THE MARCHES OF
THE BRITISH ARMIES
IN THE
PENINSULA OF INDIA,
DURING THE
CAMPAIGNS OF 1790 AND 1791;
ILLUSTRATED AND EXPLAINED
BY REFERENCE TO A MAP, COMPILED FROM
AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,
TRANSMITTED BY
EARL CORNWALLIS
FROM INDIA.

BY MAJOR RENNELL.

—Just in time thou com'st to have a view
Of his great power; for now the Parthian King
In Ctesiphon hath gather'd all his host.
—See, though from far,
His thousands, in what martial equipage
They issue forth———

MILTON.

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MDCCXCII.
Entered at Stationer's Hall.
The accompanying Map is formed chiefly from materials, transmitted by Earl Cornwallis, from India, by the last dispatch. They consisted of two distinct maps, on very large and similar scales (nine inches to a degree); the one containing the campaign of General Medows, in 1790; the other that of Lord Cornwallis, in 1791. The first was compiled by Captain Allan, who held the office of Captain of Guides to the Army, during the campaign of 1790; the other by Captain Beatson, who held a similar post, during the succeeding campaign; and who had previously given very sufficient proofs of his ability, as a geographer, by his surveys and remarks made in the north-eastern parts of the Peninsula. Each of these maps possesses a very con-
siderable share of merit: and collectively they describe a chain of positions fixed by cursory measurement, and angles taken from the distant hills; through a space containing near three degrees of latitude (from about $10^\frac{1}{2}^\circ$ to $13^\frac{1}{2}^\circ$), and from two to three degrees of longitude: and this, chiefly through a tract, in which, although we had a previous knowledge of many particulars, we still wanted data for the geometrical arrangement of.

It is to be regretted, that these valuable documents, which are so much to the credit of their respective authors, could not have been published separately, on the original scale, and with the original matter, unmixed with other materials of less value; for the purpose of ascertaining, and of exclusively fixing, the respective merits of each, in the public opinion: but the fact is, that the public mind could not have obtained a clear idea of the operations of two distinct campaigns, in different parts of the same country; and pointing by dif-
different routes to the same object; unless the geography of both, was made to coalesce: and the detail, as well as the general scope of both, brought into one point of view. Besides, as an army from the western side of India, was made to co-operate, it became necessary to include that side of the Peninsula also: and we may add, that unless a competent number of the surrounding positions were inserted, none but a person, perfectly well instructed in Indian geography, could have profited by the publication: for an idea of the position of the army, in respect of certain well known points in the geography, could have been no otherwise obtained, than by a reference to another map; and that, after all, but imperfectly. For all these reasons, it was thought proper to extend the map, so as to make it include the whole breadth of the Peninsula; for the purpose of obtaining a clearly-defined natural boundary on the east and west. And by including the borders of the Sera, and Bednore countries, on the
one hand; and Madura, and the dependencies of Travancore, on the other; a well known political boundary is also fixed on the north and south. And this being the case, the reduction of the scale was in a manner unavoidable: for as the present scale, which is \( \frac{3}{4} \) of the original one, requires a large sheet; the same geographical space, would on the large scale, have required two sheets, of course: by which the map would have been extended to an inconvenient size, and the execution delayed: and that without gaining any advantage, save the increased magnitude of the different objects; for as every position, and every name, that occurs in the original maps of the marches, is preserved in the reduced one; nothing is, in effect lost: but, on the contrary, a great deal is gained, by the matter that has been added, in explanation.

As dispatch was the principal object, as far as was consistent with the accuracy of the marches, and with such a degree of
neatness, as conduces to perspicuity; nothing beyond a mere sketch was attempted, in the parts remote from the routes of the armies. The reader is therefore requested to consider both of the sea coasts; the courses of the rivers in the Carnatic, and on the west of the Gouts; and the chains of hills, or such parts of them, as did not present themselves to the view of the gentlemen who surveyed the marches; as lines calculated merely to enable him to form a general idea of the connexion of the inland country, with the sea coasts; and of the different Gouts, or passes, with each other.

Thus much I thought was necessary to be said, concerning the history and construction of the Map of the Marches. With respect to the following pages, written with a view to explain the object, intended by each particular line of march, on the map; and by that, the general scope of the designs of each commander; as far as we understand the subject, either from their own declarations, or the apparent tendency of
the motions themselves: for these I can only apologize, for offering to the public so imperfect a performance. Content with furnishing a clue, to the apparent labyrinth exhibited on the map, by the marches during the southern campaign, I hazard not my judgment on the operations themselves, nor on the arrangements that gave occasion to them. They were, doubtless, made with the best intentions; but failed, as to the attainment of the object proposed. I do not hesitate to acknowledge, that in the succeeding campaign, I trace the steps of the army with more satisfaction; as victory, and even partial success, have more attractions, than disappointment and failure. I should have found yet more occasion for self-congratulation, had the necessity of a third campaign been obviated, by the possession of those advantages, with which we were flattered, by the brilliant victories of the second. But the difficulties that a general has to surmount in that country; and particularly in the article of feeding his
army, and its myriads of followers, and beasts of burden; is greater than most European officers can readily conceive. In an army composed chiefly of Asiatics, whose ordinary habits and prejudices cannot be conquered by discipline; since the indulgence of those very habits and prejudices, constitute the chief hold that their European employers have on their minds and affections, in commanding their services; a vast train of followers, is one inevitable consequence: and these hold the army in a considerable degree of dependence, by their wants. Wars undertaken at the distance of some hundred miles from the centre of our established influence, and powers of regular supply; no magazines, in consequence, to have recourse to; and the severe police of the enemy, precluding any effectual assistance from the natives; the only system to be adopted, is that of carrying a stock of provisions with the army. And the transport being effected by means of a numerous train of slow-paced, and feeble beasts of
burden, creates a fresh difficulty; namely, the want of forage to subsist them, until their burdens are brought into use. Every grain of rice, and every shot for the battering train, must be carried on the back of a bullock: and when, to the number required for these purposes, the draft-cattle for the train, and its carriages; and for the private baggage of the army, are added; the whole number required, is so enormous, that the provision of forage, when near to, or in the presence of, an enemy, becomes impracticable. So that the act of providing against a scarcity amongst the troops, begets a scarcity of another kind, and little less pressing, as it regards the success of the campaign: for the scarcity of forage soon manifests itself, in the slow progress of the train of artillery, and of the army in consequence.

The numerous cavalry of the enemy, also present a formidable obstacle to the progress of an army, so much inferior in that respect. Added to the rapid destruc-
tion of the provisions and forage, near the line of march, effected by their motions, they moreover shut out all possibility of a deliberate examination of ground: and reduce a general to the sad necessity of taking too much on trust; thus compelling him to oppose the naked means of energy and perseverance, unassisted by a knowledge of facts, in cases where a great degree of fore-knowledge and fore-thought, are generally deemed requisite to success.

Of the success of this energy and perseverance, we have, however, some splendid examples before us: but the incurable evils arising from a deficiency of provisions, or of forage, were continually operating, to prevent the seasonable progress of the campaign; so that when prudence and valour had accomplished their part, they were made the sport of contingency.

It is to be regretted, that the vicissitudes of the seasons, whose effects could neither be evaded nor controlled, should have been tempted, under the pressure of emergency,
or the influence of an active zeal for the service. We do not, however, find, that the temporary distresses and hardships, consequent on the weather, and the failure of a regular supply of provisions, have, in the least, weakened the confidence of the army, in its General: on the contrary, the manliness and purity of his character, together with his spirited exertions in every situation, have united the public mind in his favour, and gained him the ascendant, in the councils of our allies in the field. With these flattering prospects, at the opening of the campaign; and the certainty of a long season of fair weather; we may, I hope, anticipate the fall of the tyrant: who has, in some very recent instances, forfeited every claim to mercy and forbearance, if subdued: and staining his hands with the blood of defenceless prisoners, has called down the vengeance of our countrymen, on his guilty head.
EXPLANATION OF THE MAP.

The Marches of the armies, are described by dotted lines, coloured: each army, having a colour, appropriate to it.

Earl Cornwallis's has - RED.
Gen. Medows's - BLUE.
Gen. Abercromby's - PURPLE.
Col. Maxwell's - GREEN.
Tippoo Sultan's - ORANGE.

Each encampment of the British armies, is marked by a square flag; and Tippoo’s by a pointed one. As the flag shews the centre of the front, of each camp; it sometimes happens, that the flag is placed, out of line of march. The date is added to each encampment; and the mode of placing the day of the month, before, or after, the month itself; points out the direction of the line of march, at that particular time. Thus, Nov. 15th, shews that the army was moving to the right; and 18th Nov. to the left.
EXPLANATION OF THE MAP.

The broken lines of colour, shew the marches of detachments.

The ascent to the high Gouts; or, in other words, the boundary of the elevated region of Mysore, &c. is marked by a deeper shading of the mountains.

I am indebted to a sketch, made by Captain Allan, for the positions of such of the passes through the Eastern Gouts, as are not described in Captain Beatson's map.
War having been determined on, against the Sultan of Mysore, the grand Carnatic army assembled in the southern provinces, in May 1790. The general plan of the campaign, was, for the grand army to reduce the Coimbettore country, and other bordering tracts, below the Gauts;* and then to advance by the Gujelhetty Pass, or Gaut, to the siege of Tippoo's capital, Seringapatam. It was expected that the possession of the Coimbettore coun-

* The word Gaut, in a limited sense, signifies a pass, through, or over mountains: but in a more extensive signification, it is applied to the mountains themselves: and when the Mysore country is known to be a kind of table land, or tract, elevated far above the rest of the Peninsula, the phrases above and below the Gauts, will be readily understood. More will be said on this subject, in the sequel.
try, would not only ensure supplies of provisions for the campaign, above the Gauts; but deprive Tippoo of one of his principal resources. At the same time, the Bombay army, under General Abercromby, was to undertake the reduction of the country, lying on the west of the Gauts; and afterwards to co-operate with the grand army under General Medows, as circumstances might require, or permit. The safety of the Carnatic, was provided for, by a force, styled from its position, the centre army; under the command of Colonel Kelly: it was stationed in the line between Madras and the passes leading to Mysore; and was soon to be reinforced by a strong detachment from Bengal, under Colonel Cockerell. Such was the disposition of the British armies, meant to be employed in the Mysore war.

Our allies, the Poonah Mahrattas, and the Nizam, were respectively to attack the enemy’s dominions, in the quarter bordering on theirs: and to penetrate towards
Seringapatam, as to a common centre. A brigade of British troops, was attached to each of these armies.

General Medows joined the grand army in the plain of Tritchinopoly, the 24th of May. This spot is rendered memorable, by the victories of Lawrence, and the heroes of his times; when the Mysoreans were rabble, and their chief, Hyder Ali, an unpractised soldier. But such are the mutations in human affairs, that one of these parties, a handful of British troops, then in the capacity of auxiliaries to the Nabob of Arcot; became, in the course of a few years after, the arbiters of empire in India: and the other, their most powerful and determined enemy.

