesis that would privilege “pure” or “unmediated” or “nondual” experience over either ritual performance or doctrinal learning. Nishida would also provide the philosophical inspiration
for a new generation of *nihonjinron* thinkers, who, ever eager for novel intellectual models with which to articulate the differences between Japanese and non-Japanese peoples, would assert that the Japanese are racially and/or culturally inclined to experience the world more directly than are the peoples of other nations (see below).

Nishida’s lifework revolved around the elucidation of the notion of pure experience (*junsui keiken*) introduced in the opening paragraph of his first philosophical monograph:

Experience means to know reality exactly as it is. It is to know by entirely abandoning the artifices of the self and by following reality. Since usually those who discuss experience actually conjoin thought of some sort to the idea, “pure” means precisely the condition of experience in itself without the admixture of any thinking or discrimination. For example, it means, at the instant of seeing color or hearing sound, the experience prior not only to thinking that it is the function of an external thing or that it is my feeling, but before even the judgment of what this color or sound is, has been added. Therefore pure experience is identical with immediate experience. When one immediately experiences a conscious state of the self, there is still neither subject nor object; knowledge and its object are entirely one. This is the purest form of experience.53

In this and later works, Nishida would continue to develop the concept of pure experience and the related notion of *jikaku* or “self-awareness.” Although Nishida struggled against the “psychologism” latent in these terms, the philosophical value Nishida placed on the “unmediated experience of the world as such” would help Nishida “[resist] the self-understanding being urged on Japan from the outside world: the understanding of self and world in terms of scientific theories of knowledge or philosophical ontology.”54 And it was this ability to appropriate key concepts from the West, while at the same time appearing to challenge the cultural hegemony of Western modes of thought, that was so appealing to proponents of the New Buddhism. In short order, “direct experience” was being touted as the characteristic feature of Eastern spirituality in general, and Zen in particular. Given the importance placed on “religious experience” in the works of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Rudolf Otto, Joachim Wach, William James, and other leading Western scholars of religion around the turn of the century, it is no wonder that Western enthusiasts, seeking alternatives to their own seemingly moribund religious institutions, would find the emphasis on personal, unmediated, veridical experience the single most attractive feature of Zen.55

The irony of this situation is that the key Japanese terms for
experience—*keiken* and *taiken*—are rarely attested in premodern Japanese texts. Their contemporary currency dates to the early Meiji period, when they were adopted to render Western terms for which there was no ready Japanese equivalent. *Keiken*, which I have been unable to locate in any premodern Chinese or Japanese source, became the common translation for the English "experience." And while *taiken* is occasionally found in Sung Neo-Confucian writings meaning "to investigate firsthand," its modern currency can be traced to its use as an equivalent for the German *erleben* and *Erlebnis*. As Leslie Pincus has pointed out, this latter neologism proved to be particularly mischievous: the fact that the compound *taiken* incorporates reference to the physical body "made it easier for Japanese theorists to embed experience in nature, and thus remove it from the reach of critical thought."57

Similarly, although the term *jikaku* is occasionally found in classical Chinese Buddhist scriptures, including the literature of Ch’an, the term does not carry the epistemic or phenomenological sense of the modern Japanese vernacular; it simply means to be "personally awakened," or "to awaken oneself," as opposed to awakening others.58 In fact, one searches in vain for a premodern Chinese or Japanese equivalent to the phenomenological notion of "experience." Nor is it legitimate to interpret such technical Zen terms as *satori* (to understand), or *kenshō* (to see one’s original nature) as denoting some species of unmediated experience in the sense of Nishida’s *junsui keiken*. In traditional Chinese Buddhist literature such terms are used to denote the full comprehension and appreciation of central Buddhist tenets such as *śūnyatā*, Buddha-nature, or dependent origination. There are simply no a priori grounds to conceive of such moments of insight in phenomenological terms. Indeed, Chinese Buddhist commentators in general, and Ch’an exegetes in particular, tend to be antipathetic to any form of phenomenological reduction.

It would appear that Nishida’s interest in experience—unmediated or otherwise—is better traced to contemporary Western philosophical sources, particularly to the writings of the American philosopher William James, whose works were introduced to Nishida by D. T. Suzuki in the early years of this century.59 Yet Nishida turns the notion of pure experience into precisely the kind of idealism that James sought to critique—on ontological ground capable of guaranteeing epistemological certainty—which would, in short order, serve as the intellectual foundation for a new school of Japanese philosophy, as well as for a revamped Zen mysticism.60
Although Nishida and his Kyoto school followers played a crucial role in the construction of contemporary Zen discourse, I will forgo a detailed analysis of Nishida’s philosophy here; it is simply too large and complex a topic. It is, however, important to note that Nishida was himself guilty of the most spurious forms of *nihonjinron* speculation. We find, for example, repeated attempts to characterize Japanese culture as a culture of “pure feeling,” which is more emotional, more aesthetic, and more communal than Occidental cultures. In contrast, Occidental cultures are more intellectual, more rationalistic, and more scientific. Moreover, Nishida, caught up in the nationalistic vision of a unified and politically supreme *kokutai*, aligned his musings on the metaphysical differences between East and West with the ideology of Japanese New Buddhism and its pretensions of evolutionary superiority. In 1938, as political and military tensions in the region were escalating, Nishida wrote: “That the Japanese alone in the Orient, though sharing in these cultural influences [i.e., ones in common with India and China], have gone forward to absorb Occidental culture and have also been considered the creators of a new Oriental culture, is due, is it not, mainly to that same Japanese spirit, free and unfettered, which ‘goes straight to things’?” And just a year before his death, in the midst of the horrors of war, Nishida would write:

Present-day Buddhists have forgotten such a true meaning of the Mahayana. Eastern culture must arise again from such a standpoint. It must contribute a new light to world culture. As a self-determination of the absolute present, the national polity [*kokutai*] of Japan is a norm of historical action in such a perspective. The above mentioned true spirit of the Mahayana is in the East preserved today only in Japan.

It would be a great mistake if people should hold that religion is merely a matter of individual peace of mind, and therefore is unrelated to the question of nation. The world of the absolute present is always historical and formative as the self-determination of form. This must be called national. Nations are the forms of the self-formation of the historical world. National polities [*kokutai*] are such forms of individuality. Our selves must be national in the sense of always being historical and formative as individuals of the world of the absolute present. True obedience to the nation should be derived from the standpoint of true religious self-awareness. Mere seeking one’s own peace of mind is selfish.

Nishida and Suzuki were major influences upon one another, with Nishida drawing on Suzuki for his understanding of *prajñā*, Zen, and Pure Land, and Suzuki drawing on Nishida for his no-
tions of pure experience and absolute nothingness. In fact, Suzuki saw Nishida as propounding a “Zen philosophy” inaccessible to those lacking Zen insight: “Nishida’s philosophy of absolute nothingness or his logic of the self-identity of absolute contradictions is difficult to understand, I believe, unless one is passably acquainted with Zen experience. . . . [Nishida] thought it was his mission to make Zen intelligible to the West.” Not only did Suzuki share Nishida’s emphasis on experience—with the result that only those privy to a legitimate kenshō experience are qualified to speak of Zen—but Suzuki, like Nishida, placed his reading of Buddhist history and exegesis in the interests of the most specious forms of nihonjinron.

Suzuki’s preoccupation with nativist and nihonjinron themes— notably the concern to demarcate the innate spirituality of the Japanese in contradistinction with the Occident—began in earnest in 1935, with a series of Japanese books that appeared over a period of some thirty years dealing with Buddhism, Zen, and the Japanese character. The titles alone are revealing: Zen and the Character of the Japanese People (1935), Zen and Japanese Culture (1940), Oriental Oneness (1942), More on Zen and Japanese Culture (1942), The Facts of Religious Experience (1943), Japanese Spirituality (1944), Building a Spiritual Japan (1946), The Awakening of Japanese Spirituality (1946), The Spiritualizing of Japan (1947), East and West (1948), The Revival of the East (1954), The Oriental Outlook (1963), and The Mind of the Orient (1965). And no one can accuse Suzuki of hiding his nihonjinron musings from the purview of his English-speaking audience. In 1938 he published a series of lectures delivered two years previously in England and America under the title Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture, which was later revised and republished in 1959 as Zen and Japanese Culture. This latter title, published under the prestigious imprint of Princeton University Press and the Bollingen Series, was to become the classic English statement on the identity of the Japanese spirit, the spirit of the samurai, and Zen Buddhism.

The details of Suzuki’s Zen exegesis, with its emphasis on kenshō and satori, are well known. In short, according to Suzuki, “To study Zen means to have Zen experience, for without the experience there is no Zen one can study.” Moreover, the Zen experience is not merely the foundation for Zen understanding, or even of Buddhist understanding; Zen is the foundation of all authentic religious insight, both Eastern and Western:

The basic idea of Zen is to come in touch with the inner workings of our
being, and to do this in the most direct way possible, without resorting to anything external or superadded. . . . Zen professes itself to be the spirit of Buddhism, but in fact it is the spirit of all religions and philosophies. When Zen is thoroughly understood, absolute peace of mind is attained, and a man lives as he ought to live.69

But while Zen experience is the universal ground of religious truth, it is nonetheless an expression of a uniquely Japanese spirituality. This notion that Zen is somehow essentially and uniquely Japanese necessitated a particularly convoluted logic, since Suzuki was, of course, thoroughly familiar with the Chinese origins of Zen. Indeed, Suzuki’s exegetical writings draw upon the recorded sayings of Chinese masters at virtually every turn. Yet, as Suzuki would have it, “Buddhism is not primarily an imported religion; I feel that neither Zen nor Pure Land possesses a foreign nature. Of course, Buddhism did come from the continent . . . but what entered was Buddhist ritual and its trappings.”70

According to Suzuki’s analysis in Japanese Spirituality, the difference between Chinese and Japanese Zen is that in China Zen did not permeate the everyday life of the people: “For the Chinese, guided by the thought and feeling of a northern people, a doctrine of good actions leading to good rewards, which has about it a logical nature, would probably be more effective than the Zen-type thought of the south” (p. 22). This situation is very different in Japan:

Zen typifies Japanese spirituality. This does not mean Zen has deep roots within the life of the Japanese people, rather that Japanese life itself is “Zen-like.” The importation of Zen provided the opportunity for Japanese spirituality to ignite, yet the constituents themselves which were to ignite were fully primed at that time. Zen arrived in Japan riding the wave of Chinese thought, literature, and art, but Japanese spirituality was by no means seduced by these trappings. It was nothing like the entrance of Buddhist literature and thought that took place during the Nara period (646–794). The Buddhism of the Nara and Heian [794–1185] periods was merely tied conceptually to the life of the upper classes, whereas Zen put down its roots in the midst of the life of the Japanese samurai. It was cultivated and it budded in that which existed at the depths of the samurai’s seishin. These buds were not foreign clippings but developed from the very life of the Japanese warrior. I said it put down roots, but that is not quite the correct expression. It would be better to say that spirituality of the samurai was on the verge of breaking through to the surface, and that Zen removed all the obstacles from its path. . . . Thereupon, although the Zen Sect of Japan was content to allow the supremacy of
Chinese literature, the Zen life of the Japanese came to full flower in Japanese spirituality. (Pp. 18–19)

In order to decipher this passage it is necessary to isolate the individual and sometimes incongruent items on Suzuki’s agenda. First, Suzuki wants to argue that prior to the arrival of Buddhism there was no authentic “spirituality” in Japan: “Although the sects of Shintō might be regarded as transmitters of Japanese spirituality, Japanese spirituality does not appear there in a pure form. Those traditions labeled Shrine Shintō, or Ancient Shintō, being fixations of the Japanese people’s primitive conventions, did not touch spirituality” (p. 18). Second, while Buddhism was brought to Japan from the continent, it was only in Japan that Buddhism would find its ultimate expression: “Buddhism . . . is really a manifestation of Japanese spiritual awakening” (p. 59). Third, the forms of Japanese Buddhism that predate the Buddhism of the Kamakura period (1185–1333) were devoid of “authentic spirituality.” Suzuki confidently informs us that “the whole of the Heian era did not produce a single man who can be said to have had a spiritual existence or religious character. Even such men as Dengyō Daishi [Saichō (767–822), the founder of Japanese Tendai Buddhism] and Kōbō Daishi [Kūkai (774–835), the founder of Japanese Shingon Buddhism] did not have sufficient contact with the earth” (p. 43). This was because “the Heian period had nothing derived from the earth” (p. 45). In fact, it was only when Chinese Ch’an met the samurai culture of the Kamakura that one finds the blossoming of “authentic spiritual insight,” since the samurai, “who had immediate connections to the peasantry,” represent a culture “coming from the earth” (pp. 44–45).71

In the final analysis, Japanese Zen constitutes not only the essence of Buddhism, but also the essence of the Japanese spirit. It is the key to everything authentic, sacred, and culturally superior in Japan: “Today, seven hundred years after [the blossoming of Zen, Zen] has come in substance to be the basis for the Japanese character, thought, religious faith, and esthetic tastes. With it, I believe in the future there can be constructed something new of world-wide significance. Such is the mission of today’s Japan” (p. 46). At the same time, Zen spirituality emerges from the ground of the human soul, not merely the Japanese soul. The natural question is, If Zen is so closely identified with Japanese spirituality, and if it is at the same time the foundation for all religious insight, are non-Japanese capable of comprehending Zen? While Suzuki is hesitant to deny the possibility outright, he does claim that the Japanese have an evolutionary advantage:
A people cannot awaken to spirituality until they have proceeded a certain degree up the cultural ladder. In a certain sense, the existence of spirituality cannot be denied even in the consciousness of a primitive people, though it would have to be of an extremely primitive nature. It would be a mistake to regard it as the same as genuine and refined spirituality itself. Even after a culture has advanced to a certain point, it still cannot be said that its people as a whole have awakened to, and are in possession of, spirituality. (P. 16)

Thus, while not all Japanese are in full possession of "genuine spirituality," it is nonetheless their birthright: "When the 'bright and pure heart' of the Japanese ceases to work on the surface of consciousness and begins to move submerged in its deepest parts, when it is moving unconsciously, with non-discrimination, without thought, then Japanese spirituality can be understood" (p. 22). Occidentals, on the other hand, are at a distinct disadvantage: "The only thing we can state here about Zen is that it is an altogether unique product of the Oriental mind, refusing to be classified under any known heading, as either a philosophy, or a religion, or a form of mysticism as it is generally understood in the West. Zen must be studied and analyzed from a point of view that is still unknown among Western philosophers."72

And after over fifty years of proselytizing in Europe and America, Suzuki remained pessimistic concerning the spiritual potential of the West; Zen, it would seem, was simply too much for the Western mind. Suzuki's view is made abundantly clear during a private conversation with Hisamatsu Shin'ichi (see below), recorded at Harvard in 1958:

Hisamatsu: Among the many people you've met or heard of (in the West) is there anyone who you think has some understanding of Zen?
Suzuki: No one. Not yet anyway.
Hisamatsu: I see. Not yet. Well then, is there at least someone you have hope for? (Laughter)
Suzuki: No. Not even that.
Hisamatsu: So, of the many people (in the West) who have written about Zen there aren't any who understand it?
Suzuki: That's right.
Hisamatsu: Well, is there at least some book written (by a Westerner) which is at least fairly accurate?
Suzuki: No. Not to my knowledge.73

Over half a century had passed since a youthful Suzuki had praised Carus for "rightly comprehend[ing] the principles of Bud-
Having lived through the military humiliation of Japan at the hands of the "culturally inferior" Occidental powers, Suzuki would devote a considerable portion of his prodigious energies tantalizing a legion of disenchanted Western intellectuals with the dream of an Oriental enlightenment. Yet all the while Suzuki held that the cultural and spiritual weaknesses of the Occident virtually precluded the possibility of Westerners ever coming to truly comprehend Zen. One is led to suspect that Suzuki's lifelong effort to bring Buddhist enlightenment to the Occident had become inextricably bound to a studied contempt for the West, a West whose own cultural arrogance and imperialist inclinations Suzuki had come to know all too well.

Hisamatsu and the Zen of Japanese Art

The evolution of Zen "occidentalism," which was in part a Japanese response to the "orientalism" of the West, culminates in several respects in the figure of Hisamatsu Shin'ichi (1889–1980), Suzuki's partner in the dialogue recounted above. Although Hisamatsu is not nearly as well-known in the West as is Suzuki, this charismatic and multitalented man attracted a host of highly educated and influential disciples and associates from both Japan and abroad. With Hisamatsu we have the full synthesis of (1) the philosophy of Nishida with its rhetoric of "pure experience," (2) the notion that Zen is the essence of all religious teachings, and (3) the evolution of a fully laicized form of Zen practice.

Hisamatsu was born in Gifu Prefecture and raised in a devout Shin Buddhist family, but abandoned his faith in high school upon being introduced to "scientific knowledge." He writes of this event as "a conversion from the naive, medieval form of religious life which avoids rational doubt, to the critical attitude of modern man that is based on autonomous rational judgment and empirical proof." He studied philosophy under Nishida at Kyoto University, and it was Nishida who directed him to the Zen teacher Ikegami Shōzan Rōshi (1856–1928) of Myōshinji. Following what appears to be a pattern in the biographies of modern lay Zen masters, Hisamatsu writes that he had kenshō during his very first rōhatsu sesshin with Shōzan. Hisamatsu went on to teach philosophy at Kyoto University and to instruct a small but influential group of followers in tea ceremony (chanoyu) and Zen practice. On April 8, 1944, with the war turning perilously against the Japanese, Hisamatsu and several students from Kyoto University founded the Gakudō-dōjō, a Zen group that would
become the forerunner of the F.A.S. Society. This group met regularly
to discuss religious issues and conduct intensive Zen retreats (ses-
shin) in Reiun-in, a temple within the Myōshinji compound.

The F.A.S. proper was founded in 1958 by Hisamatsu after he
returned from travels in America, Europe, the Middle East, and In-
dia. This society had little formal organizational or institutional
structure, and it is best treated as a loose fraternity of scholars and
intellectuals united by a common commitment to a rather abstract
and idealized conception of Zen. “The name of our society—F.A.S.—
refers to the three dimensions of human life, namely self, world
and history as an inseparable whole. ‘F’ stands for the Formless self
awakening itself, ‘A’ for taking the standpoint of All humankind, and
‘S’ for creating Suprahistorical history.”

Since Hisamatsu’s death in 1980, the F.A.S. has continued to
conduct occasional retreats and weekly meetings, and to publish pe-
riodicals in Japanese and English, although with less energy and di-
rection. Those with direct or indirect ties to the F.A.S. include the
preeminent Zen historian Yanagida Seizan and Abe Masao, who
has been particularly active in interfaith dialogue in Europe and
America.

Hisamatsu and his followers in the F.A.S., following a strategy
largely derived from Nishida and Suzuki, were intent on depicting
Zen as a transcultural truth that is nevertheless the unique property
of the Japanese. This was accomplished through a polemic that treats
Zen not as religion per se, but rather as the noncontingent, trans-
cultural, nondual spiritual gnosis that underlies all authentic reli-
gious inspiration. Abe Masao is unequivocal in this regard: “The true
kenshō experience in Zen transcends historical and ethnic differ-
ences. It is identical in all times and in all people.” The use of
the term “Zen” by Hisamatsu, Abe, and company is structurally analo-
gous to Otto’s use of “the holy” or “numinous”: in each case the
agenda includes legitimizing one’s own particular tradition by claim-
ing direct access to that which transcends particularity. Thus Hisa-
matsu insists that Zen “is nothing ‘particular.’ It is, in the ultimate
sense, non-particular, totally undifferentiated; what, again in the true
sense, never becomes an object never can be objectified. Zen is the
Self that is ultimately and wholly beyond objectification; in brief,
Zen is the Self-Awareness of Formlessness.” Abe Masao concurs:
“[Hisamatsu] did not choose Zen as one religious denomination
among others, or as the way of practice of a particular Buddhist sect.
As one who had rejected the standpoints of both theocentric, heter-
onomous faith and anthropocentric, autonomous reason, he sought
a religion without a god, an atheistic religion—a standpoint of absolute religious autonomy that transcends yet does not run contrary to rational autonomy.”

To corrupt a traditional metaphor, Zen is not a finger pointing to the moon, but rather the moon itself. This rhetorical strategy has the unfortunate effect of turning everything it touches into Zen. Elsewhere, I have discussed the nature of this form of “rhetorical hegemony,” which in various different guises enjoys a long and noble history in Chinese Mahāyāna and Ch’ an. Here I need only note that this rhetoric need not be reductive when understood in the full context of traditional Buddhist monastic practice. Dialectical subtleties tend to be lost, however, when the same rhetoric is wrenched from its institutional context and used in the interests of a dubiously nationalistic agenda.

Hisamatsu’s nationalism—specifically his belief in the spiritual and cultural superiority of the Japanese—is unmistakable, for while nondualistic Zen truth may have been experienced by a few Occidental religious saints in the past, this truth, according to Hisamatsu, could never be fully accommodated in the excessively discursive cultures and religions of the West. Ultimately, according to Hisamatsu, whether due to an innate spiritual faculty, cultural conditioning, or even the syntactic features of the Japanese language, the Japanese alone possess the aesthetic and intellectual sensibility required to fathom Zen. Accordingly, Hisamatsu will refer to this truth as “oriental nothingness” (tōyōteki mu), insisting all the while on its universality:

I have long spoken of “Oriental Nothingness”... I qualify it as Oriental because in the West such Nothingness has never been fully awakened, nor has there been penetration to such a level. However, this does not mean that it belongs exclusively to the East. On the contrary, it is the most profound basis or root source of man; in this sense it belongs neither to the East or West. Only as regards the actual Awakening to such a Self, there have been no instances in the West; hence the regional qualification “Oriental” (emphasis added).

According to Hisamatsu, nowhere is the exalted spiritual sensibility of Zen (or “oriental nothingness”) more apparent than in the traditional arts of Japan, which are rendered expressions of truth itself. Hisamatsu shares with Suzuki (and to a lesser extent, Arthur Waley) the dubious honor of popularizing the notion that Zen is the foundation of virtually all of the Japanese fine arts. Thus in Zen and the Fine Arts, following the lead of Suzuki’s Zen and Japanese Cul-
ture, we learn that everything from Chinese landscape painting and calligraphy to garden design and Noh drama are expressions of the Zen experience. Unfortunately, many Western scholars have uncritically accepted this Zen appropriation of the finest artistic products of Japan despite the fact that it is blatantly ideological and historically dubious.

It is true that the medieval organization of government-sanctioned Zen monasteries, known as the “five monasteries” (gozan) system, was one of the primary vehicles for the importation of Chinese literati culture during much of the medieval period. Generous aristocratic and shogunal patronage of gozan temples turned them into flourishing centers for the cultivation of Chinese arts. Because of the close ties that existed between the gozan temples and the elite class that patronized them, a relationship emerged between many of the Chinese arts and Zen doctrinal themes. Thus we find influential masters of Noh, tea, calligraphy, and other fine arts, including such luminaries as Zeami (1363-1443) and Sen no Rikyū (1522-91), turning to Mahāyāna doctrine in their attempts to formulate the aesthetic principles of their craft. Throughout much of medieval Japanese history Zen temples continued to be associated with aristocratic breeding and refined taste.

But traditional Chinese literati pursuits are as Confucian or Taoist as they are Buddhist. So-called Zen gardens, to pick a single example, are essentially Japanese versions of Chinese landscape gardens that were popular among the Sung aristocracy. Such gardens came into fashion among the elite patrons of gozan temples, but there is no evidence that, prior to the modern period, they were ever considered to be expressions of Zen thought or Zen enlightenment. Indeed, the earliest reference to the notion that the “dry-landscape gardens” associated with Zen temples are manifestations of Zen realization is found in an English-language guide to Kyoto gardens written in 1935 by Loraine Kuck, a one-time neighbor of D. T. Suzuki.83 Similarly, the cultivation and enjoyment of calligraphy, painting, poetry, and tea was the common heritage of Chinese literati irrespective of their religious or institutional affiliations. It is not surprising that the highly educated and culturally refined Chinese Buddhist priests proselytizing in Japan should have sought to promote their native cultural heritage among their Japanese patrons and disciples.

This is precisely why we should be suspicious when we hear modern Zen apologists insist that the arts of Japan are manifestations of the Zen experience. Given the particularly nationalistic tendencies of the Japanese in the early part of this century, Japanese intellectuals
were not predisposed to emphasize the tremendous cultural debt they owed to China. By emphasizing instead the role of Zen they reoriented the discussion away from the Chinese origins of Japanese high culture toward their origins in a spiritual gnosis that transcends national boundaries. In doing so they simultaneously elevated these art forms from mere hobbies of the leisure class to manifestations of ultimate truth. By claiming a deep connection between Japanese high culture and Zen, Japanese scholars managed to apotheosize the nation as a whole.84

As we have seen above, this project was facilitated by rendering Zen an “experience” logically independent from any particular form in which it might be expressed. The social and intellectual circumstances in Japan that gave rise to this interpretation of Zen are similar in many respects to those found in the West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Wayne Proudfoot has traced the origins of the European interest in “religious experience” to the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, who “sought to free religious belief and practice from the requirement that they be justified by reference to non-religious thought or action and to preclude the possibility of conflict between religious doctrine and any new knowledge that might emerge in the course of secular inquiry.”85 Nishida, Suzuki, Hisamatsu, and their followers, like Schleiermacher, Otto, and James before them, were reacting to the onslaught of Enlightenment values. They sought to reframe our conceptions of the religious such that a core of spiritual and moral values would survive the headlong clash with secular philosophy, science, and technological progress. They were thus led to posit an “essential core” of religion, conceived of as a private, veridical, ineffable experience inaccessible to empirical scientific analysis.

Zen and Nihonjinron

We have seen that the men most responsible for laying the intellectual foundation for Zen in the West did not emerge from traditional Zen monastic settings. Rather, they were educated proponents of post-Meiji New Buddhism, concerned with rendering Buddhism and Zen socially and intellectually respectable. While a number of these men received permission to enter training monasteries and engage in intensive retreats, they were largely laypersons who elected not to follow the monastic vocation.86 Instead, they sought to realize Zen within themselves so that they might take it with them when they left
sesshin. Of necessity, their Zen had to transcend the institutional and ritual forms with which Zen had always been associated. These reformers were more than a little self-serving when they argued that Zen was not the possession of the ordained priesthood alone.

Moreover, many of the Japanese proponents of Zen in the West were university graduates who successfully pursued academic careers in their own country. The universities in which they were trained and later taught were modeled on systems largely imported from the West. As students they were introduced to Western secular thought in general and European philosophy in particular, and as teachers they actively sought to formulate a Japanese response to the challenge posed by Western culture, science, and technology. This response took the form of identifying and defending a spiritual sensibility which they felt to be uniquely Japanese, or at least uniquely Asian. Like other Japanese intellectuals in the early twentieth century, they were deeply concerned with the place and future of Japan in the modern world and sought to defend indigenous cultural institutions from the onslaught of Western civilization. In short, their agenda was a species of *nihonjinron*—a popular discursive enterprise devoted to the delineation and explication of the unique qualities of the Japanese, which invariably touts the cultural homogeneity as well as the moral and spiritual superiority of the Japanese vis-à-vis other peoples. But while other *nihonjinron* thinkers would turn to the climate, language, architecture, or the landscape of Japan in order to explain Japanese mores, these men turned to Zen. They argued that the roots of Japanese culture, Japanese spirituality, Japanese morality, and Japanese aesthetics are all to be found in the Zen experience.

Nishida’s philosophical exposition of “pure experience,” in which there is no duality between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, set the stage for a series of newfangled *nihonjinron* theories, all based on the dubious notion that the Japanese mode of experiencing the world is somehow more immediate, or direct, or nondualistic than that of others. Thus Suzuki was by no means alone when he insisted that Japanese spirituality is characterized by “directness” or “going-straight-ahead-ness” that establishes a connection with “highest reality without the intervention of some intermediate condition.” But while Suzuki, Hisamatsu, and other Zen apologists would emphasize the dominant role of Zen in determining Japanese modes of cognition, others would focus on everything from language and family structure to climate and architecture.

Yukawa Hideki is one who, drawing on the work of Watsuji Tetsurō, saw the Japanese climate as engendering a sense of unity
between man and nature: "The Western mode of human living is characterized in a broad sense, by confrontation with external environments, whereas the Eastern mode is characterized by adaptation to them." This is because the Japanese live in isolation in a mild climate: "[Western attitudes] are those of hostility to and reconciliation with Nature. But, in Japan, there was originally no such thing as alienation between man and nature."99

The writer Tanizaki Junichirō popularized an alternative explanation based on the nature of the Japanese language. This line of reasoning is later adopted by Kishimoto Hideo:

It is not necessary in Japanese to specify the subject by explicitly stating whether "I" am feeling lonesome, or the scenery is lonesome. . . . Analytically, the sentiment is the result of the collaboration of the subject and the object. . . . One of the characteristics of the Japanese language is to be able to project man's experience in its immediate and unanalyzed form. . . . The syntax of Western languages requests, in their construction, more distinct and full indication of the subject-object relation than does the Japanese. So, a full statement of the subject-object relation is expected in English, while the Japanese language is more closely connected with man's immediate experience.90

Japanese writers have even argued that the Japanese predisposition to experience the unity of subject and object make the Japanese better scientists, since they are more "at one" with the world of nature.91 It should be clear by now that the rhetoric emanating from Zen apologists concerning the relationship between Japanese character, Japanese culture, and the nondual experience of Zen is but a variation on a popular theme. But it is a theme with a dark underside: the notion of the unity of subject and object readily lent itself to kokutai ideology, with its emphasis on the essential unity of individual and state—of private and public interests.92

_Nihonjinron_ is in large part a Japanese response to modernity—the sense of being adrift in a sea of tumultuous change, cut off from the past, alienated from history and tradition. Since the Meiji reforms, Japanese intellectuals have been confronted with the collapse of traditional Japanese political and social structures, accompanied by the insidious threat posed by the hegemonic discourse of the West. In response, the Japanese would formulate a conception of Japanese-ness that would, in part, insulate themselves from Western universalizing discourse. This was accomplished through insisting that the essence of Japanese character lay in a uniquely Japanese experience of the world, an experience that was thus conveniently out of the reach
of foreigners. This experience, in turn, is responsible for an interrelated set of uniquely Japanese aesthetic, spiritual, and moral values, invariably defined in contradistinction to everything the Japanese found most contemptible and threatening about the West.

Ironically, the vanguard of *nihonjinron* theorists consisted of a select group of Japanese intellectuals and writers who lived and studied, often for extended periods of time, in the West. In her study of one such figure—Kuki Shūzō—Leslie Pincus notes that “it was often in Europe that Japanese artists, writers and thinkers first surrendered to the spell of their own ‘far away island country.’ To put it boldly, Kuki and others reappropriated Japan from Europe as an exoticized object. . . . Whether tangible or intangible, the artifacts of Japanese culture had become indelibly marked by the accents of Europe’s fascination with (or depreciation of) its cultural other.”

D. T. Suzuki then joins the ranks of Okakura Kakuzō, Watsuji Tetsurō, Kuki Shūzō, and Tanabe Hajime, all of whom encountered the tremendous cultural arrogance of the Occident, dangerously coupled with a vast technological and military superiority. While living abroad these men came to conceive of the Japanese ethnos as the very antithesis of everything they detested most about the West: the crass materialism, the inauthenticity brought about by the technologies of mass production, the crude democratization and vulgarization of aesthetic taste and value, and the pervasive mood of spiritual alienation. Nonetheless, they articulated their renewed appreciation of “Japanese values” in a rhetoric appropriated largely from their Western mentors. In particular, a generation of Japanese would borrow the language and methods of phenomenology from Heidegger—attracted by a discourse that promised the disclosure of reality through the contemplation of experience. Yet the Japanese, unlike Heidegger, would attempt to wrest experience away from history.

*Nihonjinron* thought is distinguished precisely by its thoroughly ahistorical character. Individual artifacts of culture are isolated, stripped of their historical context, and raised to the status of icons of the Japanese spirit. No shifting semiotic field is invoked in the analysis of a temple garden, a tea bowl, or a ritual suicide. Rather, these cultural products are offered up as vivid manifestations of the timeless and unchanging Japanese character. Such a radically ahistorical stance is a convenient means of concealing the very real historical situation—the threat posed by rapid technological and industrial modernization, imperialist aspirations, and diplomatic failures—in which *nihonjinron* rhetoric flourished.

Nowhere is this desire to step outside the contingencies of his-
tory more apparent than in the rhetoric that would render Zen "pure experience" free of mediating discursive structures. Indeed, Japanese Buddhists would turn to the myth of an unbroken mind-to-mind patriarchal transmission to support their claim as to the universality and transcendence of Zen experience. Yet this would not discourage them from identifying anything and everything Japanese as the expression of this experience. Not only would this serve to glorify Japanese culture, but by explicating the particularities of Japanese culture and the Japanese mind in terms of a sui generis religious experience, the Japanese could repudiate the enormous cultural debt they owed to China.

The Allure of Zen

The assertions made by men such as Suzuki, Hisamatsu, and Nishitani for the transcultural nature of the Zen experience continue to be reiterated by Western writers on the topic. It is perhaps surprising that the Zen claim to have direct access to universal truth was taken seriously by intellectuals in the West, considering their ready rejection of similar fundamentalist claims associated with other religious traditions. But it is even more surprising that these same intellectuals failed to recognize the nihonjinron polemics that lie behind such claims. Note that such a failure cannot be attributed to linguistic barriers alone: in substantiating my argument I have intentionally referred to material readily available in English, rather than to untranslated works in Japanese by Suzuki and his confederates. The extensive corpus in Japanese is, as one might expect, even more forthright in its cultural chauvinism.

It is undeniable that Suzuki's brand of Zen held a strong appeal to intellectuals in the West. Philosophers and scholars of religion were attracted to Zen for the same reason that they were attracted to the mysticism of Otto, James, and Underhill: it offered a solution to the seemingly intractable problem of relativism engendered in the confrontation with cultural difference. The discovery of cultural diversity, coupled with the repudiation of imperialist and racist strategies for managing cultural difference, threatened to result in the "principle of arbitrariness," the notion that there is no necessary reason for us to conceive of the world one way rather than another. In mysticism intellectuals found a refuge from the distressing verities of historical contingency and cultural pluralism; by invoking a sui generis nondiscursive, unmediated experience they could gracefully elide problems of ontological reference.
Zen appeared on the scene at precisely the right historical moment. The allure of Zen lay in the fact that it seemed to confirm the theories of mysticism propounded by Otto and his intellectual descendants, for here was an authentic mystical tradition of considerable antiquity that clearly articulated the crucial distinction between (1) unmeditated mystical experience per se and (2) the culturally determined symbols used to express it. The purported anti-intellectualism, antiritualism, and iconoclasm of Zen were ample evidence that Zen had not lost touch with its mystical and experiential roots.

The much-touted spiritual vibrancy of Zen was particularly attractive to a vanguard of Catholic monastics interested in revitalizing their own contemplative practice. These Catholic monks willingly accepted the notion that Zen was not a religion per se, but rather a “spiritual technology” capable of inculcating the mystical experience that lay at the source of all authentic religious insight. This would allow them to practice Zen meditation under the direction of Asian masters, confident in their belief that they were not compromising their Christian faith.

The irony, as we have seen above, is that the “Zen” that so captured the imagination of the West was in fact a product of the New Buddhism of the Meiji. Moreover, those aspects of Zen most attractive to the Occident—the emphasis on spiritual experience and the devaluation of institutional forms—were derived in large part from Occidental sources. Like Narcissus, Western enthusiasts failed to recognize their own reflection in the mirror being held out to them.

As it turned out, the seemingly felicitous convergence of Eastern and Western intellectual and spiritual agendas prevented those on both sides from recognizing the historical mischief entailed in the radical decontextualization of the Zen tradition. Asian apologists, convinced that Zen was making significant inroads in the West, failed to recognize the degree to which Zen was “therapeutized” by European and American enthusiasts, rendering Zen, from a Buddhist point of view, part of the problem rather than the solution. And Western enthusiasts systematically failed to recognize the national ideology underlying modern Japanese constructions of Zen.

Conclusion

There are many related issues that, for lack of space, had to be omitted from the discussion above. I have not, for example, dealt in any detail with Nishitani Keiji, a student of both Nishida and Heidegger,
whose many translated works continue to exert a considerable influence on Western students of Japanese philosophy, theology, and "Zen thought." And while I have focused on the construction of Zen rhetoric in the West, I have avoided a discussion of the particularly Western understanding of Zen practice. Suffice it to say that, just as the writings of Suzuki and Hisamatsu are not representative of traditional (i.e., pre-Meiji) Zen exegetics, the style of Zen training most familiar to Western Zen practitioners can be traced to relatively recent and sociologically marginal Japanese lay movements which have neither the sanction nor the respect of the modern Rinzai or Sōtō monastic orthodoxies.

Indeed, the one feature shared by virtually all of the figures responsible for the Western interest in Zen is their relatively marginal status within the Japanese Zen establishment. While Suzuki, Nishida, and their intellectual heirs may have shaped the manner in which Westerners have come to think of Zen, the influence of these Japanese intellectuals on the established Zen sects in Japan has been negligible. At this point it is necessary to affirm that Japanese Zen monasticism is indeed still alive, despite the shrill invectives of some expatriate Zen missionaries who insist that authentic Zen can no longer be found in Japan. The three major Japanese Zen sects together operate some sixty-six monks' halls, where unsui (novice priests) continue to endure the rigors of intensive Zen practice. As of 1984 there were a total of 23,657 ordained Zen priests in Japan, each of whom had completed a minimum of two or three years in monastic training, and who collectively staffed the 20,932 registered Zen temples scattered throughout the country. The vast majority of these functioning Zen priests have little knowledge of, or interest in, the musings of intellectuals such as Suzuki, Nishida, or Hisamatsu, whom they regard as academics and outsiders who lack the proper training and credentials required of legitimate Zen masters (rōshi).

It is unfair to suggest that all Western observers have uncritically accepted the nationalistic construction of Zen spirituality as taught by the self-appointed "representatives" of Zen to the West. By the early 1960s we already find warnings against the nascent chauvinism and nationalist tendencies in the Zen being packaged for export. Arthur Koestler, in a droll article that elicited sharp responses from D. T. Suzuki, Christmas Humphreys, and Carl Jung, lambasted those who would uncritically accept the obfuscations and confusions that were proffered forth by Suzuki as Zen wisdom, and mockingly suggested that Suzuki's work may be an elaborate "hoax" intended to confuse Western intellectuals. Meanwhile Paul Demiéville and
R. J. Zwi Werblowsky offered more sober critiques of Suzuki in their reviews of his works; both scholars were particularly disturbed by the manner in which Suzuki placed Zen above all moral considerations. Demiéville, perhaps the greatest scholar of East Asian Buddhism of his day, decried the manner in which Suzuki attempted to embrace the whole of Japanese culture under the banner of Zen, and the facile comparisons between Western and Eastern mentalities of which Suzuki was so fond.

Yet the cautionary note sounded several decades ago has, for the most part, gone unheeded. Western scholars and lay enthusiasts alike continue to represent Zen Buddhism in particular, and Asian culture in general, as rooted in an experience of oneness with all things. As recently as 1990 Heinrich Dumoulin, widely regarded as an authority on Zen, would reaffirm that “Eastern people grasp the universe as a whole in motion and experience themselves as inserted into the flowing stream of the whole, whereas Westerners strive after a goal that defines the meaning of their lives and which is inscribed in the texture of the world that surrounds them and the duties it imposes.”

It would seem that we are a long way from divesting ourselves of the **nihonjinron** theories of our Japanese mentors.

The influence of the Zen missionaries and apologists examined above has made a significant impact not only on the study of Buddhism and Japanese culture, but also on a host of related fields, including the history of religions, comparative religion, and the study of mysticism. These disciplines were founded not so much on a base of ethnographic research, as on a dialogue that took place at the turn of the century between Western scholars, most of whom were Christian, and various “representatives” of Asian cultural traditions. All too often these representatives, who were invariably the products of European-style educations, formulated their understandings of their respective traditions in a European intellectual context. Rammohan Roy (1772 [or 1774]–1833), to cite an early but influential example, the founder of the Hindu reform movement Brâhmo Samāj (Society of the Worshipers of God), evolved his notion of Hinduism as a “universal” and “humanistic” religion which rejects idolatry and advocates social activism, in continuous dialogue with his English missionary teachers. And both Vivekananda (1863–1902) and Dharmapāla (1864–1933), the principle representatives of Hinduism and Theravāda Buddhism, respectively, at the 1893 World Parliament of Religions, were very much the products of their English missionary educations. In addition, Dharmapāla had a close connection with the Theosophical Society, as did a number of other non-Christian dele-
gates to the parliament, including a Japanese Buddhist representative Hirai Kinzō (founder of the Kyoto branch of the Theosophical Society) and the Hindu delegate G. N. Chakravarti (an active member of the Indian Theosophical Society). (In this connection, it is notable that the representative of Islam, Alexander Russell Webb, was a Western convert to the religion as well as a Theosophist.)

Like the Japanese proponents of Meiji New Buddhism, these Western-educated Asian intellectuals were all too ready to present their own spiritual heritages as paragons of enlightened, scientific, rational, humanistic, and universal religious creeds grounded in the direct experience of divine truth. The modern notion of religion as an appropriate cross-cultural object of scholarly investigation emerged directly out of this complex dialogue, in which Western investigators were ever encouraged to find their own romanticized notion of true or essential religion mirrored back to them by their Asian protégés. This raises serious questions as to the very foundation of the secular study of comparative religion in the West, but a full exploration of this larger topic will have to be deferred until a later time.

