THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF INDIA

CENTRAL AND WESTERN SECTOR

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ALLIED PUBLISHERS
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TO THE MEMORY OF

MY PARENTS
PREFACE

The northern frontier of India, comprising the Himalayan ranges of varying elevations, occupies a unique position in Indian history. The inaccessible, formidable and impassable mountain ranges presented no problem during the times when technical and military skill was not developed and space travel was unimaginable. In the modern times, however, the problem of the northern frontier has acquired new dimensions. In the context of present tensions, when two of India’s neighbours are inimically poised against her, a correct appraisal of the problem is most desirable. The validity of the rival claims on territory and the justification or otherwise of the military measures of the recent times necessitate a systematic and authentic study of the growth and development of the northern frontier. Voluminous literature is being produced on the current boundary dispute between India and China but scholars have not delved deep into the formation of the northern frontier. The present work is an attempt to piece together and reconstruct, on the basis of source material of unquestioned authenticity, an account of the development of the frontier regions with a view to determining the justifiability or otherwise, of the claims of India and her neighbours on the territories in the Himalayan regions. The views expressed in this book do not conform to any official programme or doctrine.

Historical objectivity is very difficult to achieve. Thus during the times when rival claims on territories are put forward with equal vehemence based on seemingly incontrovertible evidence and when national sentiments are worked up, a scholar working on a subject like this faces genuine difficulty in formulating an unbiased and dispassionate attitude and avoiding national affiliation. It has been tried, so far as is humanly possible, not to be swayed by such considerations and it can be modestly claimed that nothing has been extenuated or exaggerated and nothing has been set down in malice.
A probing analysis of the early history of the northern frontier reveals that many independent kingdoms had sprung up in the northern belt after the death of Harsha in 647 A.D. when the central authority had almost collapsed and the empire was reduced to a congeries of independent and warring states. Sometimes there emerged a comparatively powerful kingdom which claimed the allegiance of her weaker neighbours and this making and breaking of states continued till the Imperial Mughals obliged them to accept their overlordship. However, administrative control in the hilly tracts was never far-reaching and considerable amount of internal freedom was enjoyed by the hill chiefs. It should be noted that these hill kingdoms were ruled by kings of Indian origin and their populations were preponderatingly Indian. It is true that China had planted her foot in Sinkiang towards the close of the first century A.D. but it must be clearly understood that her authority was intermittent and never unchallenged. She maintained herself by force of arms and many a time successful rebellions had been engineered against her authority. Tibet had also to bear the weight of Chinese arms and accept China's protectorate but China hardly ever fulfilled the obligations of a protector and her authority in Tibet was in name only. Moreover towards the close of the nineteenth century China herself had denied her authority in Tibet. In the eighteenth and the middle of nineteenth century the British consolidated their rule in India. While they were aggrandizing themselves in the Gangetic plain and central India momentous changes were shaping themselves in the northern frontier regions. The eagle-eyed Sikh ruler, Maharaja Ranjit Singh was carving out large slices of territory beyond river Sutlej and the process was continued by his valiant generals even after his death. The British watched these developments keenly. The death of Ranjit Singh whetted their appetite for territory. The Sikhs were defeated and their kingdom dismembered. Gulab Singh was set up as an independent ruler in Jammu and Kashmir. But alongside the acquisition of political power, the British had their eyes on trade also and a combination of these two motives led them to interfere in Tibet whose boundary with Jammu and Kashmir was sought to be defined. The Russian thrust in Afghanistan after the Crimean War posed a potential danger to the British possessions in India and the British, therefore, thought it essential to bring Jammu and Kashmir under
effective control and to render the northern frontier inviolable. The quest for security necessitated an effective control of vulnerable frontier and with this end in view several explorations were made in the Sinkiang region and several lines of control were suggested and formulated. With a view to keeping the Russians at an arm's length, the declining power of the Chinese was induced to secure her hold in Sinkiang. The thesis of this book lies in the argument that India's northern frontiers are not as they have been bequeathed to us by the British. As a matter of fact the British, in their anxiety to formulate a strategic and inviolable line of defence, had made cession of large slices of Indian territory to the Chinese and had kept the effective line of control much below the ancient and traditional frontier of India.

The source material pertaining to the subject is voluminous and exists in English, Russian, Tibetan and Ladakhi languages. I have consulted and utilized almost all published and unpublished material preserved in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. As for the source material in Russian, Tibetan and Ladakhi languages I have, for the purpose of this work, utilized such English translations of the records as are available in India.

The treatment of the subject is chronological. However, in the earlier chapters where the history of different territories had to be traced, the narrative does not proceed strictly along chronological lines. It would not have been possible to weave into one narrative the events happening simultaneously in different territories or kingdoms and involving conflicting interests.

The book is based on a thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Saugar.

My sense of obligation is great towards my teachers who have helped me during my study and research. I owe a great debt of gratitude to all the scholars who have written on the Himalayan areas, and upon whose writings I have drawn liberally. I express my most profound feelings of gratitude to Dr. S. Gopal, who has been instrumental for my interest in the area. I am grateful to Dr. H. L. Gupta for his invaluable guidance and advice and for the keen and consistent interest he has shown in the completion of this study. I am thankful to several authorities of School of International Studies, particularly to Shri Ram Rahul and Dr. Bimal Prasad. I am grateful to my critics and admirers alike. While the former have strengthened my determination, the latter
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Needless to say, the responsibility for ideas, errors and omissions, if any, rests solely on me.

S. C. Bajpai

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Along the northern frontier of the Indian subcontinent the Himalayas form a broad continuous arc for nearly 1,600 miles from the river Indus in the north-west to the river Brahmaputra in the east. Whereas in the west, the Hindukush mountain runs from the Pamirs in the south-westerly direction and is regarded as the natural boundary of India in the north-west, this mountain wall on the north, north-east and north-west separates India from the rest of Asia. North of this mountain system lies Sinkiang and in the north-east the plateau of Tibet which extends northwards to the Kun Lun range. To the south, the average width of the Himalayas is between 200 and 250 miles up to the plains. Physically the Himalayas form three parallel zones: (1) the Great Himalaya, (2) the Inner Himalaya also known as Middle or Lesser Himalaya, and (3) the Sub-Himalayan foothills. Each of these lateral divisions exhibits certain homogeneous characteristics.

The Great Himalaya, the highest zone, consists of a line of snowy peaks with an average height exceeding 20,000 feet. The width of this zone is about 15 miles. Spurs from the Great Himalaya project southwards into the Inner Himalaya in an irregular fashion. The Nepal and Sikkim portion of the Great Himalaya contains the largest number of highest peaks. Next in general elevation is the Kumaun section, followed by the Punjab and Bhutan sections. The Great Himalaya is lowest in Assam. The snow line on the southern slopes of the Great Himalaya varies from 14,700 feet in Nepal and Sikkim to 17,000 feet in Himachal Pradesh. The Himalayas on the whole contain 114 peaks of over 20,000 feet, of which 75 exceed 24,000 feet. The best known peaks are Gauri Shanker or Everest, 29,140 feet, the highest mountain in the world; Kanchanjangha, 28,176 feet; Dhaulagiri, 26,826 feet; Nanga Parbat, 26,600 feet, and Nanda Devi, 25,661 feet. The entire Great Himalaya is mostly uninhabited.

The Inner Himalaya, about 50 miles wide, borders the Great Himalayan range on the south. It consists principally of high ranges
issuing obliquely from the Great Himalayan range at points where the latter changes its direction, and several outer disconnected ranges. These comprise Nag Tibba, branching off from Dhaulagiri, the Dhauladhar range from the neighbourhood of Badrinath, the Pir Panjal range, and the north Kashmir range from the Joji La separating the Jhelum and Kishanganga rivers. The three outer parallel ranges are the Mahabharat, stretching through Nepal; the Mussoorie range between the Ganges and the Sutlej; and the Ratanpir in southern Kashmir, separated from Pir Panjal by the Punch river. The Inner Himalaya possesses a remarkable uniformity of height, between 6,000 and 10,000 feet. It is a complex mosaic of forest-covered ranges and intervening fertile valleys. While it is not as forbidding as the great Himalaya to the north, it has none the less served to isolate the fertile valleys of the Himalayas from the Gangetic plains. Except for major valley centres such as Srinagar, Kangra and Kathmandu, and hill stations such as Simla, Mussoorie and Darjeeling, the region in general is moderately populated.

The outermost and lowest zone, the Sub-Himalaya, including the Siwalik range, is contiguous with the plains. Its width gradually narrows from about 30 miles in the west until it nearly disappears in Bhutan and Assam. A characteristic feature of the Sub-Himalaya is the large number of longitudinal, flat-bottomed valleys.¹

Traditionally Known Northern Frontier

This rugged train of the Himalayas and the natural barriers of hills and rivers in it, and elsewhere in the Indian subcontinent largely determined the different political and cultural units into which India was divided. Natural divisions favoured the growth of local and regional spirit and fostered separatist tendencies. Though the consolidation of large kingdoms was very difficult, yet it was never unknown. At times there were small independent kingdoms, and in other periods they were incorporated in large empires of the Mauryan and Gupta kings. But there had always been a fundamental unity of India. The people and the rulers always regarded themselves as Indians and remained in the Indian fold. This

concept of one nation and one people has been known from time immemorial. In Vishnupurāṇa we read:

Uttram yat samudrasya himādrescaiva dakṣinam
Varṣam tad (tam) bhārtam nāma bhārati yatra santatiḥ.

The country lying to the north of the ocean and to the south of Himandri (Himalaya) is called Bharata-Varsha (Land of Bharata) for there live the descendants of Bharata (Bharti Santith). The date of this text is not known. But it indicates that the Greater Himalaya had been the northern limits of Bharatavarsha.²

The Himalayan frontier of Bharatavarsha had always been known to Indians throughout the Vedic period. The Rig-Veda which was written about 1500 B.C. contains abundant geographical knowledge of this region.³ Almost every river which had its origin in the Himalayas was known to the author of the Rig-Veda. Evidently the land below the Himalayas was India proper. Geographical information contained in Samhitas, Brahmanas, Upanishads and Sutras makes us believe that at no time had India considered Kailash Mansarowar region a foreign land, which is still considered as a place of pilgrimage for the Hindus.

Northern India during the early Vedic period was inhabited by several tribes. The northern-most portion of the Himalayas was inhabited by the Mujavant tribe. They were a distinct people taking their name from a mountain Mujavant in the Himalayas. The Bakalikas were another hill tribe inhabiting the adjacent region. Mahavrishas and Gandharis were the immediate neighbours of the hill tribes. Sialkot and Central Punjab were inhabited by Uttarakurus and Madras. Kashmir and the foot-hill area was the territory of Uttara-Madras and Uttarakurus.

The tribal population of the Aryans gradually came to be organized into a political state. Tradition tells us that one of the earliest rulers of the land was Manu, who ruled between 3100 B.C. and 2550 B.C. During his times the country was visited by a serious flood and Manu had to take refuge in the Himalayas. Druhyus, one of the later rulers of the age carried the Aryan culture beyond the natural borders of India and established several colonies in that

³ F. Max Müller, ed., Rig-Veda Samhita (Varanasi, 1966), vol. IV, p. 401.
region. The Manu period of the Vedic age was followed by the Mandhatri period ranging from 2750–2550 B.C. and the Parasuram period from 2550–2350 B.C. During this period several monarchs such as Jamdagini, Sahastra Arjun and Sagara rose to great prominence. The old kingdoms of Pauravas, Kanyakubjas, Druhyus and Anavas disappeared in the Punjab. The Yadwas receded into the Deccan. The eastern kingdoms of Vaisali, Videh, Ayodhya, Kasi and Anvas in Bengal continued to exist. These kingdoms played a dominant role in the age of Ramchandra 2350–1950 B.C. Raghu, the founder of the dynasty, was followed by his grandson Dasharath who led his victorious campaigns throughout the length and breadth of India. His two grandsons were the rulers of Kasapath-Desa near the Himalayas. The Krishna period 1950–1400 B.C. was marked by the great Bharta War. This war was fought sometime in 1400 B.C. Several rulers of the Himalayan region were the participants in it. The exact location of their territories has not been ascertained. But the geographical knowledge which one derives from the accounts of the Mahabharata and Bhagavat Gita, provides sufficient ground for believing that the frontiers of India during that period were formed by the Himalayas.

India in the Sixth Century B.C.

After the long traditional epic period, we are on firmer historical ground. At the beginning of the sixth century B.C. India was divided into sixteen great Janpad and several smaller ones. Among them Gandhara, Kamboj, Kuru, Kosal, Mull, Vajji, Panchal, Sakya were either in the southern Himalayan regions or had their territories extended up to the Himalayan ranges. The extent of the country known to the great grammarian Panini is indicated in the Sutras. According to that information the westernmost point of Bharatvarsha was Prakanva, corresponding to modern Ferghana. To the south of it was Kamboj the modern Badakshan Pamir. It was known as Gandhara in the contemporary literature and the edicts of Asoka. The extent of Gandhara was roughly around Rajouri including Hazara district in Pakistan, and probably extending as far as Kafiristan. South of Kamboj was Kapisi, the modern Kafiristan south-east of Hindukush. The Kabul river valley with its outpost at Takshila was known as Gandhara Valley. At times Kashmir was also included in Gandhara. Among the autonomous clans the Sakya state was most important. It was
bounded on the north by the Himalayas, on the east by the river Rohini and on the west and south by Rapti. Besides these, Trigorta i.e. Central Kulu, Mandamati, i.e. Mandi, Kalakuta, i.e. Kumaun, were also known. Kalakuta was an extensive region including the lofty mountains, wherein the Beas, the Sutlej, the Yamuna and the Ganga had their sources.4

The Period of Imperial Unity

Of all the states that were flourishing in the sixth century B.C., the kingdom of the Magadha was the first to make a successful bid for supremacy under Bimbisara and has left behind a rich legacy of Imperial tradition. Its emperors belonging to the Sunaga, Nanda and Maurya dynasties carried their banners up to the inhabited parts of the inner Himalayan regions. Chandragupta Maurya who freed India from the Macedonian yoke and brought about its political unification under one sceptre, negotiated an alliance with Parvatka (Himalayan king) before empire building. With the help of the several frontier tribes such as the Kiratas, Kambojas, Panasikas and Balkikas, he build up the great Mauryan Empire. The empire of Asoka extended up to the natural boundaries of India and beyond that in the west. His influence spread far and wide even in the north Himalayan regions. His son, Kunal, was the Governor of Gandhara and another son, Jaluka, became an independent ruler of Kashmir after his father’s death.5 After the collapse of the Mauryan power the Kushanas established an extensive empire within and beyond India in the north-west. Emperor Kanishka’s hegemony spread over Kashmir and the Central Asian regions of Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan. In Central Asia he fought against China for a long time to maintain the integrity of his frontiers with China. In the Central sector of the modern boundary of India in the north, his hold extended up to the territory of the Inner Himalaya. In the meantime northern India was divided into a number of small kingdoms and autonomous tribal states. From Kashmir to Kafiristan there was a great Janpada Ki-Pin. In the neighbourhood of Jamuna, Sutlej and Beas, the Kuninda tribe was ruling. Kulu was inhabited by Kulutas.

4 V. S. Agrawala, India as Known to Panini (Lucknow, 1953), pp. 37–54; R. C. Majumdar and A. D. Pusalkar, ed., The History and Culture of the Indian People: The Age of Imperial Unity (Bombay, 1951), vol. II, pp. 1–17.
Territory to the east of Kangra was occupied by Andumbras. Nagas were the rulers between the Ganga and Jamuna valleys in the north. Rohilkhand and the adjoining areas were parts of the kingdom of Ahichchhatra. Under such divided country the Gupta empire grew. Samudragupta's empire comprised within it the territories of Rohilkhand, Kumaun, Garhwal, Nepal and Assam. Its northern boundary was along the high Himalayas. Chandragupta II Vikramaditya (375–414), the son and successor of Samudragupta completed the task begun by his father. His victorious arms penetrated to the far eastern limits of India, and beyond the Hindukush in the north-west. The Gupta Empire continued to flourish up to A.D. 467. On the disruption of the Gupta Empire Mihirkula, the Huna leader, established his sway in Kashmir and the neighbouring areas, but was dislodged within a few years. Yasodharman of Malwa rose and fell like a meteor between A.D. 530 and 540. His suzerainty was acknowledged over the vast area extending up to the Himalayas in the north.

Harsha of Thaneswar

Early in the seventh century Harsha came to power at Thaneswar in A.D. 606. During the course of the next four decades he had established a most powerful empire in India. All the existing kingdoms of Kapisa, Kashmir, Kuluta, Satadru, Mo-li-pa-lo and Suvarnagoota were incorporated in his empire. Mo-li-pa-lo was the name of Ladakh and Suwarnagotra was situated in the high Himalayas. It was ruled by women and was known as the Kingdom of Women. The sovereign sway of Harsha was extended from the Himalayas to the Vindhyas including Kamrupa. Harsha was probably the second great emperor of India who was having diplomatic relations with China. He died in A.D. 647 and with him the glory of Thaneswar and Kanauj departed for ever. The country was once again divided into the old principalities of the sixth century B.C. with the addition of Gurjara-Pratiharas, Guhilots

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7 Radhakumud Mookerji, The Gupta Empire (Bombay, 1948).
9 R. S. Tripathi, History of Kanauj (Banaras, 1937); Majumdar and Pusalkar, ed., n. 8, pp. 96–123. For the geographical knowledge of the area during the period up to sixth century A.D. known to Chinese one can see, L. Petech, Northern India According to the Shui-Chung-Chu (Rome, 1950).
and Chapas. On the northern frontier of India several small kingdoms began to take shape.

**Events in Heartland of Asia**

While in India there was comparative stability, in the far west Hazrat Hohammed was born in A.D. 570. He made his first public appearance in A.D. 613 and started the preachings of Islam. After the death of Mohammed on 7 June 632, Islam became a militant religion. The battle of Siffin between Sunnis and Siyas was fought in A.D. 657, after which the spread of Islam became very rapid. Around A.D. 712 this religion reached Sinkiang and about the same time Muhammed bin Quoasim made an attack on India. In China the weak Han regime was replaced by the T'ang Dynasty. Kao Tsu, the first emperor of the new dynasty began to consolidate China from A.D. 618. In Tibet the monarchy had, after ages, acquired new dimensions with Song-ten-Gam-Po.

**Tibetan Imperialism**

Tibetan kings traced their ancestry to the son of a noble family of Magadha in Bihar, India, who is said to have been born with long blue eyebrows, a full set of teeth, and webbed fingers. According to a legend, the king of Kosala, Prasenjit had expelled his son who became the ruler of Tibet in the name of Gua-Khristsan. Another legend says that the first king of Tibet was the son of Krishna. According to Chinese legend, the ruler of Tibet came from the western country and settled at Si-Tche-Choui. His name was Houi-ty-pou-lsoni-ye. Sangtsen Gampo was the great king of Tibet. He came to power in A.D. 618, and soon set about the consolidation of the kingdom. His successor, Mang-Song Mang-ten (649–676) soon began his Imperial career. He came into conflict with the Turks and Chinese power. After subduing them Mang-Song Mang-ten extended his empire beyond Pamirs, including the whole of eastern Turkistan. During the time of his successor, Du-Song Mang-po-je (676–704), the four garrisons (Kashgar, Khotan, Kucha, Karushsher) were reconquered by the Chinese in A.D. 692. His entire career was spent in suppressing rebellions in different parts of the empire. He took the field in person against Nepal, and was killed during the course of campaign in 705.

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Tri-de-Tsung-tsen directed his attention towards China and consequently the border peoples once again became independent of imperial authority. Being free from China, he once again turned towards the west, and recaptured the four garrisons of Sinkiang whence the Tibetans had been driven in 692 by the Chinese forces of the Emperor Wu. The Tibetan army advanced westward to the Pamirs and even reached the Oxus river. A few years later, the Arabian Caliph Harun Al Rashid allied himself with the Chinese in order to keep the Tibetans in check. Attacked by the allied forces of the Chinese and the Arabs, the Tibetans succeeded in holding their own without substantial loss of territory and in spite of considerable setbacks. The expansionist dreams of the Tibetans were, however, checked. Soon afterwards the Tibetan nobility became rebellious and more powerful during the reign of Tri-de-Songtsen (800–815). He, therefore, decided to free the monarchy from the power of the nobility, and confiscated their lands. He also divided the country of Tibet from the country of Ragy and defined the frontiers. His definition of the frontier was: “All the grass under Tibetan rule grew with points looking towards Tibet.”

Imperial Tibet once again returned to religion and the feudal supremacy was established. “The Tibetan monarchy, although it filled two centuries of the history of Asia did not leave any political or ethical traces in Turkistan, it left only scanty and unimportant traces in Tibet itself, which in 842 found itself nearly in the same conditions as it was in the 6th century.”

**Growth of the Kingdoms on the Frontier**

Prior to the sixth century the kingdoms on the frontier were part of the mighty empires of India. But from the sixth century they began to grow rapidly. For a brief period of Harsha’s rule they once again came into the imperial fold. When a strong central authority disappeared the petty principalities on the frontier were once again left to themselves. The petty states were wholly unconnected with one another. This was one of the fundamental reasons why the hill chiefs could not afford any noticeable resistance to the Tibetans, when they tried to overrun the territory in the second half of the seventh century. The withdrawal of Tibetan

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12 Francke, n. 11, p. 87.
authority was followed by the systematic growth of Gilgit with its dependencies of Hunza and Nagar, Baltistan, Ladakh, and Spiti. Below the river Sutlej, Bashahr, Garhwal, and Kumaun were also developing as independent units.

Gilgit

Gilgit was known by the name of Sargin in ancient times. Later the name of Gilit was given to it, and this was changed into Gilgit after the Sikh Dogra’s conquest of the place. In ancient Sanskrit literature the place was probably known as Gahalata and the area ruled by Hindu Rajas with a title of Ra. Unfortunately the names of Hindu Ras have been lost, with the sole exception of the last of their number, Shri Buddutt. The principalities of Hunza, Nagar, Darel, Chilas, Astor, Haramosh, Gurais, Yassin, and Chitral were under the control of Shri Buddutt. The rule of Buddutt was most oppressive. The people were delivered out of this oppression by an adventurer of the name of Azor, and Buddutt was killed. Azor married the daughter of Buddutt and established himself as ruler of Gilgit. The Dynasty thus founded by Azor was called Trakhane, after Tarkhan, the ninth ruler of the line. The fortunes of the Shin kingdom of Buddutt began to decline with the introduction of Islam by Azor.14 The kingdom was broken up into a number of small independent states, which commenced to make periodical wars with one another. The petty quarrels were continued up to 1841 when Karim Khan sought the help of the Sikhs and lost the territory to them.15

Hunza and Nagar

Hunza and Nagar after the assassination of Buddutt became one kingdom. It was ruled by a branch of the ruling family of Gilgit. The seat of the government was Nagar. The first Mohammedan Thum (King) Mayroo Khan was married to a daughter of Tarkhan, the King of Gilgit, who bore him twin sons named Moghlot and Girkis. The twins were hostile to each other from the beginning. Mayroo Khan, unable to settle the question of

14 Major J. Biddulph, The Tribes of Hindoo Koosh (Calcutta, 1880), pp. 20, 134. It seems that Islam was introduced in the late tenth or early eleventh century in the Gilgit region.
succession, divided his state between them. Girkis was given the territories north of the river known as Hunza and Moghlot received Nagar. From then these states were hostile to each other. Only in the face of an external enemy did they combine, otherwise they did not see eye to eye with each other. For centuries they were independent. Only after the establishment of Mughal power in India they came under its fold.

Baltistan

Baltistan was for many years bound up with Ladakh. During the time of the Great Tibetan empire Baltistan appears to have formed part of it. It was the introduction of Islam in particular which alienated the Baltis from their Ladakhi neighbours. At the same time when Azor established himself in Gilgit, a Mohammedan adventurer, Ibrahim Shah, had usurped the sovereignty of Baltistan. Ibrahim Shah originally came from Egypt, and became the founder of the Makpons dynasty. It appears from the genealogy that the five successors of Ibrahim Shah were under the influence of the then prevailing religion of the area. At one period the royal race was nearly extinct. The king had only one daughter who was given to a fakir in marriage and the offspring from them became the rulers of Baltistan. Ali Sher Khan, the thirteenth ruler from Ibrahim Shah was most powerful. He extended the territories of Baltistan at the cost of Gilgit and Ladakh. Except for local wars with Gilgit and Ladakh, nothing significant happened. After the death of Ahmed Khan, his sons began to fight each other and sought the help of the Mughals. Help was promptly dispatched and the state was made a tributary. Soon after the collapse of Mughal authority Baltistan became free.

Ladakh

The kings of Ladakh traced their origin to the Sakya family of Suddhodana. Some of the rulers of the line were known by the names of Ikshvaku, Karnika, Dharmaraja and Rastrananda, etc. It is difficult to construct any rational history of Ladakh prior to the ninth century. Up to the period of Harsha, the Chronicles of Ladakh only mention names of persons, places and gods of worship,

16 Biddulph, n. 14, p. 31.
etc. known to Indians. From the middle of the seventh century Ladakh was colonized by Tibetans. Faced with combined forces of Arabs and Chinese in Turkistan, the Tibetans had to withdraw early in the ninth century. In the words of Luciano Petch:

Ladakh did not constitute an integral part of the Tibetan state, but must have been considered as a dependency or even as a kind of Colony, since, like the whole of Western Tibet, it remained outside the territorial organisation of the Tibetan army as described in the *Padma-bKai-t’anyio*, part V, Chapter 4. This Colonial or Semi-Colonial status is quite natural, because Ladakh's population was not as yet or was only beginning to become Tibetan,—a process that must have required a long time...when Skyid-Lde Ni-ma-mgon early in the 10th century founded the Western Tibetan Kingdom, he found no trace of Tibetan rule in Ladakh. The lower part of the valley was divided into a large number of very small states, while Upper Ladakh constituted a single state a little more important; its dynasty boasted, as did the Gru-gu dynasty, of descending from Kesar. Probably this situation had existed from very ancient times, notwithstanding the invasions the country had suffered.¹⁸

In A.D. 842 the first Ladakhi dynasty was founded by Skyid-Lde. He was also known by the name Ni-ma-mgon. He was followed by his son, Lde-dpal-nKor-btsan. The period from 842 to 900 was known for its vigorous religious activities. Skyid-Lde Ni-ma-mgon, (900–930), the third in the dynasty was a great King. He consolidated the kingdom of Ladakh and his possessions were far wide. The kingdom of Ladakh in the time of Sykid-Lde-Ni-ma-mgon extended from the northern mountain ranges up to Roduk, including Demchog, Guge (south-east of Roduk and west of Mansarovar) and the modern districts of Lahul and Spiti. The king had three sons. Before his death he divided the vast kingdom of Ladakh amongst his sons: to the eldest Dpal-gyi-mgon, he gave Ladakh proper, to the second Purang and Guge were assigned, and the third, LDe-Gtsug-mgon, was made the ruler of Zanskar and Spiti. Dpal-gyi-mgon, the owner of Ladakh, was made suzerain

¹⁸ Petech, n. 13, pp. 102-3.
over his brothers. After the partition Ladakh enjoyed complete peace and prosperity up to the fourteenth century, except for a minor attack by Kublai Khan in 1207. Utpala (1090–1110) had subjugated Kulu, Purang, Guge and several localities of Baltistan in the eleventh century. Rgyal-Bu-rin-Chen (1320–1350) in the fourteenth century was a great king of Ladakh. He invaded Kashmir and overthrew the ruler Sahadeva.

Ladakh, Baltistan and other hill principalities paid tribute to Kashmir only when its ruler happened to be powerful. After the attack by the Ladakhi King, a Muslim dynasty in Kashmir was founded by Shah Mir in A.D. 1339. The successors of Shah Mir turned their attention towards the tributary principalities. In A.D. 1359 Shabudin attacked Ladakh and added Baltistan, Kashgar and Kabul to the Kingdom of Kashmir. Shabudin's conquests were shortlived, and the principalities became independent once again. In A.D. 1423 Zain-ul-Abdin reduced all tributary states of Kashmir. He carried his victorious arms to Guge, Bhotta Desh, Sheh, north of Leh. The entire region which was situated on the banks of the river Indus, came into the Sultan's possessions. One of the brothers of the King of Guge was taken as hostage to Kashmir, and was then converted to Islam. Ladakh once again became independent. Between 1440–70 Ahmad Khan, the ruler of Kashmir, invaded Ladakh and with the help of Khri-dpon of Purang went up to Guge. Thereafter the successive Muslim rulers of Kashmir were engaged in attacking Ladakh. In 1553 and 1562, Ladakh was conquered by Haider Chak and the sons of Ghazi Shah. In the meantime the Mughal power was taking root in the country. Akbar who came to power focussed his attention on Kashmir. Mughal attacks on Kashmir were resisted by Kashmiris. Though Kashmir was annexed by Akbar in 1587, Ladakh remained independent. In the sixteenth century Ladakh was attacked by several adventurers like Mir Vali, Mirza Haider and Sultan Said Khan, from the north and north-west.


Son-ge-rnam-rgyal came to power in Ladakh in 1590. During the forty-five years of his rule he restored the shattered Kingdom of Ladakh to its former glory. In the east he subdued Guge, Rudok including Kailash up to Central Tibet. Si-ri and Kyar-Kyar, parts of western Tibet, were made tributaries. Zanskar and Spiti were regained. But when he turned westward, he was met by an army of the Baltis in alliance with the Mughals. He was defeated and fled to the fort of Kharbu. Sen-ge-rnam-rgyal then sent a messenger to Husain Beg and opened negotiations with him. He promised to send a suitable tribute to the Mughal Court. But this promise was never fulfilled and Ladakh remained independent. Bde-Idan-rrnam-rgyal, the son and successor of Sen-ge-rnam-rgyal had to face the Mughal ambassador Mohammed Shafi in 1664 and had to send him back with tribute of 1,000 Asarfis and Rupees 2,000 and many gifts. He maintained the Kingdom of Ladakh which included Guge, Purang, Rudok, including the Mansarowar and Kailash region.\(^{22}\)

Ladakh-Tibet War and Treaty of 1684

During the reign of Deleg Namgyal (1675–1705) a dispute arose between Bhutan and Tibet. Ladakh, on behalf of Bhutan, took arms against Tibet and a battle was fought. In this war Ladakh had to have the assistance of Kashmir. Ibrahim Khan, the Mughal governor of Kashmir, sent a huge army under his son, Fida Khan, in support of his vassal state of Ladakh. The Mongolo-Tibetans were routed at Basgo. They were charged up to Tashigong in Guge territory near the present border. At this stage the Lhasa government approached Ladakh for peace negotiations. On the intervention of the Tibetan Lama, Hbrug-pa-pham-dbam-po, a peace treaty was concluded in 1684. This treaty provided:

As in the beginning King Skyid-Lde-ni-ma-mgon gave a separate Kingdom to each of his sons, the same delimitation to hold good. The Ladakhis were not to allow an army from India to proceed to attack upon Tibet through Ladakh; mn’ario-Skot-gsum was ‘set apart (from Ladakh) to meet the expenses of sacred lamps and prayers’ (offered at Lhasa); but at Mensar

\(^{22}\) Petech, n. 13, pp. 150-56. For History of Ladakh (see, Alexander Cunningham, *Ladakh: Physical, Statistical and Historical*: with notices of surrounding countries (London, 1854); Francke, n. 11; Zahiruddin Ahmad, n. 19.
(near mount Kailash) the King (of Ladakh) shall be his own master, so that the Kings of Ladakh may have wherewithal to pay for lamps and other sacrifices at the Gang Tso; it shall be his private domain. With this exception, the boundary shall be fixed at the Lhari stream at Demchog.²³

By this treaty, except for a small village of Mensar, Ladakh lost all her possessions in western Tibet. The Kailash Mansarowar region was also ceded to Tibet. However, its old boundary with Tibet was retained. Soon after this treaty Aurangzeb's control over Ladakh became weak and after his death in 1707 it once again became independent. Prior to the Dogra conquest in 1834 the Kingdom of Ladakh was bounded in the north by Shahidulla and in the east by Polong Darndra. "The people who dwelt between the Zoji pass, Landar, Shedulla, and Plong Darndra" were the subjects of the Ladakhi King.²⁴

Spiti

Spiti in early times was ruled by Sen Kings. One of the earliest known rulers was Samudra Sen. He presented to the temple of Parasram at Nirmad a Copper plate grant and founded that institution. In the course of time in the reign of Rajendra Sen, Kulu became tributary to Spiti for a short period. The fortunes of Spiti declined during the reign of Chet Sen and in the seventh century it was annexed by Ladakh. A small Jagir of three villages was given to the son of Chet Sen who settled there peacefully. Later in the tenth century Spiti was given to one of the three sons of Skyid-Lde-mi-ma-Mgon, the King of Ladakh. Subsequent to this the fate of Spiti was determined along with Ladakh.²⁵


INTRODUCTION

Bashahr

In about the sixth century Bashahr state was ruled by a Rajput family. One of the earliest rulers was Praduman. He was succeeded by several unimportant Kings. During the Mughal rule in India, the state was ruled by Raja Kehri Singh. He was the most powerful amongst the hill Chiefs. One of the Mughal emperors summoned Kehri Singh to Delhi. It was said that he was always guarded by a portion of cloud on his head. The Emperor was very much pleased with the hill Chief and he honoured the King with the title of Chatrapati. The successors of Kehri Singh ruled the state even after the collapse of the Mughal power. Prior to the advent of the British the state was temporarily occupied by the Gorkhas of Nepal.26

Garhwal

From time immemorial the region was known by the name of Kedar-Khanda. This has been the most holy and esteemed land for Hindus all over India. Ancient Sanskrit classics such as Vishnu Purana and Mahabharata, etc. tell us that a number of tribes were dwelling on the borders of Bharat. Amongst them the Sallas, the Nagas, the Khasas, the Hunas and the Kiratas were the most important. The area between the Sutlej and the Yamuna was divided into “Bavoni” states, i.e. in fifty-two small feudatories. All the rulers of the later period had claimed their decent from the famous Salivahana.27 Kedar-Khanda was known as the kingdom of Brahmapura. When Huen Tsang, a Chinese traveller visited India in A.D. 629 the area was ruled by a Katyuria dynasty. The last of the Katyuris was Birdeo. He was a most tyrannical King. After his death the principality was divided among small feudal lords. Amongst them one Som Pal was successful in establishing the Kingdom of Garhwal. His sovereign sway was extended all over Garhwal and the pilgrim route to Gangotri was in his control. In the fourteenth century the seat of government was at Dewalgarh. Around A.D. 1483 Bahadur Khan Lodi, the King of Delhi, granted the title

26 Andrew D’cruz, The Political Relations existing between the British Government and Native States and Chiefs subject to the Government of N.W. Provinces (Calcutta, 1862), pp. 313ff; Punjab State Gazetteer (Lahore, 1911), vol. VIII, pp. 5-7.
of Shah to Balbhadra Shah of Garhwal. This title is still used by the descendants of rulers of Garhwal. Balbhadra Shah was followed by Man Singh, Dularam Shah, Mahipati Shah and Medini Shah. Fateh Shah, the successor of Medini Shah, ruled Garhwal from 1684 to 1716. He was the most powerful ruler and had once attacked Tibet without any success. Garhwal was always openly hostile to Kumaun, and a regular war was fought under all the rulers. So long as the Central power was not affected, none of the Mughals ever interfered in this hill state. The Mughals were content with the nominal subordination of Garhwal. With the fall of the Mughal rule Garhwal became independent and was occupied by the Gorkhas of Nepal in 1803, and remained so up to the rise of the British power.

Kumaun

Kumaun was also ruled by Katyuris for several centuries. It appears that the Kingdom of Kumaun and Garhwal were one under Birdeo, the ruler of the Katyuria dynasty. After the fall of Katyurias the Kingdom was divided into small feudal principalities. A Rajput adventurer who came from Jhansi in Uttar Pradesh was destined to be the first Chand ruler of Kumaun. Atma Chand (975–1055) and his successors had ruled the state till the Gorkha occupation. It was only when a strong Central power developed, that Rudra Chand was invited to Delhi. He immediately accepted the overlordship of Mughal authority in the reign of Akbar. Among the successors of Rudra Chand, Baz Bahadur was most powerful King of Kumaun. He extended his sovereign sway to a greater territory, and brought Bhotia Mahals of Kumaun under his direct control. Not satisfied with territorial possession, he attacked Tibet. Heavy snow and unfavourable terrain compelled Baz Bahadur to retreat. His successors could not maintain the kingdom well. At a time when Mughal authority became weak, the decline in the fortune of Kumaun also set in with the accession of Devi Chand in 1720. Before the rise of the British Government Kumaun was in possession of the Gorkha rulers of Nepal.28

Hill Chiefs in Relation to Paramount Power

So long as the strong power of the Mauryas, Kushanas, Guptas and Harsh was ruling in India, the hill areas were a part of their empires. But from the time of the Pratiharas (725-1027) till the rise of the Mughals, the Central authority in India was practically non-existent. Several rulers came and went but the extent of their possessions was very limited. For most of the time they fought amongst the rulers in the plains. This led to the rise of powerful hill principalities. With the expansion of Islam, India was successively attacked by Muslim adventurers. The rulers in India remained busy in resisting the Muslims and the adventurers remained busy in looting the rich and fertile plains of India. Only one Bakhtyar ever tried to cross the natural frontiers of India in Assam. His attempt proved a complete failure, and his army was destroyed in the high hills. Mohammed Bin Tugluk once tried without success to subdue the hill Chiefs of Himachal. Consequently the hill Chiefs remained outside the reach of the Muslim invaders for a long time. It was only after the establishment of Mughal authority in India that Akbar looked towards the hill Chiefs. Kashmir was annexed in A.D. 1587 to the Mughal Empire. From Akbar to Aurangzeb all the hill Chiefs accepted the Mughal overlordship. The Emperors themselves remained content with nominal allegiance and tributes. They never tried to impose administrative control in the hills. Paramount and dependent, both were happy. The fall of the Mughal Empire once again let loose the constituent parts of the empire, and the hill Chiefs became free. The British empire which came to be established in India, extended gradually from Calcutta to Kashmir. After occupation of every state, the territorial limit was ascertained, accepted and modified as per needs of the empire.

CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF KUMAUN AND GARHWAL AND CONTROL OVER KALI-SUTLEJ FRONTIER

The Mughal monarchy did not fade out of India immediately after the death of Aurangzeb—as a matter of fact it continued for a century and a half more—but its power and prestige rapidly declined. The provincial viceroys had set up as independent Princes in all but name and some newly-risen Indian powers had seized territory and assumed sovereign power. The invasions of Nadir Shah and the Abdali had dealt deadly blows to the falling fabric. The English took advantage of the sorry state of things and soon established their firm sway over such regions as had become most vulnerable due to the protraction of war or the weak administration of ineffective princes. The battle of Plassey had put them on the road to power; the third battle of Panipat (1761)—though fought far away from the field of activity of the English, and between the Marathas and the Abdali, with either of whom the English had little to do—opened up possibilities for the furtherance of their political ambitions. After establishing themselves in Bengal, the Company moved westward fairly fast. A treaty of friendship and alliance was concluded with Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula of Awadh in 1765. The British troops were stationed in the forts of Chunar and Allahabad in 1772. The possessions of Raja Chait Singh of Banaras were ceded to the Company by Nawab Asaf-ud-Daula in 1775. The succeeding Nawab Saadat Ali Khan brought the British to the banks of the Jamuna by ceding the lands in Ganga Jamuna Doab and the whole of Rohilkhand in 1801.1 Thus, by the dawn of the nineteenth century, the British East India Company came to a region where several powers were contending for territorial gains at the cost of the twin states of Kumaun and Garhwal, between the rivers Jamuna and Sutlej on the frontiers of India.

With the accession of Raja Devi Chand in 1820, the political power of Kumaun began to decline rapidly. He was weak and irresolute and under the influence of his advisers, he embarked upon the wild schemes which were ultimately responsible for the fall of his house. In order to establish the “Golden era” in Kumaun he tried to pay off the debts of all his subjects. This undertaking was a costly affair. About a crore of rupees was spent without the realization of the ruler’s object. The condition of his unthrifty subjects remained as it was. He fought wars with Garhwal and Doti and tried to take part in the struggle for power then going on in the plains. On the advice of Manik and his son, Puran Mall Bisht, Devi Chand took Afghan Daud Khan into his service as a military general. Some time before this Devi Chand had supported the cause of one Sabir Shah in opposition to the Mughal King of Delhi and the latter now sent one Azmat-ullah Khan to take possession of Rudrapur and Kashipur. Devi Chand with his army marched from Almora to meet him in battle near Nagina. Before the commencement of battle Daud Khan was bribed by Azmat-ullah Khan to desert Devi Chand with all his forces. Devi Chand was defeated and took shelter in a Thakurdwara. Soon after this he retired to the village of Debipur in Kota, where he had built himself a pleasure house. He remained there for the last three years of his reign. In the year A.D. 1726 he was murdered by Ranjit Patoliya at the instigation of the treacherous ministers, Manik Bisht and Puran Mall Bisht. Devi Chand died without heirs and the Bishts, who now held the real power searched out one Ajit Singh, son of Narpat Singh, Raja of Kalehir by a daughter of Gyan Chand of Kumaun. Ajit Singh was called to Almora and installed as king under the name of Ajit Chand. The Bishts along with one Birbhadra Joshi as Kamdar began to plunder the people of Kumaun. Ajit Singh was, however, not destined to rule for long and like Devi Chand, he also was murdered in 1729 by the Bishts. A puppet King was again searched out and the bastard son of a female slave was placed on the throne as a son of Ajit Chand with the name of Balo Kalyan Chand. Their triumph was, however, short-lived. The Maras and Phartiyals, the people of Kumaun united and sent messengers to the Mal Rajas of Doti in search of the members of Narayan Chand’s family who had settled there. One Kalyan was discovered and was brought to
Almora to be installed as Raja under the name of Kalyan Chand in 1730.2

Immediately after his accession Kalyan Chand set himself to punish the Bishts. Both Manik and Puran were killed along with their families. The poor little Raja Balo Kalyan was given away as a slave to a Musalman Javelin-man who was attached to the court. Thus ended the Bisht interregnum. Kalyan Chand was confronted with the stupendous task of restoring internal order in Kumaun and resisting the external aggression of Awadh and Rohillas. He somehow managed the affairs of the state for seventeen years and died early in A.D. 1748, leaving his son and family in the hands of Shiva Deo Joshi the then Prime Minister of the state. Dip Chand who succeeded his father Kalyan Chand in 1748, was a man of mild and weak temperament. He was generous and kind to one and all. He was entirely in the hands of the priests. Despite the weaknesses of the king, Shiva Deo Joshi, the Prime Minister, managed the affairs of the state fairly well throughout his life and justified the trust reposed in him by Kalyan Chand. He was killed in a revolt of soldiery in A.D. 1764 (11 Pus 1821 Sambat), and this tragic event was followed by an era of chaos and confusion, which paved the way for the Gorkha occupation of the state in 1791.

Shiva Deo Joshi was succeeded by his eldest son, Jai Krishna, as Prime Minister and Viceroy of Kumaun. Within two and a half years of his succession to the office, a son was born to Raja Dip Chand. On the birth of this prince, Queen Shringari Manjari began to entertain the thought that she had a claim on the regency. Soon she entered into an intrigue with Hafiz Rahmat Khan of Rampur through Jodh Singh, a relation of hers and a favourite of the Rohilla Chief. She desired that Jai Krishna should act according to her wishes or else quit his office. Hafiz Rahmat Khan revealed this to Jai Krishna who, out of disgust and disappointment, resigned from all his positions and retired from the Government. Thereupon Shringari Manjari appointed her favourites to the various posts of the state. Krishna Singh was appointed Prime Minister, the post of Commander-in-Chief was given to Mohan Singh, Parmanand, the paramour of the Queen, was appointed to the Viceroyalty and Jodh Singh was appointed manager of Kashipur. This team could not work well together, and well within a year Mohan Singh was

relieved, and replaced by Parmanand. He fled to the Rohillas, and with the assistance of Dundee Khan of Bisauli gathered a body of troops. He also drafted the Rohillas to attack Almora and defeated the Rani's troops. Raja Deep Chand was captured and the Rani and her paramour, Parmanand were put to death. Hafiz Rahmat Khan who had a soft corner in his heart for Raja Deep Chand, sent for Harsha Deo and Jai Kishan, sons of Shiva Deo Joshi, and helped them in ousting Mohan Singh who fled to Awadh. This time Deep Chand appointed Harsha Deo as his Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief and Nand Ram as the Governor of Kashipur. Thus peace was restored in the kingdom of Kumaun for the time being, but soon intrigue was set on foot. Jai Kishan opened correspondence with Mohan Singh and paved the way for his return on condition that he apologized for his past misconduct. Jai Kishan was keen to remove Nand Ram from Kashipur. But while on his way to Almora, Mohan Singh won over Nand Ram and warned him of the impending danger. Mohan Singh had encouraged Nand Ram to resist the plan of Jai Kishan. Soon afterwards, Jai Kishan was defeated and put to death by Mohan Singh. In 1777 Deep Chand and his two sons were killed by Mohan Singh. After overcoming all his adversaries, Mohan Singh proclaimed himself Raja, assuming the title of Mohan Chand. He assigned the Tarai to Nand Ram, who surrendered it to the Nawab of Awadh. Mohan Chand let loose a reign of terror. The relations and friends of Shiva Deo Joshi were stricken with fear and migrated from Kumaun. The atrocities of Mohan Chand attracted the attention of the rulers of Doti and Garhwal. They opened communications with Harsha Deo who was then in prison and at an opportune moment they attacked Kumaun, and compelled Mohan Chand to seek safety in flight to the plains. The victorious prince of Garhwal, Lalit Shah, placed Kumaun in charge of his son, Pradyumna Shah, under the title of Pradyumna Chand.3

Pradyumna Chand restored the Joshis to power, and Harsha Deo Joshi was appointed Prime Minister. It was only after the death of Lalit Shah that the relations between Jayakirti Shah, his successor in Garhwal, and Pradyumna Chand, his son in Kumaun, became strained. This gave a chance to Mohan Singh once again to enter into Kumaun politics. He soon entered into an understanding with Jayakirti Shah in the hope of recovering the kingdom

of Kumaun. When this was known to Harsha Deo, he on behalf of his master went to Srinagar to demand an explanation from Jayakirti Shah who refused to be coerced. The struggle which followed was a great blow to Garhwalis. Jayakirti Shah suffered a crushing defeat and died shortly afterwards. Pradyumna occupied the throne and joined Garhwal and Kumaun into one kingdom; but his preference for Garhwal alienated the Kumaunese people. By 1786, the people of Kumaun threw off the dominance of Garhwal, and Mohan Singh once more came to power in Kumaun. Harsha Deo Joshi fled from Kumaun and collected a large army for an attack on Mohan Singh. He defeated Mohan Singh and took him and his brother Lal Singh prisoner. Lal Singh was pardoned but Mohan Singh was put to death. Harsha Deo invited Pradyumna Shah to come to Kumaun, but when the latter declined, he placed on the throne Shiva Singh, a descendant of Udyat Chand. But this arrangement was destined to be of very short duration. Kumaun, this time was attacked by Lal Singh, who compelled the King and the Minister to flee. Lal Singh occupied the throne of Kumaun and Mahender Singh, the son of Mohan Singh, became his Prime Minister. Whilst Kumaun was passing through such a state of demoralization, it whetted the appetite of Awadh, the Ruhellas and the Gorkhas of Nepal.