On the following day, the General saw the line under arms: and was highly pleased with its appearance. Indeed the strength* and appointments of this army were uni-

* It is an unpleasant reflection, that a necessity should have existed, for a progressive increase of our military force in India. But it is a necessary consequence of our wars, to
versally allowed to be superior to those of any other army, that had ever taken the field in India; and its discipline was at the highest point it could possibly attain. It consisted of about 14,000 effective men.

On the 26th, the army marched from Trichinopoly plain, towards the Coimbet- tore country; carrying with it, forty days provisions on bullocks, and five more in the knapsacks; in all forty-five days provisions. The 15th of June, General Medows entered Tippoo's country, and took possession of the fort of Carroom; which, as well as all the other places in the General's march to Coimbettoore, was evacuated by the enemy. Tippoo was at this time on the Malabar coast; and, notwithstanding the long warning of our approach, he stationed no force in any place below the Gaarts; nor took any measures for the removal, or destruction of the grain, in the places evacuated.

make better soldiers of those we contend with. An army of seven thousand in the field, established our power; twenty-seven thousand only support it.
Carroor is about 4½ miles from Tritchinopoly. The army had been in motion six days between those places: and during the remainder of the interval, appear to have halted for the purpose of collecting grain; with a view of forming a magazine, or depot, at Carroor. Here they halted till the 3d of July, employed in collecting provisions, and making the fort tenable.

The army left Carroor on the 3d of July (after depositing half the battering train, and the sick of the army there), and in six marches (59 miles) came to Daraporum, on the 10th. Great plenty of grain was found in this place: and the surrounding country is described as being rich, and well cultivated; exhibiting a beautiful and pleasant appearance. Tippoo was said to have ascended the Gaus; after leaving Syed Saib with a strong detachment of horse, at the foot of them; between Gujelhetty and Damicotta.* The Looties, or plundering

* This place is so differently spelt in the different dispatches, letters, and maps, that it is difficult to ascertain its
horsemen of the enemy, had made their appearance at Carroor, and on the march from thence. The roads were found to be exceedingly bad, in this march; and retarded the army very much: the direction of it, was also very circuitous; considered as the line of march from Carroor to Coimbettore.

A small garrison, but said to be left unprovided with cannon, was sent into Daraporum; and from thence, the army took the road by the right towards Coimbettore (making a very great detour), from an apprehension, it is said, of a want of water, on the other road; which was the one Colonel Fullarton took, when he marched through that country, in 1788. The army left Daraporum the 17th June, and entered Coimbettore town on the 22d; making in five marches, 58 miles. The country through true name; although there is no doubt as to its identity. It is written Damicotta, Damencotta, Damagoncotta, Dangercocotta, and Danaigencotta. I have adhered to my former spelling, Damicotta; not knowing which of the new ones to prefer: admitting that any of them merit a preference.
which the route lay, was well watered, rich, and abounded in grain and forage.

Coimbettore was also evacuated; and much grain, and some military stores, were found in it. These, together with the pettah, or town, were saved, by the precaution of sending on a party, the night before the army was expected to arrive. Tippoo's conduct, in leaving so much grain, to fall into the hands of the invaders, appears unaccountable; unless we refer it to the deep design of lulling his adversaries into an absolute degree of security.

Coimbettore is situated near the eastern foot of the Gaut mountains, or continuation of the elevated region described in page 15; but at a part, where it is narrowed to the space of a few miles; and soon after, in its progress southward, is divided by a gap or valley, through which the river of Paniany passes, in its way to the western sea.*

It is reckoned the capital of the surrounding

* More concerning this gap, will be found in the Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan.
tract; which, although lying much higher than the Carnatic, is yet a low country compared with that of Mysore, which rises abruptly from the northern quarter of Coimbettore.

The fort of Coimbettore was of mud; and hardly defensible against a small regular force: and the pettah was absolutely untenable. From this station, it was determined to send out detachments, to reduce the surrounding posts of the enemy. These were, 1st. Palicaudcherry, a fort of considerable strength, situated at the opening of the beforementioned gap, towards the low country of Calicut; and commanding of course, the communication between the eastern and western coasts. This place may be reckoned about two marches to the WSW of Coimbettore. It

* It appears, however, by the spirited and effectual resistance made by Captain Chalmers, against a strong detachment sent by Tippoo in the course of the summer of 1791, that the strength of a fortification depends as much on the valour and ability of the garrison, as on the goodness of the walls and ditches.
was taken by Colonel Fullarton in Nov. 1783. 2d, Dindigul, a strong post on a hill of difficult access, in the quarter towards Madura; and about 80 miles to the S E of Coimbettore. 3d and 4th, Sattimungalum and Damicotta *, two inconsiderable forts, on the north and N N E of Coimbettore, distant from 38 to 42 miles; and not far from the foot of the Gujelhetty Pass, or Gaut, leading to Mysore. On the south of these posts, and almost close to them, runs the river Bowanny, or Bavani, in its course towards the Cauvery; at common times an inconsiderable stream, but subject to be suddenly swoln by the rains in the neighbouring mountains. Such being the circumstances of this river, nothing less than some very tempting occasion, could have induced the Mysorean to place himself on its southern bank, whilst our army was in force, within a short distance of it: and on the other hand, a small garrison of ours, in

* See the different readings of this name in page 20.
either of those posts, with the army at a distance, would have been exposed to the hazard of capture, by being cut off from assistance, by the sudden swelling of the river. 5th. Erroad, a post, equally insconsiderable with the former, situated five or six marches to the N E of Coimbettore, near the western bank of the Cauvery; which, in the dry season, is fordable a little lower down. This place, and Sattimungalum, were intended for advanced depots, for the army, when it should move towards the Mysore country.

Immediately after the arrival of the army, at Coimbettore, the cavalry under Colonel Floyd were sent towards Damicotta, about 40 miles (as we have said) to the north, to endeavour to surprise Syed Saib's party; but he only succeeded in taking a party of about 50 horse. Colonel Oldham, with two battalions and four guns, was sent about 20 miles onward, to be at hand to support Floyd.

On the 24th, Colonel Stuart was sent
with a brigade to besiege Palicaudcherry; but returned on the 31st, because the incessant and heavy rains, made it impossible to lie before it; that place being exposed to the rainy monsoon of the Malabar coast, which prevails in May, June, and July.

On the 3d of August, Colonel Oldham was sent with a brigade to reduce Erroad; he arrived before it on the 7th, and the place was surrendered, on his firing a few shots.

Colonel Stuart marched on the 5th with a strong detachment to besiege Dindigul, and arrived before it on the 16th. On the 22d, it surrendered.

Nearly about the time that Colonel Stuart marched from Coimbettore, Colonel Oldham's detachment at Erroad, was reinforced with two battalions and part of the 36th regiment: and Major Younge was sent to bring a convoy of rice and other provisions from Carroor to Erroad; intended, as we have said, to be made a depot.
A part of the stores and provisions, had already been sent thither.

The army, now reduced in point of strength, by the detachments sent out to different quarters, to about two regiments of European, and three battalions of native infantry (or Sepoys), changed its ground, at Coimbettore, and took a strong position at about two miles S E of the fort.

Towards the latter end of this month (August), Colonel Floyd was sent to reduce Sattimungalum and Damicotta. The former surrendered almost immediately; and little of consequence was found in it. It was garrisoned with a battalion; and large quantities of grain, &c. were collected and sent into it: this place, being intended for the principal depot in this quarter. It was on the 26th August that Sattimungalum came into our possession: and its situation in respect of the pass of Gujelhetty, and the river Bowanny (as we have described in page 23), together with the
state of its defences, rendered it very critical, considering its intended use. Colonel Oldham, with the greatest part of his detachment, had, by this time, joined Colonel Floyd; who was now at the head of a detachment, in point of strength nearly equal to one wing of the grand army; but, I believe, without its proportion of artillery. It was posted on the south of the Bowanny, nearly opposite to Sattimungalum: and about 42 miles, or 3 marches, to the NNE of Coimbettore.

Colonel Stuart, who had returned from the capture of Dindigul, on the 7th September, was reinforced, and again detached to besiege Palicaudcherry, situated, as we have said in page 22, to the WSW, or opposite quarter to Sattimungalum: the rainy season having now ceased.

In this situation of things, Tippoo, on the 12th of September, descended the Gujelhetty Pass; and on the following day cannonaded Colonel Floyd's detachment; which, as we have seen, was encamped on
the south of the Bowanny river, nearly opposite to Sattimungalum. In the night, the Colonel found it necessary to prepare for a retreat, towards Coimbettore; and withdrew the garrison from Sattimungalum. Early in the morning of the 14th, the detachment began to retreat, and marched the greatest part of the day, closely pressed by the whole force of the enemy; whose attacks were repelled with great firmness and judgment; and probably, on no occasion whatsoever, was presence of mind so completely and universally preserved, by each individual corps, as on the present. The great trial of strength was made at the close of the day, near Showoor, when the enemy retired beaten from the field. Colonel Oldham, second in command, had the charge of the infantry.

On the report of Tippoo's approach, General Medows marched to the northward on the 14th, with a view to support Colonel Floyd. He reached the neighbourhood of Vellady, that night: at which
point of time the detachment reached Shoor, which lay about 20 miles to the east of Vellady: but by some misconception, the army continued to march to the northward the following day; and did not join Floyd till the 16th, at Vellady.

The 17th, the whole army halted, in order to allow Colonel Floyd's detachment time to recover their fatigues. The loss had been very great: no less than 150 killed, and near 300 wounded: and six guns had unavoidably been left behind, by the loss of their draft-cattle. We lost also, in consequence, our two posts of Sattimungalum, and Erroad: and with them, the provisions and necessaries laid up at those places, for the army.

From Vellady, General Medows made two marches to the eastward, to offer Tippoo battle. He however had fallen back to Sattimungalum. Mean time, our army, having marched light, were in want of provisions: the General therefore returned to
Coimbettore, for the double purpose of receiving supplies, and covering the siege of Palicaudcherry.

The army arrived at Coimbettore the 23d September, and Palicaudcherry had surrendered the day before; after a siege of twelve days: and on the 25th, Colonel Stuart returned to head-quarters, having left a battalion to garrison his new conquest.

On the 29th of September, the grand army marched again in quest of Tippoo, who was known to be in the neighbourhood of Sattimungalum. The approach of General Medows, was, however, the signal for his decamping; and when the General came to Erroad, on the 4th October, Tippoo had left the place that morning, and gone to the south-west: though his designs were not known, or apprehended. The 5th and 6th, the army marched down the western bank of the Cauvery, to Cudimoody, fourteen miles from Carroor,
to protect a convoy of provisions, expected from that place: and on the following day, the convoy joined.

From Cudimoody, the army on the 8th and 9th, made two marches, westward, along the bank of the Noyel river; when the heavy rains on the 10th, compelled the army to halt:* and at this time the rumour of Tippoo's being gone to Daraporum, began to spread. Daraporum lay to the SSW of the camp, about 28 miles, in direct distance: what the distance by the road might have been, I am ignorant.