Postscript

Several years have passed since an earlier version of this essay was submitted for publication to History of Religions. In the meantime I have had the opportunity to continue to explore some of the issues raised in the essay, and to reflect on criticisms directed against it. I had employed a rather broad brush in my analysis of contemporary Zen nativism, and thus I looked forward to the opportunity to develop the thesis further for republication in this collection.

One issue that I planned to pursue was the influence of the Swedenborgians and the Theosophical movement on the young Suzuki—an influence that no doubt encouraged Suzuki’s presentation of Zen as a species of “religious mysticism.” As is well known, Suzuki took a keen interest in Swedenborg’s writings, and he was instrumental in the propagation of Swedenborgianism in Japan. Less clear is the direct influence of the Theosophical movement on Suzuki’s thought. Suzuki’s American wife, Beatrice Erskine Lane (1878–1938), was active in the Theosophical movement, as were so many of the intellectuals, scholars, and Buddhist laymen who crossed Suzuki’s path in the West. (It is also interesting to note that Beatrice Lane had studied with William James—another Theosophist—while at Radcliffe.) Suzuki himself appears to have been personally
active in the Order of the Star in the East (a subgroup of the Theosophical Society associated with Annie Besant and Krishnamurti), as a branch of the Order met at Suzuki’s home in Osaka in the 1920s. However, details relating to Suzuki’s marriage to Beatrice Lane and his interest in Theosophy are sketchy at best, and much work remains to be done on this topic.

I fully intended to pursue these and other issues. However, in the years since I wrote the original article a number of important studies bearing on related themes began to make their way into print. Unbeknownst to me, Bernard Faure had been working on very similar questions under the general rubric of Zen and “reverse orientalism,” and his fine work on the subject is now becoming available. In addition, the 1994 Kyoto Zen Symposium sponsored by the Taniguchi Foundation was devoted to the theme “Zen, the Kyoto School, and Nationalism,” and the sixteen papers prepared for the conference are now being readied for publication. It was clear that this was a topic whose time had come, and my efforts to flesh out the issues on my own were being rendered somewhat superfluous by the increasing involvement of a diverse group of specialists from different disciplines. At the same time, as none of the recent spate of research on the topic controverted my thesis, I felt content to let my original article stand for republication with relatively minor revisions.

The polemical tone of my article has, not surprisingly, led to certain misunderstandings. The most critical responses came from (1) those who saw it as a tendentious attack on the intellectual integrity and character of certain Japanese scholars, notably D. T. Suzuki; and (2) those who construed the article as a critique of contemporary Zen practice in the West. Both responses are, I believe, off target.

D. T. Suzuki was indeed an extraordinary and inspiring figure—an indefatigable champion of Zen who made a lasting impact on a generation of philosophers, theologians, writers, and artists, in addition to scholars of religion. While much of his literary output was apologetic in nature, it was not exclusively so; he was in fact a capable philologist who made important contributions to Buddhist and Zen scholarship. His vast oeuvre in Japanese (his “collected writings” comprise some thirty-two volumes) includes significant research on the Tun-huang Ch’an manuscripts, and his editions and studies of several key texts continue to be consulted by scholars of early Ch’an today. As mentioned above, he also contributed to scholarship on Mahāyāna sutras, notably the Lankāvatāra. While he does not seem to have actively discouraged the cultlike following that attended him in his later life, it is difficult not to admire the energy and sincerity
with which he promoted Zen and Japanese culture. In short, I do not believe that he can be faulted for his enthusiasm for his own religious tradition, or for being a product of his times.

As such, my consternation is directed not at the profligate apologetics of men like Suzuki and Hisamatsu, even though I suspect that their rhetorical excesses ultimately do a disservice to their own cause. Rather, I am dismayed by those Western scholars who uncritically accept these Japanese missionaries as living representatives of an unbroken tradition, and who refuse to acknowledge the ideological and rhetorical dimensions of the Zen of men like Suzuki. It is time to demand the same critical and dispassionate rigor in the study of Zen that we casually demand in the study of other religious traditions. And we need to cast a particularly suspect eye at the special pleading of Zen adherents who would have us believe that Zen and Zen alone is to be exempted from the hermeneutical suspicion that is habitually taken for granted in all serious scholarship.

The second often indignant response to my argument comes from those who mistake the article as a critique of contemporary Zen practice in the West. Such a critique was never my intention. Buddhism will not survive in Europe or America unless it manages to accommodate itself to modern Western sensibilities. The capacity to accommodate itself to local norms has been one of the underlying strengths of Buddhism—a strength that allowed Buddhism to spread and take root throughout the diverse cultures of Asia.

In the West, assimilation has involved various attempts to identify an essential “core” of Zen that can be isolated from its Chinese and Japanese “cultural accretions.” Adherents and scholars may well have varying views as to how one should go about circumscribing this core, whether identifying a core is indeed necessary, and whether the inevitable changes to the tradition brought about through its transposition to a foreign culture will seriously compromise the integrity or “spiritual foundations” of Zen. (Ironically, any attempt to delimit an “essence” or “core” is made particularly difficult by Mahāyāna tenets that explicitly repudiate all such essences.) These issues are clearly of some importance to contemporary practitioners, Buddhist “theologians,” and those interested in the sociology of transplanted Asian religions.

However, this study was directed to a very different issue. While the complex dialogue concerning the essence of Zen and “Zen experience” may be of existential import to Zen practitioners today, I argued that the underlying epistemology of such a dialogue is of relatively recent origin, and thus of dubious value to scholars whose interest
lies in the self-understanding of Zen monastics in premodern times. As a religious historian I am ultimately concerned with hermeneutic issues that attend to the interpretation of medieval Buddhist texts. And while I find it laudable that contemporary Zennists would take an interest in historical issues, I think it would be naive, if not foolhardy, to proffer scholarly reconstructions of medieval Zen monasticism as a normative standard against which one might assess the "authenticity" or "purity" of contemporary Zen practice.

NOTES

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7. See the full discussion in Ketelaar, *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan*, chap. 3.


12. The institution of national evangelists formed a part of the “great promulgation campaign” (taikyō senpu undō) carried out between 1870 and 1884, primarily under the direction of Shintō leaders. These evangelists—whose ranks included not only Shintō and Buddhist priests, but also entertainers, preachers of national learning, and representatives of various new religions—were charged with promulgating national ideology under the rubric of the “three standards of instruction” (sanjō kyōsoku), namely, (1) to comply with the commands to revere the kami and love the nation, (2) to illuminate the principle of heaven and the way of man, and (3) to serve the emperor and faithfully obey the will of the court (Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan, p. 225; Murakami, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, p. 29). For a description of the inglorious role of the Ministry of Doctrine and the national evangelists in the 1870s, see Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan, pp. 96–122; and Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 1868–1988 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 42–48.


14. Kösen founded the Ryōmō-kyōkai—a zazenkai or “meditation society” for lay practitioners—in the early Meiji, and it was later revived by Tetsuō Sōkatsu (also known as Shaku Sōkatsu, 1870–1954) at the behest of Shaku Sōen. Tetsuō Sōkatsu and his student Sasaki Shigetsu (better known as Sōkei-an, 1882–1945), were among the handful of pioneers who first took Zen practice to America, and soon after their arrival in California they established a “branch” of the Ryōmō-kyōkai on Sutter Street in San Francisco (Rick Fields, How the Swans Came to the Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America [Boulder, Colo.: Shambala, 1981], p. 177). The Ryōmō-kyōkai may have been the first Zen center in modern Japan explicitly dedicated to teaching meditation to laypersons, and it became the model for the urban lay meditation centers that were so influential in the propagation of Zen practice in the West.

16. Soen's trip to Manchuria was by no means unusual; rather, it was part of a general policy spanning all the major Buddhist sects to "[uphold] Buddhism's reputation as 'protector of the country'" and to provide chaplains to minister to the troops (Murakami, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, p. 54).


18. Shaku Soyen, Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot: Addresses on Religious Subjects, trans. D. T. Suzuki (New York: Weiser, 1971), pp. 211–12. This text, originally published in 1906, was taken from a memorial address delivered in Manchuria for those who died in the Russo-Japanese War. There is ample documentation of Soen's support for the Japanese war effort. See, e.g., the letter of February 5, 1904, written to Zen'eki Kitamura at the very start of the Japanese-Russian conflict: "Now that the relation between Japan and Russia has changed from diplomatic negotiations to military actions, we have apparently crossed the crucial juncture. The nation's future for 100 years depends entirely on this venture. In such an emergency, we Japanese should not idle about even for a moment. Relying neither on the Cabinet, nor on the Army, we have to face this emergency with the united loyalty of the people. It may be the inevitable destiny of this world that it has to go through such human savagery repeatedly in the future, too, for the sake of the ultimate peace of the world. As we have to turn our daily training to account on such occasions, our colleagues are now to work out both directly and indirectly" (cited in Furuta, "Shaku Soen," pp. 79–80). One might also note the following statement by Soen, quoted by Tolstoy in an antiwar essay published in 1904: "Even though the Buddha teaches not to take another's life, he also teaches that all sentient beings through the exercise of infinite compassion will be united and thereby obtain final and ultimate peace. As means toward the harmonizing of the incompatible, killing and war are necessary" (cited in Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan, p. 171):


22. Kasumi Bunshô, Zen ni ikiru ketsuso: Nantenbô (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1963), p. 168. T. Griffith Foulk reports seeing a portrait of Nogi in the mid-1970s outside the sanzen room at Kaiseiji, a temple in which Nantenbô served as abbot from 1902 until the end of this career.

23. Mention might also be made of an interesting volume published by E. J. Harrison in 1913, the same year that saw the publication of Nukariya’s Religion of the Samurai. Entitled The Fighting Spirit of Japan and Other Studies (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), it contains a full chapter on "The Zen Cult in Japan." Here one finds discussions of the meaning of Zen, the flower sermon, Bodhidharma, the four great vows, kōan, sanzen, Dogen, and so on (pp. 173–88). Harrison also argues quite sensibly that Zen was
influential among the Samurai primarily because they turned to the educated priesthood for instruction in literature and other refined arts, rather than for practical training in the arts of war. While Harrison is not entirely unsympathetic to Zen, he does accuse Bodhidharma of using ambiguity as a "convenient cloak for ignorance" (pp. 186–87), and goes on to say that "the least desirable aspect of the cult... must be pronounced a species of intellectual priggishness nothing less than irritating to the Occidental. I have met Zen students in my time who quite unconsciously inspired me with a desire to kick them round the block" (p. 187).


28. Paul Carus, The Religion of Science, 2d. ed., revised and enlarged (Chicago: Open Court, 1896), pp. 6–7. This title was originally published in 1893.

29. See Jackson, “The Meeting of East and West,” p. 79.

30. See e.g., Paul Carus, God: An Enquiry into the Nature of Man’s Highest Ideal and a Solution of the Problem from the Standpoint of Science (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1943); as well as Carus’s The Religion of Science, pp. 33–62.


33. Carus's interest in Asian religion may in fact be traced to the mathematician Hermann Grassmann, with whom Carus studied at the gymnasium in Stettin. Grassmann is well known among mathematicians for his work on *Ausdehnungslehre*, or the calculus of extension, but he was also a scholar of Sanskrit who was known in his time for his work on Vedic literature (*Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda* [Stettin, 1872]; see Hay, "Paul Carus," pp. 505–7; and Meyer, "Paul Carus and the Religion of Science," pp. 599–600).

34. Carus was a major figure in a series of organizations formed in the 1890s and 1900s in the hope of keeping alive the kind of interfaith dialogue that characterized the parliament. He also tried to form a "lay church" that would embody the ecumenical religious ideals of the parliament, but in the end all such projects ended in failure (see Jackson, "The Meeting of East and West," pp. 86–87).

35. Ibid., p. 84.


37. Ibid., p. xii.

38. Letter from Sōen to Carus, dated May 17, 2554 (1894), Open Court Papers, Special Collections, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (hereafter cited as Open Court Papers).

39. Sōen comments that "the sacred books of Buddhism are so numerous that its beginners are at loss how to begin their study," and thus Carus's book fills a real need (letter from Sōen to Carus, November 7, 1894, Open Court Papers). Moreover, according to a letter from Ohara Kakichi of Omi, Japan, December 26, 1894, Open Court Papers, both the Jōdo and Jōdo-shin organizations adopted *The Gospel of Buddha* into their curriculums.


42. Letter from Suzuki to Carus, March 10, 1895, Open Court Papers.

43. Note that Sōen's correspondence with Carus at this time was usually translated into English, if not actually composed, by Suzuki himself, and this letter is in Suzuki's own hand.

44. Letter from Carus to Sōen, January 17, 1896, Open Court Papers.

45. I would like to thank Harold Henderson for bringing the discrepancy between the two accounts to my attention. Suzuki's account, written some sixty years after the events took place, runs as follows: "When *The Gospel of Buddha* was finished, Dr. Carus continued to be interested in things Oriental, and he began to translate the *Tao Te Ching* of Lao-tzu. For
this task he needed someone who could read Chinese with him, and he wrote to Shaku Sōen, asking him to recommend someone. This is how I came to La Salle in 1897, exactly sixty years ago” (Suzuki, “A Glimpse of Paul Carus,” p. xi). The surviving correspondence provides no support for Suzuki’s version, but rather confirms the fact that Carus believed Suzuki was coming to study philosophy. In response to a later letter from Sōen expressing concern for Suzuki’s economic welfare, however, Carus did reply by offering Suzuki remuneration for assistance in Chinese translation.

49. Of the ten or so books Suzuki authored or jointly authored by 1910, only a couple of tracts composed in collaboration with Shaku Sōen are concerned specifically with Zen. These are Suzuki’s *Seiza no susume* (Tokyo: Kōyūkan, 1900), which was written in collaboration with Sōen Rōshi; and Sōen’s *Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot*.
51. On Suzuki’s *kenshō* experience at Engakuji in 1896, see his “Early Memories” in Abe, ed., *A Zen Life*, p. 11. Note that this short piece originally appeared in *The Middle Way* 39 (1964): 101–8 in 1964, sixty-eight years after the event took place. Suzuki opens his 1949 essay entitiled “Satori” with the characteristically blunt assertion, “To understand Zen, it is essential to have an experience known as satori, for without this one can have no insight into the truth of Zen” (Abe, ed., *A Zen Life*, p. 27).
56. The term is found in the writings of Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86) and Chu Hsi (1130–1200). See the Tz’u-yüan, which glosses t’i-yen as equivalent to t’i-ch’a.
58. See, e.g., the Chin-kang san-mei ching, where the term jikaku refers to the personal awakening of the Tathāgata (Taishō daizōkyō [Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai, 1924–32], 273:9.366c25). See also Kumārajiva’s translation of the Saddharma-pundarīka-sūtra (Taishō daizōkyō, 262:9.11a14, 19b26) for similar usage. In Ch’an and Zen texts the term jikaku is usually implicitly or explicitly opposed to takaku, “to awaken others” (Zengaku daijiten [Tokyo: Daishukan, 1985], p. 417).
60. See Dilworth, "The Initial Formations," p. 99; and Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness, p. 224, n. 21. James had a very specific problem: the intractable dualism that resulted from the kind of substance ontology that continued to infect classical empiricism, saddled as it was with the reification of mind and object. He sought to overcome this problem by a functional account of the field of experience that avoided the reification of either subject or object. For James, thoughts and things are ontologically homogeneous when subject to analysis from the perspective of pure experience. James’s project was very far removed from that of the young Nishida, who was attempting to integrate his interest in Japanese Zen with Western philosophical notions shorn from their historical and intellectual context. In the end, Nishida turns pure experience into a hypostatized ontic ground—the ground of “absolute nothingness” as opposed to the ground of “being.” Despite his protestations, there is little doubt that Nishida’s notion of pure experience skirts the edges of idealism: “For many years I wanted to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality. . . . Over time I came to realize that it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that an individual exists because there is experience. I thus arrived at the idea that experience is more fundamental than individual differences, and in this way I was able to avoid solipsism” (Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, p. xxx). On the relationship between James and Nishida, see also Andrew Feenberg and Yoko Arisaka, “Experiential Ontology: The Origins of the Nishida Philosophy in the Doctrine of Pure Experience,” International Philosophical Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1990): 173–206.
61. See, e.g., the final section of Tetsugaku no konpon mondai, where we learn that Japan is a culture founded on the notion of nothingness, as opposed to the West, which is founded on the notion of being. As a consequence, the “special characteristic [of Japanese culture] lies in being an emotional culture. It does not look to the eternal beyond. It moves imma-
ently from thing to thing, without transcending time. It acts within
time, This is the reason why Japanese culture may be thought to be a monsoon
culture” (Nishida Kitarō, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy: The World
of Action and the Dialectical World, trans. David A. Dilworth [Tokyo:
Sophia University Press, 1970], p. 247). See also the comments on Nishida’s
nationalism in Ichikawa Hakugen, Bukkyōsha no sensō sekinin (Tokyo:
Shunjūsha, 1970), pp. 225–53, and Nihon fashizumu shita no shūkyō (To-
Nishida,” p. 486 ff.

Masao Abe and Richard DeMartino, in Sources of Japanese Tradition, ed.
Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 859. This is a selection from Nihon
bunka no mondai, originally delivered as a series of lectures in 1938, repub-

63. Nishida Kitarō, “Towards a Philosophy of Religion with the
Concept of Pre-established Harmony as Guide,” trans. David A. Dilworth,
Eastern Buddhist, n.s., 3, no. 1 (1970): 36, 45 (originally published as
“Yoteichōwa o tebiki toshite shūkyōtetsugaku e” in 1944; reprinted in
Nishida, Nishida Kitarō zenshū, 11:114–46). On the issue of Nishida’s “na-
tionalism,” see also Klaus Kracht, “Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) as a Philos-
opher of the State,” in Europe Interprets Japan, ed. Godaon Daniels
(Tenterden, Kent: Paul Norbury, 1984), pp. 198–203; Yuasa Yasuo, “Na-
tionalism and Japanese Philosophy,” Obirin daigaku kokusaigaku rebyū 2
(1990): 9–28; Yusa Michiko, “Fashion and A-letheia: Philosophical Integ-
rity and the War-time Thought Control,” Hikaku shisō kenkyū (Studies in
Comparative Philosophy) 16 (1990): 294–81 [sic], and “Nishida and the
and Pierre Lavelle, “The Political Thought of Nishida Kitarō,” Mono-
menta Nipponica 49, no. 2 (1994): 139–65. Nishida was generally against
the use of military force to advance Japan’s interests, and he opposed the ul-
tranationalists, especially when their actions threatened the intellectual free-
dom of the academy. At the same time, Nishida maintained close relations
with a number of politicians and intellectuals associated with the military
regime. The contributions to the volume being edited by James Heisig and
John Maraldo (see the postscript to this article) shed a great deal of light on
Nishida’s complex and often ambiguous position vis-à-vis nationalism and
Japanese wartime policies.


65. From D. T. Suzuki’s preface to Viglielmo’s translation of Nishida’s
Zen no kenkyū (A Study of Good), pp. iii–vi.

66. D. T. Suzuki, Zen and the Character of the Japanese People, (Zen
to nihonjin no kishitsu) (Tokyo: Nihon bunka kyōkai, 1935), Zen and Japa-
nese Culture (Zen to nihon bunka) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1940), Oriental
Oneness (Toyōteki ichi) (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1942), More on Zen
and Japanese Culture (Zoku zen to nihon bunka) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,
1942), The Facts of Religious Experience (Shūkyō keiken no jijitsu) (Tokyo:


71. The resulting claim that Zen and Zen alone constitutes the heart of Japanese spirituality presented somewhat of a problem for Suzuki, implying as it did that the “essential spirituality” of the Japanese nation did not emerge until the Kamakura period. It is hard to imagine the sense in which this spirituality is essential to the Japanese, given its relatively late date. Suzuki’s somewhat ad hoc solution to this dilemma is to assert that Japanese spirituality was “germinating” in the Nara and Heian periods, but only “blossomed forth” in the Kamakura in the form of samurai culture and Zen *Japanese Spirituality*, p. 46 ff.).


79. Abe, “Hisamatsu’s Philosophy of Awakening,” p. 34.


82. Waley published a short essay entitled *Zen Buddhism and Its Relation to Art* in 1922 (reprint, London: Luzac & Co., 1959). Despite Waley’s considerable familiarity with classical Zen scriptures, his approach to the subject is rather romantic; he compares Zen both to Quakerism and contemporary psychology, and believes that through Zen one may reach “the Universal Consciousness which, according to certain modern investigators, lies hid beneath the personal Consciousness” (p. 25). Accordingly, he credits Zen with a privileged understanding of the “psychological conditions under which art is produced” (pp. 21–22). However, Waley’s conception of “Zen art” is far more constrained than that of Hisamatsu or Suzuki, and he stops well short of claiming that Zen is the creative force behind Japanese culture.

83. A discussion of the origins of the Zen interpretation of Japanese landscape gardens may be found in Wybe Kuitert, *Themes, Scenes and Taste in the History of Japanese Garden Art*, Japonica Neerlandica, Monographs of the Netherlands Association for Japanese Studies, vol. 3 (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1988), pp. 150–60. According to Kuitert, prior to Kuck’s English-language guide there is simply no reference to garden design as an expression of Zen philosophy or Zen consciousness. Indeed, there is no evidence that the craftsmen responsible for the design and construction of such gardens had any schooling in Buddhism at all. The earliest reference to “Zen-style gardens” in Japanese (*zenteki teien*) is found in Hisamatsu’s *Zen to bijutsu* of 1957 (Kuitert, p. 153).

84. This claim is implicit or explicit in writings too numerous to enumerate here. We have already mentioned two classics available in English: Suzuki’s *Zen and Japanese Culture* and Hisamatsu’s *Zen and the Fine Arts*. A more recent and considerably more informed study is *Zen to nihon bunka* by the Zen scholar Yanagida Seizan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1985). Western reiterations of the notion that Japanese arts are essentially “Zennish” abound; see, e.g., Helmut Brinker, *Zen in the Art of Painting*, trans. George Campbell (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987; first published as *Zen in der Kunst des Malens* [Berne and München: Barth, 1985]); and Richard B. Pilgrim, *Buddhism and the Arts of Japan* (Chambersburg, Pa.: Anima, 1981).

85. Proudfoot, p. xiii.

86. Suzuki had no formal Zen disciples—indeed, he was in no position to take on students, having never received any official sanction himself.
Of Hisamatsu's students, the only one to enter the priesthood appears to have been Hirata Rōshi, now of Tenryū-ji. Hirata was an early member of the Gakudō dōjō group, and he was directed to the monks' hall by Hisamatsu.


90. Kishimoto Hideo, "Some Japanese Cultural Traits and Religions," in Moore, ed., *The Japanese Mind*, pp. 110–11. Suzuki also flirted with linguistic explanations. In his autobiographical memoir, for example, he suggests that the deficiency in Western thought is built into the very structure of the English language: "[In teaching English] we always translated everything absolutely literally, and I remember being very puzzled by the way one says in English 'a dog has four legs,' 'a cat has a tail.' In Japanese the verb to have is not used in this way. . . . Sometime afterwards I developed the idea that this stress in Western thought on possession means a stress on power, dualism, rivalry which is lacking in Eastern thought" (Suzuki, "Early Memoires," p. 6).

91. In *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness* Peter Dale discusses the *nihonjinron* polemics surrounding Japanese primatology, where the claim is made that, since the Japanese do not distinguish sharply between subject and object, Japanese primatologists are able to identify closely with monkeys, unlike Western scientists who cannot tell one monkey apart from another without tattooing them (pp. 191–98). In the words of Umesao Tadao, "The development of primatology in Japan is due to the intimacy which subsists here between man and monkey. For Europeans, of course, there is an unbridgeable gap between man and the animal kingdom" (cited in Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, p. 193). Thus, the Japanese have no need for a theory of evolution because "in Japan, man and monkey form a continuous link . . . therefore our thought pattern was so inherently evolutionist as not to require a formal theoretical elaboration" (Kamishima Jirō; cited in Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, p. 193).

92. See the discussion in Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, pp. 209–10. A constant refrain in the *Kokutai no hongi* is the essential oneness of the individual and the nation: "Our relationship between sovereign and subject is by no means a shallow, horizontal relationship such as implies a correlation between ruler and citizen, but is a relationship springing from a basis transcending this correlation, and is that of 'dying to self and returning to [the] One,' in which this basis is not lost" (*Kokutai no hongi*, trans. Robert Hall and John Gauntlett, in Tsunoda et al., eds., *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, p. 788).


94. Among the Japanese who studied with Heidegger in the 1920s were Watsuji Tetsuro, Tanabe Hajime, Nishitani Keiji, and Kuki Shūzō (Steven Heine, "The Flower Blossoms 'Without Why': Beyond the Heidegger-

96. It is true that some of the earlier teachers active in the West were in the Rinzai line of Kōsen Rōshi, including two dharma heirs of Shaku Sōen who taught in California: Tetsuō Sōkatsu and Senzaki Nyogen. Moreover, Shaku Sōkatsu’s disciple, Sasaki Shigetsu (Sōkei-an), founded the First Zen Institute of America in New York in 1931. But far more influential were teachers in the line of Harada Daiun (1870–1961) and Yasutani Hakuun (1885–1973), including Yamada Kōun (1907–89), H. M. Enomiya-Lassalle (1898–1990), Philip Kapleau (1912– ), Robert Aitken (1917– ), Maezumi Taizan (1930– ), and Eido Tai Shimano (1932– ). Yasutani, who dedicated himself almost exclusively to training laypersoners, severed his affiliation with the Zen establishment of his day in order to found his own Zen sect called the Sanbōkyōdan (Three Treasures Association), to which most of his spiritual descendants belong. I intend to present a full analysis of the Sanbōkyōdan and its influence on Western constructions of Zen in a future article. Suffice it to say that the Zen practices taught by these teachers are oriented toward lay practitioners and diverge significantly from the training offered in traditional Zen monks’ halls (sōdō).

97. These figures, compiled by the Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs (Bunkachō), are distributed among the three major Zen sects as follows: the Rinzai school accounted for thirty-eight monks’ halls, 5,754 temples, and 6,196 priests; the Sōtō school had twenty-six monks’ halls, 14,718 temples, and 16,705 priests; and the Ōbaku school had two monks’ halls, 460 temples, and 756 priests; see T. Griffith Foulk, “The Zen Institution in Modern Japan,” in *Zen: Tradition and Transition*, ed. Kenneth Kraft (New York: Grove, 1988), p. 158.


99. See Paul Demiéville’s review of D. T. Suzuki’s *Zen and Japanese


102. On the Theosophical presence at the conference see Jackson, The Oriental Religions, pp. 251-52.

103. In this regard we should also note Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975), the Indian counterpart to Nishida Kitarō, whose writings were in part an attempt to bring Indian religious thought into the sphere of Western philosophical discourse.


105. After marrying Suzuki in 1911 and moving to Japan, Beatrice Lane took an active interest in Shingon, authoring over a dozen articles and pamphlets on the subject, many for publication in the Eastern Buddhist. This interest in Shingon—the Japanese version of “Buddhist esoterism”—was no doubt spurred in part by her Theosophical background. See, e.g., Beatrice Lane, “Kōbō Daishi, the Saint of Shingon,” Eastern Buddhism 3, no. 1 (1924): 70-75, “The Shingon School of Mahayana Buddhism, Part 1,” Eastern Buddhist 5, no. 4 (1931): 291-311, “The Problem of Personality, according to the Shingon School of Buddhism,” Young East 6, no. 2 (1936), “The Shingon School of Mahayana Buddhism, Part 2,” Eastern Buddhist 7, no. 1 (1936): 1-38, “Ceremonies for Lay Disciples at Koyasan: Part I: The Bosatsuakai; Part II: The Ango,” Eastern Buddhist 6, no. 2 (1933): 157-75, and so on. Several of these articles were later incorporated into her Impressions of Mahayana Buddhism (Kyoto: Eastern Buddhist Society; London: Luzac, 1940).

107. I would note in passing the influence of Theosophy on the development of Buddhist studies in the West in the earlier part of this century: W. Y. Evans-Wentz, Alexandra David-Neel, Christmas Humphreys, and Edward Conze are just a few of the many scholars and popularizers of Buddhism who were associated with the Theosophical movement.


109. The symposium was held in Santa Fe, New Mexico, March 9–13, 1994. The papers will appear in *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism*, ed. James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995).
So this, then, is the game I play, until the slight wave of my existence, stirred up briefly by chance in the ocean of life, disappears again into its never-ending wells to give way to other fleeting ripples: my small and harmless game, while others amuse themselves with more demanding and dangerous pastimes.

Giuseppe Tucci

4 Giuseppe Tucci, or Buddhology in the Age of Fascism

Gustavo Benavides

As a scholar of Buddhism Giuseppe Tucci dealt with virtually all the cultural areas and aspects of Buddhist scholarship. From India and Tibet to China and Japan, from the Buddhist logicians to the Tantras, from the editing and translating of texts to archaeological work, Tucci's accomplishments are such that only a fraction of them would be enough to satisfy most scholars. And yet, together with the massive learning, one finds in Tucci's vision of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Asia an oscillation between strict philological accuracy and the most ideologically charged constructions of the Orient. The tension between philology and ideology becomes clear in the early 1930s, reaches its peak in the early 1940s, during the war, and then continues softened, after the war years. If Tucci's research had been restricted to the Mādhyamikas, or, even better, to the Buddhist logicians, his ideological inclinations would have appeared either as mere political opportunism or as an aberration: in any event, as the historically determined blindness of a great philologist. On the other
hand, had he dealt exclusively with Tantrism, the Tantric notion of a coincidentia oppositorum and of a liberation understood—perhaps just metaphorically, perhaps literally—as bodily bliss would not have been inconsistent with a longing for a world not touched by the icy winds of modernity. But Tucci, like the Tibetan scholars whose works he studied, was as interested in mystical experience as in the rules of disputation and the means of establishing the validity of knowledge, and therefore one cannot without violence regard him merely as one of the exponents of a clearly antimodern, authoritarian, and irrationalist version of the philosophia perennis.

Our task, then, will be to explore through the contradictions present in Tucci's work the reasons behind the emergence of a particular construction of the Orient. Ultimately, however, our concern will be less to come to terms with Giuseppe Tucci as a man and scholar than with the reactions of a significant number of Western intellectuals to the demise of the old European social order and to the always contested spread of modernity. The vision of the Orient nurtured by these intellectuals is of interest to us inasmuch as this Orient was in most cases a screen upon which they could project their understanding of the Occident: either the triumphant discovery that the West was superior to the East, or the melancholy realization that the East possessed a magic no longer present in the West—or, more often, the uncertain combination of the contempt and the longing. That many of these scholars dealt with religion is not surprising, since 'religion' is the name given to those practices and presuppositions which, infinitely malleable both by insiders and by outsiders, articulate a culture's, or perhaps just an elite's, unspoken understanding of itself. That in this particular case we are dealing with a student of Buddhism is quite understandable as well, since Buddhism, perhaps even more so than other religions, is built around a set of concepts which seem always to be on the verge of disappearing into the realm of what can no longer be conceptualized, and which therefore can lend themselves to such unlimited exegesis that they can be made to agree with one's particular philosophical and ideological commitments.

Timelessness and Experience

Of the works Tucci devoted to India at the beginning of his career, the most significant in his history of Indian materialism, published in two
parts in 1923 and 1929. No Orientalism in this work: on the contrary, the reader is told that there is no opinion as false and conventional as that which holds that India is the land of dreamers and ascetics who in their mystical enthusiasm have renounced the world. In fact, “Linee di una storia del materialismo indiano” is not only a thorough examination of nonspiritualist trends in Indian philosophy, but also a demonstration of what peddlers of a mystical India must necessarily ignore, namely, the central role played by speculation about power and politics in Indian philosophy. Tucci, for example, refers to a play, the Prabodhacandrodaya, in which one of the characters, a Cārvāka, claims that there is only one science, daṇḍanīti, the science of the king’s staff. Similarly, among studies devoted specifically to Buddhism, he translated besides Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, essentially a devotional work, Aryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, and Śatasāstra, two treatises in which the concept of liberation is subject to such a relentless logical examination that any facile use of the term ‘mysticism’ in a Mādhyamika context is rendered necessarily problematic, unless one understands mysticism as an exploration of the limits of the process of signification.

In L’Oriente nella cultura contemporanea, published in 1934, he again castigates those who, unable to deal with reality—a weakness to which, he hopes, fascism will put an end—look for chimeras in foreign cultures, and maintains quite accurately that life in the Orient will stop those fantasies. But he also says that Asia is difficult to understand because, unlike Western life, which is lived more on the surface, life in Asia is centered upon an inner vision, which results in the world being regarded as an ephemeral and distorted projection of religious and mystical realities; that inner vision, centered upon itself, cannot be communicated through concepts but must be felt and relived. It is in passages like this that the ambiguity towards the East appears, because now, with the introduction of what could be regarded, borrowing a Buddhist concept, as a two-truths approach to Asian cultures, the superficial level can be presented as indeed mundane: one in which life is hard and nonmysterious; while one can also maintain that at a deeper level, there lurks an inner, mystical reality. But the ambiguity lies not so much in the fact that this two-truths approach makes it possible to preserve both the technological superiority of the West and the mystical uniqueness of the East, as in the realization that while the East can make use of what the scientific genius of the West has produced, the latter cannot follow the former along the spiritual path. Tucci’s conclusion appears as a model of
common sense: all that is possible is collaboration, not in the sense of the cooperation of the entire human race towards a transcendental goal, but simply in the sense of mutual understanding and working together. At the same time, despite the common sense—which applies only at the level of surface truth—a spiritual realm has been created, a garden of paradise to which the West will have access only under special circumstances.

The tension between a nostalgia for a world in which the cold intellect does not reign supreme and the realization that the West cannot follow the ascetic and mystical ways of the East continues reappearing through Tucci’s work, often articulated through the opposition between being subject to the tyranny of time and living in a timelessness realm. For example, in a lecture delivered in Budapest in 1942, commemorating Csoma de Kőrös, he speaks of the mysterious links among Italy, Hungary, and the mystical depths of the roof of the world, Tibet. Entering Tibet, he writes, gives him the impression of having gone back in time, as if by incantation: a pleasant feeling, since it is proper to man to try to escape the tyranny of the present. Tibet is outside time, since Tibetans, as Orientals, have as an almost second nature a sense of the ephemerality and unreality of terrestrial things and a natural proclivity to feel apart from the changing nature of the world. Being outside time, Tibetans are described as having the ingenuous serenity of the child.

The opposition between time and the timeless is, to be sure, a cliché, particularly in religious and mystical discourses. But, in the often indistinguishable discourses of exoticism and romanticism, this cliché became such because of the real changes in the perception and measurement of time that accompanied the process of Western industrialization. It is not surprising, therefore, that the perception of time not just as the motion towards dissolution and death, but as the tyrannical force that manages every detail of one’s life, was contrasted to the alleged timelessness of ‘Orientals’ and ‘primitives.’ Like most constructions of this type, the opposition could play a double function: it could serve as the utopian horizon that could be opposed to the everyday drudgery of a totally administered world, or it could fulfill the distancing function required by colonialisit ideologies, or, as it often happens in these cases, it could oscillate between ideology and utopia. In Tucci’s case, timelessness, as we shall have occasion to see again, plays an oscillating role, so that, besides allowing him to escape European meaningless temporality, when the times require it, timelessness can serve, together with the ineffable experi-
ence of the cosmos or the nation, in the struggle for military victory. Functioning as ‘placeholders,’ that is, as operators designed to achieve the result they are supposed to describe, timelessness and pure experience could sacralize, precisely because of their lack of content, the position one had assumed. These mystical notions could therefore perform a useful function within the decisionism so useful to fascist ideologies.

Another commonplace in the study of religions, and a fortiori of mystical systems, is the insistence upon the experiential, sui generis, and ineffable character of what is supposed to constitute the core of a religion. An experience is considered as an a priori, as a presence around which belief and ritual systems emerge, the ritual component generally being considered as a routinization, if not outright degeneration, of a primordial insight. In Tucci’s work, one finds frequently the opposition between knowledge and realization; knowledge being mediated by words, which cannot contain the undefinable flow of life, just as truth cannot but be lived and felt, not formulated. He claims that all forms of Indian and Tibetan thought are based upon an experience that alone gives these forms their content and real value. On the other hand, referring to the actual practices of Tibetans, Tucci considers “Lamaism” as the formalistic mechanization of the rites of an Indian gnosis that at one time had the same dreams and longings found in the hellenistic and Central Asian gnosis. Lamaism in its present state is, for him, the result of an obfuscation, a passing from mystical contemplation to the torpor of the services performed in the monasteries. In a formulation that would probably surprise those who would like to romanticize pre-1951 Tibetan monastic life, Tucci asserts that not a single saintly or learned voice emerges from the monasteries that used to irradiate the great of life and religion. Despite, or actually because of, the colossal development of monasticism, faith is no longer creative in Tibet. Tibetan monasticism is a kind of elephantiasis of asceticism, whose rules have sterilized the spirit; in the monasteries, the spirit spent, the letter reigns supreme, words being considered sacred because they are no longer understood. Wanting to write about experiences, but functioning within a discourse in which time and the timeless are radically opposed, he does write about experiences, only that those experiences, besides being incommunicable, are nowhere to be found, because even Tibet, the land outside time, lives now in a timelessness which is not the original timelessness of the old gnostics. To those in the West who believe that Tibet is the land of mystics, he
responds that that may have been the case some centuries ago: now on the contrary mystics are as rare in Tibet as they are in India.31

This critical, but still ambivalent, attitude to the current state of Buddhism in Tibet is extended to the conditions in which Tibetans live. Describing their poverty, he blames the old Chinese rule but also the native clergy, indifferent to the interests of the people and fearful of innovation.32 Nevertheless, even this poverty—described as turning into misery, abjection and shame, since it makes men indistinguishable from animals—is spiritualized at least retrospectively, and regarded as having produced Tibet’s spiritual wealth.33 Similarly, since the essential difference between East and West is built around the relationship between humans and the cosmos, and since both humans and animals are part of nature, animality—described once as a sign of degradation—is used in the same essay in positive terms, when Tucci describes a Tibetan physician’s ability to identify, more by instinct than by science, medicinal substances with the sureness with which a sick animal finds what will cure it.34

Also Indians are part of nature. In La crisi spirituale dell’India moderna, first delivered as a lecture in Rome in 1940, Indians are presented as primordial beings, still part of nature, and India as living at least partly in a different time. Unlike Europeans who dominate it through science, Indians participate in an unmediated manner in a nature in which there are no hierarchies among living beings.35 But India, which until now has lived dreaming, lost in its contemplating serenity, having never occupied itself with the problem of good and evil, is being awakened by the West, and forced to enter the realm of time.36 And now, India has two souls, one found in the villages, where one can live as if one or two thousand years had not passed, and one found in the cities, where life is full of doubts, oscillating between tradition and revolution.37 In reality, the British invention of an India without history, constituted by religion and caste, opposed to the new, illegitimate India of the cities, is relatively recent, being ultimately the product of the so-called Great Mutiny of 1857.38 But even before the opposition between city and village was sacralized, it was imperative, as Inden has argued, to deconstitute the Indian state and to imagine India as rural, ready to be possessed by the British.39 For Tucci, however, what matters is to preserve traditional India and to protect it from the tragic crises found in other countries of the East.40 His suggestion is that India follow Japan’s example: let the intellect function in the Western manner, but place barriers between the intellect’s operations and the life of the spirit.41 After all, as we
saw earlier, science and technology were born in the West, and it is therefore the West's prerogative to develop them: it is only recently and as a result of the influence of European culture that Orientals have begun approaching nature as conquerors.\textsuperscript{42}

If for the ideologues of colonialism the issue was to imagine the East as eternal in order to subjugate it with the help of time, the issue for Tucci was to imagine it as timeless in order to find in it a defense against the thin air of the West. Neither ideologues nor reactionary utopians were concerned with the Orient; ultimately, it was a matter of raw materials, of capital,\textsuperscript{43} or of that most precious of commodities: meaning. Imagining Asians as primordial beings—as in Tibet, where “man has not yet disintegrated”\textsuperscript{44}—allows one to paint in stark colors and denounce the disintegrating world in which Europeans have to live. Thus Tucci can write: “Scientific certitude, of which we are so proud and solicitous, makes the air so thin that it can hardly be breathed, spreads a light so bright that our eyes so dazzled. But when the shadow of mystery is removed and the blossom of dreams nipped in the bud, the tree of life withers and dries up.”\textsuperscript{45}

Halfway between the romantics and the postmodern deriders of the Enlightenment, he complains about the disease of the West, a disease which has required coining a new word, unwonted in the history of human thought: “intellectual.” Unlike India, where the intellect has often occupied a subordinate position, and where the world of the unconscious is not denied but transfigured in an harmonious process,\textsuperscript{46} in the West even anti-intellectualism is intellectualist, going from mirage to mirage, imprisoned by mere thinking and far from God and nature. India's anti-intellectualism, on the contrary, is that of the mystics, one which does not substitute one fantasy for another, but which truly leaves the intellect behind.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{In tempore belli}

Discarding the intellect seems to lead—although not necessarily, as we shall see—to the neglect of politics. Forgetting the Cārvāka who had maintained that the only true science was \textit{daṇḍanīti,}\textsuperscript{48} Tucci claims that it is because of the influence of the West that innovators such as Nehru (who, unlike Gandhi, does not understand his own people) are trying to cut with the knife of reason the living complexity of man, substituting philosophy for religion, and bringing to India a new unhappiness and arbitrary formulas that defile the serenity of faith. In a
passage in which Orientalist ideology about nonviolence clashes with the demands of the times, Tucci writes, piling contradiction upon contradiction, that there are those in India who, copying the methods of the West, want to fight, and talk of violence, including the violence among classes to redeem the miserable, and are therefore not like Arjuna, who before the great battle of Kurukṣetra was reluctant to fight and kill his relatives. But then he has to add that of course Arjuna fought the battle, because God himself reminded him of the harsh laws of life, of the duties of his warrior caste, and, above all, of the implacable evanescence of created things. How, then does one reconcile what is supposed to be India’s supreme principle—for, is it not true that “ahimsāḥ paramo dharmaḥ”?—with Arjuna’s fighting? The answer seems to be given by Kṛṣṇa’s presence: more precisely by the fact that Arjuna does not fight alone, because Kṛṣṇa is at his side, guiding him.49 It would appear, then, that it is not ahimsā that is the highest law, but properly guided war. Some years earlier, in a article on Indian cinema, Tucci had already reminded young Indians that renunciation, the slow burning of passions, is not the only form of sacrifice: sacrifice can also be accomplished by rendering passions titanic, and by annihilating oneself in the service of a demonic or saintly idea.50

The themes of politics and war, relatively unimportant in his writings on India and Tibet, are central in those about Japan, a country Tucci visited in an official capacity in early 1937 to inaugurate a cultural institute and to deliver lectures about his expeditions in Tibet. Tucci’s writings on Japan, most of which were published between 1937 and 1943, belong to the category of journalism and propaganda rather than scholarship. It is also in the writings on Japan that Buddhism—Zen Buddhism—is discussed in a manner that combines Orientalist ideology with the demands of the times. Thus in “Lo Zen e il carattere del popolo giapponese,” published in 1939, Japan is presented, among all the nations of the Orient, as the one in which spiritual riches surpass material power. Basing his observation on Suzuki’s Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture, published the previous year, a book in which Zen and virtually the entirety of Japanese culture are uncritically equated,52 Tucci describes Zen as perhaps the most efficacious among the spiritual currents that have contributed to the formation of Japanese character.53 In an age in which the reality or the proximity of war demanded that one envision society through organic metaphors, Zen is seen as giving man a new value, one in which what counts is one’s being human, rather than one’s occupation or social status.54 But this freeing oneself from social constraints is to be understood in more than meta-
physical terms, because once men have given up the garments of everyday life, men become “men among men, soldiers of an army that marches towards a fate that equalizes everyone.” Tucci denies that Zen is a system: “Zen . . . is not a system. A system can be explained, defined, discussed. Not so Zen, Zen is lived.” The rhetoric of experience and immediacy, common to most conceptualizations of ‘mysticism,’ and especially pronounced in studies of Zen, leads him to say that all mystical systems are lived: “They are not based upon being persuaded through logic, but are based on an inner experience which, emerging mysteriously from within the darkness of our life, transforms night into day, so that as soon as we are touched by its grace we feel reborn in another level where everything is new, luminous and blissful.”