Garhwal

While Kumaun was engaged in the intrigues of Bishts and Mohan Singh, Garhwal enjoyed a comparative stability. Fateh Shah (1684-1716), credited with an attack on Tibet, was succeeded by his son, Dalip Shah, in 1717. He could reign only for a few months and was succeeded by his brother, Upendra Shah. Upendra Shah was ruler of Garhwal for a period of only nine months. Pratap Shah, son of Dalip Shah, succeeded Upendra Shah and ruled Garhwal for half a century. During his reign Garhwal, including Dehra Dun, which was exceptionally prosperous. This prosperity soon attracted the attention of Najib Khan, the Ruhella Chief of Saharanpur. In 1757, the Ruhella led his first expedition into Dehra Dun and after a very feeble resistance on the part of Garhwal Raja, established his authority there. Till 1770 Dehra Dun had been in the hands of the Ruhellas. Pratap Shah died in 1772 and was succeeded by his son, Lalit Shah (1772-1780). The latter ignored Dehra Dun which became a happy
hunting-ground for Gujars, Sikhs and Musalmans. He was a weak ruler, and appeased the offending jagirdars of Dehra Dun with the grant of villages. Gulab Singh, the Pundir Rana obtained twelve villages with the hand of Lalit Shah's daughter in marriage. In the anarchy of Kumaun Lalit Shah was forced to intervene in 1779. He defeated Mohan Singh the usurper in Kumaun at Bagwali Potchar and permitted his son, Pradhuman, to become Raja of Kumaun. Lalit Shah had four sons: Jayakrit, Pradhuman, Parakram and Pritam. Lalit Shah was succeeded by Jayakrit Shah in 1780. The two brothers of Kumaun and Garhwal began to quarrel for supremacy. This quarrel led to the overthrow of Jayakrit Shah, who died in 1804.

Muslim Inroads in Kumaun and Garhwal

Weak rule in Kumaun and Garhwal and the internal strife and struggle, first attracted the attention of neighbouring Muslim rulers of the area. Kalyan Chand, the Raja of Kumaun, provided the cause for the first Ruhella attack on Kumaun. A fugitive from Kumaun, Himmat Gosain, had taken shelter in the Ruhella camp in 1743–44. Kalyan Chand despatched assassins to the Ruhella camp to murder Himmat Gosain and his family. Ali Mohammad Khan enraged at the murder, sent a force of ten thousand men under the command of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Pinda Khan and Bakshi Sardar Khan to invade Kumaun. This force immediately smashed the feeble resistance of Shiva Deo Joshi at Rudrapur and proceeded to Almora. Kalyan Chand fled from Almora and appealed to Pradip Shah of Garhwal for help. Almora was soon occupied by the Ruhellas. The combined forces of Kumaun and Garhwal met the Ruhellas at Dunagiri, but were utterly defeated. The triumphant forces of the Ruhellas threatened Srinagar, the capital of Garhwal. Thereupon the Rajas of Kumaun and Garhwal came to terms and agreed to pay three lakhs of rupees to the Ruhellas who in turn vacated the country. Soon after the withdrawal of the Ruhellas, Nawab Mansur Ali Khan of Awadh occupied the pargana of Sarbana in Kumaun. In a battle against Teju Gujar, the Awadh Chakladar, Shiva Deo Joshi, was wounded and taken prisoner. It was only after the intervention of the Mughal Emperor, that the pargana of Sarbana was restored to Kumaun. Najib Khan of Saharanpur captured the Garhwal territory of Dehra Dun in 1757,

and held it till his death in 1770. From 1770 to 1785 Dehra Dun was under the control of local jagirdars. In the year 1786, Gulam Kadir, the grandson of Najib Khan, attacked Dehra Dun and inflicted untold miseries upon the population of the valley.

_Gorkha Attack and Occupation of Kumaun and Garhwal_

When Kumaun and Garhwal were under the attack of Awadh and the Ruhellas, a strong power was emerging in the Kathmandu valley. Prithvinarayan Shah came to power in 1742 over a small principality of Gorkha. Immediately after his accession to power he commenced his career of conquest with the annexation of Nawakot and the hill country in the west. By 1763 he annexed Kirtipur, Banepa, Bhatgaon and was then in possession of Kathmandu. He died in 1775 and was succeeded by his son, Singh Pratap Shah. Singh Pratap ruled for a short while and was succeeded by his son, Ran Bahadur Shah, in 1778. Kumaun was then a cockpit of intrigues and anarchy. Ran Bahadur despatched an army to Kumaun under the command of Chautaria Bahadur Shah, Kazi Jagjit Pande, Amar Singh Thapa and Surbir Thapa in 1790. Both Lal Singh and Mahendra Singh met the enemy on the battlefield, but were badly defeated. They were compelled to leave the country at the mercy of the invaders. Next year the Gorkhas launched an attack on Garhwal from Almora. Garhwal forces met the Gorkhas at Fort Langurgarhi and a battle was fought. While the siege of Langurgarhi was on, reports of Chinese incursion into Nepal were received. The Gorkha show of force was enough to frighten the Raja of Garhwal, who concluded a treaty of peace agreeing to pay an annual tribute of rupees twenty thousand and to keep an agent at Kathmandu. The Raja of Garhwal remained loyal to the terms of the treaty for the next twelve years. The Gorkha forces were withdrawn from Garhwal in 1791. Harsha Deo Joshi was put in charge of Almora by the Nepalese and Joga Mall was left to administer Kumaun. Being free from the Chinese, the Gorkhas once again turned their attention towards Garhwal. In 1803, a well-equipped army under the leadership of Amar Singh Thapa, Hastidal Chautariya and Bam Shah Chautariya invaded Garhwal. The Raja and his family were closely pursued by the Gorkhas, but they successfully escaped to Dehra Dun. Amar Singh Thapa and his son, Ranjor Thapa, assumed the charge of the administration of Kumaun and Garhwal. The
now triumphant Gorkhas expelled the Raja of Bashahr from his capital, Rampur, and occupied the Sutlej-Kali tract.

The British in Kumaun and Garhwal

The British Government after its establishment in the Ganga Jamuna Doab and Rohilkhand, was eagerly watching the developments on the frontiers. After expelling Jaswant Rao Holkar from the Punjab, the British Government had formed a treaty of friendship and alliance with Ranjit Singh in 1806. In 1809 the extent of Ranjit Singh’s territories was limited by the river Sutlej. Thus securing themselves from all probable enemies, the British Government was looking forward to annexing the frontier principalities between the rivers Kali and Sutlej.

After the occupation of Kumaun and Garhwal, the Gorkha power, unmindful of the power of the British Government embarked upon a series of aggressions in the British territories. On the Saran frontier about thirty villages were occupied by the Gorkhas. In Tirhoot about two hundred villages were seized. The Nawab of Awadh was badly harassed and places like Butwal, Tilpur and Bankeepur were captured by the Gorkhas. Five parganas of Rohilkhand were occupied. Kashipur in Moradabad district was occupied and Raja Sansar Chand of Kangra was threatened. Under such circumstances it was decided to strike at the Gorkha power. Lord Hastings declared war on 1st November 1814. It was decided to attack Nepal simultaneously from as many points as possible. Major-General Morley with 8,000 men was sent to Behar. In Gorakhpur a force of 4,000 men was entrusted to Major General Wood. General Gillespie with 3,500 men was instructed to enter Garhwal and eject the Gorkhas from Srinagar. At the extreme west of the position General Ochterlony was to hold the Gorkhas in check. In Kumaun Lieutenant Colonel W. L. Gardner was to proceed up the Kosi river and direct the attack against Almora. Captain H. Y. Hearsay with 1,500 men was to enter the area near Kali river by the Timla Pass. The object of the British Government in roping in the Gorkhas can be described thus:


6 Nepaul War Papers (Calcutta, 1824); Prinsep, ibid., pp. 81-213; K. C. Chaudhari, Anglo-Nepalese Relations: From the earliest times of the British Rule in India till the Gorkha War (Calcutta, 1960).
The acquisition of the low countries along the whole course of the frontier and of the province of Kumaun may it is hoped in a great measure contribute an indemnification for the expenses of the war while the occupation of these posts in the Hills which government may determine to retain will materially strengthen our frontier in that quarter, and enable us to maintain that control over the restored chiefs necessary for the preservation of harmony and tranquillity among them.\(^7\)

The result of this elaborate military mobilization by the British Government was a foregone conclusion, the power of the Gorkhas was shattered. General Ochterlony who was in the extreme west entered into an agreement with Kajee Amar Singh Thapa, the Gorkha Governor of Garhwal, on 15th May 1815 by which the entire Garhwal passed into the hands of the British Government.\(^8\) On 15th May 1815 the Gorkha forces in Kumaun were expelled beyond the river Kali. This territorial acquisition was confirmed in 1816 by the treaty of Sanguli.\(^9\) Thus the frontier territory between the rivers Kali and Sutlej went into the hands of the British Government.

The British Government, soon after the annexation of Kumaun and Garhwal, began to ascertain the boundaries of the area with Tibet. W. L. Gardner who was chasing the Gorkhas reached the northern border and set himself to the task. He reported that Nangulee, Millum and Neetee Ghat were the border villages. The possessions of Kumaun and Tibet (Condeyse) in the area were separated by the high passes of Beeanse (Lepu Lekh) Darmah, Joowar, Neetee and Perwa. Through these passes the communication and trade with Tibet was regulated. These passes were “... open across the Hymachal into Condeysee from the 26th of June till about the end of November.”\(^10\) Gardner left Kumaun under the control of his assistant, George William Traill, who was later

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\(^8\) Convention or Agreement entered into between Kajee Amar Singh Thappa and Major-General Ochterlony, 15 May 1815, No. 43; Ibid., pp. 100–1.

\(^9\) Colonel J. Nicolls to C. M. Ricketts, Principal Private Secretary, 16 May 1815, No. 44; Ibid., p. 102.

\(^10\) W. L. Gardner to Colonel Nicolls, 14 May 1815, Nos. 42A and 42. Ibid., pp. 96–99.
appointed Commissioner in 1815. He ruled the area for two decades and extended the administration up to the high passes of Mana, Niti, Jowar, Darma and Byans.\textsuperscript{11}

Beyond the territories of Garhwal, Raja Mahendra was restored to power in the state of Bashahr on 8th February 1816.\textsuperscript{12} The boundaries of the state were defined. The territories of Bashahr and Tibet were divided by the Shipkee pass which was situated at a height of about 13,500 feet above the sea level.\textsuperscript{13}

The administration of the Kali-Sutlej tract was entrusted to the Superintendent of Sikh and Hill States and the Commissioner of Kumaun and Garhwal. The boundary determined during the first two decades of the nineteenth century ran along the high passes of Shipkee, Mana, Niti, Jowar, Darma and Byans, and has remained so since then. No conflicts occurred with Tibet on this issue and the East India Company pursued a policy of independence and non-interference with it.

**Tibetan Encroachments in Garhwal and Kumaun**

By 1858, practically the whole of India had passed into the hands of the British Government and the rule of the East India Company was replaced by the Crown. The British administration in India thought it expedient to revise their policy towards Tibet. The Duke of Argyll while agreeing to the proposal, informed Lord Mayo, the Viceroy, on 5th May 1870:


\textsuperscript{13} Captain P. C. Kennedy, Assistant, Deputy Superintendent, Sikh and Hill States to Lieutenant W. Murray Superintendent, Sikh and Hill States, 6 July 1824, *Punjab Government Records, Delhi Residency and Agency 1807–1857* (Lahore, 1911), vol. I, pp. 255–99; para 84; Captain Alexander Gerard, *Account of Koonawur in the Himalaya etc. etc. etc.*, George Lloyd, ed., (London, 1841), pp. 122, 282. “From the Oopsung the Road was a firesome and rocky ascent to the pass which separates Koonawur from the Chinese dominions, 13,518 feet above the level of the sea.” (p. 282). Entry into the narrative of the journey made in 1818, dated 12 October.
I entirely concur with Your Excellency's Government that benefit may reasonably be expected from the proposed measure of abandoning our recent policy of isolation towards Tibet and resuming the former friendly communications with its ruler, which was originally opened by Mr. Warren Hastings, which have unfortunately been too long in abeyance.\textsuperscript{14}

This change of policy did not affect the border between the Kali and Sutlej rivers, however its manifestations were definite and perceptible on the frontiers of Kashmir, Sikkim and Bhutan. A Resident was appointed in Kashmir in 1885 and Maharaja Pratap Singh was deposed on flimsy pretexts in 1889. The opening of Sikkim was vigorously pursued and a Political Officer was appointed there in 1889. At this time also occurred a change in the attitude of the Tibetan Government towards the British. Dalai Lama XII died in 1876, and the Regency which assumed power was more hostile to the British Government than the Dalai Lama had been.\textsuperscript{15} The concentration of British activities in the frontier region, created greater suspicion in the minds of Tibetans about the intentions of the British Government. Every attempt towards the opening of Tibet was frustrated, and a series of encroachments were made by the Tibetans on the frontier land.

\textit{Garhwal, Barahoti}

In about 1888 a British officer named Campbell on leave was travelling along the frontier near Niti pass. In order to prevent the entry of the British officials Tibetans came down to Barahoti—a place in the vicinity of the pass—and established a custom post with ten or twelve men. This encroachment was reported to the British Government. In the opinion of the Chief Secretary of NWP and Awadh, the small guard house was of no harm to the people in the area. But he was told that, “... their action in establishing a custom house within the British frontier constitutes an encroachment which cannot be tolerated.”\textsuperscript{16} It was decided to communicate with the Tibetan authorities in the area. Failing

\textsuperscript{14} Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India to Earl of Mayo, 5 May 1870, \textit{Foreign Political A.}, June 1870, No. 102.
\textsuperscript{16} G. R. Irwin, Under Secretary to Government of India to Chief Secretary, N.W.P. Awadh, 21 September 1889, \textit{Foreign External A.}, November 1889, No. 21.
THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF KUMAUN AND GARHwal

in the efforts of communications with the Tibetan authorities, the matter was brought to the notice of the Viceroy. Lord Lansdowne reluctantly remarked, "I should be sorry to resort to a little expedition, but it would not do to overlook a deliberate encroachment".17

Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief was asked for the needful action in getting the territory vacated by the Tibetans. The first and third Gorkha Battalions under Major C. Pulley were immediately sent to the area and on the approach of this force near Barahoti the Tibetans ran away. Soon after the expedition, Pandit Dharmanand Joshi, Deputy Collector of Kumaun, was deputed to explain to the Tibetan official, Sarji, with the help of the maps, the exact boundary line in that region so as to avoid future incidents.18 However, the Tibetans occasionally transgressed the boundary to announce the trading season to the people of the area. The Government of India on its part decided not to notice these minor border encroachments. In 1914 the Government of India again wrote the description of the Barahoti boundary to the Tibetan official Lonchen Shatra. No objection was ever raised in regard to the boundary in the area by the Tibetan authorities.19 Therefore the issue was taken as settled and the Niti pass remained an undisputed frontier between Garhwal and Tibet.

Kumaun

During the same time as that made at Barahoti, Tibetans made encroachments in Kumaun. The Tibetan officer (Jongpen) was in the habit of stopping travellers and sending down his men into the British territory. People from Taklakot (Tibet) were regularly using roads in the British territory whereas British European subjects were subject to harsh treatment. Wood and fuel was freely taken out of the British territory. The Rest houses and Dharmasalas were smashed by Tibetans. There was no British Agent at Garbhyang to listen to the disputes or to supervise the area. Major-General G. L. Channer, Commander, Rohilkhand Division, who had been to Mansarowar Lake in 1894, brought the matter to the notice of the Government. He suggested the appointment of a native

Mukhtar (Agent) at Garbhyang for forwarding complaints regarding disputes and the destruction of property. Channer asked the Government that the Jongpen (Tibetan officer) should be informed that as the Tibetans freely used the roads in the British territory, Englishmen should also be allowed access to the lake and Kailash for sports. He demanded the deputation of a party of Gurkha rifles under a British officer to Dharchula.

It was with great difficulty that T. U. Stuart, the Deputy Commissioner of Almora, could meet the Jongpen and impress upon him the wrongs done by the people of this area. He succeeded in bringing him round to his viewpoint. At the same time Lieutenant E. E. Bliss was asked to move to Dharchula with a detachment of first and third Gorkha Rifles. The administration of the area was reorganized and tightened. Khadg Bahadur Pal and Parmanand were appointed as Mukhtiyar and Peskar with certain powers at Garbhyang and Pithoragarh (SOR). A Tehsildar was appointed at Champawat. Bageshwar road, connecting Almora and Askote, was repaired, and arrangement was made for the assessment of the taxes at Bageshwar fair. In 1897 the Tibetans levied certain taxes on the people of Dharma Pargana near the Dharma Pass. The area was separated from the rest of the district of Almora (now Pithoragarh) by a lofty range of mountains which rendered them inaccessible except during the summer months. The Government of India took exception to this and suggested to the local authorities that, "... if need be a military force should be sent. No land tax of any kind can be levied by Tibetans on Indian territory". However, the issue was decided amicably by the officials of both governments. But during the fifty years of the present century there were several small encroachments on this border by Tibetans, at Nilang, Jadhang and Barahoti. All the disputes arising out of these encroachments were mutually and amicably settled by the local officers of the British and Tibetan Governments.


21 J. D. La Touche, Chief Secretary to NWP and Awadh to Secretary, Government of India, 15 January 1895, Foreign External A, April 1895, Nos. 93–100.


23 Captain H. Daly, Deputy Secretary, Foreign Department to Chief Secretary, Awadh, 18 September 1897, Foreign External A, November 1897.
It appears, there was no dispute about the boundary in the area prior to the advent of the Chinese in Tibet.

The boundary between the rivers Kali and Sutlej had been marked by nature in the form of watersheds, mountain passes and river valleys. There had been no disputes regarding the boundary. The rulers of the area, both Katurias and their successors—the Shahs and the Chands—always knew the limits of their possessions. These limits were later confirmed by the British Government which came to power in the area in 1815. The people of the border area on both sides had almost the same religious beliefs and, therefore, they always had some sort of affinity. They were using the passes for their trade and social get-together. Authority and politics never came into their way of life. No authority either in India or Tibet ever entertained mutual hostility towards, or fear from one another. If ever there were any sporadic attacks, they were of very short duration. It was only after the British Government came to power in India that the Tibetans became a little alert. Being sensible of the fate of the Rajas and Nawabs of India, the Tibetans had to adopt a policy of watchfulness in self-defence. This Tibetan attitude grew gradually with the strengthening of the British power on their borders. The British efforts towards the opening of Tibet from different sides were met with greater resistance on its borders and gave rise to the encroachments in Kumaun and Garhwal by the Tibetan. These petty encroachments were always settled amicably by the border officers. The Chinese power in Tibet was practically non-existent in the nineteenth century.
CHAPTER III

MAHARAJA GULAB SINGH AND THE TREATY OF 1842 WITH TIBET

The forces of disintegration which Aurangzeb had kept at bay began to work with full pressure soon after his death. The policy of religious intolerance had sapped the vitality of the once mighty Mughal Empire and the princes of inferior stamp who succeeded Aurangzeb could not arrest the decline that had set in. Provincial Viceroyds rebelled against the central authority and set up splinter kingdoms. The Marathas and the newly risen powers, such as the Jats and the Ruhellas and the Sikhs, set the authority of the Mughals at naught. The balance of power between Persia and India was upset by the fall of the Safavids, followed by the meteoric rise of Nadir Shah, who thought more of plunder than of civilized administration. He ascended the throne of Persia in 1736, and ransacked the Punjab and inflicted untold miseries on the citizens of Delhi in 1739, killing thirty thousand people in cold blood. On his assassination in 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali emerged as the ruler of an independent splinter kingdom of Persia. He made successful attacks on India in 1749, 1751-52 and captured Delhi in 1757. He met the Marathas at the battle of Panipat on 14th January 1761 and inflicted upon them a crushing defeat. He, however, went back to Afghanistan leaving behind a puppet Afghan chief to rule Delhi in the name of the Emperor. Thus in 1761 the collapse of the Mughal empire was nearly complete and the central authority was practically non-existent. With certain exceptions, strife and anarchy spread over the length and breadth of India. The local authorities kept order in their immediate districts to some extent, "... but, in general, the absence of a government strong enough to protect its innocent subjects from internal vice or external aggression, was manifested in the fearful audacity with which the Pindary, Dacoity, and Thug, the trained marauder, thief, and assassin, pursued their murderous avocations, in the blaze of noon as in the darkness of midnight".

Maharaja Ranjit Singh

The opportunity thus offered by the chaotic condition of India was seized by a young man Ranjit Singh who became Zaman Shah’s (1792–1800) Governor of Lahore in 1798 and afterwards master of Lahore on 6th July 1799. He was “brave in battle, enterprising in action and a born leader of men in a degree surprising in a lad not yet out of his teens”. He won Kashmir from the Afghan Governor in 1819, and annexed it to his own kingdom. Three years later, in 1822, he entrusted the governorship of Jammu to a military adventurer of his times, the Dogra Chief, Gulab Singh.

Rise of Gulab Singh

Gulab Singh, son of Kishore Singh, was a direct descendant of the Raja Dhrou Dev, who first established the Dogra family as rulers of Jammu after the invasion of Nadir Shah in the first half of the eighteenth century. He was born on 4 October 1792 (5 Kartik, 1849 Vikrami Sambat). At the time of an unsuccessful Sikh invasion of Jammu in the year 1807, Gulab Singh a boy of fifteen distinguished himself in military skill. On the annexation of Jammu to the Sikh empire, he joined the forces of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1809 as an ordinary trooper. As a warrior he attracted the attention of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the year 1813, when the latter led a force in person into Kashmir. He soon distinguished himself at the siege of Jullundhar, at the conquest of Multan in 1819, in the frontier campaigns of Ranjit Singh between 1815 and 1820 and in the subjugation of the bandit chief, Mian Dedo, who controlled the hills around Jammu. His personal magnetism, dazzling victories and ever-ready smile made him the idol of his soldiery. As a warrior his fame had reverberated throughout the Punjab. For the meritorious services rendered to the Lahore Government, Maharaja Ranjit Singh awarded Gulab Singh the principality of Jammu in fief (jagir) with the right of raising an army of his own, when he put down the rebel, Agar Khan, at Akhnur on the banks of river Chenab.

2 Tarikh-i-Sikhan, p. 139, as quoted by N. K. Sinha, Ranjit Singh (Calcutta, 1951), edn. 3, p. 12.
In 1821, Gulab Singh undertook the conquest of Khistwar, which he acquired by a stratagem rather than by force of arms. The following year, he was entrusted with the reduction of Rajouri, in which he was successful. These distinguished services were rewarded by Maharaja Ranjit Singh by the granting of the principality of Jammu to Gulab Singh and his successors, with the hereditary title of Raja, on 27th June 1822 (4 Ashad, 1879 Vikrami). Gulab Singh thus started as an ally of the Lahore Government and soon embarked upon the task of building up his own state. He conquered the hilly tracts lying in the interior of Jammu and added Reasi, Khistwar, Rajouri and Samarth prior to the conquest of Ladakh and Baltistan.

Zorawar Singh and his Military Campaigns

Zorawar Singh Kahluria, who earned undying fame by his conquest of Ladakh and Baltistan and his invasion of Tibet, was a native of Kussal near Reasi in Jammu. He began his career as a private soldier. He brought himself to the notice of Gulab Singh by pointing out the manner in which great reductions might be made in the expense of the army. Gulab Singh empowered him to give effect to the scheme he had proposed. Zorawar Singh conducted himself so admirably that he gained the fullest confidence of his master. In 1815, after the capture of Reasi, a small principality near Jammu, Gulab Singh entrusted the defence of it to Wazir Zorawar Singh.5

Ladakh

Ladakh, a tributary of the Mughal Empire, ceased to pay tribute to Kashmir soon after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707. During the period of chaos which began with the attack of Nadir Shah and lasted till the rise of Ranjit Singh it was a tributary of the Abdalis, who had established their rule in Kashmir in 1752. It was only after the expulsion of Abdalis from Kashmir in 1819, that Kashmir became a part of Lahore Kingdom and with it came Ladakh, the ruler of which began to send tribute to Ranjit

4 Amulya Chandra Banerjee’s Chronological Tables (Calcutta, 1913) have been used for the change of dates from Samvat to A.D. era. Copy of the Sanad is given in Panikkar, n. 3, pp. 32–34; E. Rehatsek, “A notice of the Gulabnama”, Indian Antiquary, vol. XIX, p. 294.

5 C. E. Bates, Gazette of Kashmir (Calcutta, 1878), pp. 112–14; Panikkar, n. 3, p. 24; Rehatsek, no. 4, pp. 293–94.
Singh. Except Kashmir, "Ladakh had no relation with China of a political nature, had no connection with Lhasa save that which arose from community of religion, language, manners and close proximity".6

Gulab Singh, who became King of Jammu on 27th June 1822, began to consolidate and expand his kingdom. While his master, Ranjit Singh, was occupied with the affairs of Afghanistan, his general, Zorawar Singh, probed the possibilities of capturing Ladakh. The administration of Ladakh was far from satisfactory. Raja (Gyalpo) Tshepal Namgyal, (Tshe-dpal-mi-hgyur-don-grub-Rnam-rgyal) who came to power in 1790, was not only peculiar in his personal habits but was also the reverse of the Ladakhi traditions in matters of administration. He had taken over the Privy Seal from Khalone (Prime Minister) and had dismissed all the old counsellors and governors. He appointed upstarts as his counsellors and governors. This resulted in the practical break-up of the administration. Feudal clashes began between Spiti and Kulu; Kunawar and Zanskar; the King of Zanskar and the Minister of Burig were imprisoned. The people requested the King for help but the latter treated the request with contempt and punished them instead of offering any help.7

Taking advantage of this maladministration Zorawar Singh marched his forces into Ladakh in March 1834.8 This created


8 Captain Wade, Political Agent at Ludhiana to J. J. Metcalfe, 27 January 1835, Foreign Political, 19 February 1835, No. 7; Col. H. J. Tapp; Political Agent at Sabathu to J. J. Metcalfe, Agent to Lt. Governor, N.W.P., 10 November 1836, Foreign Political, 9 January 1837, No. 24; Clark to Hodgson, 10 June 1841, Foreign Secret, 5 July 1841, No. 95; Cunningham to Clark, 30 July 1842, Foreign Secret, 5 October 1842, Nos. 73–76; G. J. Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier 1865–95 (London, 1963), p. 20. The Dogra War has been variously described by different writers. A. H. Francke in his Antiquities of Indian Tibet, vol. II (Calcutta, 1926) has given two versions. One of them is Ladrags-rgyal-rabs (The Chronicles of Ladakh), pp. 127–38, and the other is Tshe-brtan’s account which appears on pp. 245-56. This Tshe-brtan of Kha-la-riise, in his younger days had done military service in the Dogra wars of 1834–42. His account was written in the early years of the present century
consternation in different parts of Ladakh. Wazir Mohammed Ali Khan of Ruskyum fled away from the seat of his power out of fear of the Dogra army. But the Wazir Salam Khan of Soundh collected an army of 3,000 men and gave battle to Zorawar Singh. He was, however, captured and made prisoner by the Dogras. Soon after this initial victory Zorawar Singh sent a message to the Gyalpo (King) demanding Rupees 30,000 as tribute. On hearing this message the King commanded the Wazir of Bazgo to meet the Dogra army. Chamuck Buidun, the Wazir of Bazgo along with Bankah Sallerd collected an army and gave battle to Dogras. Dogras lost the battle and fled, abandoning the forts of Paskum and Soundh. The Ladakhi wazirs came back to Shergol and Mulbik. Zorawar Singh halted at a distance of about 45 miles and reorganized his forces once again. The King now commanded Kunmajee and Josunm to meet the Dogra troops. The Ladakhi forces once again killed some thirty men of the Dogra army, prior to the final showdown. It so happened that at that time all of a sudden the day became dark and visibility became difficult, when they and hence may be considered as a soldier's reminiscences. Alexander Cunningham, in his book, *Ladak: Physical, Statistical and Historical: With Notices of the Surrounding Countries* (London, 1854), pp. 333-54, has written an account mainly based on the information furnished by Basti Ram, a general of Zorawar Singh. K. M. Panikkar in his book, *The Founding of the Kashmir State: A Biography of Maharaja Gulab Singh 1792-1858* (London, 1953), edn. 2, pp. 74–89, has written an account which it seems, he has taken mainly from *Gulabnama* of Diwan Kirpa Ram, which is really an official account of Kashmir relating to the life of Gulab Singh. Arjun Nath Sapru in *The Building of the Jammu and Kashmir State* (Punjab Government Record Office Publications, Monograph No. 12, Lahore, 1931), pp. 23-29, has given an account, the information of events he has derived mainly from the travel accounts of Moorcraft, Vigne and Cunningham’s *Ladak*. N. K. Sinha, in his book, *Ranjit Singh* (Calcutta, 1951), edn. 3, pp. 123–27, has described the conquest of Ladakh in little detail and has made a passing reference to the conquest of Iskardu. Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback, in their *Himalayan Battleground* (London, 1963), pp. 42–59, have given a description, perhaps after consulting all the possible sources. A reference may also be made to Alastair Lamb’s, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia* (London, 1960), p. 60; J. D. Cunningham’s *History of Sikhs* (Delhi, 1955), p. 181; Robert A. Huttenback, “Gulab Singh and the Creation of the Dogra State of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh”, *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. XX, 1960-61, pp. 477–88; Zahiruddin Ahmed, “Tibet and Ladakh: A History”, *St. Antony’s Paper No. 14*, *Far Eastern Affairs* (edited by G. F. Hudson, London, 1963), pp. 50–55. I have based my narrative on a deposition of the Vakil of the Raja of Ladakh before Col. H. T. Tapp, Political Agent, Subathu on 22 November 1836, as it is the more reliable account being nearest to the event.
were preparing to give battle. Zorawar Singh seized this opportunity quickly and made a strong attack on the Ladakhi army. The sons of Sumbhu Kotwal and Bankah Wazir were made prisoners and on their refusal to surrender they were killed. The Dogra army then marched to Mulbik and plundered the fort there.

Zorawar Singh once again sent a message from Mulbik to the King to the effect that if he would pay a tribute (Nazarana) of Rupees 30,000 he would quit his country and return to Jammu. The King, however, paid only Rupees 15,000. The Dogra Sardar left Mulbik but, unmindful to the partial payment of tribute, plundered another fort and a temple (Thakurdwara) nearby. From that place Zorawar once again repeated the same message concerning tribute to the King. Ultimately it was settled that the King should come to Mulbik and pay Rupees 30,000 tribute, and the Dogra Sardar would pay his respects to him and leave his country. On the arrival of the King, Zorawar Singh expressed his desire to see Leh. After gratifying this wish and fixing the annual tribute he once again promised to retire to his country through Suru Valley.

No sooner did Zorawar Singh came back from Leh than Wazir Sher Ali Khan, another Ladakhi chieftain, assembled forces for battle. This was immediately communicated by Sumbhu Kotwal to the Dogra Sardar who returned with his forces to meet the challenge and take the King's son as a captive. Before Zorawar could reach Leh, the King's son fled from the capital and came to Bashahr. Zorawar Singh ejected the Raja from his territories and placed Sambhu Kotwal on the throne. A fort was erected at Leh and Dalel Singh was appointed its Thanadar (Superintendent). He, however, was soon murdered by Ladakhis. The next five years of Zorawar Singh were wasted in suppressing revolts in various parts of Ladakh and in search of a suitable puppet ruler, before he could make an effort towards the subjugation of Baltistan.

**Baltistan**

Like Ladakh, Baltistan, a territory between Gilgit in the West and Ladakh in the East, was tributary to the Mughals. It became

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part of the Mughal Empire in the reign of Shah Jahan (1628–1658). During the later Mughal period it became independent, and like Kashmir and Ladakh went into the hands of Abdalis for some time. With the disappearance of Abdali power it became independent, only to come back into the Dogra fold in the forties of the nineteenth century.

After the conquest of Ladakh in 1834, Gulab Singh wrote a letter to Ahmed Shah, the ruler of Baltistan, extending the hand of friendship but the reply of the ruler was most discouraging.\textsuperscript{10} Meanwhile Gulab Singh learnt that his designs towards Baltistan had not the approval of the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh, hence he suspended the project for a more appropriate occasion.

While Gulab Singh was looking for the opportunity to subjugate Baltistan, a quarrel in the ruling family of that principality took place. King Ahmed Shah had appointed his younger son, Mohammad Ali, as heir to the estate and in-charge of the fort of Iskardo, in preference to his elder son, Mohammad Shah. The latter being offended by this arrangement entered into a conspiracy with the nobles, with a view to overthrow his father’s authority. Failing in this attempt Mohammad Shah left the country in search of external assistance. On 7th September 1836, he met Mian Singh the Sikh Governor of Kashmir at Srinagar. He was offered protection and an allowance of Rupees 3 per day.\textsuperscript{11} Mohammad Shah made several unsuccessful attempts in collaboration with the ruler of Chilas and Gilgit to overthrow his father. Ultimately he approached Wazir Zorawar Singh and was promised assistance at an appropriate time.

Soon after the death of Ranjit Singh on 27th June 1839, Wazir Zorawar Singh made active preparations for the attack of Baltistan. While Lahore Court was busy in internal struggle for power, Zorawar Singh attacked Baltistan in the month of March 1840 with a force of 1,000 strong along with Mohammad Shah in the front. Ahmed Shah had collected about 3,000 troops in separate columns. After a skirmish Ahmed Shah carried off his adversary’s son as a prisoner. He was closely followed up by Zorawar Singh and was defeated. After three days he was arrested and Mohammad

\textsuperscript{10} Wade to Macnaghten, 30 December 1836, \textit{Foreign Political}, 30 January 1837, No. 25.

\textsuperscript{11} Wade to Macnaghten, 30 December 1836, \textit{Foreign Political}, 30 January 1837, No. 28.
Shah was proclaimed ruler of Baltistan. Zorawar Singh demanded a tribute of Rs. 7,000 from Ahmed Shah and assured him that on the payment, he would be restored to power.\textsuperscript{12} After a few months Ahmed Shah was restored to power on payment of tribute and sent off one of his sons to reside at Jammu. At this stage the small principalities of Hunza and Nagar also accepted the overlordship of the Dogras.\textsuperscript{13}

The British Government with whom Ahmed Shah had been in friendly correspondence since 1826, could not render any help to him in spite of several appeals. British interest was at this time concentrated on the bigger gains arising from the anarchy of the Sikhs at Lahore, rather than on a remote hilly principality.

Thus, by the middle of 1840, the Dogras had firmly established their authority throughout Ladakh and Baltistan, and looked forward to fresh conquests. From Leh Zorawar Singh wrote to the ruler of Yarkand to the effect that he should depute an agent with tribute to him as a token of his submission to the Dogra Government. The ruler of Yarkand declined to comply and wrote back to him:

\ldots This country, be it known to you, is one of the dependencies of China and if the Sikh Government has really arrived at that pitch of power as to covet its possessions, it would be as well that it should first depute their agents to demand a tribute from China and after having fixed the amount of the tribute with the ruler of the empire we then shall have no objection to follow his example. In any other case it will be better for the Sikhs to desist from vain boasting, which is always detested or at least slighted by wise men and having closed their lips against begging, remained satisfied with their place, without boasting so arrogantly of their bravery.\textsuperscript{14}

This Yarkand rebuff compelled Zorawar Singh to look to the east, on Tibet, for territorial gains. He renewed his correspondence

\textsuperscript{12} Clark to Maddock, 31 May 1840, \textit{Foreign Secret}, 1 March 1841, No. 127.
\textsuperscript{13} Col. W. F. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir to H. M. Durand, Foreign Secretary, 27 February 1892, \textit{Foreign Secret F}, April 1892, No. 74, Nos. 75-76. Translations of Sanads with Nagar and Hunza.
\textsuperscript{14} Agent N.W.F. to Henry Forrers, Officiating Secretary to Government of India, 25 August 1840, \textit{Foreign Secret}, 1 March 1841, No. 126 and enclosures.
with the officer at Gartok, in which he had failed at the time he took over Ladakh in 1834. He requested the officer and other feudal lords (Thakurs) friendship and alliance. The officer at first refused the proposal but subsequently yielded to the request on some monetary payment. In the meanwhile Zorawar Singh, clever as he was, surveyed the entire area of western Tibet through his confidential agents. He really wanted to consolidate his hold before it was known to Lhasa. But in consequence of his subsequent proceedings with his troops in the direction of Gartok, its officer, notwithstanding this new alliance, assembled as a precaution, about four to five thousand troops and remained constantly on the alert.

Tibet

Rudok, Guge and Purang in western Tibet formed part of the Ladakhi kingdom prior to 1684. Zorawar Singh first asserted the ancient claims of Ladakh’s supremacy on the three territories which were given over to Tibet by the treaty of 1684. He demanded the surrender of Rudok, Gartok and the holy lakes of Mansarowar, from the priestly King of Lhasa with a view to controlling its lucrative shawl-wool trade. Shawl-wool was reaching British factories at Ludhiana and Delhi through passes in control of the British Government due to the unsettled state of affairs in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.

In 1841, the time seemed ripe for the attainment of his ambition. Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839 had left the Lahore Kingdom only a hot-bed of feudal intrigues, and thus the Sikhs were absorbed in their own internal dissensions. The interests of Gulab Singh were properly watched by his brother Raja Dhian Singh at Lahore Court. Nepal with the fall of Bhim Sen Thapa in July 1837 presented a sorry spectacle and the internal administration of the state was in a flux, chaotic and unstable. Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, was also shaken by the power struggle between the Regent of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Ministers. China was busy at two fronts; at sea in the first opium war; and at Sinkiang where

15 Clark to Henry Thomas, 21 September 1840, Foreign Secret, 12 October 1840, Nos. 107-8.
there were regular Muslim rebellions. The British were preoccupied in Afghanistan, China and Burma.

Under such a favourable international situation, Zorawar Singh with a force of about 6,000 men, largely Ladakhis, Baltis, and Kishtwaris around a Dogra nucleus, advanced up the Indus valley into Tibet in the month of May 1841. He tried to disguise his invasion as a pilgrimage to mount Kailash and the holy lake of Mansarowar. The Tibetan border officials, alarmed by the size of his forces, sent a warning to Lhasa. Zorawar Singh had divided his forces into three divisions. One moved up the Indus valley towards Tashigong, another through Rupshu. These two contingents plundered Buddhist monasteries at Hanle in Ladakh and Tashigong in Tibet on the way and moved towards Mansarowar lake. The third contingent moved into Rudok district via the route south of Paugong Lake. This unit first captured Rudok and then moved south where it joined forces with the first division and captured Gartok. The district officer of the place offered resistance with the local people but failed in the face of the better equipped Dogra army. After these initial victories and the capture of the headquarters of western Tibet, Zorawar Singh announced his intention to conquer in the name of the Jammu Raja, Gulab Singh, all the territories west of Mayam Pass, on the plea that this territory had rightfully belonged to Ladakh since ancient times. He advanced along the old caravan route between Ladakh and Central Tibet, and cut the trail between west Tibet and Bashahr. One of his contingents reached Taklakot, on the western extreme of the Nepal-Tibet border, by 6th September 1841, after garrisoning several forts along the way. The Tibetan general who offered resistance at Taklakot was unable to hold it with the help of the local forces then at his disposal, and had to retreat behind the Mayum Pass.

18 Clark to Maddock, 30 July 1841, *Foreign Secret*, 16 August 1841, Nos. 34–38; Sapru, n. 3, p. 28; Panikkar, n. 3, p. 80.
The British Apprehensions

So far as Zorawar Singh's conquests in the mountain areas around Kashmir were concerned, the British had not been greatly perturbed. In fact disorders in Ladakh had been advantageous to the British-protected Bashahr from the commercial point of view. But with the invasion of Tibet, the benevolent British attitude towards Gulab Singh changed, because it threatened both the commercial and political interest of the East India Company in India.

The Dogra attack on Tibet was accompanied by the presence of troops in Lahaul, Kulu and Spiti, on the southern side of the Tibetan frontier between Ladakh and the Sutlej. The commercial benefits resulting from the unrest in Ladakh promptly evaporated, and the flow of wool into Bashahr and other border areas was immediately stopped. Apart from this, Gulab Singh was trying to spread his influence throughout the hill states under British protection, through matrimonial negotiations. He had negotiated the marriage of the daughter of the Raja of Bashahr to his son. Moreover, he was claiming the customary presents from Lahul, Kulu and Spiti which these principalities used to make to the Ladakhi kingdom in the past, in order to increase his influence.

Besides the commercial loss and the spread of the influence of Gulab Singh on the border states, there were greater political complications, which might have endangered the British Government in India. From the Gorkha War of 1814-16, the cardinal point of the British policy towards Nepal was the political isolation of Nepal from other Indian states. This object was threatened by the fall of Bhim Sen Thapa in 1837. The issue at stake before the Nepal court was whether they should follow a policy of hostility or of neutrality towards the British. The situation was made grave by the approach of Dogra forces near the border of Nepal. The British fears concerning Nepal were increasing from 1837, when a Nepali delegation had been well received in Lahore. In 1839, a Nepali delegation headed by Matabar Singh had again been very warmly welcomed by Ranjit Singh, which apparently confirmed the British

22 Thomason, Secretary NWF to Lushington, 31 July 1841, Foreign Secret, 16 August 1841, Nos. 34-38.
24 Minute by Lt. Governor T. C. Robertson, Meerut, 28 September 1841, Foreign Secret, 11 October 1841, Nos. 46-51.
fears. The establishment of a Dogra post at Taklakot made the situation grave and the British Government decided not to allow the Lahore and Nepal dominions to march with one another behind the Himalayas. It was also thought that the pending negotiations, at the distance of half the earth's circumference, in the opium war with China might be affected by the presence of Dogras in Tibet. Before the combination of all these events could prove a real threat to the British Empire in India, the Government, on the suggestion of Clark, decided on making a representation to the Lahore Durbar.

The British Intervention

Auckland, whose policy had met with disaster at Kabul was in no mood to take a chance and hence he immediately asked his Agent G. Clark to make a request to the Lahore Court for the withdrawal of Zorawar Singh from Tibet. Maharaja Sher Singh took it easy and his Minister, Dhian Singh, gave ample time to his brother, Gulab Singh, to take as much territory as was possible. The impatient British Government could not wait for the results of the representation to Lahore Court. They fixed 10th December 1841 as the final date for the withdrawal of the Dogras from Tibet. Lieutenant Joseph Davey Cunningham was asked to proceed to the frontiers and to watch events.

Death of Zorawar Singh

Providence had different things in store. It was in November 1841 that a superior Lhasa force came to meet the Dogras. A small force which was sent by Zorawar Singh to oppose the enemy forces, and for ascertaining their strength was cut to pieces by the Tibetans. On 9th November 1841, Taklakot was taken by the Tibetan forces after severe fighting. Several Tibetan detachments were sent forward to cut Dogra communications and take over their fortifications. Zorawar Singh was obliged to take command of the army in the Taklakot area. Fighting continued indecisively for about three weeks. Ultimately the Tibetans, aided by a heavy

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25 Cunningham was of the opinion that Matabar Singh was a refugee in Lahore Court, and that the Nepal Government herself was apprehensive of him. J. D. Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs* (Delhi, 1955), footnote, p. 219.
26 Clark to Cunningham, 20 October 1841, *Foreign Secret*, 8 November 1841, No. 45.
snowfall, were able to defeat the Dogra forces and Zorawar Singh himself was killed on 14th December 1841. After the death of Zorawar Singh, the Dogra army suffered untold hardships. A great portion of the army was annihilated in the snow. Out of the 5,000 fighting men, a few were arrested, about a thousand escaped, and the rest were dead.

