AFGHANISTAN.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THAT OF

AFGHANISTAN

SINCE THE ACCESSION OF

THE AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN.

Published by Order of the Secretary of State for India.

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1878.
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CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

TREATY between the BRITISH GOVERNMENT and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Walee of Cabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession; concluded on the part of the British Government by JOHN LAWRENCE, Esquire, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, in virtue of full powers vested in him by the Most Noble JAMES ANDREW, Marquis of DALHOUSSIE, K.T., &c., Governor-General of India; and on the part of the Ameer of Cabool, Dost Mohammed Khan, by Sirdar Gholam Hyder Khan, in virtue of full authority granted to him by His Highness.

ARTICLE I.

Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan, Walee of Cabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.

ARTICLE II.

The Honourable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Walee of Cabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages, on his own part and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein, and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.

Done at Peshawur this 30th day of March 1855, corresponding with the 11th day of Rujjul, 1271 Hijree.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner of the Punjab.

As the representative of Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, and in person on his own account as heir-apparent.

Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor-General at Ootakamund, this 1st day of May 1855.

(Signed) DALHOUSSIE.

No. 2.

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT made at Peshawur on the 26th January 1857 (corresponding with Jumadee-ul-Awal 29th, A.H. 1273), between Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Ruler of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, on his own part, and Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, K.C.B., Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. EDWARDS, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawur, on the part of the Honourable East India Company, under the authority of the Right Honourable CHARLES JOHN VISCOUNT CANNING, Governor-General of India in Council.

1. Whereas the Shah of Persia, contrary to his engagement with the British Government, has taken possession of Herat, and has manifested an intention to interfere in the present possessions of Amir Dost Mohammed Khan, and there is now war between the British and Persian Governments, therefore the Honourable East India Company, to aid
Amir Dost Muhammed Khan to defend and maintain his present possessions in Balkh, Cabul, and Kandahar against Persia, hereby agrees, out of friendship, to give the said Amir one lac of Company’s rupees monthly during the war with Persia, on the following conditions:

2. The Amir shall keep his present number of cavalry and artillery, and shall maintain not less than 18,000 infantry, of which 13,000 shall be regulars, divided into 13 regiments.

3. The Amir is to make his own arrangements for receiving the money at the British Treasuries, and conveying it through his own country.

4. British officers, with suitable establishments and orderlies, shall be deputed, at the pleasure of the British Government, to Cabul or Kandahar or Balkh, or all three places, or wherever an Afghan army be assembled to act against the Persians. It will be their duty to see generally that the subsidy granted to the Amir be devoted to the military purposes for which it is given, and to keep their own Government informed of all affairs. They will have nothing to do with the payment of the troops, or advising the Cabul Government, and they will not interfere in any way in the internal administration of the country. The Amir will be responsible for their safety and honourable treatment while in his country, and for keeping them acquainted with all military and political matters connected with the war.

5. The Amir of Cabul shall appoint and maintain a vakil at Peshawur.

6. The subsidy of one lac per mensem shall cease from the date on which peace is made between the British and Persian Governments, or at any previous time at the will and pleasure of the Governor-General of India.

7. Whenever the subsidy shall cease the British Officers shall be withdrawn from the Amir’s country; but at the pleasure of the British Government a vakil, not a European officer, shall remain at Cabul on the part of the Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Cabul.

8. The Ameer shall furnish a sufficient escort for the British Officers from the British border when going to the Ameer’s country, and to the British border when returning.

9. The subsidy shall commence from 1st January 1857, and be payable at the British Treasury one month in arrears.

10. The five lakhs of rupees which have been already sent to the Ameer (three to Candahar and two to Cabul) will not be counted in this Agreement. They are a free and separate gift from the Honourable East India Company. But the sixth lakh now in the hands of the mahajuns of Cabul, which was sent for another purpose, will be one of the instalments under this Agreement.

11. This Agreement in no way supersedes the Treaty made at Peshawur on 30th March 1855 (corresponding with 11th of Rajab 1271), by which the Ameer of Cabul engaged to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company, and the Ameer of Cabul, in the spirit of that Treaty, agrees to communicate to the British Government any overtures he may receive from Persia or the allies of Persia during the war, or while there is friendship between the Cabul and British Governments.

12. In consideration of the friendship existing between the British Government and Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan, the British Government engages to overlook the past hostilities of all the tribes of Afghanistan, and on no account to visit them with punishment.

13. Whereas the Ameer has expressed a wish to have 4,000 muskets given him in addition to the 4,000 already given, it is agreed that 4,000 muskets shall be sent by the British Government to Tull, whence the Ameer’s people will convey them with their own carriage.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

(Signed) HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Commissioner of the Peshawur Division.
To the Right Honourable Sir Charles Wood, Bart., G.C.B., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Department, Simla, dated 28th July 1863.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a communication from the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, and of its enclosure to my address from Sirdar Shere Allee Khan of Cabul, announcing the death of his father.

2. I have directed the issue of the necessary instructions to the British Vakeel of the receipt of Sirdar Shere Allee Khan's letter, and that a reply will be sent to it for delivery through him.

3. It is my intention to await further information from Afghanistan before taking a formal step in acknowledgment of Sirdar Shere Allee Khan as the successor to Dost Mahomed, and as charged with the maintenance of the friendly relations existing between the two Governments.

4. If it be true that Mahomed Ufzal Khan is raising an army it will not be long before the contest for power begins. Meanwhile, the acknowledgment by the Vakeel of the receipt of the letter, and that a reply will be sent, as also the presence of the Vakeel with Shere Allee Khan, will be regarded as indications that the British Government are not indisposed to accept Dost Mahomed's election of his successor, provided the latter is in a position to uphold the authority thus conferred upon him.

(Signed) ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

No. 111 of 1863.

From the Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, dated the 11th July 1863.

Forwards copy of the annexed letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, No. 122, dated 7th instant, with enclosed communication from Sirdar Shere Allee Khan, announcing his father's death on the 9th ultimo, to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.

By order, &c.

(Signed) T. D. Forsyth, Officiating Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Copy of a Letter, No. 122, dated 7th July 1863, from the Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawur Division to Secretary to Government, Punjab.

I beg to enclose a Morasilah just received from Sirdar Shere Allee Khan, announcing his father's death on the 9th of June, to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General.

2. My telegram of to-day's date will have given you the heads of the Despatch just received; further translations will follow to-morrow.

(True copy.) (Signed) W. Kirke, Assistant Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

Translation of a Letter from Sirdar Shere Ali Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, dated Herat (Friday), 24th Zeelhej 1279, A.H., corresponding with 12th June 1863.

(After compliments.)

I beg to inform your Excellency that as death is the common lot of man, my revered father, 14 days after the capture of Herat and its dependencies, died of a chronic illness at sunrise on Tuesday the 21st of Zeelhej (9th June).

In accordance with the wishes of my father to give intimation to your Excellency of everything, whether trifling or important, I beg to apprise you that as long as I live I will, please God, follow the
laudable example of my father in maintaining the strong ties of friendship and amity subsisting between
the British and this State.

I trust that your Excellency, setting your mind at ease in every respect, will continue to gratify me
from time to time with gracious letters.

I have thought it expedient to stay here a few days, in order to appoint a ruler of Herat, and to
make boundary settlements, and afterwards I will take my departure for Cabool.

(True translation.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 3.

No. 441.

From the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General to the Officiating
Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies, dated Simla, the 22nd July
1863.

Foreign Dept.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 522, dated 11th July, forward-
ing a letter to the address of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General from Sirdar Shere
Allee Khan of Cabool, announcing the death of his father.

2nd. In reply, I am directed by his Excellency to request that the British Vakeel may be informed,
through the Commissioner of Peshawur, of the receipt of Shere Allee Khan’s letter, and told that a
reply will be sent to it for delivery through him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. M. Durand,

Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

Simla, the 22nd July 1863.

No. 4.

Political, No. 44.

To the Right Honourable Sir Charles Wood, M.P. and G.C.B., Her Majesty’s
Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Department,

Fort William, dated 23rd December 1863.

Sir,

In continuation of the letter to your address, No. 5., dated 28th July, we have
the honour to forward, for your information, copy of a letter to the address of His High-
ness Shere Ali Khan, Chief of Cabul, recognizing him as successor to the late Ameer
Dost Mahomed Khan.

2. Copies of letters from the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, are likewise
forwarded.

(Signed) W. T. Denison.

R. Napier.

H. B. Harlington.

H. S. Maine.

C. E. Trevelyan.

W. Grey.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

No. 189.

From the Secretary to Government, Punjab and its Dependencies, to the Secretary to
the Government of India in the Foreign Department with the Governor-General,
dated Lahore, the 28th October 1863.

Political.

Sir,

I am directed to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-
General, copies of the Commissioner of Peshawur’s letter, No. 185, dated 15th instant,
and diaries of the Cabul Wakeel, extending from the 15th September to the 1st instant.
2. The Lieutenant-Governor desires to draw his Excellency’s attention to Colonel Taylor’s 4th paragraph relative to the anxiety of Shere Ali Khan to be recognized by the British Government as the late Ameer’s successor, and to the Commissioner’s concluding opinion that it is advisable that this recognition should be accorded. His Honour inclines to the opinion that some such action will hereafter be desirable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. H. Davies,
Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM COMMISSIONER AND SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, Punjab, No. 185, dated 15th October 1863.

I beg to forward the accompanying documents.

With reference to the translation forwarded of the Cabul Diary from the 22nd to the 24th September, I beg to note two points.

1st. It will be observed that the Ameer asks the Vakeel, rather anxiously, whether he has received letters from the Commissioner of Peshawur regarding affairs connected with the country, and subsequently he adds that he refrains from writing again till he receive replies to his first letters. The letters alluded to are those forwarded with my letter of the 17th September 1863 to your address, and no doubt the Ameer counts on the tenour of the answer from the Supreme Government acknowledging him as Ameer of Cabul and successor to the same relations as existed between the late Ameer and the British Government.

2nd. I have also to bring to notice that on the 2nd of August I wrote by direction to the Vakeel, instructing him to inform Ameer Shere Ali Khan that his letter announcing his father’s death had been received, and would be subsequently answered.

In the same Diary of the 24th September mention is made of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan having sent a messenger of his own to me from Gurdez with a letter. This is fact. The messenger arrived about the 12th September at Abbottabad, bringing the letter; while the messenger was still with me, however, intelligence was received through the Vakeel that a reconciliation had been effected between the reigning Ameer and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and copies of the agreement entered into and signed by the parties were forwarded by the Vakeel. I made all these over to the messenger, allowing him to read them. I then dismissed him with the letter, and a small “zyafut” for his expenses on the road. I was just leaving for Murree at the time, and the man was anxious to be gone. I trust that under the circumstances my action will be approved. It appeared to me that at the time no other course could be adopted. I am well aware that, ordinarily, all such communications should be referred for ruling. I may note that, should there be any wish to open up communication with Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, an opportunity is given by his letter forwarded by the Vakeel, but I do not recommend the course, and would rather advocate that Shere Ali Khan be at once acknowledged as his father’s successor.

Enclosure 3 in No. 4.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of a “MURASILAH” or LETTER, without date, from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan (son of the late Ameer of Cabul) to the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR.

After compliments. Seeing that during the lifetime of the late Ameer the administration of affairs in Afghanistan was greatly facilitated and strengthened by the friendship subsisting between the Ameer and the British Government, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan was desirous that this state of things should continue, and with this view he used every exertion on the death of his father to maintain it. Shere Ali Khan (the present Ameer), however, notwithstanding the advice tendered by Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, began to oppress his brothers and the people generally. The British authorities are not acquainted with Shere Ali Khan’s disposition. In the conjuncture just alluded to the writer had no alternative but to separate himself from his brother at Isfizân, and to betake himself to Zoormut. Shere Ali Khan is ruining the administration and oppressing
those whose relatives are serving in Turkistan to induce them to recall their friends. Much injury will accrue to the whole army from a continuance of such proceedings. It is very probable that Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan will, in consequence of Shere Ali Khan’s measures, proceed to Cabul, thus imperilling the security of his hold upon Turkistan. It remains to be seen what the result will be. Considering that the prosperity, or otherwise, of this country (Afghanistan?) depends so much upon the pleasure of the British Government, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan begs that the Commissioner of Peshawur will write and express his views on the state of affairs, advising the writer of the best course to be pursued, in order that the country may be saved from calamities and remain in peace.

(True Extract.)
(Signed) A. A. Munro,
On special duty with Commissioner.

Enclosure 4 in No. 4.

REPLY of the COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWUR to communication from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan.

After compliments. Acknowledges the receipt of a communication intimating the occurrence of misunderstandings between the Sirdar and Shere Ali Khan, and expresses much regret at the intelligence. Before the departure of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan’s messenger information of the agreement entered into between Ameer Shere Ali Khan and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan at Zoormut was received through the Cabul Vakeel. The Commissioner is highly gratified to hear of this amicable settlement of the dispute, and writes by the messenger to congratulate the Sirdar upon the issue, which has happily rendered any further allusion to the original communication unnecessary.

(True Extract.)
(Signed) A. A. Munro,
14th October 1863.
On special duty with Commissioner.

Enclosure 5 in No. 4.

EXTRACT from Diary of the CABUL VAKEEL for the half week from the 22nd to the 24th September 1863.

The Vakeel was accosted by the Ameer and asked whether any letters regarding public affairs had lately been received from the Commissioner of Peshawur. The reply was that none had been received, and that the Vakeel would have at once communicated the contents to the Ameer had any communications come to hand. The Ameer said he deferred writing again until replies should be received to his former communications. He seemed somewhat anxious as to the cause of non-receipt. Intelligence has been received that a confidential servant of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan had reached the Commissioner of Peshawur, and made certain overtures. It is reported the messenger was informed that Afghanistan is in a manner subject to the English Government, and that the appointment or approval of a Cabul ruler rested with the British. That this was said by way of qualifying Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan.. The Ameer on hearing this was further troubled in spirit, and he ascribes his not having received replies to his communications to some such cause as is here alleged.

Lall Mahomed Khan, who had been sent by the Ameer, had returned from Turkistan with letters from Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan. He was accompanied by a Nazim of the Sirdar, and delivered his despatches. The contents will be communicated next week, or when ascertained.

(Signed) Ghalam Hussain Khan,
Alizai.

(True Extract.)
(Signed) A. A. Munro,
On special duty with Commissioner.
Enclosure 6 in No. 4.

COPY of a LETTER, dated 14th November 1863, from the COMMISSIONER and SUPERINTENDENT, Peshawur Division, to the SECRETARY to GOVERNMENT, Punjab.

I have the honour, in forwarding the diary of the Cabul Vakeel for the half week from the 16th to the 19th of October, to call attention to the two passages I have marked.

I have before brought to notice that the present Ameer was led to expect an answer to his letters announcing his father's death, I having been directed to inform him that they had been received, and that an answer would be subsequently sent.

His Honour will observe the tenour of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's letter to me and also of the allusions to Sirdar Mahomed Azul Khan.

I have previously reported the nature of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's communication and of my reply to it (to which the Sirdar alludes), in which of course I avoided offering any kind of advice, merely saying that I was glad that a reconciliation had been effected between himself and his brother.

What appears to me the evil of our not acknowledging the de facto ruler of the country is, that the other Sirdars, to whom the fact of our keeping the matter in suspense is well known, will be inclined to think that we have other intentions; that we have in fact selected some successor other than the present one whom we mean to favour; and such a belief can only foster distrust and dissension, while it will greatly weaken the present Ameer's hands.

Enclosure 7 in No. 4.

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION of LETTER from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan to the Commissioneer of Peshawur. No date, but reference made to it in Vakeel Diary of 8th October 1863.

AFTER compliments. Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan states that he formerly communicated with the Commissioner on the state of affairs generally throughout Afghanistan, and his own particular relations thereto, but had not received a reply which was calculated to guide him. He had mentioned the impossibility of arranging matters with his brother Shere Ali Khan, and the necessity there was for his (Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan) maintaining his own ground. Shere Ali Khan, however, anticipating him, brought a force to meet him, but finding the Sirdars and Chiefs favourably disposed towards Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and unprepared for a contest, Shere Ali Khan proposed an arrangement of differences, and the Chiefs, with reference to the great distance of Sirdar Mahomed Azul Khan, recommended Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan to accede to it. Since then a reply has been received from Sirdar Mahomed Azul Khan to a requisition by Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan for aid. The former Sirdar reminds his brother that the Cabul Government has derived much strength from its alliance and good understanding with the British, and he advises Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan to be mainly guided by the council which he may receive from the British authorities, whom he wishes his brother to consult as to the propriety, or otherwise, of his own retention of the management of affairs in Toorkistan.

Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan further states that in the present temper of the Sirdars and Chiefs, and in the absence of particular recommendations from the Commissioner of Peshawur, he has restricted himself to one interview with his brother Shere Ali Khan, and does not consider it advisable to renew the conference. Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan further states that his brother (the present Ameer) drew out the written agreement in accordance with his own views, avoiding reference to the settlement of Toorkistan affairs; that he has already infringed the terms of the paper of reconciliation by interdicting the British Vakeel from visiting him (Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan) to console, according to Mahomedan custom, on the death of the late Ameer, and that the Ameer has in other ways shown an inclination not to abide by the conditions which he himself imposed. Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan therefore hopes for a reply calculated to guide him in the particular juncture, and he does so with the greater boldness, as he has all his life entertained friendly feelings towards the British Government, and has obtained many marks of favour from the British authorities.
He intimates that his brother Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan is equally anxious with himself for an expression of Commissioner's views on the state of affairs.

(True Abstract.)

(Signed) A. A. Munro,
On special duty with Commissioner.

Enclosure 8 in No. 4.

To His Highness Ameer Sher Ali Khan, Walee of Cabul, &c. &c., dated 23rd December 1863.

After Compliments.

Your friendly letter communicating the melancholy tidings of your father's death was received by my lamented predecessor, Lord Elgin, with the utmost regret for the loss of so firm and constant an ally of the British Government.

You will have learned from my separate letter of the death of the late Viceroy and Governor-General, an event which was preceded by a severe and protracted illness, during which a formal reply to your announcement was necessarily postponed.

My separate letter will also have informed you that I have assumed the office of Governor-General, and I take this early opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your Khurreen, in which you intimate your succession to the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and your desire, as Ruler of Afghanistan, to maintain the same friendly relations with the British Government as have heretofore existed.

You may rest assured that the British Government participate in this desire, and I sincerely trust that under your rule Afghanistan may possess a strong and united Government, and that the good understanding and friendship which prevailed during the lifetime of the late Ameer, your predecessor, may continue to gain strength and stability under your own administration.

Moved by a sincere wish for the permanent welfare of your rule and of the people of Afghanistan, I deem it advisable to commend to your careful consideration and attention the words of the late Viceroy when acknowledging, in his letter of the 3rd July last, the announcement made by the late Ameer of the capture of Herat by storm under your Highness' leading. I feel that I cannot too strongly press upon your attention the necessity for your taking the utmost care to prevent any of your Highness' officers on the Persian frontier from permitting themselves to be led into any measures or enterprises which could justly give umbrage to Persia. I am confident that your Highness, conscious how greatly the interests of yourself and the Afghan people are at stake in this matter, will be solicitous to maintain peace and order on your own frontiers, and will countenance no aggressions on the part of any persons over whom your Highness' officers have influence.

In conclusion, &c.

(Signed) W. Denison.

No. 5.

No. 73.

To the Right Honourable the Earl de Grey and Ripon, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.—(Extract.)

Foreign Dept.
Political.

My Lord,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter, No. 355, dated 17th instant, addressed under our instructions to the Government of the Punjab, from which it will be perceived that, in consequence of our Vakeel at Cabul having unwarrantably overstepped the limit of his functions as a news-writer, and taken upon himself to make overtures of friendship and alliance between the British Government and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, we have been compelled to order his recall.
We have at the same time communicated to the Lieutenant-Governor our view as to the policy by which the relations of the British Government with the contending factions in Afghanistan should be regulated. The cause of the Ameer Shere Ali is by no means finally lost, and we consider that, until such a result is reached, we are bound equally by good faith and by considerations of policy to recognize no other Chief as Ameer of Afghanistan. Should the present contest terminate in a disruption of the kingdom into two or more principalities, it will be time enough to give these our recognition when they develop themselves in a form having some appearance of stability. In the meantime we intend maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality, leaving the Afghans to choose their own rulers, and prepared to accept with amity whatever Chief may finally establish his power in the country.

Her Majesty’s Government will observe that Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, wishing to feel his way with the Government of India, has addressed overtures to the Commissioner of the Peshawur Division, and that Colonel Becher’s reply, couched in terms of general courtesy, without any reference to the object which the Sirdar had at heart, is in the tone which we conceive proper to the occasion.

We have, &c.,
(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
W. GREY.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.

Enclosure in No. 5.

From the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, to the Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 355, dated Simla, the 17th April 1866.

With reference to the direct communications from the Commissioner of Peshawur noted in the margin, I am directed to convey to you, for the information of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor the views held by the Government of India upon the present state of affairs in Afghanistan.

2. Copy of letter marked L, dated 1st instant, to the address of the Punjab Government, forwarding translations of a missal from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan and of the Moonshee’s Diary, dated 15th ultimo.

2. The Governor-General in Council has reason to believe that Colonel Becher replied to Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan’s letter in terms of general courtesy. His Excellency in Council approves of this proceeding.

3. As regards the conduct of the Moonshee at Cabul, it is clear that he has exceeded his powers. He had no authority to assume the functions of a Representative of the British Government; his duty was simply to watch and report events and cultivate friendly relations with all parties. The course which he has adopted is certainly premature, and may prove embarrassing.

4. When the Moonshee made his first mistake the Government of India directed his recall, but subsequently modified these instructions at the request of the Lieutenant-Governor and the Commissioner of Peshawur. It will be inconvenient to recall him, as we shall then have no person at Cabul to report events, and the recall may give offence to Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan. Nevertheless, his Excellency in Council thinks that the step must be taken: it is the simplest way of putting matters on a proper footing, and the Commissioner of Peshawur may, perhaps, be able to make other arrangements for obtaining intelligence from Cabul. The Government of the Punjab will therefore issue without delay the necessary orders for giving effect to this decision.

5. It is difficult, the Governor-General in Council observes, to foresee what may be the turn of events in Cabul. The Ameer Shor Ali may recover his power.

6. Already it is said that Mahomed Rufeek Khan, the ablest Chief in the country, whose desertion was probably one of the main causes of the collapse of the Ameer’s party at Cabul, is discontented with Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and has come to an understanding with the Ameer.

7. The Ameer himself has shown that he in many respects possesses the qualities of a ruler; but he has also considerable defects. There can be little doubt that he has alienated from himself most of the influential Chiefs; and his conduct towards his brother, Sirdar Mahomed Azif Khan, whom he treacherously imprisoned after the most solemn promises and oaths of full security, shows that no faith can be placed in him. Still Afghan chiefs are not to be judged by the principles of Christendom, nor can we be sure that the nobles and people may not again rally round the Ameer if he shows resolution and vigour.

8. In the opinion of his Excellency in Council, sound policy dictates that we should not be hasty in giving up the Ameer’s cause as lost. We should await the development of events and for the present continue to recognize Sher Ali as the Ameer of Afghanistan. If the Ameer fail in his attempt to recover Cabul, and Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan establish his power and make overtures to the British
Government, the latter can then be recognised as the ruler of such parts of the country as he may possess. It should be our policy to show clearly that we will not interfere in the struggle, that we will not aid either party, that we will leave the Afghans to settle their own quarrels, and that we are willing to be on terms of amity and good-will with the nation and with their rulers de facto. Suitable opportunities can be taken to declare that these are the principles which will guide our policy, and it is the belief of the Governor-General in Council that such a policy will in the end be appreciated.

No. 6.

To the Right Honourable the Earl de Grey and Ripon, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

We have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty’s Government, copies of further papers relative to the state of affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

W. MANSFIELD.

H. S. MAINE.

W. GREY.

G. N. TAYLOR.

W. N. MASSEY.

H. M. DURAND.

Simla, 30th June 1866.

Enclosure 1 in No. 6.

No. 275.

From W. Kirke, Esq., Assistant Secretary to Government, Punjab, to W. Muir, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

My Lord,

I am directed to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy in Council, copies of a letter and its enclosure from the Commissioner of Peshawur Division, No. 58, of the 11th instant, and of the reply thereto, regarding the state of affairs in Afghanistan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. KIRKE,

Assistant Secretary to Government, Punjab.

Enclosure 2 in No. 6.

From Colonel J. R. Becher, C.B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, dated 11th June 1866, No. 58.

The Ex-Governor of Jalalabad, Shah Murd Khan, came into Peshawur on 20th May with a party of horsemen, giving no further notice than a message when he entered the first British village. He brought a letter from Sirdar Futtah Mahomed Khan (nephew of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan and son of the late Wuzeer Mahomed Akbur Khan), lately commanding the Jalalabad force which was dispersed near Cabul.

This letter stated that the Sirdar had been obliged to fly, and asked permission to proceed through British territory to Shikarpore to join the Ameer.

On 27th May a party of two generals of artillery and one general of infantry and fifteen men came into the British border at Spersung without giving previous notice; they said they had been sent in by the Sirdar to Shah Murd Khan to know why there was
delay, and moreover that they were in fear of their lives beyond the border. I allowed them to put up with Shah Murd Khan.

On 29th May permission was accorded to Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan. I did not write, but communicated through Shah Murd Khan that the Sirdar was at liberty to come or not to come into British territory, and that a passage would be given to him; the information does not, however, seem to have satisfied him entirely.

The Sirdar, when he wrote, was at Koonur; he has never made his appearance, but has instead been entering into negotiations with the Cabul Government, while Shah Murd Khan, as his vakeel, has remained at Peshawur, first on the excuse of waiting for the Sirdar; lately he has decided himself to return, but in order to keep with both sides wishes his son to go to Shikarpore with the three Generals.

On 9th June a letter was sent from Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan to Shah Murd Khan, a translation of which I annex; it shows that the Sirdar was entering into negotiations with the Cabul party for a road to Khilat by Cabul; it asks for a letter from me to assure him that he may come in. As the Sirdar has been doing everything that is calculated to embroil us with the present Government of Cabul by separating himself from his Generals, and instead of coming in at once has been delaying and going to Jalalabad and entering into negotiations, I have now directed Shah Murd Khan to inform him that, as the circumstances of the case are quite changed from the time when he represented himself as a defeated refugee, he must no longer count on the Shikarpore road.

Probably he will make his way to Candahar by Cabul, or else there is another road through the hills. He speaks in his letter of calling the Generals to him if he be given a road by Cabul, and I hope he will, for it is very embarrassing to know what to do with them. In their character of refugees in fear of their lives it is not right to expel them beyond the border; their going by Shikarpore (although of course without an overt assistance) lays us open to offending Mahomed Azul Khan, and opens out a dangerous precedent for the future; for I apprehend that others will be making their escape to the Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Candahar.

I will each day report what further occurs in this matter.

Enclosure 3 in No. 6.

Letter of Sirdar Futteh Mahomed Khan to Shah Murd Khan, Aboo Ahmud Khan, Abdool Kurreem Khan, and Hufeezoolla Khan.

Greeting,—

From the day I left I have heard nothing of you. I have remained in consequence of not hearing from you. When I received your note I immediately marched by the road of Koonur to have an interview (zearut) with the Akhvond of Swat, and then come into Peshawur; but before I left a note came to the Badshah (of Koonur) desiring that I should not be let go, but come by his road. They made objections; I saw that they would not let me have a way from fear of their lives. I returned thence to Jalalabad.

Sultan Mahomed Khan Momund was in the city; a letter also came to him, and he also made objections. Sirdar Mudut Khan and Sirdar Abdool Khalik Khan sent an agreement to me from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan to the effect that if I wished to go to Khilat I should go by the road of Cabul. I sent back these messengers saying that if I was not to be annoyed with service and paying of my respects, and if I were given a road by Soorkhab or Lohgurh, I would join them. After six days I get information; if they give me a road, I will give information to you and to the Commissioner and go by that road. If they insist on service I will set off as a single horseman and reach Peshawur.

You should quickly let Aboo Ahmud Khan, Abdool Kurreem Khan, and Hufeezoolla Khan go, that they may quickly reach the Ameer Shere Ali. Rest assured of all matters in these parts, and let me know of your welfare.

P.S.—A kossid from Khilat states that the Ameer Shere Ali came and remained two nights in Khilat, and then left for Candahar after strengthening the garrison of the fort. Sirdar Mahomed Shureef Khan and Sirdar Mahomed Ibraheem two days previously had entered Candahar with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. For the rest all is well.

P.S.—I receive information from Cabul after six or seven days. If General Aboo Ahmud Khan and Abdool Kurreem Khan and Hufeezoolla Khan be delayed it is well, so that they may hear what is the state at Cabul. If they give me a road I will let you know, and if not I will alone night and day come in. If you consider it right send me a letter quickly from the Commissioner, and I will come in quickly as a single horseman. For the rest all is well.
In reply to your letter No. 58, dated 11th instant, I am directed to state that the Lieutenant-Governor considers you are quite right to watch carefully the progress of events in Afghanistan, and to act accordingly.

2. In the present constantly changing state of matters, and without full cognizance of the temper of the parties concerned, it is not possible to give in a satisfactory manner definitive instructions in anticipation. But should Futtah Mahomed Khan be constrained to enter our territory as a refugee, and desire to join the Ameer through British territory, the Lieutenant-Governor thinks he may be allowed to avail himself of the privilege heretofore conceded him by his Excellency the Viceroy, though His Honour does not think this permission should be extended to any large number of his followers.

3. His Honour's own feeling is that it is more important that we adhere strictly to our engagements with the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, so long as any prospect remains of his resuming authority, than that we endeavor to secure the friendship of the party which is now in the ascendant and may perhaps permanently retain power. On the other hand, His Honour would use every legitimate means to satisfy that party that beyond what we deem incumbent on us in fulfilment of our engagements we have no desire or intention to uphold one party against the other.

Enclosure 5 in No. 6.

No. 664.

From the Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

Foreign Dept.
Political.

SIR,

Simla, 25th June 1866.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 15th instant, No. 275/512, submitting copies of correspondence with the Commissioner of Peshawur regarding the attitude to be observed towards the contending parties in Afghanistan, and in reply, to state that His Excellency the Governor-General in Council approves the tenor of the Lieutenant-Governor's communication to the Commissioner.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. Muir,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 7.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranborne, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Dept.
Political.

MY LORD,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, further papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan.

2. Your Lordship will perceive that we have at last recognised Sirdar Mahomed Ufzul Khan as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar, and have invited him in that capacity to tender his adhesion to the Treaty engagements which were concluded by his father, Dost Mahomed Khan, with the British Government.

3. Ameer Shere Ali has fled to Herat, and so long as he retains possession of that province and desires to be on good terms with the British Government, we shall continue to recognise him as Ameer of Herat and to reciprocate his friendship.
4. The rising of Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan in Balkh is not yet suppressed; but it is doubtful whether he will be able to hold out much longer now that the decisive defeat of the Ameer Shere Ali has left the Cabul troops free to operate in force towards the north. On the whole, the brothers now in power at Cabul appear more likely than any other party to consolidate their power in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
W. GREY.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to J. W. S. WYLLIE, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta, No. 116-75, dated Lahore, 15th February 1867.

I am directed to forward herewith an open khureeta from Sirdar Mahomed Ufzul Khan to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy announcing the complete defeat of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan and the occupation of Candahar by the Cabul troops. A translation is also enclosed.

2. As there now appears to be no doubt that Ufzul Khan is in full possession both of Cabul and Candahar, the fact having been corroborated from various authentic sources, it appears to the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor that, in conformity with the tenor of former letters, the concession of the title of Ameer in our correspondence with him should no longer be withheld, even although it is yet uncertain what may be the fate of Herat, and Faiz Mahomed Khan still holds out in Turkistan. It appears to His Honour that Ameer Shere Ali Khan, who is generally considered not to be in his right mind, can no longer hope to regain power, and Ufzul Khan, if not completely established in the Chiefship of Afghanistan, is nearly so, and much more likely than anyone else to consolidate his power, unless by misgovernment he should alienate the bulk of the people.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Translation of a Khureeta from Sirdar Mahomed Ufzul Khan, styling himself Ameer of Afghanistan, to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 28th Ramzan (3rd February 1867).

My brother Ameer Shere Ali Khan was defeated at Saidabad, and he fled to Candahar, and I took possession of the throne at Cabul. Information of this was duly communicated to you. In consideration of our relationship I let him alone at Candahar, and took no steps to expel him from there; but he was not long there when my brother again prepared himself for a contest. He sent inflammatory letters to the Chiefs and people of this country; he excited my brother Faiz Mahomed Khan, who was under great obligations to me, and whom my son had left as his substitute in Turkistan when he himself came to Cabul, to rebel against me, and that ungrateful man acted on his instigation. It became therefore necessary to punish Faiz Mahomed and to secure the comfort of the people; I accordingly sent my brother Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and my son, Abdul Rahman Khan, with a strong force against Candahar. They had gone just beyond Makar, which is situated half way, when Ameer Shere Ali Khan with his troops marched to Kilat and prepared to fight. Some of the Ameer's troops who had advanced to oppose the progress of my force were repulsed, but on Wednesday (9th Ramzan), 16th January, a battle was fought, which lasted four hours, and in which Ameer Shere Ali Khan was completely defeated. Shere Ali Khan then took to flight, and his artillery, &c. fell into our hands, and his men were made captives. On the 19th of Ramzan (26th January) my brother and son entered the city of Candahar and took possession of it.
I congratulate my old friends on this success, and send intimation of it to you, because it is necessary that friends should be informed of it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.

KHUREETA to His Highness AMEER MAHOMED UFZUL KHAN, Walee of Cabul and Candahar, dated Fort William, 25th February 1867.

I have received your Highness's friendly letter informing me that your Highness's troops under the command of Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan and Sirdar Abdool Reyman Khan have completely defeated Ameer Shere Ali Khan, and have followed up this victory by capturing and occupying the city of Candahar.

Your Highness must pardon my saying that I feel pity for Ameer Shere Ali Khan personally. He succeeded your Highness's renowned father as the ally of the British Government, and he adhered to the alliance, giving me no cause of offence at any time. Nevertheless, the general welfare of the great Barukzye house and of the Afghani people has higher claims upon my consideration. With great sorrow and solicitude I have, for three years past, seen that house and people a prey to the most calamitous dissensions. I am disposed therefore to hail hopefully any event which may tend to bring Afghanistan nearer to the attainment of a stable peace and strong Government under one of the sons of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. And in this spirit I beg to tender to your Highness my congratulations on the recent victory secured for your Highness's arms by my friend Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan and your Highness's gallant son, Sirdar Abdool Reyman Khan.

My friend! the British Government has hitherto maintained a strict neutrality between the contending parties in Afghanistan. Rumours, I am told, have reached the Cabul Durbar of assistance having been granted by me to Ameer Shere Ali Khan. I take this opportunity to request your Highness not to believe such idle tales. Neither men, nor arms, nor money, nor assistance of any kind, have ever been supplied by my Government to Ameer Shere Ali Khan. Your Highness and he, both equally unaided by me, have fought out the battle, each upon your own resources. I purpose to continue the same policy for the future. If unhappily the struggle for supremacy in Afghanistan has not yet been brought to a close, and hostilities are again renewed, I shall still side with neither party.

My friend! as I told your Highness in my former letter, the relations of the British Government are with the actual Rulers of Afghanistan. Therefore, so long as Ameer Shere Ali Khan holds Herat and maintains friendship with the British Government, I shall recognise him as Ruler of Herat, and shall reciprocate his amity.

But upon the same principle I am prepared to recognise your Highness as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar, and I frankly offer your Highness, in that capacity, peace and the good-will of the British Government. I shall expect your Highness in return to recognise as binding on your Highness's Government of Cabul and Candahar the engagements concluded between the British Government and your Highness's father, the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, as contained in the Treaty of 30th March 1855, and that part of the Treaty of 20th January 1857 which is still in force.

My friend! it will give me much pleasure if your Highness consent to this proposal and accept the alliance of the British Government. Confidently anticipating that your Highness will appreciate the advantages of such a course, I desire to bring to your Highness's notice the provision made in Article 7 of the Treaty of 1857 to the effect that, "at the pleasure of the British Government, a Vakeel, not a European Officer, shall remain at Cabul on the part of the British Government." Your Highness is aware that since my last Agent was recalled to India three years ago, my communications with the Cabul Government have been carried on through a Moonsheer whom the Agent left behind for the purpose. This arrangement was never intended to be otherwise than temporary, and it has been found inconvenient in practice. Accordingly, if your Highness has no objection, I shall at once depute a Mahomedan gentleman of rank and character to be my representative at your Highness's Court.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
To the Right Honourable Sir Stafford Northcote, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Fort William, 27th March 1867.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 44, dated 28th ultimo, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, further papers relating to Afghanistan affairs.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
H. S. MAINE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to J. W. S. Wyllie, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Fort William, No. 163–90, dated Lahore, 1st March 1867.

I am directed to forward, for the information and orders of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, copies of a letter from the Commissioner, Peshawur, No. 17, dated 26th ultimo, and its enclosed communication from the Cabul Moonshee.

2. The Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor presumes the Moonshee may be informed that the British Government can by no means advise the Rulers of Cabul to afford assistance to Bokhara at the present time, but will always be glad to receive intelligence regarding the progress of events, and will gladly accept this evidence of friendly confidence.

3. I am to add that in a recent demi-official communication from Sir Henry Green it is stated that "Ameer Shere Ali Khan has left Candahar for Herat with the expressed determination of continuing the struggle and of seeking the assistance of Persia and Russia." It seems to the Lieutenant-Governor highly probable that, under existing circumstances, he will seek for aid from every quarter whence he may entertain any hope of obtaining it; and it is, therefore, desirable that this Government be put in possession of the views of His Excellency in Council as to the course which it will be advisable to pursue in the event of his application being favourably received and responded to by those to whom he may address himself.

Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Copy of a Letter from Major F. R. Pollock, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 17, dated 26th February 1867.

Agreedably to instructions conveyed in your No. 4, dated 4th January 1867, and enclosure, I wrote to the Cabul Moonshee, directing him, with reference to Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan's "Rookha," which furnished news of the recent proceedings of Russia in Central Asia, to inform the Cabul Rulers that the British Government had no reason to suppose that Russia would molest those who are in friendly relations with England, and that between England and Russia there existed most friendly relations.

2. Last evening I received from Cabul a communication, translation of which is annexed, and I have to solicit instructions as to what answer should be sent to the enquiry which I have italicised.
Enclosure 3 in No. 8.

FROM CABUL MOONSHEE, dated the 14th February 1867.

ACKNOWLEDGES receipt of reply to his communication which contained a "Rookha," in original, from Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, on the subject of Russian proceedings in Central Asia.

States that on the 14th he communicated to the Walee the reply from Peshawur, and that the Walee said that now his apprehensions regarding Russian proceedings had been removed, and that formerly his only object in writing as he did was to keep the English informed as to what was passing; that he comprehended all that had been written in reply from Peshawur, but that it might be well to ask one question, viz., Supposing that Bokhara, in consequence of the ancient friendship subsisting between her and Cabul, should seek assistance from Cabul, what should be said in reply? and that he had, during the last few days, heard that Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan, Governor of Balkh, had of his own action entered into communication with the Russian Governor at Tashkend, and that although the English said they were satisfied that Russia had no unfriendly intentions towards people who were allied with them (the English), still he thought it as well to mention what Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan had done; and that he would continue to report all such matters as they came to his knowledge.

He also mentioned that Sirdar Fyz Mahomed Khan had agreed with his troops that they should, when the Ramzan came to a close, but that nothing recent had been learnt of his doings. It appeared from what the Walee said that the Ameer Shere Ali was about 14 days ago at Washere, and bent on proceeding thence to Herat. Washere is 80 coss from Candahar.

Enclosure 4 in No. 8.

From J. W. S. Wyllie, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, No. 242, dated Fort William, the 12th March 1867.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 163-90, dated 1st instant, and, in reply, to state that, as regards Bokhara, the Governor-General in Council approves of the answer which His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor proposes to send to the Cabul Moonshee.

2. With reference to Ameer Shere Ali Khan's proceedings, His Excellency in Council desires me to state, for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor, that a cousin and prominent partisan of the Ameer's, bearing the same name as the Ameer, has arrived at Kurachee, commissioned to ask for assistance on his master's part. The Commissioner of Scinde has been instructed to hear and report all that the Sirdar has to say, but to do nothing more. When, on receipt of the expected report, the Government of India shall have come to a conclusion as to the course which it may be most expedient to adopt in the matter, a further communication will be made to the Lieutenant-Governor. Meanwhile no action should be taken inconsistent with the Government's steady resolve to abstain from all interference in the struggle now going on in Afghanistan.

No. 9.

No. 105.

To the Right Honourable Sir Stafford Northcote, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Foreign Dept. Political.

Sir,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers relating to Afghanistan affairs.

2. There are three points in these papers on which a few remarks from us may be advisable.

3. In the first place, the Ameer Ufzul Khan, writing from Cabul, under date April the 22nd, has replied to the letter in which the Governor-General recognised him as

Simla, 20th June 1867.
Ruler of Cabul and Candahar. Ufzul Khan expresses his appreciation of the friendly feelings of the British Government towards the Barukzye family generally, and consents to receive a native gentleman as the representative of the British Government at his Court. This reply is satisfactory. But when it was first received, we doubted whether, with reference to the possibility of Ufzul Khan being ousted from Cabul by Fyz Mahomed before our Vakeel could arrive, it might not be advisable to await the issue of Fyz Mahomed's adventure so that the credentials to be borne by the Vakeel might be addressed to the party whom he would find actually in power at the Bala Hisar. Our next intelligence represented Fyz Mahomed as still lingering in his northern possessions. At the same time, we took into consideration that the want of a competent representative at Cabul, in the present disturbed condition of Afghanistan, kept the Government of the Shah under a great disadvantage; and that, whatever chief might be in possession of the capital, we could reckon with tolerable assurance on his welcoming and protecting our Agent. Therefore, on the 29th ultimo, we telegraphed to the Punjab Government discretionary authority for the immediate despatch of the Vakeel by a safe route to Cabul. Atta Mahomed Khan is the name of the Vakeel, and we have full confidence in his discretion and fidelity. We have just heard that the Lieutenant-Governor, acting on this discretion, has thought it expedient again to defer the departure of the Agent.

4. Secondly, the Ameer Shere Ali Khan has left Herat and personally effected a junction with Fyz Mahomed Khan in Balkh. Until this step had been actually taken it was difficult to guess what reliance could be placed on the rumoured alliance between the two chiefs. In 1865-66 Fyz Mahomed had traitorously connived at Abdool Rahman's passage from Bokhara through Balkh to capture Cabul; and his full brother, Wullee Mahomed, has for some time past been a hostage in the hands of the Ameer Ufzul Khan. It was doubtful therefore how far Fyz Mahomed, in his new character as champion of the Ameer Shere Ali's cause, could be regarded as sincere. Even now it is probable that he acts more from motives of self-aggrandisement than from any devotion to his nominal lord. But it seems none the less certain that he is now advancing across the Hindoo Koosh with serious design to attack Cabul in the name of the Ameer Shere Ali; and that, whether Shere Ali accompany him or not to the actual assault, the expedition has considerable chances of success. Ameer Ufzul Khan's son, Abdool Rahman, has arrived at Cabul from Candahar, and, in view of organizing a defence against the northern invader, urgent messengers have been despatched for the recall of Aazum Khan to the capital; but the old jealousy subsisting between the latter and his nephew, Abdool Rahman, still divides the counsels of Ufzul Khan's party. In short, Shere Ali, at a time when his fortunes were at their lowest ebb, has received from a most unexpected quarter such an accession of strength as may carry him again for a time to the chief power in Afghanistan. Whatever happens, we contemplate no divergence from our settled policy of neutrality; unless indeed Shere Ali or any other party should throw themselves into the hands of Persia, and obtain assistance from the Shah; and even in this event nothing would be done without previous reference to Her Majesty's Government. You are aware that even in the same document in which we recognized Ufzul Khan's possession of Cabul and Candahar, we expressed sorrow for the fall of our original ally, Shere Ali, and announced our determination still to recognise him as Ameer of any portion of Afghanistan which might continue in his power. Thus, whether the brothers, Ufzul Khan and Aazum Khan, maintain their hold on the Bala Hisar, or whether Shere Ali, with Fyz Mahomed's aid, regain the throne of his inheritance, our relations with Afghanistan remain on their first footing of friendship towards the actual rulers, combined with rigid abstention from interference in domestic feuds.

5. Lastly, we may notice the fact of the journey to Meshshed undertaken by the Shah of Persia, and the rumour that he will be met there by an Afghan agent of rank, Meer Mahomed Ufzul Khan. Her Majesty's Envoy in Persia appears to be satisfied that the Shah's object is a religious one, unconnected with the politics of Afghanistan; and necessarily Mr. Alison must be the best judge on this point. We are aware that Shere Ali has at various times, and especially before his accession to the throne, shown marked proclivities towards a Persian alliance, and it would be only natural if after his recent defeat at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and in his despair of any material aid from British India, he had applied to the Persian Government for assistance against his foes. But we have reason to believe that Meer Mahomed Ufzul Khan, the officer designated as Shere Ali's Envoy to Meshshed, is still at Furrah, a city on this side of Herat; unless therefore Shere Ali should have two distinguished partisans of the same name, our information tends, to some extent, to discredit the rumour that Meshshed is likely to be the scene of a political intrigue between the Shah of Persia and Shere Ali. At any
rate we have no reason to doubt the correctness of Mr. Alison's views as to the absence of ambitious designs on the Shah's part.

We are, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
G. U. YULE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

From Ameer MAHOMED AEFZUL KHAN to His Excellency the Viceroy of India, dated 16th Zilhij 1283 A. H. (the 22nd April 1867).

ACKNOWLEDGES receipt of his Excellency's letter, stating that during the time that dissensions prevailed in Afghanistan the British Government maintained strict neutrality, and gave no sort of assistance to Ameer Shere Ali Khan, and that the same policy would be acted upon in future, and countenance given to neither party.

States that he is certain that it has been the desire of the British Government to see the dissensions among the members of the Barukzye family put a stop to and the Afghan nation in prosperity and comfort; and His Highness appreciates the kind intentions of the Government.

As regards the friendship between the two States alluded to in the letter of his Excellency, it has subsisted since the time of his late father, and His Highness hopes it may continue as formerly, and nothing will be done on his part prejudicial thereto.

His Excellency has alluded to the advantages of friendly relations with the British Government. His Highness admits that friendly relations with the powerful British Government will surely be productive of great advantage. His Excellency is desirous of sending a Vakeel to the Court of His Highness; and as friendship exists between the Governments, the Vakeel may be sent. He should, however, proceed to Cabul by the Koorrum route.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

SERVICE MESSAGE.

From Simla, dated the 29th May 1867.
From Foreign Secretary.
To Lahore.
To Secretary to Government.

"If Lieutenant-Governor sees no special objection, Viceroy approves Vakeel being now sent to Cabul, due precaution being taken for his reaching safely."

No. 10.
No. 3.

To the Right Honourable Sir Stafford NORTHCOTE, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (Extract.)

Foreign Dept.

Simla, 3rd September 1867.

Sir,

In the Cabul diary from 20th to 30th July, the following passage occurs:—

"The Wâlee (of Cabul) has heard from Sirdar Mahomed Aazum Khan as follows:—

"The Shah of Persia, on arriving at Meshed, told off a force of 16,000 men for Seistan, and wrote to Mahomed Yacoob Khan, Governor of Herat, requiring him to restore to
Persia all the munitions of war, guns, and small arms that Persia in former days made over to a former WAlee. The Sirdar excused himself from replying to this demand, till he could hear from his father, Ameer Shere Ally.

2. Again, the same diary says,—

The WAlee has sent by the hand of the Meer Moonshee (Secretary of the Durbar), in original, a letter he has received from Sirdar Mahomed Aazum Khan relating to affairs at Herat; it is submitted herewith. The Meer Moonshee stated verbally, by order of the WAlee, that the Ameer of Bukhara had several times sought assistance from the WAlee against Russia; but that the WAlee, out of motives of friendship towards the British Government, had not responded, and had reported to the British Government who, in reply, intimated that the proceedings of Russia had caused them no annoyance owing to the terms of amity existing between the Russian and English Governments. Subsequently to that, the WAlee had still sent no answer to Bukhara, and now it was seen what the proceedings of the Ameer Shere Ally were.

3. The following is said to be a translation of the Sirdar's letter containing the above information:

From Herat, it appears, by the report of a messenger I sent there, and who has now returned, that an Elchee (envoy) brought a letter from Meshed from the Shah of Persia, to Sirdar Mahomed Yacoob Khan, Governor of Herat, to the effect that if he was loyally and friendly disposed, he should come and pay his respects. The Sirdar replied that his conduct must be guided by the wishes of his father, and sent Mahomed Oomr, special messenger to the Ameer, who replied by express, that he had prayed God for such a turn of affairs, and that he (the son) should lose no time, but mount and wait on the Shah. Accordingly, Sirdar Mahomed Yacoob Khan, taking several horses with rich caparisons, and Cashmere dresses and other gorgeous presents, left for Meshed. He must have started thirty-four days ago; there is no doubt as to the fact. It remains to be seen how events will develop themselves, and what God will ordain.

4. On receipt of the above intelligence we despatched the following message in cypher to Her Majesty's Embassy at Teheran:

It is reported that on reaching Meshed the Shah wrote to Governor of Herat demanding restoration to Persia of certain guns, arms, and munitions of war, made over by Persia to a former Governor, also inviting the Governor to pay his respects to the Shah. The Governor, with sanction of Ameer Shere Ally, is reported to have set out with suitable presents for the Shah.

Pray ascertain what is the real state of the matter.

5. It is impossible for us, at the present moment, to say what amount of truth there may be in the above reports. On the one hand, it is for the interest of the party now in power at Cabul, to seek our good offices by representing their opponent Ameer Shere Ally as in league with Persia; and the tenor of the Durbar Moonshee's communications, in delivering Sirdar Mahomed Aazum Khan's letter to our news-writer, evidently points to such considerations as being uppermost in the WAlee, Ameer Azulf Khan's mind. "Bukhara," he said, "had made repeated advances to him for aid against Russia, which had been refused from his desire not to offend the British Government; now his enemy was intriguing with Persia;" implying that the Ameer by this conduct had placed himself beyond the pale of our alliance, while the party now in power at Cabul deserved our countenance and aid. Such being the views of the dominant party, it is quite possible that the intelligence, if not fabricated altogether, is yet much exaggerated and over-coloured. On the other hand, Ameer Shere Ally has long been said to look for aid from Persia, on finding that he could get none from us. And, with the struggle for the mastery at Cabul impending, and the Shah with a large army on the Afghan frontier, with the known desires also of Persia to have an interest in the administration of Herat, it is far from improbable that the Ameer Shere Ally should have been tempted to open negotiations with the Shah.

6. In this uncertainty as to the facts, we should have waited for the reply of Mr. Alison, who with much foresight has deputed a British Officer to be in attendance on the camp of the Shah and watch the proceedings of the Court of Persia in the direction of Afghanistan. But we may not receive a reply for some time. Unless the officer in question should already have reported the state of things to the Embassy, it will probably take several weeks before the facts are ascertained. We have thought it right, accordingly, not to delay communicating our sentiments to you, in order that we may be in timely possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government, and be able to act with promptitude on the possible contingency that Shere Ally throws himself into the arms of
Persia, and that the Shah takes measures to support him, and practically becomes again master of Herat.

Should the rumour prove untrue, of course the necessity for any present action will no longer exist. But if it should turn out to be founded on fact, that is, if it should be ascertained that Ameer Shere Ally has made overtures to Persia, and that in consequence terms of mutual aid and concession have been concluded between the two powers, then in that event we think that it might be highly for the interests of British India to declare the treaty at present existing between us and Ameer Shere Ally at an end; and to openly assist the party in power at Cabul, if at the time being that party should appear to be in a condition likely, with such assistance, to hold its position against Ameer Shere Ally. Our aid would be confined to a moderate subsidy of money, and a supply of arms and accoutrements. The moral and material help thus rendered would go a great way to give the party at Cabul, in such active alliance with ourselves, a clear and unassailable supremacy.

7. Ameer Shere Ally has been already warned what the consequences of an alliance with Persia would be, and could not justly complain if we, under the supposed circumstances, adopted the course above sketched out.

8. Although the Affghans are proverbially fickle and venal to the last degree, yet we apprehend that there would be motives rendering such action on our part not displeasing to them. The inhabitants of Herat are allied more to the Afghan race than to that of Persia. Any predominance of Persian interests would be unpalatable to the chiefs of Afghanistan. The Persians are disliked in consequence of both national and religious antipathies. An alliance of the Afghan chiefs with ourselves (so as it did not rouse suspicion and bigotry by the presence of European officers) would be far from unpopular, especially if it were known to be the only alternative to the Persian proclivities of Ameer Shere Ally.

9. In considering the possibilities of the future, it might turn out that Ameer Shere Ally, having entered into negotiations with Persia, should regain the throne of Cabul. In that event, we think that the value he is known to attach to the countenance of the British Government, would enable us to detach him from any such engagements. But if otherwise, and it were ascertained that he continued bound to Persia in a manner inconsistent with his relations to us, it would only remain for us to call the attention of Persia to her engagements in reference to Herat, and to insist upon their faithful observance.

10. It is also a probable contingency that the party now in power at Cabul, even if aided and countenanced by us, should, under the present shifting phase of Affghan affairs, in its turn pass away, and be succeeded either by Shere Ally or by some other combination of the Sirdars. We are of opinion that any such change need in no degree affect the British line of policy. Our relations should always be with the de facto ruler of the day, and so long as the de facto ruler is not unfriendly to us, we should always be prepared to renew with him the same terms and favourable conditions as obtained under his predecessor.

In this way we shall be enabled to maintain our influence in Afghanistan far more effectually than by any advance of our troops—a contingency which could only be contemplated in the last resort, which would unite as one man the Afghan tribes against us, and which would paralyze our finances.

11. Such are our views on the present state of affairs, and we are anxious to have a very early expression of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the action we propose adopting, should the contingencies we have adverted to take any definite shape.

12. The intelligence now communicated suggests the discussion of another subject, which has latterly from time to time forced itself on our attention. We allude to the present position of Russia in Central Asia. From circumstances which Russia alleges to have been to a great degree beyond her control, and to have forced upon her an aggressive policy, her advances have been rapid. And by the late victory she is reported to have achieved over Bukhara, her influence will no doubt soon, if it has not already, become paramount at Samarcand and Bukhara, as it has for some time past been in Kokand. However, some of her own statesmen assert that the true interests of Russia do not consist in the expansion of her posts and frontier among the bigoted and uncivilized population south of the Oxus, and they aver that the late advances have been prosecuted, not in fulfilment of any predetermined line of aggressive progress, but by the hostile attitude and schemes of Bukhara, and in opposition to her normal policy. If these representations be a correct exposition of the views of Russia, then it is as much in harmony with her interests as it is with those of British India, that up to a certain border the relations of the respective Governments should be openly acknowledged and admitted
as bringing them into necessary contact and treaty with the tribes and nations on the several sides of such a line. If an understanding, and even an engagement, of this nature were come to, we, on the one hand, could look on without anxiety or apprehension at the proceedings of Russia on her southern frontier, and welcome the civilizing effect of her border government on the wild tribes of the Steppe, and on the bigoted and exclusive Governments of Bukhara and Kokand. While Russia, on the other hand, assured of our loyal feeling in this matter, would have no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the Afgan and neighbouring tribes.

13. If such be the line of policy advantageous to the interests of both Empires, the time would now appear to have come when the subject might with great advantage be brought under discussion in Her Majesty's Cabinet. And, should you coincide with us in these views, we would respectfully suggest that a communication might be made in the sense of what we have now written to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

We have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. H. MANSFIELD.
H. S. MAINE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
G. U. YULE.

Postscript.—Since this letter was written a reply has been received from Teheran. A copy of Mr. Alison's message is subjoined. In spite of the protestations of the Persian authorities, we think the simple fact of the Governor of Herat having visited the Shah's camp at Meshed strong evidence that there is an understanding between the King of Persia and Ameer Shere Ally Khan. Unless it were so, the Ameer's son Sirdar Yacoob Ally Khan would scarcely have paid this visit, particularly at a moment when the Afgan force in Herat must be very weak. Accordingly, we are of opinion that some arrangement connected with Herat, which time only can develop, has probably been entered into between the two parties. A rumour is current at Cabul that Persian troops have already occupied Herat. We doubt the correctness of this rumour, and think it more likely that any assistance rendered by Persia would be in a form less direct and less calculated to attract our attention.

Our Native Agent for Cabul is still at Peshawur. The Lieutenant-Governor has been unwilling to despatch him to that Court while an early attack from Ameer Shere Ally Khan was expected. But we have this day explained to his Honour that, unless the Agent himself should anticipate danger in proceeding to Cabul, we desire that he should set out upon the journey at once. The Moonshee at Cabul has done very well. But the presence of a Puthan of good family, of considerable ability, and of tried experience, such as Khan Bubadoor Atta Muhammad Khan, would at this juncture be valuable at Cabul. He will be able to form a correct judgment of the feelings of the parties in Afghanistan, and of the probable result of the impending contest, on which points it is most important that we should possess the best information.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Copy of Message.

From Teheran. To Simla.
From Alison. To the Viceroy of India.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs says that he does not believe that the Shah demands restoration of these guns, et cetera; but he will inquire and clear up that point. Mr. Thomson does not report anything on the subject. The Shah left Meshed on the 21st ultimo. Before leaving, Yakoob Ally Khan came with presents on the part of latter and received equally valuable presents in return. Shah had sent me the assurance that, whatever representations might be made to him by Yakoob Ally Khan on the part of Shere Ally Khan, the greatest care should be taken that nothing was done by the Persian Government to transgress or encroach upon the stipulations of the Treaty regarding Afghanistan. 26th, 7-15 P.M.—27th, 0-45.
To the Right Honourable Sir Stafford Northcote, Bart., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Sir,

Fort William, 7th December 1867.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers relating to Afghanistan affairs.

2. It will be seen that Sirdar Mahomed Afzul Khan is dead, and that Sirdar Mahomed Aazam Khan, brother of the deceased, has been elected Ruler of Cabul.

3. We have made a communication to the new Ameer condoling with him on the death of his brother, and congratulating him upon his accession. Our Vakeel will proceed at once to assume his functions at the Court of Cabul.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
G. U. YULE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Service Message, dated 11th October 1867.

From Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur, reports that Afzul Khan died on 7th instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Service Message, dated 19th October 1867.

From Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Intelligence received that Mahomed Azim Khan has been formally acknowledged as Ruler of Cabul in open Durbar, not only by the chiefs and nobles generally but by his nephew Abdul Rahman Khan, who has made over his father's sword to Mahomed Azim Khan, but continues to hold the post of commander of the forces.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

Service Message, dated 22nd October 1867.

From Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Secretary to Government, Punjab.

The credentials of the Vakeel will be postponed until we hear further from Cabul.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor-General, Simla, No. 387-817, dated Murree, the 19th October 1867.

I am directed to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General in Council, and for any orders that may be deemed necessary, copies of a letter and its enclosure from the Commissioner, Peshawur, No. 83, dated 16th instant, communicating
the formal recognition of Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan as Ruler of Cabul in succession to his brother, the late Muhammad Afzal Khan; and of my reply thereto of this date, conveying the orders of the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor in regard to the despatch of our Agent, Atta Muhammad Khan, to Cabul.

Enclosure 5 in No. 11.

From Major F. R. Pollock, Commissioner, Peshawur Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 83, dated the 16th October 1867.

I have the honour to annex translation of a communication received this day from the Cabul Munshi, to effect that the defeat of the troops under Sardar Fyz Muhammad Khan, the death of that Khan, the retreat or flight of the Amir Sher Ali Khan, and the death of the Wali Muhammad Afzal Khan from dropsy, have been rapidly followed by the open and formal recognition at Cabul of Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan as Wali or Amir in his brother's place.

2. Previous accounts showed that ill-feeling between Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan and his nephew, Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan, continued to exist, and the news now reported can only be taken to mean that Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan has for a time yielded to the force of circumstances and temporised with his uncle. The previous history of the uncle and nephew render it, in my opinion, extremely unlikely either that Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan would voluntarily consent to waive his right of succession, or that Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan can succeed in consolidating his power permanently and outlive his reputation for tyranny and deceit. I beg, however, at once to solicit instructions on the subject of sending condolences to the Barakzey family on the death of their father, the Wali (Sardar Muhammad Khan), the death of that Sardar's nephew Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan at first entertained the belief that on the demise of his father, the Wali (Sardar Muhammad Afzal Khan), he would succeed to the throne, his uncle, Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, taking the second place in the conduct of affairs as Naib ; but Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, sending for his nephew and Abdool Rahim Khan (Abdool Rahman Khan's confidential servant), explained in a private audience that, in event of his (Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan's) being able to undertake the responsibilities of the Government, he (Azam) was willing to bow to his will, and reside at Candahar or Khooram, or any other place he might indicate, except Cabul, waiting on him at Cabul if sent for on emergency; and that it was with Ameer Sher Ali Khan alone that he (Azam) could not agree, and that he would always look on him (Abdool Rahman Khan) as his son, and would do nothing to injure his own family. The Sardar, owing to his isolation (tunhaee) and to the diversity of opinions at Cabul, replied that he would give way to his uncle, and consider him in the light of a parent; accordingly, to day, after the conclusion of third day's mourning for the Wali, the Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan in public Durbar made over the sword of his deceased father to Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan and tendered his allegiance to him, which was followed at once by a similar submission on the part of all the Sardars and Notables. Briefly, the Government was made over to Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, and Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan assumed formal charge of the Commander-in-Chief of the army.

Enclosure 6 in No. 11.

Translation of a Communication received from Cabul Munshi, under date the 9th October 1867.

Sardar Abdul Rahman Khan at first entertained the belief that on the demise of his father, the Wali (Sardar Muhammad Afzal Khan), he would succeed to the throne, his uncle, Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, taking the second place in the conduct of affairs as Naib; but Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, sending for his nephew and Abdool Rahim Khan (Abdool Rahman Khan's confidential servant), explained in a private audience that, in event of his (Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan's) being able to undertake the responsibilities of the Government, he (Azam) was willing to bow to his will, and reside at Candahar or Khooram, or any other place he might indicate, except Cabul, waiting on him at Cabul if sent for on emergency; and that it was with Ameer Sher Ali Khan alone that he (Azam) could not agree, and that he would always look on him (Abdool Rahman Khan) as his son, and would do nothing to injure his own family. The Sardar, owing to his isolation (tunhaee) and to the diversity of opinions at Cabul, replied that he would give way to his uncle, and consider him in the light of a parent; accordingly, today, after the conclusion of third day's mourning for the Wali, the Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan in public Durbar made over the sword of his deceased father to Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan and tendered his allegiance to him, which was followed at once by a similar submission on the part of all the Sardars and Notables. Briefly, the Government was made over to Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, and Sardar Abdool Rahman Khan assumed formal charge of the Commander-in-Chief of the army.
Enclosure 7 in No. 11.
From T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to Major F. R. Pollock, Commissioner, Peshawur Division, No. , dated the 19th October 1867.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 83, dated 16th instant, relative to the formal recognition of Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan as Ruler of Cabul in succession to his brother; and, in reply, to state that, in the event of your receiving in time the expected letters from the Cabul Ruler indicative of a desire to maintain intimate relations with the British Government, you should regard this as sufficient authority for carrying out at once the orders for the despatch of our Agent, communicated in letter of the Supreme Government, No. 1028, dated 11th instant, without waiting for a special reply as to the wishes of the Ruler on this point, which was prescribed on the supposition that his real wishes might be still uncertain.

2. The tenor of the instructions to be given to the Agent have already been communicated to you; and the credentials promised by the Supreme Government will be forwarded hereafter, when they should be despatched so as, if possible, to overtake him. In the meantime, he should be introduced by a letter from yourself to the address of the Amir, remarking, with reference to the latter's expected letter to your address, that it is hoped the presence of our Agent at Cabul will be regarded as evidence that the British Government is desirous, as it has ever been, of maintaining intimate relations of friendship with the accepted ruler of that territory, and promising to forward replies to his other letters when received.

Enclosure 8 in No. 11.
Khureeta to the Address of His Highness Ameer Mahomed Aazum Khan, Walee of Cabul and Candahar, dated the 13th November 1867.

I have received from my news-writer at Cabul intimation of the sickness and death of your Highness' brother, the late Ameer Mahomed Afzul Khan, and of your Highness having succeeded to the Ameership.

My friend! I offer to you my sincere condolence on the distress which has been occasioned to your Highness' illustrious family from this painful event.

At the same time it has given me much satisfaction to learn that, with the consent of the son of the late Ameer, Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan, and the approval of the chiefs and people of the country, you have been installed as the successor of your late brother.

And, my friend! it is my earnest hope that this auspicious event may tend towards the consolidation and prosperity of the kingdom.

(Signed) John Lawrence.

No. 12.
Copy.
Secret, No. 15.

To the Right Honourable the Governor General of India. (Extract.)

India Office, London,
26th December 1867.

1. Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the important political questions to which your Excellency has lately directed their attention in various letters.

2. These questions relate, firstly, to the position of affairs in Afghanistan, and the course to be pursued towards the ruler of that country by your Excellency's Government; and, secondly, to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and the diplomatic action which might advantageously be taken with respect to it by Her Majesty's Government in Europe.

3. Although these questions are to some extent interlaced with and dependent upon each other, it is desirable that they should be separately treated.
4. With respect to the first question, Her Majesty's Government observe that, on the death of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, his son Shere Ali Khan, who had been nominated heir-apparent, was recognised by the British Viceroy of the day, as the de facto Ruler of Afghanistan. The Treaty rights to which the Sirdar thus succeeded were those which resulted from the engagements contracted between the British Government in India and Ameer Dost Mahomed, when your Excellency as Chief Commissioner of the Punjab in 1855, met the Sirdar Hyder Khan at Peshawur. But there was nothing in this Treaty rendering it incumbent on the British Government to support the pretensions of Shere Ali Khan, or of any other chief, if, in the progress of events, it might appear that his policy was not such as to promote the interests of the Afghan nation by securing the internal tranquillity and independence of the country and the preservation of the peace of the frontier.

5. There has, therefore, been no breach of faith in the decision adopted by your Excellency to recognise the late Sirdar Mahomed Aftzul Khan as de facto Ruler of Cabul, when the course of events in Afghanistan placed him in that position; nor can there be any impropriety in your equally acknowledging his son and successor Abdul Rahman Khan, if it appear that he is the chief preferred by the nation.

6. It is the desire of Her Majesty's Government not to interfere in the internal conflicts of the Afghans, so long as they do not jeopardize the peace of the frontier, or lead to the formation of engagements with other powers dangerous to the independence of Afghanistan, which it long has been and still is the main object of our policy in that part of the world to maintain. If, however, your Excellency should see reason to believe that either party in the State is endeavouring to strengthen itself against the national feeling by invoking foreign aid, and especially if you should observe any disposition to make territorial sacrifices, or otherwise to compromise the integrity of Afghanistan for the sake of obtaining such aid, it is quite right that you should warn those who may evince such an inclination that by such a course they may compel the British Government to give material support to their rivals.

7. I learn from the despatch under reply that your Excellency has already given such a warning to Shere Ali Khan, and I approve of your proposal, should you ascertain that this Chief has entered into any compact with Persia involving the interference of that power in Afghan affairs, to give support in the form of a subsidy or of a supply of arms to the de facto Ruler of Cabul, declaring at the same time that the Treaty with Shere Ali Khan is at an end.

8. Her Majesty's Government, however, cannot anticipate that the Persian Government will enter upon a course of policy distinctly renounced in the Treaty of Paris, and they take for granted that even if Shere Ali Khan should have made overtures of the character you describe they will have been declined by the Government of the Shah.

9. Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with your Excellency in the opinion that if any aid at all is given to the Ruler of Cabul, it should be in the form of a subsidy or of a grant of arms, and not by any advance of our troops. Such an advance would in all probability give occasion for grave misapprehensions as to our intentions, and might lead to serious complications.

10. Having thus conveyed to your Excellency the general views of Her Majesty's Government, I have only to add that they place the most implicit confidence in your prudence, and in your intimate acquaintance with the political condition of Afghanistan, and feel assured that they may safely leave it to your discretion to act as you may think right upon any emergency that may arise.

11. I now proceed to the second question, to which your Excellency refers, namely, whether it is desirable to make any communication to the Government of Russia, in order to obviate any possible inconvenience that might be apprehended from the progress of that power in Central Asia.

12. Upon this point Her Majesty's Government see no reason for any uneasiness or for any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has made, and apparently is still making in Central Asia, appear to them to be the natural result of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly communications have at various times passed between the two Governments on the subject, and should an opportunity offer Her Majesty's Government will avail themselves of it for the purpose of obviating any possible danger of misunderstanding either with respect to the
proceedings of Russia, or to those of England. This is all that it appears necessary or desirable to do.

(Signed) S. H. NORTHCOTE.

No. 12A.
No. 29 of 1868.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Political.

TO HER MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.

SIR,

Fort William, the 14th February 1868.

With reference to suggestions made by our late colleague, Sir George Yule, for the purpose of improving our position in respect of the Cabul Government and the Afghan tribes on the border, a memorandum on the subject has been, under our instructions, prepared by Mr. T. H. Thornton, Secretary to the Punjab Government, and this we have now the honour of submitting for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
G. N. TAYLOR.
W. N. MASSEY.
H. M. DURAND.
W. MUIR.
H. S. MAINE.

Enclosure in No. 12A.

MEMORANDUM, dated 18th November 1867.

The design of the present memorandum is to describe the measures taken since the annexation of the Punjab for promoting the growth of friendly relations between the British Government and the Afghan nation generally, and in particular the Patan tribes of the north-west frontier; to state the result of those measures; and to indicate the measures in contemplation for giving further encouragement to friendly intercourse between the people of Afghanistan and the Punjab.

2. To enable the reader to form a fair estimate of the measure of success which has been achieved, it is necessary, in the first instance, to describe briefly the number and character of the tribes referred to, and their relations with the Government of the Punjab previous to annexation.

3. The Patan tribes immediately adjacent to the Punjab frontier are the following:—

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<th>Adjoining frontier of Hazara District.</th>
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<td>Hassanzais.</td>
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<td>Juduns.</td>
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<td>Bonairwals.</td>
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<td>Swatis.</td>
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<td>Ranizais.</td>
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<td>Osmankheylis.</td>
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<td>Upper Momands.</td>
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<th>Adjoining frontier of Peshawur District.</th>
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<th>Adjoining frontier of Peshawur and Kohat Districts.</th>
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<td>Adjoining frontier of Kohat District.</td>
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<td>Adjoining frontier of Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan Districts.</td>
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<td>Adjoining frontier of Dera Ismail Khan District.</td>
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<td>Adjoining frontier of Dera Ghazee Khan District.</td>
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4. Their character is graphically portrayed in the following extracts from Mr. Temple's Report on the independent tribes of the north-west frontier:—

"Now these tribes are savages, noble savages perhaps, and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to government or civil institutions; they have for the most part no education; they have nominally a religion, but Mahomedanism, as understood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the credos of the wildest races on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword for all infidels, that is, for all people not Mahomedans. They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests (Mullas) are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the plain. The hill-men are sensitive in regard to their women, but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very prejudicial to social advancement. At the same time they are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Patan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements; it would never occur to their minds that an oath on the Koran was binding if against their interests. It must be added that they are fierce and blood-thirsty. They are never without weapons: when grazing their cattle, when driving beasts of burden, when tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetually at war with each other. Each tribe, and section of a tribe, has its internecine wars, every family its hereditary blood-feuds, and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Each person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. Reckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. Men of the same party will stand by one another in danger. To their minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer, he may be robbed or killed. They are charitable to the indigent of their own tribe; they possess the pride of birth, and regard ancestral associations. They are not averse to civilization whenever they have felt its benefits; they are fond of trading, and also of cultivating; but they are too fickle and excitable to be industrious in agriculture or anything else. They will take military service, and, though impatient of discipline, will prove faithful, unless excited by fanaticism. Such, briefly, is their character, replete with the unaccountable inconsistencies, with that mixture of opposite vices and virtues, belonging to savages."

5. To establish enduring relations of peace and amity with tribes so bigoted, so fickle, and so treacherous, is in any case a matter of the greatest difficulty; but the difficulty is enhanced in the case of Patan tribes by two notable characteristics, viz., their essentially republican constitutions and everlasting factions. In dealing with such tribes the Government has to deal, not with a single recognized Chief or a united clan, but with a house divided against itself. Friendship with one section of the tribe is apt to be enmity with another; and treaties ratified one day are repudiated the next.
Nothing seems to unite them but a common danger, and a common jealousy of the intrusion of strangers into their tribes.

6. The policy pursued by the Sikh Rulers towards these tribes was not such as to encourage friendly intercourse. When occupying a frontier district they would build a small fort somewhere in the centre of the tract, and then leave the whole country to the mercy of the border tribes, who were permitted to carry on their petty feuds with impunity so long as they wrought no material injury against the Government. A heavy revenue was demanded from independent tribesmen holding lands within the Sikh border, and obnoxious cesses, such as the capitation tax of the Bunnu District, were levied from those who might visit the markets of the plains.

7. As for trade and communications, there was not a road worthy of the name, and the whole country wasthreaded with a net-work of preventive lines, and these lines were dotted with innumerable posts for the collection of every kind of tax, direct and indirect. No article of home or foreign manufacture could traverse the kingdom in its length or breadth, nor could enter any large market, without paying the duty a dozen times over. Trade with Cabul through the Peshawur passes was reduced to the lowest ebb, while the caravans which travelled from Ghuzni were forced to follow the most difficult and circuitous routes.

8. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the relations of these tribes and the Sikh Government were not of a friendly character; they were, in fact, those of deadly hostility. On the north the Yusufzais and Khataks never abated a determined resistance to Sikh authority; in so much so that General Avitabile, the Governor of Peshawur, dared not leave his capital except accompanied with a large force. On the west the Wazir border was rife with raids and forays, fortified villages were beleaguered, and pitched fights took place with considerable loss of life. Further south the Sheorans were the terror of the border. They would carry off not only cattle, but men and women; they once sacked the town of Drabund, though defended by a small Sikh garrison, and for miles the border was laid waste by their depredations, or deserted for fear of their attacks.

9. Such, briefly, was the state of affairs on the border previous to the annexation of the Punjab. I proceed to describe the progress and results of British Administration.

10. One of the first acts of the British Government was to abolish all customs duties, and render the trade with Cabul and the frontier altogether free; it discontinued the capitation tax; reduced the land tax upon holdings of independent tribes in British territory, and at the same time confirmed whatever fiefs they may have held from former Rulers; and while it organized a strong military force for the defence and pacification of the frontier, it issued standing instructions to its administrative officers to cultivate friendly relations with the frontier tribes; to receive their "Jeergahs," or deputations of elders, with consideration, and entertain them hospitably; in the event of hostilities, to act, in the first instance, purely on the defensive, and to strive to conciliate and reason into submission before resort to coercive measures. Such has been the policy continuously pursued, and up to the present day much of a frontier officer's time is taken up in interviews with the representatives of border tribes, in patiently hearing their representations and endeavouring to adjust their differences; and some thousands of rupees are spent annually in showing them consideration and hospitality.

11. The Government has further freely admitted men of Afghanistan and the border into the ranks of the public service, whether military, police, or civil.

12. It has established all along the border charitable dispensaries open free of charge to men of all nationalities and all creeds, where men of frontier tribes are not only treated, but fed, at the public expense. One of these dispensaries is at Abbottabad, in the Huzara Hills, another at the old Sikh Cantonment of Hurripore, another at Murdan in the Yusufzai country, another at Peshawur, another at Kohat, with branches at Hungu and Tir, another at Bunnu, with a branch at Lakki, in the Esakheyl District, another at Dera Ismail Khan, with a branch at Kolachi on the extreme western frontier of the Punjab. Fully
one-tenth of those who receive medical aid at these dispensaries are members of independent frontier tribes. At Dera Ismail Khan in 1863, of 11,309 persons receiving medical aid, 1,423 were Patans from beyond the border, chiefly Povindals from Ghuzni; at Murdan considerable numbers of patients, both in-door and out-door, come from Bonair, Swat, Bajawar, Kunar, and Kashkar, and not a few from Cabul and from Ghuzni. "A member of a frontier tribe," wrote the Inspector General of Dispensaries in 1863, "will in a case of sickness depute a messenger to travel on foot scores of miles in order to obtain medicines or advice. In surgical cases requiring an operation they place the most implicit faith in the skill of the English operator, and submit themselves to the knife with perfect confidence."

13. With a view of still further popularising these institutions, arrangements have been made for affording a medical education to students speaking Pashtu, the language of the Afghans, and five young Patans are now pursuing their studies in the Lahore Medical School; their expenses to and from their homes are defrayed, and they are allowed a liberal stipend during their stay at Lahore.

14. A Pashtu primer and vocabulary, for the use of village schools, has been published by the Educational Department; and encouragement has been given to the study of Pashtu by English officers, both civil and military, by institution of a reward of Rupees 500 for all who can pass a satisfactory examination in that language; and copies of Dr. Bell's new Pashtu grammar and dictionary have recently been distributed to every regiment and every district officer on the north-western frontier.

15. It remains to notice the efforts which have been made to improve and facilitate communications by land and water.

I have not yet succeeded in obtaining from the Public Works Department a detail of imperial works, but the following improvements to communications have been made from local funds in the frontier districts within the last five years:—

In Peshawur new roads have been made from Peshawur to Haripore via Pehoa Ferry and Murdan; from Jehangirree on the Cabul River to Kotah in Yusufzai; from Murdan to Loondkhor and up the Loondkhor Valley; from Peshawur Cantonment to Boorj Hurree Sing. A bridge of boats has been erected over the Cabul River at Nowshera, to facilitate the salt traffic of the Khuttak Hills and the countries beyond the border. The roads to Kohat and to Michin and Doaba have been improved, and the Nisutta and Jullozye roads have been bridged. A house has also been purchased at Peshawur for the accommodation of vaecels and foreigners of distinction.

In Hazara new roads have been made from Abbottabad to Murree, opening up the Kurram country; from Murdan to Torbela; from Gurhee on the Nainsookh to Bukkote on the Jhelum; and from Kirpran to Torbela; while the road to Kaghan has been improved.

In Kohat and Bunnur the roads from Bunnur to Khooshalgurh and the roads from frontier posts have been raised and bridged, and serais built at Goombela, Peyzoo, Lukkee, Esaukheyel, Guzneekheyel, Kalabagh, and Nikkee. The timber trade by the Koorum River has been opened.

In Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazee Khan, also, various frontier roads with serais and rest-houses have been constructed, of which a detail appears unnecessary.

16. Weekly steam communication has long been established between Kotree, the Indus terminus of the Sinde Railway, and Multan, and for the last four years the steamers of the Punjab Government Steam Flotilla have been running on the Upper Indus between Sukkur and Makkudri, whence there is water communication as far as Attok on the Indus, and up the Cabul River as far as Pubbeh within 14 miles of Peshawur. The steamers of the flotilla are at present three in number, the Jhelum, the Chenah, and the Byjas. Of these, the two former belonged to the late Government Flotilla of the Lower Indus, and are of too great a draught to ply successfully on the shallow waters of the Upper Indus. The Byjas is a new vessel, built at Liverpool expressly for her present service. She is constructed on the stern-wheel principle, draws only two feet laden, most of her cargo being carried in flats. She has already proved herself the fastest vessel in the service, and with a few alterations will be all that can be desired. A new steamer on the same principle, but with improvements suggested by experience, is, it is believed, under construction, and will be shortly added to the flotilla. Meanwhile, the Indus pilots are daily improving in their knowledge of the river, and the average duration of each voyage has been considerably reduced. The earnings of the flotilla (which aggregate Rupees 50,000 per annum) do not, as yet, suffice to cover much more than
one-fourth of the expenditure; but this is to be expected at first, as the experience of the Ganges and other rivers shows that it takes some years before native shippers take confidence and trade is diverted into new routes; but the amount realised each voyage is steadily increasing, and now averages some Rupees 5,000 per voyage; and last year for the first time Povindah merchants from Ghuzni availed themselves of the flotilla for the conveyance of their goops. Meanwhile efforts are being made to improve the navigation; a River Conservator has been appointed; snags have been removed; rocks destroyed by blasting; navigable channels widened and deepened; and improvements effected in the towing paths from Mukkudd to Attok. In short, there is every prospect that, if tolerably regular steam communication is kept up between Sukkur and Mukkudd, the trade will largely increase.

17. The above sketch of the measures taken to improve our relations and develop commercial intercourse with the countries beyond the border, though far more meagre than could be wished, will suffice, I trust, to show that the assumption that “we have “done nothing to improve our position with the Afghans” is destitute of foundation.

18. But, it may be asked, are there any tangible results of the policy and measures taken? Are our Afghans neighbours more amicably disposed or less hostile than before? Has trade been developed? Has our influence increased?

19. To all these questions a reply may at once be given in the affirmative. We have not yet succeeded in making the leopard change his spots. The Pathan in his native hills is still bigoted, fickle, and treacherous, but the constant and deadly hate of the days of Sikh rule is a thing of the past. Raids, which once were chronic, are now exceptional; tracts under the hills which a few years back were a wilderness are now a broad sheet of cultivation, which is rapidly extending, not only in the richer and more civilised parts of our frontier districts, but in its most distant and rugged corners, and even to glens and passes beyond our own immediate frontier; numbers of frontier clans pray for our protection, and for permission to settle in our territories; the people of Upper Meranzai have voluntarily become our subjects; the people of Dour have more than once sought to be transferred to British rule; and within the last two years sections of the Waziri tribe, the most warlike and most predatory of the frontier tribes, have agreed to settle down as peaceful cultivators on the Tank border, and the Bithunus, a robber clan, are quietly cultivating lands in Bunnu as subjects of the British Government; disputes are voluntarily referred by contending factions of independent tribes for the arbitration of British officers; and service in our armies and militia is eagerly sought after. The trade through the Peshawur passes, which at annexation was at its lowest ebb, is steadily increasing; in 1882 it was valued at 277,156L for the year; during the months of June, July, August, and September of the past year (the latest period for which I have returns) trade between Cabul and Peshawur alone was valued at rupees 1,90,000. The proceeds of the tolls on the Attok bridge in 1866–67 was rupees 11,110 and the tolls on all the ferries on the Indus have risen from rupees 4,062 in 1857 to rupees 19,842 in 1859–60, and Rupees 24,736 in 1866–67. The tonnage on the Upper Indus has increased from 818 boats, with cargoes aggregating 265,000 maunds in 1855 (the earliest period for which statistics are available) to 3,153 boats, with cargoes aggregating 1,190,129 maunds, valued at Rupees 66,20,838, in 1865–66.

20. Lastly, of the increasing influence of British prestige beyond the border we have a signal instance in the recent capture of Koura Khan, the Kusrani Chief (the captor of Lieutenant Grey), who was pursued, caught, and delivered up to justice, not by force of arms or of blockade, but by the united action of independent frontier tribes, set on foot at the bidding of a British officer.

21. It remains to notice briefly the further measures in contemplation for carrying out the policy which has been described above, i.e., the policy of promoting, as far as practicable, friendly intercourse between the Afghan nation and ourselves. In the first place, it is believed that the establishment of Pushtu Schools in the interior of frontier districts will in time do much towards civilizing the lawless inhabitants of those parts, and through them their independent neighbours on the border; and measures are being
taken to establish at Peshawur and Dera Ismail Khan mercantile fairs, such as that which has recently been successfully started at Palumpore in the Kangra Valley.

(Signed) T. H. THORNTON,
Secretary to Government, Punjab.

No. 12b.

MEMORANDUM ON THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.* (Extract.)

When Russia began to recover from the torpor and exhaustion consequent on the Crimean War, her first care was to repair and strengthen her position in Asia. She had suffered a grievous blow in Europe, but she had escaped a still greater calamity in Asia, where, if a British force had been employed instead of a Turkish, and means had been taken to utilize the co-operation of the Circassians, she might have lost all her Trans-Caucasian provinces. To obviate the possible recurrence of such a danger required her immediate attention; and as the Treaty of Paris had left the Circassians exposed to the full burst of her hostility, 150,000 soldiers were accordingly soon arrayed in line against them. In 1859, Gournal, the stronghold of the mountaineers, was stormed, and Shamyl was taken prisoner. Success followed on success, till the disheartened Circassians, preferring expatriation to submission, abandoned their native mountains, and sought a refuge in the Turkish territory.

The importance of this extinction of Circassian nationality was certainly not recognized at the time; it has hardly perhaps been recognized at the present day, yet it was the turning point of Russian empire in the East. So long as the mountaineers resisted, they formed an effective barrier to the tide of onward conquest. When they were once swept away, there was no military or physical obstacle to the continuous march of Russia from the Araxes to the Indus.

The termination of the Circassian difficulty was immediately followed by renewed activity to the eastward. Whether, when Russia began to feel her way across the steppe in 1847-8, and to erect fortresses on the Irghiz and Turgai rivers, she was merely obeying a natural law of increase, or whether she was deliberately resuming an old traditional scheme of territorial conquest, is really a matter of very little moment. One thing alone is manifest,—and must always have been manifest to so astute a power,—that her advance from Orenburg to the Jaxartes, the transfer of her frontier from the northern to the southern limit of the steppe, was a certain prelude to bitter and interminable war. As long as the Kirghiz steppe, which is a zone of almost uninhabited desert, stretching 2,000 miles from west to east, and nearly 1,000 miles from north to south, intervened as a "buffer" between the military colonies of the Orenburg and Siberian lines and the swarming centres of Mahommadedan population beyond the Aral, so long peace was possible in Central Asia; but when once the "debateable ground" was passed, and Russian garrisons jostled against Uzbeg posts upon the Jaxartes, there was no longer a possibility of quietude or amicable relations. So no sooner was one portion of Uzbeg territory annexed than the Russian outposts came in collision with the tribes beyond. One extension begot another, with the unerring certainty of a law of nature.

Between 1853, and 1863, notwithstanding the interference of the Crimean war, Russia gradually worked her way from the Sea of Aral through the saline marshes of the lower Jaxartes, to the confines of the alluvial valley above the desert; but she did not, during these years, attempt the actual invasion of Kokand; it was only at the latter period, when her hands were freed by the pacification of the Caucasus, that she entered on a death struggle with the Uzbegs. Advancing into the rich and populous districts shut in between the river and the northern mountains, she took in rapid succession the great cities of Turkistan, Chemkend, Tashkend, and Khojend; not, perhaps, in accordance with any definite plan of aggrandisement, but, rather, as she herself asserted, from the actual necessity of the case. An attempt, indeed, was made, and apparently in good faith, after the occupation of Chemkend, to arrest the tide of conquest. Negotiations were set on foot for a delimitation of frontier, and a manifesto was published by Prince Gorchakov in November 1864, proclaiming that the late territorial acquisitions had been brought about by "imperious necessity" and against the wish of the Government, and asserting, with categorical precision, that the expansion of the empire had now reached its limit. But, as has been well said, the ink was hardly dry with which this manifesto was written, before its pacific promises were completely stultified. Hostilities indeed were resumed upon the Jaxartes early in 1865, and they have been continued ever since

* Sent to the Government of India, by order of the Secretary of State, in a letter from the Political Secretary, dated 21st August 1868.
with little intermission, and, as might have been expected, to the uniform advantage of Russia. Various pretexts have been alleged for so flagrant a departure from Prince Gortchakov's manifesto. In the first instance, the Bokharians, with whose outposts the Russians came in contact after the capture of Chemkend, are said to have challenged the invaders, and to have forced on a battle, in conjunction with the Kokandis, in the vicinity of Tashkend, which led to the capture of that city. The detention of certain Russian officers in Bokhara, where they had been sent to negotiate, brought on a renewal of hostilities in 1866. In this campaign, conducted by General Romanofski, the town of Khojend was taken, and the power of Kokand was completely crushed, one half of the territory being incorporated in the new Russian province of Turkistan, while the other half was left to be administered by a native Chief (Khudayyar Khan), pending good behaviour and almost as a Russian feudatory.

The next step in advance was the direct invasion of the Bokhara territory in 1867. General Romanofski's avowed object being to establish a "tête-de-pont" beyond the desert country skirting the Jaxartes, which should immediately threaten Samarcand and Bokhara, and should thus, as it was supposed, protect the frontier. But if Romanofski's aim had been to exasperate rather than to conciliate, he could not have devised a more effective expedient than this establishment of a fortified post at Jezzak, almost within hail of Samarcand; bearding the Amir, as it were, in the high place of his power, encouraging the malcontents throughout the province, and holding out a standing menace of invasion. That the Uzbek Chief, indeed, under such circumstances should command, indeed, could allow a force of 40,000 men to be concentrated within an easy distance of his position without taking measures for opposing it, and General Kaufman no doubt, when the crisis arrived, acted judiciously in assuming the offensive instead of waiting to be attacked; but to attribute the war, as has been done in the Russian official papers, to the bad faith of the Amir, is simply to confound cause and effect.

Another point of some importance to the true appreciation of the Central Asian question is the relation which exists between the local commanders and the central Government at St. Petersburgh. Russia has always attributed to her military chiefs a degree of power in influencing the national policy which in this country we find it difficult to realize. She used to explain the slow progress that was made in subjugating the Caucasus by pointing to the self-interest of the army, which forbade the premature closing of so fertile a source of promotion and honours. The same antagonism of feeling between the Civil and Military authorities is said to have existed in Turkestan from the first outbreak of hostilities. General Tchernaief, the captor of Tashkend, was recalled from his command, avowedly in consequence of the aggressive character of his policy; and, a few years later, his successor, Romanofski, was deprived of all military rank for the similar offence of having invaded the Bokhara territory against orders. General Kaufman, too, is likely to be publicly rebuked for his recent brilliant success. But, are these marks of the Emperor's displeasure real, or are they intended merely to satisfy the clamours of a peace party in Russia, and to anticipate foreign complaint? It is well known that Tchernaief, notwithstanding his apparent disgrace, received a diamond-hilted sword from the Emperor, as the conqueror of Tashkend, and Romanofski is understood to be about to be restored to his full rank and honours. General Kaufman, also, is pretty sure to be rewarded for his military achievements, at the same time that he is reprimanded for his undue political activity; the result of this double action being that, while Russia maintains,—or, at any rate, claims to maintain,—her character for moderation and unselfish views, and while she also respects the feelings of those politicians who honestly believe her territorial extension to be a source of weakness rather than of strength, her progress, nevertheless, is as constant and uniform as if she were really the grasping and unscrupulous power which her enemies represent her to be.

The latest intelligence received from Central Asia confirms the announcement of General Kaufman's occupation both of Samarcand and Bokhara, and foreshadows, as the inevitable fate of the Government of the Amir, that gradual absorption into the Russian Empire which, in spite of disclaimers,—in spite, perhaps, of real disinclination,—has already been carried out to its full accomplishment in regard to the greater portion of the territory of Kokand. In fact, whatever may be the policy for the moment of the Court of St. Petersburgh, it is the "manifest destiny" of Russia to absorb
the Uzbeg States. Her present position is another illustration of the old doctrine that, when civilization and barbarism come in contact, the latter must inevitably give way. She has advanced to a point from which retreat is impossible; and thus, whether the final consummation occur this year, or next year, or five years hence, or even 10 years hence,—come it soon or come it late,—we may take it for granted that nothing can prevent the extinction of the three independent Governments of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, and the consequent extension of the Russian frontier to the Oxus.

The question then arises, how will this new distribution of power in Central Asia affect our interests in India? Will it strengthen us or weaken us? Is it, in fact, to be encouraged or deprecated? A large portion of the thinking public, including the optimist class of Anglo-Indian politicians to a man, will declare in favour of the Russian advance. On general grounds, they hold that the substitution of order and civilization, and a Christian Government, for the ignorance, the cruelty, the anarchy of the fanatical Uzbegs must be advantageous; and they further point to the impetus that would be given to trade by an increased security and facility of communication, as well as by the increased wants of a settled and improving community. But, in such a view of the case sufficient weight seems hardly to be given to special political considerations. Public opinion in Russia, with a truer instinct, has declared itself in a different sense. It is, indeed, well worthy of notice that, whilst the Press in this country, with a few exceptions, has expressed satisfaction at the Russian progress in Central Asia, and has encouraged her to continue in the same course, the Russian Press has decided, with an equal unanimity, that such an advance must be distasteful, if not dangerous, to us, and has accordingly been speculating on the steps that we are likely to take in order to arrest the movement, or, at any rate, to neutralize its effects.

It is not worth while, perhaps, to quote articles from the Russian papers, as they may be supposed merely to represent the views of a party, but the letters of M. Grigorieff, the late Governor of Western Siberia, who has been personally and practically connected with the Eastern question for the last 20 years, are a more serious authority, and may be regarded, indeed, almost as an official exposition of the sentiments and policy of the Government. The following extracts, therefore, from these letters, which were published in the "Moscow Gazette" of last year, may be read with interest.

"England is the only country that can assist the Bokharians in a war with Russia. It is, therefore, very probable that the Amir, preferring a remote to an impending danger, will apply for co-operation against us to the British Government in India. According, indeed, to our most recent intelligence, envoys have been actually sent to Calcutta with solicitations for money, guns, artillerymen, and even troops, offering in return the most sincere attachment to British interests, an acknowledgment of an English protectorate over Bokhara, and, in fact, anything else that may be thought desirable. Such a line of action on the part of Bokhara may affect our relations with England; for the English, being thus applied to, and having a real interest in the independence of Bokhara, will hardly refrain from interfering between us and that country, if not materially, at any rate diplomatically. But, however probable that interference may be, it is no less probable that any diplomatic action of England in favour of Bokhara would meet with the same fate which some years ago befell their intervention in favour of the Polish insurgents. If they charged us with aggression on Bokhara, we could retort on them with a reference to their own conduct in India; we could read them a lesson in this respect that would be exceedingly bitter to them; and happily, too, the time has passed when we regarded diplomatic notes with the same terror as we regarded the approach of the cholera, and when we were prepared to sacrifice the material interests of the empire rather than be subjected to them. Our Foreign Office is now sufficiently 'fire-proof' in this respect; it is accustomed to hostile remonstrances from European Governments, and will be well able to answer any fresh attempt of such a nature with becoming dignity.

"Or it is possible that England may content herself with affording underhand assistance to the Bokharians in arms and money. Against this we cannot guard, and it is useless therefore to discuss the question; but we may remind the English that exciting or fostering revolt is a game that two can play at, and that if underhand assistance should be rendered to the dissatisfied Bokharians, we might retaliate by applying the same disturbing agency to various weak points upon the Indian frontier. Such a mode of conflict would be possible, but would be advantageous to neither one party nor the other. It would involve a large expenditure, would be derogatory
to the dignity of two great nations, and would, after all, lead to very poor results; for by no such means could the Uzbegs be enabled to cope with the Russians, nor the Indians to cope with the English."

"It is hardly to be expected that England will assist Bokhara with troops, not that there is any physical obstacles to prevent this, for the road from Peshawer to the valley of the Oxus has been found to be practicable not only for light forces, but even for heavy artillery; but the route lies through the yet independent country of Cabul, and the Afghans would never permit the march of a foreign army through their territory. And the English, moreover, have not yet forgotten the terrible lesson of 1842. They will think seven times, therefore, before venturing on such a step, and risking its consequences."

"But that Bokhara, furnished with moral support and encouragement from the south, may endeavour to stir up a general and combined Mahommedan movement against us, is more than probable. Khiva and Kokand may be expected, under certain circumstances, to unite their forces with her; but this will only lead to the more speedy destruction of the whole three provinces. In every contest, a portion of the Uzbeg territory will be lost, until their independence is entirely gone, and they are ultimately swallowed up in the Russian empire."

Now, these extracts are of value not only because they show the impression which prevails in Russia, that we shall regard her advance as a hostile movement, but because they also indicate the precise danger with which that advance is threatened. M. Grigorief no doubt gives us credit for too much sensitiveness, in supposing that we shall either resort to an unavailing diplomatic protest, or that we shall assist the Uzbegs by force of arms in resisting their invaders; but, at the same time, he really suggests a serious matter for our reflection, in hinting at the possibility of an Uzbeg defensive league; more especially as the continued restlessness of Russia may be expected to incline the neighbouring independent States in favour of such a league, and as the three Uzbeg principalities, supported on one side by Yakub Kish-begi, of Kashgar, whose power is daily on the increase, and on the other side by Persia, and backed by the Afghans, whose relations with Bokhara have long been of the most intimate character, would present a truly formidable—and, whilst maintained, an unassailable—confederacy.

Before we can form any sound opinion, however, as to the advisability of promoting such a confederacy, or adopting any other precautions, we must be satisfied as to the present and proximate position of Russia in Central Asia, and to this point accordingly an inquiry will be now directed.

Russia has proceeded throughout this Central Asian movement with the utmost caution and temper. Although steadfastly making progress year by year,—whether from accident or design is immaterial,—she has never placed her foot beyond that point from which she could, if required, conveniently withdraw it. A demonstration has been sometimes made in advance, as on the occasion of General Tcherniieff's invasion of the Bokhara territory in February 1866, but permanent occupation has only resulted from slow and careful arrangement. Russia has always had her reserves in readiness, and has not only secured her communications with her base, but has also looked to her lateral supports, so as to combine the whole forward movement in one harmonious operation. It thus happened that nearly a year elapsed between the capture of Tashkend and the attack upon Khojend, the interval being occupied in establishing communication between the new settlements in Turkestan and the old colonies of Fort Vernoe and Kopal, near the Mongolian frontier to the eastward; and, in the same way, now that Samarcand and Bokhara have been occupied, we may be sure that Russia's first care will be to strengthen and support that occupation by opening out lines of communication to the west. General Romanofski, indeed, the conqueror of Khojend, who was removed from his command last year, in consequence, as it was said, of his aggressive tendencies, and who is supposed to have been immersed ever since in the drudgery of a notary-public's office at Moscow, has just brought out a pamphlet on the Central Asian question, which has made a most profound impression in military and political circles at St. Petersburg. In this "brochure" he points out the brilliant future that is opening to the enterprise of Russia, settled as she now is on the Oxus and Jaxartes, in the very "garden of Asia," provided that no administrative or strategic errors are committed, and he suggests various measures for improving and strengthening the position.
The point, however, on which he mainly insists, as the pivot on which the whole question turns, is the immediate establishment of direct communication between the Caucasus and Turkestan, by which means the latter Government, instead of remaining as an outlying and unimportant dependency, would become an integral portion of the empire, and through which also the military resources accumulated in the western province, and now no longer required there, might be utilized by being transferred to the Oxus and Jaxartes. Romanofski suggests three different routes for this line of communication, the object of which would be to connect the Caspian with the Aral. The southern line would leave the Caspian in Krasnovodsk Bay, and would follow up the old bed of the Oxus, in which water is always found, to the present embouchure of that river in the Aral. This line would be the easiest of all in respect to the physical character of the country, but before it would become a safe route for traffic Khiva must be absorbed into the empire, and the Turcoman tribes must be brought under subjection. The northern line would be drawn from the mouth of the Emba at the north-east corner of the Caspian, and would circle round the north of the Aral to Kazala on the Jaxartes. It would present no natural difficulties, but the route would be long and circuitous, and a considerable outlay would be required in providing water along the skirts of the Kara-küm desert. According to Romanofski's view, by far the most eligible route would be a middle line which would cross the 'Ust-'Urt waste between the Caspian and the Aral at its narrowest point, from Mertvi-kultuk Bay on the one sea to Chernishchev Bay on the other. The distance across this neck of land scarcely exceeds 200 miles, and it has long been in the contemplation of the Russian Government to carry out a plan, suggested in the first instance and recommended by Prince Bariatinski, of laying down a line of rails over this interval. Were the waterless waste of the 'Ust-'Urt to be thus bridged over by a railroad, the military position of the Russians in Turkestan would be entirely altered. At present, as Romanofski remarks, it requires nearly two years to move troops and stores from the Volga across the Khirghiz steppes to the advanced posts beyond the Bokhara frontier, whereas with steamers on the Caspian and the Aral, a railroad connecting the two seas, and boats of light draught navigating the Oxus and Jaxartes, a few weeks would suffice for the transport of a force from the over-crowded camps of the Caucasus into the heart of Asia, the one river being practicable for steamers as high as Khajend, and the other to the neighbourhood of Balkh.

Now this is certainly no visionary scheme. On the contrary, so practical is it considered to be, that it is thought likely at St. Petersburg that Romanofski, who has been restored to favour, will be sent out again to Turkestan to work out his own recommendations, and in the mean time, in order to prepare the way for this junction of the Caucasus with Turkestan, so as to present a continuous Russian front to the south, extending from the Black Sea to the frontier of China, great efforts are being made to conciliate the Turcomans, who hold all the lower part of the desert between the Caspian and the Aral, and who, if they are ever reclaimed from brigandage and brought under military control, will furnish a far more formidable cavalry to a Russian army than even the Cossacks of the Ukraine and the Don.

The position, then, which, on the soberest calculation, Russia may be expected to occupy at the close of ten years from the present time, and supposing that during this period we abstain from all active interference against her, will be something as follows.

The Caspian and the Aral will be connected either by a railway, or by military roads, protected by forts, and amply furnished with water and supplies. Turkestan will thus be brought into easy and direct communication, not only with the Caucasus, but with the Russian cities on the Volga, and even with St. Petersburg. The independent Uzheg Governments will have ceased to exist, and in their places, will have been established Russian provincial Governors, the seat of central authority being probably at Bokhara. The country will be administered under the joint control of Russian and Native officials, according to the system which has long been successfully practised in the Trans-Caucasian provinces. Mohammedanism will be respected, though the extravagant bigotry and fanaticism of the Bokhara priesthood will, no doubt, have been repressed. Trade will prosper; manstealing, the present bane of the country, will be suppressed; cultivation will be increased; and the condition of the people generally will be improved. The mouths of the Oxus and Jaxartes will have been dredged and deepened, and flotillas of steam boats will have been established on both rivers. The strength of the permanent garrison will be regulated by the wants of the country, as well as by its resources. At present, 16,000 men are sufficient to hold the extent of country which Russia has subdued, and which is scarcely a third of that which will ultimately come into her possession. The future garrison, therefore, when Khiva and Eastern Kokand
have both fallen in, and Turkestan is bounded on the south by the Oxus, can hardly be estimated at less than 40,000 men, of which 5,000 would be allotted to Khiva, 15,000 to Kokand, including the populous cities of the valley of Ferghânë, and 20,000 to Bokhara and its dependencies; and there can be little doubt that the resources of the country would be ample to meet this amount of military expenditure.

Let us now consider the effect of this position upon India. As long as Russia remained in her present strength to the northward of the Oxus, and confined her attention to the consolidation and improvement of her newly acquired territory, we should have no occasion to complain of her neighbourhood. In fact, beyond the gradual exclusion of our commerce from the markets of Central Asia, her neighbourhood would exert little or no influence on our affairs. But would it be possible for her, even with the best intentions, to maintain this passive and innocuous attitude? Could she, if she wished, divest herself of the responsibilities and obligations, the temptations to interference, inseparably associated with her new position? This is what it may be permitted to doubt. Intermediate, it must be remembered, between her position beyond the Oxus and our own frontier, broadly marked by the valley of the Indus, would lie the strong and independent country of the Afghans. To pretend that it is physically impossible for Russia, entrenched upon the Oxus, and wielding the resources of Bokhara, to exercise an influence on Afghanistan, as boldly asserted in a recent number of the "Invalides Russes," is simply false and fatuous. To apprehend, on the other hand, with the Indian alarmists, that, while Cabul still maintains its independence, we shall be subjected to the full inconvenience of Russian contiguity, is equally unreasonable. The truth lies between the two extremes; we are, no doubt, exposed to a certain danger from the advance of Russia to the Oxus, and that danger approaches us through Afghanistan, but the danger is not immediate, and it is evitable.

The close connexion which exists, and has for a long time past existed, between Bokhara and Cabul is not generally known in England, yet it is an important element in the consideration of the Central Asian question; the most important element, indeed, since it is this circumstance alone which forces us into contact with Russia. The connexion between Bokhara and Cabul is both geographical and political. The two provinces march with each other for many hundred miles. The cities of Balkh, Khulm, and Kundüz, which, for the last 30 years, have been held by the Afghans, belong properly to Bokhara. Other districts, such as Myemeneh, Sir-i-Pîl, and Andkôi, are in dispute between the two States. Russia, in fact, in possessing herself of Bokhara, will inherit a multitude of Afghan grievances and embarrassments, from which she cannot shake herself free. The political relations, again, of the two countries are even more intimate than the geographical. For the last 30 years, Bokhara has largely influenced the fortunes of Cabul. When we drove Dost Mahomed Khan from power, in 1839, he took refuge with the Ameer, and it was from Bokhara that both he returned in 1841, and his son in 1842, to attack us in Cabul. In all the recent Afghan revolutions, also, Bokhara has played a prominent part. It was chiefly by means of an Uzbek contingent that Abdur-Rahman Khan, who has married a daughter of the Ameer of Bokhara, expelled his uncle, Shir Ali Khan, from Cabul, in 1865, and, since that time, Bokhara has swarmed with Afghan refugees. It appears, indeed, that it was a body of these refugees, 500 or 600 in number, who, having transferred their allegiance to Russia, in consequence of oppressive treatment by the Uzbeks, led the Russian troops to the recent attack upon the Ameer's forces, and fought in line with them at the battle of Samarcand.

The implication of Russia in Afghan affairs is therefore no longer a matter of speculation. She has an Afghan contingent in her service, commanded by a grandson of Dost Mahomed Khan's. She is the mistress of a country which, on more occasions than one, has been the arbiter of the destinies of Cabul. It will depend on her discretion, whether she interfere to the extent of regulating the succession and directing the Government, or whether she merely offer friendly counsel, and cultivate general relations of amity.

The next point, then, to consider is, in what shape danger can come upon us from this Russian connexion with Cabul. The idea of invasion from such a quarter, which used to be brandished before us "in terrorem," may be dismissed as almost chimerical. If a foreign army every does descend upon the Indian frontier, it will be by way of Herat and Candahar, where the roads are open and traverse districts that have been called "the granary of Asia," and not through the sterile and difficult passes between Cabul and Peshawer. But it is not invasion from any quarter, or in any form, that we have at
present to guard against. The presence of Russia will make itself felt in a less obtrusive, though perhaps in a not less effective, way. If she establish a mission at Cabul,—and she can hardly do less, should we fail to preoccupy the ground,—the effect of such an establishment will be at once perceptible in India. The intrusion, indeed, of a foreign European element within the restricted circle of our Indian relations will of itself exert a disturbing influence through the country of a most mischievous and even dangerous tendency. Already the Maharaja of Cashmere, taking offence at our efforts to promote trade by insisting on a reduction of the transit duties in his dominions, has been negotiating with the authorities of Tashkend, and urging them to appoint Commercial Agents at Yarkend on the immediate frontier of Tibet, and if the Russians were more accessible, his example would be followed by scores of others. There can, indeed, be no doubt that if Russia once assumes a position which, in virtue either of military forces on the Oxus, or of a dominant political influence in Afghanistan, entitles her, in native estimation, to challenge our Asiatic supremacy, the disquieting effect will be prodigious. Every Chief throughout Northern India, who either has,—or fancies he has,—a grievance, or who is even cramped or incommoded by our orderly Government, will at once commence intriguing in the hopes of relieving himself from our oppressive shadow. It is not that the natives of India, whether Mahommedans or Hindoos, have any particular affection for the Russians, or believe that their rule would be more kindly and beneficial that our own. On the contrary, the followers of the Prophet everywhere regard the Russians as more incorrigible infidels than the English, from their uncleanly habits and their supposed worship of images; but, on the other hand, the approach of a rival European Power betokens change, and to the active, gambling, reckless spirit of Asiatics change is always exciting and agreeable.

There is, however, a still more important point of view from which the subject must be regarded. Hitherto, the argument has proceeded on the assumption that Russia is friendly to England, and has not contemplated the acquisition of any direct advantage over us from her career of Asiatic conquest. She must, of course, be conscious that her new position gives her a means of political leverage against us which she did not before possess; and that she is thus relatively so much stronger than she was at the time of the Crimean war, but it would be unfair to impute this result to her as the motive of her recent aggressions. Supposing, however, that owing to complications in Turkey it should be the policy of Russia to weaken and embarrass us, to find, indeed, such employment for our armies in the East as should prevent our active interference in Europe,—let us consider, under this altered aspect of affairs, how her position at Bokhara and her relations with Cabul would affect us. Now, in order to appreciate the danger which might thus beset us, it is necessary to look our position in India fairly in the face, and for this purpose we cannot have a better or more authentic guide than the series of Reports recently presented to Parliament under the title of "(East India) Systems of Government." Here amid much that is satisfactory, amid a mass of evidence of the highest character, which tends to show that the agricultural populations of India are in general contented and prosperous, and that with these classes our administration is popular, there is also much of a very different complexion, much that furnishes abundant food for reflection and uncasiness. There is unfortunately, at the present time in the Afghan territory a machinery of agitation singularly well adapted for acting on what has been called the "seething, fermenting, festering mass" of Mahommedan hostility in India. The fanatics of Sittana, who gave us so much trouble a few years back, are now showing signs of renewed vitality. They have been joined by the notorious Feroze Shah, who, as the last representative of the throne of Delhi, assumes the title of "King of Hindustan," and proclaims himself our implacable enemy, and they are known to be in active communication with the Wahabis and other Mahommedan malcontents in Upper India. It is certain, then, that if Russia desired to embarrass us, and were sufficiently strong at Cabul to require the Governor of that city to set in motion against us the Sittana confederacy, directing and encouraging the movement through the Akhond of Swat and other Afghan spiritual chiefs, and supporting it by inroads and forays of the mountain tribes along the whole line of frontier, we might be placed in a position of very considerable difficulty, of such difficulty, indeed, as to require extensive reinforcements from England, and thus to fulfil the very object which Russia had in view from the commencement.

With this prospect before us, with the knowledge that we present a vulnerable front, and that if Russia were so disposed she might, in the natural course of events, be enabled severely to injure us, are we justified in maintaining what has been sarcastically, though
perhaps unfairly, called Sir John Lawrence's policy of "masterly inactivity"? Are we justified in allowing Russia to work her way on to Cabul unopposed, and there to establish herself as a friendly power, prepared to protect the Afghans against the English? It has been said by the advocates of inaction, that in competing for the good will of the Afghans, the power which appears last in the field will be the most successful; that the first armies will be naturally regarded as enemies and those who follow as deliverers; but this leaves out of sight the fact that there is already a national feud between the English and the Afghans, which has been rather deepened of late years by our withdrawal of the subsidy, and our persistent refusal to mingle in their internecine quarrels; while, on the other hand, the Russians, having never exerted any military pressure on the country, or otherwise offended the pride of the mountaineers, are regarded by them, if not with friendly feelings, at any rate without animosity or fear. The main argument, however, against interference of any sort in the affairs of Afghanistan, has hitherto been that the country is a hotbed of anarchy and disorder, that in supporting one candidate we provoke the enmity of his rivals, and throw them into the arms of Russia, whose appearance on the scene would be thus accelerated rather than retarded; but this is hardly a fair representation of the case. If we do nothing, Russia is sure in due course of time to secure a political footing at Cabul, as a necessary consequence of her occupation of Bokhara. By some, indeed, it is suspected that the pending revolution in Afghanistan is due to her instigation, Shir Ali Khan having been launched from Herat as a sort of pilot balloon, preparatory to her own advance on Bokhara; and, if this be true, it may be difficult, in the event of Shir Ali's success, which seems now almost certain, to prevent a very rapid development of her plans; but if, as is more probable, she is at present merely watching the progress of affairs, nursing her little nucleus of Afghan refugees, and expecting by their means to establish her influence at Cabul, then it would seem to be our bounden duty at once to step forward and forestall her. No one, probably, will dispute that Lord Auckland's famous doctrine of "establishing a strong and friendly power on our North-West frontier," has always been the true policy for India, though of late years too often neglected, and once fatally mismanaged in execution. No one will question but that this policy would be advantageous at present, if it could be carried out without any considerable risk or expense. And why should there be any serious risk? Is it true that our intervention in Afghanistan would lead to "confusion worse confounded?" Is it borne out by experience that disorder is the normal condition of the country? Is it not notorious, on the contrary, that from the time of our evacuation of Cabul in 1842 to the year 1863, a period of more than 20 years, Afghanistan was perfectly tranquil and contented under the strong and friendly rule of Dost Mahommed Khan? This chief, having a firm belief in our power and a scrupulous regard to his own engagements, repressed on all occasions the turbulence and unfriendliness of his subjects, and, in fact, conducted himself towards us, throughout his long career, with such perfectly good faith and orderly procedure, as to make us doubt whether the revolution and counter-revolution which have distracted the country ever since his decease, to the injury of trade and the constant disturbance of our own frontier, may not be owing, as much to our persistent non-interference, as to the incompetence of the old chief's successors, or the natural indolency of the Afghans. It is asserted by many authorities, fully competent to form an opinion, that if, in deference to Dost Mahommed's nomination, we had acknowledged and assisted Shir Ali Khan from the commencement, continuing to him the same subsidy which we had granted to his father, and according him our general support, he would have summarily suppressed the opposition of his brothers and nephews, and would have retained his power unbroken to the present day. Another opportunity now presents itself: The fortunes of Shir Ali Khan are again in the ascendant. He is already in possession of Herat, Candahar, and Ghizni, and is expected, either in person, or as represented by his son, Mahommed Yacub Khan, to be soon installed at Cabul. He should be secured in our interests without further delay. Provided that he is unentangled with Russia, the restoration of his father's subsidy and the moral support of the British Indian Government would probably be sufficient to place him above all opposition and to secure his fidelity. If he has been already tampered with, his expectations, of course, will be higher. It may, indeed, be necessary to furnish him with arms and officers, or even to place an auxiliary contingent at his disposal; but whatever the price it must be paid, of such paramount importance it is to obtain at the present time a dominant position at Cabul, and to close that avenue of approach against Russia. Whether the time is come for the re-establishment of a mission at Cabul, charged with the distribution of the subsidy and the direction of our quasi-protectorate of the country, is a question that can only
be decided on the spot. It is a position that we must inevitably occupy sooner or later, unless we are prepared to jeopardize our Indian Empire, and when once we have acquired the goodwill and confidence of the Governor, there can be no great risk attached to it. The success, indeed, of Major Lumsted’s mission in 1856, has already shown that British Officers, of firm but conciliatory bearing, may traverse our old battle-fields without exciting any special or dangerous hostility, and the prestige of our recent Abyssinian triumph would, no doubt, give an additional personal security to our envoy.

There is one other argument, relating to this branch of the subject, which it may be worth while to notice. Putting aside all consideration of the Russian advance, and the danger of their establishment at Cabul, it would seem to be a duty which we owe to our subjects in the Punjab to make serious efforts for the consolidation of a strong and friendly Government in Afghanistan. Anarchy is contagious, and, with the spectacle of constant bloodshed and rape about the passes, it is impossible to preserve order and content among the frontier tribes. In the interests, then, of peace, in the interest of commerce, in the interests of moral and material improvement, it may be asserted that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty, and that any moderate outlay or responsibility we may incur in restoring order at Cabul will prove, in the sequel, to be true economy.

Hitherto the argument has been confined to a practical consideration of the effects of Russia’s present and proximate position in Central Asia; but if we look a little ahead, and take in a somewhat more general view of the subject, we shall find many topics of equal, or even greater, interest. Any one who traces the movements of Russia towards India on the map of Asia cannot fail to be struck with the resemblance which these movements bear to the operations of an army opening parallels against a beleaguered fortress. The first parallel would, thus, be the Russian frontier of 20 years back, stretching from the upper end of the Caspian, by the Orenburg and Siberian lines, northward of the steppe, to the Irish. This may be considered strategically as a mere line of observation. The second parallel, which would constitute her line of demonstration, would be the frontier which she is now preparing to take up, and which, according to Romanof-ki’s plan, would be drawn from Krasnovodsk Bay, about the centre of the Caspian, south of Khiva, to the Oxus, and along the course of that river to the Panjir plateau, thus including the whole of the Uzbek territory, and placing at her command the entire waterway of the Oxus and Oxartes. This parallel is above 1,000 miles in advance of the first line, but it does not directly menace India, inasmuch as the intervening Afghan mountains constitute a strong military defence. The third parallel, which would be the natural result of the preceding preliminary operations, and which, if Russia survive revolution in Europe and catastrophe in Asia, she will assuredly some day attempt, would be drawn from Asterabad, at the south-east corner of the Caspian, along the Persian frontier to Herat, and from thence through the Hazarad uplands, to the Oxus, or possibly by Candahar to Cabul. Established upon such a line, her position would indeed be formidable. Troops, stores, and material might be concentrated to any extent at Asterabad. The country between that port and Herat is open, and admirably supplied. A line of military posts would connect the two positions, and effectually control the Turcomans, thereby conferring an essential benefit on Persia, and securing her goodwill and co-operation. Herat has been often called “the key of India,” and fully deserves its reputation as the most important military position in Central Asia. The earthworks which surround the town are of the most colossal character, and might be indefinitely strengthened. Water and supplies abound, and routes from all the great cities to the north, which would furnish the Russian supports, meet in this favoured spot. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that, if Russia were once established in full strength at Herat, and her communications were secured in one direction with Asterabad through Meshed, in another with Khiva through Merv, and in a third with Tashkend and Bokhara through Mynenek and the passage of the Oxus, all the forces of Asia would be inadequate to expel her from the position. Supposing, too, that she were bent on mischief,—and it is only hostility to England that would be likely to lead her into so advanced and menacing a position,—she would have the means of seriously injuring us, since, in addition to her own forces, the unchallenged occupation of Herat would place the whole military resources of Persia and Afghanistan at her disposal.

It is not in general sufficiently considered that, in a political struggle with Russia of this nature, we should not engage her upon at all equal terms. We have no natural claim on the affections or allegiance of the intermediate nations, no inducement to hold out to them, as affecting their own interests, which should lead them to prefer our alliance.
to that of our rivals; whereas Russia has only to point to India as the traditional plunder ground of Central Asia, as the prize which has ever rewarded the victorious hordes rushing down from the northern mountains, and she at once enlists their passions in her behalf. The pleasant memories of the sack of Delhi by Nadir Shah, and of Ahmed Khan Abdalii's successful campaign against the Mahrattas, have hardly faded from the minds of the present generation of Persians and Afghans. Such visions possess irresistible attractions for them, and would always, unless counterbalanced by some special considerations, incline them to side with the invader rather than the invaded. It is thus quite within the bounds of possibility that, some years hence, if Russia found herself engaged in another war with us, she might launch upon India, from her Herat base, a force of 50,000 Persian "Sirbaz," disciplined and commanded by Russian officers, and thus fully competent to cope with our best Native troops; supporting such a force with 20,000 Turcoman and Afghan horse, than whom there is no better irregular cavalry in the world; and, if she were really in earnest, detaching also a small auxiliary body of her own picked troops, to give strength and consistency to the invading army.

Now, an attack of this nature might not lead to any serious result, might not jeopardise, that is, our hold upon India; for our garrisons, reinforced from England, would probably be equal to the emergency; but, at any rate, we should have to fight for our lives, and should be quite powerless to strike a blow against Russia in return. Are we justified, then, in disregarding this danger, merely because it is remote? Ought we not rather, while there is yet time, to provide against the possibility of being thus taken at a disadvantage? Russia could never establish herself at Herat, and keep up her communications with Asterabad, without the co-operation of Persia, and against that co-operation our efforts should be accordingly directed. The doctrine which prevails at present in our Eastern diplomacy is simply this, that Persia is too weak and faithless to justify any extraordinary expense in keeping up cordial relations with the Shah. We are content for awhile to occupy a subordinate position to Russia at Teheran, trusting that, when the time comes for action, we may regain our lost ground by increased expenditure and redoubled activity; but this is, after all, a very short-sighted policy. The good will of a nation,—that which we once possessed, but have now lost in Persia,—is not to be purchased in a day. It is the growth of time, of steady unremitting attention. If we desire, then, to check the advance of Russia towards India, if we desire, above all, to render impossible,—or at any rate, indefinitely to postpone,—her occupation of Herat, it is indispensable that we should bestir ourselves in Persia at once. The vast expenditure that we incurred in the days of Harford, Jones, and Malcolm, in expelling the French from Teheran, is no longer required. What is required is an indication of renewed interest in the country, and a disposition to protect it against Russian pressure. Our officers should be again placed in positions of influence and power with the Persian troops, as in the days of Christie, of Lindsay, and of Hart. Presents of improved arms, and perhaps artillery, would testify to our awakened interest. The Persian nobles should be encouraged to send their sons for education to London, rather than to Paris. Investments of English capital in banks, in railways, in mining operations, and other commercial enterprises are freely preferred, and if supported by our authorities would create a further bond of union between the countries. Among a people, again who are so fond of display, and attach so much value to outward forms, it is of the first importance that our mission should be kept up on a very liberal scale, and that presents should be freely distributed, that the diplomatic establishment, in fact, at Teheran, should be Oriental rather than European. A further opportunity has occurred for creating a very favourable impression, and, in fact, inaugurating the new system which is recommended, in the Shah's application for our aid in creating and keeping up a Persian naval force in the Gulf. Considering the singular maritime inaptitude of the Persians, it is not likely that this scheme, notwithstanding our countenance and support, will ever realize the Shah's expectations, but our acquiescence in the proposal would, at any rate, very much strengthen our influence at Court, and might aid even in developing that community of interests which our joint telegraphic establishment has already initiated.

In connexion with these suggested reforms in our Persian diplomacy, it is important to consider whether our relations with that country ought not to be again placed under the India Office. Now, there can be no doubt, that Persian diplomacy is essentially an Eastern question, and mainly dependent on considerations of Indian policy. It is the advance of Russia towards India, and her demonstrations against Cabul and Herat, which seem now to require our more active interference at Teheran. Every measure of defence, referring either to Persia or Afghanistan, must be organised in India and executed from India. If troops were required they would be supplied from Peshawar or Sinde. Officers
for the Shah's forces would be drawn from the Indian Army. Bombay would furnish the naval material for the Gulf. The Persian telegraph is an Indian establishment. The Indian revenues contribute a sum of 12,000£ per annum towards the expenses of the Persian mission. There is no single element, indeed, of European diplomacy connected with Persia, except the relations of that country with Turkey, and even these relations, referring almost exclusively to frontier grievances, are more naturally under the jurisdiction of Bagdad or of Erzeroum than of Constantinople. It may further be questioned whether the traditions and practice of the Foreign Office, admirably adapted as they are to European diplomacy, are fitted to deal with the peculiarities of Eastern character. Tehran is an Oriental Court, of the same type and temper as the Courts of Cabul, of Lahore, of Delhi, Lucknow, or Hyderabad, where the eye must be addressed rather than the reason, and where individual character is of so much more importance and effect than the forms and precedents of office. It may be doubted if the duties of the Tehran mission, reorganized as a powerful machine of Indian defence, could be carried out by an ordinary staff of Foreign Office attachés. At any rate it would be infinitely better to employ Indian Officers, accustomed to the Native character, acquainted with the language, and who would look to Persian and Afghan service as their career in life, instead of pining for the luxuries and leisure of Paris and Vienna. One thing may be confidently predicted, that if we neglect the present occasion for re-transferring life, instead of pining for the luxuries and leisure of Paris and Vienna. One it will require all the use of that country as an instrument to facilitate her own advances towards India.

The only other point refers to the proposed establishment of a fortified outwork at Quetta above the Bolan pass, a measure which has been strongly advocated in some quarters, and as strongly opposed in others. No one will be inclined to question the military advantage of such a work. As a place d'armes, it would cover the frontier, and being held in too great strength to admit of being masked, would, in the event of invasion, delay an enemy sufficiently to enable us to mass our full forces in the rear. Perhaps, also, under present circumstances, the erection of such a fortress would have a salutary effect upon the native mind in India. Our friends are now said to be dispirited at our inactivity, while our enemies acquire fresh confidence and power. Breaking ground at Quetta would cheer the one class, and would check the other. It would show that our repose had been the repose of strength, that we were fully alive to the gravity of the situation, and prepared to move immediately that the occasion arose. But, on the other hand, it is doubtful how such a proceeding would be regarded at Candahar and Cabul. If our position were already secured with Shir Ali Khan, and he could thus be led to look upon the Quetta post as a support to his own power, then we should hardly be deterred from undertaking the work by mere considerations of expense; but if, as is more probable, the tribes in general regarded this erection of a fortress,—above the passes, although not on Afghan soil,—as a menace, or as a preliminary to a further hostile advance, then we should not be justified, for so small an object, in risking the rupture of our friendly intercourse.

London, July 20, 1868.

H. C. Rawlinson.
To the Right Honourable Sir Stafford H. Northcote, Baronet, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Government of India, Foreign Department,
Simla, 16th October 1868.

Sir,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a translation of a Persian letter from the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabool, and a copy of our reply to His Highness.

2. We would draw the special attention of Her Majesty's Government to this correspondence, which, politically, may prove of the highest importance.

We have, &c.

(Signed) J. LAWRANCE.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
G. N. TAYLOR.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.
H. W. NORMAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 13.

Translation of Letter from the British Vakeel at Cabul to the Commissioner of Peshawur, dated September 1868.

At the time of writing the Government despatches, the Ameer, with the outward appearance of the most esteemed friendship, was pleased to remark that "although notwithstanding the many trials and misfortunes of every kind that I have endured, nothing has up to the present day proceeded from me which should be a cause of offence to the British Government. Further, I have neither by hint or sign, nor openly or secretly, made cause with any other power except the powerful English Government. For instance, during the Swat and Boneyr difficulty (Ambeyla Campaign), simply for the purpose of pleasing the British Government, I ruined my own son-in-law Saadut Khan, Mohmund, and caused myself to be abused throughout Islam for such an act. But from the British Government, I have received comparatively no friendship or kindness with reference to my success in this miserable civil war, until God Almighty of his own favour has again bestowed upon me the country of my inheritance. Now it is my desire to send some of my trusted and reputable representatives, or else proceed myself in person with a small party to Calcutta for the purpose of a meeting, and to show my sincerity and firm attachment to the British Government, and make known my real wants. At present writing letters on my part is of little avail in every way until I first receive congratulating letters from the British Government."

Upon this, certain of the Ameers who are well-wishers to the British Government represented to him that "at the present moment it is not advisable for your Majesty to exceed the bounds of the treaty made by the late Ameer and formerly by yourself, but it will be better in every way merely to intimate your desires by letter, so that they may act as seems best in their judgment in respect to an interview, and in order that the former friendly relations may become more securely permanent."

At length the Ameer agreed to the writing of the letters intimating his wishes. Today three letters have been written and brought to the Agency. They are herewith forwarded in original.
Enclosure 2 in No. 13.

TRANSLATION of a Letter from AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN, Walee of Cabul, to the GOVERNOR GENERAL, dated Cabul, 26th Jumadil-Awul 1285 A. H., corresponding with 14th September 1868.

(After compliments.)

I beg to state for your Excellency's information that by the grace and help of the Almighty God, my flag safely reached the metropolis of Cabul on Tuesday the 20th (8th September 1863) Jumadil Awul.

As the relations of friendship and amity subsist between the two States, I beg to communicate this intelligence for the gratification of my sincere friends.

By the blessing of God every thing is right in this part of the country, and I am defended by divine favour.

I hope that your Excellency will continue to gratify me with the welcome tidings of your good health.

Enclosure 3 in No. 13.

To AMEER SHERE ALI KHAN of Cabul.

I HAVE received your letter, informing me of your safe return to Cabul, and the recovery of your dominions. I congratulate your Highness on your success, which is alone due to your own courage, ability, and firmness. I sincerely hope that your Highness will now be able to re-establish and consolidate your authority. I trust that you will deal leniently with those who have fought against you, particularly when there may be reason to believe that they were carried away by the difficulties of their position, and the course of events, when they can give you assurance of future fidelity. By kindness and generosity in this respect, your Highness will take the best mode of establishing your rule throughout your dominions. It has always been to me a cause of sorrow that the family of your great father, the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, should have broken up into contending factions, who have resorted to civil war, causing the ruin of many brave chiefs, and the general weakening of Afghan power. I trust that your Highness will be able, by the exercise of those excellent virtues kindness, foresight, and good management, to restore peace and prosperity to your country. I am prepared not only to maintain the bonds of amity, and good will, which were established between Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and myself, acting on the part of the British Government, but so far as may be practicable to strengthen those bonds. In all cases of this kind, it is essential that both parties should act with sincerity and truth, so that real confidence may exist between them.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Simla, 2d October 1868.

No. 14.

No. 1 of 1869.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Political.—Confidential. (Extract.)

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

We have the honour to transmit a series of Minutes, with annexures, as per accompanying Abstract of Contents, bearing on the important political question raised in the confidential Memorandum of Sir H. C. Rawlinson, which was forwarded, under Sir Stafford Northcote's instructions, in Mr. Kaye's letter of 21st August last. The Honourable Mr. Maine wishes it to be understood that he concurs entirely in the Minute of the Viceroy.

2. The various proposals brought forward in that Memorandum, in order to counteract, in some measure, the advances of Russia in Central Asia, and to strengthen the influence and power of England in Afghanistan and Persia, have received from us that careful
consideration which is due to the well-known career and abilities of the writer, and to the magnitude of the events and interests of which he has treated.

3. A careful perusal of the Memorandum forwarded to us, and a further discussion of the subject in all its bearings, has not led us to recommend any substantial alteration in the course of policy to be adopted on the frontier, or beyond it. On the contrary, the closer and more constant the attention which the subject receives at our hands, the more settled is our conviction that any serious departure from the principles which we have already enunciated, would be the cause of grave political and financial embarrassments, and would probably involve us in doubtful undertakings, the issue or duration of which no statesman could venture to predict.

4. We solicit a full consideration of our subjoiued Minutes. They have been penned with reference to every available source of information, after careful observation of the protracted struggle for supreme authority in Afghanistan, which is not yet terminated, and under a deep sense of our responsibility for the welfare of all classes in India, and for the permanence of the British power. In these Minutes the consequences of any deviation from our established policy have been viewed by us under various aspects, and your Grace will observe that due regard has been paid to the division and conflict of parties in Afghanistan, and to the peculiar national characteristics of the people; to the difficulties of establishing, supporting, and supplying troops in isolated positions, and at a distance from our own territories; to the financial outlay which any strategic advance beyond our own border, or even the formation of a Native Contingent, would certainly entail; and to the probable effects of such measures on the feelings and wishes of those classes of Her Majesty's subjects in India itself whom it is our object to attach to us by just and kind treatment, or, if necessary, to control by salutary awe. These considerations deserve fully as much attention as the gradual advance of Russia in Central Asia, and her military occupation of the cities and territories of Samarcand and Bokhara, on which many writers have been led too exclusively to dwell.

5. We venture to sum up the policy which is recommended or supported, in various language and by various arguments in our Minutes, somewhat as follows:—We object to any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by the deputation of a high British officer with or without a contingent, or by the forcible or amicable occupation of any post or tract in that country beyond our own frontier, inasmuch as we think such a measure would, under present circumstances, engender irritation, defiance, and hatred in the minds of the Afghans, without in the least strengthening our power either for attack or defence. We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia, if that power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own frontier, and met her half way in a difficult country, and, possibly, in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

6. Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal Chief and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.

7. We think it necessary to dwell strongly on this part of the policy of the Government of India, because the subject has lately been revived in the public prints, and
because some writers possibly imagine that a change in the Head of the administration may be a fit occasion for a change in our foreign or domestic policy.

8. It is not difficult for public writers, who are often wanting in detailed and accurate information, and who may write without a full sense of political or financial responsibility, to advocate or suggest measures which, for a moment, may delude or influence the public.

9. The following are the only fresh measures which we could bring ourselves to recommend:--We think that endeavours might be made to come to some clear understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and designs in Central Asia, and that it might be given to understand, in firm but courteous language, that it cannot be permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier. We are aware that this subject was pressed on Sir Stafford Northcote in the despatches from us, which were all reviewed by him in his letter of the 26th of December 1867, No. 15, but without any result. The subject, however, is of such paramount importance, that we think ourselves justified in again pressing it on Her Majesty's Government. The truth appears to us to be, that the advances of Russia, coupled with the constant allusions made in the newspapers to her progress as compared with what is called the inaction of the British Government, have produced, in the minds of Europeans and Natives, what we believe to be an exaggerated opinion of her resources and power. A mutual good understanding between the two Powers, though difficult of attainment, would enable us to take means to counteract unfounded rumours and to prevent unnecessary alarms.

10. Then, we think that our relations with the Court of Teheran should be placed entirely under the Secretary of State for India; and that we should be empowered to give to any de facto Ruler of Cabul some arms and ammunition and substantial pecuniary assistance, as well as moral support, as occasion may offer, but without any formal offensive or defensive alliance. We have already authorised the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to give Shere Ali six lakhs of rupees, and we shall further be prepared to supply him with some thousand stand of arms. We should be glad, therefore, if a discretion were given us, at once to act on any emergency on the above principles, without any special reference to Her Majesty's Government at home.

11. In the event of Ameer Shere Ali proving successful in the struggle now going on between him and his nephew, Sirdar Abdool Rahman, should His Highness desire to meet the Governor General, we think it would be politic that his request should be complied with. If any such arrangement were inconvenient for the Governor General, his place could be supplied by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The meeting might, with most advantage, take place at Peshawur, which is easier of access than more remote parts of the border, and where there is a large force to represent British power and influence. On this occasion the Ameer could explain fully his views, his hopes, and his desires; and thus place us in possession of a great deal of valuable information, which it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in any other way. If, however, as is now very unlikely, Abdool Rahman Khan, or any other chief, prove victorious, we must wait and see whether he can consolidate his possession of the supreme power in the country.

12. With these remarks we would suggest further that opportunity be taken by Her Majesty's Government to lay down a course of action which will avoid the perpetual recurrence to these exciting topics, and which will strengthen the hands of those who have to conduct the affairs of India on the spot, by, as we hope, endorsing views which, in the best interests of all parties, we have carefully considered, and to which we respectfully and firmly adhere.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.  
W. R. MANSFIELD.  
H. S. MAINE.  
J. STRACHEY.  
R. TEMPLE.
Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

REMARKS ON SIR H. RAWLINSON'S MEMORANDUM ON CENTRAL ASIA.

His Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor General having requested me to give my opinion on a memorandum by Sir H. Rawlinson on the Central Asian question, I beg to record my cordial agreement with the author in his general views of the subject.

2. Every one who has an intimate acquaintance with Afghanistan and its Rulers, and has thought over the probable effects of the advance of Russia from the banks of the Oxus, must, I think, agree with me, that, however desirable it was on the death of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to allow the Afghans to select their own Ruler, the time has now arrived for prompt and effective support being given to Shere Ali Khan, the nominee of the late Ameer, and now triumphant head of the people.

3. Experimenting with the idea of a subsidy, however large, paid in cash to the Ameer, has no lasting effect on the Government, but only goes to swell the allowances of the immediate capital, given to the people to take place at Kooram.

4. The great difficulty in the way of a cordial understanding with the Ameer will be the distrust of our influence there. The influence of our own Envoy at his Court, the questions of an Envoy at his Court, the questions of an Envoy at his Court, and the determination, which excludes all recusants at one blow, to by the Ameer, to settle accounts with all blockaded tribes.

5. Whatever determinations are come to by Government, it is evident that the situation admits of no delay, if we are in earnest, and really wish to secure that paramount political influence in Afghanistan, which all authorities agree to be our best safeguard against Russian intrigue.

6. As a first step towards bringing about a thorough understanding with Ameer Shere Ali Khan, I would suggest a Durbar on the largest scale being held for a meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor General and Shere Ali Khan, which would proclaim to Asia the cordial renewal of treaty relations with Afghanistan and its Rulers.

7. As Ameer Shere Ali Khan could not conveniently, under existing circumstances, be so long absent from Cabul as a visit to the mouth of the Khobar would involve, the meeting might be arranged to take place at Kooram.

8. Once in face to face communication with the Ameer, the questions of an Envoy at his Court, the amount and nature of the support proposed to give him, &c., &c., could easily be arranged, and the meeting alone would be of inestimable advantage to him in his present position, and go far to correct public opinion in India as to his Russian proclivities.

9. My propositions to him would be,—

1st. To keep up for him five regiments of Infantry and two batteries of guns, to be raised, paid, and equipped by us, one regiment to be a depot, one constantly in our own provinces, and relieved annually.

2d. An Envoy with suitable staff and escort at his Court, through whom the force would be regularly paid.

10. When by the above measures a thorough understanding has been established between the two Governments, I would guarantee him Cabul, on condition that (to enable us to do so) he makes over Koourum and Khost to us for an annual payment of one lac of rupees (he does not get more than 15,000 from it now); we could then establish a cantonment in the Koourum valley, only eight marches from the capital, the last four of which are in the plains of Cabul.