The difference between Zen and other mystical systems, Tucci maintains, is that Zen, instead of transcending the world, finds eternity in the world. It is here then, in a world seen sub specie aeternitatis, that the ideology of the day—that is, the demands of the Japanese state involved in the war against China—can be absolutized through the nonabsolutizing Zen. Not misinterpreting Zen, but in fact doing what the formulators of samurai ideology had done before, Tucci resorts to the mystical cliché about the identity between life and death which allows one to suppress one’s blind desire to live; this mystical commonplace, combined with the cult of heroic death promoted by fascism, and earlier by the romantics, can now be used in the service of the state. Similarly, in “Il Giappone moderno e la sua crisi spirituale,” published in 1940, he refers admiringly to the Zen monks, trainers of samurai, and to the military transfiguration of Zen immediacy and spontaneity.

The ideas presented in “Lo Zen e il carattere del popolo giaponese” are reinforced in a series of short journalistic articles published in Yamato, a monthly magazine devoted to strengthening the cultural ties between Japan and Italy, published from January 1941 to August 1943, and in two small books published during the war, Il Buscidò and Il Giappone. Tucci was not just a contributor to Yamato, for which he wrote a dozen articles over a period of thirty-two months, but was throughout the magazine’s life one of the three members of the editorial board. In fact, the first issue includes a letter in which the Japanese ambassador states that the magazine’s existence is “the result of the initiative of the illustre member of the Italian Academy, his excellency Giuseppe Tucci.” In the same letter, the ambassador asserts that no one can understand better than Italians the
Japanese spirit, just as the Japanese are those better able to intuit the fascist idea. Tucci's contributions to *Yamato* are worth examining in some detail, because the very fact that these were short, journalistic pieces without scholarly apparatus or pretensions presents in its purest state the ideological and propagandistic intentions of the author (in *Yamato* one can also find four pictures of Tucci attending official functions wearing the fascist uniform).

The first article, ostensibly about Japanese music, is in fact a meditation about the crucial difference between the ways in which Asia and Europe approach nature: in Asia man abandons himself to nature with the abandonment of plants and things, and thus one finds that Japanese music, even popular Kabuki music, has not lost a tragic character that reflects the elementary play of cosmic forces which men cannot hope to control and from which they cannot emerge. It is as if, writing in January 1941, sixteen months into the war in Europe, the demands of the nation, which were in reality those of the fascist state, had to be presented as the demands of the cosmos. There is an aestheticized and at the same time profound pessimism in all the writings of the period: a sense of being imprisoned not just by history but by a cosmic game, less *māyā* than *līlā*, but a terrible *līlā*. This fatalistic aesthetization reappears in his contribution to the second issue, "Il ritmo delle stagioni," and in one about snow in Japanese poetry and painting; in these, moving from a discussion of music—after all a cultural creation—to one of the seasons, Tucci returns to one of his obsessions: the sense, so alive in the Orient, of the rhythms of the universe, a sense that in Japan appears in an even more concrete form, because the Japanese, educated by Shinto and Zen, have a non-hierarchical and unitary sense of life. The aesthetization of violence, cultivated with such virtuosism by the fascist regimes, is rehearsed again in an article about a Roman exhibition of drawings of Japanese children. In this short piece, published in May 1942, the instinctive sense of art goes hand in hand with hardness in war, with nobility and with the infallibility of one's sword.

In *Il Bushidō*, also published in 1942, Japan is presented, in a way that resembles what Tucci had written earlier about Tibet, as a force in modern history because of its spiritual riches, shaped by the discipline of poverty. The distrust of the fragmentation of life, supposedly prevalent in Europe, and encountered already in Tucci's writings about India and Tibet, is contrasted with the situation found in Japan, where spiritual education saves man from the disintegration that is the fatal result of the joint work of abstract intelligence and the mechanization of nature. Just like Zen, Bushidō, cannot be defined,
because the logical rigor of words cannot contain the will of a people. Bushidō is not a written code but a way of life: the glorification of the world of history and the courageous attempt to endow māyā with a divine meaning.69 Central components of Italian fascist ideology, including Gentile's *atto puro*,70 are found in preindustrial Japan—not unreasonably, since the Bushidō ideology had been devised during the Tokugawa shogunate—and in medieval Italy. Both in Italy and Japan, the ethos of medieval knighthood has managed to keep under control, through the implacable severity of discipline, honor, and sacrifice, the elementary impulse toward struggle. In Japan, one finds the cooperation of two religions, Bushidō, which, as pure action, creates a participation between the earth and the continuity of tradition, and Zen, which replaces fickleness and arbitrariness with the spontaneity of the impulses of life.71 The coexistence of Bushidō's pure action and Zen's presumed spontaneity allows Tucci to claim that there is a natural antipathy between the tortuous ways of thought and the immediacy of a kind and action which, decisive, cutting like a sword and infallible like an arrow, creates history.72 This spontaneous action, doubly sanctified now through Shinto and Buddhism, makes it possible for him to claim that there is no difference between citizen and soldier, just as there is no solution of continuity between war and peace: what we call peace is the calm in which a tempest awaits, the silent preparation for war.73

War seems to represent for Tucci—who was drafted on December 1, 1915, fought at the front, and became a lieutenant in 191774—what it did to many veterans: the antidote to the cold rationality and impersonality of the modern age. This sense of community, relentlessly idealized during the war by all the governments, was further cultivated after the war, when right-wing ideologues, particularly members of the Freikorps, carefully cultivated the myth of community and sacrifice75 that could be used to counteract socialist revolts. Although this nostalgia for the spirit of heroism supposedly prevalent in the world of the trenches was particularly strong in the defeated countries, it was also present in Italy, a country in which, despite some territorial gains, the supposed betrayal at Versailles contributed to the myth of Italy as the “proletarian nation.” Tucci, therefore, was not alone when he claimed that in the exaltation of war—in war as “inner experience,” to borrow the title of one of Ernst Jünger’s glorifications of slaughter76—one transcends ephemeral individuality, and in transcending this one frees oneself, like heroes and saints do, from the tyranny of time.77 The desire to flee time (which reminds one of the “terror of history,” omnipresent in the
writings of another ideologist of the archaic, Eliade\(^78\)), and to transcend one's short-lived humanity can be achieved through the sacrifice for the sake of the motherland and the subordination of thought, will, and act for the sake of the race.\(^79\)

But, ultimately, as in the case of Zen, what seems to fascinate Tucci is death itself. This fascination, which brings him closer to the mythology of the Romanian Legionnaires and to some of the most extravagant images used by the German romantics than to the glorification of mere heroism cultivated in Mussolini's Italy,\(^80\) makes him describe the encounter with death as the peak of heroism, and Bushidō itself as an initiation into death.\(^81\) In the apotheosis of a beautiful death, he writes, Japanese heroes are no longer alone: they converse in the language of eternal ideas with other heroes: those fallen in the war of the Pacific in harmony with the ones fallen in North Africa and in the Russian steppes.\(^82\) Similarly, in his contribution to the penultimate number of *Yamato*, shortly before Mussolini's imprisonment, the sacrifice of the defenders of Attu gives Tucci the possibility to move away from examples taken from books and allows him to refer instead to real embodiments of the Bushidō and the samurai spirit. In this, his last contribution to *Yamato* (the last issue would appear the following month, dated agosto 1943, rather than the usual 1943–XXI, indicating twenty-one years of fascist rule: Mussolini was out of power), Tucci's hymn to military virtues reaches its climax, homage necessarily turning into silence, since, as he writes, certain episodes have such spirit grandeur that words offend their sacred solemnity.\(^83\)

The demands of the present are also very much present in *Il Giappone, tradizione storica e tradizione artistica*, published in 1943, a book which, according to the introduction, was born out of the desire to provide Italian readers with a brief orientation to the complexities and spiritual riches of a people who share Italy's military endeavors. Much of the book, however, simply reproduces pieces previously published. The chapter on Zen for example, repeats what was already said in the article of 1939. Another chapter, on the artistic sensibility of the Japanese people, goes back to points made in *Yamato*, including the opposition between Western and Eastern attitudes to nature.\(^84\)

**Spiritual Politics**

Orientalist ideologies accomplish their task of obfuscation through the exoticization of the political life of the cultures one seeks to
transfigure. There are at least two ways of doing this: the very existence of a group’s political life can be denied, or, conversely, politics can be presented as an impenetrable realm of treachery and intrigue.\textsuperscript{85} The path followed by Tucci was the first one. We already saw how, in \textit{La crisi spirituale dell’India moderna}, he contrasted Gandhi’s spiritual and truly Indian ways with Nehru’s novel ones, imported from the West.\textsuperscript{86} In his account of an expedition to Tibet in 1948, he says that he has not dwelt at length on Tibetan politics because, if there is anything he intensely dislikes, “it is just politics, anywhere and at any time.”\textsuperscript{87} But he also seems to imply that politics is still unknown in Tibet when he writes that if Tibet, threatened by China, were to strengthen its ties with India, “the amenities of politics, the whirlwind of parties and pageant of politicians would commence for Tibet as well, and the people would lose their detachment and engage in strifes which would enslave them in the name of freedom, as actual freedom belongs to man alone, and all the rest is treachery and trash.” Contradicting what he had written earlier about misery and animality—although, even in 1940, misery was seen as producing spiritual riches\textsuperscript{88}—he writes now that “the medieval aura still enshrouding Tibet . . . in spite of appearances . . . still allowed man a greater mastery than Western ways of life.”\textsuperscript{89}

In a passage, ostensibly about Tibet, that at first seems to provide an almost textbook example of the classical distinction between idyllic \textit{Gemeinschaft} and impersonal \textit{Gesellschaft}, he manages to write what could be read as a denunciation of either the corporatist, the socialist, or the democratic state, all of this accompanied by the longing for a personal master: “The State was not an anonymous tyrant poking his nose everywhere and controlling all you did. . . . In Tibet the State was a few people you could get personally—and humanly—in touch with. . . . Give me a personal master any time rather than an abstraction named State or democracy or what not, in whose hands I should feel hopelessly enslaved. Man has indeed been born under an unlucky star, and only the saint or the poet can somehow struggle free from it.”\textsuperscript{90} In reality, as the scholar he was, he could not write about the history of Buddhism in Tibet without taking constantly into account the political role of monks and monasteries, and without examining the political functions and implications of intramonic disputes. He does this, among other places, in his study of sacral kingship in ancient Tibet, and repeatedly in his great comprehensive history of Tibetan religions, \textit{Die Religionen Tibets},\textsuperscript{91} where he also deals in a straightforward manner with issues such as the eco-
nomic cost of supporting the monastic system and the economic activities of the monasteries.92

The truth of the matter is that Tucci was involved in politics; first, ideologically, like everybody, particularly scholars; and second, through his activities as a member of the Italian Academy93 as organi-

zer of the research center Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (ISMEO)94 and of Yamato.95 The Istituto, a research center of the highest academic standards, known for its valuable Serie Orientale Roma, had Giovanni Gentile as its first president, from 1933 to 1944, when he was killed by partisans in Florence.96 Gentile, Mus-
solini’s minister of education at the beginning of the fascist regime, and also part of the government of the Republic of Salò, established in northern Italy by the Germans after they had rescued Mussolini from prison, was not merely the producer—compared by Croce to the early Nazi Heidegger97—of ultimately inconsequential speculation about ‘ego,’ ‘state,’ ‘act,’ and the like, or one of the many enemies of materialism, abstraction, and positivism.98 Gentile’s position as, in effect, the official philosopher of fascism gives his opinions a historical concreteness that forces one to consider otherwise vacuous notions such as “pure act” (l’atto puro) and the difference between the logo concreto and logo astratto in the light of the domestic and international policies of fascist Italy.

Gentile’s discourse on the State99 reaches a pitch that reminds one of what is generally referred to in a reified manner as ‘mystical language.’100 For Gentile, the State has not just an absolute moral value: the State acquires a suprapersonal mystical status when he claims that the State is the individual’s personality, but one freed from accidental differences and personal interests. In language that seems to be describing the Upanishadic identity between Atman and Brahman, the State—whose essence is described as will, intelligence, and moral action—is presented as the most intimate reality of an individual whose surface individuality has been left behind.101 For Gentile, fascism was the system in which true and concrete freedom, created through will and action, replaces abstract and false freedom;102 it is through the State—ultimately indistinguishable from the Spirit—and through fascism, that the Italian people, moving away from false liberty, will be able to reach unity and consciousness of themselves.103 According to Gentile, the individual realizes himself through the State—keeping in mind that, as Mussolini maintained, the nation is the creation of the State, rather than vice versa104—in such a manner that the State’s will and the individual’s will become one, even if the process involves violence, as fascist violence, unlike private violence,
is sacred. As the climax of violence, war becomes central to fascist dogma, according to which peace is neither possible nor useful, since only war brings to his highest tension all human energies and impresses with a seal of nobility the peoples who have the courage to confront it.

One might be tempted to say that Gentile provides the philosophical foundation of the heroic outbursts and denunciations of the modern world found in Tucci’s writings of the thirties and forties—were it not for the fact that, from a hypothetical pure fascist position, the very idea of such philosophical foundation would have to be considered as betraying the essentially praxical nature of the movement. Be that as it may, it is these ideas, not invented but systematized by Gentile, that we encounter in Tucci’s writings. As if Gentile, Tucci, and a large segment of Western intelligentsia, all fleeing the terrors of the Enlightenment, had succumbed to what Tucci describes elsewhere, dealing with Mahāyāna hypostatizations, as the process of nomina becoming numina, we encounter them during these decades believing in the sanctity and the heroism of l’atto puro, supposedly uncontaminated by economic motives and mere reason, and willing therefore to sacrifice themselves and others for the sake of the Spirit-State.

Peace

Tucci became director of the IsMEO in 1947, three years after Gentile’s death, and after a brief period when he was not able to teach. In the postwar years, having stopped writing about Japan, he devoted his immense energies primarily to Tibetan studies. During these years, his vision of Buddhism seems to have moved away from the heroic vision of the 1930s and 1940s to one which stressed compassion. Now, Tucci’s concern was to make known to the West an “Asian humanism” that “was not aggressive like ours,” one that “did not assert the dignity of man so as to establish hasty and transient hegemonies,” but which was “a spiritual humanism.” Moving away from the sharp distinction he made earlier between European and Asian ways of being human, he writes in “A Propos East and West” that “in Europe as well as in Asia we always find the self-same creature, with the same contradictions and hopes, equally consumed by time and yearning after eternity.”

In a lecture delivered at the IsMEO, on May 30, 1956, on the occasion of the Buddha Jayanti, he said: “The Great are not the Pow-
erful, the deluded artificers of history, so bathed in tears and blood; the Great are those who can rediscover in the bed of the river of life that flows on, uniform and constant in its mutations and its storms, the incorruptible clarity of the Eternal.”

Now, after the horrors of the war years—when he had written that the Bodhisattva is not only he who loves and sacrifices himself, but the armor-clad hero who fights—he describes the culminating point of the Great Vehicle as “the desire, I might say the yearning anxiety, to succour those who suffer in a solidarity of sorrow and love which, little by little, replaces the detached figure of the Saint, anxious for his own salvation, by that of the Bodhisattva, he who sacrifices himself for others.” The shift in the images Tucci uses when referring to the Bodhisattva—from armor-clad hero to the saint who yearns for the release of all sentient beings—is significant, not only as an indicator of the changes in Tucci’s political attitude, but also as an indicator of the function of ideals which because of their very extremism can be interpreted in diametrically opposed ways. In effect, once one conceptualizes the Bodhisattva’s compassion as boundless, that compassion can be made to manifest itself not just as what one would recognize as such under ordinary circumstances, but also as what would have to be interpreted as violence. Thus actions involving killing, even by monks, can be considered as ultimately compassionate, since they can be explained as restraining the victim from committing violent activities that would result in the perpetrator having to suffer unspeakable punishment in hell. In this context, the Bodhisattva’s self-sacrifice could be understood as his willingness to be punished for the violent acts he would force himself to commit in order to stop someone from engaging in sinful behavior, although, in fact, the murder of a potential murderer would be an example of ‘profound morality’ (gāṁbhīriyaśīla), and in karmic terms it would result in the accumulation of great stores of merit.

Tucci was quite aware of the problem surrounding the interpretation of texts dealing with concrete issues such as violence and war. Thus in the account of his 1952 expedition to Nepal, Journey to Mustang, he described in the following terms his reaction to meeting Nepalese who had fought during the second war in Europe: “I must say I found these encounters rather painful . . . I felt humiliated by my membership in a world which has not been able to teach these people anything but the art of war and has taken them to other lands to kill and be killed, which has not felt ashamed of this slave trade and above all has not understood the disgrace of its well-composed falsehoods which construct gaudy facades of fine words to hide the arro-
gance of politics and the selfish interest in its own power.” But besides lamenting the way in which European powers had made use of the services of Nepalese mercenaries, he reminds us, and possibly also himself, that “like all religions, when it was a matter of defending its own interests Buddhism could find justification for war with that subtle casuistry which theologians the world over have at their shrewd disposal. The captious doctors showed how passages from the scriptures could legitimate the harsh and unavoidable necessity and even killing, naturally for the salvation of the sinners, so that they would not be stained by fearful and inexpiable guilt. They were undisturbed by the fact that these were late writings, and that the Buddha had taught total pacifism.” Although Tucci was thinking primarily about the actions of monks in defense of Buddhism, he could have also referred to the more general legitimizing role of Buddhism, particularly in situations, in Southeast Asia for example, in which the king presented himself as a Bodhisattva and as a defender of the Dharma, and in which it was difficult if not impossible to distinguish between the defense of the interests of the state—that is, of the interests of elites—and those of the Dharma.

The Buddha Jayanti issue of *East and West* includes also an article, “Spiritual Virility in Buddhism,” that could have been published fifteen or even thirty years earlier. Although the author, Julius Evola, was not a Buddhologist, his Orientalist fantasies are worth mentioning, since in them one finds in naked form the antidemocratic ideologization of Buddhism that would be useful to fascism. Moreover, in “Spiritual Virility in Buddhism,” the doctrines of Buddhism are presented in a manner so diametrically opposed to Tucci’s postwar views that it would almost seem as if Evola’s piece had been written either against Tucci—which would have been unlikely, considering that Tucci was one of the greatest Budhologists alive, and certainly the greatest in Italy, and Evola was not—or perhaps as the ghostly and brutal echo of what Tucci had written, in a much more lyrical manner to be sure, during the war years. Against the vision of universal benevolence found in Tucci’s “Buddha Jayanti,” Evola, who believes that Buddhism is essentially initiatic, aristocratic, and antidemocratic, claims that the Mahāyāna and earlier forms of Buddhism are “falsifications of the message of the Buddha, a deteriorated version suited not to virile men, standing with head erect, but to men lying prostrate in search of escape and spiritual alleviation.” Predictably, he uses Zen and the samurai as a counterexample directed to “those who accept unilaterally the doctrine of innocuousness, of the timorous respect of all forms of life.” In the best fascist tradi-
tion, Buddhism for him is not “a system of sickly sentimental secular morality, consisting of humanitarianism and indiscriminate love.” Indeed, “as the form in which Buddhism has become a religion sui generis, and, worse still, as to those forms in which it is conceived and appreciated as a democratizing humanitarian morality, they should be rightly considered as an unparalleled contamination of the truth.”

In propagating his vision of an aristocratic original Buddhism, Evola was acting in a way that parallels the views about the decadence of Buddhism and the concern with origins prevalent in European scholarship since the mid-nineteenth century. In Evola’s case, however, the quest for the original state of Buddhism did not bring us to a situation of spiritual peace, but rather to one in which the supposedly uncontaminated doctrine supported this author’s unreconstructed fascist commitment. But it should be remembered that, repellent as one may find his position, in propagating a militaristic vision of Buddhism, Evola was not behaving too differently from the hypothetical theologians described by Tucci in *Journey to Mustang*, or the Zen ideologists studied by Sharf, or the leaders of Asian politics who, while considering themselves followers of the Dharma, engaged in bloody military enterprises against neighbors who frequently were also Buddhist.

**Ideology through Utopia**

If one tries to place Tucci’s vision of Buddhism in perspective, and if furthermore one takes into consideration parallel developments in European scholarship on religion during the first half or so of this century, the theme that recurs in Tucci’s work—ultimately, the opposition between authenticity and artificiality—can be seen as part and parcel of the longing for a disappearing or already vanished life, one supposedly rooted in tradition and certainty, and the rejection of another, already in place—but, as Arno Mayer has shown, not fully—corroded by rootlessness. The reasons for this can be found in the series of dislocations that took place in Europe as a result of industrialization and rapid urbanization and even earlier, during what Franz Borkenau has called the “manufacture period.” Caught in the middle between a disappearing world based on agricultural work dependent on the rhythms of nature, and an industrial one relatively free from such limitations, conservative intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century appear to have articulated the fears
of those sectors of society that were uncertain about their place in the new order, and in so doing they seem to have lived more fully than others the fear and the nostalgia. It is not that the desire was for the return of the old way of life: what was longed for were certain virtues supposedly in place in the old world, for just as there was a necessary relationship between the rhythms of nature and the rhythms of the soil, the old way of life was seen as based on certainties that had the solidity but at the same time the suppleness of physical, organic solidarity. As opposed to this, the rapid growth of the cities and of the production of the factories had, despite its massive character, a contingency that could be regarded as verging on unreality. As opposed to the seasons, cities could be otherwise, just as industrially manufactured products could be otherwise or not at all. The same was true of exchange: less and less identified with those doing the exchanging, it was becoming, as it is for us, apparently grounded upon itself.

Abstract exchanges, calculation, wage labor: the supposed solidity of a reality in which everything, especially one’s social position and therefore access to wealth, had its place was being replaced by abstraction and arbitrariness. The same was true of experience: although never truly our own, when it became apparent that the ego was even more precarious than it had been briefly believed, the experiencing ego was made in retrospect the one true ground of reality, and experiencing became the goal. To experience truly, however, one had to experience what was not subject to a fickle, arbitrary time, loose from the rhythms of the cosmos, and if that was impossible, experiencing had to take place outside time. The experiencer as well could not be the contingent ego, separated from nature, but one which had lost its arbitrary boundaries either by merging with the cosmos or by identifying with the community, the nation, the race. The alternatives were, then, experiencing the timelessness of the cosmos, or that of the nature, or even that of the State: it was the business of the students of religion to show how that kind of experiencing had been the case in the past: it was the task of the students of the exotic to find that this was the case in the present.

But it would be a mistake to follow the current fashion, and approach these changes as if they had to do only with mutations in forms of perception or of experiencing. These changes were taking place in a world in which resources and power, finite always, had to be fought over. The great threat in northern Italy were the organized laborers, both urban and rural, especially in the Po Valley, where capitalist agriculture developed and where fascism, as Lyttelton puts it, “took off.” The threat, then, was ultimately Marxist: Marxism
being the conscious realization that, besides the reality of nature, much of it human creation in any case, the only reality was that of the connection between labor and wealth, all other social links being derived through an almost impenetrable process of social causation through labor: all contingent processes without substance, although real, one could say, in the sense in which, as the Buddhist logicians knew, what has effects is real. Marxism could be defeated only through the brute force of the squadre d’azione, which could bring to an end the political activities of the reds, and through philosophies in which the irrationality of the absolute act managed to conjoin opportunistic voluntarism and absolute noncontingency. Unarguable experiences had by a nonartificial experiencer in a language that was no language in a time that was no time would stop the pernicious workings of the intellect.

It is here that the roots of the affinities between the Religionswissenschaft that originated during the first part of the century—from the Weimar theologians to Eliade, Tucci and Dumézil—and political conservatism, including its most extreme form, fascism, must be sought. This does not mean that the Religionswissenschaft that originated during the first decades of this century has to be considered as necessarily fascist; it means, however, that we must understand its emergence in the context of the changes taking place at all social levels, and as an attempt to come to terms with those changes. Industrialists and military strategists as much as politicians and philosophers had to devise ways of dealing with modernity. In this division of labor, it was left to the architects of the imaginary—anthropologists, students of religion, Orientalists—to investigate, but also to imagine, realms of otherness—geographical, temporal, experiential—which could serve a variety of functions. Multiplying real differences, especially those regarding perceptions of time and space, and the relationship between individual, community, and nature, all of this the product of long historical processes, one of their tasks was to construct a timeless realm whose geographical and human counterpart could be occupied and exploited at will. Another, complementary one was to delimit a domain that could serve functions similar to those fulfilled by rituals of reversal and by mystical discourse: a domain to which one could either flee, if only momentarily, the administered world, or from which one could judge and condemn that world. Another function of these imaginary spaces was, and is, as important as the previous ones: to identify sources not just of raw material or cheap labor, or even spurious freedom or utopian horizon, but of reinforceers of one’s ideological positions. Dreams about a non-Western world, constituted by unmediated
experience, silence, and death, could be joined to similar represen-
tations present in the Occident since the days of romanticism. Represe-
ntations of an organic East, close to the rhythms of nature, could be
used to revitalize indigenous European mythologemes, active since
before the days of Menenius Agrippa, and help counteract the ene-
mies of the corporatist state by keeping the workers in their place.
Silent, incommunicable experiences could be used in the service of a
state that could not otherwise provide a rationale to those who would
be required to kill and be killed.

In all these cases, what was imported had its counterpart in the
West, although not necessarily in as raw a form as, for example, the
Bushido ideology, or the jati system. What made these imports effec-
tive, and necessary, was their aura, the very fact, to use Fabian's term,
of their lack of "coevalness." Rather than creating only a situation
of irreducible opposition, as emphasized by Said, Orientalism
could also serve as a conduit through which Western elites could replenish their ideological arsenal by employing representations that
because of their spatial, temporal, and even ontological otherness
could function as utopian horizons. Turning around Jameson's con-
ception of an ideology which, no matter how vile, carries within it-
self, like an Embryo of Buddhahood, the possibility of its transfigura-
tion, we must insist that it is precisely because of its utopian com-
ponent that the process of ideologization could be undertaken. With-
out its utopian aspect, without the promise of wholeness and leisure,
or of ecstasy and heroism, it would have been—it would be—impossible to keep the ideological machinery going.

In Tucci's case, the situation can be considered as complicated
by the fact that he was a scholar of Buddhism, that is, of a system that
in its early forms emphasized, like no other before and hardly any
after, causal processes, subjecting all our mental constructs to a thor-
oughgoing dereification. But this in itself could be considered as sig-
nificant, because it would show that someone as intelligent as Tucci,

much as he claimed to dislike the pure workings of the intellect, was
so much a product of the Enlightenment that he had to explore
through his work on Indian epistemology and logic the outer limits of
those feared processes, while also occupying himself with the inte-
grating dreams of Tantrism, and while participating in the utopian-
ideological campaigns of fascism. Therefore, Tucci's heroic inter-
pretations of Zen and his enthusiastic collaboration with the fascist
regime should not be considered as mere political opportunism,
but as the result of a deep antagonism toward a fragmented modern
world: like many others, he seems to have believed for a time that in
the exaltation of violence, in the dissolution of the individual will in
the will of the nation which is ultimately the will of the State, one
surpasses, like that combination of hero and saint, the Siddha, the
limits of time, and the illusory limits of individuality. Tucci’s Orien-
talism, then, is a peculiar creature in which a deep dissatisfaction
with modernity led him to imagine an Orient in which he could al-
ways find—constantly contradicting himself in the process—the
wholeness no longer available in the West. His Orientalism imagined
a timeless realm ready to receive him when he wanted to escape the
tyranny of time; but this imaginary realm was also a repository of
power and violence, found in its purest form in Japan, where it had
blossomed, so he and Suzuki claimed, as the result of the happy con-
junction of Shinto and Zen. As a student of the exotic, one of his
tasks—what he called his “small and harmless game”—during the
age of fascism was to bring home that irrational presence to reinforce
with it the ideological machinery of the State.

NOTES

I wish to thank Donald Lopez for his comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts of this chapter.

1. “Questo sarebbe allora il mio gioco, in attesa che la breve onda che
io sono, suscitato per caso e per breve incorporamento sull’oceano della vita,
scompia di nuovo nella mai spenta agitazione di quello, per dar luogo ad
altri labili flutti: gioco innocuo e modesto, come altri in più impegnativi e
pericolosi giochi si trastulla,” see Giuseppe Tucci, Tra giungle e pagode
(Roma: Libreria dello Stato, 1953), p. 120, translated as Journey to Mustang,
1952, Bibliotheca Himalayica, Series 1, vol. 23 (Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak

2. For some biographical information on Tucci, see Raniero Gnoli,
Ricordo di Giuseppe Tucci, con contributi di Luciano Petech, Fabio Scialpi,
Giovanna Gallupi Vallauri, Serie Orientale Roma 55 (Roma: Istituto Italiano
per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente [IsMEO], 1985); Luciano Petech, “Giuse-
ppe Tucci (1894–1984),” Journal of the International Association of Bud-
dhist Studies 7 (1984): 137. A selection of Tucci’s articles dealing with
philosophical, philological, historical, and archaeological matters, origi-
nally published between 1921 and 1962, as well as a bibliography (284 items
published between 1911 and 1970) can be found in Giuseppe Tucci, Opera
Minora, 2 vols., Università di Roma, Studi Orientali a cura della Scuola Ori-
revised bibliography (360 items from 1911 to 1983) was published in Gnoli,
Ricordo di Giuseppe Tucci, pp. 57–79. Another collection of writings, deal-
ing with religious and cultural issues, published originally between 1927 and
1940, can be found in Giuseppe Tucci, Forme dello spirito asiatico (Milano


5. This issue has been treated recently in Andrew Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna (New York, 1990). Unfortunately, Tuck approaches ‘isogesis’ only from the point of view of the history of ideas, disregarding the role of sociopolitical forces in shaping one’s understanding (and use) of religious and philosophical systems.


Despite several attempts, Tucci’s *Il Buddhismo* (Foligno: Campitelli, 1926) remained inaccessible (there seems to be a copy at the Yale University Library). In his “Appunti per una storia degli studi buddhisti in Italia” (p. 182), Oscar Botto describes *Il Buddhismo* as a “magistrale sintesi del pensiero buddhista, mirabile per la vastità della erudizione che la sostiene.” On the other hand, in the necrological note, “Giuseppe Tucci (1894–1984),” p. 138, Luciano Petech describes this work as “a fine but perhaps premature effort.”


14. Tucci, L'Oriente, pp. 20–21. See also Tucci, Forme dello spirito asiatico, p. 11.


17. Giuseppe Tucci, Teorie ed esperienze dei mistici tibetani, Il Pensiero religioso 4 (Città di Castello, 1931), reprinted in his Forme dello spirito asiatico, pp. 170–82 (see p. 180), but see Tucci, Storia della filosofia indiana, 1:29, on the reality of the universe according to most Indian philosophical schools.


21. The functions of the “denial of coevalness” are discussed more than exhaustively in Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New York, 1983).


23. On decisionism, see Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entschei-
dung. Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, Göttinger Abhandlungen zur Soziologie 3. Band (Stuttgart, 1958), Krockow’s analysis applies as much to the German decisionism of the 1920s and 1930s as it does to its postmodern French and, hopelessly epigonic, North American versions.


28. On the ideological connotations of the term ‘Lamaism,’ see Donald S. Lopez’s contribution in this volume, “Foreigner at the Lama’s Feet.”


30. Giuseppe Tucci, “Peregrinazioni nel Tibet centrale,” in his Forme dello spirito asiatico, pp. 201–2: “Nel Tibet il monachismo è una specie di elefantiasi dell’asceticismo: regole, disciplina e norme, le quali hanno iste- rilito le risorse dello spirito.” On the importance of sound rather than of sense in prayer, see Tucci, Journey to Mustang, p. 57. For a discussion of accounts of Buddhist monasticism as lazy, stupid, and immoral found in Western scholarship, see Philip C. Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism (Cambridge and New York, 1988), pp. 119–23.

31. Tucci, Forme dello spirito asiatico, p. 201: “Si crede in Occidente
che il Tibet sia il paese dei mistici; ciò poteva essere vero un tempo, qualche secolo fa. Adesso i mistici sono rari nel Tibet, come sono rari nell'India." In *Tragiungle pagode*, p. 65 (*Journey to Mustang*, p. 45), Tucci describes how a *sādhu* who joined his expedition turned out to be "a real first-class scoundrel."

32. Tucci, *Forme dello spirito asiatico*, pp. 200–201: "La povertà estrema del Tibet, causata specialmente dal malgoverno cinese; alla quale Lhasa e il clero che oggi impera non hanno saputo rimediare nella loro indifferenza per gli interessi del popolo e perché temono ogni innovazione." Decades later, in *Die Religionen Tibets*, p. 322, he writes that a lack of fellow feeling is a remarkable characteristic of Tibetan religiosity: "Ein bemerkenswertes Kennzeichen der tibetischen Religiosität ist ihr auffallender Mangel an sozialem Mitgefühl."

33. Tucci, *Forme dello spirito asiatico*, p. 202: "Il Tibet è povero: ma, come succede da per tutto, questa povertà ha provocato la sua ricchezza spirituale. Adesso però la povertà sta diventando miseria e la miseria è l'abiezione vergogna: vergogna per chi la tollera, abiezione per chi ne soffre e vede quotidianamente la sua dignità umana scomparire ed annullarsi fino a che l'uomo si confonde con la bestia."

34. Tucci, *Forme dello spirito asiatico*, p. 213: "Medicine trovate per istinto più che per scienza, con quella sicurezza inconsapevole con cui l'animale ammalato sa scegliere l'erba che per natura gli giova."


38. The reasons behind the idealization of village India are discussed in Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, 1982), pp. 251–52.


41. Tucci, *La crisi*, p. 9: "In questa incertezza bisognava fare quello che ha fatto il Giappone: lasciare che l'inteletto si coltivi alla maniera occidentale, ma mettere barriere ben salde fra le operazioni sue e la vita del spirito."


44. Giuseppe Tucci, *To Lhasa and Beyond: Diary of the Expedition to Tibet in the Year 1948* (Roma: Libreria dello Stato, 1956; reprint, Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987), p. 130 (originally published as *A Lhasa e oltre* [Roma: Libreria dello Stato, 1950]; this edition was not consulted).
45. Tucci, *To Lhasa and Beyond*, pp. 129–30. This was already a cliché used against eighteenth-century Aufklärer; see Klaus Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism* (Princeton, N.J., 1966), p. 72: “They were also attacked as unbalanced personalities who lacked a sense of the importance of emotion, mystery and tradition in human affairs, and were blind to the claims of national feeling.”

46. Giuseppe Tucci, *Teoria a pratica del mandala, con speciale riguardo alla moderna psicologia del profondo* (Roma: Ubaldini Editore, 1969: seconda edizione rifatta sulla prima edizione italiana [1949]) e sulla edizione inglese *The Theory and Practice of the Mandala* [London: Rider & Co., 1961], p. 15 (page citations are to the 1969 edition). In contrast, the quotations from the *Hevajaratantra* and the *Doha* of Saraha on p. 125 express very well the longing for a situation in which the spiritual and the material worlds are not separated.


48. See n. 7 above.


51. The visit is described by Karl Löwith in *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933. Ein Bericht* (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 112–13. Löwith, who was teaching in Japan, having been forced to leave Germany, gives an amusing portrait of “die faschistische Eccellenza Tucci.” I owe the reference to this book to an anonymous reader for the University of Chicago Press.


56. The ideological background of Nishida’s, Suzuki’s, and Hisamatsu’s concern with experience is examined in Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism.” Much as Tucci relied on Suzuki’s Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture for his discussion of Zen, the convergence between his conception of experience and the one proposed by the Japanese ideologist was not the result of influences: Tucci and the Japanese apologists were functioning in a context in which experiences without content were ideologically necessary; see also nn. 22 and 23 above.

57. On the neologisms keiken and taiken as translations of erleben and Erlebnis, see Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism.”

58. Tucci, “Lo Zen,” p. 3: “Lo Zen dunque non è un sistema: un sistema si spiega, si definisce, si discute. Lo Zen no, lo Zen si vive. E questo non è molto dire: perché tutti quanti i sistemi di mistica si vivono: non sono basati su un convincimento logico, ma su un’esperienza interiore.”


73. Ibid., p. 15.


Sociological Perspectives on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement in Romania," in Who were the Fascists, ed. S. U. Larsen et al. (Bergen, Oslo and Tromsø, 1980), pp. 379–94, esp. 388–89. "Mitologia fascista in Spagna e in Romania" is discussed in Furio Jesi, Cultura di destra (Milano), pp. 30–38. It should be remembered that the notion of death as sacrament and of nuptials with death go back to the romantics and to the medieval Frauenmystik; see Gerhard Kaiser, "Patriotischer Blut- und Wundenkult," chap. 9 of Pietismus und Patriotismus im literarischen Deutschland: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Säkularisation, 2d ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), pp. 124–38, esp. the examples given on p. 136.

81. Tucci, Il Buscidò, p. 16: "[La vita], quando c'è rumore d'armi, sembra quasi trovare il suo compimento nella negazione di se medesima, e anziché difendersi dall'incombere della morte a questa corre incontro con un'esultanza che è il più grande miracolo che sia al mondo." This passage should be compared with Mircea Eliade’s description of death in his Os ro- menos, latinos do oriente (Lisboa, 1943), p. 75, and with Jünger, Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis, p. 54.


85. A combination of both techniques can be found in C. Geertz’s approach to Balinese politics; see Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, N.J., 1980).

86. See n. 49, above.

87. See Tucci, To Lhasa and Beyond, p. 11; and R. Gnoli, Ricordo di Giuseppe Tucci, p. 9.

88. See n. 33 above.

89. Tucci, To Lhasa and Beyond, p. 134.

90. Ibid., p. 134. There are echoes of Leopardi in this passage; on Tucci’s admiration for the poet, see R. Gnoli, Ricordo di Giuseppe Tucci, p. 10.


92. Tucci, Die Religionen Tibets, p. 22 (on the cost of maintaining the monks); p. 25 (on the dangers for the state as a result of the growth of monasticism); p. 178 (on the economic activities of the monasteries and individual monks, including money lending).

93. On the Reale Accademia d’Italia, see Michel Ostenc, Intellectuels italiens et fascisme (1915–1929) (Paris, 1983), pp. 252–64; “le philosophe orientaliste Giuseppe Tucci” is mentioned in passing on p. 63. For Tucci’s opinions regarding the political plots that led to the shutting down of the Academy, see Tucci, To Lhasa and Beyond, p. 9.

94. On the foundation of the Istituto, see R. Gnoli, Ricordo di Giu-


99. The official fascist position on fascism and on the fascist state can be found in Mussolini/Gentile, “Fascismo - Dottrina,” p. 848.