The death of Zorawar Singh let loose the disgruntled elements in Ladakh. The Raja and Wazir of Ladakh joined the Tibetans. With the help of the Tibetans, they staged a revolt in Ladakh, and seized the Dogra garrison. Gon-Po of Hemis monastery requested the British Government for help. He was told that the British Government was desirous of peace in Ladakh, but as the Sikhs were also friends, they were unable to do anything. In the meantime the ex-King of Ladakh sent a petition on behalf of the people of Ladakh to the King of Lahore. At the same time he appealed to the Emperor of China for help. Nothing came out of these appeals and petitions of the King and people of Ladakh.

No sooner did the news of the Ladakhi revolt reach Jammu than Gulab Singh raised a new army and despatched it to Leh under the command of Dewan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratanu. The Tibetans were also preparing for a fight and had assembled troops near Gartok area. Neither side was willing to settle the issue without a trial of strength. By the end of August both parties were in the battle field near Leh. Two battles were fought in early September. In the first the Tibetans lost about 1,000 or 1,200 men, while in the second the loss was equal on both sides. On 27th September Cunningham reported that the Dogras had decisively

27 Cunningham to Clark, 4 March 1842, Foreign Secret, 13 August 1842, No. 10; Panikkar, n. 3, p. 81; Fisher, Rose, Huttenback, n. 26, p. 53 and Appendix 165; Sapru, n. 3, p. 28.
28 Cunningham to Clark, 2 February 1842, Foreign Secret, 30 March 1842, No. 101; Cunningham to Clark, 13 March 1842, Foreign Secret, 31 August 1842, No. 11; Clark to Maddock, 7 March 1842, Foreign Secret, 30 March 1842, Nos. 89-90; Cunningham to Clark, 19 May 1842, Foreign Secret, 14 September 1842, Nos. 49-51.
29 Gumbo to Cunningham, 18 April 1842, Foreign Secret, 6 July 1842, Nos. 40-44.
30 Raja of Ladakh to Raja of Lahore, 27 May 1842, Foreign Secret, 3 August 1842, No. 29.
31 Fisher, Rose, Huttenback, n. 26, p. 54.
32 Clark to Maddock, 25 June 1842, Foreign Secret, 3 August 1842, no. 28.
defeated the Tibetans and captured their commander Surkhang.\textsuperscript{34} Soon afterwards a treaty was signed between the two parties on 24th September 1842.\textsuperscript{35} This treaty provided that the Dogras were to be the rulers of Ladakh, but that their control was not to extend to Tibet, and that the boundaries of Ladakh and Lhasa would be constituted as formerly. “That in conformity with ancient usage Tea, Pusham and Shawal wool shall be transmitted by the Ladakh road. That no person from Ladakh to Tibet and \textit{vice versa} will be obstructed. That war will not be renewed between Ladakh and Tibet. That whatever customs were prevalent of old shall prevail.”\textsuperscript{36} Barring minor local disputes, which were settled amicably, the treaty of 1842 continued unchallenged.\textsuperscript{37} Only recently after the triumph of communist China over Tibet, this treaty was challenged.

Ranjit Singh was the last independent ruler of India who tried to consolidate political authority over the far flung areas of India. In this task he was supported by several gifted generals of the time. Notably among them were Gulab Singh and Zorawar Singh. Under the patronage of Gulab Singh, Zorawar Singh had not only conquered Ladakh, Baltistan, but had humbled Hunza and

\textsuperscript{34} Cunningham to Clark, 27 September 1842, \textit{Foreign Secret}, 9 November 1842, No. 61.

\textsuperscript{35} Clark to Maddock, 28 October 1842, \textit{Foreign Secret}, 21 December 1842, Nos. 63–64. I have taken this date as it was reported by J. D. Cunningham, who was near the scene of action. Gartok Governor writing on 2 October 1842 to Bashahr Raja told him that the peace was made (Clark to Maddock, 21 October 1842), \textit{Foreign Secret}, 11 January 1843, No. 43). But as per Hindi calendar date given by Cunningham 10 Asuj, it should be 29 September 1842. The copy of the treaty forwarded by Raja of Bashahr gives the date 17 October 1842 (28 Asuj 1842). [Erskine to Clark, 1 April 1843, \textit{Foreign Secret}, 26 May 1843, Nos. 61–63.] This date has been adopted by Lamb, n. 24, p. 70; Fisher, Rose, Huttenback, n. 17, p. 55, 17 September 1842; J. D. Cunningham in his book, n. 25, p. 221, gives no date; Panikkar, n. 3, p. 85, gives 15 August 1842. Gulabnamai of Dewan Kirpa Ram, p. 264, gives 2 Asuj 1899 which is 22 September 1842, but Aitchison, \textit{Treaties, Engagements and Sanads} give it 17 September 1842.

\textsuperscript{36} Erskine to Clark, 1 April 1843, \textit{Foreign Secret}, 24 May 1843, Nos. 61–63; Ramsay to Nisbet, 23 June 1893, \textit{Foreign Secret F}, September 1889, Nos. 211-17; Panikkar, n. 3, pp. 84–89; Sapru, n. 3, Appendix I; Cunningham, n. 25, pp. 220–21; Lamb, n. 24, p. 70; Fisher, Rose, Huttenback, n. 17, p. 55; Zahiruddin Ahmed, “Tibet and Ladakh: A History”, \textit{St. Antony’s Papers, Number 14: Far Eastern Affairs} (London, 1963), pp. 51–58. For a text displayed at temple wall in Tibet see Appendix III.

\textsuperscript{37} Agreement of 1858, Ramsay to Nisbet, 23 June 1893, \textit{Foreign Secret F}, September 1889, Nos. 211-17. For text see Appendix VI.
Nagar. Hunza and Nagar had accepted Zorawar Singh's supremacy in 1841. Apart from the known extent of the states of Ladakh and Baltistan, Zorawar Singh sought to incorporate even Guge and Purang in western Tibet, where lies the mount Kailash and lake Mansarowar. The area was ceded to the Tibetans in 1684. Although Zorawar's attack to Tibet in 1841 earned him an undying fame for himself, yet it proved very costly to him. He was killed in Tibet on 14th December 1841. The war of 1841-42 was fought only between Gulab Singh and the Tibetans. The suzerain power—the Sikhs and the Chinese—had nothing to do with it. At that time in China the Anglo-Chinese war of 1840–42 was going on. Hence the British in India were conditioned by Chinese fears. Therefore, whatever was written during this period in regard to Tibet was denoted by the name of China. J. D. Cunningham who was deputed by the British Government to the scene of war used the word "Chinese" in all his dispatches, in the first instance, but subsequently he used the words "Tibetans". The latter was in fact the correct description. The treaty of 1842 was signed by Tibetans and Dogras. Neither Peking nor Lahore was party to it. It seems K. M. Panikkar is not correct in producing the third version of the treaty, which in his opinion was ratified by Peking and Lahore. The Chinese authority in Tibet after 1792 was in reality non-existent. The Chinese Amban in Lhasa Meng Pao had reported the events in the area to the Emperor of China. Hsi-Tsang Tsou-Shu (Tibetan Memorials and Reports) contains nothing more than reports and the reply thereto by the self-styled protector, the Manchu Emperor of China.

39 All the dispatches of Cunningham referred in this chapter are the best examples, where he had used "Chinese" and Tibetans indiscriminately.
40 H. E. Richardson, Tibet and its History (London, 1962), p. 72. Richardson has said that "A Dogra invasion of west Tibet in 1841 was repelled by a force which was purely Tibetan, although it has sometimes been wrongly described as 'Chinese'.
41 Panikkar, n. 3, p. 87; Ahmad, n. 36, p. 52. Footnote 100: "Panikkar wrongly described the third treaty as one 'on behalf of the (Sikh) Government of Lahore'—the suzerain of the Dogra Government of Jammu—'and the Emperor of China' (the suzerain of Tibet)."
CHAPTER IV

EARLY BRITISH CONTACTS WITH THE TERRITORIES NORTH OF SUTLEJ AND THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS OF 1846 AND 1847

While Ranjit Singh and his feudatory Gulab Singh were active in the consolidation of Northern India beyond Sutlej, the British power in India was also expanding gradually from east to west. Jaswant Rao Holkar who was pursued by Lord Lake suddenly appeared in the Punjab and sought the help of Ranjit Singh. Disappointed in his efforts of procuring assistance from Ranjit Singh, Holkar concluded a treaty with the British Government and returned to his territories. Apprehensive of a powerful alliance between Holkar and Ranjit Singh, the British Government immediately drew up a treaty of friendship and alliance with Ranjit Singh and his ally Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia. This treaty provided that Ranjit Singh would help Holkar in removing his army to a distance of 30 koss from Amritsar and "will never hereafter hold any further connection with him". The British Government agreed that:

...as long as the said chieftains Runjeet Singh and Futtah Singh abstain from holding any friendly connection with the enemies of that Government, or from committing any act of hostility on their own parts against the said Government, the British Armies shall never enter the territories of the said Chieftains, nor will the British Government form any plans for the seizure or sequestration of their possessions or property.¹

Notwithstanding with this solemn agreement with Ranjit Singh, the British Government soon began to meddle with Phulkian Misl on the left bank of the Sutlej. In the quest of securing a scientific boundary to their possession, and in order to avoid enemy

penetration between theirs and Ranjit Singh's territories, the British Government sought to hold the Jumna-Sutlej tract. Coupled with these reasons, the rise of Napoleon with his designs in the east, compelled the British Government to seek an alliance with Ranjit Singh and to bring it about, Charles Theophilis Metcalf was appointed the British Envoy to the Court of Ranjit Singh on 20th June 1808. Imam-ud-din, an adviser of Ranjit Singh met him at Patiala on 22nd August 1808. After a great deal of negotiations a four-articles treaty was signed on 25th April 1809 at Amritsar. This treaty with the Raja of Lahore provided that "perpetual friendship" would continue between Ranjit Singh and the British Government. The British Government promised to consider Ranjit Singh and his heirs and successors with "respect" on the footing of the most favoured powers; and would not have any concern with the territories and subjects of the Raja to the northward of the river Sutlej. Ranjit Singh promised not to interfere with the people below Sutlej. Thus all the cis-Sutlej states went into the British protection, and the boundaries of the British Empire in India extended up to the river Sutlej.

Not content with the treaty of friendship, the British Government in India began to expand the bounds of their knowledge beyond Sutlej, and the activities of the Maharaja were closely watched. Several British travellers went beyond Sutlej to the remotest parts of northern India, under the pretext of adventure, geographical curiosity and commercial enterprise. The findings of these travellers supplied first hand knowledge to the administrators of the Company and paved the path for the ultimate annexation of the Punjab.

James Baillie Fraser

Soon after the Anglo-Nepal War in 1815, James Baillie Fraser went up to the Sutlej river in Bashahr state. He was a very keen observer. He reported on all the aspects of the state of Bashahr situated in the Sutlej river valley. He pointed out that the limit of Tibet on the Indus river extended only up to Toshigong. In regard to Tibet's relations with China Fraser was of the

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3 B. H. Hodgson, Resident in Nepal to Metcalfe, Secretary, Fort William, 11 September 1819, *Foreign Political*, 20 October 1819, Nos. 28–29.
view that Tibet was "...indeed very independent in all but name".4

William Moorcroft

William Moorcroft a native of Lancashire, and a Superintendent of Military Stud in the East India Company in Bengal, visited Gartok in western Tibet in 1812. He went without permission and succeeded in obtaining some of the shawl wool. He could not discover much about the lands beyond Gartok.5 In October 1819 Moorcroft set out on the great journey which took him first to Ladakh and then later through Afghanistan into Bukhara. He was accompanied by a young companion George Trebeek. The journey was "...undertaken not without the encouragement of the Government of India but without their expressed approbations". The twofold objective of his journey was to procure a good type of horse for cavalry and to explore the "...possibility of establishing a commercial intercourse with the trans-Himalayan districts".6 Moorcroft and Treebeek reached Leh, the capital of Ladakh on 24th September 1820. They had a formal meeting with the King of Ladakh. Moorcroft made proposals for a commercial treaty. He submitted a draft of the treaty containing a provision for the liberty of trade with Ladakh and through Ladakh to other countries, with a permanent factory at Leh. It took him several months to finalize the provisions. Ultimately in the month of May 1821, engagements were exchanged between the King and the chief officers of Ladakh and William Moorcroft on behalf of Calcutta merchants. At the same time the King of Ladakh, out of fear of the Sikhs, offered allegiance to the British Government. Moorcroft was not empowered to deal in political matters. He, therefore, forwarded the

4 J. B. Fraser, Journal of a tour through part of the snowy ranges of the Himla Mountains and to the sources of the rivers Jamuna and Ganges (London, 1820), p. 309. On the route from Leh to Gono "11th day—7 cos—Donzog, thus far in Ladak, 12th day—8 cos—Tuzhzheegong (a Chinese fort)".
King's request to the Government at Calcutta. The British Government was not in a position to take on the extra burden of protection of a state, far away from their possessions. Prior to the annexation of the Punjab this proposition was hard to accept. Hence the request of the King of Ladakh was rejected. Whilst at Leh, Moorcroft tried to establish contacts with Ahmed Shah, the ruler of Baltistan.

Moorcroft was the first British traveller who went into Ladakh. He supplied more valuable information about the country to the administrators of the East India Company in India. According to him the country of Ladakh was bounded by Yarkand province in the north. In the south it was bounded by Bashahr, Kulu and Chamba. In the west it was surrounded by the independent principalities of Hunza, Nagar and Baltistan. In the north-east Ladakh was bounded by a mountain, "... which divides it from the Chinese province of Khotan, and on the east and south-east by Radokh and Chan-than, dependencies of Lhassa".

It appears, therefore, that the Government of China and the Government of Lhasa were two separate Governments then, and they had nothing in common with each other. Moorcroft did a great deal of travelling in the eastern region of Ladakh. He was of the view that the boundaries of Ladakh in the east were in a semi-circular line. Beyond the boundaries of Ladakh, the Tibetan province of Chanthan was located. The most northern part of Chan-than was known as a separate province of Radok. This was located along the northern border of the lake of Pangong. Along the course of the river Indus (Sink-Kha-bab) the province of Gardokh (Garo) was situated, which was "said to be distant six days journey from the frontier, the Sinh-Kha-bab is crossed". Moorcroft with his companion went little beyond the village of

9 Chan-than or snow country was known to the Bhotias as Him-des, and to the Tibetans "Nari", *Asiatic Researches*, vol. XVII, p. 45; Alexander Csoms de Koros, "Geographical Notes on Tibet", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. I, 1832, p. 124.
10 Moorcroft, n. 6, vol. I, p. 363; details of these locations are dealt at pp. 360-63, 423-40; a day's journey was about 15 miles, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. IV, p. 593.
Chusul in the vicinity of Pangong lake, via Chushut, Marshilla, Sakti, Chumri, Changla and hot springs. From the village Chushul, while Trebeek went up to Chibra via Tsakala Ralmang, Kang-jung and Moorcroft went to Leh. Moorcroft's projected journey to Yarkand was frustrated and hence he went towards Dras—in route to Afghanistan and Bukhara.

**G. T. Vigne**

Baltistan’s relations with the British Government began in 1829. Ahmad Shah the King of Baltistan sent Chirag Ali with a letter to Captain C. M. Wade, the British Political Agent at Ludhiana. He requested Wade for the deputation of some intelligent person of the British Government to his capital Iskardo, for the purpose of the investigation of a fort which was supposed to have been constructed by Alexander the Great. This desire of Ahmed Shah was not fulfilled. Wade replied to him, “I cannot properly depute a person on my own part, for answer your questions without the permission of my Government”. But when Vigne was leaving Ludhiana on 1st June 1835 for his journey to Iskardo, Wade requested him to visit the capital. Vigne visited Iskardo and had an interview with Ahmed Shah. This traveller supplied most valuable information about northern India to the British Government. According to him the northern frontier of India was, “...divided into several Tibets and that Ladak, Iskardo, Khopalu, Purik, Nagar, Gilghit and Astor etc. are distinct Tibets”. This whole region was, “...divided into, upper, middle and little Tibet, and it extended east and west from Lhassa to Gilghit for a distance of about twelve hundred English miles”. This general application of the word Tibet to all the hilly tract of northern India was common in the first half of the nineteenth century—in the English-speaking world. Vigne went east-ward from Iskardo. When he reached


Ladakh, he met with a hostile reception by the soldiers of Maharaja Gulab Singh.  

**Political Asylum to the King of Ladakh**

Ladakh was practically conquered by Zorawar Singh in 1834 and its capital, Leh, was occupied in the spring of 1835. The King of Ladakh, Juspal Namgyal appealed several times to the commander-in-chief of the British Government for aid, but he could secure none. His appeals were turned down by the commander-in-chief on the plea that “the country of Ladakh is beyond the limits of the Company’s dominions”. The King of Ladakh was, however, allowed to stay in the British territory in Bashahr on the condition that, “he must refrain from acts of hostility beyond the frontier, and remain quiet and peaceable”. A pension of Rupees 200 per month was granted to the son of the King of Ladakh in 1838. The British Government in India remained a silent spectator of the activities of Zorawar Singh, so long as they were confined to Indian territory.

**First Anglo-Sikh War 1845–46**

At a time when Ranjit Singh and his subordinates—Chieftains—were busy in capturing Kashmir, Ladakh and Baltistan, the British were concentrating on the expulsion of the Gorkhas from Tarai, the breaking of the Maratha confederacy, the chasing-up of the Burmese in Assam, and the reduction of Bharatpur. Thus, after consolidating their position in India, with a debacle in Kabul and a triumph at Nanking in China, the British Government in India looked towards the Punjab. The kingdom of Lahore, after the death of Ranjit Singh on 27th June 1839, was in a state of utter

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13 Wade to Macnaughten, 30 August 1837, *Foreign Political*, 20 October 1837, No. 62.


15 *Foreign Political*, 20 December 1837, Nos. 6–9; *Foreign Political*, 17 July 1837, Nos. 81–83; *Foreign Political*, 14 August 1837, Nos. 7–9; *Political Letter to the Court of Directors*, 24 January 1838, No. 5, 4 April 1838, No. 10.

16 H. J. Tapp, Political Agent at Sabathu to J. J. Metcalfe, 10 November 1836, *Foreign Political*, 9 January 1837, No. 24.

confusion. Mutual friendship and trust between the Sikhs and the British were subjected to a severe test. The military anarchy of the Sikhs led to British suspicion, distrust and territorial ambition. Lord Ellenborough (28th February 1842–15th June 1844) took necessary precautions, and kept his home government informed of the events in Lahore kingdom. He cautioned Baron Fitzgerald, the President of the Board of Control in London, that “such a position could not be endeavoured and the necessity would be imposed upon us of occupying the hills and taking the summit of the Himalaya as the boundary of our dominions”.18

The British and Sikh forces began to collect on the respective banks of the river Sutlej. Sir Henry Hardinge (23rd July 1844–12th January 1848) the succeeding Governor-General made due preparation for war. On 5th December 1845, Sir Huge Gough, the Commander-in-Chief was told that: “In point of fact all diplomatic relations have ceased. I have been obliged...to dispense with the presence of the Lahore Vakeel in my Camp. ...”19 On 11th December 1845, the Sikh Army had crossed the river Sutlej. Therefore, war was declared against the Sikhs. Several battles were fought between the Sikhs and the British at Mudkee, Ferozshah, Budhowal and Aliwal. On 10th February 1846, the battle of Sobraon resulted in a decisive triumph for the British forces. The action was over by noon and the Sikh army was scattered beyond any possibility of an effective rally. The way to Lahore was open for the victors. On 13th February the British troops were at Kasoor, and on the 20th February, the capital of the Sikhs, Lahore, was in British occupation. In the meantime Hardinge issued a proclamation to the effect: “The Sikh army has been expelled from the left bank of the river Sutlej having been defeated in every action with the loss of more than 220 pieces of field artillery.”20

The Treaty of Lahore 1846

Soon after the hostilities, peace negotiations began between Bhai Ram Singh, Raja Lal Singh, Sardar Teja Singh, Dewan

18 Ellenborough to Secret Committee, 20 January 1843, Foreign Political. 20 January 1843, No. 7.
19 Hardinge to Gough, 5 December 1845, Foreign Secret, 26 December 1846, No. 183, and K.W.
Deena Nath, and Fakeer Nooruddin on behalf of Maharaja Dalip Singh with Fedric Currie and Brevet Henry Montgomery Lawrence on behalf of the East India Company, and ended in a sixteen-articles treaty of Lahore on 9th March 1846. It imposed upon Lahore Durbar a war indemnity of one and half crores of Rupees; reduced the strength of the Sikh army to twenty battalions of infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each with 12,000 cavalry; and placed a check on the expansion of territory. It seized from Dalip Singh thirty guns and the territory between Sutlej and Beas. Finally: “The Maharaja ceded to the Honorable Company in perpetual sovereignty as equivalent for one crore of Rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the hill countries which are situated between the rivers Beas and Indus including the province of Kashmir and Huzarah.”

Thus the kingdom of Lahore was reduced to the principality of Lahore. Suprisingly, the will of the British Government was imposed under the high sounding slogan of “perpetual peace and friendship” with heirs and successors, as in the case of the treaty of 1809.

**Treaty of Amritsar, 16 March 1846**

Out of the dismemberment of the kingdom of Lahore, the modern state of Jammu and Kashmir emerged. In pursuance of articles four and twelve of the treaty of Lahore, a week later the treaty of Amritsar between Gulab Singh and the British Government was signed. Gulab Singh and his heirs were guaranteed “all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul”, on the payment of rupees one crore, the part of war indemnity imposed upon Lahore Darbar. The British Government promised aid in the event of external aggression, but did not guarantee the internal security of the state. Thus the position of Jammu and Kashmir with respect to the British Government was more favourable than that of the other princely states of India. Besides the ascertainment of the limits of the territories of the British and that of Gulab Singh, the treaty of Amritsar

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21 Fedric Currie to Office Secretary, Fort William, 17 March 1946, Foreign Secret, 26 December 1846, No. 443.

\textit{The Boundary Commission of 1846}

Under articles four and nine of the treaty of Amritsar, the limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh were to be ascertained and the boundary between the British Government and Jammu and Kashmir was to be laid down. A two-man boundary commission of Vans Agnew and Alexander Cunningham was appointed to ascertain the territories of Gulab Singh, and Captain James Abbott was to fix the boundaries between the British and Kashmir. The Commission of Agnew and Cunningham was instructed to ascertain the point where the territories of Gulab Singh, the British Government and Tibet met. It had to stop all payments by Spiti to Tibet, Ladakh, Kulu and Bashahr, except that, “if there are religious presentations they need not to be interfered with”. The proper facilities to the traders were to be guaranteed. As the departure of the Commission was late, it was proposed to ascertain the entire boundary in the next season. Unfortunately this commission could never reach the frontiers. From the native information Vans Agnew had compiled a memorandum. This memorandum provided all the necessary information in regard to trade and trade routes, between Yarkand, Tibet and the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh. In regard to the boundary Agnew stated that the border of Tibet and Kashmir was “...the ancient boundary of Ladakh and Chantham and Yarkand and Chinese is well known and undisputed”. According to him it touched the British Spiti frontier on the river Pare and went upward by the south of Tso Morari lake and Hanle monastery and met the river Indus, “near a village called Demchok”. From the Indus river it went along the ridge and crossed Pangong Tso (lake) approximately in the middle, and continued on the top of the ridge to Bakala (Lanka La). From Lanka La it went along the ridge beyond the Shyok river. Later it turned westward and passed between Yarkand and Nubra of Ladakh along the mountain range till it passed over Nagar and Hunza principalities. Agnew was however of the opinion that:

\textsuperscript{23} Lawrence to Agnew, 31 July 1846, \textit{Foreign Secret}, 26 December 1846, No. 1335.
It is of course highly advisable that all boundaries be defined; but on the reference to the map and after comprehending the ground natural characteristics of the boundary above detailed, the absence of all grounds for variance, the undisputed right of Ladak to the roads up the Shoyak and the Indus to certain fixed points and that of the Chinese beyond them. While there is absolutely nothing else to acquire nearer than Yarkand, Rodekh and Garo I conceive that as safe and unmistakable a boundary could be traced by the commissioners on paper at their first meeting, as if they were to travel along its whole length.24

When the Boundary Commission was appointed, a communication was sent to the Wazir of Lhasa, informing him of the change of sovereignty brought about by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar. Henry Hardinge desired the deputation of a similar commission on the part of Tibet for the determination of the boundaries. Not willing to forgo the trade and commerce with Tibet, the Governor-General suggested a change in the treaty of 1842 to the effect that “such persons as may in future proceed from China to Ladak or to the British territory or its dependencies or from the Ladak or the British territory and its dependencies to China are not to be obstructed on the road”.25 This letter was carried by Anant Ram, a native of Bashahr state, to Gartok (Garo). The Gurpon (officer) at first refused the letter by saying that “...it was against their rules to receive any such communication from strangers”. Later he accepted it but refused to send it to Lhasa.26 A copy of the letter to the Wazir of Lhasa was sent to Sir John Davis, the Governor of Hongkong, for its transmission to the Imperial Government at Peking through

26 Lt. Strachey to Fedric Currie, Resident, Lahore, 26 January 1848, Foreign Secret, 27 May 1848, No. 73.
Keying, High Imperial Commissioner at Canton. Hardinge wrote to Davis:

I am led to understand that Tibet is immediately under the authority of the Imperial Court at Peking, I have to request that your excellency...will take such measures as to you may appear best calculated for securing the co-operation of the Chinese authorities and for facilitating the objects of the Commission so far as they are connected with the boundaries subject to the Empire of China.27

This was perhaps the first time when the British Government effectively entertained China's suzerainty over Tibet. A good deal of correspondence between Davis, Keying, Hardinge and Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary went on for over a year. Ultimately Keying informed Davis:

Respecting the frontiers I beg to remark that the borders of those territories have been sufficiently and distinctly fixed, so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them.28

On further pressing by Davis, Keying informed him that the Peking Government had sent instructions to her Amban in Lhasa for arranging the matters satisfactorily by deputing boundary commissioners.29

The Boundary Commission of 1847

The Government of India appointed a new boundary commission on 10th July 1847. It was comprised of Captain Alexander Cunningham of the Engineers, Lieutenant Henry Strachy, 66 Regiment N.I. and Assistant Surgeon Thomas Thomson, M.D.

27 Hardinge to Davis, 29 August 1846, Foreign Secret, Proceedings, 26 December 1846, No. 1338.


29 Keying to Davis, 8 August 1847, Foreign Secret, 30 October 1847, Nos. 26-29.
The primary function of the commission was to ascertain the boundaries of Maharaja Gulab Singh in consultation with the commissioners of Tibet and Kashmir. Besides the boundaries, the commission was asked to investigate the line of trade, the population of the countries nearby and the method of barter system prevalent. It was observed that:

As the greater part of the boundary between Ladak and Chinese Tartary is laid down by nature, and as it is believed that scarcely any portion except the two termini can admit of dispute, the business with the Chinese commissioners will most probably be soon adjusted, and when everything has been accomplished on the border of (if nothing can be accomplished on the border from the absence of Chinese mission) . . . the commissioners should individually use their best endeavours to increase the bonds of our geographical knowledge in those remote regions.  

This commission arrived at the village of Khyuri on the river Pare, at the junction of British India, Tibet and Kashmir, on 29th August 1847. Neither the commissioners from Tibet, nor from Gulab Singh were available there. They attempted to enter Tibet but due to the opposition from the people of the village of Shaktal they could not do so. Cunningham sent a fresh note to the Tibetan authorities, asking them to send the commissioners to Hanle. Thereafter the commission moved to Hanle via Tso Morari lake and reached there on 14th September 1847. At Hanle two persons from the Gurpon of Gartok met Cunningham and told him that Khalun Ghakchoo from Lhasa had been to Gartok for the settlement of some revenue dispute. Ghakchoo was not deputed for ascertaining the boundaries of Ladakh and Tibet. The agents of Maharaja Gulab Singh, Mean Jawahar Singh and Mehta Basti Ram could not reach Hanle. Therefore in the absence of the Tibetan and Kashmiri commissioners, the primary object of the British commission remained unfulfilled. It was left with the task of trade assessment and geographical enquiry.

30 Elliot to Cunningham, 27 July 1847, Foreign Secret, 28 August 1847, No. 162.
31 Cunningham to Lawrence, 29 August 1847, Foreign Secret, 27 November 1847, No. 23.
Dr. Thomas Thomson and Alexander Cunningham left for Leh via the Indus route. Lt. Strachey went along the boundary line and reached Demchok on 10th October 1847, and reported that a small rivulet “...constitutes the boundary in this quarter, between Gnari and Ladak”. From Demchok Strachey went to Leh to pass the winter there. The next year, on 20th April, he left Leh and entered into Nubra. He reached Akham (Agram) on the river Shyok. Following the course of the Shyok river Strachey reached Shyok village. From Shyok he went towards the north following the course of another river, which was flowing through an isolated valley, and reached Durguk. At Durguk he met a Dogra officer whose function was to collect taxes on salt and wool. From Durguk to Pongong lake he followed the route of Moorcroft and Trebeek. At Pangong lake he was intending to go round the lake but due to the fear of being obstructed by the people of Rudok in the “half way”, he could not do so. From the south side of the Pangong lake, he crossed a high road between Ladakh and Rudok and reached Chushul on 8th May 1848. At Chushul, once again he tried to contact the Rudok authorities. He went up to a lake situated at a distance of 12 or 13 miles from Rudok in the area. He was of the opinion that: “The Rudok boundary as at present received lies across the mouth of a narrow valley running parallel to the south side of the Pangong lake, directed therefrom by a narrow line of mountains and opening into the east side of the Chushul valley opposite the village.” From Chushul he went back to Leh and tried to communicate with the Lhasa authorities through the head of the Lapchuk mission, who went in the month of July 1848. But he could not succeed. His entire efforts to induce the Tibetan authorities failed. Dr. Thomson who was busy with his researches, made observations only about the boundary point at River Pare. Though a positive attempt was made to ascertain the boundaries of Maharaja Gulab Singh, due to the non-cooperation of Kashmir and Tibet nothing came of it. The boundary commission could unilaterally ascertain the boundaries between Shipki La approximately up to Lanka La.

32 Strachey to Lawrence, 15 November 1847, Foreign Secret, 28 May 1848, No. 68.
33 Strachey to Sir Fedric Currie, Resident at Lahore, 10 June 1848, Foreign Secret, 7 October 1848, No. 8.
34 Thomas Thomson, “Report on Western Tibet”, Foreign Political, 29 December 1849, No. 332.
The British power in India expanded from east to west. It captured the Jamuna-Sutlej tract of land in 1809. After the first Anglo-Sikh War of 1845-46, the Sutlej-Beas tract was taken over by the British Government. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was created out of the Sikh kingdom as a powerful friendly buffer. The British Government in a triumphant hour after the treaty of Lahore and Amritsar was not in a mood to sacrifice the rich shawl wool trade of Tibet. Therefore Hardinge tried to cancel some of the provisions of the treaty of 1842 and sought the cooperation of the Tibetan and Chinese authorities. Tibet was a forbidden land for the British Government and their appealing to China could yield no results. China, then a weak power, lost all her influence at Lhasa after 1792, and therefore their writ regarding the deputation of boundary commissioners remained unimplemented.

35 Dr. Alastair Lamb, in his Chatham House Essays, tried to advocate the Chinese case on the Sino-Indian boundary. He has advocated that Ladakh was a dependency of Lhasa and therefore was Chinese protectorate, because the rulers of Lhasa and Ladakh were from the Sakya clan. Certainly Sakya clan was not a Chinese clan, it was an Indian clan to which Great Gautam Buddha belonged. The ancient ruler of Tibet was an Indian not Chinese. If Ladakh was a protectorate of China, why not China came for the protection of it at the time of Dogra invasion in 1834. Similarly his doubt about the treaty of 1842 on the basis of a dispatch of Lt. Strachey is untenable (Foreign Secret, 27 May 1848, No. 73). He, I believe, has not taken into account the existence of treaty in Gulabnama, in Antiquities of Indian Tibet, vol. II, in Aitchison treaties, etc. Surprisingly he contradicts himself just within four years from 1960. In his book, Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa 1767-1904 (London, 1960), p. 70, he has utilized all manuscript material in regard to the treaty of 1842 and has admitted its existence. His doubts about the Demchok village, again on the basis of the dispatch of Lt. Strachey is not at all justified. Because he had failed to consult the memorandum of Vans Agnew of 1846 (Foreign Secret, 28 August 1847, No. 154). In this memorandum Agnew had clearly stated that the boundary runs below the village of Demchok. Lt. Strachey’s relevant paragraph which Lamb refers runs as follows: “On the 10th October I reached Dunjijokh (Demchok) the frontier point upon the Indus, it is a hamlet of half a dozen huts and tents not permanently inhabited, divided by a rivulet (entering the left bank of the Indus) which constitutes the boundary in this quarter, between Gnari and Ladakh.” (Foreign Secret, 28 May 1848, No. 68, Strachey to Lawrence, 15 November 1847).
CHAPTER V

THE BRITISH IMPERIAL PROJECTIONS IN KASHMIR UP TO 1870

The Boundary Commission of 1847 could not achieve anything substantial. The author of the Commission Sir Henry Hardinge laid down the office of Governor-General of India on 12th January 1848 and sailed for England on 18th January 1848. The departure of Hardinge marked the suspension of the forward frontier policy for two decades after which it was revised in altogether different circumstances. The succeeding Governor-General Lord Dalhousie abandoned further attempts towards frontiers in May 1848, and centred his attention on the internal affairs of the native states.¹ His policy of land acquisition led him to battlefields in the Punjab and Burma. The Punjab, the Kingdom of Sikhs, was annexed to the British possessions after three bloody battles at Ramnagar, Chillianwalla and Gujarat in 1849. Similarly the gold-rich province of Pegu was wrested from the Buddhist sovereign of Burma and bought under the jurisdiction of the East India Company’s Government in India, after the Second Burmese War of 1852-53. The doctrine of lapse brought to the British fold the states of Satara, Nagpur, Jhansi, Sambalpur and others. The Nizam of Hyderabad was deprived of the province of Berar, and Awadh was taken on the plea of maladministration. Thus the map of India became practically red leading to the eventful years of 1857-58.

Gilgit Tribal Territory and Kashmir State

While Dalhousie and Canning were busy in annexations and suppressions, Maharaja Gulab Singh and his successor Ranbir Singh were busy in the consolidation of the newly created state of Jammu and Kashmir on the frontier of India. The affairs at the eastern frontier of Kashmir state were settled by a treaty between Gulab Singh and Tibet in 1842, but the tribes on the western end of the state had engaged the attention of Kashmir

rulers constantly ever since 1842. In the year 1841-42 the hereditary ruler of Gilgit had been subdued by his more powerful neighbouring Chief Gauhar Aman, the ruler of Chitral. Sikandar Khan, the hereditary chief, who had taken refuge in the fort of Sanagarh sent his youngest brother, Suleman Khan, with his two wazirs to Kashmir, to ask for aid from Shaikh Gulam Muhiuddin, the Governor of that province. The aid was granted under sanction of Lahore Darbar and a force of 1,000 men was sent under the command of Syed Nathe Shah. As soon as the news of this military movement reached Gilgit, Gauhar Aman had Sikandar Khan murdered in the fort of Bakrot where he had retired from Sanagarh. Nathe Shah stormed the fort of Gilgit in one siege. Gauhar Aman who fled from Gilgit was followed by Mathura Das a commander under Nathe Shah. Karim Khan a younger brother of Sikandar Khan was allowed by the Sikh Government to succeed to the Government of Gilgit and Syed Nathe Shah was appointed Military Governor (Thanedar) to occupy and hold Gilgit. The Raja was bound to pay an annual tribute of 2,500 Hari Singhi rupees as a condition of protection. Along with Gilgit, the principalities of Hunza and Nagar had also entered into an alliance with Syed Nathe Shah. On the decline of the kingdom of Lahore, and the creation of Jammu and Kashmir state on 16th March 1846, Maharaja Gulab Singh became master of the principality. Karim Khan the Raja of Gilgit sent his younger brother Suleman Khan to the court of Jammu and Gulab Singh recognized the existing administration of Gilgit.²

The newly created state of Jammu and Kashmir had soon to bear the brunt of an attack by Gauhar Aman who marched on Gilgit in 1848. The immediate cause for it was the refusal of Gulab Singh to surrender Isa Bahadur, a step-brother of Gauhar Aman who took refuge with Kashmir in February 1848. Gulab Singh sent a reinforcement of 2,000 men under the command of Fateh Khan and recalled Nazir Ali Shah the Governor. Fateh Khan was partly able to recover Gilgit, but another force of 2,000 men under Bakshi Hari Singh recovered the lost forts of Gilgit region in May 1849. Mohammad Khan, son of the late Karim Khan was made Raja and Aman Ali Shah the Governor. Chilas, a tribal territory strategically situated on the route to Gilgit was subdued by Bakshi

Hari Singh and Dewan Harichand in the course of the Gilgit operations and was added to Gilgit. Subsequent to this second attack by Gauhar Aman, Gilgit was taken by him again in 1853 and 1857. Gulab Singh changed his strategy in the area putting more reliance on intrigues and diplomacy than on the might of arms. Gulab Singh and his son and successor Ranbir Singh kept the tribes separated from each other. It was only after the death of Gauhar Aman, that Gilgit was finally restored to Kashmir in August 1860, when Colonel Lochan Singh seized it. Wahab, the Wazir of Gauhar Aman, was killed in the action. Later Yasin and Ponial were subdued and punished by the forces of Kashmir.  

*Kashmir State in Relation to the British Government*

The British object in carving out the state of Jammu and Kashmir from the kingdom of Sikhs was twofold. Firstly, it was to weaken the Sikh kingdom of Lahore, and secondly, it was to create a friendly Rajput kingdom on the borders of the British possessions in India. Gulab Singh was the master of the principality in any case. He was Raja of Jammu from 1822. All the states of his brothers Dhyan Singh and Suchet Singh and nephew Hira Singh fell to him after their murder and death by 1844. As Prime Minister of Lahore Darbar he was in actual control of the territories. The recognition of the fact amounted to rupees seventy-five lakhs to Gulab Singh which he paid to the British Government. The Treaty of Amritsar by which this recognition was awarded stood on a different footing from other treaties with the Indian state. The territories of which Gulab Singh was recognized as ruler were handed over to him as independent possessions, and with the understanding that there was no agreement on the part of the British Government to guarantee the internal security of the state. In the event of external aggressions the treaty only provided the British “aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories”. Therefore in essence the Treaty of


Amritsar was "...to confirm Gulab Singh on what he already possessed...".\(^5\)

In spite of the guarantee of non-interference in the internal affairs of the state, the British Government never refrained from doing so. When Gilgit was threatened by Gauhar Aman in 1848, the Resident and the Agent to the Governor-General at Lahore asked Gulab Singh for information regarding arrangements he had made for the defence and protection of Gilgit, and suggested certain other things for its defence. Gulab Singh replied to him that his military commander Nathe Shah would do the needful after the snowy season. This brief reply of Gulab Singh was not satisfactory to the Agent, and he wrote several other letters to Gulab Singh with pointed references to the articles four and five of the treaty of Amritsar. The Maharaja ignored these letters. Even after the annexation of the Punjab, the Board of Administration again asked Gulab Singh to supply information regarding the Gilgit frontier. Gulab Singh quietly ignored these queries and sent the information only after Gilgit was recovered from Gauhar Aman. Lord Hardinge himself also tried to interfere in the internal affairs of the state and wrote to Gulab Singh for the appointment of a Resident at Srinagar. Gulab Singh claimed in his reply that a promise had been given to him that no Resident would be appointed in his state. Thus the idea was dropped for the time being, but as the number of European visitors to the state unprecedently increased and it was feared that they would misuse Gulab Singh's hospitality, the idea was again revived.\(^6\) In 1851 the British Government wrote to Gulab Singh that every year the number of British visitors to the valley was increasing and that their interests should be looked after by a Resident. Gulab Singh strongly resisted this claim and in protest said that the appointment of a political officer, as in other Indian states, was against the degree of independence guaranteed to his state, and that as the European visitors frequented the valley in summer it would be sufficient if an officer was appointed for the season only. The demand was withdrawn and Major Macgregor was deputed to Srinagar for the summer season in 1852. He had no powers of political supervision, his sole function


was to supervise the conduct of European visitors to Kashmir. This supervisory appointment of a British officer in Kashmir marks the beginning of the British interference in Kashmir state.

New Power Pattern on the Frontiers of Kashmir

The power pattern among the three empires—British, Chinese and Russian—in Central Asia was seriously threatened in the second half of the nineteenth century. The authority of the Manchus in China was seriously menaced by internal revolts and external aggressions. Whilst the Central provinces of China were in revolt in “T’ai P’ing” and “Nien ’Fei” China had to face an external enemy in the Lorch war of 1856. In Sinkiang there were series of Mohammedan risings ending in the establishment of an independent Kingdom under Yakub Beg, a Kokandi official, in 1866. Russia, whose expansion in Europe was checked after the Crimean War of 1854–56, began to expand in Central Asia. Captain Valikhnov disguised as a merchant visited Kashgar in 1858. In 1860 Russia established its footholds on the Amu river and broke down the last resistance of the Caucasian hill tribes in 1864. In the rapid march towards the Khanates of Central Asia Russia took Tashkent in 1865 and Samarkand Bokhara in 1868. This menacing march of Russia in the power vacuum of Central Asia alarmed the British power in India, who after annexation of the Punjab in 1849 and suppression of the rising of 1857-58 were seriously in search of security and commercial prosperity.

The annexation of the Punjab made the British territory fully coterminous with the independent kingdom of Gulab Singh. For a while the British officials were fully engaged in the administration of the newly acquired territories. Among the first priorities, they improved the internal communications and abolished the former Sikh transit duties on trade. But the prohibitive trade duties of the Kashmir Darbar were great barriers for the smooth flow of trade with Kashmir and beyond it. R. H. Davis, Secretary to the Punjab Government, and Thomas Douglas Forsyth, Commissioner and Superintendent of Jullundhar, impressed upon Sir Robert Montgomery, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, the desirability of negotiations with Ranbir Singh, the Maharaja of
Kashmir for the reduction of the import and transit duties. It was a hard task for Montgomery to persuade a reluctant Maharaja to effect reduction in state revenues. The Maharaja was, however, willing to reduce the customs duties levied on goods imported into Kashmir. The method of its collection was simplified, and a transit duty of 5 per cent on goods conveyed via Srinagar was imposed in lieu of the fiscal exactions in 1864.

The commercial concessions were not sufficient for the Russophobe officers of the British Government in India. Captain Charles H. Strutt of the Royal Artillery impressed upon the Government the desirability of free commercial intercourse with Kashmir state, and pointed out that "...of all our northern frontier, Kashmir is undoubtedly the line of least resistance into India...", and recommended the establishment of a military post in Ladakh either for offensive or defensive purposes. Forsyth, another officer, said that, "...the very fact of Russia being able to threaten us on the Cashmire frontier, would injure our prestige". Without offering any opinion of his own, he simply quoted from the writings of Mons. A. Vambery:

...would it not be a mortal sin to continue even presently in the way of obnoxious inactivity and to frustrate an opportunity, which is rarely offered by political coincidence? "One nail can save a horse shoe, one horse shoe a horse, one horse a man, one man a Govt.", says a Turkish proverb and I think the much wanted nail is easily to be found beyond the range of Kuen Luen mountains.

British Trade Agent at Leh

This strong official opinion in favour of the tampering with the sovereignty of Kashmir, and the failure of trade concessions provided the cause and the occasion for rethinking about Kashmir in the British Government. Forsyth recommended the appointment of a British Trade Agent at Leh to check the extortions on traders

7 R. H. Davies to Secretary, Government of India, 23 January 1863, Foreign Political A, May 1864, Nos. 9–12; E. W. Trotter to Secretary, Government of India, 11 June 1863, Foreign Political A, July 1863, Nos. 73–75.

