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INTRODUCTION

On the last day of the year 1600, Elizabeth the First, Queen of England, signed a charter bringing into being the East India Company. Jahangir, Moghul Emperor of India, followed by granting this company the right to establish a trading center in India. These two royal signatures set in motion events which would, two hundred years later, dominate a century of lively controversy over a small sector of land called Afghanistan.

The publisher of this volume has gathered together a most interesting collection of articles written during the height of this controversy by authors with many years association with the areas of which they speak. Most were in position to influence decisions. They are outspoken, presenting their arguments sometimes with anger, sometimes with sarcasm, always with clarity. They wrote for an audience in England where government policies regarding the "Afghan Question" were as hotly debated as those of Southeast Asia today. Public opinion was sharply divided, harsh in condemnation, staunch in defense. There are many modern parallels. When these articles appeared, therefore, they were eagerly pursued for material to bolster or demolish argument.

Why the controversy? Essentially, it concerned the protection of an emerging empire. By the end of the Eighteenth Century, numerous trading centers were in operation in India; rich prizes demanding protection from powers which threatened outside India. Napoleon was the first to raise concern when he led his armies into Egypt in 1798; when he extended feelers eastward, the consternation deepened. Britain was by no means in control of all India. The first traders had found the country torn by anarchy and the Moghul Empire virtually disintegrated after the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707. For protection, the trading settlements were fortified and British control extended into surrounding areas.

Outside the British administered territories, however, numerous Indian princes still retained control of their native states and it was here, at their courts, that agents actively intrigued for France. In the west, moreover, French and Russian influence grew strong at the Persian Court. Clearly, it was vital for the British in India to learn what lay between their holdings and these potentially hostile adversaries.

A glance at history showed the territory under scrutiny to be a strategic corridor of invasion through which armies from Persia and from Central Asia had marched into India ever since the beginnings of recorded history. In his article on the mountain passes of the Afghan frontier, Mr. Markham presents a concise and extremely Interesting
summary of the specific routes and passes used by these invading forces.

Now, as the Nineteenth Century opened, Persia and Central Asia (Russia) threatened together, and, in Afghanistan, it was rumoured that a grandson of Ahmad Shah readied his forces to reclaim Durrani conquests lost by Timur Shah. Mr. Boulger expresses a widely held belief which, when coupled with an awareness of these historic invasions, added greatly to the perturbation: «Afghans have always joined, and will always in the future join, any army which with reasonable prospect of success advances on the Indus with intention of invading India». Suspicion of the «wily Afghan» is a key attitude throughout the controversy under discussion.

The current scene reinforced the wary appraisal. Initial contact with the Afghans was made in Peshawar, the Afghan winter capital, on the 25th of February, 1809. At that time, Mountstuart Elphinstone, 30, signed a treaty of friendship with the Afghan monarch, Shah Shuja, but the most lasting result of his mission was his book, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul. It continues to be a most valuable book on Afghanistan, but when it appeared in 1815 it literally opened up a new world. It was a world worrying to Nineteenth Century British objectives for India. They looked for stability and found tribal wars and dynastic quarrels as noted by both Mr. Boulger and Captain Bellew in their remarks on the tribal contests between the Ghilzai and Durrani, the Sadozai and Barakzai.

They looked for rulers with whom to negotiate, and found a plethora of petty chiefs owing but nominal allegiance to a few major chiefs, themselves in constant danger of being deposed. Shah Shuja, for instance, lost his throne within weeks of the first British contact with an Afghan king. They looked for trade and the markets of Kabul and Central Asia beckoned brightly but Russian interests were also marked. The race to Central Asia would be for commerce, as well as for politics.

They looked for a boundary, some place to establish a barrier protecting India. There were none. Persia contested Khorasan and Sistan with Afghanistan, Bokhara contested the lands of the Oxus, Afghans and Sikhs quarreled over Peshawar, and Pushtun tribal chiefs acknowledged no superiors.

British attempts to deal with these disturbing conditions and create a stable political buffer, one in which trade would flourish, form the substance of the articles included in this work. The attempts alternate between periods of aloofness and periods of forceful intervention, or, according to the terminology of the day, between «masterly inactivity» and the «Forward Policy». Both came in for public criticism; they lie at the heart of the controversy.

Events in Europe and domestic politics in England contributed greatly to the policies carried out in India. They are beyond the scope of this short discussion but the alternating periods of inactivity and activity
can be summarized briefly. Contact with the area was initiated when Britain first became apprehensive over the safety of India's western frontiers while Lord Minto (1807-1813) was Governor-General of India. Apprehension deepened into fear and in 1830, during Lord Bentinck's term (1828-1835) as Governor-General, the push toward involvement began.

Hesitant and full of dilatory diplomacy at first, the process finally erupted into the First Anglo-Afghan War under Lord Auckland's administration (1836-1842). Thirty-five years of "masterly inactivity" followed.

Evasive, vacillating diplomatic exchanges became even more apathetic after the Czar's visit to England brought about a lull in Anglo-Russian rivalry over Central Asia. When Russia renewed its advances, steady from 1865 onwards, however, Lord Mayo (1869-1872) strove to create a neutral zone of fully independent states between Russia and British India. During this bright period, the Oxus River was held to be the line beyond which no further Russian advance could be tolerated; by 1873 Russia and Britain had agreed to the principle that all territory then in the possession of Amir Sher Ali of Afghanistan would henceforth be considered outside Russia's sphere of influence. The trouble was, no one could decide exactly how far the Amir's authority extended.

With the arrival of Lord Lytton (1876-1880) as Viceroy of India, however, the policy of maintaining a fully independent state of Afghanistan was abandoned in favor of the "Forward Policy" which was essentially defensive against Russia, offensive against Afghanistan. The same fears and prejudices dominant in the first half of the century continued to dominate the second half, reinforced by the psychological scars left by the First Anglo-Afghan War and the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Distrust toward all "native" peoples hardened and relations with Afghanistan were conducted with cold, bureaucratic caution, bordering on arrogance. Years of widening estrangement built up a wary hostility and haughty reserve, on both sides, and it was inevitable that the change to active involvement should lead to violence, culminating in the Second Anglo-Afghan War. After the British Mission to Kabul was massacred, government policy was committed to the total disintegration of Afghanistan.

It may be noted in passing that though modern historians refer to both phases of action on Afghan soil from 1878-1880 as the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the authors of these articles speak of the second war as ending with the Treaty of Gandamak which was signed on 26 May 1879. The subsequent march of General Roberts to Kabul in October following the massacre in September, and the occupation period, is considered by them as the Third Afghan War. The Third Anglo-Afghan War in modern terms, however, refers to the war in 1919 which, of course, had not taken place when these articles were written although allusions to the inevitability of such a war are made.

The Treaty of Gandamak gave Britain control of Afghan foreign affairs but during the time the British held Kabul, the policy of disinte-
gration was discarded and annexation was looked upon with horror. Instead, it was decided to confine the area by ringing it with boundaries drawn by: the British and the Russians in the north; the British and the Persians on the west; the British on the east. Within these borders the new Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan, was expected to establish his authority by his own efforts.

Neither approach, "masterly inactivity" nor the "Forward Policy", met with much success. The pity was that the same mistakes had to be repeated. These were not so much mistakes of military strategy but more often failures in human understanding. During periods of British aloofness, overtures of friendship were curtly rebuffed, the simplest of assurances were withheld, and diplomatic procrastination coupled with gross inconsistencies, noted in detail by these authors, generated an atmosphere of disappointment and distrust. Without doubt, some of the inconsistencies stemmed from prior policy decisions relating to matters closer to British holdings in India. The commitments dictated by the British alliance with Ranjit Singh in the Punjab, for instance, kept British support from Amir Dost Mohammad for a deep and abiding hatred existed between these two strong men.

More often, however, the problems grew from an inability to understand Afghan custom and attitudes, especially when these conflicted with the attitudes of the mid-Victorian era.

In the genealogical table following Captain Bellew's second article, he wisely groups the major contestants in Amir Dost Mohammad's struggle for the throne according to their maternal connections. Full brothers rarely fought amongst themselves; the contests raged between half-brothers. The mother's tribal affiliations were, moreover, all important, since the tribe would generally align itself with the son and those backed by the more powerful tribes had an obvious advantage.

Dost Mohammad was an anomaly, it is true. He had no powerful fraternal connections and his mother was a non-Pushtun Qizilbash. His half-brothers, nevertheless, intrigued against him in the time honored manner, even to treating with the arch enemy, Ranjit Singh. Countering all these negative factors, Dost Mohammad won his throne through ambition, individual ability and charisma, qualities greatly admired by the Afghan. Dost Mohammad proved this after he returned from exile. British supposition that they could put aside such a man and replace him with a puppet propped up by foreign arms was a tragic misreading of the Afghan character.

At a later period, when Amir Sher Ali fought for the throne, it was again half-brother pitted against half-brothers. Dost Mohammad passed over his elder sons, born of a wife from the Bangash tribe, and designated Sher Ali, born of a wife from the more prestigious Popalzai, as his heir. (Mr. Leitner has reversed these maternal tribal connections. Keeping tribal and family affiliations straight during this period is no easy matter though it is essential to a correct reading of affairs. Mr. Griffin, for instance, refers to Mohammad Yusuf, son of Amir Dost.
Mohammad, as a cousin of Amir Abdur Rahman, instead of an uncle. To find uncles the same age as their nephews, or even younger, is common, and confusing). Primogeniture has never been strictly adhered to in Afghan tribal leadership selection: tribe, ability, strength and charisma often outweighs the moment of birth.

That British delays in recognizing Sher Ali as Amir contributed to chaos in Afghanistan is vividly expressed by both Mr. Boulger and Captain Bellew. The problem was compounded by the government’s recognition of the eldest son when he succeeded I.e. in winning Kabul in 1866. This was certainly rank interference during a period when diplomatic dispatches proclaimed “non-interference in domestic affairs” to Amir Sher Ali. There were, however, many among the British policy makers who saw the eldest son as the legitimate heir and they also felt that they were under no obligation to recognize Dost Mohammad’s selection. Dr. Leitner, in fact, refers to Mohammad Afzal Khan, the eldest son, as heir to the throne of Kabul, without mentioning the fact that Sher Ali was the chosen successor. Note: Captain Bellew states that Mohammad Afzal ruled as Amir for only six months. Actually, he ruled from May, 1866, until his death in October, 1867, whereupon his full brother, Mohammad Azam (erroneously spelt Azim by many British authors) I.e. Ruled until he was defeated by Sher Ali on 7 September 1866.

There were other more obvious attitudes which also went unheeded. Afghans, then as now, prefer face-to-face confrontations. Relations improved markedly on each occasion when an Afghan Amir met with a British Viceroy. Agreements made on such occasions are more binding than anything set on paper, which also failed to be realized. Instead, especially in the case of Amir Sher Ali, the goodwill generated at the face-to-face meetings were discounted and old disdainful attitudes were allowed to rise to be exhibited in fits of diplomatic pomposity epitomized by the conferences held in 1873 and 1877, in Simla and Peshawar.

Positive Afghan traits were misconstrued. Afghans were generally recognized as being fiercely independent but in an unruly, pejorative sense, and Afghan abhorance of outside influence was thoroughly exasperating to most British authorities. In insisting on stationing a British representative in Kabul, Afghan pride of independence was totally disregarded. Captain Bellew criticizes British refusal to give Shah Shuja some semblance of control as a tactical mistake, but the conviction that there must be a British Representative at the center of government to supervise, guide and restrain, colors Anglo-Afghan relations throughout this period. This was the procedure that had worked so successfully all through India and distinctions of national character failed to be fully appreciated. Furthermore, the positive aspect of this pride in independence was blurred by suspicion: the Afghans desired to remain independent of Russia, of Britain, of Persia — and anyone else who might come along.

The Afghan Amirs, therefore, steadfastly resisted attempts to station a British representative in Kabul. The only exception ended in murder
and war as here recounted with the insinuation that British insistence on an inordinate amount of control over local affairs contributed materially to the insurrection of 3 September 1879. Mr. Boulger credits the Afghans for following an astute policy, from their point of view, but he is outspoken in his criticism of his own government for conducting affairs according to the interests of a foreigner. Many agreed with him and one cannot overlook a current attitude which took for granted Britain's right to rule. The means might be questioned, not the right. As the «Forward Policy» was moved into action this feeling became paramount: «The absolute right of this country to supremacy in Kabul, as absolute and as clear as Russia's claim to supremacy in Bokhara, for the first time became an accepted axiom in our policy».

The right imposed certain responsibilities and throughout these articles statements like «trying to civilize them (the Afghans) and increase their prosperity», «subjecting them to the salutary restraints of law and order» and «giving security and encouragement to all by the mere establishment of British authority» will be found. That benefits accrued from mere association with the British presence was such a foregone assumption that many would have agreed with Captain Bellew when he says that Sher Ali consolidated his kingdom «Under British protection, aid and support...», even after reading his convincing argument that British non-action actually led Amir Sher Ali to seek Russian aid. Large parts of Afghanistan today remain unconvinced of the merits of western innovations even as introduced by their own government through the aegis of foreign development projects. They had even less appeal i.e. in the Nineteenth Century and this lack of appreciation confounded and annoyed the would-be benefactors then, as it does today.

All outsiders were unwelcome, not only soldiers and diplomats. The effects of this snub on the British mercantile community should not be discounted. Trade was, after all, one of the preliminary interests in the area but now millions of pounds sterling were being thrown into the area to disappear with absolutely no trace of a return as far as the business community could see. The cost of the wars and of the subsidies were severely criticized, and government's inability to establish favorable conditions for trade was nothing less than unbelievable, and utterly frustrating. The frustrations clouded thinking further.

One particular Afghan trait was viewed with darkest suspicion. After a more regularized relationship was entered into with Afghanistan, the Amirs received regular subsidies from the British to help strengthen their position against foreign intervention. When, therefore, the Amirs continued to keep in friendly touch with rival countries, they were thoroughly condemned in British eyes. Twice the presence of Persian and/or Russian envoys in Kabul brought British troops onto Afghan soil. Amir Abdur Rahman was particularly suspected of duplicity for he had been a Russian guest in exile for eleven years before he came to the throne of Kabul. To take from one and still maintain friendship with the other was nothing short of treacherous behavior to the British, good diplomacy to the Afghans who walked the tight-rope well, gaining useful
experience for the confrontations of the Twentieth Century. No longer
does Afghanistan stand isolated between antagonistic ideologies and
ambitions. Today, Russia, the United States and the People's Republic
of China, together with a welter of allies, stand committed to
Afghanistan's neutrality. To guarantee it, they each participate in gran-
diose development projects and the Afghans, for their part, continue to
manipulate negotiations with enviable skill.

To protect India in case the Amir should play them false, the
authorities in India decided to secure their position on the Afghan-Indian
frontier. The annexations of territory and the demarcation of the Durand
Line in 1893 had many critics and a major credibility gap noted by both
Mr. Leitner and Major Raverty, two most articulate critics, soon developed
as government actions belied government pronouncements. Major Raverty
deplores the methods used to annex territory, finding them both morally
suspect and politically dangerous. Basing his arguments on his intimate
knowledge of the area, he concludes that to cut off the Amir from
such a large number of Pushtun groups would so weaken the Afghan
position that both British and Afghan objectives were bound to fail. Amir
Abdur Rahman also predicted trouble, if the tribes were divided. He was
right. The eastern border is still a major source of contention between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Britain's successor to these problems. Insis-
tence on tribal identity has not diminished. It has, in fact, assured the
continuance of a separate administrative area for the tribes in what Is
now Pakistan since 1901 and it dominates the current political scene.
Those concerned with current politics in this border area will find many
of these articles of immeasurable interest.

Major Raverty's theory that the Hazara are the descendants of the
military colonists of the Mughal (Mongol) deserves a short comment.
As Mr. Markham comments, the question «is one of great intricacy» and
even modern research has failed to produce a definitive statement. Those
interested in the complexities of the problem are directed to H. F.
Schurmann's discussion in his The Mongols of Afghanistan, 'S-Graven-
hage, 1962. The Imaks, mentioned by Mr. Markham, are also the
subject of current research. Imak is the Turkic generic term for tribe
and in Afghanistan it embraces a conglomerate of ethnic units. The
Jamshidi and the Firozkohi are two very important groups which should
be added to those listed in his statement.

Major Raverty's assumption that the Hazara rebellions were the result
of Russian intrigue and Mr. Griffin's similar assumptions regarding
Ishak Khan's rebellion are reminiscent of current affairs in Afghanistan
where student demonstrations and the like are variously laid to Soviet,
U. S. or Communist Chinese hanky-panky, depending on the political
leanings of the speaker. Ishak Khan's desire for local authority clashed
with Amir Abdur Rahman's aim to create a strong central power. Ishak
had declared himself Amir in the public mosque of Mazar-i-Sharif on
10 August 1888. He was defeated three miles south of Tashkurgan on
27 September and fled to Samarkand where Amir Abdur Rahman had
lived in exile for eleven years.
The Hazara revolt was only one of the many contests fought by Amir Abdur Rahman as he sought to establish direct control. Nor were the rebels always non-Pushtun. Amir Abdur Rahman had to quell numerous revolts among the Pushtun and one doubts if affairs would have gone quite as smoothly as Major Raverty infers had all the Pushtun tribes been part of his domain. The struggle against the Ghilzai, for instance, was long and acrimonious, giving rise to the criticisms and reservations about the new Amir expressed in some of these articles. He was a harsh man dealing with harsh men bred of violent times and while his methods may be deplored by another culture and another time, he succeeded where others had failed. Mr. Bouger correctly credits Mir Wais (Vais) with imbuing the Afghans with a sense of national destiny for the first time. But two centuries after Mir Wais, tribal friction still kept them divided: Dost Mohammad’s surrender to the British in 1840 was an admission that the tribes were not yet ready to unite, even in the face of a foreign invader; in 1879, the tribes held the British besieged at Sherpur, but internal bickering robbed them of their advantage.

Modern Afghanistan emerges from the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman and Mr. Griffin’s personal account of his negotiations with this indomitable figure is of extreme importance. Readers interested in more detailed discussions of the man and his accomplishments will enjoy the Amir’s autobiography (edited by Sultan Mahomed Khan, London, 1900) and the work of an Afghan historian, H. Kakar, The Consolidation of the Central Authority in Afghanistan under Amir Abd al-Rahman, 1880-1896 (M. Phil. thesis, S.O.A.S., London, 1968; Afghanistan, Kabul, 1971).

In a larger view, Major Raverty also challenges the centuries-old concept of making new conquests in order to secure occupied territory. The British had maintained their empire in India by the sword but Major Raverty, among others, speaks harshly of the annexation of territory along Afghanistan’s border saying: “We have really been doing on our side what the Russians have been doing on theirs, and setting them an example”. Anglo-Russian movements may be summarized thus:

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<tr>
<th>BRITISH</th>
<th>RUSSIAN</th>
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<td>Sind</td>
<td>Transcaucasia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>Caspian to Aral Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab — TransIndus:</td>
<td>To Syr Darya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peshawar, Kohat,</td>
<td>South from Aral Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannu, Dera Ismail, Khan, Der Ghazi</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khan</td>
<td>Kokand (dependent)</td>
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<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>Samarkand</td>
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<td>Khyber, Kurram, Sibi, Pishin</td>
<td>Bokhara (vassal)</td>
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<td>Zhob, Waziristan, &amp;c</td>
<td>Khiva (vassal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durand Line 1893</td>
<td>Kokand (abolished)</td>
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<td>Panjdeh</td>
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In 1837 when the British first pushed into Afghanistan, the Sutlej River marked the northwestern limit of British India. Subsequently, British annexations occurred in three major phases: first, the acquisition of lands across the Indus River up to the foothills; second, the posses-
allon of the major corridors through the mountains; third, the demarcation of a line along the crest of the mountains connecting the corridors.

Russia's progress was a steady movement south toward the Oxus River, reducing the Independent Uzbak Khanates one by one. Both sides publically rationalized their actions in depriving these native states of their Independence. It was necessary, they said, to curb these unruly tribes, the Turkoman in Central Asia, the Pushtun and Baluch in India, who impeded administrative processes for "progress" and "civilization". Privately, both sides remained convinced of the other's ulterior motives.

In forestalling a Russian invasion of India, the city of Herat, subject of three articles in this collection, was of utmost concern. Almost everyone was convinced that Russia and Britain must meet in Afghanistan but arguments raged over whether the Russians would approach via Herat and Kandahar or via Balkh and Kabul. Like Colonel Malleson, many believed that a successful defense of Herat would render invasion impossible. He traces his reasons through history and though there are inaccuracies in points of detail they do not detract from his general thesis that Herat has persisted as a strategic city since ancient times. Only the major period of confusion is, therefore, commented on here. Mohan Lal's dates may also be checked with this brief discussion.

The period in question covers the troubled years between 1040, when the Seljuks detached Herat from the Ghaznavid Empire, and 1397, when Tamerlane's son, Shah Rukh, took over as governor of Herat. The Seljuks lost Herat to Sultan Ghiyath ud-Din Ghori who came out of the eastern hills of Ghor to take the city in 1175. Ghorid rule in Herat lasted only until 1206 when the city was captured by the Khwarizm Shah from south of the Aral Sea; they were in turn swept away by the armies of Genghis Khan. Tuli, this conqueror's young and favored son, was sent to subdue Herat in May, 1221, at which time he put only the 12,000 defenders of the citadel to the sword, leaving the rest of the city largely untouched. Infuriated by this act of clemency, Genghis Khan personally saw to its utter destruction when the city rose in revolt a year later. He is said to have left only forty persons living.

Herat's remarkable facility for survival ensured its revival under the Karts, a prominent local family serving the Mongol Il-Khans of Persia. Vassal governors at first, they declared their independence in 1332 and ruled with enlightened distinction until cut down by Tamerlane in 1381. Tamerlane did not inflict much damage on Herat at this time but two years later, after the city had risen in revolt, he destroyed it without mercy.

Colonel Malleson gives Miran Shah the credit for refurbishing Herat. Although he was Governor of Herat for a few years, this derranged son of Tamerlane is, however, reputed to have torn down buildings when he found he could not build more beautifully than his father. Credit should be given instead to his successor, Shah Rukh, Tamerlane's youngest son, who made Herat the cultural and political center of an empire stretching from the Tigris to China's borders. He ruled from 1405 to 1447.
None but the most devoted will care to follow the battles which raged over the possession of Herat for 350 years after the fall of the Timurids in 1507. Suffice it to say that the Persians jealously maintained their control over the city, contesting countless attempts, many temporarily successful, by the Uzbaks and the Afghans to take it from them. When, however, they seized Herat in October 1856 (not 1855), Britain declared war. In the Treaty of Paris, signed on 4 March 1857 (not 1856), Persia finally relinquished all rights to the city. (Note: Other dates similarly off by a year or two are not noted if the inaccuracy does not affect the tenor of the discussion. Dates many be checked with any number of general sources).

Most of Herat’s buildings described by these authors continue to attract visitors today. Gazurgah is one of the more celebrated shrines in Afghanistan and the descriptions given by Mohan Lal and Captain Yate could easily be used as a present-day guide. There are, however, discrepancies with respect to the date of the death of Herat’s patron saint who lies buried here. Khwaja’ Abdulla-i-Ansari died on the 8th of March, 1088.

There is an interesting modern tradition concerning the marble figure Captain Yate noted crouching in front of the entrance to the shrine of Gazurgah. He was told it was a tiger. According to the story now told, the figure marks the grave of Qavam al-Din b. Zain ul-Din (d. 1439), the architect who embellished Herat under the patronage of Shah Rukh and his Queen. Because he held the Khwaja’ in such reverence, Qavam al-Din requested his tombstone be fashioned in the form of a dog posed humbly in obeisance.

Such watchful, prone figures have long been popular as symbols of protection and others may be found today at the Ziyarat-i-Sultan Mir Shahid in Herat although Captain Yate does not note seeing any there. He does note poles topped with the figure of an open hand and remarks that no meaning seems to be attached to the symbol. Nowadays countless graves and shrines throughout Afghanistan display this symbol generally considered to represent the hand of Fatima, the Prophet Mohammad’s daughter (not his wife as stated by Yate). It also symbolizes protection.

Inside the courtyard at Gazurgah the saint’s tomb is now covered with marble but otherwise the description of the masses of tombstones, exquisitely carved, holds true today. (Note: A number of the A.H./A.D. conversions are incorrect. For instance, 621 = 1224; 843 = 1439/40; 1057 = 1647; 1094 = 1682/3). Mohan Lal’s statement that the tombs on the right mark the resting places of the Timurids, those on the left, the descendants of Genghis Khan is, however, too simplified. There is a great mixture of periods as described by a distinguished modern historian of Herat, the late Fikri Seljuki, in his work entitled Gazur Gah, Kabul, 1341/1962-3 (in Persian).

The Ziyarat-i-Shahzada Qasim mentioned by Captain Yate as the second shrine of Herat is one of many enshrining early Arab residents who used the city as a springboard from which to launch Islam into

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Central Asia. Shahzada Abulqasim came as a political exile during the time of the Abbasids in the Ninth Century. Living in Herat amidst great splendor, he attracted a large following and his shrine, redecorated during the reign of Shah Rukh, continues to be visited by the faithful.

There is some confusion in these articles with regard to the identification of the buildings in the Musalla complex. Mohan Lal correctly identifies the domed building as the mausoleum of Gawhar Shad (d. 1457), wife, not sister as he states, of Shah Rukh. She commissioned the building of a musalla (place of worship) and a madrasah (place of learning) in which the mausoleum was built.

Only the mausoleum and two minarets remain in Gowhar Shad’s musalla complex. The four 120-foot high minarets standing north of the mausoleum once formed part of a later madrasah built by Sultan Husain Baiqara (r. 1468-1506, not 1487 as given by Yate), last of the Timurid rulers. The magnificent buildings to which these minarets were once attached fell victim to constant sieges, not to Genghis Khan as quoted by Colonel Malleson. That conqueror’s visit took place two hundred years before Gawhar Shad began her building project in 1417. Captain Yate presided over the last act of destruction in 1885 when the area was cleared in order to provide a better field of fire for an expected Russian advance after the Panjdeh Incident. The attack never materialized but these monuments of incomparable beauty disappeared for ever.

Mohan Lal is correct in attributing the Masjid-i-Jami’, inside the city, to Sultan Ghiyath ud-Din Ghori but it is no wonder that Captain Yate was unable to find the date of its construction. This was hidden under a Timurid reconstruction until 1964 when removal of the later decoration revealed a splendid inscription announcing the construction of the mosque by order of the Sultan in the year 1200. Like the musalla complex, the mosque was ravaged by a succession of wars over Herat; pictures taken in the early Twentieth Century show bare, whitewashed walls surrounding a rubbish-filled courtyard. Redecorated with brilliant mosaic tile in the Timurid style, the mosque stands again as one of the more impressive monuments in Afghanistan.

The great bronze (not tin) cauldron which attracted Mohan Lal’s attention still stands in the courtyard. Cast in 1375, it was a creation of the Karts, not the Ghorids. Mohan Lal also mentions repairs carried out under Mir Ali Sher Nawai (1472-1501), Sultan Husain Baiqara’s illustrious Prime Minister. This refers to the restoration and redecoration of the mosque, not the cauldron, in 1498 (not A.H. 950/1543).

Colonel Malleson gives detailed treatment to all the roads leading from Herat to India. This is not the place to note modern variations and discrepancies except to caution the reader that some of the information is misleading. Herat to Karrukh is, for instance, 25 miles, not 4 miles; Qala-i-Nao to Bala Murghab, 69, not 25 miles. Most misleading is the statement that the direct route through the high mountains of the Hazarajat presents no difficulties. This route represents a portion of ECAFE’s Asian Highway scheme which envisions a network of paved
roads from Turkey to Singapore. The directness of the route appeals to modern highway builders as it did to Colonel Malleson, but the current estimated cost runs close to a million U. S. dollars per mile. This would indicate that there are indeed a number of difficulties and those who have travelled it will certainly concur.

Modern Afghan highways approximate the routes given in Colonel Malleson's article to a remarkable degree. Those interested in comparing these routes with those in 1972 are referred to this writer's An Historical Guide to Afghanistan, Afghan Tourist Organization, Kabul, 1971.

The detail with which Herat is described in these articles which span a period of fifty years is indicative of the avid interest in all things Afghan, a natural corollary of the controversy over the «Afghan Question». Next to nothing was known about this remote kingdom when the controversy began but volume upon volume subsequently appeared and this selection of articles include some of the more respected authors contributing to the great mass of material which accumulated as the controversy continued. Furthermore, as the following biographical discussions illustrate, they embrace the entire period of the controversy.

The earliest article was written by Mohan Lal who accompanied the first officially sponsored British mission to Central Asia. The small, adventurous group of five was led by young (27) Lt. Alexander Burnes who remained a central actor in the drama until he was killed by an angry mob in Kabul in 1841 during the first great upheaval to result from British penetration of the area. Mohan Lal was also very young in 1832 when he set off with Burnes acting as Munshi or Secretary-Interpreter, although the exact date of his birth is not known. One of the first Indians to receive an English education, he studied for two years at Delhi College before he embarked on this journey which took him to Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. The article reprinted here, «The City of Herat», was written in October, 1833, while he was in Kandahar just after he had left Herat. It appeared in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, in January, 1834. A detailed diary of his trip was published in 1834 entitled Journal of a Tour through the Punjab, Afghanistan, Turkestan, Khorasan, and Parts of Persia.

Mohan Lal played an active role in Kabul during the First Anglo-Afghan War, before and after Burnes was murdered, which he describes in his book Life of the Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, of Kabul: with his political proceedings towards the English, Russian and Persian Governments, including the Victory and Disasters of the British Army in Afghanistan, a two volume work published in London in 1846. After leaving Kabul he spent most of his time in Delhi where he died late in the 1870s, shortly before the same chain of disastrous events he had witnessed were repeated in agonizing detail. He was, however, aware of the impending danger. Three letters from Mohan Lal addressed to Francis H. A. Seymour, 5th Marquis of Hertford, dated 1875 and 1876, preserved in the Warwick Country Record Office (Shire Hall, Warwick), volunteer
Information regarding Russian advances toward Afghanistan. He never lost interest in this land he helped to open to the western world.

Five authors represented in this collection wrote during the second period of upheaval. Demetrius C. Boulger (1853-1919), a journalist and co-founder/editor (with Sir Lepel Griffin) of the influential *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, wrote extensively concerning the problems and personalities of Central Asia which he related to India and the Anglo-Russian confrontation. His theses are contained in a two volume work *England and Russia in Central Asia*, London, 1879. In *Lord William Bentinck*, Oxford, 1892, he sketches the period in which the fear of Russia took root. His article, «England’s Policy towards Afghanistan», which is included in this work originally appeared in the January issue of the *New Quarterly Magazine*, 1879. It ends just as the Amir Sher All goes north to seek promised Russian aid. The aid was not forthcoming and two more wars would be fought before Afghanistan would win full independence in 1919, the year of Mr. Boulger’s death.

The anxieties occasioned by the rapidly deteriorating relations between British India and Afghanistan renewed interest in the nature of the terrain lying between British holdings and the lands of the Afghans.

On 21 September 1878, the Commandant of the Fort of Ali Musjid in the Khyber Pass refused to allow a British Envoy, Sir Neville Chamberlain, to pass his post. An apology was demanded by 21 November. It not being received, General Brown occupied Jalalabad (2 December), General Roberts led an expedition into the Khost Valley (2 December - 30th January 1879), and General Stewart occupied Kandahar (12 January).

Captain Gerald Martin’s account of the survey undertaken while he was with General Roberts’ expedition is filled with the detail and excitement to be expected of an explorer of unrecorded territory. Entitled «Survey Operations of the Afghanistan Expedition: the Kurram Valley», it was published in the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, Vol. 1, 1879. Kurram, ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Gandamak (26 May 1879), was not formally occupied by the British until 1892, thirteen years after this report was filed.

The push into Afghanistan gave another articulate observer a chance to describe unrecorded areas further to the south of the Kurram Valley. Major-General Michael Biddulph (1823-1904) was commanding the Quetta Field Force at the time and led a Division of the Kandahar Field Force to Kandahar in December 1878 during which he collected much new geographical information. He returned to Quetta the following spring and in March he went to the Punjab via an unrecorded route through Thal and Chottiiali. He was later to command the Thal-Chotiiali Field Force. He retired in 1900. As with Captain Martin, the excitement of exploration is explicit in his article reproduced in this work: «Pishin and the Routes Between India and Kandahar», which appeared in the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society & Monthly Record of Geography*. The wealth of detail fascinates.

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General Biddulph speculates about building a railway to Kandahar. The British subsequently built lines to Landi Kotal, in the Khyber Pass, and to Chaman, on the road to Kandahar. Both lines stopped at the Afghan border, however, and Amir Abdur Rahman steadfastly refused to entertain any requests for their continuation across his borders. Interestingly, a feasibility survey is now being undertaken, one hundred years later.

Sir Clements Markham (1830-1916) mentions the necessity of piecing together the scattered information gathered by travellers and officers, such as General Biddulph and Captain Martin. A more talented genius for such a task would be hard to find. His three articles in this volume are detailed and concise. At the same time they are thoroughly enjoyable. "The Mountain Passes on the Afghan Frontier", "The Upper Basin of the Kabul River", and "The Basin or Helmund", appeared in the Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society.

Incidentally, current scholarship in Afghanistan attributes the Hindu derivation of Hindu Kush (kills the Hindu) mentioned by Sir Clements to a corruption of Hindu Koh (Hindu Mountain), the name of the mountain range which, in pre-Muslim times, divided the area of dominant Hindu control to the south and southeast from the non-Hindu areas of the north, probably Zoroastrian.

Sir Clements Markham had a distinguished career. He was appointed to the Board of Control of the East India Company in 1854. He later served as Secretary of the Hakluyt Society from 1858-87 and became its President in 1890. From 1863-1888 he also served as Secretary, Royal Geographical Society, becoming its president from 1893-1905. From 1867-1877 he was Assistant Secretary, India Office, in charge of the geographical department. As might be expected from these examples, he was a prolific writer and contributed over seventy papers to the Royal Geographical Society's journals. In addition he wrote: Travels in Peru and India, 1862; Memoir on the Indian Surveys, 1st. edition 1871, 2nd edition 1878; General Sketch of the History of Persia; Missions to Tibet; History of the Abyssinian Expedition; Reports on the Moral and Material Progress in India from 1871-1872.

As stated earlier, though the British occupied Kabul in October, 1879, no serious efforts were made to annex Afghanistan. The crucial search for a leader eventually focused on Abdur Rahman Khan. The sensitive responsibilities of negotiation were given to Lepel Henry Griffin (1838-1908) then Chief Secretary, Punjab, of whom the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, said: "I've come to the conclusion that there is only one man in India who is in all regards completely qualified... to do for the Government of India what I want done as quickly as possible...". Mr. Griffin arrived in Kabul in April, 1880; he left it on the 11th of August, having entrusted the Kingdom of Kabul to Amir Abdur Rahman.

Mr. Griffin had joined the Indian Civil Service in 1860 and since that time had served in the Punjab. His political foresight and skill were largely responsible for his successful negotiations with Amir Abdur
Rahman and this personal account of the initial meetings, "A Page of Afghan History", included with this collection, illustrates this. It appeared in the Asiatic Quarterly.

After leaving Afghanistan, Lepel Griffin served mainly in Central India, retiring in 1889. He continued to write on his experiences with Amir Abdur Rahman, however, and many articles by him appeared in the Fortnightly Review from 1885-1901. In 1885 he founded, in conjunction with Mr. Boulger, the Asiatic Quarterly Review, and was its coeditor for some years. He also wrote extensively on the Sikh Rajas of the Punjab and one work on Famous Monuments of Central India (1886).

These writers of the war years are followed by two who are concerned with the problems of settlement at the conclusion of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Relations between Afghanistan and British India seemed in a hopeful state while Amir Abdur Rahman sat on the throne, but the Russian menace loomed fearfully. The probability of invasion was universally expected; only the route was excitedly debated. Colonel George Bruce Malleson (1825-1898) describes the possible routes, emphasizing the key position of Herat in his chapter in this book: "The History of Herat", an abridged version of his book Herat: The Granary and Garden of Central Asia, London, 1880, which followed his A History of Afghanistan written in 1879. Colonel Malleson joined the Bengal N.I. in 1844 and served in various parts of India, including as Guardian to the Maharaja of Mysore from 1869-1877. He retired in 1877. He wrote numerous articles for the Calcutta Review and several important volumes on various phases and personalities in Indian history. Colonel Malleson was, as one contemporary reviewer phrased it, "recognized as one of the masters of Indian history".

On assuming responsibility for Afghanistan's foreign affairs, Britain was committed to deal with Afghan-Russian relations which, at this moment, concerned the safe-guarding of the northern provinces. To issue an ultimatum to the effect that any Russian advance beyond Afghan borders would bring about war with Britain was difficult, however, because the northern boundary was most tenuously defined. As previous diplomatic attempts had only succeeded in muddling matters, it was decided, with the consent of Amir Abdur Rahman, that a joint Anglo-Russian team should settle the question on the ground. Captain Charles E. Yate (1849-1940) of the Bombay Staff Corps entered the army in 1867. He served in the Second Anglo-Afghan War and was subsequently appointed as Political Officer with the Afghan Frontier Demarcation Commission which arrived in the vicinity of Herat in November, 1884. At that time no members of the team were permitted to visit the city but later Captain Yate spent much of July through October, 1885, in and around Herat for the fortification of that city had suddenly become the burning question of the moment. The cause of the excitement was the Russian occupation of an Afghan border post at Panjdeh on the 30th of March, 1885. Captain Yate was the principal British representative present at Panjdeh when the Russian army appeared; the last to leave
after negotiations failed. After the Russian threat disappeared, Captain Yate continued to work with the Commission until the final demarcation of the border between the Hari Rud and the Oxus River was completed during the winter of 1887. His article with this selection was originally submitted as a report to the Indian Government and later appeared in the, Asiatic Quarterly.

A detailed day by day account of his travels with the Commission was published in a book entitled *Northern Afghanistan or Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission*, London, 1888. A companion account by his brother, Lt. A.C. Yate, also a member of the Commission, had appeared earlier as *England and Russia Face to Face in Asia: Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission*, London, 1887. These two works present an entertaining insight into the creation of Afghanistan as a buffer state.

The last three authors speak from retirement after many years service in the Afghan and closely related areas. Their articles deal principally with the drawing of Afghanistan's eastern border, the so-called Durand Line which was agreed upon in principle in Kabul in November, 1893. Actual demarcation was cause for much argument, however, among both Afghans and the British. Indeed, it is still a contested boundary.

Major Henry George Raverty (1825-1906) joined the East India Company’s 3rd Bombay Infantry in 1843 just after the British had extricated themselves from their first involvement on Afghan soil, at a time when the Afghan-Indian border area was of utmost concern. Major Raverty immersed himself in the study of these tribal areas, an interest which he maintained throughout his twenty-one years of service in India where he spent most of his time along the frontier and serving as Assistant Commissioner, Punjab, from 1852-1859. He retired in 1864 leaving behind a large body of writing concerning the Pushtun tribes. His Pashto grammar shows his high proficiency in this difficult language as do his translations of Pashto poetry. He was also fluent in Persian and translated the lengthy *Tabakat-i-Nasiri*, a detailed history in Persian of the Ghaznavid and Ghorid dynasties, as well as much Persian poetry. His *Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan* was published by the Secretary of State for India in 1888. In addition, he wrote many articles on geography, history and ethnology which record, collate and analyze a phenomenal mass of material with amazing precision. He presents his conclusions in involved intricate arguments from which he seldom deviated and he comments on conflicting theories with devastating sarcasm. The government, not his colleagues, receives the brunt of his remarks in the two articles included in this work: «The Independent Afghan or Pathan Tribes» and «The Waziri Afghans and their Country». They appeared in the, Asiatic Quarterly.

One colleague with whom Major Raverty often tangled is also represented in this collection. Captain Henry Walter Bellew (1834-1892) came out to India with the Bengal Medical Service at the age of 22 in 1856. Son of Captain Bellew, Bengal Army, killed during the retreat from Kabul in 1842, he arrived during the hiatus when «masterly inactivity» was in
vogue. Later, however, he participated actively in the events occasioned by the «Forward Policy». A hostile Persian advance on Herat in 1856-1857 persuaded both Amir Dost Mohammad and the British Government in India that more decisive action was necessary for the protection of the routes into India. Accordingly, permission was granted for British officers to enter Afghanistan temporarily, and Captain Bellew accompanied Sir H. B. Lumsden to Kandahar. Later, he served as interpreter at the crucial Ambala Conference when Amir Sher Ali met with Lord Mayo in 1869, revisited the Kandahar area at the time of the Seistan border arbitrations in 1872, and served as Chief Political Officer in Kabul during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Having a lively interest in ethnography and history, he collected much information on the Afghans which he included in two works: From the Indus to the Tigris: A Narrative of a Journey through the Countries of Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Khorassan and Iran, In 1872, London, 1874, and The Races of Afghanistan: Being a Brief Account of the Principal Nations Inhabiting that Country. Calcutta, 1880.

Captain Bellew retired as Surgeon-General in 1886 and the two articles presented here were written only a year before his death. Both articles appeared in the Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1891: «British Relations with Afghanistan» as two articles in the January-April issue and «The Ethnology of Afghanistan», in the July issue.

In «The Ethnology of Afghanistan», Captain Bellew argues for a Greek origin for the people of Afghanistan. Many classically-oriented writers of the period were fascinated by Alexander the Great's sojourn in the area: his route, the towns and cities he founded or captured, and the people he met with were tracked with excitement and involved, often torturous, hypotheses were advanced to defend varying identifications. A Greek origin for the Afghan is no longer held valid but there were cities in the Afghan area peopled by the Greeks and the first Greek city to be scientifically identified in Afghanistan is now being excavated by French archaeologists. Situated at modern Ai Khanoum, at the confluence of the Oxus and Kokcha Rivers in northeastern Afghanistan, it commands the approaches from Turkestan and Badakhshan, and may prove to be Alexandria-ad-Oxiana.

Captain Bellew deplores the absence of «a connected history» in Afghanistan, calling those that do exist «silly fables». Here he speaks with a western outlook. There may be few factual historical chronologies, but, as illustrated by Major Raverty's article on the Waziri, Afghan genealogies are very complex and fix an individual's position in the tribe with a preciseness unthought of in the western world. To the Afghan this is of paramount importance for here lie his rights and his obligations; his duty and honor. Where you came from is of little consequence when compared to who you are and what your place is in the day-to-day order of life. Where no strong central government exists, as it did not during the period under consideration, this place is determined by one's position in the tribal hierarchy.
In closing, Captain Bellew expresses the hope that his article will lead others to find an interest in Afghan ethnographical research. Today, almost a hundred years later, though an increasing number of Afghan and Western ethnographers have taken an interest in the area, the field remains virtually un plumbed. Those interested in a general discussion of the diverse ethnic complexities in Afghanistan are referred to Louis Dupree's *Afghanistan*, Princeton, 1971, which also includes an extensive bibliography of individual studies published to date.

Born in Budapest, Gottlieb Wilhelm Leitner, PhD (1840-1899) spent a busy life in education and exploration in India. Principal of Government College, Lahore, in 1864, he was instrumental in the founding of the Punjab University and he founded an Oriental Institute at Woking, Surrey. He established the journal *Indian Public Opinion*, edited the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* from January, 1890, and was an early collector of Gandhara art. Most of his publications deal with the languages and peoples of Dardistan which he was one of the first to visit. Dardistan, southwest of the Pamirs, included Dir, Swat, Hunza and Nagar, other little known areas in which the British brooded over Russian advances. His articles: "The Amir, The Frontier Tribes and the Sultan" and "The Amir of Afghanistan and Great Britain" appeared in the Asiatic Quarterly Review. Like Major Raverty, he questions the methods employed in carrying out the "Forward Policy."

The First Anglo-Afghan War has an ageless fascination; every year brings revived accounts and new appraisals. The Second Anglo-Afghan War is, by contrast, virtually forgotten, its events little spoken of except, perhaps, for General Roberts' march to Kandahar which, incidentally, comes in for some caustic remarks from Captain Bellew. This war, however, took place during an anxious time deserving of consideration for anxieties of a similar nature plague the world today. Speaking with concerned urgency, the authors represented in this book present the perplexities of a dramatic moment in history.

*NANCY HATCH DUPREE*

Kabul
January 1971
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF AFGHANISTAN

By Captain H. H. Bellew

Of the several nations named by Herodotus and mentioned as inhabiting certain Persian satrapies, which were included within the area of the region afterwards known as Ariana, almost every one is at this day represented by a so-called Afghan tribe of precisely the same name, and in much the same situation too as that assigned by Herodotus to the ancient nation of which it is the relic or survival. The same may be said also in regard to the various nations mentioned by the later Greek and Roman writers as in their times,—the first two or three centuries of the Christian era,—inhabiting different parts of this region, which in their day had come to be known by a geographical nomenclature of provinces and districts unknown to Herodotus. But amongst the clans and sections of these existing tribes, bearing the names of the ancient nations above referred to, is found a variety of names evidently belonging to different races and nationalities the ethnic affinities of which afford an interesting subject for investigation.

Some of these clans and sections, especially all along the mountain ranges bordering upon the Indus, are at once recognisable by name as representatives of the posterity of nations of a remote antiquity in this part of Northern India and Central Asia, as recorded in Sanskrit writings, such as the Rāmayana, Mahābhārata, Harivansa, Vishnū Purâna, etc., and referable to aboriginal Indian races on the one hand and to early Skythic invaders, principally of the Naga race, on the other. Whilst in other parts of the country, chiefly in Balochistan, are found tribes whose names indicate affinity with the ancient Assyrian and Babylonian races.

Besides these, there are other tribes, found in the areas of these ancient satrapies, and mentioned by Greek writers subsequently to the conquest by Alexander the Great, which bear names of a stamp different from the preceding, and clearly referable, some to Thracian affinities, and others to Skythian. Amongst these last are classed, by the native Afghan genealogists, a number of tribes bearing Rajpūt names referable to the Sākā Skythian races, of later arrival in India than the Nāga Skythians above mentioned, but earlier than the Jata Skythians who dispossessed the Greeks of Baktīrāna, and swarmed into India at about the same period that other Jata hordes of their kindred surged westward into Europe, as Jutes, Goths, and Vandals, the Jit, Jāt, and Mandan of our Indus valley tribes.

Coupled with these are certain other tribes whose names are found neither in the early Greek nor Sanskrit writings, but appear, some of them only, for the first time in Muhammadan authors of comparatively
recent times, and, most of them, in the modern tribal nomenclature of the country. In this category are included representatives of the Alexandrian Greek conquerors, and later Turk and Mughal invaders, commonly designated Tatar; though the Tatar proper belongs to a much earlier period, being mentioned in the Mahābhārata as the Tittar, along with various tribes of Turk race.

The above brief sketch conveys some idea of the composite constitution of the existing population of the Afghanistan to which our inquiry is directed. The various race elements composing it afford so many subjects for special study and research, as to when and under what circumstances they came into the localities they now severally occupy in that country. In one or two instances I have ventured to indicate the origin of tribes whose true derivation was previously unknown and altogether unsuspected even by the very people themselves; although their persistent avowal of descent from a source different from that of any of the other peoples amongst whom they dwell, would have led one to expect the survival of some tribal tradition relating to their origin; but if such formerly existed, as is very probably the case, it has long since been forgotten under the levelling influences of a jealous Muhammadanism, combined with the ignorance attending degradation and barbarism. So that now, though the knowledge of a distinct racial origin survives, there is no legend, token, or tradition amongst the people to point out where the distinction lies; and in default of better information they are content to receive, certainly with more or less of indifference, if not incredulity as well, the silly fables concocted for them by Musalman priests as full of religious zeal as they are empty of historic lore.

The remarks just made in reference to some two or three particular tribes of Afghanistan may be appropriately extended to most of the others of old date in the country. The absurd etymologies and stupid stories of the Musalman genealogists in explanation of the names borne by various Pathian tribes have done much to obliterate the memory of traditions formerly current amongst the people. But, fortunately, proper names have seldom been distorted beyond recognition, in the case of the larger and better known tribes at least; although, not unfrequently, some of the lesser clans have adopted purely Musalman surnames to the total effacement of the original patronymic; even in these, however, the old name sometimes still lingers as an alternative appellation, or it is preserved as the ancient designation by neighbouring tribes. The tribal traditions, though largely corrupted under Musalman influences, for the most part retain some faint clue to, or hazy feature of, the original; a lucky circumstance which sometimes enables the investigator to connect the garbled account with some corresponding record of authentic history.

For instance, there is the Baraki tribe of Kabul. This tribe is in Afghanistan acknowledged to be of different origin from all the other peoples amongst whom they dwell. But nobody mentions the existence of any tradition as to whence they originally came; though themselves and their neighbour tribes with one accord declare that they were planted
in their present seats in the Logar valley of Kabul by Mahmūd of Ghazni. But they say, with one accord also, that they are by descent neither Afghan nor Pathan, being excluded from their genealogies; further, they say that they are neither Turk nor Tajik, nor Chilzi nor Kurd, nor Hazārah nor Mughal. In fact, of the Baraki tribal traditions really nothing is known for certain, and next to nothing of their peculiarities in respect to domestic manners and customs. They are known to use a peculiar dialect of their own amongst themselves, though ordinarily they speak the vernacular of the district in which they reside; those dwelling about Kabul using the Pukhto, and those in Kunduz and the Tajik States north of Hindu Kush using the Persian. Of their own Baraki dialect very little is known to others, and from the very meagre vocabularies of it which have hitherto been obtained no definite opinion can be formed, though it is probable that careful examination would disclose a great majority of Greek elements. The Baraki are a fine manly race, of generally fairer complexion than those amongst whom they live, and are sometimes quite as fair as Englishmen; at least, I have seen two such. Amongst the Afghan they enjoy a reputation for intelligence and bravery superior to the ordinary standard of those qualities amongst their countrymen, and are credited with a loyalty to the ruling Barakzi dynasty so marked as to obtain record in the writings of contemporary native authors, and attested by their almost exclusive employment as the palace guards at Kabul since the time of the Amir Dost Muhammad Khan.

The Baraki possess their own hereditary lands, castles, and villages, and are principally engaged in agriculture and sheep-breeding, though many take service in the regular army, and some engage in trade as caravan merchants. They are said to have formerly been a very numerous and powerful tribe, holding extensive territory throughout the country from Kunduz and Indarab, north of Hindu Kush, to the Logar valley and Butkhāk in the Kabul district, and to Kanigoram on the Suleman range; but now they are much reduced and scattered, their principal seats being in the Baraki castles of Logar, where they are agricultural, and in the Khijnān and Baghlān districts of Kunduz, where they are pastoral; they have lesser settlements in Kaoshan district on Hindu Kush, and in Kanigoram district on the Suleman range. They are reckoned at between twenty and thirty thousand families altogether, half the number being south of Hindu Kush and the rest to its north. In this latter direction their chief place is the village of Baraki in the Baghlān district of Kunduz; and this appears to have been the original settlement of the tribe in this part of the world. For it is said, as above noted, that they were planted in Logar by Mahmūd of Ghazni (in the beginning of the eleventh century), who afterwards gave them certain lands in Kanigoram as a reward for their services in his expeditions into Hindustan. As to the origin of the Baraki nothing is known by the Afghans; by some they are classed amongst the Tajik, and by others they are reckoned as Kurd; whilst the Baraki themselves prefer to be considered as Arab, perhaps of the Koresh tribe, that convenient refuge of so many of the wild tribes of these parts, who on entering the fold of the ennobling faith become ashamed of their
poor relations, and willingly forget all about their early parentage. The foregoing is what we learn from the local sources of information available amongst the people themselves.

But from our more extended inquiry the Baraki of Afghanistan appear to be no other than the modern representatives of the captive Greeks who were transported, in the sixth century before Christ, by Darius Hystaspes, king of Persia, from the Libyan Barkê to the Baktrian territory, as recorded by Herodotus, who further tells us that the village which these exiles there built and called Barkê, was still inhabited in his time, which was about a century later. It appears also from the passage I have quoted in this connection from Arrian, that in the time of Alexander's campaign in Baktria, say a century later again, the descendants of these Barkai, or Barkaians, were still there; and not only so, but also that their true origin was known to the followers of Alexander. For although Arrian does not mention the Barkai by name, it can be only to them that he refers when incidentally mentioning the Kyreneans in the passage above referred to. For otherwise what could Kyreneans be doing in this distant part of Asia? If they were not the descendants of those who had been transported to this very tract by Darius from Barkê, a colony of Kyrene, then who were they? From the tenor of Arrian's account it would seem that these Barkai in Baktria were recognised as the posterity of the exiles from Kyrene, and that the history of their presence there was so well known at that time as not to require any special explanation in mentioning them by the name of the country whence they had originally come. Besides, it is probable that in their passage of the Kaoshan Pass over Hindu Kush, at that time in the possession of these Kyreneans, as it is now of the Baraki, the Makedonian army received succours in the form of supplies and guides, which the historian, bent on magnifying the exploits of his hero, would not care to lay too much stress upon. The district in Baktria to which the Barkai of Herodotus were transported would appear to be the present Baghlan; and the existing village of Baraki there probably marks the site of the village they there built and named Barke. In the text of my «Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan».

I have preferred, rightly or wrongly, the Baraki in Logar as the original settlement of the Barkai in these parts, because of its being the better known of the two; though the Baraki in Bughland accords best with the situation indicated by Herodotus—the district in Baktia—whilst the other is in Baktiana, or the wider territory of Baktia proper.

There was another body of Greek exiles recorded to have been settled, by Xerxes after his flight from Greece, in much the same part of this Baktian country; namely, the Branahdai of Milesia on the Hellespont. According to Arrian's account, their posterity settled in Sogdia, were exterminated, and their village there levelled with the ground and effaced altogether by Alexander, in punishment, it is alleged, of the crime committed by their grandsires at Didymus. It is probable, however, that this punishment only involved the people of one particular village; many of their kinsmen residing elsewhere escaping the fury of
Alexander. Anyhow it seems that traces of the posterity of these Brankhidai are still to be found in Afghanistan; where, indeed, formerly they seem to have been a numerous and widely-distributed tribe, to judge from the several different places bearing their name.

The original settlement of the Brankhidai, when transported into Baktria, appears to have been in the modern Indarab district, north of Hindu Kush; where there still exists, in the hills to the east of Khost and bordering on Badakhshan territory, a canton called Barang of Farang, inhabited by a people called Barangi, and classed among the Tajik population. They may represent the ancient Brankhidai or Brankhoi, and perhaps in their original settlement in Baktria. There is another place not far distant referable to the same people, and situated to the west of Indarab, and on the south slope of Hindu Kush; namely, Barangan, or Farangân, a cluster of villages in the Ghorbând district; the name is the plural form of Barang, and a native of the place would be naturally called Barangi. A few miles from this place, is a very ancient lead mine, unused for ages, and its existence apparently unknown to the people of the neighbourhood till its discovery by Dr. Lord in 1839-40; to judge from his description of it, the mine might well have been the work of Greeks, perhaps of the Brankhoi, our Baranki, of the vicinity. The shaft, it is stated, descended, one hundred feet perpendicular before it reached the ore; and the galleries had been run and the shafts sunk with a degree of skill that showed an acquaintance with the lie of the mineral, and an engineering knowledge that could scarcely be exceeded in the present day. Besides the above-mentioned, there is another district called Barang in the Nawagai division of Bajaur on the Indus border; probably so named after its former settlers, of whom traces might possibly be brought to light by local inquiry. There is also a village called Farangi in the Koh-dâman of Kabul, and another called Farangabad or Piringabad in the Mastung Valley, south of Quetta in Balochistan; both names are different pronunciations of Barangi, which is the same as the Greek Brankhoi, of which Brankhidai is a derivative. But besides these traces of Barangi occupancy, we have a clan of that name forming a division of the Syâni branch of the Lodi-Afghan, and comprising numerous sections as shown in our "Inquiry". The above-mentioned Baraki or Bàrkâl, and Barangi or Brankhoi are both instances of Greek settlements in this remote frontier of ancient Persia at a period antecedent by several generations to the conquest by Alexander the Great. Inquiry would, no doubt, lead to the discovery of many other instances of Greek cities and colonies surviving to our day, and probably by names but little altered by the lapse of centuries, the changes of revolutions, and the succession of dynasties. In the modern town of Anidhkhâi, and the existing tribe of Shekh Ali, both within the area of the ancient Baktria proper; our "Inquiry", shows the one to represent the Antiokhia built as a Syrian city by Antiokhus the son of Seleukus; and the other to represent the Greek Aioloi, who, it would seem, colonized this part of the country in considerable strength, perhaps, as the chief or foremost tribe amongst those constituting the support of the Greek kings of Baktria. But these are by no means the only Greek names that our "Inquiry" has brought to notice, as will be seen by reference thereto.
The Alexandrian conquest of the Persian Empire no doubt brought about great and important changes in the population of the country. But it would appear that the Greek element had already become strongly diffused more or less throughout the wide extent of that sovereignty for centuries before the birth of Alexander the Great; and very likely this circumstance, in its way, contributed to the celerity and success of the military achievements of that great conqueror. Each of the four great divisions of the ancient Greeks—the Ìonoi, the Aioloi, the Doroi, and the Boioi—had for nigh a thousand years prior to the Macedonian invasion, established powerful and flourishing colonies in Asia Minor, and these, in the pursuit of their own interests and affairs, were the means of bringing the sovereigns of Persia and Lesser Asia into more or less close relations, hostile or otherwise as the case might be, with the leaders of the ever unstable and turbulent Greek States in Europe. Further, it would seem that these Asiatic Greek colonies, at an early period after their establishment, sent out adventurous bands of emigrants, even into the far east of the Persian dominions. The Ìonoi (Ionians), the Doroi (Dorians), especially, together with the Mysoi (Mysians), and Lydoi (Lydians), it would seem, advanced eastwards up to the borders of the Indus at a very early period, if we are to recognise them in the Javana or Jûna and the Dor or Dôdh of the Sanskrit writings, and in the Mûsa and the Lodi of the Musulmans. Be this as it may, however, it seems that these several Greek tribes made numerous and powerful settlements in the territory of our Afghanistan during the period of the Greek sovereignty in that country; for their names, in the forms of Jûna and Yûnus, of Dor, Dôrh, and Dôdh, of Aali and Ali, and of Bae and Bî, of Mûsa and of Lodi, appear frequently amongst the clans and sections of the existing Afghan tribes; chiefly amongst the Pathan tribes along the Indus border. Some of these, as the Juna, Dor, and Bai have found a place in the Rajput genealogies; not as true Kshatrya by descent, but as tribeless Rajput by adoption, on account of association and common national interest. The names Yûnus and Ali are Musulman forms of the Greek Ìonoi and Aioloi. The Greek Akhaioi may possibly in some instances be represented by the Afghan Akà; but there is a difficulty of etymology here, and it is more likely that the Afghan Akà uniformly represents the Akà tribe of the Naga, anciently the dominant race in Northern India, and largely figuring in the Sanskrit writings.

Besides the instances above adduced there are some other less known tribes or clans, which may possibly represent the posterity of Greek colonists. In my «Inquiry» I have briefly adverted to the settlements of his own made by Alexander in the Indus provinces of Afghanistan, as indicated by Strabo; and in another passage have also noted that, according to Seneca, the Greek language was spoken on the Indus so late as the middle of the first century after Christ; if, indeed, it did not continue to be the colloquial in some parts of that valley up to a considerably later period still. Anyhow, from the statement of Seneca, above alluded to, we may conclude that the Greek language was commonly spoken along the Indus, say in the sixth generation, or nearly a hundred and eighty years after the overthrow of the Greek dominion.
in our Afghanistan by the Jata. Who, then, were the people by whom this Greek was spoken on the Indus so long a while after the destruction of Greek sway in that region? They could be none other than the progeny of the Greek colonists established there some two hundred years before the overthrow of the Greek kingdom of Baktria, above referred to; a progeny, too, by Greek women, for it is the mother's language which the infant learns. This is a conclusion which should not excite surprise when we consider the numerous instances, recorded by ancient Greek and Roman writers, of the employment of Greek women in the households of the Indian princes and nobles of that day, and sometimes in the retinue of Greek ladies married to Indian sovereigns and grandees. There is no doubt that the Greeks accompanying Alexander freely took wives from the women of the countries they had conquered; but after their rule was established under Greek kings, there is equally no doubt that the successive reinforcements they received from the home country were accompanied by more or less large convoys of merchants, mechanics, menials, and emigrants, amongst whom was a no small proportion of Greek women.

Moreover, it is to be borne in mind, that although the Jata deprived the Greeks of the paramount authority and kingly rule, the Greek was by no means thereby effaced, nor at once degraded by the conquest of the barbarian. On the contrary, he long continued to exercise the just influences of his superior knowledge and higher civilization, and probably also, as an honoured subordinate, was granted a fair share in the government and administration of the country from the paramount rule of which he had been deposed. As, indeed, is evidenced by the use of his language on the coinage of the new Sovereigns during several succeeding centuries; as is attested by the art of his architects and sculptors, the more durable relics of whose work are in our day so plentifully discovered in the ruins of former habitations throughout the area of Greek occupancy in this region; as is visible in the Greek cast of decorative art, in the domestic furniture and utensils of the people, as practised by them at the present time; and as is traceable, if I mistake not, in the presence of Greek vocables and derivatives in the very vernacular of the country itself. Results such as these could proceed only from Greeks naturalized to the soil, and maintaining their nationality and civilization, in more or less of integrity, for a long period after their fall from the high position and dominant authority they had possessed and exercised. With the lapse of time, however, and the operation of dynastic changes, the Greeks of Ariana gradually lost their influence through the resulting decay of their national characteristics, and finally—perhaps not before the rise of Islam—became lost to view in the common multitude of the Infidel of these parts; along with whom they afterwards passed undistinguished into the fold of the Faithful, where we now find their descendants.

The Greeks were dispossessed of Baktria, and deprived of their rule in Afghanistan by the Jata—the Goths of Asia—whose tribes are largely represented in the population of the north-eastern parts of the country, and all along the Indus valley. But before proceeding to notice these later arrival, we may here conveniently refer to the tribal constituents
of the population of ancient Ariana prior to the Alexandrian conquest, or at the period immediately preceding that great event. From the records quoted in our «Inquiry» it appears that the western portion of that region was inhabited by Persian tribes, amongst whom had intruded at a comparatively recent date at that period—the middle of the fifth century before Christ, when Herodotus wrote—various hordes of the nomadic Skythians, called Sâkâ, Sakai (Saxons), by the Persians and Greeks respectively.

The Persian tribes mentioned by Herodotus, and stated to have been exempt from the payment of tribute—and probably for the most part inhabiting Persia proper—were the Pasargadai, the Maraphoi, and the Maspioi; the Panthialai, the Derusiai, and the Germanoi, who were all husbandmen; and the Daol, the Mardoï, the Dropikoi, and the Sagartoi, who were all nomads. These were the principal tribes of the Persians, and they are enumerated by Herodotus in the three separate groups as above distinguished. Of these the first group comprised the tribes of the royal family and ruling classes. Of the three names given, the first in the list and the noblest of all, Pasargadai, is rather a descriptive title than a tribal patronymic. The name seems to be the Greek form of the Persian Pisar Kada—«Sons of the House,» which was probably the colloquial term applied to the tribe to which the royal family belonged. In fact, as Herodotus says, «among them (the Pasargadai) is the family of the Akhaimenides from which the kings of Persia are descended.» That is to say, one of the Pasargadai, or Pisar Kada clans, was called Akhaimenes, which is probably the Greek rendering of a native name—perhaps Akâmanush, or «Men of the Akâ race»; the Akâ being a tribe of the Nâga, to which also belonged the Mada, or Medes. The tribe in which this Akhaimenes, or Akâmanush, clan was incorporated, was probably the Kurush (so named after the Kuru, another great tribe of Nâga race), from which Cyrus (Kurush) took his name. The Kurush, as shown by our «Inquiry», are still largely represented by that name in our Afghanistan; of which country itself the Persian king Cyrus was not improbably a native. The Maraphoi may be represented by the Marûf sections found in some of the Pathan tribes; the name may also be connected with the Marûf district to the south of Ghazni along the western skirt of the Suleman range. The Maspioi may stand for one of the clans of the great Aswa tribe celebrated in the legends of antiquity relating to this part of Asia; the name is most likely the Greek form of Meh-aspa, in the colloquial Meh-isap, «the great Isap,» and may be now represented by the Isap, Isapzl, or Yusufzi of Afghanistan, the Aspioi of Strabo and Arrian.

The three tribes in the second group—Panthialai, Derusiai, and Germanoi—all of whom were husbandmen, evidently represented the settled agricultural or peasant population of the Persian race. The last named is represented now-a-days by the people of the province of Kirman, in the south east of the modern Persia; but it is probable that formerly a branch of these Kirmani had an occupancy on the Indus, where they gave their name to the Kirman district watered by the Kuram river. The Panthialalai also, it would seem, formerly had a settlement on the Indus border, for we have a district, in the Mahmand hills north of
Peshawar, called Pandiali, which probably took its name from this tribe of the Persians; the Pandiali are not now found as a separate territorial tribe in Afghanistan, though it is probable that traces of them exist among the Tajik population. The Derusiai are now represented in Afghanistan by the Darazi or Darzai tribe inhabiting the Ghor hills to the east of Herat, and supposed to be a branch of the Druses of the Lebanon in Syria.

The third group comprises the four tribes, Daai, Mardoi, Dropikoi (Derbikoi of Strabo), and Sagartoi, all nomades. Each of these tribes is represented in our Afghanistan; the two first named by the Dâhi clans of Hazârah, among which is one called Dâhi Marda; they are probably more fully represented among the Ilyat of Persia. The Dropikoi, I have in our «Inquiry» supposed to be represented by the Rajpût minstrel clan Dharbi or Dharbiki, from the similarity of the name to the Derbikoi of Strabo; though the Rajpût are not supposed to have come into these western borders of ancient Ariana at this early period; but they may have been adopted into the Rajpút genealogies, like many other tribeless clans of Rajpût. The Sagartoi are not found by that name as a separate tribe in Afghanistan; perhaps they may be included among the Tajik of Sistan, or among the Ilyat of Sagarkand to the south of Sistan; or they may be represented by the Sâgari or Saghri clan of the Khattak on the Indus in Peshawar district.

All the foregoing tribes were of the Persian race proper, and as such exempt from the payment of tribute. Hence their names do not appear among the nations named as composing the several satrapies respectively. Of these last, the tribute-paying nations, Herodotus furnishes us with the names of a considerable number, whose territories lay in the different satrapies or provincial governments which were included within the geographical limits of the ancient Ariana—our Afghanistan—as defined at the outset of our «Inquiry». Almost every one of these nations is today represented among the inhabitants of Afghanistan by tribes bearing similar names, and situated in the corresponding satrapies, so far as the position and extent of these are determined by the identity of nomenclature.

For instance, the second satrapy, comprising the Mysoi, the Lydoi, the Lasonoi (called in another passage Kabaloï Meionoi), the Kabaloï, and the Hygennoi, is shown by our «Inquiry» to have occupied that central portion of our Afghanistan which is contained between the Kabul and Helmand rivers on the north and west, and bounded by the Suleman and Khojak Amran ranges of mountains on the east and south respectively. In other words, the second satrapy of Herodotus comprised the modern Afghan districts of Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar together. Because the several nations mentioned by him as composing that satrapy are to-day represented in the area above roughly defined by the territorial tribes named Mûsa, Lûdi, Mîyânî, Kâbuli, and Khûgâni. The Lasoni are not now found by that name in this area, but they are represented in Balochistan by the Lasi, Lasâni, Lashâri and Laghâri, all variants of the original patronymic Las, after which is named the Las Bêla province of Balochistan. The Lûdi, whose history as an
Afghan people is fairly well known, are not now found as a separate territorial tribe in Afghanistan, having bodily emigrated to Hindustan in comparatively recent times. The others are all well-known tribes in the area spoken of.

Again, the seventh satrapy comprised the Sattagyda, the Gandarioi, the Dadikai, and the Aparytai, «joined together», as Herodotus states. Each of these nations I have shown to be now represented by the Khattak, Shattak, or Sattag (for the name is met with in each of these forms), the Gandhari, the Dādī, and the Afridi; and from their several occupancies along the Indus border, have marked out roughly the situation and extent of this satrapy. It lay along the Indus up to the eastern watershed of the Sulemān range, and its northern extension of Sufed Koh and Khybar range to the mountains of Bājaur; and extended from the Bolan Pass in the south to the watershed of the lofty mountains separating it from the eleventh satrapy in the north.

The eleventh satrapy comprised the Kaspioi, the Pausikoi, the Pantimathoi, and the Dāritai. It lay athwart that just described, through the ancient Paropamisus, from the Arghandab valley in the west to the Kashmir border in the east; being bounded in the south by the second satrapy above mentioned towards the west and by the seventh onwards to the Indus in the east; whilst in the north it was bounded by the tenth satrapy, to be next noticed. The Kaspioi I have supposed to be a tribe of the modern Kashmir country, and as such beyond the area of our inquiry. The Pausikai I have recognised as the Pāsi or Pāsiki of the Rajataringini, the modern Pashai of Lughman and Ghorband, and in the «Inquiry» have included the Bash or Bashgali of Kafiristan with them, though these last probably derive from a different source; from a later invasion of the northern Nomads, and speaking a different language, though probably of the same stock as the Pasi originally. The Pantimath I suppose to be represented by the Mati of the Arghandab and Upper Helmand valleys. The Dāritai are the Dārada of the Sanskrit, the modern Dardu of Dardistan.

The twelfth Satrapy comprised the Baktroi as far as the Aiglai, and is represented by the modern Balkh and Badakhshan, now commonly called Afghan Turkistan. It extends from the Murgāb river on the west to the Sarikol Pamir in the east; being bounded on the north by the Oxus, and on the south by Hindu Kush and Kohi Bābā. It was here that were settled, several generations before the Alexandrian campaign, those Greek exiles from Kyrene and Milesia, the Bārkai and Brankhai, whose posterity we have recognised in the Baraki and Barangi, at this day dwelling in the very seats originally allotted by Darius Hystaspes and Xerxes to their remote ancestors. And it was here that was established the centre of the Greek dominion in this part of Asia resulting from the conquest of Persia by Alexander the Great. What connection, if any, the one may have had with the other is a very interesting question for investigation by the historian and statesman. For not only have we here the posterity of the Greek exiles above mentioned, but also that of the Greeks who ruled this country as its conquerors and naturalized citizens for a period of two hundred years; from 330
B. C., when Alexander took possession of the country, to 126 B. C., when his successors here were deprived of the government by the barbarian Jata. The Greeks took the country from the Baktri, whom, it would seem, they also deprived of their lands, for the Baktri were the only people who obstinately opposed the progress of Alexander after he had passed from Aria (Herat) into Drangia (Sistan). But however this may be, there are no Baktri now known by that name as a tribe in this satrapy. Their modern representatives are supposed to be the Bakhtyârî (for Bakhtari, from Bakhtar, the native original of the Greek Baktria), now found settled principally in Persia, and scattered about sparsely in different parts of Afghanistan as travelling merchants and carriers; though they have small settlements in Kandahar, at Margha in Arghasân, at Drâband in Kolâchi of the Indus Derajât, and a few other places. In Balkh their place appears to be occupied by the Shekh Ali and Ali Ilahi, or Ali Ali tribes, whom I have supposed to represent the Aioloi Greek; and it is probable that representatives of other Greek tribes may yet be discovered among the so called Tajik population of the petty States of Badakhshan, inasmuch as many of the existing chiefs and noble families of that country claim descent from Alexander and his followers. In later times a new racial element has been introduced into the population of this province by the invasion of Uzbak and Turkman tribes, mostly nomads; but in numbers sufficient to have acquired for the country the modern designation of Afghan Turkistan.

To the north of this Baktria province, across the Oxus, and to its west, beyond the Murgâb, lay the sixteenth satrapy of Herodotus, which comprised the Parthoi, Khorasmoi, Sogdoi, and Arioi. Of these nations only the first named and the last come within the range of our inquiry. The Parthoi, who occupied the modern Sarakhs and Mashhad districts, are of interest to us as the nation to which belonged the celebrated Arsaki tribe, now represented by the Harzagi division of the Turkoman of Marv—a tribe anciently associated very intimately with the Greeks of Baktria, and which gave its name to the dynasty more familiarly known as that of the Arsacides. The name Parthoi may be the Greek rendering of the native Pars, or Bârs, which means "Leopard", used as the national designation of the Komân or Turk Komân of these parts, according to the usage anciently current amongst the Skythic hordes. In which case the Parthoi of Herodotus would now be represented by the Turkman tribes of the Marv country, who have recently become subjects of the Russian Empire. The Arioi occupied the modern Herat country, and are now represented by the Herati, the Haravi of Muhammadan writers, and perhaps the Haraya of the Rajpūt genealogies. They are not now known as a distinct territorial tribe by that name in the Herat province, but are scattered about in isolated families all over Afghanistan, chiefly in the larger cities and centres of town population, where they are engaged as scribes, shop-keepers, artisans, and so forth.

To the south of the Herat province, the ancient Aria, lay the fourteenth satrapy of Herodotus, which comprised the Sagartoi, the Sarangoi, Thamanai, Utoi, Mykoi, "and those who inhabit the islands on the Red Sea, in which the king settles transported convicts". This satrapy is
represented by the modern Sistan province and western Makrân. Of these nations, the Sagartoi have been mentioned above as nomads, and described among the principal Persian tribes who were exempt from tribute. Here we have them again, but included among the nations paying tribute. The Sarangoi were the same people as the Zarangoi and Drangai, inhabitants of Drangia, the modern Sistan, in which country the site of their capital city is now marked by the ruins of Zarang. The name has been revived in modern times in the national appellation of the Durâni, as explained in our «Inquiry», though probably the tribe itself is now represented by the Kâyâni of Sistan, a Persian tribe of ancient date, supposed to be the same as the Kakâya of the Sanskrit writings, and to include the existent Kâkâr Pathan of the Suleman range, who are called Kâyan, Kâikan, and Kâikanan by Muhammadan authors. The Thamanai are the modern Tymani of Ghor. The Utoi are now represented in Afghanistan by the Utmân tribes on the Indus border, to which quarter they migrated from the Kandahar country in the fifteenth century as described in our «Inquiry.» The Mykoi I have supposed to be represented in Afghanistan by the Mâkû, though probably they are better represented in Persia—along with the Uti, also—by the Muki.

The remaining portion of ancient Ariana was covered by the seventeenth satrapy of Herodotus, which comprised the Parikanoi and Asiatic Ethiopians. It lay to the south of the second satrapy, first above mentioned, and is represented by the modern Balochistan. The terms used by Herodotus to designate the natives of this satrapy are somewhat indefinite, though they may be comprehensive enough. The Greek Parikanoi seems to be a close transcript of the Persian form of a Sanskrit designation; of Parikân, the Persian plural form of the Sanksrit Parva-kâ, which means «of the mountains», or «mountaineer»; and may represent the Brahwi of Eastern Balochistan, or the Kalât Highlands. The Asiatic Ethiopians evidently refers to the various Kush, Kash, Kach, Kûj, or Kaj tribes, after whom the country is still named, in its great divisions of Kach Gandava and Kaj Makran. The principal of these tribes was the Gadara, after which people the country was called Gadrosia by the later Greeks. They seem to be the same people as the Garuda (Eagles) of the Sankrit writings, the inveterate foes and destroyers of the Nāga (Snakes). They are now represented by the Gadari of Las Bêla. Another was the Boledi (mentioned by Ptolemy), and whose real name seems to have been Bola, probably deriving from the Assyrian (Asura of the Mahâbhârat) Bael, Bal, or Bel. In the foregoing enumeration we have the names of all the principal tribes, as mentioned by Herodotus, inhabiting our Afghanistan in the century preceding its conquest by Alexander the Great. In the Râmâyana, Mahabharat, and other Sanskrit writings, we have the names of many tribes dwelling in these parts at the same early period, some of which are indentifiable with nations named by Herodotus, and others of which were probably included among their clans or tribes. But this is too long a subject to enter into now. Nor indeed have I touched it in the course of our «Inquiry»; referring to which I would merely observe here, that among the various names appearing in the sections of the
several clans and tribes of Afghanistan, many are recognisable as of Sanskrit record, and as such referable to a period antecedent to the Greek invasion. Thus, from Herodotus on the side of Persia, and the Sanskrit records on the side of India, we are enabled to obtain a fairly complete view of the racial elements composing the population of Ariana at the time of its conquest by Alexander the Great.

By the historians of his campaign, and the geographies of Strabo and Ptolemy relating to this newly-opened part of the world, we are furnished with a different nomenclature of peoples and provinces contained within the region to which our inquiry is directed. Some of these peoples are at once recognised as those mentioned by the earlier authorities above indicated, whilst others are explicitly described as tribes of the invading barbarians by whom the Greek rule and civilization in these parts was overthrown and ultimately destroyed; but besides these there is a third set of names referable to neither of the preceding categories, and which, though few in number, require further elucidation. The list of these tribes and their allotment in the categories above mentioned is too lengthy for description here. I merely allude to the subject now, to point out that after investigating all the names of nations and tribes, in this region of Ariana, which are mentioned by the ancient authorities prior and subsequent to the Alexandrian conquest, as above indicated, and adding to these the tribes introduced by the later Turk, Mughal, and Tatar invasions during the Muhammadan period, we still have a few tribal names the affinities of which can be referred neither to the one nor the other of the preceding sources. These tribes, from the similarity of names, I have supposed to represent the posterity of certain Thrakin and Lydian tribes assumed to have accompanied or followed the Greeks, who we know conquered, ruled, and colonized extensively this our Afghanistan some twenty-two centuries ago; and who, we also now know, established the seat of their authority in the province which for several generations preceding had already been occupied by two distinct and more or less numerous settlements of their own nationality; and the posterity of which earlier Greek colonists we now discover in the Baraki and Barangi inhabiting the very localities assigned by the ancient authors before cited to the original settlements in this region of the Baraki and Brankhai Greeks. Now, if, as seems to be clearly established, the posterity of the Greek exiles above described, first planted in Baktria in the sixth and fifth centuries before Christ respectively, have survived down to our day in the very tracts originally settled by their remote ancestors, surely we may reasonably expect to find some posterity of those Greeks who during the two succeeding centuries at least occupied, if they did not also thoroughly colonize, this same region in vastly greater numbers, and under incomparably more favourable conditions, than were ever enjoyed by their compatriot predecessors above mentioned.

The Afghan tribes which I suppose to be of Greek ancestry, are the various clans and tribes called Ali or Aàli, representing Aioloi, or Aioli, or Aiolians; the clans and sections called Jüna or Yona, Javana or Yavana by the Hindus, and Yûnus by the Musalmans, representing the Iônoi,
or Ionians; the clans called Báï, Baë, and Báizi, representing the Boiótioi, or Boeotians, for through in my «Inquiry» I have entered the name as Báï, dropping the affix -zi or -khel, as there explained, I should state that the name is invariably, so far as I am aware, met with as Báizi, and I cannot cite a single instance of its appearing as Báî-khel, though I know of no reason why it should not so occur also. Besides these names commonly found amongst the clans and sections of most of the Pathan tribes, there are, doubtless, others which have escaped my notice. I have, in my «Inquiry», suggested the connection of the Báarak, or Báarakzi, tribe of the Durani Afghan—the tribe of the ruling Báarakzi Amir of Kabul—with the Báarak above mentioned, the representatives of the Greek Báarkai or Báarkaeans, of Kyrène; and should further research establish the reality of such connection, we must reckon the Báarakzi also as of Greek ancestry, the remotest of all to be found in the country.

Regarding the other tribes, and the origin of the name Afghan, I must refer to the «Inquiry» itself; for my introductory précis has already much exceeded the limit at first fixed; and in now concluding my remarks, I would beg it to be understood that my «Inquiry» is what that word signifies, and by no means pretends to a complete elucidation of the ethnography of Afghanistan. The «Inquiry» contains what I have been able to put together in some sort of connected order in the course of a hasty gallop against time over the length and breadth of the wide area of the ancient Ariana, snatching up here and there, wherever recognised, stray relics of the inhabitants of long bygone ages, and tacking them on, wherever they seemed to fit, to those now dwelling in their former occupancies. Such a proceeding on unknown ground would have been venturesome indeed; but being acquainted more or less with much of the region traversed in our excursion, I venture to hope the results which I have here set forth will not prove altogether profitless, even if they serve no other purpose than to show others where lies a field for most interesting research alike to the ethnologist and the antiquary.
ENGLAND'S POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN

By Demetrius C. Boulger

The Afghan question is not the growth of yesterday. It was a burning question before the fate of England was decided on the field of Senlac. Every successive dynasty, every succeeding dominant power in India, has been called upon to deal with it since Mahmud of Ghazni first led the mountaineers down from their fastnesses to pillage the cities of Hindostan.

On two occasions in modern times the problem has been solved—at least for a generation or so. The first was when an Afghan dynasty established itself in India in the 15th century; and the second when Baber, after absorbing Afghanistan and Northern India, was succeeded—after a brief interval, during which his son Humayun was an exile in Persia and Kabul—by his grandson Akbar. The latter solution was, however, more temporary than the former. The growing strength of Persia, which steadily pushed her encroachments beyond Seistan in the direction of the Healmund and Kandahar, was a danger to the tenure of that important city by the Indian Government. As the effete successors of Akbar grew less and less capable of exercising imperial power against warlike neighbours and over turbulent races, Persia's advance became more persistent and more openly declared. At last Kandahar itself fell into the Shah's possession. Many an army crossed the Suleiman to regain that all-important city, but despite superior numbers and resources the hosts of the Great Mughal were worsted by either cold, treachery, or superior skill. In those days Afghan patriotism did not exist. There was no country to fight for, no union, no public cause. The country of the Afghans was that of the Indian ruler. They were content to be his most valiant warriors, his most skilled ministers, and his most accomplished courtiers. But in 1709 the Ghilzai chief, Mir Vais, snatched Kandahar from the Persians, and established in Southern Afghanistan a form of government which, whatever its irregular method of creation may have been, was founded on a perception of the necessities that a great and brave people felt for a sympathetic rule. In modern times it was the origin of Afghan liberty, and of the Afghan state. It was then that the Afghans began for the first time to perceive that they had a national destiny, and that they could exist in independence of alien sovereigns. The credit of that discovery was due to the genius of the chief Mir Vais, and to the valour of the Ghilzai tribe.

It is unnecessary here to sketch in any close detail the events which occurred after the death of Mir Vais; suffice it to say that his son, and then his nephew, invaded and conquered Persia. An Afghan ruler less than twenty years after the first declaration of Afghan independence was supreme from the frontiers of Hindostan to the borders of Armenia,
and Ghilzai warriors rode in triumph through Khorasan, Seistan, and Iran. Within the short space of a single generation the kingdom of Afghanistan had come into being, and had absorbed the far more powerful state of Persia. The triumph was brief. Shah Hussain's son Tamasp found a deliverer in the person of one of his general, Nadir Kuli, who in time became Nadir Shah, the most extraordinary conqueror and ruler that has appeared in Asia since the days of Timur, with the possible exception of the Emperor Babar. This man, having defeated Ashraff, the Afghan ruler, drove the Afghans out of the country, worsted the Turks, treated on terms of equality with the Czar of Russia, and then collected his armies for the purpose of crushing out all remembrance of Afghan prowess by a successful campaign against Kandahar. As a preliminary step in this design, he overthrew the confederacy which the Afghan clan of Abdalis (1) had erected round Herat, and with the conquest of that place he proceeded to mature those schemes of vengeance which he had designed against Kandahar and the Ghilzais.

With a large army he approached the walls of Kandahar in 1737. Long and desperate was the siege, and many a time did Ghilzai valour effectually check the onset of the Persian; but there was no quarter from which Kandahar could expect succour, and the besieger was as persistent twelve months after he had arrived before its gates as on the day when he first sat down before them. All sieges carried on under such conditions must have an end adverse to the besieged, and Kandahar at last surrendered. It is beside our present object to follow Nadir Shah in his Indian campaigns further than to say that the Afghans themselves bore a prominent part in them. It is pertinent to observe here, as Lord Lawrence himself has admitted, that the Afghans have always joined, and will always in the future join, any army which with reasonable prospect of success advances on the Indus with the intention of invading India. A chief of the name of Ahmed Khan, the head of the Sudozai family of the Populzai branch of the great clan of the Abdalis, had been delivered from imprisonment in Kandahar by Nadir Shah. In gratitude to his deliverer, and anxious to participate in the glory of the campaigns that were on the point of being conducted against India, Ahmed joined the army of the Persian conqueror, took a prominent part in all of his wars, and on his murder in 1747 strove to avenge him. In that effort he failed; but retiring on Kandahar, he set himself up as king of the Afghans. His authority was slowly extended over Herat, Kabul, and eventually over the Punjab, and Lahore became the second capital of the state. The only difference between his authority and that of Mir Vais and his two successors was that under the latter the Ghilzais were the dominant tribe, whereas under the former it was the Abdalis. To give a lustre to his person, as well as perhaps to assuage the bitter feeling previously existing between Ghilzai and Abdali, Ahmed assumed the title Duri-i-Duran (meaning the «Pearl of the Age»), and henceforth the Abdali clan became the Durani. The brilliant campaigns which Ahmed conducted with such remarkable skill against the Emperor of Delhi and the Mahratta confederacy gave a cohesion to the newly-founded state...
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which was unexpected. Feared abroad and respected at home, the great Durani left to his son Timur an inheritance of which any ruler might have been proud. There were, however, within the state discordant elements that could only be kept reconciled by the firmness of a great ruler. The old aspirations of the Ghilzais, far from being allayed, burnt as fiercely as ever below the surface. It was they who had first showed the Afghans the path to freedom; it was they who had first given their country a native rule. To such public benefactors a secondary position was intolerable. The feud at last broke out in open hostilities. The war which raged between Ghilzais and Duranis during the closing years of the last century and the earlier ones of the present concluded with the triumph of the latter. The Ghilzais resisted stubbornly, but the resources of the state were on the side of the Duranis, and they won. With the defeat of the Ghilzais it might be supposed that the rule of Timur Shah's successors was more firmly assured than before, but it was not so. Ghilzai ambition certainly represented a national danger, as the state might have been split into two hostile confederacies; but the danger of which we have now to speak, although only a dynastic one, has so much influenced the course of more recent events that there will be little hesitation in saying that it was of equal importance with the question of inter-tribal differences and jealousies. Among the nobles of the court of Ahmed Khan none occupied a more prominent place both in regard to influence and power and also for personal ability than Sarfraz, better known as Poyndah Khan, head of the Barukzai family of the Duranis. The friend and companion of Ahmed, he remained the prop of Timur; and when Timur was succeeded by his son Zemaun, the influence of Poyndah had descended to his son, Futteh Ali Khan, who wielded the great power of the Barukzais. Three Sudozai rulers were alternately supreme in the state during the first fifteen years of the present century, viz., Zemaun, Mahmud, and Shuja-ul-Mulk; but the country was in a very disorganized state, and the Barukzais, who appear at first to have been actuated by honourable motives, soon began to intrigue and to fight for their own hand. There can be no doubt that the murder of Futteh Ali Khan during the course of these disturbances, with every circumstance of brutal cruelty, by Mahmud and his son Kamran, inflamed the resentment of the Barukzais, and gave a point to their ambition and covert hostility. The murder of Futteh Khan was amply avenged. His numerous brothers, towering among whom stands the figure of the able Dost, ousted the Sudozais from the state, and although for many years Mahmud and Kamran retained the semblance of sovereignty in Herat, the Barukzai house had completely displaced the older and more privileged family. Dost Mahomed soon made the triumph of his clan his own particular triumph, and before the first Afghan war commenced he was de facto Amir in Eastern Afghanistan.

It is only necessary to describe very briefly the diplomatic relations that subsisted between England and Kabul up to the point when it was resolved to uphold the cause of Shuja-ul-Mulk, the exile of Ludhiana. The mission of Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1808 refers to such and old-world state of things—when France's pretensions were considered to
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endanger our hold on India, either through the overweening ambition or the extraordinary genius of Napoleon—that it is unnecessary here to consider it at all. The Burnes Mission in 1837, after the lapse of a complete generation, made a fresh start in our Afghan policy, but unfortunately that new departure was founded on the mistake of making Dost Mahomed our foe instead of our ally. After the Simla proclamation it became simply a question of settling the internal affairs of Kabul as speedily as possible at the same time that we secured those engagements which were then so easily to be obtained from Shuja-ul-Mulk. It is scarcely required to point out how our occupation was either too brief or too long for practical purposes, and that the triumphs of [Major-General Sir George] Pollock and [Major-General Sir William] Not did not entirely dissipate the remembrance of the disaster which had brought avenging British armies back to Kabul. The Afghan wars of 1839 and 1842 left the relations of England and Kabul in an uncertain state. Shuja-ul-Mulk and his son were dead. The life of the Sudozai cause was extinct. The only man that could restore order to the country was the Barukzai chief, who was a prisoner at Calcutta. It was resolved to release Dost Mahomed, and it became necessary to shape a definite line of policy towards him. The whole subject of the Anglo-Afghan question is to be mastered in the consideration of what that policy was and how it arose.

When Dost Mahomed was about to leave Calcutta he addressed an English officer who was present in words which, though seldom quoted, have exercised a great influence on the policy of our Governments. The Amir said that during his residence among us he had marvelled greatly at our strength and our resources, at our fleet and our lines of communication both by road and water; that he admired our system of government and the manner in which it was administered; but that there was one thing he could not understand, and that was, what interest we could have in the affairs of Kabul, which was a land of rocks and stones. While we remained uncertain as to our policy, Dost Mahomed was clear in his own mind that his true policy consisted in widely spreading the belief among Englishmen that a great and rich power such as England could never, by any chance, have any interest or concern in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. His efforts were attended with great success. He was undoubtedly aided very much by the impression that the Afghan wars had left behind on the mind of almost every Anglo-Indian, with the exception of Sir Henry Rawlison. On all occasions he made a point of treating with astonishment any suggestion that England should establish herself within his frontier. He was our good friend, and he intended remaining so; but, as a proof of that friendship to us, he advised us, and his advice was listened to, never to interfere either in the internal affairs or in the intestine disturbances of his state. For thirteen years he carried on this astute policy, and its effect was not weakened by the dubious part the Afghans played in the Sikh War. But after we became his close neighbour in 1849, upon the occupation of the Punjab, it was found necessary to have some more regular arrangement with his Government—now supreme north of the Hindu Kush, as well as south of it—than
the tacit understanding at which we had arrived. With that object a treaty was signed at Peshawar on March 30, 1855, and by its terms there was to be amity for ever between the two Governments. The Amir still protested that he could not admit British officers, and he also convinced our authorities that it would be a positive disadvantage to us to secure the concession. In 1857, danger to Herat and a Persian war compelled us to take a more decided step. The Amir was subsidised, and permission granted to the British Government to send officers to supervise, in «Balkh, Kandahar, Kabul, or elsewhere,» the expenditure and offensive measures that were being carried out. Still Dost Mahomed adhered to his principle, and the deviation from it was only to be temporary, and under the present emergency. On his death-bed, in 1863, he advised his son to follow the advice of England, and to trust to her for support; but he could not forego the repetition of his old formula once more, which impressed upon us the necessity of leaving Kabul untouched and in a state of isolation.

From an Afghan point of view nothing could be wiser than the policy of Dost Mahomed. It preserved Afghan independence at the same time that it maintained a fiction of friendship and alliance between England and Kabul, which we now know to be delusive. It gave him all the advantages of an English alliance free of cost or responsibility; and for what he received he had to render no equivalent. There is no reason why this state of things should not have indefinitely continued, had there been no such power as Russia in Central Asia. But with that potent fact on the south-east shores of the Caspian, rampant in Bokhara and on the Oxus, and slowly pressing down on Wakhan and Baroghil, it was clear that the policy of Dost Mahomed could not long remain the policy of England. If we are to judge of statecraft as something more than the adjustment of a question which is of the hour only—if we may assume that there is such a thing as a great national policy in Kabul and Central Asia, which aims at shaping events in such a manner that each succeeding generation of Englishmen may find present difficulties to have given place to future advantages, and the successful solution of the danger of the hour to have become the sure guarantee of tranquillity in the future—then, admitting that there is something higher than a timeserving wish to shirk responsibility and danger, it must appear that the policy of Dost Mahomed was not a policy worthy of our country. Yet it was adopted.

Lord Lawrence had, as chief commissioner of the Punjab, concluded those treaties with Dost Mahomed in 1855 and 1857, of which mention has already been made. No man ever had a higher opinion of the Afghan Amir than he had; and he showed thereby that he could appreciate the genius of one of the most remarkable of modern Asians. But it is permissible to believe that, however much one may admire a foreigner, it is not usual to adapt the policy of one's country towards his, in accordance with the view he may have formed upon the subject. Dost Mahomed was the fountain-head from which Lord Lawrence derived his inspiration as to the virtue of «masterly inactivity» on the North-west Frontier. He was also impregnated with a belief that Heaven
had declared against us in our previous wars in Afghanistan, which the historians of his school have not hesitated to characterize as iniquitous. He believed in the possibility of the recurrence of that unparalleled series of mistakes which produced the catastrophe to Elphinstone's Brigade, and, as Sir John Kaye has expressed it, the conviction was dominant in our council chamber during these years that «the judgment of God is against you, and He will requite,» would be the certain result of any fresh advance into Kabul. All the Punjab authorities of the last twenty-five years are not free from this taint. Over their heads there has sat the Nemesis of the past, and the one point on which they were unanimous was, «never to interfere in Afghanistan under any pretence whatever.» And this policy came to be known as one of «masterly inactivity.» It is impossible to challenge its claims to the epithet of inactivity; but whether it was masterly or mischievous, history must decide.

When, therefore, the assured rule of Dost Mahomed came to an end with the death of that venerable prince, and a period of internal disturbance began in Kabul which continued more or less during six years, it was by a policy of inaction, caused by a too implicit belief in the soundness of the Dost Muhamed's doctrines, and also by an unreasoning and unreasonable dread of a repetition of the misfortune of 1841, that our Government strove to cope with a difficulty which formed the crisis in the relation between the two states. From the blame which must attach to the Indian Government of the day for delaying to recognize Sher Ali as Amir upon the death of his father, Lord Lawrence must be exonerated, as he did not arrive in India to take up the Governor-Generalship until the year 1864. The death of Lord Elgin undoubtedly produced some confusion in the arrangement of foreign matters, and in order to explain the delay it is not necessary to suppose that Sir William Denison's letter of December, 1863, had been purposely held back in order to see how matters progressed within the Kabul state. Dost Mahomed has never advised that we should not recognize his heir, and upon that heir he had impressed the necessity of relying upon the moral support of England. The very first act of the Indian Government was to offer a slight to the new ruler, which was imprudent and in contravention of the spirit of our understanding with Dost Mahomed. The delay of six months in officially replying to Sher Ali's letter written from Herat was so far productive of ill to the cause of that prince that we find on reference to the «Afghan Blue Book» (pp. 5 and 7), that during those months Azim Khan, his elder brother, wrote letters to us which were overtures for an alliance. While our Government delayed its reply, all Afghanistan construed the delay as arising from a dislike to Dost Mahomed's choice, and as a natural consequence Sher Ali's brothers, who had sworn on the Koran to obey him, began to intrigue, and to take steps for challenging his authority.

There was much to be apprehended by Sher Ali from the intrigues of Afzal (2) and Azim, who were both personal friends of Lord Lawrence, but there was also a more immediate danger from his own full brother, the turbulent Ameen, strong in the affections of the people of Kandahar.
When in December of the year in which Dost Mahommed died, the formal recognition of Sher Ali came, it arrived too late in one respect, for the confederacy among the brothers had already been formed against Sher Ali; and Amin, the first to take the field, was already assembling his forces for the fray. We need only consider the fortunes of this war in so far as they affect our policy, which became with its outbreak one of intensified „masterly inactivity.„ In 1864 Lord Lawrence assumed the supreme control of Indian affairs, and one of the first points which he had to consider was the overtures made by Sher Ali to him for a fresh treaty. On this point the „Afghan Blue Book‟ is strangely reticent, but Aitchison, Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, has supplied the deficiency to a certain extent. By this time there had been several collisions between the troops of the Amir and those of his brothers. But the result was favourable to Sher Ali. His brother Azizal became a state prisoner, in direct contravention of promises which the Amir had given him at an interview near Balkh; and for the moment both Azim and Amin were passive. It was but the lull before the storm, and Sher Ali knew it. He resolved to throw himself into the arms of England, and with that intention he despatched as his envoy his ablest and most trusted general, Mahomed Rafik Khan, to India to ask for a fresh treaty which should give him that moral and material support of which he stood in need. Sher Ali undoubtedly wanted arms and money. It is probable that he did not specify what he would give in return. It is also probable that we did not quite know what to ask. In those days Russia was far off. Tidings of Tchernaieff’s advance against Tchimkent had then barely reached British India or Europe. It required a little foresight to perceive that within a decade Russia would be on the Oxus with Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva at her feet. But it certainly should have been clear to our authorities that Sher Ali’s overtures to us afforded a favourable opportunity for strengthening our position towards Kabul that should not be lost. Mahomed Rafik failed in his mission. He could get nothing out of Lord Lawrence. He was told that there was a treaty in force between the two states which answered every requirement. For a second time Sher Ali met with a rebuff at the hands of our Government.

After this event the war broke out with renewed vigour. Sher Ali won battles at Seyyidabad and Kujhbaz, at the latter of which his son Mahommed Ali and his rival brother Ameen were killed. But, on the other hand, his second son Ibrahim was driven out of Kabul, and when Sher Ali endeavoured to restore the fortunes of the war he was worsted at Shaikhhabad, and routed at Khelat-i-Chilzai. His cause was abandoned even by his once-trusted general Mahomed Rafik, and when he quitted Kandahar the clouds over the Amir were black without a rift. In this dark hour of his destiny he bore himself like a true man. „He was still the rightful ruler of Afghanistan,‟ he said, „and so long as he had life he would never cease to assert his rights; and for himself he knew that the result rested with Allah.‟ This was his proclamation to his adherents as he fled through Kandahar towards Herat and the yet-faithful West. It has been said on good authority that whatever personal sympathies Lord Lawrence had with any of the claimants were principally
attracted to the persons of Afzal and Azim, both of whom were men remarkable for their courage and ability. Whether there is any foundation for the assertion or not, Lord Lawrence at once proceeded to recognize Afzal, who had been released at the battle of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, as Amir of Kabul and Kandahar. This was done in a very gracious letter dated February 25, 1867 («Afghan Blue Book,» p. 14). Here was a departure of the highest importance from the policy of inactivity which had been hitherto in vogue. If «masterly inactivity» had anything to recommend it, it certainly required to be consistent and applicable to all cases. It was consistent neither with our promises to Dost Mahomed nor with our repeated declarations on the subject, to seize so eagerly the opportunity afforded by the result of the 1866 campaign for recognizing a new Amir. That grave step was taken with apparently as much levity as if our Indian statesmen were mere schoolboys, instead of being men grown grey in the service of the state, and intimately conversant with Afghan history and affairs. The well-known uncertainty of military fortune was also utterly ignored; and the only precautionary measure which was taken was to «officiously» recognize Sher Ali as Amir of Herat! This was but adding fuel to the flame. Sher Ali might have forgotten our desertion of his cause, but he could never condone the insult we offered him in recognizing him as Amir in a portion of the territory which was his by inheritance and by virtue also of our declaration in 1863. Upon the death of Afzal in October, 1867, Azim was recognized as Amir (see «Afghan Blue Book,» p. 24), and while Sher Ali was gathering strength in Herat, and recovering from an abortive expedition north of the Hindu Kush, the relations between England and Kabul were for the nonce satisfactory.

In 1868 the fortune of war once more veered round to the side of Sher Ali, and through the abilities of his son Yakub Khan, governor of Herat, Sher Ali recovered Kandahar and Kabul. Azim and his nephew Abdurrahman—Afzal’s son—were driven into exile, the former to die in the wilds of Seistan, the latter to find a place of refuge within Russian territory. Once again the weary game was gone through. There was a reversal of our foreign policy. Sher Ali was recognized, and became the hero of the hour. A new Viceroy assumed the reins of power. Lord Mayo succeeded Lord Lawrence; but although there was no longer any question of recognizing any other ruler than Sher Ali, «masterly inactivity» was still accepted as wisdom without a flaw. There appears to have been no apprehension that the ill-treatment Sher Ali had received at our hands would ever exercise any influence on the progress of events. The reasons for our recognizing his brothers were assumed to be perfectly clear to Sher Ali, and thoroughly appreciated by him. No doubt they were. A present of money and arms in 1869 was to obliterate, it was supposed, all remembrance of our acts in 1863, 1864, and 1867. At this point, when the first stage of our Afghan policy terminates, it is advisable to sum up what had been done in the way of propitiating the Afghans, and of knitting their rulers to our cause. It is evident that we had done nothing towards effecting either of these necessary objects. Our hesitation in 1863 encouraged the rivals of Sher Ali to challenge his authority; our refusal in 1864 to assist him, when both
in arms and money he was nearly destitute, gave a fresh impulse to
the sedition in his state; and lastly, our acknowledgment in 1867 of
Afzal and also of Azim afforded natural cause of offence to a man who
up to that point had been true to the English alliance. The Afghans
saw in our vacillating action the cause of many of their misfortunes;
their ruler attributed to it the disasters which almost crushed him in
1866. With his final triumph it became necessary to repair the blunders
of the past by convincing Sher Ali that for the future we were enlisted
in support of his cause.