11. Thus, without entering a single pass, or in the slightest degree endangering our communications, we should be in a position to completely command the Pashto Pass, and make our influence felt at the capital, while the advantage to Shere Ali Khan would be not only an appreciable increase of revenue, but also the release of a considerable body of his own troops now required to hold Khost and Koourum.

12. It may be hinted by some that "this proposition is on a par with the Hindooostanee scheme, the last four of which are in the plains of Cabul.

13. With reference to the dangerous influence which might be brought to bear on the Mahomedan portion of our own subjects through Ferozeh Shah and the rest of Wahabee refugees beyond our border, alluded to by General Rawlinson, I would suggest that, now that we have an adequate force on the spot under General Wilde, the opportunity might be taken, not only to rid the border for ever of these pests, but also to settle accounts with all blockaded tribes.

14. I would proclaim our determination to rid the border of these Hindooostanee Wahabees, and to punish severely any tribe assisting them with men, supplies, or asylum, and would carry out my threat to the letter. This would doubtless prolong operations a little, but I maintain that it is cheaper and more likely to settle with all recusants at one effort, than to have a series of concentrations of troops on the border year by year, which, however well conducted and successful, have the appearance of failures from their frequency. No one can calculate the benefit to be derived from our thoroughly rousing ourselves into action on a frontier which has never yet felt the effect of a blow in earnest from the British Government.

15. Equal in importance with our relations with Afghanistan and our other neighbours is the question of the influence we hold at the Persian Court, so ably advocated by General Rawlinson. I most cordially agree with him in all he says on this head, and consider that the recovery of paramount influence there at the present juncture would be cheap at a heavy outlay.

16. In conclusion, I would beg to enter my protest against the habit, so universally indulged in by almost every writer on the subject of the defence of India, as well as by General Rawlinson, of looking on the Khobar and Bolan routes as the only two inlets for an invading army on to the plains of the
Punjab, and utterly ignoring in their calculations the almost equally good Golari Pass openings on the Derajat. If any one doubts the practicability of this route, I would refer him to “Havelock’s Narrative of the War in Afghanistan,” 1838–39, page 205, vol. II.

17. As for the project of occupying Quetta as a place d’armes, pushed 250 miles beyond its nearest supports, with nothing in front, and its only communication through a long, difficult, and, in many places, waterless pass, flanked all the way by wild and warlike tribes, the idea suggests to my mind nothing but a wanton throwing away of troops and resources which would be of immense value elsewhere.

18. Since writing the above remarks, I have seen a pamphlet by Dr. Bellow, which is useful, in so far as it shows the general feeling in favour of immediate political action, but the stupendous move proposed is simply impossible.

19. To take all the passes into our own hands, subdue 100,000 warlike men in their own hill fastnesses, and keep them under at the same time that we are repelling a serious invasion from the west, with a probable rising in the heart of our own provinces, is an undertaking which no one but a doctor, with a writing mania on him, would think of proposing to a too confiding public.

H. B. Lumsden,
Brigadier-General.

Simla, 21st September 1888.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

MEMORANDUM ON Paper by Sir Henry Rawlinson on Central Asian progress of Russia.

With the exception of the suggestion in regard to occupation of Quetta, I entirely agree in the practical conclusions arrived at in this able paper. But I do not wholly concur with the writer in some of the views urged in the body of it. I cannot pretend to so intimate an acquaintance with the characteristics and relations of the tribes inhabiting those regions as Sir Henry evidently possesses, and it is consequently with diffidence that I state the reasons why I differ from him, more or less, on some points.

2. That a profound impression is produced on the minds of the inhabitants of Northern India, especially by the rapid advances of Russia during the past few years, there can be no doubt. The general impression, too, on the minds of our Indian subjects generally is, that we are, and must be, hostile to the British Government and ours, has been increased, and leads to the Indian Press, and very many of them, I believe, are convinced that we dread them as a superior and more powerful nation.

3. But I do not think it can be fairly said that the races with whom Russia is now coming newly in contact regard her without animosity or fear, while the Afghans consider themselves to have a national feud with us.

4. As regards the former point, all the information I have been enabled to obtain on the subject leads me to believe that there exists, throughout Central Asia, in the minds of all the most influential and best informed of its populations, a wide spread feeling of distrust and dislike of the Russians, as an aggressive and unscrupulous power, who have brought their co-religionists to ruin and humiliation in almost all quarters where their dominion has been established. Many who go on pilgrimage to Mecca visit Constantinople and the southern provinces of Russia, containing Mahomedan populations, and I have myself heard from some of these expressions of horror at the tyranny and oppression exercised by Russian Governors and officials. That Russia can hold out sufficient attractions to win over some of the people she subdues to her side and enlist them in her service I have no doubt. But, nevertheless, I feel assured that the general feeling entertained towards her is far more unfavourable than that entertained towards ourselves.

5 Passing on to the second point, I very greatly doubt the correctness of the opinion expressed, that the Afghan nation generally considers itself to have a national feud with us, whatever may have been the case in the past, I believe they now fully appreciate the uniform civility and protection which their traders or travellers experience in our territory, and the bearing of Amir Shere Al Khan, since he has regained the throne of Cabul, certainly shows anything but a disinclination to be on friendly terms with us so far as he has hitherto pronounced himself. He complains of our not having assisted him, or shown him any sympathy during the troubles through which he has passed. But on every suitable occasion he has dwelt on the friendship of late years existing between the Afghan Government and ours, has emphatically declared that he has never swerved from it, or applied to any other power whatever for support, and has evinced and avowed a strong desire to meet the Vicerey in person.

6. That it is the destiny of Russia to subdue the Sarts and Uzbeks, the Kirghiz, and the Kipchaks of Tartary and the Steppes, I think far from improbable, and from the comparative inexperience and disinclination for regular warfare of the populations of “Mawar-un-Nahr,” at all events during later times, their utter inability to oppose disciplined troops, and the fertility of their country, it is quite possible that Russia may, in the end, be able to make the conquered territory pay. But I believe that people will find it a long and arduous task to establish themselves so securely as to admit of their raising a regular revenue of any considerable amount from races which have heretofore enjoyed so much license for ages past, and I feel sure that the difficulties of the Russians will increase, with each extension of territory, especially if their rule is found to be productive of such desolation and stagnation of national life as are said to have resulted from their occupation of the territories bordering on the Eunice.

7. In short, I believe that, in spite of the semi-Asiatic character of the Russians, and the constant feats of military prowess on their part, which must be anticipated for some years, the contrast between an aggressive power and a non-aggressive one will become more and more conspicuous, and will tell more and more in favour of the latter in the general estimation, the more frequent become the opportunities, and the greater the incentives to compare the policy and conduct of the Russian Government with those of British India at the present time.
8. The paper dwells much on the irresistible inducements to Russia to advance beyond the Oxus when once established on it. But I would observe that, on coming in contact with the Afghans on their own ground, she will meet with a very different race from the comparatively luxurious populations occupying the country between the Jaxartes and the Oxus (or "Mawar-un-Nahr"), a race more formidable than what Russia experienced much nearer home, for a long season of years, from the Circassians, while the country could never repay the outlay which any tampering with it might involve. That portion of Afghanistan which is designated Turkistan, including Balkh and Kunduz, might perhaps offer some temptation, but any interference with it would probably rouse the hostility of the entire Afghan nation. And I should doubt very much the disposition of that people even to cultivate unequally advantageous relations with a power which has steadily carried on a series of aggression on, and ultimately appropriated, all the countries up to its border, unless driven to that course by causes which, with the most ordinary prudence on our part, can hardly occur.

9. If, on the other hand, Russia should endeavour, as Sir H. Rawlinson suggests she might do, to arouse the cupidities of the races north of Hindustan, by representing the latter as the traditional plunder ground of Central Asia, of which, with her aid, they might possess themselves, the people of India would not be slow to realize the results which must ensue to themselves from the carrying out of such a project, seeing that they would necessarily be the chief sufferers from inroads similar to, but much more formidable than, those which have devastated their lands and cities in former times; and with the populations of India on her side, England can have nothing to fear.

10. The arguments used by Mr. Grigorief as to the course which it is open to Russia to adopt to counteract a presumed line of action on the part of our Government have, in all probability, I am disposed to think, been drawn largely from the comments of our own newspapers, and the writings of English authors. The assumptions which his letter contains, however, have been entirely negativized by facts, and, as remarked by Sir H. Rawlinson, he gives us credit for too much sensitiveness in supposing that we would either resort to unavailing diplomatic protest, or assist the Uzbegs in resisting Russia. Should Russia, by an act of aggression, or pursuit on her border in a line with the paper, while the whole position will have become changed. The seemingly inevitable absorption of barbarous races by contiguous ones far more advanced in civilization, will no longer hold good, and it is not on Asiatic ground that the chief conflict will be carried on.

11. There are two other remarks in the above paper which appear to me open to correction; one relates to Cashmere, the other to the Mahomedan fanatics from British India, located in Swat and Boner.

12. In regard to Cashmere, Sir H. Rawlinson remarks that the Maharajah, "taking offence at our efforts to promote trade by insisting on a reduction of the transit duties in his dominions, has been negotiating with the authorities of Tashkand, and urging them to appoint commercial agents at Yarkand, &c." But in point of fact, whatever rumours to the above effect may have arisen, and I do not believe they ever assumed any very definite form, date from a period anterior to the action on our part, which is supposed to have given offence, and I myself entirely disbelieve those rumours, which, in all probability, resulted from the fact that the Maharajah, at our request, made inquiries through traders and confidential agents as to the state of matters at Tashkand and elsewhere. In Gilgit, Hunza, and elsewhere, the Maharajah has had abundant experience of the difficulty of dealing with wild Mahomedan races bitterly opposed to a Hindu Government established in their midst; and I am convinced that the very last thing he would desire to see, would be the encouragement of such races on his border to assume an aggressive attitude, which he would assuredly expect to be the result of Russian influence.

13. His Serene Highness Prince Frederick of Schleswig Holstein, who has spent the rainy season in Cashmere, has become very intimate with the Maharajah, and mixes much with the people, wrote in a private letter to Sir H. Rawlinson that there was in great alarm about the expected advent of the Russians into his immediate vicinity. The confidential Minister of the Maharajah was questioned on this point by our representative for the season in Cashmere, and his reply was, that he had no doubt Russia would, within two years, take possession of Yarkand, but that the Maharajah, being under the shadow ("zer sayah") and protection of the British Government, had nothing to fear; and this I firmly believe to indicate correctly his real feeling.

14. He has no doubt been much disturbed by the unscrupulous writings of some English authors, and by the remark of a portion of the public Press. While not having yet attained to an entire faith in the benefits of free trade, he has been apprehensive lest serious detriment should result to him and his territory from the "pashim" or fine wool of Turfau and Kuchar finding its way into British territory. But I believe, nevertheless, that the relations between the Cashmere Government and ours were never more cordial than at the present time; that the suspicions of the Maharajah, who is naturally of a very amiable disposition, are beginning to wear away; and his mind to open to the convictions that the British Government is in reality his sincere friend; the officials around him no doubt dislike the interference of British Government with the operations of trade which necessarily results from the presence of our representative at Le; but the Maharajah himself seems really anxious to meet our views, and begins even to evince an interest in the marked increase of trade which is resulting from the measures which have been adopted in deference to our wishes.

15. The true position of the Wahabees from Hindustan, whom Sir H. Rawlinson designs "the fanatics of Sitana," and believes to be now showing increased signs of vitality, appears clearly not to be understood. The tenets of advanced Wahabism render it degrading, and a reproach in the estimation of the masses of any but the Mahomedan nations; and we have lost our territory to seek an asylum amongst co-religionists, however ungenial. Happily, however, Wahabism, from its ascetic and strict character, has never found favour with the people of the Punjab, and least of all with the Afghan races, so that this colony has always remained, amongst the latter, by sufferance only. At Ambala, where their assistance was gladly accepted by the tribes, the latter showed how little affection they felt for them, by a contemptuous disregard for and neglect of the corps of those who fell. Since that time, the colonists appear to have presumed upon the assistance
then rendered by them, and to have become a source of irritation, insomuch that the Akhund of Swat, with the help of the Asahazis and other tribes of Boner and Swat, after defeating them in fight, and killing at a woundinf a considerable number, has recently entirely expelled them, and the great bulk are now in a very deserted state, in a locality on the left bank of the Indus belonging to independent tribes of Hazara, where it may be hoped that we shall shortly be able to come to an understanding with them, whether by bringing our forces now in the field in their immediate vicinity to bear upon them, or by permitting them to return to their homes in Hindustan. The person calling himself Feroz Shah, of whom mention is made in connexion with them, has also, from whatever causes, left Swat, and reached Cabul, where, so far as we have yet learned, he has received but a sorry welcome from Amir Sher Ali.

16. From the above remarks, it will be seen that I do not regard the position by any means in so serious a light as Sir Henry Rawlinson appears to do, provided we adhere strictly to the non-aggressive and disinterested policy which has been inaugurated of late years, and of our determined adherence to which, notwithstanding the remarks of Mr. Gregorief, which may be true enough in regard to portions of our past history, we have of late years given to the world such notable proofs, that we can safely afford to abjure the antecedents which antagonists may lay to our charge.

17. Having said thus much, however, I would repeat what I have said before, that with one exception, I fully agree with Sir Henry Rawlinson in the opinion that we should assume a much more friendly position, than we have hitherto shown to enter into friendly relations with all the tribes on our frontier, however rude, and to exercise liberality and kindness towards them, whenever fitting opportunity may occur. It would, I think, be well worth while to endeavour to conciliate Boner (already friendly on the whole), Swat, and its Akhund, Dher, Chitril, the Afridis, and Orakzias of Teerah, and all other tribes, not immediately subordinate to either Cabul or Cashmere, and a few timely and appropriate presents, occasionally conferred on their Chiefs and principal men, would have a most salutary and decided effect. We cannot, I think, be too careful at the same time to avoid taking undue offence at occasional misdoings on the part of some of their nobles, and, where coercion becomes necessary, to resort to every available form of it before making a hostile entry into their country. I have elsewhere advocated the formation of a frontier militia for the Peshawar District, to be recruited chiefly from these tribes, and I believe that this measure, if adopted, besides greatly increasing our immunity from frontier marauders, would, as in the Derajat, have a most important effect in improving our relations with the border tribes.

19. I think of it importance further to remark, in connexion with this matter, that the responsibilities and labours of the Commissioner of Peshawur have greatly increased, and are increasing, with the complexity of Central Asian politics, and in connexion with them, those of our frontier tribes, our relations with whom are necessarily watched over and directed by that officer, and to enable him to do justice to these duties, I consider that it has now become absolutely necessary that he be relieved from the pressure of judicial duties by the permanent appointment of a Sessions Judge, who shall relieve him of the great bulk of judicial work, and when absolutely necessary, of such portions also of the executive duties of the Division as may be made over to him, acting, however, at all times under the general control of the Commissioner.

21. He has alluded also to the vast importance of completing, at the earliest possible date, railway communication from Peshawur to Lahore and to the seaboard. And I need hardly ask that I most heartily concur in this view. The former work has at length been undertaken by Government itself, but communication with the seaboard must remain in a most unsatisfactory state until the comparatively short and easy line connecting Multan with Kotri is sanctioned, and this existing gap filled up. It is, I think, almost impossible to over-estimate the importance to the Punjab at the present time of both these works, and as on the Punjab must necessarily devolve, in the first instance, the defence of the frontier, the imperial interests must be regarded as intimately bound up with those of this province.

22. I have said above that I by no means advocate the occupation of Quetta as a strategical military position, however important this position may be deemed by some from a political point of view. Sir Henry Rawlinson admits that we should not be justified in taking this step if we should thereby run the risk of losing our friendly intercourse with either Cabul or Bisho, and as I feel fully convinced that it would cause extreme suspicion and uneasiness on the part of the former, at all events I would strongly deplore all thoughts of this or any analogous scheme for obtaining a footing in foreign territory until it shall be absolutely forced upon us by aggression, and by the occurrence of a
state of things not now existing. I believe it to be quite essential, both for our own credit and interests, and for the future well being of the territory committed to us, that we abstain in the most scrupulous manner from evincing any desire whatever for future territorial acquisitions.

23. There is but one further remark which I would wish to make in conclusion, viz., that it appears most unsatisfactory that our newspapers, English and vernacular, and our authors on Oriental subjects, should be allowed the opportunity of writing in a strain eminently calculated to create and foster a spirit of suspicion and hostility between Russia and ourselves, without an effort being made by our Government to disabuse the public of the idea that such a feeling exists or must exist. The actuating motives of Russia appear to be but imperfectly understood. But those of our countrymen who know that country best, or at all events some of these, appear to think the most favourably of those motives, so far at least as affects us. The caviarity and confidence shown to our officers everywhere in Russia, the willingness with which the geographical and topographical information obtained by its officers is communicated to us, and the freedom with which the Russian newspapers discuss the events occurring in Central Asia, all seem to indicate that she has no wish to conceal her movements from us. And, however desirous she may naturally and very properly be to secure an entrance and safe conduct for her trade with those regions, I am unwilling to believe that she would attempt or desire to exclude however desirous she may naturally and very properly be to secure an entrance and safe conduct for her trade with those regions, I am unwilling to believe that she would attempt or desire to exclude

P.S.—In the foregoing remarks, I have confined myself to the question of political or military precautions to be adopted by us with reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia. There can, however, I think, be no question that the devising of means by which our own internal administration of India may be rendered more popular than at present, and by which to prevent its becoming distasteful to the mass of the people, is of far more importance as a means of securing our immunity from dangers of whatever kind than all other considerations whatever. I have long been of opinion, and have urged it heretofore, that the best, if not only, means of effecting this object, is to give to the yeomanry, middle classes, and gentry of the country a much larger share in the details of administration, especially of what may be termed the social administration of the country, than they at present possess. A good beginning has been made in the formation of municipal committees, xaildars, &c., and I sincerely trust that further efforts will be made in the same directions, and their importance appreciated.

I believe that by acting on this principle, and introducing it on a large scale, two great objects will be gained. Firstly, we shall in a great measure emancipate the people from a feeling of thraldom, which at present depresses them, and create a much more vigorous, practical, and, I may add, loyal race, as well as one much more likely to value knowledge for its own sake, than the inexperienced professors of an exotic literature, whom our educational system is at present raising up, and teaching to criticise their rulers in a most unamiable, impractical, and self-sufficient spirit; secondly, we shall afford more leisure to our European officers to cultivate an intimate acquaintance with the people, as they will be relieved of much detail, which under the vastly increased precision of system, and exact observance of legal forms now required, leaves them leisure or inclination for little beyond the decision of cases, and supplying of returns and reports. It is vain to suppose that an Oriental race can be satisfactorily governed by foreigners while this continues to be the state of the case, and it is yearly becoming more and more so, to the serious prejudice of the best interests of the country.

Enclosure 3 in No. 14.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel R. Taylor, Commissioner, Umbeylah.

Sir Henry Rawlinson's Minute very fully describes the whole position in Central Asia, and the paper is so clearly and forcibly written that it must command attention.

One point noticed by Sir Henry appears to me of great importance, namely, that it is probable that the political and territorial connexion between Bokhara and Afghanistan is very considerable, and that this is almost sure to lead to the possessors of the former State, if the stronger being ere long led into meddles in the affairs of the latter.

This is the result of his view, though it is not expressed in the above words. I am writing without having the paper to refer to.

I believe that this opinion will undoubtedly prove correct; there is, in fact, an immediate motive of contention ready to hand in the province of Balkh, only comparatively recently wrested by the Afghans from Bokhara.

Supposing that the restoration were not demanded by a power that obtained complete mastery in Bokhara, it would still be almost certain that other questions, territorial or political, would arise, which would be settled when convenient (and they would probably not be allowed to arise till it was convenient also to dispose of them), in very much of the wolf and lamb style.

* If any proof or illustration be required to establish the fact that what may be called the administrative training of a people tends in the most marked manner to promote their intellectual culture, I believe that such may be found in the history of every country which has made much progress in elevating the character of the bulk of its population, and that it may easily be shown from the evidence thus supplied that a share in their social administration is, in fact, quite indispensable to render a people generally intellectually vigorous. A recent instance appears to be afforded in the case of Russia, since the emancipation of her serfs, as attested from many sources. Thus, the "Journal de Moscou," as quoted by the Calcutta "Englishman," of the 14th July 1869, remarks "a desire for popular education is springing up rapidly in these parts of Russia where the peasants take part in the system of self-government."
For this is a point on which I find that, on such experience and observation as I am able to apply to
the subject, my views differ considerably from those of most of the writers whose minutes and
memoranda I have been allowed to peruse. I allow to the estimation formed of the military status of the
regular Afghan forces, those troops, I mean, that would have to move to a given point, and fight a battle
to prevent an invading force occupying Cabul.
The tone generally adopted is that the Affghans, being hardy, manly, and warlike, would, if properly
trained and directed, oppose a formidable obstacle to Russian progress; and this assumes that they
would be able to meet the latter in the more open parts of the country, such as the Russians would, of
course, as far as they were able, select for their lines of approach.

But I do not believe that the regular armies of Afghanistan, namely, its half-trained artillery and
infantry, and wholly unmounted and individually brave and efficient bodies of cavalry, could stand for one half day's struggle with the Russian troops, or against any disciplined force, officered mainly by Europeans, and led on with judgment by an experienced General.

Why should we suppose that the men from whom our, at the time, over-taxed troops wrested the
strong fortress of Ghuznie by a coup de main, and who, in the hour of their own triumph, flushed with
success, and commanded by the victorious Chief, a Prince of the land, who had just destroyed an
English army, albeit of helpless fugitives, suffered a garrison of toil-worn and partially dispirited men
to march out and put them to shameful rout, camp, baggage, the Chief's tent, all being left you knew as
spoil to a weaker British brigade—I say, why should we suppose that these men, who have never
checked on a fair field, be able to oppose any real barrier to the advance of the Russians, when
the latter have resolved to move into the Affghaan territory?

Much the same results as those noticed above occurred at Candahar, Tezeen, Izstalif, Guzerat, and
elsewhere.

In fact, I know of no instance of the Affghans gaining a success in an open fight against
disciplined soldiers in fair order and properly led. At Begmaroo our troops were already demoralized,
and at Purwan-Durrah the success was achieved by a Prince who, though he had the flower of Afghan
swordsmen around him, was over a body of Native Cavalry of questionable efficiency, poorly armed, and with little self-confidence to support them; the event therefore, proves nothing.

My own belief, then, is that, subsidise and drill the Affghans through Native instructors as much as
you choose, no efficient opposition to the onward move of Russian aggression would be the result, when
once the Russians had made their arrangements in the rear, and were resolved to advance on Cabul.
It might be different, I allow, if the Affghans were officered by Englishmen, and provided with an
efficient staff, similarly commanded: and only a force thus composed would, as far as my judgment
goes, have any chance of checking the Russian troops when they moved on.

Of course, this onward movement would not be made till they had made matters
satisfactory to themselves. It would be done with exertion and trouble, and we
might not be able to see the

If we are unfortunately downstairs and out in the street, and must ascend narrow and difficult
paths of steps, with no good landing-places on them, in order to get even up to the first floor. Our efforts
in this way must always be in vain, and should have a decided tendency to wear us out and discourage us,
in the first instance, and to make us lose all confidence in the success, which we might at
first look for, in a contest so difficult and toilsome. These objects must be
very well borne in mind, as they are of

We are unfortunate to find ourselves in such a situation on which I feel myself bound to
express an opinion, and one which, if clearly stated, will be felt by all who are

We cannot count upon a Russian victory. No time has yet been allowed
for her to attack, and no time has yet been allowed for her to

In this way, Mahomed-animism may yet exhibit a course which will
put the Muscovites in their place, and throw back their gains for a long period to come.

I confess that I dislike Islamism so much that, in prospect, it gives me no satisfaction to contemplate
the possibility of such an accident, and I would that, by some treaty or compact between the two
sister nations of Christendom, we might be so circumstanced as to be able and inclined to look upon
a misfortune to Russia in Asia as a mishap to civilization and progress, and, therefore, as an unmitigated
evil, instead of having to rejoice at the wilderness being left again to itself.

I think this attitude towards one another on the part of two Christian nations meeting in the
winds of Central Asia would be more creditable to our civilization and mutual faith, than talking of
hounds on Mahomedan populations and confounding modern history on our rivals and embarrass

I have been asked if I think that the views which I have expressed are not too
strongly stated. I cannot say that I think they are

I can easily understand that it may be next to impossible to obtain such a treaty. Russia possibly
does not think she needs it: and if we should obtain it, we might find that it involved inconveniences,
such as the necessity of dealing with infringement, and also of preventing aggression on Russian
territory by the classes occupying what should be decided to be the buffer tract: this latter we could not
undertake to do. The least flaw or mistake in the Russian arrangements would be immediately
taken advantage of by the powerful clans around her, whose strength is especially shown in at once

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detected and failing on a weak point, and it would be utterly impossible for us, occupying the position we do, to undertake to repress this action on the part of the Afghans, or any other tribe or class concerned.

It is, therefore, I believe impossible for us to enter into any rigid compact with Russia regarding the manner in which she is to be bound to conduct herself in Central Asia, nor could she, on her part, bind herself to refrain from this or that policy or step, as it might be very shortly forced upon her in a way that would admit of no hesitation or avoidance, and we could not undertake to relieve her of the pressure which might be causing the evil.

Still, I think some general declaration of principles on both sides might be obtained, and Russia might well bind herself to respect the limits of Afghanistan, unless aggressed upon by its rulers or people, and then, if this latter did occur, and was beyond our control, we must abide by the consequences. With even a native envoy at Cabul, we could not be deceived as to the real character of the offensive movement on either side. If Russia aggressed in an unprovoked manner contrary to her agreement, the character of her action would be at any rate sufficiently declared, and we must deal with it as best we may.

I think it might be well for Russia to accede to an arrangement which should allay the excitement and uneasiness felt by the Afghans, as well as ourselves, regarding her advance, as that uneasiness may force measures upon us which cannot but have a disturbing effect on the minds of the Afghan people and others.

After a considerable pause we may be induced to reopen our purse-strings, and commence to pay again; the Afghan will know very well that this is not merely in affection for him. "What is it then?" "We are uneasy about the Russians and their progress;" this being recognised as the screw that moves us, it will not fail to be sufficiently worked; when the silver stream once begins to flow, it will be kept up to its full volume, if it be not increased from year to year by tricks and false representations.

I would give the Afghans, as a body, credit for a genuine wish to keep out the Russians, and they will, no doubt, do something without money in the right direction by drilling their troops, strengthening their fortresses, &c.; and it is possible, as things progress and a better feeling and more confidence grows up between us, that they may ask for European Officers and Artillery. All this, then, if directed against Russia, will be really disadvantageous to her, and, perhaps, lead to a collision between us long before there was any necessity for it, or when it might have been avoided entirely.

It is on the above account that I think that Russia might do wisely in allaying anxiety and by giving us some trustworthy guarantee, which, by setting our minds at rest regarding her intentions and projects, might obviate the necessity of our expending men and treasure in educating these half barbarous but brave classes so as to enable them to hang efficiently on her advance, opposing her to the utmost, and to be ready, as they would be, to lend vigorous aid to their co-religionists in taking signal and fatal advantage of any unlooked for accident of war, famine, or pestilence, which befal her sons, and thus reduce her distant detachments to some of those unforeseen straits and emergencies that would experience in her advance, as well as ourselves, regarding her advance, as that uneasiness may force measures upon us which cannot but have a disturbing effect on the minds of the Afghan people and others.

Islamism has much warlike vitality in it, yet we are enlarged, and dwell in its tents, and by superior knowledge, character, system, and method, and let me add, by the will of Heaven, we hold our own, and control them so far that we are able to make use of these teeming masses of men, inured to the use of arms from their childhood, as if they were born to do our bidding; but there may come convulsive efforts to break this chain, and the Russians, with their extended communications held by troops which for years will be comparatively new to the work, may feel the strain when it comes as much or more than we are likely to do. Large bodies of men among the Mahomedans in our own territory live only on the hope of successfully accomplishing this effort, and are most bitter in their hatred to us. Could we be assured that Russia's designs are not directed against us, it would be much better for us to have a Christian and civilised nation sitting on the head of Government. By regarding the Moscow power as reducing nugatory its boast of an endless background of true believing nations and peoples from the Indus to Constantinople, than, perhaps, to see that civilised power worsted and obliged to fall back, while barbarism and the faith that opposes all progress and improvement should triumph.

I should then, certainly, like to see some reliable understanding come to with Russia which should limit her approach towards us, for it is truly very necessary for peace and quiet that there should be a good belt of independent country between us, and then surely we have both of us plenty to do in the civilising and consolidating way, without distracting and weakening one another by threats of direct and indirect hostility.

Such a compact need not embrace a time when the two nations might be at war in Europe.

It is true that, in the cause of civilisation, it might be creditable to both nations if they would consent to enter into a purely Asiatic treaty, in order, if it might be, to obviate the evils that would attend our coming into collision when surrounded by half civilised nations of a bitterly hostile faith, who would be eager to take advantage of any weakness which our unseemly jealousy of each other might cause to either side.

But perhaps this amount of philanthropy and forbearance is not to be hoped for. Russian politicians, no doubt, think that her advanced position in Asia will give her a hold over us in case of an European war, and this they will be both to forge.

I do not see why we should feel anxiety on this point. We are not likely to go to war with Russia in Europe single-handed, and she herself, therefore, is likely to have her hands tolerably full at or near home, and in that case, would not have much leisure or surplus material to send on the hazardous enterprise of advances through the Afghan passes to attack us at the base of the mountains or on the line of the Indus.

And here I must notice, that because I have written above in a depreciating manner of the regular Afghan army, it must not be supposed that I in the least undervalue the difficulty that any nation of aliens would experience in dealing with the independent Afghan tribes inhabiting the rough belt of mountains through which an invader of Hindostan would have to make his onward way, and also to secure his retreat. It is these men who constitute the strength of Afghanistan in some senses, its
weakness in others; it is a mistake to confound them with the armies of the rulers for the time being.

The latter may, indeed, be largely recruited from the mountain tribes, but the commanders and instructors of the Afghans troops have not the faculty possessed by our British officers in so remarkable a degree of imparting a new and increased power to such men, by giving them a certain sufficient amount of discipline, coupled with a thorough knowledge of and dexterity in using superior arms, while they are careful to retain and foster all the natural vigour and instinctive intelligence in these wild recruits which are the qualities which constitute their especial fitness for mountain warfare.

The rough tribesman on entering the ranks of the regular Afghan army, separates himself from his own native hills, where alone he can fight to the best advantage. If he is allowed to retain his own arms, they are clumsy and of poor quality; in open country, and against trained infantry, if a new weapon is subcult to him, it is one that he does not care about or know the use of, and no one takes the trouble to teach him.

The Sikhs, who could do nothing against the Mahomedan hill tribes in their own fastnesses and invariably made miserable failures of their attempts to coerce them, always signally defeated the Afghans when the latter attempted to meet them in the open.

I have above, then, given distinctly the opinion that the Afghan army, though drilled and paid by us, if only led by its own countrymen, will not hold the Russian troops in check for a day; but, on the other hand, I am perfectly aware that it would be a most hazardous attempt for the Russians to advance through the Afghan passes, leaving them in their rear, to attack us. Not merely defeat, but a check of a few days, would place them in a very critical position. A reverse would be utterly and irretrievable ruin.

From any other kind of army recruited in Asia, and hounded on to attack us, we should have nothing to fear. In fact, I should think it very doubtful whether Russian injunctions or incitement would produce the classes of Central Asia, who know our power and their own weakness in a fair stand up fight perfectly well, to make the methods of discipline and trained by us.

I beg to say that Russia in Bokhara would be led on into Afghanistan, and that she would soon find her position and power to be that of the wolf dealing with the lamb, and act accordingly. She would thus, at the outset at any rate, find that she could hold Cabul, Ghuznee, and Candahar, as we could have held them if proper arrangements and preparations had been made, and the force had not been placed in a false and dubious position, which was calculated to discipline its leaders from taking with firmness those necessary precautions, which they would of course have taken in regard to a force entirely dependent on its own resources.

Russia, with our example before her, will commit no such mistake; she will take care that her troops trust to themselves alone, and that they shall thus be able to hold themselves free of treachery and its paralyzing consequences; and setting about the matter in this way, I feel certain that she would at first find comparatively little difficulty in holding the open portions of the country, which would be all that she would care about in the first instance.

Like us, however, she would ere long wear out her welcome and must look out for squalls. The large mountain clans occupying and controlling important passes would prove as formidable as any other nation in the same instance, and it would be a most hazardous attempt for the Russians to advance through the Afghan passes, leaving them in their rear, to attack us. Not merely defeat, but a check of a few days, would place them in a very critical position. A reverse would be utterly and irretrievable ruin.

Sulposing Russia by force or treaty to become mistress of Afghanistan, she would naturally take possession of the valleys of Khoorram and Khost, and thus her most advanced detachments would come at once almost in sight of our outposts. It is necessary to look at this point in the face.

There remains the possibility, which I have before alluded to, of Russia being drawn on against her will and intention, and being thus forced into an advance on Afghanistan. This sort of thing has happened so often to ourselves, that we could little blame Russia for acting as we have been obliged to do so many other civilized nations, and it therefore becomes necessary to consider well what would be the result of an event which, though perhaps deprecated and struggled against by the politicians of both nations, may yet, perhaps, happen, in spite of their wishes and endeavours to the contrary.

Supposing Russia by force or treaty to become mistress of Afghanistan, she would naturally take possession of the valleys of Khoorram and Khost, and thus her most advanced detachments would come at once almost in sight of our outposts. It is necessary to look at this point in the face.

The question, then, is, what action is open to us in order to ward off this undoubted evil? Could the influence of Russia be effectually confined to her present limits, I would much rather have her where she is than away; but it is, however, equally certain that it would be very inconvenient to have her in Afghanistan.

There appear to be several lines of policy under discussion with the above object.

Sir Henry Rawlinson's proposition is to make friends with Afghanistan and Persia, re-establishing our influence with both. He would give European Officers for the Persian Army, and I think (I write
from memory), he makes mention in one place of giving material support to Afghanistan, if necessary, though he would prefer our efforts being confined within the limits of diplomacy.

If Persia can thus be made ours in feeling by aid given to her by us in establishing a naval force in the Gulf, and if her army can be drilled and commanded by British Officers, at any rate there would be a game worth playing, and, situated as the Persian territory is, such a position must have a certain influence on Russian proceedings in Central Asia, while it would tend to our honour and influence in Asiatic politics generally.

Whether this attitude can be accomplished without an enormous and well nigh ruinous outlay for a structure which might crumble to pieces when submitted to real pressure, for I have, I confess, a very poor opinion of the Persian troops, I am not in a position to judge. Persia has always appeared to me to be overcrowded and expansion-minded, and regards Russia, that I have never felt it likely that we should be able to cope successfully with the latter in Persian diplomacy, and thus that what favourable point might be obtained for a time would only be to keep us in play and draw our money. But there may be wheels within wheels, which I am not aware of, which may really incline Persia to look for friendship farther from home. The hereditary domestic tyrant, the domineering elder brother, may be the least loved member of the circle, and, if so, by all means let us take advantage of the opening, for, indeed, from our unfortunate position making action so difficult, we do want every help to give us a lift in the estimation of all classes in Asia in this especial matter.

If we do not advance into Afghanistan to meet the Russians and thus play the forward game, we must appear to await attack at the foot of the mountains, and that appearance itself is an evil and misfortune. If, however, the rumour got abroad that we were strong in Persia, there would be an appearance of life, and we should be supposed to know very well what we were about in other divisions of the game.

The second portion of Sir Henry Rawlinson's plan is to subsidize Afghanistan, cultivate friendship with its Ruler, and, I think he means, if it should prove necessary, lend our Officers, and give it other material support.

I have no objection to the subsidy, if we can afford it, and if it is to be within reasonable limits, and not subject to periodic enhancement; but it is the commencement of a system which, unless jealously watched, may suck our blood to a dangerous extent, and in some measure sap our prestige, as the Afghans and others will know well that we are induced thus to pay by some apprehension connected with our own interests. With regard to this, however, I feel satisfaction in the remembrance that we have already once stopped the subsidy, so the Afghans are on this account not likely to fall into the mistake of supposing that it is from any anxiety regarding them that we begin to pay again.

On the whole, however, it may be truly urged to a system of paying heavily for a doubtful benefit may be set the decided advantage of its being known that we are on friendly terms with the Ruler of Afghanistan—a state of things which would always be popular with our own troops, and which also would have an appreciable effect on our relations with the border tribes. No real material power would be conferred, perhaps, by the Ameer's friendship; neither he nor we would be one whit nearer the mark of actual supremacy over the tribes, or be assisted in the task of coercing them, and yet the fact of its being known that we were on friendly terms with Afghanistan would have a certain sedative effect on the independent belt of mountains between us, and would prevent refugees and adventurers, preferably hostile to us, being received with favour at Cabul, and publishing from thence lying assertions that the efforts of their friends on the border against us had the countenance and sympathy of the Afghan authorities.

This advantage, coupled with the rumour throughout the lands that, in addition to a revived influence in Persia, the British have a hold on Afghanistan, and are on friendly terms with its Ruler, also the comfort of being up and doing something, so as not to be entirely passively looking on at the progress of Russia, and in a manner awaiting attack from her—a position which I confess would be extremely disagreeable to our neighbours, and in which we would feel inclined to much nearer to us; these, I say, may be looked upon as real benefits to be derived by us in return for our heavy outlay of hard coin. But, as I have before noted, I have no hope that subsidized Afghanistan would be able to resist the progress of Russia when once an onward movement had been resolved on; it is, however, quite possible that such a show of strength might be made that Russia might not feel inclined to venture into so rough a country, garrisoned by a known warlike people on friendly terms with and subsidized by us, and thus attack might possibly be avoided, and the attention of the aggressive power be turned elsewhere.

This is the favourable side of the picture, and the hope might be fulfilled; but the Afghans are so greedy of money, and are such adepts at trickery and evasion of solemn agreements, and withal are so reckless and mischievous, that it is certainly possible that they might act very differently; thus, finding money going on both sides, they might play off one rich nation against the other, greatly enjoying the result as it affected themselves; or they might even, with deep design, based on their own general Khanah-ba-dosh character and power of finding secure retreat, if necessary, in mountain fastnesses in which they could safely "jouk and let the jaw go by," if their plans happened to explode unfavourably. I say they might, even at some stage of the proceedings incommode to both Russia and ourselves, bring about a collision betwixt the two intruders, with the intention of profiting by the result, whichever way matters happened to fall out.

There is a deep under-current of religious fanaticism in all these Mahomedan classes which is ready to blaze out whenever opportunity offers for a successful display of it. Thus it may seem strange, as we are working against Russia, but I consider it to be certainly true, that, supposing we had taken up an advanced position beyond the passes, nothing perhaps, would be more unfavourable to our power and military prestige than a moral祀，it did not feel inclined to do anything, or to complete collapse of Russian influence in front of us, coupled, perhaps, with disaster to her advanced detachments. The Mahomedan spirit would immediately be in the ascendant, and one set of intruders would be regarded as distastefully as another.

Brigadier-General Harry Lumsden and his brother, Colonel Peter Lumsden, the Quartermaster-General of the Army, than whom no two men in the country know better what they write and speak.
about when Afghan and Central Asian affairs are the subject under discussion, are strongly in favour of taking up a position at Khoorrum. This to be done by an arrangement with the Ameer, who, it is proposed, should be the two districts of Khoorrum and Khoot to us for a handsome yearly rent.

Brigadier-General Lumsden couples the plan with the proposed establishment of a British Envoy at Cabul and the formation of a contingent of Native troops, Artillery and Infantry, to be watched over and paid by the English Officer in the position of Envoy.

The position at Khoorrum would be in a fine open valley within a couple of marches of parts of our present border, while it would be only eight from Cabul.

The proposition, as a whole, as might be expected from the source from which it emanates, is quite practicable, and many of the risks and evils which would probably be derived from it. It is, as a whole, because I do not think that we could with any wisdom seize the Khoorrum valley and hold it by force: hold it we might, but our communications with the rear would immediately become involved in difficulty. These communications would lie through the Meeranzye valley to Hungoo and Kohat on one side, and to Bunnnoo, by the bed of the Khoorrum, on the other; there is nothing impracticable in either route. Meeranzye has, indeed, given us a good deal of trouble first and last, and the defile of the Khoorrum is stiff and liable to be infested by the Wuzeeerie tribes, but acting, as we should, in concert with the Ruler of Cabul, no real difficulty would, I am of opinion, be experienced in keeping open our communications with our advanced position in the Khoorrum valley.

I understand from General Lumsden's memorandum that he would locate the force about four miles on this side of the Peiwar Kothul, the ascent of which on the eastern side is comparatively short, while the descent into the Loghur valley is long. This, I allow, gives the command of the pass rather to the forces on the eastern side of the pass than to those on the west, but I note that it is not an easy thing for a force to leave its cantonment and occupy a pass, as we have found at Kohat, and, therefore, as a rule, I should dislike a position immediately under a pass: it is not convenient to march out and perch yourself upon it: it is equally perilous to be occupied there: you have to be on the look-out for robbery, and the like.

But the thought of carefully thinking out the Khoorrum plan is a conviction in my mind that the garrison of Khoorrum would in reality only be used as a substantial point for a much larger force to march on in case of need, and I must allow that, from position and facilities, it affords the best possible attitude for us to assume if our desire be to be so situated as to be able to lend material succour to Afghanistan in a case of emergency, or merely to preserve a material influence over the counsels of its rulers in ordinary times.

There is also the point that I have noted elsewhere, namely, that whoever makes himself master of Afghanistan becomes possessor also of the Khoorrum and Khost valleys immediately above Bunnnoo and Meranzye. The Dost's son, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, descended from Khoorrum on Bunnnoo with a fully appointed force provided with field guns, &c., in 1848-49, and the same route could undoubtedly be taken by a large invading army. This fact has never given us any anxiety while the Afghan armies alone were our neighbours, as our ordinary frontier force could have dealt with them, but, supposing Afghanistan to be held by the disciplined armies of an European nation, the case might become very different, and the Russians, for instance, holding a position in the Khoorrum valley, would undoubtedly be extremely communicative to us. On the other hand, unless our position in Khoorrum meant thoroughgoing material support to the Afghan army beyond the passes, I should not see the use of taking it up, as it certainly would not be likely to prove a convenient position for us to meet a large force descending for invasion, and, further, it would immediately and perhaps prematurely bring us into collision with the conquerors of Afghanistan, as we should be actually on Afghan soil, and the new comers, who claimed to have acquired Afghanistan in its integrity, could not afford to let us alone.

I hope I have above given fairly the advantages of the Khoorrum position; it is an unsatisfactory task to dwell on the disadvantages and risks that would attend our thus moving in to occupy a wild Afghan valley by powerful tribes that we have hitherto had nothing to do with; these drawbacks can be imagined, and need not be detailed. The game we have to play is no easy one, and we must not expect that any plan of action we enter upon will be devoid of risk and difficulty, but there is one point which I must be allowed to lay particular stress upon, and that because it appears to me to be extremely important.

I allude to the fact that a forward movement of this sort involves the absolute necessity of more extended operations when the actual strain should come.

As long as we keep to our own line of border and adhere to our policy of not advancing from it, the Afghans can have no plea for calling on us for material assistance beyond the passes. We have practically declared what we will defend, and could not be justly taunted with inactivity or indifference, if we resolved to wait till we are assailed; but, on the other hand, departing from this sober line of policy, we commence pushing up our detachments into Afghan valleys, professedly because our doing so will give us useful and commanding positions with regard to the Afghan theatre in front of us, then I think we should be considered by the world around us to have accepted the whole responsibility of a more active policy of resistance to Russian aggression.

Imagine a British Officer Envoy at Cabul, a Russian force advancing from Bokhara, first lapping up Bulk and then moving on Cabul, driving in the Afghan advanced detachments and threatening a decisive battle at or near Bumeen, and the Afghan troops in good faith marching to the front to fight the battle on which so much would hang affecting both their interests and ours. What, I would ask, under such really momentous circumstances, would the fine and efficient force, for such it would be, be at the head of the Khoorrum valley be doing nothing at ease in its cantonment, and awaiting tidings of the result? This would be poor work, and I think it probable that, long ere the actual collision occurred, we should, on the solicitations of the Envoy and on our own convictions of the vital importance of the crisis, have moved on to back up our allies, and share the warlike dangers and political risks of a struggle by the results of which we were so greatly to profit or suffer.

It would, I think, have become specially incumbent on us to act thus if, up to that time, we had been able to get the Afghans with the hope of material support when the actual hour of difficulty should come, and if the general belief in the country, in the Afghan army, and our own, had been that such
would be our action, for if after having, by our previous line of conduct, raised such hopes we should prove a broken reed to them when the hour for action arrived, we should incredibly injure our own honour and prestige, and cut down the morale of our troops.

I should say, then, that if such a conjunction of circumstances as above described should occur, then to go forward would be the right thing, but this would involve our fighting above the passes—no such great matter, perhaps, if we are provided with men and money, and have the full sympathy of the Afghans for the time being. We have fought on the same ground before, and not without honour, and we could undoubtedly do the same again, but it is, at any rate, a very serious matter, and the advantages and disadvantages of making the plains of Afghanistan our arena in such a struggle should be well and carefully weighed before we place ourselves in positions which must, I believe, lead us on directly to such a result when, perhaps, we might not fully have contemplated occupying such an extended field of operations.

My feeling, therefore, is that the occupation of Khooorrum, as proposed by the Lumdens, coupled with the establishment of a British Envoy and contingent at Cabul, must, if any strain occurs, involve us in that very active interference in the military position beyond the passes which it would appear that Colonel Peter Lumsden, in his Memorandum of October 1867, was inclined greatly to deprecate.

If I am right in the above conclusion, the simple question is, are we prepared to fight above the passes?

We should not probably have to meet any very large body of disciplined troops, and Russia would fight at as great risks as ourselves; that is, she could as ill bear reverse as we could. Bear or lose would be all one to the wolves if overtaken by misfortune. Russia's retreat under defeat, through Bulkh and Bokhara, would prove as disastrous as ours would be, under similar circumstances, to Khooorrun and Bunnoo (here I would allow that the Khooorrun position would stand us in good stead), probably worse, as from our neighbourhood, and the position we hold permanently in Meeranzye, the tribes might fear retribution.

In the matter of risk, then, we should be about on an equality, and our troops, aided by a drilled Afghan army, would be a formidable body for the Russian or any other power to attack under the circumstances of the case.

There would be, therefore, nothing to be especially anxious about were the possibility of an actual collision with the Russians on the plains of Afghanistan the only contingency which it was necessary to be prepared for.

But there are difficulties and actual dangers which would beset our occupying so extended a position for a long period which are not merely military in character.

In the first place, very great solicitude regarding our position in the country, and the risks we may have to encounter in coming years from internal conspiracy, disloyalty in the army or among the Native Chiefs, &c., are sufficiently set forth in a paper I lately wrote on a proposal to throw open military cantonments, which, I am aware, has been perused by his Excellency the Viceroy.

But I do not distrust the native army. The men mean loyally by us, and would at first go eagerly about a new and interesting service, as this would be. The Afghans in our ranks, and they are numerous, would be delighted, and they could be trusted until we got into very great straits, and would not, in fact, desert us then if serving under Officers who had managed to attach them by previous kindness and interest. The Sikhs would be proud to find themselves in Afghanistan in the and open Cabul valleys; one regiment of them would deal with three times their number of Asiatics, whatever their name and prestige in their own hills might be. The Ghorkhas would grieve over leaving their wives and children, but would go cheerfully at first, and be interested in seeing the new hill country. The soul of the Poorbeah would sicken at the sight of Afghan passes again, but he would be supported by the cheerful bearing of his more hearty and adventurous brethren. The English Officers would be in high spirits, and all for a new or more war as a marriage bell.

But when the novelty wore off the separation from families would be felt painfully by the Sikk, Ghorkha, and Poorbeah soldiers; the expense of two establishments would press upon them, more pay would be wished for at first, then asked for, and finally perhaps demanded. Our Native army is comparatively small now, and the Cabul duty would recur frequently, regiments would go once, twice, contentedly; the third time they would do anything they could to get off it. The passes would always be a difficulty; convoys would have to be forced through them, ill-protected property, parties, or individuals moving up to join the army would be plundered, if not murdered, though we were supposed to be the allies of the Afghans, and no real satisfaction or reparation would be obtainable.

In Afghanistan itself our troops would very likely ere long, at the solicitation of its rulers, become involved in the task of bringing this or that tribe to its senses for the general weal, and thus there would be much work and service for the troops, and not very clearly in our own quarrels.

The whole thing from beginning to end would be tested by a class of rather influential characters in Asiatic warfare, known as camp followers; they have an old grudge against Afghanistan, not without cause, poor fellows, as their lot there, as elsewhere, was usually to come in for a share of any kind of violence, while their scale of remuneration is, as a rule, not such as to foster an enthusiasm for distant and hazardous service.

Our camp followers are not mere "dumb driven cattle," without opinions of their own; they form, at times, strong views for themselves, and hold them in opposition to, or entirely independent of, those of the troops they are serving with.

At Umbeylah (I do not think that I have mentioned it above two persons since the affair) the camp followers bore extreme extenuated disloyal. The sullen (camel drivers) extenuated the Musulman soldiery, as they turned out to fight, for siding with infidels against the true faith. I myself heard a ring of camel drivers and domestic servants round a fire joking over a fresh batch of doolies full of dead and wounded going down to the plain. On another occasion, when the pickets were being relieved, I heard a party of men talking together when a bugle sounded from one of the pickets. "Hallo!" said one fellow, "what are they blushing about already?" "Oh, that's for 'mudul' (assistance), said another, and then there was a general laugh. Small matters, but they contained the fact that a large proportion
of these wretches, who actually exist by hanging on to our camps, are at heart disloyal to us, or care so little about us, that a few days of real difficulty and hard fighting is liable to estrange them.

Well, I think, as a nation, we care as little about these uncertainties as men well can; but when we embark in distant expeditions, and move far from our base, making ourselves so greatly dependent on the loyalty and zeal of men whose affection for us has so little root that a few days only of not complete success undermines it, I confess that our position is rather unsound. I must say, however, that in Afghanistan the camp followers, if once landed in the country, are pretty sure to stick to their colours, for much the same reason that Claverhouse felt confident of his dispersed life-guardsmen finding their way to the head-quarters of the regiment after their retreat and at Dumfries.

But, though remaining in their duty, they might exhibit much discontent, and their murmurings would, after a time, affect the troops, and thus we might have extremely delicate and difficult matters to deal with, affecting pay and extra allowances, and the general necessity of keeping the troops in good temper at critical moments, which might, with our new Native army, as was the case with the old, be the commencement of a dangerous knowledge of strength on the one side, and of virtual confession of the lack of it on the other, and this might bear bitter fruits in our own internal management both of our army and territory after a time.

Circumstances being as we are, I do most firmly believe that we cannot in wisdom go beyond the passes to occupy the stage, and prepare to fight the Russians. I fully feel and allow that it would be the true policy of any nation playing its own game with its own nine-pins, and thus if we could afford to keep a fine preponderantly European force above the passes without injuriously weakening our garrison of India, and were ready to keep this force up to full strength by recruits and detachments from below when necessary, then that would undoubtedly be the game to play. Our troops have once held Candahar against all comers under most adverse circumstances and could surely do it again; their prestige on that plain, gained amidst the dastardly military treachery of the line, with the hopefully Afghans holding the right at Ghuznee and Cabul, would be very strong, and the front shown would be a formidable one for any nation to meddle with that had its own rear communica-
tions to look to, and other risks and uncertainties to provide for. But, unfortunately, we must needs in front prize shape our garment to suit the especial breadth and quality of the material of which it is to be made. It is natural enough for men at a distance merely to count pips, and write of men in thousands, but it is, I conceive, absolutely necessary for us on the spot to pause and consider what, in a few years or less time, would be the feeling of the large bulk of our army regarding this, to them, distant and disagreeable service.

The mistake must not be made of regarding it as a service near home, because our Native troops have gone cheerfully to more distant places, such as China and Abyssinia, by sea. The character of such services is somewhat different; men or regiments usually volunteer for the duty, they are in consequence made a good deal of, and enjoy the éclat of the thing; every care is taken of their comfort, and the difficulty usually occupies a limited period, after which the regiment is conveyed back to near their own homes, with a good name, and in high good humour with itself. The Afghan is a native army, on the contrary, would be only a great, and, to our Native troops, after a time, highly distasteful extension of ordinary marching duty, the éclat would wear off the toil, and absence and other disagreeables would remain, and the evils I have above noted would, I believe, without doubt, be ere long the result, and, under these circumstances, I would avoid those positions which might against our will entangle us in Afghan affairs to such an extent that, on the strain coming, we must either go forward and fight at disadvantage, or hold back, and thereby, from better hopes having been entertained of us, lose good name and prestige, and, perhaps, mar the morale of our own troops at a critical time.

My inclination, then, in making any arrangement with the Afghan Chiefs, would be to let them know distinctly that we have no intention of advancing beyond our own border. Of course, if we found it convenient, we could do so to say that we would guard against any possibility of the Afghans having it in their power to say that we had proved a broken reed to them when their difficulties came to the worst point, and that thus the help they had counted on had failed them.

Having fully warned them of our intentions, I should see nothing but good in being friends with them, and if we can afford it without having to tax our own subjects to provide money for this rather unproductive field, I should see no objection to a moderate subsidy being given. I do still dislike it, but I would be content, as it may do some good, and cannot do much harm. It will have an appearance of life, and satisfy those who appear to regret that we did not provide Shere Allee Khan with the means of dealing with his brothers, and securing himself on the throne. Why this should be considered to have been in any way our duty I cannot conceive. Sir Henry Rawlinson mentions the uninterrupted friendliness of the father, Dost Mahomed Khan, apparently forgetting, or, perhaps, purposely purposely giving the contrary unfriendly attempt of the latter to take advantage of our difficulties in 1848-49, by assisting the rebellion of the Sikhs against us, his troops besieging Attock, and fighting against us at Guzerat.

During the Persian war the Dost received a large subsidy, and I quite agreed in the policy of giving it to him at that time, as the name of his being friendly was good for our object; but could reliable information be obtained as to how the money was spent, it would not probably be found that much had been done with our treasure towards furthering our design in giving it. After the war the subsidy was, I have always thought rightly, stopped, it being natural and not derogatory for us to pay for a special object, but decidedly undignified, and lowering to our prestige to continue to do so when there was no particular advantage to be gained, and only as it would have appeared to the surrounding classes to consolidate the weak-handed Ruler of Afghanistan who could not meet a division of our troops in the field.

In the present instance, if we pay, the Asiatic world will know that we do so in order to be generally on friendly terms with the Afghans, and this with reference to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, so there is not likely to be any particular regard for our movement regarding the supply when there was no qual pro quo to be expected. I know that this may be represented to be a niggardly and selfish policy, but in combating this objection I must really stand on my knowledge of
the Afghan character, and assert that, in dealing with them, it is the only line of conduct by which we shall preserve our dignity and prestige, and I am further inclined, if the view I have expressed is to be stigmatised as wanting in liberality and generosity, to ask what claim in honour or chivalry the Afghans can have on us; they have twice behaved towards us in a treacherous and unfriendly way, and would do so again if it suited their game, even after taking our money; and I cannot help further adding my conviction that were there no Russians in Central Asia, and the Afghans were believed to be as weak for aggression as I know them to be, it would not be a large amount of our hardly collected revenues that English politicians would recommend should flow monthly up the Afghan passes.

In Shere Allee's case, on his father's death, we recognised Shere Allee Khan as his successor, as he was his father's nominee, but it surely was not incumbent on us to make arrangements which would have greatly taxed and embarrassed us to see that he retained the throne. He now, after a considerable and gallant struggle, though marked, as might be expected, with acts which I think it was well that we were free of even the most distant connexion with, greatly needs help and countenance; and as we have an object of our own in view, and our meddling is, therefore, in the eyes of all natural and not unwarrentable, I see no insuperable objection to our affording him a certain amount of assistance. I would fix the subsidy to be given at a sum which should be a sufficient earnest of our good-will, and be a solid assistance to him, while it should not overtax and burden us or those who contribute to our Exchequer, for, if the Cabul subsidy were known to be a heavy item, the tax-payers of Hindostan would not be long in crying out that they, being loyal subjects, were being squeezed to supply the wants of the Afghans, who rendered no tangible service in return, and had never been known in all their history to do any good to anyone, and the taunt would not be easily answered.

I wish briefly to notice one or two points in Sir Donald McLeod's memorandum, in the general tenor of which I agree most fully.

I do not think that the Afghans dislike us individually. English Officers would always be on hearty terms of good-fellowship with Afghan Sirdars; the latter are frank and free, and manly in ordinary intercourse; they are devoted to the love of well-made firearms, horses, dogs, sport, &c., and in all these matters are inclined to look on us as "costards." There is no race antipathy between us, and if they are proud of having by fair means and foul destroyed an army that occupied a part of their country on the understanding of support from a considerable Afghan contingent, which failed in the hour of need, the Englishman can quietly congratulate himself on the fact that the whole clan hill tribes, and all united and aided by the natural strength of their country, were quite unable to prevent an avenging force from moving into the heart of the country and doing as it liked.

But an Afghan Chief's friendship is a very superficial matter, and can be only calculated to last as long as is quite convenient to him,—I speak of the class generally; I know that in our former connexion with Afghanistan there were one or two brilliant exceptions.

But as a class they are politicians from their youth up, and must and will adopt the side which appears to be best for their own interests.

On the other hand, as a body, the Afghans do distrust us, and the re-appearance of fair faces in the streets of Cabul would not be popular, as they would be regarded as the forerunners of occupation; there would, however, even then be a large body of men who would, as Sir Donald McLeod imagines, feel kindly towards us as the protectors and promoters of chivalry and kindness to our women and prisoners. The men have many fine qualities, and life among them is pleasant and genial, but they are not to be trusted when the political horizon is clouded.

Sir Donald McLeod is again further anxious that we should adopt a more conciliatory policy towards the hill tribes.

This is the stated opinion of many, but usually, I think, of men who have lately come from England, and who, therefore, ignorant of the long and really important struggle that we have gone through with these men.

Sir Donald McLeod's appearing to endorse the opinion may have the effect in England of inclining those in high authority to think that the idea given by certain writers on frontier matters to the effect that the character of our administration of it has been too harsh and unhending is correct, and I think this would be extremely unfair on all the Officers who have labourd in the field.

Sir Donald McLeod, I know full well, is as thoroughly acquainted with the difficulties of the case as any man. He has had the Kohat Pass, the Hussainkhail, and the Bortolom tribes to deal with and has lately had to go to war with the Black Mountain; he knows them pretty well the difficulty that attends the not very dignified task of holding out your hand all day to a man who declines to take it. I therefore take Sir Donald's remarks as only an expression of that hearty wish that we must all feel—that a better understanding could be come to with the tribes.

I myself would gladly see conciliation carried to its utmost point, but I know how very difficult it is to conciliate without being mistaken.

How am I to begin? I ask especially to the Puthan tribes. Our whole relations with the Belooch tribes on the Deraj Ghaizee Khan and Scinde border are on a different footing; land is more plentiful, and water in some instances can be made available; and in these localities I believe that much might be done by encouraging the tribes to settle partially in our territory.

But in the case of the Puthan tribes, as I say, where are we to begin? I do not know any important class along the border, the conduct of which would entitle it to be the first to receive our favours, and I do not know one that would not probably misunderstand such advances. If you give to one you must give to all, and what rule or limit can you fix. Those that got least and thought they ought to have
got more would immediately take measures to induce you to fill up their measure for peace and quietness sake.

Our only experience with paying has been in the Kohat Pass, and surely the result there has not been such as to encourage us to adopt the system elsewhere.

A generally conciliatory bearing I would of course greatly advocate, and I am sure it has not hitherto been wanting; one of the moves, however, most necessary for promoting this very desirable object is, as proposed by Sir Donald McLeod, that the Commissioner of Peshawur should be set free of ordinary judicial work, so that he may have leisure to give more attention to his political duties, and thus have more time for seeing and conversing with political visitors, outsiders from the hills, &c. He should be able to let the British, free-handed in trespassing, and be allowed to entertain visitors of note during their stay at Peshawur, and to send them away with suitable petty presents of loungeois and the like.

All this would enhance our popularity, be limited in its character, and be fully understood and appreciated; but even this must not be set about at first in a lavish way, otherwise, if the news spread that the Commissioner kept open kitchen, he would be persecuted by all the useless drones of the neighbourhood—men who would either scorn upon our hospitality, or go away discontented if not kept at free quarters as long as they expected.

But this I think may be attempted in the smallest degree to the black-mail system, anything in fact that may lead the easily inflated Pathan brain into the mistake that would be natural to it under the circumstances, namely, that we were anxious to purchase its owner's good-will because we regarded his displeasure with some anxiety. Wherever liberality can be shown without raising this idea it might be well bestowed.

After a rather toilsome, but, I think, honourable struggle of 20 years, we have shown the hill men that we can hold our own, and do not, in a military point of view, care the flourish of a file for their hostility, and if not a timbre, has need only, if we can only get them in order, let once taken advantage of; but, as I have said, in mentally glancing down the border, I do not see the portion of it where much can be done without incurring the above-noted risk of leading the recipients and their neighbours into the mistake of thinking that our liberality is in reality based on weakness.

In the case of the Pathan tribes we have not an inch of land to give them; every cultivable acre in front of their mountains is held, and has been held for ages, by men who are now our subjects, and who, before they became such, held these hills, springs, and lands, with varying fortune and at the expense of much loss of life and other sufferings, in defiance of the powerful hill tribes above them. I presume that no Englishman who knew what he was writing about would counsel our taking these lands from their gallant defenders to make them over to their hereditary enemies. I am very sure that Sir Donald McLeod would not advocate such a policy.

Along the whole border our conduct has been uniform. Under real difficulties at times, and at much expense and trouble throughout, we have assisted the occupiers of the soil, whom we found in possession, to carry on more effectually and fully, and, as at present, with complete success, the game that had been handed down to them from generations, of holding the fertile springs and well lands of the plains against the lawless and in-warring hill tribes above them, and I need not say that this was the line of action most calculated in the end to redound to our honour along the Afghan border.

There is one other case I would notice, as it might be brought forward in favour of a liberal policy. I allude to the revenue settlements in Hazarajat.

I quite allow that liberality in this case was wise and has borne excellent fruit, but the distinction I would draw is that these men were to be our subjects, and, under such circumstances, it was open to us to be as liberal to them as we pleased in money matters, as we held ourselves in readiness to enforce obedience with a strong hand, if necessary, in all other ways.

I have lately written notes on our connexion with the Kohat Pass, and on the Beozote affair; if these matters, close to our border and affecting only one or two tribes, are matters of real difficulty to us, how can we, with any wisdom, contemplate grasping the whole mountainous belt that divides us from the Afghan valleys? It is one of the remarkable anomalies of the case that we could hold the open valleys of Afghanistan with the central points of influence, although so much more distant from our base, more easily than we could occupy and control the Khyber Pass and the Teroor Mountains, which are both of them in sight of our cantonment at Peshawur.

I have thought it right to give exactly what was in my mind on this difficult point. I am aware that, from the perplexities of the case, I have scarcely done more than state the dilemma we are in without proposing any tangible remedy. The last thing I should wish to do would be to appear to set up my judgment against that of others like Sir Donald McLeod and the Lumadens, who have had more experience, the latter having seen the interior of Afghanistan, which I have not. I am, I think, entitled to write of the border, having spent ten good years of my life on it, and I have wished to draw more distinctly than is usually done the distinction between the Afghan regular armies and the mountaineer warriors of the independent belt of rough country in front of our outposts, who prove so formidable when assaulted in their own fastnesses, but who are almost powerless for aggression or for war in open ground, and who, therefore, would prove but weak and inefficient defenders of the Afghan territories against the disciplined armies of an European power.

R. TAYLOR, Colonel, Commissioner, Umbellah.

23rd November 1868.
I have deferred until now making any comments on the able and exhaustive paper by Sir Henry Rawlinson, setting forth his views on the great question of the position and progress of Russia in Central Asia, and of their effect upon India. I had hoped that the response which I had made to Ameer Shere Ali in the early part of October last, expressing my readiness to meet him at Peshawur or Rawul Pindee, would have led ere this to a friendly interview between us, when I purposed to offer him some material assistance in the shape of money, arms, ammunition, and accoutrements to enable him to strengthen his hold on his country. But I have been disappointed in this anticipation. The Ameer, though desirous of meeting me, is at present unable to do so. He is not yet recovered from an attack by the combined forces of his brother, Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan, and of his nephew, Sirdar Abdool Rahman Khan (the son of his late brother, Mahomed Aftzul Khan), a Chief who has already gained the reputation of a soldier of ability, enterprise, and spirit. It seemed probable, and it was generally supposed, that Abdool Rahman would have delayed his advance on Cabul until the spring. But whether it be that he has judged it more expedient to give his uncle no time to organize his resources and recruit his army, or that urged by his Officers and soldiers, many of whose families are at the mercy of Ameer Shere Ali, and exasperated perhaps, too, at the treatment of his mother, the famous Beebee Muwared, it is certain that he has resolved on an immediate attack, and by the latest accounts he was on his march for Cabul. Indeed, before I left Umballa, on the morning of the 16th instant, I received a telegram from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, then at Peshawur, announcing a current rumour in the bazaar there, that the Ameer's troops had been defeated. It was added, that the report required confirmation, and as it has not yet been confirmed the probability is that it is unfounded.

3. If I think it right here to remark that, whatever may be the value of the arguments for or against the early recognition of Shere Ali as Ameer of Cabul, after the death of his father, that matter had been disposed of before I arrived in India in December 1863. Some time, no doubt, was intentionally allowed to elapse before the Government of India formally recognized Shere Ali's accession to power. And bearing in mind the personal character of this Chief, and the formidable combination, headed by his two elder brothers, which then threatened him, I do not think that it can be fairly said that the conduct of the Government was unreasonable, and not justified by circumstances.

3. I do not share the opinion—it is mere conjecture—that, had Ameer Shere Ali been aided by us earlier in the day, it would have enabled him to beat down the Opposition he subsequently encountered, and to which he, for a time, succumbed. It is more reasonable, I think, to infer that his misfortunes were mainly due to the defects of his own character, and were the natural consequences of his misrule. His eldest brother, Mahomed Aftzul Khan, turned out to be a sot and an imbecile. Mahomed Azim Khan, the second brother, though a man of more character than Aftzul Khan, has proved himself unfit to rule, and a soldier of little capacity and courage. The Ameer's most formidable antagonist was his late brother, Mahomed Ameen Khan, the son of the same mother. To a certain extent the interests of these two brothers were identical, and a very moderate amount of good management on the part of the Ameer would probably have attached this Chief to him. The Ameer, however, made no real attempt to accomplish this important object. The brothers were soon at war. In the battle which ensued, Mahomed Ameen Khan slew with his own hand Mahomed Ali Khan, his nephew, the brave and enterprising but wayward son of the Ameer, and fell himself a moment afterwards, shot dead by a private soldier. In this action the Ameer thus lost his eldest son, the chief hope of his party, and almost immediately afterwards, by his capricious and harsh conduct, he drove into rebellion the best and most trusty General in his service, Mahomed Rufeek Khan, who had up to that time served him with fidelity and ability. In short, as I have already said, the Ameer's own faults and Cantankerous disposition was clearly due to his own great defects. At one time he was capricious, violent, and headstrong; on other occasions, when energetic and prompt decision was essential, he would himself give no orders, and would not allow others to act. It is said that he had already ample ground to distrust his son Yakooob Ali Khan, and he has now, I believe, but few Officers of mark on his side. Since his return to Cabul, when he was welcomed very generally as a deliverer (so obnoxious had Mahomed Azim Khan become during his short rule), Ameer Shere Ali has lost, I hear, his recently acquired popularity. Indeed, such has been his action, that the report is again current, which was rife for some time while the Ameer was shut up idling in Candahar, that his mind is affected with the taint of insanity. It is right that I should, however, add that the Ameer has certainly some counterbalancing good qualities. He evidently possesses great courage and determination, and is said to be popular with the soldiers and common people.

4. Looking to the character and position of the Ruler, Ameer Shere Ali, to the resources and prospects of his rivals for power, his brothers Mahomed Aftzul Khan and Mahomed Azim Khan, was it not too presumptuous to feel it my duty to urge you should have reason to allow them unmolested to fight out their own battle? It appeared to me, I confess, at the time, and it still appears to me, that this was in every view the wisest and most politic course to pursue. When I met Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan at Peshawur in February 1857, I told him that it was his wish, and the earnest desire of all Afghans, that we should not interfere in their quarrels, but should allow them to manage their own concerns, and to fight out and settle their own domestic broils in their own way. The Chiefs and people of Afghanistan, he assured me, one and all, mainly dreaded, and would ever more strongly resent, any such interference. But in the present very inconvenient position of matters, it is perhaps very inconvenient for us to have found ourselves supporting the cause of the unsuccessful candidate to the throne of Cabul.

5. But, setting aside the views and wishes of the Afghan people, had there been a Chief of real mark or character among the Afghans, whom the great body of the people was really willing to accept as their Ruler, there would, I admit, have been some, perhaps I may say strong, grounds for helping such a Chief with money and war material to maintain his position. In point of fact, however, the
very reverse was the case. It was impossible to make a really good selection between the contending factions, and the wise course was, I submit, to leave both parties alone. Latterly, when the Ameer Shere Ali had resided for a time in Europe, and had apparently headed back to Cabul by the very soldiers and people who had deserted him, the time seemed at length to have arrived when we might, with some show of reason, help him to render firm his recovered position, and to consolidate his power.

6. It is, I own, impossible, I may say it is not wise, altogether to disregard the views and arguments of those who advocate a different policy to that which has been followed. I frankly confess that I cannot, however, bring myself to see the formidable character of the danger with which we are said to be threatened by the presence of the Russians in Central Asia, whilst, on the other hand, I can perceive so much real difficulty, and to which we are exposed from various circumspection and fear in India, more particularly if we adopt a policy in Afghanistan from which it may prove difficult hereafter to recede. I think, too, even if it be admitted that danger may arise to us in the future from Central Asia, the real difficulty is to decide what, under our peculiar position in India, is the true policy to adopt in view to meeting it. It has lately appeared to me that the time had arrived when we might reasonably endeavour to ascertain whether the Ameer of Cabul, tried by adversity, and grown more wise, if it might be supposed, from misfortune, might not feel earnestly desirous of entering into friendly relations, and of offering us some mineral aid, with a view to maintain what still remains of Afghanistan under his rule. Now it would seem as if at the moment when we are about to make the experiment the power of the Ameer begins again to crumble to pieces. It would be vain to endeavour to forecast what may be the result of the revived contest in Cabul amongst the Baruckzais, and what may be the eventual fate of the country. And until we have grounds for the formation of some reasonable conclusion on this point, there is nothing for it but to hold our hand until one or other regain the mastery. This seems to me to be the only way to avoid serious difficulties and complications. And it is, moreover, the very line which, by the last letter received from the Ameer, he himself says he wishes to be pursued. He tells me that he has put down the present movement against him he will be prepared to meet the Governor-General and explain his views and wishes.

7. It appears to me, also, that it will always be found exceedingly difficult, for any extended period, to maintain a united and strong Government in Afghanistan. The genius of the Chiefs and people, as evinced in the independent Pathan communities of the border, is evidence to this effect. A Chief may now and then arise, who may for a time unite the different provinces under one rule, but when he has passed away the tendency again will be to separation. With the single exception of the pressure of a common enemy, and even this circumstance will not always avail, there appear to be no ties to bind the Afghans together. The history of the country is a history of anarchy and civil war. The Sudderzai brothers were always each other's worst enemies. Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan had the advantage of succeeding to a family which was hated and despised. He was at feud with some of his brothers, with whom he waged war, and whom he expelled the country. He had the utmost difficulty in controlling the others. He barely maintained a semblance of order to the end of his life. Long before his death, every one had foreseen, he had himself predicted, commotion, conflict, and war to the death between his own sons. Can we, in such a case, reasonably come to conclusions which do not accord with those which he has expressed. But I have lately appeared to me that the time had arrived when we might reasonably endeavour to ascertain whether the Ameer of Cabul, tried by adversity, and grown more wise, if it might be supposed, from misfortune, might not feel earnestly desirous of entering into friendly relations, and of offering us some mineral aid, with a view to maintain what still remains of Afghanistan under his rule? Can a Chief likely come to the front whom it would be right for us to endeavour to maintain in full power over the country?

8. Sir H. Rawlinson's vast experience and great knowledge of all matter connected with the past history of Afghanistan, Persia, and Central Asia generally render me somewhat diffident in adopting views and coming to conclusions which do not accord with those which he has expressed. But I have been brought a deal in contact, during my career, with Officers who served in Cabul at one time or another, and within the last twenty years have had many opportunities of studying the character of the Afghans and other Pathan races, and of forming an estimate of the difficulties which beset a right solution of the present question.

9. No one, of course, can deny that the advance of Russia in Central Asia is a matter which may gravely affect the interests of England in India. No person can doubt, I admit, that the approach of Russia towards our North-Western frontier in India may involve us in great difficulties, and this being the case, it will be a wise and prudent policy to endeavour to maintain a thoroughly friendly power between India and the Russian possessions in Central Asia. Nevertheless, it appears to me to remain true that it is quite out of our power to reckon with any degree of certainty in the attainment of this very desirable end, while I believe that there is very great danger that some of the very measures which Sir Henry Rawlinson recommends towards securing that object may lead to opposite results, and that, on the whole, our wisest course is not to attempt much beyond our frontier, but to consolidate our power in India, to do all we can to improve our administration, and to reconcile the people to our rule. We might also endeavour to come to some mutual arrangements, and to an understanding with Russia; and, as far as may be, in order to understand what Power towards India, beyond a certain point, would entail on her war, in all parts of the world, with England.

10. The conquests of Russia in Central Asia have doubtless of late advanced with gigantic strides, and will in all probability be still further pushed. But it appears to me that we have not the right openly to question or impede this advance so long as it is not clearly directed against our interests, and that any such attempt of ours in this quarter of the world would be mad in vain. Possibly the danger which some anticipate may never arise. But, admitting that it may, any serious attempt to restrain Russia's advance by active measures on our part in Afghanistan is safest to be undertaken with a view to a policy resulting in our eventual occupation of that country, as was the case in 1838. Most people would, I should think, deprecated this result, and would affirm that this is the last object which they desire. Nevertheless, the real point is, whether an interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, however moderate and limited in character in the first instance, is, or is not likely to lead to such a result.

11. While there are difficulties which the vicinity of Russian power may bring upon India are exasperated on in vivid and grave, it strikes me that the unparalleled extent of Russia's tenure of Central Asia is a good deal understated. Would not Russian difficulties increase in proportion as she enlarged her borders? If dangers and complications may be anticipated from the approach of
Russia to our North-Western frontier in India, will not Russia likewise be met by similar difficulties in her possessions in Central Asia. The population of her territories is, on the whole, more hardy, more intractable, and more fanatic than the mass of the people of British India, whose character, in comparison, indeed, may, generally speaking, be described as docile, and imbued with a strong respect for authority. It is, as a rule, only on our western border, or among tribes descended from races such as those of that border, that we meet with the spirit of independence, violence, and contempt of the governing power, which generally prevails among the people of Central Asia.

12. Surely, if Russia attempts an advance on India in any force she will be severely taxed to provide for the maintenance of her own communications, and for the security of the vast area which her troops would leave behind them. Would not the opportunity be naturally seized by the predatory and restless races of the country? The danger which is likely to arise to Russia in those countries is rather when she has completed her conquests than when she is making them. So far as the bulk of her forces are in the country, well in hand, and dealing blows, there seems to be little or nothing capable of offering anything like effective opposition. But when these conquests have been completed, when she has to hold the country by the dispersion of her armies, when she has to elaborate an efficient system of administration, in a word, when she attempts to make the people pay the cost of their own subjugation, then it appears to me that her complications will begin.

13. At first sight it may appear as if the objects described as necessary for the consolidation of Russian power in Turkestan are not difficult of attainment. But, in point of fact, they are prodigious. They would require the expenditure of vast sums of money, which Russia has not to spend; they would occupy many years, and would probably then be liable to crumble into dust on any serious reverse of fortune. We may judge what all this would cost Russia, by a review of the labour, expenditure, and time we have devoted to the development of our rule in India, even with the great advantages which we have found in the accessibility of the country, in an industrious and generally civilized people, and in a fertile soil.

14. Sir Henry Rawlinson points to the irresistible temptations which India presents to the predatory races of Central Asia, and of Afghanistan in particular. I quite concur in these views. It is for these very reasons, as well as on account of their general character as a lawless, plundering, faithless people, that I feel hopeful of no good results, but foresee rather much evil from any close communication with them. I feel no shadow of a doubt that, if a formidable invasion of India from the west were imminent, the Afghans en masse, from the Ameer of the day to the domestic slave of the household, would readily join in it.

15. But all such hordes, all such bodies, however hardy, however reckless, however bent on plunder, could not fail in an invasion on the drilled and iron ranks which we could oppose to them in the plains of the Punjab and India. In infantry and artillery (I allude to Central Asian standards) they could have nothing worthy of the name of soldiers for such a foreign war. Their best cavalry, it has often been proved, could not cope with our Native horsemen when led by a few English Officers.

16. Let us only, however, be careful to maintain a sufficient, though moderate, force of British troops in India, and so long as we do so we can have always, under suitable conditions, a Native army to supplement those troops, and the two combined will sweep from before them all the invading hosts which may venture for a moment to appear in the field.

17. I do not attempt to deny that the approach of a hostile invader in force on our western border might lead to insurrections and trouble of various kinds. But after all we have only a choice of difficulties, and our plain course is to examine and determine clearly on which side the advantages preponderate, where the advantages are fewest, and to adopt that line of policy. It has been the character of the various races in India (if I read its history aright) not hurriedly to join contending powers; but, on the contrary, to hold aloof, often too long for their own interests, until they could see which gained the mastery, and then to submit to the conqueror. I think it is probable that this is the course which will be preferred, when the circumstances are such as I do, the truth of the character and disposition of various classes of Mahomedans, as depicted by Sir R. Temple, and quoted by Sir Henry Rawlinson, it must be remembered that the vast majority of the people of India, including the Chiefs, are Hindoos, both by race and by religion. No people in all India are more hostile to Mahomedans than the Sikhs of the Punjab and the Goorkhas of Nepal, two of the most warlike races of the country. The Sikhs, we know, under the rough form of confederacies, almost altogether consisting of village yeomen and peasants, under leaders of the same cast, not only broke the power of the Mahomedans in the Punjab, but, as they became better trained and more confident in their strength, resisted invasion from the west. And if we maintain a proper balance of power in the shape of a suitable British force in India, it is likely that these Sikhs will be less faithful and less stubborn on our side, knowing that, in the one case, the prestige of a hundred victories surrounds our banners, and, on the other, the success of the invaders would prove the spoliation of their homes and the devastation of their fields. By a series of foolish and impolitic acts we may bring about a state of things when every race in India of warlike and aspiring temperament may be tempted to break out for themselves an independence; but assuredly, on the other hand, if we are true to ourselves, we shall ever, by God's blessing, be able to assert our own supremacy in India, whoever may be the invader.

18. I will now endeavour to explain my views on the specific propositions which Sir Henry Rawlinson has made. These appear to be that we should occupy Quetta in front of the Bolan Pass; that we should place a British Agent with his staff of Officers in Cabul, and, if necessary, organize a contingent for service in that country; that the control of the Mission in Persia should be transferred to the Secretary of State for India; and that that Mission should be placed on a larger and more expensive footing than at present. I will take up first the suggestions regarding Persia. I am in favour of the transfer of the Persian Mission to the control of the Secretary of State for India, for the reasons given by Sir Henry Rawlinson, provided that the arrangement becomes permanent. But I do not support the recommendation that English Officers be encouraged to enter the Persian service, and an altogether opposed to the policy of spending much money out of Indian revenues in Persia. I believe that such a system
would prove of no real advantage in strengthening our influence in Persia, and I certainly think that such an expenditure would prove more beneficial on our own frontier. Persia appears to me to be weaker in herself from various causes that she is practically under the control of Russia, and utterly unable to resist the influence of that power. In any great struggle connected with Afghanistan Persia would certainly follow the behests of Russia, even though unwilling on some grounds to do so.

19. Persia has often shown a strong desire to gain possession of Herat. Whatever may be her real motive for such a policy, she asserts that such possession is essential to the security of her Khorassan border, in order to enable her to defend her people from the attacks of the Turcomans. To me this appears a mere straw in some important matters, and, in fact, requires on our part more perhaps as, indeed, in other parts of her territory, is a strong Government and a good military organization.

20. In respect to the occupation of Quetta, I am still firmly of opinion that this would be quite a false move. It would assuredly be looked on by the Afghans as the forerunner of our advance to Candahar, and, perhaps, to Herat. I do not, moreover, believe that the presence of a force at Quetta would be acceptable to the Chiefs and people of Khelat; and unless that force were large, and composed of a considerable proportion of British troops, placed in a strong fortified position, it would, in the event of a formidable invasion, be liable to be cut off. Under such circumstances we should have to occupy the region not, as now, with the minimum number of troops, but in considerably increased force, so as to provide support to Quetta. Our occupation of Quetta would be an unpopular measure both to British and Native Officers and soldiers.

21. Further, I am opposed to the appointment of a British Agent in Cabul and to the organization of a contingent for service in Afghanistan. If anything of the latter kind be decided on, then I prefer the arrangement described in a note by Brigadier-General H. Lumsden, which I will annex to this Minute. His suggestion is, that all the officers, as well as men, of the contingent should be Afghans or natives, and that his point of view is that the men are to be excused from the terms of his note, but I have learnt from personal communication that such is his meaning.

22. I do not think that British Officers, with a Native contingent, at a distance from any material support in the shape of British troops, would be safe, or would be able to exercise a proper influence over their men. And a contingent officered and composed purely of Native soldiers would be a dangerous force to our own representative at Cabul, and a source of distrust and irritation to the Ruler of the country.

23. No doubt it is correct, as observed by Brigadier-General Lumsden, that if we give a subsidy to the Ameer he will employ the money for his own purposes, and not in the manner we may desire. But, after all, our object must be to strengthen his position, and to secure his good-will, as the Ruler of the country. On the whole, he must be the best judge of the necessities of his position. A contingent paid directly by a British Agent would be looked on by the Ameer as a body of our troops. He would certainly himself intrigue with the Officers and men. His enemies would attempt to tamper with them, in order to employ them to subvert his power. Under such circumstances the Ameer would learn to regard the British Agent as his rival rather than his friend, in which light he should look on the treaty of friendly Government, while the Agent himself would probably become coining to his Government of the radical insecurity of his own position. I feel a strong conviction that such an experiment would certainly fail, though the failure would not produce such disastrous results as if the contingent were officered by Englishmen.

24. As regards the appointment of a British Agent in Cabul, I firmly adhere to the views which I expressed last October. I much prefer, whilst circumstances remain as they are, having Native Agents in such dangerous positions. I believe that Native Agents can efficiently perform all the duties which we require at present in some important particulars, and under such circumstances as those under consideration, they are to be preferred to British Officers. My belief is that Major H. Lumsden and the Officers with the Mission at Candahar in 1857 were in great personal danger, and that so it will usually be with Agents similarly situated, especially in times of commotion. Nay, more, I am persuaded that they were utterly helpless, and in a condition of practical imprisonment. They could have done more at Peshawur than they were able to do at Candahar. A native would not be in personal danger in such a case, and he could make friends and acquire influence and information in a manner impossible with a European.
that the conduct and bearing of these tribes towards us have greatly improved. So far back as the time of the mutiny, when the border was greatly denuded of troops, this feeling was conclusively shown. Numbers of these hill men take service in the Native Army, and show themselves obedient and steady soldiers. But we cannot expect in a few years to change the nature of men, who, like the border hill men, belong to a race which has lived self-reliant from generation to generation, in habits of rapine, violence, and bloodshed.

27. I altogether deny that the frontier is in an unsatisfactory condition, and is not fairly protected. I believe that it is, on the contrary, generally speaking, secure, and that to improve the present state of things would entail a considerable addition to our already very large outlay. It must be remembered that the inhabitants of the plains have their villages close up to the mountains, and among the valleys and gorges which indent these ranges, that their flocks and herds are often in danger of depredation by robbers and outlaws in their own protection. Indeed, were it not for the robbers and outlaws of the plains, who, with their relatives, make common cause with the hill men, the security of the lowlands would be still more complete than at present.

28. If any change in our western frontier is desirable it is to reduce rather than extension of its limits that I should look. It is altogether a mistake to suppose that the occupation of Jellalabad would strengthen our position. Whatever might be the first impression in the minds of people at such extension of our frontier, the move being a false one, the defects would soon become apparent. It would greatly enhance our present difficulties. It would at once entail a considerable addition to our troops, British and Native, while it would revive in the minds of the Affghans the fear of our encroachments, which is now partially at rest.

29. To oversee and control the border tribes our troops must occupy suitable positions, ready to move out at an hour's notice. Even under present circumstances, with the advantage of operating generally in the plains and open valleys, it is not always easy to bring up an adequate force at a short warning; but for a hill campaign the necessary arrangements always require serious consideration. Every hill can be converted into a fortress; every steep declivity is easy of defence. For a hill campaign brought together if we are to operate in the hills with security and good effect. After the late misconduct of the Sipahie section of the Afreedee tribe, when Captain Ruxton was killed, it was under contemplation to invade and punish these offenders. I understand that General Wilde estimated that a force of 20,000 men would have been required for the purpose. Colonel Reynell Taylor, who knows the frontier remarkably well, confirmed this view. He assured me that any movement into that part of the hills would surely lead to a combination against us of all the various sections of the real Afreedee tribe. I have seen this part of the border, and can well understand the formidable character of the opposition which our troops would have to encounter. We may judge of the character of the warfare by the difficulties we have experienced in dealing with the Afreedees of the Kohat Pass. Even Sir Charles Napier attacked them with but scant success. Since then we have blockaded them; we have subjugated them; we have fought with them: we have tried every means to make them abide by their engagements, and maintain friendly relations with us, but with no permanent effect. We may gather from this experience, which might be indefinitely multiplied, how our difficulties would be increased if we enlarged our border. One kind of complication would not be changed for another by going onwards; but all our difficulties would be immensely enhanced. I do not think that I exaggerate when I affirm that it would probably take the whole army of this Presidency, British and Native, to conquer and hold in subjection the hill tribes along the North-Western Frontier of the Punjab. And even if we succeeded for the time we should only obtain many thousands of warlike and disaffected subjects, ready to break out at the first opportunity. If the border is now unsafe and unprotected it would be a hundredfold more so under such a system.

30. Jellalabad, in adequate force, would no doubt command the direct route from Cabul to Peshawur, as well as that by the Tartarea Pass; but such occupation cannot have any influence, it is obvious, on those by Swat and Chitral, or those through the Khurreeem Valley over the Pywar Pass; nor on the passage of troops through the different defiles leading to the Derajat, the submontane tracts of the Trans-Indus. When General Pollock made his advance through the defiles of the Kyber the possession of Jellalabad had no influence in his favour. Our troops under General Sale were cooped up in that place, barely able to hold their own, and with difficulty at last sallied out and drove back their assailants. Had General Sale, after the defeat of Mahomed Akbar Khan, endeavoured to force the passage of these defiles, he would have had to fight his way to Peshawur, just as Generals Pollock and Nott had to do on their return from Cabul. And so it would prove with any garrison we might place in Jellalabad. It would have to be sufficiently strong to meet all comers; to keep open the defiles from Peshawur to Cabul, and also to control the surrounding country; and, in the event of any serious invasion from Cabul, it would certainly prove a source of great anxiety to us. All the objections to the occupation of Quetta would apply still more forcibly to the occupation of Jellalabad.

31. So far as I can judge, it is generally admitted, at least by the inhabitants of Indus, that the Affghans are superior in courage, hardihood, and force of character to all other races of Central Asia. I am inclined to think that this opinion is correct: and that the Affghans, if united, bearing in mind the remarkable strength of their country, could hold their own against any enemy which might come against them, more particularly if that enemy's army were not largely composed of European troops of the best class. One could hardly, I admit, reckon on such united action. The probability, however, in numbers, coming with the while invasion, would be resisted by the main body of troops. It is much easier to perceive the weakness and insecurity of the present state of things in Affghanistan than to apply a remedy. So long as a rival to the Amur can induce a strong party to follow him, and renew the war, the present struggle will continue. And in such intermucrs the struggle can only cease by the utter destruction of one party, for there is no hope of compromise and reconciliation. Whichever party is defeated will be ready to call for foreign aid.
32. It does not appear to me that the assistance which Mahomed Aflar Khan and Mahomed Abdool Rahman may have obtained from Bokhara or elsewhere in Turkistan has had much influence on the war. The Ameer, as I have already said, defeated both of them, as well as Mahomed Ameer Khan, and it was mainly from the disaffection of his own Chiefs and soldiers, and from the assistance of the Afghan population, who from various causes flocked to the standards of his brothers, that the Ameer failed to maintain his power.

33. Then, again, it is sometimes asserted that Sirdar Mahomed Azim Khan was badly treated by us when he found refuge in the Punjab. But there are no valid grounds for this imputation. No doubt the Chief was dissatisfied with his treatment, and expected more than he received at our hands. But if any party had just cause of complaint it was the Ameer, and not Mahomed Azim Khan. The Ameer, indeed, must have felt that it was the laxity of our surveillance over Mahomed Azim Khan, and the assistance that he was allowed to remain so near the frontier as Rawul Pindi, which enabled the latter to intrigue with his adherents and the disaffected party in Cabul, and finally to return there to wage war with the Ruler of the country. The fact was that, owing to the alleged part which Mahomed Azim Khan adopted during the mutiny in our favour at Cabul, it was generally believed that he was well disposed towards us. And probably he expected, or, at any rate, he affected to hope, that we should espouse his cause against the Ameer. When, however, he succeeded in driving that Chief from power, and became the leading Chief in Afghanistan, he showed in many ways that he was really at heart hostile to us, and complained of harsh treatment when in the Punjab. And so it is likely ever to be, sooner or later, with exiled Chiefs, who cannot obtain the means from us of attempting to recover their lost authority, however generous and considerate may be our conduct towards them.

34. In all probability, if Ameer Shere Ali were driven from Cabul, and were to take refuge in British territory, he would try to convince us that the Treaty of 1856 was made with his father, the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, individually, and that its advantages ought to be limited to his son, his successor; and if we did not act on this construction he would, when opportunity offered, resist our conduct as Mahomed Azim Khan has done. That Ameer Shere Ali has not already adopted this course is due to the circumstance that he had not given up the expectation of our eventually affording him assistance; and mainly, perhaps, because that, in recognizing Mahomed Azim Khan, we distinctly reserved the right of Shere Ali to those parts of the country of which he still held possession.

35. I am myself inclined to doubt whether the Native community in Upper India really feels that strong dread of Russian advances on India which some Englishmen suppose. I have never observed much system of such a feeling, and believe that, as a rule, they place great confidence in our power and resources. On the other hand, I am certain that no sympathy exists among Natives towards Russia. On the whole, I am of opinion that much of the interest which at times has been expressed by Natives in the proposed movements of Russian troops in Central Asia is simply the reflected opinions of the English press, in which the Natives take little interest. Thus, during Dewan Jawalla Sahai’s visit to me at Simla last month, he made no allusion whatever to anything bearing on the subject, and when direct inquiry was made, repeated very much what is said to have been his reply to Sir D. M‘Leod. The Dewan’s mind during his different interviews with me was full of matters relating solely to his master’s relations with the British Government, and the opinions which had lately been expressed in British journals regarding the administration of Cashmere and Jummoor. I judge that the Maharajah, therefore, has no anxiety in respect to the movements of Russia, but is strongly impressed with the fear that some day we shall interfere with his authority. Indeed, I have reason to believe that His Highness even thinks that the newspaper criticisms are only preparatory to some such impending interference.

36. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has expressed an earnest feeling in favour of a liberal and generous policy towards the people of the frontier, whether they are British subjects or not. To a considerable extent I concur in these views; and I have a strong impression that such has always been our policy. I believe that, whether we consider our administration on the one side, in the shape of light taxation, or on the other, in the form of a large amount of service and a fair proportion of privileges and advantages in favour of the better classes of the people on the border, our policy has been of the character I have described. That many persons on the border districts are discontented, from one cause or the other, I can well understand, but I believe that this arises mainly from political and religious grounds. Such evils inevitably accompany foreign rule, especially among such fierce, independent, and fanatical people as those now referred to. And the further we extend our possessions, especially in a western direction, the greater will be our difficulties in this respect. I have more than once said that the difficulty of the Punjab is the extreme that the Government of India will meet with the people of the frontier. And as regards his specific suggestions to extend the system of a militia to the Peshawur valley, I have requested him to report in detail what he would suggest.

37. Lastly, while I am by no means confident that the plan of subsidising and otherwise assisting Ameer Shere Ali will work well, and produce decisive results, such as are anticipated, I think that the time has come when it should be tried. Should the Ameer succeed in defeating his nephew, Abdool Rahman Khan, he will soon be in a position to meet the Governor-General or his representative, and to explain personal grievances and wishes. If at that time I am still Governor-General, I shall be prepared, time admitting, to return to the Punjab with this object. If, however, I cannot do this, it will rest with my successor to decide what course shall be adopted. If it were decided that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab should be empowered to meet the Ameer, and arrange with him, general instructions should be prepared and sent for Sir D. M‘Leod’s guidance; and any difficult points which occurred during the interviews could be settled by telegraphic communication.

38. I do not think it would be politic to do more than renew generally the engagements of 1856 between the British Government and the Affghan State. I would on no account recommend that we
should accede to a request which the Ameer will probably make, for an offensive and defensive alliance between him and the British Government. I would not consent to any engagement which might imply responsibility on our part for the maintenance of his authority. I would not even guarantee the payment of an annual subsidy for a term of years. I would rather suggest that we simply engage to give the Ameer a certain sum annually, so long as we are satisfied with his bearing and conduct towards us. I don’t think it would be expedient that this sum should be less than 10 or 12 lacs of rupees. I would annex no conditions beyond general fidelity in his relations towards us, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, but I would lead the Ameer to understand distinctly that these conditions must be fully observed. Thus I would make him understand that simple professions of amity to the British Government, and to the Native Agent accredited to the Court of Cabul, would not suffice; but that the Ameer must exercise such a control over all of the tribes on the frontier which are subject to him as will prevent their making raids at any time into British territory, and that he will not allow these tribes to give asylum to criminals from our districts. And I would further stipulate that we may send Native Agents also at any time to Candahar, Herat, or other important places within the Afghan territories, should we desire to do so. These conditions might be drawn up in the shape of articles of agreement, and signed by the representatives of both Governments.

39. I also propose that we should give the Ameer a supply of arms, accoutrements, and ammunition. I have directed that 6,000 stand of arms should be collected at Peshawur for this purpose.

40. While strictly refusing to enter into anything like an offensive and defensive alliance with the Ameer of Cabul, I think it should be carefully explained to him that we are interested in the security of his dominions from foreign invasion, and that, provided he remain strictly faithful to his engagements, we are prepared to support his independence; but that the manner of doing so must rest with ourselves.

41. The inconvenience of all engagements with an Afghan Chief, situated as the Ameer of Cabul must be, arises from the circumstance that he will be disposed from time to time to make excessive demands on us, and that, if disappointed, he will be disposed at a suitable opportunity to repudiate these engagements, and act against us. It appears to me, in all probability the policy which the Ameer will adopt, should danger press him from any quarter, it is desirable that our relations with him shall confer real and substantial benefits, which it is obviously his interest to retain, while they should not be of a character to shackle us in case we discovered that he was not acting towards us in good faith. An open arrangement such as this, whilst only fair to ourselves, would, I am disposed to think, be as binding on the Afghan Chief as one more strictly drawn. Indeed, it appears to me that the more dependent he felt on us for the maintenance of such beneficial relations, the stronger would be his desire to do all in his power to retain our good-will. Unless the Ameer firmly favoured the British Government, the payment of a subsidy to him would be derogatory to our character, and detrimental to our prestige.

Calcutta, 25th November 1868. (Signed) John Lawrence.

P.S.—Since the completion of this Minute, I have received a memorandam from Colonel Reynell Taylor, the Commissioner of the Umballa Division, whom I had consulted on the Central Asian question, and its bearings on the interests of India. Having written my note fully on this subject, and being anxious to see it disposed of, if practicable, before I leave India, I will now say no more at present than to commend this paper to the careful attention of those interested in the subject, and to add that I concur generally in much which Colonel Taylor has advanced.

Enclosure 5 in No. 14.

MINUTE by the Hon. Sir R. Temple, dated 8th December 1868.

I have heard this subject discussed by the most experienced persons of the time, both European and Native, ever since the year 1859; and, as Secretary to the Punjab Government for some years, I necessarily had an intimate acquaintance with these affairs. I therefore might have much to write thereon; but the whole question has been so well treated in the papers before us, and the policy which I, for one, have always believed to be the best, is so strongly set forth by his Excellency the Governor General (Sir John Lawrence), that I shall now attempt to do more than record my testimony, or opinion, for what it may be worth, on the principal points at issue.

Before the Crimean war, in 1854, the fear of Russia was considerable in the minds of the political classes of Upper India. After that this feeling abated, the belief being that Russia had been beaten. But since 1855 the successes of Russia in Central Asia have caused the old fear to revive among the political classes of Natives all over India. Meanwhile, our own power and prestige in India have risen, and the Natives, while somewhat struck by the progress of Russia, are yet impressed by notions of British resources; and, on the whole, hardly know what to make of the matter. Still, a sort of uneasiness with some, of excitement with others, and of uncertainty with many, is gaining ground, and will grow more and more if Russian power in Central Asia shall further expand. The growth of any such feeling among its subjects could not properly be disregarded by the British Government in India.

Again, recent events have caused a real accession to Russian power in Asia. Doubtless, Russia is acquiring a new sovereignty over some of the most unmanageable and unstable classes in the world, and will never fail the conciliate those fanatic Mahomedans. On the other hand, some classes in the population of those regions can be conciliated by good government. The country is in many parts fine, with natural and artificial capabilities. The means of military communication may be made considerable, by means of steamers on the Aral, the Jaxartes, and the Oxus, and by the extension of the railways
either under construction or projected. The consolidation of Russian power in that quarter has become easier than it was since the subjugation of Circassia. Thus, although, on the one hand, Russia may be courting difficulties and overstraining her resources, still she may, on the other hand, by patience and sagacity, succeed in establishing herself.

Further, such establishment really brings her into a contiguity that might prove inconvenient to us. From some points of view we might be glad to see Russian rule substituted for the political evils of Islamism; we might even regard Russia as a better neighbour, in respect to trade and peaceful communication, than the existing Native Governments. We might grieve to think of such a spectacle being afforded to the barbarians as an internecine contest between two Christian nations for dominion in Asia. But, unfortunately, such events have happened, and may easily happen again. And for the best of our interests, it is by no means so clear as is often supposed, that circumstances may change, and that an advance upon India, for a long time to come impossible, may ultimately become possible. But even if she should never be in a position to try such a conclusion with us, still her acquisitions in Central Asia would give her a vantage ground over us in the event of any general contest. Although it were found that she had weakened herself by taking up more strain than she could hold, still she might be able to harrass us, to stir up trouble for us, to compel us to lock up large forces in the East, to distract our efforts, and thus to lower our status in the world generally. This much she could effect even in these the days of our strength, and she might regard this as a political gain, so far secured anyhow, and as a sufficient modicum of result for the efforts made. Perhaps she may be able to essay more, in the days of our weakness, if these shall ever come. If her establishment on the Oxus shall not open the way to India, never mind; it is worth her while to get even that far, for the sake of the advantage over us in the event of general war, so far wish for her. If her present objects do not now prove fortunate, the establishment of a Russian position on the Oxus should open the way for India, better still for her. Thus she may have two advantages: one proximate and probable or certain, the other contingent and uncertain. If the second should be for ever unattainable, still that would not invalidate the first.

To those, therefore, who regard with apprehension the progress of the Russians in Central Asia it would not suffice to answer that the invasion of India is impossible. Let this impossibility for the present be fully granted, and still there remains ground for grave reflection in respect to recent events.

The above possibility, however, is by no means so clear as is often supposed. For although it is true that, nation to nation, we are more than strong enough to repel all and any attacks from Russia, yet why should Russia be so rash as to trouble us, when we have nothing else to do but to bring our own strength to bear upon her? She would rather choose some occasion when we may be engaged with other powers. When we should be thus occupied and distracted, then would arise Russia's opportunity in respect to India.

When the Khans of Kokan and of Bokhara sent ambassadors to us, the former in 1854, the latter in 1855, they foresaw their coming fate of absorption into the Russian Empire. We probably could never have prevented this; certainly we should not now try to do so. Nothing can apparently stop Russia from settling on the Oxus, overlooking Bokhur, or from reaching the passes which command the road from Kokan to the plains of Yarkand. Thus soon there will remain nothing but Afghanistan between us and Russian Bokhara, and nothing but Yarkand between us and Russian Kokan.

Having got thus far, Russia would, no doubt, begin to meddle with Afghanistan and Yarkand, unless we can succeed in interposing in some way or other. If we cannot succeed in preventing Russia from coming over into the Russian Empire we shall be prepared for much worse, and be more troublesome to us in Afghanistan than in Yarkand. But she would be troublesome enough, even in Yarkand, as that is conterminous with the territory of the Maharajah of Jumnoo and Cashmere, which, though administered by a Native sovereign, is really a dependency of the British Empire. The presence of Russian agents, the spread of Russian influence, in either of these two countries, must be seriously inconvenient, as causing all manner of doubts to arise in the minds of our Indian subjects, as strengthening the hopes of all our enemies, and as being likely to occasion manifold complications in time of war; in short, as being dangerous to us in every respect.

Without, therefore, at all objecting to what Russia is doing in Bokhara, we have a right to ask, for our own interest and safety, that she abstain from all interference in Afghanistan (including Herat) and Yarkand. As our relations with Russia are at present friendly, we might, I submit, make diplomatic representations to her on the subject. As the reasonableness of our demand could not openly be denied, her answer, if it were vague and unsatisfactory, could hardly be unfriendly. And the fact of our demand being made would warn her in time, as she has experience of the sort of action with which British demands of this character might in certain circumstances be met. It is probable that she persisted in interfering within the prohibited limits, it could only be with a view of injuring us, and our Government would know how to take the steps which alone could properly be taken under such circumstances.

In that case Russia would have to look to her own safety in various parts of the world.

At the same time, I would recommend that the Native Governments in Afghanistan and Yarkand should be informed that we intend to respect their independence ourselves, and desire to see them independent, and would afford them such help in that view as we might see fit. Beyond this I would grant these Native Governments no promise whatever; no offensive and defensive alliance supporting a Ruler of the day against his own subjects or family; no positive programme of what would or would not be done by us; and no fixed subsidy. Indeed, what exact measures should be adopted in the event of their independence being threatened or infringed by Russia could not be foreseen even by us, and must depend on the circumstances of the moment. It is probable that they would not be fully content with assurances qualified as above. But, under the circumstances it would be inexpedient to concede more.
Having given this much of assurance to these Native Governments, but having carefully abstained from any specific engagements, I would concede such subsidies in money as might at any time seem proper, and also arms and ammunition, such assistance to be understood to be temporary and provisional, solely at the pleasure of the British Government of the day. But the amount of such pecuniary aid should be carefully limited; if moderate, it might do good (though that is very uncertain); if lavish, it would do harm, and would lead to fresh difficulties.

I would gladly see the appointment or the continuance of Native Political Agents at the Courts of the Rulers of Afghanistan and Yarkand; such officials are very useful, while their presence excites no jealousy.

In connexion with this subject it is impossible, of course, to overlook the position of Persia. It is needless for me here to enter into the various considerations, past and present, involved in this. But there are two points adverted to in these papers, of immediate consequence, relating to the Persian Court and the Persian Gulf, both of which would be of great importance to the British Government in its relations with Russia.

One point is the placing of the British Embassy at Tehran entirely under the supervision of the Government of India. Such a measure would be, I apprehend, to the advantage of the Shah and the Persian court. But the British Government might well take the opportunity of assuring the Shah that it would maintain, as an ally, such naval force as might be needed. An additional reason for doing this might be the apprehension that, if we hold back, some other European naval power might step in. And we have actual information that something of this kind has been thought of by at least some French authorities.

While endeavouring, however, fully to estimate the real danger arising to British interests from Russian proceedings in Central Asia, and while advocating, as above, certain measures to counteract that danger, we are unable to advocate certain other measures, some of which I regard as detrimental to the best interests of British India. To these I will very briefly advert.

I deprecate the sending of a single British Officer or a single British soldier into Afghanistan, in time of peace, at all events. What might or might not be necessary in time of war need not now be discussed. But to attempt this in time of peace would, I apprehend, do more harm than good. So clear, indeed, are the evils which would result to us from the military occupation of Afghanistan,—from the national feud which would establish with the Afghans, from the cruel drain there would be on our resources, from the bloodshed and revolution which would constantly occur,—that probably nobody goes so far as to recommend this, especially after the warnings of the past. Nevertheless, measures are often proposed which, when examined, are found to lead directly or indirectly to this result. Such measures are the formation in some shape or other of an Afghan Contingent; the occupation of the valleys of Khost and Koorrum; the appointment of a British Officer as Envoy to Cabul; the occupation of Quetta; and, generally, the maintaining of a strong Native Government in Afghanistan in British interests.

The study of British political affairs in Asia generally, and on the north-west frontier of India in particular, impresses me with a sense of the onward tendency which ever impels us. So long as some rigid bounds are observed it is just possible (and no more) to check this tendency. Once those bounds are over-passed the tendency becomes irresistible. If British Officers cross the Afghan border troops will follow sooner or later. If one part of Afghanistan is occupied the occupation will spread to other parts, till the whole is occupied, or until some tremendous consequence arises. The very energy and spirit of enterprise which happily distinguish our countrymen generally would in this case prove irresistible. And the Government, once embarked on such a course, would be committed by the proceedings of its own servants, if by nothing else, to go on and on. Moreover, a large section of public opinion has been, is now, and probably will be, in favour of advancing. Considerable pressure is even now put on Government in this direction. It is easier now to resist all this, because a clear line is drawn, and it can be consistently argued that so far we will go and no further. But if this line were overstepped, that is, if we crossed into Afghanistan, the consistency of the argument becomes lost; and it would be no longer possible to define the limits to which we should or should not proceed. Then, indeed, the pressure of opinion would be more difficult to resist, and the reasons for advancing more and more would be harder to answer.

The formation of a strong and friendly Government in Afghanistan is often spoken of, as if it were reasonably possible, whereas it is next to impossible. Such a thing has been very rare in the history of that country, and has perhaps never existed save through the genius or fortune of an individual. The whole character of the people militates against anything of the sort. Any attempt to effect this on our part would be almost sure to end in failure, and would be quite sure to lead to vast expense and to political troubles.

The despatch of a British Envoy to Cabul would surely lead to further troubles. So high a functionary could not be left unsupported. He must be backed by some force, and then some sort of military occupation would result. Moreover, such an Officer would be really surrounded by difficulties, from which he could hardly extricate himself without recommending some onward move. He might
possess all the forbearance and skill and self-control, as well as the courage and fortitude, for which British Political Officers are so often distinguished, but he would be sorely tried, and tempted to extend our political ramifications farther and farther.

It may be true that the Afghans have no national feud with us, that in some respects they are even friendly to us. But it is certain that they cannot bear the presence of Europeans in their country, and that this feeling, however smothered for a time by fear or greed, would, sooner or later, burst forth like a flame, in a more or less terrible form, according to opportunities.

The formation of an Afghan Contingent is beset with difficulties. If it is to be paid for by or even through the agency of the Ameer, the payments will be irregular; then a series of disputes would arise with the Ameer, and the troubles in this respect, so well known to Hyderabadi and elsewhere in India and Central Asia. If it is to be paid by the British Government through a British Officer, then it will be regarded by the Ameer as a body of foreign troops, and jealousy or disquietude must follow. Suppose a Contingent had been formed, what side is it to take in such civil wars as those which have happened within the last few years, when one Ameer is beaten and another succeeds, who in his turn has to give way to the original Ameer, who again, on his accession to power, is seriously threatened with a loss of it. If it be kept on one side throughout, and if the majority of the Chiefs and people were on the other side, then the British Government would be in the position of maintaining an unpopular Government in Afghanistan. And how would that help us in a struggle with Russia? There would be any hope that such a Contingent would enable the Afghans of themselves to oppose Russian invasion. The Afghans, though brave and warlike, cannot in the least degree cope with any European troops in the open country, or even in such open country as might be afforded by the valleys.

As to the leasing of the districts of Khost and Koourrun from the Ameer,—firstly, he would never consent to lease them to us, or, if he did consent in words, in his heart he must necessarily be dissuading. Similarly, his people would regard our position there as an invasion of their country. We know but too well the bearers of malice in the East; which we would not be surprised at or anxious for.

And, having incurred the ill-will and distrust of such a people as the Afghans, how would that help us in a struggle with Russia? Moreover, it is probable that, if Russia were to be marching through Afghanistan on the way to India, an advanced position in Kost or Koourrun would commit us to the policy of fighting the Russian force somewhere in Afghanistan, instead of choosing our own battle field near Peshawur.

Much the same remarks would apply to the proposed occupation of Quetta. This would be a cause of fear to Khelat, and would be regarded as a menace by Cundazar. Here, again, we should have the disadvantage of inspiring the Afghans with distrust till the war with Russia comes, and when that does come we shall be obliged to move on from our advanced post at Quetta, instead of selecting our own ground near the mouth of the Rahan Pass.

The cost of all or any of these operations which might be undertaken would, of course, have to be defrayed from the revenues of British India. Whatever expenses are really necessary for the safety of the country must be met in this way. But it is a serious thing to expend large sums of money, drawn from the people of India, beyond the borders of India itself, in foreign and alien countries. Under Providence we are trustees for the public funds of India, and we are responsible for the careful application of them. When there are so many objects of certain usefulness and necessity within India itself on which to expend this money, it is a grave thing to expend such money in foreign regions on objects of doubtful expediency. How many millions of Indian money were sunk in Afghanistan, and what return to the people of India? At present, Russia, with all her resources in men, is deficient in money; in that respect being very inferior to us. Besides other advantages, we possess as yet a decided superiority in financial resource and credit, the benefit of which would be sensibly felt if we came to the decision to wage war against Russia. But this advantage we should lose if, unfortunately, we were ever induced to dissipate our treasure in such a country as Afghanistan. In short, by retarding the progress of India, and by impoverishing our exchequer to a level of our enemies, we should be just playing their game for them.

Again, even if the money were found, where are the troops to come from for the occupation of places beyond our borders? India cannot spare them. And Great Britain has difficulty enough already in maintaining an army of sufficient strength for the occupation of India, without furnishing any force for Afghanistan. It might be said that excellent Asiatic troops could be raised on our north-west frontier. But if the European force cannot be augmented, the old difficulty rears of having too many native troops in proportion to the Europeans.

And after all these sacrifices had been made for Afghanistan we should find the Afghans just as fierce and intractable as ever, and, in the end, have the satisfaction of seeing them join the Russian enterprise, in the hope of sharing in the plunder of India.

If we engage ourselves in Afghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial impoverished and embarrassed. If we keep our hands off Afghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial strong, rich, and prosperous in India. If we really believed what we maintain must necessarily be the case, that we ought to give up our attempts as to pursue the former course. But it is for us to avoid the course which our enemies, if we have any, would desire us to follow. At present, Russia, in respect to India, is at one great disadvantage. She could only approach through a very difficult country; whereas we have a capital position, with every military and material advantage. Her troops would be worn and wasted; ours would be in the highest condition. But if we enter Afghanistan we leave our vantage ground, and place ourselves so far on with our enemy as to have our empire with our own forces.

In short, that we ought not to waste our Officers, our soldiers, our treasure in Afghanistan, that we ought not to entangle ourselves with such an incorrigible people as the Afghans, will be usually admitted as general propositions. Still, particular measures such as these just adverted to are proposed which do actually conduce to these very things.

I shall conclude by advertling to our policy on the trans-Indus frontier. I have been exactly acquainted with nearly all the transactions between the Local Government and the independent tribes on that frontier, and I affirm that, on the whole, the British dealings with those tribes have been con-
siderate, just and firm. It is most important to use kindness and conciliation with these people, and our policy has been marked by these qualities. On the other hand, after the failure of all other remedies, the application of force has occasionally been unavoidable. In every such instance, the adoption of force has been warranted by clear justification. The mixture of forbearance on the one hand, and firmness on the other, has now, after the lapse of some years, been followed by great improvement in the conduct of these people. There has never been any encroachment or aggression upon them on our part, and I hope that there never will be such. Their independence has been entirely respected, and it may be hoped the results of our frontier policy will stand us in good stead, if ever we come to a struggle with Russia in Asia.

The railway from Lahore to Peshawur has been ordered, and is to be commenced. It may not prove remunerative; its importance will be military and political. It will doubtless be finished in good time.

R. Temple.

Enclosure 6 in No. 14.

MINUTE on the subject of the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and of the defence of our North-Western Frontier.

The recent valuable paper of Sir Henry Rawlinson, on the advance of Russia in Central Asia, has led to the Viceroy once more to write a minute, setting forth the views of his Excellency on the important subject of our proper policy on or beyond our North-Western Frontier. His Excellency's minute is accompanied by papers by the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and by Colonel Reynell Taylor (who served for many years on our trans-Indus border) on the same topic, and I understand that it is the Viceroy's wish that the Members of Government should now, before the close of his Excellency's administration, express their views on the subject.

It is now expected, that this question was very fully gone into by the Viceroy and those who were in the Government about 14 months ago. Then, as Secretary to Government in the Military Department, had the honour to submit my opinion as to the course we should pursue, and I can see no reason now to alter the views then expressed.

It may be inferred from the tenor of certain parts of Sir H. Rawlinson's memorandum that he was unacquainted with the papers just alluded to. Had he seen them, it is probable that he would have noticed, or replied to, arguments used in those papers, which seem to have anticipated some of his present proposals.

It would perhaps have been well had those papers been communicated to him, and to others interested in, and who may be justly deemed authorities on, the subject. The writers in the public Press are mainly in favour of a line of action which is deemed to be impolitic and dangerous by many authorities whose experience and knowledge must be allowed to be worth something. The public, therefore, both in England and in India, is liable to be influenced by writers who are for the most part without official responsibility, and who in various ways betray an ignorance of the subject on which they treat; while that which is written in a contrary sense by officials who have given their earnest attention to the matter for many years, and some of whom have necessarily done so in pursuance of their official duties, remains unknown.

I do not suppose that it would be proper to publish all these writings, but I cannot but think it very expedient, that to some extent, the public should be aware of the policy that is advocated by those in authority in this country, and of the reasons they give for their view.

Various writers are now advocating measures of a more or less active character on our border, and we have, therefore, not only to consider how best to oppose Russian advances, but also to deal with the general question of our policy towards the tribes on our North-Western Frontier, which is attacked and declared faulty.

I propose to reply to these latter in this minute, and will observe that I am perhaps justified in holding a somewhat decided opinion as to our frontier policy from the circumstance of having served on the North-Western Frontier from our first occupation of Peshawur in March 1849 till 1855, and again in part of 1856, during nearly the whole of which period I was principal Staff Officer to the troops, and as such, present in many affairs with, and expeditions against the hill tribes.

As respects the mode of dealing with Russian advance, I have really little to add to memorandum of the 8th October 1867, which has already gone to the Secretary of State.

I esteem the various plans propounded by different authorities (three of whom, Sir H. Rawlinson, Major-General H. Lumsden, and Colonel P. S. Lumsden, speak with a weight justly due to their knowledge and ability) whether for placing a force at Herat, or at Quetta, or at Jellalabad, or for having a British Envoy at Kabul with or without a contingent of Native troops, or for supplying the Persian army with British Officers, or for occupying Khourram, as unnecessary, and perhaps useless for the object aimed at, and as certain to involve us in difficulties and expense.

It is, however, certain that we have Herat, which involves occupying many other places, and also would render it necessary to keep other troops in readiness at all times to support those in advance. I believe such a measure would involve quite the expense stated in my memorandum of the 8th October 1867, as well as all the other difficulties therein detailed, and that it would weaken our defensive powers. Indeed, if we occupied Herat, Russia might force us to use nearly all our resources in supporting the troops at that place, and then, while we were thus occupied, prosecute with little hindrance her designs against us (if she has any) in quite a different quarter.

The occupation of Quetta or Jellalabad, or both, could exercise no more sensible influence on Russian advance than does the existing occupation of Peshawur or Jacobabad. If political necessity arises, both can be occupied with rapidity, but there is no political necessity whatever, and to carry out the measure without strong reasons seems to me most inexpedient.
We should have to place at least a very strong brigade of all arms, say 4,000 men, at each place, or at one, if only one was occupied. An equal force would have to be in reserve within our own frontier ready to move up. Both places have proved themselves very unhealthy for our troops at certain seasons. The distance and difficulty of the roads would render the measure costly, and there would be frequent interruption of communications through the passes, running as they do through mountains inhabited by robber tribes who own but soant allegiance to the Ruler of Kabul.

There would be the further difficulty of first obtaining the assent of the Affghans to the measure, and after that the still greater and lasting difficulty of keeping clear of misunderstandings.

And to what purpose is all this to be undertaken? I fail to perceive any solid reason to show that such measures now adopted would check Russia; and for the mere purpose of rendering our present frontier more secure or quiet, independently of considerations connected with Russia, troops placed as proposed would be thrown away.

The next proposals are for having an Envoy at Cabul and a contingent of Native troops at the same place. His Excellency the Viceroy has spoken of both those proposals in paragraphs 21 to 24 of his present minute, and I most entirely concur in his Excellency’s views. The presence of either would be likely to drag us into difficulties, and would in no way strengthen us or aid us in checking Russian advance.

What we really want just now is to be on friendly terms with the Affghans, to strengthen their Rulers hands, and to obtain correct intelligence of what goes on. By our native Agent and in other ways we obtain the latter satisfactorily and we can strengthen the hands of the Ruler for the time being, much better by not interfering with him, or giving cause for disagreement which the presence of a British Envoy would probably lead to, and which would almost certainly in the end be brought about if there was a contingent at a capital paid by us.

We can strengthen the Ameer in other ways, as we are now prepared to do, with arms and money, in a manner agreeable to him and to his subjects, and without incurring the risk of embroiling ourselves with the Afghan nation.

I also entirely agree with the Viceroy as to the inexpediency of placing British Officers with the Persian troops. If a struggle comes and Persia is inclined to our side, no doubt we may then use means to strengthen her hands, but the presence of British Officers might not be accepted now, or, if accepted, might lead to disagreements, while their employment cannot be supposed to be likely to influence Persia to side with us, and if disposed to go against us, she would dismiss these Officers at her pleasure.

The last proposal to be discussed is that of occupying Khoorrum.

Such a measure would be expensive; we cannot be at all certain that it would be assented to by the Ameer, while it would certainly extend the circle of our frontier difficulties, and it is easy to conceive, as one result of the measure, that we might possibly have troops locked up uselessly in this forward position of Khoorrum at a time when they would be invaluable for active service elsewhere. This argument, I may observe, applies equally to every pushing forward of troops unnecessarily to particular places, when we can in no way predicate in what direction Russia may press forward.

Khoorrum is a few marches nearer to Cabul than any of our present garrisons, seems to me an argument of no force. Circumstances are not likely to require us to move to Cabul so suddenly that a difference of a few days will be of any moment; but if, contrary to all reasonable expectation, such circumstances did arise, the force we could ordinarily afford to keep at Khoorrum would not be strong enough to move up to Cabul for any useful purpose without reinforcements joining from Peshawur, while troops from Peshawur itself, replaced rapidly from Rawal Pindee and Jhelum, could in respectable strength reach Cabul direct, at least as soon as they could by joining the Khoorrum troops, and proceeding to Cabul by that route.

Whether it is better to have our troops at a place like Peshawur with obstacles and enemies in front only, and then only such as a fair force properly equipped would overcome, or to have that place placed as is described at page 7 of Colonel Taylor’s memorandum, from which it would seem that we might have the rear of the Khoorrum force altogether cut off from us for a time, and not by any means without difficulties in its front, is a matter of opinion, but I for one have no hesitation in saying “leave Khoorrum alone.”

To conclude this part of the subject, I would only say that I think we are following the proper policy at present. We remain within our own border; we are strengthening ourselves there by placing more troops within easy reach, by having a portion of those troops well equipped for mountain warfare, by improving our railway communications, and by fortifying Peshawur; we are endeavouring to be on friendly terms with and to strengthen the Affghans ; we watch and are aware of all that goes on; and, as the Secretary of State says, in his Despatch of the 20th December 1867, His Majesty’s Government are prepared, if opportunity and necessity arise, to enter into friendly communication with Russia as to her advances in Central Asia, so as to avoid danger of misunderstanding.

If these fail, and Russia presses on as seriously to menace us, we shall be in a position to go to war with unwasted resources. I will say nothing of all that we might do against Russia elsewhere than in India, but here we could collect 70,000 or 80,000 good troops on our frontier, and, if necessary, advance into Affghanistan with a force likely to be superior in numbers, and equipment, and condition to any Russian force we can contemplate as being brought there. Our reserves, too, would be close at hand, and placed in the midst of all our abundant resources.

I do not think there need be fear for the result. Some think that the mere rumour of conflict between the Russians and ourselves would be the signal for great trouble within the limits of our own provinces. I do not think that we need be very apprehensive on this score. Many of us can recollect the invasion of the Sikhs in great force in 1845, and how for two months our troops, though fighting great battles, and suffering severely, had failed to drive them. Surely there is no reason to suppose that the natives of our Provinces would sympathize more with the Russians than with Sikhs, and yet, though circumstances then compelled us to demote our garrisons of European troops, so that a white soldier was scarcely to be seen.
between the Sutlej and Fort William; what happened beyond some excitement, and one plot nipped in the bud at Dinapore: I believe the people of India have no desire at all for the Russians, though, of course, whether with Russians or others, if we suffer a succession of disasters in India, we must expect our native friends to leave us; but this cannot be avoided, and certainly will not be averted by any of the expedients proposed. It is a reason, though, and a strong one, for not adopting measures of doubtful expediency, and which may end in disaster.

We have plenty to do in India, and political, military, and financial considerations alike point to the propriety of remaining within our present frontier; but if, at some future day, our successors have to advance and encounter Russia beyond India, I think we may, humanly speaking, feel as confident as we have done in former wars, that we can engage our enemies, and hold the country in our rear with honour and success.

I will now proceed to discuss our policy for the protection of the North-Western Frontier, and I would first say that I do not believe any one at all acquainted with that frontier would suppose that by placing a British or a Russian garrison over there elsewhere in Afghanistan, we should render our border more secure from raids than it is at present. All the tribesmen, except the independent tribes, would remain practically uninfluenced by such a measure. They are close to our frontier, and to our troops on that frontier, but would be far removed and separated by great ranges of mountains from our forces in Afghanistan. No one, I suppose, would suggest sending troops into Afghanistan solely to preserve peace along our present border; but I think it may be safely asserted that, if sent there for any other reason, troops so situated would absolutely in no degree beneficially influence the peace of our frontier, while the passage of convoys through the passes would tend to embroil us with our hill neighbours, as offering often very great temptations to their passionate desire for plunder.

I will dismiss this notion, therefore, of improving the peace of the border by a forward move into Afghanistan; and I should refer to a project put forward by a so-called "Punjab official," to occupy the hilly country generally between Eusufzai and Scinde.

This might be a very efficient measure as respects the present border, if we had money and men with which to carry it out; but as, on a moderate computation, a hundred thousand men would not suffice to remedy what is really a vastly insignificant evil, I think this idea too need not be seriously entertained, especially as it is quite impossible to see that our frontier system would be improved by pushing forward our troops a certain distance, where they would have enemies in front and all around them, in most difficult ground, and in a country which would supply them with nothing, instead of remaining, as at present, in a fertile plain, with their rear open, and no inconvenience ever arising from an enemy, save by an occasional raid, which in nine cases out of ten is promptly repelled with punishment to the raiders.

It is my belief, that we might uselessly expend ten thousand men a year in carrying out Dr. Bellè's most impracticable and unpractical proposal.

Our present system is easily explained. The frontier garrisons throw out a line of outposts, extending from Jacobabad in Scinde to the Eusufzai country, which is bordered to the east by the Indus. These outposts are ordinarily quite sufficient, but if the difficulties are apprehended they are reinforced or supported from the garrisons on which they are dependent.

The whole force thus posted belongs to eight cantonnments, viz., Jacobabad, Rajanpore, Dera Ghazar Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar, including Nowshera, and Murdan, and comprises 2 Horse Divisions in Horse Artillery, 4 Horse Field Batteries, 1 Field Battery, Heavy Field Battery Royal Artillery, 3 Punjab Native Field Batteries of 4 guns each, a Native Mountain Battery of 4 guns, 4 mountain guns attached to Jacob's Rifles at Jacobabad, and a Native Garrison Battery, 2 Companies of Sappers and Miners, 113 Regiments Native Cavalry, 3 Regiments British Infantry, and 17 Regiments Native Infantry,—not a very large force for a frontier extending over many hundred miles, and inhabited by very warlike tribes, who feel the comparative security of their own fastnesses.

It will be seen that the bulk of the force here posted is native, and this is wise, for Natives are better suited to constant out-post duty in this country than British troops, but the country must contain a far larger proportion of British troops. I have not included Hazara in the above account of the troops for frontier defence, for though bordered by wild tribes who recently gave us trouble, it is apart from the regular system of frontier defence, being Cis-Indus, and it has no line of outposts, the military station Abbottabad itself being in the hills. Before quitting the subject of Hazara, I may once for all say that we have now held it for close upon 20 years, with an ordinary garrison of one or two Native regiments, while the Sikhs with difficulty held their own with a small army. Only twice in the whole of that period has it been raised to the standard of the 2,000 men to which it is entitled, and in 1852, when in consequence of the murder of Messrs. Carne and Tapp, who went beyond our border into a dangerous tract, where the people seem to have thought they were going to establish a Customs line, the Hussuznais of the Black Mountain were punished by a force of Native troops, directed by Colonels Mackeson and R. Napier (now Lord Napier of Magdala), and the other day, when circumstances, which are of such recent occurrence as to render it unnecessary to recount them, led to the assembly of a large force under Brigadier-General White, to punish various tribes who inhabited the fastnesses of the Black Mountain beyond our border.

In fact, few who knew the history of Hazara when we occupied it in 1849 would ever have imagined that, inhabited as it is by somewhat fanatical Mahomedan mountaineers, we should, during 20 years, have had only on two occasions to resort to arms, and never, I believe, have blood spilt save in these instances. Yet, to show how exaggerated accounts are published of all that goes on in this frontier, I may mention that a paper which is supposed to be a good authority declared the other day that we had been obliged to undertake three expeditions in 15 years in Hazara, on, as the writer said, on the "well known" system of evidently believing that this celebrated mountain is in Hazara. Instead of three in 15, we had two expeditions in 20 years, having not 20 men killed, I believe, in both.

Any account of the tribes who inhabit the hill country beyond our frontier, from the Indus, where it leaves the mountain, to Scinde, would be out of place here. Sufficient to say that they are all more or less warlike, all more or less predatory; that they are all Mahomedans, and that they are poor.
All these circumstances are reasons why we should expect trouble, and at the very best, not infrequent plundering raids into our more fertile plain country; and when I say plain country, I must not be understood as saying that all our border country is a plain. Here and there it is intersected by hills, which run down and separate our valleys, and in some cases these hills are not inhabited by our subjects, but speaking generally, we hold the plains and leave the hills alone.

Our posts, which are usefully aided in places by small bodies of Border Militia, are charged with the protection of our people and their property, and, on various occasions, the parties stationed at them have distinguished themselves greatly in repelling raids. These raids, considering that we have villages possessing large herds of cattle within a mile or two of mountains occupied by robber tribes, have really been a thing that have seen in the end been unpunished.

The usual course when a tribe or section of a tribe has offended is to blockade it. As traffic with the plains is essential for them to obtain various necessaries, and to dispose of other articles, this is an effectual punishment, and often has induced the offending tribe to make restitution. Failing this, the usual course is for an expedition to be organized to enter the hills and punish the offenders. Large numbers of the enemy are rarely killed on these occasions, for as they fight in mountains, in light skirmishing order, and never cease unless on some detachment that may be in difficulty or for a night attack, they do not often fall, save under stray shots from our troops. The exceptions to this have been few, and then mainly when, emboldened by superior numbers, they have ventured to attack us, or meet our attack in comparatively open ground.

But though the numbers killed may never seem to the outside world an adequate result for what is perhaps a much talked of expedition, with a fine force of troops, punishment has almost always been successfully given, and felt as punishment. Though the men may retire before us, and send their women and cattle away, their villages remain, which can be destroyed, their watch towers (useful in their internal quarrels) blown up, their stores of grain destroyed, and what, perhaps, has a stronger effect than all else, we have awakened in those various hill tribes a dread of our particular villages, and can go there again with far greater confidence than on the first occasion, if necessity arises.

Such is the usual result, and though a writer ignorant of hill warfare may sneer at the smallness of the number of the enemy destroyed, the object has been effected, the offenders have been punished, and will behave well for a very long time to come.

This is, I may say, our invariable experience of hill expeditions, even when it seems to some that perhaps the enemy had not received, owing to uncontrolable circumstances, a sufficient punishment. I maintain that the system is a good one, and that it is successful beyond any expectation that could have been formed by those who knew the frontier when we first took charge of it.

A writer the other day said we had been engaged in 23 campaigns against the hill tribes on our north-western frontier. Now I have before me a list of every expedition since 1849. To call some of the little expeditions that lasted perhaps a week or less "campaigns" is surely an exaggeration.

Including General Wilde's recent expedition, there seem to have been 18 in 20 years,—say one a year; and this includes all our encounters (save slight affairs of outposts) with every tribe from the borders of Affara and Cashmere to Scinde.

Some of these expeditions were of an easy description, and in only two do we appear to have had more than 20 men killed; in most much less; the exceptions being that of the Mahsoud Wuzreecr expedition, where a detached portion of the force had to endure and to repel a most serious night attack, and the Umicyla expedition, where, I think entirely through a deviation from the plan sanctioned, our troops were brought into collision in a very unfavourable ground with one of the most powerful tribes in the hills, with whom we had no quarrel.

The tribes are learning, and, indeed, many have learned already, that punishment is sure. That officers may be pardoned now and then, and that sometimes we hide our time, waiting for a favourable season, or till we find it convenient to chastise them, is true, but come in the end chastisement does. If this plan is steadily pursued, we shall have little to complain of; for I, for one, cannot admit that the necessity of every now and then undertaking an expedition is any very great evil, while I know full well what benefit we have experienced from having Officers and troops trained in our border school, and used to such expeditions.

It is only when we enter and remain inactive or on the defensive in the hills, as we did at Umbyla, that there is real danger, for then there is time for combination, and for our troops to get, as it were, mopped.

Any action of the hill tribes against us in our own plains need hardly be thought of. For a brigade of our troops, with Cavalry and Horse Artillery in sufficient proportion, to defeat any force of hill men we are likely to see in the plains is hardly more arduous work than a good active field day.

My remarks have hitherto applied mainly to our Punjab Trans-Indus frontier, but we may glance for a moment at a service in a different way. These operations are mainly composed of Cavalry, and this is right, as the robber tribes have to cross a broad belt of desert country between the hills and our posts. It seems, indeed, that expeditions into the hills have been found quite needless in that quarter, the usual course of events being that, when a raid takes place, the marauders are encountered and pursued by Cavalry from the nearest post, and generally with most satisfactory results.

In a return of encounters on the Scinde border, extending over 20 years, I find that ten such encounters have taken place, and that some of these entailed no casualties to our troops engaged, who varied in strength from 17 to 133 sabres. In the whole of these encounters we have had 38 men killed and wounded.

Surely this is not a very great expenditure of blood for the protection of that portion of the frontier.

While I advocate expeditions when necessary, I am fully aware of the difficulties of hill warfare. No man who has seen warfare in mountains occupied by active enemies, knowing every crag, can understate these difficulties. These operations require an able, intelligent, and experienced Commander, they require good, active, forward troops, and they require perfect equipment. Expeditions should never be lightly undertaken; they are always attended with risk; for in no warfare does the safety of the
force and success of the campaign so much depend on the quick intelligence, and, if need be, judicious vigorous action of subordinate Officers, who are constantly placed with detachments in unexpected circumstances, with no possibility of referring for orders.

The difficulties of the ground which are usually known beforehand, the fact that everywhere and close around an active brave enemy may be lying concealed, ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity, or to kill stragglers or followers, the circumstance that, when a Commander would gladly dispense with baggage of any kind, he is compelled to carry with him every particle of food and other necessaries, the impossibility of sometimes keeping open communications with the base, and many other hindrances sure to arise, render it no light matter to enter the Afghan hills. This is no reason, and should never be accepted as a reason, for not doing so when good policy requires it, but it is a good reason for not listening to clamour which presses on the Government a line of conduct unnecessary, and likely to cost blood and money without satisfactory result.

I trust the desire to enter the hills, save in fulfilment of a necessary and judicious policy, will always be checked by Her Majesty's Government, and I hope that the occupation of particular places in the mountains, on various specious pretexts that are put forward, will be steadily forbidden.

So much for our policy with the frontier tribes; and with regard to the Russian advance in Central Asia, I have expressed my humble opinion as to our proper line of policy.
Calcutta, 8th December 1868;

W. H. NORMAN.

Enclosure 7 in No. 14.

MINUTE by Mr. G. N. TAYLOR, First Ordinary Member of Council.

A perusal of Sir H. Rawlinson's valuable memorandum, and of the papers which have been written by other authorities on the subject, has not altered the views on the Central Asia question, which I ventured to express very briefly when it was under discussion last year.

In the remarks now recorded by His Excellency the Governor-General in his minute of the 25th ultimo, so far as they relate to the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan, I most fully and cordially concur. The measures which were in contemplation before the Government left Simla, and which his Excellency still recommends should be carried out when the proper time arrives, have for their object to strengthen the position of Shere Ali, and to place our relations with the reigning Amir on a firm and solid basis. Those measures will, I firmly believe, conduces to the result so obviously desirable and so forcibly advocated by Sir H. Rawlinson,—the consolidation of a strong and friendly Government in Afghanistan.

For the present, we are doing what is necessary for the protection of our own border; we are strengthening the frontier posts and fortifying the garrison of Peshawur; while, at the same time, the efforts of Government are steadily directed to the improvement of our internal administration. We have undertaken the direct construction of the railway from Lahore towards Peshawur. Other important lines are progressing towards completion, and the Indus Valley line, the necessity for which is not so pressing, will doubtless follow in course of time.

So long as we remain within our own border, and continue our present policy of friendly conciliation and alliance with our immediate neighbours across the frontier, we have nothing whatever to fear from Russian aggression. Still it is impossible to regard her steady advance with complete indifference. She has already made rapid strides in Eastern Turkestan, and is still pushing forward; and though her tenure may for the time be insecure, she is doing her utmost to establish her power and confirm the position she has acquired in those countries. The question is, what measures or precautions can we legitimately adopt in order not merely to check her onward march, but to neutralize or control her predominating influence and preserve the balance of power in Central Asia?

I believe that the first step that is necessary to cement our friendship and alliance with Afghanistan and Kashmir; and as regards our Persian diplomacy, though Sir H. Rawlinson's proposals and suggestions are entitled to great weight, I incline to agree with the Governor-General that, for the present at least, the transfer to the India Office of our relations with that Court is all that is required. With respect to our more northern frontier, we are exerting our influence in view to the extension of British commerce into the regions of Central Asia by facilitating the free course of traffic by assisting in the opening out of the best existing route to the eastward of Kashmir, and by giving protection to traders to and from those parts. We have already established peaceful commercial relations with the ruler of Yarkand by deputing, at the invitation of the Koshoghi himself, a Native Consul to protect the interests of British traders at his capital. What is now wanted is a further move in the same direction. We have to meet Russia, in short, in her own field; to assist rather than oppose her action in the cause of civilization and progress, and to come to such terms with her as will facilitate commercial intercourse between both nations and with the regions of Central Asia.