On the 12th October, when the army had advanced two marches farther to the

* The rainy season on each side of the Peninsula, is determined by the periodical wind that blows from the sea, towards the coast. We have made remarks in page 25, concerning the rainy season on the Malabar coast, which happens with the south-west monsoon. On the east of the Gaits, the north-east wind produces the same phenomenon: the time of its commencement near the sea-coast, is the latter end of October, and it continues till the end of December. But as the rain begins in the neighbourhood of the hills first (in Bengal, a month at least), the rain mentioned on the 9th October, was probably the commencement of the season, though earlier than common.
west, a confirmation of the report arrived: and this appears to have been the first authentic intelligence concerning Tippoo's motions, that had come to the knowledge of the army, since the 4th instant. He came before Daraporum the 7th; left it the 9th; and was reported to have gone westward to Annimally. The General was still at the distance of two long marches from Coimbettore: and that place, which contained the sick and wounded, together with the battering train, camp equipage, &c. was at evident risk, although reinforced by Colonel Hartley, of the Bombay establishment; who arrived at Palicaudcherry, two days after the General left Coimbettore. On the 15th the army reached the neighbourhood of Coimbettore: and Tippoo, as it appears, had returned to the neighbourhood of Daraporum, preparatory to his marching northwards.

The garrison of Daraporum arrived in the camp, on the 17th, under an escort of Tippoo's troops; conformable to the terms
of the capitulation. They spoke in high terms of their honourable treatment; excepting that the parole, not to serve during the war, was in some measure exacted from them.

It was now evident, that the rapidity of Tippoo's marches was such, that no army, appointed like ours, could ever bring him to action, in the open country: so that he could penetrate our line, and effect his purposes, with impunity.

Tippoo quitted the neighbourhood of Daraporum on the 20th, and proceeded to Sattimungakum: desirous, no doubt, of placing the Bowanny river between his army and ours, during this season of its swelling. As the centre, or western army, now commanded by Colonel Maxwell (Colonel Kelly being dead), was not put in motion from Arcot until the 18th, we cannot refer Tippoo's motions, at this time, to any particular plan of operations against the centre army: however, as it was known on the west of India, so early as the
13th of October,* that a junction of the two armies was intended; Tippoo could hardly be ignorant of it. And therefore, his position on the north of the Bowanny river, between Sattimunggalum and the Cauvery, was doubtless chosen, as well with a view to a future expedition against Maxwell; as to present security: and was the best that could be taken, for both these purposes.

General Medows marched again from Coimbettore, on the 20th October, that is, five days after his return to it: and was near Viziamungalum, about 20 miles short of Erroad, on the 25th. On the preceding day, a detachment had been sent, to bring a convoy of provisions to the army from Carroor. The army halted some days to cover the march of this detachment: and on the

* As appears by the Bombay Gazette of that date. The original plan of operations for the centre army, after it had been resolved to send it out of the Carnatic, was (as I understand) to lay siege to Bangalore, whilst Tippoo was supposed to be kept in check, by the grand army. Colonel Kelly, who then commanded the centre army, had sent a proper person to explore the pass of Muglee, by which Lord Cornwallis afterwards ascended the Gouts.
1st and 2d of November, marched forward to Erroad; where it again halted for the convoy, which did not arrive until the 7th, although expected by the army on the 2d or 3d. Whilst in this neighbourhood, the army in general was supplied with five days rice from the crop on the ground, which was just ripe.

Since the 1st of the month, Tippoo was reported to be on the north of the Bowanny river, and was moving eastward: and on the 7th, Colonel Floyd, who had been sent to reconnoitre, beyond Bovincoral (at the conflux of the Bowanny and Cauvery), gave information that Tippoo had crossed the Cauvery, to the north-east, on the 1st and 2d instant; at a place about 18 miles above Erroad. He had thus the start of our army, both in point of time and of distance; supposing his object to have been the army of Colonel Maxwell.

On the 8th, the provisions and stores, together with one brigade of the army, were
sent across the river: and on the following day, the main body of the army crossed, and encamped on the eastern bank. The Cauvery was at this time four feet deep, and about 250 yards broad.

The 10th, the army marched to the north-east, to gain the great road leading from Tritchinopoly to the Barramaul: and encamped on the 11th, at Mallesundrum, 24 miles from the passage of the Cauvery. Tippoo had been here from the 5th to the 7th; having struck off to the right from the direct road to the Barramaul: for what reason does not appear, unless the report concerning his depositing his heaviest artillery, &c. at Salem, should be true. From Mallesundrum, on the 7th, he took the direct route, by the pass of Tapore, to Caveripatam (without halting), where Colonel Maxwell had been encamped, in a strong position, since the 3d; having, in his march through the Barramaul, taken possession of several of
its forts.* Our army followed Tippoo, at an equal pace: for on the 14th, it occupied his camp of the 9th, at Tapoor: and those of the 10th and 11th, at Adamancotta, and Poolampetty; on the 15th and 16th.

The pass of Tapoor leads through a double ridge of mountains, which separates the low country east of the Cauvery, from the elevated valley of Darampoory; and which also links the eastern Gauts, or ascent to the Mysore country, with the mountains that shut up the Carnatic. The encampment of the 14th, was in a valley situated between the double ridge, through which the Tapoor river runs to the south-west, to join the Cauvery. The first part of the pass from the south, leading into the valley, is not steep; though very narrow and rugged: but the part through which the ascent lies, to the valley of Darampoory, is

* The term Barramaul, or Barra-Mahal, signifies The Twelve Places: the valley having in it that number of forts, situated on rocky eminences. Amongst these, Kistnagheri is reckoned the strongest.
both steep and rugged: although the guns were got up without much delay. The whole length of the way, that partakes of the nature of a pass, or strait, seems to be at least seven or eight miles.

As the army came to its ground on the 15th, at six or seven miles above the pass, with the valley of Darampoory fairly open to view, on every side; Tippoo's camp was seen, pitching, on the north-west side of the valley, at the foot of the Great Gauts. The distance marked on Captain Allan's Map of the Marches, is about 13 miles, direct. On the appearance of our camp, Tippoo's was instantly struck; and his army (as appeared by the cloud of dust) entered an opening of the mountains, now known to be the Oodeadurgam or Pallicode pass;* leading by a short and easy passage, from the Barramaul into the country of Mysore.

* This pass is named indifferently, Oodeadurgam, or Pallicode, from two places situated at each extremity of it. The former lies towards Mysore; the latter towards Darampoory, and the Barramaul,
To account for Tippoo's appearance, in this situation, it is proper to mention, that he had availed himself of being so far advanced, before the grand army, to present himself before Colonel Maxwell's camp, in line of battle, on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of November; but finding both a countenance and position superior to his attacks; and knowing, of course, the near approach of General Medows, he drew off, just in time to place himself in a favourable position, for a secure retreat: and that position, being removed from the common line of approach of the two British armies, by nearly the distance of a day's march; his judgment in the arrangement of his marches, cannot be questioned.

On the 16th, the grand army reached Poolampetty, 15 miles short of Caveripatam; a little to the northward of which, was the camp of Colonel Maxwell (and had been, since the 3d); and on the following day (the 17th) the two armies effected a
junction, at Poolamputty.* This had been Tippoo's camp on the 11th, in his way to attack Colonel Maxwell: and, I apprehend, he encamped here again, on his return, the 14th: after shewing himself to Maxwell, that morning, for the last time.

On the 18th, the two armies moved to the southward, by the route that General Medows came: and late in their march, unexpectedly came in view of the rear of Tippoo's army; the advance of which was probably entering the pass of Tapoor, before described. The rear was composed, apparently, of Tippoo's best horse, drawn up in compact bodies, to favour the retreat of the main body; and wearing a face of resolution. They were cannonaded, and suffered some loss; and were pursued to the entrance of the pass. Our armies encamped, at about two miles from the pass;

* This place is also named Carrimungalum, on one of the maps sent home: or it may be that Carrimungalum, and Poolamputty, are two places, lying close to each other.
and near the extremity of the valley of Darampoory: having marched upwards of 20 miles that day.

It appears that Tippoo had crossed the valley of Darampoory, from the mouth of the Pallicode pass, the preceding night, whilst our armies lay at Poolamputty; and came into the great road near Darampoory fort, in the course of the forenoon: which accounts for his sudden and unexpected appearance. He doubtless misconceived the scope of our designs: and did not mean to risk a meeting with our army, so strongly reinforced. As he is known to have cleared the pass of Tapoor, and to have formed his encampment at Dyasundrum, on that day; he must have made an extraordinary long march. Our armies made 32 miles, in two marches from Poolamputty to Dyasundrum: but Tippoo must have come from a point rather more distant than Poolamputty, on the day when his army was pursued and cannonaded. So that he gained one march on our army, on the day of the
pursuit: previous to which it had marched no less than 133 miles, in 10 days; with one intervening halt only.

On the march through the pass of Tapoor, on the 19th, there were seen very evident proofs of the confusion and flight of the enemy, the day before; the pass being strewed with the dead carcasses of horses and bullocks; together with broken carriages, shot, &c.

On the 20th, General Medows encamped near Wombinellore (called also Oomaloor), where he had been on the 13th, on his way to the northward: and here he halted the 21st for Colonel Maxwell’s army; which had encamped the 19th, in the valley of Tapoor. And now the two armies were formed into one; consisting of nine brigades of infantry, and two of cavalry: containing 33 corps, and altogether about 23,000 effectives: and of these Colonel Maxwell brought 9,000.

In two marches more, the army came, on the 23d Nov. to their old camp of the
11th, at Mallesundrum. Here Tippoo had been, four days before (the 19th), so that he had made one march, of the three marches of ours; that is 31 miles: and as he came at least 32, the day before, here are no less than 63 miles marched over, in two successive days; with a very large army, accompanied, at least, by some artillery! But having gained so much the start, and his army being, no doubt, excessively fatigued; he moved but slowly during some days afterwards; turning off, from the Carroor road, by Namcul, towards the Carnatic: his view being now, to draw the grand army out of his country, to defend their own: for as the centre army had been called out of the Carnatic, no opposition could be made to his progress, at present. The General's intention seems to have been to cross the Cauvery, and then to march by way of Carroor; to cover, or reinforce, Trichinopoly; and to supply the wants of his army there: and these must have been great, by the nature of their late march;
which had carried them out of the neighbourhood of their usual places of supply; and left them little leisure to collect any provisions by the way.

The army arrived at the north bank of the Cauvery, at Veyloor, about 60 miles above Trichinopoly, on the 27th November. On the next day, two brigades crossed the river (Colonel Oldham's, and Major Cuppage's), to proceed to Carroor with the sick, spare guns, and stores: but on the following day, the river became impassable, by the heavy rain the night before: and continued in that state, until the 2d December; when a regiment of horse was also sent over, to reinforce Colonel Oldham.

On the 3d, the army moved down the side of the river, 12 miles, to Moganore: the ford there was impassable. Here it was learnt, that Tippoo had gone on towards Trichinopoly; having, indeed, been on the road from Namcul, on a line with this place, eight days before.
The badness of the weather impeded its progress, so much, that the army did not arrive in the neighbourhood of Tritchinopoly, until December 8th: and then the river being in such a state as to be too deep and rapid for carriage-bullocks, to cross; and in many places, too shallow for boats; no great supply could be obtained; since the mode of carriage could be only on men's heads.