When Lord Mayo became Viceroy in January, 1869, he found that a
meeting between the Amir and his predecessor had already been sug-
gested. The final effort made by Azim and Abdurrahman in October,
1868, caused the postponement of that interview, but when Lord
Lawrence left India it was generally recognized as about to take place.
Great stress has been laid on the friendly tone of Sher Ali's letters at
this period as showing that he had forgotten, or perhaps never felt hurt
at, the desertion of his cause by us; but this deduction from his letter
of the 12th of Shaban, 1285, is not justified by the facts. The cause
of the friendly tone of these documents was not that Sher Ali had
forgotten or condoned anything in our past conduct, but that he simply
desired to return suitable thanks for the six lakhs of rupees which were
sent him in December, 1868. That gift had been most opportune. The
revenue of Kabul had already been realized by Azim «not only for the
present year, but in some parts of the country for the coming year
also;» and from the impoverished people of a country distracted by six
years of internecine war it was impossible to wring a sum adequate to
the Amin's expenses. In such a strait our money was not to be despised.
Sher Ali could not then boast, as he did the other day, that in his
treasure-house there were seven crores of rupees; and for the moment
he consented to forget the wrongs which he was persuaded he had
received at our hands. Yet even in these letters he permitted himself
to be slightly satirical. Lord Lawrence, in his letter of October 2, 1868,
had assured Sher Ali of his desire to maintain the bonds of mutual
amity and goodwill, and had congratulated the Amir on his success,
«which is alone due to your own courage, ability, and firmness». Sher
Ali in his reply says he had learnt of our «sincere desire» to see his
authority strengthened, but he very pertinently remarked that his
«sincere desire» was «in a greater degree than before». Despite our
presents, and notwithstanding the more friendly attitude we observed
towards him, Sher Ali was still sceptical as to the durability of our
intentions. His position, however, did not become secure in Kabul for
many months. While Azim lived there was constant danger, and the
hold Abdurrahman had secured on the people of Afghan Turkestan,
both by marriage with a Badakshi princess and also by his residence
among them as governor, was not to be shaken in a day. The British
alliance was necessary to Sher Ali; however piqued he might secretly
be, he must conceal it. The tact and hearty manner of Lord Mayo
undoubtedly produced a good effect upon the somewhat morbid
temperament of the Afghan ruler, and the Ambala Durbar went far
towards removing from the mind of Sher Ali the unfavourable impres-
sion which the policy of Lord Lawrence had produced upon it. So long as Lord Mayo lived, that friendly sentiment remained a vital force in the bosom of Sher Ali. It induced him to forego the indulgence of any spleen at the acts of his predecessor. But during these years Sher Ali's own power was undergoing a change. His rivals had disappeared, his revenue was becoming assured, Afghan Turkestan was again in his possession. He was busy creating an army, which was expected to make him omnipotent at home and respected abroad. And finally, Herat—which had fallen into the possession of his son Yakub Khan, who, having quarrelled with his father, ruled there in semi-independence, and in much too close relationship with Persia to be agreeable to the Afghan sovereign—had passed, with the imprisonment of Yakub and the flight of his younger brother Ayub, into his hands. In the year 1874 Sher Ali ruled over all the dependencies which the genius of Dost Mahomed had knit into one grand confederacy. The Seistan Boundary Commission had not, indeed, given him what he wanted in that quarter, but it had pushed Persian pretensions further back, and had brought security to Ferah, and the country watered by the lower course of the Helmand. But the Seistan question sinks into insignificance beside the far greater and more momentous matter which was now reaching an acute stage. The labours of the English arbitrators between the Shah and the Amir had not long ceased, when General Kaufmann undertook the third Russian invasion of Khiva. In that expedition [the Central Asian people] felt the deepest concern. At all times Khiva has held a position scarcely less important in Turkestan than Bokhara. Its prestige was great, and although its actual power was insignificant, its natural defences, surrounded on all sides by deserts, were so formidable that it appeared to its neighbours to be safe from the assault even of Russia. The approaches from the Caspian lay through a barren and inhospitable tract of country which had already been whitened by the bones of Russian soldiers, and from the Jaxartes across Kizil Kum the dangers and obstacles were scarcely less grave or formidable. The expedition against Khiva was a test of Russia's strength in the eyes of Asian people. It succeeded, and the reputation of Russia for the first time became in Kabul that of a power equal in resources and strength to England. For the sake of argument it is unnecessary to dwell on the breach of faith Russia committed towards this country in annexing the right bank of the Oxus. Strong language might be applied to the falseness her Government then showed towards this country, but for the purpose we have at present in view it is unnecessary to indulge in any recriminations.

Lord Northbrook's telegram of July 24, 1873, is the first token that was afforded of the effect Russian triumphs in Central Asia were producing in the Kabul Durbar. Khiva had surrendered to [General] Kaufmann on June 10th, and five weeks after that event Sher Ali was so alarmed at Russian progress, and dissatisfied with the very vague assurances he had received from us, that he was anxious to know definitely how far he might rely on our help if invaded. Sher Ali's fear was caused by apprehension both of national and of personal danger. General Golovatcheff's expedition against the Turcomans might be but the
prelude to an occupation of Merv; and with Russians at that place, there could be no durability for the Amir's authority north of the Hindu Kush. The possibility of Abdurrahman reappearing in the field, backed up by Russian assistance in money and men, also assumed a more probable aspect, and with Russia hostile, and England only vigilantly passive, there loomed before the Amir a time of trouble and uncertainty. He resolved to take precautions in time, and his first object was to secure from us a guarantee that his territory should not be invaded, and that his own individual right should not be assailed either by foreign power, or by a domestic enemy supported by foreign aid. In 1873 Sher Ali wanted a guarantee against Russia, and also against Abdurrahman. He laid his demand before our Government, and Lord Northbrook at one moment appeared to be disposed to concede the substance of his request. Other counsels ultimately prevailed, and the reply to Nur Mahomed Shah, the Amir's envoy, was substantially that the discussion of the question had better be postponed to a more convenient season, and that we saw no reason for alarm at Russia's progress. Russia was, moreover, on terms of friendship with us, and under a distinct obligation never to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. The negotiations that were carried on between Lord Northbrook and Nur Mahomed Shah are known as the Simla Conference, and they extended from July 12 to July 30, 1873. The pith of the negotiation is to be found in the Viceroy's letter to Sher Ali, dated September 6, 1873 (Afghan Blue Book, p. 116). The policy of «masterly inactivity» had never been carried by Lord Lawrence to the pass that it was by Lord Northbrook and the Duke of Argyll in 1873. For five years Sher Ali had been in undisturbed possession of his kingdom. His authority had during these years remained unchallenged. The choice of Dost Mahomed had been ratified by time, and confirmed by success. It was no longer a question of interference in the domestic quarrels of the Barukzai house. The original regulations of the policy of Lord Lawrence were no longer applicable, yet despite warning voices, and in defiance of the better sense which found expression in some of Lord Northbrook's utterances, our policy, which had been modified in 1868-69, relapsed into the old apathy and cruel indifference which had marked it in 1864 and 1867. The virtual effect of the abortive Simla Conference was to bring Russia and Sher Ali into relationship with each other (3). General Kaufmann's solicitude became extreme and frequently expressed in the welfare of his neighbour; and Sher Ali's alarm grew less and less as Russia's soothing words became more and more sweet.

The effect of this policy was to raise doubts in the bosom of the Amir as to our intentions towards his state that had long lain dormant. He was unable to persuade himself that our interest in his country had ceased; and he reconciled our attitude towards him with what he knew to be one of the necessities of our rule in India, by assuming that we either did not sympathize with him personally, or that we had ulterior designs against his throne. Yet, in those days, he had no other course but to temporize, and his letter of November 13, 1873 (Afghan Blue Book, p. 119), in one of the most skilful instances of
a man disguising his real mind, at the same time that he leaves clear indication of what that mind is.

The arrest of Yakub Khan in November, 1874, when he came to Kabul under a safe-conduct from the Amir, called forth a protest from Lord Northbrook which deserves the highest commendation, as an act of generous appreciation of the qualities of a man upon whom now depends more than upon any one else, perhaps, the future history of Afghanistan. There can be no doubt, however, that this act inflamed the resentment of Sher Ali against us. While Russia had been flattering his vanity with repeated inquiries after the health of the declared heir, Abdullah Jan, England pronounced her sympathy for the cause of the distressed prince, who had at one time been a proclaimed rebel. The act was generous, but impolitic; but for generous acts, however impolitic, it would be wrong to pass censure on any British statesman. Had there been more generosity, more sympathy, in the cold and calculating policy of «masterly inactivity», it might have been less worthless. It would, at all events, have possessed the one redeeming feature of generosity; and a sympathetic mood towards the difficulties of an Afghan ruler, during the years of warfare, would have facilitated the arrival of that day when British influence must be supreme south of the Hindu Kush, and that would have been the case whether we pinned our faith to the person of Sher Ali or one of his brothers. All that was necessary was, that we should be consistent to our word and our declarations. But we were true neither to Sher Ali nor to Azal, nor yet to Azim [Khan]. We fluttered helplessly from one side to the other, and our responsible statesman showed neither common sense nor foresight.

In January, 1875, Lord Salisbury penned a despatch to Lord Northbrook, in which the sentence occurs that «though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in Central Asia and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution.» The object of the policy which this dispatch foreshadowed was to take precautions against Russia. It was the starting-point of a new policy. Up to that moment our policy had never so much as glanced beyond the Kabul council-chamber. We were on good terms with Russia, we trusted to her engagements, and we were generally contented with the existing situation. From that date to the present time a larger view has been taken of the Afghan problem. It was no longer only a matter of how we were to stand with the Amir, but of how we were to make our relations with that prince a means of restraining Russia, and, when the occasion arose, of checking her advance upon the gates of India. The exhaustive reply of Lord Northbrook of June 7th of the same year, containing thirteen enclosures, with the opinions of many of the Punjab authorities, was, as a matter of fact, beside the main point in the question. It was no longer an Afghan question pure and simple, but a Russian and Central Asian problem. Dost Mahomed’s panacea was wholly out of date, and it was necessary to treat the altered circumstances of the case in a different
manner. Lord Salisbury renewed his suggestions for an improved method of communicating with the Amir on November 19th, but Lord Northbrook again failed to perceive either the necessity or the advisability of the change. Shortly afterwards Lord Northbrook left India, and under the new Viceroy, Lord Lytton, the suggestions contained in Lord Salisbury's despatches, and in his instructions to the Governor-General of February 28, 1876, began to bear fruit in acts. It is not necessary, nor is it possible, to say that all these acts were wise, and certainly some of them were carried out in an imprudent manner. But from this date it was clearly recognized that we should make a friend of the Amir if possible, and that we should at any rate take up, by treaty right or otherwise, a position in advance of our present frontier that would enable us to check any undue aggression on the part of the Tashkent authorities. The absolute right of this country to supremacy in Kabul, as absolute and as clear as Russia's claim to supremacy in Bokhara, for the first time became an accepted axiom in our policy. All our subsequent efforts have been made with the double object of repairing the mistakes of the past, and of taking up a fresh position towards the Afghans and Persia. With this object in view, overtures were made throughout the year 1876 to Sher Ali, and the old scheme of the occupation of Quetta, sanctioned by our Treaty with the Khan of Khelat, and advocated long ago by General John Jacob, was revived and carried out. The occupation of Quetta was really a defensive step. There were symptoms even then that Sher Ali was meditating on that policy into which he took such a fatal plunge last autumn. Russian emissaries had come to Kabul, and had been received in a semi-official manner. The same presents that were made to our native agent were given to the Russian, and the representative of Tashkent was placed on an equality with the British.

This state of things could not be tolerated. It would perhaps have been carrying the point too far to make the reception of Kaufmann's native envoys, a casus belli, but the lesson of precaution which it impressed upon us was not to be disregarded. These acts on the part of the Amir also rendered some warning measure on our side necessary, and none was readier to hand than the occupation of Quetta. That advance should have proved to Sher Ali that we were in earnest as to the fresh demands we made upon him during the Peshawar Conference, which was held in the early part of 1877. The treaty, a sketch of which was placed before the Amir ("Afghan Blue Book," pp. 184 and 189, &c.), that we were willing to grant him, would have conceded him everything he had asked in 1873, and even more. But the negotiations between Nur Mahomed Shah and Sir Lewis Pelly proved abortive. Sher Ali still distrusted us. The promises from Tashkent were more specious, and apparently more attractive. Sher Ali thought they were also more to be depended upon. He had tried English friendship, and he had often found it wanting in substantial favours; he would now try Russian by way of a change. It does not follow, as a matter of course, that he wished to quarrel with us. He wanted to preserve his complete independence and the traditions of the Durani monarchy. He saw that we were becoming daily more persistent in making inconvenient demands.
upon him, and he fell back upon the Russian alliance as his only
resource. The great recommendation in the Russian promises was that
they required him to do nothing that would abate one jot of his
sovereignty. They rather drew pictures of greater power and wider
empire yet to be secured. From the close of the Peshawar Conference
to the reception of the Stolietoff Mission, that is to say, for a period
of eighteen months, the attitude of the British Government was one of
sustained vigilance. It required no great wisdom to foresee what would
be the upshot of the dislike and suspicion that lurked in Sher Ali’s
bosom, when they were brought face to face with the settled purpose
of our authorities to solve the Afghan problem. In an extremity, Sher
Ali or any other Afghan ruler must yield to the necessities of our
empire in India. It is unnecessary to linger over the details of the
Stolietoff Mission, or to describe the events which immediately preceded
and followed the departure of Sir Neville Chamberlain from Peshawar.
Nor need we extend our concluding remarks to embrace what is already
matters of daily gossip, by narrating the course of a campaign which
had ended as soon as it had begun. Sher Ali’s military strength was
found to be a fiction; and he, like, his father, has no other support
than the rugged mountains which envelop the country on all sides. On
no occasion have the Afghans fought with anything like desperation.
At Peiwar, where they were in an almost impregnable position, they
fled the instant they thought their line of retreat was threatened, and
the advance of Sir Samuel Browne to Jellalabad has been completely
unopposed, since the capture of Ali Musjid. Yet experts tell us that the
Afghan powers of resistance, if they only had an able ruler whom they
would faithfully obey, are far from being crushed; and it is easy to
see from the acts of the Afridis, and of the Turis and Jajis, what form
that resistance would take.

The flight of Sher Ali into Afghan Turkestan, and the release of his
son Yakub Khan from confinement, are events too recent, and also
too vaguely reported, to admit of any unhesitating opinion being passed
upon their political significance. The flight of Sher Ali from Kabul was
either compulsory, or was made in fulfilment of some plan of coming
to terms with England, in which the reconciliation of Yakub Khan and
his father occupied a foremost place. It is much more probable that the
Amir felt obliged by the failure of his new policy and by the desire to
provide for his own safety to accompany the Russian Mission in its
flight through Bamian, for the turbulent Kabulis were manifesting their
antipathy towards Russia, as the cause of their country’s misfortune, by
demonstrations against the mission that could not be mistaken. The
Amir, never very popular with his subjects, saw danger to himself in
the demeanour of the townspeople, and when the Russian Mission
abandoned the scene of its sinister and happily abortive labours, the
Amir accompanied it in its journey across the Hindu Kush. There,
have been rumours that he has entered Russian territory, that he has
proceeded to Herat via Maimena, and that he is staying at either Balkh
or Khojah Saleh on the Oxus. It is impossible to test the accuracy of
any of these rumours; but it would be at the least very strange if Sher
Ali should have so completely given up the battle as lost, and have
sunk into a second Abdurrahman without an effort to retrieve the fortune of war. Time alone will instruct us on this point.

Of the exact position of Yakub Khan, who was erroneously asserted to have arrived at Jellalabad the other day, we are also ignorant. That he is free, there can be no question; that he is in possession of his senses, is also certain; but that he is in power and supreme, there is as yet no certain evidence to show. The Ghilzais are to a great extent on his side, and so also are the Momunds. His mother was the daughter of a chief of the latter, and his wife of a chief of the former. Nowroz Khan, who was reported to have brought the Momunds over to our side, is his uncle; and he stands well with the army, and also with the Heratees. He is a good soldier; he out-manoeuvred both Azim and Abdurrahman in the 1868 campaign. He is a skilful administrator; witness his management of Herat on two different occasions; and as a diplomatist he has already shown, in his dealings with Persia, that he possesses ability and tact. Yakub Khan is decidedly a man who must play a foremost part in the present crisis. Of the attitude he will adopt towards us it would be rash to hazard an opinion. Patriotism and personal pride will probably play a larger part in his resolve than is generally supposed; but, on the other hand, he will recognize that Sher Ali's policy must be reversed. He may endeavour to revert to the basis of the negotiations in 1876-77; and would certainly offer us the concessions which would at that time have sufficed. Over the right to station British officers at Balkh, Maimena, Herat, and Kandahar, Yakub Khan would raise no objection; but to cede territory which belongs, in his eyes, by right indefeasible to the Duranis, is what he will certainly not consent to do. It is trusting to a broken reed to suppose that Yakub Khan will assist us in rectifying our frontier at the expense of the outlying districts of Afghanistan. He will do nothing of the kind, and it is not natural to suppose that he should. The rectification of the frontier will have to be carried out in spite of the Amir's inclinations.

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(1) The Abdalis became at a later period the Duranis and the most powerful of all the Afghan tribes. Their chiefs whether Sudozai or Barukzai have ruled Afghanistan for 140 years.

(2) The father Amir Abdurrahman.

(3) These lines were written in the last weeks of 1878. How accurate they were may be judged from what Yakub Khan told General Roberts at Kabul ten months later. "In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you... He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but nevertheless he returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of Nur Mahomed Shah to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries, received from Nur Mahomed Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted, and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended."
The earlier part of the British dealings with the Afghans is now matter of history, and requires here no more than a passing allusion to the more important events in the long chain of diplomacy, ending in war, that extends from the first years of the present in war, that extends from the first years of the present century to nigh its middle. The terror inspired in the minds of the Directors of the East India Company, towards the close of the last century by the reported designs of Napoleon against the British power in India, and the alarms at the same period disturbing the equanimity of the people of India by the threatened invasions of Shah Zaman, led to the despatch of the magnificently equipped Missions of Malcolm to Persia and that of Elphinstone to Afghanistan. The Missions of both, however meagre the diplomatic results of their respective errands, proved eminently successful in the acquisition of a vast and varied store of information relating to the two countries they separately dealt with—information so well digested and arranged that little room has been left for amplification or correction by subsequent closer contact and more intimate acquaintance, except in matters of detail.

The good work thus achieved dissipated at once the veil of ignorance that had previously hung over both Persia and Afghanistan, and brought to light the character and nature of their respective peoples, climates, productions, physical features, etc. All which was good enough and most useful in its way, and perhaps well worth the great expenditure lavished upon these Missions; but neither Mission effected anything useful or advantageous to British interest in a diplomatic sense. On the contrary rather, Malcom’s endeavours to stir up the Persians against the Afghans by way of diverting Shah Zaman from his ambitious projects against Hindustan—at that time over-run by the Mahrattah—produced no other effect than to establish more firmly than ever in the mind of the Persians the conviction of their national right to the whole of the Khorasan country that was formerly included within the empire of the preceding Saffavi dynasty, at the time of its overthrow by the Ghilzie invasion from Kandahar and usurpation of Nadir; that is to say, the whole region of what is now called Western Afghanistan, as far eastward as Ghazni, or even Kabul itself. And this is a claim which the successive Shahs of Persia have persistently maintained—though with more or less of emphasis and scope according to the circumstances of the moment—much to the disturbance of quiet in the Afghan States, and much also to the complication of affairs between the Indian Government, or rather British diplomatists, and the Persian and Afghan rulers on various occasions in the past.
As to Elphinstone's Mission, it proceeded no farther into Afghanistan than Peshawar, where it was hospitably entertained by Shah Shuja'. But what negotiations could be thought of with a sovereign who could barely hold his own against home rivals? And who was indeed shortly afterwards (1809) driven from his throne and country an unhappy, friendless wanderer; first a refugee with the Sikh chief, Ranjit Singh, by whom he was despoiled of his precious jewel, the historical Kohi Nur, now a shining light in the British diadem; and then (1815) a refugee with the East India Company, by whom he was granted a safe and peaceful asylum at Ludianah, where he lived in obscurity for many years on the bounty of the Court of Directors, until at last the fateful current of events brought him forth from his retreat, first to venture on the recovery of his lost kingdom, and then to figure as the plaything and puppet in that most remarkable, military adventure in which he perished miserably and his dynasty with him.

The increasing strength of the Sikh nation, the rapidly progressive encroachments of Ranjit Singh upon the Afghan territory during the long years of anarchy in Afghanistan under the rule of Shah Mahmud, and the internal weakness produced by the split up of the country (1818) into independent chiefships by the now dominant Barakzai—Herat alone with Mahmud as king remaining as the last relic of the dissolved Saddozai monarchy—together with the activity of intrigue with Persia and Russia resulting from such a state of affairs, all these circumstances gave to the British protectors of Shah Shuja sufficient reason to entertain with favour the exiled monarch's projects for the recovery of his throne and the re-establishment of his kingdom.

Accordingly, in January, 1833, Shah Shuja', with the countenance and good-will of his patrons, set out with an army raised in India to recover his lost power. He proceeded leisurely by the Shikarpur and Bholan route to Kandahar; but was there, in the following spring (1834), confronted and signally defeated, with the loss of everything but his life (which he saved by precipitate flight), by Dost Muhammad Khan, who, on the successful revolt of the Barakzai against Mahmud, had established himself as ruler at Kabul. Shah Shuja', through the friendly aid of the Khan of Kelat, was enabled to return to his former asylum at Ludianah, and there again became the recipient of the Honourable Company's bounty, and once more, for a time at least, lapsed into the obscurity of a broken-down exile's retreat; whilst Dost Muhammad, covered with glory by his victory over the Saddozai sovereign, marched back in triumph to Kabul, where he established his authority on the secure basis of a people's suffrage, and at once became acknowledged as the leading chief in Afghanistan with the title of Amir, not only his own Barakzai tribe but by the numerous and powerful Ghilzie also—in fact by all Afghanistan, excepting only Herat, which held out as an independent Saddozai kingdom under Mahmud. The prominent position now attained in Afghanistan by Amir Dost Muhammad Khan excited in his mind the ambition to extend his authority over the other adjacent provinces previously ruled by the Saddozai—to Peshawar and Kashmir, both at this time held by the Sikh; but he felt himself
unequal to the task without the support of external aid and alliance; and it was at this juncture (1834) that Burnes was despatched on his Mission to Kabul. The British Envoy's negotiations with the Kabul Amir did not, however, make much or satisfactory progress. Because, apparently, he required many concessions of the Barakzai chieftain, whilst in return he could hold out no prospect of the Honourable Company acceding to the earnest desire of the Amir for a friendly alliance and aid or countenance in his cherished project for the recovery of Peshawar. But be this as it may, it is clear enough that Dost Muhammad, however great may have been his anxiety to secure the friendship of the British and their recognition of his claim to Peshawar, did not consider himself dependent solely on their good-will or pleasure. He had in fact more strings to his bow than our Envoy gave him credit for, and at the very time of Burnes' arrival in his capital was in communication with the Court of Persia, and apparently also with the Russian Government; for in the midst of his conferences with the British Envoy he received and entertained at Kabul the Russian Emissary, Viteovitch. The appearance of this personage on the scene put an end to the British Envoy's Mission; and Burnes left Kabul with a barren issue, so far as his immediate business was concerned, but his mission led to consequences pregnant with disaster alike to the Court to which he had been accredited and to the Government which he there represented.

Dost Muhammad—although he had committed no fault against the British, nor indeed given them any just cause of offence—now became the bête noire of the Government of India. But the appearance of a real live Russian Emissary at Kabul, and the reception accorded him as an honoured guest by the Ruler of the country—albeit not so honourably received nor so hospitably entertained as the English Envoy—was as a veritable bogie to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, where seemingly ignorance prevailed as crass at that time as at any subsequent period. Consequently the Amir Dost Muhammad was considered to be a ruler in whom the Government of India not only could place no reliance as a friendly neighbour, but also in whom they had a probable enemy; and it was declared to be expedient, as a precautionary measure necessitated by the exigencies of the situation, that he should be deposed and replaced by one more amenable to British influence, if not more devoted to British interests. And so it came about that the Government of India, under the administration of Lord Auckland, resolved to utilize their effete old pensioner at Ludianah, the Shah Shuja', and to restore him to «the throne of his ancestors».

Shah Shuja' was the second son of the Shah Tymür, under whose extravagant and voluptuous reign of twenty years the Afghan kingdom founded by his father, Ahmad Shah Abdali, gradually fell to pieces, and, losing all the external provinces, became confined to the home country extending from Peshawar to Herat, with Kandahar to the south and Kabul to the north. On the death of Tymur, his eldest son Zaman became Shah, who, after a reign of four years or so, was ousted and
blinded by his half brother (by a different mother) Mahmud. This last was in turn attacked, captured, and imprisoned by Zaman’s full brother (by the same mother) Shuja’, who was at that time Governor of Kandahar. Shuja’ then became Shah, but he did not long enjoy the kingdom, for his Wazir Fattah Khan, Barakzai, in revenge for the execution of his father, the Wazir Paindah Khan, by Shah Zaman, released Mahmud from prison at Kabul and set him up as Shah (1809) during the absence of Shah Shuja’ at Peshawar, where Elphinstone’s Mission was at that time located.

Shah Shuja’ at once marched towards Kabul, but being defeated on the road fled to the neighbouring Pathan Hills, whence, after various hardships and adventures as a friendless wanderer, he found his way to Lahore and sought refuge with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh Maharajah, with the result already mentioned. Having effected his escape from Lahore, Shuja’ fled to the Chamba Hills, and thence founds his way by Subathu to Ludianah, where he threw himself on the mercy of the British, as has also been mentioned in a previous passage. From this retreat, with the encouragement of his hosts, he made a futile attempt to recover his lost kingdom, which he had possessed but for a brief four or five years of unremittingly disturbed rule—his rival, Mahmud, at the time reigning as independent king at Herat, and the usurping Barakzai governing as independent chiefs at Kandahar and Kabul. He made his essay by way of Kandahar, of which province he had been governor under the reign of his father the Shah Tymur; but being defeated and put to flight there by Dost Muhammad Khan, he again returned to his previous asylum at Ludianah. And from this retreat he was now, in 1837, drawn forth by the Government of India to be restored to «the throne of his ancestors», as the lawful sovereign of Afghanistan and the trusted ally of the British Government. At this time the river Satlaj formed the boundary between British India and the Panjab, held by the Sikh people. Consequently it became necessary to arrange with the Sikh Maharajah for a safe transit through his territories; and the Tripartite Treaty, between the Company, Ranjit, and Shuja’, was the result.

The way thus prepared, our protégé was escorted to his native country by a British army of 25,000 men (of whom 6,000 were Shah’s troops, raised and equipped in India, and commanded by British officers, whom the Government had permitted to enter the Shah’s service), and about 60,000 camp-followers, with over 50,000 camels, besides bullocks and other baggage animals innumerable. Shah Shuja’ was installed in his kingdom, first at Kandahar and then at Kabul—the two extremes of his sovereignty, or what remained of it—under the aegis of the same protecting arm; or, as the State papers of the day put it, he was seated on the throne of his ancestors as sovereign of the Durrani Empire amid the acclamations of his subjects. Medals were struck to commemorate the glorious event, and the Order of the Durrani Empire was created to reward, on the part of the restored monarch, the marititious soldiers by whose military skill, daring, and prowess the stupendous obstacles of mountain fastnesses and desert plains, the guerrilla attacks of native
banditti, the organized defence of fortresses vaunted impregnable and passes proverbially impassable, the hardships of the march through intervening foreign States and principalities,—across large rivers, arid deserts, through dark defiles and over mountain heights,—and finally the vicissitudes of climate in the various regions traversed of low and high altitude, of hot and cold temperature, were all alike overcome, mastered, and endured with a success, a courage, and a fortitude reflecting the very highest honour on the military leaders under whose command these distant exploits were achieved, no less than on the troops by whom they were performed. Indeed, amidst the contempt and reprobation of the policy that led to this military expedition, the disgust and mortification provoked by the subsequent political mismanagement of the Shah's affairs, and the humiliation and sorrow caused by the final catastrophe, the mind rests with gratification and pride on one consolatory feature of the enterprise—upon the conduct of the military operations, among which the passage of the Bholan and Khybar Passes, and the storm and capture of Ghazni were in themselves achievements of which any army might be justly proud.

Shah Shuja' was thus established once more on his throne. But the Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, who, on the Shah's approach to Kabul with his British supporters, had fled thence to Bukhara, was still at large and might it was thought renew the war; it became necessary therefore to retain the British troops in Afghanistan to support the king who had re-ascended the throne of his ancestors amidst the acclamations of his subjects, at least until he had raised an army of his own countrymen in addition to the force he had brought from India. This work progressed apace; regiments of horse and foot were raised, equipped, and commanded by British officers, who were permitted by their Government to enter the service of the Shah; and when the deposed Amir, the fugitive Dost Muhammad, suddenly, on the 4th November, 1840, came to Kabul unattended, and surrendered himself unconditionally to Sir William McNaghten, the British Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shuja', the force had attained proportions ample for the maintenance of the Shah in his own kingdom, without the continued presence of the British troops; and when, moreover, Dost Muhammad was shortly afterwards deported a State prisoner to India (at the close of 1840), there remained no valid reason for further detention of the British troops in Afghanistan, more especially as these troops were wanted nearer home to meet threatened contingencies in the Panjab, owing to the state of anarchy into which that country had fallen after the death of Ranjit Singh, which occurred during the course of our proceedings in Afghanistan.

Indeed, it was at this time generally expected that the British army of occupation in Afghanistan would be at once recalled to India; and doubtless it would have been the wisest and happiest policy had it been marched back at the same time that Dost Muhammad was deported. Because, other considerations apart, the service in Afghanistan had for some time past become very unpopular both amongst officers and men, European and native (excepting only a few who held lucrative
appointments and had comfortably settled themselves), owing to the disturbed state of the country, the savage character of the peoples, and the long absence from home. But the conflicting views regarding the disposal of Herat, which had long exercised the Politicals, and the false position from the very first taken up by our Envoy in regard to the Shah's government of his own kingdom—the usurpation in fact of his sovereign authority—compelled Sir W. McNaghten to insist on the retention of the British troops—nay, even to call for the despatch of reinforcements—without whose presence indeed his own position was entirely untenable.

Had the Government of India been content with having set Shah Shuja' on his throne and leaving him to rule his people according to Afghan custom or national usage, had they withdrawn their troops, and perhaps most of their Politicals as well, after the surrender of Dost Muhammad, there is good ground for the belief that the Shah would have been able easily to maintain his position, especially if assisted with a treaty of amity and an annual subsidy. But the ambitious spirit of the Politicals, the wild schemes running in their heads, and the exaggerated notions they entertained of impending Russian aggression and Persian intrigue, blinded their judgment as to the real nature of the situation in Afghanistan (with the Panjab an independent country between our frontier in India and the Shah's kingdom); whilst the activity of interference in Afghan home and domestic affairs by the host of Political agents that overspread the country, were all facts that in no way conspired to the realization of the Shah's very natural desire to manage his own affairs himself. In fact, their mere presence in the country when no longer required was nugatory of the Shah's kingly sovereign rights lowered his dignity and deprived him of both the esteem and the confidence of his people.

That the Shah Shuja' himself at this period earnestly desired to assume the unfettered government of his own people was made manifest by his repeated remonstrances against the domineering acts of the Envoy; but for his disgust and displeasure at such interference with his kingly rights he had no remedy. He could show his vexation and dissatisfaction only by periodical fits of the sulks, and by repeated warnings to the Envoy that his manner of dealing with recusant chiefs and questions of tribal administration could end only in rebellion and disaster—warnings truly prophetic and to be fulfilled but too soon and sorrowfully. Indeed, so galling and humiliating did Shah Shuja' feel the position he occupied under the tutelage of the British Envoy, that it was seriously believed by many on the spot that he could not but be our secret enemy, and at all events that he was cognisant of, if not a promoter of, the successive tribal revolts that so long kept detachments of our troops employed in the field both in Kabul and Kandahar. In fact, Shah Shuja' expressed his feelings of dissatisfaction at the prolonged stay of the British officials and troops in his country so plainly and so frequently that even his best friends and well-wishers among our people at times suspected his loyalty. Even the Envoy himself had begun to tire of the entanglement of his position, and only a month or two before matters
came to a crisis, had accepted the post of Governor of Bombay, only too glad at the prospect of quitting the country. But it was fated otherwise; and the affairs he had conducted to their present state of confusion he was destined to continue, to his own death and our discomfiture. The discontent of the Afghan people at our continued presence and dominant position over their king rapidly spread all over the country and finally burst out in open rebellion. The outbreak of this smouldering volcano was bound to take place sooner or later; but it was suddenly brought about and precipitated by the injudicious reduction by our Envoy of certain allowances made by the Shah on his first arrival at Kabul to (amongst others) the chiefs of the Eastern Ghilzie, through whose territory our communication with Peshawar and India was carried on; and their first act of reprisal was to cut off our post and close the road against us. This occurred in the beginning of October, 1841; and now was displayed in its full extent the nature of the relative positions occupied by the Shah and our Envoy in regard to the people of the country. It is a long and doleful story, but we may well dismiss it in a few words. It was not the king who now dealt with his own refractory countrymen and subjects, either to reason them back to allegiance and peaceable behaviour or to coerce them to obedience and submission. It was the foreigner, the British Envoy, who now—as a matter of course considering the position he had from the first assumed in regard to the control of the Shah's home affairs—took upon himself the hazardous task of negotiating with an outraged and enraged people.

A detachment of British troops was sent from Kabul to clear the road through the revolted Ghilzie country to Jalalabad. It was presently forced to seize that town itself; and there it held out with heroic courage and fortitude till the arrival of our avenging army. But unhappily it was not in this Ghilzie country alone that rebellion was rife. In the city of Kabul itself mischief had long been brewing, and so secretly, that not a breath of it had reached our Politicals. On the 2nd of November the city rose in revolt, and as a first act set fire to the houses of Sir Alexander Burnes (the Envoy designate in succession to Sir William McNaghten) and other British officers who resided within the walls. Immediately the Envoy and General met in Council, and forthwith informed the Shah (in the Bala Hissar) of the orders they had issued. But the revolt in the city grew apace, Burnes and several others had been slain, and presently the rebels besieged our troops in their entrenched cantonment. To add to the difficulties of the situation, differences arose between the political officers,—whose mismanagement had brought about these disturbances, and who now required extraordinary and perilous action on the part of the troops—and the military authorities, who best knew what their men could undertake, and declined to throw away the lives of their men uselessly in the narrow alleys of a crowded city. It must be confessed, however, that the British General was at this critical moment almost a bed-ridden cripple, and altogether incapacitated for active exertion or energetic action, mental or bodily, owing to long-continued ill health; and, moreover, that the morale of the troops—from whatever cause—had very
sensibly deteriorated during their long cantonment at Kabul. This was forcibly exemplified in the several sallies made from their entrenched position to drive out the besiegers from the adjacent forts and enclosures that contained our Commissariat stores, etc.; and consequently General Elphinstone (who, with a foresight of the military situation not to be expected of a civilian, had, from the outbreak of the rebellion in the city, repeatedly urged on the Envoy the wisdom of a timely retreat), with the concurrence of the three senior officers under his command, now (on the 8th December, 1841) officially informed the Envoy that the situation of the troops was such from want of provisions (but three days' supply for the Sepoys at half rations, and an almost entire absence of forage for the horses and cattle) and the impracticability of procuring more, that no time ought to be lost in negotiating for a safe retreat from the country.

Following this, negotiations were re-opened with the rebel chiefs, and (on the 11th December) the Envoy met them outside the British cantonment, and produced for their acceptance the draft of a treaty for the evacuation of Afghanistan by the British, and the virtual abdication of Shah Shuja'. The treaty was for the most part agreed to by the chiefs, among whom Muhammad Akbar Khan (recently returned from Turkish), the favourite son of the deposed Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, our prisoner in India, occupied a prominent position. Nothing, however, was done to carry out the terms of the treaty, except the delivery to the insurgents of some Commissariat forts we held close to our cantonment, and matters, daily growing worse, reached a crisis on the 23rd of December, when another meeting took place, as before, between the Envoy and the rebel chiefs, to discuss fresh terms proposed by Akbar Khan, at which Sir W. McNaghten was treacherously killed on the spot. The sequel may be summed up in a few words.

Akbar Khan now took the general direction of affairs. He arranged the departure of our troops from Kabul, and the safe custody by his kinsman Zaman Khan of our hostages and prisoners of war; and he, too, provoked the attacks of the Ghilzie on the disorderly and famished crowd of retreating soldiers and camp-followers, through the whole length of inhospitable frost-bound and snow-covered hills on the road to Jalalabad, to the destruction literally to a man of the entire multitude. On the 6th January, 1842, the British troops, numbering about 4,000 soldiers and 12,000 camp-followers, quitted their position at Kabul, and on the 13th but a solitary survivor, wounded and exhausted, reached Jalalabad to tell the mournful tale.

Shah Shuja', who had hitherto been the plaything of the British Envoy, now became the puppet of Akbar Khan and the other Barakzai chiefs associated with him in the revolt, and when he had served their purpose he was treacherously assassinated by one of them on the 5th April. Whilst these events were enacting at Kabul, Brigadier Sale held his own at Jalalabad, and General Nott maintained the position at Kandahar; but the garrison of Ghazni, after manfully holding out till March, were at last compelled to capitulate, and were treacherously attacked and finally destroyed by the infuriated Afghans. For the relief of Sale and
the recovery of our hostages and prisoners, a fresh army from India, under the command of General Pollock, was sent to Kabul. This force, having defeated Akbar Khan near Jalalabad, reoccupied Kabul, where it was joined by Nott with the troops from Kandahar, and by our liberated captives from the Kohistan. The great bazar of the city was now destroyed as a mark of our retribution, and then the whole combined forces, on the 12th October, 1842, marched away on their return to India, leaving the Prince Shahpur to make the best he could of the place recently occupied by his defunct father the Shah Shuja'. But the unfortunate youth, being driven out by Akbar Khan, fled to Peshawar before our returning troops had well reached India; and then, the British Government having determined to leave the Afghans to govern themselves, Dost Muhammad and the other Afghan prisoners were released, and forthwith (in the beginning of 1843) returned to Afghanistan. Thus ended this unjust, impolitic, and unnecessary interference with the affairs of a distant, independent, and unoffending State. The expedition, during the four years it lasted, employed beyond the British frontier between thirty and forty thousand troops, and cost the revenues of India twenty millions of money, entailed an untold misery, sorrow, and loss of human life, and the miserable destruction of 100,000 camels and beasts of burden. And with what advantage? The ruler we dethroned was again restored to his country. The king whom we set up perished ignominiously in the calamitous rebellion which our mismanagement had brought about. An important division of our army of occupation suffered an unheard-of disaster. And the people to whom we had become favourably known through our previous missions, and who viewed us in the light of friends, now knew no words of reproach too execrable for us, and hated us with a fervour measured by the evils we had inflicted upon them. Dost Muhammad on his return to Kabul was hailed with joy by his people, and quickly re-established himself as Amir with greater popularity and authority than ever, and, as a first measure of security, with a very reasonable precaution, closed his country to all communication from the side of India with a jealous care and vigilance.

The excitement caused by the stirring events of the war in Afghanistan hardly had time to settle into quiet, when the Government of India was involved in hostilities with Sindh and the Panjab. Both countries, the first rapidly, the other more leisurely, were conquered after hard-fought and bloody campaigns, and finally annexed to the British dominion in India, excepting Kashmir, which we sold to Gulab Singh. And so, in 1849, Peshawar, the Afghan province that Dost Muhammad had long so earnestly desired to recover from the Sikhs, and in the hope of regaining which he had come down to oppose our army at the battle of Gujrat, became the frontier-post of our newly acquired territory, and brought us into direct contact with the Kabul country. But this proximity did not lead to any formal resumption of diplomatic relations with the Kabul Amir; rather it stimulated the activity of the priesthood in their denunciations of the infidel Faringi, and confirmed the nobles of the country in their course of fanning the spirit of hatred and revenge against us in the minds of their clansmen, which had been naturally
kindled by our conduct towards them. At the same time, Dost Muhammad, whilst extending his authority at home, by the annexation of the provinces of Balkh and Kandahar on the north and south respectively, as preparatory steps to the consolidation of his rule by the capture of Herat, maintained a very cautious reserve in all his communications with the British, and guarded the approaches to Kabul with unceasing watchfulness and suspicion. But with all this, the anxiety caused by the renewed activity of Persia in her designs against Herat, brought about a mutual rapprochement between the Government of India and the Afghan Amir; so that in 1855 Dost Muhammad sent his favourite son and declared heir-apparent Ghulam Hydar Khan to Peshawar, for the purpose of a formal renewal of amicable relations. This was followed by the Amir himself coming to Peshawar in the beginning of 1857, to make a new treaty in amplification of the Short Articles obtained by Chulam Hydar Khan, and to negotiate for assistance against the Persians at Herat. The treaty of friendship now concluded between Dost Muhammad Khan and the Government of India, bound the Amir to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies, but contained no reciprocal engagement on the part of the British, though Dost Muhammad urgently pleaded for an offensive and defensive alliance. His disappointment on this point was, however, somewhat mitigated by the cordially hospitable reception accorded him, the encouragement of his policy to establish a consolidated rule in Afghanistan, and the substantial aid afforded him to clear Herat of the Persians.

For this purpose the Government of India granted the Amir a supply of arms, and a subsidy of a lakh of rupees a month from the revenues of India during the continuance of the Persian war; and Major Lumsden's mission was sent to Kandahar to aid the Amir with advice and countenance in his contemplated operations against Herat. The Mission, however, had hardly reached its destination when the Persian war was terminated by the retreat of the Persians from Herat, and the Mutiny in India broke out; but it being a matter of importance that at a crisis such as this the Amir should be kept to the observance of his friendly relations with the British, the Mission was retained at Kandahar till the Mutiny was quelled, and the monthly subsidy was continued until its return to India in July of the following year. The amicable relations thus established between the British Government and the Kabul Amir continued to run a smooth course during the lifetime of Dost Muhammad. But after his death, which occurred at Herat in July, 1863—just after the aged chieftain had captured the fortress and added this long-coveted province to the Barakzai dominion in Afghanistan—there ensued a long civil war, during which the various claimants to the throne sought to obtain of the British Government, each for himself, the same terms of friendship and recognition as had been accorded to the deceased Amir. The British Government, however, sternly observed an attitude of strict impartiality and non-interference in the internal affairs of the country, and, content to accept the de facto ruler without reference to the merits of the case, maintained their policy of neutrality throughout the five years of contention. This decision of the Govern-
ment of India caused unexpected trouble to Sher Ali Khan, who, after the death of his full brother Ghulam Hydar, had been nominated heir-apparent by the Amir Dost Muhammad, to the great offence of his elder sons by another wife. Both Ghulam Hydar and Sher Ali had accompanied their father to India as prisoners of war. Of the two brothers, the former had always, entertained and expressed sentiments of good-will towards the British; but it was otherwise with the latter, who, on his return to his native country, indulged in outspoken feelings of aversion towards the nation which had brought so great calamities upon his family and his country. So strong was this feeling of hostility in the breast of Sher Ali, that when Lumsden’s Mission passed through his provincial government of Ghazni, he studiously kept aloof from it, and neglected the hospitalities which it was his duty to observe; and moreover, when, during the crisis of the Mutiny, with the British army before Delhi, there was a party in Afghanistan urging on Dost Muhammad to seize the opportunity of attacking the British troops at Peshawar, and recovering that province of the Durrani kingdom, Sher Ali openly identified himself with the war party. At this moment of pressure Dost Muhammad was wavering in his decision, until the straightforward and manly advice of his son Muhammad Azim Khan, his governor of Kurrum, came opportunely to fix his decision to the loyal observance of his treaty engagements. «By all means», said Azim, «as a good Muslim you may well wage war with the infidel Faringi, but before you commit yourself to such a very hazardous enterprise, count well your chances of success. We have had the British here before when the Panjab lay between us; but with them now at our very door, if you bring them here again, by God, here they will stay».

On the death of Dost Muhammad, Sher Ali, as the appointed heir, assumed the government at Kabul, and announced the fact to the British Government, at the same time soliciting their recognition and a continuance of the friendly support accorded to his father. About this time (1863-4) the British were engaged in the Ambela campaign against the Hindustani fanatics settled at Malka on the Mahaban mountain, and Sher Ali Khan’s communication did not receive immediate notice or acknowledgment. And at the close of the Ambela war,—it having been found that Sher Ali, if he had not actually encouraged the religious war preached against us by the Mussulman priesthood in his country, at all events took no steps to check it, nor even to restrain his frontier tribesmen from rushing in shoals to swell the multitudes in our enemy’s camp,—when the time came for the Government of India to reply to his communication, he was formally made acquainted with the policy of strict neutrality adopted by the British Government in regard to its relations with Afghanistan and its de facto rulers. This information, whilst it filled Sher Ali with dismay, encouraged his rivals to more strenuous exertion, assured as they thus were of a free field and no favour to fight out their fight amongst themselves. Sher Ali was soon involved in hostilities with his elder brothers by another mother, and after varying fortunes and some severe losses, was at length driven to seek refuge at Herat. Muhammad Afzal Khan (the eldest son of Dost Muhammad) by the aid of his son Abdurrahman
(the now ruling Amir) and his own full brother Muhammad Azim Khan, became Amir of Kabul in May, 1866, and was recognised as such by the Government of India. Afzal died after a rule of only six months, and was then succeeded at Kabul by Azim, to the discontent of Abdurrahman, who looked upon himself as the rightful successor, and consequently retired in disgust to Balkh, his father's previous provincial government. Azim, owing to departure from its previously announced policy of neutrality, had not yet received the recognition of the Government of India as Amir, when—on account of his intolerable oppressions—he was driven to seek refuge in Persia (where he died), and Sher Ali, overcoming all his opponents again (in the early part of 1869), reestablished himself at Kabul. Abdurrahman, now seeing his last chance lost, fled to Bukhara, and thence found an asylum with the Russians at Samarkand. Such, in briefest terms, were the prominent events of the civil war in Afghanistan following upon the death of Dost Muhammad, as far at least as concerns the fate of the several competitors for the throne. Sher Ali's rivals had all been removed by death or exile, and he now had no opponent in the country to contest his right as Amir of Afghanistan.

During the period of this prolonged anarchy and strife in Afghanistan, the affairs of that country engaged an unusual amount of the public attention, and various were the speculations as to the future of its relations with the British Government, and, indeed, as to its continued existence as an independent State. Past experience had shown clearly enough that no reliance could be placed on the stability or prosperity of any native Government among a people of such heterogeneous, discordant, and barbarous elements as composed the Afghan nationality, without the material support and paramount influence of some great external Power. But the difficulty lay in combining the support and influence together; for the Afghan rulers were willing enough at all times to accept any amount of material support from whatever quarter available short of armed intervention, but they could not bear the idea of paramount influence and the necessary intercourse with foreigners, of whatever creed. They desired to keep their country strictly to themselves, and to exercise their authority unfettered by outside influences; and with this aim in view it has always been their policy to preach hatred of the foreigner, and to implant it deep in the hearts of their savage and ignorant people by exciting their religious bigotry and patriotic zeal. Their game, in fact, has been to take all they could get by playing off the rival interests of their great neighbours against one another, without, on their own part, rendering anything in return, or modifying their accustomed habits to the changing conditions and advancing civilization of their surroundings. The rough nature of their country and the uninviting character of its inhabitants have hitherto enabled them to maintain their position of isolation with an amount of success that has hardened them against any notion of reform. But the steady advance of the two great and civilizing Powers of Asia from the north and south—Russia and Britain—respectively, towards their country, as the meeting-point of their different systems and rival interests, must, in the course of time—from their near approach to each
other—now not far distant, put a stop to this state of things, and lead to a redistribution or division of the Afghan country between them.

This is an eventuality that has long been foreseen, and its discussion has led to the advocacy of very different measures by those who have viewed the question from the standpoint of British interests. And at the time now under consideration—the period of the Afghan civil war from 1864-1869—the subject attracted a very lively attention. Some held that Afghanistan was a mere bugbear; that the disposition and acts of its rulers and people were matters of indifference; that the natural and proper boundary of India towards that country was the river Indus; that this great stream formed an impassable barrier against any invader from the west; and that it was sufficient for the safety and integrity of the British dominion in India to fortify this river boundary, not so much by the erection of a chain of forts and strong places in support, as by the cultivation of the good-will and patriotism of the Indian princes and peoples. For the rest, they would leave Afghanistan to itself, and be content to control its rulers and people by moral suasion and the more direct incentive of commercial interests.

Others were of opinion that such notions were puerile absurdities; that Afghanistan was a bugbear merely from ignorance, and the consequent inability to appreciate the country and its people at their proper worth; that the uncontrolled disposition and acts of the Afghans were matters of most serious import to the peace and welfare of India; that the Indus afforded no defensible barrier at all; and that the loyalty of India could only be hoped for so long as we held a dominant, secure, and undisputable position on the frontier. That, as to leaving Afghanistan and the Afghans to themselves and their own devices, we should soon find that country and its people, in the hands of others, very troublesome and dangerous neighbours; whilst to talk of moral suasion and commercial interests was simple claptrap, as the one could produce but barren results, and the other be easily diverted and monopolized by more active and intelligent competitors. They looked on the serious entertainment of such views as not only dangerous, but as delaying the adoption of more suitable measures for the safeguarding of our position in India, either until it was too late to undertake them with advantage, or until they were forced upon us under unfavourable conditions, and at an enormously increased expense and difficulty. They advocated a sounder policy, and insisted on the necessity of a rectification of the undefined frontier attained by the Sikhs, in the course of their encroachments upon Afghan territory, at the time we conquered the Panjabis, and acquired, with its annexation, their yet unsettled trans-Indus territories, the frontier of which was an undefined line running irregularly along the base of the Pathan hills. They proposed to rectify this useless and troublesome border-line by the general annexation and settlement of the great mountain range, buttressing the highlands of Kabul and Ghazni, from the Khybar to the Bholan, against the Indus valley and plain of India. They considered that our several successive punitive expeditions into the hills of this range should be utilized to subdue, annex, and settle the several tribal communities, to open
out their lawless territories by roads and military posts, and thus to confer on these abandoned and predatory hillmen the benefits and blessings of British rule, with the security, peace, and prosperity that characterize it in other hill states of the Panjab, the people of which were considered equally wild and barbarous before we came to know and rule them. They argued that the long succession of our punitive expedition, as heretofore conducted, were a fruitless waste of life and money, and in no way deterrent of the raids they were meant to check; they effected no good, but, on the contrary, only intensified the aversion and hostility of the tribes, by inflicting indiscriminate injury, and loss, and suffering upon the innocent mass for the faults of the guilty few. They did not conceal from themselves the magnitude of the scheme they advocated, but maintained that, carried out district by district, from time to time, as occasion presented, the enterprise was perfectly feasible, and in this manner became divested of the alarming difficulties and dangers that the opponents of such a project put forward; for, instead of the 800 miles of mountain fastnesses to be conquered from hundreds of thousands of indomitable warriors, there would be but a few thousand square miles of hill country, and a few thousand armed men to be reckoned with at a time—such as our punitive expeditions had frequently dealt with successfully. Further, they held that the advantage gained by taking these independent tribes in hand betimes, would compensate for the cost by permanently pacifying an habitually turbulent people—whilst subjecting them to the salutary restraints of law and order—by finding them fixed and profitable employment in the ranks of our soldiery and police, etc., and by giving security and encouragement to all by the mere establishment of British authority. Moreover, they insisted on the advisability of an early adoption of their views, so that when the day of trial on the frontier came, we should find the hill tribes well in hand, and loyal to our cause, if not from natural predilection, at least from personal interest; for where security reigns, there property increases, and the instinct to preserve it impels to the support of the protector. These proposals of the advocates of a rectified frontier, though scornfully criticized and denounced at the time by their opponents in authority with Government, have since been, to some extent (though but very partially) adopted, and are now being carried out by the British occupation of the Bholan and Khybar passes, whilst efforts are being made to initiate like operations in the intervening tracts of country. The Kâkar country, at the southern end of the Sulman range, has recently been occupied and taken under British control, by the small force of the Zhob Valley Expedition, without difficulty and with complete success. The remaining Waziri country, northwards up to the Kurram Valley, may be similarly dealt with, and with equal facility. The pity is, that the rectification of the frontier should have been taken up in earnest at so late an hour of the day.

There is yet another party of those who have taken an interest in the affairs of Afghanistan and studied the history of that country, who see no satisfactory settlement of the question of its future, in respect to the peace of India and the security of British rule in that peninsula,
except by its conquest, annexation, and settlement as an integral portion of the British dominion. But at the time we are now considering, their views were looked upon as altogether premature, impracticable, and fraught with peril. Since that time, however, they have had reason to think that a grand and most favourable opportunity of effecting this desirable end was thrown away in the last Afghan war 1878-1881, and they hold that the measure will yet be forced upon us under immeasurably greater difficulties, and with far more doubtful results than if the country had been taken and occupied when there was no prospect of meeting a European antagonist in the field.

With the termination of the civil war, and return of Sher Ali to Kabul, a new turn was given to the current of public attention towards the affairs of Afghanistan. Whilst at Herat, Sher Ali had sent his son Ya'cub Khan to interview the Shah of Persia, His Majesty happening at that time to be at Mashhad; and shortly after his return Sher Ali set out from Herat to recover Kabul by way of Kandahar, and carried everything before him. But with all his success, Sher Ali—whether on account of his negotiations with Persia, of the fear of Abdurrahman renewing the contest with Russian aid—was mistrustful of his position, and most anxious to secure the recognition and support of the British Government. He lost no time now in making known his desires once more; and his overtures, so steadily rejected in the past, were this time promptly responded to, and as an earnest of our good-will, a handsome donation of two lakhs of rupees was forthwith remitted to him at Kabul. On this Sher Ali at once threw himself on the support and protection of the British, and without loss of time came to India to meet the new Viceroy, Lord Mayo, on his way to Simla. The meeting took place at Amballa in March, 1869; and a magnificent and very cordial reception was accorded to the successful Amir. The hospitable entertainment he received on this occasion went far to obliterate the bitter feelings Sher Ali was wont to express against the British Government on account of its having abandoned him and his acknowledged rights in the recent contest for the succession; and—although disappointed in his wish for a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance—he returned to Kabul highly pleased with his honourable reception and the rich gifts in arms and money bestowed upon him, fully assured of the security of his position, and every way disposed to maintain a loyal and friendly attitude.

Among the more important matters discussed at the Amballa meeting were the questions of the Oxus boundary, the Persian encroachment on Sistan, and Sher Ali's nomination of his youthful son Abdullah, as heir-apparent. As to the first, the alarm expressed by Sher Ali at the rapid advance of Russia in Turkistan, and his solicitudes for the safety of his frontier on the line of the Oxus, led to diplomatic correspondence on the subject between the British and Russian Governments, the result of which was a definition of the Oxus boundary highly favourable to the Amir, inasmuch as it included within the Afghan boundary the previously unappropriated States of Badakhshan and Wakhan. As to the last, Sher Ali failed to obtain the recognition of the British Govern-
ment for his nominee, the proved ability and State services rendered by Ya'cub Khan—the elder son by another mother—appearing strong points in favour of his claim. The question of Sistan the Amir confidingly entrusted to the care of the British Government, and consented to its settlement by arbitration; meanwhile Sher Ali agreed to refrain from any forcible measures against the territory in dispute.

On his return to Kabul, Sher Ali entered actively on the work of reform in the administration of his government, and introduced some important changes; but he devoted the most of his attention to the increase, improved discipline, and better equipment of his army, in the prosecution of which measures he received both encouragement and very material aid from the Government of India, in the shape of drill-instructors, artificers, and large supplies of arms and ammunition, together with two batteries of the modern artillery, besides considerable money grants and a fixed subsidy of a lakh of rupees a month. In return for all these favours Sher Ali gave us his good-will—he could not at present receive British Officers as residents in his country, though he hoped to be able to do so later on—and to some slight extent relaxed the previous rigid exclusion of foreigners from the side of India, and entered on a course of friendly relations that promised well for the future—as well, at least, as could be expected considering the steady interchange of communications with the Russian authorities in Turkistan; a correspondence which had commenced directly after Sher Ali recovered his position as Amir at Kabul. This favourable turn of affairs, however, did not last long. Sher Ali, though the British Government had rejected his nominee, now formally proclaimed Abdullah as his heir-apparent, an act which provoked Ya'cub to rebellion and flight to Herat. On this Sher Ali again appealed to the British for a recognition of the heir of his choice, but with no better success than before. Following this, the decision of the Sistan arbitration of 1872—by which the Persians were confirmed in their possession of the portion of that country then occupied by them—was in the following year communicated to the Amir.

The result was so different from what Sher Ali expected when he entrusted his interests in this quarter to the care of the British Government, that he now considered himself grievously injured; and the doubts as to our sincerity, raised in his mind by the rejection of his wishes in regard to his proclaimed heir, became confirmed, and produced a revulsion of feeling towards us which destroyed the confidence inspired by the meeting at Amballa. Some other mishaps too in the course of our relations with Sher Ali on several subsequent occasions acted as goads to keep alive and increase the dissatisfaction thus produced, particularly the intervention of the Viceroy on behalf of Ya'cub, whom the Amir had imprisoned for rebellion. Sher Ali warmly resented this interposition as an unwarrantable interference with his parental authority and with the affairs of his government. But the ill-temper and suspicions aroused by these untoward occurrences were trifles compared with the effects produced in Sher Ali's mind by the development of our dealing with the chief of Balochistan and the posi-
tion we had just at this time taken up at Quetta. He looked upon this move as a stealthy step to menace his independence, and, full of mistrust, became at once completely estranged from us.

In place of the good-will and frank confidence he at first displayed on his return to Kabul from the Amballa meeting, Sher Ali now observed a strict reserve; and whilst closing his country to access from our side, and limiting his correspondence with the British within the narrowest limits of official propriety, he entered upon a course of more active correspondence with the Russians in Turkistan, and received a succession of their agents and emissaries at Kabul. In fact Sher Ali, though he had not yet (in 1875) finally cut adrift from the British—by whose support and assistance he had become not only firmly established in the rule of Afghanistan, but had also become the possessor of a numerous and well-equipped army with an abundant store of war munitions—evidently thought to frighten them into a more careful regard for his honour and dignity by an attempt to try a turn of the Russian friendship. But in his communications with the Russian emissaries he was quickly drawn further away from the British than he really desired. He obtained from his Russian friends nothing in the way of material support, but abundance of promises and encouragement of the idle schemes he now began to hatch for the employment of his army in the recovery of the long-lost Afghan provinces on the side of India. But with all this Sher Ali had no predilection for the Russians, and certainly—his dissatisfaction notwithstanding—preferred the British as allies. He was driven to extremity by our mismanagement, and, for purposes of his own, thought to play off Russia against Britain. Unfortunately for Sher Ali, the Russians took advantage of the occasion to turn their dealings with the Amir to purposes of their own in connection with the warlike aspect of British and Russian relations in Europe caused by events of the Russo-Turkish war; and with the result of utter ruin to Sher Ali.

The friendly relations so succesfully initiated by Lord Mayo had hardly time to mature before the sudden and lamentable death of the Viceroy deprived Sher Ali of a trusted friend, a powerful supporter, and a wise counsellor. During the Viceroyship of his successor the smooth course and promising progress of the newly-commenced relations between the British Government and the Afghan Amir received a succession of shocks and checks by which the confidence of Sher Ali in our sincerity was completely undermined, and by which he was driven into an attitude of hostility, which, though not uncongenial to his natural disposition, he at this time little desired.

In this unsatisfactory and menacing state of affairs at Kabul, Lord Lytton arrived in India as the new Viceroy, and no time was lost in taking steps for an amicable adjustment of the existing differences and for a more stable arrangement for the future relations between the British Government and the Afghan Amir. To effect these objects the British Government was now prepared to recognise the heir of Sher Ali's choice, to conclude a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, to grant him an annual subsidy and a large sum of money immediately
besides. The preliminary arrangements for negotiation, however, were so hampered by party spirit among high officials in India, and Sher Ali himself was so sore and suspicious that, though he was anxious for a means of extricating himself from his present difficult position, he could not divest himself of the distrust that possessed his mind, and on the move of our troops to Quetta resolved to sever his connection with the British. The efforts made by the new Viceroy to come to a mutually advantageous understanding between the British Government and the estranged Amir were thwarted at every turn and failed throughout. Sher Ali treated all the friendly overtures now made with disdain; he took no notice of the Viceroy's invitation to the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, but busied himself in assembling an army at Jalalabad; he unnecessarily delayed sending his envoy to India to discuss the several matters then awaiting adjustment between the two Governments; and finally he rejected the basis—the reception of British officers as political agents at his capital and on his frontiers—on the acceptance of which the opening of negotiations depended. In consequence of this behaviour of Sher Ali, the Government of India (in October, 1876) occupied the position at Quetta with a military detachment and moved up troops to strengthen the garrisons towards Peshawar. But these measures only increased the Amir's hostility, and he—whilst his envoy was at Peshawar—raised a war-cry among his people, took possession of the fort of Ali Masjid in the Khybar, and garrisoned the pass itself with his troops. The breach between Sher Ali and the British Government was now complete. Our Native Agent at the court of the Amir had accompanied the Afghan Envoy to Peshawar (where the Envoy died), and he did not again return to his post at Kabul. Sher Ali thus finally cut himself adrift from the British alliance and turned to cultivate the friendship of the Russians. He had so effectually closed his country against us that no reliable intelligence of his proceedings was now obtainable, till at last (in July, 1878) it became known that a mission of Russian officers had arrived at Kabul, where they were most hospitably entertained and treated with the highest distinction by Sher Ali.

The British Government now resolved to send a Mission of their own to Kabul, and accordingly without delay despatched in advance a native gentleman, who had formerly held the post of British Agent at Kabul, to inform Sher Ali of the approach of a friendly British Mission. The cold reception he met from the Amir noded no good, but as at this juncture the heir-apparent (Abdullah) happened to die, the business of the British messenger was postponed till the expiration of the forty days of mourning, and in the meantime the Viceroy addressed a letter of condolence to the Amir. Finally the British Mission, which had assembled at Peshawar in the beginning of September, on the 20th of that month advanced to the entrance of the Khybar pass, but there finding the road closed to them by the Amir's military commandant, who declared that he had the Amir's positive order to prevent the passage of the Mission, by force if necessary, the Mission was recalled and dissolved.

After this insult the next step was war, and—after giving the Amir grace to the 20th of November—the British troops on the following
day invaded Afghanistan in three divisions simultaneously by the Khybar, the Pewar, and the Khojak routes. Sher Ali did not himself take the field; but after the defeat and flight of his troops in the Khybar and the advance of the British upon Jalalabad, he liberated Ya'cub from prison, and committing the government to him, himself (13th December) fled from Kabul to his Turkistan province, with the avowed intention of proceeding to St. Petersburg to lay his case before the Powers of Europe. On his flight from Kabul, Sher Ali was accompanied by two members of the Russian Mission who had remained behind with him after the departure of the others; but Sher Ali never got beyond his own territory; he fell sick at Mazari Sharif, and died there on the 21st of February, 1879.

Ya'cub was now acknowledged as Amir by the unanimous voice of the chiefs and nobles of the whole country; and having at this moment received a friendly letter from Major Cavagnari, the political officer with the troops at Jalalabad, he lost no time in opening communications with the British for a friendly and satisfactory settlement of the existing state of affairs. Disclaiming all hostile desires against the British and professing his attachment to their Government, he looked now for their friendship, support, and recognition of himself as Amir on the same terms as heretofore enjoyed by his predecessors, avowing his willingness to meet the wishes of the British Government to the utmost of his ability. Ya'cub's overtures were favourably received; and after some preliminary correspondence, and the advance of our troops to Gandumak, he voluntarily came to the British camp (8th May, 1879) to personally negotiate the settlement of his affairs, and on the 26th May signed the Treaty of Gandumak, which was finally ratified on the 7th June. By this treaty the Amir Ya'cub Khan bound himself to perpetual friendship with the British; to grant an amnesty to all of his subjects who had aided the British in the war; to subordinate his foreign relations to the control of the British Government, in return for which he was to be supported by them against foreign aggression with money, arms, and troops at their discretion; to receive and guarantee the safety and honourable treatment of a permanent British resident at Kabul and agents on his frontiers as might be necessary; to open a telegraph line to Kabul; to relinquish authority over the Khybar and Michni tribes; and to cede as assigned districts the Kuram, Peshin, and Sibi Valleys; besides an agreement to encourage commerce. With such a treaty, if properly observed, Afghanistan was as good as annexed; and Ya'cub, through he felt he had gone too far in some of the concessions, yet on the whole expressed his satisfaction and looked forward to an early meeting with the Viceroy to confirm and improve the rapprochement now established.

Matters thus settled, the Amir Ya'cub returned to Kabul; and the British troops, gradually evacuating their advanced positions, returned to India, leaving strong detachments to hold the three newly-acquired districts. And thus ended the war with Sher Ali, the strongest Amir that Afghanistan had ever seen. Under British protection, aid, and support he had acquired a well-defined and consolidated kingdom, an army
of about 60,000 disciplined troops, and a magazine well stored with munitions of war. Yet so slight was the power he held over the discordant elements constituting his Government, that when war was declared many of his principal chiefs deserted his cause to side with the invader. At this time it would have been no difficult task to conquer and annex the whole country and settle its affairs once for all. The popularity of Ya'cub, however, amongst British officials of high position on the frontier secured for him the favour of Government; and though on closer acquaintance he was found to be a man of far inferior abilities to what reports had painted him at a distance, it was decided to give him a fair trial, under our own control, as ruler of Afghanistan.

And so, consequent on the Treaty of Gandumak, Sir Louis Cavagnari was appointed the British Resident at Kabul. He proceeded without delay to his post there, accompanied by three other British officers, namely a Secretary, a Doctor, and an officer to command his personal escort, which consisted of twenty-five troopers and fifty Sepoys of the «Guides» corps, together with their servants and followers, the whole party numbering some two hundred souls. The British Resident arrived at Kabul on the 24th July, 1879, and was received by the Amir Ya'cub Khan with every mark of honour and welcome throughout the march from the advanced position occupied by the British on the Pewar route, and with a brilliant reception at Kabul itself, where he was installed in the Residency, situated in the Bala Hissar, close to the Amir's own palace, with kindly attention and cordial hospitality. The British party, well pleased with the honours done them, settled down in their new quarters with every outward sign of a quiet and peaceful sojourn before them. Before many days, however, it became apparent that two kings could not reign in one capital, and the British Resident, desiring a free and unrestrained access of the Amir's subjects to himself, caused the guard of the Amir's household troops, placed by Ya'cub over the Residency, to be removed and discontinued. Following this, whispers were heard of the Amir's chafing under the high-handed ways of the British Resident, and there was talk of his interference in Government affairs, and comment on the little deference and respect shown by the British officer towards Ya'cub himself and his dignity as Amir. The newly-arrived Resident soon became unpopular at the Kabul court; and within a month of his taking up his duties, there were already two rival factions formed, popularly styled the Cavagnarizai and the Ya'cubzai—the partisans of Cavagnari and the partisans of Ya'cub. The British Resident forgot that he was not now the frontier Deputy Commissioner, backed in his deeds and demands by the force of authority and the support of British troops, and he failed to recognise the altered conditions of his position. In short, the name of Cavagnari soon became bandied about the bazar with disrespectful and abusive epithets. Just at this time some five or six regiments having arrived from Herat in a state of mutiny on account of arrears of pay, they took up the cry and coupled the British. Envoy with the Amir in their threats and denunciations. Ya'cub was not a stranger to such displays of insubordination, and dealt in his own cautious way with these mutineers. He
marched off some of them to distant districts to collect revenue, others he sent away on furlough, and the rest he deprived of their arms and ammunition; and then hoped to quiet their discontent by an instalment of pay. For this last purpose, on the morning of the 3rd September, 1879, three of the disarmed mutineer regiments were marched from their camp outside, into the Bala Hissar to be paid at the treasury office. Here one month’s pay being offered instead of the five they claimed, they broke out, attacked their own officers, and then rushed off in a body to the Amir’s palace. Here they were turned off by the guard, and then tumultuously made for the British Residency, which they commenced stoning. Unluckily some one in the Residency fired on the mob, on which the mutineers ran off to the magazine, and there arming themselves returned to attack the Residency. Uproar and confusion now ensued; and the mutineers were quickly joined by other regiments and the rabble of the city. The Amir sent in succession several leading men and his own son to quell the disturbance, but all to no purpose. He, however, immediately sent intelligence of the outbreak to the nearest British authority, the political officer at Ali-Khel, by whom the alarming news was received during the night of the 4th September, and at once telegraphed to the Viceroy at Simla.

Cavagnari and his brave companions defended themselves with heroic courage, to the admiration and applause of even their Afghan enemies. But the place being set on fire, and no egress possible, they all perished in the ruins, except three or four natives, who managed to escape at the outset.

The early occupation of Kabul now became necessary, and an immediate advance was made on the Kuram line, whilst the troops at Kandahar were held fast there, and the advance of a column by the Khybar rapidly organized. Meanwhile at Kabul, the Amir’s army dispersed, his Government collapsed, and anarchy reigned supreme. Some of his chiefs were for a national rising to oppose the British advance; but the Amir refused to lead the movement. He wrote to the British, deploring the catastrophe, courting their inquiry, and lamenting the loss of his authority and Government, and his own helpless condition. Before the close of September, General Robert, with a compact movable column of 7,000 men, had crossed the Shuturgardan Pass, and at Khushi, the first stage on the other side, Ya’cub Khan, having abandoned Kabul, joined his camp. Here he was welcomed with a melancholy satisfaction, and placed under honourable restraint. The force then advanced upon Kabul, and defeating the opposing rebels at Charasin, took possession of the capital on the 7th October. Shortly afterwards, Ya’cub Khan formally tendered his abdication, and Afghanistan was now, at the close of October, 1879, left in the possession of the British without an Amir of its own.

The first business to be done now at Kabul, was the capture, trial, and punishment of the guilty in the massacre of the British embassy, and the investigation of the conduct of the Amir Ya’cub Khan in relation to this matter. Two or three prominent men and a number (40 or 50) of obscure persons were capitaly punished for the part they were
proved to have taken in the attack on the Residency; but as no evidence of complicity was attainable to directly implicate the Amir as a participator in the foul treachery, he was deported to India as a State prisoner for political reasons. The next business was to pacify the country and subdue the resistance of hostile gatherings. But this, owing to the absence of plan, purpose, or policy, was no practicable matter in the state of complete anarchy into which the country had fallen; the local governors having everywhere disappeared, and the tribal chiefs in all directions working each for his own hand. It was easy enough to chastise and disperse hostile gatherings of the turbulent populations around the positions held by the British forces; but all these military operations and burning of villages, from want of a fixed policy, served only to increase the enmity and hatred of the people towards us, without in the least tending to pacify the country.

The point on which the British Government had to come to a decision at this time was the immediate disposal of Afghanistan, which, with the advanced positions assigned to the British by the Treaty of Gandumak, and the actual possession at the moment of Kabul and Kandahar, its northern and southern capitals, was practically a conquered country, and now lay without a ruler on our hands, either to be pacified and settled as an annexed province of our Indian empire, or to be abandoned once more to native rulers to be again the cause of yet greater anxiety, trouble, and expense. The British position with regard to Afghanistan was at this period certainly one of great difficulty, and various alternatives were discussed as to the course to be now adopted. The only fixed point in the policy of the British Government with regard to Afghanistan was its determination not to annex the country; and there was nothing left but to cast about for some means of extricating the British forces from their present positions without abandoning the country to uncontrolled anarchy.

If Afghanistan was to be maintained under Barakzai rule in its present consolidated integrity, as left by Dost Muhammad and amplified by Sher Ali, and to be given another lease of British support and protection, the present occasion offered the opportunity of either restoring Ya'cub as Amir,—and this is what the people desired,—and supporting his authority by British garrisons at Kabul and Kandahar, or such other suitable points as might be determined; or of placing his youthful son Musa on the throne, with a native council of administration, the members to be nominated partly by the British Government and partly by the Amir, and to be under the supervision of a Board of Control composed of British officers. If the maintenance of the country as a united whole was not considered of such importance, then the split up of Afghanistan into independent chiefships, as at the time of the dissolution of the Saddozai rule and the division of the kingdom among the Barakzai chiefs in 1818,—under British control and protection, and support,—was the alternative that presented itself. This was a prospect which past experience had proved to be anything but desirable, and one in no way calculated to smooth or improve the course of British relations with the country. Yet it was the policy actually adopted by
the Government of India in the Viceroyship of Lord Lytton. The Khandaari chief, Sher Ali Khan was actually installed in the government of that province under British control and support, with the title of Wáli, and as such was acknowledged by the Queen Empress; and the Kabuli chief Wáli Muhammad Khan was seriously taken up as a suitable governor for Kabul under similar conditions; whilst as to Herat, the idea was actually entertained—nay, the offer was made—of restoring that province to the Persians. Had this scheme of breaking up Afghanistan into chiefships been adopted, without at the same time supporting the several chiefs of our selection with a military force in their respective capitals, it is certain that Afghanistan would have become a scene of continuous anarchy and a hot-bed of intrigue, and ere long would have necessitated our again occupying the country with our troops.

The question of Wáli Muhammad's recognition as Wáli of Kabul was yet under consideration, when another claimant appeared in the field, not as mere governor of this province or of that, but as Amir of Afghanistan in its integrity, as left by his grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, and as ruled by his own father, Amir Afzal Khan (eldest son and successor of Dost Muhammad) the de facto Amir of 1866, and acknowledged as such by the Government of India of that day. This was no other than Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan, who on the recovery of his throne by Amir Sher Ali Khan, in 1869, fled the country and for the past twelve years had lived in exile at Samarkand, on the bounty of the Russian Government. He was at this crisis of the British political situation in Afghanistan, drawn out from the obscurity of his asylum, and with the countenance and aid of his Russian supporters was now put forward to secure for himself the country, to the throne, of which he claimed to be the rightful heir. It was a repetition of the Shah Shuja game, which was played from the side of India forty years before, only, to be sure, played with greater prudence and more foresight, and moreover with complete success by the Russians with their kite.

At the time that Abdurrahman appeared in Balkh or Afghan Turkistan—the province formerly governed both by his father and by himself—in February, 1880, the Government of India, in its perplexity for want of a settled policy in regard to Afghanistan, was only too impatient to quit the country,—the occupation of which in this intolerable, useless, and very troublesome manner was draining the revenues of India to a dangerous degree of depletion, and unsettling the minds of the natives to no good purpose,—and shrunk with dread at the bare notion of any turn in events which should prolong the stay of the British forces in the country, which the British Government had no intention to annex. Consequently they seized eagerly upon the opportunity now offered to make friendly overtures to Abdurrahman, who at this time—March, 1880—had already get together with himself four infantry and two cavalry regiments, and two batteries of artillery, and was busy levying more troops and raising a party for himself in Afghanistan.
In reply to the letter from Mr. Griffin (dated 1st April), the political officer with the British force at Kabul, Abdurrahman (on the 16th April) desired to know the nature of the friendship the British Government now desired, and offered to come to Charikar to discuss matters with the English officers; because, if they desired to place him in power, it was necessary that they should make him secure before they withdrew from the country. At the same time—after this long cogitation—Abdurrahman, whether of his own motion or the prompting of his Russian friends, candidly declared his obligations and gratitude to the Russian Government, from which he had received many favours during the past twelve years, and frankly expressed his desire to be now the friend of both Powers, and to live at peace between them. These frank avowals on the part of Abdurrahman, and his expressed desire to be established in the rule of Afghanistan under the joint protection of the British and Russian empires, did not, in the opinion of the British Politicals, appear «to render him less eligible than when selected by the British Government, but more so». And consequently (30th April), further communications ensued, inviting Abdurrahman to come to Kabul to discuss arrangements, with the object of unconditionally transferring to him the government of the country, from which, he was informed, the British forces would, in any case, be withdrawn a few months later; the British Government having no desire to annex Afghanistan, but only to establish an Amir who was willing to live in peace and friendship with it; and as he was ready to do this, the British Government would assist him to establish himself and supply his immediate wants. As to what he had said regarding Russia, on that point there was no difficulty, the British Government desiring nothing different from what had been already agreed upon between that country and itself. Abdurrahman was further informed that Kandahar had been severed from Kabul, and given to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, who had already been recognised as Wali by the Queen Empress, but that Herat was at his disposal either to annex or not, as he pleased; and, further, that in now accepting him as Amir of Kabul, the Government of India required no pledges, concessions, or reciprocal engagements. They merely wished to leave the country in the hands of a competent ruler, and were ready to afford him facilities and support in establishing himself at the capital. This information did not seem to satisfy the expectation of Abdurrahman, and he required more explicit information as to the extent of his territory and the nature of his responsibilities as ruler of Kabul before he could proceed further towards the capital; and to get a reply quickly, he proposed to place mounted couriers on the road, and to issue a proclamation to his countrymen directing them to assemble within their own bounds, and to abstain from provoking hostilities against the British army. This was the report of the British messenger on his return to Kabul at the end of May. It now appeared to our Politicals that Abdurrahman had been merely temporizing; and as just at this time the general state of fermentation among the people was increased and extended by letters, purporting to come from Abdurrahman, circulating through the country, bidding the tribes to be armed and ready; and as simultaneously Abdurrahman was reported
to be in close correspondence with Muhammad Jan—an active participant in the attack on the British Residency, and the most energetic and determined of our opponents in the field—who was undoubtedly levying forces against us, grave doubts arose in their minds as to the good faith of Abdurrahman, and they recommended that further amicable communications with him should be abandoned.

At this juncture Lord Ripon came to India as the new Viceroy. It was clear that the claimant for the throne of Afghanistan, let loose by Russia, was not relying solely upon British aid and recognition, but was taking early measures to strengthen himself independently by summoning his countrymen to be ready to join his standard in case he failed to come to a satisfactory arrangement with the British. But so great was the anxiety to avoid any course that would create fresh difficulties and prolong the detention of the British forces—at this time numbering 20,000 strong at Kabul—in the country beyond the period fixed for their withdrawal (the 10th August following), that it was decided to continue communications with Abdurrahman, and to send plain replies upon the points to which he had referred—namely, the extent of his territory and the nature of his responsibilities as Amir of Kabul. Accordingly, on the 14th June, Abdurrahman was informed that the Kabul ruler can have no political relations with any foreign Power except the British, since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all political interference with Afghanistan affairs; and that if any such interference should occur, and lead to unprovoked aggression on the Kabul ruler, then the British Government will be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it, provided that he follow its advice in regard to his external relations. As to the limits of the country, he was informed that Kandahar had been placed under a separate ruler, except the districts of Peshin and Sibi, which are retained in British possession; and that the question of the North-West Frontier of Afghanistan was also excluded from discussion. With these reservations the British Government was willing that he should establish over Afghanistan—including Herat, of which he was at liberty to take possession—as complete and extensive authority as had been hitherto exercised by any Barakzai Amir. That he would not be required to admit an English Resident anywhere, although it might be advisable to station, by agreement, a Muhammadan Agent of the British Government at Kabul. Abdurrahman was also informed that he was allowed five days within which to send his reply to this communication.

Abdurrahman replied within the limit fixed, and his letter reached Kabul on the 26th June. He said that what was the wish and object of himself and people had been kindly granted by the British authorities; that the boundaries of Afghanistan, which were settled by treaty with his grandfather, Dost Muhammad, these were now granted to him; that an English Envoy in Afghanistan had been dispensed with, and that he might admit a Musalm Agent, if he pleased. As to his relations with foreign Powers, he said: «How can I communicate with another Power without advice from and consultation with you? I agree to this also». In regard to foreign aggression upon Afghanistan, he wrote: «You
will under all circumstances afford me assistance; and you will not permit any person to take possession of the territory of Afghanistan. This also is my desire, which you have kindly granted. As to Herat, he was content to leave it in the hands of his cousin Ayub, so long as he did not oppose him. «Everything», he added, «shall be done as we both deem it expedient and advisable». He further intimated having written and sent letters, containing full particulars, to all the tribes of Afghanistan.

This reply,—as well it might be,—was considered ambiguous; and as another letter had been addressed to Abdurrahman on the 15th of June, requiring him to use his authority to repress tribal gatherings, in reply to which he pleaded weakness of authority, and declared that by ordering the clansmen to disperse he should only alienate his supporters, the political officers at Kabul now again doubted the sincerity of Abdurrahman, and for the second time represented the necessity, in this critical situation, of breaking off with him. The Government of India, however, thought such a measure hardly justifiable, and Abdurrahman was desired to proceed at once to Kabul. In compliance with this request he arrived at Charikar on the 20th July, and two days later, with the object of re-assuring the people and putting an end to this period of uncertainty, was formally and publicly recognised on the part of the British Government as Amir of Kabul. This lucky step was no sooner taken than news arrived of the defeat of General Burrows, on the Helmand, at Kandahar, by Ayub, and it became necessary to hasten arrangements with the Amir. Consequently on the last day of July, Mr. Griffin proceeded to Zimma, sixteen miles north of Kabul, to meet the Amir Abdurrahman Khan, and dispose of the matters for discussion. This political officer was most favourably impressed by the appearance, manner, and intelligence of Abdurrahman, who, he believed, was sincerely anxious for friendship with the British Government, and that he would hereafter prove a valuable ally. On this occasion five lakhs of rupees were made over to the Amir, and he was requested to send an energetic chief to accompany General Roberts' force, about to leave Kabul for Kandahar, to secure an unopposed march of the division to Ghuzni, to the charge of which place the Amir was also requested to appoint an officer. On the 5th August nothing remained to be done but to hand over Kabul to the Amir, and withdraw the British troops from the country. General Roberts' force now left Kabul for Kandahar, and immediately after (12th August) General Stewart, with the remainder of the British forces, marched away for Gandumak, on the return to India. The Amir Abdurrahman, to whom all our recent fortifications of the place were made over in fact, now took possession of Kabul, and entered on his rule of the country.

Thus ended the hostilities commenced in November, 1878, by the Government of India against Amir Sher Ali Khan, and renewed almost immediately against his son and successor Amir Ya'qub Khan. During this period of less than two years, the British Government employed, more or less continuously, upon and beyond the British frontier, as defined by the advanced positions acquired by the treaty of Gandumak,
an army of eighty thousand British troops—European and native—accompanied by, as many camp followers, and an untold number of transport cattle, to the dangerous denuding of the Indian garrisons and exposure of our military weakness in the country; and at a cost to the revenues of India of fully twenty millions of money, and to the people of the country of much political disquiet, great personal suffering, and serious loss of life. The war inflicted upon the people of India very wide-spread misery and hardship, from the loss by death of husbands, fathers, and sons—the natural supporters of the family—and from the high prices of food, caused by the drain to feed the army in the field. It entailed a serious loss of life among the troops and followers, more from disease than from battle, and, owing to the enormous destruction of camels and draught cattle, paralyzed for the time the transport powers of the country. Added to which it created an unwholesome excitement in the courts of the native princes, because of the uncertainty as to the nature of the British policy.

Upon the Afghans the war inflicted but another term of the anarchy and confusion to which that country was no stranger; with the difference, however, that under our hostility, though they lost more lives than in their own inter-tribal contentions, they, on the other hand, gathered a rich harvest of rupees, and suffered but little disturbance in their homes. So much so, and so little so, indeed, that after the British forces evacuated their country, they began to calculate when they might again expect such a haul of money. Of our troops the Afghans showed less fear on this occasion than in the first Afghan war; and of our military position in the country they held no great opinion, so long as they restricted our authority to the line of our camp sentries, and drew from us rupees without stint for such services as they chose to render.

In return for the overwhelming force employed and the enormous expense incurred, what has the Government of India to show by way of gain? The position at Quetta and the ascendency in Balochistan, having been acquired prior to the outbreak of this war, are not of course to be counted among the advantages derived from its prosecution. The advantages then gained by the Afghan war of 1878-80 are the acquisition of the advanced positions on the Afghanistan frontier at the Khojak and Khybar passes, and that is all. But these in themselves are no small nor unimportant gain. With these positions in our hands the whole aspect and entire conditions of our military and political situation towards Afghanistan are completely changed, and rendered of a far more favourable character in respect to any future operations or dealings with that country than has ever been the case at any preceding period. This fact, coupled with the ensuing development of our railway system in connection with these advanced positions, and the state of our preparedness for and immediate extension of the lines to Kandahar and Kabul, is in itself a gain to our position in India equivalent to an army of the strength of that employed in the attainment of this valuable result.
BRITISH RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN

With these commanding advanced positions on the southern and northern extremities of our frontier towards Afghanistan in our own possession, it becomes an easy matter to close up and secure the intervening mountain range by a like appropriation of the several main routes which traverse its hills and defiles to the highlands of Ghazni and the basin of Kandahar. When we shall have opened out the passes in the Waziri and Kakar hills by good roads and occupied them with our troops, then the first step will have been taken towards the enrichment, the pacification, and the subjugation to civilized life of the lawless Pathan tribes, who from times of old—of the Indo-Scythian or perhaps of the Graeco-Bactrian sovereignties, some 1,500 or 2,000 years ago—have continued (except, perhaps, during the period of the Ghaznavi dynasty) to exist in the secluded valleys and inaccessible fastnesses of an unclaimed mountain barrier, sunk in the poverty, the isolation, and the anarchy of a rulerless nation of predatory bandits. With British authority established in his country, the hungry, restless, and savage Pathan of the Suleman range, from the Waziri in the north to the Kakar in the south, will for the first time taste of the pleasures of uncontested wealth, the comforts of undisturbed peace, and the value of assured security. And for blessings such as these he will, from mere personal interest, if for no other reason, soon learn to appreciate the advantages of the new order of things, and will voluntarily own as his master and protector the power whose beneficent rule has conferred so great benefits. The effects of forty years of British rule over a kindred people in the Trans-Indus provinces afford gratifying evidence of what can be done towards ameliorating the material and social conditions of a notoriously turbulent and warlike population, and this without the exercise of any special measures for their reclamation. And there is no doubt that similar results would be attained by the extension of British rule into the hill districts of the border Pathan in the Suleman range. Changes such as have been effected by the British rule in the Trans-Indus provinces—the accumulation of wealth, the security of property, the adoption of peaceable employments, and the pursuit of industrial occupations among a people born and bred and dying in ignorance, strife, and bloodshed—are, however, the growth of years, and may not be seen within the first generation; hence the pity that the policy now in operation for the rectification of this frontier was not adopted and set in action at an earlier period, or during the opportune occasion offered at the time of the Afghan civil war of 1864-69. Though, perhaps now, the quick-working influences exercised in the direction of civilization by the railway and the telegraph may suffice, with the facilities they afford for rapid communication with the frontier, to extend and diffuse new ideas and new habits with the knowledge and the wealth they convey, and to hasten the adaptation of the people to the altered conditions of their environments, and render them more speedily amenable to our rule.

But, be this as it may, there can be no doubt as to the immense advantage gained to the Empire by the acquisition of the advanced position now occupied by the British Government at the southern and northern extremities of the Suleman range, not only as starting-points
for the prosecution of future military operations in the territories they command to the westward, but as strategic points for the defence of the approaches to India in those directions; and perhaps, also for the control of the tribes inhabiting the intermediate portion of the range itself. To what extent and in what manner the advanced positions we now hold on the immediate frontiers of Kandahar and Kabul are likely to affect the nature of future military operations in those countries is a subject which—though of no small importance and interest in itself—can hardly be discussed profitably in the present state of uncertainty as to the requirements and character of the occasion that may render such enterprise necessary. It may not, however, be altogether unprofitable at this time to take a hasty comparative glance at the nature of the conditions under which the operations of the first Afghan war of 1838-42 and the late Afghan war of 1878-80 were undertaken and pursued.

At the time of the earlier war, the Satlaj river formed the north-western limit of British India—500 miles distant from the Afghanistan border; and Russia, in central Asia, was then nigh twice as distant from the nearest point of Afghanistan in that direction. The British army employed on that occasion—Bengal and Bombay troops, together with the 6,000 men raised in India for Shah Shuja'—did not exceed thirty thousand men, with more than double the number of camp-followers, and an extraordinary multitude of transport cattle. The troops were armed with a smooth-bore musket of 100 yards range—the old «Brown Bess»—and the bayonet for the infantry; the artillery had also smooth-bore and muzzle-loading cannon; the cavalry was armed much in the same manner as at present, except that their carbines were smooth-bore and muzzle-loading. In physique the men were decidedly of a superior stamp: the European, a hardy five feet eight to five feet ten, broad-chested, square-shouldered, muscular, and bayonet-work man; the sepoy was the stalwart Purubiya (the Pandy), in build and strength little if anything inferior to his European comrade, so far as concerned the Bengal division; whilst the Bombay man, or Dakhani (the Duck), was neither so strongly built nor so well set up in figure, though an equally good sepoy in his way.

This army had a march of from ten to twelve weeks across the independent Native States of the Panjab and Sindh, before it arrived at the entrance to the mountain defiles and passes leading into Afghanistan. And in these awe-inspiring, barren, rugged, rocky, and unknown fastnesses they had to fight their way against the opposition and predatory attacks of the savage mountaineers. On the other side of the passes they entered upon the highlands of Balochistan and Afghanistan, and on these distant battlefields displayed their mettle and the stuff they were made of.

Their enemy, everywhere, was armed with the national jazáll and cháráh—the one a long rifled matchlock of 300 yards range, the other a long, straight, thick-backed knife running to a sharp point; they used besides, the sword and shield; and many had only pikes and blunderbusses. They had few cavalry and fewer cannon, both inferior to our
own, and the latter chiefly mounted in their fortresses. The Afghan, however, with his rifle and knife was a better-armed man than the British soldier with his "Brown Bess" and bayonet, but he had no discipline and lacked subordination to command; on the other hand, he had the courage inspired by patriotism and the confidence arising from a knowledge of his ground. Nevertheless, everywhere, barring one or two mishaps to small isolated detachments acting on the defensive, the British troops—operating generally on the offensive, and usually with small handy detachments—carried victory in their path, whether in the hard-contested field or against the obstinately defended fortress. The action at Hykalzai and the forcing of the Khojak pass, the storm and capture of Ghazni, and later on of Kilati Baloch—the two strong places considered impregnable by the people—were performances which created in the mind of the Afghan a wholesome respect for the British soldier, whether European or Native.

But with the prolonged stay of our army in Afghanistan and the more frequent contact of the people with our troops, the impression produced by our first successes against them soon faded away, and the Afghan presently showed us that he neither feared our troops nor was any way backward to meet them in the field after, to be sure, his own fashion. The various actions about the Helmund at Girishk and in Zamindawar, on the Tarnak, at Kilati Ghulzi, and elsewhere in 1841, when rebellion and disorder seem to have overspread the country, were for the most part hard-fought contests by small detachments of the British troops (sometimes in conjunction with the Shah's troops) against hosts of the armed peasantry, and with results uniformly creditable to the British arms. But later on, towards the close of the same year, the affairs between our detachments and the rebellious clansmen in Zurmat and in Kokistan, south and north of Kabul, were not attended with such conspicuous success. And following close upon these came the revolt at Kabul itself, and the sudden discovery of the insufficiency of the British force there—less than 5,000 men, divided between the two positions of the Bala Hissar overlooking the city and the entrenched camp at Bimar, three miles distant—to cope with the difficulty. The retreat of the garrison and its speedy destruction were consequences of the upper hand gained by the rebels.

This great disaster, including the later massacre of our garrison at Ghazni, though speedily avenged by a fresh army pushed through the Khybar and joined at Kabul by the force from Kandahar, created a great sensation at the time, and has left a lasting impression, at least in India—exaggerated in all its features by want of a sober and just consideration of the subject in all its bearings—of the ferocity and warlike spirit of the Afghans, and a furtive belief in their invincibility. Unstinted blame has been heaped upon the military authorities for their inability to perform impossibilities and their unwillingness to throw away the lives of their men in useless enterprises; whilst the conduct of affairs by the political authorities—through whose bad management and want of information as to what was going on around them, the revolt was
brought about in a manner and with a suddenness which it was impossible to check or cut short with the force of British troops on the spot, has hardly received the full condemnation it deserves. Had the political authorities gained but an inkling of what their management of the affairs under their special control was leading to among the people; had they even ordinary information of the movements of the disaffected chiefs, it would probably have been possible to employ the troops placed at their disposal usefully and successfully to coerce them, or better, to forestall their plans. But when they found everything gone by the run, it was too late for the politicals then to call upon the military to extricate them from their difficulty, because the task had then become impossible. Had the General in command of the British force at Kabul been invested—as undoubtedly he should have been—with political powers jointly with the Envoy and Minister, in so far as related to the requirements of the military situation in the country, he could have acted independently in an emergency of this kind, and exercised greater influence on the course of action to be promptly adopted in such a crisis. Had the General possessed such independent power, it is clear, from what has been recorded, that when the revolt broke out and showed the hopeless nature of our false position at Kabul, he would have left the Shah to quell the rebellion of his nobles in his own fashion, and by a timely retreat to Jalalabad have preserved unsullied and unbroken the honour and welfare of the troops committed to his charge, even if from that position it were impossible to retrieve our political supremacy at the capital. But the General was under the control of the Political, whose every act in this supreme crisis was marked by a fatal scheming and procrastination; and his repeated and urgent representations as to the necessity of an early retreat from an untenable position, whilst there was yet no snow and supplies were still procurable, were time after time rejected. And so it came to pass that a timely and practicable retreat, with our honour in our own keeping, was week after week postponed, until at last it was forced upon us, with our honour lost, our prestige destroyed, and our success hopeless. Famine, frost, and fatigue killed more than the knives and bullets of a bloodthirsty and revengeful people; and our Kabul garrison perished on the road, annihilated to a man. Our honour was retrieved by the re-occupation of Kabul and recovery of our captives by a fresh army—an avenging army. But our prestige,—what with this disaster to the British arms, the slaughter of the king the British Government had set up, and the destruction of the Government they sought to establish, the abandonment of the country they had invaded, and the restoration of the ruler they had deposed—with all these causes of destruction our prestige was not so easily regained; and to this day, with the Afghan, whatever the share of other causes, the Kabul disaster itself has obliterated the impression made by the previous victorious course of the British arms; and further, its effects on the national pride have not been effaced by the more recent occupation of the country by British troops.

In the later Afghan war of 1878-80, the British troops invaded the country under vastly more favourable conditions than any that obtained
in the preceding war. The Sindh and Panjab had long since become British territory, and were at this time traversed by railways well advanced towards the frontier. The frontier of British India was now well within the Baloch and Afghan national limits, and lay along the base of the Suleman range. Instead of a march of two or three months across foreign countries to reach the passes, as many days almost sufficed for the purpose; our frontier garrisons lying in close proximity to the passes—now no longer unknown ground—and their inhabitants readily amenable to the argument of rupees. The Russian frontier in Central Asia, or Turkistan, was at this time advanced to within easy reach of the Oxus and Herat boundaries of the Afghan State. The British troops employed in this war on and beyond the frontier exceeded eighty thousand men in number, attended by upwards of 100,000 camp-followers, and an innumerable multitude of transport animals, of which sixty thousand camels alone were destroyed in the service of the army in the field. As to the physique and armament of the troops, there was no longer any fair comparison. The Afghans were still armed with the national jazáll and chárah, and sword and shield, with a sprinkling here and there of Enfield and Snider rifles, carried off by deserters on the break-up of Sher Ali's government, and the dispersion of his soldiery. They were the same hardy, courageous, patriotic, and ferocious warriors as of yore, and showed no inclination to acknowledge the British superiority in arms.

As to the British troops, the European—though constituting a far greater proportion of the entire force than in the first Afghan war—was decidedly of inferior physique and powers of endurance; but he was armed with the best weapon of the day, the Henry-Martini rifle, true to 1,200 yards range. The native soldier, whether the Bengal, Bombay, or Madras sepoy (for they all took port in the war), each in successive gradation was inferior in physique and strength to the old stamp of Purubiya (discarded since the Mutiny), but he was better armed—with the Snider rifle. The artillery was all rifled and breech-loading, and infinitely more powerful than any previously known; whilst the cavalry were stronger than ever, with the breech-loading carbine and improved mountings.

At the outset of the war, when the British troops, thus armed, were opposed by Sher Ali's disciplined regiments, armed with the Enfields and Sniders, and served by the modern artillery with which, in the days of their friendship, the British had presented the Amir, they speedily defeated and dispersed them, and carried everything before them with irresistible force. But when the regular Afghan troops—disciplined in imitation of our army—were no longer an organized body; and the opponents of the British soldier in the field were the patriotic armed clansmen of the nation, with no sort of acknowledged tactics other than what instinct prompted at the moment, the unmeasured superiority of our arms, discipline, and science hardly came up to the standard of decisive results that was naturally to be expected, and on several occasions the British troops were forced to fight on the defensive; whilst throughout the campaign the British authority in the country was limited to the ground actually held by their troops.
The operations of the British troops against the Afghans were, to be sure, trumpeted cloud by newspaper correspondents with the army in no uncertain strain, and doubtless conduced to the self-gratulation and pride of the nation, if not also to the overweening conceit of the military commanders. But by the calm and unbiassed observer they were viewed more soberly from the standpoint of practical utility, the means employed, and the results obtained. To the mere civilian, looking at the vast superiority of armament, the exact discipline, and the reckless expense on the one side, and at the antiquated arms, the irregular order, and the strict economy on the other, the direct results of the British military operations appear altogether absurdly inadequate; whilst some of the most important of the military arrangements in the course of the campaign, even to his unprofessional eye, provoked a criticism in no sense complimentary to the skill or science of the professed soldier. To the military expert, viewing the subject from the same standpoint, there would naturally be a tendency to exaggerate the difficulties of field service on strange ground, against a barbarous enemy; but even in his view several glaring mistakes and inexcusable neglect of ordinary military precautions are acknowledged to have detracted largely from the credit of good generalship in this campaign.

The various prompt movements and successful fights of the British in the advance towards Kabul were represented by the newspapers with a glamour that—whilst it threw into the shade the equally meritorious proceedings of the forces employed towards Kandahar—diverted attention from the realities of the case, and produced a wrong idea of the nature of our victories and a false estimate of the actual capabilities of our troops; and nobody paused to reflect how matters would have gone had the enemy been on a par with our own troops in arms, organization, and science. But the subsequent experiences of our forces in Afghanistan, and the defensive attitude they were so often driven to adopt in face of attacks by the armed peasantry, soon gave cause for very serious reflection on the various bearings of so important a matter.

In the first Afghan war of forty years before, the British troops, armed with «Brown Bess», marched about the country and fought the tribesmen—armed then as now—in small or large detachments of Native troops commanded by a captain or a colonel. But in this war of 1878-80, our military expeditions against recalcitrant clansmen were undertaken with nothing short of a brigade of all arms—European and Native—armed with the Martini and Snider and rifled cannon, and yet with less uniform success than fell to the lot of the Sepoy detachments in the earlier war. The check our troops met with in Chardeh, and the ensuing successes of the enemy (without cannon or cavalry, but in overwhelming numbers, to a large extent armed only with pike and knife, and with a goodly sprinkling of unarmed followers) at Kabul itself in the Aoshar and Asmái affairs, leading to the immediate investment and siege of the British force, 7,000 strong and with a powerful artillery, in the Sherpûr cantonment in December, 1879—a siege happily raised a week or so later by the more attractive and profitable
plunder of the city and consequent dispersion of the enemy with their 
booty—recalled to mind the Kabul revolt and the incidents of December, 
1841, when the British entrenched camp, on the very site of the walled 
and fortified barracks of the Sherpur cantonment, was besieged by the 
rebels, intent, not on plundering the city, but on expelling the invader. 
And comparing the two parallel events, one can now justly treat with 
lenient criticism the failure of the British force—4,500 strong, armed 
with «Brown Bess» and smooth-bore muzzle-loading cannon—not to quell 
the revolt, for that in the circumstances of their case was an impos-
sibility, but to hold their camp under the heights of Bimaru (now in-
cluded with the Sherpur cantonment), occupied by the enemy, against 
the determined assaults of the hosts of an uprisen people.