102. See Gentile, Che cosa è il fascismo, p. 26, on “Il concetto di


104. On Mussolini, the nation, and the State, see Sternhell, “Fascist Ideology,” p. 356.


108. See Mussolini/Gentile, “Fascismo - Dottrina,” p. 849: “Il fascismo crede ancora e sempre nella santità e nell’eroismo, cioè in atti nei quali nessun motivo economico—lontano o vicino—agisce.” The reference to the saint and the hero, or to the saint, the hero, and the poet, occurs frequently in Tucci’s writings.

109. The reasons are unclear; see Gnoli, Ricordo di Giuseppe Tucci, p. 24: “Durante e subito dopo la guerra, divenuto impossibile, per forza di cose, uscire fuori d’Italia e, per breve tempo, anche l’insegnamento, perché, nel 1944, stupidamente epurato.”


113. Tucci, “Il Buddhism e l’uomo,” in his Forme dello spirito asiatico, pp. 61–65; see p. 62: “Il Bodhisattva non è soltanto colui che ama e si sacrifica, ma anche colui che lotta. ‘E un eroe, un guerriero coperto di coraza.” Although Tucci is referring to a spiritual fight, the imagery he uses expresses very well the attitude prevalent in Italy in 1940.


115. See La somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asaṅga (Mahāyānasamgraha),
éd. et tr. Étienne Lamotte, Bibliothèque du Muséon 7 (Louvain, 1938–39), 2:216: “Le Bodhisattva, en vertu de son habilité dans les moyens, même s’il commet l’acte mauvais de dix espèces, meurtre, etc., n’encourt pas de reproche, mais gagne un mérite immense et atteint rapidement la suprême et parfaite illumination.” This passage is also referred to by Demiéville in his discussion of Mahāyāna justifications of violence; see “Le bouddhisme et la guerre,” pp. 379–80 (pp. 293–94 in his Choix d’études bouddhiques). Demiéville quotes a passage from Asaṅga’s Yogācārabhūmi (T.1579,XLI,517b) in which it is said that if a Bodhisattva sees a bandit ready to kill a large number of people or to commit a sin that would result in immediate damnation (ānantarya), he should say to himself: “Si, en tuant cet homme, je tombe en enfer, qu’importe? Il ne faut pas que cet être soit voué à l’enfer.” See also “The Definitive Vinaya” (Sūtra 24, Taishō 310, pp. 514–19; translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci), English trans. in A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras, ed. Garma C. C. Chang (University Park, 1973), pp. 263–79, esp. p. 268, and p. 278, n. 10.

116. Tucci, Journey to Mustang, p. 27: see Tucci, Tra giungle e pagode, p. 41.

117. Tucci, Journey to Mustang, pp. 55–56; the original can be found in his Tra giungle e pagode, p. 78. Tucci refers to the passage of the Mahāyānasamgraha (Lamotte, p. 216) quoted in n. 113 above. On the ‘superior morality’ (adhisīla) that applies to Bodhisattvas, see É. Lamotte, L’Enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrtinirdesa), Bibliothèque du Muséon, 51 (Louvain, 1962) (reprinted as vol. 35 of the Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste de Louvain [Louvain-la-Neuve, 1987]), p. 415. It would be worthwhile to compare the Buddhist developments discussed here with those analyzed in Robert P. Eriksen, Theologians Under Hitler (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1985).

118. On Evola, see Jesi, Cultura di destra, pp. 89–102.


120. Ibid., p. 322; cf. also p. 323.

121. Ibid., pp. 325, 326.


124. On the growth of the cities, see ibid., p. 69 ff. On the various meanings of modernity, see Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air.
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(New York, 1982); Matei Calinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity*, 2d ed. (Durham, N.C., 1987); and n. 20 above.

125. Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudal en zum bürgerlichen Weltbild. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie in der Manufakturperiode* (Paris, 1934, reprint Darmstadt, 1980); his discussion of the mechanical worldview and of quantification is particularly relevant to our argument: see p. 9 ff.


132. See n. 21 above.


135. The oscillation between engaging in reactionary and revolutionary action once a certain ‘mystical’ level of discourse has been reached is ex-

Experimental psychology . . . did its best to become a psychology without a psyche.

The investigation of the psychoneuroses, however, has established beyond a doubt that . . . the psychic factor . . . is the essential cause of the pathological state.¹

I have found that modern man has an ineradicable aversion for traditional opinions and inherited truths. . . . Either they cannot reconcile the scientific and the religious world views, or the Christian truths have lost their authority and their psychological justification. . . . What is evil for one man is good for another. After all, why should not the Buddha be right too?²

5 Oriental Wisdom and the Cure of Souls: Jung and the Indian East

Luis O. Gómez

Etymology, usage, and experience tell us that, in order to preserve, a curator must also repair, and therefore recreate. This is as true of the textual scholar as it is of the curator of works of art. Determining how much restoration is too much remains, for both métiers, a singular challenge. We may ask, however, if the same is true of the curator of the soul. Perhaps for those who claim to know the exact boundaries of the soul, knowing how much to restore and preserve is not a problem. But what happens to the practitioner of the cure of souls when he or she is forced to practice the art of healing in a world without a soul? Or, even more puzzling, what is one to do in a world of many souls—when the very notions of God and soul slip between our secular, and multicultural, fingers?

In the quotations in the epigraph, C. G. Jung seems to struggle with these issues. In those early essays on the psychology of religion, Jung sought a new concept of the cure of souls that would somehow “reconcile the scientific and the religious outlook.” What was not expressed in these essays, but is obvious in hindsight, is the extent to which Jung was looking for a new form of religious authority, for a religious justification of his psychology as much as for the “psycho-
logical justification” of religion (and perhaps a justification for Jung’s own understanding of those “Christian tenets” that are in need of renewed justification).³ Behind this complex quest may lie still one other presupposition: since the modern person’s religion is undermined by a cacophony of voices, the way out of this relativism is both an examination of contradictory voices and a personal (and relative) choice among them. It is no accident that in the essay of 1928 the phrase “what is evil for one man is good for another” is followed by the statement “after all, why should not the Buddha be right too?”

The last statement raises a red flag, however, especially in light of Jung’s own long journey into the “Wisdom of the East.” Are we seeing here perhaps a slip, an unconscious expression of Jung’s ambivalence towards Buddhism, and Asia? If this suspicion is sound, how should we construe this ambivalence? Jung is easy prey for the postmodern Orientalist-hunter as much as he was before easy prey for the Orientalist historian. Even one of his defenders has characterized his work on Asia as “spasmodic and rather amateurish.”⁴ He is so easy a quarry in this regard that I shall pursue this line of argument only when it contributes directly to the goal of this chapter, namely, the exploration of what we may learn from Jung’s Orientalism. The presence of an Orientalist bias and a colonial frame of mind should be noted, but I am more interested in the manner in which this bias and this frame of mind manifest themselves in Jung. I am fascinated by the ambivalence of a man that is at the same time a defender and a detractor of the Asia he envisioned. I wonder at the depth of his ambivalence; and under his abstruse intellectual flights I discover a fierce struggle to find a place for “the other” in “the self,” to somehow make the self grow through the other, while preserving the self. This hesitation is the subject of the present chapter. I will have much to do, therefore, with Jung’s ambivalence towards the texts and symbols he subsumes under expressions such as “the East,” or “Eastern man.”

I shall also avoid dwelling on the problem of the empirical foundation for his psychological theories. Notwithstanding the repeated claims of Jung and his advocates for an empirical foundation for this psychology,⁵ Jung’s speculative psychology is also easy prey for the modern empirical psychologist, who at best is puzzled, at worst amused, by the overconfident assertion that it is a fact “established beyond a doubt that . . . the psychic factor . . . is the essential cause of the pathological state,” a belief that appears to be closely tied to the idea that religion can be both explained and justified by positing this mysterious entity as some kind of later-day substitute for the soul.
The term "psychic factor" is itself problematic, philosophically and empirically. It is of greater interest to me, however, that this same idea of a "psychic factor" is used by Jung to argue for a religious etiology and a religious cure for the neuroses. I will consider the uses and abuses of this vagueness, and I will address the way in which Jung's quest for the "psychic factor" reflects both a religious quest and the puzzlement of someone attempting to incorporate the experience of others into a coherent self and reality.

In short, although reactions to the work of Carl Gustav Jung range from admiration bordering on adoration to scorn bordering on anathema, in the following pages I should like to attempt a sympathetic, but critical, reflection on his work as the work of a curator of souls trapped in a world without a soul. A close reading of several of his texts suggested this interpretation. The conflict between his perception of the therapist as a curator of souls and his perception of religion (and the role of the pastor) as somehow problematic appears in the first of the two papers quoted above, a lecture Jung delivered to the Alsatian Pastoral Conference in Strasbourg in May 1932. This speech was published in the English Collected Works under the enigmatic title of "Psychotherapists or the Clergy." I assume the translator meant this title as a question or as a choice of sorts; but the original essay, which was published as a pamphlet in Zurich, shortly after it was delivered as a lecture, appeared under the suggestive title of Die Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge ("The Connections of Psychotherapy to the Cure of Souls").

Jung had addressed the same issues in an earlier paper, published in Ethik in 1928, under the title "Psychoanalyse und Seelsorge" ("Psychoanalysis and the Cure of Souls"). In this earlier paper, Jung tried to distinguish clearly between psychotherapy and pastoral care. The practice of the former, he states, "is a medical intervention, a psychological technique whose purpose it is to lay bare the contents of the unconscious and integrate them into the conscious mind." The practice of pastoral care, he seems to dismiss as "a religious influence based on a Christian confession of faith." The later, and more extensive, 1932 article shows a definitely more sympathetic assessment of religion as a form of healing. In it religion is clearly the model for Jung's cure of souls (almost to the point that it would seem better to speak of "the salvation of souls"): Seeking revenge for the violence [the individual's] reason has done to her, outraged Nature only awaits the moment when the partition falls so as to overwhelm the conscious life with destruction. Since the most ancient and
primitive times, humans have been conscious of this threat, a threat to the soul, and in order to arm themselves against this threat and to heal the damage done, human beings developed religious and magical practices. This is why the medicine-man is always at the same time the priest: he is the saviour of the soul as well as of the body, and religions are systems of healing for psychic illness. This is especially true of the two greatest religions of humanity, Christianity and Buddhism. A suffering human being is never helped by what he thinks up by himself; only superhuman, revealed truth lifts him out of his state of misery.  

This passage is pregnant with meaning and suggestive of Jung’s many ambivalences and hidden claims. The language, the metaphors and hyperboles, of this paragraph seem to be far from those of modern scientific discourse, but close to those of theology. The Romantic ambivalence towards nature, the idealized medicine man and priest, who “is the saviour of the soul as well as of the body” (and with whom Jung clearly identifies himself), are all component elements of the complex position assumed by Jung towards religious phenomena, language, and practices.

Moreover, in this passage, Jung reveals the fundamental contradictions and ambiguities of his position vis-à-vis Buddhism and “the East.” On the one hand, he makes the sweeping statement that “religions are systems of healing for psychic illness”; on the other hand, he privileges psychotherapy over religion. On the one hand, he will use the authority of Western culture and religion in support of his own concept of the self; on the other, he uses the authority of “Eastern” religion and culture as a basis for a critique of Western views of the individual. Conversely, he uses the Western model to criticize his own construct of the East. In the end, Jung emerges from this ambiguity triumphant as the one who has not only bridged, but transcended the two worlds he created for his readers.

Implicitly, Jung is also laying the same claim to superiority over the shaman, the medicine man, the priest, the Christian, and the Buddhist that was expressed openly in the earlier paper of 1928. In the latter paper, he argues for a scientific basis for his own claims, adopting a peculiar reading of Freud to argue for both a scientific psychology and a psychology based on a soul substance:

[For medicine in the 19th century,] the psyche as a mental substance did not exist, and experimental psychology also did its best to become a psychology without a psyche.

The investigation of the psychoneuroses, however, has established beyond a doubt that the noxious element (Noxe) [behind the psychoneuroses],
which is the essential cause of these pathological states, is the psychic factor, and that [this factor] must therefore be recognized in its own right, along with other admitted pathogenic factors such as inheritance, disposition, bacterial infection, and so forth. All attempts to reduce the psychic factor to physical factors proved to be misguided.

The subtle, but obvious, identification of the entity posed by Jung's new psychology with some form of spiritual entity is further used by Jung to construct a model of mental health that can be barely separated from that of salvation. Both forms of Heil come together implicitly and reluctantly, but unequivocally, in Jung's own words:

[A cure] is brought about by the archetypes awaking to independent life and taking over the guidance of the psychic personality, thus supplanting the ego with its futile willing and striving. As a religious-minded person would say: guidance has come from God. With most of my patients I have to avoid this formulation, apt though it is, for it reminds them too much of what they had to reject in the first place.

One must ask, then, is this "apt formulation" a metaphoric expression? Is "God" another word for the archetypes? Is psychotherapy nothing more than a benevolent ruse, or, more charitably, a skillful means (upāya)? Whatever our answer to these questions might be, the fact remains that Jung's conceptualizations obscure the fact that the patient's ambivalence and incredulity were most likely shared by Jung himself. In one of those high-sounding statements of universal truth that reveal as much about the speaker as they do about the topic of the proposition, Jung speaks through the voice of a third person, but in the first person:

I have found that modern man has an ineradicable aversion for traditional opinions and inherited truths. . . . Every one of them has the feeling that our religious truths have somehow become hollow. Either they cannot reconcile the scientific and the religious world views, or the Christian truths have lost their authority and their psychological justification.

But the last sentence is only part of a paragraph that ends with the revelation of still another conflict: the conflict of variant religious truths, and the clash of variant cultural, for Jung perhaps racial, worlds. "Sin," concludes Jung, "has become something quite relative: what is evil for one man is good for another. After all, why should not the Buddha be right too?"

Although Jung has been for many the champion of psychotherapy as a form of spiritual counseling, psychotherapy as an extension of religion, and psychology as the Western counterpart of the
Wisdom of the East, Jung’s own position on the matter of religion, especially the religions originating in Asia, was far from clear. This ambivalence is not surprising for a variety of reasons. His encounter with Asia was an “Orientalist’s encounter”; it could not be otherwise given his cultural milieu and historical times.

But to say it could not be otherwise is only a step towards understanding Jung, not an argument for justifying his position. I have no brief in defending Jung where his position merits no defense—when his ambivalence turns to ambiguity or, as in the now exhausted arguments attempting to shelter him from accusations of Nazi sympathy, when his ambiguity turns to equivocation. Among such problematic rhetorical moves, one must include Jung’s attempts to present as neutral, empirical, science what is a very idiosyncratic view of the self and the individual in human society, a view that is ultimately religious, and is clearly intended to displace religion, though it never quite succeeds in replacing it. In the latter class of arguments one finds the tendency to use a particular religious outlook as a foundation or justification for Jung’s own psychological theories. This strategic move includes his use of Buddhism, and the equally vague concept of yoga, not so much as objects of psychological inquiry as exemplifications of Jung’s own theories—positively as arguments for his concept of individuation as integration, and negatively as setting a baseline, by contrast, to his theory.

Jung’s position straddling a positive and a negative view of Asia is worth examining, given the authority his voice carries among many who study Asian religion, and religion generally. The ascendancy of Jung can hardly be compared to the continuing and pervasive influence of his estranged teacher, whose hold on critical theory tightened even as he lost ground among psychiatrists and psychotherapists. But the erosion in the prestige of Freudian theory as nosology, psychotherapy, anthropology, and even metapsychology has undermined many of the basic assumptions of Jung as well. Yet, both psychologies retain a prestigious position among literary critics and students of religion. Freud seems to be preferred among critical theorists (recently much less among social scientists), and Jung among mythographers and historians of religion. But Jung is also the champion of many admirers, believers, and practitioners of a broad range of religious ideologies and traditions—from contemporary revivals of ancient mythologies to Buddhist meditation, from Gnosticism to religions of faith.

Although he can easily be accused of falling prey to a Romantic mystification of the psyche, and a private use of religious symbolism,
Jung managed to distance himself from nineteenth-century and post-Enlightenment positivistic views of religion. To Jung's credit, he was not afraid to grant a major role to religious symbolism in his psychology, without disparaging religion as "mere" symptom or manifest meaning of a deeper latent sexual meaning. But the originality of his perspective came with a price: it came tied with the European love for exotica and esoterica, and the Romantic view of the non-Western.

Jung held himself, and his psychology, between religious awe (as the unconscious recovered some of its ancient aura of truth and mystery) and a scientific detachment of sorts (as religious truth was safely interpreted as psychic reality). This tour de force may have been, ironically, if not paradoxically, one of the reasons for his ambivalence towards organized religion, and one of the reasons for his enduring influence.23

In some ways Jung found himself in a quandary similar to the one he attributed to the Buddha in an essay titled "What India Can Teach Us." There Jung states that the Buddha said, and tried to make it true, that the enlightened man is even the teacher and redeemer of his gods (not their stupid denier, as Western "enlightenment" will have it). This was obviously too much [for his own civilization], because the Indian mind was not at all ready to integrate the gods to such an extent as to make them psychologically dependent upon man's mental condition. How Buddha himself could obtain such insight without losing himself in a complete mental inflation borders on a miracle.14

From this passage one can surmise that Jung identified his own position with that of the Buddha. His admiration for the Buddha, however, was not unqualified—nor was his admiration for Asia without tensions and ambivalence. In fact, the importance of Jung's "Eastern connection" in the development of his thought cannot be understood simply as a case of intellectual influence.

Following his traumatic break with Freud (finalized in 1913), Jung literally withdrew into himself. It was during the subsequent dark years of "creative illness,"25 a period of almost ten years, a time when "everything essential was decided,"26 that Jung is supposed to have discovered "Eastern thought." But Jung's personal and intellectual development during this period meandered into Western, as well as Eastern, symbolism. The derivation of and influences upon his thought are much more complex than anything the phrase "discovered Eastern thought" could possibly convey. It is true that during this formative period he conceived of the core elements of his theory of individuation, and that he discovered new for-
mulations about the structure of the self through mandalas that he
drew in trying to analyze his own dreams and fantasies. But these
speculations and drawings led him to Gnosticism and Western al-
chemy much more than to anything that could be labeled "Eastern
thought" (Memories, Dreams, Reflections, pp. 200–206).

In the following period (roughly 1920 to mid-1930s) Jung
practiced some form of yoga to calm himself during self-analysis.
Jung's own allusions to these exercises are obscure at best, equivocat-
ing at worst. As recorded by Jaffé, Jung referred to these practices tan-
gentially with the qualifier "certain":

I was frequently so wrought up that I had to do certain yoga exercises in or-
der to hold my emotions in check. But since it was my purpose to know what
was going on within myself, I would do these exercises only until I had
calmed myself enough to resume my work with the unconscious. As soon as I
had the feeling that I was myself again, I abandoned this restraint upon the
emotions and allowed the images and inner voices to speak afresh. The In-
dian, on the other hand, does yoga exercises in order to obliterate completely
the multitude of psychic contents and images. (P. 177)

In those years Jung also dabbled briefly in the mysteries of the
Yijing (I-ching) (pp. 373–77). He developed a friendship with the
German translator of the Yijing, Richard Wilhelm, who in 1928 sent
Jung a copy of the manuscript of his translation of a Chinese treatise
called The Secret of the Golden Flower. Jung was fascinated by the
book, and thought he had discovered in it independent confirmation
of his theories of mandala symbolism. Ironically, Wilhelm felt that he
had "discovered Jung through China" (as we shall see, an interesting
reversal of influence). But this text was more important in leading
Jung in a different direction, perhaps away from the East. Jung ap-
pears to have become interested in alchemy only after he read Wilh-
elm's translation. His sense of discovery, actually of self-discovery,
is summarized in Memories, Dreams, Reflections as follows:

Light on the nature of alchemy began to come to me only after I had read the
text of the Golden Flower. . . . I commissioned a Munich bookseller to no-
tify me of any alchemical books that might fall into his hands. Soon after-
ward I received the . . . Artis Auriferae Volumina Duo (1593).

I let this book lie almost untouched for nearly two years. Occasionally,
I would look at the pictures, and each time I would think, "Good Lord, what
nonsense! This stuff is impossible to understand."

It was a long while before I found my way about in the labyrinth of
alchemical thought processes, for no Ariadne had put a thread into my hand. . . . It was a task that kept me absorbed for more than a decade.

I had very soon seen that analytical psychology coincided in a most curious way with alchemy. The experiences of the alchemist were, in a sense, my experiences, and their world was my world. This was, of course, a momentous discovery: I had stumbled upon the historical counterpart of my psychology of the unconscious. (Pp. 204, 205)

The discovery of the East was therefore more of a catalyst. During the same period, Jung traveled to North America, discovered the Pueblo Indians, and attempted to penetrate the ancient wisdom of the Elgonyi of Kenya during a second trip to Africa.27 His visit to India was, according to Memories, Dreams, Reflections, not taken on his own initiative; and once there, he remained within himself “like a homunculus in the retort” (pp. 274, 275). The Secret of the Golden Flower sent Jung in the direction of alchemical lore, but in the direction of Western, not Chinese, alchemy. The bulk of his work thereafter would be with Western sources—on alchemy, on Gnosticism, on Christian theology, ritual, and symbolism. It was during his careful study of Western alchemy, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, that his self-analysis, his study of Gnosticism, and his alchemical researches all crystallized in what was most original in his psychological theories: individuation, the collective unconscious, the archetypes, and the transformations of the unconscious.

Nevertheless, Jung’s interest in “the East” never ceased. It is true, as noted more than once,28 that his psychology and his psychology of religion are best understood as derivatives of his understanding of Western spirituality and esotericism, but it would be a mistake to ignore the role of Jung’s Asian interests in the formation of his ideas. In Jung’s own words, “India did not pass me by without a trace”—his own doubts (“India is not my task. . . . What are you doing in India?”) were often counterbalanced by his recognition of the debt he owed to his Asian studies (India was “a part of the way—admittedly a significant one—which should carry me closer to my goal”).29 As early as 1912—before the mandala drawings, and before The Secrets of the Golden Flower—he used Indian metaphors and symbols in his psychological theories. Wilhelm’s discovery of Jung in China was no accident: Jung had also written on Chinese symbolism in 1921.30 His friendship with Wilhelm, and subsequently with the Indologist Heinrich Zimmer, also left a clear mark in the work of Jung, who often shared the limelight with both of them.
and other distinguished Orientalists at the Eranos Seminars. Moreover, what may be historically more significant, Jung left a deep imprint on the study of Asian religions, especially on the way Asian religious ideas, and to a lesser extent practices, are adopted and assimilated in the West. As Wehr has noted, it would be a mistake to class Jung as "a superficial champion of the Eastern approach." But it would also be a mistake to downplay his contribution to Orientalism, and to its half sister, Comparative Religion, in an attempt to erase Jung's role as a model for impressionistic scholarship in both of these fields. Whatever the unwholesome effects may have been, his contribution as a catalyst alone has been far too consequential to be ignored. If one considers only the importance of his participation in the Eranos Seminars (he was invited fourteen times) where he interacted with leading scholars of differing backgrounds and interests (granted they were mostly European), and the impact of the papers that resulted (the Eranos Jahrbuch), one must admit that Jung contributed significantly to the Seminars' stated goal of establishing a bridge and an understanding between East and West, at the very least by creating the illusion of such a dialogue and the illusion of a common vocabulary.

It would be an equally serious mistake to ignore Jung's sense of self-recognition in Asian symbols that alternated with his sense of distance. Thus, for instance, Jung saw the arrival of Wilhelm's translation of The Secrets of the Golden Flower as a case of perfect "synchronicity," as it occurred while Jung was working on his now famous castle mandala. Under the painting of the castle Jung wrote, "1928: even as I was painting this picture, which shows the golden, well-fortified castle, Richard Wilhelm of Frankfurt sent me the thousand-year-old Chinese text on the yellow castle, the germ of the immortal body."

Yet, insofar as Jung was aware of any Asian influences or of the influence he had on Western admirers of Asia, he was a reluctant and cautious agent. Furthermore, Jung was far from being either a convert to "Eastern thought," or a scholar of Asian religions. Those who have written on Jung's theory or on his personal quest have said more about his Asian interests than he ever said—an observation that applies to the present chapter as well. Students of his psychology and adherents of his school often display more interest in and enthusiasm for Asian religions than his own cautious posture would justify—and they may mystify the connection between his psychology and "Eastern spirituality" more than he did. Yet, both his use of Asian themes and his cautious, perhaps ambivalent, stance are worthy of close
scrutiny from the point of view of the history of Western views of Asia—and no less of Asian views of the West. One can also use Jung’s writings to question the ways in which the Western scholar—or, for that matter, psychotherapist—remains equivocal in the face of tradition, traditional symbols, traditional legitimation and mystification, and above all, in the face of institutional religion.

His “Psychological Commentary” to the Evans-Wentz edition of the Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation contains an example of Jung’s ambivalence that epitomizes both Jung’s genius and his incapacity to come to grips with Asia on its own terms; reacting to what the English editor calls “at-one-ment with the One Mind,”34 which he renders “The Transcendent At-one-ment,” Jung notes:

The Mind in which the irreconcilables—samsāra and nirvāṇa—are united is ultimately our mind.35 Does this statement spring from profound modesty or from overweening hybris? Does it mean that the Mind is ‘nothing but’ our mind? Or that our mind is the Mind? Assuredly it means the latter, and from the Eastern point of view there is no hybris in this; . . . whereas with us it would amount to saying ‘I am God’. This is an incontestable ‘mystical’ experience, though a highly objectionable one to the Westerner; but in the East, where it derives from a mind that has never lost touch with the instinctual matrix, it has a very different value. The collective introverted attitude of the East did not permit the world of the senses to sever the vital link with the unconscious; psychic reality was never seriously disputed, . . . and this is particularly true of that aspect of it which stresses the validity of psychic phenomena, such as relate to ghosts and spirits.36

Under the spell of nineteenth-century theories of race and civilization, Jung has a hard time separating different non-Western groups. Asia is all one “East,” barely distinguishable from Africa and native America.-37 Thus, his model for non-Western religion is the so-called mentality of the primitive. Thus, he compares the “Asian mind” to the mind of “the primitive”:

The only known analogy to this fact is the mental condition of the primitive, who confuses dream and reality in the most bewildering way. Naturally we hesitate to call the Eastern mind primitive, for we are deeply impressed with its remarkable civilization and differentiation. Yet the primitive mind is its matrix.38

Jung is, of course, under the spell of Lévy-Bruhl and the notion of the psychologically primitive, notions that he inherited in part through his Freudian legacy. But note that even here (as it is true even today) among psychoanalysts the word “primitive” retains its pe-
jorative connotations, its associations with pathology. And yet one
must remember that Jung himself did not share Freud’s positivistic
approach to “psychic phenomena,” to spirits and ghosts, in short, to
the magical mind of the so-called primitive. For him, therefore, the
primitive represents one force, but with two aspects. It is the so-called
dark side, the unconscious, but it is a dimension that must be touched
and accepted, a dimension that cannot be ignored, although it must
be explored with caution. In short, in this aspect of Jung’s characteri-
zation of the “Eastern mind” he gives Asia a certain advantage over
Europe:

The West has simply cultivated the other aspect of primitivity, namely, the
scrupulously accurate observation of nature at the expense of abstraction.
Our natural science is the epitome of primitive man’s astonishing powers of
observation. We have added only a moderate amount of abstraction, for fear
of being contradicted by the facts. The East, on the other hand, cultivates the
psychic aspect of primitivity together with an inordinate amount of abstrac-
tion. Facts make excellent stories but not much more.

Thus, if the East speaks of the Mind as being inherent in everybody, no
more hybris or modesty is involved than in the European’s belief in facts,
which are mostly derived from man’s own observation, and sometimes from
rather less than his observation, to wit, his interpretation. He is, therefore,
quite right to be afraid of too much abstraction.

The dichotomy constructed here by Jung is something more than a
description, it is also the establishment of Jung as an intermediary
between East and West, between an incomplete science and an in-
complete yoga.

Referring back to other parts of his essay, and to some of his
major works, he states unambiguously his criticism of both West-
ern psychology and yoga:

I have mentioned more than once that the shifting of the basic personality-
feeling to the less conscious mental sphere has a liberating effect. I have also
described, somewhat cursorily, the transcendent function which produces
the transformation of personality, and I have emphasized the importance
of spontaneous unconscious compensation. Further, I have pointed out the ne-
glect of this crucial fact in yoga.

Interestingly enough, this weakness in yoga (and perhaps in “the
mental equipment of Eastern man”) is in fact the reason why, ac-
cording to Jung, Westerners cannot practice yoga.

The significance of Jung’s use of Buddhist yoga, however, ex-
tends beyond that of serving as a straw man. The way Jung constructs
his arguments often tells us much regarding the way he (and many of us with him, or like him) came to conceive of, and know, “the Orient.” Asia became a new voice that could not be dismissed without careful consideration, and a voice that promised to reveal a curative formula, even for those who, like Jung, would return to Europe to find the final answer. From his conception of the Orient, therefore, we learn much about how notions of healing are tied up with our views about self, and what is not self, hence, with notions of what constitutes cultural identity, and what threatens it.

The last point is central to understanding Jung as psychologist and as informed cultural critic. If the cure of souls is intimately connected with the cultural construction of the normal self, then a psychotherapist is one who articulates those norms and develops the skill (or claims to have the skill) to do one of two things: restore a broken self to its putative pristine state of cultural normalcy, or lead a person on the path to a greater self. Western psychotherapists share many of the responsibilities of the shaman and the witch doctor, and with those responsibilities they must also possess the skill to recognize a cultural norm, and, in some cases they must also possess the capacity to conceive of that norm with enough flexibility to allow for the individual variations that underlie pathology and deviancy. Thus, on the one hand, in this person’s capacity to heal there is also implicitly a capacity to define human identity clearly, but, on the other hand, there is a capacity to recognize the potential for human adaptability.

On the surface, Jung appears to have used these assumptions and pursued these goals to suggest to the generations that followed a psychology of Asian religions or a way to discover in Asian religious texts both wisdom and healing power. But his text is ultimately making a claim for his own psychology. The healing power of Asia ultimately emanates from Jung’s claims for his own understanding of the human psyche. He always maintained the Asian sources at arm’s length, highlighting their alien or exotic character almost paragraph by paragraph, even as he attempted to appropriate them. This process is particularly evident in his essay “The Psychology of Eastern Meditation.” I will note some of Jung’s strategies for appropriation and alienation by way of a reading of this essay.

The essay is presented as a commentary on a text first made available in the West in 1894, through an English translation published as part of the Sacred Books of the East, and known since then as the Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra. Interpreting this text as a manual for yoga practice, Jung sets out to explain, and somehow make accessible
to a Western audience, the practice of yoga, an aspect of a culture that Jung regarded as not only unfamiliar to the European ("dem Europäer ungewohnte") but in fact alien and inaccessible ("fremdartig und unzugänglich"). Following a stereotype common in Jung’s days (and perhaps still very much alive today outside scholarly circles), Jung proposes that the so-called Indian mind seems to have no regard for external, empirical reality, but directs its eyes inward. One should not seek for a critique of this stereotype in the writings of Jung. A psychology of race (culture is not the operative term here) is at the heart of the Jungian repetition of the stereotype that assumes a special psychology for the Asian mind, an organization of the mind that places the Asian both beyond and below the limits of European normality.

Although Jung may have formed his own opinion of India and Indian psychology, one must count among the formative factors in Jung’s views, and among the most faithful reflections of the Zeitgeist, the work of Jung’s friend, Heinrich Zimmer. In Jung’s writings on India Zimmer’s voice rings in the background. In the essay on the psychology of Oriental meditation, we must count Zimmer’s interpretation of Indian culture in terms of yoga as a fundamental presupposition. Echoing Zimmer’s Kunstform und Yoga, Jung explains the “mysteries” of Indian iconography:

Indian thought and [art] forms merely appear in the world of the senses, but they cannot be derived from it. In spite of the often overwhelming sensuality of their expression, they are nevertheless in their most authentic essence unsensual, not to say suprasensual. It is not the world of the senses, of the body, of colors and sounds, not human passions that are recreated in transfigured form or with realistic pathos through the creativity of the Indian soul [Seele]. Rather, it is an underworld or an overworld of a metaphysical nature, out of which alien forms emerge into the familiar earthly scene.

Jung’s hesitation between under- and overworld may appear to reflect uncertainty; but one has to wonder if there is not something else behind this apparent doubt. It is not so much amazement or bewilderment, as it is a sense of alienation. This vacillation between seeing India as superhuman and infrahuman is best explicated by Jung’s own commentary: “If one once carefully observes the tremendously impressive impersonations of the gods performed by the Kathakali dancers of southern India there is not a single natural gesture to be seen. Everything is bizarre, subhuman and superhuman at once.”

From statements such as these one would think Jung had never heard of stylized art forms, of artistic convention, or that he had
never been to the opera or the ballet. The explanation must be sought elsewhere, of course. It is not that Jung is not aware of the conventionalization and stylization of artistic forms in his own culture, but that he is predisposed to see India as the wholly other, hence, as existing in a realm that cannot be analogous or contiguous, let alone overlapping, with his own, European realm. The other is always other, always outside, above or below, not natural, not quite human. In the end, the other becomes the bizarre.\(^5\) In Jung, a chasm separates both worlds, the world of the self and the world of the other. Jung will continue to dwell on this gulf throughout his essay.

But the recognition of his own incapacity to accept the other as anything but other, is not the only position Jung assumes. Jung is also seeking in the other, in India, a self-confirmation . . . almost as if one needed to recognize in an other part of oneself that could not be seen as self, and would otherwise remain totally other, inaccessible, and unacceptable. Jung therefore emphasizes the fact that for all its strangeness, India expresses something that is also present in the European psyche, in the depths of our psyche, as an important, and not pathological, dimension of the Western (and the universal) human psyche. For, the artistic and religious forms that at first may seem odd to the European observer “do not appear to the Indians as dreamlike but as real, just as they likewise, with an almost terrifying intensity, touch upon something in us for which we have no words.”\(^5\) I shall return to the question of whose dream this is, if it is not a dream to the Indian; but first we should ask, why should we perceive this dreaming as terrifying and beyond words? It is clear that Jung is arguing that this common ground between “East and West” is in the East the surface reality, and in the West a hidden dimension of the self, if not its darkest side. As Jung states, with his characteristic prudishness, “What we hide most shamefacedly is the holiest symbol to the Indian” (no doubt referring to the yoni and the lingam).\(^5\) Such statements have to be understood in the context of Jung’s insistence on the truth of his hypothesis that “the Indian” lives in the unconscious, and “feels himself to be outside good and evil.”\(^5\)

According to Jung, this deeper, but nevertheless problematic dimension of the psyche is what appears so strange to the European, but so natural to the Indian. It is the basis of yoga, and dhyāna, both of which he regards as a kind of “sinking,” a concept he no doubt extrapolates from the German word for meditation “Versenkung,” but which has no clear Indian counterpart.\(^5\)

Availing himself of a well-known stereotypical dichotomy between the mind of the East and the mind of the West, Jung uses his
reconstruction of Asian yoga as a way to signal what is unique, and unforsakable, in Western attitudes. But, simultaneously he reveals an added, and neglected dimension of the psyche by way of an equivalence between his Asian text and his own psychological theories. Nevertheless, the concession to the Indian mind is always reluctant; Jung's preferences are always obvious. Thus, he begins his characterization of yoga by stating a generalization that is patently unfounded, and could not have withstood a careful reading of the texts that lay before him in the Sacred Books of the East:

We believe in doing, the Indian in immobile being. Our religious exercise consists of prayer, worship, and the singing of praise. The Indian's most important exercise, on the other hand, is yoga, the immersion in what we would call an unconscious state, but which he praises as the highest consciousness. Yoga is the most eloquent expression of the Indian mind and at the same time it is the instrument continually used to produce this peculiar attitude of mind.⁵⁶

One wonders how one can possibly characterize, without some kind of independent test, another person's state of mind as unconscious in the face of that person's assertion that he or she is in some sort of conscious state ("the highest consciousness," in fact). But then this is indeed a fascinating theory of culture (the continuous practice of a spiritual exercise being required to maintain a culture's habits of mind), and a fascinating characterization of a civilization in which most likely a very small minority has ever engaged in anything that could be called yoga, let alone in one single type of yoga.⁵⁷

Jung is aware of the great diversity of practices that go by this name; still, he prefers to regard all of them as sharing the same goal.⁵⁸ He understands correctly that etymologically, the term yoga refers to some form of yoking, of restraint, and that this restraining is somehow analogous with Christian control of superbia and concupiscencia. But Jung is not interested in investigating what we may call, for lack of better terms, the behavioral and the explicit meanings of yoga. He is pursuing singlemindedly the goal of discovering an Asian parallel to at least part of his theory of individuation. Hence, he wants to show that the claims of yoga do not explain the role of the unconscious as Jung sees it, yet betray an awareness of the unconscious unknown in the West before the advent of the analytic psychologies.

To pursue this line of thought, Jung then begins his detailed explication of the so-called Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra. This text is preserved only in Chinese under the title of Guan-wulianpishou jing, but Jung refers to the text with the Sanskrit title falsely reconstructed by
J. Takakusu in his nineteenth-century translation, *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra: The Sūtra of Meditation on Amitāyus*. This sutra, often quoted under the anglicized title of the *Meditation Sutra*, is now regarded as a Chinese Buddhist “apocryphal” text: although it claims to be an Indian canonical text, it is in fact a relatively late Chinese or Central Asian composition. Although it calls itself a *guan* text (contemplation? visualization?), it is not clear in what sense it is to be regarded as a member of this genre—in fact we do not know enough to be able to define this genre accurately. Be that as it may, Jung follows Takakusu in assuming that this is a text on *dhyāna*, a term that for Jung, as for many Indologists of his day, was synonymous with *yoga*. Hence, Jung regarded this text as “a yoga text that allows a deep insight into the psychic processes of yoga.”

The text is used in Japan as a major source for the Buddhism of faith (as Jung recognizes, “[es] gehört in das Gebiet des sogennanten theistischen Buddhismus”); but among Chinese Buddhists, and in Japan outside the Pure Land traditions, it may be used as a visualization text—that is, as a text outlining topics for visualization. In the latter sense, we may speak of a type of “yogic” application of this text, not so much as a source of “instructions,” but as a repository of topics of meditation or objects for visualization. Jung’s recognition of the text’s connection with Indian traditions of meditation is not totally off the mark; but, although the text appears to be simply a listing of topics for visualization, Jung sets out to discover in the topics themselves some kind of structure of the yoga process.

One of the many difficulties that this text presents to us is in fact its disconnected character. If one uses the frame story as a frame of reference or a basis for an interpretation, then one must take into account that this is a story of betrayal, of tragic disappointment: Prince Ajātaśatru incarcerates his father Bimbisāra, and tries to kill him by starvation. When Ajātaśatru discovers that his mother, Queen Consort Vaidehi, has been secretly feeding King Bimbisāra, he incarcerates her as well. In her sorrow, Vaidehi does not give up her faith in the Buddha, and invokes him. The Buddha appears before her, and she asks that he teach her of a place where there is no sorrow. Then, in the main body of the sutra, the Buddha teaches her how to visualize the paradise, or Pure Land, of the Buddha Amitāyus. Finally, he explains to her how one may be reborn in this wonderful paradise, a land without suffering, a world of endless bliss. At the end of the sutra Vaidehi is mentioned only once more, as one among many who were enraptured by the Buddha’s preaching.

The story presents an interesting twist to the Oedipal story. In
fact, Japanese psychiatrist Keigo Okonogi speaks of an Ajātaśātrū complex, which he attributes to the Japanese people (perhaps in his own version of reverse Orientalism). One wonders what drove Jung to ignore this story as a fascinating myth of child-parent rivalry, and of a child’s failure to repay a debt of nourishment. One also wonders why he chose to ignore the centrality of the themes of tragic suffering, hope, grace, and compassion—all topics that figure prominently in some of the East Asian exegetical traditions. But, even if one grants that this story is only a pretext, one has to wonder what other bases, criteria, or templates could be used to understand the sutra. Jung sets aside, without one word of justification, the theological underpinnings of the sutra, and its use in the Pure Land tradition.

Jung proceeds to analyze some of the visualization topics described in the sutra. After an extensive quotation from the sutra, Jung presents an imaginative reconstruction of the method of practice presupposed by the sutra’s topical descriptions. This praxis begins, according to Jung, with the creation of an afterimage by actually gazing at the setting sun. The first visualization is followed by a meditation on water that is supposedly not based on any sense impressions. Jung presents a similar, imaginative, but historically unfounded analysis of other aspects of the text. He finally returns from the particulars of the text to his own broad generalizations:

Although it appears exceedingly obscure to the European, this yoga text is not a mere literary museum piece. It lives in the psyche of every Indian, in this form and in many others, so that his life and thinking are permeated by it down to the smallest details. It was not Buddhism that nurtured and educated this psyche but yoga. Buddhism itself was born of the spirit of yoga, which is older and more universal than the historical reformations wrought by the Buddha.

In an instant, Jung leaves the sutra to return to his own theories, the topics of the sutra now only a vague background to his own speculations.

I wish particularly to warn against the oft-attempted imitation of Indian practices and sentiments. As a rule nothing comes of it except an artificial stultification of our Western intelligence. Of course, if anyone should succeed in giving up Europe from every point of view, and could actually be nothing but a yogi and sit in the lotus position with all the practical and ethical consequences that this entails, evaporating on a gazelle-skin under a dusty banyan tree and ending his days in nameless non-being, then I should have to admit that such a person understood yoga in the Indian manner.
It is difficult to read this passage without sensing a certain overconfidence, if not sarcasm, but Jung advises, in the same paragraph, that “we should not belittle these strange Indian ideas and practices or scorn them as absurd errors.” What then is the sense of the word “strange” in this sentence, and the references to “evaporating on a gazelle-skin”?