To this end, I think the time has arrived for a more decided diplomatic action than has yet been employed. It is true, as Colonel Norman has remarked, that the attention of Her Majesty's Government has been directed to the subject; but I think it is one of so much importance that it might with propriety be again urged on the early and serious consideration of the Secretary of State in view to the adoption of such a line of policy as would ensure the establishment of amicable commercial relations between the two powers. A mere diplomatic protest will not avail; but I submit that negotiations conducted in a fair and friendly spirit will, in all probability, lead to a cordial understanding, and secure some permanent arrangement, whether in the shape of a convention or by an interchange of Consular agencies, which would put an end for ever to the visionary idea of Russia's hostile designs upon India, which exists in so many minds.
Calcutta, 12th December 1868;

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. N. TAYLOR.
MINUTE by the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF in INDIA, suggested by Sir H. RAWLINSON'S MEMORANDUM on the Questions connected with Central Asia, dated 24th December 1868.

In the various papers submitted by me in the Foreign and Public Works Departments, on matters connected with the Central Asian question, Afghanistan, and the defence of India on the North-West Frontier, during the last two years, I have given my opinion on many of the questions suggested by Sir Henry Rawlinson in his Memorandum.

Thus, I think the argument is complete against a British occupation of Quetta, or an advance on Afghanistan, unless a real casus belli should arise in our relations with that country.

I hold, very strongly, that those relations should not be left to chance, or to be determined according to a distrustful or hostile attitude on our part, but that we should encourage diplomatic intercourse with the Court of Caubul, and, whilst treating something like a genial sympathy towards the Government de facto, we should by political pressure and the practical testimony of our own good offices, bring about a reciprocity of good feeling towards ourselves.

I have thoroughly concurred with His Excellency the Viceroy in the policy pursued during the last four years.

Afghanistan being in a state of civil war, and it being really impossible to say from day to day what party might be in the ascendant, it has appeared to me to be clearly necessary to let the opposing parties fight their quarrel out; neutrality on our side being absolutely observed.

But I think it is obvious that such a policy of passiveness should be limited by the pressing necessity of actual civil war, and that so long as we are able to assign something like firmness and stability to the de facto Government, we should not only speak to it with civility, but we should give it moral, and even material support.

This is required not only on the grounds of a large policy which we should direct as the great Indian power, a power resting on an European as well as an Asiatic basis, but also with regard to the considerations of trade with Caubul and the countries lying beyond. Such relations with the Court of Caubul should then be put on a footing of liberality on such grounds, care being taken to exclude the notion that we are led to this by any fear or mistrust of Russian proceedings.

To make an alliance offensive and defensive with Caubul would indicate this fear of Russia, and therefore, on that ground alone, it is an inadmissible measure.

But it is certainly right so to influence the Ruler of Caubul, as to cause him to look to us as his best friend and support, and one to whom he may come for counsel and assistance, provided that, in important matters, he is disposed to adopt reasonable advice, and a policy in conformity with justice to his own subjects and respect to foreign obligations.

It will have been seen in my previous papers that I entirely decline to follow in the wake of those who are constantly striving to excite the military spirit in England and India against Russia.

But while I regret to see the efforts made in this sense, it does appear to me to be necessary to keep a vigilant watch over the proceedings of that country in Asia, just as we see a like precaution pursued by the Foreign Office with reference to the assumed ambition of Russia in her relations with the Danubian Provinces and the Porte.

Such diplomatic vigilance is required by general considerations. But it may be said with truth that the alarm testified with regard to Russia, as affecting British interests in India, is more unreasonable than it is possible to describe. As a military and vast political power, we have literally nothing to fear from Russia, whether she stop at her present limits, or spread her power even to our own borders.

A great mischief is done by those who, from whatever cause, occupy themselves in preaching the falsehood of our weakness in India. We are simply invincible in that country against all the powers in the world, providing only we are true to ourselves. If we choose to commit ourselves to a policy of aggression, we can go and establish ourselves where we please. If, on the other hand, being guided by a true and sound policy, we restrict our ambition and fortify ourselves by a continuance of good Government and careful attention to the efficiency of our military establishments, without extravagance on the one hand, or unwise cheapness on the other, we not only do that which is best for the great empire committed to our charge, but we comply with the conditions requisite for security and freedom from political anxiety.

Reasoning from this point of view, I would repeat that we are bound to organize our Asiatic communications with Russia on a proper diplomatic and consular footing.

The absence of such arrangements between ourselves and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, on matters connected with Central Asian policy was, perhaps, not inconvenient before Russia had become the dominant power of Central Asia. But now that this has actually taken place, to forgo diplomatic and consular intercommunication is opposed to a proper British policy, as shown by our proceedings in all other parts of the world, including those European countries where we habitually check Russian ambition. By such omission we cannot fail in the long run to precipitate the very dangers against which we are now warned by those who propagate alarm and suspicion of Russia's designs against India.

For it is but too true that we do not at present enjoy the advantage of correct information, and the policy of India beyond her frontiers has almost a Chinese character. That is to say, following an Asiatic idea, we seem to be jealous of the curtain between India and the outer world being penetrated, while we show no wish to exercise an influence beyond it.

I cannot think that this spirit is ever or to the narrowest sense. For in this manner we are left to the mercy of mischief-makers in both countries, and of the unbounded suspicions and panic which are the children of ignorance.

This want of policy is certainly opposed to the traditions of our history, and it is also opposed to the modern notion that we have a mission before us of extension by means of civilising influences, although not of territory, and not by force of arms.
If this modern notion is to be abandoned, it will hardly be denied that the retrogression of Great Britain as one of the great empires in the world, it may be said, perhaps, with truth, the greatest, has commenced.

For to stand still, that is to say, to decline to exercise a civilising influence over nations with which we are brought in contact, and which are notoriously in a semi-barbarous state, is to declare in favour of a Chinese immobility, and to relinquish the hope of commercial extensions. This I take to be, in other words, retrogression from our place in the world, and the beginning of decline.

All that has been done of late years in India, the enormous commercial and pecuniary liability undertaken by England in this country, and the absolute confidence with which the Native powers look to us, notwithstanding the apparent alienation produced by difference of race and language, are certain proofs that we have not reached the point when such a policy of immobility can be embraced by any British Government, whether in England or in India.

I therefore take my stand upon this, that, so far as a broad Anglo-Asiatic policy is concerned, we ought not to use our influence, and at times, to enforce results, although it is my conviction that we have reached the proper limits of territorial development.

It appears to me that the value of the distinction here indicated is generally lost sight of, a mistake in the consideration of these matters which has already done much mischief in the inflammatory writings of those who are either jealous or afraid of Russian power in Asia, as well as in restricting the spread of legitimate British influence.

The restriction has been partly due to the fears of our own Government, and partly to the natural jealousy of what was once the policy of Great Britain in all parts of the world, but is so no longer.

With regard to the countries under Asiatic Governments intervening between the British border and the countries more or less influenced by Russia, it is not difficult to mark a popular error to a certain extent blinds judgment in England.

Thus all the countries west of our north-west border are apt to be jumbled together as if they formed one united kingdom.

We, on the other hand, know that we have to deal with a belt of independent tribes spreading for many hundreds of miles, which are as free of the Court of Caubul as they are of ourselves. If there is a difference, however, it is to our advantage; for these tribes have a wholesome dread of our arms and power of arrangement, whereas they have little or none of the Afghan Government.

It seems to me that the Government of India has not as yet made such progress in assimilating these border tribes to its own purposes as it might have done, and yet a very great deal has been effected.

It is to be recollected that influence over these independent tribes depends, first, on invincible firmness in the repression of border disorder; secondly, by letting it appear, although we do not choose to annex their mountainous country, that whenever we do move we act as the suzerain, and will be obeyed, whatever the cost and trouble; and, thirdly, that in this sense we are willing to conciliate, the conciliation springing from the good will and strength of the suzerain, and not from the notion that we are unable to deal with them as we please.

An instance of the mode of conducting a war policy with the frontier tribes has been lately seen in the campaign of the Black Mountain, viz., to move in considerable force, and thus to overpower the very notion of opposition. When punishment has been inflicted for serious misconduct, conciliations may begin, but not before. For the prosecution of a peace policy with the same people, we need not look for an example further than Cashmere or any of the independent states in India itself.

It is sometimes said that our policy of forbearance is misconstrued on the frontier.

I find a difficulty in admitting the soundness of such an opinion. I believe that all experience shows that forbearance and conciliation have a lasting effect if the wild inhabitants of the mountains are duly impressed with a sense of their own power and thus forbear. But that sense of power must not be weakened by attempts to conciliate when punishment is due, and before the due punishment has been inflicted. For, whenever this takes place, there is not only loss of prestige, but of the loyalty of those who may come to think that misconduct is more remunerative than fidelity to engagements.

But I would go farther still, and I would state my opinion that the true character of our policy should be so practically explained and enforced on our neighbours that there should be no possible mistake on their part. Thus I would make friendship with us a duty, the principle being broadly proclaimed and acted on that these border tribes which are not with us are against us, and to be dealt with accordingly by force of arms.

Thus I would not allow such an authority as the Akhoond of Swat to preserve a hostile attitude towards the British Government, which has been permitted during the last 20 years. I would simply tell him on the first opportunity that he must either be a friend or be treated as an enemy, and I would advance at once upon him, and so put an end to the discreditable state of things as regards that authority which I believe to exercise a very pernicious effect within our own territories and along a large extent of the border.

It is probable that a campaign and the deployment of 10,000 men for three months would be necessary on this account; in short, such a campaign as we have lately seen on the Black Mountain, although a stern resistance would be encountered.

But it is very possible that recourse to arms may not be necessary if the Akhoond be invited to enter into proper relations with the Punjab Government, he being given to understand that ultimate recompense on his part in the denial of all intercourse would be visited by us hereafter as hostility which could not be permitted.

It is probable that some such action is required also with the great Afræedie tribe, and possibly with others.

This brings me to a point in the existing mode of management of the Indus border and of the relations with the Court of Caubul.
At present all the questions connected with these matters come, in the first instance, to the Commissioner of Peshawur, who is, besides, the Administrative and Chief Judicial Officer of a large district.

It is, I think, clear that it is impossible for one man to be able to combine such very opposite duties, or to find time for their due exercise. I know that this is the opinion of those who have had to carry on the duties, and who are now engaged in their execution.

With regard to the affairs of the Government of Caubul, as well as difficulties with the frontier tribes involving peace and war, the decision rests with the Supreme Government, although the papers have passed immediately from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Punjab Government.

Consequently, as regards the Government of Cawbula, there is certainly, at the first blush, no reason fail to be a convenient mode of transacting business with concomitant weakness and a tendency to procrastination, which would be avoided if, as regards the trans-frontier matters, there were an officer specially charged with them, who should take his instructions from the Governor General in Council.

In short, I think there should be a Governor General's Agent, who might be entrusted with all matters connected with the policy of the border, and who should be the Correspondent of our Native Envoy at Caubul.

It is not usual to entrust diplomacy and decisions affecting war and peace to a minor Government. And in point of fact, when such matters pass through the hands of a minor Government, it comes in truth to be a sort of post office of transmission, and not the means of decision and action.

Yet, owing to the very circumstance of the Punjab Government being the authority to which the Commissioner of Peshawur reports, the ultimately deciding power, viz., the Government of India, ceases to take the direct interest necessary for due appreciation and guidance of a policy, and, as I have been credibly informed, does not now possess all that information which it otherwise would have. It may be that I am misinformed, but I am convinced that the present system is most likely to lead to conditions of insufficient information and of weakness of purpose which we cannot afford in the execution of relations with such a Government as that of Cabul, or of a policy of firmness with the border tribes.

It will not be understood that I am not attributing blame to any one, but am merely calling attention to what appears to me to be a vicious system.

I think it would be admitted by the Foreign Department of the Government of India, that when Sir R. Temple took office about this time last year, he found a great want of information, both practical and documentary, in the office as regards Caubul, the frontier tribes, and the Central Asian questions.

I have reason to believe that the Quartermaster-General was then much consulted by the Foreign Secretary, because no one in his office had any real knowledge of these most important matters, and because there existed no means of informing the Foreign Secretary.

Well, what is the cause of this? The answer is obvious, that these most vital considerations come before the Government of India at second hand through the Punjab Government, just as the affairs of Muscat and Zanzibar reach us through the Government of Bombay.

When an affair reaches the Supreme Government at first hand, there can be observed which we know to have enormous weight in the minds of all Asiatic Chiefs, viz., that they should feel that they are dealing directly with the head of all, and not through a subordinate Governor. On this ground alone the Governor General's Agent is required.

Should this proposition be admitted, it would not be very difficult, I imagine, to institute the Durbar system, according to which all the chief tribes in the frontier from Sinde to Cashmere should be represented by their Vakeels, according to what we know of the system pursued by the Governor General's Agent in Afghanistan and Central India. The arrangement already made for the due correspondence of our Native Envoy at Cabul would continue, but with this difference, that his correspondent would be the Governor General's Agent, instead of the Punjab Government.

Cashmere may be properly left in its present relations with the Punjab Government. The footing of that State is satisfactory, and there is probably no country in the East which is so well known to Englishmen as this province. The Consular appointment of Dr. Cayley at Leh has answered extremely well, and such is the growing trade with the Punjab, the same extending beyond Cashmere to Central Asia, that no object would be gained in effecting any change in that quarter, while, perhaps, some delay, lukewarm interest, weakening of responsibility, first in the Punjab, and then in the Supreme Government, with consequent diplomatic debility, and all the concomitant results on border management, of which only those who occasionally meet the Border Officers, and talk with them in familiar confidence.

It is almost incredible, but it is true, that according to this extraordinary system, Cundahar news, which is very often most important as regards the dynasty in possession at Caubul, reaches the Government of India through the Commissioner of Sinde and the Government of Bombay.

Hence delay, lukewarm interest, weakening of responsibility, first in the Punjab, and then in the Supreme Government, with consequent diplomatic debility, and all the concomitant results on border management, of which only those can judge who occasionally meet the Border Officers, and talk with them in familiar confidence.

With regard to Persia, I am unable to see that any special advantage would flow from replacing the Mission at Teheran under the Government of India. I am impressed with the idea that the disputes of Persia with Turkey, and the general support of that country against Russian encroachment, the pressure required for the telegraphic system, and to soften or annul a barbarous policy, whether to her own subjects or towards independent tribes, can be better managed from Downing Street than Calcutta. Besides which, there can hardly be a doubt that the Shah would rather treat with the Representative of the Queen of England than with the Vicereoy of India.

There is, indeed, a reason for adhering to existing diplomatic arrangements with regard to Persia similar to that I have indicated for the transfer of direct communication with the Court of Caubul from the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab to the Government of India.
The British Resident in the Gulf, being a servant of the Government of India, seems to me to answer every Indian question with regard to the peace of the Indian seas, the control of the Arab tribes, Muscat, &c., &c.

I can see no reason for repeating the experiment of sending British Officers to drill the troops of the Shah. This has been tried before, both in Persia and Turkey, without any really practical result, so far as I have ever been able to learn.

In short, I imagine such a measure in such countries to be without use or meaning, unless their Governments would consent to the Foreign Officers being the actual commanders and leaders of large divisions of corps d'armées, as we saw in the Punjab in the time of Runjeet Sing.

As such an arrangement is clearly out of the question in Persia, to commit ourselves de novo to the measure of sending English drill masters could hardly do anything but awaken extreme and reasonable jealousy in the Russian Government, and, perhaps, in other quarters also.

It appears thus, finally, to me that the whole of Indo-Asiatic policy requires revision, but in a sense opposite to that entertained by Sir Henry Rawlinson.

Thus I would put aside jealousy and antagonism towards other provinces, but would frame all our measures on a basis of international communication of peaceful character, of confidence instead of distrust, suspicion, and ignorance.

Thus, wherever and whenever it is possible, Consular agency should be reciprocated between countries hitherto supposed to be rival, Great Britain and Russia. If the latter should object at first we should not be discouraged, but persevere until we carry our point.

The same should follow in Eastern countries proper, of which an example has been set by the establishment of Dr. Caley at Leh, and of the Native Ugskul or Consul at Yarkund.

Thirdly, I would place our relations with Caubul under a Governor General's Agent, and so cause the communication with that country to be direct with the Government of India, instead of with the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, as is now the case.

Fourthly, the same functionary should guide all the relations with the independent tribes of the border, direct communication being not only encouraged, but, if necessary, enforced by downright pressure. Without this the frontier peace has been constantly endangered, and it must continue to be so.

Fifthly, I would leave the system as at present pursued in Persia without change. On the whole, we have reason to be satisfied with the results of the last few years, as shown in the construction of the telegraph wire, the navigation of the Euphrates, and the tone of the Shah's Government in its communications with Mr. Alison, and its general attention to British suggestions.

(Signed) W. R. Mansfield.

24th December 1868.

Enclosure 9 in No. 14.

Minute by Mr. R. H. Davies on Sir H. Rawlinson's Paper on Russian Progress in Central Asia, dated 27th December 1868.

A perusal of Sir H. Rawlinson's paper leads me to the conclusion that he has failed to make out any sufficient case for the measures which he proposes. It is not, indeed, altogether consistent with itself, for while he professes to regard an invasion of India by Russia as a contingency not requiring to be guarded against, he nevertheless draws an alarming picture of the descent of 50,000 Persian Sufis, supported by the Russian column, Russian non-combatants that it might be successful, owing to the prevalent disaffection of the Mahomedan population of India.

His immediate object, however, is to bring some kind of increased diplomatic pressure to bear on the Rulers of Cabul and Persia.

One argument for interfering at Cabul is founded on the general advantages of keeping good order in a country adjoining our frontier; but a second plainly points to the creation by our agents of a confederation of the Mahomedan States in antagonism to Russia. The various composition of such a league, and the utter bad faith of the parties to be consulted, would, I think, render such a scheme impracticable, as well as dangerous. The Russians would regard it as threatening their position in Bokhara, and as justifying any reprisals. Nothing but overt aggression on their part would, in any degree, recommend such a project.

The argument for interfering in Persia is that Russia may otherwise seize Herat. Various modes of intervention are suggested, all more or less involving expenditure on our part.

Now, does past experience warrant our augmenting our diplomatic interference in the affairs of these countries? Can we forget our former failure in Afghanistan, and its fatal consequences? Can we forget that, when Persia went to war in 1832 with Turkey, in 1826 with Russia, in 1832, 1836, and 1837 against Herat, she, in each instance, did so contrary to the remonstrances of the British Minister; and, in the case of Mahomed Shah, commenced hostilities immediately after we had aided his accession to the throne, with troops drilled by our Officers? Is there any hope of our efforts and expenditure now being more effectual? Shall we find less slippery materials to work with,—instruments more reliable,—than Dost Mahomed Khan, and the Kandahar brothers, or the vainglorious Shahs bygone. Neither Oriental character nor the circumstances of these Mahomedan Governments have changed. Under the unpliant law of the Koran, every vacancy in the Musnad is liable to be contested with the sword. To side with one candidate is to make the other, and, perhaps, a strong party with him, an enemy; to side with neither is to pretermit the purpose of the negotiator; and, while thus all the old elements of failure await him, is there any fresh cause of alarm? Does the position of Russia in Khokand, Bokhara, or Mongolia, in any way lessen the stupendous physical difficulties of the route to Cabul by Bamiyan, or to Kashmir by the Karakoram? Russia has been any time during the past thirty years as well able as she is now to aid Persia in the seizure of Herat. She has refrained from doing so. She refrained even at the time of the Sepoy mutiny. Is it to be imagined that she will attempt the precipitous and sterile passes of the Hindoo Khooosh and Karakoram, so long as she has the Kandahar route as an alternative? And yet her approach to these, our natural and impregnable
The minute is extracted from the Honourable Sir R. Temple, dated 30th December 1868. It concerns the proposal for a railway to connect Bombay with Kandahar, and mentions the construction of a fort at Kandahar. The decision makers are considering the feasibility and cost of this project, as well as the potential benefits to the region.

Still I should wish to append my explanation.
It is very true, as mentioned by his Excellency, that I used to have long conversations with the Quartermaster-General, Colonel Peter Lumsden, on Central Asian subjects. That Office and I were both old Punjabis, with many associations in common. He is an accomplished Officer, with special knowledge of Afghanistan, Thibet, and the countries beyond them. Moreover, in matters which were much connected with military communications, the Quartermaster-General was an authority with whom the Foreign Secretary would naturally confer. I acknowledge with pleasure the instruction I derived from my conversations with Colonel Lumsden.

On the other hand, there was as much information as could fairly be expected in the Foreign Office at Calcutta. As regards Afghanistan, the late Under Secretary, Mr. J. Wylie, had earned a name even in England by his writings on the most recent history of the Afghans. The thread of the story was carefully taken up by Mr. Wynne, his successor. Moreover, I should say that Mr. Wynne had made the topography and recent politics of the Trans-Oxus Provinces his particular study. The newest books and maps were at hand, and were practically attended to. The reports by Pundit Munphool and his staff, after their travels in Badakshan, Thibet, and Yarkand, were carefully collated. A special agency was employed in England to obtain the most recent information about the Russians in Central Asia, and to furnish translations of all articles in the Russian Press that might bear on these matters. No doubt I somewhat expanded this system of examining the Russian newspapers, but I found it in full work before I joined. Again, the report on the tribes on our Trans-Indus border, which I prepared some years ago in the Punjab, had been carefully brought up to date by my successors, and was at hand in the Foreign Office. There was a mass of Caubul diaries regularly furnished by our Native Agent there. There was information of Southern Afghanistan regularly transmitted by the Sindh authorities. On joining the Office, almost the first thing I had to do was to examine the proofs of an elaborate history of the affairs of the Foreign Department during the past four years by Mr. Assistant Secretary Talboys Wheeler.

On the whole, I must testify that I received over the Foreign Office from my predecessors in excellent working order; though, of course, like every other Department, it may be improved more and more. Indeed, the collection of all the best publications, and the collation of the most recent and authentic information about the countries beyond the limits of India, are matters demanding incessant vigilance in the Foreign Office.

R. Temple


SUPPLEMENTARY MINUTE by Sir J. LAWRENCE, dated 31st December 1868.

Time will scarcely permit my analysing in detail all the points which are raised in the Minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 24th instant. I feel bound, however, to express my dissent from some of Sir W. Mansfield's suggestions. But, in the first place, I think it right to say that I cannot admit that the Foreign Office of the Government of India has, at any time since I have been Governor General, been defective in regard to information in respect to Caubul, the frontier tribes, and Central Asian affairs. Perhaps I may be admitted to have had special opportunity of forming a correct opinion in this matter, as much as I have retained the Foreign Department under my personal control since I became Governor General. And during all this period it has been my distinct impression, that the information the Department has possessed has been considerable in itself, and quite as accurate as the relative circumstance between British India and those countries and their people would admit. During the last five years, we have maintained a Native Agent at the Court of Caubul, whose reports have proved remarkably accurate; and we have had special Agents travelling in different parts of Central Asia, through whom we have obtained valuable information. The knowledge which has in this way been acquired has been digested and collated with special care by Mr. John Wylie and Mr. C. Girdlestone, successively Under Secretaries of the Foreign Department, and by Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler, the Assistant Secretary. No doubt, in progress of time, we may hope that our relations with these countries will still further improve; but I believe that they are at present as good as circumstances will admit. And, until a change of this kind takes place, it seems to me vain to hope that any great improvement in the information which is procurable will occur.

In view to make my remarks as brief as is possible, I have made notes on the different suggestions of Sir W. Mansfield in parallel columns to his Excellency's remarks, copies of which should be sent to the Secretary of State.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

31st December 1868.

Enclosure 12 in No. 14.

MINUTE by Sir W. R. MANSFIELD, Commander-in-Chief, dated 1st January 1869.

I am afraid, from the remarks of his Excellency the Viceroy, in his Minute of the 31st December, that either some words of mine are open to misconstruction, or that an impression has been conveyed which was certainly not my intention. Thus in my Minute of the 24th December, in the course of a somewhat long expanse of my views on the foreign policy of India, the necessity occurred for showing what seems to me to be an inconvenient and unusual mode of transacting the most important diplomatic business which comes under the notice of the Government. It appears to me that the existing system tends to the weakening of responsibility where it should be most clearly defined, and that a division of duties should take place, which have hitherto been united in the same functionaries. But it was certainly very far from my wish to
assail the administration of the Foreign Office, either directly or indirectly, and I do not think that I have done so.

It is my conviction that the vast experience of his Excellency the Viceroy has during the years of his administration generally covered the want of a more perfect diplomatic system with respect to the region which has called for my remarks, and I must have often given expression to this opinion in conversation. So thorough and sincere is my respect for that great experience and for the administrative ability with which it has been applied, my knowledge of those qualities having extended from a date long antecedent to the time when I was first associated with his Excellency's Government, that I have always felt extreme distrust of my own opinion if it differed in even slight particulars from that of the Viceroy and of the foreign policy of India.

I believe I have generally had the happiness to concur with him on all foreign affairs of real importance, this being shown in his Excellency's marginal remarks on my Minute of the 24th December, for, as respects the essence of the matter of these papers, there is no difference between us, although on certain points of detail the execution of a policy there is difference of degree, but not, I think, in substance.

But I venture to submit, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, that the extraordinary experience, the immense knowledge of detail, and the administrative ability distinguishing his Excellency, on which, at the close of his administration, I may be permitted to dwell with a hearty feeling of real admiration, form together a happy and, perhaps, an unexampled accident. We can but seldom expect to see all these conditions united in the person of the Governor-General of India.

It is on this very account that the necessity has occurred to me, with a force I am unable to describe, that for the political security and peace of this country and its development in a peaceful sense, the supervision of frontier affairs should be organised after the manner I have attempted to sketch, and that the Court of Caubul should, through a frontier Governor-General's agent, be brought into direct communication with the Government of Caubul, independently of the Punjab Government.

When the Punjab was first annexed, we had a body of frontier officers, who were at the same time distinguished soldiers and accomplished frontier diplomats. That body of officers, which had been formed and inspired by the late Sir Henry Lawrence and by his Excellency himself, may be appropriately called the "Lawrence School" for the management of the border and general appreciation of Caubul and foreign Asiatic affairs.

It is not too much to say that that especial school, which sprang from the events preceding the annexation itself of the Punjab, has almost died out. The officers of the present day are well nigh overwhelmed with revenue and judicial duties, with attention to codes and the execution of the law of the Punjab, and to the material development of their districts and people on the other. Many of them are young, as cannot be helped, and I apprehend that all, as being under the yoke of regular administration, are unequal to the political management of the frontier, which might fairly demand all the energy and thought of men set apart for it.

Therefore it is that I think we do want a separate political or diplomatic agency which shall in some measure serve to reproduce a school such as that I have referred to. It would, in truth, be a part of the Foreign Office, which appears to be absolutely incomplete without it, just as it would be incomplete without Governor-General's agencies in Rajpootana and Central India.

For I am compelled here to submit that his Excellency's analogy with reference to those agencies is incomplete. It would only be correct if the Governor-General's agents in Rajpootana and Central India reported, through the Government of the North-Western Provinces, to the Government of India, instead of being in direct communication with the latter, a condition believed by me to be as necessary for the North-West Frontier as it is for Rajpootana.

Perhaps before I close this paper I may advert to certain facts which bear on the question as now stated.

Thus, I believe it may be asserted that hardly one Peshawur Commissioner has executed his office since the annexation who has not found the mixed political and administrative duties almost beyond his powers.

More assistance has been constantly called for by the successive Commissioners. I have talked with many officers intimately acquainted with the subject, some belonging to the Punjab Government, and some unconnected with it, but all possessing experience and speaking from personal knowledge, and I have never heard but one opinion, viz., that the daily growing demands of the administrative and judicial work have rendered it almost impossible to do justice to that other portion of their labours which immediately after annexation engrossed almost the whole time of the Peshawur Commissioner and his assistants, viz., frontier management.

It must not, therefore, be thought that I am imputing blame to any man or to any set of functionaries. I have merely indicated that, as could not be helped, the nominal system of 20 years ago does not meet the demands of the present time, and that while we attend to the administrative duties of our districts, we should take care that special duties, on the execution of which the questions of peace and war depend, should receive the particular study and attention they deserve, and should therefore not be postponed to other cares in the routine administration.

I am confident that the necessity of the change I advocate will make itself henceforth constantly more and more felt, till it is carried into execution. I only trust that it will not be delayed till calamity or a wasting war have followed on the want of it.

After this explanation of my views, Sir Richard Temple will doubtless believe that I have intended no improper reflection on the Foreign Office. But I may refer to my conversations with him in the early part of the expired year as the justification for my introduction of his name with reference to my remarks on the wants of the department: he lately presided over, wants inherent to a political system hitherto exceptionally pursued in the Punjab Frontier as distinguished from other parts of India, and not to be attributed to personal direction.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

1st January 1869.
No. 146.

No. 27 of 1869.

Government of India, Foreign Department.

Political.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, the 19th January 1869.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of a correspondence, from which it will be seen that we have granted further supplies of money and arms to His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

2. We beg to draw the attention of your Grace to our letter dated the 9th instant, and to the khureeta of His Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer of the same date, indicative of the policy which, after full deliberation, we have thought it desirable to define and pursue in consideration of the state of affairs in Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MAYO.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
G. N. TAYLOR.
H. M. DURAND.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 14a.

Telegram, dated 21st December, 1868.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab.

The Viceroy wishes you at once to offer Shere Ali six lakhs of rupees, including the two already sanctioned.

The six lakhs should be a gift to help the Ameer in his need. Perhaps he will be able to draw on merchants at Cabul, who could be paid at Peshawur or Lahore.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14a.

Translation of a letter from Ameer Shere Ali Khan, of Cabul, to the Governor General, dated 12th Shaban, 1285 A.H.

My grateful thanks are due to God (who has no equal), through whose favour the object of my heart has been attained, and the mind of your Excellency, as well as that of mine, have been made happy.

As the principles of friendship render it incumbent upon friends to communicate good accounts for the information of each other, I write this friendly letter, in which I beg to state that the British officers have much regard and friendship for this territory.

Such kindness on their part has laid me under great obligation, and has placed the affairs of this State on a firmer basis.

I hope that your Excellency, considering me as a sincere friend, will always gratify me with accounts of your good health. The act of pursuing such course will not be opposed to the rules of friendship.
Enclosure 3 in No. 14A.

Translation of a khureeta from His Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan, of Cabul, to the Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, dated 12th Shaban, 1285 A.H.

Although, from the friendly communications of His Excellency the Governor General of India and those of your Honour, as well as from the verbal representations of the British Envoys, I had learnt of the sincere desire (in a greater degree than before) of the British Government to see the foundations of my Government strengthened and the circumstances of my subjects (who had been the victims of lawless usurpers) improved, yet I deferred the settlement of all amicable relations and matters till such time as I should have a personal interview with His Excellency and your Honour; and I was preparing for the journey, when suddenly the hostile proceedings of Sardar Muhammad Azim Khan and Sardar Muhammad Abd-ul-Rahman Khan diverted my attention towards them, and rendered it necessary that I should chastise them. Wherefore my meeting with my friends was postponed.

I have now been informed that the British Government, acting in a most friendly spirit, and keeping in view certain important enterprises which must be undertaken by my Government, have hastened the despatch of some money to me, and I am extremely obliged to the Government for this act of kindness. Whereas your Honour is well acquainted with the state of affairs of my country, and you are already aware that the agents of the usurpers forcibly realized the entire revenues, not only for the present year, but in some parts of the country those for the coming year also; and whereas the large number of my troops and dependants and followers is well known to you; should I now make further demands, such an act would be extremely oppressive on my subjects and calculated to ruin them; and, at the same time, if my troops and dependants are not paid, my Government would be weakened: therefore considering that the interests of the two Governments are identical, if the Government will, under these circumstances, with due regard to my requirements, help me with further remittances of money and arms, such assistance would not be opposed to the dictates of friendship, and would be attended with great advantage to my Government.

Enclosure 4 in No. 14A.

Khureeta, dated 9th January 1869.

From the Viceroy and Governor General of India to His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabul.

I have received and carefully perused your Highness's letter, dated the 12th of Shaban 1285, and addressed to me.

I have also read your letter to His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab of the same date.

From an attentive perusal of these papers, as well as from a constant and careful observation of all the various events which have taken place in Afghanistan during the past few years, I am well acquainted with your Highness's present position and future prospects, and feel satisfied that your Highness desires that the friendship which has hitherto subsisted between you and the British Government should be maintained.

It is the earnest desire of the Government of India, as I have already intimated, to see your Highness's authority established on a basis of solidity and permanency, and to cement the bonds of friendship and alliance which ought to exist between the British power and your Highness as an independent Ruler.

You have been already apprized by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that a sum of six lakhs of rupees has been placed at your unreserved disposal. For this, the British Government looks for no other return than abiding confidence, sincerity, and good-will.

I regret that obstacles of an insuperable nature should have prevented my meeting your Highness at some suitable place on the frontier of both kingdoms.

As a further proof of the desire of the British Government, which fears no aggression, and which wishes for no conquest, to see a strong, a just, and a merciful government established by your Highness at Cabul and throughout Afghanistan, I have to inform you that, in the course of the next three months, three sums of two lakhs of rupees each, or, in all, of six lakhs more, will be placed at your entire control, to be applied by
your Highness in the manner which you may think most conducive to the furtherance of your interests and to the consolidation of your authority.

For this, again, the Government of India will expect no return save one of the kind just indicated in the preceding part of this letter.

I am leaving the country almost immediately, and am handing over the high office of Viceroy and Governor General to my successor.

But the policy which I have advisedly pursued with regard to the affairs of Afghanistan is one which I have entered on with anxious deliberation, and which has commanded the assent and approval of Her Majesty the Queen of England; and as long as you continue, by your actions, to evince a real desire for the alliance of the British Government, you have nothing to apprehend in the way of a change of policy, or of our interference in the internal affairs and administration of your kingdom.

It will remain for the head of the administration to consider, in each succeeding year, what further proofs may be given of our desire to see your power consolidated, and what amount of practical assistance, in the shape of money or materials of war, may periodically be made over to your Highness as a testimony of our good will, and to the furtherance of your legitimate authority and influence.

But be assured that you will never err in shaping your course with a view to British alliance, and in considering Her Majesty the Queen of England and her Viceroy in India as your best and truest friends.

(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE.

No. 15.

No. 78 of 1869.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

Fort William, 13th March 1869.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty’s Government, a copy of papers relating to the meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General and the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabul, which it is proposed shall take place at Umballa towards the end of this month.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MAYO.

H. M. DURAND.

H. S. MAINE.

J. STRACHEY.

R. TEMPLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

Telegram, dated 10th February 1869.

From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India to Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab.

Propose to Shere Ali to meet me at Umballa about the 25th of March, or not later than 1st of April.

He will be received with all honour at all our stations, and every facility will be afforded by the officers of Government for his journey to Umballa and back.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

No. 127-51, dated 16th February 1869.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

Under instructions conveyed demi-officially by His Excellency the Viceroy, our Agent at Cabul was desired to ascertain from the Ameer his wishes in regard to an interview with His Excellency.
2. I enclose a translation of the reply of the Agent dated 7th February.

3. His Honour presumes a final decision will be deferred until a reply has been received to the definite proposals contained in His Excellency's telegram of the 10th idem. It would appear from the present communication that the Ameer has contemplated a meeting at an earlier period than that proposed in His Excellency's telegram, and that, so far as he is concerned, he will be glad to have it held at as short a distance from the Afghan frontier as may be practicable.

Enclosure 3 in No. 15.

Dated 7th February 1869.

From ATA MUNNAHAD KHAN, British Vakeel at Cabul, to Major F. R. Pollock, C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I mentioned to the Ameer what you wrote on the subject of the proposed meeting between His Excellency the Governor General and the Ameer. His Highness replied that, although regarding all parts of the dominion of Her Majesty as his own house, he feels that he is honoured all the same wherever he may go, far or near; but inasmuch as matters on the Turkistan border have to be settled, His Highness would have much rather wished that the meeting took place in the neighbourhood of Lahore or Delhi, so that he might return to Cabul quickly and attend to the settlement of his frontier affairs. But should His Excellency the Governor General be unable to come to Lahore or Delhi, His Highness is prepared to proceed even to Calcutta if necessary, for he considers the obtaining of a meeting with His Excellency to be more important than the settlement of his frontier affairs, the accomplishment of which latter object, too, depends on the friendly sympathy of the British Government.

It has been accordingly arranged that the advance tents shall be sent off on 26th Shawwal (9th February), and that the Ameer himself will start on the 10th. His Highness intends to be at Beet Khal, the first stage (D.V.), on the 11th, on his way from Cabul to Peshawur. I have stated the sentiments of the Ameer. It now rests with you to arrange for the meeting at such place and in such manner as you deem proper.

The Ameer, on perusing this petition, said that he would not be able to travel at night either by rail or carriage, but that he would travel only by day.

At present the Ameer intends to make 15 marches from Cabul to Peshawur. But the date on which His Highness shall reach Peshawur will be fixed on arrival at Jelalabad, and shall be duly communicated to you.

Enclosure 4 in No. 15.

Abstract Translation of a Letter from ATA MAHOMED KHAN, Khagwanee, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 18th February 1869.

To-day your Honour's letter dated 11th February 1869, regarding the interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India and the Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Umballa, was received by undersigned at Gundamuk. It was in original submitted to the Ameer, who was extremely gratified and obliged by the consideration and kindness of the British Government. He intimated that he would arrive at Jellalabad the day after to-morrow, and, after two or three days' halt there, would set out for Peshawur by regular marches. He would fix the date of his arrival at Peshawur after reaching Jellalabad.

(Signed) ATA MAHOMED KHAN, Khagwanee
Enclosure 5 in No. 15.

Telegram, dated 3rd March 1869.
From His Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Peshawur, to His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta.

I have this day arrived at Peshawur, and beg to make my acknowledgments for the honourable reception I have met with from the Commissioner and the General and other officers whom I had the pleasure of meeting.

Enclosure 6 in No. 15.

Telegram, dated 3rd March 1869.
From His Excellency the Viceroy, Calcutta, to His Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Peshawur.

I cordially welcome your Highness to Her Majesty's territories, and wish you a prosperous and happy journey to our appointed place of meeting.

I am gratified that your Highness is pleased with your reception at Peshawur. You will receive from the British authorities, according to my desire, every honour and attention during your Highness's journey and stay in this country.

No. 16.

No. 98 of 1869.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke,

Fort William, 20th March 1869.

In continuation of our letter, dated 13th instant, No. 78, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further papers relating to the visit of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.

We have, &c.

(Signed) Mayo.
H. M. Durand.
H. S. Maine.
J. Strachey.
R. Temple.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

Memorandum, dated 9th March 1869.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab, to W. S. Siton-Karr, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.


Diary (Extract).

The Ruler of Cabul, Ameer Shere Ali Khan, arrived at Peshawur on the 2nd instant, on his way down to Ambala, for an interview with His Excellency the Viceroy. His Highness was met at 7 a.m., within the mouth of the Khyber Pass, by Major Pollock.
C.S.I., Commissioner of Peshawur, and Brigadier-General D. M. Stewart, C.B., commanding Peshawur Brigade, and a large party of gentlemen, accompanied by a guard of honour of the XIX. Bengal Lancers.

After a hearty welcome to British territory,—a welcome which at once put His Highness at his ease,—he was escorted by the British officials to his camp at Burj Hurri Singh. On arrival at Jamrood a royal salute was fired as His Highness passed within the British border. Another salute was fired as His Highness dismounted at his camp, where he was received, with full military honours, by a guard composed of Her Majesty’s Regiment and the XIX. Bengal Lancers.

The Commissioner, Major Pollock, C.S.I., and the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Waterfield, attended His Highness in camp during the day.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab (demi-official) to W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, dated 12th March 1869.

I forward herewith a copy of Major Pollock’s Report of the proceedings of His Highness the Ameer on the 6th, 7th, and 8th instant, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy.

Ameer Shere Ali Khan at Peshawur.

On the 6th instant, the Commissioner, Major Pollock, C.S.I., paid a visit to the Ameer. His Highness, during the interview, mentioned having received His Excellency the Viceroy’s reply to his telegram of the 3rd instant, and expressed his heartfelt gratification at the cordial welcome to Her Majesty’s territories given him by His Excellency the Viceroy, and said he hoped the friendship between the two Governments would now be firm and lasting. In the evening His Highness drove out in an open carriage, attended by Colonel C. Chamberlain, C.B., 23rd Pioneers, and Dr. H. W. Bellew, civil surgeon, whose attendance His Highness specially requested. His Highness drove through cantonments along the mall, and visited Her Majesty’s 36th Regiment in the barracks. Colonel McMahon, C.B., received His Highness, and conducted him through the barracks, sergeant’s mess, reading-rooms, &c. His Highness minutely inspected the men’s kits and arms, and spent some time in the reading-room and listening to the band. On re-entering his carriage the men of Her Majesty’s 36th Regiment gave His Highness three good British cheers. His Highness expressed his high appreciation of the compliment, and thanked Colonel McMahon for his polite attentions. His Highness observed that he had now seen the British soldier visited unawares in his barrack. “Nothing,” His Highness said, “could exceed the order, cleanliness, and comfort in which I have found them.” His Highness was struck with the magnificence of the new barracks, and remarked—“They are far more magnificent and luxurious than any building in my kingdom, not excepting my own Palace.”

On the 7th instant, Sunday, His Highness drove out in the evening, attended by Dr. Bellew, civil surgeon, in an open carriage. He passed through cantonments, along the mall, and returned to his residence at sunset. His Highness conversed a good deal on the affairs of his own kingdom, and lamented the ignorance and stubbornness of his own people, and attributed all their deficiencies to the absence of wealth from the country.

On the 8th instant, His Highness visited the photographic studio of Mr. Baker. He was attended by the Commissioner, Major Pollock, C.S.I., and the civil surgeon, Dr. Bellew. His Highness and his son, Sirdar Abduoolah Jan, were photographed singly, and then in a group with some of their attendant court officials. His Highness took a great interest in the process, and minutely examined all its details. He observed that our ingenuity had reached the highest point of perfection. “In fact,” observed His Highness, “all people are advancing in the arts of peace and civilization. It is only we Afghans who remain the ignorant asses we have always been.”

On being escorted back to his residence, His Highness was shown a portion of the Atlantic submarine cable. On its mechanism and uses being explained to him, he
expressed great astonishment, and could hardly credit the possibility of a message being sent from Peshawur to London within 24 hours. In the course of a general conversation, His Highness stated that coal was known to exist in the Sohgar valley, but the people were too ignorant and unsettled to make any use of it. In Toorkistan, he stated, the Russians worked mines of it. His Highness, on another occasion, referred to the thorough subservience of Persia to Russia, and observed that the British influence in that country was quite powerless against that of Russia. His Highness and all his suite being dressed in the costume of the people of Herat, and not in that of the Afghans, gave rise to comment on the part of the native residents of Peshawur. His Highness explained that he had adopted this costume ever since he succeeded to the throne of Cabul, as being one more suited to a military life than the cumbrous robes and head-dresses of the Afghans.

In the evening, attended by Colonel Chamberlain and Captain Upperton, His Highness drove out in an open carriage, and visited the Peshawur Museum.

(Signed) F. R. POLLOCK, Major, Commander, and Superintendent.

No. 17.


Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To his Grace the Duke of ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke,

We have the honour to transmit papers relative to the meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council and His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabul, which has taken place, as proposed, in this station, and further to submit a brief narrative of the events of the past few days.

2. The Viceroy, accompanied by the members of his Government, and by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, arrived at Umballa on the morning of Saturday the 27th, and arrangements had been previously made for the reception of the Ameer in open Durbar on the evening of the same day.

3. For the proceedings which took place at the reception of the Ameer, and also for those of the visit paid by his Excellency in Council to the Ameer in return, we beg to refer your Grace to the Gazettes Extraordinary, published for both these occasions, copies of which we enclose.

4. On the afternoon of Monday, March the 29th, the return visit having taken place that morning, the Viceroy accorded a private interview to his Highness, who was attended by his most confidential and trusted adviser, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. There were present also at this interview, his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, the Foreign Secretary, and Captain Grey, who acted as interpreter. After free and unreserved discussion between his Excellency the Viceroy and his Highness the Ameer on important matters relating to the affairs of Affghanistan and to the visit of his Highness, it was arranged that a letter should be addressed to his Highness expressive of the sentiments of the Government of India in respect to the matters under discussion. At a meeting of His Excellency's Council, which was held on the next day, Tuesday, March the 30th, the whole subject was very fully discussed in Council, and the form and contents of the letter, a copy of which is enclosed, was agreed to.

5. The letter was very carefully translated into the Persian language, and was presented to the Ameer by our Foreign Secretary, who was deputed to his Highness for that purpose.

6. A reply to the same has been received from the Ameer expressive of the satisfaction and thanks of his Highness at the kindness and friendship evinced by the British Government. A translation of this reply is also appended.

7. Two interviews have taken place between the confidential adviser of His Highness Syud Noor Mahomed Shah and our Foreign Secretary. At these interviews various matters of importance were fully discussed, and the means whereby trade with Afghanistan could be encouraged, and additional measures for securing the peace of the frontier could
be promoted, were carefully considered. An opportunity was also taken, at the same time, to inform the Minister, in the clearest and most explicit terms, that the British Government would always abstain from any direct interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and that under no circumstances could British troops or British officers be employed across the frontier in quelling civil contentions or domestic strife.

8. We have every reason to hope that the visit of his Highness and the communications which have taken place will be productive of the happiest results. It has assured his Highness that the policy which was adopted by his Lordship's predecessor, on the Ameer's regaining the throne of Cabul in August last, will be continued. It will show to the world that we have in the Ruler of Afghanistan a faithful ally, and that while the British Government has no desire of aggrandisement and extension of territory, it will still use all its influence to support neighbouring princes and rulers who are earnestly endeavouring to create by their own exertions a strong, independent, and friendly government.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MAYO.

W. R. MANSFIELD.

H. M. DURAND.

H. W. ELLIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, published by Authority.

Foreign Department.

Camp, Umballa, 31st March 1869.

At 5 p.m. on Saturday, March the 27th, 1869, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General held a Public Durbar at Umballa, in honour of his Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan. The Durbar was attended by his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, his Excellency the Commanding-in-Chief, the Honourable the Members of Council, his Excellency Lord Napier of Magdala, Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, the Maharaja of Puttiala, the Rajas of Jweend, Nabi, and Kuppoorthulla, the Nawabs of Maler Kotla, the Chief Sirdars and attendants of his Highness the Ameer, the General Commanding the Sirhind Division, the Officers attached to the Army Head Quarters, the Secretaries and Under-Secretaries to the Government of India, the Secretaries to the Government of the Punjab, and by a large number of other official and non-official gentlemen present at Umballa.

Raised seats were reserved for, and occupied by ladies, on both sides of the Durbar Tent. With the exception of the high officials entitled to salutes, the British officials and the Native chiefs were all seated by 4.30 p.m.

His Highness the Ameer, together with his son Abdoollah Jan, his chief Sirdars, and the British officers attached to the suite of his Highness, were escorted from his Highness' place of residence by a deputation consisting of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, the Secretary and Under Secretary in the Foreign Department, the Agent to the Lieutenant-Governor for the Cis-Sutlej States, the General Commanding the Sirhind Division, and the Private Secretary and the Aides-de-Camp to his Excellency the Viceroy.

His Highness was received at the entrance of the Durbar Tent by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, attended by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Members of Council, and he was conducted to the dais by his Excellency.

Before taking their seats, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General addressed his Highness the Ameer in the following terms:

"In the name of Her most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and Sovereign of India, I bid you a hearty welcome, and express to you the sincere gratification that it gives me to receive your Highness as the guest of the Queen." I trust that this visit may be the commencement of many years of amity between Her Majesty and yourself, and of mutual confidence and goodwill between the nations which Her Majesty rules in India, and all the subjects of your Highness."

After a conversation of about fifteen minutes duration, fifty-one trays of presents were brought into the Durbar Tent for his Highness the Ameer; twenty-one trays for his Highness' son; and five trays for each of his Highness' six principal Sirdars. Six horses were also led to the entrance of the Tent for the acceptance of his Highness.

When all the presents had been duly laid before the throne, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General placed a sword of honour in his Highness' hands, prefacing the gift with these words:

"I present you with this sword as a token of my desire that you may ever be victorious over your enemies, in defence of your just and lawful rights, and in all your efforts for the consolidation of your kingdom."

At the close of the Durbar his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General conducted his Highness the Ameer to the entrance of the Durbar Tent, and there took leave of him. His Highness and his suite were then escorted to his Highness' residence by the same deputation and with the same
formalities as were observed on the occasion of bringing his Highness to the Durbar. The body-guard of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General formed the escort to his Highness the Ameer in his progress to and from the Durbar Tent.

A Royal salute was fired as his Excellency the Viceroy entered the Durbar, and as he quitted it. The road from the house of his Highness to the barriers of the Viceregal camp was lined with cavalry. The main street of the Viceregal camp was lined with infantry, and a guard of honour was drawn up in front of the Durbar Tent. The troops saluted his Highness the Ameer as he passed. A Royal salute was fired both on the arrival and on the departure of his Highness.

The usual salutes were fired on the arrival and on the departure of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and the troops presented arms.

The chiefs present at the Durbar were honoured with the salutes due to their ranks.

The actual proceedings commenced at 5 o'clock and terminated at 5.45.

By order of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

W. S. SETON-KARR,
Secretary to the Government of India.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

The GAZETTE of INDIA, Extraordinary, published by Authority.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Camp, Umballa, the 31st March 1869.

His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan held a Durbar at 8 a.m., on Monday, 29th March 1869, in his own camp, for the reception of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

All the officers of Government, both civil and military, who attended the Durbar of Saturday the 27th of March, were present on this occasion also, but owing to the limited accommodation available in his Highness' tents ladies and non-official gentlemen could not be invited.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General was escorted to the Durbar by Sirdar Abdoolah Jan, the son of the Ameer, and by his Highness' two principal Ministers, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and Shahghassi Shere dil Khan. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Lord Napier of Magdala, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and the personal staff of his Excellency likewise accompanied the Viceroy.

The Viceroy and Governor-General was met at the entrance of the Durbar Tent by the Ameer, and by the British officers attached to his Highness' suite, and was conducted by his Highness to the dais. His Excellency took his seat on the right hand of the Ameer, and on the left hand of his Highness was his son Abdoolah Jan. At the close of the interview his Highness, in complimentary language, presented his Excellency with his own sword.

When the conversation was over his Highness led his Excellency to the entrance of the tent, and there took leave of him. His Excellency was then escorted to his own camp with the same formalities, and by the same British officers who had accompanied him to the Durbar.

The same ceremonies were observed with regard to the array of troops the presenting of arms, and the firing of salutes to those entitled to these honours, as were observed in the Durbar of Saturday.

The proceedings closed at 8.30 a.m.

By order of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India,

W. S. SETON-KARR,
Secretary to the Government of India.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 17.

From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies.

Dated, Camp, Umballa, 31st March 1869.

As your Highness did me the honour to intimate that some further expression of the sentiments of the British Government in regard to your present visit and to the affairs of Afghanistan, would be acceptable, it is with much pleasure and satisfaction that I accede to your Highness' wishes in the following communication.

I am most desirous of expressing to you the sincere gratification which the visit of your Highness has afforded to me and to all the members of my Government.

I regard this visit as a mark of the confidence reposed by your Highness in the Government of the Queen, which will ever be remembered. I earnestly trust that on your Highness' return to your own country you may be enabled speedily to establish your legitimate rule over your entire kingdom; to consolidate your power; to create a firm and a merciful administration in every province of Afghanistan; to promote the interests of commerce; and to secure peace and tranquillity within all your borders.

Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require
to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.

It is my wish, therefore, that your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect.

By these means, and by the exercise of mutual confidence, I entertain well-grounded hopes that the most friendly relations between the British Government and that of your Highness may ever be maintained to the advantage of the subjects both of Her Majesty the Queen and of your Highness.

That your Highness may long enjoy health and strength sufficient to enable you to perform the arduous duties of your exalted station is the sincere wish of your friend.

(Signed) MAYO.

True Copy,
W. S. SETON-KARR,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 4 in No. 17.

From Ameer Shere Ali Khan of Cabool to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

After expressing the earnest desire I have of seeing your Excellency, I beg to begin to write the subject of my letter. Your Excellency's friendly letter of the 31st March 1869, corresponding with the 17th Zelhej 1855, Hidjree, reached me at Umballa and strengthened the buildings of friendship of my Government (which has been given to me by God), and that of the powerful British Government. When our hearts are thus rendered clear as mirrors, and are reflecting light to all, how is it possible that the dust of ill-will may ever darken those mirrors (hearts)?

If it please God, as long as I am alive, or as long as my Government exists, the foundation of friendship of my Majesty's Government much satisfaction to be assured that the British Government and that of your Highness will not be weakened.

I strongly hope that the British Government will always do good and be kind to me, and keep me under its protection.

In conclusion, I beg to offer my friendly thanks to your Excellency. I hope your Excellency will consider me a well wisher and a friend of yours, and gratify me with accounts of your health.

Allow me, &c,

(Signed) Ameer Shere Ali.

Dated, Umballa, the 29th of Zelhej 1855 Hidjree,
corresponding with the 3rd April 1869.

No. 18.

Secret, No. 6.

To the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

My LORD,

India Office, London, 14th May 1869.

1. I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Foreign (Political) despatch of the 3rd of April 1869 (No. A. 1.) with its enclosures, giving a full account of the conduct and the result of the meetings between your Excellency and the Ameer of Cabul on the 27th and 29th of March.

2. It gives Her Majesty's Government much satisfaction to be assured that your Excellency explained verbally but fully to the Ameer upon those occasions that "under no circumstances could British troops or British officers be employed across the frontier in quelling civil contentions or domestic strife."

3. It is not, however, without some concern that I observe the expressions used in certain paragraphs of your Excellency's letter to the Ameer, which, in so far as they stand alone and apart from the verbal explanations I have referred to, may some day be construed by the Ameer or by his successors, as meaning more than, with those explanations, they were intended to convey.

4. Under these circumstances I have to inform your Excellency of the views of Her Majesty's Government on the relations which it is desirable to establish with the Ruler of Afghanistan, and on the spirit in which any future communications with him ought to be conceived.

5. Her Majesty's Government agree with the late Viceroy of India, Lord Lawrence, that it is for the interest of our Indian Empire that there should be a strong and settled Government in Afghanistan, such as may promote commerce with us and protect the people of that country from the evils of civil war. For the purpose of promoting the
establishment of such a government it may be wise from time to time to assist with money or with arms any existing Ruler of Afghanistan whose character and position appear to afford the best hope of establishing a prosperous and peaceful rule. But Her Majesty's Government desire that the discretion of the Indian Government, under direction from the Government at home, should be kept absolutely free as to the occasions on which, and as to all the circumstances under which, such assistance should be given or withheld. It ought to depend not only upon the conduct of the Ruler of Afghanistan in his relations with the Government of India, but to some extent also upon his conduct in his relations with his own people. Her Majesty's Government indeed do not desire to exercise any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, nor can they pretend to pass judgment on the ordinary conduct of its affairs. But there are possible conditions under which it would not be for the credit of the British Government to support the Ameer either by money or by arms. If he succeeds in establishing a government, which is strong but notoriously cruel and oppressive, Her Majesty's Government ought to be free to withhold all assistance from him.

6. Although I do not construe the letter which your Excellency has addressed to the Ameer as depriving the Government of this free discretion, there are some expressions used which may occasion some embarrassment. The promise to view with extreme displeasure any attempts to rebel against the Ameer is not qualified by any reference to our right to form any opinion whether the Ameer may or may not have brought such rebellion justly upon himself. Again, the expression "rightful rule" may be construed to pledge the Government of India to an acknowledgment of his de jure sovereignty respecting which Her Majesty's Government would desire to be kept absolutely free.

7. It may be true as the Ameer argued that the avowal of a policy on our part having reference solely to de facto possession would not operate in itself as any discouragement of insurrection or of civil wars; but no such avowal is required or proposed. It is sufficient if the hands of the Government of India are left free to deal with future contingencies as they may arise. But for this purpose it is necessary to avoid the use of any language which is liable to be misconstrued.

8. For these reasons, Her Majesty's Government would desire that, as future occasions of communicating with the Ameer will certainly occur, your Excellency should make use of any opportunity which may arise of explaining more fully in writing the warnings which you have already verbally given against any expectation on his part of armed intervention; and also that your Excellency should make it clear to him that the money now or hereafter to be given is solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful as well as a strong government in Afghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India, and on its approval of the Ameer's conduct, not only towards us, but also in so far as we may have the means of judging towards his own people.

9. Your Excellency will understand that Her Majesty's Government do not desire that you should immediately follow up the letter already sent by another, since such a proceeding might appear like a change of policy and like a retraction of assurances already given. Her Majesty's Government only desire that, as natural opportunities may arise for further communications with the Ameer, your Excellency should govern the language you may address to him by the views of policy explained in this despatch.

I have &c.

(Signed) ARGYLL.

No. 19

No. 213.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Political.—Secret.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke,

Dated Simla, 1st July 1869.

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Grace's secret despatch of the 14th May last, in reference to the meeting between the Viceroy and the Ameer of
Cabul which took place at Umballa in the month of March last, and containing some observations on certain expressions used in the letter which the Viceroy on that occasion addressed to His Highness.

2. We are glad to find that the general tenor of the policy which we pursued on that occasion has commanded Your Grace's approval, but we think it incumbent on us respectfully to offer some remarks on those portions of the despatch which express "apprehension" and "concern" in respect to some words used by the Viceroy in his letter to the Ameer.

3. We regret that Your Grace should have apprehended that a peculiar signification and meaning may be attached to the words "severe displeasure" and "rightful rule," used in the letter to the Ameer of Cabul, which, in our opinion they do not bear, which they certainly were never by us meant to bear, and which we are convinced that the Ameer quite understood that they did not bear.

4. We entirely agree with the principles laid down in Your Grace's despatch, i.e., "that it is for the interest of our Indian Empire that there should be a strong and settled government in Afghanistan, such as may promote commerce with us and protect the people of the country from the evils of civil war; that the discretion of the Indian Government should be kept absolutely free as to the occasions on which such assistance should be given or withheld;" that further, we should abstain from exercising "any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan," and give no pledge which would lead the Ameer to believe that we should ever countenance or support a notoriously cruel and oppressive government.

5. All this we shall show was fully considered and agreed to by us, as soon as the meeting was determined on, was steadily kept in view, and strictly adhered to in every thing that took place at Umballa.

6. That it was laid down beforehand is shown by the semi-official communications addressed to Your Grace by the Viceroy early in March before he left Calcutta.

7. The Viceroy informed Your Grace that no one could be more impressed than he was with the necessity for abstinence, on the part of the Government of India, from interference in Asian politics; that whether it be in the central portions of the continent or elsewhere, our policy should be to keep on friendly terms with all our neighbours, to encourage them in any efforts they might make for the development and security of trade, but to let them know that if they chose to quarrel (which they are always ready to do) they must fight it out without any assistance from us, that the impolicy of having anything to do directly with these people was shown by the manner in which the existence of the lines of our telegraph along the coast of Beloochistan and Mekran had brought us into immediate connection with the disputes between Persia and the tribes in that district; that with regard to the approaching interview with the Ameer, the Viceroy's intention was to avoid any engagement of a permanent character opposed as he was to treaties and subsidies; that it was impossible to discuss the matter until we knew what the Ameer was going to say; that his Highness's visit would, he believed, do much good, showing him that we had no other wish than to see a strong government in Afghanistan; that we had no thought of interfering with him in any way; that we wanted no resident at Cabul, or political influence in his kingdom; while, at the same time, it would impress the people of India generally with the idea that we had a faithful ally in Afghanistan.

8. The object of the Viceroy, therefore, in agreeing to Shere Ali's request for a meeting was to show to him and to the world that we desired to establish with him a friendly and faithful alliance; to encourage him in his efforts to create a thoroughly independent kingdom and a just and merciful government; to acknowledge him as the rightful ruler of Cabul, not only as having inherited his throne by his father's will, but in public in the lifetime of Dost Mahomed, but as the "de facto" sovereign of the country.

9. But the objects of the Ameer in coming to Umballa went far beyond this. It was evident from his communications with the Viceroy, the conversations of the Foreign Secretary with his minister, and the paragraphs which he suggested for insertion in the letter to be addressed to him (as per margin) that he desired a treaty supplementary to that made with his father in 1857 (which he termed one-sided) and which would declare that we should be "the friend of his friends" and "the enemy of his enemies." He further desired that we should publicly declare that we
should never acknowledge "any friend in the whole of Afghanistan save the Ameer and
"his descendants," and he evidently expected a promise of a fixed subsidy.
10. But this was not all.
11. He desired and asked that the British Government should not be the sole judge of when and how future assistance was to be given,
"in the Viceroy's letter "as circumstances may require,"* should be altered to "as his (the Ameer's) welfare might require."
12. Compliance with these desires was impossible, but it was necessary,
by a straightforward and unmistakable expression of opinion, to furnish the Ameer with some declaration (which without encouraging hopes that could not be fulfilled) would be of present use, truly describe our feelings and intentions towards him, and satisfy him that his journey and (to him) somewhat perilous absence from his kingdom, had not been made in vain.
13. This object was accomplished but not without difficulty.
14. A comparison of the principles laid down in Your Grace's letter of the 14th May with the action taken, and the opinions expressed at Umballa, will show how completely in accord those principles and those actions arc. And although no instructions were received from the Home Government beyond a short general expression of desire contained in Your Grace's private letter to the Viceroy that he should "maintain that policy of reserve and of abstinence from interference which has been pursued by your predeccessor," yet it can be shown not only that the communications made to the Ameer at the conference did not exceed former promises or extend in any way our liabilities, but that in effect they thoroughly defined and clearly explained the position we had previously lain under as regards his Highness.
15. The first words which the Viceroy addressed to the Ameer at the conference of the 27th March were to express the firm desire of the British Government to see established at Cabul a just, strong, and independent Government; that we had no intention to deviate from the course which we had adopted since he had last regained his throne; that we wished to see him firmly established as ruler of Cabul, and that he should be able specially to establish tranquillity and good government in his territories.
16. The policy that we had endeavoured to establish may be termed an intermediate one, that is to say, that while we distinctly intimated to the Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or money allowance would be given for any named period; that no promise of assistance in other ways would be made; that no treaty would be entered into, obliging us under every circumstance to recognize him and his descendants rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were prepared by the most open and absolute present recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly disposition, of respect for his character and interest in his fortunes, to give all the moral support in our power, and that in addition we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or desirable to do so.
17. In paragraph 8 of the official letter of the 3rd of April, we wrote as follows:—
"We have every reason to hope that the visit of his Highness, and the communications which have taken place will be productive of the happiest results. It has assured his Highness that the policy which was adopted by his Lordship's predecessor, on the Ameer's regaining the throne of Cabul in August last, will be continued. It will show to the world that we have, in the ruler of Afghanistan, a faithful ally, and that while the British Government has no desire of aggrandizement or extension of territory, it will still use all its influence to support neighbouring princes and rulers who are earnestly endeavouring to create by their own exertions a strong, independent, and friendly Government."
18. These references clearly show that not only was it our wish and policy, in the interest of our Indian empire "that there should be a strong and settled Government in Afghanistan," but that it should be such an one "as may promote commerce with us, and protect the people of the country from the evils of civil war."
19. They also show how completely free the Viceroy kept the hands of the Government of India as to the occasions on which, and as to all the circumstances under
“which assistance (to the Ameer) should be given or withheld.” For, besides what has been already said, the Viceroy informed your Grace that if at any future time we thought it to be our duty to assist his Highness, we should do it in any way which would neither entangle us in any engagements which might prove embarrassing nor weaken his independence.

20. The Ameer of Cabul fully understood that the British Government would assist him with money, now or hereafter, solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful, as well as a strong government in Afghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India, which principle is set forth, as far as it could be in a public document, in our letter to the Ameer, in which, as already quoted, we say:

“It (the British Government) will further endeavour from time to time, by such “means as circumstances may require,* to strengthen the Government “of your Highness, to enable “you to exercise with equity and

* Or more literally, "as fall in with the necessities of the circumstances of

the time.”

with justice your rightful rule,” &c., &c.

21. How thoroughly the Ameer understood this is shown in a Memorandum, marginally quoted, by Captain Grey, the Persian interpreter at the conferences, whose communications with the Ameer and his minister were of a most confidential character.

22. The position of affairs at the close of the conferences may, in the Viceroy’s words, confidentially addressed to Your Grace, be summed up as follows:

1stly. What the Ameer is not to have—

No treaty, no fixed subsidy, no European troops, officers, or residents, no dynastic pledges.

2ndly. What he is to have—

Warm countenance and support, discouragement of his rivals, such material assistance as we may consider absolutely necessary for his immediate wants, constant and friendly communication through our Commissioner at Peshawur, and our native agents in Afghanistan; he, on his part, undertaking to do all he can to maintain peace on our frontier, and to comply with all our wishes on matters connected with trade.

23. As regards the question of a grant of money to the Ameer it will be seen that the Viceroy was hardly prepared to go so far as Lord Lawrence in this particular respect.

24. In the letter of the 9th of January last from the Foreign Secretary to the Punjab Government, His Excellency in Council (Lord Lawrence) records his conviction “that the amount of money to be disbursed in the Ameer’s favour should be a matter for periodical consideration year by year, and that in preference to regularly subsidising the Court of Cabul by a fixed sum, it will be expedient to make to it annual free grants of such sums of money as may be thought desirable by the Government of India, and may be justified by the necessities, the proved good intentions, and the whole circumstances in which the Ameer may in each year be placed.”

25. We never at any time during the conferences contemplated giving the Ameer “annual grants” of money; nor of adding to the amount already given by the late Viceroy, unless an absolute necessity were found to exist, and unless it were quite clear that British interests would be thereby advanced.

26. In informing your Grace as to what assistance should be immediately given, the Viceroy said that as the Ameer had not yet received the second instalment of the 12 lacs promised by Sir John Lawrence, he did not think it desirable to give him any more money just at present.

27. On the night before he left Umballa, earnest entreaties were made to the Viceroy by many persons of authority, who had been in communication with the Ameer, that he
should promise at once a large addition to the subsidy. It was said, with great force and truth, "that Azim Khan had levied a year's revenue in advance; that the Ameer had therefore at once to raise another half year's taxes, which would cause much poverty and oppression; that the 60,000£. of Sir John Lawrence's allowance, not yet paid, was forestalled, and would have to be appropriated to the payment of his troops; that though the Ameer accepted the large present of arms and ammunition with gratitude, that he felt he was going back empty handed; that Yakoob and the Sirdars left behind at Cabul would laugh and say that he had gone on a fruitless errand; that immediate supplies were necessary for the commencement of the Turkistan campaign; and that the policy of support and countenance would not be believed in unless accompanied by a large gift of gold," &c.

In reply to these representations, the Viceroy said, viz., that he had made up his mind that he had his own reasons for the course he had adopted; and that he did not intend to add to the subsidy at present. These reasons were, that he wished to force the Ameer to spend the 60,000£. still due to him in paying his troops, and not on follies that he had his own reasons for the course he had adopted in council, and behind at Cabul would laugh and say that he had gone on a fruitless errand; that immediate supplies were necessary for the commencement of the Turkistan campaign; and that the policy of support and countenance would not be believed in unless accompanied by a large gift of gold," &c.

28. We now address ourselves to paragraph 6 of your Grace's letter of the 14th May, in which remarks are made on certain expressions used in our letter to the Ameer as those which "may occasion embarrassment," such being the promise "to view with severe displeasure" any attempts to rebel against the Ameer, without being qualified by any reference to our right to form any opinion whether the Ameer may or may not have brought such rebellion justly upon himself.

29. Your Grace also appears to entertain the same opinion of the term "rightful rule," which you consider may be construed "to pledge the Government of India to an acknowledgment of his de jure sovereignty, respecting which Her Majesty's Government would desire to be kept absolutely free."

30. As regards the first point, we think it necessary to explain that the words "severe displeasure" (etab-i-shadid) or more literally in the Persian language, "strong or vehement displeasure," were most anxiously and most carefully considered by us in council, and were selected by three or four of our best Persian scholars, after much deliberation, as the only words that fully and adequately expressed our meaning and object, viz., that we should use every means in our power, short of those to which we have referred, to prevent Shere Ali's rivals from again entering the field against him, plunging the country into the horrors of civil war, and postponing the establishment of a strong and friendly rule. Our object was to comply, as far as possible, with the Ameer's request, and to furnish him with something to show that we took a warm and real interest in his attempts to subdue his rivals and establish his power.

31. There were no other words which occurred to us that were so suitable and so expressive of our feelings, and the Persian expression, as mentioned in the margin,* we have reason to believe, accurately and faithfully conveys their force.

32. They are strong, straight forward, and truthful. They convey a real and practical meaning; for we apprehend that we should not act as British honour and true policy demand, both as regards the Ameer and in the interests of humanity and justice, if in the event of any person, people, or power, endeavouring wantonly either by force or fraud to dethrone His Highness, to conquer his kingdom, or to re-kindle civil war in Afghanistan, we did not, as opportunities occurred, express "severe displeasure," if we thought that by such expression we could prevent internecine contention, and could avert from our ally and his subjects disaster, misery, and disgrace.

33. It would have been both ungenerous and imprudent on our part, on such an occasion, to have addressed His Highness in "uncertain sounds." The use of a less forcible expression would have misrepresented our intentions and feelings, and would probably have defeated all the objects of the conference.

34. And we know that, happily, British influence in the East is so paramount and so overwhelming that we do possess the power of securing (by various means short of armed intervention) to a faithful ally safety and peace.

35. With reference to the expression "rightful rule," we consider that under the circumstances no other term could have been so appropriately employed.
36. In the Persian translation the words used are "wa hukūmat-i-ra, keh istikāk "an ast, ba ādul o insāf jari darand," which, literally translated, are "that you may "exercise, with equity and justice, rule, that right rule is."

37. Before the Dost's death, i.e., in September 1858, Lord Canning's Government recognised Shere Ali as heir apparent on the death of his elder brother, and by the advice of Lord Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, it acknowledged the notification from the Dost with an expression of hope "that the new heir apparent "would, under the tuition of his father, learn to conduct the Government with the same "wisdom and success." These papers were forwarded to your Grace's predecessor, and are to be found in the proceedings of the Foreign Office, Nos. 253–256, dated 1st October 1858.

38. On the death of the Dost, Shere Ali, as a matter of course, succeeded to the throne. There was some little delay, which was in part due to the illness and death of Lord Elgin, in formally recognising him as Ameer of Cabul; but at length, in December 1863, Sir William Denison, then acting as Viceroy, did notify the formal acknowledgment of the new ruler on the part of the Government of India.

39. Subsequently, in 1864, Shere Ali sent a Vakeel to Peshawur with several requests, one of which was "an expression of hope that the friendly alliance and moral support "extended by the British Government to his late father, might be unreservedly con- "tinued to himself;" another, that his eldest son, Mahomed Ali, might be "henceforth "styled in correspondence heir apparent (Wullee Ahud)."

40. Major James, the Commissioner, informed the Vakeel that, as regards the first point the Ameer would already have received that assurance from the Governor-General, instancing as facts the letters addressed to the Ameer by Sir W. Denison and by Lord, then Sir John, Lawrence, as well as the resistance to all attempts on the part of rival and ill-disposed Sirdars to enter into correspondence and be countenanced by our officers, &c., &c.

41. In a letter dated the 4th of May 1864, the Viceroy, Lord Lawrence, entirely approved of Major James' proceedings, and was pleased to accede to the Ameer's request that his eldest son should be styled "Wullee Ahud," or heir apparent, in all future correspondence.

42. Again in March 1865, Lord Lawrence issued instructions to the Bombay Government with reference to some envoys, who had come down through the Bolan Pass from Ameer Khan of Candahar, a rival of Shere Ali, with letters and presents for the British authorities, that they were not to be received; that our treaty engagements were with "the Ameer, and the British Government could not consent to recognise in any way "the independence of any of his relations, or to give any countenance to proceedings, "having for their object the assertion of their object, the assertion and establishment of such independence," the substance of which, the Under Secretary of the Foreign Department, in a Memorandum, dated 11th June 1866, states, was communicated to His Highness, in order that he might not have the slightest grounds for supposing that the British Government gave any encouragement to his enemies.

43. In 1868, when Shere Ali regained his throne, after nearly three years of civil war, Lord Lawrence wrote in a Minute, dated 25th November 1868:

"Latterly, when the Ameer Shere Ali had recovered his throne, and had apparently "got the better of all his enemies, and was even welcomed back to Cabul by the very "soldiers and people who had deserted him, the time seemed at length to have arrived "when we might, with some show of reason, help him to render firm his recovered "position, and to consolidate his power."

44. Fortified by these proofs, we venture to think that in the words "rightful rule "we not only used a term which accurately described Shere Ali's present position as the inheritor of his throne in virtue of the provisions of his father's will, and as the present "Ruler of Afghanistan, but that we acted in conformity with former proceedings of this "Government in respect to His Highness.

45. One of the most urgent and prominent demands made by the Ameer at Umballa was that we should recognise and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal descendants against all comers and under all circumstances.

46. On every occasion that he brought the subject forward, the Viceroy declined to entertain it.
47. At the further conference that took place between his Excellency and the Ameer he (the Ameer) declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognise and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal descendants, or successors in blood; and this phrase he repeated several times with great earnestness and emphasis. He explained again, and at some length, that merely to acknowledge the Ruler *pro tem.* and *de facto* was to invite competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that if the British Government would recognise him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his part or his descendants should vitiate all engagements on ours.

48. The Viceroy, in reply, remarked that it was impossible to prophecy or to anticipate events; that we must deal with the present, and that His Highness could not expect him to enter into engagements as to a state of circumstances which might never occur.

49. It would have been impossible to have alluded to many of the foregoing topics in a public document without giving needless offence.

50. Had the Viceroy referred, in the letter addressed to His Highness, to the subject of armed intervention in Afghanistan, His Highness' subjects would have immediately concluded that this question had been discussed at Umballa.

51. Had he endeavoured to lay down in that letter an abstract principle with regard to "de facto" rule, it would have been taken as little short of an insult.

52. Had he intimated that our future support depended upon the Ameer's administering the affairs of his kingdom in a just and merciful manner, it would have been thought that we entertained suspicions that his rule was likely to be cruel and oppressive.

53. Had he referred in any way to a subsidy, it would have given colour to the prevalent opinion amongst Europeans and Orientals that we intended to make it permanent.

54. In addition to this, we considered that it was undesirable to engage in voluminous written communications with the Ameer. The visit was one of a personal character, conceived in the spirit of amity and good faith. We had previously determined that no formal treaty was to be entered into; and having made His Highness aware of our opinion in this respect, we could not with propriety have ventured on written suggestions to him on the foregoing points.

55. Such a course would have inevitably led to many difficulties, and as everything that we wished to communicate to His Highness was conveyed to him in a more suitable manner, it could have been attended with no useful result.

56. We now turn to another portion of Your Grace's despatch (paragraph 8.), and must express our opinion that there may be considerable difficulty in complying with the suggestions contained therein, and to submit for Your Grace's consideration that an immediate communication is not necessary, and could hardly be made without much risk.

57. A favourable occasion may not presently occur for making an important official communication to the Ameer.

58. Two recommendations are made by Your Grace; 1stly, that we should explain more fully in writing the warnings which we have already given; 2ndly, that now and hereafter the payments should be made solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful, as well as a strong Government in Afghanistan.

59. With regard to the first, the Ameer has been made fully aware that no armed intervention on our part for the purpose of suppressing rebellion ever was intended by us, or can be expected by him and his ministers.

60. Although this intimation was conveyed to His Highness in the clearest manner it was hardly necessary, for we were given to understand that he would decidedly object to any armed interference on our part. We also know that such is the present state of feeling in Afghanistan, that if it was supposed that the Ameer had asked for or acquiesced in the advance of a British force into his territory it would probably cost him his throne.
61. With regard to the second suggestion, we have to observe that such an intimation as is proposed might hold out a hope that we intend to continue the money grant as an annual one and to make it permanent. When the Ameer was at Umballa it was supposed that he would be obliged to enter upon an expensive and uncertain campaign in order to regain his province of Turkistan then in open revolt. This would have involved a large expenditure of money, and it was thought that it would possibly be desirable to add to the grant that he has already received. Happily, to all appearance, for the present at least, that danger had passed away, and the unhesitating submission of the chiefs of Turkistan, and the neighbouring districts of Badakshan and Koonduz render it probable that a great military movement to the north of the Hindoo Koosh will not now be undertaken by the Ameer.

62. It is expected, therefore, that the consideration of an additional grant of money may be postponed for the present, and we are not without hope that His Highness may be able to maintain his position and carry on his Government without any further assistance in money from us. This is, however, still exceedingly uncertain.

63. Every step that has been taken in this most important matter has been the subject of constant and anxious deliberation on our part, and on every point the most complete unanimity has prevailed in our counsels. From the 16th of March, when the Viceroy first wrote demi-officially to Your Grace, till now, the policy on which we had agreed has been rigidly adhered to, and, on a very critical occasion, fully and clearly explained to the Ameer.

64. On the whole, the Umballa conference, while it had the effect of impressing upon Shere Ali the friendly feelings we hold towards him, and the warm interest we take in his welfare, while it gave him, for the first time, a true view of our political greatness, our administrative strength, and our military power, it afforded us an opportunity of explaining, limiting, and defining, any intention, engagement, or liability, which may have been supposed to have existed on our part towards him.

65. The result is that while we, to all present appearances, have secured a powerful ally, our position with regard to the ruler of Afghaistan is now clearly laid down, and our engagements towards him have been limited and defined.

66. No one can foretell what the course of events in Central Asia may be. War in those regions is the normal state of the people. A single rash act on the part of the Ameer may again imperil his throne, and foreign intrigue, or some bold deed of arms on their own part, may render Azim Khan and his nephew or even other rivals again formidable.

67. But for the present civil war has ceased, and the man whose nominal rule extends from the Oxus to the Helmund, from Herat to the gates of Peshawur, has, while seated on the throne of his father, professed himself our true and faithful ally.

68. The effect of the meeting may be already traced. As Your Grace has been from time to time informed, Mahomed Ishak Khan, son of Azim Khan, has fled from Toorkistan and his army has dispersed. The news was sent to the Ameer, Shere Ali, signed and sealed by twenty-six of the leading Khans of Turkistan in token of their submission. The Meer of Badakshan, the connection and close ally of Azim Khan, has given in his adhesion without a blow, and has stated his wish to be considered the friend and dependant of the Ameer.

69. In fact the whole of Afghaistan Turkistan, the focus of discontent and rebellion, has been tranquillised without a struggle, and a perilous and bloody campaign has, we trust, been avoided.

70. The Ameer himself, from the moment of his return to his own country, has evinced the most fervent desire to comply with the wishes of the British Government as to the administration of his kingdom, so repeatedly conveyed to him at Umballa; he is endeavouring to establish a just, strong, and merciful rule. He has, against all Afghan precedent and doctrine, reconciled himself to many of his opponents, amongst others to Shah Nawaz Khan, son of Sooltan Ahmed Khan, who, it was reported at one time, was threatening Herat with a large force under Persian influence.

71. He has evinced a desire to carry out useful administrative and financial reforms in many parts of his kingdom, the accomplishment of which, should he not force them too quickly on his people, on which point we have repeatedly cautioned him, will go far to establish what we so much desire, a strong, just, and merciful Government in Afghaistan.
72. The effect of the Umballa meeting on the frontier tribes, combined with well
planned and decided measures taken at the same time for the punishment of crime, has
been equally favourable.

73. We cannot describe this with greater force than in the words of Lieutenant-Colonel
Pollock, the able and experienced Commissioner of Peshawur, in an official letter dated
1st May 1869.

"We have already seen, I venture to think, some excellent results from the Umballa
meeting and the kingly reception of the Cabul Ruler. His Highness' recovery with-
out a struggle in Turkistan (Balkh), the flight across the Oxus of the Ex-Ameer
Mahomed Azim's son, Sirdar Mahomed Ishak Khan, and the submission of the Meer
of Badakshan, have mainly if not entirely to be attributed to the news of the British
alliance, and the manner of the reception of the Ameer reaching Cabul and Central
Asia, while the orders issued by the Ameer to his officials in Koorrum and Khost in
the matter under report, although not necessary to us in the accomplishment of our
object, were clearly serviceable, both at the time, and as showing the neighbouring
tribes that the two Governments would in future act in concert. Had our troops
moved in the spring of 1868 instead of 1869, the then Ameer would have publicly
addressed unmeaning replies to our letters, and privately have done all in his power
to thwart us."

74. In conclusion, we beg to assure Your Grace that on every point of present policy
with regard to Afghanistan, we entirely agree with the opinion and principles laid down
in your despatch of the 14th of May, and that we are prepared most heartily to carry
into effect the instructions of Her Majesty's Government as conveyed to us therein.

75. We venture to hope that, on reading the foregoing history of the course which
the Government of India have taken in this matter from the moment of its recognition
of Shere Ali in September last to the present time, you will come to the conclusion that
its policy and its action have been prudent and consistent, and that its present effect has
been to strengthen British power, to lay the foundation of a Government of justice and
mercy in Afghanistan, and to promote the chances of peace throughout the States
of Asia.

We have, &c.

(Signed) MAYO.
W. R. MANSFIELD.
H. M. DURAND.
H. S. MAINE.
J. STRACHEY.
B. H. ELLIS.

No. 20.
Secret, No. 8.

To the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

India Office, London,
27th August 1869.

My Lord,
I have read with much satisfaction your letter of the 1st July last, No. 213,
explaining more fully the sense in which you have acted, spoken, and written in the
affairs of Afghanistan.

2. These explanations are in all respects satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government,
inasmuch as they afford evidence that your policy cannot have been misunderstood by
the Ameer, and that this policy is in accordance with "the opinions and principles laid
down in my Despatch of the 14th May."

3. In these circumstances, and in view of the satisfactory course which events appear
to have taken in Afghanistan since the interview between Your Excellency and Shere
Ali at Umballa, I do not desire that you should make any further communication to
him on the subject of that interview, unless at any future time it should seem expedient
to your Government to do so.

(Signed) ARGYLL.
No. 33 of 1873.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke,

Fort William, 28th March 1873.

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Grace's secret despatch, No. 13, dated 7th February, communicating a copy of Prince Gortchakoff's despatch dated 19th–31st January 1873, in which the Russian Government intimate their acceptance of the Afghan boundary, as defined in Lord Granville's despatch to Lord Loftus, dated October 17th, 1872.

2. Enclosed is a copy of a letter* which we have caused to be addressed to the Punjab Government on the subject. Your Grace will perceive that we have not failed to counsel His Highness Ameer Shere Ali to persevere in the peaceful policy which, in accordance with the advice formerly given him by Lord Mayo, he has adopted and has enjoined the Governor of his Turkestan frontier to observe. So far as our advice and influence will avail we shall be ever ready to exert them for this end. We understand that the result of the late correspondence is that the Russian Government have agreed to co-operate with us in our endeavours to establish and maintain peace in Central Asia by impressing a similar policy on those States and tribes beyond the limits of Afghanistan which come within the sphere of Russian influence and control. Relying, therefore, on the friendly assurances again given by Prince Gortchakoff in his despatch of 19th–31st January 1873, that peace and tranquillity in Central Asia are the objects which Russia in common with England continues to pursue, we look with confidence to the fulfilment of the promises given by the Russian Government in 1869, to which we have so often referred in former despatches. We confidently expect that while on the one hand our good offices are exerted to dissuade the Ameer from aggression, Russia on the other hand will similarly use her good offices to restrain the States of Central Asia within her influence from transgressing their proper limits.

3. Prince Gortchakoff, as Your Grace is aware, assured Her Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty the Emperor considers extension of territory to be extension of weakness; and His Majesty has himself stated that there is no intention of extending the Russian dominions.

4. It is with much satisfaction then that we learn from the enclosures of your despatch No. 7, dated 17th January 1873, that in his recent mission to London, Count Schovaloff gave Her Majesty's Government the "most decided and positive assurances that not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva." In our despatch No. 28, dated 26th May 1871, we addressed Your Grace on this subject, and we accept the renewed assurances given by Count Schovaloff as evidence that the policy of the Russian Government on this question has undergone no change, and that the Government of His Imperial Majesty will approve of no course of action calculated to revive the uneasiness in regard to Central Asian affairs which the frank and amicable discussions of the last three years have done so much to allay.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. W. ELLIS.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
Enclosure 3 in No. 20A.

No. 562 P, dated Fort William, 22nd March 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

Under the instructions of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, I have addressed you in a separate letter of yesterday's date, No. 534 P, on the subject of the settlement of the Seistan boundary.

2. His Excellency in Council is desirous to take advantage of the interview between the Ameer and Mr. Macnabb to make His Highness fully acquainted with the progress and conclusion of the communications which have taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia on the subject of the extent of His Highness' dominions. His Highness has already received several letters from the Viceroy, in which his Excellency conveyed to him the assurances given by the Russian Government that they recognised as belonging to Afghanistan all the territories then in His Highness' possession. Assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Russian Government towards His Highness have been given to the Ameer by the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend. His Highness is also aware that ever since his meeting with the Viceroy at Umballa and the deputation of Mr. Forsyth to St. Petersburg the question how these assurances could best be given effect to has formed the subject of correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia.

3. His Excellency in Council has now to announce to His Highness that the Government of Russia has accepted the views of the British Government and engaged to recognise the Ameer's territories as they are described in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October 1872. I enclose, for communication to the Ameer, copies with Persian translations of the latest and most important portions of the correspondence on the subject. Having now received the official pledges of the Russian Government to recognise the Ameer's possessions, His Excellency in Council trusts that His Highness will be enabled to devote his undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of his internal Government.

4. In accordance with the advice given to him by Lord Mayo, the Ameer has more than once expressed his determination to abstain from interference in the affairs of States and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and has issued stringent instructions to his frontier officers to commit no aggressions on neighbouring powers. Her Majesty's Government have therefore felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon His Highness the importance of maintaining this peaceful attitude, and of allowing no considerations to tempt him to entertain any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the country described in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October 1872. The Russian Government have, as His Highness was informed in Lord Mayo's letter of 24th June 1870, undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

5. A translation of this letter is enclosed for delivery to the Ameer at the interview referred to in my separate letter regarding Seistan.

No. 21.

Telegram No. 1,414 P., dated 27th June 1873.

From Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London.

Despatch goes by next mail summing up Central Asian correspondence with Russia in conciliatory spirit, in accord with Gladstone's speech on Eastwick's motion.

We think it for interests of peace that Russia should know our relations with Afghanistan, and we say in paragraph 18: "Although we have abstained from entering into any treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of
“India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues as he has hitherto done in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty’s Government to render him such assistance.”

I propose to inform Cabul envoy of sense of this paragraph.

No. 22.
No. 60 of 1873.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke,

Simla, 30th June 1873.

In our despatch No. 33, dated 28th March last, we communicated shortly to Your Grace our views with respect to the understanding that has been effected with the Russian Government on the subject of the Afghan boundary. As, however, the immediate duty of giving practical effect to that understanding on the part of Her Majesty’s Government will devolve upon the Government of India, we consider it to be desirable to enter somewhat more at length into the nature of the obligations which appear to us to have been undertaken by the British and Russian Governments respectively, and to state our view of the general policy which has been agreed upon between the two Governments in regard to their dealings with the countries which lie between their respective possessions in the East. A clear appreciation of that policy and of those obligations appears to us to be essential in order to avoid the risk of misunderstandings arising which might be detrimental to the friendly and cordial relations which now happily exist between the two countries.

2. To advert shortly to the general policy which has been pursued of late years by the Russian Government in Central Asia, our opinion is still that which we expressed in 1869 in the following language:-

“We by no means share in the exaggerated apprehensions expressed in many quarters as to the danger to British rule in India which may arise from an extension of Russian influence in those countries lying to the South and East of her enormous possessions in Asia. We believe that the influence of a civilized European power over wild and savage tribes cannot be otherwise than beneficial. We would therefore heartily assist in establishing a frank and clear understanding with Russia as to the relative position of British and Russian interests in Asia.”

In accordance with these principles, therefore, we suggested that, as it was for the interests of both countries that a wide border of independent States should exist between the British and Russian frontiers, it would be desirable that Russia should be invited to adopt the same policy with regard to the independent States which come under her legitimate influence as we have pursued with regard to Afghanistan and the independent States within our influence. The friendly interchange of communications between Her Majesty’s Government and the Russian Government which we propose to review in this despatch appears to us to have established results entirely in accordance with the sentiments we have heretofore expressed.

3. It is unnecessary for us to advert to any occurrences previous to the communications which are contained in the papers recently laid before Parliament, commencing with the letter addressed by the Earl of Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan on the 27th of March 1869.

Lord Clarendon, shortly before the date of that letter, in several conversations with Baron Brunnnow, recommended “the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and which should be scrupulously respected by both Powers.”
Prince Gortchakow, to whom Baron Brunnow had communicated Lord Clarendon's suggestions, replied that the idea of maintaining between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia "a zone to preserve them from any contact" had always been shared by the Emperor, and authorised Baron Brunnow to "repeat to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State the positive assurance that His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence. No intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into his intentions."

4. Lord Clarendon answered, after expressing the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the friendly feelings which had prompted Prince Gortchakow's communication, that the Secretary of State for India, having consulted those Members of his Council who were well acquainted with the countries in question, had arrived at a decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory that it was the object of the two Governments to establish, and that it was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus should be the boundary line which neither Power should permit its forces to cross.

5. In the autumn of 1869 an interview took place at Heidelberg between Prince Gortchakow and Lord Clarendon, at which the subject was further discussed. On the one hand, the Prince declared that "the Emperor considered, and he entirely shared His Majesty's opinion, that extension of territory was extension of weakness, and that "Russia had no intention of going further south," and that it was the desire of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand. On the other, Lord Clarendon explained that the relations between the Government of India and the Ameer of Afghanistan had been entered into solely with the object of enabling him to maintain that order in Afghanistan which was of importance to the neighbouring possessions of Great Britain,—had no reference to the advances of Russia in Central Asia,—and evinced no hostile disposition towards Russia.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon, November 2nd, 1869.

Mr. Forsyth to Sir A. Buchanan, November 2nd, 1869.

6. In the latter part of the year 1869 the presence of Mr. Douglas Forsyth at St. Petersburgh, afforded an opportunity for a more full discussion of the proposals which were under the consideration of the two Governments.

The subject of the influence which should be exercised by Russia and Great Britain respectively, over the States on their frontiers was frankly entered into, and it was agreed that beyond the limit of the provinces which the Ameer of Afghanistan then held he should not attempt to exercise any interference or influence, that the good offices of England should be exerted to restrain him from all thought of aggression, and that, similarly, Russia should exercise all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

7. Prince Gortchakow expressed his opinion that there might be some difficulty in restoring Samarkand to Bokhara, notwithstanding the desire of the Emperor to do so. He considered that the influence possessed by the Government of India over the Ameer of Afghanistan was greater than that of Russia over Bokhara, but admitting "that to be a mere question of appreciation," he did not anticipate much difficulty in inducing the Ruler of Bokhara to abstain from aggressive acts against Afghanistan. He felt assured that the advice of Russia to the Khan of Khokand to live in peace with his neighbours would be followed. He stated that he saw no objection to English officers visiting Cabul, though he agreed with the Earl of Mayo that Russian agents should not do so.

With regard to Kashgaria or Yarkand, in which country the Atalik Ghazee recently established a Government, Prince Gortchakow observed to Sir A. Buchanan that the Atalik Ghazee had nothing to fear from Russia, but as the Russian Government had no relations with him, and the Government of India appeared to have had dealings with him, "you can assure him, on my authority, that Russia has no hostile intention towards him, or any desire to make conquests in his territories."

Prince Gortchakow, on the conclusion of these communications, requested Sir A. Buchanan to tell Lord Clarendon that "as both Governments are free from all arrière-pensées, ambitious views, or unfriendly feelings towards each other, the more fully
"and frankly all questions connected with Central Asia are discussed between them "the more effectually will the 'mists' be blown away which, through the misrepresenta- tions of over-zealous subordinate agents may, at any time, hang over them."

Lord Clarendon, in reply, requested Sir A. Buchanan to state to Prince Gortchakow "that Her Majesty's Government entirely reciprocate Lord Clarendon to Sir A. Buchanan, November 10th, 1869. "these opinions, and will act upon them without reserve and in a spirit of confidence, being assured that such a "course is best calculated to promote the entirely good understanding with Russia "which we are so anxious to maintain upon the only matters upon which an apparent, "though not necessary, divergence of interest might lead to differences."

8. The general policy to be pursued by the two Governments was thus satisfactorily agreed upon. The result of the communications that had passed was summarised as follows by Prince Gortchakow in his despatch to Count Brunnow of the 1st of November 1871 :

"(a.)—That the territory in the actual possession at the present moment of Shere Prince Gortchakow to Count Brunnow, November 1st, 1871. Ali Khan should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan."

"(b.)—That beyond these limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression."

"(c.)—That for their part the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.

"These principles had been unreservedly accepted both by the Cabinet of London "and the Governor-General of India."

9. There remained the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan so as to embrace the provinces then held by the Ameer. Some delay not unnaturally occurred in the settlement of the north-eastern and western portions of this boundary, for it required an investigation into the condition of countries little known either to the British or to the Russian authorities. Ultimately there was a difference of opinion between the two Governments upon the question whether Badakshan and Wakhan did or did not form part of the provinces held by the Ameer. It is only necessary for us again to express the satisfaction with which we have learnt from Prince Gortchakow's letter to Count Brunnow of the 19th January last, that the Russian Government finally agreed to accept the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the question, and we regard this as a proof of the desire of the Russian Government to avoid, as far as possible, any future elements of discord.

10. Notwithstanding, however, that the precise boundary of Afghanistan had remained unsettled from the end of the year 1869 until January last, the Government of India have been guided in their transactions with their Asiatic neighbours by the principles of policy which were agreed upon in 1869 between the two Governments. At the Umballa Durbar and on several other occasions the Ameer of Afghanistan was earnestly advised to commit no aggression on his neighbours. This advice was repeated with special reference to the differences then existing between the Ameer of Bokhara and his rebellious son, and to the wish of Shere Ali Khan to annex Kirkee and Charjui. Our influence was on these occasions exercised with success, and we had the satisfaction of being informed by your Grace that our proceedings were considered by the Emperor of Russia as a gratifying proof of the good effects of the communications between Prince Gortchakow and Lord Clarendon at Heidelberg, and of the determination of the two Governments to do everything in their power to promote peace in Central Asia.

We have also advised the Atalik Ghazee to abstain from interference in the political affairs and quarrels of neighbouring States. Our communications with him have been confined to the establishment of friendly relations, and in pursuance of negotiations which commenced some years ago we are now engaged in the conclusion of a Treaty of Trade and commerce with Yarkand. It is apparent from the language used by Prince Gortchakow to Sir Andrew Buchanan in 1869, which is quoted in the 7th paragraph of this despatch, that Yarkand was not included by the Russian Government among the countries within the immediate sphere of Russian influence, and we do not consider that the recent conclusion of a commercial treaty by Russia with Yarkand has substantially altered the position of that country as regards Russia.

We have declined to exercise any interference in the affairs of Bokhara and Khiva when appealed to more than once by envoys from those countries.
11. On the other hand, the action of the Russian Government upon several occasions has been in accordance with the same policy.

In the beginning of 1870 apprehensions were entertained of a hostile movement on the part of the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghanistan, and a rumour had reached India of a contemplated attack on the territories of the Atalik Ghazee by the Khan of Khokand. Communications were addressed to the Russian Government, and Prince Gorchakow repudiated the idea of the Ameer having the slightest ground for apprehension. Sir Andrew Buchanan then said:

"That if it can be shown that the Emperor of Russia is following a similar policy with the Government of India, and that the object of His Majesty's policy is to create on his frontiers a series of influenced, but not tributary or neutralized States, to secure to them national independence, and to put an end for ever to that state of conflict and internal disturbance which has for ages prevailed in those regions, the interests of civilization will be strengthened and possibly permanently consolidated; that the Viceroy had done all in his power to maintain peace on the frontier of Afghanistan, and that it therefore rests with the Government of the Emperor, by adopting the same course with regard to those countries which bound the Russian possessions in Central Asia as the Viceroy has taken towards Afghanistan, permanently to secure peace throughout their wide districts, which are influenced respectively by the Government of the Queen and that of His Imperial Majesty."

M. Stremoukoff replied:

"What you have read is our programme, and describes exactly what we desire, and are endeavouring to establish."

Subsequently Prince Gorchakow requested Sir A. Buchanan to assure Lord Clarendon in the most positive manner that "the Russian Government lost no opportunity of impressing on the Khan of Bokhara their desire that he should abstain from all aggression on the territories of the Ameer of Cabul." At the same time, the Emperor, in an interview which he accorded to Sir Andrew Buchanan, entirely confirmed this assurance.

12. General Kaufmann, during the same period, assured the Ameer of Afghanistan that he had given no encouragement to Abdool Rahman Khan, the nephew of the Ameer, who was residing as a refugee in Russian territory and was supposed to entertained designs upon the tranquillity of Afghanistan.

General Kaufmann's language to the Ameer was as follows:

"The Czar's possessions in Turkestan do not border on the countries at present under your rule: we are separated by the Khanate of Bokhara, whose Ameer, Seid Mouzuffar, has concluded a peace with Russia, and is at present friendly towards and under the protection of His Majesty: the Emperor of all the Russians. No collision or misunderstanding can therefore take place between us, though we are distant neighbours, and we can and ought to live in peace and concord. I have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, because, on the one hand, you are under the protection of the English Government, who, as you are probably aware, are friendly towards that of the Czar; and because, on the other hand, I do not perceive any interference on your part in the affairs of Bokhara."

13. The settlement of the boundaries of Afghanistan will render it more easy for the authorities of both nations to carry into practical effect the policy which has been agreed upon between the two Governments, and the public announcement of the agreement will, in our opinion, conduce to the preservation of peace in the countries concerned. At the same time, much will depend on the firm adherence to the policy of non-annexation both by England and Russia; for we have good reason to believe that an advance of the Russian frontier towards that of Afghanistan would undoubtedly revive in that country the uneasiness which the frank avowal of the good understanding between Great Britain and Russia on the general question of Central Asian policy has done much to allay.

14. It is obvious, from the whole tenor of the communications between the two Governments, that although the term "neutral territory" was originally used by the Earl of Clarendon, the idea has not been pursued in the subsequent negotiations, mainly owing, as it appears to us, to Prince Gorchakow's objections to the adoption of the Upper Oxus as the line of demarcation for a neutral ground. The expression originally
15. Our opinion upon this subject was given to Her Majesty's Government in the year 1869; and we still think that the existence of a treaty which would limit and control the conduct of either of the two great Powers with regard to their immediate neighbours might prove a fertile source of dispute between the two Governments. It would be impossible to expect Russia to agree to any such stipulations in regard to Khiva or Bokhara, and our relations with Afghanistan are of a kind quite inconsistent with "neutrality" in its strict sense.

16. As it is possible that the Russian Government are not in possession of full information with respect to the nature and scope of those relations, it may be advisable shortly to recapitulate them.

The Earl of Mayo informed the Ameer of Afghanistan at Umballa, in the spring of 1869, that although the British Government did not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between the Government of India and His Highness had lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, we should endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances might require to strengthen the Government His Highness; and that we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it desirable to do so. The hands of the Government of India were left absolutely free as to the occasions on which and the circumstances under which such assistance was to be given to or withheld from the Ameer. He was given clearly to understand that the assistance then or hereafter to be given him was solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful as well as a strong Government in Afghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India. These explanations were accepted and approved by Your Grace as in all respects satisfactory and in accordance with the opinions and principles laid down by Her Majesty's Government. It was distinctly explained to the Ameer that he was to receive no fixed subsidy from us, and as a matter of fact the only occasion on which, since the Umballa Durbar, His Highness has received assistance in money from us was in the spring of 1872 when we made him a present of two lakhs of rupees to assist him in carrying out certain reforms in his internal administration. It is probable that a further sum of money will now be supplied to him for the purpose of facilitating the peaceful settlement of the disputed boundary between Afghanistan and Persia in Seistan.

17. This statement will suffice to show the nature of our relations with Afghanistan. Our influence has been exercised with the Ameer to encourage him in the peaceful policy which he has hitherto pursued towards his neighbours and we believe that it will in future be sufficient to secure that most desirable object. Indeed, we are confident that the Ameer himself will appreciate his obligation, in consideration of the recognition by Russia of the boundaries of his territory, to refrain from any aggression; but we have never desired to interfere with the independence of Afghanistan, and, therefore, we can undertake no further responsibility with regard to the action of the Ameer than to press upon him in case of need in the strongest manner our friendly advice, and to govern our relations towards him in accordance with the action he may take, in the same way as the Russian Government have engaged to act with regard to Bokhara.

18. Although we have abstained from entering into any treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops, in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance.

19. The assurances given by the Russian Government of their determination not to interfere with Afghanistan have been clear and positive throughout the whole course of these negotiations. We unreservedly accept those assurances, and we are satisfied that this frank explanation of the position of the Government of India as regards Afghanistan will not be misinterpreted.

20. Both powers have now publicly avowed their adherence to the policy of not further extending their territorial possessions in the Southern portion of Central Asia.
They have pledged themselves reciprocally that so far as their influence extends over the States lying between their respective frontiers, that influence will be exerted in the interests of the general peace to restrain those States from aggression upon each other. As regards Afghanistan, the boundary recently settled is to be the limit of the Ameer's dominions; while, on the one hand, the Government of India are to use all the influence they possess with the Ameer to prevent him from transgressing that boundary, Russia will on her part use all her influence over Bokhara and the other States to which her influence extends to restrain them from aggressions on Afghanistan. Therefore, so long as the Ameer confines himself to the boundary now defined, he need fear no molestation from Russia or the countries under her influence.

Should our general view of the recent negotiations and of the obligations which will consequently devolve upon us receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government, we would suggest that a copy of this dispatch might be communicated to the Russian Government, in order that we may act with freedom and confidence in our future communications with the different countries whose interests are concerned.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTH BROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOB HOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

No. 23.

Telegram, dated 1st July 1873.

From Secretary of State, London, to Viceroy, Simla.

YOUR telegram of the 27th June. I do not object to the general sense of the paragraph, which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Ameer of material assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expectation. He already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give.

No. 24.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Simla, dated July 24, 1873.

Ameer of Cabool alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity. Answer by telegraph quickly.

No. 25.

Telegram from Secretary of State to the Viceroy.

India Office, dated 26th July 1873.

Cabinet thinks you should inform Amir that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it: but you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs.
To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our Secret Despatch, No. 60, dated 30th June last, and with reference to the telegraphic correspondence marginally noted, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers connected with the communications that have recently taken place with the envoy of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul, regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan and the general policy of the British Government towards that country.

There was little difficulty in explaining to the envoy the result of the recent correspondence with Russia regarding the northern boundaries of Afghanistan. He appeared to appreciate correctly the nature of the arrangement concluded with Russia, but sought for an explanation on certain minor points which have been satisfactorily cleared up in the final letter from the Viceroy to the Ameer.

From conversations with the envoy we were led to believe that the Cabul Durbar had interpreted the friendly assurances of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo to mean that the British Government had bound themselves to comply with any request preferred by the Ameer. It was necessary, therefore, in the first place to remove any incorrect impressions on this score, and in repeating to the Ameer the assurances given to him at the Umballa Durbar, we have given the envoy distinctly to understand that, while the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo will be maintained, the British Government reserve to themselves the right of judging as to the propriety of any request preferred by the Ameer.

In the course of the discussions the envoy stated that he had been instructed to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective; the former for the purpose of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, and the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a Foreign Power. Though believing, as the envoy was distinctly informed, that the result of the recent arrangement with Russia has been to remove further than before the possibility of foreign aggression on Afghanistan, we were of opinion that the time had arrived for affording the Ameer present assistance in accordance with our settled policy. As your Grace was informed, we had promised the Ameer five lakhs of rupees to assist him in adjusting the claims of his subjects who had suffered from raids in Seistan, and we have now decided on presenting His Highness with an additional sum of five lakhs of rupees and with 10,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles for which he had applied previous to the envoy's arrival.

The question of the policy to be pursued in case of actual or threatened aggression on Afghanistan, was the subject of considerable discussion with the envoy. After receipt of your Grace's telegram of the 1st July, the envoy was informed at the interview of the 12th instant, that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would afford the Ameer material assistance in repelling an invader, but that such assistance would be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Further and more definite explanations were given on this subject in the conversation with the envoy of 30th July, to which we beg to refer your Grace.

A copy and translation of these conversations were annexed to the letter which the Viceroy has addressed to the Ameer. But as the subject is one of great importance, and the envoy appeared to doubt how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to any definite arrangement, we considered it advisable to postpone the settlement of it to a more favourable opportunity, when we trust the matter may be discussed with the Ameer in person.

From the separate memorandum of the several points which the envoy is to lay before the Ameer, your Grace will observe that we have suggested the expediency of
deputing a British officer to examine the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan.

Though we think that the presence of accredited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and possibly also Candahar, would for many reasons be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries. Independently of the valuable information, both geographical and political, that might be collected, a judicious officer would have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feelings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent British representatives in that country, if such a measure should at any time be considered desirable or necessary.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in 26.

TRANSLATION of Letter, dated 14th April 1873, from the Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

After reading your letter to me, dated 4th April 1873, which was received by me on 9th inst, on the subject of rifles, the Ameer observed as follows:—

"No doubt the kingdom which God has given me should be thankful to the British Government for their sympathy and cordiality, but it is as clear as daylight that both the nobles and common people of Afghanistan are armed with guns, and always accustomed to the use of rifles. A factory for the manufacture of Snider guns has been started in this country, but as the workmen have not sufficient skill, the Snider and other guns cannot be prepared so speedily as to be available for the whole of the Afghan troops in a short period. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has expressed his wish to send 5,000 Enfield rifles; this offer, though it is a proof of the kindness and favourable consideration of the British Government, will not meet the requirements of the army of this kingdom. Consequently, as intimated before, it is necessary that small arms to the number of 15,000 three-grooved rifles and 5,000 Snider guns should be procured at any price at which it may be possible to procure them." This letter is forwarded after perusal by His Highness the Ameer.

Enclosure 2 in 26.

TRANSLATION of Letter, dated 5th May 1873, from the Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

Information regarding the observations made by the Cabul authorities before was submitted with my letter of 14th April 1873 to you. For the last few days discussions are going in between the Ameer and his principal durbar officials, and on some occasions His Highness in a friendly manner makes some remarks to me. These observations which His Highness makes are as follows:—

"After giving all the details of the state of affairs in Afghanistan at the Umballa conference, I exonerated myself from the responsibility of making arrangements for the security of the Afghan border. Should an opportunity occur for a special meeting between me and a representative of the British Government, I will recapitulate the circumstances which I mentioned before in the above-mentioned conference. It is manifest that his Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor-General of India has clearly written in his murrassila in clear terms that Mr. Forsyth, Commissioner, has decided the question about the boundary of Afghanistan with the Russian authorities at Sr. Peterburgh. The Russian Governor-General also wrote to me in his murrassila in clear terms that they, Russian Government, will not interfere with the dominions which are at present in my possession. I am at a loss to surmise what great difficulty has given rise to the deliberations which have taken place the second time between the British and the Russian Governments about the northern boundary of Afghanistan.
It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunition of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border. And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan Government to
oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. Should the British Government desire that I should at once organize the Afghan troops, and make arrangements for the security of the border against the Russians on a favourable occasion, I think it is impossible to do so. No person has attained his object in this world immediately. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens. It is rather advisable that the British Government for its own and my satisfaction should set apart some property, either in India or in Europe, for my support, in order that if, which God forbid, a serious difficulty constrains me to quit Afghanistan, I may retire there with my family and children, and find both accommodation and maintenance there, and after this reassurance I will work with zeal and high spirit day and night for the security of the border of Afghanistan, which is in truth the border of India. Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urgan and Merve Shahjahan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merve Shahjahan, the Turkomans will necessarily take refuge in Badghies in Herat, and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour, viz., from causing injury to the Russians from time to time, theRussians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan Government that either the Turkomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances, such difficulty will present itself to me that even the British Government with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English Governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal. Koshad Khan, Chief Merv Shahjahan, has sent his son to me undoubtedly for this reason, that should the people of that territory be unable to oppose the Russians, the Afghan Government may not prevent them from seeking shelter in Badghies. It is well known that if in the event of the Turkomans being overcome by the Russians, they wish to come to Badghies, the Russians will not withhold the Russians from going in pursuit of them. The Turks can be opposed merely by the means above noted. Besides this, as the British Government has approved of the cession of the fertile territory of Seistan proper to the Persian Government, this decision will one day cause so much injury to Afghanistan that it will not be surprising if its effects will at the end spread as far as India, as there is a straight road from Merve Shahjahan to India via Seistan. There will, therefore, be no person throughout this road to oppose the Russians as far as the border of India. The injury which will be caused to Afghanistan by the recent decision of the Seistan question is more clear than the light of the sun, and I cannot, therefore, in my opinion, accomplish the provisions of this decision. The British Government should take my views and reflections into most careful consideration, and be kind enough to sympathise with Afghanistan, otherwise I have not at all received any peace of mind whereon I can place perfect reliance and remain quiet or free from anxiety. Should the British Government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporarily rising for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation.

As I have no authority to give any answer to the Ameer in such most important matters, I could not but remain silent. His Highness, in agreement with the opinion of the Cabul authorities, desires that the British Government should commence forthwith to organise the Afghan troops, to send from time to time large amounts of money with great number of guns and magazine stores in order that His Highness may steadily be able in a few years to satisfactorily strengthen the Afghan kingdom.

Enclosure 3 in 26.

Translation of a Letter from His Highness the Ameer of Cabul to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General, dated Thursday, the 4th Rubee-ul-awal 1290 A. H., corresponding with 22nd May 1873.

As it has been determined that Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, my special Motamid, should wait upon your Excellency for the purpose of drawing closer the bonds of friendship of this state with the British Government, I therefore beg to address this friendly letter, and to say that the said Syed Noor Mahomed Shah will present himself before your Excellency, will hear any communications that may be made in regard to the affairs of State, &c., and will submit all that I have to make known concerning the welfare of both the states. He will return after attaining his object.

Enclosure 4 in 26.

Memorandum of a Conversation Between His Excellency the Viceroy and Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, the Cabul Envoy, held at Government House, Simla, on Saturday, the 12th July 1873.

Present:
His Excellency the Viceroy.
The Cabul Envoy.
The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Aitchison.
The Private Secretary, Captain Baring.

Interpreter.
Captain Henderson, Under-Secretary, Foreign Department.

His Excellency the Viceroy commenced the conversation by observing to the Envoy that the result of the recent correspondence that had taken place between the British and Russian Governments
regarding the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, was considered by the British Government to be highly advantageous to His Highness the Ameer.

Here the Envoy remarked that he had only received on the previous day a translation in Persian of the papers connected with that correspondence; there had not therefore been sufficient time for him to consider the subject fully, and he proposed to reserve an expression of his sentiments on the subject of that correspondence until he had attentively considered the matter and discussed with the Foreign Secretary certain points which were not clear to him.

His Excellency the Viceroy approved of this course, and, observing that it was not intended in the present conversation to touch on the details of the communications with Russia, continued that the British Government considered the result of those communications to be advantageous to the Ameer for the following reasons:

The Russian Government had given positive and repeated assurances to the effect that they considered Afghanistan "completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence," and had stated that "no intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters into its intentions." These assurances, however, left the boundaries of the Ameer's possessions undefined, and so long as they remained so there was the possibility of differences as to the precise territories to which the assurances applied. Russia had now accepted the definition of the northern and western boundaries proposed by the British Government, who became thus a party to the settlement and interested in maintaining the integrity of the frontier.

The British Government would be prepared to use their best endeavours to maintain the frontier intact so long as the Ameer or the Ruler of Afghanistan follows their advice as regards his external relations, and abstains from encroachments and aggression on his neighbours. If, for example, troubles should arise and the boundary in question were violated by neighbouring countries, or by any tribes under Russian influence, the natural course would be for the Ameer to refer to the British Government, and every effort would be made by that Government to bring about a satisfactory settlement.

His Excellency wished it to be clearly understood by the Envoy that the influence proposed to be exercised by the British Government referred to the external relations of Afghanistan alone, and that no interference was contemplated in the internal affairs of that kingdom. The Ameer, continued His Excellency, must be well aware that, occupying as Afghanistan does an intervening position between the British and Russian dominions, it was important for the interests of India that she should be both a strong and an independent State.

His Excellency the Viceroy observed that, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would of course be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression.

When His Excellency had concluded the above remarks, the Envoy observed that the Ameer, as well as the people of Afghanistan, were fully aware that the influence of the British Government would be exercised solely in the interests of Afghanistan, and that no interference in the internal affairs of that kingdom was to be anticipated.

The rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia had, he said, aroused the gravest apprehensions in the minds of the people of Afghanistan. Whatever specific assurances the Russians might give, and however often these might be repeated, the people of Afghanistan could place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British Government. The Envoy continued that he fully appreciated the nature of the communications that had been made to him at the present conference, but he wished to reserve any further discussion of the subject for a future occasion.

His Excellency expressed his approval of this course, and the interview then terminated.

C. U. Aitchison.

Memorandum.

This conversation is referred to in paragraph 5 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer, dated 6th September 1873, and a copy of it, with translation, was attached to that letter. A further copy was given to the Envoy under cover of letter No. 1857 P., dated 18th August 1873.

C. U. Aitchison.

Enclosure 5 in 26.

Memorandum of Interview between His Excellency the Viceroy and the Cabul Envoy, held at Government House Simla, on Wednesday, the 30th July 1873.

Present:

His Excellency the Viceroy.

The Cabul Envoy.

C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary.

Captain Henderson, Under Secretary, Foreign Department, Interpreter.

His Excellency the Viceroy observed that at the previous interview held on the 12th July, when the result of the recent correspondence between the British and Russian Governments regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan, had been explained to the Envoy, he had expressed a wish to reserve any remarks until he had fully considered the subject and discussed certain points with the Foreign
Secretary. His Excellency the Viceroy observed that he had been made acquainted with the communications that had passed with the Foreign Secretary, and now invited the Envoy to state briefly the points for consideration.

The Envoy said that on perusal of the correspondence between the Russian and English Governments, translations of which had been furnished to him, he had noted two points which might give rise to question in Afghanistan, and which it would be advisable to explain in the paper containing the result of the present communications of which he would be the bearer to the Ameer. These points were as follows:

(a.) From the passage marginally quoted occurring in Earl Granville's despatch of the 17th October 1872, it appeared that the object of the correspondence between the English and Russian Governments was to secure peace and tranquillity in Central Asia. If at any time fault should be found with the internal condition of Afghanistan by a Foreign Power, and if it should be asserted that these terms of peace and tranquillity are not appropriate to it, there was room for apprehension that this might be held to constitute a condition of affairs that would invalidate the arrangement entered into between Russia and England. The Envoy, therefore, wished it to be clearly explained that the Afghan Government should be allowed to follow its own laws and customs in its own territories; that the internal administration of the States on both sides of the frontier shall be free from interference; and that the expression alluded to had no reference to the internal condition of these countries.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that there could be no doubt whatever that the words "peace and tranquillity" referred to the external relations of the countries concerned, and that the absence of these conditions in the internal economy of those countries could not in any way invalidate the arrangement.

His Excellency had no doubt that in the letter to the Ameer, of which the Envoy would be the bearer, this point would be satisfactorily disposed of. At the same time His Excellency observed that if any merchants were to enter Afghanistan with the Ameer's permission, they would be given the same protection as other merchants.

(b.) The second point to which the Envoy alluded was the confirmation by Bokhara of the claims of Afghanistan, mention of which is made in the same despatch from Lord Granville.

"Her Majesty's Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government, by an open recognition of the right of the Ameer of Cabul to the territories which he now claims, and which Bokhara herself admits to be hers, &c." His Excellency was quite prepared to maintain the rights of the Afghan Government.

His Excellency replied to the extent that the arrangement arrived at is final, and that no further negotiation on the subject would take place.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that no subsequent denial by Bokhara could in any way affect the arrangement between the English and Russian Government, and that this would be declared in the letter to be given by the Envoy.

The Envoy next alluded to the absence of any distinct assurances on the part of Russia in the recent correspondence that no aggression would be made on Afghanistan.

To this the Viceroy replied that it was the latter part of the correspondence between England and Russia that was confined to the specific subject of the actual northern boundary of Afghanistan, and that such assurances would, therefore, have been out of place. At the same time, however, not repeatedly given by Russia before, and also in the commencement of the correspondence, they would be embodied in the final letter to the Ameer.

Next the Envoy proceeded to state that whatever assurances were given by Russia, the Ameer and people of Afghanistan would rely on definite promises of assistance given by the British Government. He had explained in detail to the Secretary the precise grounds for the apprehensions entertained by Afghanistan, and it was, therefore, unnecessary to enlarge on the subject. Assistance was solicited by Afghanistan for two reasons: First, it was the expectation of the Ameer that the British Government would aid him with money and arms so that he might be enabled to strengthen his frontier against any possible future attacks. This request, said the Envoy, was based partly on the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, on the length of which the Ameer had been induced to raise a large body of troops for the defence of his territories.

With respect to these promises the Envoy appeared to be under the impression that the British Government were pledged to comply with any request for assistance preferred by the Ameer. He proceeded unwillingness to press this point, but his Excellency the Viceroy deemed it desirable to refer to the correspondence in order to remove any incorrect impressions that he might entertain with regard to the promises given by the British Government. After hearing the passages in the correspondence bearing on the subject, the Viceroy inquired of the Envoy whether he would be satisfied with the assurance that the points of which the Envoy appeared to be under the impression were bound to comply with every request preferred by the Ameer. The Envoy replied to the extent that may be proper. Such being the case, his Excellency observed, that it was desirable that no doubt should exist on the subject, and that it must be distinctly understood that the British Government are to be the judges of the propriety of any request preferred by the Ameer. His Excellency proceeded to say that Lord Mayo had assured the Ameer that any representation he might make would always be treated with consideration and respect, and that his Excellency was quite prepared to maintain the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and to entertain in a similar spirit the request now preferred. His Excellency said that the British Government were far from sharing the apprehensions entertained by the Ameer.
by the Ameer of dangers from without, for they considered that the result of the recent correspondence between England and Russia was to strengthen very materially the position of Afghanistan; but that, apart from these considerations, it was the policy of the British Government to see Afghanistan powerful. The request for present assistance would, therefore, be complied with to the extent which the British Government might consider appropriate to the present necessities of Afghanistan, and His Excellency invited the Envoy to see the Foreign Secretary again on the subject.

Proceeding in the next place to the question of the assistance to be given to Afghanistan in case of actual aggression from without, the Envoy observed that at the previous interview his Excellency had said that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. His Excellency had also said that such assistance would of course be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Now the Ameer, in expectation of the assistance of the British Government, had up to the present time followed the advice of the Viceroy as regards abstinence from aggression, and in the event of assistance being given would continue to follow that policy. The Envoy continued that he had at an interview with the Secretary brought forward many arguments with regard to the proffered assistance, showing how it would fail to convey sufficient re-assurance. In the event of assistance being given to Afghanistan by the British Government, it should be in the form of a promise to assist that country with money and arms according to the circumstances of the case in the event of invasion, and if the Ameer should be unable to cope single-handed with an invader, and should prefer a request for troops, the British Government should promise to despatch troops to his aid and withdraw them when the necessity for their employment is over.

His Excellency the Viceroy replied that the British Government did not share the Ameer's apprehensions, but that as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would either by negotiation means in their power to make such a contingency impossible, or if it were inevitable, by every means to reduce the mischief. It was not intended, by insisting on such previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Ameer as an independent Ruler to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories; but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event should these endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government are prepared to assure the Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also in case of necessity aid him with troops. The British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent: moreover, the assistance will be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. The Envoy said that both in conversation with the Foreign Secretary and at the present interview he had explained his views on the subject, and his objections on certain points, and the matter would now be laid before the Ameer for his consideration.

Two points in connection with the promised assurance were then brought forward by the Envoy. He requested in the first place, that in the event of any aggression on the Ameer's territories, the British Government would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor as an enemy.

His Excellency said that in diplomatic correspondence such expressions were always avoided as causing needless irritation. In His Excellency's opinion the assurance above given should be sufficient to satisfy the Ameer as to the light in which any aggression would be considered by the British Government.

Next the Envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Ameer. His Excellency replied that the advice given by the Foreign Secretary was correct. The Turkmans were robbers and kidnappers and the cause of a large portion of the mischief in Central Asia. The Ameer would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible for such people in any way whatever. Of course friendly answers should be returned to friendly letters from them, but the Ameer should in no way make himself responsible for them or countenance their lawless proceedings or any opposition on their part to the march of Russian troops.

The Envoy concurring in the wisdom of this course, said he would let the Foreign Secretary see the letter drafted to return friendly answers to these friendly letters from Russia.

The Envoy having intimated that there were no further points connected with the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, which he wished to discuss, the conversation turned on Seistan matters. Particulars will be found recorded in a separate memorandum.

C. U. AITCHISON.

MEMORANDUM.

This conversation is referred to in paragraph 5 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Ameer, dated 6th September 1873, and a copy of it, with translation, was attached to that letter. A further copy was given to the Envoy under cover of letter No. 1857 P., dated 18th August 1873.

C. U. AITCHISON.
Enclosure 6 in No. 26.

MEMORANDUM OF CERTAIN POINTS WHICH WILL BE LAID BEFORE THE AMEEK BY THE ENVOY.

The Envoy has explained the views entertained in Afghanistan regarding the advance of the Russians towards the frontier of that country, and the probable establishment by them of cantonments in Kirkee, Charjoea, and other places near the frontier: also regarding the probable entry of the Turkmans into the Badgois District, and he expressed a fear lest the Cabul Government should be called upon by Russia for political objects to enter into arrangements for the establishment of a Russian Mission and Agents in various parts, or to comply with other demands. He represented that the establishment in Afghanistan of a Mission on the part of so great a Power presents many difficulties and is indeed impossible. As regards other matters also many difficulties might arise, and he inquired in the present condition of Afghanistan what answer could then be given to such a request as that made by the Envoy regarding the condition of Afghanistan. At an interview with His Excellency the Envoy was requested to communicate to the British Government the advice of the British Government should be at once sought. If in this or any other matter, the Ameer should seek the advice of the British Government, such advice would be given him as the circumstances of the case might require.

As before explained the British Government are far from entertaining apprehensions of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. It is, on the contrary, their decided belief that the effect of the recent arrangements has been to render the occurrence of such a contingency more remote than ever. Under these circumstances, therefore, they could not encourage the Ameer to launch out into any large expenditure for the purpose of guarding against this contingency.

At the same time they are desirous to see the Ameer strong and his rule firmly established, and to maintain their policy in regard to strengthening His Highness. For this object they are prepared to give him any reasonable assistance. A request has been preferred by the Ameer for 20,000 stand of arms, viz., 5,000 Sniders and the remainder Enfields, with proportionate Snider ammunition and accoutrements. There is not at present in India a sufficient reserve supply of Sniders for the use of the British troops, and it is further impossible to spare at present more than 5,000 Enfields. This number will be at once placed at the disposal of the Ameer for removal whenever desired. The remainder have been ordered from England, and will be forwarded as soon as received.

The British Government have considered in a spirit of utmost friendliness the representations made by the Envoy regarding the condition of Afghanistan. At an interview with His Excellency the Viceroy the Envoy communicated the advice of the Foreign Secretary intimated that His Excellency had directed him to offer the Ameer a gift of ten lakhs of Rupees, inclusive of the value of the arms, in addition to the five lakhs promised last year as a contribution towards the amount to be paid as compensation to His Highness' subjects who have suffered by raids from Seistan, making fifteen lakhs in all. Accordingly ten lakhs in cash, viz., the five lakhs promised for compensation to the sufferers and five lakhs more will now be placed at the disposal of the Ameer, and the remaining five lakhs will be reserved for the arms. Immediate instructions will be issued to have the ten lakhs in readiness at Peshawur for removal whenever desired, and after the price of the arms has been ascertained the balance of the remaining 5 lakhs, if any balance should remain, will be forwarded to Cabul with the arms.

Looking to the responsibilities that have been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Afghanistan, and looking also to the imperfect information which they possess regarding the border in respect to which these responsibilities have been incurred, it is considered highly desirable that a British Officer of rank, accompanied by a competent Staff, should proceed to examine thoroughly the northern and north-western boundary as far as its eastern extremity; it would be advisable that this officer should also visit the Seistan boundary, proceeding thither via Candahar and eventually returning by way of Cabul, when he would have an opportunity of conferring with the Ameer regarding the condition of the border and could lay before His Highness any views he may have formed regarding the measures necessary for the security of the entire frontier. His Highness would thus be enabled, in communication with the British Government, to devise such measures as, after consultation with this officer, might be deemed best fitted for the defence of Afghanistan. As already intimated, the British Government do not anticipate any danger to Afghanistan from without. Still cases might arise in which from imperfect information the interests of Afghanistan might suffer. The very great importance, therefore, of the British Government both in India and England being in possession of such accurate information as will enable them to reply promptly and authoritatively to any reference or question that may be raised on the subject is so obvious that it is unnecessary to dwell further on this point. On receipt of a reply on this subject, early arrangements will be made for the deputation of an officer, and details will be arranged in communication with His Highness' Government.

It is also desirable that if possible the Ameer should arrange for a regular dak via Budukshan to communicate with Mr. Forsyth's mission while in Yarkund.

C. U. ATCHISON.

MEMORANDUM.

This memorandum is referred to in paragraph 7 of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Highness the Ameer, dated 6th September 1875, and a copy of it with translation was attached to that letter.

C. U. ATCHISON.
From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness Ameer Sher Ali Khan, Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies,

The object which I had in view in recently proposing to depute a British officer to Cabul was to explain to your Highness the result of certain correspondence that had taken place between the British and Russian Governments with regard to the frontiers of Afghanistan and to fulfill his duties with zeal and intelligence.

Noor explain to your Highness the result of certain correspondence between the British and Russian Governments to remove the possibility of further south, and that they recognised as belonging to Afghanistan all the territories then in your Highness' possession. Prince Gortchakoff has further intimated to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, that the Emperor of Russia "looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence," and that "no intervention or interference whatsoever opposed to the independence of Afghanistan enters into his intention." These assurances, however, left the territories then in your Highness' possession undefined, and as long as the boundaries of Afghanistan remained undefined, there existed the possibility of difference as to the precise extent of territory to which the assurances applied. The object of the latter part of the correspondence between the British and Russian Governments was to remove the possibility of doubt or misunderstanding by declaring definitely what territories belonged to Afghanistan, and it is now my pleasing task to inform your Highness that the Government of Russia has finally accepted the views of the British Government, and has engaged to recognize the limits of your Highness' territories as they are described in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872, a translation of which, as well as a translated extract from the Russian reply, is herewith enclosed for your Highness' information.

It has been a source of much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that your Highness has more than once expressed your determination, in accordance with advice given by the late Earl of Mayo, to abstain from all interference in the affairs of states and tribes beyond the borders of Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, felt no hesitation in undertaking to use their influence to impress upon your Highness the importance of maintaining this peaceful attitude, and of allowing no considerations whatever to lead to any designs of conquest or aggression beyond the limits described in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872. On the other hand the Russian Government have undertaken on their part to use their best endeavours to restrain the States over which they have any influence from transgressing the limits of Afghanistan as above described.

Your Highness will see that the correspondence on the subject of the boundaries relates only to the external relations of Afghanistan; and I entertain a confident hope that, by the conclusion arrived at, the important object referred to in Lord Granville's letter of 17th October, viz., the maintenance of peace and tranquillity between the States of Central Asia in their external relations will be attained, and that in future no aggressions will be made from either side of the boundary now fixed.

The result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments has been, in my opinion, materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan, and to remove apprehension of dangers from without. The boundaries of your Highness' dominions to which the letters refer have now been definitely settled in a manner which precludes any re-opening of the matter by Bolschaw or any other power, or any further question or discussion on the subject between your Highness and your neighbours in those quarters. To this settlement the British Government are a party, and they are consequently even more interested than before in the maintenance of the integrity of your Highness' frontier. I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness' territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is in my opinion one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity.

I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Highness' territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency. My hope is that having received the foregoing assurances, your Highness will now be enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of your internal government. The British Government desires to see your Highness' country powerful and independent. It is my determination to maintain the policy which has been adopted towards your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and I repeat to your Highness the assurance given you at the Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.

There are some details connected with the recent negotiations and other matters on which explanation has been given to your Highness' Envoy, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, in a separate memorandum.

On the subject of the Seistan boundary, I have addressed your Highness in a separate letter.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

Dated 31st June 1870.
" 1st May 1872.
" 7th September 1872.

Enclosure 7 in No. 26.

KHAUREETA, dated Simla, 6th September 1873.
No. 27.
No. 4 of 1874.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.

To His Grace The Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke,

Fort William, the 23rd January 1874.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the enclosed correspondence between the Viceroy and the Ameer of Cabul, relative to the nomination of Sirdar Abdoola Jan to be heir-apparent to the throne of Afghanistan.

2. From the Cabul diaries and the letters of our Cabul Agent, which have been separately forwarded, Your Grace will have learned that the installation of the Sirdar as heir-apparent was carried out with great ceremony and rejoicing, and that most of the principal Governors and Sirdars of the country have offered their congratulations to the Ameer on this event either in person or by deputy.

3. How far this may be taken as an indication of the real state of feeling in Afghanistan, and of acquiescence in the succession of Yakoob Khan, to whom the Ameer is mainly indebted for the recovery of his throne, remains to be seen. It would be rash at present to hazard a conjecture. Meanwhile Yakoob Khan himself has sent no congratulations, and, if reports be true, he has placed the adherents of the Ameer and Sirdar Abdoola Jan at Herat under restraint, and is strengthening the defences of the town and fort. Several influential Sirdars, and among them Sirdar Ibrahim Khan, the Governor of Cabul, are reported to be dissatisfied with the nomination of Abdoola Jan. The Ameer himself and the officers of his Court are evidently anxious as to the attitude which Sirdar Yakoob Khan may assume, and various proposals for his removal from the Government of Herat, and for attacking him from Furrah, &c., have been discussed in the State Council. At one time it was proposed that the Ameer himself should go to Candahar for the winter, with a view to check him should he attempt a movement; but this project was over-ruled.

4. It seems to us very doubtful whether Sirdar Yakoob Khan will quietly acquiesce in the nomination of his younger brother. But he is reported to have no funds, and it seems improbable that he will attempt any movement at present until circumstances be more favourable for the assertion of his rights.

5. The Ameer has taken this important step, which is very likely to have a marked effect on the course of events in Afghanistan, without reference to the British Government, a circumstance which we consider fortunate. We could not have approved of the measure had we been previously consulted, nor could we have hoped to influence the Ameer's choice in the matter. In the reply to the Ameer no opinion as to the wisdom of the step which has been taken by the Ameer has been expressed, and the letter has been designedly couched, as nearly as circumstances admit, in the same language as that in which, in 1858, the Punjab Government were instructed to reply to the letter from Dost Mahomed Khan, intimating the selection of Shere Ali as heir-apparent in succession of his elder brother, Mahomed Afzul Khan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
R. TEMPLE.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
A. HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Amir of Cabul to his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 9th Shawul A.H. 1290, corresponding with the 30th November 1873.

Be it known that the recent sudden illness with which we were seized caused general consternation and anxiety, so much so that certain of the chief persons of the State and officers of the Government assembled together and after mutual consultation made an unanimous representation to the effect that, in accordance with the approved custom of ancient kings, and for the purpose of securing the welfare of the subjects of this kingdom, it was absolutely essential to appoint an heir and successor to the throne.

On hearing these representations from the said officers of the State, we ordered the matter to be referred for consultation and deliberation, and a few days before the auspicious occurrence of the Eid-Fiitr all the nobles of exalted rank, the chief and leading men of Afghanistan, after careful deliberation cast the dice of this auspicious fate in the name of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, whose stature of ability they judged would best befit the regal robes of sovereignty after our removal from this world.

Accordingly, on Sunday, the 1st Shawal, being the opening day of the festival, we honoured and osalted Sirdar Abdulla Jan with the title of heir-apparent agreeably to the sincere desire of all classes of our subjects, and all the followers of Islam opened their lips in prayer for our son, and stretching forth their hands in acknowledgment of his selection recognized him as their absolute sovereign, ruler over all the territories of Afghanistan, &c., and master of the entire country and army of this Government. They submitted, moreover, a formal document recognizing the Sirdar as heir-apparent and sovereign.

Since there has always existed a firm and constant friendship between this State and the British Government, it has been deemed fitting to afford information of this matter, which has been approved by all classes in the State, and accordingly the present letter has been written.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

Khurjeta, dated 21st January 1874.

From Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness Amir Shere Ali Khan, Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies.

I have received your Highness' friendly letter of 9th Shawul A.H. 1290, corresponding with 30th November 1873, and trust that your Highness has completely recovered from the illness which afflicted you. I pray that your Highness may still enjoy many years of life and good health during which the cords of friendship may be drawn yet closer, and that Sirdar Abdulla Jan, whom, with a view to the welfare of your kingdom, you have appointed to be heir-apparent, may, under your Highness' tuition, learn to conduct the Government with the same wisdom and success.

Consider me always as your Highness' friend, and sincerely desirous of the prosperity of your kingdom.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.
No. 28.
No. 7 of 1874.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My LORD DUKE,

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 75, dated 15th September 1873, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the enclosed correspondence between the Viceroy and the Amir of Afghanistan.*

2. We propose shortly, in a separate Despatch, to lay before your Grace some general considerations regarding Afghanistan, and we shall reserve till then our remarks on this correspondence.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF CABEL TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, DATED CABUL, 21ST RUMSIAN 1200 A.H., CORRESPONDING WITH 15TH NOVEMBER 1873.

Be it known to your Excellency that at this happy time, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah arrived here and delivered to me your welcome letters. As these letters contained intelligence of your Excellency's good health, the perusal of their contents afforded me much pleasure. I am deeply thankful for the honour, respect, and kind attention with which your Excellency and the officers of the British Government, out of regard to the relations of amity subsisting between the two Governments, treated my Envoy. God be praised that the bud of welfare of both the States continues expanded. I entertain a hope that the relations of friendship and amity between the two great Governments may become stronger day by day.

All that has been written regarding the northern boundary I have fully understood, and I offer up my grateful thanks to the Almighty that peace and tranquillity have, praise be to God, been established in all States in perpetuity, and that doubts and disputes have on every side been removed; and that such security has been established in all countries that no aggressions will take place, nor will any power raise discussions or disputes with another within the dominions of that power; and that the use of inimical expressions has been discontinued in diplomatic correspondence, and that peace and tranquillity have been secured to the whole world.

In respect to the brief mention that your Excellency has made of the Seistan question, your Excellency has observed that, "to this I have no objections on the understanding that the exercise of any military force which may cross the frontier for the above purpose shall retire to its own territory as soon as its object is accomplished. This condition is made on account of the existence of a similar stipulation in the Treaty of Paris between England and Persia regarding the violation of the Persian frontier by Afghanistan." Your Excellency if the Seistan matter had been decided in accordance with the 6th Article of the Treaty concluded at Paris there would have been nothing further to be said. Your Excellency has observed that it is advisable that I should issue stringent orders to my boundary officers to refrain from interference on the Persian border. From the commencement to this day I have, out of regard for the British Government, issued stringent instructions to these officers on the subject. Now again I issue strict orders to my officers on the frontier, warning them to abstain as before from interference on the Persian border.

The friendly declaration of your Excellency to the effect that you will maintain towards myself the same policy which was followed by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo has been the cause of much gratification to me. My friend! under this circumstance of the case it was not necessary to hold all those conversations with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah at Simla. The understanding arrived at in Umballa is quite sufficient. As long as the beneficent Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England continues firm and constant in its friendship I shall also, please God, remain firm in my sincere friendship, as on the occasion of my meeting at Umballa with Lord Mayo, whose writing I hold in my possession, as also a document from Lord Lawrence. Of this friendship your Excellency may rest assured.

Mr. Macnabb, the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawur Division, wrote through the British Agent at Cabul to the effect that Colonel Baker wishes permission to come to Hindooostan from Q. 3
Teheran through Cabul. Your Excellency! my Envoy at interviews and conversations with your Excellency explained the many objections that exist to men like Colonel Baker and others travelling in Afghanistan. I therefore do not think it necessary to allude to the subject further.

I hope your Excellency will consider me as your sincere friend, and will continue to gratify me with friendly letters containing accounts of your good health.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

Khureets, dated Fort William, 23rd January 1874.

From Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Walee of Cabul and its Dependencies.

