N.-W.F.P. ADMINISTRATION UNDER BRITISH RULE 1901-1919

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To

My Mother and Father
This study deals with two aspects of the administration of the North-West Frontier Province under British rule: one, the government's relations with the Frontier tribes; and second, the administrative, social and economic developments of the settled districts with special emphasis on development in the spheres of communication, land revenue, irrigation and education. The policies made and the infrastructure laid for the first time in this period had significant socio-economic and political consequences in the years to come.

One dominant theme of most of the existing works on the North-West Frontier is the political and strategic aspects of the British frontier policy. The authoritative and competent studies in this field are the late Dr. C. C. Davies' *The Problem of North-West Frontier, 1890-1908* (1932) and L. Harris' unpublished Ph. D. thesis on "British Policy on the North-West Frontier of India, 1889-1901" (1960). Another useful and older work is R.I. Bruce's *The Forward Policy and its Results* (1500). Of the social anthropological literature, two outstanding books are Fredrik Barth's *Political Leadership Among Pathans* (1959) and Akbar S. Ahmad's *Millennium and Charisma Among Pathans* (1976). The latter is a recent study and combines good scholarship with close and personal knowledge of the people. The three general works of comparatively recent date, the theme of which is the people of the North-West Frontier Province, are *The Pathans (550 B.C.—A.D. 1957)* (1958) by Sir Olaf Caroe, *North-West Frontier: People and Events, 1939-1947* (1967) by Arthur Swinson and *The Pathan Borderland* (1963) by J. W. Spain. Spain discusses, rather briefly, the socio-cultural life of the Pathans with a summary of British tribal policy, the political reforms in the Frontier Province, the problems faced by the Pakistan Government in the area and the progress achieved after 1947. While the last of these three books is of some interest in relation to the present study, none of them concentrates on the developmental activities in the administrative, social and economic evolutionary process of the settled districts of the Province—
an aspect chosen for this study and based on original source material available in British and Pakistani archives.

Research extending over a period of four years (1964-68) made this study possible for presentation as a Ph. D. dissertation in the Department of History, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. A portion of the chapter on World War I and the Tribal Territory and a portion of the chapter on Education were originally published in *Asian Affairs* and the *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* (London).

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DUE TO its geographical position, the North-West Frontier Region has played an outstanding role in the whole history of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent, and it did so too in the days of British rule. The region which constituted the British Indian Province\(^1\) was situated between 31° and 36° north latitude and between 69° and 74° east longitude. The greatest length of the Province was 408 miles and, its greatest breadth 279 miles; the total area being approximately 39,000 square miles. To its north lay the Hindu Kush, to the south Baluchistan and the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the Punjab; Kashmir and the Punjab lay to its east and Afghanistan to its west. Except for the Province’s district of Hazara and a part of its Kohistan area which were cis-Indus, the rest of the Province was trans-Indus.\(^2\)

The Province had a double boundary: one administrative and the other political. The former separated the five administered districts from the tribal territory and extended to the foot of the mountains. The latter boundary, known as the Durand Line, marked off Afghanis-

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1. In 1955 the Province was merged in the ‘one-unit’ scheme of Pakistan, but then re-emerged in 1971 with the reinstitution of the four provinces.
2. For the Geography of the Province, see Census of India, 1911, vol.XIII. N.W.F.P., pp. 5-7; ibid, p. 192, vol. XIV, pp.7-9; Imperial Gazetteer of India. 1908, Provincial Series, N.W.F.P., pp. 1-5, 11; O.H.K. Spate, India and Pakistan, pp. 432-451; David Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan.
tan from British India. The intervening area between the two boundaries was—and still is—occupied by Pathan tribes.

The Province had two political divisions: the five administered districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan with a total area of 13,419 square miles; and the tribal territory with five Political Agencies—the Malakand, the Khyber, the Kurram, Northern and Southern Waziristan, and five tribal areas. The Malakand Agency included the frontier Chieftainships of Chitral, Dir and Nawagai. The tribal territory had an area of 25,500 square miles.

The physical features of the North-West Frontier Province presented an extremely complex and varied picture. There were three principal geographical divisions: first, the cis-Indus district of Hazara extending north-eastwards into the Himalayas. Its northern section was hilly, while the southern part opened out into the fertile plains of the Punjab. Second, the comparatively narrow strip between the Indus and the hills, in which area lay, from north to south, the four districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The tribal territory between the districts and the Afghan frontier formed the third division containing a terrain, rugged, rocky and wild with lofty mountains, and between them deep, narrow and inaccessible valleys. The Political Agency of Dir, Swat and Chitral lay between the Hindu Kush and the border of Peshawar, made up of mountains and valleys with but scanty cultivation. To Chitral's south lay the hills of Dir and Bajaur and the fertile valleys of the Swat and Panjkora rivers. The Mohmand hills, which were mostly without vegetation, flanked the Malakand Agency on the south-western side. Further south was the narrow gorge of the Khyber Pass, linking Jamrud, on the Peshawar border, with the eastern boundary of Afghanistan at Landi Khana. Still further south lay Tirah, the home of the Afridis and Orakzais. The Kurram Agency, a fertile valley, was situated to the west of the Khyber Agency and extended from the high peak of the Sīkaram and the Peiwar Kotal Passes to the western end of the Miranzai Valley of the Kohat district. Further south could be seen the hilly area of Waziristan, the Tochi valley and the plain of Wana. The Wazir hills joined another mountain range, the Sulaimans, which dominated the Derajat.

1. In December 1973, two new Political Agencies, Bajaur and Orakzai, were created. Bajaur was previously a part of the Malakand Agency, whereas Orakzai area was under the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat. Government of Pakistan, Bajaur Agency, 1975, p. 6; Ibid., Orakzai Agency, 1975, p. 8.
2. By a special Presidential Order in 1969, the Frontier States of Chitral, Dir and Swat (which was recognized as a State in 1926 by the British) were merged in the North-West Frontier Province.
The north-western hills of the Province had some very important passes, serving for centuries as routes of invasion and trade between Central Asia and the plains of the Subcontinent. These passes invested the Province with great strategic and political importance; Baroghil and Dorah, two important Passes, lay in the northern zone of the Hindu Kush ranges, the former leading into the Pamirs and the latter into Afghanistan. Further south lay a route leading from the Kunar Valley into Bajaur, Swat and the Peshawar plain. In the southern zone of the Hindu Kush lay the famous Khyber Pass, the main route of communication between Afghanistan and the Sub-continent. Further south, the Peiwar Kotal and Shutargardan Passes led to Kabul and Ghazni. Then there were the Tochi and Gomal Passes, the latter much used by trade caravans from Afghanistan.

The Indus, which entered the Province north of the Black Mountains, was the principal river, draining almost the entire territory of the Province, and forming about 200 miles of its eastern boundary. Besides the mountain streams of Hazara flowing into the Indus, the river was fed by its most important tributary, the Landai. The Kabul River was another important source of water supply for the Province. Rising in the Hindu Kush range about 45 miles west of Kabul, the river flowed eastwards, crossed the Mohmand hills and entered the Peshawar district at Warsak. The Bara River, which issued from the hills of Tirah south of the Safed Koh range and drained the Afridi country, fell into the Kabul River, and so did the Yarkhun, Chitral, Kunar, Panjkora and Swat rivers which drained the territories of Chitral, Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Kurram River flowed down from the southern slopes of the Safed Koh, and after crossing the Kurram valley and the Lower Wazir hills entered the Bannu district. The Tochi or the Gambila River watered North Waziristan.

In population, the North-West Frontier was the fourth smallest province of British India. The 1921 census showed its total population as 5,076,476, of which about 92 per cent was Muslim and over 7 per cent Hindu or Sikh. As for the ethnic origins of inhabitants of the

2. With the exception of the Kunhar River in Hazara, which falls into the Jhelum.
4. It was estimated that the tribal territory contained 56 per cent of the total population, *ibid.*
Province, Dr. Davies has rightly observed that "No ethnological problem is more complicated and intricate than that which is presented by the North-West Frontier of India". However, the Pathans predominated, including the tribes of the Yusufzais, Mohmands, Afridis, Shinwaris, Orakzais, Turis, Bangashes, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Bhittanis, Daurs, Khattaks and Bannuchis. The cis-Indus district of Hazara had a mixed population, mainly of Indian origin, such as the Awans, Gujars, Tanaolis, Dhunds, and Kashmiris. In the Dera Ismail Khan district, the Baluchi and Jat tribes predominated. The Pathans of the settled districts and of the tribal territory were similar, culturally, linguistically and racially; but the former, accustomed to long traditions of independence, were of a fierce independent nature, stolid and strong willed, and possessed a virile and martial character.

The Tribal Territory

The administration of the Frontier region under the Sikhs (1818-49) had been of the loosest type. The Sikhs “possessed but little influence in the trans-Indus tracts, and what influence they had was confined to the plains. Even here they were obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the country”.

The Sikhs failed to establish peace and order in the Frontier, since the prevailing lawlessness among the tribes—their bitter feuds leading to incessant violence, and their unwillingness to pay revenue bringing about frequent armed encounters with the rulers—created a state of continuous anarchy.

On the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the task of establishing peace and order, the ensurance of the security of life and property, therefore fell to the lot of the Punjab authorities who were entrusted with the administration of the Frontier region. This administration had two aspects: the management of the tribes in order to ensure the security of

1. C.C. Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, p.37.
the settled districts from frequent tribal raids; and the civil administration of the settled districts. This arrangement continued until the formation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901.

British policy on the North-West Frontier passed through various stages. For over a quarter of a century, after the annexation of the Punjab, the Punjab Government followed what came to be known as the 'close-border' policy. The main feature of the policy was to guard the border closely with a view to keeping raids and consequent reprisals by military expeditions to the minimum. Non-aggression on tribal territory and non-interference in tribal affairs were the declared objects of this policy. For defensive purposes, a military force, called the Punjab Frontier Force, was raised under the supreme control of the Government of the Punjab, which in 1886 was amalgamated with the regular army. The existing forts were repaired and new ones were built along the administrative boundary and were connected with each other by a military road. At the same time, various conciliatory measures were adopted. Agreements were made with the tribes obliging them to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the Government in return for subsidies and allowances. The tribesmen were allowed entry into British territory and to trade freely; but British officers were instructed not to cross into tribal territory. According to British writers, the tribesmen frequently broke these agreements and the Government had to stop the allowances, impose fines or blockades and, when all these proved unavailing, to send expeditions into tribal territory. Between 1849 and 1899, the Punjab Government undertook as many as sixty-two expeditions.

But this policy had to be abandoned in favour of what came to be

1. The relative merits and demerits of the 'close-border' policy on the Punjab frontier had often been compared with another system adopted on the Sind frontier in dealing with the Baluch tribes. Its exponent was Captain Sandeman. In 1877 the Baluchistan Agency was created and Sandeman was appointed the first Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. The policy which Sandeman followed was described as "one of friendly and conciliatory intervention". He occupied the central points in the Agency by troops and linked those points by good roads. He made friends with the Baluch chiefs and made them responsible for the control of their tribes. Railway and telegraph development was also undertaken. For discussion on the respective policies, see Davies, op.cit., pp. 33-5; Philip Woodruff, The Men who Ruled India: The Guardians, pp. 143-9; "Sind and Punjab Frontier Systems" by H.B. Frere, 22 March 1876, P.S.M., A. 12; H. T. Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, Appendix B, pp. 404-15.


3. A complete list of expeditions is given in Harris, op.cit., Appendix G, pp. 433-40. See also Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, vol. I; Tribes North of the Kabul River, vol. II, North-West Frontier: Tribes Between the Kabul and Gomal Rivers, P.S.D.L., B. 234; H.L. Nevill, Campaigns on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1908; H. C. Wyllie, From the Black Mountain to Waziristan.
known as the 'Forward Policy' of the Nineties. The Russian expansion in Central Asia and its advance towards the borders of Afghanistan alarmed the British, who regarding the Russian threat as "a very real" and "a very close" danger to the frontier of India. Consequently, the defence of India had to be organized, and this could be achieved by the occupation of the "scientific frontier" based on the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. For this, it was necessary to control the passes in the North-Western hills, to improve communications both in tribal and British territories and to set up advanced military posts in the tribal region with a view, especially, to facilitating occupation of the strategic line. The implementation of this policy involved the establishment of a workable relationship with the Amir of Afghanistan and control over the frontier tribes.

Under Lansdowne (1888-94) and Elgin (1894-99) the Government of India took new measures for the defence of India, introducing the forward policy for the tribal territory. The Government had already acquired control of the Khyber Pass during the Second Afghan War (1878-80). In 1878 the Khyber Agency was created and the Political Agent conducted relations with the tribes of the Agency. In 1890, agreements were made with the Shiranis, Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khel to open the Gomal Pass in South Waziristan for traffic. To guard the Pass, tribal levies were raised and levy posts built. In 1891, the Samana Range was occupied enabling the Government to dominate the Miranzai Valley and Southern Tirah. Here also posts were built and occupied by the tribal militia. In 1892, the Turis, who were Shias, let the British exercise control over their territory, where a Political Agency was set up and the area was thus brought under British administration. The Kurram Militia was raised in 1893. The acquisition of the Kurram Valley gave the British command of the Kurram Route leading over the Peiwar Kotal Pass to Ghazni and Kabul.

These forward moves on the Indo-Afghan border alarmed the Amir of Afghanistan and made him suspicious of the intentions of the Government of India. Considerable uncertainty prevailed regarding the

2. This was the strategic line which the Government of India was to occupy in case of a Russian move towards India or in the event of domestic troubles in Afghanistan. See, for details, Harris, op.cit., pp. 384-96.
3. Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.F.P., p. 25.
4. A lucid discussion is given in Harris, op.cit., pp. 22-41.
5. Afridis, Orakzais, Mullagoris, Shilranis and Shinwaris.
respective spheres of influence of the two Governments over the tribes. To resolve this, in 1893, the Durand Agreement was concluded for the delimitation of the boundary between India and Afghanistan. In 1894, a section of the boundary from the Bashghal Valley on the borders of Kafiristan¹ to Nawa Kotal on the junction of Bajaur and the Mohmand territory, was demarcated. Further south, the demarcation could not be carried out, as the Amir was not prepared to accept the British proposals on the Mohmand territory. The section from the Kabul River to Sikaram (Safed Koh) was also left undemarcated; and it was not until 1919, after the conclusion of the Third Afghan War, that this demarcation was defined. From Kurram to the Gomal River the line was demarcated in 1894-95, but only when an expedition had been undertaken against the Mahsuds, whose territory, South Waziristan, was made a Political Agency in 1896.² The Mahsud allowances were redistributed in return for their promise to maintain the peace and security of the Gomal Pass, the construction of militia posts in certain places, and their undertaking to desist from raids into British areas. In October 1895, at the request of the Daurs and Wazirs of the Tochi Valley, the Government occupied their territory and turned it into the North Waziristan Agency. The Daur Valley, like the Kurram Valley, was brought under British administration.

Simultaneously, the forward policy was also pursued in the north, with the object of securing control of passes in the Eastern Hindu Kush. Since 1878, the British had exercised some influence in the area through the Maharaja of Kashmir, a dependent ally of the Government of India. In 1889, the Gilgit Agency was formed. In 1892, taking advantage of the death of the ruler of Chitral and the anarchy that followed, garrisons were stationed at Chalt and Hunza. Three years later, Chitral’s external relations were taken over by the Government of India, and a permanent garrison was placed at Chital. British troops also guarded the Malakand Pass and the Swat River crossing. The construction of a road connecting Peshawar with Chitral through the Malakand Pass, Swat and Dir was begun in 1895. The Khan of Dir and the tribes of Dir were given allowances in return for their undertaking to protect communications in their areas, to provide tribal levies to guard military posts, and to allow the movement of British troops for relief operations. This led to the creation of the Malakand Agency in 1896, consisting of Chitral,

1. Now renamed Kalash.
Dir, Bajaur and Swat (there was no State of Swat in those days). The former three had chiefs who were the allies of the Government. Unlike other Agencies, which were under the Punjab Government, so prominently did the Malakand Agency then figure in imperial strategy, that it was put under the control of the Government of India.

The active forward move into tribal territory during the Nineties alarmed the tribesmen, who feared that the Government were out to destroy their cherished independence. Their reaction took the form of a great tribal uprising in 1897, involving the Darwesh Khel Waziris, the Swatis, the Mohmands, the Afridis and the Orakzais. This led the Government to undertake seven military operations against the tribesmen, in which 70,000 troops were engaged. The operations were “long, arduous and costly”. The events of 1897 brought home to the Government the fact that its frontier policy needed revaluation. Elgin’s viceroyalty having come to an end in 1898, Curzon launched upon a new frontier policy with far-reaching results, not only on British relations with the tribes, but on the administration of the settled districts.

**Administrative Territory**

The problem which the Punjab Government faced in the so-called settled districts was of civil administration. After the annexation, the trans-Indus plains between the Indus and the hills had been divided, for administrative purposes, into five districts, stretching from north to south: the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. Including the cis-Indus district of Hazara, all six became the frontier districts of the Punjab. They were organized into two divisions, the Peshawar Division in 1850 and the Derajat Division in 1861, each under a Commissioner. A simple but efficient and forceful administration based on the non-regulation system was introduced. Under this system the district officers had more extensive

2. Ibid., David Dichter, *op.cit.*, p. 70.
4. Dera Ghazi Khan was on the border of Baluch territory.
5. The Peshawar Division included Hazara, Peshawar and Kohat districts and the Derajat Division consisted of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. *Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.F.P.*, pp. 19, 58.
criminal powers than in a regulation province.\textsuperscript{1} In addition, the Deputy Commissioners of the Frontier districts were responsible for relations with the tribesmen of the adjoining tribal areas. After the system of Political Agencies came into force,\textsuperscript{2} they were left with only a few "tribal tracts" bordering their districts.

The British administrators introduced reforms in all branches of administration, including the police, justice, land revenue, public works and education etc., in the new territory.\textsuperscript{3} But during the rule of over half a century by the Punjab Government over the Frontier districts, these areas had made slow progress and were less developed in various fields of administration than the cis-Indus areas of the Punjab. Their somewhat neglected condition might be attributed to the Punjab Government's greater preoccupation with the problem of security, law and order in the Frontier districts than with other administrative matters. Added to this, indeed, was the strategic importance of this "outpost of the Indian Empire" where administrative developments were subordinated to strategic necessities.

One of the first concerns of the new rulers was the preservation of law and order and the suppression of crime. The duties of civil police were invested in levies which were under the control of the Deputy Commissioner in each district. These levies were made up of local tribesmen who were chosen by their chiefs and paid by the Government. This police force was gradually changed into a regular police force. Village watchmen were also appointed, who helped the police in the prevention and detection of crime.\textsuperscript{4} Unlike the other districts of the Punjab, the people in the trans-Indus districts were allowed to retain their arms for the protection of life and property from the raids of the trans-border tribesmen.\textsuperscript{5} This system remained in force till 1899-1900, when partial disarmament of the districts was undertaken.\textsuperscript{6}

2. See supra, pp. 6-8.
3. The following works give some interesting accounts of the early administrative activities in the Punjab with special reference to the British officers who formulated and carried them out. They also throw light on the conditions of the Frontier districts at that time and their gradual transformation under the British. H.B. Edwardes, A Year on the Punjab Frontier; H.B. Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence; H. Pearson, The Hero of Delhi, The Life of John Nicholson; G.R. Elsmie, Thirty five years in the Punjab; W. Lee-Warner, The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie; R.C. Temple, Men and Events of My Time in India; Maud Diver, The Unsung; A. C. Taylor, General Sir Alex Taylor; R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence.
special measure which the Punjab Government undertook for the administration of justice was the enactment of the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation in 1872. This regulation empowered the Deputy Commissioner of a Frontier district to refer the question of guilt or innocence of an accused person to a Jirga (Council of Elders) convened according to Pathan customs.\(^1\)

The complex question of land revenue administration was dealt with circumspectly. The Frontier districts were at first put under "summary settlements".\(^2\) The policy was to fix the revenue at a low rate because the villagers were reported to be refractory, and if pressed betook themselves to the hills.\(^3\) Besides, the influential classes were granted special concessions.\(^4\) The period of the summary settlements of the Frontier districts lasted rather a long time, until in the 1860s it was thought practicable to undertake the first regular settlements, a time when revised settlements were being made in most of the other Punjab districts.\(^5\)

Closely linked with the systematization of land revenue was the development of canal irrigation for agricultural improvements. Tremendous progress had been made in this field in the Punjab; but, in comparison with the enormous irrigation works constructed there, the irrigational projects in the Frontier districts were far less conspicuous.\(^6\)

The fostering of trade, commerce and agriculture by constructing roads had, too, been given some attention. In the Frontier, a further purpose of building roads and railways was strategic. No sooner was the Punjab annexed than the Government of India directed the Board of Administration to take steps to lay out military roads in the Frontier areas and link them with the rest of the Punjab. But the progress made was slow.\(^7\)

As for education, the Frontier districts made similarly little progress. The organization of a Department of Public Instruction in the Punjab took place in 1854, when it was put under a Director. The new educational system grew slowly and institutions of all kinds were established.\(^8\) But education in the Frontier districts did not proceed beyond the secon-

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1. Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies 1873-4, Chapter III, p. 21. This Regulation was superceded by the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1887 and again by the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, see infra, pp. 30-31.
2. See Chapter V, p. 138 and footnote 2, for nature of summary settlements.
5. Ibid., p. 33.
dary stage. Amongst the thirty-one districts of the Punjab, the Frontier districts were by far the least advanced in regard to education.\footnote{Report on Popular Education in the Punjab and its Dependencies, 1889-90, p.11.}

It may be concluded, therefore, that in 1901, at the time of the creation of the North-West Frontier Province under Curzon, all aspects of administration were much less developed in the Frontier districts than in the remaining districts of the Punjab.
ON ASSUMING office as Viceroy in January 1899, Curzon had to deal with the two-fold problem of the North-West Frontier of India: the reorganization of military defences, and the reform of the administration of the trans-Frontier districts. The Frontier was Curzon’s forte. By wide travel and study he had acquired an extensive knowledge of Frontier problems and politics, particularly of Central Asia, although he belonged to “neither school of Frontier theorists”. Even before coming to India he had given indications of not only his appreciation of India’s Frontier problems, but his desire to deal with them as well.

Soon after his arrival, Curzon took up the question of military

2. M. Edwardes, *High Noon of the Empire*, p. 64.
dispositions and the control of the tribes. Curzon’s policy was, first, the “withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions”, second, “the concentration of British forces in British territory behind them as a safeguard and a support” and, finally, “the improvement of communications in the rear”. The regular garrison in Chitral was reduced, the troops being concentrated at Kila Drosh at the extreme southern end of the Chitral territory. The outlying posts were manned by the Chitrali levies themselves. Further southwards, such posts were held by levies from Dir and Swat for the security of the Dir-Chitral road. Regular troops were stationed at Chakdara, Malakand and Dargai to support the levies. To strengthen the British position at Malakand, a light railway was constructed from Nowshera to Dargai in 1901. In the Khyber all regular troops were withdrawn from advanced positions and replaced by two battalions—1,250 strong—of the reorganized and enlarged Khyber Rifles, with an increased number of British officers and an improved scale of pay. For their reinforcement, a flying column was maintained in readiness at Peshawar; and for its support, Peshawar was linked with Jamrud—a distance of 12 miles—by an extension of the broad-gauge railway, and with Landi Kotal, by a road running through the Mullagori territory. Between Peshawar and Kohat, a cart road was built through the Kohat Pass. South of Kohat, a force of tribal militia—450 strong—called the Samana Rifles was raised under British officers. It was largely recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen and formed a part of the Border Military Police; the Samana Rifles replaced the regular garrison of the Samana Range. In the Kurram Valley, the Kurram Militia was augmented and reorganized in two battalions—1,250 strong—on the model of the Khyber Rifles. Both the Samana and the Kurram positions were to be supported by a light railway to be constructed from Kohat to Thal. Further to the south, two battalions of the Waziristan Militia—800 strong each—were raised, one being for the Tochi Valley or North Waziristan, and other for the Gomal Valley or South Waziristan. The militia replaced the large garrisons of regular troops which had been kept in these valleys since 1895, and were supported by mobile columns garrisoned at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. By 1904 the new Frontier

2. See chapter II, p. 53.
4. See chapter IV, p. 111.
defence policy was in operation along the entire line from Chitral to Baluchistan.

The new military structure had, in the words of Curzon, the advantages of "reduced outlay, of increased tactical mobility, and of tribal contentment".\(^1\) It relieved the soldiers of the Indian army of arduous trans-Frontier duty and left them, in the event of a war, to be concentrated on the two main routes to Afghanistan, Bolan and Khyber. It was further hoped that the presence of local garrisons would reduce the chance of "commotion and reproach attached to military disaster".\(^2\)

The press in India and England commended Curzon's Frontier policy on economic and political grounds. *The Times of India* hailed it as "the most important work" undertaken by the Viceroy "in the domain of Indian statesmanship".\(^3\) *The Spectator* and *The Times* approved the new policy, although the latter was not "without doubts as to the confidence and loyalty of the tribal levies".\(^4\) Curzon's own mood was one of cautious optimism. He was fully aware that his Frontier policy would not save the Government "from Frontier warfare, or from occasional expeditions, or from chronic anxiety". His plan, he claimed, was essentially one of "military concentration as against diffusion, and of tribal conciliation in place of exasperation".\(^5\)

Not only were the military defences reorganized, but, to improve relations with the tribes, some positive measures were also adopted. The Frontier officers were given increased freedom to act on their own responsibility and initiative. They were asked to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes and gradually acquire control over them. They were also required to deal with local offences expeditiously.\(^6\)

At the same time, subsidies to the tribes were increased. It was expected that the system of tribal militia and local levies would make the tribesman responsible for the maintenance of peace in his own land; make his service to the Government "a guarantee" for the "independence" of his land, and instil in him discipline by close contact with British officers, which contact, in its turn, would foster "mutual trust". It would mitigate, to a certain extent, the poverty and unemployment in the

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2. Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 26 October 1899, *P.S.L.I.*, vol. 117, Reg. No. 208.
tribal area.\textsuperscript{1} The policy was an attempt at developing intimate knowledge of the tribesmen and their affairs, improving their economic condition, and in this process gradually acquiring an influence over them.\textsuperscript{2}

The success of his Frontier defence scheme, Curzon was certain, depended on the reform of the administration of the trans-frontier districts. The existing system of administration, he saw, was full of "complexities...anomalies and...inerradicable flaws". The remedy, in his view, lay in the formation of a Frontier province: the trans-Indus regions had to be brought under "more prompt, more imperative and more direct" control and authority of the Government of India through the removal of the intervening barrier of the "elaborate organization" of the Punjab Government.\textsuperscript{3}

The idea was not Curzon's own. Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, various kinds of schemes for the formation of a new administrative unit on the Frontier had been mooted by officials and submitted to and debated by the Government of India. Most of the Frontier experts of the time had agreed on the need for such a unit.\textsuperscript{4} Yet, the fact that this much-desired change had not been effected was a pointer to the complexity of the issue.

From the Uprising of 1857 until 1889, the Frontier question centred on the various proposals to amalgamate Sind with the Punjab with a view to co-ordinating the Frontier policies of the two administrations. From time to time, schemes for the transfer of Sind from Bombay to the Punjub were submitted to the Government, but ultimately dropped.

In 1876, Lord Northbrook's recommendations on the same issue were accepted in principle by the then Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury. However, "the plan foundered, partly on the question of cost, but more because of the opposition of the Bombay Presidency". The Bombay Government was not prepared to lose Sind unless, in compensa

\textsuperscript{1} In October 1896, the amount of allowances given to the North-West Frontier tribes on the Punjab border, including payment to tribal levies was Rs. 565,864. February 1908, the grand total of tribal allowances including payment to military and tribal levies swelled to Rs. 1,849,600 per annum. Harris, op.cit., Appendix pp. 427-30; Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 24 February 1908, P.S.L.I., vol. 212, Re No. 458.

\textsuperscript{2} Curzon's Speech at Peshawar, 26 April 1902, Raleigh, op.cit., pp. 424-5.

\textsuperscript{3} Curzon's Minute, 27 August 1900, op.cit., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{4} The experts were Bartle Frere, Henty Durand, General Roberts, James Brow Robert Warburton, Robert Sandeman, General Lockhart, Charles Aitchison and George Chesney. See Curzon's Minute, ibid., p. 2.
tion, other areas were transferred to its jurisdiction.\(^1\) During the Lytton’s viceroyalty, the increased danger of Russian aggression from Central Asia necessitated a “vigilantly precautionary Frontier policy”.\(^2\) Salisbury strongly urged unity of action on the part of the Government in the Western and North-Western Frontier of India by bringing it under the direct control of the Government of India. Lytton, in his well-known minute of April 1877, accepted the Secretary of State’s suggestion, and sketched out a scheme for the formation of a separate trans-Indus province which went far beyond the original recommendations of the Secretary of State. The proposed province was to consist of the six Frontier districts of the Punjab—Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (excluding the cis-Indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception) and Dera Ghazi Khan—and trans-Indus Sind (excluding Karachi). This large province was to be headed by a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. Under him were to be two Commissioners: one for the Pathan and the other for the Baluch tribes.\(^3\)

Salisbury saw that Lytton’s proposals were “measures of defence and security, not of aggression”; but since they involved a huge expense and “too large a change”, he rejected them. Alternatively, he proposed a compromise scheme: two Commissioners, the one for the trans-Indus Punjab, and the other for Sind, to be appointed directly by the Viceroy. In regard to external affairs, they would correspond with the Viceroy direct, while, in matters of internal administration, they would act under the Punjab Government.\(^4\) Salisbury’s proposal met with severe criticism. Charles Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, and Robert Egerton, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, condemned it as “full of the seeds of future misunderstanding, confusion... divided responsibility”, and certain to cause “the worst effect upon the internal administration of the frontier districts”.\(^5\) Despite this criticism, Lytton accepted Salisbury’s proposals. General Frederick Roberts was designated the first Commissioner of the trans-Indus districts. But, soon afterwards, the Second Afghan War broke out resulting in the termination of Lytton’s viceroyalty. Ripon, who succeeded Lytton, abandoned the scheme altogether.

3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
In 1889, when Lansdowne was Viceroy, the Baluchistan Agency was created with Robert Sanderman as its head; Sind ceased to be a Frontier province. Before laying down his office, Lansdowne expressed the desirability of the creation of a single Frontier charge which should be entrusted to the management of a single officer under the immediate direction of the Government of India.

The tribal uprising of 1897-98, as has already been seen, underscored the need for the detachment of the tribal territory from the Punjab administration, and its placement under the direct control of the Government of India, to ensure its efficient management. Hamilton, the Secretary of State, therefore, suggested to Elgin, who had taken over from Lansdowne in 1895, that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India.

Accordingly, he proposed a scheme which provided that the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinate officers responsible for dealings with Frontier tribes should act directly under the Government of India, while in all matters of civil administration, he and his subordinates would continue to be under the Punjab Government. This was a mere replica of the Salisbury's scheme advanced twenty-one years before, and met with an equally frosty reception from the Punjab authorities.

It fell to Curzon's lot to deal with the problem that had taxed the energies of the earlier Viceroys.

Curzon was not a man to let matters drift. Before Elgin left India, Curzon had discussed the matter with him. In April 1899, he held discussions with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Mackworth Young, and other Frontier officers, Curzon suggested four possible solutions: first, the status quo should be maintained; second, a separate Frontier province and commission should be created; third, Hamilton's compromise plan should be adopted; fourth, the trans-Frontier districts should be divided into five or six separate charges, each under a political officer. Curzon claimed that the opinion of the Punjab officers was in favour of the creation of a separate province, while the Lieutenant-Governor, though in favour of maintaining the status quo, did not seem either "unreasonable or immoderate". Curzon, for himself,

2. Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 5 August 1898, C.C., vol 301.
maintained that the status quo was unsatisfactory. The existing system was such that the Viceroy, though directly responsible for Frontier administration, had to implement his policy through the medium of subordinate officials who might well have no special knowledge of Frontier affairs, and over whose appointment, interchange or removal, the Viceroy had no control. In normal times, the Supreme Government did not interfere with the Punjab Government’s handling of Frontier affairs. But emergencies could arise when they had to act and even assume entire control of the Frontier. Such control could hardly be effective as the Supreme Government had to act through agents who are not its own; while the Punjab Government, dispossessed and sulky, stands on one side, criticizing everything that is done. Naturally Curzon felt gratified to have received what he called “a unanimous pronouncement of the leading officials of the Punjab Government against their own system”.

In a series of private and official letters to Hamilton, Curzon scathingly condemned the extremely unsatisfactory way the Frontier was being administered by the Punjab Government. The latter, he pointed out, had no idea of any Frontier policy at all; the officers at Lahore had neither any knowledge of nor any interest in Frontier affairs; the Punjab Government showed “distrust” of their own officers in the Frontier areas, which bred mutual disagreement, “perpetual friction... inevitable blunder and... scandalous delay”.

In a minute dated 27 August 1900, “perhaps the most elaborate written by a Viceroy”, Curzon sketched out his scheme for taking over the administration of the Frontier from the Punjab Government and the constitution of a new province. In Curzon’s opinion the area between the Swat River and the Gomal Valley was the “most critical, most anxious and most explosive section of the entire frontier” of India. It was inhabited by the “most numerous, fanatical and turbulent of the Pathan tribes”. And in regard to such an area, the Viceroy, who was the “Foreign Minister” of India, could not issue orders or make an appointment except through the Punjab Government. This, Curzon asserted, was a most reprehensible system:

I venture to affirm that there is not another country or Government in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a subordinate official,

1. Ibid.
3. Curzon to Hamilton, 9 March and 27 September 1899, ibid.
but of a subordinate Government, on the mere geographical plea that the latter resides in closer proximity to the scene of action—a plea which itself breaks down when it is remembered that for five months in the year the Supreme and the Local Governments are both located at the same spot, Simla.¹

Curzon felt that the officers posted to the Frontier did not possess the necessary qualifications and training. Nor could they gain enough experience and specialized knowledge; for they did not serve long enough in the Frontier. He pointed out that the five Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab since 1877, who had to their credit the total cumulative service of 145 years at the time of their appointment as heads of the Punjab Government, had only served in the Frontier districts for the total cumulative period of twenty months. None of the Chief Secretaries of the Punjab Government between 1878 and 1899 had, at the time of their appointments, any experience of political service in the Frontier at all.²

Curzon, therefore, believed that the Punjab Government’s personnel was not specially equipped with knowledge and experience of the Frontier. The officers of the Punjab Commission, the Viceroy went on, due to the wider scope of promotion in the Revenue and Finance Departments, did not like to serve in the Frontier, for it was a tedious, risky and less remunerative job. There was much “departmental irresolution” in the administration, and the “dissipation instead of concentration, of responsibility”. Where “rapidity of action and swiftness of execution” were so essential, the long official chain and numerous links of references made prompt action impossible. It was wrong to suppose, said Curzon, that the interposition of the Punjab Government between the Supreme Government and the Frontier involved “a wise and necessary decentralization”. On the contrary, it led to “centralization of the pettiest and most exasperating description”. Three factors were responsible for this: the indecision of the Punjab Government, “the timidity” of its junior local officers, and the restrictions on the initiative and authority of these officers. Curzon concluded that the existing system of Frontier administration

attenuates without diminishing the ultimate responsibility of the Government of India. It protracts without strengthening their action. It interposes between the Foreign Minister of India and his subordinate agents, not an Ambassador, or a Minister, or a Consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a Local Government, and the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant-Governor. . . . Worked as the system has been

with unfailing loyalty and with profound devotion to duty, it has yet been the source of friction, of divided counsels, of vacillation, of exaggerated centralization, of interminable delay.¹

The remedy lay, Curzon was convinced, in the creation of a new province, consisting of the trans-Indus districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and the Political Agencies with headquarters at Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Wana. The inhabitants would be, as far as possible, Pathan only.

The head of the new administration would be a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, appointed by and directly subordinate to the Government of India. He would reside at Peshawar, and would be assisted by a Revenue Commissioner and a Judicial Commissioner. A small commission would be set up to deal with matters regarding the recruitment, replacement and promotion of officers in the new province. The Frontier officers would cease to belong to the Punjab Commission, being brought within the graded list of the Political Department of the Government of India. However, the Divisional and District Judges and Settlement Officers would be borrowed from the Punjab or from other provinces. For other Departments, such as Police, Jail, Medical, Education, Irrigation and Public Works, and the subordinate establishments of all Departments, Curzon would temporarily take over the whole or the bulk of the existing staff of the Punjab Government serving in the area of the proposed province. The Viceroy expected that in return for the employment of the officers of the Punjab Commission in the new province, the Punjab Government might be willing to employ educated Pathans of good family in the Punjab Civil Service.²

The plan for the new province having been set out, Curzon proceeded with meeting some objections to the project and emphasizing its compensating advantages. Hamilton, in his despatch of 5 August 1898, has raised four possible objections to a new Frontier province. The first was that the scheme would have the effect of breaking up the established administrative units of the Punjab and disturbing, in particular, the revenue system in the Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu Districts. The proper functioning of the revenue system needed specially trained officers, such as were not ordinarily available in the Political Department. To overcome this difficulty, Curzon proposed that the new province would continue to get officials with experience in revenue

matters from the Punjab. In this way the revenue administration of the Frontier districts would be left undisturbed.1

Hamilton's second objection was that the creation of a new province would entail "a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations". Curzon did not regard this as a valid objection; for the change did not warrant any compensation to the Punjab. The new province, Curzon pointed out, would take away only one-fourteenth of the Punjab's total area, one-fifteenth of its total revenue, and a little less than one-eighteenth of its entire population.2 In the circumstances the question of any territorial compensation to the Punjab, he said, did not arise at all. Moreover, the districts that were to be detached did not belong to the Punjab, either geographically, historically or ethnologically; they were inhabited by entirely different peoples having different modes and standards of life. These essentially different conditions obtaining in the area had, in fact, been recognized by the Government as indicated by the operation of special rules and regulations in the Frontier districts.3 Besides, Curzon went on, the making of Baluchistan into a separate administration, the inclusion of Chitral and Dir within the British sphere of influence, the Durand Agreement,4 and the consequent political protectorate over Waziristan, had "revolutionized the state of affairs on the Frontier". These developments had changed the nature of administration in the Frontier, which had become mainly political, thus bringing it within the sphere of the Supreme Government. Considerations of compensating the Punjab Government for the loss of its jurisdiction, Curzon contended, should no longer stand in the way of the long overdue change. He dismissed these pleas as being irrelevant, and reinforced his arguments against any compensation by referring to the opinion of F.D. Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar, who in 1898 had remarked:

2. The area, population and revenue of the Punjab according to the 1891 census were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenue (Rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>148,966 sq. miles</td>
<td>25,130,127</td>
<td>27,532,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the districts to be withdrawn from the Punjab:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenue (rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10,691 sq. miles</td>
<td>1,365,575</td>
<td>1,875,847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. See supra, p. 10.
The population, revenue, trade and wealth of the province [Punjab] have so increased since the question of a separate Frontier Commissionership was mooted some twenty years ago under the Government of Lord Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat and a strip of the Derajat is still sufficient to constitute an administrative area of the first class.¹

Hamilton's third objection to a new province was that it would deprive the Punjab Government of a valuable opportunity of training officers for the Frontier service and of acquiring knowledge of the tribesmen. Curzon maintained the contrary view: the creation of a Frontier province would offer greater opportunities for such training than had hitherto existed, since the officials would belong to a separate Political Department of the Government of India. An officer displaying exceptional ability in tribal dealings would have no fear of being withdrawn, unless his services were required for a more responsible post of a similar nature in Baluchistan or in the Political Department of the Supreme Government. On the other hand, an officer lacking in aptitude in dealing with the tribesmen could be easily transferred to another place in the Foreign Department. It could be expected that a "fresh goal of ambition" would lie in front of political officers; that, in the near future, the new province would attract the best men in the civil and military service and, that it would be "the nursery of a new school of political officers who would revive the memories and credit of bygone days".²

Finally, Hamilton had held that the change would lead to a "forward and aggressive policy" on the part of the Government. This Curzon rejected as an "entire illusion", contending that, in the past, the intervention of the Punjab Government had not acted as a barrier against "a forward policy" or saved the Supreme Government from punitive expeditions or from Frontier war. The fifty-year control of the Punjab Government over the Frontier, he asserted, had neither prevented forty military expeditions against the tribes nor held back the Government's rapid forward move into tribal territory.³

Having dismissed the objections raised by the Secretary of State, Curzon proceeded to convince the members of his Council. Copies of his Minute were sent to each member of the Viceroy's Council at the end of August 1900. A special meeting of the Council was held on 10 September 1900 for final discussion;⁴ and, three days later, Curzon's minute, with a covering dispatch was sent to the Supreme Government "with an

¹ Quoted by Curzon in his Minute, op.cit., p. 23.
² Curzon's Minute, op.cit., p. 25.
³ Curzon's Minute, op.cit. p. 27.
⁴ Note by Curzon, 27 August 1900, C.C., vol. 319.
expression of our unanimous and hearty agreement with its main provisions".¹ In a mood of relief, Curzon wrote to Arthur Godley, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the India Office:

My Frontier Scheme is finished and done at last, I feel like an Eton boy who has got through trials. Be kind to it and help it on. It would break my heart if it were now to fall through.²

Even though Curzon had claimed the "unanimous and hearty agreement" of his officers, he, in fact, had not bothered to consult the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Mackworth Young, before he sent his proposals to the Secretary of State. The Viceroy's explanation of why he kept the matter from the Lieutenant-Governor was that the latter being "slow, very sensitive" and "very disputatious" would have taken the measure as "a wilful diminution of his prestige" or even as a "personal affront". He would have "violently protested" against the scheme, incited an agitation both in India and in England, and rendered its passage through the Council difficult.³ But after sending off the dispatch to the India Office, Curzon privately informed Young about his scheme and assured him that, if it received the approval of the Supreme Government, he would have "full and immediate" consultations with the Lieutenant-Governor concerning the details of the plan, and would show the most scrupulous regard for the "traditions, interests and feelings" of the Punjab Government and of Young himself.⁴ Naturally the Lieutenant-Governor's reaction was one of anger and surprise; he had expected that Curzon would give him a chance to express his opinion about the issue before any formal proposals were made to the Secretary of State. Young blamed Curzon for having ignored him altogether and for showing want of confidence in him.⁵

In January 1901, the Government of India, having received the sanction of the Home authorities for its scheme, officially informed the Punjab Government and solicited its "hearty cooperation" in the scheme's execution.⁶ The relations between the Viceroy and the Lieutenant-Governor had now become extremely strained, the latter maintaining that, from the constitutional point of view, the Viceroy's not having consulted the Punjab Government was an "unprecedented" procedure, and that it involved "a most dangerous doctrine".⁷ Young

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1. Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 13 September 1900, *ibid*.
2. Curzon to Godley, 12 September 1900, *ibid.*, vol. 159.
5. Young to Curzon, 20 September 1900, *C.C.*, vol 202; Lt.-Governor, Punjab, tc Viceroy, Tel. 20 September 1900, *ibid*.
6. Govt. of India to Govt. of Punjab, 28 January 1901, *C.C.*, vol. 338.
7. Govt. of Punjab to Govt. of India, 13 February 1901, *ibid*. 
was indiscreet enough to give outspoken vent to his bitterness and wrath, which emmitted his relations with the Viceroy still further. Curzon heard from "several persons" that Lady Mackworth Young entertained "bitter feelings" and had said "bitter things" about him; and he believed that she had "vilified and abused" him all over Simla. These incidents wounded Curzon deeply, and it was long before they were "effaced from his recollection". Not only the Lieutenant-Governor himself, but his subordinate officers also took the decision of the Supreme Government as a personal slight. When Curzon's Minute was published, Herbert Fanshawe, the Commissioner of Delhi and an ex-Chief Secretary of the Punjab, resigned, feeling that "a great public indignity had been thrust upon the [Punjab] administration as unmerited as it was ungenerous". The appointment of Colonel H. Deane as the first Agent to the Governor-General in the new Province gave further offence to the Punjab Government. Deans was then Political Agent of the Malakand Agency. Curzon considered him, by his experience and qualifications, to be the best officer outside the Punjab Commission to head the new Province. Young objected to Curzon's choice, pointing out that the two Frontier Commissioners, F. Cunningham and W.H. Merk, were the most senior officers in the Punjab Commission. Deane was junior to both the officers by thirteen and ten years, respectively, and had served under them. Young recommended that either Cunningham or Merk be given the post. Curzon rejected the recommendation, since Cunningham was about to retire, and he felt that Merk was not a suitable choice. Deane was "highly thought of" in the India Office; and there his proposed appointment was received favourably.

The Viceroy asked Deane to work out a plan to make the new Province "independent, self-contained and self-supporting". Accordingly, Deane recommended the inclusion of the Mansehra, Abbottabad and Haripur Tahsils of Hazara District in the new Province not originally included in the scheme. The reasons given for this incorporation were that, leaving aside the Abbottabad Tahsil, Hazara was a Frontier District. It was a part of the Peshawar Administrative Division where the same Border Military Police System and the Frontier Crimes Regulations were in force. A considerable proportion of the inhabi-

1. E. Baring (Military Secretary to Viceroy) to Lady Young, 23 September 1901; M. Young to Curzon, 30 September, 1901, C.C., vol. 230.
4. Curzon to Young, Tel. 4 February 1901, C.C., vol. 203.
tants of Hazara was of Pathan extraction. Moreover, Hazara would provide the base for political control over the cis-Indus Black Mountain tribes. In addition, Hazara would furnish a good health resort in summer for the Agent to the Governor-General and his officers, and would bring the whole of the Punjab Frontier Force, with its headquarters at Abbottabad, within the local limits of one single civil administration.¹

Young, as could be expected, was critical of the scheme, contending that such severance of the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara from the Punjab would be unpopular with the people and the chiefs of the districts alike; that the "miniature administration" of the new Province, apart from involving considerable expense, would be far from efficient; that the Chief Commissioner would not be able to give equal attention to his political and administrative duties, and that, under the new scheme, the border districts would be reduced to a status of an "inconvenient appendage".²

Curzon dismissed Young's views as a "belated edition" of his protest against the formation of the new Province.³ He also rejected Young's request that the severance of the Frontier districts from his charge be put off until March 1902, when he would retire. The Viceroy was eager to inaugurate the new administration without any delay, because, as he said,

> The unfortunate attitude of M. Young is known everywhere in the Province, the idea had been widely disseminated that the Local and Supreme Governments are at loggerheads with each other; that the Lieutenant-Governor has successfully defied the Viceroy; and that it is possible that the new scheme may still fall to the ground.⁴

The only way to disprove these apprehensions was to bring the new administration into existence with as little delay as possible. The North-West Frontier Province, therefore, came into being on the King's birthday, 9 November 1901.⁵ The formal inauguration of the Province took place five and a half months later, on 26 April 1902, when Curzon held a big durbar of three thousand dignitaries of the area in the Shahi Bagh at Peshawar. Curzon's address to the assembly was a full statement of his Frontier policy. He told his audience that the Viceroy's presence in person on the occasion was proof of his interest in the new Province and his sympathy with the new administration. He hoped that the crea-

1. Ibid., p.4.
4. Ibid.
5. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 29 October 1901, P.S.L.I., vol. 138, Reg. No. 1276
tion of the Province would lead to “the peace and tranquillity and contentment of the Frontier”. Its control by the Government of India “instead of somebody else”, the Viceroy asserted, would be advantageous both to the Government and the Frontier people.

Business will be better done and more quickly done; and there will not be long and vexatious delays. The system of rule will not be altered, but it will be more efficiently worked. Every man in the Frontier districts ought to look upon it as a direct gain to himself that he has a local government on the spot, and that there is nobody above that local Government but the Government of India... Merit will be better known under the new system, service will be more quickly rewarded, abuses will be more promptly checked, responsibility will be more strictly enforced and punishment, when punishment is needed, will be more swift.1

The Viceroy called upon the leading men of the Province to cooperate with the local administration, especially in the detection and punishment of violent crimes, to help the Government attain their object of establishing peace and order in the Province. Curzon assured the durbaris that he would watch the new administration “with a fond and parental eye”, see to it that the “local pride and local patriotism” were “jealously guarded”, and that the Province showed itself “ever more and more deserving of the interest that has secured for it a separate existence and an independent name”.2

The head of the North-West Frontier Province was a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, appointed by and directly responsible to the Government of India. The Chief Commissioner had a dual duty to perform, which constituted a unique feature of the administration of the Province. In his capacity as Agent to the Governor-General, he controlled political relations with the border tribes, while as Chief Commissioner, he exercised the same powers in the civil administration of the Province as the heads of other provinces did in their charge.3 The staff of the Chief Commissioner consisted of members of the Indian Civil Service, military officers of the Political Department of the Government of India and the Punjab Commission, members of the Provincial and Subordinate Civil Services, police officers and officers specially recruited for the Departments, such as Health, Education, Public Works, Forestry, Jails etc. The Chief Commissioner’s principal advisers were the Judicial and Revenue Commissioners.

2. Ibid., pp. 427-8.
The Judicial Commissioner headed the judicial administration of the Province, his court being the highest civil and criminal appellate tribunal, which replaced the chief court of the Punjab. Subordinate to the Judicial Commissioner were the two Divisional and Sessions Judges of Peshawar and of Derajat. As Divisional Judges, these officers decided most of the appeals in civil suits from the "courts of first instance". As Sessions Judges, they tried sessions cases, with the aid of assessors, and heard criminal appeals. The Revenue Commissioner was the controlling and final appellate revenue authority in the Province. He had also to act as the Revenue and Financial Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, besides being the Director of Land Records and Agriculture, Commissioner of Excise, Superintendent of Stamps, Registrar-General, Inspector-General of Registration and Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. No change was effected in the subordinate revenue agency. Each of the five districts remained, as before, under the Deputy Commissioner. The Yusufzai, Mardan and Nowshera Tahsils in Peshawar, and the Tahsils of Thal in Kohat and Tank in Dera Ismail Khan formed subdivisions, each in charge of an Assistant or Extra-Assistant Commissioner. Each of the five Political Agencies had a Political Agent. In the Kurram, Northern and Southern Waziristan Agencies, the Political Agents exercised the powers of District Magistrates and courts of session in dealing with criminal cases.1

The administration of the Province had certain distinctive features that were indicative of the special treatment which the Government thought the area deserved in view of its political and strategic importance. The first such feature was that, not only was the Province itself under the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, but the higher posts of Chief Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents in the Province were mainly manned by officers in the Political Department and by men who had political experience and training.2 The first Chief Commissioner was Colonel (later, Sir) Harold

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2. Between 1901 and 1921, the position of military officers who held the post of Deputy Commissioners in the five districts was as follows:
   - in Dera Ismail Khan there had been thirty-four changes between twenty-five persons; and on fifteen occasions, military officers held the post. In Bannu there had been thirty-three changes between twenty persons; and on nineteen occasions, military officials held the post. In Hazara there had been twenty changes between fifteen persons; and on twelve occasions, military officials held the post. In Kohat, between 1909 and 1915, there had been eighteen changes; and on nine occasions, military officials held the post. In Peshawar, since 1908, there had been eighteen changes between thirteen persons; and on ten occasions, military officials held the post. N.W.F.P. Enquiry Committee Report, 1924, pp. 45-6.
Deane. From 1885 to 1895, he was Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Yusufzai subdivision of the Peshawar District and the Deputy Commissioner of the District. Between 1895 and 1900, he acted as the Political Agent of the Malakand Agency. Deane’s long record of service among the Pathans enabled him to know the people well, to speak their language and to command their respect and confidence. His political experience, combined with his strong personality and fearless character, had influenced Curzon’s decision to give him the charge of the Province in preference to his seniors in the service.¹ Curzon regarded him as “an ideal ruler” of the new Province, who was “modest, cool, alert, well-balanced, a master of his subjects and his men”, and who inspired “both affection and respect”.² Deane remained in office for over six and a half years before being succeeded, in June 1908, by Lt.-Col. G. Roos-Keppel, who, since 1900, had been the Political Officer in Khyber.³ Lord Minto, the Governor-General, selected him mainly because he was “an expert in tribal administration” who wielded remarkable personal influence with the Afridi tribes. Though Minto liked Michael O’Dwyer, the Revenue Commissioner of the Province, he did not give him the Chief Commissionership, because, as the Governor-General himself put it,

the pressing need of the... Province is tribal administration and not the furtherance of revenue questions—as yet at any rate.⁴

There was an adverse reaction in the Political Department on Roos-Keppel’s appointment “over the heads of fifty seniors or even over eighty”. Besides, Roos-Keppel had no experience of civil administration. But John Morley, the Secretary of State, approved of Minto’s choice, because, he said, “Peshawar requires” a man like Roos-Keppel.⁵ Roos-Keppel remained in office until 1919, when he retired.

Another striking feature of the administration of the Province was that it had always a budget deficit. From 1901 to 1910, the revenue and expenditure of the Province was wholly Imperial. It was hoped at the time of the formation of the Province that its finances would be provincialized by a “quasi-provincial contract” as soon as possible; but, because there was no “sufficient data to go upon”,⁶ the hope remain-

5. Morley to Minto, 16 July 1908, ibid., vol. 3.
ed unfulfilled. In 1909 the Decentralization Commission took up the issue, and recommended a quasi-provincial settlement for the Province on the lines of Baluchistan, and the recommendation was accepted by the Government in 1910-11. According to this settlement, the local administration was assigned revenues under major heads, such as land revenue, stamps, excise, forests, registration, police, health, jails, education etc. In the event of expenditure exceeding the assigned revenues, the difference was to be made up by a fixed recurring grant from Imperial revenues. The Government of India also took the responsibility for providing the expenditure under the "political subsidies", "refugees and state prisoners" and "salaries of officers borne on the cadre of the Political Department". In regard to the assigned revenue and expenditure, the Chief Commissioner was authorised to exercise the same powers as the heads of other local governments. The revenue increased steadily, but the expenditure of the administration rose rapidly, too; with the result that the budget always showed a deficit. The large excess of expenditure over revenue was attributed to the geographical position and political importance of the Province, considerations of Imperial policy calling for special outlay under political... police, general administration and civil public works.

The Government's main expenditure lay in matters relating to the tribal tracts and border defence, the largest increases in this expenditure appearing, necessarily, under political and police heads, which included the tribal allowances, maintenance of tribal levies and the Border Military Police, which was reorganized in 1912-13 as the Frontier

3. *The North-West Frontier Province—Revenue and Expenditure*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902-1903</td>
<td>4,540,924</td>
<td>7,492,646</td>
<td>2,951,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>4,657,275</td>
<td>9,930,435</td>
<td>5,273,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1920</td>
<td>7,085,845</td>
<td>18,020,927</td>
<td>10,935,082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constabulary. The figures below show that the “principal rise in expenditure”, since the formation of the Province, had been due to the need for the “protection of India’s land frontier”.