Perhaps even more perplexing is the absence, in statements of this type, of a voice that both explains and makes natural the Indian position. In other words, what is most bewildering is the silence of the putative Indian voice. Jung’s essay reflects Jung’s world, of course, more clearly than anything it might reflect about India. This is a world in which Jung can speak about India, but India never speaks back. India is indeed passive, not because this is its own inscrutable way of being, but because Jung’s vantage point leaves no room for an Indian voice. In this essay, it is a presupposition, and a rule of discourse, that “if we wish to understand at all, we can do so only in the European way.” And, needless to say, the European way has to be Jung’s psychology.

Jung then returns to the symbols that form the topical headings of the sutra. These are best understood as the established motifs or conventional images of a genre, that of the description of Buddhist paradises found in Mahayana sutras. The sutra is, after all, something of a Central Asian (or Chinese) commentary on two Indian texts (the two Sukhāvatīvīraśvanā Sūtras) belonging to this genre. Following closely the tradition of these texts, the Meditation Sutra presents concrete images of a paradisiacal world. The images are presented as unstructured sets of motifs, but, at least judging by subsequent tradition, they form a composite picture of the fantastic land of Buddha Amitābha. If anything is missing from this picture it is psychological meaning and interpretation. Tradition focuses either on visualization as a form of realization (a so-called alternative reality) or on faith as acceptance of the reality described with the images. But even if one assumes a psychological meaning, the concreteness of the imagery begs for an interpretation that takes into account this concreteness, the specificity of the imagery.

Jung, on the other hand, looks for psychological structure and significance. Without reference to any of the traditions that produced or used the sutra, he argues that sun and water are “divested of their physical objectivity” in the sutra, so that they “become symbols of psychic contents, images of the source of life in the individual psyche.” The way he derives these conclusions is simple enough, since it is a summary of what sun and water evoke in Jung, not a con-
sideration of the place of these images in the text or within the tradition. Thus, Jung argues that the sun, as giver of warmth and light, is the indubitable central point of our visible world. As the giver of life it is always and everywhere either the divinity itself or an image of the same. Even in the world of Christian ideas, the sun is a favorite allegory of Christ. A second source of life, especially in southern countries, is water, which also plays an important role in Christian allegory, for instance as the four rivers of paradise. . . . In this connection I would also mention Christ's talk with the woman of Samaria at the well. . . . A meditation on sun and water evokes these and similar associations without fail, so that the meditator will gradually be led from the foreground of visible appearances into the background, that is, to the spiritual meaning behind the object of meditation. He is transported to the psychic sphere, where sun and water, divested of their physical objectivity, become symbols of psychic contents. 75

Without reference to any Buddhist meaning or usage, we are asked to accept Jung's psychological intuition as the key to the text. With this sleight of hand Jung presents us with the unconscious: "Meditation on the meaning of sun and water is therefore something like a descent into the fountainhead of the psyche, into the unconscious itself." 76

Jung fails to acknowledge the fact that the text makes no mention of "psychic contents," and that it nowhere suggests that sun and water are or represent "the foreground of visible appearances." It is difficult to venture any interpretation of this obscure text or its obscure origins, but if the first two meditations are to be understood in terms of traditional Buddhist meditational technique, they are preparatory for the visualizations that follow. They serve as a sort of preparatory kṣṭaṇāyatana (usually known in the West under the Pali name of kasina). That is to say, if we use traditional "Buddhist yoga" as the template for understanding them, the first two "meditations" are not intended as symbols but as technical preparations of the mind, as a means to focus the mind, make it pliable in preparation for the difficult process of visualization. 77 It is also possible to conceive of the visualization of sun or water as focal points of departure for more elaborate visualizations, as is customary in Indian sādhanas. Later in the sutra, the meditator is advised to use one of the thirty-two prominent features, or one of the eighty secondary traits of all buddhas, as a focal point, from which a vision of the other marks will flow naturally. 78

Within the literary and devotional rhetoric of the text, however, the sun has another role. It is also a standard, and rather obvious, figure for the Buddha Amitāyus. In that sense, seeing the disk of the
sun is a guarantee of Amitāyus’s presence and saving grace; visualizing the sun or keeping an afterimage of the sun is synonymous with being saved by the Buddha Amitāyus. Thus, the devotee who repeatedly invokes the name of Amitāyus will thereby expiate the sins of countless past lives, and “as his life comes to an end, will see a golden lotus flower appearing before him like the disk of the sun. Then, in the interval of a single instant of thought, he forthwith attains rebirth inside a lotus flower in the paradise of Amitāyus, the Land of Highest Bliss.”

The bulk of the text is dedicated to a detailed description (or visualization, depending on how one reads the narrative) of this paradisiacal land. Most of the details are borrowed verbatim from earlier sutras, particularly the two Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtras. The source texts for this imagery are not related to yoga or meditation; even if one assumes, with part of the tradition, that a vision of this land is possible through the practice of yoga, we have no early textual key to a putatively “deeper” psychological or philosophical meaning to these images. They stand before us in their bare, but mysterious and powerful, concreteness—there is a Pure Land; it is one among many, although it is clearly the best, and it is like this:

the ground [is] made of lapis lazuli, transparent and shining both within and without. Supporting the ground from below are golden banners, made of diamond and of the seven precious substances. [The shaft of] each banner has eight facets and eight ridges; every facet is made of a hundred jewels; every jewel emits a thousand rays of light; each ray of light has eighty-four thousand colors. When they are reflected on the ground of lapis, they are like a thousand million suns, and it is difficult to see them all one by one. The surface of the ground of lapis is crisscrossed by intertwined golden cords; the seven precious substances form borders that demarcate and divide every section clearly. Each of these [borders of seven] precious substances [displays] rays of lights of five hundred colors; the rays are like flowers, and like the stars and the moon that float in the sky. [These rays] form radiant pedestals on which there are ten million towered-pavilions made of a hundred jewels.

Any interpretation that claims that the imagery of the sutra represents the structure of the psyche would have to account not just for the general, and obvious, spatial distribution of images into up and down, above and below. It must likewise explain the rest of the imagery, the objects and sensory impressions distributed over these spatial confines of up and down, above and below. It cannot afford not to recognize and explain, moreover, that the most significant events take place above, and on high, not below.
By the same token, the symmetry of the Pure Land's layout is constantly broken or complicated by images that beg for an explanation (if one wishes to read the text as an esoteric symbolization of the psyche, that is). Thus, in visualizing the Pure Land, you should see rows of trees:

When you visualize (guan) these trees, see them one by one, and form a mental image of these trees in rows seven deep. Every tree is eight thousand leagues (yojana) high; not a single jewel tree lacks flowers and leaves made of the seven precious substances. Each flower and leaf is the color of a different precious substance. Those that have the color of lapis emit a golden light; those that have the color of crystal emit crimson rays of light; those that have the color of agate emit sapphire rays of light; those that have the color of sapphire, emit rays the color of green pearls. . . . Nets of exquisite pearls are spread over the trees; each tree is covered by seven layers of such nets.

In the midst of each lake there are sixty million lotus flowers, made of the seven precious substances; each lotus flower is perfectly round and twelve leagues wide. A stream of mani jewels flows between the flowers, and rises and falls against the trees. The sound of the [flowing water], melodious and exquisite, proclaims [the truth of] suffering, emptiness, impermanence, and no self, and of the perfections [of the bodhisattva]. [The sound of the water] also extols the [thirty-two prominent] features and [the eighty secondary] traits of all buddhas.82

One could quote the bulk of the sutra and the mystery would continue; any meaning other than the concrete presence of a marvelous land would still escape our grasp. It is only natural that Jung would be captivated by the enigmas of this text. It is not surprising that the text both cast a spell over him and challenged him to find a way to rationalize this mystery. It is almost predictable that he would think of his own theory of mandala symbolism, of individuation and the ego; after all, the text suggests a certain symmetry, a mysteriously ordered space, confined by boundaries that appear to be both protective and integrating. Unfortunately, the text is open to many other plausible interpretations; but, more central to the argument I wish to make, the interpretations of the tradition, ignored by Jung, simply do not suggest any of his psychological meanings.

The sutra itself is crowded with allusions to the tradition Jung does not take into account: the centrality of images of light and of vast, open, cosmic spaces;83 the stereotyped images of colossal buddhas and bodhisattvas, adorned with standard iconographic features;84 the conception of visualization, and invocation of the names, of buddhas and bodhisattvas as a means to erase evil karma and at-
tain supreme bliss; and the explicit establishment of a hierarchy of vision and faith based, not on psychological insight, but on the particular way in which each person is reborn in the Pure Land of Amitāyus.

The most problematic sutra passage for Jung, however, is one that he quotes as “a digression on the fate of the unenlightened,” but which he nevertheless characterizes in the same sentence as a paragraph in which “the Buddha sums up the yoga exercise.” Nowhere does he mention the fact that tradition regards the statements of this paragraph as an alternative path to the same goal that has been promised to those who are able to practice the visualization of the Buddha Amitāyus and his Pure Land. It is a passage where the text speaks about those who Jung seems to neglect—those who simply cannot practice meditation of any kind, let alone yoga:

this person is too tormented by pain, so he will not be able to bring the Buddha to mind. A good friend will [then] say to him: “If you cannot bring the Buddha to mind, you should invoke and take refuge in the Buddha of Immeasurable Life (Amitāyus). Thus, you should single-mindedly call [upon him] uninterruptedly, [even if] you call for [only] ten instances of thought, saying ‘Homage to the Buddha Amitāyus.’” Because he [thus] invokes the Buddha, with every instant of thought [that he does this], he erases all the sins of eighty million cosmic ages.

In this passage we return to Vaidehi’s initial request, her confession of helplessness, and her hope of rebirth in a land free of suffering. This dimension of the sutra—as narrative, as doctrine, as repository of symbols—is ignored by Jung.

Never mind that the remaining symbols and topics of the sutra point away from Jung’s simple structure—that so much remains unexplained: the bodhisattvas in the Pure Land, the ground made of lapis lazuli and crisscrossed with golden lines, the trees made from the seven precious substances. Never mind the fact that this sutra is not about meditating on the meaning of the sun and water (this is Jung’s agenda). Never mind the fact that the sutra never speaks of descent, that the Pure Land is in the West, that this is not a text about dissolving the self into some primal force or fountainhead. In spite of all this, Jung still pursues his goal:

Here then is the great difference between the Eastern and the Western mind [Geist]. It is the same difference we met before: the difference between the high and the low altar. The West is always seeking uplift [Erhebung], but the East seeks sinking or absorption [Versenkung oder Vertiefung]. Outer reality
with its bodiliness and weight appears to take a much stronger and sharper hold \[anzupacken\] on the European than it does on the Indian. Therefore the European seeks to raise himself \[sich \ldots zu erheben\] above the world, while the Indian gladly returns to the maternal depths of Nature.\textsuperscript{89}

Unfortunately for Jung’s fundamental exegetical assumption, nothing in the text suggests absorption into the maternal womb.\textsuperscript{90} Unfortunately for Jung’s theory, the doctrinal conceptions behind this sutra are closely linked to a well-established and important Indian belief in heavenly paradises ("buddha-fields"), and a yearning for transcendence that is better conceived as "uplift" than as a form of sinking. Belief in these paradises is closely connected, through literary motifs and cosmological theories, to a ladder of being, in which spiritual progress is represented by spiritual ascent, purity by images of light and detachment—in short, nothing suggesting sinking, darkness, or the unconscious. Through the motif of the cosmic mountain, the structure and layout of temples and worship sites can also be connected to the cosmology of heavenly paradises. In this complex of images, the paradises are always above, and ascent is still the most common kinesthetic equivalent to spiritual progress and transcendence. The conception of the Pure Land as developed in Central and East Asia (and in the Guan-wuliangshou jing) owes much to the cosmography of these paradises, and their description is often formulated by explicit contrast to the underground hells.\textsuperscript{91}

But there is more to Jung’s analysis of the sutra, because he also uses the text as a pretext for a criticism of the West, as well as a criticism of India. As in his psychological commentary to Evans-Wentz’s Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation, Jung finds fault in the Western incapacity for introspection:

We have an abysmal fear of that lurking horror, our personal unconscious. Hence the European much prefers to tell others "how to do it." That the improvement of the whole begins with the individual, even with myself, never enters our heads. Besides many people think it morbid to glance into their own interiors—it makes you melancholic, a theologian once assured me.\textsuperscript{92}

Still, the key is that the corrective is not in Asia but in the West. Perhaps not in traditional Western religion, philosophy, and psychology, but most definitely in a Jungian psychology that clearly identifies itself as European. This is clear to the point that Western psychology is not only complementary to Asian yoga, it in fact has had the same insights: “I have just said that we have developed nothing that could be compared with yoga. That is not entirely correct. True to our Eu-
european bias, we have evolved a medical psychology dealing specifically with the kleshas. We call it the 'psychology of the unconscious.' ” We must assume that the “kleshas” (Sanskrit kleśa) stand here for the unconscious, specifically the unconscious as that which “contains the source of the instinctual forces of the psyche and [contains as well] the forms or categories that regulate those [forces], namely the archetypes.” Needless to say, this is hardly the meaning of the term in India, much less its meaning in the sutra. Nor is removal of the kleshas the sole goal of yoga, much less the goal of visualizing the Pure Land. The Meditation Sutra in fact does not use the term kleśa (that is, does not use the Chinese equivalent, fannao). Vaidehi seeks release from suffering, pure and simple—from rebirth and karma, as well, of course, but only as a secondary effect of escaping her present suffering at the hands of her cruel son. Her goal is escape to a world of purity, or at least, a perfect vision of such a world. Facing the Buddha, she declares she does not wish to remain in our world,

this defiled and evil world. This defiled and evil place is filled with the denizens of hell, the hungry ghosts, and those reborn in animal forms. . . . I only wish that from now on I do not hear evil words, do not see evil persons. Now, prostrating myself before you, World Honored One, I repent seeking your compassion. For I only desire . . . that you allow me to see a place wherein all acts are perfectly pure. The application of yogic theories of klesha to this religious context is as inappropriate as the interpretation of the resulting vision as a manifestation of an unconscious suppressed or ignored in Western traditions. But the important point to note is the implication of Jung’s twist to the concept of klesha: the implication is obvious, the European (whoever he or she might be) does not need yoga—psychotherapy will serve that role for Europe. But note also that even if we concede that Western psychology deals “specifically with the kleshas,” and even if we concede that this method is comparable to yoga, it seems farfetched to understand yoga, much less the Meditation Sutra, as expounding anything in any way comparable to the techniques and theories of Western psychoanalysis and analytic psychology. This becomes clear when we read on to discover that the technique Jung wants to compare to yoga is Freudian psychoanalysis, which, Jung himself concedes, deals with a topic about which the sutra is silent! “The movement inaugurated by Freud recognized the significance of the human shadow-side and its influence on consciousness, and then got entangled in this problem. Freudian psy-
chology is concerned with the very thing that our text passes over in silence and assumes is already dealt with.” If the text “passes over in silence” the shadow, and the unconscious, how can we know that it “assumes [this] is already dealt with”? And if the text does not address these two key principles of analytic psychology, how can Jung say later that there is a “remarkable agreement between the insights of yoga and the results of psychological research”?

The silence is explained away by arguing that the yogi “knows nothing of the moral conflict which the kleshas represent for us” Westerners. The absence of this conflict (which Jung would have recognized had he looked more closely at the frame story of the sūtra) is presumably an indication of the capacity of the yogin to take that additional step that the Westerner can only take through psychology, but skipping an important dimension of the process of individuation. This is the step into the structure of the unconscious. This structure Jung finds in the latticed floor of lapis lazuli, which, as we might have guessed, is understood by Jung as a sort of mandala, but as a mandala not in any technical Indian sense, but rather in a Jungian technical sense:

Our Western psychology has, in fact, got as far as yoga in that it is able to establish scientifically a deeper layer of unity in the unconscious. It is true that the mythological motifs whose presence has been demonstrated by the exploration of the unconscious, form in themselves a multiplicity, but this culminates in a concentric or radial ordering [ordering of these motifs], which constitutes the true center or essence of the collective unconscious. On account of the remarkable agreement between the insights of yoga and the results of psychological research, I have chosen for this central symbol the Sanskrit term “mandala,” which means “circle.”

Without considering the shape, organization, and traditional interpretations of Buddhist mandalas (which may or may not follow the stereotypical layout of Jungian mandalas), much less of Pure Land mandalas (which, needless to say, never follow the layout of Jungian mandalas), and without considering the layout of the Pure Land suggested by the sūtra, Jung begs the question of a “remarkable agreement between the insights of yoga and the results of psychological research.”

This is not to say that the Pure Land, or a yogi’s samādhi, cannot be conceived as a protected sacred space, a temenos. I do not wish to minimize Jung’s insight into the connection between religious space and selfhood. The object of my criticism is the claim implicit in two key phrases of the previous quotation: (1) that “Western psychol-
ogy has, in fact, got as far as yoga,” and (2) that there is “remarkable agreement between the insights of yoga and the results of psychological research.” These conclusions do not follow from our sutra, nor, in fact, from Jung’s analysis of the sutra. One can even detect Jung’s own hesitation throughout the paper. It is particularly acute when, towards the end of the essay, he tries to force the image of the Buddha sitting in a lotus flower into his concept of the mandala. He realizes that there is no magic circle in the sutra, so he has to fall back on his theory of the mandala (circle) as a variant of the cross (embodiment of quaternity), then he free-associates from the Pure Land to the Christian cross and the swastika.

But, I would argue, this is not simply a hesitation resulting from poor scholarship—it is more of a shift at the service of a different kind of hesitation, an ambivalence arising from a quest for self-confirmation. In this, and the other related essays—especially since they are about the exotic other—one discovers the ambivalences of Jung’s vision of himself and the twentieth-century West. What Jung calls the third, and present, stage in the development of Western civilization, the “psychological stage,” appears on the one hand as a tantalizing, and only lightly disguised, expression of human yearning for the exotic and the mysterious. It is not so much a psychological transcendence of religious authority and scientific detachment as a new mystification of both religious and scientific authority. But the concept of a psychological stage of human civilization also places Jung at the center of this new age. Although Indian yoga is the pre-text, there is still room for Jung’s own vision of Western religion and culture. For we may also say that the authority established or revealed by the study of “other people’s myths” is the authority of the integration and confirmation of one’s own self. “Eastern thought” appears as a pretext—or rather, as ex post facto confirmatory “data”—for a self-concept.

It is of course possible to do the opposite, to rely on Jung’s authority to reestablish or claim the authority of an Asian religious tradition. In an ironic twist to “Orientalism,” Buddhism and yoga become methods of psychic healing, “in the Jungian sense,” for those who would adopt Asian religious practices. The Asian practice is reconceived and appropriated through the lens of a reconception and appropriation of Jungian ideas. The fundamental assumption that “if we wish to understand at all, we can do so only in the European way” had been implicitly accepted even in Asia itself. But the idea that the European way has to be Jung’s psychology, or that his psychology is somehow a privileged way of looking outside Europe,
would eventually be adopted by many seeking a way of reconstructing a broken Western identity with pieces from Asia and Western psychology.

The contortions to which one must submit the idea of culture and self in order to appropriate these two alien authorities, Asia’s and Jung’s, are exemplified by a text from the plethora of writings on Jung and Asian religion. By way of illustration I have chosen one author, both for her clarity and her sincerity. Radmila Moacanin’s *Jung’s Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism: Western and Eastern Paths to the Heart* instances both the profound personal significance attributed to the combined appropriation of Jungian and Asian authority, and the intellectual difficulties inherent in such attempts.104

In a triple take on Buddhism, Jung, and Jung’s own Western source of authority (here assumed to be Gnosticism), Moacanin states unambiguously, “It appears quite obvious that Buddhist and Gnostic Christian symbols express the same inner experiences and, whether the disciple adopts one or the other, the essential quest for meaning and spatial and temporal transcendence is the same.” 105 But this leveling of voices is perhaps meant to give as much authority to particular (if not individual) Western habits and attitudes as it is meant to maintain a triple standard of authority. Thus, in a much modified version of Jung’s caveat to the Western practitioner of Asian meditation, the author adopts the protean authoritative voice of “the Tibetan Buddhist,” and affirms that Tibetan Buddhists urge Westerners not to abandon the values of their own culture. In fact a proper understanding of one’s own culture and being deeply rooted in it—they would say—is a prerequisite for venturing into and benefiting from practices of a foreign tradition. There is also always the danger of grasping the literal rather than the intrinsic meaning of symbols and rituals, and thereby going astray and getting lost in one’s practices.106

One may ask then: Why study Tibetan Buddhism at all? The answer appears to be: Because Western values are after all lacking in some fundamental sense (an interesting use of Jung’s rhetoric). As Moacanin explains,107 Tibetan notions of the degenerate age can be compared with Western notions of the crisis of the twentieth century. Echoing Jung, and Buddhism, she suggests that the solution is some kind of self-liberation; then she adds that,

*According to Jung*—and this is the same idea that Tibetan Buddhists are proposing—the change must begin with individuals, in their own psyche, their greatest instrument. *To Jung* that implies self-knowledge, knowing the
dark side of the psyche, the unconscious as well as its conscious aspects, and to reconcile the polarities. . . . “Action comes from right thinking, and . . . there is no cure and no improving of the world that does not begin with the individual himself,” says Jung. The right action and right thinking, is that not what Buddha taught 2500 years ago?108

The rhetorical question “is that not what Buddha taught 2500 years ago?” asks us to agree. It is an interesting echo of Jung’s own question, “After all, why should not the Buddha be right too?”—except that Jung expresses ambivalence. What to do then with Jung’s own ambivalence, if not suspicion, towards the practice of Indian yoga (which for him included fundamentally all forms of Indian spirituality)? Moacanin replies, “Jung suspected that Westerners’ attempt at detachment as a way of liberation, which they learned from yogic practices, was only a way of liberation from moral responsibilities.”109 Then, without any transition that may suggest to us the logic of the surface argument or the underlying text, Moacanin presents her argument for restoring Buddhism to a position of authority, for Westerners as well as for Asians, and notwithstanding Jung’s reservations: “Buddhism is one of the most highly developed ethical as well as psychological systems. Ethical issues and individual responsibility are always and without exception an integral part of its philosophy and practice. The rule applies to all schools and of course to Tantric Buddhism as well.”110 Although this assertion does not quite address the issues raised by Jung (whatever their historical, philological, ethnographic, and psychological merits may be), statements of this sort serve a rhetorical function. They advocate a particular interpretation of Jung as a normative standard for Buddhist orthodoxy and orthopraxis. But they also neutralize Jung’s own ambivalence, silence his own claim to authority. They serve to neutralize the ambiguity of others, the uncertain authority of others, Moacanin included, of course, but that of her readers as well.

Ironically this is the most common application of Jung’s views to the interpretation of “Oriental” materials. Jung’s text provides, in spite of itself, and pace Jung himself, the authority for appropriating Asian religious ideas. In a twist of poetic justice, Jung’s writings have paid the price of appropriating authority—the appropriated voice comes back with a new life of its own. There is no reason why this should not be so. Perhaps this is the functional definition of a classic: a text that is no longer read in its contexts yet forever retains its authority. But in the present context both Buddha and Jung embody the classical text. There is also no reason why the historian should ap-
point himself as the guardian of Jungian orthodoxy, or as a detached and informed fundamentalist. The point here is of a different sort. The question is, what do we learn from all of this?

The first point of interest is that Moacanin cannot be faulted for doing just what Jung did: validating the self by borrowing the authoritative presence (and occasionally, the voice) of an other that is in part authoritative because it is a distant other—distant in time, space, or culture. In an interesting turn to the common human obsession with distant origins and authoritative primary texts, where classics meet scripture, some of us, born within a Western tradition of one kind or another, have seen it fit to draw upon the authority of a distant culture's distant past. Others, coming originally from a non-Western tradition, or returning to the modern West after an incursion into a non-Western tradition, seek a new, presumably Western, perhaps scientific, validation of the authority they have derived from a non-Western past. In the examples treated in this chapter, the first kind of seeker seeks to discover self in Asian Buddhism or yoga, the second seeks to discover Asia in Jung.

Perhaps we may see even Jung as returning to the West, to an authority that is only disguised as objective science, and that ultimately is Jung's own private religion. In "the East," "exotic" and "strange" as it may be, I see myself. Insofar as the reflection is accurate, I praise the original. Insofar as it appears distorted, I blame the mirror. My quest for the authority of the self requires that I see myself in the other—reflected, never distorted. Yet, the image is by necessity distorted, otherwise it would lack its persuasiveness, its conviction, its authority—otherwise it would be too obviously an extension of the self. The other serves to confirm the familiar, and perhaps make familiar what at first seemed strange (Freudian drives tamed within the structures of individuation; "bizarre" and "incredible" Indian myths and rituals transmuted by the alchemy of theory).

Though some may resist this reading, I believe Jung was much more candid about this than we give him credit for. Thus, in what I believe is one of his least ambiguous statements, the Jung-Jaffé memoirs reminisce:

By that time I had read a great deal about Indian philosophy and religious history, and was deeply convinced of the value of Oriental wisdom. But I had to travel in order to form my own conclusions, and remained within myself like a homunculus in the retort. India affected me like a dream, for I was and remained in search of myself, of the truth peculiar to myself.111

In another moment of great insight and honesty Jung recognizes that
he was not seeing India's dream, but his own: "Life in India has not yet withdrawn into the capsule of the head. It is still the whole body that lives. No wonder the European feels dreamlike: the complete life of India is something of which he merely dreams." If he could have only prefaced the first two sentences with the same self-awareness expressed in the last sentence! Perhaps with a simple "In my own dreams: Life in India has not. . . ." But Jung's conscious dreaming only took him further away from India. It was his last dream in India, which he recognizes as a turning point (away from India). His own conclusions read:

Imperiously, the dream wiped away all the intense impressions of India and swept me back to the too-long-neglected concerns of the Occident, which had formerly been expressed in the quest for the Holy Grail as well as in the search for the philosopher's stone. I was taken out of the world of India, and reminded that India was not my task, but only a part of the way—admittedly a significant one—which should carry me closer to my goal. It was as though the dream were asking me, "What are you doing in India? Rather seek for yourself and your fellows the healing vessel, the servator mundi, which you urgently need. For our state is perilous; you are all in imminent danger of destroying all that centuries have built up."

Jung seems to recover a sense of cultural belonging, and a sense of mission. The key symbol in the dream is the Holy Grail, the unum vas, which would suggest that Jung has also become aware of his role as healer. His concepts of unity (such as individuation, the temenos, and quaternity) are seen as the una medicina and unus lapis of the alchemist. But the dream, and its interpretation, if they occurred in 1938 as they were later recollected circa 1961, did not keep Jung from attempting many other incursions into Orientalism during the following years. His insight does not lead him far enough to also question his use of India and Indian sources as corroboration of his own ideas.

That he was not able to take his reflections beyond this point may be attributable to Jung's own ambiguous tolerance (which I believe is amply demonstrated by the foregoing analysis), but may reflect two historical circumstances: the decline of Western colonialism, and the attempt to understand this decline in terms of nineteenth-century Orientalism. In the memoirs we find a passage that illustrates these two reasons for the persistence of Jung's Orientalist speculations. The passage shows at one level the facility with which Jung identifies his own emotion and thought with the thought of others, and is able to live within the resulting contradictions. But
this segment also shows the extent to which he was still indebted, at another level, to the legacy of Orientalism:

The intensity of my emotion showed that the hill of Sanchi meant something central to me. A new side of Buddhism was revealed to me. I grasped the life of the Buddha as the reality of the self which had broken through and laid claim to a personal life. For Buddha, the self stands above all gods, a unus mundus which represents the essence of human existence and of the world as a whole. . . . Buddha saw and grasped the cosmogonic dignity of human consciousness; for that reason he saw clearly that if a man succeeded in extinguishing this light, the world would sink into nothingness. Schopenhauer's great achievement lay in his also recognizing this, or rediscovering it independently.\textsuperscript{115}

The Buddha could be right too . . . but only if he agrees with Europe—needless to say, with Jung's Europe. Or, perhaps it is better to say the Buddha's teachings (like alchemy) could become intelligible only if his teachings are those of yoga, and if the teachings of yoga represent at least one aspect of Jungian metapsychology.

In a loose Lacanian sense,\textsuperscript{116} we may speak of a reflection of the self that is genuinely other insofar as it is an image of wholeness representing or integrating the subject's fragmented experience of itself. But we may also see this process as something more than a play of mirrors, as a first step towards listening to the genuinely other. However, insofar as the genuinely other is a force for disintegration, one contains this force by hearing one's own message in the voice of the other. But as the other's voice becomes more clear as that which is not self, one is forced to distance oneself from that voice.\textsuperscript{117}

It is therefore not surprising that Jung would on the one hand praise India, and on the other distance himself from it. For instance, regarding the Buddha's view of illness, Jung said, “In our sphere of culture the suffering and the sick can derive considerable benefit from this prototype of the Buddhist mentality.” But he could not avoid a qualifying clause, adding “however strange it may appear.”\textsuperscript{118} Although he recognized the extent to which a religious tradition can be critical or even intrusive in its own culture of origin, and hence the diversity of the voices that constitute a culture's imagination, Jung persisted in hearing single voices. Thus, Jung insisted in distancing himself, and the West, from Indian “introversion”—overlooking what was not introversion in India and what was introversion in the West and in Jung himself. Yet, at the same time, he praised the value of Indian “yoga”—in Jung's usage referring to an “introverted” practice.
Jung’s occasional exaggerated admiration for Asia, his mystification of Asian religions (and, for that matter, of religion in general), combined with his suspicion of what is not Western, and his insistence on being Western, all epitomize the problems of confronting the other, problems that we have not outgrown despite our methodological sophistication. It is easy to find fault with Jung’s mystification of Asia. Many would do so today, and I have done likewise in this chapter. Perhaps some would find fault with the other side of his ambivalence—his reluctance to give up his self-image as a stereotypical Westerner, rational, extroverted, life-affirming. Criticizing either side is not such a difficult task. Suggesting how it could be possible to encounter self and other without falling into either of these extremes is not so simple a task. Jung’s ambivalence is understandable and predictable, given Jung’s Zeitgeist (which included, among other things, National Socialism, the discovery of the unconscious, and disillusion with the scientific West). But it is so in retrospect. Lacking such a vantage point on our own ambiguities, it is difficult to see as far as we can see when we look at Jung and his times; yet our situation might not be that different. We can find fault with each one of the stones that form Jung’s mandala wall, but we cannot exculpate ourselves of forming similar walls.

We should ask, therefore, what defines the Orientalist bias, and the unavowed colonial stance, in Jung’s writings on Asia as exemplified by “The Psychology of Eastern Meditation.” This stance is clearly outlined in the three movements of recognition, appropriation, and distancing. The European maintains his control over Asia first by conceding authority to the alien culture, then by assuming that authority for himself, and last by asserting the difference that separates him from the other.

One must wonder, however, how much “colonialism” there always is in all attempts to understand and communicate, let alone appropriate. To what extent do we appropriate (or is it misappropriate) the authority of the traditions and texts we study? I would argue we do so even as we assume the now common scholarly posturing of neutrality, of avoiding questions of judgment and value. All of us aspiring scholars must heed the danger signs of crypto-Orientalism—the willingness to bask in the glory of our texts and then use them to our own ends, the desire to tell our subjects what they really think, and the compulsion to deny any sympathetic involvement. After all, where shall we draw the line between an interesting theoretical formulation and a cultural reductionism, between understanding critically and the misunderstandings of criticism? Or, what seems to me more
problematic, where do we draw the line between (1) repeating, albeit respectfully, a tradition, (2) viewing it critically and creatively, and (3) appropriating an “alien” culture through a construct from one’s own culture.

The outlines of the Orientalist fallacy that can be recognized in Jung’s essay may serve as a warning to ourselves, but this does not preclude us from a critical look at his views. If he is to be censured it is for his willingness to take up the authority of the tradition only to use this new-found authority to claim a privileged access to the tradition, and then finally to deny others access to that same tradition. Also problematic is Jung’s capacity to transform sacred, and communal authority, into secular, and individual authority. Somehow the sacredness of the original is lost, or, rather, is not even acknowledged. Similarly, the unique characteristics of the culture of origin are lost. Even as Jung draws a sharp dividing line between East and West, he erases the idiosyncrasies of his text, and ignores the variety of traditions of exegesis and praxis that form the context of his source text in Asian cultures.

The shortcomings in Jung’s Orientalism reflect, unavoidably, the ambiguities of all European encounters with non-Europeans (xenophobia mixed with xenophilia), but these are ambiguities confronted by any self encountering an other. They can be recognized, for instance, in the reaction of the colonized to the colonizer (as in Latin American perceptions of America and Europe), or in relationships with more complex power differentials (as in Japanese perceptions of America and Europe). If we restrain our impulse to feel superior to Jung and his times, to a Swiss under the spell of Vienna, Benares, and Berlin, if we restrain our delusions of being free from the perils of “colonialism” and “Orientalism,” we may be able to discover in Jung’s personal quest and in his theoretical efforts to make sense of human religiosity our own efforts at making sense of the self and the other—the self being present not only in a mythical “inside,” but in the strangest of others, and the other being present not only in distant lands, but in the most intimate recesses of our mind. In a generous reading of Jung, allowing for every reasonable doubt, one must wonder if his ambivalence is not of one piece with the ambivalence that accompanies every encounter with the other.

Moreover, to personalize this critique, one must wonder if his ambivalence is not of one piece with the ambivalence that must accompany every honest attempt to practice the cure of souls in general. This raises one last doubt regarding Jung and our judgment of his Orientalism, for Jung’s claims to an authoritative voice have still two
other, closely related dimensions. First, to claim authority from yoga
is also to claim authority for the personal unconscious (abstract and
disembodied as the notion may be, it is safe to assume that the con-
cept resonates with something that was for Jung very personal and
conflictive) by transforming it into a collective unconscious (exotic
yet near). In a certain manner of speaking, he must wrestle away and
gain possession of this power of the unconscious, so similar to the
power of spirits that possess human hearts and minds. This implies a
second dimension of Jung’s claim on authority: to return to a topic
already mentioned earlier in this essay, Jung is not only a scholar of
texts and symbolism, he is also a healer. As such, his claim on author-
ity competes with the claims of other healers, and with the claims of
the spirits that possess the sick (so that his claim also competes with
the patient’s claims to an authoritative perception of the world and
his or her own person). Jung’s predicament is thus that of a not-so-
hypothetical shaman confronted with new spirits and new healers.
He must defeat them and wrestle away their power. Jung must lay
claim to the wisdom of the Buddha, and then something more.

The Spanish explorer Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, lost among
the tribes of the North American Gulf Coast, found himself forced to
accept not only new languages and customs but new forms of heal-
ing. If we are to believe his own account, he became an ac-
complished shaman, healing even those patients that his Native-
American counterparts could not heal. He even claims to have
brought a dead young woman back to life! His life has been idealized,
by Todorov, and more recently in a film by Echevarría, making him an
early anticolonialist and multiculturalist. His own words are much
more ambivalent: even as he cured by the traditional laying of hands
he had learned from his Native-American teachers, he recited contin-
uous Hail Marys to insure the success of his efforts. It is of course
difficult to tell how much of this is rhetoric meant to please the au-
thorities in Spain (his subsequent difficulties with the crown and the
Inquisition suggest that he may have been in fact much more of a maver-
erick than his words reveal). But his account is a marvelous example
of the press to appropriate the authority of competing healing (and
spiritual) powers at the meeting point of cultures, that is, at the meet-
ing point of powerful, and potentially destructive, social and political
forces.

I suggest that Jung is engaging in a similar attempt. This at-
tempt is required by the demands of language (that we speak within
our own language), and by the general demands of cultural conflict
and exchange. But the urge to place appropriation and supersession
before acceptance and understanding is especially acute, and problematic, in the art of psychic healing, where one is asked to put a broken mind back together again. Here the thing to be restored is by definition an entity of one’s own culture, healed through the power of one’s own language, restored to a place in one’s own society. Yet, the claim is that we are restoring or recovering much more than that. The healer aspires to restore the whole person, the real and good self, a self that would be regarded as real and good anywhere and at any time (something analogous to what used to be called “the saved soul”); hence, confronted with new or foreign healing techniques and claims of healing power, the healer is driven to displace or conquer, detract or appropriate, this new power.

This press comes naturally, perhaps unavoidably, and with it come the problems associated with claims to truth and authority: At which point does the exercise of healing authority become only an exercise in authority? Or, what is even more interesting: Could it be that by virtue of our drive to defeat or conquer we concede power to a system presumed to compete with ours so that we empower that system beyond its real powers? In other words, in attempting to appropriate the power of yoga, Jung turns it into a healing art. On the one hand, this disarms yoga, placing it within a realm in which Jung feels competent and authorized. On the other hand, it empowers yoga by turning it into a potential equal of Western psychology, by giving it an authority it did not have in the realm of Western religious, as well as psychological, discourse. I read Jung as attempting the former, but in doing so he also achieved the latter. As many of his admirers contend, Jung has in fact empowered Asian religious traditions generally, the inaccuracy of his generalizations turning into a blanket blessing. Both movements illustrate the complexities of the process of appropriating and distancing; both are dimensions of an Orientalism which, together with its corresponding Occidentalism, refuses to die.

NOTES

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:


GW  *Gesammelte Werke.* (1958–).

MS  *Meditation Sutra,* printed in the first volume of the *Collected Sacred Texts of Pure Land Buddhism* (Shinshū seikyō zensho) (Kyoto, 1941).

1. C. G. Jung, *Die Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge* (Zürich: Rascher, 1932/1948), p. 7. This pamphlet contains the text of a lecture delivered before the Alsatian Pastoral Conference, Strasbourg, May, 1932 (Alssässischen Pastoralkonferenz zu Straßburg). It was first translated into English in 1933. The Hull translation appears in “Psychotherapists or the Clergy,” *CW,* 11, §490–91. Most references to the works of Carl Jung are to the paragraph numbering followed in both the German *Gesammelte Werke* (abbreviated GW) and in the English standard edition published in the Bollingen Series as *Collected Works* (abbreviated CW). But some materials are either not found in these two collections or not available to me. Whenever I have felt necessary to deviate from the standard English translation or to quote from the original German, I have included the reference to the German edition I have consulted (with paragraph numbers in the text of GW, if they do not agree with those of CW, and with page numbers whenever the GW version was not available to me)—thus, a reference to the most widely used English version is always provided, even when I quote or translate the German. In the above quotation, I have modified slightly Hull’s rendering on the basis of Jung, *Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge* (1932), which is not divided by paragraphs, hence the double reference—page number to the German, paragraph to the English version in CW. The textual history of Jung’s works presents interesting challenges. His corpus has been treated as a canon, and therefore is usually presented as an integral presentation of a timeless truth. See the observations of P. Homans, *Jung in Context: Modernity and the Making of Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 27–28, regarding the limitations of the *Collected Works* as valid source for the study of the evolution of Jung’s though, and on the problem with the editing and revision of Jung’s works. I have made no attempt to systematically check originals or systematically review the textual history of the Jungean canon as it now exists in the “authoritative” English versions.

2. Jung, *Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge* (“Psychotherapists or the Clergy”), pp. 20–21; *CW,* 11, §516. The word translated as “justification” by Hull is *Daseinsberechtigung,* i.e., the psychological “legitimation for their existence,” or more generally, their psychological raison d’être.

3. Jung’s expressed sympathies for Christianity are no secret. His was, however, a churchless (or shall we say private?) Christianity, very much like his Buddhism was a very private, a distant, and cautious Buddhism. His
Christianity was also colored by his reading in, and fondness for, alchemical esotericism. Homans comments on Jung’s “repudiation” of Christianity, while recognizing that his psychology of religion has “a distinctly Christian cast” (Homans, Jung in Context, pp. 186–87).

4. J. J. Clarke, In Search of Jung: Historical and Philosophical Enquires (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 87. Wehr, who recognizes Jung’s role in the development of a Western awareness of Asian culture and spirituality, and defends him against those who regard him as “a superficial champion of the Eastern approach,” concedes nevertheless that Jung’s treatment of alternative traditions is generally indiscriminate (Gerhard Wehr, An Illustrated Biography of C. G. Jung, trans. from the German by Michael H. Kohn [Boston: Shambhala, 1989], pp. 83, 87). This concession, however, is only with regards to Western traditions: “It is impossible to ignore certain criticisms of his judgment of the spiritual paths known in his time. . . . [The] religious teaching of the West are, with the exception of late medieval alchemy, often thrown together in an undiscriminating fashion. . . . This indiscriminate lumping together is regrettable.” (Wehr, An Illustrated Biography of C. G. Jung, p. 87). Wehr assumes that Jung’s treatment of Asian traditions is more discriminate, a contention that I challenge in this chapter—although this is a point that needs to be argued only for those unfamiliar with the religious traditions of Asia.

5. For example, Wehr, An Illustrated Biography of C. G. Jung, pp. 83–84.

6. The concept of “psychic factor” is not one of Jung’s major technical terms, but “the psyche” is a key concept. He uses the words Psyche and Seele interchangeably.