8 Note on Yarkand by Charles H. Strutt, 29 March 1863, Foreign Political A, May 1863, No. 77.

9 Extract from T. Douglas Forsyth's Report on the trade with Central Asia, Foreign Political A, November 1868, Nos. 1–6.
by the Kashmiri officials and to watch the events beyond the borders in Central Asia. The proposal was officially forwarded to the Government of India by the Punjab Government. Sir John Lawrence, the then Viceroy of India reluctantly agreed to the proposal as a temporary measure only for one season. Dr. Henry Cayley a physician was appointed to the post with a salary of Rupees 1,000 per month in spite of the vigorous objections of the Maharaja of Kashmir. He reached Leh the capital of Ladakh on 24th June 1867. Even while in Ladakh Cayley felt that “unless it is known that the appointment will be continued or renewed, little or no permanent good will result”, and requested the Government for the continuance of the Agency. It was decided to continue the British agency at Leh. Sir Stafford Northcote Bart, Secretary of State for India, while sanctioning the Leh Agent observed:

...Dr Cayley as Commercial Agent in Ladakh, is ever to bear in mind that he is in foreign territory... (and will refrain from)... dictatorial language calculated to give offence to the rulers of these countries.\(^\text{10}\)

When the decision of the British Government was made known to the Maharaja of Kashmir, he was very sore and asked his Dewan Kirpa Ram to make a representation to the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. The Dewan pointed out that the Commercial Agent at Leh was for the year 1867 only, and was appointed to make enquiries into the state of the trade with Turkistan, and to see that the scale of duty that was fixed in 1864 was observed. But since the tariff of 1864 was implemented, there would be no justification for the continuance of the Agency. He also pointed out that its continuation was not only the violation of the customs and usage followed so far but would damage the prestige of the Maharaja’s authority. It would also create an impression on the minds of the people that the Maharaja was deemed incapable of carrying out effectively the administration of his country. Kirpa Ram assured him that the desire of the British Government in regard to the opening of the Chang-Chenmo route

\(^\text{10}\) Northcote to Lawrence, 15 February 1868, *Foreign Political A*, March 1868, No. 144.
and the encouragement of trade with Turkistan would be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{11}

The Lieutenant Governor while appreciating the sentiment of the Maharaja told Kirpa Ram that the appointment of a Commercial Agent was in accordance with the practice prevalent amongst the civilized nations of Europe. If, however, there was any erroneous notion among the population in regard to the object and functions of the Commercial Agent, it could be dispelled by the circulation of a proclamation among the people. Accordingly a proclamation was issued on 8th July 1868 to the effect that:

\ldots The Maharaja is in the same position in regard to his dominions as the late Maharaja Gulab Singh\ldots Dr Cayley or any other officer in his position has no power or right to interfere with the internal administration of the country or to listen to the complaints of Zageerdars or other subjects of Maharaja\ldots . The Maharaja is a faithful feudatory of the British Government with which the most friendly relations exist and possessed of full sovereign powers in his own territory.\textsuperscript{12}

Not satisfied with the outcome of his representation to the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, the Maharaja deputed Dewan Jwala Sahai and Dewan Kirpa Ram to the Viceroy of India. They impressed upon him the desirability of not renewing the appointment of a Commercial Agent to Leh and in return promised on behalf of the Maharaja, to withdraw all duties hitherto levied on merchandize conveyed by traders to and from British India via Ladakh, and would readily permit the deputation for a period of one month in the year, of the British officer stationed during the season in Kashmir. Nothing came out of this representation of the Maharaja. The Punjab Government and Cayley had their way in spite of the opposition of the members of the Council in London\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Memorandum on the Representation of Dewan Kirpa Ram, 2 July 1858, \textit{Foreign Political A}, January 1869, Nos. 352–58.

\textsuperscript{12} Memorandum in reply to Representation of Dewan Kirpa Ram, 6 July 1868, \textit{Foreign Political A}, January 1869, Nos. 352–58.

\textsuperscript{13} Sir George Clark and Sir John Kaye were opposed to the commercial prospects with Eastern Turkistan. Sir John Kaye regarded the British interference in Kashmir as:
and the attitude of Sir John Lawrence. Lawrence sanctioned the deputation of a Commercial Agent to Leh, and observed:

...the presence of a British official is, in itself, irksome and inconvenient to the Maharaja, and however discreet may be the conduct of the occupant of that situation, his mere deputation gives rise to surmises which cannot but cramp the action and lessen the self respect of the ruler himself, while by some of his subjects it is regarded as a pledge and even a menace of further and more direct interference in the affairs of a kingdom which we have agreed generally to consider and to treat as an independent.... The case of Kashmir is peculiar, and our policy in regard to a kingdom on the frontier is now, and ought to be specially one of avowed conciliation and scrupulous forbearance. The position of the territory, the zeal and the fidelity displayed by its rulers to the British cause at various important epochs ... and the earnest desire of the Government of India to have in the space between British India and Central Asia, at least one friendly state, and one Ruler, thoroughly well disposed to British ascendancy and influence.... [it is] both wise and politic to run the risk of some possible impediments to commerce and some misconstruction of political motives, in order to secure in the ruler of Kashmir, a cordial supporter instead of a lukewarm friend.14

While the British energies were centred round the establishment of a Commercial Agent at Leh, the Maharaja busied himself on other theatres of the frontiers of his state. After the final ejection of the forces of Gauhar Aman in August 1860, the Maharaja's forces under Lachman Singh proceeded to punish the rulers of

... highly offensive. ... I do not myself see what right we have to dictate scales of duty to an independent sovereign. ... I very much doubt the policy, to say nothing of the justice, of thus interfering with Kashmir except in respect of friendly advice. The inconsistency—the difference between precept and practice in our case—is obvious. For we prefer to be horror-struck at the idea of monopoly of any kind; yet our Empire was originally founded on a monopoly and we still maintain certain monopolies of our own because our revenue cannot do without them.

Quoted by Alder, n. 3, p. 29.
14 W. S. Seton Karr to T. H. Thornton, 9 November 1868, Foreign Political A, November 1868, No. 82.
Yassin and Payal in Chitral Bala. On 14th September 1860 the fort of Yassin was taken over and its ruler, Malik Aman, was made to leave Yassin. Col. Lachman Singh returned to Gilgit after handing over the charge of Yassin to Azmat Shah and Payal to Isa Bahadur. Soon after this the Maharaja proposed to the Ameer of Kabul that since the territories around Gilgit were never under the complete control of Kabul, it would be better if he took a few lakhs of rupees and transferred Badakhshan to the Kashmir Government. But the Ameer could not entertain the project as he was involved in a family dispute. Yakub Beg, the new ruler of Eastern Turkistan, proposed to the Maharaja a friendly alliance and write to this effect on 18th July 1866. Next year the Yarkand envoy Mohammad Nazir reached the court of the Maharaja at Jammu. Though the Maharaja forwarded the envoy to Lahore, the event made the British officers think afresh about the status of Kashmir.

G. N. Taylor supported the efforts of the Punjab officials towards greater interference in the affairs of Kashmir. After quoting Forsyth who wrote, "... Kashmir has gone so far as to render the line of our northern boundary and power very faint, the Maharaja has acquired a position not only of an equal, but even of a superior", he pointed out to the Government that the considerate and liberal treatment of the Maharaja had been taken as a sign of the weakness of the British Government. Therefore, the time had come when the British Government should assert her supremacy and prohibit the Maharaja from deputing any agent whatever to Yarkand, or other foreign states without the sanction of the British Government. It was nothing more than the occasion required. The Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab pointed out to the Viceroy the lacunae in the treaty of Amritsar 1846, which provided no control over the diplomatic relations of the Maharaja and promised aid in the event of external aggression. However to Lawrence these pleadings meant nothing. He pointed out that the clause on the

15 Kabul Diaries from 25 December 1863 to 7 January 1864, Foreign Political A, February 1864, Nos. 202–3. Hugh R. James, Commander and Superintendent, Kabul, remarked: "It is believed that the object of the Kashmir ruler is to secure a place of safety for his treasure, family, and troops, at a distance from English territory, and where he could himself resort in event of trouble."

16 Minute by G. N. Taylor, 10 December 1867, Foreign General A, January 1868, No. 5.
control of diplomatic relations was omitted because the state of Kashmir was "beyond our own boundary", and that the "British frontier did not, at that time, even touch that of the Maharaja...". So far as the clause of aid was concerned Lawrence said, "... they are as a matter of fact limited to promise..." which would be taken into account if the circumstances permitted. Lawrence laid down his policy for the benefit of the Punjab authorities and said:

(It was not) ... expedient still less necessary that the British Government should insist on the exercise of a direct control over the diplomatic relations of the Maharaja. The treaty does not as has been shown, prescribe, and in the practice that has prevailed since 1846, there are no precedents to warrant, such a course. A requisition of the kind would be distasteful to the Maharaja and any attempt to enforce it would probably be found nugatory.\(^\text{17}\)

Dr. Cayley’s appointment as Commercial Agent at Leh was not the last act of British interference in the internal affairs of Kashmir. With the speedy increase of the geographical knowledge of the area, the zeal for commercial enterprise also increased gradually. Eastern Turkestan and its fabulous wealth had always been a centre of attraction for the Europeans. The wave of enthusiasm for trade with Eastern Turkestan was greatly strengthened in the late sixties with the political developments in the area. Yakub Beg who became the ruler of Kashgar was equally interested in the development of the trans-frontier trade. Caley who as a Commercial Agent at Leh had collected information about the various routes to Turkestan, had already recommended the opening of the Chang-Chenmo route which was a regular route starting from Kulu to Leh and which passed through Chang-Chenmo valley, crossed Karakash river and met the Karakoram route at Sarket, a place midway between Karakoram Pass and Shahidula.\(^\text{18}\) Robert Shaw, a tea planter, who visited these areas privately, urged the Government to negotiate with the Maharaja of

\(^{17}\) Under Secretary, Government of India to Government of Punjab, 10 January 1868, *Foreign Political A*, January 1868, No. 78.

\(^{18}\) Dr. Cayley’s Report, 13 January 1868, *Foreign Political A*, March 1969, No. 7.
Kashmir for the opening of a new trade route to Turkestan.\textsuperscript{19} William Hayward, a traveller, in a memorandum confirmed the desire of the other two, and pointed out the comparative advantage of the routes.\textsuperscript{20}

Sir John Lawrence "... well aware of the tendency for annexation to follow trade..."\textsuperscript{21} was reluctant to accept the forward policy towards Eastern Turkestan, much less to annoy the Maharaja of Kashmir. His successor to the Viceroyalty, Lord Mayo (1869–72) had taken into account the pleadings of the Punjab Government for a forward policy towards Eastern Turkestan and Kashmir. He had none of Lawrence's inhibitions in his dealings with Kashmir and believed that it had been "a mistaken policy" to allow the Kashmir officials to hinder British trade for so long. Recommendations of Cayley, Shaw and Hayward in regard to the Chang-Chenmo Route made a positive impact on his mind; and the warning of the excessively suspicious Forsyth that Kashmir

... is a foreign state, quite on the external frontier, exposed to all kinds of temptations. There is fascination to all asiatic minds in change, and a scramble for power, and as regards Kashmir, it would not be matter for surprise if Russia were to tempt the Maharaja with the offer of a slice of Turkistan.\textsuperscript{22}

stimulated his thinking in regard to forward policy. Mayo, relying on two weapons, diplomacy and persuasion, moved quietly to deal with the Maharaja of Kashmir.

\textit{Commercial Treaty of 1870}

While the plans for a commercial treaty with the Maharaja were in progress, the Maharaja on his own accord announced his desire to open the Chang-Chenmo route in December 1868. He reduced the duty on goods passing through that road from 5 per cent to 4 per cent, and sanctioned Rupees 5,000 for the repair of the road and renovation of rest houses (sarais) on the route. The following

\textsuperscript{19} Robert Shaw's Memorandum, 18 September 1869, \textit{Foreign Political A}, July 1870, No. 73.

\textsuperscript{20} William Hayward's Memorandum, 11 October 1869, \textit{Foreign Political A}, February 1870, No. 296; also Alder, n. 3, pp. 30–34.

\textsuperscript{21} Alder, n. 3, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{22} Extract from proposed negotiations with Russia regarding Central Asia by T. D. Forsyth, 7 October 1868, \textit{Foreign Political A}, November 1868, Nos. 1–6.
year he instituted a present of Rs. 30—to a kafila using the road and the duty on every two Damas of tea was remitted.23

In utter disregard of this goodwill gesture of the Maharaja, Mayo decided to negotiate a commercial treaty with him. The Maharaja was informed that Sir Donald Macleod, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, would make known the desire of the Viceroy. Captain Grey, the courier to the Maharaja, was charged to intimate that one or more British officers would examine and survey the trade routes described by Shaw and that no officer or the subjects of the Maharaja should interfere with the work of such officers. In this way whichever route was chosen was to be a free highway to all and no obstruction should be placed on it. For the maintenance of the route, joint commissioners were to be appointed whose functions would be to supervise and to decide civil and criminal cases of a petty nature. Except for the joint commissioners no other officer of the Maharaja was to be allowed on the route; and the Maharaja should renounce the transit duties of 4 per cent on Chang-Chenmo route and 5 per cent on all other routes. The Maharaja would allow the British Yarkandees and his own subjects to keep and maintain the means of carriage and transport at different stations on the route.24

The elaborate negotiation which followed on these basic points continued for a long time. Dewan Jwala Sahai and Kirpa Ram pointed out specifically to Captain Grey that on the matter of the boundary of the state the British officials would not have any say and would have to accept the points indicated by the Kashmir officials.25

Whilst agreeing to the proposal, the Maharaja pointed out that he should be given a Sanad to the effect that the “... settlement now made is final and will hold good for ever”. The loss suffered by him in removing duties would be compensated by the British Government and that from now onwards there would be no Commercial Agent at Leh as one British officer would be in the Chang-Chenmo valley as a joint commissioner.26

23 Ranbir Singh to Macleod, 28 September 1869, Foreign Political A, March 1870, Nos. 45-47.
24 Charles Girdlestone to Captain Grey, 19 October 1869, Foreign Political A, July 1870, No. 83; C. U. Aitchison to T. H. Thornton, 6 October 1869, Foreign Political A, July 1870, No. 74.
25 Grey’s Memorandum on Negotiations, Foreign Political A, July 1870, No. 90.
26 Ranbir Singh to Mayo, Foreign Political A, July 1870, No. 91.
At this stage of negotiation Captain Grey was replaced by Douglas Forsyth whose interest in Kashmir and suspicion of the Maharaja were well known. While rejecting the demand of the Maharaja that the settlement would be final, Mayo assured "... the British Government will at all times be guided by the most scrupulous respect for your honour and by a sincere desire to exalt your dignity in the eyes of your subjects...". In regard to compensation for the loss of duties he told the Maharaja that the stamp duty on civil cases and fines in criminal cases decided by the joint commissioners, would go to Kashmir revenues and that the shawl and textile manufactures of Kashmir would be exported outside India duty free. With regard to the presence of a British officer in Ladakh the Maharaja was told that in case the appointment of joint commissioners should render the trade agency at Leh useless, it would be withdrawn.27

Thus a ten-article treaty was concluded on 2nd April 1870 and ratified on 2nd May 1870. It provided for the survey of all routes, and the nomination of a route which could be "a free highway in perpetuity for all travellers and traders"; two joint commissioners, one each from Kashmir and British India, were to be appointed to supervise the route, settle disputes and exercise jurisdiction within a defined limit on each side of the chosen road; arrangements were to be made for providing transport by independent agents; the establishment of supply depots and rest houses was to be decided by the joint commissioners. In return for the refund of all important duties on goods transmitted in bond through India to Kashmir and Eastern Turkestan, the Maharaja agreed to leavy no transit duties on the free highway or on goods passing unopened through Kashmir.28 To this treaty a set of rules was appended for the guidance of the commissioners and a fixed amount was allocated for road maintenance.

The treaty of Amritsar (1846) by which the state of Jammu and Kashmir was created as it exists today had no provision for the interference in the internal administration, or control over the external relations of the state. It merely promised an aid in an event of external aggression. Thus an independent state was created

27 Mayo to Ranbir Singh, 8 February 1870, Foreign Political A, July 1870, No. 97.
on the ruins of the powerful independent state of the Sikhs. But the fate of this treaty was the same as that of any other with native states of India. Hardly had the ink of the pious agreement at Amritsar dried than the British began to interfere in the internal administration of the state. They not only abolished the Passport systems for European visitors to the state, but also appointed an officer on special duty in 1852 to supervise the conduct of European visitors, and a Commercial Agent at Leh in 1867 to be followed by a joint commissioner on the Chang-Chenmo road in 1870. Again in an event of external aggression by Guhar Aman on Gilgit the British Government failed to give any aid to Kashmir. On the contrary they sought irrelevant information. In matters of external relations the Maharaja was asked to send the Yarkand envoy to Lahore. This gradual interference of the British Government in the affairs of Kashmir made people doubt the competence of the Maharaja. The power and the prestige of the Maharaja began to decline, only to be replaced by a Resident later and the deposition of the next ruler.

29 H. L. Poerwynne to Secretary, Punjab, 10 March 1870, *Foreign Political A*, March 1870, No. 260.
In pursuance of the first Article of the Commercial Treaty of 1870, Dr. Henry Cayley was appointed, with the consent of the Maharaja of Kashmir, the first British Joint Commissioner, "to survey the trade routes through the Maharaja's territories from the British frontier of Lahul to the territories of the ruler of Yarkand, including the route via the Chang Chenmoo valley".¹ At the end of the first season Cayley expressed his satisfaction with the duel system of control and survey of the road.

**Chang-Chenmoo Route**

The road from Ligtee at the Lahul border to Yarkand via Chang-Chenmoo, Lugzi Thang, Rupsu, Qara Qash, and Shahidulla, was surveyed and marked by Cayley and W. H. Reynolds. Certain repairs and improvements were carried out over a portion of the road. The jurisdiction of the Joint Commissioners over the territory along the road was decided. It was two miles (Kosa) where the road passed through inhabited territory but where it passed through uninhabited territory, the availability of water and grass determined the jurisdiction of the Joint Commissioners. Camping grounds—a dozen in number—for the traders in the inhabited area were fixed at Gya, Upshi, Machalong, Chimri, Zingrul Tsaltak, Durgu, Tantsi, Muglib, Tsoar, Zukung and Chagra. Besides the four rest houses and supply depots at Tantsi, Sakti, Chimri and Gya, established earlier by the Maharaja of Kashmir, the joint commissioners had established six more at Gogra, Pamzal, Panglung, Lunkha, Chagra and Zingrul. They further suggested the establishment of eight more rest houses in the uninhabited territory up to Shahidulla.² Though Shahidulla was considered to be the most suitable place for having the last rest house Major Montogomerie,

² Cayley to Griffin, 20 October 1870, *Foreign Political A*, June 1871, No. 572.
an officer in the Survey Department, expressed his doubts about it and stated:

... as the Maharaja has abandoned his guard house there, I do not see how it (the suggested plan) is to be carried out. Shahidulla would be the proper place for it, ... But I understand that is now considered to belong to the Yarkand side. ... But if it is not considered to belong to Yarkand I hardly think the Government could now recommend the Maharaja to resume its occupation, as it must necessarily be risky at such a distance, even if it were not always cut off in the winter from all possibility of being reinforced....

Although the survey work of all the routes was completed, the final choice of the route was left for a latter date. R. B. Shaw, the next Joint Commissioner at Leh, again submitted a detailed report pointing out the advantages of various routes passing through Ladakh to Yarkand and made request for the final choice of a free highway in 1872. Baron Napier, the then acting Governor-General and Viceroy, deferred the final decision and was of opinion that unless the traffic was fairly settled the period during which the Joint Commissioners were "to exercise the powers on all the trade routes through Ladak" be extended. Similarly almost all the Joint Commissioners laid stress on the selection of a free highway up to 1887, but at every occasion the final decision was deferred for a later date, as it was observed earlier that the "Chang Chanmo route is one of those hobbies which have pretty well served their day...." The provisions of the treaty of 1870 about the "free highway" and the Joint Commissioners' jurisdiction along it remained unimplemented.

The Chang-Chenmo venture was a dismal failure, because despite the rest houses, supply depots, guides and mail runners, only 408 men used the route in either direction inclusive of the two Forsyth missions, between 1870 and 1877. However, it proved highly beneficial to the British Government as it gave an opportunity

3 K. W., Foreign Political A, June 1871, Nos. 560–97.
5 Aitchison to Griffin, 26 April 1872, Foreign Political A, May 1872, Nos. 126–30.
6 K. W., Foreign Political A, August 1873, Nos. 215–18.
to it to survey the eastern portions of the territory of the Maharaja of Kashmir and to lower his position in the eyes of his subjects. The Trade Agent at Leh became Joint Commissioner with his extended sphere of activities at par with the Wazir Wazarat of Ladakh. One was Agent to the British Government and the other was an Agent to the Maharaja of Kashmir.

**British Agent at Gilgit 1877–81**

At a time when the activity in regard to the Chang-Chenmo route was in progress, the negotiations between Yakub Beg of Yarkand and Russia were in progress; the Anglo-Afghan crisis was in progress; it was felt by the British Indian Government a suitable opportunity to extend her area of influence among the tribes of the western region of Kashmir territory in order to check the Russian activities and to embarrass Afghanistan. To this end, Forsyth suggested the establishment of an agency at Gilgit like that of Leh in the Kashmir territory in 1874. Long before the idea of an agency was mentioned to the Maharaja of Kashmir, his cooperation was sought for the exploration of the passes into Chitral and Yasin, in order to counteract the alarmist thinking in the British press. John Biddulph who went for the exploration discovered that the Ishkoman pass was really open only in winter and was practically of no importance, whereas Darkot Pass leading direct to Yasin was impassable for artillery, although open for ten months in a year. Only the Baraghil Pass leading to Mastuj and Chitral was found easy and practicable for artillery for ten months in the year, but this too was closed on the south side by an easily defensible gorge of first rate importance.

Despite the different strategical situations which the discoveries of Biddulph revealed, Baron Lytton, the then Viceroy of India went ahead with his schemes towards the Kashmir state. He met the Maharaja at Madhopur on 17th and 18th November 1876 and proposed to him that Chitral and Yasin should be brought under the control of Kashmir, that the British Agent should be appointed at Gilgit, and that an Officer on Special Duty should stay in Kashmir all the year round. For the accomplishment of

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these objectives Lytton promised an aid of five thousand rifles and a suitable quantity of ammunition. Ranbir Singh readily accepted the proposal of extension of his territories, but demanded a "written authority to commence negotiations, in order that it may not be in the power of evil disposed persons hereafter to accuse him to entering into relations with foreign states for his own ends". The other two proposals of the Viceroy were met with tough opposition from the Maharaja who "have been most afraid of the sort of high-handed interference in domestic matters 'like what was done by Dr. Cayley at Ladakh'...". At one stage the negotiations were about to break down, but the Maharaja reluctantly accepted the British Agent at Gilgit on the written assurance that there would be no interference by the Agent in the domestic affairs of Kashmir, while Lytton shelved his proposal for a British Resident in that state.

Maharaja Ranbir Singh had accepted the British Agent at Gilgit with the utmost reluctance. The appointment of Dr. Cayley at Leh a decade earlier was still fresh in his memory, and also its subsequent results of opening up the entire eastern portion of Kashmir for British survey and supervision. The Maharaja was determined to put a stop to British encroachments, whereas, contrary to the written assurances to the Maharaja in regard to the scope of activities of the British Agent at Gilgit, Lytton charged John Biddulph, the Officer on Special Duty, with specific duties of "(1) obtaining trustworthy information in regard to occurrences beyond the border and (2) of gaining influence among the neighbouring tribes". Thus, long before the departure of Biddulph to his isolated post at Gilgit, a hostile combination of the tribes in the area was reported by Major Henderson. Not deterred by the news, Biddulph marched to his post of duty, and after meeting on the way Bhai Gurbuksh Singh, the acting Kashmir Governor at Gilgit, reached it on 30th November 1877. Long before his arrival at Gilgit the people of the area were told that they might have to

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11 Alder, n. 9, p. 118.
13 Ripon to Kimberley, 15 July 1881, Foreign Secret, July 1881, No. 396.
14 K. W., Foreign Secret, August 1877, Nos. 80–95.
bear unendurable oppression from the residence among them of a British officer, and they were warned against offering services to him or meeting him without permission from the Governor. The headmen of the area were asked to cooperate in driving him from the place by spreading alarming reports and making things uncomfortable. On Biddulph's arrival the officiating Governor began to act on the lines laid down for him. So much so that Biddulph's "baggage was openly plundered by an official without any attempt being made to enforce reparation or punishment". Biddulph complained about the Governor of Gilgit. The Maharaja immediately replaced the Governor, but expressed his apprehension in regard to the safety of Biddulph at Gilgit.

Unmindful of the hostile attitude of the local authorities, Biddulph began to interfere in the internal matters of the state. He entered into correspondence with Ghazan Khan, the Mir of Hunza, with regard to Mir's customary presents to the Chinese Amban at Yarkand, and Chaprot fort. This fort, situated at the point where the Hunza, Nagar and Gilgit territories met and believed by the tribesmen to be impregnable, was obviously of some importance strategically. For Kashmir it was especially valuable because it dominated the route between Gilgit and Hunza and safeguarded the Gilgit garrison against a flank attack from the North. This fort had been a bone of contention between Hunza and Nagar. In 1877 the fort was seized by Kashmir and was handed over to Azar Khan, the son of Jaffar Khan of Nagar. Since then it had been garrisoned by fifty soldiers of Kashmir. Ghazan Khan of Hunza wanted the fort of Chaprot to be taken over by Kashmir troops permanently. Both Biddulph and Henvey asked the Maharaja for action but he refused to take any action in face of acute famine in the Kashmir valley. The tribal population of the area showed threatening postures to recapture Chaprot. At last in 1880 the Maharaja decided to take action. General Hoshiara, a competent Kashmiri officer was sent to Gilgit and he immediately began putting the defences in order. The garrison there was gradually increased to what Biddulph wanted. Azor Khan's subsidy was

15 Biddulph's Memo, n. 10.
increased. Hunza and Nagar were warned in the strongest possible terms.17

John Biddulph made a visit to Chitral and Yasin in October 1878. Contrary to the wishes of the Kashmir ruler, his efforts at having direct dealings with the chiefs on the Gilgit frontier met with mixed response from the different rulers. At Yasin he met with Pahelwan Bahadur, the chief of that place. Pahelwan Bahadur told him frankly that "... he had not wished him to come but having come, he would spare no trouble to make me welcome".18 Being sandwiched between Chitral and Kashmir, Pahelwan tried to establish direct contacts with the British Government through Biddulph. The latter expressed his inability to help him and rather advised Pahelwan Bahadur to send his vakils to Jammu for the yearly subsidy. For a while Pahelwan Bahadur adhered steadily to the course of friendship towards the British Agent at Gilgit. This friendly attitude of his soon changed into an open hostility in March 1880.

In contrast to the conduct of Pahelwan Bahadur, Aman-ul-Mulk, the ruler of Chitral, tried to take credit for inviting Biddulph to his country. But soon he complained that his visit would prejudice his position in the eyes of the Chitralis. The presents given by Biddulph were taken by Aman with little courtesy and he himself was treated with great contempt by the latter. He was asked for presents and money several times, and was subjected to many small vexations about supplies. The Aman tried to prejudice Biddulph against Pahelwan and refused to discuss the treaty with Kashmir. Though he promised Biddulph the severing of his connections with Kabul, he sent his vakils there within a few days of the departure of the British Agent. In fact the Aman's conduct varied from time to time towards the British Agent at Gilgit. He spread rumours of British reverses in the Afghan war. But from the time of the death of Amir Sher Ali of Kabul, some steadiness developed in his behaviour towards the Agent though his conduct remained always unreliable.

The Maharaja of Kashmir on his part, paid no attention to these difficulties of the British Agent. He made no efforts towards the

18 Biddulph, n. 10.
construction and repairs of the roads towards Gilgit. Chitral and Yasin both were enjoying good relations with the Maharaja, even before his meeting with the Viceroy Lytton at Madhopur in November 1876. From his meeting Lytton, the Maharaja got written assurance from the British Government regarding his dealings with tribes beyond his borders. He was also benefited by the grant of five thousand rifles and an equipped mountain battery.\textsuperscript{19} The Maharaja maintained his contacts with the tribal people as usual and entered into a written agreement with Chitral to the following effect:

1. I agree that I will always sincerely (from bottom of my heart) endeavour to be in submission and obedience to His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. I will inwardly and openly consider the friend of the Maharaja as my own friend and the enemy of His Highness as my own illwisher. In recognition of the superiority and greatness of His said Highness I will present annually the following articles as Nazzerana—Horses 2, Hawks 2, Hunting dogs 2.

II. A confidential agent of the Sirkar shall always remain in Kashkar and one at Yassin, and due respect and regard will be shown to them. Similarly, an agent on my behalf shall always be present at the Durbar of His Highness and an (agent) on behalf of the ruler of Yassin shall remain at Gilgit to carry out orders.

III. On condition of my abiding by the above cited Articles and doing every act in accordance with the pleasure of the Sirkar, I shall receive an annual stipend of Rs. 12,000 Srinagar currency from the Sirkar. If instead of an Agent, my son attends the Durbar, he shall receive a separate stipend from the Sirkar.\textsuperscript{20}

This agreement with Chitral was communicated to the British Government, but the tribes remained hostile to the British Agent at Gilgit. The Governor of Gilgit added to this discontent by his tyrannical attitude towards the people and by underhand intrigues. The situation became so critical that in October 1880, a one-time friend of Biddulph, Pahelwan Bahadur, aided by a Hunza force

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} Kashmir Chitral Convention, \textit{Foreign Secret}, October 1879, Nos. 315–19.
seized Gakuch, overran Ponial and besieged Sher Qila, a fort only twenty-four miles from Gilgit. Besides this Chilas was ready to attack Burgi and cut Gilgit off from the outside world. Without an exception every village on the Gilgit side of Indus was ready to join Pahelwan. The chiefs most suspected by Biddulph, Jaffar Khan of Nagar and Aman-ul-Mulk of Chitral, saved the situation by their timely actions. Jaffar sent a small force to aid Gilgit, and Aman launched an attack on Yasin while Pahelwan was before Sher Qila. This led Pahelwan to fly almost alone into Wakhan. Thus by the end of the year the main danger was over.21

The incident made the British cautious and a search for a new policy for the Northern frontier began at once. By September 1880 the second Anglo-Afghan war was favourably concluded. Gilgit for a while lost its importance. The Viceroyalty of Lytton was over. Ripon, his successor was a great admirer of John Lawrence and thus was a natural opponent of Lytton's "forward" policies in almost every sphere of Governmental activities. He decided to withdraw the Gilgit Agency and pointed out that:

... The late rising of Yassin chief who had primarily been friendly, and whose conduct is still unexplained shows that the Political Agent had failed ... to secure any solid or durable influence over the petty chiefships with whom he had dealings for three years past. Under these circumstances, it appeared to us that the British Agency at Gilgit could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages which could be expected to result from its maintenance ... and to leave altogether in the hands of the Kashmir Durbar the local management of affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State.22

Colonel Tanner, who was officiating for the Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit was asked to march down before the end of July 1881 with his office establishment. He was however cautioned not to wind up or conclude any business or correspondence in haste. The Maharaja was greatly relieved by the departure of the British Agent at Gilgit. But Biddulph, whose conduct was subject to severe criticism, warned the Government that:

22 Ripon to Kimberley, 15 July 1881, Foreign Secret, July 1881, No. 396.
To merely withdraw the officer would, however, be to encourage the Maharaja to persecute his intrigues to greater advantage ... and he will be able to show the native princes of India that, following the example of the King of Burma and the Amir of Kabul, he has rid himself of the presence of a British Political Agent.\(^\text{23}\)

This warning of Biddulph had its due effect on those who managed the affairs of the Government of India. The British became more cautious in their relations with Kashmir than with other frontier chiefships.

**British Resident in Kashmir and the Deposition of Pratap Singh**

Withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency gave an impetus to the long-planned ambition of the British Government, to appoint a Resident in Kashmir, the efforts towards which were initiated by Lord Hardinge in 1848. The matter was again raised in 1851, when an officer on Special Duty for the summer months was appointed without any political functions. Lord Northbrook in 1873 again recommended the appointment of the Resident. But at that time it was thought unnecessary. In the meantime the Officer on Special Duty was designated Political Agent and Justice of Peace in 1872. Certain rules were made by the British Government for regulating the powers of the British Officer at Srinagar in respect of civil and criminal cases, involving the British European subjects and the subjects of the Maharaja. Mixed courts were established under the authority of the Officer on Special Duty.\(^\text{24}\) Prior to 1872, no European visitor to Kashmir was allowed to stay there after 15th October without the specific permission of the Maharaja. This restriction was removed by Northbrook, in spite of the remonstrances of the Maharaja.\(^\text{25}\) Up to 1877 the affairs of Kashmir were conducted through the Punjab Government, but in that year the Government of India took over the direct control of the state. All these efforts were well-thoughtout and were directed

\(^{23}\) Biddulph’s memo, no. 10.

\(^{24}\) Aitchison, n. 1 (Calcutta, 1931), vol. xii, pp. 29-30; *Foreign Political A*, October 1872, nos. 374–77; *Foreign Political A*, April 1873, Nos. 187–96.

\(^{25}\) Secretary, Punjab to Secretary, Government of India, 25 November 1872; Secretary, Government of India to Secretary, Punjab, 27 December 1872; *Foreign Political A*, January 1873, Nos. 88–89; “Maharaja’s Remonstrances”, *Foreign Secret*, August 1877, Nos. 73–75.
towards the breaking of the grip and sovereignty of the Maharaja of Kashmir over his own territory.

Ripon, who had withdrawn the Gilgit Agency in 1881, proposed within three years that on the death of Ranbir Singh, the eldest son, Pratap Singh, should be recognized as a ruler of the state. On the succession of the new chief, a representation should be made for introducing substantial reforms into the administration of Kashmir. A Resident Political Officer should be appointed, who should exercise a general supervision over the affairs of the Kashmir state. The Earl of Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India accepted the proposals with an observation of the fact that:

It may indeed, be a question whether, having regard to the circumstances under which the sovereignty of the country was entrusted to the present Hindu family, the intervention of the British Government on behalf of the Muhammadan population has not already been too long delayed; but, however this may be, Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that, upon a fresh succession, no time should be lost in taking whatever steps may be requisite in order to place the administration upon a sound footing.

Accordingly instructions were issued to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir. Maharaja Ranbir Singh died on 12th September 1885 at 4.30 p.m. Sir Oliver St. John, who upon the death of the Maharaja became Resident, reached Jammu on 15th September 1885. On the same day at five in the evening he met the new Maharaja Pratap Singh in the presence of Diwan Anant Ram, Babu Nilambar Mukerjee and Diwan Govind Sahai, as the new Council was not constituted, and the Maharaja was in mourning for thirteen days. Pratap Singh was informed that his succession to the Chiefship was recognized by the Viceroy, and that he would have to introduce reforms in the administration of the state with the assistance of a British Resident. In regard to the position of the Resident, the Earl of Dufferin intimated that "... I hope that Your Highness will not fail to consult him freely at all times,

26 Ripon to Kimberley, 7 April 1884, Foreign Secret E, May 1884, Nos. 354–57.
and to be guided by his advice in carrying those views into execution”. This British interference into a native state of India, whose sovereignty they themselves guaranteed, led to a protest by the Maharaja. Pratap Singh requested the British Government not to change the status of an Officer on Special Duty to that of a Political Resident “and thus lowering me in the eyes of my subjects and in the estimation of the public”. He begged for a reasonable time limit for effecting reforms in the administration without any interference from any quarter. This protest made no impact on the mind of Dufferin.

In the afternoon of 25th September 1885 the Maharaja took his seat in the full Durbar. The British Resident announced the measures adopted. A weak state had no option but to accept the changed status. Even the personal visit of the Maharaja to Calcutta in the winter of 1885-86 resulted in failure. Soon after the return of the Maharaja, Sir Oliver St. John was transferred and was replaced by a more hostile T. Chichele Plowden in March 1886.

Deposition of Pratap Singh

Plowden paved the way for the removal of the Maharaja. He set himself so completely in opposition to the Maharaja that he obstructed every measure of the Maharaja’s towards reforms in the administration. The Maharaja was anxious that his subjects should receive a liberal education. Plowden did not rest until he had secured possession of the educational rules which the Durbar had framed. The Maharaja was thinking about an equitable land settlement in Kashmir. In consultation with Sir Charles Aitchison the Maharaja wanted to appoint a native Muhammadan Settlement Officer as the population of Kashmir was mostly Muhammadan. But Plowden got appointed an Englishman named A. Wingate as Settlement Officer. Nilambar Mookerjee, the Finance Minister of the State, resigned in September 1886. The Maharaja thrice refused to accept his resignation but ultimately he had to accept it. Soon after the departure of Mookerjee, Dewan Govind Sahai was replaced by an incompetent man named Lachaman Das as Prime

28 Dufferin to Pratap Singh, 14 September 1885; Oliver St. John to Durand, 16 September 1885, Foreign Secret E, December 1885, Nos. 192-245.
29 Pratap Singh to Dufferin, 18 September 1885, ibid.
Minister of the State. On assuming office Lachman Das swept away most of the reforms that had been introduced during the preceding twelve months. The Maharaja was rendered powerless by Plowden and could not save his system from total wreck. He himself was reduced to a nullity. But the Plowden-Lachman Das ascendancy fell through on account of its own weakness. Raja Amar Singh the youngest brother of the Maharaja came to the side of his brother, to fish in the troubled water and got Lachman Das dismissed in 1888. All the efforts of the Maharaja towards the formation of a ministry of his choice were frustrated by Plowden. At this stage the idea of a Council under the Maharaja's President-ship was conceived. But it was so constituted that the Maharaja could not secure the services of his trusted servants in the Council, and his wishes were ruthlessly overridden. Perfect strangers were thrust upon him as Members of his Council. The recommendation of Plowden to deprive the Maharaja of all "real power", and that "He may reign, but not Govern" was turned down by Dufferin.

Plowden was replaced by Colonel R. Parry Nisbet as Resident in Kashmir towards the end of 1888. Nisbet discovered on 25th February 1889 a batch of thirty-four letters, said to be in the handwriting of the Maharaja himself. Some of them dealt with his relations with the Russians while others related to the removal of his two brothers, Ram Singh and Amar Singh and the former British Resident Plowden by murdering them. Immediately after the discovery of the said letters Pandit Suraj Kaul was called by the Resident to Sialkot. The Pandit conferred with the Resident for eight days and then came back to Jammu. The Maharaja was asked to send Amar Singh to Sialkot and the latter remained with the Resident for two days. After his return from Sialkot, Amar Singh informed the Maharaja about the letters and sought his permission to proceed to Calcutta with the Resident. The Maharaja


31 Plowden to Durand, 5 March 1888; Dufferin to Sir R. A. Cross, Secretary of State for India, 18 August 1888, Foreign Secret E, March 1889, Nos. 107–200; Durand to Plowden, 28 May 1888, Foreign Frontier B, June 1888, Nos. 176–79.

32 Nisbet to Durand, 27 February 1889, Foreign Secret E, April 1889, Nos. 80–98.
refused permission and summoned the Resident to Jammu. The Resident did not reply to the call for two days, thus the Maharaja in his despair said: "Let them locate a cantonment and take any portion of my territory, but why do they trouble me in this way and put me to all sorts of disgrace." The Resident ultimately went to Jammu and before meeting the Maharaja, had a long talk with Amar Singh at the Residency. Ultimately he went to the Maharaja and was most offensive in his behaviour towards him. Nisbet left a draft on the basis of which an edict of resignation was to be prepared by Amar Singh. In spite of several pressures on the Maharaja he refused to sign it. Failing in the efforts of his co-conspirators, Colonel R. P. Nisbet himself took the field, and obtained signatures of the Maharaja on a prepared draft of the so-called resignation on 8th March 1889. The appeal of the Maharaja reads thus:

With the information of these letters, and with the full confidence and strength of being supported by my own brother and his now strong party, Colonel R. Parry Nisbet dashed into my room at a fixed time and brought such a great and many sided pressure in all solemnity and seriousness that I was obliged to write what was desired, rather demanded by him, in order to relieve myself for the moment, having full faith that Your Excellency’s Government will not accept such a one sided view of the case, and that full opportunity will be given to me of defending myself.

The Marquess of Lansdowne rejected this appeal and obtained the seal of approval by the Secretary of State for India, for the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh.

In reality the British Government coveted the Gilgit region of the Maharaja’s territory, the refusal of which brought his deposition, so swift and so clean. The echo of the criminal deposition of Pratap Singh was loud, and was heard everywhere. In Jammu the Dogra Residents submitted a petition to C. Bradlaugh, MP,

33 Digby, n. 30, pp. 93–98; Pratap Singh to Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, Foreign Secret E, August 1889, Nos. 162–203. For Digby’s details of deposition of Pratap Singh, see Appendix N. IX.

34 Pratap Singh to Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, Foreign Secret E, August 1889, Nos. 162–203.
who in India was considered as a friend, for help and protection. Webster, a Conservative Member of the House of Commons, asked a question on 14th March 1889 which was disposed of quickly by Sir John Gorst Chatham. Bradlaugh brought an adjournment motion to the House of Commons on 20th June 1889 and demanded a Select Committee of the House or a Judicial Committee in India to be appointed to make due enquiry. All the demands were finally rejected. On the periphery of the Kingdom of Kashmir, the reaction to the deposition was all the more sharp.

**Tibet**

The news of the deposition of the Maharaja, alarmed the Lhasa people immediately. Demo Rimpoche III, the Regent, issued an edict by which he prohibited the entry of any subject either of Ladakh or that of the Maharaja, into Tibet. The people of Gartok and Rudok were asked not to allow any foreigner in Tibet. Round the clock watch was kept up by the people of the area. Simultaneously a person was despatched towards Sinkiang for obtaining the news of Russian activities in that quarter. In the meantime Demo Rimpoche III ordered preparations for a probable war with the British. Some two lakhs troops were collected. War equipment, guns and grains were got ready. At this time the Anglo-Chinese Convention regarding Sikkim was signed by the Chinese Amban on 17th March 1890, without the consent of the Regent, who refused to accept it, and sent a petition to the Chinese Emperor against it. He pointed out that wherever the Britishers went the grain became costly, and:

...the friendship of English men is nothing but a trick, that it may be known to the Emperor how at first the Englishmen made friendship with all the Rajas and Nawabs of India, that afterwards they sent doctors and again appointed their

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35 For text see Appendix No. X.
37 Gulam Ahmad Kadar to Wazir Wazarat Ladakh dated 12 July 1890, Foreign Secret E, August 1890, Nos. 110–13, Foreign Secret E, December 1890, No. 182.
38 Nisbet to Durand, 1 March 1890, Lhasa News, Foreign Secret E, March 1890, Nos. 133–35.
39 Nisbet to Durand, 10 June 1890, Foreign Secret E, June 1890, Nos. 530–31.
commissioners and thus creating disunion among the Indians, took possession of their country, and that similarly they have taken all the native states into their possession and this was the result of their friendship.\textsuperscript{40}

**Chinese Position in Tibet**

The petition of the Regent was accepted. As a matter of fact the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was a complete myth. Though Tibet has been regarded as a Chinese Protectorate from 1720 to 1792, this Protectorate status began to decline with the conquest of Sinkiang by the Chinese around 1758. It was only in the event of a Gorkha invasion of Tibet in 1792, that a Chinese army was despatched to protect Tibet but never after that.\textsuperscript{41} In the nineteenth century the Chinese authority in Tibet was non-existent. Not a single soldier fought against the Dogras' authority in 1841-42.\textsuperscript{42} Similarly no Chinese protection was offered at the time of the Nepalese attack in 1856 or at the time of the British expedition under Francis Younghusband in 1904. Not only did the Chinese fail to protect Tibet, but their commands were never respected in Tibet during the same period. In spite of having a valid passport from the Peking authorities, the Russian explorer Prjevalski was refused permission to enter Tibet in 1878.\textsuperscript{43} In pursuance of the provisions of the Chefoo agreement of 13th September 1876, when a British Mission under Colman Macaulay in 1886 was commissioned, the Tibetans looked upon it "as the first step in a British invasion of Tibet", and refused its entry into Tibet.\textsuperscript{44} Apart from this factual position, the Chinese officers had denied their authority in Tibet on several occasions. In 1873 when the British Government desired the opening of communication with Tibet, the Chinese Government told the British Minister at Peking that they had not sufficient control on Lhasa to ensure the entry of European travellers into that country. At the time of the negotiation of an additional article to the Chefoo Convention in 1876, a similar.

\textsuperscript{40} Nisbet to Durand, 1 March 1890, *Foreign Secret E*, March 1890, Nos. 133–35.
\textsuperscript{43} Ney Elias's Note on Tibet, 5 March 1887, *Foreign Secret E*, May 1887, No. 119.
denial of authority was made by the Chinese and thus the phrase “with due regard to the circumstances” was added to the article. A similar denial of the authority of Lhasa was made by the Chinese while issuing passports to Charles Ellias in 1883 and to A. D. Carey in 1884. As a matter of fact, the Chinese would have been happy, if somehow the exclusiveness of the Lamas might have been abolished.

The appointment of the Chinese Amban (Resident) at Lhasa was part of a reciprocal arrangement under which Lhasa used to send certain Lamas to reside at Peking nominally to worship for the Imperial family. The Ambans had no control over the Government of Tibet and exercised no authority at Lhasa. In the matters of official ceremonies and religious rites, concerning the reigning family at Peking, Amban was only consulted by the Tibetan authorities. Still they resided at Lhasa as the representatives of the Emperor. From time to time they used to write memoranda and dispatches on the affairs of Tibet in a style that gave the reader the impression that they were the masters of the situation in Lhasa. In essence the position of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa was just like that of the British Resident in Kathmandu, neither having powers of interference in the affairs of the state where they were stationed. The chief reason for the perpetuation of this fallacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet lay in the works of the modern writers who derived their information exclusively from Chinese sources. The memoirs of Chien Lung (1735–1796), the Manchu Emperor, give an impression of the degree of sovereignty which that ruler imagined or intended to have over Tibet and became the basic source material for the modern writers of Tibet.45

Inter-Frontier Relations

Tibet did not have an isolated existence prior to the advent of the British authority in Kashmir. There were most amicable inter-frontier relations between people and Government, specially manifested in the border trade between Ladakh and Tibet. On governmental level there used to be exchanges of several missions.