Your Highness' letter of 21st Rumzan 1290 A.H., corresponding with 13th November 1873, has been received and considered by me with the attention due to the importance of its contents. I fully reciprocate the hope expressed by your Highness, that the relations of friendship between the two Governments may become stronger day by day.

The intimation made to me that your Highness has fully understood all that has been written regarding the northern boundary, and that as regards Seistan you have again issued strict orders to your officers on the frontier, warning them to abstain as before from interference on the border, is a cause of satisfaction to me.

There are, however, some matters referred to in my letter of 6th September 1873, and the papers attached thereto, on which I have not been favoured with an expression of your Highness' views. There are others in regard to which I judge from your Highness' reply that the views of the British Government have perhaps not been fully understood. My friend! considering it due to our established friendship that I should withhold no manifestation of the friendly interest which the British Government takes in your Highness and the prosperity of Afghanistan, or of my personal desire to see your Highness' Government strengthened and your dominions transmitted to your descendants in integrity, I was perfectly unreserved and explicit in my communications with your Highness' Envoy, and I cannot expect to make matters plainer by explanations beyond the terms of my previous letters to your Highness, which were designedly framed by me with the view of drawing the cords of friendship still closer and of giving your Highness assurances of support even more explicit than those contained in the auspicious writings of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo to which your Highness has referred.

It is not always easy for friends who are far removed from each other to adjust the details of important questions affecting their common welfare by means of letters. Your Highness will therefore probably agree with me that it will be preferable to postpone the further discussion of the matters now under consideration till some more convenient opportunity.

My friend! with regard to the request made by Colonel Baker through the Commissioner of Peshawur, that officer returned to England some time ago and abandoned his intention of travelling to India through Afghanistan. I am aware of the difficulty in which your Highness is placed with regard to the reception of guests in Afghanistan. It is usual, however, to express regret when the request of the servant of a friendly power, preferred through the constituted authorities, cannot be complied with, and I feel sure that your Highness regrets your inability to welcome the servants of Her Majesty the Queen in the same manner as I receive your Highness' servants and subjects in India.

I beg again to assure your Highness that I fully understand and appreciate the difficulties of Afghanistan with reference to political events, and that I sincerely sympathise with your Highness in the anxieties which you have more than once expressed. I trust that your Highness' reign may be prolonged, and that the peace which so happily prevails throughout your dominions may remain long unbroken by enemies from without or by rebels from within.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness and to subscribe myself your Highness' sincere friend.

No. 28a.

No. 17 of 1874.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret (extract).

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a letter* from the Commissioner of Peshawur, giving over to a communication from the British Agent at Cabul, who reports the arrival at that place of Ibrahim Khan, an Inspector of Police in the Punjab, who is attached to the Yarkund Mission. Ibrahim Khan was sent by Mr. Forsyth from Kashgar on the 1st January with instructions to proceed to Cabul by
the Pamir and Budukshan route, and deliver to the Ameer a letter expressing a wish that the Yarkund Mission may be permitted to return to India through Afghanistan. It will be seen that the Ameer has as yet given no definite reply to this request. We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 28a.

No. 88-470, dated 26th February 1874.

From Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

SUBMITS, for the information of the Supreme Government, translation of a letter from Ata Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, dated 19th current, to the address of Commissioner, Peshawur Division, together with enclosure.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 28a.

Translation of a Letter, dated 19th February 1874, from Ata Mahomed Khan, Cabul Agent, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

YESTERDAY (18th instant) Inspector Ibrahim Khan arrived here and came to stay in my house. I immediately obtained the honour of presenting myself to the Ameer and informed him of his arrival. The Ameer expressed a wish to see him at once, so the Inspector proceeded to the Durbar, and had the honour of being presented to His Highness. He delivered two letters addressed to His Highness, one from Mr. Forsyth and the other from Dr. Bellow. The Ameer, with expressions of gratification, read the letters. The tenor of the letter was to express a wish to return vio Budukshan and Turkistan.

His Highness, after making some enquiries from Ibrahim Khan about the state of affairs in the countries he had come through, observed in course of conversation, "Yarkund lies at a vast distance from the territories of the British Government and is close to the confines of the Russian possessions. I cannot understand what advantage is looked for by the establishment of this intercourse, but I suppose the officers of the British Government see some prospect in view of results favourable to the interests of their Government." After a short interval the Ameer gave the Inspector leave to retire. Ibrahim Khan brought a letter from Mr. Forsyth, a copy of which I annex. I shall not fail to report whatever is done in this matter in Durbar, and so far as I am able will endeavour to give assistance in promoting the object in view.

Naib Mahomed Alum Khan treated Ibrahim Khan with honour and hospitality, and sent his own peshkhidmat with him to Cabul. He has brought letters for Syud Noor Mahomed Shah also, and I will take the first favourable opportunity of presenting him to the Syud.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 28a.

Translation of a Letter, dated Kashgar, the 1st January 1874, from D. T. Forsyth, C.B., Esq., to Ata Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul.

You have no doubt heard of a mission having been sent by the British Government to Yarkund and Kashgar. Our present intention is that I and the other officers who accompany me, after concluding such arrangements as we were desirous of making in these parts, which by the grace of God have been accomplished according to our wishes, should return to Hindostan by way of Budukshan and Turkistan, and have the honour of an interview with His Highness the Ameer. I explained all this to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah at Simla, and doubtless he has ere this brought it to the notice of the Ameer. At present his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India has sanctioned my
returning to Hindostan via Budukshan and Turkistan, provided that His Highness
the Ameer has no objection to offer to the arrangement. I have therefore sent the
bearer of this letter, who is attached to this mission, with a letter to His Highness
the Ameer, which I shall be obliged by your presenting to His Highness on the first
favourable opportunity after its reaching you. Have the goodness also to explain to
Syud Noor Mahomed Shah that I confidently believed that the authority of the
Ameer is all powerful in the countries through which the mission would have to travel,
that is to say from Sirikol to Wakhan and Killa Panja; there is only the Pamir desert
which is under the authority of the Meer of Wakhan, a tributary of Budukshan. It is
an uninhabited plain, but caravans of merchants and traders are constantly passing over
it. All the rest of the way from Faizabad to Kundooz and Khulm and on to Cabul
there are frequented roads through a populous country, and it is possible to make
arrangements for carriage, &c. from place to place with the assistance of the local
Governors. The best arrangement would be that His Highness should send a trust-
worthy and responsible person with intelligent attendants to me to Kashgar, that I might
make all arrangements with him about the journey, stages, supplies, &c., and that His
Highness the Ameer might issue such orders as he may think necessary at suitable times.
I hope that you will give such assistance as you can in this matter.

No. 29.

No. 28 of 1874.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State
for India.

My Lord Marquis,

With reference to our Despatch, No. 7, dated 23rd January last, we have the
honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, translation of a
letter from the Ameer of Cabul, dated 10th ultimo, which is a reply to the communica-
tion sent by the Viceroy to His Highness on the 23rd January.

2. From the further paper herewith forwarded, which gives cover to the Cabul Agent's
letter of the 11th instant, it will be seen that the return of Mr. Forsyth's Mission from
Kashgar by way of Budukshan is considered by the Ameer Shere Ali inadvisable with
reference to the present posture of affairs in Afghanistan in consequence of the designs
of Sirdar Yakoob Khan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTH BROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
JOHN INGLIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

Translation of a Khureeta from the Ameer of Cabul, dated 22nd Safar 1291 A.H., corresponding
with the 10th April 1874.

Be it known that I received on the 29th Zilhij your Excellency's friendly letter dated 23rd January
1874, which was written in reply to my communication of the 21st Ramzan 1290 A.H., and was
gratified to receive accounts of your health and welfare.

With regard to the statement in the letter under reply to the effect that I had omitted to indicate
my sentiments on the subject of your letter, My Lord! my opinion is identical with that which my
Envoy represented and explained both verbally and in writing at Simla, on which occasion he neither
kept back nor concealed anything. Notwithstanding that* my sentiments are identical with those which were fully set forth in my
letter of the 21st Ramzan, viz., that the arrangements made by
Lord Lawrence and by Lord Mayo at the Umballa conference are

* This appears to mean "Notwith-
standing that my Envoy's repre-
sentations were sufficient I have again
repeat that my sentiments, &c."

sufficient, and that there is no need to repeat all this discussion.
What your Excellency has been pleased to indite with friendly pen to the effect that looking to the established friendship, the prosperity, welfare, and consolidation of my State is an object of consideration, and that in verbal and written communications with my Envoy at Simla there had been no concealment and no matter kept back.

It is full certain that the members of the exalted British Government, looking to the union of the two great States, will ever, and do ever, consider and regard the prosperity, welfare, and consolidation of my kingdom because the exalted greatness of the kingdom of Her Majesty the Queen is more apparent than the sun and more plain than yesterday. Looking to the requirements of friendship and amity, my Envoy, with a truthful and pure heart, made all those verbal and written representations at Simla, and explained fully what was in his mind without any reserve.

As to the sentiments of regret expressed by your Excellency, the fact is this, that I also experience regret and uneasiness, for this reason, that the people of Afghanistan are rude mountaineers, unenlightened with knowledge and wisdom. Accordingly it is my endeavour day and night to teach these people wisdom, knowledge, and excellence, and I fervently hope that by degrees that even Afghanistan will share in the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom.

Your Excellency! Since Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, especially the former, possessed an intimate knowledge of Afghanistan and its frontiers, and your Excellency also must certainly have acquired the same knowledge, I, therefore, am desirous that your Excellency, after full and careful consideration of the approval expressed by Her Majesty the Queen, the “Sunnu” of Lord Lawrence and the decision of Lord Mayo, will remain firm and constant in order that Afghanistan and its territories may be maintained inviolate and secure.

A letter has recently been received by the hands of Ibrahim Khan, attached to the Yarkund Mission, from Mr. T. D. Forsyth, C.B. An exact copy of that letter and the reply is herewith forwarded. It is certain that Mr. Forsyth has not been informed of the objections of Afghanistan and the conversation which took place between your Excellency and my Envoy. Your Excellency will certainly (now) inform Mr. Forsyth.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

**Substance of Mr. Forsyth’s Letter to the Ameer.**

After reminding the Ameer of the previous occasions on which he had seen His Highness, and expressing regret at an opportunity having been afforded him of a further meeting, Mr. Forsyth says that His Highness was doubtless aware that when Syud Noor Mahomed was at Simla in the middle of last year he (Mr. Forsyth) had been deputed to conduct a Mission to Yarkund. He had then mentioned to the Syud that in order to gratify his desire for a meeting with the Ameer he had resolved to return to India viz Budukshan.

Mr. Forsyth then informs the Ameer that the Mission has arrived, and of his intention, after its business was concluded, to proceed viz Sir-i-kul and Budukshan and present himself to the Ameer.

As His Excellency the Vicereoy had ordered that the return of the Mission by Budukshan was to be dependent on the will and pleasure of the Ameer, therefore Mr. Forsyth expressed a hope that arrangements might be made, and he proceeds to explain the nature of these arrangements.

The Ameer’s reply to Mr. Forsyth is that the latter cannot be aware of the nature of the communications between his Excellency and Syud Noor Mahomed, but doubtless he would be informed of the same.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 29.

**Translation of a Letter, dated 11th April 1874, from the Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.**

After two days private discussion replies to the murrasias received from his Excellency the Vicereoy and Governor-General of India and Mr. Forsyth were written in the Cabul Durbar. The murrasias to the address of the Vicereoy was sent to the Agency Office, and the other to Mr. Forsyth having been made over to Ibrahim Khan of the Yarkund Mission, a “Rukkisatana” of four hundred rupees of Cabul currency cash, one Cashmere shawl, and an embroidered broad cloth chugra were assigned to him. Unless any impediment presents itself, he (Ibrahim Khan) will return to Mr. Forsyth viz Balkh and Budukshan, in company with Mirza Abdul Haqi Khan, Agent of Naib Mahomed Alum Khan, Governor of Balkh, to-morrow or the day after to-morrow. The views of the Cabul Government will become known to you by the contents of the murrasias to the address of his Excellency the Vicereoy and the enclosed copy of the second murrasias.*

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* Not received; will be asked for.

"As regards Herat matters, if, through misfortune (‘Na-Sandat Mandi”), Sirdar Mahomed Yakoo Khan fails to arrive at a right conclusion (literally straight road,” rah-i-rast”) the Cabul Government will be constrained to send troops against Herat. In such case the Cabul authorities do not consider it advisable that Mr. Forsyth should return to India viz Cabul, especially because when Sirdar Mahomed Yakoo Khan took flight from Cabul he put off his uniform outside the city, and with a view to collecting short-sighted people (‘Kotah-Andesh’) he gave out that the Ameer on his return from India after the Umballa conference had abandoned the Mahomedan religion, and that he (the Sirdar) intended to wage religious war against His Highness with the aid of the Musalmans of the country. If, therefore, Mr. Forsyth should come to this kingdom at a time when it is proposed that..."
troops should proceed to Herat the Sirdar will undoubtedly make ignorant people believe his former statement, and will thus find an opportunity to support his designs for raising disturbances, and the Cabul authorities will feel great anxiety lest any injury shall befall Mr. Forsyth."

The Ameer then desired me to insert his observations in Persian in this letter as follows:—

"While replies were being written to the murrasilas received from his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and Mr. Forsyth, the members of the Durbar observed that it would be proper if it were written (to British Government) that the statements made by Meerakhor Ahmed Khan, Moolah Yahaya, and Khalifa Abdool Rahman, who have lately arrived from Herat, confirm the representations of the Cabul Envoy made before his Excellency the Viceroy at Simla about the obstacles (in the way of a safe journey) of Afghanistan, but that it is not advisable to make mention either colloquially or in writing of such matters from which no advantage can be derived."

The Ameer has written a friendly murrasila to Dr. Belieu and the Sadr-i-Azem one to Mr. Forsyth, to the effect that the views of the Cabul Durbar will become known to him from the Ameer's murrasila.

I have submitted a letter to Mr. Forsyth to the following effect:—

"Ibrahim Khan, Inspector, has been permitted to-day by the Ameer to return to you with Balkh and Budukshan. The views of the Cabul Government will be known to you from the Ameer's murrasila, which he bears, and he will give accounts of the state of affairs in this country. I am extremely sorry that I have not been able to fulfil my wish of having an interview with you at Cabul on account of the unsatisfactory state of the affairs of this kingdom. May God make you successful in your mission."

No. 30.

No. 70.—Government of India.

Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis,

Fort William, 20th November 1874.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the enclosed documents relative to the visit of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan to Cabool, and the arrest of the Sirdar by His Highness the Ameer.

2. The conditions on which Sirdar Yakoob Khan is understood to have visited his father are reported in the telegram from the Commissioner of Peshawur dated the 12th instant, and in the Cabool Diary of 3rd to 5th November. As our Agent at Cabool had reported that the Ameer was much gratified at the visit of his son, and had received him with kindness, we were unprepared for the intelligence we received on the 16th, that Yakoob Khan had been placed by the Ameer in custody a few days after his arrival.

3. We have not as yet been informed of the reason for the arrest. But considering our relations with the Ameer, our declared desire to see "a firm and merciful administration established in every province of Afghanistan," and "peace and tranquillity secured within the Ameer's borders," considering the assistance we have given to His Highness in money and arms to enable him to strengthen his position, considering also the previous fortunes of Yakoob Khan, and the fact that a temporary reconciliation between him and his father was effected through the influence of the Government of India in 1871, and bearing in mind the position of the Sirdar, we have deemed it right, although it is neither our desire nor our intention to interfere actively in the internal dissensions of Afghanistan, to address a message to the Ameer through our Agent, which we trust will prevent him from committing himself to any course calculated to disturb the peace of his kingdom, and to produce complications in his relations with the British Government.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
JOHN INGLIS.
Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

Cabul Diary from the 27th to the 29th October 1874, inclusive.

URSULLA KHAN and Ismutoolla Khan, Ghilzai Chiefs, wrote to the Ameer that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan would arrive at Cabul on 1st November 1874, and His Highness assigned the Bagh-i-Shahi in the Bala Hisar for the residence of the Sirdar, and the stable of Sirdar Wullee Mahomed Khan for his horses. To-day Councils are being held in a private apartment as to the policy which should be assumed on and after the arrival of the Sirdar at Cabul, and His Highness has therefore been unable to hold an open Durbar. The adherents of the Sirdar, who had been entertaining great designs, feel now very anxious as to the steps which will be taken on their behalf and for the Sirdar. If reply to his application mentioned in the last diary, Naib Mahomed Allum Khan has been ordered to await instructions at Ghorian.

It was first proposed that on his arrival at Ghorian he should be directed to come to Cabul to give Councils as to the measures to be adopted for Budukshan, or that instructions might be sent to him. The people of the Cabul city went for three days to Jubba with alms to perform special prayers for the discontinuance of the earthquakes. Slight shocks are felt from time to time.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

Cabul Diary from the 30th October to the 2nd November 1874, inclusive.

The Council mentioned in the last Diary resolved that according to the custom of the country every token of kindness should be shown to Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, and consequently trays of sweetmeats were sent on the road for him on the part of the Ameer, the heir-apparent, Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, &c., and with the exception of the Mustowie and the Sadr-i-Azem all the members of the Durbar and Chiefs and Sirdars were sent yesterday to receive him at Delt Bori. The Sirdar arrived at Cabul at 11 a.m., and according to the custom of the country (waited on the Ameer and) kissed His Highness' feet. The Ameer received him with kindness, and the Sirdar having presented 36 horses of superior breed and some choice cloth manufactures of Herat, such as "kark," "kakuma," carpets, woollen "daries," &c., returned after half an hour under permission to the Bagh-i-Shahi. At present he gets cooked food from the Ameer's own kitchen; a cash ziafat will be assigned hereafter. At the time of his expressing his intention to return from Herat to Cabul, he proposed, as was reported before, to bring with him his younger brother, Sirdar Mahomed Ayoob Khan, five hundred cavalry, and all the Chiefs and Moollas of Herat, but he has brought only his Chief Agent, Abdool Zahir Khan, two or three Chiefs, and one hundred cavalry. Meer Mutzra Shati, the Mutwali of the shrine of Hazrat Abdoolah, has gone by his permission from Candahar to Mecca. Further accounts will follow after enquiry.

General Sufidari Ali Khan writes from Candahar to the Ameer that the Khan of Khelat has guaranteed the security of the Moolla Pass, and that the merchants intend to export their goods by that route; also that Said Mahomed Fazul Shah, the British correspondent (Candahar), died after three or four days' illness.

The earthquakes have now ceased for the last two days. Nazir Wali Mahomed Khan, the Governor of the Kohistani, reports the death of 7,052 persons in his country in consequence of these shocks, and though reports from Nijrab and Tagabs have not yet been received, it is probable that the number of persons killed there will exceed the above.

To-day the Ameer graciously sent for Ahmad Khan, the Agent's son, one of the horses presented to His Highness by Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, and the Agent gave a Peshawuree embroidered lama and Rupees 20 cash to the servants who brought it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

Telegram, dated 12th November 1874.

FROM COMMISSIONER AND SUPERINTENDENT, PESHAWUR DIVISION, TO FOREIGN SECRETARY, CALCUTTA.

Yakoob's visit attributed to poverty; stipulated that he should not be detained more than ten days; should retain Herat Government; be excused waiting on or seeing heir-apparent, and be allowed to take back his adherents with him. All these points were conceded by Ameer's Agents, Ismutoolla and Ursulla Ghilzai.

Enclosure 4 in No. 30.

Telegram, dated 16th November 1874.

FROM DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, PESHAWUR, TO FOREIGN SECRETARY, CALCUTTA.

REPORTS, by desire of Commissioner, Ameer placed his son, Yakoob Khan, in custody on 8th instant.
Enclosure 5 in No. 30.

Telegram, No. 2470 P., dated 17th November 1874.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur.

INSTRUCT Agent at Cabul to deliver following message to Ameer: Message begins:—

The Viceroy has been informed that Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan came to Cabul under a safe conduct from the Ameer, and that notwithstanding the safe conduct he has been placed in custody by His Highness. The Viceroy, as a friend and well-wisher to the Ameer, hopes this report is untrue, and desires strongly to urge His Highness to observe the conditions under which the Sirdar has come to Cabul. By so doing the Ameer will maintain his good name and the friendship of the British Government. The Viceroy would be glad to receive early assurances to this effect, and to be correctly informed of what has taken place. Message ends.

Translate carefully message which Agent should read, having no discretion to vary terms thereof.

If before despatch of message from Peshawur further information should arrive, telegraph it at once and detain message pending instructions.

Enclosure 6 in No. 30.

Cabul Diary from the 3rd to the 5th November 1874, inclusive.

YESTERDAY (4th) a letter from Khan Bahadour Ibrahim Khan to my address reached me, written on 19th October, from Wakhan, to effect that he had safely arrived on previous day at Killa Punja, and nothing preventing would on following day (20th October) start on his return journey. If Mirza Abdul Hadi Khan (Agent of Naib Mahomed Ali Khan sent with Ibrahim Khan from Cabul) decided on taking the Hindoo Koosh road they would quickly reach Cabul. If the Tashkurglian road should be taken, then some little delay would be caused.

When Ismuutolla Khan and Ursulla Khan reached Herat, Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan told them that if they would take oath with him on four points he would feel reassured and would accompany them to Cabul, otherwise owing to want of confidence he must decline to accompany them—

1st. Herat to remain as now in his hands.
2nd. Ameer not to detain him more than ten days in Cabul.
3rd. That he should be excused from visiting the heir-apparent, and from holding interview or shaking hands with him.
4th. That he should be allowed to bring back with him to Herat without hindrance any of his adherents.

On this Ismuutolla Khan and Ursulla Khan feeling helpless in the matter agreed to all four points, writing them in a Koran, and taking oath regarding them. It is also reported that the Sirdar has been obliged to return to Cabul, because, under the idea that he would be able to complete his designs, he entertained a large number of troops, but in consequence of his pecuniary embarrassment and the small revenue of Herat, he found himself unable to pay their salaries. Some of the troops received four months' pay and others six months' pay (in the year), and consequently all these troops were dissatisfied with him and anxious for the arrival of the Ameer. First the Sirdar prepared a list of some of the Chiefs of Herat with a view to bringing them to Cabul, but afterwards he abandoned this idea, fearing lest they should report to the Ameer that they had got no allowances, and thus reveal all the circumstances of Herat to His Highness. He has therefore brought only a few Cabulees with him.

The Sirdar attends the Durbar in the morning and evening every day, and the Ameer receives him ostensibly with kindness. Councils are being held by the members of the Durbar as to the policy which should be adopted towards him. They say that should he be allowed to return to Herat, the same anxiety and vexation will be felt on account of him which have been hitherto felt, and that he be kept at Cabul it would tend to difficulties. It appears from the tenor of their observations that they are of opinion that he should be sent back of necessity to Herat. These Councils have not been yet brought to conclusion.

Naib Mahomed Ali Khan writes to the Ameer that, as the climate of Ghorian did not agree with him, he got fever and arrived at Mazur-i-Sharif, and that although on the road he received His Highness' orders for remaining at Ghorian, he did not go back in consequence, and that he was ready to present himself wherever His Highness might order him.

On the authority of General Sufdar Ali Khan's letter mentioned in the last Diary, the Sadr-i-Azem has written to Fittah Khan, Governor of Candahar, to enquire by a murrasila from the Khan of Khelat whether he has really made arrangements with traders to open the Moola Pass for them.

General Sufdar Ali Khan has sent to the Ameer two lakhs of rupees (Candahar currency) on account of Government revenue, 150 camels, and 60 loads of horse coverings of "Namda," prepared in Candahar.

Slight shocks of earthquakes have recommenced for the last two days in Cabul.

To-day, by order of the Ameer, the Commander-in-Chief brought out nine infantry and two cavalry regiments to the grass plain near the chief private serai to salute His Highness.
No. 30 A.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

Secret. (No. 1.)

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis,

Fort William, 1st January 1875.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers specified in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, relative to the affairs of Afghanistan.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
B. H. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.
W. MUIR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30 A.

Translation of a Letter from the Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 14th December 1874.

After reading your letter of 18th November 1874 to me, in the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, the chief members of the Darbar observed privately as follows in surprise:—

"We do not understand as to what judgment is given in all religions against a son who having rebelled against his father resolves to ruin him. We need not describe the misbehaviour of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, such as the writing of an (insolent) epistle to the Ameer at the time of his departure from Herat; causing ruination to people from Cabul to Herat; killing Sirdar Futtech Mahomed Khan, his son, and some other Chiefs; plundering the city of Herat, murdering the Commander-in-Chief (Feramorz Khan); making the Chiefs and people at large in the neighbourhood of Herat uneasy, and disobeying the orders of the Ameer. All these faults are as evident as daylight. When the Sirdar was unable to deal with the people of Herat, and he returned to Cabul, it was not advisable to send him back as Governor of Herat, but the Ameer, through paternal affection, notwithstanding the above serious faults, sent him to that territory, under the impression that probably he would keep in view His Highness' fresh kindness, and in repentance of previous misbehaviour would in future not deviate from submission to His Highness. However, the Sirdar, owing to his evil disposition and by reason of associating with mean people, Jid not desist from his rebellious designs, and, contrary to the interests of the Government, entered into negotiations with the Persian Envoy without the permission of the Ameer, and though His Highness made enquiry he did not inform him of the real object of the deputation of the Envoy. Now the Ameer has kept him under surveillance in his chief apartment (lit. has given him a place). The real object is to bring the Sirdar to a right conclusion, to show kindness to him again, and to relieve the people of Afghanistan from apprehension as to the security of the border. Taking into consideration the conduct of the Sirdar the Cabul Government recently felt anxiety lest he should be made an officer of a foreign State (Persia), take action against the interests of this Government and throw all the people of Afghanistan into serious danger; otherwise, it is evident that a father never becomes an ill-wisher of his son. Fathers always wish that his children may turn out best of all in the world, in all virtues, and gain a name for their family. Should by any accident private disputes occur between father and son it is advisable that other people should put a veil on them ("chashumposhi"). It is not heard that there is any room (for claim) for the fulfilment of conditions and stipulations between son and father. The British Government has sent a communication in this private affair between the son and the father, and we do not understand as to what is their real object as regards the interests of Afghanistan. The Ameer will have to endure a heavy injury to State and private matters in the release of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan."

In short, the Ameer has given a Persian reply in this matter, every word of which is herewith submitted.
Enclosure 2 in No. 30A.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from the Agent at Cabul to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 14th December 1874.

To-day, in reply to your letter of 18th November 1874, to me, in the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan, the Ameer observed as follows:—

"In reality the recommendation of his Excellency, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India is based on friendship and well-wishing. There is no necessity for describing the misbehaviour and misconduct which has frequently come to light on the part of Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan. There can be no doubt that they (acts) are not hidden from his Excellency. I feel shame in repeating them. Mention before a father of the evil actions of his son undoubtedly tends to increase the father's shame. Sincere, intelligent friends, owing to their sound judgment and foresight, do not like under any circumstances to put their faithful friends to such shame. Should Government's guidance be serviceable to him (the son) what difficulty is there in enabling him to regain good fortune ("saadat")? As regards the friendship existing between the two Governments (viz., the English and Afghan Governments), by the help and grace of God, it is being confirmed and consolidated every day and every minute. Neither on the part of the British Government nor on the part of the Afghan Government does any unsuitable action occur against (or opposed to) the purport of former written or verbal communications which might tend to any sort of displeasure or annoyance to his Excellency. By the grace of God, in future also the friendship existing between the two Governments will continue to increase."

No. 31.

Secret, No. 2.

To the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

My Lord,

Her Majesty's Government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in Central Asia, and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. Though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in those regions, the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution.

2. In considering the questions of policy which arise from time to time, Her Majesty's advisers cannot but be struck with the comparative scantiness of the information which it is in your Excellency's power to supply. For knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan and upon its frontiers they are compelled to rely mainly upon the indirect intelligence which reaches them through the Foreign Office.

3. Your Excellency maintains a Native Agent at Cabul. I am informed that he is a man of intelligence and respectability. But it appears to be very doubtful whether he is in a condition to furnish you with any facts which it is not the Ameer's wish that you should receive. Even if you could rely upon the perfect frankness of his communications, it is not likely that any Native Agent would possess a sufficient insight into the policy of western nations to collect the information you require. One of the principal qualifications for this function is the neutrality of feeling in respect to religious and national controversies which only a European can possess. Of the value of the Cabul diaries different opinions are expressed. It is obvious that they are very meagre, and doubts have been thrown upon their fidelity.

4. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that more exact and constant information is necessary to the conduct of a circumspect policy at the present juncture. The disposition of the people in various parts of Afghanistan, the designs and intrigues of its Chiefs, the movement of nomad tribes upon its frontier, the influence which foreign powers may possibly be exerting within and without its borders, are matters of which a proper account can only be rendered to you by an English Agent residing in the country. There are many details, moreover, a knowledge of which it is material that the military authorities should possess, and with respect to which it is not to be expected that a Native Agent would be either able or willing to collect for your Government trustworthy information.
5. I have therefore to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. When this is accomplished it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Kandahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people.

6. The Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an Agent at Herat, and it is therefore not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now. But if he should do so, your Excellency will doubtless point out to him that the interest which Her Majesty feels in the integrity of Afghanistan makes it essential that she should be able to receive, from the observations of her own officers, warnings of danger that may threaten it.

7. I have dwelt upon the importance of an English Agency at Herat exclusively for the sake of the information an English officer might collect. But it will have other material, though more indirect, results. It will be an indication of English solicitude for the safety of our allies, and may so tend to discourage counsels dangerous to the peace of Asia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 32.

No. 19 of 1875.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Most Honourable the Marquis of Salisbury, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Marquis,

Simla, 7th June 1875.

We have the honour to reply to your Lordship's Secret Despatch, No. 2, dated the 22nd January 1875, on the subject of the deputation of British Agents to Herat and Candahar.

2. In the Despatch under acknowledgment it was stated,—1st, that though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty, the aspect of affairs on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution; 2nd, that Her Majesty's Government are compelled mainly to rely upon the indirect intelligence received through the English Foreign Office for a knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan and upon its frontiers, as the Native Agent of the Government of India at Cabul does not, and cannot be expected to, furnish the full and trustworthy information which is required; 3rd, that the Ameer of Cabul, having more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of a British Agent at Herat, would probably raise no serious objection to the proposed arrangement if his intentions are still loyal.

3. We were accordingly instructed to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. The adoption of a similar arrangement at Candahar was indicated as a desirable measure to be taken hereafter, but having regard to the fanatical violence of the people the establishment of a British Agency at Cabul was not suggested.

4. By telegram from the Viceroy despatched on the 18th February 1875 your Lordship was informed that in our judgment the time and circumstances appeared unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter; that nothing was traceable among the records of the Government of India showing that the Ameer had ever expressed his readiness to agree to the presence of a British Agent at Herat; that His Highness might have objections to such an arrangement, and yet that those objections might not indicate disloyal intentions on his part towards the British Government. We therefore inquired whether the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were to be carried out at once, or whether a discretion was left to the Government of India with respect to time and opportunity.
5. In answer to the above inquiry we received your Lordship’s telegram despatched on the 23rd February 1873, by which we were informed that a delay of three or four months would be within the discretion contemplated by the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government, but that for any further delay our reasons should be stated. We were also referred to certain papers in support of the statement that the Ameer had expressed his readiness to accept a British Agent at Herat, and we were directed to ascertain the fact from Sir Richard Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, Mr. Thornton, Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, and Mr. Girdlestone, Resident in Nepal.

6. The Viceroy had arranged to be at Delhi towards the end of March, and it was therefore deemed desirable that further consideration of the subject should be postponed until his Excellency should have had the opportunity of conferring personally with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and with some of the officers whose names have been mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The conference took place on the 23rd March 1875, and on the 24th your Lordship was informed by telegram that the opinions of the officers of the Punjab were adverse to the proposal that the Ameer should be pressed to accept a British officer as Agent at Herat. We added that the views of those officers who had been consulted would be considered at Simla, and the opinion of the Government of India would then be communicated to Her Majesty’s Government.

7. We at once addressed the Government of the Punjab for the purpose of obtaining the recorded opinions of the Lieutenant-Governor and such experienced officers of the Punjab as his Honour might consider competent to advise on the subject. The following points were indicated as those to which attention should be directed:

First.—Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place.

Second.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

Third.—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor was satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence received from the British Agent at Cabul, and if not, whether his Honour could suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence.

8. Mr. Girdlestone, Resident in Nepal, was also asked whether he could call to mind the authority from which the information recorded in his note of the 26th March 1869 was derived, that the Ameer was prepared, if requested, to allow European Agents at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh.

9. The replies to our inquiries have been received. They are enumerated in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, and they form the basis of the opinions which we now submit for the consideration of Her Majesty’s Government.

10. Before entering upon the question whether, at the present time and under existing circumstances, it would be politic to request the assent of the Ameer of Cabul to the residence of British officers within his dominions, we desire to notice the two other points mentioned in the Despatch of 22nd January 1875, namely, first, the value of the intelligence at present received through our Native Agent at Cabul, and, second, the statement that the Ameer has more than once in former years expressed his readiness to allow the presence of an European Agent at Herat.

11. As regards the first of these two points, we are of opinion that the value of the reports which we receive from our Agent at Cabul has been under-estimated, and we have no recollection of important intelligence relating to Afghan affairs having been communicated to us from Teheran, or from England, through the Foreign Office. Information respecting the condition of the Turkistan frontier of Afghanistan will probably be obtained with greater promptness and accuracy through Persia than through Afghanistan.

12. It is no doubt true that the position of the Native Agent at Cabul compels him to be cautious in communicating news to the British Government. As observed by Sir Richard Pollock, “Any native who took a perfectly independent tone at Cabul and “made no secret of reporting regularly to his Government without reference to the “wishes of the Ameer all information that he believed to be correct would very shortly “find his position at Cabul unbearable.” We think, moreover, that in endeavouring to keep on friendly terms with the Ameer, the Agent does no more than common prudence would dictate, and that he shows a right judgment in omitting to report every idle rumour that may come to his hearing.

13. We have no reason, however, to believe that information of importance has been withheld, or that the intelligence reported in the Cabul Diaries has been subjected to the approval of the Ameer, and we would refer as illustrations of our meaning to the two
Diaries numbered 12 and 13 in the Abstract of Contents. In both these Diaries there are allusions to the conduct of the Governor of Afghan Turkestan, and in the Diary for the period from the 4th to 6th May 1875 it is mentioned that two adherents of Sirdar Mahomed Yakooob Khan had been blown from guns. We think that these and other particulars contained in the Diaries are not pieces of intelligence which the Ameer of Cabul would be desirous of bringing to the knowledge of the British Government.

14. On the whole, we are of opinion that, making due allowances for the position of our Agent at Cabul, the information which he supplies is fairly full and accurate. In this conclusion we are supported generally by the views of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and his most experienced officers. There are doubts indeed as to the sufficiency of the intelligence given, but we think that a retrospect of the series of Diaries relating to recent events at Herat will prove that the value of the information is not destroyed by such defects. The correctness of our Agent's reports has been corroborated by confidential information which we obtain from time to time from Afghanistan.

15. On the second point mentioned in the 10th paragraph of this Despatch, namely, that the Ameer had more than once in former years expressed his readiness to permit the presence of a British Agent at Herat, we invite special attention to the Memorandum of Secret Records in the Punjab Office which is appended to Mr. Thornton's note of the 21st April 1875. It will be observed that the person on whose authority the statement respecting the intentions of the Ameer in some measure depended has since affirmed that, so far as he could ascertain at Umballa in 1869, it was the belief of the Afghan councillors that the Ameer had never agreed to the location of British officers in Afghanistan.

16. Sir Richard Pollock and Mr. Thornton, from whom the information recorded in Mr. Girdlestone's note of the 26th March 1869 was supposed to have been derived, are not under the impression that the disposition of the Ameer was such as was described in Mr. Girdlestone's note. Mr. Girdlestone's information was not obtained from the Ameer himself. No admission on the part of the Ameer of his readiness to receive (European) British Agents in Afghanistan is to be found in any document that passed between the Government of India and the Ameer. The subject was not mentioned at the official interviews between Noor Mahomed Shah and the Foreign Secretary on the 1st and 3rd of April 1869 when the question of the mission of Native Agents alone was discussed. It was not alluded to by Lord Mayo in his conferences with the Ameer; nor was the future establishment of British Agents in Afghanistan reported to the Secretary of State as one of the results of the Umballa conferences.

17. On the contrary, we find that in the Despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, No. 213, dated 1st July 1869—a Despatch written for the purpose of explaining some doubts which had been expressed by the Duke of Argyll as to the policy of the negotiations with the Ameer—it was said:

Paragraph 16. "We distinctly intimated to the Ameer...that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities," and "the position at the close of the conferences may, in the Viceroy's words confiden-
tially addressed to your Grace, be summed up as follows:—

"1st.—What the Ameer is not to have: No treaty, no fixed subsidy, no European troops, officers, or Residents."

18. On the other hand, Captain Grey, who was in confidential communication with the Ameer and his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, at Umballa has stated in his letter dated 29th March 1875 that "the Ameer did freely consent to the appointment of "European British Officers in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul." But it will be observed that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has expressed strong doubts as to whether the meaning of the Ameer may not have been misapprehended. Sir Robert Davies believes that, while the Ameer may have been ready to acquiesce in the appointment of mere news-writers, his Highness was never prepared to accede to the appointment of Political Agents within his dominions.

19. On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did in confidential communications with Captain Grey express a readiness to accept at some future time not far distant the presence of British Agents at places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself. But our impression is that the intimation was intended to be contingent either upon the receipt of far more substantial assistance than was promised the Ameer at the Umballa conferences, or upon the conclusion of a Dynastic Treaty, that is, upon obtaining the recognition, in a treaty with the British
Government, of his son Abdoolla Jan as his successor. Such a formal recognition of His Highness was anxious to secure, but Lord Mayo, for obvious reasons, declined to entertain the proposal.

20. Looking to all the circumstances of the case, the absence of any formal record of the alleged admission, its entirely private and confidential nature, and the uncertainty as to its scope and intention, we consider that we should not be justified in founding any representation to the Ameer regarding the mission of a British Agent to Herat on the assumption that he had, when at Umballa, expressed his willingness to agree to such an arrangement; nor do we think that, in forming an opinion upon the Ameer's reception of any such proposal at the present time, we could fairly attach any importance to the communications which were made to Captain Grey at Umballa in 1869. Of any previous or subsequent acceptance of such a proposal by the Ameer we can find no trace.

21. We now proceed to consider the question whether, putting aside the supposition that the Ameer has on previous occasions assented to the proposal, it would be wise and politic to urge upon him the establishment of a British Agency at Herat or Candahar. And here we invite attention to the opinions of the able and experienced officers whose letters accompany this Despatch.

22. If the concurrence of all those who may be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer is of any value, we must be prepared to find him most unwilling to receive a British Agent at Herat. On this the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Richard Pollock, Major-General Reynell Taylor, Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari are all agreed, and their views are confirmed—

First.—By those of Nawab Foujdar Khan and Nawab Gholam Hassan Khan, who have successively served as British Agent at Cabul, and who have means of knowing the present sentiments of the Ameer.

Second.—By the opinion of Noor Mahomed Shah, the Cabul Envoy, who, when at Simla in 1873, advised the Foreign Secretary that a specific request should not be preferred to the Ameer for British officers to be stationed within the Afghan dominions.

Third.—By the recent acts of the Ameer in objecting to permit Sir D. T. Forsyth to traverse Balkh on his return journey from Yarkund and in discouraging* Colonel Baker from returning to India from Teheran via Cabul.

23. Assuming that the Ameer would object to the location of a British Agent at Herat, we are not of opinion that his objection would imply that his intentions have ceased to be loyal towards the British Government. It is true that such an objection, if raised by an European Power, or even by some Asiatic rulers, although it might be justifiable by the principles of international law, would evince a disposition but little removed from actual hostility; but the motives of the Ameer cannot, in our opinion, fairly be judged by this standard.

24. There can be no reasonable doubt that there still exists a strong party among the Sirdars of Afghanistan opposed to the measure. Although the time which has elapsed since the Afghan war appears to us to be long on account of the succession of Governors-General of India, and the importance of the events that have intervened, there are many persons living in Afghanistan who were engaged in that war, and whose memory of what took place is probably the more lively from the narrow limits of their thoughts and actions. Those who have had the most intimate acquaintance with Afghanistan have always expressed their opinion that the establishment of complete confidence between the Afghans and the British must be a work of time, and this opinion will be found repeated in the enclosures of this Despatch.

25. We consider that the reluctance of the Ameer to consent to the presence of British officers in Afghanistan is attributable mainly to the adverse feeling entertained by an influential party in that country to the measure, and to the consequent unpopularity he would incur by consenting to it. His position in Afghanistan is not so secure that he can afford to neglect any strong feeling among an important section of his subjects. He may also be influenced by the possibility of the safety of the officers employed being endangered by the acts of fanatics. This danger was hinted at by both the Sadr-i-Azem and the Ameer at the time when Sir T. D. Forsyth's return through Afghanistan was discussed in the Cabul Durbar. It was for these reasons that we thought the Ameer's refusal to allow Sir T. D. Forsyth to return through Afghanistan might reasonably be explained without assuming that it was prompted by an unfriendly feeling.

* Vide enclosures to our Despatch, No. 7, dated 23rd January 1874.

† Vide enclosure of our Despatch, No. 29, dated 1st May 1874.
towards the British Government, and we accordingly abstained from pressing him upon the subject.

26. Besides the above reasons, there is probably also the apprehension that the permanent location of British officers in Afghanistan would bring to light proceedings which would be condemned by our standard of right and wrong, and might find their way into the public press, of which the Ameer feels a great dread. We may again refer to the Diaries accompanying this Despatch as containing illustrations in point. That such apprehensions are not confined to the Ameer of Cabul is evident from the strong feeling which has been expressed by the Maharaja of Cashmere against the appointment of a permanent Resident at His Highness' Court.

27. We have thought it to be our duty to state in what particulars our information as to the condition of Afghanistan and the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government leads us to differ from some of the opinions entertained by Her Majesty's Government. At the same time we agree with Her Majesty's Government that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkistan, it would be desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat. The appointment, it is true, would be attended with some risks, and the usefulness of the measure would depend on the discretion of the Agent who might be selected. But if an officer of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of the Ameer and the Afghan officials, we should anticipate great advantage from the arrangement. Under such circumstances, the Agent would be in a position not only to procure valuable information, but probably also to exert his influence with some hope of success in the interests of peace by preventing collisions between the subjects of powers beyond the frontier and the subjects of Afghanistan. His presence at Herat would also, to some extent, be a check on any movements threatening to Afghanistan.

28. But for the attainment of these ends, it is in our opinion essential that the proposed arrangements should have the cordial consent of the Ameer. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that, if we were to press the question on the Ameer at present, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or accepted with great reluctance.

29. If the Ameer should give an unwilling consent, the officers whom we have consulted are agreed that no advantage would be derived from the presence of a British Agent at Herat. The case is forcibly stated in the 33rd paragraph of Major-General Taylor's letter, dated 17th April 1875, and the obstacles which would render the acquisition of valuable information impossible under such circumstances are described in paragraph 3 of Sir Richard Pollock's letter of 30th March. Moreover, if the Ameer should represent the risk to which our Agent might be exposed from the acts of fanatics or persons opposed to the presence of our officers in Afghanistan and an outrage on the person of the Agent were attempted, we should be subjected to a humiliation for which under the circumstances we might not be justified in holding the Afghan Government responsible, and for which therefore it would be extremely difficult to obtain satisfaction.

30. If the Ameer should refuse, his refusal would impair the influence of the Government in India in Afghanistan. It must either be accepted without any change being made in our present policy towards Afghanistan, in which case the Ameer would be encouraged to act upon other occasions without regard to the wishes of the British Government; or we must treat it as a proof of unfriendly feeling on his part, modify our present policy, retire from our attitude of sympathy, and withdraw our assurances of support. If we are correct in believing that the refusal would not show the intentions of the Ameer to be disloyal, it would afford no sufficient justification for a change of policy which might throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia upon the first favourable opportunity. We may also observe that the refusal would weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in any future negotiations with Russia when questions might be raised as to the real value of British influence in Afghanistan.

31. After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the disposition of the Ameer and of the probable result of pressing him to accept a British Agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to your Lordship by telegraph on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer, or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the pro-
posed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now. In the meantime we shall neglect no opportunity of obtaining full information respecting events in Afghanistan by such means as may from time to time present themselves.

32. It may not be out of place to add some observations upon our present relations with Afghanistan.

33. It is difficult to appreciate the feelings which influence the conduct of the Ameer Shere Ali, subject as he is to the risk of a revolution at home and apprehensive of attack from abroad. He cannot be expected to comprehend the language of European diplomacy, and his Ministers are imperfectly educated, of limited experience, and doubtful integrity. We believe, however, that he understands that the British Government have no designs of encroaching upon Afghanistan, that he feels that the interests of British India and his own are identical, that he is seriously alarmed at the progress of Russia, and that his main reliance is placed upon British support. His language after the return of his Envoy, Noor Mahomed Shah, from Simla in 1873 was certainly far from satisfactory; but we are disposed to attribute it either to his impression that we were so anxious for his support that by assuming an attitude of dissatisfaction he might obtain further assistance from us; or to his disappointment that we did not give him the distinct pledge he asked that the British Government would protect him under all circumstances against external attack, coupled perhaps with his discontent at the result of the Scistan arbitration.

34. Sir Richard Pollock, whose intimate acquaintance with Noor Mahomed Shah gives him the best means of forming a correct judgment of the Simla negotiations, and who on his return to Peshawur in the beginning of 1874 obtained confidential information as to the sentiments of the Ameer, stated his "conviction that no unfavourable change whatever had occurred in the disposition of His Highness, that he leaned as much as ever on the British Government, and that he (Sir Richard Pollock) could find no symptoms whatever of an inclination on the part of the Ameer, or on the part of those about him, to seek assistance from any other quarter. On the contrary," (Sir Richard Pollock adds) "it would appear that he looks with increasing distrust and suspicion on his northern neighbours, while Persia, his only other neighbour worth writing of, is his natural enemy." Similar information has been received by us from other sources. We attach but little value to the vague rumours which have reached us from time to time that communications unknown to the British Government have passed between the Ameer and Russian Officers, or that Russian Agents have penetrated Afghanistan. It must not be forgotten that such rumours are frequent in regard to those countries. Similar rumours prevailed with respect to our own communications with Bokhara, and are current even now as to our dealings with the Turkoman tribes, without any foundation in fact.

35. Since the Umballa conferences the Ameer has never shown any disposition to neglect our advice as to the external relations of Afghanistan. He accepted fully, although with great reluctance, the decision of the British Government in the Scistan arbitration, and we have no reason to doubt that he intends loyally to abide by it.

36. This being so, and if we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning in the time of Dost Mahomed,—which was renewed by Lord Lawrence on the first favourable opportunity that occurred after the death of Dost Mahomed—which was ratified by Lord Mayo at the Umballa conferences—and which we have since steadily pursued,—are secured. We have established friendly relations with Afghanistan: that country is stronger than it has ever been since the days of Dost Mahomed, and our influence is sufficient to prevent the Ameer from aggression upon his neighbours. It is to be regretted that old animosities and other causes have hitherto prevented the establishment of free intercourse between European British subjects and Afghanistan, and the location of British Agents in that country. But we believe that these things will naturally follow in course of time when our motives are better understood. Their attainment would be hastened by a further advance of Russia in Turkistan, or by any other danger that may threaten the integrity of Afghanistan.

37. Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turkoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then
become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier.

38. We think that these would be the measures best calculated to avert any dangers that may ensue from a Russian advance to Merv, and that they should be adopted when the necessity for them arises. The observations addressed on this subject by the Earl of Derby to Count Schouvaloff appear to us to indicate the policy which should be pursued by the Government of India, and we have before stated our opinion that the more clearly Russia is given to understand the position which we have assumed towards Afghanistan the greater will be the probability of the maintenance of peace. To anticipate the Russian occupation of Merv by any active measures or specific Treaty engagements would, in our opinion, be more likely to prejudice than to advance the interests of Her Majesty's Indian Empire.

39. We attach great importance to the moral and material advantages which are derived from maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan; and we would impress upon Her Majesty's Government our conviction that such relations will best be secured by a steady adherence to the patient and conciliatory policy which has been pursued by the Government of India for many years towards Afghanistan; and by making every reasonable allowance for the difficulties of the Ameer, even if he should be reluctant to accede to the views which we may entertain as to the measures which may be advisable equally for his own interests and for those of British India.

40. In making these observations we by no means desire to imply that we are willing to concede any caprice of the Ruler of Afghanistan, and to grant everything that may be asked of us without requiring any return. Neither in the Umballa conferences, nor in the Simla negotiations of 1873, were nearly all the demands of the Ameer complied with; and recently, when we had reason to suppose that he intended to demur to our reasonable request that Ibrahim Khan should pass through Afghanistan with a communication from us to the Meer of Wakhan, we insisted upon a compliance with our wishes. We should adopt the same course again under similar circumstances.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
W. MUIR.
A. EDEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32

No. 48 C.P., dated 25th March 1875 (strictly confidential).

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council directs me to request that His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will be so good as to submit his opinion on the following points at as early a date as possible:

1st.—Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place.

2nd.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

3rd.—Whether the Lieutenant-Governor is satisfied with the sufficiency and accuracy of the intelligence now received from the British Agent at Cabul, and if not, whether he can suggest any way of procuring fuller and more accurate intelligence.

2. His Excellency in Council would wish the Lieutenant-Governor confidentially to consult such officers in the Punjab as from previous or recent experience of the country he may consider competent to advise on these questions, and submit their opinions with his own.
Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

No. 59 C.P., dated 27th March 1875 (strictly confidential).

From C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to C. E. R. GIRDLESTONE, Esq., Resident in Nepal.

On 26th March 1869 you submitted a note of certain information regarding Cabul affairs obtained in conversation with Punjab officials, and observed that your chief informants were Major Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, and Mr. Thornton, the Secretary to the Punjab Government. Among other things it is stated in the note that "the Ameer is prepared, if asked, to allow European Agents at Cabul, Heras, and Balkh, but he would raise difficulties, though not probably insuperable ones, about such an officer at Cabul."

The Governor-General in Council desires me to enquire whether you can call to mind if you received this information from Sir R. Pollock, or Mr. Thornton, or any other officer of the Punjab, or whether it was derived from the Ameer himself, or from a report by X. Y. of certain consultations which according to his account were held at Lahore on 17th March 1869.

2. Sir R. Pollock and Mr. Thornton do not entertain the impression that they had then any reason to believe that the disposition of the Ameer was such as was described in your note, and you therefore probably depended upon some other information.

4. An early reply is particularly requested.

Enclosure 3 in No. 32.

Dated Katmandoo, 7th April 1875.

From C. GIRDLESTONE, Esq., Resident in Nepal, to C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In acknowledging your letter, No. 59 C.P., dated the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to say that my memory fails to recall with certainty the authority for the passage quoted, but I am under the impression that the information was given to me either by Major Pollock or Mr. Thornton on the strength of previous communications with the Ameer and his suite. It was my usual practice in the Foreign Office to give my authority for any statement of importance, and from the fact of my having mentioned the names of these gentlemen as the "chief informants," for the note under reference I attribute to one or both of them this special statement, rather than to any other member of the Punjab Commission whom I met at Umballa in those days. The only other Punjab official with whom I remember to have talked about Afghan affairs was Colonel Reynell Taylor, then Commissioner of Umballa. The information was not obtained from the Ameer, to whom on the indicated date of the note (March 25th), as I learn from a private diary, I paid my first visit, which was purely of a ceremonial character, nor from X. Y., with whom I was not acquainted.

Enclosure 4 in No. 32.

No. X., dated Lahore, 21st April 1875 (confidential).

From T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, to C. U. AITCHISON, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 48 C.P., dated the 25th March, in which you convey the request of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council for an expression of the opinion of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, and of such officers in the Punjab as may be considered competent to advise on the question in regard to the deputation of European British officers as Resident in Herat and Candahar, or at either place.

2. In reply, I have the honour to submit copy of a Minute by Sir Henry Davies, together with letters from the officers noted on the margin, containing an expression of their views in regard to the three points noted in your Despatch, also a note by the undersigned, and a letter (dated 29th March 1875) from Captain Grey, Official Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepoor, who acted as the Viceroy's interpreter at the Umballa Conference, and was asked to record exactly what passed on that occasion in reference to the subject now under inquiry.

Copy of a Minute by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab on the Inquiries contained in the Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 48 C.P., dated the 25th March 1875.

Question 1.

I have always had the impression that in the present state of affairs the Ameer would not willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place, and from perusal of the Secret papers in this office and of Captain Grey's statement, it seems to me extremely doubtful whether His Highness ever intended to be understood as expressing such consent. My belief is that while he may have been ready to acquiesce in the appointment of mere news-writers, such as were Mr. Masson or Shahamat Ali before the occupation of Afghanistan, he never was ready to acquiesce in the appointment of Political Agents.
Question 2.

I do not think the presence of Residents at either of the places named would be advantageous to the British Government. On the contrary, I think their presence against the Ameer’s wishes would irritate him personally, and would disincline him to communicate information to them himself, or to allow them access to his Government. It is probable that his influence with the Ameer depends in a considerable measure on his abstaining from criticism on the internal state of Afghanistan and on the persons trusted by the Ameer. On the whole, I consider this partiality favourable to British interests, and calculated to give weight to advice which the Agent on serious occasions may be authorised to put forward. I do not think that any innovations on the existing system would, at the present time, be of any advantage, and I consider that the Ameer having now got Herat into his own hands would probably be himself sensitive of any menace to it, and will not be slow to apprise the British Government thereof.

(Signed) R. H. DAVIES.

Enclosure 5 in No. 32.

Dated Peshawur, 30th March 1875.

From Colonel Sir R. POLLOCK, K.C.S.I., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to T. H. THORNTON, Esq., D.C.L., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt this morning of your No. A, dated Camp Delhi, 26th instant, and enclosure (extract copy of letter of Supreme Government, dated 25th idem, No. 48 C.P.), and I proceed at once to reply to the questions put therein.

Question 1.

2. I am quite convinced that His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan would not willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar, or at either place, and that his dislike to such an arrangement would only be short of what he would feel if asked to consent to the location of such an officer at his capital. As regards the past, it is well known to Government that the strongest objection has hitherto existed to such nominations. Major Lumsdon’s deputation to Candahar was only agreed to ungraciously when the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan found that only on this condition could he obtain the valuable subsidy promised by our Government.

In my judgment nothing has occurred since that time to lessen the dislike of the Afghan Government to allow European officers to take up a permanent position in their country, while one additional reason for their not unnatural dislike to such a measure has arisen. The recent action of Russia, and specially her military operations in the Khanate of Khiva, would lead the Ameer and his Councillors to believe that any permission granted to the British Government to send Agents to Herat or Candahar, or to both places, would be certainly followed by a similar demand from the Russian side.

Question 2.

Para. 3. I am equally convinced that the result of sending such officers would not be advantageous, assuming my previous statement to be correct, viz., that the Agents would be there contrary to the wish of the Ameer and his Councillors.

We know what occurred in Major Lumsdon’s case, and how impossible he found it to bring any influence to bear usefully, or, to obtain valuable information for his Government, and although it may certainly be urged that the circumstances were peculiar, and that the breaking out of the mutiny or insurrection of 1837 lowered our prestige for a time, and led to the serious discussion of plans for the invasion of British India, I feel quite sure myself that more favourable circumstances would not have produced good results, and that from the Ameer’s point of view excellent reasons can be brought forward in justification of the dislike to all interference which I believe to exist.

Question 3.

Para. 4. There is not much to be said against the accuracy of the news from week to week submitted by the Cabul Agent, though the sufficiency of it may doubtless be questioned. Any Native Agent who took a perfectly independent tone at Cabul, and made no secret of reporting regularly to his Government, without reference to the wishes of the Ameer, all information that he believed to be correct, would very shortly find his position at Cabul unbearable.

Obvious objections exist to the employment regularly of paid secret correspondents, and I am myself inclined to recommend that we should continue to content ourselves with receiving the official dairies, supplementing and checking them by the occasional employment of Agents, such as the person whose narrative was lithographed in the Jail Press here, and whose second narrative is now in course of being...
printed, or the person whose reports received recently through Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, were so full of interest and in many particulars correct. Secret agents regularly entertained and salaried are, whether resident or peripatetic, a mistake, so far as my experience goes for, thinking it necessary to earn their bread by writing something periodically, correct or incorrect, they seriously mislead their employers, besides which their employment becomes gradually a matter of notoriety, and this is clearly undesirable.

Enclosure 6 in No. 32.

No. 785, dated Umritsur the 17th April 1875:


With reference to your letter No. C. of Camp Delhi, dated March 26th, 1875, I have the honour to forward my opinions on the points noted by the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

1. Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly consent to the appointment of European British officers as Residents at Herat and Candahar.

2. Before attempting to answer this question, I must note that I have not, for a considerable period, had any opportunity of watching the Ameer's tone and conduct nor that of his advisers. The newspaper accounts do not command confidence, as frequently what is asserted in one issue is contradicted in the next, and thus the inclination to express the opinions on the Ameer which I have had in my experience, strongly warn me against any premature conclusion.

3. It is very possible, therefore, that my opinions, based, I must allow, on a generally low opinion of Afghan political morality, may appear to bear harshly on the Ameer, if he has indeed made more genuine efforts to act up to the spirit of treaties than I on my rather desultory sources of information give him credit for.

4. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is, I know, aware that my opinions regarding affairs in Afghanistan are much derived from the views entertained by Nawab Ghulam Hussan Khan Allzyee; in fact, as I am at present situated, he and Nawab Foujdar Khan and other occasional visitors from the frontier are, apart from the newspapers, my only means of gaining information.

5. Nawab Ghulam Hussan Khan lately wrote a paper on this subject, based on certain rumours he had seen in the Native newspapers regarding a proposed mission to the Ameer. This paper has been, I am aware, perused by his Excellency the Viceroy. It contained opinions bearing on the questions now put by the Foreign Secretary. I shall therefore freely quote Ghulam Hussan Khan's opinions. The Lieutenant-Governor is aware that I have the highest appreciation of his loyalty and integrity, though I cannot always agree in his political views.

6. To point then, with regard to the Foreign Secretary's first question, I feel certain that I have good grounds for saying that the Ameer would not willingly consent to the appointment of British officers as Residents or Political Agents of our Government to be located at Herat and Candahar, or at either place. I was, on my own knowledge, pretty well convinced that the Ameer and his advisers would dislike the presence of an English Envoy at Candahar as much as they would be averse to one being located at Cabul itself; but I did think it possible that, from the peculiar antecedents of Herat, and from the fact that his (the Ameer's) material hold upon it is not as yet a very firm one, he might be so disinclined to accept of our assistance and countenance in holding Herat; but I see that Ghulam Hussan Khan is distinctly of opinion that the Afghan feeling would be one and the same regarding any arrangement which located a British officer in any part of their territory.

7. This distrust, which really proceeds from a variety of causes, some of which I shall subsequently allude to, is partially entertained by the Ameer himself; but the feeling in his mind is constantly intensified by the action and language of the Afghan Sirdars around him, the majority of whom appear to be senselessly rabid on this point, losing no opportunity of exalting this prejudice in the Ameer's mind against the admission of British officers to the country in any form. The result is that he (the Ameer) yields to the influence of the common cry about him, and is thus induced by his advisers to act in what we naturally regard as a senselessly churlish manner on this point.

8. A portion of this hostile feeling on the part of the Sirdars may be attributable to actual dislike, but a large share of it is, in fact, complimentary to our energy and power. Thus they believed that, if they were to allow the small end of the wedge to be put in we should very soon split up their country and take the rule and lead in all matters connected with the management of it into our own hands, and they have spirit enough to prefer managing matters for themselves. They, moreover, I am expressed by the British officers would be writing for this thing and that, and the Ameer would have to comply with those requisitions, and thus in a very short time he would virtually surrender his independence, and be at the beck and call of the British Resident. The advice of the Sirdars, therefore, to him is strongly against the adoption of any measure which should result in the deputation of British Agents to the chief political or strategical points of Afghanistan.

9. I think it but fair to urge that under these circumstances it would not be just to be too hard on the Ameer for what must and does appear to us a churlish refusal, reiterated from time to time, to allow officers belonging to a friendly nation, and one which has striven with no niggard hand to gain his good-will and that of his Sirdars and people to travel even through his country. It may be a fact that the Ameer is somewhat himself afraid of the mischiefs and annoyances, if not real dangers as he considers them, that would follow from the presence of British officers, but he is still more afraid of Afghan opinion and averse to running counter to the strong national feeling against permitting our interference in any shape with their affairs, which is still, I fear, the predominant feeling in the breasts of Afghan Sirdars with regard to us.

10. It is perhaps strange that this feeling should be nationally as strong as it is, for it is a fact that personally British Officers and Afghan Sirdars can be on very friendly terms, entertaining respect for another, coupled with true kindly feeling, but nationally there exists on both sides a recollection
of wrong suffered and wrong done, which makes a hitherto unbridled chasm between us, and which I believe, probably to the end of the chapter, will render our reappearance in Afghanistan distasteful to its people.

17. There is another cause for the apparently reckless conduct of the Afghans which may not be understood by those only partially acquainted with this peculiar people, and that is, that, strange as it may seem to us, I believe that the Afghans do not habitually feel that they greatly need our assistance; they have an overweening confidence in the efficacy of their Kuzzak style of warfare, and believe that they will be able to preserve their Pathmillkjeeb grasp of the country against all comers, either by fighting at their own chosen spots or by getting out of the way till fortune grants them the opportunity. I do not believe that their disadvantages themselves with the Ameer and some of his more close advisers are better informed and are well aware that they could make but little head against Russian invasion, and consequently they would like to retain a lien on the assistance of a strong Government like ours, as a pis aller, when the dire extremity came, but until that final pressure is at the door, these wise heads, as well as the rest, would wish to have as little to do with us as possible, always excepting of course the matter of receiving arms and money in which, Afghan-like, they are not unnaturally ready to play their part.

18. One feeling I can imagine weighing strongly with the Ameer against the acceptance of British Officers is the danger of dealing with rivals in order to clear away his difficulties would cause much scandal and annoyance to any British Officers who might be witnesses of these proceedings on the spot, the result possibly being accurate and reliable reports on these occasions to their own Government, followed by remonstrances from that Government, which the Ameer must either comply with and thereby incur the scorn and indignation of his Sirdars, who would taunt him with being under English influence, or he must disregard these well-meant strictures on his conduct, and this no doubt would be done at some pain to himself.

19. In this way the Ameer’s case is somewhat like that of a border Baron or Chiefzain under the feudal system, patronised by the neighbouring settled Government on account of the political or strategical importance of the position he occupied, the Chief himself being conscious of the advantage of being recognised and supported by the countenance of the stronger power, but from intrinsic weakness, internal feuds, &c. being obliged to maintain his authority by irregular and unjustifiable action. In such a case, though anxious to fulfil the expectations of his powerful neighbour to the best of his ability, the last thing which the rough-dealing, semi-outlawed Chief would probably choose would be to have members of the regular Government billeted on him to be, as he would fear, remorseless scrutiners of his rather questionable methods of maintaining his power.

20. Lastly, but not least in importance, is the fact that the Ameer probably feels that he cannot depend upon his own people, and that, either in opposition to his wishes, or perhaps in order to embroil him with the British Government, or from a burning, perhaps fanatical, zeal in the cause of “Afghanism for the Afghans,” British Officers located in or travelling through the country might come by evil mishaps, which he would be utterly unable to control or remedy. This is perhaps the truer key to that mode of expression which I, believe, has been used more than once by the Ameer and his advisers, namely, “Do anything, but from British Officers on us.”

21. On the above grounds, I feel quite clear on the point that the Ameer and his Sirdars would not, at any rate at present, willingly agree to the location of British Officers at Candahar or Herat.

22. The second point is whether the presence of such Residents at both these places, or at either, would be advantageous to the British Government.

23. What am I to say,—it would be very charming to have Herat and Candahar news put on our tables twice a week. Given as a matter of course, among us would feel great satisfaction at having thrust out a western horn to correspond to the eastern one at Yarkund and Kishgir. Politicians at home and abroad, who are inclined to be chiefly influenced by the appearance of things upon the map, and who wash their hands of local difficulties, would allow that we had fully occupied the ground diplomatically in front of the Russian onward wave. There would further be no fear of the Afghans keeping us in the dark regarding events in their front, or of their deceiving us regarding their own action with reference to the approach of the Russians.

24. We have established relations with the Ruler of Yarkund, and have located a British European Agent in his territory. It would be a natural further move to occupy the left of the advanced line in the same way.

25. Lastly, it might be a step towards an amelioration of manners and bearing on the part of the Afghans contact with us: and a gradual rising to our ways, coupled with a progressive perception of, and belief in, the general honesty and simplicity of our intentions, are perhaps the only things which hold out a hope of his amelioration.

26. The above are the advantages which probably would attend the location of British Officers at important points like Candahar and Herat.

27. But the arguments against the plan are very strong too. I have given it as my opinion that we should not be able to obtain the willing consent of the Ameer and his councillors to the appointment of British Residents in their country. It must then be accomplished by the exertion of pressure, but the Afghans in their pride, based on the rough and impregnable character of the more difficult portions of their country, and on the warlike prestige of the men who inhabit and are ready to defend them, are but little inclined to yield readily to pressure from us, as they know how averse we are to the exertion necessary to make our displeasure felt. Unless, therefore, we are able and willing to put the screw, as the expression is, on them in some material fashion, they will not probably disregard our attempts to force them into doing what is so disagreeable to themselves.

28. They are such careless, happy-go-lucky fellows, too, that I do not think that the threat to withhold thepagedrelease State prisoners, &c., would induce them to accept a condition regarding which they feel so strongly.

29. It is, therefore, the very peculiar character of the Afghans as a people, coupled with certain perplexing and peculiar points in our relations with them, the fruit possibly in some measure of former
mistakes of our own, added to the material obstacles presented by the rugged Passes and their warlike defenders that divide us from their country, which make the difficulty of the case a matter of the people different, and our relations with them cordially friendly, it would be of no matter of difficulty for us to scan the whole country and arrange for its being so strengthened as to make it so easy matter for the Russians, with their enormously extended line of advance, to think of absorbing Afghanistan by force.

22. Also, if the Afghans were either weaker or stronger, they would very likely welcome our assistance. As it is, they are weak enough to be distrustful of us, and yet strong enough to hope to be able to play the game without calling us in; and thus though they know that they may deeply need our aid, they are afraid to welcome us frankly as allies, lest the result should be the loss of their independence.

23. I proceed at this point to notice more particularly Nawab Gholam Hassun Khan's writing and opinions. Having seen in the Native newspapers a rumour of an intention to send a mission to Cabul accompanied by English officers, &c., he states that he is greatly averse to the measure in the first instance, as he believes that if this plan was adopted without the way being in some measure prepared for the event, the Afghans would be so agitated by the approach of the mission, that they would possibly decline to receive it; and if not this, that they would be so disturbed, and the whole thing be so distasteful to them, that there would be no hope of the benefit being gained, which he (Gholam Hassun Khan) believes might be obtained in another way.

24. Gholam Hassun Khan recommends, in place of the above plan, that an emissary chosen from the Ameer's own class—one with whom he could discuss matters freely—should be employed in the first instance on this duty, and that the Native gentleman thus employed should be commissioned to explain the whole case to the Ameer, and should endeavour to bring him to a point in regard to the chief requirements it presents. Gholam Hassun Khan's belief and hope is that in this way the Ameer might have his eyes opened to the suicidal character of the policy which his Sirdars and advisers are inducing him to pursue, and that he might thus be brought to relax the stringency of his opposition to the visits of British officers, and the like, which could do him and the people no harm, and might greatly strengthen his hands.

25. I am aware that the above proposition of Gholam Hassun Khan's might be supposed by those who do not know the man to emanate entirely from an interested wish on the part of the writer to suggest a duty which he of all others would be the best qualified to perform. Some little margin must be allowed for human nature in such cases; but I have that confidence in the man's honest zeal for the welfare of the British Government, which assures me that he would not make the recommendation unless he truly believed it to be the best course that could be adopted.

26. Gholam Hassun Khan is of opinion that if it proved that the Ameer, notwithstanding a calm discussion of the matter in all its bearings, would do nothing in accordance with the advice given, and would in no wise relax his policy of exclusion, in that case it would be of course open to the British Government to withdraw from the position which has grown up, reverting to one of general friendship and good-will, keeping up appearances, but not lavishing too much on an ally who makes no suitable return for the favours bestowed upon him and his people. This change of policy would have to be formally announced to the Ameer and Afghans by a second mission, or in some other formal manner to avoid a subsequent assertion of its not having been understood.

27. As I understand Gholam Hassun Khan's meaning, it is that the attitude of the British Government to be reverted to would be that sketched by Lord Lawrence in the 38th to 41st paragraphs of his Minute of the 25th of November 1868, commenting on Sir Henry Rawlinson's papers on Central Asian affairs.

28. Gholam Hassun Khan, however, is very averse to anything like an open breaking with the Ameer at this juncture, as it would have a bad effect in the country he thinks, weaken our position at Yarkund, and leave the field open to the Russians all along the line. He is of opinion, then, that the Ameer should be gently forced into a more genial reciprocation of our solidly expressed good-will towards himself and his countrymen. He notes that the late proceedings and successes of the Russians have established their influence over all Turkoman tribes, viz., the Tekke, Yemout, Merve, Sarukhs, &c., in fact close up to Herat, while in the East they are close up to the Yarkund and Kashgar territory. They, the Russians, are further projecting to connect the Amoo and Syr rivers by a navigable canal which would consolidate their position close up to the Turkestan provinces of Afghanistan. I may note that I saw mention of this project in the Geographical Magazine, but I do not think that the points on both rivers to be united were mentioned, but I think Charjooee on the Oxus (Amoo) was mentioned as one.

29. Under these circumstances Gholam Hassun Khan's feeling evidently is that it is unreasonable that we should not have the power of sending officers to study the lay of the country, and thus to understand the full bearings of the game we are supposed to be playing, and so I must confess, judged by ordinary rules, it is. It is only the extraordinary difficulties of the case which render it not so unnatural a result after all as it appears at first sight.

30. On the above ground, namely, on the difficulties which now surround the external relations of the Cabul territory, Gholam Hassun Khan is of opinion that it would be natural and appropriate that we should at this time insist on our influence being materially extended in Afghanistan. Secondly, on account of the internal state of Afghanistan, he considers that our interference would be equally beneficial at this time. He mentions the remarkable instances in which the Ameer has disregarded the advice successively given him by Sir John Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and his Excellency the present Viceroy, and always with disastrous consequences to himself, the result in the last instance being that he, the Ameer, has deeply offended and possibly estranged the two powerful Ghilzai Chiefs, and he thinks that the influence of the British Government might be beneficially employed in saving the Ameer from such mistakes in future.

31. This of course would involve an amount of interference in the internal affairs of the Ameer's country which I feel certain we are not likely to embark in.
32. My own opinion hinges, as I have before said, on the character of the Afghans and of the country to be dealt with.

If the Afghans were truly friendly to us, and inclined to welcome our assistance, or were their country such that it would enable us, without desperate exertion, to avenge, if necessary, insult or injury done to our officers employed in the country, if they came by mishap, then I should probably favour the idea of our sending forward political representatives to look after our interests in that quarter.

33. But as it is clear that the Ameer and his advisers will not willingly receive our European Residents, I am quite certain that it would be a deeply unwise act to force them upon them, and further as the recent avenging injury done to our representatives would be a grievous misfortune to us, I am strongly of opinion that it is most expedient to avoid putting our officers in positions which might endanger such a result.

34. I need not say how unfortunate the scandal would be to us if we had to go to war with our reputed allies to punish them for dealing treacherously with the officers whom we had put forward to assist in what was supposed to be our common interests.

35. I forward with this paper a transcript of a memorandum which I wrote in 1867 for Sir John Lawrence. There are some points in it which I think it fair to point to, as showing that my views have been consistent with regard to what was to be hoped from the Afghan character, but I would deprecate the idea that I dislike the men: they have some fine qualities, and as men are, at any rate, remarkable, being one of the finest races in the world; but their political morality is certainly of the lowest order, and I pray my Government to beware of them in all matters that demand stability of action and good faith.

Enclosure 7 in No. 32.

No. 124 C, dated Dera Ismail Khan the 14th April 1875.

From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab.

In acknowledgment of your No. B., of 26th ultimo, and its annexure, I have the honour to state that, in so far as my information enables me to judge, I believe the appointment of British Officers as Residents at Candahar and Herat, or at either of those places, would be distasteful to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan.

2. As a Barukzai, the Ameer can hardly be expected willingly to consent to such a measure. If His Highness were even prepared to waive his own personal objections from a desire to maintain the alliance and secure the continued support of the British Government, it is probable that the opposition of the great majority of those Sirdars who are friendly to him could not be got over. The memory of former British occupation of the country is still fresh amongst the older Sirdars, whose prejudices and opinion the Ameer might not be in a position to overrule successfully.

3. The general impression abroad regarding the intelligence received through the British Agent at Cabul is, that it is as authentic as any information obtained from exclusively Native services can be expected to be.

Enclosure 8 in No. 32.

Dated Dera Ismail Khan the 14th April 1875.

Demi-official, from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Munro, Officiating Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, to T. H. Thornton, Esq., Secretary to Government, Punjab.

I yesterday returned to Dera Ismail Khan after my tour in the southern part of the Division, and I have since had the opportunity of questioning Nawab Foujdar Khan on the subject of your confidential note of the 27th ultimo.

In course of a visit which he paid me this morning to discuss other matters, I managed to get his opinion on the subject of your confidential official letter, No. B. of 26th ultimo, without appearing in the least to desiderate the information by direction of the authorities. The Nawab says he thinks the Ameer of Cabul would have strong objections to the permanent location of British Officers for political purposes either at Herat or Candahar. His acquaintance with the Ameer personally and knowledge of his views and objects lead the Nawab to believe that the Ameer would dislike the appointment of British Officers as Residents at either place. The recollection of some former Missions is still fresh in Cabul, Candahar, and Herat; even if the Ameer were prevailed upon to forego his own predilections in order to secure the alliance and confidence of the British Government, the strong feeling which exists amongst the Afghan Sirdars generally against a re-introduction of British Officers could hardly be resisted, and the unpopularity of his Government, specially with those who are already secretly the Ameer’s enemies, would be largely increased by his consenting to such a measure. The Nawab is of opinion that the objection to the location of Native Agents of the British Government would not be so strong, and that if such a measure were deemed advisable, the Ameer’s consent might be obtained more easily, though a certain amount of suspicion and distrust might be aroused by its being carried out.

The Nawab says the information furnished through the British Agent at Cabul is generally to be relied upon, much of it being obtained from independent sources.
I do not believe that Ameer Sher Ali Khan would willingly assent to such appointments in any part of Afghanistan. He would probably declare that the unsettled state of his kingdom prevented his being able to guarantee the safety of the officers appointed. The Ameer has always evinced extreme jealousy at any step towards interference on the part of our Government, and more enable our officers to deal direct with any of the Afghan is especially noticeable on the Kuram border of the Kohat Thal (on the Kuram) either with or without troops, that an Agent has not been deputed from Cabul to watch my movements, and particularly to see that nothing approaching to cordiality takes place seen and acknowledge the advantages that would result to his Government by the appointment of such Residents, the measure would undoubtedly be very beneficial to both Governments:

1st.—Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly assent to the appointment of European British Officers, as Residents, at Herat and Candahar, or at either place.

2nd.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

3rd.—Whether the British Government would be in a better position to obtain reliable intelligence and to watch passing events than can possibly be the case by trusting, as at present, to European Governments, would assuredly consider that the presence of an European British Agent would he merely a preliminary step to annexation. This would tend to check all opposition against the Ameer, for those inclined to resist his Government would assuredly consider that the presence of an European British Officer was a sign that the British Government was prepared to aid the Ameer in every possible way, not only by money and arms as heretofore, but by force if necessary. The presence and advice of British Officers might inaugurate a better state of Government, and thus tend to allay much of the present discontent against the Ameer, which is in a great measure caused by the oppression of his Governors.

I do not believe that the people generally of Afghanistan would seriously object to the appointment of such Residents, not only at Herat and Candahar, but at Cabul itself and Balkh. What could be worse for them than the condition of the last-mentioned Province, the people of which are goaded to the utmost exasperation by the tyranny and oppression of a low-born ruler (Naib M. Alum Khan, the only point in whose favour is that he is a Mahomedan)! The slightest show of resistance at Herat by Ayroob's party would to a certainty have been followed by a general revolt in Balkh. The Sirdars, who probably hope to become Governors in the different Afghan Provinces, would, like the Ameer, be adverse to the appointment of European British Officers. They probably fear that the appointment of such Residents would be merely a preliminary step to annexation.

It is notorious that only such information as the Ameer approves of is furnished by the British Native Agent at Cabul. Such can only be expected, as the Agent knows that he must either act up to the wishes of the Ameer, or else he would be treated with contempt and possibly be brought to disgrace in some way or other. During the first days after his appointment, Alta Muhammad Khan did attempt to act independently, but he soon discovered that his munshi Bakhtyar Khan, who acted up to the Ameer's wishes, received far more distinction and honour than he, the British Agent, did. The position is now quite reversed, and Alta M. Khan is spoken of as one of the Ameer's confidential advisers.

I think it possible to establish a system of communication through Kuram by means of reliable agents who would furnish regular and authentic information on important Central-Asian matters. Doing so from the Kohat side would probably attract less notice than could be hoped for if agents were employed from Peshawur, for I am informed that any man coming from Peshawur, of the class likely to be used as a means of furnishing information rarely escapes scrutiny, and if at all suspected of being on such an errand he would be so closely watched that his usefulness would be very much impaired.

The difficulty, however, is not so much in finding agents to furnish news as to get men who will send really true and unvarnished information. Newsagents are apt to imagine that the very fact of their being employed is a sign that we wish to discover something going on in Afghanistan injurious to British interests, and that news of that kind is expected from them. They therefore are inclined either to trump up something which will meet the object in view, or else they twist and turn about with the same intent facts that have really occurred, so that a minimum amount of value can be attached to what is reported. I am more inclined to credit information received from special agents deputed occasionally into Afghanistan to observe and report what is going on than that furnished by a regularly appointed agency; for the latter, after the first freshness is worn off, sooner or later degenerates into newswriting more or less of a stereotyped form.

Peshawur, 1st April 1875.

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI, Captain, Officiating Deputy Commissioner.
Enclosure 10 in No. 32.

Note.

I have been desired by the Lieutenant-Governor to record my opinion upon the three points noted in Foreign Department's Letter No. 45 C. P., dated 25th March, and give it for what it is worth.

In regard to the first point, I concur in the opinion expressed by Sir R. Pollock, Major-General Taylor, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari that the location of English Officers at Herat and Kandahar, or at either place, would be very distasteful to the Kabul Government. I was not present at any of the conferences between Lord Mayo and the Amere at Umballa in 1869, and cannot, consequently, speak from personal knowledge of what passed on those occasions; but from the evidence contained in the secret records of the office, of which I append an abstract, it would appear that, though the Amere was at first personally inclined to meet the supposed wishes of the British Government in the matter of having English Agents in certain parts of his territory, his Council, and especially the present Prime Minister, Sayed Naur Mahommed Shali, were decidedly opposed to the measure.

Captain Grey states in his letter of the 29th March 1876 that the Amere "freely consented to the appointment of European British Officers in Bakh or Herat or anywhere but actually in Cabil;" but I cannot find in Captain Grey's letter that any definite understanding was come to on the subject; all that the Amere appears to have been ultimately prepared to accede to was the deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased and the deputation of an English Envoy at some future time when things had settled down.

But if this is all that could be obtained from the Amere at a time when "his whole attitude was that of one eager to please---what is likely to be the policy of the Amere and his councillors now that he is no longer "eager to please," but still suffering from bitter disappointment at the result of the Seistan arbitration? We have some indication of what their policy and feelings are in the Kabul Agent's letter of the 14th April 1875, in which an account is given of the manner in which the proposal to send Mr. Macnabb to Cabul to explain the details of the Seistan arbitration was received in Durbar; from that account it is clear there was then a decided objection to an English Officer proceeding to Cabul for even a temporary purpose; the same policy was exhibited in reference to the proposal return of Sir D. Forsyth's Mission through Afghanistan, and I have no reason to believe that matters have in any way improved. It is possible, indeed, that the Amere's strange unwillingness to take the subsidy, which long lay ready for him on the frontier, was dictated by a fear of its leading to a proposal to depute a British Officer to see how it was spent.

But, though I believe the location of British Agents (Europeans) in Afghanistan would, under present circumstances, be most distasteful to the Kabul Government, I am not without a hope that a change for the better may hereafter take place. X.Y., himself an Afghan and in frequent communication with his countrymen, is of opinion that the people of Afghanistan and many of the Sirdars are getting weary of the present state of things, and are becoming inclined to look upon the presence of English Officers in their country as likely to bring about an amelioration of their condition.

In regard to the second point, it would not, in my humble opinion, be to the advantage of the British Government to send European Officers into Afghanistan, if their deputation is, as I believe it to be, highly distasteful to the Amere or his Councilors; on the contrary, such a measure would probably lead to grave embarrassment. With reference to the third point, I have no reason for doubting the accuracy of Atta Mahommed Khan's intelligence; but it is undoubtedly meagre,—and, if we get the truth, we do not get the whole truth; e.g., at this present moment we are not by any means fully informed if the Government of Afghanistan will not hostile measures towards the English. No more can I undertake, though of course we can very well guess the cause; still I cannot suggest any other practicable means of supplementing our intelligence save those indicated by Sir R. Pollock.

21st April.

T. H. Thornton.

Enclosure 11 in No. 32.

Appendix to Note.

From a reference to the secret records of the Persian Office, it appears that on the 17th March 1869 (while the Amere was at Lahore) X. Y. reported the substance of a discussion which took place at Cabul on the receipt of the Vicerey's letter of the 9th January 1869. In this discussion the Amir, Noor Muhammad Shah, and others took part, and the conclusion arrived at was that the British Government had no intention of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. This discussion was followed next day by a private discussion between the Amere and Noor Mahommed Shah, at which no third person was present. It turned upon the following passage in the Vicerey's letter: "It will be left to the Head of the Government of India year after year to determine what shall be done by the British Government in proof of its desire to strengthen your Highness' power, and what assistance in the shape of money and arms shall be given year after year for the consolidation of your Highness' Government and in evincing the good-will of the British Government." Syed Noor Mahommed Shah observed that "it does not appear from the wording of the passage what are the wishes of the British Government. If the Government desires to ask for any place in Afghanistan wherein to establish a cantonment, it is impossible to comply with its wishes, as the Government desires to send its troops to this country under the name of an auxiliary force, this will alienate the tribes from us and unsettle men's minds. What is practicable is this, that the money and arms be given by the British Government; the men composing the troops should be provided by us, and the power and management should rest with ourselves. It shall be our duty to show due submission and good-will towards the British Government."
Enclosure 9 in No. 32.

REPLIES to Questions received under Cover of SECRETARY GOVERNMENT PUNJAB'S LETTER No. 1, dated 27th March 1875, to address of Captain CAVAGNARI, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Peshawur.

I do not believe that Ameer Sher Ali Khan would willingly assent to such appointments in any part of Afghanistan. He would probably declare that the unsettled state of his kingdom prevented his being able to guarantee the safety of officers so appointed. The Ameer has always evinced extreme jealousy at any step towards interference on the part of our Government, and more especially at any measure which would affect Provincial Governors or officials. This is especially noticeable on the Kuram border of the Kohat District. I have never yet been up to Thal (on the Kuram) either with or without troops, that an Agent has not been deputed from Cabul to watch my movements, and particularly to see that nothing approaching to cordiality takes place between myself and the Kuram Governor (Sirdar Wali M. Khan).

Could the Ameer be brought to see and acknowledge the advantages that would result to his Government by the appointment of such Residents, the measure would undoubtedly be very beneficial to both Governments:

1st.—Whether the Ameer of Afghanistan would willingly assent to the appointment of European British Officers, as Residents, at Herat and Candahar, or at either place, especially at any measure which would affect Provincial Governors or officials. This is especially noticeable on the Kuram border of the Kohat District. I have never yet been up to Thal on the Kuram) either with or without troops, that an Agent has not been deputed from Cabul to watch my movements, and particularly to see that nothing approaching to cordiality takes place between myself and the Kuram Governor (Sirdar Wali M. Khan).

2nd.—Whether the presence of such Residents at either place would be advantageous to the British Government.

3rd.—Whether the British Government would be in a better position to obtain reliable intelligence and to watch passing events than can possibly be the case by trusting, as at present, to the Native Agent at Cabul or to casual sources of information. But should the Ameer refuse, or unwillingly assent to the measure, it would possibly be productive of very evil results. Everything would be done to thwart the action of the Resident, and not unlikely some sort of insult would be offered, which would either result in his having to be withdrawn, or supported in his position by force of arms.

I do not believe that the people generally of Afghanistan would seriously object to the appointment of such Residents, not only at Herat and Candahar, but at Cabul itself and Balkh. What could be worse for them than the condition of the last-mentioned Province, the people of which are gored to the utmost exasperation by the tyranny and oppression of a low-born ruler (Nabib M. Alum Khan, the only point in whose favour is that he is a Mahomedan?)! The slightest show of resistance at Herat by Ayoob’s party would to a certainty have been followed by a general revolt in Balkh. The Sirdars, who probably hope to become Governors in the different Afghan Provinces, would, like the Ameer, be adverse to the appointment of European British Officers. They probably fear that the appointment of such Residents would be merely a preliminary step to annexation!

It is notorious that only such information as the Ameer approves of is furnished by the British Agent at Cabul. Such can only be expected, as the Agent knows that he must either act up to the wishes of the Ameer, or else he would be treated as a nonentity and very possibly be brought to disgrace in some way or another. During the first days after his appointment, Ata Muhammad Khan did attempt to act independently, but he soon discovered that his munshi Bakhtryar Khan, who acted up to the Ameer’s wishes, received far more distinction and honour than he, the British Agent, did. The position is now quite reversed, and Ata M. Khan is spoken of as one of the Ameer’s confidential advisers.

I think it possible to establish a system of communication through Kuram by means of reliable agents who would furnish regular and authentic information on important Central-Asian matters. Doing so from the Kohat side would probably attract less notice than could be hoped for if agents were employed from Peshawur, for I am informed that any man coming from Peshawur, of the class used to be made as a means of furnishing information rarely escapes scrutiny, and if at all suspected of being on such an errand he would be so closely watched that his usefulness would be very much impaired.

The difficulty, however, is not so much in finding agents to furnish news as to get men who will send really true and unvarnished information. Newspapers are very apt to imagine that the very fact of their being employed is a sign that we wish to discover something going on in Afghanistan imical to British interests, and that news of that kind is expected from them. They therefore are inclined either to trum up something which will meet the object in view, or else they twist and turn about with the same intent facts that have really occurred, so that a minimum amount of value can be attached to what is reported.

Personally I am more inclined to credit information received from special agents deputed occasionally into Afghanistan to observe and report what is going on than that furnished by a regularly appointed agency; for the latter, after the first freshness is worn off, sooner or later degenerates into newswriting more or less of a stereotyped form.

Peshawur, 1st April 1875.

(Signed) N. CAVAGNARI, Captain, Officiating Deputy Commissioner.
Enclosure 10 in No. 92.

Note.

I have been desired by the Lieutenant-Governor to record my opinion upon the three points noted in Foreign Department's Letter No. 48 C. P., dated 25th March, and give it for what it is worth.

In regard to the first point, I concur in the opinion expressed by Sir R. Pollock, Major-General Taylor, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari that the location of English Officers at Herat and Kandahar, or at either place, would be very distasteful to the Cabul Government. I was not present at the conference between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at Umballa in 1869, and cannot consequently speak from personal knowledge of what passed on those occasions; but from the evidence contained in the secret records of the office, of which I append an abstract,* it would appear that, though the Ameer was at first personally inclined to meet the supposed wishes of the British Government in the matter of having English Agents in certain parts of his territory, his Council, and especially the present Prime Minister, Sayid Nizr Mahomed Shah, were decidedly opposed to the measure.

Captain Grey states in his letter of the 29th March 1875 that the Ameer "freely consented to the appointment of European British Officers in Balkh or Herat or anywhere but actually in Cabul;" but I cannot find in Captain Grey's letter that any definite understanding was come to on the subject; all that the Ameer appears to have been ultimately prepared to accede to was the deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased and the deputation of an English Envoy at some future time when things had settled down.

But if this is all that could be obtained from the Ameer at a time when "his whole attitude was that of one eager to please," what is likely to be the policy of the Ameer and his councillors now that he is no longer "eager to please," but still suffering from bitter disappointment at the result of the Seistan arbitration? We have some indication of what their policy and feelings are in the Cabul Agent's letter of the 14th April 1873, in which an account is given of the manner in which the proposal to send Mr. Macnabb to Cabul to explain the details of the Seistan arbitration was received in Durbar; from that account it is clear there was then a decided objection to an English Officer proceeding to Cabul for even a temporary purpose; the same policy was exhibited in reference to the proposed return of Sir D. Forsyth's Mission through Afghanistan, and I have no reason to believe that matters have in any way improved. It is possible, indeed, that the Ameer's strange unwillingness and to take the subsidy, which long lay ready for him on the frontier, was dictated by a fear of its leading to a proposal to depute a British Officer to see how it was spent.

But, though I believe the location of British Agents (Europeans) in Afghanistan would, under present circumstances, be most distasteful to the Cabul Government, I am not without a hope that a change for the better may hereafter take place. X.Y., himself an Afghan and in frequent communication with his countrymen, is of opinion that the people of Afghanistan and many of the Sirdars are getting weary of the present state of things, and are becoming inclined to look upon the presence of English Officers in their country as likely to bring about an amelioration of their condition.

In regard to the second point, it would not, in my humble opinion, be to the advantage of the British Government to send European Officers into Afghanistan, if their deputation is, as I believe it to be, highly distasteful to the Ameer or his Councillors; on the contrary, such a measure would probably lead to grave embarrassment. With reference to the third point, I have no reason for doubting the accuracy of Atta Mahomed Khan's intelligence; but it is undoubtedly meagre,—and, if we get the truth, we do not get the whole truth,—e.g., at this present moment we are not by any means fully informed of the circumstances under which the hostile movement against Nouroz Khan has been undertaken, though of course we can very well guess the cause; still I cannot suggest any other practicable means of supplementing our intelligence save those indicated by Sir R. Pollock.

T. H. Thornton.

21st April.

Enclosure 11 in No. 92.

Appendix to Note.

From a reference to the secret records of the Persian Office, it appears that on the 17th March 1869 (while the Ameer was at Lahore) X. Y. reported the substance of a discussion which took place at Cabul on the receipt of the Viceroy's letter of the 9th January 1869. In this discussion the Amir, Noor Muhammad Shah, and others took part, and the conclusion arrived at was that the British Government had no intention of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. This discussion was followed next day by a private interview between the Ameer and Noor Mahomed Shah, at which no third person was present. It turned upon the following passage in the Viceroy's letter: "It will be left to the Head of the Government of India year after year to determine what shall be done by the British Government in proof of its desire to strengthen your Highness' power, and what assistance in the shape of money and arms shall be given year after year for the consolidation of your Highness' Government and in evincing the good-will of the British Government." Syud Noor Mahomed Shah observes that, "it does not appear from the wording of the passage what are the wishes of the British Government of the Government desires to ask for a place in Afghanistan wherein to establish a cantonment, it is impossible to comply with its wishes, considering the usage of Afghanistan. If the Government should desire to send its troops to this country under the name of an auxiliary force, this will alienate the tribes from us and unsettle men's minds. What is practicable is this, that the money and arms be given by the British Government; the men conquising the troops should be provided by us, and the power and management should rest with ourselves. It shall be our duty to show due submission and good-will towards the British Government."
Hearing this interpretation the Ameer said:—

"May God will that at the time of treaty the wishes and requisitions of the British Government be such that there may seem nothing to prevent our complying with them. I would agree even to this, that the troops be our own and the military officers and drill instructors be furnished by the British Government, and that a confidential Agent of the Government be stationed in Balkh and Herat!"

Syed Noor Mahomed Shah said:—

"Be that as it may, at the present time the British Government has also its own objects in view. You are the same Ameer Shere Ali Khan who after the defeat at Candahar repeatedly asked for assistance. Why did not the English agree then? Now both the parties have their own objects. May God vouchsafe all is that good!"

The Ameer then said: "May God send us good! And may the requests of the British Government be such that our people may be able to agree to them! If the British Government put upon my neck a heavier load than my country and religion would be able to bear, there will be difficulty."

On the 18th March X. Y. repeated a discussion that took place in the Saniman Boorj in the Lahore Fort on the 17th March, at which the Ameer observed that personally he would have no objection to an English Envoy being stationed at Cabul, but that owing to the turbulent character of the people it would not be safe. The same objection, however, did not apply to Balkh, Candahar, or Herat, and the arrangement by which an English Officer should be stationed at these places would be beneficial to both Governments. A translation of this report was sent to the Foreign Office, and printed in extenso.

On the 26th March X. Y. reported a discussion which took place at 7 A.M. on 25th March between the Ameer, Noor Mahomed Shah, and others on certain questions which had been put to the Ameer by Sir Donald McLeod. One of these questions was:—

"What can the Ameer do to procure intelligence from the frontier of Afghanistan, and what assistance can the British Government give in this matter?"

The Ameer and his councillors are reported to have said:—

"The object of the British Government appears to be to place their own men on the frontier. For this purpose his Highness Mahomedan troops be our own, and that a confidential Agent of the Government be stationed in Bunkh and Herat!"

Syed Noor Mahomed Shah then said:—

"Since His Highness and Her Majesty's Government are partners in each other's benefit and losses, how can His Highness set lightly in collecting information and watching the course of events in Central Asia. On the contrary, he will, to the utmost of his power, endeavour to collect correct information of passing events. There is no such necessity for assistance in the collection of information on the affairs of Central Asia from the Government of Her Majesty, for the two Governments are as one, and if any expense be incurred it is of no consequence."
should be held the second private interview, which would, in a manner, sanction and confirm the result of the negotiations. The points (recorded in pencil notes in my possession) were:—

"1. That the Ameer should accede to our deputation of Native Agents wherever we pleased.

To this the Ameer agreed, and promised to assist them in every way.

"2. To ascertain whether the Ameer was agreeable to the deputation of an Envoy at some future date. On this point the Ameer expressed his willingness to receive an Envoy as soon as things had somewhat settled down, anywhere save at Cabul, where he thought it would affect his power with the people."

I may note that the Ameer was at that time eager to meet what he supposed to be our views, and his whole attitude was that of one eager to please.

Enclosure 13 in No. 32.

Opinions of Nawab Goolam Hossein Khan Bahadur, C.S.I., Native Commandant, 15th Regiment Bengal Cavalry, on the present state of affairs in Cabul, submitted to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Always actuated by a sense of devotion and loyalty towards the British Government, I have been in the habit of occasionally venturing to give any information, with my views, on the subject of Afghan politics, whenever I considered such conducive to the interests of Government. Seeing, therefore, that the British Government at the present day takes more than ordinary interest in the affairs of Afghanistan, and that events of some importance have recently transpired in that country, which have been noticed by the Native Press in India, adding that the British Government had resolved on sending a special mission to Afghanistan; and having in former years served as British Agent at the Court of Cabul, and being more or less acquainted with the internal and external affairs of that country, and to this day in correspondence with trustworthy friends there, I am to a certain extent kept acquainted with the course of events and the opinions entertained thereon, and consider it my duty towards the Government I have the honour of serving to express my opinions, based as they are upon former experience. And although it may be considered presumptuous in so humble an individual to express any opinion in such important and delicate questions, still trusting to the indulgence granted to all faithful servants of Her Majesty, I propose to offer the following:—

For some time the British Government has been anxious that order and tranquillity should be established in Afghanistan, but the Ruler of that country, through error of judgment and want of foresight and proper discernment, has not acted on the wholesome advice given him, but to all appearance considered such advice as being injurious to the interests of his own country and, if followed, greatly to the advantage of the British Government only; and in support of this view gave some weak reasons. But the expression of this hostile opinion does not emanate from the Ameer himself, but rather from a number of influential Sirdars who are constantly about him, and who have recently risen to high office in the State. These men are not only ignorant and wanting in judgment, but are also avaricious, and under the cloak of patriotism have become the confidential favourites of the Ameer, and, taking advantage of their influence to benefit and enrich themselves, represent the friendly advice, tendered by the British Government, as injurious to the country, and use all manner of artifice to impress this upon the Ameer, who is quite unable to judge for himself the true merits of the case. Moreover, it is well known that when the principal officers of a State, for motives of their own, try to divert the interests of their country, however intelligent the master himself may be, it is extremely difficult for him to arrive at the truth. It is therefore at this last importance to make known to the Ameer by sound advice and good counsel what his true interests are, put him on his guard, and show him the machinations of the honey-mouthed but designing men who are about him.

It remains to be considered in what way this can be brought about; and in my humble opinion it would be desirable for Government to name a person of the same creed and country as the Ameer, an individual well disposed towards both Governments, who could win his confidence, and take the opportunity of communicating to him the views and friendly advice of the British Government, explain to him the present and future benefits to be derived from following such friendly advice, &c. This person to act in concert with the British Agent at present in Cabul. Should, however, the advice given not be followed by the Ameer, owing to the intrigues of selfish and interested courtiers, still no change should be allowed to take place in the relations at present subsisting between the two Governments, and then, if considered necessary, a mission might be sent to express openly and candidly to the Ameer the British views, and what was done, and might have been done, if the advice given was not listened to. But I consider that to send a mission composed of European officers, in the first instance, would be a mistake, and this for two reasons: in the first place, the members of the Afghan Durbar on hearing even that a mission might be expected at Cabul would become greatly excited and annoyed, and in that case the friendly advice given from purely interested motives and not for the sole benefit of the Ameer and his country; in the second place, should the Afghan Durbar either from fanaticism, ignorance, or other motives oppose the dispatch of a mission into Afghan territory, and the British Government calmly accept the refusal, its dignity and prestige would be compromised to a serious extent, and cause anxiety as to what further step to take under the reftil. I repeat then my conviction that, under the present circumstances, it would not be advisable to send a mission composed of European officers, but a native of distinction as already stated, if the object in view is to be attained.

Again it is a matter for serious consideration whether, in the present state of affairs, it has become necessary for the British Government to tender advice to the Ruler of Afghanistan. In my humble opinion there are two good reasons why such advice, if possible, should be given. The first concern the external relations of Afghanistan with its neighbours, such as Yarkund, Turkomania, Tek, Yamoot, Merv, and the country in the vicinity of Herat, which have been encroached upon by Russia, whose
conquest and influence are daily on the increase; and although there are still tribes of Turkomans and desert tracts intact, still these even may be considered as if already in the hands of that power; and Government is aware of the efforts Russia is making to navigate the rivers of Turkistan, and to connect the Syr Darya and Amu rivers with a view to intercommunicate by means of steam vessels; that already their trading vessels are on the Amu Darya and have penetrated to Balkh and Badakhshan, while no British officer can penetrate to Balkh, Herat, or Badakhshan; nay not even a traveller has access to these countries—a proof that British interest has rather decreased than increased of late in those parts, which makes it more necessary that some attempt to establish intercourse should be made; and, in my humble opinion, taking into consideration the inroads of Russia into Turkistan, it would be wise to act with forethought in the affairs of Afghanistan.

Anleer, Khan, the Ruler of Cabul, frequently wrote to the Ameer in a friendly way not to drive his promising son into exile, but rather to allow him to visit Cabul, also that European Political Officers should be allowed to reside in different parts of Afghanistan, but on his return to Cabul his Government disavowed this condition, stating that such a demand could not be complied with.

When the Ameer took the field against his brother, Sirdar Mahmood Ameen Khan, then Ruler of Candahar, the British Government in a friendly manner advised him in vain not to proceed to violence; finally, Mahmood Ameen Khan and the Ameer's elect son, Sirdar Mahmood Ali Khan, then head of the party, lost their lives in the conflict which ensued, thus giving the family of Mahmood Afsal Khan the opportunity of intriguing and seizing upon Cabul, Turkistan, and Candahar after defeating the Ameer.

The late lamented Lord Mayo, after the flight of Sirdar Mahmood Yakooob Khan from Cabul, frequently wrote to the Ameer in a friendly way not to drive his promising son into exile, but rather to conciliate and call him back; but the Chief of Cabul would not take his advice, and finally the above-named Sirdar attacked and took Herat. Sirdar Futfeth Mahmood Khan, then Ruler of Herat, and his son with other Chiefs were killed in the defence. Such were the results of the bad counsel given by the Ameer's advisers; and it is these very men who have instigated the recent act of treachery on the part of the Ameer towards his son, which has brought the Ameer into such bad repute in the country, and more especially among the Ghilzie Sirdars who were security for the safety of Yakooob Khan, and it is more than probable that serious disturbances will break out before very long.

The remonstrances of the British Government for this act of treachery have been disregarded by the Ameer, and in this state of things it has become almost a necessity for the British Government to interfere by calling upon the Ameer to settle the administration of his country. Considering then the external and internal state of Afghanistan, I am firmly convinced that now is the time for the interference of the British Government with a view to the peace of that country and the tranquillity of Hindoostan.

The following are a few of the reasons why the Government of India should interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan:

1st.—For a long time the British Government has been anxious to establish amicable relations with the Ruler of Cabul, but without success. The interference of Government in former days, and the expenditure of large sums, notwithstanding that the powerful and independent kingdom of the Punjab intervened.

2nd.—That notwithstanding the aid treacherously given to the Sikhs by Dost Mahmood Khan, the British Government considered it advisable at the time to keep on friendly terms.

3rd.—Sending a costly expedition to Persia with a view to annex Herat to the Afghan kingdom.

4th.—Grant of large sums of money to the Ameer, together with arms, &c.

5th.—Making a clause in the new Treaty that an external enemy (having designs on Afghanistan) should be considered an enemy to the British Government.

6th.—The protection given to the Sirdars made prisoners by the Ameer, and their support by the British Government.

7th.—The bad results to British trade from the navigation of the Amu Darya by Russia.

8th.—The possible inclination of the Ameer towards another party (Russia?) owing to the silence and apparent apathy of the British Government.

9th.—The constant anxiety felt on the frontier under British rule owing to the unsettled state of affairs in Afghanistan.

11th.—Suggesting to the Native Princes of India thoughts (conjectures) as to why the British Government had relinquished its hold on that country.

12th.—The establishment of friendly relations with Yarkund will lose its advantages.

Advantages to be derived from interference in the affairs of Afghanistan—

1. To perpetuate the old friendship which subsisted between the two Governments.

2. To derive some benefit after expending large sums of money on that country.

3. To secure the prestige of the British Government.

4. The sense of security to Afghanistan itself which would result from a good understanding between the two Governments.

5. The sense of security and peace in India and the Punjab, &c.

6. The possibility of strengthening friendly relations with the Ruler of Yarkund.

7. Advantages to be derived from commercial intercourse.

Camp, Umballa, 15th January 1876.
No. 33.

Secret, No. 34.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council (Extract).

India Office,
London, 19th November 1875.

My Lord,

1. I have carefully considered your letter of 7th June, and the papers accompanying it, with respect to the establishment of a British Mission in Afghanistan.

2. I do not gather that in your Excellency's mind, or in that of the able Officers whose communications are appended to the Despatch, any doubt exists as to the insufficiency of the information which you now receive from that country. The baldness and extreme scantiness of the Diaries hardly require to be established by testimony, and it appears, from the statements of Captain Cavagnari and Sir R. Pollock, that only such information as the Amir approves of is contained in them. It would seem further that, in the opinion of Sir R. Pollock, intelligence from Afghanistan was never so hard to obtain as it is now. Still less are the present arrangements efficient for the purpose of obtaining intelligent reports upon Central Asian affairs generally, or any trustworthy estimate of the course they may be expected to take; or for exercising any influence, in case of emergency, on the minds of the Amir or his nobles.

3. Your Excellency does not doubt that, having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Central Asia, it would be desirable that a British Officer should be stationed at Herat, and you anticipate great advantage from the arrangement, if the Officer should be a man of sound judgment and possessing the full confidence of the Amir. The only point which you raise for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government is whether the advantages are such as to justify efforts being made for obtaining the concurrence of the Amir, which would be attended with difficulty, and would not be certain of success.

4. The question has been clothed with an importance it never possessed before by the recent advances of Russia, which have placed her outermost posts in some places almost on the frontier of Afghanistan, in others upon roads which lead to it by easy and well supplied marches.

5. As the proximity of Russia to Afghanistan becomes closer and more established, the danger which is to be feared, whatever its extent may be, will probably take one of three forms. Russia may, by terror or corruption, obtain a mastery over the Amir, which will detach him from English interests, and leave to her choice the moment for penetrating to any portion of the country. Or, secondly, if she fails to shake his loyalty, his hold on power may be destroyed by internal disorder, and Russia, by establishing her influence over the Chiefs who may become dominant, may secure the same advantages as would have resulted from the adhesion of the Amir himself. Or, thirdly, if both the Amir and his Sirdars remain insensible to the suggestions of the Russian Agents, they may by some imprudence come into collision with the frontier forces of that empire, and afford a pretext for the exaction of some territorial penalty.

6. The general tendency of the information you have furnished to me is to the effect that no apprehension of the first alternative need be felt. Your Excellency and your most experienced officers appear to be convinced that the Amir's dislike of the presence of any British representative in his dominions does not furnish ground for inferences unfavourable to his loyalty. But, whatever confidence present circumstances may justify you in entertaining, the well-known peculiarities of the Afghan character forbid the omission of such a contingency from any computation of the probable result of a close neighbourhood between Russia and Afghanistan.

7. The second and third alternatives appear, unfortunately, from the papers you have forwarded, to be still less beyond the range of probability. The fiscal corruption to which the Cabul Diaries bear testimony, seems, according to the Candahar Diaries, to have produced the natural result of excessive taxation, and consequent discontent. Captain Cavagnari speaks to an amount of oppression in the Province of Balkh, which may probably lead to a revolt on the first favourable opportunity; and Goolam Hossein anticipates the breaking out of serious disturbances before long, in consequence of the irritation of the Ghilizc Sirdars. Even, therefore, if the Amir's loyalty could be counted on for an indefinite period, a field would still be left for foreign intrigue, dangerous alike to the Amir's power and to the interests of Great Britain.

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8. The military operations lately undertaken by the Amir, which appear to have been resolved upon before any information was communicated to your Government, suggest that the contingency of collision between his forces and those of Russia, or of the allies of Russia, must not be left out of account. Territorial boundaries in those countries are vague and ill-recorded, and the Amir has never shown any disposition to seek peace by abating a doubtful claim. He may think himself bound to assert supposed rights which may trench on the claims of Russia or of her allies; and steps may be taken which, in the judgment of the frontier commanders, may render a movement in advance necessary to the honour of Russia before your Government has had the opportunity of interposing either remonstrance or restraint.

9. The chance that any of these opportunities would be offered for the establishment of a dominant Russian influence in Afghanistan would be materially diminished, if not wholly neutralized, by the presence of a British Officer in that country. The evils to which I have referred would lose their formidable character if warnings could be given to your Government, or advice tendered to the Amir, in good time. They could only grow to dangerous proportions if their first commencement were hidden from your knowledge.

10. I do not desire, by the observations which I have made, to convey to your Excellency the impression that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Russian Government have any intention of violating the frontier of Afghanistan. The restraining force exercised from St. Petersburg may not have been altogether effectual in its results; and it may depend in the future upon fortunate circumstances, which an accident may terminate. Still, it is undoubtedly true that the recent advances in Central Asia have been rather forced upon the Government of St. Petersburg than originated by them, and that their efforts, at present, are sincerely directed to the prevention of any movement which may give just umbrage to the British Government. But the very fact that the measures of the frontier authorities do not always faithfully represent the ideas of the distant Government on whose behalf they act makes me more anxious that your Excellency should possess some channel of speedy and accurate information from the regions in which this dangerous policy is pursued. The case is quite conceivable, in which Her Majesty's Government may be able, by early diplomatic action, to arrest proceedings on the frontier which a few weeks, or even days, later will have passed beyond the power even of the Government of St. Petersburg to control.

11. On all these grounds, Her Majesty's Government continue to attach very serious importance to the presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan. I do not gather that your Excellency is inclined to differ from this judgment. But, in your opinion, the moment for giving effect to it will not arrive until the advance of Russia is further developed, and its forces have occupied Merv. In this opinion it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur. If ever the Russians should accomplish the permanent occupation of Merv, the time would possibly have passed by when representations to the Amir could be made with any useful result; for the influence of your Government at Cabul, already enfeebled, would, for such a purpose, have in a great measure disappeared. The Amir has watched the steady progress of the Russian arms, scarcely impeded by such resistance as the Governments of his own race and creed have been able to offer. He has warned the British Government that one advance would follow another, and his prediction, disregarded when made, has been shown by the issue to be true. If, in spite of all promises given, and confidence expressed to the contrary, the Russians should advance to Merv, the Amir will conclude, until at least the contrary has been established, that no power exists which is able to stay their progress. He will then be hardly induced to consent to an arrangement which may cause him to lose favour in the eyes of the neighbour whom he esteems to be the strongest.

12. I gather from your letter under reply, that the principal objection felt by you to an immediate effort to obtain the consent of the Amir to a British Agency in Afghanistan is the fear that the effort would be vain. You apprehend that a refusal might lower the estimation of British power among the Afghans, and that England might be placed in an embarrassing position whenever it might hereafter be desirable to persuade the Russian Government of the existence of a real British influence at Cabul.

13. That a refusal would illustrate the feebleness of our influence with the Amir cannot be doubted; but I apprehend little evil from this disclosure. It is not likely that either the Afghan Sirdars or the Russian Ministry are misinformed as to the true state of the case, or that any useful purpose would be served by keeping up, even if it were possible, an appearance of influence which does not correspond with the reality.
14. But I am not convinced that the Amir's present disinclination indicates that his concurrence will be ultimately refused. He has had no opportunity of forming a more enlightened judgment. He has no assistance from any European mind in interpreting the events which have recently taken place in Central Asia. In judging of the probable course and the relative importance of the two European powers upon whom the destiny of his country depends, he can only reason by his Asiatic experience and the counsels of a singularly prejudiced durbar; and he is little able either to measure the gravity of the danger which threatens him, or to discern his best chance of safety. It is premature to abandon all hope of leading him to form a juster estimate of his position. Indian diplomatists, by superior intellect and force of character, have, in their intercourse with Native Princes, often triumphed over more stubborn prejudices. The serious peril to which his independence is exposed, the inability of the British Government to secure the integrity of his dominions unless it can watch through the eyes of its own officers the course of events upon his frontiers, will, if these topics are enforced in personal intercourse by an Agent of competent ability, probably outweigh in the Amir's mind any rancour surviving from the events of 35 years ago, or any dissatisfaction with the issue of the Scistan arbitration.

15. The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations with the Amir upon a more satisfactory footing, will be to induce him to receive a temporary embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establishment of a permanent mission within his dominions. There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create. I have therefore to instruct you, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, without any delay that you can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a mission to Cabul; and to press the reception of this mission very earnestly upon the Amir. The character you will give to it, and the amount of escort, if any, that it will require, I must leave entirely to your judgment. The Envoy whom you may select will be instructed to confer with the Amir personally upon the recent events in Central Asia; to assure him of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack; and, at the same time, to point out to him the extreme difficulty which will attend any effort on your part to ensure this end, unless you are permitted to place your own officers upon the frontier to watch the course of events. In these communications he will not depart from the amicable tone in which your intercourse with the Amir up to this time has been conducted. On the contrary, he will not forget that one of the chief objects of his mission is to create in the Amir's mind an undoubting impression of the friendly feeling of Her Majesty's Government. But, maintaining this tone, it will be the Envoy's duty earnestly to press upon the Amir the risk he would run if he should impede the course of action which the British Government think necessary for securing his independence.

16. I request that you will furnish me with an early report of the measures you have taken to carry out the instructions of this Despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 34.
No. 10 of 1876.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.

To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

Fort William, 28th January 1876.

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's Secret Despatch, No. 34, dated the 19th of November 1875, in which, after reviewing our Despatch, No. 19, of the 7th of June last, and conveying to us the views of Her Majesty's Government on the important questions of policy discussed in that Despatch and in previous correspondence, you instruct us, without any delay that we can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a mission to Cabul, and to press the reception of the mission very earnestly upon the Amir; the object of the mission being to urge upon His Highness the desirability of stationing British officers upon the frontier of Afghanistan.

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2. Before explaining the reasons which make it necessary for us to ask for further instructions on the subject of the proposed mission, we desire to observe, with reference to the remarks contained in the earlier paragraphs of the Despatch, that the views and opinions set forth in our Despatch of the 7th of June appear to have been misapprehended in several important particulars.

3. In paragraph 2 it is stated that we appear to entertain no doubt as to the insufficiency of the information at present received from Afghanistan; that the diaries of our Agent in Cabul are bald and extremely scantly; and that it appears from the statements of Captain Cavagnari and Sir R. Pollock that only such information as the Ameer approves of is contained in them. With reference to these remarks we would explain that in paragraphs 11 to 14 of our Despatch of the 7th of June we stated our opinion that though there might be doubts as to the sufficiency of the intelligence given by our Agent at Cabul the value of the information was not destroyed by such defects; that while the position of the Agent compelled him to be cautious in communicating news to the British Government we had no reason to believe that information of importance was withheld; that, on the contrary, the information supplied was fairly full and accurate, and that the diaries contained internal evidence that the intelligence reported in them was not submitted to the Ameer for his approval. The opinion which we then expressed was based upon our own experience, confirmed by the views entertained by Sir Henry Davie, Sir R. Pollock, Colonel Munro, and Nawab Foujdar Khan.

4. The information we have since obtained confirms us in these opinions. It is true that Sir R. Pollock, writing in July 1874, stated that he had at no time experienced greater difficulty in procuring reliable intelligence regarding Afghan affairs, but he now informs us that he has every reason to be satisfied with the fullness and accuracy of the intelligence at present furnished by our Agent; and a perusal of the recent diaries is sufficient in our opinion to establish the improbability of the statement (for which indeed we have never seen any evidence advanced) that the Agent withholds information in deference to the wishes of the Ameer. As a matter of fact, we are not aware that any event of importance which it would have been the Agent's duty to report has not been promptly communicated to us. The diaries received since our Despatch of the 7th of June was written abound in matter which it is impossible to believe the Ameer ever saw, or would wish to be reported to the British Government.

5. It would also appear from paragraphs 3 and 12 of your Lordship's Despatch, that our opinions with respect to the negotiations proposed by your Lordship with a view to the establishment of a British officer at Herat, as expressed in our Despatch of the 7th of June, have been imperfectly apprehended. Our object was to inform your Lordship that there was an entire concurrence of opinion among all those who could be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer that he is most unwilling to receive British officers as residents in Afghanistan; that his reluctance is consistent with his loyal adherence to the interests of the British Government; and that such being the case we considered it would be a grave error to urge upon him the establishment of a British Agency at Herat or Candahar at the present time, because it would be a deviation from the patient and conciliatory policy which had hitherto guided our relations with Afghanistan. We expressed an opinion, indeed, that "having regard to the present aspect of affairs in Turkestan it would be "desirable that a British officer should be stationed at Herat," and that "if an officer "of experience and sound judgment were chosen who possessed the full confidence of "the Ameer and the Afghan officials we should anticipate great advantage from the "arrangement." But we considered that these advantages were contingent upon a condition of things which did not exist. We did not discuss the question whether the advantages to be expected from the proposed measure were "such as to justify efforts "being made for obtaining the concurrence of the Ameer;" because in our judgment the advantages to be gained from the presence of British officers on the Afghan frontier depended entirely upon the cordial concurrence of the Ameer, and would not be secured by his reluctant assent after pressure put upon him by us. We gave at considerable length our reasons for thinking that the Ameer's cordial consent could not be obtained, and we said that "if we were to press the question on the Ameer at present, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or accepted with great reluctance." In either case we pointed out the serious objections to the scheme, and we added:

"After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the disposition of the Ameer, and of the probable result of pressing him to accept a British Agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to your Lordship by "telegraph on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are
unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition, and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now."

6. We have deemed it necessary to enter at some length on these explanations because, from the tenor of the Despatch under reply, we gather that Her Majesty's Government have concluded that the measure we are now instructed to carry out would present itself to us in a more favourable light than that in which we really regard it.

7. Having made these preliminary observations, we proceed to explain the steps we have taken in order to comply with the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatch. Immediately after we received it we summoned Sir R. Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, to Calcutta to confer personally with us on the subject. The Viceroy also placed himself in private and confidential communication with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The result of our deliberations is that we are convinced that, if a mission is to be sent to Cabul, the most advisable course would be to state frankly and fully to the Ameer the real purpose of the mission, and to invite him to enter cordially into those closer relations with the British Government which the mission is to endeavour to establish. The Ameer and his advisers are shrewd enough to understand that only matters of grave political importance could induce us to send a special mission to His Highness' Court. If the mission were ostensibly directed to objects of minor political importance, the Ameer and his officials would be incredulous. He might then decline to discuss the weightier questions brought forward by our Envoy, and in all probability his confidence in us would be shaken, especially as the proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our Despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa conferences of 1869. A reference to the correspondence forwarded with our Despatch, No. 46, dated 22nd May 1873, will show that the Ameer is not likely to welcome any mission we may send unless its objects are fully and clearly explained to him beforehand.

8. If notwithstanding the views expressed in this Despatch Her Majesty's Government determine that a mission shall be sent, the Ameer should in our opinion be informed in a letter from the Viceroy that the present condition of affairs in Central Asia makes it expedient that the relations between the British Government and Afghanistan should be placed on a more definite footing than at present; that, while we have no proposals to make deviating in any way from the policy, which has hitherto guided and will continue to guide us, of complete abstention from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, we are desirous of arriving at a clearer understanding as to the arrangements necessary for obtaining full information of events on and beyond the frontiers of Afghanistan so that the British Government may be able to avert by a timely exercise of friendly influence any danger which may threaten the integrity of Afghanistan; and that for this purpose direct personal conference with His Highness is necessary. We would then suggest to the Ameer either that he should come to Peshawur to meet the new Viceroy in person at some early and convenient time to be hereafter arranged, or, if His Highness preferred it, that we should send a mission to such place as he might consider most convenient, to explain our views. It might be advisable to give the Ameer these alternatives, which were suggested by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, because it would be more difficult for him to refuse both proposals, and if he were not disposed for the personal interview he might more readily accept the mission.

9. On the whole, however, we doubt whether the Ameer would exhibit less reluctance now to receive a special Envoy than he did in 1873, when we proposed to send the Commissioner of Peshawur to Cabul to explain the result of the Seistan arbitration and the assurances given by Russia in respect to the boundaries of Afghanistan and the integrity of the Ameer's territories.

10. As the steps which we believe to be the best for commencing negotiations with the Ameer differ from the suggestions contained in your Lordship's Despatch in the important particular that the nature of the business would be indicated in the first instance instead of the mission being ostensibly directed to some object of minor importance, we should have thought it necessary, upon this point alone, to ask for instructions before making any communication to the Ameer. But, apart from the
procedure to be adopted, we shall have to instruct the Envoy who will be charged with the negotiations upon several subjects regarding which it seems to us to be necessary that we should receive some further explanation of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

11. The correspondence which has taken place with the Ameer of late, and the experience derived from the communications held with Syud Noor Mahomed at Simla in 1873, satisfy us, and our opinion is entirely shared by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and Sir Richard Pollock, that at least two important questions will be raised by the Ameer if he entertains the proposal that British Residents should be placed at Herat and Candahar.

Those questions are—
1st. Whether Her Majesty's Government are prepared to give unconditional assurances of their determination to protect the territories of Afghanistan against any external attack.

2nd. If the Ameer should apply for assistance for the purpose of fortifying Herat and improving his army, to what extent his demands should be complied with.

12. Both these questions are of great importance. Your Lordship will doubtless have read the observations made by the Ameer in May 1873 and the communications which took place with Syud Noor Mahomed later in the same year on the subject of the protection of Afghanistan. It then appeared that nothing short of a full and unconditional promise of protection against foreign attack would have been satisfactory to the Ameer; consequently, in the Viceroy's letter to His Highness of the 6th of September 1873, the question was deliberately reserved for future consideration. We had no authority then, nor have we received authority since, from Her Majesty's Government to give to the Ameer any such unconditional guarantee, and we are of opinion that there are grave objections against binding the British Government by such an obligation. We are precluded by law from entering into a treaty of this nature without the express command of Her Majesty's Government, and unless such a treaty is accompanied by reciprocal engagements on the part of the Ameer which seem to us to be inapplicable to the present condition of affairs.

13. The Ameer will in our opinion, judging from the whole tenor of his communications and from the language used by Syud Noor Mahomed in 1873, expect some large pecuniary assistance in aid of the protection of Afghanistan, if the contemplated negotiations are opened. The Syud studiously avoided making any definite official demand, but the sum of 100,000L, which, bearing in mind the dissatisfaction felt by the Ameer at the result of the Seistan arbitration, we then offered to put at his disposal, was evidently considerably below his expectations. Your Lordship is aware that up to the present time the Ameer has not taken advantage of the offer. The reason may be either that he was disappointed at its amount, or that, having objected to the return through Afghanistan of Sir Douglas Forsyth's mission to Kashgar, he was reluctant to accept the gift. However this may be, his conduct affords no encouragement to the successful accomplishment of the objects of the proposed mission. His objections to the presence of British officers in Afghanistan are clearly very strong, and his expectations of pecuniary aid are very high.

14. In our opinion it would be impolitic to expend large sums of money for the purpose of strengthening the position of Afghanistan. Considering the insecure basis upon which the Government of a country like Afghanistan rests, it is impossible to foresee the use to which the fortifications far from our own base of operations which would be improved and the troops who would be raised and equipped at our expense might at some future time be applied. We concur in the objections expressed by Lord Lawrence in the Despatch of the 4th of January 1869 to the imposition of heavy charges upon the revenues of India for such purposes.

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* We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the object which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control.

* Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, it not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security and title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of
15. Sufficient has been said to show the difficulty of the two questions which we have discussed and the necessity we are under of asking for further instructions with regard to them. But besides these questions it is our duty to urge upon your Lordship the difficulty we feel in framing directions to the Envoy as to the arguments which he is to use when pressing upon the Ameer the advisability of accepting British Residents in Afghanistan.

16. In your Lordship's Despatch under reply, an opinion is expressed to the effect that the Ameer's independence is exposed to "serious peril," and the possibility of diminishing or neutralizing that peril by the personal influence of a British Agent in Afghanistan and by timely information of the course of events on the Afghan frontier is the consideration which Her Majesty's Government desire to press upon the Ameer.

17. The dangers to the independence of Afghanistan may be considered as possible from two different causes—from the future action of the Russian Government or of Russian officers on the one hand, and from the action of the Ameer and the Sirdars or people of Afghani斯坦 on the other.

18. We are in possession of no information which indicates an intention or desire on the part of the Russian Government to interfere with the independence of Afghanistan. In the correspondence forwarded to us with your Lordship's Secret Despatch, No. 32, dated 19th November last, there has been a frank interchange of views between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government on the subject of their policy in Central Asia, and Her Majesty's Government have intimated that "they have now received with the most sincere satisfaction the assurances conveyed in Prince Gortchakoff's Despatch as to the enlightened conviction of His Imperial Majesty that such extension, if either on the side of Bokhara, or Krasnovodsk, or on the Attrek, is contrary to Russian interests, and that formal orders have been given that all future action in those regions is to be strictly confined to the defence of existing limits and the protection of property and commerce from pillage and brigandage."

19. In this satisfaction we fully share. As Her Majesty's Government are aware, we have always held that the wisest course to pursue is to explain fully to Russia the importance to British interests of the complete independence of Afghanistan, and to make it clearly understood that Great Britain could not look with indifference on any measures tending to impair or interfere with that independence. We therefore view with peculiar gratification the clear exposition of the policy of Her Majesty's Government as set forth in the Foreign Office Memorandum of the 11th of May 1875. At the same time we fully appreciate the force of the considerations referred to in the 10th paragraph of your Lordship's Despatch, which render it conceivable that circumstances may occur, as they have occurred before, to draw the Russian Government into a line of action contrary to their real intentions and wishes.

20. At present, however, we are in possession of no information which leads us to look upon Russian interference in Afghanistan as a probable or near contingency, or to anticipate that the Russian Government will deviate from the policy of non-extension so recently declared. The Ameer has always watched the progress of the Russian power with alarm, and has at times been greatly agitated by the possibility of the Russian occupation of Merv and the immediate contact of the Russian and Afghan dominions. But we have been informed that Her Majesty's Government did not at all share his alarm and considered that there was no cause for it. The Ameer was accordingly told that the result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments regarding the boundaries of his dominions has been materially to strengthen the position of Afghanistan and to remove apprehension of danger from without, and he was counselled to devote his undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of his internal government. Apparently these communications have tended to remove the feelings of alarm which were undoubtedly felt by the Ameer when he first heard the rumour of a Russian expedition to Merv. In October 1873 he is reported to have written to his Agent at Bokhara as follows: "It is evident that the British Government

the principal Chiefs and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in the trust in a rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt."

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"has defined the Afghan boundary with the Russian and Persian Governments, and that "even if the Russians take possession of Sarakhs and Merv Shahjehan it is not to be "apprehended, with regard to the communications made between the Russian and the "British Governments on the subject of the definition of the Afghan boundary, that they "will attempt any advance into the Afghan boundary." If representations of an opposite tenor are now to be made, the Ameer will expect to be fully informed of the grounds for them.

21. Moreover, the assurances given to the Ameer, that a good understanding exists between England and Russia on Central Asian affairs and that his dominions are secure from Russian attack, have in our opinion had a salutary effect in inducing him to adhere to the policy of peace which he has hitherto pursued towards his neighbours. It is manifestly important to avoid anything which might lead him to doubt the correctness of the assurances repeatedly and advisedly given him, or might have the effect of unsettling his mind and of weakening the influence which we have for many years successfully exercised at Cabul in the interests of peace; collision between the Ameer and the frontier tribes or with the allies of Russia, which we consider under present circumstances to be unlikely, would become probable; and the understanding arrived at with Russia regarding the boundaries of Afghanistan and the independence of the Ameer's territories would be imperilled. Language which indicates a change of policy fraught with consequences so grave to Afghanistan and to British interests in Central Asia ought not in our opinion to be used unless there be a material change in existing circumstances, and we are not aware that any such change has occurred.

22. We do not share to the full extent the apprehensions expressed in paragraphs 6 to 8 of your Lordship's Despatch. Of course it is impossible to predict with confidence what turn affairs may take among a people like the Afghans. But, so far as circumstances enable us to form a forecast, we have no reason at present to anticipate the occurrence of a collision between Russia and Afghanistan from any of the causes mentioned. Those officers of our Government who are best acquainted with the affairs of Afghanistan and the character of the Ameer and his people consider that the hypothesis that the Ameer may be intimidated or corrupted by Russia (even supposing there was any probability of such an attempt being made) is opposed to his personal character and to the feelings and traditions of his race, and that any attempt to intrigue with factions in Afghanistan opposed to the Ameer would defeat itself and afford the Ameer the strongest motive for at once disclosing to us such proceedings. Whatever may be the discontent created in Afghanistan by taxation, conscription, and other unpopular measures, there can be no question that the power of Ameer Shere Ali Khan has been consolidated throughout Afghanistan in a manner unknown since the days of Dost Mahommed, and that the officers entrusted with the administration have shown extraordinary loyalty and devotion to the Ameer's cause. It was probably the knowledge of the Ameer's strength that kept the people aloof from Yakoob Khan in spite of his popularity. At all events, Herat fell to the Ameer without a blow. The rebellion in Lalpoora in the extreme east was soon extinguished. The disturbances in Badukshan in the north were speedily suppressed. Nowhere has intrigue or rebellion been able to make head in the Ameer's dominions. Even the Char Emak and the Hazara tribes are learning to appreciate the advantages of a firm rule.

23. We by no means overlook the contingency referred to in paragraph 8 of the Despatch under reply, but we think that Her Majesty's Government scarcely do justice to the Ameer and his unqualified acceptance hitherto of our advice in his dealings with his neighbours. The military operations referred to are probably the expedition to Mainena, a place which forms an integral part of the Afghan dominions. The reduction of the Chief of Mainena to obedience is therefore a domestic affair with which it is contrary to our policy to interfere, and on which we should not ordinarily expect the Ameer to communicate with us. As a matter of fact, however, the operations were not resolved upon before information was communicated to us. We were kept acquainted with the whole course of the discussions in the Durbar previous to the despatch of the troops, and have been since regularly informed of the progress of the expedition.

24. But what we wish specially to repeat is that from the date of the Umballa Durbar to the present time, the Ameer has unreservedly accepted and acted upon our advice to maintain a peaceful attitude towards his neighbours. We have no reason to believe that his views are changed. On the contrary, so late as September last, when the Ameer received news of the disturbances in Kokand, and heard news of a general
rising against the Russians, he wrote to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan "that he must "make endeavours to obtain as much information as possible in this matter, but that he "should be careful lest any person in his territory should act against the Russians, and "that he should exercise such restraint over his people that no act contrary to the "friendship existing between Afghanistan and Russia may take place."

25. The observations which we have hitherto made apply to the manner in which the instructions contained in your Lordship's Despatch could in our opinion best be carried into effect, and to the further instructions which appear to us to be necessary before the proposed negotiations can be commenced. But the matter is, in our own judgment, and in that of all those whom we have been able to consult, of such grave importance that we feel it to be our duty to add some further remarks for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government in the hope that the whole question may still be reconsidered.

26. It is in the highest degree improbable that the Ameer will yield a hearty consent to the location of British Officers in Afghanistan which the Mission is intended to accomplish; and to place our Officers on the Ameer's frontier without his hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most impolitic and dangerous movement. Setting aside the consideration of the personal risk to which under such circumstances the Agents would be exposed and the serious political consequences that would ensue from their being insulted or attacked, their position would be entirely useless. They would be dependent for their information on untrustworthy sources. They would be surrounded by spies under the pretext of guarding them or administering to their wants. Persons approaching or visiting them would be watched and removed; and though nothing might be done ostensibly which could be complained of as an actual breach of friendship, the Agents would be checked on every hand, and would soon find their position both humiliating and useless. Such was the experience of Major Todd at Herat in 1839 when his supplies of money failed. Such was the experience of Colonel Lumsden when he went to Candahar in 1857 as the dispenser of a magnificent subsidy.

27. A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view. We already see the fruits of the conciliatory policy which has been pursued since 1869 in the consolidation of the Ameer's power and the establishment of a strong Government on our frontier. The Ameer's not unnatural dread of our interference in his internal affairs, and the difficulties of his position as described in our Despatch* of the 7th of June last, combined, perhaps, with the conviction that if ever a struggle for the independence of Afghanistan should come we must in our own interest help him, may have induced him to assume a colder attitude towards us than we should desire. But we have no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other powers. We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Ameer on a satisfactory footing; and we deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's Despatch.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
   H. W. NORMAN.
   A. HOBHOUSE.
   W. MUIR.
   E. C. BAYLEY.
   A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
   A. CLARKE.

1907.
No. 35.
Secret, No. 3A.

To the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

My Lord,

I enclose herewith, for your Excellency's information and guidance, the instructions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the affairs of Afghanistan and Khelat. I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

Enclosure in No. 35 (Extract).

My Lord,

India Office, 28th February 1876.

The tranquillity of the British power in India is so far dependent on its relations with the Trans-frontier States, that Her Majesty's Government cannot view without anxiety the present unsatisfactory condition of those relations. The increasing weakness and uncertainty of British influence in Afghanistan constitutes a prospective peril to British interests; the deplorable interruption of it in Khelat inflicts upon them an immediate inconvenience by involving the cessation of all effective control over the turbulent and predatory habits of the Trans-Indus tribes.

2. In view of these considerations, Her Majesty's Government have commended to the consideration of the Governor General of India in Council arrangements for promoting unity of purpose and consistency of conduct in the administration of the Sindh frontier. They have also instructed the Viceroy to find an early occasion for sending to Cabul a temporary mission, furnished with such instructions as may, perhaps, enable it to overcome the Amir's apparent reluctance to the establishment of permanent British Agencies in Afghanistan, by convincing His Highness that the Government of India is not coldly indifferent to the fears he has so frequently urged upon its attention; that if he is willing to afford him material support in the defence of his territories from any actual and unprovoked external aggression, but that it cannot practically avert or provide for such a contingency without timely and unrestricted permission to place its own Agents in those parts of his dominions whence they may best watch the course of events.

3. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the present moment is favourable for the execution of this last-mentioned instruction. The Queen's assumption of the Imperial title in relation to Her Majesty's Indian subjects, feudatories, and allies will now for the first time conspicuously transfer to Her Indian dominion, in form as well as in fact, the supreme authority of the Indian Empire. It will, therefore, be one of your earliest duties to notify to the Amir of Afghanistan and the Khan of Khelat your assumption of the Viceregal office, under these new conditions.

4. A special mission, having for this purpose a twofold destination, might perhaps be advantageously despatched from Jacobabad, up the Bolan Pass, to Quetta, where the Khan could be invited to meet and receive it. After delivering your letter to the Khan, the mission might proceed to Kandahar, and thence, under an escort furnished by the Amir, continue its journey to Cabul. From Cabul it would return to India, either through the Koorum Valley or the Khyber Pass, according to circumstances.

5. Her Majesty's Government, however, only suggest this plan to your consideration, with due reference to the circumstances of the moment as they arise. You may possibly find it advisable, on your arrival at Calcutta, to communicate indirectly with the Amir through your Commissioner at Peshawur. This officer might privately inform Shere Ali of your intention to send a complimentary letter to him, as well as to the Khan of Khelat, and ascertain the route by which it would be most agreeable to His Highness that the mission charged with the delivery of that letter should approach his capital. If the Amir expresses any preference for the northern route, the mission could proceed directly to Cabul by the Khyber Pass, returning to India through Kandahar and Khelat.
6. To invite the confidence of the Amir will be the primary purpose of your Agent. To secure that confidence must be the ultimate object of your Government. But to invite confidence is to authorise the frank utterance of hopes which it may be impossible to satisfy, and fears which it may be dangerous to confirm. Whether these hopes and fears be reasonable or the reverse, their open avowal is, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, preferable to their concealment.

7. The maintenance in Afghanistan of a strong and friendly power has at all times been the object of British policy. The attainment of this object is now to be considered with due reference to the situation created by the recent and rapid advance of the Russian arms in Central Asia towards the northern frontiers of British India. Her Majesty's Government cannot view with complete indifference the probable influence of that situation upon the uncertain character of an Oriental Chief whose ill-defined dominions are thus brought, within a steadily narrowing circle, between the conflicting pressures of two great military empires, one of which expostulates and remains passive, whilst the other apologises and continues to move forward.

8. It is well known that not only the English newspapers, but also all works published in England upon Indian questions, are rapidly translated for the information of the Amir, and carefully studied by His Highness. Sentiments of irritation and alarm at the advancing power of Russia in Central Asia find frequent expression through the English press, in language which, if taken by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the objects of British policy as regards Afghanistan are—

1st. "To secure that State against aggression."

2nd. "To promote tranquillity on the borders of that country, by giving such moral and material support to the Amir, without interfering in the internal affairs of his country, as may enable Her Majesty's Government to prevent a recurrence of the disturbances and conflicts between rival candidates for power among his own family, or the Meers of the different Provinces."

9. The Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James has been officially informed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the objects of British policy as regards Afghanistan are—

1st. "To secure that State against aggression."

2nd. "To promote tranquillity on the borders of that country, by giving such moral and material support to the Amir, without interfering in the internal affairs of his country, as may enable Her Majesty's Government to prevent a recurrence of the disturbances and conflicts between rival candidates for power among his own family, or the Meers of the different Provinces."

10. Her Majesty's Government would not, therefore, view with indifference any attempt on the part of Russia to compete with British influence in Afghanistan; nor could the Amir's reception of a British Agent (whatever be the official rank or function of that Agent) in any part of the dominions belonging to His Highness afford for his subsequent reception of a Russian Agent similarly accredited any pretext to which the Government of Her Majesty would not be entitled to except as incompatible with the assurances spontaneously offered to it by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. You will bear in mind these facts when framing instructions for your mission to Kabul. To demands which you have no intention of conceding your Agent will oppose a frank and firm refusal. You will instruct him to prevent such demands from becoming subjects of discussion. Others which, under certain conditions, you may be willing to entertain, he will undertake to refer to your Government, with such favourable assurances as may induce the Amir to recognize the advantage of facilitating, by compliance with your wishes, the fulfilment of his own.