7. Jung, Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge (“Psychotherapists or the Clergy”), p. 23; CW, 11, §519. The passage in question is nevertheless ambiguous: “This is why I consistently regard the religious problems that the patient presents to me as authentic and as possible causes of the neurosis.” (“Deshalb nehme ich die religiösen Probleme, die mir der Patient vorlegt, durchaus als eigentlich und als mögliche Ursache der Neurose.”) The italics are, of course, my own, and highlight a term left out in Hull’s translation.

8. It is also easy to pick at this or that ambiguous statement of Jung to show his Nazi sympathies. Without denying the validity of these efforts, and without suggesting that his ambivalence is anything less than disturbing, I will not focus on this issue in the present chapter, mentioning the Nazi connection only where relevant to my argument (see n. 20 below).


10. The German text accessible to me (Jung, Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge, 1932) is in the form of a pamphlet published in 1948 by Rascher Verlag, Jung’s publisher in Zürich. Since this publication dates its copyright as 1932, I assume it is a reprint of the original version. I was not able to obtain a copy of the version in GW.


13. It is difficult to defend Jung’s claims regarding the function of religion and the religious specialist, if these claims are taken at face value.

14. Needless to say, Jung’s conceptions of nosology and pathology would be considered dated by most mental health scientists today regardless of their positions in the nature-nurture and pill-talk controversies. See also n. 17.


16. Ibid.

17. Jung’s position on the ontological status of the psyche and on the referentiality of language in the talking cure is not easily characterized. Perhaps it can be described as vacillating, perhaps as subtle and complex. To be fair to him, one must also consider statements in which he seems to undo his implicit ontological claims. The claim can be detected in key phrases, such as, “the psyche as a mental substance” ("Die Seele als eine geistige Substanz"—in his translation, Hull places the word “substance” in quotation marks). In the same essay, however, Jung backtracks, albeit with some hesitation, suggesting first that the psyche is perhaps not a substance, and then that psychotherapeutic discourse is a kind of fiction:

> Organic therapy in principle fails completely in the treatment of neuroses, while psychic methods cure them, just as if these psychic methods were glandular extracts. So far, then, as our present knowledge goes, neuroses are to be influenced or cured by approaching them not from the proximal end, i.e., from the functioning of the glands, but from the distal end, i.e., from the psyche, just as if the psyche were itself a substance. For instance, a suitable explanation or a comforting word to the patient can have something like a healing effect which in the end may even influence the glandular secretions. The doctor’s words, to be sure, are only vibrations in the air, yet their special quality is due to a particular psychic state in the doctor. His words are effective only in so far as they convey a meaning [Sinn] or have significance [Bedeutung]. . . . But “meaning” is something mental or spiritual [ein geistiges Etwas]. Call it a fiction if you like. Nevertheless this fiction enables us to influence the course of the disease far more effectively than we could with chemical preparations. Indeed, we can even influence the biochemical processes of the body. . . . Fictions, illusions, opinions are perhaps the most intangible and unreal things we can think of; yet they are the most effective of all in the psychic and even the psychophysical realm. (Jung, *Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge* ["Psychotherapists or the Clergy"], pp. 9–10; CW, 11, §494).

In this quotation I have changed Hull’s English only in a few instances (italicized above), where I though he glossed over important nuances, ambiguities, and contradictions. I have retained as much of his translation as possible, first, because his English is usually much more elegant than mine, and, second, and more importantly in terms of my argument, to highlight the differences between his interpretation and mine. I have not consulted the
translation of Dell and Bayes, which was consulted by Hull, so I cannot de-
terminate how much of Hull’s interpretation is original to him.

18. Jung, Beziehungen der Psychotherapie zur Seelsorge (“Psycho-
therapists or the Clergy”), p. 21; CW, 11, §516; italics mine.

19. Ibid.

20. At the risk of beating a dead horse . . . I wish to note that Jung’s
detractors as well as his defenders seem to conceive of Jung’s putative Nazi
sympathies as a question of guilt hinging on an ahistorical, clear, moral
choice between total culpability and acquiescence on the one hand, and total
moral purity and radical opposition on the other. But if one considers the
limited range of choices open to an individual given his or her own historical
circumstance, the matter cannot be decided either way other than to say that
Jung’s position could never be presented as a paragon to be emulated, but
that his role was evidently not one of a collaborator. I cannot agree either
with Rosenzweig’s claim that Jung had read and borrowed ideas from Mein
Kampf (Saul Rosenzweig, Freud, Jung, and Hall the King-Maker: The His-
toric Expedition to America (1909) [Seattle: Hogrefe & Huber Publishers,
1992], pp. 70–77). This is not to say that we can be sure he did not read it;
but his preconceptions about the Jewish race reflected prejudices available to
most German speakers (including Hitler and Jung) through a vast anti-
Semitic literature whose themes were several centuries old. Jung’s sense of
racial superiority was, to say the least, nuanced by his own struggle to under-
stand the non-European, and the non-Germanic, but his “Aryan pride” was
rooted not on a conscious racist stance, but on an unconscious participation
in the collective history of European colonialism and ethnocentrism—a his-
tory that included at the individual level a strong sense of identification with
a grandfather active in the pan-German movement. The problem with Jung’s
blindness to the evils of Nazism is not very different from the problem of the
whole world’s blindness, but can hardly be classified as collaboration. The
fact that he evidently expected in the early days of the war that something
good could come out of Nazism, however, is another matter, and shows
Jung’s very own dark side (his “shadow”), a point conceded by his defenders.
Perhaps, Jung’s position vis-à-vis Nazi Germany is best understood as equiv-
ocation, or from a more charitable and humane perspective, as naïveté,
ambivalence, and doubt. But it took him surprisingly long to come to his
senses, and when he finally did, he never quite interpreted the meaning of this
dark fantasy of his. The problem with his subsequent, and belated, retrac-
tion, however, is not so much that his words were long overdue by the time he
pronounced them, but that his words were not as forceful and plainspoken as
the situation required. After all, to refer to his previous indifference by simply
saying, “Well, I slipped up,” as he is reported to have said to Rabbi Leo Baek
in 1946 (G. Scholem, in Aniela Jaffé, From the Life and Work of C. G. Jung,
been able to check the original German, published as Aus Leben und
Werkstatt von C. G. Jung: Parapsychologie, Alchemie, Nationalsozialismus,
Erinnerungen aus den letzten Jahren [Zürich: Rascher & Cie, AG, 1968]),
implies that even after the war he did not quite grasp the magnitude of what

Even Jaffé, who has made one of the honest attempts to defend Jung (From the Life and Work [1971], pp. 78–98), concedes (p. 88) that Jung "set his hopes on a fruitful development in Germany [under National Socialism], and that he was willing to give National Socialism a chance in its early days."

21. An extreme version of this position can be seen in Rieff's claim (Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966], p. 87) that there is a sharp distinction between a so-called therapy of commitment, which Rieff says belongs "to the religious category of cure: that of souls," and, on the other hand, a scientific psychotherapy, which is purportedly more "modest," and gives "men that power of insight which would increase their power to choose," but with "no intention of telling them what they ought to choose."

I am not arguing that empirical science is ever purely empirical, much less neutral, but that Jung used the myth of science as a source of authority for his own views without fully acknowledging both the limitations of science and the constraints of science as intellectual ideal.


23. Jung, like many after him, may have overreacted to Freud's facile rationalism, forcing himself then to walk the thin line between psychological explanation and psychological reductionism. Some of the difficulties of this position have been explored perceptively by Robert A. Segal in several essays reprinted in his collection Religion and the Social Sciences: Essays on the Confrontation, Brown Studies in Religion, no. 3 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), especially in "Erik Erikson: Psychologist or Historian of Religion?" (pp. 63–66) and "The Social Sciences and the Truth of Religious Belief" (pp. 75–86). See also the opening sections of C. G. Jung, "Psychological Commentary on The Book of the Great Liberation," CW, 11, §760–63. This article was written in 1939, but no published until 1954, in W. Y. Evans-

24. C. G. Jung, “what india can teach us,” CW, 10, §1003. This short essay was originally published in English in Asia 39, no. 2 (1939): 97–98.


27. On this trip to America, see Jung and Jaffe, Memories, dreams, reflections (1961/73), pp. 247–53—on his earlier, and more famous trip, to America, see Rosenzweig, freud, jung, and hall the king-maker. His first trip to Africa was in fact to north Africa in 1920, the second to Kenya in 1925 (Jung and Jaffe, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1961/73), pp. 238–46, 253–71).


29. The two short quotations, from Jung and Jaffe, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1961/73), pp. 284, 282, are presented in the context of Jung’s recollections from his 1938 trip to India. They are memories at least twenty years old, and may be more in the nature of confabulations or reconstructions (as so many human memories are). Nevertheless, this account of his trip is consistent with many of the ideas he expressed about India and the East in the essays referenced in n. 26. above, especially the short articles published in 1939, shortly after his trip to India. For more extensive quotations from this crucial passage in Jung and Jaffe, see the conclusion to the present chapter.

30. Jung refers to Tao (Dao) as a Chinese symbol for the middle way already in Psychologische Typen (Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1921), pp. 229–33, trans. and rev. R. F. C. Hull in CW, 6, 1971, pp. 214–18, §358–70). His main source appears to have been Deussen’s history of philosophy, but the English translation makes generous use of Waley’s translation of the Dao De Jing (Arthur waley, trans., The Way and its power [London: Allen & Unwin, 1935]). The German version of Psychologische Typen was subsequently published, with an appendix, as “9. revidierte Auflage,” GW, 6, 1960 (= Eng. CW, 6, §§[401–20]. I have used the German 9th ed., and the English paperback 9th printing of 1990, which is a reprint of Hull’s 1971 revisions.

32. The goal of the Seminars was stated in the first of the Jahrbücher, which was devoted to “Yoga und Meditation im Osten und im Westen”: “The Eranos Seminars have set as their goal a mediation between East and West. The challenge of this ideal of mediation, and the need to create a place where such an understanding could take place in the intellectual and spiritual realms (auf geistigen Gebieten), had always been clear to us. And so, after some years, was born the meeting hall at Eranos” (*EJ* 1 [1934]:5). The Seminars, more appropriately “Conferences” (*Tagungen*), were founded by Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn (1881–1962), who convened the Seminars at the Casa Eranos, a retreat she had constructed next to her villa in Moscia, near Ascona, on Lake Maggiore, near the Swiss-Italian border. Seminars were often held in the garden, and occasionally at Fröbe’s villa, called Casa Gabriella. The first of the Eranos Seminars was held in 1933. The proceedings were published a year later as the first *Eranos Jahrbuch*. In addition to Jung himself, the seminar had six participants: three scholars were specialists in Western religion, the other three were the distinguished Orientalists Heinrich Zimmer (Heidelberg), C. A. F. Rhys Davids (Pali Text Society), and Erwin Rouselle (Frankfurt am Main). The meetings continued to be held, and the series continued to be published, uninterruptedly until 1969, eight years after Jung’s death.

33. The mandala is reproduced, with the inscription, in Aniela Jaffé, ed., *C. G. Jung: Word and Image*, BS, 97, no. 2 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 93; originally published as *C. G. Jung: Bild und Wort* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag Olten, 1977). See also Jung and Jaffé, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (1961/73), pp. 197–98, for a discussion of the dream that led to the mandala, and Jung’s interpretation of the dream. The term synchronicity is, of course, a technical term in Jungian psychology, and appears in quotation marks when it refers, in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, to the events of 1928. The term postdates the event, however, or at least was proposed publicly and formally for the first time long after Wilhelm’s gift—the technical use of the term followed Jung’s work on astrology, and may date from as late as 1951 (see Jung’s “On Synchronicity,” appearing in *EJ* 20, which was published in 1952, but contained papers presented in 1951). The term was proposed as an explanatory category that transcends causality—see, e.g., the two essays “Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle,” and “On the Nature of the Psyche,” in Jung, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, CW, 8, 1960.


35. I have modified the spelling of samsāra to conform to contemporary convention. Jung’s text follows Evans-Wentz in spelling sangsāra.


37. Jung’s view of America is not clear to me. But in general he prefers to contrast Europe (not the West in general) to the East.

39. The present chapter does not allow for a full discussion of Jung's positive contributions to psychology, which I sketch only in contrast to Freud's reluctance to admit an adaptive function to religion. In a certain manner of speaking the strengths and weaknesses of Freud and Jung can be summarized by characterizing Freud as an heir to rationalism and the Enlightenment, and Jung as indebted to his German religious and Romantic legacy. Jung, unlike Freud, was predisposed to recognize the adaptive value of religion, as well as the importance of myth, symbol, and ritual in the process of transformation that he conceived as the generation of a complete and mature individual. This is not to say that because Freud dismissed Jung's understanding of mythology and parapsychology he was completely immune to a similar, not always well-hidden, fascination with the mysterious and the uncanny, a fascination that in both Jung and Freud brings about a certain return of the repressed, a revival of religion and magic under the guise of science. I see this fascination in Freud's view of dreams and the parapraxes, for instance—the return of belief is hidden by displacing (or banishing) trust in hidden powers to the unconscious. But one cannot avoid a feeling of recognition when one reads, for instance, Todorov's description of Spanish reports on Aztec "superstition": "Every event the least bit out of the ordinary, departing from the established order, will be interpreted as the herald of another event, generally an unlucky one, still to come (which implies that nothing in this world occurs randomly). For instance, that a prisoner should become depressed is an evil omen, for the Aztecs did not expect any such thing. Or that a bird should cry out at a specific moment, or a mouse run through the temple, or that one might make a slip of the tongue, or have a certain dream" (Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, trans. R. Howard [New York: Harper & Row, 1984]). We all know, of course, of the séances that fascinated Freud, even as, across the Atlantic, William James was being attracted by similar phenomena.


43. Ibid.


46. I will not attempt to look closely at his many other writings on the subject, some of which deserve a close examination as well, but which are amenable to an analysis similar to the present one (in fact motifs and phrases repeat themselves almost verbatim throughout these essays). Nevertheless, one cannot approach this topic without at least a passing reference to other writings, above all, to the groundbreaking "Commentary on The Secret of the Golden Flower" (first published in German in Munich, 1929; 1st English
edition, 1938; rev. ed., 1962; CW, 13, pp. 1–56). Relevant material can be culled also from other essays written within a span of five years: the “Psychological Commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Dead” (first published in German, 1935; first English version, Oxford, 1957; CW, 11, pp. 509–26); “Yoga and the West” (published as section 3 in the Ramakrishna Centenary Number of Prabuddha Bharata (1936), CW, 11, pp. 529–37); the pointedly titled essay “The Dreamlike World of India,” Asia 39, no. 1 (1939): 5–8, CW, 10, §981-1001; “What India Can Teach Us,” (1939); the “Psychological Commentary on The Book of the Great Liberation” (1939/54); the foreword to Suzuki’s Introduction to Zen Buddhism (originally published in German as a preface to H. Zimmer’s German translation, 1939; 1st English ed., 1949; CW, 11, pp. 538–57). These short writings were followed by “The Psychology of Eastern Meditation” (Zur Psychologie östlicher Meditation) (1943/63); and Jung’s preface to Heinrich Zimmer’s Der Weg zum Selbst: Lehre und Leben des indischen Heiligen Shri Ramana Maharshi aus Tiruvannamalai (Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1944), titled “The Holy Men of India.” Roughly half of these pieces were published as introductions to some of the most popular and influential books on Asian religions by European authors or by Asian authors publishing in English. The genre of these writings, therefore, gave Jung a religious and Asian imprimatur he otherwise would not have, and gave him likewise a strong hold on a particular type of Western Orientalist audience. In a fascinating symbiosis, Jung’s psychology rode the wave of Western fascination with the East even as the East rode on the wave of Western interest in psychology, especially on the wave of psychology as the one substitute for religion that believed itself to be scientifically sanctioned (a shift noted, ironically, by Jung himself).


49. Ibid. Zimmer also worked on the assumption that the gap between East and West could be bridged only by some sort of psychological understanding (Heinrich [Robert] Zimmer, Kunstform und Yoga im indischen Kultbild [Berlin: Frankfurter Verlags-Anstalt AG, 1926], pp. 7–8; reprint, with a preface by Friedrich Wilhelm [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976]; English trans. by G. Chapple and J. B. Lawson, in collaboration with J. M. McNight, Artistic Form and Yoga in the Sacred Images of India [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984]). His work proba-
bly gave Jung the idea that the difference between the two cultural spheres first imagined by Europe (a monolithic East and a monolithic West) could be encapsulated in the contrast between “äußeres Sehen und inneres Schauen” (Zimmer, *Kunstform und Yoga*, p. 45 ff.). Zimmer expended much energy in explaining the obvious presence of an äußeres Sehen in Indian culture by positing, and attempting to demonstrate, the hypothesis that artistic forms in India were projections of an inner or meditational schema (“das innere Schaubild”; Zimmer, *Kunstform und Yoga*, p. 29 ff.). This hypothesis, wholeheartedly adopted by Jung, finds its most extreme expression when Zimmer states categorically that Indian iconography is always a yantra (“Das Kultbild ist ein yantra und nur ein yantra”; Zimmer, *Kunstform und Yoga*, p. 31)—the West produces art, India produces yogic iconography. On Zimmer’s own intellectual development and cultural roots, see Margaret H. Case, ed., *Heinrich Zimmer: Coming into His Own* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). The relative valuation of inner and outer projected by Zimmer, and especially by Jung, on India is of course of Western, especially Christian, origin. The history of “inwardness” in the West has been recently reviewed by Charles Taylor in *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). The inversion of this appraisal of human experience, so that inwardness represents withdrawal and self-centeredness and outwardness represents life affirmation and rationality, is an implicit rejection of spirituality and the inner presence of a light not visible to the senses—it is an affirmation of positive science against faith and contemplative spirituality. This inversion was further heightened by the appearance of “narcissism” (not “egotism,” mind you) as a category of nosology claiming to be devoid of moral or spiritual judgment. The distinction between inner and outer experiences, moreover, is both philosophically and historically problematic, and has been the object of much debate in the philosophy of mind.


51. The etymology of the word “bizarre” is in itself interesting. In English the word means “unconventional, odd,” usually referring to strikingly unconventional behavior or dress, and often associated with the grotesque and the fantastic. It seems to have come into English from French or Italian, where it also means “strange.” The word, however, is a distorted borrowing from Spanish bizarro, which means “brave and gallant” (the Spanish is itself probably from Basque bizar, the beard as a sign of masculine dignity). Behavior that appeared to be gallant and courageous, if not dignified, to a Spaniard, no doubt appeared odd to Frenchmen and Englishmen! . . . Perhaps very much like the elegance of the Kathakali appeared both sub- and superhuman to Jung!


55. Verenkung, like English “absorption” and “trance,” are concepts of Western mysticism and spirituality, not Indian concepts at all. At least in Buddhist meditation theory, a sinking mind is a depressed or sluggish mind (lina-citta), and suffers from one of the so-called defects of meditation. In “Psychology of Eastern Meditation” (Psychologie östlicher Meditation) (1943/63), §911, Jung compares the so-called Western high altar with a putative “alten indischen Tempeln,” with altars sunk 2–3 meters deep into the ground, and presumed to be homologous with dhyāna. The latter term Jung glosses with “Meditation und Verenkung.” Jung may be referring to underground chambers sometimes found in Hindu temples. My colleague Madhav Deshpande (electronic communication, August 15, 1993) described to me one such chamber under a Ganesh temple on the outskirts of Poona. I have not seen examples of these chambers myself, but the sunken floor surrounding the altar at Enrakuji in Mount Hiei comes to mind.


57. One must note, in Jung’s defense, that the idealization of Indian culture was not all his doing, but may reflect in part the influence of his Indian informants. Thus, Jung was led to believe that every Indian house had a special room for meditation, an idea he brought back to his home in Switzerland.


59. See references in n. 47 above. Of the numerous reprints of Takakusu’s translation, I have consulted Müller, ed., and Cowell et al., trans., Buddhist Mahāyāna Texts. A more recent translation is Meiji Yamada et al., The Sūtra of Contemplation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life, trans. and annotated by the Ryukoku University Translation Center, under the direction of Meiji Yamada (Kyoto: Ryukoku University, 1984). There are also numerous printings of the Chinese original. I have used the text (abbreviated henceforth as MS) as printed in the first volume of the Collected Sacred Texts of Pure Land Buddhism (Shinshū seikyō zensho) (Kyoto, 1941); references are to the page in this edition, but followed, for the English reader’s sake, by the paragraph in Takakusu’s English translation. I have excluded from my discussion any reference to textual variants, or to differences in interpretation that reflect disputes internal to the exegetical traditions of Pure Land Buddhism—fascinating as these are.


61. The term “apocryphal” is, strictly speaking, a misnomer. “Pseudepigrapha” may be more accurate, although not without some problems of its own.
62. The word guan ("to look at, to look at carefully") designates in nontechnical Chinese the activity and effects of looking and observing, and, therefore, of the imperfective or progressive aspect of seeing. In religious literature, the term has a variety of uses, extending from the close observation or examination of religious truths, objects, or images to contemplation and visualization, but may also refer to visionary experiences. These visionary experiences are often called samādhis, a term that also means "perfect mental calm and concentration." Thus in texts that describe fabulous visions, such as those of the Pure Land, there is always the implication that these visions are accessible to those with profound mental concentration or absorption, a connotation picked up by Jung in spite of his inability to understand the contexts and technical meanings of the term.

63. Neither the text, nor Takakusu for that matter, discusses the topic of dhyāna. The term perhaps only reflects Takakusu's infelicitous attempt to render the word guan in the original Chinese title by tracing it back to some kind of "Sanskrit original."

64. Jung, "Psychology of Eastern Meditation" (Psychologie östlicher Meditation) (1943/63), §912.

65. Ibid.

66. MS, p. 50; Takakusu §5.

67. MS, p. 66; Takakusu §32.

68. Keigo Okonogi, Nipponjin no Ajase-conpurekkusu (Tokyo: Chūkōronsha, 1982), and Edipusu to Ajase (Tokyo: Aonisha, 1991). The story also lends itself to a Kleinian interpretation; and much could be made of its relevance for adolescent psychology. Of course, the question of a cultural difference between a Western and a Japanese Oedipal conflict is different from the question of psychological relevance or application of the Oedipus and the Ajātaśatru myths. Also relevant are the issues raised in Martin Stanton's useful and succinct discussion of, and bibliography on, the feminist critique of the Oedipus complex theory (in Elizabeth Wright, Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A critical Dictionary, advisory ed. Dianne Chisholm, Juliet Flower MacCannell, and Margaret Whitford [Oxford: Blackwell, 1992], pp. 290–96). I was made aware of Okonogi's work by my friend Rev. Imai Akinori of the Berkeley Higashi Honganji, who is himself an accomplished pastoral counselor and an avid reader of Jungian psychology—a note of gratitude to him for many useful conversations.

69. Jung's cursory, and, often reckless treatment of Pure Land thought is disconcerting. He even speaks of a eucharistic feast: "Im Kulte des Amitābha findet bemerkenswerterweise eine Art Eucharistiefeier mit konsekriertem Brot statt" (Jung, "Psychology of Eastern Meditation" [Psychologie östlicher Meditation] [1943/63], §912.)

70. Ibid., §933.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., §934.

73. The two Sukhāvatiyūha Sūtras were translated by Müller in Müller, ed., and Cowell et al., trans., Buddhist Māhāyāna Texts. See also n. 47 above.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Although I regard this as a reasonable interpretation, I do not take it to imply that the text can only be read as a yoga manual. I am more inclined to understand this text as part of a genre in which known meditation techniques are used as pre-texts or sources of authority for a devotional literary imagination. In other words, the text appeals to authoritative motifs of yogic realization as a grounding for the reality, truth, or authority of its vision of paradise. Needless to say, the later Chinese tradition has used meditation topics from this sutra as objects of meditation. I am only arguing that the text can also be read as part of the universes of discourse of Buddhist literary imagination, Buddhist devotionalism, and a Buddhism of eschatological hope.

78. MS, p. 58; Takakusu §18.
79. MS, p. 65; Takakusu §30.
80. It is not certain that the word translated by Takakusu as lapis lazuli (Chinese liuli) refers to the stone identified by the Japanese tradition as lapis. It may be a form of emerald, beryl, or chrysoberyl.
81. MS, p. 52; Takakusu §§10.
82. MS, pp. 52, 53, 53–54; Takakusu §§10, 12, 13.
83. MS, pp. 56–57; Takakusu §18.
84. MS, pp. 57–58; Takakusu §18.
85. For example, MS, p. 59; Takakusu §18.
86. MS, p. 60; Takakusu §82 ff.
88. MS, p. 65; Takakusu §30.
90. One should note that even if one concedes the appropriateness of a homology between our concept of Nature as mother and some concepts of deity in India, conceptions of deity as maternal image do not appear to play any role within the traditions that form the background of this sutra. Jung often used the term “nature” apparently unaware of this concept’s culturspecificity; see, e.g., “[the Indian] wishes to free himself from nature” (Jung and Jaffe, Memories, Dreams, Reflections [1961/73] p. 276). The term was used by early Indologists as an infelicitous equivalent for Sanskrit prakrti.
91. Mario Jacoby (The Longing for Paradise: Psychological Perspectives on an Archetype, trans. from the German by Myron B. Gubitz [Boston: Sigo, 1985]) makes a more reasonable attempt to understand belief in paradises before he develops a Jungian psychological explanation of such beliefs. Unfortunately, Jacoby does not consider Asian concepts of paradise. A different Jungian angle on Pure Land belief (but not addressing the question of the meaning of paradise) is found in Peter Bishop, “Jung, Pure Land Buddhism and Psychological Faith,” Eastern Buddhist 22, no. 2 (1989): 1–13.
92. Jung, "Psychology of Eastern Meditation" (Psychologie östlicher Meditation (1943/63), §940. Needless to say, the classical systems of meditation in India and China were not concerned with any glancing into the interior of the human mind, not in the sense in which Jung is suggesting here, or in the sense in which he practiced introspection during his years of self-analysis. The unconscious is not at issue, and the criteria for interpreting dreams and fantasies are very different from those proposed by the analytic psychologies. Jung is not alone among psychologists in attempting a psychological reduction before they have understood the basic language and rules of an alien religious system. Sudhir Kakar, who is, by birth and education, much closer to India, still clings to the notion that there is some kind of parallel between free association and the early stages of yoga. He concedes, however, that in the last phase of rāja-yoga "a comparison with psychoanalysis is no longer possible" (Sudhir Kakar, Shamans, Mystics and Doctors: A Psychological Inquiry into India and Its Healing Traditions [Boston: Beacon, 1982], p. 25).


95. The kleshas are not passions pure and simple, much less drives or instincts. They are attitudes and preconceptions of mind that range from hatred to mistaken ideas or ways of perceiving. Definition of classical yoga in Yogasutra, 2:3–13.

96. MS, p. 50; Takakusu §5.


98. Ibid., §945.

99. For a stronger statement of this point, in terms that must be understood as an indictment of India, yoga, and implicitly Buddhism, as Jung conceived them, see Jung and Jaffé, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1961/73), pp. 276–77. In the present context, the issue of the "Western" or "Eastern" valuation of the kleshas is, of course, in many ways moot, because the Meditation Sutra does not use the term. One must wonder, however, exactly how far one can go in comparing differences in cultural valuations when the range and the nuances of a term have not been properly understood.

100. Jung, "Psychology of Eastern Meditation" (Psychologie östlicher Meditation) (1943/63), §945.


102. Although this essay was written and read in 1943, in the midst of the Second World War, when even Switzerland was going through difficult military and diplomatic exchanges with Nazi Germany, Jung makes no mention of the war and the swastika as a Nazi symbol. I find it hard to believe that
he would not have seen a problem in his theory of the putative symbolism of
the swastika if he had felt at this point any strong reservations regarding Nazi
policy and actions. At best, he chose not to pursue the matter out of fear of
future consequences; at worst he had yet to realize the error of his early "sus-
pended judgment" on the Nazi terror.

103. Jung, “Psychology of Eastern Meditation” (Psychologie öst-
licher Meditation) (1943/63), §948.

104. Radmila Moacanin, Jung's Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism:
Western and Eastern Paths to the Heart (London: Wisdom Publications,
1986).

105. Ibid., p. 96.

106. Ibid., p. 97. In this and the following quotation, I have marked
with italics those expressions that indicate authoritative voices and explicit
changes in voice. I invite my readers to do likewise with my essay, to both
enjoy and criticize my use of Jung's voice, interspersed with Indian voices. Of
course, my main methodological quibble is that "interspersed" voices are
not "mixed" or "identified" voices.

107. Ibid., p. 98.

108. Ibid., p. 99. Moacanin is quoting here a passage from Jung’s Two
Essays on Analytical Psychology, CW, 7, p. 226. A similar focus on Jungian
introspection is found in J. Marvin Spiegelman and Mokusen Miyuki, Bud-
dhism and Jungian Psychology (Phoenix, Ariz.: Falcon, 1985).

Here Moacanin is supposedly referring to the “Psychological Commentary
on The Book of the Great Liberation.” But Jung’s statements in that essay
extend beyond the question of moral responsibility; they echo both the hesi-
tation and the obvious distancing of the earlier “Psychologie östlicher Medi-
tation,” and likewise, confer upon the voice and the jargon of Jungian
psychology the authority to speak from a position above that of yoga. The
passage in question (“Psychological Commentary on The Book of the Great
Liberation” (1939/54), pp. lv–lvi; CW, 11, §§802–3) reads:

If the European could turn himself inside out and live as an Oriental, with all the so-
cial, moral, religious, intellectual, and aesthetic obligations which such a course would
involve, he might be able to benefit by these teachings. But you cannot be a good Chris-
tian, either in your faith or in your morality or in your intellectual makeup, and prac-
tise genuine yoga at the same time. I have seen too many cases that have made me
sceptical in the highest degree. The trouble is that Western man cannot get rid of his
history as easily as his short-legged memory can. . . . If you can afford to seat yourself
on a gazelle skin under a Bo-tree or in the cell of a gompa for the rest of your life with-
out being troubled by politics or the collapse of your securities, I will look favorably
upon your case. But yoga in Mayfair or Fifth Avenue, or in any other place which is on
the telephone, is a spiritual fake.

Taking the mental equipment of Eastern man into account, we may sup-
pose that the teaching is effective. But unless one is prepared to run away from the world and
to disappear into the unconscious for good, mere teaching has no effect, or at least not
the desired one. For this the union of opposites is necessary, and in particular the diffi-
cult task of reconciling extraversion and introversion by means of the transcendent function.

One could write many volumes on this passage. Suffice it to suggest here that we wonder why Jung does not make similar remarks about prayer and fasting—both practices common to Western desert hermits and modern lay believers.

110. Moacanin, Jung’s Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 99–100. Contrast Jung’s numerous assertions to the contrary, e.g., in the passages referenced in nn. 99 and 109 above.


112. Jung, “The Dreamlike World of India,” CW, 10, §988. I am not sure I understand what Jung means here with “mind” and “body,” but I suspect he is using a colonial stereotype (the “natives” are “physical,” “we” are “intellectual”) that runs counter to one of his main claims, that Indian “form” and “body” are always symbols of the spirit. Be that as it may, I would argue that Jung ironically was attracted by those aspects of Indian culture that ask us to withdraw “too much into the capsule of the head.” He too enjoyed this withdrawal or self-encapsulating in the world of the abstract spirit. This is part of what makes him attractive to Humanists rather than empirical scientists.


114. See references in n. 46 above. The terminus ad quem of the recollection is the date of the 1st edition of Jaffé’s transcription and edition of Jung’s recollections, Erinnerungen Träume Gedanken von C. G. Jung, that is, 1961 (see n. 26 above), which is also the year of Jung’s death.


117. In this context “the Other” includes the inner other, or those parts of the self that are not seen as parts of the self, and which are in need of reconciliation and repair. On this point see the tour de force of R. K. Papadopoulos, “Jung and the Concept of the Other,” in Jung in Modern Perspective, ed. R. K. Papadopoulos and G. S. Saayman. (Hounslow, Middlesex: Wildwood House, 1984). My view of the problem, however, is not as sanguine as that of Papadopoulos, who concludes his essay (p. 88) by affirming that in “the formulation [of the concept] of the Other-as-Archetype . . . the structuring principles [of the self] are appreciated in their broader cultural and human perspectives. . . . [This] formulation also accounts for the developmental process of individuation. Therefore the problematic of the Other which Jung embarked on in an attempt to isolate and identify the Other gradually grew to reveal the whole dialectical process of the individual’s arriving at the Self. Like the Wittgensteinian ladder, this problematic provides the necessary steps of the earlier formulations. However once hav-
ing climbed the problematic of the Other, the centre shifts from the Ego to the Self. . . . The ladder should be dropped, for at the new centre is the Self, and being the ultimate unity and wholeness of the total personality, no problematic any longer exists, nor any ‘Other.’”


119. Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, *Relación de los naufragios y Comentarios, de Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, ilustrados con varios documentos inéditos*, Colección de libros y documentos referentes a la historia de América, tomos 5–6 (Madrid: V. Suárez, 1906), 1:78–83, 107. Cabeza de Vaca’s *Los naufragios* was originally published at Zamora in 1542 under the title of *La relación que dio Aluar Núñez Cabeça de Vaca de lo acaecido en las Indias, en la armada donde yua por gobernador Pamphilo de Narbaez, desde el año de veynte y siete hasta al año d‘treynta y seys.* A second edition, published at Valladolid in 1555, included a second work, the *Comentarios*, an account of Cabeza de Vaca’s expedition to Paraguay. Since then, these two works are usually published together under the title *Relación des los naufragios y Comentarios*; but the first one, the *Relación*, is popularly known as *Los naufragios*. It is also common, even among Spanish speakers, to refer to the author by the second of his two surnames, i.e., as “Cabeza de Vaca.” There are several English translations; e.g., *The Journey of Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca and His Companions from Florida to the Pacific, 1528–1536*, translated from his own narrative by Fanny Bandelier, together with the report of Father Marcos of Nizza and a letter from the viceroy Mendoza, ed., with an introduction by Ad. F. Bandelier (New York: Allerton Book Co., 1922). This translation appeared more recently in *The Narrative of Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca*, trans. by Fanny Bandelier, with an introduction by John Francis Bannon, illustrated by Michael McCurdy, with Oviedo’s version of the lost Joint Report presented to the Audencia de Santo Domingo, trans. Gerald Theisen (Barre, Mass.: Printed for the Imprint Society, 1972).
When trying to photograph shy natives, it is well to conceal the fact that the real lens is pointing at them. A dummy lens fixed at the side of the camera and pointed away at right angles to the natives, will make them think that they are safe, the real lens being concealed by the hand until the last moment.

Notes and Queries on Anthropology, 1929 edition

6 Foreigner at the Lama’s Feet

Donald S. Lopez, Jr.

The urgency of the last moment, the urgency of the hidden gaze directed at the natives while a blind eye is turned toward their site, the urgency for the control of representation will be considered here in an exploration of the relation between the Orientalist and the Tibetan lama. I take the term “Orientalist” in its weakest sense, as a professional expert on the Orient, recognizing, however, that the stronger connotations of the term occasioned by Said’s critique remain inevitably present. These connotations are particularly resonant in the case of the study of Tibetan Buddhism, which has gained status as a legitimate “field” within the western academy only in the last half of the present century. This status has been won in large part because of the effects of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet (which began in 1950), precipitating the apparently urgent task of preserving traditional Tibetan culture, and what is regarded as its most precious legacy, Tibetan Buddhism, before its “loss.” This task has largely been assumed by the present generation of western scholars of Tibetan Buddhism, whose project of preservation has, for reasons to be explored below, brought them into relation with refugee Tibetan lamas, construed as the native conservators of an endangered archive.

It is this relation that will be explored here, a relationship of
pronounced ambivalence. For the modern western scholar of Tibetan Buddhism is heir to the legacy of Orientalism described by Said, a legacy marked by a nostalgic longing and a revulsion. Buddhist Studies, like its parent Indology, has largely been a bibliophilic tradition, concerned above all with the collecting, editing, and translating of texts originating in an often ill-defined classical age, whose fluid borders exclude nothing but the present day. It has been the conviction of European (and later American) Orientalists that the classical age is forever lost, leaving them the task of the preservation and care of its remnants, most often in the form of textual and artistic artifacts; contemporary Asians have allowed this classical age to pass into near oblivion, and thereby have forfeited their proprietary rights over its remains. Those rights were ceded, almost always through the process of colonial appropriation, to the Orientalist academy. Thus, the past of this Orient is regarded with nostalgia, the present with contempt.

These sentiments are very much at play in the case of Tibet, but with further ideological encrustations, many of which derive from the fact that Tibet never came under the direct colonial domination of a western power. Tibet was thus transformed into a particular focus of European desire and fantasy. The familiar nostalgia and revulsion were certainly present, for Tibet was coveted as the repository of lost Sanskrit manuscripts and their accurate Tibetan translations, preserved from the ravages of time. At the same time, with the European construction of “original Buddhism,” the practices observed by European travelers and colonial officials positioned on the Tibetan periphery were deemed a repulsive corruption of the Buddha’s rational teaching, polluted with demon worship and sacerdotalism to the point that it could no longer be accurately termed “Buddhism” at all, but became instead “Lamaism.”

But persisting through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was another fantasy, one which saw not just the texts preserved in Tibet but Tibetan Buddhist culture itself as an entity existing outside of time, set in its own eternal classical age in a lofty Himalayan keep. With the Chinese takeover of Tibet, this timeless culture was placed in profound jeopardy; there was the fear that exposure to time would cause its contents to wither, like the bodies of those who dare leave Shangri-la. Hence, there seemed to be an especial exigency about the preservation of Tibetan culture so rudely ushered into history, a task that seemed too important to be left to the exiled Tibetans alone. The confluence of ideologies that led to the repetition of this ostensibly unique imperative will be considered below, in part through a reflection on my own “fieldwork” as a graduate student in the late 1970s.
In order to demonstrate that the notion of urgency about Tibet has itself a rather long history, I will begin by identifying several occasions in its evolution. It is not my intention to provide a history of the study of Tibetan Buddhism in the west, but rather to note in passing several emblematic moments in which foreigners positioned themselves before Tibetan lamas, sometimes standing, sometimes sitting, moments to which the present-day scholar of Tibetan Buddhism is inevitably heir.

**Ippolito Desideri**

The first Catholic priest to take up residence in Lhasa seems to have been the Jesuit priest Ippolito Desideri who arrived in the city on March 28, 1716. He remained there for five years until he received word from Rome that the mission-territory of Tibet had been removed from Jesuit jurisdiction and given to the Capuchins.\(^1\) During his journey back to Italy, he began writing his *Notizie Istoriche del Thibet*, an account of his journey and of Tibetan religion and culture.\(^2\) It is work imbued with missionary zeal. In the preface, he writes that Tibet’s “Religion, founded on the Pythagorean system, and so entirely different from any other, deserves to be known in order to be contested. I flatter myself that these pages may induce the learned to confute this new mixture of superstitious errors, and move some to go to the assistance of that benighted nation.”\(^3\) However, it is also the most systematic and detailed account of Tibetan Buddhist doctrine produced by a European before the twentieth century.

Despite his unconcealed motivation to confute the Tibetans’ false religion and lead them to the true faith, Desideri enjoyed the patronage and friendship of Lha bzang Khan, the chieftain of the Khoshuud Mongols and self-proclaimed “King of Tibet.” In the summer of 1717 Desideri received permission to take up residence at Se ra, a monastery of some 5,000 monks and one of the “three seats” of the dominant dGe lugs sect. There are a great many issues to be pursued concerning his study at Se ra, especially its importance for the composition of his magnum opus, a work in Tibetan of over 500 folios entitled *Questions on the Views of Rebirth and Emptiness, Offered by the White-headed Lama called Ippolito to the Scholars of Tibet*.\(^4\) Here, we will only pause to consider a passage from the *Notizie* in which he describes his studies at Se ra:

Occasionally I attended their public disputation, and above all I applied my-
self to study and really attempted to understand those most abstruse, subtle and intricate treatises they call Tongba-gni, or Vacuum, which are not to be taken in a material or philosophic, but in a mystical and intellectual sense; their real aim being to exclude and absolutely deny the existence of any un-created and independent Being and thus effectually to do away with any conception of God. When I began to study these treatises the Doctor who had been appointed my Master declared that he could not explain them or make me understand them. Thinking this was only a pretext to prevent my gaining any real knowledge of such matters, I repeatedly entreated him to explain what I did not understand without help. Seeing that I was by no means convinced that he was so incapable and that, as he said, only some of the chief and most learned Lamás would be able to instruct me, he offered to bring other Doctors, declaring that he would be well pleased if I found any one who could throw light on these intricate and abstruse questions. In fact we both applied to several of the most esteemed Masters and Doctors and all gave me the same answer. I was, however, determined to try and find out the real meaning contained in these treatises, and seeing that human aid was of no avail, I prayed to God, the Father of Light, for whose glory alone I had undertaken this work, and again applied myself to solitary study. But I could discover nothing. Again I read most attentively, but with the same result. Persuaded, however, that labor improbus omnia vincit, with renewed courage I began at the beginning, carefully considering every word, but to no purpose. Briefly I continued my task until the dark clouds were pierced by a faint ray of light. This raised my hope of finally emerging into bright sunshine; I read, re-read and studied until, thanks be to God, I not only understood, but completely mastered (all Glory being to God) all the subtle, sophisticated, and abstruse matter which was so necessary and important for me to know.s

Desideri appears to have concluded that if he was to convert the Tibetans to Christianity, he must refute what they profess to be their most profound philosophical tenet, the doctrine of emptiness (śunyata, stong pa nyid). But in order to refute it, he must first understand it. He evinces a compelling need to reach this understanding, as if the entire success of his mission depended upon it and would be impeded until such understanding was gained. However, in order to come to an understanding, he finds himself in an ambivalent position before the Tibetan monastic scholars: he cannot refute them until he understands their doctrine yet he cannot understand their doctrine without their instruction. That is, he has his own pressing agenda to pursue which cannot succeed without the aid of his perceived opponents. This ambivalence of the European before the lama would continue in the centuries that followed.
Desideri is initially impeded by the reluctance of the geshes (dge bshes, the highest scholastic degree of the Tibetan monastic academy) of Se ra to explain the doctrine of emptiness to him. Since their professed inability to do so appears highly suspect in light of the traditions of dGe lugs scholasticism, with its technical vocabulary for the discussion of the ultimate, one must seek other motives. A scriptural motivation is available among the bodhisattva vows that all geshes hold, where they are enjoined against “teaching emptiness to the untrained” (ma sbyangs stong nyid bstan), generally interpreted to mean that the doctrine of emptiness should not be taught to those who might be frightened by it. But Desideri had been admitted to the monastery by the order of Lha bzang Khan, a Mongol regarded with a certain opprobrium by the Tibetans for deposing the sixth Dalai Lama and dispatching him on his fatal journey to the Manchu court. The Khan was himself overthrown and killed by a rival Mongol tribe in the very year that Desideri moved to Se ra. A more practical motivation would then seem to be the geshes’ wish to prevent the foreign polemicist, whose patron had usurped the Dalai Lama’s throne, from understanding what they considered their most unassailable philosophical position.