The peculiar feature of the judicial administration of the Province was the Frontier Crimes Regulation, “an exceptional and somewhat primitive” regulation, as the India Office described it. It was enacted in 1872 by the Punjab Government and was revised in 1887 and 1901. The Regulation empowered the Deputy Commissioner to refer both civil and criminal cases to the Council of Elders, called the Jirga. The Jirga was a traditional indigenous institution for administering justice, which was recognized and resorted to by the tribesmen themselves. The Government preserved this institution in a modified form, and made use of it in the settled districts as well as in the administered tracts of the Political Agencies. Under the Regulations, a Jirga consisted of three or more persons, nominated and appointed by the Deputy Commissioner. The latter referred a civil case to the Jirga if he was convinced that the dispute would cause a blood-feud or murder, a breach of peace or some other mischief, especially if a frontier tribe were involved in the dispute. The Jirga was required to make an on-the-spot investigation and to submit a report of its findings to the Deputy Commissioner. If the report proved acceptable to the Deputy Commissioner, he passed a decree which, however, had to be agreed upon by not less than three-fourths of the Jirga members. If the Deputy Commissioner did not agree with the findings of the Jirga, he could remand the case again to the Jirga for a further enquiry, or refer it to another Jirga. Disputes involving local customs, matrimonial infidelity and claims for debts,

1. Selected Items of Revenue and Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1902-1903</th>
<th>1910-1911</th>
<th>1919-1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Revenue</td>
<td>1,726,302</td>
<td>2,032,731</td>
<td>2,028,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>153,755</td>
<td>763,302</td>
<td>1,358,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamps and Excise</td>
<td>581,876</td>
<td>880,210</td>
<td>1,729,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Political&quot;</td>
<td>2,097,106</td>
<td>3,214,115</td>
<td>5,311,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>584,080</td>
<td>702,020</td>
<td>1,133,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1,067,104</td>
<td>1,559,816</td>
<td>4,103,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29,937</td>
<td>161,796</td>
<td>881,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Works (roads and buildings)</td>
<td>26,041</td>
<td>2,153,735</td>
<td>2,132,755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

etc. could be disposed of by the Jirga without recourse to the ordinary law courts, so that the wakils and pleaders were dispensed with. The system had the practical advantage of securing decisions with the assistance of those who had the best knowledge of actual incidents and of local custom. In regard to criminal cases, the Deputy Commissioner's power to nominate Jirga members was limited in one respect: the accused person had the right to object to any nominated member of the Jirga. The maximum penalty for a criminal offence was fourteen years rigorous imprisonment or transportation for life.¹ No appeal could be made to a higher court against the ultimate decision of the Deputy Commissioner; but it was common to petition the Chief Commissioner, requesting him to review the Deputy Commissioner's decision. Section 21 of the Regulation provided for the blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribes. The usefulness of the Regulation was emphasized by the Frontier Enquiry Committee (1924) thus:

To repeal its civil sections would be to inflict grave hardship on the Pathans, who rely on them for a cheap and expeditious settlement of their disputes by a Jirga. . . . To repeal the criminal sections would be to undermine the forces of law and order and to deprive the Hindus, in particular, of one of their greatest safeguards, in a land where passions are hot, blood feuds are endemic, legal evidence is exceedingly difficult to obtain, and refuge from the arm of the law is close to hand across the border. To repeal the trans-frontier sections would be to paralyse our whole system of trans-frontier control.²

¹. Ibid., the Regulation, sections 8-12, Imperial Gazetteer, op.cit., p. 61; Davies, op.cit., pp. 53-4; James, W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, pp. 145-7.
². N.W.F.P., Enquiry Committee Report, p. 27.
The main object of Curzon's North-West Frontier policy was to ensure law and order upon the borders of settled British territory. He sought to achieve this end by securing the "pacification and contentment" of the Frontier tribes. One great question was what mixture of force, threat of Force, diplomacy or material inducement would best produce that pacification and contentment. The other, of course, was how far the means chosen could be reconciled with the maintenance of good relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, with whose considerable influence over the tribesmen the British had always to reckon. Not all areas of the Frontier were of equal military sensitiveness, nor were all the tribes of such strength or strategic importance as to be able to affect the success of Curzon's policy. The evolution of that policy will, therefore, be considered in relation to Waziristan and the country south and north of the Khyber, and to the inhabitants of these regions, the Mahsuds, Afridis and Mohmands.
The Mahsuds

The first area to be considered is Waziristan, the southern portion of the area of mountains which forms part of the North-West Frontier. Waziristan is situated between the Kurram River on the north, the Gomal River on the south, the Durand Line on the west, and the administrative border of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts on the east. Its strategic importance lies in the fact that it dominates the Tochi and Gomal, two Passes on historic routes from Afghanistan to the Indo-Pak Subcontinent. The southern half of the area is a tangled mass of mountains, cut and intersected by ravines. There are well defined ranges which protect the interior of the country by double barriers, and make penetration into it a matter of extreme difficulty. North Waziristan, on the other hand, is richer and more open, consisting of large and fertile valleys separated by high barren hills.

Waziristan is inhabited by several tribes, the most important of which are generally referred to as Waziris. In origin, the Mahsuds are Waziris; but by the British period, they were, for all practical purposes, considered to be a separate tribe. The inaccessibility of Waziristan has always prevented any close contact between it and the ruling power of either Subcontinent or Afghanistan; and its inhabitants maintain that "they never owned the sway of any sovereign". The Mahsuds occupying the central portion of Waziristan were of a particularly independent nature. In their rugged hills, they knew how to fight. A General Staff Report commenting on their effectiveness against regular British troops, remarked: "The Waziris and Mahsuds operating in their country can be classed among the finest fighters in the world....they seldom allow a tactical error to go unpunished." As recently as 1937, 40,000 British troops took part in a series of campaigns which in the last analysis still left the tribes of Waziristan, "masters of their own house".

On their annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the main problem facing the British Government on the border had been the defence and security of the settled districts of the Punjab from trans-frontier raiders. It was not deemed politic to maintain direct relations with the Mahsuds,

2. Army Headquarters, General Staff, Operations in Waziristan, 1919-1920, 1921; p 3; Denys Bray on British Policy towards the Frontier tribes, 5 March 1923; C. H. Philips, ed. The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947, p. 496.
nor was it held to be advisable to interfere in their affairs. Instead, the Government decided to deal with them through intermediaries like the Nawab of Tank, who were thought to have considerable influence over them. But this method of keeping the tribes quite proved a short-lived and unsuccessful expedient; for in March 1860, the Mahsuds, attacked Tank. The Government of India thereupon resorted to force and launched an expedition. For some years hereafter order prevailed.¹

But the campaign had another result. Having once entered the tribal lands, the Punjab Government became involved in Mahsud affairs. In 1865-66, therefore, the British Government tried the new experiment of settling a number of Mahsuds on lands allotted to them in Tank and, in return, making them responsible for border defence. This experiment, too, proved unsuccessful, whereupon the Punjab Government assumed "direct control of border affairs".²

During the second Afghan War (1878-80), the Frontier was greatly disturbed, and the tribes once again became restless. In January 1879, the Mahsuds burnt Tank. An expedition was then sent, and the Mahsuds were compelled to make the reparations demanded by the Government. By this time a new factor had been introduced into Frontier politics: the British fear of Russian intervention. Consequently, the non-interventionist policy hitherto followed gave way to the 'Forward Policy'. In 1887-88, a survey expedition was sent up the Gomal Pass to secure its strategic line of communication. But the attempt having failed, a new policy was tried. In 1889-90, Robert Bruce, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, and later the Commissioner of the Derajat, proposed a plan to control the Mahsuds through their own tribal organization. A policy of control through tribal leaders had been tried with success in Baluchistan by Robert Sandeman.³ Now a similar scheme called the 'Maliki system' was introduced by Bruce for Waziristan. The leading Maliks were selected by Bruce and graded according to their supposed power and influence and paid allowances by the Government. In return, they were required to supply a number of tribesmen for service as levies to guard the Gomal Pass, to control the tribe as a body, and to surrender individual criminals to the Government for trial.⁴

³. See supra, foot note on p. 5.
But, according to Davies, Bruce committed three mistakes in introducing the ‘Maliki system’ in Waziristan. First, unlike Sandeman, Bruce did not occupy any garrison central points in Waziristan to assist the Maliks in times of emergency. Secondly, Baluchis and Brohis had powerful tribal chiefs who could control them, whereas among the Mahsuds no such powerful chiefs existed. And lastly, in comparison with the Baluchis, the Mahsuds were much more democratic, and this made it extremely difficult to control them through their Maliks.¹

These factors soon made the Maliki system face a hard test. In 1893 a British officer was assassinated by the Mahsuds. The offenders were tried by the Jirga and sentenced, which infuriated a faction of Mahsuds with pronounced anti-British feelings. They, under their leader, Mulla Paiwandah attacked the Maliks who had tried the murderers of the British officer. Three of the Maliks were killed and others were forced to flee their homeland. The Punjab Government urged that a punitive expedition be undertaken; but, as the Supreme Government was busy with Frontier demarcations under the Durand Agreement concluded in 1893, this course of action was not adopted. However, soon after, in 1894-95, the Government of India mounted its third expedition against the Mahsuds, following an attack on Wana, which had come under permanent British occupation in 1894. It was Mulla Paiwandah who had organized the Mahsud’s opposition against the British on that occasion. Mulla Muhiy-ud-Din, popularly known as Mulla Paiwandah² was a Shabi Khel Alizai of the Sultanai sub-section of the Mahsuds. At first, he appeared as a talib-ul-ilm or seeker after knowledge at Bannu. Later on, he assumed the title of badshah-i-taliban or king of the seekers (after knowledge), and became a murid or disciple of the well known Mulla Gulab Din of Waziristan.³ At the beginning of 1890s, Mulla Paiwandah acquired for himself the position of a prominent religious leader of the Mahsuds and began to exert great influence over them.⁴ Henceforward, he put up a stubborn resistance to the encroachments of the British in Waziristan, and continued to take the lead even in armed opposition to the forces of the British Government.⁵

1. Davies, op.cit., pp. 34, 124-5.
2. In British records, Paiwandah is spelled as Powindah or Powinda.
In 1895, the whole of Waziristan was brought under British political control. Political Agents were posted at Wana and Tochi, with garrisons at Wana and Miranshah. The Government also continued its policy of giving allowances. These were now increased on the Malik's undertaking that they will ensure the general good behaviour of the tribesmen, their desistance from attack on British territory or protected areas, such as Gomal, Wana, Spin and Zarmelan, the surrender of criminals to the Government, and that they would be ready to serve under the British in any part of the country. For three years after this, the Mahsuds remained generally quiet; they did not even participate in the great tribal uprising of 1897-98.

But the turn of the century saw a resumption of Mahsud attacks on British controlled territory. Government troops were ambushed and attempts were made to assassinate British political officers. The man behind all these troubles was believed to be Mulla Paiwandah. However, in the absence of any positive evidence, the only punishment that could be inflicted was the enforcement of tribal responsibility by the imposition of a fine. Apart from the Mulla's complicity, the Mahsud attacks were attributed to their receiving Government allowances that enabled them to buy rifles, and to the activities of the Mahsud colony in Dera Ismail Khan. This colony, according to one of the border chiefs, was a "school of badmashi opened by the Government for the instruction of our young men".

This was the situation in Waziristan when Curzon took over as Viceroy. The Government had not yet evolved a sound policy, and the best method of dealing with the local tribesmen was "still a matter of experiment". Curzon's Viceroyalty witnessed a change in the Government's policy towards Mulla Paiwandah and the Mahsud tribe in general. By this time, the British officers had recognized the considerable influence Mulla Paiwandah exercised over his tribesmen. He emerged, in their estimate, as a leader and a power. The policy

2. From Rs. 51,228 to a total of Rs. 61,548.
5. In 1896, R.I. Bruce, the Commissioner of Derajat, allotted 5,500 acres of land in the Tank tahsil of the Dera Ismail Khan district to Mahsud Malik's for the settlement of Mahsuds as tenants on this land.
of ignoring the Mulla, pursued so far in the Government's relations and transactions with the Mahsuds, could no longer be considered expedient. The Government, therefore, decided to come to terms with him. But in what way? The Government of the Punjab conspired "to commit him in the eyes of his tribe" by granting him an allowance secretly. But the plan miscarried. "The whole affair", the Secretary of the Indian Government wrote, "has been so fully and openly discussed that anything given to him now would probably be regarded on every hand as an acknowledgement of him as a leader and a power in the tribe, which is just what the Government of India want to avoid."  

It could not be avoided now. Curzon was furious. The whole thing, according to him, had been "shockingly mismanaged."  

However, in the middle of 1900, the Government did bestow a monthly allowance of one hundred rupees on the Mulla, hoping that "by publishing the fact and the circumstances connected with the grant, we could probably destroy, or at any rate greatly reduce the Mulla's influence and prestige with the tribesmen."  

No Mahsud Malik at this time was in receipt of an allowance of even half that sum. The Government had thus guaranteed the Mulla's position. While the Government was thus busy pursuing its "Machiavellian" tactics with the Mulla, W.R. Merk, the Commissioner of the Derajat, was expressing his dissatisfaction with the Maliki system as a whole. In July 1900, he pointed out to the Punjab Government that:

There is something radically wrong... in the present system. We move in a vicious circle. We look to the Maliks and they look to us. Between the two the management of the Mahsuds falls to the ground. 

Merk proposed that an allowance be paid to the tribe rather than to some selected Maliks, and that the Government should deal with the tribe as a whole and enforce tribal, instead of individual, responsibility in case of offences. The practical advantage of the method, he argued, was that every member of the tribe would become interested in controlling the offenders.  

The argument about a change in the Maliki system was given further urgency by the continuation of Mahsud raids. Early in September 1900, therefore, two conferences were held at Simla, attended by

1. Note by Sir William Cunningham, the Secretary, Govt. of India, C.C., vol. 308. 
2. Note by Curzon, ibid. 
3. Note by Captain Daly, the Deputy Secretary, Govt. of India, ibid. 
Curzon, Young, General Egerton, the Commander of the Punjab Frontier Force, and Merk, to discuss the Mahsud problem. It was decided that the Mahsuds should be given a period of grace within which to make a settlement with the Government, and that failing compliance, a blockade of the whole tribe should be imposed at the beginning of December 1900. Merk’s recommendation to discontinue the Maliki system was also accepted; in future, the Government would deal with the tribal or sectional Jirga to whom the subsidy would be paid; a portion of the subsidy, however, might be reserved for certain individuals whose interests it was impossible to ignore.¹

In October 1900, the Government imposed a fine of one lakh rupees on the Mahsuds for the offences committed by them.² On 8 November 1900, Merk summoned a great Jirga of the Mahsuds at Tank. The Maliks declared themselves helpless and requested that their territory be taken over by the Government. This, however, was not in accordance with the wishes of the tribesmen. Merk then announced the terms of the Government to the assembly, and the tribe was given fifteen days to discuss them.³ The Maliks consulted the tribe but with no result. The time of grace was over, and the blockade duly began on 1 December 1900, with the avowed object of starving the tribe into submission.⁴ The blockade lasted until March 1902. In the initial stages, it failed in its purpose; the Mahsuds continued both to raid and trade. Eventually, in November 1901, active operations were mounted against the tribe. The Mahsuds were obliged to compromise. On 16 January 1902, they sent in a deputation to tender their submission. The terms offered by the Government were the payment of a fine of one lakh rupees in full, the return of all rifles looted and all cattle taken during the blockade, and the surrender of certain outlaws.⁵

On 5 March 1902, Merk met the Mahsud Jirga at Tank. The Jirga appointed and despatched two hundred chalweshtis (Mahsud tribal police) for the arrest of the outlaws demanded by the Government. On the promise of future good behaviour and the acceptance of tribal responsibility, the Jirga was permitted to disperse with orders to reassemble.

¹. Note by Curzon in the Military Department, 9 August 1900, Note by Curzon, 10 September 1900, C.C., vol. 308; Govt. of India to Govt. of the Punjab, 18 October 1900, P.S.L.I., vol. 127, Reg. No. 1169.
². Govt. of the Punjab to Govt. of India, 23 October 1900, P.S.L.I., vol. 141, Reg. No. 293; Govt. of India to Govt. of the Punjab, Tel. 25 October 1900, ibid.
³. Commissioner, Derajat Division, to Govt. of the Punjab, Tel. 8 November 1900, ibid.
⁴. Commissioner, Derajat Division, to Govt. of the Punjab, Tel. 1 December 1900, ibid.
Relations with the Frontier Tribes

ble at Tank on 24 March 1902. On 10 March, the blockade was raised; and on 24 March, Deane, the Chief Commissioner, accepted the formal submission of the Mahsuds and announced the restoration of their allowances.

In Deane's view, the blockade was not a really effective method of dealing with hostile tribes; and he felt that the Mahsud blockade had been a failure. Instead, he argued that "the punitive expedition remains and will remain the best resource for enforcing peace on the Frontier". Deane was not sure that even this extreme measure would be a guarantee for the future good behaviour of the tribe.

"It was hopeless to expect that there should be no trouble with a tribe whose record from all time has been one of thieving and raiding and who for years past have terrorized their neighbours, and it may be that the restless and turbulent spirit in the tribe may again prevail." This was Curzon's feeling, too; for he commented that the Mahsud problem had not been solved either permanently or temporarily, that before long the Government might be compelled to take coercive measures against the tribe.

Merk, however, still hoped to conciliate the tribe through allowances. Accordingly, on 5 April 1902, he distributed the tribal payments. Out of the total sum of Rs. 61,000, Rs. 54,000 were equally apportioned among the three sections of the Mahsuds—the Alizai, Bahlolzai and Shaman Khel. The balance was reserved for distribution among the old Maliks as rewards for their services to the Government. Merk regarded the arrangement as satisfactory and reported to the Government:

So far as I am able to judge the Mahsuds have not the slightest intention of permitting any one to do what may lead to the forfeiture of the tribal allowances and to the rescission of the present settlement... If nothing unforeseen occurs, I see no reason why the settlement should not work. There will be difficulties of course... but one may reasonably hope that they will be overcome and that affairs will go smoothly till they become matters of routine.

This, however, proved to be too optimistic a view. Within three months of Merk's settlement, Johnston, the Political Agent of Wana, was pointing out the inadequacies of the arrangement and forecast its failure. Merk had laid down that the payment of fines by the three

2. Merk to Govt. of India, Tel. 10 March 1902, ibid., Note by Curzon, 8 March 1902, C.C., vol. 308.
sections of the tribe was to be made in exactly the same proportion as the distribution of allowances among them. He had thus stretched tribal responsibility for offences to a point where even the innocent had to share the punishment with the guilty. He also argued that the sum reserved for the deserving Maliks was inadequate; most of the old Maliks and the large class whom Johnston called Motabars had held aloof from the settlement. Without their cooperation, it was impossible to achieve satisfactory relations with the tribe. In Johnston’s view, the arrangement was unworkable. He, therefore, proposed a compromise scheme between the Maliki system and Merk’s tribal responsibility arrangement; the old Maliks were to receive better recognition than hitherto while the distribution of allowances was not to be on the sectional basis proposed under Merk’s arrangement. Johnston recommended that an additional sum of Rs. 9,000 be sanctioned, thus raising the total allowances to Rs. 70,000 per annum. Of this, Rs. 54,000, as arranged by Merk, were to be tumani1 for the tribe as a whole, and the balance was to be distributed among the old Maliks and Motabars.2

Deane supported Johnston. He pointed out the risks involved in conducting relations with “the great Jirga of the Mahsuds”, which was “an armed rabble of several thousand strong”. It was, besides, expensive to entertain such a large gathering.3 Curzon had become exasperated with the Frontier officers’ “constant oscillations” of policy and the lack of a fixed plan. “I have not the least confidence”, he noted “in the new settlement now proposed, or in the capacity of any of the Frontier officers whom I have yet come across to advise us on the Waziris. They have no fixed plan, and they wobble to and fro from year to year, carrying us with them in their melancholy gyrations.”4 He now reluctantly accepted Johnston’s “conglomerate scheme” on the express responsibility of “those who proposed it”. He urged the officers to make earnest efforts to secure continuity in the Government’s dealings with Waziristan and to bring the era of divided counsels and fluctuating actions to an end.5

In February 1903, Johnston proceeded to put the scheme into effect. He held a fully representative Jirga of 3,500 men at Jandola; Mulla Paiwandah and every other man of importance attended the Jirga. The Jirga unanimously agreed to do away with all the tribal representatives

1. Tuman=the whole body of the tribe; tumani=Payment of allowances to the whole tribe.
5. Govt. of India to Deane, 22 December 1902, ibid.
selected in the preceding year, as they were men of no account. For these were substituted all the old *Maliks* and other leading men who at the last distribution of allowances had stood aloof in the hope of obtaining separate recognition. It was proposed that the old *Maliks* and *Motabars* should enter the *tuman* as *wakils* (representatives), that the Rs. 16,000 assigned for the *Maliks* should not be divided in any arbitrary way, but should follow the tribal distribution and be given solely to the *Maliks*. The Mulla, who had been receiving an allowance from the Government and who was attending the *Jirga* for the first time, stood up to defend the new arrangement as a "fair, just and generous" scheme. Then adding a personal explanation, he said that "his presence there meant the beginning of a new era" in Mahsud relations with the British Government. For ten years past he had consistently opposed the Government, but now he promised to renounce his old ways and cooperate with it for the good of the whole tribe.1

Deane was happy that, in place of the unwieldy, expensive and irresponsible *tuman*, the new scheme had set up a comprehensive system of representation. He hoped that the arrangement of subsidizing the Mahsuds would secure both their goodwill and the cooperation of their leaders and thus ensure peace.2 The hope was strengthened when the Mahsuds willingly enlisted in the Militias. Three companies, each about one hundred strong, were recruited in the South Waziristan Militia, each company being formed from a different clan of the tribe. One such company was recruited in the North Waziristan Militia. Gradually the Militia took over all the posts in Waziristan which were formerly held by regulars, with the exception of Jandola.3

These were evidently encouraging signs; but there were others which clearly suggested that the conduct of the tribe was, indeed, unpredictable. Thus, within about eighteen months of Johnston’s arrangement, a sepoy of the South Waziristan Militia murdered Captain Bowring, the Political Agent of Wana. In February 1905, Colonel Harman, the Commandant of the South Waziristan Militia, was murdered by another Mahsud sepoy. At first fanaticism was suspected to be the cause of these incidents. Then they were attributed to a "plot among certain Mahsuds in the Militia". In consequence, four hundred Mahsuds in the Militia were disbanded and sent back to their homes, while twenty, who were suspected of being the perpetrators of the crimes, were sent to Dera Ismail Khan for trial.

2. Deane to Govt. of India, 25 March 1903, *ibid*.
In November 1905, a third British officer, Captain Donaldson, Brigade Major at Bannu, fell victim to an ex-Militia man. Mulla Paiwandah was suspected of instigating these murders.1

This was the position on the Frontier when Curzon in November 1905 handed over charge to Minto. Before his departure from India, in a speech at the Simla United Services Club, Curzon claimed that the Frontier was quiet and that during seven years of his Viceroyalty no Frontier expedition had been undertaken, and that the Government had spent only £248,000 on what he called the "semi-pacific operation of the Mahsud blockade" as compared to £4.5 million in the five years preceding his rule.2

Minto, the incoming Viceroy, refused to accept Curzon's claims. Indeed, he felt that he had inherited a difficult position on the Frontier. Our relations with the Amir, with the tribes, the position of the Militia levies, and the view our officers take generally of Frontier questions all seem to me to have been influenced by a spirit which I do not profess quite to understand, but which I think has not indicated a sense of the necessity of avoiding friction on the Frontier as much as possible.3 He could point to the evidence of unrest in the series of murders of British officers by Mahsud Militiamen. It became increasingly obvious that the Border Military Police were not strong enough to safeguard the border from tribal raids, which grew in intensity and frequency. Moreover, Minto soon discovered that the official reports submitted during Curzon's time had been deliberately slanted to throw a favourable light on the Frontier situation. Several daring raids had been suppressed by the local authorities, but had not been brought to the notice of the Foreign Department, "for the sake of giving a good impression of Curzon's Frontier Policy". Minto declared himself unable to understand the line adopted by the previous administration, and in a very strong letter he warned Deane that

the suppression of information respecting raids and the tendency to ascribe as many evil acts as possible to Afghan influence cannot be tolerated.4

The immediate problem Minto had to deal with was the punishment of the Mahsud murderers. Deane's proposal was that the five relatives of Captain Donaldson's assassin should be surrendered by the tribe to Government, that all lands in the British territory belonging to the

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4. Minto to Morley, 13 March 1906, ibid.
Sultani section of the Alizai clan of the Mahsuds be confiscated, that the
Mahsud allowances be stopped for two years, and that a fine of 25,000
rupees be imposed on the tribe. Failing compliance within a month,
Deane recommended that an expedition be sent and the Mahsud territory
occupied.¹

In December 1905 and January 1906, Minto discussed the issue in
his Council. There were two questions: first, the need for immediate
action to secure the safety of British officers serving with the Militia levies
on the Frontiers; second, how best to punish the tribe. As for the first,
two alternatives were suggested: either the Militia posts in Waziristan
should be strengthened by the addition of separate contingents of troops
from India, or the Militia levies should be reorganized by the incorpora-
tion of a proportion of Sikhs and Dogras, who would act as a counter-
poise to the Mahsuds. The former was a difficult course to adopt; for
to send small bodies of troops to reinforce the Militia posts was risky in
the existing state of feelings in Waziristan. On the other hand, the re-
organization of the Militia levies would take quite some time.²

As for punishing the Mahsuds by an expedition, neither Minto nor
Kitchener were favourably disposed to the idea. The members of the
Council, though generally desirous of adopting this course, could not
ignore the risk of the expedition escalating into a Frontier war.³ Minto-
therefore, accepted Deane’s proposal to impose a fine of Rs. 25,000 to be
recovered from the tribal allowances, and to withhold all allowances for
one year, unless the tribe cleared itself of suspicion or handed over the
five men suspected of the murder of British officers.⁴ The plan seemed
to have worked when Mulla Paiwandah surrendered three of the men
demanded. The fourth was also soon brought in. But the fifth, a rela-
tive of the Mulla, fled to Birmal, within the Afghan boundary. Despite
the suspected complicity of the Mulla, the Government hesitated to take
action against him. L. Crump, the new Political Agent of Wana, for
instance, thought that the Mulla was implicated in the crimes, but com-
mented that to “punish him means war, and war means annexation”.
Crump, therefore, proposed that the Government purchase the Mulla’s
loyalty by publicly granting him a plot of land in British territory; this
would bind him “by ties of personal interest to Government” and “inci-
dentally... reduce his paramount influence” in the tribe. Simultaneously,

1. “Memorandum of Information for December 1905, regarding affairs on and beyond
3. Minto to Morley, 10 January 1906, ibid.
4. Minto to Morley, 1 February 1906, Morley to Minto, 29 March 1906, ibid.
Crump asked the Government to rearrange the *Maliki* allowances of Rs. 16,000; for he thought that Johnston’s *wakils* were merely ordinary householders of the tribe who did not exercise any real influence, but had undeservedly got a share in the *tumani* and in the *Maliki* allowances. Crump wanted to introduce the old *Maliks* into the settlement to give the tribe alternative leaders and “to strengthen the oligarchy of really efficient *Maliks*” to counterbalance the influence of the Mulla.\(^1\) Deane was not in favour of Crump’s “revolutionary” proposal regarding the Mulla;\(^2\) but Minto believed that it was worth buying the Mulla off. In recent transactions, the Mulla had behaved fairly well. He was evidently anxious to keep on good terms with the Government. For a long time, the relations of the Government had been very intimate with him, and the officers trusted largely to him to carry out the Government’s negotiations with the tribe. To Minto, it appeared that it would be shortsightedness to alienate the Mulla on dubious charges of being involved in the murders of British officers. The Government had made every possible use of his services since those murders. “Now”, Minto wrote, “we have a chance of getting him still more under our control by an offer of land in British territory, which he is most anxious to acquire, it would be a great mistake on the part of the Government to lose him”.\(^3\) The grant of land to him was, therefore, publicly announced, the Government’s intention being to “cut away from him all his pretensions to religious piety” and “to set the *tumani* strongly against him”. Johnston’s “conglomerate” scheme was also changed; the number of recipients of *Maliki* allowances was reduced from 1,500 to 300.\(^4\)

For a while, the officials claimed that the Government’s object of curbing the Mulla’s influence had been realized. Several attempts were reported to have been made on the Mulla’s life, possibly by those 1,200 men who attributed the loss of their *Maliki* allowance to him. This led the officials to believe that the Mulla’s prestige was at a low ebb, which was, indeed, wishful thinking; for the Mulla continued his struggle with the discontented *Maliks*, “a struggle fraught with menace to the peace of the border”.\(^5\)

There was a recrudescence of raids by the Mahsuds, with an organized system of assassinations. British subjects inside the administered area

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2. Deane to Govt. of India, 11 July 1906, *ibid.*
ran great risks, while the British officers in Waziristan were practically prisoners in the Militia forts.

In July 1907, Crump forwarded a statement to the Indian Government, contending that Mulla Paiwandah had been “privy to if not an active instigator” of the murders of the British officers; he had abetted almost every raid and robbery committed by the Mahsuds prior to the blockade; and that either by direct instigation or by virtue of his position and influence as the recognized leader of the tribe in both political and religious matters, he was personally or morally responsible for the entire misconduct of the Mahsuds. Deane was fully convinced of the truth of Crump’s indictment. The situation, which seemed to be getting out of hand, was described by Minto thus:

*We sent what practically amounted to an ultimatum to the Mahsuds in July, warning them that if they did not believe themselves the consequences would be more serious. Their reply to this has been a raid by a force of an unusual strength, composed of all sections of the tribe, into British territory and an insolent letter to Crump ... much of it in a tone of contempt and defiance, whilst a man has been arrested near the tennis ground at Wana, who has confessed that he was employed by the Mulla Paiwandah to assassinate Crump.*

The Government, therefore, had no choice but to withdraw the grant of land from the Mulla as well as the special cash allowance. But this was not enough.

Deane, who was “rather pessimistic” about the Frontier affairs, once again urged Minto to launch an expedition against the Mahsuds. Minto was in a predicament: he held that, for the vindication of the Government’s authority and prestige, an expedition was justified; but he was handicapped by the fact that it might have unfavourable repercussions on British relations with Afghanistan as well as with Russia. “It is all-important”, Minto explained to Morley, “that nothing should arise to jeopardize the Treaty with Russia,” and violent anti-British feeling on the Frontier might for the moment react on Afghan politics, and handicap the Amir in any wish he may have to meet us half way.” Besides, any expedition was an expensive undertaking. Minto was supported in his views by Kitchener, who absolutely agreed that to enter the Mahsud country simply to punish the tribe and then to withdraw would be “full of the most unfortunate results”. Minto had an intense dislike for what

2. Minto to Morley, 16 October 1907, *ibid*.
4. The Anglo-Russian Convention concluded in August 1907.
was known as the “steam roller policy”, that is going into a country simply to burn and destroy all we can lay our hands on and then going away again, leaving a starving population with their hatred for us increased a hundred-fold.

The withdrawal of the British troops after inflicting punishment on the Mahsuds, Minto explained, would be credited to no feelings of generosity on our side, but simply to fear of the tribes...whilst our own soldiers would say, with truth, that their comrades who were killed had sacrificed their lives for nothing.

However, should an expedition be forced on the Government by the continued aggressiveness of the tribe, then Minto preferred to occupy the Mahsud territory by establishing military posts and improving the means of communication rather than to devastate it and then withdraw. It was not necessary, in his view, to force upon it a “British administration, collection of revenues” etc. It would be sufficient to hold the area by the creation of one or two roads, or rather by the improvement of existing roads by means of tribal labour, for which we should not pay, and the establishment of a few armed posts, leaving the tribe as heretofore to carry on its own tribal administration.

It was a safe policy to adopt, Minto asserted, as well as one likely to bring “happiness and prosperity to the districts we have pacified”. Moreover the “pacification of Waziristan” by this means would, Minto hoped, “in the long run, be far less expensive than a succession of expeditions.”

The Home Government’s reaction was cautious. Morley was not only against any expedition; he was also opposed to any form of occupation of the tribal territory. On 5 December 1907, he wrote to Minto:

Things may be tiresome; they always are tiresome in that delectable region, but who thinks they would have been less so, if we had listened to Frontier counsels. Whatever the Amir may say about the Russian Convention, for us to have gone into the field against his friends on the border, while he is deciding his tactics, would beyond all doubt have prejudiced our chances of his assent [to the Convention]. Much therefore do I applaud your cautious refusal to go in for punitive expeditions... as at present advised, or as likely to be advised, H.M.’s Government will certainly refuse to set up permanent posts, or anything else that is of the nature of annexation.

Meanwhile, the Mahsud attempts to kill British officers went on unabated. On 13 March 1908, matters came to a head. The Mahsuds killed the Political Agent’s bearer and the Political Tahsildar’s munshi. Thereupon, Crump effected an immediate baramata (seizure of person and property).

of all the Mahsuds in the protected and administered areas and secured the capture of four hundred Mahsuds. Deane and Minto fully approved of this step, but Morley said he was "rather quaking". He wrote to Minto that the "doings of Crump and Deane" struck him "as savouring unpleasantly of the forward frontier school". Morley feared that Crump's action without orders was just the kind of thing to commit his Government to an expedition.

While the Viceroy and the Secretary of State were busy debating the wisdom of Crump's action, Deane was directed to get in touch with the Mahsud Jirga. Speaking to the Jirga at Tank in April 1908, Deane announced the definite forfeiture of the previous year's allowances, and reiterated the warning of July 1907 regarding tribal responsibility for the prevention of outrages on British territory and attempts at the murder of British officers and British subjects. Unless the tribe stopped these practices, its allowances would be withheld. The Maliks, as before, pleaded their inability to control the outlaws and Mulla Paiwandah, whereupon Deane recommended that the Government should launch an expedition as the only solution to the long-festering problem.

Minto by now was very anxious; he realized the extreme strain under which British officers were living in the troubled region "with their lives in their hands from day to day with a constant threat of assassination". The Viceroy began to feel that, as repeatedly urged by Deane, an expedition was the only way of dealing with the situation. However, since Minto found it "uncommonly hard" to persuade Morley to sanction this course of action, he had to drop the idea.

Matters kept on drifting, and no satisfactory solution of the intricate Mahsud problem was forthcoming. In June 1908, Roos-Keppel replaced Deane, whose health gave way under the heavy strain. Deane went home, a physical wreck, and died soon after. One of the first steps taken by Roos-Keppel was to place Waziristan under D.S. Donald, a senior and experienced officer, to coordinate and control all political work in the region.

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5. Minto to Morley, 23 June 1908, Morley to Minto, 16 July 1908, ibid.
7. Olaf Caroe, op.cit., p. 422.
8. Roos-Keppel to Govt. of India, 18 June 1909, Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 3 November 1910, P.S.L.I., vol. 244, Reg. No. 1670.
During this time, an unofficial correspondence took place between Crump and Roos-Keppel. Crump recommended the occupation and direct administration of Waziristan. He proposed the construction of a road from Thal in Kurram via Idak in Tochi through the heart of the Mahsud country to Wana in Gomal. There would be a garrison of some 2,500 regular troops at Razmak, and the road would be held by a series of Militia posts. The entire tribal territory would be administered on the system in force in the protected areas of the Wana and Tochi Agencies. A light revenue in the form of a house tax would be levied. Crump also urged the Government to adopt such measures as would promote the economic development of the Mahsud territory. The mineral wealth and forests of Waziristan, if developed, could not only bring prosperity to the people but transform their habits as well. Urging a change of outlook on the part of the Government, Crump wrote:

At present the Mahsud is treated as an outcaste, with suspicion and hatred. He is a byword for treachery. There is splendid material of humanity in the people, and it is time that Government ceased to treat the Mahsud as a brute, and began to treat him as a man. Let Government enter and administer the territory; it will not only be blessed by its own subjects, but afford a chance of civilization to one of the finest of the Pathan tribes.

Crump’s scheme was a departure from the Government’s policy of non-interference in the internal administration of the tribal people. Roos-Keppel, considering it “a war policy”, did not attach much importance to it, while Minto, regarding it as the “irresponsible utterance of a subordinate official”, asked Morley to ignore it.

The year 1909 began with the Mahsud problem becoming a trifle easier. In January sixty rifles were surrendered to the Government as a token of Mahsud submission and as an assurance of the tribe’s future good behaviour. The Government also made certain gestures. In May sectional instead of tribal responsibility was once again enforced. Several sections of the tribe paid fines to the Government; and to allay the dissatisfaction regarding the existing system of distribution of Maliki allowances, the Government introduced a rearrangement of the system. Lists of sectional Malik were drawn up by each section, and allowances were paid out by the Government in accordance with the lists.

2. Roes-Keppel to Govt. of India, 11 January 1909, ibid.
3. Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 8 April 1909, ibid.
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ously, the Mahsuds again began to be recruited into the army. Mulla Paiwandah’s influence, too, seemed to be on the wane. He failed, according to Merk, to convene a Jirga at Kaniguram in November 1909, and to prevent the Mahsuds attending a Jirga called by the Government at Tank in January 1910.

In late 1910, Minto was succeeded by Lord Hardinge, who, in the words of Morley, was “an enemy of the Forward Policy.” Under Minto, whatever the Viceroy’s personal beliefs and convictions might have been, the Mahsud situation had been handled by makeshift arrangements with the predominant object of avoiding a punitive expedition. As a result, the situation was by no means easy, and the new Viceroy had plenty of anxiety and worry in store for him.

The year 1911 was very hard for the Mahsuds, as the country suffered from a bad drought and famine. The Government feared that the failure of crops would intensify the Mahsud’s propensity for raiding. They, therefore, thought it “very desirable from the political point of view” to give some sort of employment to the Mahsuds to ease their economic distress and thereby minimize the risk of Mahsud attacks on British territory. The Railway Department had at that time a scheme for the extension of the Kalabagh-Bannu line from Lakki to Tank. Hardinge saw that the section from Lakki to Pezu—a distance of about 25 miles—could offer employment to a large number of Mahsuds for a few months. Accordingly, in February 1912, nearly 2,000 Mahsuds were employed for this, and many more were engaged on the Khuzma road in the Gomal and the Mughal Kot road in the Zhob Valley. The Government’s development of communications on the Waziristan border was distasteful to Mulla Paiwandah, who unsuccessfully tried to damage the Khuzma road.

In November 1913, the Mulla died. For nearly two decades he had dominated the politics of South Waziristan. He saw in the British advance into Waziristan, with its outward manifestations of the Militia, military posts and roads, a menace to the cherished independence of his

5. Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 6 March 1912, ibid., vol 85; V.
6. Roos-Keppel to Govt. of India, Tels. 1, 4, 6 March 1912, P.S.F., vol. 13, 1912, File No. 1088, Govt. of India to Roos-Keppel, Tel. 15 March 1912, ibid., File no. 1291.
territory. To safeguard this independence, he set himself to wreck British plans; and his methods—raids on British territory, assassination of British officers and intrigues with the anti-British party at Kabul—had proved a constant source of anxiety for the British Government. The latter's policy towards the Mulla lacked consistency. At first he was ignored; then he was favoured with a liberal gratuity and friendly relations with British officers; later he was deprived of both. This "mixture of cajolery and snubs" did not work. He remained a bitter opponent of the British till the last. Curzon, Minto and Kitchener, to whom the Mulla had given many anxious moments, despised him as a "first class scoundrel", "a great rascal" and "a pestilent priest"; but to a later competent British observer, Evelyn Howell, the Mulla was a remarkable man. In Howell's view, the Mulla cannot be judged by any standard current among Englishmen... By those who had made allowances for the environment in which he lived, he cannot be denied some tribute of admiration as a determined and astute, though not altogether single-minded, patriot and champion of his tribe's independence... his forceful character, striking appearance and persuasive eloquence made a deep impression on those with whom he came into personal contact. A man who, without any inherited advantages and without education, could make so large an instalment of Frontier history, in effect, but a series of chapters in his own biography, could have been no little man, and given more malleable material to work upon than Mahsuds have ever afforded and a more fortunate setting in time and space, he might well have ranked with many who are accounted great men.¹

The Mulla's farewell letter to his people reveals his patriotic spirit and concern for his motherland. He exhorted the Mahsuds to hold their nationality intact and allow neither the British Government nor the Amir to encroach upon their territory, to compose their internal differences and to give up raiding, so as to deprive Government of a convenient excuse for occupying Mahsud territory.²

Mulla Paiwandah commended his second surviving son, Fazl Din, a stripling of fourteen or fifteen years of age, to the Mahsuds as his successor. Fazl Din was destined to carry on his father's policy as a "centre of opposition" to any friendly relations between Mahsuds and Government.³

This was soon apparent; for in January 1914, Captain Butler, the Second-in-Command of the South Waziristan Militia, was killed by a sepoy. Two months later, Major Dodd, the Political Agent of Wana;

¹ Howell, op.cit., p. 30.
² Ibid.
³ Olaf Caroe, op.cit., pp. 399-405.
Captain Brown, the Second-in-Command of the South Waziristan Militia; and Lieutenant Hickie, of the Royal Artillery, along with three sepoys, lost their lives at the hands of a Bahlolzai Mahsud, Sarfraz by name, who was the personal orderly of Major Dodd. An inquiry into the incident revealed that the murders had been previously planned and were the result, not of any private grievance, but of a “tribal movement”. Mulla Abdul Hakim, an intimate friend and for years the “confidential munshi” of the late Mulla Paiwandah, was strongly suspected of complicity in the crime.¹

Donald, who was officiating as Chief Commissioner, interviewed the Mahsud Jirga in May 1914, enforced tribal responsibility, and suspended the tribal allowances. The Mahsuds were asked to surrender three relatives of Sarfraz and three other men who were accomplices in the murder of the British officers. The Mahsuds refused compliance.² Shortly thereafter, the Great War started and accentuated the Mahsud’s hostility towards the British.³

The Afridis

The Gomal and Tochi Passes have a local strategic and commercial importance, but there is no doubt that of all the routes from Central Asia and Afghanistan, none rivals the Khyber. The Khyber has been rightly described as “the most historic... of all the passes of the world”.⁴ It begins near Jamrud, a little over 10 miles west of Peshawar, and runs through the Khyber hills for about 33 miles in a north-westerly direction, till it reaches Loi Dakka in Afghan territory. The Khyber has been the high-road from Central Asia to the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent; hence, its strategic and commercial importance.

The Khyber Pass runs through the territory of the Afridis. The Khyber Afridis⁵ are divided into six main clans: The Kambar Khel,

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¹ Donald to Govt. of India, 6 June 1914, P.S.F., vol. 46, 1914, File No. 2627; Note by F.A. Hirtzel, undated, *ibid.* File No. 1469.
² Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, 1910-16, p. 100, H.P., vol. 131, Donald to Hirdinge, 19 July 1914, enclosed in Hardinge to Crewe, 30 July 1914, *ibid.*, vol. 120. IV.
³ Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, p. 100, H.P., Vol. 131.
⁵ Besides the Khyber Afridis, there are two other Afridi clans—the Adam Khel and the Aka Khel. Their original habitat was also the Tirah, and a small number of them are still living there; but at present, the Adam Khel live in the Kohat Pass between Peshawar and Kohat and in the Jawaki area adjacent to the Kohat District. The Aka Khel live in the hills south of Jamrud.
Kamarai Khel, Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel, Sipah Khel and Zakha Khel. Their common homeland is the Tirah to the south of the Khyber Pass. Each clan has its own habitat. Of these clans, the Zakha Khel had, in the past, been the most important, most powerful and the most turbulent, being regarded as the "archetype" of the Afridis. They were less amenable to British control than the other clans partly because their settlements were a long way from the settled border and also because their trade with British-controlled territory was small.1

The British Government first came into contact with the Afridis during the First Afghan War. Then when Peshawar, as a part of the State of Lahore, became a British possession in 1849, many Afridis took service in the British Indian Army and helped it to crush the Uprising of 1857. In the beginning, British relations with the Afridis, as with the Mahsuds, were maintained through influential men of the Peshawar border, called the Arbabs. These intermediaries, however, proved unreliable, being prone to intrigues against the British. To enhance their own importance, they fomented unrest among the Afridis and prevented friendly relations developing between the tribe and the British Government. During the Second Afghan War, the Afridis, particularly the Zakha Khel, harassed the British troops passing through the Khyber. In 1878, the Government were obliged to send a punitive expedition against the tribe.2

In 1879, by the Treaty of Gandamak concluded with the Amir of Afghanistan, the British Government secured control of the Khyber Pass. The Khyber Political Agency, the first of its kind in the Frontier, was then created by the Government. It included the Mullagori territory north of the Khyber, the Tirah to the south and the area on both sides of the Khyber Pass. An agreement was also made, on 17 February 1881, between the British Government and the Afridis, by which the latter, together with the Loargai Shinwaris of Landi Kotal, accepted entire and exclusive responsibility for the safety of the Khyber; and, on condition of British recognition of their independence, undertook to have no relations with any foreign power. In return for this agreement, the allowances fixed for the Afridis, including the Shinwaris of Loargai, amounted to Rs. 87,540 per annum, which were, however, liable to forfeiture if any Afridi committed dacoity, highway robbery or murder in British territory. The management of the Khyber Pass was entrusted to the tribesmen

1. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, vol. II., pp. 13-4, 19; Davies, op. cit., p.135.
2. Imperial Gazetteer of India, North-West Frontier Province, 1908, pp. 231-2; R. Warburton, Eighteen years in the Khyber (1879-1898), pp. 35-6, 328-9.
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themselves. Some local levies called *jezailchis*, numbering about 400, were also raised to escort caravans through the Khyber twice a week. They were paid by the Government; but their appointment and dismissal lay with the chiefs of the clans concerned, who were solely responsible for the management of the levies. The Political Agent of the Khyber dealt with matters relating to the Afridis. The British Government exercised the right of levying tolls on traffic carried through the Khyber Pass.¹

During the tribal disturbances of 1897-98, the Afridis were dealt with by the Tirah Expeditionary Force under General William Lockhart. In 1898, a fresh settlement was made with the Afridis, requiring them to have no intercourse with any power except the British and to raise no objections to the Government’s construction of railways or roads through the Khyber Pass. On these conditions, their allowances were restored, with a small increase of Rs. 250 per mensem for the Kambar Khel.²

Under Curzon’s scheme of Frontier defence, the *jezailchis* were renamed the Khyber Rifles and augmented to two battalions of 600 men each. They were placed under British officers and supported by a mobile column at Peshawar. The Government of India took responsibility for the safety of the Khyber road and the Khyber Rifles.³

Before the Agreement of 1881 had brought the Afridis under British control, the Amir of Afghanistan had been accustomed to exercise “some measure of control” over them. He had, for example, paid allowances to the tribe to keep the Khyber Pass open for trade. Under the 1881 Agreement, the Amir was obliged to refrain from interfering in Afridi affairs.⁴ However, Afghan influence over the tribe did not suddenly cease, nor did its intrigues with them. These intrigues and continual raids by the tribe on Frontier districts constituted one of the main problems of the British Government in 1901-19.

In 1902-03, Afghan intrigues, not only with the Afridis but the Orakzais and Mohmands too, took what was considered by the Government to be an “extremely undesirable” turn. These tribesmen visited Kabul in large numbers in response to invitations from persons who represented themselves as the Amir’s agents. Khwas Khan, an *ex-Malik* of Zakha Khel, who had fled to Kabul after the 1897 disturbances, was the Amir’s principal agent in dealing with the tribes. In Kabul the

tribesmen were liberally treated; substantial sums of money were distributed among them; pensions and allowances were fixed for some of the chiefs; facilities were provided for extensive purchases of arms and ammunition; and they were even enlisted in the Afghan army. It was also reported that the Amir had conferred the title of Khan Bahadur on five Afridi leaders, including Chaman, a Zakha Khel raider and a most determined foe of the British, thus making a mockery of Curzon’s bestowal of that title on the pro-British Malik, Yar Muhammad Khan of the Malikdin Khel. The Amir declared that the man honoured by Curzon was “disloyal to his tribe and his King”, and that his own nominees were “faithful to their religion”.

Afghan intrigues resulted in what looked to the British to be the splitting up of the Afridis into two factions, the Kabul Party and the Sarkar (Government) Party. The former was numerically weak, but its members, out of gratitude for past and hope of future favours at the hands of the Amir, were his active and enthusiastic supporters. They openly boasted that their object was to embroil the Afridis with the Government of India and to bring the tribe closer to the Amir. The Sarkar Party, on the other hand, was headed by the Maliks and elders who were well-disposed towards the Government but powerless against the “malcontent minority”.

The Government took a serious view of the Amir’s activities, but was not quite sure about their motivation. The British Government’s Agent in Kabul reported, in September 1904, that the Amir had doubts about British friendship, and so had deemed it expedient to increase his influence with the Afridis. It was also possible, the Government felt, that by intriguing with the tribes on the undemarcated section of the Indo-Afghan boundary, Habibullah was seeking to “force us at demarcation to accept his views”, or perhaps “trying to coerce us on the subject of our general arrangements with him”.

In September 1904, in a dispatch to the Secretary of State, the Government of India elaborated its views on the Afghan intrigues and the measures it deemed necessary to deal with the situation. It proposed that it should ask the Amir to abide by his treaty engagement and to press the Afridis to observe their agreements. If the Amir desisted

from intrigues, the Government would not find it difficult to deal with the Afridis, especially if the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary were carried out.¹ The Government was ready to establish a post at Sassobi on the border to close this “back-door” to Afghanistan used by the Sarhang of Dakka² for his communication with the Afridis. In the event of the Orakzais and Afridis refusing to obey Government orders and continuing to ignore the 1898 settlement, the Government would stop its allowances and accept the request of the Shia Orakzais to take over their territory.³

This request had been made in the beginning of 1904 by certain clans of the Shia Orakzais across the Kohat border who were seeking protection against rival Sunni clans who, they claimed, oppressed them.⁴ Deane strongly urged the Government to annex the territory of the Shia Orakzais because of its many advantages. The Government would secure a firmer political control over the adjacent Afridis, especially the Zakha Khel and Aka Khel sections, by occupying a strategic base in the rear of the Afridi area. Deane recommended that after taking the Shia Orakzais under its protection, the Government should administer the tract on the lines of the Kurram Agency. A Native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat should be appointed, a cess of Rs. 4 per house should be collected, and a corps of 200 local levies should be raised for the protection of the border and affiliated to the Samana Rifles.⁵

Curzon, so it seemed to Ampthill, the Acting Viceroy, was “a little dubious” about the matter. Kitchener and Edmund Elles, the Military Member of the Council, were willing to accept Deane’s recommendations.

1. See supra, p.7; also see infra, pp. 69-74.
2. Dakka was a village in the Jalalabad district of Afghanistan and was about 12 miles from Landi Kotal on the road to Kabul. A force of 200 Khassadors armed with Lee-Metford rifles was stationed there, under a Sarhang or Sartip.
4. The Orakzai clans were divided into two religious factions of Shias and Sunnis. There existed, between them, a long standing animosity which could easily be fanned into bitter conflict by a religious leader. Such a situation arose in 1903. According to the British, a Sunni religious leader, known as the Malang Fakir from Ghazni, preached a Jihad (holy war) against the Shia Orakzais. This led to several conflicts between them. The event caused great concern to Shias living in adjacent British-controlled territory and also in Kurram. The Shias approached the Government for assistance, but the Government refused to give it. When the fighting was over, the Shias submitted to the British political officers an application proposing that their area should be taken over by the Government and administered on the lines of the Kurram Agency.
5. See for further details L. White King, Monograph on the Orakzai country and Clans, Lahore, 1900: P.L.N. Cavagnari, Report on the Syads of Tirah and their quarrels with the Sunnis, Lahore, 1875.
But in Ampthill's view, this course involved a distinct departure from the existing Frontier Policy, as laid down by the Supreme Government in 1898, prohibiting the undertaking of any new responsibility unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities, and forbidding any unnecessary interference with the tribes. At the end of 1904, the issue was discussed in Council. Kitchener stuck to his views, maintaining that the Kabul-Kandahar line was the strategical boundary for the defence of India against any enemy advance through Afghanistan. That being so, it was absolutely essential that the Government should assert itself and control the tribes up to the Durand Line, for these tribes were both able and ready to endanger the approaches to the Kabul-Kandahar position. Kitchener strongly urged that such control required the gradual incorporation and absorption of the Frontier tribes. To leave them in a "state of semi-independence as a sort of buffer state" would, in his view, be "fatal to any scheme for the defence of India". Edmond Elles, the Military Member, supported Kitchener; but other members of the Council opposed the idea, being unwilling to reverse the existing Frontier policy, to incur the expense involved in the project, and to run the risk of stirring up hostilities with the Afridis.

The news of the Orakzai approach to the Government of India had already reached the Afridis by July 1904; and according to one informer, "there is not a tree in Maidan under which you will not find three or four men discussing the Shia affair". The Amir, too, was aware of the matter. Ampthill, hesitating to take a definite decision, sent a "non-committal" dispatch to the Secretary of State, stating that

if the policy of peaceful penetration is actively pursued all along the border, we shall add seriously to our responsibilities, while our relations with the Amir will become closer and more delicate.

In October of the same year, the Cabinet discussed the issue and decided against any departure from the policy laid down in 1898. Curzon, then in England, wrote a Minute supporting the Cabinet's decision.

During this time, the Indian Government, while preparing for the dispatch of a Mission to Kabul to conclude a fresh treaty with Afghanistan,

5. Ibid.
6. Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 28 October 1904, ibid.
suggested to the Home Government that the Amir be addressed on the subject of intrigues and raids on the border. Ampthill explained:

Our attitude should be firm and uncompromising, and the Amir should be told in an unmistakable language that he will be held to the engagement of 1893, and that any interference or intriguing with the tribes on our side of the boundary that may be fixed under the Durand Agreement will be regarded as an unfriendly act and a most serious violation of that Agreement, which may necessitate our taking measures to prevent the possibility of such action on his part in the future.1

Louis Dane, the leader of the Mission, was instructed accordingly.2 In December, Dane raised the issue with the Amir. In March 1905, after signing his treaty with the Government of India, the Amir informed Dane that he had appointed a committee of seven persons to deal with the general question of Frontier crimes and control of the outlaws. Dane hoped that the Amir’s ‘septemvirate’ would cooperate with the British officers on the Frontier; but later it was found that no such committee was ever formed. However, after the treaty, there was a temporary cessation of raids, giving the Government some hope that the tribe had changed its hostile attitude. This hope soon proved illusory.

From the middle of 1905 until the beginning of 1908, the Zakha Khel, with the assistance of the Orakzais and the Hazarnao, a band of Afghan’s outlawed by the British, mounted a series of daring raids into British territory. Five raiding groups were organized under the influential elders of the Kabul Party; Dadai, Usman, Multan, Gulbaz and Muhammad Afzal. Peaceful villages well within the administered districts were raided, border military posts were attacked, Government property looted, British Military Police constables and British subjects abducted. The efforts of the Afridi Jirgas and Malikṣ to pacify the raiders did not succeed. In July 1906, the Zakha Khel wreaked vengeance on an elder of their own section for assisting the British Government in the capture of a few Afghan outlaws; they thus meted out what they claimed to be an exemplary punishment to those traitors to the national cause who had dared to... aid the British authorities.3

The activities of the Zakha Khel were arousing anti-British feelings, as Roos-Keppel, then Political Agent at Khyber, reported

3. Roos-Keppel to Deane, 18 November 1906, P.S.L.I., vol. 32, Reg. No. 2134; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 3 December 1906, ibid., Reg. No. 2179; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 7 February 1907, ibid., Reg. No. 491; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 7 March 1907, ibid., Reg. No. 559; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 1 November 1907, ibid., Reg. No. 2149B.
Every man, woman and child looks upon those who commit raids, murders and robberies in Peshawar or Kohat as heroes and champions. They are the crusaders of the nation; they depart with the good wishes and prayers of all, and are received on their return after a successful raid with universal rejoicings and congratulations. Should a raider be killed during a raid... he is pronounced to be a martyr, and is mourned as such. On the other hand, his victims die as Kafirs and are condemned to eternal damnation for no crime but that of being British subjects.1

In February 1907, Roos-Keppel again informed the Government that “Men of other tribes—Aka Khel, Orakzai, Sturi Khel—are joining the raiders and the temptation to the Afridis of all sections to do so is becoming overpowering, as they see that, week after week, villages, police posts, caravanserais, and main routes, can be attacked with impunity; that cattle, camels, horses, women and men, even Government servants, can be carried off and sold or held to ransom, while the authorities appear to regard the matter with indifference”.2

Deane estimated that during the previous seven years thirty-two British subjects had been murdered, twenty-nine wounded, thirty-seven kidnapped and held up to ransom by the Zakha Khel, either alone or in conjunction with the Hazarnao, while the property looted was worth over one lakh rupees.3

The Zakha Khel kept visiting Kabul, where they were encouraged by Nasrullah Khan, the Amir’s brother and the leader of the anti-British Party in the Afghan court. The Zakha Khel praised Nasrullah for his “generosity and Pan-Islamic sympathy” and for having gone “further in encouragement to Afridis than ever did his father or brother”.4

The Frontier Province Government adopted several measures to check the Afridi raids. An elaborate system of picquetting the Peshawar and Kohat roads by troops was established, and detachments of regulars and cavalry were engaged to cut off raiders. Special patrols of the Border Military Police were organized and Border Military Police posts near the Peshawar and Kohat frontier were strengthened. Border villages were given arms and village chighas (pursuit parties) were organized to cooperate with the local authorities to defend themselves against raiders. But all these defensive measures proved inadequate to deal with the situation. The tribesmen set up an elaborate system of espionage; so that in the wide stretch of the country and its terrain, with which the sure-footed

1. Roos-Keppel to Deane, 18 November 1906, ibid., Reg. No. 2134; Davies, op.cit., p. 146.
3. Deane to Govt. of India, 13 February 1907, ibid.; Davies, op.cit., p. 146.
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hill men were thoroughly familiar, enabled them to avoid Government posts, patrols and armed villages. The Border Military Police was inadequate in strength and lacked both efficiency and discipline. Besides, their arms were inferior to those of the tribesmen, who obtained better rifles from the Persian Gulf.