45 Ney Elias's Note n. 43, S. C. Bajpai, "China’s Sovereignty Over Tibet a Historical Fiction", The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 21 December 1962; Captain R. L. Kennion to A. C. Talbot, Resident in Kashmir, 7 October 1900, Foreign Secret E, November 1900, Nos. 55–57.
The two important missions, Lapchak and Chaba, were originated in the treaty of peace between Ladakh and Lhasa in 1684. The Lapchak mission went from Leh to Lhasa once every three years. Its object was in part trade and in part religion. It was headed by a prominent Ladakhi monk, and it was accompanied by a leading Ladakhi Muslim (Arghun) merchant of that class which had by long tradition been permitted to trade in Tibet. The mission carried letters and presents from the Gyalpo (King), of Ladakh to the Dalai Lama. The Lapchak mission always passed through Gartok on its way to Lhasa. The Tibetans, in return for the Lapchak, sent an annual mission to Leh known as the Chaba, or “Tea Man” mission. Its head, the Chaba or Zungtsan, was the Dalai Lama’s personal trader to Ladakh. The Chaba mission left Lhasa each June, with tea for sale in Ladakh, and it arrived at Leh in December. It remained in Leh until the following April, when it set out once more for the Tibetan capital with Indian manufactured goods.

Whereas Lapchak and Chaba missions were continued by the Kashmir Darbar, even after the advent of the British Resident, the entry of the British European subjects into Tibetan territory was a problem. The Tibetans were always vigilant and alert whenever any British European subject was reported travelling close to their boundary. But if per chance anybody happened to cross into Tibet he was subjected to severe punishment. A. H. Landor entered Tibet from Kumaun in 1897. Near Mansarowar he was arrested by a Tibetan patrol party. “He was beaten, tied up, deprived of most of his possessions, made to travel in bonds for several days and finally released when he had reached a state of physical collapse.” But in spite of the difficulties, the search for the communication with Lhasa was continued. In 1898, there arose a dispute between Ladakh and Lhasa traders. To settle this dispute Captain R. L. Kennion visited the Tibetan Centre of Rudok on 4th September 1899. He stayed at Rudok and settled the issue with the Jongpen (officer).

48 Lamb, n. 44, pp. 231-33.
49 Kennion to Talbot, 8 November 1899, *Foreign Frontier A*, February 1900, Nos. 17-18.
to Rudok convinced him that he might profitably open some sort of negotiations with the Garpons at Gartok. In 1900 Kennion started for Gartok but failed to reach the destination due to opposition by Tibetans. He, however, delivered the letter of the Viceroy to the Dalai Lama to the Garpon who met him at Namku, about twelve miles west of Gartok. Though the conduct of his mission was praised, the results were nil. The letter was later returned unopened. 60 However, Lord Curzon was not to be disconcerted by this failure and, in 1904 he dispatched an expedition under Francis Younghusband.

**Sinkiang**

As in Tibet, the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh was immediately noticed in Sinkiang. The Chinese, the new masters of the area, stopped the trade and intercourse with Kashmir. 51 The Chinese power in Sinkiang had always been very shaky. The area originally populated by an Aryan Race, came under the control of the Chinese in A.D. 94 during the Han Dynasty, for a short time. After about six hundred years the Tang Emperors sent expeditions to Central Asia. The sway of the Chinese ruler over Sinkiang lasted only for a while, till Islam appeared there in A.D. 712 Muslim rule flourished in Sinkiang for nearly five hundred years. At one time in the eleventh century their rule extended from the Caspian Sea to the Gobi desert. It was only in the thirteenth century that Chingiz Khan made his appearance in Sinkiang. In A.D. 1220 Sinkiang became part of the Mongol Empire. Chingiz Khan, his son, Chagatai Khan, and his descendants continued to rule the country up to about 1678. The Jungars who took over power from the Mongols ruled the country for about 78 years, after which the Chinese became the masters of the area. In essence the history of Kashgaria from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century affords an unbroken record of civil war between two religious parties. It was only on the death of Khan Haldan-Shirin, that the struggle assumed menacing dimensions. The struggle in his family for pre-eminence ended in the mutual

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50 Kennion to Talbot, 7 October 1900, *Foreign Secret E*, November 1900, Nos. 55–57; Lamb, no. 44, pp. 245–50.

61 Pandit Narain Kaul Wazir Wazarat Ladakh to H. Ramsay, 1 February 1890, *Foreign Frontier A*, April 1890, Nos. 44–54.
overthrow of the direct heirs. Amoorsana, a distant relation of Halden's and a chief of one of the Kalmuck tribes thought that he would take advantage of these dissensions to possess himself of the Jungar throne. Accordingly with the aid of the devotees to his cause, he made an attempt. Being unsuccessful, he and his tribe declared themselves to be subjects of China. The sons of the Celestial Empire did not let slip this favourable opportunity afforded to them of gaining possession of Jungaria. A Chinese army was immediately advanced, and by the year 1758 Kashgaria was conquered by them.

As a specimen of the evil deeds that were perpetrated by members of the house of Haldan in order to secure the supreme power, the following extract from an article by Mons. Abramoff, from the proceedings of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for 1861, p. 160, is worthy of note. The article was compiled from a translation of the Chinese work—entitled Su-Yuivinv-Loo (Chronicles of the countries laying near the western borders of China):

“In September 1745, Khan Haldan-Shrin died. In accordance with the terms of his will, his second son, TSAVAN-DORIZI-ATCHJA-NAMIYAL succeeded to the khanship, and he at once slew his younger brother TSAVAN-DJAIL. Haldan-Shirin's eldest son, LAMA-DARDJA, fearing a like fate, killed the successor to the throne, and assumed the reins of Government; Lama-Dardja's sister GOLAN-BAYAR and her husband having rebelled against him were also killed. We must observe that all these murders were accomplished in the course of several years. In the year 1754, the Khan's two kinsmen TAVATS and AMOORSANA, rose against him, AMOORSANA with 1,500 men came by night to Ili and killed LAMA-DARDJA in his palaces. The Djoongars then chose for a Khan TAVATSI (He being the nearest relative of the deceased) and not AMOORSANA, as he himself expected. AMOORSANA being offended at this, as we shall see further on, acknowledged himself as a subject of the Chinese and betrayed his own country to them.”


The Manchu masters over an alien Muslim population in Sinkiang failed to preserve peace for long. Well within a century Jæhângir Khán rose into open rebellion in 1825. His revolt was so successful that he was practically the master of Kashgaria for a while. The effect of this revolt was so profound that it created a sensation throughout Central Asia. It was soon followed by the revolt of Khója Mohammed Yasúf in 1830, and later by that of the seven Khójas headed by Katta-Turra. The descendants of the dispossessed rulers of the country made repeated attempts to recover their lost patrimony from the alien Chinese masters. The last of such efforts was that made by Valí Khán Turra in 1857. Valí Khán Turra was able to hold Kashgar and rule it for some months till he was driven out by the Chinese. In July 1864, a band of Tungans came from Urumchi to foment risings against the Manchu dynasty. This revolt of the Muslim population was so widespread that it embraced the western provinces of China, Jungaria and Yarkand. One after the other, Kuchu, Yarkand, Khotan and Kashgar fell to the Khójas. The Chinese garrison was cut to pieces at every place. Kucha and Yarkand were held by Rashid-ud-deen. Khotan elected Haji Habíbulla as its ruler. In the meantime Bazurgá Khán arrived from Khokand with a force of 500 men under the able command of Yakub Beg Kushbegi. After a number of successes against the Chinese, Yakub arrested his incapable master and then set about extending his own sway. His possessions extended as far as Manas and Urumchi on the north-east and to Khotan in the south. By 1869 this obscure minor Kokandi official had made himself the absolute ruler of Sinkiang. It was a remarkable achievement. “Yaqub Beg was virtually the last truly independent sovereign of Central Asia and perhaps the most outstanding ruler that Asia produced after Nadir Shah.”54

The Chinese rule in Sinkiang was non-existent after 1863 and the major problem before Yakub was the maintenance of his rule against Russian encroachments.55 For a while China lost all her hope of reconquering Sinkiang. It was only in 1874 that the Chinese General Tso Tsung Tang attempted the reconquest.

54 Alder, n. 9, pp. 25.
Kansu was subjugated and the Chinese forces moved slowly in the
direction of Urumchi. The Chinese force was so ill-equipped that
much apprehension was felt in regard to its succession against
Amir Beg Khusbegi.\(^56\) This army moved gradually towards
Urumchi. On 16th August 1876 a town named Kunluti or Tsi-
Hwai-Cheng was captured and the next day Urumchi or Hung-
Miao-Tse (Red Temple). The town of Manas was taken from
Tunganis on 6th November 1876. This success of the Chinese gave
them an access to the north side of Thian-Shan.\(^57\) At this stage of
the campaign against Yakub, there was some difference of opinion
in regard to the continuance of the war. Prince King supported
by King-Lien was in favour of the termination of the campaign,
but the militant group among the Council prevailed and the action
was continued.\(^58\) The Chinese forces met with a serious repulse
at the hands of Yakub in the month of September 1877.\(^59\) But
soon they captured the cities of Karashar and Kucha on 7th and
18th October 1877.\(^60\) In the meantime Yakub Beg Khusbegi died.
It was rumoured that his son had conspired with Hag Kuli Beg,
Azar Khan Tora, and Niaz Hakim and poisoned him through
the medium of one of his favourite female slaves. The death of
Yakub was followed by a war of succession.\(^61\) The Chinese imme-
diately took advantage and captured the entire Kashgaria once
again towards the end of 1877.\(^62\) This Chinese re-occupation of
Sinkiang, like the previous one, failed to produce positive stability.
Constant Muslim rebellion was continued. One such rebellion
was reported in the province of Kansu in 1894. This was however

\(^{56}\) Lord A. Loftus, Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Earl of Derby, Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, 8 December 1875, *Foreign Secret*, February 1876, Nos. 2–5;
\(^{57}\) K. W. on T. F. Wade, British Charge d'Affairs in Peking, dated 16 and
\(^{58}\) K. W. notes to Nos. 185–239, *Foreign Secret*, October 1877.
\(^{59}\) Huge Fraser Peking to Earl of Derby, Telegram 13 October 1877, *Foreign
Secret*, April 1878, No. 82.
\(^{60}\) Fraser to Baron Lytton, 4 December 1877, *Foreign Secret*, April 1878, Nos.
196–97; from Lord A. Latstus, Ambassador at St Petersburg to Earl of Derby,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 23 January 1878, *Foreign Secret*, May 1878,
Nos. 21–30.
\(^{61}\) Diwan Govind Sahai to A. C. Lyall, 4 October 1878, *Foreign Secret*, February
1878, Nos. 73–78.
\(^{62}\) Telegram, Canton, 27 May 1878, *Foreign Secret*, November 1878, No. 145;
Ladakh Diaries, Henvey to Lyall, 26 September 1878, *Foreign Secret*, December
1878, Nos. 103–11.
suppressed. Though "Sinkiang has lain within the political horizon of China for more than two thousand years, but only intermittently has it been under Chinese influence, control, or sovereignty".63

Inter-Frontier Relations

There had always been inter-frontier trade between India and Sinkiang. This trade was continued with intermittent gaps up to the arrival of the Communist regime in Sinkiang. In ancient times there were more stable and positive contacts with the people of Sinkiang. Archaeological expeditions of modern times have excavated many old sites situated in Sinkiang. These sites buried deep under beds of sand, have revealed a new picture of old times in Sinkiang. Pioneer among the explorers Sir Aurel Stein brought to light certain documents of an administrative character which testify to the political authority exercised by Indians in this region. From Lop-Nor in the west to the Tarim basin in the east, there were several Indian settlements in the form of small colonial kingdoms. "They introduced Buddhism and, along with it, Indian languages, script and other elements of culture which took deep root in the soil and profoundly modified the local culture and civilization of the vast region from Pamir to the borders of China."64

Two such colonies were Khotan and Kuchar. Khotan was colonized by Kunala, the son of Asoka, the great Maurya Emperor. Details about the colonization of Kuchar are not known. These Indian colonies flourished till the arrival of Islam in the area. During Muslim rule in Sinkiang it is said that there had been some migration to Sinkiang. Khan Badshah Habibulla of Khotan traced his origin from a certain family which migrated from Delhi during Mughal rule in India.65

In the later nineteenth century, with the disappearance of Chinese rule in Sinkiang, a fresh beginning towards political and commercial relations with the area was made. Yakub Beg Khusbegi, the new master of Sinkiang deliberately reversed the restrictive policies of the Chinese. He encouraged merchants from all

63 Lattimore, n. 53, p. 5.
65 Lepel Griffia's Memorandum on the resources of the province of Khotan, Foreign Political A, April 1866, No. 137.
neighbouring states to trade with Sinkiang. In 1866, even before he had consolidated his position, Yakub Beg had sent Mohammad Nasir to the Maharaja of Kashmir proposing the establishment of friendly relation.\textsuperscript{66}

The British Government in India ever apprehensive of Russian expansion in Central Asia seized their opportunity. Restrictions were placed on direct diplomatic relations with the Maharaja, and he was advised to send Mohammed Nazir to Lahore. While Mohammed Nazir was in Jammu, Jumma Khan, a representative of Khan Habibulla of Khotan, reached Calcutta, with a letter from his master. Habibulla had appealed for military forces, and equipment. Jumma Khan, after an interview with the Viceroy, was dismissed with a present of Rupees five hundred. “I regret that it is out of my power”, Lawrence told Khan, “to furnish you with arms and equipment. . . .”\textsuperscript{67} Early in 1870, Mirza Shadi, an accredited envoy of Yakub Beg, reached Calcutta via Lahore. He had an interview with Lord Mayo on 28th March, during which he requested arms aid against an expected Russian advance. He also requested the appointment of a British representative to the court of Yakub Beg. To this Mayo replied to Mirza Shadi that although the British could not officially sell arms to Yakub Beg, they would not object to their purchase in open market.\textsuperscript{68}

To his other requests, Mayo did, however, agree to send an Agent to accompany him back to Turkestan. Mayo promptly appointed Forsyth as his envoy, with Dr. George Henderson of the Indian Medical Service, and Shaw was included in the party at his own request, to assist him. Forsyth was instructed to proceed to Turkestan via Chang-Chenmo valley, which Mirza Shadi wanted particularly to see so that he could report on it to Yakub Beg. While in Turkestan, Forsyth was to explain the nature of the treaty between the British and Kashmir to Yakub Beg. He was to explore the possibilities of trade between India and Eastern Turkestan and to reiterate the Viceroy’s advice and warning in regard to

\textsuperscript{66} Yakub Beg to Ranbir Singh, 18 July 1866, \textit{Foreign Political A}, October 1866, Nos. 181-82.

\textsuperscript{67} John Lawrence, Governor-General and Viceroy of India to Earl of Grey and Ripon, Secretary of State for India, 8 March 1866, \textit{Foreign Political}, March 1866, No. 43.

\textsuperscript{68} Thornton to Aitchison, 31 January 1870, \textit{Political A}, Proceedings June 1870, No. 205; Memorandum of the interview, \textit{Foreign Political A}, Proceedings, June 1870, No. 215;
Russia. Forsyth's mission was not a political one. He was, therefore, positively instructed "to abstain from taking any part whatever in the political questions that may be agitated or disputes that may arise further than conveying to Atalik Ghazee the general advice already given to him by the Viceroy".69

When Forsyth's mission passed through Ladakh, the necessary supplies were not on hand, causing a great loss of livestock. Cayley, the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh, felt "convinced that the plan was intentionally formed for arresting progress of the mission to Yarkand and, still more, of preventing the opening of the Chang-Chenmo route".70 From the start the mission was impeded by intrigue by Mirza Shadi and the Kashmir authorities. When Forsyth reached Yarkand, Yakub Beg was engaged in warfare at a distance of 700 miles. The mission had therefore to return to India without achieving any results. The mission was a complete failure, but was considered a success and large profits from the Turkestan trade were confidently awaited.71 Yakub Beg was not inactive in the days following Forsyth's visit. A series of exchanges of envoys took place. One such envoy, Ahrah Khan Tora, came to Calcutta in June 1872. In the following year, Yakub Beg sent another envoy Syed Yakub Khan to the British Viceroy in India. This ambassador, in keeping with Yakub Beg's careful policy of balance, had already visited St. Petersburg and Constantinople before he reached Calcutta. In his audience with Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy, Yakub Khan again asked for British support against the Russians and was given the same answer as his predecessor. He also requested the appointment of a British mission to accompany him back to Turkestan. He asked for an increase in commercial intercourse, and the exchange of permanent representatives. To all this the Viceroy agreed, and Forsyth was once more appointed to lead the mission, which was to be much more impressive than the previous one.72

69 Aitchison to Thornton, 14 April 1870, Foreign Political A, Proceedings, June 1870, No. 219; Prasad, n. 53, p. 73; Alder, n. 9, p. 43.
70 Dr. Cayley's Report, 23 July 1870, Foreign Political A, December 1870, No. 465.
71 Dr. Cayley's Reports, July to November 1870, Foreign Political A, December 1870, Nos. 461-504.
The commercial treaty with Yakub Beg was the main object of this mission of 1873-74. But in addition Forsyth was instructed to obtain as much scientific, geographical and strategic information as possible. With the permission of Yakub Beg Forsyth was to obtain full information regarding the boundaries of Eastern Turkestan. Should Yakub Beg request the demarcation of his borders with Russia and India, this information was to be forwarded to Northbrook directly. If it was possible to represent the British Government in the court of Yakub Beg, R. B. Shaw, then British Joint Commissioner at Leh, was the Viceroy’s choice.

Forsyth arrived in Kashgar in December 1873. He was accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Gordon, Second in Command; Dr W. H. Ballow, Surgeon-Major; Captain H. Trotter; Captain J. Biddulph of the 19th Hussars and an aide-de-camp to the Viceroy; Captain E. F. Chapman, Secretary to the mission; and Dr Ferdinand Stoliezka of the Geological Survey of India. Forsyth stayed four months in Kashgar and during this period he had five audiences with Yakub Beg. He successfully negotiated a treaty of commerce and friendship with Yakub Beg (Atalik Ghazi), which was signed on 2nd February 1874, and was ratified by the Governor-General of India on 13th April 1874. The thirteen-articles treaty provided, among other things, free trading and residence rights for the nationals of India and Eastern Turkestan on a most-favoured national basis. Trade was to be free and protected within both countries, although British merchandise could be charged a duty at entrance not exceeding $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent ad valorem. Goods from Turkestan crossing to India were to enter duty free. The usual appointment of high level representatives and such subordinate commercial agents as might be suitable, was stipulated.

The treaty of 1874 required ratification by the Viceroy and subsequently the signatures of the Amir, who had only placed his seal on it so far. The ratified copy from Calcutta did not reach Forsyth before his departure to India. As a result, a mission under R. B. Shaw, was sent to Turkestan, to carry the ratified treaty to Yakub Beg. In essence his mission was to ascertain whether it

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73 Northbrook to Argyll, 30 June 1873, Foreign Secret, June 1873, No. 368.
75 Northbrook to Salisbury, Secretary of State for India, 17 April 1874, Treaty, 2 February 1874, Foreign Secret, April 1874, Nos. 44-49; C. U. Aitchison, n. 1, pp. 7-11; Boulger, n. 74, Appendix pp. 322-29.
would be desirable to station a permanent British official in Kashgar or Yarkand. Although Yakub Beg wanted Shaw to remain in the country, Shaw reported that, according to Haji Tora, the Amir "never entertained the idea of our [Shaw and his party] staying". Subsequent to this visit of Shaw two Yarkand envoys visited the Viceroy and impressed upon him the desirability of stationing a British Agent in Kashgar. Lord Lytton, the successor of Northbrook, never wanted to risk either the dignity of the British Government or the life of their representatives. He, therefore, enquired from Lord Salisbury the desirability of sending an envoy to Yarkand. The Secretary of State for India was of the opinion that, "the advantage is not worth the risk". In the meantime the Yarkand envoy had an interview with the Viceroy, and the project of sending an envoy to Yarkand was abandoned for the time being.

By 1874, the kingdom of Yakub Beg became a focal point for the extension of their sphere of influence by Russia and England respectively. Both wanted to maintain the independence of Sinkiang. The Russians were interested because they were committed to withdraw from the Ili Valley only if the Chinese should re-establish their control there. The British on the other hand wanted Sinkiang to be a stable buffer between theirs and the Russian Empire.

Meanwhile the Chinese forces under Tso-Tsung-Tang entered Sinkiang. The British made an abortive attempt to keep Yakub Beg's kingdom intact. Sir Doughas Forsyth met Li-Hung-chang in Peking on 9th April 1876 and raised the question. Li made it clear to Forsyth that the Chinese Empire was not prepared to recede except on condition of the submission of Yakub Beg to China. He was to remain only as a vassal and not as an independent ruler. The triumphant army of Tso-Tsung-Tang captured the whole kingdom of Yakub Beg by the end of 1877. Soon after the

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76 Northbrook to Salisbury, 2 June 1874, Foreign Secret, June 1874, Nos. 81–87.
77 Northbrook to Salisbury, 25 December 1874; Shaw to India, 10 October, 27 October 1874, Foreign Secret, December 1874, Nos. 64–74.
78 Telegram of Salisbury to Lytton, 17 August 1876, Foreign Secret, December 1876, Nos. 81–118.
79 Kuropatkin, n. 52, pp. 191–92; Wade to Forsyth, 6 April 1876, Foreign Secret, January 1877, No. 118.
80 Forsyth to Wade, On Board the Steamer Shantung, 9 April 1876, Foreign Secret, January 1877, No. 120; Prasad, n. 53, pp. 78–79; Alder, n. 9, pp. 64–65.
The capture of Sinkiang the Chinese closed the trade routes to Kashmir and British India.

The British Government in India never rested content with the changed conditions in Sinkiang. Johnson, the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh tried to contact the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang. He first sent one Mulla Mohammed Yusuf with a letter to the Amban (Resident). But this letter was not even acknowledged. In 1878 Johnson despatched Alum Jan with a letter and presents to Sinkiang. On his arrival at the Kilian Pass, he was stopped by the Chinese. Alum wrote to Niaz Hakim of Yarkand who sent his servants to him. Hakim's servants escorted him to Yarkand, and there he met the Chinese Amban, who refused permission to foreign merchants, observing that it was against their rule to allow strangers to visit their new conquests until they had already settled down there. Next year in July, Ney Elias, officiating British Joint Commissioner, went up to Kilian. He met the Chinese Amban and stressed upon him the desirability of opening the trade routes. The Amban, therefore, enquired if he had any letters from the British Government and a passport from Peking. Elias had none and explained his position that he was only a border employee. In matters of trade, the Amban told Elias, it was all under the instruction of superior authorities at Kashgar. But he pointed out that this was temporary.

In the spring of 1879 news was published regarding the Russian advance from Samarkand to the Upper Oxus. Elias felt alarmed by it and immediately wrote to his governments: "Would it not be advisable for me to go to Kashgar again this year and thence to Badakhshan, in order to report upon what is really going on." Lord Ripon immediately accepted the proposal and instructed him to proceed with Godwin Austin, Extra Assistant Commissioner of the Andaman Islands. He was instructed to "visit Yarkand and Kashgar and collect information, especially with regard to the commercial position and proceedings of the Russians and the

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81 Abstract translation of a letter from Niaz Hakim to Johnson, Foreign Secret, May 1879, No. 73B.
82 Henvey to Lyall, 18 November 1878, Foreign Secret, May 1879, Nos. 69476.
83 Ney Elias to Henvey, 12 September 1879, Foreign Secret, November 1879, No. 270; Alder, n. 9, pp. 76-77.
84 Ney Elias to Lyall, 2 January 1880, Foreign Secret, March 1880, Nos. 221-18, K.W.
influence of the last Russo-Chinese treaty upon our trade interests".  

The dispatch of Elias to Kashgar on the excuse of trade was sharply attacked in the Council of the Secretary of State for India. Sir Erakine Peny remarked that, "... all this bash about the promotion of trade, of which we have heard so much before, is too flimsy to be repeated".

Ney Elias reached Kilian on 27th May 1880 and Yarkand on 8th June. In his conversation with Hakim Beg he discovered that the Chinese were not much concerned with either trade or other matters, "... because the Indian frontier gave the Chinese no anxiety and involved no troublesome question". On 10th June 1880 he met the Chinese Amban at Yarkand and impressed upon him the advantage of trade routes and the local trade. The Amban, although agreeing with Elias, was not in a position to do anything. He forwarded Elias to Kashgar. On 19th June Elias met the Chinese Amban in Kashgar and discussed the commercial matters with him. The Amban replied:

If any of your people came whether for trade or to see the country, or to bring letters from your Government, I shall always be glad to see them, and will allow them to do whatever they please here and see that they are properly treated; this you may report to your government, and I do it because our two governments are friendly to each other, but I have no power to sanction arrangements or lay down any rules for intercourse, or to appoint officers to superintend trade.

In the meantime Peking also permitted Elias' mission to Yarkand. Despite permission from Peking to travel extensively, Elias was met everywhere with humiliation and obstruction. He returned convinced that nothing could be achieved except by a properly accredited mission. In his report he stated that "... the whole of the trade with India is regarded as illegal by the Chinese

85 Lyall to Elias, 8 March 1880, Demi-official Foreign Secret, March 1880, Nos. 211–18, K.W.
86 Quoted in Alder, n. 9, p. 78.
87 Ney Elias's Diary, 8 June 1880, Foreign Secret, January 1881, Nos. 132–43.
88 Ney Elias's Diary, 19 June 1880, ibid.
authorities, and, being only allowed on sufferance, is liable to be stopped at any moment".89

Within a year of the departure of Elias from Kashgar, Russia signed a treaty with China on 12th February 1881 at St. Petersburg. By this twenty-article treaty, Russia virtually gained all desired commercial privileges in Sinkiang. These privileges included, a free zone along the western Chinese boundary; the remission of two-thirds of duty on land-borne goods; the opening of thirty-six new points of entry; and new Consulates at Ili, Tarbagatai, Kashgar and Ourga.90

This was really a positive rebuff to the British position in Sinkiang. Someone was badly needed to watch the activities of Russia in Sinkiang, close to the Indian border. Ripon's successor, Lord Dufferin made a positive departure from his predecessor's policy towards Sinkiang. The loss suffered by the treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881 was to be regained. Therefore the commercial-cum-political pattern of relations with the Chinese concerning Sinkiang was changed to political-cum-commercial. In the meantime the political situation in the Upper Oxus was deteriorating and more reliable information about it was expedient. Consequently Ney Elias was once again in 1885 sent to Kashgar. He was instructed to negotiate with the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang for a permanent Political Agency and the removal of trade restrictions.91 Elias met with a very unfriendly reception by the Chinese in Sinkiang.

The Chinese decline even to discuss the trade question and the minister has not thought it worthwhile to mention the main object of the mission i.e. the establishment of an Agent. He (Amban) says that he 'imagines' I might remain as long as I please under my passport, or even 'establish myself' there, but in what capacity and with what functions is not apparent.92

Nicholas O'Connor, the Secretary of the British Legation in Peking, was having difficulty in dealing with the authorities there.

89 Elias to Henvey, 31 August 1880, Foreign Secret, January 1881, No. 133.
90 Mayer, n. 44, pp. 271-77.
91 Alder, n. 9, pp. 82-83.
92 Elias to Durand, 17 January 1886, Demi-official, Foreign Secret, March 1886, No. 298.
The Yamen (Chinese foreign office) flatly refused to send anyone to negotiate with Elias and argued that the trade was too small to justify any special regulation. O’Connor, however, remained optimistic. Several attempts were made by Dufferin and his successor Lansdowne towards the installation of a British Consul at Kashgar, but with no results. The Russian threat was increasing gradually. It was most desirable to obtain accurate information. Francis Younghusband was, therefore, deputed to Sinkiang for one year from 1st June 1890. He was accompanied by G. Macartney as his interpreter. At the end of his term Younghusband returned to Calcutta, leaving Macartney in Sinkiang. By 1893 Macartney won some sort of local recognition, and was invested with the title of “Special Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Chinese Affairs”. Eleven years later, he became Consul. But on both occasions without Chinese consent.

Gilgit Agency 1889

The deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh was followed by the installation of the Second Gilgit Agency in July 1889. From July 1881, when the first Gilgit Agency was withdrawn, the venue of the British activities shifted from Gilgit to Jammu. In the course of eight years, not only was a British Resident appointed in Kashmir, but the ruler of the State was unceremoniously deposed. The Gilgit region and the Russian activities in its neighbourhood was, however, never lost sight of by the British statesmen. Tribal activities and explorations were continued. In 1885, while Ney Elias was sent to Kashgar, Colonel W. S. A. Lockhart, in company of Colonel Woodthrope as Surveyor, Surgeon Giles and Captain Barrow of the Indian Intelligence Deapartment, was sent into the tribal lands south of the Hindu Kush. He was to determine to what extent India was vulnerable through the Hindu Kush range between the Kilik Pass and Kaffristan. He surveyed twelve thousand square miles of territory. In April 1886 he visited Hunza. Next year in 1887, Andrew Dalgleish, a British trader, informed the Government that the Russians had already endeavoured to explore

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93 O’Connor to Dufferin, 31 December 1885, Foreign Secret, March 1886, No. 301; Alder, n. 9, p. 83.
94 Kimberley to Lansdowne, 8 February 1893, Foreign Secret F, February 1893, No. 207.
the region, but were stopped on the Hunza frontier.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} A similar report was made by Captain E. G. Barrow, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch, to the Government. In the meantime, the Rajas of Hunza and Nagar with 2,000 men threatened Chaprot and Chalt forts.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} Under such conditions Captain Algernon Durand, the younger brother of the Foreign Secretary, was deputed to Gilgit in 1888. He was instructed to "... examine the military position from a general point of view having regard to possible future complications with Russia...".\textsuperscript{\textcopyright}

Immediately after his arrival at Gilgit he formed his opinion that "Hunza and Nagar we should undoubtedly get at quicker. ..."\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} In the same year it was reported that a Chinese official visited Hunza by the Kirish route. Under these circumstances, Captain Durand, after careful survey of the area, proposed the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} By then, the British game at Jammu was accomplished. Maharaja Pratap Singh was deposed and Raja Amar Singh, the Prime Minister, readily agreed to the proposal.

Captain Durand, thus armed with powers to deal with the tribal chiefs, reported at Gilgit on 27th July 1889. Soon after his arrival he began to establish contacts with the tribal chiefs. He went to Nagar early in August and offered a subsidy of Rs. 2,000 yearly to the Raja and his son.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} On 25th August 1889 he reached Hunza and offered the same terms to Raja Safdar Ali as he had offered to Jaffar Khan of Nagar. Safdar Ali at first agreed but later demanded Rs. 500 extra for his minor son. This first

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} Dalgleish’s Memorandum on the routes to Central Asia, 21 October 1887, Foreign Secret F, January 1888, No. 61.

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} Plowden to Durand, Telegram, 3 February 1888, Foreign Frontier A, May 1888, No. 153.

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} H. M. Durand to Captain Durand, 22 June 1888, Foreign Secret F, September 1888, No. 176.

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} Captain Durand to H. M. Durand, 23 August 1888, Foreign Secret F, K. W. 2, October 1888, Nos. 102–21.

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} Captain Durand's Report, Foreign Secret F, May 1889, Nos. 544–59; Lansdowne, to Cross, 6 May 1889, ibid., no. 559; Cross to Lansdowne, 28 June 1889, Foreign Secret F, October 1889, No. 104.

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} Nisbet to Durand, Telegram, 27 August 1889, Foreign Secret F, September 1889, No. 240; H. S. Barnes, Under Secretary to Raja Jaffar Khan of Nagar, 13 September 1889, Foreign Secret F, September 1889, No. 252.
mission was partly successful as Safdar Ali agreed to allow Younghusband to pass through his territories.\(^{102}\) In the meantime Perry Nisbet, the Resident in Kashmir, got the replacement of Wazir Gulam Haider by Mohammed Khan, a choice of Captain Durand as governor of Gilgit. Francis Younghusband passed through Hunza safely. But in the meantime, it was reported by Durand that the deposed Maharaja of Kashmir had warned the chiefs of Hunza and Nagar about the English designs. He had pointed out to them how he and his brothers had been ruined and urged them to combine against the English penetration.\(^{103}\)

**Hunza Expedition, 1891**

Tension between the British and tribal chiefs of Hunza and Nagar began to mount. They failed to send their vakils to Kashmir and the attack on the Kashgar trade was continued. Safdar Ali refused to pass mail through his territory to Younghusband.\(^{104}\) Lt. Colonel Durand wrote to Safdar Ali and Jafar Khan of Hunza and Nagar, about the passage of troops and the construction of roads within their territory. He pointed out that:

> You are well aware that a Russian force this year moved on to Pamirs and explored the passes leading from them southwards over the mountains. Your state lies to the south of these mountains, which here form the boundary of the Indian Empire and is within the borders of India.... The roads must be made. Unless you instantly comply with the demands of supreme government, troops will enter your territory, and the roads will be constructed in spite of any opposition that you may offer. Three days from this date [29th November 1891] will be allowed you, during which your answer will be awaited, and I warn you, should it not be completely satisfactory, the troops under

\(^{102}\) Captain Durand to Mortimer Durand, 1 September 1889, *Foreign Secret F*, September 1889, Nos. 231–52; H. S. Barnes to Safdar Ali, 19 October 1889; *Foreign Secret F*, October, 1889, No. 131.


my command will move forward and carry out the orders of Government.\textsuperscript{105}

In the meantime sanction for the Hunza expedition was received from England. On 1st December 1891 Lt. Col. Durand reported that the chiefs of Nagar and Hunza had decided on fighting, and a force had crossed the river Hunza for making an attack on Nilt. Next day the British troops were mobilized and Nagar was captured on 21st December and Hunza on 22nd.\textsuperscript{106} As soon as the British force entered Nagar, Safdar Ali, Wazir Dadu and Uzrkhan fled towards Sinkiang without any followers, and their territories were officially surrendered. After the capture of these states the subsidy hitherto paid was stopped. Raja Jaffar Khan of Nagar who had not cooperated in the hostile acts of his son, Uzr Khan, was restored to power, after he had made an unqualified submission. In Hunza no ruling member of the family was readily available. Therefore Humayun, the younger brother of Dadu, and a former Wazir of Ghazan Khan, the father of Safdar Ali was made governor temporarily. These states remained dependencies of Kashmir as usual.\textsuperscript{107}

In April 1892, Mohammed Nazim Khan, the half-brother of Safdar Ali, and the likely choice of the successor of late Ghazan Khan, was installed ruler provisionally. Later on Nazim Khan was confirmed to the Rajaship of Hunza. At this stage the Chinese tried to take part in the installation ceremony. They were told that: "The Chinese delegate should attend as an honoured spectator taking no active part."\textsuperscript{108} Peace and prosperity began to grow in the little kingdoms of Hunza and Nagar. The subsidies to the rulers which had been stopped, were restored. Both Nagar and Hunza were granted a total subsidy of Rs. 4,000 each from 1895.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{105} Lt. Colonel Durand to Safdar Ali and Jafar Khan, 29 November 1891, Foreign Frontier A, January 1892, No. 51.


\textsuperscript{107} Lansdowne to Cross, 16 March 1892, Foreign Secret F, March 1892, No. 194.

\textsuperscript{108} Lansdowne to Cross, Telegram, 28 May 1892, Foreign Secret F, June 1892, No. 186.

Hunza and Chinese

The tribal states of Hunza and Nagar were one state in the remote past. During the reign of Shah Jahan (6th February 1628–8th June 1658), a prince of Nagar had visited Kashmir to seek assistance against his brother. The aid was granted. This precisely marks the beginning of tribal relations with the Mughal rule in India. After the rise of Sikh rule and the annexation of Gilgit in about 1841, the tribal states of Hunza and Nagar agreed to become dependencies of Kashmir. Both Hunza and Nagar had executed the deeds of surrender to Kashmir. Shah Ghazanfar Raja of Hunza declared: "That at the time when the honoured Madar-ul-Mohrun (Prime Minister) Wazir Zorawar Singh taking possession of the country of Skardu annexed it to the Sarkar's State, I paid my respect to the above Wazir and accepted the Sirkar's rule."

The state of Nagar used to pay a tribute of twenty-one tolas of gold and two baskets of apricots, to Kashmir state from 1853. The state of Hunza paid a yearly tribute of two horses, two pounds and twenty ounces of gold-dust to Kashmir from 1869.

The relations of China with Hunza began in 1847. At the time of the insurrection of seven Khojas in Yarkand, Shah Ghazanfar Khan of Hunza rendered assistance to the Chinese in overcoming the rebellion. In recognition of the services rendered, the Chinese granted a jageer to him in Yarkand. Besides the jagir a fixed subsidy was paid by the Chinese to the Raja of Hunza, who in return gave presents to the Taotai of Kashgar. It is evident from the correspondence that passed between King Ghazanagar Ali Khan and the Chinese Ambans of Yarkand and Kashgar between 1850–1863, that the relations between Hunza and the Chinese in Sinkiang were perfectly friendly, based on equality, and were not between a subordinate and a paramount power. Whenever the Mir of Hunza received less subsidy than was stipulated, he used

111 Copies of Treaties, Col. W. F. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir to Durand, 27 February 1892, Foreign Secret F, April 1892, Nos. 74–76. For text see Appendix Nos. VII and VIII.
112 Biddulph, n. 110, pp. 25, 29.
113 Ibid., p. 28; Alder, n. 9, p. 160; Taotai of Kashgar to Nizam Khan, 30 September 1897, Foreign Secret F, March 1898, No. 375.
to demand the balance from them. But when the Chinese rule disappeared from Sinkiang in 1863, with the rise of Yakub Beg Khusbegi, this system of subsidy and presents was stopped. After the reconquest of Sinkiang by the Chinese in 1878, their Commander-in-Chief, Zunk-Tunk Daubaklo, addressed a note to the Mir of Hunza, to the effect that:

From enquiries I learn that the district of Kanjut has been under the rule of China. You are a wise man and therefore I have written this to you, so that you will consider and let me know distinctly, how many districts are under you, and whether you are willing to submit to and serve the Emperor of China.

In the meantime a British Agency at Gilgit was posted under Major Biddulph in 1877. He tried to win over the rulers of Hunza, by entering into correspondence with him. At this time perhaps out of fear of the English, the Mir of Hunza sent his presents to the Chinese Amban in Sinkiang. The first Hunza Envoy reached Kashgar in November 1879 with presents and a letter. The Envoy was well received and was sent back with presents and a letter to the Khan. During November 1879 and April 1880, the Raja of Hunza sent several messengers with letters and tried hard for a

114 Jan-Wang-Sola, Amban ruler of Yarkand to Shah Ghazanfar Beg, 22 July 1850; this bunch of papers contains several letters to the ruler of Hunza to the same effect, but without date. One such is marked as “25th Dokwang year 18th day of the 2nd Month”, Foreign Secret F, September 1892, Nos. 428, 434, 450, 454, 460; Cf. Captain A. H. McMohan, Political Agent, Gilgit, who wrote that: “China claims that Hunza has paid tribute to her since the time of the Emperor Chien-Lung (1736-1796).” Foreign Secret F, July 1898, No. 327. For papers found in Hunza see Appendix No. XI.

115 Chinese Proclamation in Turki and Chinese (Translation) dated 24th day of the 12 month of the 3rd year of the reign of Kwang Shui, Foreign Secret F, September 1892, No. 409.

116 Biddulph in a memorandum on the present conditions of affair in Gilgit wrote that: “On one pitiable occasion when an unexpected chance of exploration in Hunza [in 1876], which would have yielded valuable results, presented itself, pressure was placed on the Mir of Hunza to make him withdraw the offers he had spontaneously made, and he was threatened with the Maharaja’s displeasure for daring to make friends with the English.” Dated 31 March 1881, Foreign Secret, July 1881, Nos. 314–99.

In his book Tribes of Hindoo Koosh published in 1880, he says that he had been to Hunza in 1876. See p. 22. Cf. Alder, n. 9, p. 138.
BRITISH ACTION IN AND AROUND KASHMIR

complete liaison with the Chinese. In April 1880 Dilawar Khan, the Hunza envoy went to Kashgar with 9 miscals of gold and 9 fox skins.117

Colonel Lockhart, the first European to do so, visited Hunza in 1886. In the meantime Russian activities became intense. Grum Girjimails visited Hunza in 1887. Captain Gromchevsky and a party of Cossacks crossed over into Hunza territory in 1888.118 Under such circumstances, China’s relationship with Hunza attracted British attention for the first time. Sir John Walshan, the British Envoy at Peking reported the publication of a memorandum from the Governor of Chinese Turkestan in Peking Gazette on 13th November 1886, referring to the present of an ounce and half of gold dust from Hunza.119 Walsham was told privately by Dufferin to maintain the British rights over Hunza. In 1888 at the time of a tribal attack on Chalt and Chaprot in Gilgit area, Tsungli Yamen alleged a British attack on Hunza.120 Tsungli Yamen was told that:

... the chief of Kanjut has also long been a feudatory of Kashmir, receiving a yearly pension and paying tribute. It would be impossible therefore for the Indian Government to allow this petty border chieftain to create disturbance on Indian soil with impunity and in reliance on his pretension to be a tributary state of Chinese Emperor.121

After this final reply to China, all other Chinese pretensions were politely put off. Russians in Yarkand became aware of the disagreements. They began to create a gulf between the British and the Chinese. They scrupulously exploited every situation

118 Translation from the Proceedings of Russian Imperial Geographical Society, vol. XXVI, 1890, No. 1, Foreign Frontier B, September 1890, Nos. 128-29.
120 Walsham to Dufferin, Telegram, 9 June 1888, Foreign Secret F, July 1888, No. 98; Walsham to Dufferin, 24 July 1888, Foreign Secret F, October, 1888, No. 102; Tsungli Yamen to Walsham, 7 June 1888, ibid., no. 103.
thereafter. Therefore, on the successful occupation of Hunza in 1891, by the British, the Chinese requested to be represented by an accredited envoy of the Chinese Emperor at the installation of Nazim Khan. But they were allowed only as honoured spectators. In December 1892, the Jokin wrote a letter to the Mir of Hunza asking for the rehabilitating of the family of Wazir Dadu who had fled the country during the British expedition of 1891. Colonel Durand, Political Agent, Gilgit, assured the settlement of the family in Hunza territory subject to the good conduct of the members of the family. But he warned the Jokin “... it would be more convenient in future, should you write on matters relating to affairs in the territory of the Government of India, if your letters were addressed to me and not to officials subordinate to me”. The relations of Hunza with China were fully discussed in the Council of the Viceroy, and it was decided that “if a Chinese official is sent to Hunza I would decline to let him have any direct dealings with the Mir and would be civil to him and bow him out...”

Consequent to this positive reply by the British Government, the Chinese tried to install a Resident at Hunza. But they were told that “this was an innovation, and one which was out of the question”. In the matter of presents from the ruler of Hunza, which the Chinese had always treated as tributes, the attitude of the British Government paved the way for strengthening the fiction of the Chinese rights over Hunza. It was decided that “... H.M.'s Government do not wish to interfere with any customary interchange of presents between Hunza and Kashgar”.

122 G. Macartney to Lansdowne, 19 December 1891, Foreign Secret F, April 1892, No. 42.
123 Lansdowne to Cross, 28 May 1892, Telegram, Foreign Secret F, June 1892, No. 186.
124 Jokin of Yarkand to Mohammed Nazim Khan, 18 December 1892, Foreign Secret F, April 1893, No. 23.
125 A. G. Durand to Taotai of Kashgar, 1 January 1893, Foreign Secret F, April 1893, No. 24.
127 Earl of Roseberry, Secretary for Foreign Affairs to N. R. O'Conor, Minister at Peking, 5 July 1893; Asia Confidential, No. 1926, Foreign Secret F, October 1893, Nos. 129, 130, 132.
This concession on the part of the British Government to China out of sheer friendly relations, was used as an instrument by the Chinese. They demanded every year from Hunza a tribute, the receipt of which they published in Peking Gazette yearly.129 Prior to 1863 this present was only a token acknowledging the Hunza jagir in Yarkand.