Frustrated by the reluctance of his hosts, Desideri appeals to his own god and is eventually rewarded. However, it is noteworthy that the rhetoric of discovery which he employs here may not reflect his own “experience” but could just as well have come from one of the works on emptiness provided by his hosts, an early instance of the process by which the rhetoric of the Orientalist is shaped by that of his “subject.” The work is called “Praise of Dependent Origination” (rT'n 'brel stod pa), a paean to the doctrine of emptiness written by the “founder” of the dGe lugs sect, Tsong kha pa (1357–1419). Toward the end of this famous (and commonly memorized) work, Tsong kha pa writes:

People who do not comprehend how wondrous is this good teaching become utterly agitated, like grass. When I discerned this, I tried many times, following scholars, seeking again and again [to know] your [i.e., the Buddha’s] intention. After studying many texts of our own sect and those of others, my mind was tormented by webs of doubt. You prophesied that the texts of Nāgārjuna, a garden of jasmine, would explain how your unsurpassed vehicle abandons the extremes of existence and non-existence. [They are] a vast mandala of stainless wisdom moving unimpeded through the sky of scriptures, eradicating the darkness at the heart of extreme views, outshining the constellations of mistaken philosophers, illuminated by a wreath of white
light, the eloquent explanations of the glorious moon [Candrakīrti]. When I discerned this through the kindness of my lama, my mind found rest.\(^6\)

Here, as with Desideri’s account, we find a sense of despair at the profound difficulty of the doctrine of emptiness and the compulsion to understand it, a report of earnest endeavor, studying many texts with many masters, and, finally, images of illumination and understanding, attained through the grace of the divine teacher.

But the work of Father Desideri was soon forgotten, in large part due to the disarray produced in the Jesuit archives as a result of the suppression of the Jesuits from 1773–1814 under Pius VI and VII, remaining unknown until the present century. In 1754 the Capuchin mission in Lhasa was closed. In 1793 the Manchu emperor decreed imperial control over Tibetan communication with foreign countries, serving thereby to close the frontiers. From this point and until the present day, further relations of Europeans with the lamas would be positioned at the borderlands.

**Alexander Csoma de Kőröös**

Concurrent with the rise of the bourgeois class in Europe and the concomitant rise of nationalism during the eighteenth century was an increased interest in and promotion of national languages and literatures, and an attendant deemphasis of Latin. At the same time, the science of philology postulated the existence of linguistic families and lineages, searching ever for the source from which all languages had sprung. These trends also touched Hungary. But Hungarian was not a Germanic language or a Slavic language, like those of its neighbors, nor was it a Romance language. The consensus among Hungarian scholars of the day who speculated about the origin of the Hungarian people and their language was to look east, to the Huns and the Avars, perhaps to the Turks. A Transylvanian with an obvious talent for languages (he is said to have learned seventeen), Alexander Csoma de Kőröös (1784–1842) took it as his task to “discover the obscure origins of our homeland.” In late 1819 he set out on his quest, arriving in Teheran a year later. From his studies of Arabic sources, he became convinced that the ancient homeland of his ancestors was to be found among the Uighurs in the Tarim Basin of modern Xinjiang, an area then called Bokhara. Toward that destination, he traveled through Afghanistan and the Punjab, arriving in Kashmir in 1822. He spent the next year traveling back and forth be-
tween Srinagar and Leh, the capital of Ladakh, searching in vain for a caravan he could join for the journey to Yarkand. It was on one of these trips that he chanced to meet a European, traveling alone in the opposite direction. This was Dr. William Moorcroft, a veterinarian officially serving as “Superintendent of the East India Company’s stud-farm on mission to Upper Asia” but also an explorer who seems to have functioned as a self-appointed spy for the British government. He observed the political situation in the small Himalayan states bordering British India, reporting and, if possible, thwarting any contacts they may have with Russia, an early player in “the great game.”

Moorcroft convinced Csoma de Kőrös to delay his search for the source of the Hungarian language in order to learn Tibetan; he wrote that “a knowledge of the language alone is an acquisition not without a certain commercial, or possibly, political value.” They agreed that this could be accomplished after a year in Tibet preceded by a year of Csoma studying Tibetan on his own in Srinagar.

He arrived in Ladakh in June 1823 where he began to study under the tutelage of a lama recommended by Moorcroft. Csoma de Kőrös worked on the project for the next seven years in a variety of locations along the southwestern borders of Tibet, sometimes with the lama, sometimes alone, “disappointed in my attentions by the indolence and negligence of that Lama,” sometimes with a British stipend, sometimes without resources. During this time, he fulfilled what he termed his “heavy obligations to the [British] Government [of India]” producing a Tibetan-English dictionary, a grammar of the Tibetan language, and an English translation of the great ninth-century compendium of Buddhist terminology, the Mahāvyutpatti. Beyond this remarkable work, as Max Müller observed in 1862, “Such a jungle of religious literature—the most excellent hiding-place we should think, for Lamas and Dalai-Lamas—was too much even for a man who could travel on foot from Hungary to Thibet.” In 1830 he left Tibet for Calcutta, where he published these works and numerous articles on Tibetan Buddhist literature under the auspices of the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. In the preface to the dictionary, he wrote poignantly:

Though the study of the Tibetan languages did not form part of the original plan of the author, but was only suggested after he had been by Providence led into Tibet, and had enjoyed an opportunity, by the liberal assistance of the late Mr. Moorcroft, to learn of what sort and origin the Tibetan literature was, he cheerfully engaged in the acquirement of more authentic information upon the same, hoping that it might serve him as a vehicle to his immediate
purpose; namely, his researches respecting the origin and language of the Hungarians. . . . After being familiarized with the terminology, spirit, and general contents of the Buddhistic works in Tibetan translations, the author of this Dictionary estimates himself happy in having thus found an easy access to the whole Sanscrit literature, which of late has become so favorite a study of the whole learned Europe. To his own nation he feels a pride in announcing, that the study of the Sanscrit will be more satisfactory, than to any other people in Europe. The Hungarians will find a fund of information from its study, respecting their origin, manners, customs, and language; since the structure of Sanscrit (as also of other Indian dialects) is most analogous to the Hungarian, while it greatly differs from that of the languages of occidental Europe.\textsuperscript{12}

But further studies in Sanskrit and Bengali convinced him that he was wrong. In 1842, he set off from Calcutta to travel to Sikkim, planning then to proceed through Lhasa to his long-postponed destination, the Tarim Basin. He died of malaria in Darjeeling.\textsuperscript{13}

His chance meeting with Moorcroft had deferred him from his quest for the origins of his culture but had led him to embark on studies that had as their effect a different kind of procreation; Csoma de Kőröss is today known as the "Father of Tibetology." Indeed, in recognition of his role in the discovery of Tibetan Buddhism, Csoma de Kőröss was officially recognized as a bodhisattva by Taishō University in Japan in 1933.\textsuperscript{14}

If we find in Csoma de Kőröss the moment of origin of the academic study of Tibet, he was nonetheless what Said would call "a gifted amateur enthusiast," working not in a European university, but in "the field," in this case in various sites along the Tibetan border but never in Lhasa, with, it appears, only the grudging cooperation of a lama. The coincidence of the interests of nationalism, represented by Csoma de Kőröss's search for Hungarian origins, and of empire, represented by Moorcroft's conviction that a knowledge of Tibetan language would prove of value to the British, resulted in the creation of a science and a profession called "Tibetology," for by the mid-nineteenth century, the center of Oriental studies had moved from the Orient to the universities of Europe.\textsuperscript{15}

The European scholars of Buddhism, well-trained in Greek and Latin, created their own version of "classical Buddhism" derived from evaluating the Sanskrit and Pāli texts they studied for their relative proximity to the founder.\textsuperscript{16} Very few of these scholars ever traveled to Asia during their careers: it was not necessary since they had Buddhism in their libraries. It was against this textually crafted clas-
sical Indian Buddhism, now conveniently dead and thus not present to contest European knowledge, that the Buddhisms of Asia, of Sri Lanka, China, and Japan were judged to be derivative, deficient, and degenerate, their adherents unreliable interpreters, unworthy descendants, unqualified bearers of the Buddha's noble truth, now passed to the scholars of Europe. Tibet, the blank place on the map between India and China, was officially declared closed to foreigners by decree of the Manchu emperor Qianlong in 1793 after a war with the Gurkhas, and unlike India, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan, never came under the domination (above all in the epistemological sense) of the European colonial powers. Yet Tibet was to have its own ambivalent position in the European creation of Buddhism.

L. Austine Waddell

L. Austine Waddell, another gifted amateur, gathered a great deal of information on Tibetan Buddhism, especially on ritual practice and popular belief, from his post as a British functionary in Sikkim from 1885 to 1895, which he published in The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism. In the preface of that work, Waddell reports that he was able to gain such a wealth of information by purchasing “a Lamaist temple with its fittings” in Darjeeling and then having the officiants explain to him the rites which he paid them to perform. He was further able to learn their “secrets” by allowing the monks and lamas of Sikkim to believe that he was the fulfillment of a prophecy that an incarnation of the buddha Amitābha would come from the west. This recurrent trope of the colonial conqueror, reminiscent of Cortés and Captain Cook, allowed Waddell a double claim to superiority: on the one hand, he was an emanation of the Buddha of Infinite Light; on the other, he understood, better than the credulous monks and lamas, that he was not. Thus, although he spent most of his career on the border of Tibet, longing to enter Lhasa, the center, he nonetheless adopted a posture of both control over and contempt for his informants and secured his authority by allowing the lamas to believe that he was ultimately one of them. With the confidence of the Tibetans secured via their incorporation of him into their pantheon, Waddell establishes his distance from them by confiding his deception to his European audience. His authority over Tibetan Buddhism is constructed by allowing the Tibetans to believe that he is a Buddhist (even a buddha) while assuring his European readers that he is not.
Unlike Desideri and Csoma de Kőrös, Waddell wrote in a time when the Orientalist enterprise was in full flower. He does not attempt, as they do, to describe the pieces of what remains a great puzzle, in an effort to arrive at a coherent picture of Tibetan Buddhism. For Waddell, the picture is clear and his rhetoric is one of comprehension, locating Tibetan Buddhism within the master narrative of the history of Buddhism. Although himself another amateur, he was heir to the commonly held view of European professional Orientalists in which the Buddhism of Tibet figured prominently as the end point in the Victorian vision of the history of Buddhism: after the early centuries of the brotherhood, Buddhism in India followed a course of uninterrupted degeneration from its origins as a rational, agnostic faith, free of all superstition and ritual. With the rise of the Mahāyāna, the agnostic idealism and simple morality of primitive Buddhism was replaced by “a speculative theistic system with a mysticism of sophistic nihilism.” Yet another degeneration occurred with the rise of the Yogācāra, which, for reasons that remain unclear, was regarded with particular antipathy: “And this Yoga parasite, containing within itself the germs of Tantrism, seized strong hold of its host and soon developed its monster outgrowths, which crushed and cankered most of the little life of purely Buddhist stock yet left in the Mahāyāna.”\(^{20}\) Were this not enough, the progress of the contamination continued as the pure essence of primitive Buddhism was once more polluted in India with the rise of tantrism.

It was this mere shadow of original Buddhism that was belatedly transmitted to Tibet, where it was further adulterated with the demon worship of the Tibetans: “The Lamaist cults comprise much deep-rooted devil-worship, which I describe in some fulness. For Lamaism is only thinly and imperfectly varnished over with Buddhist symbolism, beneath which the sinister growth of poly-demonist superstition darkly appears.”\(^{21}\) For Waddell most Tibetan Buddhist practice was contemptible mummer and Tibetan Buddhist literature was “for the most part a dreary wilderness of words and antiquated rubbish, but the Lamas conceitedly believe that all knowledge is locked up in their musty classics, outside which nothing is worthy of serious notice.”\(^{22}\) Lamaism thus stands at the nadir of a long process of contamination and degeneration from the origin. (Waddell conducted his researches while serving as assistant sanitary commissioner for the Darjeeling district and in 1889 had published, “Are Venomous Snakes Autotoxic?” in the Scientific Memoirs by Medical Officers of the Army of India.)

Tibetan Buddhism is thus regarded by Waddell as doubly other
in a complex play of Orientalist ideologies: with the discovery and translation of Sanskrit and Pāli texts, Buddhism is invented and controlled by the west as the other of Romantic Orientalism, which saw Europe's spiritual salvation in the wisdom of the east. This other was called “original Buddhism,” represented as a “religion of reason” in Victorian Britain. Western Buddhologists became the true and legitimate conservators of this “classical tradition.” Tibetan Buddhism then is constructed as the other of this other (“original Buddhism”). It is a product not of the religion of reason but of degenerations of the Indian textual tradition, namely, the Mahāyāna and tantra. There is thus a nexus of forces brought to bear to create degenerate Tibetan Buddhism or, more properly, “Lamaism.” Like many before and after him, Waddell compares this Lamaism to Roman Catholicism as a further strategy of condemnation, where “Lamaism” becomes a substitute for “Papism.” The Tibetans, having lost the spirit of primitive Buddhism, now suffer under the oppression of sacerdotalism and the exploitation of its priests, something that England had long since thrown off. But it is not simply a case of analogy: Pāli Buddhism is to Tibetan Buddhism as the Anglican Church is to Roman Catholicism. It is rather a strategy of debasing the distant and yet unsubjugated other by comparing it to the near and long-subjugated other, subjugated both by its relegation to England’s past and to England’s present European rivals and Irish subjects.23

We find in Waddell a mixing of center-periphery discourse, of metaphors of surfaces and essences, of origins and evolutes. Sometimes Buddhism is just a veneer crudely applied to Tibetan demon worship. Elsewhere, the essence of primitive Buddhism lies obscured beneath the layers of Tibetan idolatry. There are rare moments when Waddell concedes the civilizing influence that Buddhism has had on the Tibetans. “And it is somewhat satisfactory to find,” he writes, “that many of the superior Lamas breathe much of the spirit of the original system.” Despite his obvious contempt, Waddell believes that there is something in Tibet, possessed by the heathens, which is not yet his and his alone, although he possesses more than any other European. For him, the Buddhism of Tibet still preserves “much of the loftier philosophy and ethics of the system taught by the Buddha himself. And the Lamas have the keys to unlock the meaning of much of Buddha’s doctrine, which has been almost inaccessible to Europeans.”24

This obsession with the interior is evident in his impatient desire to reach Lhasa. In the preface to The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism, a book researched for the most part in Sikkim ten years
before the Younghusband expedition, he describes his qualifications for writing the book: "Being one of the few Europeans who have entered the territory of the Grand Lama, I have spent several years in studying the actualities of Lamaism as explained by its priests, at points much nearer Lhasa than any utilized for such a purpose, and where I could feel the pulse of the sacred city itself beating in the large communities of its natives, many of whom had left Lhasa only ten or twelve days previously." Waddell had tried to enter Tibet disguised as a Tibetan pilgrim in 1892, with surveying instruments hidden in his prayer wheel, but was turned back. In 1904 he finally reached the forbidden city, no longer disguised as a Buddhist pilgrim or pretending to be an incarnation of Amitābha, but in the uniform of a British colonel. He was the chief medical officer of Younghusband’s expeditionary force, which left at least one thousand Tibetans dead before it achieved its purpose of securing a trade agreement with Britain. In his long account of the campaign, *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, published in 1905, Waddell was unable to resist including an appendix in which he listed how close other recent European travelers had gotten to the holy city (Rockhill, 110 miles; Captain Bower, 200 miles; Miss A. Taylor, twelve days’ journey), implying, of course, that unlike them, he had reached his destination.

We see here the playing out of the relationship between the top and the bottom, in which the dominant member of a hierarchy (in this case Britain) attempts to eliminate the subordinate member, the other (in this case Tibet), for reasons of prestige and status but cannot because it is ultimately dependent on the other for that status. Thus, Waddell wants to dismiss Tibetan Buddhism as Lamaism, a degeneration of the “original Buddhism” which he controls. But he cannot dismiss it because it is precisely the existence of Tibetan Buddhism which makes his “original Buddhism” somehow original. Rather than eliminating the bottom outright, the other becomes incorporated symbolically into the top as a primary, often eroticized, component of its fantasy life. This seems to occur for Waddell in his gnawing suspicion that the Tibetans indeed possess some secret understanding of Buddhism which he lacks.

It is also evident in his attitude toward uncolonized Tibet, which he seems to have regarded from the Sikkimese border in 1898 as a tempting seductress resisting his attempts at penetration, and which he portrayed in 1905 as his deflowered and debased conquest when he finally reached Lhasa with Younghusband. That which he was felt driven to reach when he stood at the border could be dis-
missed with contempt when he stood at the center, an officer of the army that had put the Grand Lama himself to flight:

Wreathed in the romance of centuries, Lhasa, the secret citadel of the “undy- ing” Grand Lama, has stood shrouded in impenetrable mystery on the Roof-of-the-World, alluring yet defying our most adventurous travelers to enter her closed gates. With all the fascination of an unsolved enigma, this mysterious city has held the imagination captive, as one of the last of the secret places of the earth, as the Mecca of East Asia, the sacerdotal city where the “Living Buddha,” enthroned as a god, reigns eternally over his empire of tonsured monks, weaving ropes of sand like the schoolmen of old, or placidly twirling their prayer-wheels, droning their mystic spells and exorcising devils in the intervals of their dreamy meditations. But now, in the fateful Tibetan Year of the Wood-Dragon [1904], the fairy Prince of “Civilisation” has roused her from her slumbers, her closed doors are broken down, her dark veil of mystery is lifted up, and the long-sealed shrine, with its grotesque cults and its idolised Grand Lama, shorn of his sham nimbus, have yielded up their secrets and lie disenchanted before our Western eyes.27

He ends his account of the British invasion of Tibet by proclaiming that, rather than burying Tibetan Buddhism as a decadent cult, it is the mission of England “to herald the rise of new star in the East, which may for long, perhaps for centuries, diffuse its mild radiance over this charming land and interesting people.”28 Despite Waddell’s hopes, Tibet was never to come under the colonial domain of Britain. Nonetheless, he was able to construct in his representation of Lamaism an ideological dominion over Tibet that would have served as the necessary prerequisite for British colonial rule. It is not coincidental that many of the same characterizations of Tibetan Buddhism appear in Chinese discourse of the last four decades, serving as a justification to the west for the process of invasion, occupation, and colonization of Tibet by China.

Tibet in Exile

The invasion and occupation of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army in 1950 and the Tibetan uprising and subsequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 were to bring, beyond the devastation suffered by the Tibetans, significant shifts in the western construction of Tibetan Buddhism. Of the approximately 70,000 Tibetans who successfully followed the Dalai Lama into exile in 1959 and 1960, an
estimated 5,000–7,000 were monks, a tiny fraction (perhaps 5 percent) of the monastic population of Tibet. In 1974 attempts were begun to reestablish the three great dGe lugs pa monasteries (Drepung, Sera, and Ganden) in India. The government of India had been reluctant to have the by then roughly 100,000 Tibetan refugees settle in a single location, preferring instead to provide them with tracts of unwanted land spread throughout the subcontinent. Tibetan laypeople had already done some initial work of clearing the jungle when the monks moved south. Drepung (‘Bras spungs) and Ganden (dGa’ ldan) were reestablished about three miles apart in northern Karnataka. The new Sera (Se ra) was built further south, near the city of Mysore. The monasteries were built in the midst of farming settlements of Tibetan refugees under the administration of the Department of Rehabilitation of the Home Ministry of the government of India and were declared off-limits to foreign visitors. Under this system, Ganden was known as Lama Camp 1, and Drepung as Lama Camp 2. In the early years, the situation was quite difficult, with the monks living in tents, spending their days clearing jungle land to make cornfields.

The monasteries found themselves in a new position. The monastic rules had forbidden monks to cultivate the earth, ostensibly to prevent the accidental killing of insects. In Tibet the monasteries had been major property owners, employing tenant farmers to cultivate fields of barley. But in south India Tibetan Buddhist monks were pulling plows and later driving tractors, assigned to take their turn at sitting up all night in the fields, ready to beat on drums and gongs to drive away the elephants that ravaged their cornfields. By 1980, Drepung, Ganden, and Sera had each built temples, assembly halls, and quarters for approximately three hundred monks. At each monastery about one hundred monks had come from Tibet, the other two hundred were boys between the ages of eight and eighteen drawn from the local refugee communities. In exile the role of the monastery inevitably changed. The monasteries were no longer rich and powerful institutions whose influence was feared by the Dalai Lama himself. They no longer enjoyed government support nor the donations of wealthy lay patrons. There was no shortage of new monks; the refugee families were happy to enroll their sons in the local monastery where they would be educated, clothed, and housed, and could still come home on weekends. But unlike Tibet, where it was expected that one became a monk for life, young men only became novices, often renouncing their vows before full ordination on their parent's
advice, returning to lay life to work on the farm. The great monasteries were becoming, in effect, boarding schools.

The Tibetan diaspora also initiated a new period in the history of the study of Tibetan Buddhism in the west. In the 1960s, scholars from European universities, such as Herbert V. Guenther and David Seyfort Ruegg, traveled to India to work with refugee Tibetan scholars in the translation of Buddhist texts. Popular interest in the exotic world of Tibetan Buddhism also boomed as Evans-Wentz’s 1927 rendering of a Tibetan text he dubbed *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* became part of the LSD canon and Dharamsala became an obligatory stop on the Asian pilgrimage. In 1964, Robert Thurman became the first westerner to be ordained as a Buddhist monk of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Many other European and American men and women soon went forth as well. In 1961 the first doctoral program in Buddhist Studies in Europe or North America was established at the University of Wisconsin and by 1975 there were tenured scholars of Tibetan Buddhism at Columbia University, the University of Washington, and the University of Virginia, where graduate students received government fellowships to study the Tibetan language under the auspices of the National Defense Education Act.

At the same time, the U.S. Library of Congress was sponsoring the publication of thousands of heretofore unknown Tibetan texts, under the direction of the redoubtable E. Gene Smith. Autochthonous Tibetan works published by the refugees accumulated in depository libraries across the United States as a result of Public Law 480, under the terms of which the huge debts owed by the government of India to the United States for shipments of American wheat provided for famine relief would be repaid in the form of books. Specifically, a designated number of copies of every book published in India was to be provided to the Library of Congress, which would then distribute them to the depository libraries. In this way, the long mysterious Tibetan archive became as if magically manifest in the stacks of American university libraries.

There was constant reference during this period to the present perilous state and how it differed from “pre-1959 Tibet.” The change was indeed profound. Although Lhasa had been occupied by foreign armies before and the previous Dalai Lama had gone into exile to escape foreign troops, sometimes British and sometimes Chinese, this was the longest exile of a Dalai Lama from Tibet and the damage done to Buddhist institutions in Tibet was far greater than any in history. Drastic changes had occurred and yet the reactions they elicited
in western students of Tibetan Buddhism are not to be explained simply by taking account of the events of the day; it was not simply the fact of change that brought forth such reactions.29

The story is told in a Buddhist sūtra of a lone blind tortoise who dwells in the depths of a vast ocean, coming up for air only once every hundred years. On the surface of that same ocean floats a golden yoke. It is more common for that tortoise to place its head through that yoke when it takes its centennial breath, the sūtra says, than it is for a being imprisoned in the cycle of rebirth to be born as a human with the good fortune to encounter the teaching of the Buddha. Human birth in a Buddhist land is compared to a rare jewel, difficult to find and, if found, of great value, because it is in the human body that one may traverse the path that leads to liberation. Western students of Buddhism imbibed this rhetoric of urgency from the Buddhist texts they studied. This attempt to partake of Buddhist notions marked a new phase in the history of western urgency about Tibet. Here, unlike with Desideri or Waddell, the aim of study is not to defeat Tibetan Buddhism in ideological battle; instead, Buddhist doctrine is sympathetically regarded as valuable because of its salvific powers for the modern world, its own myths enlisted in the crusade for its preservation. In the Buddhist texts there is continual reference to the precious rarity of rebirth as a human and the need to take full advantage of this lifetime by “extracting its essence,” to find the dharma and put it into practice before one is destroyed by inevitable but unpredictable death and reborn in less fortunate circumstances.

There was also the traditional doctrine of the decline of the dharma that had been invoked in Buddhist societies throughout Asia for two millennia. It had been proclaimed that the world had passed into an age of degeneration during which all Buddhist scriptures would disappear from the world, with the only recourse being the special teaching of the sect that delivers the ominous proclamation. In the last stages of degeneration all Buddhist texts will disappear, the saffron robes of the monks will turn white (the color of the robes of the laymen), and, in the end, all of the relics of the cremated Buddha—the teeth, the bones, the fingernails, the hair—will break free from their reliquaries, the stūpas and pagodas, and magically travel to Bodhgaya where they will reassemble beneath the tree where the Buddha achieved enlightenment. There they will be worshiped one last time by the gods before they burst into flames and vanish.30

At the same time, a variety of western myths of Tibet were at play. One of these derived from the historical fact that Tibet preserved, in translation, the largest corpus of Indian Buddhist literature
in the world. But this corpus, the famous bKa’gyur and bsTan’gyur, was not kept only in Tibet. In 1829 Brian Houghton Hodgson, British resident at the Court of Nepal, acquired a complete set of block prints and deposited them at the East Indian Company’s College of Fort William. The Peking edition of the Tibetan canon had been published in Japan in 1956 and was widely available in the west. More potent was the promise of long-unknown “indigenous Tibetan literature” with its potential to bring the newly founded area of Tibetan Buddhist Studies from the margin. Tibet existed on the periphery of the two great civilizations of Asia, and was regarded as peripheral by both. For the Indians it was a distant place across the mountains, beyond Mount Kailash, where the Buddhist panditas fled from Muslim invaders. For the Chinese it was a barbaric place, whose religion was not Buddhism but lama jiao, the source of the problematic term “Lamaism.” The Tibetans had accurate translations of the Sanskrit texts, the originals of which had been long lost. But Tibetan Buddhism was not considered one of the major streams of Buddhist thought in its own right; rather, its adherents were reduced to the role of custodians in their lofty preserve, their own practice generally either condemned as the product of a complex process of degeneration, as in the opinion of Waddell, or exalted as the ethereal dwelling place of the telepathic mahatmas, preservers of Atlantean wisdom for the postdiluvian age, as was the view of the Theosophists. Reflecting on his 1948 travels in Tibet, Giuseppe Tucci, the most eminent Tibetologist of this century, wrote, “In Tibet man had not yet disintegrated; he still sank his roots fully into that collective subconscious which knows no difference between past and present.”

This perspective began to change after the diaspora of 1959, with a more historically based variation on the Theosophical theme. The view of Tibet as a closed society that had so fascinated and vexed European travelers in the colonial period now was represented as a reason Tibetan Buddhism was more authentic than any other. Tibet had never been colonized as had India and Southeast Asia, had never been “opened” to the west as had China and Japan, had never suffered a revolution as had occurred in China in 1911 and 1949, and had never attempted to adopt western ways, as had Japan since the Meiji. Rather, Tibet was seen to have resisted all foreign influence, with the monasteries forcing the thirteenth Dalai Lama to close down the English-language school in Lhasa, to abandon his plans to train a modern army, to discourage the introduction of European sports by proclaiming that he who kicks a soccer ball kicks the head of the Buddha.
All of this meant that the Buddhism of Tibet was pure and this purity derived in large part from a connection with the origin that the Tibetans themselves often invoked. Like other Buddhist traditions, the Tibetans based claims to authority largely on lineage, and in their case, they claimed that the Buddhism taught in Tibet in 1959 could be traced backward in an unbroken line to the eleventh century, when the founders of the major Tibetan sects made the perilous journey to India to receive the dharma from the great masters of Bengal, Bihar, and Kashmir, who were themselves direct recipients of teachings that could be traced back to the Buddha himself. Moreover, this lineage was represented as essentially oral, with instructions being passed down from master to disciple as unwritten commentary on sacred text. Significantly, many of these Tibetan travelers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries had also been translators. Now that lineage was in danger of extinction. There was something apocalyptic about it, as if the Tibetans, long conservators of timeless wisdom in a timeless realm, had been brutally thrust from their snowy sanctuary into history, where time was coming to an end and with it, their wisdom. For the oral tradition not to be lost, locked within the minds of aged and dying refugee lamas, it had to be passed on, and there seemed to be few Tibetans willing or able to take on the task. Those left in Tibet, where the Chinese commissar had turned on the Buddhist yogi, seemed lost, while those in India were having to cope with the body blows of modernity, moving, as was often noted, from a country which even in the twentieth century only had wheels of dharma and wheels of protection, but no wheels on wagons, multiple metaphoric vehicles to liberation, but no carts. If this were not enough, the young Tibetans appeared to be losing interest in their religion, seduced by materialism, nationalism, and rock music. There seemed to be only one group ready for the task: American graduate students.

Answering the Call

There occurred then a rather strange confluence of a Tibetan Buddhist hegemony, now made more manifest in exile, and the ideology of the nouveau Buddhologists from Europe and America. These were the circumstances at the time that I began graduate studies in Tibetan Buddhism at the University of Virginia in 1974. In 1977 I began plans for my dissertation, which was to be a study of an Indian school of Madhyamaka philosophy, drawn largely from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Tibetan doxographies. In the course of my
research, I came to participate in a variety of myths, some Tibetan, some western, about Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism, the observation of which occurs only in retrospect.

It was a requirement for the Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies at the University of Virginia that graduate students do what was called "fieldwork." Even if it had been possible to go to Tibet, there seemed to be little point: most of the monasteries had been destroyed and the remaining monks laicized during the Cultural Revolution. One would go instead to India, where the refugee lamas resided, thus imitating the travels of the eleventh-century Tibetans who left their homeland for the journey to India, where they received teachings and gathered texts. We also would journey to India, not to study with Indians, who had lost their Buddhism long ago, but with Tibetans, who had tragically been displaced from the land where Buddhism had been preserved to the land where Buddhism had been born.

As Desideri found it imperative that he understand emptiness so that he might convert the Tibetans, as Csoma de Kőröös was pressed to find the source of the Hungarian language, as Waddell felt compelled to cross the border and enter Lhasa, so there seemed a certain urgency about my studies: the need to learn to read and speak Tibetan as quickly as possible so that I might participate in the preservation of Tibetan culture, a culture that was in danger of extinction. The urgencies of Desideri, of Csoma de Kőröös, of Waddell, and myself were not merely coincidental or even just imitative of one another; they were constituents of a genealogy of urgency that shared a common referent, marked by the term "Tibet," a threatened abode of western construction, a fragile site of origin and preserve, still regarded from the periphery as a timeless center, still perceived with simultaneous nostalgia and contempt. There was nostalgia for the already lost secrets of Tibetan Buddhism. And there was a patronizing contempt for the exiled Tibetans as custodians unequal to the task of preserving their own culture without our help. That they were perceived as inadequate caretakers of that culture derives not so much from the difficult times in which they found themselves as from the fact that the culture they were charged to preserve was not of their making, but of ours.

It was known that the three great seats of the dGe lugs sect had been reestablished in south India and that many of the great scholars were there, but no one had gone there to study yet. My adviser had worked with a number of Tibetan scholars in writing his own dissertation, most of whom were associated with the Gomang (sGo mang) College of Drepung monastery. This was then my lineage as well and I
chose a seventeenth-century work by the most famous scholar of that college to serve as the basis of my dissertation, and I determined to study it under the tutelage of the greatest expert on the text among the refugee community, who was then serving as the abbot of Gomang College, relocated in south India.

My interest, like that of other graduate students, was not in the more mundane expressions of Tibetan Buddhist practice, nor in its institutions, nor its history. It was rather in what we called philosophy, the product of a long tradition of dGe lugs scholasticism and the content of training in the storied geshe curriculum. The scholastic curriculum took approximately twenty years to complete and was built around the systematic study of five Indian texts. These texts, dealing with such subjects as logic, cosmology, epistemology, monastic discipline, and the structure of the paths to enlightenment, were committed to memory. It was not uncommon for a scholar who had completed the curriculum to have committed several thousand pages of these texts and their commentaries to memory. The geshes (dge bshes), as the monks who successfully completed the curriculum were known, were believed to possess an insight into the most profound topics of Buddhist thought and it was this insight that was in danger of disappearing. It was this knowledge that I sought to capture, keep, and preserve for the world before it was too late. This seemed at the time a noble task, far nobler than, for example, studying the kinds of rituals of blessings and exorcism that Waddell had cataloged, whose description would only tend to reinforce the view that Tibetan Buddhism is obsessed with magic. It seemed preferable to focus on those works that would legitimate Tibetan Buddhism, showing that it, too, had philosophy, a philosophy which, unlike its more mundane rituals, was not culturally determined, but which deserved to be placed alongside or even above the classics of the west for its profound insights into the perennial questions.

This was the task; the method was translation. Translation not of the words, which presumably could have been accomplished without leaving the comforts of America, but translation of the meaning, enhanced and supplemented with the lama's oral commentary. But my purpose was very different from that of Orientalists of the previous century, as Max Müller had described them in 1862:

Sanskrit scholars resident in India enjoy considerable advantages over those who devote themselves to the study of the ancient literature of the Brahmans in this country, or in France and Germany. . . . [T]here are few large towns in which we do not meet with some more or less learned natives. . . . These
men, who formerly lived on the liberality of the Rajahs and on the supersti-
tion of the people, find it more and more difficult to make a living among
their own countrymen, and are glad to be employed by any civilian or office
who takes an interest in their ancient lore. Though not scholars in our sense
of the word, and therefore of little use as teachers of the language, they are
extremely useful to more advanced students, who are able to set them to do
that kind of work for which they are fit, and to check their labors by judicious
supervision. All our great Sanskrit scholars from Sir William Jones to H. H.
Wilson, have fully acknowledged their obligations to their native assistants.
They used to work in Calcutta, Benares, and Bombay with a pandit at each
elbow, instead of the grammar and dictionary which European scholars have
to consult at every difficult passage.\textsuperscript{35}

I did not go to India to use the lama as a walking dictionary, as Orien-
talists had done in the previous century, although that was also part
of his value. Nor would the lama's commentary be the interlinear
translation that Benjamin prescribes for the sacred text, but an invis-
ible commentary; not a translation deriving from the afterlife of the
text, but, with the lama's word, an isomorphic rendering of the au-
thor's intention, as passed down orally from teacher to student,
traced back ultimately to the author himself. That author, in turn,
had written his text based on what he had been taught by his teachers,
traced back, of course, to the Buddha.

This particular vision of Tibetan culture seems in retrospect to
be of a piece with what has been variously referred to as salvage eth-
nography, redemptive ethnography, or the ethnographic pastoral.
George Marcus speaks of what he calls "the salvage mode" in which
"signs of fundamental change are apparent, but the ethnographer is
able to salvage a cultural state on the verge of transformation." Here,
the current surviving elements of cultural authenticity in the midst of
change are located in terms of a temporal or spatial preserve, such as
a premodern "golden age" or a remote, and thus untainted, locale.\textsuperscript{36}
The ethnographer's task is to represent the culture, in writing, in that
moment before its imminent loss, just as I attempted to capture the
lamas' wisdom before they succumbed to history.

It was first necessary to get there, which entailed applying for
grants. I was told that the government of India was not well disposed
toward projects that involved working with Tibetans and under no
circumstances would it approve a project that proposed study with
Tibetans outside of Delhi or Benares. It was therefore necessary to
craft the first of many dissimulations and disguises; the means of ac-
cess to secret knowledge seemed to remain closed, even outside Tibet.
So I proposed to study a chapter of a second-century Sanskrit text with scholars at Delhi University, which had the only Department of Buddhist Studies in India. That grant once received, it was necessary to determine the best means of getting to the monastery, located in an area of restricted access to foreigners, as Tibet itself had been since the reign of Qianlong. I was advised to make application to the Department of Rehabilitation of the Home Ministry, which had jurisdiction over the monasteries, officially known as Lama Camps. It was important, however, that I not reveal that I was a graduate student on a government grant (it was important above all, I was warned, that the Department of Rehabilitation not suspect that I was an anthropologist), but rather to represent myself as a Buddhist layman seeking to visit the monastery in order to practice my religion. The Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in New Delhi provided me with a letter to that effect which I carried to the director of the appropriate department, who advised me that I could apply for a one-month pass, but it would take several weeks for the pass to be processed. The disguise had worked. Those weeks turned into months, during which time I tried to make do, studying with monks in Dharamsala and Delhi, frustrated that they were either young, having received the bulk of their training after leaving Tibet, or of the wrong college, outside the specific lineage of the author of my text. In each case, what I learned was useful but, I felt, inauthentic. It was necessary for me to go to the south, to don a disguise and cross the boundary into the restricted area, where the old monks lived and where their lineage of teachings had not been tainted by entering the ears of foreigners.

In The Monastery

On February 4, 1979, I arrived by taxi at a place called Mundgod, near the town of Hubli in Karnataka state in southwest India. In Mundgod stood the refugee versions of two of the three great seats of the dGe lugs pa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. These were the monasteries of Ganden and Drepung, which in their original locations outside of Lhasa housed 5,000 and 12,000 monks, respectively, Drepung being the largest Buddhist monastery in the world. In 1979, now known officially as Lama Camp No. 1 and Lama Camp No. 2, each housed approximately 300 monks, most of whom were children. In due time I was escorted around the monastery to meet the various dignitaries: the abbots, ex-abbots, and incarnate lamas. I was told that the abbot of Gomang College, the monk whom I had come so far
to meet, was away, having been called to mediate a land dispute between Tibetan farmers near Mysore. He would be away for a month. I had only planned to stay for six weeks.

To each of the lamas I met, I explained that I had come to study this particular text with this particular abbot and they all commented duly on the difficulty of the text and the great learning of the abbot. At some point, I was led into what was little more than a hut, where in the middle of the stone floor sat an elderly monk. He wore only his dull yellow lower robe and a white undershirt, the sleeveless strap kind that old men wear. He was the ex-abbot of the other college of Drepung; in Tibet there has been a long political and scholastic rivalry between the two colleges. I went through my now well-rehearsed accounting for my presence, explaining that I was there to study with the abbot of the other college. He seemed not to mind, saying that all lamas teach pretty much the same thing, the only difference is that when they give examples, some use a pillar and some use a pot (the two standard examples used in Tibetan Buddhist logic). “Both are impermanent,” I responded, demonstrating my knowledge of Buddhist philosophy. He laughed. This ex-abbot was now devoting all of his time to teaching, lecturing to six different classes a day, ranging from ten-year-olds learning the basics of Buddhist epistemology to forty-year-old monks studying the arcane codes of monastic discipline. Later than day, before supper, I was walking around the monastery, the day of formalities done, when I encountered the old ex-abbot. This time he was wearing his full robes. Now standing, taller than me, he looked rather formidable. He took me by the hand and we began to walk together as he went to an evening assembly. “I’m quite busy these days,” he said, “but I’ll teach you whatever you wish.” My chief informant had found me.

What I describe could very well be translated into the vocabulary of ethnography. The fieldworker arrives for the first time at the site, makes the appropriate contacts with the hierarchs of the society, learns some of the etiquette of interaction, chooses a native informant, and establishes the all-important rapport. But the rapport was the product of a complex overlay of categories, achieved only by a certain slippage in lines of demarcation. I was a foreigner, a layman, an American, relatively speaking, quite wealthy, and a student. He was a Tibetan, a monk, a refugee in India, a famous scholar and retired abbot, in exile. As a foreigner I had gained entry into one of the major monastic centers of Tibetan Buddhism, but only in its refugee incarnation. This would have seemed impossible in pre-1959 Tibet, but now the monastery was a stateless institution deprived of its past
enormous wealth, where I was welcomed, but chiefly (I suspected) for my potential as a patron, being requested constantly by the monastery administration to support building projects, to buy raffle tickets, to translate appeals for donations. I was frequently invited by individual monks to elaborate meals which ended in the request that I become their “sponsor,” one of the few English words they knew.

At the same time there was a certain resentment at my presence in a place where I did not really seem to fit. The former abbot was one of the three highly respected scholars in the monastic college and so was in great demand as a teacher, his entire day filled with classes of up to twenty young monks in his small room. He had now agreed to teach me for an hour and a half a day, disrupting his schedule and those of his students. Mine were almost always private classes, with another monk occasionally sitting in. When I would come for my class and stand waiting outside his room, one of the monks would announce, “The inji is here,” using not the more proper term for foreigner, phyi rgyal ba (“one from an outer kingdom”), but inji, the Tibetan term for “English” used commonly to name all Europeans and Americans, at least from the time of the Younghusband invasion, the most significant encounter with westerners in Tibetan cultural memory.