The situation was evidently gloomy, but the Government's policy towards the Afridis was as cautious as it was towards the Mahsuds. In consequence, for a long time no measures were taken against the Zakha Khel. Since 1906, Roos-Keppel had been urging the Government to occupy the Bazar Valley and to hold it with Militia Posts at important points like China, Mangal Bagh and Sassobi to be garrisoned by the Khyber Rifles; this, in his view, was the "only completely satisfactory" solution of the Zakha Khel problem. The occupation of the Bazar Valley, Roos-Keppel pointed out, would give the Government command of the passes leading to Tirah and Afghanistan, which were used by the Zakha Khel as their escape routes. Should the Government decline to take this step, Roos-Keppel recommended the stoppage of the Zakha Khel allowances. Deane had agreed with Roos-Keppel, urging the Government that it must decide whether to let things go on as heretofore or to take "definite action" against the Zakha Khel. The Indian Government were at this time anxious to avoid any disturbance in the Khyber region, as the Amir was about to visit India. Until the Amir returned home, they were naturally unwilling to take any step which might lead to an open rupture with the Zakha Khel. Therefore, the Government, instead of stopping the Afridi allowances altogether, instructed Deane to defer their payment until March 1907, by when it was expected that the Amir would have left India.

Minto, as seen earlier, was in favour of peaceful penetration into the tribal area and against the policy of punitive expeditions. He told Morley that he did not have "any land hunger" for the tribal territory. Instead, his policy was actuated by a strong belief that the extension of British administration on the Frontier would bring "an increase in prosperity and happiness and a greater security for life", as, he claimed, had been the case in the Kurram, Tochi, Sam Ranizai and Baluchistan areas. The

2. See infra, p.p. 77-79.
4. Govt. of India to Deane, Tel. 13 December 1906, *ibid.*, Reg. No. 2174.
5. See supra, pp. 45-46, 56.
Viceroy agreed with the Frontier officers about the occupation of the Bazar Valley and the construction of military posts there because certain posts on our political frontier would deprive the raiders of their lines of retreat into Afghanistan, and would give us such a general control over the Bazar Valley (without ourselves attempting to administer it) as would do much to contribute to the safety of the Frontier. Morley, however, had two objections to Minto's policy; it was expensive and it was risky. "Though an individual post", he said, "costs no mountains or marvel of money, yet the policy is not cheap". Secondly, Morley asked Minto if Frontier officers like Deane and Roos-Keppel, advocating the policy, were "alive to the risks... of the posts kindling the wrath of neighbouring tribes". The Home Government, Morley added, could never forget the Tirah campaign, a result of the sort of policy in question. At any rate, Morley needed a tremendous weight of argument to induce him to sanction the policy of establishing posts in the tribal tracts. Realizing that Morley remained absolutely unimpressed by his arguments, Minto let the issue lie for the moment.

In these circumstances, all that Minto could do was to question the Amir on the sanctuary given to the Zakha Khel and other raiders at Ningrahar in Afghan territory, and request him to release the kidnapped British subjects, to restore the looted British property, and to prevent Afghan territory from being used as a base by the Zakha Khel. The Amir did no more than to promise to make enquiries into the matter.

Towards the end of 1907, another development took place. The Gaduns on the Yusufzai border and the Darwesh Khel Waziris of the Tochi Valley asked for Government protection, saying they wanted "peace and quiet". Deane welcomed this overture, believing that taking over the Frontier tribes generally would prove the "eventual solution of a lot of difficulty on the Frontier." Minto agreed with Deane, and took this opportunity to write a long private letter to Morley. Elaborating his general Frontier policy, Minto said that he had always considered the gradual absorption of tribal districts as the proper solution of our Frontier difficulties. He once again, "really earnestly", asked Morley" not to think that we are afflicted with incurable land hunger, but that we only wish to do

2. Morley to Minto, 14 March 1907, ibid.
what is best in the cause of peace and civilization”. It seemed clear to Minto, that, when these unfortunate people, sick of fighting, come to us and ask us to take them over, we should not lose the opportunity of doing so. It would not mean that we assume the government of their territory with the idea of administering it and collecting revenue, but that we guarantee the peace of their homes, leaving their territory to their own tribal administration, whilst the fact that we have taken over a district does not only affect the district itself, but contiguous districts throughout the border. It is a choice between a continuance of perpetual raids into British territory and murders of British subjects followed by useless punitive expeditions and possibly the necessity for ultimate conquest, or meeting the wishes of the tribes themselves, and taking them under our wing.

Minto supposed that “it was the suspicion of a policy of advance and grab” which stood in the way of what promised to lead gradually to a peaceful solution. Minto regretted that the Government had made a great mistake in refusing to take over the Shia Orakzais at their own request. “If we had done so”, he pointed out to Morley, “we should have been far better able to deal with recent raids, some of which very probably would not have occurred”. Minto’s conclusion was:

now if we are forced to enter the Bazar Valley, I cannot but think it will be unfortunate if we do not leave behind us a sufficient number of small posts to guarantee future quiet.1

Morley was unmoved, and refused to act; for, apart from the expense and the risks of a tribal conflagration, there was the fear of estrangement from the Amir. Morley was totally against any absorption, incorporation, or by whatever other names the Deanes and Crumps choose to call a process that would inevitably mean fresh responsibility and increased expenditure.2

Any lingering hope that Minto might have had of eventually bringing Morley round to the Indian Government’s view was removed by the latter’s private letter to the Viceroy, dated 19 February 1908. Morley wrote:

you speak of Frontier policy, and suspect that I only half understand your view. I do believe I understand it wholly, though I read the lesson of the Tirah campaign in a different sense from yours. Now I dislike a ragged edge as much as you do, and in many painful ways the state of the borderland is what you bluntly call it—‘disreputable’—and if we had a quarrel with the Amir, or with the Czar, these 300,000 catamounts, o caterans, or whatever the name for border ruffian may be, would be no only disreputable but dangerous. Only I cannot but think that an

1. Ibid.
2. Morley to Minto, 8 January 1908, ibid., vol. 3.
policy tending towards a repetition of Tirah (when we had over 60,000 men in the field) would be, or might be, a great deal more dangerous still.

Morley felt "as strongly as I can feel about anything relating to Frontier policy" that lord Salisbury's Government "were as right as could be" in asking the Indian Government under Curzon to forbear from a forceful Frontier policy, and pointing out to them that the Home Government, in consideration of international implications, would not allow any deviation from their instruction. Morley asked Minto to convince the Home Government of three things, and then "we would throw the reins on your neck, and let you stay in the Bazar Valley, etc., as long as ever you like."

The three things were

1. Would it not be likely to alarm and irritate their [Zakha Khel] neighbours against us?...
2. Would it not put a good card into the hands of the anti-British party at Kabul—just at the moment when we are (with rather uncomfortable minds) waiting for the Amir to show himself our friend?
3. Would it not involve exposure to fresh liabilities, risks and, above all, expenditure?

And then Morley put his foot firmly down: "we won't prolong the controversy, unless you like, but that's my sort of case".1

Meanwhile, the Zakha Khel made the situation very intolerable for the Government. Visits to Kabul went on; increased allowances were received from Nasrullah Khan and his men; the Zakha Khel bought large quantities of arms and ammunition and carried out raids of greater daring on the Peshawar and Kohat border. Deane and Roos-Keppel once more urged a punitive expedition and the occupation of the Zakha territory.2

On 28 January 1908, a group of sixty to eighty Zakha Khel raided the house of a Hindu banker and decamped with property worth one lakh rupees. British troops and the Khyber Rifles chased them, but in vain. "The boldness of the exploit", so ran the Khyber Political Diary, "and the enormous booty carried off fired the minds of the Zakha Khel and indeed of all Afridis, who openly expressed their regret that they were not among the raiders".3 It was the proverbial last straw.

The Indian Government had reached the end of its patience. It now decided to take firm action against the Zakha Khel. The Secretary of State was informed that the Government would summon an Afridi Jirga

2. Roos-Keppel to Deane, 9 October 1907, P.S.S.F., vol. 32, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 644; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 1 November 1907, Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 25 November 1907, ibid., Reg. No. 2049B; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 9 January 1908, ibid., vol. 33, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 192.
3. "Khyber Political Diary, for the week ending 1 February 1908", p. 31, ibid., Reg. No. 496.
and demand that the tribe ensure that the Zakha Khel would make reparation for their offences and stop misbehaving; otherwise, the Afridis were notified that the Government would take punitive measures against them. Indeed, the Government would not only punish the offenders, but also recover the fine and disarm the Zakha Khel, capture and bring their leaders to trial, and, finally, construct a road in the Zakha territory, which would be maintained on the lines of the Khyber Road. This, it was thought, would enable the Government to control the Zakha Khel by holding the exits to Tirah and Afghanistan. Morley, while maintaining his opposition to any occupation or annexation of tribal territory, agreed to “consider proposals limited to blockade and punitive measures or combining blockade with punitive action”, as in the Mahsud blockade of 1901. He asked the Indian Government to ensure the neutrality, if not the active cooperation of other sections of the Afridis in punishing the Zakha Khel. On 31 January 1908, Minto discussed the situation in Council, where it was decided that it was absolutely necessary to vindicate authority without delay. It was also decided to summon the Maliks of different sections of the Afridis, to point out to them the gravity of the situation and to reassure them that, in taking action against the Zakha Khel, the Government in no way intended to injure other sections of the Afridis or interrupt the Government’s friendly relations with them. This assurance, it was added, would immediately be followed by the entry of troops into the Bazar Valley. Morley approved of the course, but at the same time reminded the Indian Government that the end in view was strictly limited to punishment of the Zakha Khel and not either immediately or ultimately, directly or indirectly, occupation or annexation of tribal territory.

On 5 February, the Amir was informed of the Government’s determination to punish the Zakha Khel, and he was requested to ask his Frontier officials to prevent the Zakha Khel fleeing to Afghan territory or securing assistance from Afghan subjects. A week later, Deane met a Jirga of Afridi Maliks and sought their cooperation to make the Zakha Khel come to a settlement with the Government. On the next day, the Bazar Field Force, under the command of Major General James Willcocks, left for the Zakha territory, and then for four days, from 18 to 21

1. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 31 January 1908, 1 February 1908, *ibid.*, Reg. Nos. 259-60.
2. Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tels. 2, 6 February 1908, *ibid.*, Reg. No. 204.
February, mounted heavy military operations against the clan. No Frontier tribe had, according to Willcocks, ever been so "sharply, quickly and effectively" dealt with as the Zakha Khel on this occasion.1

The success of the expedition was due to several factors: the military skill of the British troops; the loyal cooperation of the Afridi Maliks; the exemplary behaviour of the Khyber Rifles; the remarkable influence of Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, the Assistant Political Agent, Khyber,2 on the Afridis, and, above all, the tact of Roos-Keppel.3 On 28 February, the Zakha Khel accepted a settlement. Other Afridi clans held themselves responsible, jointly and separately, for the future good behaviour of the Zakha Khel, and promised, when called upon by the Government, to assist each other in punishing Zakha raiders; the Afridi clans also agreed to the Government's right to punish them by fine or by exclusion from British territory for the misdeeds of the Zakha Khel, for whom they stood security. The clans deposited fifty-three rifles with the Government as a guarantee to honour their commitment. The next day, British troops pulled out of the Bazar Valley.4

Morley was very happy with the result of the expedition. He informed Minto:

we Indians are all in great spirits here just now at the end of the Zakhas, and at its being a good end, and our gratification is shared to the full by all the rest of the world. I think the policy of His Majesty's Government has amply justified itself in the result.5

The Afridi Maliks and elders kept their word. They succeeded in punishing all major Zakha raiders, except Multan; and took only two months to restore looted property worth Rs. 33,489.6 Multan received wounds in the fighting, and went to Jalalabad. The tribe stood surety for his good behaviour. But soon he was on the war path again: "With a touch of ruffianly humour that distinguished Multan", he sent a notice saying that he intended to visit British territory again, and invited the authorities to catch him.7 The Border Military Police was alerted, but Multan knew how to avoid it. For years, he had

1. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 20 February 1908, enclosing Reports from Willcocks, ibid., Reg. No. 416; Willcocks to Govt. of India, Tel. 25 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 584.
2. See infra, pp. 87-88, 101, 207-211, 218.
4. Roos-Keppel to General Mullaly, 3 March 1908, op.cit.
laughed at all the precautions of the Government. The Frontier “watch and wara” agency was helpless. The general tone was ‘Oh, we can do nothing’. In December 1908, Multan and his men, dressed in the uniforms of the Border Military Police, carrying rifles and accoutrements complete, marched into Aman Kot, near Pabbi, and attacked a Hindu house. It was said that they even passed a police detachment, who failed to recognize in the seemingly harmless detachment the much wanted Multan and his party. Ultimately, Multan met his end in an encounter with the Border Military Police at Peshawar. His death brought an immense feeling of relief to the inhabitants of Peshawar, especially the Hindus and the authorities. He was, in Minto’s words “a fine wild spirit in many ways and a personal friend of Roos-Keppel’s, but the terror of the border”. Multan was an Afridi paladin, and a hero of the anti-British party. Legends of his heroic deeds are still a part of the folklore of the Afridis. Shocked at Multan’s death, Nasrullah Khan exhorted the Afridis to take revenge on the British. “Cut their sim [telegraph-wire]” he urged them “and commit robberies on their roads”, because “the Firangis are the enemies of our religion and izzat [honour]”.

Nevertheless, hereafter, relations between the Zakha Khel and the British generally remained free from strain and trouble. Yet one result of the Zakha Khel expedition, was to unsettle another tribe, the Mohmands, against whom the Government then sent an expedition in May 1908.

When strategic roads were constructed through the Khyber Pass in 1913-14, some important political issues arose. The opening of these roads provided the Afridis with an opportunity to demand an increase in their allowances on the ground that they had “lessened permanently the strategical value” of the Khyber Pass, a development which its owners naturally resented. In 1914, the Afridis submitted a petition to the Government, further pointing out that the rise in prices and in population had considerably reduced the value of the Afridi allowances. On the other hand, the value of tolls in the Khyber realized by the Government had risen considerably, and the responsibilities of the Afridis in the

2. The Pioneer Mail, 8 January 1909.
5. Mohammad Azim Afridi, Drey Nangiali, Peshawar, 1973, pp. 36-68
7. See infra, p. 76.
8. See Chapter IV.
Khyber area had thus increased. S.E. Pears, the Political Agent of Khyber, strongly supported the Afridi petition, and stressed the inadequacy of the allowances the tribe received from Government. Pears pointed out that the net increase in the allowance between 1879 and 1914—thirty-five years—had been only Rs. 6,500, while the rise in the total income of Government from the tolls in the Khyber Pass during the same period had been more than Rs. 27,000. Moreover, with the years, Afridi responsibilities had increased both within and outside the Pass limits. Originally, the tribe’s responsibility had been limited to providing security for the movement of caravans on fixed days and for the rate movement of local officers through the Pass. The construction of the roads had led to an increase in traffic that involved additional security tasks for the Afridis. Moreover, the Government’s policy of direct contact with the 

**Maliks** and “the grey beards” of the tribe, making them responsible for the good behaviour of different tribal sections, had increased the burden of responsibility for these elders and, through them, for the tribe itself. When, for example, an Afridi crime was committed at Peshawar or Kohat, the Khyber Political Agent exerted “a long and troublesome pressure” on Afridi tribal leaders to bring the offenders to book. Pears indicated that this system of control through sureties had gradually spread from the Khyber to the Tirah and the Bazar Valley, and that, in 1908, each subsection of the Zakha Khel had been subjected to the guarantees and control of other powerful sections of the Afridis. For their services and heavy responsibilities, the Government rewards received by the **Maliks** and elders were by no means generous—only Rs. 6,000 to 7,000 a year distributed among 700 men—rewards which were accepted, Pears said, “only for their sentimental value attached to the recognized status of ‘grey beards’ in tribal society”. The construction of the Khyber Road had converted the Khyber Pass “from a doorway into a gateway”. Formerly, the political and strategical value of the Khyber Pass had resided not only in its being the main artery of communication through the mountain barrier between Afghanistan and India, but also in its offering a gap that could be easily closed and held by a small number of Afridis against a far larger force. But with the construction of the strategic roads, the Government could now easily send the Khyber Mobile

1. In 1879 the tribal allowances were Rs. 72,600 per annum; in 1914 they were Rs. 79,200 per annum. “Note on the Petition of Afridi Maliks” by S.E. Pears, 15 January 1915, P.S.F., vol. 26, 1912, Reg. No. 974.
2. In 1882-83, the income from these tolls amounted to Rs. 55,882; in 1913-14, it was Rs. 83,161. *Ibid.*
3. See supra, p. 64.
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Column up to Landi Kotal to prevent the Afridis from closing the Pass. The latter realized the diminution of their power, and an Afridi Malik speaking in a Jirga, remarked:

The Mullagori Road and the new Khyber Road have emasculated the Afridis.

In such circumstances, Pears strongly felt that the Afridi grievances set forth in their petition to Government were genuine, and that their allowances should, therefore, be increased. The World War had by now started, making the maintenance of peace and order on the Frontier the first care of the Government. Donald, the Officiating Chief Commissioner, fully agreed with Pears, thinking it politically expedient to accept the Afridi petition; and, in 1915, the Indian Government took action on it.

The Mohmands

North of the Khyber, in the great angle formed by the Kabul and Kunar rivers, the Mohmands held sway. They lived partly in the Afghan province of Ningrahari, partly in the hills between the Kunar Valley and the Peshawar Plain, and partly in the Peshawar District. The Mohmands who lived between the Kunar Valley and the Peshawar Plain were known to the British as the "independent" or "hill Mohmands". They were divided into eight clans—Khwezai, Baizai, Halimzai, Tarakzai, Isa Khel, Burhan Khel, Dawezai and Utmanzai.

Since the days of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the rulers of Kabul had exercised "some sort of vague suzerainty" over the Mohmands, as they had over the Afridis. The Mohmands were ruled by hereditary chiefs, selected by the Amirs of Kabul, who paid allowances to different sections of the tribe through their chiefs. In addition, the Halimzai and Tarakzai, two clans of the eastern Mohmands, held large jagirs on the Peshawar border, of which they were dispossessed by the British after the latter had annexed Peshawar in 1849. The clans naturally took a hostile attitude towards the British; and when, with a view to recovering their lost fiefs, they made inroads into Peshawar, they had to contend with punitive expeditions in 1851, 1852 and 1854.

1. "Note on the Petition of Afridi Maliks" by Pears, op.cit.
During the Uprising of 1857, the Mohmands were enthusiastically excited, looking upon the event as an opportunity to strike a blow against the British and recover their lost territories. The British Government had no troops to move against the tribe, and Colonel Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, had to promise that their territories would be restored. This quietened them for a while. In 1859, the jagirs of the Tarakzai Mohmands were restored, subject to good conduct and the payment of a light revenue to the Government. In 1864, following a Mohmand attack on Shabkadar Fort, the Government sent their fourth expedition against the tribe. From 1864 to 1897, there was comparative peace on the Mohmand border, disturbed only on two occasions. In 1873, Major Macdonald, Commandant of Fort Michni, was murdered in an assault in which the third brother of the Khan of Lalpura, a Mohmand chief, was implicated. During the second Afghan War, the Mohmands, many of whom were Afghan subjects, constantly attacked British lines of communication; and in 1880, the British finally took punitive action.1

The Durand Agreement of 1893 divided the Mohmand country between the British and Afghan Governments. The boundary drawn on the map according to the Agreement ran through the centre of the Mohmand hills. This boundary had, however, never been demarcated; and later it was disputed on various occasions. After signing the Agreement, Durand had an interview with the Amir, who told him:

I won't interfere with Bajaur; but, of course, all the Mohmand country is mine.2

The Government of India thought that the Amir either did not understand, or pretended that he did not understand, the map attached to the Agreement he had signed. Later, in 1895, when the Delimitation Commission reached Nawa Kotal, the Afghan Commissioner contended that the Line would so run as to include all the Mohmands within the Afghan territory. Since the Government of India disputed this claim, a deadlock was reached.3

According to the Durand Agreement, the eastern Mohmand clans fell to the British side of the border. In 1896, the Jirgas of the eastern Mohmands—Halimzai, Kamali, Dawezai, Utmanzai and Tarakzai were received by Dennis Fitzpatrick, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab;

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and, on condition that they would remain faithful to the British, allowances were granted to them to replace those which they had hitherto been receiving from Kabul. Henceforth, these Mohmands were called the “assured” clans to distinguish them from those who were not under the influence of the British Government.\(^1\)

In August 1897, during the tribal uprising, the Mohmands, led by Najm-ud-Din, known as the Mulla Sahib of Hadda,\(^2\) attacked Shabkadar and burnt the town; whereupon, the Government dispatched a punitive expedition. However, on payment of a fine of Rs. 15,000 and a few rifles, the Mohmand allowances, stopped during the expedition, were restored.\(^3\)

In November 1902, the Baizai Musa Khel of Mitai became an “assured” clan and received allowances on conditions similar to those imposed on other clans by the agreement of 1896. Amir Habibullah and the Afghan mullas resented this.\(^4\)

At this time, the Government of India was considering the construction of a strategic railway from Peshawar to the Afghan frontier through the Khyber,\(^5\) and British engineers were sent out to Khyber and Mullaghori to make preliminary inspections, while, in March 1903, Kitchener visited Loi-Shilman in the Mohmand territory. The Afghans disliked these visits.\(^6\) At the instigation of the Sartip\(^7\) of Dakka, the Afghan Khassadars destroyed wells and crops in the border villages of Shinpokh and Smatzai, whose Maliks had friendly relations with the Government of India.\(^8\) Early in 1903, on Curzon’s instruction, Captain W.E. Venour, the Political Agent of Khyber, marched into Smatzai and Shinpokh with the Khyber Rifles and occupied the two places without facing any opposition. The risk of further trouble being over, the Khyber Rifles withdrew and the Government engaged some thirty Shilman Khassadars for the protection of the Smatzai and Shinpokh.\(^9\)

These incidents made the Indian Government realize the desirability of demarcating the section of the frontier between the Kabul river and the Sassobi Pass, south of Landi Khana, in order to end the uncertainty

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5. See Chapter IV.
7. Sartip was the leader of six or more bairaks (companies) of Khassadars, who were irregular foot soldiers.
about the boundary that in the past had led to repeated conflict. Also, a suitable demarcation of this sector of the frontier could, in Kitchener’s view, provide a terminus for the broad-gauge railway which the Government was intending to construct from Peshawar to Kam Dakka.¹

Accordingly, a lengthy correspondence began between the Government of India and the Afghan Government. Mentioning the incidents at Smatzai and Shinpokh, pointing out the objectionable conduct of the Sartip of Dakka, and claiming that the two places lay on the British side of the Durand Line, Curzon proposed to the Amir, in April 1903, that the boundary between the Kabul River and the Sassobi Pass be demarcated.² The Amir agreed about the need to demarcate the boundary; but he made the counter-proposal that the entire border from Nawa Kotal (on the dividing range between Kunar and Bajaur) to the Sikaram Sar (at the western end of the Safed Koh overhanging the Peiwar Kotal) be delimited. This section passed through, and bisected, the Mohmand territory and included the Khyber and Afridi boundaries towards Afghanistan.³

The demarcation of this section had not been taken up in 1897-98. The Viceroy did not accept the Amir’s proposal for the delimitation of the entire undemarcated boundary from Nawa Kotal to Sikaram Sar. Curzon held that there was no necessity to delimit the Mohmand section of the boundary because all was quiet in the region; whereas in the southern section of the boundary between Palossi on the Kabul River and the Sassobi Pass, according to his view, recent “acts of aggression” on British territory had taken place with the connivance of the Amir’s officers. Curzon was ready to name the British representative for the joint demarcation as soon as the Amir would agree to the proposed demarcation of the boundary from the Kabul River near Palossi to the Sassobi Pass.⁴ Habibullah did not dispute Curzon’s claim on Shinpokh and Shilman as British; but as for Smatzai, he contended that, pending demarcation of the boundary, it was difficult to say whether the place was British or Afghan. As for the boundary demarcation, Habibullah reiterated his earlier proposal, adding that over the Bohai Dag lands in the Mohmand territory, he had “full rights”.⁵

Deane, when consulted by the Government of India about the Amir’s claim on Bohai Dag, pointed out that the value of the area in

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². Viceroy to Amir, 29 April 1903, ibid., Reg. No. 658.
⁴. Viceroy to Amir, 26 May 1903, ibid.
⁶. Govt. of India to Deane, 27 July 1903, ibid., Reg. No. 1552.
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question lay in the fact that the Government, by paying allowances to the local Mohmands, could strengthen relations with them in order to ensure their cooperation in the protection of the projected Kabul River Railway. Moreover, if the Government could get Kam Dakka from the Amir in exchange for Bohai Dag, it would be a good bargain because the possession of Kam Dakka would provide the terminus for the projected railway, and the boundary along the Kabul River and then to Sassobi Pass would "effectually round up the Khyber territory".

Curzon, while avoiding any formal offer of Bohai Dag to the Amir, again tried to settle the boundary demarcation issue with him. He informed Habibullah that the British Government agreed with the Amir that the entire undemarcated frontier should be demarcated and necessary arrangements would follow soon, but urged that meanwhile the delimitation of the line between Palossi and the Sassobi Pass should be undertaken. Curzon proposed Roos-Keppel as the British representative for the joint demarcation of this sector. The Amir did not budge from his stand; he insisted that not only a section, but the entire line should be demarcated. The Government of India thought that the Amir was intransigent because he hoped to get the Mohmand territory from the British Government before conceding any territory to it on the Kabul River; and, once he had what he wanted, he would refuse any concession to it, thus emerging doubly victorious. Curzon believed that he had seen through the Amir's game, and, therefore, he would take a firm stand; he would concede "nothing...in the Mohmand territory except in return for a corresponding concession by the Amir on the Kabul River". Deane, when consulted again, expressed his readiness to cede Bohai Dag with the definite stipulation that the Amir would give a "substantial quid pro quo" on the Kabul River—suitable boundary including, or being in the neighbourhood of, Loi Dakka. The military authorities took a stiffer attitude: no cession of Bohai Dag should be made to the Amir before the British had actually secured the quid pro quo from him.

Curzon then proposed to the Amir that a survey for the delimitation of the boundary should start, pending the settlement of any points over

1. See Chapter IV.
2. Deane to Govt. of India, 19 August 1903, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 1552.
4. Amir to Viceroy, 19 September 1903, ibid.
5. Govt. of India to Deane, 6 November 1903, ibid., Reg. No. 296.
6. Ibid.
7. Deane to Govt. of India, 10 November 1903, ibid.
which the Commissioners of the two Governments might fail to agree.1

The Indian Government’s line of thinking was: demarcation should begin in the north from Nawa Kotal as the Amir had desired; on coming down to the Bohai Dag section, if the Afghan Commissioner claimed the area, its delimitation would be put off and the matter referred to the Amir; the Commissioners would then proceed further south to demarcate the section the British wanted. This proposal, so Curzon calculated, would provide a test of whether the Amir was at all serious about demarcation and really wanted to effect a settlement.2 In his reply, the Amir stated that the delimitation must follow the original Durand Line and firmly repeated his claim over Bohai Dag.3

The Amir’s attitude now convinced the British that they would not get what they wanted. While Curzon, therefore, thought of “dropping the project” altogether,4 Deane recommended its postponement until circumstances became favourable.5 In his reply to Curzon’s letter, Habibullah had also taken the opportunity to use the delimitation issue as a peg on which to hang all his grievances against the Viceroy regarding the subsidy and the supply of arms and ammunition.6 Since an answer to this letter involved wider questions of general relations between British and Afghan Governments, and consequently required a decision from the Home Government, the Government of India decided not to reply to it.7

The Anglo-Afghan boundary issue was again taken up in 1905, when the Dane Mission went to Kabul to negotiate a treaty with the Amir.8 The Government instructed Dane to press the Amir to agree to a railway terminus at Loi-Dakka “on the ground that the military cooperation and support for Kabul, for which the Amir had pleaded”, were out of the question unless the Government of India had a railway reaching the Kabul River plain. If the Amir did not concede this, Dane was to press for Kam Dakka, and ascertain whether the Amir wanted any territorial compensation elsewhere. Dane was further instructed not to mention any other place as the terminus for the Kabul River Railway. However,

2. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 9 December 1903, ibid.
4. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 28 February 1904, ibid.
5. Deane to Govt. of India, 17 March 1904, ibid., Reg. No. 918.
6. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 25 March 1904, Viceroy to Amir, 1 April 1904, ibid.
7. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 7 May 1904, Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 16 May 1904, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 1697.
8. For Dane Mission to Kabul, see L.W. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900-1923, A Diplomatic History.
Dane found the Amir in no mood to discuss any question of territorial concession on the frontier, let alone deal specifically with the Kabul River Railway issue, which he regarded with extreme suspicion and resentment. The Mission's long stay had aroused suspicions in Kabul that great concessions to the British were involved, and this also had some influence on Habibullah's attitude.¹

Shortly after Dane's return from Kabul, the Government of India again considered raising the demarcation issue with the Amir. But Deane was unenthusiastic; he saw no reason why the Government should be eager to reopen the issue. The Government, he pointed out, suffered no inconvenience from the frontier being undefined, except in regard to the difficulty of acquiring a suitable rail-head for the Kabul River Railway. Deane was not in the least optimistic that delimitation of the boundary would enable the Government to obtain either Kam Dakka or Loi Dakka as the rail-head. In such circumstances, instead of asking the Amir for his cooperation in demarcating the boundary, the Government should confine its efforts to securing a suitable rail-head by direct negotiation with him. It was preferable, in Deane's view, to request the Amir to grant the Government a lease of the necessary ground on payment of rent, or in return for a gift of rifles, rather than to try to obtain a cession of territory from him. The Amir, it was argued, should himself state the amount he wanted as rent; for if the British suggested any sum, he would make the proposal a "basis for argument and obstruction".²

The climate of opinion, too, was not propitious for a reasonable delimitation of the boundary. Strong religious feelings were then being fanned by Afghan mullas among the Mohmands. Two influential mullas, Sufi Alam Gul Sahib and Kama Mulla had, according to the British, "produced a state of terror, both spiritual and material," on the Mohmand border.³ Consequently, the Dawezai, Utmanzai and Mitai Musa Khel clans of the Mohmands hesitated to come to receive their allowances. Even the Halimzai clan, with whom the Government's relations were very close, only received their subsidy after considerable reluctance. They also appealed to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar for the Government's protection against the Afghan mullas.⁴ Then, at the instigation of the Sartip of Dakka, Afghans attacked Smatzai, but had no success.

¹ Dane to Govt. of India, 27 March 1905, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552; Reg. No. 1095; Summary of Curzon's Administration, Foreign Dept., p. 66, C.C., vol. 526.
² Deane to Govt. of India, 9 May 1905, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 1099.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
To the Viceroy’s request to call the Sartip to account, the Amir reiterated his claim over Smatzai. Curzon intended to make a spirited reply to the Amir’s assertion and his refusal to admonish the Sartip, and to raise, once again, the delimitation and rail-head issue. But the Secretary of State, St. John Brodrick, advised caution in view of the temper of the Mohmands and the feelings of the Amir. He instructed Curzon to take up only the Smatzai incident with the Amir, affirming that it was British territory, and not raise matters like rail-head and boundary demarcation. The British Government then also did not see any point in continuing efforts to discuss the delimitation issue. The India Office, some time later, summed up the situation thus:

it would be unwise again to suggest demarcation of the debatable portion [of the boundary]. From past experience it was certain that Government shall issue from any negotiations badly discomfited or minus considerable concessions. It was apparent that demarcation was for some reason or other distasteful to the Amir.

Meanwhile, the Government went ahead with the Kabul River Railway project. No part of the railway actually crossed through Mohmand territory; but, since a Mohmand attack on it from the left bank of the Kabul River was not unlikely, it was decided to grant an additional allowance of Rs. 5,000 to the Tarakzai Mohmands at the end of 1905. A few Mohmands were also recruited to the Peshawar Border Military Police.

The Mohmands generally remained quiet until the beginning of 1908, when the Bazar Valley expedition gave them a chance to rise against the British. For the Afghan mullas, too, the expedition and the unrest among the Mohmands appeared a good opportunity to mount a campaign against the British. The Mohmands collected a lashkar, but it materialized too late to prove of any real assistance to the Zakha Khel. Jihad was preached by the Afghan mullas; supplies of grain, arms and ammunition from Ningrahar flowed in. Overtures were made to the tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Afridis, Loargai Shinwaris and Zakha Khel were also approached, but without success.

The Government were not quite certain about the causes leading to the Mohmand rising. Deane believed that the uprising was due to a

2. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 2 August 1905, Ibid.
6. See supra, pp. 63-64.
rumour that the Indian Government intended to invade Mohmand territory. To Minto, the origin of the tribal excitement was "a mystery". It might have been the aftermath of the Zakha expedition. Minto believed that the withdrawal of the British troops from the Bazar Valley had been well-timed. A delay in the withdrawal, he feared, would have unsettled the whole frontier. But the withdrawal had also another effect. It was "talked of in Afghanistan as a retreat, and there was a general determination amongst many who were too late for the fray not to be despoiled of the fun of a fight". The mullas had taken advantage of this feeling; and it seemed to Minto, more than probable that Nasrullah Khan was trying his utmost to set the tribesmen against the British, "very possibly in hopes of rendering the Amir's agreement to the Anglo-Russian Convention more difficult for him". Reports of great military activity in Kabul came thick and fast, making even Kitchener, usually cool and confident, feel "extremely anxious and apprehensive" that the British were face to face with possible hostilities with Afghanistan.

The Government chose to pick their way; they took defensive measures until the situation reached such a pass that punitive measures against the Mohmands became absolutely unavoidable. Then the British troops were alerted, and on 24 April 1908, General Willcocks dispersed a mixed Afghan-Mohmand lashkar near Matta and Sardar Ghari. Ten days later, another Afghan lashkar under Sufi Sahib was driven back near Landi Khana on the border.

Minto, in the meanwhile, apprised the Amir of the situation, requesting him to recall the armed bodies of his subjects taking part in the fighting and prevent them from violating British territory. The Amir responded. He issued strict orders against any Afghan crossing into British territory; recalled those who had joined the Mohmands; and took steps against the Afghan ringleaders. This relieved the Government of their fear of Afghan involvement in the Mohmand trouble.

In May 1908, the Government decided to summon a Mohmand Jirga to meet Willcocks, hoping to reach a settlement with the tribe without resorting to an expedition. But the Mohmand Maliks refused to come, and sent "insulting" replies. Minto then instructed Willcocks to march against the Mohmands, reminding him that the object of the expedition

was purely punitive, to bring the tribe to submission as soon as possible. Willcocks was asked to make it widely known that the Government had no intention of annexing territory or of interfering with the status quo in regard to general relations between the tribe and the Government. Willcocks was further asked to spare no opportunity of securing the assistance of other sections of the tribe in bringing the offending sections to submission. The Government’s policy on the Mohmand expedition was thus, in Minto’s own words, “the same as that...in the case of the Zakha expedition”.¹ The Amir was informed of the expedition and requested to see to it that his subjects did not join the Mohmands.² On 11 May 1908, the Mohmand Field Force under Willcocks advanced into Mohmand territory, fighting their way through valleys and villages. On 30 May, it withdrew. Next day the Mohmands paid fines; they had submitted.³ The expedition was short and successful because of the cooperation of the Tarakzai and Halimzai Mohmands and the friendly attitude of the Khans of Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Amir, too, kept his subjects dissociated from the campaign.⁴

After the expedition, the Mohmands were left in suspense for a time; they were not told definitely whether or not peace had been made with them. In this state of uncertainty, Jirgas of various Mohmand sections visited Afghanistan. Though well treated and given sums of money, they seem to have received only evasive promises of active assistance from the Amir against the British or his taking the tribe under his protection. In September 1908, Roos-Keppel interviewed a representative Mohmand Jirga at Peshawar, which presented him with a number of petitions for arrears and an increase of allowances, for the release of Mohmand prisoners, and for the appointment of a special Political Officer. Thereupon, the Government restored the Mohmand allowances withheld so long.⁵ Hereafter, followed a long period of comparative quiet, broken only by the occasional demonstrations of those sections of the tribe who thought their allowances to be inadequate, or by the depredations of outlaws from the Afghan side of the border.⁶ It was only with the outbreak of the World War that fresh disturbance in the Mohmand territory occurred.⁷

¹. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tels. 10, 13 May 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 984.
². Viceroy to Amir, 13 May 1908, ibid.
³. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 2 June 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 1119.
⁵. Minto’s Administration of India; Afghanistan and North-West Frontier, 1908-09, pp. 11-2, Minto Papers, vol. M. 959
In dealing with the tribal disturbances, the Government took two important measures during the period under review: the suppression of the arms traffic from the Persian Gulf to the tribal territory, and the improvement of the Border Military Police. The first decade of the present century saw a flourishing arms trade in the Persian Gulf. European firms poured arms and ammunition into Maskat, which were then smuggled across to the Persian coast and which ultimately found their way, in large quantities, into Afghanistan and the adjacent tribal territory. The growth of this trade led to the tribesmen’s possessing arms of precision, which increased their military power and intensified their raiding propensities and lawlessness. The Afridis and the Ghilzais were the main dealers in the arms trade, which also received the active assistance of the Afghan Government.1

The situation caused considerable concern to the Government of India. In August 1906, Kitchener reported that the military strength of the tribes had been increasing by leaps and bounds; he estimated the fighting population in the tribal territory as 270,000 men who had some 94,000 breech-loading rifles. In a few years, Kitchener had no doubt, every fighting man in the area would possess a modern rifle.2 In 1907, 15,000 rifles were reported to have been smuggled into Afghanistan from the Persian Gulf, a figure which increased to 40,000 in 1909.3 In 1909, the Indian Government reported to the Home Government that the arms traffic had “upset the balance of power”, constituting a serious menace to the maintenance of peace on the Frontier.4 Next year, when Minto visited the Frontier and went to the Kohat Pass, the thing which impressed him most was “the complete change in the personal armament of the tribesmen”. In olden days, the tribesmen had only flintlocks, matchlocks, shields and long knives; but now breech-loading rifles were “universal”, the Martini-Henry being by far the most numerous. Besides, there were plenty of 303’s and a sprinkling of the old Snider. At a Jirga in the Kohat Pass, Minto saw several hundred rifles—“every rifle loaded and full-cock, and their owners heavily laden with ammunition”.5 The whole atmosphere, the Viceroy said, was “full of stories of raids, counter-raids, blood-feuds”. He warned Morley:

1. For “Arms Traffic” see P.S.M., B 182, 196, 196B, D 171, 181, 182, 223-4, and P.S.S.F., vols. 2-8, 14, 1907; vols. 4-7, 82, 1912.
3. Davies, op.cit., p.177.
One cannot but shut one’s eyes to the seriousness of the position. The conditions we should have to face now in a frontier war on a big scale would be entirely different to those of past years.¹

The Home Government then stirred itself to vigorous action to suppress the arms trade. In 1910, it instituted a strong naval blockade in the Persian Gulf to intercept the arms-laden boats on their way from Maskat to the Persian coast. The blockade continued until the outbreak of the World War in August 1914, when the vessels employed for the blockade had to be diverted for war services. From the very outset, the blockade was successful; and besides the capture of large quantities of arms and ammunition, it reduced the dealers’ profit to such an extent that all the European firms at Maskat, except the Goguyers, were forced to wind up their business.²

The second measure for dealing with the tribal problem was the improvement of the Border Military Police. Since the 1880’s this force had been the Government’s main instrument for securing life and property on the Frontier against tribal raids. The Border Military Police in each of the Frontier districts formed an important link between the district officers and the tribes across the border; supplied intelligence of the movements of raiding gangs and bad characters; and repelled raids. The corps received frequent support from regular troops and armed villagers.³ But Curzon’s tribal policy brought considerable changes in the state of things. He withdrew the regular troops from the tribal areas and disarmed the border villages, so depriving the Border Military Police of assistance when threatened by tribal raiders. Besides, while the tribesmen had secured improved arms, the Border Military Police was left with old weapons of poor quality. There had been no improvement in its personnel either. It was reported that service in the corps had become unpopular, and men from good families could no longer be obtained as recruits. The pay of the sepoys had also long “ceased to be a living wage”. No wonder that in 1912 the Government considered the corps to be useless as a defence against organized lawlessness in the Frontier. For several years, much discussion and voluminous correspondence had taken place about improving the corps; but nothing positive was achieved until 1911, when Hardinge appointed a very strong committee to go into the question of the Border Military Police and the suppression of crime on the border.⁴

¹. Ibid.
³. Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 5 September 1912, P.S.F., vol. 10, 1912, Reg No. 3676.
⁴. Ibid.
The Committee made several recommendations. First, the garrison at Thal should be increased to one battalion with two cavalry squadrons and at Tank to one battalion and one regiment of cavalry, while regulars should be retained at Shabkadar, Abazai, Hangu, Kohat, Fort Lockhart and Bannu, and the Samana Range held entirely by regular troops and not, as hitherto, jointly by the Samana Rifles and regular troops. Second, the lower Tochi posts should be entirely handed over to the Militia or the Border Military Police. Third, the Thal-Idak line of posts should be held permanently by the North Waziristan Militia and the Samana Rifles. Fourth, all posts in the Wana Agency should be abandoned beyond Sarwakai, and Sarwakai itself made the headquarters of the South Waziristan Militia and of the Agency, while similarly, all posts in the Tochi Valley beyond Idak should be abandoned, and Idak made the headquarters of the North Waziristan Militia and the Agency. Fifth, the pay of the Kurram-Waziristan Militia should be increased. Finally, the entire Border Military Police Corps should be reorganized under the name of the “Frontier Constabulary” and become a purely civil force, under full-time police officers, at the disposal of the Deputy Commissioners. “The interior economy and discipline” of the corps would then become the responsibility of the commandants who would be directly responsible to the Chief Commissioner. The force would be entirely local, recruited within the Frontier districts. The duties of the force would be to “watch and ward” the district borders, “to collect information, and to serve as the medium of communication with the tribes under the control of the Deputy Commissioners”. The Committee’s proposals involved an initial expenditure of Rs. 750,000 and an additional annual expenditure of about Rs. 100,000.

The Government of India did not accept all these proposals, partly because they involved a “considerable departure from established policy” and partly on grounds of “prohibitive expenses”. They accepted only a part of the first proposal that all the Samana posts be made over to the regular troops; the committee’s third, fifth and sixth proposals were also accepted. In December 1912, the Home Government made its limited approval known.

1. The Committee consisted of Harcourt Butler, the Education Member; Henry McMahon, the Foreign Secretary; Roos-Keppel, the Chief Commissioner of the Frontier Province; A. Hamilton Gordon, the Director of Military Operations; and H.G. Stokes, Deputy Secretary in the Finance Department.

2. Since the beginning of 1911 the posts had been held temporarily by these Militias.

3. Secy. to the Border Military Police Reorganization Committee to Govt. of India, 19 August 1911, enclosed in Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 5 September 1912, P.S.F., vol. 10, 1912, Reg. No. 3676.

4. Secy. of State to Govt. of India, Tel. 3 December 1912, ibid.
The Government of India’s relations with the Frontier tribes were of such an intricate nature that they almost defied solution. Curzon’s Frontier policy, to a certain extent, stood the test of the tribal unrest. The Mahsud blockade and the short and swift Zakha Khel and Mohmand expeditions were mounted with comparative ease. The Militia experiment seemed to have succeeded, except for its temporary failure in South Waziristan, where some British officers were shot by Mahsud Militiamen. Curzon, however, set his face against any direct interference or involvement in tribal affairs. This was clear from his inconsistent policy in regard to the Mahsuds, which he was forced to follow while admitting its unsatisfactory character. A military occupation of Mahsud territory, in Curzon’s opinion, was the only solution of the problem, which he was, however, not prepared to adopt. In his own words:

No patchwork scheme—and all our present recent schemes, blockade, allowances, etc., are mere patchwork—will settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military steam-roller has passed "over the country from end to end, will there be peace. But I do not want to be the person to start that machine."

Minto advocated a change in the policy towards the Frontier tribes. A gradual occupation and absorption of the tribal areas by the Government of India would, in his view, tend to bring prosperity and happiness to the tribes concerned and lead to ultimate peace on the Frontier. This was a forward policy and did not find favour with Morley, the extremely cautious Secretary of State. Minto’s policy, Morley said, would involve fresh responsibilities and increased expenditure. It would be dangerous, too, because it would stir up the tribes and adversely affect Anglo-Afghan relations. Hardinge carried on the policy which he found in operation, but attempted one essential reform in the system of border defence—the reorganization of the Border Military Police into the Frontier Constabulary.

DURING the First World War, the situation on the North-West Frontier of India, which had been a perennial source of danger for the British Government of India, gave them many anxious moments. It was feared that Habibullah Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, who had been enraged at not being consulted over the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907, would become still more hostile, events in Europe providing him with an opportunity to declare a preventive war against the British. An Anglo-Afghan war would be certain to arouse the Frontier tribes and involve them in a tribal conflagration. Should large-scale tribal raids be made on British territory in the hope of finding the Frontier denuded by the dispatch of troops overseas, the Government might be forced to launch a campaign into tribal territory, the consequences of which would be unforeseeable. The situation was all the more dangerous for the Government because of serious internal troubles caused by increasingly militant activities of the Indian freedom fighters in Bengal, Western

India and the Punjab. There was the further British fear that Indian Muslims might be aroused against them by pan-Islamic propaganda from Turkey, and by Frontier risings.

Hardinge's policy was to keep on good terms with Amir Habibuilah, who was promptly informed of the outbreak of the war, advised to maintain neutrality, and requested to take special steps for the preservation of order on the Indo-Afghan border. To the relief of the Government of India, the Amir assured them of his neutrality, an assurance which he repeated in November 1914, when Turkey entered the War. Throughout the War, the Amir remained true to his pledge, although this was by no means an easy task. The anti-British and pro-Turkish faction at Kabul, headed by Nasrullah Khan, the Amir's younger brother, and supported by what the British called priests and fanatical elements, made no secret of their opposition to the Amir's neutral policy, and exerted strong pressure on him to enter the War on Turkey's side. When a Turco-German Mission arrived at Kabul in August 1915, allegedly bearing messages from the Sultan of Turkey and the Kaiser of Germany, and the collaboration of Indian freedom fighters with the anti-British elements at Kabul made the situation all the more difficult for the Amir, there were rumours of rebellion against him, and even of his assassination. Habibullah handled the situation skillfully in the interests of his agreement with the British; he listened to the advice of the pro-Turkish elements in his court, but never acted on it; he welcomed the Turco-German Mission, but kept it guessing about his intentions. He also kept effective control over the Frontier tribes. He restrained his subjects from taking offensive action in British territory, sent troops to recall those assisting in raids, reproved
the most influential Afghan religious leaders for directing these operations, and discouraged the tribes on the Indian side of the Durand Line from hostility towards the British Government. The Amir’s influence was of vital political importance to the British; for it helped in steadying the situation on the Frontier. Hardinge had the “firmest confidence” in Habibullah’s good faith, and so had the Home Government. In September 1915, George V sent the Amir a letter of thanks, and the Government of India increased his subsidy by Rs. 2,00,000.

Towards the tribes, Hardinge had meanwhile, with the concurrence of Crewe, the Secretary of State, maintained a “watchful policy”. In August 1914, three divisions of infantry and a cavalry brigade were maintained on the Frontier on a “mobilized footing”, with three other Frontier brigades at Kohat, Bannu and Derajat. Their particular task at the commencement of the War was to watch the Mohmands and the Mahsuds, both of whom were restless. From the adjacent Afghan district of Khost, over which the Amir’s authority had slackened through maladministration, incursions on the Kurram and Tochi Valleys were apprehended. However, there were some important loyal elements in the tribal territory, such as the Mehtar of Chitral, the Nawab of Amb, the tribes of Swat and the Khyber Agency, all of whom offered their services and cooperation to the British. So, too, did the Bhittanis of Jandola and the Waziris of Tochi; and the Khyber Rifles and the North Waziristan Militia volunteered contingents for active service.

Even so, the uneasy balance of forces on the Frontier was threatened by Turkey’s entry into the War. It obliged the British to exercise increased vigilance over Indian Muslims, who were reported to be in a state of “considerable bitterness and some unrest”. Yet, at the same time, more and more Indian Army units had to be dispatched to Mesopotamia and other theatres of war in the Middle East. As a result, for several weeks in 1915,
the number of troops for the maintenance of internal security in India fell "dangerously below the safety level", the total British garrison in India consisting of less than 15,000 men. A mutiny of the Pathan companies in the 130th Baluch Regiment and the suspected disaffection of other Indian troops added to the Government's worries. A number of "disquieting symptoms" had appeared amongst the trans-border troops; and in January 1915, serious trouble broke out. On the Commander-in-Chief's decision that the 130th Baluch Regiment should be sent to East Africa, three companies of Pathans, mostly Afridis, reacted with "mutinous behaviour". They "declined to go on active service at all" because they had "...a strong disinclination...to fight against Turks". These 'mutinous men' were then disarmed and imprisoned. The ring leaders were tried by summary court martial "and drastically dealt with". Other men were sentenced by another summary court martial to various terms of transportation.

War with Turkey also furnished influential religious leaders in the tribal territory with a good opportunity to urge the local population to Jihad. Hopes of a great Islamic renaissance were at once aroused. The anti-British elements hoped that Persia would join the War on the side of Turkey, and that the Amir, notwithstanding his present neutrality, would ultimately join Persia. The tribal mullas were reinforced by the mullas of southern Afghanistan in urging the tribesmen to rise in the name of the Sultan of Turkey, and to take advantage of the drain on Government strength caused by the War. The return of sick and wounded soldiers from France gave rise to stories of German invincibility; and hundreds of trans-border tribesmen serving in the Indian Army deserted their ranks, and joined the mullas. In 1914, there were nearly 5,000 trans-border Pathans in the Indian Army, of whom about half were Afridis. By June 1915, over 600 Afridis had deserted; and there were many dismissals and discharges for misconduct. In November 1915, all recruitment of trans-border Pathans was stopped; and by the end of 1918, there were less than 1,800 trans-border Pathans in the Indian Army.

To this situation among the Frontier tribes, the Government of India, with depleted and in some cases wavering forces, was compelled to res-

1. Lord Hardinge, My Indian Years, 1910-16, pp. 102, 117-8.
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pond as much with political as with military measures. The attitude of the Afridis, ‘the keystone of the Frontier arch’, was of paramount importance. Roos-Keppel, while emphasizing this, stated:

In the Muhnmedan crisis, which there is reason to believe is approaching rapidly, their (Afridi) friendship will be of incalculable value. So long as we hold the Afridis, who can form a fireproof curtain between northern and southern Islam on this frontier, no jihad or rising can be general.1

The Mohmands, Orakzais and other neighbouring tribes, he pointed out, were eagerly awaiting a lead from the Afridis. He, therefore, urged that the Afridis’ allowances be increased forthwith, pointing out that an Afridi petition to this effect was already before the local Government.2 The Government of India actually doubled the allowances,3 and the Home Government endorsed this decision, agreeing that the “wisdom of this concession at the present time can hardly be disputed”.4 On 13 February, 1915, Roos-Keppel held a representative Jirga of 3,000 men in the Victoria Memorial Hall, Peshawar, where he announced the grant of increased allowances on condition of “loyalty, good conduct, ratification of past agreements, and equitable distribution of the whole subsidy” by the tribe. The announcement was received with a satisfaction that led Roos-Keppel to hope that “the Maliks, the elders and the tribe as a whole will be with us and that nothing but a general upheaval of the Islamic World, including Afghanistan, will shake the Afridis”.5 Further, as a measure of support and encouragement to the loyal trans-border chiefs, Roos-Keppel recommended a gift of rifles and ammunition to the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawabs of Amb and Dir.6

Simultaneously, military measures were taken, in which modifications were made in the distribution of troops among key points of the Frontier. A detachment of Gurkhas was stationed at Oghi, at the foot of the Black Mountains to defend the border against the Black Mountain tribes and the Mujahidin.7 Parachinar in Kurram was also strengthened with the addition of two companies of Gurkhas and a squadron of cavalry to repel any attack from Khost. A strong column was located at Miranshah to

2. Ibid., see Chapter II, pp. 65-67.
3. Formerly the allowances were Rs. 84,040.
4. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 2 February 1915, P.S.F., vol. 26, 1912, Reg. No. 974; Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 4 June 1915, Note by Thomas Holderness, Under Secy., ibid., Reg. No. 1402A.
5. Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 14 February 1915, ibid.
7. For Mujahidin, see pp. 90-94.
defend the Upper Tochi against possible Afghan incursions from Khost. The Dera Ismail Khan brigade was moved to Tank to keep an eye on the Mahsuds. Further, mobile wireless stations were installed at Wana, Tank, Miranshah, Bannu, Kohat and Landi Kotal. These measures, though they strengthened forward positions along the Frontier, were intended to be purely defensive. Preoccupied with the war in Europe and the Middle East, the Government had to be content with what Hardinge described as "necessarily a hand to mouth policy" in the Frontier. This policy, as Rooke-Keppel later elaborated it, was
to keep on as good terms as possible with the tribes who are behaving well, freely to use force in crushing any incipient outbreak, to encourage and support the people of the districts in resisting trans-frontier raids and, generally, to carry on as well as possible until the cessation of other preoccupations enables us to initiate a definite policy of setting our house in order.

However, as things developed, it proved increasingly difficult to maintain this policy. In 1915, a number of attacks on British controlled territory took place, and the tribal religious leaders continued to urge the mobilization of a Jihad. There were attacks on Miranshah and Spina Khasora in the Tochi Valley by the Afghans of Khost; and they were repulsed only by the strong action of the North Waziristan Militia and the Bannu Brigade. Similarly, the containment of five attacks on the Peshawar border by the Mohmands, Upper Swatis and Bunerwals involved the combined force of the First Division, part of the Second Division and the Frontier Constabulary. In November 1915, Rooke-Keppel informed Hardinge:

It is a merciful dispensation of Providence that these tribes can never combine, short as we are of troops at present, we should be hard put to it were several of the bigger tribes to rise simultaneously—but they always give us time to settle one lot before taking on the next.