In the Kabul revolt the British General was subordinate to the superior 
authority of the political chief; and the political chief was so entangled 
in the toils of negotiation with the rebel chiefs—not one of whom had 
he in his power—that even those inclined to assist the British were 
helpless to aid them in this crisis of their affairs. Moreover, communica-
tions were cut off on all sides, without a prospect of succour from 
any quarter. In the Sherpur siege the British General held the supreme 
authority, military and political; and he held moreover, fortunately, the 
most influential chiefs of the place and principal officers of the late 
Afghan Government in his own hands as prisoners in his own camp, 
whilst communications were not entirely cut off, and succour was 
speedily received from the division at Jalalabad.

What would have been the result if the plunder of Kabul had not 
demoralized and dispersed the besiegers of Sherpur cantonment, it is 
impossible to guess; for the defenders had but 300 rounds of ammuni-
tion per man left, and the Eastern Ghilzai tribes were ready to join 
the movement against us, headed by Muhammad Jan (the 44devant 
colonel of artillery in Sher Ali’s army), had it continued but a few 
days longer. The timely arrival of re-inforcements, however, hastened 
the departure of the last of the besiegers, and matters at once took a 
more favourable turn. The city was quickly re-occupied by the British, 
and order restored after a fashion; though our authority in the country 
extended nowhere beyond the range of our rifles. It is worth noting 
that, in the course of these events, one fact—as unexpected as it is 
remarkable in Afghan warfare—stood out clearly, and that is, that the 
Afghan warrior, when excited by fanaticism, does not fear the British 
soldier—European or Native—or his long-range weapons, but comes 
boldly on to get at close quarters, when he knows or believes that 
victory is his. It was so in the various actions in Chardeh and about 
Kabul leading to the investment of Sherpur. It was so at Ahmad Khel, 
in the determined attack of the Ghilzai clansmen upon General Stewart’s 
division marching from Kandahar to Kabul. It was so also in the defeat 
and destruction of our troops at Mywand, and in the ensuing siege of 
Kandahar itself. On all these occasions, except at Mywand, where Ayub 
Khan employed regular troops of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery 
(though even here the bulk of his force was composed of the tribesmen 
of the country), the enemy were the armed peasantry of the country,
with no cavalry, no artillery and no organization, but with over-abounding fanaticism.

An immense fuss has been made about the march of the division—specially prepared and equipped for the duty—which, as the closing performance of our military operations in Kabul, proceeded quickly a distance of 300 miles, at the rate of fifteen miles a day, from Kabul to the relief of Kandahar, and there defeated and dispersed the Herati force of Ayub Khan; as if, after all the extraordinary preparations made for the purpose, nothing out of the ordinary was to be expected. The force was undoubtedly a splendid body of picked troops—soldiers such as any nation would be proud to own—and it did its work right well; but it was nothing more than was to be expected, considering the means employed, and certainly needed none of the claptrap and puffing that has been expended upon it. No such fuss has been made, nor indeed more than very ordinary notice taken, of the far more arduous march of the division which a few months earlier marched from Kandahar to reinforce the army at Kabul, on account of the continued turbulence in Kohistan, and the menacing attitude of Sher Ali’s governor in Balkh, who had with him a strong division of the late Amir’s army, but chiefly on account of Abdurrahman’s appearance on the Balkh frontier—where he was speedily joined by the governor with his troops—as claimant of the throne of Afghanistan. Nevertheless this division, by the signal punishment of the enemy at Ahmad Khel, so effectually pacified that part of the country that the clansmen had no notion of again trying conclusions with the later division marching over the same ground on its way to Kandahar, and it passed on in no way disturbed.

The Kabul division of picked regiments, specially equipped for the march to Kandahr, was 10,000 strong (including a strong cavalry brigade and three mule batteries), with nearly as many camp followers, and upwards of 8,000 transport animals—all mules and yaboos—under a strong staff of transport officers. The division was preceded a day’s march ahead by an influential officer and party of subordinates appointed by the new Amir (for Abdurrahman was no ways averse to any attempt on our part to break up the increasing popularity and success of Ayub, his only rival in the country now) to procure supplies and clear the road of obstruction; which last part of their programme they performed by telling the tribesmen that the Amir was sending this party of the infidels out of the country by the way of Kandahar, and that if they stirred from their homes to disturb them, by so much as even throwing a stone, they did so at their peril. “It it the Amir’s command!” and the magic words took effect. The division in fact swung along in fine style, as was to be expected under such conditions, and met no difficulty of any kind throughout the march. On arrival at Kelati-i-Ghilzie they learned from the garrison (a detachment from Kandahar) holding that for that the siege of Kandahar had been raised by Ayub, who had withdrawn his army to the Argandab valley, a few miles to the northward of the city. The swarms of armed peasantry who had flocked to Ayub’s standard after his victory at Mywand now, on
the near approach of reinforcements converging on Kandahar from the north and south, quickly dispersed to their homes; and the ensuing operations against Ayub were undertaken without delay, the strength of the British army now at Kandahar enabling the General in command to assume the offensive with a well-provided force numerically stronger than that commanded by Ayub. The attack on the enemy’s position was promptly and skilfully planned, and as rapidly carried out on the 1st of September, 1880, with a vigour that ensured speedy success. The enemy, after a brief stand at Pir Pymal, were defeated and put to flight, abandoning their camp at Mazra, with all their tents, baggage, and the whole of their artillery, to the victors; but Ayub and his army escaped us scot free.

Considering the course events had taken at Kandahar since the disaster at Mywand on the 27th July preceding, the victory at Pir Pymal shone out conspicuously as a fitting close to the operations of our armies in Afghanistan prior to their impending evacuation of the country in which they had met such varied experiences, both at Kabul and at Kandahar. In regard to the latter, it should be borne in mind that in criticizing the conduct of affairs by the military authorities there due allowance should be made for the difficulties of their situation. The siege of Kandahar, with its British garrison at that time of 4,000 men, was in no way comparable with the far less serious state of affairs in the investment of Sherpur, with its British garrison of 7,000 strong; because the latter had the place to themselves, whereas the former were shut up with the city population, a large portion of which was declaredly hostile to them. The defenders of Sherpur, though nearly twice as numerous as those of Kandahar, had a smaller and more compact position to hold, and entirely free from risk of internal attack or treachery. No such advantages obtained with the weak garrison of the large walled city of Kandahar, which, with enemies in their midst, had a far more perilous and arduous task before them. In both cases the enemy withdrew and raised the state of siege on the near approach of reinforcements, and then in both instances the British troops quickly retrieved their honour and safety. Though that such mishaps as the investment of Sherpur and the siege of Kandahar should be possible with organized troops, armed and disciplined as were the British forces in Afghanistan, is, considering the arms and ignorance of the enemy, somewhat surprising, and may well afford food for serious reflection.

Immediately after the Kandahar division left Kabul, the remainder of the force at the latter place marched away (11th and 12th August, 1880), on its return to India; and the Amir Abdurrahman at once took possession of our abandoned cantonment, and the various fortified positions our engineers had erected about the city, all of which were now handed over to him in thorough order, with a supply of arms and ammunition, and a round sum of twenty lakhs of rupees to start him fairly in his government. His first act, after the departure of the British, was to seal up the country against communication on the side of India, and the next to search out the partisans of Sher Ali, and those who had assisted the British during their occupation of Kabul. The first
were blood-feud enemies; the others, fair game to squeeze for the ill-gotten wealth amassed from the rupee-scattering infidel. For it was a common saying with the Afghans in respect to our way of waging war: «This is not war; this is playing with rupees». And doubtless Abdurrahman wrung out a goodly proportion of the many lakhs our politicals had distributed here, there, and everywhere; and to what good purpose our military commanders perhaps can say. Anyhow, the unfortunates who assisted the British, and could not quit their homes with the retiring invaders, had a sorry time of it at the hands of our new friend, the most superior and intelligent Afghan our politicals had ever had to deal with. Ay, and the most shrewd and masterful as well.

With Abdurrahman installed as Amir at Kabul, and our armies on the march back to India, the third Afghan war came to a close. The first Afghan war was an unjust, unprovoked, unpolitic, and unnecessary aggression by the British Government, and ended in disastrous failure; they ousted and sent into captivity an independent prince who had done us no injury, but desired only our friendship and alliance; they put in his place, under British tutelage, an effete puppet, who perished in the midst of our own disasters, and then replaced the very ruler they had dethroned; and, though amicable diplomatic relations were ultimately established between the Government of India and the wronged prince, the war produced no other result, as between the British and the Afghan peoples, than a lasting hatred and suspicion each of the other. And all this at a cost to the revenues of India of twenty millions of money. The second Afghan war,—short sharp, and decisive,—was undertaken against the son and appointed successor of the prince we had dethroned in the first war. Having at first abandoned his cause, the Government of India afterwards, on his establishing his authority independently of their aid, took him by the hand and made him powerful, and then by mismanagement drove him to enmity. His flight and death brought the war to an early close. The third Afghan war was but a renewal of the second, and the two together cost the revenues of India another twenty millions. The war was renewed to avenge an act of grievous treachery under the commencing rule of the son of the preceding prince (whose power we had destroyed but a few short months before)—a broken-spirited and incapable ruler, whom the Government of India had set on the throne only to dethrone and deport as a political prisoner. The punishment dealt out threw the country into anarchy, and destroyed all semblance of government, which the British did nothing to re-establish; till at last, weary of the confusion they had created, and averse to further complications, the Government grasped at a new claimant, set forward by a rival Power as the rightful heir to the vacant throne, and eagerly making him their own choice, abandoned the country unconditionally to his power, on a mere verbal understanding of friendship; which friendship on their part has been steadily importunated by large grants of money and arms, by a subsidy of a lakh of rupees a month at first, to be doubled, trebled, or quadrupled in prospect, and by a moral support of so very lenient a character as to bear more the semblance of subserviency; which friendship on the part of Amir Abdurrahman has been steadily granted just in the degree
it has been paid for. He has certainly abstained from any act of overt hostility against his very liberal paymasters; he has received and protected a very numerous staff of extravagantly equipped Boundary Commissioners, at an equally exorbitant charge for the favour; but he has shown no cordiality, nor any desire for a rapprochement that does not yield rupees. At what limit the Amir's appetite for Indian rupees will rest satisfied, and at what limit the Government of India will stop the supply from inability to continue it, are curious problems awaiting solution. These three Afghan wars, what with military expenses, political disbursements, State subsidies, and pensions to exiled princes and chiefs, have already cost the revenues of India a good fifty millions of pounds sterling, and have yielded in return the acquisition of two undoubtedly valuable positions, dominating the interior of the country, but have left the people and ruler as independent and out of hand as ever.

As soon as Abdurrahman had been acknowledged as Amir, the governor whom the British had established at Kandahar, the Wali Sher Ali Khan—there being a longstanding family feud between the two—found his position no longer tenable without the support of a British garrison, and as this was not forthcoming, he soon resigned his position, and retired to India as one more costly addition to the host of pensioners thrown upon the suport of the Government of India by the events of the war. Ayub, too, after his crushing defeat at Kandahar, fled to Persia, where he was interned as a pensioner at the cost of the British. And thus Amir Abdurrahman soon obtained in its integrity the country he came to claim—the Afghanistan consolidated by his grandfather, Amir Dost Muhammad Khan. On the instalment of Abdurrahman as Amir at Kabul, a large number of the members of the late Amir Sher Ali's family, together with chiefs and government officials, who had taken a prominent part as his partisans during the civil war of 1864-69, now sought safety in exile, and quitted their homes with the retiring British army, and with a prudence of foresight that was not belied. For the new Amir had no sooner settled down to his government, than he set to work to eradicate all possible chances of its internal disturbance; and a reign of terror ensued which has not yet, after a decade of endurance, entirely ceased.

The vigilance with which Abdurrahman closed all communication with India, except such as he himself chose to permit, rendered it most difficult to learn anything of what he was doing; and though, by agreement with the Government of India, he received a Native Agent at Kabul, and appointed one of his own in return with the Viceroy, the information obtainable by these channels was of the most meagre and unsatisfactory description. It was known, however, that on one side were continuous communications with Russian agents, and on the other repeated assurances of friendship, coupled with large expectations of money to enable him carry on his government; and all the time a diligent removal of obnoxious persons and coercing of merchants for money,—by the lopping of heads, imprisonment, and torture, by confiscations of property, and extortion of fines,—was carried on to an extent
that paralyzed trade and made his very name a terror. The parallel deeds of Theebaw, the Burman king, so loudly denounced by the British when they decided to annex his rich country, were thrown into the shade by the atrocities of our Amir Abdurrahman, who, as the Government did not desire to annex his poor country, they in the same breath belauded as a firm and strong ruler; although he was hunting up and executing as traitors all he could seize of those who had helped us during the war. Abdurrahman having thus secured himself at home by the destruction of his own enemies and of our partisans, and being assured of the friendship of the British, was now at leisure to give attention to their business with him in regard to the delimitation of the north-west boundary of his country. The settlement of this boundary had been a subject of diplomatic correspondence between the British and Russian Governments prior to the accession of Abdurrahman to the throne of Afghanistan, and the opportunity was now taken to bring the matter to a final settlement. The Amir's friendly reception and protection of the numerous staff of British officers, with their military escort and followers, forming the Afghan Boundary Commission, was secured (in 1883) by the payment of the handsome monthly subsidy of a lakh of rupees, whilst the money so freely spent by the Commission itself rendered them, as guests of the Amir, very acceptable visitors amongst the tribes of that frontier, who had no national antipathies nor personal grievances against the British. The rapprochement at this time between the Government of India and the Amir of Afghanistan was closer than at any previous period since the instalment of Abdurrahman in the rule of that country; and the opportunity was seized to invite him to meet the Viceroy of India for the purpose of strengthening the alliance and entente cordiale between the two Governments. The meeting between Lord Dufferin and Amir Abdurrahman took place at Rawalpindi, in April, 1885; but of the nature of the business transacted on this occasion nothing has, up to the present time, been revealed. Not, it is said, because there was nothing done in the way of a settled understanding, nor because what was done would not bear the light, but because, and perhaps very properly so, it was deemed essentially expedient that this trump card in the game of Central Asian politics should be held as the winning cast.

Be this as it may, the reticence of the Government did not check the curiosity or prevent the speculations of its subjects and tax-payers. By those who pretended or were supposed to be in the secrets of Government it was self-complacently asserted that the British Government had gained all that it desired, and now held the Afghan Amir in the hollow of its hands. But by those who enjoyed no such advantages, and could judge only from the outward semblance of affairs, it was feared that the astute Amir had got his British negotiators pretty firmly under his heel, and had drawn another big haul out of the by no means very full Indian treasure chest. Now, whatever the nature of the agreement or compact made and signed at this meeting in 1885, it is quite clear from the course of the subsequent diplomatic relations between the shrewd potentate of Afghanistan and the hopeful Government of India, that those relations have not proved to be exactly such as the
Government of India could consider as at all satisfactory. It was known at the time that the Amir came to Rawalpindi, that his mind was inflated with a portentous expectation of rupees—the coin which, seemingly, was the principal commodity and accommodation he required at our hands. His friends gave out that when Abdurrahman was approaching Kabul to claim his throne, he had been promised—or so understood it—a sum of five krors of rupees (five millions of pounds sterling), to establish him peaceably in his government as an ally of the British. Incredible as this is, there is no doubt that Abdurrahman has, ever since his connection with us, evinced an eager desire for our money, and has doled out his friendship only in proportion to our advances of it.

It is now proposed to largely increase the large subsidy the Amir Abdurrahman has enjoyed during the past seven years since 1883, from the Government of India; and it is to be hoped that with this addition to his regular stipend, and the large sums previously lavished on him, the British Government will at last get in return for their large outlay from the revenues of India something tangible in the way of material advantage to our at present unsatisfactory position in relation to the control of the country he rules as the friend of both Russia and Great Britain. If the Amir Abdurrahman, with his friendship divided between the two great rival Powers of Asia, is really willing and able now to join the British heartily and honestly in opening out the country he rules by means of railways, extended from Peshawur to Kabul, and from Quetta to Kandahar and Herat, as the first step to a really profitable commerce, and a real community of interests, then we can well afford to help him handsomely to maintain order in his country. But if his allowances are to be increased unconditionally merely on a more loudly protested friendship, without some show of its reality by an earnest acquiescence and active participation in carrying out the British programme, then any more grants of rupees made to him will be merely so much more money thrown away.

Perhaps, in this commercial age, it is more profitable to buy our way into the country than to fight our way into it, particularly considering the way we wage war, or at least have hitherto waged war in Afghanistan; and more particularly considering the fact that we handed over to the Amir Abdurrahman a Kabul more strongly fortified—by ourselves—than the place had ever been before. But whatever the British Government may now do to secure the paramount influence in Afghanistan, it must fall short of what was to have been realized had we annexed and settled the country once for all twenty-five or even twelve years ago. By this time, under such periods of British rule, interest would have been created to bind the Afghans to British rule, similar to those that now bind the people of India to it. Not, to be sure, from any sentiment of love or respect for their British rulers, but purely from motives of self-interest and of attachment to the Government, which here, as wherever else it has taken root, has brought them peace, plenty, and security. It is useless, however, at this hour of the day to dwell on the advantages conferred by the British rule, and on
the lost opportunities of extending it in this direction, when time presses forward with increasing strides to the day of settlement. Whether the British will now be permitted to settle Afghanistan in their own interests as masters of India, without disturbance by rival powers claiming a share in the possession of the country, is a point which the not distant future will assuredly show forth. And if our next warfare in Afghanistan is to be against troops equally well armed and organized as our own, and manoeuvred, too, with European science, we must be prepared to face difficulties infinitely greater than any our armies have had to encounter and overcome in our previous warfare in that country. And if our previous wars in Afghanistan have proved costly, troublesome, and difficult, and a serious strain upon the resources of India in money, men, cattle, and food,—notwithstanding the allowance to be made in respect to the altered conditions of difficulty affecting some of these items, on account of the facilities afforded by the development of our Indian railway system up to the frontier of Afghanistan,—any future war in that country against a European rival will assuredly prove tenfold more costly, troublesome, and difficult. And if we mean to command success and respect for our arms, it will be necessary to make some important changes in our method of doing things. It will not do to purchase our supplies at eight or ten times the market rate and then pay for the carriage to our camp. It will not do to purchase the goodwill of district nobles and local chiefs and then to allow their people with impunity to harry the roads and murder our soldiers and followers falling out from the ranks or venturing beyond our sentry lines. Most of our troubles in Afghanistan were due to our loss of respect in the eyes of the people from and incomprehensible disregard of the prompt and obvious measures necessary to be taken on our part to stop once for all any repetition of such evidences of hostility, by an exemplary punishment of the responsible chiefs.

Difficulties of this kind are, however, easily to be overcome by a proper change in our tactics. But it is not so with the difficulty of expense. It is the expenditure on our armies which will be the crucial test of our final success. If Russia is to be our enemy in the next Afghan war—which is generally believed to be now more imminent than ever—she can ruin us in India by the adoption of tactics prolonging the war beyond the endurance of the Indian revenues, considering the little expense of her system of warfare as compared with ours. It is not our purpose to enter upon any consideration of the military capabilities of the two rival nations—Britain and Russia—upon the battlefield of Afghanistan, especially as the war would not be confined to the limited area of that country. But it is well to bear in mind, what history has so often proved, that wealth, luxury, and extravagance, with their products—sentimentality, hypocrisy, and pretended philanthropy—are not the qualifications calculated to fit a nation for successful warfare against the want, the hardiness, and the thrift of the barbarian, with his brutality, enthusiasm, and earnestness of purpose. Yet such is the prospect looming ahead.
For more than fifty years past it has been the steadily avowed policy of the British Government, in regard to Afghanistan, to maintain the integrity of the country as an independent State in friendly alliance with itself, and subordinate to itself alone in its foreign relations. In pursuance of this policy, the British in 1839-40, went to war with Persia for the independence of Herat, and at the same time with the Amir of Kabul, Dost Muhammed Khan, in favour of the Shah Shuja'. After the failure of the Shat Shuja' experiment, they restored Dost Muhammed to his country, and in 1855 established friendly relations with him as Amir of Kabul, Balkh, and Kandahar. Two years later they again went to war with Persia for the independence of Herat, and at the same time confirmed the existing amicable relations with Dost Muhammed by a treaty of friendship and alliance, accompanied by moral and material support in the shape of an embassy, and gifts of arms and ammunition, and the grant of a handsome subsidy. With such aid and the countenance of the British, the Amir Dost Muhammed, was enabled to annex (in 1863) Herat to his rule, and thus to consolidate the country as an independent State under the government of a single chief. The death of Dost Muhammed occurred shortly after this event, and then ensued the Afghan civil war of five years duration, between his sons for the Amirship. In this contest the British Government abstained from interference in the internal affairs of the country, until Sher Ali Khan, the late Amir's appointed heir and successor, finally succeeded in recovering his rights, and, in 1868-69, re-establishing himself at Kabul as Amir. The British Government now extended to him the hand of friendship, and by a freely granted support soon made him the most powerful Amir Afghanistan had yet seen. Ten years later the British went to war with their intractable protégé; and Sher Ali, flying his capital to seek the promised aid of Russia, was cut off by death on the frontier of his own territory in that direction. His son, Ya'cub Khan, now succeeded to the rule, but having no excuse of quarrel, or desire to continue hostilities with the British, he was immediately accepted as the new Amir of Afghanistan; a treaty of friendship and cession of territory was at once concluded, and Ya'cub Khan was confirmed as the Amir with a British Envoy at his capital, in July, 1879.

The Amir Ya'cub was hardly settled down to the new order of things in the Afghan Government when a mutiny amongst his troops at Kabul led to the attack and destruction of the British Embassy, and the sudden collapse of the Amir's authority, and the break-up of his Government. On this the war was immediately resumed, and Kabul and Kandahar were again speedily occupied by British armies. Now followed a period of indecision as to the final disposal of the country, which, amidst the numerous candidates for our favour and the throne, lay upon our hands without a ruler, and with all semblance of orderly government completely destroyed; whilst constant hostilities with the people, impatient of the presence of our troops in their country, only quickened the desire of the British to be quit of their troublesome burden. In this dilemma, Abdurrahman Khan issued from his asylum with the Russians and entered Afghanistan, with a rapidly increasing force, as the rightful
Amir, and heir to the independent State consolidated by the Amir Dost Muhammed Khan.

Overtures were at once made by the British for the unconditional transfer of Kabul to his authority as a friendly neighbour, as the time fixed for the withdrawal of the British forces was nigh at hand. Abdurrahman took the offers made to him with leisurely composure, and, whilst summoning the tribes to be ready to join his standard, plainly informed the British that although he desired their friendship, he had also obligations of gratitude to his Russian patrons, and that it was his hope to live in peace under the joint protection of Russia and Britain. With these frank avowals on his lips, Abdurrahman was not considered less eligible, but was considered even more eligible for the Amirship, on the ground that by the diplomatic understanding come to between the British and Russian Governments, the latter was pledged to abstain from interference in the politics of Afghanistan, as a country acknowledged to be beyond the sphere of Russian interests. And so—at a moment of pressing exigency in regard to our military position in the country—the British, without loss of time, proclaimed Abdurrahman as Amir, and, by way of friendship, gave him a large sum of money to meet his immediate wants; and, as a further token of confidence, transferred Kabul to him, together with all the new fortifications erected by our engineers—handed over intact as evacuated by our troops.

By this acknowledgment of Abdurrahman—the avowed friend of Russia and of Great Britain—the British Government made a notable departure from the policy they had steadily pursued during the preceding half-century of their relations with Afghanistan, and supported by a succession of costly wars and long years of subsidies. Heretofore the British had succeeded in keeping the Afghan Amirs, each in succession, by treaty engagement, as the friend of their friends and the enemy of their enemies, and moreover subordinate to British control in respect to their foreign relations. But now, with an Amir of Afghanistan who is an avowed friend of Russia as well as of Great Britain, these advantages no longer obtain, and the political relations between the British Government and the Afghan Amir must necessarily be based upon other considerations and conditions. The meeting at Rawalpindi in 1885 between the Indian Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, and the Afghan ruler, Amir Abdurrahman, may have settled matters on a new basis; but from the course taken by diplomatic relations between the British and Afghan Governments since that event, the arrangement then made, whatever its nature, has not answered the expectations of the Government of India. It is indeed impossible to work satisfactorily with a middleman whose interests are divided between his two great rival neighbours, and the day cannot be far off when the two principals must deal directly together for the final settlement of the line up to which each is entitled, by his position in Asia, to extend his authority. How this question is likely to be settled is a matter of speculation; but we must remember that the countries draining to the Oxus and Herat rivers are not Afghan soil, and this fact will probably be utilized to some purpose in the final settlement of the Afghan Amirship.
Tradition says that the eldest descendant of Israel was Abdal Ahlko.

- Abdallah Khan
- Sahib
- Daud Khan
- Nek
- Imdad Khan
- Khizar Khan
- Omair Khan
- Mothimmed Khan
- Wali
- Umar

There are five or six other younger brothers, and so many younger brothers and sisters.

Pedigree of Dost Mohammad Khan.

Mohammed Asad Khan
- Longford
- Akbar Mohammad Zaman Khan
- Namb
- Quraish Khan
- Shaikh Muhammad Amjad Khan
- Navab Mohammad Khan
- Sardar Muhammad Unman Khan
- Amir Mohammad Khan
- Shams Ud Din Khan

- Mohammed Akbar Khan
- Mohammad Ali Khan
- Mohammad Amir Khan
- Mohammad Nasir Khan

The descendants of Dost Mohammad Khan have many younger brothers and sisters.
THE HISTORY OF HERAT

By Col. G. B. Malleson

CHAPTER I

The New Frontier

I propose to devote a few pages to a description of the country which is known to past ages as the granary and garden of Central Asia [...] Herat.

James Fraser, a gentleman who explored Khorasan in 1821-22, and who published three years later an account of his travels, thus describes that country. «Situated», he wrote, «on the borders of the two great divisions of the Asiatic world, Irán and Turan (1) and occupying a portion of both, Khorasan was continually a subject of dispute between the monarchs of each, and sometimes fell wholly into the power of the one, sometimes of the other. Whether in the more limited sense of its name, as a province, or in the more enlarged acceptation, as a state of no mean importance, it was the scene of mighty operations; and many of the greatest atrocities and severest conquests Asia ever witnessed, were committed in its cities, and took place upon its plains.»

This description in no way exaggerates the importance of this border land. The people who inhabited it were in all respects worthy of their country. They were brave, hardy, and enterprising. If in the mountains of Khorasan the rulers of Persia have found the firmest bulwarks against the Turanians, in the inhabitants they have found their bravest warriors. Western Khorasan is, in fact, the Parthia of the Romans, the home of the warriors who first lowered the pride of the Roman legions. It was leading the descendants of these men that Nadir Shah, himself a Khorasani, conquered Afghanistan and over-ran the Panjab and northern India. The position of the province and the capabilities of its people impressed themselves so strongly on the mind of that conqueror that he styled Khorasan «the Sword of Persia.» «Whoever,» he is reported to have said, «holds in his hand that sword, possessing the brain-capacity to wield it aright, is lord alike of Iran and of Turan.» Nadir Shah exemplified the truth of the aphorism.

The limits of the country known as Khorasan have varied with time and circumstances. James Fraser, however, taking into account its natural lines and the political considerations affecting them, thus assigns the boundaries of the country.

«A line», he writes, «swerving but little from the meridian, and marked in its greatest extents by deserts, skirting the districts of Ispahan and Kashan, and meeting the Elburz mountains near Deh Nimak, (2) will divide Khorasan from Irak on the west. If this line from its northern
extremity be continued in an easterly direction nearly to the meridian of Jahjarm, and thence crossing the mountains in a northerly course to the plains of Gurgaon at their feet, it will enter the desert on the eastern side of the Caspian Sea and touch the steppe of Khwarizm. It is not easy, nor is it of much importance, to decide in what part of the great desert that occupies the whole space between the feet of the Elburz range and the Oxus, the northern limits of Khorasan should be placed; politically speaking, it does not at present extend beyond the feet of these mountains. To the eastward it may properly be allowed to include the districts of Sarrakhs, Hazarah and Balai Murghab, and a line running between these and the dependencies of Balkh, in a direction nearly south, including the districts of Herat and touching Sistan, would circumscribe Khorasan on the east; Kerman and part of Fars upon the south complete the boundaries.»

[...]  

CHAPTER II

Herat

«Khorasan,» runs the Eastern proverb, «is the oyster-shell of the world, and Herat is its pearl.» This once splendid city is situated 34° 26' N., 62° 8' E., two thousand six hundred and fifty feet above the sea, in the valley of the river Herirud, which runs below it. The Herirud rises in the mountains of Hazarah, not far from the village of Robat Tarwan. Under the name of Jangal-ab, it flow in a southwesterly direction to a point below Daolatyar, a village on the direct road between. Herat and Bamian. At this point it is joined by another branch, the Sir Tingalab, which rises likewise in the Hazarah ranges, though at a point somewhat more to the south-east than the upper branch. From the point of junction, the united rivers, taking the name of Herirud, follow an almost direct westerly course south of the Parapomisan range and pass south of Herat. Some fifty miles beyond that city the Herirud takes a turn to the north-west and then to the north, receiving many waters in its course, and passing Sarrakhs just to the west of it. Not far from this place it loses the name of Herirud and assumes that of Tajand. Under this name it flows northwestward, till it is finally lost in the sand and swamps of the great Turkman desert.

At the point already indicated, where the Herirud receives the waters of the Sir Tangal-ab, the river traverses a broad valley, which it adorns and fertilises. All along this valley channels from the river spread over its broad surface, converting deserts into cornfields and waste land into fruit gardens. Its water is singularly bright and pure. Runnings swiftly, it never fails. The supply has ever been equal to the demand, even in the days when Herat was the most famous city of Central Asia, possessing alike the most brilliant court and the most splendid commercial mart in the eastern world.

The city of Herat is the principal city in this valley. According to Conolly, (3) whose account of it is most graphic, the city is situated «at
four miles distance from hills on the north, and twelve from those which run south of it. The space between the hills is one beautiful extent of little fortified villages, gardens, vineyards, and corn-fields, and this rich scene is brightened by many small streams of shining water, which cut the plain in all directions. A dam is thrown across the Herirud, and its waters, being turned into many canals, are so conducted over the vale of Herat that every part of it is watered. Varieties of the most delicious fruits are grown in the valley, and they are sold cheaper even than at Mashad; the necessaries of life are plentiful and cheap, and the bread and water of Herat are a proverb for their excellence. I really never, in England even, tasted more delicious water than that of the Herirud: it is «as clear as tears,» and, the natives say, only equalled by the waters of Kashmir, which make those who drink them beautiful.»

Herat can boast of very great antiquity. It is mentioned by very early writers. Ibn Haukal, who lived in the tenth century (4), gives a glowing description of its citadel, its buildings, its gardens, and speaks even of a church of the Christians, probably the Nestorians. Edrisi, (5) who lived nearly two hundred years later, but who apparently never visited the city, wrote of it in terms not less glowing. Abulfeda, who lived at Herat during the fourteenth century, adds but little to previous information. But the accounts of all these writers tend to prove how famous was the city and how magnificent were its buildings.

Ibn Batuta, who visited the city about the same time, 1340, wrote of it as the most important city in Khorasan; «a province,» he added, «which in Herat and Nishapur possesses two most flourishing cities with fertile lands depending upon them, and two which had been so, but which lay in ruins, Balkh and Merv.»

These writers testify to the great prosperity of Herat during the four hundred years of which they successively wrote. The buildings which half a century ago still remained speak of its pristine splendour. «We ascended,» wrote Conolly in 1831, «by one hundred and forty steps to the top of the highest minaret, and thence looked down upon the city, and the rich gardens and vineyards round and beyond it—a scene so varied and beautiful, that I can imagine nothing like it, except perhaps in Italy.» Some idea of the magnificence of the buildings and the extent of the city may be derived from the perusal of the following extract from the memoirs of the Emperor Babar, who visited the city in 1506, and who learned there to realise some of the joys of existence. His visit, be it borne in mind, took place after the city had suffered from the ravages of Chingiz Khan and of Timur. «During the twenty days that I stayed in Heri,» (6) wrote Babar, «I every day rode out to visit some new place that I had not seen before. My guide and provodector in these visits was Yusuf Ali Gokultash who always got ready a sort of collation, in some suitable place where we stopped. In the course of these twenty days I saw perhaps everything worthy of notice except the Khanekah (or convent) of Sultan Husen Mirza. I saw the bleaching-ground, the garden of Ali Shir Beg, the paper mills, the Takht Astaneh (or royal throne); the bridge of Kah; the Khardistan, the Bagh-i-Nazar-gah; the Niamat-abad; the Khiaban, or public pleasure walks; the Khatirat of Sultan Ahmad Mirza; the Takht (7)-i-Safar, or Safar Palace; the Takht-i-Nawai; the Takht-i-Barkir; the Takht-i-Haji Beg; and the Hakhts of Shekh Baha-udin Umar, and Shekh Zain-udin; the mausoleum and tomb of Mulana Abdul-rahman Jam; the Ninazghah-i-Mukhtar, or place of prayer; the fishpond; the Sak-i-Suliman; Balmerti, which was originally called Abul Walid; the Imam Takhr; the Bagh-i-Khiaban; the colleges and tombs of the Mirza; the college of Guher-shad Begam, her tomb, and her grand mosque; the Bagh-i-Zaghan (or Raven Garden); the Bagh-i-nou (or New Garden); the Bagh-i-Zobeideh (or Zobeideh's Garden); the Aksarai, or White Palace, built by Sultan Abusaid Mirza, which is situated close by the Irak gate; Puran and Sufeh-i-Sirandazar (the Warrior's Seat); Chirg Alanik and Mir Wahid; the Bridge of Malan; the Khwajeh Tak (Khwajeh's Porch), and
The Indus Valley according to Ibn Haukel.
Bagh-i-Sufed (White Garden); the Tarab-Khana (Pleasure House); the Bagh-i-Jahanara; the Kioshk and Makavi Khaneh (or Mansion of Enjoyment); the Sosni-Khana (or Lily Palace); the Doazdeh Burf, or twelve towers; the great reservoir on the north of the Jahanara; the four edifices on its four sides; the five gates of the town walls, the King's Gate, the Irak Gate, the Firozabad Gate, the Khushe Gate, and the Kipchak Gate; the King's Bazar; the Charsu or great Public Market; the college of Shekh-ul-Islam; the Grand Mosque of the Kings; the Bagh-i-Shahar, or City Garden; the College of the Badia-i-zaman Mirza, which is built on the banks of the River Anjil; Ali Shir Beg's dwelling-house, which they call Unsia (or Palace of Ease); his tomb and great mosque; his college and convent, his baths and hospital; all these I saw in the short space I had to spare.\textsuperscript{1} Wearisome as the repetition of names may be found, I know no other description which brings so vividly to the mind the splendour of Herat as Herat was before it had been plundered and desolated by the Afghans.

The origin of Herat can be traced far into antiquity. To the ancients the province of which it is the capital was known as Aria and Ariana.\textsuperscript{2} The name was, in the course of time, gradually changed to Heri—a name which still survives in the river flowing to the south of it, Herirud, the river of Heri—and later to Herat. It is mentioned by the earliest writers, and has often served as a residence of the greatest conquerors of the East. Tradition has brought here Nebuchadnezzar and Semiramis. The Persian historians assert, with a remarkable unanimity, that Alexander the Great gave it its earliest name of Artakoana. Arrian writes of it as Artakoana or Artakana, the royal city of the inhabitants of Aria. There can be no doubt, at any rate, that the city of the time of the Macedonians was the gate through which Alexander the Great passed to the conquest of India.

It is difficult to trace the history of Herat between the era of the conquest of India by Alexander (327 B.C.) and the devastation of the city by Chingiz Khan (1221-22). But if I pass over this period of fifteen hundred and fifty years more lightly than I could wish, I shall be able to dwell with more detail on the Herat of the middle ages—the Herat which commanded all the trade of Asia—to indicate the causes which led to its decline, and to show how, its place having been unappropriated by any other city, it is possible now to restore to it its pristine splendour, to make it once again the granary and garden of Central Asia.

According to Ferishta\textsuperscript{3} Khorasan with its capital Herat was conquered in 651 A.D. by Abdulla bin Amir, Governor of Basrah, for the Caliph Othman. It was then that the faith of Islam was spread throughout the border-land of Iran and Turan. In the course of a few years Khorasan and the country beyond the Oxus devolved upon the princes of the house of Samani, whose capital was Bokhara. Towards the end of the tenth century, however, Khorasan, severed from Turanian Asia, formed part of the country which procured its independence under Sabaktaghin, father of the renowned Mahmud of Ghazni.
What Herat was at this period I have already described. (10) The city was already famous for the magnificence of its buildings. The districts around it were even then proverbial for their fertility. Already Herat had become a commercial centre of no ordinary attraction. In spite of the fact that the times were unsettled, that the border-land between Iran and Turan was frequently the battleground for empire, this prosperity never wavered. There was a magic in the situation—the centre where the roads from Bokhara, from Persia, from India converged—in its fertile and well-watered valley, that preserved Herat, even in the ordinary times of a troublous era, from devastation and plunder.

Not, however, that the fair city remained unmolested in the hands of the Ghaznivides. Whilst the most renowned of that race, the famous Mahmud, was engaged in his raids against India, there arose in Transoxiana a family whose fame was destined to equal that of his own. Thogrul Beg—the son of Mikail, the son of Seljuk—the founder of the Seljuk dynasty, was born in Transoxiana in the beginning of the eleventh century. In the early portion of the second half of that century he crossed the Oxus with his followers, known in history as the Seljuki Turks, and, defeating the army of Masaod, son of Mahmud of Ghazni, possessed himself of the city of Nishapur. Recognised as king in that city and in the districts dependent upon it, he resolved to extend his sway over all Khorasan. With this view he despatched (A.H. 429, A.D. 1038) his brother Giafar Beg to Herat. Herat was conquered. Merv, assailed by Thogrul Beg in person, yielded to his might, and in a very short time the remainder of the province acknowledged him as Sultan. Thogrul Beg, consigning Herat to the care of one of his uncles, made Merv the capital of the province. «Having established there his royal residence» writes the historian, «he gave new laws to all the country of Khorasan, by which all the disorders and injustice which had been perpetrated there for a long time were repressed.» (11)

The conquest of Herat and the occupation of Khorasan by the Seljuks gave a permanent character to the population alike of the city and the province. The indigenous inhabitants would seem to have been Persians. The settlement in large numbers of the Seljuks who came with Thogrul Beg caused the first graft of a new blood on the original stock. The Mughals who subsequently came with Chingiz Khan and the Turko-Tartars who followed Timur still further affected the strain. The result has been the collective name of Char Aimak, and the subdivision of the people into the Jemshidi, Firuzkuhi, and Taimani or Timuri (12).

The nephew and successor of Thogrul Beg, the renowned Alp Arslan—the prince of whom d'Herbelot records that he had seen at the foot of his throne two hundred princes or sons of princes paying him their court—retained Khorasan and Herat during his reign. He died at Merv (13) A.H. 465, A. D. 1072. Khorasan continued under Seljuk rule during the reigns of Malik Shah, son of Alp-Arslan (who died A.D. 1092); of
Map of Afghanistan in 1890. After Andrees Handatlas 1893.
Barkiarok, son of Malik Shah (who died A.D. 1104); of his brother, Galathudin (who died A.D. 1117); and of his brother, a very famous prince, Sangiar, who died, after a glorious reign of forty years, in A.D. 1158. Mahmud, a son of the sister of Sangiar, reigned, according to the historian Khondemir, five years in Khorasan after his uncle's death. At the expiration of this term one of the great lords of the country revolted against him, defeated him, and deprived him of his eye-sight. The result of this successful rebellion was the severance of Khorasan from the Seljuk dynasty. The larger portion of the province, including Herat, fell under the dominion of the Sultans of Khwarizm (Khiva); the remainder was occupied by the rebels. Within a few years, however, the several parts were united under the rule of Muhammad Khan, King of Khwarizm, A.D. 1199. For a moment, indeed, (A.D. 1207,) Herat fell into the possession of the united forces of Mahmud, the titular successor of the last of the Ghori dynasty, and of Kutb-ud-din, the founder of the slave dynasty of Hindustan; but, attempting to penetrate thence into the country now known as Afghan Turkistan, the two princes were defeated by Muhammad Khan, and dispossessed of all their conquests. From that moment till the appearance of Chingiz Khan the rule of the Sultan of Khwarizm in Herat was unquestioned.

The faint outline of the history of Herat, sufficient, perhaps, for the purposes of this narrative, is thus brought up to the year 1219. Throughout this period the prosperity of the province had been increasing. In that year it seemed assured. The records of the period assert that there were then in the city twelve thousand retail shops; six thousand public baths, caravansaries, and water-mills; three hundred and fifty schools and monastic institutions; a hundred and forty-four thousand occupied houses; and that the city was yearly visited by caravans from all parts of Asia.

This prosperity received its first terrible blow from Chingiz Khan [Jenghiz Khan, 1162-1227]. This conqueror, the leader of the Mongols [or Mughals], having first asserted his authority over his own people, marched at their head to devastate Asia. In the course of a few years he established his supremacy over the vast country bordered in the east by China, in the north and the west by the Volga and the Caspian. Proclaimed the Great Khan of the Tartars, he, at the beginning of the year 1219, had conquered Western China, and had penetrated as far as Pekin.

He then turned his arms against the kingdom of which Herat formed a component part, and of which Muhammad Khan was the ruler. That kingdom, including, besides Herat, Bokhara, Samarkand, Khokand, Kashgar, Persia, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan as far as the Indus, fell before the invader. Every conquered city felt the fury of his warriors. According to the Khurasani historian, Khondemir, (14) a native of Herat, that city suffered by the two stormings of Chingiz Khan a loss of a million and a half of men. For there were two stormings of Herat. The city was taken and plundered by the army of Chingiz Khan in 1219. It was retaken by Jalaludin, son of Muhammad Khan, in 1221.
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ROADS

RAILWAYS

PASSES

DAMS

of Afghanistan
It was stormed a second time by the troops of Chingiz Khan in 1222. But Chingiz Khan was a passing scourge. Twenty-nine years after the second storming of Herat, he and his successors had disappeared, and from that time (1251) until the invasion of Timur—better known in Europe as Tamerlane—(1381), the granary and garden of Central Asia enjoyed under the fostering care of native rulers—the Ghorian dynasty—unchekered prosperity. Once more was the city populated; again did palaces reappear and markets reopen. Again did the city become renowned for its splendour, for its wealth and for its luxury. In the course of these hundred and thirty years the royal palaces became adorned with costly treasures; the workers in gold and silver ornaments sent their fame throughout Central Asia; the city walls were rebuilt, and the city gates ornamented with splendid carvings, fringed with the polished steel of the country. Again did Herat become the wonder of the eastern world. In that world the proverb then was universal, «Which is the most splendid city in the world? If you answer truly you must say Herat!»

But at the end of those hundred and thirty years, years of peace, prosperity, and splendour, the destroyer once more appeared. The destroyer was Tamerlane. Gathering in his own hands the guiding-reins of the Turki tribes of Central Asia, this able warrior setting out from Samarkand, burst suddenly, in 1381, upon Herat. He delivered the splendid city to destruction and pillage. The costly ornaments of the royal palace, the abundant supplies in the treasury, the throne, the golden crown, the ornaments of gold and silver, the precious stones, were all carried off by the conqueror; the city walls were cast down; the city gates were taken to Kesh—the birth-place of Timur. An enormous contribution was levied on the inhabitants. Their luxurious houses, adorned within with Kachan porcelain, were indeed allowed to stand, but many of the most learned doctors and sages of the place were transported across the Oxus. The humiliation of the city seemed complete. (15)

It was not so, however. Timur was a statesman as well as a warrior. He recognized at once the value of the central position he had gained in the capital of Khorasan. From that country he conquered Persia. Through the gate of Herat his armies marched to Kandahar and to Delhi. So sensible was he of its importance, that the third year after Herat had been all but demolished, he sent thither his son Miran Shah to reoccupy it. Many of the damages caused by the siege were then repaired. The palaces were redecorated, the character of the city as the commercial capital of Central Asia was restored; only the walls were not rebuilt. But so speedily did the city rise from its ashes, that in 1389 we find the same Miran Shah, who in the interval had led the armies of Timur into various parts of Asia, and who had then but recently been sent to repress a revolt in the city of Tus, near the modern Nishapur, determining to rest for a month at Herat, «to divert himself» on his way to his father's court at Samarkand.

About eight years later, 1396-7, Timur conferred the government of the provinces of Khorasan, Sistan, and Mazandaran, upon his fourth
son, the Mirza Shah-Rokh. Again was manifested the great value attached to Herat. "As soon," writes d'Herbelot, "as this Prince was given this government, which he held almost in sovereignty, he selected the royal city of Herat for his general residence." He resided there up to the time of his father's death in 1405, (16) when the rich heritage of Transoxiana and of Turkistan devolved upon him. But once more did Herat vindicate her claims to be the Queen of eastern cities. Transoxiana boasted of many royal residences. Samarkand had been the seat of government of Timur, the capital of his vast dominions. But Shah-Rokh saw in Herat a city whence he could hold fast Transoxiana, whilst keeping in his own firm grip the key of the countries to the west, to the east, and to the south of him. He therefore sent his son Ulugh Beg as his lieutenant to Samarkand, whilst he himself kept royal court at Herat. Virtually Herat thus became the capital of the whole of Central Asia.

This was the period of the greatest prosperity of the royal city. Shah-Rokh has left a name which still lives in Oriental history. He rendered himself famous, not less for his military talents than for his justice, his piety, and his generosity. His reign of forty-three years is a long record of actions honourable to him, alike as a man and as a ruler. He had done much for Herat in the lifetime of his father, but after Timur's death he restored the fortifications, rebuilt and redecorated the gates, paying for the redecorations from his private funds.

The life of Shah-Rokh has been narrated by the Herati historian Abdulrazzak. His work has been translated into English, and a compendium and review of it are to be found in successive numbers of the *Journal Asiatique* for 1836. To give in this book all the details of a long reign would be foreign to my purpose. It will suffice to state that under Shah-Rokh Herat attained a prosperity greater even than that which it had enjoyed before the sacking of the city by Timur. So favoured, indeed, is the city in its situation, in a fertile and fruitful valley, commanding the point on which all the commercial routes of Central Asia converge, that it needs only good and beneficent administration to enable it to attain to and to sustain the very highest degree of prosperity. The history of the past eight hundred years has shown that long-continued and permanent misgovernment can alone neutralise the natural advantages possessed by Herat; and that, crushed as she may be by these, she possesses the elasticity which enables her to rebound at once when the pressure is removed.

To give the reader some idea of the magnificence of the city of Herat at this period, I cite from Quatremere's translation of a portion of the work of Abdulrazzak (17), the following account of the preparations made for the royal festivities on the occasion of performing the rites of circumcision on Mirza Baisangar and Muhammad Djonglu Bahadur, the two sons of the Emperor Shah-Rokh. "In the royal garden were erected tents, which had from eighty to a hundred poles, scarlet pavilions, and tents made of silk. In these tents were thrones of gold and silver, encircled by garlands of rubies and pearls. From the carpets issued vapour of amber, whilst the durbar tent was perfumed with the
soothing odour of musk. Bazaars and shops, richly ornamented, recalled the beauty of the garden of Irem. Cupolas, fascinating to the eye, elegantly decorated, seemed like caskets filled with precious stones, or constellations of numberless stars. Cupbearers, on silver pedestals, with hands as white as crystal, smiling lips, and holding golden cups, gave everywhere the signal of pleasure. Singers sang to melodious tunes the songs formerly heard at the court of Sassanidae. Skilful musicians, touching deftly the lute and the lyre, ravished the reason of the listeners. In each tent was a magnificent reception room. The diversions were prolonged for many days without interruption. The Emperor was prodigal to all, to those of low as well as to those of high rank, of his generosity and munificence. This august fete was celebrated in the city of Herat, the capital of the kingdom, in the last days of the month of Rebi.

This great prince died A.H. 851, equivalent to A.D. 1447. He was succeeded by his son Ulugh Beg, who for thirty-eight years had ruled as his father's lieutenant in Transoxiana. Ulugh Beg was forced, however, to fight for Herat. His nephew, Allauldaolat, son of the Mirza Baisangar who was one of the heroes of the fete I have described, seized that city and the districts of which it is the capital, and tried to hold it. Ulugh Beg defeated him, however, near Balai Murghab. He was not so fortunate a few months later in a contest with his own son, Abdul Latif, who, rebelling and fighting against him, took him prisoner near Balkh, and caused him to be put to death. Ulugh Beg had reigned, since his father's death, two years and nine months. He was a great prince, a lover of the sciences, especially of astronomy. The importance of Herat was in no way impaired during his reign.

His successor in Transoxiana, Abdul Latif, survived him only six months. He was killed by his own soldiers. His cousin, Abdullah, followed, but reigned only one year, when he was dispossessed by Abusaid, grandson of Miran Shah, son of Timur. During these years, following the death of Ulugh Beg, Babar, grandson of Shah-Rokh through Baisangar Mirza, had reigned peaceably in Herat. Babar died in 1456. Then the Abusaid above alluded to, who had already annexed Kashgar, Kerman, and Multan to his empire, and who had long coveted Herat, occupied that city. He held it till the year A.H. 872, equivalent to A.D. 1468-9, when making an expedition into Irak (18), he was surprised, defeated, and slain by the Turkman chief, Hassan Beg. His death, known in history as «the calamity of Irak,» was the signal for the break-up of the empire which Timur had founded.

For the moment Herat fell into the possession of the son of Abusaid, Mirza Sultan Mahmud. Mahmud had been present at the battle in which his father had fallen, and had fled from the field after the defeat. He now came to Herat. His abode there was not, however, of long duration. Sultan Husen, son of Mansur, great-grandson of Timur, who had more or less successfully opposed Abusaid during his lifetime, marched into Khorasan, conquered it, and established his seat of government at Herat.
Again, for the first time since the death of Shah Rokh, did Herat enjoy a firm and settled government. The reign of Sultan Husen Mirza, beginning in 1470, covered thirty-five years of unexampled prosperity. Husen Mirza would have been accounted a great man in any age. To a love of the higher branches of science he added a profound knowledge of the art of governing, and he was animated by an earnest desire for the welfare of his people. Under his rule Herat became the most magnificent city in the east; Khorasan the most cultivated and the most fertile kingdom in Central Asia. The accumulating wealth of the province poured into Herat. Wealth attracted men of learning, men of science, men of literature. Under such auspices culture rapidly developed. The fame of the city spread throughout the east. Its central position attracted merchants from all lands. The natural resources of the province were developed in an extraordinary manner. Khorasan became the milch cow of Central Asia, Herat her magnificent capital.

Shah Husen Mirza died in 1505. The prosperity of his country had excited the envy of the neighbouring princes and people, and his sons, amiable and agreeable though they were, had been born in the purple. But the times were threatening. An Uzbek chief, lineally descended from Chingiz Khan, Sheibani Khan, better known in history as Shahi Beg, chief of the Turki Uzbeks, and who, after a life of adventure, had conquered a great part of Transoxiana and the kingdom of Khiva, was at the time threatening the gate of India. The sons of Shah Husen Mirza, reared in the purple, were not the men to meet a dangerous crisis, and it happened that to the danger of invasion was at this moment added the greater danger of a disputed succession.

The eldest son of Shah Husen Mirza was Badi-al-zaman Mirza; the son of his favourite wife was called Mozaffar Husen Mirza. It was between these two that the contention for the succession arose. In the presence, however, of a common danger, that of invasion, they had the good sense to enter into a compromise, and to agree to a joint sovereignty. It was just after this arrangement had been concluded that the renowned Babar, the founder of the Mughal Empire in India, came to Herat on a visit. Babar was distantly related to the princes. He was fifth in descent on his father's side from Timur, and twelfth on his mother's side from Chingiz Khan. At this time he was King of Kabul and Ghazni. Previous to his death Shah Husen Mirza had invited him to visit Herat, and Babar was on his way thither, and had reached Kahmerd (19), when he heard of the death of the Shah.

Babar remained at Kahmerd till the dissensions to which I have alluded were appeased. He then continued his journey, joined the two princes on the banks of the Murghab, and became their guest in camp, and subsequently in Herat.

Of his visit Babar has left a long and interesting account in his memoirs. He detected at once the utter unfitness of his hosts for the arts of war and of government. «Although very accomplished at the social board,» he wrote, «or in the arrangement of a party of pleasure, and although they had a pleasing talent for conversation and society,
they possessed no knowledge whatever of the conduct of a campaign or of warlike operations, and were perfect strangers to whatever related to the arrangements of a battle or the dangers and spirit of a soldier's life. In fact, though every consideration required that a forward move should be made in the direction of Balkh to repel the Uzbekks, no such move was made. Babar not only counselled it, but offered to lead it. But doubt and hesitation ruled the councils of the princes, and they waited till it was too late.

The princes then endeavoured to induce Babar to return with them to Herat. He was unwilling to be so long absent from Kabul, but in the end he consented. «I could not say No,» he writes, «in the face of the Mirzas, and consented to remain. One reason that influenced me was that so many kings had come to urge my stay; a second, that in the whole habitable world there was not such another city as Heri (Herat).» He stayed a month at Herat and tasted of its pleasures. But, if he learned there to drink wine, he saw there, by the example of the princes, how over-indulgence in it was apt to render unfit for affairs those who partook of it too freely. He foresaw that the princes, his hosts, who did so, would not be able to retain for long the inheritance of their father.

In forming this judgment Babar displayed his customary acumen. He started on his return journey to Kabul in the height of winter. No sooner had that winter been succeeded by the early spring than Shahi Beg entered Khorasan. The two kings who had feted Babar moved from Herat and took up a position at Baba Khaki. Here they remained for some time, a prey to the divided counsels which were the necessary consequences of divided authority. Whilst they were still disputing, Shahi Beg, advancing on the line on which General Kaufmann will march from the Oxus, made a flank march and seized Sarrahs, then, as now, an important position, and on the direct caravan road to the capital. The move was fatal to the two kings. They appreciated the enormous consequences to Herat of the possession by their enemy of a place so important, in a strategical point of view, as Sarrahs. They at once broke up their army and abandoned Herat. That capital city fell at once into the possession of Shahi Beg. The dynasty of Timur thus succumbed in Khorasan without striking a blow.

Shahi Beg retained his conquest only four years. Those years were spent by him in completing the subjugation of Khorasan, in besieging and taking Kandahar, in waging a not altogether successful campaign against the Kaizak Uzbekks, and in an unprofitable expedition against the Hazaras. But in the fourth year he himself was threatened by Ishmail, Shah of Persia.

Ishmail, founder of the Safvi dynasty of Persia, was one of the most renowned characters of Oriental history. «He was endowed,» writes d'Herbelot, «with a courage unparalleled. In the greatest dangers he was intrepid, terrible and formidable to his enemies. He enforced military discipline with severity, and was so ambitious that he was in the habit of saying, «One God for the Heavens and one Monarch for
the Earth. Such was the prince who, having established himself in Persia and in part of Arabia, now threatened the ruler of Khorasan with a formidable army.

Threatening, and receiving no submission, Ishmail acted. He invaded Khorasan and marched on Mashad. Shahi Beg, leaving a small force to defend Herat, directed his remaining troops to concentrate at Merv. There, on the 2nd December 1510, he encountered the Persian army. It was the contest for empire between the Uzbek and the Kazzalbash. The Kazzalbash won. Shahi Beg was completely defeated and slain.

«Immediately after this decisive battle,» writes Erskine, «the Uzbeks retired in every direction from Khorasan. Shah Ishmail soon after repaired to Herat, where he spent the winter. His first care was to introduce the observances of the Shiah sect into his new dominions; and, as he was met by a bigotry and firmness equal to his own, he did not accomplish that object without a severe and cruel persecution, in the course of which the blood of many men eminent for their piety and their virtues flowing, and many distinguished names were added to the list of martyrs for the pure Sunni faith.» (20)

With the conquest of Herat by Persia the greater glory of the city departed. The Persian monarch transferred the government seat of Khorasan first to Tus—a city now fallen into decay, seventeen miles from the modern Mashad—and subsequently to Mashad. To foster the prosperity of this last-named town the efforts of the court of the Safvis were strenuously devoted. Situated in a fertile valley, varying in extent from twelve to thirty miles, Mashad seemed to offer almost every advantage required by a capital. A river runs to the north and north-east of the town, which is, on the whole, well built and well arranged. It failed, however, in one most essential point. Lying two hundred and twenty-eight miles westward of Herat, it was removed by that distance from the point where all the commercial roads of the East, one only excepted, converged. The defect was fatal. An officer of the Engineers in India, to whom the marking out of a certain line of railway had been entrusted, took the line at a distance of some four to eight miles from the principal towns on the route. When remonstrated with, he remarked that it did not signify, as the towns would come to the railway. He was wrong; the towns did not come to the railway. The princes of the Safvi dynasty acted on the principle which guided the decision of the engineer, They beautified and subsidised Mashad, whilst they utterly neglected Herat, believing that by so acting the trade would abandon Herat and come to Mashad. But the eternal law which decrees that commerce shall find the quickest and cheapest route, and, finding, shall adhere to it until another route, quicker and cheaper, shall be found; which, when the route by the Cape of Good Hope was discovered, abandoned the time-honoured markets of Venice; which, now that the route by the Suez Canal has been made practicable, is seeking, and if we English do not keep our eyes open, will find, to our detriment, a cheaper and a shorter route to the markets of the world;—that law foiled the plans of the Safvis. Mashad, though petted as Trieste was petted by the Austrians when they held that city and
Venice, did not supersede Herat. But, nevertheless, Herat suffered. The city, once so splendid, once the capital of a kingdom, was neglected and oppressed. It is true that Shah Ismail, after he had incorporated Khorasan with Persia, twice visited the city. His first visit, and the wretched persecutions of which it became the consequence, I have already noticed. He resided there a second time in 1511, after he had expelled the Uzbeks from Khwarizm (the kingdom of Khiva). But the death of Ismail in 1523, and the succession of a boy prince, Shah Tahmasp, revived the hopes of the Uzbeks. They raised an army the same year, and laid siege to Herat.

This was the first of the long sieges which the city sustained. It was defended by the governor of the province, Durmish Khan Shamlu, with extraordinary courage. Every attack was foiled, and after many attempts to gain the city, made during a period of seven months, the Uzbeks were forced to beat a retreat.

But the retreat provided but a respite for Herat. The following year death carried off not only the brave governor I have mentioned, but the governor of Mashad likewise, and Khorasan was left without a head. The Uzbeks took advantage of this double disaster to renew their invasion. Crossing the Oxus at Charjui, they marched on and captured Merv and Sarrakhs; they then attacked Mashad. Mashad fell after a desperate resistance. (21) Tus, which Mashad had even then supplanted, was next attacked. After a siege of eight months Tus capitulated on terms. In spite of the terms, however, all the men in the place were massacred and the women carried away captive. (22)

In consequence of events in other quarters calling away the attention of the Uzbek leader, Herat was for the moment spared the horrors of a siege. Only, however, for the moment. In 1527 the Uzbeks laid siege to it. The city was defended by Husen Khan Shamlu, a man bold, daring, and fertile in resources. During seven months he repulsed every assault. Provisions then began to fail. To feed his garrison, and thus to prolong the defence, he forced the inhabitants to yield up their supplies. Even then he was reduced to the last extremity, when Shah Tahmasp, defeating the Uzbeks at Damghan, and advancing rapidly on Mashad to cut off the retreat of the army besieging Herat, forced its leader to raise the siege. A few weeks later, 26th September 1528, Shah Tahmasp encountered and completely defeated the Uzbeks at Jam, a town nearly midway between Mashad and Herat. The battle was one of the best contested of the age, and is referred to with justifiable pride by Persian historians as illustrative of the manner in which Persian troops, well drilled and well led, can and will fight. (23)

The year following, the Uzbeks recovering from their defeat, once more invaded Khorasan and took Mashad. They then moved on Herat. Herat withstood them for seven months, and then, hopeless of succour, capitulated. But the triumph of the Uzbeks was short-lived. The following year, however, (1530), Shah Tahmasp advanced with an army, and recovered the whole of Khorasan. But Herat was again attacked by the Uzbeks, and again relieved by Shah Tahmasp towards the end of the
same year. Shah Tahmasp wintered in the neighbourhood, and for the two following years the city enjoyed peace.

But events happened, then, which exposed Herat to a danger greater than any it had encountered since the days of Timur. It had enjoyed the two years of tranquillity of which I have spoken, under the rule of Sam Mirza, son of Shah Tahmasp. This prince, irritated by the slaughter, by order of his father, of the Shamlu tribe of which his two governors, when he was a child, had been members and his present minister actually was a member, determined to conquer Kandahar, and to erect it, with Herat, into an independent principality.

Sam Mirza accordingly marched on and besieged Kandahar. The siege had lasted eight months, when Kamran Mirza, son of Babar, advanced to the relief of the town and defeated the Persian prince, who fled with difficulty to Tabbas.

The departure of Sam Mirza on this expedition had left Khorasan exposed to the Uzbeks. They seized their opportunity, and in the middle of 1536 laid siege to Herat.

Herat had but a small garrison. The officer who commanded it endeavoured to enlist the townspeople in its defence. They were unwilling, but the severities of the commander soon disgusted them with military service, and they began to yearn for the end,—even, it is said, to intrigue with the Uzbeks. But for five months the siege continued. The city had been unprovided for such a contingency, and the inhabitants suffered all the miseries of war and famine. At length, three hundred Uzbeks having gained entrance by night into a bastion, it is said by treachery, the city was taken. All the horrors of a storm following. The garrison fled to the citadel, which, however, was a few days later yielded to the Uzbeks, under terms which were violated.

Four months later, 1537, Shah Tahmasp recovered Herat, the Uzbeks retreating on his advance. Their retreat was a final one. Never again was Herat molested by the Uzbeks, and during the period of more than a century and a half that followed, the city enjoyed peace, and was able, by the unrivalled advantages of its position, to sustain on more than equal terms the growing commercial opposition of Mashad.

Some idea of the quick revival of the prosperity of Herat may be gathered from the visit paid to it in 1544, seven years only after the final departure of the Uzbeks, by the Emperor Humayun, then a fugitive from India, and repulsed from Afghanistan by his brother Kamran. Humayun had been hospitably received in Sistan by the Persian governor, and had been invited by him to proceed to Irak and the Persian Court. The reputation of Herat for splendour and magnificence so attracted the royal fugitive that he asked for and obtained permission to take that city and Mashad on his way. The glories of this visit are recorded at length in the Akbarnama. As Humayun approached Herat, the entire population of the city poured out, and covered the hills and plains, the trees and house-tops, as he passed along. He was received with the magnificent courtesy such as a royal
 prince, not a fugitive, might have looked for. He was lodged in the royal palace. A magnificent entertainment was provided for him in the Jahanara gardens. The eldest son of the Shah paid him royal honours. Nothing was wanting to the dignity and grandeur of the reception.

Humayun stayed a month at Herat. Notwithstanding its sieges and its misfortunes since the time of the visit paid to it by Babar, just after the death of Shah Husen Mirza, it was still one of the finest cities in the east. So Humayun found it. The impressions made upon him during his stay there were neither effaced nor weakened by the later glories of his reign.

From this date to the year 1715 Herat shared the fortunes of the Persian monarchy. Administered by a Persian governor, with the sole object of advancing the interests of Persia, often to the detriment of its own, the city was neglected and its prosperity declined. During this period, Mashad, on the other hand, made rapid strides. The illustrious monarch, Shah Abbas the Great, who ruled for forty-six years—from 1582 to 1628—devoted himself to push the fortunes of the new capital of Khurasan. His policy was a policy of sentiment. He had made the city of Ispahan the capital of his dominions, and had adorned it with magnificent and useful buildings. The population of the city more than doubled during his reign. From Ispahan to Mashad the distance is nearly two hundred parasangs, or nearly eight hundred miles. Mashad had a great attraction for the King on account of its containing the tomb of the saintly Imam Ali Reza, and he visited it frequently. On one occasion he walked the entire distance, followed by the chief officers of his court. It can easily be conceived how his love for the city led him to make it worthy of the place it held in his affections. He beautified it as he had beautified Ispahan. He endeavoured by all means to make it the commercial capital of his empire. The money he spent upon it attracted capitalists and merchants. The trade route to China passed through its streets. But Mashad never became a centre. Mashad never entirely superseded the neglected Herat. The palaces in that city might remain unoccupied, but the caravansarais continued full to repletion. Merchants from all parts of the world still met in her great Charsu, and the manufactures of the East and of the West were still exchanged within her gates.

Abbas the Great died. From the date of his death in 1628 till the accession of the last of his dynasty, Sultan Husen, in 1694, the history of Herat is a blank. The policy of exalting Mashad continued, to the detriment of the beauty, but without materially affecting the credit, of the real commercial capital. But with the accession of Sultan Husen began a new era—the era of dismemberment for Persia, and no long time elapsed before Herat, with all the sensitiveness peculiar to commerce, felt the consequences of his relaxed rule.

Dwelling in the Hazara country, vassals of Persia, and immediately subject to the governor of Herat, were the Afghans of the Abdali tribe. Up to the beginning of the eighteenth century these rude mountaineers were content to be vassals and nothing more than vassals. To humour
them Shah Abbas the Great had consented that they should be ruled over by the chief of their own tribe, subject to the supervision of the governor of Herat. But this wise rule had been departed from by the successors of Abbas the Great. Persian lords, favourites of the Court, were often sent to control the chiefs; and the corrupt action of these men tended to excite angry feelings in men who, till then, had never thought of rebellion.

A shameful act of a shameless man brought, in 1717, matters to a crisis. The Persian Governor of Herat, Muhammad Zuman Khan, offered to Azadulla Khan, son of the chief of the Abdalis, one of those insults which can only be atoned by blood. The father, horrible to say, was privy to the insult. It stirred Azadulla Khan to fury. He slew his father, and then marching at the head of the warriors of his tribe, by whom he had been proclaimed chief, attacked, defeated, and killed Muhammad Zuman Khan in the Zamindawar; then pushing on for Herat, seized it, and declared it independent of Persia!

Thus it was that the great commercial centre of the East fell into the possession of the rude Arghans. [...] The effect on Herat has been the more disastrous inasmuch as the occupation has been permanent. The heavy hand of the rude and uncultivated boor has pressed, for more than a century and a half, upon the more refined races which peopled the beautiful city. And with what result? Hear Vambery, who visited Herat in 1863. «It needs only some attack, no matter by whom, to be made upon Herat for the Herati to be the first to take up arms against the Afghans!» They are, of their own action, taking up arms against the Afghans now!

Before I endeavour to show how it is that Herat has not absolutely succumbed under the desolating sway of the Afghan foreigner, I shall describe in a few words the modus operandi of that sway. I shall, in the first instance, quote Ferrier, a writer quick to see the good points of an Asiatic people, and not without sympathy for certain sides of the Afghan character. «In Afghanistan,» writes Ferrier, including in that title Herat and the other provinces ruled by the successors of Ahmad Shah Durani, «the ideas and objects of the government and the governed are wholly different; there each man thinks only of destruction and disorganisation; it is, who shall labour least, or who shall enrich himself the most, and by the most culpable means. The depositaries of power, instead of leading those under them in the right path, instead of giving them, by their own conduct, a good example, and ameliorating the condition of the people, load them with exactions, and enrich themselves at their cost. This system of spoliation and embezzlement is practised by functionaries of every class.»

The remarks which follow apply rather to the masses of Afghans than to the indigenous population of cities, such as Herat, which the Afghans hold by right of conquest. How the policy is applied to Herat is told by Vambery. «Instead of seeking to heal the wounds they (the Afghans) have inflicted, their miserable policy seems now to aim at reducing the whole province still further to beggary.» Speaking of the
affection felt by the Herati’s for Major d’Arcy Todd, Vambery writes further on: «The Herati saw, during the government of Major Todd, more earnestness and self-sacrifice with respect to the ransoming of slaves than they had ever even heard of before on the part of a ruler. Their native governments had habituated them to be plundered and murdered, not spared or rewarded.»

But nothing affords a greater proof of the misgovernment of the province than the exactions and restrictions placed upon trade. Every man, from the governor down to the meanest official, plunders the arriving caravan. «The Afghan functionary,» writes Vambery, alluding to the custom-house official, «threw into the shade all the inhumanity and barbarity of similar officers in Central Asia.» The details follow. Poor wretches, who had been plundered sufficiently before, were compelled, on reaching Herat, to yield up their very asses to be sold!

But, it may be asked, what is it which has enabled Herat to maintain her commercial position during a century and a half of foreign oppression such as that which I have described? It was not alone the character of the people. The Turko-Persian race which constitutes the bulk of the population have, indeed, lost everything under the Afghan scourge, except their dexterity and their patience. Confiding in the glorious position of which their oppressors could not deprive them, they have been content to wait. But it was, in the main, that position which has saved Herat. During those long years the caravans traversed Persia and Mashad; Bokhara, Merv, and Murghab; Shikarpur and Kandahar; all to centre in Herat. The people clung to their callings, and though bowed down by taxes and by plunder, still maintained the old lines of traffic, confident that it needed only the smallest encouragement to enable those lines to resume their former importance, and hoping always that prosperous times would return.

It was not from misgovernment only that Herat has suffered during this terrible period of more than a hundred and sixty years. In 1731 the city was besieged by Nadir Shah, on whom, in gratitude for the expulsion of the Afghans from Persia, Shah Tahmasp had bestowed four of the finest provinces of his kingdom, one of these being Khorasan. Nadir pushed the siege of Herat with his accustomed energy, and soon forced it to surrender. The capture of Herat enabled the conqueror to march on Kandahar and subsequently on India. On the death of Nadir Shah in 1749, the Afghan chief of the Abdali tribe, Ahmad Khan, afterwards known as Ahmad Shah Durani, took the city by storm. Since that time it has been the scene of many desperate struggles for supremacy on the part of Afghan pretenders; twice—in 1838 and in 1855—has it been besieged by a Persian army. Nine years after the last siege it succumbed to the Amir Dost Muhammad. Since that period the city has had to contend only against the tyranny of Afghan misrule.

Of two of the three sieges referred to a slight description seems necessary, as showing how the position of Herat enables it to make a determined stand even against a formidable enemy. The reader who
has so far accompanied me will have observed that none of the sieges sustained by Herat were of short duration. In the middle ages the city resisted the greatest conquerors of the day for periods of seven and more months. When in comparative decay it baffled Nadir Shah for four months, and about a century later it offered, under the inspiring lead of a British officer, a successful resistance to the army of Persia, led by the king of that country, influenced by Russian advisers, and strengthened by a regiment composed mainly of Russians, commanded by Russian officers.

The first Persian siege of Herat began on the 23rd November 1837. It lasted till the 9th September 1838. During that time several assaults were delivered. So great was the superiority in numbers and in matériel of the besiegers that each of those assaults ought to have succeeded. «It is my firm belief,» wrote the Englishman who was the soul of the defence, the gallant Eldred Pottinger, «that Muhammad Shah might have carried the city by assault the very first day he reached Herat, and that even when the garrison gained confidence, and were flushed with the success of their sorties, he might have, by a proper use of the reserves at his disposal, taken the place in twenty-four hours.»

Of all the assaults, that made on the 24th June more nearly than any other obtained success. At four points the attack was repulsed; on the fifth it had, but for one man, succeeded. In the glowing pages of the historian (24) of the first war in Afghanistan the reader who cares to know what it is possible for one brave man to accomplish, will find recorded how it was that one Englishman was able to inspire with a portion of his own dauntless nature the Afghans who, but for him, would have resigned the city to the enemy. It was so throughout the siege, even to the very last day. Never was the influence of England more conspicuous than when, on the 9th September, the baffed Shah mounted his horse to return to Tehran. (25).

The second siege of Herat by Persia began in the autumn of 1855 and ended in the spring of 1856 by the surrender of the city to the besiegers. This time there was no Pottinger in the place; the supply of provisions was scanty; and the inhabitants had so great a detestation of their Afghan masters that they, welcomed the Persians. But the action of England in the Persian Gulf in 1855-56 forced Persia to let go her hold and to restore Herat to the Afghans. The city, though under Afghan sway, remained distinct from the ruler of Kabul till 1863, when it was taken by the Amir Dost Muhammad. Since that year it has been governed by lieutenants of the successors of that prince.

Such, in brief outline, is the political history of Herat. A glance at the record will show the reader that from time immemorial the city was regarded as an outlying bulwark, the possession of which was necessary prior to attempting the conquest of India; the holding of which by India, or by quasi-vassal powers dependent on India, would render impossible an invasion of that country. It was so considered by Alexander, by Mahmud and his successors, by Chingiz Khan, by Timur, by Nadir Shah, by Ahmad Shah, and by Muhammad Shah, the Persian
prince who attacked it in 1837. In the cases of all but the last, the possession of Herat led to the conquest of India; in the case of the last, the successful defence of that city rendered invasion impossible. 

[...]

CHAPTER III
The Granary and Garden of Central Asia

What are the markets of Central Asia? They are the markets which, of all countries in the world, England is best able to supply. The people of those countries have plenty of raw material. Khorasan produces wool, but she cannot use it. Cotton goods she has not; leather she possesses only in small quantities. The articles which form the staple of the shipments to India are all needed in Central Asia. Civilisation is never wholly dead in a country in which it once has flourished, and it must ever be remembered that the country of which Herat is the centre gave, four hundred years ago, the law in civilisation to all the countries in its vicinity. Herat was then as far in advance of Dehli as Calcutta is now of Herat. But the influences which have made of the little village of Chattanatti the capital of India can restore to Herat more than its former greatness. *

The actual products of the Herat valley are assafaetida, saffron, pistachio-nuts, fruits of all sorts, gum-mastic, manna, wheat, barley, and other descriptions of corn. «The population of the province must now be great,» wrote Conolly in 1831, «and were this fertile country settled and equitably governed, there would be scarcely bounds to the produce.» The grapes he describes as particularly luscious. «The cultivators of this 'happy valley,' he records in the same chapter (26) «enumerate, if I remember right, seventeen different sorts of grapes which they grow;—the marble and the raisin grape, that which is translucent and without seeds, the golden grape of Kas-vine, and the small red grape of Badakhshan, with other temptingly named varieties of this delicious fruit. The vines are planted in the trenches, and trained over a sloping bank of earth, on which they are suffered to ripen.»

Horses abound in this part of Khorasan and are exported annually in large numbers. They are, if small, yet hardy, enduring, and with plenty of bone. Ferrier pronounces them to be «splendid animals, probably the finest and most capable of enduring fatigue in Central Asia.» Cattle of all kinds, sheep, and goats abound. Wild asses swarm in the plains. The skins of the sheep and lambs form a large article of commerce. Brought into the city, they are made up into caps and cloaks, and returned so made up into the districts. The cowhides are not so plentiful. «There were, if I remember right,» writes Conolly, «more than one hundred and fifty shoemakers' shops in the city, but they were unable to supply the demands from the province, and many camel-loads of ready-made slippers were brought from Kandahar, where they are

* [The author was in favour of capture and permanent occupation of Herat during the third Afghan war].
manufactured in great quantities. The leather comes from Hindustan.

Another of the staple articles of manufacture in Herat is the carpet. The Herati carpet is famed above all others for the brilliancy and permanency of its colours. These carpets are made in all sizes and at all prices from one pound sterling to a hundred pounds. The trade, which owing to the unsettled state of affairs on the frontier, has declined of late years, could easily be revived. Conolly pronounced the best pieces he saw to equal the Turkey carpets, and their price to be moderate.

Silk is abundant in the valley. It is reeled from the cocoon, then dyed, twisted, and woven. Most of it, writes Captain Marsh, who visited the city in 1872, is sent to Mashad and Kabul, in the shape of yarn. The silk stuffs are much esteemed.

The hills in the vicinity yield lead, iron, and silver. The mines have been worked up to the present time in the most perfunctory manner. Shah Kamran, who ruled over Herat during the second quarter of the present century, was so sensible of the enormous advantages which might be derived from properly working the lead and iron mines, that he urgently requested Dr. Gerard, who visited Herat in 1832, to return, with the permission of his Government, for that express purpose. The scimitars and cutlery made from the ore already obtained from the surface are famous throughout Central Asia, and are greatly valued.

The existence of the silver mines rests on the authority of Ibn Haukal and Edrisi. These writers place the «Silver Mountain» as it is called by the former, on the road to Sarrakhs, near Kan and Kawakir. Edrisi states that the working of the mine had been abandoned on account of its great depth, and by reason also of the scarcity of firewood in the vicinity.

Fraser, who visited Herat in 1824, whilst giving in detail the several articles of produce to which I have referred, adds that from the information he had collected there and in Persia, it had been proved that in spite of the revolutions which had desolated the country, Herat still continued to prosper. «Indeed,» he adds, «every one agreed in assuring me that no place in Persia, except Ispahan, could at all compare with it in size or population.»

The cause of this permanence of prosperity is the same, according to this experienced traveller, as that which I have endeavoured to trace in these pages. It will bear repetition. «Herat,» adds Fraser (27) «owes its prosperity to the great commerce it enjoys, being the only channel of communication between the east and the west of Asia; all the trade and produce of Kabul, Kashmir, and India, on the one side, and of Bokhara, Persia, Arabia, Turkey, and even Europe, on the other, must pass through this city, and, consequently, the richest productions of all these countries centre and are exchanged in its bazaars.»

This prosperity suffered greatly under the insatiable avarice of the Afghan. Mohun Lal, a Dehli munshi, who accompanied Dr. Gerard in
1832, and who enjoyed opportunities often denied to a European, wrote in that year: «since Kamran's dynasty the commerce of Herat has fallen to nothing. The caravans are plundered, as we ourselves were witness of. The resident merchants are fined in a large sum of money upon any foolish pretext of the Government.» Yet so elastic is the position, that with the cessation of the tyrannical rule, prosperity has at once revived. On Kamran's death, his vizier, Yar Muhammad, who had murdered him, succeeded, after a short interval, to the throne. It became the cue of this usurper to win the Heratis. He won them by securing their commerce. «The town of Herat,» says Ferrier, writing of this period, «destroyed by the siege of 1838, rose by degrees from its ruins, thanks to the gold that the English had so profusely scattered around them; Yar Muhammad continued the improvements, and applied prompt remedies to the evils under which the population still suffered. He especially encouraged agriculture and commerce, placed a very light duty upon the sale of corn and the necessaries of life, and further relieved the poorer classes by setting them to work to rebuild the fortifications of the town... Finally, he completely checked the pillage that had been carried on, not only in the principality, but even up to the gates of Herat.» Naturally, trade revived as if by magic. A little later, however, civil war broke out, prohibitive duties were reimposed, and the caravans were again plundered.

I proceed now to give a brief description of Herat as it now is.

The latest English traveller who has actually visited Herat is Captain Marsh, who proceeded thither from Mashad in 1872. Captain Marsh thus describes the outer city. «The walls,» he writes, (28) «have been so often knocked down and rebuilt, that the present ones are built on the top of a high mound of vast thickness, the accumulated debris of a hundred generations. The ditch is very deep and broad, and can be filled with water from the river at a short notice. There are five gates, all of which are level with the country outside, consequently much lower than the actual walls. The ark (citadel) «stands out very prominently; and on the outer slope of the mound, between the ditch and the walls, are two covered ways, or faussebraye, one commanding the other; and, lastly,—the walls themselves are well flanked by large bastions—a place of vast strength when commanded by a resolute garrison. The circumference of the city is about a farsak (nearly four miles), «the interior nearly a mile square. It is commanded by two elevations about eight hundred to one thousand yards distant, Mosulla and Thaleberghy; but from neither can the interior of the city be actually seen, they being only on a level with the walls. Both these elevations are covered with ruins and remnants of forts, and the former with the magnificent ruins of the mosque and tomb of Sultan Husen Mirza, one of the House of Timur, of the fifteenth century, the elegant minars of which I saw long before I arrived at this city, and said to have been partially destroyed by Chingiz Khan.»

As an adjunct, in one sense even as a contrast, read the following picturesque description by Vambery (1863). «We entered,» writes the observant Hungarian, (29) «by the gate Dervaze Arak. The houses
which we passed, the advanced works, the very gate, looked like a heap of rubbish. Near the latter, in the inside of the city, is the Ark (citadel), having, from its elevation, served as a mark for the Afghan artillery; it lies there blasted and half demolished. The doors and windows have been stripped of their woodwork, for during the siege the inhabitants suffered most from a scarcity of fuel. In the bare openings of the walls are perched here and there a few wretched-looking Afghans or Hindus—worthy guards of such a ruin. Each step we advance we see greater indications of devastation. Entire quarters of the town remain solitary and abandoned. The bazaar that is to say, the arched part of it, where the quadrangle of the bazaar is united by its dome, and which has witnessed and resisted so many sieges—alone remains, and affords, in spite of its new population, dating only three months ago, (30) a really interesting sample of Oriental life—a blending of the characteristics of India, Persia, and Central Asia, better defined than even in the bazaar of Bokhara. It is only from the karavansaral Hadji Resul to that of No that a throng, rightly so called, exists; and although the distance is small, the eye is bewildered by the diversity of races—Afghans, Indians, Tartars, Turkmans, Persians, and Jews. The Afghan parades about, either in his national costume, consisting of a long shirt, drawers, and dirty linen clothes, or in his military undress; and here his favourite garment is the red English coat, from which, even in sleep, he will not part. He throws it on over his shirt, whilst he sets on his head the picturesque Indo-Afghan turban. Others again, and these are the beau monde, are wont to assume a half-Persian costume. Weapons are borne by all. Rarely does any one, whether civil or military, enter the bazaar without his sword and shield. To be quite a la mode, one must carry about quite an arsenal, consisting of two pistols, a sword, poignard, handjar, gun, and shield. With the wild martial-looking Afghan we can only compare the Turkman-like Jamshidi. The wretchedly dressed Herati, the naked Hazari, the Taimuri of the vicinity, are overlooked when the Afghan is present. He encounters around nothing but abject humility; but never was a ruler or conqueror so destested as is the Afghan by the Herati. The bazaar itself, dating from Herat's epoch of splendour, the reign of the Sultan Husen Mirza, and consequently about four hundred years old, deserved still, even in its ruins, the epithet beautiful. The description continues, but for more of it I must refer the reader to the fascinating volume.

Of the interior of the city it is unnecessary to say more. What it has been I have already recorded. What it may become under good government must be clear to all who have followed me so far. Every European who has seen Herat and its magnificent valley has borne witness to its splendid capabilities. To the testimony of Forster, Fraser, Christie, Conolly, Gerrard, Mohun Lal, Ferrier, and Vambery, may now be added the latest of all—that of Captain Marsh. «Herat», wrote that officer in 1873, «is situated in a broad valley, four miles from the hills to the north, and about twelve to the hills south of it. The large valley is watered by canals from the Herirud, which is dammed up by a bund thrown across it, a few miles above the city. One of the many watercourses enters the city, others water the whole plain,
which, if the country were quiet, would be one large sheet of cultivation. As the land is fertile and the climate good, a few years would turn all this desert into a garden!». (31)

One word about the revenue. On this point it is impossible to give an accurate estimate. The one fact that many of the richest districts are held by chiefs on condition of military service, and the other, that since 1750—the year of the inauguration of the Afghan rule—there has been protection of life and property neither for the agriculturist nor the trader, prevent the possibility of making a reliable calculation. In a word, the Afghans have squeezed the land till the cultivators have been ruined.

[...]

CHAPTER IV
Kandahar to Herat

In this and the following chapters I propose to give, in such detail as I have been able to collect from the reports of those who have traversed the country, an account of the roads connecting Herat with Kandahar to the south; with Mashad to the west; with Sarrahs, Merv, and Charjui to the north; with Mamainé, Andkho, Shiborgan, Takhtapul (near Balkh), Khulm, and Faizabad to the north-east. I shall then connect Khulm with Kabul, and the latter with Herat. The present chapter will be devoted to the road between Kandahar and Herat.

There are three important posts on the principal road between Kandahar and Herat—Sabzwar, Farrah, and Girishk. The distance by this road is three hundred and sixty-nine miles.

From Kandahar to Girishk the distance barely exceeds seventy-five miles.

The first march is to Kokaran—seven miles. The first three miles of road pass through the enclosed gardens and suburbs of the city. The road crosses the several canals drawn from the Argandab for irrigating the Kandahar valley. At Kokaran water is abundant, the encamping-ground is well adapted for a large force, and forage can be supplied in sufficient quantities.

To Sanjari—five miles. The bed of the Argandab is crossed. The river, in the month of June, averages about two feet and a quarter in depth, and the passage of it is easy. There is a ford about three-quarters of a mile lower down by which it would be advisable to cross heavy guns. Beyond the river one or two artificial watercourses have to be crossed. The road is stony in some places, but generally good. There is excellent encamping-ground at Sanjari; water is plentiful, and forage is sufficient.

To Hauz-i-Maddad Khan—fourteen miles. An excellent road across a broad, hard, level plain. A canal runs parallel to the road the whole of the march. The ground for encampment is good; water is plentiful
near the camp; forage for camels is abundant; grass is scarce near the
camp, but plentiful a few miles to the south of it. There are several
villages in the neighbourhood; as well as flocks of sheep and goats.

Khushk-i-Nakhud—fifteen miles and three-quarters. A hard, level, gravel
road without obstacle or difficulty. At Khushk-i-Nakhud water is plen-
tiful, from two artificial watercourses; the encamping-ground is good;
fodder for camels is plentiful; but grass, in the immediate vicinity of
the camp, is scarce.

To Khak-i-Chapan—nine miles and three-quarters. The road generally
good and level, though here and there the sand lies deep. The encamp-
ing-ground, though somewhat irregular, could easily be occupied by a
large force. There is a sufficient, though not over-abundant supply of
water. Forage of all sorts is less plentiful. There are, however, villages
and cultivation two or three miles south of the encamping-ground, as
well as large flocks of sheep.

To Girishk—not quite twenty-four miles. The road to the left bank of
the Helmand, about twenty-two miles and a half, is generally good
and hard, the first part slightly undulating, with one or two sandy
patches. There is a well about midway, but the water procurable from
it is insufficient for more than a few travellers. On the left bank of
the river is an excellent encamping-ground, with abundance of water
and an ample supply of forage of all sorts. The Helmand is a difficult
river to cross. In June its depth is about three feet nine inches; its
width in the widest branch is seventy yards. The current runs at the
rate of three miles an hour. There is a ferry which it is sometimes
necessary to use. At Girishk the encamping-ground is sufficient, though
here and there broken. Water and supplies of all sorts are abundant.

What Girishk once was may be gathered from the traditions of the time
of Zaman Shah. Even then people used to say that «the Helmand flo-
wed through a garden». Now, though arable land abounds, there is but
little cultivation. In fact, with the exception of the land immediately on
the bank of the river, there is none. Afghan oppression has made itself
felt even here!

The fort, though much dilapidated, commands a good view of the
surrounding country. It is not, however, capable of defence against ar-
tillery.

From Girishk to Farrah the distance, by the route adopted by Ferrier
and Marsh, is a hundred and twenty miles. There is a route by Shorab
and Hasan Gilan, shorter by twenty miles, but of this I have been
unable to find any accurate record.

Girishk to Zirak—twenty miles. The first six miles stony and undulat-
ing, the beds of several torrents crossing the line. The road then be-
comes level and easy till the fort of Saadat, eighteen miles from Gi-
rishk, is reached. Saadat, once a rather strong, but, when Captain Marsh
saw it in 1873, a deserted and ruined hill fort, has a plentiful supply
of water. The road then becomes again undulating and continues so
until close to Zirak. Zirak is a small village situated at the foot of the mountains on the right of the road to Herat and opposite Mahmudabad, described by Captain Marsh as a small village in a hollow watered by an artificial watercourse. At Zirak water is good and abundant, and forage for camels and horses is plentiful.

To Dushakh—twelve miles and a half. The road hard and level. Water at the village of Sur, about half way. The encamping-ground at Dushakh is good, and forage for camels and horses is abundant.

To Biabanak—three miles and a half. Road level, across a tolerably hard plain. There is an artificial canal at Biabanak providing plenty of water. Grass and fodder are abundant.

To Washir—twenty-four miles. About four miles from Biabanak the road enters a range of hills with a gradual ascent to nine hundred feet, presenting no great difficulties. From this point to Washir the road winds among declivities, and follows the bed of watercourses, passing over much difficult ground. For the last nine miles the road runs down a valley, with a gentle slope. It is hard and good till within two miles of Washir, when it becomes undulating and stony. Many villages and gardens, watered by artificial canals, are passed in this descent. Ferrier made the journey by halting during the heat of the day at Biabanak and then pushing on across the range, twenty miles, to Painak, but with no advantage over the route here laid down. At Washir supplies of all sorts, including water, are abundant.

To the Kashrud river—fourteen miles. The road stony and uneven, the last four miles being along a dry watercourse. The descent into the bed of the Kashrud steep and bad. It is, however, practicable for artillery. The river supplies excellent water. Forage for camels abounds, but grass is less plentiful.

To Haji Ibrahimi—fourteen miles. The fording of the Kashrud is at certain seasons impossible, in consequence of the impetuosity of the torrent. In the hot season, however, the depth of the water does not exceed eighteen inches. After crossing the river the road pursues a tortuous course among hills for about three miles; it then crosses a dreary steppe till it reaches Haji Ibrahimi. Ferrier states that between Haji Ibrahimi and Kashrud there is not a drop of water. Water and forage are both procurable at the former place.

Haji Ibrahimi to Siah-ab—Ferrier calls this place Shiaguz—distance ten miles. Siah-ab is the point whence a direct road, avoiding alike Farrah and Sabzawar, runs via Giraneh to Herat. It is an encamping-ground where water and forage are alike available.

Siah-ab to Kharmalik—twenty-two miles. The first and last part of this stage leads the traveller through plains, fields, and marshes. The intermediate part is intersected by stony mountains, steeply scarped at the sides. Kharmalik, writes Captain Marsh, «is situated in a small grassy hollow. A few date-palms and cattle, in the immediate neighbourhood of a few mean huts and wall-surrounded tower, are all it possesses». Water and forage are procurable here.
Kharmalik to Farrah—twenty miles. The road leads across a desolate plain; then, over a low pass, enters a stony valley. Numerous ruins near the road indicate that the district was once well populated. The plain is totally devoid of drinking-water.

«The appearance of Farrah a short way off», writes Captain Marsh, «is imposing. Its high embattled and bastioned walls, its broad, well-kept ditch, and fine large gate and drawbridge give in the air of wealth and ease. But what a delusion is this! On entering the city I was surprised to see its fallen state. The size of the interior is, perhaps, the third of Herat; but it does possess twenty huts, and those all in ruins. Where is the city of Farrah? Nowhere».

Farrah owes its destruction to the Persians and the Afghans. In 1837 the Persians besieged and laid it waste because it belonged to Afghanistan. In 1852 the Barakzye Afghans completed its destruction because it was dependent upon the Saduzye Afghan rulers of Herat. What Farrah was before the first of these events Conolly bore testimony in 1832. After speaking of it as a town possessing two thousand houses, he adds: «The land is fertile and much grain is cultivated, as the shepherds for many miles are supplied with it from hence... The Furrah-rud~ (river of Furrah) «is in spring a wide and deep river, and there is always sufficient water for much cultivation». Then years previously Mr. Fraser had described it as «a city as large as Nishapur, situated in a valley among hills with about twenty villages and many gardens».

I have stated that from Siah-ab runs the direct road to Herat via Giraneh, avoiding Farrah and Sabzwar. It is worthy of consideration whether this route might not be ultimately made the main line of communication. It is shorter; and a force stationed at Giraneh would command alike Farrah and Sabzwar. Ferrier, after alluding to the strength of the fort as it was five-and-thirty years ago, thus writes regarding the position. «The position is important. It commands the passage of the river and the defiles in the mountains of the south. A small force quartered there might maintain its authority in the districts of Sabzwar, Farrah, Laush, Bakwa, Gulistan, Gour, and Sakkar, Giraneh being the central point round which converge these localities—information», he emphatically adds, «for the English and the Russians!» May the English first profit by the hint!

I may add that the road from Giraneh to Herat runs by Ab-i-Kurma and Shah Jahan, and joins the Sabzwar road at Kash Jabran, a few miles above Sabzwar itself. The distances may be thus computed from Ferrier's journal. From Kash Jabran to Shah Jahan about nine hours caravan journey, or about twenty miles; from Shah Jahan to Giraneh fifty-six miles. The country during the greater part of the way is described by Ferrier as well wooded and abounding in game, notwithstanding an almost entire deficiency of water.

I return now to the route by Farrah and Sabzwar. The distance bet-
ween those two places is eighty miles. «There are», writes Captain Marsh, «no villages—a vast jumble of valleys and hills, with small plains, inhabited only by a nomadic people. Each place has its name, but if the traveller finds tents at the same place twice he is lucky». Captain Marsh accomplished the journey in three days, by Khush, Kilamusha, and Darwazai. At each of these places he found water. Indeed, after the first twenty-five miles, the traveller follows, with a few deviations, the valley of the Rud-i-Adrashkan. Regarding this river Ferrier observes that an army marching from Herat in the summer months should follow its course, as the commander would then be free from anxiety regarding the supply of water for his men and cattle. (32) The hint should not be forgotten by an army which should march to Herat.

Sabzwar is eighty miles from Herat. It lies at the extremity of a large oblong plain, ten or twelve miles in circumference. The fort, prettily situated, is not formidable. The country around it is well cultivated, and abounds in flocks and herds. Water and supplies are abundant. A Hindu, who visited it in 1823, compared it for fertility with the best parts of Hindustan.

The road between Sabzwar and Herat needs no special description. It is good and level and passable for wheeled carriages of all descriptions. Supplies of all kinds are abundant.

The following are the stages—easily, if considered advisable, to be divided:

Sabzwar to Kash Jabran twenty-one miles. Midway is a water reservoir, now in ruins. At Kash Jabran the direct road to Kandahar branches off, taking the route by Giraneh.

To Adrashkan—eleven miles, about a mile on the Sabzwar side of the river of the same name.

To Shah Beg or Bad—twenty-three miles. Five miles after crossing the Rud-i-Adrashkan the traveller reaches the Rud-i-Gaz, a rapid stream, fifteen or twenty yards broad, whose waters flow into the Adrashkan a little to the west of the village of that name. Six miles further the ruined caravansarai of Mir Allah is reached. It is surrounded by cultivation, and a fine stream of water runs under its walls. Six and a half miles further, again, the traveller passes a spring of sweet water on the left of the road. The dwarf reed, which provides sufficient fodder for horses, is here abundant; but the food of man has to be carried. Water is plentiful at Shah Beg.

To Mir Daud—twelve miles. The traveller descend from Shah Beg. The descent is regular and gradual. The country is now uninhabited and uncultivated. Red and grey partridges abound. There is an artificial arrangement for the supply of water at Mir Daud, but under Afghan rule it has been but little cared for.

To Herat—eighteen miles. A good view of the city is obtainable from
the last-named station. The traveller proceeds by a good road, ten miles, to Rozeh Bāgh, a royal garden—in olden days planted with Scotch firs of great size and beauty. Little more than four miles further on, the Herirud is reached. The breadth of the river at this point is about one hundred and fifty yards. Its bed is here hollowed out, and its waters run in fifteen separate channels, twelve feet wide and very deep, enclosed between two embankments formed of the earth taken out for the excavations. To the south of the river is a fine piece of pasture-land formerly thickly, studded with gardens and villages. The ruins of houses, aqueducts, and other industrial monuments between this point and the city give the traveller an idea of what Herat used to be in her palmy days...

CHAPTER V

Mashad to Herat

I proceed now to examine the routes and the nature of the country between Mashad and Herat. The information given by James Fraser on this subject in the appendix to his valuable work has been practically superseded by the experience of later travellers. Of these I select as my guides Captain Marsh and Colonel MacGregor, who traversed the country, severally, in 1872 and 1875. The routes adopted were not altogether the same, but the points of divergence will be indicated. The distance by Captain Marsh's route may be calculated at about two hundred and twenty-four miles.

The first march from Mashad takes the traveller to Sangbast—a distance of about twenty-four miles. Sangbast is described by Captain Marsh as an old village and caravansarai, walled, formerly occupied by a colony of Afghans, but now in ruins. MacGregor (33), who travelled in the opposite direction from the vicinity of Herat to Mashad—thus describes the country between that place and Sangbast. «Next day I marched into Mashad over the same sort of country» (low, undulating hills) «as far as Torokh, a village of five hundred houses, walled, and with a great deal of cultivation, protected by numerous Turkman towers. The range to the right of the road, which is called Koh-i-Sar-i-Jam, ends quite abruptly; there is a break of some distance before the Mihrab range commences. There is no doubt, however, that the latter is a continuation of the former, as between Sharifabad and Nishapur is a low ridge, which drains on one side to the Ali-i-Mashad, and on the other to the Nishapur valley; and the Mihrab range takes this main range on to the hills of the Atrak.» (34) Colonel MacGregor gives a far more glowing description of Sangbast than does Captain Marsh. It is the first and only village he had seen in Persia which was regularly laid out. The supply of water to it is plentiful, and is capable of being largely increased.

The second march lead to the village of Farimun, about twenty-two miles. Colonel MacGregor thus describes the route, starting, be it remembered, from Farimun.
The road from Farimun to Sangbast with the exception of a couple of miles at the beginning, (beginning from Farimun), is all over a waste of low, undulating hills which bound the valley of Jam to the west, and are the link connecting the Jam range with that of the Koh Gaghar range on the north. The tract, he adds, is considered very dangerous, as the Turkmans are enabled to come in through the Koh-i-Chihl Sang range (which runs parallel with that of the Goghar, and is everywhere practicable) from the direction of Sarrakhs. The Persians have got a line of look-out towers placed on commanding sites all along the north flank of this road, and these would no doubt prove useful under efficient arrangements, but they are, as a rule, left without any look-out men, very much like a light-house without a light. About half way we passed a ruined village called Faizabad, which, four years ago, the Turkmans had surprised when most of the men were out, and had carried off every soul—about one hundred—out of it.

From this point to Kahriz the roads of the two travellers diverged, Captain Marsh taking the more northern route by Abdulabad, Colonel MacGregor the more southern by Shahr-i-nao. I shall first follow Captain Marsh.

That officer's third march took him to Bardu, an insignificant place about five miles short of Abdulabad—the distance from Farimun about twenty miles. The road he describes as bad and stony, with small hills on both sides, behind which it is easy for the Turkmans to lie in ambush. Eight miles from Farimun he passed through the village of Kallandarabad, which had then but recently been plundered.

Captain Marsh's fourth march was to Mahmudabad, a distance of twenty-six miles. He speaks in high terms of the cultivation he met with on the way. Here, he writes, I saw rich green fields, crops of barley and wheat, just cut, also lucern grass for winter fodder. He adds that the soil is extremely fertile, producing wheat once and barley twice a year.

In his fifth march Marsh reached Turbat-i-Jami, about eighteen miles. He speaks of the country as becoming more open, and of the population as becoming less Persian and more Afghan in dress and appearance. Five miles from this place, at the town of Jam, was fought, in 1528, the decisive battle between Shah Tahmasp and the Uzbeks.

Marsh's sixth march was to Kahriz—thirty-two miles. He describes the country as nearly flat; though the soil is good it is a wilderness, thirty-six miles without a tree or a habitation. Kahriz is a small fortified village near the Persian frontier.

Having brought Captain Marsh to Kahriz by the upper, I must conduct Colonel MacGregor thither by the lower, road. I left him, it will be recollected, at Farimun.

MacGregor's third march was Himmatabad (distance not recorded, but probably twenty-eight miles). It was when making this journey—in the
reverse direction—that [Mac Gregor] was attacked by Turkmans. Of the country he formed a very high opinion. "There is abundance of water," he writes, "and as the soil is good there is no reason why these hills should not support a considerable population if there were any. The climate, too, on this range is quite lovely; the sun, though hot, is not too powerful to prevent a man remaining out in it, and working all but, say, four hours in the middle of the day. For this reason I am of opinion that Europeans could easily colonise this and similar parts of Persia."

MacGregor's fourth march was to Shahr-i-nao, twelve miles. His account of the tract he traversed is not less favourable than the preceding. He speaks of the road as leading "now through cultivation, now through the most splendid pasture-land I have seen in Persia." Shahr-i-nao he describes as "having a great deal of cultivation and very numerous gardens for so small a population, and, as there is plenty of good water, cultivation might be increased to any extent almost."

The next halting-place on [MacGregor's] route was Mashaddi Reza, two villages not far from the Khauf range,—distance not recorded, but about twenty-two miles. The road from these villages to Shahr-i-nao ascends "imperceptibly to a low ridge, which runs out from the Khauf range, and divides the drainage of Kahriz from that of Mohsinabad. This is crossed just before getting to Shahr-i-nao, which is in a little basin." Of the two villages he records that they are about a mile apart, but connected by cultivation, of which, as well as of water—which comes from Kahriz—there is abundance.

The sixth march connected these two villages with Kahriz, about twenty-four miles, "a small place," writes MacGregor, "of about one hundred houses, most of which are inside the fort, though there are some outside near a serai. The fort is a strong place, and might make a decent resistance. The village is celebrated for its melons, but in order that the community may not enjoy too much bliss, it is also known as about the most exposed place on the frontier."