11. If the language and demeanour of the Amir be such as to promise no satisfactory result of the negotiations thus opened, His Highness should be distinctly reminded that he is isolating himself, at his own peril, from the friendship and protection it is his interest to seek and deserve.

12. The requests which may be made by Shere Ali in connexion with his reception of permanent British Agents in Afghanistan will probably raise the question of granting to His Highness—

1st. A fixed and augmented subsidy.

2nd. A more decided recognition than has yet been accorded by the Government of India to the order of succession established by him in favour of his younger son, Abdallah Jan.

3rd. An explicit pledge, by Treaty or otherwise, of material support in case of foreign aggression.
13. The first of these questions is of secondary magnitude. You will probably deem it inexpedient to commit your Government to any permanent pecuniary obligation on behalf of a neighbour whose conduct and character have hitherto proved uncertain. On the other hand, you may possibly find it worth while to increase from time to time the amount of pecuniary assistance which up to the present moment the Amir has been receiving. But your decision on this point can only be determined by circumstances which have not arisen, and considerations which must be left to your appreciation of such circumstances.

14. With regard to the recognition of Abdulla Jan, whose selection as legitimate successor to the throne of his father has been made with much solemnity by Shere Ali, and ostensibly acquiesced in by the most influential of the Afghan Chiefs, Her Majesty's Government in considering this question have before them the solemn and deliberate declaration made in 1869 by Lord Northbrook's predecessor to the present Amir, viz., that "the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have been lately more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul, and rekindle civil war; and it will further endeavour from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor."

15. The Government of India having in 1869 made that declaration, which was approved by Her Majesty's advisers, have not based upon it any positive measures; while to the Amir, who had received that declaration under circumstances of some solemnity and parade, it appears to have conveyed a pledge of definite action in his favour. It is not surprising that these conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous formula should have occasioned mutual disappointment to His Highness and the Government of India.

16. Her Majesty's Government do not desire to renounce their traditional policy of abstention from all unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. But the frank recognition of a de facto order in the succession established by a de facto Government to the throne of a foreign State does not, in their opinion, imply or necessitate any intervention in the internal affairs of that State.

17. You may also find it in your power to bring about a reconciliation between the Amir and his nephew, Abdul Rahman Khan, who is now a refugee at Samarcand, under Russian protection. The order of succession established by Shere Ali would derive increased solidity from the support of this powerful discontent, whose adhesion to it might, perhaps, be secured through the friendly assistance of your Government.

18. Any of these arrangements might strengthen the position of the Government of India in Afghanistan, by securing its influence over the present Ruler of that country, and exhausting some of the sources of the political and social confusion which his death is now likely to occasion. But you will fully understand that, in advertizing to them, I am only suggesting points to which your consideration should be directed, and am in no way limiting your discretion with respect to them.

19. It remains to consider the question of giving to the Amir a definite assurance of material support in case of external aggression upon those territories over which Her Majesty's Government has publicly recognized and officially maintained his right of sovereignty.

20. With or without any such assurance, England would be impelled by her own interests to assist His Highness in repelling the invasion of his territory by a foreign power. It is, therefore, on all accounts desirable that the Government of India should have at its disposal adequate means for the prevention of a catastrophe which may yet be averted by prudence, and the fulfilment of an obligation which, should it ever arise, could not be evaded with honour. The want of such means constitutes the weakness of the present situation.

21. In the year 1873, Lord Northbrook gave to the Envoy of the Amir the personal assurance that, in the event of any aggression upon the territories of His Highness which the British Government had failed to avert by negotiation, that Government would be prepared "to assure the Amir that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, assist him with troops."

22. The terms of this declaration, however, although sufficient to justify reproaches on the part of Shere Ali if, in the contingency to which it referred, he should be left
unsupported by the British Government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to secure confidence or inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness. The Amir, in fact, appears to have remained under a resentful impression that his Envoy had been trifled with, and his attitude towards the Government of India has ever since been characterized by ambiguity and reserve.

23. If, therefore, Shere Ali be frank with your Envoy, he will probably renew to him the demand addressed in 1873, through his own Envoy, to Lord Northbrook, "that in the event of any aggression of the Amir's territories, the British Government should distinctly state that it regards the aggressor as its enemy; and, secondly, that the contingency of an aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Amir."

To answer this renewed demand in terms identical with those of the answer formerly given to it would prejudice, instead of improve, your relations with the Amir, by the evasion of an invited confidence.

24. Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, prepared to sanction Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, prepared to sanction such precautionary measures as they may deem requisite. These precautionary measures by no means involve the establishment of British garrisons in any part of Afghanistan, nor do Her Majesty's Government entertain the slightest desire to quarter British soldiers upon Afghan soil; but they must have, for their own Agents, undisputed access to its frontier positions. They must also have adequate means of confidentially conferring with the Amir upon all matters as to which the proposed declaration would recognize a community of interests. They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels; and the Amir must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country, and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorized to enter them.

25. In the next place, they cannot secure the integrity of the Amir's dominions, unless His Highness be willing to afford them every reasonable facility for such precautionary measures as they may deem requisite. These precautionary measures by no means involve the establishment of British garrisons in any part of Afghanistan, nor do Her Majesty's Government entertain the slightest desire to quarter British soldiers upon Afghan soil; but they must have, for their own Agents, undisputed access to its frontier positions. They must also have adequate means of confidentially conferring with the Amir upon all matters as to which the proposed declaration would recognize a community of interests. They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels; and the Amir must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country, and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorized to enter them.

26. Her Majesty's Government are also of opinion that the establishment, if possible, of a telegraph from some point on the Indian frontier to Cabul, via the Koorum Valley, is an object deserving of your consideration, and the permanent presence at the Viceregal Court of a properly accredited Afghan Envoy is much to be desired, as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of counter obligations on the part of the Amir, and the uninterrupted facility of your confidential relations with His Highness. Subject to these general conditions, Her Majesty's Government can see no objection to your compliance: with any reasonable demand on the part of Shere Ali for more assured support and protection, such as pecuniary assistance, the advice of British officers in the improvement of his military organization, or a promise, not vague, but strictly guarded and clearly circumscribed, of adequate aid against actual and unprovoked attack by any foreign power. Such a promise personally given to the Amir will probably satisfy His Highness, if the terms of it be unequivocal. But Her Majesty's Government do not wish to fetter your discretion in considering the advantages of a treaty on the basis above indicated.

27. The conduct of Shere Ali has more than once been characterised by so significant a disregard of the wishes and interests of the Government of India, that the irretrievable alienation of his confidence in the sincerity and power of that Government is a contingency which cannot be dismissed as impossible. Should such a fear be confirmed by the result of the proposed negotiation, no time must be lost in reconsidering, from a new point of view, the policy to be pursued in reference to Afghanistan.

28. On the other hand, the success of those efforts (which, if they be made at all, cannot be safely delayed) will be pregnant with results so advantageous to the British power in India that Her Majesty's Government willingly leave to the exercise of your judgment every reasonable freedom in carrying out the present instructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Salisbury.
To the Most Honourable the MARQUIS of SALISBURY, P.C., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD MARQUIS,

We have already notified to your Lordship by telegraph the close of the recent conference at Peshawur between the Envoys of the British and Afghan Governments; and we now take the earliest opportunity in our power of submitting a full report of our proceedings in connection therewith. Those proceedings have been governed by the general principles laid down for our guidance in your Lordship's Despatches of the 23rd January and 19th November 1875, and your further separate instructions for our guidance in your Lordship's Despatches of the 28th February 1876. We were informed by the above-mentioned communications that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the time had arrived when it was desirable to place our relations with Afghanistan on a more definite and satisfactory footing; and that for the attainment of this object the first favourable opportunity should be taken to open amicable negotiations with the Ameer of Cabul.

2. For the complete explanation of the steps taken by us in accordance with the views thus held by Her Majesty's Government, we must preface our report of them by a brief recapitulation of our past relations with that Prince, so far as they affect the questions dealt with in this letter.

3. The only formal obligation still extant between the British Government and the Barackzai Rulers of Afghanistan is the Treaty of the 30th of March 1855. This Treaty comprises three short articles. The first article established perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and Dost Mahomed Khan and his heirs; the second pledged the British Government to respect the territories then in His Highness' possession, and never to interfere therein; the third pledged the Dost, his heirs and successors, similarly to respect the territories of the British Government, and to be the friend of its friends and enemy of its enemies, without any such corresponding obligation on our part. It did not take long to prove the somewhat imperfect character of the Treaty thus contracted. Two years afterwards, on the first occurrence of a crisis affecting British interests in Afghanistan, a much more complete engagement stipulating for British Agencies in Cabul, Candahar, and Balkh, and granting aid to the Ameer in money and arms, was entered into by Sir John Lawrence and Dost Mahomed. That engagement, though limited to the duration of the war then being waged between the British Government and the Shah of Persia, was declared by Lord Canning to be sound in principle, liberal, and simple; tending to "redress the somewhat one-sided character of the Treaty of 1855, in which we appeared to take more than we gave;" and his Excellency expressed an earnest hope that, independently of the war in which we were then engaged, the relations of the British Power with Afghanistan might remain upon a permanent footing, similar to that upon which the above-mentioned engagement had placed them.

4. Dost Mahomed Khan was informed, during the course of the negotiations of 1857, that the British Government's support and assistance of him would be conditional on its officers being received in Afghanistan with the countenance and protection of His Highness. They were not, however, to exercise authority, or command, on Afghan territory; their duty (in the performance of which the Ameer was expected to afford them every facility) being simply to give advice when required, and to obtain all the information needed by our Government. The readiness with which the Ameer and his Sirdars perceived the propriety of this condition was, it is said, remarkable; and the measure, although not unattended by risk, met with reasonable success. This, at any rate, may be assumed from a careful review of past records, and from the views entertained by the experienced Head of the Mission, then stationed at Candahar, in favour of a renewal, at the present moment, of the policy then adopted.

5. It must, however, be observed that, although the residence of a British Mission at Cabul formed part of the stipulations agreed to in 1857, this step was not enforced by the British Government. The Dost urged that the Afghan people would view it with dislike; but Sir John Lawrence deemed it more probable that the real motive of
this representation was the disinclination of His Highness to let British officers discover the weakness of his rule, or come in contact with disaffected Chiefs at his capital. Provision was therefore made in the Treaty that, whenever the subsidy should cease, and the British officers have been withdrawn from the Ameer's country, a Vakeel, not an European officer, should remain at Cabul on the part of the British Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Cabul. The stipulation thus agreed upon has, so far as the British Government is concerned, been tacitly observed, for convenience sake, from that day to this; but it is worthy of remark that the Government of Cabul withdrew its Vakeel from Peshawur in 1858, and has never replaced him by another. With the exception of this last-mentioned provision, the obligations of the Treaty of 1857 were contracted for a special and limited purpose which has long since lapsed with the lapse of time; it fixed the relations of the British Government with the Ruler of Cabul, and their reciprocal obligations, for the duration of the war with Persia; and our only object in referring to it now is to bring to recollection the good feeling of the Afghan Ruler and people, some twenty years ago, in regard to the stationing of British missions in their territory, elsewhere than at Cabul.

6. No further change occurred for some years in the relations between the two Governments. They remained in a condition of friendly reserve. After the death of Dost Mahomed, in 1863, Afghanistan became involved in civil war, which lasted four years; it did not necessitate, in the opinion of Lord Lawrence's Government, any active interference on our part. The present Ameer, alone and unaided, after varying fortunes, and many severe reverses, regained the throne bequeathed to him by his father, the Dost. But no sooner was he firmly established thereon than he expressed a great desire,—not without some feeling of resentment for the neutral attitude which had been observed towards him in his hour of need,—to bring himself into friendly relations with the British Government. Lord Lawrence responded to his wishes; he presented His Highness in 1868 with a free gift of money and arms, and would have effected a friendly meeting with him at Peshawur had not the expiry of his tenure of office obliged his Excellency to return to England.

7. That meeting was, however, carried out at Umballa, in March 1869, by Lord Lawrence's successor in a manner which laid the foundation of closer relations between the two neighbouring Powers, and enabled Shere Ali to consolidate his authority on his return to Cabul. The Ameer, in his conferences with the Viceroy, bitterly complained of the one-sided character of the existing Treaty relations—those of 1855—between the two Governments, and earnestly solicited an amendment of them. Lord Mayo, however, was precluded, not only by the orders of Her Majesty's Government, but by his own convictions, from acceding to the wishes of His Highness. The policy of the Viceroy was, in his own words, an "intermediate" one, susceptible of development in proportion to the subsequent consolidation of the Ameer's authority, and the continued good conduct of His Highness, in his dealings with the British Government. In order, however, to meet, in some measure, the wishes of the Ameer, and to give him a tangible proof of the friendship of the British Government, Lord Mayo added a large gift of arms to that of the money already presented to His Highness; he, moreover, handed the Ameer a written assurance that the British Government would assist His Highness in strengthening his Government as circumstances might require, and would view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of His Highness' rivals to disturb his position as Ruler of Cabul. This document was in no way intended to have the force of a Treaty; it was given to the Ameer in compliance with the earnest representations of His Highness that, without such an assurance, he would be unable to return to Cabul; and it is needless to observe that it did not commit the British Government to any unconditional protection of the Ameer, or to any liabilities which were not dependent on his future conduct towards us.

8. We may here mention that there are undoubted grounds for the conviction expressed to your Lordship in our Despatch, No. 19, of the 7th of June 1875—a conviction since strengthened by reference to persons in Lord Mayo's confidence, who conversed frequently at Umballa with Shere Ali and his confidential Minister—that a readiness was then manifested on behalf of His Highness to agree to the presence of British Agents at any places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself, on condition of more substantial assistance, and open support, than the British Government was willing to afford him in 1869.

9. Owing to the strong personal influence established by Lord Mayo over Shere Ali, our relations with Cabul, although still somewhat distant and indefinite, remained for a
few years upon a satisfactory and friendly footing. During this period the British Government completed, on behalf of the Ameer, successful negotiations with the Government of the Czar for the definition, in a manner most favourable to His Highness, of the exact limits of the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, within which the Russian Government engaged to refrain from all interference.

10. The result of those negotiations, which had extended over more than three years, was communicated to Shere Ali early in 1873, when Lord Northbrook's Government, in its review of our position towards Cabul up to that period, expressed the opinion that—

"Although we have abstained from entering into any Treaty engagement to support the Ameer by British troops in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Ameer continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to render him such assistance."

11. The Ameer, apparently actuated, at this period, by a deep-rooted fear of the Russians, professed himself at a loss to understand the great delay and difficulty which had arisen in the deliberations between the British and Russian Governments; he informed the British Agent that it was "impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations;" and that his anxiety would never "be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with cordiality in this matter before its destruction of forts through the northern Afghan border. If an emergency arises," he said, "the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens."

12. With these thoughts in his mind, His Highness deputed Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, in the summer of 1873, to wait upon Lord Northbrook, and submit this and other matters to the consideration of the Viceroy. The Envoy's object appeared to be the establishment of an assumption on the part of the Ameer that both Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo had given His Highness unconditional promises of aid in money and arms,—an assumption which Lord Northbrook at once refuted, reminding the Envoy that the British Government alone was to be the judge of the propriety of any request for assistance preferred by his master. The Viceroy, finding that the Envoy was instructed by Shere Ali to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective—the former for the purpose of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a foreign power—and learning, moreover, that he was not satisfied with general assurances, telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government for further instructions. On receipt of these, he informed Syud Noor Mahomed that it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, which would endeavour, by negotiation and by every means in its power, to settle the matter and avert hostilities; but that, should these endeavours prove fruitless, the British Government was prepared to assure the Ameer that it would afford him assistance in the shape of money and arms, and, in case of necessity, aid him with troops. Lord Northbrook, however, deemed it advisable to avoid giving Syud Noor Mahomed any more definite pledge than this, or to comply with the request preferred by him for a distinct statement by the British Government that, in the event of any aggression on the Ameer's territories, it would consider the aggressor as an enemy to itself.

13. During the presence at Simla of the Afghan Envoy the subject of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan became, as in 1869, a topic of discussion. Our Foreign Secretary suggested the deputation of a British officer, of high standing and in the full confidence of the British Government, to the Court of the Ameer as the best preventive of the danger apprehended by His Highness; this officer could advise Shere Ali as to the circumstances of each case, and the action which, in cases of emergency, it might be necessary to take till the Government of India could be communicated with; whilst such a measure need not be followed by the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, which
would be incompatible with the pledges given by Prince Gortchakoff to Her Majesty's Government. The object of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan would, Mr. Aitchison said, be primarily to obtain accurate information on all matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan, whilst in no way exercising interference in its internal affairs. The Envoy expressed his general concurrence in the principle of some such arrangement, but declined to recommend to the Ameer any specific proposal for giving effect to it, on the ground that it might occasion mistrust and misapprehension. He suggested, as an alternative, the deputation of a British officer to inspect the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan, who could enter by Candahar and return by Cabul, and be again deputed to the capital, if necessary, at a later period. Such a course would, he said, familiarize the Ameer and the people of Afghanistan with the idea of receiving a permanent British representative, and eventually effect the desired object.

14. A Memorandum embodying the Envoy's alternative proposal was consequently communicated to the Ameer by the Government of India. The proposed arrangement was, in this Memorandum, strongly urged, as highly desirable, on account of "the responsibilities that have been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government on behalf of Afghanistan," and "the imperfect information which they possess regarding the border in respect to which these responsibilities have been incurred." The Government of India, when reporting its proceedings in the matter, expressed to your Lordship's predecessor the following opinions:

"Though we think that the presence of accredited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and possibly also Candahar, would, for many reasons, be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries. Independently of the valuable information, both geographical and political, that might be collected, a judicious officer would have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feelings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent British representatives in that country, if such a measure should at any time be considered desirable or necessary."

15. The Envoy left Simla without having obtained the avowed object of his mission. On bidding farewell to those members and officers of the Government of India with whom he had been associated during the course of it, the Syud was profuse in his expressions of personal gratitude for the hospitality of his entertainment, and the courtesy with which he had been treated. But no sooner had he returned to Cabul than it became apparent that his feelings towards the British Government were most unfriendly; and from that time forward his influence in the Cabul Durbar, which we believe to have been considerable, was exerted on every occasion to the prejudice of our relations with the Ameer.

16. At the conclusion of the Simla conferences the Viceroy presented the Ameer with 100,000l. and 20,000 rifles. But, notwithstanding his Excellency's gifts and assurances, the attitude of the Ameer became increasingly frigid, sullen, and discourteous. His Highness evinced deep disappointment at the result of his Envoy's interviews with the Viceroy. To all appearance, whilst mistrusting our repeated assurances that he had nothing to fear from the rapid and unchecked advance of Russia towards his Asiatic frontier, he had nevertheless persuaded himself that, in any emergency, the British Government would be compelled, by its own interests, to afford him unconditional assistance. Under this impression he seemed to believe that, in the meanwhile, he might with impunity disregard its advice, and reject its offers of conditional protection.

17. The falacy of these views lay in their erroneous estimate of the political necessities of this Government, which are as adverse to the wholly uncontrolled personal action of any Afghan ruler, as they are favourable to the territorial independence of Afghanistan. It may, however, be admitted that the Ameer was at this time led, not altogether without cause, to hope and seek from the British Government evidence, more conclusive than he had yet received, of its professed regard for his interests. The arms and money denied to His Highness at a time when they might, perhaps, have saved his country and himself from prolonged civil war, were subsequently given to him when his need of them was infinitely less, and his cause for gratitude proportionally small. But the particular form
of support which, as the established legitimate Ruler of Afghanistan, he then most needed was again refused him, at the time when, if given, it would have been best appreciated. On the part of the British Government he had seen nothing but extreme caution in committing itself to his support, whilst it lost no opportunity of assuring His Highness of its friendship with Russia and its reliance on her promises. On the part of Russia he saw nothing but a system of aggression on territories neighbouring his border, and a series of pledges unfulfilled. He had been officially informed in 1869 by Lord Mayo that the Government of the Czar would not interfere in Afghanistan, and would recognize as his all the territories then in his possession; and yet he was shortly afterwards beset with communications from General Kauffman which seemed to him inconsistent with this assurance; nor was it till nearly three years afterwards that Russia finally withdrew her strong opposition to the recognition of his authority over a most important portion of his territories. Again the promised restoration of Samarcand by Russia to the Ameer of Bokhara had been formerly announced to him by us, and yet evaded; whilst he found the pledge of the Russian Government not to annex Khiva virtually disregarded, and the Russian forces firmly established on the Oxus close to his own frontier.

18. In such circumstances it is, perhaps, hardly to be wondered at that the assurances given to His Highness by Lord Northbrook in 1873 failed to satisfy the Ameer, or to restore that confidence and good feeling which, for some time previously, had been upon the wane. His reply to Lord Northbrook's letter, submitted to him through his Envoy, was ungracious and evasive. He accorded no further notice to the Viceroy's proposals for sending an officer to inspect his boundaries than the curt statement that he had read and understood them; he hesitated for some time to receive the arms that were sent for his acceptance; and the subsidy of ten lakhs of rupees, lodged to his credit at the Kohat Treasury, he contemptuously rejected. Moreover, in terms positively offensive, he refused to permit any English officer to enter his territories; and peremptorily prohibited Sir D. Forsyth from passing through Cabul on the return of that officer, in the capacity of British Envoy, from Kashgar to India. In his recent interesting narrative of the journey of Syud Yakoob Khan to Russia, Captain Molley reports, and comments on, the prejudicial effect of this unfriendly act upon our position in Kashgar, and our prestige throughout Central Asia. Of such conduct, on the part of the Ameer, the reports received from our Native Agent at Cabul afforded no intelligible explanation. Of the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan, of the projects and proceedings of its Ruler, the strength of his military force, the sentiments of his advisers, and the circumstances of his subjects, the Government of India was then without any trustworthy information, or any means of obtaining it. The evidences of a strong irritation in the mind of the Ameer against the British Government were obvious enough; but the true causes of this irritation our Native Agent seemed unable to remove, or even to indicate. It was also sufficiently apparent that, whilst the British Vakeel exercised no influence over the Ameer, the Ameer was exercising considerable influence over the British Vakeel; the tenor of whose correspondence with the Commissioner at Peshawur suggested an impression (which subsequent information proves to have been accurate) that his letters, if not always submitted to the Ameer for approval, were generally written in the sense believed by the writer of them to be in complete accordance with the wishes of His Highness; and that they never contained any intelligence, or the expression of any personal opinion, which could expose him to the Ameer's resentment, if those letters were to fall into the hands of the Cabul Durbar.

19. Such was the condition of our relations with Afghanistan when we received your Lordship's Despatch, * conveying to us the instructions of Her Majesty's Government to take an early opportunity for improving them, if possible, by endeavouring to secure the Ameer's assent to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. We informed your Lordship that, whilst fully appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from such an arrangement, we could not disguise from ourselves the practical difficulties of carrying it out; and that, for any immediate attempt to overcome them, the time and circumstances appeared to us inopportune. In fact, the late Viceroy was of opinion that precautionary measures in regard to Afghanistan might be advantageously deferred till the Russian frontier had been pushed on to Merv. It would then, in the opinion of his Excellency, be necessary to give more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan, and be probably desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him, followed by the natural consequence of the establishment of British Agencies upon his frontier.

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* No. 3, 23rd January 1875.
20. Your Lordship informed us in reply that it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur in this opinion. If the Russians advanced their frontier to Merv the time would probably have passed when representations to the Ameer could be made with any useful result. The Ameer's reported and very probable disinclination to the establishment of a British Agency in his country might possibly be overcome if His Highness could be convinced of the inability of the British Government to secure the integrity of his dominions without this precautionary condition. At any rate, the attempt was, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, well worth making without further delay, since such delay was unjustified by any prospect of spontaneous change for the better in the ascertained tendency of Central Asian affairs, or any initiative on the part of the Ameer for the improvement of his relations with the British Government. Your Lordship, therefore, renewed the injunction, previously made on the subject of a special mission to Cabul, for the above-mentioned purpose.

21. On receipt of the Despatch conveying to us this expression of the views of Her Majesty's Government, we asked your Lordship for further instructions, pointing out that any overtures to Shere Ali, of the kind commended to our adoption, would probably provoke from His Highness counter demands which could not be satisfied without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government. All the recent conduct and language of this Prince had pointed to the conclusion that he cared little, or nothing, for such eventual protection of his country as our own political necessities might oblige us, in any case, to afford it against foreign aggression; and that what he really did care to obtain from us was some unconditional pledge of personal and dynastic support to himself and family. On this point we desired to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government before proceeding further. Those views were received by us at the hands of the present Viceroy, and immediately commanded our careful consideration. In the main they removed the chief ground of our objection to any step which might have the effect of bringing to a crisis the relations of this Government with the present Ruler of Afghanistan, by informing us that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to enter into a more definite, equilateral, and practical alliance with His Highness. Our consideration of your Lordship's above-mentioned instructions was also influenced to some extent by the information which the present Viceroy was enabled to place before us, after personal conference, not only with Her Majesty's Government, but also with the Russian Ambassador in England, on the general circumstances of the situation we were now called upon to deal with. Whilst still alive to the difficulties and risks inseparable from any attempt to enter into closer and more responsible intercourse with a barbarous neighbour, so suspicious, discontented, and untrustworthy as Shere Ali, we certainly could not regard with unconcern the increasing inconvenience, and possible peril, of the extremely ambiguous and uncertain character of our existing relations with him. It was impossible to deny that the practical results of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory.

22. In 1869 overtures for closer relations between the two Governments, and freer intercourse between their respective subjects, had been initiated by Shere Ali. In 1876 there was every reason to anticipate that similar overtures, if initiated by us, would be rejected by His Highness. The Ameer left Umballa apparently much impressed by the power, and most solicitous of the friendship, of the British Government. Since then his respect for the one, and his desire for the other, had, to all appearance, been steadily decreasing. In the meanwhile His Highness had received from the British Government 12 guns, 21,400 rifles, 11,000 muskets, 1,200 carbines, 1,000 pistols, and a quarter of a million sterling of money. It was certainly not in our power to point to any reciprocal benefits which, during the same period, the British Government had received from the Ameer. The turbulent tribes which occupy the mountain passes between Cabul and Peshawur constitute a social barrier between Afghanistan and India, which the Ameer would doubtless endeavour to strengthen if he mistrusted our friendship. On the other hand, if we were sincerely desirous of improved intercourse between the two countries, and more practical relations with the Government on whose military support the protection of his Asiatic frontier has been assumed to be dependent, then he would naturally do all in his power to assist us in removing such a barrier by bringing these turbulent tribes under orderly control, and keeping open the passes which it is in their
power (if uncontrolled) to close between Cabul and Peshawur. This, indeed, His Highness engaged to do when he took leave of the Viceroy at Umballa; and, for a short while after his return to Cabul, he adhered to his engagement. But for the last three years he has withdrawn, the allowances, previously given by him in conformity with that engagement, to the Afreedis for keeping open the Khyber Pass; which has consequently remained practically closed against us. In the meanwhile the negotiations which had taken place between the Cabinets of St. James and St. Petersburgh had placed us in the apparent position of the avowed protectors and controllers of the Amee of Cabul. Prince Gortchakoff had not been slow to fix upon us all the responsibilities of such a position. Were Shere Ali, by his dealings with the Tekki Turkomans, to provoke the hostility of the Russian Power in Central Asia, it is the British Government which the Government of Russia would endeavour to hold responsible for the conduct of the Amee; and, in fact, complaints on the supposed intentions, or rumoured action, of Shere Ali have already on more than one occasion been addressed in this sense by the Russian to the British Government. Yet the imperfect character of our relations with His Highness virtually rendered us unable to control his action, or even to obtain timely knowledge of his intentions. At the same time, were the Amee's conduct such as to subject Afghanistan to a sudden attack from the Russian forces, the interests of our own Empire, complicated by the assurances we had repeatedly given to His Highness, would probably compel us to resist the attack ni et armis. In short, the policy hitherto pursued by the Government of India, in its relations with the Ruler of Cabul, had bequeathed to it certain imputed liabilities towards Russia on the one hand, and Afghanistan on the other, which the practical results of that policy did not enable it to fulfil except under conditions heavily disadvantageous to its own interests. For all these reasons we considered that, although the prospect of any attempt to improve our relations with the present Amee of Cabul was extremely unpromising, still the necessity of bringing those relations to a definite issue, and promptly defining the position in which they could safely be left by us, was no longer open to reasonable question.

23. We, therefore, lost no time in acting on the last instructions of Her Majesty's Government. The Viceroy was of opinion that the opportunity and pretext hitherto wanting for the despatch of a complimentary special mission to Cabul were furnished by his Excellency's recent accession to office, and the addition which the Queen had been pleased to make to Her Sovereign titles with special regard to India. Concurring in that opinion, we made immediate preparations for announcing these events to Shere Ali by a special Envoy, secretly authorised to use his best endeavours to bring about a favourable opening for the renewal of the discussions commenced in 1869 with the Amee, and continued in 1873 with the Minister of His Highness, on matters of common interest to the two Governments. But, in order to ensure, if possible, the friendly reception of it, we decided to depute, in the first instance, a trusted Native Officer charged to deliver to the Amee a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur, announcing to His Highness the ostensible objects of the proposed Mission. With this letter Resaldar-Major Khanan Khan reached Cabul on the 17th of May 1876. His arrival there was announced to us by our Cabul Agent in a letter stating that the Amee would "decline the interview as on former occasions." This information was shortly afterwards confirmed by a communication from the Amee himself, declining the proposed Mission, on the ground that he desired no change in his relations with the British Government, which appeared to have been defined by that Government to its own satisfaction at the Simla Conference. If the British Government had now anything new to say about them, he would prefer to send his own Agent to the Viceroy, in order that the subjects of discussion, "weighed by a minute and exact investigation, might be "committed to writing." An explanatory letter, simultaneously received from the British Vakeel at Cabul, stated that the additional reasons professed to him by the Amee for declining the proposed Mission were—1st, that he could not guarantee the personal safety of "the Sahibs;" and, 2ndly, that, if he admitted a British Mission, he could not refuse to receive a Russian one, for the similar purpose of better defining his relations with the Russian Government.

24. After full consideration of these communications, we came to the following conclusions:—1st, that the result of the Simla Conferences having been eminently unsatisfactory to ourselves, and apparently no less unsatisfactory to the Amee, it was not desirable to renew that experiment; 2ndly, that the Amee's objection to a British Mission, on the ground that it would oblige him to receive a Russian one, involved a conscious and significant disregard of the understanding arrived at on his behalf between
the British and Russian Governments, and communicated by us to His Highness; and, thirdly, that in the Ameer's interests, as well as our own, it was undesirable to regard as absolutely final an answer which appeared to have been written without due deliberation, and might possibly have been inspired by a very erroneous estimate of the position in which His Highness would find himself placed if we at once proceeded to act upon it. We, therefore, exhorted His Highness once more to consider seriously before he rejected our proposals, the consequences to himself of obliging the British Government to look upon him henceforth as a prince who had voluntarily isolated his personal interests from its proffered alliance and support. We felt that the studied ambiguity of his response to our preceding communication made it more than ever incumbent on us to ascertain promptly the precise nature of his real disposition towards us, and the extent to which we might rely, in case of need, upon his recognition of the favours he had received from us, up to this time, without any corresponding obligations on his part. The terms of our answer to his letter were governed by these considerations. But, in order not to leave untried every legitimate means of convincing His Highness that our purposes, as well as our warnings, were sincere, we authorised Dr. Bellevé, and other personal friends of theirs in the service of our Government, to address at the same time to the Ameer and his Ministers letters, unofficially explaining our sentiments, and the importance of the opportunity then offered to the Afghan Government for materially strengthening its position at home and abroad.

25. The Ameer replied to our above-mentioned communications after a significant delay of two months. In the meanwhile, we had received from our Vakeel at Cabul reports of the reception by His Highness of frequent confidential emissaries from General Kaffman. Of what had passed between the Ameer and these Russian Agents, our knowledge was entirely confined to the contents of a letter delivered by one of them to His Highness from the Russian Governor. A copy of that document, communicated by the Cabul Durbar to the Government of India, and forwarded by us to your Lordship, has already been the subject of a correspondence between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. The answer finally received from the Ameer submitted to us two alternative proposals—First, that an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from the Viceroy at Peshawur; and, second, that the British Vakeel at Cabul should proceed to Simla with a confidential explanation to the Viceroy of the personal views and sentiments of the Ameer on the subject of his relations with the British Government. As regards the first of these proposals, we were of opinion that it was clearly inexpedient that representatives of the two Governments should be authorised to commence negotiations which could not fail to attract the attention, and excite the curiosity of the public, before the basis of such negotiations had been duly considered and distinctly accepted by each party to them. The second proposal appeared to us, not only free from objection, but altogether advantageous to the realization of our chief object, which was to ascertain the real sentiments of the Ameer. We, therefore, authorised our Vakeel to set out for Simla immediately, after placing himself in communication with the Ameer on the subject of his instructions.

26. This Vakeel, the Nawab Atta Mahommed Khan, reached Simla on the 6th of October last. At first, though pressed to be explicit, he threw little light on the views and feelings of the Ameer. His Highness was, he said, resentful to the rebuffs met with by his previous representations to the Government of India, and resolved not to incur any repetition of a result which he deemed offensive to his dignity. Further pressure, however, elicited from the Vakeel four special causes of grievances as alleged by the Ameer against the Government of India. The first was a communication from Lord Northbrook in 1874, on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakoob Khan, whom he had imprisoned. This he resented as an unwarrantable interference in his most domestic concerns, as well as a support given to his personal enemies. The second cause of complaint was our decision on the question of the Seistan boundary, which he regarded as an unfriendly act, depriving him of his legitimate possessions. In the third place, he resented, as an interference with his authority, and an offence to his dignity, the gifts sent by the late Viceroy direct to the Chief of Wakhan, who is a tributary to His Highness. Finally, the Ameer was profoundly mortified by the repeated rejection of his previous requests for a defensive alliance, coupled with our formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his youngest son, ABDULLA JAN. It was also elicited from the Vakeel that the Ameer was much in want of money, and his people much disaffected by his expedients for obtaining it; that the undoubted reluctance
of His Highness to receive British officers was occasioned, not by fears for their personal safety, but by a dread of their probable popularity and possible intervention on behalf of oppressed or discontented subjects; that the Ameer, confident in the strength of the army our gifts had enabled him to equip, no longer felt his old dread of the power of Russia; that, in accordance with our own exhortations, he had lost no opportunity of improving his relations with the Russian authorities in Central Asia; and that between General Kauffman and His Highness permanent diplomatic intercourse was now virtually established by means of a constant succession of special Agents, who held frequent conferences with the Ameer, the subject and result of which were successfully kept secret. In short, the information gradually extracted from our Kabul Agent convinced us that the system on which we had hitherto conducted our relations with Shere Ali had practically resulted, not only in the alienation of His Highness from the Power which had unconditionally subsidised and openly protected him; but also in the increased closeness and confidential character of his relations with the only other Power that can ever cause serious danger to our Empire in India. The Vakeel, however, represented to the Viceroy that the Ameer, though strongly disinclined to admit British officers into any part of Afghanistan, would probably, if the point were pressed, accept such a condition rather than forfeit the advantage of a long-desired alliance with the British Government upon terms certain to strengthen his personal position at home, about which His Highness was chiefly anxious.

27. These statements gave us, for the first time, a clue to the Ameer's feelings, and the motives of his previous attitude towards us. After prolonged consideration of them in connection with the last instructions received from your Lordship, the Viceroy came to the conclusion that the Treaty of Alliance and the formal recognition of the Ameer's selected heir, which His Highness was supposed to desire of us, might be safely and advantageously accorded to him; provided that his willingness and ability to fulfil with loyalty his own part in the reciprocal obligations of such a Treaty were first manifested to us in a satisfactory manner. These concessions, sanctioned by your Lordship's last instructions, would not practically commit the British Government to anything more than a formal re-affirmation of the assurances already given by it, through Lord Mayo, to the Ameer in 1869, and a public recognition of its inevitable obligations to the vital interests of its own Empire. There was great reason to believe, for the ultimate stability of his previously contested authority, the father of the present Ameer was mainly indebted to the supposed protection of the British Government. It might, therefore, be presumed (and such a presumption was strongly confirmed by all our most verified knowledge of the social condition of Afghanistan) that, notwithstanding the apparently precarious tenure of Shere Ali's power, and the youth of his appointed heir, the timely and positive proclamation of such protection would effectually prevent those civil conflicts, otherwise certain to recur upon the death of the present Ameer. On the other hand, the conditions on which the concessions thus contemplated would be made dependent were such as any neighbouring Prince, sincerely desirous of our active friendship, might accept with personal cordiality and national benefit. They involved no interference with the Ameer's independent authority, no occupation of any portion of his territory, no foreign control over his civil or military administration. They were strictly confined to the location of at most two or three British officers (accredited to His Highness, placed under his protection, and precluded from all interference in the internal affairs of his Government) upon those points of his frontier whence we were unable to obtain intelligence by other means, and which were most exposed to the attacks against which we were asked to defend it. The Viceroy was nevertheless of opinion that it would be wholly inconsistent with the dignity, and contrary to the interests, of this Government to urge any proposals on the unwilling acceptance of the Ameer, or afford His Highness the opportunity of rejecting its positive demands. The Ameer's apparent object was to place the British Government in the position of a petitioner; and that position it behooved the British Government to reverse. Such were the opinions of the Viceroy, in which we generally concurred.

28. The Vakeel was consequently instructed to return to Cabul, and there explain to the Ameer, with the utmost possible precision, the moderate and necessary condition on which the British Government was prepared to sign with His Highness a Treaty of Alliance, and to accord its formal recognition to his heir-apparent. The Vakeel was charged to explain to the Ameer very clearly that our assent to the conference, suggested by His Highness in reply to our previous communications, would be entirely dependent on his agreement to this preliminary condition as a basis of negotiation. In order to
prevent the possibility of misunderstanding on that point, Atta Mahomed received from
the Viceroy an Aide Memoire, which he was authorised to communicate to the Ameer.
The Viceroy also addressed to His Highness a friendly letter, inviting him to Delhi as
the guest of the British Government at the Imperial Assemblage, and proposing on that
to open. He, however, requested permission to defer his final answer on this
point until he had made a full and detailed statement of the Ameer's views respecting
his relations with us, and of certain episodes in the history of those relations which His
Highness considered himself entitled to complain of. As we had all along been anxious
to obtain authentic information of the Ameer's real sentiments on this subject, the
Envoy's request was at once agreed to; on the condition, which he understood and
accepted, that his statement should not be received by us, or be treated by him, as a
basis of discussion.

31. This statement by the Afghan Envoy, which is herewith enclosed, is an interesting,
instructive, and important document. It repeats and confirms the information previously
given by Atta Mahomed to the Viceroy in regard to the Ameer's professed grievances
against the British Government. It assumes, as a matter of course, that the British Govern
ment is already bound, in honour and by written contract, to afford to the Ameer and his dynasty unconditional military support, both at home and abroad, whenever called upon to do so by His Highness. On this assumption, it naturally questions the advantages to the Ameer of any treaty of alliance which, on our part, would merely re-affirm liabilities already contracted by us towards His Highness; whilst, on his part, it would involve the definition and acceptance of liabilities altogether novel towards ourselves. Furthermore, it refers indirectly to the Ameer's relations with Russia in terms which seem to imply an impression on the part of His Highness that the claim of the Russian Government upon his consideration is practically much the same as that of the British.

32. Owing to the Envoy's increasing ill health, several weeks were occupied in the delivery of this long statement. During that time intelligence reached us from Cabul that the Ameer was straining every effort to increase his military force; that he was massing troops on various points of his British frontier; that he was publicly exhorting all his subjects and neighbours to make immediate preparation for a religious war, apparently directed against his English, rather than his Russian neighbours; both of whom he denounced, however, as the traditional enemies of Islam; that, on behalf of this jehad, he was urgently soliciting the authoritative support of the Akhoond of Swat, and the armed co-operation of the Chiefs of Dhir, Bajour, and other neighbouring Khanates; that, in violation of his engagements with the British Government, he was, by means of bribes, promises, and menaces, endeavouring to bring those Chiefs and territories under personal allegiance to himself; that he was tampering with the tribes immediately on our frontier, and inciting them to acts of hostility against us; and that, for the prosecution of these objects, he was in correspondence with Mahomedan Border Chiefs openly subsidised by ourselves.

33. In acknowledging the receipt of the Afghan Envoy's statement, the Viceroy instructed Sir Lewis Pelly to point out to the Envoy that the alleged grievances, over which the Ameer appeared to have been resentfully brooding for some years in unbroken silence, were mostly the result of mutual misunderstandings which could not possibly have occurred had the two Governments possessed the ordinary means of diplomatic intercourse with each other. With this remark, Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded to correct the Ameer's interpretation of our existing engagements with His Highness, and explain the thoroughly conditional character of them. He demanded from the Envoy an explanation of the reported hostility of the Ameer's language and conduct, ut that, of his own absence from the Cabul Durbar His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences which he himself deposed and condemned; he would lose no time in addressing to the Ameer strong remonstrances on this subject. With regard to the Agency condition, he regretted to say that he was still without instructions, for which, however, he would again make special reference to Cabul. He was reminded, in reply, that the condition of our assent to negotiation with the Ameer had been distinctly explained to His Highness many months before he had decided, after deliberately considering it, to open the conference at Peshawur. If the Ameer had subsequently changed his mind, and now wished to revoke his acquiescence in this condition, we were in no disposition to urge it on his acceptance. It was merely part of a general arrangement to which, if seriously desired by His Highness, we were willing to assent. If the Ameer considered the arrangement disadvantageous to himself, he had only to say so, and the discussion of it would cease ipso facto. But we must, in either case, insist on a prompt and plain answer.

34. The Envoy replied that the reports which had reached us of the Ameer's utterances and proceedings were, he trusted, much exaggerated; he feared, nevertheless, that since his own absence from the Cabul Durbar His Highness had fallen under mischievous influences which he himself deposed and condemned; he would lose no time in addressing to the Ameer strong remonstrances on this subject. With regard to the Agency condition, he regretted to say that he was still without instructions, for which, however, he would again make special reference to Cabul. He was reminded, in reply, that the condition of our assent to negotiation with the Ameer had been distinctly explained to His Highness many months before he had decided, after deliberately considering it, to open the conference at Peshawur. If the Ameer had subsequently changed his mind, and now wished to revoke his acquiescence in this condition, we were in no disposition to urge it on his acceptance. It was merely part of a general arrangement to which, if seriously desired by His Highness, we were willing to assent. If the Ameer considered the arrangement disadvantageous to himself, he had only to say so, and the discussion of it would cease ipso facto. But we must, in either case, insist on a prompt and plain answer.

35. The Afghan Envoy, who had long been suffering from a mortal disease, expired shortly after his receipt of this communication. His surviving colleague, the Mir Akhor, declared that he had no authority to answer any question from the British Government; and Sir Lewis Pelly was consequently instructed to close the conference on the ground that there was no basis for negotiation.

36. Apparently the Ameer, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the conference, His Highness was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong it by
every means in his power; a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government. The Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy to close the conference. But it appeared to his Excellency that liabilities which the British Government might properly have contracted on behalf of the present Ameer of Cabul, if that Prince had shown any eagerness to deserve and reciprocate its friendship, could not be advantageously, or even safely, accepted in face of the situation revealed by Sir Lewis Pelly's energetic investigations. Under these circumstances, the prolongation of the Peshawur conference could only lead to embarrassments and entanglements best avoided by the timely termination of it.

37. To the letter addressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to the late Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, on closing the conference at Peshawur, no reply has yet been received from the Ameer. Some time previously we received, from secret Agents of our own, information that the Ameer had despatched a confidential Envoy to Tashkend; and this information has lately been confirmed by a telegram from Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran. Such a proceeding was to be expected on the part of His Highness, whose policy is to play off against each other his two powerful neighbours. Seeing no immediate prospect of further support from the British Government, and fearing, perhaps, the consequences of its surmised resentment, he would naturally become more urgent in his advances towards Russia. But the war now raging between that power and the great Mahomedan Empire of the West will render it extremely difficult for His Highness to receive open support from the Russian Government, or enter into closer relations with the Russian authorities, in face of the religious fanaticism which the Ameer himself has done his utmost to inflame throughout Afghanistan. Meanwhile, his endeavours to organize a general jehad against the British Government appear to have completely failed.

38. The motive of this abortive attempt was not, in our opinion, a religious, but a purely political one, easily explained by the history of the Ameer's relations with the British Government during the last four years. So long as Shere Ali cherished the hope of obtaining eventually from us a personal and dynastic support, he was willing to associate his interests with our own, and even anxious for the protection of the British Government. When, however, the discouraged hope of such support, with each succeeding year, grew feeble, he appears to have turned his attention to such sources of strength as might, in case of need, be derived from the fanaticism of the Mahomedan populations occupying the wild tracts still left between the British and the Russian outposts. For some years his influence, so far as we can judge, has been passively opposed to our own over the border tribes, and, at last, the apparent determination of the British Government to bring its ambiguous relations with His Highness to a definite issue, coinciding with the critical and sinister situation of the whole Eastern question, doubtless induced the Ameer to believe that the decisive moment, to which he had long been looking forward as ultimately inevitable, was then imminent. Under this impression, he attempted to place himself at once at the head of an armed movement, fanatical on the part of his dupes, but purely political so far as he himself was concerned in it. The attempt, however, failed. The Akhhood of Swat mistrusted the designs of the Ameer even more than he disliked the neighbourhood of the British. Old, wary, and with nothing to gain by the sword, this spiritual potentate temporised with the secular ruler who had raised an inconvenient religious cry; but, when it came to the point, he refused to identify himself with it. The Ameer's subjects responded coldly to his call, and the neighbouring Chiefs, to whom he had appealed, availed themselves only of the favourable opportunity to extract money from him. So completely had the whole movement collapsed before we closed the conference at Peshawur, that the first step taken by the Ameer, immediately after that event, was to send messages to the authorities and population of Candahar, informing them that the jehad project was abandoned, requesting them to do all in their power to allay the religious excitement he had till then been endeavouring to arouse, and adding that his relations with the British Government were eminently satisfactory.

39. If those relations are not as satisfactory as Shere Ali would have them supposed, we have at least every reason to believe that they involve no feelings of irritation against us which are not entirely confined to His Highness. Our relations with the people of Afghanistan are as friendly as they have ever been. At Candahar, where recent events in Beloochistan have brought us into contact with Afghanistan from a new side, we have every evidence of the amicable feeling of the population, and their disposition to look to us as protectors rather than as enemies. From Sibi the Chiefs and headmen, subjects...
of the Ameer, recently waited on the British Agent in Khelat for the purpose of inviting his mediation in their domestic and inter-tribal quarrels, and his protection from their neighbours, the Murrees. Elsewhere, the British officers lately at Thull, on a mission of inspection, were received by the Ameer's people beyond the border, and invited inside their frontier posts with every demonstration of cordiality and confidence. On the other hand, all our reports from Afghanistan concur in representing the Ameer's subjects as generally disaffected on account of the heavy military burdens recently imposed on them; his army in arrears of pay, and portions of it mutinous; his treasury nearly exhausted, and his personal position precarious.

40. The further course of Cabul politics we cannot foresee, and do not attempt to predict. But we await its natural development with increased confidence in the complete freedom and paramount strength of our own position. In the meanwhile we see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on the part of the present Ameer, or on our own part any cause for interference with His Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries. But whilst, on the one hand, they are now relieved from all liabilities, real or imputed, on behalf of his personal fortunes or those of his dynasty, on the other hand, they have been placed by our recent arrangements with Khelat (and others which will be separately reported to your Lordship) in a position much less dependent than heretofore upon the personal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so uncertain a neighbour.

41. In closing this unavoidably long report upon the cause, the course, and the result of the Peshawur conference, we desire to express our entire satisfaction with the manner in which that conference was conducted by Sir Lewis Pelly. We are of opinion that, in the skilful discharge of a very delicate task, Sir Lewis has upheld with heretofore upon the personal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so uncertain a neighbour.

We have, &c.  
(Signed)  
LYTTON.  
F. P. HAINES.  
E. C. BAYLEY.  
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.  
A. CLARKE.  
J. STRACHEY.  
E. B. JOHNSON.  
W. STOKES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

Extract from a Report purporting to contain an account of a Secret Council held by the Ameer in the Fort of Lahore on the 17th March, in the presence of Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and others.

"The Ameer then said, 'should the British authorities propose that an European Agent be stationed at Cabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such arrangement, but the people of Cabul are turbulent and mischievous, should such European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Ameer, my father, on these very considerations refused to have an European Agent at his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, at places like Candahar or Bakh or Herat, there would be no objection. Such an arrangement would be advantageous to both the Governments; for instance, at the present time the people of Lower Seistan have commenced encroachments on the Candahar boundaries. Lower Seistan was formerly always attached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by Persia only since a short time. We are not aware what agreement exists between the British and Persian Governments regarding Lower Seistan. If there should be an European Agent on the border, he would be possessed of the necessary information, and would be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to territories beyond the borders.'"

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Extract from a Note by Under-Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated 26th March 1869.

"The Viceroy may possibly desire to have without delay the following details which I have learnt from Punjab officials in the course of conversation yesterday and to-day. The chief informants
honourably treated. You do not want our country, and were the
Afghanistan, entitled

EXTRACT

forts power to you.

EXTRACT

Was the second private interview

The Ameer is prepared to act on what he may see is the nature of the friendship the British propose to afford him. If, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the Ruler of Cabul de facto, well and good; but if prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he may point out (the contrary having produced the present troubles), there is nothing he will not accede to.

"He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border, while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or Engineer superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet."

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

EXTRACT from Notes of a Conversation between the Foreign Secretary, Captain Grey, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, held at Umballa on 1st April 1869.

"We know the Russians to be great tyrants, and not so trustworthy as you. In old days, in Afghanistan, you showed a want of consideration to those who were most entitled to it. From the public reception at which the Ameer was present, the other night, he saw that this policy had been put aside, and that little Native Princes of the Punjab, such as he had met, were fairly and honourably treated. You do not want our country, and were you to get it, there would be no profit to you.

"The Secretary asked him if the Ameer would sanction Native Agents* in Afghanistan either as visitors or as permanent residents, supposing the British Government wished it; the Minister replied that he did not wish to commit himself and asked, rather anxiously, whether European Agents were intended, observing at the same time that it was of no use to send any but Mahomedans, Hindoos were of no good at all; . . . . . he added, he was looking far forward, and the day might come when the 'Russ' would arrive, and the Ameer would be glad not only of British Officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them."

Enclosure 5 in No. 36.

EXTRACT from Memorandum of a Conversation held at Umballa on 3rd April 1869 between the Foreign Secretary and Syud Ndur Mahomed Shah.

"Referring to the points which were reserved in the conversation of 1st April 1869, the Minister said there was no occasion to include Ghuznee as a place of residence for a British Agent, as Ghuznee was included in Cabul; the Ameer was ready to have a writer to accompany him whenever he moved, and to allow of men in Turkestan and Balkh, when the country was more settled. The Minister himself considered Unwar, the present news-writer at Candahar, to be a thorough rascal. Any agents so sent were to be merely for the sake of sending intelligence. The great danger of these agents was, unless they were treated as they wished, they vilified the Government in their reports. As an instance, he quoted that, when the Ameer was defeated at Candahar, Azeem Khan sent to Unwar Killotts, money, &c., and in return Unwar wrote false accounts of Shere Ali's proceedings and flaming reports of Azeem Khan's power and success. "If you don't believe me," he urged, 'send for the diaries of that period from Jacobabad.' As long as the Ameer gave the news-writer dilance (smoothed him down), it was all very well. With these reservations the British Government has full power to send news-writers. If any news-writer was personally offensive to the Ameer, the Secretary explained, of course the Government would not continue him in his post or insist on his retention."

The Officers most intimately acquainted with the Ameer and with the mind of the Viceroy of Umballa in 1869, say as follows:—

*Letter, 29th March 1875, to Secretary to Punjab Government.

† Letter, 29th March 1875, to Secretary to Punjab Government.

Dr. Bellow says*, "The impression left on my mind was that he (the Ameer) wanted no troops, but might apply for the services of some European Officers to organise his army, and that he would gladly see Agents at Herat and Candahar; he was at that time in a very good humour with his reception, and doubtless

* Letter to Colonel Burne, 2nd July 1875.

† Some similar treatment on our side might bring him back to a like frame of mind."

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Colonel Burne says,† "I cannot understand why Lord Northbrook's Government have thrown doubts on facts which were patent in 1869. I can fully corroborate all that Captain Grey and Dr. Bellew say as to the willingness of the Ameer at Umballa to consider the subject of British Agencies in Afghanistan had he received encouragement to enter officially into the subject, and had his expectations of being granted a new treaty been responded to. The same evidence which certified to Shere Ali's desire for a treaty certified to his willingness to receive British Agents. If the one was imaginary, so was the other. Being at that time in Lord Mayo's full confidence, I can testify to the fact that both he himself and those associated with him accepted the evidence of the Ameer’s wishes in both cases as genuine. The time had, however, not arrived for the consideration of either question; and the orders of Her Majesty’s Government, added to Lord Mayo’s own personal views as to the requirement of the moment, and the danger of suddenly deviating from the policy of the Viceroy, who had just left India, induced him to discourage the official mention of either matter at the conference. Moreover, His Highness made no formal proposition on the subject, hoping, as we were led to believe, that it might come first from the Viceroy, and thereby ensure him better terms.”

The Government of India say, in their Despatch of 7th June 1875,—

"19. On the whole, however, we think that either the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, did, in confidential communication with Captain Grey, express a readiness to accept at some future time, not far distant, the presence of British Agents in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself."

Enclosure 6 in No. 36.
Draft sent 5th May 1876.

From Commissioner of Peshawur to Ameer of Cabul.

I avail myself of this propitious moment to acquaint you that his Excellency Lord Lytton has assumed the Viceroyalty of India, in succession to Lord Northbrook, who left Calcutta for England on 15th of April last.

Informed of his Excellency’s arrival in India, I lost no time in waiting on him; and in the course of a lengthened interview with which I was honoured by his Excellency, the present Viceroy enquired very cordially after your Highness’s health and welfare, and those of His Highness Abdullah Jan; intimating his intention of deputing to your Highness, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, his friend Sir Lewis Pelly, who has accompanied his Excellency from England, and who will return so soon as his interviews with your Highness are completed. Sir Lewis Pelly will be accompanied by Dr. Bellew and Major St. John for the purpose of delivering to your Highness in person a klureeta, informing your Highness of his Excellency’s accession to office, and formally announcing to your Highness the addition which Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to make to Her Sovereign titles in respect to Her Empire of India.

I feel sure that your Highness will fully reciprocate the friendly feelings by which the Viceroy’s intention is prompted; and I beg the favour of an intimation of the place at which it would be most convenient to your Highness to receive his Excellency’s envoy.

Sir L. Pelly, who is honoured by the new Viceroy with his Excellency’s fullest confidence, will be able to discuss with your Highness matters of common interest to the two Governments.

Enclosure 7 in No. 36.
Dated 22nd May 1876.

From Ameer of Cabul to Commissioner of Peshawur.
(Literal Text.)

The friend, emblem of sincerity and friendship, the friend, foundation of affection and candour, the kindest of friends, Colonel Sir Richard Pollock, Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawur Division, may his favours increase, and the desire of an agreeable meeting increase! After writing the customary expressions of affection, and calling to mind the requisite expressions of unity, makes known to the heart full of sincerity (friendship) that the letter full of kindness, dated 5th May in the year 1876 of Jesus, was brought to the clear (brilliant) consideration of the suppliant at the Sublime Throne (of God). It is hoped that what you wrote of your interview full of pleasure with his noble Excellency of exalted titles the Viceroy and Governor General Lord Lytton, and the succession to the illustrious office of Viceroy and Governor General of the Empire of Hind, and the requisites of the road and the intention of the visit of Sir Lewis Pelly and Dr. Bellew and Major St. John at some place, and the intimation of the glad tidings of Her Majesty the Great Queen, who has become entitled with the title of Shahinshahi Sultanati-Hind, has become fixed in the heart of this friend.

Kind friend, by hearing the good news of the Shahinshahi (office of Shahinshah) of Her Majesty the Great Queen, in view of the friendship and union of the two Exalted Governments, much joy and pleasure and happiness were produced in the penetrating heart. Consequently the firm hope is this, that from the most excellent title of Shahinshah of Her Majesty the Great Queen reposes a deep security in all that belongs to the affairs of the servants of God, for they are the created subjects of the Creator.
more than in former times, will be experienced in reality (as a matter of fact). And also the arrival of his noble Excellence of exalted titles Lord Lytton, Governor General of the Empire of Hind, has produced complete satisfaction, and it is expected that the friendship and union of the two exalted Governments, more than in past times, will be fixed and secured.

And in the particular of the coming of the Sahibs for the purpose of certain (some) matters of the two Governments is this—that the Agent of this friend formerly personally held political parleys at the Station of Simla; those subjects, full of advisability for the exaltation and permanence of friendly and political relations, having been considered sufficient, and efficient, were entered in two letters, dated Thursday, the 21st of the month of Ramzan the Sacred in the year 1290 of the Flight of the Prophet, and dated Friday, the 22nd of the month of Safar the Victorious in the year 1291 of the Flight of the Prophet, and need not be repeated now.

Please God, the Most High, the friendship and the union of the God-given State of Afghanistan in relation to the State of high courage (lofty authority), the Majestic Government of England, will remain strong and firm as usual. At this time, if there be any new parleys for the purpose of refreshing and benefiting the God-given State of Afghanistan entertained in the thoughts, then let it be hinted, so that a confidential Agent of this friend, arriving in that place and being presented with the things concealed in the generous heart of the English Government, should reveal them to the suppliant at the Divine Throne, in order that the matters weighed by a minute and exact investigation may be committed to the pen of affectionate writing.

In this, the principal advice that now will occasionally gladden the friend by news of the health of your constitution, tempered with affection. Dated Monday, 27th Rabi Sani in the year 1293 of the Flight of the Prophet, the blessing of God upon him and his family and peace.

Enclosure 8 in No. 36.

Dated 22nd May 1876.

From the British Agent, Cabul, to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

Salutation to my cherisher. May his prestige endure. Submits that in the matter of the answer to your bountiful honour's letter, written 5th May 1876, there has been a consultation for three or four days continuously in the private assembly of His Highness the Ameer. The members of the assembly, in this consultation, said that, although the coming of a European Agent of the English Government would be altogether an access of freshness and advantage to the State of Afghanistan, still, by reason of regard to the barbarity and ignorance of the diverse tribes of Afghanistan, there is profound cause of fear.

In the first place is this—that to maintain the safety of the gentlemen (Sahibs) is difficult, because some people are such that, by reason of their own ignorance, putting forward the name of "religious enmity" (ghaza), they will become perpetrators of injury; and other people are such that, simply with the idea of an ultimate injury to the special family of His Highness the Ameer, they will purposely consider the infliction of injury upon the Sahibs as of the first importance.

Under these circumstances, should by any means injury occur to them in this country of Afghanistan, then there would, without fail, occur a difference in the friendship of the English Government and of the Government of Afghanistan; and the occurrence of that difference (or opposition) in the friendship of the two Governments would be, under every condition, injurious to all the people of Afghanistan. As, in illustration of this, is apparent, the affair (case) of the murder of Major Macdonald (Makdala) at Mienh, and the hard treatment in respect of it of Nooroz Khan, in which, notwithstanding the innocence of Nooroz Khan, merely out of deference to the English Government, Nooroz Khan was for a while suspended from the Khani (or local rule), with the punishment of a heavy fine, and several persons were severely punished.

In the second place is this—that, if the Envoy of the English Government should put forward any such weighty matter of State that its entertainment by His Highness the Ameer, in view of the demands of the time, should prove difficult, and he should verbally reject it, then, too, will (would) occur a breach in the friendship of the two Governments. And then, for the sake of removing that breach (injury), it will be necessary for both Governments to endure troubles. It was by reason of these very objects (considerations) at the time of making the first treaty between the English Government and the State of Cabul, His Highness the late Ameer objected to the coming of an English Envoy of European race. Moreover, from that time to this, whatever occasions have presented themselves for the coming of Sahibs, the Cabul Government has always objected to them from far-sightedness. Now, too, the coming of Sahibs, in view of the state of affairs, is not advisable.

To us especially, in particular, in chief regard is this—that, if simply, for the sake of seeking the goodwill of the English Government, we consent to the coming of an European Agent, and for this safety, let's suppose, perfect arrangements are made, then this great difficulty arises, that the coming and going of the Sahibs cannot be kept concealed anyhow from the Russian Government, which on my northern border (frontier) is conterminous (joined) with the frontier of the English Government.

The people of the Russian Government are extremely fearless. If any man of theirs, by way of Envoy, or in the name of speaking about some other matter of State, should suddenly enter the territory of Afghanistan, then it would be impossible by any means to stop him. In other words, their way too, would be opened; and in the opening of the road there is good neither to the State of Cabul nor the English Government.

Consequently in this matter it is better that the coming and going of the Sahibs should, according to the former (old) custom, remain closed (prohibited); and, first, that some confidential Agent of ours going to the English Government, and there becoming acquainted with the State requirements (objects sought), should inform us of what is in the mind of the English Government; and the Cabul Government, considering the subject in its own place, give answer to the English Government regarding these objects, whether written or verbal.

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And if our man, in conversation there, agree to, or refuse, any point, then by all pretense His Highness the Ameer can arrange for its settlement. But if in his presence it devolves on His Highness the Ameer to summarily accept or reject some State demand, this becomes a very hard matter, and its ultimate issue will not turn out well.

In short, the letter regarding the impropriety of the coming of the Sahibs having been written in your bountiful honor's name and closed, was this day given to Alijah Khanan Khan by the Cabul Durbar at the time of his dismissal. And 500 rupees in cash with one chogha and one Cashmere shawl were given to the above-named Alijah by the Cabul Government by way of dismissal gift.

Mulla Muhammad Nasim Khan, Cabuchi, has been appointed to accompany the above-named Alijah from Cabul by Jellalabad to the Cabul frontier. The Alijah will start from Cabul to-morrow for Peshawur.

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Enclosure 9 in No. 36.
Dated 8th July 1876.

From the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Ameer of Cabul.

(Compliments.)

I HAVE received your Highness's letter of the 22nd May, and informed his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of its contents.

In intimating to your Highness his intention of deputing his confidential Envoy, Sir Lewis Pelly, to wait upon your Highness, at such place as your Highness should appoint, for the purpose of announcing his accession to office, and the addition which the Great Queen of England has made to Her Sovereign titles, the Viceroy was actuated by the most true friendship for your Highness. His Excellency considered that the proposed complimentary and friendly mission would not only be acceptable to your Highness, as following the course adopted between all civilized Courts, but that it would also afford a desirable opportunity of improving the existing relations between the two Governments by means of frank communication on matters of common interest.

The reluctance evinced by your Highness to the reception of this friendly mission is, therefore, much to be regretted.

But by a letter which I have received from the British Agent at your Highness's Court, I am induced to believe that your Highness's advisers, in counselling you not to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, may have been influenced by a misconception of the objects of his Excellency, or may not have fully considered the light in which such a refusal might be regarded by the British Government. I have, therefore, in accordance with the Viceroy's instructions, explained at length to the British Agent the views of his Excellency on the relations between the two Governments, and on the causes to which he attributes the reluctance of your Highness to receive the mission. These views the Agent has been instructed to communicate to your Highness.

Your Highness has indeed suggested that it would answer all purposes were you to depute a confidential Agent to learn from the Viceroy the views of the British Government. My friend! The Viceroy cannot receive an Agent from your Highness when you have declined to receive his Excellency's trusted friend and Envoy. The British Agent at the Court of your Highness will explain to you the reasons which make it impossible for the Viceroy to accept such a proposal.

It is the Viceroy's sincere desire not merely to maintain, but also materially to strengthen, the bonds of friendship and confidence between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan; so that the interests of your Highness, as the Sovereign of a friendly and independent frontier State, may be effectually guaranteed against all causes for future anxiety. But the support of the British Government cannot be effectual unless it is based on reciprocal confidence and a clear recognition of the means requisite for the protection of mutual interests.

I am to repeat that, in proposing to send a friendly mission to your Highness, the Viceroy has been actuated by a cordial desire, which it rests with your Highness to reciprocate, for the continuance, on closer terms than heretofore, of amicable relations between the two Governments in view of common interests, more particularly affecting Afghanistan and the personal welfare of your Highness and your dynasty. It will, for this reason, cause the Viceroy sincere regret if your Highness, by hastily rejecting the hand of friendship now frankly held out to you, should render nugatory the friendly intentions of his Excellency, and oblige him to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British Government.

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Enclosure 10 in No. 36.
Dated 8th July 1876.

From the Commissioner of Peshawur to the British Agent, Cabul.

Your letter of the 22nd May has duly come to hand, and I have submitted it to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General.

The unsatisfactory and inadequate reasons which, according to your above-mentioned letter, would appear to have induced the advisers of the Ameer to persuade His Highness not to receive a friendly and complimentary mission from the Viceroy and Governor General of India, have caused his Excellency profound surprise.

Your letter states, in the first place, that "to assure the safety of the Sahibs is difficult" on account of religious and political enmities which the Ameer is powerless to control.

The Viceroy and Governor General cannot suppose this objection to be serious, more especially as, in my former communication, it was intimated to the Ameer that his Excellency was prepared to
send his Envoy to any place of meeting where it would be most convenient to His Highness to receive him.

In the second place, your letter specifies, as one of the reasons for declining to receive the Viceroy's confidential Envoy, that His Highness's advisers are not without a fear lest the Envoy should address to the Ameer demands incompatible with the interests of His Highness, which demands it might be impossible to comply with, and embarrassing to reject.

You are to inform the Ameer that this fear is quite groundless. It can only have been derived from idle reports, or mischievous misrepresentations, by which His Highness will always be liable to be led into grievous error as to the intentions of the British Government so long as he declines toavail himself of the opportunities afforded him for entering into frank and open communication with it.

The Ameer has, on previous occasions, expressed to the British Government the anxiety caused him by circumstances which did not, on those occasions, appear to the British Government so serious as to require any immediate measures on its part for the protection of His Highness. But some time has now elapsed since any interchange of opinions has taken place on this subject between the two Governments. The Viceroy would, therefore, have been glad to afford the Ameer a timely opportunity of making known his views in regard to the interests of Afghanistan under existing circumstances: and His Highness will incur a grave responsibility if he deliberately rejects the opportunity thus offered him.

The Ameer has already received from this Government substantial proofs of friendly interest in his welfare which I need not now enumerate; and His Highness must be aware that the British Government cannot be indifferent to any circumstances, or contingency, likely to affect the condition of a State so close upon the frontier of British India as the State of Afghanistan. The Viceroy will, therefore, regard the interests of Afghanistan as identical with those of the British Government so long as the Ameer proves himself to be its loyal friend and ally. In that case, the Ameer need certainly have no fear of any desire on the part of his Excellency to interfere with the political independence, or commercial freedom, of Afghanistan; whilst he may as confidently reckon upon the Viceroy's willingness to consider in the most frank and friendly spirit the best means of giving practical effect to any precautions which His Highness may desire to suggest for the increased security of his dominions and his dynasty.

But you will explain to the Ameer how impossible it is for the British Government to maintain this community of interests with the Government of His Highness, or to protect the independence and integrity of his State, under conditions incompatible with the ordinary intercourse between friendly Courts.

The Viceroy is, moreover, surprised by the statement in your letter that the Ameer would be obliged to receive Russian Sahibs if he received the British mission intended to be sent by his Excellency.

As the responsible Representative of the Queen of England and Empress of India, the Viceroy cannot consider this excuse a valid one.

The Ameer must be aware that the British Government, acting on behalf of His Highness's wishes and interests, has obtained from the Government of the Czar written pledges not to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of Afghanistan.

The reception of a British Envoy cannot, therefore, necessitate the reception of a Russian one; for, in refusing to receive a Russian Envoy, His Highness would only be acting in conformity with the policy thus solemnly agreed upon.

The Viceroy is willing to believe that, in declining to receive the Envoy of the British Government, the Ameer may, perhaps, have fully weighed all the considerations set forth in this letter, or realized their grave import.

If, on further reflection, His Highness should recognize the expediency of learning the true nature of his Excellency's views and dispositions in regard to matters which materially concern the interests of His Highness, Sir Lewis Pelly will still be authorised to wait upon the Ameer at such place as he may appoint; and, should the interviews consequent on this meeting lead to a more cordial and reliable understanding between the two Governments, the Viceroy will be happy to meet the Ameer in person at Peshawur in November next, if His Highness should so desire.

But you are, at the same time, to inform His Highness that, having due regard to all the circumstances of the present situation, and considering the friendliness and sincerity of the Viceroy's intentions, as well as the apparent mistrust with which your letter represents them to have been received by the Cabul Durbar, his Excellency is obliged to decline, as derogatory to the dignity of the British Government, and otherwise wholly inadequate, the alternative proposal of His Highness in regard to the deputation, on his part, of an Agent in view to becoming acquainted with what you designate "the objects sought" by the British Government.

If the Ameer, after deliberately weighting all the considerations now commended to his serious attention, still declines to receive the Viceroy's Envoy, the responsibility of the result will rest entirely on the Government of Afghanistan, which will have thereby isolated itself from the alliance of that Power which is most disposed, and best able, to befriend it.

You are hereby directed to communicate His Excellency's views to the Ameer, and to prepare a careful and complete statement of all that passed at your interviews, and of the decision of the Cabul Durbar, for transmission to me.

You will, at the same time, hold yourself in readiness to come to Peshawur without delay, should your presence be required by his Excellency.

Z 4
Kind friend! Kindest of friends, His Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan Bahadur, Wali of Cabul, may his prosperity endure for ever!

After salutation with both hands, and expression of desire for a meeting, begs to represent to that kind friend that this sincere well-wisher had entertained the hope of one this, having had the good fortune and honour of again meeting that illustrious Sovereign, and renewing the friendship so auspiciously begun on the occasion of the Umballs Durbar.

But to the purpose. It is not hidden from your Highness that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has conferred upon this well-wisher of your Highness the great honour of appointing him to attend his Excellency's proposed Envoy to your Highness, and this party looked forward with unfeigned pleasure to the prospect of again meeting many frontier friends. Very recently it has come to the knowledge of this writer that circumstances have intervened to delay the despatch of the proposed Envoy, and this sincere friend and well-wisher of your Highness takes the liberty, from motives of pure good-will and friendship, to address your Highness, in the hope that his representations will be accepted as those of an old friend of the Afghan people, amongst whom he has spent so many years of his life. My honoured friend! It is known to me that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has the most earnest desire for the consolidation on a firm basis of the friendship now existing between the Government of India and that of your Highness, and I am persuaded that a free and frank intercourse between the two Governments will conduces to the very material advantage of your Highness and your Highness's house. And it is this belief which urges me to address your Highness in this juncture, in the earnest hope that so good an opportunity may not be allowed to pass unheeded, as the poet said, "The lapsed moment, Oh! Ruhanum, is gone for ever. The passed moment returns not again!" To the wise a hint is enough.

This sincere friend presents his compliments and best wishes to His Highness the Sirdar Abdullah Jan, and hopes he is in the enjoyment of good health. More than this would exceed the bounds of respect. Farewell! Welfare in the future!

Enclosure 12 in No. 36.

Extract from Cabul Diary, from 9th to 12th June 1876, inclusive.

On the 9th instant, Mirza Abdul Karim, the bearer of the murassila of the Russian Governor-General, arrived at Cabul with the Agent of the Mir Mursali, who delivered in Diary of the 1st instant, was sent to bring him. He was put up in the house of Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan. The Durbar appointed no official, &c., to meet him on the road. He receives cooked food from the Ameer's kitchen. To-day he waited on the Ameer through Sirdar Mahomed Yusaf Khan, and delivered the murassila to His Highness, and, after a formal interview of about half an hour, returned to the Sirdar's house. The British Agent has not yet read the murassila, but it is reported that it is merely a complimentary one, conveying information of the fall of Kokend. God willing, a copy of it will be submitted by next post.

Enclosure 13 in No. 36.

Extract from Candahar News-Letter, No. 29, for the week ending 9th August 1876.

A Candahari, who hires out baggage animals in Turkestan, Bokhara, and Cabul, and who has been on friendly terms with the writer (Duod Khan) from his infancy upwards, and who, for the last three or four years has been on intimate terms with Sirdar Mahomed Alam Khan, Loi Naib Bahadur, arrived at Candahar a few days before the death of the Sirdar. On the writer of this letter asking him for the news of the country, he said that Mahomed Alam Khan brought with him to Cabul secretly a Russian, who came from Turkestan. On his arrival at Cabul, by order of the Ameer, he went to reside in the house of Mirza Mahomed Tahir Khan, situated in the quarter of the town called Alh Raza Khan. Of the arrival of this Russian, which is kept secret, only the Ameer, Mahomed Alam Khan, and Mirza Mahomed Tahir Khan knew of it. When the Ameer has interviews with the Russian they take place secretly in the garden of the Fort, where they hold council together. A few days after the arrival of the Russian the Ameer sent for Mullas Mushik Khan, who is a man trusted by the Ameer, and of note in the country. He lives some distance from the city. The Ameer consulted with him, pointing out that he was on friendly terms with the British Government, that he could now get nothing from them, and was disheartened, and desired to fight with them. He asked, in the event of his doing so, whether the Mulas and Mahomedans would aid him, and whether it would be contrary to their religion to do so. The Mulla replied that, were he (the Ameer) to do so, it would be in accordance with his religion, and would benefit him in this world and in the world to come. Enquiries were made of the Candahari as to whether the British Agent at Cabul, Atta Mahomed Khan, or the Sadr-i-Azin, knew of this occurrence, and he replied in the negative. The writer can fully certify that the Candahari who gave him this news has been, for the last few years, an intimate friend of the late Mahomed Alam Khan; that he felt it to be his duty to give this news as told to him, and that, in writing it, he has only done what was right and proper; that, if true, it is of value, if false, telling what was told to him can do no harm.
Enclosure 14 in No. 36.
Dated 3rd September 1876.

From Amur of Cabul to Commissioner of Peshawur.
(After compliments.)

Your letter of 8th July concerning certain matters was duly received by me, and was an occasion of pleasure to me. I understood its purport. I also arrived at a clear comprehension of the meaning of the letter addressed by you to the Agent. I have already made a friendly representation of my wish that, in accordance with the custom observed in past years, and with existing cordial relations, my Envoy might be received by the British Government for the better understanding of the objects of both States.

Now, though I still retain the same wish, nevertheless, in consideration of the views of the British Government expressed in your letter to the Vakil, I have come to this conclusion, that if an Envoy of the British Government, and a selected trusted Representative of this Government, should meet on the frontier to explain mutually the views and wishes of their respective Governments, it would be a very advantageous arrangement; or, should that course not approve itself to the British authorities, then, that the British Agent at Cabul, who has long been intimately acquainted with all my wishes, should be summoned to his own Government, and expound the whole state of affairs, and, having fully understood the desires and projects of the British Government, should return back to me, and explain them all to me in private, after which I should be the better able to decide what course it is incumbent on me to adopt in the interests of my country.

Dated 14th Shaban = 3rd September 1876.

Enclosure 15 in No. 36.
Dated 4th September 1876.

From British Agent at Cabul to Commissioner of Peshawur.

For two days there was constant consultation in the private Durbar of the Amir about the letter of 8th July. The conclusion at last arrived at was, that either the British Government should first call for an Agent of the Cabul Government, or that the Representatives of the two States should hold a conference on the border, or else, that the British Government should summon their Agent now in Cabul, and, having learnt from him the whole of the views entertained by the Cabul Government, should explain to him their own objects and wishes, and then send him back again, that the Cabul Government might, after comprehending the desires and projects of the British Government, take such action as should be considered advisable.

After the enclosed murasilla to your address was written, His Highness sent for me, and handed it to me for transmission. If the Government approves of the third plan suggested, I could come at once. Even if the first or second propositions be accepted, it would be well to send for me, so that I could verbally explain all that I have heard or observed in the Durbar at Cabul after many years residence in this capital.

I had frequently spoken to the Sadri-i-Azim on the subject of this letter. After the murasilla now sent was written, he told me that, if the English Government approved of either of the first two propositions, no other man but himself would be sent from Cabul, and that, on account of his former intimacy with the Commissioner of Peshawur (Colonel Pollock), they would be able, when they met, to talk over all matters frankly and fully together.

Enclosure 16 in No. 36.
Dated 16th September 1876.

From Commissioner of Peshawur to Amir of Cabul.
(After compliments.)

The murasilla from your Highness, dated 14th Shaban, to the address of Colonel Sir Richard Pollock, arrived after that gentleman had taken his departure for England on leave for three months. Judging that the letter was on State affairs, I opened and read it, and communicated the purport of it to his Excellency the Viceroy. In reply, I have this day received the orders of his Excellency to the following effect, viz., that the Viceroy, having considered the subject of the communication from your Highness, regrets that your Highness has left the question of the reception of a complimentary mission in obscurity. But, with regard to the proposals contained in your Highness's letter, his Excellency, animated by the most friendly and cordial sentiments towards your Highness, is pleased to express his willingness to receive the British Agent immediately, on condition that your Highness should yourself explain to him fully and confidentially your views, so that the Agent, on having the honour of waiting on the Viceroy, should be able to explain them confidentially in detail, as proposed in your Highness's letter. In that case, in the same manner, the Agent will be frankly informed as to the views of the British Government, and, returning to Cabul, will expound them to your Highness.

This also I am to represent to your Highness, that on the 10th October the Viceroy will leave Simla for a tour through Cashmere and along the northern and western frontiers, and will pursue his journey to Bombay and Delhi, where he will hold an Imperial Assemblage for the proclamation of the title of Empress of India recently assumed by Her Majesty the Queen of England. On this account it is important that the Agent should start immediately, so as to reach Simla before the 10th of October.

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Enclosure 17 in No. 36.
Dated 16th September 1876.

From Commissioner of Peshawur to British Agent at Kabul.

The answer to the Ameer's letter, dated 14th Shaban, is sent to you herewith. You will yourself present it to the Ameer, after making complimentary enquiries from me after His Highness's health. As suggested by his Excellency the Viceroy, His Highness the Ameer will explain all matters to you; and, as soon as you have thoroughly understood His Highness's meaning, you must start at once, and travel without delay. When you get to Peshawur, you will be able to go on to Simla by dak and rail.

You must understand that the reason why it is so important that you should make such haste to reach Simla is, that his Excellency the Viceroy starts on the 10th October on a journey to Cashmere and the North-West Frontiers, and, when he has started on his journey, he will no longer be at leisure to receive you.

You must say to all who may ask about your journey that you have been permitted to return to the Punjab to look after the arrangements for the jaghir that the Government has lately bestowed upon you, and use discretion, so that no one shall speculate on the real cause of your journey. I think it very probable that I shall have returned to Peshawur by the time you arrive. At any rate, I wish you to understand, from what I have written above, that it will not be possible for you to see the Viceroy unless you reach Simla before the 10th of October.

Enclosure 18 in No. 36.

Summary of a Conversation with Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Kabul, held at Simla on the 7th October 1876. (Extract.)

Present:
Sir Lewis Pelly.
Lieutenant-Colonel O. T. Burne.
Captain Grey.

After an interchange of the usual complimentary inquiries, the Agent submitted that, in obedience to instructions, he had waited on the Ameer at Cabul, and had learned from His Highness his view of the relations at present subsisting, and those to be desired, as between himself and the Government of India.

The Ameer had declared that all his wishes had already been communicated to our Government, either by himself at the Umballa Durbar in 1869, or by his Agent, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, at Simla, in 1873, or in the correspondence which passed at or about that latter period.

Being pressed to explain more in detail the views or wishes which the Ameer expressed at his interview, the Agent repeated that the Ameer had no further wishes than those already on record, and deemed that a renewal of a request for their fulfilment would lead to no solid result, as nothing had come of his previous efforts.

The Agent was then requested to state in particular his own estimate of the feelings and causes which had estranged the Ameer from the British Government, and had induced His Highness to object to the reception of a complimentary mission.

The Agent replied that he could not pretend to be acquainted with all that passed in the mind of the Ameer on the above subjects; but that, in so far as he could ascertain, among the causes of estrangement and annoyance were the following:—

1st.—The Ameer and his Minister, Syud Noor Mahomed Khan, had been extremely disappointed by the decision and consequences of the Seistan Boundary Commission, in which, after dissuading His Highness from an appeal to the sword, we had raised his hopes of an equitable settlement under our arbitration, and had then given award in terms unjust towards him and injurious to his interests.

2nd.—That our recent proceedings in the Khelat territories had given umbrage to the Ameer, who regards those territories as having formed a portion of the Afghan State since the time of Ahmed Shah Durrani. But the Agent, on being asked if he were speaking seriously, laughed, and admitted that this grievance was of a sentimental character, and not seriously urged.

3rd.—That our proceedings in 1874, or remonstrances on the occasion of the incarceration of the Ameer's son, Mahomed Yakob, had irritated the Ameer, who was strongly averse from our intervention in this domestic affair, and suspected us of being in communication with Mahomed Yakob or his party. The Agent stated that the Ameer was all the more irritated by our proceedings, because he had been previously assured, in 1869, that any attempt to disturb his rule on the part of a rival would be regarded by us with severe displeasure; that subsequently his son had unmistakably rebelled against his authority, and plotted against his father's life and rule; and that, notwithstanding this, we interfered, almost authoritatively, in his favour.

4th.—The Ameer had taken exception to our transmitting presents by the hand of Ibrahim Khan to Wakhan, without His Highness's consent or knowledge.

5th.—That the results of the mission of Syud Noor Mahomed in 1873 had offended the Ameer; while the treatment which the Syud pretends to have received at our hands, as well on the occasion
of that mission as during the period of his being associated with us in the Seistan Boundary Commission, had annoyed the Syud, who, on further finding that both his missions had proved failures, caused any longer to counsel the Ameer to friendly and close alliance with the British, and used all his influence in an opposite direction. The Syud is still embittered against us.

Upon being asked what were the specific grounds of the Syud's complaint in respect to the treatment he had received, the Agent explained that among those causes were the disregard of the Syud's requests, the pressure put upon him to accede to our views, and the scant courtesy shown to him at Simla. He remembered with much soreness that an officer, provoked at his want of accord, had used towards him some angry expressions in English.

6th.—In the opinion of the Nawab, the Ameer was not pleased with the reference made to his advisers in a recent letter addressed by the Commissioner of Peshawur to him (the Agent). When that letter was read out, some of his advisers had remarked—"The British will require the removal of Noor Mahomed Shah," to which the Ameer had replied—"Yes, and the removal of all of you."

7th.—That His Highness is under the impression that our lines of policy and action in his regard have been traced towards objects of our own self-interest, irrespective of the interests of Afghanistan; that he has come to question our consistency and good faith, while his councillors are habitually seeking hidden meanings in our communications.

8th.—That the principal object of Syud Noor Mahomed's mission to Simla in 1875 was to secure a definite Treaty of Alliance with the British Government; and that, this Treaty signed, the Ameer would have been prepared to aid us with a contingent in the event of war; but that our proceedings on that occasion showed that, while we desired to depute Political Agents into Afghanistan, and induce the Ameer to guide his policy by our advice, we were unprepared to bind ourselves to any future course in regard to him. Under these circumstances, His Highness had been unwilling to bind himself by our wishes, and had consequently declined to accept our proffered subsidy. He looked for something more valuable than money.

As regards the Ameer's objections to receiving the mission which his Excellency the Viceroy had proposed sending to Cabul, the Agent stated—

1st.—That His Highness was under the impression that, after all that had occurred in 1873 and since that time, no practical result would follow the mission, and that he entertained no hope of an improvement in our mutual relations.

2nd.—That the presence at Cabul of even a temporary mission might create excitement, and be attended with personal risk to the Envoy.

3rd.—That His Highness feared that the mission might merge into one of a permanent character, and that the Envoy, like our Political Agents at the Courts of the Indian Native States, might become a referee for discontented Afghan subjects; that, in any case, the permanent presence of a mission would embarrass His Highness in his internal administration, causing annoyance to the patriotic party, and raising the hopes of the disaffected.

Another reason advanced by the Ameer for declining the mission was, that a pretext would thereby be afforded to the Russians for deputing a similar mission to Cabul; that the circumstance of their having given assurances to the contrary would not stop them; that the Russians broke treaties at pleasure, were very pushing in their policy, and feared no one. The recent political history of Europe showed that the English were unable to compel the Russians to adhere to treaties, and were equally impotent to arrest Russian aggressions. The Ameer was well aware that, sooner or later, Russia would attack Afghanistan, and this with ulterior objects; but that His Highness also knew that in such crisis the British would defend him in their own interests. His Highness does not suspect us of conspiring with Russia to his prejudice; nor does he suspect the British of coveting any portion of his territory, which, at the utmost, could not yield them more than a crore of rupees worth of revenue, while it would cost them tenfold that sum to hold the country. As to Russian Agents at Cabul, the Agent admitted that one or two had recently arrived at Cabul, and thence returned to Russian territory. Two Russian Agents were still in Cabul, but were, the Agent said, men of no consequence, and were not often seen abroad with interviews with the Ameer.

The Agent, on being reminded that the option was accorded the Ameer of receiving the mission either at Cabul or at any other point, explained that the Ameer hold it concerned his own dignity not to leave his capital for that purpose; that His Highness pretended to be a Sovereign equal with, or even superior in dignity and power to, the Shah of Persia, and was even now dissatisfied with the titles accorded him in British correspondence. At the same time, the Agent was of opinion that the Government of the Ameer is not so firmly established as to admit of his leaving Cabul so long as Mahomed Yakoob Khan remains there in confinement.

As to Mahomed Yakoob Khan in person, the Agent considers that we have overrated his character and abilities. His successes have been principally attributable to his well selected instruments. He showed himself to be extremely rash when he came alone to Cabul, and then bearded the Ameer in his own capital. The Sirdar once had a party composed in large part of Heratees, Mohmonds, and some Chiefs; but this party is now broken up. To Sirdar Abdullah Jan, the Agent thinks it too soon to estimate his future. He doubts this Sirdar becoming a man of mark. As yet he is without power or party.

Reverting to the subject of the mission the Agent added that one reason for the Ameer's objecting was his fear that the Envoy might press him on behalf of Mahomed Yakoob Khan, whose cause the British had so frequently favoured.

The Agent, being asked as to the general situation in Afghanistan, replied that at present no communication passed between the Courts of Teheran and Cabul; that the Ameer regards the Agents from Russia as sources of embarrassment; that quiet prevails along the Horat frontier; that the frontiers of Maimenah, Shubbergan, Andakhoce, &c., are tranquil; that the principal Usbeg and Eimak Chiefs are at Cabul; that the Ameer has no relations with the Turkomans, but will be prepared to afford them asylum when Russia drives them from Merv, and that, as to the British Government, His Highness entertains no hope of support from us, either for himself or his dynasty, unless as against Russia; that our policy is dictated by the convenience of the moment; that at Umballa we had
engaged to regard with severe displeasure all attempts to impair his power and rule, and yet, that we have subsequently rather encouraged Mahomed Yakoob.

The interview being now terminated, Captain Grey accompanied the Agent on his ride home, and afterwards visited him, in view to quietly ascertain (without committing Government in any way) somewhat more as to the Ameer's real position and views.

During the ride to his house the Agent informed Captain Grey that the position of the Ameer is certainly precarious, and that, in his opinion, he would be glad to come to our terms if he were once convinced of our meaning real business, but that we must be clear and open in our communications, as the Afghans have come to suspect a second meaning in all that we utter.

The Agent recommended that we should agree to our Envoy meeting Syud Noor Mahomed Shah on the frontier, in view to arranging for the reception of the mission, &c. These details, the Agent thinks, might be smoothly arranged if we were prepared to re-assure the Ameer of our future support, on which his Highness does not at present place the slightest reliance.

On the morning of the 8th instant, Captain Grey paid the visit to the Agent, previously arranged, and learnt from him the details contained in the following note of his conversation:

I visited the Nawab this morning to ascertain what, in his opinion, were the Ameer's probable demands.

"He promised by repeating that the Ameer himself would put forward none, considering it useless to do so, but would want to know what we proposed. At the same time, there could be little doubt that the requests brought forward in detail in 1873 would be those that would be again urged by the Ameer should he be led to believe that there is any chance of our really befriending him.

"So far as the Nawab is acquainted with the feelings of the Ameer and his advisers, the matters which they have at heart are—

"1st. That no Englishmen should reside in Afghanistan, at any rate at Cabul.

"2nd. The British Government should utterly disclaim connection with Mahomed Yakoob or any other pretender (actual or possible) to the Afghan Throne, agreeing to recognize and support only his declared heir.

"3rd. That we should agree to support the Ameer, on demand, with troops and money in all and every case of attack from without. Also, should he call upon us to do so, to aid him in the event of internal disturbance.

"4th. That we should come to some permanent arrangement regarding subsidy. All those hitherto bestowed have been expended. The treasury is empty; the revenue, which is under a million sterling, is quite inadequate to the maintenance of his present force of some 75,000 troops. Consequently the force is underpaid, ill-found, and insufficient, and our help is needed to make it efficient. The Ameer is also keen upon having a pied à terre in British territory, whither to send his family and property when he clears for action with the Russians.

"5th. That the British Government should engage to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

"6th. That in any engagement entered into, an expression to the following effect be embodied:—

'The British Government regards the Ameer's friends and enemies its own, and the Ameer similarly regards those of the British Government.'

"7th. That we should alter the style in which we address the Ameer, according him more dignified titles. He considers himself quite the equal of the Shah of Persia."

Enclosure 19 in No. 36.

MEMORANDUM of an INTERVIEW at Simla between His Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Att Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, on 10th October 1876.

PRESENt:

His Excellency the Viceroy.
Sir L. Pelly.
Lieut.-Colonel O. T. Burne.
Captain Grey.

The Viceroy opened the conversation by recapitulating all the heads of the information furnished on the 7th instant by the Agent, respecting the views and feelings of the Ameer. The Agent having acknowledged that his statements had been correctly repeated to the Viceroy, His Excellency said that this information was very full and interesting, but quite new, although it ranged over a period of two or three years. The Agent's diaries during the last six months, and those furnished under the preceding Vicerey, contained merely reports of events, without comment or explanation, and without any expression of the Agent's own views. Why was this?

The Agent disputed the justice of this description of his reports; but, on being further pressed, observed that, in the first place, he had received no encouragement or instruction from the Government to furnish his impressions and opinions as well as facts; and, in the next place, it was not safe to put very confidential matter into the Cabul Diaries.

The Viceroy then requested the Agent to understand that henceforth he would be expected to keep the Government fully informed, not only of all that actually takes place at Cabul, but also of his own impressions as to the cause and character of the events reported by him, as well as the dispositions, motives, and influences, of the chief actors in Afghan affairs. He must do this fully, even at the risk of occasionally expressing mistaken views, and take his own precautions for the safety of his dispatches as far as Peshawur, at which Station the Commissioner would be responsible for their safe transmission to the Viceroy.
His Excellency then proceeded to say that he regarded, with no other feeling than that of profound compassion, the present situation of the Ameer, and the state of mind attributed by the Agent to His Highness; for whilst, on the one hand, it was evident that His Highness believed he had good cause to regret the past policy, and mistrust the present attitude of the British Government, on the other hand, it was equally clear that the Ameer very inadequately realised the gravity and imminence of the danger into which he is drifting under the influence of these unfortunate impressions; or the practical impossibility of maintaining himself in a position of independence, isolated from the protection, or exposed to the mistrust of the British Government.

The Ameer had apparently come to the conclusion that, having nothing to hope from us, and, at the same time, nothing to fear, he may safely stand aloof from the British Government; confident that, in the event of external attack, we shall be obliged to help him, for the protection of our own interests, even if we are under no contract obligation to do so.

This was a very natural conclusion; but, unfortunately for the Ameer, there was a fatal flaw in its premises. It is true that, if the Ameer proves himself our friend and loyal ally, not our interests only, but our honour, will oblige us to defend his territories and support his throne. But the moment we have cause to doubt his sincerity, or question the practical benefit of his alliance, our interests will be all the other way, and may greatly augment the dangers with which he is already threatened, both at home and abroad. As regards the former, the British Government can only assist those who value its assistance; and the assistance which the Ameer seems at present disinclined to seek or deserve may, at the moment, be very welcome to one or other of those rivals, from whom he will never be free till he has our assured support. As regards the latter, our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at all expenses.

As matters now stand, the British Government is able to pour an overwhelming force into Afghanistan and be for the protection of the Ameer, or the vindication of its own interests, long before a single Russian soldier could reach Cabul. His Excellency illustrated this statement by detailed reference to the statistics of the Russian Military Force in Central Asia, and the British Military Force in India, showing the available troops of either power within certain distances of the City of Cabul.

The Vicerey then said that, if the Ameer remained our friend, this military power could be spread round him as a ring of iron, and, if he became our enemy, it could be used as a reed. But our relations with Afghanistan could only be as good as they are. They must become worse or better. It was his Excellency's sincere desire that they should become better; and, on his part, he was cordially willing to do all in his power to make them so.

The Vicerey, however, pointed out that he could not help a State which would not allow him the means of helping it; nor undertake responsibility for the protection of a frontier which he is unable to look after by means of his own officers. Unless we can have our own Agents on the Afghan frontier, and thus know what is going on there, and beyond, we cannot effectively defend that frontier. It is out of the question that we should be committed to seeing the Ameer through a war with Russia, without being in a position to prevent his becoming involved in such a war.

It was natural enough that, in the present state of his relations with us, the Ameer should view with aversion, and even alarm, the presence of British Agents in any part of Afghanistan. There is probably at present no part of Afghanistan in which the Ameer's hold over his own subjects is not liable to be weakened by any doubt in their minds as to the friendliness of our attitude towards him. And, in the unhappy ambiguity which still characterises his relations with us, the Ameer's people might suppose that the British Government had sent its Agents into Afghanistan, to exert pressure on His Highness's enemies, or to bully him, to spy out the nakedness of his land, or encourage the disaffection of his subjects. The Ameer, however, must surely perceive how different would be the result, and how advantageous to himself, if the presence of any British Agent in Afghanistan were preceded by the publication of such a document as his most powerful predecessors had been eager to possess; frankly declaring to all the world that the British Government is the friend of his friends, and the enemy of his enemies. The Ameer's people would, in that case, recognize in the Representatives of the British Government the most potent supporters of his authority, and their influence would go far to consolidate his power. Under such conditions, moreover, the residence of a British officer at Herat would be a significant advertisement to all the external enemies of the Ameer that the power of England is there upon the watch to defend his from aggression; and that whoever touches him will be touching us.

In short, the Vicerey re-affirmed the necessity of the British Government watching the Afghan frontier if it is to undertake the protection of that frontier; and to this arrangement it is necessary that the Ameer should accede: as also to the reception of special missions when requisite, if his relations with the British Government are to be maintained at all.

It is indispensable that his Excellency should be in a position to acquaint himself with the true state of things in Afghanistan. The Vakil had said that the Ameer was strong, but what were the facts admitted by himself? His own son was his opponent. This son had been imprisoned certainly, but was still so formidable that the Ameer could not leave Cabul on his account. It was believed that conspiracies were rife in favour of this son; that the people were discontented on account of the conversation; that the treasury was empty; and, in fact, that the Ameer's position was surrounded with difficulties.

This, said his Excellency, is the man who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia independent of either! His position is rather that of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots.

The Vicerey went on to observe that British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite treaty engagements. The Ameer hitherto had only verbal understandings with us. The letter
given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms.

The Ameer has now the opportunity of concluding arrangements which will make him the strongest sovereign that has ever sat on the throne of Cabul.

The Ameer complains of the insufficient dignity of his titles, and desires to be treated on the same footing as the Shah of Persia. But Persia has shown every disposition to enter into the category of civilized states. The Shah receives at Teheran a large English mission on a permanent footing, and entertains Englishmen, who can travel throughout Persia, and penetrate to all parts of the country, under the protection of the Persian Government. Let Afghanistan act in the same way, and the Ameer may then claim to be the Shah's equal.

The Viceroy then proceeded to detail the concessions he was prepared to make, and the conditions on which he would make them—

**CONCESSIONS.**

1. That the friends and enemies of either state should be those of the other.
2. That, in the event of unprovoked aggression upon Afghanistan from without, assistance shall be afforded in men, money, and arms; and also, to strengthen him against such aggression, the British Government is willing, if he wishes, to fortify Herat and other points on the frontier, and, if desired, will lend officers to discipline the Army. But these would be matters entirely for the Ameer's consideration, the British Government having no desire to urge them.
3. That Abdullah Jan shall be recognized as the Ameer's successor.
4. That a yearly subsidy shall be afforded to the Ameer, the amount of which, and other details, will be settled by the Plenipotentiaries.

**CONDITIONS.**

1. That the Ameer refrain from external aggression, or provocation of his neighbours, and that he hold no external relations without our knowledge.
2. That he decline all communication with Russia, referring his (?) Agents to us.
3. That British Agents reside at Herat and elsewhere on the frontier.
4. That a mixed Commission of British and Afghan officers shall determine and demarcate the Ameer's frontier.
5. That arrangements be made, by allowance or otherwise, for free circulation of trade on the principal trade routes. In the cost of these arrangements the Ameer will be assisted by the British Government.
6. That similar arrangements, with similar assistance, be made for a line of telegraph, the direction of which shall be subsequently determined.
7. That Afghanistan be freely opened to Englishmen, official and non-official, and arrangements be made by the Ameer, as far as practicable, for their safety, though, of course, His Highness will not be absolutely held responsible for isolated accidents.
8. That the Viceroy will forego the establishment of a permanent Envoy at Cabul on condition—
   1. That he receive special missions whenever requisite.

The Viceroy further added that, if the Ameer required it, he was prepared to undertake the safe custody of Mahomed Yakoob.

The Viceroy then concluded by saying that the Ameer, while refusing the Mission originally proposed, had suggested two alternatives—

1. That the Cabul Vakil should come to Simla to detail the Ameer's views, and learn those of the Viceroy.
2. That his Agent should meet a British officer on the frontier, and discuss matters with him.

The first proposition had been acceded to with good results. His Excellency had learnt the Ameer's feelings, and the Vakil was put in possession of his own intentions. His Excellency would now accede to the second proposal. If the Ameer were prepared to treat on the basis required by the Viceroy, he should at once send Syud Noor Mahomed Shah to come to an arrangement on that basis with Sir Lewis Pelly, meeting him at Peshawur, Jellalabad, or wherever the Ameer might desire. His Excellency had deputed Sir Lewis Pelly, as being entirely in the confidence of the Cabinet and of himself. Dr. Helles was appointed to assist him, as being believed to be a person acceptable to the Ameer, and on friendly terms with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah.

Unless, however, the Ameer was prepared to enter into such a Treaty as proposed by his Excellency, it would be useless for him to send his Agent to discuss matters further, as no discussion on any other terms can be accepted. If, however, he agrees to the Treaty on this basis, it might be drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries, and the ratifications exchanged, either at Peshawur—by the Ameer meeting the Viceroy there in November, if the negotiations could be disposed of in time— or at Delhi, if the Ameer accepts the Viceroy's invitation to the Imperial Assemblage there.

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**MEMORANDUM OF THE SECOND INTERVIEW at Simla between his Excellency the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Agent at Cabul, on the 13th October 1876, after consultation in Council in regard to certain points connected with its purport.**

**PRESENT:**

His Excellency the Viceroy.
Sir L. Pelly.
Mr. T. H. Thornton.

Lieut.-Colonel O. T. Burne.
Captain Grey.

His Excellency commenced by acknowledging the fulness and importance of the information which the Vakil had now laid before him regarding the state of affairs at Cabul. He said he had
treated the Vakil confidentially, and had stated, without reserve, all that he had in his mind. He had no doubt that the Vakil would convey this faithfully to the Ameer, and he trusted that it would cause the Ameer to lay aside his present attitude of reserve, and be equally frank and open. The Viceroy's object was, that the Ameer should understand everything in his Excellency's mind, so that, if the Plenipotentiaries met, nothing should come as a surprise. At the same time, the Vakil should understand that his Excellency attached certain conditions to the opening of negotiations, without which it was needless for the Ameer to send down his Representatives—

(1)—The location of British officers upon the Afghan frontier.

(2)—An attitude of friendship and confidence on the part of the Ameer.

As there were some points to which the Viceroy might have omitted reference at the first interview, he would proceed to recapitulate them. First, as regards a pied à terre for the Ameer in British territory, the Viceroy was quite willing to agree to the Ameer's wishes in this respect, which, as far as was in the power of the British Government, should be complied with. The details must be settled hereafter.

Secondly, when the Viceroy agreed to recognize Abdullah Jan, this was not a mere form of words; it was, of course, impossible beforehand to make stipulations providing for every contingency that may arise. The arrangement was intended to give the fullest effect to engagement of this nature, compatible with the condition, urged by the Ameer himself, of abstention from unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It would be, of course, impossible that the British Government should undertake to reverse accomplished facts. If the Ameer, or his heir, were ever actually ejected from the throne of Cabul, the British Government would not undertake a war with the Afghans for their restoration. If, however, the Ameer gave notice in due time, while still in possession of his throne, that he was in difficulties, and needed material assistance, such assistance would be afforded with all possible speed. It might be impracticable at the time, such assistance could not be practically possible without greatly improved facilities for postal and telegraphic communications between British territory and Cabul; nor even then, if the Ameer keeps us in ignorance of his true situation, disregarding our advice till he is in extreme need of our help, and concealing his difficulties till we can neither avert them nor extricate him from them. The Ameer will, therefore, perceive that the first step towards giving practical effect to any such agreement must be the establishment of mutual confidence and better means of communication between the two Governments.

The Viceroy then handed to the Agent an Aide Mémoire* for his guidance as to what he was authorised to state to the Ameer on the part of his Excellency; also a letter for the Ameer on the subject of the proposed negotiations, conveying also a formal and friendly invitation to the Ameer on the part of the Indian Government to the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. He then presented the Agent with a watch and chain, and bestowed on him a khilut of Rs. 10,000, in acknowledgment of the appreciation of the Government of his past faithful service.

AIDE Mémoire for the British Agent at Cabul.

1. AUTHORISE the Agent to tell the Ameer that I am glad to find it in my power to relieve his mind from many apprehensions as to my intentions, which appear to have been caused by circumstances previous to my assumption of the Government of India.

2. I authorize the Agent to tell the Ameer that, if His Highness wishes to make me his friend, I will be a warm and true, a fast and firm, friend to him, doing all that is practically in my power to stand by him in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to confirm the succession in the person of his son Sirdar Abdullah Jan.

3. I am, therefore, willing to give him a Treaty of friendship and alliance, and also to afford him assistance in arms, men, and money, for the defence of his territory against unprovoked foreign invasion.

4. But I cannot do any one of these things unless the Ameer is, on his part, equally willing to afford me the practical means of assisting His Highness in the protection of his frontier, by the residence of a British Agent at Herat, and at such other parts of that frontier, most exposed to danger from without, as may be hereafter agreed upon.

5. I do not even wish to embarrass the Ameer, whose present difficulties I fully sympathise with, by carrying out this arrangement to put until after the signature of a Treaty of Alliance to be made on terms which ought to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our friendship; nor until after the Ameer shall have had the means of making known to his people that the presence of a British Agent in

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Afghanistan signifies that he is there without interfering in internal State matters, as the firm supporter of the Ameer and of the heir-apparent, to aid them with all the influence and power of the British Government in defending their country against foreign aggression, and to discourage attempts on the part of the disaffected to disturb its internal tranquillity or weaken the throne of His Highness.

5. It will be the duty of any such British Agents to watch the external affairs of the frontier, furnishing timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain that any British Agent has interfered in the internal affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be recalled.

6. I have no wish to disturb the existing Native Agency at Cabul, or to urge upon the Ameer the question of a permanent British Envoy at his court, if His Highness thinks that the presence of such an Envoy would be a source of embarrassment to him. But, in that case, I should of course, expect that no obstacle be placed in the way of confidential communications between myself and His Highness, by means of special Envoys, whenever the interests of the two Governments may require them.

7. In short, it is my object and desire that the Treaty of friendship and alliance, as well as the presence of British Agents on the Afghan frontier, should be a great strength and support to the Ameer, both at home as well as abroad, and not a source of weakness or embarrassment to him.

8. I am quite ready to consult with the Ameer, in a friendly and confidential way, through our respective Representatives, as to the best means of placing our relations on the permanent footing of a Treaty engagement by which his independence and dignity will be assured in a manner satisfactory to himself as well as to the British Government. But, unless the Ameer agrees to the arrangement indicated in paragraph 4 of this Note, and cordially enters into it, it will not be practically in my power to undertake any obligations on his behalf, or to do anything for his assistance, whatever may be the dangers or difficulties of his future position.

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Dated Simla, 11th October 1876.

From the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness Ameer ShereAli Khan, Wali of Cabul and its Dependencies.

(After compliments)

On my arrival in India, I instructed my Commissioner at Peshawur to intimate to your Highness my friendly desire of deputing a special and temporary mission to your Court at Cabul for the purpose of announcing to your Highness, in the most complimentary manner, the formal assumption of the title of "Empress of India" by Her Majesty the Queen, as well as my own assumption of the Viceroyalty of India.

It would also have been agreeable to me, and I believe satisfactory to your Highness, had my confidential Envoy been permitted to proceed to your capital, and had his arrival been followed by frank communications, tending to render the relations between the British Government and that of your Highness of a cordial character.

Your Highness did not respond to my friendly offer; and a perusal of your Highness's reply, as well as of some previous correspondence which I found on record, induced me to infer that your Highness was under a misapprehension as to my real intentions.

I, therefore, directed the Commissioner again to address your Highness, and from your reply I learned that it would be agreeable to your Highness, either that the British Agent at Cabul should first come to Simla for the purpose of personally explaining to me the views of your Highness, or that my Envoy should meet your Minister on the frontier.

Accordingly, the British Agent has now waited on me with full particulars, and I have enabled and desired him to convey to your Highness, in the most friendly manner, an unreserved and sincere explanation of my own views.

Your Highness will thus be assured by the Agent that I shall be prepared to comply with the wishes which you announced through your Agent at Simla in 1873, and to which you have adhered in more recent communications.

Reciprocally, your Highness will, I doubt not, be prepared to enable the British Government to undertake the weighty obligations it will incur on your behalf by agreeing to the arrangements which will be submitted to you by the Agent who conveys this letter, and in the absence of which the British Government could not practically fulfil these obligations.

Should your Highness still desire to enter into a Treaty engagement on the basis above referred to, I shall be happy, in compliance with your Highness's suggestion, to instruct my trusted friend, Sir Lewis Pelly, to hold himself in readiness to meet your Highness's Minister immediately at Peshawur, or elsewhere, for the discussion of details and the embodiment of our respective wishes in a definite form, to be approved and ratified by your Highness and myself.

I have instructed the Agent to present to your Highness, together with this letter, an invitation from myself, as the Representative of Her Majesty, to the great ceremonial which I am about to hold at Delhi, on the 1st of January next, for the proclamation of Her Majesty's Imperial title. To this great ceremony I have also invited the Governors of the French and Portuguese Possessions in India, and those Kings and Princes in whom Her Majesty gladly recognizes the Sovereign allies and neighbours of Her Indian Empire.

Trusting that I may have the high satisfaction of receiving your Highness also, as an illustrious guest of the British Government on that occasion, I shall much appreciate so auspicious an opportunity for exchanging with your Highness the ratifications of the above-mentioned Treaty, and for renewing to you the assurance of my personal regard, as well as the friendly interest taken by my Government in the security of Your Highness's throne and the prosperity of your dominions.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness.
Enclosure 23 in No. 36.
Dated Mushobra, near Simla, 17th October 1876.

From T. H. Thornton, Esq., D.C.L., to Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I. (Extract.)

Having been present at the interviews which lately took place between the Viceroy and Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, the British Native Agent at Cabul, you are aware that the Agent has been authorised by Lord Lytton to return to the Court of the Ameer of Cabul, charged with messages from his Excellency, which has assented to the Viceroy's opinion that the Ministry of His Highness, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, should meet you, either at Peshawur, or at some point on Afghan territory, for the purpose of there endeavouring to effect with you an agreement as to the terms of closer and more satisfactory relations between the British Government and that of His Highness. You are also aware that his Excellency has invited the Ameer to attend the ceremonial about to be held at Delhi on the 1st of January next, for the purpose of there exchanging with the Viceroy in person the ratification of the Treaty of Alliance which you are authorised to negotiate with Syed Noor Mahomed Shah.

2. In accordance with the arrangements thus proposed, I have now to instruct you to proceed, at your early convenience, to the neighbourhood of Peshawur, and to wait there the Ameer's answer to the messages now on their way to His Highness from the Viceroy. This answer will be communicated to you by the Commissioner at Peshawur, and you will then either await at Peshawur the arrival of Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, or else proceed at once to meet the Minister at any part of the Afghan territory which may be indicated in His Highness's reply to the Viceroy's letter, or in any communication from the Cabul Agent to the Commissioner of Peshawur.

3. For your more complete information, in regard to the object and character of the negotiations which you are authorised by the Governor General in Council to open with the Ameer's Minister on behalf of the British Government, I am directed to furnish you, confidentially, with certain documents. With the contents of these documents I believe you are already well acquainted, but I am to commend them to your careful and reiterated perusal.

4. The main objects of your negotiations with the Ameer's Minister will be those ascribed by the Earl of Derby to the general policy of the British Government as regards Afghanistan, in his Lordship's communication to the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, copy of which is herewith enclosed. These objects are:—1st, to provide for the external security of Afghanistan; and 2ndly, to ensure the internal tranquillity of that state in a manner conducive to British interests.

5. The time has now arrived when, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, the attainment of the above-mentioned objects demands more definite arrangements than have hitherto existed between the Government of India and that of Afghanistan. The tone which you should adopt and adhere to in the discussion of such arrangements is so clearly prescribed, and so fully explained by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, in his Lordship's Secret Despatch of the 28th February 1873, that I need not instruct you further.

6. The conditions on which the Governor General in Council is now prepared to enter into closer and more definite relations with the Government of Afghanistan are in every particular the same as those desired by the Ameer himself on the occasion of his visit to Umball in 1869, and again in more or less general terms so urged by him on the Government of India through his Minister Syed Noor Mahomed Shah in 1873.

7. The enclosed papers will show you that, in 1869, the Ameer lost no opportunity, directly and indirectly, of stating that the paramount object of his heart was the conclusion of a Treaty with the Viceroy, declaring the friends and enemies of His Highness to be those of the British Government, and vice versa; and that on this condition he was willing to receive British Agents in various localities along the Afghan frontier, for the better protection of those interests which would be publicly recognised in the proposed Treaty as common to the two allied Governments. In other words, there was in 1869 nothing to which the Ameer would not accede if the British Government were prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he might appoint; he was open "to any proposition for securing his nephew a firm and perpetual connexion with the British Crown"; and if ever the Ameer was to be made a British Ally in the Indian Empire, he still thought precautions should be taken, and expressed his desire to construct forts on his own part, or under British superintendence, and to admit European garrisons if ever desired; he, moreover, at that time affirmed that he would gladly see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent in Balhik, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition that his independence was undermined.

8. You will further learn from the subjoined papers that the Ameer and his advisers were equally explicit in the profession, not only of their desire, but of their ability (if once assured of an open alliance with the British Government) to facilitate friendly intercourse, trade, and traffic between this Empire and all parts of His Highness's dominions.

9. The enclosed documents will also show you that in his personal interviews with Lord Mayo the Ameer spoke earnestly in the sense of the wishes and desires which he had previously expressed to others, saying that the "tranquillity of the country, which the Viceroy had so much at heart, would be the natural consequence of the security of his power and dynasty, and that all things, including the increase of trade (which results from the prosperity and wealth of a nation) which the British Government might desire, would follow from the establishment of a firm and permanent government." The accompanying letter from the then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to the Foreign Secretary attests the emphatic character of the terms in which the Ameer repeated his wishes to Sir Donald MacLeod; urging that "a clause might be introduced into any official communication to him, to the effect that we have not, and will not have, relations of friendship with any one in Afghanistan apart from the Ameer," adding that "a fire had been lit in that country by the declaration that we would acknowledge any one who should win his way to the throne, and that nothing short of a declaration of this kind would suffice to extinguish it." It is unnecessary here to explain the various reasons which, in 1865, and again in 1873, induced the British Government to decline the proposal for a definite Treaty of Alliance which was then urged on their acceptance by the Ameer of Cabul. I need only observe that those reasons had reference to a
situation which has been essentially altered by the progress of events during the last seven years, and the position of affairs both in Europe and Central Asia at the present moment.

12. This altered situation is such, in the opinion of the Governor General in Council, as to render inexpedient any prolongation of uncertainty as to the policy of the Afghan Government, or its practical means of self-defence in the event of future complications in Central Asia.

13. The Governor General in Council is, for this reason, prepared to contract with the Ameer of Cabul a definite and practical alliance on the terms desired by His Highness in 1869 and 1873, without exacting from the Ameer any conditions of alliance to which the anticipatory assent of His Highness was not freely given in those years.

14. You are aware that the Ameer has been informed by the Viceroy, through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, that his Excellency is ready to afford His Highness immediate and material assistance in the protection of the Afghan frontier against foreign aggression, on the condition desired by the Ameer in 1869; viz., the location of competent British Agents on that frontier, for the purpose indicated in the general conferences on the occasion above referred to. On this point, therefore, your negotiation with the Ameer’s Minister will be confined to the friendly arrangement of the measures necessary to give practical effect to this principle.

15. In doing so, you will be careful to consult the dignity and convenience of the Ameer in every way not incompatible with the attainment of the object in view. The Ameer, in 1869, appears to have expressed his reluctance to receive a permanent European British Agent at Cabul, for reasons which he then explained. If those reasons still exist in the mind of His Highness, the Governor General in Council, respecting their sincerity, will not urge such an arrangement on his acceptance. At the same time, it may be well that you should point out to the Afghan Envoy the probable advantage which, in the event of any sudden accident to the health or the life of the Ameer, the interests of the heir-apparent would derive from the presence in Cabul of a competent British Representative, whose influence might assist the Durbar in preventing the attempts likely to be made, should such a contingency occur, to inflict upon the country the calamities of a civil war by disturbing the peaceable succession of the established dynasty.

16. As regards the security of trade between the territories, and the encouragement of friendly interests between the subjects of the two Governments, as well as mutual aid in the management of Pass tribes and the maintenance of safe border highways, you will invite the Afghan Envoy to discuss with you, in the frank and friendly spirit evinced by himself and the Ameer during the negotiations of 1869, such measures as may be expedient for the attainment of these objects.

17. On behalf of your own Government you will be equally frank and conciliatory. You will fairly point out to the Afghan Envoy the reciprocal character of those advantages, on behalf of which the loyal co-operation of his Government is desired and expected, in regard to the protection of trade, and the security of peaceful travellers; but you will abstain from putting forward any unreasonable demands, and you will not propose to make the Afghan Government responsible for the safety of British subjects entering its dominions without a passport from the British Government. This Government does not desire to impose on the Ameer burdens which His Highness is demonstrably unable to sustain. Its object is not to impose, but to assist, his hands and resources.

18. You will, however, expect from him the amendment of that tone of evasion and mistrust which has recently characterised his language in reference to the possibility and reciprocal benefit of improved intercourse between his own subjects and those of the British Government.

19. You will impress on the Ameer’s Minister that the British Government will expect His Highness to recognise fairly and fully the duties incumbent on him as the avowed friend and ally of Her Majesty, and to give loyal effect to the declarations made by him to the Viceroy in 1869, that, “if the British Government would recognise his own dominions as a part of his Indian Empire, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and life; it being understood that the slightest failure on the part of himself or his descendants should vitiate all engagements on our part.”

20. For the speedy improvement of the means of communication between the two Governments, it appears to the Governor General in Council very desirable that the Ameer should co-operate with the Government of India in establishing and maintaining a line of telegraph between certain points on Afghan and British territories, the selection of which may properly form one of the subjects of your negotiation. The same observance applies to the means of working and protecting any such line or lines of telegraphic communication. In the discussion of the measures necessary for that purpose, you will evince every reasonable readiness to comply with such wishes or suggestions as the Ameer’s Minister may submit to you on behalf of His Highness. On this point, I need only add that the British Government is prepared to bear the cost of laying down the lines, if the Ameer will guarantee the protection of those portions of them which are within his own territories, and come to some mutual agreement as to the safety of the portions passing through his territory, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and life; it being understood that the slightest failure on the part of himself or his descendants should vitiate all engagements on our part.

21. In the first place, it is obvious that, if the British Government is to undertake any responsibility for the defence of the Ameer’s territories from foreign aggression, the Ameer’s external policy must not be conducted in a manner that will prejudice his safety. It will, therefore, be necessary that your negotiation should not prejudice the British Government an effective control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan. A stipulation to this effect can be worded in general terms, and in the manner which you may think least derogatory to the dignity and independence of the Ameer, which it is most desirable to uphold in the eyes of his own subjects.

22. The next point demanding your attention, and which must be pressed upon the consideration of the Afghan Government, is the attitude now assumed by that Government towards the subjects and representatives of your own. This attitude on the part of the Ameer should be frankly and promptly abandoned. The British Government cannot be his friend in need, and his friend in deed, if the friendship on which he is to reckon in his needs, limits, meanwhile, no recognition in his deeds. You will,
therefore, give the Ameer's Envoy to understand that the offers of assistance in men, money, and arms, are conditional on a distinct understanding that the Ameer will encourage on the part of the tribes and Sirdars under his authority, and maintain on his own part, free, frequent, and friendly intercourse with the British Government and all its subjects.

25. The various modes in which practical effect may be given to this understanding will be the natural subject of discussion, and detailed arrangement, between yourself and the Ameer's Representative.

26. Not the least important of the subsidiary arrangements on which the Governor General in Council desires you to come to an understanding with the Ameer's Representative will have reference to mutual aid in the more friendly and effective control of the Freebee tribes who now infest the Khyber Pass, and not only impede free access between Peshawur and Cabul, but surround an important portion of our north-western frontier with a fringe of turbulent barbarism the continued existence of which is most inconvenient to the Government of India. The independent character of these tribes, the practical difficulty of exerting over them any effective control either from Cabul or from Peshawur, and the general character of our relations with them up to the present moment, as well as of their relations with the rest of the Afghan population, are all so well and accurately known to you that it is hardly necessary to do more than commend this object very earnestly to your attention.

27. The general character and extent of such Imperial support as the Ameer and his dynasty may be fairly entitled to expect from the British Government, under the terms of the proposed Treaty of Alliance, are also clearly indicated by the negotiations which took place in 1859 on the subject of a similar instrument. The British Government has never desired, and can never desire, to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; nor is it probable that it will ever again be disposed to undertake such a war as was undertaken by it on behalf of Shusujah for the re-imposition of a deposed Prince upon the throne of Cabul.

28. For the same reason, the British Government cannot contract any obligation to support the Prince of Afghanistan against the opposition of the Afghan nation, or any large majority of their subjects whose loyalty has been alienated by misgovernment or oppression. But, subject to these reasonable and necessary limitations, the British Government will do all that may be practically in its power to maintain the just authority of the Ameer, or his recognised successor, against those intrigues and conspiracies of unlawful and unscrupulous pretenders to the throne which are incompatible with the settled order, good government, and peace of the country. The precise form which, in case of need, the British Government may be prepared to give to such assistance must, of course, depend upon the circumstances of the moment, which are not susceptible of anticipatory definition in any formal document.

29. Assuming the Ameer's loyal fulfilment of all his own obligations under the terms of the proposed Treaty, the British Government will be willing to afford His Highness, if he desires it, pecuniary or military assistance in the fortification of his frontier, or to provide him with the services of experienced British officers for the better organization of his military force. It is also willing to embody in the terms of the proposed Treaty its distinct recognition of the order of succession as contemplated by His Highness in the person of Abdulla Jan.

30. Whilst thus preparing before you the general views and orders of the Government of India on the subject of the important negotiations with which you are entrusted, I am to state that it is not intended to fetter your discretion with reference to any stipulation not mentioned in this instruction as being essential. But you will understand that in the Treaty you are authorised to negotiate with the Ameer's Minister there must be a fair and full reciprocity of benefit to the contracting parties.

For the weighty obligations which, on this condition, the British Government is not unwilling to undertake in the interests of the Ameer, it will be your duty to secure an adequate return substantially advantageous to British interests.

32. To afford you the means of quick and confidential communication with the Viceroy during the course of your negotiations, I hereby furnish you with a Cipher Code. In your use of this Code, you will, on the one hand, abstain from unnecessary reference to the Viceroy in regard to matters of minor importance; and, on the other hand, you will keep his Excellency fully informed in regard to demands which ought not to be complied with, or concessions which ought not to be granted, without his sanction.

33. In conclusion, I am to express the confidence felt by the Governor General in Council in your ability, tact, and experience. In the difficulties of your negotiations, you may be assured of the sympathy and support of the Government of India.
successors, makes the like engagement in regard to territories in alliance with, or under the rule and protection of, the British Government.

**Article 2.**

Between the British Government and that of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Ruler of Afghanistan, his heirs and successors, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship. The friends of the one Government shall be the friends of the other; and the enemies of the one Government shall be the enemies of the other.

**Article 3.**

In the event of the territories now possessed by His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan being invaded by a foreign enemy, the British Government will aid His Highness, in the defence of those territories, with men and material of war; it being clearly understood, and hereby provided, that the conduct of the Ameer and his Government shall, at the same time, be in strict conformity with the declarations contained in the above Article 2; and that His Highness shall have refrained from all provocation of, aggression on, or interference with the States and territories beyond his present frontier, save with the knowledge and consent of the British Government.

**Article 4.**

In accordance with this understanding, His Highness the Ameer agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in harmony with the policy of the British Government.

**Article 5.**

For the better protection of the Afghan frontier, it is hereby agreed that the British Government shall, on its part, depute accredited British Agents to reside at Herat, and such other places in Afghanistan as may be mutually determined by the High Contracting Powers; and that the Ruler of Afghanistan shall, on his part, depute an Agent to reside at the Court of the Viceroy and Governor General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.

**Article 6.**

His Highness the Ruler of Afghanistan, on his part, guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agents whilst on Afghan soil; and the British Government, on its part, undertakes that such Agents shall in no way interfere with the internal administration of Afghanistan.

**Article 7.**

Furthermore, with a view to facilitate expeditious and friendly intercourse between the two allied Governments, it is hereby agreed that such lines of telegraph as may be necessary for that purpose shall be, from time to time, constructed by the British Government in the territories of the Ruler of Afghanistan.

**Article 8.**

His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan also undertakes, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peaceably travelling or trading within his dominions, so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

**Article 9.**

In proof of its desire to see the Government of His Highness Shere Ali Khan consolidated, and undisturbed by domestic troubles, the British Government hereby agrees to acknowledge whomsoever His Highness may nominate as his heir-apparent, and to discountenance the pretensions of any rival claimant to the Throne.

**Article 10.**

The British Government, its Officers and Agents, will, as heretofore, abstain from all interference in the domestic administration and internal affairs of Afghanistan; except in so far as their assistance may at any time be required and invoked by the Ameer, his heirs and successors, to avert from that country the calamities of a recurrence to civil war, and protect the peaceful interests which this Treaty is established to establish and promote. In that case, the British Government will afford to the Government of Afghanistan such support, moral or material, as may, in its opinion, and in general accordance with the foregoing declaration, be necessary for the assistance of the Ameer, his heirs and successors, in protecting equitable authority, national sentiment, and settled order, from disturbance by the personal ambition of unlawful competitors for power.

**Article 11.*

* The wording of this article must be most carefully considered and recast by Sir L. Polley, in consultation with the Commissioner of Peshawur.

Trade shall pass uninterrupted between the territories of the High Contracting Powers, subject only to, &c. &c.

For this purpose, certain routes shall be appointed, and His Highness the Ameer will use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders, and the free transit of traffic along these routes. The selection of such routes, the measures to be taken for their security, and the tariff of duties leviable...
upon merchandise carried over such routes, shall be settled by Commissioners to be jointly appointed by the two Governments.

**Article 12.**

The routes thus selected shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may deem most expedient for the general convenience of trade and traffic, and under such financial arrangements as shall be mutually determined between them. The Ameer Shere Ali Khan undertakes, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to co-operate cordially with the British Government in its endeavours to keep all such roads and passes free from marauders, and to maintain the general tranquility of the mountain tracts lying between British and Afghan territories.

**Article 13.**

His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali Khan furthermore engages, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, to support the British Government in checking and suppressing the trade in slaves, and to prohibit the practice of kidnapping or seizing human beings within his dominions for the purpose of selling them into bondage.

**Article 14.**

For the further support of His Highness the Ameer in the permanent maintenance of his authority, and efficient fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by His Highness on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, in accordance with this Treaty, the British Government agrees, on condition of a faithful performance of the obligations herewith contracted, to pay His Highness, his heirs and successors—.

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**Enclosure 25 in No. 36.**

**Aide Memoire for Subsidiary Secret and Explanatory Agreement.**

1. In regard to Article 3, it is understood by the two contracting Powers that the words "invaded by a foreign enemy" shall be held to include European as well as Asiatic enemies.

2. It is likewise understood, in regard to Article 4, that, in return for the important pledge involved in the above article on the part of the British Government, the Ameer binds himself to abstain from discussion of political, international, or State matters with any Foreign Government, save in friendly concert with the British Government, to whom His Highness will unrestrainedly communicate all correspondence, or overtures, of this nature.

3. It is likewise understood, in regard to Articles 5 and 6—

1st.—That, unless or until otherwise mutually arranged between the two Governments, a Native Agent only need reside at Cabul city.

2nd.—That, wherever in the opinion of the Viceroy of India, it may be necessary to communicate direct with the Ameer on matters of an important or confidential character, a special British Envoy shall be deputed on a temporary mission to the Court of the Ameer.

3rd.—That the principal duty of the British Agent or Agents shall be to watch events outside the frontiers of Afghanistan, and to supply timely information to the British and Afghan Governments of any political intrigues or dangers threatening the peace, stability, or integrity of the Afghan dominions.

4th.—That the local Afghan authorities shall cordially co-operate with the British Agent or Agents for the common interests of their respective Governments.

4. It is likewise understood, with regard to Article 7—

1st.—That the cost of the construction of a telegraphic line or lines shall be borne by the British Government, and that of the establishment and maintenance of such line or lines by the Ameer in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon between the two Governments.

2nd.—That, whilst the Ameer engages to be responsible for the protection of such portions of the line or lines as may be within the limits of his own territories, the protection of any part thereof, across tracts intervening between Afghan and British boundaries shall be provided for as the two Governments may mutually arrange.

5. It is understood, in regard to Article 8, that, until otherwise arranged, British subjects shall not enter Afghanistan without the authoritative and written permission of their Government, based on a mutual and cordial understanding between the two Governments.

6. It is likewise understood, in regard to Article 10, that the British Government in no way desires to change its settled policy of non-interference with the internal affairs or independence of the Afghan nation; it will, therefore, only afford material assistance to the Ameer, his heirs and successors, at their express request; provided also, that such request shall be accompanied by timely and adequate information, and that the British Government shall be the sole judge of the manner, time, and expediency of furnishing such assistance.

7. It is likewise understood that, for the support of the Ameer in the maintenance of his lawful authority, and the efficient fulfilment of the engagements now undertaken by him on behalf of himself, his heirs...
and successors, the British Government will, on condition of a faithful performance of the obligations herewith contracted, pay His Highness, his heirs and successors, a sum of 20 lakhs of rupees immediately on the ratification of the present Treaty, and afterwards an annual sum of 12 lakhs of rupees, in addition to such other material assistance in officers, men, or money, as may be deemed from time to time beneficial for the interests of the two neighbouring Governments.

Enclosure 26 in No. 36.

PRIVATE LETTER from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, dated Cabul, 23rd November 1876.

YESTERDAY morning His Highness the Ameer sent for the Sadr-i-Azim, the Mustowfi, and the Wazir-ool-dowlah Kharijah to his private apartment, and took counsel with them about the communications made by the Agent and the letters brought by him from his Excellency the Viceroy, desiring them to weigh all considerations, and give him their best advice in the interests of the Afghan State and people. What their advice was, after the consultation then held, has not been made known in detail. At 2 p.m. the same day His Highness sent for the Agent, and, in the presence of the three Ministers above named, began to discuss with him those important matters. The conversation was long continued, and, though no definite decision was arrived at, the general result of their observations was that the Government of Afghanistan was not in a position to receive British officers within its frontiers. The contemplation of such an arrangement filled them with apprehension.

The Agent endeavoured to explain away the objections raised, and to allay their fears to the best of his ability. The meeting was dissolved after three hours, and further discussion postponed till a future occasion.

The Agent will continue to report the progress of negotiations, and will not fail to endeavour to convince His Highness of the advantages to his Government to be looked for from the proposals made.

Enclosure 27 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 5th December 1876, from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

AFTER holding councils and consulting his Durbar officials, the Ameer summoned me yesterday at 4 p.m. All the Durbar officials in concert gave opinions that the request of the (British) Government should be declined. Every member of the Durbar officials went (to their houses), after some assurances and great encouragement, I represented to the residence of the Sadr-i-Azim—"Every member of Durbar cannot be able (lit. it is not his business) to reflect on the consequences (lit. beginnings and ends) of difficulties in State matters. Discrimination between good and bad (consequences) in delicate State matters cannot be made without (great) experience. In this question of the (British) Government, your Highness should use your own judgment as to its advantages and disadvantages (to you), and settle it as soon as possible." After great deliberation and lengthy discussions, His Highness somewhat yielded (lit. arrived at a right conclusion), and observed that he would send the Sadr-i-Azim to my house this morning, that we should discuss the question with him to-day (the result of our discussions) to him. Accordingly, the Sadr-i-Azim called on me to-day at 7 a.m. First I gave him various assurances, and then discussed the question with him, and, on giving him some arguments as to its results, made him yield (lit. tender) a little. Then we both waited in person on the Ameer, and, after some assurances and representations as to the advantages of the promotion (lit. firmness) of friendship existing between the (two) Governments, made efforts (lit. attempts) in a pacific and pressing manner ("sard-o-garm"—cool and warm) for the realization of the wishes of the (British) Government. His Highness considered over this matter for some time, and then asked the Sadr-i-Azim to give an opinion, and the latter expressed himself less disinclined or indisposed ("irkhai-inan"—loosening reins) than on previous days. On the conclusion of our discussions, it appeared to-day, from the tone of the Ameer's remarks, that he would probably agree to the residence of British officers on the border. He observed that his councils had not been brought to a conclusion, and that he would give a reply after full consultation (with his officials). Though I have not yet become quite confident of the realization of the objects (of the British Government), I hope, with the aid of God, that success may be attained (lit. it is not improbable that failure would not ultimately be the result in them).

Enclosure 28 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from Nawab Atta Mohomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 7th December 1876.

TO-DAY I waited on the Ameer to pay respects to His Highness, and, in private, solicited him to give a reply to the questions of the British Government. His Highness observed to the Sadr-i-Azim—"To-morrow I will attend the Durbar later. You should summon—

The Mustowfi,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs,
The Hashmut-ul-Mulk,
Mr. Ahmed Khan,
Sirdar Shergild Khan, and
Sirdar Mir Afsal Khan,

and hold a Conference with them as to the advantages and disadvantages to this Government, and communicate to me the result of your councils in a free and unrestrained manner, in order that the matter
may be settled. I do not join at this sitting, because (I desire) that you may in an independent
(lit. fearless, "bikalab") manner discuss with each other with full far-sightedness as to the loss and
gain and advantages and disadvantages of the (two) Governments."

His Highness then told me that a suitable reply would be given after full deliberation in this delicate
matter, in which permanent loss or gain of reputation is concerned. I met the Sadr-i-Azim, and asked
him to give a decision (lit. took steps to gain our objects). He said that, as far as possible, he would
make efforts in this matter to-morrow. I am giving assurances separately to the other Durbar
officials to realise these wishes, and it remains to be seen (what will be their opinions).

Enclosure 29 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER, dated 11th December 1876, from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan,
British Agent at Cabul, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I asked the chief Durbar officials to give a reply to the questions of the (British Government),
Discussions between the Ameer and the Members of Durbar continued for two days, and then they
observed privately—"Yielding to necessity, and in view to the continuance of the friendship existing
between (the two) Governments, the location of British officers on the border may be approved of,
but some conditions in regard to their residence must be fixed for use for the future (lit. one day).
The Sadr-i-Azim and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan Ishakzai should go to British territory with the
British Agent at Cabul to represent these conditions and other questions (lit. objects) of the (two).
Governments, and get them sanctioned (lit. confirmed)." These conditions have not been made
known. I waited on the Ameer yesterday, and solicited His Highness again to give a reply in this
matter. His Highness observed—"We are occupied in this delicate (State) matter, and have become
somewhat inclined to sanction these questions (lit. the proposal is somewhat meeting with success).
Ged willing, in a short time a suitable reply will be given." I intimated to him the advantages
to (his) Government, and represented that the sooner he would settle this matter the more beneficial
it would be to him) to (the best of) my judgment, and that it would not be advantageous to make
these important matters lengthy. It remains to be seen (what will be his decision). I am making
great efforts.

Enclosure 30 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of LETTER from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Cabul, to
Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, dated 10th December 1876.

To-day I held discussions in a suitable manner for three hours with the Ameer and the Sadr-i-Azim
on the questions of the British Government, and then His Highness observed—"I propose to depute
with you the Sadr-i-Azim, the Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, and Aka Said Ahmed Khan" to British territory, in
order that, after making representations as to the views of the Cabul Government, they may bring British officers for residence on the border.
"As this matter is a most delicate one, and requires far-sightedness, councils have not yet been brought
to a conclusion. On the termination of the councils a suitable reply will be given. To make haste
in such important matters is not advisable." In short, the Ameer awaits the arrival of the Kohistian Chiefs to
consult with him. They have not yet arrived. The Cabul authorities will probably give a final (lit. full) reply in this
matter after the "Id-u-Zuha" festival.†

† On 27th December 1876.
(Signed) F. R. Pollock,
Commissioner.

Enclosure 31 in No. 36.

TRANSLATION of PERSIAN LETTER, dated 21st December 1876, from the British Agent at Cabul
to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

Yesterday, in the matter of the wishes of the (British) Government, the Ameer observed as
follows:
"Since the day of the commencement of friendship between the Government of Afghanistan and
the British Government up to the present time, as (shown) in former letters and documents, no effort
has been spared (lit. interference or disturbance caused) by the Government of Afghanistan which
God has given (me) in making the foundation of the palace of the friendship existing between the
(two) Governments firm. The members of this Government have always paid respect to (their)
(lit. pure) friendship with the British Government. Now, for some time past, the British authorities
continually send communications in support of their confirmed views for the residence of British officers
on the border. It is (well known) that this Government, which has been granted (to me) by God,
has repeatedly (lit. several times after the first motion) and several times before the termination of the question made representations in various ways as to the points which we (Afghan Government)
regard as important. Even now, in my opinion, the residence of British officers on the border would
not at all be advantageous to the (two) Governments. However, as the British authorities insist on
this question every day, I have proposed, but merely to strengthen (my) friendship with the British
Government, that after the 'Id-u-Zuha' festival the Sadr-i-Azim and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan should
so with the British Agent at Cabul to British territory; and, after making representations as to the:

views (of the Cabul Government) settle the questions and some important conditions, and then agree to the residence of British officers on the border.

In short, I submit this letter after perusal by the Ameer.

Translation of Letter, dated 21st December 1876, from the British Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

I again solicited the Ameer to give a reply to the questions of the British Government, and, in consequence of my having used much pressure, councils between His Highness and his chief Durbar officials continued on the 28th instant from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m., and on the 21st from 8 p.m. to 12 noon. At 1 p.m. His Highness summoned me, and I made lengthy discourses in a very suitable (lit. energetic) manner till 5 p.m., with arguments as to advantages and disadvantages and loss and gain, and then His Highness observed,—"God willing, for ever, the friendship existing between our Government and the British Government will remain more firm than before, and this true friendship will never be disturbed. Whatever objections or pleas (lit. discussions) have been hitherto made as to the residence of British officers on the border are owing to the savage conduct of the people (lit. contrary demeanour of the countries) of Afghanistan, and even now we agree to their residence on the border owing to helplessness ('na-etaaj'). But in this matter it is most incumbent on us to represent some important conditions to the British Government; and, with a view to representing these conditions (lit. difficulties), and settling all the questions (lit. objects) of the (two) Governments, I depute the Sadr-i-Azim and Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan to British territory, (and desire that) they should go with you after the Id-u-ZulHa festival, and, after stating all the difficulties, and settling all questions of the (two) Governments, bring the British officers to live on the border.