1. Rooke-Keppel to Hardinge, 10 March 1915, R.P.
2. Hardinge to Rooke-Keppel, 28 March 1915, 10 May 1915, Rooke-Keppel to Chelmsford, 13 April 1916, ibid.
3. The five engagements were these: On 18 April 1915, the Mohmands attacked Hafiz Kor; on 17 August 1915, the Bunerwals, Upper Swatis and the Mujahidin advanced against British forces at Rustam on the Buner border near the historic Ambela Pass; on 28 August's night and the morning of 29 August 1915; the Swatis raided the British at Landakai Spur; on 5 September 1915, the Mohmands launched an attack against the British at Hafiz Kor; and on 8 October 1915, the Mohmands again took the field near Shabkadar. Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, pp. 92, 99-103, H.P. vol., 131.
4. For lawlessness and tribal attacks, see P.S.S.F., vol. 4-7, 1912, File No. 46; vols. 45-50, 1913, File No. 13464; vol. 22, 1915, File No. 622. See also Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 4 July 1916, Dispatch of Commander-in-Chief in India on operations on the North-West Frontier up to 9 March 1916.
Though outside India little was known about these Frontier raids, Hardinge claimed to have successfully carried out "the greatest military operations on the Frontier since the Frontier Campaign of 1897".¹

That these Jihad campaigns did not escalate into a general uprising in the tribal territory was, according to the British, due to three causes. First, the Amir's attitude had some restrictive influence on the tribes. Hardinge kept Habibullah informed about the movements of his Afghan subjects and urged him to restrain them. Habibullah made genuine, though not uniformly successful, efforts to prevent his subjects from taking part in the Jihad, or otherwise creating trouble for the British.² Roos-Keppel was sure that;

but for the Amir's prompt action, the flame of jihad would have spread, and that there would have been a whole rising of Ningrahar and of the Mohmand and Bajaur territories. His Majesty has displayed unprecedented boldness in his attitude towards the mullas and the jihad party and has incurred much unpopularity, but his attitude and action have been of incalculable value to us.³

It was, indeed, a most striking admission on the part of a Chief Commissioner who, as the India Office noted, had "seldom...a good word to say for the Amir"⁴, and who appeared to Chelmsford, Hardinge's successor, as "confessedly an Afghanophobe".⁵

The second favourable factor for the Government was the continued loyal behaviour of the Afridis, which, true to Roos-Keppel's anticipation, drove an effective wedge between the tribes of the northern and southern borders of the Province. Apart from the increased allowances, another factor which contributed notably to the quiet in Afridi territory was the remarkable influence of Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum,⁶ the Assistant Political Agent of Khyber, who, in Roos-Keppel's words, was an "anchor to which Tirah is moored". "If we get through this critical year (1915)", Roos-Keppel informed Hardinge, "this will be more due to Abdul Qaiyum

1. Lord Hardinge, op.cit., p. 131.
4. Ibid., Deptt. Note.
6. Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, (12 December 1864—4 December 1937): held non-gazetted appointments, 15 February 1887—June 1898; officiating Mir Munshi to the Government of the Punjab, June 1898—September 1898; Assistant Political Agent, Khyber, September 1898-1910; Extra Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, June 1910; Assistant Political Agent, Khyber, September 1910; K.C.I.E., June 1917; Political Agent, Khyber, May 1918; Retired, December 1919; Kaisar-i-Hind Medal (1st Class), June 1929; Delegate to Indian Round-Table Conference, London, November 1930—January 1931, September—December 1931; Minister of North-West Frontier Province under the Reforms of 1932, 1932-37.
than to any other individual, I include myself.”

The third factor in the Government’s favour was the loyalty and cooperation of the Khans and Nawabs of the settled districts who volunteered to help the local Government put down tribal Jihad operations.

It was fortunate for the British that the Amir and the Afridis did hold firm; for, from the military point of view, 1915 was a very trying year for the Government of India. Their military strength was waning as a result of Kitchener’s ceaseless demands for troops from India, to which Hardinge’s Government responded with increasing reluctance. The efficiency of the three Frontier divisions was greatly reduced when good Indian battalions from these divisions were sent overseas and replaced by inferior Indian battalions, “under-officered, under-gunned” and composed chiefly of new recruits and reservists. This the tribesmen soon came to know about. They had the “utmost contempt” for Indian battalions, especially those having Brahmin elements: it was only British battalions, so Hardinge believed, whom the tribesmen feared.

The Government of India’s anxiety over the draining away of good troops was exacerbated by the war situation in Mesopotamia and Persia and its effect on Afghanistan and the Frontier. In July 1915, when Kitchener asked for more British regular battalions from India, both Hardinge and Beauchamp Duff, the Commander-in-Chief, flatly refused to send any. There were then only eight British battalions in India, all stationed on the Frontier. It was impossible, in Hardinge’s opinion, “to play with the situation on the Frontier”, where peace hung in the

1. Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 19 July 1915, R.P.
2. On 5 April 1915, Roos-Keppel wrote to Hardinge that many leading Khans of the Peshawar District had “offered to raise contingents of horse and foot for local service, as their fathers and grandfathers did in the Mutiny. Conditions had changed since 1857, as in those days all such levies provided their own arms while now the Government would have to arm them. In this, there would be some risk, but if things take a turn for the worse we should be forced to gamble high, and we might do worse than accept their offer.” On a leading Khan’s request that their ‘loyal offers’ should be conveyed to the Viceroy, Hardinge wrote back to Roos-Keppel: “You may tell them that I received the information with very great pleasure and am much touched by their ready offers and by their loyalty, of which I never had a single doubt.” When the fight on 18 April 1915 took place, the Nawabs and Khans of the Peshawar and D.I.Khan districts “volunteered for service. More than 50 of them, including some very aged men, arrived at Shabkadar and begged to be allowed to place all their resources of influence, men and money at Government disposal and came themselves out to the fight of the 18th (April 1915). Their behaviour had an excellent effect upon public opinion.” Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 5 April 1915, Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 11 April 1915, Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 21 April 1915, R.P.
3. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2 July 1915, H.P., vol. 121. On 10 September, Hardinge complained bitterly of the “melting away” of the 4th Quetta Division; and on 5 November 1915, pointed out that only two British cavalry regiments remained in India—of which one was already on the Frontier. See Hardinge to Chamberlain, 10 September, 5 November 1915, H.P., vol. 121.
balance. If Persia were involved in the War, that balance, Hardinge feared, could no longer be maintained; and this the Viceroy clearly pointed out to the Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain.¹

The Home Government saw Hardinge's point. In December 1915, Chamberlain apprised the War Committee of the Cabinet of the Viceroy's anxiety about the military situation on the Frontier. The War Committee decided to send, "without delay", reinforcement for the British regiments on the Indian Frontier as well as to Mesopotamia. Accordingly, four garrison battalions immediately sailed for India.²

Meanwhile, Roos-Keppel was becoming concerned over the situation at Kabul. Reports of German agents consolidating their influence came thick and fast. Nasrullah's influence, too, was on the increase; he was now being addressed as "Amir Nasrullah Khan". In January 1916, an apparently forged letter, purportedly signed by the Amir, by Nasrullah and by the pro-Turkish elements in the Afghan court, was circulated in the Frontier areas, asking the "mullas, Maliks and Kazis of the Tirah Ilaka" to prepare for a Jihad in the spring of 1916. Stories of German plans for the invasion of Egypt, Persia and Afghanistan gained wide currency and ready credence in the Frontier Province. Roos-Keppel feared that, under pressure from Nasrullah and his men, the Amir was "showing signs of wavering" from his neutral policy.³

Hardinge, reporting Roos-Keppel's anxiety to Chamberlain in January 1916, made it clear that he still regarded the Chief Commissioner's views as rather too pessimistic.⁴ Nevertheless, the Viceroy himself was uneasy; and he waited impatiently for the Amir's reply to the letter from King George sent three months back. Meanwhile, he speculated on whether the recent British set-back in Mesopotamia had compromised British prestige so much as to encourage Habibullah to abandon his neutrality,⁵ and even on what would happen if he were assassinated.⁶ In order to strengthen the Amir's hand, the Viceroy intended to write him a farewell letter, using the announcement of his impending retirement to cover a veiled warning that any hostile attitude towards the British would be dangerous for Afghanistan. However, in February 1916, the tension relaxed: the long-awaited reply of the Amir to the King's and the

¹. Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2 July, 10 September 1915, H.P., vol. 121.
². Chamberlain to Hardinge, 9 September 1915, ibid.
Viceroy’s letters reached Delhi, and in addition Habibullah saw the British Agent at Kabul. These responses encouraged the British. Hardinge could now “feel confident that he (the Amir) means to maintain his neutrality, provided that he can do so, and I think he can.”1 Meanwhile, the Russian successes in Persia and the Caucasus had restored the Allies’ prestige in Afghanistan, and proportionately strengthened Habibullah’s position.

The Government of India’s military position had also improved by the beginning of 1916. In January, the four garrison battalions from England arrived in India. Quietly but steadily, territorial battalions had been moving up to the Frontier, and two flights of aircrafts were also sent there, which created quite an impression on the tribes and the Afghans.2 On 17 February 1916, at a garden party at Peshawar, 25,000 tribesmen, with many Afridi Maliks and Chiefs among them, together with a good number of Afghans, saw an aeroplane flight organized by Roos-Keppel. The effect was tremendous. One Afridi elder asked Roos-Keppel: “What do those things cost? The two that you have there are worth 20,000 men to you. And one Mulla Doda Jan, in an intercepted letter to Babra Mulla,3 wrote thus:

I have heard wonderful things from the Mulla of Khema, who says that the wicked British have got aeroplanes in Peshawar District where they fly in the sky. God knows whether we can fight against them or not. The Mulla of Khema is sent on to you in order to relate the account to you personally. But the Grace of God is greater than such deeds of devils.4

As a further demonstration of British military might, armoured cars and mechanical transport were also kept on the Frontier.5 Lastly, in March 1916, the War Office in London provisionally earmarked two divisions in Egypt as a reserve for the Indian Frontier.6

Maintaining peaceful relations with the Frontier tribes during this period was made more difficult by the incursion of anti-British elements into tribal territory from both India and abroad. These elements were the Mujahidin,7 called the “Hindustani fanatics” by the British; the Indian freedom fighters whom the British referred to as “seditionists”; agents from Turkey; and the Haji Sahib of Turangzai, a prominent re-

4. Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 26 February, 13 March 1916, R.P.
7. Men dedicated to jihad for the re-establishment of a Muslim State in the Indian subcontinent.
ligious leader of the Peshawar border. The tribal regions provided both a rendezvous and a base of operations for these elements.

The Mujahidin colony at Sittana in Buner had long been a centre of the Jihad movement in the tribal territory. The Mujahidin were followers of Syed Ahmad Shahid (1786-1831), a native of Rai Bareilly in Oudh and a spiritual disciple of Shah Abdul Aziz of Delhi. Their aim was to re-establish a Muslim State, as conceived by Shah Wali Allah (1703-62), a renowned Muslim scholar and reformist, and to deliver the Muslims from the bondage of infidels. "They faced formidable opponents; the Marathas in the south, the Sikhs in the Punjab and the British who were to overthrow all".

Appearing on the Yusufzai border, Syed Ahmad had soon mobilized the local population for holy war against the Sikh rulers of Peshawar. This had its vicissitudes; but thenceforth the Mujahidin on the Frontier kept the spirit of Jihad alive "against the non-Islamic rulers of India, and no period of political stress... passed without an attempt on their part, attended with varying success, to engender religious excitement among the border tribes." The Mujahidin had always maintained secret communication with their sympathizers in India, who sent men and money to the colony. In the nineteenth century the Mujahidin had had several armed conflicts with British troops. However, in the last quarter before the twentieth century, the fighting spirit of these "professional fanatics", as Roos-Keppel called them, deteriorated; and, thereafter, their activity was confined to "occasionally making a noise" in the tribal region with the object of keeping up "the supply of presents from the Amir (of Afghanistan) and of offerings from the dupes in India."

Seizing the opportunity of British involvement in the War, the Mujahidin stepped up their activity, and in 1915, their colony moved to

Samasta in Buner. In the middle of that year, a branch colony was set up at Chamarkand in Bajaur. Mulla Bashir and Mohammad Ali from the Punjab were the chief builders of this colony. They chose Chamarkand because it was "handy for communication with India and Kabul", and was easily reached. This provided a rallying point for anti-British elements. Soon after its establishment, 110 Indians from Kabul and 100 others living in Samasta joined the new colony, which eventually became the Mujahidin's headquarters. In August 1915, the Mujahidin were directly involved in a tribal attack on the village of Rustam on the Peshawar border. The Government retaliated by blockading the Mujahidin; the blockade pressed hard on them and reduced them to sore straits. In April 1917, two Bengali Muslims were arrested at Peshawar while carrying Rs. 8,000 for the Mujahidin. This strengthened the Government's decision to continue the blockade, though, at the same time, the Mujahidin leader Niamatullah Khan was led to believe that the Government would accept his overtures for a settlement. In October 1917, after four months of negotiations, in which Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum acted as intermediary, an agreement was reached, the Government paying Niamatullah Khan certain allowances for keeping his men away from anti-British elements in the tribal territory. Niamatullah was thus won over by the British. Later, in recognition of his friendliness to the Government during the Third Afghan War (1919) Roos-Keppel recommended a reward of Rs. 25,000 and 25 squares of good land in the Punjab for his family. Niamatullah's attachment to the British brought him into disrepute among those of his followers who remained true to the Jihad cause; and on 4 May, 1921, he was assassinated.

The Mujahidin were a Muslim body whose opposition to infidel rule in India was of long standing and cast in a traditional mould. But,

5. Roos-Keppel to Grant, Secy. Govt. of India, 7 May 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
6. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 16 May 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, ibid.
8. Roos-Keppel to Hignell, 21 August 1917, C.P., vol. 23; Roos-Keppel to A.H. Grant, 1 September 1919, R.P.
besides them, there was a small but well-organized group of Indian freedom fighters, composed of Hindus and Sikhs as well as Muslims, whose aim was to overthrow the British Government in India by violent means, and whom the British called "seditionists". They took their models from Europe and looked for support there as well as in India. In British eyes, the War gave them an opportunity to stir up trouble by appealing to the "ignorance and fanaticism" of the Frontier tribes.¹ During the War years, violently anti-British personalities from the Punjab, East Bengal and even the Far East, together with eight students from the North-West Frontier Province, found their way into tribal territory.² In August 1915, the famous Indian revolutionaries, Maulvi Barkat Ullah and Mahendra Pratap, reached Kabul at the same time as the Turco-German Mission,³ and were presently joined by Maulana Obaid Ullah Sindhi.⁴ The three men formed a "Provisional Government of India", with Mahendra Pratap as its President, and sought an alliance with the Turkish Government against the British. This was the "silk letter plot" discovered by the Government of India in August 1916, and derived its name from the yellow silk on which Maulana Obaid Ullah wrote letters to his contact in Mecca.⁵ The group also urged the Amir to declare a holy war against the British, and was in close touch with the Mujahidin, the Haji Sahib of Turangzai and all important religious leaders on the northern sector of the Frontier. Two Muslims from the Punjab, Barkat Ali and Mohammad Ali had, according to Roos-Keppel's estimate, "acquired great influence over the fanatic Amir (Amir-al-Mujahidin)."⁶ In July 1917, Maulvi Taj Mohammad, also from the Punjab, brought a good deal of money from Kabul and was "trying to work up Bajaur, Swat and the Indus Valley tribes."⁷ In July 1919, an autograph letter of Maulana Obaid Ullah to the Mujahidin was intercepted in which the Maulana stated that he had

⁴ For Obaid Ullah Sindhi, see Muhammad Sarwar, Talimat-i-Maulana Obaid Ullah Sindhi, Kabul Mein Sat Sal.
⁶ Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 16 May 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
⁷ Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 6 July 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Montagu, 19 July 1917, ibid.
decided “to establish a centre of movement at Chamarkand.” 1 Next month, proclamations of the “Provisional Government of India” were issued in English and Urdu, informing “people of India that the Provisional Government had succeeded in obtaining help for them in the shape of arms.” An informer, later on, stated that the Maulana had sent 500 bombs to Samasta to be smuggled in small quantities into India. 2 These anti-British elements remained active on the Frontier until the early 1920’s.

They relied on Turkish agents to develop contacts with the tribes, and their operations had the financial support of Nasrullah Khan. The most serious attempt to mobilize tribal support was made in the Tirah (an area in the Khyber), where, in June 1916, two emissaries were sent: one was Khired Bey, a staff colonel of the Turkish Army, and the other Mohammad Abid, alias Abidin, an Arab, formerly employed by the Turks as a drill instructor in Kabul. Turkish agents, it was reported, had gone with escorts of Afridi deserters to the Mahsud border and to the neighbourhood of Chaman. 3

Before the Turkish emissaries arrived in the Tirah, one of their agents, Mir Mast by name, had already established contacts with the Afridis. Mir Mast was a Kamber Khel Afridi and an ex-Jamadar of the 58th Rifles, from which he had deserted in France and then accompanied the Turco-German Mission to Kabul. The “uneasy feelings” in the tribal area aroused by the efforts of the Mission were further intensified by Mir Mast’s activities in the Khyber. 4 On their arrival in the Tirah, the Turkish emissaries delivered a number of speeches at Bagh. They unfurled a flag which had, according to them, been blessed by the Caliph. They declared themselves to be the Sultan’s plenipotentiaries and offered the Afridis his protection and assistance against the British. The Afridis were also promised concrete support in the shape of arms, ammunition and money. 5 In the middle of 1916, deserters and dismissed Pathan sepoys from the Indian Army swelled the ranks—mainly pro-Afghan Afridi... of the emissaries. The latter started recruiting for what they alternatively called a “Turkish Army” or the “Amir’s Army”. It

2. Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, Tel. 9 August 1919, ibid.
5. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 21, 29 July 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 4 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
appeared to Roos-Keppel as if the Turks intended "to embody about a thousand Afridi deserters as a regiment of the Turkish Army and to locate it in Bazar for use as escorts to further Turkish or German visitors and to act as a thorn in our side whenever a demonstration is considered to be advisable." By July 1916, the total number of Afridi recruits so enlisted was reported to have reached 400. They were posted at three Kambar Khel villages near the home of Mir Mast. They had made a parade-ground and were drilled every day by Mir Mast under the supervision of the Turkish Colonel.

This Turkish activity in Tirah and other parts of the Frontier was "annoying" to Roos-Keppel. Doubting the Amir's ignorance of it, he told the Viceroy that

In the present state of the Jalalabad Province, I consider it impossible that these Turks could have come to Tirah and to Asmar without the Amir's knowledge and permission... The policy of the Amir for the last ten years of subsidizing, in defiance of his treaty obligations, a Kabul party among the Afridis is now bearing fruit, and it is this Kabul party which, with the assistance of the deserters, is supporting the Turkish visitors.

On 18 August 1916, Roos-Keppel noted:

No trouble seems to be taken to hide the connection between Sardar Nasrullah Khan and these Turks, as a bi-weekly dak [mail caravan] between them has been arranged by the Commandant at Kahi and messengers from Tirah are passed through and given escorts and take their dispatches direct to the Sardar. I hear that the Qazi of Achin has been reading out to the Afridis the Siraj-al-Akhbar article about the

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1. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 29 July 1916, ibid.
3. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 29 July 1916, ibid.
4. In 1911, Siraj-al-Akhbar was started by Mahmud Tarzi. Expressing his views about the newspaper, Roos-Keppel noted in September 1912: It "was in reality started mainly with a view of disseminating pro-Afghan feeling among the Frontier tribes and Frontier districts." Mahmud Tarzi was described as "very strongly anti-British." In July 1915, Roos-Keppel reported that the tone of Siraj-al-Akhbar was "as bad as that of the worst nationalist rag in Ireland." It was publishing "anti-British and pro-German news," and that "some copies are sent by hand to persons in Peshawar," the Indian Government took steps to intercept the issues of the newspapers. Also, the Viceroy complained to the Amir against it and the newspaper then came under his "direct censorship."

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2. Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 6 September 1912, R.P.
4. Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 8 July 1915, R.P.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
Arab revolt and has been preaching on this text, but the Afridis are much more interested in the prospect of getting money, arms and ammunition out of the Turks than in religious subjects.1

This was, according to A.H. Grant, in keeping with Nasrullah’s traditional policy of “keeping the Frontier sore open” for the British.2 Roos-Keppel further reported:

The Turks seem to have got over their first fright and are now more active. . . . They have gone for a tour amongst the Orakzais and the smaller tribes on the Kurram border. Had they started this campaign at the beginning of the summer, they might have caused us considerable embarrassment, but the time is unfavourable for them, as the cold weather is approaching and the tribesmen are looking forward to coming to British territory as usual.3

A report from Waziristan runs thus:

Some Mahsuds and Waziris have come to Matun to see the Governor. They say that Turks have arrived in Birmal and are exhorting the Mahsuds and Waziris in the name of the Amir to prepare for a very early Jihad. The deputation has come to ask the Governor of Khost whether these men are really authorized by the Amir or whether they are adventurers—a very difficult question for the Governor to answer.4

In the meantime, Norman Bolton the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, reported that

...the news of the movement is causing excitement and some alarm in Peshawar, and that it has quite taken the place of the Arab revolt in the public mind.5

Roos-Keppel kept a close watch on these developments. According to him, the Turkish agents had succeeded in creating a schism in the tribe, which was gradually being divided into two camps: one in favour of maintaining peace and friendship with the Government, the other advocating Jihad against it. The Chief Commissioner could not take action against the Turkish agents and their Afridi supporters for fear of disturbing what he saw as “a very delicate equilibrium” in the tribe, and thus probably straining the Indian Government’s relations with Habibullah Khan. In such circumstances, he considered it better to “leave the Turks alone.”

The Turkish Mission to Tirah did not succeed. The pro-Government Afridis, as one of the Malikis reported to Roos-Keppel, told the Turks that “unless they see the Amir, the Germans and the Turkish armies

1. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy, Govt. of India, 18 August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
2. cited by Adamec, op.cit. p. 98.
3. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy, Govt. of India, 18 August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
4. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy, Govt. of India, 22 August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 30 August 1916, ibid.
5. ibid.
with their own eyes, they will never raise any trouble for the British."

The Afridi Maliks further told them that

they need expect no help from them unless the Amir himself leads a

Jihad and unless they are given very large quantities of arms,

ammunition and money.

But the Turks, for their part, could not get Nasrullah to put up more than 1,500 sovereigns in all; and later bitterly complained "how Nasrullah had ruined the whole movement by failing to send the money and ammunition which he had promised." It was reported in early October 1916 that Kazim Bey, along with some others, had left for Herat. Kazim Bey was believed to have been the organizer of this Turco-German Frontier Policy, and his departure looked to Roos-Keppel as if he had given up the game.

The time, too, was not suitable. The Turks began their activity late in summer, when the Afridis looked forward to the approach of cold weather in order to go to the British territory for allowances and employment. Finally, the British officers in Khyber, successfully played upon the mutual jealousy of the Afridi religious personages, and kept a few of them on the side of the Government. Then in the middle of September 1916, under "gentle pressure" from British officers in the Khyber, the pro-Government faction of the Afridis drove off the Turks to Rajgal near the Afghan border; and in June 1917, the Turks appear to have finally left the tribal territory and crossed over to Afghanistan.

Turkish efforts were more successful in Mohmand territory and in Bajaur. Two Pathans, who had lived for a long time in Berlin and then accompanied the Turco-German Mission to Kabul, acted as Turkish agents in these areas. Already the Haji Sāhib of Turangzai and other local mullas were busy gathering support against the British. Haji Sahib's name was Fazli Wahid. His ancestors, who originally came from Kandahar in Afghanistan, were men of great piety and sanctity.

2. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 7 August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 11 August 1916, ibid.
3. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 4 October 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 12 October 1916, ibid.
4. Ibid.
6. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 4 October 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 12 October 1916, ibid.
8. Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, November 1916, R.P.
knew Haji Sahib and "had always looked upon him as a very sensible and level-headed man." Pious and much respected, Haji Sahib had great influence in the Peshawar District and its adjacent tribal area. In the Chief Commissioner’s estimate, Haji Sahib had for years steadfastly refused to take any part in politics or in what I may call the warlike side of the Islamic religion and has confined himself to efforts in the cause of education, to settling out-of-court disputes between Mussalmans and to arranging marriages for the daughters of the poor who are unable to give dowries and whose daughters might, without his assistance, have remained unmarried. His reputation for sanctity and for unselfish benevolence has greatly increased, as has also his influence, which has hitherto been entirely for good on both sides of the border; he is probably more respected and trusted than any other mulla.

At the end of April 1915, Haji Sahib suddenly left his home at Turangzai in Peshawar by night and crossed over to the tribal area. According to Roos-Keppel, "the intriguers in Peshawar who wanted to make use of his influence for their own purposes" had terrified him by sending him repeated messages that orders had been given for his arrest and imprisonment in the Peshawar jail. After he had crossed the border, he travelled to Buner to the famous shrine of Pir Baba, and was received with "acclamation" by the Bunerwals. The Mujahidin gave him an enthusiastic welcome too. His visitors, in most cases, were known to be "very anti-British." Haji Sahib’s proceeding to tribal territory came "as a great surprise" to Roos-Keppel, because it had seemed to him that "Haji’s personal leanings were towards peace" and that he was not "hostile". Roos-Keppel, therefore, tried to induce him, through his friends, to return to Turangzai. "Many leading Khans of the Peshawar District were working very hard" towards that end. But by the end of July 1915, it was reported that Haji Sahib was "in active communication with most of the mullas on the Northern Frontier". A dismissed school master from Delhi, named Maulvi Abdul Rahman, who had joined the Mujahidin,

7. Ibid.
8. In another place, he is mentioned as Maulvi Saif-ur-Rahman.
became Secretary to the Haji Sahib. It was, in Roos-Reppel's opinion, "probable that the letters issued in his name [to religious personages and others] were stronger than he would write them himself." His conclusion was that the Haji Sahib had come "under the influence of the hostile elements and was forced to join the Jihad party together with the other mullas", and has, thus, turned against the British. The Jihad feeling, which had been sedulously worked up among all the tribes on the northern border of the Peshawar District, culminated in a raid at Rustam on the Buner border, on 17 August, 1915.

Throughout the War years, the Haji Sahib intermittently visited the Swatis, Bajauris and Mohmands to preach Jihad. He also established contact with the anti-British party at Kabul and set up a press from which he issued "a series of rousing Jihad leaflets". Influenced by this preaching, the Mohmands began carrying out extensive raids in the Peshawar District; and in October 1916, the Government felt obliged to impose a blockade of the tribe. When, despite this, the Haji Sahib managed to assemble a force of about 6,000 Mohmands on the hills west of Shabkadar it was quickly dispersed with the help of aeroplanes on the morning of 15 November 1916. This was the first time that War planes had been used in India, and they were reported to have "afforded great assistance". The blockade continued until July 1917, when a settlement was reached.

The Government made its peace with the Mohmands because of troubles with the Mahsuds. Since the Tank incident of April 1914—in which the Mahsuds killed Major Dodd, Political Agent for South Waziristan, two other officers and three sepoys—they had been openly hostile to the Government. This hostility was fanned by the pro-Turkish and anti-British elements from Kabul; and in January 1916, Roos-Keppel informed the Viceroy that no village is safe, and the Mahsuds raid from their hills right down to the banks of the Indus and kill, entrap and abduct Hindus. Altogether the position of the people is pitiable, and we can do very little to protect them or even to alleviate their sufferings.

2. Ibid.
3. See supra, p. 86.
7. See Chapter II. pp. 50-51.
8. E. Howell, Mizh, A Monograph on the Mahsuds., pp. 36-8; Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 31 January 1916, R.P.
In the first half of 1917, the Mahsuds raided Government pickets, garrisons and convoys, inflicting heavy losses.\(^1\) To restore the Government's prestige, the Chief Commissioner pressed for an immediate punitive expedition;\(^2\) and in June 1917, the tribe was subdued by the Waziristan Field Force, under the command of Major-General Beynon. On 10 August 1917, an agreement was concluded with a Mahsud *Jirga.*\(^3\) This ended the Mahsud affair to the great relief of the India Office: "The North-West Frontier of India", the political Secretary sanguinely commented, "is now free from trouble."\(^4\)

In November 1918 the War ended. Meanwhile, those who served the Government loyally during the War had been rewarded. A free bonus of one year's allowances was given to the Afridis.\(^5\) The Nawabs of Amb and Dir and the Mehtar of Chitral were paid handsomely. Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum had, in 1917, received a K.C.I.E., and in May 1918, he was appointed Political Agent in the Khyber. Finally, Roos-Keppel himself had, in 1917 earned a G.C.S.I. for his war services.

At the end of the War, the North-West Frontier appeared to Roos-Keppel to be settling down to a quieter and quieter state: there was, in his opinion, "no history" for the year 1918-19.\(^6\) On 10, January, 1919, he wrote to Maffey: "Everything on the Frontier is so extraordinarily peaceful that it is almost safe to prophesy a quiet summer."\(^7\) His optimism soon proved mistaken; as in May 1919, the Third Anglo-Afghan War broke out, once more setting the tribal belt aflame.

World War I was hardly over, when nationalists in Afghanistan urged the Amir "to take advantage of the world political situation to free Afghanistan from British tutelage and to champion the cause of the Pathans of the North-West Frontier Province, the Ottoman Empire. and pan-Islamism."\(^8\) Habibullah, consequently, wrote to the Viceroy on 2 February, 1919, seeking British cooperation "in obtaining international recognition of the absolute liberty, freedom of action, and perpetual independence of Afghanistan" at the Paris Peace Conference.\(^9\) The Amir

1. Roos-Keppel to Foreign Secy. Govt. of India, 7 May 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, *C.P.*, vol. III.
3. A full account of the Mahsud operations is given in a dispatch by A.A. Barrett, March-August 1917, *P.S.S.F.*, vol. 50, 1913, File No. 1364, Pt. 6; Viceroy to Secy. of State, 11 August 1917, *ibid*.
4. Note by Political Secretary, India Office, 16 August 1916, *ibid.*, Reg. No. 3265.
7. Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 10 January 1919, *C.P.*, vol. 22.
had yet to receive answer to his letter when he was assassinated on 20 February 1919 at Jalalabad. He had thus paid "with his life for his determination to observe his treaty obligations with the British and for his failure to heed the demands of the Afghans for full independence."¹

In the struggle for power, Amanullah Khan, the youngest son of the late Amir, emerged successful. At the very beginning, he was determined to obtain complete independence for his country. Informing the Viceroy of his accession, he proclaimed the independence of his country as well. The Viceroy took some time in replying; and his reply was evasive.² Then, in the first week of May 1919, hostilities broke out between the two countries.³ Who started the war is still a debatable issue. In furtherance of their cause, the Afghans made use of the nationalist sentiments in India where widespread disturbances were caused by the Rowlatt Bill, the Satyagraha movement and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. On 5 May 1919, Roos-Keppel reported:

The Afghan postmaster in Peshawar has been sending constant reports to the Amir to the effect that we have practically lost the Punjab, and are likely to lose the rest of India, and that here (Peshawar) the people are only waiting for a sign. He has also been told that the Germans have taken up arms once more and have inflicted a series of defeats upon us in Europe; also that Egypt has thrown off the British yoke. All this the Amir believes...⁴

After two days, he sent this report:

Kabul is covered with placards denouncing the tyranny of the Rowlatt Bill, and in Kabul all believe that in India prayers in temples and mosques are forbidden.⁵

In Peshawar, the situation gradually worsened. The Punjab agitation spread to Peshawar City and a few of its surrounding villages. The emissaries, from the Punjab, mainly Hindus, actively collaborated with the Afghan Postmaster to stir up trouble.⁶ The Postmaster Office became a centre of anti-British activity and propaganda. The plan was to synchronize a rising in the city with the first engagement between the Afghan and British troops at Landi Kotal and news of this was eagerly awaited at the Post Office. On 7 May Roos-Keppel reported that feelings were running high in Peshawar City; there was talk of a mob of 7,000 to 8,000 attacking the cantonment, the military stores, the Treasury, telegraph installations

1. Ibid., p. 226.
2. Ibid., p. 229.
5. Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, Tel. 7 May 1919, ibid.
and the Railway Station. Among intercepted Afghan mail were found "copies of a violently anti-British proclamation, with instructions to distribute them widely but discreetly in all cities among Muslims". On 8 May, Roos-Keppel took drastic action, and the city was cordoned off by British troops. The Afghan Postmaster from whose house Rs. 1,00,000 were unearthed, was arrested with all his principal associates, including Milap Singh, Abdul Jalil and Dr. Ghosh, who were regarded as the "most dangerous men of the Bolshevist Committee of Peshawar". They were later deported to Burma. On 9 May, Martial Law was proclaimed in the Peshawar District, and 500 regular troops were posted in Peshawar City. These moves cowed down the city, and the danger of large-scale disturbances passed off.

This development was not wholly to the liking of the Hindus, who took fright; as Roos-Keppel noted:

This Afghan threat has given the organizers of the Satyagraha movement food for thought. That movement, is, I am satisfied, Hindu in origin and the Hindus have least cause to desire an irruption of Afghans, who would undoubtedly skin them alive; not only the Hindus but the Mussalmans also are beginning to show signs of apprehension. The object of all in the recent movement in the Punjab and here was to get rid of us, but I am quite certain that they have no wish to change masters and become part of an Afghan Empire.

Again, he reported:

The Hindus here are now thoroughly scared (though none the less hostile) and, having done as much mischief as they can, are leaving in large numbers for the Punjab and elsewhere to get away before the storm bursts.

Although the Afghan War was soon over, it had disastrous effects in the tribal territory. It had been an axiom with Frontier officers having an intimate knowledge of the region that the Frontier tribes would rise at once in the event of an Afghan Amir declaring holy war against the British Government; and the Afghan plan of campaign was, in fact, based on that hope. Simultaneously with the outbreak of hostilities, a proclamation against the British, "couched in the most hostile terms", was distributed by Afghans in the tribal belt, summoning the tribes to take part

1. Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, Teles, 6, 7, 8 May 1919, C.P., vol. 22.
2. Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, Tel. 8 May 1919, ibid.
3. Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, Tel. 9 May 1919, ibid.
5. Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 5 May 1919, ibid.
7. "Diary of Events", 29 April to 4 August 1919, R.P.
in the Jihad,\(^1\) and distributing arms, ammunition, and money.\(^3\) The Khyber Rifles, lacking the support of regular troops, and fed on messages from anti-British elements in Peshawar, deserted in large numbers. On 18 May, 1919, the Government was obliged to disband the Khyber Rifles.\(^3\)

In Waziristan the situation was even worse. The Afghan General Nadir Khan (afterwards His Majesty Nadir Shah) advanced slowly from Khost towards the Indian border with Afghan regulars and tribal levies. The British decided, on 26 May, to evacuate the militia posts in Upper Tochi and on the Thal-Idak Line, and to concentrate troops in Miranshah. The evacuated posts were immediately occupied by Mahsuds and Waziris. Spinwan fell to the Afghans. The danger of an all-out Mahsud and Waziri attack having become imminent, the Political Agent of Wana ordered withdrawals from the Sarwakai and lower Gomal and the Wana and Upper Gomal posts.\(^4\) The Waziris and Afridis in the South and North Waziristan Militia then mutinied. Some 12,000 rifles and 70,00,000 rounds of ammunition fell into their hands, and Wana was occupied by Afghan troops. The whole of Waziristan was now up in arms. The tribesmen chased away the few British loyalists of the South Waziristan Militia across the Gomal to Baluchistan. Many desertions took place in the Zhob Militia too; and Fort Sandeman was attacked. The British Government thus lost the whole of Waziristan, except for the line along the Tochi Valley up to Miranshah, which was also seriously threatened.\(^5\)

The armistice with Afghanistan did not lead to a cessation of tribal troubles. Tribal incursions, which continued well into the early 1920s, involved no less than 611 raids in the settled districts of the Frontier Province. During these raids, 298 British subjects were killed, 392 wounded and 463 kidnapped. The loss of property was estimated at Rs. 30,00,000. Towards the end of 1919, the Government then undertook military operations against the Mahsuds, which lasted nearly four years. But in the end, the British re-established their control over Waziristan.\(^6\)

The Afghan War, and its impact on tribal territory, exposed the weakness of the existing tribal policy of the Government, and led it to formulate and adopt a new policy. The existing policy, as framed by

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2. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 22 May 1919, ibid.
Curzon, had the Militia system as one of its main features. This system broke down under the strain of the Afghan War, when the Afridis, Waziris, Sherwanis, Bhittanis and Orakzais, who composed the Khyber Rifles, and the North and South Waziristan Militia proved what the British called their "treachery and unreliability". But then, not foreseeing this was the Government's own fault. As Roos-Keppel pointed out, "the Militia system grew up as a cheap expedient to relieve regular troops from irksome and arduous duties in a country where service is unpopular."\(^1\)

The Militia outposts were located far off in tribal areas, and miles of hostile and dangerous country separated them from the nearest posts of regular troops. In such circumstances, and particularly when there were no regular troops to support them during the Afghan War, the Militia men could hardly have been expected to remain loyal to the British Government in face of the cry of \textit{jihad} in Afghanistan and of the aggravated anti-British feelings in tribal territory.\(^2\)

Besides, as Roos-Keppel, with his quarter of a century's experience in the Frontier, pointed out in August 1919, the existing tribal policy had three other defects. First, it provided no real security to the people of the settled districts against recurrent tribal raids, which the Government only dealt with through a policy of "patched up peace or truce". There was no compensation for the loss people suffered, nor any effective provision to guard against similar raids in the future. Second, \(^1\) :policy also proved a failure with regard to Afghanistan, since it provided no defence against recurrent Afghan intrigues with the tribes on the British side of the border. Third, the Government's policy of non-interference with the tribes, as Roos-Keppel realized, had gone too far to remain in step with its objectives. Indeed, according to Roos-Keppel, the way this policy was implemented also exhibited a lack of responsibility and duty towards the tribesmen. The same policy, he said, had been seen in action towards the Zulus of South Africa with similar consequences. To illustrate his point, Roos-Keppel cited Sir Bartle Frere's letter to Gladstone, in which Frere had drawn attention to the dangers of British Zulu policy. "The true causes of the Zulu, as of the Afghan War", Frere wrote, are neglect of neighbourly duties and responsibilities incumbent on a rich, civilized and powerful nation towards poor barbarous tribes on its borders. We have allowed a noble people, capable of rapid and permanent advancement in civilization, to grow in numbers, whilst they

\(^{1}\) Roos-Keppel to Private Secy. to Viceroy, 21 August 1919, \textit{C.P.}, vol. 23.
festered in barbarism, till they became a serious danger to us. We have shut our eyes and turned our backs on their wants and defects, left them as much as possible to themselves, endeavoured to see and know as little of them and to let them see and know as little of us as possible, and then we are surprised to find that they have grown into a danger only to be averted by war.¹

Roos-Keppel then sketched out a new Frontier policy, the aim of which, he contended, should be to
civilize the Frontier tribes up to the Durand Line, first by crushing their fighting power and disarming them, and then by making roads throughout their countries and establishing and maintaining order, which would be welcomed by a large percentage who are tired of the anarchy which prevails in tribal territory.⁶

He would not, he said, start “immediately and without provocation”, a general crusade against all the Frontier tribes; that would be both expensive and inexpedient. Nevertheless, he urged that, as a start for this new policy, now that the Afghan War had ended, an expedition should immediately be launched, at least against the Mahsuds. Subsequently, whenever any tribe arose, similar expeditions should follow with the ultimate object of “civilizing” the tribe. “By this policy and by this alone”, he urged, could the British “secure immunity from further trouble and expense on the Frontier and at the same time discharge” their “obligations to the people who live under our control and to the tribes for whom we are responsible”.³

This policy, called the “Modified Forward Policy”, was adopted by the Government after the Waziristan campaign in 1919-23.⁴ Its main features were to ensure British control of Waziristan through a road system and to maintain some 4,600 Khassadars and about 5,000 troops at Wana and Razmak.⁵ These Khassadars were tribesmen, mainly trans-border, employed for watch and ward on and across the border. They patrolled and picketed roads, furnished escorts and intercepted raiders. They fed, clothed, housed and armed themselves on a monthly Government salary which, in 1922, amounted to between Rs. 20 and 30. As Denys

1. The Zulu War in 1878-79 coincided with the Second Afghan War. Sir Bartle Frere was the Governor of Cape Colony in 1877-80. In defence of his policy towards the Zulus and in refutation of Gladstone’s charges against his policy, Frere wrote a series of letters to Gladstone, which were published in 1881 under the heading, Afghanistan and South Africa, a Letter to the Right Honourable W.E. Gladstone regarding Portions of his Midlothian Speeches. Frere was Governor of Bombay in 1862-67, whereafter he became a Member of the Council of India.

2. See Chapter II.


Bray, the Secretary to the Foreign Department, maintained, this was “a forward policy in a very real sense of the word”. He also felt that it was a policy of progress... a big step forward on the long and laborious road towards the pacification through civilization of the most backward and inaccessible and, therefore, the most truculent and aggressive tribes on our border.1

The Government was determined, as Bray stated, that “come what may, civilization must be made to penetrate” the hills of Waziristan, and this object had to be achieved through the development of communications in the region.2 Although the policy was originally adopted in Waziristan, it was gradually extended to the whole of the Frontier from the Gomal River in the south to the Malakand Pass in the north—and continued in operation until 1947.

There were three main considerations behind the British Government's construction of strategic railways and roads in the Frontier regions. First, the steady advance of Russia in Central Asia since the 1860s; second, the uneasy relations between the Governments of India and Afghanistan, especially in the last decade of the nineteenth century; third, the disturbed situation in the tribal territory.

The Russian conquests of Central Asian territories had invariably been consolidated by the construction of a network of railways. The Central Asian or the Trans-Caspian line reached Kizil Arvat in 1881, and was extended to Askabad in 1885, and to Merv in 1886. From Merv, the line was carried to Samarkand in 1888 and linked with Tashkent and Andijan in 1899. Another line was extended to Kushk on the Russo-Afghan border in 1900. In the same year, the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent line began and was completed in September 1904.1

The Russian advances in Central Asia alarmed the British Government; and the fear of Russian aggression in India prompted them to strengthen Afghanistan as a buffer state. But the relations between the Government of India and of Afghanistan "were never thoroughly satisfactory". Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan (1880-1901) was, in the British estimate "at times a troublesome neighbour." After his death, there was fear of a bloody struggle for succession, with consequent risks of political instability at Kabul and further deterioration in Anglo-Afghan relations.

The attitude of Frontier tribes, as already seen, was hostile; and the British considered it necessary to gain greater control over them—one means of doing this being to construct roads and railways for the quick movement of troops into the tribal territory.

It was during and after the Second Afghan War (1878-80) that the British made determined efforts to improve their lines of communication in the Frontier. In anticipation of a Russian thrust towards Afghanistan, the British were anxious to occupy the approaches to the Afghan cities of Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. These cities guarded approaches to the main passes leading from Central Asia to India, and hence had great strategic importance. The Government of India concentrated their efforts on constructing railways in two main directions: to the south towards the Bolan Pass, and to the north towards Khyber and Kurram. Lord Roberts, when Commander-in-Chief in India (1885-93), was an ardent exponent of Frontier roads and railways. He wanted to "push on" with their construction with "all possible speed"; he urged:

we must have roads, and we must have railways; they cannot be made on short notice, and every rupee spent upon them now will repay us tenfold hereafter. Nothing will tend to secure the safety of the Frontier so much as the power of rapidly concentrating troops on any threatened point, and nothing will strengthen our military position more than to open out the country and improve our relations with the Frontier tribes. There are no better civilizers than roads and railways; and although some of those recommended to be made may never be required for military purposes, they will be of the greatest assistance to the civil power in the administration of the country.

Russian & British Indian Railways Towards Afghanistan's Frontiers.
In May 1880, the Government of India completed the first strategic railway from Ruk to Sibi, and extended it to Quetta in 1887. Five years later, it reached Chaman on the Afghan boundary. Abdur Rahman strongly disliked it, regarding it as a "Knife in his vitals." On the northern side, a railway was extended from Jhelum to Rawalpindi in October 1880. Two lines forked from this terminus: one to Khushalgarh, which was completed in 1881, the other to Peshawar, completed in 1883. But by 1889 there were still only 44 miles of railway in the Frontier districts of the Punjab.

The railway system was supplemented by several important roads, not only in settled districts, but in tribal territory as well. The Grand-Trunk road was constructed in 1863-64, parallel to the railway from Attock to Peshawar. In the 1890s, the construction of the North-West Frontier Road (234 miles) began, connecting the headquarters of the four trans-Indus districts of the Punjab: Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. This road, while passing through the Kohat Pass, linking Kohat and Peshawar, was not metalled. Another road connected Khushalgarh, the railway terminus from Rawalpindi, with Kohat and Thal.

From Thal a rough country road, 57 miles long, which ran through the Kurram Valley to Parachinar, was improved. From Parachinar, a trade route followed over the Peiwar and Shutargardan Passes to Kabul. Another road from Dera Ismail Khan to Murtaza, via Tank, was metalled. In 1897-98 Bannu was linked with the Tochi Valley by a metalled road passing through Miranshah to Datta Khel. A metalled road from Dargai, in lower Swat, was also built up the Swat Valley to Chakdara. From Chakdara an unmetalled road was carried through Upper Swat and Dir, and on to the top of the Lawari Pass and Chitral. Abbottabad, the headquarters of Hazara, was linked with Hassan Abdal, which was 8 miles from the boundary of the Hari pur Plain, by a metalled road, 44 miles long. By 1900-01 there were 448 miles of metalled roads in the Frontier districts of the Punjab.

The development of communications formed one of the main principles of Curzon's Frontier policy, his object being to concentrate troops

3. The road was 96 miles long.
4. The road was 60 miles long.
5. The road was 64 miles long.
6. From Dargai to the Lawari Pass the distance is 118 miles.
rapidly at any threatened point to reinforce tribal Militia, to inspire the Militia men with "greater confidence in themselves", and to give them "security in their loyalty" to the Government.1 "Half these Frontier questions of forts, cantonments and moveable columns", Curzon pointed out to Hamilton, would be solved if only the Government would construct railways. Railways were expected to give an impetus to trade as well, which in its turn would, Curzon added, bring prosperity to the Frontier tracts and foster peace and good understanding between the Government and the local people.2

In January 1901, a narrow-gauge railway was built from Nowshera to Dargai—about 40 miles—to strengthen the British position at Malakand. Another, a 33-mile line, was constructed from Khushalgarh to Kohat in May 1902, and about a year later extended to Thal. In January 1908, the Khushalgarh-Kohat section was converted to broad-gauge railway, with a bridge over the Indus at Khushalgarh.

Alongside railways, some roads were also constructed, the most important of them being the Kohat Pass Road, the Murtaza-Wana Road and the Thal-Parachinar Road. In April 1899, Curzon took up the project of improving the road between Peshawar and Kohat through the Kohat Pass; this improvement, he believed, would repair a serious break in Frontier communications.3 The Government of India asked the Punjab Government to assure the Kohat Pass Afridis that the project would involve no change in the Government's existing relations with the tribe, nor any interference in its internal affairs. The tribesmen would be given work on the road, if they wanted it; and their allowances would be moderately increased, if they assisted in the execution of the project. But, if not, the Government would take all necessary measures for both the construction and maintenance of the road.4 In order to buy off the tribesmen, who "generation after generation had evaded their engagements, the Punjab Government proposed a large increase in their subsidy.5 In the beginning, Curzon was not enthusiastic;6 but in September 1899, he accepted the recommendations of the Punjab Government.

3. In 1849 the British Government entered into an agreement with the Kohat Pass Afridis by which the latter undertook to keep open communication through the Pass after being assured of an annual payment of Rs. 5,700. The Afridis, however, honoured the agreement more in the breach than in the observance. Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 31-2. Also see Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, vol. I, pp. 344-6.
4. Govt. of India to Govt. of Punjab, 16 April 1899, enclosed in Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 21 September 1899, P.S.L.I., vol. 116, Reg. No. 929.
5. Govt. of Punjab to Govt. of India, 1 June 1899, ibid.
6. Govt. of India to Govt. of Punjab, 20 June 1899, ibid.
Pass Afridis agreed to let the Government construct a metalled road through the Pass on condition that the tribal subsidy would be increased by Rs. 3,000; Rs. 2,500 would be given to deserving Maliks; reasonable compensation would be paid individually to owners of cultivated land through which the road would pass; and the tribe would be consulted if the Government desired to construct railway and telegraph lines through the Pass.\footnote{Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Dane, Tel. 5 September 1899, Govt. of Punjab to Govt. of India, 12 October 1899, \textit{ibid}; Aitchison, \textit{op.cit.},p. 107.} Within two years, the road was completed, and thus Curzon was able to wipe out what he considered a standing disgrace to the British prestige in the area.\footnote{Curzon to Hamilton, 27 September 1899, \textit{C.C.} vol. 158.}

Having achieved the object which in Curzon’s words had taken “exactly half a century to realize”, the Government of India entered into agreements with the Waziris in North Waziristan to open and safeguard the routes passing through their territory.\footnote{Deane to Secy., Govt. of India 10 April 1904, \textit{I.F.F.P.}, vol. 6884, June 1904, Proc. Nos. 115-7; Aitchison, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 141-9.} In 1903, the construction of a 64-mile road from Murtaza to Wana, through Kajuri Kach in South Waziristan, was undertaken and completed in 1906. This road passed along the Gomal River Valley, through which lay an ancient trade route from Afghanistan to India. Every year hundreds of well-armed Powindahs passed through this route.\footnote{Summary of Curzon’s Administration, Foreign Department, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, C.C., vol. 526, p. 43. \textit{I.F.F.P.}, vol. 6884, February 1904, Proc. Nos. 119-22; May 1904, Proc. Nos. 17-8.} In 1904-05, the Government of India improved the Kurram Valley Road from Thal to Parachinar—a distance of 54 miles. The improvement was undertaken mainly on “military grounds”, the Government’s object being to keep the road in a thoroughly efficient condition, fit for wheeled traffic throughout the year. However, for financial reasons, the road could not be metalled.

It was in the Khyber that the most important communication projects were undertaken, Curzon’s policy being to confirm the Government’s hold on this strategically important Pass and to secure it, not only against any external threat, but also against the everpresent troubles from the Afridis. Within two months of his taking over as the Viceroy of India, Curzon considered the feasibility of constructing a railway through the Khyber Pass with the object of linking Peshawar with Jalalabad, and later with Kabul. A railway through the Khyber was not Curzon’s brain child. His predecessor, Elgin, had, in June 1898, proposed a narrow-gauge railway from Peshawar to Landi Kotal up the Khyber; and the Home

\footnote{Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 17 May 1904, Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 8 July 1904, \textit{I.F.F.P.}, vol. 7125, February 1905, Proc. Nos. 16-8.}
Government had approved the project, which, however, could not be taken up on account of Elgin's departure shortly thereafter. Curzon took up the issue where Elgin had left it.\(^1\) Technical and political difficulties in putting the project through engaged the attention of the Government for several years.

There were two possible routes for a railway from Peshawar into Afghanistan: the Khyber Pass route, and the Kabul River Valley route. Several objections were raised to the Khyber Pass route. The high and rocky terrain involved great engineering difficulties and consequent expense, as a result of which the railway would have had to be a narrow-gauge line. But this would not have adequately served the purpose of moving large bodies of troops in times of emergency. Expensive to build and difficult to maintain, the railway would have aroused Afridi opposition and the Government would have been constantly involved in ensuring the safety of the line. Curzon was, therefore, totally averse to "placing too valuable a hostage" in the hands of the Afriedis. Further, the Government feared that the railway might produce a "widely diffused apprehension" in other tribes that, through the construction of the railways, the British wanted to suppress the independence of the tribes. Accordingly, none of the members of Curzon's Council, except Edwin Collen, thought that the railway would be profitable enough "to justify the constant expense which its maintenance must involve".\(^2\)

The second route was through the Kabul River Valley, which had been surveyed by Captain J.R.L. Macdonald in 1890-91 under the orders of Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief. Macdonald had reported that a broad-gauge line could be constructed from Peshawar to Dakka along the southern bank of the Kabul River. The route presented no great engineering problems, and the temper of the neighbouring tribes—so Curzon expected—was such as to make the line less exposed to attacks than if it were built through the Khyber. In the circumstances, the Kabul River Valley route commended itself to Curzon and his colleagues, who, from a political point of view, regarded it as "the permanent line of advance" from British India into Afghanistan.\(^3\)

But it was one thing to draw up the project on paper and quite another to implement it. Curzon had no doubt that the project would ultimately embroil the Government in hostility with the Amir. Therefore, in February 1899, he had taken steps to invite the Amir's views. Abdur

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1. Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 20 July 1899, *P.S.L.I.*, vol. 115, Reg. No. 775A.
Rahman had no objection to the construction of railways through British territory; but he was determined not to allow any railway to pass through Afghan territory "to the extent of even a single span". To be of any positive military value at all, the line had to be carried on to Dakka or Jalalabad, both of which were situated in the Afghan sector. This could be done either through British occupation of the two places—an impolitic course—or by improving relations with Abdur Rahman, or, in the event of his death, with his successor. Curzon and three members of his Council—Colleen, C.E. Dawkins and T. Raleigh—were extremely uncertain about the "political future of Afghanistan and of the part we [British] shall play in it"; and therefore they considered it "unwise at present to spend money on so large and costly an experiment" as the project involved. The line could not even be carried on to Shinpokh and Smatzai because they were on the still undemarcated section of the Indo-Afghan boundary. Besides, neither place was deemed suitable for a railway terminus; and Curzon also pointed out that "if we ran the line to either and went no further, we should be caught in a cul de sac", which would be politically unwise. Finally, a railway extended to Smatzai or Shinpokh only would have been of no commercial value, because the Amir would never have permitted his people to use it. In such circumstances, Curzon wanted to postpone the project, particularly since there were "many other pressing demands" on Government finance.

But the Commander-in-Chief, General W.S. Lockhart, and two members of the Council, S. Rivaz and R. Gardiner, took the opposite view: the line must be built at once at least up to Smatzai or Shinpokh. They were influenced "more particularly by a sense of the great military value" of the line that, in the event of an emergency, would enable the Government to land men and material within a comparatively short distance of Jalalabad and, if necessary, occupy it. They strongly held that if the railway were built at least up to the border during the existing peace time, the Government would not only construct it at half the cost which would be necessary if it were made in a hurry in time of war, but they would also, when the emergency arose, have gained practically a start of two years in the matter of railway construction towards Afghanistan.

3. Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 20 July 1899, P.S.L.I., vol. 115, Reg. No. 775A.
4. Ibid.
Pending the settlement of the issue, Curzon, impressed by the "positive military value" of a railway, both for the suppression of tribal uprisings and for an advance into Afghanistan, recommended the construction of a 12-mile broad-gauge railway from Peshawar to Jamrud. He stressed the "commercial utility" of the line as well as the fact that it would cost no more than Rs. 5 to 6 lakhs. In August 1899, Hamilton sanctioned the scheme, expressing his agreement with Curzon and the majority of his colleagues in the Council about the inexpediency of commencing the construction of the Kabul River line.

While the construction was in progress, the Government, in May 1900, noticed increasing signs of unrest among the Afridis, whom the Amir's officials were persuading to obstruct the work. The position seemed intolerable to Curzon, who directed Roos-Keppel to remind the Afridis of their agreement of 1898, whereby they had accepted the British right of making railways in the Khyber. At the same time, they were warned to keep themselves off the railway, which lay entirely within British territory, or else they would be severely dealt with. The threat worked: the Afridi opposition "fizzled out", and the line was opened in January 1901. A daily train service was introduced in October 1901.

In July 1901, the Government of India appointed a Light Military Railway Commission to report on the best possible route for a railway from Peshawar to Afghanistan. In its preliminary report of 18 September 1902, the Commission recommended the construction of a narrow-gauge railway from Peshawar to Dakka via Warsak. The line, it recommended, should be laid along the Kabul River up to the point where the River met the Kam Shilman Valley. From that point, the railway should be taken to Dakka via the Loi Shilman Valley, this route being considered "the easiest and quickest". The section from Peshawar to the point where the Kabul River met the Kam Shilman Valley, as pointed out earlier, had already been surveyed by Colonel Macdonald in 1890-91. The other section, between Kam Shilman and Dakka needed reconnaissance and survey. Accordingly, in September 1902, a team of four members, with Colonel W.R.L. Macdonald as the Chairman, was sent for the reconnaiss-

1. Ibid.
2. Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 30 August 1899, Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 1 September 1899, P.S.L.I., vol. 115, Reg. No. 577-B.
5. Curzon to A. Godley, 4 July 1900, ibid.
6. Summary of Curzon’s Administration, Foreign Department, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, p. 64, C.C., vol. 526.
It submitted its report on 5 November 1902, examining the existing means of communication between Peshawar and Dakka and proposing their improvement and development. The report pointed out that there were three routes of advance from Peshawar to Dakka; first, the unmetalled Khyber road connecting Jamrud and Landi Khana—a distance of 24 miles. From Landi Khana to Dakka—10 miles—the road was merely a nulla bed. The second route was the old kafila route, a very rough mule-track passing through the Mullagori territory to the east of the Khyber. The third route crossed the Kabul River, which was navigable from Warsak to Dakka. All the three routes, the Macdonald Committee pointed out, were “lamentably defective”, and were utterly insufficient for the movement of a large body of troops. The Committee, therefore, urged the absolute necessity of improving roads and constructing railways in the Khyber area. It recommended that a railway be built along the Kabul River from Peshawar to the Indo-Afghan border, the line proceeding via Warsak to the point where the Kabul River met the Loi Shilman Valley, thence cutting across the hills on the side of the Loi Shilman Gorge to Multan Killa, and finally, going up the open valley to the summit of the Shilman-Ghakhe Pass, which was close to the Durand Line. From Peshawar to the Shilman-Ghakhe Pass the distance was about 39 miles.

On the political aspect of the project, Roos-Keppel pointed out that the development of communication through the Khyber Pass would be “distasteful” to the Afridis, who “hate the idea of a railway through their limits”, and to the Amir who wielded considerable influence over the Western Mohmands north of the Kabul River, and who maintained close and constant touch with the Afridis.