At Kahriz the roads taken by the two travellers joined. The next march was to Kohsan, the frontier fort of the province of Herat, distance twenty-eight miles. Kohsan is now in ruins, but in MacGregor's opinion it could easily be improved "so as to make it worthy of the frontier post of a warlike nation." Of the results of the fertility of its soil, the same author writes with enthusiasm. "Conducted into a most delightful garden, I bivouacked under the shade of some fine plane trees, by a tank of delicious clear water. After a good bath in the latter, it was a great luxury to lie back on one's bed, and devour, for nothing, bunch after bunch of glorious grapes, that at home would have ruined me." MacGregor makes special mention likewise of the fine gardens and vineyards, and of the numerous windmills near Kohsan. To reach this place the Herrirud has to be crossed about two miles from it, and the traveller finds himself, at last, in the glorious Herat valley.
From Kohsan Marsh proceeded to Herat in three stages. The first—a short one of about twelve miles—to Sabah, «a little, mean, dirty fort, barely habitable»; the second to Shakhwan—about thirty-two miles. Captain Marsh thus describes the road:—«The road goes along the high grounds at some distance from the river; gravel soil and a vast plain with distant hills on both sides. We passed the fort of Rozanak, and saw Ghalian in the distance, a large village, about a farsak (four miles) off, on the left bank of the river; the revenue of this village is six thousand tomauns, (35) and it supports four hundred sowars as militia, who hold «free» lands or Teool, on condition of military service. At Rozanak we stopped to see some curiously-made windmills, erected on one of the bastions of the village. The windy season, they say, blows from the north, and comes regularly; so windmills are more common here than watermills. They worked horizontally, and had six arms, on which were hung mats as sails... And old Shah Abbas' caravanserai in ruins was passed, then over a bad water-covered road, being a network of canals from the river to Shakhwan, a large group of three villages and forts.»

The next day Marsh rode into Herat. The distance by direct road is twenty-four miles, but to avoid the wet cultivation near the river, Captain Marsh made a detour of eight miles, crossing the Julkha or plain of Herat, «a sandy loam which bears good crops by irrigation.»

I return now to MacGregor. From Kohsan the route of that officer lay to Ghorian; from Ghorian, through Zandehgan to Deh-i-Minar; and from the latter place to Kargan, five miles from Herat. A better division of this route would be Ghorian, Zandehgan, and Herat itself. MacGregor gives in his interesting work a graphic description of the personal difficulties which beset him in his march from Kargan to Kohsan, and of the soldierly manner in which he overcame them. With the country he was favourably impressed. […]

CHAPTER VI

Herat to Sarrakhs, Merv, and Charjul

I now proceed to detail the information I have been able to collect regarding the route from Herat to Merv, via Sarrakhs; then the alternative route by the Murghab valley; and lastly, the route from Merv to Charjul, the ferry on the Oxus.

The caravan route from Herat to Merv takes the traveller along the Mashad road traversed by Captain Marsh as far as Kohsan—sixty-eight miles.

From Kohsan to Sarrakhs the distance is eighty four miles. For the description of the road I am indebted to MacGregor. (36) Kohsan to Chasma Saoz—twenty-four miles. The road, which is good, traverses a plain on the left bank of the Herirud. Supplies of all sorts are here abundant. Chasma Saoz to Pul-i-Khatan—twenty-eight miles. The road
crosses the Kotal Istakhanchil pass and then traverses hills, crossing to the right bank not far from Pul-i-Khatan. Though not good, it is practicable for guns. There is no village, but forage is abundant. Not far from this the Herirud separates into two branches, the northernmost of which takes the name of Tajand.

Pul-i-Khatan to Sarrakhs—thirty-two miles. Road level. At eight miles the village of Naozabad is reached; sixteen miles further Kala Daolatabad. The road proceeds to Sarrakhs along the left bank of the Tajand river.

Sarrakhs is described by MacGregor. The soil he speaks of as being of a light sandy nature, but as there is abundance of water at a depth of about twenty feet, it would, he thinks, be capable of producing large crops. The place he pronounces to be admirably situated for drawing to it all the trade between Turkistan on the north and Khorasan on the south. «It has,» he adds, «every advantage of soil and water and climate that would be necessary for these purposes.»

Regarding its military position, the words of MacGregor, himself one of the most able and distinguished officers on the general staff of the army in India, are full of warning. There is no uncertainty in the sound they breathe. «With regard to its strategical importance,» he writes regarding Sarrakhs, «I think a glance at the map will show that in the complications which must arise ere the Russo-Indian question can be deemed settled, its future is likely to be a stirring one. Placed at the junction of roads from Herat and Mashad, by the Herirud and the Ab-i-Mashad valleys respectively, and at the best entrance to the province of Khorasan from the north, it cannot fail to exercise a very serious influence on the momentous issue of the above question. This must happen, whether it fall into the hands of the friends of England or into those of her foes.» [...]

Let the reader bear in mind that Sarrakhs is distant from Herat one hundred and fifty-two miles; from Merv, certainly more than fifty, probably but little short of seventy.

MacGregor crossed the Tajand, rode some twelve miles from Sarrakhs in the direction of Merv, to the edge of the desert. He was not allowed to proceed further. That desert was traversed by Sir Alexander Burnes (then Lieutenant Burnes, F.R.S.) with a caravan in 1832. The caravan (of laden camels) passed within sight of the ruined castle of Merv (which Burnes did not examine) on the afternoon of the 29th August, and reached Sarrakhs at sunrise on the 2nd September. This would make it a journey of between seventy and eighty hours. But the caravan changed its route on the way, and only began the direct track on the 31st. Coming from Charjui, the caravan had reached and encamped upon the banks of the Murghab on the 26th August. On the 29th of marched twelve miles down the river, and crossed to the left bank at Ulisha. The travellers then passed close by Merv and took the direct road, by way of Artak, to Mashad. In consequence, however, of an
intended Turkman foray, the chiefs of the caravan resolved to alter the
route to Sarrakhs. The caravan accordingly retraced its steps to Kanju
Kulan, a few miles to the north of Merv, on the direct road to Sarrakhs.
From this place, on the left bank of the Murghab, the route lay thirty-
seven miles across the desert to Kalurni. This route Burnes thus
describes: «The tract was entirely different from the opposite side»
(of the Murghab) «and about the middle of the journey the desert
changed into a level, hard, flat surface, which it ever afterwards
preserved... The country was destitute of water, but there are many
remains of caravansarais and cisterns that had been built by the
philanthropic Abdulla Khan of Bokhara.»

Kalurni is a ruin. The distance thence to Sarrakhs is thirty-three miles,
of which about twenty are desert of the same character as that already
described. The last twelve or thirteen miles bear a different character.
«As we approached Sarrakhs,» writes Burnes, «we could distinguish a
gradual, though almost imperceptible rise in the country. We exchanged
the shrubs that I have before described for the tamarisk and the camel's
thorn, which does not grow in the desert.»

I regret I am unable to discover an account more in detail of the road
between Sarrakhs and Merv. That which I have given, however,
shows clearly enough that the desert between the two places
offers no invincible obstacle to the march of a well-organized army, or
indeed, to any army led by a competent and active general. The dis-
tance by this route I have calculated to be two hundred and twenty-two
miles, but the calculation is probably slightly in excess of the actual
figure. At all events the distance has not been overstated.

Before proceeding from Merv to Charjui it is necessary that the alter-
native route from Herat to the former, along the valley of the Mur-
ghab, should be indicated. This route was traversed by Captain James
Abbot in 1840, and by the late Sir Richmond Shakespear in the follow-
ing year.

The first march by this route leads to Parwana—eleven miles. The road
lies between close hills, of no considerable height, and ascends the en-
tire distance to Parwana. Around this village are hills and high plains
producing wormwood, which is browsed by the wild antelope. There
are many wells and a little cultivation.

From Parwana Captain Abbot, whose journal I am following, (37) pro-
ceed across the mountain ridge of Kaitu to Kushk, somewhat off the
direct road. Captain Abbot writes: «Avoiding now the more direct and
difficult passes of the mountain ridge of Kaitu, we crossed that chain
without accident, meeting neither dwelling nor tent, excepting two
ruined hospitia in the valley, and, descending some grassy heights,
pitched at evening in a hollow, where we found a little water . . . . .
One flock of sheep in the distance, and the wild antelopes of the
wilderness, were the sole living things we saw.».
From this hollow Captain Abbot proceeded the next day by a very distressing cross-country path, over steep hills covered with grass, to the rivulet Kushk, which we ascended to the capital of that name. The valley here is picturesque and interesting. Of the inhabitants—Jamshidis of Turkish descent—Captain Abbot writes as follows:—They are short, stout, very dark, with decidedly Tartar features. Wherever water and soil are found a little cultivation is maintained by them, but their wealth consists in flocks of sheep and herds of horses of Turkman breed.

From Kushk Captain Abbot marched down the valley of the rivulet of the same name in the direction of Chaman-i-Baid. He encamped in the evening at a point on the river, evidently between Kushat Siah and Kala Tapah. He thus describes the country: We passed down the valley of the Kushk rivulet, averaging about half a mile in width, and bounded on either side by sloping, grassy downs, sprinkled with flocks of sheep and goats. Under the low sunny cliffs and hills the Jamshidis had pitched their black tents in considerable numbers; and in the fields of the valley hundreds of mares and colts were grazing. The scene was extremely pleasing. The valley is highly susceptible of culture, and has once been well tilled.

In the next march, similar scenery and similar cultivation as far as Kala Tapah. Beyond Kala Tapah there are few black tents; but large flocks of sheep are still met with. The shepherds come even from Merv to this pleasant valley, bringing water and all other necessaries on asses. The march, which continued all day, concluded within two miles short of Chaman-i-Baid.

The day following presented scenes almost similar. Large flocks of white sheep still sprinkled the hills on either side, but those hills were growing more arid and sandy as we advanced. The march concluded at Kala-i-Maur. On the way we met not less than six or seven caravans of grain from Merv. At this place the traveller enters the kingdom of Khwarizm.

From Kala-i-Maur Abbot marched from the valley of the Kushk into that of the Murghab, passing the ruined vineyards and deserted fields of a once populous and cultivated district. The Murghab and the valley traversed by it he thus describes: The Murghab is here a deep stream of very pure water about sixty feet in breadth, and flowing in a channel mined to the depth of thirty feet in the clay soil of the valley. The banks are very precipitous, and fringed with tamarisk and a few reeds. The valley itself is, at Panjdeh, (38) about nine miles in breadth, but narrows as we advance. Here—at Pul-i-Kishti, where the Kushk joins it—it is about three-quarters of a mile in breadth. On the east bank are sloping sand-hills, about six hundred feet higher than the valley. On the west is the desert, a high, sandy plain over-run with low bushes and camelthorn, and extending to the mountain barrier of Persia. The valley of the Murghab has once been well cultivated, but is now, from Panjdeh to Yulatan (39), utterly deserted, owing
On the fourth day after leaving Kalai-i-Maur Abbot reached Yulatan, still following the Murghab through a country similar to that already described. There would appear, however, to be considerable traffic on the road. «We met a caravan every third mile», writes Abbot, «laden with wheat and barley from Merv». As he approached Yulatan he found the desert aspects of the country a little broken by symptoms of recent cultivation.

From this place Abbot reached Merv in one march.

Abbot's description of Merv will go far to show that it is a place which no nation would care to conquer for its own intrinsic value; that its possession is desirable as a stepping-stone to further advance, but for no other reason. «Merv», writes Abbot, «was one of the most ancient cities of Asia. It was situated in the plain, about twelve miles east of the little bazaar which at present bears its name, and was watered by a canal from the Murghab or Ab-i-Maur . . . . During the misrule and anarchy of the last sixty years the ancient dam of the Murghab was neglected and carried away. The city in consequence became uninhabitable, and was utterly abandoned. The dam is again set up, and the lands are brought under culture, but the ancient site continues a deserted ruin. The present Merv is an assemblage, on the Murghab, of about one hundred mud huts, where a considerable bazaar is held. The entire waters of the Murghab are dispersed over the sandy plain for the purposes of irrigation. This profusion of water renders the soil productive; but it has not the strength to bear any but the poorer kinds of grain. The plain is perhaps an area of sixty miles by forty, or two thousand four hundred square miles, running on every side into the desert». A little further on he adds: «I was glad to quit this wretched though much-vaunted plain and enter the desert, which is a paradise in comparison».

I have now given the two routes between Herat and Merv, the first being the caravan route via Sarrahrs; the second the valley of the Murghab, also for a considerable portion of the way a caravan route. The first, presenting no difficulties not easily to be surmounted to an army, covers, as already stated, a distance certainly not exceeding, and probably somewhat short of, two hundred and twenty-two miles. The distance of the second is not so easily calculated. Captain Abbot, making a divergence of two days from the direct route in order to visit Kushk, accomplished the journey in thirteen days. Deducting the two days, the distance, granting an average rate of travel of twenty-two miles, may be surmised to be at the utmost two hundred and forty miles. This agrees with the Herati estimate of the distance.

From Merv to Charjui the distance is one hundred and forty-two miles. As there is no prospect that the English would march upon Charjui, whilst a Russian general has declared that, starting from that place, he would engage to reach Merv in five days, it will be convenient to
make the point of departure from the Oxus. Charjui lies on the left bank of that river, and forms an important point in the direct road from Bokhara to Herat and Persia. Between the town and the right bank, on which is a fort—Fort Yazty—is a most important ferry. Burnes describes the river at this point as having a breadth of six hundred and fifty yards, and a depth in some places of twenty-five and twenty-nine feet. Charjui is six miles distant from the left bank. It is, according to Burnes, who visited it in 1831, a small town, with a population of four thousand to five thousand, pleasantly situated on the verge of culture and desolation. A pretty fort, crowning a hillock, overlooks the town. It is probable that since that period the population has considerably increased.

The description given by Burnes of the trade at Charjui is so graphic that I make no apology for quoting it. «I sauntered through the bazaar», he writes, «much more amused with the people than with the wares they were selling, which were in every respect poor. These were knives, saddles, and bridles, cloth and horse-cloths, of native manufacture; but the only articles of European fabric were a few beads and chintz skull-caps, which latter were purchased very readily. There were also lanterns, ewers, and copper pots in considerable number; the vendors of many of these retailed their goods on horseback, and all the purchasers were mounted».

Two miles from Charjui, on the road to Merv, begins the great desert which separates Turkistan from Persia. Burnes, marching with a caravan, made his first halt at Karoul twenty-two miles from the starting point (40). The march for the last twenty miles was across a vast ocean of sand—a dreary waste of sand-hills; they were quite soft, but the sand was not dusty, and the camels slid down them with their burdens. . . . There was no water throughout the whole march, and no sign of inhabitants but a ruined fort that had once served as a look-out from the Oxus». At Karoul there was a well of brackish water, thirty feet under ground, lined with branches of trees.

I regret I am unable to follow Burnes further on this route. On leaving Karoul the caravan to which he was attached was forced to quit the direct road by order of the Turkmans. It may suffice briefly to state that from that place to the next well, Ishk Robat, the distance is eighteen miles. (Here another road by way of Balgui leads to Kara Tapah, north of Merv). From Ishk Robat to Robitak the distance is sixteen miles; from Robitak to Pindi twenty miles; from Pindi to Nizushaki twenty miles; thence to Khalka twenty miles; and from Khalka to Merv twenty-six miles—seven marches, averaging a trifle over twenty miles a day.

I have referred to a second road from Charjui, on the same lines as the first as far as Ishk Robat, whence it branches westward to Balgui, and proceeds by Sir-ab and Uchgui to Kara Tapah, a little to the north of Merv. This route, known to the native traders as the Rafatak route, is about ten miles longer than the other. It is, however, perfectly feasible for caravans.
It was into this route, that Burnes and his party moved from Karoul, when ordered so to do by the Turkmans. According to Burnes, Balgui is twenty-four miles from Karoul. It is simply a well about four feet in diameter, thirty feet deep. The water was good.

The desert is described by Burnes in colours far from glowing. There was no water save at the wells, and a few lizards, rats, and beetles, with here and there a solitary bird, were the only inhabitants. Some of the sand-hills attained the height of sixty feet, an elevation at which they are bare of all vegetation. The heat of the sand rose to one hundred and fifty degrees; that of the atmosphere exceeded one hundred degrees; and it was the steadiness of the wind alone that made travelling possible.

It is interesting to note the pace of the caravan under these difficult circumstances. On this point Burnes took accurate observations, which he thus records. «Our caravan advanced at a firm and equal pace among the sand. . . . They» (the camels) «moved at the rate of two miles and one-eight in the hour (three thousand seven hundred and forty yards); and I have since found that the judicious Volney assigns the distance of three thousand six hundred yards as the hourly journey of a camel in the sands of Egypt and Syria».

The third march was a long one, thirty-five miles, to Sir-ab—a well with water—which first tasted fetid, but which exposure to the atmosphere rendered sweet. In this march the nature of the country somewhat changed. The great sand-hills disappeared; the desert presented an undulating and uneven country of sand, partially covered with shrubs.

The fourth march led to Uchgui, or the Three Wells, distance twenty-six miles. The water here was bitter, but, records Burnes (41) «the shepherds seem indifferent to its quality». The country, as the caravan advanced, became more flat and free from sand, though it still ran in alternate ridges and hollows.

The fifth march was to the banks of the Murghab, to a place called Khwaja Abdulla, distant thirty miles. Khwaja Abdulla is twelve miles from Ulisha, and four or five more from Merv. The total distance by this, the second, route, between Charjui and Merv is about one hundred and fifty-four miles.

In every respect this route is inferior to the first route. Not to speak of the small increase in distance, the supplies of water are fewer and the water itself is less palatable. Burnes considered it extremely doubtful if the three arms composing an army could cross by this road. His conclusion is based mainly on the fact that water was both bitter and scanty, and that there is nothing that so quickly demoralises an army as the want of good water. He likewise lays stress on the want of fodder for horses. He admits, however, that the road might be made practicable for guns, by placing brushwood, which abounds, on the sand, and that many armies have crossed it before. The difficulties to
the route made by Burnes seem then at once to disappear. If the road could be made practicable for guns it could be made practicable for supply-carts. There is abundant water in the Oxus, and there are thousands of camels in the desert. The water carried in skins, though less palatable than fresh water, could easily be endured for a week; and in less than a week an invading army would be at Merv on the Murghab, with a choice of two routes, both well supplied with water, to Herat. It is fair to conclude, then, that the second route, though inferior to the first, is practicable for an army.

There is, likewise, a third route, east of the first route, and not much longer than the second. This route, called the Kalkuju route, starts from a point a few miles higher up the Oxus than Charjui and runs to Kazaldi, a post on the Murghab, below Merv. Beyond the fact that it is practicable for caravans, but little is known of this route.

We have thus three routes between Charjui and Merv. An examination of the country proves that, with sufficient preparation, the assertion of the Russian general that he could accomplish the distance with a sufficient force in five days, was no vain boast. The task would be difficult, but, unless the general were opposed in force, it could be performed. The case, however, would be different if the Russian advance were to be opposed by the Turkmans. In that case it would be possible to cause it to end in disaster. The wells are not always easy to find; the Turkmans alone know their exact position. A long train of baggage carts and camels would invite attack from the swarthy horsemen of the desert; and such an attack would so impede the hostile force as to render a successful march on Merv in the highest degree improbable. So far, then, the Turkmans and the desert are the best allies of Great Britain. The desert remains, and has remained for ages, difficult yet feasible. But the Turkmans? The services of the Turkmans will be at the disposal of the European nation which shall first occupy Herat!

The opinion I have here recorded regarding the practicability of the route is confirmed by Ferrier. «A Russian army», writes that traveller (42), «might thus direct its march, as it thought fit, either to Khulm, or, withdrawing from the river on its arrival at Charjui, reach Merv by the desert, and marching along the fertile and populous banks of the Murghab, reach Herat. There would not be any obstacle of a serious nature to stop an army on its way to the river, and the desert between it and Merv offers no difficulties that cannot be surmounted». Again the question arises—Will Russia exterminate the Turkmans; or will England, by occupying Herat, make of them her firmest and her best allies?

CHAPTER VII

Herat to Maimane and Andkho

The stages from Herat to Maimané and 9ndkho may be thus roughly enumerated:—
Herat to Kurrukh, four miles.
Kurrukh to Kila-No, twenty miles.
Kila-No to Bala Murghab, twenty miles.
Bala Murghab to Kila Veli, twenty-five miles.
Kila Veli to Chitchekta, twelve miles.
Chitchekta to Narin, twelve miles.
Narin to Kaisar, seven miles.
Kaisar to Maimané, twenty-five miles.
Maimané to Andkho, twenty-two miles.
The total distance is, thus, to Maimané, one hundred and twenty-five miles; to Andkho, one hundred and forty-seven miles.

Regarding the road between Herat and Kurrukh, Vambéry, who made the journey between Herat and Andkho in 1863, thus describes the latter portion of it, that nearest to Herat: «The traveller approaching from the north will certainly be surprised when, on turning round the mountain Khodja Abdulla Ansari, he sees lying before him the beautiful immense plain called Djolguei Herat, with its numerous canals and scattered groups of villages.» The traveller from Herat to Maimane, crossing this beautiful and fertile plain, and at a distance of four miles reaches Kurrukh at the foot of one of the spurs of the Safed Koh. The distance is so short and the road so easy, that but for the fact that, with a difficult mountain route before an army, it is always advisable to make a short journey the first day, it could scarcely be called a march. That title has, however, under the circumstances, been always conferred upon it.

The distance from Kurrukh to Kila-No is twenty miles. So great, however, are the difficulties of the route, that the caravan with which Vambéry marched required four days to overcome them. On the first of those days, the easiest, the ridge, at the foot of which lies Kurrukh, is crossed into the valley between it and the Saraband mountain. In this valley the halt is made at the village Sertcheshme. (43) Thence, the second day, the traveller ascends the Saraband, covered with eternal snows. The ascent, after emerging from the valley, is continous, and, according to Vambéry, both difficult and dangerous. «There are some very dangerous places,» writes that experienced traveller, «the path, passing close to the edge of the precipice, being only a foot broad.» The summit of the mountain formed, in Vambéry’s case, the conclusion of the second stage. Thence, the third day, a descent was made to the village of Alvar; and, from that place, the fourth day, over a mountainous country, to Kila-No.

The difficulty of the road consists, it will be seen, mainly in the ascent of the Saraband. There can be no doubt but that the track could be so improved as to divide the time I have noted by one half. Indeed, the track being as it is, the journey is made by horses in two days. It must be recollected that Vambéry travelled with a caravan of camels, all of whom, he tells us, carried greater loads than usual. Were the road to be widened and otherwise improved, the distance between
Kurrukh and Kila-No could certainly be accomplished by artillery and infantry in two days.

Kila-No, fifty years ago, was a flourishing town and fortress. It is now in ruins. A few tents occupied by Hazaras represent its former prosperity—a striking commentary on the curse of a rule which allows every man to be free to raise his hand against his neighbour.

From Kila-No to Bala Murghab the road runs by Mogor—a small collection of huts—over the Telkhguzar to Pul-Taban—a ruined stone bridge built in the time of Sultan Husen Mirza. At this point the valleys of the Gulchin and the Murghab unite. The traveller, following thence the Murghab, crosses the first Darband Kotal—a narrow and difficult pass on the summit of which are the ruins of an ancient castle—the summer residence of the Sultan Husen Mirza above referred to. (44)

Descending from this pass the traveller crosses the second and more imposing Darband Kotal, its summit likewise surmounted by a ruined fortress. From this point Bala Murghab is reached without difficulty. The distance is computed to be about twenty miles.

Bala or Balai Murghab is a ruined fortress, the importance of which in the days of Sultan Husen Mirza was great. Numerous ruins in the interior and in the environs, writes Vambery, indicate a bygone civilisation. To the south-west of the fortress, according to the same writer, the valley becomes so narrow that it merits rather the name of a defile. «Through the midst,» he continues, «the Murghab rolls foaming away with the noise of thunder; it is not until it has passed Pandjdeh, where the river becomes deeper and more sedate, that the valley spreads itself out and acquires a breadth of one or two miles. When Merv existed, there must have been here, too, a tolerable amount of civilisation.» The inhabitants of this part of the Murghab valley are called Jamshidis. Of Persian descent, the mixture of Turki blood has made them Turkman in character. Under ordinary circumstances their thrift and industry would go far to restore prosperity to the lands they cultivate. But they know well that whether they cultivate much or cultivate little, everything beyond the exact quantity necessary for their sustenance will be confiscated by the rapacious Afghan.

From Bala Murghab the traveller crosses the transparently clear green waters of the river of the same name, and proceeds to Kila Veli—also a ruined fort—distance about twelve miles. The current of the river is strong, but there is a ford not far from Bala Murghab. Crossing by this, the traveller follows the course of the river for two or three miles, and then traverses the mountains by a rough pass, in many places very steep and very narrow. Vambery states that this pass is said to be the only practicable passage leading over the mountain. Kila Veli, once a populous place, was surprised and plundered by the Sarik Turkmans in 1861. It lies just beyond the mountains range which intervenes between it and the valley of the Murghab.
Starting from Kila Veli, the traveller enters the valley known as the Chitchepta—one of the most fertile valleys in Central Asia. "We passed all day," writes Vambery, "through magnificent meadows, which, in spite of the advanced season of the year, were covered with flowers and grass that came up to our knees." The land, he tells us in another place, "is exceedingly fertile, but it lies there, unhappily, fallow and without an owner." Travellers by this route are subjected to much fear from the daring of the mountain robbers, the Sarik Turkmans and the Firuzkuhs, who dwell on either side of the road. The distance to Chitchepta is about twenty miles.

From Chitchepta to Narin—fifteen miles—through an easy and fertile country. From Narin to Kaisar, seven miles, the greater number of which lie along fruitful but abandoned valleys. From Kaisar to Maimané, sixteen miles, the entire road traversing a mountainous country.

Until Maimane was visited by Vambery in 1863, but one European, Captain Stirling, had, so far as I have been able to ascertain, set foot within it. Captain Stirling describes the place as a big village. From Vambery we have a more detailed description. "The city of Maimané," he writes, "stands in the midst of hills, and is only visible when approached within a distance of a quarter of a league. It is extremely filthy and ill-built, and consists of one thousand five hundred mud huts, and a bazaar built of brick, that seems about to fall." Its inhabitants are Uzbeks, of whose prowess Vambery formed a very high opinion, and there is besides a sprinkling of Tajiks, Heratis, Jews, Hindus, and Afghans. The trade of the place is considerable. Maimane is renowned for its carpets and other stuffs, made partly of wool and partly of camels' hair. It carries on also a considerable trade with Persia and Bagdad in raisins, aniseed, and pistachio nuts. Horses are good, plentiful, and cheap. "Horses," writes Vambery, "that I saw sold in Persia for thirty or forty ducats, fetch here from fourteen to fifteen. Never did I behold in Bokhara, Khiva, or Karshi, horses so fine sold at prices so low."

Maimane has ever remained independent of Afghanistan. The Uzbek inhabitants of the Khanate, numbering about one hundred thousand, are renowned for their courage. Their town, however, is in no condition to resist a scientific enemy. "The walls, made of earth, are twelve feet high and about five broad; the fosse is neither broad nor particularly deep; the citadel is elevated, and situated upon a conspicuous hill of steep ascent, but in the neighbourhood there are still higher hills, whence a battery could in a few hours reduce it to ashes." (45) Naturally, in a country where horses are so cheap, the inhabitants are all bold and fearless horsemen.

From Maimane the traveller follows the course of the stream called the A'ndkho for fourteen miles to a village about three miles on the Maimane side of Yakatat. For the first two miles there are considerable ascents. These then become gradually less until the spongy marshes of Batkak are reached. Without being dangerous, these marshes are
fatiguing to beasts of burden. They, however, are soon passed. From the point already indicated, three miles on the Malmane side of Yakatat, the road presents no difficulty.

Andkho is, like Merv, a relic of the past. Yet that past is not very distant. Less than half a century ago it was a very flourishing town with a population of fifty thousand souls. It carried on then an important traffic with Persia in the sheepskins known as the Astrakhan. It possessed camels, too, of a very remarkable breed called Ner, distinguished by abundant hair streaming down from the neck and breast, a slim, slender figure, and extraordinary strength. Now, the inhabitants numbers only fifteen thousand, and the habitable houses do not exceed two thousand. The trade in sheepskins has diminished, the rare breed of camels is fast disappearing. How has this change been wrought? By the same cause which has turned a garden into a desert in all the lands south of the Oxus; by the hand of the pitiless, destroying Afghan. In 1840 the Afghan army, under Yar Muhammad Khan, besieged A’ndkhol, which then belonged to Bokhara. The siege lasted four months. At the end of that period the city was taken by storm, plundered, and made a heap of ruins. The greater part of the inhabitants who could not flee fell before the swords of the merciless Afghan. The same merciless conqueror still governs and still desolates A’ndkhol. (46)

CHAPTER VIII

Andkhol to Shiborgan, Balkh, Takhtapul, Khulm, and Falzabad

From A’ndkhol to Shiborgan the distance is about twenty miles. (47) The road crosses an extremely rich and fertile country, resembling an immense garden. Shiborgan is a considerable town, boasting a population of twelve thousand souls, the majority of whom are Uzbeks. It has a citadel, but no other fortifications. It is surrounded by good gardens and excellent cultivation. The climate is salubrious, but the water-supply is precarious. This supply, writes Ferrier, who visited the place in 1846, «comes from the mountains in the Khanate of Sirpul; and as there are frequent disputes between the tribes inhabiting it and those living in this town» (Shiborgan) «a complete interruption of the supply is often threatened.» In other respects Ferrier pronounces Shiborgan to be one of the finest towns in Turkistan south of the Oxus. The inhabitants are renowned for their courage.

From Shiborgan on the road to Balkh the first halting-station is A’khchec; the distance about twenty miles. The road still continues across the magnificent plain above alluded to, presenting the entire way an animated and picturesque scene. A’khchec is a small walled town of seven or eight thousand souls, protected by a citadel. The inhabitants are Uzbeks—a brave and warlike race. Thence to Mailik the road runs—likewise a distance of twenty miles—across a marshy plain, full of reeds and trees. The position of Mailik is important. It occupies a
point at which meet the roads to the south, to the west, to the northwest, and to the east. Ferrier states that this position has made it the resort of spies of the princes of Afghanistan and of Turkistan. The place derives additional interest from the fact that it is built on the ruins of a large Bactrian town.

Mailik to Balkh—twenty-eight miles. The road crosses a plain closed in on the left by very high mountains, from which streams of water flow. When Ferrier made the journey these streams had broken up the road almost continuously, and sometimes formed marshes of mud, from which the horses of himself and his companions had the greatest difficulty to extricate themselves.

Owing to circumstances, which he details at length, but which it seems unnecessary to record here, Ferrier, to his great regret, did not enter Balkh. He writes, however, with rapture and commiseration of its splendid position. «The lovely and advantageous position of the Mother of Cities, in the midst of a rich plain, though favourable to any agricultural or commercial undertaking, has rendered it liable to the sad misfortune of being a constant bone of contention between the Amirs of Khulm and Bokhara, whose ruthless armies almost annually dispute the suzerainty of the place.»

Another writer, Sir Alexander Burnes, visited Balkh at a somewhat early date. He gives a description the reverse of glowing of the fallen city. «Its ruins extend for a circuit of about twenty miles, but present no symptoms of magnificence; they consist of fallen mosques and decayed tombs which have been built of sun-dried brick; nor are any of these ruins of an age prior to Muhammadanism.» It is extraordinary that other ruins should be wanting, considering the great antiquity of the city. Firdusi speaks of it as the capital of the Persian empire in the time of Kaomours, the founder of the Paishdadian dynasty. Arrian writes of the residence in the city of Alexander the Great, and of his leaving there an army of fourteen thousand men, when he marched southward. Gibbon refers to Balkh as having been the city in which, in the third century of the Christian era, Artaxerxes had his authority confirmed by the assembled vassal chiefs. But little is known of its history till the ninth century. In the year 869 we hear of Balkh having been conquered by the famous Yakub-ben-Lais. On the downfall of the house of Ben Lais, the city and province fell to the family of Samani.

Ibn Haukal speaks of Balkh in the year 1004 as being one of the four capitals of Khorasan—Herat, Merv, and Nishapur being the other three. At that time Balkh was the ruling queen of sixteen provinces, having eight cities dependent upon her. The city, distant twelve miles from the mountains, was surrounded by an earthen wall with six gates; it possessed also a citadel, and was rich in mosques. Through it flowed the river Rud-i-Haas, turning in its course ten mills and fertilising the lands of the villages and districts in the vicinity. Round the city lay magnificent gardens and orchards, producing every kind of fruit, dates
alone excepted. Edrisi, who wrote more than a century and a half later, confirms this account, and adds: "The city has now become the capital of the Turks; the head-quarters of their troops; the residence of their princes, their judges, their administrators; it possesses flourishing suburbs, a considerable population, many industries, and a large mosque surrounded by bazaars; it is full of merchandise, and busy with traffic." He goes on to sing the praises of the colleges for arts and sciences, and the colleges for students; to describe the wealth of the merchants, and the consideration they enjoyed; also the number of men of distinction within the walls. This flourishing condition he attributes to the fact that Balkh is a central point where the trade lines meet.

The prosperity so glowingly described by Edrisi received a death-blow from the ruthless Chinghiz Khan in 1220. Although the inhabitants, on hearing of the approach of the conqueror, despatched a deputation laden with the richest presents to pacify him, he would not listen to their entreaties, but caused the population to be butchered in cold blood. Balkh never recovered from the blow. A hundred and twenty years later, A.D. 1340, Ibn Batuta found the city still in ruins. Nearly thirty years later it was taken by Timur. Though Balkh was subsequently recognised by that prince as the capital of a province, its prosperity did not return. Under the Mughal rule in India, it formed an outlying province of the empire founded by Babar. Humayun and Kamran fought for its possession, and somewhat later Aurangzib resided within its walls as representative of his father, Shah Jahan. On the break up of the Mughal empire, Balkh again underwent the horrors of an assault, at the hands of Reza Kuli, son of Nadir Shah. After the death of that conqueror, Balkh fell into the possession of the Afghans and remained for about eighty years under their blighting rule. It was then conquered by the King of Bokhara, when once more it became a battleground. Finally, however, the Afghan prevailed, and the city still endures the oppression which the Afghan alone is capable of inflicting. When Burnes visited the place in 1832, he found that the population did not exceed two thousand, and that these were mostly natives of Kabul and a few Arabs. (48)

Burnes gives an unfavourable account of the salubrity of Balkh. He attributes its unhealthiness partly to its water, "which is so mixed up with earth and clay as to resemble a puddle after rain," and partly to the fact that all old cities and ruins are more or less unhealthy. "It is not probable," he pertinently adds, "that so many kings and princes would have patronised a site always unfavourable to the health of man; and Balkh itself is not situated in a country naturally marshy, but on a gentle slope which sinks towards the Oxus, about one thousand eight hundred feet above the level of the sea." The soil is very rich and very productive.

A road connects Balkh with the ferry of Chuskaguzar (49) on the Oxus, at a distance of about thirty miles, over a route, practicable, though intersected near Balkh by watercourses.
Takhtapul is the new Balkh. It lies nearly three miles to the east of the old city, possessing all the advantages of the site, and free from the drawbacks to which Burnes referred. A direct road, joining the road from Balkh, connects Takhtapul with the Chuska-guzar ferry on the Oxus. Between Balkh and Takhtapul the land is well cultivated.

Leaving Takhtapul, the traveller, after a ride of about five miles across a cultivated plane, intersected by watercourses, reaches Muzar, a walled village containing two hundred houses. When Ferrier passed it there were in the neighbourhood tents of thousands of Uzbeks and Aimaks. The Afghan garrison occupied a village of wooden huts outside the walls.

The next station is Khulm, thirty miles distant across an arid plain. «On the road between Muzar and this place,» writes Ferrier, «are some clay hills, amongst which anciently stood the village and caravansarai of Abdou. Both are now uninhabited and in ruins.» Burnes had previously written of the road as barren and dreary, and of Abdou as being the resort of robbers from every quarter.

Khulm is a very important place. The distance between it and the Oxus scarcely exceeds twenty miles. «It stands on the plain,» writes Ferrier, «and consists of four or five villages, now become quarters of the town, united with each other by gardens; there are bazaars, caravansarais, baths, and the population may amount to fifteen thousand inhabitants.» The district of which it is the capital is extensive. It contained, when visited by Ferrier, seven hundred thousand souls, mostly of the Tajik race, and produced an annual revenue of twenty-four thousand pounds in gold and fifty thousand pounds in cereals. Its influence on the states around it is, according to the same writer, not inferior to the influence exercised by Kabul, Herat, and Bokhara.

Burnes speaks favourably of Khulm; of its beautiful gardens, its apricots, its cherries, and its mulberries; of the noble view it commands towards the north. From Khulm the country slopes down to the Oxus, but the rivulet, which bears the name of the town, is consumed for the purposes of irrigation before it reaches that noble river. The soil has great capabilities, the development of which requires but a few years of peace and security.

From Khulm to Kunduz the distance is just over seventy miles. For the first forty-five the traveller journeys along «a dreary road, over two low passes among hills, not enlivened by a single tree, nor blessed with a drop of fresh water.» (50) Twelve miles from Kunduz fields and orchards are reached, and from this point to the town the country is agreeable and even interesting. The town, according to the graphic description of Burnes, «is situated in a valley, surrounded on all sides by hills except the north, where the Oxus flows at a distance of about forty miles. It is watered by two rivers, which join north of the town. The climate is so insalubrious that there is a proverb among the people, which runs as follows:—'If you wish to die, go to Kunduz.' The greater
part of the valley is so marshy that the roads are constructed on piles of wood, and run through the rankest weeds; yet wheat and barley are produced, as also rice, in the places which are not entirely inundated. The heat is described as intolerable, yet snow lies for three months in the year. Kunduz has at one time been a large town, but its population does not now (1832) exceed one thousand five hundred souls; and no person makes it a residence who can live in any other place, though it be the market town of the neighbourhood. The chief never visits it but in winter. It has a fort surrounded by a ditch, which is a place of strength; the walls are constructed of sun-dried brick; and such is the heat that they crumble under the sun's rays and require constant repair. The great mountains of Hindu Kush lie in sight, south of Kunduz, covered with snow. The neighbouring hill are low, creeping ridges, covered with grass and flowers, but destitute of trees or brushwood. A little further up the valley the climate becomes more genial; and the people speak in raptures of the groves and rivulets, the fruits and flowers, of Badakhshan.

Pursuing the journey eastward to Faizabad, the traveller rides fifteen miles to Khanuabad, a village situated on the brow of the hills above the fens of Kunduz, and enlivened by a rivulet which runs briskly past a fort, shaded by trees of the richest verdure. Burnes, who thus describes the place, writes of the heat as being great, but Dr. Lord (1838) speaks of the air as being purer than that of Kunduz. The road between the two places is of the marshy character referred to in the description of Kunduz.

Khanuabad to Talikan—twenty-four miles. The road is apparently good, as Dr. Lord accomplished it without difficulty in 1838. Burnes, who did not, however, visit it, speaks of the climate as being pleasant, and the soil rich and prolific.

From Talikan the road leads by Ak-bulak, Kila-Afghan, Mashad, Taishkan, and A'rgu to Faizabad, crossing the Lataband range (four thousand nine hundred and twenty feet) between Talikan and A'kbulak; the A'gur mountains between Kila Afghan and Taishkan; the Junas (six thousand feet) between the latter place and A'rgu; and ascending thence to Faizabad on the river Kokcha. I have been unable to obtain a detailed account of the nature of the country and of the distances. Every report regarding those more eastern districts testifies to their beauty, to their fertility, to their wonderful capabilities. «They have,» wrote Burnes, «none of the defects of climate which are peculiar to Kunduz, and both natives and foreigners speak in rapture of the vales of Badakshan, its rivulets, romantic scenes and glens, its fruits, flowers, and nightingales.» Regarding Faizabad and the district it represents, the same author writes: «This once celebrated country is now almost without inhabitants; it was over-run by the chief of Kunduz about twelve years ago» (in 1820): «its ruler has been dethroned, and his substitute exists as a mere pageant; its peasants have been driven out of the country, and a rabble of lawless soldiery is now quartered in the different provinces. It also suffered from an earthquake in January 1832, which destroyed
many villages and a great part of the population. The same writer informs us that the natives of the province are Tajiks; that they are very fond of society, and much given to hospitality, bread being never sold in the country. Their language is the Persian, and they still adhere to the simple manners and customs which obtained north of the Hindu Kush before the invasion of the Tartars. Such is the people which now groans under the ruthless tyranny of a barbarous race alien to them in blood, in customs, even in religion—for the Badakhshanis are mostly Shiahs—the tyranny of the cruel, the rapacious, the merciless Afghan!

CHAPTER IX

Kabul to Khulm

Although in the two preceding chapters I have indicated the direct road from Herat to the most eastern point of the proposed military frontier, it must not be supposed that it would be necessary for our soldiers to adopt that route. For the troops who may be stationed in Badakhshan there are direct routes from Kabul. One of these I propose now very briefly to indicate.

There is what is called a high road between Kabul and Khulm; the total distance is approximately two hundred and twenty-eight miles.

(51) The first stage leads to Argandi, twelve miles. The first nine miles run through the beautiful Kabul valley. Turning off, then, at the village of Kila Kazi, the traveller, inclining to the right, reaches the village of Argandi, situated at the foot of the Paghman range. It is an ascent of eleven hundred and twenty feet from Kabul, the altitude of Argandi reaching seven thousand six hundred and twenty-eight feet.

Argandi to Rustam Khail—eight miles. From Argandi a narrow gorge with stony bed leads by a steep ascent to a plateau surmounting the spur. The road continues over this plateau in a westerly direction for two miles and then descends to Rustam Khail in the valley of the Kabul river. Here the valley has a width of about a mile, is well cultivated, and abounds with villages and orchards.

Rustam Khail to Jalraiz—ten miles. The traveller continues along the valley, which, however, narrows as Jalraiz is approached.

Jalraiz to Sir-i-Chashma—ten miles. Then road along this march is often confined by the spurs of the Paghman to the narrow stream.

Sir-i-Chasma to the Unah pass, distance thirteen miles and a half. To the foot of the pass the road mounts the hill side, till an elevation of ten thousand feet is reached. Thence to the summit—an ascent of one thousand four hundred feet—the traveller meets a succession of short ascents and descents.

The summit of the Unah pass to Kharzar—fourteen miles. The Helmand
river is forded about two miles from the summit of the pass, and the traveller enters the defile of the Siah Sang—narrow, with a rough stony bed, and a meandering stream, which has to be crossed more than twenty times before a small mud fort, called Siah Kila, distant six miles and a half from the Helmand, is reached. Thence, marching along the defile, at a distance of six miles, the fort of Kharzar, on elevated table-land above the valley, is reached.

Kharzar to the valley of Mian-i-Irak—fifteen miles and a half. Five and a half miles from Kharzar the fort of the pass of Irak Kotul is reached.

The ascent to an altitude of thirteen thousand feet is not difficult. The road from the further base of the pass continues in a narrow valley to Mian-i-Irak. Here the ground is open and well cultivated. The hills which surround it are of no great altitude.

Mian-i-Irak to the foot of the Kalu pass—ten miles. A march across the pass of Hajigak, twelve thousand four hundred feet above the sea. The ascent gradual and easy, but the descent steep and long. The Kalu valley is studded with mud forts, but is tolerably well cultivated with wheat and barley. Boulders of granite are of frequent occurrence.

The foot of the Kalu pass to Kila Topchi—eight miles. The Kalu range, forming part of the principal chain of the Hindu Kush, thirteen thousand four hundred feet above the sea, is crossed. The length of the ascent is about two miles; that of the descent nearly four miles. Kila Topchi is about two miles beyond.

Kila Topchi to Bamian—eleven miles. The road lies along a narrow, cultivated valley till the Bamian river is reached. The course of the river is then followed to Bamian.

Bamian to A'k-Robat—fifteen miles. Open country as far as the Surkh Durwazai—some five or six miles from Bamian. The road here enters a narrow defile enclosed by red cliffs of no great altitude. For about five miles it continues along the banks of a stream, then mounts by a tolerably easy road the hill-side on the right. For some miles thence it crosses an undulating table-land, until it finally descends into the valley of Ak-Robat, a small basin among the hills.

Ak-Robat to Salghan—twenty-two miles. A continuous descent, crossing at the fourteenth mile-stone the well-cultivated valley of Shatu. The fortress of Sir-Sang is perched on an insulated rock at the entrance of the Salghan valley—twenty-two miles from Ak-Robat.

Salghan to Bajgah—twenty-one miles, by the Nal-i-Farash pass. A very difficult and steep ascent, yet found practicable for guns in 1840.

From Bajgah the road crosses the Kara Kotal to Rui—distance (approximate) twenty-eight miles. General Kaye writes about the Kara Kotal: «This» pass «was reconnoitred in May, and found to be one of great difficulty, the ascent over huge layers of rock, quite impracticable for artillery on wheels.»
Rui to Kuram, across the Chambak pass—thirteen miles. I have been unable to ascertain any particulars about this road, but it has been traversed by British troops.

Kuram to Haibak—twenty miles. Ferrier thus describes the road. «Across steep mountains, in a dark ravine, between high rocks, some hundreds of yards in elevation. The road is execrable, covered with rounded stones and broken up by water and brushwood. Occasionally the gorge widened, and we saw orchards and gardens around small villages, of which I was told the climate was exceedingly good, and favourable to the cultivation of fruit.» Haibak was the extreme point to which our troops penetrated during the first Afghan war. A party of Captain Hopkins's regiment, detached from Bamian, held Saighan and Haibak for some months, and thus threatened Khulm, where Dost Muhammad had then his head-quarters. (52).

The distance from Haibak to Khulm is about thirty miles over a fertile and well-cultivated country.

It would not enter into the purpose of this volume to describe in full detail all the passes between Kabul and the country beyond the Hindu Kush. The curiosity of the reader to inquire further may perhaps be stimulated by the testimony regarding them given by one who, writing from his own experience, had the highest claim to speak with authority—the Emperor Babar. «Between Balkh, Kunduz, and Badakhshan, on the one side, and Kabul on the other,» wrote that illustrious conqueror, «is interposed the mountain of Hindu-Kush, the passes over which are seven in number. Three of these are by Panjshir, the uppermost» (most eastward) «of which is Khawak; lower down is that of Thal, and still lower that of Bazarak. Of these three passes, the best is that of Thal, but the way in somewhat longer. The most direct pass is that of Bazarak. Both of these passes lead over to Sir-Ab. Another route is that of Parwan. Between Parwan and the high mountain, there are seven minor passes, which they call Haftbachha— the seven younglings. As you come from the Andarab side, the two roads unite below the main pass, and lead down on Parwan by way of the seven younglings. This is a very difficult road. There are besides three roads in Ghorband. That which is nearest to Parwan is the pass of Yangi-yuli (the new road), which descends by Gwalian and Khinjan. Another route is that of Kipchak» (Char-darya) «which leads by the junction of the rivers of Surkhab and Andarab. This is a good pass. Another route is by the pass of Shibrtu. During the summer, when the waters are up, you can go by this pass only by taking the route of Bamian and Saighan, but in the winter season they travel by way of Abdereh.»

Clements Markham, in his learned paper published in the proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society for February 1879, thus classifies the known passes over the Hindu Kush.

From the Chitral valley: the Boroghil (twelve thousand feet); the
Ishtirak; the Agram; the Nuksan (seventeen thousand); the Khartaza; and the Dora (sixteen thousand five hundred).

From the Panjshir valley: the Anjuman; the Khawak (thirteen thousand feet); the Thal; the Zarya;—joining on the northern descent: the Yatumak; the Umraz; the Shwa; the Bazarak. connecting on the northern descent: and the Shatpal.

From the Parwan valley: the Bajgah, and the Sar Ulang (twelve thousand feet).

From the Ghorband valley: the Kushan (fifteen thousand feet); the Gwalian; the Gwazyar; the Chardarya; the Ghalalaj; the Farinjal; and the Shibr.

A description of these passes is given in the paper referred to.

CHAPTER X

Herat to Kabul

But little is known of the direct road connecting Herat with Kabul, but that little is calculated to show that in the summer it would present little difficulty to the march of an army. The first attempt, of which any detail has reached us, to march an army from Herat to Kabul, was made by Babar in 1506. An account of this attempt has been written by the emperor himself. The route he selected led by way of Badkis, Langar-Mir-Ghaias, Chakcharan, Chiraghdan—close to the junction of the two branches of the Herirud—Anjukan and Khawal-Koti, across the Zirin pass; thence by Yek-Aulang to Bamian. The route from Bamian we have traversed in the preceding chapter.

It was scarcely possible to choose a more direct route, and there is every reason to believe that had it been attempted in a favourable season, it could have been accomplished. In fact, it has been repeatedly accomplished on horseback. But Babar selected the winter to make the experiment. He set out with his army on the 24th December, after the snow had begun to fall. He marched first to the neighbourhood north-east of Herat, «halting,» he writes, «a day or two at every station.» The exact situation of Badkis I have been unable to ascertain, but it probably lay at the foot of the great mountain range to the north of the Herirud. It was evidently a well-sheltered place, for Babar, who left Herat in spite of the solicitations of his hosts, made the going into winter-quarters at Badkis the pretext of his move. Thence he marched by the route I have indicated to Chakcharan, the snow falling every day. The further he advanced, the deeper was the snow. At Chakcharan it reached above the horses’ knees; two or three days after leaving that place, it reached above the stirrups. After passing Chiraghdan—marked on the map near the junction of the two streams which form the Herirud—not only was the snow extremely deep, but it had effaced all traces of the road. Babar halted whilst he sent out parties to try
and discover any of the mountaineers who might be wintering in the valley or sheltered grounds. All their efforts, however, were unsuccessful. At the end of three days they returned, not having encountered a single inhabitant. All had left for their homes in the lower ground.

Still Babar persevered. "Por about a week," he writes, "we continued pressing down the snow, without being able to advance more than two or three miles. I myself assisted in depressing the snow... Every step we sank up to the middle or the breast, but still we went on trampling it down." In this way, and literally dragging the horses through the snow, his troops at length reached Khawal-Koti—a cave—at the foot of the Zirin pass. "That day," he writes, "the storm of wind was dreadful. The snow fell in such quantities, we all expected to meet death together." But the night passed, and next morning the storm and tempest ceased. He then pushed on in the same manner as before, reached the summit of the pass, and then began to descend. Night came on before the valley had been reached, and Babar and his followers were ignorant of the way. But still they pressed on, crossing crevasses and ravines over which the snow had hardened, till at last they reached Yek Aulang in safety.

Yek Aulang lies about thirty miles south-west of Bamian. There Babar and his men obtained food, clothing, and warmth. One day only they stayed to enjoy these luxuries, and then resumed their march. But the difficulties had been surmounted. They had indeed thirty miles of hill country to traverse, but the level was lower and the climate warmer, and in a few days they reached Bamian in safety. Thence they proceeded to the vicinity of Kabul by the Shibrtu pass.

From this account it is clear that the road itself presents no difficulties which could not easily be surmounted. Even under all the disadvantage of snow lying up to the waist, the Zirin pass was ascended and its descent partly accomplished during the light of a short winter day; and that pass, probably not exceeding a few hundred feet, constituted the main difficulty of the road between Herat and Bamian.

The Munshi, Mohan Lal, who visited Herat with Dr. Gerard in 1832, gives a decided opinion in favour of the practicability of the road. He quotes, likewise, two examples of the easy accomplishment of the journey. "From Herat to Kabul," he writes, (53) "the route is beautifully covered with villages, the produce of which can feed a considerable army. It is twenty days' journey without crossing any hill." He then states that Shah Zaman, shortly after his accession to the throne, marched from Herat to Kabul, accompanied by a large body of horsemen, in ten or eleven days; and that at a later period, Shah Muhammad and Kamran accomplished the distance, after having been defeated by Dost Muhammad, in thirteen days. It is certain that the journey presents no real difficulties, and that it would be easy to make a road which should be feasible for guns at all but the most inclement season of the year.
In general terms, Persia and Turkistan: or, to state it more accurately, the countries divided by the Oxus. «Since the time of Ferdinon», writes d'Herbelot (1778), «the provinces which, in the present day, form the kingdom of Persia, bear the name of Iran, whilst those beyond the Oxus are always called Turan. In the treaties made between the Persians and the Turks, the Oxus has always been accepted as the line of demarcation between Iran and Turan».

About 52o 10' long., 35o 20' lat.

Captain Arthur Conolly, 1807-1842: wrote an account of his journey through Central Asia. Imprisoned with Stoddart and both executed in Bokhara, 1842.

Ibn Haukel was the author of a valuable work on Oriental geography, published in 1796. To qualify himself for writing this work he spent twenty-eight years in travelling through the Mahomedan countries of the world. The work referred to was translated from the Persian and published in an abridged form by Osuley, in 1800.

Edrisi was a famous Arabian geographer. He was born in 1099 and died in 1164. He was a great traveller, and published many works on the geography of the Eastern world, all of which have been translated, with commentaries, into French.


The word takht signifies «palace».

The town of Herat has several names in Persian. It is called Hir, Hira, Hirva, and Hirat; the dialect of the country, and a native thereof, are both called Hiravi; and anything belonging to the district is styled Hiriva. All these words take their origin from the sound Hir or Har, akin to the Bengali word ar-ya, a husbandman, and the Sanskrit a-ya, the Hindu par excellence, or agriculturist as opposed to the nomad. Ar means «to plough», and is the same as the old English verb to erre (Lat. errare, to err, to go), and it was the source not only of the word A'rya as applied to the Hindus, but of Ir-an, the name of Persia itself, and of Arla the district of Herat, which must thus have received its very name on account of its abundant fertility and agricultural resources.

Briggs's "Ferishta", vol. i. page 3.

The testimony of Ibn Haukel.

D'Herbelot.

Vamberey's "Travels", page 273.

On his tomb was placed an epitaph, of which the following is a translation: «You, all of you, who have seen the greatness of Alp-Arslan, mounting up to the skies, come to Merv, and you will see him mingled with the dust».

The work of this historian, who flourished in the fifteenth century, bears a Persian title, the signification of which is: «A work which contains all the most certain and most exact details contained in authentic and accepted histories». The work traces the order of events from the creation of the world to the year 1471.

That Timur should have allowed Herat to be sacked and plundered is a stain upon his name. The city offered no resistance. D'Herbelot expressly states that the governor of the city, finding himself incapable of offering a successful resistance, went to meet him, and paid him homage. The fact of the pillage is uncontested. It is affirmed not only by D'Herbelot, but by the Persian historians of the period. (Vide "Ritter, Die Erdkunde, Achter Theil"). It must not be supposed from this that Timur was a mere destroyer. In a careful summary of his character and career he is thus judged by Erskine: «Whatever Timur's descent, his high elevation was due to his own transcendant talents. His first contests, like those of Chingiz Khan, had for their object to gain the direction of his own tribe, which, after many vicissitudes of fortune, he attained; and following up his success, after long and painful exertions he became the undisputed ruler of all Mawer rannaher» (Trans.Oxiana) «and had the glory of restoring to peace and prosperity its various provinces which had long been a prey to anarchy . . . . He left at his death one of the greatest empires the world ever saw».

Timur died in the year of the Hegira 807. Erskine renders this date A. D. 1405.


The greater Media of the ancients.

It is interesting to trace the course followed by Babar from Kabul to Herat. He took the route of Ghorbond and Shiberu. From Ushtar-Shahr he proceeded to Zohak and Gumbazak, descending by Saighan and the Denderan Pass to Kahmerd. The more southerly route he took on his return is described in the last chapter of this book.—Vide "Erskine", vol. i., page 239.

Erskine's "Life of Baber", vol. i. page 305.

"Erskine", page 457: but Babar says, in his "Memoirs", that "Mashhad, having no means of defence, submitted".

Babar's "Memoirs", page 343.
(23) The Persian army numbered only forty thousand men; but they were veterans trained to servce in the Ottoman wars. They possessed a fine artillery, two thousand trained artillerymen, and six thousand matchlockmen. The Uzbeks, accord-
ing to the lowest calculations, numbered one hundred and five thousand men.—

to 300.

(25) "There was one true soldier in Herat, whose energies never failed him; and
History delights to record the fact that that one true soldier, young and inexpe-
rienced as he was, with no knowledge of active warfare that he had not derived
from books, rescued Herat from the grasp of the Persian monarch, and baffled
the intrigues of his great northern abettor."—Kaye’s *History of the Afghan War*.

(26) Conolly’s *Travels to the North of India*, vol. II. page 5.


(28) "A Hide through Islam*, by Captain Marsh. Tinley Brothers: 1877.


(30) When Herat had been captured by the Amir Dost Muhammad.

(31) I must refer the reader who desires a more particular account of Herat and of
what it suffered from its several sieges, to Ferrier’s *Caravan Journeys*.

(32) The Rud-i-Adrashkan takes its rise near Onah, to the east of Herat, and debouches
in the plains of the Adrashkan district—whence its first name. It subsequently
assumes the names of the districts through which it flows until it takes finally
the name—which in ancient times it bore throughout its course—of Harutrud,
and loses itself in the Sistan lake.

(33) *Journey through Khorasan in 1874*, by Colonel C. M. MacGregor, London: Allen
and Co. 1879.

(34) The word Atrak is the plural form of the word *Turk*: the river Atrak is, thus,
"the river of the Turkmen*.

(35) This must refer to the village alone; for Fraser writes: "The town and district of
Ghorian yield fifty thousand tamauns to the Government of Herat*. A Herati
toman is worth twenty rupees.

(36) "Journey through Khorassan*, Appendix, vol. II. The distances in this and other
works are reckoned in farsangs or tomauns—i.e. parasangs. A parasang is generally
something short of four English miles; but I have followed Fraser in reckoning
it as the exact equivalent of that distance.

(37) "Narrative of a Journey from Heraut to Khiva, Moscow, and St. Petersburgh*, by

(38) Between Meruchak and A’k Tapah.

(39) Not marked in the map; but probably not far from Kazaldl.

(40) Karoul is correctly marked on the map attached to Professor Vambery’s *Travels
In Central Asia*, as the first stage on the route called the Atch Hadjl route—the
shortest between Charjul and Merv.

(41) Burnes does not give the actual distance: but whereas the march to Sirab—the
distance of which is given—occupied twenty-four hours, and that to Uchglu only
eighteen hours, it is reasonable to conclude that the length of the latter was
shorter by one-fourth than that of the former.


(43) *Here*, whites Vambery, "springs. It is believed, a strong stream, that, after
bathing Herat on the north side, falls into the Herilrud*.

(44) Vambery writes: "In the time of this, the most civilised sovereign of Central
Asia, the whole of the neighbourhood was In a flourishing state, and many
pleasure-houses are said to have existed along the course of the Murghab*.
That which has been may yet be again!

(45) Vambery.

(46) For the information contained in this chapter I have been mainly Indebted to
Vambery (*Travels In Central Asia*).

(47) Ferrier calls the distance five parasangs.

(48) These Arabs are the descendants of the Arabs who colonised Khorasan and
Balkh in the seventh century.

(49) This ferry is not marked on the map accompanying this volume. It lies about
twenty-five miles to the west of the ferry of Termez.

(50) Burnes. It is necessary, however, to record that at the present time there are
three stations with abundant water at equal distances between Khulm and Kunduz.

(51) This account of the route is based mainly on the paper read by Lieutenant
General Kaye at the Royal Geographical Society—Vide Proceedings for April 1879.
General Kaye made the Journey as far as Bamlan In 1840 with horse artillery,
cavalry, and Infantry.

(52) Ferrier’s *Caravan Journeys*, note.

(53) *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, January 1834.
NOTE ON THE CITY OF HERAT

By Captain C. E. Yate

[The following paper is a revised reprint of portions from Captain Yate's printed report to Government. The inscriptions have been revised by Maulawi Abdul Hak Abid, who has added translations together with some critical and explanatory notes (marked A. H. A.) The inscriptions, however, would require to be verified by collating with the originals or facsimiles. Some of the names are doubtful (marked?). Ed.]

The most prominent feature of the city is the «Arg-i-Kuhnah» (?) or old citadel, which stands on the northern face towering over the rest of the city. That this citadel was formerly a place of great strength, is proved by Ibn-i-Hauqal, who writes—«Hirat has a castle with ditches. This castle is situated in the centre of the town and is fortified with very strong walls.» This building, which is altogether some 250 yards in length, now stands not in the centre of the town, but slightly back from the main northern wall. The ditches mentioned are now mostly choked up and full of reeds, though efforts are being made to clear them out.

The only building noticeable by its size and height above the uniform level of mud houses is the Jam'ih Masjid, a large and lofty structure in the north-east portion of the city. Ibn-i-Hauqal says—«In all Khurasan and Mawarau-n-Nahr there is not any place which has a finer or more capacious mosque than Hiri or Hirat. Next to it we may rank the mosque of Balkh and after that the mosque of Sistan.» But there is nothing in the Jam'ih Masjid to record its age that I know of, older than an inscription in the Khat-i-Suls character on a slab above the «Mihrab», put up apparently by Sultan Abu Sa'id in A. H. 866, to record the abolition of some oppressive tax. This date corresponds with about A. D. 1461, seven years before Abu Sa'id's death, and at a time when, so history says, he was engaged in waging war with Turkish tribes in Khurasan.

The objects of interest outside the city are almost entirely confined to religious structures such as the Musallá and to Ziyarats or shrines. Of the latter the most famous is the shrine of Gazurgah, a large building up at the foot of the hills some two miles to the north-east of the city, and the residence of the Mir of Gazurgah, one of the most richly endowed and influential divines in the Hirat district. The office of Mutawalli or superintendent of the religious endowment of this shrine has descended for generations in the family of the present Mir Murtaza. The Mir's eldest son Muhammad 'Umar Jan, a man of some 35 years of
age, is married to a daughter of the late Amir Sher 'Ali, a sister of Sardar Ayyub Khan.

The shrine is distinguishable from afar by its huge, lofty, square-topped building surmounting a high arch, the usual feature of all sacred buildings in this country, and is well worth a visit if only to see the beautiful carved marble headstone surmounting the tomb of the saint and the simple yet handsome tomb of the Amir Dost Muhammad.

Passing first through a large walled garden of pine and mulberry trees, the visitor comes to an octagonal domed building full of little rooms and three-connered recesses, two stories in height and all opening inwards, built apparently as a cool, breezy place in which to pass the heat of the summer days. Beyond this again is the main enclosure of the Ziyarat, now a deserted and dilapidated-looking place; everything bears a look of decay; the unkept courtyard, the broken tile work on the archway and entrance to the shrine, and general want of repair everywhere visible, betoken a great falling off from former prosperity.

There is a covered reservoir built, according to local tradition, by a daughter of Shah Rukh, but the following inscription, which was deciphered with some difficulty, proves that the reservoir was originally built by Shah Rukh himself, but fell into disrepair and was subsequently restored, 243 years after his death, by some lady of royal descent, whose name, as usual, is not given:

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1. Perhaps A. H. A.
NOTE ON THE CITY OF HERAT

This inscription by the Abjad reckoning gives the date of A.H.1100 or A.D. 1689.

The entrance to the shrine lies at the eastern end of the main courtyard, through a doorway under a high arched vestibule and across a covered corridor, paved with slabs of white marble, worn and polished into the most dangerous state of slipperiness by, presumably, the feet of countless pilgrims. Roundabout this door sit Mulas, beggars and pilgrims of sorts, in addition to the numerous blind Hafiz or reciters of the Quran who here seem to act as the general showmen of the place.

Immediately in front of the entrance and looking inwards, but now half-buried in the ground, is the carved figure in white marble of a long, thin animal, said to be a tiger, though what a tiger is the symbol of in such a place I cannot say.

Passing through the entrance one emerges into a square courtyard surrounded by high walls and little rooms, with a lofty half-domed portico at the eastern end, the tile work on which is very much out of repair. It is generally the custom to engrave the date of any mausoleum over the entrance door, but there is no date engraved on this.

On either side of the entrance are the usual retiring rooms with arched prayer niches. In the northern niche the following text is engraved:

1 The word āli is doubtful here. The line does not scan and may be changed thus:—

* The numerical words are enclosed within brackets; thus $8 + 6 + 30 + 10$; hence $8 + 6 + 800 + 7 + 40 + 7 + 40 + 60 + 30 + 60 + 2 + 10 + 80 = 1100$. Ed.
The tomb of the saint Abu Isma'il Khaja 'Abdu-l-lah Ansari is a large mound, some 10 yards long by 6 feet high, covered with stones, and stands immediately in front of the arched portico under the shade of a tree.

The tradition is that the original buildings having fallen into decay, the present structure was erected by Shah Rukh Mirza, the youngest son of Amir Timur, who ruled at Hirat from A. D. 1408 to 1446.

The great feature of the shrine is the headstone of white marble to the grave of the saint, which stands some 14 or 15 feet in height and is most exquisitely carved throughout. This stone is a beautiful piece of work, as not only is the carving of text and inscription well executed, but the whole proportions of the stone are beautiful. The whole of the Arabic inscription, carved in what is known as the Khat-i-Suls character, could not be deciphered, but at the end of it the name of the saint is entered in full, Abu Isma'il Khaja 'Abdu-l-lah Ansari, and the date A. H. 859 also appears. This date, though, corresponds to about A. D. 1455, or 9 years after the death of Shah Rukh, and owing to the whole of the inscription not having been deciphered, it is uncertain what it refers to.

The date of the death of the saint, recorded in the following quartrain, seems to have been subsequently inscribed, as it appears on a separate corner of the stone and in a different character:—

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(3) } & \text{آن خواجه} \text{ که در مربیت ر معنی شاهست} \\
& \text{زر سر حقيقت دو كر آگاهست} \\
& \text{از روي حساب جمل ارداني (فات)} \\
& \text{تاریخ رفته خواجه عبد اللہ است} \\
\end{align*}\]

«Fat» by the Abjad reckoning equals A. H. 481, or about the year A. D. 1089.

On one side of the tomb the following inscription appears, recorded by Hasan, son of Husain Shamlu, in the year A. H. 1094 or A. D. 1640:—

\[\begin{align*}
\text{(4) } & \text{دهد تا ساقی عرفان دامت را جام هشیاري} \\
& \text{در ادر برمگا خواجه عبدالله انصاري} \\
& \text{بدر اوج مزارش نازشی سری که از ششخی} \\
& \text{ملانک را جه تمنی کرد ره ناله و زاری} \\
\end{align*}\]

1 Read از A. H. A.
NOTE ON THE CITY OF HERAT

Round the tomb itself the following inscription appears:

• طریبی لرزه، بیستون آرشا آگه‌یا
• چاوشی لیسته، نه بیستون آگه‌یا
• این آستانه، ایستن یک آزاد که برزن
• شاهان ملک انسار عزیز سربیار جاه
• رخ چن نیست، پا به نیست آنانه
• چون از دام پاش، نم نامه نیست
• چون ابر اکر نسبنف روشن، جهد مطر
• سر بر نتار ز طارم، چرخ، برین، چیا
• گیرد جهان، ز شمس ایوان، او فراغ
• بر مدد این سخن در گواهمه مهر و میا
• بنده برور، خروه، همه، دره‌ی جانه
• هرکس که آرد، مهر، دره، پن‌یا
• این منقبت، ز دره، ماه‌باز، گرفت
• کز مهد خاک کره، در ایبی بقعه، چای‌گاه
• پیر هرات‌زاده، انصار، که سود
• بر طاق چرخ، تب، تهدیز او کله
• تصنیف ایست در، مچیمل مدرسه
• تلفیقی ایست، درک سردار، خانه‌ای
• گاز کهست یورت، او کابر، مفصرت
• در ساحه، سفی، کن، نامی، سیاه
• میل سر مزار، بر انوار، آو، کشید
• زورا به‌بنیاد، دول که، انتی‌های
• دل‌و رؤیست، صرف، تنهب، مرتدش
• گری رهیده، برسف، دلها، زحیب، چاه
• نور وایتش که جهان، را نزی کریدت

تای خسرو پاشا، منجر، یافته‌گان راه
• جامی حرم، کوه، هر حاچیت این دراست
• اری دعا بکونه کن، ر حاچی، جنگ
The Amir Dost Muhammad's tombstone is a plain simple but handsome block of pure white marble, some 8 feet in length by about 1 1/2 or 2 feet in height and breadth, finely carved and surrounded by a marble balustrade. It lies just to the north of the saint's tomb in the open enclosure. At the head and foot of the grave stand small blocks of white marble, carved in imitation, but a very bad imitation, of the head and foot stones of the Khaja's tomb. They are dwarfed and quite lost in comparison with the original monuments.

The Amir Dost Muhammad Khan died in 1863, a few days only after the capture of Hirat, and curiously enough there lies buried quite close to him his rebellious nephew Sultan Ahmad Khan, the son of Muhammad 'Azim Khan, brother of Dost Muhammad, the then ruler of Hirat, whom he was besieging and who died during the siege in the spring of the same year.

The remainder of the enclosure is as full of graves as it can hold, not only of notable Afghans, but of members of the Safwian dynasty and also of the descendants of Jingiz Khan, the latter apparently predominating.

Inside the portico also there are some 20 or 30 tombs mostly of the families of Jingiz Khan and Shah Rukh. One of the tombs of some member of the latter's family is noticeable by the fine block of black marble of which it is composed, beautifully carved and inscribed in Arabic. It bears the date of A. H. 895 or about A.D. 1490. Another to Rustam Muhammad Khan, a descendant of Jingiz Khan, bears the date, according to the Abjad reckoning of the following Persian verses inscribed in the Nast'aliq character, of A. H. 1053 or A. D. 1643:

Another marble tombstone has an Arabic inscription in the Suls character, recording the death of Muhammad 'Iwaz Khan, simply described as the son of the third Khan in A. H. 1057 or A. D. 1657.

A marble tomb to Muhammad Amin Khan, another descendant of Jingiz Khan, is dated, according to the Abjad reckoning of the following line, A. H. 1076 or A. D. 1666:

Mādā' Tāriḵ Muḥammad Amin Khan (Roṣṭa ẓārāda) āst
Another marble tomb to Shahzada Massa’ud is dated, according to the Abjad reckoning of the following verses, A. H. 1256 or A. D. 840:—

Several other marble tombs have had the names and dates obliterated, and one of black marble, finely engraved in Arabic, bears no name but the date of A. H. 865 or A. D. 1461.

In the rooms around the enclosure there are many notable tombstones. One of the finest of these is to the mother of some monarch, known as the «Mahd-i-‘ulya,» but the tombstone has no other name on it or anything to show who she was, as it was apparently the custom at the time of her death not to inscribe a woman’s name on her tomb. The date of her death is fixed by the following hemistich:—

literally, «the place of descent of the light of pardon from the kindness of the Incomparable and Eternal God.» It would appear that Mahbit has been purposely incorrectly spelt, having been inscribed Mahbit instead of Mahbit for the sake of the date. As it stands the date is A. H. 866 (A. D. 1083), apparently considerably anterior to any of the others.

A marble tomb to Ustad Muhammad Khaja is dated in Arabic A. H 842 or A. D. 1439. Another to Khaja Sultan Muhammad, dated in Arabic A. H. 761 or A. D. 1360, was the oldest tomb noted.

Another tomb of some Shah Rukh Khan, made of marble and
engraved in Khat-i-Nasta’liq, has the following couplet:

(10) 
• گل گذار خوبی شاهرخ خان
• که از این جهان با نور ایمان

which gives the date by the Abjad as A. H. 1168 or A. D. 1755.

Another to Muhammad Rahim Khan, bears the following inscription:—
giving a date of A. H. 1201 (A. D. 1787).

(11) بود مفت محمد رحیم خان ایمان

A black marble tomb finely engraved in the Khat-i-Suls to the daughter of some king, name illegible, bears the date A. H. 1109 or A. D. 1698 in the following line:

(12) بود معصمہ احفاص خاقان

A marble tomb to Muhammad Quli Sultan has the following engraved in the Khat-i-Nast’aliq:

(13) سال تاریخ اور ریاست جناب

giving the date of A. H. 1015 or A. D. 1607.

A tomb of some one «Az aulad-i-Salatin,» but name illegible, has the date A. H. 893 A. D. 1488, engraved in Arabic:

(14) تاثر و تسمین و زمان

There is a handsome black marble tomb finely engraved in the Khat-i-Suls character to Sultan Muhammad Bayasunghur Ibn-i-Shah Rukh Ibn-i-Timur, but it has had the date carefully erased.

Another tomb of some ruler has the name illegible, but the couplet:

(15) • مهرب تاریخ شه عالیقدر
• طیب الله عالی مثواه

gives the date of A. H. 1115 or A. D. 1704.

Another black marble tomb, name unknown, bears the date of A. H. 902
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(A. D. 1487) in the following couplet:—

- مَرِيرُتُ دِوَرَ كَلَكَ قَضَى
- كَرَمُ تِحَرُّبُ فَقَدَ طَابَ تَرَى

There was formerly a Qadamgah, or stone bearing the mark of the footstep of Hazrat'Ali, in an arched portico built by Shah Tahmasp Safawi on the north side of the court. The stone apparently was carried away, as shown by the following words at the end of the inscription over the arch:—

- ۸قُدُرُوی دِوَرَی مَهْرُ تَرَی

which gives the date, by the Abjad reckoning, of A. H. 949 or A. D. 1543. On the south side of the court the corresponding portico has fallen down and the tombs in it are buried under the debris. At the door on the right-hand side as one enters the inner court is a large circular font of white marble, used though, so far as I could learn, only as a bowl to mix sherbet in for the use of the pilgrims visiting the shrine.

Between the Gazurgah and the Joe Nao or new canal is the tombstone of Amir Jalalu-d-din, dated A. H. 858 or A. D. 1454, but the name of his father is obliterated. Jalalu-d-din himself is named the Shahid, proving that he met a violent death.

Of the other shrines around Hirat, the largest is the Ziyarat-i-Awal Wali as it is commonly pronounced, but in reality the tomb of Sultan Abu-I-Walid Ahmad, the son of Abu-r-Raza 'Abdu-llah Hanafi of Azadan of Hirat, who died in the year A. H. 232, or about A. D. 847.

The tombstone over the grave has disappeared, but the following inscription taken from a slab, put up over the door of the shrine by Sultan Husain Mirza, gives the name and date of the death of the saint, though the date of the inscription on the slab is not mentioned.

- ۸بِنیَةُ الرَّحْمَانِ اِبْنِ الْمَلَکَ وَ الدِّیبَی مَهْرُ سَاطِرُ حَسَنَی اِبْنِ ابْنِ اَبِی اَبَالْوَادُ أَحْمَدُ بِن
- ۸بِنیَةُ الرَّحْمَانِ اِبْنِ الْمَلَکَ وَ الدِّیبَی مَهْرُ سَاطِرُ حَسَنَی اِبْنِ اِبْنِ اَبِی اَبَالْوَادُ أَحْمَدُ بِن
- ۸بِنیَةُ الرَّحْمَانِ اِبْنِ الْمَلَکَ وَ الدِّیبَی مَهْرُ سَاطِرُ حَسَنَی اِبْنِ اِبْنِ اَبِی اَبَالْوَادُ أَحْمَدُ بِن
- ۸بِنیَةُ الرَّحْمَانِ اِبْنِ الْمَلَکَ وَ الدِّیبَی مَهْرُ سَاطِرُ حَسَنَی اِبْنِ اِبْنِ اَبِی اَبَالْوَادُ أَحْمَدُ بِن

The shrine lies some two miles to the west of the city, and the present building was, it is said, erected by Shah Sultan Husain, who reigned at Hirat from A. D. 1487 to 1506. It possesses the usual lofty arched portico with a domed enclosure containing the tomb behind and
other rooms around, but is built of plain brick throughout and unadorned except by some mosaic word inside. The garden in front has been allowed to fall into decay, but some lofty pine-trees still remain.

There is another large and similar shrine about a couple of hundred yards to the south of the city, known as the Ziyarat-i-Sultan Mir Shahid. The tomb stands in the centre of the lofty domed enclosure immediately behind the arched portico, and is surmounted by flags of many colours, the poles of which are mostly topped with the figure of an open hand. No meaning appears to be attached to the symbol; it is simply said that the standards, presented by the Prophet to his people, were surmounted by a hand, and the tradition still remains.

To show how little is known about the history of these shrines, I may mention that I was assured that the saint buried here was Sultan Mir 'Abdu-l-Wahid, the ruler of Hirat, when the city was besieged and captured by Hulaku Khan, the son of Tuli Khan, son of Jingiz Khan, shortly after his capture of Baghdad in A. D. 1253, and that Sultan Mir 'Abdu-l-Wahid fell in the defence and thus earned the title of Shahid or martyr. On having the tombstone cleaned from the lamp oil and dirt of ages, it appeared, however, from the Arabic inscription, that the name of the saint was 'Abdu-llahu-l-Wahid, the son of Zaid, son of Husan, son of 'Ali (the son-in-law of the Prophet), son of Abu Talib; that he was born either in A. H. 35 or 37 (A. D. 656-58), and that he died in A. H. 88 (A. D. 707) in the lifetime of his father; that his grave was found in A. H. 320 (A.D. 932) in the time of 'Ali, son of Hasan (an Imam of the Zaidi sect) and of Shaikh Hasanu-I-Basrah, and that the present shrine was erected by Shah Sultan Husain in A. H. 890 or A. D. 1486.

In the same building there is another tomb. The inscription on the stone gives the name Ja'far Abu Ishaq and date A. H. 289 or A. D. 902.

In addition to the Ziyarats at the city gates, there is a small shrine called the Ziyarat-i-Khaja 'Ali Baqar on the nort-east side of the city, and another called the Ziyarat-i-Khaja Taq (?) adjoining a graveyard, used as the burial-place for the Kabulis, a little to the east of the city.

To the north of the city there is a long mound which evidently at some time or other formed part of the rampart of the city wall. This is confirmed by Ibn-i-Hauqal, as above quoted, and it is clear therefore that the city extended up to this point as late as the 10th century. This mound is now known by the name of Tall-i-Bangiyan or the mound of the bhang-eaters; the people given to bhang having, it is said, been in the habit of holding their meetings on this mound; before that, the mound is said to have been called Tall-i-Qutbiyan or the mound of the holy men, from the numbers who lie buried in it. The mound at the present day is one mass of graves, and at one place on the northern side, in digging out the foundations for the fortifications, a large stone-lined mausoleum was found at a considerable depth, full of human bones, but with nothing in it to show who the people buried there were, though they are believed to have been Muhammadans.
There are two shrines on the mound, ordinary domed buildings of burnt brick. One contains the tomb of 'Abdu-llah, son of Mu‘awiyyah, son of Ja‘far, son of Abu Talib (the father of Hazrat ‘Ali) and grandson of Zainab (the daughter of the Prophet by his wife Fatimah). The following inscription, giving these particulars, is engraved round the pedestal of the tomb, but does not give the date of death; it records the fact that the present building was erected by Shaikh Bayazid, son of ‘Ali Mushrif in A. H. 865 (A. D. 1461).

In the same building there is a tomb said to be that of Mir Husaini, but on the tombstone the name of Amir Muhammad and date A. H. 838 (A. D. 1435) are inscribed. This tombstone is said to have been brought from elsewhere and stuck up here.

The second shrine is known as the Ziyarat-i-Shahzada Qasim, but the tombstones here also are said to have been brought from elsewhere. On the headstone to the grave the name of Abu-I-Qasim, son of Ja‘far, is engraved in Persian and the date of death A. H. 994 or A. D. 1586, while on the back of the same stone another inscription gives the date of A. H. 897 or A. D. 1492. On the footstone the name of Amir Jalalu-d-din is engraved, but without date or particulars.

I now come to the Musalla, formerly, I suppose, the grandest building anywhere in this part of the world, but now in ruins and under orders from the Amir ‘Abdu-r-Rahman in course of demolition. The so-called Musalla in reality consists of the remains of three separate buildings, running north-east and south-west, and covering a total space of nearly 600 yards from end to end.

Of the Madrasah or college nothing but two high arches and four minarets remain. The arches must be at least some 60 feet in height and are covered with the remains of fine tile work of beautiful and artistic designs. The tile work on the minarets seems to have been mostly worn off by stress of weather, while inside the arches the tiles in some places are still perfect. The minarets of the Madrasah appear taller than those of the Musalla and must be between 120 and 150 feet.
in height. There is a tradition that the present remains formed portions of two colleges, known in Turki as the Kosh Madrasah or pair of colleges, which are said to have been built by Shah Rukh Mirza. At the western end of the ruins there is a large, handsome black marble tomb with a well-carved inscription in Arabic, bearing the date A. H. 843 or A. D. 1440. The inscription is broken and covered with dirt, but the following was deciphered, showing that it is the tomb of Bayaqra, son of Umar Shaikh, the son of Amir Timur:

The domed building called the tomb of Shah Rukh stands between the Madrasah and the Musalla. It is faced on the east by an archway and by one solitary minaret, still covered with tile work. The dome, too, was once covered with blue tiles, but is now sadly out of repair.

Within the dome there are six tombstones lying scattered about, all of black marble, engraved in Arabic in the Khat-i-Suls character. The principal of these and the one that gives the name to the building, though the latest in date, is the tombstone of Shah Rukh, but instead of marking the tomb of the great Shah Rukh, the son of the Amir Timur, and the founder of the Madrasah as I was given to understand, it appears from the following inscription that it is the tomb of some other Shah Rukh, a great-great-grandson of the Amir Timur, who died 47 years after the death of the real Shah Rukh.

The inscription is as follows:

Shah Rukh Sultan, son of Sultan Abu Sa’id, son of Sultan Muhammad, son of Miran Shah, son of Amir Timur, dated A. H. 898 or A. D. 1493.
The second is the tomb of Bayasunghur, son of Shah Rukh, son of Timur, and is dated A. H. 836 or A. D. 1433:

(22) مَعَمَّى السَّلَطَةُ وَ الدِّينُ وَ الْدِّينُ الْوَاحِدِينَ يُسْعِفُ اِسْمَاعِيلُ بْنُ سَلَطَةٍ تَمْرُدُ السَّدِّ.

The third is the tomb of Sultan Ahmad, son of 'Abdu-l-Latif, son of Sultan 'Ubaid, son of Shah Rukh, dated A. H. 848, (A.D. 1445):

(23) نظامُ الدِّينِ سَلَطَانٌ أَحَدُّهُمْ أَبِي عِبَادَةُ التَّفْيُضِيْنِ اِبْنُ سَلَطَانِ عِبَيْدُ كَرْمَانِي

بي شاهرُ سَلَطَانَ رَتَّعَتْ وْرَتَّعَهُ نَيْ عَاَّشَرُ ذِي الْحَجَّةِ سَنَةَ ثَنَانِى وَ أَرِيْعَى

وَ نَدَاْئِبَةً

The fourth is the tomb of 'Alau-d-Daulah, son of Bayasunghur, son of Shah Rukh, dated A. H. 863 or A. D. 1459:

(24) سَلَطَانُ دَوَالُ الدِّينِ وَ الْدِّينُ وَ الْدِّينُ الْوَاحِدِينَ يُسْعِفُ اِسْمَاعِيلُ بْنُ سَلَطَةٍ دَاوَالُ الصَّدْبُورِ

الْحَدِيثِ مَعَمَّى السَّلَطَةِ وَ الدِّينِ وَ الْدِّينُ شَاهِرُ سَلَطَانُ الدَّارِ الرَّاجُعُ خُضُوْرُ شاَهْرُ وَ وَرَتَّعَهُمْ رَضِيَّةً وَ نَدَاْئِبَةً

الْبَرَاءَةُ فِي سَادِسِ ذِي الْحَجَّةِ الْهَرَامِ سَنَةَ ثَنَانِى وَ سَتِينَى وَ نَدَاْئِبَةً

جَلَالَةُ أَ. ه. آ

The fifth is the tomb of Ibrahim Sultan, son of 'Alau-d-Daulah, son of Bayasunghur, son of Shah Rukh, son of Amir Timur, who apparently died in the same year as his father, viz., A. H. 863 (A. D. 1459):

(25) إِبْرَاهِيمُ سَلَطَانُ أَبِي عَلَى الدِّيرَةِ أَبِي بَسْطُوْنِيْنِ اِسْمَاعِيلُ بْنُ سَلَطَةٍ إِبْرَاهِيمُ

وَرتَّعَتْ الْوَرَتَّعُ فِي ذِي الْحَمَيسِ ثَانِى عَشَرُ رَضِيَّةُ الدِّيْرَ مَارِكَ سَنَةَ ثَنَانِى

وَ سَتِينَى وَ نَدَاْئِبَةً

The sixth is the tomb of Gohar Shad, said to have been the wife of Shah Rukh and the sister of Qara Yusuf Turkman and the founder of the Gohar Shad Masjid in Mashhad. The inscription, which is as follows,
gives the date of her death as A. H. 861 or A. D. 1457:—

There is also a domed building, called after her name, in Kuhsan (?), but it contains nothing to show how it came to be so called.

The Musalla was a huge, massive building of burnt brick and mortar throughout, almost entirely faced with beautiful tile, or rather mosaic work as the various patterns were all formed of small pieces of enamelled tile compactly fitted together in fine gypsum plaster.

Musalla means the place of prayer, and the building is said to have been erected by Sultan Husain Mirza (the grandson, I believe, of the Bayaqra, the grandson of Amir Timur, who lies buried in the Madrasah), who ruled at Hirat according to history from A. D. 1487 to 1506. Sultan Husain Mirza is said to have been buried in the Musalla; but now that the building is in course of demolition, any graves that may be there are buried many feet deep in the debris, and it is impossible to verify the statement.

The main building of the Musalla consisted of a fine, lofty dome some 75 feet in diameter, with a smaller domed building behind it and many rooms around.

The entrance to this was from the east through a lofty archway some 80 feet in height, the outer face of which was one great sheet of mosaic work, mingled with large inscriptions in gilt. Above the archway was a square-topped mass of masonry containing rooms and passages of sorts, adding greatly to the height of the building. Beyond again, or to the east of this archway, was an enclosed courtyard some 60 to 80 yards square, surrounded with corridors and rooms several stories in height, all faced with enamelled tile and mosaic work.

The main entrance to the building lay through another massive archway, also some 80 feet in height; but though the inside of the arch was lined with tile work, the outside was bare and looked as if it had never been finished. Four minarets, some 120 feet in height, form the four corners of the building, and are still for the most part covered with tiles, though a good deal has been worn off by the weather, especially on the north by east, the side of the prevailing wind.
The rooms around the courtyard are supposed to have been for the accommodation of students, who, doubtless, flocked to Hirat in the palmy days of Shah Rukh and Sultan Husain Mirza.

Beyond the Musalla, a mile or more to the north of the city, there is an old domed building, covered with the remains of tile work, and with a hole in the centre of the floor giving access apparently to some underground chamber now mostly filled up. Local tradition declares that there used to be a passage from this chamber right into the citadel, but the appearance of the building would seem to show that it was built as a mausoleum, through no tombstones are visible.

Some 40 or 50 yards off there are five or six tombstones lying about, both of white and black marble, some inscribed in Arabic and others in the Nast'aliq character, but only one of them could be deciphered, and that was to Amir Jalalu-d-din and dated A. H. 847 or A. D. 1444.

There is also a stone bearing Amir Jalalu-d-din's name in the Ziyarat-i-Shahzada Qasim, and the third between Gazurgah and the canal, but who these Jalalu-d-dins were could not be ascertained.

To the west of the domed building with the underground chamber, there are various other shrines and tombs of holy men, so holy that access to them by Shi'ahs even is forbidden by their Sunni guardians. One of these tombs is said to be that of Maulana Jami Sha'ir, but the inscription in the Nast'aliq character on a pillar at the head of the grave gives the name of Shaikh Zainu-d-din, and I mention it because the determination of the date of his death, as rendered by the Abjad reckoning of the inscription thereon, has proved such a puzzle that no two of the experts to whom I have shown it could agree in the interpretation of it.

The inscription is below, and the translation is something to the following effect:—Shaikh Zainu-d-din, Imam and leader of men of religion, the axis of the world, the threshold of forgiveness, the relation of truth, who rose from the earth below to the heaven above and on whose skirt there was no dust. His age was 81 and the time of his death was also that number with one year added to the calculation.

This inscription has been variously interpreted to me as A. H. 202, 621, 741 and 832 or A. D. 818, 1224, 1341 and 1429; but which is correct I cannot say.
Translators of the preceding inscriptions prepared by Maulawi Abdul Hak Abid, Professor of Persian, Calcutta Madrasah.

No. 1

When the just monarch Shah Rukh laid the foundation of an elegant building for the purpose of doing honour to the sepulchre of the master of the Ansar, (1) he found the open yard of Gazur-gah, (2) like Quds-i-Khalil, (3) an object of jealousy to Baqi'u-l-Jannah, (4) owing to the blessings of the souls of godly men.

1 Ansár—assistants, defenders, applied particularly to the citizens of Madinah who assisted Muhammad when obliged to fly from Makkah (Mecca); also, applied to the descendants of those citizens who now form a tribe called Ansar. Here the word is used in the latter sense.

2 Gazur-gah—name of a place in Hirát, containing the remains of Khája 'Abdu-l-láh Ansárí.

3 Quds-i-Khalil—name of a place in Jerusalem containing tombs of several religious persons, of whom the most famous was Imam Muhammad Taj-i-Faqih, whose descendant Makhdum Sharafu-d-din Ahmad lived at Bihár.

4 Baqi'u-l-Jannah—commonly called Jannatu-l-Baqi' is the name of a place at Madinah, where are buried Imam Hasan, Zainu-'l-Abidin and some other members of their family.

(Here) he built monasteries and erected convents for offering praises and thanks to the Great Lord of the universe.

This clear reservoir he constructed for the thirsty pilgrims of this threshold, for the sake of God's pleasure.

For years men derived benefit from this lasting work of utility, just as a thirsty cloud receives water of blessing from the river Nile.

Because, like a boat for a long period, it received slaps of waves, it was at last made to sink down by the heavy burden (or, its base, at last, sunk down under the superincumbent mass).

As there is no constancy in the material objects, long age proved to be the cause of its ruin.

One of the descendants of the monarch, a deceased lady, repaired it, in order to gain a perpetual reward and numerous blessings.

(1) Khazír—poetical name of the writer.

1 Khazír—poetical name of the writer.
No. 2.

«And the angels called to him, while he stood praying in the arched niche». (This is a text from the Quran, appertaining to Zachariya.)

No. 3.

That Khaja, who is both externally and internally a king, is aware of the secret of the real state of both worlds.

If you know, according to the Abjad reckoning, Fat is the year of the death of Khaja 'Abdu-llah.

No. 4.

In order that the cup-bearer of the divine knowledge may give your heart the liquor of wakefulness, come to the assembly of Khaja 'Abdu-Ilah Ansari.

The tombstone of his sepulchre is a beautiful cypress which, by its excessive beauty, has so moved the angels that they exclaim and cry like turtle-doves.

No. 5

Welcome to the shrine, on the ground of which bows down many a head! Hail to the threshold, the dust of which is kissed by many lips!

This is a threshold, by the dust of which kings of the world hold the crown of honour and the throne of dignity.

How can the sun put his face on this exalted threshold, if the sky do not double itself under his feet.

If rain shower down from the root of its lofty building as if from a cloud, grass will grow on the dome of the high sky.

The world receives light from the sky-lights of its building; and of the truth of this saying both the sun and the moon are witnesses. He shuts the doors against all misfortunes, who takes shelter within the compound of its threshold.

It acquired this distinction through the favour of that pious man who took his seat here in the cradle of dust, the saint of Hirat, the chosen of the Ansar, the dome of whose threshold touched the arch of the sky.

The studies of the students of colleges are his works, and the prayers of the disciples of Khanaqahs are his teachings.

His tomb is a gazurgah (1) (a washing-place), wherein the cloud of the divine forgiveness washes white the black (sinful) records of men.

1 Here the word 'gázur-gáh' is used in its literal sense, as a common noun, meaning a 'washing-place'; but at the same time it refers to the place of that name, mentioned in Note 2.
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The Mil (2) (head-stone) at the head of his grave, overcovered with light, serves to apply the collyrium of wakefulness to the eye of the heart of the visitors.

The lantern of his tomb is a bucket of gold in appearance, by means of which the Joseph (3) of the heart got rid of the confinement of the well.

May the light of his saintliness, which has spread over the world, be a guide, up to the day of resurrection, to the travellers led astray from the right path. O Jami! (4) this door is the Ka'abah, (sanctuary) for the realization of every desire; so direct the face of supplication to it and submit your want.

2 Mil—a block of stone of roller-like form erected perpendicularly at the head (and sometimes both at the head and foot) of a grave to mark the spot; also, a skewer or wire used to anoint the eye with collyrium. Hence a play upon the word.

3 Here is a reference to the story of Joseph, son of Jacob, who was thrown into a well by his envious brothers, but an Arabian merchant, Malik, passing by the well, took him out by means of a bucket.

4 Jami—poetical name of a celebrated Persian poet, who flourished at Jâm [name of a town].

No. 6.

The light of the star (1) of Jingiz Khan, the decoration of the masnad (throne or cushion) has unfortunately put his feet out of the field of the world.

The 'Aziz (2) (king) of the Misr (metropolis) of wealth, the sun having the grandeur of Jupiter, the beauty of the garden of royalty, (namely) Rustam Muhammad Khan.

Some one came forward from secrecy, and dictated the year of his death (as follows):—

«He is the king of the throne (or cushion) of faith in the dominion of the next world.»

No. 7.

The words which contain the date of Muhammad Amin Khan's (death) are 'Rauzat-i-Jawidan' (an eternal garden).

No. 8.

Alas! the revolution of the sky threw aside the star which was shining in the Zodiac of greatness by its happy rise.

It uprooted a straight cypress from the garden of kingship, for in the cry of the dove you hear a mournful groaning.

1 The word kaukab generally means a star; but it may be taken as a contraction of kaukabah which is applied to a polished steel ball suspended from a long pole and carried as an ensign before the king.

2 'Aziz-I-Misr—was formerly the title of the minister of Egypt, but afterwards it was assumed by the kings themselves. Misr—lit. a large town, applied both to Egypt and its metropolis Cairo.
One of the descendants of the royal family, whose end has become happy on account of the prosperity of the faith, through the holiness of the Ka'abah of Islam.

Prince Masa'ud, who, on account of his generosity and spirit, was accustomed to show politeness, high-mindedness and generosity. When wisdom asked the date of his death from Rizwan, (3) he replied:—
«The prince Masa'ud came to Paradise.»

3 Rizwán—the porter or gardener of Paradise.

No. 9.
It is, by the favour of the incomparable Eternal Being, the descending place of the lights of forgiveness.

No. 10.
The flower of the garden of beauty, Shah Rukh, who went out of this world with the light of faith.

No. 11.
He said «Muhammad Rahim Khan carried faith with him.»

No. 12.
She is a chaste girl of the descendants of Khaqan (monarch).

No. 13.
The year of his death is «Riyaz-I-Jinan» (the garden of Heaven).

No. 14.
Eight hundred and ninety-three.

No. 15.
For the date of the dignified king is:—«May God, the Most High bless his grave.»

No. 16.
On the tombstone of his sepulchre, the pen of the decree of God wrote:—«Indeed his tomb is hallowed.»

No. 17.
«It was the Qadamgah of Hazrat 'Ali.» (1)

No. 18.
Abu-l-Ghazi, Mu'izzu-l-mulk-i-wa-d-din Shah Sultan Husain Abu-l-Walid Ahmad, son of Abu-r-Raza of the Hanafi sect, a native of Azadan, died in the year two hundred and thirty-two, A. H.

1 Qadam-gah—place for the feet to rest on.
No. 19.

And he is the king of lords and chiefs, the martyr killed unjustly, the diver of the ocean of divine knowledge, and the traveller in the ways of religious observance and spiritual purification, the one chosen to look into the mysteries of God the most powerful, 'Abdu-llah, son of Mu'awiyah, son of Ja'far, son of Abu Talib; may God be pleased with him and with his great mother, Zainab, the virtuous daughter of the Prophet's daughter, Zainab. Through the exertion of the sinful and poor slave, the servant of the descendants of the Prophet, this humble self Shaikh Bayazid, son of 'Ali al-Mushrif, (this building or tomb was erected) in the year eight hundred and sixty-five, A. H.

No. 20.

Mu'izzu-d-daulat-i-wa-d-din, Bahaq, son of the monarch, the fortunate martyr 'Umar Shaikh, son of Timur, the Gurgan, died in the year eight hundred and forty-three, A. H.

No. 21.

He, before whom stand the kings of the dominions of Islam and who is the protection of the monarchy of Khans, the king of all the quarters of the world, the fruit of the tree of royalty and justice, by inheritance and right, Mu'inu-s-saltanat-i-wa-d-dunya-wa-d-din, Shah Rukh Sultan, son of the fortunate monarch, Sultan Abu Sa'id, the Gurgan, son of the great monarch Sultan Muhammad, son of the great and just monarch, Miran Shah, son of the first great monarch Qutbu-l-haqq-i-wa-s-saltanat-i-wa-d-dunya-wa-d-din, Amir Timur, the Gurgan, died on the 15th Shawwal, in the year eight hundred and ninety-eight, A. H.

No. 22.

Mu'inu-s-saltanat-i-wa-d-dunya-wa-d-din, Bahaq, son of Shah Rukh, son of Timur, died on the 6th Jumada-1-ula in the year eight hundred and thirty-six, A. H.

No. 23.

Nizamu-d-din, Sultan Ahmad, son of 'Abdu-l-Latif, son of Sultan 'Ubaid, the Gurgan, son of Shah Rukh Sultan, died on the 10th Zi-l-hijjah, in the year eight hundred and forty-eight, A. H.

No. 24.

Sultan 'Alau-d-daula, son of Ghiyasu-d-daulat-i-wa-d-din, Bahaq, son of the fortunate and praised king, Mu'inu-s-saltanat-i-wa-d-dunya-wa-d-din, Shah Rukh Sultan, may God enlighten their judgments, died on the 6th of Zi-l-hijjah, in the year eight hundred and sixty-three, A. H.

No. 25.

Ibrahim Sultan, son of 'Alau-d-daulah, son of Bahaq, son of Shah Rukh, son of Amir Timur, died on Thursday, the 18th of the holy month of Ramazan, in the year eight hundred and sixty-three.
NOTE ON THE CITY OF HERAT

No. 26.

This is the tomb of her whom the great God granted power to have together the sovereignty of this world and the happiness of the next, and of whose magnanimity there are left, on the face of the earth, many great and eminent footprints in the path of benevolence. She was Gohar-Shadagha, the exalted cradle, the greatest concealed, the Bilqis (the wife of Solomon, the prophet) of her age, the possessor of kingdoms in the countries of religion, the chastity of both the worlds, may God enlighten her judgment. The great calamity (of her death) occurred in the middle of Ramazan, in the year eight hundred and sixty-one. O God forgive her!

No. 27.

Shaikh Zainu-d-din, the leader and the chief of the faithful, the Quth (saint) having the heaven for his threshold, the Ghaus (saint) possessing the knowledge of the mysterious truths, went out from the low spot of the earth to the height of heaven, with his skirts free from the dust referred to in (the following verse of the Quran) «I wish I were dust.» (1) His age was eighty-one, and this same number, if increased, by one year, will represent the year of his death.

[Maṇlawī Abdal Hak Abid has kindly worked out the various dates, mentioned on p. 99. The date 202 is obtained by adding 81 to the value of the letters of the two words یِبک سَال (91 + 30 = 121); 741 is got by adding 1 to the value of ہشناد یِبک (30 + 710); and 832 is got by adding 1 to the value of ہشناد یِبک سَال (91 + 30 + 710). By similar processes the following additional dates may be obtained; viz., 831 by adding 740, the value of ہشناد یِبک (30 + 710), to 91, the value of one سَال; again 861 by adding the same 740 to 121, the value of یِبک سَال (91 + 30). Besides several other combinations might be made. But perhaps the date really meant is simply 811, i. e., I added on to 81. Ed.]

1 The infidels will utter these words on the day of resurrection.
The city of Herat

By Munshi Mohun Lal

Tradition and the following Persian verse say, that the foundation of the city of Herat, or Hari, was by an ancient king called Lahrasp, who was succeeded by Gushtasp. Alexander, the successor of Behman, built and finished the structure of Herat very beautifully, and after him it was never repaired.

(Lahrasp laid the foundations of Hari. Gushtaps erected many buildings thereon; Bahman after him added greatly to the town, and Alexander put the finishing stroke to it). The city is environed by a strong wall, and also by a small, weak, and thirsty ditch. The circumference is nearly four miles. The houses in the city are generally made of two stories high, and have very small doors to enter at.

Great part of the population of the city, and even of the western district, is Parsi Baban, the follower of Panj-tan, or five persons, namely, Muhammed, Ali, Fatimah, Hasan, and Hosain.—They are all fond of the Persian government—not with regard to religion, but through the ill treatment, which they daily receive from Kamran and his ministers.