Tippoo had arrived at Munsurpet, near the north bank of the Colaroone*, opposite Tritchinopoly, on the 28th of November; and continued encamped there, until the 6th of December; but without making any attempt on Tritchinopoly: owing probably to the swoln state of the river, at that time. On breaking up his camp, he marched northward, by the route of Wolgonda and Tiagar.

Our army continued in the neighbour-

* The Cauvery river, at a few miles above Tritchinopoly, separates into two branches, the northernmost of which takes the name of Colaroone.
hood of Trichinopoly, until the 31st December. During their stay there, the news of Lord Cornwallis's arrival, as well as of the decisive victory, gained by Colonel Hartley, on the Malabar coast; reached the army.

The army, leaving Trichinopoly, arrived the 5th January (1791) at Tiagar; which place Tippoo had left nine days before; and gone on to Trinomaly, 38 miles more to the north. He had been before Tiagar, from the 11th to the 28th December; employed in an unsuccessful attempt on the pettah. He had left marks of his savage barbarity, everywhere, along his march: and at Trinomaly, where the Bramins retired to the Pagoda on the Hill, and made a shew of resistance; he carried off some of the principal of them, prisoners: thus invading what has been held sacred, ever since the Mahomedan conquerors in India have understood the character of the Hindoos.

On the 10th January, the army reached
Polore, one march beyond Trinomaly: but Tippoo had turned off, from the latter place towards Chitteput, and Wandiwash: being, as usual, three or four marches advanced: making easy marches, when at a distance; and forced ones only, when near our army. By this policy, he secured himself from the possibility of being brought to action, contrary to his inclinations: for no local point of contest existed, to which the attention of his army could be fixed, in our territory. His object was to destroy that part of our resources, which he could not convert to his own use: and this was effected with impunity, by the very means which he pursued to avoid an action.

The army arrived at Arnee the 12th January, where the left wing remained with General Musgrave: together with the sick, heavy guns, &c. The right wing marched to the neighbourhood of Conjeevaram; and afterwards to Vellout, 18 miles from Madras. Tippoo was at this time between Wandiwash and Pondicherry.
EARL CORNWALLIS joined the army at Vellout, on the 29th of January, 1791; and was much pleased with its appearance. General Medows, as second in command, also joined: and General Musgrave was left to command in the Carnatic.

A part of the battering train, consisting of 12 eighteen pounders, with eight small mortars, &c. &c. having joined the army; it marched in two columns towards Velore, on the 5th February: and on the 11th, encamped in the neighbourhood of that fortress; 67 miles from Vellout. During this march, the Looties, or plunderers, belonging to Tippoo's army, were not inactive: carrying off some camels, bullocks, and baggage.

The army halted in this encampment the 12th and 13th; receiving from Velore.
in addition to their battering train, two twenty-four pounders: and sending the sick persons into the fort.

From the direction of the march, hitherto, it was supposed that Lord Cornwallis meant to enter the Mysore country, by way of the Barramaul valley: and Tippoo was so firmly persuaded that this was his Lordship's design, that his whole attention was directed towards the passes in that quarter; having quitted the Carnatic, early in February, and proceeding by the Changanah pass. Indeed, so complete was the deception (said to be partly accomplished by means of false intelligence, which a detected spy was compelled to give), that no sort of interruption was given to the army, or its followers, either during the march of five days from Velore to the pass of Muglee; or until the third day's march from the pass westward.

This measure, therefore, was conceived and executed, with great judgment. To accomplish it, a detour of several days
march, was made to the north, by Chittore; through rugged or deep roads, the heavy gun carriages sometimes sinking up to the axles. They found, however, abundance of forage and provisions: this part of the country not having been disturbed during the war. The arrangements of the Commander in Chief, on approaching the pass, are greatly to the credit of his military character; and I lament that the nature of this sketch, will not admit of such details.

On the 20th of February, the army gained the head of the pass; and encamped at Palamnaire, a short distance beyond it. The pass is described in the following words:

"Several parts of it are steep; particularly the second and longest ascent, of about 500 yards; which, at the top, has rather a sharp turn to the left. The road was new, and well made; and neither rugged nor stony. The draft bullocks were not taken out of the yokes: and with the assistance of the troops at the drag-ropes; and the elephants, push-
"ing from behind; the whole of the heavy "guns were got up, in a few hours. Se-
veral other considerable ascents, as well "as descents, occurred, in going through "the rest of the pass; which is all together "about six miles through."

As we understand this to be the shortest and easiest pass, up the great eastern range, it may easily be conceived, how much the difficulties might have been increased, by the presence of a bold and active enemy, already in possession of the southern passes; had either of those within our knowledge been attempted. The distance from the camp at Velore to Muglee, near the foot of the heights, is 45 miles.

It will be proper in this place, to say a word concerning this range of ascents; which presenting a stupendous rampart towards the Carnatic, and a vast terrace towards Mysore, influences the seasons, as well as the military operations, in both.

Its extent and bearings to the northward, we are not well informed of; nor is it of
much importance to the present discussion: its elevation, however, is less, in that quarter, than between the parallels of Chittore and Darampoory; where it is reckoned about 3000 feet above the low country of the Carnatic.

The level of the terrace or Table Land supported by the Gauts, must necessarily rise as it extends westward; as all the rivers come from that quarter: and we may therefore conceive, that the top of the western Gauts, or edge of the Table Land, fronting the Malabar coast, is several hundred feet higher than the eastern: for no less can be supposed, in a gradual ascent of more than 200 miles. On that side, it falls with so abrupt a descent, that it merits the term of wall, more, perhaps, than any other range of mountains whatsoever. The edge of this precipice rises so little above the general level of the terrace, that, viewed from above, it has scarcely the appearance of a ridge of hills.

This Table Land forms the theatre of
Lord Cornwallis's campaign of 1791: and a general idea of its extent, southward and westward, may be collected from a cursory view of the map; in which it will be found, that the eastern boundary of this Table Land, forms a very irregularly indented line, running in a south-westerly direction, from the place where his Lordship ascended, to the neighbourhood of Coimbettore. There it meets the line of the great western Gaut, which forms the boundary on the Malabar side; leaving a narrow tract of low land between it and the sea. This may suffice for the general outline of the tract; and the positions of the ranges of Gaus: but to gain a more particular idea of the eastern range, we must trace it from Muglee, southward by Sautgur, and Amboor, to the head of the valley of Barramaul; and along the northern part of that valley, to the neighbourhood of Kistnagheri, and Caveripatam: when after forming, in like manner, the western boundary of the valley of Darampoory, it is intersected by the
course of the Cauvery river, near Alembaddy. From this point, skirting the western bank of that river, and taking a more southwardly course, it approaches the Coimbettore country; and then turning suddenly to the west, forms the boundary between it and the southern part of Mysore.

Not that the reader is to consider this tract of elevated country (or *Table Land*, as it is commonly styled) as an even surface. So far from this being the case, it has a vast number of lofty eminences on it: but these, in a general point of view, are nothing more than inequalities, on the top of a vast flat mountain.

After what has been said, it will appear plainly, that to enter the Mysore country, from the east, west, or south, this vast terrace must be ascended: and also, that it is loftier and steeper, on the west, than on the east and south. The passes, or ascents, are very numerous; but few of them are practicable, in a military point of view.
In our former wars, we made use of those which lie in the neighbourhood of Amboor; and in the western quarter of the Barramaul: but both Hyder Ali and Tippoo, it is said, made the most frequent use of the pass of Oodeadurgam, or Pallicode (mentioned in page 38), which opens into the valley of Darampoory. It has been lately explored, and is reported to be a very practicable, or, comparatively speaking, an easy road; and perfectly convenient, in point of situation, for a communication with the Carnatic, either by way of Amboor, or Changamah; as circumstances may suit. The Mysoreans preferred Changamah; because, by following that route, they avoided our post of Velore, and Amboor; and the strait passages leading to them. We shall find in the sequel, that the last movements of Lord Cornwallis's army, were directed to the measure of seizing on the hill forts, that command this important pass of Oodeadurgam: in order to secure a passage for his
supplies from the Carnatic, through the Barramaul.

Here it may be proper also to describe the valley of Barramaul; called also, from the advanced post of the Mysoreans, Vaniambaddy. It is situated between the foot of the high Gatts, and the mountains that shut up the Carnatic, on the west. It is reckoned to extend from the neighbourhood of Amboor on the N E to the Ponear or Panaur river, on the S W: under which description it is near 40 miles in length: and its breadth is nearly as much, in the south part; but it ends in a point, at the north. It appears to me, that the Darampoory valley, which joins it on the south, is properly a continuation of the former valley: so that, in effect, they form one valley of about 70 miles long, divided in the middle of its greatest extent, by the river Panaur; which joins the sea, at Cuddalore. In our account, we may at least consider them as one: an elevated valley,
or vast hollow between the Carnatic and Mysore mountains; and an intermediate step between the two: of considerable fertility and population, and commanding the principal avenues, between the two countries. The northern part, or proper Barraaul, contains, as we have said before, a number of strong, though small hill forts. Therefore, in point of strength, of position, and of produce, it is a most important spot: and in the event of a partition of Tippoo’s dominions, it ought, together with Darampoory, Coimbettore, and the intervening valley of Salem; to be placed in our hands.

We left Earl Cornwallis at Palamnaire, at the head of the Muglee pass; where the second division of the army, and the battering train, arrived on the 20th February. By the 22d, the last of the public stores, and baggage of the army, were got up; and the following day was a day of halt, to refresh the army and cattle after their fatigues; and to make arrangements for their future proceedings. The order of battle
was published; and the bullocks mustered, to the number of 27,000, fit for service.*

Eighty elephants also were with the camp; 67 of which arrived from Bengal, the day before.

The army left Palamnaire the 24th February: and eight marches (89 miles), with the intermission of two halts, brought it to Bangalore; where the camp was formed on the N E side of that fortress, and just out of gun-shot.

Tippoo's boundary was passed, at four miles beyond Palamnaire.

The country (of Mysore) during the march was various; but generally well cultivated, and full of villages. Water (contrary to expectation) was found in the greatest plenty: and that chiefly in natural ponds, or pools; which, lying below the surface of the country, could not be drained by the enemy. The air was re-

* On a subsequent occasion, we find the requisition was for 6000 draft, and 20,000 carriage bullocks: implied to be the number required for the public service.
markably pure; and the nights very cold; from the greatness of the elevation. The Commander in Chief was compelled to make some severe examples, amongst the followers of the army, for marauding and burning the villages on the march.

At Colar, was seen a mausoleum, erected to the memory of Tippoo's grandfather; who had held a military appointment, under one of the Kings of Mysore.

On the third day of the march, parties of the enemy's horse appeared, which increased as the army advanced; and when within 16 or 18 miles of Bangalore, they burnt all the villages and forage round about.

At Kistnaporum, ten miles short of Bangalore, Tippoo's army appeared, in high order: and taking possession of the heights, cannonaded our rear; whilst his cavalry made an unsuccessful attempt on the baggage, at the commencement of the march. Tippoo came from Bangalore the day before: and returned to it, the day after our
army reached it. He had not seen our army, since the affair of Tapoor, in November.