In the circumstances, Curzon, after considering the report of the Committee, decided to postpone the construction of the railway until relations with Habibullah, the new Amir, improved. The Viceroy then took up another project: a military road in the Khyber linking Landi Kotal with Peshawar—a distance of 42 miles—which could pass through the territories of the Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris, who were all friendly to the Government. Such a road had been recommended by

1. Col. W. R. L. Macdonald, Roos-Keppel, Major Walton and Major N. Dundee were the members. Ibid.
3. “Memorandum on Political Questions connected with the Proposals of Colonel Macdonald’s Committee,” by Roos-Keppel, 5 November 1902, Ibid.
5. Summary of Curzon’s Administration, op.cit., p. 65.
Warburton in 1887, and the necessary survey had been conducted by Captain Macdonald in 1888-89, whereafter construction had commenced. But the work had soon been abandoned because of Robert’s preference for a railway along the Kabul River Valley.1

In 1900-01, Roos-Keppel also had strongly proposed the construction of a road through Mullagori territory. Afghan opposition and Afridi resentment were, of course, anticipated; but Roos-Keppel believed that the local friendly tribes, if promised increased allowances and trade facilities with Peshawar, were unlikely to be influenced by Afghan or Afridi incitement. Roos-Keppel had suggested that construction work should be undertaken in cold weather when Afridis migrated to the Peshawar Plain with their families, thus enabling the Government to hold them as sureties. Deane went a step further, contending that the road must be built even at the risk of tribal troubles.2

The idea appealed to Curzon: the Mullagori road would provide an alternative to the Khyber Pass route, and would enable the Government to reinforce its position at Landi Kotal and, if necessary, move troops against the Afridis. Thus, as Curzon explained to Hamilton, instead of all our eggs being in one basket, as they now are with the present Khyber route, and the Afridis being practically able to dictate terms to us in the event of a Frontier campaign, we shall have them completely in our hands, by our ability to leave the Khyber Pass severely alone, and shall have permanent guarantee for their good behaviour.3 Curzon did not take the Afridi opposition to the Mullagori road very seriously: the tribe might just “fret and fume”. Nor did he expect “any sort of protest” from the Amir because the road would be on the British side of the Durand Line. He therefore appealed to Hamilton to accord immediate sanction to the proposed project.4 The Secretary of State, while agreeing with Curzon about the usefulness of the road, advised caution. At this time the South African War lay heavy on the British, and the Home Government was particularly averse to a road-building venture that might precipitate tribal trouble requiring military action. Moreover, the Frontier Province was then being formed; and any disturbance on the border, so Hamilton warned Curzon, would encourage the Punjab Government to intensify its opposition to the creation of the new Province.

2. Secy., Govt. of India to Roos-Keppel, 4 May 1901, Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 5 May 1901, Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 13 May 1901, P.S.L.I., Vol. 113, Reg. No. 673.
4. Curzon to Hamilton, 10 July 1901, ibid.
Prudence, therefore, dictated that it would be better to postpone the project.1

It was after the establishment of the Frontier Province that, in October 1902, Hamilton telegraphically authorized the offended Viceroy to start the construction of the Mullagori Road.2 Curzon, with his usual zeal, within ten days of the receipt of the Secretary of State's telegram, put Major Dundee in charge of the work with instructions to carry out the project without any delay. Small contracts for different sections of the road were given to friendly tribes through whose territory it passed.3 The road, which was metallised, was completed in the beginning of 1905 at a cost of Rs. 404,000 and without any tribal opposition. For their good behaviour during the construction of the road, the Mullagoris, Shinwaris and Shilmanis were rewarded with an increase in their allowances.4

The successful completion of the Mullagori Road encouraged Curzon to improve the existing means of communication between Peshawar and Landi Khana through the Khyber Pass. The main road through the Pass was commonly known as the North Khyber Road, which was unmetalled. In addition, there was a track, running close and parallel to the North Khyber Road and sometimes used by Kafilas, which was known as the South Khyber Road. The Government wanted to widen and metal the North Khyber Road and improve the South Khyber Road. The two operations together were referred to as the “doubling” or “duplication” of the Khyber Pass Road.6 Major Dundee, with his recent experience of the construction of the Mullagori Road, was put in charge of the new project and the same method of construction was followed. First, contracts were given to the friendly Shinwaris of Loargai for the section from Landi Kotal to Landi Khana. The progress having proved “extraordinary”, contracts were next given to the Malik Khel and Malikdin Khel Afridis for the section from Jamrud to Gurgurra, which lay 3 miles beyond Ali Masjid. The contractors had to contend with “every kind of pressure direct and indirect” by other Afridi clans who were influenced by Afghan mullas. There were cases of firing on the road builders’ camps, necessitating the reinforcement of the Khyber Rifles

3. Secy., Govt. of India, to Deane, 28 October 1902, Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 15 November 1902, ibid., vol. 145, Reg. No. 1546.
between Jamrud and Ali Masjid. Patrols were organized and armed and chowkidars posted. At the end of December 1905, Habibullah protested against the construction of the road when it approached Landi Khana, contending that, as the Indo-Afghan boundary near Landi Khana was still undemarcated, the British should desist from their activity. But the Government of India ignored the Amir's protest. By the middle of 1907, the North Khyber Road had been metalled to a width of 12 feet, and the South Khyber Road, though unmetalled, had been considerably improved. Six years later further improvements were made in both the roads. In 1910, two motor cars of the Amir passed through the Khyber Road to Peshawar—an event which, in the Government's opinion, “deserved to be placed on record as a land-mark in the history of the road”.

Roads in the Khyber were no doubt an achievement for the Government; but, from the military point of view, they were not enough—particularly in Kitchener's eyes. The Commander-in-Chief would have railways, too; and shortly after his assumption of office, he pressed for the implementation of the Kabul River railway project which Curzon had earlier put off. Until he left India in 1909, Kitchener did not cease urging the Government to construct the railway, which he looked upon as an essential military requirement. In March 1903, Kitchener visited the Loi Shilman Valley with a view to “thoroughly looking” into the project. He returned convinced of the feasibility and urgency of constructing a broad-gauge railway from Peshawar to Smatzai through Warsak, the Loi Shilman Valley and the Shilman-Ghakhe Pass. Curzon, however, was reluctant to take up the project because the Indo-Afghan boundary in this sector had not been demarcated yet.

In London, the Committee of Imperial Defence discussed the issue in several meetings. The Prime Minister, A.J. Balfour, was “fairly puzzled” by the difficulties, both political and technical, of the project. Roberts, now the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army and a member of the Committee, repeatedly urged the imperative necessity of “keeping Russia where she is as long as possible” and “endeavouring by every means in our power to extend our railway system, so that when the time comes we

5. See above, p. 114.
7. See Chapter II, p. 68.
may be able to meet the Russians with a sufficiently large army”. In March 1904, in a private telegram to Curzon, Brodrick, the new Secretary of State, apprised the Viceroy of the Defence Committee’s anxiety regarding the Amir’s consistent opposition to the British railway project in the Khyber region.

This, together with Kitchener’s insistence, led Curzon, in April 1904, to agree to the undertaking of a survey of the Loi Shilman route. A preliminary reconnaissance of the route was undertaken in July-August 1904, when Ampthill was the Acting Viceroy. Brodrick, while approving the survey operation, reminded Ampthill that, not merely strategic factors, but the British Government’s general political relations with the Amir should be carefully considered before the construction of the railway was started.

In December 1904, Captain Hopkins of the Royal Engineers submitted a report of the survey of the Loi Shilman route. Hopkins maintained that a railway from Peshawar to the Indo-Afghan border through the Loi Shilman Valley and the Shilman-Ghakhe Pass would, for various reasons, be less suitable than one along the south bank of the Kabul River, which route Captain Macdonald had already surveyed in 1890-91. The Loi Shilman route would be more expensive than the valley route, as it presented greater engineering difficulties. Whereas a railway through the valley could be a broad-gauge line and would take two and a half years to complete, that through the Loi Shilman route would have to be a narrow-gauge line which could not be completed in less than three and a quarter years. This also meant that the former would have a larger hauling capacity, along a route that, in any case, had greater commercial prospects. Dundee also favoured the valley route, and so did Deane.

Louis Dane’s mission to Kabul offered the Government of India an opportunity to raise the Kabul River railway issue with the Amir. Dane was instructed to persuade the Amir to agree to a rail-head at Loi Dakka or Kam Dakka. Dane raised the matter with the Amir several times;

2. Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 28 March 1904, Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel 30 March 1904, C.C., vol. 174.
3. Summary of Curzon’s Administration, op.cit.,p. 65.
5. Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 23 September 1904, ibid.
7. W.H.J. Dundee to Commanding Royal Engineer, N.W.F.P., 9 December 1904, Deane to Secy. Govt. of India, 17 December 1904, ibid.
but only succeeded in getting him to say that while the British Government could of course build railways on their side of the demarcated section of the Indo-Afghan boundary, they must keep off the undemarcated section of the boundary. The Amir's attitude was clear enough from his remark that "Your Khyber railway is a spear pointed at my heart."

Meanwhile, the Imperial Defence Committee in London was anxiously awaiting the decision of the Government of India on the Kabul River railway project; and on 17 April 1905, Brodrick telegraphed Curzon, voicing this anxiety. Curzon was at first against the Loi Shilman route, but ultimately yielded to Kitchener, who wanted this route and no other. Brodrick was informed, on 9 June 1905, that a railway would be built up to the Shilman-Ghakke Pass, but that its extension towards Dakka would have to wait until the Amir's attitude became favourable. The cost of the railway was estimated at Rs. 15,100,000.

When the Imperial Defence Committee expressed its preference for the River route, Brodrick then pointed out that the first 25 miles—Peshawar to Haidar Khan—were common to both the routes, and that the Government of India should, therefore, be allowed to commence the construction of this section of the line, pending a decision on the route the line should take from Haidar Khan onwards. Brodrick's suggestion was accepted by the Committee, and the Government of India was instructed accordingly. The Government of India was further asked to review its decision to take the line through the Loi Shilman route, and to give the Secretary of State a more detailed report on the relative merits of the two alternative routes.

The construction of the line up to Haidar Khan duly started. And since it was exposed to attacks by the Afridis on the right bank of the Kabul River and by the Mohmands on the left bank, the Government

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3. Minute of the 68th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Indian Frontier Railways, 29 March 1905, C.I.D.P., Cab. 38/8, No. 209; Sery. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 17 April 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 2857.
4. Curzon preferred the valley route.
7. Minute of the 74th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the "Peshawar-Dakka Railway Extension", 6 July 1905, C.I.D.P., Cab. 38/9, No. 54; Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 11 July 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1086b.
8. "The Peshawar-Dakka Railway Extension", a note by Sir George Clarke (Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence), 11 July 1905, C.I.D.P., Cab. 38/9, Nos. 59-60; Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 21 July 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1086b.
decided to strengthen the Khyber Rifles to guard the line with the help of friendly Mullagoris, Shilmanis, Shinwaris, and some Mohmands from the "assured clans", employed as escort parties.2

In November 1905, Minto took over from Curzon. Unlike his predecessor, the new Viceroy was at first not enthusiastic about pushing railways on to the Afghan frontier. Regarding the Kabul River railway, the Viceroy's personal opinion was that, no matter what route the railway took after Haidar Khan had been reached, it would be "intensely unpopular" with the Frontier tribes, as well as with the Amir, and therefore, the project had better be abandoned. Minto explained:

To my mind it is of immense importance to us to keep on good terms with the Amir and to encourage him to trust us; and the advance of our railways will, I am afraid, militate against our influence with him. Again, as to the Frontier tribes, everything points to an inflammable state of affairs, and the advance of the railway may lead to a blaze—and a Frontier war on a big scale would be a harder nut to crack than it has ever been before, owing to the better arms and the large supply now in possession of the tribes.4

Besides, the Viceroy thought that general Anglo-Russian political relations were showing signs of improvement, and that the negotiations which were afoot in London and St. Petersburgh promised a relaxation of the century-old tension between the two Powers, leading to a composition of their differences. In such circumstances, Russian pressure on the Frontier would probably diminish to the point of relieving the Government of India from the need to undertake expensive railway projects. Minto, therefore, questioned the value of extending the projected railway beyond Haidar Khan, believing that the recently improved Khyber roads were sufficient for military purposes.4

When consulted, Kitchener, again very strongly advocated constructing railways in the Frontier and carrying them to the Afghan border. Presenting a comparative survey of railway construction in Central Asia by Russia and in the Frontier by Britain, Kitchener sought to establish that "the menacing of Afghanistan, Persia and India" was the "ultimate view" of the Russians. The Merv-Kushk Line, built in 1900, had brought Russia within about 70 miles of Herat, posing a threat to the Kandahar Line, while the completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent Line, in September

1. See Chapter II, p. 69.
2. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 5 August 1905; Secy. of State to Viceroy, 24 August 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1233; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 4 January 1906; Secy. of State to Government of India, 16 March 1906, ibid., Reg. No. 264.
3. Minto to Kitchener, 19 May 1906, Minto Papers, M 978.
4. Ibid.
1904, was an equally great danger to the Oxus-Kabul Line. These railways, Kitchener felt, had completely changed the strategic conditions affecting the defence of India. Kitchener, warned that the Government of India “must on no account allow” the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar Line to be menaced by Russia, and that preparations for the defence of India should take this paramount factor into consideration. The construction of the projected Loi Shilman railway, Kitchener pointed out, was only a modest British attempt to restore the military balance disturbed by the latest Russian railways in Central Asia. The railway would meet the Russian danger on the “Kabul flank of the strategic front”; it was not “only an essential measure of precaution” on this flank, but also one whose abandonment or postponement, at the present moment, would oblige the British to recast their entire defensive preparations. Kitchener, therefore, urged that the project be implemented irrespective of what turn international politics took. He warned:

Any power dominating Afghanistan at Kabul, and attracting to her side the tribes on our Frontier, would constitute so serious a menace to our Empire that I consider that, no matter how peaceful the immediate aspect of the international horizon may appear, we should lose neither time nor chance now, in time of peace, and with money available, to take the simple and obvious measures which alone can avert so dangerous a state of affairs.¹

Kitchener regarded the Loi Shilman railway as not only of “the greatest value in the critical phases”, but probably “a saving factor” in a war involving Afghanistan. Kitchener added that Roberts, with his unrivalled knowledge of the Frontier and its military requirements, had been pressing him for the immediate construction of a railway from Peshawar to the Afghan border. Its abandonment would leave the British “impotent” in regard either to defence of the Amir against Russia or “even to coerce him ourselves”, if necessary. The Amir, already hard to manage, would become harder still, while the tribesmen would regard the abandonment as an “exhibition of extraordinary weakness” on the part of the British Government. The railway projects of the Government in the Frontier, Kitchener held, provided “the shortest, safest and most economical” means of securing British control of the border; they constituted “the best guarantee of continued peace on the frontier” by enabling the Government “to dominate... the most formidable and important section of the whole border-land”, and at the same time providing the tribesmen with “those

increased facilities for trade which have hitherto invariably proved a great civilizing factor amongst the Pathans”.

As for the route which the railway should take from Haidar Khan onwards, although Kitchener admitted that the river route would pose fewer engineering difficulties, he stuck to his preference for the Loi Shilman route because it passed through the friendly Shilman country and hence carried less risk of political trouble.¹

Minto also asked Deane about the effect of abandoning the Kabul River railway project on the Amir and the tribesmen.² The Chief Commissioner, like Kitchener, considered that this would be a political mistake: the tribesmen would take it as a manifestation of the Government’s weakness, and those engaged in the construction and protection of the Line would lose confidence in the Government. Deane also pointed out that the Amir would not object if he were assured that the railway would be extended only up to Shinpokh, and not beyond until the Khyber section of the boundary had been delimited.³

Minto was very much impressed by Kitchener’s views and entirely agreed with his line of argument. He came to feel that the projected railway to the Afghan border was, indeed, a great military necessity; and this he impressed upon Morley in a private letter dated 12 June 1906. Morley had asked for Minto’s views on the Home Government’s proposal to include, as one of the terms in the contemplated Anglo-Russian agreement, a ten-year moratorium on railway construction towards the Afghan frontier by both Powers. But Minto was “strongly opposed to any agreement with Russia in respect to railways”, because such an agreement would “grievously cripple”, the security of the Frontier and would “tend to delay”, for a decade, “the prosperous development and better government” of Frontier tracts. Minto urged:

> we must surely be masters in our own house. We surely cannot agree to sacrifice the security and internal improvement of a portion of our domains for the sake of our relations with a foreign Power?⁴

Developing his arguments further, Minto pointed out that, from the British military point of view, the proposed agreement with Russia regarding railway construction would suffer from one-sidedness: a ban on such construction would put the British at a serious disadvantage. The construction of the railway from Peshawar to the Afghan border, which was

3. Deane to D. Smith, 29 May 1906, ibid.
in progress, would take at least two and a half years more to complete, while the Russians could connect Samarkand with the Afghan frontier by railway in a few months. Besides, Russia had the advantage of water transport along the Oxus River, while the British had no such facility. It was also reported that the Russians had a railway plant at Charjui ready for an immediate advance parallel to the Oxus, and another plant at Kushk ready for an advance to Herat. The Russians had a military base on the Afghan frontier which would give them a definitely better position than the British could have in the event of a war involving Afghanistan. Thus, even if the Anglo-Russian *entente* lasted for ten years, at the end of that period “Russia would still be in the same superior position as regards aggression in Afghanistan” as she now was, while Britain would “still be at the same disadvantage”. Besides, discontinuance of Frontier railway construction would seriously handicap the Government in dealing with any future Afghan or tribal hostility. Minto also drew Morley’s attention to the civilizing influence of railways and the economic setback for Frontier tracts that the abandonment of the railway projects would entail. These views prevailed with the Home Government, which accordingly decided to drop the railway issue from the Anglo-Russian negotiations.

Minto then tackled the still undecided issue: the route of the railway after it had reached Haider Khan. In January 1907, the Railway Board appointed H.S. Harington, the Chief Engineer, to examine the issue and submit an “unprejudiced” report to Minto. Harington decided in favour of the Loi Shilman route. However, Minto soon came to know, and was “surprised” to find, that Kitchener had advised Harington to report against the River valley route. Thereupon, Minto himself went into the matter and wrote a memorandum in support of the River route. But, lest the members of his Council might feel some “hesitation” to agree with him, Minto proposed another railway-expert report on the issue. Accordingly, W.H. Johns, a Superintending Engineer, was entrusted with the task in October 1907. Johns’ report established that the River route was preferable to the Loi Shilman route, mainly on grounds of economy and greater carrying capacity. Deane also supported this

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1. Minto to Morley, 12 June 1906, *ibid.*
route, as he had done earlier. But before a decision could be taken by the Government of India, the Mohmand troubles broke out in the beginning of 1908. All work on the railway was then stopped. The railway had not yet reached Haidar Khan.

Towards the end of 1908, the Kabul River railway project was reviewed by the India Office. L. Abrahams, the Financial Secretary, pointed out the great increase in the estimated cost of the project since its sanctioning in November 1905. He asked the Political Department whether it was still desirable to go on with such an expensive project. Richmond Ritchie, the Secretary of the Political Department, did not think that the railway was at all essential in view of the improved political relations between Russia and Britain brought about by the Convention of 1907. The Convention, in his opinion, had "completely altered" the political situation that had justified the project. Morley agreed with Ritchie, and telegraphed Minto on 21 December, asking him to stop further work and expenditure on the railway. The scheme was then abandoned. In 1911, rails and girders were removed, leaving no trace of what was regarded as "the most expensive line in the world".

Another project that was abandoned in 1908, and on the same grounds, was the scheme for the conversion of the narrow-gauge Kohat-Thal Line to a broad gauge rail and the construction of a broad-gauge Line from Thal to Parachinar. Already in February 1907, pointing out that the revised estimate of the cost of the project had far exceeded the original estimate sanctioned in December 1906, Morley had recommended that the scheme should be suspended. Kitchener greatly regretted the decision; but in December 1908, the scheme was scrapped altogether.

1. Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 6 January 1908, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 326.
2. See Chapter II, pp. 74-6.
3. In November 1905, the revised expenditure was estimated at Rs. 5,042,874; in 1906 at Rs. 7,230,000; and by November 1908, at Rs. 10,875,157—more than double the original estimate.
5. Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 21 December 1903, Secy. of State to Govt. of India. 25 December 1905, ibid; Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, Army Department, p. 87, H.P., vol. 131; Magnus Philip, Kitchener: The Portrait of an Imperialist, pp. 232-3.
9. The cost of the project in 1906-07 was estimated at Rs. 8,500,000; in 1907-8, at Rs. 11,553,452; in 1909-10, at Rs. 16,252,288. Minute by L. Abrahams, 17 November 1908, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 212A.
Further improvement in the Khyber Pass roads was then the most important communication project undertaken under Hardinge. This improvement was urged upon him by Indian military authorities, who pointed out that, notwithstanding the relaxation of Anglo-Russian tensions following the Convention of 1907, the need to strengthen the Government’s position in the Frontier through roads and railways remained because relations with the Amir were still far from satisfactory and tribal disturbances continued unabated. In July 1912, Percy Lake, Chief of the General Staff, pointed out that, in the event of a war with Afghanistan, the Government would have to depend “almost entirely” on the road through the Khyber, which, unless improved in peace time, might become a serious bottleneck for Government’s operations in such a war.

Lake, therefore, recommended that the existing 12-foot wide metalled North Khyber Road be widened to 24 feet, and the South Khyber Road, which was unmetalled, be metalled to a width of 12 feet. Because of Afridi opposition, the work, Lake noted, would require great caution and tact on the part of Political Officers. It should be taken up “gradually bit by bit” and as “unostentatiously” as possible. Lake suggested that the Government of India should maintain “perfect secrecy” in the matter, the Viceroy informing the Secretary of State only privately. Roos-Keppel agreed with Lake about the need for tactfully handling the Afridi tribe, the guardian of the Pass; and suggested that the cultivated tracts through which the South Khyber Road passed be purchased piecemeal at a high price. The Amir, in Roos-Keppel’s opinion, was unlikely to object to the improvement of the Khyber Pass roads if he were assured that the improvement was being effected to facilitate the movement of caravans, which was in the interest of Afghan trade. In a telegram dated 6 August 1912, Hardinge strongly urged Crewe to sanction the scheme, saying that

the military authorities cannot accept responsibility for success of possible operations [in Afghanistan] unless proposed improvement is effected.

Crewe, however, refused to oblige Hardinge before the latter submitted a detailed report on the scheme. It was not until April 1913 that the sanction was given by the Secretary of State. The Government of India then took steps to start the project without any further delay, as the

3. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 6 August 1912, ibid., Reg. No. 3067.
4. Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 21 August 1912, ibid.
conditions on the Frontier at the time were favourable. Roos-Keppel had informed the Government of India that the Afridis were suffering under a prolonged drought and were pressing for some employment to mitigate their suffering. The Assistant Political Agent of Khyber, Abdul Qaiyum, who enjoyed the confidence of the Afridis to "a remarkable degree" and so was "the fittest" person to induce the Afridis to give up a part of their cherished land for the road, was shortly going on leave; and this Roos-Keppel considered an additional strong reason why the project should be taken in hand immediately. These arguments prevailed with Crewe.

The work was completed by the end of 1914 without any unfavourable incident. It was carried out "so quietly and with so little friction" that few people among the general public of the Province were aware of the project. Its successful implementation was a testimony to the "tact and discretion" of both the Political Agent of Khyber, S.E. Pears, and his assistant, Abdul Qaiyum.

Another example of employing tribal labour for Frontier communication projects at a time of economic distress prevailing in the tribal territory was afforded by the extension of the Kalabagh-Bannu Line from Lakki to Tank. In March 1913, 4,500 Mahsuds were working on this narrow-gauge line, and their economic dependence on the Government kept them— as was the Government’s declared object—quiet. The line was constructed to strengthen the Government’s positions towards North and South Waziristan as well as to attract the trade between Afghanistan and India that hitherto had passed through the Gomal Pass. The line was opened to traffic in October 1917.

The road and rail building activities were interrupted during the War years, partly for financial reasons and partly due to the Government’s anxiety to avoid trouble with the tribes. However, after the Third Afghan War (1919), and in pursuance of the Government’s new policy in Waziristan, important communication projects were taken up and completed between 1921 and 1925. In Waziristan, 140 miles of road fit for mechanical transport were constructed, connecting all important posts of

1. Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 20 September 1912, *ibid.*, Reg. No. 3352; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 14 November 1912, *ibid.*, Reg. No. 4585A; Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 13 March 1913; Secy., Govt. of India to Roos-Keppel, 21 April 1913, enclosed in Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 8 May 1913, *ibid.*, Reg. No. 2043.
2. Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 13 March 1913, *ibid*.
3. Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 20 June 1913, *ibid*.
5. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 24 October 1911; Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 24 November 1911; *I.R.P.*, vol. 8986, July 1912. Proc. Nos. 125-151. The section from Lakki to Tank was about 46 miles long.
irregular and regular troops, such as those at Jandola, Dwa Toi, Razmak, Miranshah, Datta Khel, Wana, Tanai and Sarwakai. Along the border of Derajat, 100 miles of road were built for lateral communication.\(^1\)

In 1919, the Third Anglo-Afghan War, once again, impressed the Government of India with the urgency of constructing a railway in the Khyber. Consequently, the Government deputed Colonel (later Sir Gordon) Gordon R. Hearn to examine and report on the best route for the construction of a railway to the Frontier. He carried out a “masterly survey” showing “that a broad-gauge line could be laid up and over and down the other side of the Khyber Pass”.\(^2\) The construction of the Khyber Railway thus began in 1920, and was completed in 1926. Linking Jamrud with Landi Kotal, the track was 25.5 miles long. The work is regarded “as a classic example of brilliant surveying”; and from the engineering point of view, it has “no superior in the world”.\(^3\) It is stated that this “single broad-gauge track with its reversing stations was twice as costly to build as the magnificent railway construction of 1895 through the Bolan Pass, much of which is double-line. The Khyber Railway cost Rs. 7.8 lakhs a mile to build and the density of the train service has never exceeded two trains a week.”\(^4\) It was the last of the great railway constructions undertaken on the Frontier during British rule.

The relatively extensive road and rail building of this period was largely undertaken for strategic reasons. Out of a total of 1,015 miles of metalled road in 1919-20, no less than 631 miles were devoted to “military communications”. Likewise, the railway lines, which were extended from 40 miles in 1899 to 283 miles in 1919-20, all had military objectives. Curzon was mainly responsible for the improvement and extension of

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2. P.S.A. Berridge, *Couplings to the Khyber: The Story of the North-Western Railway*; p. 228.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 228. “... the Khyber Railway has a ruling gradient of 3 per cent between Jamrud and Landi Kotal (3,494 feet above sea level). There is a rise of nearly 2,000 feet in twenty-one miles, and a drop of 872 feet in the 44 miles down to Landi Khana, where the gradient stiffens to 1 in 25. There are four reversing stations which are also crossing stations, and six ordinary crossing stations; thirty-four tunnels with an aggregate length of 3 miles; ninety-two bridges and culverts, none with a span longer than eighty feet; and four locomotive watering stations. And during the construction, three million cubic yards of materials, mainly rock, were moved in cuttings and embankments.”

these roads and railways. His policy of withdrawing troops from advanced positions in tribal territory had created a great urgency for such measures. Even though a railway had reached Peshawar and another touched Khushalgarh on the Indus even before Curzon's reign, it was his characteristic zeal that pushed these lines to Dargai, Jamrud and Thal, the points which dominated the Malakand, the Khyber and the Kurram Agencies. Simultaneously, existing roads were improved and new ones added through the Kohat Pass and in the Khyber and Kurram Valleys and in Waziristan. Like Curzon, Kitchener was a great exponent of the extension of means of communication in the Frontier. Under his influence, the permanent bridge across the Indus at Khushalgarh was constructed and the narrow-gauge line from Khushalgarh to Kohat was converted to a broad-gauge rail. He advocated the construction of both the Kabul River and the Kurram Valley railways. In fact, it was under his pressure that their construction was started. But a conflict of views arose between Kitchener, Minto and the India Office authorities over the possible route of the Kabul River railway after it had reached Haidar Khan. Kitchener insisted on the Shilman route, whereas Minto and the India Office favoured the Kabul River route. While the issue was still being debated, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 "decreased the presumption of war with Russia". Consequently, strategic considerations and financial stringency demanded a change in policy. By the end of 1908, Morley, the Secretary of State, decided to abandon the projects.

Unlike the Russian threat, the possibility of trouble from Afghanistan and the tribesmen could not be ruled out. This led Minto and Hardinge to carry out improvements of roads in the Frontier and to build a narrow-gauge railway line from Kalabagh to Bannu, and to extend it from Lakki to Tank. The Third Afghan War (1919), and the consequent unrest in tribal territory, again made the British see, with even greater force, the need for the construction of further roads and railways in the stormy Frontier.

Though built mainly for military purposes, the railways and roads did also serve some commercial and political interests. It was expected that they would promote trade, and through trade, bring peace to the border. Addressing a durbar at Peshawar in April 1902, Curzon forecast the beneficial effects of railway lines:

The Pathan is a curious mixture. He is a man of war, but he is also a born trader. I see him conducting business right away in the bazars

1. Summary of Hardinge's Administration, Army Department, p. 87, H.P., vol. 131.
of Bengal. I have come across him in Burma and Assam. The trade of Swat pours down the line to Nowshera. Some day the trade of Afghanistan will descend the other Frontier lines. As people trade together they get to know each other better, and every mile of Frontier railroad that we build will turn out in the long run to be a link in the chain of friendship as well as of peace.1

In addition, the Government tried, as far as possible, to employ tribal labour on the communication projects in order to keep tribesmen busy and quiet. This proved a valuable inducement to ensuring their peaceful behaviour during Hardinge’s reign from 1912 to 1913.

The roads and railways opened up new avenues for trade, not only with Afghanistan, but also in Dir, Swat, Bajaur, Tirah, Kurram and Waziristan.2 So far as commerce was concerned, the Frontier Province mainly depended on its external land trade. Situated as it was across the historic trade routes, the Province linked the tribal territory and the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia with India. The important routes of trade from Afghanistan were through the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, through the Peiwar-Kotal Pass to Kurram and Kohat, and through the Gomal Pass to Derajat. The caravans laden with merchandise and passing along these routes were registered near the entrances of the Passes. Improved and new roads in the area facilitated the flow of traffic. For instance, the new Murtaza-Wana Road, it was reported, became increasingly popular with the Powindahs (nomad merchants). Some of the affluent among them even began to travel in a tumtum3 (a horse-drawn carriage). Similarly, the Nowshera-Dargai railway proved highly popular with the tribesmen of Swat. When the line was opened to traffic in 1901, “the platforms were soon three feet deep in grain” and the tribesmen were “clamouring for more room for their produce”.4 Five years later, in April 1906, when Minto visited Dargai, the inhabitants of Sam Ranizai requested the Viceroy to arrange a daily return service between Dargai and Mardan and to convert the Line to broad-gauge rails.5 Minto accepted the first request; but the conversion of the line had to wait because it was not urgently required on political or military grounds. Nevertheless, by 1906 the passenger traffic on the railway had increased 60 per cent and the goods traffic had more than trebled

2. Reports on the External Land Trade of N.W.F.P., 1901-02, 1907-08.
since 1901. Shortly after 1920, it was converted to broad-gauge rails, because "having brought peace to the area, the increase in commerce demanded the increase in rail capacity". The overall external land trade with Afghanistan and the tribal territory, and between Kashmir and Hazara, also registered a steady expansion; and this increase, shown in the following figures, was, at least in part, attributed to the extension of road and railway facilities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports Rs.</th>
<th>Exports Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-02</td>
<td>8,760,325</td>
<td>14,514,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>9,442,108</td>
<td>24,778,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>19,156,717</td>
<td>39,128,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Deputy Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 22 June 1906, Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 25 January 1907, Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 12 April, 1907, Deputy Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 29 October 1907, ibid.
To the British administrator, the most striking feature of all Indian land systems was the absence of absolute private property in land and the presence everywhere of communal shares in the produce of the soil. Instead of the English pattern of landlord, tenant, farmer and landless agricultural labour, in India there was the pattern of the grain heap in which ruler, officials, zamindars, cultivating ryots and village servants all had a customary share. In the Frontier this communal ownership, not so much of soil, perhaps, as of its output of crops, was particularly clear, though with this difference that only at intervals was a ruler successfully able to demand a share in the tribal property.

The most notable characteristic of Pathan land tenure, then, was that it was based on a strong sense of territorial right, which was collective, while providing for the separate enjoyment of the individual family share in the land. A very important aspect of this right was the system of *taqsim*, or the division of newly conquered tracts among the tribes, their clans and subsections.

...the possession of a separate tract by each tribe was parcelled out into blocks and held separately by different clans or sections of clans.
Thus, there were tappas representing the lots of different main subdivisions of a tribe and estates consisting of blocks of land in each tappa allotted to different sections or khels. Inside the estates were kandis or tarafs representing the minor subdivisions of these khels, generally the different branches of what was originally the same family, while inside each kandi each individual proprietor had his share or bakhra. Each bakhra was not, however, represented by a single compact plot of land, for to secure an equality of distribution each kandi was subdivided into wands according to the nature of the soil or facilities for irrigation, and each share was represented by a field or fields in each wand which usually ran the whole length of the block.1

The main allotments of territories were originally made by tribal chiefs, while further subdivisions of land were effected by various subsections of tribes (khels) themselves.2 The taqsim in the Doaba, Hashtnagar, the Samah proper, Swat, Buner and Bajaur was associated with the name of Shaikh Mali of the Akazai clan,3 and is known as the "Daftar-i-Shaikh Mali". This distribution of land had, most probably, taken place in the third decade of the sixteenth century.4 In the Hazara District the original distribution of tribal land was known as wirasat or inheritance, the owner being called waris or inheritor.5 According to tribal custom, some portion of land was always set apart for the purpose of common grazing (shamilat). The individual share of the shamilat was called inam. The tribal land was called daftar, and the individual having a share in the daftar was known as a daftari. In Dir and Swat the status of a daftari was and is considered particularly important, because the very membership of a tribe here was based on the holding of that title. A man who ceased to be a daftari "was no longer entitled to be called a Pathan", and became a "fakir, without a voice in village or tribal councils."6 Not only had the Pathan clans their general territorial boundary, which they were prepared to defend resolutely as a body, every clansman, too, had an indefeasible right to a certain share in the territory.

The second very interesting, though complicated, aspect of Pathan land tenure was the custom of periodical redistribution or exchange of all tribal lands by the casting of lots—the custom being locally known as

vesh or khasanri. The practice was originally intended to remedy defects of the first distribution of land, which was "admittedly imperfect", and to keep up a common interest in the land and the "feeling of a sort of general clan ownership".\footnote{Hastings, \emph{op.cit.}, p. 85.} It no doubt reflected the democratically individualist nature of the Pathans, and was an attempt to seek equality by ensuring the enjoyment of the better lands to each by turn and to "check" the development of leadership based on economic power".\footnote{Spain, \emph{op.cit.}, p. 84.} These exchanges of land were effected both among the different sections of a tribe and among the different members of the same sections at fixed intervals. The system involved no mere adjustments of possession according to shares, but complete exchanges of property between one group of proprietors and another, followed by division among the proprietors of each group.

Nor were these exchanges and distributions confined to the proprietors of a single village. The tribe, not the village, was in many cases the true proprietary unit; and the exchange was then made between the proprietors residing in one village and those of a neighbouring village. In some cases, land alone was exchanged; in others, the exchange included houses as well as land.\footnote{B.H. Baden Powell, \emph{A Manual of the Land Revenue Systems and Land Tenures of British India}, p.405, f.n.}

In the course of time, the vesh system fell into disuse. This may be attributed in part to the overriding of Pathan traditions by foreign rulers, such as the Sikhs; in part to the fact that in such districts as Dera Ismail Khan or Hazara the Pathans formed only 29 and 10 percent, respectively, of the total population; and in part to the greater availability of land, as more and more forests were cleared. However, the system was still found during the first regular settlements in 1868-80 in the Tank \emph{Tahsil} of Dera Ismail Khan, the Upper Miranzai of Kohat District, in the Marwat \emph{Tahsil} of Bannu and in some Peshawar villages, though in a languishing form. In the tribal territories of Dir, Swat, Bajaur and the Utman Khel territory, however, the system was found existing with "little or no change" as late as 1901.\footnote{McMahon and Ramsay, \emph{op.cit.}, p. 21; \emph{Administration Report of N.W.F.P.}, 1901-3, p.14; Baden Powell, \emph{The Indian Village Community}, p. 255 "In due course of time khasanri between tribes was stopped or made permanent, but in individual villages between the khels it continued and continues even to this day. In Thana much of settlement was done in 1953 and very little is left which requires permanent allotment." Munawwar Khan, "The Swat In History", \emph{Peshawar University Review}, vol. 1, 1974-75, No. 1. p. 76.}

Tribal custom allowed Khans and Maliks as a rule to claim no more land than their fellow tribesmen; they had no "territorial revenue", only
their personal share of the tribal possession. Originally the Khans and Maliks were, in fact, no more than leaders of tribesmen in war and their agents in dealings with others; they possessed influence rather than power, which itself lay in the Jirga or tribal council.¹ The priestly classes, Mallas and Sayyids, were allowed no share in the tribal daftar. However, since their services were considered indispensable to the community, some portions of common land, called seri, were assigned to them. Sometimes such allocations were also made to important Khans to enable them to meet the expenses which their position warranted. But the grant of seri lands was not always “a matter of unselfish generosity”, for they were as a rule lands on the border between two communities, disputed lands, and lands which for some reason or other would be difficult to hold except by those whose strength, religious status etc. both enabled them to hold such lands in peace and also to form useful buffers for the rest of the community.²

The Maliks and Khans thus received some recognition for their responsibilities in the form of seri land; but otherwise they were on the same footing as the other full members of the tribe, the daftaris. Each daftari cultivated his own share in the tribal land, paying “no tribute, or share of the produce, to anyone”. What he did contribute was his obligatory participation in all tribal defensive and offensive operations, in accordance with the decision of his Jirga.³

Besides the full tribal members, Pathan villages had dependent cultivators, called fakirs, and also village servants, menials and artisans who held land rent-free in return for services to the tribe in peace and war. There were also hamsayas (clients) who were dependent cultivators occupying bandas (hamlets) on the outskirts of tappas (lands allotted to tribal subdivisions or Khels). These men held lands on condition that they would assist the khel to whom the lands belonged in repelling raids of rival khels. Such hamsayas could not claim a share by descent within the tribe, but could in this way be given pseudo-daftari status. Only the daftari, of course, had a voice in the tribal council.⁴

Under the Durrani and later Sikh rule, the Khans’ and Maliks’ position in tribal society was strengthened by the rulers as a matter of policy to use them, and their personal ambitions, to facilitate control and exploitation of the ordinary tribesmen—a policy we have seen the British

¹. Baden Powell, op.cit., p. 245.
². McMahon and Ramsay, op.cit., p. 21; Olaf Caroe, op.cit., p 182.
⁴. Baden Powell, The Indian Village Community, p. 255; Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-8, p. 158.
employ in their *Maliki* system and their reward for the “loyal”.¹ The Durranis and the Sikhs gave the *Khans* and *Maliks* large tracts of land on lease at fixed rates, which these chiefs paid to the rulers from the revenue collections they made from their tenants. The Sikh revenue system was thus based upon the principle of dealing not “with the people but with the chiefs”; the Sikhs “did not collect land revenue but exacted tribute” from the chiefs. Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and part of Dera Ismail Khan were actually “tributary areas”. Hashtnagar in Peshawar, for instance, was assigned to one Sardar Sultan Mohammad Khan Barakzai. In Bannu the tribute levied on local *Maliks* was “never paid except under compulsion”. The more powerful *Khans* took possession of the waste lands set aside for common pasturage. Sometimes they appropriated the lands of those tribesmen who had left the country or died childless. Sometimes they even overruled the old tribal division of land, “becoming virtually owners of the whole of the land”. The *Khans* and *Maliks* did not personally cultivate their lands, but handed them over to tenants, such as *fakirs* and *hamsayas*, on condition of the latter’s pledge of assistance against rival *Khans* and *Maliks*—and of course payment of revenue.²

The Sikhs usually collected the tribute in kind, the rates being one-half of the produce on irrigated lands, and from one-third to one-eighth on unirrigated lands. Besides, they imposed numerous cesses and vexatious dues.³ In Hazara the Sikhs destroyed the proprietary rights of the old land-owning community, the *warises*, and claimed the entire area as belonging to the State. The *warises* and their tenants were treated alike, being allowed to hold their land at the will of the State and on condition of paying the full rent, which was in theory one-half of the gross produce, but in practice varied in different *talukas*.⁴

The dismantelling of the old tribal structure of land-holding which occurred under the Durranis and Sikhs continued after the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849. The successful imposition of a State demand upon the independent tribes had given the *Khans* and *Maliks*, who were made responsible for the opportonment and collection of tribute, the appearance of super landholders. The movement towards a landlord-tenant relationship fitted British predispositions and was to continue.

1. See supra, pp. 34-5, and also infra, pp. 143-4.
However, in the peculiar circumstances of the Frontier districts, questions of tenures and agricultural usages were not raised for some considerable time: the immediate problems were those of assessment and collection.\textsuperscript{1}

The districts were first put under “summary settlements”\textsuperscript{2} which were very light, and no regular settlement was carried out for many years because it was considered “inexpedient”.\textsuperscript{3} It was not until 1868-80 that the first regular settlements of the Frontier districts were undertaken.

Settlement operations required, first, the framing of a record of rights in land and, then, the making of a fair assessment of land revenue. For this, an accurate map of each village was needed, indicating the position and boundaries of each field. This was accomplished through a systematic survey of the fields. The survey parties encountered many difficulties in carrying out their operations. For instance, on the Waziri border in Bannu, they had to be escorted by Militia and to sleep in outposts, while the local Babbu Khel at first refused to let them enter their lands unless a promise was given that the demand for land revenue would not be increased. One survey party without escort was “surrounded, robbed and stripped naked in broad daylight, and then allowed to go”.\textsuperscript{4} Owing to these difficulties and to the general reluctance of the Pathans to furnish the settlement officers with accurate information, the survey operations for the first regular settlements could not be satisfactorily carried out in all parts of the Frontier districts.\textsuperscript{5}

Where completed, however, survey operations resulted in the production of village boundary maps (naksha thakbast), field maps (Shajra kishtwar) and a register (khasra) showing, for each field, the name of its owner and the person who cultivated it, its linear dimensions and extent, the class of land it contained and the crops grown.\textsuperscript{6}

The next step was the determination of the rights of different individuals in the soil with the object of fixing the land revenue. In fact, in the first regular settlements, the framing of the records of rights in land was considered much more important than assessment of land, because

\textsuperscript{1} Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab and Its Dependencies, 1871-2, pp. 103-4.
\textsuperscript{2} Summary settlement consisted of “fixation of a preliminary amount of revenue, pending a more exact adjustment and pending arrangement for a survey and record of rights”. The Land Systems of British India, vol. I, p. 304. In the Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara Districts, there were two, four, two, three and two summary settlements, respectively, between 1847 and 1858.
\textsuperscript{3} Douie, op.cit., p. 22-3.
\textsuperscript{4} Gazetteer of the Bannu District, 1883-4, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{6} Douie, op.cit., pp. 112-3.
the result of the one operation was permanent, and for all practical purpose final, the result of the second was temporary and remediable. The settlement officers were armed with judicial powers to determine the titles in land which were in a "very confused and doubtful condition". The settlement officers took great pains to make the people understand that this was the time to establish all their rights and claims; and to prevent any man raising the objection that he did not know what was recorded about his status, because of his inability to read.

The result of these operations was that five classes of men holding permanent proprietary rights in land were recognized: full proprietors; owners by possession (Malik Kabza); superior proprietors; inferior proprietors; and occupancy tenants. A full proprietor was one who cultivated his land himself and was entitled to the full produce of his land. He had unrestricted power of alienating the land, subject only to the right of pre-emption vested in the co-sharers, relations and other proprietors of the kandi or village.

A malik kabza was often a kamin (upstart) or Hindu who had acquired his proprietary right in land by purchase or by favour of the Government. He occupied an intermediate position between the full proprietor and a tenant. He was not a member of the co-parcenary body of the village proprietors; nor could he claim any share in the common land of the village. He was responsible for the payment of the revenue and cesses on his holding and could alienate his land. A superior proprietor was one whose interest in land was confined to the receipt of quit rent: sometimes he had large rights in waste land, though he had little control over cultivated holdings. The inferior proprietor was often the actual cultivator, but sometimes he might have tenants under him. Where superior and inferior proprietors co-existed, the policy was to make the settlement with the latter:

The tendency was to commute the superior rights where they were established into a moderate percentage on the revenue and to take engagements from the inferior proprietors and allow them the sole management of the estates.

1. Ibid., p. 53.
2. Ibid., p. 54.
The area under dual ownership was not great, except in Kohat, where the Khan of Teri had been recognized as the superior proprietor of the tahsil after its settlement of 1885-95. He was allowed to collect certain dues fixed by the Government from the tenant of his tahsil.1

Simultaneously, with the question of rights of owners in the land came that of the rights of tenants, as well. Two classes of tenants—occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will were recognized. The former were known as maurusi or hereditary tenants, and the latter as ghair maurusi or non-hereditary. The occupancy tenants were those who paid no rent beyond the share of the State revenue demand and the village cesses, and who had continuously remained in possession of their land for twenty years or more. They had a right to hold their land so long as they paid the fixed rent. A tenant-at-will, on the other hand, was a tenant from year to year. His rent was determined by agreement between himself and his landlord. He was liable to ejection at the end of an agricultural year in pursuance of a notice of ejection issued by a revenue officer on the application of a landlord.2

The status of tenants in all the Frontier districts, except Hazara, was first officially determined by the Punjab Tenancy Act XXVIII of 1868. In the Dera Ismail Khan District tenants like butemars and lathbands2 acquired permanent rights in land by bringing waste lands under cultivation. In the Hazara District, the determination of tenants' rights necessitated a special regulation. Captain Wace, the Settlement Officer of Hazara, pointed out that, if the Punjab Tenancy Act (1868) was applied to Hazara, many tenants who were fairly entitled to occupancy rights would be excluded from such privileges, and that the Act would "degrade them to a position of insecurity lower than they have ever previously occupied". Wace strongly advocated that the occupancy rights of the tenants in the District should be protected:

proprietors of Hazara are, as a class, lamentably deficient in those principles of generosity and fair dealing without which their investment with unlimited powers over their tenants could only result in the material degradation of the tenantry and ill fame to the Government that permitted it. The tenantry of Hazara are a very numerous body, and have prospered greatly under our rule; they are a thrifty set, well-off, contented, and well-disposed to our rule. To cut off from them the protection of the State which they have hitherto enjoyed, would immediately and

3. Butemar and lathband were tenants who acquired permanent rights in the land by clearing it of jangal and by embanking fields. Tucker, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
materially lower their present prosperity, discontent them with our rule, indefinitely retard much promising agricultural improvement, and destroy a cardinal element of the stability of our revenue. Accordingly, a Special Regulation (3 of 1873) was passed, which gave a broader interpretation to the term “occupancy right” than that given in the Punjab Tenancy Act. The Regulation conferred the right of occupancy on every tenant who either himself or through his predecessor had continuously occupied his holding from a period earlier than the summary settlement of 1847.

As regards assessment of land, the policy in the Frontier districts was the same as in the Punjab. Two methods of assessment were introduced at the time of the first regular settlements: fixed cash assessment and fluctuating assessment. Under the former, which was introduced in all the Frontier districts, except some parts of Dera Ismail Khan, the State demand was fixed for the entire term of the settlement. The fluctuating system was applied in the Daman tract of Dera Ismail Khan, where the yield of crops was liable to extreme variations due to the uncertain supply of water. Under this system, land revenue was assessed at prescribed rates on such crops only as actually matured at each harvest. The assessment of land revenue was based on the principle of half-net assets. It was laid down that Government demand of land revenue should not exceed “the estimated value of half the net produce (nisf mahasil milkiyat) of an estate, or, in other words, one-half of the share of the produce of an estate ordinarily receivable by the landlord either in money or kind.” But in fixing the land revenue demand, the policy followed was that the assessment of the Frontier districts should be light and the border villages should be favourably assessed, because administrative and political questions on this border intimately connected with the land revenue demand, and other considerations than the productiveness of the soil and the resources of the people must determine the measure of assessment. From border villages the Government expects effective assistance in repelling raids and robberies by tribes

2. Watson, op.cit., p. 18. The Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868 was replaced later by the new Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887. Similarly, the Hazara Regulation of 1873 was also revised and a new regulation called the Hazara Tenancy Regulation 13 of 1887 was passed, which determined the status of tenants in the Hazara District.
4. Daman represents the plain which slopes down from the Sulaiman Range to the Indus where cultivation is carried on in embanked fields by means of irrigation from the hill streams which issue from that Range. Baden Powell, The Land Systems of British India, vol. II, pp. 595-8. See also chapter VI, pp. 175-6.
The determination of half-net assets was a laborious process. A district was first divided into homogeneous assessment circles. Then all cultivated land was graded into separate categories according to productivity. To estimate the gross produce of each district, the average area annually under each crop was ascertained by circles and soils. Next, the percentage of the average matured area having principal crops and their yield per acre in the circles and different kinds of soil was set out. The results attained were then valued at commutation prices. To work out the half-net assets, the rent rates were applied to the value of the gross produce of the district. Broadly speaking, three kinds of rent were prevalent in the Frontier districts: batai (kind) rents, zabti (cash) rents, and chakota or kalang rents (consolidated cash rents on a holding). Rents in kind were common; cash rents were uncommon in all districts except Hazara, where 24 per cent of the cultivated area was held by tenants paying such rents. The rent rates varied from district to district, and from tract to tract in each district. For instance, in the Daman tract of the Dera Ismail Khan District, the rent rates on good rodhkohi (hill torrent) lands were 45 to 50 per cent, on kalpani (perennial streams of clear water issuing from hills) lands about 50 per cent, and on the poorest dagar tracts about 33 per cent the gross produce. In the Kohat District, the rent rates were usually 50 per cent of the produce for abi (irrigated) lands and 25 per cent for barani (rain) lands.

In the Frontier districts, as elsewhere in the Punjab, for purposes of revenue collection, the system of joint village responsibility was introduced in place of the tribal responsibility obtaining under Sikh rule. The collection of land revenue was entrusted to a number of lambardars, who were representatives of the whole or part of a proprietary community. The lambardars were usually Maliks or other influential men, and were allowed a 5 per cent commission on the actual revenue collection. This commission was called the lambardari cess.

The terms of the first regular settlements were, twenty five years for

4. A steep slope like the bank of a river.
5. Gazetteer of the Dera Ismail Khan District, 1883-4, p. 87.
Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan, and thirty years for Bannu and Hazara.

A typical characteristic of the British land revenue administration of the Frontier districts consisted of large allocations of Government land revenue to local Nawabs, Khans and other leading men, made with a view to attaching the influential to the Government. The practice was partly inherited from Durrani and Sikh rule, and partly created by the British themselves, who confirmed many old grants and gave new grants following the annexation of the Punjab and the uprising of 1857, after which the general policy of the British was to reward all those who had rendered them service.1

Before the first regular settlements, the jagirdars, who were "adepts at the art of rack-renting", were allowed to collect revenue in kind, with the result that their exactions bore hard on the tenants. In order to protect the latter, it was decided, during the first regular settlement, to abandon the practice of assignment of revenue in kind. The change affected the jagirdars' pecuniary interests as well as their influence and position among the tenants. The Government, therefore, gave the jagirdars some extra cash grants, a measure which it justified thus:

... it was found on examination into their [jagirdars] status, that if their assignments were cut down to the letter of the grants they held from the British Government, and they were to be prohibited from taking ought from their jagirs beyond the bare amount of the Government demand assessed thereon, they would be ruined, all their influence and power for usefulness would be gone, and we should have for our leading men a body of needy malcontents.2

The cash grants—a purely British creation—were otherwise called "political pensions". In Peshawar they were known as muwajib. Similar allowances given to the important chiefs of the Marwat Tahsil of the Bannu District were called barat. These allowances had been given by the Sikhs, too; but the British converted them from kind to cash. Leading zamindars, lambardars, religious families like the Sayyids and of the ulama, and sometimes religious shrines, were given revenue-free lands, called muafis, within the boundaries of assessed villages. These grants were made either for life or for the term of the settlement. The continuance of each grant depended on the good conduct of its recipient and on proper maintenance of a religious institution if the grant was made towards its upkeep.3

There were several kinds of *inams* or cash rewards given to leading men of the Frontier districts for political or administrative purposes. The *lambardars* were allowed a fixed remuneration of 5 per cent on their collection; but it was considered “desirable to reward specially the most deserving, influential and useful members of this class”, and this end was achieved by giving the leading *lambardars inams* in addition to the 5 per cent cess. In Bannu, the leading Waziri *Maliks* were granted *lungi inams*; and similar *inams* were given to *Maliks* of Peshawar. Then there were *sufedposhi inams* (white-collar rewards) granted to *lambardars* in the Dera Ismail Khan District. Leading *daftaris* in the Mohmand and Daudzai *tappas* received *daftari inams*.1

Villages adjacent to the tribal border and families requiring special consideration for services rendered to the Government were favourably assessed. This grant of Frontier remissions was designed to encourage the settlement of tribesmen within British territory, and to encourage those villagers on the border who were most vulnerable to tribal raids and whose services as Militia levies the Government wished to enlist for “repelling raids, pursuing raiders, capturing dacoits or outlaws and recovering stolen property”. The concession could be withdrawn, wholly or partly, upon neglect of these duties.2

The British system of land revenue administration brought considerable changes in land tenures. The villages were constituted into *zamindari, pattidari* and *bhaiachara* types, and were made units for assessment of land revenue.3 The *vesh* system of periodic repartition was not recognized because it was against the spirit of the new land revenue procedure. The fixity of tenures which became more feasible under the regular settlement was further helped by the introduction of canal and well irrigation on a larger scale, giving considerable impetus to agricultural im-


3. In the *zamindari* villages “the land is so held that all the village co-sharers have each their proportionate share in it as common property without any possession or title to distinct portions of it and the measure of each proprietor’s interest is his share as fixed by the customary law of inheritance.” *Pattidari* villages are “a form of joint or landlord village in which the land is divided out on shares purely ancestral; here there is a several enjoyment, but the community is not dissolved”. *Bhaiachara* villages were those which were once “ancestrally shared, but where the shares had been (wholly or partly) lost or upset. The term also represents villages which were “never shared at all—each man’s possession the measure of his right”. Baden Powell, *The Land Systems of British India*, vol. I, pp. 157-77.
provement. Moreover, the framing of the records of rights in land made it almost impossible to adhere to the vesh system, except in alluvial lands where changes were expected due to river action.¹

The Punjab revenue administration treated the Frontier districts very differently from the rest of the Province, for a long time leaving them very much as they were until it became practicable to undertake regular settlements. These, when concluded, naturally brought changes; but the people were pacified by the light revenue demand. When the Frontier Province was formed in 1901, the terms of the first regular settlements had come to an end in four of the five districts. Between 1900 and 1908, therefore, revised settlements were undertaken in Kohat, Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan (The Peshawar District had been resettled in 1896-7)². The Daur Valley in the Tochi Agency and the Kurram Agency were, for the first time, also brought under regular settlements between 1903 and 1907.³ The terms of the new settlements in the four districts and in the Kurram Agency was provisionally fixed for twenty years, and in the Daur Valley for ten years.