By desire of the Ameer I enclose a Persian letter, after perusal by His Highness. The Durbar has not yet proposed that a murrasila (to address of British Government) annex the deputation of the Sadr-i-Azim should be written. At present I have only received this information, that the chief Durbar authorities, in private, propose the following conditions:

1st. Should by any accident any injury occur to the life or property of any British officer in Afghanistan, steps should be taken (in such matters) according to the custom and law of Afghanistan, and the British Government should not put much pressure on the Afghan Government.

2nd. The duties of all British officers on the border should be fully defined (lit. limited); they should not secretly or openly interfere with the internal civil and military affairs of Afghanistan.

3rd. Should a Russian Agent come to Afghanistan, contrary to the wishes of the British Government, to make representations regarding any object ("wasila"), the British Government should make their own arrangements to prevent his arrival, and give no trouble as to this prevention to the Afghan Government.

* Meaning (in my judgment) that should the assistance in money, &c., offered by British Government seem insufficient to the Afghan Government, they may be allowed to decline any assistance, while still permitting the residence of the British Officers.

(Sd.) F. R. Pollock, Commr. and Subdt.

* 4th. Should the British Government not give full aid in money, arms, &c., for the satisfactory promotion of the strength of Afghanistan, (other) assistance should be accepted on (lit. taken), and, without any desire for an exchange or equivalent, (the Cabul Government) should allow British officers to remain on the border merely on (the understanding of) the friendship (existing between the two Governments).

It remains to be seen what will happen thereafter: whatever happens will be reported.

Translation of Letter, dated 25th December 1876, from the Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

Yesterday I waited on the Ameer and asked His Highness to fix a date for the departure of the Sadr-i-Azim. His Highness observed: "Unless any accident occurs, the Sadr-i-Azim will be sent "with you on Sunday, the 31st December 1876. As the Sadr-i-Azim has been ill for some time, "care should be taken that (you proceed by) short marches." I submit this letter for your information. The date of arrival at Peshawur will be reported when we leave. It has been mentioned in to-day's diary that Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan desires to go to wait on the Akhlaqul Swat. I think he goes with the advice of the Durbar authorities. The real object in his going is probably this, that the Akhlaqul Swat may be consulted on those questions for the settlement of which the Sadr-i-Azim proceeds to British territory. Councils continue in this matter, and whatever further happens will be reported.

Memorandum by Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., dated Peshawur, 28th January 1877.

At noon this day I visited the Cabul Envoy, and was received by him in a friendly manner. I found him engaged with some written papers and books, and attended by two servants whom he dismissed on my entry.

After health enquiries on behalf of Sir Lewis Pelly, there was a prolonged pause, during which he maintained a thoughtful look, only breaking the silence to call a domestic and order tea to be served.
When the tea was brought, I took the opportunity to say that I hoped he found everything in the house to his liking, and begged that, if anything had been omitted, he would consider himself as in his own home and own what he wanted. He replied that he was perfectly happy and comfortable on that score, and that all the arrangements made for his reception were more than he could desire. He then paused again for a brief interval, and then observed that his thoughts dwelt on the business that had brought him here.

I said I hoped it would all turn out satisfactorily, as personally I had a great regard for himself and for the Ameer, and from my long acquaintance with the Afghan people felt an interest in their prosperity and welfare.

He replied—

"I reckon you as our friend, and I know that the Ameer esteems you as such, and often speaks of you in terms of commendation, but it is different with your Government. The Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government, and he has many reasons for this mistrust."

I observed that I was much concerned to hear him say this, as I had always considered that the disposition of the British Government towards that of the Ameer was of a most friendly character, and that I felt sure, from all that I knew, as a private individual, that his most earnest desire was to see the Ameer's Government strong and prosperous, and consolidated on a firm basis.

The Envoy rejoined with some animation—

"This is what you say. But the promises of your Government are of one sort and their acts of another. Now listen to me. I tell you what I know. It is twenty-two years since the Government of the Ameer made a treaty with John Lawrence Sahib, and it has not from that time to this diverged from it. At that time the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan refused to consent to the residence of British Officers in his country, because he knew it would alter the character of his people, the lawlessness of which they had killed Englishmen when the time of Shah Shuja's overthrow. Well, his解释 was accepted and friendship continued, and then after a time the Ameer (Sher Ali Khan) came down and met Lord Mayo. Again the question of British Officers was advanced, and on the same grounds objected to. After this you came with Pollock Sahib to Seistan. You will recollect that on one occasion he spoke in praise of Yakub Khan, and I immediately warned him that if he desired to secure the Ameer's confidence he would never mention the name of Yakub Khan again. Well, when I returned from Teheran I met Lord Northbrook, and discussed various matters at Simla, where the question of British Officers coming to Afghanistan was again mooted. Now, why all this pressing to send British Officers to Afghanistan when you declare that you have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan? It has roused the suspicion of the Ameer, and his suspicion is confirmed by the arbitrary acts of your Government, and he is now convinced that to allow British Officers to reside in his country would be to relinquish his own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on the Afghan people will be attached to his name, and he would sooner perish than submit to this. The British nation is great and powerful, and the Afghan people cannot resist its power, but the people of Afghanistan only respect those who have their honour and character respected. Now, I will tell you what has turned the Ameer's confidence from your Government (Sarkar). In Lord Mayo's time his confidence was perfect, and he agreed to refer all overtures and correspondence received from Russians to Lord Mayo, and to send back such replies as the British Government might desire, and he did so in perfect good faith. But what came to pass in the time of Lord Northbrook? I will now tell you. Lord Northbrook wrote to the Ameer on behalf of Yakub Khan, who was in prison at Cabul, to send him back to Herat, and said that if he were reinstated there the friendship between the Ameer's and the British Governments would be restored. The Ameer promised to allow the Envoy a free per-

The document is a letter discussing the relationship between the British and Afghan Governments, and the author's concerns regarding the Ameer's mistrust of the British Government. It highlights the tension between the two nations and the author's attempts to reassure the Ameer about the intentions of the British. The letter also mentions a previous proposal to allow British Officers to reside in Afghanistan and the consequences of this decision on the Ameer's confidence. The author concludes by expressing his hope for a resolution and a continuation of friendly relations. The document is signed by Lewiselly, Envoy.
Enclosure 35 in No. 36.

Peshawur, 50th January 1877.

First meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon, 30th January 1877.

Present:

Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah, Cabul Envoy.
Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at Court of Cabul.
Mir Akhbar Ahmed Khan, deputed by His Highness the Ameer of Cabul.
Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Interpreter.
Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary of the Cabul Envoy.

Sir Lewis Pelly opened the discussion, after compliments, by observing that His Highness the Ameer had addressed two letters to his Excellency the Viceroy, in one of which His Highness stated that he had deputed Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah as his Envoy to the British Government, and that he would make known His Highness's wishes; whilst in the other letter it was written that the Envoy above named would explain the reasons of His Highness's inability to take part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

On this the Cabul Envoy said that, with reference to the Ameer's inability to take part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, he would speak afterwards; but, with reference to the 1st letter, he would observe that there was no mention of any wishes on the part of the Ameer; the letter merely stated that the Ameer's Envoy would make known the state of affairs. In the first instance, the Commissioner of Peshawur wrote to the Ameer that Sir Lewis Pelly had been nominated as Envoy to His Highness, but the Ameer expressed his wish to send Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah down instead. The desire to send a British Envoy hadoriginated with the British Government. It devolves on the British Government to make known its wishes.

Sir Lewis Pelly observed that, on the arrival of the Viceroy in India, there were two matters which rendered it desirable that he should make a friendly communication to the Ameer, viz., the assumption by Her Majesty the Queen of the title of Empress of India, and the assumption by his Excellency of the office of Viceroy and Governor General of India. And his Excellency the Viceroy had considered that this communication would be most pleasantly made by sending a special Mission to His Highness's Court, thereby affording also an opportunity of discussing other important matters of State, and of removing any misapprehensions which might have occurred between the two Governments.

The Cabul Envoy here interposed with some energy and warmth, saying—

"Was the misapprehension (the Persian expression used was 'nahmauner', unevenness) on our part or on that of both sides? Further, when did the misapprehension occur—before the arrival of the Viceroy, or after? If before his arrival, then what is it? And if after, then also, what is it? For we have had no communication, and no misunderstanding has occurred since his arrival.

In reply, Sir Lewis Pelly observed that when the Viceroy arrived in India he perceived that some misunderstanding existed between the two Governments, and that was, in part, to clear up this misunderstanding, and make known the good wishes and friendship of the British Government, that the Viceroy desired to depute Sir Lewis Pelly as his Envoy to the Ameer. But when the Viceroy learned that the Ameer preferred, in the first instance, to depute Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah to India, or that the British Agent at Cabul should proceed to the Viceroy's Court in order to ascertain how matters really stood, his Excellency summoned the British Agent from Cabul, and, having heard all he had to say, again despatched him to Cabul with a friendly letter addressed to the Ameer, and with an "Aide Memoire" of that which His Excellency the Viceroy was prepared to do for the Ameer, provided the Ameer rendered this aid possible by consenting to certain essential conditions, and with instructions to explain them fully to His Highness the Ameer.

The Viceroy also intimated through his Agent that, should the Ameer so wish, his Excellency would depute Sir Lewis Pelly to meet Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah at Peshawur or elsewhere, and there negotiate. The Viceroy, having subsequently learned through his Agent that the Ameer accepted his "sine qua non" to opening negotiations, and had deputed his Minister Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah to negotiate at Peshawur, his deputed Sir Lewis Pelly to meet Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah at Peshawur, with the most friendly object of re-establishing the relations of the two Governments on a firm, and reliable, and lasting basis.

Accordingly, added Sir Lewis Pelly, his Excellency the Viceroy has concluded, from a perusal of the letter sent to his Excellency by his Agent at Cabul with the cognizance of the Ameer, and from the fact of the Ameer's Envoy having come to Peshawur, that the Ameer has accepted the "sine qua non" condition that British Officers may reside on the frontiers of Afghanistan for the purpose of their watching exterior events, and of informing their own Government as well as that of the Ameer of the state of affairs beyond the frontiers. The acceptance of the principle that British Officers may reside on the Afghan frontiers is absolutely necessary as a preliminary to the commencement of negotiations. This point being granted, other details can be discussed and settled hereafter. But, unless the principle of British Officers residing on the Afghan frontiers, and of informing the British Government of events passing on or beyond those frontiers, be conceded, it is impossible for the British Government to take upon itself the formal responsibility of assisting the Ameer to defend his country from the attacks of external foes.

Sayyid Noor Mahomed Shah desired more than once to interrupt and defer this point to a later period of the negotiation. But Sir Lewis Pelly begged that he might repeat that the Viceroy understands from the letter of his Excellency's Agent at Cabul, and from the arrival of His Highness's Envoy at Peshawar, that the principle of the residence of British Officers on the Afghan frontiers has been accepted and agreed to by the Ameer.

Sir Lewis Pelly then, and at the desire of the Cabul Envoy, reiterated the above condition, in order that it might be perfectly understood word for word, so that nothing might remain obscure. And Sir Lewis Pelly added that he desired to speak on this and all other matters with the greatest frankness and sincerity, and in the most friendly manner, so that all questions might be thoroughly understood by
both sides, and leave no room for its being subsequently said by either side that such and such words were not so understood at the time.

On this particular condition, however, Sir Lewis Pelly said he had no discretionary powers. His instructions from the Viceroy were categorical as to the admission of the principle that British Officers should be permitted to reside permanently on the frontiers of Afghanistan, and that, until he is clearly informed that the Ameer accepts this principle, Sir Lewis Pelly could not otherwise even commence negotiations, although the settlement of the details by which the arrangement would be carried out might form a subject of full and free discussion. It was far from being the wish or intention of the Viceroy unnecessarily to embarrass the Ameer.

The Cabul Envoy made no direct reply to this, but for some time busied himself in perusing the notes made by his Secretary, and then, after a few unimportant remarks in Pushtoo, referred again to the word "misapprehension," which had been translated "nahamidwi," and observed—

"In the commencement of the conversation Sir Lewis Pelly said that Syud Noor Mahomed Shah had been deputed to meet Sir Lewis Pelly to clear up some misapprehension. What was this misapprehension? He pleased to inform me, in order that I may be prepared to discuss the point."

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he was not sure whether the precise word "nahamidwi" was in the Viceroy's communications. But he would look at them again, and inform the Cabul Envoy at the next meeting. Meanwhile Sir Lewis Pelly was bound by the exact words of the Viceroy's letter.

The Mir Akhor, having twice fallen asleep during the discussion, now begged permission to proceed to say his prayers, and the meeting closed.

Before separating, the hour for the next meeting was fixed at 3 p.m. on the following day, Wednesday, 31st January 1877.

Memo.

Peshawur, 30th January 1877.

Before leaving the room, however, the Cabul Envoy said he wished to say, as a private individual, and not in an official sense, one word which was in his mind—

"Your Government," he said, "is a powerful and great one; ours is a small and weak one; we have long been on terms of friendship, and the Ameer now clings to the skirt of the British Government, and till his hand be cut off he will not relax his hold of it.

"Whatever be the issue of our negociations, personally I shall always entertain the sentiments of brotherhood with you (Sir Lewis Pelly) in remembrance of your kindness to me at Bushir, which I have often mentioned in Durbar. However this business may be decided, our wish is only for friendship with the British Government."

Enclosure 36 in No. 36.

Peshawur, 1st February 1877."

SECOND MEETING between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon, on the 1st February 1877.

PRESENT:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter.
Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Cabul Envoy.
Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer.
Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary of the Cabul Envoy.

Sir Lewis Pelly began by observing, in reference to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah's question put at the close of the last conference, that the word "nahamidwi" appeared to him to represent the meaning he desired to convey.

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah asked the meaning of the word "nahamidwi," and was informed that it meant "unevenness," but that, if another expression were desired, the word "fahmi na sawal" or misapprehension, would do.

Sir Lewis Pelly referred the Envoy to the Viceroy's letter dated 11th October, and to the "Aide Mémoire" given by the Viceroy to the British Agent for the information of the Ameer. The Aide Mémoire was then read by the British Agent.

The Envoy remarked that the Aide Mémoire stated the apprehension and anxiety to be on the Viceroy's part.

Sir Lewis Pelly then caused the Aide Mémoire to be again read, and pointed out that the object expressed was to "relieve his (the Ameer's) mind from many apprehensions as to my (the Viceroy's) intentions, which appear to have been caused by circumstances previous to my (the Viceroy's) assumption of the Government of India, and by a policy which His Highness had considered to be neither hot nor cold."

The Envoy asked what apprehensions (qadech), as the Ameer has had none? He has never committed any act contrary to correspondence which has taken place between the two Governments, and has therefore given no cause to awaken anxiety on the part of the British Government.

The Syud then remarked parenthetically that he hoped Sir Lewis Pelly would not suppose that he wished to give unnecessary trouble in asking this question. Sir Lewis Pelly replied "By no means. We shall never arrive at a really satisfactory understanding concerning the future until we have thoroughly understood and cleared up the past." Sir Lewis Pelly continued that he would endeavour
to explain some among the apprehensions (andaasha), and which appeared to have been consequent upon certain wishes and requests made known by the Ameer at the conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa in 1869, and at the interviews of Syud Noor Mahomed Shah himself at Simla in 1873, and in a communication received through the British Agent at Cabul in May 1873.

The Envoy asked Sir Lewis Pelly to specify the wishes and requests to which he alluded. Sir Lewis Pelly then caused the following extract from the Note of the interview which had taken place between Lord Mayo and the Ameer on the 29th March 1869 to be translated to the Envoy:

**Extract.**

"To this the Ameer replied that the friendship with his father was a 'dry friendship' and one-sided; he seemed unwilling, though pressed on the subject, to give any more distinct or decided expression to his feelings and wishes, though his Minister at last explained that they were, first, guarantee of the Ameer and his family against all comers whilst in actual possession of the throne; second, such present assistance in money and arms as could be given.'

"At length, after some hesitation, and conversation in Pushtoo with his Minister, Noor Mahomed, he declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognize and acknowledge, not only himself, but his lineal successors in blood (munee oueladi muus*), and this phrase he repeated several times, with great earnestness and emphasis. He explained again and at some length that to acknowledge the ruler pro tem. and de facto was to invite competition for a throne and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that, if the British Government would recognize him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his or his descendants' part should vitiate all engagements on ours."

The Envoy begged the favour of Sir Lewis Pelly causing translations of all the documents he had referred to being made for his (the Envoy's) perusal, and that the further discussion of the Ameer's requests and apprehensions might be deferred pending the preparation of those translations.

The Envoy, having observed that it was necessary in these discussions to proceed link by link of the chain, otherwise confusion would ensue, begged that the meeting might now terminate for to-day.

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**Enclosure 37 in No. 36.**

**Note.**

Peshawur, 3rd February 1877.

The translations promised at the last interview having been sent this morning to the Cabul Envoy, Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded to the conference room at the hour appointed for meeting. On arrival there he received, through the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, a verbal message from the Cabul Envoy to the effect that he had received the translations and had perused them. He would now refer to his own papers, and make his reply on Monday; till these translations were replied to and disposed of, he could not enter upon the discussion of other questions. But he would be glad to meet Sir Lewis Pelly now in an unofficial manner if convenient.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that he would be happy to meet the Envoy in the manner proposed at the conference room.

The Envoy having arrived, Sir Lewis Pelly observed that he was willing to meet the Envoy's wishes for a postponement of further discussion until Monday, 5th instant, at noon. And that, in view to obviate unnecessary delay, he would now ask the Envoy whether he had a clear recollection of the contents of the *Aide Mémoire* sent by the Viceroy for the information of the Ameer by the hand of Nawab Mahomed Atta Khan. Sir Lewis Pelly added that, if the Envoy so wished, he would be happy to cause the *Aide Mémoire* now to be read over to him.

The Envoy asked for a copy of the *Aide Mémoire*, and Sir Lewis Pelly said he would telegraph to the Viceroy on the subject.

Sir Lewis Pelly then mentioned that the Viceroy has expressed his desire for a most friendly and suitable reception of the Envoy, and doubtless would be glad to hear of his comfort and happiness. The Envoy begged Sir Lewis Pelly to submit his respectful compliments to the Viceroy, and remarked that on all previous occasions of his coming to British territory he had been made most comfortable and happy by the honourable reception accorded to him, but on this occasion he had been treated with even greater consideration, and could find no words to express his gratitude. His happiness, the Envoy continued, was perfect whilst he was here, but its endurance would depend upon the way in which he should part from Sir Lewis Pelly after completing his negotiations.

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that the Envoy was well aware of the sincerely friendly intentions of the Viceroy, and that it would depend on the Ameer whether the Envoy's departure should prove as happy as he desired.

The Envoy replied—"No, it depends on you," and, then correcting himself, added, "In truth, it depends neither on you nor on the Ameer, but on justice."

It was then arranged that the Envoy and Sir Lewis Pelly should resume their discussions on Monday, 5th instant, at noon.
Meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadri-I-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at 11 a.m., 5th February 1877.

Present:

The Afghan Envoy stated, in his note of the first conference, that he finds that the andeshka (anxiety) was prior to the arrival of the present Viceroy.

The Envoy proceeded to say that he does not consider the present Viceroy as distinct from his predecessor.

"I confidently believe," he said, "the present Viceroy will acknowledge in their exactitude all the conditions and agreements that the English Government have made with the Afghan Government, and every agreement which the present Viceroy makes with the Afghan Government after any length of time, every Viceroy who shall succeed him will recognize the agreements of this Viceroy as well as of those who have preceded him. But, if this Viceroy should make an agreement, and a successor should say, I am not bound to it?"

Sir Lewis Pelly replied with reference to the old Treaty. The Envoy here interrupted, and said all Sir Lewis Pelly was about to say would come afterwards, and wanted a yes or no. Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that, with the permission of the Envoy, he would make his own remarks in the manner which might appear to him to be proper.

As regards the old Treaty, Sir Lewis Pelly repeated—"It appears that it gave no satisfaction to the Ameer, who had repeatedly requested an agreement of a more specific and detailed character.

The Viceroy has now recently offered to the Ameer a Treaty of a more specific and intimate character, viz., a Treaty of defensive and offensive alliance, and one tending to strengthen and secure his dynasty and power by the public recognition and support of the British Government, provided the Ameer should agree to the conditions which are absolutely necessary as a means towards enabling the Viceroy to carry out the heavy obligations he would undertake under such an instrument.

These conditions were long ago explained to the Ameer by the Agent, and the Ameer took two months to deliberate, after which he accepted the conditions preliminary to negotiation, and deputed his Envoy with full powers. The Viceroy now confidently expects a prompt and definite reply to his request, since, if that principle were not admitted, he (Sir Lewis Pelly) would not be permitted to reside on the frontiers, and till the arrival of the present Viceroy, has always been mentioned in our past correspondence. And we are firmly of those opinions now. Therefore, how can we consent to the addition of such hard conditions, the performance of which in Afghanistan will be impossible, as we can show by many proofs?"

Sir Lewis Pelly asked whether the Envoy intended him to understand that the Ameer declines to admit the principle of the condition that British Officers should be permitted to reside on the frontiers of Afghanistan for the purpose of watching events beyond those frontiers, and of reporting to the Ameer and the British Government. Sir Lewis Pelly added that he would beg the favour of the Envoy’s affording a well-considered reply, since, if that principle were not admitted, he (Sir Lewis Pelly) would be unable to open negotiations for the proposed Treaty of Alliance.

The Envoy replied—"If the Ameer saw the welfare of both sides in such a difficult matter, and consented to it, where would be the necessity of all this talking? Therefore now, after mentioning the considerations as to the inadvisability of this matter, I will discuss the proposals for the settlement of the conditions, in this very particular, of the residence of British Officers, without entering upon other matters in regard to the Treaty, in so clear and friendly a manner that it may be thoroughly understood by both sides, and this, in order that no doubt may remain in the mind of either party. With respect to the extracts from the records of the Meeting at Umballa, which you have given me, I desire to comment upon them, that they may all be made clear, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, in the course of the friendship of the two Governments, in any matter which may hereafter become the cause of regret."

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Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he would be most happy, and was most desirous, to discuss all the details of the proposed Treaty, but that before doing so he must be explicitly assured that the above-mentioned principle is accepted. On this point Sir Lewis Pelly had no discretionary power. He trusted, therefore, that the Envoy would not impute to him any want of courtesy or inclination to negotiate if he again requested the favour of the Envoy’s distinctly informing him whether the Ameer adheres to his assurance that the above-mentioned principle is admitted, or whether His Highness now withdraws from that assurance. And Sir Lewis Pelly again explained that the reason for the Viceroy declaring the admission of this principle to be a sine quan non to the opening of negotiations is that he cannot formally take on himself the weighty object for present negociation, except to the Ameer, prepared to allow him the means by which alone he can satisfactorily observe, and become informed of, events alone he can satisfactorily observe, and become informed of, events.

The Cabul Envoy replied—“I have nothing to say as to the consideration of the Treaty, but my object for present consideration is this, viz., that I may explain to you the true facts of past circum-
stances in reference to this subject, and what is the desire of the Ameer, and also what are the views of the whole Afghan people, who withdraw from this proposal; I beg you first to listen to what I say, and to consider whether you may understand it, and no doubt may remain on the subject.”

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he would be glad to hear him.

The Cabul Envoy then said—“The meeting between the Ameer and Sir D. Macleod took place at Lahore and at Umballa. But what you have stated that the Ameer said is not so; because the Ameer expressed no wish for any Government matter, and his coming was merely to make known his friendship, in order that it might be known to everybody that at the time of revolution in his country, he did not ask after my welfare, but that I, at the first opportunity, came down; that, in accordance with his friendship and past agreement and correspondence, I might show that I was constant and firm.” And this was known to the British Agent at that time, as was written to Lord Lawrence. Again, at Lahore Sir D. Macleod desired an interview, and it was at his desire the meeting took place. Whatever was advanced was advanced by Sir D. Macleod, and the Ameer only replied to him. And now it is said the Ameer made the first advance.

Again, regarding the letter not satisfying his friends in Afghanistan, and by his returning without its alteration, they would consider he had gained nothing by his journey.” I beg to observe that those words did not occur in that interview. Yes; the word dushmani (enmity) did occur, and I will explain in this meeting how it came to be mentioned. But what is written in the extract—“this is not possible, and he (the Ameer) allowed it to pass, but said that, if he did so and so, according to our decision, he hoped the Queen would be informed that his wish was still such”—is not correct. This also was not said on that day. The copy of the written record of that day’s interview is here; let it be examined and ascertained how the fact stood, see paragraph 5, etc., who asked the question and alteration was the reply? But the paragraph about dushmani (enmity) is correct, for the Ameer said—“Let the enemies and friends of both sides be equally considered enemies and friends.” It will be seen in paragraph 6 of the record.

But in the Simla discussion with Lord Northbrook the word dushmani (enmity) was omitted in official papers, and the Ameer also was pleased with this. When I come to mention the discussion at Simla, I will more carefully explain this matter, and it will also be borne out by the papers of the Ameer.

In reply, Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that there appeared to be a difference between the Afghan and the English records of the proceedings at the Umballa Conference. He could only go upon the records on which he was instructed; but, in regard to the letter of Sir D. Macleod, Sir Lewis Pelly believed that, although the interview may have had place at Lahore, it was reported from Umballa, as the letter is dated from that place.

The Cabul Envoy continued—“The interview between the Ameer and Lord Mayo also was owing to a privately expressed wish on the part of Lord Mayo. Gray Sahib came to me, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and said that Lord Mayo expressed his wish to speak with the Ameer in private. The Ameer consented to his wish, and they had a meeting. Therefore I now ask, according to your own records of that meeting, and not according to my own account of it. According to your statement, the Ameer said this. What did Lord Mayo say in reply to the Ameer, to produce an anxiety (anulokan) in the mind of the Ameer on his return from Umballa? What did Lord Mayo convey to the Ameer? What was the wish to remove anxiety from the mind of the Ameer? Some of the translated papers you have given me are correct, and are remembered by me.”

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that apparently the anxiety was caused in the Ameer’s mind through the British Government deeming that it was not then necessary to formulate all the Ameer’s wishes in a Treaty.

The Cabul Envoy replied—“I hope our friendship will always remain strong and lasting on both sides, in accordance with the old agreements; but if such very serious discussions are to arise in the future, I do not understand at any time upon doubtful expressions, it gives room for much regret and despair. I also desire to state that at Umballa, after the interview between Lord Mayo and the Ameer, a written paper was drawn up and given to the Ameer. These words, which you have written as from the Ameer, should appear in that document. Let it be referred to, for the question was then settled by it. Since then there has been no reference to the subject. Let that paper be consulted, for from it the matter will be well ascertained and understood, and it is incumbent, to act upon its terms, and not to permit any transgression of them; and if they are transgressed it will be a cause of great regret to us. Further, in my opinion, the Ameer returned from Umballa without anxiety.”
Sir Lewis Pelly begged to be informed what written paper the Cabul Envoy referred to, and whether he could bring a copy or give its date.

The Cabul Envoy said he would produce a copy of it at the next meeting if possible, and if not, would at all events indicate its date. The Conference was fixed to meet at noon to-morrow, and then broke up.

Mir Akhor left at 1 p.m., or before.

Enclosure 39 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadri-azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 6th February 1877.

Present:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, Dr. H. W. Belieu, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly, Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul, Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by Ameer of Cabul, Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to Cabul Envoy.

The Cabul Envoy began by saying he would give Sir Lewis Pelly a copy of the convention (scritti) made between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at Umballa; and if he would observe, by way of precaution, there would be some slight difference in the copy, it would not be of an important kind. The Cabul Envoy then read the above letter, and Sir Lewis Pelly begged he might be favoured with a copy of it.

To this the Cabul Envoy replied, he would give him a copy on condition of his discussion was disposed of, and he entered into discussion of details.

Sir Lewis Pelly remarked that he was at present awaiting a reply to a telegram which he had last evening addressed to the Viceroy, and that in the meantime he would not press for an explanation of the discussion to which the Cabul Envoy referred. Sir Lewis Pelly would only remark en passant that, had the Ameer not still retained anxiety in his mind after the conclusion of the Umballa Conference, it is improbable that he would have addressed to Lord Northbrook, through the British Agent, his letter of 1873, and have deputed Syud Noor Mahomed Shah himself to the Conference which ensued on the Ameer's letter.

"The Cabul Envoy replied that, whenever you do press for a discussion, it will be well. My desire is that I may make clear these matters with the greatest pleasure to you, that no doubt may remain in the mind of either party. In my making these explanations to you, all these particulars will be in their proper places made known to you. After you have well weighed them, let me know whatever is your opinion."

Before separating, some friendly conversation took place, which the Envoy requested might not be put in the Record of Proceedings. Finally the Envoy explained, in reference to his statement of yesterday, that he did not intend by it either to reject or accept the Agency clause; that he begged to be allowed two or three more days in which to state what the Ameer had directed him to submit, and that he would then give a definite answer to the question of Agency.

P.S.—My principal object in endeavouring to obtain the Envoy's Persian version is to compare it with the English version. As the Envoy read the Persian, it seemed to me that the words conveyed more than Lord Mayo intended to express; for example, my ear caught the Persian words for severe punishment in connection with the eventualty of internal disturbance of the Ameer's rule.

Enclosure 40 in No. 3.

Note of Dr. Bellieu's Private Interview with Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, dated Peshawar, 7th February 1877. (Extract.)

The Cabul Envoy, though better to-day, was not well enough to attend Conference, and desired Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan to explain the reasons of his inability to do so to Sir Lewis Pelly. The Nawab stated that the Cabul Envoy was in some pain till nearly midnight, and then after the employment of his own remedies fell asleep, and is better to-day, but still not fit to do business.

At 2 p.m. I visited the Cabul Envoy, to inquire after his health on behalf of Sir Lewis Pelly. He received me in his private sitting room. I found him alone, with one servant in attendance, whom he dismissed on my entry. The Envoy had just risen from his couch, on which he had been reclining. After compliments, and a lengthy account of his illness, which it appears is the result of a chronic stricture of the urethra of many years standing, he remarked that the hard work during the preceding two days of writing his Despatches to the Ameer on the subject of his conferences with Sir L. Pelly, and which occupied him far into the night, had somewhat fatigued him, but that the rest he had enjoyed to-day had restored him to his usual health.

The Cabul Envoy continued that he would be able to resume his conference with Sir Lewis Pelly to-morrow, and begged that I would intimate to Sir Lewis Pelly that he wished to state his own case on the part of the Ameer's Government in detail, beginning with the Treaty made by the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan with Sir John Lawrence, then with a review of the meeting between the present
Ameer and Lord Mayo, and finally with a brief summary of the discussions he had with Lord Northbrook at Simla. He begged that he might be heard throughout without remark or reply on the part of Sir Lewis Pelly, and that all be stated might be at the time taken down in writing. When he had finished his statement, which he said he hoped to do in two sittings, he would beg Sir Lewis Pelly to consider and weigh well all that he had said, and then to state on his own part the proposals he had to make on behalf of the British Government. He did not wish for an immediate rejoinder, the Envoy continued, from Sir Lewis Pelly, but would prefer that he considered and weighed all that had been stated by him (the Cabul Envoy) with care and foresight, for three or four or more days, before he (Sir Lewis Pelly) entered on the subject of the proposals of the British Government. The Cabul Envoy would then hear all that Sir Lewis Pelly had to say, and would in his turn give a final and definite reply, which would settle the business.

The Cabul Envoy here paused a short time, and then said:—"It is a very serious business, and this is the last time that the Ameer will treat with the British Government. God grant that the issue be favourable (well). But you must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear, and if you overload us the responsibility rests with you." I interposed here, and asked the Cabul Envoy what the burden was which he alluded to. He at once replied:—"The residence of British Officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan." He then went on with some warmth and excitement to enlarge upon the objections of the Afghan people to the presence of foreigners in their territories, and upon the difficulty the Ameer would experience in protecting them from insult and injury in the event of his acceding to the condition of their residence in his country. He said further that he did not see why they were wanted on the frontiers at all, and, even if there, what good they could do; for they would be utterly useless and helpless without the cordial support of the Ameer.

I remarked that it was of course understood that the Ameer, in accepting the condition of British Officers being posted as Government Agents on his frontiers, if indeed he did accept the condition, did so with the conviction that it was for his own advantage, and was prepared to protect them and assist them as friends of himself and his Government.

The Cabul Envoy, in reply, shook his head negatively, and said:—"We mistrust you, and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us and load to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands." I replied that I felt sure that the disposition of the British Government towards that of the Ameer was most friendly, and that its sincere wish was to see the Ameer's and Lord Russia's residence firmly secured on the throne of Cabul as its trusty friends of himself and his Government.

On the contrary, I continued, the British Government not only entirely withheld from any attempt to enter their territories, but altogether abstained from interference in their internal affairs, and at the same time, as a mark of its good-will, whilst exacting no concession from them in return, allowed these border tribes the most free access to its territories, and granted them the same protection of the laws as its own subjects enjoyed. "You may rest assured," I added, "that it is the sincere wish of the British Government to see the Ameer and his dynasty firmly secured on the throne of Cabul as its trusty friends and allies, and it behoves the Ameer to ponder well before he rejects its proffered friendship."

The Cabul Envoy replied that the Ameer and his people thoroughly appreciated the friendship of the British Government. "We know," he said, "who rescued Herat from the Persians and gave it to the late Ameer. We will not now speak of Seistan, but we know who assisted Turkey against Russia in the Crimea, and we know who is the friend of Turkey in this Servian revolt. We know on which side our interests lie. But this is a question I shall discuss in conference with Sir Lewis Pelly."

Referring again to the Servian revolt, the Cabul Envoy enquired whether it was true, as commonly stated, that the Russians had instigated the rebellion, and, producing a map, asked me to point out the positions on it of Herzegovina, Servia, Bulgaria, Crimea, Circassia, &c. Whilst looking over the map, the Cabul Envoy enquired how it was that the nations of Europe permitted Russia to send her soldiers to fight in the Servian ranks whilst the Russian Ambassador remained at Constantinople.

I told him my information did not enable me to answer his enquiry. The Cabul Envoy then alluded to the military preparations of Russia, and, pointing to Circassia on the map, said the corps d'armées there were in a position to threaten both Turkey and Persia.

The Cabul Envoy next observed that he was to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at 4 o'clock, and I consequently took leave of him.
Enclosure 41 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sad-i-Azim, Envoy of Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 8th February 1877.

PRESENT:
Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
Dr. H. W. Bellow, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
Munshi Mohammed Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

Syud Noor Mahomed Shah opened the discussion by stating that he wished to make a detailed statement of his case on the part of the Ameer, and begged that he might be heard throughout without reply from Sir Lewis Pelly, until he had finished what he had to say, which he desired might be taken down in writing.

Sir Lewis Pelly observed that he would gladly accede to the request of Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, and hear what he had to say.

On this, without further remarks, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah said—

"In respect to the paper of the British Agent in 1873, with an extract from which I have been furnished by Sir Lewis Pelly, I am not well informed regarding it. I do not know whether the Ameer actually did so speak word for word; but I may say, in respect to the perfect candour of the Ameer's heart towards the British Government, which he then had and still has, that in all his conversations with the British Agent he explained the state of affairs in his usual friendly manner.

"Again, with respect to the terms of the letters (vasika) of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, who wrote— Always write and communicate with the British Government, in regard to matters between the two Governments, without fear. If the whole of that letter be here quoted, it will lead to delay, I therefore refer to the letter of the 20th of October, in which Lord Lawrence wrote— 'The consent and approval of Her Majesty the Queen of England has been accorded to this letter after mature reflection and deliberation.' Therefore, in order to reassure the authorities of the British Government, lest they should think the Ameer does not respect those promises, and, in his own opinion considers these promises of the British Government as worthless, I may state that, if the authorities of the British Government have a regard for their own promises and act upon them with sincerity, in accordance with the customary friendship which was formerly, and is now, observed between the two Governments, there is no ground for any anxiety.

"I will also mention the reason for this in a friendly manner, after the settlement of the question now before us, should the decision turn upon details; otherwise not.

"Again, in regard to the meetings I had with Lord Northbrook and the Foreign Secretary at Simla, as mentioned in the paper furnished to me by Sir Lewis Pelly, I beg to observe that so many discussions were held in that place that not a single subject was left out; but if all those discussions were to be gone over and explained now it would so lengthen what I have to say that I should fail in my object. I will therefore speak of them in a summarised manner.

"In the first place, I would ask whether my going there was by the desire of the Ameer or by the desire of Lord Northbrook. Again, out of all the discussions which took place there repeatedly, and in which not a single subject escaped mention, I am now only furnished with an extract in which the head and foot are concealed and something from the waist is made known; or, in other words, one paragraph of its many paragraphs is brought forward, and so on.

"First, as to what it is alleged that I said there. The subject alluded to was there discussed and decided and finally settled, and not a shred of the various questions discussed was allowed to remain unconsidered. So it should be now.

"Then, in respect to the word 'wishes.' It was not that the Ameer deputed me of his own wish. It was in this wise:— The British Government, in the first instance, wrote to the British Agent to inform the Ameer that in these days certain matters are appearing in the newspapers. They are not to be relied upon. The object of my writing is that the former Viceroy had written to you on a certain date, saying that the communications addressed by the British Government to the Russian Government continued in force.

"In the next place, in letters written to the British Agent on the 23rd and 26th of March 1873 by the British Government, it was stated that an officer of rank would proceed to Cabul in order to explain to the Ameer the final settlement of the Scitian question. The Cabul authorities gave their reply to these letters through the British Agent. In summary, it was to the effect that the circumstances of the final settlement are not known to us. We wish to be informed of the nature of the settlement, and if it be in accordance with the views and powers of this God-granted Government, then so much the better. But if not, and it be contrary to the views and power of this Government, then the state of our affairs will be notified to the English Government. And, if the coming of the above-mentioned officer be for some other matter connected with the welfare of Afghanistan, let us be informed of it.

"In reply to this, the British Agent received a letter, dated 12th October 1873. In that letter it was stated that the purpose of the sincere friend is this, that a British officer should be deputed for two objects, viz., the instruction of the final decision of the Scitian question, and also of certain matters connected with the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, in order that he may explain certain communications which have passed between the two exalted Governments of England and Russia, and regarding which the Viceroy previously wrote.'
"When the Ameer perceived that Lord Northbrook was very persistent, the Ameer communicated his views, in conformity with his customary friendship, to the British Agent. In brief, they were to the effect that 'having perused the letters of the Viceroy of India, dated 24th June 1870 and 1st May 1872, and 9th May 1872, and also the letters of General Von Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, concerning the former arrangements made for the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, and which are now before me, it seems, in my opinion, suitable that the Governor-General of India should, in the first instance, honour my Agent with an interview, in order that he may learn the nature of the new communications regarding the frontiers referred to, and ascertain the views of the British Government; and, after having thoroughly understood these, he should return to me, in order that I may consider how they may be gradually carried out.'

"On the receipt of this communication by the Viceroy of India, the Viceroy, in the spirit of the agreement which existed between the two Governments, asked that an official of the Ameer's might be deputed to him. The Ameer accordingly deputed me (Syud Noor Mahomed Shah) as his Envoy to the British Government. Lord Northbrook, on the conclusion of the discussion on the 30th August 1873, said to me (Syud Noor Mahomed Shah)—I have asked for you to be deputed 'from a wish of my own.' This fact will be seen by reference to the discussion. The 'wishes,' therefore, 'on whose part were they?' And as to other wishes also, it will be seen from the discussions, by whom they were expressed,—I refer to the discussion of 12th July 1873 at Simla. Ascertain from whose side the desire for the discussion originated. In that discussion I received from Lord Northbrook re-assurances as to the absence of aggression on the part of the Russians, and also on the part of those tribes which are under the influence of the Russians, and at the same time I ascertained that there was a possibility of aggression. This threw a doubt upon the letter of 24th June 1870 from Lord Mayo, which in the matter of confirming the communication of General Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkistan, stated—'There is a perfect assurance; do not on your part bring any doubt upon it.' And so also with other promises from that side of the North, the detail of which here is not necessary, because you can consult those papers in which the explanation is recorded.

"In that meeting Lord Northbrook, of himself, observed without my asking him—'It is necessary that the Ameer be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is situated between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous that the Government of Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' He also said of his own accord, without my expressing any wish on the subject,—'In regard to invasion of the Afghan frontier by a foreign enemy, it is probable that in such case the English would assist the Ruler of Afghanistan in repelling such aggressors.' But the nature of this assistance was left obscure both in his writings and sayings. When I saw that Lord Northbrook was, without any expression of views on my part, very persistent in this particular matter, I said, owing to his persistence, that the people of Afghanistan did not place so much reliance on the promises of Russia as they did upon the assistance of the British Government. I said also that I could not speak further on the subject with him, nor could I say all that was in my mind until I had considered the matter and talked it over with the Foreign Secretary. This concluded our interview. The reason I had for not discussing this subject with Lord Northbrook was that I did not consider it suitable to do so orally, without previous conversation with the Foreign Secretary."

At this point Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, who had evidently been somewhat inconvenienced by his ailment during the latter part of his statement, paused, and, expressing himself unable to continue the topic, begged that the Conference might be adjourned to Saturday.
As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th of July, that I said, 'It is necessary that the Ameer should be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is a `buffer' between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous for Hindostan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against Russia, does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that 'even a friendly Government can become an aggressor. But the English Government, considering the repeated certain assurances which they have received from the Russian Government, cannot entertain any likelihood of it.' After hearing this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance.

As regards the name of Russia, which I mentioned in connection with aggression, it was owing to an observation made by Lord Northbrook in the interview of the 12th of July, that I said, 'It is necessary that the Ameer should be informed that, since the country of Afghanistan is a `buffer' between the territories of the English and Russian Governments, it is therefore advantageous for Hindostan that Afghanistan should be strong and independent.' Therefore, since he called Afghanistan the buffer against Russia, does this, or not, prove the aggression of Russia? Ultimately the Viceroy observed that 'even a friendly Government can become an aggressor. But the English Government, considering the repeated certain assurances which they have received from the Russian Government, cannot entertain any likelihood of it.' After hearing this, I remained silent, because I thought that unity and friendship between Governments is a matter of the greatest importance.
"Again, at the time of his departure, Lord Northbrook sent a communication to the Ameer, the substance of which I will now repeat from memory. If there should be some slight difference in the wording, let it not be a matter of blame. In brief, its substance was to this effect—"I am going, and I leave with the friendship remaining on the same firm footing as before, and my successor will also maintain the same course."

"Therefore, till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook, that previous course continued to be observed. From the discussions, then, that have taken place in these meetings at Peshawar, what anxiety can there be in the mind of the Ameer, that you should now remove it?"

The Cabul Envoy here observed that he had now concluded what he desired to say, and that there was no grievance in the mind of the Ameer in respect to the matters referred to by Sir Lewis Pelly, but that discontent had really found place in the Ameer's mind in connection with other questions; and if Sir Lewis Pelly would permit him to enumerate the causes of this discontent in a friendly unofficial way, and without provoking controversy by a reply, he (the Envoy) would do so.

Sir Lewis Pelly expressed his readiness to hear whatever the Cabul Envoy might have to say, and begged to inform him that it was the desire of the Viceroy to learn all the causes of anxiety that there may be in the mind of the Ameer.

The Cabul Envoy then proceeded to say that if any anxiety have already come into the mind of the Ameer, or should hereafter come, it will be from other causes. "I will, therefore, owing to friendship and expectation of favour, mention some of them.

"The first cause is this:—At the end of the year 1869, or in the beginning of the following year, all the Chiefs of Beloochistan, having been honoured by an interview with the Ameer at Cabul, presented a petition the purport of which was to present a petition the purport of which was to a11 the Chiefs of Beloochistan, having been honoured by an interview with the Ameer, that you should now remove it?

"The second cause is this:—In regard to the matter of Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan, it was written in a communication from Lord Mayo that 'if efforts and endeavours should appear on the part of domestic rivals, in order to disturb the position of that kind friend in the Government of Cabul, and again kindle the fire of civil war, this circumstance will certainly be the cause of the severe displeaseure of the English Government,' and further, from time to time, they will adopt such means and measures in this matter as may be deemed advisable under the circumstances of the time.

"Moreover, I told Commissioner Pollock Sahib, in the journey to Seistan, that 'if you value the friendship of the Ameer, do not say anything in this matter.' Of course he will have written to his own Government.

"Again, Mr. Macnabb in 1873 wrote to the British Agent—"Inform the Ameer that on the part of the British Government nothing will be said to the Ameer.'

"Further, in the interview at Simla one day, the conversation between Lord Northbrook and myself turned accidentally on this subject. Lord Northbrook said to me orally—'In the matter of Yakub Khan, I have no concern that I should say why and wherefore, or do so and do so. In such matters, if the Ameer should ask my advice, I will advise him according to my knowledge; whether he act upon that or not, it does not matter to me, because the Ameer will do what he considers advisable for his own welfare.'

"Consequently, when the Ameer, for State reasons of expediency, prohibited Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan from returning to Herat, and imprisoned him, the English Government, in place of severe displeasure and efforts and endeavours, in order that the foundation of the Government of the Ameer should be strong, and in spite of the declaration of the above-mentioned Lord Sahib that 'I have no concern in this matter,' wrote to the British Agent through Ommannay Sahib, the Deputy Commissioner, who said—'A telegram has arrived from the Foreign Secretary to Government of India.

"Be so good as to inform His Highness the Ameer that the Viceroy urgently desires the observance of those conditions on which Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan came, that they should be fulfilled. In this case, the good name of the Ameer and the friendship of the British Government will remain intact, and the Viceroy will be glad if he is re-assured as soon as possible in regard to the above-mentioned circumstances, and that he also be informed of the real state of the case.'

"Now I will put the question—Is this, or is it not, an interference in the affairs of the Afghan Government, tending to diminish its independence?

"Again, that which you have written by way of note furnished to me in this present Conference, to the effect that 'we will bind ourselves in writing that, should any disturbance arise within Afghanistan, the English Government, supporting the Ameer, will suppress the internal disturbance,' Now, since Lord Mayo has already given a writing in this matter, what necessity is there for its repetition? Let that document be acted upon.

"It is sufficient, and, if that should not be sufficient, in what manner can the present writing suffice?"

At this point the Cabul Envoy, expressing himself fatigued by the day's exertions, begged that the meeting might be adjourned, and observed that he hoped to finish all he had to say, in putting forward the statement of his friendly and unofficial explanations, at the next Conference.
Enclosure 43 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sahir-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 12th February 1877.

Present:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer of Cabul.
Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

After interchange of the usual complimentary greetings, the Cabul Envoy requested permission to continue his friendly and unofficial statement of miscellaneous anxieties which had heretofore arisen in the mind of the Ameer.

The Envoy then said the third cause of anxiety was this: In the matter of Ibrahim Khan going with a letter and presents from the English Government to the Mir of Wakhan, for the reason that the said Mir had hospitably entertained Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and other officers. In the first instance, intimation was received by the British Agent at Cabul that he should obtain the permission of the Ameer for his coming. The Cabul authorities expressed many objections in the matter to the Agent, the detail of which objections you can ascertain from the records of the Agent, and part of them is to this effect, viz., that this course is contrary to the observance of the rule and customs of the two exalted Governments, and it is not even the usage of this country. This matter was yet under consideration, and no final answer was received from the English Government, when the above-named Ibrahim Khan came to Cabul without the permission of the Ameer.

Now I beg you to observe this:—When a servant of the Ameer's Government, by the permission of that Government, performs an act of hospitality, and employs some local Malik (Chief) of these on the spot on that duty, and then a letter from the Viceroy, or the Lieutenant-Governor of Lahore, is sent with presents to that local Malik, it raises a doubt in the minds of the people as to what may have been said to that local Malik, the Mir of Wakhan. Many speculations on this subject are already current amongst the people of Afghanistan, and in this matter particularly they now say,—On one occasion a Salih came by permission for one or two days to the frontier, and even then there was so much wilfulness (tivitak as obstinacy) that a letter with presents was sent to the Malik of that place by the Viceroy of India. If they be permitted to reside on our frontiers, in the course of time, what may not occur? And how shall we provide against such a difficulty? For in this matter of Wakhan they have directly interfered in the affairs of Afghanistan.

The fourth cause was in the matter of the Seistan question, the decision of which is known, and consequently needs no repetition: for if I entered into its explanation, it would greatly prolong the business; but if there be a necessity for its explanation, I will refer to it after the special subject now before us is disposed of, shall I consider it advisable at the time; otherwise I will not.

Now, if there be cause for anxiety (andesha) in such matters as those referred to, there is much more in the proposal which is now under discussion, for its adoption in Afghanistan is very difficult, and its result will be the very reverse (parahemen) of what you had in view; because, referring to the former state of affairs at the time that the late Ameer and Lord Lawrence met at this very Peshawur and concluded a Treaty, this very question which we are now discussing was mooted between them. Had its entertainment been possible, it would have been at that time acceded to, for the above-mentioned Lord was very well acquainted with the circumstances of Afghanistan, and its good and evil were clearly known to him. The late Ameer himself explained in detail to Lord Lawrence that the entertainment of this proposal was impossible, and that it could not be carried out at his hands. And Lord Lawrence consequently settled and decided the point, and, for the sake of maintaining the mutual friendship, omitted the proposal from the written Treaty. Let this be considered, and let no proposal be brought forward between us which may abrogate that Treaty and other assurances.

Again, Lord Lawrence, at the time of his departure from India in 1866, wrote a letter to the Ameer, which explains and bears testimony to that Treaty. It was written,—If you do not give up from your hands this manner of friendship which you now have with the English Government, that Government has now necessity to employ an equalizing influence (tasaref-adila) in Cabul, and friendship will be firm throughout Afghanistan in the former manner.

It was also written,—Your sincere friend has adopted the course which is now made current in relation to the affairs of Afghanistan advisedly, and after mature reflection and consideration, and Her Exalted Majesty the Great Queen of England has approved and consented to it. That kind friend (the Ameer) will have ascertained from the nature of his own action in the Treaty and compact with the English Government that there is no fear of change in the course mentioned, nor of interference by the English Government in the internal affairs of that dominion (Cabul), or in the administration of that kind friend (the Ameer).

It was also written,—Let it be considered certain that if that kind friend (the Ameer), in order to benefit by the Treaty and compact with the English Government, do not deviate from the former course, there will never be any mistake in his administration.

There were also other things written in that letter which I need not adduce. You can peruse the letter and ascertain what they are. But it is our earnest hope that, in conformity with that letter, no change be now made.

With respect to the letters and other successive communications from Lord Mayo, it was especially stated in one letter,—Whatever wish of your own you may put before this Government will meet.
with attention and respect. Lord Mayo, in conformity with the former friendship, most thoroughly maintained and strengthened the friendship in accordance with the customary usage.

Now our wish is that, in accordance with the writings of Lord Mayo, you will act in conformity with the former assurances. Let not such matters come between us as will make us suspicious of State affairs (Government deeds) and scatter away former assurances, especially a matter the performance (mustiar) of which is impossible.

As to the state of affairs from the time Lord Northbrook came to India till the time he left India. Although there were discussions on the subject, still he left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct of his predecessors, and in conformity with the preceding usage. As I have already mentioned all these circumstances here in Peshawar there is no need to repeat them.

I beg the favour of your consideration of the true facts of the state of affairs in Afghanistan with justice and impartiality. The condition of the Afghan people is perfectly well known to the authorities of the English Government. There is no need therefore for a detailed mention of them.

I will only allude to some of them briefly.

In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands. In no way can they be reassured on this point, and it is impossible to remove these opinions from their minds, for they adduce many proofs in support of them, the mention of which now would greatly prolong this discussion.

Therefore, since the opinions of the people of Afghanistan are such, the protection of the Englishmen in the midst of those hill tribes is difficult, if not impossible, because the whole army and the subjects of the Government are of these mountain people.

It is necessary to view the subject with justice. It is known what mere interference was in that country, and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was with you, and I need not therefore relate them. What deeds did they do in the life of his own Commander-in-Chief, then in their friendship with you, and I need not therefore relate them. What deeds did they do in the midst of those hill tribes is difficult, nay impossible, as was admitted by the authorities of the English Government. There is no need therefore for a conference, in conformity with the terms of the treaties between the two Governments, either now or hereafter. Under the previous arrangement, up to the present time, nothing has occurred contrary to friendship in conformity with the terms of writings and documents.

And what advantage is there, that the Ameer should now knowingly make such an arrangement, the result of which would be enmity and regret to the two Governments, and alienation of the friendship between them? If he now undertake this difficult task, and it be impossible to carry it out, you will be the first to say, why do you enter into an arrangement which it is impossible to perform? And what will all people and all nations on the face of the earth say? And further, since, with all the treaties and documents of the British Government which he has in his hand, no blame can be attached to the Ameer, any alteration now will impose a load of blame on him which will be both injurious to Afghanistan and reprehensible also. Now, blame is the worst of all things in any matter. Why, therefore, should the English Government, notwithstanding the friendship which the Ameer so much expects from them, be disposed to impose such a load of blame upon so sincere a friend?

In the first day's conference, in the outset of the conversation, you proposed to remove any anxieties that might be in the mind of the Ameer. Now, will this remove the anxiety from the mind of the Ameer, or will it raise a fresh anxiety, not only in the mind of the Ameer, but in the minds of all the people of Afghanistan? Therefore I now expect from the great civilized English Government that they
will well weigh the several arguments I have adduced in conversations and discussions, and quotations I have made from papers and documents, as well as what I have said on the head of the customary usage and the impracticability of this proposal, owing to the views of the people of Afghanistan and the actual condition of their country, in order that they may arrive at a just and correct opinion as to who has the right on his side and what is best. And I beg that the English Government will not raise a question which will abrogate the former treaties and agreements, and the past usage, in order that the friendship should continue strong on the same footing as hitherto.

Enclosure 44 in No. 36.

Meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadri-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 15th February 1877.

Present:
Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
Dr. W. H. Belлев, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
Mir Akhour Ahmed Khan, deputed by the Ameer of Cabul.
Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy.

Sir Lewis Pelly commenced by saying—I assure the Envoy of the close attention I have paid to all he has been so good as to state, and that what has fallen from his lips appears to me to strengthen a conviction at which the Viceroy has long ago deliberately arrived, viz., of the necessity which existed for frank, confidential, and personal explanations between the two Governments, in view to removing misapprehensions concerning the past and as to the nature of the Viceroy's own intentions for the future. An opportunity for these explanations has happily now been found in our present meeting, and I would premise that the motive of the Viceroy in desiring, by means of this Conference, to arrive at a satisfactory understanding is, not to interfere in Afghanistan, but to avert the danger of future interference by others; and Sir Lewis Pelly continued—In handing to the Envoy some extracts from the records of the Government of India, my object was, not to enter into controversy concerning the past, but to prove to the Ameer the careful consideration which the Viceroy has accorded to the wishes of His Highness (as recorded in those extracts) for a formal and permanent alliance of a defensive-offensive and dynastic character. It is clear to the Viceroy that one of the causes which has led to a diminution of the confidence and satisfaction evinced by the Ameer on the occasion of his visiting the late Lord Mayo at Umballa is to be found in the fact that the British Government, both then and subsequently in 1873, deemed it premature and otherwise inexpedient to comply with the above-mentioned wishes of the Ameer, and declined to commit itself to any engagement. Another cause of mutual misapprehension has been the want of frequent, cordial, and confidential communications between the two Governments. The Envoy's recapitulation of the Ameer's real grievances and anxieties, and of what has happened in past times, shows that His Highness has for years been more or less estranged from the British Indian Government, on grounds which have only recently come to the knowledge of the present Viceroy, and which would probably have been prevented by a better knowledge of the Ameer's feelings. It is, in the opinion of the Viceroy, certain that, had an intelligent British Officer been in direct personal communication with the Ameer, many of the alleged causes of His Highness's grievances and consequent resentment could not have taken place. Referring further to the Ameer's real grievances, * which the Envoy had alluded to in a friendly and unofficial manner, and had properly explained to be apart from the subject of the proposed negotiation, I felt no hesitation in declaring myself quite willing to listen to the Envoy's enumeration of them, because I am aware that the Viceroy has always wished to be thoroughly informed of His Highness's real views, desires, and requests on all matters affecting their common interests.

Again I acceded to the Envoy's request that his statement of grievances might be made ex parte and without reply, not through lack of argument and other opposing matter for a reply, but I refrain from controversy upon past affairs.

Sir Lewis Pelly proceeded—The Viceroy, having given every practicable consideration to the circumstances of the past relations between the two Governments, and having carefully studied the position of the Ameer in relation to the existing political situation in Central Asia—a situation which shows that the integrity and independence of Afghanistan and the consolidation of the Ameer's rule may ere long be imperilled—deems it equitable, and for the common interest of both Governments, that he should inform the Ameer of his willingness to accord him (the Ameer) open and active support against his danger of interference from without.

The Viceroy further desires that this concession should be unaccompanied by any demands on his part whatsoever, or by any conditions other than such as are reasonable in themselves, or plainly necessary to enable him to fulfill the obligations which he would undertake in ratifying a Treaty of the contemplated character. That among these conditions is one which is so obviously essential to

the proposed undertaking that it would be futile to open negotiations except this condition should be agreed upon as a preliminary, viz., the admission on the part of the Ameer of the principle that the British Government shall be allowed to station British Agents on the frontiers, which this Government undertakes to aid in defending, for it is manifest that the Viceroy could not pretend to protect those frontiers except he should be enabled to collect, through his own responsible Agents, timely intelligence of what might be passing on or beyond them, and so prepare himself for meeting contingencies, and for explaining to Her Majesty's Government, from independent, unprejudiced, and official sources, the facts of any alleged aggression, and the necessity which existed for repelling the same.

In insisting, however, on the admission of this principle as a sine qua non to the opening of negotiation, the Viceroy has no wish or intention unnecessarily to embarrass the Ameer in the exercise of it, and would therefore leave the settlement of the details for giving effect to this principle to be arranged in the present Conference.

As regards the Treaty of 1855. The Envoy has declared that the Ameer holds it to be still valid, and adheres to its terms. The Viceroy also admits this Treaty to be still in force, and on his part will, in the absence of a revised Treaty, observe its terms. But I would remind the Envoy that the first article of this Treaty provides for perpetual friendship, which between States implies good neighbourhood, and that the third and last article of the same Treaty binds the Government of the Ameer to join the British Government in war with any other power, but does not, in any manner or degree, bind the British Government to aid the Ameer against his enemies, whether foreign or domestic. Finally, said Sir Lewis Pelly, the Viceroy, in now offering to enter into the proposed formal public engagement, concedes what he believes the Ameer to have heretofore wished or requested, and evidences, to the utmost of his power, his sincere desire for cordial and intimate relations with the Government of Afghanistan. It now rests with the Ameer, through you, His Highness's Envoy Plenipotentiary, either to meet the Viceroy in the trusting spirit he displayed at Umballa in 1869, and accord to the Viceroy the means of affording the Government of Afghanistan open and active support, or else to reject the advantages offered.

But, in the most friendly manner, I beg the Envoy to understand that, if the Ameer reject all we offer and all we ask, and no basis of negotiation is left, the Viceroy, while observing the terms of the Treaty of 1855, will decline to support the Ameer and his dynasty in any troubles, internal or external, and their unknown consequences, and will continue to strengthen the frontier of British India without further reference to the Ameer, in order to provide against probable contingencies.

As the question, now immediately under discussion, relates only to the admission of the principle that British Agents shall be permitted to reside on the Afghan frontiers, my remarks have been confined to this subject, taken in connexion with the question of frontier defence. But I need not assure the Envoy that, should this principle be admitted, I shall be happy to discuss, in the most friendly and fair manner, the details of a formal agreement under which the British Government would bind itself, not only to a defensive-offensive alliance, but to the heir, and to affording His Highness support against factious disturbance within.

Sir Lewis Pelly here concluded his remarks. On this, the Cabul Envoy observed that he did not understand what was meant by strengthening the frontier of India without further reference to the Ameer.

Sir Lewis Pelly said in reply—The Viceroy will take such measures as he may deem wise and lawful for strengthening the frontier of British India and providing for the safety and repose of that empire; and this without communication with the Ameer.

The Cabul Envoy on this asked—In regard to the strengthening of the frontier of British India, without reference to the Ameer, which you have alluded to, I would ask—Does this mean, within the territories of the Ameer of Afghanistan, or otherwise?

I have already stated, Sir Lewis Pelly replied, that the object of the present Conference is not to interfere with Afghanistan.

I have also stated that the Viceroy will observe the terms of the Treaty of 1855, even if the proposed negotiation do not have place.

I now repeat that the Viceroy has no intention of interfering with the jurisdiction of the Ameer in any territory where we have recognized that jurisdiction. The Cabul Envoy here remarked that he would give his definite answer on the Agency clause on Monday, 19th instant. The meeting then closed.
Enclosure 45 in No. 36. (Extract.)

Meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul, at noon of the 19th February 1877.

Present:

Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, Envoy of the Ameer of Cabul.
Dr. H. W. Bellew, C.S.I., Secretary and Interpreter to Sir Lewis Pelly.
 Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, British Agent at the Court of Cabul.
Mir Akhor Ahmed Khan, deputed by Ameer of Cabul.
 Munshi Muhammad Baigir, Secretary to Cabul Envoy.

Sir Lewis Pelly commenced by saying that, in accordance with the arrangement made between the Cabul Envoy and himself on the 5th instant, the Cabul Envoy had made his statement concerning the past, and Sir Lewis Pelly had offered his remarks thereon. Sir Lewis Pelly would now, in accordance with the above-mentioned arrangement, request the favour of the Cabul Envoy affording him a definite reply as to whether the Ameer still adheres to, or withdraws from, the assurance given to the Viceroy by His Highness, to the effect that he agrees to the principle of British Agents being allowed to reside on the Afghan frontiers, in view to the protection of those frontiers by observing and reporting the events that may have place on or beyond those frontiers.

The Cabul Envoy here said that, in accordance with what he said on Monday to the effect that, had the Ameer seen any advantage to the two sides from this difficult proposal and consented to it, there would have been no necessity for all this discussion, but that he would to-day in this meeting finish all he had to say on the matter, and give his definite reply to the question put by Sir Lewis Pelly; but, if he were not considered so by Sir Lewis Pelly, he was present to hear what he might have to say. He then proceeded in saying:

I beg to say that, since it is the hearty desire of both sides that the misunderstandings connected with past matters, and also connected with the explanation of the wishes of his Excellency the Viceroy, should be removed, it affords room for hope and pleasure, because the true state of affairs, being understood by both sides, will be based upon the firmness of the old friendship. His Excellency the Viceroy especially should be well informed as to the true state of affairs in Afghanistan, and he should kindly pay attention to them as to what degree and of what kind his power is in a matter which is impossible.

As to the matter of the past, I have explained them in these meetings of some days past. There is no need for repetition. It is a matter which has been disposed of: it will be for both sides to act on that footing. And as to the future, that also I have explained with sundry quotations during the seven conferences of the month of Mohurrum 1294 H. (corresponding with 17th January to 16th February 1877). You will through them have been informed of the state of the case. Notwithstanding that the explanation of the condition of Afghanistan was made, especially in the conference of the 27th of that month (corresponding with 12th February 1877), it will be again clearly and confidentially made known in the contents of these following paragraphs.

I beg to state that it was the cordial desire of His Highness the Ameer that in these friendly and confidential conferences at Peshawar the discussion together should be with sincerity of purpose, so that, in accordance with the tenor of past writings, no doubt should remain on any matter on either side. And its object was this, that the usual friendship should remain firm on the former footing.

As to what has been written in the matter of non-interference in Afghanistan, it is certain that the British Government will never in any manner interfere in such manner as to cause an anxiety in the mind of His Highness the Ameer or his successor, or to shake the independence of Afghanistan.

As to the matter of removing the danger of future interference by others; in this matter the Government of Afghanistan is rendered without want by the successive writings of Lord Mayo and of Von Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General in Tashkend, who wrote in the first letter; and this is a summary of one of its paragraphs, viz., "there will be lasting peace and friendship between us and you. I have no intention to interfere or meddle with the Government of the Afghans."

Further, Lord Mayo repeatedly gave a general confirmation to his papers, especially this first paper of his, which he expressly and wholly confirmed; and His Highness the Ameer forwarded his reply to it in accordance with the advice of the above-named Lord Mayo, and confirmed those papers, and, in accordance with the writings of Lord Granville and Prince Gorchelakoff, which he gave me at Simla, thoroughly reassured me upon them. On the 6th September 1873 he wrote to His Highness the Ameer, and the following is an extract from that letter:—"The Russian Government has expressed that it considers all the territories in the possession of that kind friend to be the property of Afghanistan; and Prince Gorchelakoff has expressed to the Prime Minister of Her Majesty the Queen that the Emperor of Russia does not consider Afghanistan to be amongst those territories in which the counsel of the Russian Government would have effect." And this also, "no kind of interference and meddling which can be the cause of injury to the independence of Afghanistan is even thought of."

Lord Northbrook also wrote:—"The Government of Russia has asserted that it has accepted the boundaries of the territories of that kind friend such as they were specified in the letter of Lord Granville, dated 17th October 1872." He also wrote to the effect that the Ameer should rest assured of peace and prosperity, and that he need fear no kind of aggression, or interference, in the territories mentioned in the aforesaid letter of Lord Granville. "The Russian Government," he wrote, "has taken upon itself the responsibility of restraining the tribes which are under the influence..."
of its counsel from aggression upon the territories of that kind friend, such as their limits were defined in the afore-mentioned letter of Lord Granville.

Lord Northbrook also wrote to the effect that the Ameer should adopt the chief object mentioned in the letter of Lord Granville. And that chief object was this, that in the States of Central Asia, as regards relations with him, peace and tranquillity should subsist between them, and that in future there should be no aggression from one side of the specified frontier to the other. He also wrote to the effect that the result of correspondence which had passed between the Governments of Russia and England was to strengthen Afghanistan, and to remove all fears and dangers which were apprehended from without; and he assured the Ameer that he need have no misgivings as to external danger to his territories, and could, with leisure and security, devote himself to the internal advancement and organization of his territories.

Therefore the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan have the most perfect confidence that there can be no deviation from the tenor of these writings, which have been briefly mentioned, in respect to the peace and tranquillity and lasting friendship of the States, in accordance with the reply of His Highness the Ameer to the letter of Lord Northbrook of the 6th September 1873. If there should be a want of confidence in the substance of these subsequent writings approved by Governments, or the probability of a causeless want of confidence in them becoming a reason for displeasure to the Governments, what propriety is there in this? It is far from the welfare of States if there should be the possibility of objection to the promises made by such religious Governments and such Ministers and Viceroyes. If the authorities of the Government of Afghanistan were, without cause, to think there was the probability of objection to the treaties and agreements they have in their hands, it would undoubtedly be contrary to confidence and amity and friendship.

As on the first day of our conference the discussion commenced with the subject of the misapprehensions in the mind of the Ameer prior to the arrival of the present Viceroy, and extracts were quoted in support thereof from the records of the meeting at Umballa and conversations at Lahore and Simla, it is necessary that I (should) now explain the matter. In the conferences of the 8th and 10th of February I explained this matter with proofs in support of my assertions. Here are now applicable, and need not be repeated. As to what was said in respect to the probability of the misapprehension of the Ameer not having occurred had the Viceroy had better knowledge of the views of His Highness. From my statements of the 10th and 12th February it is clear that whatever has occurred has been with knowledge, and not without knowledge. My object in these statements was this, that the authorities of the British Government should not show such attention in the formalities of friendship to the rights of the Ameer; and, in conclusion, I explained the grounds of anxiety in such a difficult matter as the question now under discussion, the carrying out of which in Afghanistan is impossible and embarrassing. My object is this, that you should not throw such new causes for anxiety, not only into the mind of the Ameer, but upon the whole of Afghanistan.

As to what was said in reference to the external danger, I beg to observe that danger is of two kinds, internal and external; the internal danger owing to the residence of English officers on the frontiers, is apparent, and admits of no doubt. Matters would fall out in accordance with my description of the state of affairs in Afghanistan in the Conference of the 12th February. Therefore consider what will be the beginning, and what the end, of such a measure. As to external danger, as I have already shown to-day, I do not entertain its probability.

As to a new Treaty, I have said nothing, and, holding aloof, will say nothing. I will discuss your special proposal and dispose of that.

In respect to the Treaty of 1855, which has been repeatedly mentioned, I beg to observe that I have made no mention of the Treaty of 1855. I have stated that the late Ameer and Lord Lawrence met and made a Treaty and Covenant. But, now that the subject of the Treaty has come before me, I beg to point out that the Treaty of 1855 was made with the late Sirdar Ghulam Hyde Khan, and the Treaty of 1857 by the late Ameer himself with Lord Lawrence. Further, the last letter of Lord Lawrence in 1868 was sent to the Ameer by way of a written (wazaira) authority, and the subsequent conversations with Sir D. Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor of Lahore, were in accordance with it; as also were the documents of Lord Mayo from Umballa in 1869, and the papers of Lord Northbrook from Simla, including the last letter at the time of his departure, together with other State papers which I have already referred to to-day. These are all connected one with the other; they are not separate, they are one. Of course, the tenor of all these will be attended to. If there be want of acknowledgment, and want of regard to the tenor of one of them, it will undoubtedly be the cause for want of acknowledgment and want of regard to the whole of them.

With special reference to the Treaty of 1857 which the late Ameer made with Lord Lawrence: Inasmuch as the condition of Afghanistan was thoroughly well known to Lord Lawrence, he bound himself, in the 7th Article of that Treaty, that the British Government might maintain an Agent at Cabul on the part of the English Government, but he was not to be an Englishman. The Government of Afghanistan will never in any manner consent to acknowledge the abrogation of this article.

With reference to the desire of his Excellency the Viceroy for cordial and intimate relations with the Government of Afghanistan, and that it now rests with His Highness the Ameer, in the trusting spirit he displayed at Umballa in 1869, to be in accord with the Viceroy, I beg to enquire what has occurred contrary to that trusting spirit of Umballa in communications and State observances. The Ameer is, with sincerity of purpose, in accord with his Excellency the Viceroy, in accordance with those communications and the former course. And, as to according his Excellency the Viceroy a "means," I beg to say that no better means exist than those of the past, which formerly, in the time of perplexity, and subsequently up to the present time, have produced sincerity and good deeds.
from time to time. If I were to mention them in detail, it would prolong our discussion; but if you wish me to do so, I will describe them.

The Ameer has always received the praise and approval of past Viceroy's on account of those of his good deeds, as is manifest in their letters to him. Her Majesty the Queen has also given her approval to them.

How then can he now hope to accord a new means which is not in his power?

As to rejecting of advantages, has anybody ever rejected his own advantages? As to the cordial desire of his Excellency the Viceroy for the advantages of the Ameer, it is based upon such new and hard conditions, especially the residence of British officers upon the frontiers, which of itself is clearly a cause for the rejection of his proposed advantages, that there is no need for the Ameer to reject them. As to the admission of this principle of the residence of British officers on the frontiers, which has been repeatedly brought forward, although I have distinctly explained the matter in my description of the condition of Afghanistan in the Conference of the 12th February, I would now beg to observe as follows:—His Excellency the Viceroy will, of course, through your agency, consider the whole of the quotations I have made in these conferences from beginning to end. First, he will consider the treaties and agreements and writings, from time to time, without rejection. Second, the assurances of the Government, which I have adduced this day in the commencement of this statement, to the effect that the probability of external danger had been removed. Third, he will, under the conditions of Afghanistan, consider this chief proposal of the British Government is difficult. Inasmuch as this chief proposal, owing to successive causes, is impossible, I will again refer to documents. And first, to the letter of his Excellency the Viceroy to the address of His Highness the Ameer, dated 11th October 1876, which was sent by hand of the British Agent. In that letter it is stated to the effect that, when the British Government takes upon itself weighty matters on behalf of the Ameer, the Ameer will, for facilitating these weighty matters, acquiesce in whatever the above-mentioned Agent, bearer of the letter, may explain to him; and, in the absence of this, the English Government will not be able to carry out the matters mentioned. Further, you yourself, in the discussion of the first day's conference, stated, and have repeated on various occasions in these conferences, that if His Highness the Ameer accepted this principle of the residence of English officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan, it was not possible for the English Government to take upon itself the responsibility of aiding to repel an external enemy. It was further stated that his Excellency the Viceroy has no wish or desire to embarrass the Ameer in the matter of carrying out this proposal for the residence of English officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan. I beg to assure you that it is a matter of satisfaction, and enough of hope, to the Ameer, that His Highness the Ameer has withdrawn from this source of embarrassment. He has, therefore, no weighty matter to awe present before the English Government; nor does he put upon the English Government the responsibility of assistance to repel an internal enemy; nor has he entrusted the protection of those frontiers from an external enemy to the English Government; nor has he the power to consent to so difficult a matter, the result of which will be nothing but reproach to the Ameer himself, because the territories of Afghanistan have not in themselves the power to endure such a measure as the residence of British officers in their frontiers.

Therefore I earnestly hope, for the welfare of the two Governments, that his Excellency the Viceroy, through your good offices, will, with great frankness and sincerity of purpose, act in conformity with the course of past Viceroy's, and that by means of his own good acts the relations of friendship and unity may be increased.

As to what was said in reference to no basis being left for negotiation, I beg to observe, in a friendly and frank manner, that the basis which has been laid for you by the wise arrangements of previous Councillors and Ministers of Her Majesty the Queen of England in London, of Her Viceroy's in India, after mature deliberation and thought, from time to time, during the course of all these past years, and has been approved of by Her Majesty the Queen, still exists. Friendship has remained firm upon it and the Viceroy, and the previous Viceroy's have written their praise and commendation to His Highness the Ameer for his worthy acts. What matter then has appeared, which is contrary to the tenor of past written communications, that there should be now no basis left for negotiation?

The Government of Afghanistan is certain that the British Government, of its own perfect honesty, will continue constant and stable to that firm basis.

The Cabul Envoy having finished his reply, Sir Lewis Pelly commenced.

Then the Envoy declines the zine qua non preliminary. As I have already said, I decline to leave the point immediately before us, and go into controversy. But, since the Envoy has stated that the Ameer has always adhered to the terms of the old Treaty, I would ask the Envoy whether he considers the repeated refusal of the Ameer to receive temporary and specially friendly missions, the rejection of British Agents, the absolute and permanent closing of Afghanistan against British subjects and their trade, and the denial to an English traveller of passage towards British India, are acts of friendship and good neighbourhood, or consonant with the spirit of the first article of the Treaty still subsisting? Or does the Envoy suppose that there is any other potentate, claiming to observe civilized treaty relations, who would venture thus to treat Englishmen?

Again, the Envoy has stated to the effect that letters received from Von Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General at Tashkend, have removed all need for fear as respects Russia. And, in making this statement, the Envoy has doubtless afforded what he may deem to be adequate consideration to the events of the past three years in the direction of Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand, and the Turcoman border. Now, unless the Envoy have forgotten the representation which then Ameer has heretofore made to the British Government of India as to his apprehensions of Russian aggressions. But all these matters are for the judgment of the Afghan Government. England has no reason to fear Russia.

In conclusion, the Envoy Plenipotentiary on behalf of His Highness the Ameer of Cabul having declined to admit the principle that British Agents shall be allowed to reside on the frontiers of Ameer.
Afghanistan for the purposes already mentioned by me, I have no powers or authority to open negotiations. I am willing, however, as requested by the Envoy, to refer what he has said to the Viceroy, and to await his Excellency's written reply. But in the meantime the commencement of negotiations must be postponed, and I feel bound to tell the Envoy that, in my opinion, there is no probability of the British Government agreeing to negotiate on any basis other than that to which my powers have already been confined; and I fear that the Ameer has missed an opportunity, which may never recur, of greatly strengthening his position.

The Cabul Envoy, having heard the remarks of Sir Lewis Pelly, begged that all he had said to-day might be submitted to the Viceroy at Calcutta, and his Excellency's written reply be awaited, on receipt of which the Envoy would point out what he thought expedient or inexpedient in his Lordship's decision, and then, either himself give a definite reply, or, if he should be unable to do so, would refer to the Ameer for further instructions.

Proceedings for the day then closed.

Enclosure 46 in No 36. (Extract.)
Dated 15th March 1877.

FROM SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.S.I., to H. E. SYDNOOR MAHOMED SHAH.

At our last conference on the 19th February, your Excellency expressed a wish that I would submit all you had stated to the Viceroy at Calcutta, and await his Excellency's written reply, on receipt of which you would point out what you thought expedient or inexpedient in his Lordship's decision, and then give a definite reply, or, if you should be unable to do so, would refer to His Highness the Ameer for further instructions.

I lost no time in submitting your Excellency's statement to his Excellency the Viceroy, who read it with interest and attention, and authorized me, by telegraph, to express to your Excellency his thanks for the care you had taken to explain fully the views and feelings of the Ameer in regard to the relations between His Highness and the British Government.

Your Excellency's ill condition of health deprived me of the pleasure of communicating to you, in person, the Viceroy's agreeable telegram, and I, therefore, transmitted it to you through the Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan.

I have now received from his Excellency the Viceroy the written instructions which we have been awaiting, and, learning with the most sincere regret that your Excellency's health continues to be so impaired as to render it impossible for you to meet me in conference, I am reduced to communicating by letter.

The Viceroy understands that, before entering into any practical negotiations, you desire to be made acquainted with the general impressions left in the mind of the Viceroy by a perusal of your above-mentioned statement, and I am instructed to comply with this wish.

Your Excellency's statement appears to the Viceroy virtually to consist of two parts, one of which refers to the past, the other to the present.

The first is not susceptible of discussion with a view to any practical result, since it relates exclusively to events which cannot be recalled. I sincerely regret to learn by it that the Ameer has been for years secretly harbouring in his mind a sentiment of resentment towards the British Government in consequence of three or four incidents in the conduct of its relations with His Highness, which caused him, at the time of their unnoticed occurrence, feelings of annoyance, only now for the first time made known to the Viceroy. The Viceroy is confident that the causes of annoyance enumerated by your Excellency were not occasioned by any deliberate or intentional, or even conscious, disregard of the Ameer's feelings on the part of the British Government. His Excellency has no doubt whatever that most of them might, and would, have been prevented by the presence of a discreet and intelligent British officer at Cabul, had such an officer been admitted to that unrestricted intercourse with the Government of His Highness which an experience tested by centuries, and gratefully acknowledged by every civilized State in the world, has proved to be the only practical means of maintaining amicable and mutually advantageous relations between neighbouring States. Such States must always have many interests in common, on which misunderstandings can hardly fail to arise if their Governments have no adequately confidential and authoritative medium of communication with each other.

The impression, therefore, which the Viceroy derives from his perusal of the first portion of your Excellency's statement greatly increases his regret that the Ameer should still feel himself precluded, by the rude and stationary condition in which Afghanistan has remained under the administration of His Highness, from receiving a British Envoy at his Court, and thereby placing his relations with the British Government on a footing commensurate with the rank and dignity which, were it possible, the British Government would willingly accord to the Ruler of Afghanistan in the international hierarchy of those States with which the Government of the British Empire maintains diplomatic relations. As, however, the objections entertained by the Ameer to any such arrangement have always been represented to the British Government as insurmountable, as the practical impediments to it, which, in the time of His Highness's father, were occasioned by the then unsettled and turbulent condition of the Afghan population and the comparative weakness of the sovereign power, appear to have increased rather than diminished under the reign of His Highness, and as the British Government has most certainly no desire or intention whatever to urge upon the Ameer the adoption of this, or
any other, arrangement which His Highness does not spontaneously and cordially recognize to be conducive to his own advantage and that of his dominions, it is useless to dwell on the considerations suggested by the last portion of your Excellency's statement, since the only practical conclusion to which it points is one which the Ameer has no disposition to accept and which the British Government has no desire to force on his unwilling acceptance.

His Excellency the Viceroy turns, therefore, to the consideration of the second portion of your Excellency's statement. But, in doing so, he must confess that he experiences the greatest difficulty in understanding the real drift and purport of it; which, he trusts, he may have misinterpreted. So far as he does understand it, it seems to amount to this—that the Ameer, although dissatisfied by the result of his relations with the British Government up to the present moment, is equally dissatisfied with all the proposals the British Government has now spontaneously made for the improvement of them; whilst, at the same time, he has, on his part, no counter-proposals to make for the attainment of that result. If this be indeed the case, there is, so far as the Viceroy can judge, no basis left for negotiation between us. In the proposals it has already made through Attar Mahomed, and for the negotiation of which the Viceroy understands the Ameer's Minister to be appointed with full powers, but which he has hitherto declined to discuss, the British Government went to the utmost limit of concession and proffered aid, in order to prove the sincerity of its good-will. If, therefore, those proposals be rejected unconditionally, or entertained only on conditions obviously inadmissible, the British Government shall have no choice but to regard His Highness the Ameer Shere Ali of Cabul henceforth as a neighbour with whom its relations are neither satisfactory nor susceptible of improvement.

Your Excellency's language, however, leaves the Viceroy somewhat in doubt whether the objections you urge on the part of the Ameer have reference to the arrangements His Highness was authorised to rely upon our willingness to agree to, and even to propose, were the British Government assured that they would be agreeable to himself; or only to a proposal which he apparently supposes the British Government likely to urge on his acceptance, although it has never given him any such intimation. Your Excellency has laid so much stress on the 7th clause, of the Treaty of 1857, which has nothing whatever to do with the matters now under consideration, and has taken so many pains to explain the various reasons why the Ameer still declines to receive a resident British Officer at Cabul, whilst at the same time you have so carefully avoided all reference to the reception of British Officers in other parts of Afghanistan, that the Viceroy knows not whether he is to understand your statement as a refusal to entertain any proposal for the residence of British Officers, for certain purposes, on certain points of the Afghan frontier, or merely as a refusal to reopen the question, which the British Government has never desired or attempted to re-open, of appointing a British Officer to reside at Cabul. The British Government does not propose the appointment of a resident British Officer at Cabul; and the reason is, that it has never had any cause to anticipate that such an arrangement would be agreeable to the Ameer, whose appreciation of his own interests the British Government is not concerned to contest or discuss so long as it involves no aggression upon the interests of the British Empire. The Viceroy has, however, intimated to the Ameer his willingness to discuss with His Highness the terms of a definite Treaty of Alliance involving the appointment of competent officers in other parts of Afghanistan, to aid both His Highness and the British Government in watching the progress of events which the Ameer has repeatedly represented as sources of alarm to him; and the reason is, that many previous utterances, on the part both of the present Ameer and of His Highness's father, had induced the British Government to believe that the advantages of such an arrangement would be cordially welcomed and gratefully appreciated by his Highness. If, as your Excellency's language tends to imply, this belief was entirely erroneous, there is an immediate end of the matter; for the British Government has not the slightest desire to urge upon an unwilling neighbour an arrangement so extremely onerous to both parties. Whilst elaborately discussing proposals which the British Government has not made, and which you had no right to attribute to it, have left altogether unnoticed those proposals, which are the only ones your Excellency is authorized to discuss. I am therefore instructed by his Excellency the Viceroy to request your Excellency to state distinctly and promptly whether he is to understand that the Ameer does not now desire the alliance of the British Government, and that His Highness refuses to receive British Officers in any part of Afghanistan. For a plain answer to this plain question no further reference to Cabul is needed, or can be awaited.

Your Excellency expressed a desire to discuss with me the expediency or inexpediency of the conclusion arrived at by the Viceroy after perusal of your Excellency's statement. But the Viceroy does not permit any such superfluous criticism. The Ameer has afforded ample time and opportunity to consider the expediency or inexpediency of the Viceroy's conclusions (which the Envoy's statement leaves unaltered) before he accepted them as a basis of negotiation. He cannot discuss this now. In the communications made by the Viceroy to His Highness from Simla in the month of October last, the Ameer was distinctly informed that, unless he was prepared to recognize in principle the expediency of appointing British Officers to reside on certain parts of the Afghan frontier, it would be useless to appoint Envoy for the negotiation of a Treaty entirely conditional upon that arrangement. His Highness was at the same time earnestly requested to consider very carefully the expediency of the proposal then made to him, before committing himself to a decision. He did take many weeks to consider it; when, after having thus deliberately considered it, he apponted his Minister to negotiate with the best means of carrying it out the Viceroy was entitled to assume, as he naturally did assume, that the principle clearly explained by him to be the only possible basis on his part had been duly and fully accepted by His Highness, and that the expediency of carrying it out was no longer open to discussion. Your Excellency's present ignoring of the past.
recognition of that principle, and attempting to discuss the expediency of it as an open question, is a breach of the understanding on which the Viceroy agreed to receive you as the Ameer's representative in this negotiation.

If, however, as would seem to be the case, the Ameer, influenced by circumstances or considerations still unknown to the Viceroy, has completely changed his mind since he entered upon the negotiation (which, in its present form, was originated by His Highness), the very last thing desired or attempted by the British Government would be to pin His Highness pedantically to the fulfilment of an understanding from which he now wishes to withdraw, or the adoption of an arrangement which he does not regard with satisfaction. So far from wishing to urge upon his reluctant consideration the expediency of British Officers being appointed to assist him in the defence of his frontiers, I am to inform your Excellency that the proposal of this arrangement was regarded by the British Government as a great concession; and that the British Government will most assuredly not allow its officers to undertake duties on behalf of Afghanistan involving a residence in any part of that country, unless their presence there is specially invited and cordially welcomed by the Ruler of it, whoever he may be, and their personal safety and comfort solemnly guaranteed by the Ruler of it. Therefore, if the Ameer has made up his mind that he has no reason to desire a definite alliance with the British Government on the above-mentioned basis, it only remains for your Excellency to say so plainly and without hesitation.

I desire to make your Excellency clearly understand that you need be under no apprehension of any disposition on the part of the British Government to urge upon the consideration of the Ameer proposals which His Highness is not disposed to accept, on behalf of arrangements which could have no possible value in the Viceroy's eyes without the cordial concurrence of His Highness; and to which indeed nothing less than the complete assurance of the Ameer's loyal appreciation of their generosity could ever reconcile the British Government. The Viceroy observes that your Excellency has incidentally referred to existing Treaties as an alternative basis of negotiation. I am to point out to you that these existing Treaties have long ago been negotiated and concluded, and, not having been since then disputed by either party to them, afford no basis whatever for further negotiation. When the Viceroy agreed to the Ameer's proposal that His Highness, who had declined to receive a British Envoy on Afghan territory, should appoint an Afghan Envoy, with full powers, to meet the Viceroy's representative on British territory, it was not for the discussion of old contracts, but for the preparation of new ones.

If, therefore, the Ameer has no desire whatever to place his relations with the British Government on a new and better footing, there is nothing left to propose or discuss; and, in that case, the two Governments will, in accordance with the wishes of His Highness, revert to their previous relative positions. But those relative positions appear to be so completely misapprehended by the Ameer, that I must point out to your Excellency, has completely changed his mind since he entered upon his personal safety and comfort solemnly guaranteed by the Ruler of it, whichever he may be, and their personal safety and comfort solemnly guaranteed by the Ruler of it. Therefore, if the Ameer has made up his mind that he has no reason to desire a definite alliance with the British Government on the above-mentioned basis, it only remains for your Excellency to say so plainly and without hesitation.

Your Excellency's contention is that the British Government is already bound, by its existing engagements with the Ameer, to support and defend His Highness against any foreign or domestic enemy; and that consequently the Ameer has nothing to gain by a Treaty of Alliance which, so far as the British Government is concerned, would be a mere re-statement of the obligations it has already contracted on his behalf, while, so far as His Highness is concerned, it would impose upon him obligations altogether new.

This is, I think, a fair summary of your Excellency's argument: and the argument would be perfectly sound if its premises were true. But, unfortunately for the Ameer, they are fundamentally erroneous. The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of each other by the British Government and the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857. The second of these two Treaties was contracted for a special and limited purpose, and with exclusive reference to an occasion which has long since passed away. This second Treaty, therefore, belongs to the class of Treaties known as transitory Treaties; and on both sides the obligations contracted by it have lapsed, as a matter of course, with the lapse of time. The first of the two Treaties, however, clearly belongs to the class of Treaties called perpetual. The obligations embodied in it were contracted with general reference to the permanent relations between the two Governments; and on each of the contracting parties those obligations still remain binding.

The Treaty of 1855 contains only three articles. The first stipulates that there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the East India Company (to whose Treaty rights and obligations the British Government has succeeded) and the Ameer of Cabul, his heirs and successors. The second binds the British Government to respect the territories possessed by the Ameer at the time when the Treaty was signed, that is to say in 1855, and not to interfere with them. The third article binds the Ameer, his heirs and successors, not only to respect the territories of the British Government, but also to be the friend of its friends, and the enemy of its enemies. It is to be observed that this Treaty contains no corresponding obligation on the part of the British Government. The British Government is not without cause to complain that the Ameer's conduct of late years has been inconsistent with the obligations contracted by the Government of His Highness under the terms of Article I of this Treaty of 1855. Friendship between neighbouring States does not necessarily involve liabilities on the part of either State to furnish the other with material assistance; but it does necessarily involve the uninterrupted maintenance of friendly intercourse, and the fairly reciprocal recognition and discharge of all the customary duties of good neighbourhood.

Now, not only are all the territories of the British Government freely open at all times to all the subjects of the Ameer, but His Highness has received from the British Government repeated gifts of
arms and of money, as well as a consistent moral support both at home and abroad, e.g., since 1868-69 the British Government has given to His Highness 12 guns, 21,400 rifles, 11,000 muskets, 1,200 carbines, 14,000 goats, and a quarter of a million of money. In fact, for these advantages, His Highness what has the British Government received from the Ameer? The territories of His Highness have been, and continue to be, inhospitably closed to all the subjects of the British Government, with whom the Ameer forbids his own subjects to hold any kind of friendly intercourse. Trade, traffic, travel, all the customary bonds of union between neighbouring and friendly States, have been systematically discouraged and practically prohibited to British subjects in Afghanistan by His Highness.

The Ameer has refused permission to the Envoy of the British Government, bound on a peaceful mission to another neighbouring State, to pass through his territory; and the determination of His Highness to withhold from the British Government all such natural good offices has been conveyed to it in terms scarcely consistent with courtesy, and certainly not consistent with friendship. Colonel Macdonald, a British subject, was barbarously murdered on the borders of the Ameer's territory by a person subject to the authority of the Ameer and for whose punishment His Highness was, therefore, responsible. But, instead of cordially and efficiently co-operating to avenge this crime, the Ameer has allowed the murderer to remain at large. The Viceroy forbears to dwell upon the Ameer's discourtesy in leaving wholly unanswered the proposal made to His Highness by the late Viceroy for the demarcation of his boundaries, in refusing to receive a complimentary mission from the present Viceroy, and in taking no notice whatever of the very friendly invitation to Delhi which was subsequently addressed to His Highness. More serious grounds of complaint exist in the fact that the closing of the Khyber Pass for the last two years appears to be mainly attributable to the unfriendly influence of the Ameer; that His Highness has openly received at Cabul in an authoritative manner, and subsidised, the heads of frontier tribes who are in the pay and under the control of the British Government; that he has, for some time past, been speaking and acting in such a manner as to indicate hostile designs upon territories beyond his own, and in the neighbourhood of the British frontier, and that, even since the commencement of the present negotiations, he has been the British and actively endeavouring to excite against the British Government the religious animosities of his own subjects and of the neighbouring tribes by misrepresenting the policy, and maligning the character, of the British Government.

In short, the whole conduct and language of the Ameer during the last four years has been one chronic infraction, or evasion, of the first article of the Treaty of 1855. But this Treaty cannot be abrogated without the mutual consent of the two contracting parties to it; and, so long as it remains valid, the Ameer is legally bound by it to co-operate with the British Government, if called upon to do so, in attacking its enemies and defending its friends, although the Treaty does not place the British Government under any reciprocal obligation on behalf of the Ameer. His Highness indeed was so conscious of this fact, when he met the Earl of Mayo at Umballa, that he then vehemently complained of the Treaty of 1855 as "a one-sided Treaty," and earnestly solicited from the British Government a new Treaty based upon the terms which the present Viceroy was prepared to offer the Ameer in the month of October last.

It is clear, therefore, that, under the terms of the Treaty of 1855, the British Government has contracted no liabilities whatever on behalf of the Ameer.

I now turn to the consideration of the subsequent Treaty signed in 1857. This Treaty consists of thirteen articles. The first of them recites the circumstances arising out of the war then being waged between the British and Persian Governments, which induced the British Government to "agree, out of friendship, to give the Ameer" of Cabul one lakh of rupees monthly during the continuation of that war, upon certain conditions. The second, third, fourth, and fifth articles specify these conditions: whereby, in return for the pecuniary assistance guaranteed to him by Article I, the Ameer is to appoint to his army at a certain strength, two captains and maintain a Vakeel at Peshawur, and to receive at Balkh, Cabul, Candahar, and other places in Afghanistan, British officers with suitable establishments, whose duty shall be to ensure the subsidy granted the Ameer being devoted to the purpose for which it was given. The sixth Article stipulates that this subsidy shall cease at the conclusion of the war between England and Persia, or at any previous date preferred by the British Government. The seventh Article, to which your Excellency has made special reference, stipulates that, on the cessation of the subsidy, the British officers shall be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but that the Ameer shall continue, during the pleasure of the British Government, not only to receive at Cabul a permanent resident Vakeel appointed by the British Government, but also to appoint and keep, on behalf of the Afghan Government, a permanent resident Vakeel at Peshawur. Your Excellency further stated that the Ameer has scrupulously adhered to the terms of this seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857; but, so far as the Viceroy is aware, His Highness has not for many years fulfilled the last-mentioned condition of the article. All the remaining articles of the Treaty refer exclusively either to the preceding stipulations, or else to special circumstances, considerations, and conditions occasioned by, and ceasing with, the war between England and Persia, which led to the signature of the Treaty of 1857.

The Viceroy would not have thought it worth while to say anything at all about this Treaty of 1857, if your Excellency had not laid such special stress upon its seventh article; which is indeed the only one of all its articles that has reference to the conduct of general relations between the two Governments. It is obvious, however, that no Treaty stipulation was required to oblige the British Government not to appoint a resident British officer at Cabul without the consent of the Ameer; for it is not practically in the power of one State to accredit a representative to the Court or Government of another without the consent of that Court or Government; nor could such an absurd idea...
ever occur to the Government of any civilized Power. It is equally obvious that the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 was not intended to bind, and could not possibly bind, the Ameer never under any circumstances, or at any future time, to assent to the appointment of a resident British officer at Cabul; for such a stipulation would have been clearly inconsistent with the freedom and dignity of the two contracting Powers. It is, therefore, certain that there is in the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857 absolutely nothing whatever to preclude the British Government from pointing out, at any time, to the Ameer the advantage, or propriety, of receiving a British officer as its permanent representative at Cabul, nor even from urging such an arrangement upon the consideration and adoption of His Highness in any fair and friendly manner. But it so happens that the British Government has not proposed, and does not propose, or intend to propose, that arrangement. Consequently, your Excellency's remarks on the Treaty of 1857 are not to the point, and need not be further noticed.

Now, these two Treaties, of 1855 and 1857, are the only ones which, up to the present moment, the British Government has ever contracted with the Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan; and it is as clear as anything can be that neither the one nor the other imposes on the British Government, either now, nor in the future, any obligation, or liability, whatever, to defend, protect, or support the Ameer, or the Ameer's dynasty, against any enemy, or any danger, foreign or domestic.

Your Excellency, however, appears to be under an impression that obligations and liabilities of this kind, though not contracted under any Treaty, have been none the less incurred by the British Government through certain written and verbal assurances received by the Ameer in 1869 from Lord Mayo, and by His Highness's Envoy in 1873 from Lord Northbrook. This impression is entirely erroneous; and I am, therefore, to examine in detail the facts and circumstances referred to by your Excellency in support of your assumption that the Ameer of Cabul has, at the present moment, any claim upon the unconditional support of the British Government.

The words referred to by your Excellency as having been addressed by Lord Mayo to the Ameer on the 31st of March 1869 were as follows:—

"Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul, and rekindle civil war; and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor."

Now, what were the circumstances in which these words were uttered? Only just established on a throne to which he had fought his way through a long and bloody civil war, the Ameer had come to Umballa, anxious for the support and protection of the British Government, and hopeful of obtaining from it a Treaty of Alliance. Disappointed in that hope, he eagerly sought the then Viceroy to give him some written assurance of the good-will and friendship of the British Government, which might serve to strengthen his position when he returned to Cabul, by convincing both his subjects and his rivals that his relations with that Government were of a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory character. In compliance with this request, the words above quoted were addressed to His Highness by the then Viceroy. Such were the circumstances in which they were uttered. What, then, were the meaning, purpose, and intention of their utterance? It is self-evident, in the first place, that, whatever their meaning, and whatever their purpose, they were not intended to have the force of a Treaty; for the British Government had just declined the Ameer's request for a Treaty of Alliance with it, and it could have had no possible reason for declining the Treaty, if it were prepared to accept on his behalf, in a form equally conclusive, all the liabilities of an alliance.

The meaning and purpose of the Viceroy's assurance to the Ameer in 1869, however, are clearly indicated and explained, beyond all possibility of question, by the context, as well as by the circumstances, of his Excellency's address to His Highness at Umballa. In that paragraph of the address which immediately precedes the one I have quoted (because it is the one to which your Excellency has referred) the then Viceroy expressed his confidence (a confidence founded on the assurances of His Highness) that the Ameer was about "to create a firm and merciful administration," and "to promote the interests of commerce in every province of Afghanistan." In encouraging recognition of these excellent intentions (never fulfilled by the Ameer) and of the closeness with which the bonds of friendship were then drawn between the British Government and His Highness (whose subsequent conduct has relaxed them), the Viceroy assured the Ameer that the British Government would view with severe displeasure any attempt to disturb his throne. It is perfectly clear, however, that the Viceroy did not, and could not, thereby commit the British Government to an unconditional protection of the Ameer, or to any liabilities on behalf of His Highness which were not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects. In short, the true meaning of the Viceroy's statement was neither more nor less than an assurance that, so long as the Ameer continued to govern his people justly and mercifully, and to maintain frank, cordial, and confidential relations with the British Government, that Government would, on its part also, continue to use every legitimate endeavour to confirm the independence, consolidate the power, and strengthen the Government of His Highness.

In precisely the same spirit, and from the same point of view, the present Viceroy authorised the Cabul Agent to assure Shere Ali, last October, that if His Highness sincerely desired to deserve the friendship, and thereby secure the protection of the British Government, they would be cordially
and unreservedly accorded to him. But His Highness has evinced no such desire; and it is absurd to assume that, because the British Government would have viewed with severe disapproval in 1869 any attempt to disturb the throne of a loyal and trusted ally, it is, therefore, bound in 1877 to protect, from dangers incurred regardless of its advice, the damaged power of a mistrustful and estranged neighbour.

His Excellency the Viceroy instructs me to inform your Excellency plainly that the British Government neither recognizes, nor has ever recognized, any such obligation. British influence is so paramount throughout the East that the Government of India need rarely have recourse to arms in order to protect the friends who are faithful to it, or to punish those who are faithless. There is no neighbouring State which is not strengthened by the bestowal, and weakened by the withdrawal, of its friendship.

The observations above made in allusion to Lord Mayo apply to the statement made by Lord Northbrook in 1873 to the Ameer’s Envoy at Simla. Your Excellency on that occasion represented and explained to the Viceroy the apprehensions and anxieties occasioned to the Ameer by the recent advance of the Russian Power in Central Asia. His Highness, fearing that, without the declared alliance and material support of the British Government, his independence might ere long be exposed to dangers with which he could not cope single-handed, had instructed you to sollicite once more from the British Government a definite Treaty of Alliance on the basis of reciprocitv, as well as material assistance in arms and money. Lord Northbrook declined to give the Ameer the Treaty which His Highness asked for. And therefore, as in the previous case at Umballa in 1869, it is clear that any subsequent verbal assurances given by Lord Northbrook to the Envoy were not intended to commit, and could not possibly commit, the British Government to any of those liabilities which it would have contracted on behalf of the Ameer had the Viceroy felt able to comply with the request of His Highness by signing with him a Treaty of Alliance. Your Excellency then endeavoured, as you have again endeavoured on the present occasion, to maintain that the British Government had already contracted such liabilities by virtue of assurances received in time past from Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. In reply to this contention, Lord Northbrook laid before your Excellency the whole of the correspondence which had passed between his Excellency’s predecessors and the Ameer, and requested you to point out in it a single word confirming, or justifying, the statement he had made, “that the British Government was bound to comply with every request preferred by the Ameer.” Your Excellency, however, was unable to do so and acknowledge the fact. Lord Northbrook then gave your Excellency the following assurance: that in the event of any imminent aggression upon the territories of His Highness, “should the endeavours of the British Government fail to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government were prepared to assure the Ameer that they would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money; and would also in case of necessity aid him with troops,” adding, however, that “the British Government held itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent; moreover, the assistance would be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.”

It is sufficiently apparent that this personal assurance committed the British Government to no pledges which were not carefully guarded on every side by positive conditions with which the Ameer has, of late, evinced no disposition to comply. On receipt of it, your Excellency left Simla, apparently disappointed, and observing that the Ameer was not likely to derive from it much comfort or support.

Your Excellency doubtless will perceive and acknowledge that, in intimating to the Ameer, last October, his willingness to grant him not only money, arms, and should be require it the services of British officers, but also a definite Treaty of Alliance, solicited from the British Government, in 1860, and once again in 1873,—the present Viceroy not offering His Highness altogether new, and very substantial advantages. It appeared to the Viceroy that relations of mutual reserve and mistrust between neighbouring States so closely contiguous, and having in common so many interests, as Afghanistan and the Empire of India, were much to be deplored; more specially in the interest of the Afghan State. An attentive study of the correspondence to which your Excellency has referred induced him to think that, in judging of the unfriendly attitude which, during the last few years, the Ameer has thought fit to assume and maintain towards the British Government, it would be ungenerous not to make great allowances for the disappointment and mortification with which His Highness appeared to have regarded the recent failure of all his previous efforts to enter into closer relations with that Government; the extent to which the increasing weakness and isolation of his position might have aggravated this feeling, and the fact that the unfortunate imperfection of the hitherto existing means of communication between the two Governments afforded to neither of them any adequate opportunity of avoiding or removing those causes of irritation which might be solely attributable to their ignorance of each other’s motives and interests. The Viceroy, therefore, came to the conclusion that, if the Ameer still sincerely desired the open alliance and protection of the British Government, and was prepared to prove the sincerity of that desire by taking practical steps for placing his relations with it on a thoroughly cordial and satisfactory footing, the wishes of His Highness in regard to the Treaty of Alliance and any other reasonable evidence of our confidence and friendship, should receive from us a similarly frank and British response. Her Majesty’s Government concurred in that conclusion; and it was in all sincerity that the Viceroy authorised the British Agent at Cabul to say to the Ameer—“If you really desire to secure and reciprocate our friendship you shall have it without reserve, and find in us a firm and faithful ally.”
It would appear, however, from the whole tone of your Excellency's language, and from the statement so carefully made by your Excellency of the Ameer's present views and sentiments, and submitted by me at your Excellency's request to the Viceroy, that His Highness now no longer desires the British alliance and protection. The British Government does not press its alliance and protection upon those who neither seek nor appreciate them. This being the case, it only remains for the Viceroy to withdraw, at once, the offers made to the Ameer in the month of October last; and, in so doing, to express its deep regret that these offers, and the spirit in which they were made, should have been so completely misunderstood and so publicly misrepresented by His Highness. Such unwarrantable misrepresentations of our recent policy, however, render it necessary to guard against similar misrepresentation of our present position. I am, therefore, to explain distinctly to your Excellency, and to place on record, in language not susceptible of misconstruction, that, in withdrawing from the Ameer those offers of material assistance in reply to which His Highness has instructed you to inform me that he neither requires nor is disposed to accept them, the British Government harbours no hostile designs against Afghanistan.

The British Government has no sort or kind of quarrel with the people of Afghanistan. It sincerely desires their permanent independence, prosperity, and peace. It has no conceivable object, and certainly no desire, to interfere in their domestic affairs. It will unreservedly respect their independence, and should they at any time be united in a national appeal to its assistance, it will doubtless be disposed, and prepared, to aid them in defending that independence from aggression. Meanwhile, the Afghan people may rest fully assured that so long as they are not excited by their Ruler, or others, to acts of aggression upon the territories or friends of the British Government the British soldier will ever be permitted to enter Afghanistan uninvited.

But the British Government repudiates all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer and his dynasty. The British Government does not, indeed, withdraw from any obligations previously contracted by it; but it absolutely and emphatically denies that it has ever incurred any such obligations as those imputed to it by your Excellency; and it further affirms that it will never, in any circumstances, undertake such obligations without adequate guarantees for the satisfactory conduct of the Ameer.

At the same time, the British Government will scrupulously continue, as hitherto, to respect the Ameer's independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognized as being in the lawful possession of the Ameer, and will duly abstain from interference so long as the Ameer, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own.

The Ameer, therefore, so long as he remains faithful to those Treaty stipulations which your Excellency has involved on behalf of His Highness, and which the British Government fully recognizes as still valid, and therefore binding upon the two contracting parties, need be under no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the part of the British Government.

(Signed) LEWIS PELLY.

Enclosure 47 in No. 36.

MEMORANDUM.

On 16th March, about 12 o'clock, Munshi Muhammad Baqir, Secretary to the Cabul Envoy, waited upon Sir Lewis Pelly at the request of the Cabul Envoy. The Munshi stated that he now wished to answer the remarks made by Sir Lewis Pelly at the last meeting of the conference.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied that the arrangements entered into between himself and the Cabul Envoy at the conference had been, that the Cabul Envoy should make his statement uninterruptedly, that afterward Sir Lewis Pelly should reply, and that the Cabul Envoy should then give a definite answer on the Agency clause.

The Cabul Envoy had occupied the whole time of three conferences in making his statement, absolutely uninterruptedly by Sir Lewis Pelly. Sir Lewis Pelly had then replied briefly, and had requested the promised definite answer. The Cabul Envoy had then again requested a delay of a week in order to make some additional remarks and give his definite answer. Sir Lewis Pelly had acceded to this request, and the Cabul Envoy had then given an answer which, though inexplicitly worded, appeared to Sir Lewis Pelly to amount to a rejection of the principle of the Agency clause.

Sir Lewis Pelly had informed the Cabul Envoy accordingly, and had explained to him, that such being the case he had no power or authority to open the proposed negotiations.

The Cabul Envoy had then requested that his statement might be submitted to the Viceroy, and the reply of the Viceroy be awaited, when he (Cabul Envoy) would certainly give his definite answer.

Sir Lewis Pelly had acceded to this request, and, before the meeting closed for that day, reminded the Cabul Envoy that the Cabul Secretary had not written down the last remarks which he (Sir Lewis Pelly) had made.

The Cabul Envoy had therefore explained that he was too tired and ill to sit in conference any longer that evening, but that he would meet for the purpose of writing it down the next morning.

On the following morning the Cabul Envoy sent to say he was too ill to attend conference, and from that date (the 20th February) until to-day (16th March) the Cabul Envoy has continued to send messages to Sir Lewis Pelly to the effect that he (the Cabul Envoy) was too ill for work.

On several occasions Sir Lewis Pelly caused it to be intimated to the Cabul Envoy that his Secretary had not written down Sir Lewis Pelly's final remarks. Sir Lewis Pelly had explained that the writing them down or not was a matter wholly for the consideration of the Cabul Envoy, but that
If the Cabul Envoy did wish to have them written Sir Lewis Pelly would be happy, either to send the Secretary to the Cabul Envoy's house, or receive the Cabul Envoy's Secretary at his house for the said purpose. After a lapse of many days, &c., about a fortnight ago, the Cabul Envoy sent his Secretary, and the remarks were taken down; and from that date to this Sir Lewis Pelly has heard no more of the matter.

Yesterday Sir Lewis Pelly had the honour of sending, by his Secretary, to the Cabul Envoy the written reply of his Excellency the Viceroy, drawn out in the Persian language; and now, within a few hours of receiving that reply, instead of affording the promised plain and definite answer, the Cabul Envoy has sent his Secretary to submit that he has prepared a rejoinder to the remarks made by Sir Lewis Pelly on the 19th February.

Sir Lewis Pelly therefore requested his Secretary to inform the Cabul Envoy that, the arrangements agreed upon between them for the conduct of discussion at the conference having been amply fulfilled, he could not postpone the Viceroy's more recent reply and revert to a portion of the discussion which had been concluded.

But that if, in giving his promised definite answer to the Viceroy's communication, the Cabul Envoy should make any relevant remarks, Sir Lewis Pelly would be happy to receive them with his wonted courtesy.

The Secretary then explained that the Cabul Envoy was too ill to consider the Viceroy's reply; but Sir Lewis Pelly contended that the Viceroy's communication required only a simple yes or no, and that if the Cabul Envoy were sufficiently in health to dictate criticism on Sir Lewis Pelly's former remarks, which the Secretary admitted he had in his pocket, the Envoy was also well enough to dictate a plain yes or no to the Viceroy's question on the admission, or otherwise, of the principle of the Agency clause.

The Cabul Secretary persisted in endeavouring to induce Sir Lewis Pelly to accede to the Cabul Envoy's wish, and Sir Lewis Pelly firmly replied that he must categorically decline.

The Cabul Secretary then said that it would be a long time before the Cabul Envoy would be well enough to consider the Viceroy's reply, evidently intending hereby to gain time for a further reference to Cabul; but Sir Lewis Pelly again firmly urged that the Viceroy had distinctly stated in his instructions that, the principle of the Agency clause having already been considered and admitted by the Ameer in Cabul, and subsequently fully discussed in conference, a further reference to Cabul would not be needed, and would not be awaited for the disposal of this point.

If, therefore, the Cabul Envoy adhered to his refusal of the sine quâ non preliminary all that was necessary was for him to say so, and that he could supplement his refusal after his return to Cabul.

Sir Lewis Pelly asked when he might expect a reply to the Viceroy's instructions. The Secretary replied that he had no instructions to answer any question.

Sir Lewis Pelly then said he could only express his regret that the Secretary had troubled himself to come over.

Sir Lewis Pelly having then sent a polite message, and expressed hopes for the speedy recovery of the Cabul Envoy, the Secretary withdrew.

Enclosure 48 in No. 36.

Extract from Kazi Syud Ahmed's Diary of News for the 22nd March 1877.

A few Chiefs of Kundahar who were discontented with the Ameer have gone over to the side of the English at Khelat, on account of which the Ameer feels very anxious.

Russian couriers bring letters for the Ameer almost every week by the way of Sheikh Ali through Hazarajat. The Ameer sends answers through Saghliwar Sherull Khan, Governor of Turkestan.

The Ameer is now quiet, does not talk of jehad openly, but preparations are otherwise being made all the same. It is said that the Ameer is waiting for a reply to the letter he has sent to the Russians asking their advice in his project of jehad.

The sons of Sirhur Mahomed Sharif Khan have sent a letter to the Akhund of Swat begging him to write and ask the Ameer to allow their father to come back to Cabul. The Akhund has given no reply yet.

Enclosure 49 in No. 36.

CIPHER TELEGRAM, dated 26th March 1877.

From Sir Lewis Pelly to the Viceroy.

Thirteen o'clock a.m. I regret to report the Cabul Envoy died about an hour ago. I am despatching an express courier to Ameer.

Enclosure 50 in No. 36.

TELEGRAM, dated 26th March 1877.

From Sir Lewis Pelly to the Viceroy.

In consultation with Sir Richard Pollock, deputations of condolence are being sent to the Afghan Mission; the leading members of the Kazakhvel will be present on my part at burial service, and
cause the customary funeral feasts, &c., to be provided, flags at fort and general quarters hoisted half-mast, sixty minute guns, being the number of the years of deceased, will be fired, commencing as the corpse leaves the house, mixed deputation of native officials and gentlemen accompanying corpse to Boorj Hurri Sing, from which point Khalil Arbab and following accompanying corpse to frontier. Mission requested that no military guard might be furnished. Sir Richard and I pay visit of condolence to Mission to-morrow morning. Courts closed to-day.

Enclosure 51 in No. 36.

Dated Peshawar, the 26th March 1877.

From Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., to His Highness the Amir of Cabul.

After compliments,—

It is with feelings of profound regret I have learned that Your Highness’s Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Sadr-i-Azim, died at his residence in Peshawar about an hour ago, i.e., about 2 o’clock this morning.

Your Highness is doubtless aware that the Sadr-i-Azim has, for some time past, been more or less suffering, and that every effort was made on the part of the British authorities to be of aid and service to him in his illness. For some little time, beginning from the 27th February, the Sadr-i-Azim desired and received the professional attendance of the Civil Surgeon at this station, and at his Excellency’s request the Civil Surgeon discontinued his visits on the 9th March.

I need not assure your Highness that it will be the wish of his Excellency the Viceroy that every possible respect should be shown in Peshawar to the memory of the deceased, and that everything should be done which may be of service to the gentlemen of the Mission in their bereavement.

Permit me to add that by the death of his Excellency the Sadr-i-Azim I am sensible that I have lost a colleague who was a devoted servant of your Highness and a sincere well-wisher of the Afghan and British Governments. Personally, I feel I have lost in Syud Noor Mahomed Shah a friend whom I have known for 16 years.

I beg your Highness to accept the expression of my sincere sympathy in the loss which your Highness has sustained.

Enclosure 52 in No. 36.

Cipher Telegram, dated 30th March 1877. (Extract.)

From the Viceroy, Calcutta, to Sir Lewis Pelly, Peshawar.

Close conference immediately, on ground that basis on which we agreed to negotiate has not been acknowledged by Amir; that, Mir Akhor not being authorized to negotiate on that basis, nor you on any other, conference is terminated ipso facto; and that you will leave Peshawar on a stated day. The date of it you will fix yourself, but it should be as early as conveniently possible, in order to show we are in earnest and avoid further entanglement. Let your language to Mir Akhor be most friendly. If, in the meanwhile, new Envoys or messengers arrive to continue negotiation you will tell them that your powers are terminated. On closing conference, write to Amir friendly letter notifying the fact.

I entirely approve your letter to Amir.

No. 37.

Secret.—No. 64.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

My Lord,

India Office, London, 4th October 1877.

1. Her Majesty’s Government have considered with the attention due to the importance of its contents the Secret Letter of your Excellency’s Government, No. 13, dated the 10th May last, reporting the transactions which preceded the Conference lately held at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly, on behalf of your Government, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, Prime Minister of the Amir of Cabul, the course of the discussions which then took place, and the views of your Excellency in Council in regard to the results of the Conference and your future relations with the Amir.

2. Before making the general observations which are suggested by the papers under notice, it is my agreeable duty, on the part of Her Majesty’s Government, to convey to your Excellency their full and cordial approval of the proceedings of your Government, their high sense of the patience and discrimination shown by your Excellency
throughout the negotiations, and their entire satisfaction with the manner in which, under Your Excellency's instructions, the discussions with the Afghan Envoy were conducted by Sir L. Pelly.

3. The considerations which led Her Majesty's Government to desire the presence of British Officers at certain points on the frontiers of Afghanistan were set forth at length in my Despatches addressed to your Excellency's predecessor on the 22nd January and 19th November 1875, while the instructions furnished to your Excellency under date the 28th February 1876, in regard to frontier matters generally, placed you in possession of their views as to the manner in which the requisite negotiations with the Ameer might most conveniently be commenced, and authorized you to make concessions to His Highness, which, it was known, had in former years been greatly desired by him, and which could not fail both to strengthen his own power and promote the permanent interests of his dynasty.

4. When vesting your Excellency with discretion to offer to the Ameer large pecuniary aid, a decided recognition by the British Government of the order of succession established by him in favour of his younger son, Abdullah Jan, and an explicit pledge, either by treaty or otherwise, of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression on his territories, Her Majesty's Government were justified in hoping that advantages so great would be accepted by the Ameer in the spirit in which they were offered, and that His Highness would not hesitate to allow to their Agents unrestricted access to positions in his dominions where their presence would not, even in appearance, prejudice his personal authority, and where they would be favourably situated for acquiring early information of any circumstances which might threaten disturbance to the independence or tranquillity of his dominions.

5. But, while holding this reasonable expectation, Her Majesty's Government did not disguise from themselves that of late years the conduct of Shere Ali had been such as to indicate a possibility that, owing either to confirmed disbelief in the sincerity of the British Government or to doubts of its power, the Ameer might reject the proposals which you were authorised to make to him. This contingency rendered it desirable to proceed with caution, but, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, afforded no sufficient reason why the necessary overtures should not be made; on the contrary, it seemed to them in the highest degree expedient that the real sentiments of the Ameer should be ascertained beyond doubt.

6. Upon this point the history of the events reported in the letter under reply is unhappily conclusive, and demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently as the year 1875 by Sir R. Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, that "no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the Ameer." Shere Ali's confidential Envoy stated explicitly that his master had "now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British Government," and ample confirmatory evidence of this fact has been furnished by the refusal of the Ameer to receive at Kabul or elsewhere the temporary mission which you proposed to send to him; by his obstinate objection to accept the principle of free access for British Officers to Afghanistan as a preliminary to negotiations plainly declared to have for their object arrangements which had been pressed for by His Highness in 1869 and again in 1873; and by the attitude of positive hostility which he assumed while the discussion between his Envoy and Sir L. Pelly were proceeding at Peshawur.

7. It would be futile to discuss the causes which may have led to this complete alienation of the Ameer, or to speculate how far, and in what proportions, it may be attributable to the circumstances upon which Syed Noor Mahomed Shah dwelt with so much persistence, to imperfect appreciation of the political situation in Europe and Asia, or to foreign intrigue. Your Excellency judged correctly that, the fact having been established, continuance of the negotiations was unlikely to lead to permanently satisfactory results, and, in taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the death of the Afghan Envoy to close the Conference, you adopted that course which was in all respects the most expedient.

8. Although that cordial agreement between the British and Afghan Governments, which is so much to be desired in the interests of both powers, still remains, therefore, to be effected, Her Majesty's Government cannot regard the result of recent proceedings as either unimportant or unsatisfactory. The position of the British Government towards that of the Ameer has been clearly defined. His Highness has now been informed in unmistakeable language that under the terms of the Treaty of 1855—which alone of the two treaties contracted between the British and Afghan Governments has a character of perpetuity—the British Government has incurred no liabilities whatever
on his behalf; and it has been distinctly intimated to him that neither by Lord Mayo in 1869 nor by Lord Northbrook in 1873 was any assurance given of unconditional protection, nor any obligation contracted towards him which was not dependent on his future conduct towards the British Government and his own subjects. Any illusions, therefore, which Shere Ali may have entertained upon this point have been effectually dissipated. He has further learned that the British Government will not undertake the formal responsibility of assisting him to defend his country from the attacks of external foes, or of supporting his dynasty against sedition, unless British Officers are allowed to reside on the frontier for the purpose of acquiring information for communication to their Government, and unless His Highness is himself prepared to receive, when necessary, the confidential Agents of the Viceroy of India.

9. To both the parties to them, therefore, the recent negotiations may prove to have been beneficial. The British Government has for the first time become acquainted with the real sentiments with which it is regarded by a ruler as to whose disposition it was important there should be no uncertainty, and can regulate its policy accordingly; the Ameer, on his part, now knows the precise terms on which he may obtain the support of the British Government for himself and his heir. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, His Highness may well be left for a time to reflect upon the knowledge which he has acquired. There are already indications of a change for the better in the attitude of the Ameer. Her Majesty's Government trust that the improvement may be progressive, and that His Highness may ere long awake to the fact that, while his interests are bound up with those of the Government whose alliance he has lately rejected, the converse proposition is by no means equally true. This result may in the end be most speedily attained by abstention for the present, on the one hand, from any hostile pressure on His Highness, and on the other, from any renewed offer of the concessions which have been refused.

10. The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards the Ameer under present circumstances has, indeed, been anticipated by your Excellency in the assurance conveyed to the Afghan Envoy by Sir L. Pelly under your instructions, that "while repudiating all liability on behalf of the Ameer and his dynasty, the British Government will continue as heretofore to respect his independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognized as being in the lawful possession of His Highness, and will abstain from interfering therein so long as the Ameer, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own." Her Majesty's Government would have been glad had the Ameer, by a cordial acceptance of the propositions made to him, allowed them to substitute for the attitude of indifference indicated by the terms of the above assurance one of hearty co-operation for the protection of common interests. The integrity of the Ameer's dominions is liable to be menaced either by direct foreign attack or by the results of domestic discord. Foreign aggression may not be, and probably is not, at all imminent, though the prospect of it has more than once, in recent years, excited the fears of the Ameer; but danger from the members of his own family must be ever present to the mind of His Highness, who can scarcely reckon with confidence upon immunity from it during his lifetime, and must be well aware that it is certain to ensue upon his death.

11. The independence of Afghanistan is a matter of importance to the British Government, and, as an essential part of arrangements for its protection, Her Majesty's Government would still be glad to station Agents upon whom they could rely at Herat and Cundahar. In the event, therefore, of the Ameer, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your Excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by him, his advances should not be rejected. If, on the other hand, he continues to maintain an attitude of isolation and scarcely veiled hostility, the British Government stands unpledged to any obligations, and, in any contingencies which may arise in Afghanistan, will be at liberty to adopt such measures for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the north-west frontier of Her Majesty's Indian dominions as the circumstances of the moment may render expedient, without regard to the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali or the interests of his dynasty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.
Some time ago I was asked whether I would object to an opinion I had once expressed, adverse to Sir John Jacob's proposal to advance a division of the Indian Army to Quetta, being quoted in a discussion in the House of Lords.

I replied that, whilst depreciating public discussions of the question, which lay bare all our weak points to our enemies, I had no objection to my opinion being quoted, provided it were added at the same time that I considered the circumstances had so completely changed as to justify me in a change of the views formed 10 or 12 years ago.

I considered the advance, when first proposed, to be unnecessary, and open to the objection of leaving the Bolan Pass and the Scinde desert between it and its supports.

I consider now that the advance is necessary, and that its political advantages would far outweigh its military disadvantages, provided that proper measures are taken to support it.

The military disadvantages are greatly reduced by the progress of the railroads, which renders it now quite possible to make a branch railway for a considerable part of the distance towards Quetta, and the Scinde canals have carried water throughout the west bank of the Indus.

When the occupation of Quetta was first advocated it was viewed as a strategical point to take in flank any Russian or Persian expedition against Cabul. There is now no question of an expedition launched from a distant base against Cabul, but there is a question of a steady approach of Russia by absorption of territory, by maturing her communications with Russia, and by forming new bases of operation in the fertile valley of the Oxus.

Already Shere Ali, through causes on which I will hereafter touch, has his ear (and probably his hand) open to the Governor of Turkestan.

If we have Russian possessions near to us, we shall find the Government of India far more expensive and more difficult than it has hitherto been.

If we compare the present situation of Russia in Central Asia with what it was 20 years ago we must expect the close approximation of our frontiers in less than the same time, unless we can find means of preventing it.

Does not the example of Turkey, with her tributary States stirred into rebellion by emissaries from Russian societies, show the mischief which Russia might work in India when her close neighbourhood would give her easy opportunities of communication?

It appears to me to be our clear policy to exercise all our observation and watchfulness so as to detect any further advances, and to use all the influence that we can bring to bear in Europe to prevent them for the future.

I am not in any way an advocate for advancing into Afghanistan contrary to the wish of the Ameer Shere Ali, but we have a right by treaty to go to Quetta, and I believe that our occupation of it, if carried out when we were on good terms with him, would not have been considered an aggression. But his present alienation, his apparent understanding with Russia, and his assumption of a claim on Quetta, form a sufficient reason, if none other existed, for our occupation of that post.

The disturbed state of the Khelat territory resting on our border, the impotence of its ruler to restore or maintain order, the obstruction to our trade with Candahar, rendered it necessary for some one to interfere. If our abstention from all action had continued we should have had no just right to complain if the ruler of Afghanistan, or the Shah of Persia, had stepped in and taken the place which we had abdicated.

We have unfortunately managed Shere Ali badly. Perhaps it might not have been possible, with our scruples, and his want of them, to have managed him advantageously; but it must be admitted that we have not given him the reasons to unite himself with us that he naturally expected.

First, we stood aloof in his struggles for life and empire, ready to acknowledge whoever might prove the master of Afghanistan.

Then, when Shere Ali had subdued his enemies, he came forward to meet us with an alliance, but we were willing only to form an imperfect alliance with him.

He was willing to trust us, provided that we would trust him; but we felt that we could not bind ourselves to unreserved support of a power whose ideas of right and wrong were so different from ours.

We therefore proposed to bind him, leaving ourselves (according to his idea) free, and he recoiled from this bargain.

His friendly feelings, however, were not entirely alienated by that experience of us; he abstained from any action towards Seistan at our desire, and he believed that the
mediation which we pressed upon him would have ended by the restoration of the portion of Seistan that Persia had occupied in his days of trouble.

And not only Shere Ali, but the whole Afghan people, believed that we should restore to them what they had lost.

When they found that we had allowed Persia to obstruct and ill-treat our arbitrator, and to retain much of her encroachments, they looked upon us as a weak and treacherous people who, under the guise of friendship, had spoiled them in favour of Persia.

This I believe to be the root of Shere Ali's discontent with us.

Our going to Quetta (illustrated by all the hostile intentions attributed to it and industriously advanced in the newspapers by opponents of the measure) has naturally been seized upon by Shere Ali, in his present frame of mind, as a cause of offence.

If we consider the anarchy and bloodshed which have prevailed in the Khelat territory since we withdrew our protection and support from its ruler, the stoppage of our trade with Afghanistan and Persia by the slaughter and plunder of the traders, in fact, the complete closing of the highway,—if we look to the constant disturbances of our borders formerly by the tribes over whom the Khan claimed authority but whom he could not control, and compare that state with the present condition of peace and order (ensuring the security of the Khan himself and his people) we cannot doubt that we have been fully justified by necessity, and by the interests of humanity, as well as by treaty, in assuming our present position.

We are thereby enabled to assist the Khan with money and advice, by our influence over his turbulent feudal neighbours, and by restoring to comparative tranquillity the country which was formerly a theatre of bloody struggles and treacherous murder.

Our policy of masterly inactivity, or rather of receding from every difficulty until what were matters easy of suppression have grown into serious dangers, has continued too long, and if it is maintained will lead us to disaster.

It has been frequently asserted, by people with pretensions to speak with authority, that we shall be secure if we remain within our mountain boundary.

But this is at variance with all history. A mountain chain that can be pierced in many places is no security if you hide behind it. India has been often entered through her mountain barrier, which was never defended. India waited to fight the battle in her own plains, and invariably lost it.

How much Austria lost in not defending the Bohemian mountains! What might have been the position of the Turks had they properly secured the passage of the Balkans?

Afghanistan is closed to us, but the one post of Quetta that we can hold by right of treaty should be made secure; its communications should be completed, and a proper support provided. To retreat from it now would do the power of England more injury in India than the loss of a battle.

30th May 1878.

NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

No. 39.

TELEGRAM, dated 7th June 1878, from Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London.

NEWSLETTERS from Kabul and Peshawar have been received to effect that Amir has been informed by Russian Agent, and by Tashkend Governor-General's letter, that Envoy sent by Russian Emperor will shortly visit Kabul as Ambassador. These reports require verification.

No. 40.

From the Viceroy, Simla, dated June 19th 1878.

In continuation of my telegram of 7th June, we have received further corroborative information from various sources of mobilization of Russian forces in Central Asia, opening of road towards Afghanistan, and pressure on Ameer to receive important Russian Embassy.

These reports not yet fully substantiated, and their degree of importance cannot be precisely ascertained, but we transmit information for such use as may be considered desirable.
No. 41.

TELEGRAM, from Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London, dated 1st July 1878.

FOLLOWING message received from Cavagnari. Begins: A Peshawar merchant has received special information from his firm at Bokhara that a Russian force of 30,000 men has arrived at Karshi, and the merchant is recommended to send no more merchandise until further instructions. A letter from Kabul reports that, on the 13th instant, an Agent from Russia reached Kabul, and informed the Amir that the Russians are about to establish cantonments at Sherabad, and at the ferries of Kilif and Karki on the Oxus. Points named are on direct route from Tashkend to Kabul, and cantonment at Kilif would bring Russians in immediate contact with Afghanistan. While numbers are evidently grossly exaggerated, the mass and concurrent testimony of reports regarding Russian movements is so great that we cannot altogether disregard them.

No. 42.

TELEGRAM, dated 30th July 1878.

FROM VICEROY, Simla, to SECRETARY OF STATE, London.

BRITISH Native Medical Officer lent some time ago to Amir returned on leave to Peshawar, the 21st instant, reporting that Kauffmann, with troops, had reached Karki, and was personally proceeding to see Amir. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending Amir's orders; but he declined to obey them. Amir thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers. Native Doctor heard Amir tell his Minister in durbar, 7th July, that Kauffmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Kabul, refusing to be stopped. I refrained from telegraphing this information to you, pending confirmation. Have now heard from Peshawar reported arrival of Russian officer at Kabul with large military escort. This, of course, cannot be Kauffmann, and may be Native of rank in Russian service; though all accounts as yet point to European officer. If such Mission be authenticated, I will telegraph again. It will be difficult to act or instruct frontier officers without definite indication of views of Cabinet on such conduct on part of Russia and Amir, having regard to Russia's formal promises and Amir's refusal to receive British Mission in any shape. What I shall then require to know without delay is, whether this will be treated by Her Majesty's Government as an Imperial question with Russia, or left to us to deal with as a matter between Amir and Government of India. In latter case, I shall propose, with your approval, to insist on immediate suitable reception of European British Mission. I will communicate with you further on measures which may in this contingency become necessary for securing due permanent preponderance in Afghanistan. The alternative would be continued policy of complete inaction, difficult to maintain and very injurious to our position in India.

No. 42a.

FROM VICEROY, 31st July 1878.

Following message received to-day from Peshawur. Message begins,—

Three special messengers from Kabul have just arrived. They left Kabul nine days ago. Three Russians in European costume have reached Kabul accompanied by Cossacks and Uzbek horsemen. Sirdar Ibraheem Khan was sent to meet them. The chief of mission talks Persian, but not fluently. Kauffmann is called Gobernah. This officer is called Gobernah. Last part pronounced shortly.

One messenger speaks of him as Deputy Governor-General. Possibly it may be General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand.

Message ends.
No. 43.

Telegram from Secretary of State, 1st August 1878.

Your telegrams relating to Kabul received. Make yourself certain of the facts before insisting on the reception of British envoy. Perhaps you might send a Native to ascertain whether Russians are really there, and telegraph to me when the truth is known.

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No. 44.

Telegram from Viceroy, 2nd August 1878.

Your telegram of yesterday—Kabul. Native had been already sent for purposes you suggest. Reports at present confirmed from independent sources by three messengers from Kabul, by letters mentioning officer in charge of Mission by name, and by details of rank and title of officer, constitution of escort, and honours and salutes with which Mission has been received.

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No. 45.

Telegram, dated 2nd August 1878.

From Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London. (Extract.)

Further confirmation received of presence of Russian Mission at Kabul headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarkand, who is mentioned by name.

Referring to my telegram of 30th, we desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honour, and are staying at Kabul within short distance of our frontier and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there.

We have further reports of Russian officers having visited and been well received at Maimena.

To remain inactive now, will, we respectfully submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly and as completely under Russian power and influence as the Khanates. We believe we could correct situation if allowed to treat it as question between us and the Amir, and probably could so do without recourse to force. But we must speak plainly and decidedly, and be sure of your support.

It appears to us that the contingency contemplated in the Secretary of State's letter, No. 2 of 2nd January 1875, has arisen; and we propose, therefore, in the first place, to insist on reception of suitable British Mission at Kabul. To this we do not anticipate serious resistance; indeed, we think it probable that Amir, adhering to his policy of playing Russia and ourselves off against each other, will really welcome such Mission, while outwardly only yielding to pressure. We would thus endeavour to effect arrangements similar to those urged on us by your Lordship's predecessor in despatch above quoted, but avoiding all dynastic obligations. It is possible we should find considerable difficulty in obtaining Amir's assent to such arrangements; but in hands of skilful negotiator, difficulties might be overcome, and at least it is desirable to make the effort in the first instance. Amir is aware we are in position to enforce our demands. Failing in these endeavours to re-establish the preponderance of British influence in Afghanistan which we believe to be necessary for the safety of India, we shall then have to consider what measures are necessary for the protection and permanent tranquillity of our North-west frontier, as indicated in last paragraph of Secretary of State's despatch, No. 64 of 4th October 1877. We earnestly solicit an early reply as situation is urgent.
No. 46.
From Secretary of State, 3rd August 1878. (Extract.)

Assuming the certainty of Russian officers at Kabul, your proposals to insist on reception of British envoy approved. In case of refusal you will telegraph again as to the steps you desire to take for compelling the Ameer to receive your Mission.

No. 47.
From Viceroy, 5th August 1878. (Extract.)

Your telegram of 3rd.—Kabul. No hostile action shall be taken without full previous communication with you.

No. 48.
No. 53 of 1878.
Government of India—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 5th August 1878.

We have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of telegraphic reports and correspondence regarding the entry into Afghanistan, and the arrival and reception at Kabul of a Russian Mission to the Amir. We propose to report in full hereafter upon the course of these events and upon our proceedings in dealing with the situation.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 5th June 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Viceroy, Simla.

Report received that the Russian Agent at Kabul has informed Amir that European Russian Envoy of equal [status?] to the Governor-General of Tashkend will shortly visit Kabul. Governor-General has written to the Amir to the same effect; adding that he must be received as [an Ambassador?] sent by the Emperor of Russia.

The son of the Khan of Khiva is to be employed with 800 horsemen to protect the working-parties on both sides [of the] road about to be constructed between Khiva and Charjui, and thence to Akcheh; and now to accompany the Envoy to Kabul. Amir has summoned a [council] of the leading Chiefs to deliberate whether he should join Russia or England.

Enclosure 2 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 21st July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

Cheytan Shah has arrived. He corroborates the intelligence I have recently reported regarding Russian pressure on the Amir, and military preparations in Trans-Oxus. He states that Kauffmann, with some troops, has arrived at Karki, and that he himself is on his way to Kabul to see Amir. The Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending the Amir's orders; but he declined to obey them. The Amir, on receipt of this report, sent orders that no interference with the Russian officers should be offered.
Enclosure 3 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 23rd July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

I have cross-examined Chetan Shah about the report he sent me. He states that he heard the Amir tell his Ministers in durbar, on the 7th July, that he had received report from Balkh that Kauffmann, or an officer of equal rank to him, from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus and was on his way to Kabul, and refused to be stopped. Chetan Shah appears to have studiously avoided political matters while at Kabul. I am inclined to regard his news as the old story I have already reported regarding an officer of rank being about to visit Kabul; and I think it improbable that it is Kauffmann himself, but one of his officers. Judging from the movement from Chikishliar, I think Russians are endeavouring to persuade Amir to give them right of way through North-west Afghanistan towards Merv, and, failing, will probably commence to open up direct communication from Charjui and Karki; this being quite beyond Afghanistan limits.

Enclosure 4 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 29th July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

A man who left Kabul fourteen days ago reports that the arrival of a Russian of high rank, accompanied by 100 Cossacks and 200 Usbeg horsemen, was daily expected at Kabul, and that the Amir was preparing to receive him with great honour. Buktyar Khan communicated the above information.

Enclosure 5 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 29th July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Foreign Secretary, Simla. (Extract.)

Reports received of the arrival at Kabul of a Russian officer accompanied by a large escort, variously reported at from 200 to 400 horsemen. I have been unable to ascertain whether he is dressed in European or Native costume.

Enclosure 6 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 30th July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

Three special messengers from Kabul have just arrived; they left Kabul nine days ago. Three Russians in European costume have reached Kabul accompanied by Cossacks and Usbeg horsemen. Sirdar Ibrahim Khan was sent to meet them. The Chief of the Mission talks Persian, but not fluently. Kauffmann is called Gobernat. This officer is called Gobernah, last syllable pronounced short. One messenger speaks of him as Deputy Governor-General; possibly it may be General Abramoff, Governor, Samarkand.

Enclosure 7 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 31st July 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

A letter has just arrived by special messenger for Sirdar Jalaludin Khan, which Agents have seen. In it General Abramoff is mentioned by name as the Chief of the Mission. I sent a special Agent to Kabul on the 15th instant, and he ought to return within the next few days. I am doing everything in my power to get strong evidence of the presence of a European Russian officer at Kabul. I believe it is true, as it is reported from many quite independent sources.
Enclosure 8 in No. 48.

Telegram, dated 1st August 1878, from Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

An arrival from Kabul reports that salute of guns was fired in honour of Russian Mission, and that the Chief of the Mission is spoken of as the General Sahib.

No. 49.

No. 61 of 1878.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

Simla, 19th August 1878.

With our despatch No. 53, dated 5th August, we forwarded telegraphic reports and correspondence regarding the arrival and reception at Kabul of a Russian Mission to the Amir, and we promised to report hereafter the course of these events and our proceedings in dealing with the situation.