He is a decrepit and gloomy prince. He excites the pity of mankind. He has neither state nor good palace, which is like a prison. He is destitute of the signs of royalty, and a ray of meanness and melancholy gleams on his features.

He is afraid of his ministers and of the whole Ala koo zay family, who over-rule him. He is anxious to get rid of them, and to be an ally of the English Government, of which he often talked very friendly.

Shair Muhammed Khan, the Acting Vizier, is a talkative and base man. He suspected us to be Russian spies, and twice sent thieves at night to destroy us, but availed nothing.

Our abode in Herat for seven months was very far from agreeable, especially as we hoped to be in Cabul in December. Upon one hand, the plague was ravaging the city; on the other, the dearth of every article caused us to spend a great deal of money.

The streets of Herat are very narrow and dirty, but the roofed bazar, or charsu, gives an idea that in old days it was a great mar-
The shops are adorned by English chintzes, which are here very dear.

The people of Herat, though poor, are fond of pleasure. They go daily to gardens, which resemble paradise, and pass their time in firing from horse-back, in racing, and also in singing, joking, dancing, and sleeping.

Their dress is a red shirt and an open red trowser, below a cloak or chogha, and on the head a turban of Peshawer lungi. They tie a very thin cloth round their waist, and keep a knife on their girdle for show, and also for aggression.

The suburbs of Herat are exceedingly fertile, and covered by numerous villages, which extend as far as the eyes reach. The whole country is divided into four parts: namely, Obaih, Kurakh, Ghuryan, and Sabzwar, or Isfazar.

Since Kamran's dynasty, the commerce of Herat has fallen to nothing. The resident merchants are fined in a large sum of money upon any foolish pretext of the Government.

There are two frequented roads from Herat to Bokhara, one goes through Maimara, where the caravans generally meet with difficulty. The other, which is easy, leaves Sarakhs on the left hand. By this last route the caravans cross the Mur-ghah river, and reach Bokhara after 23 marches, the distance of which (a merchant told me) is 110 farsangs, or 480 miles.

The caravan pays duty only in four places through all the way, and I have got the name of every stage written in my diary.

I subjoin the list of the income of Herat,...
16 Money collected from the black tents of Emak or Elat annually... 2000
17 Monopolizer of wood for burning and all other uses pays... 300
18 The head of the horse-sellers pays... 180
19 Money collected from Zeh ṭabi, or skin ropes, exported to India... 4
20 The inhabitants of Caravan-serais pay... 50
21 Money collected from the Kandahar gate... 150
22 Do. collected from the Khushk gate... 50
23 Duty taken upon charcoal... 60
24 Money obtained from all shops... 1000
25 Duty taken upon tobacco... 200
26 Dabagh or the head of skin-cleaners pays... 110
27 Money collected from stamping the kafak or a kind of shoe... 300
28 Monopolizer of assafetida pays... 600
29 Money collected from each Toman’s king, called the Toman Shahi... 300
30 Manufacturer of the rice or Shali pays annually... 600
31 Monopolizer of the mint (in Haji Firoze’s reign, 50 toman every day) now pays yearly... 120
32 Revenue of Ghuryan... 220
33 Do. of Obaah... 300
34 Do. of Kurakh... 110
35 Do. of Sabzwar... 100

List of the Corn produced in Herat, &c.
Corn produced in the suburbs of Herat... 27000
Do. in Obaah... 2000
Do. in Kurakh... 1020
Do. in Ghuryan... 2000
Do. in Sabzwar... 1300

20 Rupees make a Toman of Herat, which is equal to 6 Rs. and 12 As. of India.
Koran is a measure of 100 maunds of Tabriz, which is equal to six maunds and
10 seers of India.

On the 4th of July, 1833, before the sun rose, we set out to the east of the city, to examine the place called Gazur Gah, where the body of Abu Ismael, or Khajeh Abdul Ansar, the son of Abu Mansaur, the son of Abu Ayoub, the son of Mat Ansar, or the bearer of Muhammad’s Koran, reposes.

When we reached the pleasant Gazur Gah, we entered the Charsu or square of Hasan Khan Shamlu, who has also built a few shops and a fine cistern on account of the periodical fair in spring. Having passed through the sahan, we came to the door which led us to the grave of Abu Ansar. The door is made of copper, and on each side are fine and clear mosques, where we saw a few Korans laying on the shelves.

Abu Ansar was struck with stones by the boys, when he was doing penance, of which he expired in 1065, A. D., or in 481, Hejri. He had learned about 12,00,000 poems by heart, and was the author of 100,000 couplets.

The year 481 Hejiri began on the 27th March, 1088, not 1065 as above stated.—Ed.
or rahals. The Musnavi, or the book of Mualnanal Rûm, is recited every morning, and the people faint during the invocation.

On our right hand were the tombs of Mansur Sultan, the father of Shah Rukh Mirza, and of the descendants of Amir Timur. On our left were buried the successors of Chengiz Khan. The body of Mansur was lodged on a large platform, bordered with marble, and towards the head of the tomb we saw the following inscription:

The substance of the inscription may be thus rendered:

This excellent construction and meritorious work which resembles Paradise, resplendent with the lights of divine favour and the blessings of the merciful God, has been built with great art and beauty as the monument of the famous Sultan Ghhususuddin Mansur and his pious descendants, in the year of H. 772. Written by Sultan Muehhadlm.

Among the graves of Changiz Khan’s family was a body covered with black marble, on which we beheld the surprising sculptures of the ancient unknown hewer. The works are incomparable at the present day. The stone was carved in seven figures, called «haft kalm,» or seven pens. I copied the following inscription from the above tomb:

The tomb of Abu Ansar was very large, bordered with marble, and covered with stones: on the head of the grave stands a marble l'oh which resembles a minar: it is beautifully made of two pieces. The size of one piece is five feet high, and of the other is 10 feet. It is covered with Arabic letters, and has only one in the following Persian:

The Khajeh, in look and verity a king, was equally versed in the affairs of both the worlds: would you know the date of his death, read it in the words ‘Khajeh Abdulla,’ i.e. A. H. 737. The words give the same date.
The tomb is commanded by a magnificent high arch, erected by Shah Ruka Mirza, 480 years ago. It is 70 feet high.

Timur Shah resolved to gild the arch, but was diverted by some accidents. On the right hand of the tomb are many inscribed poems written by the celebrated author named Jami, but the following verse made by Hasun Khan Shamlu informs us the day of Abdul Ansar's death:

(If you are desirous that the cupbearer of wisdom should give you a cup full of understanding, come into the banqueting house of Khajah Abdullah Ansari. His monument is like the graceful cypress which enchants the angels to hover over it, crying and lamenting like doves).

When we came out of the door, we went to the cistern, which contains a very delicious, sweet-flavoured water, called Ab Zem-zem; it is cold in summer, and hot in winter, which I believe is owing to a deception in the temperature of the atmosphere. There were written plenty of verses in the arch, which I wished to copy.

The purport of this long inscriptions is, that Adil Shah Rukh erected a well and terraces, &c., for the use of pilgrims to the tomb of Khajeh Assar, which having fallen into disrepair were reconstructed at the expense of a female descendant of Ca'n one of the sons of Chengez Khan in the year (houz-zemzem-silsabil) 9.

The original name of Gazur Gah is Karzar Gah. Kerzar means in Persian battle, and Gah, place, (the place of battle;) in short, it is the seat of happiness and pleasure, and the people always go and pass their time in drinking and singing, which seems very inconsistent with the solemnity of the dead.
The water of the neighbouring covered fountain runs beautifully, through the canal which ornaments Gazur Gah, and makes it a lovely spot in Herat.

Towards the north of the city, under the base of the hills, flourishes a pleasant edifice, called Takht Safar constructed by Sultan Hosain Mirza, the fourth descendant of Amir Timur. In spring the neighbouring fields and mountains are covered with a bed of yellow and red flowers, called UrGhavan. The place is now going to decay, but seems to have been once a paradise. A tank of water possesses a magnificent fountain, which with its watery arrows fights with the top of the building. The height of the edifice is measured 100 feet.

In the reign of Sultan Hosain Mirza the punishment for the people of bad demeanor was to reduce them to the office of masons, who were ordered to assist in the building of Takht Safar. He also published a poem and applied it on every gate, that the passengers should read it.

هکه با لاله رخانی باده گلارنه کشید
حکم مرزاست که برختی سفرسنگ کشید

(All who have been trespassing in the pleasures of wine and beauty, by Mirza's command must add a stone to the takht-safar).

To the N. E. of the city stand the two very grand ruins separated by the stream Anjir.

Sultan Hosain Mirza leaves his name by building a stately college, which is all levelled to the ground. Two arches and four minars have still a grand appearance, and are separated into two equal parts by the above stream. The arch and the two minars which are situate on the right bank of the water are in the vicinity of the grave of Sultan Hosain, who is remembered with great respect and honor. He reigned in 1500, A. D. The head master of the college was the famous poet named Jami, whose works are very interesting indeed.

On the left bank of the stream rest the body of Goher Shád, the daughter of Amir Timur, and the sister of Shah Rukh. The grave is shaded by a very high gilt dome. There were formerly nine tombs, all made of black marble, ornamented by inscription in the Arabic character. The letters are all rubbed out and not legible.

She built a fine edifice called Musallah, and is said to have been the most incomparable lady in the world. She never married, but devoted herself to the perusal of the Koran; she was anxious to encourage the people to learn. The place is decorated by four high minars and two lofty arches, which make a beautiful square of 75 paces.

On the top of the arch were a few defaced Arabic inscriptions which I could not read. The minars seem half finished, and bent towards Meshid,
to salute Emam Reza. I ascended a minar of two stories high by difficult paces, and had a very striking view of the city. Every story contains 20 steps.

Having passed the square, we entered a lofty dome, which encouraged us to climb five stairs, and to come into the gilt and painted room where Goher Shád prayed.

All these ruins are decorated with azure and gold colour: (the blue colour is made of lapis-lazuli, which is found in considerable quantities in the mines of Badakhshan).

It is alleged, one day Goher Shád, accompanied by 200 beautiful ladies, came into the college, and ordered all the students to go out; she passed all day in the place, and had the pleasure of seeing every room.

One of the students, being sleepy, was not aware of her coming, and therefore he remained in the college. He awoke and peeped fearfully through the holes of the window. He cast his eyes on a ruby-lipped lady, one of the companions of Goher Shad. She caught the sight of the scholar, and fell in love with him. She left her associates, and entered the room of the student, who gained the pleasure of her society.

She was a delicate virgin, and after leaving the student, she joined her party, who suspected her by the irregularity of her dress and manners.

Goher Shád, on the information of this, was very much vexed, and to wipe away the reproach, she married all her associates to the students of the college, who were first ordered to avoid the friendship of the women. She gave them clothes, fine beds, and good salaries to live upon; she made rules for the collegians to meet their wives after seven days, on the condition not to forget their studies. She did all this to arrest the progress of adultery.

On the east end of the city flourished a very grand ancient building, called Masjid Jamah, or great mosque. It was erected by Sultan Ghiasuddin, the old king of Gaur, 700 years ago. He was the son of Muhammed Sam, and the sixth descendant of Abu Bakr, one of the friends of Muhammed.

The mosque has four doors and many arched domes. We made our entrance through the door called dar-hauz-vakil. Having traversed 70 paces under a roof supported by massive pillars, we opened into the great square of the mosque.

On our left hand were two pieces of marble, decorated with Persian inscriptions, which contained no valuable subjects, but an order to the custom-house officers, to provide the mullas with livelihood. The length of the square is 111 paces, and the breadth, 83.
There are four lofty and magnificently painted arches facing each other. The arch which stands to the west led us into the praying place, covered with heaps of mud, which has lately fallen by the severity of the winter. We saw a marble tomb-stone lying on the ground, which had Arabic characters. It was engraved by Ferokh Shad Shervani, to cover the grave of Sultan Abu Saed Kurgani.

The eastern arch exhibits a great deal of Mohammedan neglect. It is almost hidden under considerable masses of earth. The arch, which is situate towards the south, contains numerous Arabic inscriptions. They are all wasted away by the rains.

The northern arch is the place for students; it conducted us into a cupolated structure, where we were astonished to see a marble slab in the shape of a door. It was of a single piece, and so beautifully clear, that our faces were reflected in it. The length of the stone was ten spans, and the breadth, eight.

Having passed through a very small door, we happened to come into a square of 20 paces, where the body of Sultan Ghiasuddin reposes. The place is very filthy, and the grave is reduced to pieces. There is no inscription at all. The roof has fallen into decay, and overwhelms the tomb. There are many graves also, and the bones of the dead seemed to be decayed. Our sight got dim by visting the sepulchres. There was no difference between the tomb of the great Sultan and that of the poor man.

In the square of the mosque is a small cistern of water, for ablution, and a large heavy vessel of tin, made by Sultan Ghiasuddin; the circumference of which was 20 spans, and the thickness of the edge was one. There were inscriptions written on the borders of the vessel, dated 700 years ago.

It was repaired by Malak Ghiasuddin Cu'rt, 470 years ago, and repainted by Mir Ali Shair, the minister of Sultan Hosain, 350 years ago. The verse informs us the day of the repair.

(This place, which was before vile as a rotten bone, has acquired enduring fame like the Ka'ba. I inquired the date of the building, and my mind answered: «It is second altar of Abraham». A. H. 950).

The ruined buildings of Herat are beyond my ideas of description, and I am very sorry indeed that I am not well conversant with the English language.

One farsang far from the city towards the south is a famous bridge, called Pul Malan. In former days there were 33 arches, but now only 27 remain.
No history gives us any information about the foundation of the bridge, but the people say that it was built by a lady named Nur Biby, who lived more than 1000 years ago. The books of Herat give no account of the bridge, which is called by the natives "the matchless in the world". The inundation of the river was so rapid, during our residence at Herat, that three arches were swept away from one end, and nearly for two months all intercourse between Herat and other places was arrested.

From Kochan or Kabu Shain, where we were with the camp of H. R. H. Abas Mirza, Astrabad, a sea-port town on the bank of the Caspian, is nine days journey; and I am sorry not to know what sort of road continues from this to the above place; but in winter we hear the road to Astrabad is so muddy and troublesome that foot passengers even find difficulty to go.

The horsemen from Kochan to Herat may come very easily in eight days, and are supplied with all sorts of provision in the way. From Herat to Cabul the route is beautifully covered with villages, the produce of which can feed a considerable army. It is 20 days' journey without crossing any hill.

On the death of Vizir Fatha Khan, his brother, Dost Muhammed, mutinied against Shah Muhammed and Prince Kamran, and defeated them after a great loss. They escaped from Cabul and came to Herat through the Hazara country, after 13 marches; they were also accompanied by a numerous army.

Shah Zaman, on his coming to the throne, had occasion to quell an insurrection at Cabul, and arrived there from Herat in the space of 10 or 11 days, and a large body of horsemen accompanied him.

The road through which these two above-mentioned kings came to Cabul is hilly, and the people are called independent Hazaras.

From Cabul to the bank of the Indus, the road, through the Khybur country, is not to be traversed by carriages, and is eight days' journey; and from thence to Lahore we saw ourselves in some places that it was a difficult route. 15 marches bring the travellers from the bank of the Indus, or Atock to Lahore.

Alexander the Great, on his invasion of India, came by this road, without encountering any difficulty, and also Nadir, who is called an adventurer, followed his example.

Our last interview with Shah Kamran was a very friendly one. He promised a great deal to be friendly with the British Government, and never to submit to the Persians, who he said, are the "obedient slaves of the Russians." He told Dr. Gerard to come again to Herat on leave from the Government, where they both will get a great advantage by working the valuable mines of his country.
The danger from the Durand arrangement with the Amir is, that the Indian Government may continue to coerce the independent Afghan tribes, under the name of "Pathans," by supposing them to be a non-Afghan race, as has hitherto been the case. This misconception will eventually be more injurious to us than to the Afghans. For if we really want to see a strong Afghan government, the Afghans must be under the rule of the Amir of the Afghans; and every effort should be made, not to alienate the oldest Afghan tribes from him, but rather to aid him in bringing them under his rule. It has ever been the great weakness of the Afghans that they have not been in accord one with another. Their poet, the Khatak chief, Khush-hal Khan, says in one of his heart-stirring poems:

"If the different tribes would but support each other, kings would have to bow down in prostration before them."

The ancient people known to history under the general name of Afghans call themselves Pushtanah as well as Afghans; but those Afghan tribes, who, nearly seven centuries ago, migrated from the south-western part of their original country, and are now located on, and north, of the river of Kabul, east of the meridian of Jalal-abad, change their name into Pukhtanah, and Pukhtun, and the name of their language from Pushto to Pukhto. This is the only difference between them. Those Afghans or Pushtanah dwelling nearest to India on and west of the Indus, are also known as "Patans"; but there is no more difference between an Afghan, a Pushtun, or a Patan than between a Grecian, a Greek, or a man of Greece. Most Europeans, however, have got hold of the idea that the name Patan (or "Pathan" as it is commonly written,) refers to a totally different race; but it does not, unless they mean the descendants of those Patans or Afghans who settled in India itself, during the time of the Afghan rulers of Hindustan—(from 1450 A.D. to 1526 A.D., and from 1540 to 1555 A.D.)—who intermarried with the Muhammadans of India and who are vulgarly known by the name of Rohilahs as well as Patans; but who centuries ago had, for the most part, ceased to speak the Pushto or Afghan language. These so-called Patans, however, are not in question at all, but only the real Patans or Afghans who inhabit their original and true country "The Afghanistan," as explained further on. As for Rohilah, this merely means "mountaineer" and comes from the term "Roh," which is applied to a still more extensive tract, stretching from, and including Swat and Panj-korah down to Siwi (Sibi), in one direction, and from Hasan-i-'Abdal to Kandahar in the other. It refers to the mountain
tracts as distinct from the plains of the Derah-jat farther east. Indeed, «Roh» is a corruption of «Koh» signifying mountain or mountain range. (1)

Mount-Stuart Elphinstone, who was the first to give us an account of this famous people and of their country, makes no difference whatever between Pus'htanah, Afghans, or Patans, because no difference whatever exists. (2)

At the present day we understand by «Afghanistan,» the territories under the sway of the Afghan Amir, which is a vast extent of country, embracing a great part of the empire of the famous Turk Sultan, Mahmud of Ghazni. Of this, «the Afghanistan» is but a small portion. It is for attempting to consolidate his rule by bringing under his sway the remaining, and principal, part of «the» Afghanistan respecting which so little is known, that the Barakzi Afghan Amir, 'Abd-ur-Rahman Khan, our friend and ally, was only lately threatened with a military force by his British protectors, as though he were invading a foreign territory.

The Amir is in a most difficult position, confronting an enemy who has been permitted to appropriate a large tract of his best territory on the very glacis of his country's natural fortress in the north-west, to threaten Hirat at all times, and to intrigue with the descendants of the Mughal mings or Hazarahs (the Persian translation of the Turkish ming). These are the descendants of the military colonists, located in these parts by the Mughal invaders, after they had destroyed nearly all the Tajik or Persian population. These Hazarahs were never very obedient, even to their own Mughal rulers, much less to the Persians and Afghans who succeeded. The upshot has been a serious rebellion which went on for some considerable time, and is, perhaps, not yet completely crushed. There can be little doubt that this outbreak was in some way connected with Muscovite tactics.

On the other side of «the Afghanistan,» the Amir has a friend or protector, who assists him with much money and more advice, but who may find it convenient, when the Pamir question comes to the front, to abandon him, as was done at the time of the unprovoked outrage at Panj-Dih, when the Russians were allowed to appropriate the north-western parts of Maimanah and Indakhud (Andkhui) as also the greater part of the Badghais district; for the Indian Government

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1 It is partly owing to the loose way in which Survey Officers, who have no special knowledge of Afghāns draw up their accounts through their Hindustāni officials, or native interpreters. It is by such reports that the Indian Government is led astray. No people or tribes whatever speak Pushto as their mother tongue but what are Patāns or Afghāns, both words being synonymous. (See my «Notes on Afghānistān», etc., page 482 for an illustration of this).

2 I may mention that from the time I entered the service of the «Grand old Company», fifty years ago, I always took a great interest in all things Afghān, and for more than thirty years I have been collecting the materials for a history of that people, which I am now preparing for the Press.
was hand-tied by a party Government at home which shifts with every election. (3)

This friend and protector, who so much desires to see a strong Afghanistan, very lately has done even more to weaken the Afghan State. Our Indian executive being dubious as to who are <Afghans> and who are <Pathans> have not ceased, for years past, from encroaching upon that very Afghanistan, and from coercing peaceable and independent Afghan tribes who had given no offence, by calling upon them to come in. (4)

This means allowing themselves to be annexed against their will, because the Amir’s friend and protector wants their country, which that friend’s political officers will not admit to be the Afghanistan, and therefore change its name, say, to <British Biluchistan>. In case of refusing to come in, these true Afghans are compelled to do so by shot and shell, or at the point of the bayonet, as in the case of the turbulent population of the Zhob valley, whose turbulence consisted in desiring to keep us out of the very truest Afghan country.

The following are some extracts from the letters of an eye-witness in the first Zhob valley Expedition—an officer present with the force—published in a leading London paper, October 1st, 1884. The force employed consisted of two European Regiments, one European Field Battery, one Native Mountain Battery, three squadrons of Cavalry, five Regiments of Native Infantry, besides Pioneers and Sappers and Miners.

The writer says:

“The original plan and one likely to be adhered to is that we should go due north from here [Smallan] enter the Zhob valley by Anambar, staying there long enough to do any necessary fighting, and for survey purposes. We first entered Zhob territory that day; but the malik of the village came in and we got all necessary supplies of grain, etc., on payment. The next day I was on rear guard, and though the actual march was only 12 or 13 miles, owing to the camels having to make a detour over a kotal and down a steep descent, I did not get into camp till 7.30 p.m. from early morning. Had any organized opposition been intended, they could not have resisted attacking our baggage train, which extended for some miles; and we had only a troop of cavalry, and two or three companies of infantry to protect them. On Tuesday, the 21st October, we turned due west and marched along the valley to our present camping ground, passing numerous villages and mud forts. The first night we got supplies on payment from a village near here; but, owing to some maliks who promised to come in having failed to do so, permission was given to loot; and we sent out regular parties, under officers, to bring in grain, etc. (5) All the villages had been deserted excepting the one mentioned as supplying us. Here, in the evening, there was a disgraceful scene of looting, owing to some native levies of the Political Officer [Baluchis probably, inveterate enemies of the Afghans], who are bigger blackguards than the Pathans, having contrary to order, gone into the village to loot. The other native followers in camp, fancying permission had been given to do so (The writer himself says it had been given and that looting parties, under officers, had been sent out), flocked in and carried off everything they could lay their hands on, even stripping clothing off the women! A native Regiment had to turn

3 I have no hesitation in saying that the Russians will endeavour to seize Hirat on the very first opportunity, treaty or no treaty; the proceedings on the Pâmiris are partly intended to divert attention from their preparations for Hirat. By giving up Bâdgâis to them we have enabled them to strike at Hirat at a moment’s notice. Nearly every enemy in the past who entertained designs upon Hirat made his preparations for assailing it in the Bâdgâis district.

4 ‘Coming In’ in former times meant persuasion by bribery; it now implies compulsion by slaughter.

5 It should be understood that these people just cultivate sufficient for their own support, never compelled to furnish supplies, even on payment, to some 6,000 troops, and the same number or more of camp followers, they are deprived of about half a year’s supplies for themselves, and that is much the same as if their crops had been devoured by locusts.
out and clear the village... but I pitied the poor folk much, who had trusted to us, and who cannot understand the reason for our change. Still I am disgusted with our treatment of frontier tribes, and believe that, just because we want to find a good route to Candahar from the Punjab and secure our Railway, and for other political purposes, we find an excuse to come and treat in the roughest way people many of whom are peaceful cultivators. It is quite true they would cut any of our throats if they are brought up to, and I do not think it justifies our action. That day we blew up several mud forts (6), etc., and it was determined to remain here some days on purpose to eat up the valley, with a view of putting pressure on the chiefs to come in... On Thursday a reconnoitring party of Lancers was fired on to the north side of the valley, and reported some 100 men assembled determined to fight. The next morning early, halt the troops in camp paraded and marched across the valley, some ten miles or so towards the place. The fighting men were still reported there, and were seen to be in what would have been an exceedingly strong position, had they been decently armed. A flag of truce was sent to try and induce them to yield (after what had been done), but what do these people know of use of truce? but it came to grief in some way, so it was determined to force them out. Some Punjaubees were started off to turn their left, and shortly after the guns were sent towards their right (our left) to shell them at long range. We accompanied the guns, and soon got our order to ascend the hills to our left and try to cut off some of them, who were making off in the same direction. Our lads were very keen to get at them, and we got up the hill quickly, but to our chagrin found that the Punjaubies, who had an hour's start of us, had crossed our front and were on a ridge in front of us; also the Pathans were bolting in every direction like rats from a hole. It is true they were men who were armed and who intended to fight (forts of their houses, the women and children; it is not go armed), and who would not accept quarter; but it seemed to me murder, and I was thoroughly ashamed of the whole affair. Happily our share in it was slight, and I draw a veil over it. With our superior arms the poor wretches could do nothing. A party of them got up a hand-to-hand fight with the Punjaubees, and wounded six of the latter; also two of the Bombay Lancers were wounded. These were all our casualties and try to cut off some of them. Were making off, and it was officially estimated that some 60 or 70 Pathans were killed. Native reporters since say that this is much beneath the mark, and that probably upwards of 100 were put hors de combat. It will be said, no doubt, that there were several hundred fighting men opposed to us, but i think there were much more than 200, and my feeling about the whole affair is one of disgust and shame. No doubt it is difficult to draw the line, for the Pathans refuse to be made prisoners, and would kill us (very naturally we might say) if they could. It may be necessary to teach them a lesson; but it seems to me like a mastiff worrying a mouse... The only prisoners we took were those badly wounded, and even they made several attempts to injure the doctors who attended them. This is natural, never having seen a doctor before, and no one who knew sufficient of their language to explain to them being available, they, of course, did not know what was going to be done to them by those who had just before done their best to kill them. They probably thought the doctors were the torturers appointed to complete the work that the others had not finished). So deadly is their hatred and fanaticism (through being attacked without having shown hostility in the first place, their homes, and crops, and cattle destroyed and 'looted', and their women molested—a good cause of hatred anywhere)... I was sorry to hear that in looting a mollah's house a lot of manuscript documents, very little of the characters I know so well, and I do not think they claim such great antiquity, that we might stumble on manuscripts of great value and interest, etc., etc. (7).

The knowledge of the past history of a people is indispensable from a political point of view, but the India and Foreign Offices at home appear to ignore that of Afghanistan, and in consequence, the loyalty of the Amir, 'Abd-ur-Rahman Khan and of his countrymen was lately strained almost to the snapping point.

The founder of the Afghan monarchy, Ahmad Shah, the Sadozi Abdali or Durrani, and his two immediate successors, ruled from the frontiers...
of Persia to the banks of the Jihlam (Jhelum) in the present Panjab territory, and for some time as far as the Sutlaj, of Hindustan as then constituted. Indeed Ahmad Shah ruled as far east as Sahrind (Sirhind) and all the Afghan or Pathan tribes, with few exceptions, acknowledged fealty to him and his immediate successors more or less, and had to furnish contingents to their armies in time of war. (8) The exceptions were the powerful and numerous Yusufzi tribe (9) and their ramifications, dwelling on the north side of the river of Kabul, in Panj-korah, Swat, and Buner, all the tracts lying north of the Pes'hawar district, and the Tarkalarni Afghans dwelling in Bajaur, of which we heard so much lately, when the Amir was commanded not to interfere with it. The Yusufzaizis were very powerful during the period that the Barlas Mughal rulers of Hindustan, descended from Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad Babar Badshah, held possession of the Subah or province of Kabul, as then constituted, which included all the territory between the Paghman mountains and the Indus, from west to east, and from the south slopes of the Hindu Kush mountains (not including the Kafiristan, nor Chitral, nor the districts peopled by the Yusufzis, and the tribes confederated with them), to the south side of the Kurma'h (Kurram) darah or valley, included in Upper Bangas'h, and Kohat or Lower Bangas'h, and Bannu, from north to south. The district proper of Ghazni was also included, but the Afghanistan or earliest seats of the Afghans, Pus'htanah, or Patans, from the time they are first mentioned in history, continued wholly independent of any other than Afghan chiefs.

Another exception was the tribe of Afridi Karlarni Afghans, who were in receipt of a yearly allowance for keeping clear the Passes between Pes'hawar and Dhakah. A third, but in more recent times, was the Waziri sub-tribe of Karlarni Afghans, who evaded payment of taxes whenever they possibly could. They were then, however, much weaker than they are at present, and were not accounted of much consequence, but they have become so numerous within the past sixty or seventy years, that, during the distracted state of the Afghan Government previous to the year 1850, or thereabouts, the rulers of that state had neither the power nor the opportunity of enforcing their supremacy over them.

The Afghan rulers of the Afghan state, whether Ghalzi, or Sadozi Durranis, or Barakzi Durranis, have always been the natural sovereigns of the Afghan tribes, with the above exceptions who had left the Afghanistan in search of new homes, and one or two petty tribes which were scarcely worth coercing.

8 Down to the time that Dost Muhammad Khan's brothers, Kohan-Dil Khan and Rahim-Dil Khan ruled at Kandahar, that is down to 1855. Shorah-bak, Siwi, Tal or Talah, and Tsotiali paid them revenue and Pushang or Pushanj (not Peshin) alone paid 900 tomans.

9 Although the Yusufzis never paid taxes to anyone, yet, whenever India was to be invaded, and even in some expeditions on the Persian frontier, they were very ready, of their own free-will, to assist their Afghan kinsmen, and this is precisely the relation which the most independent tribes cherish to the Amir, who is merely primus inter pares, but who in an emergency, say, a foreign attack, derives his main strength (which we have weakened) from their adhesion.
We profess, certainly, that we desire "a strong Afghanistan and strong Afghan Government," and yet we do all we possibly can to weaken both. The Waziris alone could easily furnish the Amir with a contingent of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, of excellent fighting quality, and accustomed to hill warfare; but we have compelled him to give up his effort to induce them to return to allegiance! The Waziris number in all upwards of 45,000 fighting men, and are remarkable among Afghans for their tribal unity. The Indian Government supposing the Waziris to be only "Pathans," and not Afghans, ordered the Amir to desist under threats of military coercion! His attempt in Bajaur to bring the Tarkalarni Afghans (10) of that part under his influence, was equally thwarted by the Indian Government, which has for years past been annexing purely Afghan territory inhabited by Afghan people by forcing them "to come in." Almost the whole of the southernmost part of the Afghanistan, in its widest sense, and lying north of the upper Sind boundary, namely from near Mangrothah on the east, to the Kojak range of mountains on the west, in length about 236 miles and in breadth nearly 100, has within the last few years, in carrying out this reckless "forward" policy, and the waste of much public money (11), been annexed by the British Government of India. They have re-named it "British Biluchistan," though nine-tenths of its inhabitants are pure Afghans, probably because Baluchis and Hindu officials—Raos and Rams—have chiefly benefited by such forcible annexation, while the Afghan tribes inhabiting the tracts in question, most of whom, have been independent from the earliest times, have been deprived of their rights. As an instance I may refer to the notable Borizi division of the Parni tribe of Afghans. The Political Officers sent to carry out the minor details of this policy of wholesale annexation in their district, knew nothing, as a rule, of their rights, language, or history. How should they, when some of the highest Government officials often do not know the difference between an Afghan and a Baluch? If it was necessary to seize upon part of Afghan territory, why also change its name? Was it in order to throw dust into the eyes of the public, who might become alarmed at part of "the Afghanistan" being seized upon? No Afghans ever yet dwelt in "Biluchistan;" Baluchs are simply modern interlopers upon the ancient Afghan territory on the upper Sind border. The latest seizure of territory immediately west of the Indus is the portion belonging to the Sherani Afghans towards the lower part of the darah or valley of the Iziob (Zhob), and between it and the range of Mihtar Suliman on the east; but the whole of that darah has been "prospected," after the manner of the "Orenbourg Scout Corps" and of the Pamir, previous to further seizure: and this truly Muscovite policy was defended by an Under-Secretary of State for India, in the British Parliament! These annexations began in the first place by a numerous force of British troops, with artillery, being marched into territory

10 The Tarkalarni is one of the tribes and sub-tribes constituting the Khas'hi or Khak'hi sept of the Afghan nation; the Yusufzis, Mandars, Gagyanis, and Mukah Khel being the others.

11 The late Sir R. Sandeman is said to have "metalled the road to Kandahár in 1878-79 with rupees." Such "influence" as this is easily obtained, but is an expensive luxury.
belonging to these unfortunate Afghans or Patans, for whose independence so much solicitude is manifested. If they assemble on their hills to see what is going to happen, as frightened sheep gather together when the wolves appear, they are «shelled at long range,» or ordered to «come in;» if they do not «come in» they are reduced to submission by force of arms. This is just what the Russians have been doing, and we cannot blame them, for they are fully aware of all our movements.

In a despatch published in the «Times» of May 20th, 1891, on the operations of the «Zhob Field Force» [this was the second expedition] I find the following:—

The operations divided themselves into two phases—first, the march from the Zhob valley into the valleys of the Kundar and Gomal rivers and thence to Appozi; second, the operations against the Kidarzais and other sections of the Sherani tribe. A concentration of force was therefore arranged here (at «Tanishpa») as resistance was expected. At the approach of the force, Bangal Khan, an outlaw who had dominated the neighbourhood sometime (so all who were not agreeable to give up their independence and «come in» and be dominated by a Political were outlaws!) with a few followers took up a position on a peak over 8,000 feet high, and declared his intention of holding it to the last. He changed his mind however, and fled the day before the arrival of the force (some 5,000 or 6,000 men of all arms) and got safely away, although an attempt was made to run him down... Sir Robert Sandeman, K.C.S.I., having notified to Sir George White that no satisfactory agreement had been arrived at with the Sheranis, and that he was ready to proceed, Sir George ordered an advance of the whole force with a view to occupying the country of the Sheranis. All the principal men of the different sections of the Sherani tribe, with the exception of Murteza Khan, who of all was most wanted, had «come in» to one or other of the political officers with the columns operating in their country. A conclusive proof that the Sheranis no longer believe in the impregnability of their position to shield them from the long arm of England’s power. I thought it would be a useful lesson to the people to march troops to the top of the Takht-i-Suliman, and thus effectually roll up the curtain of obscurity which has hitherto shrouded this fabled throne... The that the British soldiers and Baluch Sepoys (12), fully accounted (50 picked men of each kind) scaled these dangerous heights, will not be lost on the Sheranis.

What was the «lesson» to the Sheranis, I fail to see; but it is a specimen of the policy which we are assured is «not to attempt an extension of the frontier of India farther than it was at present, but to bring the independent tribes, with full respect for their independence, into friendly relation with the British Empire,» etc., etc. I may mention that I gave a detailed description of the Takht-i-Suliman, which was scaled nearly a hundred years ago by a Surveyor from Hindustan, in my «Notes on Afghanistan» etc., in 1888, four years before this expedition set out, which account was not put in print by the India Office authorities, and is still in MS. No one, I should imagine, expected to find a throne there. The supposed «fabulous throne» to be «rolled up,» was a ledge of rock, and more than this, at this very place, is the tomb of Isma’il, son of Shaikh Bait, or Batanaey, the progenitor of the Batani tribe of Afghans who are said, according to reports, to have «wanted protection from the Afghans.» Thus the latest spot in this direction seized and garrisoned is Appozi, 60 miles beyond our natural frontier.

(12) I knew both the 1st and 2nd Baluch Battalions, officers of my own corps being in both; from the time they were first formed in Sind by General Sir C. Napier, G. C. B. At first, the first Battalion, which was the earliest formed, contained the scum of the bazaars, discharged servants, who could not obtain places, and camp-followers generally, with a few indifferent Baluchis to swear by. A great improvement was subsequently made and all such got rid of; and in 1847 and 48, both corps contained about 600 Afghans each, and just to the British. Baluchistan is so called because the majority of its people are Afghans, and their country «the Afghanistan»; so were these then two fine Regiments called Baluchis because four-fifths of them were Afghans pure and simple. It is more than probable that the «Baluch Sepoys» here referred to were Afghans.
The late Sir George Campbell, M.P., who knew who were Afghans and who not, better than any member of the House of Commons, and also where «the true Afghanistan» lay, in a speech in the House of Commons, on Tuesday, August, 4th, 1891, is reported to have said («Times.» August 5th):

«Sir G. Campbell, after asserting that the Black Mountain tribes which had been described by the last speaker, were ethnologically, the purest Afghans, proceeded to comment on the statement, that we were then attempting to establish relations with the tribes by peaceful means. A curious commentary, he said, was afforded on this statement by what was now taking place in that country. Did the hon. member call the Black Mountain expedition voluntary and peaceful, while no means by which tribes might be brought under our control? What he complained of was rather that we were advancing by military means, and by force of arms, trying to conquer the people. (Hear, hear). If we attempted to bring the Afghans (he was then referring to these very tribes I have here noticed, dwelling on the extreme east of «the Afghanistán», between Aoppoz and the Indus) under control by such methods, nothing but hatred would be engendered against us, and we should find that our relations with the Afghans were extremely unsatisfactory... He should have thought that this country had burnt its fingers sufficiently already by mingling in Afghan affairs. The country was like a hedgehog, and the more we interfered with it the more disposed was it to resent our interference... He deprecated the measures which had been taken to advance our Indian frontier among the tribes, by military means. A curious commentary, he said, was afforded on this statement by what was now taking place in that country. Did the hon. member call the Black Mountain tribes which had been annexed to the Government of India by the Governor-General not succeeded in exercising that amount of control over his military advisers as it was in the case in former days, etc., etc.»

In reply to this, Sir J. Gorst, the then Under-Secretary for India, said.

«He should not attempt to act as arbitrator between two such authorities as the hon. member for Southport and the hon. member for Kirkcaldy on the question of the ethnology of the tribes which bordered the frontier of India. The hon. member was wrong, however, when he spoke of the policy pursued by the Government of India towards the Afghan tribes. The policy of the Government of India was not to interfere with the independence of these tribes, not to attempt any territorial aggression (the Sheránís and their country to wit!), not to attempt an extension of the frontier of India further than it was at present (13) (Aoppoz is 60 miles west of it) but to bring the independent tribes, with full respect for their independence (What then is calling upon them at the bayonet's point to come in?), into friendly relations with the British Empire, so that they might become the guards and the protection of the frontier. (Hear, hear). In pursuance of a policy of this kind, occasional outbreaks on the frontier would take place, and during the last year there were outbreaks of that kind on the Black Mountain, and in other places (at the object which we were trying to attain). He asserted that our relations with the Afghans were extremely unsatisfactory... He should have thought that this country had burnt its fingers sufficiently already by mingling in Afghan affairs. The country was like a hedgehog, and the more we interfered with it the more disposed was it to resent our interference... He deprecated the measures which had been taken to advance our Indian frontier among the tribes. He was afraid the Governor-General had not succeeded in exercising that amount of control over his military advisers as it was in the case in former days, etc., etc.»

If such is the case, why were we at that very time threatening the Amir with an advance by the «Gumul Pass and Jandulah.» because he was trying to bring the Waziri and other Afghans under allegiance? Were they foreigners or was that foreign policy? Why not try threats upon Russia? Did the authorities desire to drive the Amir into her arms? If not, they must cease from encroaching on Afghan country, and on the independence of Afghan tribes nearest our natural frontier.

Now these «local border tribes» consist of some of the very oldest of the Afghan tribes, from which all the others have sprung. This is one of the specimens of the policy of non-interference with the independence of the tribes, and «not attempting any territorial aggression»! A telegram told us, that «a striking instance of the effect of the vigorous frontier policy now being pursued by the Government of India occurred in the Batání country near the Gomal Pass. The tribesmen gave an enthusiastic welcome to the political officer on his arrival at Jandulah with an escort of 50 cavalry. They were delighted to get protection against the»

(13) This was after the little strip of territory 236 miles long, and about 100 broad, constituting British Billoochistan, otherwise «Sande-mania» had been annexed: but the Jziob valley and other parts had been prospected under the policy of «coming in». 

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Afghans. But who are the Batanis? Afghans pure and simple, and the direct descendants of Shaikh Bait or Batanaey, who was the second of the three sons of Kais-i-'Abd-ur-Rashid, the progenitor of the whole of the Afghan race without exception. It was from Batanaey's daughter Mato that vast tribe of Ghazli has sprung, at present one of the three most numerous divisions of the Afghan race, who are still multiplying greatly, and are likely before long, if they do not already, outnumber their enemies, the Durranis. The Kakars are the next most numerous, and the Waziris the next after them. The Ghazlis gave kings to Kandahar, and they also gave two kings to Persia, after having overthrown the Safawi dynasty. From Mato's other son, Loeday or Lodaey, sprung also the great tribe of Lodi which gave two dynasties of sovereigns to Hindustan, who reigned for the most part in great glory; and they were the only Patan or Afghan dynasties that ever ruled in that country.

To make what I say more clear, I will, on a future occasion, give a rough sketch of the descent of the whole Afghan nation, from which it will be seen that the Batanis, who are said to have been «delighted to get protection from the Afghans.» were of purer Afghan blood than the Waziris themselves, the father and mother of the formers' immediate progenitor being both Afghans.

Only the other day, at a banquet at the Mansion House, Lord Roberts said:

«Circumstances might occur which would necessitate our affording his Highness that armed assistance which he would be within his rights in demanding, and in order that such assistance should be prompt and effective, it is of the utmost importance that the population of the countries through which and in which we would have to operate should be well disposed towards us. (Cheers.) A mountainous region, inhabited by warlike and independent tribes, numbering according to the best information, not less than 200,000 fighting men, separates the valley of the Indus from the Afghan table land; and if these tribes were to oppose our advance into Afghanistan, a large portion of our all-too-small field army would be absorbed in holding them in check, and in guarding our lines of communication. Although these tribes are troublesome and fanatical, they delight in military service and make admirable soldiers, and in many cases have shown a devoted attachment to the British officers with whom they have been associated. The present policy of the Government of India towards these tribes is to extend our influence among them without menacing their independence, and, by trying to civilize them and increase their prosperity, to induce them to look upon us as their friends, who will protect their interest and insure their being left in undisturbed possession of the territory they occupy. (Cheers).»

Here Lord Roberts was actually describing the true Afghanistan, and the pure and most ancient Afghan tribes whom we know from contemporary history to have been dwelling here uninterruptedly for the last thousand years. Would anyone suppose that, this policy referred actually to «the turbulent population of the Zhob valley,» who were shelled for not «coming in»; and to the Sheranis; and that among the encroachments on their independence (that we have as yet heard of in this country) was the establishment of a fortified camp at Appozi, with a full fledged «Political,» some sixty miles beyond our legitimate frontier; or with the latest encroachments in the Kurmah (Kurrum) darah, or with the occupation of all the territory from Mangrothah to Kwatah (Quetta). We have really been doing on our side what the Russians have been doing on their, and setting them an example.

Not long ago, Lord Lansdowne stated, at the farewell dinner given to him at the United Service Club at Calcutta:
The cloud which has loomed on the horizon shows signs of rolling by. A firm alliance with the ruler of Afghanistan and a determination to respect and, as far as possible, to maintain the independence of his country, have been articles of faith with the Government of India ever since the accession of the present Amir.

So it is evident that the Government of India does not really know that in alienating these true Afghan tribes, it is undermining the power of the Afghan Amir. It was the commencement of this sort of thing by the annexation of Kwatah (Quetta) of the Kasi Afghans, and Siwi (Sibi) of the Parni Afghans, that alienated the late Sher 'Ali Khan from us.

Since the inception of the «vigorous frontier policy,» we have already cut off from the Afghan ruler and the Afghan State, in order to make up this «British Biloochistan,» the whole of the Barets tribe of Afghans, the Babi Afghans, the Parni Afghans; great part of the Tarins, of which the Durrans are but an offshoot; nearly all the Kasi Afghans; numbers of the Karlarni Afghans; the Miani Afghans; and some of the Kakar Afghans; and now they want to cut away from the Afghan ruler and State, the Waziris—the most numerous of the whole Afghan race after the Kakars—the Dotarni Lodi, the Batanis, the Mandu Khel, the remainder of the Kasis, the Aor-Mars, the Sheranis, and even the main portion of the Kakars and some others!

Thus, in order to make «a strong Afghanistan,» they actually want, and have begun, to cut away from the Afghan ruler, and from allegiance to and dependence on his government, every Afghan tribe, with the sole exception of his own sub-tribe, the Durrans, all of whom are not loyal to him as being a Barakzi, and the Ghalzis who are decidedly hostile to the Durrans, and quite ready to show it on the first opportunity, and a few of the Karlarnis! Was there ever such fatuity as this? Nothing better could have been devised to break up the Afghan State altogether. How is any Afghan ruler going to retain his territory, which, with the exception of these comparatively few Durrans, (14), estimated to be about 300,000 souls (=60,000 men capable of bearing arms, but I estimate them to be rather more by one quarter), which consists of Tajiks, people of Turkish and Mughal descent, some ‘Arab, and other races, who, from time to time, have come in the train of invaders into the tracts belonging to, and comprising the greater part of the Afghan State, north, south, and west of the true Afghanistan? Thus it is proved, as I have been endeavouring to show, that the advisers of the Indian Government are under the idea that the Durrans and Ghalzis and a few Karlarnis, numbering about 900,000 in all; and who actually dwell out of «the Afghanistan», alone constitute the Afghan nation, and that the remaining 1,500,000 Afghan souls, not counting the Yusufzis and Pes’hawar tribes, and whose mother tongue, which they exclusively speak, is Afghani or Pushto, are not Afghans at all!

How can any Mission or increase of subsidy convince the Amir or his people of the correctness of such palpably unfounded reasoning? We have simply secured a lull before the storm which must, sooner or later, break out in all its fury.

(14) The Durrans from the time of their conquest and occupation of Hirat and its territory in 1713, and their long dependence upon Persia previously, acquired some of the polish of that nation, but lost a good deal of the Afghan sturdiness.
THE WAZIRI AFGHANS AND THEIR COUNTRY
By Major H. G. Raverty

The storm predicted on the Afghan frontier in my previous account of the «Independent Afghan or Patan Tribes» in the April number of this Review, has, possibly, commenced with the Waziri tribe.

It is a significant result of our alleged policy to convince the Afghan border tribes, that, to quote the speech of Lord Roberts at the Mansion House on the 13th June, 1893,

«The Policy of the Government of India is, 'to extend our influence among them without menacing their independence, and, by trying to civilize them and increase their prosperity, to induce them to look upon us as their friends, who will protect their interests and insure their being left in undisturbed possession of the territory they occupy».

A brief account of the great Waziri tribe and of the tract of country which they inhabit, as also of their immediate neighbours, may, therefore, be interesting at the present conjuncture of affairs.

The Waziri Afghans, Pushtanah, or Patans, belong to one of the four great divisions of the Afghan nation - the Karlarni. (1)

Aor-Mar, fifth son of Sharaf-ud-Din, otherwise Sharkabun, son of Sarahbarn, son of Kais-i'Abd-ur-Rashid, the Patan, the progenitor of the Afghan race, had a son named 'Umar Din, corrupted into Amar, who had two sons, Zakariya (Zacharias), and 'Abd-ullah. When the family was moving from its summer to its winter quarters, these two, roaming about one morning in search of game, came upon a spot where some other Afghan families had been recently encamped. There Zakariya found a male baby—and 'Abd-ullah picked up a shallow iron kettle which Afghans call karaey. Zakariya was the father of many sons, while 'Abd-ullah, who was very poor, had none—the more a man's sons in those days, the greater his strength—and he besought his brother to let him have the boy, whom he would adopt as his own son, and in exchange would give him the karaey. This was done, and in accordance with the circumstances under which the boy was found, he was named Kar-larnaey, the grammatical derivation of which compound word, as also details regarding the Karlarni descent, will be found in my «Notes on Afghanistan», pages 381-382.

(1) I am particular to write Afghan names correctly, and therefore may mention, that the letter represented by «ar» in italics, is peculiar to the Pushto language, and conveys the sound of «am» and «an» nasal.

In the names of tribes, where «si» occurs, it represents the tribe collectively, but «zai» and «zae», as people write it incorrectly, as in «Yussofzai» and the like, refers only to a single male of the Yusufzai tribe. Yusufzai' would refer only to a single female of the tribe, but «zi» is both the masculine and feminine plural, and refers to a tribe collectively, wherever it occurs.
Another version is, that the boy belonged to one of the Sarahbarn families, which, whilst moving from summer to winter quarters, expected a night attack from some enemy, and suddenly decamped leaving the child behind in the hurry and confusion of the march.

When Karlarnaey grew, his foster father, 'Abd-ullah, the Aor-Mar, gave him a daughter to wife, by whom he had two sons, Kodaey and Kakaey.

The former became the father of seven sons, three by one wife: 1. Utman; 2. Dilazak or Dilaizak; 3. Wuruk or Uruk; and four by a second wife: 4. Manaey; 5. Lukman, nicknamed Khatak; 6. Khogaey; and 7. Mangalaey. Two sons of a daughter of Kodaey, named Honaey and Wardag, whose father was a Sayyid, that is, descended from 'Ali, the son-in-law of the Arabian prophet, several of whose persecuted descendants took shelter with the Afghans—then a mere collection of families, descended from Kais-i-'Abd-ur-Rashid, ruled by their own elders—were adopted by their mother's father. All these were the progenitors of as many tribes, thus, Utman of the Utmanzi; Dilazak of the Dilazaks; Wuruk or Uruk of the Kurukzi; Manaey, through his son Farid or Afrid, of the Afridi; Lukman, alias Khatak, of the Khatak tribe; Khogaey of the Khogiani; and the sub-tribes of Jssadran, Mughbal, and Bahadurzi, from Mangalaey. Wardag and Honaey, the daughter's sons, adopted by their grandfather, Karlarnaey, were the progenitors of the Honi and Wardag tribes.

Kakaey, second son of Karlarnaey, had two sons, 1. Suliman, and 2. Shitak. From Shitak sprung the sub-tribes known, from dwelling in the Bannu territory, as Bannutsi. Suliman, son of Kakaey, had three sons: 1. Wazir; 2. Bai; 3. Malik Mir. The descendants of Wazir are the Waziri; those of Ba'i, the Bafiz; and those of Malik Mir the Malik-Miri or Miranzi. Malik Mir had a daughter named Kaghaz, but some called her Kaghaz or Kaghaz; and as her husband was of inferior rank to herself, a domestic of the family probably, her descendants, according to the invariable custom of the Pushtanah or Afghan people, were named after the mother, and not after the father, hence they are called Kaghazi or Kaghzi, or Kakhzi, or Kaghazi after her. The Malik-Miri or Miranzi, and Kaghazi, inhabit Lower Bangas'h, of which Kohat is the chief place, and Darsamand of Miranzi.

2 More directly a descendant of Isma'il, son of the Imam Ja'far the 6th Imam, 'Ali being the first) the founder of the Ismailian or Fatimite dynasty of Egypt; and from whom the present Agha Khan, the pope of the Khojah sect of Bombay, claims to be lineally descended, through Hasan, Ala-Zikrat-ee-Salam—or Hasan of blessed memory, the Mulahidah Chief of Alumut.

3. This was shown very plainly in that affair on the Ambela'h ridge (vul. Ambela) in 1860, where the Yusufzis made such a decided stand, which now appears to have been forgotten. The whole of the Yusufzis were up in arms to support their kinsmen of Buner; and had not an accommodation been come to when it did, there would have been 60,000 instead of 20,000 Yusufzis in the field. As it was they defended their ridge from the 20th of October to the 15th of December and inflicted on us the loss of some 16 British and 4 Native officers killed, and 21 British and 21 Native officers wounded, and a loss of men to the extent of about 1,200 killed and wounded, out of a force of about 9,000 men, well provided with artillery, they themselves losing. It is reported, 3,000. History repeats itself, and we shall have now a force numbering 10,000 or 12,000 to bring the Waziris under control.
I have thought it necessary to name all the Karlarni tribes and sub-tribes here, because "blood" is said to be "thicker than water," and may possibly prove to be so in the present instance with these Afghan people, (3) who are known to history as the "Akwaam (plural of Kaum tribe) or Bangas'h."

The following tree will show at a glance the descent of these Karlarni tribes.

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KAIS-I-'ABD-UR-RASHID, THE PATAN.

Sarahbānu.

Sharaf-ud-Din or Sherkabun.

'Umar Din or Amar.

Aor-Mar.

Zakariya.

'Abd-ullah.

KARLĀRNAEY (adopted).

Kodaey.

Kakaey.

1. Utmān.
2. Dilazāk.
3. Wūrūk or Ürūk.
4. Mānaey.
5. Lokmān alias Honaey.
7. Mangalaey.

Afrid.

Isadrām.

Mugābal.

Bahādurzi

Sulimān Shitak.

Wazir.

Bā'i.

Malik Mir.

Kāghazi (daughter)

The Waziri Karlarnis are subdivided into a number of branches (of which I have only mentioned the principal); more than any other tribe except, perhaps, the Ghaziz, Kakar, and Yusufiz. The Waziris have become numerous only within the last two hundred years—but so rapidly, that, towards the close of the last century, they were already one of the most numerous and powerful of the Afghan tribes, numbering close upon 100,000 families; and they have certainly considerably increased since then.

Wazir, the progenitor of the tribe, had two sons, Khizr or Khizraey, and Lalaey. The descendants of the latter son did not become so numerous as those of the former, and contain but two divisions, each of which consists of three clans or subdivisions. A feud having arisen between them and the descendants of Khizr, about a century ago, they separated from them, and subsequently took up their abode with their Karlarni kinsmen, the Khoghiani, and along with them they still continue to
dwell; but, in case their other kinsmen were engaged in a life and death struggle for independence, such as the present one is likely to be, they would, very probably, aid them. They are located around Gandamak—the place where the last sad scene of massacre was enacted in the disastrous retreat from Kabul in 1842—on the northern slopes of Spin Ghar, or the Safed Koh range, and are said to number 5,000 families.

Khizr had three sons, 1. Musa, who was known as the Darwesh or Devotee; 2. Mahmud; and 3. Mubarak. Musa had two sons: 1. Ahmad, and 2. Utman, who had three sons: 1. Mahmud, 2. Ibrahim, and 3. Walaey, who were the progenitors of the Mahmudzi, Ibrahimzi and Wali Khel. These again are subdivided into many branches. Ahmad, the eldest son of Musa, the Darwesh, is the progenitor of the Ahmadzi branch, which is, in consequence, accounted among them as the head or senior branch of the tribe. It contains two divisions, which are again subdivided into a number of clans or smaller sections. These descendants of Musa, the Darwesh, whom they all venerate as a saint, and whose tomb is at Nckzi, a village on the Tonchi river which flows through the dara'h or valley of Dawar, are known under the general designation of Darwesh Khel.

Mas'ud, son of Mahmud, son of Khizr, son of Wazir, had two sons, Ali, and Bahlul, whose descendants form the 'Alizi and Bahlulzi divisions. These again are subdivided into a great number of clans; and the whole of Mas'ud's descendants, who are very numerous, are known as the Mas'ud Waziris—not 'Mahsud': there is no such name among them—and may now almost be accounted a separate tribe.

Mubarak, the other son of Khizr, remaining to be noticed, had a son named Gurbuz, whose descendants, now numbering only about 1,500 families, have separated entirely from the rest of the Waziri tribe, and dwell in the elevated tract between the Shamal and Tonchi rivers, on the south-east boundary of the Khost district, about eight miles south of Segi, and east of Dawar, and immediately east of the Mughal M'la defile, on the road from Segi to Bannu, but adjoining the tract held by the Darwesh Khel branch. There the Gurbuz cultivate the available lands, for which in former times, they paid a small sum annually to the Durrani government.

The following tree will show the descent of the main branches of the Waziri Afghans here mentioned:
The Darwesh Khel dwell together, and the Mas'uds live separate from them, but, in some places their territories adjoin, or lie contiguous to each other. The former dwell chiefly in the northern and western parts of their country, and are nearest to Kohat and Bannu in British territory, on one side, and to Khost, Dawar, and the dara'h or valley of the S'haey or Right-hand Gumul (river) on the other. The Mas'uds dwell in the southern and eastern parts, and are near Bannu, Tak, and the dara'h or valley of the Gumul river, but they nowhere actually touch our border. Thus the Utmanzi branch of the Darwesh Khels is located farthest northeast, the Gurbuz farthest north-west, the Ahmadzi in the extreme south-western, and the Mas'uds in the south-eastern part of their possessions. Some few clans or sections of the Darwesh Khel became British subjects after the annexation of the Panj Ab (Panjab) territories in 1849, and took to agricultural pursuits; and others might in time, have followed their example, but for the present attempt to crush their independence in «true Circassian style.» Those who became subject to our rule, or apparently so—for they could retire into their hills and fastnesses when they chose—were responsible for the passes leading in and out of the tracts respectively occupied by them, and in advance of which, eastwards, in British territory, most of the lands they cultivated lay. Some of the Darwesh Khel, however, such as the Kabil Khel—not «Kabal» Khel—one of the four divisions of the Wali Khel, which is one of the three subdivisions of the Utmanzi, descended from Utman, son
of Musa, the Darwesh, and the Mas'ud division of the Waziris, had been, until within the last fifteen or twenty years, a perpetual source of trouble since the annexation of the Panj Ab (Panjab) territories. Such disturbances however take place on all borders, and ever will; and what have often been called Waziri «outrages,» have merely been reprisals for outrages on them on the part of portions of tribes under our rule, only, ordinary Britishers will not see this.

The Waziris dwell in an extensive tract of very mountainous country—about one hundred and twenty miles in length from north to south, and about eighty in breadth in its widest part—some of the strongest and most difficult in the Afghanistan, and, with few exceptions, as ilats or nomads. Their chief wealth consists of numerous flocks, and a vast number of cattle of different kinds. They pass their lives under their black tents chiefly, made from the hair of their goats, called Kijza'i in Pushto, and cultivate the available patches of land known as Kats (not «Kach,» as we find in maps and official reports), lying along the banks of the various streams and watercourses which run through their country, and in the defiles with which it abounds. Of agriculture they are generally ignorant.

They carry on a little trade with our frontier districts, and bring down the surplus produce of their hills, and take back fabrics for making clothes, salt, and a few other necessaries, but the tribe is quite able to support itself on the produce of the country it inhabits. There is no level ground in it, so to say, the country consisting of some of the highest spurs, ridges, and offshoots, on either side of the great eastern range of Mihtar Suliman, Koh-i-Siyah, Ghar, or Shu-al, or Shu-al Ghar, as it is called hereabouts. Wherever a small area is found capable of being cultivated it is brought under tillage, and is called by a separate name, generally the name of the clan or division who cultivate it.

They have iron mines in their country, near Makin and Babar Ghar, which have been worked for ages. The name of Aor-Mar is connected with this fact, but the particulars need not be related here; and they make exceedingly good swords and knives. They entertain an inveterate hatred towards the people of Hindustan.

This great tribe, hitherto, has been wholly independent, and has had neither tax nor tribute to pay, with the single exception of the Gurbuz, and has rendered allegiance to no one. Being divided into a number of branches, moreover, they do not acknowledge the authority of an hereditary, or of any single chief—which renders them less formidable than they otherwise might be—but have numerous head-men, who hold a little authority, and these are chosen with the consent of the division to which they belong; but when about to undertake a warlike expedition, a leader is elected, whom all implicitly obey. They are «Home Rulers» to the back bone, and consequently are entitled to the sympathy

(6) If the country of the Waziris should be annexed, we shall then be face to face with the Suliman Khel and Khorari Ghalzis, and the Jzadrarn Katlamis, who will raid, or be accused of raiding, like the Waziris, and then, after the same fashion, they must also be annexed, and so on ad infinitum.
of the party now in power. Much less internal disagreement exists among the Waziris than among the generality of Afghan tribes (or Home Rulers generally), and the consequence is, that, being more united, they are much more powerful. It is very certain that they know their own strength, and are proud of it.

They held a much greater extent of territory at the time of the annexation of the Panj Ab (Panjab) territories than they had done during the previous fifty or sixty years. They had then gained a footing in Bannu itself; and the Ahmadzis held lands in Bannu long before the Sikhs appropriated it, and used to pitch their black blanket tents therein in winter. Their country now extends from around Tal (not «Thal» nor «Thull», as in the maps) on the river of Kura'mah (vul. «Kurram»), in the Kohat district, and also in the thal, the arid, uncultivated tract of Bannu, known by that Hindi word, signifying dry, hard ground, and in which the Marwat Afghans dwell, the chief place of which is Laka'i. (There is a vast difference between the meaning of Pus'hto tal, and Hindi thal, for at Tal there is no want of water.) There is a tradition that this arid tract was once the bed of a vast lake. (See my «Notes on Afghanistan», etc., page 322, note J.) The Gambilah river flows through the middle of it.

The southern boundary of the Waziri country extends to the Gumul river, just before it enters the plain of the Dera'h-jat. Thus the country of the Waziris throughout its whole extent, consists of the main and subordinate parallel ranges, on the east and on the west, of the great eastern chain of Mihtar Suliman or Koh-i-Siyah, which is called, or rather is locally known as Shu-al, and Shu-al Ghar, and its spurs and cross ridges. These subordinate parallel ranges are much loftier on the eastern side of the main range than on the western, the country on that side being much more elevated. The south-eastern portion of this territory of the Waziris is that part of the great main eastern range of Mihtar Suliman, which, north of the Gumul, becomes somewhat disturbed, and bulges out considerably, so to say, to the westward, and meets other cross ranges from the north-west, and through its whole extent it is flanked on the east by the Koh-i-Surkh, Sor Ghar, or Rata Roh, which has been described at length in my «Notes» before referred to. The Waziri country, east of Warnah and (vul. «Wano») west of Tak, extends southwards to the banks of the Gumul river, but between the eastern boundary of the Waziris and Tak, a strip of hill country extends, part of the Koh-i-Surkh, Sor Ghar, or Rata Roh, about forty-five miles in length, and about eleven broad in its broadest part. It runs a little west of south to the Gumul, and in our maps is called the «Bhuttunnee Range,» and «Bittunee Hills,» because it is inhabited by part of the Afghan tribe of Baitni, and is properly known as the Baitni Hills. This tribe is very ancient, but insignificant in point of numbers, and used in former times, when I was on that frontier, to be styled the «jackals of the Waziris.» (7) On the north-west of the Waziri country, the main

7. These are the Patans—who wanted protection from the Afghans—the Waziris—referred to in the last April number, page 323, both being Afghans. These are «the powerful Bhittanni tribe» of the «Punjab Frontier Memorandum to the Secretary of State for India», dated October. 1876. This «powerful tribe» numbers less than 5,000.
range here throws off smaller parallel ridges, or waves, as they may be termed, which slope downwards towards the dara'h or valley of the Tonchi river, which separates the Mas'ud Waziri country from Warnah, the country of the Dotarni Lodis; and on the west, one of these parallel ranges, which is somewhat more elevated than the others on that side—for I am only attempting to describe the main features of the Waziri country—bounds the Dara'h of Warnah on the west, and separates it from the dara'h or valley through which the S'haey or Right-hand Gumul flows from north to south. Between these subordinate ranges on either side of the main range are still smaller dara'hs formed by cross ranges, such as these of Shaka'i, Dab, Hinda'i, Shpeshta'h (which signifies a «wedge» in Pushto), Badr, Sharanah, Kus'hto, etc., and some tracts of table land of no great extent, such as Sham and Razmak, Sherah-Tala'h, and others; and in these the Waziri tribe cultivate such land as is fit for tillage.

Some of the mountain tracts in the possession of this tribe are well weeded, and contain forests of pine of two or three descriptions, some of which is imported into the Dera'h-jat, as well as other forest trees, and some of lesser growth.

On the west the Waziri country touches that of the Suliman Khel and Kharoti Ghalzis; and there was a chance that, some day, they might come into contact with the first-named most numerous and most powerful of the Ghalzi Afghans, alone supposed to number over 100,000 families. It was on their account that the Waziris, powerful as they were, hesitated from extending farther westwards than Markha'h, in the upper part of the Tonchi Dara'h, into Farmul. Whether, in the present state of affairs, the Waziris may enter into closer relations with the Ghalzis, for mutual defence, remains to be seen.

Markha'h is rather less than nine miles from Kharoti, a place belonging to, and called after that tolerably powerful branch of the Ghalzi tribe, numbering about 5,000 families, and ten miles and a half from Urganhun, in the district of Farmul. The direction from Urganhun of these two places is about south-east inclining east, on the route from Ghaznih to the Bazar of Ahmad Khan, a mile and half from Bannu, and, in former times, its chief place. Margha'h lies on the north bank of the Tonchi river; and about twenty-four miles farther eastwards is Malakh where the Dawar territory commences, inhabited by other Karlarni tribes. Three miles and a half north-eastwards of Malakh is the Kalaey (village) of Ahmad Khan on the north bank of the Tonchi, and rather less than a mile east of that is Piran Shah, the name given to two or three villages of Pir-Zadahs, some descendants of Musa, the Danvesh, the progenitor of the Darwsh Khel division of the Waziris, and whom they venerated as their Spiritual Guide. These are on the south bank of the Tonchi, and one of them is named Khuzi (Khubzi?) and another Nekzi, and the tomb of the Pir is situated south of the last named place.

The northern boundary of the Waziri country is irregular. On one side the Waziris touch their kinsmen, the Jzadrarn branch of the Mangali Karlarnis, and, farther eastwards again, they are separated from Khost
by the range of mountains dividing it from the dara'h of the Tonchi, and, still farther east lies Dawar before referred to. All their neighbours in that direction, it will be observed, are Karlarnis like themselves, without exception; indeed, all the Karlarnis adjoin each other. There are about 20,000 families in Dawar alone.

It must be remembered that the Waziris being pastoral and nomadic, and only visiting some places in the winter season, have few or no villages, but live scattered about, a few families together, and mostly in kijzda'is or black tents made of the hair of their goats, and in mat or grass huts; but, in some places, among the Mas'ud Waziris chiefly, they have dwellings, partly hollowed out of the steep hill-sides, which are roofed over, and some have two or three roofs or storeys, and this, imperfectly understood, has led some persons away with the idea that they live in caves! Makin is their principal village, or rather, a cluster of small villages in the dara'h or valley of that name. This is their principal village or town, and the only one it may be said; for Karni Gram (the «Kanigaram» «Kanigaram,» etc., of the maps and of «Gazetteers») although in one of the darah's or valleys within their territory, and where they hold their jirga'hs, or tribal assemblies, it is, or was, a town belonging to the Aor-Mar tribe of Afghans, the descendants of that same Aor-Mar, one of whose sons, 'Abd-ullah, adopted Karlarnaey, from whom the Waziris are descended, as before recorded. It lies about ten miles S.S.W. of Makin, and about forty-three N.W. of Tak. The Aor-Mars are an ancient tribe of the Afghans, and once possessed the whole of the country round about, but were, in course of time, ousted from all else besides their Karni Gram, or «Stone Town,» as the words signify, by their Karlarni kinsmen, the Waziris. Two or three successive seasons of scarcity in recent years have led the few remaining Aor-Mars for the most part to abandon Karni Gram, and to take up their abode among the Wardags, with whom also they are by blood connected, as previously shown. The Wardags dwell in the dara'h or valley of S'hniz, situated between Kabul and Ghaznih. They inhabited the south-west corner of the taman or district of Bangas'h in Akbar-Badshah's reign, near the tract still held by their Jzadrarn kinsmen. The Wardags were then strong, and were assessed as liable to furnish 500 cavalry and 5,500 infantry for militia purposes. S'hniz was then held by Mughal people, the remainder of those mings, or hazarahs, or military colonies, which the Mughal rulers used to locate on their frontier districts, and the remainders of which mings still continue to dwell farther west.

The Dara'h of Warnah, (8) which is of considerable elevation, slopes downwards towards the Dara'h of the Gumul river, and adjoins the south-west corner of the Waziri territory. It lies north of the Sherani Afghan territory, previously annexed, as noticed in my paper on the «Independent Afghan or Patan Tribes.» It was from the Gumul side of Warnah that the «delimitation process» was commenced upon the country of the Dotarni Lodi tribe, and it was on the Spin, in its southern

8 It is neither called «Wanah», nor «Wano», but the word inflected becomes Warno.
part, that some of the Waziri, and others probably, indulged in what is dear to all Afghans—a night attack upon their enemies—the delimitation force of 2,500 men of all arms—a force as numerous as General Sir C. J. Napier, C.C.B., had for the conquest of Sind—on the night, or early morning, of November 3d last. (9) There was, however, another little army of the same strength not far off to support the first one if necessary.

Warnah is about thirty miles long from north to south, and about from ten to fourteen miles in breadth. A stream, known as the Spin, a feeder of the Gumul, runs through it from north towards the south, and unites with the main stream near Kot-ka'i, one of the halting places of the powandah caravans on the Ghwayi Lari route to Ghaznih.

This small tract of territory belongs to the Dotarnis, who are descended from the Mati branch of the Afghans, from an adopted son of Ibrahim—son of Shaikh Bait, or Baitnaey, the progenitor of the Baitni tribe—surnamed Lo-e-daey, from constant use abbreviated into Lodaey. It was the Lodi tribe which gave the only Patan Sultans to Hindustan, who were six in number. The great powandah or nomad merchant tribe, the Nuharni, now chiefly known as Luharni (vul. «Lohani» and «Lohanee,» etc.), the Niazis, Siarnis, and other Lodis dwelling around, therefore, are kinsmen of the Dotarnis. The latter are, for the most part, powandahs also, and deal in some of the richest and most expensive fabrics carried by those nomadic merchants, who, with two or three exceptions, are only portions of Afghan tribes, who follow mercantile pursuits. The Dotarni tribe is very small, not more than about two hundred families in all, but they hold their own, or did up to this period of time, in Warnah tenaciously.

The land therein is good, particularly that lying nearest the to'e or stream, which can be irrigated therefrom, and which constitutes about a fourth of what is capable of cultivation. This tract is very sultry in summer, and from the tortures of a vast number of mosquitoes but little rest is obtainable in any part of it.

The Dotarnis dwell in the central part of the dara'h, and there they have a walled village, formerly of some strength for those parts, which is sometimes called the kala' or fort of Warnah, but, of course, it was not a fort in a military point of view. About a third of this little tribe cultivate the lands around it, and the rest follow mercantile pursuits, as before mentioned, and only return at certain times of the year.

The other parts of the Warna'h Dara'h, north and east, are held by the

9. A few weeks ago we were told that there was «no likelihood of the Waziris offering any resistance to the Delimitation Commission»; but, as soon as the news arrived that they had, a leading article appears in a daily paper, that «No surprise need be felt at the news of severe fighting on the Afghan frontier... They received a lesson which may possibly secure the Delimitation Commission from further molestation», etc. We have just been informed, in a communication received through «Reuter's Agency» (Nov. 26), that, «hitherto the Waziris had been regarded as a cowardly race»... Those who thought so will change their minds, possibly now; and we are also told, that «if the attacking force had only waited for the junction of 2,000 allied tribesmen, the fight might have entailed a grave reverse to British arms... We shall hear more of «allied tribesmen» yet, unless we abandon our career of wholesale annexation of other people's territory.»
Ahmadzi branch of the Darwesh Khel Waziris; and the Zali Khel clan or section of that branch, which are generally the assailants of powandah caravans, always dwell therein. It is probable that it was with these that the delimitation forces came in contact. The other Waziris only resort to Warnah in the summer season with their flocks and cattle, as do likewise a few of the Daoulat Khel powandahs, who being Nuharnis, are Lodis like the Dotarnis; and some of the Sulimani Khel Ghalzi tribe also come into Warnah. The annexation force may come into contact with them likewise, and possibly have an early morning visit from them.

Although so powerful, the Waziris have not dispossessed the Dotarnis, whom they appear to hold in considerable respect. Perhaps they have other good reasons for leaving them unmolested.

The Dotarnis made some considerable figure in India during the time of the Patan or Afghan rulers; and numbers of them are to be found there. At the beginning of this century many were to be found in the Dakhân, and southern India, in the Balari (vul. «Bellary»), Karappah (vul. «Cuddapah»), and adjoining districts of the Madras Presidency, as well as Baitnis, Dilazaks, Sheranis, Parnis, and other Afghan tribes, and there their descendants still continue to dwell.

The Jani Khel branch of the Wali Khel Utmanzi Waziris, who cultivate lands around the fortified post of that name, between the Khaserah and Kahuian, passes, and near which some 6,000 Waziris are reported to be assembled, have, or had, nominees in our frontier militia, as well as other Waziris. The Jani Khel, and Malik Shah-i Wali Khel, Utmanzi cultivate lands within the British border, while others only cross the border in the cold season. Such as do are responsible, along with the Jani Khel, for the Khaserah, Khasorah, Kushto or Sukto (vul. «Shakhdoo») and Kahuian Passes, leading into Bannu. Some of them cultivate lands in front of the Passes in question, and the Wuruki or Wurki branch of the Jani Khel occupy the Khasorah Pass. If all the Waziris are not determined to fight for the general welfare of the tribe, they will not sacrifice these lands, but if they have made up their minds to fight, they will. Some restlessness exists among them as it is.

As we had entered into such a good understanding with the present Afghan government, we should have allowed time to soften down the asperities that have existed between us and the Patan or Afghan tribes, who, from the time of the first Afghan war, and since the annexation of the Panj Ab territories, and especially from our acts of late years in the search of a «scientific frontier,» have all entertained the suspicion, and with good reason, as it has turned out, of our foregone intention of seizing their country, and interfering with their independence, notwithstanding all the statements to the contrary made in Parliament and at Banquets. If left alone, these independent border tribes, would, by degrees, have become obedient to their natural head—and would have been an invaluable source of strength to him—the ruler of the Afghan state, of which we pretend we are so very anxious to preserve
the integrity, while at the very same time we are doing our utmost to disintegrate it! Or, the tribes might have become obedient to our rule, although there was the probability of their preferring, as is but natural, a Muhammadan government and ruler of the same blood and religion as themselves.

The Waziri tribe has always been tenacious and jealous of its independence as far as we are concerned, observing, doubtless, our never ceasing encroachments upon the possessions of others from the very first. How many expeditions have had to be undertaken against the Kabil Khel and Mas'ud Waziris alone, and at what cost of men and money! Yet we cry out against the Russians doing the same thing on the other side of the Afghan state, though we humbly submit to it. The treatment of the Sheranis, inoffensive cultivators, alluded to in my former paper, and the intention to annex the country, and destroy the independence, of the Waziris and the Dotarnis by main force, is just what the Russians did at Marw, and at Panj Dih and Badghais. The Waziris cannot solicit them to send a «Boundary Commission» to meet the «Delimitation Commission»; so I suppose the Russians will help themselves to another slice of Afghan territory on the other side (10).

What is called the «forward policy» whether as regards the Afghan state, or Baluchistan, or in Dardistan, and parts around, has been to crush the small independent states between ourselves and a big neighbour, and thus break down the barrier that nature and history had created for the defence and preservation of India proper, whilst the authors of it at home are knocking their own country into atoms.

The Waziris have been quieter for some years past than ever they were before since 1849; but, now that they have been roused, and another assemblage of the tribe is said to be posted on the Bannu side of their country, and «daring» to threaten it, we shall see how strong a force will be required at that point. Besides this, there are many more Waziris, and many more points that they can threaten. What will all this cost India in its present impoverished state? But what matter? Must not enterprising young «Politicals,» and other officers be rewarded with C.S.I., and other decorations?

Now as to «the frontier tribes» who make such «admirable soldiers,» who «in many cases have shown a devoted attachment to the British officers with whom they have been associated.» A recent telegram (Nov. 20, 1894), runs as follows:—

«FIGHTING ON THE AFGHAN FRONTIER»

«It is reported from Bombay on excellent authority that there is strong ground for the belief that the Waziris' recent attack upon the British force at Wano, on the Afghan frontier, was led by deserters from the 20th Punjaub Infantry, and that an ex-havildar was actually engaged in the assault. A number of rifles and horses looted during the attack have been traced to men who had previously deserted from the Indian Army.»

There are a number of men of this tribe in the Indian army, and I fear

10. The following appeared in the St. Petersburg «Ske Viodomoski», the day after the telegram of the delimitation force in Warnah: «Any occupation of Afghanistan by Great Britain would be followed by a corresponding Russian movement.» The Waziri country is the very heart of Afghanistan; so the Afghan government is likely to have a lively time of it, if no now, in the early future.
we shall hear of many more desertions; but what else could we expect? Ever since the rebellion in the N.W. Provinces, called the Mutiny, whereby a civilian party government in England, dependent on every election wind, succeeded at last in getting the sole control of the finances of India, which it had so long coveted with greedy eyes, and over the territories and troops of the East India Company, the constant endeavour has been to tear down, tinker, and spoil everything built up by that Company, and to make the native troops as inefficient as possible, by taking away from them what they most required—their own European officers—who knew their men, and whom their men knew, and turn the whole into «Irregulars,» at the advice of some inexperienced official, who had «Irregulars» on the brain. They have succeeded but too well; and they have at last, after working for thirty-six years, attained the acme of their desires, in just now putting the finishing touch to the breaking up of the armies of the three Presidencies.

Latterly it has been the fashion to enlist foreign mercenaries—we English have always been fond of such from the time of sending legions of Hessians to America to fight our battles—the plea being the difficulty of obtaining recruits. I know the time when for every one required, five or six suitable Indian recruits could at once have been got, but under the new order of things, and the never ceasing vexatious innovations, all this has been destroyed, and good natives will not enlist. The resource, therefore, is to enlist foreign mercenaries from among the Afghans—«the frontier tribes,» and other alien races, who, in an emergency, a case of reverse, or for any grievance real or imaginary, can, at any time, be «over the border and away,» taking their arms with them. During the very last Afghan war, some of these foreign mercenaries did so. Who are likely to be faithful to us, such men, or our own subjects, whose fathers, grandfathers, and greatgrandfathers have served in our ranks, and whose families and homes are in our midst? Some will say, «that all this failed in the Mutiny.» This was not the case; some of the Native troops were spoiled by bad management, and the forcing upon the East India Company, too often, of old, worn-out, and sometimes nearly blind generals, and by undermining the authority of commanding officers of Regiments.

Rome was lost through the enlistment of, and dependence on, barbarian mercenaries, and the setting aside of the native people, who thereby lost their fighting qualities. Let not India be lost from the same causes.

English people are fond of enlarging upon their patriotism and love of freedom, and they suppose seemingly, that they alone possess these feelings but I think that, if they try to crush the freedom of these 500,000 Afghans, they will find them endowed with the very virtues that we claim as our monopoly, but then they are neither Bulgarians nor Armenians.

Unceasing lamentations are made on the killing of a couple of coal strikers, who excite thousands like themselves to destruction of life and property; Commissions of Inquiry sit thereon, and a great stir is
made, but in case a few thousand Waziris should be killed by us, that is merely done to show our love for them, and that we have "not the slightest intention of interfering with the independence of these tribes," "not to attempt any territorial aggression," "nor attempt an extension of the frontier of India further than it is at present." (Sir John Gorst, Under Secretary of State for India, House of Commons, August, 1891.)
We are confronted by the inevitable consequences of the Durand Treaty, to whatever portion of the Amir's frontier it has been applied, wisely or the reverse. It is not a document complete in itself or self-explanatory, except in so far as it refers to an attached detailed Map, the original of which has not been produced and mistakes in which had to be corrected in the subsequent Udny arrangement. It is not based on any natural topographical, ethnographical or political principle of delimitation and leaves much to future boundary Commissioners, but it indicates what tribes or portions of tribes (like the Mohmands and Waziris) were to be considered as under the influence of Kabul and India respectively. As Sir Mortimer, however, himself in a very clear and straightforward manner pointed out in an «interview» the other day, the tribes on the Indian side are not to be considered as within British territory. They are simply under our influence in the technical sense of the term, that is to say, so far as the Amir is concerned and so far as they submit to our influence or we exert it. This disposes of the charge of certain recalcitrant tribes being «rebels» to our rule and so far deserving of condign punishment. Still, the Durand Treaty was a hasty document, arrived at by a «coup de main» rather than «de maitre,» but it was considered to be a triumph of Imperial policy. Experienced Panjab Officers, who alone were really competent to foresee its results, were filled with alarm. Indeed, all those whose interests are rather in the peace of the border than in personal glory have all along condemned any, and every, extension of «the Forward Policy.» In its random indications to the Mohmand, Kafir and other countries, the Durand Treaty showed local misconceptions, but, in a glimmer of political foresight, it reserved the Bashgal Valley to British influence. The fears of the Chitral campaign, if not the attitude of the Amir, induced us to surrender this Valley also to Afghanistan by the subsequent equally hasty Udny arrangement, which similarly shows a want of local knowledge. Wherever the Durand Treaty has been applied, twice in Kafiristan, twice in Swat, now in the demarcation of the Mohmand country, (though both its Afghan and British portions still acknowledge the Khan of Lalpura), it is leading to complications. Wherever even its indirect influence is exerted, as on the Afghan-Baluchistan border, it naturally rouses the suspicion of the Amir. Wherever the «Forward Policy» constructs or contemplates a military road, which is a breaking down of physical and tribal bulwarks for the sole possible benefit of a conjectural invader of India, there are risings and rumours of risings. This is why the hitherto friendly Afridis have turned against us, for, seeing that we stayed in Swat after our solemn pledge to evacuate it, in order to
construct and maintain a military road to Chitral, their confidence in our good faith is destroyed and they feel that their turn will come next. Indeed, rumours had already reached them of our intention to construct a military road through the Khyber, in which they were to work rather as labourers, than as its trusted guardians in alliance with the powerful English. Hence the emeute of a tribe, whose effective utilization in the Khyber Rifles was suggested by the Panjab Government, adopted, with some modifications, by that of Lord Ripon, and carried out by the local influence of Colonel Warburton. How could the would-be spokesman of Pathans, the Afridi, lag behind, when even the Swati, «the woman of the Pathan,» the parasite on the immemorial Yaghistan trade though his country, the chronicles of which can be traced for many hundred years, had turned against us? (1) It is now the fashion of popularity-hunting writers to describe the Swatis as heroes, whom only Alexander the Great had conquered, in order to show, by implication, how much finer the British soldier (generally a native of India) must be. In 1870 I dug up and first named «graeco-buddhistic» sculptures on the Swat border, aided by 4 Guides and surrounded by Swatis, where 4000 soldiers now cannot keep the peace. Yet as late as September 1897 the existence of these sculptures is telegraphed from Swat as a testimony, it would appear, to our bravery and enlightenment!

The Orakzais wish to avenge themselves for the occupation of Samana and certain commanding positions just inside their territory, (2) whilst the Waziris perennially expect a «punitive expedition.» It is not two years ago that Imperial conquerors, in «the glorious campaign» that gave us Waziristan in name, were decorated, whereas in former years it was left to the subordinates of a Deputy Commissioner to keep the Waziris in order. No more can be done with them than with the Hindu-Kush vulture whom they resemble in their distant and separate hursts. The Maizar trouble, it has been said, was «got up» in order to strengthen our occupation of independent territory, but this seems unlikely as the troops never expected to fight, had no service ammunition, and simply took with them what they carried in cantonment. Inquiry should rather be made into the report that the trouble was due to our fining Maizars for a transgression of other villages, one of whose Malikis, our ally, and not the Maizaris, fed us when the alleged treacherous firing of the Maizaris on our troops took place. Any story will do against an Afghan or Pathan tribe, although it may be as honest, truthful and peaceloving as is that of Buneyr. We are now also nibbling at their country, as if it were actually intended to have the whole frontier in a blaze from Quetta to Kohat and along the once «scientific frontier.» The Buneyri is not, naturally, a foe of the British. He gave

(1) The native manuscript material in my possession since 1867 regarding the Pathan countries will, I hope, also throw light on this subject.

(2) The posts were fixed by the preux chevalier General Lockhart, a fact which is sufficient to dispose of the charge brought in some papers that they were retained by an act of bad faith. Still, as the very competent civilian, C. T. Thornburn, says on page 210 of his invaluable «Asiatic Neighbours»: «We have permanently locked up in unimportant positions regular troops, who in war time could be better employed elsewhere. A large and unnecessary charge it added to the already heavy military expenditure of the Government of India, and a perpetual grievance is created which will embitter the Orakzais against us for all time.»
us no trouble after the Ambeyla campaign in 1863, but, like the Afridi, this Pathan Boeotian is astonished at our breach of faith with Swat, and is now alarmed at his own probable fate.

Our retirement all along the invaded parts to our former Panjab frontier of safety and dominance, only injured by a forward policy, would not affect our prestige with the tribes. They are accustomed alike to punitive expeditions and to our retirements, once the punishment is inflicted. They know that better articles of food and dress can be obtained in our territory, where winter is propitious and in many parts of which they possess cattle and fields. They know we are immensely stronger than themselves and they have no ambition to demonstrate the contrary. They have no cohesion among themselves and no desire of annexation, but they believe in the strength of their mountains as ever protecting their independence. Long may this belief last! It is alone compatible with their value as soldiers in our army and as our allies against foreign invasion. Just as the waves of the sea occasionally dash against a shore, without injuring it, so many a tribe, or rather a few young bloods in it, commit an ill deed on our plains, without entailing the necessity of a more than localized or personal punishment. Even when we were unsuccessful in the objects of expeditions against tribes, they have never presumed on such failures, for all they really want, as separate communities, is to be left alone. A Pathan has quite enough to do to guard himself against his own neighbour or the hostility of an adjacent tribe, to think of national prestige, a Forward Policy, a scientific frontier, a civilizing mission or even the subjugation of the Kafirs generally at the dictation of either the Sultan of Turkev or of the Kabul Amir.

Now come the tribal Mullahs, who are supposed to have preached a Jihad or holy war against the invading British Kafir or infidel. That any war may be holy in defence of a nation's independence and religion against an invader is admitted also in other, than Afghan, countries, but, beyond that general impression, the tribal risings have only occurred when we have encroached on a tribe, though, as it happens that we are not Muhammadans, this further stimulus of Jihad offers a rallying cry or consolation for meeting death to the attacked. So far the local Mullah, like some Christian priest, may even lead in the defence, but he is not pleased, as a rule, at this addition to his already too heavy duties—which we may not only call spiritual, parochial and educational, but also judicial. Wars increase, for instance, the cases of inheritance that have to be settled and sorely tax his time and secular attainments, as the Muhammadan Law on the division of property pays attention to arithmetical, if not mathematical, rules. Anyhow, the local Mullah's interest is to preserve the peace among his turbulent fellow-tribesmen and this he can only do by his better and wiser conduct. In some centres, such as Cabrial, which supply Mullahs to less regenerate parts, the carrying of arms or the erection of a fort is strictly prohibited, for piety and learning are, or should be, sufficient safeguards. Indeed, I have known many pious tribal Mullahs, whose lives and labours would be an example to believing Christians. They
are not greedy and their services as judges or priests are, in general, unpaid, except by occasional presents, perhaps, of a bit of cloth and some food. As exponents, however, of popular feeling, the Mullahs find its expression opposed in localities where State servility or obedience to Chiefs is beginning to take the place of the Muhammadan «equality,» which is only controlled by religion and the traditions of tribal honor. Thus in Dir, and to a certain extent in Nawagai, and now throughout Kabul, cautious attempts are made to identify the religious, with the secular, power with the view of gradually making the Mullahs servants of the rular rather than independent exponents of religion and spokesmen of the wants of the people. This state of things is made use of by itinerant preachers who travel through Kabul, Yaghistan, and often visit India. They have, as a rule, fewer responsibilities or scruples, but more knowledge of the world and eloquence than the local Mullah, though the apostle of Hadda has given the Amir quite as much trouble as to us, not excepting that wanderer, the «mad» or rather «perfervid» «Fakir.» The Amir's pamphlet on the conquest of Kafiristan hints at what may be hoped for in the subjugation of Kafirs generally by subordination to a Muhammadan ruler of Abdurrahman's orthodoxy. A defective translation of it, which was somewhat corrected in this Review, appeared in an Anglo-Indian newspaper, but I have since received the Persian original, the perusal of which leaves no doubt on my mind that, if it be possible that a common feeling could ever move Pathan tribes against infidels generally, it would be the conquest by the Amir of the Kafirs of the Hindukush «the brethren of the English.» But from this favorable impression as regards the Amir the step to a «Jihad» is still very far. I have shown in a pamphlet written more than ten years ago how «the doctrinal» greater Jihad, or «strenuous effort» is the worship of God, self-control, obedience to parents and moral precepts and only the lesser Jihad, is a war against infidels if they turn out Muhammadans from their homes because they are Muhammadans. Other conditions such as a common leadership of «the faithful» and a strong probability of success are also required which, in the Mullah's opinion, in the most unlikely case of the tribe considering such an abstract question, would be wanting in a war against the English by Pathans who acknowledge no superior and have no common leader. I hope that the pamphlet to which I refer will soon be circulated in Turkish, Arabic, Persian and Hindustani editions, for a disquisition of the intricate question of Jihad from a strictly orthodox standpoint tends to remove religious fanaticism in its consideration. The Amir's «strengthening of religion» = the Taqwim-ud-din', (3) includes a chapter on

(3) Really a CATECHISM, or «ALMANACH OF RELIGION.» This title almost suffices to indicate its character. It is a popular treatise and only so far controversial as it, not quite fairly, attacks the Wahhābīs. It confirms my view of the tendency in Afghanistan towards a monarchical, rather than the existing democratic, Muhammadan Theocracy of which it is implied that the secular ruler, rather than Mullahs, is the best responsible representative. It is, however, a great mistake to suppose that the Amir encourages the notion of the ruler being a non-Muhammadan, such as would appear to be the case from the slovenly or misleading translations of some extracts from the work that have been recently quoted in the English Press from a Panjab paper. For instance, the alleged passage from the Koran on the subject is: «Obey God, his apostle and the rulers amongst them whatever religion they profess» whereas the real passage runs as follows: «O ye who believe! Obey God and obey the apostle, and those in authority amongst you», the believers obviously, so that the whole addition alleged to be in
Jihad in the more restricted sense of a «holy war,» with the object of promoting a more accurate knowledge of the subject by, and among, the Mullahs, whom he had invited to meet him from all parts of Afghanistan, but it is no special, or immediate, appeal to a united movement in favor of the faith. The Government should long have obtained a copy of it for its own satisfaction, if not to allay the suspicions of half-educated writers, who in this literary performance of the Amir saw an attack on the British power. Yet there can be no doubt that the position of the Amir, as a theologically-minded Chief and one who had added long-coveted Kafiristan to the domain of Islam, is naturally becoming a leading one among all Muhammadans and that it would be unreasonable to expect him to abdicate such a position, which, in certain eventualities, may even become of the greatest service to British interests and, in any case, is now inseparable from his services to the Muslim faith.

The alleged intrigues of the «Indian fanatics» also count for nothing in the tribal risings. The settlements at Malka and Sitana, I believe, are destroyed and were never looked on with favor by the superstitious Pathans. The Patna and other Indian refugees were severe Puritans, hating all veneration of saints, and it was very absurd to identify them with the alleged intrigues of the late Akhund of Swat, himself a saint. I remember an Arab once being brought to me for report by Colonel B. and a strong police escort as a Wahabi acting under the orders of the Akhund to stir up Indian disaffection. I offered him coffee and a chibuk, of which he readily partook, thereby disposing of his Wahabism; he turned out to be a servant of the shrine of Medina, for which he was collecting subscriptions. Another, a Persian, was accused of a libel on the Empress, the «Kaisar-i-Hind» or «Caesar of India.» Enquiry proved it to be a translation of Shakespeare’s «Julius Caesar.» Many more instances may be cited to show the confusion among our authorities regarding even elementary questions that require a knowledge of the native language or polity concerned. Yet such knowledge is a sine qua non condition for government.

I do not, however, deny that the echoes of the Turkish slaughters of Armenians and Greeks, in the face of the Christian Powers, may have had an effect on the Panjab Frontier tribes. It is, however, of the very weakest description. I remember that in 1866, when I discovered the races and languages of Dardistan, the papers were full of alleged Russian intrigues in the direction of the countries bordering on the Pamirs. I did not find a Gilgiti, Chitrali, Hunza, Nagyri, or other Dard, who the badd «whatever religion they profess» is an afterthought. It is true that a Muhammadan under a ruler of a different religion is bound by his faith to obey that ruler, but the object of the Amir’s work is obviously not to teach our Muhammadans to obey us, but the Afghans to obey him, as a pious and powerful secular Head of the Muhammadan religion in an Afghanistan united against all invaders, especially infidels, who invokes the divine favour more particularly for the worldly and spiritual benefit of his own Afghan subjects. The work is able and wise, but it does not pretend to be, and is not, an exhaustive work on the Muhammadan faith. I hope to have an opportunity of analyzing it in a future number of this Review and of pointing out, with every deference to the Amir, where its raison d’être has, perhaps, affected its literal accuracy, and has limited its notions of Jihad to the technical and subordinate use of that term as an equivalent for «holy war.»
had ever heard the name of «Rus» or Russian, and many Pathans thought of «Rum» or «Turkey» as a bird. Yet it cannot be doubted that the rise, or dominance, of a Muhammadan power gives satisfaction to all Muhammadans, especially to those under «infidel» rule, but from this platonic feeling to revolt against it is a very long step. It is in India itself that the propaganda in favour of the Sultan of Turkey, so far as it departs from a reasonable and commendable sympathy with co-religionists, who ought to be our natural allies, may, under circumstances, be inconvenient to British rule. As a long resident in Turkey, I am aware that the spiritual pretensions of the «Khalifa» have largely grown since the accession of the present Sultan and that in many Indian mosques where prayers used to be, most legitimately, offered to «the ruler for the time being, and may God render him favourable to Muhammadans.» the Khutba or preacher’s address is now pronounced in the name of Sultan Hamid as Khalifa of the Faithful. How far this pretension is well-founded is a matter which I have already endeavoured to analyze in a long letter in the «Times» of 2nd January 1884 and in several papers in «the Asiatic Quarterly Review.» and it is to them that I would refer any student of the subject. Suffice it to say here, that, although not «a perfect Khalifa» because not of Koreish descent and for other reasons, which it is unnecessary to mention, I consider him to fall into the next category of «an imperfect Khalifa» or «Khalifa nāqis» because he has an army which enables him to enforce his secular decrees. He is a «Defender» of his faith, as Her Majesty the Queen is of ours, without being, thereby, a really spiritual head, for he has no power to alter a single rite, much less a dogma, of his, the Sunni, form of Islam. Still, in proportion as his claims receive the «consensus fidelium» in India, they are of alike secular and spiritual weight and have to be considered, although it should not be forgotten that the mutiny of 1857 followed closely on the support which the «Ingliz dinsiz» or the «irreligious English» had given to Turkey in 1854-56 against Russia.

The relations of the Sultan with the Amir, if any exist, I take to be purely formal and such as befit the de facto Khalifa of all Sunnis and a ruler of that denomination who teaches Islam and has added to its domain. The fact that the Shahzada did not visit Constantinople is significant. No doubt, in a certain Viceroy’s time, the Sultan sent an Envoy to the then Amir in connection with a scheme for a Jihad against a Northern power, but tempora mutantur and both Sultan and Amir have changed in them.

I trust that there will be no severe punishment inflicted on tribes that fight for their freedom and that the conquered may not be disarmed, for such a course, as in the case of the weaponless Kashmiris, would render them effeminate in course of time and would, more immediately, destroy their ability to assist us against a possible foreign invader. The high Pathan Code of Honor appreciates a Giant not using his strength and if we treat the tribes generously we shall gain their friendship, which is the avowed object of the Forward Policy. To add blood on blood, by making a severe example of them, as some suggest, is, on
the contrary, making our breach with them irreparable and, unless our prestige is that of a tyrant, is not strengthening our power as a nation of freemen representing, on the frontier as in India and elsewhere, principles of liberty, humanity and justice. The recent departures from these principles are undermining our rule in India as they are alienating our adherents in all the countries of Europe which, on that account, can now, with more safety, combine against us. The panic of an imaginary invader which has driven us into sending 42,000 troops against a few swarms of tribal flies has, it is stated, already cost sixty millions since the initiation of the Forward Policy. Less than a tenth of the stated number or amount would, under the Panjab Government, have kept the Frontier quiet for that period and it is to that Government and to local knowledge that the Frontier should be restored. Otherwise, it is impossible to estimate how many more men would be required and how much more money would be wanted when the foe, for whose benefit alone we should create an eternal blood-feud between ourselves and the intervening tribes, really meets us on the other side of the Indus. In a Panjab status quo ante he could never come so far, but, with the continuance of the present Imperialism, a resistless and bankrupt India must be the result of a policy, called «forward» but really most «backward», which sacrifices her revenues on an unnecessary and ever-growing military expenditure, instead of devoting them to the development of her resources and the advancement, intellectual and material, of her population.

To sum up, in my humble opinion, the present disturbances are mainly, if not solely, caused by our obtruding military roads and posts in tribal territories hitherto recognized as independent. A military occupation which is so strong as to absolutely preclude any attempt at internal risings or even an annexation involving complete civil administration, were it possible, would be intelligible, though most reprehensible and eventually more disastrous, but the present policy is neither a military occupation nor annexation. It is simply that small posts are dotted about scarcely accessible regions, and with little or no inter-communication, for the purpose of «dominating» the tribes. In the event of an outbreak these posts may be just able to defend themselves, but they certainly cannot suppress it, till relief comes from India. The present weak and faulty disposition, and the inevitable dispersion, of our troops, actually invited the recent tribal attacks and will ever do so, as a stronger and more effective occupation is, practically, impossible, owing to the area to be held, the distances to be traversed, and the limits of the Indian Exchequer, which makes such «a game not worth the candle» even were its ostensible object —the defence of India against a foe from the North—promoted as it is really defeated—by holding in any force the intervening countries.
THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN AND GREAT BRITAIN

By Dr. G. W. Leitner

Whatever may have been the effect of the mission of Sir Mortimer Durand in strengthening the friendship between the Amir of Afghanistan and Great Britain, it is certain that it only made assurance doubly sure. It was Lord Lytton who first conceived the brilliant idea of attaching Sirdar Abdurrahman to Great Britain when a telegram of Reuter informed the world of the present Amir’s arrival at Balkh. Though loosed upon us by the Russians, I think we can help or hurt him more easily than Russia wrote the Viceroy in January 1880 to one of his Lieutenant-Governors when suggesting this moment for very advantageous negotiations with Abdul Rahman. Among the reason for sending Mr. (now Sir) Lepel Griffin to Kabul was the necessity for securing a master-mind to carry out a master-stroke of policy, should the opportunity for it arrive in his opinion. It is well-known with what success this experienced political officer carried out his delicate task, how he cleared by his negotiations with the tribal Chiefs the road for General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar which Sir Donald Stewart had previously cleared with his sword and how they closed our last Afghan campaign with the proclamation of the installation of an independent Amir on the ‘God-given’ Throne of Afghanistan whom they had made a friend of Great Britain.

I can testify to the depth and sincerity of a friendship, suggested by Lord Lytton and so happily formed by the action of Sir Lepel Griffin and Sir Donald Stewart. It was at Rawulpindi in March 1885 that I heard and saw the Amir Abdurrahman proffer his sword in public Durbar to fight any enemy of Great Britain. Great was the consternation of politicals and greater the opportunity then lost in leaving Panjdeh unredressed and in checking Russia’s progress towards India for ever. Lord Dufferin, who succeeded Lord Lytton in India as he has succeeded him in France, reconciled the ‘poor Amir’ to the loss of prestige and Panjdeh, then, as now, relying on the promises of Russia and on his diplomatic relations with her Czar and statesmen. But it is idle to ignore that this most charming companion to those whom it is to his interest to attach, cemented, if possible, the already existing friendship of the Amir even where he cooled its ardour [...] 

It is therefore historically incorrect to allege, as some papers and persons have done, that the friendship of the Amir is due to Sir Mortimer Durand or to Lord Lansdowne. Much less is due to any European letter-carrier or workman who may claim credit for removing a hostility that never existed. The friendship of the Amir for England had never wavered for a moment, even if there were
amantium" in consequence of certain misunderstandings and encroachments and the mistaken proposal of sending Lord Roberts to explain them at the head of a force which in Afghanistan would be considered almost an army of occupation. To the military advisers of the Indian Office we are indebted for suggesting a «give-and-take» mission, like that of Sir M. Durand has proved to be. The Amir had the happy thought of sending a letter and messenger direct to the Viceroy instead of continuing to be puzzled by what passes as Persian in our Foreign Department, and Lord Lansdowne had the good sense to avail himself of an opportunity to conclude his reign with some glory by the mis-en-scène of what could not help being a successful mission.