II

The second regular settlements sought to adjust the Government’s demands for land revenue to the changes brought about during the currency of the first settlements and to rectify the defects of these settlements. Such a revision also involved the revision of maps and records of rights in land and water in almost all districts. The previous maps and records were, in many cases, found misleading and inaccurate. Thus, in Hazara, one-fourth of the old records of the remote and inaccessible tracts had to be discarded during the revised settlement.⁴ The unreliability and inaccuracy of old maps and records were not merely due to the indifference of the local people.⁵ In Dera Ismail Khan, for example, the extraordinary diversity of tenures, the intricate system of irrigation, the partition of large areas of common tribal land, the recurrence of seasons of drought

2. For the revised settlement of the Peshawar District, see L.W. Dane, Final Report of the Settlement of Peshawar District, 1898. The term of the settlement was for twenty years.
3. There had been only one summary settlement in the Kurram Valley, in 1893-4, which was for ten years. As for the Daur Valley, the Government, in 1895, collected a tithe of the gross produce which was commuted into a payment of Rs. 6,000 levied by means of a house tax.
5. See above, p. 138.
and scarcity, and the vagaries of the Indus had made the old records out of date. Besides, since the first regular settlement in 1872-79, there had been frequent sales and mortgages of land, improvements in canal irrigation and extension of cultivation. But the revenue establishment, being "insufficient and inefficient", had not been able to keep pace with the rapid changes in agricultural conditions, and consequently were not in possession of up-to-date records.1 Therefore, during the revised settlements new records of rights in land were compiled, and in a new statement of Riwaj-i-Abpashi,2 (Customs of Irrigation) a very exhaustive description of rights in water was given in the hope that, in future, it would facilitate the expeditious settlement of disputes over water rights.3

The revised settlements effected no changes in the methods of assessment, except in the Dera Ismail Khan District, where, because of its extremely precarious irrigation system and the consequent uncertainty of cultivation, the fluctuating system had been extensively adopted. The Government of India were at first not favourably disposed towards its adoption; because under this system, as the assessment varied annually with the out-turn of crops, no maximum limit in cash could be fixed. Moreover, it gave the subordinate revenue officials an "undesirable amount of power", since the assessment of revenue depended upon their first-hand reports. In short, it was considered a "retrograde step", and the Government termed it a "reversion to the methods of native rule".4 But then, despite its aversion to the system, the Government ultimately changed its stand when Deane, the Chief Commissioner, drew its attention to the peculiar conditions prevailing in the District. Deane pointed out that there was no other tract in the Frontier Province, or in the Punjab, where the conditions of life were so arduous:

with a rainfall averaging less than 10 and often falling short of 5 inches; where for months in the hot weather, the bulk of the population has to migrate to the river banks, while those who remain behind can drink only once a day and water their cattle only every other day; a land without shade or water, where the summer heat and the winter cold are equally inclement; where the cultivator has no guarantee that he will reap where he has sown, it is a wonder to find any agricultural population at all.5

Deane attacked what he called the "short-sighted and illiberal policy"

2. See below, p. 179.
4. Resolution on the Land Revenue Policy, 16 January 1902, para 36.
hitherto followed by the Government in matters relating to revenue administration in the District. The revenue history of the tract, he continued, was a record of "unsuitable forms of assessment which broke down in bad years, of frequent but partial efforts to adjust the revenue demand to the extraordinary fluctuations of agriculture, of want of system and continuity in managing the hill torrent floods\(^1\) on which the success of agriculture mainly depended".\(^2\) In the circumstances, Deane felt that the fluctuating system was the only suitable method of assessment for Dera Ismail Khan. With such strong advocacy from Deane, the Government of India had no choice but to accept his recommendations. Consequently, in the new settlement, 95 per cent of the estimated land revenue of the District was made fully fluctuating.\(^3\)

The principle of assessment remained the usual half-net assets; but the rent rates had shown a steady upward tendency brought about by factors such as the growth of population, the improvement of markets and rising prices. In the Haripur Tahsil of the Hazara District, for instance, rents of tenants-at-will had risen from 33 to 40 per cent of the produce on unirrigated, and from 41 to 45 per cent on irrigated land, since the last regular settlement in 1868-74. Similarly, in the Abbottabad Tahsil of the District, the increase had been from 38 to 44 per cent.\(^4\) In the Bannu Tahsil as a whole, the rent rates rose to 48 per cent as against 36 per cent in the last settlement of 1872-78.\(^5\) As a consequence of these rent increases, the revenue demand based upon the half-net asset rule also rose proportionately.

In the Hazara District, however, the Government was faced with the problem that the cash rents there were mostly lump sums fixed on individual holdings (chakota), which could not normally be enhanced, except by voluntary agreement between landlord and occupancy tenant, or by a suit in the revenue courts. If the Government demand here had been increased in line with that for other districts, the Government would have been raddled with a prospect of "hundreds of law suits" filed by the landlords. To avoid the waste involved in this, a special regulation, No. III of 1904, was issued, empowering the settlement officer to adjust the cash rents paid by the occupancy tenants by reassessing the rents in terms of the new revenue demand. This in turn meant that the Government could hereafter enhance these rents whenever assessments were revised and the general

1. See below, pp. 175-6.
revenue demand increased.¹

Regulation III gave the revenue authorities considerable power, but it did not solve the difficult question of how, in the revision of assessments, to strike a balance between political, social and economic advantage. Both political and economic considerations called for moderation, leniency and caution in assessment, while the changes which had occurred since the time of the first regular settlement operations justified an enhancement in the revenue demand. For political reasons, the settlement officers were reluctant to change the existing “deliberately accepted” policy of light assessments, because “any marked or sudden alteration of that policy would now be felt as a hardship”.² They also had to take other factors into account, such as the general smallness of proprietary and tenancy holdings, the deficiency of agricultural stock, and the burden of debt commonly caused by litigation and by extravagance during marriages and funerals. “The Pathan’s love of display, gambling, litigiousness and the costly luxury of crime”, the British felt, had ruined many leading families.³ Any enhancement which involved “a revolution in the domestic economy of the landlord”, wrote Glancy, was certain to provoke the “most serious resentment”, even if the rates imposed were low in comparison with those prevailing elsewhere in Northern India.⁴ On the other hand, it was thought that there was considerable justification for an enhanced assessment:

The local conditions bearing on the assessment, prices, communications... have been so completely revolutionized within the past twenty-five years that the old settlement... is no longer even a guide, though the principles of assessment remain the same.⁵

The rise in the value of land, in rents and in food-grain prices; the increase in the irrigated and cultivated area, and at places improvements in the methods of cultivation, the development of communications and new markets, and the growth of such supplementary sources of income as Government service, all these factors were considered to justify the abandonment of the old rates of assessment.

The latter argument won, and the new revenue demand was therefore substantially increased. In certain tracts and villages, it was “doubled, or even trebled and quadrupled”.⁶ In the Hazara District,

as a whole, the revenue demand was increased by 67 per cent over the first regular settlement; in Bannu by 65 per cent; in Kohat by 44 per cent; in Dera Ismail Khan by 17 per cent; in Kurram by 180 per cent, and in the Daur Valley by 500 per cent. The following Table shows the exact amount fixed for each district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Demand under the First Settlement</th>
<th>New demand as imposed under the Second Settlement</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>Rs. 294,006</td>
<td>Rs. 491,228</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannu</td>
<td>Rs. 261,366</td>
<td>Rs. 431,258</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohat</td>
<td>Rs. 193,139</td>
<td>Rs. 277,895</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. I. Khan</td>
<td>Rs. 272,097</td>
<td>Rs. 318,691</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurram</td>
<td>Rs. 31,435</td>
<td>Rs. 88,000</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur Valley</td>
<td>Rs. 6,000</td>
<td>Rs. 36,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This drastic increase in the revenue demand was not in keeping with the general policy of the Government of India, which believed that any increase in revenue must be considered from the practical point of view, and with reference to the conditions of human nature. The State cannot without hesitation call upon people suddenly to effect a great reduction in their domestic expenditure, however well justified in theory its demand may be. It became necessary, therefore, for the revenue authorities “to ease off” the burden of the progressive application of the principle of enhanced assessment. Consequently, at the time of the completion of the settlements, the Local Government sanctioned deferments for enhanced demands: of Rs. 57,596 in Hazara, of Rs. 17,356 in Kohat, of Rs. 68,387 in Bannu, and of Rs. 16,500 in Kurram.

But these measures of relief were not deemed sufficient by the Supreme Government. In their orders on the final reports of settlements for the

2. Resolution on the Land Revenue Policy, 16 January 1902, paras. 33-34.
3. By this method the full amount of the new revenue demand was announced to the landowner, but the actual collection of part of the increase was deferred for a few years.
Kohat, Hazara and Bannu Districts in 1908, they criticized the Local Government for the insufficient steps taken to mitigate the effects of heavy assessments. The Supreme Government expressed its opposition to “any large and sudden increases of revenue” in the Frontier districts. They asked the Local Government to afford a relief of Rs. 48,000 to the revenue payers of the Upper Miranzai Circle in the Kohat District, where the increase in revenue under the new settlement had been enormous. The Local Government was also asked to extend Hazara District’s term of settlement from twenty to thirty years, and to grant a relief of Rs. 135,808 to the revenue payers of Bannu. Deane was instructed to show “more liberality” in the matter of deferring enhancements, and to submit proposals for the reduction of assessments in regard to particular cases of excessive increases.

Roos-Keppel also commented upon the excessive increase in the revenue demand, which appeared to him “extraordinary and without precedent”. He believed that popular discontent had not yet erupted into the open because there were no means of conveying it—“no press, no bar and no public opinion”, not even rioting, for the people knew “that the Province is crammed full of troops”. In the summer of 1908, Roos-Keppel received petitions from the inhabitants of the Frontier districts, “complaining of the excessive increase in the revenue demand”. For four months—September to December—he made on-the-spot enquiries in the districts as well as in the Kurram and Tochi Agencies. He “met in each district at every stage, deputations of cultivators begging for relief from what they described as a ‘crushing impost’” levied on them by the Government. Roos-Keppel was convinced of the genuineness and spontaneity of these appeals: the very high increase, he said, had, indeed “completely destroyed the equilibrium of their domestic economy”. He felt so strongly about the situation that he soon called for the services of Major Rawlinson, the late Officiating Revenue Commissioner of the Frontier Province, to enquire into the whole matter and submit a report.

Rawlinson made a thorough enquiry. He visited Hazara, Kohat and Bannu, and discussed the subject with the Deputy Commissioners,

1. The assessment had been raised from Rs. 7,318 to Rs. 16,000 to start with, rising to Rs. 24,000 after ten years.
3. Roos-Keppel had taken over from Deane in June 1908.
Revenue Assistants and leading men of the districts. In Bannu, Rawlinson tried to conduct on-the-spot enquiries into villages where the increase in the revenue demand had been excessive. But having found that the enquiries were taking an inordinately long time to complete, he stopped the investigation and prepared statements from the revenue records of those villages in Hazara, Kohat and Bannu where the total gross new assessment had increased by more than the district average of enhancement. Rawlinson's findings led him to conclude that theoretically the enhancements were justified, and that the burden of enhancements had been lightened in practically all cases by the introduction of deferred or progressive assessments. Yet, he wrote

whatever the improvements effected during the currency of the former settlements, it may be said that as a whole communications remain poor, markets are few and distant, and the efficiency of agriculture is not of a high level.¹

Conditions in general were still harder and more strenuous than in the plains of the Punjab. Moreover, in the Frontier districts the average cultivator experienced "an ever present sense of insecurity" due to his constant exposure to raids and attacks by "trans-border gangs of robbers and dacoits"—fears from which the average Punjabi peasant was immune.

Rawlinson pointed out a further factor: the popular expectation of general relief aroused by the review he and other officials were making. Exaggerated stories and rumours were in spate; and it was commonly believed that all the four settlements would soon be "favourably revised in toto". A flood of petitions, verbal and written, followed, indicating the expectations of the people. These the Government could neither completely ignore nor fully meet.²

In such circumstances, Rawlinson recommended "Leniency in the matter of all assessments", and equal treatment to all the districts, because any "marked distinction in treatment between the districts concerned will inevitably result in heartburnings, discontent and jealousies".³ In elaborating his recommendations, Rawlinson examined four ways of granting relief. First, a fresh settlement of the districts could be made; but this was a costly measure and so undesirable. Second, relief could be limited to those villages which were most heavily assessed—a step likely to provoke jealousy and discontent. Third, there was the possibility of granting an all-round reduction of revenue amounting to two annas in

2. Ibid., p.4.
3. Ibid.
the rupee. This, too, was not advisable because it would cause a heavy loss to the jagirdars. Finally, Government could discontinue the collection of the local rate and the lambardari cess. This last course, Rawlinson felt, would be the best; for it would afford relief to all the revenue payers without distinction. He recommended that the Government should itself give the district boards money to maintain rural schools, dispensaries and roads, and also make the payments to the lambardars, which taken together would involve an annual expenditure of Rs. 200,000 for the Government.

Roos-Keppel strongly urged the Government to accept Rawlinson's recommendations. He also suggested that, in the Kurram Agency, where people were "thoroughly loyal, reliable and devoted to the British Raj", the Government should altogether remit the deferred land revenue. For Tochi, Roos-Keppel proposed an increase of 15 per cent in the muafis and inams. The total amount of relief proposed by Roos-Keppel, for the four districts and two Agencies, was Rs. 220,400.

The Government of India accepted Roos-Keppel's recommendations for the Agencies. They also extended the term of the settlement in the Tochi Valley from ten to twenty years. But for the districts, the Chief Commissioner's recommendations were not accepted. The Supreme Government held that the general abolition of local rates and of the lambardari cess throughout the four districts would amount to giving the same relief to all areas, unnecessary in some and insufficient in others. The Government of India, therefore, decided to afford relief in individual cases of excessive enhancement in the Bannu and Hazara Districts, and to follow "a somewhat more liberal policy" in granting Frontier remissions in the Kohat District, asking the Chief Commissioner to make recommendations in accordance with this decision.

In the meantime, Merk had taken over as the Officiating Chief Commissioner. Merk, who was formerly the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, opened the issue afresh. A careful comparison of the Frontier districts with the neighbouring districts of Rawalpindi, Attock and Mianwali in the Punjab, which had been settled at the same time as the Frontier districts, led Merk to the conclusion that throughout, the tendency was to raise the Frontier districts far too

1. The local rate was 8.54 per cent of the land revenue collected from the revenue payers for the maintenance of village schools, dispensaries and roads etc.
2. The cess was 5 per cent of the land revenue.
4. The deferred revenue amounted to Rs. 16,500.
6. Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 23 September 1909. ibid.
rapidly, and this quite irrespective of the powerful ground of political expediency.

Merk, therefore, suggested outright remission of the deferred revenues in Kohat, Bannu and Hazara, totalling Rs. 143,339, and of another Rs. 75,000 to relieve cases of individual hardships in these districts which were not covered by the deferments. In addition, he recommended the remission of the goat tax in Hazara and the date-palm tax in the Tirkha Circle of the Bannu District, since both these taxes had been introduced in the new revised settlements.1

The Government of India accepted Merk's proposals regarding the remission of the date-palm tax and the goat tax; they also agreed to remit deferred revenue in Hazara, but only to the extent of Rs. 13,559. For the rest, the Supreme Government asked for more detailed and definite information before agreeing to the "large surrender of revenue proposed".2

Accordingly, Merk, with the assistance of his Revenue Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioners of Hazara, Kohat and Bannu, undertook a detailed scrutiny of the village note books and revenue administration papers. After this enquiry, Merk proposed that a total of Rs. 79,599 be remitted for the Hazara, Kohat and Bannu Districts.3 The proposal was accepted by the Government of India. It also granted, on Merk's suggestion, Frontier remissions of Rs. 2,205 to the border villages of the Teri Tahsil of the Kohat District, and extended the term of the Kurram settlement from twenty to thirty years.4 As a result of these modifications in the revenue demand, the percentage increases in the Hazara, Kohat, Bannu and Kurram Districts was reduced to 42, 30, 35 and 127, respectively.5

In addition to the remissions, the Government also continued their policy of revenue assignments to men of mark and influence in the Province. However except in Dera Ismail Khan, the total percentages of assignments were everywhere lower than they had been under the first regular settlement.6 In Dera Ismail Khan, the percentage was slightly increased. O'Dwyer, the Revenue Commissioner, justified the increase thus:

2. Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 31 March 1910, ibid.
6. The percentage of the gross revenue alienated in revenue assignments and Frontier remissions at the time of the second regular settlements was: Peshawar 17.3; Bannu 11.6; Hazara 23.0; D. I. Khan 39.0; and Kohat, both assigned and remitted, 48.0. See. p. 144, f. n. 1.
The liberality shown in the past and the present Settlements in the matter of assignments has borne good fruit. There is no other district on the Frontier where Government can count on such prompt and willing assistance, both from chiefs and people, whether in internal administration or in the event of trans-border complications; there is no district in which the relations between all classes of the people and the local officers are closer and more cordial.\(^1\)

One other policy was adopted to soften the effect of the increases in revenue demand. This was to introduce a local element, preferably Muslim, in the subordinate ranks of the settlement establishment in the districts. Formerly the *patwaris* and *kanungos* were all Hindus from the Punjab, and most of them were either money-lenders themselves or related to the local Hindu money-lenders. The majority of them had acquired lands profiting from increasing rural indebtedness. The Government strongly disapproved of such land acquisition by members of a non-agricultural community. Many Hindu *patwaris* and *kanungos* were therefore replaced by new ones, mostly local Muslims; and the change, so the Settlement Officers claimed, resulted in an improvement in the character and efficiency of the subordinate settlement establishment.\(^2\)

### III

An important feature of the land revenue administration of the Frontier Province was the application of several legislative Acts whose explicit intent was to ameliorate the condition of the agricultural community. Curzon, who stated that the Indian peasants "should be the first and final object of every Viceroy's regard",\(^3\) was mainly responsible for enunciating two important principles on which the British land revenue administration came to be based hereafter. The declared object of the principles was to save the peasant from ruin by restricting his power to alienate the land; and to encourage the people to co-operate for the mutual supply of capital at cheap and reasonable rates.\(^4\)

Of the several resolutions and Acts under Curzon's rule, the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1904), the Suspensions and Remissions Resolution (1905), the Resolution on *takavi* advances (1905), and the Resolution passed in the same year regarding the exemption from assessment of improvements made at the cost of private capital were the most important.

\(^2\) Glancy, *op.cit.*, p. 35; Watson, *op.cit.*, pp. 46-7; Dane, *op.cit.*, pp. 52-3.
\(^3\) Lovat Fraser, *India under Curzon and After*, p 148.
\(^4\) *Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture*, p.17, C.C., vol. 493.
Minto’s Viceroyalty was characterized by the “continuance and development” of Curzon’s policy.\(^1\)

These measures were applied to the Frontier Province with some amendments to suit local conditions. In trying to improve the lot of farmers in the Province, the Government had to reckon with the age-old local customs and practices associated with the land. There were, besides, political considerations dictating restraint on the part of the Government.

The Land Revenue Resolution of 16 January 1902 set the guide-lines for land revenue administration in the Frontier Province, as in other Provinces. The Resolution was an outcome of the famine of 1899-1900, which exposed the Government to the criticism, made by prominent civil servants, that “the intensity and frequency of recent famines were largely due to poverty caused by over-assessment”. The Resolution was a frank exposition and a spirited defence of the Government’s land revenue policy. It averred that

\[
\text{the cause of famine is want of rain and not over-assessment, and that improvement in assessment can at most be a mitigation, and not a preventive of distress.}^2
\]

It also laid down “liberal principles”, emphasizing moderation in revenue assessment and collection in respect of the progressive and graduated imposition of large enhancements; greater elasticity in the revenue collection, and a more general resort to reduction of assessment in cases of hardship.\(^3\) No doubt, while asking the Government of the Frontier Province to review their second regular settlements, the Supreme Government had taken these principles into consideration.\(^4\)

The extension of the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900) to the Frontier Province was another wholesome measure. The Act was passed to restrict the transfer of land from agriculturists to non-agriculturists, such transfer being attributed to the increasing rural indebtedness. Apart from increasing the holdings of successful landlords, land was passing from the hands of old land-owning families to an entirely new class of men, such as the money-lenders, the townsmen and prosperous merchants. Rural indebtedness was the result of several factors: the general poverty of the peasants, which obliged them to borrow in poor seasons and for any investment in developing their land; their traditional ceremonial extravag-

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1. Summary of Minto’s Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, p.31, Minto Papers, vol. M 851.
2. Summary of Curzon’s Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, pp. 17-80, C.C., vol. 493.
3. Ibid.
4. See above, pp. 149-153.
gances; their proneness to litigation and gambling; the excessive subdivisions and fragmentation of land; and the insecurity of harvests caused by a combination of uncertain rainfall and inadequate irrigation facilities. Borrowing was also promoted by the fact that the increased value of land, brought about by improved communication facilities and the opening of new markets, provided good security upon which to borrow. At the end of the nineteenth century, rural indebtedness and the sale and mortgaging of land had reached "an acute stage", especially in the Punjab, and the Government viewed it as a phenomenon likely to breed not only economic but "social and political discontent". The Punjab Land Alienation Act aimed at allaying this discontent.1

For the purposes of the Act, the population was divided into three categories: first, the agricultural tribes, the protection of whose interests was the prime object of the Act; second, statutory agriculturists—"a more or less artificial class"—who were not members of any agricultural tribe, but had "long and settled interest" in the land and were considered to have certain prescriptive claims which could not be "ignored by the Government", and who included the agriculturist money-lenders; third, the "trading usurers" from whom the agricultural tribes were particularly in need of protection. The second and third categories of people were free to sell or mortgage their land without restriction, but the first category of people were not allowed such freedom. They could sell their land only to an agriculturist of the same village or to members of the same agricultural tribe or group of tribes. They could, however, mortgage their land to members of the second or third categories of people, provided that the mortgager should "remain in cultivating possession" of the land at a reasonable rent, or that the mortgagee should hold possession of the land "for a reasonable time not exceeding twenty years, at the expiry of which the mortgage debt and interest thereon will be considered cancelled."2

As in the Punjab, so in the Frontier districts, land was passing from the hands of agriculturists to non-agriculturists. Between the first and second regular settlements, land alienations in the Frontier districts showed a slow but steady passing of agricultural tracts into the hands of Hindu sahukars or money-lenders. The extent of land acquisition by non-agriculturists was considered especially serious in the Dera Ismail Khan District. In this District, 11 per cent of the total area under mortgage at the time of the revised settlement in 1900-05 had been alienated to Hindu sahukars. The total

2. Ibid., p. 25. For a detailed study of the Act, see Norman G. Barrier, The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900.
area sold since the first regular settlement in the District was 386,495 acres, of which 112,680 acres or 29 per cent had been sold to Hindus. The percentage of the total proprietary area held by Hindus at the first regular settlement had been 3.4, and this increased to 8.1 per cent at the second settlement. In the Bannu District, the total cultivated area mortgaged was 99,484 acres, of which Hindu money-lenders held 43,843 acres or 44 per cent. In the Kohat District, 5.3 per cent of the cultivated area had been mortgaged to money-lenders, and 2 per cent of the total area had been sold to them since the first regular settlement. In this District most of the sales and mortgages, however, had been confined to landowners themselves. In the Hazara District, the total cultivated area under mortgage to non-agriculturists was 4 per cent, while 3 per cent of the total area had been sold to them since the first settlement. H.D. Watson, the Settlement Officer, reported that the Hindu sahukar had not yet obtained much hold on the land in the District; but "he was exhibiting an undoubted tendency to get more and more land into his clutches".

In 1898-99, while the Punjab Land Alienation Bill was under discussion, the Government of India had asked the Punjab Government for its opinion on whether or not the Frontier districts should be covered by the proposed legislation. The Supreme Government was against the idea because it thought that

it might be politically inadvisable to extend, to the Pathans of the trans-Indus, measures which might safely be applied to the Sikhs and Mohammedans of the cis-Indus districts.

The Punjab Government, however, was generally in favour of the proposal. In 1899, the Commissioners of Derajat and Peshawar fully discussed the Draft Bill and ascertained the feelings of the agricultural population in the Districts of Hazara, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu, where both official and non-official opinion was found to be in support of the scheme. In the case of Kohat, however, the scheme was adjudged unnecessary. In Peshawar, the official opinion was favourable, but the local agriculturists' feelings were not ascertained. When the Act was passed in 1900, its extension to the Frontier districts was deferred, pending further discussion of methods of applying the Act to these districts. The Punjab Government had not yet reached a final decision when the

question of separating the Frontier districts from the Punjab arose; and the Punjab Government then decided that the practicability of the Land Alienation Act in the Frontier could best be considered by the new administration when it came into being.¹

Nearly two years elapsed before the issue was taken up by Deane. He and O'Dwyer, the Revenue Commissioner, discussed the matter afresh with officials and the local agricultural population. It was found that as in the Punjab, owners of land were at first inclined to regard the proposed legislation with suspicion and disfavour, and since its introduction in the Punjab they have been jealously watching its working.

In Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan, where the population was “more Punjabi than Pathan”, there was “now a great preponderance of opinion” favourable to the Act. In Bannu, opinion was at first averse, but appeared “to be gradually veering round”. However, in the “purely Pathan” Districts of Peshawar and Kohat, local opinion was “on the whole adverse, particularly to any interference with the freedom of transfer”; here the feeling of personal and individual ownership of land was particularly strong. The small peasant proprietors apprehended that restrictions on the right to transfer land to an outsider “will place him at the mercy of the Khans and make them masters of the situation”, while for the well-to-do Khans and Maliks complete freedom of transfer of their land was the most essential means of living an extravagant life and gratifying their “love of litigation”.² In such circumstances, Deane considered it “impolitic to force the Punjab legislation on people who are not at present willing or able to appreciate its advantages”. He was, therefore, disposed to leave things as they were in Peshawar and Kohat, while recommending the extension of the Act only to Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.

Deane suggested two modifications in the Act. First, instead of three classes of people as specified in the Act, Deane would recognize only two classes—agriculturists and non-agriculturists—thus omitting the class designated in the Act as “Statutory Agriculturists”. Deane felt that it was from the latter community, too, that the agricultural tribes needed protection. In the Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts there was a strong community of agricultural money-lenders, mostly Hindus, who expropriated the hereditary agricultural tribes as effectively as common usurers elsewhere. As Lewis Tupper, the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, wrote in 1901, the “dividing line” between agriculturists and

¹. Ibid.
². Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 10 October 1903, op.cit.; Report of the Land Revenue Administration of North-West Frontier Province, 1901-02, pp. 14-5.
non-agriculturists in the Frontier districts was "really one of religion", and that the Government should "protect the bona fide agricultural tribesmen against the encroachments of the despised kirars [Hindu money-lenders]". In Derajat, especially, it was these "statutory agriculturists" or land owning kirars who were regarded as the chief danger to the agricultural community, and it was the expropriation of land to them which Deane wished to prevent.1

Secondly, Deane wanted to bring the occupancy tenants within the purview of the Act, imposing the same restrictions on their right to sell or mortgage land as had been imposed on the agricultural tribes. Between these tribes and the occupancy tenants, Deane pointed out, there were close ties of religion, race and vocation. In the three Districts of Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan about one-sixth of the total cultivated area was in the possession of occupancy tenants.2 The Government of India accepted Deane's proposals; and with these two amendments, the Punjab Land Alienation Act was extended to the Districts of Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan in June 1904.3

The effectiveness of the Act was soon realized. After three years of its working, it was reported that the zamindars regarded it as a "real boon". To belong to an agricultural tribe was now considered a privilege which was keenly sought after. The contraction of credit popularized the takavi advances, which were liberally given. A decrease in both sales and mortgages was noticed, as was curtailment in unnecessary expenditure on social occasions. Later in 1921-22, the Act was extended to Kohat and Peshawar Districts as well, when the Government found local agricultural tribes favourable to the measure.4

A necessary corollary to the Punjab Land Alienation Act was the amendment of the Law of Pre-emption in 1905. The new Pre-emption Regulation was applied to the Frontier Province in 1906. The Regulation provided that the right of pre-emption, that is the right of a person to acquire agricultural land or village immovable property, would be restricted to members of the agricultural tribes alone. The Regulation was intended to be complementary to the Land Alienation Act. Whereas the main objective of the Act was to prevent agricultural land passing permanently out of the hands of the old established agricultural commu-

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
ties of the Province, the Pre-emption Regulation sought to afford facilities for preserving the possession of such land within the community, when a member of an agricultural tribe wanted to sell within the family or tribe to which he belonged; and when a member of a non-agricultural tribe sold land that he happened to have acquired, the Regulation was intended "to provide a means of its ordinarily reverting to the possession of some members of an agricultural tribe".¹

The Suspensions and Remissions Resolution of March 1905 was put into effect in the Frontier Province in September 1907. This provided for greater elasticity in Government revenue demand at times of crop failures. It was, in Curzon's words,

an act of compassion on the part of the State, but it is compassion in a form little distinguishable from justice: for it relates to cases and seasons in which the cultivator cannot pay his fixed demand, because the crops which he has reaped barely suffice for his own sustenance, and where, if he is called upon to pay it, he can only do so by plunging deeper into debt. In such cases rigidity of collection is not only a hardship but an injustice.²

The Resolution established two circumstances justifying suspensions and remissions of land revenue: local calamities resulting from hailstorms, floods and locusts; and widespread calamities such as droughts and famines and general failure of crops. In case of local calamities, the Collector would inspect the affected fields, and ascertain the damage done to the crops in each field, before granting any suspension of revenue. Thereafter, the Collector would await Government orders for remissions. In granting suspensions or recommending remissions, the Collector should use his discretion, taking into account the wealth or poverty of the revenue payer and the extent of damage to crops. Three classes of people could be excluded from the relief offered: men who were known to be bad landlords and rack-renters; those well-to-do landowners who could pay revenue without jeopardizing their future solvency; and the capitalists, money-lenders and such other men who held land as an investment. In case of widespread calamities, resulting in the failure of more than half the normal crops, the principle of relief was: "the degree of relief should increase, as the field decreases, more rapidly than the degree of failure". Suspension or remission of land revenue was to follow a proportionate suspension or remission of rents payable by the tenants to the landlords.

No differentiation was to be made between rich and poor villages and between rich and poor revenue payers.¹

Another Resolution prepared under Curzon, but passed in May 1906 under Minto, provided that agricultural improvements effected by private individuals should be exempted from the enhancement of land revenue. The exemptions were applicable to reclaimed waste lands and to privately constructed wells, tanks and embankments.² In the Frontier Province, these exemption rules were thought sufficiently liberal to provide a "strong stimulus" for the improvement of land by private initiative. In regard to reclamation of small areas of waste land adjoining cultivated tracts, the rule was that, if these areas had been reclaimed during the currency of a settlement, they would not be assessed until the term of the settlement had expired. The considerable stimulus provided by the rule was seen in the reclamation of 27,000 acres of waste land in the Kohat District in just two years, from 1904 to 1906. Similar reclamation had been achieved in the Hazara District as well. Lands whose productivity had increased as a result of the construction or renovation of wells, tanks and embankments by local people were also exempted from assessment for a term of twenty years. In cases where private irrigation works had fallen into disuse, the Deputy Commissioner had the power to remit the revenue from land under such works. There was also provision for relief to individual revenue payers when their holdings deteriorated during the currency of a settlement on account of diluvium, deposit of sand, spread of salt and water-logging.³

Two other measures for agricultural development were introduced during the same period: first, the grant of more liberal state assistance to ryots in the form of takavi loans, and second, the provision of credit facilities to agriculturists through co-operative credit societies, established by an Act of 1904. In the North-West Frontier Province, as elsewhere in India, the grant of takavi loans to ryots was made under the Land Improvement Loans Act of 1883 and the Agriculturists Loans Act of 1884. The object of the first Act was to grant long term loans for permanent improvements such as the sinking of wells, construction of dams and embankments, excavation of new tanks and channels. The second Act provided

short term loans for current agricultural needs such as the purchase of seeds, cattle, manure and implements. In 1905, the Government of India passed a Resolution which aimed at securing “greater liberality, greater simplicity and greater elasticity” in the grant of State loans to farmers. The Resolution provided for greater leniency in the Government demand for security from them. It was left to the Local Government’s discretion to remit outstanding instalments or part of them, when the work for which the loan was granted failed due to unforeseen circumstances. It was also provided that the suspension of land revenue should automatically involve the suspension of takavi payments. In the Frontier Province a slow and gradual increase took place in the amount of agricultural loans advanced by the Government. In 1901-02, the loans amounted to Rs. 142,844, which increased to Rs. 176,655 in 1910-11, and to Rs. 251,487 in 1919-20—an increase of 75 per cent in two decades.

These takavi loans, though useful, were too small to make good the contraction of credit caused by the passing of the Punjab Land Alienation Act. As a further measure to restore credit, and as a means of imbibing the peasants with the spirit of self-help, the Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed in 1904. The object of the Act was, as expressed by Curzon, “to make the cultivating classes themselves the borrowers”, to improve their credit, develop their thrift and to train them “to utilize for their own benefit the great advantage... of mutual co-operation”. The justification for the co-operative movement lay in the fact that an isolated and powerless individual can, by association with others, and by moral development and mutual support, obtain in his own degree the material advances available to wealthy or powerful persons, and thereby develop himself to the fullest extent of his natural abilities.

The co-operative movement in the Frontier Province had a very slow beginning. In 1904, the Local Government decided to start a few co-operative societies on an experimental basis. The societies would be managed by Settlement Officers and Revenue Assistants; their object being to provide capital to peasants for the purchase of seeds and implements, for effecting improvement in the land, and for enabling them to tide over difficulties resulting from bad harvests. Two such societies were set up in Dera Ismail Khan. In 1907-08, their total membership amounted

1. Summary of Minto’s Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, p. 3, Minto Papers, vol. M 851.
to only 98 persons, with a total working capital of Rs. 860. In 1905, it was decided to start a society in the Marwat Tahsil of the Bannu District; but "the opposition by an orthodox Mohammedan population to the taking of interest" was so great that there was doubt about the success of the society. It took several years before the co-operative movement got a substantial footing in the Frontier Province. By 1930, the number of societies had increased to 106, the number of members to 5,825, and the amount of capital to nearly Rs. 900,000. The Government's attitude to the movement was one of "wise restraint" because experience had shown the difficulties that had to be overcome in instilling into the Pathan mind the true spirit of co-operation, without which the movement could not hope for success.

The measures so far outlined had all been designed to protect the agricultural classes and to provide financial aid for them in the pursuit of their own traditional farming. In 1901, however, a first move was made to apply the resources of Government to the improvement of farming methods, when the Imperial Agricultural Department was set up with an Inspector General of Agriculture as its head. In pursuance of Curzon's "new economic policy based on science and efficiency", an Agricultural Institute was opened at Pusa in Bihar in 1904, which later became a famous centre for "agricultural research, experiment, education and demonstration". The provincial Governments were also encouraged to set up agricultural departments and to open agricultural colleges and experimental farms. In 1905, Deane submitted his proposals for an agricultural department for his Province under a Superintendent of Farms. He also proposed to establish an experimental agricultural farm in the Peshawar District. Accordingly, an area of 100 acres was selected in 1906 for that purpose about 10 miles east of Peshawar. The farm, known as the Tarnab Farm, later served as a centre of agriculture research in the Province. To equip the Farm with trained staff, the Government of India, in 1905-07, granted agricultural scholarships to five Frontier students, belonging to agricultural tribes, for a three-year training course in the Kanpur Agriculture College. All were later employed on the Farm.

However, Deane's scheme to establish a Department of Agriculture

2. Ibid., 1904-05, p. 16.
5. Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After, pp. 172-3.
in the Province did not materialize until four years later, when, in May 1910, Robertson-Brown, the Superintendent of the Agri-Herboriculture Gardens of Lahore was appointed the head of the Department.¹

Roos-Keppel exhibited keen interest in the development of both agriculture and fruit culture in his Province. District officers, Political Agents and Extra Assistant Commissioners were urged to visit the Tarnab Farm and to encourage agricultural improvements, which the Chief Commissioner believed would "appeal more to the people than anything else".² At Tarnab Farm were grown improved strains of cereals, imported from Australia and America, and finer varieties of cash crops like sugar cane and tobacco, with the help of English and American imported implements. The finest varieties of peaches, plums, apricots, grapes and oranges were brought from Pusa, Simla, Quetta, Saharanpur and Lahore for the Peshawar, Hazara, Bannu and Kurram farms.³

The administration of the Frontier Province began with the heavy work of the revised settlements in four Frontier districts. In addition, the Daur Valley and the Kurram Agency were also settled for the first time. The resettlement operations removed the defects found in the records of rights in land and water of the previous settlements, while much relief was afforded to the cultivators of Dera Ismail Khan by the adoption of the fluctuating system of assessment on a large scale. The very big increases proposed in Government revenue demand under the revised settlements for a moment threatened to make the Frontier Province administration generally disliked. But rethinking over the next few years led to smaller and more gradual increases being introduced, which did bring the Government a modest share in the increased prosperity of agriculture, but avoided any outcry.

The earlier policy of liberal land revenue assignments and Frontier remissions was continued in order to keep the class of privileged and loyal British subjects attached to the administration. A more popular change introduced into the subordinate revenue establishment was the recruitment of local people, especially Muslims, as patwaris and kanungos. (This was an indication, too, that the Muslim community was by this time taking to modern education.) These changes apart, until 1911, the land administration of the Frontier Province did not seem very different from that of its predecessor.

The establishment of the Agricultural Department in 1911, however.

was a great landmark in the agricultural development of the Province. It helped to promote an improved agronomy within limits of an inadequate infrastructure. The personal interest shown by Roos-Keppel did much in popularizing the newly established agricultural farms in the districts and the Agencies alike.

Various measures relating to the land and welfare of the peasantry, passed by the Supreme Government for India as a whole or for the Punjab, were also introduced in the Frontier Province; but here one special tendency was noticeable: new measures were introduced and applied with more caution than in other areas, since here particular regard had to be paid to local usages, customs and traditions.
VI

IRRIGATION

A REVIEW of irrigation in the North-West Frontier Province in this period presupposes a general understanding of the meteorological conditions in the Province, which rendered such irrigation necessary. Except in Hazara, where annual rainfall varied from 30 inches in the south to 50 inches in the hill tracts, the annual average rainfall in the rest of the Province was under 20 inches. It was, besides, uncertain and uneven in distribution and liable to failure or serious deficiency. In such circumstances, cultivation had to depend on an artificial system of watering crops, for which there were varied methods: the use of wells, hill torrents, perennial streams, and canals.

The Pathan expressed his knowledge of the value of irrigation in a proverb: "There are four good things in life—river water, wheat on irrigated land, weeping rice, and the strength of a young man." No wonder, then, the Pathan jealously safeguarded his rights and interests in water. These rights, like those in land, were very old and usually inherited. Originally, land for cultivation that depended on irrigation was

1. Report of the Land Revenue Administration, N.W.F.P., 1901-02, p. 10; Imperial Gazetteer of India (Provincial Series), North-West Frontier Province, 1908, p. 11.

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parcelled out among the main sections of the tribes. Subsequently, the amount of labour which the different subsections of the tribes contributed to the maintenance, improvement and extension of the existing irrigation facilities determined their shares in water. These practical shares hardened into rights that passed from generation to generation. During Sikh rule, in some places, these rights were replaced by new ones based upon the principle that a person who paid kalang or tribute should receive proprietary rights to both soil and water. In tappas\(^1\) having an abundant water supply, shares and rights in water created no problems; but where the water supply was inadequate, the tribesmen were naturally tenacious in maintaining their rights and occasionally also fought over them. In fact, they looked upon these rights as distinct from those in land—as "separate properties, being bought, sold and mortgaged independently"\(^2\).

The distribution of water among villages was determined by local customs of great variety and intricacy. Investigation into water rights during the time of the first regular settlements of the Frontier districts, between 1868 and 1880, provided Settlement Officers with much information about local customs and traditions concerning the distribution and use of water. In the Bannu District, each main canal was the joint property of a number of villages, most of which had a fixed share in the water, whether drawn off directly or from a branch channel. Water was distributed into these villages by means of sluices, known locally as sittas,\(^3\) and the unit of measuring the volume of water to be distributed was called a ganda or guta.\(^4\) At the important points of diversion, watchmen (chalweshtis) were posted to superintend the distribution of water. The cultivator's turn (war) for using the water was regulated by the casting of lots (isk).\(^5\) In the Peshawar District, water was turned from the river-bed into walas (irrigation channels) by means of dams. The villages near the head of the channel were called sar-i-warakhs, while those further down were called pain-warakhs. The system of division and distribution of water in a section (kandi) of a village was rather complicated. The shares (bakhras) of a kandi were first grouped by fours; for the irrigation of every four bakhras, a period of time (wakt)

1. See supra, p. 134.
3. A log or board of wood laid horizontally under water across the main and branch channels to regulate the flow of water. Thorburn, op.cit., p. 98.
4. Boards or stakes backed by clods, stones and brush-wood used to divide the width of the water section. The smaller unit is called ganda, and the larger guta. Ibid., p.98.
5. Ibid.
was fixed, this being either from sunrise to sunset or vice versa. Lots (pucha) settled the order of turns (naubats) among the cultivators. Sar-i-warakh fields normally got the water before the pain-warakh fields. But if, due to an insufficient supply of water, the land of a proprietor remained unirrigated, at the next turn of water distribution, he was entitled to claim the water first. In Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan similar customs, called iara and saroba-paina, prevailed, according to which lands at the head of a stream or channel were entitled to receiving their share of water before the lower fields. Water disputes usually took place when its supply was scanty or people failed to agree on a fair and equitable distribution of water among themselves. It was on such occasions that intervention by Government officials became necessary. In the Peshawar District, complaints were mostly made by the proprietors of pain warakh villages against those of the sar-i-warakh villages, charging them with theft of water and tampering with the heads of the distributaries.

When the North-West Frontier Province was formed, only 28 per cent of the gross cultivated area (2,639,727 acres) was irrigated. Of the total irrigated area, about 2 per cent was under well irrigation, confined mostly to the Swabi Tahsil of the Peshawar District and the Indus Valley in Dera Ismail Khan; 3 per cent of the irrigated area was watered by perennial streams in all the five districts; another 3 per cent was inundated by river floods, mostly in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. The remaining 20 per cent was canal irrigated. With 40 per cent of its cultivated area under irrigation, Peshawar was the most fully irrigated District.

The canals of the Province utilized the waters of the Swat and Kabul Rivers in Peshawar; of the Kurram River in the Kurram Agency and Bannu; of the Tochi River in the Daur Valley (in North Waziristan) and Bannu; and of the minor tributaries of the Indus in Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The Indus formed the eastern boundary of the Province for about 200 miles. The Punjab Government had, until 1901-02, done nothing to utilize the waters of this river for irrigating the Frontier districts. The mountainous nature of the country along the Indus banks in Hazara and Kohat and its rapid fall to the River in

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3. Hastings, op.cit., p. 279; Wace, op.cit., p. 312; Thorburn, op.cit., p.98.
4. At present, Swabi is one of the tahsils of the Mardan District.
Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan made canal construction difficult.1

There were four categories of canals in the Frontier districts under the Punjab administration. The first, the private "unscheduled" canals,2 existed in all districts except Peshawar. These communal canals were the "property of the people".3 Some of them were very old, like the Kachkot and Chasna Canals in Bannu, built by the Mangals and Hanni tribes in the fourteenth century. These canals had always been managed by representatives of the Government of the day, whose supervision ensured their efficient working. Under the British Government, the Deputy Commissioners undertook the management of these canals on behalf of the people. No canal tax beyond a small cess to cover the expenses of an establishment of Mirabs or supervisors of irrigation was levied on these private canals. The users of irrigation had the customary obligation of furnishing free labour for the construction of dams (bunds) and for silt clearance.4 Dam-building was undertaken jointly by all the share-holding villages of a canal under their tappa Maliks or other representative managers. When a village failed to furnish its quota of labourers, the manager levied a fine called nagha or absentee fee. The receipts from this fine were credited to special canal funds in the districts.5

The second category of canals comprised the zamindari or scheduled canals of the Peshawar District. Most of these canals had been constructed by the Mughal or Durrani kardars6 between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The most important of these works were the Jui Zardad, the Jui Mamun, and the Shahi Mahal. The last-named canal used to irrigate six villages forming the privy purse estate of Ahmad Shah Abdali.7 As was the case with private canals in other districts, a Mirabi cess was levied on the zamindari canals, too. After 1898, these canals were managed by the Deputy Commissioner under the Peshawar Canals Regulation (1898).8 This Regulation gave the Government full authority over the canals, vesting the Deputy Commissioner with all powers of control, management and direction necessary for the efficient maintenance and working of the canals, and for fair distribution of their

1. Ibid., p. 10.
2. The North India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, and the Peshawar Canals Regulations, 1898, described the unscheduled canals as those not constructed, controlled, and maintained by the Government. P. Hari Rao, The Punjab Acts (Civil, Criminal and Revenue), 1798-1924, pp. 441-2, 525-7.
4. Ibid., p.9.
5. Thorburn, op.cit., pp. 100-02.
8. Ibid.
water. The right-holders (those entitled to use the canal) were obliged to furnish unpaid labour for effecting the annual silt clearance and maintaining the canal in an efficient state. The Deputy Commissioner was empowered to resolve disputes between right-holders regarding the use of water and the construction and maintenance of the water-courses. But the order of a Deputy Commissioner was not final, because it could be set aside by the decree of a civil court. The Regulation further provided that the Local Government might direct that the cost of any establishment necessary for the control and management of the canal should be recovered from the right-holders. The Local Government could also at any time "suspend or extinguish" any right to which a person was entitled over any scheduled canal; but compensation would be paid to the person affected. On these canals also, a Mirabi cess was levied.

The third category of canals consisted of those constructed with District Board loans. The two built in this period were the Michni Canal, begun in 1896, which took off from the left bank of the Kabul River about a mile above the Michni Fort, and the Shabkadar Branch Canal, constructed in 1896, which started from the right bank of the Swat River in the Peshawar District. The Michni Canal was some 8.5 miles long and irrigated 3,600 acres. The Shabkadar Branch Canal was 1.5 miles long and watered about 1,800 acres. A water rate had to be paid by the users of both these canals.

Finally, in the fourth category, there were the most important canals of the Province, those owned and managed by the Punjab Government—the Swat, Kabul and Bara River canals in the Peshawar District.

Over all these categories of canals, Government exercised some degree of control; and in all, it had a variety of economic and political interests. All Indian Governments, the British included, were interested in irrigation, because it increased the yields and security of agriculture, from which Government drew the major part of their revenues. The extension of irrigation also meant an extension of the settled population of tribesmen with a valuable permanent stake in the land, who, for that reason, were more open to Government control. Both these aspects of irrigation were readily grasped by the Punjab Government. From the first, therefore, it was Government policy to maintain, improve and extend the indigenous irrigation works, and canals especially. This was an inheri-

3. Ibid., p.11.
4. Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.F.P., 1908, pp. 44-5.
5. D.G. Harris, Irrigation in India, p. 99.
ted duty, a potent means of extending Government influence, and also a useful source of practical experience that might later be applied to larger works to harness rivers and construct canals. Revenues could be increased; waste tracts populated; as elsewhere in India, even financially unproductive works might be undertaken as an insurance against drought and famine; and, at all times, irrigation works could be used to "pacify" the lawless tribes.

The first of the Government's projects to be undertaken, the Swat River Canal, very clearly demonstrates the many purposes canal construction could serve; for though it was designed to irrigate the dry, unproductive plains in the north-east of the Peshawar Valley, its construction was also prompted by political considerations. It was clearly hoped that

if only members of the Mohmand and other tribes from beyond the Frontier could be induced, by the promise of good crops, to settle peacefully in British territory, a great step forward would... have been made in the direction of promoting habits of industry and friendly intercourse among the border clans.¹

The original plan, made in 1874, was to irrigate an area of 126,000 acres at a cost of Rs. 1,945,000; and the canal was expected to yield a return of 10.7 per cent on capital outlay.² The construction of the canal posed a formidable problem for the Government. It was to pass through "a most forbidding country" with an average annual rainfall of only 14 inches—a barren, treeless and unpeopled tract. The tribesmen from beyond the border raided the work sites and killed a number of labourers, while those within the area were sullenly hostile. In consequence, armed guards had to be employed to protect the working parties at considerable cost, which increased still further when it was found that workers had to be given higher wages to keep them from leaving.³ The work suffered a major interruption during the Second Afghan War (1878-80). Thereafter revised estimates put the total cost at Rs. 3,454,810; the net area to be irrigated at only 90,000 acres; and the net revenue yield at 3.7 per cent of the capital outlay. The Canal was classed as a "Famine Relief Protective Public Work". It was completed in 1885 and proved a great success.⁴ "Even the most optimistic hopes originally entertained of the project fell far short of the results actually achieved."⁵

2. Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-8, pp. 348-56.
5. Harris, op.cit., p.45.
Contrary to all expectations, it was developed with astonishing rapidity, and soon became an outstanding financial and political success. Cultivation, green fields, trees and peaceful villages sprang into existence; despite its early vicissitudes, a canal has seldom been so happily and unexpectedly favoured by fortune.1

Waste and deserted land (maira) was brought under cultivation, leading to an increase in the production of crops and in population.2 Within four years of its completion, the Canal provided water to over 107,910 acres. In 1900-01, the area irrigated increased to 166,031 acres; and the percentage of net revenue on capital outlay then rose to 10.41.3 The tribes also derived such economic benefits from the Canal that they changed their earlier hostile attitude to it, which led the Chief Engineer, J. Benton, to remark that the tribesmen "generally regard the Canal as wholly beneficial, and are the enemies of any who would seek to injure canal works".4

The Kabul River Canal was another important state-owned project. Its construction began in 1885 and took five years to complete. The Canal was taken out from the right bank of the Kabul River at Warsak; its total length was 38 miles, of which 23 were in the Peshawar and 15 in the Nowshera Tehsil. This Canal, too, proved highly remunerative. The capital outlay on it, up to 1903-04, amounted to Rs. 501,241; the total area irrigated was 29,427 acres; and the net revenue earned was Rs. 55,135, or 11 per cent on the capital outlay. The revenue management of the Canal rested with the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and its maintenance and the regulation of water supply were the responsibility of the Irrigation Department.5

The Bara River Canal was of the scheduled type. The Bara River supplied water for drinking and irrigation purposes to the Mohmand and Khalil villages6 as well as to the Cantonment and City of Peshawar. The supply of water often ran short in summer, which gave rise to constant disputes between the Mohmands and Khalils, and created difficulties for the peoples in the Cantonment and City as well. In 1897, therefore, the weir and upper distributaries of a canal from the Bara River were constructed by the Punjab Irrigation Department to ensure

1. Newhouse (Frederick) and Others, *Irrigation*, p.54.
6. There were about 34 villages to the west and south of the Peshawar District inhabited by the settled clans of Mohmands and Khalils.
a better distribution of the river water. A water rate was levied on this canal.¹

The formation of the Frontier Province in 1901 coincided with the appointment of the Indian Irrigation Commission,² which considered the utility of irrigation as a protection against famine and drought. The Commission made certain recommendations regarding irrigation in the new Province; and with the implementation of these recommendations, the irrigation development in the Province entered upon a new phase.

The Commission emphasized the potential protective and remunerative value of the construction of the Hazarkhani branch of the Kabul River Canal in the Peshawar District and the Paharpur Canal in the Dera Ismail Khan District. Their construction in the past had been held in abeyance “solely for want of funds”.³ The Commission also recommended the improvement and development of private irrigation works in the montane and submontane districts of the Province, because their collective protective value was thought to be considerable. The Commission advised the construction of “long low dams across the beds of the streams as they debouch from the hills, so as to form, not storage reservoirs, but distributary basins by which flood waters can be drawn off into a radiating system of distributaries”. The Commission’s recommendations also mentioned assistance to farmers in the form of takavi advances, liberal grants in aid and departmental advice. To resolve water disputes, the Commission advised that rights in water should be as carefully recorded as those in land.⁴

These recommendations were gradually implemented. The first step taken was to improve the minor canals and to bring them under closer Governmental supervision, management and control. With this end in view, the Punjab Minor Canals Act III of 1905 was extended to the Frontier Province in 1907. Hitherto, as already observed,⁵ the management of the minor, private canals, though under the Deputy Commissioner, was in fact based on the acquiescence of the people and their local customs and traditions. By and large, this arrangement worked well; but its working depended “almost entirely” on the initiative of the Deputy Commissioner. An enterprising and bold officer could, with the consent of the people, extend and improve irrigation; but one who

¹. Dane, op.cit., pp. 5, 12.
⁴. Ibid., para 63.
⁵. See supra, pp. 169-70.
lacked these qualities, and who wanted to avoid involvement in disputes over water distribution and water rights, could easily justify his inaction by pleading the want of necessary legal powers. Further, the increased value of rights in land and water over the years had to a great extent altered the attitude of the people. Now they often had recourse to courts of law to question executive orders in matters of canal administration; so that Revenue Officers did not find it easy to carry out their duties. In fact, all the Deputy Commissioners and Settlement Officers had been urging the Local Government to enact a regulation on the lines of the Punjab Minor Canals Act; even the Judicial Officers supported this demand, because they found it “almost impossible” to decide the cases involving complex questions of water rights and disputes. The Punjab Minor Canals Act embodied several of the useful provisions of the Peshawar Canals Regulation (1898); but it also went beyond and was an improvement on the latter.¹ For instance, Section 13 of the Peshawar Canals Regulation had empowered the Collector to pass orders on a water dispute which remained in force until set aside by orders of a civil court; whereas under Section 43 of the Punjab Minor Canals Act, the Collector’s order was final unless set aside on appeal by the Commissioner, and it could not be questioned in a civil court. The latter provision was considered useful in dealing with a population prone to ruinous litigation, and with cases which could more easily be disposed of by Revenue Officers than by Civil courts. Again, the nagha, or the compensation payable by someone who failed to furnish unpaid labour for canals, was recoverable as a fine under Section 9 (2) (c) of the Peshawar Canals Regulation; whereas under Section 68 of the Punjab Minor Canals Act, it could be realized as an arrear of the land revenue. On these grounds, Deane, in December 1905, urged the Government to apply the Punjab Minor Canals Act to the Frontier Province. The interests involved, both of the people and the Government, he pointed out, were considerable. The total irrigated area under private canals in the four Districts of Kohat, Hazara, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu was 432,000 acres, of which the latter two accounted for 200,000 and 154,000 acres, respectively; a special arrangement for the efficient working of the private canals in these two Districts was therefore essential. Deane’s proposal was accepted; and in February 1907, the Punjab Minor Canals Act was extended to the Frontier Province, with certain modifications to suit local conditions, and the Peshawar

¹. The new Act was an improvement in the eyes of the Executive; whether the summary procedures, untestable in the courts, were an improvement in the eyes of the people might be open to doubt.
Canals Regulation was repealed.¹

The next step taken by the Government was the improvement of the Daman system of irrigation in the Dera Ismail Khan District. The Daman was the upland tract lying between the Indus Valley and the Sulaiman Range that formed the western boundary of the District. In this area, agriculture depended—and still depends to some extent—mainly on floods caused by hill torrents (rodhkohi) swelled by melted snow or heavy rains in the hills. In describing this system of irrigation, Captain Crosthwaite, the Settlement Officer of Daman, wrote in 1903:

...the waters of these torrents are caught by dams and spread out through shallow channels into the embanked fields. These fields are flooded and the water sinks into the ground leaving a rich deposit of silt. As the lands attached to each series of dams are irrigated, the dam is cut and the water sent down to the next dam of the series. These torrents, when held up by the dams, which are often imperfectly built and break under the rush of the flood-water, continually cut out new channels or form ravines, and the whole country is seamed by the scour of the flood-water. Throughout the tract, especially in its centre, there are large areas of land which are above the reach or beyond the limits of the flood-water. In these cultivation is only possible by draining the barren plains of their meagre rainfall and collecting the supply so obtained in embanked fields.²

Under this system of irrigation, cultivation was precarious and the condition of the people, naturally, hard.

"There is no tract in the Punjab", Crosthwaite pointed out, "or in the North-West Frontier Province, in which the conditions of life are so arduous. The extremely precarious cultivation depends on the hill torrents. These often fail... Without the laborious building of dams, the embanking of fields and the construction of many channels and of the "pals"³ on the catchment areas, the Daman would lie a desert plain scored with huge ravines with a few trees in their beds".⁴

Under the Daman system of irrigation, the cultivators, in keeping with age-old customs, supplied free labour for the construction and repair of the irrigation dams, called sadds, and for the maintenance of the channels. Fines (nagha) were levied on defaulters and credited to an excluded local fund known as the Saddana or Embankment Fund.⁵

1. Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 22 December 1905, 1 February 1906; Secy., Govt. of India, to Agent to Governor-General, N.W.F.P., 12 May 1906, I.R.A.P., (Land Revenue), vol. 7335, May 1906, Proc. Nos. 19-21; Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 28 November 1906; Under-Secy. to Govt. of India to Agent to Governor-General, N.W.F.P., 2 February 1907, ibid., vol. 7610, February 1907, Proc. Nos. 4-5.
3. Pals are flanking embankments forming a continuation of the main dam which prevents the water falling back into its old channel.
Until 1903, the Government had taken no interest in the Daman irrigation; which led J. Wilson, the acting Settlement Commissioner of the Dera Ismail Khan District, to condemn the Government's policy as "short-sighted" and "illiberal". He observed that although the income from land revenue depended on the maintenance of the many embankments which stemmed the floods caused by the hill torrents, the Government had hitherto contributed practically nothing towards their cost. They are made and maintained by the labour of the people, and even the pay of the establishment necessary has been defrayed from a fund made up of fines levied from absentees. This is not only shabby but short-sighted policy. More especially in future where the assessment will probably be entirely fluctuating, any improvement in irrigation will at once result in an increase of land revenue, and any falling off in the area irrigated will be at once followed by a decrease. It is, therefore, to the pecuniary interest of the Government to contribute to the cost of these embankments.