It was on the 5th of March that the army encamped at Bangalore: and on the next morning, the pettah, or town, and the northern and eastern faces of the fort (or citadel to the pettah) were reconnoitered. On the afternoon of the same day, some of the staff-officers and engineers, went again to reconnoitre the ground on the east of the fort, escorted by Colonel Floyd, with the whole cavalry of the army, and Gowdie's brigade of infantry. The Colonel, having from a height observed the rear of Tippoo's army, at a great distance from the main body, pursued and attacked it with the cavalry; doing great execution, and taking possession of some of their guns. However, the enemy, being strongly reinforced, rallied, and compelled the Colonel, who was severely wounded, to retreat: and the cavalry were nearly overpowered by numbers, when Gowdie's brigade advanced,
and repulsed the enemy. Our loss was severe: chiefly owing to the badness of the ground over which the cavalry retreated. The Commander in Chief, with one wing of the army, marched out to support the detachment.

On the following morning (the 7th), the pettah was stormed and taken, after several hours resistance; with the loss of 100 officers and men killed and wounded. Besides being in itself a fine town, 2000 yards in length, by 750 broad, within the fortifications; it contained great magazines of grain, forage, and fuel; articles that were likely to be in great request, in the course of any siege: and the two latter began to be already wanted. The pettah also afforded excellent cover, for the attack of the fort, and for the troops destined to sustain it. It was surrounded by a rampart and deep ditch; except at the part opposite to the fort; where it was, unaccountably, left open. Through this opening, a select body of Tippoo's troops attempted to regain
possession, on the afternoon of the same day: but were foiled in their attempt, by the steady conduct of the 36th and 76th regiments; who took their standards, and repulsed them with great loss. Tippoo had advanced from the NW side of the fort, and cannonaded our army, previous to this attack: in expectation of fixing Lord Cornwallis’s attention to that quarter. It had, however, the immediate effect, of making him reinforce the pettah: and Tippoo drew off his army at sunset.

On the 12th, three batteries opened on the fort, with considerable effect on the defences, but too distant for breaching. Therefore, on the 16th, a new nine-gun battery was opened, at 550 yards from the works. The stone facing was soon demolished: but the solid body of the rampart, which was of red clay, crumbled but slowly.

On the 17th in the morning, the approach of Tippoo’s army was announced, by a heavy discharge of artillery from the
heights, on the north-east of the camp. The distance was too great, to occasion any serious mischief; and the enemy, being checked by some guns that were advanced on the heights, near the camp, drew off. Had the army moved, for the purpose of bringing Tippoo to action, the stores and camp must have been left at the mercy of his great body of cavalry.

The 21st, in the morning, Tippoo drew out his army, on the east side of the fort, bringing some heavy cannon, to enfilade our attack, from the heights on that side: but as this position exposing his right wing, and rear, to an attack from one of our wings, which made a movement towards him; he drew off, leaving a part of his heavy guns behind him. He had now made an attack, from each of the three open quarters; and found them equally unsuccessful.

The breach was now advanced to a state of practicability, notwithstanding the heavy and well-directed fire from the fort; which
the mud-walls, and other cover in the pet-tah, rendered almost nugatory; and accordingly, this evening, at a quarter past eleven, the fort was stormed and carried, with great success; and with inconsiderable loss on our side. So secretly were the arrangements made, that neither the enemy, nor our own army, knew of them before hand. And indeed, considering the strength of the enemy in the field, and their ability of reinforcing the garrison, a contrary conduct might have occasioned a very severe loss of men on our part. As it was, it partook no less of glory, than of wisdom and policy.

Colonel Maxwell commanded the attack. The fort, at the moment, was enveloped in a blaze of light, from the number of blue lights thrown out, to discover the assailants (a practice very common in Indian camps and garrisons): and by this light, the assailants being also discovered to the camp, exhibited a most striking and interesting scene, during the mounting of the
breach; and of the climbing up, and over, the different parts of a gateway, which was a principal object of attack. The grenadiers of the army, having first mounted the breach, and dispersed the enemy there, with great slaughter; proceeded along the rampart, to the right; whilst the light-infantry took a contrary direction; and the 36th regiment, descended into the body of the place. All met, near the opposite gate, which the fugitives, in their tumultuous retreat, had now entirely choked up; and a horrible scene of carnage ensued. The Killahdar, or Governor, Bahaudar Khan, a venerable soldier, and favourite of his master, was killed (like Velasquez) near the colours of his fort; pierced both with balls and bayonets. About 1000 of the garrison are supposed to have shared the same fate; 300 (mostly wounded) were taken; and 2000 are said to have escaped. Our loss was only about 50 officers and men, killed and wounded.
The fort was much stronger than, from report, had been expected. It had a broad, double rampart; several lofty cavaliers; a very broad and deep ditch; and a glacis and covert-way. In form, it was an oval, whose utmost length was something more than 900 yards. Vast quantities of military stores, and 124 pieces of ordnance, were found in the fort: and in the pettah was a foundry for cannon. There were also found workshops of all kinds, both for arms and accoutrements.

The capture of Bangalore, independent of the immediate advantages accruing to us, from the possession of so important a post, and magazine; and the consequent loss, disappointment, and disgrace to the enemy; was attended with others, which although more remote, were not the less beneficial: for by its furnishing an unequivocal proof of our superior prowess, and military skill, it operated to our advantage, no less in the camps of our allies,
than in the garrisons they were then besieging;* the spirits of the one, rising, whilst those of the others were proportionably depressed. It was evinced yet more strongly, by the immediate revolt of Tippoo's new subjects, the Poligars, in the vicinity of our new conquest: they not only bringing in provisions to the army, but even seizing on some of Tippoo's ill-garrisoned forts: as if they anticipated his fall.

It will perhaps be asked, why the Commander in Chief did not take advantage of these impressions, and march without delay to Seringapatam? Many, perhaps, are not aware of the magnitude of the undertaking, or of the requisites towards it: amongst the rest, provisions; which could not be expected, in any quantity, on the march, because the enemy would either destroy, or remove them: or more especially during the siege; which would employ the atten-

* Darwar and Copool: the surrender of which places was more the effect of the fall of Bangalore, than of the efforts of the besiegers.

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tion of the whole army. And less than 40 days provision would not insure an exemption from want, during the march and siege; allowing for unforeseen delays. That a sufficiency of provisions was not in hand, is very clear: and how could it have been collected by an army tied down by a siege, and the presence of an enemy in force, attempting to raise it? And a part only, of the quantity of grain found in Bangalore could in prudence be taken from the garrison. Indeed a junction of the Mahratta force with ours, at that moment, might probably have produced the immediate fall of Seringapatam; as they might have supplied the deficiency of provisions, during the siege. But the Mahrattas were at Darwar, 280 miles by the road, from Bangalore and Seringapatam. Darwar surrendered on the 3d April; and the Mahrattas could not have joined until the latter end of April: and by that time, Lord Cornwallis might reasonably have expected to be there himself, and in possession of the desired supplies.
A convoy of provisions and stores, together with a reinforcement of troops, under Colonel Oldham, from the southern provinces, were arrived at the head of the Gauths: and a body of the Nizam’s horse, from which some useful services were expected (we being so weak in cavalry), was known to be on the march from Hydrabad to join our army. Neither of these, could safely be left to their own protection, across so wide an extent, as that between the eastern frontier, and Seringapatam; whilst Tippoo was at liberty to range it, or to detach. A third object, was a large supply of grain promised by the northern Poligars, who inhabited a fruitful country, undisturbed by the present contests; and reluctantly submitting to the yoke of the Mysorean.

It was reasonably supposed, that these several objects might have been accomplished; and the army at Bangalore again, in about three weeks from the time of its
leaving it: that is, about the 17th or 18th of April. But we shall find that the day of arrival was protracted till the 28th: which loss of time must be imputed to the tardy motions of the Nizam’s General: and to this immediate loss, should in justice be added two or three of the days lost by the badness of the weather and roads, between Bangalore and Seringapatam: so that, all together, our new allies cost us eleven or twelve days, at a most critical season.

Colonel Duff, of the Bengal artillery, was left in the command of Bangalore, with a garrison, consisting of the 76th regiment, and three native battalions. Colonel Duff was particularly selected, on this occasion, for the purpose of refitting the heavy artillery, and preparing platforms, &c. for the intended siege.

On the 28th of March, the army left the neighbourhood of Bangalore, and marched to the N.N.E, towards Chinna-Balabaram; to accomplish the objects abovementioned.
Tippoo was at this time supposed to be in the quarter between Oussoor and Ouscotta: but was, as it soon after appeared, much nearer to Bangalore: for, at the distance of eight or nine miles from that place, Tippoo's whole army crossed our line of march, in view of the advanced guard. It appears, that a battalion of ours, which had been sent forwards the night before, to secure forage; misled by the guide, got almost into the enemy's camp, at day-break; and was mistaken for the advance of our army. A precipitate march to the northwest, was the consequence: and fully accounts for the enemy's position. They were marching without much order, when first perceived: and the discovery threw them into absolute confusion. They were pursued and cannonaded, and a brass gun was taken. Our army encamped after a march and pursuit of 19 miles; in which the weak state of the draft and carriage bullocks was very apparent. This night they had a thunder-storm, and some heavy rain:
the first rain that had fallen since they entered the Mysore country.

The army came to Chinna-Balabaram (40 miles from Bangalore) on the 1st April. At this place, as well as at Deounella (the camp of the preceding day, and the birthplace of Hyder Ali), were unfinished forts, building on a very good plan. The country here, is picturesque and fertile: and produces rice in the low grounds; dry grain on the upper. A great quantity of provisions, according to promise, was brought in by the grain merchants; and the people of the country were disposed to render every assistance. They had taken possession of the fort, the day before the arrival of the army.

The Nizam's army, which was expected here on the 3d, not appearing, Lord Cornwallis moved to the eastward the 5th and 6th, to Chintominny-Pet, 23 miles; collecting provisions by the way. Whilst they remained here, the public bullocks were mustered: it was found that 12,000
had died since the 24th February; and of the 20,000 that remained, a great part were in a very weak state.*

Tippoo, who went off, after the cannonade of the 28th ult. towards Sera: countermarched, and retook the fort of Chinna-Balabaram; putting many of the Poligar's people to the sword.

On the 7th April, a party from the Nizam's army arrived: but the main body not making their appearance on the 10th, Lord Cornwallis moved next day 11 miles towards Oldham: but ascertaining the near approach of the expected troops, he countermarched on the succeeding day (the 12th) to Cottapilly, where the junction was effected, on the 13th. Their numbers were reckoned from 14 to 16,000; in quality hardly deserving the name of troops; and very ill officered.

* As 27,000 only, was the number mustered on the 24th February; and 32,000 being accounted for, here; it is probable that the 5000 additional ones, were those which brought the provisions from Chinna-Balabaram.
On the 14th, both armies moved towards Oldham: and on the 18th came to Venca-tigheri, a small fort, situated about one march distant from the head of the Peddanaigue Gaut. The country continued to be very fine: and produced plenty of forage (which indeed had been the case, generally, since they left Bangalore), until they approached the edge of the Gauts; when it became wild and rugged.