2. We have now the honour to forward copies of telegrams from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar which report the further proceedings of the Russian Mission at Kabul. It will be seen that the Russian Envoy was received in Durbar on the 26th July, and is said to have presented two letters to the Amir—one from His Imperial Majesty the Czar and the other from the Governor-General of Tashkend. At a second interview on the 2nd or 3rd August the Amir handed to the Envoy a written reply, the contents of which are not known, and which was immediately despatched by special horsemen to Russian Turkistan.

3. On receiving your Lordship's approval, by telegram, of our proposal to depute a British Envoy to Kabul, we offered the appointment to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who has accepted it. He will be accompanied, for political duties, by the officers named in the margin, and by an escort of 250 sabres. The Mission will start very early in September, and we enclose a copy of the instructions issued to the Punjab Government, requesting that the necessary preparations may be made with the utmost despatch. We have also decided to send a special native emissary to the Amir in advance of the Mission, in order that His Highness may have due notice beforehand that the Envoy is coming, and that the necessary arrangement may be made for his passage through Afghan territory. For this duty we have selected Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., formerly British Agent at Kabul, who will leave Peshawar on the 23rd August. We enclose copy of the letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Amir which the Nawab will present to His Highness upon his arrival at Kabul.

We, have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON

R. STRACHEY.

S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

Telegram, dated 8th August 1878.

From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

Newsletter of 30th July from Kabul reports that, on the 26th, Amir received Russian Envoy in Durbar. Envoy presented two letters—one from the Governor-General of
Tashkend, which Amir gave to his Secretary to read; the other from the Czar, which Amir kept, but did not open. Presents of some rifles and watches were given by the Envoy to the Amir and his Ministers.

A review of the troops was fixed for the 2nd instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

Telegram, dated 11th August 1878.

From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, Simla.

Kabul newsletter, dated 3rd instant, reports review of the troops on 2nd; after which Envoy had interview with Amir, during which Amir gave a written reply to the letter Envoy had brought; special horsemen, Russian and Afghan, with these despatches, left Kabul for Turkistan. Nature of the Amir's reply not known.

Enclosure 3 in No. 49.

No. 1,681 P., dated Simla, 13th August 1878 (Confidential).

From A. C. Lyall, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Leffel Griffin, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I am directed to inform you that an English officer of high rank will proceed, very early in the month of September next, from Peshawar to Kabul on a political Mission. He will be accompanied by at least three English officers, besides a medical officer.

His Excellency the Viceroy will be especially obliged if His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will be pleased to issue urgent orders for the preparation, at Peshawar, of all arrangements connected with the proper outfit and camp-equipage of the Envoy and his staff. It may be necessary to provide a few good horses, to retain servants in red livery, and otherwise to furnish the camp in a manner suitable to the occasion. Any assistance that the Foreign Department can contribute will be at once given on application.

Enclosure 4 in No. 49.

Dated Simla, 14th August 1878.

From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness Amir Shere Ali Khan, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

The authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the course of recent events at Kabul and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan, has rendered it necessary that I should communicate fully and without reserve with your Highness upon matters of importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. For this reason I have considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential British Envoy of high rank, who is known to your Highness, his Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that he may converse personally with your Highness regarding these urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can be best arranged for the welfare and tranquillity of both States, and for the preservation of friendship between the two Governments, by a full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is therefore sent in advance to your Highness by the hand of Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., a faithful and honoured Sirdar of my Government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that your Highness may be pleased to issue commands to your Sirdars and to all other authorities in Afghanistan upon the route between Peshawar and Kabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to my Envoy, the representative of a friendly Power, due safe conduct and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing with his retinue through the dominions of your Highness.

I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself.
No. 50.
No. 67 of 1878.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 26th August 1878.

In continuation of our Despatch No. 61, dated 19th August 1878, we have the honour to enclose a copy of a telegram received on the 21st August, communicating the intelligence that the Heir-Apparent to Kabul and its dependencies, Sirdar Abdulla Jan, died at Kabul on the 17th August.

2. This event is likely to be of great political importance, but as yet we cannot attempt to say in what direction, or to what extent, it will modify the course of affairs at Kabul. We have considered that it is advisable to adjourn the departure from Peshawar of the Mission which we are sending to the Amir, so that it may not reach Kabul before the customary period of mourning (40 days) shall have terminated. And we have despatched to Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, for delivery to the Amir, a second letter, conveying the Viceroy’s personal expression of condolence with His Highness upon the loss of his son.

3. We have nevertheless directed Nawab Gholam Hussein himself to leave for Kabul in advance of the Mission as soon as possible. We consider that it is inexpedient to relax, beyond what is decorous under the circumstances, our preparations for the speedy departure of the Mission, or to defer giving the Kabul Government formal notice of its coming; because we wish the Amir to be convinced that he may expect its certain arrival, upon urgent business, at an early date. It is, moreover, obviously desirable that the expedition should not reach Kabul late in the autumn.

4. We enclose copy of the Viceroy’s letter to the Amir, and of the latest telegraphic reports and orders.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 50.

Telegram, dated 21st August 1878.

From Major CaVAGNARI, Peshawar, to Viceroy, Simla.

Express dák received from the Mustangi, in reply to my letter of the 13th to him; announces the death of the Heir-Apparent on the 17th instant, the day on which my letter reached Kabul; and states that, under the circumstances, he could not mention the subject of Native Envoy’s coming to the Amir. And he hopes that Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan will remain at Peshawar till further notice. Letter dated Kabul, the 17th instant.

Enclosure 2 in No. 50.

Telegram No. 1753P., dated 22nd August 1878.

From Viceroy, Simla, to Major CaVAGNARI, Peshawar:

Your telegrams of yesterday.—Gholam Hussein should await at Peshawar receipt of second letter for Amir from Viceroy now under preparation, to start as soon as possible.
after receipt. Meanwhile, reply to Mustaufi, expressing great regret for death of Heir, but add that Viceroy's letters being urgently important, Gholam Hasan will start in few days for Kabul. British Mission must now follow later in September. Remain yourself at Peshawar for the present.

Letter to His Highness the Amir of Kabul, dated Simla, 23rd August 1878.

After the despatch from Simla of my letter dated 14th August 1878, which Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan will deliver with this letter to your Highness, I received from Peshawar the melancholy news that your Highness has suffered a great affliction in the untimely death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Heir-Apparent to Kabul and its dependencies. I desire to express to your Highness personally the sincere regret which this intelligence has caused to me; but life and death are in the hands of God, and resignation to His will is unavoidable. In consequence of this calamity I have directed my Envoy to postpone for a short time his departure, in order that your Highness may not be troubled by any public business, however important and urgent, until the usual period of mourning shall have elapsed.

Telegram from Viceroy, 8th September 1878.

Ameer, after much pressure from Mustaufi, has attended durbar for a short time. Abramoff reported to have left Kabul 25th, escorted by regiment of Afghan cavalry and Ameer's moonshee, leaving subordinates and escort at Kabul.

Nawab Gholam Hussein left Peshawar 30th, reached Dakka 1st, left same night for Jellalabad, was escorted and well treated by commanders at Ali Musjid and Dakka; since then Nawab only allowed to make short marches, apparent object to delay reply.

Mustaufi writes to Deputy Commissioner 2nd September that he cannot act or communicate with Ameer, therefore necessary for Nawab to remain at Peshawar. To Bukhtiar Khan he writes, same date, that he has informed Ameer, who says he cannot attend to such business, and matter must be deferred. I have telegraphed to Commissioner to inform Mustaufi that Mission will in any case leave Peshawar about 16th, that its objects are friendly, but that a refusal of free passage and safe conduct will be considered act of open hostility.

Our Mission will be accompanied by two Native nobles, members of Jeypore and Tonk families, who have eagerly and gratefully accepted the offer.

No. 52.

No. 79 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. (Extract.)

My Lord,

In our letter of the 19th August,* we reported to your Lordship our preparations for the deputation of General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., early in September, upon a special Mission to the Amir of Kabul. His departure has been adjourned, as was explained in our subsequent letter of the 26th August,† in consequence of the death of the Heir-Apparent to the Kabul throne, but the Mission will now leave Peshawar about the 16th instant.

Simla, 9th September 1878.
2. We enclose copy of our Resolution† formally appointing Sir Neville Chamberlain; and detailing the officers and gentlemen who will accompany him on political duty and upon his personal staff. It will be seen that two gentlemen belonging respectively to Hindu and Muhammadan families of the first rank in India, have joined the Mission. We considered that it would be politically advantageous to attach them to it; and our offer to do so was accepted by them at once and very willingly.

3. A copy of the letter from the Viceroy which Sir Neville Chamberlain will deliver to the Amir is also enclosed.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 52.
No. 1911P.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Political.
Resolution.
Simla, 7th September 1878.

The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has been pleased to appoint His Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in Madras, to proceed to Kabul as Envoy Extraordinary on a Special Mission to His Highness the Amir of Kabul and its dependencies. The officers named below are attached to the Mission upon political duty and to His Excellency the Envoy's personal staff:

Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I.
Surgeon-Major H. W. Bellew, C.S.I.
Major O. B. C. St. John, R.E.
Kazi Syed Ahmed, Attaché to the Foreign Department.

Maharaj Pertab Sing, of Jodhpur.
Sirdar Obed Ulla Khan, of Tonk.

Captain St. V. A. Hannick, Military Secretary to His Excellency the Envoy Extraordinary.
Captain F. M. Ondow, Madras Cavalry, Aide-de-Camp.
Lieutenant N. F. F. Chamberlain.

(Signed) A. C. LYALL,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Enclosure 2 in No. 52.

To His Highness Amir Sher Ali Khan, Wali of Kabul and its Dependencies.

My Honoured and Valued Friend,

In my letter of the 14th August 1878 I informed your Highness that I had considered it expedient to depute his Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that he might confer personally with your Highness regarding certain matters of urgency and importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. The departure of my Envoy was postponed for a time in consequence of the great affliction which befell your Highness in the death of Sirdar Abdulla Jan, the Heir-Apparent to Kabul and its Dependencies. The Mission is now about to set out from India; and this letter will be delivered to your Highness at Kabul by my Envoy in person, who will communicate unreservedly with your Highness upon the

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reasons and objects of his coming. General Sir Neville Chamberlain possesses the full confidence of this Government; and whatever he may say should be understood to have been said by myself. I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself,

Your Highness' Sincere Friend,

(Signed) Lytton,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Simla, the 7th September 1878.

No. 53.

Telegram from Viceroy, 17th September 1878.

Native Agent reached Kabul 10th instant. Well received along the road. Had private interview on 12th with Ameer, to whom he delivered Viceroy's letters. Ameer stated that Russian Mission had come to Kabul with his permission, but evinced no desire to receive British Mission; concerning which he held dilatory and unsatisfactory language. Ameer's officers at Ali Musjid has been asked to guarantee safety of Mission through Khyber Pass, failing which, arrangements will be made directly with Khyberrees, whose head men and hostages are at Peshawur.

No. 54.

Telegram from Viceroy, 21st September 1878.

Chamberlain reports from Peshawur that it is quite evident Ameer is bent on utmost procrastination, and determined on making acceptance of our Mission dependent on his pleasure and choice of time; we have given formal public notice to Ameer by Viceroy's not unfriendly letters that Mission is going on business of highest importance to both States. Ameer has received these letters, discussed them with our native emissary, and had full time for reply and arrangements on road. Mission already delayed fourteen days beyond date originally fixed, and five days beyond adjourned date last notified to Ameer, while in India considerable public preparations for Mission have been made. Therefore, now to await at Peshawur Ameer's pleasure would be to abandon whole policy and accept easy repulse at outset; it was essential to test practically Ameer's real intentions, and further delay would have much endangered arrangements concluded with Khyberrees for safe conduct to Ali Musjid; consequently Mission moved this morning to Jamrud; thence Cavagnari advances to Ali Musjid with small escort to demand passage; if reply from Ameer's officials there is satisfactory, Mission proceeds, and any subsequent instructions can follow Mission, which will not reach Kabul until about fifteen days later; if reply unsatisfactory, Mission withdraws definitely, and further measures proposed will be reported to you. Intelligence just received that Mir Akhor at Ali Musjid has at last received instructions to arrange safe conduct of Mission to Kabul. Cavagnari's advance to Ali Musjid will verify this promptly.

No. 55.

Telegram from Viceroy, 22nd September 1878.

Following telegram received last night from Sir Neville Chamberlain. Message begins: Cavagnari reports that we have received a decisive answer from Faiz Mahomed, after personal interview, that he will not allow Mission to proceed. He crowned the heights commanding the way with his levies, and though many times warned by Cavagnari that his reply would be regarded as reply of the Ameer said he would not let Mission pass. Shall I make another attempt to-morrow morning, and try to bring Faiz Mahomed to reason, or make him fire upon us? Postscript: I have just met Cavagnari, who has given me full details. I am positively of opinion that any further attempt will only bring more disgrace upon us. Message ends.
Following reply despatched. Begins: Your telegram to-day, accepting the reply of Faiz Mahomed to ultimatum by Cavagnari as positive refusal by Ameer to let Mission pass, which has been pointed by a decisive show of force, I consider Mission must now withdraw, and that you should spare no pains to detach Khyberees permanently from Ameer. Inform Faiz Mahomed by letter that his answer to Cavagnari’s demand and his action will be treated as those of the Ameer. Send letter to Gholam Hassan simultaneously, communicating briefly what has passed, and instruct him to return immediately. Reply ends.

The interview lasted three hours in presence of Native members of Mission.

I am now issuing orders for assembly of force at Thul and Quetta.

I shall use every endeavour to adjourn collision and obtain peaceful solution. No troops shall enter Afghanistan without full previous reference to you.

No. 56.

Telegram from Viceroy, 23rd September 1878.

Sir Neville Chamberlain, on withdrawing Mission, guaranteed full aid and protection of British Government if needed to Khyberee tribes who escorted Cavagnari to Ali Masjid. I have confirmed this promise.

No. 57.

Telegram from Secretary of State, 24th September 1878.

Yours 23rd. Regret news. Send full information of facts and proposed measures.

No. 58.

Telegram, dated 26th September 1878, from Viceroy, Simla.

Facts already given in mine of 17th, 21st, and 22nd. Amir has not replied, or indicated intention of replying, to my letters received by him 12th instant. He merely informed messenger verbally that British Government must indefinitely await his pleasure on subject of them which he would consider whenever it suited him, adding that Russian Mission had come with his permission, and that, in the present state of relations with us, he saw no reason for our sending British one. Departure of Mission had been twice postponed in consideration for Amir’s bereavement, but customary period of mourning had elapsed. Ample time allowed for reply to Viceroy’s letters and preparation for receiving Envoy, and, in face of prompt courteous reception of Russian Mission at Kabul, Chamberlain and self considered it absolutely incompatible with dignity of British Government, and seriously injurious to position, to keep Mission indefinitely awaiting Amir’s pleasure at Peshawar.

Satisfactory arrangements having been concluded with Khaibaris to escort Mission to Ali Masjid, and safety of Mission depending on prompt execution thereof, Mission advanced to Jamrud, whence Major Cavagnari proceeded with purposely small escort to Ali Masjid, where Mission was repulsed with strong demonstration of force as already reported. This took place in presence of the six Native noblemen and gentlemen attached to Chamberlain’s staff. Officer commanding fort said he had incurred Amir’s severe displeasure by passing Native messenger with Viceroy’s letters, and, but for personal friendship, would, in obedience to Amir’s orders, have shot down Cavagnari and his suite. Chamberlain writes thus:—No man was ever more anxious than I to preserve peace and secure friendly solution, and it was only when I plainly saw Amir’s fixed intention to drive us into corner, that I told you we must either sink into position of merely obeying his behests on all points, or stand on our rights and risk rupture. Nothing could have been more distinct, nothing more humiliating to dignity of British Crown and Nation; and I believe that, but for decision and tact of Cavagnari at one period of interview, lives of British officers and Native following were in considerable...
danger. End of Chamberlain's letter. Mission has consequently now been dissolved. Khaibaris acted admirably at risk to themselves from Amir's resentment, against which Chamberlain, with my entire approval, has guaranteed them complete protection.

No. 59.

No. 93 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

We have regularly transmitted to your Lordship, by telegraph, reports of our proceedings taken in pursuance of our resolution to depute Sir Neville Chamberlain upon an urgent and important Mission to the Amir of Kabul. And we now enclose the further telegrams up to the recall of the Mission.

2. Sir Neville Chamberlain reached Peshawar on the 12th September, and placed himself in direct preliminary correspondence with the Amir's officers stationed upon the frontier, to whom it was necessary to give notice of his movements, and from whom their instructions had to be elicited. The general tenor of this correspondence, with the principal events and circumstances attending the departure of the Mission from Peshawar and its withdrawal in consequence of the armed resistance offered at Ali Masjid by the Amir's officers, have been reported to your Lordship by our telegrams.

3. We have now the honour to enclose papers giving in detail the course of these affairs as they occurred after Sir Neville Chamberlain's arrival at Peshawar, and upon his intimation to the Afghan officials that he desired a passage to Kabul. The information which had been received, early in September, from Kabul, clearly indicated the desire of the Amir to withhold any decisive expression of his intentions regarding the reception of the Mission, his object being to keep the Mission waiting indefinitely. But it had been plain from the first that a procrastinating and ambiguous policy on his part, which had been anticipated with certainty, would, unless at once put aside, assuredly involve the Mission in discredit and ultimate defeat. Sir Neville Chamberlain was therefore authorized to send early notice to the Mustaufi that the refusal of the free passage would bring matters to an issue.

4. It was, moreover, essential, in order that there might be no subsequent shifting of responsibility, that the Amir's officers upon the road to Kabul should know the Amir even the slight ground for umbrage which might be taken at their shifting from head-quarters before the Mission should leave British territory. But as the communication of this notice to the Amir's Minister and officers, disconcerted and crossed whatever plans for temporizing may have been entertained, it unavoidably gave offence to His Highness; and the reports that the passage of the Mission would be refused and resisted grew stronger and multiplied. The Government of India were, nevertheless, reluctant to afford to the Amir even the slightest ground for umbrage which might be taken at our arranging separately with the independent tribes who hold the entry to the Khaibar Pass, for the safe conduct of the Mission through their lands, before the Amir's dispositions had been fully ascertained. Faiz Muhammad, who commands at the fort of Ali Masjid in the Pass, was therefore asked whether he would give the necessary guarantee. On this point, however, the reply was that no orders had been received; although an officer of the Amir's had already come express to Ali Masjid with secret instructions, and had returned. On the 15th September Sir Neville Chamberlain addressed to Faiz Muhammad the letter (of which we enclose copy) conveying a formal summons to him to allow passage to the Mission; and subsequently informed him that his answer would be expected after the arrival of the Mir Akhor, a confidential officer of the Amir in charge of frontier affairs. The Mir Akhor arrived on the 18th; but no satisfactory reply was received; and Sir Neville Chamberlain's proposal to put the intentions of the Amir to a practical test was at last approved.

5. This being the state of affairs, the entire Mission moved from Peshawar to Jamrud on the morning of the 21st, and Major Cavagnari, accompanied by the two Native...
gentlemen who had joined the Mission, advanced with a small escort in the afternoon to Ali Masjid to demand a passage. He was conducted to the fort by the Chiefs of the Khaibar tribes, who had agreed at the risk of incurring the Amir's hostility, to bring our officers face to face with the Amir's Commander. The result was completely decisive. Faiz Muhammad not only opposed an absolute and repeated refusal to the demand for a passage, but made all preparations for supporting his refusal with all the armed force at his command; and it is known that the garrison had been hastily reinforced for the occasion. The Mir Akhor was in the fort, but did not appear at the personal interview between Major Cavagnari and Faiz Muhammad, which lasted long; though he is understood to have been watching the proceedings. Major Cavagnari finally returned to Jamrud; and upon receipt by telegraph of Sir Neville Chamberlain's report of the affair, the Viceroy at once directed him to return to Peshawar.

6. It is to be regretted that this final endeavour on the part of our Government to arrive at some definite understanding with the Amir of Kabul should have been thus met with repudiation and affront. We submit, nevertheless, that the situation of affairs, and their tendency, left us no choice but to make the attempt; and that we employed the only method which offered any chance of success. The obviously growing estrangement of the Amir, his attitude toward us of exclusion and scarcely veiled hostility during the past twelve months, and his disregard of the amicable overtures made to him in 1876-77, gave to his formal reception, in August last, of Russian emissaries the character of a grave political declaration. It appeared quite possible, however, that the significance of this event might have been over-rated or misconstrued in India, or that the Amir himself might be induced, by timely diplomatic representations, to realize the gravity of his action, and to appreciate its inevitable effect upon his relations with our Government. But the only hope of clearing up any such misunderstandings, or of bringing our legitimate influence to bear upon the Amir, lay in the renewal of direct personal intercourse with him through a British Envoy. And there appeared to be no way left open by which this end could be attained, other than the simple and straight course of despatching a Mission immediately to Kabul. To have asked the Amir whether he would receive the Mission, and to have waited his time and pleasure, would have been a futile repetition of an experiment which had failed already. The repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain by Sher Ali at his frontier while the Russian emissaries are still at his capital, has proved the inutility of diplomatic expedients, and has deprived the Amir of all claim upon our further forbearance.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

R. STRACHEY.

S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 14th September 1878.

From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN has sent to summon back the Khaibar headmen now at Peshawar. Khaibaris wish to know what they are to do. If they disobey this order they will lose the subsidy now paid them by the Kabul Government. If the British Government wishes to continue the present negotiations, it must guarantee the Khaibaris their allowances in future, and manage them direct. Thus, it is believed, they are desirous of arranging. Such a measure may prove an obstacle in arranging matters with the Amir. If the Khaibaris return to the Pass, it prevents our bringing to an immediate issue with the Amir's officials the question of the Amir's intention regarding the passage of the Mission; and this appears to be the object of Faiz Muhammad, who probably is not prepared to oppose by force the passage of the Mission, and is desirous of preventing its reaching Ali Masjid, which it can only do by an arrangement with the Khaibaris. Sir Neville thinks that, unless the Viceroy is willing to assent to indefinite delay, or to direct the Mission to advance by some other route, the Khaibaris should be dealt with as proposed. The negotiations hitherto carried on with the Khaibaris were on the understanding that no active opposition should be made by the Amir or by his officials. The allowances nominally given by Amir amount to about forty thousand Kabul rupees per annum.
Enclosure 2 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 14th September 1878.

To Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Your telegram of this day. Care is required to avoid giving Amir any plausible ground for complaint by separate arrangement with Khaibaris before he has offered open opposition to Mission. I recommend special messenger to Faiz Muhammad, with letter stating that Mission starts immediately, referring to recent visit of Mufti Shah Muhammad and summons to Khaibari headmen, and requiring immediate plain answer whether Faiz Muhammad, having, as we know, received instructions from Kabul, is prepared to guarantee safety of Mission through Pass. If he replies Yes, then I would let headmen obey his order, and Mission would advance, holding him responsible under guarantee. If he replies No, or gives evasive answer, or no answer within reasonable time, then make arrangements independently with Khaibaris, placing responsibility on Faiz Muhammad, and advance. Khaibari headmen should be informed of our action, and detained pending result, and guaranteed allowances and permanent protection in any event. This is my view; but Sir Neville's decision on the spot will be accepted and supported.

Enclosure 3 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 15th September 1878.

From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Your telegram to-day. Letter has been sent to Faiz Muhammad in accordance with Viceroy's cipher message of last night. Limit of delay in replying fixed at 18th instant, and of course we cannot act before this date. If answer is favourable we advance at once; if otherwise I commence the alternative negotiations.

Enclosure 4 in No. 59.

Dated Peshawar, 15th September 1878.


A. C.—I write to inform you that, by command of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, a friendly Mission of British officers, with a suitable escort, is about to proceed to Kabul through the Khaibar Pass, and intimation of the despatch of this Mission has been duly communicated to His Highness the Amir by the hand of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan.

I hear that an official from Kabul has recently visited you at Ali Masjid, and he has doubtless instructed you in accordance with His Highness the Amir's commands. As, however, information has now been received that you have summoned from Peshawar the Khaibar headmen with whom we were making arrangements for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khaibar Pass, I therefore write to inquire from you whether, in accordance with the instructions you have received, you are prepared to guarantee the safety of the British Mission to Dhakka, or not; and I request that a clear reply to this enquiry may be speedily communicated by the hand of the bearer of this letter, as I cannot delay my departure from Peshawar. It is well known that the Khaibar tribes are in receipt of allowances from the Kabul Government, and also, like other independent tribes on this frontier, have relations with the British Government. It may be well to let you know that when the present negotiations were opened with the Khaibar tribes, it was solely with the object of arranging with them for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khaibar Pass, in the same manner as was done in regard to the despatch of our Agent, the Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan; and the tribes were given clearly to understand that these negotiations were in no way intended to prejudice their relations with His Highness the Amir, as it was well known that the object of the British Mission was altogether of a friendly character to His Highness the Amir and the people of Afghanistan.

I trust that, in accordance with the instructions you have received from His Highness the Amir, your reply to this letter will be satisfactory, and that it will contain the required assurances that the Mission will be safely conducted to Dhakka. I shall expect to receive your reply to this letter not later than the 18th instant, so please understand that the matter is most urgent.

But, at the same time, it is my duty to inform you, in a frank and friendly manner, that if your answer is not what I trust it will be, or if you delay to send an early reply, I shall have no alternative but to make whatever arrangements may seem to me best for carrying out the instructions I have received from my own Government.

Enclosure 5 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1878.

From Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.

Reply received from Faiz Muhammad. States that, as yet, he has no orders from the Amir to allow the Mission to proceed, but that the Mir Akhor was expected hourly at Ali Masjid, and that,
receive Mission, he will of his own accord, and will make other being present.

Viceroy's cipher telegram of the 7th instant. One of Masjid, possibly the Mustaufi. These letters went to the Amir. He desired Nawab to address

Amir of the 17th instant; and that he was well received during journey, and hospitably entertained on arrival. He was received by the Amir on the 12th.

Enclosure 6 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 16th September 1878.

From Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.

LETTER received from Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, announcing his arrival at Kabul on 10th instant; and that he was well received during journey, and hospitably entertained on arrival. He was received by the Amir on the 12th.

Enclosure 7 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1878.

From Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.

NATIVE Envoy presented the letters from the Viceroy to the Amir at a private interview, no one else being present. The Amir then handed the letter from the Commissioner to the Address of Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan to the latter to read. This letter was that sent in accordance with the Viceroy's cipher telegram of the 7th instant. One of similar purport was sent at the same time to the Mustaufi. These letters went by the Amir's post from Peshawar.

Amir was very much displeased, objected to the harsh words, and said, "It is as if they were come by force. I do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner; and until my officers have received orders from me, how can the Mission come? It is as if they wish to disgrace me; it is not proper to use pressure in this way; it will tend to a complete (rupture?) and breach of friendship. I am a friend as before, and entertain no ill-will. The Russian Envoy has come, and has come with my permission. I am still afflicted with grief at the loss of my son, and have had no time to think over the matter. If I get time, whatever I consider advisable will be acted upon. Under these circumstances they can do as they like." Nawab adds that the advance of the Mission should be held in abeyance, otherwise some harm will occur. Should the Amir decide to receive Mission, he will of his own accord, and will make all necessary arrangements. If Mission advanced now, Nawab anticipates resistance. Letter ends.

With reference to my previous telegram about the expected arrival of (Mir Akhor) at Ali Masjid, I think Government had better await the result of any communication he may make, as possibly he may have later instructions from the Amir. It is worthy of notice that the letter of the Amir desired Nawab to read, and which contained the expressions he objected to, was that addressed by the Commissioner to the Nawab, which the latter had not previously seen, and which Amir had no right to desire him to open and read to him, being a confidential letter.

Full details by to-morrow's post.

Enclosure 8 in No. 59.

Telegram dated 17th September 1878.

To Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.

I see no reason to anticipate more definite instructions by Mir Akhor than those brought by Mufti Shah; and letter from Faiz Muhammad and Amir's replies to Nawab both clearly indicate intention of endeavouring to delay Mission indefinitely.

I therefore consider that date originally named to Faiz Muhammad should be adhered to; and that, if no satisfactory assurance of safety through Pass is received by to-morrow, independent negotiations should be concluded as rapidly as possible with Khaibaris, and Mission should advance without any avoidable delay, in accordance with instructions, till forcibly opposed.

Enclosure 9 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1878.

From Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.

I have delayed sending again to Faiz Muhammad Khan to ascertain the nature of the Mir Akhor's last instructions to him until I have your approval for carrying out that step. I have considered it best to do this, considering the nature of the Nawab's letter telegraphed to your Lordship last night. Please say if you wish the communication to be made.
Enclosure 10 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 17th September 1878.
To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

Your latest telegram this day. I have no objection to your writing back to Faiz Muhammad as you propose.

Enclosure 11 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1878.
From Major CAVAGNARI, Peshawar.

All reports agree that Ali Masjid officials will oppose passage of the Mission. I personally doubt that they will do so by force of arms. The test will be applied when Mission reaches the first point of contact with Kabul officials. To effect this as speedily as possible, and to avoid the extreme measure of permanently detaching the tribes from Amir's control, I am negotiating with Khaibaris to escort, as a matter of ordinary safe conduct, the Mission to Ali Masjid, and back if necessary. Khaibaris promise a reply to-morrow, as they have sent to the Pass to consult their clansmen as to whether they can do this in spite of the prohibitory orders they have received from Amir's officials. If they agree to this Mission can advance at once.

Enclosure 12 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1878.
From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

The Mir Akhur has arrived at Ali Masjid. General opinion is that resistance to the passage of the Mission will be offered by the Kabul officials, as Faiz Muhammad, and indeed the Amir himself, have intimated to us; and I now consider it useless to communicate again with the officials at Ali Masjid. If your Lordship, after consideration of the Nawab's last letter just telegraphed, is unwilling to assent to further delay, we will continue our arrangements now in progress with the Afridis to endeavour to get as far as Ali Masjid, where the actual intentions of the Kabul officials can alone be tested. Am I authorised to endeavour to detach the tribes permanently from the Amir's control, in order to effect the above object, if it cannot be done otherwise? It should be clearly understood that our doing this will be viewed by the Amir as an act of hostility.

Enclosure 13 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 19th September 1878.
To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

Your telegram of yesterday. Further delay is certainly most undesirable. I approve negotiation with Khaibaris for safe conduct to Ali Masjid, and permanently detaching tribes from Amir if necessary. Early practical test of Amir's intentions desirable. Your letter to Faiz Muhammad received, and highly approved.

Enclosure 14 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 18th September 1878.
From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

Another letter received from Nawab Gholam Haan Khan after an interview with Wazir Shah Muhammad, who assured Nawab, on his oath, that the Amir intimated that he would send for the Mission in order to clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt to force this Mission upon him without his consent being first granted according to usual custom; otherwise he would resist it, as coming in such a manner would be a slight to him. He attributed the English grievances against him to mischievous reports of newsmen, He reiterated his Quetta grievances, &c. He says he did not invite the Russian Mission, but that, as his country was quite exposed, and he was estranged from the English, he was obliged to let them come on after they crossed the Oxus. He denies that the Russians came for any other purpose than to exchange civilities in consequence of their having a common boundary with Afghanistan. He believes that a personal interview with British Mission will adjust misunderstandings. He has no wish to give Russians a right of way through his country. He says that there has been sickness at Kabul, and that some of the Russian servants are lying ill; but that, as soon as they recover, he hopes to give
then their congé in a suitable manner, after which he will send a confidential messenger to escort the British Mission. He undertakes to be responsible for the safety of the Mission, and its good treatment if he invites it. He wishes the Mission to remain a short time longer at Peshawar. He stated that friendship had existed between the two Powers for a long time, and that he does not wish to destroy it; that in two or three days he will send for the Nawab, and, after consultation with him, will fix a date and make all arrangements for the coming of the Mission; that the Nawab should write and say that the sending of the Mission without Amir’s consent will be a slight on the Amir. Nawab thinks that the Russian Envoy will be dismissed after the Eed, and that the Amir will then send for the British Mission. Letter ends.

It is my impression from the above that Amir has received his answer from Tashkent. Another telegram follows immediately.

Enclosure 15 in No. 59.
Telegram, dated 19th September 1878.
To Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.
Your cipher telegram of yesterday was received after the despatch of mine. Nawab’s letter makes no change in situation, and should not delay your movements. Reply may, however, at once be sent to Nawab, stating you reciprocate friendly sentiments expressed to him by Wazir Shah Muhammad on behalf of Amir; that your departure has been already postponed through reluctance to interfere with mourning, and in order to give time for arrangements on road; and that you trust that this delay will have enabled Amir to make necessary preparations, so that the invitation which he has expressed his readiness to send may reach you on frontier of his territory.

Enclosure 16 in No. 59.
Telegram, dated 19th September 1878.
From Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.
The following is an abstract of a letter just received from the Nawab, dated Kabul, 15th instant. Full translation will go by post.

The Nawab says that the Amir is in a bad humour, and the Ministers tell me that on account of grief and indisposition he cannot bear to hear alternately harsh and conciliatory language. The Ministers express hope that when replies were received to the Nawab’s letters of the 12th and 13th, the reception of the Mission will be satisfactorily arranged for. Further, that if Mission starts on 18th, without waiting for the Amir’s permission, there would be no hope left for the renewal of friendship or reconciliation. In such a case we cannot hold ourselves responsible for anything. What will happen, will happen. If Mission will await Amir’s permission everything will be arranged, God willing, in the best manner, and no room will be left for complaint in the future. The Minister asks that the Amir is much annoyed by the various unbecoming communications, some to his own address, some to his officers. Communications should not be written in an authoritative tone, nor should any be addressed to his officials, as they are the servants of the Kabul Government, and not of the British. The Kabul officials have no power to do the slightest thing without the order of the Amir. Everything should be done quietly and in a friendly manner, and consistently with the dignity of the Kabul Government. The post-runners left by the Nawab had been ordered away. The Nawab writes that what he communicates is what he hears from the Wazir; that people are prevented from having any intercourse with him, that nobody visits him, and that he receives his food from the Amir. The Nawab says that if the Mission does not start on the 18th, there will still be an opening for further discussion. Also, that whether the Amir fulfils his promise to send for the Mission or not, he thinks the Amir will reply to the letters of the Viceroy. In the event of rupture and disturbances taking place there will be no chance left for further discussion. The Nawab asks to be furnished with instructions.

It is now quite evident that the Amir is bent on stretching procrastination to the utmost, and determined on asserting his claims to total independence of action by making the acceptance of the Mission dependent on his sole pleasure and dictation when it shall be received. If these points be yielded, then he holds out the hope that he will hereafter, at his own time, send a person to bring the Mission, and receive it honourably. It has been said in the clearest language by the Amir himself, by his Minister, and by his officers in command of his outposts, that they will, if necessary, stop the advance of the Mission by force. That determination is just as clear, to my mind, as if half of our escort had been shot down. Unless your Lordship accepts this position, all chance of a peaceful solution seems to me gone. The Amir is bent on upholding his own will and dignity at any cost to the dignity of the British Government. Our agent at Kabul writes as if it was our duty to accept wholly the views of the Amir. He asks for answers to his letter when there is nothing to reply to; this is evidently done by the dictation of the Amir. I suggest that the Nawab be recalled. He has done what he was sent to do. Will your Lordship sanction my recalling him?

Your Lordship’s telegram of this morning received. Negotiations with Pushtuns in progress. No answer as yet; too soon to expect one. All the sections of the tribes have to be consulted: this takes time.
Enclosure 17 in No. 59.
Telegram, dated 20th September 178.
From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

The Khaibaris agree to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid, or to any nearer point, until we come into contact with the Amir's authorities. They do not hold themselves responsible for what may then happen. They will also, if necessary, give us safe conduct back. They require a day to make their arrangements. We encamp to-morrow near Jamrud, and the next morning will advance towards Ali Masjid. A small party will suffice to test things as well as the whole escort, and I consider it most desirable to reduce to a minimum any indignity which may be offered to our Government. I shall, therefore, not move the camp from Jamrud until we know that we can pass on.

Referring to your Excellency's telegram received last night, I will not write to the Nawab until I receive a reply to my long telegram of yesterday afternoon.

Enclosure 18 in No. 59.
Telegram, dated 20th September 1878.
From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

I have already given orders, as intimated, for the Mission to move to-morrow. I am of opinion that the Mission should stand fast, and that Cavagnari, with a small escort, should go to-morrow to Ali Masjid to hear from the lips of the Amir's officer in command there, whether he will allow the Mission to pass or not. If he says No, I should consider that answer the same as if we had been fired on. I should cease negotiation, and recall Mission and Nawab. It is my strong conviction that resistance is intended, and every Native thinks so also. After long warning and considerable preparation, we cannot now move forward out of our territory and be openly turned back without being disgraced in the eye of India. This means loss of prestige, which I think should be avoided. The Amir's policy is to claim full liberty to decide on the acceptance or not of the Mission, and, if we attempt to go against his will, to say we used force. If we accept his first argument (?) there is no certainty. Finally, it is no (?) ; if the second (?), it implies we go to war with him. I would sooner have the latter without the insult.

Please instruct me at once whether to move to-morrow or to send Cavagnari.

Enclosure 19 in No. 59.
Telegram, dated 20th September 1878.
To Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

Your second telegram of to-day. I consider that Mission should move out of Peshawar to Jamrud, and that Cavagnari should proceed thence with a small escort to Ali Masjid and demand immediate passage. If this is not given, I propose to withdraw Mission, and break off negotiation. Telegraph answer received.

Enclosure 20 in No. 59.
Telegram, dated 21st September 1878.
From Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, Peshawar.

The Mission Camp is at Jamrud. I join it this afternoon. Major Cavagnari goes on to Ali Masjid to demand that the Mission be allowed to pass on to-morrow. He will return with the answer to Jamrud. It shall be telegraphed to your Lordship. Information just come in that early yesterday the Mir Akhor received a letter from the Amir, directing him to allow the Mission to pass, and to stop the Afridis collecting. The report in the town is that it is peace between the English and the Amir.

Enclosure 21 in No. 59.
Telegram, dated 21st September 1878.
From Commissioner, Peshawar.

I have received news from Ali Masjid, which I believe true, that the Mir Akhor, who had come to oppose the passage of the Mission, received an express from the Amir yesterday morning (20th),
saying that the Mission was to pass. Mir Akbar and Faiz Muhammad abused the Amir freely in the presence of my informant, and countermanded the collecting of the Thaw Aftridis. No preparations made for stopping Mission. Troops have returned from Khairbar to Dhaakka. I am told that there will be no opposition beyond Ali Masjid, the tribes merely expecting a present for escorting.

I gave this news to Cavagnari before he left this morning for Jamrud, where the Mission is today. Sir Neville Chamberlain leaves for Jamrud this afternoon. Cavagnari rides into Ali Masjid to-day to demand safe passage for Mission.

Enclosure 22 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 21st September 1878.

From Commissioner, Peshawar.

Faiz Muhammad positively refuses to allow passage of Mission. Was blamed for allowing Nawab to pass. Consequences were explained, but the refusal was absolute.

Enclosure 23 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 22nd September 1878.

From Sir N. Chamberlain, Jamrud, through Peshawar.

Just received your Lordship's sanction for the return of the Mission to Peshawar. It will do so at once. Letters will be sent off at once to Faiz Muhammad Khan at Ali Masjid, and to the Nawab at Kabul. The reports of Major Cavagnari and Colonel Jenkins of their interview with Faiz Muhammad will be sent to-day by post.

Enclosure 24 in No. 59.

Telegram dated 22nd September 1878.

From Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.

I have returned to Peshawar. What are your Lordship's orders as to the Mission, and especially as to the Native Noblemen attached to it? As the Khairbars asked me what they were to do if the Amir interfered with them, I replied that the last soldier should be sent, and the last rupee spent, in protecting them. I told them that they had done their work well for us, and that we considered them as friends. Is Amir's postmaster to be allowed to remain here, and others known to be Amir's agents and those of his officials, after the indignity the British Government has suffered by the Amir's repelling Mission? I think we are bound to take immediate steps openly to resent the affront, and to show our well-wishers that they will receive support from us.

Enclosure 25 in No. 59.

Telegram, dated 22nd September 1878.

To Sir N. Chamberlain, Peshawar.

Your telegram of 22nd. Your Mission, which has rendered a highly-valued service, can now be dissolved, and Lyall will at once communicate with its European members their respective destinations. Cavagnari should continue, and complete, as speedily as possible, detaching negotiations sanctioned in my previous telegram. I shall be glad if Native Noblemen attached to Mission will now afford me opportunity of personally thanking them at Simla before they return home. Let me know if they may be expected. Should either of them desire it, I will, with the acquiescence of the heads of their Suits, arrange for their suitable personal association with any military operation now rendered necessary. Amir's postmaster may remain at Peshawar for the present, pending assurance of Nawab's safe return. Immediate steps will now be taken in conformity with policy indicated in my Minute as applicable to present situation. About your own movements I telegraph separately.
No. 59A.
No. 96 of 1878.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of Peshawar Diary No. 34, dated 25th September 1878.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure in No. 59A.

PESHAWAR Diary No. 34, dated 25th September 1878. (Extract.)

Yesterday the 24th, a letter, dated 19th September, was received from Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan from Kabul to the address of Munshi Bakhtyar Khan. It is to be found as Appendix I. of this Diary. It was accompanied by another letter from the Nawab to the Munshi without date, written apparently at the same time, but which had been sent by other means than the Amir's post. The first suggests the wording of a letter to be written to the Amir, and begs that it may be couched in friendly terms. The second implies that the first was written at the instance of the Amir and his Wazir, and gives the real state of affairs between himself and the Amir.

(Signed) W. G. WATERFIELD, Major, Commissioner.


A. C. I beg to state nowadays the temper of the Amir is quickly disturbed by certain words in the letters from that direction (India), and he considers them as a slight upon his government, and in this state of the case it is impossible that matters can end well. I therefore write to say, in accordance with my humble opinion, that should the Commissioner approve of delay, and not consider it objectionable, a letter to the following purport might be addressed to the Amir, both by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Commissioner:—“After compliments. We have recently heard that your Highness has been grievously afflicted with sorrow in consequence of the lamented death of the heir-apparent, and that Your Highness has shown displeasure (or felt hurt) at certain expressions in friendly letters which were sent from this side out of friendly motives to Your Highness. It is, therefore, clearly intimated that a Mission of British officers has been appointed by this Government simply on account of the welfare and friendship existing between the two Governments. Until a meeting is effected and mutual discussions arrived at, no settlement is possible. Therefore, in reliance on the former friendship, it is intimated that the Mission of British officers is now at Peshawar ready to meet your Highness, and it is advisable that you issue orders to your officials for safe conduct and supplies on the journey, and (at the same time) favour me with a hint, so that I may despatch the mission with a suitable escort from this place to meet and discuss matters with your Highness, and having agreed on what is to the interests of both Governments, and to their mutual welfare, the same be acted upon accordingly. Therefore an early and favourable reply is requested. Compliments and good wishes.

My friend, the Amir is in these days full of grief, and you yourself know all well. It is as well to remember and word the letters in a conciliatory tone with the view to soliciting an increase of friendship and good-will and not their daily destruction. Compliments and good wishes.
The facts are these: Whatever I write is what I hear from the Wazir or from the Amir, and some sentences are from myself. Considering that the post is in the hands of the Amir, and that nobody is allowed to communicate with me, you may imagine what sort of an account I can give. The temper of the Amir is hasty (or touchy), and he gives little or no attention to the letters from the British Government. The reason of his not inviting the English Mission is the intention to delay. Three Russian officers have gone back and two are still in Kabul. I suspect that the coming of the English Mission is impossible so long as the Russians are here (or until the Russians have gone back). If the British Government is content to delay for its own purposes, then conciliatory letters may prove useful, but in the event of delay being considered injurious, then my stay here is of no profit, and I should be recalled in some suitable manner. If you think it fit, represent this state of affairs, and communicate the contents of the second letter. The reason of the people being kept away from me is the want of trust in everybody. The supply of cooked food is still continued to me, and there is no sign of unkindness towards me. On the contrary, my treatment may be considered kind.

No. 60.
No. 95 of 1878.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 3rd October 1878.

Our last Despatch, dated September 26th,* reported to your Lordship that the Amir’s Commander at the Kabul Frontier Fort of Ali Masjid had opposed armed resistance to the passage of Sir Neville Chamberlain’s Mission, and that we had consequently directed Sir Neville Chamberlain to return to Peshawar. The Mission has since been dissolved.

2. Sir Neville Chamberlain’s final report of his proceedings will be transmitted to your Lordship very shortly. In the meantime, we have the honour to enclose copies of the reports submitted to him by Major Cavagnari and Colonel Jenkins, who were sent in advance to Ali Masjid to demand a passage, of their interview with the Amir’s Commander.

3. We shall submit, at a very early date, to your Lordship papers showing the measures which we have decided to take upon this clear evidence of the attitude assumed toward the British Government by the Amir of Kabul. It will be recollected that the Amir and his officials had been duly forewarned, directly and indirectly, that a refusal of free passage to the Mission would be regarded as an act of open hostility. We have directed the assembling of troops upon certain points of our frontier, with a view to early ulterior operations. And we have arranged with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to make certain specific arrangements for the better watching of the border around the entry of the Khairab Pass, and for the support of the tribes in that quarter which are acting with us. The negotiations of the Political Officers with the independent tribes in this vicinity for securing their adherence, and for detaching them from the Amir’s influence, have proceeded favourably.

4. We also enclose copies of the more important reports and orders that have been received and issued.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
P. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.
Enclosure 1 in No. 60.
Dated 22nd September 1878.


In obedience to your Excellency's instructions, I left Peshawar early yesterday morning, with the view to proceeding to the fort of Ali Masjid in the Khairab Pass, in order to ascertain from the Amir's officials in charge of this post whether they would permit the British Mission to pass through the Khaibar, and be responsible for its safety and proper treatment during its journey to Kabul, or not.

2. On arrival at Jamrud, where the camp of the Mission was pitched, I communicated with Colonel Jenkins, Commanding the escort, and it was arranged that he and Captain W. Battye, with a small escort of cavalry, should accompany me on my Mission.

3. Negotiations had been concluded on the previous day with the Khaibar headmen present at Peshawar to escort the British Mission from Jamrud to Ali Masjid, or to any other point within the Khaibar at which the Amir's officials might be stationed, and back to the British frontier if it was necessary to return. I therefore sent off the Khaibaris who had preceded me to the camp at Jamrud, to make arrangements through the Pass; and I deputed messengers to Ali Masjid to inform the Mir Akhor and Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Commandant of the fort, that I, with two other British Officers, were leaving Jamrud for Ali Masjid, in order to have a personal interview with them.

4. After waiting a sufficient time at Jamrud to enable the Khaibaris and my messengers to get well ahead, I left camp and entered the Pass. On reaching Mackeson's Bridge, I was met by one of my messengers, who was returning from Ali Masjid, and who informed me that Faiz Muhammad Khan had desired him to return and request the officers to halt at whatever place the messenger should meet them, and that he would come to interview them. As this was palpably an attempt to gain time, and to ascertain that the Amir's officials were specially proficient in — and as it was my object to get as near Ali Masjid as possible, so that there should be no question as to the responsibility of the Amir's officials for any obstruction I might meet with, I directed the messenger to return and inform the Khan that I intended to proceed onward until I met him.

5. When we reached the heights above Lala China, which are about a mile from Ali Masjid and within sight of the fort, some of the Khaibar headmen met us, and informed me that the ridges in front of us, which completely commanded the remainder of the road to Ali Masjid, were held by the Amir's levies (Khasadar), who would not let our party pass. We also observed large numbers of men descending from Ali Masjid to strengthen these positions, indicating beyond doubt that there was every intention to oppose us if we attempted to proceed. As these pickets were within the limits of that portion of the Pass the Khaibaris who accompanied me were responsible for, I sent a party of them to parley with the levies; but the latter threatened to fire if any one approached. I therefore sent another messenger to Faiz Muhammad Khan, inviting him to come and meet me, or to arrange for my safe passage to Ali Masjid, as his men held command of the road and refused to allow my party to advance. As some time passed, and no definite answer was received, I sent one of the Kali Khans* who had accompanied me, to ascertain the position of affairs; but shortly afterwards I received a report that the Khan had been stopped and was not permitted to advance.

6. I then prepared to write a letter to the address of the Mir Akhor and Faiz Muhammad Khan, informing them that I had been stopped by the advanced pickets of the Ali Masjid post under their command, but that I intended to proceed until fired upon, and that if this occurred the responsibility would be theirs, and that the act would be held to indicate that, as the Amir of Kabul's representatives absolutely declined to allow the British Mission to advance, I intended to stop a reasonable interval pass, and then, if no satisfactory reply was received Colonel Jenkins and I, with a few men, were to advance towards Ali Masjid until fired upon, when we would have retired under cover of the remainder of the escort which was to be left with Captain Battye on the heights where we had halted.

7. Before this letter was ready for despatch, a message was brought me from Faiz Muhammad Khan to the effect that he was about to come to a ruined tower in the bed of the stream just below where we were halted, and that, on his arrival there, he would send for myself and three others and would communicate anything we had to communicate.

8. As it appeared to me that it would have been an indignity to have remained and waited until Faiz Muhammad Khan would send for me, as well as to be dictated to as to the number of men that should accompany me (it would have been different had I been permitted to proceed with my escort to the fort of Ali Masjid, when, of course, I would only have entered the post with as many men as the officers in command chose to admit), I determined to advance at once with as many men as I thought fit to take, and endeavour to meet Faiz Muhammad Khan before he should reach the spot named by him.

* Afridi Khan of Mulzan.
† Sic in orig.

Nawab Bahadar Niyer Khan.  
Arbab Sandez Khan.  
Arbab Fateh Muhammad Khan.  
Afzali Khan.  
Mirza Rahib Khan.  
Abbas Khan, and several others.
Malik made no further opposition—in fact, he knew that most of his tribe were with me, and he himself was only acting a part to save his allowances.

10. After meeting Faiz Muhammad Khan and exchanging salutations, I pointed to what I considered a suitable place for an interview—which was a wood with some trees close by it, and on the opposite side of the stream to the spot originally named for the place of meetings. Faiz Muhammad Khan was accompanied by the Naib, or Deputy, of the Mir Akhor, a considerable number of the Ali Masjid levies, and some of the Afridi headmen of the upper villages of the Khaibar, and their respective followers.

11. When we had seated ourselves, I commenced the interview by pointing out to Faiz Muhammad Khan that he and myself were servants of our respective Governments, and had met to carry out whatever orders we had received; so that, whatever the result of our meeting might be, there need be nothing personal between him and myself. After the Khan had fully reciprocated this friendly sentiment, I proceeded to state that he was well aware that the British Government had decided on sending a friendly Mission of European British Officers, accompanied by a suitable escort, to His Highness the Amir of Kabul; that the Mission was encamped at Jamrud, and intended to proceed through the Khaibar on the following day; that, in consequence of various reports received, I had been deputed by my Government to ascertain from the Amir's officials at Ali Masjid whether they had received instructions, or were prepared to guarantee the safe passage and proper treatment of the Mission during its journey to Kabul, or not; and I hoped that, if there was any latitude for independent action in the orders he had received from Kabul, he would do all he could towards an amicable adjustment of affairs between the two Governments. Faiz Muhammad Khan replied that he had every desire to act in a friendly manner, and that, actuated by such motives, he had allowed Nawab Gulham Hussein to proceed without any detention, but that his action in this respect had met with disapproval from the Kabul Durbar; that if he had not been friendly disposed he would not have consented to the present interview, or have restrained his levies from firing on my party; that he had received no orders from the Amir to let the Mission pass his post; and that, without such orders, he could not let it proceed; but that if the Mission would only wait for a few days he would communicate with Kabul for such orders. Faiz Muhammad Khan added that my orders were distinct, and that I was instructed to say that the Mission would advance on the next day, unless I received a reply from the Amir's officials that its advance would be opposed; and I begged the Khan not to take upon himself such a heavy responsibility as to say he would oppose the advance of the British Mission, unless his orders were clear and distinct in the matter; for, whatever his reply was, it would be considered as that of the Amir of Kabul. Faiz Muhammad Khan replied that he was only a sentry, and had no regular troops, but only a few levies; but that such as his orders were, he would carry out to the best of his ability, and that, unless he received orders from Kabul, he could not let the Mission pass his post. I rejoined to this, that it did not signify what the actual strength of his post was, as the Mission was a friendly one and went on peaceful objects, and I again urged him not to take such a grave responsibility if he had any option in the matter. He replied that it was a very heavy matter for him to decide upon; as, on the one hand, he could not act without orders from Kabul, while, on the other hand, he was told that his reply would be considered as that of the Amir of Kabul. He then began with much warmth to question the friendly intentions of the British Government by stating that it was not a sign of friendship for the British authorities to negotiate direct with the Khaibar tribes, who were subjects of the Amir of Kabul and in receipt of allowances from that ruler, and induce them to escort Nawab Gulham Hussein, and also some British officers (meaning my party), without the Amir's permission. I replied that there was no cause for dissatisfaction in what had been done in the matter. It was never anticipated that a friendly Mission would have met with any opposition, as such Missions are never opposed in any civilized country; and that the arrangements made with the Afridis were merely to induce them to undertake the safe conduct ("backplane") of a peaceably disposed Mission, which every independent Pathan tribe has a right to undertake. In this respect, Faiz Muhammad Khan continued with increasing warmth to allude to the subject, and there was an uneasy sort of murmuring commencing amongst the people around, which appeared to me (and, as I afterwards ascertained, the same idea occurred to Colonel Jenkins and to some of the Native gentlemen with me) to indicate that, if the discussion was any longer prolonged, the movement alluded to might assume a more decided form, which might possibly be one which our small party could not deal with in a suitable manner. I therefore interrupted the Khan by saying that the subject was one which it did not behove subordinates to discuss, and that, if the Amir considered what had been done as a grievance, I had no doubt that the British Government would give him a suitable answer. I then asked the Khan for the last time if I correctly understood him to say that, if the British Mission advanced as intended on the following day, he would oppose it by force; and I expressed that such a course would be unsatisfactory to me, and I then got up and shook Faiz Muhammad Khan by the hand, and assured him that I had no unfriendly feelings against him personally, and that I hoped to meet him again on some future occasion. I then turned to the Native gentlemen who were with me, and asked them if they did not consider a clear and decisive answer had been given; and they replied that it was so.

12. In fact, there was scarcely any necessity for an interview to settle this point, as the hostile preparations made by the Ali Masjid garrison on seeing my party approach, notwithstanding that my object in coming, and the small strength of my escort, had been communicated to, and received by, the Commandant of the Fort, and the Amir's representative, the Mir Akhor, would ordinarily have been quite sufficient to produce a sudden and unexpected attack; and I believe that with any other of the Amir's officials but Faiz Muhammad Khan, who, from first to last, has behaved in a most courteous manner, and very favourably impressed both Colonel Jenkins and myself, a collision
of some kind would have taken place. The general belief is that Faiz Muhammad Khan was acting under the direct orders of the Mir Akhor, who had been purposely deputed by the Amir to supervise Faiz Muhammad Khan's management of Khaibar affairs, and to see that, without orders to the contrary, he checked the advance of the British Mission. I have no doubt that Faiz Muhammad Khan softened down a great deal of the insult that was intended, though, short of actual collision, it is impossible to imagine what more could be done to effect the Amir's object.

13. The Khaibaris, as far as their conduct was tested, acted faithfully to their engagements, and, but for their assistance, we should not have been able to bring matters to a definite issue with the Amir's officials without a great deal of trouble, expense, and delay.

14. The interview with Faiz Muhammad Khan being concluded, we returned to Jamrud, and I returned to Peshawar and personally reported to your Excellency all that had taken place.

15. In conclusion, I would desire to bring to your Excellency's favourable notice the ready and courteous assistance I received from Colonel Jenkins.

The Khaibar arrangements were managed by Arbab Fateh Muhammad Khan, and I purpose bringing his services to notice in due course.

Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

Dated, Camp, Peshawar, 22nd September 1878.

From Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins, Commandant, Corps of Guides (Q.O.), to Captain ST. V. HAMMICK, Military Secretary to Sir Neville Chamberlain,

I have the honour to make the following report for the information of his Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B.

2. According to his orders, I marched from Peshawar, early on the 21st September, with the camp of the Kabul Mission, and reached Jamrud soon after 7 o'clock.

3. About 8 o'clock, Major Cavagnari arrived in camp, and told me that he was going up to Ali Masjid to get an answer from the Officer Commanding regarding the passage of the Mission through Ali Masjid, and its safe conduct to Kabul.

4. After a short delay to allow the headmen of the Kuki Khel Afridis to send some of their people ahead of us up the Khaibar Pass, to tell Faiz Muhammad Khan that Major Cavagnari was coming to talk to him, and that he had only a small escort with him, Major Cavagnari and I started from Jamrud, having with us Captain Wigram Battey and twenty-four men of the cavalry of the Corps of Guides.

5. We marched by the gun road made by Colonel Mackeson in (1840), which we found in very good order, and, before noon, reached a hill, from which we could plainly see Ali Masjid, about three-quarters of a mile distant from the fort.

6. When the people in Ali Masjid saw our uniform on the hill, they immediately made preparations to resist us. Some manned the walls of the fort, and some occupied a ridge, along the foot of which the road between us and Ali Masjid ran. At the same time, one or two signal shots were fired.

7. If we had advanced, then I am sure that we should have been at once engaged with three or four hundred men under circumstances of great disadvantage, for we should have been fighting on the lower ground, with the enemy strongly posted on our front and right flank. Besides this, I am persuaded that the Amir's officers would have excused themselves from all blame for what might have happened, by saying that we had rashly come into collision with their troops without giving time for explanation.

8. Under these circumstances, Major Cavagnari, wisely, I think, decided to remain on the hill where we were for a short time, but it was agreed that if Faiz Muhammad could not be induced to come and meet us, Major Cavagnari and I, with a couple of men, were to go towards the fort and get an answer to the question he had come to ask.

9. After waiting on the hill for about two hours, during which more than one message was sent to Faiz Muhammad Khan, Afridi Khan, Arbab of Malazai, came back to say that the Sirdar was coming to meet us in the valley below, where we were standing. Shortly after this, we saw Faiz Muhammad coming with fifty or sixty followers, and Major Cavagnari and I, with two men of the Guides, went down and met him. Major Cavagnari had also with him Fateh Muhammad Khan, Arbab Afridi Khan, and a few of the Kuki Khel Afridis who had come with us up the pass; also Bahadur Sher Khan, the Bangash Chief.

10. After shaking hands with the Sirdar, we crossed the stream, and sat down under a tree close to the village of Lala Chimu. Directly we sat down, several more of the Sirdar's followers turned up, and we had 150 or 200 of them close round us while we sat and talked.

11. Major Cavagnari began by saying that the British Government was sending a peaceful Mission to the Amir Sher Ali Khan, of which due notice had been given to the Amir, that the camp of the Mission was at Jamrud, and that he came to ask for a passage through Ali Masjid, and a safe conduct to Kabul.

12. The Sirdar replied that he had already written more than once to say that the Mission could not pass Ali Masjid without the Amir's sanction, which had not been received, and that we must wait, and that he would again refer to the Amir for orders on the subject.

13. Major Cavagnari said that the Sirdar's letters had been received, but that the British Government would not believe that a peaceful Mission, going to the Amir on business of importance, would
COPY of Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18th February 1875.

YOUR Despatch of 22nd January, Secret, No. 2, para. 6. We have nothing on record to show that Amir has ever expressed his readiness to permit presence of a European Agent at Herat; therefore we cannot agree that if his intentions are still loyal he will make no serious difficulty. Recent circumstances render this very doubtful, and his objections might not proceed from improper motives. Para. 5. Are the instructions to be carried out at once, or is discretion left to the Government of India as to time and opportunity? We think present time and circumstances are very unsuitable for taking initiative.

COPY of Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 23rd February 1875.

YOUR telegram of 18th.

How much delay do you contemplate? Three or four months would be within discretion given by Despatch. If you contemplate much longer delay, explain reasons in Secret Despatch, that Government may consider them. Events here make Russian activity more probable. For Amir's expressions, see Report of Secret Council, Lahore, 17 March 1869; Girdlestone's Official Note, 26 March, and Captain Grey's Note, 31 March 1869. Ask Pollock, Thornton, Girdlestone.

COPY of Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24th March 1875.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd February, Lieutenant Governor, Sir Richard Pollock, and General Reynell Taylor are strongly opposed to inviting Ameer to accept British officer at Herat. I shall therefore use discretion given to postpone action. The opinion of the Lieutenant Governor and of the Punjab officials will be considered by Government of India at Simla without delay, and a despatch written conveying our opinion.
EAST INDIA (AFGHAN PAPERS).

COPIES of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 18 February 1875; of REPLY of Secretary of State of 23 February; and, of TELEGRAM from Viceroy to Secretary of State of 21 March.

(Lord Robert Montagu.)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be printed,
12 December 1878.
The Sirdar owned that this was true.

Major Cavagnari then asked whether, under these circumstances, the Sirdar would oppose the passage of the Mission; and the Sirdar said that he would most certainly do so. In fact, the Sirdar never flinched from first to last, but gave us distinctly to understand that he would oppose the passage of the Mission by force, and that it was waste of time to argue with him.

Major Cavagnari then said to the Sirdar:—"You are a servant of the Amir, and you take upon yourself to stop a Mission going to him from the British Government, with which he has long been on friendly terms. How do you know that the Amir himself will not be very angry with you for doing this?"

The Sirdar replied:—"What friendship is there in what you are doing now? If the Amir had given me orders, I would have gone down to Jamrud to meet you, and bring you up the Pass; but now you have come here to your own account, and bribed the Amir's servants to give you a passage. You are setting Afridis against Afridis, and will cause strife and bloodshed in this country, and you call yourself friends?"

The Afridis who were standing round us applauded this speech; and it would not have been prudent to have continued to converse in this tone. Therefore Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar:—"We are both servants—you of the Amir of Kabul, I of the British Government. It is no use for us to discuss these matters. I only came to get a straight answer from you. Will you oppose the "passage of the Mission by force?"

The Sirdar said:—"Yes, I will; and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already." After this we shook hands, and mounted our horses; and the Sirdar said again:—"You have had a straight answer."

We returned to Jamrud by the road we came, and reached camp about 5 o'clock in the evening.

21. I was very much struck with the behaviour of Kuki Khel Afridis who went with us up the Pass. Their conduct was excellent throughout the day.

Memorandum from A. C. Lyall, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Military Department.

The undersigned is directed to inform the Military Department that General Sir Neville Chamberlain's passage to Kabul upon a Mission to His Highness the Amir, was barred at Ali Masjid, where armed resistance was offered by the Amir's garrison. Sir Neville Chamberlain consequently withdrew to Peshawar, and the Mission has been dissolved.

2. The undersigned is now directed to communicate the following measures, determined upon by the Government of India for carrying into effect the dispositions which have become necessary in consequence of this demonstration of hostility on the part of the Amir of Kabul.

3. A military force will assemble at Thul in the Kohat District, upon the frontier of Afghanistan, with all possible expedition. The regiments composing it, which will move separately to the place of assembly, will be drawn partly from the army under the command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and partly from the Punjab Frontier Force. The Military Department is requested to concert the necessary arrangements with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and with his honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The force at Thul will be held in readiness for a possible movement across the frontier into the Kurram Valley, which is a part of the territory of the Amir of Kabul. As the collection of troops upon this point of the border is likely to cause alarm to the independent tribes who occupy the country in the vicinity, the officers with whom these tribes are in political relations will be instructed, through his honor the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, to reassure them in regard to the friendly character of the movement, so far as the tribes are concerned, and to secure their good-will. It will be explained to the tribes that they will be treated as allies, and their independence carefully respected, though the British Government may possibly occupy a part of the Amir's territory.

4. The garrison at Quetta should be strengthened by sending forward a first reinforcement upon the scale already settled, as soon as the arrangements for transport and supplies have been completed. It is understood that this force will move for Quetta, partly by the routes crossing the British frontier from the Dera Ghazi Khan District on the more direct lines towards Dadar and the Bolan Pass, and partly by the usual road from Jacobabad. The requisite instructions will be sent to the Punjab Government, and to the Agent, Governor-General for Baluchistan, to secure the cooperation of the tribes on and beyond the frontier, and of the Khan of Kelat; and in order that all political questions connected with the passage of troops through foreign territory may be adjusted. But for these purposes, it is very essential that the Foreign Department and the Government of the Punjab should receive early precise intimation of the routes to be used.
5. It has also been decided by the Government of India that a second force shall be held in readiness by the 1st of November, for advance to Quetta in the event of 'ulterior operations in Afghanistan beyond Quetta becoming necessary. The strength of this column should be sufficient to enable it to cross the Afghan frontier in the direction of Kandahar, and to threaten that place, if the course of affairs render this operation desirable. It is understood that this force will assemble at Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan, and that if it is ordered to march, it will, if this be found practicable, follow the same routes which will have been taken by the Quetta reinforcements. On these points also early intimation should be given to the political and civil authorities for the necessary arrangements and preparations.

6. Negotiations are proceeding with the independent tribes adjoining the frontiers of British India and of Biluchistan, with the object of detaching them altogether from political connexion with the Amir of Kabul. The Foreign Department will keep the Military Department duly informed of their progress and result, so far as they affect the military operations contemplated.

7. In regard to the temporary camp which is to be placed during the ensuing cold weather at Lugari Barkhan, the Military Department is requested to consider and inform the Foreign Department whether the existing orders are to stand, or in what manner, and to what extent, they should now be modified.

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Eu losure 4 in No. 60.
No. 2050 P., dated Simla, 24th September 1878.

From A. C. Lyall, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to
Le pe l Griffin, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab.

I am directed to address you on the subject of our relations with Afghanistan.

2. His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor is aware of the circumstances which led to the despatch of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission to the Court of the Amir of Kabul. His Honour has also been informed that the Mission, at starting, was arrested by the armed resistance which the Amir's officers offered at Ali Masjid to its advance. The Amir has thus committed an act of open hostility which relieves the British Government from any obligation to use further forbearance towards him; and may possibly necessitate early military operations upon the North-western Frontier, and the advance of our forces across the British frontier into the Amir's territory.

3. Under these circumstances, I am to request that his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will instruct the several officers in charge of our frontier relations to lose no time, and spare no effort, to detach from all political connexion with the Afghan Government those independent tribes lying outside the northern portion of the Punjab border, whom it is most important, either upon military or political grounds, to bring permanently under our own influence to the exclusion of that of the Amir. Of these, the principal are understood to be the several sections of the Afridis who hold the Khairbar Pass, and certain sections of the Wuziris whose country adjoins the route of the Kuram Valley.

4. I am also to refer to my letter No. 1185 P., dated the 11th June, regarding the advances made by the Musa Kheyil Pathan tribes near the Derajat Frontier. There is now, I am to say, no reason why they should not be invited to discuss the terms upon which they may be admitted into substantial engagements with the British Government upon a basis of service and protection, if his Honour considers this course to be practical and politically advantageous under present circumstances. Similar instructions with regard to the Kakar Pathans on the Thul-Chotiari route have been sent to the Agent to the Governor-General for Biluchistan.

5. In conclusion, I am to ask whether the Lieutenant-Governor considers that any important section of the Mohmands, who hold the country to the north-west of Peshawar, are likely to desire to attach themselves to the British Government, and whether, having in view their situation and resources, any engagement with them could be advantageously negotiated. His Excellency the Viceroy has reason to believe that simultaneous action upon the Mohmands will assist arrangements with the Khairbaris.

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No. 61.

Telegram from Viceroy, 19th October 1878.

Ameer's expected letter received, following is the full text of it:
After compliments; your Excellency's despatch regarding the sending of a friendly message has been received through Nawab Gholam Husse in Khan; I understand its purport, but the Nawab had not yet had an audience, nor had your Excellency's letters been seen by me when a communication was received to the address of my servant Mirza Hubibullah Khan, from Commissioner, Peshawur, and was read. I am astonished and dismayed by this letter, written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend, replete with contentions, and yet nominally regarding a friendly mission. Coming thus by force, what result, or profit, or fruit could come of it? Following this, three other letters from above-mentioned source, in the very same strain, addressed to my officials, have been perused by me. Thus, during a period of a few days several letters from that
quarter have all been before me, and none of them have been free from harsh expressions and hard words, repugnant to courtesy and politeness, and in tone contrary to the ways of friendship and intercourse. Looking to the fact that I am at this time assaulted by affection and grief at the hand of fate, and that great trouble has possessed my soul, in the officials of the British Government patience and silence would have been specially becoming. Let your Excellency take into consideration this harsh and breathless haste with which the desired object and place of conference have been seized upon, and how the officials of the Government have been led into discussion and subject to reproach. There is some difference between this and the pure road of friendship and goodwill. In alluding to those writings of the officials of the opposite Government which have emanated from them, and are at this time in the possession of my own officials, the latter have in no respect desired to show enmity or opposition towards the British Government, nor, indeed, do they with any other Power desire enmity or strife, but when any other Power, without cause or reason, shows animosity towards this Government, the matter is left in the hands of God and to His will.

The esteemed Nawab Gholam Hussein, the bearer of this despatch, has, in accordance with written instructions received from the British Government, asked for permission to retire, and it has been granted. Dated Sunday, 6th October.

No. 62.

Telegram from Viceroy, 19th October 1878.

Letters from Commissioner referred to by Ameer were written under following circumstances. Commissioner had on several occasions communicated with Mustaufi about proposed mission. Nawab started with my letters to Ameer on 30th August, and was well received at first stages by Ameer's authorities, who have been subsequently blamed by His Highness for letting him pass. On 6th September information received that Nawab was being delayed, and only allowed to proceed by short marches. Letters simultaneously received from Mustaufi stated that it was necessary Nawab should remain at Peshawur, as Ameer declined to attend to business, which must, therefore, wait till Ramyan. Commissioner was instructed to inform Mustaufi that Nawab had already started, and departure of mission could not be delayed beyond 16th September, to which date it had been postponed, so as not to arrive till after Ramyan and expiration of full period of mourning; that its object and character were friendly, and refusal of its safe passage would be regarded as an act of open hostility.

No. 63.

Telegram from Viceroy, 19th October 1878.

Ameer's present letter, written after a month's deliberation, leaves still unanswered my amicable proposal of 14th August, contains no apology for public affront to British Government, and indicates no desire for proposed Mission or improved relations. In the opinion of Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir N. Chamberlain, Mr. Lyall, and all persons here familiar with Oriental style, the tone of the letter is intentionally rude, and conveys a direct challenge. It will certainly be so regarded by all our Native subjects, as it was written after the Ameer had been informed through Nawab of affront at Ali Musjid and light in which we view it. Any demand for apology would now, in my opinion, be useless, and only expose us to fresh insult, whilst losing valuable time. I will telegraph in detail proposed reasons this afternoon after special Council.

No. 64.

From Viceroy, 19th October 1878. (Extract.)

Special Council assembled to day for consideration of Ameer's letter. Following measures proposed:—

1. Immediate issue of manifesto defining cause of offence, declaring friendly disposition towards Afghan people, reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and fixing sole responsibility on Ameer.

K k 2
2. Advance into Kurram valley on completion of force now collecting at Thul.
4. Advance from Quetta on Pishcen, if necessary, to Candahar.

Advantages of delay none; disadvantages obvious. Distrust of our resolve to act already prevails widely, will increase daily, much raising Ameer's prestige, lowering ours. Shall lose present opportunity of securing adherence of independent tribes.

We therefore urgently request immediate sanction to measures stated above.

No. 65.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY of STATE, 25th October 1878.

Do not consider matters to be at present ripe for taking all the steps you mention in your telegram, October 19th.

Am of opinion that before crossing the frontiers of Afghanistan a demand, in temperate language, should be made for an apology and acceptance of a permanent British Mission within the Afghan frontiers, and that a reply should be demanded within a time sufficient for the purpose. Send by telegram text of your letter before it is despatched. In the meantime the massing of troops should be continued and adequate forces assembled at the various points at which attack would be made in case of war. There must be no mistake as to our show of power to enforce what we require. This locus penitentiae should be allowed before hostile acts are committed against the Ameer.

No. 66.

TELEGRAM from SECRETARY of STATE, 30th October 1878.

Text of letter, as approved, to be sent to the Ameer:

I have received and read the letter which you have sent me by the hands of my Sirdar. It will be in your recollection that immediately on my arrival in India I proposed to send you a friendly Mission for the purpose of assuring you of the good will of the British Government, and of removing those past misunderstandings to which you have frequently alluded.

After leaving this proposal long unanswered, you rejected it, on the grounds that you could not answer for the safety of any European Envoy in your country, and that the reception of a British Mission might afford Russia a pretext for forcing you to receive a Russian Mission. Such refusal to receive a friendly Mission was contrary to the practice of allied States, yet the British Government, unwilling to embarrass you, accepted your excuses.

Nevertheless you have now received a Russian Envoy at your capital, at a time when a war was believed to be imminent, in which England and Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides, thereby not only acting in contradiction to the reasons asserted by you for not receiving a British Mission, but giving to your conduct the appearance of being actuated by motives inimical to the British Government.

In these circumstances, the British Government, remembering its former friendship with your father, and still desiring to maintain with you amicable relations, determined to send, after such delay as the domestic affliction you had suffered rendered fitting, a Mission to you under the charge of Sir Neville Chamberlain, a trusted and distinguished officer of the Government, who is personally known to you; the escort attached to his Mission, not exceeding 200 men, was much less numerous than that which accompanied you into British territory, and was not more than was necessary for the dignity of my Envoy. Such Missions are customary between friendly neighbouring States, and are never refused except when hostility is intended.

I despatched by a trusted messenger a letter informing you that the Mission accredited to you was of a friendly character; that its business was urgent, and that it must proceed without delay.

Nevertheless, you, having received my letter, did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the frontier to repel the Mission by force. For this act of enmity and indignity to the Empress of India in the person of her Envoy, your letter affords no explanation or apology, nor does it contain any answer to my proposal for a full and frank understanding between our two Governments.
In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier, but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war.

For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank.

Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British Mission within your territory.

It is further essential that you should undertake that no injury shall be done by you to the tribes who acted as guides to my Mission, and that reparation shall be made for any damage they have suffered from you; and, if any injury be done by you to them, the British Government will at once take steps to protect them.

Unless these conditions are accepted, fully and plainly, by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government.

No. 67.

Telegram from Secretary of State, 30th October 1878. (Extract.)

If your messenger refused admission to Afghanistan telegraph forthwith. If reply not clear and categorical, must be treated as refusal.

We have assumed that Khyberees have received some damage, but are at present not threatened, nor demanding immediate aid. Our pledge to them must be fulfilled to the letter, and in case of need at once.

No. 68.

Telegram from Viceroy, 31st October 1878.

Yours 30th. Can you indicate views on military operations in event of an unfavourable reply.

No. 68A.

No. 116 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Chandos, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

With reference to paragraph 2 of our despatch No. 95, dated 3rd October 1878, we have the honour to forward the Report made to us by Sir Neville Chamberlain of his proceedings in connection with the Mission it was proposed to send to Kabul.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.
Enclosure in No. 68.

Dated Simla, 12th October 1878.

From His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., late Envoy Extraordinary to Kabul, to A. C. Lyall, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

My several confidential telegrams and letters which I despatched from Peshawar, placed his Excellency the Viceroy in early possession of all that was taking place: but it now remains for me to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a more formal and connected report of the proceedings of the Mission. I regret that indisposition since my return to Simla has prevented my discharging this duty at an earlier date.

1. On the 7th September you communicated to me the orders of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, and on the following morning I left Simla.

2. I reached Peshawar on the evening of the 12th; and at once placed myself in communication with Major Waterfield, the Commissioner; and also with Major Cavagnari, who was then specially charged with the conduct of our intercourse with Kabul and with the Afridi tribes.

3. I reached Peshawar on the 16th, or as soon after as possible, so as to reach Kabul about the end of the month, by which time the full period of mourning and of the Fast (Ramzan) would have ended. This was also the time named by the Minister as the period when His Highness the Amir of Kabul would be able to attend to State affairs. Major Cavagnari, in obedience to instructions previously communicated to him by his Excellency the Viceroy, was then in course of arranging with the independent Khoibari tribes for the safe conduct of the Mission through the Pass as far as Ali Masjid, at which place it would come into contact with, and under the protection of, the officers of His Highness the Amir of Kabul. This was, in fact, to follow the course adopted in the case of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan, who had been previously sent to Kabul, to convey to the Amir a letter of condolence from His Excellency the Viceroy on the loss of the Heir-Apparent, and also a letter to announce the coming of the Mission.

5. Arrangements with the independent tribes always take time, but all seemed to be going on satisfactorily; when, on the morning of the 14th, intimation was brought to Major Cavagnari that Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Commandant of the Amir's troops stationed at Ali Masjid, had sent in to Peshawar to summon back to the Pass all the Khoibari Malikis, or headmen, who were then in course of negotiating with Major Cavagnari. The Malikis applied to Major Cavagnari to know what course they should adopt, as they felt that, if they disobeyed, they would risk the loss of the allowance they were then in receipt of from the Amir.

6. This action on the part of the Amir's officials was most discourteous, if not hostile; for the occupation of Ali Masjid by the Amir's troops had been of no long duration, whilst it could at no time have been carried out had the measure been objected to by the Government of India. It was, however, impossible that such occupation could, under any circumstances, be accepted by the British Government as being allowed to interfere with, or to become a bar to, our right to hold independent relations with these tribes, or to interfere in any manner with our previously existing relations with them.

7. The Afridi mountains border the Peshawar Valley for many miles. The trade of the tribes is also exclusively with that valley and with our subjects. We have, therefore, continual intercourse and dealings with each other; and, in the main, we live together in friendly relations.

8. Whilst it was quite beyond reason to accept the position now assumed by Faiz Muhammad Khan, still, so great was the desire not to give the Amir any plausible ground of complaint, that the course was adopted of addressing to Faiz Muhammad a courteous and friendly letter,* explaining to him the object of the Mission, and our motive for arranging with the Pass-men for its safe conduct as far as Ali Masjid.

9. The purport of this letter was explained by Major Cavagnari to the Malikis, who fully understood and approved of its conciliatory nature, and expressed themselves as willing to abide by the result. They were further told that up to that time it was considered that their previous arrangements with the Amir were held to be in force; that nothing had occurred to put an end to them; but that if the Amir, because of their relations with us, stopped their allowance, it would then be continued to them by the British Government.

10. I, at this period, wrote to his Excellency the Viceroy that I was not sanguine of receiving a satisfactory answer, for I felt that a man in a subordinate position like that held by Faiz Muhammad would never dare assume the responsibility of acting as he had done without orders, and that, therefore, he had, most probably, only carried out the instructions he had received from Kabul. However, the object of the Mission was to promote peace, and to bring about, if it was possible, a return to friendly and close relations with the Amir, so that I still urged that all reasonable delay should be overlooked, so as to enable Faiz Muhammad to refer for orders to his nearest superior—the Mir Akbar—should he consider it desirable to do so—rather than to seem to assume the position of forcing on matters to a decisive issue sooner than was absolutely indispensable.

11. So far from Faiz Muhammad Khan feeling any embarrassment in replying to my letter, he did so at once, and I received his answer† late on the afternoon of the 16th. There could be no room for misunderstanding his meaning. He was a soldier in command of an outpost, had no orders to allow the Mission to pass, and would stop it by force of arms if need be. The position thus assumed was, in fact, to imply that the relations then existing between the Amir and the British Government were tantamount to a state of war, and thus all doubt was removed as to the nature of the orders given to Faiz Muhammad, or the source from which they...
emitted. Just one ray of hope might, however, be extracted from his last paragraph. The Mir Akhor was, he said, just about to arrive at Ali Masjid from Bhauka, he might be the bearer of fresh instructions from Kabul, and he recommended me to delay the advance of the Mission.

12. My first impulse was to await the arrival of the Mir Akhor at Ali Masjid, and then to address him direct, but as time passed on, I felt that if the Mir Akhor's visit to Ali Masjid was of a friendly character, it would have been his first duty to make this known to me, whilst to repeat to him the assurances already made to Faiz Muhammad Khan, would be to risk placing my Government in the position of seeming to plead for privileges which belonged to it as of right.

13. News of the Mir Akhor's arrival duly reached me; and it was reported that his object, instead of being of a friendly character, was to see that Faiz Muhammad did not flinch from the execution of his orders.

14. It was now clear to me that all hopes of a peaceful advance of the Mission—except possibly upon conditions to be dictated by the Amir—were at an end; and that it only remained to carry out the orders of my Government in bringing to a decided issue whether the Amir's troops would, or would not, offer the slightest opposition to the advance of the Mission.

15. If there had been any room for previous doubt as to the intentions and acts of the Amir's officials stationed at Ali Masjid, the mask had now been completely thrown aside; for it was well authenticated that both Faiz Muhammad Khan and the Mir Akhor were not only doing everything in their power to prevent the Afridis located nearest to us from giving us a passage, but were endeavouring to induce those sections of the tribe located beyond Ali Masjid, and who were therefore more under their immediate control, to intervene between us and their clansmen, in order to thwart our negotiations with them, and to make them, under any circumstances, close the Pass to the advance of the Mission.

16. If our negotiations, which had for their object merely to enable us to have a right of way as far as Ali Masjid, were to be continued with any chance of success—or if, indeed, our right to contract engagements at all with the independent Pass tribes was to be upheld—there was now nothing left for us but to, as the proverb says, "throw off the rest of which, we all considered, we had hampered us so much in coming to terms with the Afridis. Accordingly, with the sanction of His Excellency the Viceroy, the Afridi Maliks were told (on the 19th) that we were ready to deal with them independently of all other considerations—that we repeated the promise of indemnifying them for any loss they might sustain from the Amir withdrawing his allowance; and that we were, in fact, prepared, if necessary, to take over the whole Pass arrangements into our own hands for the future, and to pay them the Pass-money out of the British Treasury.

17. The day following (the 20th), the Maliks announced the ascent of their tribesmen to escort the Mission to Ali Masjid, or to any nearer point until we should come into contact with the Amir's officials; and that they would also, if necessary, give it safe conduct back to Jamrud. They asked for the delay of one day to enable them to make their arrangements for the security of the Pass.

18. Whilst the events above narrated were taking place, letters arrived from the Nawab. These announced his arrival at Kabul, and subsequent interviews with the Amir, and with His Highness' Ministers. At these interviews the Nawab was told of the bad humour of the Amir, because of the grievances of which His Highness considered himself to be the victim at the hands of the Government of India, though the Amir admitted that we also might have complaints against him. The Nawab was also told that the Russian Mission had come with the sanction of the Amir, and that it would be honourably sent away after the Eed, and that, as to the English Mission, it should not be pressed upon him inopportune; but that His Highness claimed the right to have time to consider the matter as to its reception, and that if, after reflection, its reception should prove agreeable to him, he would then fix the time for its arrival, and make suitable arrangements to receive it honourably. The Nawab was made to repeat these communications in his letters; and was further made to express the Minister's hope that the answers to the letters might be the basis of a reconciliation between the two Governments, but that, if the British Mission started on the 18th, or without the previous sanction of the Amir, matters would assume a different aspect.

19. With reference to the above, I feel called upon to say that the Nawab was merely the bearer of the Viceroy's two letters to the Amir, and was charged to announce verbally and formally to His Highness the despatch and advent of the Mission. The Nawab had no authority otherwise to represent the British Government. He was invested with no diplomatic powers; and it was altogether beyond his province to enter into communications with the Kabul Government on State affairs. His letters, as a matter of fact, merely echoed the views or wishes—or, more strictly speaking, the mere words—of the Amir; and it was manifestly no part of my duty to send answers to such communications.

20. Whatever may have been the nature of the relations entered into between the Amir and the Russian Mission—whether His Highness' mind was made up, or not, as to any definite course of future policy—it is, I consider, beyond question that his object was to procrastinate, and to defer as long as possible being forced into giving any definite answer to the Viceroy's letters; and further, to prevent, if possible, the passage of the Mission through the few miles of the Khaibar which separate Jamrud from Ali Masjid. His Highness hoped thereby to prevent the officers of the two Governments from coming into personal contact; and his mind was made up that, if they did so before he acceded his assent for the onward passage of the Mission, it should be stopped, and stopped, if need be, by force of arms and by bloodshed. The acts of His Highness' officers at Ali Masjid, His Highness' own words to the Nawab, and the words of his Minister to the same person—all bore testimony to this intention. It was tantamount to saying that if the British Government would renounce all right to independence of action, and leave it to the Amir to decide whether the Mission should be received or not, and if to be received, to leave it to him to decide the precise time, that then,
at his pleasure, he would give an answer, when, if it was favourable to us, he would depute a suitable person to receive the Mission, and treat it honourably.

21. Most assuredly no Asiatic Prince has ever thus treated the British Government unless prepared to go to war; and equally certain is it that the Amir would never have thus dealt by the Russians, unless ready to trust to the same arbitration. In fact, we have it in his own word to the Nawab, that he invited the Russian Mission—and be it remembered it came at its own appointed time—not deeming it advisable to break with the Czar.

22. On the 21st, the Mission moved to Janrud and encamped there for the day. Major Cavagnari was desired to ride on to Ali Masjid with a small escort, to demand from the Amir's officials permission for the advance of the Mission. A report of his interview with Faiz Muhammad Khan is annexed. It announced the fixed intention of the Amir's authorities to oppose the passage of the Mission; and it is evident that, but for the tact displayed by Major Cavagnari at one period of the interview, even the lives of the British officers and of their small escort were endangered.

23. This result having been reported by telegraph to the Viceroy, I, early on the morning of the 22nd, received his Excellency's orders to return with the Mission to Peshawar. Before doing so, I addressed a letter* to Faiz Muhammad Khan at Ali Masjid, informing him of the withdrawal of the Mission, and that his act would be viewed as being that of the Amir. I also sent a letter* to the Nawab, directing him to immediately take leave of the Amir, and to return forthwith to Peshawar.

24. As I was about to mount my horse to leave camp, I saw the friendly Afridi Malik. I told them they had honourably discharged their engagement with us, and that their service was considered the same as if they had escorted our last baggage-animal safe under the walls of Ali Masjid. They appeared pleased at this recognition of their services; but as my remarks drew from some of them the question as to what they should do if the Amir visited them with his displeasure because of their engagement with us, I replied without hesitation that we should take them under our protection, and would defend them to the last. This promise subsequently received the full approval and confirmation of his Excellency the Viceroy.

25. The Mission had failed—it had been turned back at the threshold of the Amir's dominions, with an affront delivered before all the world. It failed, because of the Amir's indifference to any indignity imposed by him on the British Government; whilst he himself would not tolerate anything which could be strained to bear the appearance of even a slight to his kingly privileges.

26. It seems to me that a reasonable way of judging of our position is to suppose the conditions inverted. Let it be supposed that the Amir had considered that his interests and his honour called for the immediate despatch of an envoy to the Government of India to discuss pressing differences in a friendly manner; that he had deputed a confidential agent of rank to the Viceroy to announce the approaching departure and early arrival of a Mission; that the Government of India, thereupon, had sent no direct answer to the Amir, but had endeavoured to bar the passage of the Mission through neighbouring friendly tribes; and that, on its succeeding in reaching our most distant outpost, it had been met and turned back by the threat of a resort to force if it ventured to continue on its errand. There can, I think, be no room for two opinions unless the relations between neighbouring states are to relapse into the worst form of barbarism, and to be controlled only by brute instincts and by brute force.

27. It may be said with certainty that a Mission despatched under such conditions would have met with no success had it been allowed to advance, and that it was better to fail at starting through a direct insult than to reach Kabul to arrive at no result.

28. Before concluding this report, I desire to correct a misapprehension which has prevailed as to the strength of the military escort attached to the Mission. It consisted of 150 cavalry and 50 infantry, or a total of 200 men; and, considering the description of country to be traversed, and the habits of the tribes to be passed through, this number was not in excess of requirements.

29. My Mission was not of the nature of a surprise, and to be conducted secretly and expeditiously; it had, therefore, according to custom, to be accompanied by a proportionate amount of camp equipage, baggage, and transport animals; whilst in addition to our own requirements was added the charge of valuable gifts to be presented to the Amir. I had, in fact, to go in the most open and formal manner, to represent the dignity of my Sovereign and the claims of my country; and to do this suitably, a certain amount of outward state was customary and necessary.

30. No exception is ever taken by this Government to the amount of escort which accompanies any foreign Prince visiting India; and whenever the Amir of Kabul, or one of the Princes of that house, has come to India, he has invariably been accompanied by an escort far in excess of that which I was to take; although, be it added, any individual of any nationality may traverse the length and breadth of the land, unarmed, with perfect security and without let or hindrance.

31. Finally, I would observe that so great was my desire to prevent, if possible, any false rumours of armed preparations preceding me to Kabul, that I even requested the Brigadier-General commanding the Peshawar garrison to suspend the movement of troops ordinarily carried out at that period for the preservation of the men's health, consequent upon the setting-in of the sickly season.
Enclosure 1 in No. 68a.

TRANSLATION of a LETTER from FAIZ MUHAMMAD KHAN to His Excellency Sir NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN (letter not dated),

A.C.—Your friendly letter which you sent me by the hands of Arbab Fateh Muhammad Khan has reached me to-day, the 17th Ramazan (16th September). I was gratified by the perusal thereof, and feel obliged. Kind (Sir), you mention therein that you have been ordered to proceed on a friendly Mission to Kabul, and that you are negotiating with the Afridis for an escort to Dhakka. But the Afridis are a faithless (literally, “fearless”) and covetous race. No confidence can be reposed in their engagements. Their headmen and chiefs are all with us, and in receipt of allowances from His Highness the Amir. The letter which my kind friend Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, wrote on the subject of the advance of a friendly Mission to Kabul, I have forwarded by the hands of my servant to the Mir Akhor, our superior and chief at Jelalabad; but as yet we have received no orders from Kabul or Jelalabad which we might communicate to you, whether to let the British Mission to proceed or to stop it. When we hear that the Amir has no objection (to your going), we shall do you good service, and escort you to Dhakka, whether there be any Afridis or not; for the friendship between you and the late Amir Sahib is clearer than the sun. When we receive orders from the capital (Kabul) to invite you, we shall be bound to serve you well. But as yet we have received no orders to let you go. We are servants to carry out the orders (of our master). Should you come without His Highness’s permission or orders, it will lead to a collision between us and the Afridis on one side, and you on the other; all hopes of friendship will be lost.

While I was writing this letter, a man arrived from Dhakka with the news that the Mir Akhor would shortly be here with two sowars. As he is a great man, he may have brought some orders which he, by way of friendship, will communicate to you. He will also learn your views (“jawab-o-sowal”). What I have stated above is all that I have to communicate. Further, you are at liberty to do what you like. Whether you stop at Peshawar until the Mir Akhor arrives, and have a friendly communication with you, or you proceed at once by force, you can do what you choose.

Enclosure 2 in No. 68a.

Dated, Camp Jamrud, 22nd September 1878.


A.C.—You are aware that the camp of the British Mission arrived at Jamrud yesterday, with the object of proceeding to-day through the Khaibar Pass on a friendly Mission to His Highness the Amir of Kabul. Major Cavagnari and two other British officers were deputed yesterday afternoon, under my orders, to hold an interview with you, in order to obtain from you, as His Highness Commandant at Ali Masjid, the necessary assurances of safe conduct to enable the Mission to proceed on its journey.

The said officers were prevented from approaching the fort of Ali Masjid, as your pickets were posted commanding the road, and refused to allow them (the officers) to advance. After these British officers had sought and obtained an interview with you at a place (Lala Channa) some short distance this side of Ali Masjid, and after you had been warned by them that your reply would be regarded as that of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, you declared that you had received no instructions to permit the British Mission to pass your post, and stated that you would certainly oppose it by force if it advanced. I am therefore commanded by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to inform you that your reply is considered as being that of His Highness the Amir of Kabul, and the British Mission is now returning from Jamrud to Peshawar. I again assure you that the British Government entertains nothing but friendly feelings and intentions towards the Chiefs and people of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 3 in No. 68a.

Dated, Camp Jamrud, 22nd September 1878.

From His Excellency Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., to Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, on Special Duty at Kabul.

A.C.—I send, for your information, copy of a letter I have just addressed to Faiz Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai, Commanding His Highness the Amir of Kabul’s troops at Ali Masjid.

I am commanded by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General to direct you, immediately on receipt of this letter, to take leave of His Highness the Amir of Kabul and to return at once to Peshawar.
No. 69.

Telegram from Secretary of State, 1st November 1878. (Extract.)

Yours 31st. If answer unfavourable you are to treat Ameer as a declared enemy of the British Government. The military measures must be decided upon as to time and place by your military advisers.

No. 70.

Telegram from Viceroy, 4th November 1878.

Ultimatum to Ameer delivered to Faiz Mahomed at Ali Musjid on 2nd November, and receipt obtained. Duplicate sent by post. We consider attempt to send special messenger would cause probable failure; certainly delay.

No. 71.

Telegram from Viceroy, 5th November 1878.

Yours 1st. I understand from it that I am to act on 21st without further reference in the event of no answer, or an unfavourable answer, being received, and only to refer for further instructions if the answer is of a character which seems to me to require this.

No. 72.

Telegram from the Secretary of State, 7th November 1878.

Yours of 5th correctly assumes the understanding.

No. 73.

Secret, No. 49.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

My Lord,

* No. 53, Secret, 5th August 1878.
" 61, " 19th " "
" 67, " 27th September " "
" 79, " 9th September " "
" 86, " 16th " "
" 93, " 26th " "
" 95, " 3rd October " "

India Office, London,
18th November 1878.

Para. 1. The letters* and telegraphic despatches which your Government has transmitted to me, reporting the circumstances connected with the reception of a Russian Mission at Kabul in July last, and the subsequent rejection by the Ameer Shere Ali Khan of the special Embassy accredited to his court by your Excellency, have been considered by Her Majesty's Government with the care due to their importance.

2. The various communications which have from time to time passed between the Government at home and that of India, ending with Lord Salisbury's Despatch of the 4th of October last year, contain a complete exposition of the general policy of the British Government towards Afghanistan, and set forth, moreover, the considerations which lately induced Her Majesty's Government to endeavour to place their relations with the Ameer on a more satisfactory footing. In order, however, that no misapprehension may exist on this subject, I deem it advisable to recapitulate some of the
leading features of that policy, and to trace the course of events which have led to the present condition of affairs on the frontier.

*Article I.*

Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Wale of Kabul and of those countries now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.

**Article II.**

The Honourable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein.

**Article III.**

His Highness Dost Mohammed Khan, Wale of Kabul, and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages, on his own part and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein, and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company.

† Minute, 30th April 1855, in Secret Letter, No. 3, of 10th May 1855.

"Government of India on its western frontier as complete security against a foreign "and distant enemy as it is possible for us in the nature of things to compass."

4. The question, however, has assumed special prominence since the period of the transfer to the Crown of the direct administration of India. The growing interest in the subject has been the result partly of the increased responsibilities assumed by the Government of Her Majesty in maintaining Her Indian Empire, and partly of the intestine disorders to which Afghanistan became a prey after the accession of the present Ameer to the throne in the year 1863. Upon Lord Lawrence devolved the direction of the policy to be adopted in this new state of affairs, and that statesman considered that the objects of the British Government would be best obtained by abstaining from active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and by the friendly recognition of the in fact rulers of that country, or of portions of it, without undertaking inconvenient liabilities on their behalf. On this basis Lord Lawrence thought that the British Government would have the greatest chance of gaining the permanent friendship and alliance of the Afghan people. The outposts of Russia were then distant from the borders of Afghanistan, and His Lordship's Government attached no special importance to the probability and danger of the growth of the former power in the direction of India, which they considered, would in any case best be restrained or rendered innocuous by a friendly understanding on the subject between the English and Russian Cabinets.

5. The views of Her Majesty's Government of that day on the subject of their relations with Afghanistan were in complete harmony with those of Lord Lawrence. They did not desire to exercise active influence at Kabul, nor to interfere in the conflicts then rife between contending parties in Afghanistan, so long as those conflicts did not jeopardise the peace of the frontier. This policy was therefore adhered to, although not without some inconvenient results, during the civil war which raged for so many years after Shere Ali's accession, and might not unreasonably be thought suited to the circumstances of the time. But the final and unaided success of the Ameer in regaining his throne, in the autumn of 1868, in some measure changed the position of affairs, and, in the opinion both of Lord Lawrence and of Her Majesty's Government, justified some intervention in His Highness's favour, and the grant to him of such assistance in money and arms as appeared conducive to the maintenance of his authority.

6. The policy followed by Lord Mayo's administration in its dealings with Afghanistan was to a considerable extent in accord with the course of action thus finally adopted in the autumn of 1868 by his predecessor. Whilst, however, Lord Mayo did not deviate, in any material degree, from the attitude of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, which had been so long maintained, he recognized Shere Ali as the de jure as well as the de facto ruler of that country, and, in a letter addressed to that prince, engaged to view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position. This step, added to the marked personal influence obtained by Lord Mayo over the Ameer, was sufficient at the moment to remove a certain feeling of resentment which had
been generated in his mind by the apparent indifference shown by the British Government to the result of his struggle for power, and, at the same time, rendered His Highness's position at Kabul more assured than that of any previous ruler.

7. The advances of Russia in Central Asia had not, up to this period, assumed dimensions such as to cause uneasiness to the Indian Government. Lord Mayo agreed, therefore, in the views of his predecessor, that the best means of averting interference on the part of the Turkistan authorities in the affairs of Afghanistan would be by a frank interchange of views on that subject between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. Her Majesty's Government had independently arrived at the same conclusion, and early in 1869 initiated friendly negotiations at St. Petersburg, which terminated in a very distinct understanding on this subject, and in the recognition by the Czar's Government of the limits of the Ameer's territories, in complete accord with the wishes of Shere Ali and of the British Government.

8. The policy of his predecessors was that substantially followed by Lord Northbrook, although the rapid development of events in Central Asia was gradually increasing the difficulty of abstaining from closer relations with the ruler of Kabul. The capture of Khiva by the forces of the Czar in the spring of 1873, and the total subordination of that Khanate to Russia, caused Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of the pledges with reference to Afghanistan which had been given by His Imperial Majesty to England, and which had been communicated to His Highness by the British Government. Actuated by his fears on this score, His Highness sent a special envoy to Simla in the summer of that year, charged with the duty of expressing them to the Government of India.

9. Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared* to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Government at home did not share† his Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Ameer that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season. The effect of this announcement on his Highness, although conveyed in conciliatory language, was not favourable; the policy which dictated it was unintelligible to his mind, and he received it with feelings of chagrín and disappointment. His reply to Lord Northbrook's communication was couched in terms of ill-disguised sarcasm; he took no notice of the Viceroy's proposal to depute a British Officer to examine the northern frontier of Afghanistan; he subsequently refused permission to Sir Douglas Forsyth to return from Kashgar to India through Kabul; he left untouched a gift of money lodged to his credit by the Indian Government, and generally assumed towards it an attitude of sullen reserve.

10. Such was the position of affairs when Her Majesty's present advisers assumed office in 1874. The maintenance of Afghanistan as a strong and friendly power had, at all times, been the object of British policy. The method adopted in attaining that object had not met with the success that was desirable. Its accomplishment was, nevertheless, a matter of grave importance, and it had now to be considered with reference to the rapid march of events in Turkestan. Her Majesty's Government could not view with indifference the probable influence of those events upon the character of an Asiatic prince whose dominions were thereby brought within a steadily narrowing circle between two great military empires, and although no immediate danger appeared to threaten British interests on the frontier of Afghanistan, the situation in Central Asia had become sufficiently grave to suggest the necessity of timely precaution. Her Majesty's Government considered that the first step necessary was the improvement of their relations with the Ameer himself. With this object in view, they deemed it expedient that His Highness should be invited to receive a temporary mission at Kabul, in order that an accredited British Envoy might confer with him personally upon what was taking place, might assure him of the desire of the Queen's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack, and at the same time might point out to him the extreme difficulty of attaining this object unless it were permitted by him to place his own officers on his frontier to watch the course of events beyond it. It was true that the Ameer's relations with the Russian Governor General of Turkestan had of late become more intimate, and that a correspondence which that official had
commenced with the Kabul Durbar in 1871, and which, at one time, had caused serious
disquiet to the Ameer, was being carried on with increased activity, whilst His High-
ness's original practice of consulting the Indian Government as to the replies to be sen-
to General Kaufmann's communications had been discontinued. Nevertheless, Her
Majesty's Government were willing to believe that Shere Ali, if his intentions were
friendly, would be ready to join them in measures, advantageous to himself, and essential
for the protection of common interests.

11. In view of these interests, and of the responsibilities which had morally devolved
upon the British Government on behalf of Afghanistan, looking also to the imperfect
information available in regard to the country, in respect to which those responsibilities
had been incurred, Lord Northbrook's Government had, in 1873, expressed the opinion
that the temporary presence in Afghanistan of a British officer, as then proposed by
them, might do much to allay any feelings of mistrust lingering in the minds of the
Afghan people, and might at the same time prepare the way for eventually placing
permanent British representatives at Kabul, Herat, and elsewhere. Encouraged by this
opinion, Her Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that, although Lord
Northbrook's efforts to attain the desired object had not met with success, the time had
come when the measure thus indicated could no longer with safety be postponed.
Your predecessor in Council had indeed, whilst appreciating all the advantages to be
anticipated from it, frankly represented to Her Majesty's present advisers the difficulties
attending the initiation of it; he believed the time and circumstances of the moment
to be inopportune for placing British agents on the Afghan borders, and was of opinion
that such a step should be deferred till the progress of events justified more specific
assurances to Shere Ali, which might then be given in the shape of a treaty, followed by
the establishment of agencies at Herat and other suitable places. Her Majesty's Govern-
ment, however, were unable to agree in this view; they deemed it probable that if events
were thus allowed to march without measures of precaution on the part of the British
Government, the time would have passed when representations to the Ameer could be
made with any probability of a favourable result; and they considered it important,
that the actual sentiments of His Highness, in reference to which different opinions were held
by different authorities, should be tested in good time.

12. Accordingly, on your Excellency's departure from England to assume the Vice-
royalty, Her Majesty's Government instructed you to offer to Shere Ali that same active
countenance and protection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the Indian
Government. It was clearly impossible, however, to enter into any formal engagement
in this sense without requiring from the Ameer some substantial proof of his unity of
interests with the British Government. Whilst Her Majesty's Government, therefore,
authorised your Excellency to concede to His Highness substantial pecuniary aid, a
formal recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and an explicit pledge of material support in case of
unprovoked foreign aggression, you were directed not to incur these heavy responsi-
bilities unless Shere Ali, on his part, were prepared to allow a British agent, or agents,
access to positions in his territories (other than at Kabul itself), where, without
prejudicing the personal authority of the ruler, they could acquire trustworthy informa-
tion of events likely to threaten the tranquillity or independence of Afghanistan.

13. The measures which your Excellency adopted on your arrival in India to give
effect to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were framed with discretion, and
in a spirit of consideration towards Shere Ali. You sent your Native Aide-de-camp,
Rossalder-Major Khanan Khan, to that prince, charged with the duty of informing him
of your desire to depute temporarily to his capital, or to any other point in Afghan
territory agreeable to His Highness, a special Envoy, whose mission was not merely to
be one of compliment but one for the discussion of matters of common interest to the
two Governments; and you took care to convey to His Highness verbal assurances of
the friendly character of your advances to him. But Shere Ali rejected your overtures
and declined to receive your Envoy.

14. Your Excellency exhorted the Ameer to consider seriously the consequences of
an attitude which might end in compelling the British Government to look upon him
thenceforth as a prince who voluntarily desired to isolate his interests from those of the
British Government. In a conciliatory spirit you abstained from pressing upon him the
reception of your Envoy, and you acceded to a suggestion of His Highness that your
Vakeel at Kabul should make personal representations to you on the Ameer's behalf.
These representations proved to be a recapitulation of grievances dating from 1872, and were briefly as follows:—

1. The communication which he had received from the late Viceroy in 1874 on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakub Khan, whom he had imprisoned.
2. The decision on the question of the Seistan boundary.
3. The gifts sent by the late Viceroy direct to the Chief of Wakhan, who is a tributary to the Ameer.
4. The repeated rejection of his previous requests for an alliance and a formal recognition of the order of succession as established by him in the person of his son Abduallah Jan.

15. These grievances appeared to weigh heavily on His Highness's mind, and you therefore lost no time in assuring Shere Ali, through the Vakeel, of the friendly feeling of the British Government towards him, of your desire to remove, by a frank exchange of views all causes of irritation on his mind, and of your willingness to accede to his proposal that, in lieu of Sir L. Pelly proceeding to Kabul, an Afghan Envoy should be deputed to meet one from your Excellency at Peshawur.

16. Your Vakeel thereupon returned to Kabul, charged with the duty of explaining to the Ameer, with the assistance of a clearly worded aide mémoire, the favourable treaty which the British Government was prepared, upon certain conditions, to negotiate with him, and its desire to clear up past misunderstandings. His Highness evinced no cordiality in his reception of him; but after some delay he deputed to Peshawur his minister, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, there to carry on with Sir Lewis Pelly the negotiations which Her Majesty's Government had considered of sufficient importance to have taken place on Afghan soil with the Ameer himself. Although the Ameer had been informed in writing, both of the concessions which the British Government was ready to grant to him and the conditions attached to them, and although, at the same time, it was signified to him that it would be of no avail for him to send his envoy to Peshawur unless His Highness were prepared to agree to those conditions as the bases of the proposed treaty, it became apparent in the course of the conference that the Minister had received no specific authority to accept them. As, moreover, the language and conduct of Shere Ali, which had so long been dubious, became openly inimical, you judiciously took advantage of the sudden death of His Highness's Envoy to discontinue negotiations, the bases of which had been practically rejected.

17. This step on your part, as well as all your proceedings throughout the year preceding the conference, met with the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government. As observed by my predecessor in his Despatch of the 4th October 1877, Her Majesty's Government had felt justified in hoping that the advantages which they were ready to tender to the Ameer would have been accepted in the spirit in which they were offered. At the same time, the attitude of His Highness for some years past had been so ambiguous as to prepare them for a different result. Far, however, from regarding the possibility of failure as affording sufficient grounds for total inaction, and continued acquiescence in the existing state of relations with the Ameer, they had arrived at the conclusion that while the prevailing uncertainty as to His Highness's disposition rendered caution necessary in their advances, it was in itself a reason for adopting steps which would elicit the truth. From this point of view Her Majesty's Government could not regard the result of the Peshawur conference as altogether unsatisfactory, inasmuch as they were no longer left in doubt as to the reality of the Ameer's alienation, which had previously been a matter of speculation. On the other hand, the proceedings at the conference, and the previous negotiations, had placed before the Ameer in a clear light the views of Her Majesty's Government as to their existing obligations towards him, and had, at the same time, informed him of the terms, so favourable to his interests, on which they were willing to draw closer the bonds of union between the two countries, and to place their mutual relations on a footing more advantageous to both.

18. Their overtures having been thus treated, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that no course was open to them but to maintain an attitude of vigilant reserve until such time as the Ameer might better realize his own position and interests. This view had been anticipated by you in the final assurances conveyed to the Afghan Envoy by Sir Lewis Pelly, and your policy since the close of the Peshawur conference has been in accordance with it. Whilst carefully watching the course of affairs in Afghanistan, so far as the imperfect means of obtaining information has admitted, you abstained from all interference in them, in the hope that time would enable His Highness to realize the dangers accruing to himself by the rejection of the friendly advances of the British
Government. That hope, however, has not been realized. The Ameer has persisted in his unfriendly isolation, and ultimately, having two years ago declined to receive a British Envoy, even temporarily, within his territory, on the ground that he could not guarantee his safety, nor thereafter be left with any excuse for declining to receive a Russian mission, he has welcomed with every appearance of ostentation an Embassy from the Czar, despatched to his Court at a time when there were indications that an interruption of friendly relations between this country and Russia might be imminent.

19. In these circumstances your Excellency represented to Her Majesty's Government that a policy of inaction could no longer be persisted in, and that the Ameer's reception of the Russian Mission at such a time, and under such circumstances, left him no further excuse for declining to receive at his capital an Envoy from the British Government. Your Excellency, proposed, therefore, to demand a reception of a Mission to Kabul, headed by an officer of rank, in the person of Sir Neville Chamberlain, whose name and family were held in high esteem by the Ameer.

20. This proposal was approved by Her Majesty's Government. It was evident that a potentate who willingly admitted to his capital, at a critical period, Envoy of a Power which at the moment might be regarded as making its advances with objects not friendly to the British Government, could not reasonably refuse to receive a Mission from a power with which he had continuously been in alliance. Your Excellency in Council did not anticipate any such refusal, and Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to question the soundness of your opinion on this point, based, as it must have been, on the best information at your command.

21. The anticipations both of Your Excellency and of Her Majesty's Government were, however, disappointed by the event. In a friendly letter, carried to Cabul by the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, you informed the Ameer of the date on which Sir Neville Chamberlain was to leave Peshawur, and you gave His Highness adequate time in which to issue orders to his local officials for the reception of the Mission. You caused it, moreover, to be intimated to His Highness and his officials that a refusal of free passage to the Mission would be regarded by you as an act of hostility. The orders sent to the Afghan officers at Ali Musjid were, nevertheless, the reverse of what you had a right to expect, and Major Cavagnari, who went in advance of your Envoy, was distinctly informed that any attempt to enter Afghan territory would be resisted by force, of which an ostentatious display was at once made.

22. This conduct on the part of the Ameer was wholly without justification. He was aware from various communications addressed to him by your Excellency's predecessors, that the Russian Government had given assurances to the Government of Her Majesty to regard his territories as completely beyond its sphere of action; he was equally aware that the whole policy of the British Government since his accession to the throne had been to strengthen his power and authority, and to protect him from foreign aggression, although the methods adopted for doing so may not have at all times accorded with His Highness's own views; he had received from the British Government evidence of goodwill, manifested by large gifts of money and arms, as well as by its successful efforts in obtaining from the Czar's Government its formal recognition of a fixed boundary, agreeable to himself, between his kingdom and the neighbouring Khanates; his subjects had been allowed to pass freely throughout India, to the great benefit of the trade and commerce of his country; and in no single instance has the Ameer himself, or any of his people, been treated unjustly or inhospitably within British jurisdiction. By every bond of international courtesy, as well as by the treaty engagement of 1855 existing between the two countries, binding him to be the friend of our friends and the enemy of our enemies, the Ameer was bound to a line of conduct the reverse of that which he adopted.

23. In reporting to Her Majesty's Government the forcible rejection of your friendly Mission, your Excellency expressed the conviction of the Government of India that this act deprived the Ameer of all further claim upon the forbearance of the British Government, and necessitated instant action. Her Majesty's Government were, however, unwilling to accept the evasive letter brought from Kabul by the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan as Shere Ali's final answer to your Government, and determined to give him a short time for reconsideration. While, therefore, Her Majesty's Government acknowledged fully as binding on them the pledges given by Sir N. Chamberlain to the friendly Chiefs and people who undertook the safe conduct of his Mission, they decided to make an effort to avert the calamities of war, and with this object instructed your Excellency to address to His Highness a demand, in temperate language, requiring a full and suitable apology within a given time for the affront which he has offered to the
British Government, the reception of a permanent British Mission within his territories, and reparation for any injury inflicted by him on the tribes who attended Sir N. Chamberlain and Major Cavagnari, as well as an undertaking not to molest them hereafter. These instructions were promptly carried into effect by Your Excellency's Government, and the Ameer has been informed that unless a clear and satisfactory reply be received from him by the 20th November, you will be compelled to consider his intentions as hostile, and to treat him as a declared enemy.

24. It only remains for me to assure your Excellency of the cordial support of Her Majesty's Government in the onerous circumstances in which you are placed, and to state that I have received the commands of Her Majesty to publish this Despatch for the general information of the public, in anticipation of the papers connected with the important question with which it deals. Those papers are in course of preparation, but, as they cover a period of not less than fifteen years, they must necessarily be voluminous.

I have, &c.,

CRANBROOK.
FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY,
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.
1878.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.
No. 32 of 1873.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.

To His Grace the DUKE OF ARGYLL, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My LORD DUKE,

Fort William, 28th March 1873.

We have the honour to forward copy of papers relative to the arrangements made for communicating to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan the decision of Her Majesty's Government on the Seistan boundary question. These arrangements are fully detailed in the letter to the Punjab Government, dated the 21st March 1873.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
R. TEMPLE.
B. W. ELLIS.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Khureeta, dated Fort William, 21st March 1873.

From his Excellency the VICEROY and GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA to His Highness the Ameer of AFGHANISTAN, Wali of Cabul.

With reference to Your Highness' letter, dated 13th November 1871, Your Highness will remember that the Commissioner of Peshawur subsequently expressed a hope on the part of my predecessor that when the Seistan boundary settlement was over you would be able to arrange for an interview with an officer of my Government, who would explain the details and lay before Your Highness some considerations affecting the welfare of Afghanistan.

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having confirmed General Goldsmid's award, I have deputed Mr. Donald Macnabb, Commissioner of Peshawur, an officer of high rank and dignity, in whom I have full confidence, to explain to Your Highness the details of the boundary, and to place before you certain papers relating to the final settlement of the question. Mr. Macnabb will also explain to Your Highness the negotiations which have now been satisfactorily concluded with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, whereby the Russian Government have agreed to recognize and respect the integrity and independence of the territories now in Your Highness' possession.

Whatever Mr. Macnabb may tell Your Highness on these two important questions, consider as coming from myself.

Enclosure 2 in No. 1. (Extract.)

No. 534 P., dated Fort William, 21st March 1873.

From SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA, Foreign Department, to SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of the PUNJAB.

In continuation of the correspondence on the subject of the Seistan boundary, I am directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to forward, for the information of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, an extract from a telegram dated
7th March, intimating that Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has confirmed General Goldsmid's award. The Lieutenant-Governor is aware that (under the terms agreed to by His Highness the Ameer in his letter of 13th November 1871 to the Viceroy, received under cover of your No. 451, dated 23rd November 1871) this decision of Her Majesty's Government is final, and binding upon both parties.

2. On 15th December 1871, the Commissioner of Peshawur was instructed to inform the Ameer that the Viceroy hoped, when the arbitration was over, to arrange for an interview between the Ameer and some officer of the British Government, who would explain the details and lay before His Highness some considerations affecting the welfare of Afghanistan. It is with respect to this proposed arrangement that I am now instructed to address you.

3. His Excellency in Council had hoped that General Pollock would have been able to return to India and be the medium of communicating the settlement to the Ameer. His Excellency in Council felt that, considering the connection of General Pollock with the previous discussions and inquiry in Seistan, this arrangement would probably have been most satisfactory to the Ameer. Circumstances, however, do not admit of General Pollock's return from England at present, and other arrangements must be had recourse to.

4. The Governor-General in Council proposes, if it be agreeable to the Ameer, to depute a British officer with full instructions to visit His Highness at Cabul or Jellalabad or Candahar, or any other place in Afghanistan which the Ameer may name as most suitable. Probably Mr. Macnab, the Commissioner of Peshawur, would be the best officer to select for this purpose.

5. I enclose, for the Lieutenant-Governor's information, a copy of General Goldsmid's arbitral award, and a map showing the boundary which has now been finally decided on by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as ultimate arbitrator. The evidence on which this decision has been arrived at is already known to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, the Afghan Commissioner, who has probably explained all the circumstances to the Ameer. His Excellency in Council will therefore abstain from making any reference to the evidence, which (including the appeal from General Goldsmid's award made on both sides) has been fully and carefully weighed by Her Majesty's Government with a view to a settlement in accordance with the rights and best interests of both parties. It will, however, be the duty of the officer deputed to meet the Ameer to explain the details of the actual award with fullness and accuracy, and to leave with His Highness a Persian translation of the award and of the map. Translations will accordingly be forwarded to you in due course for that purpose.

No. 2.

No. 46 of 1873.

Government of India—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD DUKE,

In continuation of our Despatch No. 32, dated the 28th March last, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further correspondence relative to the deputation of a British Officer to explain to the Ameer of Cabul, at a personal interview, the particulars respecting the Seistan Boundary Settlement.

2. It is the wish of His Highness in the first instance to depute an Agent from Cabul to confer with the Viceroy on the subject, and his Excellency has expressed his willingness to receive such an Agent.

We have, &c.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.
R. TEMPLE.
B. W. ELLIS.
H. W. NORMAN.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE.
E. C. BAYLEY
Enclosure 1 in No. 2.
No. 67 C., dated Peshawur, 5th April 1873.

From Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward translations of two letters from the Agent at Cabul, dated 31st March 1873.

2. The first of these letters is a reply to my letter of the 23rd March, written on the receipt of telegraphic instructions from the Secretary, Punjab Government, directing the Agent to communicate to His Highness the Ameer the wish of the Government that a British Officer shall have an opportunity of meeting His Highness to explain the details of the decision of the Seistan boundary. This letter, though written by the Agent, is, as he explains, really drafted by the Ameer's orders by the officials of his Durbar after a lengthened discussion, the details of which are given in the Agent's second letter.

3. There can be no doubt that the second letter was written at the express request of the Cabul Court, as a means of bringing indirectly to the notice of the Government the anxieties and expectations that now occupy the attention of the Ameer's counsellors; but the Ameer himself cannot have been aware of the style and purport of some of the observations made, which I am sure would not have met with His Highness' approval.

This letter is in the handwriting of Moonshee Bukhtiar Khan, attached to the Agency, and is, I conceive, compiled by him from notes made of the discussions in Durbar at which he was permitted to be present. It is signed by the Agent.

4. I have, as authorised by your telegram of the 21st March, told the Agent to inform His Highness of the confirmation by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the arbitral award respecting Seistan; and have also intimated that advantage would be taken of an interview between the Ameer and a British Officer deputed by the Government to make His Highness fully acquainted with the progress and conclusion of the communications which have taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia, on the subject of the boundaries of Afghanistan.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Translation of Cabul Agent's Letter, dated 31st March 1873, to the Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawur Division.

The Ameer, after perusing your letter to me of the 23rd March, received by me on the 27th March, and after consultation with the officers of his Durbar, said: If it is the wish of the British Government that one of their officers should proceed to Cabul to explain the details of the decision, it would be a cause of satisfaction to my mind if I were first informed, in general terms, what decision has been arrived at, that I might reflect on it. If this decision is in accordance with my sentiments good and well. Should it be out of my power to carry out the conditions of the decision, I will explain the circumstances to the Government. If the coming of the Sahib, in addition to Seistan matters, concerns the prosperity, consolidation, and other arrangements of the affairs and frontiers of the whole kingdom that God has given me, I should wish to be kindly informed of this beforehand.

This letter is sent after perusal by His Highness the Ameer.

Enclosure 3 in No. 2.

Translation of a Letter from the Agent at Cabul, dated 31st March 1873, to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

After receipt of your letter of the 23rd March, there was consultation among the officers of the Durbar for three days as to whether the deputation of an English officer was merely to explain the decision of the Seistan boundary question, or whether he would be entrusted with the communication of some important information concerning the frontiers of Afghanistan. There was lengthened discussion on this point. Some said it had been mentioned in the murrasillas of his Excellency the Viceroy to the Ameer, that on the conclusion of the Seistan decision a Sahib should be sent to Cabul with a view to the advantages of the State. And though nothing was yet known of what the advantage referred to was to consist in, many of the
Durbarees indulged in extravagant hopes, in the belief that the Sahib would be sent not alone to explain the decision of the Seistan boundary, but because of the near approach of the Russians, and the obvious tendency of their policy, which is to extend their power in Asia; he may be sent to arrange for the strengthening of Afghanistan, and the determination of its limits, as the boundaries of Afghanistan may be termed the frontiers of Hindoostan, and there is no possibility of establishing the frontiers of Afghanistan firmly without the intervention of the English Government; and that strength cannot be established without assistance in the munitions of war and large sums of money before any emergency actually arises. If the coming of the Sahib is only with reference to the Seistan question, and not for the lasting advantage of Afghanistan, it will be a great injury to the Afghan Government, as there exists in some quarters a great respect and consideration for the Afghan Government derived from its association with that of England, which will disappear if the support of England is withheld, especially the neighbouring countries will note any falling off in interest taken by England in the welfare of Afghanistan. The facts of the case as regards Seistan are these: that at this time had it not been for the constant restraint of the servants of this Government, in accordance with the wishes of the English Government, there would not have been the slightest difficulty in taking advantage of the disturbances in Seistan and the disposition of its people to occupy the whole as the Persians did. In fact, if the people in that direction were allowed to act, and the Turkomans stirred into action, it would be easy to take not Seistan alone but Meshed also; and, as Meshed could so easily be brought under the power of Afghanistan, it would not be difficult to put Afghanistan in a position of superiority to Persia. But what can be done when, because of their desire to preserve the goodwill of England, the officers of Afghanistan have made no move? If the Government of England has upheld General Goldsmid's decision of the Seistan boundary, it will be a cause of great injury both apparent and real; as, in the first place, Ibrahim Khan and Mahomed Shureef Khan, and others, who have lands both in Seistan Proper and Outer Seistan, will be disheartened, and the lot of those who are at the same time subjects of both the Persian and the Afghan Governments will be a hard one, and as it will be unavoidably necessary for both Powers to keep a certain number of troops on their respective borders, it will be difficult to avoid small misunderstandings and collisions which will one day lead to serious disturbances. It will be impossible to demarcate the line drawn by General Goldsmid through the uninhabited country without great expense.

Again, when increasing the numbers of the Afghan army, we hoped that the English Government would help us with arms and money, and give us a hint, either secretly or openly, to advance our frontiers in the Seistan direction. Had we not expected this, our original forces were sufficient for our country as it existed. If we should now reduce this newly-raised army, all those evils which are to be dreaded at some distant day would come on us at once in consequence of our weakness. One reflection arising from the Seistan decision is that, as the British Government, though considering Seistan to belong of right to Afghanistan, has divided that country between Persia and Afghanistan in order to avoid dispute, it may be that one day the Government of Bokhara, acting under Russian instigation, may lay claim to a portion of Balkh on the ground that it is part of Turkistan, and the English Government may, in order to prevent an open rupture, agree to the cession of Maimena or Budukshan or any other Province, and in this way Afghanistan may become dismembered. It is to be remembered that whenever the Russians, either in the current year or the next, take possession of Merv, only 12 marches will separate them from Herat, and there are no mountain ranges or other obstacles on the road. Undoubtedly, as soon as they have established themselves in Merv, the Russians will begin to enter into negotiations of friendship, trade, and political relations with the Cabul Government either openly or secretly, and we shall be placed in a most difficult position on account of our alliance with England in dealing with the questions brought forward by Russia, so that extreme emergencies will arise with which we shall be unable to cope. From all that appears in the English papers about the preparations for the advance of a Russian army, and all that the merchants tell us of the intention of Russia to open up Western Asia, it is clear the day will come when the Ruler of Afghanistan will either have to agree to all that Russia proposes, or to abandon his country, as neither are the Afghans able to contend with and check the Russians, nor is there any hope of an English army being sent into Afghanistan to protect it. Nor has the English Government as yet fixed on any place or provision in Hindoostan or Europe to which the nobles of Afghanistan may retire if driven from their own country. Taking all these matters into consideration, it would seem to be advisable that an Agent should be sent to ascertain first of all the views of the English Government
on the Seistan boundary, and all other questions affecting the interests of Afghanistan. Some of the councillors advised that before sending an envoy to Hindoostan, a written explanation of the Seistan decision should be solicited. If the decision is one that is acceptable to the Cabul Government, and no injury to Afghanistan is to be dreaded from it, and if the British Officer be empowered to make communications indicative of the care of the British Government for the firm establishment of all the boundaries of Afghanistan, and such intention of the British Government be communicated to us by letter, it will be advisable to make arrangements for the reception of the officer deputed to Cabul, and if the result of the interview with him be not satisfactory on all points, it will then be necessary to send an envoy to Hindoostan. If the English officer is to be sent simply to explain the Seistan boundary decision that could be done by written communication, and there is no necessity for a Sahib to undertake the trouble of the journey on this account; indeed, that would be a distinct loss to the Afghan Government. There are only two results to be expected; either the decision will be pleasing to the Cabul Government, or it will be displeasing; if it is displeasing to the Cabul Government, and that Government, seeing injury to its own interests in the proposed arrangements, should have any objection to urge, the British Government would certainly be annoyed, and it would become generally known that there was a feeling of dissatisfaction between the two Governments, and if the decision is accepted the ancient rights of Afghanistan must be abandoned. If the decision be communicated by letter, an answer can be sent by letter after mature consideration such as shall best conform to the interests of both countries.

In fine, after lengthened arguments between the Ameer and all his advisers, it was resolved to draw out a draft of an answer to your letter to me, and to give it to me with the request that I would write two letters to the Agent at Cabul, one specifying, for the information of His Highness the Amir, the two subjects which it is the wish of his Government should be fully explained to His Highness at the proposed meeting, and the other desiring him to ascertain the wishes of the Amir on the subject of his Excellency the Viceroy's offer of Enfield Rifles for the use of his troops. The Agent writes on the 10th instant that he has communicated the purport of these letters to the Amir, and that His Highness expressed his intention of deliberating on both matters before making any answer. I have, therefore, the honour to communicate this report of the Agent for your information as explaining the delay in the receipt of an answer.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) D. C. MACNABB,
Commissioner and Superintendent.

Enclosure 5 in No. 2.

Translation of Letter, dated 14th April 1873, from the Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

After mastering the contents of your letter to me, dated 4th instant, which was received by me on the 9th inst., and after consulting with his Durbar officials, the Ameer remarked as follows:-

"As the interests of this Government, which God has given me, and those of the British Government, are virtually in all conditions identical, the meeting of a British
Officer deputed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India with me will afford me much gratification. As regards the Seistan question, full information about the confirmation of the award of Major-General Sir F. Goldsmid has reached me, and I have gleaned information about the ancient boundary of Northern Afghanistan from the murrassillas of his Excellency the Viceroy, dated 24th June 1870, 1st May 1872, and 9th September 1872, and the murrassilla of Von Kaufmann, Russian Governor-General at Tashkend. As for the recently defined boundary of Northern Afghanistan, whatever views the British Government may have entertained about it, great anxiety weighs on me day and night, and I am not in any moment relieved from it, that the juxtaposition of boundaries with Russia will involve difficulty in making provision for the security of the borders in the interests of both Governments. Under these circumstances, I consider it advisable that one of my agents should first wait on his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to ascertain the real views of the British Government in both of these two matters, and other major or minor border affairs, satisfactorily, and to represent my views about the interests of both Governments carefully and in detail, in order that, on receipt of full information about the views of the British Government, these matters may be satisfactorily settled after deep consideration and the most careful deliberation on their probable consequences. However, if the British Government prefer to depute an English Officer to me, notwithstanding their cognizance of my views on the considerations above mentioned, and my anxious precautionary reflections, or consider it desirable to do so after granting a meeting to my Agent, bearing the representations he will make on my part, and acquainting him with the views of the British Government, I have no objections to either course. Information should be kindly sent to me as to which of these views has been approved of by the British Government in order that I may make arrangements accordingly."

This letter has been submitted after perusal by the Ameer.

Enclosure 6 in No. 2.

Translation of Letter, dated 14th April 1873, from the Agent at Cabul to Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

In reply to your letter to me of 4th instant, which reached me on the 9th idem, on the subject of the proposed deputation of a British Officer to Cabul, I beg to submit the observations made by the Ameer in the Persian language under a separate letter after perusal by His Highness. After the receipt of your letter under reply, the Ameer held a private Council for some days with his Durbar officials. Some said that the decision in the Seistan question is the same which is contained in the award of Major-General Goldsmid there is no necessity of illustrating it further. They, moreover, said that regard should be paid to the fact that if an English Officer deputed by the British Government presses it on them to accept this decision, and they refuse to do so in the interests of the Government, such direct refusal at a personal interview will undoubtedly weaken the friendly relations existing between the two Governments. Further, that if the said British Officer makes any communications in the form of advice or instructions regarding the internal affairs of Afghanistan about Sirdar Mahomed Yakoob Khan and other Sirdars or Chiefs, it will clearly be most injurious to their interests. In addition to these representations they stated that if the deputation of an English Officer is intended for the discussion of some important matter of decision of boundaries, the settlement of such a question is hardly possible without the conference of the Ameer with his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. His Highness remarked that, though in reality the settlement of border affairs is impossible without such conference, he will see about it when a wish for it is intimated to him by the British Government; that at present it is advisable that Syud Noor Mahomed Shah should be deputed as an Agent to wait on his Excellency the Viceroy to make and hear communications about boundary affairs, and that the British Government may send their Agent either before the departure of His Highness' Envoy or depute him in company with him on his return from India.
Enclosure 7 in No. 2.

No. 82 C., dated Peshawur, 19th April 1873.

From Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In forwarding the translations of the Agent's letters, dated 14th instant, I have the honour to observe that my letter, instructing him to inform His Highness the Ameer, on a suitable opportunity, that the subject of his relations with Sirdar Yakoob Khan would not be broached at the proposed meeting, must have crossed these letters.

In three days more we may hope to learn whether His Highness' views as to the expediency of the meeting underwent any modification after the receipt of that communication.

Enclosure 8 in No. 2.

No. 763 P., dated Simla, 25th April 1873.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Commissioner and Superintendent of Peshawur Division.

I am directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to acknowledge receipt of your letters, Nos. 81C and 82C, dated 19th instant, intimating the wish of His Highness the Ameer to depute one of his Agents to wait on the Viceroy before making arrangements for the conference suggested in my letters to the Punjab Government, No. 534 P., dated 21st March and No. 562 P., dated 22nd March 1873.

In proposing that you should visit the Ameer, His Excellency in Council was actuated by the desire of communicating to His Highness the Ameer the earliest possible authentic information regarding the Seistan boundary settlement, and the progress and conclusions of the communications which have taken place between the British Government and the Government of Russia, on the subject of the extent of His Highness' dominions.

As His Highness the Ameer, however, intimates that full information about the confirmation of General Sir F. Goldsmid's award has reached him, and that he has gathered information on the other subject from various documents, His Excellency in Council is quite prepared to meet the Ameer's wishes in the matter, and postpone further official communication to His Highness on the above subjects until the Agent whom His Highness may depute has had an opportunity of seeing the Viceroy.

I am to request that on the arrival of His Highness' Agent at Peshawur you will report the fact by telegraph, and, with the permission of his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, make all necessary arrangements for his journey to Simla with comfort, and for his honourable reception and treatment on the way.

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No. 3.

Dated Simla, 13th October 1876.

From Captain Grey to Syud Noor Mahomed Shah.

(After compliments.)

Be it known to you that the present Viceroy is as well disposed towards the Ameer as was Lord Mayo; but I am surprised to ascertain from Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan that the Ameer's own sentiments are considerably changed since Lord Mayo's day.

As you have frequently expressed friendship towards me, and must be well aware of my good-will, I have no hesitation in writing freely on this subject. I know that you consider you have ground for annoyance at what passed in 1873, and all I can say is let bygones be bygones.

At the present conjuncture there can be no doubt that a nobleman of your high feelings and sagacity, who has, all his life, had nothing but his master's interests at heart, will put aside all considerations, save those of the advantage of his country.

J. 359.
What these are will be explained by Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, and I firmly rely upon your wisdom and foresight to approve them, and to lead the Ameer to do so.

You will see that the Viceroy has accepted all the propositions which you made in 1873, imposing only the condition that he should be enabled to watch a frontier for which he renders himself responsible, and that the Ameer, his friend and ally, should receive his Envoy.

It would, indeed, be a strange friendship which shut the door in the face of the messengers of one's friend.

You know that at Umballa you said that, when affairs in Afghanistan had somewhat settled down, there would be no objection to the residence of British officers anywhere save at Cabul. Now the Viceroy does not the least want to place an Envoy at Cabul. He only requires to have officers at Herat and other points on the frontier.

Again, in 1873, at Simla, you gave your opinion that British officers should come and go to define the Afghan frontier; and that, when the people were thus accustomed to their presence, the Ameer would not object to their permanent residence on that frontier.

At that time the Viceroy objected to assuming the responsibility for the Afghan frontier, so the other arrangement also fell through. Now the Viceroy does assume that responsibility; the other condition ought, therefore, also to be accepted, the reasons being that the Viceroy's arrangements turn upon this condition, and the Treaty itself depends upon it.

In conclusion, your friend has to say: If there was vacillation before, it was on this account that, in the absence of a Treaty between the two States, Ministers at home, and Viceroy's in this country, exercised an unfettered discretion; but where a Treaty has been entered into, every one will be bound by its conditions.

P.S.—I very strongly hope that the Ameer will accept the invitation to Delhi. That Assemblage will not be one only of Feudatory Chiefs; but, on the contrary, the Viceroy's of the French and Portuguese Powers, and the Rulers of Burma and Nepal, are invited. The Ameer's presence will show his good-will toward the Empress of India, whose assumption of that title will there be proclaimed, and the whole will learn therefrom how close is the bond of union between the two States.

No. 4.

Dated Simla, 13th October 1876.

FROM SIR LEWIS PELLY to SYUD NOOR MAHOMED SHAH.

Your friendly message, sent by our friend Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, has reached me, and I am happy in hearing of your health and prosperity. It is agreeable also to me to know that you do not forget the pleasant days we passed together at Candahar, when you so kindly troubled yourself to render my visit all that could be desired.

It seems likely, and I sincerely hope, that we may soon meet again; and I feel I need not assure you that in any duties which I may have to discharge in association with you, it will be my sole wish to aid you in placing the relations of the Afghan and British Governments on such a footing as shall leave no room for questioning the real and intimate friendship, and the permanent unity and policy, of our Governments.

I earnestly trust, too, that the present frank and cordial expression of his views by His Excellency the Viceroy may be met in a similar manner by His Highness the Ameer, and may result in consolidating His Highness' rule, in strengthening his dominions, and in securing the stability of His Highness' dynasty. If civil war in Afghanistan henceforth be averted by good arrangements, and the Ameer's son, Abdullah Jan, and after him, his heir, should succeed peacefully to the musnud, Afghanistan would be greatly benefited.

A word is enough between friends. Pray write to me freely, addressing your letters to the care of the Commissioner of Peshawur.
No. 5.

Dated Peshawar, 27th February 1877. (Extract.)

From Sir Lewis Pelly, K.C.S.I., to the Viceroy.

I have addressed the Envoy as desired in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th instant, and now beg to enclose a copy of my draft.* The Envoy has at once sent a verbal reply through Atta Mahomed Khan, to the effect that he will lose no time in causing the jehad to be put a stop to, and will send me a satisfactory written reply so soon as he is able to work.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Draft of the Letter to the Afghan Envoy.

After Compliments—

I have, on a previous occasion, addressed your Excellency, either personally or through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, in a friendly and unofficial way, concerning the reports which reached me from many quarters of the Ameer's misrepresentations of our acts and proposals, and of His Highness' endeavours to excite a pretended jehad against the British Government in India at the very time when you, his Envoy Plenipotentiary, are here,—a public guest on British soil,—for the declared purpose of friendly negotiations. Since the last occasion on which I communicated with your Excellency on this subject, the reports have become more numerous, and have been confirmed from many independent sources, and are all consistent in showing the persistent and public manner in which the Ameer is appealing to his subjects to join in a jehad openly aimed at the British Government. Now the Ameer is free to accept, or to reject, the most friendly proposals on the part of His Excellency the Viceroy, which I had hoped to have the honour of discussing with your Excellency in the intended negotiations. But I must protest against misrepresentations wilfully and publicly made, and against the Ameer preaching a jehad at Cabul, whilst His Highness' Envoy Plenipotentiary is professing to negotiate on friendly terms at Peshawar. And I am instructed to request from your Excellency the favour of explicit explanations—

First, as to the Ameer's public accusations against the British Government founded on statements which both the Ameer and the Envoy must know to be without foundation.

Second, as to the Ameer's repeated appeals to his subjects openly aimed at the British Government.

Third, of the Ameer's reported conferences with the Russian Agents, and of his correspondence with the Russian authorities, regarding his military arrangements.

Finally, the Viceroy has reason to believe that the bearing of the Ameer's officials is increasingly unfriendly towards the British Agency at the Court of His Highness; that intercommunications between the Agency and the people of Cabul has been publicly prohibited by the Mayor of the City of Cabul; that the British Agent is apprehensive as to his personal safety.

As to the reasons for all these demonstrations no one knows better than your Excellency that the British Government is perfectly sincere in its assurance, repeatedly given, that it has not the slightest intention of attacking the Ameer; and the Viceroy deems the present attitude of His Highness to be irreconcilable with his being in possession of full and faithful reports of that of the British Government.

The Government of India notices with surprise the libels deliberately disseminated on it, and cannot doubt that the Ameer will take the earliest opportunity of explaining these proceedings, and causing the libels to be retracted as publicly as they have been promulgated.