The jagir of the Mir of Hunza in Yarkand consisted of five houses at one place and eleven houses and seven stables with cultivable land attached to them at another.130 When Nazim Khan demanded the product of these lands and properties, he was told that Safdar Ali, the ex-ruler of Hunza, with twenty-six others were living there and using their produce. This admission of the jagir came from the Chinese after a great persuasion by the ruler of Hunza.131

Raskam

Soon after the admission of the Hunza jagir in Yarkand, the Chinese authorities on the instigation of M. Petrovaski, Russian Consul-General in Kashgar, tried to stop the cultivation of the Raskam lands by the Hunza people.132 Raskam, once a flourishing settlement, was situated on one of the many branches which form the south-western source of the Yarkand river. Kirghiz, Pakpooh and Shakshooh were the tribes who used to live there. They paid tribute to the Mir of Hunza and were under the Hunza state.133 After the re-occupation of Sinkiang by the Chinese it appeared that the lands of Raskam seldom attracted any attention. Hunza had for a long time cultivated the lands of Raskam valley. The correspondence found in the captured Hunza fort in 1891 revealed that exchanges about Raskam lands had taken place between Safdar Ali and the

129 Peking Gazette, 14 May 1898, Foreign Secret F, August 1895, No. 208.
130 Taotai of Kashgar to Nazim Khan, 30 September 1897, Foreign Secret F, March 1898, No. 375.
131 Taotai of Kashgar to Nazim Khan, 21 March 1897, Foreign Secret F, October 1897, No. 325.
133 Biddulph, n. 110, p. 26; Expedition of Grombcheffshi, 1889, Translation from the Proceedings of Russian Imperial Geographical Society, vol. XXVI, 1890, No. 1, Foreign Frontier B, September 1890, Nos. 128-29.
Chinese authorities in which the latter had not denied the claims of Hunza. 134

Captain A. H. McMahon, Political Agent at Gilgit, advised the Mir to continue cultivation in Raskam on the best terms that he could obtain from the Chinese. 135 On the representation by the Mir, the Toatai wrote: "Take over the land and cultivate it well. The people may come in to cultivate it. I ask you to consider this my order and carry it out." 136 But in the meantime Petrovski protested to the Chinese authorities at Kashgarh and threatened that "if China allows Hunza 'to take' Raskam the Russians will take 'something' too". 137 Consequent to this threat, the Chinese cancelled their earlier orders in regard to Raskam. In lieu of the Raskam lands the Chinese offered grains to the increased population of Hunza. But the Mir objected to this offer and was not prepared to renounce his inherited rights over the Raskam lands. 138 Unfortunately the British Government in India decided to advise the Mir not to cultivate the Raskam lands forcefully against the desire of the Chinese Government. 139 In the meantime the British Government enquired from Russia about their threat in regard to Raskam. Count Mouravieff replied that "... (Raskam) matter is between the Indian Government and China, with which Russia had nothing to say". 140 In the meantime Sir C. Macdonald wrote to Tsungli Yamen regarding the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang. He proposed that if China withdrew her claims of sovereignty over Hunza, the British Government would not press for the

134 Papers found in Hunza Fort, Foreign Secret F, September 1892, Nos. 396–472; Alder, n. 9, p. 283; See Appendix No. XI.
135 W. J. Cunningham to Talbot, Telegram, 4 July 1898, Foreign Secret F, July 1898, No. 344.
138 Charge d’Affairs Peking to Baron Curzon, Viceroy, Telegram, 18 April 1899, Foreign Secret F, May 1899, No. 191; Curzon to G. F. Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, 1 May 1899, ibid., No. 195.
Raskam lands. Sir C. Macdonald to Tsungli Yamen, 14 March 1899, *Foreign Secret F*, August 1899; Cunningham to Talbot, 28 July 1899, ibid., No. 198.

142 Taotai to G. Macartney, Telegram, 8 November 1899, *Foreign Secret F*, February 1900, No. 142.

143 Macdonald to Curzon, Telegram, 12 May 1900, *Foreign Secret F*, 1 June 1900, No. 90.

144 Talbot to W. J. Cunningham, 15 June 1900, *Foreign Secret F*, September 1900, No. 19.

145 Aitchison, n. 1, p. 15.
his son and successor, Pratap Singh, suffered serious hardships under the Resident, who was appointed soon after the death of Ranbir Singh. Ultimately Pratap Singh was deposed on false charges in 1889.

With the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh on 8th March 1889, the British power came into direct contact with the people beyond the borders of Kashmir. The Tibetans were always apprehensive of the British designs towards their country. Therefore they never allowed any British personnel into their country. If per chance any one happened to cross, he was subjected to harsh treatment. The deposition of Pratap Singh made the Tibetans even more vigilant. It was only towards the close of the century that Kennion happened to cross into Tibet and that too without any results. On the other hand the native state of Ladakh and later Jammu and Kashmir were maintaining positive commercial and religious ties with Tibet. Chinese power in Tibet was non-existent. The Ambans were mere officials whose sole function was to observe and to report to Peking. Their interference in the state affairs was neither desired nor welcomed. The writ of China was opposed in Tibet in every respect. This happened in the case of the Macaulay Mission (1886), Petrovaski’s passport affair (1876) and in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 in regard to Sikkim.

Pratap Singh’s deposition marked a positive change in the Chinese attitude towards the British. They were the masters of Sinkiang which they had regained from Yakub Beg in 1878. Prior to that their position in Sinkiang had been very shaky. They had gained control over Sinkiang in A.D. 94 but soon lost it. It was only in 1758 that the Chinese again established their rule in Sinkiang, which was always threatened by the rebellious Jungars and Khojas. From 1863 to 1877 Chinese rule was non-existent in Sinkiang. Their “new dominions” were established only in 1878, that too, always with serious threats from its Mohammadan population.

The state of Kashmir had always maintained some sort of commercial relations with Sinkiang. In the remote past the Indians had their colonies in Sinkiang such as Khotan and Kuchar. But with the arrival of the British power on the frontiers of India and with the reconquest of Sinkiang by the Chinese, the position became different. China which had had a foretaste of British interference from the seaside and the consequences of the two wars
of 1841-42 and 1857-58, and of the treaties of Nanking and Tiensin, had steeled her resolve to offer resistance to British encroachments in her new dominions. They obstructed every British move towards the establishment of relations with Sinkiang. Although the British had gained some footing in Sinkiang during Yakub Beg’s regime, they lost all with his disappearance. The abortive effort of the British towards the creation of an independent Sinkiang was also foiled. Every subsequent British mission to Sinkiang headed by Ney Elias in 1880, 1884-85 miserably failed. Their efforts towards a commercial treaty with China in regard to Sinkiang were flatly turned down, and no trade Consul was allowed to stay at Kashgar. It was only in 1893 that G. Macartney was appointed Special Assistant to the Resident of Kashmir unilaterally and was stationed at Kashgar. The recognition of this British Consulate by the Chinese authorities came only after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

Russia gained the upper hand in Sinkiang. Though she had to vacate the Ili valley she gained the consular representation in Sinkiang in 1882, with a right to trade.

The deposition of Pratap Singh was followed by the establishment of a second Gilgit Agency in July 1889. Agent Captain A. Durand soon took steps towards the capture of the tribal states of Hunza and Nagar in 1891-92. This action of the British on the confines of Empire drove Hunza to the Chinese orbit. Hunza was a dependency of Kashmir from the time of Zorawar Singh in 1841, and was a tributary of Kashmir from 1869. The British encroachment resulted in a clash with China. Though the British Government politely put off the Chinese rights in Hunza, they got involved in the Raskam dispute. Raskam had been a part of Hunza territory from ancient times. The Russian Consul, M. Petrovaski, was instrumental in starting the Raskam dispute. He instigated China with a threat that if the Chinese gave Raskam to the British, the Russians would also take some territory. Thus the British ultimately proposed to China that they were willing to lose Raskam, if only the Chinese agreed to remove the fictitious sovereignty over Hunza. In spite of the repeated British pressures no reply came from China. Therefore it was decided that Hunza should be compensated in Kashmir territory for the loss of Raskam.

The British policy in and around Kashmir was based on the Russian apprehension, which in turn was having repercussions in
European politics. The Crimean War 1854–56 which was fought in Europe resulted in the neutralization of the Black Sea. This gave a positive check to the Russian expansion in Europe. Soon afterwards Russia began to move in Central Asia. By 1864 the whole Kazakh Steppe was encircled by a line of Russian stations, and in 1865 the city of Tashkent in the Khanate of Kokand was captured. In 1866 Kokand came to terms with Russia. Next to Kokand, Samarkand was captured by General Von Kaufman in 1868. In 1873, Khiva, the last of the Central Asian Khanates, was brought to heel, and in 1876 the troublesome client state of Kokand was annexed.

This rapid march of Russia in Central Asia brought home to the British Government the basic importance of imperial defence. Its fury was directed towards the only independent state in India, Kashmir. Dr. Cayley was appointed British Commercial Agent at Leh in 1867. Three years later a commercial treaty was signed with Maharaja Ranbir Singh, giving the British a positive leverage in that state. The restrictions on British European visitors to Kashmir were removed and the officer on Special Duty was invested with judicial powers. Biddulph was posted at Gilgit to watch the Russian movement in 1877. Failing in their endeavour to control Kashmir, the British Government appointed a Resident in 1885 and deposed Maharaja Pratap Singh on 8th March 1889. Though the last of the Indian states was brought within the British political orbit, there was no end to the British problems in the north. They had to face the resistance of Tibet and China in the east and the north. Their efforts towards expansion in these regions failed miserably. They could enter Tibet only under the guard of arms in 1904-5. In Sinkiang the Russians gained the upper hand and British diplomacy failed to hold the ground. Hence they had to adopt a policy of appeasement towards China, as it was considered better to have a weak Chinese neighbour than a hostile and powerful Russia. In the struggle between Britain and Russia, Kashmir had to suffer. It lost its independence and its dependency, Hunza lost its jagir in Pamirs and the valuable, cultivable, Raskam Valley.
While the British Government was active in Kashmir, Pamir and Sinkiang, it was equally alive to the Russian threat to Kashmir and in turn to their possessions in India. Because of the fear of Russia, they tried to secure a strategically sound boundary line of Kashmir state. The states of Jammu and Kashmir including Ladakh and the dependency of Hunza had the control over a wide range of territories. In the north-west corner of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Mir of Hunza had the boundaries of his possessions including Tagdumbas, Khunjerab and Raskam as follows:

The Northern watershed of the Tagdumbash Pamir from the Wakhijrui Pass through the Bayik peak to Tlijilga, about a mile above Dafdar, thence across the river to the Zankar nullah, thence through Mazar and over the range to Urok, a point on the Yarkand river between Sibjaida and Itakturuk. Thence it runs along the northern watershed of the Raskam Valley to the junction of the Bazar Dara river and the Yarkand river. From thence southwards over the mountains to the Mustagh river leaving Aghil Dewan and Aghil pass within Hunza limits.¹

This boundary of Hunza was very carefully ascertained by McMahon, who wrote: “It appears to be well known to all the Kanjuts [the people of Hunza], and Hunza Wazir and others tell me they could easily at once point it out on the ground.”² Ladakh under Tshedpal-mi-gyur-don-grub Namgyal (1790–1835) had control over “the people who dwell between the Zoji Pass, Landar,

¹ Captain A. H. McMahon, Political Agent, Gilgit, to Sir A. Talbot, Resident in Kashmir, 10 May 1898, Foreign Secret F, July 1898, No. 327.
² Ibid.
Shedula and Polong Darna...". After the Dogra conquest and the creation of the Jammu and Kashmir state, the Maharaja of Kashmir had a guard house at Shahidulla. The boundaries of Ladakh towards the east were defined in the treaties of 1684 and 1842, the first between Ladakh and Tibet and the second between Gulab Singh and Tibet. These treaties were further confirmed by an agreement signed in 1858 between Dewan Basti Ram on behalf of the Kashmir state and Mangyal Ishe on behalf of Tibet. It is evident from this agreement that neither was the Government of India sovereign over Kashmir nor China over Tibet. However, the British Government after the treaty of Amritsar in 1846 tried to ascertain the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir in the direction of Tibet, after dragging China into the picture. But without any results.

The Johnson Boundary

Towards Sinkiang the boundary was first ascertained by W. H. Johnson of Trigonometrical Survey of India, who crossed into Khotan in 1864, without the permission of the Government of India. According to him, the Kuen Lun range was "... boundary between the territories of the Maharaja and the province of Khotan". In spite of this very clear report of Johnson's, several authorities proposed variations in the boundary of Kashmir state at different times.

6 Translation of the treaty of 1858, Foreign Frontier A, February 1900, No. 17, Enclosure No. II. For text see Appendix VI.
7 Lt. Col. J. T. Walker to Under-Secretary, Government of India, 23 May, 1866, Foreign Political A, June 1866, Nos. 135-39, with report from Johnson; cf. Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border: The Origin of the Disputed Boundaries (London, 1964), pp. 83-87. Before any other British officer went to the area, Johnson reported the real facts objectively regarding the extent of the territories of the Maharaja of Kashmir, but unfortunately Dr. Lamb says, "Johnson in a very real sense, was a 'political surveyor'". p. 84.
Forsyth Line 1874-75

Prior to the commercial treaty of 1870 with the Maharaja of Kashmir, neither had the British Government ascertained the boundaries of Kashmir state, nor had they the means to do so. Therefore the issue of boundary then was not that of Kashmir's boundaries, but the boundaries of Kashmir and the British Government. Petty encroachments of the Kashmir officials near the Lingti River in the Kangra district were the concern of the British Government. Although the desire was great to settle the boundary near the Lingti River, yet the Earl of Mayo was of opinion that it "must not be forced on the Maharaja". The discussion in regard to the Lingti border ended in 1872 when pillars were erected between the British and Kashmir borders.

While these activities were on, the power complex in Central Asia was changing. Russia had taken over most of the Khanates. Chinese rule in Central Asia was thrown into disorder by the rise of Yakub Beg Khusbegi. Kashmir was forced to give some concessions to the British activity in the state. Under such circumstances the British Government was keen to give the world some maps showing the boundaries of their possessions in India. The Survey of India, on the basis of the limited work done by their surveyors, and relying on the limited knowledge of Johnson and T. D. Forsyth produced certain maps of Turkistan without any authority either from the ruler or the ruled of the area. On certain discrepancies in the maps so produced, Baron Northbrook observed that the boundaries are "... not laid down authoritatively". He further warned the authorities that, "we

8 T. H. Thornton, Secretary, Punjab Government to W. S. Seton-Karr, Secretary, Government of India, 25 May 1869, Foreign Political A, June 1869, Nos. 294-97, and K.W.

9 Ibid., K.W.

10 Lepel Griffin, Secretary, Punjab, to C. U. Aitchison, Secretary, Government of India, 9 April 1872; Aitchison to Griffin, 2 May 1872, Foreign Political A, May 1872, Nos. 11-12; Captain Mcweile, Assistant Commissioner, Kulu, to Deputy Commissioner, Kangra; to Griffin, to Aitchison, 30 July 1872, Foreign Political A, January 1873, Nos. 203-6.

11 Walker to Aitchison, 16 July 1869; Montgomerie to Walker, 18 October 1869, Foreign Political A, March 1870, Nos. 110-24; Forsyth to Walker, 4 July 1873; Montgomerie to Aitchison, 4 August 1873; Walker to Montgomerie, 28 July 1873, Foreign Political A, September 1873, Nos. 304-8; Memorandum on Kashmir by Girdleston, 1871, Foreign Secret, March 1874, Nos. 172-73.
should not do so without communicating with the Maharaja of Kashmir".\textsuperscript{12}

On the issue of the boundary in this area both the Indian and the Home Governments took keen interest. The missions to Yakub Beg headed by T. D. Forsyth were instructed by Calcutta to acquire the geographical knowledge of the area and to ascertain the boundaries of the possessions of Yakub Beg. The Home Government sounded the British Minister in Peking on this question, who informed the British Foreign Office:

So far as our Indian frontier is concerned, it must be remembered that there will be between it and Eastern Turkistan, to speak generally the Kuen Lien mountains and the Himalaya, to say nothing of the large wild country of the Mohamadan cities just now ruled over by Yakoob Beg, which we loosely style Kashgaria.\textsuperscript{13}

T. E. Gordon, an associate of Forsyth, after his return from the Yarkand Mission in 1874, reported on the politics of Sirikol, Pamir and Wakhan. Forsyth, while making alarmist signals regarding the march of Russia in the directions of India, ascertained the possessions of Yakub Beg:

... no claim is ascertained to any tract of country south of the Karakash River and on the Yarkand River they do not come higher up than Kufeland. ... \textsuperscript{14}

Forsyth would not rest content with only his observations on the possessions of Yakub Beg. He suggested what should be the boundary of India north of Kashmir:

... for commerce sake I would put the boundary at Ak-Tagh, and in laying out supplies I practically made that point the limit. The line then would run from the Eastern Corner of the Kuen Luen longitude 81° down to Karakash river to

\textsuperscript{12} K.W. Notes, Northbrook, 12 July 1873, \textit{Foreign Political A}, July 1873, Nos. 452–53.

\textsuperscript{13} Her Majesty’s Minister in Peking to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 October 1872, \textit{Foreign Secret}, February 1873, Nos. 31–45.

\textsuperscript{14} Confidential Report on Yarkand Mission by Sir D. Forsyth, 21 September 1874, \textit{Foreign Secret}, August 1875, Nos. 68–81.
Suget, across that pass to Ak-Tagh, Longitude 78.5 (approximately) latitude 35.59', hence down to Yarkand river to Kanjut.\textsuperscript{15}

While the Forsyth mission was active in Yarkand, the Maharaja of Kashmir strengthened his post at Shahidulla, just below the Kuen Lun range. Mohammed Rasool, a sepoy, was despatched to assist in the transit of mails to and from Yarkand.

When the Second Anglo-Afghan conflict was on in 1878, the Chinese had taken possession of Sinkiang from Yakub Beg. The British were able to instal a Political Agency at Gilgit in July 1877. The Russians were able to annex Kokand in 1876. The attention of the British Government was diverted towards the northern boundaries of Kashmir state. Lord Lytton in his policy statement, pointed out the desirability of some sort of demarcation of the political boarders of the undefined area. "The line which may at first adopt as defining the sphere of our political influence, and should coincide generally with the geographical outline of the position, which, if need be, we may be ready to maintain actively." He suggested that such points of contact should be selected beforehand, though the natural boundary of India was formed by the convergence of the great mountain ranges of the Himalayas and of the Hindu Kush. After careful investigation from the political and strategical considerations he recommended that if:

\[\ldots\] we extend and by degree consolidate, our influence over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can be permitted on this side of the mountains, or within the drainage system of the Indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier which is distinct, intelligible, and likely to be respected.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Ney Elias Proposal 1878}

While Lytton was preparing for the war with Afghanistan and China was occupying Yarkand, the Maharaja of Kashmir was concerned about the defenceless position of Ladakh. He made enquiries concerning the position, in view of the troubled state of affairs in Yarkand, from the British Joint Commissioner in

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., para. 41.

\textsuperscript{16} Lytton to Crombrook, 28 February 1879, \textit{Foreign Secret}, March 1879, No. 38.
Ladakh. Ney Elias suggested the strengthening of the Kashmir garrison at Leh and Iskardu. And at the same time he communicated to the Government his views on the boundaries of Kashmir. The line which he suggested was based on the following considerations: (1) that the line should follow on the whole the natural water-parting between the two countries; (2) that it should place a natural barrier between the people and the possible enemy; (3) that it should be near the base of supplies; and (4) that it should be easy to demarcate. He suggested that if only the boundary marks were placed, it would serve the purpose. He observed:

... in the west the crest of the Mustagh or Baltoro pass might be demarcated as the first point, the summit of the glacier at the head of the Nubra valley as the second, (it is possible that a mark between Nos. 1 and 2 might be required as it is said that a pass exists in that region) the summit of the Glacier at the head of Shayok Valley as the third, the crest of the Karakoram pass, where the main road to Yarkand crosses as the fourth, the crest of the two Chunglung passes at the crossing points of the alternative routes via Chang Chenmo as the fifth and sixth, and finally some point on the present Chinese Tibetan boundary to be afterwards decided on.17

In suggesting this line Elias ignored the Maharaja’s claims on Shahidulla and the neighbouring territory. When after a few years the Wazir Wazarat of Ladakh tried to enforce the claims of Kashmir on its northern frontiers he repeated his old line and suggested not to occupy Shahidulla.18

*Ramsay Line 1888*

After almost a decade in 1887 Sir Mortimer Durand forcefully advocated the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. In a policy statement he pointed out the unreliable nature of the cooperation of Turkey and Persia. He recommended that "... we ought to cultivate the friendship of China..." in order to check the Russian expansion in Central Asia. In the interest of Imperial

security he reluctantly remarked that the "Native States contribute very little towards the support of the Empire which has given them existence and order and wealth...". He, therefore, advocated the occupation of "...such points in advance of our border as are decided to be really necessary for the security of our military position", whether the Russian Government was interested in that area or not. His views were supported by Sir F. Roberts. Consequently the second Gilgit Agency was established in July 1889, after the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh on 8th March. The Kashmir borders were, however, never lost sight of by the British Government. Captain H. L. Ramsay, the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh, laid stress on the settlement of the boundary between Ladakh and the Chinese Turkistan. He pointed out that: "It is to our interest that Russia should be kept at as great a distance as possible to the North West of the Hindukush and Mustagh-Karakoram ranges." Thrice he reminded the Government of India of the boundary settlement, but his advocacy made no impact on the authorities. The Earl of Dufferin dismissed the case with an observation that:

It seems to me that it would not be desirable to run the risk of a troublesome controversy with China in order to push a Kashmir post beyond Karakoram, with the object of forestalling Russia when she succeeds the Chinese in Yarkand.

Not content with the attitude of the Government of India Ramsay submitted a Memorandum on 10th December 1888, in which he pointed out that the Chinese frontiers were bounded by a line extending from Sirikol to Kugiar, Kilian and Sanju, and that the "Yarkand authority do not regard Karakoram pass as their frontier". He recommended that the entire "inhospitable lands" west of Shahidulla should be included in the Kashmir borders. To the east of Shahidulla Ramsay advocated that:

19 Memorandum on "The present position in Central Asia and our Frontier Policy" by Durand, 21 May 1887, Foreign Secret F, October 1887, Nos. 286–91.
20 Memorandum on "The present position in Central Asia" by Sir F. Roberts.
For geographical and ethnological reasons, the Karakoram would appear to be the natural boundary, so far as that part of the border is concerned. This amounts to saying that the watershed of the Indus system forms the frontier, but the Shyok is part of the Indus system, and the watershed of the Shyok is on the west of Lingzi Thang and Soda plains, both of which are supposed to belong to Ladakh, unless therefore we are prepared to one day find ourselves involved in a dispute regarding this large, though pecuniarily worthless, tract of country, it is advisable that here too the frontier should be defined.23

While Ramsay was earnestly insisting upon the definition of the northern boundary of Kashmir state, the Hunza people made a raid on the people between Suget and Shahidulla. They carried off seven women, sixteen men and a large number of goats and yaks. On the receipt of this news of the raid, the Kashmir Darbar despatched twenty-three soldiers to Shahidulla for providing an escort to the merchants.24

Turdikul, the headman of the Shahidulla Kirgiz, after the Hunza attack, went to Yarkand. He requested help and protection from the Chinese Amban there, who told him that Chinese frontiers extended only to the Kilian and Sanju Passes, and if they came and settled within these borders, they would get protection. But so long as they lived at Shahidulla, China could do nothing. He advised Turdikul to apply for protection to the Ladakh authorities.25 After having a firm no from the Chinese, Musa Kirgiz came to Ladakh and requested British protection. The Shahidulla Kirgiz were regarded by the British Government as Chinese subjects but the Chinese had denied it.26 The fact was that the Kirgiz of Shahidulla used to pay tax to the Chinese only when they visited Yarkand. Since they had to visit that place for certain purchases and other requirements they had to pay the taxes. This

24 Nisbet to Durand, 15 October 1888, Foreign Frontier B, November 1888, Nos. 12-14; Ladak Diary, 6 October 1888, Foreign Frontier B, February 1889, Nos. 28-29.
was because of the fact that the distance between Shahidulla and Yarkand was less than that between the former and Leh. Thus on the representation of Musa, Ramsay recommended the help, pointing to the fact that the Kirgiz were not Chinese subjects. But it was hard to convince a pro-Chinese foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, of the fact that Karkash and Shahidulla belonged to Kashmir. Ney Elias on whose advice Durand worked on this frontier was of the opinion that it was a "... mistake to meddle with the fort or 'defensible sarai' or in any way to raise a question regarding Shahidulla". Agreeing to the remarks of Elias, Durand observed:

If we bring the Chinese on at this point we shall be in an illogical position. The waterparting ought to be our political boundary from Assam to Hunza. However, the Chinese do not recognise it.

The entire advocacy of Ramsay in regard to the boundary was thrown to the winds and no action was taken. Captain Younghusband was asked to enquire into the whole of the northern boundary of Kashmir afresh.

**Younghusband on the Northern Frontier of Kashmir 1889**

In view of the appeal of the Kirgiz and the reported visit of a Chinese officer to Hunza, the services of Captain F. E. Younghusband of the First Dragoon Guards was requisitioned by the Government of India. Younghusband was instructed to proceed to Karkash valley in company of Musha Kirgiz from Leh, for ascertaining their requirements and the degree of dependence on China. He was in fact asked to explore the entire territory between Hunza and Shahidulla. Apart from the investigation of Shahidulla fort from a defence point of view, he was warned that "... should any intimation be made to you respecting the sovereignty the Kirgiz desire to

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28 Ramsay to Nisbet, 16 July 1889; Nisbet to Durand, 8 June 1889; *Foreign Secret F*, July 1889, Nos. 203-30.
29 K.W., *Foreign Secret F*, September 1889, Nos. 31-60.
30 H. S. Barnes to Nisbet, 1 July 1889, *Foreign Secret F*, July 1889, No. 217.
live under, you will be careful to use only the most guarded language in reply".31

Younghusband reached Shahidulla on 21st August 1889. First he met the Turdikul privately and the next day he called a meeting of all the Kirgiz headmen. In their presence Younghusband ascertained that Turdikul was considered as their chief. The headmen promised to obey Turdikul. In their presence Younghusband gave Turdikul a sum of Rupees 500 for the repair of the fort of Shahidulla. In regard to the Chinese boundary Younghusband made a highly probing enquiry and found:

In the former Chinese occupation the Kuen-Lun mountains (that is the branch of them over which the Kilian and Sanju passes) were always recognised as the frontier and the country to the south belonged to no one in particular. . . . After the Chinese re-occupation of Yarkand (1878), no Chinese official or soldier has ever come across the Kilian or Sanju passes. . . .32

Younghusband was told that when Ney Elias went to Yarkand in 1885, he left a map in which some watersheds were shown. This map was in the possession of a Native with whose assistance the Chinese were trying to learn what lay beyond the Kuen Lun. In spite of this clear declaration about the Chinese boundary by Younghusband, Ney Elias prevailed upon Lord Lansdowne to accept his view. Thereupon the Viceroy decided that:

The country between Karakoram and Kuen Luen ranges, is, I understand, of no value, very inaccessible, and not likely to be coveted by Russia. We might, I should think, encourage the Chinese to take it, if they showed any inclination to do so.33

Not content with convincing the Viceroy, Ney Elias advocated his Indus watershed line to Colonel J. C. Ardagh. According to his

32 Younghusband to Durand, 20 August 1889, Foreign Secret F, October 1889, No. 184.
view the land between the Karakoram and Kuen Lun was uninhabited. So long as Sairikul belonged to the Chinese and Wakhan to the Afghans, there was no chance of occupation of the isolated lands between Kuen Lun and Karakoram by the Russians. In case Turkistan fell to Russia, then, "the Indus waterparting would form a more rational, a more simply defined and easily guarded frontier than an artificial line further north". Finally if the British Government decided to occupy the area, they would have to open "regular negotiations with China (the most impracticable nation), and have a formal Delimitation Commission to determine an artificial frontier line". Therefore in the opinion of Elias:

The simplest solution of the matter, while China occupies Eastern Turkistan would be to influence the Chinese to claim all the country draining into the Tarim system i.e. upto the heads of the Indus water. This would require no negotiation and no Delimitation Commission...  

Younghusband moved from Shahidulla towards Hunza and explored the entire region hitherto unexplored. He submitted his final report advocating a safe strategical boundary of British India. In the meantime it was reported that the Chinese had occupied Shahidulla. But as a matter of fact the report was based on mere hearsay. Younghusband’s report was carefully discussed in the Government. The deliberations and the policy to be followed in regard to the northern borders of Kashmir state were communicated to the Home Government in London. Lord Lansdowne, though partly admitting the claims of Kashmir state on Shahidulla, could not reconcile himself to the responsibilities of holding it. To his mind the land between the Karakoram Pass and Shahidulla was uninhabited and was not likely to be inhabited in future. He therefore observed that:
We should gain little by extending our responsibilities to the further side of great natural barrier like the Karakoram mountains, it is on the other hand evidently to our advantage that the tract of the country intervening between the Karakoram and Kuen Luen mountains should be definitely held by a friendly power like China.

He therefore wished from the Secretary of State that:

... the Chinese Government to be informed that we desire to see the frontiers of Chinese Turkistan conterminous to those of Afghanistan and Kashmir and its dependencies, and Chinese authority definitely asserted upto the Karakoram mountains and to the limits of Afghan territory on the Pamirs.

A copy of this policy statement was sent to Sir John Walsham, the British Minister in Peking for his information, and the British Resident in Kashmir was informed that he:

... should regard the limit of the Indus watershed as the boundary of His Highness’s territories towards the north, i.e. that the line of natural waterparting from a point near the Irsad pass on the west to the recognised Tibet frontier on the east should be also the limit of our political jurisdiction.

This decision of the Government of India in regard to the Indus watershed as the northern boundary was not pleasing to Captain Ramsay. His several protests and pointed references to the non-existence of Chinese authority beyond Kilian and Sanju Passes were deliberately ignored by the Government. The Secretary of State for India, Viscount Cross, observed that this

38 Lansdowne to Viscount Cross, 14 July 1890, Foreign Secret F, July 1890, No. 243.
40 Ramsay to Nisbet, 26 July 1890, Foreign Secret F, October 1890, No. 142; Ramsay to Nisbet, 31 July 1890, ibid., No. 145; Ramsay to Nisbet, 21 September 1890, ibid., No. 166; Ramsay’s Memo on Younghusband’s, 20 August 1890, ibid., Nos. 159-60.
"... will need confidential and delicate handling, and will likely to be decided here in London with the Chinese minister".\textsuperscript{41} He enquired about the definite line of boundary to be proposed to China. Lansdowne could not propose one, as he himself was not aware of it.\textsuperscript{42} In Peking Walsham visited Tsungli Yamen on 12th September 1890 and pressed for the appointment of the British Agent at Kashgar. Yamen refused the request saying that there was very little traffic and exchange of goods in that region, and observed that:

\textit{... the New Dominions and India could scarcely be considered conterminous countries. A large belt of country inhabited by Mohamadan tribes was wedged in between the boundaries of the two Empires.}\textsuperscript{43}

Walsham again pressed Tsungli Yamen on 30th September 1891 for the same but without any results.

\textit{Younghusband in Chinese Turkistan 1890}
While the British Government was busy inducing China at Peking and London to capture the lands between the Karakoram Pass and Shahidulla, Captain Younghusband was deputed to Kashgar. He was instructed to proceed via Leh and Shahidulla to Yarkand, and then to the Pamir region. In consultation with the Chinese officials Younghusband was asked to ascertain the degree of Chinese claims and to:

\textit{... impress upon the Chinese officials the necessity of strengthening and asserting their occupation, so that, if possible, there may be no grounds for alleging that any unclaimed strip intervenes between Afghan and Chinese territory.}

On the Kashmir frontier between Karakoram and Shahidulla his instructions were to "take opportunity of explaining to them our

\textsuperscript{41} Cross to Lansdowne, Telegram, 8 September 1890, \textit{Foreign Secret F}, October 1890, No. 151.
\textsuperscript{42} Lansdowne to Cross, Telegram, 9 September 1890, ibid., No. 152.
\textsuperscript{43} Walsham to Salisbury, Foreign Secretary, 23 January 1892, \textit{Foreign Frontier B}, July 1892, Nos. 36-37.
common interests in those regions and the friendly intentions of the Government of India".44

With these instructions Captain Younghusband reached Leh on 1st August, and reached Shahidulla via Suget on 20th August 1890. From there he proceeded to Yarkand where he met P'an Ta-jein, the Amban of Yarkand, on 5th September 1890. With the help of the maps Younghusband explained to him the geography of the entire region south of Kuen Lun and north of Karakoram ranges. He pointed out to the Amban:

... the Viceroy of India had ever been of opinion that the best boundary between Kashmir and Yarkand was that formed by the watershed of the Karakoram range. ...

On the contrary the Chinese regarded Kilian Pass as their boundary. If it was so, Younghusband said, the Viceroy of India was prepared to occupy the intervening lands. P'an-Ta-jein seized the opportunity and stated in reply that the Chinese had ever considered the watershed, "... as a natural (or literally in Chinese) a Heaven made boundary, to be the frontier between Kashmir and Yarkand...". He assured Younghusband that China was prepared to protect the trade route up to that range.45 The British game was now fairly complete.

**Chinese Activities on Kashmir Frontier**

After the deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh, China in Sinkiang became apprehensive and alarmed by the British activities on the northern border of Kashmir. These apprehensions were confirmed when the British forces entered Hunza and Nagar in December 1891. Russia on the other hand was equally alarmed at the extension of the British territories near her borders. M. Petrovsky, Russian Consul-General in Kashgar, started instigating China against the British.46 Instigated by the Russians and

44 Cunningham to Younghusband, 23 June 1890, *Foreign Secret F*, July 1890, No. 221.
encouraged by the British the Chinese became active on the frontiers of Kashmir.

Prior to the meeting of Younghusband with the Amban in Yarkand the Chinese did not regard the territories beyond Kuen Lun as the part of their Empire. The map prepared by Hung Ta-chen, the Chinese minister at the court of St. Petersburg, represented the real Chinese boundary. In this map no portion anywhere in Yarkand river valley, Karakash river valley or at Shahidulla was mentioned as Chinese territory. But after meeting Younghusband, and with adequate preparations, the Chinese came down to Kuen Lun. In 1892 they entered Shahidulla and erected boundary marks at Karakoram Pass. Next year they reached Aktagh, a place between Karakoram and Kuen Lun. Two Chinese officials, Hai-Ta-Lao-yieh and Li were deputed to survey the entire area. Li surveyed the area between Karakoram and Kuen Lun and Hai went to the Pamir region of the Chinese territory. Both of them surveyed the area thoroughly and presented the maps to Yamen. Whilst the survey operations were in progress, the traders were prevented from using the roads leading to Ladakh. Hai-ta-Lao-yieh, the Chinese border expert, made searching queries from Macartney at Kashgar about the borders of the British Government, during the same time. Not content with this, the Chinese Governor of the “New Dominions” proposed to send a man to Ladakh on the pretext of making copies of the Chinese inscriptions which were supposed to be there.

While the Chinese were active in the area between Karakoram and Kuen Lun, the Kashmir State Council was not complacent about the state boundaries. The Chinese occupation of Shahidulla

48 Barr to Cunningham, 13 December 1893, Foreign Secret F, January 1894, No. 300.
49 Macartney to Barr, 28 September 1893, Foreign Secret F, January 1894, No. 2.
51 Macartney to Barr, 26 September 1894, Foreign Secret F, January 1895, No. 290.
52 Barr to Cunningham, 20 March 1895, Foreign Frontier B, October 1895, Nos. 119–54.
was discussed on 4th April 1892, and a memorandum was presented to Colonel W. F. Prideaux, British Resident in Srinagar, and his views were sought. In accordance with the views of the Government of India the Resident stated: “I do not think I can recommend that the question of the occupation of Shahidulla Khoja by the Kashmir Darbar should be opened.” When the Chinese erected boundary pillars at Karakoram, Raja Amar Singh again approached the Government of India. He was told “it does not seem desirable that the responsibilities of the Kashmir state already heavy should be increased by the assumption of control over the country beyond the Karakoram...”

The British Government was not apprehensive of the Chinese activities which they themselves had encouraged to prevent Russian infiltration in that region. Mortimer Durand remarked: “The Kashmir State is now well in hand, and I should be inclined to explain to them that any attempt on their part to go beyond the watershed is a mistake.” But the attitude of Lansdowne was different. While agreeing with Durand he was of the opinion that no boundary pillars should be allowed to be erected on the slope of the pass. Lansdowne expressed his opinion that “no boundary marks will be regarded as having any international value, unless they have been erected with the concurrence of both powers”.

The information about the Chinese activities was reported to the Secretary of State for India. He was asked to inform the Chinese Government that their activities were closely watched and they would not be allowed to hold the land without “common consent”. Lansdowne significantly observed:

It would in our opinion be matter for congratulations, if the Chinese were to assert effectively their claims to Shahidulla

53 Vice-President State Council to Col. W. F. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir, 15 April 1892, Foreign Secret F, September 1892, No. 2; 4 April 1893, Foreign Secret F, No. 4.
54 Prideaux to Vice-President, 21 July 1892, Foreign Secret F, September 1892, No. 5; K.W. to Nos. 1–5.
56 Cunningham to Barr, 16 June 1893, Foreign Secret F, January 1893, No. 508,
57 K.W. January 1893, Nos. 500–10, Durand, 28 December 1892.
58 K.W. January 1893, Nos. 500–10, Lansdowne, 30 December 1892.
and the tract between Kuen Lun and Karakoram ranges. We encouraged them to do so at the time of Captain Young-husband's mission in 1890.59

N. R. O'Connor, the British Minister in Peking, was asked to represent the encroachments of China to Yamen. He accordingly visited Tsungli Yamen on 12th June 1893. Yamen at first pleaded ignorance of the incidents, but promised to inquire.60 After necessary enquiries from the Amban at Kashgar, he asserted that: "The locality is without doubt within the territory of China and has no connection with India."61 In his view, the Chinese activities were within their empire. Lord Elgin, the successor of Lansdowne, kept quiet on the outcome of O'Connor's representation to Yamen. He thought it "undesirable to make any objection to the attitude taken by the Chinese Government".62 O'Connor was accordingly informed not to raise the issue any more.

*Macartney's Neutral Zone Scheme*

In the meantime Macartney argued that in the event of the Russian occupation of Sinkiang, the British position would be very difficult.

Kanjut, it may be remembered, used before our occupation of it to levy taxes as far as Dafden (? Dehd) on the Taghdumbash Pamir. A portion of Sirikul known as Pakpah and Shaksah was apparently once tributary to it. A stronghold at a place called Darwaza, situated near on the northern side of the Shimshal pass, seems still to be in the possession of the Kanjutis. This jurisdiction of the Maharaja of Kashmir used to extend to Shahidulla.63

Macartney suggested that these facts should be made known to the Chinese. They might not admit territorial claims, but it would

60 O'Connor to Kimberley, 3 April 1894, *Foreign Secret F*, August 1894, No. 31.
be sufficient to place them on record in a treaty, pointing out that the claims were waived, so long as these territories remained in the possession of China. In the event of their occupation by Russia, he suggested that the British could take up the issue and establish a "neutral state" under the guarantee of both the powers. Such a state would occupy all the mountain regions between the crest of Karakoram and the Mustagh ranges on the one side, and on the other be limited by a line drawn from about Tachkurghan to Kugiar and thence by the skirts of the mountains until Polu on the Kuen Lun range. "Such places as the Taghdumbash Pamir, the Raskam district and Shahidulla would thus be comprised in a neutral zone."^64

The neutral state proposal of Macartney was thoroughly discussed and the claims of Hunza and Kashmir were investigated. Their claims were found to be genuine.°5 They were admitted by the Chinese governor of Sinkiang.°6 Still the Foreign Secretary referred the matter to the Military Department with his observation that: "The less we know about the jagir, the less I think we will be compromised." The Quartermaster General found several objections to, without any advantage in the proposal and he declared it strategically unsound.°7

While the Neutral Zone proposal of Macartney was rejected, it was decided to take steps towards the settlement of the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang. Elgin pointed out to Lord George F. Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, that:

It might be stipulated that Taghdumbash should revert to Hunza, if China abandons it. The recent Franco-Chinese treaty may offer a favourable opportunity for demanding from China the settlement of her boundary with Afghanistan, Hunza and Kashmir, in such a manner as to definitely limit extensions by

^64 Ibid.
°5 Ibid.; G. S. Robertson, Political Agent, Gilgit, D.O., 17 July 1895; Captain H. Daly to Talbot, 14 October 1896 and K.W. to Foreign Secret F, October 1896.
°7 K.W., Foreign Secret F, October 1895, Nos. 150–73.
Russia towards Karakoram Mustagh if she succeeds China in Raskam and Sirikol.68

The recommendation of Elgin was forwarded to the Marquess of Salisbury by Hamilton. But in the opinion of Salisbury the condition of China then was not satisfactory for raising any boundary question.69 Hence the matter was held over for future settlement.

The Ardagh Line

In the meantime the Pamir demarcation was complete. The Chinese were defeated by Japan and the Muslim population in Kansu province was in revolt against Chinese rule. It was thought that the Chinese rule in Sinkiang was about to collapse and likely to be replaced by the Russians. Sir John Ardagh, Director, Military Intelligence, pointed out in a memorandum that the boundary line determined by the Government of India, in the great mountain ranges north of Chitral, Hunza and Ladakh was defective. In a general sense it formed an acceptable defensible, line, because it was easy to define, difficult to pass and fairly dividing the population. But the physical conditions of these mountains, their great extent, high altitude, general inaccessibility and sparse population were the great impediments in watching the actual watershed. Therefore from a military point of view, a frontier following the highest watersheds was defective. The object of closing the passes of Kilik, Mintaka, Khunjerab, Shimshul, Mustagh and Karakoram, against an enemy would not be achieved, as he would get a safe halting ground in the valleys of Yarkand and Karakash rivers. Ardagh therefore suggested that the boundary of British India should include the:

... basins of the Danga Bash river and its affluents above Dehda, at the junction of the Ili Su and Karatchukar... of the Yarkand river above the point where it breaks through the range of mountains marked by the Sargon and Ilbis Birkar passes at about latitude 37° north and longitude 74°50' east

68 Elgin to Hamilton, Telegram, 19 September 1895, Foreign Secret F, October 1895, No. 170, Despatch, No. 186 of 1895; K.W. to Nos. 150–73.
69 Bertie to Godley, 29 June 1896, Foreign Secret F, October 1896, No. 538.
... and of the Karakash river above a point between Shahidullah and Sanju or Grim pass.

Ardagh argued his case by pointing out the inclusion of the fertile river basins, and the claims laid by Kashmir state and Hunza to the area. He was of the opinion that it was not likely that, "China in her present state would offer much objection, or indeed, that her influence extends to the south of the Kuen Lun". Salisbury suggested the desirability of acquiring an efficient control within the frontiers which were considered as "essential to British interests".

Ardagh's memorandum was sent from London on 12th February 1897, and was received in India on 1st March 1897. It was discussed by the authors of the MacDonald Line, W. J. Cunningham, the Secretary of Foreign Political Department, J. A. Douglas of Military Department and Francis Young-husband, and was unanimously rejected. Elgin had to put his seal on it and pointed out that: "No invader has ever approached India from this direction where nature has placed such formidable barriers."

In the meantime, on the instigation of M. Petrovasky, China pointed out to Macartney an error in the atlas in regard to Aksai Chin boundary. They also stopped the Hunza cultivation of the Raskam valley. But in both these cases the British Government kept mum. Hunza was asked to obtain the best possible terms from the Chinese without creating an impression that the British Government was concerned.

70 Memorandum of Sir John Ardagh, 1897, Foreign Secret F, January 1898, No. 166. See text in Appendix No. XII.
71 Bertie to Godley, 26 January 1897, Foreign Secret F, January 1898, No. 164.
72 Dr. Alastair Lamb is not correct to say that "At the very moment when MacDonald was presenting his note to the Tsungli Yamen" Ardagh made his proposals. MacDonald presented his note on 14 March 1899 while Ardagh submitted his memo in January 1897, more than two years before. See, The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries, by Lamb, p. 105.
75 Roberts to Talbot, 10 November 1896, Entry into Kashgar Diary of 2 October 1896, Foreign Secret F, January 1898, Nos. 161–62 and K.W.
Government had any knowledge of it. In Aksai Chin, for the first time, Captain Deasy was not allowed to travel through Polu on the pretext of road repairs. In fact M. Petrovasky told the Totai that the English had some secret intentions on the Aksai Chin territory, and threatened Huang Tajen that "the Russian Government would interfere". However on representation to Tsungli Yamen by Ironside, Deasy was allowed to travel in Aksai Chin.