Colonel Oldham joined the camp on the 19th, to the great joy of the whole army; he bringing with him supplies of provisions and stores, both public and private: as also a reinforcement of about 700 Europeans, and 4,500 native troops; including amongst the latter 450 cavalry. A great part of this force had been left for the defence of the southern provinces, by General Medows; as we have remarked in page 44. Colonel Oldham had been at Amboor since the 22d March: but the stores, &c. were not brought up the pass, until the approach of the grand army. The pass had
previously been cleared by the exertions of Captain Read; whose important services, in collecting provisions for the army, at a most critical period, have been so pointedly acknowledged by the Commander in Chief, and by the Government of Madras. He also took possession of the fort of Venca-tigheri; which although of bad construction, and in a ruinous state, was, in the present case, of great consequence, from its situation. About 1,300 bullocks, laden with provisions, had been taken by the Looties, on their way from the Carnatic.

Here the armies halted until the 22d; and then marched towards Bangalore, by a route, parallel to, and about eight miles to the south, of that which the army took, in February last, from Palamnaire. Six marches (66 miles), with the interval of one halt, brought them, on the 28th April, within five miles of Bangalore. During this expedition, the army was constantly attended by small parties of the enemy's horse.
On the 25th, the day of halt (at Vacka-
leer), Lord Cornwallis declared his inten-
tion of proceeding immediately to Seringa-
patam: and requested the assistance of the 
officers, in reducing their baggage; and then 
sparing their surplus cattle for the purpose 
of carrying shot and stores for the siege: 
the public cattle being in a very reduced 
state. An arrangement was accordingly 
made, by which 2,500 bullocks were trans-
ferred from private to public use: to the 
imortal honour of the officers; who, by 
this generous act of self-denial, relinquished 
those comforts, which the anticipated hard-
ships of the ensuing service, would have ren-
dered doubly acceptable, and no less desira-
ble, under any other circumstances. Every 
generous spirit, in applauding this conduct, 
will also draw this conclusion from it; that 
public spirit, and a perfect confidence in their 
leader, animated the whole body. We may 
here remark, by the way, that if, instead of 
his cavalry, the Nizam had sent an equal
number of fresh draft and carriage cattle, the army would have received a more effectual reinforcement.

From the 28th April to the 3d of May, was spent in preparations for the important march towards the enemy's capital. The sick, half of the officers' tents, and all the spare baggage, were sent into Bangalore. The cattle furnished by the officers were employed in the carriage of shot for the battering train. The Nizam's people carried also 5000 eighteen-pound shot, reckoned equal to 800 bullock loads. The troops, in general, were served, gratis, with as much rice as they could carry; which was nearly enough to last them to Seringapatam. The remainder of the provisions, was carried on bullocks. Colonel Duff, with a battering train, consisting of three twenty-four pounders, and eight eighteens; with eight small mortars, joined the army: being relieved in the command of the garrison by Colonel Oldham. Platforms for batteries, intrenching tools, and
every other article proper to the occasion, were provided; and these in high order. A garrison of 200 Europeans, and 2000 native troops, exclusive of the sick, was left in Bangalore.

There are two roads from Bangalore to Seringapatam: the direct one by Cena-patam (or Chenipatam), and a circuitous one, leading more to the south, by Cankanelly; where the road from Ryacota and Oodeadurgam falls in. The distance by the shortest road is about 80 miles: by Cankanelly, about 94. The latter was preferred: not that, as a road, it had any advantages over the other; but because it led early to the neighbourhood of the Cauvery river, which it was a part of the plan to cross; in order to join General Abercromby, previous to the siege. He had taken post at the head of the Poodicherrum.*

* The remainder of the battering train, was to be brought by General Abercromby.

† It has been printed Pondicherrum: though, I believe, only by a mistake of $u$ for $n$, when written Poudicherrum.
Gaut, opposite Cannanore, as early as the 1st of March: and waited the orders of the Commander in Chief, to advance to Periapatam, a fort situated at about three marches to the W.S.W of Seringapatam: and where he afterwards arrived on the 16th of May. He had with him three of his Majesty’s regiments; the 73d, 75th, and 77th; one battalion of Europeans, and five of native infantry, belonging to the Bombay establishment.

On the 3d of May, the grand army moved to the westward, about five miles; and then encamped at three or four, south of Bangalore: and on the four following days, marched 47 miles, and came to Sultanpetta, situated about ten miles north of the Cauvery. The roads and country had been remarkably rough, during the three last days: in consequence of which, and the want of forage, the cattle were much reduced; and a halt of two days (at Sultanpetta), became absolutely necessary, to refresh them, and to arrange the public stores.
The army followers found a considerable quantity of grain here; which was a temporary relief to their wants. At Sultanpetta, the army emerged from the hilly tract, which it had entered at Cankanelly; and which appears to be a continuous ridge, extending from the neighbourhood of the Cauvery river, in a northwardly direction, towards Sera. Here they opened a view of a fine champaign country to the west; but any advantages that might be derived from it (and a supply of green forage was one), were overbalanced by the deepness of the roads, occasioned by a great fall of rain on the 9th. This added to the fatigues of the cattle; which were now so much exhausted, that on the 10th, the guns, as well as the carriages that were laden with the stores of the magazine; were drawn along, less by their strength, than by that of the troops. This day, again, a considerable quantity of grain was found in the neighbouring villages, and distributed amongst the followers.
On the following day (the 11th) the heavy rain occasioned another halt: but on the 12th and 13th, the march was re-

It appears by the private letters from the army, during its march to join Col. Oldham, that a general want of knowledge prevailed, concerning the weather, that was to be expected in the western part of Mysore; during the approaching rainy monsoon, on the coast of Malabar. It was supposed that the great elevation of the western Gaus, would have prevented the passing over of so great a body of clouds, as was sufficient to occasion a rainy season at 100 miles to leeward of their summits. The truth was, that we knew very few particulars concerning that part of Mysore; as the sequel has fully proved. How far the rain extended easterward, remains to be told: but that it prevails generally in the line between Seringapatam and Darwar, is known by the Bombay newspaper (Herald, June 13, 1791); because the Mahratta General expected the swelling of the rivers, and arranged his marches accordingly. The north-east monsoon does not produce much change in the weather on the eastern quarter of the Table Land: for those who ascended it from the Barramaul quarter, found the weather dry, although the monsoon raged below in the Carnatic.

I do not conceive, however, that the quantity of rain that falls on the Table Land, bears any proportion to that which falls on either side of it; more especially on the west: though no doubt it falls in quantities sufficient to break up the roads, destroy the working cattle, that are exposed to it, and injure the health of the troops in the field.

I ought perhaps to have set out, with declaring my own ignorance on this subject, until the events of the last campaign, were known; concluding that the same kind of weather prevailed every where at the same season, on the east
sumed; and 24 miles brought the troops to Arakeery, from whence they had a distant view of Seringapatam (the ultimate object of the campaign), which lay about 9 miles to the west of the camp. The Cauvery river ran on the south of the camp; the left wing extending to it. At this time, it had not begun to swell, but its bed was found to be so rocky and uneven, in every part that was examined, both above and below Arakeery; that the Commander in Chief determined to try the ford of Kanambaddy, situated about 9 miles above Seringapatam:

side of the Great Gouts. For during the campaigns in the Coimbetore country, in 1767, and 1790, no rainy season was experienced with the south-west monsoon: and I applied this to Mysore; to which, it appears, the rainy season of the Malabar coast, is extended, by the operation of a vertical sun, on that elevated region: although when the sun is in the southern tropic, the rainy season of the Coromandel coast is never felt there.

I cannot help mentioning, that my friend Dr. Blagden actually predicted the kind of weather that afterwards happened in Mysore: from its analogy to other countries; conceiving the wet season in that elevated tract, to be rather of the nature of the periodical rains within the tropics, than of the proper monsoons.
at which place, he learnt, that Hyder Ali had frequently passed 12 pounders, or even heavier guns, over.

When the army came to Arakeery, on the 13th, a body of troops was seen crossing from the island of Seringapatam, to the north side of the river; and taking a position directly in front of our camp, at the distance of about six miles. At that time, these troops were considered only as a large detachment, and not as Tippoo's whole army (as in fact they were); for the projecting base, or shoulder of a hill, intervening between the two camps, shut up from our view, that part of the enemy's line, which lay remote from the river bank. But on the morning of the 14th, whilst the army halted for the purpose of examining the state of the fords, Lord Cornwallis learnt the above intelligence; and determined not to lose so favourable an opportunity of bringing the enemy to action.

Tippoo had quitted his station near Maggeri, at two marches west of Bangalore, at the
time when our army left the latter place; and took the direct road to his capital: where he arrived about four days before the appearance of our army, at Arakeery: and on that occasion, marched out of the island, and took possession of some very strong ground, adjoining to the north bank of the Cauvery, fronting our camp; and, as we have said, about six miles distant from it.

Tippoo's judgment in choosing this post, is unquestionable; as will appear from the nature of the ground itself, and that of the adjacent country: of which, I shall now proceed, with the help of the annexed plan, to give the reader a general idea.

The Cauvery river, after forming the island in which the city of Seringapatam is situated, takes a course, which is considerably to the south of east, to the ford of Arakeery. The breadth of the river bed is about 200 yards, and reckoned impassable for cannon, below the island ford. Opposite to the lower part of the island, and not far from the north bank of the river, are some lofty
hills, which extend in a broken ridge, about two miles and a half to the north-east; or nearly at right angles with the course of the river, in that part. On the south point, or shoulder of this ridge, stands the fortified pagoda of Carigat (or Cariagatam); commanding, as being situated immediately above it, the principal ford of the Cauvery, in this part; over which lies the common road from Bangalore and Cenapatam, into the island. The Carigat itself, is, however,commanded by a higher point of the ridge, on which a redoubt of inferior construction, is raised.

A gap, or opening, situated rather towards the northern part of this ridge, gives it the appearance of two distinct, and very long hills, or mountains: and of these, the one farthest removed from the river, terminates in a slope to the north-east; blending itself at the same time, with the slope of a commanding ground, which, in the nature of a shelf or terrace, projects from the eastern base of the Carigat ridge; presenting a
steep, irregular front, of near a mile and half in extent, to the northward. A deep, swampy ravine, flanks this ground on the east; rendering the access to it extremely difficult: it likewise shuts up the same ground on the south and south-east, by branches that proceed towards the Cauvery; and, on the other hand, extends its course, and inaccessible nature, far into the valley on the north.

This commanding ground, which is also thick set with rocky eminences, and has an extent lengthwise, of near three miles, along the front of the Carigat hills; and in general, a full mile in breadth from their base to the ravine; is the spot which Tippoo fixed upon for his camp and field of battle. His first position, when he drew his army out of the island, on the 13th; was in two lines, extending from the shoulder of the northernmost hill of the Carigat range, to the bank of the Cauvery; from half to three-quarters of a mile below the point of the island of Seringapatam: his front being covered by
the natural defences afforded by the ravine, as well as by the artificial defence of batteries, thickly placed on its banks. The approach to this camp from Arakeery, was through a very narrow valley; rendered difficult by swamps, ravines, and broken ground. In a word, the position was remarkably strong in itself: and if the possessors were beaten from it, the ford, over which lay the passage to the island, was only a mile and half in their rear; and was protected, both by the Carigat redoubt, and the island batteries; which also commanded the intended field of battle. We shall presently have occasion to observe, that Tippoo, being compelled to quit this position, on Lord Cornwallis's turning his left flank; took a new one, towards the north front of the same ground; with his right flank to the ravine, and his left to the north point of the Carigat range: in which position, his line was reduced to near half the extent of front, that it occupied in its former one.