Wilson recommended that the Government should, not only defray the expenses of the irrigation supervisory staff, but allocate substantial funds towards the construction of new embankments. This was in keeping with the recommendations of the Irrigation Commission. He also suggested that a separate fund be created for carrying out irrigation works in Dera Ismail Khan.¹

But no action was taken on these recommendations until 1905, when O'Dwyer suggested the improvement of Daman irrigation. To raise the funds required for the improvement, he recommended that a revised cess of Rs. 3½ per cent on the land revenue be paid by the cultivators; the Government and the assignees of land revenue² themselves contributing an equal amount. Secondly, O'Dwyer asked for an enlargement of the existing irrigation establishment at Government cost. Finally, to do away with the "oppressive" nagha system, under which labour for canal clearance, repair and construction of dams etc. had hitherto been provided free, O'Dwyer suggested moderate wages for the labourers. The Government of India accepted these proposals.³

Improvement was also effected in the irrigation system of the Bannu District, where the principal means of irrigation were the Kurram and Lohra Canals. The defective working of the Kurram canals was pointed

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¹. Ibid., cited by O'Dwyer in the above letter.
². See Chapter V, pp. 146-7.
³. O'Dwyer to Deputy Secy., Govt. of India, 3 August 1905, I.R.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 7334, January 1906, Proc. Nos. 37-9; Secy., Govt. of India, to Agent to Governor-General, N.W.F.P., 19 December 1905, ibid.
out in 1907 by R. I. R. Glancy, the Settlement Officer of Bannu.

There is no masonry weir at the head of the [Kurram] Valley; wherever possible water is drawn off from the river all along its course by means of rough boulder dams which are carried away by any heavy flood: many of the canals are aligned on wrong principles; proper escapes are not provided; the natural line of drainage is often blocked and large areas are water-logged. The system is faulty and wasteful in the extreme.¹

It was in September 1907 that Deane asked for the improvement of irrigation works in Bannu, emphasizing how heavily the Government receipts out of land revenue depended on these works. He pointed out that in the resettlement operations of 1903-07,² the fixed assessment in the District had been raised to Rs. 260,000; that but for the existing private canals as much as 21,000 acres of land would not have been cultivated at all, or at the most would have paid a dry rate of not more than four annas per acre, yielding a total revenue of about Rs. 30,000 for the Government; and that, without irrigation, Government would have lost Rs. 230,000 of land revenue from the District.³ Deane’s conclusion was that the Government should take a greater interest in the private canals of the District, and that, as a first step, a small but experienced engineering establishment should be appointed to maintain the canals in good working order and to draw up schemes for their improvement and extension. The appointment of a qualified canal engineer from the Irrigation Department was asked for because the control and supervision of the perennial canals in Bannu involved a task

of a delicate and arduous nature requiring not only considerable technical skill but special tact and force of character in dealing with the Pathan population, jealous of their rights and apt to resent any ill-considered interference with the traditional system of canal management.⁴

Deane also wanted an enlarged revenue establishment to deal with the complicated issues of water distribution, allotment and collection of statutory labour, preparation of lists of defaulters, collection of fines, and reporting cases of damage from deficient or excessive water supply. Deane also proposed a uniform cess of 2.5 per cent on the land revenue and an equal amount from Government to pay for the enlarged revenue

². See Chapter V, p. 145.
³. Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 2 September 1907; Deputy Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 7 December 1907, I.L.R.P., vol. 7612, December 1907, Proc. Nos. 41-6.
The Government of India accepted all of Deane's recommendations, except the one regarding the cess, since they were inclined to abolish the cess altogether, because this would be in keeping with their general policy of abolishing cesses wherever possible. Deane insisted on the retention of the cess, pointing out that, since the owners of canal irrigated land in Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan were paying a similar cess, its abolition in Bannu would make it hard to justify its retention in the other districts. Further, since the new assessment on canal lands was "extremely light", people could easily pay the cess. Moreover, labour supplied by the people was light, as the canals were perennial, the population dense and the need for canal clearance, owing to the rapid slope of the ground, comparatively slight. These arguments had the desired effect: the Indian Government did not press for the abolition of the cess, and they asked the Chief Commissioner to pay a moderate rate of wages to those who had the customary obligation to provide free labour for the maintenance of the canals. The arrangement, so Roos-Keppel observed later, proved "popular and fairly satisfactory", which justified its continuance.

Deane did not find much opportunity for the improvement of minor canals in the other districts—Hazara, Kohat and Peshawar. The hill streams in these three districts were snow fed and perennial. In Hazara and Kohat, they were fully utilized by a system of distributaries constructed and maintained by the people themselves. In Peshawar, the hill streams were diverted into Government and private canals.

The Irrigation Commission's recommendations for takavi loans and liberal grants-in-aid to cultivators for irrigation works was also acted upon by the North-West Frontier administration. From 1903, sums varying from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 32,000 per annum were spent on takavi loans for the construction of minor irrigation works in the Province. These grants, Deane informed the Indian Government, were much appreciated by the people and a good many useful though "unpretentious" schemes were carried out with their help.

2. Deputy Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 7 December 1907, ibid.
4. Deputy Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 4 May, 11 June 1908, ibid.
7. Ibid.
In 1906, the Indian Government took another important step to improve private irrigation works by enacting legislation to enforce the obligation to repair them. All Local Governments were asked to report, first, on existing laws and customs obliging landlords and tenants to repair irrigation works, and, secondly, on whether any measures were required to make these more effective and enforce their observance.¹

For the Frontier Province, Deane reported that in the five settled districts the obligations of the irrigation had always been embodied in a statement called the *Riwaj-i-Abpashi*. The statement was first compiled for the Peshawar District during the Settlement of 1892-6, and for other districts during the Revised Settlements (1900-1907).² It embodied the customs regarding water distribution, construction of new channels, their maintenance and repair, and silt clearance. Penalties were imposed on land owners and tenants for non-performance of their stipulated duties and obligations, which were well-known and accepted. The disadvantage of working through the *riwaj* was that no clear enforcement system existed. Deane, therefore, proposed that the Punjab Minor Canals Act should be extended to the Frontier Province, so as to provide a legal and administrative mechanism for enforcing penalties on defaulters. Sections 26 and 27 of this Act empowered the Local Government to compel the irrigators to furnish free labour for clearing the canals and keeping them in an efficient state. The Collectors would frame rules regarding the amount of labour to be furnished, the attendance, distribution and control of labourers. They would assess and recover the cost of such labour from defaulters and spend that money on the upkeep of the canals. These provisions, in Deane’s view, were sufficient to ensure the efficient working of the private canals in his Province, and no further definition of existing irrigation laws and customs was required. Deane’s proposals were accepted; and in February 1907, these sections of the Punjab Minor Canals Act were duly extended to the Frontier Province.³

From improving and extending private irrigation works, the Frontier Province authorities again turned to the construction of State irrigation projects: the Paharpur Inundation Canal, the Hazarkhani Branch of the

². See Chapter V, p. 146.
Kabul River Canal and the Upper Swat Canal in the Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar Districts.

It was in 1900 that the scheme for the Paharpur Inundation Canal was first mooted by H. W. Gee, then Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan. Its object was to utilize the Indus waters for irrigating those parts of the District which had suffered most in the prevailing drought of that year. For some time, no action was taken by the Punjab Government, mainly because of a lack of necessary funds. In 1904, J. Benton, the Chief Engineer, Punjab, who was also the Secretary for Irrigation, North-West Frontier Province, submitted a definite plan for the construction of the canal. The tract to be irrigated lay on the west side of the Indus and extended from Bilot to Dera Ismail Khan Cantonment, an agriculturally insecure area. The expense was estimated at Rs. 725,000, with a gross area of 41,588 acres to be irrigated and a hope for the return of about 7 per cent on the total capital outlay. The Local Government recommended the project as a minor work; but the Government of India found the scheme fulfilled the conditions of a productive public work and approved it as such. In December 1908, a revised estimate put the total cost at Rs. 988,282, and the return at 4.33 per cent on the total capital outlay. Completed in March 1910, the canal's total length, including the Hafizkurr distributary, amounted to 57 miles.

An area of about 10,000 acres of Government waste land was commanded by the new Canal; and the Government regarded the expected income from this tract as one of the main assets of the Canal. In 1907, Deane submitted a scheme for the colonization of the Government waste land, basing it on the Chenab and Jhelum Colonies System, with some

1. After the construction of the new Swat River Canal, the old Swat River Canal (see pp. 171-2) came to be known as the Lower Swat Canal, and the new canal as the Upper Swat Canal.
2. See above, p. 173.
4. Ibid., Govt. of India to Secy. of State, No. 34, 1 December 1904, ibid.
6. The vast tract of land, now irrigated by the lower Chenab, Jhelum and Bari Doab canals in the Punjab, was originally a desert with very scanty rainfall. Hence, “it was necessary simultaneously with the introduction of irrigation to transport bodily whole communities into the new areas thus opened up.” Before the colonists arrived, the alignment of the water-course had been made, the land in each colony tract demarcated into large and small blocks, and land set apart in the vicinity for grazing and other communal purposes. These colony villages were thus systematically planned. The colonists, who were chosen by British Revenue Officers, had a fair proportion of hereditary landlords or occupancy tenants among them. The average area allotted to each individual generally varied between no more than 40 to 50 acres. Harris, op.cit., pp. 52-8, 71-6, 85-8, 96-7; G.B. Jathar, and S.G. Beri, Indian Economics, I (fourth edn.), pp. 229-30.
modification to suit local conditions. Deane proposed that Jats, Baluchis, Marwat Pathans and other Pathans, who were the main agricultural tribes of Dera Ismail Khan and known to be the best cultivators in the District, should be settled on the lands. The new settlers were to be grouped according to tribes into four or five new villages. Deane proposed that one-fourth of the land should be reserved for the **nawabs**, **raises** (chiefs) and leading **Khans** of the District, as a reward for their loyalty and past services to Government. In order to woo the **nawabs** and **Khans**, Deane suggested special terms for them; they were to pay only a **nazrana**, to be realized in instalments, besides a **malikana** at the rate of 8 annas per rupee on the land revenue for the first three years and 12 annas per rupee thereafter. On the other hand, the peasant colonists should pay, in addition to land revenue and cesses, a **malikana** of 12 annas per rupee for the first three years and, thereafter, a sum equal to the land revenue. Deane further proposed that the **Khans** should at once be granted rights of occupancy which would pass on to their successors in accordance with the rules of primogeniture; whereas peasant grantees should be given occupancy rights only after the expiry of five years, when they also had fulfilled certain conditions regarding the cultivation and payment of sums to cover the cost of construction and maintenance of water courses. In this scheme of things, the Government would assist settlers with **takavi** loans, and allow them full remission of land revenue for the first two harvests reaped after the commencement of the tenancy. However, Deane's colonization scheme did not receive the Government of India's sanction, as it was considering a Bill to amend the law relating to the colonization of Government waste lands in the Punjab and wanted this to be extended to the Frontier Province.

In the meantime, the Mahsud problem on the border was causing great anxiety to the Government, and various measures to deal with the situation were examined. One of those considered was to settle the Mahsuds on Government waste lands on the Paharpur Canal, which could lead to their "future pacification". To W.R.H. Merk, the Acting Chief Commissioner, whose opinion was sought by the Government, the scheme appeared feasible and worth trying. Merk suggested the

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settlement of 1,000 Mahsud families over an area of about 10,000 acres of waste land. The selection of families to be settled was to be left entirely to the tribesmen themselves, because any Government attempt at general selection could cause resentment among those excluded. The management of the colony would, however, be exclusively under the direct orders of the Chief Commissioner and the Resident in Waziristan. The colony would be placed under the immediate charge of an Extra Assistant Commissioner or Tahsildar who would deal with its revenue and magisterial administration. As regards the conditions of colonization, Merk recommended that, for the first two years, nothing should be charged from the colonists; for the next three years, 8 annas per acre should be levied; then 16 annas per acre for the next five years; after which, the rates might be further enhanced. But the assessment, it was suggested, should always be on consolidated rates, since the Mahsuds were and would remain incapable of understanding the British land revenue administration, with all its complexities of owner’s rate, occupier’s rate, water rate and so forth. Since they were not well off, the Mahsuds should also be assisted by advances of Rs. 50 per family. The terms on which land was to be given to the Mahsuds should, according to Merk, include “loyalty to Government, good conduct, aid to Government officers in matters relating to the tribe, and reasonable punctuality in the payment of sums due on the land”. Merk added that, if by adopting this scheme, the Government could pacify the tribe and avoid the need for expeditions into Mahsud territory, it would escape “a grievous and deplorable burden on India”.

The Government of India then asked for the opinions of other officers having an intimate knowledge of the Mahsuds. These opinions were divided. H.R. Fraser, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, for instance, was not opposed to the scheme in principle; but he could not, at the same time, overlook that there was some danger in the settlement of the Mahsuds, “a tribe of notoriously criminal propensities”, in close proximity to the peaceful population of the district. Besides, the preferential treatment proposed for the Mahsuds, in the form of lighter water rates and land revenue, would cause resentment among the British subjects in the District, who might feel that misdeeds rather than loyalty to the Government were being rewarded. Major G. Dodd, Political Agent, Wana, however, welcomed Merk’s scheme as an important

1. Merk to Secy., Govt. of India, 21 December 1909, ibid.
2. Depy. Secy., Govt. of India to Chief Commissioner, 1 June 1910, ibid.
means of "securing satisfactory relations" with the tribe. He suggested that

the land should be made available to the Mahsuds, and that no secret should be made of the fact, and that the tribe should be informed that it would be given to them when they had set their own house in order and had shown by their continued behaviour that they were worthy of confidence, and when they were capable of allotting the land among themselves in such a way as would be satisfactory to the whole tribe and would comply with Government conditions as to tenancy.

Dodd believed that this policy was the "very best" for bringing about the pacification of the tribe.1 F.W. Johnston, the Officiating Resident of Waziristan, "generally agreed" with both Fraser and Dodd, but added that any preferential treatment to the Mahsuds would have a "bad effect on the tribe as well as on the inhabitants of the District".2 Merk appreciated the doubts and qualifications of his subordinates; but held to his own view that the Mahsud colonization scheme ought to be given a try. He recommended that the Mahsud settlers be given "easy terms at the outsets"; but in the long run, he gave the same benefits to the British subjects in the District. Merk pointed out that "a clear, reasonable and firm policy" towards the Mahsuds would promote better understanding between them and the Government, enabling the latter to construct works of public utility like roads, hospitals and wireless stations in the Mahsud area—as had been done in the Khyber and Malakand Agencies.3

The Mahsud Colonization Scheme was still hanging fire when Roos-Keppel returned from England in late 1910. Roos-Keppel did not agree with Merk, whose scheme he condemned as both "tactically and morally wrong". The British subjects in the District, Roos-Keppel argued, had a stronger claim on the Government waste land than the Mahsuds. Besides, the grant of such land had always been made as a reward for good conduct, not as "bribes to induce unrepentant criminals to reform". Roos-Keppel believed that the proposed Mahsud colony "would fail, that the ultimate result in improving Government's relations with the tribe would be nil, and that it might make things worse than they were now". The colony might serve as a base for dacoity; and the loyal British subjects of Dera Ismail Khan might resent "the dumping of undesirables" in their midst. Roos-Keppel also doubted if the Mahsud colonists could be held as a guarantee for the good behaviour of the rest of the tribe; for the Government could not, of course, punish the colonists for the crimes

1. Dodd to Johnston, 18 August 1910, ibid.
2. Johnston to Secy. to the Chief-Commissioner, 5 September 1910, ibid.
3. Merk to Secy., Govt. of India, 7 October 1910, ibid.
of their brethren in the tribal territory.¹ These arguments went home; and the Indian Government ultimately abandoned the scheme, distributing waste land among British subjects.²

The construction of the Paharpur Canal necessitated the reorganization of the subordinate revenue establishment of the Dera Ismail Khan District in connection with the working of the new Canal. To avoid the inconveniences of two revenue establishments for the ordinary district establishment to assess the land revenue and a special canal establishment to record irrigation and assess water rates, Deane proposed that both these functions should be performed by the district establishment under the Collector, who would thus be responsible for the revenue management of the canal, the assessment of water rates, their collection, and the furnishing of returns to the Irrigation Department. The Irrigation Department, on the other hand, would be responsible for the maintenance of the canal and the proper distribution of its water. To cope with the consequent increase of work for the district revenue staff, Deane proposed an enlarged district establishment.³ All these recommendations were accepted, and the consequent arrangements worked "fairly satisfactorily" in the period under review.⁴

However, the Paharpur Canal did not prove remunerative. In 1919-20, the total area irrigated amounted to only 20,670 acres, whereas the culturable area had originally been estimated at 63,450 acres. The total revenue realized from the Canal in 1919-20 came to only Rs. 14,193, as against working expenses amounting to Rs. 93,609 in the same year. There was, thus, a deficit of Rs. 79,416, and a loss of 8.62 per cent on capital outlay.⁵ The unremunerative character of the Canal may be attributed to three main causes. First, the water rates were extremely low.⁶ This was a result of the two-fold fact that it was an inundation canal available for only about four months from May to September, and that the construction of the canal had resulted in the closure of

1. Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 1 December 1910, ibid.
2. Deputy Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 10 May 1912, ibid. vol. 8968, May 1912, Proc. No. 18.
3. Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 27 November 1907; Deputy Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 11 February 1908, I.R.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol 7894, February 1908, Proc. Nos. 3-4.
4. Under-Secy., Govt. of India to Chief Commissioner, 11 July 1912, ibid., vol. 8969, July 1912, Proc. No. 8; Roos-Keppel to Under-Secy., Govt. of India, 8 January 1913; Under-Secy., Govt. of India, to Chief Commissioner, 3 March 1913, ibid., vol. 9219, March 1913, Proc. Nos. 3-4.
6. The water rates varied according to circles and nature of the crop; in 1907, the average incidence per acre was between Rs. 1-2-3 and Rs. 2-5-0. I.P.W.P. (Irrigation), vol. 7625, March 1907, Proc. Nos. 40-42.
two natural channels that the cultivators had previously used to irrigate their land, which made it necessary to allow substantial concessions on the water rate. Secondly, nearly every year the Canal was extensively breached by hill torrents, putting it out of action at the time of the "keenest demand" for water, besides involving heavy expenditure for repairs. Thirdly, when in 1917-18, the Indus changed its course to the east bank, the Bilot Creak, from which the Canal led off, silted up, so that eventually the water flow into the Canal ceased at any but the highest flood levels of the Indus.

The second State project was the Hazarkhani Branch of the Kabul River Canal in the Peshawar District. The need for this extension to supply water to the Cantonment and City of Peshawar and irrigate the Hazarkhani boundary area was realized by the Punjab Government in 1895. Lack of funds, however, prevented its construction until 1902, when M. R. Field, the Officiating Chief Engineer and Secretary for Irrigation, North-West Frontier Province, submitted an estimate for the work. A more detailed estimate was prepared two years later by J. Benton, Field's successor. The area to be irrigated was estimated at 11,251 acres. The revenue return on capital expenditure was expected to be 5.37 per cent. The extension was completed in 1906-07 and as a result, whereas in 1905-06 the Kabul River Canal had irrigated an area of 31,668 acres, in 1907-08, 37,632 acres were irrigated. At the same time, the total revenue assessment of the Canal rose from Rs. 126,572 to Rs. 141,477 in 1907-08.

Finally, the boldest irrigation scheme of the Government was the Upper Swat Canal in the Peshawar District. In the words of Harris, "although of moderate size," there are "few irrigation works in India which make so direct an appeal to the imagination as this Canal."

The great success, both financial and political, of the Swat River Canal inspired the Chief Commissioner, Deane, to extend irrigation in the Peshawar Valley still further. From time to time various schemes had been put forward with the object of enlarging and extending the waters of the Indus to irrigate the khadir (low-lying) lands in the Swabi

1. Ibid., vol. 9477, April 1914, Proc. Nos. 6-9.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
5. Benton to Secy., Govt. of India, 7 September 1904, ibid., vol. 6840, December 1904, Proc. No. 34.
7. Harris, op.cit., p.76.
Early in 1904, Benton inspected the Swat River Canal, and was convinced of the need to construct an entirely new canal taken out of the Swat River at a much higher level, so as to enable it to water a much larger area. Benton's plan was to lead a canal about half a mile downstream of Chakdarra Fort, and to carry it along fairly low land, nearly parallel with the Chakdarra-Malakand Road to the Malakand Pass. There the range of hills would be pierced by a tunnel about 5,000 feet long. On emerging from the tunnel, the water would then fall into the Dargai Nulla, forming a 300-foot cataract. On reaching Dargai, the main line (17 miles) would bifurcate into the Machai (50.6 miles) and Abazai (18.6 miles) Branches. The Machai Branch would follow the foot of the hills on the east until the crest of the Swabi Plateau, commanding the Indus Valley and both sides of the Swabi range of hills, was reached. Then it would split again into the Pehur (14.6 miles), Indus (21.5 miles) and Maira (20.4 miles) Branches. The Abazai Branch would go along the foot of the hills to the west. The entire 17 miles of the main line of the Canal, from Chakdarra to Dargai, would be located in tribal territory. The total area to be commanded by the Canal was estimated at 448,895 acres, of which 382,000 acres, or 85 per cent, would be perennially irrigated. The Canal would yield a revenue of Rs. 1,458,057, representing a return of 8 per cent on the total capital outlay of Rs. 18,240,284.

This "exceedingly bold project" had two important features: the construction of its headworks and upper reach across the frontier in tribal territory, and the great amount of tunnelling work, "never before attempted in canal construction".

In September 1905, O'Dwyer, who was officiating as the Chief Commissioner, observed that the scheme was "financially sound, politically expedient and administratively desirable". O'Dwyer quoted Deane to emphasize the political advantages of the canal. Deane had written that

"A work of this sort, which necessarily assists in settling down and bringing prosperity to a restless people, must have a good political effect. It further affords employment to a considerable number of trans-border men who have poor lands of their own and who come in as cultivators."

1. Minto's Administration of India, Public Works Department, pp. 11-12; Minto Papers vol. M. 853.
3. Ibid.
The Swat Canal was originally undertaken as a political work. It has paid in every respect beyond expectations, and I see no reason why this new canal should not be as successful.1

A shrewd Pathan had also advised O'Dwyer in like terms. The Pathan had said that

were it not for the Swat River Canal the inhabitants of our town territory north of the Kabul River would have been against us [British] to a man in the disturbances of 1897. The hold which the Canal gives us [British] over them [tribes], he said, not only kept our own people straight, but about 30 to 40 per cent of the tribal population on the Peshawar border, whose interests were directly or indirectly bound up with the Canal.2

The result of the new canal, the Pathan assured O'Dwyer, would in the first place, “make the possibility of a rising like that of 1897 very remote”, and in the second, should one occur, would “keep 70 to 80 per cent of the tribes to the north of Peshawar” on the British side.3

The attitude of the tribes, so it was reported, was most favourable. Both within the settled districts and in the tribal territory, people were already beginning to calculate the benefits they would derive from the canal, and were eagerly looking forward to its construction. Reports have it that the value of land in the Babuzai tract below the Malakand had already risen from 30 to 80 rupees per acre, and it had become difficult to purchase even fallow land. Moreover, the Maliks of Upper Swat, whose tracts were beyond the scope of the new canal scheme, had begun to approach the Political Agent of Malakand to get contracts to supply labour for the canal.4

In sanctioning the scheme, the Home Government advised the Government of India to observe “caution and tact” during both construction and subsequent administration of the canal, especially in so far as it involved dealings with the Frontier tribes.5

In June 1907, the construction of the canal began. About fifteen months later, in September 1908, it was found that the attitude of the tribesmen was not as friendly as had been expected. It had been planned that the first half of the 8 or 9 miles of the canal in tribal territory would be carried through the Amandarra Pass. This, however, was a sacred

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
place containing a large number of graves, and the Khan Khels of Batkhela protested against this. Moreover, the Alizai Khans raised objections to the importation of labour for work on the canal.\(^1\) Though Deane had originally intended to execute one-fourth of the construction with the help of local labour, it had been found impracticable to do so. The Swatis, through whose villages the canal was to pass, were too well-off to agree to work as “navvies”. They refused to undertake hard work at the market rate of wages. The Jirgas wanted to supply labour at rates which were much higher than the Government was ready to give. The Maliks, too, would take large contracts from the Government at favourable rates and then sublet the contracts to other contractors.\(^2\) Besides, trouble was also anticipated in connection with existing tribal water rights, which were likely to be affected by the new canal. Roos-Keppel told the Government that these political difficulties had not been given due consideration when the construction of the canal was started, and that the work had been undertaken without “sufficient regard to the feelings and apprehensions of a suspicious, ignorant, and fanatical people”.\(^3\)

In February 1909, the Government of India asked Roos-Keppel for a fuller report on the attitude of the tribesmen towards the canal and the political effect of dropping the project altogether. The Chief Commissioner reported that the tribes of Sam Ranizai on the south side of the Malakand Pass were strongly in favour of the canal because it would provide irrigation facilities to their lands, hitherto unirrigated. The tribes of Ranizai living on the northern side of the Malakand Pass were also favourably disposed towards the canal. But the tribes of Lower and Upper Swat resented the construction of the canal, because, while they themselves would not derive any benefit from the canal, it would give the Government a further footing in Swat. Roos-Keppel was against the abandonment of the canal project, because he felt this would give the mullas and other influential men of Lower and Upper Swat the opportunity to boast that, merely by “a show of opposition”, they had foiled the Government’s plan. If the project were abandoned the tribes of Sam Ranizai would think that they had been misled by the Government.\(^4\)

In view of these political difficulties, Roos-Keppel reported, the canal

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authorities had made some alterations in the original plan for the canal. A new low-level alignment of the canal was selected to obviate many of the difficulties of the original line and to remove the grievances of the tribesmen.\textsuperscript{1} Next, measures had been taken to secure tribal goodwill: some allowances and “quarrying royalties” were paid to the Jirgas and “very liberal rates were given for the land required for the canal, this being in many cases taken on a perpetual lease instead of, as usual, being acquired outright, so as not to affect the position held in their villages by the owners as landlords.”\textsuperscript{2} A large force of Khassadars was also engaged to provide employment for tribesmen as well as to make them responsible for the safety of the canal works during construction.\textsuperscript{3}

The new low-level alignment of the canal shortened the main channel by about 4.5 miles, but involved the construction of a tunnel 11,234 feet long (later known as the Benton Tunnel), which was more than twice the length originally planned. These changes led to revised estimates completed in December 1913; the total cost then stood at Rs. 19,924,287 and the expected return at 7.5 per cent of the capital outlay.\textsuperscript{4} The Upper Swat Canal was opened in 1914, but it was soon found that the capacity of the Benton Tunnel was far below the full requirement. To remedy this and some other defects, a second revised estimate was made in May 1915, which now set the total cost at Rs. 20,129,088 and the revenue return at only 6.5 per cent of the capital outlay.\textsuperscript{5}

Financially, the Canal proved a failure. Estimates had indicated that, in 1919-20, it would water 283,682 acres of land; but in fact only 138,191 acres, or a little less than half of the original estimate, were irrigated in that year. The gross revenue realized from water rates in 1919-20 amounted to Rs. 516,125, whereas the working expenses of the canal in that year came to Rs. 524,265, which meant that, though slight, there was a deficit on the operational outlay.\textsuperscript{6} The relatively unproductive nature of the Canal was partly attributable to political causes. In 1914-15, when the Government first planned to levy water rates, Roos-

\textsuperscript{1} Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 1 May 1909, \textit{I.F.P.P. (Frontier)}, vol. 8513, May 1910, Proc. Nos. 1-17.
\textsuperscript{2} Harris, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{3} Merk to Secy., Govt. of India, 29 October 1910, Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 29 April 1911, \textit{I.F.P.P. (Establishment)}, vol. 8770, October 1911, Proc. Nos. 12-18.
\textsuperscript{4} R. Egerton Purvez, Secy., Irrigation, N.W.F.P., to Secy., Govt. of India, 15 December 1913; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 13 August 1914; Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 23 September 1914, \textit{I.P.W.P. (Irrigation)}, vol 9477, August 1914, Proc. Nos. 4-87.
Keppel advised that only light rates should be imposed on the tribesmen as a conciliatory measure during the existing War situation. In September 1915, a permanent remission of canal water rates on one thousand acres of land in the tribal territory was granted to tribesmen as a mark of appreciation for their cooperation in the construction of the Canal. This involved the Irrigation Department in an annual loss of Rs. 45,000. Moreover, the Government had to incur some additional expenses for maintaining special establishments like the khassadars and guards for the protection of the Canal, which in 1921 amounted to Rs. 47,000. However, the Government of India was not unduly disturbed over the Canal being unremunerative in a direct way; for it felt that if the Canal helped “to convert the turbulent and restless tribesmen of the Swat Valley into peaceful and contented husbandmen, such a result will have been cheaply purchased, even if the Canal were to fail altogether to satisfy the conditions of a productive public work”.

The extension of irrigation in the Frontier Province brought about a change in the system of their administrative control. At the time of the formation of the Province, it had been decided that the State canals in the new Province should continue to be managed by the Punjab Irrigation Department, the Chief Engineer and Secretary to this Department acting in like capacity for the new Province. At that time only the Mardan Division of the Province had jurisdiction over its canal system—the Swat River Canal and the Kabul River Canal. The Division formed a part of the Jhelum Circle under the control of a Superintending Engineer.

In 1903, the revenue management of the Kabul River Canal was transferred from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar to the Irrigation Department of the Punjab Government. In 1905, the Paharpur Inundation Canal was placed under the charge of the Canal Officers of the Jhelum Circle. In 1907, when the Upper Swat Canal Project was taken up, a new circle called the Swat River Canals Circle was constituted. It included all the Government canals in the Peshawar District. The Paharpur Canal was later transferred to this Circle.

Then in August 1911, Roos-Keppel pointed out that the great ex-

pansion of irrigation in the Province had rendered the existing administration of the Irrigation Department unsatisfactory, since this system of administration precluded a close relation between the Chief Commissioner and his Irrigation Secretary. The Irrigation Department received its funds direct from, and referred financial matters direct to, the Government of India. But in 1910, by the introduction of the quasi-provincial settlement, the expenditure on all State canals, except the Upper Swat River Canal, which remained Imperial, had become provincial. Therefore, for the maintenance of financial control, direct relations between the Chief Commissioner and his Irrigation Secretary were essential. But the Secretary lived at Lahore, and it was only on the "rarest occasions" that he and the Chief Commissioner could meet. Roos-Keppel, therefore, proposed that with the exception of the Upper Swat River Canal, which would remain Imperial, all the other State canals should be placed under the control of the Superintending Engineer, Swat River Canals Circle, who would also be the Secretary to the Irrigation Department of the Frontier Province. His headquarters would be at Peshawar, so that the Chief Commissioner could consult him whenever necessary. However, the Government of India decided not to change the existing system until the completion of the Upper Swat River Canal. It was thus not till 1915 that the Frontier Province acquired a separate Irrigation Department.

The most important result of the development of irrigation in this period was the increase in acreage under irrigation. As against 225,890 acres irrigated by State canals in 1911, in 1921 these irrigated 333,809 acres—an increase of 47.78 per cent.

But in spite of this fairly progressive development of irrigation in the Province, there was also considerable underutilization of assessed potentialities. The following Table illustrates this.

1. See Chapter I, p. 29.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length of main lines in miles</th>
<th>Estimated area to be commanded in acres</th>
<th>Average area irrigated in 1919-20 in acres</th>
<th>Date of first irrigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Swat Canal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>150,406</td>
<td>1887-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul River Canal</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34,913</td>
<td>1903-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paharpur Canal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63,450</td>
<td>1907-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Swat Canal</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>309,996</td>
<td>1914-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it is evident that the Lower Swat and Kabul River Canals irrigated a larger area than they had originally been expected to cover, the areas irrigated by the Upper Swat and the Paharpur Canals fell far short of their respective target areas. These two canals involved heavy and increasing operational expenses for the Irrigation Department of the Province. The net loss to the Department from these two canals amounted to Rs. 439,974 in 1918-19; Rs. 508,231 in 1920; and Rs. 691,331 in 1921.2

The implementation of the recommendations of the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03), combined with the keen interest taken by local authorities of the Province, produced significant progress in the development of irrigation, through both the improvement and extension of the private irrigation works and the construction of new State canals.

The private irrigation systems of the Daman in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu were improved with financial support from the Government; and a large establishment was created for their efficient administration. Moreover, the Deputy Commissioner's powers of supervising, managing and controlling private irrigation works were enhanced when the Punjab Minor Canals Act was extended to the Frontier Province in 1907.

The Local Government constructed the Hazar khani Branch of the Kabul River Canal, the Upper Swat Canal and the Paharpur Inundation Canal. These developments created the need for a separate Irrigation Department for the Province, which was then established in 1915. This change ended the Frontier Province's complete dependence on the Punjab Irrigation Authorities, who, in the past, had not been able to pay adequate attention to its irrigational needs.

2. *North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee Report, 1924*, p. 42.
VII

EDUCATION

Compared with other provinces of British India, in the Frontier Province, the development of modern education has a relatively recent history. With the exception of Burma, the area which constituted the North-West Frontier Province was the last acquisition of the British, and hence the last to come under the British development of the educational system. Since the Frontier regions were outlying tracts, the Government's efforts in introducing and expanding its educational system in the territory were more restricted than in the centrally situated areas. Local prejudice and indifference to Western education had a considerable effect in retarding its spread. The mullas and other religious men, who wielded an overwhelming influence on the local population, were hostile to British schemes of popular education, suspecting them of being deliberate attempts to undermine their sacerdotal authority and destroy the religious faith of the population.¹ The

inhabitants of the Province, proud of their martial character, preferred "the sword to the pen". In fact, "The Pathan has always despised education as fit only for Hindus and cowards. He had little need for spelling, but much for swordsmanship, and if the Hamsaya of an alien creed, whom he employed to look after his money matters, cheated him so flagrantly that even his ignorant master could not overlook it, there was short shrift for the accountant, and a fresh start was made with a clean sheet.

Two definite stages can be identified in the educational development of the Province during the period under review. The first, from 1901 to 1910, was a period when the system of education prevalent in the Punjab was extended to the Frontier districts, with its administration in the hands of officers of the Punjab Government. During these years, education made slow progress primarily for two reasons: the lack of initiative and drive on the part of the educational authorities and the paucity of funds—the strings of the Imperial Exchequer were quite tight. The Local Boards did not have enough funds; private initiative was not forthcoming; the majority Muslim community was in no mood to cooperate and lacked enthusiasm for secular instruction. The second phase of educational development extended from 1911 to 1921. These were years full of promise, hope and activity; the authorities displayed resourcefulness, energy and initiative; funds were available; and above all, a clear-cut, ambitious programme was laid out, the avowed object being

a wide diffusion of free primary education...the consolidation and reorganization of existing facilities for secondary education and the encouragement of local effort for the extension of collegiate education on popular lines.

At the time of the formation of the new Province, there were three kinds of schools: those established and maintained by private munificence, endowments and customary gifts of the communities; those established and managed privately, but recognized and aided by Government; those managed and maintained by the Government through Local Boards. The existing private schools had been set up by the three main communities, the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims had their mosque schools, maktabs and madrasas. In maktabs, the maulvis and imams taught chiefly the Quran by rote, taking no fees from the pupils. In madrasas, instruction was confined to the teaching of Arabic and Persian.

2. Census of India, 1911, N.W.F.P., p. 176; Census of India, 1921 N.W.F.P., p. 177.
Girls also attended schools where the Quran was taught to them by the wives of men who were teachers by profession. The Hindus had their patshalas and the Sikhs their Gurmukhi schools; instruction in both being confined mainly to sacred scriptures. They also maintained mahajani schools where commercial instruction was imparted to students. In general, the private schools were beginning to decline, the Government giving them little encouragement, particularly to those schools imparting only religious instruction. In 1901-02, there were 927 private schools in the settled districts with 13,636 pupils.

The aided and Government schools were divided into two main categories, primary and secondary, the latter having middle and high classes. Secondary schools were further classified into Anglo-Vernacular and Vernacular, according to whether instruction in English did or did not form part of their regular curriculum. High schools were all Anglo-Vernacular, while middle and primary schools were of both kinds. In the Anglo-Vernacular schools emphasis was given to the teaching of English, and in the higher classes instruction in all subjects was imparted through the medium of English. The high schools had two classes; the middle schools three. The primary school level comprised two stages: the upper primary with two classes and the lower primary with three classes. More than half of the school-going children did not study beyond the upper primary stage.

The basic curriculum in the primary schools consisted of reading, writing and arithmetic, with some lessons in Geography, Persian and Mensuration. The courses of study in the secondary schools were the same as those prescribed for them in the Punjab. In the Anglo-Vernacular middle schools, the curriculum consisted of vernacular languages, English, arithmetic, history, geography, mensuration, elementary science and drawing; geometry and algebra were optional. The same course was taught in the Vernacular middle schools with the difference that English did not form part of the curriculum. The high schools prepared students for the matriculation examination of the Punjab University.

In 1901-02, there were 154 primary schools for boys in the Province, of which 131 were maintained by Local Boards, 16 were aided, and 7 un-

3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. The curriculum in high schools consisted of English; a classical, vernacular, oriental or Western language; elementary mathematics; history; and geography. In addition, there were alternative courses in science and commercial subjects.
aided. These primary schools enrolled 7,365 pupils.1 The Province possessed only 28 Vernacular and Anglo-Vernacular middle and high schools for boys, of which 17 were maintained by Local Boards, 5 were aided, and 6 were unaided. The total number of students in these institutions was 5,082.2

The Government's grants-in-aid to private schools were given partly per capita, the amount of aid per pupil varying according to his school grade. Further, for purposes of grants-in-aid, schools were classed, according to the standard of instruction imparted in them, into three categories of excellent, good and fair; the better the standard, the more liberal the grant. Schools with a high proportion of suitably qualified teachers received more money than those with few or none. The main purpose of the grant-in-aid system current in the Frontier districts was to encourage private enterprise to improve the standard of instruction in schools rather than to effect a direct expansion of educational institutions.3 To encourage primary education, fees in schools were kept low; and special rates were maintained for many years because of “the backward state of education in almost all the districts”. In 1901-02 there were no scholarships for pupils studying at the primary level, except for a total sum of Rs. 147 granted in studentships to a few Waziri and Dauri boys in the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu Districts.4 But 105 scholarships, amounting to a total annual value of Rs. 4,217, were given for middle and high school students.5

Of the three main communities, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, the first was the most backward in education. Though it constituted over 92 per cent of the total population in 1901, from among it, the percentage of boys attending any kind of educational institution was only 11.7 compared with 36.3 and 22.3 per cent in the case of Hindus and Sikhs, respectively. The Government encouraged education among Muslims by granting fee concessions and special scholarships. There were 9 high and 13 middle school Victoria scholarships awarded annually, and special elementary schools for Muslim boys were maintained at Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Abbottabad. Peshawar had an Islamia Anglo-Vernacular high school and an Anglo-Vernacular middle school.6
The main difficulty in the way of expanding and improving education lay in the lack of available funds. In January 1905, Deane, the Chief Commissioner, asked for a grant of at least Rs. 400,000, which, in his opinion, was the minimum amount needed to carry out basic improvements in the educational system, particularly at the primary level.1 The Government of India, however, sanctioned only Rs. 40,000, which was hardly sufficient for even minor developments. And out of this meagre sum, the cost of establishing a training school for primary teachers at Peshawar—the first of its kind in the Province—had also to be met.2

As for secondary education, the general policy of the Government of India, as set down by their Resolution of 1904, was never implemented in the Frontier Province. According to this Resolution, Local Governments were asked to bring about an improvement in existing educational institutions in three ways: the Local Government providing one high school in each district as a model for private enterprise, helping private secondary schools by large grants-in-aid to raise them to the standard of Government schools, and providing better facilities for the training of secondary-school teachers.3 Because of lack of funds in the first period (1901-1910), the Local Government failed to do anything of importance to improve secondary education, with the result that the education reports of the period show nothing but a routine slow increase in the numbers of schools and students, of which the former was quite negligible.4

However, collegiate education received some encouragement under the new educational reforms introduced by Curzon. The first college in the Province grew out of the Edwardes Collegiate (Mission) School established by the Church Mission Society. The Society had set up its Mission at Peshawar as far back as 1853 through the efforts of Herbert Edwardes, then Commissioner of the Peshawar Division. In May 1855, the Society opened a primary school in Peshawar City, named after Edwardes,5 which was later raised to the level of a high school. It was the first institution in the Frontier to impart modern education to local Pathans and members of other communities. The School soon achieved

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3. "Indian Educational Policy, Being a Resolution Issued by the Governor-General in Council on the 11th March 1904", pp. 21-22, 41-44.
4. In 1901-02, the number of secondary schools in the Province totalled only 28, which increased to no more than 30 by 1910-11; the number of students in corresponding years was 5,082 and 9,128. Quinquennium Report, 1897-1902, p.1; ibid., 1907-12, p.5.
remarkable success being considered “one of the best in India”. Two Viceroys, Lord Canning and Lord Lawrence, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Robert Montgomery, in particular showed keen interest in its progress. A hostel was built in 1872 with the avowed intention of bringing the “sons of Pathan...chiefs under Christian influence”.

In 1883-84, the School had 500 students, mostly sons of the gentry from Peshawar and Kohat. In 1900, the School opened an intermediate arts class with six students, to meet what the Missionaries called a demand for more advanced studies from local young men who hoped to qualify themselves for a professional career. In the second year, the intermediate class had 17 students, which led the Principal to make the optimistic remark that “there has been a growing interest in the new College”. An annual grant of Rs. 1,200 was allocated to the College in 1904; and in 1907, it was given a special grant of Rs. 25,000 for the construction of new buildings, a science laboratory, a hostel and a library.

In 1908, four college scholarships were instituted for students of the Frontier Province tenable at the Edwardes College or at any recognized college in the Punjab or at the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh.

In the Agencies, the state of education was even worse than in the settled districts, even though, in principle, education was free for tribal boys. For instance, in the Kurram Agency, during 1901-02, there were only six aided primary schools with a mere 110 students. In the next decade, the Local Government’s educational activity was confined to the opening of a few primary schools in the Tochi Valley, the Khyber and the Shirani territory. These schools were under the control of the Poli-

tical Agents and, in fact, owed their existence to the individual efforts, personal interest and special initiative of these officers, although they were periodically inspected by officers of the Education Department.¹

In this decade of 1901-10, there was thus hardly any educational progress. In fact, the percentage of literacy fell from 5.5 in 1901 to 5.1 in 1911.² Primary education facilities in rural areas were entirely inadequate. For an area of 4,530 square miles, with a population of 1,065,097, there were only 214 District Board Schools and 40 aided schools. The educational facilities of urban areas were little better. The educational expenditure of the five municipalities—Peshawar, Abbottabad, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu—had been largely absorbed in the maintenance of the five municipal high schools; and primary education had been left almost entirely to private enterprise. Out of a population of approximately 80,000 males in these five municipal areas, only 3,250 boys were enrolled at all levels and types of recognized schools.³

This highly unsatisfactory state of affairs Roos-Keppel attributed to official apathy, ineffective control and supervision of educational establishments, and inadequate finance. He found that very little interest was taken in Pathan education by the Punjab Government, which always looked upon the trans-Indus tract more as a step-child than as a child.⁴

The trouble was that, after the formation of the new Province, no material change had taken place in the educational set up; the entire machinery of education continued to be run and controlled, as before, by the Punjab Government. Thus the educational administration of the Frontier Province was based on a make-shift arrangement, in which it was made the responsibility of an Assistant Inspector of Education of the Punjab Government, who functioned under the general supervision of the Director of Public Instruction, Punjab. The District Inspectors in all districts, except Kohat,⁵ also belonged to the Punjab Educational Service. The teaching staff in the schools, too, was mostly Punjabi. It was to the educational institutions of the Punjab, again, to which the Frontier Province turned for collegiate education, the training of teachers,

¹ Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1902-07, p. 20; ibid., 1907-12, p. 21; ibid., 1912-17, pp. 48-50.
² The male population of the Province had increased from 1,105,683 in 1901 to 1,182,102 in 1911, while the number of literate males had decreased from 61,264 to 60,113. Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt. of India, 6 September 1911, I.E.P., vol. 8943, November 1912, Proc. No. 48.
³ Ibid.
examinations, and the choice of textbooks.¹

It is interesting to note that when the Local Government of the Frontier Province was enthusiastic about the spread of education, it was the Government of India which failed to provide adequate support. Thus, within one year of the formation of the Province, Deane had asked the Supreme Government for the appointment of an officer of the Indian Educational Service to take charge of the Education Department.² However, more than two years elapsed before, in January 1904, Dr. M. Aurel Stein was appointed as the Inspector-General of Education and Archaeological Surveyor for the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Dr. Stein was the Registrar of the Punjab University and Principal of the Oriental College, Lahore. Earlier he had served as Principal of the Calcutta Madrassa. A famous archaeologist, Aurel Stein had hardly been in the Province for two years when, in the beginning of 1906, he was sent to Turkestan on an archaeological expedition; and, thereafter, his duties were performed by officers of the Punjab Educational Service until 1910.³

The combination of the two responsibilities—supervision of archaeology and management of education—by the same officer had been a blunder; for Stein was far too occupied in archaeological excavation and exploration in distant areas to find time for the development of education in the Province. The result was that “while research gained, education languished”.⁴ The system of loaning officers from the Punjab Educational Service was also defective, since these officers “disliked what was to them foreign service”, and kept hoping and trying to be posted back to their own province. They hardly ever visited the rural areas, where schools were in a deplorable state. The newly established schools which these officers had “shown with pride in the returns” were “wretched beyond degree”.⁵ The Punjabi teachers in these schools, “with little or no knowledge of Pashto, drawing Rs. 6 or Rs. 8 a month—less than the pay of a sweeper, with practically no qualifications for teaching”, had proved a failure. Such a teacher, who combined, with his educational work, the functions of post master, unlicensed petition-

2. Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 24 October 1902; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 28 May 1903; Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 10 July 1903, I.J.P.P., vol. 638, 1903, Reg. No. 1119.
5. Ibid., p.2.
writer, shopkeeper and private secretary to the local Khan, represented in many cases the entire teaching staff of what appeared in the annual returns as a flourishing school with 30 or 40 pupils.¹

No wonder the Chief Commissioner described the education offered in these schools as “a sham”.²

The books prescribed for the schools were out of date and in most cases quite unsuitable for the pupils. Roos-Keppel, while visiting some of the schools, patiently listened to recitation of English poetry by Pathan boys, which he thought was “unintelligible nonsense”.³ The pupils themselves were not at all interested in what they read:

Neither lullabies to infants, nor poems on English flowers are attractive subjects for recitation by Pathan boys of 16 years of age.⁴

This state of affairs deeply disappointed the Chief Commissioner, who felt that the entire educational system needed overhauling. He, therefore, embarked upon large-scale reforms, which were carried out in the following decade of 1911-21. The design and implementation of these reforms was the handiwork of Roos-Keppel, who brought to his office a new and clear vision, a high purpose, a resolute spirit, and ambition. He left education invigorated in all spheres, awakening the authorities to the fulness of their responsibilities for the educational development of the people of his Province. The personal interest he took in the matter carried him to far-flung rural areas, from where he returned convinced of the defects of the existing educational machinery and determined to remove them.

The most conspicuous feature of the reforms lay in the formation of a comprehensive and systematic policy of education by the Local Government and its ability to secure the necessary support from the Supreme Government to implement it. Roos-Keppel’s first task was to obtain effective control of educational administration by demanding its separation from the Educational Service of the Punjab Government. In 1909, he had proposed that the Education Department of the Frontier Province be placed under a separate Director of Public Instruction, who should belong to the Indian Educational Service. The Government of India accepted the proposal, but appointed a Director who held the combined charge of the Frontier Province and Baluchistan.⁵ This modification of

1. Ibid., p.2.
2. Ibid., p.2.
3. Ibid., p.3.
4. Ibid., p.3.
Roos-Keppel's proposal was hardly satisfactory: the officer had quite enough work to do in the Frontier, and it was "ridiculous" that the Government should ask him "to inspect and direct education at places which are as far apart as are London and Warsaw".1 Roos-Keppel kept on protesting. In the end, the Government of India took heed; and in 1914 the educational charge of Baluchistan was separated, and the Frontier Province got a full-time Director of Public Instruction for itself.2 A separate provincial educational cadre was created for the new Province; and a revised pay scale was introduced for the officers in the Education Department of the Frontier Province.3

Now that the battle was won, Roos-Keppel, with the co-operation of the new Director, started to implement a comprehensive plan of educational reforms, the aim of which he spelled out thus:

Our desire is not to be brilliantly successful with a few selected schools or merely to aim at the higher education of picked scholars, but rather to lay the foundation of an educational system, the result of which would be apparent many years hence. We hope eventually to provide every village with a primary school on demand; a proportion of the scholars of these primary schools will go on to the middle schools and a percentage of those of the middle schools will go on to the High Schools, being aided, wherever necessary, by scholarships...From the high schools we shall get our college students and select our future generation of teachers, training them ourselves at the Peshawar Normal School, and shall thus in time get a class of primary teachers of good standing, conversant with the language of the country and in touch with the parents, instead of the dregs of the Punjab, which is all we could expect to get before on the miserable pay offered.4

Roos-Keppel hoped that, "with the Government of India, missions, private individuals and Indian Societies working together", he could make the Frontier Province a "model educational province" by establishing

at least one primary school in every village, a middle school within easy reach of every village, high schools in all cities and at the capitals of all sub-divisions, and above them, competing in friendly rivalry, the

Edwardes Mission Arts College and the Provincial Islamia Arts College, both affiliated to the Punjab University.¹

The first item in Roos-Keppel’s programme was to bring about a rapid development of primary education throughout the Province. This was in keeping with the Government of India’s educational policy, as set out in their Resolution of 21 February 1913.² In July 1911, the Government of India had asked the Local Governments to submit schemes for the expansion of primary education.³ Accordingly, in September 1911, Roos-Keppel submitted his plan, which aimed at the opening of 445 new primary schools in the rural areas within the next five years. He had even selected the sites for these schools, and had devoted considerable time to examining the curriculum, which he wanted to be as simple as possible. Only Pashto-speaking teachers were to be engaged, and the maximum number of pupils for a teacher was fixed at 40. In order to attract trained teachers, a special Elementary Teachers’ Service, consisting of four grades of salary, was to be created.⁴ The schools would be under the District Boards, as Roos-Keppel did not have any hope of private initiative and enterprise playing an encouraging role in spreading primary education in the near future.⁵ In order to ensure the requisite supply of trained teachers for urban primary schools, he recommended that the number of stipends at the Normal School at Peshawar should be increased from 60 to 100.⁶

To provide better inspection of the schools, Roos-Keppel suggested the appointment of two additional inspectors, one for Peshawar and Hazara and the other for Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan, who would relieve the District Inspectors of their administrative and clerical duties, and enable them to exercise more effective supervision over instructional methods. The expenditure for all these plans would be met from three sources: funds of the local bodies, provincial revenues, and grants from the Government of India, which Roos-Keppel wanted

4. The various grades were fixed at salaries starting at Rs. 14,16,18 and 20 per month.
6. Ibid.
to be made available to him on a liberal basis.\textsuperscript{1}

An important step towards the popularization of primary education was taken when, in November 1911, it was made free in the schools under District Board management. At the same time, English was eliminated from the primary section of the Anglo-Vernacular schools.\textsuperscript{2}

Thanks to the Chief Commissioner's sustained interest and enthusiasm, and comparatively liberal grants from the Government of India,\textsuperscript{3} primary education made considerable progress. The number of schools in the settled districts increased from 260 in 1911-12 to 585 in 1916-17, and the number of students rose from 14,129 to 25,097.\textsuperscript{4}

However, Roos-Keppel showed no great enthusiasm for rapid expansion of education in tribal territories through Government efforts. He believed that

\begin{quote}
education in the independent areas will only make progress by force of the example of the districts.\textsuperscript{5}
\end{quote}

It was only in 1912 that the first Government primary school was opened in the Malakand Agency, and the first vernacular middle school in 1914-15. The standard of instruction imparted in the schools was low, because of the lack of trained teachers; for local teachers were as reluctant to go to the Normal School at Peshawar as trained teachers from settled districts were disinclined to serve in the tribal Agencies. In order to facilitate the exchange of teachers between districts and Agencies, Roos-Keppel, in 1918, extended the provident fund and pension schemes operating in the districts to the Agencies.\textsuperscript{6}

Between 1917 and 1922, educational progress in the Province was retarded by the Government's preoccupation with the War and the disturbed political situation and by the consequent diversion of Government funds to meet military and political exigencies. During these five years, the District Boards were able to open only 40 new primary schools, and the number of students rose by only 902 over the 1917

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item The Govt. of India made a recurring grant of Rs. 50,000 for primary education in 1912-13, of Rs. 55,000 in 1913-14, and of Rs. 38,000 in 1914-15. \textit{Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P.}, 1912-17, p. 13.
\item Ibid., p.1.
\item Review of the Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1911-12, by Roos-Keppel, p.3.
\end{enumerate}
The economic difficulties of the War years also hit the privately run institutions hard. Politically, the year 1919-20 proved to be the worst, since it was in that year that there started, one on top of the other, the Third Afghan War; the Rowlatt Bill agitation; the Non-Co-operation and Hijrat Movements; the prolonged tribal disorder and extensive tribal raids on the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts—all of which created a sense of general insecurity. The number of students attending public schools decreased.

These events were interpreted to hold out one important lesson for the Local Government. The Chief Commissioner firmly believed that ignorant and credulous Pathans had fallen an easy prey to the "insidiousness of religious and political propaganda" put out by anti-British elements who sought to create trouble in the Province. The best means to avert the recurrence of such events, Roos-Keppel believed, lay in "education, more education and better education". He, therefore, proposed the opening of 500 new primary schools in the next decade. To provide more opportunities for the training of teachers, he recommended the opening of a second training facility in 1920, with 30 stipendiaries attached to the Government High School at Bannu. The pay of teachers was raised from Rs. 14 to Rs. 31 per month.

Although Roos-Keppel laid his main emphasis on primary education, he did not neglect secondary education. So far as the vernacular middle schools were concerned, he saw scope for "considerable expansion". He proposed to open five such schools in the next five years, thus bringing their total number to 19. The schools were required to employ trained staff on adequate rates of pay; and Local Boards were provided with special grants from provincial revenues to help the schools. These reforms, in Roos-Keppel's opinion, were "now reasonably adequate".