The Amir, and the Amir only, in this matter, as throughout his life, is the author of his fortune. A strong man in every sense of the term, endowed with an iron will and honest in speech and purpose, he threw in his lot with us in 1880 and has remained true to us ever since. To almost incredible provocations and misrepresentations in the Jingo Press of England and India, as to the mistakes or meddlesomeness of politicans, he has replied with a serenity, firmness and completeness that have converted foes into friends. At the very time when it was falsely stated in the Press and on platforms that he was hostile to us and that therefore a Mission to him was necessary, he wrote to me in terms which show how sincere and unruffled was his friendship for this country. I publish his letter because he asks me to thank those who have advocated his cause in the Press and because it is better that we should know, in his own words—six weeks before Sir M. Durand reached Kabul—what are his feelings towards Great Britain than to be informed of them at second-hand. Finally the letter, as a literary production, is very characteristic of a man whose pen is as sharp as his sword and among whose qualities is thoroughness in everything, great or small, down to finding out the titles and other particulars of correspondents. As to his possible visit to England, though I may have suggested it, there seem to be great difficulties in the way which mainly arise from dynastic and other political considerations and which also affect the sending of his sons to this country. There are also objections as to entourage and the exploitation generally of Oriental potentates in Europe, into which I will not enter, but which have the effect of lessening their respect for us and our civilization and thus frustrating the very object of their visit.

As regards the delimitation of the Indo-Afghan frontier I am strongly of opinion that any success on our part in alienating the independent Afghan tribes from Kabul is worse than a defeat, for, in an emergency, the Amir should lead all the tribes of that origin. It is however, a significant comment on the practical results of the Durand Mission as also a powerful testimony to the loyalty and business capacity of our great ally compared with the laisser-aller of our Government that, according to a telegram in the Times of the 14th ultimo, he should actually urge us to delimitate a portion of the frontier which we claim to be within our sphere of influence. The telegram runs as follows:

«The Ameer having asked the Government of India to expedite the demarcation of the boundaries of Afghanistan under the Durand agreement, the work will be taken in
hand at once on the Khyber, Kurram, and Beluchistan frontiers. It will be carried on by the local political officers. There may be some delay before the demarcation of the Waziristan and Bajaur boundaries is undertaken.

As for the Russo-Afghan frontier, it is very fortunate for the Amir that a Liberal Government happened to have laid down certain principles of demarcation in the Granville-Gortchakoff Convention of 1873 (republished further on, as it is out of print), which are regarded by another Liberal Government twenty years after, although the progress of Russian arms since 1873 might have been made the excuse for further encroachment to the detriment of Afghanistan on the East, as was the case on the West after the Panjdeh disaster of 1885. W. Simpson, who accompanied the Boundary Commission in that year, has furnished me with the following outline which may be found convenient in connexion with the study of that part of the present Russo-Afghan frontier, as now finally settled:

The Russo-Afghan Boundary begins on the west at Zulfiqar, on the Herl-Rud—which is about 120, or 130 miles following the line of the Herl-Rud—from Herat. A line, as the crow flies, between Zulfiqar and Herat is about 100 miles—the range of hills, known as the Paropamisus, runs along a large part of this straight line. When the Boundary was being laid out, the Russians claimed to advance their line on the Kushk River, and I think it now crosses that stream 18 miles south of Chaman-i-bald. If this is so, it brings the frontier to, or close to, Kara Tapa, or about 60 miles in a direct line north from Herat. The Paropamisus Range runs at right angles across the line from Kara Tapa to Herat—there are more than one pass over the range. From this the line of Boundary runs north east to Maruchak, on the Murghab, from which it crosses the edge of the desert to the Oxus, at Bosaga, or Kham-i-ab near Khoja Saleh.

In giving the ground on the Kushk River to the Russians—they in return gave up some ground on the Oxus. Khoja Saleh was the original point, but the line now ends at the Oxus either at Bosaga or Kham-i-ab, or between the two.

There is, of course, no connexion between the Granville-Gortchakoff Convention of 1873 and the settlement of the particular frontier between Sarrakhs and the Oxus which Sir W. Ridgeway arranged after the Panjdeh affair in 1885. Under the latter arrangement, a small part of Badghis fell to Russia, and the Amir, it is stated, was perfectly satisfied with the frontier running from Zulfiqar via Ak-Robat, Islam and Khushk to Maruchak and from thence to Bosaga on the Oxus.

The Russo-Afghan boundary, therefore, on the West, as lately re-settled, runs E.N.E. from Zulfiqar on the Hari Rud (where the Persian boundary is met) to Kham-i-ab on the Oxus, passing by Maruchak on the Murghab and the Mainena and Andikhoi (Andkui) borders.

The Oxus line of the Granville-Gortchakoff Convention separates Afghanistan on the North from Bokhara and ought not to be confounded with the line from the Hari Rud just referred to. It is understood that the Amir has consented to abide strictly by that Convention and that he has, accordingly, withdrawn from the posts held by him in Raushan on the north or right side of the Oxus, and in Shignan on the right bank of that river, there so tortuous in its course, which were not held by Afghanistan in 1873. In return, it is similarly understood, that the Bokhara State, under the advice of Russia, will surrender to Afghanistan the territory occupied by it on the south or left side of the Oxus in Derwaz since that date. [Shignan proper lies West (a narrow strip) and East of the Oxus] (1)

(1) See Dr. Leitner’s Map of the Pamirs and Col. Grombcheffsky’s account of Independent Shignán and Raushan as also Mr. C. Johnston’s paper on Derwaz and Karategln in the «Asiatic Quarterly» of January 1892.—Ed.
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Wakhan will certainly remain in the hands of the Amir and thus the Baroghil Pass and with it Chitral are as effectually protected by a Liberal Government as any Russophobe Administration could have succeeded in doing. The only unsettled question as yet refers to the boundary between Wood's Lake and China in the Pamirs, where her undoubted ancient rights have to be considered in spite of Lord Dunmore's joke regarding the fabrication of a Chinese boundary Inscription. The negotiations between Russia, China and England are not yet concluded, but it is certain that the interests of Afghanistan in those regions will be safeguarded by England. In short, there is no reason to doubt that the hope contained in Her Majesty's last message to Parliament will be fulfilled, much to the advantage of the cause of peace and of the country over which His Highness the Amir rules with a wisdom and vigour unsurpassed, if they are equalled, by any European monarch:

EXTRACT FROM THE QUEEN'S SPEECH, 12TH MARCH 1894

«The negotiations between my Government and that of the Emperor of Russia for the settlement of frontier questions in Central Asia are proceeding in a spirit of mutual confidence and good will, which gives every hope of an early and equitable adjustment».

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM THE AMIR ABDURRAHMAN TO DR. LEITNER DATED 22ND AUGUST 1893

«God is He, whose glory be (alone) exalted»

To the quintessence of those who have attained the highest learning and most perfect accomplishments and of those who, whilst most profound in Arts and Sciences, are also illustrious examples of kindness and friendship, Dr. G. W. Leitner, who is entitled Maulvi Abdur-rashid, LLD; D.O.L.

After manifesting thoughts of affection and royal favour and the desire of meeting you again, may it become evident to your affectionate disposition that this your friend has perused your letter, which, being based on the considerations of a well-wisher and a friend and giving an account of the state of health of a friend, has become the cause of great gratification and pleasure to my inmost mind.

As regards the wish that we should meet again and the getting ready of a Seat for my friendly reception in London about which you have written, I can only hope, as the affairs of the world are based on hope, that, with the Grace of God, the time of such interview may happen and become the cause of rejoicings to both our minds. Since also the resolution to do a thing is of the very essence of a deed, on this ground I have become very much pleased and accept with great gratification your intention of hospitality and the invitation which you have so cordially made. And as regards to what you wrote about the Mosque which you have established for the benefit of Muhammadans, let prayers be offered for the continuance of the life and of the possessions of the Ruler, since, according to the saying that the prayer of the absent has the speediest answer, I hope that the prayer of that absent friend will be accepted by the Throne that grants prayers.

Secondly, you have recorded that some misguided persons have said through the medium of newspapers that His Highness the Amir is not
friendly to the English Government, a statement which you have refuted at various influential meetings and proved to be unfounded in different publications of which you have sent two to me, so God will, the efforts of this friend are not without effect.

As to your request for my photograph with an account of my welfare, I send you one as you wish in order that it may be a memento of our friendship.

As regards the imaginings of men who are hungry with self-interest, they are certainly men of hostile and evil disposition who are engaged night and day in sowing dissension in the hearts of friends so as to embroil the love and friendship between two nations (or two Governments); they are no doubt inspired by love of mischief, or by greed, or follow their nature and have ever so laboured and are so labouring; since, however, on the sides of both Governments the hearts are sincere and pure and there are between us friends, like you, righteous and competent, they have not even succeeded in inflicting a scratch, nor will they so succeed, for the fruit of such vain and mendacious efforts of their can only be the disappointment of failure and the shame of ignorance. Therefore your righteous words are based on, and intended for, the advantage and benefit of the illustrious British Government and of the «God-given» Government of Afghanistan.

I am exceedingly pleased and obliged to you and after this I also hope from you for the expression of further suggestions of a well-wisher and friend.

Thirdly, in 1887 no message from you whatever has reached me from Calcutta, for had it reached me, I would most certainly have sent you an answer. In future, let your-letters also inform me of the state of your health and of your own brilliant labours, for the well-being of the conditions of friends being always the object of the satisfaction of my mind, answers to them will ever be sent.

The conclusion of this message is with expressions of thoughts of affection and desire for the glory and good health of yourself together with other friends who have composed well-wishing papers that have been sent to me as above-mentioned. Finis.

Writen on the 11th Safar al Muzaffier A. H. 1311 or 22nd August 1893 A.D.

(Signed ) AMIR ABDURRAHMAN
Amir of Afghanistan.

I have signed this because Dr. Leitner is my own friend and this is an answer to his friendly letter. Finis.

The following short biography of His Highness, the Amir Abdurrahman Khan, may be appropriate in this place. He is a Barakzai and was born in 1830, the eldest son of the late Muhammad Afzul Khan, who was the elder half-brother of Sher Ali by a Popalzai wife. Abdurrahman is thus a grandson of the famous Dost Muhammad, who ruled Afghanistan till
his death in 1863, and nephew to the late Sher Ali who was expelled by the British in 1879 and soon after died in exile. Azul was the heir to the Kabul throne, but was away as Governor of Balkh when Dost Muhammad died and Sher Ali succeeded him. The disinherited elder brother, joined by a third brother Azim Khan, then fought Sher Ali during four years. Abdurrahman, already possessed of great energy and ability and who was placed by his father in charge of Takhtapul, won several battles at Sheikhabad, Khelat-i-Ghilzai and other places, but was finally defeated by his cousin, Yakub Khan, son of Sher Ali. Some of the details of this struggle of lions were published by me in 1872 from the dictation of the Kafir, Jamshed, a nephew of the brave General Feramorz. It may be interesting to mention that the Government of India under Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, whilst recognizing one claimant as Amir de jure recognized whoever won as the de facto Amir, a distinction that Sher Ali told me much puzzled him, though, when finally victorious, he was acknowledged by us as the reigning Sovereign. Abdurrahman, who had married a daughter of the Amir of Bokhara, took refuge in the countries beyond the Oxus which had then not yet become Russian, but Yakub Khan compelled the Amir of Bokhara to deny him an asylum in his State and thus forced him to seek the protection of General Kaufmann, who procured him an allowance of 25,000 roubles per annum. The American, Schuyler, who visited him at Samarcand, expressed a high opinion of his character and intelligence. Abdurrahman was ever a man of business, working systematically and daily, entering into details of administration and regularly having newspapers translated and read out to him by his secretaries.

When Sher Ali died, he wanted to go to Afghanistan, but the Russian authorities prevented him, though they allowed him to go after Yakub Khan was deposed. He first entered Badakhshan, with which he had old sympathies dating from the days of his friend, the independent Chief, Jehandar Shah, and then advancing into Turkestan, he scarcely met with any resistance. Indeed, the whole army of that province appears to have gone over to him. It is certain that Sultan Murad Khan of Kunduz and Mir Sara Beg of Kolab assisted him and he had also many adherents in other parts of Afghanistan, especially in the Kohistan. As he was, by far, the most eligible of the claimants to the Kabul Throne, a mission from the Indian Government offering him the sovereignty of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Kabul and Turkistan, was sent early to him at Khanabad in May 1880. The Sirdar, however, wisely preferred to be a NATIONAL Ruler as the surest means of being useful to his country and dynasty as also to a British alliance. In August of that year accordingly the Amir accepted the independent possession of Kabul, when we left it, after proclaiming him as Amir. In April 1881, Kandahar was handed over to Abdurrahman, though he had to fight Ayub Khan for its possession. After defeating him and occupying Herat, he became master of the whole of Afghanistan, which he has since governed with remarkable wisdom and firmness. The more independent is a friendly Afghanistan, the stronger is our position in India against a Russian attack and I sincerely hope that a country which has so repeatedly resisted our arms may not become weakened by the too
speedy assimilation of our arts. We should bear in mind that the Amir not only occupies the Throne of Kabul by right of heredity and national election, but that he is also a religious Sunni ruler, who reigns over a God-given country by the consensus fidellum of the Sunnat-wa-jemaa't and who yet has shown his friendliness to the Shia denomination by presenting on the 17th ultimo the famous shrine of Imam Riza at Meshed with a most magnificent Koran. The less, therefore, a Christian alien power intervenes in Afghanistan, the more will it be a tower of strength to us among Muhammadans.

[...]
It is announced that on the invitation of His Highness Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan, a mission will, next month, proceed to Kabul on the part of the Indian Government, to discuss the present political situation, and attempt to arrive at an understanding on such matters of interest and gravity as may concern the two Governments, and the early settlement of which are desirable. That Lord Dufferin attaches importance to the mission is evident by his deputation of his Foreign Secretary, H. M. Durand, as its chief, accompanied by his accomplished Private Secretary, Sir Donald Wallace, whose experience of Russia and the Balkan States is unsurpassed, and who has a complete knowledge of the Eastern Questions as understood in Europe—acquirements not without their value in Afghan diplomacy. A third member of this mission is F. A. Cunningham, Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar, a man of ability and experience, who was my First Secretary and Political Assistant during the negotiations which ended with the recognition and installation of the present Ruler of Afghanistan, and to whose valuable assistance the successful result was largely due.

It is a matter of congratulation that the relations between Lord Dufferin's Government and Abdur Rahman are friendly and even cordial. Since the interview of the latter with the Viceroy in 1885, at Rawal Pindee, a much better spirit has animated the Kabul Government, and the suspicion of our intentions, and of the direction and objects of our policy, which in early days seemed the most striking characteristic of the Amir, has given place to a more complete knowledge of and a more generous confidence in the Power which not only placed him on the throne but which at great cost and trouble has maintained him there. No one knows better than Abdur Rahman that he would never have been able to build up his power and crush his numerous enemies without the material assistance given by England and the prestige with which his close alliance with her has surrounded him; no one knows so well that to England alone will be due his future independence and safety from Russia, who, he thoroughly understands, would at once reduce Afghanistan to the position of Bokhara or Khiva if it were not for the strong and constant support of his powerful friend and neighbour.

There are many questions which may well form the subject of discussion and negotiation with Abdur Rahman. Among these a prominent place would be given to the extension of the Quetta railway to Kandahar, a strategical necessity which cannot be long delayed; the permanent, and, I believe, necessary appointment of British officers at Herat;
the connection of Kabul with Peshawar by telegraph, and the relinquishment by the Amir of his improper attempts to bring under his authority and influence the petty Khanates and independent tribes on the North-Western Frontier, Swat, Boner, Yassin, and Chitral, with which the Indian Government has always declared to his predecessors, Sher Ali and Dost Muhammad Khan, that Afghanistan has no concern. Other important questions are the determination of the succession and the nature of the guarantee that England might be disposed to give it; the conclusion of the long-desired treaty of offensive and defensive alliance; the delimitation of the boundary on the Eastern Oxus, in Wakhan, Shignan and Badakshan; and, lastly, the attitude of Muhammad Ishak Khan, first cousin of the Amir, who is reported to have raised the standard of revolt in Afghan Turkestan. Although this alleged rebellion might appear the most urgent matter for the Amir's attention, it is probable that he has no desire to discuss it with the English envoy. He is accustomed to settle his domestic affairs without interference, and the importance of the incident is doubtless exaggerated. There has never been much love lost between the Amir and Ishak Khan, who has always maintained an attitude of reserve, and who, while professing allegiance and obedience, has never sent much revenue to Kabul, and has persistently refused to visit the capital, from which he believed, with excellent reason, that he would never be permitted to return. If, in the early days of Abdur Rahman's rule, Ishak had elected to rebel, before the Amir had consolidated his power and had crushed the Ghilzais and killed their leading men, he might have had a fair chance of success. But it is unlikely that he will gain much by a rebellion which is five years too late; and the Amir, if he has preserved his ancient energy and determination, should not have much difficulty in ousting his cousin from Turkestan, and gaining a far more complete control and mastery of that important province than he has ever possessed since he appointed Ishak Khan, who had shared his flight from Tashkend, as Governor. The result will probably be to strengthen the Amir's position; and this is much to be wished, for, with Turkestan in unfriendly or hostile hands, the Afghan Government is exposed to constant danger from the impossibility of defending the line of the Oxus against enemies whose hopes of profitable interference might always be roused by the sight of internal confusion and discord. The Amir, however suspicious or brusque in correspondence or manners he may have been, has shown himself a sincere ally and a warm friend of England, and it is to our direct advantage that he should crush his enemies and maintain unquestioned authority over the whole of Afghanistan, north and south of the Hindu Khush.

I do not intend in this paper to discuss Afghan policy or the questions which may arise between the Amir and the British Government. Such a discussion might be inconvenient, and would certainly be inopportune. But it has been suggested to me that it would be interesting at the present time, when Afghanistan is again attracting so much attention, and when a new mission is starting for Kabul, to give some account of my first meetings with Abdur Rahman in August and September, 1880, at Zimma and Kabul, when he had just been recognized and pro-
claimed Ruler of Afghanistan, and to record the impression which he produced on the first Englishmen who ever met him. The circumstances attending these interviews were noteworthy and striking; the situation was dramatic in the extreme, and the time was critical; and although my friend Mr. Howard Hensman, whom I invited to accompany me on the expedition to Zimma, has given a graphic and accurate account of its general features in his most able and trustworthy work on «The Afghan War,» it may not be without interest for the chief English actor in the events in question to record such impressions as notes and memory will permit of the incidents of the interviews, and their accompanying circumstances and results, so far as this may be consistent with official propriety and reticence.

The battle of Maiwand, midway between Kandahar and the river Helmand, was fought on the 27th of July, 1880, when a well-equipped British force was defeated and overwhelmed by Sirdar Ayub Khan, in direct consequence of the crass imbecility and incompetence of its commanders, and in spite of the bravery and devotion of the troops, English and Indian, who, under Generals Stewart or Roberts, would have made short work of the enemy. But those in command did not understand how to fight Orientals, or realize that the cautious and defensive tactics which might be successful in European warfare are fatal in Asia, where prompt attack, without counting the number of the enemy in front, is the only road of safety. Thus has our empire in India been won, and thus it can alone be maintained. Ignorance of this elementary military axiom cost us a brigade which could ill be spared, shook most seriously the English prestige in Asia, and nearly brought to the ground the whole arrangement with Abdur Rahman, together with the prospects of peace and a settled Afghanistan.

Two days after the defeat a cypher telegram containing the news reached Sir Donald Stewart, then Commanding-in-Chief at Kabul, and was at once communicated to Sir Frederick Roberts and myself. It was thought advisable to keep it secret as long as possible, in order for communication with the Government of India, and to allow time to decide on offensive or precautionary action; while it was of the utmost importance to conclude the negotiations then pending with Abdur Rahman. The telegraph offices in Peshawar and Kabul were placed under strict surveillance, and no messages alluding to the disaster were allowed to pass except in cypher. So successful were the precautions taken, that the fact of the defeat remained unknown for two days, while its extent and grave character was not divulged until the 5th of August, by which time orders had been issued for the despatch from Kabul of an expedition under Sir F. Roberts to relieve Kandahar, while the arrangements with the Amir for his occupation of Kabul and the withdrawal of the British army had been finally concluded.

The news of the defeat of Maiwand fell upon us at Kabul like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. It seemed incredible, and we knew that it should have been impossible. It was well for England that at this time two soldiers like Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts were in chief command at Kabul. Neither were of a nature to despond when
fortune seemed unkind, and their confident spirit rose in the presence of difficulty and danger. There was thus no unworthy feeling of anxiety or alarm at the serious reverse which had befallen our arms, and the only thought was how best to retrieve the position and recover the vantage ground which the incompetence of others at a distance had caused us temporarily to lose. The immediate point for decision was whether it was possible and prudent to attempt the relief of Kandahar from the direction of Kabul, or whether it was sufficient to leave this operation to the Sind column, advancing under great difficulties from want of carriage and supplies by way of Quetta. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, and the Viceroy, Lord Ripon, were in favour of the march from Kabul, and this bold and wise step was determined upon after long and serious consideration. Sir Donald Stewart, with admirable generosity, courage and unselfishness, denuded himself of his best officers and regiments in order to ensure the success of the expedition which Sir Frederick Roberts was to lead to the South. So much so was this the case, that the remainder of the army left behind in Kabul was in a far more difficult and anxious position than that which marched to Kandahar. It had to perform the always hazardous operation of withdrawing from a hostile country, encumbered by the sick, who were very numerous, and the ordnance stores and baggage of the united army; for the troops destined for Kandahar took with them nothing which could be dispensed with, and no artillery but mountain guns. The ten thousand men whoformed Sir Frederick Roberts's force were the very pick of the army, British, Sikhs, and Gurkhas, and they could have marched straight through Asia and have defeated any force that could have been brought against them.

But it was on the political situation that the Maiwand defeat might be expected to produce the most unfortunate results. Fortune so far had been kind; although the anxiety of the long-drawn negotiations with Abdur Rahman had been great, and the delays, inseparable from all Asiatic diplomacy, which is nothing if not patient and has no idea of the value of time, had tried the temper both of the army and of the political officers, who knew that they had not a carte blanche as to the period of the negotiations, and that unless a satisfactory arrangement could be completed very speedily, the Government would withdraw its forces from Afghanistan and abandon it to the anarchy from which we had good hope of saving it.

It is necessary to give an exceedingly brief résumé of the political situation.

When I was in Calcutta at the beginning of the year 1880 to receive the instructions of the Government of India before proceeding to Kabul to take charge of the diplomatic and political work in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, the aspect of affairs was discouraging in the extreme. The country was in the wildest state of ferment. Our army had met with reverses, and in the month of December had been shut up in the fortified cantonment of Sherpur by General Muhammad Jan and a great array of Ghilzai and Kohistani tribesmen and influential chiefs. The commissariat arrangements of an Afghan levy are much the
same as were those of Scotch Highlanders on a cattle foray two hundred years ago; and the investment of Sherpur did not last very long, though the fights which preceded it cost us a large number of gallant officers and troops. But the confusion in the country became worse confounded. No one appeared possessed of such authority or following as to warrant the Government selecting him as Amir with any hope that he would be able to hold his own when the British army had left the country. As it was necessary to make some choice, and as the restoration of Amir Yakub Khan had been declared impossible by the Government, Sirder Hashim Khan, one of the ablest of the Barakzai family, and who appeared to be less unpopular than most of his house with the tribes, was virtually accepted as the best candidate for the throne; but neither Sir Frederick Roberts, then commanding-in-chief at Kabul, nor the Indian Government had much faith in his prospects of success or permanence. So much was this the case, that I left Calcutta for Kabul with no positive instructions as to any of the rival candidates, but was to carefully examine the situation and determine and report who was the most suitable for the position of Amir.

It was only the day before I reached Kabul that I received the Viceroy's orders to accept Abdur Rahman as the most likely person in the interests of the Government and of Afghanistan, and to at once open up communications with him on the basis of his acceptance of Northern Afghanistan separated from Kandahar and Herat. In this choice Lord Lytton had shown the greatest wisdom and courage, and his policy in the selection has been amply justified by the events of the past eight years. Although at times, during the anxious months which passed before the proclamation of Abdur Rahman as Amir, I was compelled to doubt whether we had secured a friend or an enemy, I am confident that there was no other member of the whole Barakzai family, which is singularly devoid of men of ability and character, who could have governed Afghanistan with the skill, energy and determination shown by Abdur Rahman, or who could, indeed, have held his own successfully against rebellious chiefs and turbulent and untameable tribesmen. The selection was as courageous as it was wise; for Abdur Rahman had fled across the Oxus from Russian territory, where he had long resided as a pensioner of the Czar, treated with consideration and liberality, although he had not been allowed any political freedom and was prevented from entering Afghanistan after the death of Amir Sher Ali Khan when he considered that his chance of obtaining the throne was exceedingly good. This prohibition rankled in the mind of Abdur Rahman, who understood that the hospitality of Russia was not altogether disinterested, and that if he was to be allowed to re-enter his country, it must be at a time when it suited Russian policy and not his own. At the same time, when Abdur Rahman crossed the Oxus with a small following into Afghan Turkistan, it was impossible for the Indian Government to know whether he had not been secretly commissioned by Russia to try his fortune and to complicate still further the English position; while, if he were successful in winning the throne,
after the withdrawal of the British army, he would have held it as the Russian nominee and in opposition to our interests.

The only way to meet the danger was to act with promptitude and decision; to accept the attitude of Abdur Rahman as independent, and to discount any Russian promises which might have been made to him or which would be made when our objects became manifest, by offering at once more than Russia was in a position to give. As an Afghan he was certain to be alive to his own interests; and as gratitude is not a factor in Oriental politics, he would probably be ready to side with that Power which could place and maintain him in the most favourable position. The courageous and far-sighted policy of Lord Lytton in this matter has never received due acknowledgment. It was a stroke of genius which deserved the success which has undoubtedly attended it. But it was not an easy task which was set before us for accomplishment. Never had a salmon-fisher greater difficulty in playing and landing his fish than we experienced in drawing, stage by stage, the suspicious and uncertain chief from the Oxus to Kabul. I had first despatched as an emissary one Muhammad Sarwar Khan, who I believed to be in the Amir's confidence, and who subsequently rose to prominence as Governor of Herat. On his safe return with friendly though vague assurances, I sent two native officers of my own staff, Wazirzada Muhammad Afzul Khan, who was afterwards appointed British Agent in Kabul, and Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, both men of the highest courage and devotion, who bore a letter in which the Amirship was offered to Abdur Rahman, without other conditions than the necessary one of friendship with the British Government. This mission found Abdur Rahman at Khanabad, and was treated by him with hospitality and honour, though the officers were practically detained as prisoners in the camp, and were not allowed to converse with any of the Sirdar's followers.

The reply that they at last brought was generally satisfactory, and it was hoped that Abdur Rahman might arrive in Kabul early in June. But it was not till the middle of July, after many communications had been exchanged, and many vexatious delays had been experienced, that the Sirdar crossed the Hindu Khush by a difficult pass, and reached Charikar in Kohistan. During the whole of this time Northern Afghanistan had been in a most unsettled and critical condition. The advent of Abdur Rahman was regarded with alarm and dislike by a majority of the people, who had good reason to believe that he had a long memory for the enemies of his father and himself. The Sirdar himself had to play a double game. Believing that an open friendship with the English would cost him the support of his fanatical countrymen, he at the same time carried on friendly negotiations with us, and excited against us the religious and national feeling. So serious did the tension become, and so grave the danger of a popular rising, that it was imperative to end the difficulty by declaring publicly the policy of the Government, and, on the 22nd of July, in full Durbar at Kabul, in presence of all the important chiefs, I announced that the Viceroy and the Government of the Queen-Empress had been pleased to recognize
Sirdar Abdur Rahman as Amir of Kabul. At this time he was still at Charikar, but, his confidence restored by his public recognition, he marched to Ak Serai, about twenty miles north of Kabul, near which it was arranged that I was to meet him and discuss the final arrangements to be made for his occupation of the capital, and hear all that he had to say regarding his hopes and prospects, and communicate to him the intentions and policy of the British Government.

It was at this critical moment that the defeat of Maiwand occurred, on the very day, indeed, the 27th of July, for which my first interview with the Amir had been arranged. Owing to his delay in marching to Ak Serai the meeting was unavoidably postponed, and when the news was received I was on the point of starting for Zimma, a small village two miles south of his camp, at Ak Serai, where tents for his reception had been pitched which we had sent out from Kabul, for the Amir in his march across the difficult Hindu Khush had brought nothing suitable for a ceremonial visit, and indeed, at this time, he and his followers possessed little beyond their clothes and arms. After a consultation with Sir Donald Stewart it was decided that no change should be made in our programme, but that I should inform the Amir of our reverses at Kandahar and engage his services and influence to secure the unopposed march of our relieving army, if possible arranging a meeting with him and the General Commanding-in-Chief in the camp of General Sir Charles Gough, whose brigade lay at Kila Haji, some seven miles south of the Amir's quarters.

About noon on the 30th of August, accompanied by my political staff, a few military officers, and a small escort, I started from Sherpur for Kila Haji. We crossed the Wazirabad Lake, then, after many months of drought, a mere marsh white with salt efflorescence, climbed the steep Pai Manar Pass, from which a splendid panoramic view of the country about Kabul is obtained, and then descending into the Kohistan plain, a pleasant gallop of ten or twelve miles over a level country broken with frequent watercourses, brought us to General Gough's camp, where we were hospitably entertained for the night. The following morning we were early in the saddle and started for Zimma, which was reported to be some five miles distant. Among the officers I took with me of my political staff were Major Hastings, an officer of great experience, whom I had placed in charge of the political work in the city and district of Kabul; Captain Ridgeway (now Sir West Ridgeway), who was on political duty with General Gough's brigade; Mr. F. A. Cunningham, of the Civil Service, before referred to as accompanying the new mission; Mr. James Christie, head of the secret service department, who gave me, throughout my residence in Kabul, invaluable assistance which I can never too warmly acknowledge, and who had made all the arrangements for the interview; Mr. Walker, C.S., and Lieutenant J. Pears. With them was Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan, the youngest son of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, whom I had nominated as Governor of Kabul when the certain advent of Abdur Rahman made impossible the continuance of the existing Governor, Wall Muhammad Khan, whom he cordially detested. During the first interview with the
Amir, Major Hastings and Messrs. Cunningham and Christie were the only officers present, but on the second day I allowed all those above named to attend.

The question of the amount of my escort had been carefully considered. It was necessary to take sufficient men to guard against treachery or sudden surprise, for it would have considerably embarrassed the Government had their envoy and his political staff met the fate of Sir William Macnaughten in 1841; while, on the other hand, it was not wise to make the escort so large as to proclaim the want of confidence which was undoubtedly felt on both sides. I had no suspicion of Abdur Rahman himself, but considerable distrust of his army, who were wild and undisciplined barbarians, suspicious of him and us, and whom he had the utmost difficulty in keeping in order. Had I not been able to satisfy their demands for arrears of pay, I do not believe they would ever have allowed their master to come to Kabul.

General Gough was anxious to furnish me with an infantry and cavalry guard and to occupy the road and passes leading to Zimma in force; but this I begged might not be done, and was satisfied with a cavalry escort, amply sufficient for any emergency, under the command of Colonel Mackenzie; a squadron of the 9th Lancers under Major Legge, now commanding the regiment at Manchester; and a squadron of the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and 3rd Punjab Cavalry. Infantry would have seriously embarrassed our movements had any contretemps occurred, or the Amir's troops attacked us, while the occupation of the passes in force would have alarmed both the Amir and his troops alike. Even as it was the Amir was terribly disturbed, as a relative in his confidence afterwards informed me, when we galloped up to the tents with so strong a cavalry guard. For a moment he thought that what his people had persistently urged on him was true, that the English were only entrapping him, and that the moment they had secured him under any pretences or promises, they would send him a prisoner to India. An Afghan is so false and treacherous himself, and will swear on the Koran to so many lies, that he finds it impossible to believe that any one else can speak the truth. To record an oath on the Koran is the most solemn pledge that a Muhammadan can give. Yet I have possessed Korans covered with the signatures of the leading nobles of Afghanistan vowing allegiance and obedience to three rival pretenders to the throne in turn.

The Durbar tent had been wisely pitched by Sirdar Yusuf Khan and Christie on the crest of a little hillock, which, to some degree, commanded the neighbouring country. It was a vast, dilapidated tent, which had belonged to Amir Sher Ali Khan and his son, and which had been annexed with other stores on the British occupation. It was, however, well suited to our purpose. A hundred yards down the hill was a small hill tent, surrounded with guards, in which the man with whom we had so long been negotiating, and on whose conduct and capacity the future of Afghanistan was to depend, awaited us with some reasonable anxiety. He had never yet seen an Englishman or British troops, and the gallant bearing and disciplined ranks of our escort, English and
native, as they drew up before the reception tent, struck him much, for Abdur Rahman is every inch a soldier. In Tashkend and Samarkand he was accustomed to disciplined Russian troops; but to match the 9th Lancers in Russia it is necessary to travel to St. Petersburg, while no Russian irregular cavalry regiments that I have ever seen are to be compared, horse and man, in size or style, with our Indian cavalry, who would, I am convinced, ride through and over double their own number of Cossack troops.

I sent a deputation of officers, Mr. Cunningham and Captain Ridgeway, with Raja Jahandal Khan and Afzul Khan, two of my native aides-de-camp, to the Amir's tent, to escort him up the hill. In a few moments he appeared, walking slowly and heavily, a large, Falstaffian, genial-looking man, with bright eyes and Jewish features, wearing the Astrakan fur cap which is usual among Afghans of rank, and a blue uniform coat with gold epaulettes, probably a present from one of his Russian friends at Tashkend. I went forward with the officers of my party a few steps from the door of the tent to meet our visitor, whom the steepness of the ascent had somewhat tried. He saluted in military fashion and shook hands with much cordiality, and we then, after I had presented all the English officers to him, took our places in the Durbar tent, the only Afghans beside the Amir present at the first interview being Muhammad Yusuf Khan, the Kabul Governor, a friend and cousin of the Amir, whom I had largely used in communicating with him in Kohistan, and the Chief of Kulab, a middle-aged man who was in the Amir's camp, half friend, half prisoner, and who, though permitted to be present at our interviews, was placed in a chair too distant to catch much of the conversation. He found it, moreover, prudent, where listening too closely might have cost him his head, to pretend to sleep, which he did for hours on both of our visits.

From the first moment that I saw the Amir I had taken a liking to him, and had formed a most favourable impression of his character. His face, somewhat coarse and heavy in repose, lighted up when he smiled in a very winning fashion, and his eyes were full of fun and vivacity. His conversation showed him at once to be a man of much information and knowledge of men and the world, his estimate of the character of the persons regarding whom we conversed was reasonable and shrewd, while, through his whole bearing, there was clearly visible much natural good humour and bonhomie. He evidently had a very high, perhaps exaggerated, opinion of his own ability and wisdom, and it was exceedingly difficult to make him change his opinion on any subject which he had considered at all closely. The subsequent career of Abdur Rahman has not induced me to alter materially the opinion I formed of him at our first interview. He has proved a stern, determined ruler, and a most cruel one if English prejudices and estimate of the value of human life be correct. But if the character of the Afghans, their ferocity, ignorance, fanaticism, and impatience of control be considered, it will be admitted that in no other manner could the Amir have maintained his position and brought order out of the most hopeless and discordant elements that ever existed in any country. I believed
in him because personal acquaintance assured me of his strength of character; but the authorities at Simla hardly expected that we would succeed, and the Foreign Secretary wrote to me that he was fully prepared to see Abdur Rahman leave Afghanistan with our army. The vanity and pride of the man are phenomenal; but they may be excused in one whose success has amply justified his self-confidence. He has thoroughly understood the people he has to govern. He has not given Afghanistan a free press or national congresses, but has ruled his people, as he assured me they could alone be governed, with the stick. In this direction he has certainly shown extraordinary energy, and where Amir Sher Ali Khan beat his people with whips, Abdur Rahman has scourged them with scorpions.

The Amir was very frank on the subject of Russia. He disclaimed utterly the idea of dependence on her, or that he was in any way deputed or instigated by Russian agents in his invasion of Turkistan. He spoke of his late hosts and gaolers at Tashkend and Samarkand with politeness, and acknowledged the liberality with which they had treated him and the largeness of the allowance they had made him, from which he said he had been able to save sufficient to pay a few hundred Turkoman cavalry and cross the Oxus, where he was joined by many of the disbanded troops of Amir Yakub Khan. Afghan Turkistan, Maimena, Balkh, and Kunduz have always been more favourable to that branch of the Barakzais represented by Abdur Rahman than to Sher Ali's branch, and this it was that caused the chief difficulty and delay in the march to Kabul, where the Amir knew that he would find himself among chiefs and people generally hostile to him, whom he could only overawe and subdue with English assistance.

I told the Amir very frankly of our defeat at Maiwand and its possible consequences, for concealment was worse than useless, and the active and instant cooperation of the Amir was needed to ensure both the unopposed march of Sir Frederick Roberts's force to Kandahar and the unmolested retreat of Sir Donald Stewart's army to Peshawar. It is true that both might have safely disregarded any possible opposition; and the Kandahar army was absolutely invincible by any Afghan force. But, at the same time, it would have had a most unfortunate effect upon our military and diplomatic reputation if the army which was to avenge our defeat and secure the position of our favoured candidate for the throne should be opposed on its relieving march; while it would ruin our prestige in India if our Northern army was to retire upon Peshawar, exposed throughout its march in the passes to the guerilla attacks which had broken down and destroyed our army in 1842. It was essential that Sir Frederick Roberts should advance through the heart of Afghanistan, absolutely unopposed, until he arrived in the neighbourhood of Sirdar Ayub Khan; and it was still more imperatively necessary that Sir Donald Stewart, encumbered with sick and baggage, should march leisurely, and with dignity from Kabul to Peshawar through a friendly country without a shot being fired. This was fortunately accomplished, and it is not generally known how difficult a feat it was, nor how much the happy result was due to the loyal and
active service of Abdur Rahman, whose emissaries, exhorting the people to maintain peace and order, were sent in all directions, while I urged him to keep in his camp, under honourable surveillance, all those Ghilzai and Barakzai chiefs whom we suspected of hostile intentions.

The Amir did not conceal his fear of the inflammatory effect which the defeat of Maiwand would have on the fanatical Afghans when it became generally known; and his requests for arms, ammunition and treasure were not at all extravagant when it is remembered that he came to Kabul, at our invitation, a penniless adventurer, and that he stood almost alone among enemies, with no men of high position or character to aid him in bearing the burden of administration. He insisted that the Government should provide him with everything, as much in their interests as his own, and the illustrations with which he enriched his arguments were both witty and to the point. He urged that he had obtained great reputation in the world and the eyes of other princes by the fact of his selection by England, and that he was consequently most anxious to organize a stable administration of a character which would be worthy of the British Government and the opinion they had formed of him. Should he fail, owing to want of adequate support and sufficient arms and money, the reproach would be with our Government. I told the Amir that the Government were prepared to help him very largely, but the sum I named was objected to as insufficient, as indeed any sum whatever would be by an Oriental who saw a prospect of obtaining more by importunity.

I WILL GIVE ONE ILLUSTRATION OF HIS MANNER OF ARGUMENT

"How," said the Amir, "can I do everything out of the Government grant? Think of the story of the man who went to a tailor with a roll of cloth and asked him to make him a morning suit. The tailor observed that his customer would also doubtless like a riding suit, to which the man assented; also one in which to appear at Durbar. And, continued the tailor, no doubt you would like clothes suitable for afternoon and evening wear? To all this the customer agreed, delighted at the prospect of receiving so many suits of clothes; but the roll of cloth was only sufficient for one man's suit, and when the five suits reached the customer he found them too small to be worn by the smallest child. "Now," said the Amir, "I seem to be like this fool who kept consenting to so many suits being made for him out of a piece of cloth only large enough for one. I agree to all your proposals and promise everything; but shall I have the means and power to carry them out?" I replied, The story your Highness has told is most apposite and ingenious, except that I object to the British Government being represented as the tailor; for we neither offer nor profess to make for you all the suits you may require. The Viceroy has indeed given you sufficient cloth to make one working every-day suit, and to obtain your dress clothes you will have to use the energy and ability with which we all credit you."

The conversation of the Amir was full of point, anecdote, and illustration, and I have rarely met any one, European or Asiatic, who was quicker to grasp the true issues of a question, or to see the weak points in an argument. On two successive days we had conversations of upwards of three hours' duration, and on the last day, having requested all English and native officers to withdraw, he discussed privately with me his hopes and prospects, and such matters as he did not desire to become public. Throughout these long interviews I was, as were all the officers with me, much impressed with the individuality of the man—his strength, readiness of resource and courage—and we felt reassured and confident in the wisdom of the choice which had been made. Among all the effete, plausible, and treacherous Barakzais who swarmed in Kabul there was none like Abdur Rahman, who, with all
his failings, was a true man, with manly qualities and virtues. No one could be long in his presence without realizing that he was a leader of men, by no hereditary right, but by his inherent force and intellect.

During these two interesting days no accident had happened, though we were well aware that volcanic fires were very near the surface, and that it would not take much to bring about an eruption. The goodwill and the good faith of the Amir were powerless, as I had already found in my prolonged negociations, in the presence of the aroused fanaticism of the Afghans, who are never friendly to strangers and Kafirs, and now suspected our intentions towards their chief. After our first interview the Amir himself was reassured; but his people were still nervously expecting us to carry him off. His army was waiting the result of the interviews immediately behind the hill on which our camp was pitched, and though comparatively few armed men were in sight, they would, like the warriors of Roderick Dhu, whom indeed these wild mountaineers very closely resembled, have sprung in thousands from the ground had a signal been given. Once or twice a gun fired in the Amir's camp seemed as if some such signal was intended; and once a ragged Durwesh came up to the door of the tent and commenced abusing the infidels within, and appealing to the fanaticism of his countrymen. But the prophet soon met the due and traditional fate of prophets, being stoned by the sentries, and his attempt to excite a tumult failed. In order to allay suspicion and to demonstrate our good faith, all the native cavalry of the escort had been sent to some distance from the tent, and only the 9th Lancers remained persistently on guard, in the saddle; and as there was no shade, and the August sun poured down in an uncompromising fashion, I have little doubt that they were very glad when the lengthy interviews ended.

On the second day all arrangements had been completed for the occupation of Kabul by the Amir and for our march to Peshawar and Kandahar, so far as their unmolested progress could be secured by the Amir, seconded by the efforts of influential men who were in accord with us, although opposed to Abdur Rahman, such as the high priest Mushki Alam and the well-known General Muhammad Jan.

I had been most anxious to arrange a meeting of the Amir with the General Commanding-in-Chief in Sir Charles Gough's camp at Kila Haji, and Abdur Rahman had expressed himself willing and anxious to attend; but the invincible suspicion of his troops and the tribal chiefs made the interview impossible. On Saturday afternoon, the day of my first meeting with the Amir, Sir Donald Stewart, Sir Frederick Roberts, and a large staff of officers had ridden out to camp for the Durbar on the following day; but the Afghans were alarmed at the movement of guns and cavalry to Kila Haji, although only intended for ceremonial and saluting purposes, and throughout the night occupied in force the crest of the pass leading to Zimma, only withdrawing at daybreak. General Gough considered it necessary to respond with the occupation of the heights commanding the road I was to traverse the next morning, besides sending four companies of infantry to within a mile of our
place of meeting—a precaution which, if necessary, was still sufficient

to so alarm the Afghans, that they positively refused to allow the

Amir to visit the British camp, and somewhat endangered the quiet

conclusion of our negotiations. The Amir assured me that he was much

disappointed at this failure to arrange a visit with General Stewart,

but he was evidently afraid to oppose the wishes of his troops, and

the Generals returned to Kabul, whither we followed them the next
day.

The week that succeeded the Zimma conferences was a busy one. The

spirits of the army were excellent. Although much annoyed and disappo-

inted at the postponement of their ardently desired return to India,

General Roberts' brigade prepared for the march to Kandahar with the

cheerful eagerness which distinguishes fine troops called on for a
distasteful duty, and the arrangements were speedily completed. On the
6th the force moved into camp, and on the 7th were well under way
on their adventurous march; while it was Sir Donald Stewart's inten-
tion, in order to allow the Kandahar brigade a fair start and to hold
in check any possible opposition, to remain some days in Kabul, and
only retire from Sherpur when General Roberts should have passed
into the Logar valley and all communication with us had ceased.

The night before the Kandahar column marched, the political officers
gave a farewell dinner to Sir Frederick Roberts and his staff. There was
present as large a number of officers as my small tents would accom-
modate, many of them then distinguished, many who have since won
fresh laurels, and some of the bravest and the best dead, like true
soldiers, in harness. Among them, not mentioning the political officers,
who were the hosts, were Sir Donald Stewart, G.C.B., Sir Frederick
MacGregor V.C., K.C.B. (died in Egypt), Col. Martin, C.B. (Central India
Horse), Col. Brownlow, C.B., 92nd Highlanders (killed at Kandahar), and
many others. As the occasion was historical, and my prophecy of the
brilliant and successful march of General Roberts correct, I may be
forgiven for rescuing from forgetfulness and placing on record the only
speeches made on this memorable occasion, when the army destined
to restore the shaken prestige of England was starting on its momentous
mission.

After the health of the Queen-Empress had been drunk, I spoke as
follows:

+SIR DONALD STEWART, SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, AND GENTLEMEN.—In Kabul, where
speeches are few and where action takes the place of words, you will perhaps excuse
me for proposing one toast to-night, and saying a few words which I wish to give
utterance to, as they come from my heart. I wish to propose the success and speedy
return with honour of Sir Frederick Roberts and the Kandahar army. I am afraid our
hospitality has been rather on the Kabul scale; but we have given you our last bottle
of champagne, and the last drops of the wine cannot be better used than in drinking
the health of so gallant a commander and so noble a force. May a glass of M6et or
R6derer never again moisten my lips if, in my thoughts, I associate the Kandahar army
with anything but success and honour. Gentlemen, I congratulate the force which Is
commanded by General Sir Frederick Roberts, the most daring leader to-day serving
Her Majesty the Queen, and than whom none is more justly honoured and loved by
the troops who serve under him. His first march to Kabul will be long remembered In
history, and with it will be remembered the no less famous march of the Kandahar
army. I would also congratulate General Roberts on the army which he commands. His
generals are distinguished, capable, and experienced, and the regiments are the very pride and flower of the British army. With such officers and such an army, difficulties become success, and victory is assured. I do not underestimate the difficulties which the force will have to meet; but the interests at stake are imperial, and the eyes of England, India, and Europe will be upon you. In the decision at which the Government, in communication with Sir Donald Stewart, has arrived, and which I firmly believe to be as wise, politically, as it is bold, from a military point of view, I see the best, if not the only, chance of the settled administration of Afghanistan, and the end of all this tangled net of complication which goes by the name of Afghan politics. The new Amir I believe to be sincerely attached to the English interest; and though his strength is not as great as his good-will, he will do all he can to further the advance of the army. It is with the utmost sorrow that we must all think of the reverse which has befallen us in Kandahar—a cloud which has come between us and the sun. But it is not a disaster. Imperial races have no disasters, and their vicissitudes of fortune are but a fresh stimulus to their energy and courage. Fortune has been most unkind in trying to overthrow our armed most contemptible. But the spirit which has animated the Kandahar army will take the field is that with which Ulysses and his companions went forth to seek other worlds:—

«It may be that the gulf will wash us down; it may be we shall reach the happy isles, and see the great Achilles whom we knew: though much is taken much abides; and though we are not now that strength which in old days moved earth and heaven—that which we are, we are, one equal temper of heroic minds, Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will, To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.»

Gentlemen, before I sit down, you will perhaps allow me to refer to a subject which is of a more personal nature. I wish on behalf of myself and of all political officers, who, I am sure, think with me, to express our cordial acknowledgment to Her Majesty’s command which has only here been heard, and I have only to add, to the experience of the military and political officers jealousies which bring about a situation little different from an armed truce. I can only say for myself that from very day I arrived at Kabul, I have received first from Sir Frederick Roberts, and later from Sir Donald Stewart, the most generous confidence and the kindest consideration. Our friendly relations are not a mere thin veneer, but are cordial and sincere, while from the officers of Her Majesty's army we have received the warmest friendship and brotherhood. We have a hundred friends in Kabul; and, I trust, not one enemy. I wish, then, to propose from my heart, to all the列位, you will perhaps allow me to refer to a subject which is of a more personal nature. I wish on behalf of myself and of all political officers, who, I am sure, think with me, to express our cordial acknowledgment to Her Majesty’s command which has only here been heard, and I have only to add, to the experience of the military and political officers jealousies which bring about a situation little different from an armed truce. I can only say for myself that from very day I arrived at Kabul, I have received first from Sir Frederick Roberts, and later from Sir Donald Stewart, the most generous confidence and the kindest consideration. Our friendly relations are not a mere thin veneer, but are cordial and sincere, while from the officers of Her Majesty’s army we have received the warmest friendship and brotherhood. We have a hundred friends in Kabul; and, I trust, not one enemy. I wish, then, to propose from my heart, to all the

SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:

«MR. GRIFFIN, SIR DONALD STEWART, AND GENTLEMEN,—I scarcely know how to thank you all for the kind way in which you have drunk my health and that of the column under orders for Kandahar. To the very flattering terms in which Mr. Griffin has spoken of me, I should have considerable difficulty in replying, were it not that I can honestly say that any success which has hitherto attended us may have been due entirely to the experienced commanders I have had with me, the most capable staff that ever accompanied a general officer in the field, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops under me. I do not think there ever have been, and I doubt if there ever will be, more efficient troops sent from India than those which General Stewart and I have had the

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«MR. GRIFFIN, SIR DONALD STEWART, AND GENTLEMEN,—I scarcely know how to thank you all for the kind way in which you have drunk my health and that of the column under orders for Kandahar. To the very flattering terms in which Mr. Griffin has spoken of me, I should have considerable difficulty in replying, were it not that I can honestly say that any success which has hitherto attended us may have been due entirely to the experienced commanders I have had with me, the most capable staff that ever accompanied a general officer in the field, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops under me. I do not think there ever have been, and I doubt if there ever will be, more efficient troops sent from India than those which General Stewart and I have had the
It is a great satisfaction to me to think that at present, at any rate, no officers will be required to remain at Kabul, and that all the political officers I see around me will return to India with the troops. But I feel quite sure, if the decision had been otherwise, officers would have been found to accept the dangerous post, either officers of the civil service, or amongst those military politicians who have gained for themselves a reputation on the Frontier and other parts of India. Gentlemen, Mr. Griffin said there must be one toast to-night; but I trust he will be kind enough to allow me to propose another, and that you will all join me in drinking the health of the political officers at Kabul, coupled with the name of Mr. Lepel Griffin.

Four days after the march of General Roberts's column our third and last meeting with the Amir took place. During the ten days which had elapsed since I left Zimma constant communications had been held with him, and he had used the time wisely in receiving the tribal chiefs, consolidating his party, paying his troops with our assistance, and making arrangements to facilitate the march of the two armies on Kandahar and Peshawar. Most of the formidable Ghilzai and Kohistan chiefs were in the Amir's camp. Mushki Alam, the head of the religious and fanatical party, had become friendly, and his son accompanied Sir Frederick Roberts's force; our old enemy, General Muhammad Jan, now reconciled, was ill with carbuncle, and I had sent him my last bottle of port wine to keep up his strength. He was too powerful and had been too successful to please Abdur Rahman, who imprisoned him not long afterwards in the Bala Hissar Fortress, where he perished in the usual manner. He was a brave man and an able commander. I had vainly endeavoured to persuade him to visit the Amir and promise allegiance. A grant of twenty lakhs of rupees had been promised to Abdur Rahman, of which one lakh was at once paid for his immediate expenses, five were given the day we left Kabul, and the remainder was to be paid at Jallalabad and Peshawar. The fortifications which British engineers had erected with much skill on the Sher Darwaza, Asmai, and Siah Sang heights commanding the capital, and which it had been determined to destroy on our evacuation, were, after much consideration, left to the Amir. It was felt that, although the chance of our having, at some future day, to recapture our own fortifications could not be altogether overlooked, it was better to thoroughly trust the man whom the Government had selected as ruler, and that his power and prestige would be seriously and perhaps fatally impaired if we proclaimed our want of confidence in his loyalty or stability by blowing up, on our retirement, the fortifications which might be essential to his safety if attacked at Kabul by his numerous enemies. We also left him a large number of field and siege guns. Small arms there were none to spare of any value, but Abdur Rahman received these later from India.

It was only on the evening preceding the march of the army from Kabul that the Amir consented to come to Sherpur to be introduced to the general commanding. I had been very anxious to bring about this visit; for although all business arrangements had been concluded, it was a due and dignified termination to our occupation, and it was important that Sir Donald Stewart should see the style and manner of the new ruler of Afghanistan. The Amir had marched on the 10th of September to the village of Deh Gopak, immediately adjacent to Sherpur, though hidden from it by a low range of hills, and on the morning of the 11th, at seven o'clock, he came to Sherpur, where my tents, which
I left him as a parting present, had been pitched about two hundred yards from the walls. The army had already marched some hours, and the Sherpur cantonment, so long the residence of a large force, was deserted except by Sir Donald Stewart and his Brigadiers, Sir J. Hills, K.C.B., Generals G. C. Gough, Palliser, Daunt, and Hughes, with political officers and officers of the headquarter staff and an escort of Guide cavalry. It was a weary, and somewhat an anxious, wait; for I was uncertain whether, at the last moment, the fears of the Amir or his followers would not prevent the promised visit, and it was with a feeling of great relief that I saw the banners of his advanced guard and a long line of his troops streaming over the neighbouring hill. The Greater part of his escort was left at some distance from the tent, and the Amir, with Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan and only a few followers, rode up, and was received on alighting from his horse by Sir Donald and myself and conducted to his seat. He was in the best of tempers, and his former nervousness had disappeared. The officers present, military and political, were introduced to him, and he acknowledged with politeness their salutes. He conversed pleasantly on ordinary subjects, and expressed his satisfaction at once again seeing Kabul. He then made a little speech, which had about it the ring of sincerity, to the effect that the British Government had distinguished and honoured him with its confidence and favour, and that his gratitude was great and would be lasting, and that his sword would ever be at the disposal of the Viceroy, to whom he desired his compliments and thanks to be conveyed. We then rose, and the Amir accompanied us to the door of the tent and said polite words of farewell as we mounted our horses and rode away, with glad hearts, from the city of Kabul, which no Englishman or Indian in the army which had so long wearily encompassed it desired ever to see again. Our road did not lead us close under the walls, but we were near enough to see that they were deserted, and no groups of citizens or soldiers lined the road to see the last of the invading and avenging army. Abdur Rahman, fearing a possible collision with the English soldiers, had wisely ordered the townspeople to keep at home. Our departure from Kabul was thus without sign of joy or sorrow from the people, many of whom doubtless would have been delighted had the British annexed the country and remained as masters. During our occupation the people had grown rich, and millions of treasure had found their way into the coffers of these frugal mountaineers. They had been well and fairly dealt with: justice was meted out to all offenders alike, whether Afghans or conquerors; their women had been unmolested, their property had been secure, and their religious sentiments and prejudices had been always respected. As a civilian accustomed to administer the law, and expecting to find in a conquering army some license and excusable violence, I affirm that no invaders in historical times have so honourable and stainless a record as the British army in Afghanistan. Violence against the people of the country, men or women, person or property, was practically unknown; while an almost Quixotic generosity led the Commissariat and Transport to pay for all necessary supplies at rates far above the market price. Although such extravagance is not to be commended, there is
no doubt that the Afghan nation has been permanently impressed by our generous treatment, and that, should fortune take our armies again into Afghanistan, we should not have to encounter the same suspicion and opposition as at the commencement of our last campaign.

The Amir loyally kept his word during our retirement. The tribal chiefs were retained under surveillance in Kabul, and General Roberts's memorable march to Kandahar and that of General Stewart to Peshawar were accomplished without a hostile shot being fired.

LEPEL GRIFFIN

P.S.—While this article has been passing through the press, further news regarding the revolt of Sirdar Ishak Khan has been received from St. Petersbourg, dated the 6th of September, through the Novoe Vremya, which affirms that the whole of Northern Afghanistan has abjured its allegiance to Abdur Rahman, and has declared for Ishak Khan, who has proclaimed himself Amir. It is added that a conflict has occurred between the insurgents and Abdur Rahman's forces of an indecisive nature, though the details are as yet unknown. The Novoe Vremya, according to Reuter, in commenting on the report, points out that Ishak Khan, with his uncle (though this is a mistake for his cousin), dwelt for some time at Tashkend, and expresses the belief that a civil war in Afghanistan may complicate the Amir's relations with neighbouring States, especially if not promptly suppressed by Abdur Rahman, which the Russian journal considers more than doubtful. The opportunity, as may be supposed, is not lost to point out that the division of Afghanistan between England and Russia might now be carried out with advantage, the former taking Kabul and Kandahar, and the latter Turkistan and Herat.

I do not think that the news thus positively announced is worth much consideration. Russian newspapers, which draw their inspiration from the Government offices, are accustomed to print whatever suits those in authority, and manufacture the news which may assist to form public opinion or direct events in a desired course. No doubt the rebellion of Ishak Khan would be desired and welcomed by Russia, as it has probably been instigated by her. Of its success I have before expressed my disbelief. I have never had any reason to think Ishak Khan a man of much energy or ability, and he certainly in these respects is far inferior to his cousin Abdur Rahman, who, with the support of the Indian Government, should be quite able to hold his own and put down any opposition. If he is not able to do this, and he sometimes has strange fits of apathy and vacillation, he is a far less valuable ally than we have been accustomed to consider him. There is, however, ample grounds for reasonable confidence in the stability of the Amir's Government, and the division of his territories proposed by the Russian press is premature. Seeing that Russia has disclaimed all pretence of interference in Afghanistan, which she has officially declared outside the range of her influence, the suggestion that she should take Turkistan and Herat, leaving the western provinces to England,
is somewhat frank if not audacious, and reminds men whose memories are not as short as are those of some distinguished statesmen, of the broken promises which have accompanied the Russian advance from the Caspian to Merv. It is possible, and I have often acknowledged the possibility, that circumstances which we have been unable to control may compel us to divide Afghanistan with Russia. The life of Amir Abdur Rahman is never a good one. He is a severe sufferer from gout and its attendant ailments: he is always exposed to the risk of assassination from his numerous enemies and rivals, and from men who have a blood feud with him on account of his unjust slaughter of their relations. His successor, if his son, may be feeble and worthless: if either of his cousins, Sirdar Ayub Khan or Ishak Khan, may be hostile, in which case we should have to expel him as we did Sher Ali Khan for the same offence. But we could never allow Russia, as the Novoe Vremya suggests, to calmly annex the northern and western provinces without territorial arrangements elsewhere to our advantage. It may be possible to come to some agreement with Russia by which both should gain equally; but there is no occasion to discuss this at the present time, while Abdur Rahman lives and governs. We are bound by every consideration of prudence and honour to support him so long as he loyally carries out in his foreign relations the directions of the British Government. When he leaves the scene we shall have to re-survey the ground and make such arrangements as may best serve our own interests. These are not likely, if our statesmen are honest and sensible, to include an invitation to Russia to occupy Afghan provinces, unless at a cost elsewhere which she may not care to pay. The time may be near when these questions will have to be considered, and it is never well to be unprepared to act as inconvenient hypotheses ripen. At any rate, our policy of to-day is clear, namely, to support cordially our friend and ally Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, and continue the important and necessary work of strengthening our defences and completing our communications on the North-West Frontier.—L. G.

September 11, 1888.
I. THE VALLEY OF PISHIN AND THE BASIN OF THE LORAS

Introduction.—The student of the physical aspect of countries may understand with what delight and enthusiasm we found ourselves at Quetta early in November 1878, on the far side of that screen of mountains which had of late years been known only to a few. We had a taste for geographical studies, and movement and exploration were, happily, in the direct path of duty. Our reading, and our experience of many mountain lands, had not prepared us for features so novel and so singular as those which met us at the outset. Before proceeding to describe our explorations, we must, at the risk of having to repeat what others have before depicted, dwell on some forms which are constantly recurring, and go far to make up every South Afghan landscape.

To give exact ideas of scenery, it is often illustrative to describe by contrast. Thus we may observe that neither in Norway, nor in the Alps, nor in the outer Himalaya do we find anything at all approaching the vast plains and huge sterile skirts or glacis of the mountains, which are the marked feature in Southern and Western Afghanistan.

In all European systems the valleys are for the most part either V-shaped or formed like the letter U. The former character is most frequent in the outer Himalaya, and where the ranges of mountains have for countless ages been subject to the furrowing of an abundant rainfall. The U-shaped valleys are often those covered for a great portion of the year by snow. Plains are, however, the leading feature in the country we were exploring, while valleys and glens characterise the systems referred to with which we were familiar.

It as on emerging from the Bolan Pass that we first became acquainted with this new scenery. For ourselves, while disappointed at finding a want of clothing to the country and some absence of picturesque beauty, we felt that here at all events our cavalry could act as our watch and guard. We found we had liberty to move and ability to see far and wide. To the horseman, these wide open sweeps of country were everything, to the footman they presented many a dreary mile of march.

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FIG. 1.—PLAIN OF DASHT-BEDAULAT.
The section here given fairly represents that of the vale which lies between the mountain of Murdar and Chiltán as seen from the point looking towards Sir-i-ab, where the road commences to rise from the Dasht-i-Bedaulat, and takes to the skirt of Murdar. On this glacis the road lies for 15 miles all the way to Quetta. Such skirts, composed more or less of minute debris of the mountain slope, lie at slight angles of from $5^\circ$ to $12^\circ$ with the horizon. The composition and pose of these uniform masses do not favour the flow of water on the surface. The springs emanating from the mountain find a passage through the soil, and are only apparent a long way down, near the termination of the slope, or in the alluvium of the lower levels of the plain. Water however is to be found, and with a rare skill, the Afghan knows how to nurse and lead the precious fluid in the karez, or underground channel, and apply it to fertilise those portions of the plain which are suited for cultivation, and which otherwise would remain sterile.

Another peculiarity which should be noticed before we proceed, is the abrupt character of the mountains and the opposition of their outlines to those of the plains. The lines do not run with grace one into the other. There is a weird severity of form. Ridges projecting boldly into the plains, like headlands on a sea coast, and the bareness of the plains, suggest the idea. This character is extended even to the occurrence of isolated portions of mountains, which look like islands in the sea.

Whence comes this abruptness of the mountain and strange uniform pose of the vast skirt at its base? How has this enormous mass of debris been spread out? Why do we not find remains of such formations elsewhere? Is their preservation here due to the slight rainfall? Such were the queries which occurred to us as we journeyed—points which we hope will be discussed by our more instructed fellow-students of physical geography.

We have to note here that the map furnished for our guidance at the commencement of our operations was that of Baluchistan, compiled in 1876, in the office of the Surveyor-General, Calcutta. There was also a map of Afghanistan, from the same source; both were very defective, showing that there was much to explore, and many errors to correct; both these maps were afterwards printed on cloth and distributed to the army. Major Wilson's more complete map reached us only when we arrived at Kandahar. In the first stage of our proceedings we were not attended by officers of the Survey Department, and our staff was so limited in number, and so completely occupied by multifarious duties, that it was difficult to get any of our explorations properly recorded and put together. Every officer was thoroughly employed on the most pressing duties, and we were constantly on the move. Our first essays were, therefore, made under great disadvantages in this manner.

Colonel J. Browne, R.E., whom we found at Quetta, with an excellent knowledge of the localities, had prepared all the leading points of the Shalkot Ranges, such as Chiltan, Murdar, Musallugh, and Takatu, and with these plotted and taken into the field our officers found their positions by cross bearings with the prismatic compass, and the work
of the several reconnaissances performed by Colonel Browne and Captains Hanna, Showers, and Harvey, and Lieutenant Smith, was compiled and plotted by Captain Hanna on our halting at the foot of the Khojak. This map of Pishin has considerable correctness as to the position of the villages and the extent and direction of the plains, but it gives but very imperfect impressions of the mountains ranges. It was printed at Lahore, and was returned for our use in January, and it formed then a valuable guide in the operations preparatory to the return march through the Kakar country. (1)

As we came to understand the Pishin country more perfectly, we used to liken the whole basin, including the Shalkot Loras—all its streams are Loras—to some mollusc or sea-monster. The body might be represented by the wide plains from Haikalzal to Gulistan Karez in one direction, and from Alizai to the mouth of the Gazarband in another. The arms would be the two branches of the Shalkot Lora, the Kakar Lora, the Surkhab, with two streams feeding it, and the Barshor Lora. The feelers might be represented by the Karatu, Khojak, and Gulistan (Ghwaja) Nullas. Such are the many arms of the basin we have to describe.

Framework or Boundaries.—The framework of the plains of the basin of the Lora is grafted on to a spur of the Safaid-Koh, which is itself an offshoot of the Hindu Kush. This spur has been styled the Western Suliman, and traced as a continuous marked feature. We apprehend that as we come to know more of the features in the unexplored space to the south-east of Lake Abistada we shall find that our old maps must undergo considerable modifications. With regard to this northern portion of the range, we have ourselves no information, but with that part of it which is represented as culminating in Toba Peak we have some perfectly accurate details, which we think will be found to be remarkably interesting. (2)

Eastern Boundary.—During the reconnaissance which was made to prepare for the movement into Pishin, it was observed that the plains of Kujlak (Khushlak) extended, as a gradually rising vale, far away to the north-east, along the western flank of the Takatu Mountain and its continuations. There was no trace of such a formation in the maps, and we were informed that no European had ever visited those parts. As soon therefore as possession had been taken of the centre of the province, a reconnaissance, under the direction of the General, accompanied by Colonel Browne, was set in motion.

The point made for was Gwal, which, resting on the slope of the Jhur Range in an open vale, lies at the exit of the old caravan road through

(1) The map accompanying this paper has been constructed from the above and the reconnaissance sheet executed by Captain Holdich, R. E. (which is a valuable and perfectly correct addition to the geography of this hitherto unexplored region), collated with Major Wilson's map of Afghanistan for the Shalkot district and the country about the upper waters of the Shroud Lora and the Bolan Pass. Captains Heaviside and Holdich, R. E., of the Survey Department, were attached to General Biddulph's column for survey operations on the march through Boral to the Derajat. Captain Heaviside was deputed to carry out the astronomical observations, and Captain Holdich the topography.—ED.

(2) Major Wilson leaves out the range altogether.
the Sagarband defile. The range of mountains lying to the east of the vale seemed continuous, and the cleft of the defile was hardly perceptible.

It was the custom in the movement of our reconnoitring columns to give no clue as to the direction in which they might move, and to this we owe in great part an absence from molestation. Thus the exploration of the Sagarband defile was at once commenced while we were on the march to take up a position at Gwal. At about a mile from the opening, a ruined tower marks the importance which the point of entry and exit possessed in the olden time. The Kakar Lora issues from the cleft a bright, clear little stream, and for a mile or so we cross and recross it, and cut off the windings, and then emerge in a more open country. We here leave the running water which comes from the south from the direction of the Sura Khwulla Pass, and then follow up the bed of a dry affluent of the Kakar Lora, and at about the sixth mile, in a direct line, from Gwal, we reach a second portal, called Gurkhai. Amira, the Malik of Gwal, is in attendance to give us information as to the localities, and this he does very intelligently.

![Figure 2: Valley Leading N. E. to Mulazim Skobaie.]

From the height to the south side of the Gurkhai gap we make out that we are in a country of a very broken character, of minor elevations, with the main range behind us, and Takatu end on and severed from it by the Kakar Lora; this bold promontory now appearing as an isolated and grand mass of a conical form.

Takatu we find to be joined on to Zarghun and Murdar by a low ridge (Fig. 3) in which occur two depressions, which are in order the Sura Khwulla and Hunna passes. Here, in the first pass, is the water-parting of the Shalkot water and that of the Kakar Lora we had lately followed. In the Hunna gap the waters flow on one side back to the Shalkot Lora, and on the other towards Sibi. We were approaching a country rich in water-partings. In front and to the north-east there was a sea of hummocks of a strange and confused configuration, presenting rounded surfaces of bare earth and clays of various colours. It was late, but we made out the valley stretching towards Borai, winding to the north-east, and returned to our camp at Gwal.
FIG. 3.—MT. TARATU.

FIG. 4.—LOOKING DOWN THE VALE TOWARDS KUJLAK; SHOWING THE LENGTH OF THE PLAINS ALONG THE KAKAR BORDER.
From Gurkha we resumed our interesting and necessary explorations the following day, and reached the Ushmughzai ridge after following up the nulla to its head, passing through the strange hummocky ground noticed the day before. The Ushmughzai is a low ridge running north-east and south-west, of easy outline and soil, and offering no great obstacle to a road. Here we reach the point where waters flow back to Pishin and on to Sibi, we are therefore on the crest of the spur which forms the eastern boundary of Pishin. Strange to say we have passed through the line of the greater elevations, and though we are in the presence of high points and ridges they are detached, and it is not easy to make out their disposition.

Direct to the eastward, across a plain called Brahiman, a beautiful mountain mass rises, which is cleft diagonally to its very base, and called Tsaroe Tungi (Fig. 7). The combined stream of drainage takes its way towards Sibi through the cleft, which also gives passage to a track said to be passable for camels. To the north-east we noticed a high ridge, which we afterwards made out to be Mazwah, and along its southern flank the valley passes, which we were informed gave a perfectly traversable road towards Smalan, Boral, Tal, and Chotiali, through Mulazim Skobaie (Fig. 2). We noted that the country skirting the Brahiman Plain trending to the north-east was open and easy to traverse, so we made a push to reach a more distant point of observation. A gallop of four miles brought us suddenly in full view of the village of Ahmedun, the headquarters of Malik Fyzu and of the Panizai Kakars (Fig. 5).

Having come upon the village unexpectedly to the inhabitants and to ourselves, we halted, and opened communications through the good offices of our guide Amira, who is a Kakar. After some difficulty and delay, the villagers were induced to come out and talk with us, and we were able to remove any hostile feelings, if such had existed. So far, we had met with no inhabitants, and the country had a look of extreme desolation. The village of Ahmedun, disposed on a low ridge above a little stream, to which we afterwards approached, had an air of comfort and relief. Orchards and plots of cultivation mixed with the houses, and the beetling cliffs which overhung the village, and the grand outline of hills of rich colour, composed a picturesque scene which we shall long remember. Our inquiries confirmed what Amira and others had described, and it was a great satisfaction to us to find that the veracity of our guides and instructors in Kakar geography could be depended on. It was sunset, and, well satisfied with our day's work, we withdrew peaceably, to make 18 miles of intricate road back to our camp, which we reached long after night had closed on us.

Subsequently, Colonel Browne revisited Ahmedun, and was attended by Captain Holdich, R.E., who thus had an opportunity of laying down with more accuracy the topography of which we were able only to make hasty notes.
Having thus made an important step towards the exploration of the old kafila route, and, as it were, opened the door of the Kakar country, we pursued our way along the border to the north-east, making for the villages of Khanizai (Kanozai) and Balozai.

The great features of the continuous range on our right, to the east of our track, and of constantly ascending open plain, were still prominent. The left of the vale we found was bounded by the Jhur Range, a feature of minor magnitude, and of soft outline. The eastern line of hills, north of Takatu, takes the names of Mulla and Barai, and there is a peak called Surana. A little to the north of Zarghun Karez, we insensibly reached the water-parting between branches of the Kakar Lora and the Surkhab, but at this season there was no running water in the bed of the stream, though the village lands find sufficient for irrigation from karezes. Soon after passing Zarghun Karez, the Jhur Range sinks into the plain, and at its termination we find the village of Khanizai situated in the midst of a wide plain. The plain is surrounded on three sides by high ranges of hills, and, stretching for many miles to the north-east, terminates under a fine mountain, which we afterwards ascertained to be the Kand Peak. Under the peak, and to the south of it, there is a low and open pass, and this, we are informed, leads direct into Zhob.

Due east of Khanizai there is an opening in the range, and at some distance within the outlying ridges a commanding peak rises, which is described to us as Surghwand. This opening in the hills, we are told, leads direct to Borai, Tal, and Chotiali.

We observe that from the Kand Peak a spur springs, which running direct towards Pishin, there terminates in a peak which is named Shorgandai, the spur itself being called the Timurk Range. The Balozai-Khanizai Plain, which forms the basin of the Surkhab, extends to the south-west, following the course of this stream between the Jhur and Shorgandal hills, and it thus forms a continuation of a fair highway of plains in a great loop running along the whole Kakar border of the province of Pishin.

These features, hastily observed, we were able to understand imperfectly, but the expedition on which we were engaged could not be prolonged to enable us to pursue our investigations and complete our topography. We wished much at that time to look into Zhob and Borai, and actually visit the water-parting from the great spur of the Safaid-Koh, to the Indus on the one hand, and to the Sistan Desert on the other. We halted at Khanizai one night, and on the following day the column was directed over the Surai Muzzaie Pass towards Kila Khushdil Khan. Before we left, Colonel Browne, having lost sight of Chiltan, calculated a base between two hills by timing the report of guns, and thus gave a new support to our topography.

It was not at that time likely that either Colonel Browne or any of us would revisit these parts, and we left the work of discovery incomplete, with much regret.
An idea of the scenery and physical character of the country so far under description may be obtained from the accompanying Sketches, Figs. 4 and 5. Sketch No. 4 exhibits the length of plain along the Kakar border, looking back towards Kujlak—the reverse of that view which attracted our notice at the commencement of the expedition. The superiority of Mount Takatu is here very prominently shown, and it rightly asserts itself; for in every position it forms a striking and beautiful object in the Pishin landscape. In Sketch 5 we view the opening in the range towards Borai, and become acquainted with Surghwand, a peak which will in future enter into our geographical descriptions. The village of Khanizai stands in a well-watered portion of the great plain, which produces all the ordinary grains in fair abundance—more than sufficient, as we fortunately found, for the inhabitants and for our troops.

It is not, however, our purpose to enter into minute descriptions of inhabitants or of produce, but to consider specially the physical aspect and the framework of the country. To enable us, therefore, to complete the eastern border, we shall now leave the track of the reconnoitering expedition so far followed, and pass on to a time four months later, and note the discoveries made on the return march of the columns towards India.

For this operation, under sanction of Government, the arrangements with the tribes for the supply of the troops were made by Major, now Sir Robert, Sandiman, K.C.S.I., and our columns were halted for organisation at Balozai in the admirable position afforded by the great plain there. We ourselves reached that place on the evening of the 22nd March, after a somewhat forced march from the Helmund.

Simultaneously with the entry into Kakar country, it was considered advisable, as a military measure of precaution, to reconnoitre to the right as far as Ahmedun, and to the left as far as the Zhob border.

The expedition to Ahmedun was entrusted to the direction of Colonel Browne, and we accompanied the reconnaissance towards Zhob. This reconnaissance, which was made on the 23rd March, was supported by eighty rifles of the 1st Gurkhas and eighty sabres of the 15th Hussars, under command of Captain Langtree. The expedition was accompanied by Captain Heaviside, R.E., who superintended the running a traverse by a native surveyor. Captain Wylie attended as political officer, and a native of Balozai acted as guide.

We found the plain through which the western branch of the Surkhab flowed extending to the north-east, perfectly open, for seven miles, with a gradual ascent; the vale then narrowed, being enclosed between low hills. For two miles the track led up the bed of the stream, which found its way through a defile of low cliffs and rounded hills of soft strata. At about the ninth mile we emerged upon a wide plateau, saucer-shaped as regards its cross-section, and extending longitudinally with a gradual rise as far as the eye could reach. We here find ourselves abreast of the village of Tiarai, which, nestled in fruit-trees, lies on the
slopes of a limb of the Kand Mountain, which rises to the left of the pass. We are some distance yet from the water-parting which we wish to reach. As it was late at starting, and the distance considerable, we left the infantry on the plateau at the tenth mile, while we pushed on with the cavalry for further exploration. During this time the native surveyor was running his traverse with the plane table.

We rode for six miles over the very open, gradually rising plain (Fig. 6), and reached the village of Mehtarzai. The inhabitants of the village, never before visited by any Europeans, turned out peaceably to communicate with us, and we had a long conversation. We were informed that they and all the people of the plateau were independent, not having ever been under the rule of the Amirs of Kabul, and that they hold only a slight allegiance to Shah Jehan, the Zhob chief, though they belong to the family of the Kakars.

From our point of view on the skirt of the Kand Peak itself (Fig. 6) we saw the spurs which, springing from the great parent spur, terminate on the Zhob Valley and form a long perspective, bounding it on the north. We observed on the right the commencement of the spurs which project from the ridge, which we afterwards made out divided Boral from Zhob. The fairwall down the valley and the first plains were visible, the direction of the valley lying 15° north of east.

The water-parting was somewhere abreast of the village in the centre of the saucer-shaped plateau, which, by a uniform and easy slope, such as that by which we had gained the summit, descended towards Zhob. Our calculations gave the elevation of Balozd to be 6392 feet above the sea, and that of the Mehtarzai Kotal to be 7139, the rise was therefore about 750 feet in a distance of 15 miles. The natives call the water-parting Sarah Buzzah, and the whole plateau is named Kahan; in width it is about five to six miles, and the length may be 12 miles. The whole area, which is of a light soil, is more or less under cultivation. The few villages we saw were surrounded by orchards, but there is a lack of trees elsewhere, though there is a sparse growth of grasses and shrubs.
Kand Peak was ascertained by our survey officers to be in latitude 30° 48', and longitude 67° 29', therefore, 55 miles south-west of its position on the old maps; the spur of the Safaid-Koh (by whatever name we may eventually call it) consequently has a more westerly direction than has hitherto been represented, and forms the eastern boundary of Pishin. Kand Peak we had seen snow-clad, and forming a commanding point as we marched along the Daman road, coming from Kandahar. As we opened the Barshor Valley it came well into view, and asserted itself as one of the chief objects in the ranges which form the boundaries of the Pishin plains.

The physical character of this pass, its comparatively low elevation, the easy gradients leading to it, and the cultivated, open nature of the habitable plateau, mark it as a way of communication between two great systems of populous plains, which must in the future come into use, and we are sure to hear of it again. This exploration defined the extent of the Pishin basin in this direction.

These reconnaissances completed, and all being in order, the second column, under command of Colonel R. Sale Hill, 1st Gurkhas, was on the 24th March put in movement, and the General and staff marched with this body. The first column, under command of Major F. S. Keene, 1st Punjab Native Infantry, and under the guidance of Major Sandiman, was already several days in advance in the Borai Valley. The third column, under command of Brigadier-General J. Nuthall, was to follow the second column on the 25th.

The route selected by Major Sandiman was up the eastern branch of the Surkhab through the opening, represented in Diagram 5, which leads direct on the Surghwand Peak. The track lay across the plain, gradually rising up the mountain skirt, and entering the low hills by an open passage. To cut off a detour, made by the river to the north of the direct line, we pass over the Mosai Kotal at an elevation of 7078, and then gain the bed of the Togai stream, which we find to be 6954 feet above sea-level. The Surkhab here assumes the name of Togai. There appears to be no physical difficulty in following the valley. The road now winds up the valley, crossing and recrossing the stream. We pass hamlets of the Yusuf-Kach (Isaf Kach) settlement, cultivated plateaux, and note fruit and willow groves, with houses roofed with timber and grass. We encamp in an amphitheatre on a sloping field, which is pretty well covered with grass; and altogether there is a more abundant vegetation, gratifying to our eyes.

An ascent of some 400 or 500 feet to the height on the south of our camp reveals to us the configuration of the country. The point ascended is called Zuddin. The country spread out at our feet is desolate and weird. A rough plain extends easterly and south-westerly, fitted into the base of the line of hills which forms the southern boundary of the Togai Valley. To the southwest we recognise many points. Ahmedun is not visible, but we make out where it lies, and the lumpy plain we look over extends to the hummocky country about Ushmughzai. Takatu, a fine, conical object, marks where lie Quetta and Kujlak. The
eastern affluent of this branch of the Togai finds its source in an upland called Pinakai, which is at the north base of Mazwah.

To the south east we see fully developed a mountain mass, which, with Surgkwand, we had observed from afar as we were marching eastwards. It is now revealed to us to the base, extending as a precipitous ridge twenty to twenty-five miles long. Mazwah is the name given to it by Kullu, a very intelligent guide who joined Colonel Browne here. An affluent of the Togai rises in the plain before us, coming from the southwest and from the east in two or three branches, and the combined stream finds its way through a gap in the hills a little to the eastward of our camp. To the north the hills rise to considerable heights, the crest of these being retired from the Togai Valley. The northern slopes of this range descend towards the Mehtarzai Kotal, and the drainage of the south reaches the Togai stream.

The elevation of the Yusuf-Kach camp we found to be 7180 feet, and the distance from Balozai being nine and a quarter miles, we have a rise so far of 788 feet, and the gradient following the river would be less severe.

The course of the march on the following day was up the Togai Valley, which, hemmed in by a line of hills on either hand, had a direction at first east and then E.S.E. We passed several pretty hamlets, plots of cultivation, and groves of willows. We noticed one rather considerable stream, which joined the Togai from the ridge to the north. The valley rises gradually, there are no difficulties to be encountered in the construction of a road for wheeled traffic, and Colonel Browne considered that the turns were not too sharp for a railway.

So far we have had Surghwand as a fine mass in our front, but now on turning its shoulder we see it in flank, and it loses in beauty of form. Gradually we enter on a highland country of confused low hills, composed of highly-coloured earths and clay. The growth of grasses and underwood increases, and cypresses of great age and of grotesque forms are grouped and dotted over the landscape. Mazwah rises on our right front, and becomes a most imposing and picturesque object.

At the 11th mile from Yusuf-Kach, the head of the Togai is gained, and the height is found to be 8277 feet, making a rise in the 11 miles of 1097 feet. Here is the water-parting of Pishin and Sibi waters. The pass is called Ushtirrah Sirra; it is situated to the south-west of the peak of Surghwand, and is about four miles distant from it. The country around for many miles is quite uninhabited, and there appears to be an absence of water in the neighbourhood of the kotal.

We were unable to make the ascent of Surkhwand, or ascertain its physical character; and this was the more to be regretted as it proves to be in some respects the most interesting of the summits of the great range which we were studying. From its crest we should have seen into Zhob, into Borai, and also into Pishin. From its slopes waters flow in four directions—towards Dera Ismail Khan, towards the Kuchi Plain, via Borai and via Sibi, and back to the Sistan Desert, via Pishin.
We have now, in following the Kakar Lora and the Surkhab to their several sources, ascertained and defined the limits of the Lora, or Pishin, basin, on this eastern side of the province, and become acquainted with three passes and roads leading towards India. We have found most prominent as landmarks, and also as grand mountain forms, the Peaks of Kand and Surghwand, and the precipitous ridge of Mazwah, and the isolated promontory of Takatu. Toba Peak and Mount Chappar, prominently given in the old maps, we have not heard of. The line of water-parting is thus through Kand, across the Mehtarzai Kotal, up Surghwand, down to Ushrirrah Sirra, across the Pinakai upland, then skirting Mazwah, through the lumpy plain to Ushmughzai, and on to the Surra Khwulla and Hunna passes, where it reaches Murdar, a well-known point.

Northern and Western Boundaries.—Having thus disposed of the eastern side, so far as we are able, we will turn to the northern and western limits of the basin.

We know now that the Timurk-Shorgundai promontory is rooted into the Kand Peak. The western faces of this ridge drain into the Barshor Lora—the ridge itself forms the eastern boundary of a great bay of the plain which runs north-east of Khushdil Khan, up the valley of the Barsor Lora. We have penetrated some little distance within the low hills in the direction of Barshor, and gained a high point on the western side of the valley. We found the Lora making its passage through the hills; a bright clear stream, with a considerable amount of water, and a bed which told us that the drainage area must be very extensive. We were unable to see the open valley which was said to lie within the hills. Up to the time when we left Pishin no one had explored the upper portion of the Barshor River; but it is probable that this interesting part of the province has since been examined. Up this valley a road to Ghazni leads, and it was used by our troops in the old wars.

Continuing our course westerly, we find that the range forming the western boundary of the Bashor Plain terminates in a promontory at the villages of Brahamzai and Zeri. Still more to the westward, opposite the large village of Alzai, an opening of the range occurs, but of a different character from the valleys of the Loras and Surkhab. Here the skirt of the mountains rises rapidly, and leads to the Karatu Pass by a steep gradient. These parts were explored by Colonel H. Moore. Taking a departure from the village of Zumri, Colonel Moore, at about 15 miles distance from that place, came upon the edge of the Toba Plateau. A road to Ghazni could be traced over a plain which stretched for miles, bounded by low hills to the north, and a track led to the Kadanai plains, and on to Kandahar. These extensive plateaux fill up the whole mass of the angle from here to the Khoja Amran. They are the summer camping grounds of the Kakars and Achakzais, and we thought the elevation of 7500 feet would afford a suitable sanitarium for our troops.

We are much in the dark as to that part of this whole mountain range where it springs from the parent spur. We surmise, however, that it will be found to be rooted into it some 50 miles to the north of the Kand Peak.
Coasting along the skirt of the range we find it broken only by lesser watercourses, up which lead tracks to the Toba Plateau. The glacis formation is here seen in a very remarkable manner—tilted plains extend from the mountains till they merge in the level plain of the Pishin Valley itself, the whole way from Alizai to Arambi-Karez. Along this formation, unimpeded by deep nullas or river courses the Daman road to the Khojak runs. At Arambi-Karez the mountains project into the plains as a promontory, and then occurs the recess and amphitheatre of Kila Abdullah Khan, which is situated at the south side of the recess.

Into this basin short valleys, springing from the Toba Plateau and the crest of the Khoja Amran, converge, and the easy slopes and valleys give a pleasant locality for the Achakzaïs, who have always here lived a wild, semi-independent life, owning scarcely any submission to the amirs. In the cold weather many of the tribe migrate to the desert and in the hot weather the Toba Plateau affords a cool retreat.

During our march on Kandahar the Achakzaïs committed a massacre of a few detached men, and attacked one of our convoy escort camps. A column was marched to punish the offenders, but they absconded to the mountains. During this expedition Arambi, the chief village of the clan, was visited, for the first time, by our troops. The locality is described as a flourishing valley with a good deal of cultivation and fruit-trees.

So much has already been written on the subject of the Khojak and the Khoja Amran generally, that a minute description will not be necessary. We may not, however, leave unnoticed passes which are now routes easily traversed for even wheeled traffic. The Khojak Nulla is a dry river bed; wide and ascending easily, it offered a track for a road which required no making. At about the ninth mile from Kila Abdullah Khan the spurs press on the nulla and it becomes a defile. The defile at about a mile from the top is still wide enough to afford camping ground, and there is a good deal of khinjak wood in the valley and of brushwood on the slopes of the hills. Gradually the nulla is completely compressed between rocky sides and the gradient increases, and for half a mile from the top it is very steep.

In three days our troops improved, sufficiently for camel and mule traffic, the native tracks, and in one part we brought into use a portion of the road made during the old expeditions. The summit is more or less rounded, and we were enabled to cut out of the hill-side platforms for sideing guns and carriages. The descent is far more abrupt than the ascent, and at first the passage of laden camels caused these poor creatures much suffering, and the loads were cast, and blocks of the transit took place. In a short space of time it was impossible to make roads with good gradients, so to pass over guns a slide was made, having an average slope of $30^{\circ}$, which led from the top down to the commencement of an easy slope which extended down to Chaman. In a day and a half a whole battery was passed over, and a steady stream of troops, camels, cavalry, guns, moving onward, and of unladen camels returning, produced a busy scene of traffic from early morning till dark.
The operations of road-making were executed by the troops and a few Ghilzai labourers, under the skilled direction of Colonel W. Hichens, R.E., and his engineer officers. The passage of the Khojak occasioned much arduous work, which was executed by all concerned with an admirable spirit.

We were not willing, however, to allow the opportunity to slip of perfecting the communication. A line of road was at once traced out suited for wheeled traffic. The direction of this work was left to Lieutenant H. S. Wells, who executed it in six weeks with a gang of Ghilzai labourers. The length of the road is one mile 880 yards, its width 13 feet, and the average gradient about 1 in 14. The soil is so well suited for its maintenance, and there is so little drainage area above the road, that it is almost indestructible. We make the height of our camp on the east side of the Khojak 6742 feet, and that of the kotal 7380.

From the Khojak Peak, 8017 feet, and from the ridge generally, there is one of the most surprising views we have ever seen. The plains of Kadanai, leading on to other plains, are laid out like a map, and, seen in the marvellous clearness of the frosty air of December, the effect was most extraordinary. Beyond the plain, ranges of strangely isolated masses of hills run in parallel lines north-east and south-west, and jut out towards the desert which lay to the south like a sandy shore. There were rocky hills far away in the midst of the desert, appearing like veritable islands, and islets occurred in the Kadanai Plain. There was no wood and no verdure on the plains, and at that elevation and distance it was not possible with the naked eye to make out any villages, and we could hardly do so even with the glass. The aspect of this sterile-looking country did not foreshadow to us the sufficiency of food afterwards supplied at some of our camps on the way to Kandahar.

The Khoja Amran, a uniform and featureless range, forms a regular rampart between Pishin and the country beyond, which is some 2000 feet lower than the Plain of Pishin. The pass next in order through this barrier is the Roghani, a track only fitted for foot and horse traffic. Opposite Gulistan Karez there occurs the nulla up which lies the great kafila road to Kandahar. The pass debouches on to the plain on the west side at Gwaja, which gives its name to this route.

Our officers having pronounced that the Gwaja was by nature a much easier gradient than the Khojak, and therefore suited for the passage of the heavy artillery, Lieut.-General, now Sir Donald, Stewart decided on preparing it for that arm, and for the march of the division led by himself in person. Colonel R. H. Sankey, R.E., was therefore directed to superintend the works, which were executed by our officers and troops. The native track was widened and improved, and by the devotion and energy of the troops the pass was ready for use in a very short space of time. The Spinatija Kotal is much lower than the Khojak, it is approached by a long, gradual ascent up a nulla. The descent on the west side is steeper than the ascent.
The elevations and distances show the nature of the gradients:

Gulistan Karez ... ... ... ... ... ... 5112 feet
Ispintaza or Spinatija Kotal 12-2 miles ... 6888 feet

giving a rise of 148 feet per mile.

The distance from the Kotal of Ispintaza to Gwaja, where the more level skirt is reached, is 10 miles, and the elevation of that place is 4591 feet, which gives a fall of 228 per mile, or of 1 in 23; it is probable, however, an easier descent may be found. After the Gwaja, the Khoja Amran offers no break to the south-west until it comes to an end.

As we were traversing the great plains of Pishin, from Haikalzai to Abdullah Khan, and from the Gazarband to Gulistan Karez, having the profile of the range in full view, we used often to wonder how the great plains extended to the south, and how the Khoja Amran finished. We often longed to explore this region, but having secured two good practicable routes over the range which answered our purpose, it did not fall within the limits of our programme to extend our explorations so far to the left. Subsequently, under the orders of Lieut.-General Stewart, expeditions were organised to report on the country in the direction indicated, and we are indebted to Major W. M. Campbell, R.E., to Captain P. J. Maitland, 3rd Sind Horse, to Captain Wylie, and to Dr. O. T. Duke, for information of much importance on this most interesting quarter of the basin of the Loras.

There is in every mountain system a characteristic configuration which only becomes apparent as we complete our study of it, and plot the work of survey. It is of the greatest benefit if we can speedily grasp the character, as it is often the key to the whole nature of the country. The marked feature in the physical character of South Afghanistan, is the uniform direction and parallelism of the ridges. The great ranges in which lie the water-partings often have a direction of their own, at an angle to the parallel ridges. We find the usual direction of the ridges is from north-east to south-west, and this is the general lie of the slope or tilt of the country.

The range we call the Khoja Amran has this character of parallel ridges, and the feature is exhibited in the outlying range which extends from Kila Abdullah Khan to Gulistan Karez, which leaves an open, nearly level plain between it and the main range. We shall see that the Khoja Amran, though it terminates, yet has the feature of a continued range, taken up by a parallel ridge running in a like direction to the south-west for a distance as yet unknown.

Immediately south-west of the Spinatija Kotal the Khoja Amran is continued under the names, first of Ashusta or Shista, and then Tank. Long spurs branch off to the southwards, terminating on the desert and on the cultivated plain of Shorawak. There are isolated hills carrying on the feature into the desert itself, and the desert sand is dovetailed into the hills. There is here exhibited an actual movement of the sand of the desert over the true land, which it swallows up under the action of the prevailing west wind.
Fig. 7.—Trabz Turgel

Fig. 8.—The plains of Pishin looking towards S.W. Shorawak in the far distance. Sarlat range 50 miles off.
Poti, 31 miles to the south-westward of Ispintaza, is at the end of the Khoja Amran, and on the edge of the Shorawak cultivated land, which is estimated to have a breadth of six miles, and a length of 13 miles down to Hisabat. Including the skirts on both sides, the breadth of the Shorawak Plain is 10 miles, and its length may be 50 miles. The Lora River enters the Shorawak Plain at Mir Allum Khan at its north-east corner, and flows down its eastern border. The river, however, has its waters drawn off by numerous irrigation channels, till in the dry season no water remains. In flood-time the water is stored in reservoirs. The water of the Lora being highly charged with a fertilising mud, the result of this deposit is that Shorawak is very fruitful, bearing all the common grains, &c., abundantly. The plain is 3250 feet above the sea and the climate is perfect in winter, though very hot in summer. Camels thrive well, and the tamarisk and other plants afford abundant grazing. The chief possessors of the Shorawak Plain are the tribe of Barechi Pathans. The Brahuis are mixed with them on the south border, and the Achakzais hold the north border.

The boundaries of this country are: on the western side the desert, on the north the spurs of the Khoja Amran, and on the east the Sarlatti, or Sarlat Range. The south border is not so clearly defined.

The nomenclature of the mountains in these countries is exceedingly difficult to decide. No two tribes agree in pronunciation or in the names by which they describe the same feature. Observers at the same time find it very difficult to catch the correct pronunciation, and, receiving their information from a variety of sources, no two travellers are found to agree. There is therefore much difficulty surrounding this branch of the geographer's duty. As a rule, we are apt to give a general name to a range of mountains, because we notice that it is a great physical feature; but the untravelled and unlearned natives have their own name for the particular portion of it known to each. One can only suggest that the greatest care should be taken in catching the pronunciation, in being sure that we have the right name, and in having it entered in plan and report in a perfectly legible manner.

The Sarlat Range commences a little to the south of Gulistan Karez, as a ridge parallel to the Khoja Amran, and divided from it by the Tangi gorge and by the Lora defile, also called Tangi. This ridge thus overlaps the Khoja Amran. At the north end this range receives the name of Walli or Salwatu, to the south it is called Salat, Salotu, Sarlat, and Sarlatti, and Dr. Duke adds the name of Singhbar. We prefer to use the name Sarlat, by which Major Campbell familiarly calls this feature. The western faces of the Sarlat drain towards Shorawak to the Lora, which in flood-time pursues its course between the desert on the west and this range on the east. The Lora basin is therefore here compressed to a breadth not exceeding 20 miles—a strange contrast to the wide diameter it has across the main plains of Pishin about Haikalzai. The eastern slopes of the Sarlat drain towards a valley called Ispinkal, which is about 2400 feet higher than the Shorawak Plain.
The north end of the Shorawak Plain is a meeting-place of routes. The great kafila road from Kelat to Kandahar crosses the Lora at Mir Allum’s Fort, and, proceeding by Poti, it turns the Khoja Amran, and gains the Gwaja and Kandahar route. The only difficulty met with north of Shorawak is the short defile through the Chawell Range, which is an east and west semi-detached spur of the Tang; the defile is 2.1 miles in length, it is not steep, but would require some labour to make it practicable for wheels.

It would be well if we could find a passable route into the Shorawak Plain from the north-east or eastward, but this does not appear to be possible. The road to Pishin up the Tangi gorges is very difficult, it has to cross and recross the Lora, which, in flood-time, would render the passage impassable.

Over the Sarlat Hills, to the eastward, there are three passes—the Shutar, the Salwatu, and the Bed Kotals; of these, the last is described as the best. It enters the hills about opposite to Hisabat, which is 15 miles south of Poti. For eight miles there is a gradually increasing gradient up to 1 in 23 to the foot of a final ascent, which is even steeper, and narrow. From the crest the descent leads to the fairly open valley of Ispinkai to a place called Ittaz Karez, 3½ miles distant from the crest. There are a few huts here, and a stream and a tank, but no supplies. This road is therefore one which would offer considerable difficulties to the railway. It is not our intention to devote too much space to the consideration of the roads, but the question does arise here as to whether this route does satisfactorily turn the Khoja Amran. The country to the eastward, in the direction of Quetta, is crossed by a number of ridges, and cannot therefore be compared with the plains of Pishin in regard to the facilities offered for a railway; we are therefore led to the conclusion, that we shall not find any route which affords such facilities as the Gwaja, where the difficulties, we believe, may be overcome.

Southern Boundary.—In carrying out our purpose of defining the next portion of the frame or lip of the Lora basin, we now find considerable difficulty, as we have no plan, and only a sketch report of Major Campbell’s to study.

As before mentioned, the Ispinkai Valley is, proceeding eastwards, the next valley to Shorawak. There is a branch of the Ispinkai Valley, which, equally with it, seems to take its origin to the north, in an offshoot of the Sarlat Range. This valley is called Kotori, it drains into the Ispinkai Valley, which runs parallel to the Sarlat Hills, and the waters of this last run southward, and fall into the Kaisar, which flows towards Nushki. We are unable to trace this connection, but from the direction of the head of the Ispinkai and Kotori valleys, we know that from where these spring there must be a water-parting towards Pishin, which defines the edge of the Lora basin in this direction. Following Campbell’s track, we find that the feature next in order to the eastward of Kotori is an extensive vale running several miles to the north and also to the south-west, divided from the Kotori by a low
water-parting. It seems to be bounded by hills in both directions. The width of the plain is three miles, it is gently undulating, with a good deal of level ground, and the elevation is about 5400 feet. The western edge of this plain appears to be about 20 miles from the Shorawak Plain, and the spot where it was entered is due east of Iltaz Karez, probably south-east of Potti. A short distance south of the track by which Campbell crossed, there is a water-parting, and from here water drains north into the Lora through the Kurum Dasht, and south to the Kaisar torrent by the Tilera Dasht. So that here we have again the edge of the Lora basin. All these valleys, Ispinkai, Kotori, Kurum, and Tilera are without settled inhabitants—the country is a grazing ground for the pastoral tribes. To the eastward of Kurum and Tilera a continuous range, called variously Zarisar or Allser, divides these plains from Shorud.

Shorud is a plain at an elevation of about 4800 feet. It is well watered by kerezes which have their sources in the Zarisar Hills. There are five principal villages, Makhmad Kheli, Chichezai, Panjpai, Sir Kozai, and Mial Khanzai. Chichezai, seven miles E.N.E. of the east end of the pass through the Zarisar Hills, is 18½ miles from Iltaz Karez. This valley, which seems to have its position now determined for the first time, will, when it has been completely surveyed and plotted, add much to our geographical knowledge, and having a drainage from south to north it belongs to the basin of the Loras.

Shorud receives the waters of the river marked in Wilson's map «Khurd Singbur.» The Sir-in-ab, which is the combined river of Kelat, Mangurchur, and Mustang, also flows through a portion of the valley, and the combined drainage of this extensive basin then flows, under the name of Lora, northwards to Pishin, to join the Greater Lora there. This Lora is a salt stream, and it gives the name of Shor to the country it traverses—Shor-rud—we may therefore very properly name this Lora the Shorud Lora.

The boundaries of Shorud given by Campbell are: on the west the Zarisar Hills having a direction N.N.E. and on the east the Dinar Range a defined feature trending north by east. This direction will set the course of the Shorud Lora very far to the north-eastward of that indicated in Wilson's map, which shows it sketched with a north-west course from Panjpai until it falls into the Pishin Lora. The direction given to the ranges bounding Shorud renders such a course impossible. We believe that the confluence will be found to lie about due west of the Gazarband, and not far south of Segai, which is on the Lora, between the Gazarband and Gulistan Karez.

In the present state of our geographical knowledge of all this quarter it is impossible to make a satisfactory study of the water-partings of the Shorud Lora basin. The western lip is as yet very undefined. The area drained by this river is very extensive, and it would be very interesting to have a separate report on it. The Kelat branch appears by Wilson's map to rise in the Herbu Mountains, an offshoot of the great Hala Range. Thus from south to north, from the source of the
On the top of this hill there was in old times a post said to have been held by the Moguls. Remains of tanks, cultivation, and ruined walls still exist.
Kelat stream to that of the Surkhab, the basin of the Lora is 180 miles across. In the highlands of the Hala Range are the sources of streams running in every direction.

While we are studying this portion of the Lora basin, it will be well to record what is known of the road which strikes south from Kelat to gain the sea at Sonmiani.

The distance from Kelat to Sonmiani is 340 miles, which is divided into twenty marches. Some of these marches vary from 18 to 24 miles, the stages being of this great length on account of the scarcity of water. There are only six places—viz. Sohrab, Bagwaná, Khozdar, Wudd, Bela, and Uthal—where supplies in any quantity are procurable, and at most camps little or nothing is to be had. The heat on the southern half of the road is naturally very great, rendering this route impassable during four months of the year.