But I was not wholly other because I spoke the language. In 1951, Evans-Pritchard, stressing the absolute necessity of complete fluency in the native’s tongue, wrote, “To understand a people’s thought one has to think in their symbols.” In 1982, Marcus and Cushman listed nine conventions of ethnographic writing, the last of which was “a reticence by the authors to discuss their competence in the Other’s language.” The Tibetan language is often divided into two forms: the religious language (chos skad) and the common language (phal skad). My training had been almost exclusively in the former, such that I could understand and participate in discussions of technical scholastic topics with effort but could describe life in America, for example, in only the most simple terms. To be able to speak Tibetan at all as a foreigner was quite anomalous in Mundgod. The anomaly was multiplied by the fact that I, a foreigner and a layman, could talk about, albeit haltingly, and wanted to study, the things that monks study.

In Tibetan society there was a rather clear demarcation between the roles of monks and laypeople, a demarcation that seemed to be rigidified in exile. In Tibet only about 25 percent of the monks at the three great monasteries around Lhasa had been engaged in the scholastic curriculum and of these only a small portion went beyond
rather elementary levels. The rest of the monks pursued a variety of occupations, employed either by the monasteries or engaged in their own businesses. There were monks whose task it was to propitiate the protective deities of the monastery, there were monks who cooked and brewed vats of Tibetan tea, and monks who took for themselves the task of enforcing order. These last were the infamous ldab-ldobs, a category without a precise analog in the history of western monasticism, something of a cross between an athletic fraternity and a police force.38

Laypeople made offerings to monasteries or to individual monks in the form of money, grain, tea, and butter. They would receive blessings from incarnate lamas at public festivals or teachings, and could pay monks to read scriptures or perform rituals of protection or exorcism, or to provide advice about the future through a variety of forms of divination. More wealthy laypeople might donate funds for the printing of texts or make a large offering to a monastic college or house in which each monk would be provided tea and tsampa (roasted barley flour that is the staple of the Tibetan diet) and a small amount of money. It was quite rare for a layman to study the scholastic literature or to speak the scholastic language, which the lay community seemed to regard with some pride as incomprehensible. The monk-layman occupational division was changed in exile, where almost all of the monks were engaged in the scholastic curriculum at some level. At the same time, the land owned by the monastery was no longer cultivated by tenant farmers, as it had been in Tibet, but by the monks themselves. The older monks sometimes lamented the time that was lost from study, heightening the contrast between their present situation in exile and that of pre-1959 Tibet, where there seemed always to have been time.

Because I had studied at the University of Virginia, where the Buddhist Studies program was to some degree modeled on the monastic curriculum, I had had some of the indoctrination of the scholar-monks; I had studied some of the same texts, albeit in very different contexts. It was this minimal shared vocabulary that allowed us to speak. For me to remark to the former abbot that a pillar and a pot are both impermanent was to indicate knowledge of the code, making me, in some limited sense, an insider. The first thing that the monks wanted to know was whether I had studied mtshan nyid, which might be rendered as “dogmatics,” the hermetic discourse the mastery of which determined status in the monastery. This was how they placed me. Yet, as a foreigner who had come to study Madhyamaka (which the Tibetans considered the most profound of
all philosophical schools), I fit neither the category of the monk nor the layman and occasionally would feel pushed in one direction or the other. When talking with an abbot one day while he was having his head shaved by another monk, I was invited to sit in the chair when he was finished. I could resist such suggestions by pointing out that I was married (in colloquial expression, literally, “I possess one of inferior birth” [nga la skyes dman yod]). When I would ask what projects I might support to improve the living conditions of the monks, I was often directed toward such traditional lay roles as sponsoring the printing of books or the casting of buddha images or paying for a ceremony in which I would pay for the monks’ morning tea and then walk down the rows of assembled monks, giving each Rs 1 (at that time approximately eight cents). In From Anxiety to Method, George Devereux explores the problem of what he called “elicited countertransference,” that situation in which the participant-observer fails to realize “that his subjects force him into the procrustean bed of an ascribed status, chosen in accordance with their own needs.”

In my case, I was unwilling to accept the role which would have most clearly justified my study, that is, the role of a monk, but I was willing to accept the role of the Buddhist layman, paying for ceremonies and building projects when I felt the money could be better spent on diet and hygiene.

For all this I was perceived as being quite wealthy. Indeed, I was told later that the monthly stipend for the Fulbright Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad grant at that time exceeded the salary of the prime minister of India. Although I had come seeking their wisdom, to sit at the lama’s feet, a great deal of power rested with me, with the monks acceding to my requests (usually for books) which they probably felt unable to refuse. Despite their pride in the scholastic tradition, it seemed baffling to them that someone from America, which they envisioned as something akin to a Buddhist Pure Land, should want to live in their dry and dusty little monastery, where even they felt out of place. I would explain that I was there to write a book that would make me a teacher of Buddhism in America. But this only perplexed them more; that a person whose knowledge of Buddhist doctrine was so limited, who on the debating courtyard never seemed to get beyond the more dull-witted fifteen-year-olds, should be on the verge of becoming a teacher of Buddhism in America seemed to induce an incredulity that I soon began to share.

Toward the end of the first of my two stays at the monastery (the first of six weeks, the second of four months) the abbot of Gomang for whom I had been waiting so long finally returned to the monas-
tery. He agreed to read my text with me, but when I arrived for the first class and set up my tape recorder, he protested. The tape recorder was my primary instrument for recording the precious oral commentary, and without it much of my purpose was lost. But he insistently refused to allow me to record his voice, explaining that his dentures distorted the sound of his voice, something he did not want preserved. I was left to ask questions and take notes. Throughout he seemed bored by the process, always finding ways of changing the subject, often to a book he was writing about tea. His primary interest in me seemed to be the number of languages in which I knew the word for "tea" and how those might be rendered in Tibetan transliteration.

Forbidden to capture the lama’s voice because he had no teeth, I now placed my hopes in the former abbot of the other college of the monastery, while continuing to visit the Gomang abbot occasionally in order to maintain good relations with both of the rival colleges of the monastery. I would now go every afternoon to the room of the former abbot, wait until his class was over and then go in, bow down three times, and sit on the floor in front of him. He would be sitting on a wooden platform about a foot high, covered with Tibetan rugs, that also served as his bed. There was a small wooden table in front of us on which he would place the text; I would set up the microphone next to it. The text then rested between us, laid open, with a microphone beside it, there to record the words that would animate the writing. After chatting briefly, he would ask me where we had stopped last time and then begin reading from the previous page, going over what he had read the day before, sometimes at great length, so that in some cases we progressed only a few lines beyond the previous day’s terminus. The sessions lasted about 90–100 minutes.

His approach was to begin by simply reading the sentence aloud, sometimes twice. He would then paraphrase it, which often meant nothing more than changing the verb from the classical to the colloquial form. If the sentence was something that he had nothing to say about, he would go on, unless I stopped him to ask a question. Often he would ask me whether I had understood, by asking, “Is it all right?” before proceeding. The text that he was reading from was one that I had chosen, an eighteenth-century doxography which offered syntheses of the tenets of the four Indian schools of Buddhist philosophy. It was a well-known work but one which was not included in the standard geshe curriculum of any of the dGe lugs colleges. The ex-abbot did not own a copy of the text and I was not sure whether he had ever read it, nor did he seem to have read ahead to prepare for the
Donald S. Lopez, IR classes, because he sometimes would seem surprised or puzzled by something in the text, in which case he would return to that point the next day, obviously having given the matter some thought the night before. His accumulated knowledge of the major works upon which the doxography was based seemed sufficient to allow him to expound, often in great detail, on points that he felt were important. He would dwell especially on those topics that received particular attention in the geshe curriculum, explaining how they were understood by one college as opposed to another and how the points would be debated between them. I very rarely spoke except to ask a brief question or to ask him to repeat something I had missed. When I was tired I often let statements pass without understanding them, knowing that I could go back and listen to the tape and, if still confused, bring my question the next day. The session would end when he said, “Shall we stop there?” Sometimes we would pass the point to which I had prepared and I would ask if we could stop. Especially long sessions would end when I had not brought enough tape. He would then offer me a drink called Orange Squash, an artificial fruit concentrate that was poured into a glass of water. I would always apologize by saying that foreigners could not drink the water because it made us sick, at which point he would call for one of the young monks to go buy us a small pot of sweet milk tea at the monastery kitchen. This would be brought in a few minutes, and we would drink the tea out of tin cups and talk; he would usually tell me about monastery life in Tibet.

Most of the day was spent in my room, reading and writing. I was often frustrated by the fact that this was indeed a monastery, where there were a great many assemblies, ceremonies, and debates which the ex-abbot attended, requiring that our classes be canceled. There was a daily schedule and monthly calendar that I never fully understood. Much of my typing was done to the background sound of several hundred monks chanting in the main hall fifty yards from my room, their rhythms punctuated by blaring horns, beating drums, clashing cymbals, and the foghorn blasts of the great trumpets. It was in this setting that the creation of the English text took place.

It was there that I tried to synthesize two very different models of authority. From the Tibetan perspective, which I sought to appropriate, there seemed to be a powerful investment in the spoken word. For me to sit at the lama’s feet was to imitate the setting of a Buddhist sutra: “Thus did I hear at one time. The Buddha was seated on Vulture Peak surrounded by a great assembly of monks and a great assembly of bodhisattvas,” one which is evoked in all teachings in

which the student is instructed to imagine the teacher as the Buddha. The centrality of hearing the words from the mouth of the teacher is evident everywhere. There is, for example, the case of lung, a term used to render both the Sanskrit term āgama, generally translated as “scripture,” as well as the term vyākarana (as in lung bstan), with its two denotations of “explanation” by the Buddha (usually in answer to a question) and of “prophecy,” notably the Buddha’s prediction that a particular disciple will become a buddha at a specified time in the far distant future. But most commonly, when Tibetans speak of receiving lung they are referring to a ritual in which one is granted permission to engage in a specific meditation or study a specific text through hearing the text that serves as the foundation of the practice. This hearing is often accomplished through a form of speed-reading in which the lama races through the text at a pace that makes the apprehension of any meaning nearly impossible. But grasping the meaning does not seem to be the point, it is rather that the student hear what the teacher heard from his teacher, who heard it from his teacher; this transmission of the text, without a word of explanation, is a participation in origin, the kind of commentary that Foucault describes as “agitated from within by the dream of masked repetition: in the distance there is, perhaps, nothing other than what was there at the point of departure: simple recitation.”

Something similar seems to be at play in times of crisis in the monastery or community, when the canon is recited. The 108 volumes of the word of the Buddha are taken from their place in the temple and carried in a procession around the monastery. They are then all read, not in chorus but in cacophony, as each monk takes a different portion of a volume and reads it aloud at the top of his lungs as his fellows read other portions until every page of the canon has been spoken. (Such a ceremony took place during my time at the monastery in order to speed the arrival of the monsoon.) There is also the convention that to study a text, it is not sufficient merely to read it; one must receive oral instruction upon it from a teacher who has in turn received such instruction in the past.

Buddhist Studies, as it has developed in the west, privileges, on the surface, a very different locus of authority. Buddhist Studies has long placed its faith in the text, to be excavated with philology and explicated with comparative philosophy, with no need for living Buddhists. Its progenitors are scholars like Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Max Müller, and Arthur Waley, who never visited Asia during their distinguished careers as translators, participants in the nineteenth-century assumption that it is the task of the western scholar to recover
the classical traditions of Asia from their ancient texts, traditions that have been either lost or corrupted by the modern inhabitants of the continent. The residue of this assumption still lingers, with the scholar's primary task remaining the establishment of a critical edition of his chosen text, which may or may not then be translated. From such a perspective, the ephemeral words of Buddhist monks carry very little weight, for how is their validity to be judged unless they can be located also in a text?

I was left to negotiate between two traditions, one that located authority in the word, the other in the text, as I now begin to write what was to be judged as my own text, the means to establish my own authority in the western academy. I would sit at the typewriter translating the Tibetan text based on what I had learned from the lama, trying to weave his commentary into my rendering of the words on the page. And indeed, his commentary was indispensable in the ostensibly simple task of gaining a rudimentary grasp of the meanings of the words, because the text I was translating, like so many others, was part of the vast intertextual yet hermetic world of Buddhist doctrine, with allusions so thick as to be incomprehensible without the lama’s word. But beyond the translation there was the matter of how to handle his extensive elaborations on the text. I decided to write an introduction to the translation which would explore the points that he had raised. This introduction, constructed from the tapes, eventually grew to exceed the length of the translation itself, making the translation in effect an appendix, a supplement to the commentary. His words were obviously deeply embedded in scholastic literature and, in order to satisfy Buddhological demands of reference to a text, I made every effort to trace his explanations to a written source, to find what he had said already inscribed in a book. This was usually possible eventually, but there remained points that seemed original to him, who was the author of no text, at least in the Buddhological sense. From these strands I wove my own text, taking the words I had heard in the day, repeating the act of hearing at night, but this time listening to his disembodied voice emanating from the speaker of the tape recorder, and translating those words into my English text. But how should these be referenced? I ended up footnoting such points as “oral commentary of Ye shes Thub brtan” although they were words which only I had heard, recorded on cheap cassettes that disintegrated over the years, years during which he died. I moved then from the role of listener, to that of recorder, transcriber, translator, and finally, author, with the name of the lama marginalized to the acknowledgments at the beginning and the footnotes at the end.
Yet the words of the lama, the oral commentary, were already a text, when writing is seen not only as a technology in its more narrow sense, as a mechanism that leads to new intellectual practices and hence new ways of producing consciousness in society (as important as this is in the history of Buddhism). Writing is also a technology in the wider sense, as a more amorphous, pervasively deployed, institutional practice. It is in this wider sense that one could argue that even if the lama’s words were never turned into the shapes of Tibetan letters and carved in relief and backwards into a wooden block to create a xylograph, even if they were never translated into English and typed by me onto a page of paper, they were still already written. If writing is seen as “the durable institution of a sign,” as a means for recording speech so that it can be repeated in the absence of the original speaker and without knowledge of the speaker’s intention, then all linguistic signs are a form of writing. Here at the monastery, the original speaker, the eighteenth-century author of the text I was translating, was absent, as was the ur-speaker from which all Buddhist speech is seen ultimately to derive, the Buddha himself. The Buddha was absent although his signs were everywhere. What the lama provided was merely a commentary on those words, which carried with it the unspoken claim to know that ur-speaker’s intention. Taking my place in the unbroken line of transmission, it was my task to also produce a commentary, a commentary in Foucault’s sense: “Commentary questions discourse as to what it says and intended to say; it tries to uncover the deeper meaning of speech that enables it to achieve an identity with itself, supposedly nearer to its essential truth; in other words in stating what has been said, one has to re-state what has never been said.” My assumption was that there was an essential meaning that had been transmitted from master to student, and which was now being transferred from this master to this student, through the endless elaboration of commentary. And it was, further, my task to create my own commentary, through translation, tapping “the inexhaustible reserve” of the signified. The task was to bring the essential meaning closer to its self-identity, to create “the prolix discourse which is both more archaic and more contemporary” than the recorded words of my teacher: more archaic because I knew the history of the complex of allusions that is Buddhist philosophy in a way that my teacher did not. I could trace his citations of passages, drawn from his memory, back to the texts which were their source and I could check his versions against the originals, accounting for the variants. More contemporary because I was preserving the endangered commentary in English and recasting it to conform to the stan-
dards of Buddhological science, giving physical form to his oral text, turning it into a scholarly commodity to be weighed, cataloged, and deposited in the archive. I could thus participate in the Buddhist myth of the essential presence of the dharma to be translated and transmitted, and take pride in my part in rescuing it from its prophesied disappearance, so greatly hastened by the People’s Liberation Army. At the same time, however, I claimed the vantage point from which to observe my text, not on the surface of the timeless and hence ahistorical present I imagined my teacher to inhabit, but with an X-ray vision that allowed me to see into the depths of its history, even to its origin, most hidden yet most fundamental, giving myself over to one authority while claiming another, all the while remaining blind to the practices of domination of which I was both agent and object. As Robert Young notes, “Those who evoke the ‘nativist’ position through a nostalgia for a lost or repressed culture idealize the possibility of that lost origin being recoverable from its former plenitude without allowing the fact that the figure of the lost origin, the ‘other’ that the colonizer has repressed, has itself been constructed in terms of the colonizer’s own self-image.”

From such a perspective, the Buddhologist engaged in the study of Tibetan Buddhism is faced with a dilemma, deriving from a relation to the text and a relation to the lama. The relation to the text may be termed hermeneutical in Gadamer’s sense, to the extent that the text is judged as a historical object with which the modern scholar must somehow come to terms. The nature and consequences of these terms remain to be adequately defined in Buddhist Studies, where principles of interpretation have rarely passed beyond elementary problems of translation, seeking to determine what the words mean. That the translation of a single text remains a primary focus of the field and a fundamental rite of passage in the writing of the dissertation suggests that the nineteenth-century vision of Buddhism as a collection of texts in the possession of the west is still very much present, the process of appropriation being furthered incrementally as those thousands of texts are transferred one by one from an Asian language to a western one. Yet the fact that this is a process of appropriation should not obscure the degree to which Buddhist Studies imitates that which it seeks to decode, for one of the most persistent and powerful metaphors in the history of Buddhism is that of transmission, that beyond the statues and the relics and the books, all surrogates for the absent Buddha, there is a dharma to be passed from teacher to student and from culture to culture, and that dharma can be translated from one language to another without that essence being lost, a
conviction held by the kings and emperors of Asia who supported the enterprise of translation, an enterprise supported today by Chinese and Japanese industrialists.

The other dilemma of the scholar of Tibetan Buddhism may be termed ethnographic in the sense that it entails coming to some understanding of the implications of his (or, less often, her) relationship to contemporary Tibetan culture. There is an immediate difference between Tibetan Buddhist Studies and classical ethnography. Evans-Pritchard declared in the ante-Derridian age, “Primitives have no texts.”47 The Tibetans certainly do, and this is where what might be termed the hermeneutical and ethnographic dilemmas of Tibetan Buddhist Studies collide, in the moment of reading texts from which one is alienated by time, under the tutelage of lamas from whom one is alienated by culture.

As texts and artifacts, Buddhism as a cultural object could be controlled from Europe. Tibet could remain valued as a repository of translations of Sanskrit texts long lost and the ancient depository of Sanskrit manuscripts long thought lost, but discovered by Sankrityayana and Tucci. The Buddhism of Tibet could at the same time remain the object of scholarly neglect as a barely recognizable mutation of the Indian original, as described by Waddell. Even those who made extensive studies of Tibetan Buddhist literature felt somehow compelled to posit a classical age for Tibetan Buddhist civilization, an age, of course, long past:

For a long time a great number of masters and doctors were educated in the convents, who delved deep into lore received from India, shed light on it with notes and commentaries and stayed as faithful to the systems of interpretation followed in the great Indian universities as no Chinese or Japanese ever did. . . . Hardening of the arteries set in with the double threat of formulas replacing the mind’s independent striving after truth, and a withered theology taking the place of the yearning for spiritual rebirth. A tendency to formalism and worship of the letter gained ground on spiritual research.48

This was the reaction of a European Buddhologist who, visiting Tibetan monasteries in 1948, found monks reading, memorizing, and debating about the classical works of Indian Buddhist philosophy that had long been held within the exclusive purview of the west; their study in twentieth-century Tibet is dismissed as yet another sign of degeneration from a golden age.

Since the Tibetan diaspora the existence of extensive Tibetan commentary and exegesis has once again had to be confronted. This is the dilemma of the relation to the lama. An opposite reaction from
Tucci's has occurred, portraying the oral commentary on these texts as a cultural treasure in danger of extinction as Tibetan society has been pushed by the Chinese from their ahistorical past into the maelstrom of history, a history where, some seem to say, they cannot survive. Now the westerner who goes to study among the refugees often appears to be engaging in a New Age anthropology as cultural critique, not only portraying the old Tibet as an idyllic agrarian society, but also as a land of lamas, endowed with ancient, sometimes secret, wisdom and ruled benevolently by a Buddha.49 (To this has been added in recent years the view of Tibet as an environmentally enlightened realm.) Tibet thus has become subject to what Fabian has called "chronopolitics," in which the society under anthropological scrutiny is portrayed as occupying a time other than that of the anthropologist.50 Pre-1959 Tibet was seen as an atemporal civilization, isolated and above the world, possessed of a timeless wisdom, undifferentiated from the "collective unconscious," a land before the fall. With exile in 1959, Tibetan culture descends into history, the site of danger andextinction. Once they have entered our time, their value is measured by what they carry from the timeless. Hence, my interest was to record the words of the old lamas, those who had received their training in Tibet, rather than those trained in exile, seeing the old lamas as remnants, artifacts of the other time.

Once Tibetan culture was perceived as struggling for survival under the threat of history, the salvage mentality easily set in, fed from two sides. From the side of the tradition itself, there was the powerful rhetoric of the oral transmission, the word to be passed on, the words being those of Madhyamaka philosophy, regarded as the most sublime of Buddhist doctrines, and expounded by the dGe lugs pas as their unique claim to doxographical triumph. From the other side was the long-established priority in Buddhist Studies of the preservation of the text, for salvage has been an essential activity in the construction of Buddhism as a textual object since the time of Hodgson. Manuscripts have been searched for, discovered, taken from Asia so that they can be preserved, and once in Europe, edited into critical editions, with grammatical and scribal errors corrected. These were texts that were seen as cultural artifacts of modern Asian societies, but from an earlier time, a classical period, that modern Asians had long forgotten and thereby forfeited any rights to: those responsible for the decay could not be trusted with the treasures. Hence, there was disquiet upon discovering that Tibetan monks had been studying, memorizing, and debating these classical texts since their translation from Sanskrit for almost a millennium. One re-
sponse to the Tibetans’ possession of what European Buddhist Studies had thought was theirs alone was to dismiss the Tibetan tradition of study, as Tucci had, as turgid and desiccated scholasticism.

But another strategy was also available, one which carried not the contemptuous air of the more familiar Orientalism, but one which seemed somehow more moral. This was my practice of gathering the oral teaching, something that was difficult before 1959 but possible in exile. It was in exile, with Tibetan cultural capital exposed to western evaluation (supported by academic institutions), that it could be appropriated. With the motivation of salvaging what was in danger of extinction without our help, the discourse of Tibetan Buddhism, which had remained outside the reach of Buddhological appropriation and colonial power, was now available for exploitation.

However, the mere recording of the words was insufficient. Buddhology demanded that the words be transformed into a text. Seeking to gain the authenticity traditionally associated with the lama’s speech while at the same time controlling the production of the text inevitably involved what de Certeau has termed “the circularity between the production of the Other and the production of the text.” In order to transform the words of the former abbot into a text, he must in turn be transformed into a source to be cited, something that could be footnoted and so be cited by others. It was his voice that was sought out, discovered, taken from Asia so that it could be preserved, and once in America, edited into a text with his errors corrected and his own sources tracked down, all as part of the eternal quest of the Buddhologist to bring the textual corpus under control, to trace the last allusion: “The discourse that sets off in search of the other with the impossible task of saying the truth returns from afar with the authority to speak in the name of the other and command belief.” But, as de Certeau notes, “The written discourse which cites the speech of the other is not, cannot be, the discourse of the other. On the contrary, this discourse, in writing the Fable that authorizes it, alters it.” The fable that authorizes the discourse is the fable of the oral transmission, of the line that can, they say, be traced back to the origin, to the seat beneath the tree, and it is the fable of Tibet, of the timeless reliquary smashed open in time.

Hence, my purpose was not to participate in the life of the monastery but rather to take what I needed. And what I needed was what the monastery judged its most precious possession, the learning of its teachers. I did not go to monastery to study its structure, or the role of tea in its ritual life, but to attempt to appropriate something of the elite status of the geshe. I sought to effect this appropriation by receiv-
ing instruction on the most profound of topics, emptiness, from one of the most learned living Tibetan scholars. As Dr. Brodie reports in his ethnography of the Mlch, "The tribesmen are proscribed from lifting their gaze to the stars, a privilege accorded only to witch doctors." Thus, I gained a certain status by virtue of the fact that I was receiving private instruction from the former abbot on this difficult topic. It was the very topic on which the geshes of Se ra would not instruct Ippolito Desideri, either because they would not "teach emptiness to the untrained" or because, secure in their powerful monastery in Tibet, they felt no constraint to teach a foreigner bent on refuting them. Perhaps they found in me a more "suitable vessel" for the most profound of doctrines, or perhaps, more plausibly, as impoverished refugees they hoped for my "sponsorship." This was a privilege which I exploited, as I requested and received private instruction from one of the monastery's most eminent scholars, something that would have been impossible in Tibet. But in India the situation was different. He was a stateless refugee, living in relative poverty. I came to the former British colony carrying rupees owed by the Indian government for American wheat, rupees which I exchanged for his knowledge. Throughout, teacher and student, lama and disciple, informant and graduate student remained fixed on the meaning of the text, both convinced that sufficient exegesis would lead to the recovery of the deep meaning, in short, both concerned with hermeneutics, but with one also taking something away from the other.

Cultural envy can manifest itself in a variety of forms: through scorn, as in the case of those who dismiss the Tibetan tradition of the exegesis of Indian texts as a myopic mechanism of repetition; as fantasy, as in the case of myriad European representations of Tibet in the nineteenth century; and through mimesis. It was this last expression of cultural envy that I practiced. I was imitating the lama-disciple relationship as a means of creating a text. In doing so, I was occupied simultaneously by both the Buddhological and ethnographic mentality. From the former I derived the supervaluation of the text and the concomitant devaluation of the word of the contemporary Buddhist monk. From the latter I derived the sense of urgency at the fate of Tibetan Buddhist wisdom and a role for myself as an agent of its preservation. To this end, I allowed the native to speak as my informant, but in the end I wove his words into a text in which his voice was hidden, the mimetic serving as the mode of production of the text.

In a fundamental sense, the Buddhological and ethnographic enterprises as I have characterized them are hermeneutical in that both are plumbing the depths, through a variety of methods, to arrive
at the hidden meaning. The text was regarded as something to be deciphered to arrive at its meaning, and the former abbot served a double function: as a supplement to the text itself and as the authority who, already having himself gained knowledge of the meaning of the text, would lead me to it, a meaning which I could then see and acknowledge, and “translate,” providing me the liberation I sought (whether it be from samsara or graduate school). It was as if the ethnographer’s camera of the epigraph remained locked in focus on the text, like a manuscript to be photographed and preserved on microfilm, while the dead eye of the dummy lens, directed at the right angle, remained blind to the conditions of the production of the text, to the use of the text, to the role of the subject in the construction of the text, laying claim to its meaning but failing to see its own role in the construction of that meaning.52 In my case, it was the tape recorder rather than the camera that was used to capture the native, allowing me to record and carry away the lama’s voice, the precious oral transmission, to be transformed into my dissertation, my silent text. If my lama was somehow being deceived in the process, the deception was never greater than my own, imagining that it was somehow possible to be the disciple of an Asian master while at the same time using this “experience” as a means of gaining my credentials as an Orientalist, of becoming a master of Asia myself. In his critique of participant-observation Pierre Bourdieu writes:

“Participant” anthropology, for its part—when not merely inspired by nostalgia for agrarian paradises, the principle of all conservative ideologies—regards the anthropological invariants and the universality of the most basic experiences as sufficient justification for seeking eternal answers to the eternal questions of cosmologies and cosmogonies in the practical answers which the peasants of Kabylia or elsewhere have given to the practical, historically situated problems that were forced on them in a given state of their instruments for material and symbolic appropriation of the world. By cutting practices off from their real conditions of existence, in order to credit them with alien intentions, out of false generosity conducive to stylistic effects, the exaltation of lost wisdom dispossesses them of everything that constitutes their reason and their raison d’être, and locks them in the eternal essence of a “mentality.”53

Bourdieu writes of an Islamic mountain society of Algeria but his caveat pertains equally to the case of Tibet, a mountain society of Inner Asia with its own enticing rhetoric of eternal answers to eternal questions and of lost wisdom. Crossing the border into the restricted area and entering the monastery made it easy to forget the intersecting histories that resulted in my encounter with the lama, pretending that I
could somehow appropriate his symbolic world and then leave, taking his mentality with me. I saw the historically situated problem of his having to flee his country only as my opportunity to record the words of one recently driven from his Buddhist (and also agrarian) paradise before those words were lost. In the case of Tibet, the compulsion to resort to hermeneutics, the compulsion to transcend and thus forget the historical situatedness, both of the observer and the observed, is also difficult, but no less important to resist.

The end of the day at the monastery, after the evening debating session, after dark, was the time to recite. A significant portion of the training of a Tibetan monk involves the memorization of hundreds and sometimes thousands of pages of texts. In order to keep things memorized before from being forgotten, monks would walk around the grounds of the monastery at night, alone or in pairs, reciting aloud the pages they knew by heart. At that same hour I would usually be typing in my room under a bare lightbulb, the single window in the room, a barred window (to keep out thieves I was told), open to let in the night breeze. In their nightly circuit the monks would often pause outside the window to watch me type, reciting all the while. Unlike the zombies at the window in The Night of the Living Dead, their presence was something that I did not fear. I see in retrospect that it was their words that I was typing, the bars on the window and the multitude of voices preventing me from getting it all down on paper, those long sheets of Indian paper in which the chips of wood from which the page was made are still visible.

But this examination of the forces at play during my days at the monastery should not end without describing how it ended, with a ritual of departure, a participation in omission. Before departing from the teacher, it is traditional for him to begin to teach a new text so that the student may someday return to hear the rest. Before departing from the teacher, it is traditional that the student not bow down, as he would at the end of the day’s teaching, signifying that the teaching has not ended, but is only interrupted. This suggests the possibility (or at least the dream) of someday returning to the monastery to read once again, having stopped believing in the nostalgic meta-narratives, both theirs and ours, that have so far captivated us all.

NOTES

1. The Capuchin mission to Tibet had been abandoned in 1710. However, in October 1716, just seven months after Desideri’s arrival in
Lhasa, three Capuchin fathers appeared at Desideri’s residence in Lhasa, informing him that they had written to Rome with the demand that the mission belonged to the Capuchins and no other order would be permitted in Tibet. Desideri reports that he replied that he would comply with their request and leave Tibet as soon as the order arrived from the College de Propaganda Fide in Rome. Such an order was received in 1721. One of the three Capuchin fathers was Francesco Orazio della Penna (1680–1745) who would remain in Tibet until 1731, compiling a Tibetan dictionary of 35,000 words. This was translated into English by F. C. G. Schroeter in 1826 as A dictionary of Bhotanta or Boutan language. He also is said to have translated Lam rim chen mo into Latin, the translation since lost. The documents relating to the Capuchin mission in Tibet have been gathered and edited by Luciano Petech in I missionari Italiani nel Tibet e nel Nepal, vols. 1–4 (Roma: 1952–53).


3. de Filippi, ed., An Account of Tibet, p. 49.


6. The complete title of the work is Sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das 'jig rten thams cad kyi ma 'dris pa'i mdzas bshes chen po ston pa bla nam 'med pa la zab mo rten cing 'brel par 'byung gsung ba'i sgo nas bstod pa legs bshad snying po and occurs in the second volume (kha) of his “miscellaneous writings” (bka' 'bum thor pu). See The Collected Works (gsun 'bum) of the Incomparable Lord Tson-kha-pa bLo-bzan-grags-pa (Kham gsum chos kyi [sic] rgyal po shar tsong kha pa chen po'i gsung 'bum) (New Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1978), 13a4–16a3 (Guru Deva, 225–31). The passage cited here occurs at 15a5–15b2.

7. For Moorcroft’s role in the British “discovery” of Lake Manasarowar in 1812, see Charles Allen, A Mountain in Tibet (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), pp. 79–100.

9. Ibid., 1:xxvii.


11. These works were reprinted in four volumes in 1984 to mark the bicentenary of his birth. See Terjék, ed., *Collected Works of Alexander Csoma de Körös*. The four volumes are (1) *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, (2) *Tibetan Grammar*, (3) *Sanskrit-Tibetan Vocabulary* (a translation of the *Mahāvyutpatti*), and (4) *Tibetan Studies*.


15. As Philip Almond notes in *The British Discovery of Buddhism*:

Buddhism, by 1860, had come to exist, not in the Orient, but in the Oriental libraries and institutes of the West, in its texts and manuscripts, at the desks of the Western savants who interpreted it. It has become a textual object, defined, classified, and interpreted through its own textuality. By the middle of the century, the Buddhism that existed ‘out there’ was beginning to be judged by a West that alone knew what Buddhism was, is, and ought to be. The essence of Buddhism came to be seen as expressed not ‘out there’ in the Orient, but in the West through the control of Buddhism’s own textual past.


21. Ibid., p. xi. It is noteworthy that Desideri, writing 150 years earlier and before the colonial period, offers an antipodal assessment: “Though the Thibettans are pagans and idolaters, the doctrine they believe is very different from that of other pagans of Asia [meaning India]. Their Religion, it is true, came originally from the ancient country of Hindustan, now usually called Mogol, but there, in the lapse of time, the old religion fell into disuse and was ousted by new fables. On the other hand, the Thibettans, intelligent, and endowed with a gift of speculation, abolished much that was unintelligible in the tenets, and only retained what appeared to comprise truth and goodness.” See de Filippi, ed., An Account of Tibet, pp. 225–26.

22. Waddell, Tibetan Buddhism, p. 157. With such a view, Waddell cannot resist an occasional dig at the Theosophists, who claimed Tibet to be the ethereal dwelling place of the telepathic mahatmas, preservers of Atlantean wisdom for the postdiluvian age. When Waddell finally was able to reach Lhasa, as a member of the Younghusband expedition, he made it a point during his audience with the dGa’ldan Khri pa, who was left as head-of-state to negotiate with the British after the Dalai Lama fled, of asking whether he had ever heard of the mahatmas. “Regarding the so-called ‘Mahatmas,’ it was important to elicit the fact that this Cardinal, one of the most learned and profound scholars in Tibet, was, like the other learned Lamas I have interrogated on the subject, entirely ignorant of any such beings.” See L. Austine Waddell, Lhasa and Its Mysteries: With a Record of the British Tibetan Expedition of 1903–1904 (1905; reprint, New York: Dover, 1988), pp. 409–10.

23. For an extended discussion of the deployment of the term “Lamaism” in European representations of Tibetan Buddhism, see my Prisoners of Shangri-la (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), forthcoming.


25. Ibid., p. viii.

27. Waddell, *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, pp. 1–2. Beyond the usual trope of rape for the act of imperial conquest, what is noteworthy here is the alternation of the female city of Lhasa and the male Grand Lama as victims of the rape, who together “have yielded up their secrets and lies disenchanted before our Western eyes.” Waddell’s language here is illustrative of Sara Suleri’s point of “how closely a reading of colonialism is aligned to a critique of masculine anxiety.” See her *The Rhetoric of English India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 17.


32. “The Yogi and the Commissar” is the title of an essay by Arthur Koestler, first published in 1942, in which he argued that the “sociological spectrum” of the nonwestern world (in which he included the Soviet Union) extended between two extremes, represented on one end by the Communist Commissar who is willing to employ any means toward his revolutionary end and on the other by the introspective Yogi who passively doubts all practical ends. See Arthur Koestler, *The Yogi and the Commissar, and Other Essays* (New York: Macmillan, 1947). The ways in which Orientalist discourse of the colonial period is seamlessly transformed into Cold War discourse is provocatively analyzed by William Pietz in his “The ‘Post-Colonialism’ of Cold War Discourse,” *Social Text* 19/20 (1988): 55–75. The case of the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet provides a particularly interesting example of the manipulation of colonial categories. In the nineteenth century, both Tibet and China were regarded by many European scholars and colonial officers as “Oriental Despotisms,” one ruled by a Dalai Lama, an ethereal “god-king,” and the other by an effete Emperor. During the Second World War, the Chinese, including the Communists, were briefly portrayed as a freedom-loving people, in contrast to the despotic Japanese. After the success of the Communists in 1949, the image of the oriental despot resurfaced and was easily transferred onto Chairman Mao, not as emperor but as the totalitarian leader of faceless Communists. What is notable is that the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet was not seen as the conquest of one
despotic state by another, but as a case of opposites, the powers of darkness against the power of light. The invasion of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army in 1950 was represented (and in many cases, continues to be represented) as an undifferentiated mass of godless communists overwhelming a peaceful land devoted only to ethereal pursuits, the victims of the invasion including not only the hundreds of thousands of slaughtered Tibetans but the sometimes more lamented Buddhist dharma as well. Tibet is the embodiment of the powers of the holy; China is the embodiment of the powers of the demonic. Tibetans are superhuman, Chinese are subhuman. In this Orientalist logic of oppositions, China must be debased in order for Tibet to be exalted; in order for there to be a spiritual and enlightened Orient, there must be a demonic and despotic Orient. The demonization of the Chinese in this process is yet a further manifestation of the continuing Orientalist romance of Tibet. For a detailed study of the relations between Tibet and China in the decades preceding the invasion of 1950, see Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1952: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).


34. Following the illuminating discussion of Jean and John Comaroff, I take “hegemony” to be “that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies—drawn from a historically situated cultural field—that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it” while “ideology” (citing Raymond Williams in Marxism and Literature [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977]) is “an articulated system of meanings, values, and beliefs of a kind that can be abstracted as ‘worldview.’” See Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1:23–24. The processes by which the ideology of Buddhism became hegemonic in Tibet have yet to be explored. The rule of Byang chub rgyal mtshan in the mid-fourteenth century and the rule of the fifth Dalai Lama in the mid-seventeenth century would appear to be particularly important moments.

35. See Müller, Chips from a German Workshop, 1:115–16.


40. In this sense, what I was doing bears little resemblance to the anthropologist's "interview" in which "native metacommunicative repertoires" are often ignored. For a critique of the interview techniques employed by anthropologists, see Charles L. Briggs, *Learning How to Ask: A Sociolinguistic Appraisal of the Role of the Interview in Social Science Research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).


44. On the problem of the unenlightened retrieving the intention of the Enlightened One, see my "On the Interpretation of the Mahāyāna Sūtras" in *Buddhist Hermeneutics*, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp. 47–70. The book that resulted from my dissertation research, *A Study of Śvātantrika*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1987) has since been certified as an authentic representation of dGe lugs learning on the topic by its inclusion in the standard curriculum of the Namgyal Monastery Institute of Buddhist Studies in Ithaca, New York, which, according to its brochure, "provides an opportunity for the systematic study in English of Tibetan Buddhism in a traditional monastic setting."


49. Robert Thurman writes that the Tibetans "had the living, continuously returning incarnation of this Buddhist 'God of Love' watching over them, politically and spiritually protecting them from the powers of evil, while educationally fostering their own best use of their precious jewels of human existence. They were at the center of their own highest evolutionary potential." See his "The Dalai Lamas of Tibet: Living Icons of a Six-hundred-year Millennium," *Tibet Journal* 8, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 18. The years during which Tibet was actually "ruled" by a Dalai Lama are far less than commonly imagined. Based on Shakabpa's *Tibet: A Political History* (New York: Potala, 1984), it can be calculated that from the time that the fifth Dalai Lama assumed temporal power in 1642 until the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement making Tibet part of the People's Republic of China in 1951, Dalai Lamas served as rulers of Tibet for 111 years of this 309-year period, as follows: Dalai Lama V: 1642–82; Dalai Lama VI: 0; Dalai Lama VII: 1751–57; Dalai Lama VIII: 1781–1804; Dalai Lama IX: 0; Dalai
Lama X: 0; Dalai Lama XI: 1855–56; Dalai Lama XII: 1873–75; Dalai Lama XIII: 1895–1933; Dalai Lama XIV: 1950–51.


52. As Bourdieu notes, “Nothing is more paradoxical, for example, than the fact that people whose whole life is spent fighting over words should strive at all costs to fix what seems to them to be the one true meaning of objectively ambiguous, overdetermined or indeterminate symbols, words, texts or events which often survive and generate interest just because they have always been at stake in struggles aimed precisely at fixing their ‘true’ meaning.” See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 17.

53. Ibid., p. 96.
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Curators of the Buddha is the first critical history of the study of Buddhism in the West and the first work to bring the insights of colonial and postcolonial cultural studies to bear on this field.

After an overview of the origins of Buddhist studies in the early nineteenth century, the essays focus on important "curators of the Buddha" such as Aurel Stein, D. T. Suzuki, and Carl Jung, who, as they created and maintained the discipline, played a significant role in disseminating knowledge about Buddhism in the West. The essays bring to life many of the important but unexamined social, political, and cultural conditions that have shaped the course of Buddhist studies for more than a century—and have frequently determined the understanding of a complex set of traditions. Contributors Charles Hallisey, Gustavo Benavides, Stanley Abe, Luis Gómez, Robert Sharf, and Donald Lopez challenge some of the most enduring ideas in Buddhist studies: that Zen Buddhism is, above all, an experience; that Tibetan Buddhism is polluted, or pristine; that the Buddha image is of Greek or Roman origin; that the classical text supersedes the vernacular, as the manuscript supersedes the informant; and many others.

Chronicling the emergence of the academic study of Buddhism in Europe and America within the context of the ideologies of empire, this volume provides a long overdue genealogy and clears the way for a far-reaching reconception of the discipline.

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