In regard to high schools, too, Roos-Keppel brought about considerable changes. The total number of high schools in the Province

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3. In 1919-20, the net decrease in attendance was 1,329. Annual Report, 1919-20, p.3.
in 1911 was 12, of which five were at the headquarters of the five districts of the Province, and were maintained by municipalities. The remaining seven were under private management and in receipt of grants-in-aid from the Government. Roos-Keppel proposed to convert the municipal high schools into Government high schools, a reform which was in line with Curzon’s policy.\(^1\) This measure was expected to relieve the municipalities of the burden of maintaining high schools, and thus set their resources free for the improvement of primary education, which, as already noted, was in “an extremely unsatisfactory state.” In addition, Roos-Keppel proposed to raise the status of the Anglo-Vernacular middle school at Mardan, managed by the District Board, into a Government high school. Thus, altogether, there would be six Government high schools in the Province. The Chief Commissioner further recommended that a uniform standard of staff and scale of salaries be adopted in all Government high schools. Roos-Keppel proposed that the pay of the headmasters and district inspectors should be made identical, so as to facilitate interchange between the teaching and inspecting branches.\(^2\)

As regards the seven aided high schools under private management, Roos-Keppel’s object here was to ensure “a high minimum standard of efficiency”. His main recommendations were: to provide more liberal grants to the schools; to fix a minimum standard for teachers’ qualifications and their pay; to give additional remuneration to teachers whose qualifications were higher than the prescribed minimum.\(^3\)

Furthermore, a new curriculum was introduced in the secondary schools; a uniform and higher rate of fees was levied; more free scholarships and scholarships were given to students\(^4\) belonging to the agricultural community, “admittedly the most backward section of the population”.\(^5\) It was provided that scholarships would be distributed district-wise and according to population in each district. The award of scholarships to students was to be governed by the combined criteria of poverty and merit.\(^6\)

In accordance with the Government of India’s Resolution of 21

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3. *Ibid*.
4. In 1901-02, there were 105 secondary school scholarships; in 1912, the number increased to 162. *The Educational Code of the North-West Frontier Province*, 1915, pp. 34-9.
February 1913, the Government of the Frontier Province provided secondary school teachers with greater opportunities for training than hitherto available. In 1916, the Normal School at Peshawar was made a Teachers' Training College, thus releasing the Province from its erstwhile dependence on the Central Teachers' College at Lahore, where teachers from the North-West Frontier Province found it hard to get admission, because of the competition from teachers of the Punjab schools. In the same year, the Local Government introduced the Secondary School Leaving Certificate examination. Then, in April 1919, Roos-Keppel made vernacular middle school education free, hoping that this would provide an incentive for further study to boys who tended to give up after primary school, and would prevent their "relapse into illiteracy". Another reform Roos-Keppel suggested was to place the Government High Schools in the Province under head-masters belonging to the Indian Educational Service, and thus ensure better academic standards and more efficient supervision. The students of these schools were, in time, expected to play an important role in the life of the Province; and the type of education they received—so Roos-Keppel pointed out—would considerably influence their future attitude towards the Government. Closer Governmental association with these high schools would therefore earn political dividends in the future.

That the Local Government was also keen on providing facilities and controlling centres of higher education was made evident by their involvement in the Islamia College movement at Peshawar. The idea of a Dar-ul-Ulum (Home of Learning) for the Frontier Muslims—a centre of advanced learning both in Islamic Studies and in the Humanities—was conceived by Roos-Keppel and Abdul Qaiyum. They discussed the idea sometime between the years 1904 and 1906, at Landikotal on the crest of the Khyber. "The realization of the dream" seemed difficult at the time; for then both Roos-Keppel and Abdul Qaiyum held but subordinate posts. They, therefore, bided their time, awaiting more favourable circumstances.

5. Address of Roos-Keppel to the Committee and Students of the Dar-ul-Ulum on the occasion of the Prize Distribution, 13 April 1916.
It must have struck Abdul Qaiyum that, without the sympathy and active support of the Muslim leaders and philanthropists of the Province, the scheme could not be put through. It was most probably Abdul Qaiyum who sounded the leaders of the Muslim community, both in the districts and the tribal areas, especially in Peshawar and the Khyber, where, as the Education Report of the year 1907-08 pointed out, there existed

A strong feeling among Mohammedan gentlemen in favour of a Provincial College, established under religious auspices, where Arabic would be taught side by side with more modern subjects.1

In August 1908, Roos-Keppel became the Chief Commissioner of the Province; and this ensured the implementation of the idea. Roos-Keppel was fully alive to the educational backwardness of the Province. He adopted—as already discussed2—a new educational policy, laying major stress on primary education, but also attending to the reform of secondary and collegiate education. Regarding the latter, Roos-Keppel would encourage private efforts and give guidance and support to the movement soon to be launched by some leaders of thought, guided by Abdul Qaiyum, who was eminently suited to play the role of intermediary between the administration and the public. On the one hand, he was in Government Service, and a firm friend of the Chief Commissioner; on the other, because of his position, he could influence his community.

Abdul Qaiyum felt his way and proceeded with determination. He was successful in drawing together a band of earnest and devoted workers to his cause. All of them had an interest in keeping on good terms with both Government and people. Some of them were Government contractors, others lawyers, a few merchants; there were also some in the Service, and finally, a few Khans, the rural aristocracy of the region. All were quick to appreciate the advantages of such a college for their young men.

Their combined efforts led to an organized movement for the opening of a college at Peshawar, the capital of the Province. During a period of four years, between 1909 and 1912, the movement passed through various stages. Either late in 1908 or at the beginning of 1909, a number of Muslim leaders for the first time approached Roos-Keppel to draw his attention to the need for higher education in their community. They were pleased to find that the Chief Commissioner

2. See supra, pp. 201-6.
would encourage private efforts for the purpose. A few months later, in the middle of 1909, Roos-Keppel, while paying a formal visit to the Islamia High School, Peshawar, was received by a gathering of many leading Muslims. Presenting him with an address of welcome, these gentlemen, once again, stressed the need for higher education, and suggested that, to meet this need, a college should be opened. Roos-Keppel, in reply, welcomed the suggestion and informed them that he would shortly be paying a visit to the Mohammedan College at Aligarh, while on his way to or from Calcutta. After that, he would be in a better position to discuss the issue. Accordingly, Roos-Keppel, accompanied by Abdul Qaiyum, went to Aligarh. They inspected that great seat of learning and met the few Pathan boys who were studying there, and who also organized a reception for them. Both, it was said, were greatly impressed by their visit.

On his return, Roos-Keppel made further detailed enquiries, and found a wide eagerness to have a college like that at Aligarh. The formal case was now drafted by Abdul Qaiyum. It was a clever document, obviously aiming at enlisting the sympathy and active cooperation of all parties concerned. On the one hand, it envisaged the association of the educational interests of the Muslim community with those of the political interests of the Government; and, on the other, the introduction of a higher course of Arabic in the scheme meant the collaboration of the Ulema, whose influence was a force to reckon with in the North-West Frontier. Dwelling, first of all, upon the advantages of an Islamia College, the Committee, in the subservient language of the time, pointed out:

The Musalmans of this Province (the population of which is almost wholly Muslim) have gradually awakened to the fact that their backwardness in higher university education debars them from serving the Government as they would wish and otherwise seriously handicaps them in the proper discharge of their duties. The rapid progress of India under the benign rule of the British Government and the more complex conditions of modern existence render it compulsory for them—if they are not to sink into mere insignificance—to keep abreast of modern educational advancement. To meet this necessity,


therefore, they need a college which would not merely provide a training ground for the youth of our Province, but would constitute a nucleus of rightly trained intellectual activity and would enable them to fill an honourable role in the history of the country and the progress of the Empire.¹

The Committee had thus, in the first instance, two objectives to realize:

First, that our young men should grow up to be broadminded true Musalmans; and secondly, that they should from the very beginning of their training regard loyalty to the British Throne as one of their highest and noblest qualifications.

However, the aim of the Committee was not to establish an Arts College alone. They believed that a Muslim foundation could not "leave out of its scope religious and moral training". They wished to introduce a higher course in Arabic, and believed that this distinctive feature of the college would

...increase its utility to a very great extent; and by associating the *Ulema* with the cause of progress and enlightenment, mark the beginning of a new era in the history of the Frontier people.²

The Committee asked that, as a special gesture, the Government should pay half the initial cost and half the running expenses of the College. The Muslim half of the cost would, they proposed, be met in three ways: first by donations from all well-to-do people; second, by subscriptions taken from the pay of Muslim Government employees; and finally by contributions from Muslim taxpayers.

The Committee concluded with a peroration which may read oddly today, but still carries a certain sonority and a hint of their vital concern:

The unique position of this Province at the furthest confines of the mightiest Empire which the world has ever known, the deep fidelity of its inhabitants tried and trusted on many a field of battle since the days of General Nicholson, the simple soldierly qualities of the people and the generous solicitude of the Government for their welfare, alike render it incumbent that a further link should strengthen their ties of affection. For the Government there could be no more gracious manner of doing it than by uniting with the people in the noble and glorifying task of holding aloft the torch of knowledge.³

At the beginning of 1911, when Roos-Keppel returned from leave in England, he and Abdul Qaiyum took up the issue at once, giving it a further momentum with their enthusiasm. Hamilton Grant, the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, and Abdul Qaiyum were appointed Joint Secretaries of the Provincial Committee to collect subscriptions for the

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the committee in 1910—that on the Phoenix-Kenol road—did not

by Hamilton Craig and Abdul Qayum. The site already selected by

The next matter of importance was the choice of a site, and this was made

without making Christian’s manufacturing business.

Alas! while they will not send them to Mission Schools, are those

attention is so strong among Pakistanis that few will send their sons to

Portions of some are realizing the necessary for education; but family

shorter, willing to the Victory, informed that

that their sons would also study at the new college. The Chief

poorer people whose gifts were particularly significant; for they hoped

poorer people whose gifts were particularly significant; for they hoped

those giving Rs. 10,000 or more became ,,Supporters,”. But it was the

more were honored with the title of ,,Benefactors” of the Dark-n-Light

and by 1914, Rs. 500,000. Those who gave a lakh (Rs. 100,000) or

give freely in spite of their poverty, donating Rs. 50,000 in six months’

He was right. The people cared, giving with official precision. A

idea of their subscribing such sums as a lakh can get away with official precision. A

tion (Believe unflinchingly of being particular, and people laughed at the

arid chokes contributed one month’s allowances, and sent a เลก?

to do."

Roos-Kedell now wrote a private letter to arouse the interest of

their hands deeper into their trousers’ pockets than they had intended

to donate Rs. 10,000, set an example for other “lay men.” To put

for the boys of higher class as they would not send them to Afghan

Roos-Kedell решили him to set up a school and college for their sons

and all alike, including the mostigated muluks are exactly the same.

May 1911, it was reported that the utmost interest has been excited.

The response of the Muslim administration was overwhelming. In

Project. Fund-raising deputations were sent to all the districts of the

N.W.F.P. Administration under British Rule.
appeal to them. They, therefore, sought the advice of Roos-Keppel and so came to choose what was undoubtedly his favourite place—that on which the College stands today. This, though now said to be the healthiest spot in the Peshawar District, was at that time a parched, barren and uneven tract with ancient mounds and many water-courses. It did not look attractive and was condemned by Colonel Dundee, Secretary of the PWD, who, as Grant writes, “was better in the office than on a horse”, and had such trouble with the water-courses that he declared the place “unfit for human habitation”.

But Roos-Keppel saw the college on that site in his eye of faith, and it was duly chosen.

Considered geographically and historically, the site could not have been bettered. Lying in open and beautiful country, with a panoramic view of the Khyber mountains, it stands at the extreme western edge of the Peshawar Valley. It is 6 miles away from the entrance of the historic Khyber Pass and 3 miles from the Peshawar Cantonment on the famous highway to Central Asia. It was the place where, in 1835, in a hard fought battle, the Afghans under Mohammad Akber Khan, the bold and enterprising son of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sikhs under Hari Singh, Ranjit Singh’s general who fell in the action. Finally, on this same site, a Buddhist monastery of the times of the Kushan rulers of about the second century A.D. had flourished—a fact which linked the Islamia College with a remote past and made it the successor of a renowned educational institution belonging to a great epoch of culture and civilization in Asia.

Accordingly, during the years 1911 and 1912, the Joint Secretaries acquired the site of about 210 acres through private negotiation with the owners, who lowered the price of this land as part of their contribution to the fund.

The Muslim community felt that the first building to appear on the Campus should be a mosque; and the foundation stone of this was laid on 21 March 1912 in the presence of a great concourse of people, including such local religious leaders as Haji Sahib of Turangzai and Badshah Gul Sahib of Baja Bam Khel. Many scholars and divines from outside the Frontier also came to the ceremony.

The guests were entertained by those who had been most generous to the fund, especially Haji Karim Bakhsh, who made himself responsible

2. Report on the Progress of the Islamia College and Islamia Collegiate School, Peshawar, during the year 1915-16, by the Principal, p. 2.
for the expenses of the Mosque and on this occasion distributed sweetmeats and turban cloths to the Ulema.¹

Now that the first sod had been cut and the first stone of the mosque laid, the Committee began another long series of discussions on the form which the College and its curriculum should take. It took some months to work out all the details, including the three branches into which it should be divided: the Faculty of Oriental Studies, the Faculty of Western Humanities (though these later merged into one), and a High School for boys.²

There was some discussion and protest when Roos-Keppel indicated that he wished to retain supreme power, not only to veto decisions of the Board of Trustees, Board of Governors, and Council of Management, but also to initiate such measures as he considered necessary. He thought that, “with Government control, the College would be an influence for good, without it for evil.”³ Though the Government backed him in this,⁴ public opinion did not. The vernacular press had already “hinted that, for some mysterious purpose, the Government was trying to emasculate the project of an independent college”.

As a compromise, it was agreed that the Chief Commissioner should have power to suggest, to the governing bodies, measures which he might consider beneficial, as well as the right to veto any measure passed by the three governing bodies. The Principal was to wield disciplinary powers over staff and students.⁵

The Government’s keen interest in and active assistance for the Islamia College movement were not without political considerations. The Government expected that the College would not only educate and enlighten influential Pathan families, but also attach them to the Government. Roos-Keppel put it this way:

If the College becomes a success, as there is little doubt that it will, I believe that the effect on the peace of the border will be very great eventually, as I shall try to get in all sons of the tribal Malik, the chiefs

3. Roos-Keppel to Butler, 7 October 1911, 23 February 1912, B.P., vol. 32.
of the next generation, to attend the School and to learn that the Firangi and his administration are not so black as they are painted.\footnote{1} Hardinge wholly approved of the policy; like Roos-Keppel he was "quite certain that the spread of education is the most satisfactory means of revolutionizing the situation on the North-West Frontier and keeping the tribes quiet."\footnote{2} The Islamia College was expected to serve another political purpose: to keep the Frontier Muslims away from other educational institutions in India, and particularly from Aligarh, which was then regarded as a hot-bed of Muslim political agitation. The private correspondence of Hardinge, Roos-Keppel and Harcourt Butler, the Education Member of the Viceroy's Council and later Governor of the United Provinces, provides clear proof of the policy of the Government. Butler saw to it that the Islamia College received liberal Imperial grants. In June 1911, in a secret Minute on the allotment of these grants, Butler strongly recommended that Rs. 50,000 be earmarked for the Islamia College because it was a matter of first political importance to civilize the Frontier people through a big educational institution started under our control. It is an opportunity not to be missed...on every ground it is important to isolate the Frontier people and let them have their own institution... I regard it as a form of future insurance against Frontier troubles which is worth the expenditure of a far larger sum.\footnote{3}

In April 1913, Butler wrote to Hardinge in even clearer terms:

There is a tendency to isolate Aligarh, and I think we should be wise to foster this tendency...If we strongly support the Islamia College, Peshawar, the Islamia College, Lahore, the projected Colleges at Bombay and at Dacca, and perhaps also at Calcutta, Aligarh will cease to hold the position it has got now.\footnote{4}

Roos-Keppel further stressed the point: he was sanguine that "the College will prove a very valuable barrier against Indian political sentiment, and especially against Aligarh, which is now a focus of Mohammedan discontent."\footnote{5}

Roos-Keppel was not satisfied with just engineering a break of contact between Aligarh and Peshawar; he also took steps to influence the development of the Islamia College in such a way that it would remain under Government control. For that purpose, he aimed at spending a major portion of the subscriptions on the construction of

\begin{enumerate}
\item Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 26 October 1911, \textit{H.P.}, vol. 82.
\item Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 2 November 1911, \textit{ibid}.
\item "Secret Minute on Imperial Grants for Education" by Harcourt Butler, 22 June 1911, \textit{B.P.}, vol. 47.
\item Butler to Hardinge, 3 April 1913, \textit{H.P.}, vol. 85.
\item Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 26 September 1913, \textit{ibid}.
\end{enumerate}
buildings, so as to make the College dependent on Government grants for its operational expenses, and thus open it up to direct Government control. Informing Butler about the position, Roos-Keppel, in October 1911, was quite explicit in his letter to him:

I want to spend most of it on buildings, library etc., so as to keep the College mainly dependent upon its Government subsidy. If independent, it would get out of control like Aligarh is, I understand, doing.¹

There was apparently no overt opposition to the way in which Islamia College was being manoeuvred; but there was undoubtedly, as I am told by people able to recollect those days, an undercover resentment felt in the aristocratic circles of the Province. It was not so much directed against the establishment of the institution, as against Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, who had been intimately associated with the College movement, and whom some of the Khans considered to be their political rival. Others, subject to selfish prejudices, were averse to the “rennaissance of education” under Roos-Keppel. Roos-Keppel reported in 1912 that

... among the small educated class of Muhammadans, there is a selfish minority who resist the raising of the proletariat, and urge that the spread of education will endanger the ancient fabric of society by filling the brains of the children of agriculturists with ambitious ideas above their station, and thus unfitting them for the work of hewers of wood and drawers of water to the rich.²

The Hindu press in the Punjab denounced the Islamia College scheme,³ while the Muslim press of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province welcomed it.⁴ Under the caption “Sir George Roos-Keppel’s Heap of Sins”, the Punjab Advocate wrote:

the blackest part of his sinfulness is connected with the interest which he has been evincing in the establishment of the Islamia College at Peshawar.⁵

However, the Muslim press fully supported Roos-Keppel’s encouragement of the Islamia College movement and strongly condemned the Hindu paper’s opposition to it. The Afghan of 23 January 1910 commented that the Islamia Collegiate School

will protect the Frontier Muslims from the unholy influence of the Arya National School, the sole object of which consists in the dissemination

1. Roos-Keppel to Butler, 7 October 1911, B.P., vol. 32.
3. The Punjab Advocate, 6 July 1911, 27 June 1912; The Wakil, 3 December 1913; The Punjab Native Newspapers Reports, 1911-12, 1913.
4. The Afghan, 15, 23 January 1910; The Paisa Akhbar, 5 March 1910, 4 May 1911; The Zamindar, 8 September 1911; The Observer, 18, 22 May 1912, ibid., 1910, 1911, 1912.
5. Cited in The Zamindar, 4 May 1912, ibid., 1912.
of sedition against the Government and false ideas about Islam and Prophet etc; it will also protect the Muslims from the Mission School.1

The *Paisa Akhbar*, welcoming the Islamia College scheme, hoped that the Amir of Afghanistan would assist it financially as he had been doing the Islamia College at Lahore.2 The *Zamindar* refuted the charge made by the Hindu press that the people of the Frontier Province had been forced to subscribe for the college, holding that all payments had been purely voluntary.3 The *Observer* strongly defended Roos-Keppel's active association with the college scheme, stating that the criticism levelled by the Hindu newspapers was

the outcome of the hated imagination of the Hindu press, for whom an Islamia College at Peshawar and Government sympathy for it are hateful...

Defending Roos-Keppel for his support of the college, the paper wrote that Roos-Keppel was "entirely free from all these unfounded and unjustifiable blames and slurs".4 The *Milat* spoke in similar terms.5

The building of both College and School began in October 1912, and proceeded smoothly and rapidly. Reading through the records and correspondence today, one is struck by two things: the complete co-operation that Roos-Keppel received from the civil and military staff of the Province, and the determination of all concerned that this should not only be a functional set of buildings for educational purposes, but also a beautiful addition to the district—a place of dignity made on a grand scale, complete and satisfying in itself. Even today, when the outward pressure of the Peshawar University buildings has taken away many of the playing fields and much of the agricultural land of Islamia College, it is still a splendid sight, and its completeness is most impressive.

The site, planning and design of the buildings were the work of Colonel W.J.D. Dundee, then Secretary of the Public Works Department, and Lt. Colonel G.P. Campbell, Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer, Peshawar, both of the Military Engineering Service. They found time to supervise the building operations themselves, until the pressure of work brought about by the First World War forced them to delegate much of this task to Mr. R. Sheridan, a Sub-Engineer, and a Major P.R., who appears only as such in the records. By this time, however, the

plans were made, the drawing complete, and the little town—for such it was—mapped out.¹

The opening ceremony was performed by Harcourt Butler on 5 April 1913, less than a year after the laying of the foundation stone. One grey-beard rose to give “an excited extempore harangue in Pashto” whose burden, Butler was told, was that this was the first occasion when the Mohammedans of the Frontier had given of their abundance for anything except women and boys.”² Butler, in a loftier vein, said:

Standing here on the most famous highway of Asia, facing the mouth of the Khyber Pass, I confess that my imagination is powerfully affected at the prospect of the enlightenment which will radiate from this School and College, not only in this Province and along the Frontier, but far into the recesses of Asia.³

The Islamia College was opened six months later. Though based on the Aligarh pattern in their general set up, the School and the College followed the courses of study prescribed by the Punjab University.⁴ The curriculum consisted, at first, of English, Mathematics, History, Philosophy, Economics, Arabic and Persian with Physics and Chemistry as optional subjects. Though the authorities keenly desired that they should begin with a full-fledged science faculty, this was not possible because the facilities for the teaching of science could not be made available at the start.⁵ But it was soon realized that to make the Dar-ul-Ulum “an institution worthy of its name, and one possessing distinctive features of its own”,⁶ the opening of a science faculty was imperative. Therefore, the construction of a large science block was undertaken in 1914. Classes in Biology were opened next year, “with a view to enabling students to qualify themselves for entrance to the Medical profession.”⁷ The Principal hoped that when the science block “is completed and equipped we may consider that our science side is firmly established.”⁸ Courses leading to Bachelor of Arts degrees were started in 1915 and those for Bachelor of Science in 1920. The College was affiliated to the Punjab University.

² Butler to Lovat Fraser, 8 April 1913, B.P., vol. 57.
⁴ Abdul Qaiyum to Tipping, 28 April, 2 June 1913, “Correspondence with Honorary Secretary” A Loose File in the Old Record of the Dar-ul-Ulum.
⁵ Abdul Qaiyum to Tipping, 7, 9 September 1913, Ibid.
⁶ Translation of the Report in Pashto read by the Honorary Secretary, Islamia College, Peshawar, on the occasion of the Distribution of Prizes, 30 April 1914, p.2.
⁸ Ibid.
On the College staff there were three Cambridge graduates: L. Tipping, Principal and Professor of English; Inayatullah Khan (later Allama Mashriqi), Vice Principal and Professor of Mathematics; and H.T. Bousfield, Professor of History. The Dar-ul-Ulum attracted students from the tribal territory as well as from the settled districts. It began with 25 students. After three years, it had 450 (100 in the College and 350 in the School). The bulk of the students were boarders residing in the hostels on the College premises. More than 90 per cent of the students were Pathans by birth and residents of the Province. Of trans-border students, the institution had on its rolls 691 in 1915-16. Whatever the ulterior motives of the colonial masters, the Dar-ul-Ulum progressed and expanded. After 25 years of its existence, the College had 464 students on its rolls; and when it was celebrating its Golden Jubilee in October 1963, their number had swelled to 1,400; in recent years the number has often been 2,000 or more.

Of the joint founders of the Dar-ul-Ulum, Sir George Roos-Keppel retired in 1919 and left for his home country; Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum lived on to shine on the political horizon of the Province and won laurels as a great statesman of his day. He, nevertheless, devoted much of his time and energy to the welfare of the Dar-ul-Ulum, which under his benign care grew up from babyhood into a vigorous youth. Pressing forward from one step to another, Abdul Qaiyum was just nearing the goal of converting the Dar-ul-Ulum into a University, when in a sudden heart-attack in December 1938 deprived the Province of its great man. No other leader did so much for the uplift of the Frontier people as Sir Abdul Qaiyum had done in the first half of the present century. For his services rendered to his community, he was described by Roos-Keppel as “the Sir Syed Ahmad of Musalman education and progress in the North-West Frontier Province”, and was endearingly known to the people as “the Grand Old Man of the Frontier” in his advanced age. Abdul Qaiyum’s dream of the Frontier University was realized 12 years later when the Quaid-i-Azam, in April 1948, promised a University to the Frontier Province, and thereafter the University of Peshawar was established in October 1950.

1. 23 Swatis and Chitralis including 3 sons of the Mehtar of Chitral; 20 Afridis and Shinwaris; 9 Mahsuds from Wana; 8 Waziris from Tochi; 4 Toris from Kurram; 3 Nephews of the Nawab of Amb, and 2 Buneris. Report on the Progress of the Islamia College and Islamia Collegiate School, Peshawar, during the year 1915-16, by L. Tipping, p.1.
2. Ibid., p.1.
Education for Girls

The education of girls in the Frontier Province had made little progress, as local prejudices against educating girls were so great that a colonial Government could hardly be expected to have made much headway in establishing a system of education which would have met the individual and social needs of women in the Province. Indeed, such attempts as were made by the Government in this field mostly came about only after 1911.

In 1901-02, there were no more than eight Government-recognized primary schools for girls in the entire Province, with a total enrolment of 491 pupils; and the total annual expenditure incurred on their maintenance amounted to just Rs. 2,477. The pupils were mostly Hindu Girls belonging to the families of Government servants and traders. There were no Muslim girls attending public schools in either Peshawar or Hazara, educationally the most backward districts.¹

The curriculum in the girls' schools consisted primarily of the three R's, and while needlework was taught in all schools, those at Abbottabad also had provisions for knitting and embroidery. The Arya Kanya aided school at Dera Ismail Khan, run by local Hindus, was the most flourishing educational centre for girls. For the encouragement of upper primary education among girls the Government of the Punjab had instituted 17 scholarships for 23 girls, who constituted the total number of pupils receiving upper primary education in the entire Province.²

There was no secondary school for girls until 1906, when the Arya Kanya school was raised to the status of a middle school.³ The Government's efforts were directed mainly towards improving the standards of education for girls, rather than at its expansion. In the absence of women teachers, the girls' schools generally had to be staffed by old retired teachers of boys' primary schools. There was, besides, hardly any inspection of girls' schools; for the rigid purdah system prevalent among the Frontier Muslims did not permit such inspection. In 1906-07, the Local Government secured the services of an Assistant Inspectress of Schools from the Punjab; but after two years, she asked for her transfer; and it was not until 1916-17 that the Frontier Province acquired its own Inspectress of Girls' Schools. Following this appointment, six women

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². Ibid.
were sent to Lahore to be trained at its Normal School for Women. In 1920, a Normal School for Women was opened at Peshawar; but after two years, it had to close down for lack of finances.\footnote{1}

In 1920-21, the curriculum of the girls' schools was revised, emphasis being laid on instruction in Domestic Science, which was "to form the chief function of a girl in after life".\footnote{2} Elementary nature study and instruction in handicrafts were also introduced.

The number of girls' primary schools in 1920-21 stood at 56 as against 28 in 1911-12; and the total number of pupils amounted to 3,513 and 1,925 in corresponding years. Middle schools for girls, first established in 1906, increased from one to three, and the number of their pupils from 322 to 783 in the same period.\footnote{3}

The education of girls in the Province thus had, as the Census Report of 1921 put it, hardly gone beyond the primary stage. There was no girls' high school; and a girls' college was "still a dream of the future". Prejudice against the spread of education among women, especially in the Muslim community, had "not yet appreciably weakened". The "perpetual tutelage of women which had been practised so long among both Hindus and Musalmans" continued, and most men still disfavoured the education of girls which they felt was "likely to result in the social emancipation of the weaker sex".\footnote{4}

Considering the local people's general lack of eagerness for western education, and the consequent difficulty in implementing any large-scale programme for the rapid development of education, the Government could claim that their efforts had borne some fruit. In the two decades under review, education had indeed made progress, though not with uniform steadiness. The number of educational institutions and students in the settled districts had increased, as had the Government's expense in maintaining the educational establishments. However, education had made little progress in tribal territory.

Among local people an awareness of the benefits of modern education had slowly grown—not the least of which consisted in the opportunity it provided for Government Service. The development of communications and the need for increasing contact with other parts of India acted as additional incentives. This would also explain why the Hindu and

Sikh communities of the Province took to the British system of education far more eagerly than the Muslims. The two former communities were much more inclined to enter Government Service or engage in trade; and this inclination necessarily led them to devoting more attention to attaining proficiency in modern education. On the other hand, the Muslims, being agriculturists, did not fully appreciate the benefits of modern education. Beside this, the former were mostly concentrated in towns, where opportunities for education were more easily available than in the villages where the Muslims lived. Moreover, language was a handicap for the Pathans. Finally, the decline of private schools, due to lack of adequate Government support, resulted in the loss of what could have been an effective means of popularizing education among the Muslims in rural areas.

1. Numerically, the strength of the Muslims in 1921 was over 92 per cent of the total population of the Province; but they had only 29 male and 2 female literates per 1,000 of the Muslim population, while the corresponding figures for Hindus were 322 male and 84 female literates, and for Sikhs, 469 male and 188 female literates. Census of India, 1921, vol. XIV, N.W.F.P., pp. 172-3.

2. In 1901-2, the total number of private schools amounted to 927, with an enrolment of 13,626; but in 1921-22, their number declined to 234 and their enrolment to 4,519. Quinquennium Report, 1897-1902, p.1; ibid., 1917-22, p.1.
THE eighteen-year-old history of the administration of the North-West Frontier Province outlined in the previous chapters had two main aspects: the application of Curzon's new tribal policy amidst strains and uncertainties, and the development of the administration of the settled districts on independent lines, but in conformity with the new policies of the Government of India.

Curzon's tribal policy had its merits, although its success hung in a delicate balance. It was designed to secure—so at any rate Curzon claimed—the contentment of the tribesmen and to ensure the security of British subjects in the settled districts. The withdrawal of regular troops from tribal territory had for its object the general reduction of military pressure on the tribes and the easing of tension in the region. Curzon's new Militia Scheme was a bold experiment, and in normal circumstances worked well; but it broke down under the stress of emergency in 1919. The influence which the British officers of the Militia established over their men and tribal leaders through close personal contact was found useful by the Government. For instance, in the Khyber, the friendly Maliks supplied secret information regarding the movements of the raiding parties, aided the Government in effecting agreements between the tribes and the Government, and in constructing roads and railways in tribal areas. Curzon, however, did not ignore the military defence of the North-West Frontier. The number of regular troops was increased; the troops were stationed in Cantonments in the settled districts flanking the border, and their rapid concentration at a threatened point was

1. In 1899, there were 15,289 regulars across the administrative border of British India, which had been reduced to 4,156 in 1905, while the supporting garrisons within the British border had been increased from 2,197 to 23,341. Summary of Curzon's Administration, Foreign Department, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, part II, p.5, C.C., vol. 526.
facilitated by the construction of strategic roads and railways.

Despite Curzon's bold assertions, the pacification of the tribes—the goal of his policy—was hardly achieved, as the Government's strained relations with the Mahsuds, Afridis and Mohmands, the most important tribes, testify. There was no diminution in the number of daring raids by the tribesmen, which cost British subjects heavily, both in lives and property. The Government's policy lacked consistency; and their patch-up arrangement with the Mahsuds, for example, aimed at avoiding a full-scale expedition, clearly revealed the weakness of the system. Deane believed that there had been "no policy in regard to the tribes but one of opportunism." Had it not been for the increase of Afridi allowances and the co-operation of the Amir of Afghanistan, Habibullah, the maintenance of peace and order in the Province during World War I would have been extremely difficult.

The weakness of Curzon's tribal policy was evident to the men on whom fell the task of implementing it. Both Deane and Roos-Keppel advocated modification of that policy, and so did Minto. Deane urged that whenever a tribe misbehaved in a way that called for a punitive expedition, the Government, after punishing it, should permanently occupy places of strategic importance in the area and strengthen that occupation by the construction of roads. Besides, the territories of those tribes who desired to come under the Government's protection should be taken over and administered on the lines of the protected areas of Tochi, Sam Ranizai and Kurram. Roos-Keppel in later years also criticized the Government of India for shirking responsibility by refusing to interfere in tribal affairs. In his opinion, the only lasting solution of the Frontier problem was to crush the tribes by force, to disarm them, and to occupy their territories. He urged this course because it was desirable partly in our own interest, partly in the interests of the people of our settled districts to whom we owe protection... but mainly in the interests of the tribes themselves—in fact as a scheme for the reclamation from barbarism of a fine, manly and courageous people capable of great development and of becoming a source of strength instead of weakness to the Empire.

Minto was in agreement with the 'forward' views of his Frontier officers. He maintained that peaceful penetration into tribal territory, and

1. Deane to Dunlop Smith, 30 April 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 78.
2. "Note on the probable attitude of the Frontier Tribes and of Afghanistan in the event of an attempted invasion of India by Russia and on the Frontier Policy in connection therewith", by H. Deane, 13 July 1906, P.S.D.M., A 166.
3. Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 13 March 1916, R.P.
its gradual absorption, would bring prosperity and happiness to the tribesmen, as well as leading to ultimate peace on the border. But Morley had set his heart against any annexation or penetration in the Frontier. He prohibited undue interference with the tribes and the undertaking of any fresh responsibility in tribal territory, unless absolutely necessary for actual strategic reasons. He warned Minto that the forward move which the Viceroy and his Frontier officers were advocating would involve increased expenditure, alarm the tribes, and estrange the Amir of Kabul. This cautious but strong stand against "rolling the tribes up to the Durand Line" was maintained by Morley's successors until 1921-22, when a new forward policy was adopted in the Frontier.

There were several factors which had added to the complexity of the problem and to Government's difficulty in resolving it. While the local Government and the Government of India both viewed the tribal issue mainly as a local problem, the Home Government treated it as affecting the broader question of Imperial strategy. Strategic consideration dictated the adoption of measures that were probably more stringent than necessary. It was thought expedient, from a military point of view, to deprive the tribes of some of their independence and keep them under a degree of control. This the tribes resisted. They had long traditions of independence, which they were determined to maintain. This spirit of independence and hatred of outside control made their suppression a herculean task. Moreover, the tribesmen's virile and martial character, their skill in warfare, increased by their acquisition of vast quantities of modern weapons, and their staunch devotion to their faith made them formidable antagonists. They had another advantage over their enemies in the inaccessibility of their country; in their mountain recesses, they were extremely efficient guerilla fighters. By nature, the Pathans were stolid and strong willed. In their settlements with the Government, they insisted that their views must be taken into account, as also their own notions of what was right and proper, before an agreement could be arrived at. It was this attitude which often created difficulties in the distribution of allowances, especially among the Mahsuds. Finally, the intrigues carried on intermittently from the Afghan side, and the immense influence the Amir of Afghanistan had over the tribes on the British side of the border, aggravated the tribal problem. The tribesmen's racial, religious and linguistic affinity with the tribes on the Afghan side of the Durand Line added to Government's difficulties; for raiders, outlaws, deserters, and in fact all anti-British elements, found a safe asylum in Afghan territory, which, for political reasons, the British could hardly violate.
It was mainly to overcome the difficulties faced by previous administrations in dealing with tribal questions that Curzon embarked upon the establishment of a new Province. The experiment proved a success. It served the purpose of bringing the administration of one of the most difficult areas of British India under the direct control of the Supreme Government; and this control did contribute to the vigour and efficiency of the new administration. The Province was Curzon’s child, and he rejoiced seeing his child “robust and strong”.1 Selected and able officers, a mixed body of civilians and soldiers, were given charge of the new Province. Although even hind-sight prophecies cannot be made about a region where the course of events has been so uncertain, it might be reasonably assumed that the Punjab Government would have had an extremely hard time during the period of the First World War, followed by the Third Afghan War, the Khilafat and the Hijrat movements, if the Frontier areas had been under their control. The comparatively easy handling of these events in the Frontier and the progress made in various fields of administration, which had been neglected under the Punjab Government, justified the creation of the new administration and vindicated Curzon’s stand.

But colonial considerations dominated the policies of the rulers; and these account for the slow progress made by the Province. The policy behind the construction of roads and railways in the Province was primarily to maintain law and order and meet the requirements of the defence of India’s most vulnerable land frontier. Curzon gave great impetus to the extension of communications by his policy of withdrawing regular troops from the tribal regions. Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, enthusiastically supported this policy. But his remarkable scheme for the Kabul River railway was shelved by Morley at the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907, after which Minto and Hardinge carried on only half-hearted and piecemeal extensions and improvements in roads and railways. These roads and railways gave some impetus to the external land trade of the region and to passenger traffic, besides helping to break down the isolation of the border areas. But the construction and utilization of communications for non-strategic developmental purposes was neglected. Those already in existence were inadequate, and could not by any means meet the growing needs of the Province.

Lack of communications and other developmental infrastructure

1. Curzon to O’Dwyer, 9 September 1905, C.C., vol. 211.
proved a great handicap in the way of settlement operations, as well as of general progress. For quite some time, the Frontier districts had to be content with summary settlements. When the first and second settlements were carried out, officials had to take account of the peculiar nature of the Frontier tracts and the political problems confronting the administration there. When it was found that the new revenue demands during the revised assessments in the Districts of Kohat, Bannu and Hazara were somewhat heavy, the over-load had to be remedied with the Government adopting a policy of light assessment. The earlier policy of liberal land revenue assignments and Frontier remissions was also continued in order to keep the class of privileged and loyal British subjects attached to the administration.

However, various Resolutions and Acts were also passed and put into effect, by Curzon and his successor Minto, for the welfare of the peasantry—the most important of which were the extension of the Punjab Land Alienation Act and the Co-operative Credit Societies Act. The application of both these measures showed that Deane paid due regard to local custom and usage, and did not push these policies on the agriculturists unless they themselves recognized the utility of these measures. The creation of a separate Department of Agriculture also helped to promote an improved agronomy within limits of an inadequate infrastructure.

The measures the Frontier administration adopted to improve the state of irrigation, both in extending and widening minor canals and constructing the new state canals, were a great step forward. But here, too, political considerations were at work. The Upper Swat Canal was a pyrrhic venture and political motives played an important part in its construction. It was not until the Punjab irrigation authorities' control over irrigation in the Frontier was removed that the working of the Frontier Department of Irrigation reached an acceptable standard of efficiency.

As for education, although Deane realized the need for its expansion, he was not able to achieve much because of limitations imposed by inadequate funds and ill-equipped staff. A considerable step forward was taken by Roos-Keppel when he managed to find the necessary funds and embark upon a systematic policy of educational reform. Roos-Keppel's educational reforms laid major emphasis on the extension of primary education, but also supported the improvement of secondary education. In regard to higher education, private efforts were encouraged. Grants were given to the Edwards Church Mission College, and financial assist-
ance and active encouragement were conferred on the projected Islamia College at Peshawar. World War I had a deleterious effect on the educational development of the Province, since it further curtailed the availability of requisite finances. Roos-Keppel, however, did not abandon his reforms and projects. His initiative and drive were largely responsible for the impetus given to education in the Province, even though his objectives included obvious colonial motifs. However, the most to benefit from the educational reforms were the Hindus and Sikhs. As a primarily agricultural community, the Muslims did not fully avail themselves of the opportunities provided by the administration, and more intensive and expanding efforts were needed to popularize education among them.

The backward state of education and the colonial nature of the administration of the Province were responsible for the conspicuously slow growth of political consciousness among the people. From the Government's point of view, the political, strategic and military problems of the area justified the policy of keeping the local people, as far as possible, cut off from the political developments and influences of other parts of India. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Province lacked the means of formulating and articulating public opinion. In 1902-03, there were only three vernacular newspapers in the Province, as against 209 Vernacular, Anglo-Vernacular and English newspapers in the Punjab; and even these ceased publication by 1906. In 1905, the Frontier Advocate, a weekly, was started from Dera Ismail Khan, with a circulation of just 200 copies. In April 1910, the Government stopped the paper's publication on grounds of its communal and anti-British tone. In 1909, another newspaper, the Afghan, appeared from Peshawar with a limited circulation. The Punjab newspapers had very few readers among the Pathans. There was no literary society worth the name in the Province, let alone any organized political association or platform.

In fact, apathy regarding public affairs was clearly noticeable among the Frontier people. Local self-government was in its infancy, and the people had neither acquired experience nor shown any eagerness to asso-

2. *Administration Report of the N.W.F.P.*, 1901-03, p. 72. The papers were Tuhfa-i-Sarhad, the Frontier Gazette and the Daulat-i-Hind.
ciate themselves with it. "Municipal feeling" was almost non-existent, the members of the municipalities themselves showing little interest in public affairs. Between 1867 and 1873, municipalities had been set up in all the district headquarters except Kohat, and ten years later, Kohat and seven other towns had municipalities. But by 1904, their number was reduced to six, as little use was made of them. The five districts of the Province had a District Board each. Unlike in other provinces, in the Frontier, all members of the Municipal and District Boards were nominated by the Government; and they frequently absented themselves from the Board meetings. Two influential Khans of the Province, for instance, informed the Decentralization Commission (1909) that they had been members of the District Boards for over twenty years, but one Khan had attended the Board meetings about once a year only, and the other had attended a mere five times in the entire twenty years.

Initial stirrings of political consciousness in the Province emerged as a result of the impact of political developments in the Muslim world in general and among Indian Muslims in particular. Events in Turkey and the disintegration of the Khilafat, Italy's occupation of Tripoli (1911), the Balkan wars (1912-13), and Russia's encroachments in Northern Persia (1911-12) agitated the Islamic World, in which these events appeared to be "a Christian conspiracy" against the Muslims. In India, the Government was faced with Muslim discontent over issues like the annulment of the Partition of Bengal and Government control of the Aligarh Muslim University. Through the Aligarh Muslims "tides and waves of the so-called national spirit" reached the Province; and Abdul Qaiyum maintained that "Their object is to get round us and, ignorant as we are, to work up our fanatical ideas and then use us as a cat's paw." But the Government had no immediate fear of any general disturbance in the Province, though there was little doubt that the political situation in India would sooner or later bring about repercussions in the Frontier. "A warlike and fanatical" Muslim population of four millions, observed Roos-Keppel, "was a good seed-bed for revolutionary ideas, and every effort will be made in coming years to sow upon this fertile ground".

3. Ibid., p.68.
4. Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 20 August 1916, R.P.
5. Tinker, op.cit., p. 79.
7. Abdul Qaiyum to Roos-Keppel, 25 August 1912, R.P.
8. Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 6 September 1912, ibid.
In these circumstances, Roos-Keppel advocated that
the longer we can stave off any close connection between the Frontier
and India, the better it will be for the Province and for the Government.1

Roos-Keppel was prepared to deal drastically with people who stirred up political agitation; the Frontier Crimes Regulation had given him the necessary powers to do so.2 His vigilant policy, the operation of which was no doubt facilitated by the loyalty and co-operation of the leading gentry of the Province, paid off. During the War, the Province remained peaceful, unlike other parts of India, especially Bengal and the Punjab, where revolutionary activities grew in intensity and were put down by rigorous measures of the rulers.3 The Frontier Muslims, although "deeply distressed" over the plight of Turkey, were not be roused. They prayed almost every Friday for the victory of their "Sultan Sahib", but showed no overt hostility towards the Government.4 Political unrest of any kind was reported to be "practically non-existent" in the Province.5 The Local Government received public co-operation in dealing with tribal disturbances, and in obtaining money and men for the War—45,231 men, of whom 32,181 were combatants, were recruited during the War.6 Though the Province was poor, with no industrial resources, it contributed Rs. 6,000,000 to War loans.7

The post-war years saw significant constitutional reforms in India; but the Frontier Province was excluded from this policy, because both the Supreme and Local Governments felt that here political reforms were neither necessary nor expedient. Chelmsford clearly stated that the reforms scarcely concerned the Frontier Province, where the Chief Commissioner had "other things to think about".8 This was quite in keeping with Roos-Keppel's own ideas. No political reforms were needed, as there was no agitation or demand for them; and the people were "curiously indifferent to purely Indian affairs", being "much more interested in Kabul and Persia".9 In the circumstances, the Montford

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
4. Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 6 September 1912, R.P.
8. Chelmsford to Roos-Keppel, 6 October 1917, R.P.
9. Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 10 October 1917, ibid.
Report (1918), while recommending dyarchy in other provinces, did not suggest any change in the administration of the Frontier Province. "For reasons of strategy", the Report pointed out, the personal administration of the Chief Commissioner should continue, and "no principle of responsibility" should be introduced. However, "some form of advisory council, adjusted in composition and function to local conditions" was recommended.

But Roos-Keppel found considerable difficulty even in accepting this meagre concession. He was doubtful whether leading men of the Province would be willing to act as advisers to the Local Government without receiving any salary. Roos-Keppel had been taking their advice, and had consulted them on various issues, but only informally and privately. He doubted whether these "confidential advisers" would be able to give him "as frank and honest" advice in a "semi-public Council" as they had hitherto done. All important questions of the Province, in his opinion, were political, stemming from the British Government's relations with Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes or from the effect of events in Central Asia and Persia on the tribes. These matters were treated as secret and could not be discussed "in a semi-public manner". And with the elimination of these subjects from discussion in Council, only "parish politics" would remain, which, in Roos-Keppel's view, could well be settled in consultation with the leaders of different communities. In short, the overwhelmingly political bias of the administration required that its decisions should remain quite outside the purview of an Advisory Council. Roos-Keppel's conclusion was that we...are practically unaffected by the domestic politics of India. It is thus difficult to see what advantage the institution of an Advisory Council would have?

With this adverse comment from Roos-Keppel, the Government of India decided to shelve the issue for the moment. They concluded that it was best to wait and see the general results of the introduction of constitutional reforms in other provinces before taking any definite action in regard to the Frontier Province.

The Pathans were no doubt low in the scale of political advancement; but they were not as immune from political influence, or as insensitive

2. Ibid.
to political events in India, as Roos-Keppel imagined—and this he himself had to admit when he saw the Pathan reaction to the Satyagraha Movement and the Rowlatt Bill agitation. He received petitions against the Rowlatt Bill

from every tribe, every caste and every community in the Peshawar District, the biggest men have signed these, even including the ones who are most on our side, as they say that they would lose their position and what little power they now have to help us if they declined to forward to me a unanimous petition from the whole of their people.\(^1\)

In Roos-Keppel's own admission, the Satyagraha Movement, though essentially Hindu and foreign to the Province,\(^2\) had "united all in hatred to British rule", and he added that "a large number hate us with such bitterness that they would work on even an invasion if they saw a chance of getting rid of us".\(^3\) He was amazed at the rapidity and completeness of its development. The propaganda from down country distributing mischievous descriptions of the Rowlatt Bill has affected everybody. The illiterate classes believe these statements implicitly, and even the most educated believe them in part. No counter propaganda has any effect at all.\(^4\)

Emissaries were sent from the Punjab to Peshawar to encourage people to observe hartals (strikes) and take part in the Non-Co-operation Movement. Panchayats of village elders were established to deal with civil and criminal disputes, so that litigants could dispense with the Government courts.\(^5\) There were public demonstrations, too. Satyagraha agitators were assisted by the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar and were active in the Utmanzai Village in the Charsadda Tahsil, of the Peshawar District. The synchronization of the Third Afghan War and the Satyagraha Movement made the situation especially difficult for Roos-Keppel; but with strong and prompt measures, he managed to weather the crisis.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, the Satyagraha Movement had given local people "a taste for public meetings and for the passing of resolutions". These appeared to be portentous developments to Roos-Keppel, because political agitation might "prove troublesome in the future, when the people have a real grievance instead of a fancy one like the present".\(^7\) The winds of change blowing in India had reached the Frontier; Roos-Keppel could only hope that his Province "will change more slowly than the most

2. Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 27 April 1919, R.P.
3. Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 5, 13 May 1919, R.P.
advanced parts" of the country. 1 It was, in fact, proving difficult to maintain the policy of the "intellectual and political segregation of the Pathans" 2 from the rest of India; and, in trying to do so, Roos-Keppel seems to have set himself against the current of the times. As Olaf Caroe observes, Roos-Keppel loved the Pathans, he "cared and worked" for them, but he failed to weigh up the workings of the higher education on the Pathan mind, or to appreciate that if Frontier pride was to be turned into new channels and harnessed in the service of a sub-continent, the people must be permitted, indeed encouraged, to keep up with the latest fashions. 3

1. Ibid.
2. Abdul Qaiyum, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier, p. 28.
GLOSSARY

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS

arbab middlemen. This applied specifically to the influential men of the Peshawar border who acted as intermediaries between the Sikh Government and the trans-border tribes. The practice was continued by the British Government until the end of the nineteenth century.
bachh distribution of revenue over holdings.
badmash scoundrel.
badraga tribal escort.
bairak a company of khassadars
bakhra or brakha share.
band dam.
banda hamlet.
barat an assignment of land revenue.
baramta a raid to seize persons or property as indemnity for a wrong.
batai share of produce paid as rent.
butemar a tenant who had acquired rights in land by clearing forests.
chakota lump grain rent in the rabi, and a fixed amount of cash in the kharif harvest.
chakotadar an occupancy tenant of superior position.
chalweshtis Mahsud tribal police; a canal watchman and share distributor.
chaukidar watchman.
chigha hue and cry: pursuit party.
daftar Pathan expression for the settlement of ancestral shares.
daftari  holder of an ancestral share; proprietor or land-owner.
darbar  reception.
elder  an influential tribesman who was not himself a recognized Malik. In some agencies elders received annual rewards in the form of lungis.
fakir  religious mendicant without status: cultivator or farm servant.
frontier remission  a remission of land revenue enjoyed by villages in exposed tracts or actually on the border. It usually amounted to one-third or one-quarter of the demand.
ganda  boards or stakes backed by clods, stones and brushwood used to divide the width of a water section. The smaller unit was called ganda and the larger guta.
hamsaya  dependent, occupying outlying hamlets of a pathan estate on condition of assisting in repelling raids on the land of the proprietor.
hartal  strike.
inam  a cash allowance paid to secure the services of a man of influence.
inamdar  the holder of an inam.
isk or iska  a lot: the casting of lots (also uska and hisk).
jagir  an assignment of land-revenue.
jagirdar  holder of a jagir.
jezail  matchlock.
jezailchis  tribal levies armed with jezails.
jihad  holy war.
jirga  a tribal assembly, council or delegation.
kafila  caravan. A number of animals carrying merchandise or baggage.
kafir  unbeliever.
kandi  section of a village: a division of an estate.
kanungo  supervisor of patwaris.
kalang  arbitrary tax or assessment imposed by the Sikhs.
kalapani  perennial streams issuing from the hills.
khalsa  revenue credited to Government from Crown lands.
khasanri  a straw or dry twig used for casting lots.
khasadar  was the representative of his tribe within its area for carrying out its engagements with Government, but paid by Government. He was an irregular foot soldier: the police of the country.
khasra  field number or a register.
khel  a clan.
khula vesh  fresh calculation of shares at time of vesh: an individual
share of land.

**kirar** a hindu money-lender.

**lambardar** a village headman.

**lashkar** a tribal force which was supposed to take the field under the tribal banner. The tribesmen composing a *lashkar* were in general armed with rifles, bandoliers and cartridges, and a dagger or two stuck in the waist belt. Sufficient food for three or four days, or even more, was carried in a skin bag.

**lath** field embankment to retain irrigation.

**lathband** occupancy tenant who acquired rights in land by embanking fields.

**levy** in the North-West Frontier Province, the levy system was generally applied in the settled districts. These levies consisted of tribesmen settled in British India, who were armed by Government and in receipt of a basic wage. The distinction between the district levies and *khassadars* was that,

1. the levy was a cis-border formation; the *khassadar* trans-border;
2. the levy was armed by Government; the *khassadar* had his own weapons;
3. the levy was employed in British India; the *khassadar* functioned only in tribal territory.

**lungi** a head-dress of honour often accompanied by a reward or a cash payment; an annual cash payment; a cloth used as a wrap.

**maidan** plain or field.

**maira** high land dependent for crops on rain.

**malik** a proprietor of land.

**malik** a tribal headman, who may be recognized as head of a whole tribe, or one of its major or minor sub-divisions, or of a section or sub-section.

**maliki** fraction of the tribal allowance paid to a *Malik*.

**malik kabza** one who owned the land actually in his possession, but had no share in the common property of the village community.

**malikana** a due taken by the superior proprietor.

**malatar** literally ‘binding up loins’, applied to feudal tenants.

**maurusi** occupancy tenant.

**mehtar** title of honour; a tribal chief.

**mirab** supervisor to look after the distribution of water for irrigation.

**muafī** a revenue-free assignment.

**mujahidin** those waging jihad.
mulla: Muslim religious leader, usually orthodox.
munshi: clerk.
mutabar: responsible head.
muwajib: cash allowance paid by the treasury in recognition of family service. It was originally paid by the Sikhs as a feh, for the collection of revenue, to a Khan.
nahri: irrigated from a canal.
nakshi-thakbast: rough boundary plan of an estate.
naubat: order of turns.
paina: a term used to describe the rights in water of villages situated at the tail of a canal or channel.
pain warkh: of land lying near the tail of a canal or distributory.
pals: flanking embankments forming a continuation of the main dam which prevents the water falling back into its old channel.
patwari: a village accountant or keeper of the village records.
powinda: a nomadic Afghan tribesman from Eastern Afghanistan (Ghilzai etc.).
pucha: casting of lots; share.
riwaji-abpshi: record of irrigation customs and rights.
rodhkohi: hill-torrent water.
ryots: farmers.
sadd: dam thrown across a ravine to catch flood water from the hills.
sahukar: a Hindu money-lender.
sarhang: in Persia a Major, or Lieutenant-Colonel; in Afghanistan, the leader of three bairaks of khassadars.
sarishta: tribal organisation for the enforcement of Pathan customs or the apportionment of profit and loss amongst tribal sections.
sarkar: government.
saroba: a term used to describe the water rights of villages at the head of a stream.
sartip: in Persia, a Colonel or General; in Afghanistan, the leader of six or more bairaks of khassadars. It appeared to be in reality an honorary title.
sar-i-warkh: of land lying near the head of a canal or distributory.
shamilat: village common land.
shia: a Muslim sect.
sitta: a log or board of wood laid horizontally under water across the main and branch channels to regulate the flow of water for irrigation purposes.
Sufedposhi inam  a reward assigned out of the revenue to a leading man in return for which certain services were demanded.

Suni  a Muslim sect.

Tahsil  a revenue sub-division of a district, charge of a tahsildar.

Tahsildar  official in charge of a tahsil.

Takavi  loan granted by Government to a cultivator for improvement of land for agricultural purposes.

Tappa  tribal sub-division.

Taqsim  distribution.

Taraf  a sub-division of an estate.

Tuman  a tribe.

Tumandar  chief of a tribe.

Tumani  according to tribal shares.

Tumtum  two-wheeled carriage.

Ulus  body of Mahsud tribe.

Vesh  a periodical redistribution of land among proprietors.

 Wakil  representative; a lawyer.

Wala  water channel.

Wand  land with known boundaries, a territorial block.

Waqt  time.

Wara  a turn or timed share of canal water.

Warakh  a small hole in the side of a water-course.

Yaghistan  land of the unruly.

Zaildar  a headman in charge of a circle of villages called a zail.

Zamindar  a landowner, who often but not always cultivated his own land, usually with the help of landless agricultural labour.

Zamindari  a form of tenure where an estate is held by several proprietors in common.
ABBREVIATIONS

A.P.   Ampthill Papers
B.P.   Butler Papers
C.C.   Curzon Collection
C.I.D.P. Committee of Imperial Defence Papers
C.M.I. The Church Missionary Intelligencer
C.M.S.G. Church Missionary Society Gazette
C.P.   Chelmsford Papers
D.P.   Dane Papers
Govt.  Government
G.P.   Grant Papers
H.P.   Hardinge Papers
I.E.P.  India Education Proceedings
I.F.F.P. India Foreign Frontier Proceedings
I.F.P.  India Finance Proceedings
I.F.P.P. India Foreign Political Proceedings
I.J.P.P. India Judicial and Public Proceedings
I.L.A.D. India Legislative Assembly Debates
I.L.A.P. India Legislative Assembly Proceedings
I.P.W.P. India Public Works Proceedings
I.R.A.P. India Revenue and Agriculture Proceedings
I.R.P.  India Railway Proceedings
J.R.C.A.S. Journal of Royal Central Asian Society
K.P.   Kitchener Papers
L.P.   Lytton Papers
M.C.   Montagu Collection
M.P. Morley Papers
P.D. Parliamentary Debates
P.P. Parliamentary Papers
Proc. Proceedings
P.S.D.L. Political and Secret Department Library
P.S.F. Political and Secret Files
P.S.L.I. Political and Secret Letters from India
P.S.M. Political and Secret Memoranda
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P.W.D. Public Works Department
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