**MacDonald Line 1899**

In 1898 Salisbury enquired about the boundary line to be secured from China in the direction of Afghanistan, Hunza and Kashmir. The boundary matter was again discussed by the officers of Elgin’s Government in India. The consensus was to press the claims of Hunza on Taghdumbash and Raskam, only for making a bargain with China. Lord Elgin was “prepared to renounce them in exchange for renunciation by the Chinese of all claims over Hunza”. The line which was proposed by the Indian Government to be secured from the Chinese as boundary began at Pamir region, where the Pamir Boundary Commission of 1895 had completed the work. By and large it followed the crest of the main range of mountain and runs as follows:

... beginning at the North end at the Peak Povalo-Schveikoski, the line takes a south easterly direction, crossing the Kara-chikar stream at Mintaka Aghazi, thence proceeding in the same direction till it joins, at the Karachanai Pass, the crest of the main ridge of the Mustagh range which it then follows passing by the Kunjeras pass and continuing southwards to the peak just north of the Shimshal pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running east approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal to Hunza post at Darwaza. The line turning south through the Darwaza post, crosses the road from the Shimshal pass at that

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76 Cunningham to McMahon, Telegram, 4 July 1898, Foreign Secret F, July 1898, No. 344.
78 K.W. to Foreign Secret F, November 1898, Nos. 110-14.
point and then ascends the nearest high spur and regains the main crests, which the boundary will again follow, passing the Mustagh, Gusherbrum and the Saltoro passes to the Karakoram. From the Karakoram pass the crests of the range run nearly east for about half a degree and then turn south to a little below the 35th parallel of North latitude. Rounding then what in our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed runs north-east to a point east of Kiziljilya and from there, in a south easterly direction, follows the Lak Tsung range until that meets the spur running south from the Kuen Lun range which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80° east longitude.80

Sir C. MacDonald was asked to present this line to Tsungli Yamen, which he did on 14th March 1899. Yamen promised to reply after enquiries.81 But in spite of several queries by the British officers from Yamen, no reply was received.82 Salisbury in the meantime informed Sir C. Scott: “In view of the present state of affairs in China, I approve your proposal to defer carrying out these instructions until a favourable opportunity presents itself.”83

In India Elgin was replaced by Curzon on 6th January 1899. China stopped interfering with people in the south of the Kuen Lun mountains due to internal complications and disorders. After the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 the Russian fear was removed. Younghusband had already removed the exclusiveness of Tibet in 1904. Hunza began to cultivate the Raskam lands as usual from 1914.84

It appears that in 1927 the British Government once again tried to withdraw Hunza’s claims from Raskam and the Pamirs. But the Maharaja of Kashmir asserted that the dominions of Kashmir

80 Elgin to Hamilton, 27 October 1898, Foreign Secret F, November 1898, No. 114. For text of the letter see Appendix No. XIII.
81 Box Ironside to Salisbury, April 1899, Foreign Secret F, August 1899, No. 188. For text see Appendix XIV.
82 Box Ironside to Salisbury, 22 June 1899, Foreign Secret F, September 1899, Nos. 211, 230.
83 Salisbury to Scott, 23 July 1900, Foreign Secret F, September 1900, No. 25.
were bounded to the north by the northern watershed of the Kuen Lun ranges. The area remained under the control of Kashmir state when K. P. S. Menon of the Foreign Office going to Hunza in the second half of 1944, on his way to Chunking observed that the extent of Kashmir state was beyond Mintaka Pass. He says:

Hunza, the Mir told me, used to stretch as far as Dasdar beyond the Mintake Pass—the present Wazir's grand-father really built a fort there—and until recently Hunza had the right not merely to graze their cattle in the Pamirs but to levy grazing fees from others who did.

Soon after independence in 1947, in the wake of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir, China got an opportunity under Communist regime, and occupied the area of Raksam and Tagdumbarh Pamirs up to the crest of the Karakoram mountains. This illegal occupation of Hunza lands by the Chinese was confirmed in the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement of 1963.

The British experiment in the boundary-making of India, out of the fear of Russia cost, India much. The legitimate claims of Kashmir had been ignored. A line based on military strategy was proposed. Though nothing came out of MacDonald's proposals of 14th March 1899, yet the British Government gave a positive weapon into the hands of China to play with, at an opportune time. MacDonald's proposals gained a strategic boundary for the British Empire, but India lost its legitimate claims to approximately 4,800 sq. miles in between Karakoram and the Kuen Lun ranges. China, prior to instigation of Younghusband in 1890, never claimed any territory below the Kuen Lun mountains in Sinkiang, nor had they ever raised any issue in regard to the Aksai Chin area. The claims of India on Aksai Chin are well founded. The area belonged to Ladakh prior to the Dogra occupation and later it was a part of Jammu and Kashmir state and the British Empire. Francke, Johnson and Ramsay all have justified the Indian claims. The Maharajas of Kashmir never allowed their claims to the area to lapse. Subsequent to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the British policy towards borders varied according to the fears from

85 The Times (London), 6 March 1963.
86 K. P. S. Menon, Delhi-Chunking: A Travel Diary (Bombay, 1947), p. 29.
Russia. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Russian fear subsided for a while, only to reoccur in 1927. Two decades preceding their departure from India in 1947, the British Government was more concerned with the internal freedom movement than with the far flung borders.  

87 Dr. Alastair Lamb in his advocacy of China's claims has ignored the fact that India was in existence even prior to the British occupation, though it was divided into several small states, with their well known boundaries. Cf. Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origin of the Disputed Boundaries* (London, 1964), pp. 59-114.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Ever since the dawn of human history in Asia, India, its subcontinent, had a well known geographical frontier. The land south of the high snow-clad peaks of the Himalayas was within its geographical limits. The vast tract was sparsely inhabited by several independent tribes with their peculiar dialects, customs and traditions. Almost similar was the case on the other side of the Himalayas, beyond which came to be established the Celestial Empire. On both sides the boundaries were mostly between the tribal possessions. When the Empire came to be established in India and China, they attempted to extend their suzerainty up to the high peaks of the Himalayas separating the two vast plains of Asia. Direct administration of these empires over their adjoining tracts on the two sides of the Himalayas was hardly ever established.

During the heyday of India's cultural glory Buddhist religion and culture crossed the high Himalayas and spread beyond it in central Asia, Sinkiang, Tibet and China. In fact the civilization of Tibet is traced back to this period. The Chinese influence however at no period of history ever crossed the snowy peaks of the Himalayas. At a later stage when Hinduism had fully crystallized, Badrinath, Gangotri, Jamnotri, mount Kailash and the holy lake of Mansarowar became centres of pilgrimage for the Indian people and their names have gone into the tradition, religion and culture of India. Gradually the early tribal population of India was politically organized. The country in the sixth century B.C. was divided into fourteen great Janpads (autonomous units). Bimbisara and Ajatasatru made the beginning of larger political unification, and was followed by Mahapadmananda, the great historical monarch of ancient India. During his reign the country had attained the highest degree of prosperity. This wealth and prosperity was looked upon by the Persians and Macedonians with greedy eyes. Cyrus, Darius and Alexander, had made attacks on India, and were successful to some extent. But soon Chandragupta Maurya,
who rose to power from humble origin, expelled the invaders beyond the natural border of the country and laid the foundation of the Great Mauryan Empire. Asoka completed the unfinished task of his grandfather and rose to a great glory, which has remained unsurpassed in Indian history. The edicts of Asoka, found at different places, tell us of the extent of his empire and the wealth and the prosperity the country acquired during his reign. This Mauryan glory attracted the attention of the Kushanas. But so long as the Kushanas remained aliens, they could not establish their hold over the country. It was only after they came under the influence of Hindu and Buddhist religions and were naturalized in India, that they could establish an empire. Kanishka, the great Kushan emperor, held his sway over the Central Asian Provinces of Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan. After Kanishka the Kushan power declined and was replaced by the Gupta empire. Samudragupta the greatest of the Gupta kings, subdued all petty principalities and laid the foundation of a great empire. The Kushanas and the Sakas had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Gupta Empire, which comprised Assam, Bengal, Nepal, Rohilkhand, Kumaun and Garhwal. The Gupta power remained intact only upto A.D. 467. The Gupta glory was gone in the sixth century and India was divided once again into several small kingdoms, as in the sixth century B.C. Though Harsha established the kingdom of Thaneshwar and Kanauj in A.D. 606, it remained only for four decades so long as Harsha was alive.

As a matter of fact the neighbouring regions of India in ancient times were ruled by the people who went out of this country. Khotan was ruled by some descendants of the Mauryas. The first King of Tibet was also an Indian. Therefore, there was one big family ruling the country within and beyond the Himalayas. Perhaps that was the reason for complete homogeneity in the rulers and the ruled alike up to A.D. 647. The fall of the powerful kingdom of Harsha had removed the strong central authority in India. The birth of Islam in A.D. 613 close to India had introduced a new force in the region. In China the weak Han regime was replaced

by the T'ang Dynasty in A.D. 618. Tibet had acquired new dimensions with the accession of Song-tsen-Gam-Po in A.D. 618. Therefore the clash of these diverse forces was inevitable. Tibet in a great sweep overran the border regions of India and reached Sinkiang in the seventh century. The T'sang dynasty in China, after preliminary consolidation at home, reached Sinkiang and joined hands with Arabian Caliph Harun Al Rashid. The combination of the Chinese and the Arabs compelled the Tibetans to retrace their steps and retire to their own country in the ninth century.

In India, in the absence of a strong central authority, several small kingdoms began to grow rapidly on the frontiers. The petty states were wholly unconnected with one another. This was one of the fundamental reasons why the hill chiefs could not afford any noticeable resistance to the Tibetans, when they tried to overrun the territory in the second half of the seventh century. Withdrawal of Tibetan authority was followed by the systematic growth of Gilgit with its dependencies of Hunza and Nagar, Baltistan, Ladakh, Spiti, Bashahr, Garhwal and Kumaun.

Gilgit in ancient Sanskrit literature was probably known as Gahalata. Later it was called Sargin and Gilit. After the Sikh Dogra conquest the name was changed into Gilgit. The area was ruled by Hindu kings under a title of Ra. Unfortunately the names of the Hindu Ras have been lost, with the sole exception of the last of their number, Shri Buddutt. The principalities of Hunza, Nagar, Darcl, Chilas, Astor, Haremosh, GuraiS, Yassin and Chitral were under the control of Shri Buddutt. An adventurer named Azor was induced by the people, who were suffering under Buddutt, to kill him. After the assassination of Buddutt, Azor married his daughter and established himself as ruler of Gilgit. Gradually the kingdom was broken up into a number of small independent states, which commenced to make periodical wars on one another. Hunza and Nagar were traditionally inimical to each other. These states were ruled by the twin sons of Mayroo Khan who had divided the kingdom. In course of time, the hostile attitude of the rulers of the area towards each other led to the occupation of the territory by Sikhs and Dogras.

Baltistan for many years was bound up with Ladakh. At the time when Azor established himself in Gilgit, a Mohammedan
adventurer, Ibrahim Shah, had usurped the sovereignty of Baltistan. The introduction of Islam into Baltistan had alienated the Baltis from their Ladakhi neighbours. The Makpuns dynasty founded by Ibrahim Shah continued to rule Baltistan till it was conquered by Zorawar Singh in 1840.

Ladakh was a part of the ancient Indian empire up to the time of Harsha. After the death of Harsha it was overrun by the Tibetans. When the Tibetans withdrew, the first Ladakhi dynasty was founded by Skyid-Lde (Nima-mgon). Skyid-Lde-mi-ma-mgon, the third in the dynasty was a great king. The kingdom of Ladak in his times extended from the northern mountain ranges up to Raduk, Guge (south-east of Rudak and west of Mansarowar) and the modern districts of Lahul and Spiti. He had three sons, among whom he divided his vast kingdom of Ladakh before his death. To the eldest, he gave Ladakh proper, to the second, Purang and Guge were assigned, and the third was made the ruler of Zanskar and Spiti. The eldest was suzerain over his younger brothers. Ladakh used to send tributes to Kashmir only when the ruler of Kashmir happened to be strong, otherwise it remained independent. Likewise, when there was a powerful ruler in Ladakh, the ruler of Guge and Purang was obliged to obey the suzerain, otherwise he remained independent of Ladakh. In the fourteenth century Kashmir was invaded by Ladakh and the ruler, Sahadeva, was overthrown. But soon Islam appeared in Kashmir in A.D. 1339 and the successors of Shah Mir subdued Ladakh several times. When the attention of the Kashmiris was diverted towards the attack of the Mughals, Ladakh became free. Akbar annexed Kashmir in A.D. 1587 but did not go to Ladakh. In the meantime Sen-ge-rnam-rgyal came to power in Ladakh in A.D. 1590. In the course of forty-five years of his rule he restored the shattered kingdom of Ladakh to its former glory. In the east he subdued Guge, Rudak, including Kailash up to Central Tibet. Zanskar and Spiti were restored. But when he turned towards Baltistan, he was met with an army of Balti in alliance with the Mughals. He was defeated, and promised to send suitable tribute to the Mughal Court. During his lifetime Sen-ge-rnam-rgyal never paid any tribute, but his successors had to pay 1,000 Asarfs and 2,000 rupees with many gifts to the Mughals. When Ladakh was involved in a war with Tibet in 1681–84, Fida Khan with a huge army went in aid of Ladakh. After the war a treaty was signed through the
intervention of the patron Lama of Ladakh—Hbrug-pa-pham-obam-po. This treaty confirmed the division of Ladakh made in the tenth century and fixed the boundary at Lari stream. Guge and Purang was ceded to Tibet, the revenue of which was to be spent for religious purpose at Lhasa. Except for a small village of Mensar the entire area near Kailash and Mansarowar went to Tibet in 1684.

Spiti in early times was ruled by Sen Kings. One of the earliest known rulers was Samudra Sen. The fortunes of Spiti declined during the reign of Chet Sen and in the seventh century it was annexed by Ladakh. Subsequent to the annexation, the fate of Spiti was determined along with the fate of Ladakh. In the tenth century Spiti was assigned to the youngest son of Skyid-Lde-mima-mgon and after that it remained subordinate to Ladakh.

Bashahr, Garhwal and Kumaun all were ruled by the Katurias in early times. In the course of time these principalities were separated and occupied by different Rajput clans. These Rajput rulers at times were at war with each other, but generally remained content with their possessions.

The decline of Harsha’s power in India marks the beginning of the weak central authority. From the times of the Pritiharas till the rise of the Mughals the central authority in India was practically non-existent. Several rulers came and went but the extent of their possessions was very limited. For most of the time the rulers in the plains fought amongst themselves. This led to the rise of powerful hill states and attracted the attention of Muslim adventurers of the time. For the most part the rulers in the plains remained busy in resisting Muslim invasions. The Muslims on their part remained busy in the looting of the rich and fertile plains of India. None, except one Bakhtiyar, ever tried to cross the natural frontiers of India. His attempt proved a complete failure, and his army was destroyed in the high hills. Mohammed Bin Tuglukh once tried without success to subdue the hill chiefs of Himachal. Consequently the hill chiefs remained outside the arms of the Muslim invaders for a long time. It was only after the establishment of Mughal authority in India, that Akbar looked towards the hill chiefs. Kashmir was annexed in A.D. 1587 to the Mughal empire. From Akbar to Aurangzeb all the hill chiefs had accepted the Mughal overlordship. Mughal emperors themselves remained content with the nominal allegiance and tributes from the hill
chiefs. They never tried to impose their administrative control in the hills. Consequently the paramount power and the dependent both were happy. The fall of the Mughal empire once again let loose the constituents of the empire, and the hill chiefs became free. Gradually the Mughal empire gave way to the rising British empire which became the paramount power in India, in the course of nearly a century.

II

As the British Government in India was an alien government, so was the Chinese rule in Sinkiang and Tibet. It would be wrong to think of the continuous sway of Chinese power beyond the Himalayas in Sinkiang and Tibet. Sinkiang was originally populated by an Aryan Race. It came under the control of the Chinese in A.D. 94 during the Han Dynasty, for a short period. After about six hundred years the Tang Emperors sent expeditions into Central Asia. The sway of the Chinese rulers lasted only for a while till Islam appeared in A.D. 712. The Muslim rule flourished in Sinkiang for nearly five hundred years. It was only in the thirteenth century that Chingiz Khan made his appearance in Sinkiang. In A.D. 1220 Sinkiang became a part of the Mongol Empire. Chingiz Khan, his son, Chagatai Khan, and his descendants continued to rule the country up to about A.D. 1678. The Jungars, the inhabitants of the area, who took over from Mongols, ruled the country for about 78 years, after which the Chinese became the masters of the area in about 1756. In essence the history of Sinkiang from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth affords an unbroken record of civil wars between two religious parties which paved the path for Chinese occupation. But the Chinese rule was always threatened. Well within a century of the Chinese occupation, Jehangir Khan a native of Sinkiang, rose in open rebellion in 1825. His revolt was so successful that he was practically the master of Kashgar for a while. The effect of this revolt was so profound that it created a sensation throughout Asia. It was soon followed by the revolt of Khoja Yasuf in 1830, and that of the rebellion of seven Khojas headed by Katta-Turra. The descendants of the dispossessed rulers of the country made repeated attempts to recover their lost patrimony from the alien Chinese masters. The last of such efforts was that by Vali Khan Turra in
1857. He was able to rule Kashgar for a few months. In July 1864, a band of Turgans came from Urumchi to foment risings against the Manchu rulers. This revolt was so widespread that it embraced the western provinces of China, Zungaria and Yarkand. One after the other, Kuchu, Yarkand, Khotan, and Kashgarh fell to the Khojas. The Chinese garrison was cut to pieces. Kundu and Yarkand were held by Rashid-ud-deen, Khotan elected Haji Habibulla as its ruler. In the meantime Bazurga Khan arrived from Khokand with a force of 500 men under the able command of Yakub Beg Kushbegi. After a number of successes against the Chinese, Yakub arrested his inefficient master and then set about extending his own sway. His possessions extended as far as Manas and Urumchi on the north-east and to Khotan to the south. By 1869 Yakub Beg had made himself the absolute ruler of Sinkiang. From 1869 to 1878 the Chinese rule in Sinkiang was non-existent. It was only after the death of Yakub Beg, when the war of succession in Sinkiang was on, that the Chinese tried to recapture it, and by the end of 1877 they were successful. The Chinese success did not rule out the Muslim revolts in Sinkiang. They were continued as usual. In the twentieth century, after the breach between Chiang-Kai-shek and Mao-se-Tung, Sinkiang, though ruled by the Chinese, remained outside the Peking control. It was under the sphere of influence of Soviet Russia and it was only after the Communist triumph in China that the area came under the firm control of China.

Tibet was ruled by a King of Indian origin in early times. In about A.D. 618 Tibetan power became so strong that Song-tsen Gam-po married a Chinese princess. For the next two centuries Tibetan power was felt both in China up to Sinkiang and in India. Although it remained under Chinese influence for a long time, it was free from Chinese rule. It was only occasionally that the might of the Chinese arms was felt in Tibet. It was only in the Manchu regime that Tibet was successfully attacked by China in A.D. 1720. The Chinese hold was established in Tibet and it was regarded as a Chinese Protectorate from 1720 to 1792. But with the conquest of Sinkiang by the Chinese in 1758, the Protectorate status of Tibet began to decline. It was only on the occasion of a Gorkha invasion of Tibet in 1792, that a Chinese army was despatched to protect Tibet but never after that. In the beginning

of the nineteenth century the Chinese authority in Tibet was non-existent. This fact was noted by both William Moorcroft who went to Mansarowar and Kailash in 1812, and James Baillie Fraser who after the Gorkha War of 1814-15 had toured the area between the Sutlej and Kali rivers. When the Dogra General Zorawar Singh attacked Tibet in 1841, the Chinese failed to extend protection. Similarly no Chinese protection was offered at the time of the Nepalese attack in 1856, or at the time of the British expedition under Francis Younghusband in 1904. Not only did the Chinese fail to protect Tibet, but their orders were never respected in Tibet, during the same period. Explorer Prejewalski and Colman Macaulay were refused permission to enter Tibet. Apart from this factual position, the Chinese themselves denied their power in Tibet on several occasions to the British Government specially at the time of the Chefoo Convention in 1876. As a matter of fact the Chinese would have been happy, if somehow the exclusiveness of the Lamas could have been abolished. The appointment of a Chinese Amban (Resident) at Lhasa was part of a reciprocal arrangement under which Lhasa used to send certain Lamas to reside at Peking nominally to worship for the Imperial family. The Chinese Ambans used to write memoranda and despatches on the affairs of Tibet in such a style that it gave the reader the impression that they were the masters of the situation in Lhasa. In essence the position of the Chinese Ambans in Lhasa was the same as that of the British Resident at Kathmandu. Neither had any right of interference in the affairs of the state where they were stationed. The chief reason for the perpetuation of this fallacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet lies in the writings of the modern writers who derive their information exclusively from Chinese sources. Whenever the Tibetans gave out to the world that they were under Chinese rule, the sole function was to avoid dealings with foreigners and to maintain their exclusiveness.

III

The decline of the Mughal Empire was marked by the establishment of the British Empire in India. The twofold process was a long drawn-out one. After the battle of Plassey the British firmly established themselves in Bengal, and thereafter they moved
westwards fairly fast. A treaty of friendship and alliance was concluded with Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula of Awadh in 1765. The British troops were stationed in the forts of Chunar and Allahabad in 1772. The possessions of Raja Chait Singh of Banaras were ceded to the East India Company by Nawab Asaf-ud-Daula in 1775. The succeeding Nawab Saadat Ali Khan brought the British to the Banks of Jamuna by ceding the lands in Ganga Jamuna Doab and the whole of Rohilkhand in 1801. Therefore by the beginning of the nineteenth century the British East India Company came to a region where several powers were contending for territorial gains at the cost of Kumaun and Garhwal. After a clash with the Gorkha power of Nepal, which had occupied the border regions of India, the Company took possession of the Jamuna Sutlej tract in 1815.

Beyond the Sutlej, Ranjit Singh, along with his generals Gulab Singh and Zorawar Singh, was busy in the consolidation of the Sikh Kingdom. In 1819 the Abdalis were expelled from Kashmir. Ladakh and Baltistan were subdued in 1834 and 1840. In the meantime Ranjit Singh died in 1839. Zorawar Singh with his triumphant force went to Tibet in 1841, and tried to annex the Kailash Mansarowar region, which was ceded in 1684 to Tibet, to the Dogra Kingdom of Jammu. The attempt was a dismal failure and he was killed in action on 14th December 1841. After the death of Zorawar Singh, the Tibetan forces advanced towards Ladakh. Gulab Singh though sad after the death of his gifted general, sent an enforcement under Dewan Harichand and Wazir Ratnu to meet the Tibetan menace. Several battles were fought in which the Tibetans were defeated, and the commander Surkhang was captured. Soon afterwards, on 24th September 1842 a treaty was signed. It recognized the Dogra rule in Ladakh and restored the boundaries of the State, which were fixed in the tenth century and reaffirmed in the treaty of 1684.

The British Government in India, though engaged in other theatres was not unmindful of the activities of Ranjit Singh and his Dogra Generals. A close watch was maintained. William Moorcroft was sent to Leh in 1819, and in 1835 G. T. Vigne went to Skardo and Ladakh. In the meantime Captain C. H. Wade, Political Agent at Ludhiana was maintaining regular correspondence with Ahmad Shah, the King of Baltistan. When Ranjit Singh was dead the British Government looked towards the Sikh
Kingdom of Lahore with the positive intention of its annexation. Therefore when Zorawar Singh marched into Tibet, the British Government was in no mood to take a chance, specially after a disaster at Kabul, which might have affected the negotiations with China after the first Opium War. Hence Lord Auckland, immediately wrote to Maharaja Sher Singh for the withdrawal of Zorawar Singh from Tibet. Dhian Singh, the wise prime minister delayed the matter, but impatient Auckland could not wait for the outcome of his representation to the Lahore Darbar. He asked J. D. Cunningham to proceed to the borders, and fixed 10th December as a dead line for the withdrawal of Zorawar Singh from Tibet. Before he could positively interfere, Zorawar Singh was dead and a treaty of peace was signed.

After the death of Ranjit Singh, the Kingdom of Lahore was in a state of utter confusion. The military anarchy of the Sikhs led to British suspicion, distrust and territorial ambition. Lord Ellenborough took the necessary precautions and kept the home government informed about the affairs at Lahore. But his successor, Sir Henry Hardinge, could not wait for a long time and on 11th December 1845 a war was declared. After several battles, the victors entered Lahore on 20th February 1846. The treaty of Lahore which was signed after elaborate negotiations on 9th March 1846, gave a death blow to the sovereignty and prestige of the Sikh Kingdom. The Kingdom was dismembered and out of its ruins a new sovereign state of Jammu and Kashmir was created. As a matter of fact the treaty of Amritsar of 16th March recognized Maharaja Gulab Singh as sovereign ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State, but not without booty. This recognition amounted to Rupees seventy-five lakhs. After the treaty of Amritsar the limits of British and that of Gulab Singh were ascertained by James Abbott. A separate boundary Commission comprising Vans Agnew and Alexander Cunningham was appointed in 1846 to ascertain the territories of Gulab Singh towards Tibet. Although this Commission could not achieve anything, yet it pointed out the boundary which ran along the river Pare at Spiti border and proceeded upwards by the south of Tso Morari lake and Hanle monastery to the river Indus, meeting the river below the village of Demchok. From the Indus it went along the ridge and crossed Pangong lake approximately in the middle and continued on the top of the ridge to Lanka La.
it went along the ridge beyond the Shyok river, turning westward along the mountain range and passed over Nagar and Hunza principalities.

Hardinge was not satisfied with this definition, and was in no mood to sacrifice the rich Tibetan trade. Consequently he appointed another boundary Commission comprising Alexander Cunningham, John Strachey and Thomas Thomson in 1847. In the meantime he wrote to the Vazir of Lhasa for the revision of the treaty of 1842 and sought his cooperation. Failing in his efforts in opening up Tibet, he wrote to John Davis, the British Commissioner of Hong Kong for opening negotiations with Peking Government. John Davis made several efforts with Keying, the Chinese High Imperial Commission, but could not succeed. He was told that the boundaries of Tibet were known from ancient times and needed no further definition. Both the Peking and Gulab Singh's Commissioners failed to meet the British Boundary Commission at an appointed place. Several independent endeavours of the British Commissioners also failed to achieve anything from the Tibetans. The net result of the Commission of 1847 was complete disappointment. This was perhaps the first occasion when China was consulted by the British Government on the matter of Tibet.

Henry Hardinge sailed for England on 16th January 1848. After his departure his frontier policy was abandoned. The succeeding Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie centred his attention on the internal affairs of the Indian states. He fought wars with the Punjab and Burma and annexed the Punjab and Pegu. The doctrine of lapse brought to the British fold the States of Satara, Nagpur, Jhansi, Sambalpur and Tanjore. The Nizam of Hyderabad was deprived of the province of Berar. Thus the map of India became red leading to the eventful years of 1857-58. The succeeding Governor-General and later Viceroy Viscount Canning was engaged in the suppression of revolts and in the maintenance of law and order.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the power pattern among the three empires—British, Chinese and Russian—in Central Asia was seriously threatened. The authority of the Manchu's in China was seriously menaced by internal revolts and external aggressions. While the Central Provinces of China were in revolt in "T'ai Ping" and "Nien 'Fei" she had to face an external
enemy in the Lorcha War of 1856. In Sinkiang there were series of Mohammedan risings ending in the establishment of an Independent Kingdom under Yakub Beg in 1866. Russia, whose expansion in Europe was checked after the Crimean War (1854–56), began to expand in Central Asia. The menacing march of Russia in the power vacuum created in Central Asia alarmed the British in India, who, after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 and the suppression of the rising of 1857-58 were seriously in search of security. The wild cry of the Punjab officials regarding commercial prosperity with Sinkiang made an impact on the mind of Sir Lawrence. He, in the first instance, appointed Dr. Henry Cayley as Trade Agent at Leh in 1867 for a year. Subsequent to this, the appointment was renewed yearly in utter disregard of the wishes of the Maharaja of Kashmir. For opening up the Chang-Chenmo route to Yarkand a commercial treaty was signed with Kashmir Darbar laying open the entire eastern section of the State for the British survey and observations. Several missions were exchanged with Yarkand but excepting a commercial treaty with Yakub Beg, nothing more could be achieved. The fate of this treaty was that it could never be ratified. Yakub Beg was done to death and the Chinese power returned to Sinkiang in 1878. The British and Russian efforts towards creating an independent kingdom of Yakub Beg as a buffer had failed.

In the meantime the Russian threat in Afghanistan was ever increasing. Lord Lytton, the then Viceroy of India, was conscious of it and met Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir at Madhopur on 17th and 18th November 1876 and proposed the establishment of the British Agency at Gilgit. A weak Indian State had to yield to the British pressures. John Biddulph was posted at Gilgit in 1877. His stay at an isolated post for three years made no impact either on the population of the area or on the rulers. The Maharaja deliberately frustrated the British schemes. In the meantime the second Afghan War was over in September 1880. The Gilgit Agency was withdrawn in 1881. The Centre of the British activities was shifted from Gilgit to Jammu where the ailing Maharaja was counting his days. British intrigues and interference in the State administration became the order of the day. The Maharaja who had been resisting the appointment of a British Resident died on the evening of 12th September 1885. Sir Oliver St. John, who, upon the death of the Maharaja became Resident, reached Jammu on
15th September 1885. He demanded radical administrative reforms from the new Maharaja. In spite of the best intentions Pratap Singh could not make changes in the administration of the State. Oliver St. John was replaced by Sir Chichele Plowden who made the ground fertile for the deposition of Pratap Singh. Colonel R. Parry Nisbet, who succeeded Plowden as Resident in Kashmir, discovered some fictitious letters supposed to be written by the Maharaja. He intrigued with Prince Amar Singh and other ministers of the State and forced an entry into the room of the Maharaja and got the resignation signed by him. Helpless Pratap Singh was deposed from power on 8th March 1889. None of his pleadings could make impact on Lansdowne. Reaction to the deposition in the State was very sharp. The Dogras submitted a Memorandum to Mr. C. Bradlaugh, M.P., who raised the issue in the House of Commons, but without any results. On the periphery of the State, both Tibet and Sinkiang sealed their borders for Europeans and the entire local trade was affected. The British efforts towards the opening of Tibet and the installation of a trade Consul at Kashgar failed miserably.

Soon after the deposition of Pratap Singh a second Gilgit Agency was established in July 1889. Captain A. G. A. Durand in spite of his best endeavours failed to control the tribal people. He had to resort to an expedition to Hunza in 1891 and four years later to Chitral. Thus by the close of the nineteenth century the British power reached the Hindu Kush.

While the British Government was active in subduing Kashmir, they were by no means unmindful of the boundaries of the State towards Sinkiang. W. H. Johnson who crossed into Khotan in 1864 reported that the boundary was along the Kuen Lun range. But this factual assertion of Johnson was not accepted. As a matter of fact the British Government was in search of strategically sound boundary. Forsyth who led two missions to Yakub Beg suggested a boundary in 1874-75 which was to mid-way between the Kuen Lun and Mustang Karakoram range. Ney Elias in 1878 advocated an Indus watershed boundary on the following considerations: (1) that the line should follow on the whole of the natural water-parting between the two countries; (2) that it should place a natural barrier between the people and the possible enemy; (3) that it should be near the base of supplies; and (4) that it should be easy to demarcate. A decade later, Captain H. L. Ramsay, the British
Joint Commissioner at Leh advocated for the Kuen Lun boundary. In the meantime Hunza made an attack on Shahidulla Kargiz and the British Government seized the opportunity and deputed Captain F. Younghusband for ascertaining the strategically sound boundary. The Maharaja of Kashmir and the Kashmir Darbar were advised not to occupy the fort at Shahidulla. Upon the report of Younghusband a boundary line was decided upon. In 1890 Younghusband was deputed to Yarkand and was charged to induce the Chinese to occupy the Kuen Lun Mustang Karakoram tract. After his meeting with P'an Ta-Jein on 5th September 1890, Chinese activities were noticed in the area. Mortimer Durand was of the fixed opinion that one day the Chinese rule in Sinkiang would collapse and would be replaced by the Russian. In such contingencies it was thought fit to have a strategically sound defensible boundary and a weak neighbour. But Macartney was of the opinion that the fact of the boundary should be brought to the notice of the Chinese and then they should be allowed to occupy only on the condition that so long as they were master of Sinkiang no objection would be raised to their occupation of the Kuen Lun Mustang Karakoram tract. But in the event of Sinkiang being occupied by any other power the region would be declared a Neutral Zone. This scheme also failed to make any impact on the Government. John Ardagh, the Director of Military Intelligence, pleaded for a boundary of Kashmir State along the Kuen Lun range. He advocated that in a general sense it formed an acceptable defensible line, because it was easy to define, difficult to pass and fairly dividing the population. All these pleadings by the different people were finally rejected by Elgin, and instead he suggested to bargain the MacDonald Line of 1899 with the Chinese. His condition was that China should remove the fiction of sovereignty over Hunza, and then the British Government would not press for the legal claims of Hunza over Raskam and Tagdumbash Pamir. In spite of the insistence of the British Government, no reply was received from Peking.

In the meantime the internal condition of China deteriorated. Younghusband led an expedition to Lhasa and dictated the terms there. Britain and Russia patched-up their differences in the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907. The Russians stopped instigating China against the British. Lord Curzon who succeeded Elgin believed in the Ardagh line. Minto II and Hardinge of Penshurst
had hardly anything to do with the boundary. Hunza began the cultivation of the Raskam lands from 1914. It appears that in 1927 the British Government once again tried to withdraw Hunza's claims from Raskam and the Pamirs, but the Maharaja of Kashmir asserted that the dominions of Kashmir were bounded to the north by the northern watershed of the Kuén Lun ranges. The area remained under the control of Kashmir State, up to the eve of Indian Independence in 1947.

IV

India was always a geographical unit. Culturally it has always been one. At times it was a political unit, but more often it was divided into several small units. Those who established their empire in India, could only control a portion of it. But this does not mean that beyond their sway India was non-existent. We are familiar with three different names by which this subcontinent was known. Bharatwarsh, Hindustan and India all denote the same land mass which has been in existence from time immemorial. The different empires at different times were called by names such as the Mauryan India, Gupta India, Mughal India and British India. This indicates that the different empires had certain territory of India under their control. Up to the sixth century A.D. there was hardly any point of dispute between India and her neighbours, Tibet and Sinkiang. It was only after the disappearance of a strong central authority and the arrival of the Muslims that a gulf gradually began to grow between India and its neighbours. The country itself was divided into several small principalities which, in course of time, acquired their own territorial limits. At no time was any of the northern principalities subordinate to either Peking or Lhasa. They never thought or considered themselves outside India. When the strong authority of the Mughals was established in India, all the principalities in course of time became subordinate and tributary to it, and the boundaries of the States such as Hunza, Baltistan, Ladakh, Bashahr, Garhwal and Kumaun became the boundary of Mughal India. The Mughals on their part never tried to interfere with the States, nor ever tried to effect their administrative control.
The British Government in India gradually began to seize the territories of the Indian rulers. Its policy of acquisition, specially of the frontier States was determined by two main considerations, trade and security. As regards Tibet the British aimed at opening it up for trade, whereas in regard to Sinkiang the British policy varied according to the appearance or otherwise of the Russian threat to the empire. A weak China, which was humbled by the British was considered, a better neighbour than powerful Russia. In determining the boundary with Tibet the British Government invited China into Tibet in 1846-47 and ever since then upheld that bogie of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. This Chinese authority in Tibet remained only so long as it suited the needs of the Empire. But when it became a threat to the empire it was thrown to the winds. Younghusband in 1903-4 marched into Tibet without the consent of China. No amount of hue and cry made any impact on the confident Curzon. In determining the boundary with Sinkiang, the British Government decided to part with a portion of land to China, whose sovereignty they were able to humble or uphold, as per needs of the empire. Not willing to uphold the territories between the Kuen Lun and Mustang Karakoram—rather a liability than an asset—the British Government gave it out that the land belonged to no one in particular and therefore was a no man’s land. In fact the territory up to Kuen Lun belonged to Hunza and Ladakh before the Dogra rule, and later was a legitimate part of the successor state of Jammu and Kashmir. But the Chinese Government was induced and invited to occupy the territory, in spite of the claims and protests of the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Mir of Hunza. True, no one in particular was living in the area, but the claims to the territory were never surrendered. The Chinese on the other hand never considered any portion of land below the Kuen Lun and Sanju Kilian Passes as a part of their empire. The Macartney-MacDonald proposal of 1899, though it failed to achieve any result, yet parted the legitimate land of Kashmir to the tune of approximately 4,800 square miles to China. When a State is taken by another power, it is taken in its totality, not the assets taken and the liabilities parted. Unfortunately the British Government in India had taken the former and parted the latter.
When India became free in 1947 it inherited from the British this legacy on the frontiers. Being busy with the refugee exodus due to partition of the country, and the Kabaili aggression in Kashmir it could not give proper thought to the boundaries. The Republican regime in China was replaced by the Communist regime. Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee giving place to Mao tse-tung. The Chinese liberation army quickly took up positions on the frontiers. The Government of India hurriedly revised the treaties with Sikkim and Bhutan in 1949-50. China in her hour of triumph marched into Tibet and got a Seventeen Point Agreement signed on 23rd May 1951. This agreement sealed the fate of Tibetan independence. India quickly accorded the recognition of China’s sovereignty over Tibet in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th July 1954. The spirit of Bandung prevailed for a while. Very soon in September 1957 China completed the road connecting Sinkiang and Tibet. Claims were quickly laid by China on Barahoti on 17th July 1954. An Indian patrol party was stopped by the Chinese petrol party at Damzan near Niti Pass on 15th September 1955. On 28th April 1956 a party of twelve Chinese soldiers was detected at Nilang. A party of ten Chinese Army personnel entered Shipki Pass on 1st September 1956. After these reconnaissance visits the Chinese started cartographical aggression and air intrusion on the Indian territory. Protest notes were sent and received without any positive results. The Prime Ministers of both the countries met at New Delhi from 19th to 25th April 1960, and agreed on the scrutiny of the historical materials on the boundary. Accordingly officials of India and China met at Peking, Delhi and Rangoon between June and November 1960, and scrutinized the relevant materials without reaching any agreement. The situation began to deteriorate rapidly on the India-China border. Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet were withdrawn and compensation for the loss of traders was demanded from China in September 1962. The Trade Agreement of 1954 lapsed, and an armed conflict started on 20th October 1962. On 24th October 1962, the Chinese Government issued a

statement declaring the causes of the conflict and proposed three conditions for cessation of hostilities. Several classifications were sought by India on the proposals and were replied to by China. No settlement was in sight when China suddenly announced the cessation of hostility. The firing was stopped at zero hours on 22nd November 1962. The Chinese forces withdrew 20 kilometres from the line of actual control in December 1962. Both the combatants suffered heavy loss in men and material. A solution of the India-China boundary is still not in sight. Unless both parties to the dispute are willing to settle, it seems difficult to have peace and normalcy in the area.


"His three sons were, Lha-chen-Dpol-gyi-mgon (c. A.D. 930–60); Bkra-Sis-mgon, the middle one; and Lde-gtsum-mgon, the youngest, these three. He gave to each of these three sons a separate kingdom, viz., to the eldest, Dpal-gyi-mgon, Mar-yul or Mniah-ris, the inhabitants using black bows: Ru-thogs of the east and the gold-mine of Hgog; nearer this way Lde-mchong-dkar-po; at the frontier Ra-ba-dmar-po; Wam-Le, to the top of the pass of the Yi-mig rock (LMS, Gyag-lder); (AMS) to the west to the foot of the Kashmir pass, from the cavernous stone upwards hither; to the north to the Gold mine of Hgog (LMS: of Mgon-po); all the places belonging to Rgya Bkra-sis-mgon, the second, he made ruler over Gu-ge with Pu-hrans, Rtse, etc. Lde-gtsug-mgon, the youngest, he made ruler over Zans-dkar-sgo-gsum; with Spi-ti Spi-lcogs, etc."

2. LADAKH-TIBET WAR AND THE TREATY OF 1684

His son, Lha-chen-Bde-Legs-rnam-rgyal (c. A.D. 1645–80) came to the capital. At that time the people of Lho-hbrug (Bhutan) and the Tibetans had a dispute. Now, [the head lama] Lho-hbrug was the patron-lama (patron deity) of the King of Ladakh. The latter sent a letter to Tibet, saying that he was prepared to take up his quarrel. The Tibetans carefully considered the matter. "Supposing' they said, "the King's army should arrive here first, it would in accordance with his name, lead to an overturn of the state (Bde-legs, Lit. 'good fortune', and Sde-briags, 'overturn', may have a similar sound in Tibetan pronunciation). Would it not, therefore, be well to raise an army (Here) first?" To this suggestion they all agreed. At that time there happened to be at Dgah-ldam lamasery a Mongol lama, called Tshe-dban. The calculations pointed out him (as the destined leader). He accordingly turned layman, and, heading the Mongol tribe and a powerful army [of Tibetans], he (soon) reached [Ladakh]. After a first engagement at Zva-dmar-idin the Mongol army in due course arrived at Ba-mgo (Bab-sgo). At that time the King was staying at Gtin-sgan Castle, while the Ladakhi general and some forces following him seized Ba-mgo Castle. Although they fought for three years the Mongol army would not return [to Lha-sa]. So the King of La-dvags despatched a messenger to the Nawab of Kha-chul (Kashmir). Then,

1 The Chronicles of Ladakh: Translation, A. H. Francke, Antiquities of Indian Tibet (Calcutta, 1926), vol. II, p. 94.
2 This is an extract of pp. 115–17 from the Chronicles of Ladakh: Translation, A. H. Francke, Antiquities of Indian Tibet (Calcutta, 1926).
an immense army appearing on the scene, a battle ensued on the Bya-rgyal plain near Ba-mgo. The Tibetan army was routed; they left behind them a large quantity of armour, bows, and arrows. Their rout continued until they reached Dpe-thub; the Mongol army in its flight (eventually) reached Bkra-sis-sgan. There they built a fort, shut it in with a wall, and surrounded it with water. Inside they made it secure against an assault of armies, and there they abode. Upon this the Sde-pa-gkum (Lhasa Government), apprehending that the King of La-dvags might once more come and bring succour, and thus another war might ensue, desired the Hbrug-pa-Mi-pham-dban-po to go and negotiate for peace. Accordingly the Hbrug-pa Omniscient [undertook the journey] and arrived at Gtin-sgain. Simultaneously some other messengers of the Tibetans arrived there as well. (CMS) The King of La-dvags heard that the patron-lama of his forefathers had arrived; what these two agreed upon was not to be overturned again. [The result of their deliberations was as follows:—] As the beginning King Skyid-Lde-ni-ma-mgon gave a separate kingdom to each of his sons, the same delimitations still hold good. (BMS) The Tibetans have come to consider that, since Tibet is a Buddhist, and Kha-chul (Kashmir) is a non-Buddhist country, and since Buddhist and non-Buddhist religions have nothing in common and are hostile to each other, if at the frontier the King of La-dvags does not prosper, Bod (Tibet) also cannot enjoy prosperity. [This being so], the occurrences of the recent war should be considered things of the past. The King [on the other hand, shall in future keep watch at the frontier of Buddhist and non-Buddhist peoples], and out of regard for the doctrine of Buddha must not allow an army from India to proceed to an attack [upon Tibet]. As to privileges of Kha-chul (Kashmir) [The following agreement was come to:—] The fine wool of goats of Mnah-ris-skor-gsum shall not be sold to any other country; the price of fine and coarse wool mixed shall be fixed at eighty nag to two rupees (CMS) [or] the price of fine and coarse wool mixed be fixed at forty nag to one rupee, (BMS) [to be paid in both money and kind]; the Byan[-than] people shall not be allowed to use the nag of Ron (Indus gorge?); it shall not be said of the wool of Byan[-than] that it contains soil, stones, or moisture. To Ru-thog proper none but the court merchants [of Ladakh] are to be admitted. [Regarding] the goat wool (trade):—Four Kashmiri merchants shall reside at Dpe-thub, and do the trading with the Kashmiris of Kashmir. Besides these men, who are called Kha-chul-hgo-rgya, no Kashmiri of Kashmir shall be allowed to go to Byan-than. Those Ladakhi-Kashmiris who go to Byan-than shall not be allowed themselves to go down to Kashmir with loads of wool of goats. Regarding Monah-ris-skor-gsum Mi-pham-dhan-po's stipulations were to this effect:—It shall be set apart to meet the expenses of sacred lamps and prayers [offered] at Lha-sa; but at Men-ser (CMS Smon-tsher) the King shall be his own master, so that the King of La-dvags may have wherewithal to pay for lamps and other sacrifices at the Gans-mtsho [lake]; it shall be his private domain. With this exception the boundary shall be fixed at the Lha-ri stream at Bde-mchong. From Tibet the Government trader shall come with two hundred loads of tea, and nowhere but by La-dvags shall rectangular tea-bricks be sent across the frontier. Should the government trader fail to come every year, then the above stipulations shall no longer be binding. The King of La-dvags, on the other hand, shall on the occasion of the La-phyag (bien-nial embassy) offer presents to the clergy. (CMS) This embassy has to be sent
with presents from La-dvags to Tibet every third year. (BMS) As regards presents to ordinary lamas, the quantity is not fixed, but to the Bla-drän steward shall be given tea thur-żo of gold (CMS two thurzo of gold) (ten tolas), ten sran of scent (saffron); six pieces of calico from Hor (the Mughal empire? or Turkistan?); and one piece of soft cotton cloth. Throughout their sojourn [the members of the Lo-phyag] shall receive [daily] rations. For the load (shall be supplied) [beasts of burden, to carry] 200 loads; (CMS) 25 riding horses; 10 men (to act as) groom, cook, and servant; (BMS) 15 baggage ponies, 10 riding ponies, and 3 men to act as grooms cook and servant. (BMS) There (in Tibet) the horses shall have fodder without restriction. For the steppe districts [Hbrog-sde] [will be given] one large tent and (three) small tents for the leader, the head cook, and the treasurer. The baggage ponies [will be supplied] according to stages and (CMS) both going and coming of the goods shall be transported on well-trained docile ponies. (BMS) It also had been stipulated that with every mission (Lo-phyag) one of the three (provinces of) Mnah-ris-skor-gsum should be made over to (CMS) Mi-pham-dhan-po; (BMS) but the king entered a request with the Sde-pa-gzum that he, begging to differ from Mi-pham-dban-po's decisions would prefer that they should give three districts in Tibet proper to Mi-pham-dhan-po, in the place of Mnah-ris-skor-gsum. Thereby a provocation to Mnah-ris (Skor-gsum) might he avoided. Accordingly, the Sde-pa[g]zum made over the Mi-pham-dban-po three estates. Guge, Ru-thog, etc. were annexed to Lhasa in order to defray [from the revenue derived from these districts] the expenses of sacrificial lamps and [the reading of] prayers. Then the Nawab of Kha-chul sent his army back [to Kashmir] and the Nawab and the King of La-dvags became friends. Likewise, the King of La-dvags had to send his filial share to Kashmir every third year, and also with that 18 piebald horses, 18 pods of musk and, 18 white yak tails; (CMS or every 6 year); whilst it was also settled that 500 bags of rice (CMS 300 bags of rice each year), being the revenue accruing to the King of La-dvags from his jagir Na-gu-sa-har (Naushahr) should every year be sent up from Kha-chul.