The harbour at Sonmiani is unfit for vessels drawing over 17 feet of water; and this difficulty, added to the general impracticability of the road, throws this route out of consideration in discussing the possible roads to Pishin.

South-eastern Boundary.—We must now turn to the remaining portion of the basin under study with which we have a personal acquaintance. The Great Chiltán, 12,000 feet, rises from a girdle of plains, which, though elevated, and forming part of a high table-land, still leave much grandeur to the abrupt forms of this commanding ridge, which was so far our leading landmark. The skirts of Chiltán give rise to waters flowing to the Dasht-i-Bedaulat, towards the Shorud Lora, via the fertile little valley of Kanak, and towards Mustang. From a little to the west of Chiltán flows the left branch of the Shalkot Lora. The right or Shull branch rises in the eastern skirt of Chiltan at Sir-i-ab. Other sources of this Lora lie in the Hunna and the Surra Khwulla passes. Chiltan, Murdar, Takatu and the range called in succession Dinar, Masallugh, and Anjeram, form the boundaries of the Shalkot valleys.

Having thus defined the lip of the whole basin as nearly as we are able, we proceed now to give our impressions of the interior space—the plains and intersecting ridges.

Plains and Intersecting Ridges.—The Shalkot valleys and plains are continuous, without the break of any dividing ridge. From Sir-i-ab to the base of the precipices of Takatu, there is one unbroken vale of plains and skirts, five to six miles wide and 15 miles long. From the Hunna Pass to the slopes of the Musallugh, for a distance of 16 miles, there is one sweep of open valley. The valley to the west of the Chiltan ridge is no less open, and it meets the Quetta Valley, and continues and joins the Kujlak and Urmuzai plains. Wilson's map gives this feature fairly well; but the map of the Suliman Mountains, in the Society's 'Proceedings,' brings the slopes of Chiltan and Takatu until they meet on the banks of the Lora. We would here venture to observe that the small scale on which such maps are drawn, does not permit the draughtsman to give any shading to such small features as the genti-
slopes of the mountain glacis, or to the minor ridges and spurs. If such minor features can be represented, they should be traced with the lightest and most delicate indications.

The Shalkot plains, as we have just said, are continuous, and run round the spur of Takatu, over which the Murgi Pass offers a short cut to Kujlak, the open vale of the Kakar Lora being produced right up to the Balozai Plateau, as described in the early pages of this paper. This distinct feature of plains of the Shalkot and Kakar Loras is divided from Pishin by ranges of minor character, and broken and confused hills.

From Anjeram, in continuation of the range, a long spur is thrust out to the north-east, which, though broken and gradually sinking into the plain, can be traced all the way to Khushdil Khan. This range is crossed by the Gazarband, in a direct line from Quetta to Gulistan Karez. And here the range for some distance divides the Shalkot and Kakar Lora Plain from the great Plain of Pishin.

From abreast of Nilai, a little to the north of Kujlak, there commences the defined uniform feature of the Jhur Range. Though of minor elevation, it has a distinct character, dividing as it does the Kakar Lora Valley from that of the Surkhab, and the plain of Syud Yaru Karez. The southern termination of the Jhur, and the northern extremity of the Anjeram, throw off many wave-like lesser ridges and hummocky hills, which complete the separation of the Kujlak Plain from that of Syud Yaru Karez.

This configuration has a great importance, as it divides the basin into compartments. The boundary between Kelat and Afghanistan runs diagonally from a little north of Kujlak, leaving that place in Kelat, and Julobghir and Mehtarzai in Afghan dominion.

The Kakar and Shalkot Loras approach each other near Julobghir and Mehtarzai, and there is between them a level tract down nearly to their junction; the left bank of the Shalkot stream, however, has cut into the projections of Anjeram, and the Kakar Lora has on its right bank scarped those of the Jhur. The road to Pishin crosses the Shalkot Lora near Kujlak, where the banks, 20 to 25 feet high, are composed of clay. The road then crosses through low hills, finding some level ground and undulations mixed, and passes both streams a little to the eastward of the junction. After crossing the Kakar Lora, the edge of the open plain of Syud Yaru is reached at the village of Haidarzai.

The Syud Yaru Plain is wider than the plains just described, and extends to and joins up with the Surkhab Valley, and is unbroken in the direction of Khushdil Khan. To the westward, the long, broken projection of Anjeram divides it from Pishin proper. Having reached this dividing ridge, we find the whole plain spread out in one vast surface, extending to a distant horizon in the direction of Shorawak, where the Khoja Amran may be seen fading away into the horizon, and the Sarlat can be recognised floating like an island in the mirage.
We were first made completely acquainted with the whole arrangement of the internal part of the Pishin basin on gaining the top of the Sural Mugzai Pass, and in our excursion in the Barshor Valley.

This great open space is inhabited by a population of Syuds and Tarins, with a fringe of Kakars and Achakzaibs. Generally employed in agriculture and engaged in mercantile pursuits, they are decidedly peaceable in their habits, and would gladly be defended from the incursions of their more warlike neighbours who live in the hills which bound the north, east, and west sides of the province. Though the country is strangely bare of vegetation, it is abundantly well watered by the numerous streams and karezes which descend from the surrounding mountains. Chains of villages follow the watercourses, and the area of cultivation is even now very considerable. This interesting country requires repose and the fostering care of a strong and good government.

Considering the miraculous change brought about by the last twenty years of peace and quiet in the Punjab and in Sind, it is possible to realise what will take place here. Before the next twenty years will have come to a close, the railway will have passed on towards Persia, through tracts of country over which it is even now possible to drive a phaeton. Roads or railways will have been constructed down the easy and fertile valleys of the Kakar country to India. The area of cultivation will have increased, and groves will have sprung up around the villages and along the watercourses. The people, already traders, will have benefited by the new communications, and in carrying their produce down to India and to the sea, and returning with European goods, they will have learnt by their intercourse the value of commerce and of a peaceable, firm, and just rule. Such has been the change produced in many other countries, and notably in those mentioned, which have passed under our influence in India, and we may safely draw such a picture of the immediate future of Pishin.

It is the duty of the explorer to obtain the records of the physical character of the countries he visits, and to convey the impressions he forms to the world, and in doing his hope is that civilisation and benefit to man may follow in his track.

2. FROM PISHIN TO THE SULIMAN MOUNTAIN

This paper would be incomplete if we were to omit to describe the discoveries made on the return march to India between Pishin and the Suliman Mountains. I propose, therefore, to describe shortly the leading features we met with.

At Ushtirrah Sirra, which it will be remembered is the water-parting of the Surkhab flowing to Pishin, we find the head of a drainage which eventually reaches the Nara or Sibi stream.

At five miles westward from the pass the valley we descend is met by a branch valley coming from the east, both valleys opening to each other, hemmed in on the south by the massive ridges of Mazwah and
Spinskhar. The combined stream of the two valleys escapes in a southerly direction by a gap, a very abrupt feature, which is called Lehrgut. Five miles from the junction the Pass of Momandgai is reached; elevation 8457 feet. Here we find the water-parting of a new drainage into the Borai Valley, which runs without a break by a uniform slope for 82 miles in a direction very nearly due east.

We must not, however, leave these highlands without remarking on the highly picturesque character of the country, particularly between the two passes. Mazwah and Spinskhar rise abruptly into grand rugged forms, having their lower slopes gracefully disposed and varied with a growth of cypress and other trees and shrubs (Fig. 10). In our travels we have not seen anywhere so luxuriant a growth. Momandgai is the division between Khorassan and India and also between the Panizai and Dumar sections of the Kakar tribe. The valley stretching to the eastward, descending gradually, soon loses its wooded character, and the slopes and plains assume the bare aspect of the South Afghan landscape. At Obushkai, $8\frac{1}{4}$ miles from the pass, the two bounding ridges are far apart; and at Chimjan, $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles further, the valley commences to be spread into wide plains.

Three miles to the east of Chimjan there stands the singularly-formed table mountain called Siazgai (Syajgai), which, rising well out in the plain, is a natural fortress (Fig. 9). There is here a meeting of plains and routes, and the locality has in the eyes of the people a great prestige and importance. In the old time the Moguls used the hill as a military post, and it seemed to us that it might again serve such a purpose. There is cultivation at Chimjan, and the fruit-trees and fields present a refreshing contrast to the wild hills and plain. Siazgai stands out in noble proportions as a principal object in this strange and yet grand landscape.

The offshoot from the so-called Western Suliman lying to the north of the Borai Valley divides it from Zhob. Another parallel limb separates Borai from Smalan, Tal, and Chotiali. Thus we find three great valleys having their origin in the highlands east of Pishin so disposed as to offer a choice of routes towards the Punjab. We never could have anti-
anticipated that this hitherto unexplored country would prove to be laid out so favourably for the routes we were in search of.

The lower portion of Borai is well watered, the villages are close together and well built, and to afford security against the attacks of the Marris, who sweep their marauding bodies up to this distant valley, every village is a little fort. Orchards peep above the enclosures, and fields extend from village to village. This fertile portion of the valley stretches from Ningand to Sharan, and on to Chinai. The bounding ridge between Borai and Zhob has a most strange physical character. It is a huge glacis or whale's back, having cross parallel ridges on its surface, which are disposed like cross waves on an ocean swell. The line of these ridges is about north-east and south-west. Between the ridges there are wide gaps and open passes into Zhob.

Now it must be understood that the Borai Valley has a length of about 100 miles of almost unobstructed plain, varying from five to ten miles in width. At Sharan the plain extends still in an easterly and a north-easterly direction; but the Borai River turns sharp to the south, finding an outlet through the Anumbar gap. The stream draining Western Borai is called the Lorai, and that from the eastern valley Sahan, the two meeting in the Anumbar gap. The hills on each side forming the portals of the gap are abrupt and grand masses; the western hill is called Khru (Kuru), and the eastern Guddibar (Gadiwar). (Fig. 11).

While we were in these localities we were informed of a route via Mekhtar and Karwadi which leads out to the Rakni Plain, avoiding the Barkhan Plain, following a direct line towards the Sakhi Sarwar Pass. Here also other important features were made known to us. Thus we were told that the Zhob Valley had a breadth of plain greater than that of Borai, and it was clearly explained that its outlet is towards the Galeri stream. We were also informed that due east from Sharan there lies an elevated plateau, to which the plains of Zhob and of Borai extend. In this dome-like mass, to which the natives give the name Sahara, are to be found the water-partings towards Zhob, Borai, Rakni, and the Vihova Pass. The Zhob Valley cannot, therefore, as represented in the recent edition of Walker's map of Turkistan, find an exit through the Suliman by the Vihova. When we were on the top of the Fort Munro Pass, on the Suliman, this feature of the Sahara Plain was pointed out to us looming in the distance, and we could see the Rakni Plain extending as far as the eye could reach in a direction towards it.

The physical character of the angle between Borai, Zhob, and the Suliman is most interesting, and ought to be cleared up at the first opportunity. The gap of the Anumbar is a most important feature. By it we were able to escape in the direction we wanted to go without attempting a more northerly and possibly more complicated line of country. We here open out on the Luni country, which is wide, level, and cultivated on the banks of the Anumbar. The valley trends to the south-west, and meets the Tal Chotiali Valley. The drainage area of
this vast system of valleys is a very notable feature, as here are collected
the floods which have occasionally swept over the Kacchi Plain.

We might have followed the Anurnbar down to Chotiall, and thus have
turned some of the rough country we now met with, but we preferred
to make a straight course for the Barkhan Plain via Trikn Kuram,
Chimalang (Tsamaulang), and Bala Dhaka.

The country intervening between the Luni country and Bakhans is
uninhabited, and a veritable debatable land. In it no man's life is safe.
It is overrun by all tribes on its borders, viz. by Khetrans, by Lunis,
and by Marris. There are here two valleys lying north-east and south-
west, the Chimalang and that of Bala Dhaka. These valleys are bounded
by three ridges; of these, the last, the Jandhran, is a long and formidable
feature, and the only practicable path over it to Lugari Barkhan is by
the Han Pass. This Pass was easily made fit for our passage, but it
required careful loading of camels. We thought that a cart road or even
a railway could be made over it by pursuing a more circuitous track.

The Khetran Plains, joining on to the Lugari Barkhan Plains, run along
the eastern foot of the Jandhran Range; and the outlet from the Hand
and the debatable land is through the Han Durrah, a narrow gap 200
yards wide. At the foot of the Han there is, however, a more formidable
gateway in an uplifted ridge of only a few feet wide. At the mouth of
the Han Durrah stands the deserted town of Hasni Kot, abandoned
some five years ago on account of the inroads of Lunis and Marris.
The Barkhan-Khetran plains are open, well watered, and fertile, and
they lead one to the other, presenting easy passages to the Chachar
Pass to the south-west and to the Rakni Plain to the north-east. Arrived
here, we found we had reached a friendly country—the Pathan tribes
were left far behind—we were now able to relax some of the severe
duties of watch and guard which had hitherto been so necessary to the
safety of our columns.

The Suliman Range seen from the westward rises boldly above the
Rakni Plain, and is a marked physical feature. Rothar at the foot, in
the Rakni Plain, is 3617 feet high, and the point where we crossed is
6158 feet. The climate of the Suliman was in April most pleasant. On
the border of Pishin we had snow in March, but down through Borai
the weather was deliciously temperate, and spring was coming on.
The fruit-trees were in bloom, and the corn an indescribable green. From
a temperature of 40° to 50° we in one afternoon dropped down from
Fort Munro to Zeradan, where we found the thermometer at 90° to 100°.

The country of the Derajat between the Suliman and the Indus is a rude
jumble of old river beds and ridges, arid and hot with little verdure,
which prepared us to enjoy the luxuriant trees and cultivation of Dera
Ghazi Khan.

The Chachar Pass was found to present a more gradual descent than
the Fort Munro route, and we thought it quite capable of being made
passable for wheeled transport.
The appended section (Fig. 12) will enable the reader to understand the gradients of the passes and the position and elevation of the plains between the Indus and the Kadanai Valley on the west side of Pishin.

FIG. 12.—SECTION OF ROUTE FROM THE INDUS TO THE PLAINS OF PISHIN

3. RAILWAY FROM SAKKAR TO KANDAHAR

Since this paper has been in the press information has reached us of the completion of the railway from Sakkar across the plains of Kachhi to Dadar. This work is an accomplished fact, and we cannot but admire the energy with which the project has been carried into execution. All things considered, we believe that in the present situation it was absolutely necessary to choose this line, which at one connects the foot of the Bolan with our Indian system of railways. Whatever difficulties we may meet with in the future, consequent on the Indus floods on the one hand, and the outpour of water from the mountains on the other, must be overcome by suitable works and construction. As regards the Borai line, we think, after much weighing of the matter, that such a communication may be developed in the distant future; but in the meantime we possess what we immediately require, and at any cost the railway so far constructed must be extended to Pishin, and eventually to Kandahar.

Dadar has an elevation of 750 feet, and the Bolan is a difficult route to the plains above. To avoid the Bolan, it is intended to divert the line up the Nara Valley by Sibi, and so gain the plains of Pishin at Gwal. We have no information of the exact direction of the line, but we know that the Ushmughzai Pass is the highest point on the water-parting between Sibi and Gwal, and its elevation is 6327 feet. The distance between Dadar and the passes into the basin of the Loras it may be possible by following the sinuosities of the country to spin out to 120 miles, but in this instance it will be necessary to surmount the 5500 feet difference of level.

There are three passes over which it may be possible to conduct the railroad, but in the present state of our geographical knowledge we cannot as yet know what may be decided on. The Hunna and Sura Khwulla lead into the Shalkot or Quetta plain. The Ushmungzhai Pass leads direct
on Gwal by the Sagarband defile. We have some idea that the choice will fall upon the latter.

Once Gwal is reached, it is probable the line will follow the loop of plains by Khanizai, and descend into the great Pishin Plain at Killa Khushdil Khan, which is an important point. From here the road along the Daman offers a line free from the obstructions of the many nullas of the Lora, which would be met with in taking a more direct line from Kujlak to Gulistan Karez, at the foot of the Gwaja. Thus, to sum up the difficulties to be met with, we find the most serious are that of the rise from Sibi over the lip of the Lora basin—whether it be by the Hunna, the Sura Khwulla, or the Ushmughzai. The plains of the Loras having been entered on, no obstacle of note presents itself till it arrives at the Khoja Amran. From the Khoja Amran to Kandahar there are continuous plains, the principal obstructions being the numerous cross streams, which would require bridging, and wide water-ways.
THE MOUNTAIN PASSES ON THE AFGHAN FRONTIER

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The ranges of mountains which form the north-west frontier of British India compose a system which may be separately studied, although they are connected by an unbroken water-parting with the Hindu Kush and the outer Himalaya.

The mountains of the Hindu Kush are the boundaries of the Afghan valleys on one side, whence the Kabul River flows direct to the Indus, and the river of Kandahar to its inland receiving lake. On the other side are the Sulimani mountain ranges, which (considered as one system) present an unbroken line completely separating the drainage of the Afghan valleys from that of the Indus.

A ridge, forming the water-parting between the Ghazni and Kabul basins, shoots off from the Hindu Kush, and its continuation, running east and west, from the lofty range of the Safid-Koh. The River Kabul washes its northern base, and its long parallel spurs extend to the Indus.

The Safid-Koh is the northern portion of the system which forms the subject of the present paper. Its limit in a northerly direction is the right bank of the Kabul River. From the southern face of that range, a system of mountains, with parallel ridges and many spurs, extends in one continuous line to the Arabian Sea, and forms the north-western boundary of British India. It is generally known as the Sulimani Range, but it includes more than one chain, and a closer study of its general features will show the necessity for a stricter definition of its several parts.

Like the Himalaya, the Sulimani system consists of an inner chain on which most of the rivers flowing to the Indus rise, with a continuous unbroken ridge, a central chain, and an outer chain, with lofty peaks and deep gorges, through which the rivers force their way into the Indus plain. The country between these chains consists of numerous transverse and parallel ridges and valleys, and several remarkable plateaus; and in some parts of the outer line there are indications of a formation analogous to the Dhuns and Sewaliks of the Himalayan system. The easternmost or outer chain, rising from the plains of India, is known as the Koh-i-Surkh or red range, and the inner chain is called the Koh-i-Siyah or black range. The famous peak of Takht-i-Suliman, or "throne of Solomon," is on this outer range, and the name of Sulimani should, therefore, be applied to it; while the inner range, forming the water-parting between India and the inland Afghan valleys should, for
the sake of precision, have a distinct name. It commences from the Safid-Koh, and runs in a general north and south direction to the lofty peaks of Tukatu, overlooking the Bolan Pass. It has been proposed to give the name of Jadran to this inner range, in accordance with the views of Captain Broadfoot. That distinguished explorer gave this name to what he calls the chief of the Sulimani Chain, which he himself saw joining the last roots of the Safid-Koh, and he held that it continued, under different names, to near Kwatah (Quetta). The name is derived from the wild Jadrans who occupy part of the eastern slopes. But, on the whole, and keeping in mind the analogy of the Himalayans system, it will be most conducive to clearness and accuracy of statement, if we adopt the term western and eastern Sulimani, for the inner and outer chains respectively.

South of the Bolan Pass, the mountain range continues to the Arabian Sea at Cape Monze, a distance of 350 miles. Pottinger, on his map, called this chain the Brahuik Mountains, the Brahuis forming an important part of the population of Baluchistan. Mr. Hughes has used the same nomenclature in his recent work on Baluchistan. But the term Hala Mountains appears to have been more generally adopted, and will, therefore, be used in this paper.

The mountain region which will be the subject of our study and discussion, consists of the Safid-Koh Range, running east and west from the Hindu Kush to the Indus; of the three parallel chains of the eastern, central, and western Sulimanis, running north and south from the Safid-Koh to the Bolan Pass; and of the Hala Mountains extending thence to the Arabian Sea at Cape Monze. The mountains are inhabited by Pathan or Afghan tribes in the northern, and by Baluch tribes in the southern part; the whole of the Hala Range, and part of the eastern Sulimani north of the Bolan Pass, being occupied by the latter.

Our knowledge of this mountainous region is still very imperfect, and is mainly derived from the narratives of travellers who have crossed it at a few points, and from the reports of officers accompanying expeditionary forces. It is necessary to piece together the scattered information so as to bring it into one focus, and to make some approach to systematic arrangement of existing materials, if we would acquire a general knowledge of the important region under discussion. With this object I propose to commence from the northern extremity on the right bank of the Kabul River, and to make a contribution towards describing each pass, and the locality of each tribe from north to south, until we reach the southern extreme of the Hala Mountains. At best our view will be incomplete, and in some places hazy and doubtful; but it will be an honest, and therefore useful, attempt to take stock of the knowledge we now possess.

The Sulimani Mountains are interesting, not only from their geographical importance, but from the historical associations attaching to them, and from their having contained, in all ages, the gates to the rich empire of India. The plants, on their eastern slopes, yielding the sacred soma juice, and wood mentioned in the Rig Veda hymns, bear silent but
unerring testimony to the roads by which the earliest Aryan settlers found their way into the valley of the Indus. It was along the perilous route on the northern face of the Safid-Koh that the early Chinese pilgrims reached the revered sites of Gautama's ministrations, and by the same way Alexander and his Greeks marched to the conquest of the Punjab. In November, 1001, Mahmud of Ghazni came down the valley of the Kabul River with ten thousand horsemen; and he returned to Ghazni by a more southern pass. Muhammad Ghor traversed the defiles of the Sulimani in 1191, and his lieutenant Ilduz kept the road open from the Indus to Ghazni by the Kurram Pass. Down the same pass the heroic prince Jalalu-'d-Din of Khuwarizm was hunted by Chingiz Khan, and driven into the Indus; and the conquering Timur also used the Kurram route for his invasion of India. Baber, the founder of the dynasty of the «Great Moguls,» traversed the Khaibar and the Gomul. He knew most of the passes, and was the first geographer among the conquerors of India. His topographical descriptions are masterly, and Captain Broadfoot, who followed on several of his tracks, only once thought that he had detected him indulging in oriental exaggeration. (1) Baber's descendants at one time turned the current of invasion in the opposite direction, and scaled the Sulimani Mountains with aggressive armies collected on the plains of India. Thus, a son of the Emperor Shah Jehan marched up the Sanghar Pass to Kandahar; but the tide soon turned again, and in the last century Nadir Shah and Ahmed Durani led conquering hordes down the Khaibar and Bolan passes. In our own day we once more see the rulers of India advancing up from the plains to the mountain subahs of Afghanistan, which were included in the empire of their predecessors, to avert the possibility of another invasion of Hindustan by the gates of the Sulimani Range.

The extraordinary historical interest thus attaching to this mountain frontier enhances the importance of systematising and arranging the geographical knowledge connected with it. The range also presents certain peculiarities from its position, which make its examination specially desirable for the furtherance of several branches of scientific investigation in their relations to geography. For instance, as regards botany, the exploration of the Sulimani Mountains will tend to show the relative distribution of members of the Persian and Indian floras which lie on either side of them; and the same interest attaches, for similar reasons, to researches in zoology. Beyond the collection of a few fossils in the nummulitic limestones, and the hasty descriptions of rock formations by passing travellers, the geology of the range is unknown. (2)

(1) Baber visited the shores of the Lake Abistada, and he says that the number of waterfowl was innumerable, and that a reddish tinge was given to the mass when they turned their wings in the air. When Broadfoot passed by the lake he saw few or no birds, and therefore suspected the royal author of exaggeration. But Masson, who also visited Lake Abistada, says that there were vast numbers of birds, and moreover that they had red legs; which is a remarkable corroboration of Baber's narrative (l. p. 261).

(2) Vigne says that it consists of recent formations, principally sandstone and secondary limestone; and that the fossiliferous portions contain ammonites and marine remains. The strata, he adds, are much shattered and contorted, and often overlaid by shingle or debris. A few nummulites were exhibited at the Punjab Exhibition of 1884 from the Derah Ghazi Khan district. The natives relate that the larger fossils are the petrified clothes of fifty betrothed virgins. They were once surprised while bathing
The Safid-Koh, its Spurs and Defiles.—We will now commence our survey of the region with the Safid-Koh Range, and the spurs from it to the north and east, including the Khaibar and Karkacha passes. We are able to do so under very efficient guidance, for this country has been described by Elphinstone and Macartney; was explored by Burnes, Leech and Lord, by Lieutenants Wood and Mackeson, by Moorcroft, Vigne and Masson, and was traversed by the forces of Wade, Pollock, and Nott.

The Safid-Koh Range, rising out of the high table-land which separates the Kabul and Ghazni basins, follows the 34th parallel of latitude for about a hundred miles, then sends one arm to the north-east, terminating on the Kabul River, which makes a great curve northwards to flow round its base. The main range continues eastward to the Indus between Kohat and Peshawar. The highest peak is the Sikaram (3) Mountain, 15,622 feet above the sea, whence the range preserves a tolerably uniform level, perhaps nowhere less than 12,500 feet, until it again culminates in a double-peaked mountain, whose summit average is 14,800 feet (4). The first northern spur of the Safid-Koh is the water-parting which divides the valley of the Logar River from that of the Khurd Kabul. Here is the defile of evil fame, commencing about 10 miles east of the city of Kabul, 6 miles long, with a width of 100 to 200 yards, and high mountains on either side, the road crossing the stream which flows down it twenty-three times. When Sir Robert Sale forced it in 1841, it was defended by 200 Ghilzis, and he lost 67 men; while on the 8th of January, 1842, the retreating garrison of Kabul, under General Elphinstone, was attacked at the head of the defile; a panic ensued, baggage and arms were abandoned, and 3000 souls are believed to have perished.

The next northern spur from the Safid-Koh is crossed by the Tangi Takhi Pass, and the next is crossed by the Haft Kotul Pass. The latter name signifies «seven passes,» and the pass is about three miles long. Here Sale fought a gallant and successful action, here the massacre of the retreating garrison of Kabul was continued, and here the Afghans were defeated with great slaughter by General Pollock, in September, 1842. Next comes a higher range, forming the boundary of the Tezin Valley, which is called by Wood the Karkacha Range. It extends to the right bank of the Kabul. That river separates it from a chain on the opposite side, which may be traced from the outskirts of Kafiristan, above Swat and Khagan, in continuation of the Himalaya in Kashmir. Thus the Karkacha may perhaps be considered as a connecting link between the Himalaya and Sulimani ranges. The Tezin River has a

by their future husbands. They prayed heaven to grant them a covering, and in answer to their petition the earth swallowed them up, and their clothes became stones. There were also belemnites, and several species of echinus, at the Exhibition. Dr. Fleming described the nummulitic limestones of the Sulimani Range, above the Oerajot, in the «Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society,» ix. p. 340. The Trans-Indus Salt Range was surveyed by Mr. Wynne of the Geological Survey, accompanied by Dr. Warth, in 1873; and Dr. Weagen examined the relations and mode of occurrence of the fossils in the Salt Range.

(3) Or Sitaram.

northerly course, from the Safid-Koh to the Kabul, of about 40 miles. It flows through a valley which is partly cultivated, and four passes lead from it over the Karkacha Hills, namely, the Karkacha, the Sokhta, the Chinar, and the Lataband. The Lataband Pass, which was used by Sir A. Burnes in 1832, is 6 miles long. It turns the Khurd Kabul, and the city of Kabul is in sight from its summit. The Karkacha Pass is the highest and most southerly, (5) being nearly 8000 feet above the sea. It was explored by Lieutenant Wood in September, 1837, who followed up the bed of a stream called the Hisarak until it contracted to a narrow defile 10 feet wide, the sides of which were naked, craggy, and precipitous. From the summit of the pass there is a glorious view of the mountain chains round Kabul, and the slopes are covered with almond-trees and wild flowers. The mountains are of blue slate. In the Tezin Valley Sir Robert Sale defeated an Afghan force on 22nd October, 1841, when on his march to Jalalabad. The remnant of the retreating garrison of Kabul, under Brigadier Shelton, reached Tezin on the 11th of January, 1842; and here General Pollock fought an action on the 12th of September, 1842.

The narrow and winding defile of Jagdallak (6), in which the last remnant of the Kabul garrison was massacred on the 12th of January, 1842, constitutes the first passage over the Karkacha, and leads to the three more northern passes over that range.

Between the Karkacha and Khaibar ranges there is an extensive valley, bounded on the south by the lofty Safid-Koh, on the north by the Kabul River, and intersected by lower hills. It is about 80 miles long by 35, and in many parts is highly cultivated. Jalalabad, surrounded by fields and fruit-gardens, stands near its midst, and several streams, the chief of which is the Surkh-rud, flow across it to the Kabul. The district including the slopes in the southern part of the valley of Jalalabad is called Nangnahar, not, as Lieutenant Wood supposed, because it contains nine rivers, (7) for the word is, as Colonel Yule explains, a corruption of the ancient Indian name Nagarahara (the Nagara of Ptolemy), written in Baber's time Nagarhar. Baber also calls it Adinapur, (8) and the plain is the Germisil or hot, as distinguished from the Serdisil or cold country. In 1508 Baber made a garden at Adinapur. To the westward of Jalalabad, on the north side of the Kabul, is the small district of Lamghan or Laghman, surrounded by mountains; and it was through it that the Chinese pilgrim Hiouen Thsang approached India.

(5) In Wood's *Oxus* there is a misprint of northerly for southerly.
(6) Colonel Yule identifies the *Ghideli* of Benedict Goes and the *Djeguld-All* or Forster with Jagdallak. Cathay, &c., ii. p. 556 (n).
(7) Wood's *Oxus* p. 105, and ed.
(8) Masson identified the site of Adinapur (l. pp. 182, 183).
crossing the Kabul River opposite Jalalabad. This seems to have been a usual route, for the Emperor Baber, in his ‘Memoirs,’ mentions, among four roads which lead from Kabul to Hindustan, ‘one by way of Lamghanat, which comes by the hill of Khaibar, in which there is one short hill pass.’ Thus the route appears to have followed the left bank of the Kabul through Lamghan, then to have crossed the river at Jalalabad, and entered the Khaibar defile. Masson made an excursion to Lamghan, crossing the river near Jalalabad. (9) East of Jalalabad a spur from the Safid-Koh stretches out to the River Kabul, and is crossed by a pass called the Khurd-Khaibar opposite to Lalpura. Two miles from the entrance of the Khaibar defile are the two villages and fort of Daka (1404 feet above the sea), about half a mile from the right bank of the Kabul; while on the opposite shore is the town of Lalpura, the chief place of the Mohmand tribe. A ferry of boats, and a difficult ford, when the river is low, connect the two places.

East of the Jalalabad Plain is the Khaibar Range, joined by a ridge to the northern face of the Safid-Koh. The range goes north for 15 miles, then spreads east and west, with spurs to the Kabul River, having a length of 35 and a width of about 15 miles. The connecting ridge is only 3400 feet above the sea, but the chain rises again in the Tartara Peak (6800 feet above the sea), which overlooks the Kabul River, and the valley of Peshawar. Two streams rise on the connecting ridge, one flowing north-west to the Kabul River, the other south of east to the Peshawar Valley at Jamrud. The beds of these streams form the Khaibar Pass. The actual eastern entrance of the Khaibar defile is at Kadam, 3 miles beyond Jamrud, where the hills close in on either side, and the width of the pass is 450 feet. Further on it narrows to 190 and then to 70 feet, and at Ali Masjid the width of the pass is 150 yards, with almost perpendicular sides. Ali Masjid (2433 feet above the sea) is a fort built on a conical hill 600 feet high, on the south side of the pass. Here the water is clear but unwholesome, owing to being impregnated with antimony. Ali Masjid is 8 miles from the entrance of the pass, 26 from Peshawar, and 67 from Jalalabad. Further on, in the Lalabeg Valley, the pass widens to a mile and a half, but it closes in again to a narrow gorge with precipices on either side, before the Landikhana Pass is reached on the connecting ridge (3373 feet), whence the descent is easy to Daka in the plain of Jalalabad, which is 1404 feet above the sea. The whole distance through the Khaibar Pass, from Jamrud to Daka, is 33 miles, with an easy gradient along the torrent beds, practicable for carts all the way. But there is danger of sudden rains in July and August, and also in December and January, when the roadway is converted into a torrent. Lieutenant Wood tells us that, when he was in the pass, the waters came down so rapidly, and the little rill swelled so quickly into an impassable stream, that the party was divided, some having sought shelter on the right and others on the left bank.

The Khaibar Pass, as we have seen, was that used by Alexander the Great, by Mahmud of Chazni, by Baber on more than one occasion, and

by Nadir Shah; and to every invading army the Afridi mountaineers gave serious trouble if they were not bought off. By this perilous road came Benedict Goes, Forster, and many an earlier wayfarer; by it travelled Moorcroft, Masson, and Vigne; and in 1837 Burnes, Lord, and Wood. In 1839 it became the scene of operations of British troops. On the 22nd of July, Colonel Wade, with an army of 10,000 men, entered the pass and captured the fort of Ali Masjid on the 27th, after an encounter, in which the British loss was 22 killed and 158 wounded. He met with no further opposition. A strong post was left at Ali Masjid; and another under Lieutenant Mackeson near Daka, to keep open communications with Peshawar. When Jalalabad was blockaded, it was proposed to send a force to the relief of Sale's garrison. On January 15th, 1842, Colonel Moseley reached Ali Masjid, but Brigadier Wilde, who followed him, was repulsed with heavy loss. Moseley was then forced to fight his way back through the pass, with a loss of 32 killed and 157 wounded. General Pollock advanced on April 6th, 1842, and was fiercely resisted at the entrance of the gorge, but the Afridis were routed and made no further resistance, the British loss being 14 killed and 114 wounded. On the return the British army was in three divisions. Pollock marched through without any casualty; but the second division, and the third, under Nott, were attacked three times, and suffered losses.

There is another pass over the Khaibar Range, to the north, and nearer the Kabul River, called the Tartara route. It leaves the Jalalabad Plain at Daka, and goes over very difficult and rugged mountains to Peshawar, a distance of 32 miles, emerging into that valley 9 miles north of Jamrud. Following the course of the Kabul for 4 miles, the road then ascends the mountains to a plain, 6 miles wide, where the Abkhana route branches off. Four miles further on, at Luadgal, a path leads off into the Khaibar defile, while the Tartara road goes over a succession of steep hills to the Peshawar Valley, winding round the Tartara Peak. (10) The Abkhana route leads down to a ferry over the Kabul, 12 miles above the point where that river enters the Peshawar Valley. The passage over the river is made on rafts of inflated bullocks' hides, where it is 120 yards wide, and very rapid. The precipices rise from the river banks to a height of 2000 feet, and the road goes up the Haidar Khan Mountain, whence the distance is 10 miles to the Michni fort, near Peshawar, over spurs of the Mohmand Mountains, on which the olive-trees grow in abundance. North of the Abkhana is the Karapa Pass, which leads from the Michni fort to a district on the Kabul River called Gushtia, about 25 miles below Jalalabad. Masson travelled by the Tartara Pass, (11) and the Abkhana route was used by Sir A. Burnes on his way to Kabul in April, 1832, (12) and also by Masson. (13)

We now turn from the northern to the eastern offshoots of the Safid-Koh. Colonel Walker describes them as being remarkable for their

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(10) After the battle of Gujrat and occupation of Peshawar. Sir Henry Green, Sir William Merewether, and Colonel J. T. Walker reached the summit of the Tartara Peak.
(12) Travels into Bokhara, An Account of a Journey from India to Cabool, Tartary, and Persia, &c. 3 vols. Svo., 1834.
parallelism with each other and with the parent range. The main range stretches away to Attock on the Indus, dividing the Peshawar Valley, of which it forms the southern boundary, from the valleys of the Kohat district. Higher up it deflects to the southward, to separate the Tira Valley from Kurman Durrah and the Zaimukht country. Then, passing eastward from the Dullunai-Sir Peak, to the south of the Tira Valley, it separates the affluents of the Khaibar River from those of the Kohat streams. A series of spurs from the Khaibar Range separate, in succession, the Tira, Bara, and Khaibar valleys. The Bara River rises on the eastern slopes of the Safid-Koh, runs east for 40 miles, joins the Tira, and the united stream flows north-east to the Kabul, passing within 2 miles of Peshawar. The water of this river is excellent, and the renowned Bara rice is said to derive its fine quality from the water which irrigates it. (14) The valley is in places very narrow, and is thickly studded with hamlets and little towers. Another smaller valley called Bazar, containing the village of Chura, is also fertile and well peopled, and there are paths from it to Jamrud and Ali Masjid. The Tira and Bara valleys are separated by a range called Aranga to the west, Shetafi in the middle, and Mulagarh to the east. It is about 700 feet high. The Tira Valley is about 5500 feet above the sea, almost circular, with a diameter of 5 miles, and further up there is a succession of open spaces, divided from each other by narrow tangis or defiles, along the banks of the river. To the south another offshoot, originating from the Safid-Koh, runs due east to the junction of the Kohat and Hangu rivers, and is called the Samana Range. It divides the Khankai Valley from the Miranzai and Hangu, and, commencing at 900 feet, its height gradually decreases to 6600 feet.

The singular parallelism of the Safid-Koh offshoots is a remarkable feature. In the low sandstone ranges the valleys are straight and parallel to each other, and are connected at right angles by abrupt gorges. In the limestone ranges the north-western faces are uniform slopes, while the opposite sides are scarped and rugged, and overhang spurs separated by deep gorges, which are very difficult of access. In the high sandstone ranges the western slopes are similarly smooth from top to bottom, and the rocks invariably wear away in layers parallel to the original stratification, so that the features of the range are little altered by degradation, and are never rounded off. The watercourses are limited to two directions, which are either perpendicular or parallel to the trend of the range, and it is thus their special characteristic to be incessantly turning corners at right angles. High table-lands are sometimes formed in the trough between two ranges of sandstone and limestone when in close juxtaposition, but otherwise the crests are but a few feet wide, often narrowing to mere knife-edges, with a perpendicular drop on one side and a slope of 60° on the other. (15)

The inhabitants of the Safid-Koh and its offshoots have been famous for many centuries as audacious robbers. In the extreme north the

(14) Ibid., p. 233.
(15) Colonel Walker.
Mohmands dominate the left bank of the Kabul, and levy tolls at Daka from travellers using the Tartara, Abkhan, and Karapa passes. Their six clans number about 16,000 fighting men. The Afridis occupy the lower and easternmost slopes of the Safid-Koh, including the Khaibar Pass, the valley of Bara, part of those of Bazar (Chura) and Tira, and the range between Peshawar and Kohat. Their limits are from the easternmost spur of the Tartara Ridge to the Tartara Peak, along the crest of the north side of the Khaibar defile to the connecting ridge over which runs the Landikhan Pass, then across the Safid-Koh to the Bara Valley, down to the Kohat Pass, and round the foot of the hills to Jamrud. They make their way up wild glens from the Khaibar Pass to the Bara Valley. Of their 23,000 fighting men, some 500 serve in the Punjab frontier force. They are fine, tall, athletic highlanders, lean but muscular, with long gaunt faces, high noses and cheek-bones, and fairish complexions. They are brave and hardy, but avaricious and murderous robbers, and very treacherous. On the Kohat Range, however, they have become traders, selling firewood and carrying salt to Swat and even to Chitral. In winter they live in caves in the cliffs, and in summer in mat tents. The Tira Valley is occupied by the Orakzais, another Pathan tribe, separated from the Afridis by the water-parting of the Tira and Bara. The tribe is divided into four main sections, the whole numbering 29,000 fighting men. Since 1855 they have been very troublesome neighbours to the more settled Kohat districts.

The Kurram Pass.—South of the Safid-Koh, where the Sulimani ranges begin, there is a drainage system extending over a large area, the streams of which converge to the Kurram, a river flowing in a south-east direction across the Bannu district to the Indus. The Kurram rises at the junction of the western Sulimani Range with the Safid-Koh; being formed by the Keriah, the Harlab (Huryab of Elphinstone), and streams from the Mangal country, which unite below a place called All-khel (7500 feet above the sea). Thence the combined waters enter the valley, and flow eastwards past the Kurram fort to the village of Thal in Miranzal, which is 42 miles from Bannu. The river then turns south-east, receiving the Shamil and Tochi rivers from Khost and Dawar. The river-basin within the hills, between the eastern and western Sulimani ranges, is of considerable extent, including the main valleys of Kurram, Khost, and Dawar, besides some subsidiary valleys, such as Furmul, at the back of Khost, which is watered by the Tochi, in its upper course. On the north it is bounded by the snowy heights of the Safid-Koh, and on the west by the western Sulimani Range, which forms the water-parting between the Indus and the Afghan drainages.

The Kurram district is about 60 miles long by from 3 to 10 wide. The valley is very beautiful, with the Safid-Koh looking down in great majesty on the smiling green fields and pleasant orchards. The climate is agreeable, and the clear and rapid river renders the supply of water abundant, and irrigates the rice-fields on either side. The water rushes in a winding and rocky bed down the centre of a deep fillet of rich cultivation sprinkled with villages, each with its clump of magnificent plane-trees, while the distance is everywhere closed by the ever-
varying aspect of the noble mountains which tower over the valley in its whole length. The road enters the valley at Thal, 66 miles from Kohat and 50 from the Kurram fort, and proceeds along the banks of the river. There is an alternative route, leaving the main road about 36 miles further on, and passing over the Darwaza Pass, where there is good grazing ground, to Kurram. The fort of Kurram (6000 feet) is a square enclosure with round towers at the angles and in the centre of each face, and an inner square forming a citadel. At a distance of 25 miles from the Kurram fort, up the valley, is the village of Paiwar, at the foot of a narrow gorge. Here it is necessary to cross a steep spur which forms one root of the Sikaram Peak, the loftiest of the Safid-Koh Range. Over this spur there are two roads, one by the Paiwar Pass, and the other, higher up, called the Ispingwai Pass. By the Paiwar the road leads over several deep ravines with oak jungle, and then up a zigzag ascent, with the hills on either hand covered with pine forests. The descent on the other side is gradual. The fine timber grown on these mountains is floated down the river to Bannu. The actual ascent was estimated at 1000 feet, and the crest of the Paiwar Pass is 8000 feet above the sea. From the Paiwar there is a descent to Ali-khel, and then an ascent to a camping-ground called Hazaradarakht ("Thousand trees"), which is covered with snow in winter; but in summer the short sweet grass, with stunted growth of artemisia, orchises, and lilies, affords good pasture. From this place a pass leads over the Safid-Koh into the Kabul basin, which is frequented by traders of the Jaji tribe. Masson visited a place called Murkhi Khel in the plain of Jalalabad, which is at the foot of another road leading over the Safid-Koh into the Kurram Valley. Here he saw many Jajis who had come over the pass. (16) From Hazaradarakht the Shutar-Gardan Pass ("Camel's neck") is reached, which crosses the Safid-Koh. The Shutar-Gardan in 11,200 feet above the sea. The descent into the Logar Valley is long and steep, with sharp zigzags. The pass is overhung with huge masses of naked limestone rock cropping out in every direction, (17) and the mountains have a rugged aspect. The country between the Paiwar and Shutar-Gardan passes, comprising the Upper Kurram Valley, is called Huryab by Elphinstone, and is the Iryab of Timur's historians.

South of the Kurram Valley is that of Khost, which is watered by the Shamil River (or Keyti), a tributary of the Kurram. This valley is 40 miles in length, is fertile and productive, while the surrounding mountains afford plenty of timber and pasturage. Khost contains many small villages, and a population of about 12,000. Between Khost and the western Sulmanis is the valley of Furmul, with a river forming the head-waters of the Tochi. It is inhabited by Tajiks speaking Persian, who have one village called Urghun, and are chiefly occupied in smelting iron. (18) Parts of the valley are also occupied by the Karotis. East of the Furmul and south of the Khost valley are the upper and lower Dawar valleys, separated by the Tograi Tangl Pass, and surrounded

(17) Lumaden.
(18) Broadfoot.
by mountains. Together they are 40 miles long, both being fertile, and
well watered by the River Tochi, which has the name of Gambila lower
down at Bannu, and is a tributary of the Kurram. The villages are
walled, and every field is defended by a tower. The surrounding moun-
tains are snow-covered for three months, but there are good pastures
on their slopes, and the people have large herds and flocks, and raise
crops of grain, which is exported. The population of Dawar is about
25,000, and there is a steady trade, by roads practicable for camels,
to Khosh and Waziristan. The road to Dawar from the plains leads up
the Tochi River, crossing and recrossing it seventeen times. There is
a way over the Shinki-Kotal Pass, and another, longer and steeper, by
the Baran. A third route to Dawar is by the Khusora Pass, which leads
into the Tochi Valley, its mouth being 6 miles to the south-west.

Thus the Kurram system includes the mountain valleys of Kurram,
Harrib, Kerman, Furmul, Khosh, and Dawar. The inhabitants belong to
various tribes. In the upper part of the Kurram Valley are the Jajis and
the Mangals. The former extend from the Shutar-Cardan Pass to the
Paiwar, and are believed to number about eight hundred families in
eight different khels or clans, but their numbers have been much
reduced by constant intestine feuds. Their strongly-built houses are often
blocaded by enemies, as well as by the snow, and are pierced with
rows of apertures for shooting through, and for use as chimneys or
ventillators. The Jajis are of the Shiah sect—a hardy, but very dirty
race. They breed mules, which are much in demand at Kabul. The
Mangals are not only in the upper part of the Kurram Valley, but
extend over the western Sulimani Mountains into Zarmat, and levy
tolls on the Paiwar Pass. Lower down the Kurram Valley dwell the
Turis, who have a blood feud with the Jajis, though both belong to
the Shiah sect. Neither are considered to be Afghans, but both are
supposed to be of Mongol descent. The five khels or clans of the Turis
number about 5000 men. It appears that the Bangash tribe, many of
whom also inhabit the Kurram Valley, formerly possessed the whole,
but that they were conquered by the Turis, and are now subject to
them. The Bangash are Pathans, and also inhabit the Miranzal and
Kohat valleys, mustering about 15,000 fighting men. On the north side
of the Lower Kurram, between that valley and the Miranzal, dwell the
Zalmuht Afghans, counting some 4500 fighting men.

The Kurram Pass, being the direct road from Bannu to Ghazni, has
been for centuries looked upon as one of the most important routes
across the Sulimani Mountains. In the days when Muhammad Ghori
ruled in Hindusthan (1193—1205 A.D.), Kurram was the seat of
government of his lieutenant Ilduz, who coined money there, (19) and
it was from Kurram that Ilduz advanced over the Shutar-Cardan and
conquered Ghazni. It was, as we have already pointed out, down the
Kurram Pass that Chingiz Khan hunted the Prince of Khuwarizm, in
September, 1221; but we have a clearer account of Timur's use of the
same road, from his historian, Sherifu'd-Din Ali of Yezd. In 1398,
Timur's grandson, Pir Muhammad, had advanced into the valley of the Indus from Kandahar, and laid siege to Multan. The resistance was protracted, and this induced Timur himself to invade India. He set out from Kabul on the 31st of August, 1398, and reached a place called Iryab, which General Cunningham tells us was in the Khost Valley, but it is really the Upper Kurram Valley, called Huryab by Elphinstone, and the Hariab of the present day. He then took a route by "Shenuzaun" and "Kempteghai" to the fortress of Nagar or Nugher, where he arrived by forced marches on September 3rd, after punishing a marauding tribe with great severity. The dates in Price (16) cannot be correct; but, Iryab being in the Upper Kurram Valley, Nagar was lower down in the direction of Bannu. Accordingly Nagar has been identified, by Masson, with Kafr-Kot, a remarkable ruin near Bannu. (17) Timur went thence to B~Mu, and crossed the Indus on September 23rd. When he returned he again used the Kurram Pass, leaving Bannu on March 11th, 1399, and arriving at Nagar on the following day. Timur's descendant, the Emperor Baber, mentions four roads which lead from Kabul to India. The first, by way of Lamghanat, I have already mentioned. The second, he says, leads by Bangash; and Bangash, as we have seen, is the name of a tribe which then possessed the Kurram Valley. The third is by Naghr, the place mentioned in Timur's history, probably the Kafr-Kot; and the fourth by Furmu1, in the valley of the Tochi, to the south of the Kurram. So that two out of Baber's four routes are by the Kurram Valley. There is a pass, perhaps a better one than that over the Shutar-Gardan, by the Furmul Valley, which is mentioned by Baber as leading to Kandahar. It goes from the Kurram fort and across the western Sulimanis into Zurmat, but it is unknown. In modern times the Kurram Valley was entered by a retributive expedition under General Chamberlain in 1856, when Captains Garnett and Lumsden surveyed it as far as the Paiwar Pass; and this survey was extended to Ghazni when the Lumsden Mission to Kandahar went up the Kurram Pass in 1857-58. Sirdar Muhammad Azim Khan, half-brother of the present Amir of Kabul, had a grant of the Kurram Valley, and on one occasion he carried artillery (6-pounders) over the Shutar-Gardan. They were placed on short double-humped Bokhara camels.

WazIristan.—From the southern extreme of the Kurram basin to the peak of Takht-i-Suliman is the country of Waziristan, and here the eastern Sulimani Range is more distinctly developed as a lofty chain of mountains, with several parallel ridges. In this section we have the able guidance of Colonel Walker, who explored the region in 1860; while the Great Trigonometrical Survey has accurately measured the principal peaks. Here the Sulimani Range, as seen from the Indus, appears to rise from the plains like a wall, but it is pierced at numerous points by streams, which take tither rise far west, either on the slopes of the western Sulimani Mountains, or on intermediate spurs, lower than the

(17) Masson, i. p. 102.
outer range through which they break before entering the plain. But the streams of the eastern Sulimani Range scarcely merit the designation of rivers; for they are but dry watercourses during the greater portion of the year. There is little moisture to feed them in their parent mountains, which are desiccated by the heat radiated from the extensive plains to the east and west. Vegetation is scarce, the soil is dry and arid, and pine-trees are not met with at a lower elevation than 9000 feet. Towering above all the other peaks of the range is the Takht-i-Suliman, opposite the town of Derah Ismail Khan on the Indus. Its summit is described as a narrow plateau about 5 miles long, stretching from north to south, with culminating points at either extremity, the northern peak being 11,500 and the southern 11,110 feet above the level of the sea. In the country of the Waziris to the north there are two other lofty peaks, the Pirghul, 11,580, and the Shah Haidar, 9000 feet above the sea.

Between the eastern Sulimani and the plains of the Derajat, bordering the Indus, there are belts of low hills composed of sandstone and conglomerate, with long narrow valleys like the Dhuns between the Siwaliks and Himalayas. These hills are inhabited by a small Pathan tribe called Batani, and Colonel Walker therefore calls the valleys between them the Batani Dhuns. But they are very unlike the Dhuns of the Himalaya. The Batani Dhuns are bare, arid, and uncultivated, for the streams from the higher hills, in passing through them, rush across abruptly in deep courses. There are no less than thirty-two passes from the plains of the Derajat into the Batani Hills, namely, the

1. Shamla, or Kurd Koh.
2. Saroba Kalan.
3. Uch Saroba.
4. Sond.
5. Kuha.
6. Armula.
7. Nugram.
10. Manglia.
11. Larzan.
12. Zaneja, or Bain.
15. Sorah.
17. Tand Kankara.
20. Garlal Gad.
22. Paraghul Gad.
23. Kaldan.
25. Mokiblah.
26. Tanzil.
27. Khah Putr.
28. Malker.
29. Ghoraial.
30. Spin-ka.
32. Tank (Zam).

The range of hills immediately west of the Batani Dhuns is composed of sandstone, in rear of which are limestone hills; and the river valleys vary in width from half a mile to a few feet, being narrowest when breaking through the axis of a ridge, and widest just before doing so, where there is usually a small oasis of cultivation. The best routes into Waziristan are through the Tank (Zam) Pass, which is practicable for artillery, and by the Khusora Pass further north; but there are many others.

The Waziris are a very large tribe divided into five great branches, namely, the Utmanzais, Ahmadzais, Mahsuds, Gurbaz, and Lali; the Kabul Khel, whose name occurs so often in border troubles, being a clan of the Utmanzais. The whole tribe numbers 44,000 fighting men, of whom the Mahsud Waziris, who inhabit the portion of the Sulimani
Mountains called Waziristan, claim 14,500. Our knowledge of their country is derived from the expedition of General Chamberlain in April and May, 1860, which was sent to punish a long series of raids and outrages. He entered by the Zam, and went out by the Khusora Pass. There are only two towns in the Waziri Mountains, Kaniguram and Makin, where iron is worked, and every village has its smelting furnace. The ore is broken to pieces and burnt in charcoal furnaces, with bellows of goat-skin. The iron runs out in rough pigs, and is worked into horse-shoes, gun-barrels, and swords. Kaniguram consists of about twelve hundred houses, built on the sides of a narrow ridge, the outer walls of the houses resting on fir poles planted vertically into the slope of the hill, with horizontal timbers thrown across. The chief roads of the town pass under these covered ways, the timbers above serving as floors for the houses. The most remarkable feature in the country of the Mahsud Waziris is the Ruzmuk Plain, which is 7 miles long by about 2 broad and 6800 feet above the sea. It has a very gentle slope southwards, in which direction its waters drain into the Zam, while on the north it terminates perpendicularly in a scarp of about 400 feet over the valley of Khissara. The expedition into the Mahsud Waziri country was not only accompanied by Colonel Walker, but also by Dr. Stewart, an eminent botanist, who has described the flora of this section of the Sulimanis. On the lower slopes of the Batani Hills there were tamarisk-trees, and higher up such shrubs as Acacia modesta, Capparis aphylla, and Zizyphus jujuba. They then came to a region of peach-trees, ferns, Buxus sempervirens, Daphne oleoides, and oak, and a bramble (Rubus fructicosus). At Kaniguram there were poplars and willows near the beds of streams, apricots and peaches, jasmine, and berberis. Near the brooks were plantago, oxalis, trifoliol, malva, wild thyme, and several labiatae; while tall pine forests were seen on the slopes of the Pir-Ghul. Most of the shrubs were Himalayan, and the herbaceous plants were western and European.

The Gomul Pass.—On the south of the country of the Mahsud Waziris, and just north of the Takht-i-Suliman Peak, is the Gomul River, which, with its affluents, probably drains an area of 13,000 square miles of the mountain region between the western and eastern Sulimanis. During the rains it stretches over the plains below Dera Ismail Khan, between the mountains and the Indus, to a width of 10 miles; but in ordinary weather it dries up, or is absorbed for irrigation. From the entrance of the Gomul (or Ghwalari) Pass there is a continuous ascent to the Kotal-i-Sarwandi, which is about 7500 feet above the sea, a distance of 145 miles by the road. The Ghwalari Pass is through a defile, with perpendicular walls 50 to 100 feet high, and about 200 yards wide. Beyond is the plain where the Gomul River is joined by the Zhob, which, rising in the western Sulimanis, near the Toba Peak, to the south, has a course of 90 miles. There is a pass up the river called the Zawa, but it is entirely unknown. The Gomul route thence follows the course of the stream, crossing and recrossing many times in every mile, and there is one other easy pass before the final ascent to the crest of the western Sulimanis.
The Gomul Pass is, in several respects, the most interesting in the whole range, for it has been the great trade route between India and Central Asia during several centuries. The Provindahs, or trading tribe of Afghans, say that they are descended from a goatherd of Ghor, in the Hazarah Mountains, in the days of Mahmud of Ghazni, and they have been merchants ever since, annually passing up and down the Gomul Pass.

One khel, or clan, of the Provindahs, called Niazis, has settled down to agricultural pursuits in Bannu, and the Karotis inhabit the upper valley of the Gomul and the Urghun district, on the eastern slopes of the western Sulimanis, some being shepherds and fond of deer-stalking, and others carrying on the trade with Herat. The Lohani and Mian Khel Provindahs have continued the trade in the face of extraordinary difficulties for centuries. Just as they may be found now encamped on the Derajat Plain, with their Indian merchandise ready to ascend the pass, so the Emperor Baber found them during his famous raid in January, 1505. He robbed their caravan and killed their chief, and then went up by a pass south of the Takht-i-Suliman which joins the Gomul, and so by the Abistada Lake to Ghazni. But an attack upon the Provindahs in the plains was rare; their great danger is in the pass, from the Mahsud Waziris, who watch every opportunity to attack and rob them.

In the summer the Provindahs are encamped in tents on the plains near Kalat-i-Khilzi and Ghazni, where they pay Rs. 600 a year to the Amir of Kabul for grazing rights. The women and children, with a sufficient guard, remain at the encampments, while the men are away trading at Samarkand and Bokhara, at Herat and Kabul. In the autumn they assemble to form the Indian kaffila or caravan. The tents are stowed away in a friendly fort, and the whole tribe, men, women, and children, go down the Gomul Pass to the plain of the Indus, fighting the Waziri robbers as they go, and forming a bivouac each night round their baggage. Lieutenant Broadfoot, who went with the army of the Indus as far as Ghazni in 1839, accompanied a Provindah kaffila down the Gomul Pass in the autumn of that year. The camels were not in strings, but driven separately, with horsemen in front and rear; while the young men, well armed, scoured the hills on either side in search of hares and deer, and as flanking parties. On arriving at a camping-ground the women help to unload, the girls draw water, the men graze the camels, and sentries are posted. The Provindahs bring down to India grapes, pears, apricots, almonds and raisins, figs and walnuts, roses, rhubarb and jujube fruit, saffron, madder, silk, cloths, druggets, saddlery, horses, ponies, dogs, and cats. On arriving in the Derajat, near the banks of the Indus, they pitch their second set of tents, and the men go off with their merchandise to Multan, Lahore, Benares, and other parts of India.

In April the Provindahs assemble again for the return journey, taking back European and Indian goods, spices, sugar, tea, guns and pistols, and hardware. A single Englishman, Lieutenant Broadfoot, has accompanied a Provindah caravan down the Gomul Pass. One other
Englishman, G. J. Vigne, joined their caravan in the Derajat, and went up with them some years previously. He found the Lohan camp on the hot plain near the Gomul, where it flows across the Derajat towards the Indus. The merchants had not yet returned, and the families were waiting for them. The boys were amusing themselves with pellet bows, bringing down the little birds with sure aim. Young girls were swinging, children splashed and dabbled in the stream, donkeys chased each other about, to the great discomfiture of tent-ropes. It was a scene of careless ease. Occasionally a string of camels or a single horseman came into camp. At last the fathers of families arrived with their merchandise, and the kafilas prepared to start. They set out from the encamping ground of Draband, 3 miles from the right bank of the Indus. The Povindahs went up the pass in three divisions, the first on about the 10th of April, the second on the 20th, and the third early in May. The children's hair was braided with gold coins, and the women wore massive earrings. Young brides were carried on rich cushions of silk on the backs of camels hung with tassels and ornamented with fringes and cowry shells. Older ladies were balanced against each other in baskets. The cavaliers, on handsome horses with gay trappings, pranced by the sides of their ladies. And so the great caravan moved up the pass, where there was serious work to do. On the third halt two men were murdered while asleep by Waziri robbers. Two days afterwards there was a fight in a narrow gorge, when five men were killed and two wounded. Shortly afterwards three of the rear guard fell victims; and so they fought their way up the pass. At several points on the road there are graveyards of the soldier merchants. Just before the last ascent, one division took a route to the south which led to Kandahar in ten marches. The rest went over the crest, and Vigne found himself in a country where the wild thyme and artemisia scented the cool air. Sand grouse and antelope afforded excellent sport, and the plains were dotted with mud forts and walled gardens of mulberries and apricots. This route leads by the Abistada Lake to Ghazni.

Besides the Gomul, the Lohanis occasionally use some passes to the south of the Takht-i-Suliman, such as the Shekh Haidar or Zarkani, which leads to Kandahar, by the Zawa (Zao) route up the Zhob Valley. By this way there is a gorge to pass, which is a mere cleft 16 feet across, with perpendicular cliffs 500 feet high on either side.

The Povindah trade is worth upwards of fifty lakhs of rupees, and its survival in the face of such obstacles is a proof of its healthy and permanent character, and of the skill and gallantry of the merchants.

The Sanghar and Sakhi-Sawar Passes.—The Darwazi Pass is the next to the Shekh Haidar, and leads into the more important Draband Pass to the south, which has a plentiful supply of water. It leads round the north flank of the Takht-i-Suliman Peak, joining the Dahina Pass, is one route to Kandahar. Next to it are the Guioba, Walia, Chaodwan, Torzoi, and Chabwi passes, merely leading to the country of the Shiranis, a Pathan tribe of inveterate marauders, numbering about 5000 fighting men. The Dahina Pass is more important, as it is a route from
Chaodwan, in the Derah Ismail Khan, through the Shirani country into the Zhob Valley, and thence by the Zawa route to Kandahar. South of the Shiranis come the Ushtaranis, another Afghan tribe, composed of peaceable and harmless people, but not numerous. They are separated from the Kihtrans, another small tribe, by the Kaura Pass. The Kihtrans have charge of the Wahwa Pass, and of the Barkuê, which joins it, as well as of the Liriah. The Wahwa was once frequented by merchants as a route to Kandahar. The Kihtrans are the last Afghans along the outer Sulimani Mountains, and their neighbours to the south are the Baluchis of the Kasrani tribe.

The Kasranis are met with both in the plains and among the hills, round the Bhati and Khanwah passes. In the hills there are about 450, and in the plains 1500 fighting men.

The Sanghar Pass, 30 miles south of that of Wahwa, debouches into British territory on the plains, in front of the fort of Mangrota. It is the principal entrance into the country of the Bozdars, a Baluch tribe in the outer hills, whose territory extends for about 40 by 30 miles, and is mountainous throughout. They number about 3800 fighting men. The Bozdar country is a series of bare and sterile ridges, divided by ravines, with occasional small patches of cultivation. Thus they are necessarily robbers, and, having given much trouble, an expedition was organised against them in 1857, under General Chamberlain. The troops entered by the Sanghar defile, which is bounded on either side by scarped hills of considerable height, and inflicted punishment upon the mountaineers, but the pass was not penetrated to any great distance. The Sanghar Pass is the most important route across the mountains between the Gomul and the Bolan. It is broad, practicable for light artillery, and is the best and most direct road from Multan to Kandahar. The Sanghar River rises in the western Sulimani Mountains, as do its principal feeders, the rivers Dung and Lundi. There is plenty of water in all parts of the pass, and forage is abundant; while the defile over the western Sulimani Range, near the Toba Peak, is comparatively easy. Major Raverty has shown that the Sanghar Pass was used in 1653 by Prince Dara, son of the Emperor Shah Jehan, when he marched with a large army to besiege Kandahar, which city had fallen into the hands of the Persians. His army consisted of 104,000 men, and ten guns of heavy calibre, besides thirty smaller pieces. The siege guns were sent by the Bolan, while the rest of the army marched up the Sanghar Pass. Kandahar was invested from March to September, when Prince Dara was obliged to raise a siege which had lasted five months. He returned down the Sanghar Pass with an escort of a thousand cavalry, in October, 1653.

South of the Sanghar Pass there are eighteen passes into the Bozdar and Laghari country, some of which lead into the Sanghar, while others merely form routes across the outer chain. They are the.

Rekham.  Kanu.  
Ghazl.  Sur.  

The mountain passes on the Afghan frontier.
This section of the hills is occupied by the Khosah and Lagharl Baluch tribes, the latter numbering under 4000 fighting men.

The Sakhi-Sawar Pass is occupied by the Lagharis. It is named after a village and shrine of a saint (born in 1291 A.D.), which stands on a spur jutting out into the plain, about 4 miles east of the entrance to the defile. There is a march of 13 miles to Siri, and the road then ascends in zigzags for nearly 5 miles, when a plateau is reached, which extends for another 5 miles. A descent leads thence to the Sanghar Pass; so that the Sakhi-Sawar is an important alternative route from the plains to Kandahar.

South of the Sakhi-Sawar Pass begins the country of the Gurchani Baluch tribe; where are the Kurah, Khasurah, Zangi, Suwagri, Ghati, Kaha, Khalgari, Chachar, Pitoh, Shuri, and Fajru passes. Of these the Chachar is the pass of most importance in the Southern Derajat. It was once a thoroughfare for caravans coming from the Zhob (Zawa) and Sanghar routes. But the depredations of the lawless Baluchis diverted them into less dangerous, though more circuitous routes. It is now only used by the marauders, and is practicable for horses and mountain guns.

Further south are passes called Baghari, Jahagzi, Thok, Chak, Shori, Mughal, Isfringhi, and Tahani. They all lead towards a very remarkable plateau, or, rather, series of plains divided by low hills, known as the Phylawar-Sham Plain, about 1500 feet above the sea. The word Sham in the Baluch language means a water-parting between two streams. The Sham Plain is high ground, within the Sulimani mountain system, dividing the drainage of the Chachar and Kaha rivers, with the Mari Hills to the east. It is 30 miles long by 25, with an area of about 900 square miles. It is abundantly watered by numerous perennial hill streams, and is everywhere clothed with rich grass, while shrubs and trees grow along the courses of the ravines; but the lawless character of the Mari and Bughti tribes, especially the former, who infest the approaches, prevents its cultivation or settlement. The gokhars, or wild asses, wild hogs, deer, and horses are the occupants of the Sham Plain.

The Mari and Bughti Baluch tribes occupy the lower hills in this section of the Sulimani Range. The Mari country is mountainous and barren, with a few fertile spots. Their chief town is Kahan, in a valley about 12 miles long, and they can muster 4000 fighting men. The Bughtis, more to the south, have a fighting force of 2200. Their chief town is called Dera. The Maris and Bughtis have given incessant trouble on the frontier by their depredations. In 1839 Major Billamore led a force into the Bughti Hills and inflicted great loss upon them, and in 1845 Sir Charles Napier conducted a campaign in the Mari and Bughti country. In 1846 the Bughtis carried off 15,009 head of cattle from the plains; but since then they have been kept in check by the Sind Horse, and one of Sir William Merewether’s most brilliant feats was the defeat of a large force of Bughti marauders with a small body of Sind cavalry in 1846.
The mountain passes on the Afghan frontier

To the south of the Sham Plain are the Zangi, Sat, Naffusk, Sartaf, Jihari, and Suri passes, leading into the Mari and Bughlgi hills; the last-named pass encircling the Sham Plain to the south. It was one of the principal routes of the Maris in their raids into the plains. Here is the boundary between the Derajat and Upper Sind; and the mountains, followed by the course of the Indus, make a very decided bend to the westward. The receding hills give space for the large Baluch district of Kachhi, with an area of 9000 square miles, a level region suffering from excessive heat and scarcity of water. There is an isolated ridge on the south-east side of the Sham, between that plateau and the plains, called Mount Gandharsi, which forms the angle whence the outer range of Sulimani Mountains turns westward towards Dadar and the mouth of the Bolan Pass. The inner or western Sulimani Range continues to form the water-parting, and terminates at the Takatu Peak, overlooking Kwatah, which is 12,000 feet above the sea. The Tukatu Range, north of the Bolan Pass, runs east and west, and appears to hold an analogous position at the southern extreme of the western and eastern Sulimani chains to that which, at their northern ends, is occupied by the Safid-Koh.

The western Sulimani chain of mountains, which forms the water-parting, is very little known, and has only been visited at the crests of the Kurram and Gomul passes. It probably has an elevation never less than 7000 feet, and towards the south there are some lofty peaks, namely Toba, Kand, and Tukatu. Near the Toba Peak an important offshoot branches off to the eastward, which has several names. At first it is known as the Toba Range, and here was the sanatorium where Ahmed Shah Durani, the founder of the Afghan kingdom, died in 1773. The descriptions of the Toba district show it to be rather a lofty and broken plateau than a defined mountain range. Afterwards the spur from the western Sulimani Mountains is called Khojah Amran. It separates the basins of the rivers Argandab and Lora, extends for about 170 miles, and eventually subsides into the Baluchistan desert. There are several passes over it, one of which called the Kohjak Pass, is on the main road from Kwatah (Quetta) to Kandahar, and was used by the army of the Indus in 1839.

The above description of the Sulimani system has been necessarily fragmentary, because there are wide gaps in our knowledge—extensive unexplored areas. I think, however, that the great features come out with sufficient distinctness. There is the main western Sulimani Range, forming a distinct water-parting between Afghanistan and India; and there are the eastern Sulimani Mountains with probably loftier peaks, but much broken, and far less clearly defined in their whole length. The intermediate space is occupied by a central chain which has been traced for a considerable distance. It branches from the Safid-Koh at the foot of the Sikaram Peak, where it is crossed by the Paiwar and Ispingwai passes. It is cut through by the Kurram River, and then continues in a southerly direction, forming the northern boundary of the Khost Valley, and of the Mahsud Waziri country. It may also be traced across the Gomul road, but our present information does not
enable us to follow its direction further south. The limits of the system seem to be sharply defined by the transverse ranges of the Safid-Koh on the north and of the Tukatu on the south extremity. The numerous passes which have been enumerated vary very much in importance. Only a few form main routes from India to Afghanistan. There are but three (possibly four, including the unknown Zawa up the Zhob Valley) from the Safid-Koh, to the Tukatu; namely, the Kurram, the Gomul, and Sanghar passes. A great number lead into these three from the plains, and thus form alternative routes; and several branch off from them on approaching the crest of the western Sulimanis. Many scores of passes also enter the hills from the plains of the Indus, which merely lead to the valleys occupied by hill tribes.

The Bolan Pass.—From the Tukatu Peak the Hala Mountains commence, which divide Baluchistan from Sind, and extend to the Arabian Sea. They are traversed, at their northern extremity, by the Bolan Pass, the entrance to which, in the low country of Kachhi, is in latitude 29° 30' N., about 500 miles south of the Khaibar Pass. The opening is 5 miles north-west of the town of Dadur (742 feet above the sea), and the route leads in a north-westerly direction over the mountain chain, by a succession of narrow valleys and gorges. The Bolan River, rising at Sir-i-Bolan, near the head of the pass, flows through it and supplies water along the whole route as far as its source, with the exception of one stage, where it has an underground course. The first stage of 7 miles to Khundilani is through a valley enclosed by low hills, but on the next stage of 14 miles to Kirta the pass rapidly narrows, and conglomerate cliffs, 800 feet high, close in on either side, leaving a narrow passage, through which the river flows. Kirta is a broad, level valley, 1200 feet above the sea, and surrounded by hills of nummulitic limestone. The next march of 9 miles leads to the valley of Bibi-Nani, whence a branch route goes over the hills to the left, by Rodbar, to Kalat. From Bibi-Nani to Ab-i-Gum ("lost water") is a distance of 24 miles, and it is on this stage that the river disappears. It percolates through the pebbles at Ab-i-Gum, flows underground for 14 miles, and comes out again at Bibi-Nani. Ab-i-Gum is 2600 feet above the sea. Sir-i-Bolan, the source of the river, is 6 miles beyond Ab-i-Gum, and 4400 feet above the sea. In the conglomerate hills, near this place, there are thin seams of coal. (18) For 10 miles beyond Sir-i-Bolan, to the top of the pass at Dasht-i-Bidaulat, there is no water. In the last 3 miles the hills on either side close in until only three or four men can ride abreast, while the limestone cliffs tower up to a great height. The gorge opens out into a narrow valley, at the end of which the path crosses the crest of a hill and enters the broad plains of Dasht-i-Bidaulat. The crest of the Bolan Pass is 5800 feet above the sea, and the total length from Dadur is 60 miles. The road leads thence to Kwatah (Quetta), 5537 feet above the sea. (19)

(19) Dr. Griffith's observations.
The Bolan Pass was used by Prince Dara, in 1652, for the transport of his heavy artillery when he besieged Kandahar; and Ahmed Shah Durani came down it more than once when he invaded India. The first Englishman that traversed the Bolan Pass was Mr. Masson, in 1826, and he was followed by Arthur Conolly in December, 1830, who has given a very graphic description of it. In 1839 the army of the Indus marched to Kandahar by the Bolan, the Bengal column traversing it with heavy artillery (8-inch mortars, 24-pounder howitzers, and 18-pounder guns) in six days; and the Bombay column, which followed, in about the same time. Dr. Kennedy, who was with the Bombay column, published a full account of the pass. It is infested by Mari and other robbers, who plunder the caravans, and in the season of freshes there is danger from the Bolan torrent, which rises very suddenly. In 1841 a Bengal detachment was lost, with its baggage, overtaken by a sudden flood.

The Mula Pass.—There are ten other passes, in an extent of 60 miles, leading from the plains of Kachhi to the Baluchistan highlands across the Hala Mountains, namely, the Kahun-karastah, Gazak, Makh-karastah, Ladau (or Muaj), Takari, Mula, Naghau, Bhore, Shadihar, and Nurmak passes. The principal route south of the Bolan is by the Mula Pass, the entrance to which is 9 miles from the town of Kotri. The road follows the Mula stream, crossing it several times, and after 12 miles enters a very narrow and tortuous defile with perpendicular masses of rock on either side. This leads to a basin in the hills, with some cultivation, and for the next 16 miles the ascent is easy up the bed of the stream. The pass then widens considerably, and leads into the Hatachi Valley, where supplies are abundant. Further on, after 16 miles up a winding stony path through tamarisk jungle, there is another tortuous defile emerging on the great open tract of Nasr, where there is a good deal of scattered cultivation, with pasture on the neighbouring hills. Hence a cross road leads to Khozdar. The main route ascends to Patki, 4250 feet above the sea, and again enters a narrow defile forming a passage 40 feet wide, and 12 miles further on is the source of the Mula River. Then the top of the pass is reached at 5250 feet above the sea. The pass is 102 miles in length, and forms a sharp angle, running south-west to Nasr, and then turning north-west to its summit, leading thence northwards up the Nal Valley to Kalat, the capital of Baluchistan.

From the southern angle of the Mula Pass the Hala Mountains run southwards to Cape Monze, a distance of 200 miles. They are called the Kirthar Hills from the Mula down on the 26th parallel, opposite Sehwan on the Indus, and thence to the sea they are locally known as the Pubh Hills, ending in Cape Monze, the western boundary of British India. The Kirthar division has peaks which attain a height of from 7000 to 8000 feet; and the table-land of Baluchistan, which the Hala Mountains support, is at Kalat 6800 feet above the sea. The hills gradually lose their elevation as they approach the sea, the Pubh Hills being only 2000 feet high; and Cape Monze itself (Ras Mowarl), in latitude 24° 50' N., though a prominent headland, is of moderate height. The highest part of it is 1200 feet above the sea, and Jebel Pubh, to the
north, is about 2500 feet. The two heights are separated by the Hubh River, and are excellent landmarks for making Karachi during the south-west monsoon.

**Authorities.**—An attempt to describe an important region, and to define its main features, with very incomplete materials, is always unsatisfactory. It serves a useful purpose. We thus take stock of our geographical materials, and this process often leads to accurate and authoritative communications from others who are more conversant with special portions of the subject. It is desirable also to record the sources of information which already exist. The Emperor Baber has handed down much valuable topographical detail. (20) To the persevering researches of Mountstuart Elphinstone (21) and Lieutenant Macartney, (22) we owe our first detailed information respecting the mountains on the north-western frontier of British India. The spurs of the Safid-Koh and the Khailbar Pass were first described, in modern times, by Moorcroft, (23) Masson, (24) and Vigne, (25) and by our gold medallists, Sir A. Burnes, (26) and Lieutenant Wood, (27) I.N., as well as by Dr. Lord, Captain Leech, (28) and by Sir H. Havelock, Colonel Dennie, Vincent Eyre, Greenwood, and other officers who served in the Afghan war. The first section of the Suliman system from the Safid-Koh to the Takht-i-Suliman, including the Kurram Pass, has been brought to our knowledge, in the best form, by our distinguished Associate, Colonel J. T. Walker, C.B., the Superintendent of the Great Trigonometrical Survey, and now also Surveyor-General of India, in the admirable paper published in our Journal for 1862. (29) He himself explored Waziristan with General Chamberlain's field force, and he tells us how the Kurram Pass was surveyed in 1856 by Captains Lumsden and Glenett, and explored in 1867 by the Lumsden Mission, (30) which included Dr. Bellew, (31) and how much additional geographical information respecting this region was collected by our Associate, Colonel Johnstone, C.B., when he was Topographical Surveyor of the Derajat; (32) while Dr. Stewart, of the Forest Department, reported upon the flora of the Waziri country. (33) The Gomul Pass was traversed by Mr. Vigne, (34)

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(20) "Memoirs of Baber, Emperor of Hindostan", written by himself, translated by Leyden and Erskine, 4to., 1826.
(22) The map in Elphinstone's work, by Macartney, a monument of the industry and sagacity of its compiler.
(25) "Personal Narrative of a Visit to Cabul", &c., 8vo., 1840.
(26) "Cabool in 1836-38", 8vo., 1842.
(28) "Reports by Burnes, Lord, and Wood, Political, Geographical, and Commercial, in Scinde and Afghanistan", maps, 4to., Calcutta, 1839.
(30) Official Reports.
(32) Official Reports, condensed in the Annual Reports on the Topographical Surveys of India.
(34) "Personal Narrative of a Visit to Cabul", 8vo., 1840.
and afterwards by Captain Broadfoot, (35) and it is well described by the former in a small volume published in 1840. Further south, as far as the Bolan Pass, no Englishman has ever traversed the mountains from India to Afghanistan; but General Chamberlain and other officers, when punishing inroads of the wild tribes, have entered and penetrated for some distance up many of the passes. Major Laverty, whose scholarly and accurate research places him in the foremost rank as an authority, has a profound knowledge of this region; and there must be many unpublished reports of frontier officers containing invaluable geographical information. At the Bolan Pass we come again to well-trodden ground. It was described years ago by Masson (36) and Conolly, (37) and by Dr. Kennedy, Major Hough, (38) and others who accompanied the army of the Indus in 1839. More recently it has been carefully examined by Dr. H. Cook, of the Kalat Mission.

Further south, the Mula Pass has been explored by Dr. Bellew, and details respecting the Hala Mountains have been published by our Associate, Mr. A. W. Hughes, in his work on Balochistan. (39) It is well known that a vast mass of information on the North-West Frontier has been brought together, after the untiring work of years, and most ably condensed and systematised by our Associate Colonel MacGregor. We heard this from himself in 1876; (40) but his valuable labours are still obscured in the mists of official secrecy. Geographers also owe a great deal to another Fellow of this Society, Major-General Thuillier, C.S.I., the late Surveyor-General of India, for the publication of maps, such as those of the district of Derah Ghazi Khan (1856-59), of Bannu and Derah Ismail Khan (1856-61), and others, where not only are the physical features of the country accurately delineated, but most valuable geographical notes by the surveyors are often added. The new map of Afghanistan, by our Associate Major Wilson, which was undertaken for the India Office, at the suggestion of the Geographical Department, embodies, on a large scale, all the information that could be collected together up to the present time, and represents a vast amount of research and careful study.

(36) U.S. pub.
(37) "Journey to North of India, overland from England", 2 vols. 8vo., 1838.
(38) "Narrative of Campaign of the Army of the Indus", 2 vols. 8vo., 1840, by Dr. Kennedy. "Diary of a March through Sinde and Afghanistan", by Rev. J. N. Allen, 8vo., 1843. "Narrative of March of Army of Indus", by Major W. Hough, 8vo., 1841. See also a paper on the Bolan Pass in the "R. G. S. J.", xii. p. 109. That eminent botanist, Dr. William Griffith, was also with the army of the Indus, and made a series of hypsometrical observations. See "J. A. S. B." (new series). No. xxxvii. p. 54, 55. His journals were published in 1847-54 (5 vols.).
(39) "The Country of Balochistan", by A. W. Hughes, 8vo., 1877.

In his speech at our meeting, Colonel MacGregor dwelt upon our lamentable Ignorance of Afghan geography. He said that the country of the Afridis, the Zalmukht, the Bangash, the Turks of Khost, of Dwar, of the Zhob Valley, were almost to us, sealed books. He added that he had made a list of seventeen Important military routes from Afghanistan to our frontier, of which we have not sufficient information to enable our Government to form a sound opinion respecting their merits. He added that, in an advance on Kandahar, we should probably use the Bolan Pass, but only because we do not know any other sufficiently well.---Proceedings R. G. S., vol. xx. pp. 248, 249.
THE UPPER BASIN OF THE KABUL RIVER

BY (SIR) C. R. MARKHAM, C. B., F. R. S. Secretary, R. G. S.

In the number of the 'Proceedings' for January, the geography of the Sulimani mountain system was described, including the lateral Safid-Koh Range, and its offshoots to the right bank of the Kabul River. This system forms the eastern boundary of Afghanistan. It is now proposed to discuss the geography of the basins of the Upper Kabul, of the Ghazni, and of the Helmund rivers, with their bounding ranges, which, with the Sulimans, include the whole region inhabited by the Afghan race. (1) The present paper will be confined to a study of the Upper Basin of the River of Kabul; and the Ghazni and Helmund basins will form the subject of a paper in the next number.

The Upper Kabul Basin is bounded on the north by the Hindu Kush Mountains; on the west by the Paghman Range and the Allah-Koh Ridge which connects the Hindu Kush and the Safid-Koh; on the south by the Safid-Koh, and the Karkacha Hills; on the south-east by the range separating Bajaur and Panjikora from the Kunar Valley, called the Lahori Mountains; and on the east by the same range up to the Darkot Pass, where it connects with the Karakoram Mountains. Within this mountain-girt region all the drainage converges to the Kabul River, which carries it to the Indus.

The great feature of the region is the range of the Hindu Kush Mountains, with its spurs and valleys down which the rivers find their way to the Kabul. This lofty mass commences at the south-west corner of the Pamir table-land, and ends where the Koh-i-Baba and Paghman mountains branch to the south-west and south, and the «stony girdle» becomes known under other names; a distance of 300 miles. Its peaks attain a height of 20,000 feet above the sea; and, as Colonel Yule has pointed out, it is a very distinctly defined chain, with the line of loftiest peaks coinciding with the line of kotuls or passes. It forms the water-parting of the Indus and the Oxus, and is thus the crest or parapet of the Indian fortress in this direction; the northern slopes of Kunduz and Badakshan forming the glacis, and the River Oxus the wet ditch. The mountains are generally bare of trees, and Wood remarks that what most forcibly strikes a traveller is the nakedness of the country. To the south they have the lofty uplands of the Kohistan and Kafiristan, while on their northern sides are the much lower swampy flats of Turkistan. Hence, the line of perpetual snow, which is affected by a great variety of causes, is much lower on the northern than on the southern face.

(1) Except the Yusufzai Afghans, who occupy a portion of the basin of the Indus north of Peshawur, which will not be treated of in these papers; and some of the Kakare and Terins who live to the south of the Khojah-Amran Mountains.
In the present paper I am only treating of the southern watershed of the Hindu Kush, which may be divided into three distinct sections, each occupying about one-third of the whole length of the range. The first, from the east, is the Kashkar or Chitral country, where the lofty passes lead from the Chitral Valley to the elevated plateau of Wakhan. The second, or central, is Kafiristan, and is entirely unknown to Europeans except by report. In these two sections the streams flow from the Hindu Kush into the Kunar River, which drains a long lateral valley for 300 miles. The third or western section is that of the Kohistan of Kabul, where the streams unite to form the Kabul River, and the lowest depression of the region is at the point where the Kabul and Kunar rivers unite.

In the first or most eastern section of the Hindu Kush there are six passes, leading from the Chitral Valley into Wakhan. As the valleys on either side are at great elevations, the ascents to the crests of the passes are not considerable. In fact, the Hindu Kush is here a ridge, branching gradually from the lofty table-land of Pamir. The Baroghil Pass, which leads from the Mastuj stream, the name applied to the upper portion of the Kunar, to Sarhadd, within the Upper Oxus Basin, is an easy route across an elevated table-land. There is a gentle ascent of a mile and a half to a camping-ground; another ascent of a mile, the first half of which is steep, and the level Dasht-i-Baroghil is then reached. This is the water-parting between the head waters of the Oxus and of the Kunar, a feeder of the Indus. The road traverses the Dasht-i-Baroghil for about 5 miles, with low hills on either side, then descends for 2 miles, and meets, at the foot of the slope, a small stream flowing to the Sarhadd, a feeder of the Oxus. The height of the Dasht-i-Baroghil is estimated at 12,000 feet. In summer it is covered with rich pasture, and is a favourite grazing-ground for the cattle from the Wakhan Valley, on the Oxus side; but it is closed by the snow for more than half the year. It was crossed by the Mullah, one of the native explorers employed by Colonel Montgomerie, in May, 1874.

The Baroghil Pass is on the north side of the upper extreme of the Chitrak (Kunar) Valley. On the east and south sides are the mountains which separate it from Yasin, and continue to form its south-eastern limit. These mountains, being a spur from the Karakoram Range, contain peaks rising to 21,000 and 22,000 feet above the sea.

The Baroghil is the lowest pass in this eastern section of the Hindu Kush. There are five others, called Ishtirak, Agram, Nuksan, Khartaza, and Dora. The Ishtirak and Agram passes are covered with perpetual snow, and are impracticable for loaded animals. The Nuksan was crossed by the Havildar, a native explorer employed by Colonel Montgomerie, in September, 1870. The ascent was very fatiguing, as the road was covered with snow nearly from the foot of the mountain. The slope is steep, and on the crest there are large beds of snow, and immense masses of ice. For 500 paces the road appears as though cut through the ice to a depth of from 6 to 12 feet, and at intervals there are wide crevasses. It is evident that glaciers exist on this section of the
Hindu Kush. After September the Nuksan Pass is closed. The next one is called Khartaza, and the last to the westward, in this Chitral section of the chain, is the Dora Pass. The native explorer crossed the latter on the 6th of November, when it was snowing hard with a piercing wind. But the Dora is, on the whole, easier than the Nuksan Pass. The latter is believed to be about 17,000, and the former 16,500 feet above the level of the sea.

The Kunar River flows down a valley which is parallel with the line of the Hindu Kush, receiving all the drainage of its southern slopes on the right bank, and that of the Lahori Mountains on the left. The latter range has been so named from the Pass of Lahori, by which the road from Dir to Chitral crosses it. Where the range commences at the great mountain knot whence radiate the Karakoram, the Hindu Kush, and the Lahori, the latter has peaks 22,500 feet in height. The Lahori Range extends to the Kabul River, with the Kunar flowing along its western base, and it gradually decreases in elevation. Opposite to Chitral its peaks reach to 18,900 feet, near Chigar-serai (2) to 10,000, then to 8000, and where its last spur overhangs the Kabul River, the elevation is only 5000 feet.

The valley of the Kunar has only been partially explored. The upper part is occupied by the Muhammadan state of Kashkar, or Chitral, the town of about 600 houses being on the banks of the river, and the king living in a fort close by.

Here the winter is severe, the snow continually covering the ground from November to March. All the passes are closed for traffic during this season, and trade is only carried on from July to September. Goods are carried on mules, ponies, and donkeys, the exports being wool, cloths, orpiment, and hawks, and the imports, salt, muslin, cloths, firearms, and cutlery. With Badakshan slaves are exchanged for horses and money. Apples, plums, mulberries, and apricots are grown, and crops of wheat and barley are raised, the soil being good. The valley also contains a good deal of jungle wood, but there are very few timber-trees.

The course of the river has been explored from the Baroghil Pass to a place below Chitral, called Mirkandi, where the road over the Lahori Pass comes down into the valley. But from that point to Asmar, a distance of 50 miles, the valley of the Kunar is still entirely unknown. In this unexplored gap the path is said to be along the banks of the river; horses can travel over it with difficulty, and it is probably altogether impracticable for baggage animals. Merchants never use this road in the valley, but always take the circuitous route over the mountains to Dir, and down again by the Lahori Pass.

The hills enclosing the Kunar Valley are generally stony, but more or less covered with grass, affording good pasturage, and patches of cultivation occur low down. About and above Asmar there are fine pine-trees, especially up the tributary valleys, and much timber is

(2) Chagan-serai (the white serai) of Babur.
flooded down to Peshawur. Asmar forms an independent State, and the
dominion of the Amir of Afghanistan commences at Maraora, the
frontier village of the Jalalabad province, 20 miles lower down. At the
village of Chigar-serai, 12 miles below Maraora, the river which drains
the Kafiristan region falls into the Kunar on its right bank, and thence
to the point where the Kunar (or Kawah) falls into the Kabul River is
a distance of 97 miles. The whole length of the course of the Kunar is
320 miles.

The central or Kafiristan section of the Hindu Kush extends for a
distance of 80 miles, and is entirely unknown. Doubtless there are
passes over the mountains into Badakshan, (3) but the region has never
been explored by any European. The chief river of Kafiristan is that
which falls into the Kunar at Chigar-serai. This river appears, from
the narrative of the Mullah, to be called the Pich, (4) and he says that
it has an affluent called the Kattar, after a town of that name inhabited
by Kafirs. Masson tells us that the northern part of Kafiristan is called
Kattar; and the Chief of Chitral, whose subjects seem to be allied to
the Kafirs, still has the title of 'Shah-Katawar.' The country drained
by the rivers Kao and Alishang, which flow from the Hindu Kush for
60 miles parallel to each other, and after uniting to form the Alingar,
fall into the Kabul River 30 miles above the mouth of the Kunar, is
also part of Kafiristan. Formerly the Kafirs extended still further west,
taking in the Nijrao and Tagao valleys.

This unknown portion of the southern watershed of the Hindu Kush
is inhabited by an indomitable race of unconquered hillmen, called by
their Muslim neighbours the Siah-posh (black-clothed) Kafirs. Their
country consists of the long valleys extending from the Hindu Kush to
the Kunar River, with many secluded glens descending to them, and
intervening hills affording pasturage for their sheep and cattle. The
peaks in Kafiristan reach to heights of from 11,000 to 16,000 feet. The
valleys yield crops of wheat and barley, and the Emperor Baber
mentions the strong and heady wine made by the Kafirs which he got
when he extended his dominion to Chigar-serai in 1514. The Kafirs are
described as strong, athletic men, with a language of their own, the
features and complexions of Europeans, and fond of dancing, hunting,
and drinking. They also play at leap-frog, shake hands as Englishmen,
and cannot sit cross-legged on the ground. When a deputation of Kafirs
came to Sir William Macnaghten at Jalalabad, the Afghans exclaimed
—'Here are your relations coming!'

From the days of Alexander the Great the Siah-posh Kafirs have never
been conquered, and they have never embraced Islam. They successfully
resisted the attacks of Mahmud of Ghazni, and the campaign which
Timur undertook against them in 1398 was equally unsuccessful. But
the Muslim rulers of Kabul continued to make inroads into the Siah-
posh country down to the time of Baber and afterwards. Our only knowledge of this interesting people is from the reports of Muhammadans, and from an account of two native missionaries who penetrated into Kafiristan in 1865. (5) Elphinstone obtained much information respecting the Kafirs from one Mullah Najib in 1809; and Lumsden from a Kafir slave named Feramorz, who was a general in the Afghan service, in 1857. Further particulars will be found in the writings of Burnes, Wood, Masson, Raverty, Griffith, (6) and Mohun Lal. (7)

The western section of the Hindu Kush rises from the Kohistan of Kabul, and extends from Kafiristan to the point where the Koh-i-Baba and Paghman ranges branch off. This section is the Indian Caucasus of the historians of Alexander’s campaigns. The Hindus derive the name of Hindu Kush from the tradition that a giant used to lie there in wait to kill (kesh) all the Hindus who passed that way. (8) This giant was probably the same whom we, in the Arctic Regions, used to call «Old Zero,» better known in England as «Jack Frost.» The horrors of the snow-covered wastes probably gave rise to the tradition.

The following passes traverse this western section of the Hindu Kush from east to west, namely, Anjuman, Khawak and Thal, Zarya, Yatumak, Umra, Shwa, Bazarak, and Shatpal from the Panjshir Valley; Beigah and Sar-Ulang from the Parwan Valley; and Kushan, Gwallan, Gwazyar, Char-darya, Ghalalaj, Farinjal, and Shibr from the Ghorband Valley; altogether seventeen passes.

The Anjuman Pass leads, by the border of the Kafir country, from the head of the Panjshir Valley over into the lofty Badakshan district of Anjuman. Next to the westward is the Khawak Pass, also leading from the valley of the Panjshir to that of Indarab in Badakshan. Its crest is 13,200 feet above the sea, and it is one of the lowest and most accessible of the Hindu Kush passes. The Thal and Zarya passes cross the ridge at different points, but join the Khawak Pass on the northern descent. It is probable that the Khawak Pass was used by Alexander the Great on his march from Bactria, and it was certainly the route by which the Chinese pilgrim Hiouen Thsang returned from India in A.D. 644. Timur also used the Thal Pass when he crossed the Hindu Kush in 1398. But the only travellers who in modern times have traversed the Khawak Pass are our gold medallist, Lieutenant Wood, R.I.N., and his companion, Dr. Lord, who approached it from the Badakshan side. At the foot of the pass is the secluded valley of Indarab, and Wood describes the mountains as rising like a wall, «without any intervening ridge to veil their majesty or detract from their bulk. The eye at a glance caught the mighty buttress, from its blackened base to its hoary summit: the snow-line on its mural face being clear and well defined.» Dr. Lord places the line of perpetual snow, on this part of the Hindu Kush, at 15,000 feet. Wood gives us a delightful picture of the happy relations between the Tajik Chief of

(5) Colonel Yule’s «Cathey, and the Way thither», ii. p. 555 (n.).
(6) See his work, also «J. A. S. B.», 1841
(7) Ibid., 1834.
Indarab and his people. The foot of the pass is 29 miles from Indarab. The passage was made in the middle of April, when the road was one glistening sheet of frozen snow. The rise is remarkably uniform, not a ridge occurring in the whole ascent to vary the sameness of its surface. On the southern side of the crest the snow was 4 feet deep; and a descent of 25 miles brought the travellers to the inhabited part of the Valley of Panjshir.

Next to the Khawak, on the western side, is the Bazarak Pass, which is open from the middle of June to the end of October, and is used by ponies and donkeys, but not by camels. Four more inaccessible paths, called Shwa, Umraz, Yatumak, and Shatpal, lead over the crest and join the Bazarak on the northern side.

From the Parwan Valley there are two passes, called the Bajgah and Sar-Ulang. (9) The former was perhaps that crossed by Benedict Goes in 1603. The latter was attempted by Lieutenant Wood and Dr. Lord in the month of November, but they were met by a piercing wind and drifting sleet more like ice than snow. The snow soon became too deep for the horses, the road was obliterated, and they were obliged to give up the attempt. The Havildar employed by Colonel Montgomerie crossed the Sar-Ulang Pass on November 12th, 1873, and reported it to be about 12,000 feet above the sea. The road is fairly good, and the snow was of no great depth.

The Ghorband Valley is a defile running for a long distance parallel with the crest of the Hindu Kush.

The Kushan Pass is the first of the series leading from it, and this route passes under the great peak which is visible from the city of Kabul on one side, and from Kunduz on the other. It is known as the Hindu Kush, often called by Persian writers the Hindu Koh, and it gives its name to the range. Hence the Kushan route passing under it is not unfrequently referred to as the Hindu Kush Pass.

It is a long defile, with a gradual and easy ascent, except for about a mile and a quarter, and the summit is 15,000 feet above the sea. It is closed by the snow from the 1st of November to the 15th of June. The Gwalian Pass is said to be easier than the Kushan, but the Gwazyar is a mere footpath. Next to the westward is the Char-darya Pass, which is used by caravans, and is said to be practicable for artillery. Colonel Yule holds this to be the *Kipchak* Pass, by which the Emperor Baber first crossed the Hindu Kush in 1504, and after passing which he first beheld Canopus. «Till then,» he says, «I had never seen the star Soheil (Canopus), but on reaching the top of the hill Soheil appeared below, bright to the south.» (10) Westward of Char-darya come the passes of Ghalalaj, Farinjal, and Shibr. On the Farinjal Pass there is a very extensive but long-abandoned lead mine, which was examined in detail by Dr. Lord in 1837. (11) Here the mountains are quite barren, and

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(9) So called from the last village, Ulang, on the Afghanistan side. Sar-Ulang, *head of the Ulangs*.
(10) Page 133.
streaked with snow. The Shibr Pass is at the western extremity of the Ghorband Valley, and descends upon the River Surkhab, which flows from Bamian. It is, therefore, the last of the Hindu Kush passes to the westward. Colonel Yule mentions that by the Shibr Pass the Chinese pilgrim Hiouen Thsang travelled on his way to India in 630 A.D., and it was crossed by Timur on his return from Delhi. It was also the pass most commonly used by Baber, who calls it Shibrtu, and says that it is the only pass never closed in winter.

Below the passes, the upper inhabited portion of the Hindu Kush watershed, through which the valleys by which the passes are approached wind their way towards the plain, is called the Kohistan. These three valleys are the Ghorband, the Parwan, and the Panjshir, and their rivers eventually unite and fall into the Kabul. The most western is the Ghorband, which rises on the eastern slope of the ridge connecting the Paghman Range with the Koh-i-Baba. Baber says that a steep hill pass is called bend; that this one is the route to Ghor, whence the name of Ghorband.

The Ghorband Valley has been described by Leech. Abul-Fazl, in the 'Ayin Akbari,' says that it contains an inconceivable variety of fragrant shrubs and flowers, including fifty species of tulips. At the mouth of the valley is the fort of Tutan-dara, where, on September 27th, 1840, General Sale encountered a party of Kohistanis in a strong position, and took it by assault, Captain Edward Conolly being among the slain. The Parwan is a similar valley, a narrow rocky defile with declivitous sides at the upper part, gradually becoming wider, but very tortuous, and at every turn a portion of the mountain projects over the stream. On these outlying shoulders there are patches of level ground, on which castles are erected. Mulberry-trees are cultivated in terraces up the sides of the hills, and the flour made from the unripe fruit is the principal support of the Kohistanis. On the 2nd of November, 1840, Dost Muhammad defeated our native cavalry near the entrance of the Parwan Valley, but almost immediately afterwards he surrendered himself to Sir W. Macnaghten at Kabul. In this action Dr. Lord, the companion of Lieutenant Wood in his travels, was slain. The Panjshir is a similar valley, and all are inhabited by turbulent robbers, who are Tajiks by race, and probably descended from Persian settlers who came there in the earlier Muhammadan times, long before the Afghans acquired the ascendant.

On leaving the mountains, where they flow through narrow valleys, the three rivers enter the more open country between the Hindu Kush and the city of Kabul. This region, bounded on the north by the Kohistan, and on the west by the Paghman Range, is known as the Koh-i-Daman, or Skirt of the Hills, and is a country of great beauty and fertility.

The Koh-i-Daman has the Kohistan and the snowy peaks and passes of the Hindu Kush along its northern limit, where the three rivers of Ghorband, Parwan, and Panjshir issue from their narrow valleys. They eventually unite, after having irrigated the plain. In the eastern corner
of the bounding hills is the famous "Relg-Rawan," or moving sand, adjoining the Panjshir River. Abul-Fazl, in the 'Ayn Akbari,' says that in summer is heard, in this sandy desert, the sound of drums and kettle-drums; and the natives ascribe to the sand-hills the utterance of strange unearthly sounds. This led Lieutenant Wood to visit the spot, and he found the moving sand stretching up the side of the rock for 250 yards, with a base 100 yards wide, and an acclivity of 45°. He heard the sound like a distant drum, mellowed by softer music, which was caused by the fall of particles of sand into hollows, the rustle of the dry sand being condensed and reverberated by the circular conformation of the rocks around.

The Paghman Hills, to the west, separate the Koh-i-Daman from the valley of the Helmund. The sides of the Paghmans are split by numerous ravines, down which flow rills of purest water, and the slopes are thickly planted with mulberries and fruit-trees. At their bases much debris and heavy boulders are scattered over the plain, loosened by the winter's frost from the granite peaks above. The Paghman Hills are crossed by a very easy road over the Unah (Honai) Pass (11,520 feet), leading to Bamian. To the south the Koh-i-Daman is separated from the plain of the city of Kabul by a low ridge. To the east are the mountain spurs from the Hindu Kush, between which flow the Nijrao and Tagao rivers. Baber speaks of the Nijrao Valley as a sort of sequestered corner, where grapes and other fruits are abundant. The Tagao is said to flow through a fine open valley, containing many castles and fruit-gardens, and is inhabited by Safis, or converted Kafirs. The Tagao receives the Nijrao and rivers of the Koh-i-Daman, and falls into the Kabul after a course of 90 miles.

Thus enclosed, the Koh-i-Daman has a length of 31 and a width of 7 miles. The western side is much higher than the eastern, and the drainage is consequently diverted to the south-east corner. The Ghorband River enters from the north-west corner, and the Panjshir from the north-east, the Parwan being in the centre, and uniting with the Ghorband about 4 miles below the hills. The Ghorband falls into the Panjshir at Ali-Burj, near the south-east angle of the Koh-i-Daman, and the united river breaks through an opening in the eastern hills, and finally joins the Kabul.