Opposite to this point of the Carigat
ridge, on the east; at the distance of more than a mile and half, and beyond the ravine; is the commencement of a second ridge of hills, which extends downwards, in a course nearly parallel to that of the Cauvery, to a point below Arakeery; forming the narrow valley before spoken of. It is lofty, and generally inaccessible in a military point of view; but has a gap, or opening in the part fronting Arakeery, which leads into the plain to the north. For the sake of distinction, we shall name this the eastern ridge.

About a mile and half to the north of the Carigat ridge, and fronting Tippoo’s left wing (in his second position), is a ridge, or height, of considerable elevation; and of extent sufficient to contain on its summit, a large body of troops. It terminates on the plain to the north, in an abrupt precipice; but slopes irregularly to the eastward, for the space of a mile, to a mile and half, or more; conforming to the course of the ravine beforementioned. This height may
be considered as a kind of outpost, to
the commanding ground near the Carigat
ridge; and Tippoo did not neglect to avail
himself of its advantageous position.

Having endeavoured to describe the
ground on which Tippoo's camp was ori-
ginally formed, when seen from Arakeery; as
well as that, to which he changed his
position afterwards; which description also
includes that, on which the battle was
fought; I shall now attempt to give the
reader a very general idea of the move-
ments of both armies, previous to, and
during the action of the 16th May.

The difficulty of approaching the ene-
my's camp from the side of Arakeery, de-
termined Lord Cornwallis to take a circuit
round the eastern ridge; with a view to
surprise Tippoo in his strong camp: or,
at least, to place himself more on an equa-
liy with him, in point of ground, should
he risk an action.

For this purpose, his Lordship marched
silently from Arakeery, at eleven o'clock
on the night of the 14th; with six European regiments, and twelve battalions of native infantry, with their field-pieces (96 in number); as also the regiment of dragoons, and three of native cavalry.* The camp was left standing, in charge of Colonel Duff; with one European regiment, six native battalions, and one regiment of native cavalry; together with a proportion of artillery men, and the picquets and camp guards of the corps that marched.† The Nizam's horse were to follow at daylight.

The army marched through the gap in the eastern ridge, and thence along the north side of it, by the shortest practicable route, towards the enemy's camp. The night unfortunately happened to be stormy and wet; which, added to the badness of the ground, and the jaded state of the draft-cattle, retarded the march so much, that when the day broke, the troops had advanced

* This body of cavalry consisted of about 1000, only.
† Perhaps the troops left in camp, may be taken at three parts in eight, of the whole force.
only a few miles. About eight, they reached the heights which bound the eastern side of the valley, through which the ravine runs; having in their front, the height beforementioned; which soon after became a subject of contest between the two armies. Arriving at the brow of the hill, they opened a full view of the enemy's line, save a part of the left wing, which was hid by a projecting point of the Carigat range. The nearest part of the line was only three or four miles distant; yet no one had taken the alarm: and scarce a man was seen stirring, save a few who were spreading out their wet cloaths to dry. There were no large tents to be seen; and but a few small ones: and it appeared that they had brought nothing out of the island with them, but their military equipage.

Some of the enemy's horse having now discovered the approach of our army, galloped off to the camp; which was instantly in motion. It was soon perceived that a large body of troops, with guns, was in motion to oc-
cupy the height on the opposite side of the valley; which was not only more distant from the head of our column, than from the enemy's left, but we had also the disadvantages of a rugged valley, and a difficult ravine to cross. To this ravine we were now descending: Tippoo was, at the same time, drawing out his army, and forming it in several lines, near the brow of the commanding ground, which we have described to lie between the Carigat ridge, and the ravine: covering his right flank with the ravine; his left with the shoulder of the ridge: moreover, taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground on the left, to place his field-pieces in three tiers or rows, one above the other. In this position, his front commanded the passage of the ravine, as well as the ground that our army must of necessity form on, after passing it.

The ravine presented a formidable obstacle to the progress of our line: its depth, the steepness of its banks, and the exhausted state of the gun-bullocks; toge-
ther with the threatening appearance, and frequent attacks made by the enemy's cavalry; occasioning a lapse of full two hours (from nine to eleven), before the whole army could be formed on the opposite side; and, of course, before any disposition for action could be completed. Nor could the height be attacked, until the main body of the army was formed, and at hand to sustain the detachment that was destined to attack it. During a great part of this time, the troops were exposed to the whole artillery of the enemy: that of the main body at the distance of random shot; and to the guns on the height (eight in number), within a short distance of the right wing. Fortunately, a rocky eminence presented itself, and was taken advantage of; without which, the lines, whilst forming, would have been completely enfiladed.

The army was formed in two lines; nine battalions in the first, and four in the second; and Colonel Maxwell, with five more, was appointed to attack the height.
Our cavalry, and the Nizam's, were placed out of gun shot, on the ascent of the heights, from whence we had descended to the ravine; in readiness to take advantage of any confusion that might prevail in the enemy's army. The enemy's cavalry had retreated, from the moment that our lines were formed, and ready to advance.

The ground on which our lines were formed, was the slope or ascent of the height, occupied by the enemy; the right wing standing on much higher ground than the left.

The action was begun by Colonel Maxwell's storming the height (where Kummur ul Deen commanded), and having completely succeeded, the main body moved forward; and the action soon became general along our line.

Colonel Maxwell, leaving a sufficient force to keep possession of the summit of the height, advanced rapidly to gain the ascent of the Carigat ridge, close to the enemy's left flank: and the cavalry under
Colonel Floyd advancing at the same time, towards their right flank, the enemy gave way. Some parties of infantry, however, favoured by the intervening rocky eminences, retired gradually, keeping up a fire, and favouring the retreat of their guns across the ford, into the island. One gun only, was taken on the field; and three others on the height; by Colonel Maxwell. The enemy were pursued, until the island batteries* opened, and checked the pursuit.

Colonel Maxwell proceeded along the west of the Carigat ridge, until he came to the point which overlooks the fortified pagoda, and the whole island and city of Seringapatam; which afforded a noble prospect. He there took possession of the redoubt beforementioned; but the pagoda

* Not those of the town, which is two or three miles higher up; but batteries constructed with a view either to cover the ford, or a retreat. They would have served also to protect the enemy's right wing, in his first position.
below, was too strong to be carried by a coup-de-main.

The cavalry of the enemy made no figure in this day's business. Indeed the ground was very unfavourable, beyond the place where our army formed: but even there, they effected nothing. The Nizam's cavalry, through awkwardness, impeded, rather than promoted, the attack made by ours.

The night after the action, the troops lay on their arms: and on the arrival of the tents, &c. from Arakeery, on the morning of the 16th, encamped just out of the reach of the island batteries; and partly on the late field of battle.

Our loss in this action was inconsiderable; that of the enemy very great.* Several standards were taken; and 3000 stand of arms found on the field.

* I have not seen a return of the numbers killed and wounded throughout the army in general: of his Majesty's troops (seven regiments), 25 were killed; 94 wounded.
From the redoubt on the hill, situated within a mile of the nearest part of the island, our people had a very good view of the works: and the enemy were very busy in completing them. With the assistance of glasses, a great number of Europeans could be distinguished. The enemy fired several times from heavy guns, the shot of which came into, or fell beyond the redoubt.*

After a necessary halt of two days, Lord Cornwallis moved towards the ford of Kanambaddy; with a view to attempt a junction with General Abercromby, agreeable to his former intentions. Although this ford was no more than nine miles above Seringapatam; yet, as it is obvious, that the army could not march by the direct road, which passes under the walls of that fortress, a very great detour was unavoidable: and besides this, there was a neces-

* For the plan of the battle, and the references to it, see the last pages.
sity for making a road for the train, the whole way.

On the 18th, the army marched to the north-west, about seven miles; and fixed their camp at about five miles to the N N E of Seringapatam. The extreme weakness of the draft-cattle, was now very apparent: a halt was required to enable them to proceed again, even after so short a march: and the march of 12 miles the succeeding day, to Kanambaddy, required as many hours to perform it in; although with the assistance of the troops, to draw the guns. And now, all idea of moving the heavy train from this place, was given up; for the greatest part of the bullocks, were either dead, or dying: and from circumstances, the heavy train was now become the part of the equipage, that could be the easiest dispensed with. Now, the unavoidable evils arising from a multitude of camp followers, began to be felt in their most serious consequences: although no army in
India, perhaps, was ever attended by so few.

The reader will easily conceive, that the attempt to carry a stock of provisions for the army followers, would be impracticable: and therefore could form no part of the arrangements for the campaign. On the present occasion, the wants of that numerous class of people (in which we may include, as being nearly alike circumstanced, the army of the Nizam, and its followers), altogether outnumbering, perhaps, in a fourfold proportion, the fighting men of the army;* I say, the pressing hunger of these people, occasioned such depredations on the public stock, that a bare sufficiency, at this time, remained, to last the army back to Bangalore, by easy marches. The

* General Goddard's army (1778-9), consisted of 103 European commissioned officers, and 6,624 native troops, of all denominations. The followers of this little army amounted to no less a number (as appears by the return) than 19,779; besides the bazar, or market people, not included in the return: and these were estimated at 12,000 more: in all, more than four followers to each fighting man.
idea, therefore, of a junction with General Abercromby, was abandoned; as, under the
pressure of their immediate circumstances, the siege of Seringapatam could not be un-
dertaken: and all that could be attempted to be done, was, by remaining in their pre-
sent camp, to keep Tippoo's army in check, until Abercromby had time to retreat.

In the mean time, the battering train was destroyed, and the remaining provisions
distributed amongst the troops; each indi-
vidual taking charge of his respective
share. Two brigades of the army (under Colonel Stuart) forded the Cauvery, and
took post on the opposite heights; the
ground there rising gradually from the
river bank. From these heights, on the
morning of the 21st, our reconnoitering
party saw a large body of troops march-
ing to the south-westward: this was since
known to be the detachment under Kum-
mur ul Deen, sent to Periapatam against
General Abercromby, who had arrived at
that place, on the 16th.
Periapatam was deserted by the enemy, on the General's approach; previous to which, some of the round towers, or bastions, were blown up; and all the stores and ammunition removed.

The spirits of the Bombay army were raised to the highest pitch, by the expectation of speedily co-operating with the Carnatic army, in the reduction of Tippoo's capital, and power. They had heard the cannonade that took place during the action of the 15th, and had fired a salute in honour of the victory, on the 20th.