3. **Translation of a Treaty of Peace and Amity Concluded between the Chinese and Sikhs, Subsequently to the Death of Wazeer Zorawar Singh, Signed by Kaloon Zookund on the Part of the Former, and Rutna Wazeer and Dewan Hurry Chand on the Part of the Latter**

The following chiefs having assembled in the city of Le on the 28 Assoge 1899 sumbat/corresponding with 17 October 1842/viz/Kaloon Zoorkund and Dewan Jeesy—on the part of the Chinese, and Shah Gholam on the part of the Ruler of Lahore, and Ratnu Wazeer and Hurry Chand on the part of Raja Gulab Singh—besides others of inferior note belonging to both parties—it was mutually

1 *Foreign Secret, 24 May 1843, Nos. 61–63.* This treaty was forwarded by the Raja of Bashahar to J. C. Eriskshine. Raja of Bashahar got it copied from one of the temples of Gartok where it was stuck up by Tibetans.
agreed that a treaty of amity and peace should be concluded between the Chinese and Sikhs, the conditions of which as under mentioned were recorded in writing in the presence of the chiefs aforesaid, and likewise Sibchu, Tudipun Peesy, and Lamha, Weejeer both, confidential advisers of Ludak and Lhassa.

1. That the boundaries of Ladak and Lhassa shall be constituted as formerly, the contracting parties engaging to confine themselves within their respective boundaries—the one to refrain from any act of aggression on the other.

2. That in conformity with ancient usage Tea, and Pushum and shawl wool shall be transmitted by the Ladak Road.

3. Such persons as may in future proceed from China to Ladak or from Ladak to China not to be obstructed on the road.

4. That no renewal of the war between the (Gulab Singh) Chiefs of the Rajah and of those of the Viceroy of Lhassa shall take place.

5. That the above mentioned conditions shall remain in force without interruption, and whatever customs formerly existed shall not be removed and continue to prevail.

6. It is understood that in signing the above treaty the contracting parties are bound to a true and faithful observance of all the provisions thereof by the solemn obligations attached to the Holy place called Gengu to the lake of Shantalav and to the temple of Kojoerchu in China.

(True Translation)

4. Lord Hardinge to the Vazir of Lhasa-Gartope, etc. etc. and the Authorities in Tibet, 4 August 1846

Be it known to Your Excellency that by a treaty now concluded between the two high powers, the British Government and the Durbar of Lahore, His Highness Maharaja Dulleep Singh has ceded to the British Government in perpetual sovereignty the Hill countries between the rivers Beas and Indus including Cashmere and its dependencies and the Province of Hazarah, all of which countries were up to the present time in the possession of the Lahore Government.

Be it further known to Your Excellency that the British Government have formed a treaty with His Highness Maharaja Goolab Singh of Jummoo and for good and sufficient reason and out of friendly regard to His Highness have ceded to His

1 Foreign Secret Proceedings, 25 December 1846, No. 1336. This document was delivered to Garpon of Gartok by Anant Ram of Bashahr. Garpon never sent it to Lhasa. Therefore its presence in Chinese archives is very doubtful. Dr. Lamb is of the opinion that it should be in Chinese archives. The copy of this document was sent to John Davis at Hong Kong for its transmission to Peking through His Imperial Commissioner Keying. But John Davis had prepared a separate note on the basis of this document, which he had delivered to Keying, instead of this document. See Appendix V. Cf. Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border: The Origins of the disputed boundaries (London, 1964), p. 177 footnote.
Highness in perpetual sovereignty the supremacy of the British Government all the Hill countries situated to the eastward of the River Indus and to the westward of the River Ravee including Chumba and excluding Lahoul—these countries being portions of the territory ceded to the British Government by the Lahore Darbar. As it is now deemed expedient to settle definitely the boundaries to the eastward of the countries thus ceded to His Highness Maharajah Goolab Singh, in order that hereafter no questions or disputes may arise concerning their exact limits, I have now determined to depute two of my confidential officers Mr. Vans Agnew and Captain Cunningham, in order that they in conjunction with the confidential agents of His Highness Maharajah Goolab Singh should lay down the boundary between the territories of the British Government and those of its dependants, and the territories of Maharajah Goolab Singh.

As it is understood that the territories belonging to the great Empire of China and which are under Your Excellency's Government adjoin those of the British Government and of Maharajah Goolab Singh and with due regard to the friendly alliance now subsisting between the British Government and the Emperor of China, I now think it necessary to inform Your Excellency of the deputation of my officers and of the objects they have in view.

I have to express my hope that Your Excellency will see fitting to depute confidential agents to point out to my officers the exact limits of the Chinese frontiers in order that no interference may through ignorance be exercised with the territories of your high and esteemed government. As by the 4th Article of the treaty with the Government of Lahore the entire rights and interests of the Durhar in the territory now ceded to Maharajah Goolab Singh were transferred to the British Government, I have deemed it expedient that certain portions of the Treaty between the Chinese authorities and those of Lahore should be cancelled as these were in their nature highly injurious to the interests of the British Government and its dependants. I have accordingly determined that the 2nd Article of the treaty aforesaid, by which it was provided that the entire trade should pass through Ladakh, should be cancelled, and that the 3rd Article should be modified and run as follows:

Such persons as may in future proceed from China to Ladakh or to the British Territory or its dependencies or from Ladakh or the British Territory and its dependencies to China are not to be obstructed on the road.

It is not the desire of the British Government to intrude into the China territory, or to ask for admittance except to such marts as are open to general traders of other countries, or to secure exclusive privileges for its subjects, but it desires to secure for them equal advantages with the subjects of other states and with this view it is expedient that British traders may be permitted to go and come by whatever road they please without molestation or hindrance.

As a proof of the enlightened policy of the British Government and its desire to advance the welfare of its subjects I may inform Your Excellency that no duties whatever are levied within the British territory on shawl wool or any other products of China which may be imported into such countries. An intimation of the wishes of the British Government with respect to the Treaty between the Chinese and Sikh Government has been made to Maharajah Goolab Singh—and His Highness will doubtless readily acquiesce in the just demands and wishes of the British Government.
I hope you will find it in your power to exhibit friendly attention towards my officers and to assist them in bringing to a conclusion the duty they have to perform.

I have to inform Your Excellency that I have transmitted a copy of this letter to the High Officer of the British Government stationed at Hong Kong, who is entrusted with the duty of maintaining the friendly relation between the two High Governments in order that His Excellency may take measures to have its contents communicated to His Imperial Majesty.

Accept of the expression of my high estimation and regard for Your Excellency.

5. From John Davis, Governor, Hongkong to Keying, His Imperial Commissioner, Dated 18 November 1846

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that Right Honourable Governor-General of India who rules over the British Territories extending from Ava to Kashmir has written to me officially requesting me to make a communication to the Imperial Government of Peking.

I perhaps ought on such an occasion to proceed to the Peiho to communicate directly with the minister of Peking according to the 11 Article of the treaty of Nanking but if your Excellency can manage the negotiation, it will prove more convenient. If the business cannot be transacted by your excellency my direct communications with Peking may become unavoidable.

The Governor-General of India having conquered the Sikh nation who had unjustly invaded our territory took possession of the Hilly country of Kashmir and bestowed it upon Maharaja Gulab Singh a friend and ally of the British nation. On the east of this territory extends a part of that belonging to Great Britain on the north of both the British Territory and that of bestowed upon Gulab Singh is the country of Tibet belonging to China and Governed by the Viceroy of Lhasa. I have the honour to enclose the sketch of the frontier with Chinese names for the elucidation of this subject.

Since the British territory and also the hilly country of Kashmir belonging to a dependant and ally of Great Britain are now conterminous with that of China it becomes extremely desirable to cultivate a friendly and beneficial intercourse in order that troubles and misunderstandings may be effectually prevented. As Great Britain has supreme power in India she can as the friend and ally of China prevent the dependent states as well as her own subjects from transgressing the laws of mutual friendship. But in order to do this effectually it becomes necessary to ascertain the exact boundaries which divided the Tibetan territory from that pertaining to Great Britain and from that also which has been conferred on Gulab Singh. This Prince being dependent on Great Britain can be consequently controlled by the British Government provided that the boundaries are ascertained. But without such precautions, it will be impossible to prevent serious disputes and misunderstanding.

1 Foreign Secret, 28 August 1847, No. 140.
The Governor-General perceiving this and desirous to preserve eternal peace and amity has sent commissioners to the Viceroy of Tibet at Lhasa requesting that his excellency will appoint proper officer to settle the exact boundaries of the Chinese Territory bordering not only at the British possessions—but also on those which have been conferred on Gulab Singh who will thus be obliged to respect the Chinese frontier. The good faith of the British Government, having already been proved in Eastern China will be found no less inviolable in the West.

The above is the first object of Governor-General’s mission to the Viceroy of Lhasa. A second object not less important to the promotion of friendly relations and mutual benefit is to establish the same trade and commerce between the British territory and Tibet that has already subsisted by treaty between Kashmir and Tibet. The territory of Kashmir conferred on Gulab Singh having carried on a beneficial commerce with Tibet. His lordship justly expects that the same intercourse should be passed by the British territory. It is stated expressly that no duties whatever will be levied on the produce of the Imperial dominions imported into our frontiers.

Whenever an answer has been obtained from Peking, I can convey it to India. Your Excellency being already been the glorious means of promoting peace and friendship in the east may now have the additional fame of mediating for the benefit of the remote west.

6. Translation of Treaty Concluded Between Dewan Bastiram on Behalf of the Kashmir State and Mangyal Ishe on Behalf of the Lhassa State in the Year A.D. 1858

The glorious Heaven appointed Priest and Lord at his royal residence of Lhassa, and the glorious Maharaja’s royal Government conclude in (this) the “water-tiger-year” the following peace treaty. The (former) agreement of the “water-ox-year” according to which the mutual Ambassadors were to meet in Ladakh, remains in full force, as has been the case hitherto.

(Now as to) the subject of treaty which places both courts on equal footing: (According to) the order of His Highness the Priest and Lord of Lhassa (are pointed) the (Native) Governor of Nyestod and the Lama attendant to the Delai Lama and commercial agent Namgyal Ishe as substitute for the Gargang (chief of a Camp) and for the Dzangskan of Rustaq and Lama attendant Shalsing Sigmed (acts) as substitute, the steward Legspa Isering. (Further) according to the order of His Highness Maharaja Ranbir Singh and Wazir Saheb Zorawar (are appointed) the Ladakh Tanadar Bastiram Singh Sahib and the Tanadar Isirjoo Mangal Singh, Munshi Kardar Isetan Dorji (with respect to the meeting of those both parties) in a friendly spirit, (this is) an extract of their instructions.

Ladakh and Tibet with all their numerous valleys appoint their own rulers for administrators within their boundaries, if a foreign powers army should invade

1 Foreign External A, February 1900, Nos. 17-18.
the country within the boundaries, passes and approaches of His Highness the Dalai Lama's dominions, His Highness's Government will have to give orders for the expulsion of the enemy. If, however, the army of a foreign power should invade His Highness the Maharaja's dominions, His Highness the Maharaja will have to order the expulsion. As a matter of course each nation has to protect itself and consequently has to subdue external enemies.

As to interior affairs, whilst both Governments will entertain friendly relations with each other, their noble and perfectly sincere desire will be at all times.

As regards the higher classes, a good behaviour as to all subjects, a happy existence.

The trade in tea and lena (fine wool) will be carried on in all future as was done in the past.

Though two separate states they form one common dwelling only, and all subjects without difference will live in closer fellowship than that of brothers; their happiness will increase and a genuine change unanimously and fully agreed upon (will take place) which shall abide for ever.

This is written treaty, for which the glorious God is called as Witness, and which was duly and irrevocably concluded.

(Ratified) in the current "Besak" month of the year 1915 or the Tibetan earth (?) horse year on the (?) date omitted.

By the Ladakh Tanadar Bastiram Singh and Tanadar Isirjoo and Mangal Singh with their seals.

(Munshi Kardar Isetan Dorji's seals)
the Governor of Myestod's seal

The commercial agent (of Lhassa) and Lama attendant for the Dalai Lama Namgyal Ishe, his seal (he acting) as substitute for the Gorgong.

The steward Legspa Isering's seal (he acting) as substitute for the Dzongspan of Rudok and Lama attendant Skalzang Jigmed.

(True translation)

(Signed illegible) Captain
Assistant Resident in Kashmir
Leh

7. Translation of a Treaty Concluded Between the Kashmir State and Shah Ghazanfar, Raja of Hunza

I, Shah Ghazanfar, Raja of Hunza, beg to write the following few lines to the effect:—That at the time when the honoured Madur-ul-Maham (Prime Minister) Wazir Zorawar Singh taking possession of the country of Skardu annexed it to

1 Foreign Secret F, April 1892, No. 76.
the Sirkar’s State, I paid my respect to the above Wazir and accepted the Sirkar’s rule. After that when the Sheikhs governed the country of Gilgit, I sent my Mutabirs (Trusted men) with the men who were against them (Sheikhs) to Syed Nathe Shah at Gilgit and also despatching letters and messages set on good friendly relations. After some time, the above Wazir at the instigation of Raja Karim Khan and the Wazirs of Gilgit sent his troops against me to my country. A fight took place, in which both the above mentioned Rajas and Syed were, by the will of God, killed. The Guns and Mortars belonging to the Sirkar, which were left in this fight, were kept by me with great care as Sirkar’s Amanat (deposit), but after this I could not remain on friendly terms with the Gilgit authorities. But as now the esteemed Sardar Bakhshi Hari Singh with his victorious troops has arrived on the frontiers of my country, and has encamped on my boundary, I, considering my welfare have agreed to be obedient to the servants of the Sirkar, and therefore have taken the Guns and other articles of the Sirkar and delivered them to the Bakshi Saheb and in accordance with the old terms of my 1st treaty concluded with the Wazir Saheb (Zorawar Singh), I have accepted the rule of the Sirkar and I hereby promise that I will never raise any objection to serve and carry out the orders of the Sirkar in any respect. That I will make arrangements for the merchants and traders coming from Yarkand for their journey to Skardu and Shigar giving them Badragas (guides) to pass them safely within my territory, and that, if the traders incur any damage within my frontiers, which God forbid, I shall be responsible, and in return for my services done to the traders, whatever the Sirkar may kindly grant me, I will accept. The friend of the Sirkar will be treated as my friend, and his enemy will be my enemy.

The above few lines have been written by me in the form of an agreement and I hold myself responsible that the caravans will not be robbed either by my subjects or by those who are against me. But if at any time some trick be played on me or some superior power surpass me, under such circumstances I shall be helpless.

(Marks of Seal of Shah Ghazanfar Khan)
(on four places)

8. TRANSLATION OF A TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE KASHMIR STATE AND RAJA JAFFAR KHAN OF NAGAR

I, Raja Jafar Khan of Nagar, beg to write the following few lines to the effect:— That at the time when Sheikh Gulam Mohiyuddin was Governor of Kashmir, and despatched troops with the object of conquering Gilgit, I, being a well-wisher of the Sirkar, performed services in every respect. Afterwards when the esteemed Sayad Nathe Shah died in the Hunza battle, I sent my headman with 2,000 rifles to the assistance of Syed Amam Ali Shah, and after that at the time when Syed Nazar Ali Shah came to Bunji with the Sirkar’s officers, I despatched my men to the fort of Gilgit, and turning out the Darel people gave it into the possession of the above named Syed. After that Bakhshi Hari Singh came to

1 Foreign Secret F, April 1892, No. 75.
Gilgit, and Syed Nazar Ali Shah was sent by him to Nagar, and I made him (Nazar Ali Shah) thankful and pleased showing him every hospitality. Now I agree to depute two headmen every month out of my Gilgit men who will have to remain with the Hakim of Gilgit, and according to his advice they will serve the Sirkar.

Secondly:—I will send every year my Mutabirs (trusted men) to the Sirkar for the purpose of paying respects with the same annual tribute as I now pay, and if any one will ever attack Gilgit I will assist the Hakim of Gilgit.

The above few lines have been written by me as an agreement and from this time I will remain as one of the Sirkar's subjects and if ever I do any thing contrary to my agreement, I shall be held guilty and answerable to the Sirkar.

Mark (Seal of Jafar Khan)

Signature of the Wazirs

9. Deposition of Maharaja Pratap Singh

"Pandit Sooraj Kole, the Revenue Minister of Council, says my informant, arrived at Jammu on 1st January 1889, but did not do anything of practical importance, as the judicial member had not arrived. Whatever proposals were made by Revenue Member to His Highness were promptly sanctioned, and the man was so well pleased with his situation that more than once he expressed his great satisfaction to His Highness. Prince Amar Singh, Prime Minister, was in secret communication with the Resident. The judicial member arrived and took charge of his office on 16 February. The Council, however, did not commence its sittings formally, because the rules of business had not been framed. It appears there was a hint from the Resident to delay their preparations; His Highness himself asked twice or thrice why the rules were not ready, but the Prime Minister satisfied him by saying that they would be ready soon. A fortnight passed, when all of a sudden, the Revenue Member was summoned to Sialkote and kept there for eight days. What happened at Sialkote can be easily imagined. He was called to advise what use could be made of the incriminating letters which had been sent to the Resident with his knowledge and that of the Prince (Prime Minister).

His Highness made inquiries from Pandit Soorjkole on his return from Sialkote, but the Pandit did not warn him of the trap prepared for him.

1 This is an extract from William Digby's book referred in Appendix X, pp. 95-98.
When the plot was matured between the Resident, the Revenue Member, and the Prince, His Highness was asked to send down the Prince to Sialkote. He readily consented. The Prince remained there for two days, and leaving his luggage behind, came up to Jammu and presented a letter from the Resident asking His Highness to permit him to accompany the Resident to Calcutta. His Highness asked why the Resident was going to Calcutta, to which the Prince replied: “The honour of our house is at stake; we are ruined.” Certain letters have been found which prove the Jammu family to be in league with Russia and Dalip Singh; and with tears in his eyes, he begged the Maharaja to let him go with the Resident. The Maharaja being surprised at this mysterious business, refused to let him go, and made a formal request to the Resident to see him at Jammu. The Resident did not give him a reply for two days, and to add to the extreme embarrassment of His Highness, his counsellors, including the Prince depicted in horrible colours his future fate; some said he would be sent to Rangoon as a close prisoner, another that he would be tried for mutiny and hanged; a third that he would be kept a close political prisoner and his state would be confiscated by the Government. He solemnly denied the genuineness of the letters, but this was to no purpose. The Prince told him to his face that he had already told the Resident that the writing appeared to be that of His Highness, though the signature was doubtful. On this the Maharaja, with great composer of mind, declared that, if his own brothers were determined to ruin him with false accusations, he would submit to his fate. His Highness did not take his meals for two days, he was so much overpowered, and in his frenzy he saw no room for escape except to give his consent to such arrangements as were proposed to him. Not favoured by the Resident with a reply to his call, in his despair, he said: “Let them locate a cantonment and take away any portion of my territory, but why do they trouble me in this way and put me to all sorts of disgrace?” The triumph was complete, and there could be no doubt that the Resident was apprised of it. Without giving previous notice he went to Jammu, and before favouring His Highness with a visit, had a long talk with the Prime Minister at Residency. Thus armed with necessary weapons, he visited His Highness and was most offensive to him. He distinctly told him that the Viceroy was very much displeased, and that if His Highness’s life was saved, he might consider himself lucky.

The Maharaja swore that the letters were forgeries and begged to have a look at them. The Resident replied imperiously that he was satisfied they were genuine and would not hear anything more about them. He further said that he had told the Prime Minister how the matter could be spared, and that if His Highness was anxious to save himself from the indignity of a prosecution, he must act as he was told. The Resident left a draft of an “edict” written by the Resident himself. This was laid before His Highness by the Prime Minister, and pressure was put on him from all sides to prepare the “Vosad” on its terms. His Highness persistently refused to do so. Meetings of the Council were held three or four times that day. The members lent from India distinctly refused to have anything to say in the matter, while their other colleagues, who were all Raja Amar Singh’s creatures, were trying to induce His Highness by threats and menaces to sign the document. The Resident was still at Jammu, waiting for the documents; and the Prime Minister finding that the Maharaja did not yield, threatened His Highness with a report to the Resident if the document was not executed. Next morning a
VERNACULAR translation of the Resident's draft was made out, and His Highness's signature obtained; it was then delivered to the Resident, who paid the Maharaja a visit and promised to do all he could to save him from the danger that awaited him.

There does not seem much of voluntary resignation in this incident."

10. THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE FOLLOWING DOGRAS OF JAMMU

"The Kashmir State is divided into two portions, one is Kashmir proper, inhabited by Brahmin Pandits, and the other is Jammu, inhabited by Dogras. The Dogras form the fighting portion of the state. The present Maharaja Pertap Singh belongs to their caste, and is loved to devotion by them. He has been by a trickery deposed, and his gaddi occupied by a few strangers, and these strangers are nothing but tools in the hand of the British Resident. The Dogras have never known foreign domination, and the condition to which they have been just reduced has thrown them into great alarm and distress. At the moment the saying among the Dogras is that they would rather prefer to be plundered by their own Maharaja than to be rewarded with gold by the slavish Council. The Dogras have always fought for the British Government, and will ever fight for it to their last drop of blood. In India it is said that you are friend of the people, and therefore, the petitioners appeal to you for help and protection."

(Here follows signatures)

11. SOME OF THE PAPERS FOUND IN HUNZA FORT AT THE TIME OF THE BRITISH OCCUPATION IN 1891

No. 15 is a proclamation of Turki and Chinese from Zunk Tunk Daubaklao (C-in-C) to Kaz Khan Hakim (Chief of Kanjud) and the following is a translation of its substance.

From enquiries I learn that the district of Kanjud has been under the rule of China. Since the arrival of Yakub Beg Andjani the Chinese authorities cut off for upwards of 10 years. In former times you have enjoyed the favour of a kindness of the Chinese Emperor, which fact must still be fresh in your memory. I have with the assistance of a large army captured the six famous cities, together with their chiefs and dependencies. The son of Yakub Beg has through fear escaped into the Russian territory. I, Zunk Tunk, with the army have encamped at Kashgar.

1 Condemed UNHEARD.


Strike but Hear it—

(Indian Political Agency, 29 Caravan Street, Charing Cross, London, July 1890)

2 Foreign Secret F, September 1892, Nos. 409, 428, 434, 454, 460.
I understand that you are distressed like the Kirgiz (Hill tribe). You are a wise man and therefore I have written this to you, so that you will consider and let me know distinctly how many districts are under you and whether you are willing to submit to and serve the Emperor of China. When I receive a favourable reply from you I will submit it to the Emperor and obtain his favours for you. On your submission to the emperor you will better be able to administer your country and thereby exalt your position. You must advise your subjects not to commit bad deeds anywhere. It is very necessary that no foreigners should either enter or leave the country without permission. You will consider this and act accordingly.

Dated 24th day of the 12 month of the 3rd year of the reign of Kwang Shni.1

(Chinese seal)


A.C. I have to inform you that by the grace of God we are in the enjoyment of good health.... The servant by name Kurban, whom you had deputed in view to make enquiries after my health and conveying your congratulations to me, on your having heard that by the grace and favour of God I have been appointed to the Government of Yarkand, at Yarleigh, has arrived.

I have perused your letter and having learnt from the contents that you are in good health and that your territory and its dependencies are enjoying peace and quiet, I have been overjoyed. Ten miskals of Tila, and three "saloosun" skins which you have kindly sent with sincerity of heart, as to me, I have received and accepted and I am very much delighted.

It is necessary that you should watch your territory and preserve its safety and quiet and you should act up to the old custom and usage and send the usual "Peshkah" (present or offering) every year to us at the appointed time without any delay.

This will give us great satisfaction and joy and you will receive favours from the Ambans. Keep your mind at ease.

434. Translation of a letter addressed by Sola Amban of the 1st Jirga Taji, Ruler of Yarkand to the Mir of Kanjut Shah Ghazanfar (no date).

It is now seven years that you have fought with the Hindus. We consider that you and the Hindus are mutual enemies, but you say that you have fought with them and so done service (to us). The Hindus had attacked your territory. And you further say that you prevented them from coming to this side through your territory. Is that not your territory? You said that the Hindus wanted you to go with them in view to guide them to our territory. If it prove correct that the Hindus wish to pass through your country, it is not necessary for us to bring an army from China and "Maha China". We can slaughter all the Hindus by the aid of the troops of our eight cities. (We have killed Kirghiz and Andjanis). What are these Hindus then? Now we possess ammunitions and other military stores in large quantities. The Amban-i-Kalan (?) Does not give powder and bullets to men

1 Came to throne in 1875.
who don’t belong to this territory. Notwithstanding that you and we may be in union and friendship, it is not possible to give you a supply of powder and bullets.

Sarikol also is friendly (to us) like your territory. It would be well if you pay attention to this circumstance. How is it that your men have plundered the Sarikol people. I thought that you and we are friends and if I rose to report this to Khabba Amban, it would not be well for you. I therefore sent a letter that you might recover the plundered property of the Sarikol people and return it to me so that our union might continue. But you said that you had no knowledge about it. If such is to be the state of affairs, how can we be friends? In future you should direct your people to behave well and peacefully, and that they should not play mischief anywhere they go. Your merchants, who come here for trade, can as before pass their time in safety, and you may rest satisfied on that score, as this is owing to your good luck. You send one letter today, and another tomorrow and ask for numerous favours but you do not keep your men in order and prevent them from plundering other people. Beware that the Khabba Amans do not come to hear about these your doings, otherwise your people will suffer great loss and my and your credit will be lost. I have therefore written this letter to you to listen well to what I have said.

454. From Khabba Amban in charge of 8 cities of the Musalmans, to the Mir of Kanjut, Shah Ghazanfar dated Yarkand 25th Dokwung Year 18th day of the 2nd month.

I have enquired and find that you live at a great distance, and the road is difficult. In future you should not send more than usual. His Majesty the Great Khakan has much confidence in your legal intentions, and you will hereafter also receive further favours from the great Khakan.

460. ...(not given... to Mir (no date).

We don’t consider these things as services, because I have ascertained and find that the Hindus never made an attack. The Kirghiz also, so long that the Khojas do not require them, will not make an attack. You further said that you will stop their coming and fight with them, and that you cannot do anything in matters and works which are very distant from you, you also said that I falsely accused you; and added that the distance between Yarkand and Kanjut was long and that your people had done nothing that it was a false charge. Last year when Fakhgor was plundered it was stated that the Robbers reassembled Kanjut people. It was on this account that a letter was sent to you to make enquiries. If you have not plundered Fakhgor, then the inquiry matters little it cannot be considered as an accusation. You wrote further that if due attention is not paid to the annual sending by you of the Tilas, you would not send them any longer.

You also wrote that the sheep, flour, rice, tea and such other articles were not of much value, that I should give some other more valuable articles. How it is that you utter such improper things?
12. Memorandum by Sir John Ardagh—The Northern Frontiers of India, From Pamir to Tibet

The collapse of China in the late China-Japan war showed the futility of our trusting to that power as a possible ally, and there is every reason to believe that she will equally be useless as a buffer between Russia and the northern frontier of India.

The war was followed by a serious Mohamadan rebellion in the provinces of Kansu, which has been dragging on ever since, and has lately received an additional stimulus by the adhesion of the Kolao Secret Society, the most powerful and ubiquitous organization of its kind in China.

China maintains her hold on Kashgaria by one single line of communication, namely the road between Kashgar and Peking, which passes through the disaffected Mohamadan district of Kansu and is some 3,500 miles in length.

Though this alone is sufficient to demonstrate the precarious nature of China's sovereignty in Kashgaria, it may be added that, in July last, Mr. Macartney reported that the stability of Chinese rule in Kashgaria had been much shaken and that riots were taking place, not so much due to the inhabitants as to the unruly Chinese soldiers quartered there.

The general history of Russian expansion in Central Asia, the eagerness with which she has advanced her borders towards India over such inhospitable regions as the Pamirs, the comparative fertility and natural wealth of Kashgaria, as well as the political activities displayed by the Russian representative in Kashgaria, lead one to suppose that an eventual Russian occupation is far from improbable.

In this connection, too, it is worthy of remark that Russia has not demarcated her frontier with Kashgaria further south than the Uzbel Pass, between the latitudes of Kashgar and Yarkand, thus leaving herself untrammeled in the natural process of expansion from the Pamirs eastwards.

The rumours current during the summer of 1896 of an impending Russian advance into Kashgaria appear to have been unfounded. Mr. Macartney, confirming this view, is of opinion that the Russians have made no preparations for intervening, as the time is not yet ripe, and as a Russian demonstration, unless it were immediately followed up by annexation would only serve to strengthen the hands of the Chinese by intimidating the rebels.

If, then, the eventual annexation of Kashgaria by Russia is to be expected, we may be sure that Russian, as in the past, will endeavour to push her boundary as far south as she can, for political reasons, even if no real military advantage is sought. It is evident, therefore, that sooner or later we shall have to conclude a definite agreement regarding the Northern Frontier of India.

We have been accustomed to regard the great mountain ranges to the north of Chitral, Hunza and Ladak as the natural frontier of India and in a general sense they form an acceptable defensive boundary, easy to define, difficult to pass, and fairly dividing the peoples on either side. But the physical conditions of these mountains, their great extent, high altitude, general inaccessibility, and sparse population, render it impossible to watch the actual watershed, and the measures requisite for security, and for information as to the movements of an

1 Foreign Secret F, January 1898, No. 166.
enemy, cannot be adequately carried out unless we can circulate freely at the foot of the glacis formed by the northern slope, along those longitudinal valleys which nature has provided on the northern side at a comparatively short distance from the crest, a configuration which it may be observed does not present itself on the northern slope of the range.

For military purposes, therefore, a frontier following the highest watersheds is defective, and we should aim at keeping our enemy from any possibility of establishing himself on the glacis, occupying these longitudinal valleys and there preparing to surprise the passes. We should therefore seek a boundary which shall leave all these longitudinal valleys in our possession or at least under our influence.

The application of this principal to further demarcation of the northern frontier of India leads to the following results:—The Hindu Kush, the Mustagh range, and the Karakoram range, form the principle line of waterparting between the basin of the Indus on the south and the basins of the Oxus and the Yarkand rivers on the north.

On this range are situated, inter alia, the Kilik Mintaka, Khunjerale, Shimshal, Mustagh, and Karakoram Passes, access to which we desire to bar to a possible enemy, by retaining within our territory the approaches to them on the northern side, and the lateral communications between these approaches.

This object is to be attained by drawing our line of frontier so as to include the basins of the Danga Bash river and its affluents above Dehda, at the junction of the Ili Su and Karatchukar, called by Captain Younghusband Kurghan-i-Ujadbai, of the Yarkand river above the point where it breaks through the range of mountains marked by the Sargon and Ilbis Birkar Passes, at about latitude 37° north and longitude 74°50' east on Mr. Curzon's map published by the Royal Geographical Society, and of the Karakash River above a point between Shahidulla and the Sanju or Grin Pass. These three basins would afford a full adequate sphere of influence beyond the main crests.

During the disturbances in Kashgaria Shahidulla was occupied by Kashmir. At the time of Sir Douglas Forsyth's mission to Yarkand in 1873 the frontier post of Kashgaria was situated at Shahidulla. When Captain Younghusband visited that place in 1889 the fort had long been abandoned, and he granted money to the Kirghiz chief to rebuild it and keep it in repair as a protection to the trade route from Leh to Yarkand. He forestalled Captain Grombtchevsky, whom he met on the Yarkand River.

In 1890 the Chinese pulled down the Shahidulla Fort, and built another near the Sujet Pass, where in 1892, Lord Dunmore saw a notice board to the effect that "anyone crossing the Chinese frontier without reporting himself at this fort will be imprisoned".

In 1874 Dr. Bellow found an abandoned Chinese outpost at Kirghiz Tam near Shiragh Saldi. In 1889 Captain Younghusband likewise found Shiragh Saldi outside the recognized Chinese frontier.

We are therefore justified in claiming up to the crests of the Kuen Lun range.

We now represent on our maps the Yarkand River as a boundary, the Taghdumbash Pamir is claimed by China, at least as far as Bayik. It is therefore clear
that the three basins described above may encroach upon Chinese territory to a certain extent which may be difficult to define and our solicitude should be to obtain from China an agreement that any part of those basins which may eventually be found to lie outside our frontiers shall not be ceded to any country but Great Britain. If China were strong enough to maintain possession and to act the part of a buffer state, this assurance would not be needed, but in view of her decadence and the prospect of Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan falling before long into the hands of Russia, it will be well to take timely precaution to prevent her from becoming so close a neighbour to the mountain rampart of India as she has lately become on the Chitral frontier.

The present value of this very sparsely inhabited country is insignificant, but its importance as a security to the Indian frontier is considerable.

The same principles and arguments may have to be applied at future period to the upper basins of the Indus, the Sutlej, and even the Brahmaputra, in the event of a prospective absorption of Tibet by China. At the present moment, however, we are only concerned in the definition of a frontier between British India and Kashgar Yarkand Khotan.

Dealing it with the first portion of the line marked on our maps as following the Yarkand River we find that Captain Younghusband in 1889 pointed out that this stream would form a bad boundary, as it is fordable and the road along the valley frequently crosses from one side to another. This objection is well founded. If we are to keep this valley which contains mines of iron and copper, hot springs, and possibly petroleum and gold, and which formerly cultivated, has within late years become depopulated in consequence of Kanjuti raids, now at an end in consequence of our occupation of Hunza, we should include the northern slope of its basin up to the crests of the Kuen Lun Mountains. It is not likely that China in her present state would offer much objection, or, indeed, that her influence extends to the south of the Kuen Lun. This, then, is the line which it would be preferable to claim. But, if it be found that there should arise insuperable objections to the Kuen Lun line, and that we cannot adopt the line of the river, there is, yet a third alternative which will still give us a glacis in front of the Mustag viz. the mountain crest commencing at the summit marked 14,680, near the Kurbu Pass, passing by the Uuruk Pass to the summit marked 8,815, crossing the mouth of the Mustagh or Uprang River, and following the line of waterparting between that river and the Yarkand river, to which it would descend at a point near the ruins of Kugart Auza and mount on the northern side, and some point between the Sokhbuluk and Sujet Passes, following the latter range eastward across the Karakash, and onwards to the point where the frontier makes it great bend southward. This second line as defined by the river basins would compromise within our territory, the basin of the Mustagh River from its junction with the Yarkand River or Raskam Daria, the basin of the Upper Yarkand River above the ruins of Kujnat Auza, and the basin of the Karakash above latitude 36° north.

At the western extremity of both this line and the Kuen Lun line we have to deal with Chinese claims to the Taghdumbash Pamir. The Chinese have their furthest post up the valley at Chadir Tash or Bargik, where the road from the Bargik Pass meets the Karatchukar river. Above that point the Nomad Kirghiz pay taxes to both China and Hunza and we may claim on behalf of Hunza the basin of the Karatchukar above some point between the Bargik Chinese post and Mintaka
Aghazi, the boundary to the North of the River being one of the spurs descending from the Povalo Shveikovski Peak. This would cover the debouches from the Tagerman-Su, Mikhman Guli, Kukturuk, Wakhju, Kalik, Mintaka and Karchenai Passes. It is therefore of much importance to secure the possession of Mintaka Aksai.

On the eastern side of the Tughdumbash Pamir, the debouches of the Kunjerab and Kurbu Passes can be secured by the possession of Mazar Sultan Sayid Hassan. A parallel of latitude south of the Baijik post is the simplest mode of laying down a boundary here so as to include Mazar Sayid Hassan. From thence the boundary should mount to the waterparting near the Zepleh Pass, and thence join the Kuen Lun, the Yarkand river or the Uruk lines, already described.

Under circumstances of China quoted at the commencement of this paper, the settlement of this frontier question appears now to be urgent. If we delay, we shall have Russians to deal with instead of China, and she will assuredly claim up to the very farthest extent of the pretensions of her predecessors in title, at least to the very summits of the Mustagh and the Himalayas.

I venture, therefore, to recommend that the matter should now be brought to the notice of the Government of India, if the proposal meets with approval at the Foreign and India Offices.

When the Government of India has studied the question and pronounced an opinion as to the line which would be most advantageous, the matter will, on our part, be ripe for further action. But, as it may happen that, at that moment, other considerations may render it unadvisable to communicate with China, it may be well to point out that there are other steps short of actual delimitation or international agreement which would tend greatly to strengthen our position while awaiting a favourable opportunity for arriving at a definite settlement.

The Governor-General's agents and officers adjacent to the frontier may arrange to procure the recognition of our supremacy and protection by the chiefs of the local tribes, and to assert it by acts of sovereignty, annually exercised within the limits decided upon, and in this manner acquire a little prescription.

13. FROM EARL OF ELGIN, GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND VICE ROY OF INDIA TO LORD G. C. HAMILTON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, SIMLA, 27TH OCTOBER 1898

Descriptive Statement of Boundary

2. The matter of first importance in our judgement is to secure some line by which China will agree to be bound. In the present condition of things the Hunza state has indefinite but rather extensive claims over Raskam and Taghdumbash, while the claim of China to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction of a shadowy sort in Hunza has received definite admission at our hands by the continuation of Hunza's tribute payment to Kashgar, and by the permission granted to Chinese officials to be present at the installation of the Mir of Hunza.

1 Foreign Secret F, November 1898, No. 114.
3. If the district of Yarkand were at any time to pass from the possession of China into that of a more energetic power, these acknowledged rights within our borders could scarcely fail to be extremely embarrassing. We are not anxious to make good Hunza's counter claims, except as a means for disentangling Hunza itself from the claims of China, and as we have already stated in our secret despatch No. 170 (Frontier) dated the 23rd December 1897, no strategical advantage would be gained by going beyond mountains over which no hostile advance is ever likely to be attempted.

4. Beginning at the Peak Povalo-Schveikovski, at the end of the Pamir line demarcated in 1895 by the Joint Commission under Major-General Mir Montague Gerard and Major-General Povalo-Schveikovski, we would desire to follow generally the crest of the main range of mountains from that point along the east of Hunza and Nagar and the North of the Baltistan and Ladakh until the line which is at present marked as the Eastern limit of Ladakh is reached. This line of frontier, which would run along the crests of a high mountain range, always difficult and in places inaccessible, would not be one which could be demarcated on the ground. Our object is to arrive at an agreement with China describing the line in question by its better known topographical features, each power reciprocally engaging to respect the boundary thus defined.

5. The following is a description of this line, beginning at the north end at the Peak Povalo-Schveikovski, the line takes a south-easterly direction, crossing the Karachikar stream at Mintaka Aghazi, thence proceeding in the same direction till it joins, at the Karchanai Pass, the crest of the main ridge of the Mustagh range which it then follows passing by the Kunjerab Pass and continuing southwards of the peak just north of the Shimshal Pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running each approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal to the Hunza post at Darwaza. The line, turning south through the Darwaza Post, crosses the road from the Shimshal Pass at that point and then ascends the nearest high spur and regains the main crests, which the boundary will again follow, passing the Mustagh, Gusherbrums and the Saltoro Passes to the Karakoram. From the Karakoram Pass the crests of the range run nearly east for about half a degree and then turn south to a little below the 35th parallel of north latitude. Rounding then what in our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed runs north-east to a point east of Kizil Gilga and from there, in a south-easterly direction, follows the Lak Tsung Range until that meets the spur running south from the Kuen Lun Range which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80° east longitude.

6. We regret that we have no maps to show the whole line either accurately or on a large scale. This first part of it, from peak Povalo Schveikovski to where the line re-ascends the main crest of the Mustagh after passing Darwaza is marked on the enclosed N.T.F. Sheet No. 2 (April 1898). This section has been surveyed and may be taken to be accurate. The "map to illustrate the explorations of Captain F. E. Younghusband, King's Dragoon Guards on the northern frontiers of Kashmir" contains the continuation of the line of the 79th degree of East Longitude, and is approximately correct, while the general trend of the whole may be gathered from sheet No. 4 of the map of Turkestan, a copy of which with the line hand shaded, we have the honour to enclose.
7. It will be observed that the line described in Para 5 includes within the frontier which we desire to secure two tracts which lie beyond the main watershed. Although, as we have stated, we are not anxious to add Raskam or the whole of Taghджумбаш to the territory of Hunza, we think that there would be advantages in including within our sphere the western end of Taghджумбаш, in accordance with the marking upon the map. So long as it remains in Chinese possession it is not likely to be a source of inconvenience. If it should pass into the hands of another Power we do not apprehend that any serious danger could arise, but in certain contingencies it might, form its position between Hunza and the eastern extremity of Wakhan and at the entrance of the passes leading to Hunza, become a source of annoyance and inconvenience to us, and we therefore consider it expedient to secure it for Hunza if this can be done without difficulty, and without the sacrifice of other more important advantages. We trust too, that there will be no trouble in securing the consent of the Chinese to the small deviation from the main crest of the Mustagh near the Shimshal Pass to Darwaza. This is in accordance with actual possession. Captain Younghusband found a Kanjuti post at Darwaza in 1889 and we have not heard that the Kanjutis have ceased to hold it. It is just in advance of the Shimshal Pass, which Captain Younghusband reported to be quite easy and passable by cavalry; the ridges leaving the main range at the peak above the Shimshal, taking in the Darwaza post, and returning to the main ridge as shown in the accompanying map are nearly as stupendous as the main ridge itself, and would make a good and well defined boundary.

14. **Sir C. Macdonald to the Tsungli Yamen, 14 March 1899**

*From Bax Ironside to the Marquess of Salisbury*

[MacDonald had addressed to Yamen on the 14 ultimo on the frontier of the empire advocating an understanding as to the frontier between China, Turkistan and Afghanistan, Hunza and Kashmir.

The Tsungli Yamen have informed me verbally that they have referred the question to the Governor of Chinese Turkistan, and that upon receipt of his report they will reply to Macdonald.]

I have the honour by the direction of Her Majesty's Government to address Your Highness and Your Excellencies on the subject of the boundary between the Indian state of Cashmir and the New Dominion of Chinese Turkistan.

In the year 1891 the Indian Government had occasion to repress by force of arms certain rebellious conduct on the part of the ruler of the State of Kanjut, a tributary of Kashmir. The Chinese Government had then laid claim to the allegiance of Kanjut by virtue of 1½ ounces of Gold dust paid by its ruler each year to the Governor of the New Dominions who gave in return some pieces of silk.

It appears that the boundaries of the state of Kanjut with China have never been clearly defined. The Kanjutis claim an extensive tract of land in the Taghджумбаш Pamir, extending as far north as Tashkurgan, and they also claim the district known as Raskam to the south of Sarikol. The rights of Kanjut over part

1 *Foreign Secret F*, August 1899, No. 188.
of the Taghdumbash Pamir were admitted by the Tootai of Kashgar in a letter to the Mir of Hunza, dated February 1896, and last year the question of the Raskam district was the subject of negotiation between Kanjut and the officials of the New Dominions in which the latter admitted that some of the Raskam land should be given to the Kanjutis.

It is now proposed by the Indian Government that, for the sake of avoiding any dispute or uncertainty in the future, a clear understanding should be come to with the Chinese Government as to the frontier between the two states. To obtain this clear understanding, it is necessary that China should relinquish her shadowy claim to suzerainty over the state of Kanjut. The Indian Government, on the other hand, will, on behalf of Kanjut, relinquish her claims to most of the Taghdumbash and Raskam districts.

It will not be necessary to mark out the frontier. The natural frontier is the crest of a range of mighty mountains, a great part of which is quite inaccessible. It will be sufficient if the two Governments enter into an agreement to recognize the frontier as laid down by its clearly marked geographical features. The line proposed by the Indian Government is briefly as follows: It may be seen by reference to the map of the Russo-Chinese frontier brought by the late minister, Hung Chung from St. Petersburg and in possession of the Yamen.

Commencing on the little Pamir, from the Peak at which the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission of 1895 ended their work, it runs south-east, crossing the Karachenai Pass and crest of the main ridge of Mustagh range. It follows thus to the south, passing by the Kunjerab Pass and continuing southward to the peak just north of the Shimshal Pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running east approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal to the Hunza post of Darwaza. The line turning south through the Darwaza post crosses the road from the Shimshal Pass at that point, and then ascends the nearest high spur, and regains the main crests which the boundary will again follow, passing the Mustagh, Gusherbrun, and Saltoro Passes by the Karakoram. From the Karakoram Pass the crests of the range run east for about half a degree (100 li) and then turn south to a little below the 35 parallel of north latitude. Rounding then what in our maps is shown as the source of Karakash the line of hills to be followed runs north-east to a point east of Kizil Gilga, and from there in a south-easterly direction follows the Lak Tsung range until that meets the spur running south from the Kuen-Lun range, which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80° east longitude.

You will see by examining this line that a large tract of country to the north of the great dividing range shown in Hung Chun's map as outside the Chinese boundary will be recognized as Chinese territory.

I beg Your Highness and Your Excellencies to consider the matter, and to favour me with an early reply.

Claude M. MacDonald
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