The northern portion of the Koh-i-Daman, watered by these rivers, is a basin lying 40 feet below the level of the south part. The former or lower portion of the valley yields grain, cotton, tobacco, and vegetables, and has innumerable plantations of mulberry-trees; while the latter is famed for its fruit-gardens. The Koh-i-Daman is thickly studded with castles and villages, but the inhabitants are turbulent, and life and property are very insecure. The people are, for the most part, of Tajik race, and many of the followers of Baber were also settled in the valley. The north-western part of the Koh-i-Daman is occupied by the Plain of Bagram (8 miles long by 4), on which Mr. Masson made the immense collection of coins which were treated of by Professor Wilson in his 'Ariana Antiqua.' In describing the view from the Plain of Bagram, Masson says that the courses of the rivers, the picturesque
appearance of the gardens and castles, the verdure of the pastures, the bold and varied aspect of the hills, crowned by the snowy summits of the Hindu Kush, form a landscape of surpassing beauty.

The Koh-i-Daman contains many towns, the chief of which is Charikar, near the entrance of the Ghorband Valley, and 40 miles from Kabul, which is the key to half the passes. It was the residence of a political agent during the English occupation, but the garrison was besieged in 1842, their water-supply was cut off, and nearly all were killed in the retreat. Eldred Pottinger, Lieutenant Haughton, and one Gurkha alone escaped. Another town is Istalif, about 25 miles north of Kabul, a lovely and enchanting spot. The houses rise in terraces up the side of a mountain, the summit of which is crowned by magnificent trees. The Emperor Baber (12) says that few countries possess a district that can rival Istalif. «A large river runs through it, and on either side are gardens, green, gay, an beautiful. Its water is so cold that there is no need of icing it. In this district is the garden called Bagh-i-Kilan, and on the outside are large and beautiful spreading plane-trees, under the shade of which there are agreeable spots finely sheltered.» Istalif was partly destroyed as a measure of vengeance by General MacCaskill in 1842.

The Koh-i-Daman is obviously a position of great strategic importance, for it commands the outlets of all the Hindu Kush passes. Its command of the passes did not escape the vigilance of Alexander the Great, and there can be very little doubt that the city founded by the Macedonian conqueror, and called Alexandria ad Caucasum, was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Charikar (40 miles north of Kabul) or on the Bagram Plain. The city, according to Strabo, was placed at the Triodon, or parting of these roads to Bactria. At Opian, near Bagram, three roads would converge from Bactria, leading over the Khawak, the Kushan, and the Shibr passes; and here General Cunningham places this city of Alexandria. Bagram (from Vigrama, a capital city) continued to flourish until it was destroyed by the ruthless hordes of Chingiz Khan.

The Koh-i-Daman was surveyed by Lieutenant Sturt, and also by Lieutenant Leech; but the maps and field-books of the gallant Sturt were lost, and Colonel Yule has pointed out the great deficiencies in our knowledge of this part of Afghanistan. We have no exact information respecting the Ghorband and Panjshir rivers from near the base of the Hindu Kush to their confluence, and none for the fertile valleys of Tagao and Nijraro, later than the 'Memoirs' of Baber. The whole district of the Paghman Hills and the Kohistan, which will be of extreme importance in the event of a war in that quarter, are blanker than the Desert of Gobi. The distances of Kabul from Charikar, Istalif, Ghorband, and Parwan, differ by many miles on the maps of Walker, Lumsden, and Cunningham. As regards Charikar there is a distance of 15½ miles between the maps of Cunningham and Walker, and 7½ miles between those of Cunningham and Lumsden. These discrepancies show the very

(12) 'Memoirs', p. 107
unsatisfactory state in which our maps of this important region still remain.

Between the range of low hills forming the southern limit of the Koh-i-Daman and the first spur from the Safid-Koh is the valley of the Kabul River, in which stands the city of Kabul, with the Bala Hissar towering over it. The Kabul River rises close to the Unah Pass, over the Paghman Hills, at a height of 11,320 feet above the sea, and flows thence for 60 miles to the city of Kabul. In this part of its course it is everywhere fordable. The Logar River rises south-west of Kabul, on the spur which connects the Paghman Range with the Safid-Koh, and flowing northwards for 150 miles, falls into the Kabul River at a point about 10 miles north-east of the city, which is 6396 feet above the sea. Vigne describes the Logar Valley as a dreary waste bounded by still more barren mountains, the aspect of the scenery only being varied by patches of verdure produced by irrigation round the villages. But all travellers agree that this dreariness is exchanged for a mass of smiling vegetation in the immediate environs of Kabul. "Shady orchards and meadows, made verdant by artificial streams, line the roads," and the country is highly cultivated for several miles round the city. After receiving the Logar, the Kabul becomes a rapid river with a great body of water; and about 30 miles lower down it is joined by the united streams of the Ghorband, Parwan, Panjshir, Nijroo, and Tagao rivers.

The River Kabul, thus increased in bulk by the drainage of the whole western division of the Hindu Kush, now enters the district of Lamghan; which is about 55 miles long by 15, bounded by the rivers Tagao, Kabul, and Kunar. The rivers Alishang and Kao unite in Lamghan as the Alingar, and, after a course of 10 miles, fall into the Kabul 30 miles above the mouth of the Kunar. The Emperor Baber calls the Kabul, the receiver of all these streams, the River Baran. (13) After flowing past Lamghan it breaks through a gorge called Tangi-i-Kharun, in the mountains of the Siah-Koh, as the northern spurs of the Karkacha Hills are called, and is then joined by the Kunar River nearly opposite to Jalalabad. The Kabul then enters upon its lower course from Jalalabad to Peshawar.

The principal authorities for the geography of the upper basin of the Kabul River are the Emperor Baber in his 'Memoirs,' and Abul-Fazl in his 'Ayin Akbari.' General Cunningham has discussed the ancient geography, especially with reference to the campaigns of Alexander the Great, and Wilford, in the 'Asiatic Researches,' has recorded the Hindu traditions. Much information as regards comparative geography will also be found in Major Raverty's annotated translation of the 'Tabakat-i-Nasri,' in Professor Dowson's notes to Elliot's 'Muhammadan Historians of India,' in Colonel Yule's Cathay, and the Way thither; and in the works of James Prinsep, edited by Mr. Thomas, as well as in the 'Ariana Antiqua' of Professor Wilson. The most exhaustive modern account is in the work of Mountstuart Elphinstone, with Macartney's

(13) It is also called the Kama, from Jalalabad to Peshawur, according to Jehanghir and to Macartney. The Kunar is called the Kama by some writers. Kama is a fort opposite to Jalalabad.
Among the narratives of travellers are those of Foster, Alexander Burnes, Gerard, Leech, Lord, Griffith, Masson, and Vigne, and best of all, the second edition of Lieutenant Wood's Journey, with the exhaustive introductory essay by our gold medallist, Colonel Yule. I have already enumerated the sources of information respecting the Siah-posh Kafirs, and our existing knowledge is completed by the narratives of the native explorers so ably edited by our gold medallist, the late Colonel Montgomerie.

In conclusion, it will be well to enumerate the passes over the Hindu Kush which have been described in this paper, commencing from the eastern extremity of the range.

### Passes Over the Hindu Kush.

#### I.

**Chitrāl Division.**

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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Feet</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Baroghil Pass</td>
<td>12,000</td>
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<td>2. The Ishtirak</td>
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<td>3. The Agram</td>
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<td>4. The Nukzan</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Khartaza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Dora</td>
<td>16,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**From the Chitral Valley.**

#### II.

**Kafiristan Division.**

The Passes unknown.

#### III.

**Kohistan Division.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Feet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. The Anjumān Pass</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The Khawak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The Thal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The Zarya</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. The Yatukm</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. The Umraz</td>
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<td>13. The Shwā</td>
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<td>14. The Bazarak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The Shatpal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**From the Panjābīr Valley.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Feet</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. The Bajgah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The Sar-Ulang</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. The Kūshán</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. The Gwāliān</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. The Gwāzyār</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. The Char-darya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. The Ghajalaj</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. The Farinjal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. The Shibr</td>
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**From the Ghorband Valley.**

(2) See map in January number of the "Proceedings", p. 80.
The western portion of Afghanistan includes the inland basin of the River Helmund, and the smaller inland basin of the Abistada Lake. It is comprised in one of those river systems without any outlet to the sea, which occupy a vast area in the interior of Asia, where the drainage flowing from a circle or semicircle of mountains is formed into a lake or morass at the lowest level it can reach. Such are the basins of the Caspian and the Aral, of the Balkhash and Baikal, of Lake Lob and the Tibetan plateau, of the Heri-Rud and the Murghub, of the Helmund and the Abistada Lake.

The two latter form the subject of the present paper. They are surrounded, except to the westward where the Helmund drainage is emptied into the Sistan morass, by a vast amphitheatre of lofty mountains. To the eastward is the great chain of the Western Sulimani, forming the water-parting between Afghanistan and India. To the north is the ridge connecting the Hindu Kush with the Sullmani, and the continuations of the Hindu Kush mountains, known as the Koh-i-Baba and the Siah-Koh. To the south are the Khoja-Amrani Range and the desert of Baluchistan, and to the west is the depression of the Persian desert and the Lake of Sistan, which receives the surplus waters of the Helmund Basin. These limits enclose a mountainous region which is 420 miles in length by about 250 in its greatest breadth.

The basin of the Helmund is classic ground, and is the scene of many of the ancient Persian tales as related in the pages of Ferdosi. The tyrant Zohak, who overthrew the Persian monarchy then represented by Jamshid, was in turn overthrown and driven out of Iran. His memory is preserved in the castle of Zohak near Bamian, and his descendants are said to have founded the dynasty of Chor, in the wild recesses of the Siah-Koh. Zal was a prince who dwelt on the banks of the Helmund, and the story of his love for Rudabah, a princess of Kabul, is one of the most romantic episodes in the *Shah-namah*. They were the parents of Rustam, the great hero of ancient Persian history; whose castle is said to have been on an island in the lake of Sistan.

The mountain masses continuing westward from the Hindu Kush are furrowed by the river valleys. They thus form a series of ridges running west and south-west from the western extreme of the Hindu Kush, where that name ceases to be used.

The main continuation of the Hindu Kush is called the Koh-i-Baba, and runs due west, separating the drainage of the Oxus from that of the
THE BASIN OF HELMUND

Helmund. It is only known at its eastern end, where there is a magnificent view of three snow-clad mountains, and of a succession of lofty peaks as far as the eye can reach. Here the peak known as the Koh-i-Baba, is 18,000 feet above the sea. This scenery has been enjoyed by travellers who have taken the route to Bamian. Dr. Griffith ascended the Koh-i-Baba range in August 1840, to 13,500 feet, and he estimated the height of the peaks at 15,000 feet, the upper portions being entirely bare, and consisting of angular masses of rock. The general character of the range is great barrenness. Ferrier mentions a lofty snow-capped cone called the Chalap Peak, which is probably about 18,000 feet high, as towering above all the others. The eastern end of the Koh-i-Baba Range is crossed by three passes leading to Bamian from the upper valley of the Helmund, namely, the Irak, the Hajikhak, and the Pusht-Hajikhak. The road from the Helmund Valley winds up a zigzag defile to the summit of the Hajikhak Pass, an ascent of 3000 feet, which is dangerous and difficult in winter on account of snow-drifts. The height of the crest is variously given by Burnes, Wood, and Griffith, but the mean of their observations is about 12,000 feet. The descent into the Kalu district and thence to Bamian is between a ridge of high hills on the right, and a rough irregular valley on the left. The Pusht-Hajikhak, to the south, offers a better road, but can only be traversed by caravans from July to September. The Irak Pass is approached, from the Bamian side, by a good road with a gentle ascent, and the summit is a bleak table-land where the snow covers the ground, and high winds are almost continuous. The summit is about 13,000 feet above the sea. The descent is equally gradual and easy. A valuable description of the route from Kabul to Bamian over the Irak Pass, by General Kaye, who traversed it during the first Afghan war, will appear in the next number of our 'Proceedings.' Westward of these passes to Bamian, the Koh-i-Baba Range is entirely unknown. The Koh-i-Baba extends, from the point where the Hindu Kush ends, westward for about a hundred miles, when it separates into two ranges, one continuing westward and called the Safid-Koh, or white mountains (not to be confused with Safid-Koh which bounds the Kabul Valley to the south), and the other running south-west and separating the basin of the Helmund from that of the Heri-Rud River. The latter is called the Siah-Koh, or black range.

The Siah-Koh runs south-west towards the Persian desert, dividing the Helmund drainage, and the rivers flowing direct to the Lake of Sistan, from the valley of Herat. Ferrier is the only European who claims to have crossed the Siah-Koh Range to the east of the high road from Kandahar to Herat. On that road, south of Herat, the elevation of the water-parting is 6500 feet. The country of Ghur is on the southern slopes of the Siah-Koh.

The Koh-i-Baba and the Siah-Koh, being practically the continuation of the Hindu Kush, form the northern boundary of the basin of the Helmund. They are the Paropamisus Mountains of ancient geographers.

At the point where the Hindu Kush and Koh-i-Baba join, a ridge runs off to the south and west, separating the valley of the Helmund from that of the Argandab. This is the chain of the Paghman Mountains. At
first it divides the Ghorband and Kabul valleys from that of the Helmund. Here it is crossed by the road from Kabul to Bamiyan over the Unai Pass, which is easy and not very steep. The road then descends into the Helmund Valley, and crosses the Koh-i-Baba by the Hajikhak Pass to Bamiyan.

From the Paghman Range a ridge passes eastward, and connects the system of the Hindu Kush with that of the Sulimanis. This ridge, passing north of Ghazni, separates the basins of the Kabul and Helmund, and is crossed by the road from Kandahar to Kabul. It is called the Sher-Dahan, from the pass which is the highest point on the Kandahar and Kabul road. From the north this pass is approached by an easy ascent to the crest, and the southern descent towards Ghazni is through a narrow gorge to an extensive plain. In the winter the Sher-Dahan Pass is entirely blocked up with snow, and can only be passed with great difficulty on foot; but it can be turned by the Sargawan Kotal, which is always practicable for horsemen.

The Gul-Koh Mountains start from the Sher-Dahan ridge or, more strictly, from the Paghmans, and separate the Argandab Valley from the Ghazni Basin, and then from the Turnuk. They attain a height of 13,000 feet, the lower parts being scantily clothed with trees, and the summits showing nothing but barren rocks. In the spring and summer a vast variety of wild flowers clothes the slopes; hence the name. There are six passes near Ghazni which lead over the Gul-Koh Mountains into the valley of the Argandab—namely, the Kakrak, Turgan, Gulbarri, Roba, Barakat, and Markul passes.

From the Gul-Koh Mountains a spur branches off to the south, which bounds the Turnuk Valley to the south and east, dividing it from the basin of the Abistada Lake, and, lower down, from the Arghesan Valley. It is called the Surkh-Koh.

Between the Gul-Koh and Surkh-Koh hills on the east, and the Suliman Hills on the west, is the lofty inland basin of Lake Abistada. It is 120 miles long and about 60 wide, with the above limits to east and west, mountains separating it from the Arghesan Basin on the south, and the Safid-Koh and its spurs to the north. The Takri and Katasang hills intersect the northern half of the Abistada Basin.

These mountain ranges form so many rays branching west and southwest from the Hindu Kush. First the Koh-i-Baba and Siah-Koh mountains form the northern limit of the Helmund Basin. Next, the Paghman Hills separate the Helmund from the Argandab, the Gul-Koh Hills separate the Argandab from the Turnuk, and the Surkh-Koh and Gul-Koh divide the Turnuk and Argandab valleys from the Abistada Lake system. The Sher-Dahan Range is the water-parting between the Helmund and the Kabul, and the Western Sulimanis between the Helmund and Abistada and the Indus. Lastly, the Toba and Khoja-Amran mountains, to the south, complete the chain encircling the Helmund Basin. Having thus examined the orography of this region, we may now proceed to consider the river valleys which these ranges enclose.
Three rivers flow direct into the Lake of Sistan from the Siah-Koh Mountains, without first joining the Helmund. The westernmost of these is almost on the boundary between Afghanistan and Persia. This is the Harut-rud, or Sabzawar River, rising in the continuation of the Siah-Koh, to the south of Herat, and flowing southwards for 50 miles under the name of Adraskend. Here it receives the Rudi-i-Gaz, and flows through the plain of Sabzawar under the name of Jaya. Finally it is known as the Harut-rud until it falls into the Sistan Lake, after a course of 230 miles. Much of this course is through a sandy and barren region.

The Farah-rud is so called from the town of Farah near its banks on the road from Kandahar to Herat. It rises in the unexplored region of the Taimuni Imaks, the ancient kingdom of Ghor. This mountainous and secluded tract, in the recesses of the Siah-Koh Mountains, formed an independent sovereignty in the twelfth century, and its kings are said to be descended from Zohak, the famous tyrant of ancient Persia. The Ghori dynasty flourished from A.D. 1150 to 1214; and in 1180 Muhammad Ghori replaced the Ghaznivide dynasty in India, taking Delhi and Ajmir in 1193. The Ghori supremacy came to an end on his death, and Ghor was overrun in the following century by the Mughal conquerors. The inhabitants are men of Turanian origin, but speak a dialect of the Persian language. A section is said by Abul Fazl to be descended from a colony established by the Mughal conquerors, consisting of four regiments of a thousand men. Hence the name Hazara (a thousand) for the people, and Hazara-jat for the country. But the question of the origin of these mountaineers is one of great intricacy, and even Sir Henry Rawlinson hesitates to pronounce a decided opinion on the subject. The whole of the region on the southern slopes of the Siah-Koh, and in the upper valleys of the Farah-rud, Khash-rud, Helmund, and Argandab is inhabited by the Imaks and Hazaras. The Imaks are to the west of the Hazaras, and inhabit the Ghori country, numbering some 450,000 souls. They are chiefly occupied as shepherds, living in tents, their chiefs occupying strong castles. The Imaks are divided into Taimunis, Taimuris, and Zuris.

The Farah-rud River drains part of the Ghori country, and flowing south-west for about 200 miles, falls into the Lake of Sistan. It is crossed by the main road from Kandahar to Herat, and Conolly says that it is nearly dry during part of the year. But in the spring it is a wide and deep river, and during flood caravans are sometimes detained for weeks. A great deal of the water is taken off for irrigation.

The Khash-rud, east of the Farah-rud, also rises in the Siah-Koh. Conolly describes it as having a broad bed with not much water. In the low country, as they approach the lake, these rivers have their banks fringed with tamarisk-bushes, mimosa, and dwarf palm.

The River Helmund rises at Fazindaz in the Paghman Mountains, 11,500 feet above the sea, and after a south-westerly course of 700 miles, falls into the Sistan Lake. Near its source it is crossed, at Gardan-Diwar, by the Kabul and Bamian road, between the Unai and Hajikhak Passes, and here the elevation is 10,076 feet. At this point the Helmund Valley
has been visited by Masson, Burnes, Wood, Griffith, and by English officers during the first Afghan war. The river flows along the northern skirt of the plateau of Urt, a plain on the crest of the Paghman Range 8 miles wide, and 9000 feet above the sea. Here it is joined by the Abi-Siah stream coming from the southern slope of the Hajikhak Pass. Thence it passes on, down a deep valley for 35 miles, hugging the southern skirts of the Koh-i-Baba, to Chaoch-Khol, a village at the junction of the Ab-i-Dilawar. The banks are fringed with rose-bushes and osiers. It next receives rivers on the left bank from the Paghman Hills, called the Tirin and Gurumah, which flow through districts called Tirin, and Nesh; surveyed by Captain Sanders in 1840. After leaving the mountains through which it flows for several hundred miles, the Helmund takes a course along the eastern border of a pastoral district called Zamindawar, which extends for 40 miles to the west of the river.

Most of the wool exported from Afghanistan comes from Zamindawar; which district is inhabited by the Alizai branch of the Durani clan of Afghans. An important river called the Bugran, rising in the Siah-Koh, and flowing for some distance parallel with the Khash-rud, waters Zamindawar from north to south, and falls into the Helmund. Lieutenant Cooper, in 1840, mapped about 80 miles of the course of the Bugran, from the Helmund to a place called Hazar-Darakht, far up in the mountains.

Girishk is at the southern limit of Zamindawar, on the right bank of the Helmund. The fort of Girishk stands about a mile and a half from the river, and the site was selected from its proximity to the fords practicabile in June and July, and to the ferry which is established when the river is not fordable. The river, in its course through the mountain valley, is believed to flow in a deep channel between scarped rocks, and to be much obstructed by enormous boulders. At about 40 miles above Girishk, where it has Zamindawar on its right bank, it has a sandy and gravelly bed and runs through a flat country with a less confined channel. Here the water begins to be drawn off for purposes of irrigation. At Girishk, Conolly describes the Helmund as having banks a thousand yards apart, the right low and sandy, but the left rocky and high. In October it had a stream stirrup deep at the ford, with a width of 350 yards. About 50 miles of the course of the Helmund, above Girishk, was surveyed in 1840, and the map, preserved by the late Captain William Fraser Tytler, is now in the Geographical Department of the India Office.

At about 45 miles below Girishk, the Helmund is joined on the left bank, by its principal tributary the Argandab. It then takes a great southern sweep through the Garmisil region, and falls into the Sistan Lake, after a course of over 700 miles. The Garmisil consists of a breadth of rich land about two miles wide, extending along the banks of the river. Even in the dry season the Helmund is never without a plentiful supply of water, but in the winter, after the floods, it comes down with astonishing violence and rapidity. It is prevented from overflowing by embankments of ancient construction at several points, which have now fallen into decay, and in its lower course much of the water is taken off to irrigate the fertile tracts on either bank.
The Argandab, the chief tributary of the Helmund, has its sources 8500 feet above the sea, in the roots of the Paghman and Gul-Koh mountains, in the two elevated valleys of Jarmatu and Aludani, which are inhabited by independent Jagur Hazaras. The district at the sources of the Argandab is called Malistan on Fraser Tytler's map. The river flows thence down a valley between the Paghman and Gul-Koh ranges, receives the Turnuk 30 miles below Kandahar, and falls into the Helmund after a course of 350 miles. The point of junction is about 2000 feet above the sea, so that the fall is 18 feet per mile, and the velocity of the current in winter is very great. Little is known of the Argandab Valley. In September 1841, it was visited by General Lynch, who crossed the Gul-Koh Range, and came upon the river about midway between its source and Kandahar. Here the Argandab is a fine river, flowing rapidly over, a ford where the water was up to the horses' girths. The valley is populous and well cultivated, and there were numerous forts.

Kandahar is situated on a level plain between the Argandab and Turnuk rivers, 233 miles south-west of Ghazni, 318 from Kabul, and 380 from Herat; and here the Argandab is easily fordable in July, the stream being 40 yards wide. Fraser Tytler preserved several manuscript route-maps of portions of the basin of the Argandab, which are now in the Geographical Department of the India Office. These are a route from Kandahar across the Argandab, and north as far as a place called Gunda; a survey of the district of Nesh between the Argandab and the Helmund; the country on the right bank of the Argandab to the east of Nesh; the district of Kakrez between the Helmund and the Argandab, with much detail, especially on the right bank of the latter river; and a detailed survey of the Valley of Kandahar by Fraser Tytler himself, down to the junction of the Argandab and Turnuk. Below the Jagur Hazaras, the Argandab Valley is occupied by the Ghilzi Afghans, and below them are the Alizais, a sept of the Durani clan.

The Turnuk River is better known than any other in Afghanistan, because the road from Kandahar to Ghazni passes up its valley. This road was traversed by the armies of Lord Keene and General Nott, and has been travelled over by many Europeans. The sources of the Turnuk are 7040 feet above the sea, at the base of a rock on the high road, and to the north of the village of Mukur, where there is a pool of water supplied by six or seven springs. Thence the river flows through an open ravine to Kalat-i-Ghilzi, where the valley becomes more contracted. Kalat-i-Ghilzi is a strong fort on the right bank, 89 miles from Kandahar, and 144 from Ghazni, situated on an isolated plateau, having a command to the south of several hundred feet above the surrounding country. It is 5773 feet above the sea. The Turnuk In its lower course supplies irrigation to a rich and populous valley, and passes 8 miles south of Kandahar to join the Argandab about 40 miles lower down; but most of the water is consumed in irrigation. The whole length of the course of the Turnuk is 200 miles, and the fall 18 feet per mile. General Lynch explored several of the valleys down which the streams flow from the Gul-Koh Mountains to swell the Turnuk. One of these, called Resenna, he describes as a basin about 7½ miles long by 5, and
surrounded by high mountains. This valley was highly cultivated, yielding fine crops of corn and lucerne, and was irrigated by khariz, or underground watercourses. It was densely populated by people of the Hazara race, and covered with forts, in which they reside for safety. He visited a similar valley, within the Turnuk Basin, called Angori, and he describes the valleys of Resenna and Angori as perfect little paradises, surrounded by barriers of rocky mountains, from which numerous streams descend. In the Angori Valley there were no less than 150 forts, in which all the inhabitants lived, and into which they drove their cattle in times of danger. In these valleys there is a plentiful growth of the Salab (Salapl-Mbri), a plant like an onion. The bulbous root, when dried in the sun, shrinks into a small hard substance, which is the Salep so much used in India for its nutritive qualities. The Afghan name is Peel-I-Koh, or «the onion of the mountains»; but it is a Eulopilia (Orchidaceae), not an onion.

The Arghesan and Dori, which unite and join the Turnuk, drain the eastern slopes of the Western Sulimani Range, and the northern sides of the Khoja-Amran. The Arghesan, rising on the Charalbi Pass, in the Sulimanis, and flowing west, joins the Dori 7 miles from Kandahar. The course of this river is entirely unknown; though the Bombay column, under Neil Campbell, must have crossed it near its source. The road from Kandahar to the Gomul Pass, which has never been traversed by any European, is said to meet the Arghesan 35 miles from Kandahar, and to follow its course for 20 miles to the foot of the Sargaz Kotal which divides two branches. After crossing this pass the road again reaches the bed of the Arghesan and continues along it for 50 miles to the Ghwarza Pass, where it leaves the river. The Dori River rises in the west slopes of the Kohjak Pass—on the road from Kwatah (Quetta) to Kandahar—and after a course of about 90 miles, falls into the Turnuk.

Thus the rivers which drain direct into the Sistan Lake are the Harut-rud, the Farah-rud, the Khash-rud, and the Helmund: of which the latter is by far the most important. The Helmund, Argandab, and Turnuk flow down valleys in the mountains of the Siah-Koh and its offshoots, of the Paghman and Gul-Koh, all belonging to the Hindu Kush system; while the Arghesan and Dori drain the eastern slopes of the Sulimanis and their offshoots. The history of the lower course of the Helmund, after the river has received all its tributaries, and of the changes which have taken place in its mouths, presents a most interesting and instructive subject of investigation for the student of comparative geography. But the whole history of Lake Sistan and its changes has already been exhaustively discussed by Sir Henry Rawlison in a learned paper which appeared in the forty-third volume of our 'Transactions.' (1)

It remains to notice the remarkable isolated basin of Lake Abistada on the eastern side of the Western Sulimani Range. (2) This basin is 150 miles long by 50 broad. Its eastern half is drained by the river of Ghazni. This river is formed in a little valley 12 miles from Ghazni,
at the foot of the Gul-Koh mountains. The city of Ghazni, on the left bank of the river, is built on level ground between it and a spur of the Gul-Koh range. This place, which is 7726 feet above the sea, is important because it is the capital of the Ghilzi country, and is on the direct line of communication between Kabul and Kandahar, 85 miles from the former, and 233 from the latter. Here, too, was the capital of Mahmud, the famous invader of India, who flourished from A.D. 997 to 1030. It was Mahmud who formed the river of Ghazni. He dammed up two out of the three rivulets which are its sources, and thus formed the present river. In the dry season it issues from the dam a stream 20 feet wide and 2 deep, with a velocity of 5 feet per second. In spring it is much larger. The dam, called ‘Band-i-Sultan’ consists of a wall of masonry closing up a rocky valley, and when complete it was 300 yards long, and from 20 to 30 feet high. The outlet is closed in autumn, and a lake fills the valley, 600 yards across. In spring, the orifice is opened for irrigation, and after a course of 10 miles the volume is much reduced, water having been taken off to irrigate fields on either side. Thence it flows over a desolate tract, impregnated with salt, to the Abistada Lake. The eastern half of the Abistada Basin is occupied by the districts of Zurmat and Katawaz.

Zurmat is a valley 40 miles long by 20. Near its northern extremity is a town called Gardez, containing 250 houses of Tajiks, and still further north is Michelga. The mountains which bound Zurmat on either side furnish many khariz or underground watercourses for irrigation, and a line of forts is built along these khariz, and parallel to the bases of the hills. From Gardez a good road crosses into the Logar valley and goes thence to Kabul; and there is a more difficult one, by Michelga, to Jalalabad. The Shutar-gardan Pass, from the Kurram Valley, also opens upon Zurmat, and the road leads across that district where water, forage and grain are abundant, to Ghazni. The River Jalgu waters the Valley of Zurmat, and falls into the Ghazni.

Katawaz, also in the Abistada Basin to the south of Zurmat, is 48 miles long by 24 in breadth. This district consists of a level and open plain, bounded on the east by the Western Sulimani Mountains, on the west by the lower hills of Katasang, which bound the valley of the Ghazni on the east, and on the south by the Abistada Lake. Katawaz is entirely occupied by the Suliman-Khel division of the Ghilzi tribe. It is watered by the River Paltu which rises in the Western Sulimanis, and has an independent course to the lake. Its stream is about 20 feet wide and a foot deep. The Pass of Paltu, at the source of the river, is reported by Broadfoot to be difficult, and leads over the Sulimanis into the country of the Karotis in the Gomul Valley.

Lake Abistada is 7050 feet above the sea. It was described by the Emperor Baber, and has been visited during this century by Masson and Broadfoot. It is 65 miles south-west of Ghazni, a distance which nearly represents the length of the river, and it receives the Ghazni River, with its affluent the Jalgu, at its northern end; and the Paltu River from the east. The lake is 17 miles long by 15 broad, and it has a
trifling depth of 12 feet in the centre. It is bounded by a gently shelving margin of naked clay. Not a tree is in sight, nor even a blade of grass. The water is salt and bitter, and the banks are deeply encrusted with salt. The fish brought down by the Ghazni River, on entering the salt part, sicken and die, and at the point where the river enters the lake, thousands of dead fish are strewn. Some of the sources of the Arghesan River approach very closely to the southern margin of Lake Abistada, but they are separated by a ridge, from the northern slope of which a stream, with a very short course, flows into the lake. The Afghans say that this stream drains the waters of the lake; and the point is still doubtful. The surrounding country is very barren and dreary, with scarcely any inhabitants.

The basins of the Helmund and Abistada are partly occupied by Imaks and Hazaras, and partly by Afghans, while in the cultivated parts there are many descendants from Persian settlers. The Imaks, a people of Turanian descent, but speaking Persian, occupy the ancient kingdom of Chor, on the southern slopes of the Siah-Koh Mountains. To the eastward are the Hazaras, who are also established in the upper valleys of the Helmund and Argandab. The powerful Ghilzi tribe of Afghans inhabit a region bounded on the south by Kalat-i-Ghilzi, on the west by the Gul-Koh Mountains, on the east by the Sulimanis, and on the north by the Kabul River. This comprises the upper half of the Turnuk Valley, and the whole of the Abistada Basin. Their number is estimated by Lumsden at 200,000 souls, or 30,000 fighting men. The Durani Afghans occupy a country north and south of the road between Kandahar and Herat, which is about 400 miles long by 80 broad. This territory is bounded on the north by the mountainous slopes of the Siah-Koh, occupied by Imaks and Hazaras; on the west by the Persian frontier; on the south-west by Sistan; on the south by the Khoja-Amran Mountains; and on the east by the country of the Ghilzis. Zamindawar, north of Girishk, is inhabited by the Alizal branch of the Duranis, and these shepherds find a summer retreat in a mountainous region called Siah-band, abounding in cool and grassy valleys, which they share with the Taimuni Imaks. The Durani tribe, which includes the ruling clan of Barakzais, numbers at least 100,000 families.

The authorities for the geography of the basin of the Helmund are numerous. For the physical geography of the lower Helmund and the Sistan Lake we have the narratives of Christie and Conolly; the route of Patterson; the works of Ferrier and Khanikoff; the information given by Goldsmid, St. John, and Lovett, in the official work on Eastern Persia; and the Paper by Sir Henry Rawlinson. The Memoirs of Baber, and the notes in Major Raverty's translation of the Tabakat-i-Nasri, contain much information. Several travellers, and the officers of the first Afghan campaign, have described Kandahar, and the route thence, by the Turnuk Valley, to Kabul, while Broadfoot and Nell Campbell traversed the Abistada Basin. Broadfoot reported on the Ghilzi country and Ghazni; Dr. Kennedy gave an account of the country from the Kohjak Pass to Kandahar, and from Kandahar to Kabul; Masson's and Vigne's journeys led them over the same country; General Lynch explored the
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valleys of the Turnuk and Argandab; and the Lumsden Mission to Kandahar resulted in the collection of a large mass of useful information. Still, the greater part of the Helmund Basin is entirely unknown, including the Siah-Koh and nearly all the Koh-i-Baba mountains, several hundred miles of the courses of the Helimund and of the Argandab, a great part of the Abistada Basin and the valley of the Arghesan. This, and the two former papers on Afghan geography, are intended as a review of our existing knowledge, to which great and important additions are certain to be made by Major St. John, Captain Holdich, and other zealous geographers and explorers now serving in Afghanistan.

A description of the valleys of the Upper Oxus, of the Murghab, and the Heri-Rud, would complete this view of the geography of Afghanistan, and I trust that an abler hand may undertake the preparation of such a paper, as a contribution to some future number of our 'Proceedings.'
SURVEY OPERATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN EXPEDITION:
THE KURRAM VALLEY

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Introduction.—In accordance with the desire expressed by the Surveyor-General of India that I should write a short narrative report of the proceedings of the survey party attached to the Kurram Valley field force, I have attempted to draw up the following account, and to keep it as concise as possible, without omitting anything I thought of great importance or likely to be of interest. I feel that Captain Woodthorpe, R. E., would probably have done this duty far better than myself, as he was with the column from the commencement of the expedition, and with it throughout the operations in Khost, while I was not; but he had other duties to attend to, and thus the reporting of our experiences fell on me. He has, however, informed me of all that happened before I joined, and by this information, combined with my own experiences since I have been with the force, I hope I have compiled a report which will answer the purpose required.

The area which has come under survey extends first from Thal up the Kurram Valley to the Paiwar range, being bounded on the north by the mountains of the Safid Koh; next the district of Khost to the south of the Kurram, including the mountains between it and that river; also the country west of the Paiwar range, called the Ariob, not Haliab, as some writers have put it, up the Hazardarakht stream to the Shutargaradan; and again the country south of this to the land of the Ahmed Khels, Lajhwars, and Chakmannis on the Kurram; besides having sketched some other portions of the country on the south side of this river. We also were enabled to cross the Lakeral Kotal (pass) of the Safid Koh range, for a short distance, and so mapped a small portion of the valley of the Surkab River north of these mountains.

Altogether the country surveyed amounts roughly to an area of about 4500 square miles; the most eastern point being Thal, lat. 33°22', long. 70°36'; the most western the Shutargaradan Kotal, lat. 33°56'30", long. 69°24'50"; the most northern the Lakeral Kotal over the Safid Koh, lat. 34°5'10", long. 69°50'30"; the most southern a point on the watershed between the country of the Waziris and Khost, lat. 33°12'40", long. 70°7'50". We have not had time at present to work out all our calculations, so these values are not final, but they may be taken as approximately correct, and refer to spots actually visited, though of course we were able to fix many distant points which will be of use to future explorers. The scales used were 4 miles to the inch for the geographical map, and 1 inch to the mile for the route survey.
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RIVERS.—The rivers in our work are nearly all so intimately connected with the Kurram, that in the description of that stream I shall give an account of most of the others that pour into the valley.

The River Kurram is fed by three streams of importance, which flow into and join in the Ariob Valley. They are:—

1. The Smaller Hazardarakht or Ghogazai stream, rising northeast of the Sirkai Kotal, flowing for about 8 miles in a north-easterly direction, and then turning south-west and flowing past the village of Ghogazai to that of Dreikula, where it meets the Hazardarakht stream proper.

2. The Hazardarakht stream rises near Sirkai Kotal, from a high hill to the south-east of that kotal, called Saratega, and flowing almost parallel with the Ghogazai, meets the latter near Dreikula. On their junction they flow in a south-westerly direction and continue to flow so to Ali Khel, under the name of the Hazardarakht (thousand trees).

3. The third is the Ariob, which rises in the Paiwar range, and flows in a westerly direction, being fed by the Sargal from Ada Khel, the Laridar from the Lakerai Kotal, and the Karchatel from Ali Sangi, and other minor streams, until it meets the Hazardarakht stream at Ali Khel.

The real source of the Kurram River should be considered the second of these, viz. the Hazardarakht, as it is the longest and has the largest body of water. These three streams thus joined flow on under the name of the Ariob—but of course it is really the Kurram River—in a westerly direction (it is fed by small streams, the most important of which is the Dapozai, running down from Saratega, and passing the village of Dapozai, which is on the right bank of the Kurram), for about 12 miles, when it suddenly turns sharply to the south, between very close precipitous rocky sides, a most peculiar formation, the stream not being broader than about 50 feet. This place is called the Tangi, and is just opposite the villages and in the territory of the Ahmed Khels. Near here the Arjob, or Kurram, as it really is, is fed by a stream which rises near the Surki or Spiga Kotal (not Sirkai) on the road to Ghazni, but probably rising really in the mountain Saratega, over the Surkal Kotal. This stream is also called the Ghunzai.

From the point where the Ghunzai or Surki meets the Kurram the latter flows a little south, and is met by the Wom on the left bank, and the Ooma on the right, all near Ahmed Khel. From Ahmed Khel the river bends again and flows in an easterly direction past Lajhi, Keraia, &c., to Kurram. It is fed in this part (where it bears the name of Kurram) by many streams; the principal being, the Wom, Mangior, Isteah, Spingawai, and Shaluzan streams on its left bank; and the Ooma, Lajhi, Gabara, Zigor, and Darwazagai on its right bank.

A little below Kurram Fort the Karman River from the Safid Koh flows into the Kurram, and about this point the river takes a more south-easterly direction until the Karmana River from the Mozazai Valley flows into it, when it turns almost due south to Hazar Pir. Here the Jaji Maidan River joins the Kurram on its right bank, and the latter
then again flows south-east to Thal; thence to Bannu, and into the Indus at Isakher. From the Shutar-gardan we were able to see the Logar or Logard River in the distance, but I was not able to get near enough to fix or draw it in; in fact, as I explain further on, my visit to the Shutar-gardan was so hurried I could do but little. The name of this stream is written by the Ghilzais as Logar, (1) but by the Farsibands or Persian-speaking inhabitants, i.e. the tillers of the land generally, it is written Logard (soft d), (2)

Of the other streams, the Laridar, mentioned above, is important, as it rises by the Lakerai Kotal of the Safid Koh, which is a pass towards Jagdalak and Gandamak, and to get to the pass one has to go up the bed of the Laridar stream. I was able to put in the Surkab River at its source, which flows down from the north side of the Lakerai to the district of Esarak and round easterly to Gandamak.

I notice that Colonel Edwardes, in his account of the Kurrarn Valley in 1856, speaks of «the ever white Spinghar or Safid Koh,» and again, of «the noisy babbling Kurram whose waters are as clear and crystal as the snow from which they come.» I can't say I altogether agree with this, for there was no snow on the Safid Koh up to the middle of January, and it generally begins to die away by the middle of June, all having gone as a rule by the middle of July or beginning of August; and again, though the waters of the Kurram are noisy, they are at the same time decidedly dirty, with a great deal of mud and sand in suspension, at least they have been so ever since this Expedition has been in the valley. The mountain streams are certainly some of them as clear as crystal, but even many of them become muddy and dirty as they near the larger river. Of course the snow remains longer on the north side of the Safid Koh and may be all the year round there, but that is not visible from the Kurrarn Valley.

In Khost the principal rivers are the Shamil, the Matun, the Zumba, and in the Jaji Maidan territory the Jaji Maidan River. The Shamil rises in the Jadran Hills and flows easterly to Matun, where it is met by the Matun River; it then continues its course, easterly still, until the Zumba or Kam Khost River flows into it near Arun Khel, and about 4 miles beyond this it turns in a southerly direction to Laram, where it again turns easterly and flows into the Kurram near Zaron, south of Thal. The Matun and Zumba or Kam Khost rivers both rise in the Gabar Mangal Hills, and both flow almost parallel in a south-easterly direction; the former joining the Shamil at Matun, the latter at Arun Khel. The Jaji Maidan River rises on the south side of the range of hills between the territory of the Makhbuls and Jaji Maidan, and flows through the latter territory in a south-easterly direction, joining the Kurram River near Hazar Pir.

Roads.—There are many roads, none of them very good in a military point of view; and of course there are several over passes only fit for foot travellers, which we do not yet know.
The principal and most important road is that from Thal, now improved by the British; it leads by the village Mandoria along the left bank of the Kurram, and by the Alizai and Shinak to Kurram. The old road from Thal used to cross to the right bank of the river at Kaplunga and continue along that side, and was at first made use of till the British improved the other; it used to pass by Ahmed-i-Shamu and Hazar Pir, and cross the left bank above Shinak and so to Kurram.

From Kurram the road runs across an open dry plain to the village of Habib Killa, a Durani cantonment, and thence up the Paiwar range to the Paiwar Kotal. The walk from Kurram to Habib Killa is the longest march a man can take, i.e. it seems so. It is only 13 miles, but going either way you see your destination the whole time, and it seems quite near when you start, and never any nearer for every step you take; it is more tiring to march from one to either, and back, than any other 26 miles I know of.

This same road then passes over the kotal, and running down the western side between pretty wooded spurs it goes by Zabardast Killa, and Bian Khel, to Ali Khel, keeping on the left bank of the Ariob River. Thence a road turns along the Hazardarakht stream, passing Rokian, Dreikula, and Jaji Thana, over the Surkai Kotal, down into the valley on to Kasim Khel, Hazratt Thana, and on to the Shutar-Gardon. Thence the road runs by Dobandi and Kushi, into the Logar Valley, and then northwards to Kabul. This is considered one of the great roads, and is of course the one that will now be of most importance.

To return again as far as Kurram, we have another important road, and that is the continuation of the Thal one, along the banks of the Kurram, past Keraia, through the Chakmanni country, by Lajhi to Ahmed Khel, thence up the Ghunzai or Surki River, over the kotal of that name, and on to Ghazni.

After the Surki Kotal is passed, the road branches off to the Tera Gawi Kotal, and thence to Kabul. The first portion of this road near Chakmanni and Lajhi is dreaded on account of the robbers, or otherwise it is the best road to Ghazni. It was by this road, and over the Spiga Kotal, that Mahomet Azim Khan, the old ruler and builder of Kurram Fort, brought the guns to Kurram. The name Altimor is used by General Abbott, and I believe this is the summit, and Tera Gawi the foot of the pass.

To return to Ali Khel again, we find a road along the Ariob River by Karmana, Secunder Khel, and Dapoza, joining the road over the Spiga Kotal, near the Ahmed Khel Tangi of the river.

Let us start now at Ahmed-i-Shamu, on the old road between Tahl and Kurram, and we find a road running by Shobakghar and Landiah, on the Shamil River, and up that river to Matun. This continues along the river into Jadran. Again from Hazar Pir a road runs by Jaji Maidan and Jaji Danni, by Bakh, and south to Matun. This is the principal road into Khost. Where the Zumba River cuts the last named, a road branches off to Sabori.
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Again, starting from Hazar Pir we have a road passing through the Jaji Maidan country, and then turning north, and crossing the Darwazagai Pass, comes out of the hills, to the Kurram Valley, a little east of Kurram Fort. At Sadar, where the Karmana River joins the Kurram, a road goes along the former stream into the Mozazai Valley; but I cannot say we know anything about it. Nor do we know any more of another road starting from the same place by Dandoghar Mountain, and on to Togh.

There is a road from Kurram by Zeran village, and over the Aghane Pass of the Safid Koh, and on to Jalalabad, which we have only seen as far as the pass. The same holds for the important road running by Bian Khel and Belut along the Laridar River, by the Lakerai Kotal, into the Babar Ghilzai territory of Azar and Esarak to Jalalabad.

The Ghogazai route to the Logar Valley passing by Mir Alum’s Fort is another road, avoiding the Hazardarakht route and the Surkal and Shutar-gardan kotal, joining the Hazardarakht route at Dreikula. Captain Rennick, the political officer of the Ariob, tells me he thinks the telegraph ought to be carried into Kabul by this route, as it would avoid the snow-drifts of the Akund defile and the storms of the Shutar-gardan. The portion of this road from Ghogazai to Mir Alum is not good, however, being as bad, if not worse, as that by Dreikula and Jaji Thana, though the remaining portion (as I mention further on) inspected by Captain Rennick and myself, i.e. from Mir Alum to a kotal north of the Shutar-gardan, is excellent.

Besides all these roads, there are several minor or contraband ones, such as across the Mangior Kotal from Ali Khel by Sapri to Keraia on the Kurram River, and that by the Isteah Pass out of the Ariob Valley to Isteah on the Kurram.

Towns, &c.—The principal villages (they really cannot be called towns) we have met with are Kurram, Ali Khel, Habib Killa, Sali Mahomet Khan’s Killa, and Matun in Khost. These are perhaps a little longer and more important than some of the others, but all are really very much alike, being composed of mud houses surrounded with a mud wall. Kurram, Matun, and Sali Mahomet Khan’s Fort, in Chakmanni, have pretensions of being fort, however. Kurram is the largest. Kurram Fort is a square mud fort, having towers at the corners and in the middle of each side; rooms are built for the garrison all along inside the walls, and there is a place for a bazaar, and an inner square mud building for the magazine. It was built originally by Mahomet Azim Khan, and used to be called by his name. All other forts are, as I say, on much the same principle.

The villages even are similar, and fortified to some little extent. They are, of course, built of mud with thick walls, and the dwellers try their best to make their exits and entrances as difficult as possible. In some places that I have seen, a man has to clamber up some feet, and go through a hole to get to a room. For light and air in their rooms the villagers have holes (about a foot square) made high up in the
wall, so as to be out of the reach of a man outside, as they apparently never can be sure when an enemy may be near, and one playful custom is for a man to put his gun through the hole, if he can reach it, and fire into the room at night. I have seen many of these little holes provided with small iron shutters. The villagers light their fires in their rooms, and have no chimneys. I have slept in their rooms under such circumstances, and have experienced the pain the smoke causes to the eyes; but I was told that one soon got accustomed to it, and that the watering of one’s eyes was very good for them.

**Climate.**—The climate generally of the Kurram Valley is that of the Punjab, only severer in its extremes. There is a very severe winter—of course, far severer than that of the Punjab, the thermometer having gone down to 5 Fahr. in December last, and having averaged 12° to 15° Fahr. often during the night. Even in April it has been as low as 27° Fahr.; and yet this was not considered a severe winter, but rather the contrary. The summer is very dry and hot, and the rainfall small. It may be imagined that in the valleys such a climate must be very trying and I personally have my doubts whether this will be found so healthy a country as many seem to expect. We have been knocking about in tents for some time, and the men, both Europeans and natives, are as hard as nails, and in rude health, so one cannot judge from this what troops will be like when living a sedentary life in a cantonment in these valleys.

Our native followers suffered most from pneumonia during the intense cold, and the Europeans stationed in the valley would probably suffer more from the heat, if it were not for the grand pitch of training to which they have been brought. There are, however, hills all around, and quite close at hand, and I allow that such air as one can obtain on the Paiwar Kotal and other spots is simply life-giving.

**General Description of the Country.**—The country round Thal is like that of the Punjab Salt Range, the hills being for the most part barren and all vegetation scarce, the mountains having only a few stunted shrubs on them; except in the ravines and the foot of the hills, where, being protected, there are a few trees. This, of course, is to be expected, owing to the severity of the winter and the want of moisture in the air at other times. One large hill, Kadimakt, on the left bank of the Kurram, rises over Thal to about 4900 feet. A little distance out of Thal we begin to get more vegetation, and the hills have a little more scrub jungle on them.

When we arrive at Kurram we find ourselves in a large, dry, open plain. The fort is situated in this plan, so dreary, dry, and ugly, that the mud huts of the villages being almost the same colour as the ground can hardly be distinguished at a short distance, and were it not for the loose stones and boulders lying about, against which one’s feet continually knock, and which add considerably to the bootmaker’s bill, one might imagine it (as far as the valley is concerned) the plains of the Punjab.
But there is happily something to break the monotony of this scene, and that is the hills around; first among which is the beautiful range of the Safid Koh. At Kurram this range is visible from Sikaram on the west, bearing away to the east, and beyond a fine pointed peak called Keraira, just a little north-east of Kurram, till it is lost to view; but looking back, down the river, we see the hills we have already passed on our way from Thal, and the mountains (one grand fellow among them) of the Zaemukt country, besides other large hills, and one feels oneself repaid for living through the dry heat, the cutting cold, and the dusty storms (we always had one of these at Kurram) by the enjoyment afforded us by the varied beauties of these glorious ranges.

Early in the morning, and at sunset, we always had some picturesque effect to entrance us. Perhaps silver grey and soft shadows, perhaps deep reds and purples, perhaps black angry clouds floating over the tops of the mountains, with white masses half-way down them; whatever the state of the weather, whatever the light, we could every day find and enjoy some new beauty in the mountains. Nevertheless, although I admired the hills and loved to look on their ever-changing beauties, I could not but wish that the hideous foreground, which it made one thirsty to look at, could be changed for something more in accordance with my ideas of what the country behind it deserved.

On our way to the Paiwar Kotal we pass a village at the foot of the Safid Koh, called Shaluzan, about 5 miles east of the old Durani cantonment of Habib Killa. I cannot pass this without mentioning it, for it is indeed a lovely spot. Situated at the foot of huge mountains rising over 15,000 feet; hid among a forest of walnut-trees, with little temples built on the points of the various underfeatures, with many clear-sparkling mountain streams rippling along, and its quaint little mud huts, it is one of the most lovely and picturesque spots I have ever seen. One can sit under the shade of the various trees there, and they are many, and imagine there is no hideous dry, hot plain beyond, for all one sees is pretty, green, soft, undulating ground; sunlight falling between the trees, glimpses of the snows of the Safid Koh, the sparkle of the crystal water, and perhaps here and there a group of men clothed in their picturesque garb. The inhabitants always look right, they are always in the right place, they always sit or stand in the most picturesque way, and their natural unconsciousness makes their positions all the more easy and graceful. Their dresses are of lovely colours; generally they are of a deep, almost invisible blue, with some other shade of the same, or perhaps some other bright bit of colour put in here and there to relieve it. They seem unconsciously always to put in this bit of colour in the right spot, and the dirt with which they are all covered seems but to improve the richness of the hues. Add to this the quaint weapons and strange faces of the men (some really very handsome, like fine old Jewish heroes, others "hang-dog", or crafty), and the fact that, group themselves as they will, they seem always to improve the scene, and it can be imagined what a fairylike spot this seemed to us.
While talking of Shaluzan, I should mention the fact that on the 28th of May, just after the Queen's birthday, and a little before peace was signed, the Commander-In-Chief of the Pattiala Contingent gave a picnic in the name of H. H. the Maharajah, to the General and almost all the officers of the column (i.e. as many as the distance to be got over, or duty, would allow to go). It was a most hospitable and generous act, quite worthy of the liberality of native princes, and a pretty courteous wind-up of the excellent service they and their men have performed as long as they have been with the force. They had most trying and difficult duty to carry out, in keeping our communications open, and escorting supplies; and it was most gratifying to see the pains they all took, both officers and men, to do everything in their power to help. The alacrity with which they worked, their zeal, and intense anxiety to please, was noticed and was talked of by every officer from the General downwards. It was their misfortune (at least I expect the men themselves thought so), that there was no more fighting to be done, and considering what a good stock they came from, and what fine, powerful, muscular men they were, I think the enemy would have found them very ugly customers to deal with.

But to return to our picnic. It was no ordinary entertainment, and the expense must have been enormous, when we remember that luxuries of all sorts were in profusion (including champagne, ice, and soda-water), luxuries that were certainly not procurable in Afghanistan. A photograph was taken of the party, and after that we had some wrestling. The two best bouts were between a Pathan and a gigantic Sikh, the latter winning, and being in consequence challenged by another Mussulman later on, but the Sikh again was the conqueror.

We heard that Shaluzan was famous for its lovely women, but as I never saw any of the fair sex at all, it is impossible to pass an opinion on their looks. I am now afraid that the charms of this picturesque spot will soon be at an end, as a military cantonment is being laid out quite near it, which means ugly barracks, hideous houses, cutting down of trees, and generally destruction of all that is lovely as far as it is possible to destroy it.

The Paiwar range, as before mentioned, is really a spur running south from the mountain Sikaram. It is a well-wooded spur rising in one part, north of the kotal, to a point about 9400 feet high, and decreasing in height by a series of small peaks till it arrives at the kotal; from there the range begins to rise again, running south, and being crossed by several passes leading from the Ariob Valley into the Kurram Valley proper, the principal being the Isteah, Strimander, and Drak Algar, and finally ending in one fine hill called Mandeha, about 11,000 feet high, just over the village of Kerala, on the Kurram, and overlooking the Mangler Defile. On the opposite side of the kotal, i.e. the western side, long spurs run down, and the scenery begins to wear a more pleasant aspect, one of these spurs running along parallel with the Ariob, and helping to feed it by many very small streams. From the Isteah Kotal runs down another stream, and on this same bank one
more stream also flows, called the Ali Khel, nearly parallel to the last, and both fall into the Ariob before we reach Ali Khel.

From the Mandeha range, as I shall call this southern and high portion of the Paiwar range, runs out a spur on which is the Drak Algar Pass, mentioned above, and this spur rises at the other end to a point about 10,800 feet, visible from Ali Khel. All these hills being thickly wooded, with a large amount of deodar, and in places being steep and precipitous on the river bank, cause this side of the Ariob to be very pretty and effective.

The country on the right bank of the Ariob, after passing Zabardast Killa, is more open, rising gradually to the foot of the Safid Koh until we pass Bian Khel, when we begin to see the effects of the spurs from Matungeh, a noble mountain, 12,800 feet high, which stands over Ali Khel in a direction nearly due north.

The Safid Koh range from Sikaram runs for about 4 1/2 miles northwest, and then, the edge ending rather sharply, strikes off into two branches. One spur runs northwards, where it has one or two well-marked peaks, and gradually dies away, forming part of the watershed of the Surkab River, which flows north to Esarak and then east to Gandamak. The other spur continues to drop steadily to the Zera Kandai Kotal and thence to the Lakerai Kotal. The former is a bad pass, and very steep and difficult to climb, while the latter is an important pass about 10,000 feet high, and is the best road across from Ariob to Jagdalak and Gandamak. After this, the range turns southerly somewhat, and begins to get higher and higher until it culminates in the hill previously mentioned north of Ali Khel.

There is a peculiar formation of three plateaus near Ali Khel village, owing to the drainage into the two rivers, Ariob and Hazardarakht, that meet there, surrounded by smaller hills; these plateaus made capital encamping grounds. One of the most exquisite views we have had was from the top of one of these small hills, looking up the river towards Paiwar Kotal.

The village of Ali Khel lies beneath, on the banks of the river which you see winding away in the distance, with small villages dotted about on its banks, and surrounded by green rice fields and orchards. Matungeh stands on your left, black and frowning, with scanty vegetation on its lower spurs, while nearly the whole range of the Safid Koh, from Sikaram, lies before you, its many spurs running out in all directions and taking various hues—lit up here, in shadow there. And again, on the right, the well-wooded ranges from Mandeha to the kotal give a variety of tints in the colour of their foliage. I should be sorry to say how many men have tried to sketch this, and how many have come far short of doing justice to its beauties—failed in fact for lack of power in their brushes, as I feel I have failed from lack of power in my language.

All this part of our course is well cultivated, rich in barley, rich in rice, the villages surrounded by fruit-trees, and most of the field watered by a most laborious system of irrigation from the river.
Now let us turn up from Ali Khel and look at the country by the Hazardarakht stream. The hill Saratega I should guess to be about 12,000 feet high, lat. 33°54'45'', long. 69°31'59'', situated a little south-west of the Surkai Kotal (Red Kotal), on the way to the Shutar-gardan. The spurs from this high mountain run down for 12 or 13 miles, of course each one forming almost a range of its own. One of these spurs runs down to the Ali Khel, ending in small undulating features; but as we go up the Hazardarakht stream towards Dreikula we find these spurs end more abruptly, forming much steeper banks, and having less vegetation.

The opposite bank is formed by a large spur from Matungh with peculiar pointed hills and strangely shaped features. Opposite Dreikula village, at the meeting of three streams (as its name «three-mouthed» implies), there is a strange set of rocks standing up like a wall or a series of broken columns, some ending in sharp points. Near Dreikula the pine forests begin again, and all up the Hazardarakht stream, nearly to Jaji Thana, the forest is thick, and both banks of the river steep. On the way from Ali Khel to Dreikula we pass on the right a village, Rokian, famous for its wheat and apples.

From Jaji Thana to the Sirkai Kotal the country is again rather barren and the hills bare. Crossing over the Sirkai Kotal we descend into a green plain and arrive at Hazratt Thana or Kasim Khel, from which we go to the Shutar-gardan Kotal; and all this part of the country is again rocky and very bare; the ascent up to the Shutar-gardan being very gradual on this side, but being remarkably steep on the other side down to Dobandi. From what I could see from the kotal, there was a descent practicable into a rich, fine land; but I had gone as far as I could be permitted.

Let us start once again from Ali Khel, and go down the Ariob River still further. We pass a pointed hill, well wooded, on the left, called Uth Mander, at the foot of which is Mirak Shah's Fort, a person whom I shall have to mention further on; and by this passes the road to Chapri, or Sapri, and over the Mangior Kotal down the defile to the Kurram River. Continuing down the Ariob, we pass Karmana, from which village is another road to Sapri. Then we come to Secunder Khel, an important village, and at about 10 miles from Ali Khel the large village of Dapozai. All the left bank is formed by well-wooded hills, rising between 10,000 and 11,000 feet high, and rather steep at the river edge, but going off into long ranges and spurs, and rising a little again, and then finally dropping down straight, forming steep banks to the Kurram, near Lajhi. The right bank of the Ariob from Ali Khel to Ahmed Khel is formed, like the right bank of the Hazardarakth, by the long spurs from Saratega, only in this case they do not run down so closely to the water's edge, and slope more gradually. These slopes also are wooded some few hundred feet up, but not very much so nearer the bottom and the river.

A short distance beyond we come to the important feature of the river, described before, called the Tangi, and here the country is naturally
all rocks, and very barren, the sides being most precipitous, but the Ahmed Khel villages have fields down on the river side, and many along the Surki stream, all reclaimed by immense labour from the waters.

The sides of the Surki stream are well wooded, and on the left bank are formed by the spurs from Saratega Mountain, and on the right bank by spurs from the high hills behind the Ahmed Khel villages. But, as I said previously, the country round the Tangi and on to Lajhi is, on each side of the river, very bare, rocky, and wild; the banks being very precipitous and the river very narrow and winding considerably. Passing Lajhi, and getting into the country of the Chakmannis, or Chamkannis, we begin again to get into a well-wooded and fertile land, and so on to the mouth of the Mangior Defile, and by Isteah back to the foot of the spurs from Mandeha and the end of the Paiwar range. In going along this route we pass two rivers on the right bank, up which I have been, one the Gabara River rising in the Gabar Mangal Hills, and flowing into the Kurram opposite Keraia, which is full of villages, and most excellently cultivated for some 8 or 9 miles, until we begin to leave the Chakmanni country and enter that of the Gabar Mangals, where we get more rocky, hilly country, and naturally wilder. It is curious to notice how, with few exceptions, these independent, wild robbers seem to live in the most difficult country.

The second river we passed was the Zigor, which rises in the Makhbul country, but which is not nearly so well cultivated. When we went with the General and his staff up this river on a reconnaissance with a cavalry escort, we found it difficult to get any water for the horses; though at last the villagers showed us some black stuff they called water for the quadrupeds, and many of us bipeds drank boiled milk brought from the village. We had not long to complain of want of water in the Makhbul country, for a tremendous thunderstorm broke over us, and we were all well soaked before we got home. Disagreeable as it was, however, when the yellowish-green light from between the black clouds lit up a few peaks here and there, and the lightning, now and then quite dazzling, was followed by a clap of thunder that was taken up by the echoes and rolled along from hill to hill for some minutes, I thought the Makhbul country a far finer bit of territory than I had in the early morning, when all looked dry and uninteresting.

Khost lies to the south and west of the Kurram River, and behind the range of hills on the right bank of the Kurram. It is bounded on the north by the Jaji Maidan and Gabar Mangal hills; on the south by the Waziri Hills; on the east by a range between it and the Hasan Khels and Darwesh Khels, and on the west by the Gabar Mangal and Jadran Mountains. Khost is also split up by low ranges of hills running across from east to west, dividing it as it were into three principal valleys, which are flat, and the soil alluvial. About Matun the country is very well cultivated, a good deal of irrigation being carried on, but the natural growth on the hills is spare, being small scrub jungle.
Peaks and Places of Interest visited by the Survey.—The principal peaks visited by Captain Woodthorpe and myself have been, Bodin, 14,000 feet, lat. 33° 58' 57'', long. 70° 15' 8''; Matuneh, 12,800 feet, lat. 34° 0' 29'', long. 69° 45' 7'', this on two occasions; the Lakerai Kotal on the Safid Koh, 10,600 feet, lat. 34° 5' 10'', long. 69° 50' 30''; the Shutar-Garden, 10,800 feet, lat. 33° 56' 30'', long. 69° 24' 50''; Sikaram Peak, 15,600 feet, lat. 34° 2' 21'', long. 69° 56' 35''. I trust before this is read that Sikaram will have been ascended a second time, and also that Keraira, a very pointed peak over Kurram, and on the Safid Koh, also will have been observed on. We have had an idea for some time that this last point was higher than Sikaram, but since we have been up the latter we have abandoned the notion, although it cannot be far below the same height: this point, Keraira, is in lat. 33° 58' 26'', long. 70° 16' 42''.

This will make six ascents of the Safid Koh by the officers of the Survey with this column, those to Bodin, Matuneh, and the Lakerai having been made, as far as I know, before any other officers of the army had attempted them. The honour, however, of being first on the top of the highest point, Sikaram, lies with Mr. Scott of the Survey Department attached to the Peshawur division.

As some of our trips may be interesting. I will briefly give an account of one or two.

Captain Straton of 2nd battalion 22nd Regiment, in charge of the signalling (he relieved Captain Wynne, 51st Light Infantry, who was in charge of the signalling formerly, but went home), has accompanied us on all our trips of any importance or where there was a likelihood of danger, in order to keep up communication with the troops. While mentioning signalling, it is strange more men do not know it. We have used the heliograph under the name "heliotrope" for many years in the Survey before it ever came into use in England, and for triangulation it was very useful. It cannot be expected that in England the heliograph will be as useful as in this country, but considering how much can be done with it, and how much we have to do with Eastern countries, we ought certainly to have many more officers and men, not only able to communicate, but able to talk with ease. A 5-inch heliograph has been used to communicate at a distance of 75 miles out here, and there is no reason why a 6-inch heliograph should not be read at 100 or 150 miles. Captain Wynne on this expedition has kept up communication with a 3-inch Mance heliograph at 34 miles. Captain Straton also has read a 3-foot flag at 25 miles with a good telescope. We certainly have found this on many occasions of great use to us.

One of the 72nd Highlanders, Corporal Eason, an excellent signaller, a first-rate shot, and good walker, has been with us also on every occasion of importance, and on every ascent of the Safid Koh; except when we visited the Lakerai Kotal, when no one but Captain Woodthorpe and myself went, as the General wished our visit to be kept as secret as possible.

The second trip to Matuneh was made on the 24th of April from Ali Khel. Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, Captain Woodthorpe,
Captain Straton, and myself, accompanied by Corporal Eason and three signallers of the 72nd Highlanders, started from the village at about 5 A.M. Ali Khel is about 7300 feet high, so we had a climb of about 5500 feet before we reached the top, and we were not very near the foot of the hill, and so had some little distance to travel before our work began. We had had very severe storms for a day or two before, and the thermometer went down to 27° Fahr. at Ali Khel. These storms had prevented our going before on the 20th as we had originally intended. It was very cold therefore on the 24th, but perhaps not so bad as a few days previously. Toiling along a spur, we managed to reach the top in about five hours. For the last 1500 feet we had snow of some depth, but which luckily was only frozen in one steep place, and this certainly was a nasty little bit to get over; otherwise, except for the fact that making steps and so on delayed us, and the sinking of our feet in the snow where soft tired us, there was nothing dangerous. Perhaps the most trying thing was the glare off the snow, the sun being very bright; at least the next day I suffered rather from sore eyes. The cold at the summit was very great and the wind most cutting. Captain Woodthorpe took the observations with a 6-inch subtense transit theodolite by Troughton and Simms, which was a trying and annoying piece of work, for there being several feet of snow, the legs of the instrument would sink as the day wore on, making frequent readjustment necessary. I did the plan tabling, but found it was no easy matter to draw with fingers that continually lost their feeling; and from standing still in the snow I was not aware of the existence of my toes. However, we had a good day and got through plenty of work, returning to the camp at Ali Khel comfortingly tired and healthily hungry to enjoy commissariat rations in the evening.

On April 30th Captain Woodthorpe and myself, with thirty Gorkhas of the 5th, went to Belut, a village on the Laridar River, preparatory to starting up the Lakeral Kotal; as the General required a reconnaissance to be made of that route. We kept it as quiet as possible, and under the charge of Sarwar Khan, son of Mahomet Amin Khan of Gandeah, and a baddraggar (guard of villagers) of most cutthroat-looking villains, and leaving a few of our Gorkhas to take care of our camps, we started on our journey the next morning, the 1st of May.

A Pathan, one of the 5th Punjab Native Infantry, a havildar, by name Hassrat Shah, had been kindly sent with us by Major McQueen, of that regiment, and he was most useful, having been along the route before, and being able to act as interpreter for us with the baddraggar. The first part of our journey was along the bed of the Laridar (or Lalidar) stream for 7 or 8 miles, and between thickly wooded spurs of the mountains; the river, like all mountain streams in this country, being full of boulders against which to skin one's shins. The road then turns a little to the left over a low spur, and following this up arrives at a small saddle. Here we halted for a few minutes to collect our men who had begun to straggle.

We had by this time begun to reach the snow which was about a foot or two deep in some places. The scenery of this portion was exquisite
and quite Alpine in many parts. In the midst of a deep forest where the sunlight fell between the trees, the lower underfeatures of various colours were lit up in places by the sun, while in others they were rich in deep-coloured shadows, the dark pines all around and above looking blacker and blacker as you gazed upwards, in contrast to the snowy, glistening range of the Safid Koh behind them; the grandeur of the scene caused us to stop, and excited mingled feelings of awe and admiration. But what could one do? Even if I had the power to sketch such a scene, I had not the time, for speedy observation was necessary if we intended to do work and return in safety.

Combined with this, there were our ruffianly-looking baddraggars in their dark blue lungis, and with their quaint weapons, who at every halt cast themselves about in most natural and picturesque groups, always improving rather than spoiling the scene; so different from the European dresses of myself and companions, which made us appear out of place and more like barbarians than our guides were. Continuing our way along the spurs, we began to leave the vegetation as we got higher and into deeper snow, until we arrived at last at the kotal, about 16,600 feet. The northern side had very deep snow on it, and asking how much there was generally in winter, one of our guides in explanation placed his hand as high as he could above his head. On this occasion it was about 2 or 3 feet deep. I did some plane-tabling and found it quite as cold as on Matungeh, but the villagers had brought some wood with them, and we lit a nice fire by which at intervals I warmed my fingers. We then went a short way down on the north side, so as to get a good view of the valley and the villages. There are some Mangal villages there, on the banks of the Surkab River, viz. Taghan, Langiar Killa, Sirket, and Nasir Mahomet, and our guides began to get anxious and begged us not to go too far; so, as we had a long walk back after having gone about a mile and a half down, we began our return journey. In the Laridar nuddee I forgot to mention one spot called Baguchina, a pretty green place with many springs of delicious water; and here we were told that bodies of armed men always encamped, and we rather disgusted our baddragar by stopping here, as they said no one tarried along the road between this place and the mountains, as it was a great place for robbers.

A short time after we had left Belut in the morning, and a short distance up the river, a shot was fired at us from the heights (it was amusing to see how our Gorkha guard «woke up,» if I may so use the expression), but we sent the baddragar up to crown the heights and continued on our way, finding no one and meeting with no other adventure. We took the same precautions coming back, and reached Belut quite comfortably, having had a most pleasant walk of about 22 miles through charming scenery, new country, and performed a satisfactory day's work.

Our trip to the Shutar-gardan on the 5th of May was not so satisfactory. We were rather a large party, with political officers (Colonel Gordon and Captain Rennick), and a large baddragar mounted on
squealing ponies. At the Sirkai Kotal I was able to do some plane-
tabling, but after that, when we left Hazratt Thana and arrived at the
Shutar-Gardan Kotal I was not able to do much. I went up a small hill
on one side, and Captain Woodthorpe intended to go over the kotal for
some little distance to examine the eastern side, but I had only just
fixed my position and begun work when I received a message to come
down at once, the position apparently not being considered safe; thus
I was able to do hardly anything in the way of topography. The slope
on the eastern side is steep to Dobandi, and near that village the
country appeared well cultivated, but all the country round the pass
itself is very dry and barren, with very little snow, and none on the
kotal itself at the time we were there, it lying but thinly on the
adjacent hills. We slept that night on the ground of an upper room in
a house in Hazratt Thana, and though I suppose I slept soundly enough,
still I would not wish my best friends to have to do the same. I could
dream of nothing but hopping, crawling, and voracious creatures, and
often awoke imagining all sorts of horrors in that way; but we could
not have brought our tents with us, and it would not have been safe
to sleep outside, so there was no help for it but to try to sleep, and
trust something would be left of us by the morning. On our return to
Ali Khel the care we took not to let any of our blankets go into our
tents previous to careful examination was as necessary as it was nasty,
though perhaps amusing to those not personally interested. On our
return journey, on the 6th of May, I took a small circuitous route with
Captain Rennick and an old malik (headman of a village), to see the
road to another kotal, north of the Shutar-gardan. The road to this,
between it and Mir Alum Fort, is simply excellent; it is all springy
turf, on which I galloped, but I could not go to the kotal to see the
other side. The old malik said the road on the other side «was like
the palm of one's hand,» but of course I cannot vouch for the truth of
this statement. If this is the case, however, it is simply a kotal that
turns the Shutar-gardan, and I am sorry I was not allowed to survey
the country all about.

The road from Mir Alum's Fort to Dreikula by Ghogazai is very bad
indeed, but that between Hazratt Thana and Mir Alum is a good one; so
that though I do not think the road to the northern pass could be used
by troops until they had passed the Sirkai Kotal, yet it seems to me
it might perhaps be of use after they had done so, for I think men could
be marched back from Hazratt Thana to Mir Alum and sent by the
other kotal without the defenders of the Shutar-gardan seeing them, and
their attention could be riveted on their front defence; or again,
anyhow, the offensive party showing that they had the knowledge of
this route, would make the defenders inclined to weaken their force
at the Shutar-Gardar, in order to defend the other pass, as it leads to
Dobandi, and attacks their rear; and, lastly, in any movement to
concentrate force in one spot or the other, those in the attacking force
would be able to move more rapidly and more secretly in the valley
than the defenders could on the hills from pass to pass.

We did not always get off without a shot or two at us, and a little
excitement. On one occasion, the 15th of June, General Roberts and
his staff, accompanied by ourselves, with a few native orderlies, went on a reconnaissance up the Kurram, from Keraia village, intending to reach the Ahmed Khel villages, near the Tangi. Captain Woodthorpe, Captain Stratton, and myself, under the charge of the Malik of the Ahmed Khels, were to sleep at their village that night, in order to work on some hills near there the next morning, while the rest returned to Keraia. For this purpose it was necessary we should go along the Kurram River by Lajhi where the Lajhi Mangals dwell. Lajhi, both villages and river, are on the south bank of the Kurram. The Mangals have always been independent, and have levied a tax or toll on whatever passed along that road, or robbed the whole. Political manipulation had, however, brought in many independent tribes, the Gabar Mangals among others, and just before the reconnaissance the Lajhi Mangals, or as they are properly called, Lajhwars, had sent in a Jirgha. Thus when we started some of the head men of the tribe of Lajhwars were actually detained at Keraia as hostages for our safe conduct through the Kurram.

We all started with a baddraggar, composed of Chakmannis, Mangals, Ahmed Khels, Makhbuls, Hasn Khels, &c. Troops, however, were not taken to Lajhi, but some were left some two miles short of that place in our rear. Our small party therefore advanced quite contentedly until, arriving at the mouth of the Lajhi, we found the Mangals jumping about like monkeys on the hills, and barring our passage. They at last fired into us, but shot badly. After some further talking (which had nothing to do with me, so I did not attend to it) the General determined to retire. We were not allowed to return their fire, and I dare say wisely, or I think we could have picked off a few of them. Soon after they saw us retiring they began to shoot at us, and as we went down the river they ran along the hill tops to follow us up.

At one time we cannot have been more than 120 yards from them, and how they missed us I cannot understand, certainly I allow their bullets came quite close enough to be uncomfortable, as far as we were concerned, but still it was very bad shooting on their part. Luckily no one was killed, two native orderlies and one of the baddraggar being wounded, and two animals hit; but had the General's or some other valuable life been taken this affair (which we have all laughed over since) would have been far more serious. I believe there is no doubt now that some of our own baddraggar amused themselves by firing at us. The Lajhwars, like the rest of the Mangals, have always been independent, and as long as they liked to be so, and fight it out, they could only be admired, but when they send in men as hostages, and are apparently willing to receive the party in a friendly way, and then on their arrival (in a narrow part of the river) begin to fire on them, their behaviour is hardly what can be called noble. I hear that other tribes say they consider it disgraceful conduct, and a breach of all their rules of baddraggar, but I do not know whether because they say so, it follows that they think so. I hear that they have since sent in a sum of money and sheep, and sworn to be our allies, and to keep the road open along the Kurram for us, but I suppose time will show
the value of these oaths. Anyhow it is certain that our subjects must be allowed to proceed unmolested along the Kurram, if the valley is to be ours, and if our neighbours do not choose to let them, they must be taught by a lesson they can understand. Before peace was made they might have been fighting for their soil, but men such as the Mangals doing this after peace is declared and signed, means highway robbery.

On one other occasion, when two other officers were with Captain Woodthorpe and myself, and two signallers of the 72nd and six sepoys accompanying us, for survey on a hill near the Mangior Pass, some of these same Lajhwars and a few Ahmed Khels, in all about two or three hundred men, came into the valley below. Luckily these men had been firing on some grass-cutters just before, who were on the hills between us and our camp at Ali Khel, and had thus betrayed their presence. Here the heliograph came in useful, for General Cobbe warned us of this from Ali Khel, and told us he was sending out four companies of Gorkhas to our help. Soon after the enemy had seen us on our hill and got pretty near us, the Gorkhas arrived in the valley below, and so they took themselves off after firing about fifty shots at us, nearly all of which went over our heads, while we had the grim satisfaction of knowing afterwards that they had lost one man for their pains.

Ascent of Mount Sikaram.—We went to Sikaram (15,600 feet) on June 1 have endeavoured to find out the real name of this mountain, but without success. Some say the name is Sheik Harm, others say there are no sheiks, and never were any here, and that it is not its name; others call it Setaram, but I think the generally received name is Sikaram, as they say it was given by the Sikhs.

The night before the ascent we encamped at Sirgall, a village northwest of Zabarast Killia, and about 5 miles (as the crow flies) from the hill top. We had intended to go part of the way up the first day, but owing to our being delayed at the Ali Khel, and not arriving at Sirgal till late, we had to stay at that village for the night. We also had some little difficulty about getting villagers to carry up our bedding the first portion of the journey; and en passant I may remark this is the worst country I have ever visited in which to get a man to carry anything; or even a water bottle. They certainly are ready, on payment, to help in a way, but their gun, their pistol, and knife are the only things they apparently consider they ought ever to pick up.

As the chance of fighting with the Amir became less and less, officers were continually asking leave to go with us on our expeditions, so we often had company. On the present occasion we had a large party, for, being the biggest hill, there were many who wished to make the ascent. It consisted of Major White of the 92nd Highlanders (an officer who, whenever duty or distance from his work did not prevent him, always tried to get leave to accompany us for his own pleasure, and very good company he was), Captain Straton, our two selves, seven other officers, and the Rev. J. Adams, the Chaplain of the force. There were also four men of the 72nd, four of the 92nd, and two of the 67th.
These were all the Europeans of the party. Besides these there were our men carrying the instruments, natives from different parts of India. These men did not all reach the top, and among them, I am sorry to say, the man with our lunch.

My plane-table was carried up excellently by a man who has been with us everywhere, a native of Chazni, and the best walker among our native followers. Of the Europeans, all reached the top except two officers and one man, who were not in the same good training as ourselves. Major White, the first of the party, reached the top at 9.30 A.M., having left Sirgal at about 4 A.M., and the others came in at various times afterwards. Considering that Sirgal was 8800 feet, leaving 6800 feet direct ascent, and that there was a small range to be climbed and descended before the final ascent commenced, I do not think this was very bad work; especially for men who were not practised mountaineers. But especially good was the day's performance for the soldiers, who brought up their rifles, and twenty rounds of ammunition per man.

A good deal of marble strewed the beds of the streams at the foot of the mountain, and near the top there was a quantity of loose shale, most disagreeable to climb; but the wind up of all consisted of crag climbing, broken here and there by a sloping bit of snow, which had to be crossed. In many places this was frozen, but there was always enough surface of snow over the ice to give one a footing. Thus, except that it was a very tiring, long climb, it was not so formidable as it promised to be from below. The north side of the mountain had much more snow on it, and went off in long slopes, nothing near so steep as the southern side.

Unfortunately we had not a very good day; we could certainly see the Hindu Kush, but not very clearly; the Kurram Valley had a mist over it which hid the furthest hills in the direction of Thal. We were in hopes of being able to see the mountains north of Kashmir near Gilgit, but on such a day of course they were not visible. We did what work we could however, though not so much as we had expected, and left about 3 p.m., all arriving at Sirgal again in time to get over our meals comfortably, and turn into bed. We can only hope our next visit to this mountain and to Keraira will be more fortunate, though I fear we run the risk of most days being hazy now.

Vegetation and Vegetable Products.—It may be expected that, with a climate of such extremes as I have described, vegetation is scanty. Kadimakt, for instance, the hill above Thal mentioned before, would be far better clothed if it were in the Punjab Salt Range; and towards Kurram the nakedness of the land increases.

The olive is rare from Kurram to Shaluzan, growing only near houses and holy places; its place at Thal is taken by the Reptonia buxifolia, which bears a remarkable resemblance to it. The scrub jungle from Thal to the Ariob consists of daphne, sophora, and cotoneaster, the latter being found among most of the pines at 10,000 feet. The chief Punjab forms are soon lost ascending the valley, and at Ahmed-i-Shamu
Acacia modesta and Dahlbergia Sirsor are last seen. Periploca aphylla, however, is found up to Kurram, and is used as fodder for camels. Plistacla integerrima and a small Rhus are also found.

Trees occur near houses, and where irrigation is largely employed, as at Hazar Pir. We find in such situations fine specimens of Platanus orientalis, olive, celtis, and the chamaerops palm-tree, which increase in size going up the river; but the last gradually disappears, except near the Darwazagai Pass, where it forms a thick, dense, olive-like scrub jungle. When this palm is not cut, it forms a thick, branching tree, from 15 to 16 feet high, and this is specially so near holy places; there is an example of it within the walls of Peshawur, near one of the gateways. It also extends largely into the Khost country, and in the Kurram Valley the fibre of the leaves is usually the only source of rope, it being made from leaves brought from Khost. Where the rivers leave the hills and there is protection, as at Shaluzan, vegetation is most abundant; the trees there grow to a considerable size, and are also healthy, for owing to the dryness of the climate they are not affected by the numerous lichens and fungi as in Kashmir. There are chunars (Platanus orientalis) at Shaluzan and in the neighbourhood with a girth of 14, 16, 18, 25, and one of 35 feet.

Dr. Aitchison (who was appointed as botanist to the force, and whom I have to thank for all my botanical information) says that the walnut-trees near Shaluzan are finer than any he has ever seen, many trees being upwards of 10, and some 17 feet in girth. The amlok (Dispyros Lotos, L,) is very numerous, and is a good tree, its fruit being considered next in value to the walnut. Apricots, plums, apples, pears, grapes, elaeagnus, a few peaches, quince, pomegranate, and almonds are found here. Mulberries are grown for feeding silkworms with, and are not very numerous, though they are fine trees; they seem to me to be more numerous in the Ariob Valley. A cypress of great girth and age is seen growing on the side of a hill close to Shaluzan. At 6 feet from the ground its girth is 6 feet, and the tree is visible at a great distance.

The scrub jungle between Kurram and Shaluzan consists of daphne, cotoneaster, sophora, some berberis, species of Labiates and Compositae, and artemisia in plenty. Convolvulus lanuginosus is profuse, growing on small hummocks, all the way from the Punjab Salt Range to All Khel. Dr. Aitchison says that many of the Astragali found here are Tibetan in type. On the hills with a southern exposure, the first thing met with is Quercus ilex at 7000 feet as a thick bush; higher up it is more like a tree, and we have deodor, Pinus excelsa, and Abies Smithiana gradually forming a dense forest, when Abies Wilklana appears, mostly near the ridges, at about 11,000 feet, and then the forests thin off and gradually cease. At 9000 feet Quercus ilex is pushed out by Quercus semicarpifolia, the latter often driving out the pines, and forming a forest of its own. East of Shaluzan we get Juniperus excelsa and Pinus Gerardiana, the tree from which the chiolgoza nut is obtained.
Dr. Aitchison remarks he has seen no *Pinus longifolia*. *Pinus excelsa* is called in Pashtu, «makhtar», and *Taxus beccata* in the Arbob district is called «serap» or «serpah.» The deodar is very fine, forming splendid forests, this tree being quite three times as numerous as any other. It is curious to notice how the forest of pines is directly got at through the *Quercus ilex*, there being no intervening forest as in the Himalayas. As already mentioned, the forests extend to about 11,000 feet; but here they are less dense and a few shrubs of rhododendron, the gooseberry, a currant, with a bush juniper (not excelsa), some willows, and honeysuckle (*loniceræ*) fill up the vacant spaces. At higher elevations still the bush juniper with the birch (*Betula Bojputtra*) alone remain, to be afterwards superseded by rhubarb, eremuri (allied to the Asphodel, having a pretty spike of yellow flowers), also tulips (*Fritillaria*), *Cruci-feræ*, and rushes (*Carices*), with some grasses. Vegetation on this southern exposure is not stopped by perpetual snow, but it is kept down in altitude by want of moisture in the soil and in the air; but, as Dr. Aitchison says, if snow existed all the year round, the vegetation would ascend higher than it does at present. The same authority also states that between Thal and Shaluzan he has seen only one fern, the *Adiantum Capillus-Veneris*.

On the northern exposure we find the pines descending to form a natural forest much lower down than on the southern side, and deodar and *Pinus excelsa* occur at 6500 feet. The forests are thin, with a great deal of scrub and underwood. We find at first the daphne, sophora, cotoneaster, berberis, the *Fothergilla involucrata* (a Kashmir type), coleaster, several roses, Buddleia, a small tree like the almond, several large Astragaloid Leguminosae, another large berberis, jasmines, honeysuckles (*loniceræ*), and the pomegranate, all mixing with *Quercus ilex* and a profusion of grasses.

In the Strend Toi stream Dr. Aitchison found the walnut as a fruit-tree quite wild and perfectly natural, as proved by the fruit. At altitudes between 8000 and 9000 feet the rhododendron, eleven species of ferns, with podophyllon, and quantities of *Hedera helix* were met with.

Now let us advance towards the Paiwar Kotal. On the ascent of the kotal, at the base, we meet in the valley near Turai village a dense jungle of *Quercus ilex* (which is covered with a species of mistletoe), but mixed here and there with *Juniperus excelsa*, which last, a little further on, is found as a tree. We also find the same daphne, cotoneaster, and sophora as before, and the small yellow rose and Buddleia. Ascending, the deodar becomes numerous and the oak has become a tree, and *Pinus excelsa* with *Abies Smithiana* forms the forest. Here also we find the ash. When fairly in the kotal woods, we meet with *Abies Webbiana*, but not before. In these woods, except the two oaks as bushes, *Quercus ilex* and *Quercus semicarpifolia*, there is no undergrowth. *Pinus Gerardiana* is not met with here until we arrive at the lower edge of the forest with a northern exposure, and there it is plentiful.
The deodar forest, from the Spinghar Kotal, and for many miles, is superb; almost unlimited in extent, and capable of being made great use of. Descending the Ariob, the right bank is well cultivated, and the left is nearly bare until we arrive at Ali Khel. The plane-trees and vines do not grow just here, and the walnut at this spot is rare as a tree. In the bed of the stream is the willow (*Salix Babylonica*), which with a naturally wild *Salix* is cultivated to protect embankments for irrigation purposes. *Hippophaea* is cultivated as a hedge, *elaeagnus* is common, and apricots, plums, apples, and a few pears are found. Also as before we have daphne, sophora, two species of cotoneaster, the single yellow rose, a sort of gooseberry, a species of coleaster, and lastly a very handsome *laburnum* (like *Astragalus*), called *jirril*. The bark of this cut off in rings in employed by the natives to put round the sheaths of their knives in place of brass. The fern chiefly met with in the Ariob Valley is the *Asplenium ruta-muraria*. The forest would probably grow down to the water's edge, but for the fact of their being cleared for wood and for irrigation purposes.

The cultivated trees are *Populus alba* and the before-mentioned *Salix Babylonica*, besides a species of poplar new to Dr. Aitchison. In the Kurram Valley two crops are grown during the year; the first barley, wheat, and a kind of clover; the second rice, maize, millets, tobacco, peas, a little opium, and some cotton. Most of the villages also have orchards.

In the Ariob only one crop is grown (except in Ahmed Khel where there are two), and this one consists of wheat, barley, maize, rice, millets, pulses, and clover. Tobacco is occasionally planted, some vegetables, a little opium, oil seeds, and some peas. Hasn Khel and Ahmed Khel produce the best grapes, but the people are so poor and so greedy they never let them ripen. Rokian has by report the best wheat and apples.

In actual gardening little is done; onions, a white radish, and some members of the melon tribe are sown, and flowers are raised for ziarats and holy places. These include the red damascene, white and double yellow Persian roses, an iris, a mallow, and an *elaeagnus*, for the sake of its sweetly scented flowers and its fruit.

Dr. Aitchison, to whom I again express my acknowledgments, has of course compiled a full and scientific botanical report of his own work, which I presume will be published, and which will necessarily be very interesting, especially to botanists and those peculiarly interested in the subject.

**Inhabitants.**—The people are agricultural, and their irrigation works show immense labour, but how many generations it has taken to bring them to their present state it is impossible to say. Their manufacturing industry is limited to guns (*topak*), long-barrelled weapons, very heavy, and bound round with brass, with a stock cut out in a curve; pistols (*kesai*) and knives (*charras*) in Khost, Shaluzan, Zeran, and other places; the Khost knives being considered the best. Some of the guns
are rifled, and some of the men have old Enfields, the stocks of which they have cut down to the same shape as their own; this preference appears strange, as of course the whole balance of the weapon is spoilt. I noticed that all the better sort of guns were English made, and where not entirely so, the lock generally was; even their flint locks were mostly English, and I have not seen one gun with hammer and nipple that was not marked «Tower».

Their pistols are great, heavy, clumsy things, some handsomely inlaid, having large bell mouths, others being straight in the barrel. I was informed by them that the bell-mouthed one was for use when near an enemy, as they put in three or four balls, and it made a large wound so the man could not recover, while the straight barrel was for shooting at an enemy when a little distance off. Their knives are about two feet long, about one inch and a half deep at the hilt, and about a third of an inch thick at the back near the hilt. They take a deep edge, are always kept very sharp, and taper off to a very fine point, which has a little curve upwards. It may be imagined what a terrible gash is given by such a knife. The handles of course (like all Eastern swords and knives) are small, in fact much too small for Europeans to take a good grip of them, and I have not seen a single knife, even among the best of them, without a flaw in the metal. They make baskets of very open work, and also chaplis or grass shoes, the best things to climb hills in when accustomed to them.

The women make a very coarse stuff out of sheep's wool, and make the men's large loose trousers (rog) and their own (jerob), which latter are tighter than the men's below the knee. A shirt (ghat) also is made by them of wool or cotton, which hangs down from the neck to the ankles. A loose description of chogha (or choga as English people call it), called sharre, is also made in the villages; it is very coarse.

Tribes—Turis, Jajis, &c.—The Kurram Valley from Thal to the eastern foot of the Paiwar range is inhabited mostly by the Turis; a strong, sturdy people, who like all these hill men are filthy in person. This part of the country originally belonged to the Bangashes, but they have been driven out by the Turis till they have only a few villages such as Shaluzan and Zeran left. The Turis were very dissatisfied with the Durani rule, and have hailed the advent of the British with delight. They are of the Shiah persuasion of Mussulmen, and this did not tend to make them look on the rule of the Durani Government very favourably even had it been good, they being Sunnis. Although reported to be a brave race, they did not appear in very good colours during the attack on the Paiwar Kotal. They, however, have been useful to us in many ways during the campaign in providing carriage, &c. The Turis are divided into sections, the Gundi Khels, Alizai, Hamza Khels, Mastu Khels, and Dapozai.

The Bangashes, who are also Shiah, inhabit the Miranzai Valley, on the east of the Kurram, and the country round about Kohat.
The next people we come to are those inhabiting the Ariob, and as these are the people who have given us most trouble throughout the war, and are likely to be the cause of most anxiety in the future, I will dwell a little longer on them; the more so as we knew nothing about them previously.

The valley of the Ariob is principally inhabited by the great tribe of Jajis, with a few hamlets belonging to Mangals and wandering Ghilzais, called Ham Shayahs, who have been allowed to settle on small portions of land which the Jajis themselves did not care to cultivate, the latter at first being only tenants, but with the lapse of time acquiring vested rights, and also helping to protect the Jajis from excursions made by the Mangals.

The Jajis are a tribe of some 25,000, the fighting strength being about 6000. There are twelve sections in the tribe, four of which are not in Ariob and eight are. The four outside the Ariob are:—(1) Jaji Maidan, on the borders of Khost; (2) Jaji Danni, near the former; (3) Jaji Isteah, in the country at the foot of the Isteah River and on the Kurram; (4) Jaji Algarh, in the country about the Drak Algarh Pass. Of these I suppose the Jaji Maidan and Jaji Dannis are not likely to come under our rule. The remaining eight, in the Ariob Valley, are as follows:—(1) The Ada Khels; (2) the Lehwannis, who are considered the bravest of the Jajis and their best swordsmen; they opposed us to the very last in the attacks on the 28th of November and 2nd of December on the Paiwar Kotal; (3) the Ahmed Khels, Bian Khels; (4) the Petla Ali Sangis; (5) the Ali Khels; (6) the Shamu Khels, who are the most powerful, numerous, and wealthy of the Jajis; (7) the Hasn Khels, the poorest and the most dreaded of all the tribe, being the most independent and most daring robbers in the neighbourhood. In fact, no man dared to kill a Hasn Kel, even if he caught him in the act of housebreaking. The Amir used to pay them a regular subsidy to prevent them robbing along certain roads leading into Kurram, Khost, and the Logar. There is a story told of one of our promising new subjects, an old gentleman, who having been paid for some service he had performed, remarked with disgust, «That he could steal more than that in a night!» Lastly, (8) the Ahmed Khels of Kara, the most bigoted in their religion of all the Jajis (living near the Tangi), and also perhaps the most well to do.

Religion, Marriage Customs, &c.—The religion of the Jajis is that of the Sunni sect of Mahommedans, and they are mortal enemies of the Turis. They claim down to the eastern base of the Paiwar Kotal range as their territory. They are supposed to have originally come from Nital, in the district below Hangu, between Thal and Kohat; at least they have retained to this day some customs which are neither Sunni nor Shiáh, amongst others the bad practice of buying wives. The betrothal and purchase of wives leads to more bloodshed than any other transaction. When a girl attains the age of seven or eight years, and sometimes earlier, she is betrothed to a lad, who is allowed the entry of the house of the girl's parents, no one else daring to propose to her. She is allowed to grow up in close intimacy with her intended
husband until she arrives at the age of puberty, when the man is called on to pay a preposterous sum, varying from 100 rupees even to 400 rupees, before he can marry her, and in case of refusal he is forbidden the house. The result invariably leads to a fight, as in nine cases out of ten the girl simply runs away with her lover, and then her father either murders his would-be son-in-law, or what probably satisfies him as well, some one of his near relations. The other family then seeks revenge, or as they calmly call it, an exchange (badli), and so it continues. If the girl is a very obedient one, and is reluctant to leave her home or disobey her father, then her lover murders her father and takes her off to his house. A fight from this cause at Karrana, not far from our camp, was kept up all night, from house to house, and three persons were wounded. Marriages are celebrated with a good deal of firing, and dancing with swords, both on the occasion of the bridegroom going to the bride’s house and on his bringing her to his own.

The Jajis bury their dead on the nearest hill, and erect kangahs or shrines to the memory of all travellers killed by robbers, whom they raise to sanctity. The women assist in the burial as much as the men, but they mourn for their dead all by themselves in a separate place. The arrival of a young Jali into the world is celebrated by a regular fusillade and rejoicing, at whatever period of the twenty-four hours, night or day, the event may take place.

**Assessed Revenue.**—The assessed revenue was so much per each Jali section, viz., 680 rupees, except the Hasn Khels who paid 500 rupees, besides kharwars (mule-loads) of 80 maunds each. Out of this, 32,000 rupees were paid to the maliks (headmen of villages), inamdars (men holding gift-lands), and mollahs (priests); and the balance of 35,000 rupees was paid to the Kabul Government, making the total 67,000 rupees. Of the kharwars (mule-loads of grain) there were collected 35 altogether; out of these, 12 kharwars 28 maunds to the Durani Government. All professions and trades were taxed, which naturally extinguished any small spirit of enterprise that might otherwise have existed.

**Remaining Tribes.**—The remaining tribes who have been directly or indirectly concerned in the campaign, some of whom will be British subjects and others neighbours for the future, are as follows:—On the north and north-west and over the Lakerai are the Azar Khels, Akbar Khels, Sacfoodeen Khels (sword of religion), and Babar Ghilzais, who have always been independent of the Kabul authority. These Ghilzais, Captain Rennick tells me, are neither marauders nor kooches, and they will probably be very unobtrusive and peaceful neighbours.

To the west and south-west are the great tribe of Ahmedzai Ghilzai, consisting of the Zaman Khels, Amran Khels, Kasim Khels, Machalgu, Tota Khels, and Bago Khel Ghilzais. The three last-named sections of this tribe are to it what the Hasn Khels have been to the Jajis, i.e. robbers by training and profession. These tribes, though nominally independent, are yet somewhat under the influence of Padshah Khan, now Wazir to the present Amir, and who is the head of the great Ghilzai clan, about and west of the Shutargardan.
South of the Ariob are the Sohaks or Kohsimwars, or Zurmats Ghilzais. Also south of the Kurram and on its left bank, holding the country about the Lajhi River, are the Lajhwars, who are Mangals, and these Lajwars are divided into three clans; the Fattahkekhul, the Agarkhul, and Andazkhul. These Lajhwars are the men who behaved so treacherously, and fired on us when we went to Lajhi.

Again, on the right and left bank of the Kurram, coming next to the Lajhwars, on the east, are the Chakmannis, or Chamkannis, holding the country about Keraia, on the Kurram to Lajhi, to Makhbul Land, and up the Gebara River to the Mangal country. Next the Chakmannis, to the east, are the Makhbuls in the country between Jaji Thana and the Kurram.

All these tribes are independent, but I have no reliable information as to whether any or how many of these will come under British rule. Khost is inhabited by Khostwals who are Sunnis, and whose chief, Akram Khan, gave in his submission to the British at once; they were under the Kabul Government. To the west and north-west of Khost are the Jadranis and Gabar Mangals, both independent. South of Khost and Kurram is a powerful tribe, the Waziris, who are divided into the following clans: Luli, Mahsud Waziris, Guzbuz Waziri, Ahmedzais and Utinanzais.

The Mangals are scattered all over the country and there are many divisions of them. They are robbers and ruffians generally. There are Mangal villages near the Mangior and in Khost, and even to the east of the Paiwar. Some are found also on the north side of the Lakerai Kotal in the Surkab Valley, and in fact wherever they can get a piece of land. Whatever portion of this robber tribe may come under our rule, it is to be hoped they will learn that there is a difference between "meum and tuum".

The dress of all these hill men consists of a large, loose pair of trousers (partuk), a loose sort of coat, called a khat, a turban or puggree (usually dark blue), called rumeal, a long shawl or scarf about the body, usually dark blue, and then called a "lunghi," and sometimes a white sort of scarf called a "tekral." When the weather is cold they wear the coarse chogha I mentioned before, and some wear poshtees made of sheepskins. When it is wet the hair is worn outside, at other times the leather side (sometimes very well worked) is outside. They all walk about armed with a gun or rifle, a knife, and two pistols.

The women wear trousers and a jacket, and a long shawl, generally all blue with a little red here and there, with which they cover up their bodies and faces, no matter how old or hideous they may be. I have never seen any young women; there have been some fearful hags sometimes outside the villages, but that is all.

While at Keraia the Chakmannis gave us an evening entertainment of dancing and singing. In their war dance there were an inner ring of young men dancing round the fire and an outer ring, outside of which again men were running as fast as they could go. They all brandished
knives at the imminent risk of cutting off one another's heads; but the dance was neither interesting nor picturesque.

They showed us, however, a marriage dance, which was better. There was an inner and an outer ring made round the fire. The inner was composed of men with long hair, who at a distance looked almost like women. When I asked who they were, I was informed they were young men who wore their hair long because the ladies liked it; but, being amused at this reply, I remarked they were not all young, to which I got the curious reply, that nevertheless the ladies were very fond of these men. These with long hair moved round the fire at a somewhat slower pace than the outer ring, keeping time with the tom-tom which, of course, was being beaten. They did not seem to sing much, being apparently more intent on making their long hair swing about in time to the tune. This they did by leaning forwards towards the fire, and swaying their heads about from right to left, backwards and forwards, and round and round, with such energy that their wiry hair moved about, keeping quite straight out on end, without a wave in it, by the force of the motion. I don't know if they suffered from headaches the next morning, but they certainly ought to have felt very ill. The outer ring was composed of males of all ages, from young children to toothless old men, and these in the meantime went through a most quaint dance.

This outer circle was divided into three parts (three arcs as it were), those composing one of the portions singing together some words, which seemed to proceed from their nasal organs, all the rest then joining in a chorus, that sounded as if it came from the bottom of their throats, and appeared to be something like «Ach ah—Ah or—Wuh ah—Wuh ho.» At the same time they all clapped their hands and bowed to the fire, turned round to the right, raising their hands over their heads, turned back again, and clapped their hands again; then turned to the left and back again, and bowed to the fire and clapped their hands again; this they did several times, and then the next portion of the circle sang a verse followed by the chorus again, and so on. Their feet also did a step, a most decided step, something between a Highland fling and a Christy minstrel breakdown. All the time they were also gradually moving round the fire. The tom-tom was beaten, and as it grew louder and quicker, so did the song and dance go louder and quicker (the men's heads in the middle also moving more rapidly), until at last they got very excited, made a great noise, and looked very wild. There were clear indications of an air in this song, and certainly most marked time. With their picturesque dresses, quaint faces, and wild gesticulations (all made more grotesque and savage by the fire-light), it formed a most curious and interesting scene.

After these dances they began some solos, quartetts, &c., but these were too dreadful. A boy screeched as if he wished to break a blood-vessel, and not being able to stand this part of the performance, I retired to my tent and fell asleep.

Conclusion.—Of all the tribes that will come under our rule none will be of so much importance to us as the Jajis, and none will probably
feel the change more; but I think they already begin to perceive that the advent of the British has been a godsend to them. Before then they had been driven nearly wild by the heavy taxations of the late Amir Shere Ali. They had also suffered much from the floods in the spring of last year which carried away nearly 15 per cent. of their cultivated lands. These floods were very severe, and for more than four months there was over 7 feet of ice in the Ariob Valley. In February and March there was as much as 3 feet of snow. But the Jajis are now flocking back to their villages; even those who had gone as far as the borders of Kafirstan are returning to their ruined homes, and the waste lands are being brought under cultivation with great vigour. This they are doing in spite of the numerous other occupations the British provide them with, and which they seem fully to appreciate. They are apparently beginning already to see that peace and security have made them richer than they were; and that the money thrown into their hands for transport, grass, timber, road-making, &c., means the power to reclaim from the river the lands they have lost.
TOMB OF SULTAN MAHMUD OF GHAZNI
SIR ALEXANDER BURNES
DR. G. W. LEITNER (dressed as an Afghan)