On the 23d, in the morning, parties of the enemy appeared, for the first time, and drove off some of the bullocks belonging to the camp; and in the evening, a part of the enemy's encampment, was seen from the fort. At the same time the General received orders from Lord Cornwallis, to return to the coast; and the army was accordingly put in motion for that purpose, at two in the morning of the 24th. Four eighteen-pounders, a part of the battering
train, intended for the siege of Seringapatam, were destroyed; but the army in general left nothing behind, excepting what was plundered by some straggling horse of the enemy's: and on the 27th, arrived at their old post at the head of the Gout. The force under Kummurul Deen made no attempt to impede their retreat: and was seen (by the grand army) to return to Seringapatam, on the morning of the 28th.*

* Periapatam is three marches, or from 30 to 33 miles, from Seringapatam; in a W S W, or S W by W direction: but nearer to Kanambady, by several miles. From the Poodicherrum Gout, it is also three marches: and Poodicherrum is reckoned four marches from Cannanore, on the Malabar coast. Thus the whole distance from Seringapatam to Cannanore, is ten marches, in point of absolute distance: but the ascent to the Table Land of Mysore, is so steep and difficult, that some days are required to get up the artillery and stores. On a future occasion, it is probable that all the battering train will be sent from the eastward. It may not be amiss to mention, that General Abercromby arrived on the coast, in the beginning of December, 1790; and took possession of Cannanore on the 16th: previous to which, Colonel Hartley had broken the enemy's force on the west of the Gouts, by his brilliant and decisive victory, over Hussein Ali Khan, at Tervanagary, on the 10th December.

Colonel Hartley joined his force to General Abercrom-
On the 26th, the grand army marched from Kanambaddy to the north-eastward, on its return towards Bangalore: and in the course of the march, to the infinite surprise of the Commander in Chief, intelligence was brought, of the near approach of the Mahratta armies, commanded by Purseram Bhow, and Hurry Punt Furkya. In consequence of this intelligence, Lord Cornwallis continued his camp, in this neighbourhood; and on the 28th, the Mahrattas, to the number of 30,000, joined: so that Tippoo saw three hostile armies, encamped within seven miles of his capital.

The Mahrattas came by rapid marches from the neighbourhood of Chitteldroog, more than 120 miles to the northward: and there can be little doubt, but that their movements were accelerated, by the news of Tippoo's defeat. As the difficulty concerning a supply of provisions, as far as
regarded the present moment, was got over; the combined armies moved slowly towards Bangalore, occasionally diverging from the direct route, as suited their convenience. They seized on some small forts, in their way, and collected a considerable quantity of provisions. In the fort of Oliadurgam (or Hooleardurgam), 30 Carnatic people were liberated. One of them had been kept there, in irons, 14 years; another seven; perhaps forgotten by the tyrant of the day: for it is difficult to assign a motive for the perpetual imprisonment of a few obscure peasants, brought from a distant country.

It was on the 6th of June, that the combined armies left the neighbourhood of Seringapatam; and on this day, their encampment was formed, partly on the field of battle of Milgotta, or Mailcotta; where the army of Hyder Ali was totally defeated by the Mahrattas, in 1772.

The combined armies continued in the line of communication between Seringa-
patam, and the northern detachments of the Mahratta army, until the 25th of June: at which period, those detachments having either been called in, or sent beyond the Tumbaddra (or Tongebadra) river, Purseram Bhow took his station in the Sera country, whilst Lord Cornwallis, with Hurry Punt, and the Nizam's horse, marched towards Bangalore; which place they reached, the 11th of July: the grand army having left it 68 days.

Nothing could be attempted, against Seringapatam, until the falling of the Cauvery, to a low state; and until draft and carriage cattle, provisions, battering train, and stores, were got ready; which could only be expected at a distant period of time. And as Tippoo, who could be under no apprehensions for the safety of his capital, during the swollen state of the river that surrounded it, might possibly make an attempt on the Carnatic, with a view of leading our army out of his country; as well as of cutting off some of our convoys; the Commander in
Chief, after drawing a supply of provisions, and some heavy guns, from Bangalore, marched to reduce Oussoor, and other fortresses, situated on the south-east of Bangalore; and in the great line of communication between the Carnatic and Seringapatam, by the Barramaul valley. The possession of these fortresses, would in a great measure exclude Tippoo from any communication with the Barramaul and Carnatic, by the northern passes: at the same time that it added to the security of our own convoys from those quarters. Oussoor is in itself a place of importance, from its strength and situation in respect of the passes; and from its capacity of holding a strong garrison: and therefore a more convenient place of arms, for the protection of convoys, than Bangalore; which lies wide of the road to Seringapatam, by the Barramaul route.

Oussoor was abandoned on the approach of our troops. Lord Cornwallis then (July 18) proceeded farther to the south-east, to
support a brigade sent to reduce the hill forts, situated at, or near the opening of the Oodeadurgam and Ryacota passes; from 15 to 20 miles from Oussoor: all of which submitted. The principal of these, Ryacota, and Oodeadurgam, were garrisoned. The pass of Oodeadurgam (of which mention is made in pages 38 and 55), is reported to be the easiest and best, that leads up the ascent to Mysore, from the east. It points to the S E from Oodeadurgam, to the place where it opens into the Darampoory valley, near Pallicode, about 15 miles to the S W of Caveripatam. It has an excellent gun road, the whole way through; and is of considerable length, from the easiness of the slope. By this pass, of which we seem to have known but little, till lately; it was determined by Lord Cornwallis, to bring the convoys of provisions, artillery, and stores, from the Carnatic: on the safe arrival of which, the success of our attempt on Seringapatam, would depend. It must however be acknowledged, that considering
the number of outlets that Tippoo has, from the Mysore country; the safety of our convoys may sometimes be rendered doubtful: at all events, some attempts may be expected from so active and vigilant an enemy: as so much depends on the arrival of certain particulars, in those convoys.

On the 29th of July, the army left the neighbourhood of Oodeadurgam, and marched to the north-west: and on the 31st, being then to the S W of Oussoor, and near the road leading from that place to Allumbaddy, a detachment was sent to examine the passes and country towards Malicandraog, Anchitty, and Allumbaddy. This service being accomplished, the detachment joined the army again, on the 10th of August; not far to the west of their point of separation: and on the 11th, the whole moved towards Oussoor.

From this time the army moved ground occasionally, between Oussoor and Bangalore: and on the 30th, encamped about six miles to the S E of the latter; apparently,
in the old camp of the 28th April, at Agarum. It remained in this position, when the last accounts of the 9th of September came away: it occupying nearly the centre of a line possessed by the confederates, extending in front, from Ryacota to Sera: Purseram Bhow, with his 20,000 Mahrattas, taking possession of the latter country; and thereby straitening and distressing Tippoo's army for provisions: as all the country on the north and east of his capital, beyond the line abovementioned, was cut off from him, by the posts and armies of the confederates.

I have now (with what success, the public must determine) endeavoured to trace the routes of the armies, during the two campaigns; as well as to note the principal events, to which the several movements gave birth. If, amongst the defects of this performance, some errors, arising from a hasty retrospect of the transactions that are recorded; or the no less hasty manner in which it was composed; should be noticed;
I flatter myself that they will be imputed to a strong desire of gratifying the curiosity of the public, as speedily as possible: in the pursuit of which object, all nicety of arrangement and expression, were sacrificed to dispatch.

Those who have been in the habit of considering the management of our Indian warfare, as a task that any one could perform; and with as little force as they chose to employ; will now alter their opinions, on a retrospect of the three wars, maintained by Hyder Ali and his son, against us; in the course of 25 years: in which they appear to have progressively improved in generalship, and in discipline; as well as increased in power. Our former contests were against undisciplined troops; unprovided with manageable artillery; and generally acting without much system, either of attack or defence. It was reserved for the Mysoreans, to put our prowess and discipline to the test: and he who could arrive at that point, might possibly, had he been
left to pursue his plans without interruption, have revived the Mohamedan empire in India; and began a dynasty of Mysorean Emperors in his own person.

To what extent Tippoo's views of conquest might have reached, is doubtful; as those views, like all others, expand during a successful pursuit: but those who have had an opportunity of perusing the preface or exordium to his military code, inform us, that he sets forth in that performance, as the strongest inducement towards attaining a perfection in discipline, "that the Europeans, having usurped from the Faithful, certain large tracts of land, in various parts of India; they ought, from pious motives, to be dispossessed of them." It is also given, as the opinion of some able judges in the army, now in Mysore; that Tippoo had ruined his great plan of conquest, by engaging too early in the dispute with the Rajah of Travancore. He had begun to strengthen some inland fortresses; which, when completed, would
severally have stood a regular siege: and had also begun a new system of defence, on the Malabar side, by dismantling Mangalore, and transferring the point of resistance, to the foot of the Gaus: to which place the assailant must have dragged his cannon, and transported his stores, for the attack; through a country, in which there is no established mode of land carriage. He had also extended his frontier at the expence of the Mahrattas, and the Nizam.

It is fortunate for our power in India, that none of the northern potentates have yet made any great improvement in their discipline: for we could ill afford to combat with a second enemy, like the Mysorean. Our power was originally established, by a daring spirit of adventure; which, however, calculated its powers of action, and seldom mistook the means of accomplishment. Victory was insured, by appearing to despise the numerous forces of the enemy; when cautious measures would have ruined our cause, by inspiring them with courage.
As we could not present a front, that bore any proportion to the enemy’s line (or perhaps crescent), our attacks were directed against a part of it: and having defeated the troops which we opposed, the remainder quitted the field with precipitation. And on any other system than this, against such disproportionate numbers, the fleets of Europe would be unequal to the task of wafting a sufficient number of combatants, to the shores of Asia.

March 1st, 1792.
REFERENCES to the Plan of the Battle of Seringapatam; fought May 15, 1791: drawn by Lieutenant R. H. Colebrooke. The ground from actual survey, and measurement.

A Route of the British army to attack the enemy. (a) The point from whence the enemy's camp was first seen, on the morning of the 15th.

B B First position of the army (consisting of 18 battalions of infantry, and 36 field-pieces) after passing the ravine.

C The British cavalry. D The Nizam's.

E E The army, advancing to the attack.

E e Colonel Maxwell's attack of the height on which Kummur ul Deen was posted.

F F The main body of the enemy's infantry.

F f The enemy's detachment posted on the height.

G The enemy's principal body of horse.

H A body of the enemy's horse, which made a shew of charging, whilst the army was crossing the ravine.

I Charge of the cavalry, under Colonel Floyd.

K K The encampment of the enemy on the 13th and 14th May: and until our army appeared on their flank, 15th May.

L L The island batteries.

M M The roads to Cenapatam, or Chenapatam.

N The British camp, after the battle: the picquet on the Carigat ridge.
[No 1.

3d Bengal Brigade.

Col. Cockrell.

B. M. Douglas.

Capt. M'Leod.

Capt. Scott.

Capt. Sir P. Balfour.

Capt. Rattray.

Capt. A. Stuart.

B. M. Douglas.

Capt. Cockrell.

Capt. A. Stuart.

Capt. Rattray.

Capt. M'Leod.

Capt. Scott.

Capt. Sir P. Balfour.
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- 4th Brigade (Bengal)
- Col. Cockrell
**[No 3.](#)**

**CROMBY, Commander.**

**RIGHT BRIGADE.**

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