I am also again to request that your Excellency will make such communications to Cabul as may put a stop to wilful and injurious misrepresentations of the objects of the proposed friendly negotiations.
TRANSLATION of a Letter from His Excellency the CAHUL ENVOY TO COLONEL SIR LEWIS PELLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, dated Saturday, the 3rd March 1877.

A. C.—

The letter, dated 27th February 1877, which you sent by hand to Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, reached my residence in Peshawar Cantonment on Tuesday, the 13th of the month of Safar (begins Tuesday evening), and the tenor of your friendly writing is ascertained.

It is true that either through Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan or personally you have stated that reports have reached you from many quarters, to the effect that the Amer was exciting a jehad against the British Government. Kind friend! I at that time told Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan that during the time I was there these matters had not place, and even now I am unaware as to what sort of matter this is. Secondly, I verbally told yourself (that kind friend) that this sort of matters pass in a variety of forms from mouth to mouth of the public till at length the news-writers write all sorts of things. Further, I place no reliance upon such statements. How can one rely upon the statements of the common people (public)? For when Captain Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner, came to the frontier of his own limits on the road to Koorum, what papers and statements did not trustworthy men write, viz., that such a large army is coming to Koorum, and that the British Government has such and such designs? The most noble Ruler (the Amer) placed no reliance upon them. In what manner, then, can the authorities of the British Government place reliance upon such statements? Kind friend! I again write that I have no acknowledge of these affairs.

In case, however, there should be something of the kind, whether the Government be a great one or a small one, and such an impossible measure be desired by a great Government, then every Government takes counsel for itself of the royal family, and also of the nobles and learned men, as well as of the chiefs of tribes and camps. Therefore, in such a matter, the carrying out of which is recorded upon the responsibility of that people, it is incumbent on the King that he should consult with every tribe in this matter. With every tribe which may be consulted, it is the custom that each one, in consultation, should separately express his own opinion. And those persons, when they return to their own audience-halls, are questioned by their people; for each has his own tribe and people, and each tells them that he advised such and such. And when the matter is talked of in those counsel-chambers, it becomes altered and changed, and then these people, when they go to their own homes, again say something else which produces another alteration. Besides this, there are interested persons who, for purposes of their own, add other matters to it, and send it off to news-writers in a different character. To believe in such sort of statements is far from friendship.

Again, you have written that "it now rests with His Highness the Amer to accept or to reject the most friendly proposal of His Excellency the Vicereoy which I had hoped to have had the honour of discussing with you, his Envoy, in these negotiations." Kind friend! With much deference I beg to say that from the day I arrived in the nine conferences I have veiled nothing of the true state of the case. Whatever has been said in those nine conferences, and especially in the last conference on Monday, the 19th February, no change in that can be accorded.

That which you have written that "I feel bound* you are professedly conducting friendly negotiations at Peshawar." I repeat those very words of that kind one. From the day that I came to Peshawar with what varied arguments have I endeavoured to strengthen the customary friendship on the old footing! And in what manner did I bring it to an end in the last paragraph on Monday, the 19th February? Therefore, it is also surprising to me why you should not trust my word, but rely upon that of news-writers.

In the matter of the accusations you have written of—Kind friend! From the day that I arrived, if there be a single matter on which it can be adduced that it was based on accusation, be pleased to make it clear. It is expected that that kind one will pay attention to my conversations and not to the absurdities of news-writers.

And that which you have written in regard to the Russian Government. This a very great question (anmariyasim), and I am also not instructed in this question that I should say anything. But since I am sorry at the mention of such a matter, I will, by reason of right say, briefly from myself in a friendly manner, that from the day the most noble Ruler (Ameer) returned from Umballa to his capital of Cabul, the paper that came from the Russian Officers was opened, and the wax and seal removed in the presence of this
very Agent of the British Government who is now present here, and who was summoned nightly for the purpose. After two or three days' consultation, that very paper, in the original English, Persian, and Russian, was forwarded to Lord Mayo, and by his advice a paper was written to the Officer of the Russian Government. From that day to the present day, what paper has come from the Russian Government a copy of which is not in the record office of the British Government? And what paper from the Ameer has been sent to them which is contrary to the tenor of that first paper which was written in consultation with Lord Mayo? You advance objection to those very writings which in this particular were from the British Government.

As to the Russian Agents: Will you (please) prove when a Russian Agent came into Afghanistan? Couriers of the Russian Officer, who are Mussulmans of the Syud and Sahibzada clan (both religious classes), do come for the purpose of delivering letters. If from the accident of winter, &c., he should remain five days or so; nobody has said to a guest, "Get those out of my house." Since this matter of the Russian Government is a very great question, I cannot say more than this.

When I become honoured by returning to the most noble Ruler the Ameer, having thoroughly informed him of the views of the British Government in this particular, this point will become very well and satisfactorily cleared up. And that which you have written in respect to your own Agent, your Agent is present here with the Ameer, none of the nobles or chiefs are more respected and honoured than he has been. And what is the matter that they have kept concealed from him?

That which you have written that "the people of the city of Cabul have been publicly "prohibited by the Mayor of the city of Cabul from going to the Embassy quarters." I have no belief in this.

In the matter that "there is not the slightest intention of attacking the Ameer." My friend! From the day that this friendship has continued, especially in these present discussions at Peshawar, in which the whole discourse has been full of this, that the British Government (has declared that it) will in no manner interfere with or aggress upon the territories of the Ameer and of Afghanistan in which there should be displeasure to the Ameer or his successor, or there should be a decline in the independence of that Government. Neither has the Ameer at any time shown any reliance upon the sayings of people with interested motives in respect to the British Government. The regard has always been and will be for the friendship of the British Government.

And that which you have written, viz., "Retract these libels in the same public manner that they have been promulgated." My friend! I will never admit that anybody can have made an accusation against the British Government. But in the particular of a proclamation in respect to the matters which have come to pass between us when I have reached the Ameer's presence, and there informed him of the friendly views of the British Government so far as I have seen and known, and also of these matters of contrary dispositions as to what is the reality of them and what their nature; having there weighed all these matters together with minuteness, it will be promulgated in a highly satisfactory manner as may be suited to the case, so that those proclamations shall openly reach the British Government.

Written on Saturday, 3rd March 1877.

No. 7.
No. 86 of 1878.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.
To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of further telegraphic reports and orders in connexion with the Mission to Kabul.

2. Your Lordship will perceive that Nawab Gholam Hussain Khan, who was sent in advance of the Mission, left Peshawar on the 30th August, that he has been well received at all the stages on the road, and that on the 4th September he reached Jelalabad, where he was visited and entertained by the Governor. On the 8th September a letter was despatched to the Mustaf informed him that the Mission would leave Peshawar on or about the 16th September. The substance of the letter was also made known to the Afghan authorities at Ali Masjid, Dhakka, and Jelalabad; and
an answer was received from Faiz Muhammad Khan, who commands at Ali Masjid, to the effect that without permission from Kabul he cannot permit the Mission to pass unopposed. It will be observed that subsequently, on the 13th September, he received secret orders by express from Kabul.

We have, &c.
(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 23rd August 1878. (Extract.)
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.
The Mir Akhor has been suddenly summoned to Kabul from Jelalabad, probably in connection with Khaibar negotiations. Order reached Jelalabad 18th.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.
Telegram No. 1,790 P., dated 26th August 1878.
To Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.
Mustaufi should be told that Mission leaves Peshawar on 16th, and Gholam Hussein might, on arrival at Kabul, intimate quietly that departure of Mission on fixed date is certain, and that attempts to prevent or delay journey will indicate distinctly unfriendly resolutions on the part of Kabul Government.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 26th August 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.
Message received. Does your Lordship desire the intimation to Mustaufi to be sent at once, or when Gholam Hussein leaves?

Enclosure 4 in No. 7.
Telegram No. 1805 P., dated 27th August 1878.
To Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.
Your telegram 26th. Intimation should be sent at once to Mustaufi, but delay until 30th morning the departure from Peshawar of Gholam Hussein.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 27th August 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.
Your letter of 23rd, and packet, just received. In accordance with the Viceroy's telegram of to-day, Gholam Hussein Khan will leave on the morning of the 30th instant.
Enclosure 6 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 29th August 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Native Envoy leaves this to-morrow morning, halts for the night in the Khaibar, and proceeds to Dhakka on morning of 31st. I will leave this on 1st, and will reach Simla on morning of 4th. My object in remaining here to-morrow and next day is to note the results of Khaibar arrangements.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 30th August 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Native Envoy left this morning. I am hourly expecting news from Ali Masjid as to his progress.

Enclosure 8 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 31st August 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Native Envoy reached Ali Masjid yesterday afternoon, was hospitably entertained by Faiz Muhammad Khan, Ghilzai; Shinwari Maliks preparing to entertain him at Lwargui. It is expected he will reach Dhakka this afternoon. I leave to-morrow morning; will reach Simla early on 4th. Latest advice from Kabul, dated 21st, state that, on 20th, Amir, after much persuasion from Mustaufi, attended durbar for a short period.

Enclosure 9 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 31st August 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Iahii Bakhsh, Peshawar merchant, has received letter from Kabul, dated 25th: states that Abramoff, accompanied by Mirza Muhammad Hasan, Amir's Mir Munshi, has left for Russian Turkistan, but has left his two subordinate officers at Kabul; and it is given out he will return after consultation with the Governor-General of Turkistan. General opinion in Kabul is that the Amir will receive British Mission.

Enclosure 10 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 31st August 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

From the open way Faiz Muhammad Khan has acted, he himself having accompanied Envoy from Ali Masjid en route to Dhakka, it may be inferred that secret instructions have been issued to Amir's officials, and that Envoy will not be detained at Dhakka. A reply to my communications of 23rd ought, in the course of a day or two, to be received from Mustaufi. Commissioner will receive and communicate contents.

Enclosure 11 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 1st September 1878.
From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Letter just received by Bakhtiar Khan in reply to his private communication to Mustaufi. Writer states that all arrangements for Gholam Hasan's journey will be made.

B 4
Enclosure 12 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 3rd September 1878.
From Commissioner, Peshawar.

Gholam Hussein reached Dhakka 1st September; was leaving midnight towards Jelalabad. Hospitably entertained by General Gholam Haidar, who gives him escort.

Enclosure 13 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 5th September 1878.
From Commissioner, Peshawar.

General Gholam Haidar Khan has sent back our postal runners from Dhakka. I propose sending any communications for our Vakil to said General, to go to Kabul as before with Amir’s post. Inference is, Amir sanctions our Vakil’s visit to Kabul.

Enclosure 14 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 6th September 1878.
From Commissioner, Peshawar.

Mustaufi writes to Deputy Commissioner, dated 2nd September:—Your letters received, but we cannot act or communicate with Amir. It is necessary for Nawab to remain at Peshawar. Mustaufi writes to Bakhtiar Khan, same date:—Your letters received; matter understood. I have informed Amir of coming of the Vakils. Amir remarked that he was unfit to attend to such business. I privately informed you that this matter must be deferred, perhaps after the Ramzan, Amir replied. Letter ends.

Since 27th, some change has taken place. Nawab is only allowed to make short marches, so that reply may not reach Peshawar by 16th; and Amir probably desires to receive some communication from Russia before sanctioning British Mission.

Enclosure 15 in No. 7.
Telegram dated 6th September 1878.
From Commissioner, Peshawar.

Letters received by Bakhtiar Khan from Faiz Muhammad Khan from Khaibar Pass, that he is to send no more letters through him, but through the post office, and advising him that the passing of the Vakil or Envoy is to depend on the permission Amir. This letter was written in Kabul for Faiz Muhammad.

Enclosure 16 in No. 7.
Telegram No. 1907 P., dated 7th September 1878.
To Commissioner, Peshawar.

Yours of yesterday. Inform Mustaufi, both directly and indirectly, that Mission will leave Peshawar about 16th, whether Nawab has reached Kabul or not; that the object of the Mission is friendly, but that a refusal of free passage and safe conduct to Kabul will be considered as an act of open hostility. Letter should also be written to Nawab Gholam Hussein directing him to push on to Kabul as fast as he can, and show firmness in resisting endeavours to delay him.

Enclosure 17 in No. 7.
Telegram No. 1910 P., dated 7th September 1878.
To Commissioner, Peshawar.

In continuation of this day’s telegram, tell Mustaufi that it has been arranged that Mission shall not arrive until after Ramzan.
Enclosure 18 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 8th September 1878.
From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Two telegrams (dated 7th) received. Letter will be despatched to Mustaufi through Amir's post this day. I suggest sending similar information to Ali Masjid, Dhakka, Jelalabad. Officer commanding must communicate with Kabul for instructions and regarding supply. Mustaufi's letter may be delayed. Early orders solicited.

Enclosure 19 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 8th September 1878.
From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Orders also sent to Nawab Gholam Haidar (?), in accordance with the telegraphic instructions.

Enclosure 20 in No. 7.
Telegram No. 1920P., dated 9th September 1878.
To COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Your telegram 8th. The substance of your letter to Mustaufi may be communicated to Ali Masjid, Dhakka, Jelalabad, for information of what has been written to Kabul, not as a separate notice addressed direct to local officials.

Enclosure 21 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 8th September 1878.
From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Letter received from Nawab. Has had fever from the heat. On leaving Dhakka was met by Kotwal of Jelalabad. Reached Jelalabad 4th; received by son Mir Akhor; was visited and entertained by Mir Akhor. Leaves 5th for Kabul.

Enclosure 22 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 10th September 1878.
From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Your Excellency's orders carried out. Information sent to Ali Masjid, Dhakka, and Jelalabad.

Enclosure 23 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 11th September 1878.
From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Reply received by Bakhtiar Khan from Ali Masjid to my letter of yesterday that without permission from Kabul he (Faiz Muhammad Khan) will not allow the Mission to pass unopposed. Letter civil but firm.

Enclosure 24 in No. 7.
Telegram, dated 13th September 1878.
From COMMISSIONER, Peshawar.

Mufti Shah Muhammad, Manager of Frontier Affairs, visited Ali Masjid and communicated secret instructions to Faiz Muhammad, and returned express to Kabul yesterday.
No. 8.
No. 117 of 1878.
Government of India.—Foreign Department.
Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

MY LORD,

We have the honour to forward the full text of the Amir's letters, as carefully translated at Simla.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.
F. P. HAINES.
A. J. ARBUTHNOT.
A. CLARKE.
W. STOKES.
A. R. THOMPSON.
R. STRACHEY.
S. J. BROWNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 8.

Translation of Letter from Amir Sher Ali Khan, of Kabul, to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 8th Shawal (6th October).

After the usual complimentary beginning.—Be it known to your Excellency (Janâb) that your Excellency’s friendly letter, which was sent by the hands of the highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, and which contained the news of the deputation of a friendly Mission, namely, a Mission from the British Government, has been perused by me; and on perusal I have fully informed myself of its contents. But the above-named Nawab had not yet been honoured with an interview, and your Excellency’s friendly letter had not yet been seen by me, when a letter addressed by Major Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, to Mirza Habibulla Khan, an official of this God-granted Government, having arrived here, was perused by this supplicant before the throne of God. And great surprise and astonishment was caused by the writing of the officer above mentioned—that is, the Commissioner. What can be the result, meaning, and advantage of such a vehement* communication to an ally and friend, and of advancing by force a friendly Mission in this manner.

Subsequently three more letters from the same officer, in the same tone and style, to the address of the officials of this God-granted Government, were seen. Moreover, in the course of a few days, several other letters, which were received from that direction, were seen. These were not free from harsh and rough words and expressions, which are inconsistent with the forms of courtesy and civility, and contrary to the mode of friendship and sympathy.

In consequence of the attack of grief and affliction which has befallen me by the decree of God, great distraction has seized the mind of this supplicant at God's threshold. The trusted officers of the British Government, therefore, ought to have observed patience, and to have stayed, at such a time; and this would have been the most commendable and appropriate course. Your Excellency should be pleased to have regard to (mulahaza farmâyand) this harsh (style of) address and provocation, as well as to the altercation with such anger with my officials. How inconsistent is this with the sublime way of friendship and alliance! In any case the officials of this God-granted Government, notwithstanding the threatening communications of the officials of the British Government, which communications are still in the possession of the officers of this Government, will not evince any hostility or opposition to the British Government. Moreover, they do not entertain any hostile or antagonistic feelings toward any Government whatever. But should any Government entertain without cause any hostile and inimical feelings towards this God-granted Government, I commit all my affairs to the merciful God, upon whose will and intention all matters depend. He alone suffices for us, and He is the best to be trusted.†

* Literally, "blustering," or "full of noise."
† Literally, "the best Waked."
The highly-honoured Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan, who is the bearer of this friendly letter, has, in accordance with the instructions received from the officers of the British Government, asked leave to return, and the requisite permission has been granted.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 8.

Translation of Letter from Amir Sher Ali Khan to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, dated 8th Shawal (6th October).

A.C.—Be it known to your Excellency that your Excellency’s most friendly letter, expressing deep sorrow and regret at the death of my beloved son, Sirdar Abdulla Khan, the Heir-Apparent to the God-granted Government of Afghanistan, which your Excellency sent by the hands of Nawab Ghulam Hussein, has been perused by me. The sorrow and regret which your Excellency, in conformity with the forms of friendship and amity, has expressed regarding this mournful event, which has taken place by decree of God, is indeed according to the rules of friendship and concord, and to the behaviour of friends to friends in affliction. But as no one can resist or escape the Divine decree, it is fitting and appropriate under all circumstances to submit and resign one’s-self to the will of God. What more of friendliness can be written?

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No. 9.

No. 119 of 1878.

Government of India.—Foreign Department.

Secret.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Simla, 7th November 1878.

We have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty’s Government, a copy of telegraphic correspondence relating to the negotiations with the tribes of the Khaibar Pass.

We have, &c.

(Signed) LYTTON.

F. P. HAINES.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.

A. CLARKE.

W. STOKES.

A. R. THOMPSON.

R. STRACHEY.

N. B. CHAMBERLAIN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

Telegram, dated 31st October 1874.

From Major Cavagnari, Jamrud (through Peshawar).

Reconnoitred to-day the Kajuram plain, the winter settlements of the Tirah Afridis. Have received a deputation from the principal headmen of the Kambar Khel Afridis, who offer to send in their Jirga. I am now in communication with all the principal Afridi tribes who are connected with the Khaibar. The Shinwaris appear most desirous for a settlement with us, and will supply mules. Six men died yesterday at Ali Masjid.

A man from Turkistan reports arrest by Russians of Takhtamush Beg, son of Abdul Ghafir Beg, in the Oratippa district, and that Russians are advancing on Kashgar.

In Ghazni the Mullahs are inciting the people to a religious war.
Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

Telegram, dated 1st November 1878. (Extract.)

From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

All sections of Khaibars have separately attended, and have expressed their willingness to resume former relations for Government control of Khai bar. They have promised to furnish levies to assist, during any military operations, and will give selected hostages as guarantees of good faith.

Enclosure 3 in No. 9.

Telegram, dated 2nd November 1878.

From Major Cavagnari, Peshawar.

Ten days or a fortnight will probably elapse before all the tribes can assemble here to arrange some united course of action regarding their withdrawal from their relations with the Amir. At a week's notice, the sections that have promised active co-operation can collect their armed men.

No. 10.

Proclamation issued by the Viceroy, in English, Persian, and Urdu, on the 21st November 1878.

The Viceroy of India to the Ameer Sher Ali Khan, of Kabul, to his Sirdars and subjects, and to all the people of Afghanistan. It is now 10 years since the Ameer Sher Ali Khan, after a prolonged struggle, had at last succeeded in placing himself upon the throne of Kabul; at that time his dominion still needed consolidation, and the extent of it was still undefined. In these circumstances the Ameer, who had already been assisted by the British Government with money and with arms, expressed a wish to meet the Viceroy of India; his wish was cordially complied with; he was courteously received and honourably entertained by the Viceroy at Umballa; the countenance and support he had come to seek were then assured to him; he at the same time obtained further unconditional assistance in arms and money. These tokens of the good-will of the British Government, which he gratefully acknowledged, materially aided the Ameer after his return to his own country in their securing his position and extending his authority; since then the Ameer Sher Ali Khan has received from the British Government, in confirmation of its good-will, large additional gifts of arms; the powerful influence of the British Government has secured for him formal recognition by the Emperor of Russia of a fixed boundary between the Kingdom of Kabul and the Khanates of Bokhara and Kokand; the Amir's sovereignty over Wakh and Badakshan was thereby admitted and made sure, a sovereignty which had till then been disputed by the Russian Government; his subjects have been allowed to pass freely throughout the Indian Empire, to carry on trade, and to enjoy all the protection afforded by the British Government to its own subjects; in no single instance have they been unjustly or inhospitably treated within British jurisdiction; for all these gracious acts the Ameer Sher Ali Khan has rendered no return, on the contrary he has required them with active ill-will and open discourtesy. The authority over Badakshan, acquired for him by the influence of the British Government, was used by him to forbid passage through that province to a British officer of rank returning from a mission to a neighbouring State; he has closed, against free passage to British subjects and their commerce, the roads between India and Afghanistan; he has maltreated British subjects, and permitted British traders to be plundered within his jurisdiction, giving them neither protection nor redress; he has used cruelly and put to death subjects of his own on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British Government; he has openly and assiduously endeavoured by words and deeds to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incited war against the Empire of India. Having previously excluded British officers from every part of his dominions, and refused to receive a British mission; having left unanswered friendly communication addressed to him by the Viceroy, and repelled all efforts towards amicable intercourse between the British
Government and himself, he has, nevertheless, received formally and entertained publicly at Kabul an embassy from Russia; this he has done at a time when such an act derived special significance from the character of contemporaneous events in Europe, and the attitude of England and Russia in relation thereto. Furthermore, he has done it well knowing that the Russian Government stands pledged by engagements with England to regard his territories as completely beyond the sphere of Russian influence. Finally, while this Russian embassy is still at his capital, the Ameer has forcibly repulsed at his outpost an English envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had formal and timely announcement by a letter from the Viceroy, attesting the importance and urgency of the envoy's Mission. Even then the British Government, still anxious to avert the calamities of war, deferred hostile action, and proffered to the Ameer a last opportunity of escaping the punishment merited by his acts. Of this opportunity the Ameer has refused to avail himself. It has been the wish of the British Government to find the best security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State whose independence it seeks to confirm, and of a Prince whose throne it has helped to support. Animated by this wish, the British Government has made repeated efforts to establish with the Ameer Sher Ali Khan those close and cordial relations which are necessary to the interests of the two neighbouring countries, but its efforts, after being persistently repulsed, have now been met with open indignity and defiance. The Ameer Sher Ali Khan, mistaking for weakness the long forbearance of the British Government, has thus deliberately incurred its just resentment. With the Sirdars and whose independence it seeks to confirm, and of a Prince whose throne it has helped the Russian Government to find the best security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State

No. 11.

Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 30th November 1878.

Send text of letters from Commissioner referred to in Ameer's letter of 6th October.

No. 12.

From Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1st December 1878.

Your telegram 30th. Following is text of Commissioner of Peshawar's letter, 7th September, to Mustaufi. Letter begins—"After compliments, I write this friendly letter to inform you that the 16th or 17th September has been fixed for the departure of a Mission of high rank from the British Government to Kabul, and that the Mission will start whether Nawab Gholam Hossein shall or shall not by that time have had the honour of waiting on His Highness the Ameer. The object for which Mission is deputed is friendly, and the refusal of free passage to it, or interruption, or injury to its friendly progress will be regarded as act of hostility. I am to explain that the Mission will not in any case enter capital of Kabul before expiry of the month of Ramazan. In conclusion may you keep well." Letter ends. Following is text of letter from Commissioner to Gholam Hossein. Begins same as other down to word "hostility." Then continues thus—"You should, under all circumstances, use all endeavours to reach Kabul soon. Should any impediments be interposed to your journey in such case it is fit you should act firmly." Second letter ends.

Please remember that these letters are a continuation of preceding correspondence between English and Kabul officials, in which the latter said matter must be wholly deferred pending Ameer's pleasure. Letter to Gholam Hossein, opened by Ameer, was private to our own officer.
No. 13.

Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 3rd December 1878.

Yours 1st. Gives text of two letters, Ameer refers to four.
What are the other two?

No. 14.

Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, 4th December 1878:

Yours of 3rd. The four letters to which the Ameer alludes in his letter of 6th October are the Commissioner’s letter to the Mustaﬁ, and simultaneous communications containing similar notice to the Ameer’s Officers at Ali Musjid, Dakka, and Jellalabad. These latter were sent for information and not as separate notices.
PRÉCIS OF COMMUNICATIONS

BETWEEN

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA,

ON THE

AFGHAN QUESTION.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH RUSSIA.

This précis is intended to deal only with the communications addressed by the British Government to the Russian Government on the subject of the communications between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali, the movement of Russian troops in Turkestan, and the despatch of the Russian Mission to Cabul.

The papers are placed, as far as possible, in the order which shows what information was in the possession of the Government when they made communications to the Russian Government.

In the references in the margin, A signifies the Afghanistan Brown Book, F signifies the Foreign Office White Book, entitled “Central Asia No. 1 (1878).”

During the time that Lord Mayo was Viceroy he did everything he could to assure Shere Ali that he had nothing to fear from Russian aggression. The following paragraphs taken from Sir John Strachey’s Minute, giving an account of Lord Mayo’s administration after his death, show what Lord Mayo’s policy was:—

“The Amee’s reception at Umballa caused at the time considerable excitement in Russia. Exaggerated rumours of all kinds circulated in Central Asia, and were caught up by the Russian Press. Many affected to believe that some secret compact had been entered into with the Amee to stir up the Chiefs of the countries bordering on the Oxus to resist and repel the advances of Russia. Although these absurd fears were never entertained by the Russian Government, some anxiety was nevertheless exhibited on its part to obtain assurances that the Amee of Afghanistan would be restrained from molesting the King of Bokhara. An opportunity for frank and friendly explanations presented itself in the Mission of Mr. Forsyth to Russia in the first year of Lord Mayo’s Viceroyalty. The full exposition of the peaceful policy that was then made elicited from the Emperor himself a statement that the Russian Government entertained no intention of extending their dominions; that if the idea of conquest were banished from the Amee’s mind there would be peace in Central Asia; and that while the good offices of England should be exerted to dissuade the Amee from aggression, Russia would similarly use all her influence to restrain Bokhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

“The friendly interchange of assurances that both nations intend to devote all their influence to introduce peace into the troubled regions of Central Asia has been repeatedly renewed since then between the representative of Her Majesty’s Government and the Ministers of Russia, and the fruits of this good understanding have been frequently manifested. To Russian influence on Bokhara was due the prompt withdrawal of a party of Bokhara troops who had crossed the Oxus in the winter of 1869. To the restraining hand kept by Russia on the Afghan refugees in Turkestan is to be attributed the absence of any attempt on their part to shake the throne of the Amee. When
the most formidable of those refugees, Abdool Rahman,* once openly represented that it would be for the interest of Russia to assist him in conquering the throne of Cabul. General Von Kaufmann replied that hospitality had been afforded him in consideration of his destitute circumstances, and not as an enemy to England, or a pretender to the throne of Cabul. Russia, he said, wished every prosperity to Shere Ali, who had never given her any cause for dissatisfaction. General Von Kaufmann, himself, in the spring of 170, commenced a direct correspondence, which has been renewed from time to time, and has conveyed to the Ameer assurances of the neighbourly sentiments entertained by the Russian authorities towards the Afghan Government. There is every reason to hope that the permanent definition of the boundaries between Afghanistan and Bokhara, a matter in which Lord Mayo took deep interest, will before long be accomplished with the consent of all who are concerned."

Shere Ali was much troubled when he first received a communication from General Kaufmann, on the 15th of May, 1870, as appears from his letter to the Commissioner of Peshawur. Lord Mayo wrote to Shere Ali, on the 24th of June, to reassure him, saying:—

"The letter which General von Kaufmann has addressed you contains, as I have already stated, assurances on the part of the Russian Government of their resolution to adhere to this policy of peace; and these letters will, doubtless, be seen by rightly understood, a source of satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to your Highness, because they indicate that, so long as you continue the course you have so happily pursued since the visit you honoured me with at Umballa, it is most unlikely that your territories will be disturbed by Russia, or by any tribe or State which may be influenced by the officers of the Emperor."

And the Government of India explained their views to the Secretary of State as follows, on the 24th of June, 1870, as follows:—

"General Von Kaufmann's communication appears to us to be the result of the instructions which, as reported in your Secretary's Secret letter, dated 6th May, 1870, the Court of St. Petersburg had determined to send to Tashkend, viz., that General Von Kaufmann should make it known everywhere in Central Asia that a perfect understanding exists between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia with reference to the affairs and interests of those countries. In answering the Ameer's letter we have taken the opportunity to explain to him the reiterated assurances we have received from the Russian Government of their determination to pursue a peaceful policy in Central Asia. We have also informed him that the letters addressed to him by General Von Kaufmann, containing as they do a renewed expression of this policy to the Ameer himself, will doubtless be, when rightly viewed, a source of satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to His Highness that, so long as he continues the course he has so happily followed since his meeting with the Viceroy at Umballa, it is most unlikely that his territories will be disturbed by Russia, or by any tribe or State which may be influenced by the officers of the Emperor."

Shere Ali sent General Kaufmann, on the 15th of

* Nephew of Shere Ali, and the most powerful claimant to the throne in the event of his death. He is a refugee in Russian Turkestan.
July, a civil reply, in accordance with Lord Mayo's advice, which General Kaufmann answered on the 20th of December. Shere Ali sent this letter, on the 7th of March, 1871, to Lord Mayo, who wrote to him on the 9th of May:—

"It gives me much pleasure to observe that your reply gave the greatest satisfaction to the Russian Governor-General, and that it has elicited from him a renewed expression of the friendly intentions of his Government."

And advised him to send an answer

"Expressing in general terms your gratification at his friendly assurances, and the determination of his Government to cultivate harmonious relations with its neighbours."

"In December, 1871, Shere Ali received a reply from General Kaufmann, dated 28th October, in which there is the following paragraph:—

"It has also been ascertained from the Envoy that your eldest son, Mahomed Yakoob Khan, has sought a reconciliation with you. If this is actually the case, I congratulate you on the happy termination of this miserable business. My sympathies have been with you throughout the affair, since the right was on your side; for God favours not a son who rebels against his father, nor do men wish success to such a one."*

The reconciliation between Mahomed Yakoob Khan and his father, Shere Ali, had been mainly brought about by the influence of Lord Mayo with the latter, and there was nothing in General Kaufmann's remark on the subject to which we had a right to take exception. I had succeeded Lord Mayo as Viceroy, and I wrote to Shere Ali, on the 1st of May, 1872:—

"Your Highness will learn from these translations that General Kaufmann's letter contained renewed assurances as to the peaceful intentions of the Russian Government, and confirmed the assurances on this subject which the late Viceroy communicated to your Highness in his letter of the 24th June last year.

"It is a source of much gratification to me to know that the letter of your Highness to the address of General Kaufmann has elicited so friendly and satisfactory a reply."

Shere Ali sent a suitable reply, on the 19th of May, to General Kaufmann's letter of the 28th of October.

On the 19th of May, 1872, Shere Ali sent me a letter from General Kaufmann requesting him to receive his nephew, Sekunder Khan, who wished to return to Afghanistan. I had been already in communication with Shere Ali about this nephew, whom he did not wish to receive.

Shere Ali answered this letter on the 20th of July, but made no reference to Sekunder Khan.

In July, 1872, a letter was received by Shere Ali from General Kaufmann, replying to his letter of the 19th of May, in which a reference is made to the boundary between Afghanistan and Bokhara, which caused Shere Ali some anxiety; and he made

* From Cabul to Bokhara,
to the British Native Agent at his Court some remarks of the same kind as he had made to Lord Mayo in 1870. At this time the British and Russian Governments were at the point of arriving at an understanding with regard to the Northern Frontier of Afghanistan. Nothing would have been more unwise and incorrect than for me to have given Shere Ali any reason to suppose that the British Government mistrusted the good faith of the Russian Government in the matter, and I therefore replied to Shere Ali, after giving him my view as to the answer he should give to General Kaufmann:

"My friend! since the date of my lamented predecessor's letter to your address of the 24th June, 1870, I have no reason to believe that any change has taken place in the views and policy of the Russian Government. On the contrary, I confidently believe that the assurances given by the Russian Government, of which your Highness was informed in that letter, will be strictly and faithfully adhered to."

The Government of India wrote at the same time to the Secretary of State, expressing our hope that the negotiations with Russia as to the boundary of Afghanistan might soon be concluded.

In September, 1872, another letter was received from General Kaufmann, of the same character, as to which the British Agent at Cabul was informed:

"Should His Highness the Ameer allude to these letters, and manifest the apprehensions which his courtiers entertain, the Agent should be instructed to state that the Viceroy and Governor-General, in Council, sees in them no ground whatever for apprehension, but rather additional reason for believing that the Russian authorities desire to maintain none of the relations but those of amity with the Government of Afghanistan."

In forwarding copies of this correspondence to the Secretary of State, we pointed out that it had caused some anxiety to the Ameer, and the Duke of Argyll suggested to the Foreign office that copies of this and future similar correspondence should be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

In November, 1873, a copy of a letter from Shere Ali to General Kaufmann, in reply to a letter from him of August 1st, 1873 (which is not included in the papers) was sent me, and in December, 1873, Shere Ali received a letter from General Kaufmann, through the agent of the latter at Bokhara, informing him of the end of the Khivan Campaign.

In April, 1874, a letter was received by Shere Ali from the officiating Governor-General at Tashkend. In this letter there is the following passage:

"In your murrasilla of 6th Zilhij you sent information that you had nominated your son, Sirdar Abdoola Khan, as your heir-apparent; I congratulate you on this selection. Such nominations tend to the comfort and tranquillity of the kingdom. I wish perpetual possession of your kingdom by you and your heirs, and hope that after your death Sirdar Abdoola Khan will follow your example and make himself an ally and a friend of the Emperor. Your Highness is aware of
the friendly relations which hitherto existed between the British and Russian Governments, but lately these relations have been confirmed by an alliance between the Rulers of these two kingdoms. The daughter of the Emperor has been married to the second son of Her Gracious Majesty the Queen Victoria. I send this happy information to your Highness on account of the friendship existing between your Highness and the Russian Government, and hope that you will consider this relationship advantageous to our friendship with the English Government, who are favourably disposed to you. May God be your protector under all circumstances and keep you happy."

There seems to be some omission in the published papers, for a letter is given from the officiating Governor-General of Turkestan of the 18th of December, 1873, the connection of which with the former correspondence is not apparent. The Government of India did not consider the tone of this letter from General Kolpakofski to the Ameer was right, and called the attention of the Secretary of State to it. The passage is as follows:—

"Being charged with the Government of Turkestan during the absence of his Excellency, I consider it my duty to express to you my satisfaction as regards the feelings of friendship and devotion which you set forth in your letter.

"In despatching the same to the High Governor-General for his favourable consideration, I entertain the hope that he will not refuse your request, and that he will represent to His Majesty the Emperor your conscientious mode of action, and your endeavour to become worthy of the grace of my august Master.

We desired the Agent at Cabul to ascertain from Shere Ali what the reference to his request was, and to acquaint him, in case the tone of the letter should have caused him any apprehension, that "the Russian Government had given renewed assurances to Her Majesty's Government that they have no desire to interfere with His Highness's territory."

In August, 1873, Shere Ali summoned the British Native Agent at his Court, and told him that a native of Samarcand, had, as Russian Envoy, crossed the Oxus with a letter. A full account of his reception and entertainment was given by the British Agent, to whom the Ameer gave the letter for perusal as soon as he received it. It contained the announcement of General Kaufmann's return to Turkestan, after an absence of a year-and-a-half, and is as follows:—

"I (the Governor-General) remained for about one-and-a-half years at St. Petersburgh to settle some matters. Two letters were received from your Highness at that place. In one you announced the appointment of Sirdar Abdulah Khan as your heir apparent, and we were highly gratified. The friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan will increase and become firm owing to the recent alliance between England and Russia, and I hope that the countries under the protection of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and Her Majesty the Queen will enjoy peace and comfort."

The Envoy returned to Tashkend with a civil answer from the Ameer on the 20th of September.

The last letter which Shere Ali received from General Kaufmann when I was Viceroy was in reply to Shere Ali's letter of the 20th September, and in-
formed him of the result of the Khokand expedition. This letter was despatched by a "messenger of the King of Bokhara," and it was answered by the Ameer on the 3rd of February, 1876.

I have to remark generally upon these letters, that unless there had been an engagement between the British and Russian Governments that no correspondence whatever should pass between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali, there was nothing in the letters to which exception could be taken, excepting in the particular instance I have mentioned. There was no sign that Shere Ali wished to encourage those communications, on the contrary, he expressed his annoyance at them upon more than one occasion. There was no concealment of the arrival of the letters, of the manner in which they were brought, or of the answers given to them. It has been said in Lord Cranbrook's despatch to Lord Lytton, of the 18th of November, 1878 (paragraph 10, p. 282), that at first Shere Ali sent the letters to the Viceroy, and consulted him as to the reply to be given, but that he had discontinued the practice, and it is implied that this shewed a desire on the part of Shere Ali to intrigue with Russia before 1874, when the present Government came into office. It is correct that he at first sent the letters to the Viceroy, and afterwards he did the same when they were written in Russian, but having received both Lord Mayo's and my advice as to the general character of the answers to be sent to General Kaufmann, there was no need for a special reference in each case. Shere Ali's replies were always communicated to the British Agent. The persons who brought the letters were not Russians, they were natives of Samarkand or Bokhara, and they do not appear to have stayed longer at Cabul than was necessary in order to receive the reply to the letters. In short, there is not the least reason to suppose from the papers, nor had I any suspicion from any private information, that, up to the time I left India in April, 1876, there were any Russian intrigues in Cabul connected with this correspondence, or otherwise.

In May 1875, a most important communication was made by Count Schouvaloff to Lord Derby, upon the policy of England and Russia in Central Asia. This was referred to Lord Salisbury on the 26th of May, his opinions were given on the 22nd of June, and a reply conveying the opinions of Her Majesty's Government was sent to the Russian Government on the 25th of October, which was communicated to the Government of India on the 19th of November, and particularly
alluded to in our despatch to the Secretary of State of the 28th of January, 1876, para. 18. In these most serious communications with the Russian Government there is not the slightest allusion to the letters from General Kaufmann to Shere Ali as being objectionable, and if Lord Salisbury had at the time attached any importance to them he would undoubtedly have taken advantage of the opportunity to stop them. In February, 1876, the Emperor of Russia accepted the view adopted by Lord Derby of the position of England and Russia in Asia. On the 12th of May, 1876, Lord A. Loftus writes from St. Petersburg that

"The speech of the Prime Minister on Mr. Baillie Cochrane’s motion in the House of Commons has given great satisfaction here, not only in the official circles, but also generally among all classes.

"I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship an article published this morning’s Journal de St. Pétersbourg from the Moscou Gazette (the organ of the Russian press which has hitherto been the least favourably disposed towards England in regard to the affairs of Central Asia), in which, after stating that the frank and firm reply of Mr. Disraeli places the two countries in the position conformable to their dignity, their greatness, and to their mutual interests, it adds with satisfaction the statement that the good understanding between the two Governments had never been more complete than at the present moment.

"It further continues to observe that the mutual concord and confidence of the Great Powers had never been more decisive for the peace of Europe, and it terminates by stating that, in the midst of the general concord, the mutual confidence between England and Russia was an element of decisive value.

"I met General Kaufmann yesterday at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and he expressed to me the pleasure with which he had read Mr. Disraeli’s speech, and he expressed a hope that England and Russia would act cordially together in Central Asia for their mutual welfare, and for the advancement of civilization."

The passage in the Journal de St. Pétersbourg was as follows:

"Maintenant on peut considérer les contestations diplomatiques au sujet de l’Asie Centrale comme ayant définitivement pris fin, et il convient de dire à l’honneur de l’Angleterre que c’est à son libre vouloir et à sa sage modération que nous devons ce résultat. La réponse franche et ferme de M. Disraeli replace de nouveau les deux pays dans la situation mutuelle la plus conforme à leur dignité, à leur grandeur, et aux intérêts de chacun d’eux. Le Chef du Cabinet Britannique dit qu’il ne craint pas la Russie, laquelle, elle non plus, n’avait pas interprété dans le sens d’une menace les explications données au Parlement à l’occasion des débats sur le titre de la Reine. (Nos lecteurs se souviendront, dit à ce sujet la Gazette de Moscou, que nous ne nous étions pas mépris en son temps sur la portée des explications de M. Disraeli.) Le Ministre a dit ensuite que la Russie connaît la ferme intention de l’Angleterre de maintenir sa domination aux Indes et son influence en Orient, et que la Russie ne considérait pas cette politique comme étant incompatible avec une bonne entente entre les deux États; ce qui nous paraît le plus remarquable dans le discours du Ministre, ce sont les paroles suivantes :

"‘Loin de m’alarmer des progrès de la puissance Russe dans l’Asie Centrale, je ne vois pas de raison pour que la Russie ne conquière point la Tartarie quand l’Angleterre a conquis les Indes. Je désire seulement que le peuple de la Tartarie retire autant d’avantages de la conquête Russe que le peuple Hindou a retirés de la conquête Anglaise.’"

Unfortunately, however, this amicable understanding between England and Russia, which I have shewn to have been maintained until after I left India in April, 1876, and which was most advantageous for
the interests of British India, and for those of Russia in Asia, was interrupted by the rebound upon Asiatic politics of the antagonism between England and Russia upon the Turkish question in Europe.

I do not intend to enter upon any discussion of that question. It is enough to remember that the speech of the Prime Minister in November, 1876, at the Lord Mayor's dinner, contained little less than a menace to Russia, and although during the Conference at Constantinople, in the winter of 1876-77, a different position was assumed by Lord Salisbury, the former policy was resumed by the British Cabinet upon his return, and in the autumn of 1877, it was supposed, that England was on the point of interfering by arms in favour of Turkey. Lastly, in the spring of 1878, before Russia had agreed to the Berlin Conference, so critical was the state of affairs that Indian troops were sent to Malta, and England and Russia were on the verge of war.

It is essential to bear this state of affairs in mind, in order to interpret rightly the occurrences in Afghanistan towards the end of 1876.

On the 17th of July, 1876, the Government of India sent, in the ordinary manner, to the Secretary of State a report which they had received from the British Native Agent at Cabul of a letter purporting to come from General Kaufmann to Shere Ali, on the subject of the conquest of Khokand. My impression from its contents is that this letter, which is a very long one, was not written by General Kaufmann, but by some other officer, especially as General Kaufmann had already, in February, 1876, announced to Shere Ali the conquest of Khokand.

This despatch was sent without remark by Lord Salisbury to the Foreign Office, and transmitted, on the 6th of September, by Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus, also without remark.

But on the 16th of September (two months after their first letter), the Government of India telegraphed to the Secretary of State:—

"We send you a despatch by this next mail, expressing decided opinion on necessity of Her Majesty's Government remonstrating with Russia on Kaufmann's repeated correspondence with Amur by hand of Russian agents, two of whom are now in Cabul.

"Although hitherto the Government of India have not asked Her Majesty's Government to formally remonstrate on this open breach of repeated pledges, we now deem it necessary to request you to do so, as the correspondence is creating much sensation at Cabul and forms basis of intrigue which may seriously impair our relations with Amur.

"We will take the earliest favourable opportunity of co-operating with any action you may deem expedient to impress on Amur risk he runs and necessity for his stopping reception of these intriguing agents."
"If without waiting receipt of despatch you can act at once on this information, result of such action communicated to me by telegraph may favourably affect negotiation mentioned in my accompanying telegram."

It is to be observed with respect to this telegram:—

1st. That it was a new thing that Russian agents should remain in Cabul.

2nd. That no occasion had hitherto occurred to ask the British Government to remonstrate as to the letters sent from General Kaufmann to Shere Ali, excepting in the one case to which I have referred at page 7 of this précis.

3rd. That the Government of India, in Lord Mayo's time and in mine, had never considered the correspondence that had passed as "an open breach of repeated pledges," and that Her Majesty's Government, although fully kept informed, had expressed no such opinion, although they had, between May and October, 1875, been called upon to review the relations between Russia and Afghanistan.

4th. That the former correspondence was carried on without any concealment—the messengers who conveyed General Kaufmann's letters had not remained at Cabul, and the Government of India did not suppose, and had no reasonable ground for supposing, that any "risk was run by the Ameer" by receiving such letters; on the contrary, he was assured by Lord Mayo that the letters proved that Russia entertained no ideas of aggression in Afghanistan, and I had constantly given him the same assurances, founded upon the information communicated to the Government of India by Her Majesty's Government down to November 19th, 1875, that they had unreservedly accepted those assurances.

5th. That the remonstrance had reference to another telegram, of the same date (September 16), relating to "a negotiation." This telegram is not given in the Afghanistan Papers, and the reference to it shows that other reports to Her Majesty's Government were made from time to time by the Government of India besides those given in the published papers. From the Afghanistan Papers it appears that a very strong letter had been sent by Lord Lytton to Shere Ali on the 8th of July, which I believe to have been the turning point of the negotiations with him. My opinion is that this letter, and the letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Agent, of the 8th of July, which was also written by Lord Lytton, and which the Agent was directed to communicate to Shere Ali, made the latter believe that the British Government were determined to
break with him. General Kaufmann, on the other hand, in consequence of the attitude of the British Government towards Russia, may have been instructed that he need no longer adhere to the previous understanding between the two Governments as regards Afghanistan. This is confirmed by the news received by the Government of India from their Agent at Candahar, in his news letter for the week of the 9th of August, and from Lord Derby's letter to Lord A. Loftus of October 2nd, in which he says that it was reported that a Russian Agent at Cabul was instructed to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with Shere Ali. The report is not supported by any information given in the published papers.

On the 16th of September the Viceroy communicated to Shere Ali his acceptance of the suggestion made by the latter that the British Native Agent at Cabul should visit Simla to confer with the Viceroy, and this must have been the "negotiation" which was alluded to in the "accompanying telegram." The Viceroy evidently thought that some real mischief was brewing, and that a check might be put upon it by action from England upon Russia.

Lord Salisbury on the 22nd of September wrote to the Foreign Office that he concurred in the views expressed by the Viceroy, and was of opinion that "a remonstrance against General Kaufmann's proceedings should be addressed to the Russian Government without delay."

Lord Derby accordingly, on the 10th of October, communicated with Count Schouvaloff, who on the 12th received from Prince Gortchakov authority to give a categorical denial that General Kaufmann was intriguing at Cabul.

A correspondence also took place with the Russian Government on the subject. On the 2nd of October the Foreign Secretary wrote to Lord A. Loftus the following letter:—

"In my despatch to your Excellency of the 6th ultimo, I enclosed a copy of the Cabul Diaries received from the Indian Government.

"You will find at page 10 of those Diaries a letter addressed by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Cabul, which appears to have been conveyed to its destination by an Asiatic agent, who still remains at Cabul, and it is reported from other sources that his instructions are to induce Shere Ali to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with the Russian Government as well as a Commercial Treaty.

"Although the tone and insinuation of General Kaufmann's letter appear to Her Majesty's Government to be undesirable, the letter itself does not contain any statement of a distinctly objectionable character. Your Excellency will address a note to the Russian Government, reminding them of their repeated assurances that 'Afghanistan is completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence,' and you will endeavour, if possible, to obtain from the Russian Government a written disclaimer
of any intention on their part to negotiate Treaties with Shere Ali without the consent of Her Majesty's Government."

Lord A. Loftus brought the remonstrance of the British Government before the Russian Government on the 12th of October.

On the 13th, he reported that he had seen M. de Giers on the subject, who had informed him that General Kaufmann was at St. Petersburg at the time the supposed letter was written, but that he had asked him for an explanation on the subject.

In the meantime a despatch was received from the Government of India, and communicated to the Foreign Office, giving their objections in full to the frequent missions of Russian Agents to Cabul.

This despatch was communicated to Lord A. Loftus by the Foreign Secretary, with the following instructions:

"I take this opportunity of sending your Excellency a copy of a further letter from the India Office, including copies of despatches from India, in which it is shown that General Kaufmann for many years past has been in the habit of keeping up a correspondence with the Ameer, a proceeding which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, is opposed to the understanding between England and Russia, which stipulates that Russia shall not interfere in any way in the affairs of Afghanistan."

On the 15th of November, Lord A. Loftus saw Prince Gorchakov and made the representations which he was instructed to make.

"Prince Gorchakov replied that there was no Russian Agent at Cabul as far as he knew, and that General Kaufmann had merely forwarded a complimentary letter to the Ameer, as he was in the habit of doing on returning to his post.

"But," added His Highness, 'quand nous avons en main une baleine, je ne puis pas m'occuper des petits poissons.'"

On the 4th of November, Lord Salisbury communicated to the Foreign Office the text of the communications which had passed between Shere Ali and General Kaufmann, on July 6th and August 27th, 1876, which were merely formal letters of compliment.

On the 17th of November, Lord A. Loftus reported his interview with M. de Giers on the subject, in which the latter said:

"That there was no question of General Kaufmann entering into political communication with the Ameer of Afghanistan, nor was there the remotest idea of any Treaty engagements. The Agent was simply charged to deliver a letter of courtesy from General Kaufmann to the Ameer, which was an usual custom on his resuming the duties of his post, and as the Governor-General of a neighbouring State.

"This I replied that he was not the Governor of a neighbouring State, inasmuch as the Khanat of Bokhara was still to be regarded as an independent State, and that I therefore considered it necessary that General Kaufmann should receive express orders from the Imperial Government to desist in future from sending Agents to Cabul and from entertaining political communication with the Ameer of Afghanistan."

"M. de Giers then informed me that the Imperial Government had received information, both from General Kaufmann, and through
the Imperial Minister at Tehran, that the Afghan Government were making great military preparations. He stated that 10,000 men were assembled at Herat, with 1,600 cavalry, all well-equipped; that they were being constantly drilled and exercised, and that a cannon foundry was established at Herat capable of producing one cannon per day. From the information the Imperial Government had received, this armament was destined for an expedition against the Turkomans and against Merv.

"It would appear, from the report of General Kaufmann, that he was somewhat disturbed in mind by this reported expedition."

On the 1st of December, M. de Giers sent a reply to the note which Lord A. Loftus had addressed to him on the subject; in this he repeated the categorical denial of the accuracy of the statement that a Russian Agent had been despatched to Cabul, charged to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance with Shere Ali. He said that—

"The letter of General Kaufmann contained nothing beyond a message of courtesy, and did not give evidence in any way of the existence of any political negotiation whatsoever between our authorities in Turkestan and those of Cabul."

And added—

"We learn at the same time that considerable armaments are taking place at Herat, in view of an expedition against the Turkomans of Merv.

"If these facts received any confirmation, they would constitute a direct infraction of the understanding of 1872, by which Great Britain engaged to dissuade the Ameer from any aggression beyond the zone recognized as being under Afghan dominion.

"The Imperial Ministry do not doubt that the British Government will employ all its influence at Cabul to prevent encroachments of this nature."

On the 15th of December, M. de Giers sent to Lord A. Loftus a letter from General Kaufmann, in the following terms:—

"Your Excellency was good enough to transmit to me, in your letter of the 8th October last, the translation of a note of the English Ambassador at the Imperial Court relative to a supposed Agent whom I was said to have despatched to Cabul, according to information received by the British Government, in order to conclude a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, and also a Treaty of Commerce.

"I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency that, since entering on my duties as Governor-General of Turkestan, my relations with Shere Ali Khan have been limited to interchanges of civility, and that I have never sent to Cabul either Agents or even a single Djiguite.

"My letters have always been sent, once or twice a-year, through the Ameer of Bokhara, who forwarded them to Cabul, or by a Djiguite of Samarcand addressed to the Chief of Balkh, who sent them on to the Ameer of Afghanistan.

"These communications had never any other character than one of pure courtesy, as your Excellency can convince yourself from the copies kept in the Asiatic Department.

"I have the honour, therefore, to beg your Excellency to be so good as to protest formally against the assertions contained in the note of the British Ambassador, which are completely without foundation.

"I deny that the source from which this entirely erroneous information may have been derived can have any authentic character."

It appears from the despatch from the Government of India of December 8th, 1876, that on the 19th of October, 1876, there was a Russian Envoy at Cabul who
received, on a ceremonial occasion, gifts of the same kind as the British Agent; that he was still there on the 30th, and that another Russian Agent, with a letter, came to Cabul at the end of November.

Lord Salisbury on the 27th of January, 1877, reviews the answer of M. de Giers on the subject, in the following terms:

"Lord Salisbury observes from these papers that the statement that Russian agents have been sent to Cabul with the object of negotiating a Treaty with the Ameer is denied both by the Russian Government and General Kaufmann, and that it is asserted that the General's communications have been merely letters of courtesy sent through the Ameer of Bokhara.

"Lord Salisbury has received the assurance given on the first point with satisfaction, but he cannot accept as correct the general view of the correspondence taken by the Russian Government without referring to earlier communications; it is impossible to regard as a mere letter of courtesy General Kaufmann's letter of February last, which contained a detailed account of the Russian conquest of Khokand with justificatory remarks of a suggestive character; while as regards the allegation that the bearers of the different letters have not been Russian agents, but messengers employed by the Ameer of Bokhara, it is enough to observe that they have been viewed at Cabul in the former light, and treated accordingly. The fact that the character, both of the letters and of their bearers, is open to such misconstruction is, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, a sufficient reason for the issue by the Russian Government to General Kaufmann of orders to altogether discontinue his communications to the Ameer."

And, on the subject of the reports that Shere Ali contemplated an attack upon his neighbours, said:

"No information has reached this Office, nor is there any reason to believe, either that the Ameer contemplates aggression on Darwaz, or that the preparations which have been for some time past in progress at Herat are in any way directed against the Turkomans of Merv. On this subject, however, the Government of India has been asked for information."

The Foreign Secretary wrote to Lord A. Loftus accordingly, on the 7th of February, and a formal note was addressed to M. de Giers in the same terms, on the 22nd of February.

M. de Giers had previously (February 14th) told Lord A. Loftus that:

"The name given in the Cabul Diaries of the reputed Russian Agent was the same as that mentioned by General Kaufmann, but his Excellency said that he was not personally employed by General Kaufmann, nor was he personally known to him. The letter of which he was the bearer had been sent by General Kaufmann to the Ameer of Bokhara for transmission to Bakh, from thence it was forwarded to the Ameer at Cabul.

"The agent in question was the mere bearer of a letter, was neither selected by nor personally known to General Kaufmann, and consequently was in no way authorized to assume the character of a Russian Agent or Envoy at Cabul.

"M. de Giers stated that he had sent a copy of the extracts from the Cabul Diaries which I had given him to General Kaufmann, and had observed to him that the assumed character at Cabul of a Russian Envoy by this messenger was incorrect, liable to misconception, and consequently to be guarded against for the future."

The formal reply of M. de Giers, on the 5th of March, 1877, to Lord A. Loftus's note relates that the Russian Government had

"Felt ready to give, in the notes of the 10th November and the
16. December, the assurance that Russia had not endeavoured to conclude any arrangement, commercial or political, with the Ameer of Cabul, and that the true relations of our authorities in Central Asia with the latter had never borne any other character than one of pure courtesy, in conformity with local usages in the East. While now renewing these assurances, the Imperial Government hope the British Government will recognize that practically we have never swerved from them, whatever may have been the erroneous interpretations placed by the native Asiatic Governments on the communications of General Kaufmann, and whatever false importance may have been attributed to the method of transmission adopted by him. Misunderstandings on this subject were nearly inevitable, considering the uncertain character of the native populations of Central Asia, and their inveterate inclination to intrigue; the only effective way, in our opinion, of meeting this danger lies in the good faith and loyalty which, we are glad to think, will never cease to influence on either side, any interchange of views between us and the British Cabinet."

It will be observed that the Russian Government declined to admit the contention of the English Government that General Kaufmann's communications with Shere Ali were contrary to the understanding between the two Governments regarding Afghanistan, and declined to comply with the demand of the English Government that instructions should be given to General Kaufmann to discontinue those communications.

No notice appears to have been taken of this refusal on the part of the Russian Government.

On the 12th of June, 1877, Lord Salisbury sent to the Foreign Secretary a despatch from the Government of India of the 3rd of May, in which they wrote:

"There can be no doubt that the communications between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali Khan exceed the requirements of mere exchanges of courtesy; and are regarded as something much more than complimentary by the person to whom they are addressed. The messages from General Kaufmann to the Ameer have not been despatched, as stated by the General (in his letter of the 9th November, 1876, to the Russian Foreign Office), only 'once or twice a year.' During the past year they have been incessant. The bearings of them are regarded and treated by the Ameer as Agents of the Russian Government, and on one pretext or another some person recognised by the Afghan Government as a Russian Agent is now almost constantly at Cabul.

"We desire to submit to your Lordship's consideration whether our own conduct would be viewed with indifference by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, were the Government of India to open similarly friendly relations with the Khans of Khiwa and Bokhara; and if without actually making to them overtures of alliance, we addressed to those Princes frequent letters containing assurances of friendship, coupled with explanations of the policy we deem it desirable to pursue towards the States upon our own frontier."

Lord Salisbury did not suggest that any communication should be made to the Russian Government upon this representation from India.

On the 12th of September, 1877, the Russian Government complained of the passage through India to Afghanistan of an Envoy from the Sultan to Shere Ali.

M. de Giers stated to Lord A. Loftus—

"That the object of the Envoy's mission was to preach a religious crusade amongst the Russomman population of Central Asia, and, through the Ameer of Afghanistan, to induce the Ameer of Bokhara to excite the populations of Central Asia to revolt against Russia.
"The Amur of Bokhara, his Excellency observed, had proved a
faithful ally to Russia, and the Imperial Government placed full
confidence in him. But difficulties might arise in consequence of reli-
gious agitation between Bokhara and Afghanistan, which might
compromise the friendly relations between those Rulers. It was, there-
fore, of importance that reasonable advice should be given to the
Amur of Afghanistan to abstain from any action which could
endanger the peaceful relations of the two States.

"M. de Giers added that General Kaufmann had been instructed
to be guided by the arrangements entered into between Great Britain
and Russia in regard to Afghanistan, and to remain strictly within the
limits of those arrangements."

On the 17th of October, Lord Derby replied to
Lord A. Loftus:—

"With reference to your despatch of the 12th September
reporting a conversation which you had had with M. de Giers on the
subject of the recent Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, and the passage
of the Envoy through India, I have to state to your Excellency that,
at the request of the Porte, a Turkish Envoy to Afghanistan was
allowed to pass through Indian territory, but that Her Majesty's
Government have no reason to suppose that the object of his mission
was to preach a crusade in Central Asia.

"Her Majesty's Government will continue, as they have hitherto
done, to use such influence as they possess with the Amur of
Afghanistan to induce him to maintain peace with Bokhara."

On the 8th of March, 1878, Lord Salisbury sent to
Lord Derby a further despatch from the Government of
India shewing that a Russian Envoy still remained at
Cabul.

It appears from this prévis of the information
contained in the papers presented to Parliament that the
relations between England and Russia in regard to
Central Asia became strained from October, 1876. On
the one hand, the English Government found that far
more frequent communications than formerly had been
addressed by General Kaufmann to Shere Ali; they
demanded from the Russian Government that those
communications should be stopped; the Russian
Government declined to comply with that demand; and
the English Government did not press it. On the
other hand, the Russian Government requested the
English Government to advise Shere Ali not to agree
to the proposals which they supposed would be made
to him by the Sultan's Envoy to join in a Mahomedan
war against Russia, and the English Government only
replied that they would use "such influence as they
possessed" with Shere Ali to induce him to maintain
peace with Bokhara. This obviously was not the
meaning of the Russian Government, and was practically
a refusal to comply with their request, which, as in the
corresponding case, was not pressed. In fact, the
amicable understanding of 1875 between the two Govern-
ments was virtually at an end, in consequence of the
course of events in Europe, which had brought England
and Russia to the verge of war.

It is important to observe, here, that there is no
evidence in the papers published by the Government
that Shere Ali had responded to the advances which it is
pretty clear had been made to him by General Kaufmann,
at any rate until the Viceroy broke with him in March,
1877, if afterwards. In October, 1876, the British Native
Agent at Cabul was summoned to Simla. He stated
that one of the reasons advanced by Shere Ali for de-
clining to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Cabul was

"That a pretext would thereby be afforded to the Russians for
deputing a similar mission to Cabul; that the circumstance of their
having given assurances to the contrary would not stop them; that
the Russians broke treaties at pleasure, were very pushing in their
policy, and feared no one. The recent political history of Europe
showed that the English were unable to compel the Russians to adhere
to treaties, and were equally impotent to arrest Russian aggressions.
The Ameer was well aware that, sooner or later, Russia would attack
Afghanistan, and this with ulterior objects; but that His Highness
also knew that in such crisis the British would defend him in their
own interests. His Highness does not suspect us of conspiring with
Russia to his prejudice; nor does he suspect the British of coveting
any portion of his territory, which, at the utmost, could not yield
them more than a score of rupees worth of revenue, while it would
cost them tenfold that sum to hold the country." As to Russian Agents
at Cabul, the Agent admitted that one had recently arrived at Cabul,
and thence returned to Russian territory. Two Russian Agents were
still in Cabul, but were, the Agent said, men of no consequence, and
were not often honoured with interviews by the Ameer."

And that the Ameer regarded "the Agents from Russia
as sources of embarrassment."

In a private conversation with Captain Grey, the
Agent said:—

"The Ameer is also keen upon having a pied à terre in British
territory, whither to send his family and property when he clears for
action with the Russians."

We now come to the more recent events which
preceded the war with Afghanistan.

May 22, 1878, (received 27th). Lord A. Loftus
reports the formation of eight battalions of infantry
reserves for the reinforcement of the Turkestan military
district.

June 7. Viceroy telegraphs report of impending
visit of Russian Envoy to Cabul.

June 19. Viceroy reports corroboration of mobili-
ization of Russian forces in Central Asia, opening of
road towards Afghanistan, and pressure on Ameer to
receive important Russian Embassy. Reports not fully
substantiated.

June 18 (received 26th). Lord A. Loftus has heard
of no fresh military movements since May 22. Force
at Krasnovodsk reduced. Military projects in Central
Asia suspended.

June 24. Lord Cranbrook sends Lord Salisbury
the Viceroy's telegram of June 7, for information, without
remark, and on the 26th Lord Salisbury sends Lord A.
Loftus a copy of it, and instructs him to endeavour to
ascertain whether there was any truth in the report.
July 1. Victoria telegraphs report of arrival of a Russian force of 30,000 men at Karshi; that on 13th of June an agent from Russia reached Kabul, and informed Amir that the Russians intended to establish cantonments on the Oxus, which would bring them into immediate contact with Afghanistan; while numbers are evidently grossly exaggerated, the mass and concurrent testimony of reports regarding Russian movements is so great that we cannot altogether disregard them.

(This despatch does not seem to have been communicated by Lord Cranbrook to the Foreign Office).

July 3 (received 11th). Lord A. Loftus reports the interview held on 2nd with M. de Giers.

"At an interview I had yesterday with M. de Giers I inquired of his Excellency whether any Russian representative was instructed, either by the Imperial Government at St. Petersburg or by the Governor-General of Turkestan, to proceed to Kabul.

"M. de Giers replied, that no such mission had been, or was intended to be, sent to Kabul either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann.

"I observed to his Excellency that, for some time past, a Russian agent had resided at Kabul, and that intrigues had been apparently carrying on with a view to create disensions between the Amir of Afghanistan and the Indian Government. I stated that this course was not in conformity with the arrangement entered into between the Governments of England and Russia, and that if it continued it must inevitably produce results prejudicial to the good relations between the two Governments.

"M. de Giers replied, that there had been a moment when war appeared to be almost imminent, and that under those circumstances no doubt the military commanders conceived it to be their duty to take such measures as might be necessary and serviceable to their country. He denied, however, as far as he was aware, that there had been any intrigues with the Amir of Kabul of the nature to which I had alluded. He admitted that he had sent M. Iskouline, the Russian Consul at Astarabad, to Meshed to watch the movements of Captains Butler and Napier, who were reported to be inciting the Turkoman tribes to hostilities against Russia. This was the only diplomatic measure he had taken.

"I stated to M. de Giers that Captain Butler was a mere traveller on his own account, and no agent of Her Majesty's Government, and that urgent orders had been sent to him by the Commander-in-Chief in India to return forthwith to his military duties.

"M. de Giers, who appeared to be well informed both in regard to Captain Butler and Captain Napier, stated that he was aware that Captain Butler had been recalled, but that nevertheless he had refused to obey the orders he had received, and was persisting in his intention to visit the Akhal tribes. He referred even to the letter which Captain Butler had addressed to certain Turkoman chiefs, of which his Excellency had evidently received copies."

"I inquired from M. de Giers whether any expedition was intended, or was now being undertaken by General Linnamkin against the Turkomans.

"His Excellency professed ignorance as to any such intention, observing that it was frequently necessary to repel the attacks of those tribes, or to punish them for raids committed on Russian commerce.

"I finally observed to his Excellency that, at a moment when Europe was sitting in Congress for the purpose of maintaining peace, it was advisable to avoid anything which could disturb the harmony and good understanding between England and Russia (the two Asiatic Powers), in other regions where their mutual good fellowship and cooperation could render such valuable service to the cause of humanity and civilization."

July 10 (received 16th). Lord A. Loftus sends par-
ticulars as to the formation in May of Russian columns in Central Asia.

F. p. 133. July 17 (received 22nd). Lord A. Loftus sends further particulars.

F. p. 134. July 26 (received 26th). Lord Cranbrook sends to Lord Salisbury further particulars received from India.

F. p. 135. July 31 (received August 5). Mr. Plunkett (Chargé d’Affaires at St. Petersbourg) sends further particulars.

F. p. 140. July 30. Viceroy telegraphs report that

A. 227. "Kaufmann, with troops, had reached Karki,* and was personally proceeding to see Amir. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending Amir's orders; but he declined to obey them. Amir thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers. Native Doctor heard Amir tell his Minister, in Durbar, 7th July, that Kaufmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Kabul, refusing to be stopped. I refrained from telegraphing this information to you, pending confirmation. Have now heard from Peshawar reported arrival of Russian officer at Kabul with large military escort. This, of course, cannot be Kaufmann, and may be native of rank in Russian service; though all accounts as yet point to European officer. If such Mission be authenticated I will telegraph again. It will be difficult to act or instruct frontier officers without definite indication of views of Cabinet on such conduct on part of Russia and Amir, having regard to Russia's formal promises, and Amir's refusal to receive British Mission in any shape. What I shall then require to know without delay is, whether this will be treated by Her Majesty's Government as an Imperial question with Russia, or left to us to deal with as a matter between Amir and Government of India. In latter case, I shall propose, with your approval, to insist on immediate suitable reception of European British Mission. I will communicate with you further on measures which may in this contingency become necessary for securing due permanent preponderance in Afghanistan. The alternative would be continued policy of complete inaction, difficult to maintain, and very injurious to our position in India."

July 31. Viceroy telegraphs report that three Russians had reached Cabul, accompanied by Cossacks and Uzbek horsemen.

A. 227. August 1. Lord Cranbrook telegraphs to Viceroy:—

A. p. 228. "Make yourself certain of the facts before insisting on the reception of British envoy. Perhaps you might send a native to ascertain whether Russians are really there, and telegraph to me when the truth is known."

August 2. Viceroy telegraphs twice in reply. The second being the most full report:—

A. p. 228. "Further confirmation received of presence of Russian Mission at Kabul, headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarkand, who is mentioned by name.

"Referring to my telegram of 30th, we desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honour, and are staying at Kabul, within short distance of our frontier and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there.

"We have further reports of Russian officers having visited and been well received at Maimena.

It is to be remarked that this telegram is marked "extract," and that the whole of it is not given.

August 8. Lord Cranbrook, after reciting assurances

* Query Karki.
given by Russia, that she would not interfere with Afghanistan, writes Lord Salisbury:

"The Russian Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards the State during the same period has been shaped in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence, and, whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been in the interests of peace to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

"It is true that the Russian Government has denied the reality of any such step on its part as that now reported. M. de Giers had formally stated, in fact, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that no such Mission as that referred to by Lord Lytton has been, or was intended to be, sent to Cabul by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann; he has, with equal emphasis, denied the existence of intrigues between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali. But, on the face of the particulars now received from India, corroborated as they are from other sources, Viscount Cranbrook cannot pretend to accept as satisfactory these denials.

"Assuming the truth of the fact reported, it appears that contrary to all engagements with England, a Russian Mission has found its way to the Ameer of Cabul, who has received it, either willingly, or under pressure, without reference to the Indian Government. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men, moving through the Turkoman country, and on the line of the Oxus, and converging on points which may be said to directly menace the safety and integrity of Afghanistan.

"To meet this difficulty the Viceroy has proposed, as a preliminary measure, to insist on the reception by the Ameer of a suitable British Mission at Cabul, a proposal which the Secretary of State for India has deemed it expedient to sanction.

"But Lord Cranbrook cannot consider this step as adequate in itself to the occasion, and is strongly of opinion that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be at once instructed to address the Russian Cabinet upon the proceedings of the Russian authorities in Turkestan.

"It is the Russian Cabinet alone which is responsible for the acts of the Agent; and it is the Russian Government-General of Turkestan, rather than the Ameer Shere Ali, who, with or without authority, is at this moment pursuing a policy of which the effect must be to seriously agitate the minds of Her Majesty's subjects throughout India.

"In view of the gravity of the situation, the Secretary of State for India may safely leave to Lord Salisbury, who has a full knowledge of the question, the adoption of such language at St. Petersburgh as he may think best calculated to bring about a result such as the engagements of Russia entitle us to expect."

August 9. Viceroy telegraphs report from Cabul of July 30th, that Ameer had received Russian Envoy in Durhar, on 26th, and that he had presented two letters, one from the Governor-General of Tashkend, one from the Czar.

August 9. Lord Cranbrook sends the telegram to Lord Salisbury.


"The reports which reached her Majesty's Government in the spring of the year, announcing extensive military preparations in Russian Turkestan for some object not officially revealed, received practical confirmation in the General Order issued by the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan on the 14th May last. That General Order, which was stated to be based on instructions received from the Russian Minister of War, directed the formation as a preliminary
measure, of three operating columns, aggregating some 15,000 men. The principal column, consisting of about 12,000 combatants at full strength, under Major-General Trofimsky, was ordered to be formed at Samarcand, to proceed thence to Djam; and further, according to orders, the second column, organised at Marghilan, and consisting of about 1,700 men, was to proceed, under command of Major-General Abbamoff, to the Kizil-Su valley, where it was also to await further orders; the third, or Amu-Darya (Oxus) column, formed at Petro-Alexandrovsk, under Colonel Grotchenhau, and amounting to about 1,700 men, was to move up the banks of the Oxus to Chardjuy, and further according to orders. In addition to these three columns, a force of five regiments of infantry and some guns, besides 1,000 Cossacks, or some 4,000 men in all, has, according to reports received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, been organised at Chikishkh on the Caspian, for the occupation of the Akhal country, a measure which, by the latest information received in this Office, is in course of execution, with the consent and assistance of the Persian Government.

Thus, there are reported to be in movement in the trans-Caspian district, and on the Oxus, four Russian military expeditions, comprising nearly 20,000 men, converging on points which directly command Merv and the Akhal country, and menace the northern frontier of Afghanistan.

In the absence of an explanation from official Russian sources, it may be surmised that the object of the Russian Government in originally sanctioning the movements in question, was to anticipate the contingency of a war with England, and consequent danger to Russian Turkestan by seizing strategic positions on the Oxus and elsewhere. The Russian press is generally so well informed on these matters, that Lord Cranbrook would invite Lord Salisbury's particular attention to the articles referred to in the margin,* which strongly support the view above expressed.

It will be in Lord Salisbury's recollection that when, in the spring of 1875, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, called upon the Earl of Derby to ascertain more clearly than he had yet done "views of Her Majesty's Government on the Central Asian question," he was reminded of the warning which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had already given him of the great importance which the Indian Government attached to Merv, and of the danger to the relations between the two Governments that would, in Lord Derby's opinion, ensue if that place were modulated with. The private interchange of views, which at that period took place, resulted, as Lord Salisbury is aware, in the important communication, dated the 5th of April of that year, addressed by Prince Gorchakov to Count Schouvaloff, inclining a Memorandum which reviewed all the correspondence that had passed between the two Governments since 1864. That Memorandum expressed the determination of the Czar not to extend the frontier of Russian territory beyond its then existing limits, either in the direction of Bokhara, Krasnovodsk, or the Attrek, reiterated in unmistakable language a declaration on the part of the Russian Government that Afghanistan was a State outside the sphere of Russian action, and that the same time concluded by claiming full liberty of action over the countries intervening between the Russian possessions and the latter State.

"This claim so gravely qualified the formal and satisfactory assurances given in the earlier paragraphs of Prince Gorchakov's communication that the reply of the English Cabinet was framed in language which could not be mistaken in its import. Whilst frankly accepting the assurances given by the Russian Chancellor, it strongly deprecated any further advance of the Russian frontier towards Afghanistan as being likely to involve complications which might seriously compromise the integrity of Afghan territory, "to maintain which Her Majesty's Government reserved the most complete liberty of action under all future contingencies."

The exchange of views thus carried on between the two Governments in 1875, conceived and conducted in a conciliatory manner on both sides, had no practical result. In spite of the direct engagement recorded in Prince Gorchakov's Memorandum as to non-extension of Russian territory, the Russian Government increased rather than relaxed its activity in the Turkestani question, and on the Oxus. On the strength of rights secured in 1873 by Treaties with Khiva and Bokhara, the Governor-General of Turkestan placed steamers on that river, and despatched exploring parties to Hisaar, Kulab, Shorabak, and elsewhere in its neighbourhood; whilst, in direct contravention of orders

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* "Russki Mir," May 11; Moscow Gazette, July 7.
issued by His Imperial Majesty, the Russian Commander of the trans-Caspian district secured the country in the neighbourhood of the
Attrek with a considerable force. Close upon this renewed activity
followed the annexation of Khokand, as well as a marked increase of
correspondence (carried by Russian Agents) between the Russian
Governor-General of Turkestan and the Amir Shere Ali, in a tone,
the part of General Kaufmann, which drew from Her Majesty's
Government a remonstrance at St. Petersburg.

"In short, far from the Russian Government adhering to its
pledges of 1875, the past three years have been marked by a con-
siderable increase of territory, by expeditions into the Akhal country,
by secret missions of Russian Agents both in the Turkoman country
and in Western Afghanistan, and, finally, by the present military
movements.

"Lord Cranbrook is not in a position at this moment to indicate
what effective steps should, in his opinion, be taken by the Indian
Government in the altered situation created by the proceedings of the
Russian authorities in Turkestan; but requests Lord Salisbury to
keep him informed of any measures which he may adopt to obtain
explanations from the Russian Government, and the result."

August 14. (received 19th.) Mr. Plunkett reports
the following conversation with M. de Giers:

"Reverting to the explanation which he had given to Lord A.
Loftus, that, in view of the probability of a war with Great Britain,
the Russian military commanders in Asia had been justified in
preparing such measures as they deemed most likely to prejudice
Great Britain, I said that peace was now happily secured, and there-
fore I ventured to inquire what measures had been taken for arresting
the march of the Russian columns which had left Tashkend and
Krasnovodsk, and whether it was true that the Russian Envoy or
Agent was still residing at Cabul.

"After carefully weighing his words his Excellency replied that
I must understand that, in questions of military movements, he
could not be answerable for the details, with which he was
naturally not acquainted; he could only answer for the principles
which had been laid down for the policy of the Government. He
could then assure me that it was not true that any Russian Emissary
had proceeded to Cabul with any letter from the Emperor to the Amir.
Possibly there might have been a letter from General Kaufmann.
Orders had been given to arrest the march of all the columns which
had been put in movement from Tashkend, and as a matter of fact he
was under the impression, although he could not tell me so, either
officially or positively, that the troops had already resumed their
old stations.

"I then inquired whether the column which had left Krasnovodsk
under General Lianakin had also returned; but on this point I
failed to elicit any distinct reply.

"I obtained, however, an assurance from M. de Giers, which he
reported to me twice, that all the special measures which had been
taken in Central Asia, and which, M. de Giers said, Russia had as
much right to take, in view of the impending risk of war, as Great
Britain had had to bring Indian troops to Malta, had been stopped;
and he asserted positively that at the present moment no military
measures whatever were being taken which could give umbrage to
Her Majesty's Government.

"I said that I was glad to receive these assurances as regards the
military movements; could his Excellency give me equally satisfactory
assurances concerning those political steps which had been com-
mented in view of complications with Great Britain?

"M. de Giers at once replied: 'Everything has been stopped.
The political as well as the military precautions which we thought
ourselves justified in taking against you—everything has been
stopped.'

"I have full confidence that in the above assurances M. de Giers
correctly conveyed to me the substance of the orders sent from here
as far as the Cabinet knows them; but he had warned me that he
was necessarily ignorant of many military details, and experience has
already shown how elastic Imperial orders become by the time they
reach Tashkend.'"

August 14 (received 19th). Mr. Plunkett sends
further information as to Russian movements.

"These articles are at present interesting, more from a theoretical
than from a practical point of view.
August 19. Lord Salisbury writes Mr. Plunkett:—

The Russian Government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British Government towards that State has confessedly, and with the concurrence and approval of Russia, been shaped, during the same period, in an entirely opposite sense; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceable policy towards his neighbours; to respect his independence; and, whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of Her Majesty’s Government has been, in the interests of peace, to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount.

The Government of Russia have given that of Her Majesty no reason to suppose that they had departed from the line of policy thus indicated. On the contrary, when inquiries were recently made by Lord A. Loftus, as reported in his despatch of the 3rd ultimo, M. de Giers emphatically denied that any such Mission as is now spoken of had been sent, or was intended to be sent, to Cabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann.

But the circumstantial reports now received from India corroborated as they are from other sources, are of a nature which it is impossible for Her Majesty’s Government to ignore or overlook.

Assuming the truth of the facts reported, it would appear that a Russian Mission has found its way to the Ameer of Cabul, who has received it, either willingly or under pressure. This Mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men, moving through the Turkaman country, and on the line of the Oxus, and so directed that the Ameer may not unnaturally consider them as offering a menace to the safety and integrity of his dominions.

I must therefore request you to mention these reports to Prince Gorchakow, and to inquire whether there is any foundation for them. You will not conceal from His Highness that proceedings of this kind referred to would cause uneasiness in India and dissatisfaction in this country; and should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian Mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of Her Majesty’s Government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from His Highness.

August 16th (received 21st). Mr. Plunkett sends information that the Russian military movements had been stopped since the Congress of Berlin, adding:—

I beg also to submit to your Lordship a translation taken from the ‘Agence Russe,’ of an article from the ‘Golos,’ which endeavours to prove that the Russian movements in Central Asia are the reply of this Empire to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 4th June; but I would venture to remark that, as General Stolzoff, who commanded the expedition, was dispatched on his mission so long ago as the end of March, or commencement of April, the dates of the two events clearly prove the hollow nature of the argument put forth by the ‘Golos.’

August 27 (received September 2nd). Mr. Plunkett reports the receipt on the 26th of Lord Salisbury’s despatch of the 19th; that he had failed in obtaining an interview with M. de Giers, and had consequently addressed him on the 26th a note embodying Lord Salisbury’s despatch.

August 28 (received September 2nd).

September 4 (received September 10th).

Mr. Plunkett sends reports regarding the movements.
of the Russian troops, showing that the last portion of the expeditionary force was to have returned to Tashkend by the 30th of August.

September 10. Lord Cranbrook sends Lord Salisbury information from India as to the proceedings of Russian agents at Cabul in May and June, 1878. (This information does not relate to the mission of General Stolteff, but to previous transactions.)

Sept. 10 (received 16th). Mr. Plunkett reports that on the 6th he inquired "why he had not yet received any answer to the request of Her Majesty’s Government that the Russian Mission should be withdrawn from Cabul," he continued:—

"I pointed out to him that in the "Journal de St. Petersbourg" of the previous day, there was an account of the progress of the Mission towards Cabul; that after the repeated assurances given to Her Majesty’s Government, it was difficult to see what right such a Mission had to go there; and even if, as the Russian Government now tried to argue, such a step was an act of legitimate preparation in view of the then possible war with Great Britain, there could now no longer be any excuse for such a measure, after the signature of the Peace of Berlin. I added that the question raised in my note was one which deeply affected the interests of Great Britain, and that I must therefore beg him to press M. de Giers for a reply.

"M. de Melnikoff promised that he would immediately inform M. de Giers of my wishes. After objecting to my having quoted any extract from the unofficial portion of the "Journal de St. Petersbourg," M. Melnikoff stated that the Foreign Department had not been aware of the despatch of this Mission; that it had been sent by General Kaufmann, in the exercise of the discretion with which he is invested as Governor-General of Turkestan; and that the Foreign Department often did not know exactly where the Mission might be, except from what it learnt through the Ministry of War.

"To this I replied that Central Asiatic affairs being directly under the Foreign Department, except in so far as regards military details, I could not accept this explanation, for, even if General Kaufmann had taken the Mission, without permission, such a step as to send a Mission to Afghanistan, the Foreign Department were responsible for the acts of their Agents, and might long ago have directed him to recall it."

Sept. 13 (received 18th). Mr. Plunkett sends M. de Giers' reply to Lord Salisbury's note, which I quote in full.

("I remarked to him that in the "Journal de St. Petersbourg" of the previous day, there was an account of the progress of the Mission towards Cabul; that after the repeated assurances given to Her Majesty’s Government, it was difficult to see what right such a Mission had to go there; and even if, as the Russian Government now tried to argue, such a step was an act of legitimate preparation in view of the then possible war with Great Britain, there could now no longer be any excuse for such a measure, after the signature of the Peace of Berlin. I added that the question raised in my note was one which deeply affected the interests of Great Britain, and that I must therefore beg him to press M. de Giers for a reply.

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Sept. 13 (received 18th). Mr. Plunkett sends M. de Giers' reply to Lord Salisbury's note, which I quote in full.

Londres, le 27 août 1878.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

C'est qu'ajoutant ceci que je me trouve en mesure de répondre à la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 25 courant et qui m'est parvenue durant mon voyage.

Tout en reconnaissant la parfaite exactitude des citations faites dans cette pièce, je ne puis que confirmer ce qui j'ai déjà dit l'honneur de vous dire, c'est que les dispositions du Gouvernement Impérial dans la question de l'Asie Centrale, dont ces citations reproduisent les témoignages, ont dû nécessairement subir le contre-coup des conditions politiques dans lesquelles l'attitude de l'Angleterre nous a placé durant la dernière crise en Orient. Mais dans les circonstances actuelles, ces dispositions sont les mêmes que jadis, et de nature à inspirer aucune défiance au Gouvernement Anglais.

Je dois ajouter que la mission, qu'à tort vous attribuez au Général Aulamov, est d'un caractère provisoire et de pure courtoisie; elle ne peut d'ailleurs porter la moindre atteinte aux assurances pacifiques que vous mentionnez.

J'aimais espérer que les explications que M. Bartholomé a déjà été chargé de donner à Lord Salisbury à ce sujet auraient suffisamment déclaré la situation.

F. p. 159.

F. p. 162.

F. p. 184.
September 20. Lord Salisbury forwards copy to Lord Cranbrook observing:—

"Lord Salisbury infers from M. de Giers' note that his Excellency acknowledges that all the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity."

And on the same day Lord Salisbury replied to Mr. Plunkett's despatch of the 13th as follows:—

"In the note from M. de Giers of the 27th August, of which copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 13th instant, reference is made to explanations which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London had been instructed to offer in regard to the recent proceedings of the Russian authorities in Central Asia.

'The communications made by M. Bartholomai have been generally to the same effect as what has been stated by M. de Giers. He has stated that the military and political measures adopted in Turkestan were dictated by the necessities of the situation caused by the state of affairs in regard to Turkey, and were called forth especially by the attitude of Great Britain towards Russia. General Kaufmann's proceedings, he said, must therefore be regarded as the result of a course imposed upon him by the force of circumstances.

"As I had spoken to M. Bartholomai of a letter from the Emperor which was supposed to have been transmitted to Shere Ali Khan, he asked the Russian Government for information on the point, and subsequently said that he was authorised to state that there had never been any question of sending such a letter."

It will be seen (1) that M. de Giers entirely evaded the demand made upon him by the British Government that the Mission to Cabul should be withdrawn; (2) that the acknowledgment which Lord Salisbury assumes to have been given by M. de Giers that all the former assurances of the Russian Government had recovered their validity, was by no means clearly conveyed in M. de Giers' note of the 8th of September; (3) that no reply was addressed by Lord Salisbury to the Russian Government. There the matter rests, some Russian officers, according to the last telegrams, still remaining in Cabul.

December 7, 1878.

NORTHBROOK.
I shall endeavour in this memorandum to give an account of the relations between the Government of India and the Ameer of Cabul so far as they bear upon the present Afghan Question.

2. It is unnecessary to go back further than the close of the war with Afghanistan. In 1842 the British army returned to India, leaving Dost Mahomed as Ruler of Afghanistan. On the 30th of March, 1855, Sir John (now Lord) Lawrence concluded a treaty with Dost Mahomed in the following terms:—

ARTICLE 1st.

"Between the Honourable East India Company and His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Wazee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Ameer, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship."

ARTICLE 2nd.

"The Honourable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein."

ARTICLE 3rd.

"His Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, Wazee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages on his own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honourable East India Company, and never to interfere therein; and to be the friend of the friends, and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company."

This Treaty is still in force, and is the only treaty engagement we have with Afghanistan.

3. In January, 1857, in consequence of the war between Great Britain and Persia caused by the latter Power having taken possession of Herat, an agreement was made with Dost Mahomed, by which he agreed to defend Afghanistan against Persia, and we furnished him with money and arms.

4. During the Sepoy Mutiny Dost Mahomed was faithful to his treaty engagements, and did not disturb the British frontier.

5. Dost Mahomed died on the 9th of June, 1863, and after a long civil war his son Shere Ali, the present Ameer of Afghanistan, obtained possession of Cabul in September, 1868. Sir John Lawrence, who was then Governor-General, had during the civil war abstained from giving any support to the rival candidates for the throne, but when he found that Shere Ali had fairly established himself, he telegraphed, on the 10th of September, 1868, to the Secretary of State, that

"As Shere Ali would undoubtedly be in great straits for arms and money, now would be the time to help him with effect; and it would, therefore, be expedient to let him understand that, if he applied, he would receive assistance of that kind."

In reply, Sir John Lawrence received authority to act on his own judgment in assisting Shere Ali in the manner proposed. At that time Sir Stafford Northcote was Secretary of State for India, and the action then taken was the first departure
from the policy of non-interference, or, as it was styled by Mr. Wyllie, of "masterly inactivity," and formed the commencement of the policy subsequently pursued.

6. Shere Ali, although he complained that he had received no help during the civil war, was anxious to receive the support of the British Government. In a conversation with the British Agent at Kabul, he expressed his wish to visit the Viceroy at Calcutta, and Sir John Lawrence had at the same time conveyed his opinion to the Agent that an interview between himself and the Ameer would be desirable. Circumstances in Afghanistan, however, prevented the interview from taking place during Sir John Lawrence's tenure of office. He furnished Shere Ali with money and arms, and addressed to him a letter on the 9th of January, 1869, which is important, as shewing the basis of our subsequent diplomatic relations with him. The letter runs as follows:

"It is the earnest desire of the Government of India, as I have already intimated, to see your Highness's authority established on a basis of solidity and permanency, and to cement the bonds of friendship and alliance which ought to exist between the British Power and your Highness as an independent Ruler. You have been already apprised by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that a sum of six lakhs of rupees has been placed at your unreserved disposal. For this the British Government looks for no other return than abiding confidence, sincerity, and good-will. I regret that obstacles of an insuperable nature should have prevented my meeting your Highness at some suitable place on the frontier of both kingdoms. As a further proof of the desire of the British Government, which fears no aggression and which wishes for no conquest, to see a strong, a just, and a merciful government established by your Highness at Kabul and throughout Afghanistan, I have to inform you that, in the course of the next three months, three sums of two lakhs of rupees each, or, in all, of six lakhs more, will be placed at your entire disposal, to be applied by your Highness in the manner which you may think most conducive to the furtherance of your interests and to the consolidation of your authority.

"For this, again, the Government of India will expect no return save one of the kind just indicated in the preceding part of this letter. I am leaving the country almost immediately, and am handing over the high office of Viceroy and Governor-General to my successor. But the policy which I have advisedly pursued with regard to the affairs of Afghanistan is one which I have entered on with anxious deliberation, and which has commanded the assent and approval of Her Majesty the Queen of England: and as long as you continue, by your actions, to evince a real desire for the alliance of the British Government, you have nothing to apprehend in the way of a change of policy, or of our interference in the internal affairs and administration of your kingdom. It will remain for the hand of the Administration to consider, in each succeeding year, what further proofs may be given of our desire to see your power consolidated, and what amount of practical assistance, in the shape of money or materials of war, may periodically be made over to your Highness as a testimony of our good-will, and to the furtherance of your legitimate authority and influence. But be assured that you will never err in shaping your course with a view to British alliance, and in considering Her Majesty the Queen of England, and the Viceroy in India as your best and truest friends."

7. Lord Mayo assumed the government of India in the beginning of 1869, and, the Ameer being still desirous of a personal interview with the Viceroy, it was arranged to take place at Umballa in March, 1869. The formal record of the communications which then took place between Lord Mayo and Shere Ali is contained in Lord Mayo's letter to him of the 31st of March, which was written in the following language:

"As your Highness did me the honour to intimate that some further expression of the sentiments of the British Government in regard to your present visit and to the affairs of Afghanistan, would be acceptable, it is with
much pleasure and satisfaction that I accede to your Highness’s wishes in the following communication.

"I am most desirous of expressing to you the sincere gratification which the visit of your Highness has afforded to me and to all the members of my Government."

"I regard this visit as a mark of the confidence reposed by your Highness in the Government of the Queen, which will ever be remembered. I earnestly trust that on your Highness’s return to your own country, you may be enabled speedily to establish your legitimate rule over your entire kingdom, to consolidate your power, to create a firm and merciful administration in every province of Afghanistan, to promote the interests of commerce, and to assure peace and tranquillity within your borders.

"Although, as already intimated to you, the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet, considering that the bonds of friendship between that Government and your Highness have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of your rivals to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war, and it will further endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.

"It is my wish, therefore, that your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect.

"By these means, and by the exercise of mutual confidence, I entertain well-grounded hopes that the most friendly relations between the British Government and that of your Highness may ever be maintained, to the advantage of the subjects both of Her Majesty the Queen and of your Highness."

The Ameer replied on the 3rd of April, saying

"That as long as he lived, or as long as his Government existed, the foundation of friendship between his own and the powerful Government of Great Britain would not (please God) be weakened. He hoped that the British Government would always be kind to him, and keep him under its protection."

8. Lord Mayo’s letter, however, does not explain what the wishes of the Ameer were at Umballa, and how far Lord Mayo complied with them. The Ameer wished for a treaty which would guarantee him against all competitors to the throne of Afghanistan. He desired, moreover, that this guarantee should be extended to his young son, Abdulla Jan, whom he brought with him to Umballa. Lord Mayo explained in great detail in a despatch addressed to the Duke of Argyll, on the 1st of July, 1869, the policy which he had pursued; and it is important that this policy should be clearly understood in order to appreciate the subsequent conduct of affairs. The following extracts from Lord Mayo’s despatch will clearly explain what his policy was:

7. The Viceroys informed your Grace that no one could be more impressed than he was with the necessity for abstinence, on the part of the Government of India, from interference in Asian politics; that whether it be in the central portions of the continent, or elsewhere, our policy should be to keep on friendly terms with all our neighbours; to encourage them in any efforts they might make for the development and security of trade, but to let them know that if they chose to quarrel (which they are always ready to do) they must fight it out without any assistance from us; that with regard to the approaching interview with the Ameer, the Viceroys intention was to avoid any engagement of a permanent character, opposed as he was to treaties and subsidies; that it was impossible to discuss the matter until we knew what the Ameer was going to say; that His Highness’s visit would, he believed, do much good, showing him that we had no other wish than to see a strong Government in Afghanistan; that we had no thought of interfering with him in any way; that we wanted no Resident at Cabul, or political influence in his kingdom; while at the same time, it would impress the people of India generally with the idea that we had a faithful ally in Afghanistan.

8. The object of the Viceroys, therefore, in agreeing to Shere Ali’s request
for a meeting, was to show to him and to the world that we desired to establish with him a friendly and faithful alliance; to encourage him in his efforts to create a thoroughly independent kingdom and a just and merciful Government; to acknowledge him as the rightful Ruler of Cabul, not only as having inherited his throne by his father's will, made public in the lifetime of Dost Mohammed, but as the de facto sovereign of the country.

9. But the objects of the Ameer in coming to Umballa went far beyond this. It was evident from his communications with the Viceroy, the conversations of the Foreign Secretary with his Minister, and the paragraphs which he suggested for insertion in the letter to be addressed to him, that he desired a treaty supplementary to that made with his father in 1837 (which he termed one-sided), and which would declare that we should be 'the friend of his friends' and 'the enemy of his enemies.' He further desired that we should publicly declare that we should never acknowledge 'any friend in the whole of Afghanistan save the Ameer and his descendants,' and he evidently expected a promise of a fixed subsidy.

10. But this was not all.

11. He desired and asked that the British Government should not be the sole judge of when and how future assistance was to be given, but earnestly pressed that the words in the Viceroy's letter, 'as circumstances may require,' should be altered to, 'as his (the Ameer's) welfare might require.'

12. Compliance with these desires was impossible, but it was necessary, by a straightforward and unmistakable expression of opinion, to furnish the Ameer with some declaration which (without encouraging hopes that could not be fulfilled) would be of present use in truly describing our feelings and intentions towards him, and satisfy him that his journey, and (to him) somewhat perilous absence from his kingdom, had not been made in vain.

13. This object was accomplished but not without difficulty.

14. A comparison of the principles laid down in your Grace's letter of the 14th May, with the action taken, and the opinions expressed at Umballa, will shew how completely in accord those principles and those actions are. And, although no instructions were received from the Home Government beyond a short general expression of desire contained in your Grace's private letter to the Viceroy, that he should 'maintain that policy of reserve and of abstinence from interference which has been pursued by your predecessor,' yet it can be shewn, not only that the communications made to the Ameer at the Conference did not exceed former promises or extend in any way your liabilities, but that in effect they thoroughly defined, and clearly explained, the position we had determined to assume towards Afghanistan, and rather limited any engagement or liability it might be supposed that we had previously lain under as regards His Highness.

15. The first words which the Viceroy addressed to the Ameer at the Conference of the 27th March, were to express the firm desire of the British Government to see established at Cabul a just, strong, and independent Government; that we had no intention to deviate from the course which we had adopted since he had last regained his throne; that we wished to see him firmly established as Ruler of Cabul, and that he should be able speedily to establish tranquillity and good government throughout his territories.

16. The policy that we have endeavoured to establish may be termed an intermediate one; that is to say, that while we distinctly intimated to the Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British soldier ever cross his frontier to assist him in countering his rebellious subjects; that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or money allowance would be given for any named period; that no promise of assistance in other ways would be made; that no treaty would be entered into, obliging us under every circumstance to recognise him and his descendants Rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were prepared by the most open and absolute present recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly disposition, of respect for his character and interest in his fortunes, to give all the moral support in our power; and that, in addition, we were willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers, and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or desirable to do so.

17. The Ameer of Cabul fully understood that the British Government would assist him with money, now or hereafter, solely for the purpose of establishing a just and merciful as well as a strong Government in Afghanistan, and that the continuance of our support must always depend upon the pleasure of the Government of India.

18. The position of affairs at the close of the Conferences may, in the Viceroy's words, confidentially addressed to your Grace, be summed up as follows—

Firstly.—What the Ameer is not to have.

No treaty; no fixed subsidy; no European troops or Residents; no dynastic pledges.
"Secondly. — What he is to have.
"Warn composure and support; discouragement of hiarchical; such material assistance as we may consider absolutely necessary for his immediate wants; constant and friendly communication through our Commissioner at Peshawur, and our Native Agents in Afghanistan; he, on his part, undertaking to do all he can to maintain peace on our frontier, and to comply with all our wishes on matters connected with trade. . . . . 

"45. One of the most urgent and prominent demands made by the Ameer at Umballa was, that we should recognise and acknowledge, not only himself, but his lineal descendants, against all comers, and under all circumstances.

"46. On every occasion that he brought the subject forward, the Viceroy declined to entertain it.

"47. At the further Conference that took place between His Excellency and the Ameer, he (the Ameer) declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognise and acknowledge, not only himself, but his lineal descendants, or successors in blood, and this phrase he repeated several times with great earnestness and emphasis. He explained again, and at some length, that merely to acknowledge the Ruler pro tem. and de facto was to invite competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that if the British Government would recognise him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular, and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his part, or his descendants', should vitiate all engagements on ours.

"48. The Viceroy, in reply, remarked that it was impossible to prophesy, or to anticipate events; that we must deal with the present, and that His Highness could not expect him to enter into engagements as to a state of circumstances which might never occur."

It is not without interest or importance now to note that this policy received the approval of Sir Stafford Northcote, who was then no longer Secretary of State, but under whose tenure of office it was initiated. In the debate in the House of Commons on July 9th, 1869, Sir Stafford Northcote thoroughly approved the policy of refraining from treaty engagements with the Ameer, and expressed a strong opinion against any extension of our frontier in the direction of Afghanistan.

9. The policy thus clearly explained by Lord Mayo was steadily continued by him until his death in 1872; and the following account was given of it by Sir John Strachey, who was one of Lord Mayo's Council in India, in a Minute written on the 30th of April, 1872, immediately after his death:—

"The cardinal points of the foreign policy which, in Lord Mayo's opinion, the Government of India should steadily pursue may easily be described. He desired to establish with all our frontier States intimate relations of friendship; to make them feel that though we are all-powerful, we have no desire to encroach on their authority, but, on the contrary, that our earnest desire is to support their power and maintain their nationality. He believed that we could thus create in these States outworks of the Empire, and assuring them that the days of annexation are past, make them practically feel that they have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by endeavouring to deserve our favour and support.

"There is hardly one of the kingdoms that border our Indian Empire of which it may not truly be said that peace and settled government have been unknown in it for ages. The history of one and all of them from Oman to Yarkand is a record of wars, revolutions, and dynamic changes succeeding each other with such rapidity as to leave in the mind of the reader only a confused feeling of bewilderment. This chronic state of turbulence and disorder, destructive of ancient landmarks and boundaries, and producing only weakness and disintegration, both provokes and invites annexation. It is the commerce, destroys the productiveness of the soil, scars away peaceful traders who have an interest in the preservation of order and settled government, creates a permanent class whose interest it is to perpetuate anarchy, and produces isolation, jealousy, and distrust in the countries that suffer from our course. It was this state of things in India which forced on the extension of the British Empire to the mountains beyond the Indus. It is this state of things more than lust of conquest that has extended, in spite of herself, the dominion of Russia in Asia.

"To apply a radical remedy to these evils was the main object of Lord
Mayo's foreign policy. Honestly proclaiming and showing by his acts that the spectre of annexation was laid for ever, he taught our neighbours that they have nothing to fear from us. By bringing about a common understanding between the countries on our frontier, as to their mutual boundaries, he sought to remove every pretext for war and aggression. By assisting the rulers of these States to strengthen their internal government, and by bringing both his own personal influence and the moral support of the British Government to bear in putting down rebellions and revolutions, he endeavoured to establish firm, just, and merciful government. By the encouragement and development of trade, he hoped to break down the barriers which isolate those countries from us, and to create, both within and beyond our frontier, a permanent interest in the maintenance of good order. By free and friendly intercommunication, he desired to remove that ignorance as to our policy and that jealousy of our intentions which in past years have been so fruitful of mischief. And lastly, by endeavouring through frank and amicable discussion with the Russian Government to secure the adoption on their part of a similar policy in the countries on the Russian frontier in Asia which are subject to Russian influence, it was his hope that he would be instrumental in securing some degree of peace and prosperity to the exhausted countries of Central Asia, and in removing the causes of disquietude as to the designs of England and Russia which have been so prominent in the public mind in both countries.

"It is difficult for me, in the limited space at my disposal, to do justice to Lord Mayo's foreign policy. A reference to it, however, would be incomplete without special allusion to Afghanistan. The interview with the Ameer at Umballa at the end of March, 1869, was the first great public duty which Lord Mayo had to perform after his assumption of office, and the course pursued towards the Ameer furnishes the best illustration at once of Lord Mayo's general policy and of its effects.

"I shall not attempt more than the briefest sketch of the situation in Afghanistan at the time of Lord Mayo's accession to office. Sher Ali Khan, after an unbroken series of defeats for nearly three years, had, with the help of his able son Yakoob, re-seated himself on the throne of Cabul. His rival, Azim Khan, the usurping Ameer, was a fugitive, and Abdool Rahman was compelled to take refuge in Bokhara. Even in the earliest days of Sher Ali's return to power, there had been a time when, from absolute want of money, it seemed as if he could not keep together the troops on which he depended for the retention of his hitherto considerable sovereignty. From this strait he was relieved by the arrival of £20,000 sent by Lord Lawrence, who, on learning of his restoration, at once appreciated his urgent need of material help, and followed the first gift by instructions that £100,000 more should be given. Of the total sum, half had been actually delivered to the Ameer when Lord Mayo arrived in India, and the money had been accompanied by a present of some thousand stand of small-arms.

The delivery of the remainder of the money, together with an additional present of a heavy battery of artillery, a mountain train battery, and 10,000 stand of arms and accoutrements, followed the visit paid by the Ameer to Lord Mayo at Umballa.

"The preliminary overtures for that visit had been made in the time of Lord Mayo's predecessor. Within the first few days of his restoration to power, Ameer Sher Ali had expressed his desire, as soon as the danger immediately menacing was dispelled, to visit the Vicereoy, and thereby publish to all the world the stability of his friendship for the British Government. From that time, however, till the combat which resulted in the final break-up of the army of Azim and Abdool Rahman, just a week before Lord Mayo's arrival, there was no time when his absence from Cabul would not have been dangerous. Owing to various circumstances into which it is needless to enter, the meeting between the Vicereoy and the Ameer did not take place until March, 1869. After repeated requests from the Ameer, who attached great importance to the meeting, Lord Mayo determined to grant it. The Vicereoy stated his desire that it should take place at Umballa, and to this the Ameer gladly acceded. Leaving Afghanistan, he travelled through the whole extent of the Punjab, seeing our railways, our troops, and our institutions, and gaining an insight into the real strength of the British Government in India. He made no secret of his admiration. The Vicereoy received the Ameer with all the pomp and ceremony befitting the occasion. The principal officers of the Government were present, and many of the most important of the native chiefs.

"The Ameer had come hoping for a fixed annual subsidy; for assistance to be given, not when the British Government might think fit to grant, but when he might think it needful to solicit; and for a treaty laying the British Government under obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency, and not only the Afghan Government generally, but that Government as vested in himself and his direct descendants, and in no others. These hopes he was obliged to abandon; yet he went back to his dominions a contented man. For he carried back with him not only material assistance in
money and arms, but an assurance of warm countenance and support such as had never before been given to any ruler in Afghanistan.

"It had taken many years to obliterate the memory of the disastrous policy of 1839-42, and to convince the Afghan nation that the British Power was not a neighbour whose aggression or interference was to be feared. The friendly meeting at Umballa came at the right time to remove the mistrust which had prevented British influence from being effectively exercised in Afghanistan; to bring home to the Ameer's mind the conviction that the British Government had no desire to extend its dominions; and to pave the way for the acceptance of what was to the Ameer the still stranger lesson, that his highest wisdom was to abstain from interfering in the affairs of his neighbours, and to play his part in the difficult task of restoring some measure of peace to the wasted regions of Central Asia.

This advice, repeated in writing from time to time as opportunity offered, the Ameer has not been slow to accept.

To the insidious counsels of those of his subjects who have occasionally prompted him to overstep the limits of his dominions and adopt an aggressive policy in retaliation for injuries real or fancied, the Ameer has ever turned a deaf ear. In accordance with the advice which has been given him by the late Viceroy, he has enjoined on his frontier officers a policy of watchful defence and of abstention from aggression, and has endeavoured to settle his difficulties by diplomatic action, in a manner which has not only astonished his own people, but has excited the admiration of the Russian Government. These results have been carried out without any help from the British Government beyond strong moral support, and continued advice. Since 1869 the Ameer has received no subsidy or material assistance. At no time were the relations of the Ameer with his neighbours more peaceful and friendly than at present.

I have already stated that it was one of the principal objects of Lord Mayo's policy to induce the Russian Government to adopt similar measures with regard to the Asiatic States under their immediate influence. The Ameer's reception at Umballa caused at the time considerable excitement in Russia. Exaggerated rumours of all kinds circulated in Central Asia, and were caught up by the Russian Press. Many affected to believe that some secret compact had been entered into with the Ameer to stir up the chiefs of the countries bordering on the Oxus to resist and repel the advances of Russia. Although these absurd fears were never entertained by the Russian Government, some anxiety was nevertheless exhibited on its part to obtain assurances that the Ameer of Afghanistan would be restrained from molesting the King of Bukhara. An opportunity for frank and friendly explanations presented itself in the mission of Mr. Forsyth to Russia in the first year of Lord Mayo's Viceroyalty. The full exposition of the peaceful policy that was then made elicited from the Emperor himself a statement that the Russian Government entertained no intention of extending its dominions; that if the idea of conquest were banished from the Ameer's mind there would be peace in Central Asia; and that while the good offices of England should be exercised to dissuade the Ameer from aggression, Russia would similarly use all her influence to restrain Bukhara from transgressing the limits of Afghan territory.

The friendly interchange of assurances that both nations intend to devote all their influence to introduce peace into the troubled regions of Central Asia has been repeatedly renewed since then between the representatives of Her Majesty's Government and the Ministers of Russia, and the fruits of this good understanding have been frequently manifested. To Russian influence on Bukhara was due the prompt withdrawal of a party of Bukhara troops who had crossed the Oxus in the winter of 1869. To the restraining hand kept by Russia on the Afghan refugees in Turkestan is to be attributed the absence of any attempt on their part to shake the throne of the Ameer. When the most formidable of those refugees, Abdool Rahman, once openly represented that it would be for the interest of Russia to assist him in conquering the throne of Cabul, General Von Kaufmann replied that hospitality had been afforded him in consideration of his destitute circumstances, and not as an enemy to England, or a pretender to the throne of Cabul. Russia, he said, wished every prosperity to Sher Ali, who had never given her any cause for dissatisfaction. General Von Kaufmann, himself, in the spring of 1870, commenced a direct correspondence, which has been renewed from time to time, and has conveyed to the Ameer assurances of the neighbourly sentiments entertained by the Russian authorities towards the Afghan Government. There is every reason to hope that the permanent definition of the boundaries between Afghanistan and Bukhara, a matter in which Lord Mayo took deep interest, will before long be accomplished with the consent of all who are concerned.

Much still remains to be done before a feeling of security from foreign aggression is finally restored in those parts. The bitter experience of centuries has led the people to believe that strength is only used as an engine of conquest, and that when a new power appears on the scene its progress
would never cease spontaneously, but only when it has encountered a barrier stronger than itself. Any disposition on the part of one or other of the two chief powers who guide the destinies of Central Asia to extend their arms beyond existing limits, would undo in a moment the good that has been effected. But the British Government in Europe and Asia has done its part in endeavouring to avert the possibility of any such disaster. In the last three years it has left nothing undone, by counsel, to bring those who are most immediately concerned to a preference for the ways of peace, and by negotiation to get the principles, which should regulate their action for the future, placed on permanent record, not only as a guide to the immediate actors, but also as a basis for the expression of its opinion by the voice of Europe if peace is again disturbed."

10. I arrived in India in May, 1872, and I endeavoured during my tenure of office, to maintain the policy of Lord Mayo and Lord Lawrence with respect to Afghanistan, which Sir John Strachey has so well described.

11. In the interval between the years 1872 and 1876 consider- able changes took place in the politics of Central Asia, and an important diplomatic correspondence between the British and Russian Governments was brought to a conclusion. The most considerable event which happened in Central Asia was the successful expedition of Russia against Khiva. This expedition brought the Russians into contact with the Turkoman tribes to the south of Khiva, tribes whose territory borders upon Afghanistan. On the other hand, the correspondence between Lord Clarendon, succeeded by Lord Granville, and the Russian Government, ended in that Government in the year 1872 accepting the boundary of Afghanistan which the Government of India had proposed, and engaging, so far as they could, to prevent the Khan of Bokhara from transgressing that boundary, while we on our side engaged to use our influence to prevent the Ameer of Afghanistan from doing the same in the other direction. This arrangement, made by us in the interests of Afghanistan, and of peace between England and Russia in Central Asia, afforded to Shere Ali a security with respect to his dominions which he had never before possessed.

12. He was, however, to judge by his expressions to our Agent at Cabul, more alarmed by the advance of Russia than reassured by the security which was given to him in consequence of our arrangement with Russia. In the beginning of the year 1875 it became necessary for me to explain to him the result of an arbitration which Lord Mayo had undertaken, at the instance of the Home Government, between Persia and Afghanistan with respect to the frontier of those countries in the province of Sestan. I also wished to inform him of the particulars of the recognition given by Russia to the Afghan frontier. I suggested, therefore, that he should receive at Cabul a British officer who would be able to explain these matters to him. His reply was that if I wished it he would receive a British officer, but that it would in his opinion be more convenient if, in the first place, at any rate, his Prime Minister should wait upon me at Simla, in order to hear what I wished to communicate to him. I acceded at once to his suggestion, and his Prime Minister, Noor Mahomed Shah, came to Simla in the summer of 1875. The communications which passed on that occasion are at the present moment of some consequence, because it has been alleged that these communications, and not anything which has occurred since the year 1876, have been the cause of our present rupture with Shere Ali.

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* The result of this arbitration was most unsatisfactory to the Ameer. He expected that we should decide in his favour; and he was very much disturbed on this subject.

+ Lord Northbrook to Ameer, March 21st, 1873.
13. The policy, as will have been already seen, of the Government of India was to abstain from entering into any definite treaty engagement with Shere Ali which would give him either an unconditional guarantee of protection from external attack, or a guarantee that we would support his heir against other claimants to the throne of Afghanistan after his death; but to give him assurances of support and assistance so long as he on his side conducted his internal government with justice, and in his relations with States outside his border he was guided by the advice of the British Government.

14. While this was the policy which had been pursued in our relations with Shere Ali, the Government of India desired that it should be clearly understood by the Russian Government that England would defend Afghanistan against any unprovoked attack by Russia. That opinion was embodied in a despatch of 30th June, 1873, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State. After giving a summary of the negotiations between Great Britain and Russia upon the boundary of Afghanistan, we said:—

"18. Although we have abstained from entering into any treaty engagement to support the Amur by British troops, in the event of Afghanistan being attacked from without, yet the complete independence of Afghanistan is so important to the interests of British India that the Government of India could not look upon an attack upon Afghanistan with indifference. So long as the Amur continues, as he has hitherto done, to act in accordance with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he would naturally look for material assistance from us; and circumstances might occur under which we should consider it incumbent upon us to recommend Her Majesty's Government to tender him such assistance.

"19. The assurances given by the Russian Government of their determination not to interfere with Afghanistan, have been clear and positive throughout the whole course of these negotiations. We unreservedly accept these assurances, and we are satisfied that this frank explanation of the position of the Government of India, as regards Afghanistan, will not be misinterpreted.

"20. Both Powers have now publicly avowed their adherence to the policy of not further extending their territorial possessions in the southern portion of Central Asia. They have pledged themselves reciprocally that so far as their influence extends over the States lying between their respective frontiers, that influence will be exerted, in the interests of the general peace, to restrain those States from aggression upon each other. As regards Afghanistan, the boundary recently settled is to be the limit of the Amur's dominions; while, on the one hand, the Government of India are to use all the influence they possess with the Amur to prevent him from transgressing that boundary, Russia will, on her part, use all her influence over Bokhara and the other States to which her influence extends, to restrain them from aggressions on Afghanistan. Therefore, so long as the Amur confines himself to the boundary now defined, he need fear no molestation from Russia, or the countries under her influence.

"21. Should our general view of the recent negotiations, and of the obligations which will consequently devolve upon us, receive the approval of Her Majesty's Government, we should suggest that a copy of this despatch might be communicated to the Russian Government, in order that we may act with freedom and confidence in our future communications with the different countries whose interests are concerned."

15. I, therefore, when the Afghan Prime Minister came to Simla in the summer of 1873, had to deal with two questions; first, to obtain the acceptance by the Amur of the Seistan arbitration, and secondly, to explain to him the result of the negotiations between the British Government and Russia with respect to the frontier of Afghanistan. A third question had, moreover, arisen, in consequence of the murder of Major Macdonald by a relation of the chief of a tribe over which the Amur of Afghanistan held the supremacy. I may dismiss this third question by

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* It was not considered desirable at the time by Lord Granville, nor afterwards by Lord Derby, to make this communication to Russia. Subsequently Lord Derby made a communication which was very nearly what we suggested.
saying that the Ameer, without any pressure, agreed to everything which the British Government considered it right to demand as a satisfaction for that incident. There was some difficulty in persuading the Ameer to accept the Seistan arbitration, but ultimately he gave his reluctant but unqualified adherence to the settlement. Upon the other and the most important question of the three, I found that the Ameer entertained great apprehensions that Russia, in consequence of her recent advances, might be brought into contact with Afghanistan, and that he desired more specific assurances than had been given to him by Lord Mayo of protection from Russian attack. Under these circumstances I consulted the Secretary of State by telegram on the 27th of June, whether I should communicate to the Prime Minister the substance of the 18th paragraph of the despatch of the 30th of June, 1873 (which I telegraphed in anticipation of the despatch), and which has been quoted above.† The reply of the Secretary of State, of the 1st of July, was:

"I do not object to the general sense of the paragraph which you quote as a communication to Russia from the Foreign Office, but great caution is necessary in assuring Ameer of material assistance which may raise undue and unfounded expectations. He already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give."

16. I acted upon these instructions in my first conversation with the Prime Minister which occurred on the 12th of July, using the following language:

"The Ameer must be well aware that, occupying as Afghanistan does an intervening position between the British and Russian dominions, it was important for the interests of India that she should be both a strong and an independent State." . . . "If in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable that the British Government would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would, of course, be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression."

But finding that those assurances were not sufficient, I telegraphed again to the Secretary of State on the 24th of July in the following words:

"Ameer of Cabul alarmed at Russian progress; dissatisfied with general assurances and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded. I propose to assure him if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations we will help him, with money, arms, and troops, if necessary, to repel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity."

I received a reply on the 26th of July, that

"The Cabinet think you should inform Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it. But you may assure him we shall maintain our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abides by our advice in external affairs."

17. Having received this reply, and having fully considered it, I felt myself authorised to give to the Prime Minister assurances which went beyond those which I had given in my first interview.† It will be noticed that I omitted the word "probable," which the Prime Minister did not consider satisfactory. My words in my last interview with the Prime Minister, on the 30th of July, were those:

"The British Government did not share the Ameer's apprehensions (of attack by Russia); but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour by negotiation, and by every means in their power, to settle the matter and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such

* See paragraph 14.

† In a private letter from me to the Duke of Argyll, of the 26th of July, 1873, I wrote — "Your telegram of the 26th enabled me to give the Ameer very sufficiently distinct assurances."
previous reference to the British Government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the Ameer, as an independent ruler, to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories; but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British Government assisting him. In such event, should those endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British Government are prepared to assure the Ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also in case of necessity aid him with troops. The British Government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent; moreover, the assistance will be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations.”

It will be observed that the words I used were almost identical with those which I had asked for authority to use in my telegram of the 24th of July.

18. During these negotiations I had directed the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to ascertain from the Prime Minister what Shere Ali really wanted from the British Government. His wishes will be seen from the following account of the conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister.

The Envoy asked:

“...That a written assurance might be given to him to the effect that if Russia or any State of Turkestan or elsewhere, under Russian influence, should commit an aggression on the Ameer’s territories, or should otherwise annoy the Ameer, the British Government would consider such aggressor an enemy, and that they would promise to afford to the Ameer promptly such assistance in money and arms as might be required until the danger should be past or invasion repelled. Also, that if the Ameer should be unable to cope single-handed with the invader, that the British Government should promptly despatch a force to his assistance, by whatever route the Ameer might require the same, the said force to be employed against the invader and to return to British territory when the invasion was repelled. No return for the assistance above mentioned to be required by the British Government from Afghanistan. Such assistance to be rendered solely out of friendship to Afghanistan, and with the view of protecting the integrity of the frontier, so that the existing friendship of both countries should be maintained.”

19. From this conversation it appears that Shere Ali wished to receive a guarantee of protection from external attack without any stipulation whatever on his side in return; and it was moreover apparent, from other conversations with the Prime Minister, that he would not have been satisfied without very large payments of money from us for the fortification of his frontier and the thorough organisation and equipment of his army, to prepare him to meet the attack which he apprehended from Russia.

20. To have agreed to those proposals would have made a change in the policy which we had hitherto pursued towards Afghanistan. Accordingly, not only because such a change would have been contrary to the instructions which the Government of India had received from Her Majesty’s Government, but because in my opinion such a change would have been impolitic and possibly dangerous, I did not recommend the Government to entertain the proposal, made by the Prime Minister of Shere Ali, for an unconditional guarantee of protection.

21. I addressed a letter to the Ameer on the 6th of September, at the close of the negotiations, and after giving some explanations of the correspondence with Russia about the Afghan boundary, I continued as follows:—

“...The result of the communications between the British and the Russian Governments has been, in my opinion, materially to strengthen the position
of Afghanistan and to remove apprehension of dangers from without. 

To this settlement the British Government are a party, and they are consequently even more interested than before in the maintenance of the integrity of your Highness's frontier. I have had some conversation with your Envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government would pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness's territories. A copy of the record of these conversations is attached to this letter. But the question is, in my opinion, one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity.

I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger from your Highness's territories from without, and I therefore do not consider that it is necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with a view to such a contingency. My hope is that, having received the foregoing assurances, your Highness will now be enabled to devote your undisturbed attention to the consolidation and improvement of your internal Government. The British Government desires to see your Highness's country powerful and independent. It is my determination to maintain the policy which has been adopted towards your Highness by my predecessors, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and I repeat to your Highness the assurance given you at the Umballa Durbar, that the British Government will endeavour, from time to time, by such means as circumstances may require, to strengthen the Government of your Highness, to enable you to exercise with equity and with justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful possessor.

It is necessary to observe that the "record of conversations" to which I referred in my letter to the Ameer, were formal documents, which had been translated and officially communicated at the time to the Ameer's Prime Minister, and by which the British Government were, in my opinion, bound.

22. My reasons for writing to the Ameer that the discussion of the question should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity are explained in the following paragraphs of the despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, of the 15th of September, 1873:

"5. The question of the policy to be pursued in case of actual or threatened aggression on Afghanistan was the subject of considerable discussion with the Envoy. After receipt of your Grace's telegram of the 1st July, the Envoy was informed at the interview of the 12th June that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were involved, and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was probable the British Government would afford to the Ameer material assistance in repelling an invader, but that such assistance would be conditional on the Ameer following the advice of the British Government, and having himself abstained from aggression. Further and more definite explanations were given on this subject in the conversation with the Envoy of the 30th July, to which we beg to refer your Grace.

A copy and translation of these conversations were annexed to the letter which the Viceroy has addressed to the Ameer. But as the subject is one of great importance, and the Envoy appeared to doubt how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to any definite arrangement, we considered it advisable to postpone the settlement of it to a more favourable opportunity, when we trust the matter may be discussed with the Ameer in person."

The Ameer had remarked to the British Agent at Cabil that he considered it to be advisable that one of his Agents should wait upon me and represent his views, in order that

"After receipt of full information about the views of the British Government these matters may be satisfactorily settled after deep consideration and the most careful deliberation on their probable consequences."

23. The result then, of the communications which passed in 1873 between Shere Ali's Prime Minister and myself was, that an assurance of protection was given to him in terms which went beyond the expressions used by Lord Mayo in 1869; but that, as Lord Mayo had done in 1869, I declined to comply to the full extent with his wishes with regard to the unconditional assurances to be given to him by, and the assistance to be received by
him from, the British Government. It is my opinion now as it was then, that the policy which was pursued was a right policy. It was impossible, consistently with the interests of India, to have agreed to everything which Shere Ali demanded. I gave him, however, assurances of support which should have been amply sufficient to shew him that he would be defended in the event of an unprovoked attack.

24. This being the history of the negotiations of 1873, which I have drawn up after reading again all the documents, despatches and letters in my possession relating to it, I must express my great surprise at the account given by Lord Cranbrook of those transactions, in his despatch to Lord Lytton of the 18th of November. That account is as follows:—

"8. The policy of his predecessors was that substantially followed by Lord Northbrook, although the rapid development of events in Central Asia was gradually increasing the difficulty of abstaining from closer relations with the Ruler of Cabul. The capture of Khiva by the forces of the Czar in the spring of 1873, and the total subordination of that Khemat to Russia, caused Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of the pledges with reference to Afghanistan which had been given by His Imperial Majesty to England, and which had been communicated to His Highness by the British Government. Actuated by his fears on this score, His Highness sent a special Envoy to Simla in the summer of that year, charged with the duty of expressing them to the Government of India.

"9. Finding that the object of the Amur was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But Her Majesty's Government at home did not share His Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Amur that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season."

This statement appears to imply, and, indeed, has been understood to imply, that I wished to give to Shere Ali certain assurances of protection, but that I did not give them because I was over-ruled by the Home Government. This is entirely incorrect. I did give the assurances of protection which I wished to give; and, so far from having been over-ruled by the Home Government, I gave the assurances in consequence of the reply which I received from the Duke of Argyll in my telegram, asking for authority to give them, and in almost the very words which I had suggested. The real history of the transaction is that the Amur wished for an unconditional guarantee of protection; although I wished to give him, and did give him, a guarantee with reasonable conditions attached to it, I did not wish to give him an unconditional guarantee, and I did not ask for authority to give him such a guarantee.

25. The negotiations of 1873 were reported to the Home Government in September. In February, 1874, there was a change of Government, and Mr. Gladstone was succeeded by Mr. Disraeli. The question of the relations of the British Government with Afghanistan, and with Russia in regard to Afghanistan, was raised on the 8th of May, 1874, by Lord Napier and Ettrick. In reply to him, Lord Derby, representing the Government as Foreign Secretary, stated that it would be most impolitic to give an unconditional guarantee of protection to Shere Ali; and, at the same time, used words which were quite sufficient to show that the Government agreed with the Government of India that we should defend Afghanistan against an unprovoked attack from Russia. As Lord Cranbrook's despatch to Lord Lytton implies
that under Mr. Gladstone's Administration I was prevented from acceding to Shere Ali's request in 1873, and that Lord Lytton in 1876 was authorised to agree to that request, it is not out of place to observe that, during the two years that I was Viceroy under the Administration of Mr. Disraeli, neither in private letters from Lord Salisbury, nor in debates in Parliament, nor in public despatches to the Government of India, was any opinion expressed, or even any hint given, that it would have been right for the Government of India in 1873 to have conceded to the Ameer the unconditional guarantee of protection which he asked, or that Mr. Disraeli's Administration wished me to give him such a guarantee. This is proved by the last despatch on the subject of our relations with Afghanistan which the Government of India had occasion to write before I left India. In that despatch we were obliged to call the attention of the Secretary of State to the law which precludes the Government of India from giving to a Native State such an unconditional guarantee of protection without the express command of Her Majesty's Government. We said to Lord Salisbury in our despatch of the 18th of January, 1876,

"Your Lordship will doubtless have read the observations made by the Ameer in May, 1873, and the communications that took place with Syed Nour Mahomed later in the same year on the subject of the protection of Afghanistan. It then appeared that nothing short of a full and unconditional promise of protection against foreign attack would have been satisfactory to the Ameer; consequently in the Viceroy's letter to His Highness of the 6th of September, 1873, the question was deliberately reserved for future consideration. We had no authority then, nor have we received authority since, (It will be remembered that Mr. Disraeli's Government had been for two years in office) from Her Majesty's Government to give to the Ameer any such unconditional guarantee, and we are of opinion that there are grave reasons against binding the British Government by any such obligation. We are precluded by law from entering into a treaty of this nature without the express command of Her Majesty's Government, and unless such a treaty is accompanied by reciprocal engagements on the part of the Ameer, which seems to us to be inapplicable to the present condition of affairs."

26. Indeed, notwithstanding the implication contained in the 9th paragraph of Lord Cranbrook's despatch, that the Administration of Mr. Gladstone was to blame for not having authorised me to accede to the requests preferred by Shere Ali in 1873 for an unconditional guarantee of protection, not only was no such authority ever given to me by Her Majesty's Government when Mr. Disraeli was Prime Minister, not only was the whole tenor of Lord Salisbury's correspondence with me adverse to such a guarantee, but Lord Cranbrook, in the 12th paragraph of his despatch, relates that while Lord Lytton was instructed "to offer to Shere Ali that same countenance and protection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the Indian Government, it was clearly impossible to enter into any formal engagement in this sense without requiring from the Ameer some substantial proof of his unity of interests with the British Government." That proof was to consist in Shere Ali allowing a "British Agent or Agents access to his territories other than at Cabul itself." The guarantee which Lord Lytton was directed to offer was therefore not unconditional, but subject to the condition of the access of British officers to Afghanistan. This condition was a much more unwelcome one to the Ameer than the obligation to be bound by our advice in his external affairs which I attached to the assurances of protection which I gave the Prime Minister in 1873. The question of sending British officers to Afghanistan was discussed with the Ameer's Prime Minister in 1873, and he gave his opinion that

* 33 Geo. III., c. 52.
"Speaking as a friend and in the interests of the British Government, he could not recommend a specific request being made to station British officers in certain places. Such a demand, however friendly the Ameeer might be to the British Government, 'would give rise to distrust and misapprehension.' The reasons he gave were that the Afghans were deplorably ignorant, and entertained an idea that a deputation of British Agents is always a precursor to annexation. He also said that there was a strong party in Cabul opposed to the Ameeer entering into intimate relations with the British Government."

This opinion was quoted in the despatch of the Government of India of the 19th of November, 1875, and I had previously furnished Lord Salisbury with a copy of it.

27. Not long after the accession of Mr. Disraeli’s Government to office in the year 1874, a letter was written by Sir Bartle Frere to Sir John Kaye*, recommending the occupation of Quetta, and that British Agents should be placed at Herat, Balkh, and Candahar. This letter was communicated by Lord Salisbury to Lord Lawrence, who answered it objecting to the arguments and proposals used by Sir Bartle Frere. Those papers were sent to me privately by Lord Salisbury, but they were not communicated officially to the Government of India for consideration. I told Lord Salisbury that I concurred with the views of Lord Lawrence, and as the papers were not communicated officially, no further notice was taken of them.† Early in 1875 the Government of India received a despatch from Lord Salisbury² instructing us to enter into negotiations with Shere Ali, for the purpose of placing a British officer at Herat, and perhaps one also at Candahar. We replied by telegram, on the 18th of February, asking him whether we were to consider the instructions as an order, or whether discretion was left to us, as to time and opportunity. We added that we thought the time and circumstances very unsuitable for taking the initiative. He replied that his instructions contemplated a delay of three or four months.

28. I was then at Calcutta, and intended to go to Delhi in the spring. I accordingly made arrangements to consult, when there, every one who was best able to give an opinion, whether the proposal to place British officers in Afghanistan would be likely to be accepted by Shere Ali. I found that the opinion of them all was that the proposal would be most unpardonable to him, and this opinion, together with the views of the Government of India, was communicated to Lord Salisbury in the summer of 1875.§

We said that—

"22. If the concurrence of all those who may be supposed to have the means of forming a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameeer is of any value, we must be prepared to find him most unwilling to receive a British Agent at Herat. On this the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Richard Pollock, Major-General Reynell Taylor, Colonel Munro, and Captain Cavagnari, are all agreed, and their views are confirmed—

First.—By those of Nawab Fugjar Khan and Nawab Ghulam Hassan Khan, who have successively served as British Agents at Cabul, and who have means of knowing the present sentiments of the Ameeer.

Second.—By the opinion of Noor Mahommed Sinha, the Cabul Envoy, who, when at Simla in 1873, advised the Foreign Secretary that a specific request should not be preferred to the Ameeer for British officers to be stationed within the Afghan dominions.

Third.—By the recent acts of the Ameeer in objecting to permit Sir T.D. Forsyth to traverse Balkh on his return journey from Yarkund, and in discouraging Colonel Baker from returning to India from Teheran via Cabul."

"23. Assuming that the Ameeer would object to the location of a British Agent at Herat, we are not of opinion that his objection would imply that his intentions have ceased to be loyal towards the British Government. It is true that such an objection, if raised by an European Power, or even by some Asiatic rulers, although it might be justifiable by the principles of

* This letter was published in the Times of the 17th of October last, and Lord Lawrence’s reply in the Times of the 25th of October.

† The longer and more formal memorandum, written by Sir Bartle Frere, on the 11th of January, 1875, and published in the Times of the 13th of November last, was neither communicated to the Government of India for consideration, nor privately to me.

‡ Secretary of State to Government of India, No. 2, of January 22nd, 1875.

§ Government of India to Secretary of State, No. 19, of June 7th, 1875.
international law, would evince a disposition but little removed from actual hostility; but the motives of the Ameer cannot, in our opinion, fairly be judged by this standard.

"24. There can be no reasonable doubt that there still exists a strong party among the Sirdars of Afghanistan opposed to the measure. Although the time which has elapsed since the Afghan war appears to us to be long on account of the succession of Governors-General of India, and the importance of the events that have intervened, there are many persons now living in Afghanistan who were engaged in that war, and whose memory of what took place is probably the more lively from the narrow limits of their thoughts and actions. Those who have had the most intimate acquaintance with Afghanistan have always expressed their opinion that the establishment of complete confidence between the Afghans and the British must be a work of time, and this opinion will be found repeated in the enclosures of this despatch.

"25. We consider that the reluctance of the Ameer to consent to the presence of British officers in Afghanistan is attributable mainly to the adverse feeling entertained by an influential party in that country to the measure, and to the consequent unpopularity he would incur by consenting to it. His position in Afghanistan is not so secure that he can afford to neglect any strong feeling among an important section of his subjects. He may also be influenced by the possibility of the safety of the officers employed being endangered by the acts of fanatics. This danger was hinted at by both the Sadir-Akam and the Ameer, at the time when Sir T. D. Forsyth's return through Afghanistan was discussed in the Cabinet Durbar. It was for these reasons that we thought the Ameer's refusal to allow Sir T. D. Forsyth to return through Afghanistan might reasonably be explained without assuming that it was prompted by any unfriendly feeling towards the British Government, and we accordingly abstained from pressing him upon the subject.

"26. Besides the above reasons there is probably also the apprehension that the permanent location of British officers in Afghanistan would bring to light proceedings which would be condemned by our standard of right and wrong, and might find their way into the Public Press, of which the Ameer feels a great dread. We may again refer to the diaries accompanying this despatch as containing illustrations in point. That such apprehensions are not unfounded is evident from the strong feeling which has been expressed by the Maharajah of Cashmere against the appointment of a permanent Resident at His Highness's Court.

"28. For the attainment of these ends, it is in our opinion essential that the proposed arrangements should have the cordial consent of the Ameer. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that, if we were to press the question on the Ameer at present, our proposals would in all probability either be refused or accepted with great reluctance.

"29. If the Ameer should give an unwilling consent, the officers whom we have consulted are agreed that no advantage would be derived from the presence of a British Agent at Herat. Moreover, if the Ameer should represent the risk to which our Agent might be exposed from the acts of fanatics, or persons opposed to the presence of our officers in Afghanistan, and an outrage on the person of the Agent were attempted, he should be subjected to a humiliation for which, under the circumstances, we might not be justified in holding the Afghan Government responsible, and for which, therefore, it would be extremely difficult to obtain satisfaction.

"30. If the Ameer should refuse, his refusal would impair the influence of the Government of India in Afghanistan. It must either be accepted without any change being made in our present policy towards Afghanistan, in which case the Ameer would be encouraged to act upon other occasions without regard to the wishes of the British Government; or we must treat it as a proof of unfriendly feeling on his part, modify our present policy, retire from our attitude of sympathy, and withdraw our assurances of support. If we are correct in believing that the refusal would not shew the intentions of the Ameer to be disloyal, it would afford no sufficient justification for a change of policy which might throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia upon the first favourable opportunity. We may also observe that the refusal would weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in any future negotiations with Russia, when questions might be raised as to the real value of British influence in Afghanistan.

"31. After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the disposition of the Ameer, and of the probable result of pressing to accept a British Agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to your Lordship by telegram on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer, or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or
other circumstances may present, for the purpose of sounding his disposition and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now. In the meantime we shall neglect no opportunity of obtaining full information respecting events in Afghanistan, by such means as may from time to time present themselves."

After expressing an opinion that Shere Ali, although he was not altogether satisfied with our relations with him, felt that his interests were identical with those of British India, that he was seriously alarmed at Russian progress, and relied on our support, we continued:

"36. If we have formed a correct judgment of the sentiments of the Ameer towards the British Government, the main objects of the policy which was advocated by Lord Canning in the time of Dost Mahomed, which was renewed by Lord Lawrence on the first favourable opportunity that occurred after the death of Dost Mahomed, which was ratified by Lord Mayo at the Umballa Conferences, and which we have since steadily pursued, are secured. We have established friendly relations with Afghanistan; that country is stronger than it has ever been since the days of Dost Mahomed, and our influence is sufficient to prevent the Ameer from aggression upon his neighbours. It is to be regretted that old animosities and other causes have hitherto prevented the establishment of free intercourse between European subjects and Afghanistan, and the location of British Agents in that country. But we believe that these things will naturally follow in course of time, when our motives are better understood. Their attainment would be hastened by a further advance of Russia in Turkestan, or by any other danger that may threaten the integrity of Afghanistan.

"39. We attach great importance to the moral and material advantages which are derived from maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan, and we would impress upon Her Majesty's Government our conviction that such relations will best be secured by a steady adherence to the patient and conciliatory policy which has been pursued by the Government of India for many years towards Afghanistan; and by making due allowance for the difficulties of the Ameer, even if he should be reluctant to accede to the views which we may entertain as to the measures which may be advisable equally for his own interests and for those of British India."

29. In the winter of 1875* we received a reply to our letter instructing us to press the Ameer to agree to the location of British officers in Afghanistan. In that reply the reasons which we had given appeared to us to have been misunderstood; the course which Lord Salisbury directed us to follow seemed to us to be unwise; the instructions were deficient in several important particulars; and the policy which Lord Salisbury directed us to pursue appeared to be so certain, if any weight was to be attached to the opinion of those who were best qualified to judge of the sentiments of Shere Ali, to lead to serious difficulties, that we considered it to be our duty to make a further remonstrance, and to apply for further instructions before carrying into effect the orders which we had received. Our views were contained in a despatch written on the 28th of January, 1876†. After pointing out several important particulars in which Lord Salisbury had misapprehended the opinions we had expressed in our former despatch on the subject, and explaining the nature of the further instructions which were necessary to enable us to enter into negotiations with Shere Ali, we concluded in the following language:

"25. But the matter is, in our own judgment and in that of all those whom we have been able to consult, of such grave importance that we feel it to be our duty to add some further remarks for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, in the hope that the whole question may still be reconsidered.

"26. It is in the highest degree improbable that the Ameer will yield a hearty consent to the location of British officers in Afghanistan, which the course is intended to accomplish; and to place our officers on our frontier without his hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most unpatriotic and dangerous movement. Setting aside the consideration of the
personal risk to which, under such circumstances, the Agents would be exposed, and the serious political consequences that would ensue from their being insulted or attacked, their position would be entirely useless. They would be dependent for their information on untrustworthy sources. They would be surrounded by spies, under the pretext of guarding them or administering to their wants. Persons approaching or visiting them would be watched and removed; and though nothing might be done ostensibly which could be complained of as an actual breach of friendship, the Agents would be checked on every hand, and would soon find their position both humiliating and useless. Such was the experience of Major Todd at Herat, in 1839, when his supplies of money failed. Such was the experience of Colonel Lumden when he went to Candahar in 1857, as the dispenser of a magnificent subsidy.

"27. A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations, and possibly even in the long run to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which Her Majesty's Government have in view. We already see the fruits of the conciliatory policy which has been pursued since 1869, in the consolidation of the Ameer's power and the establishment of a strong interference on our frontier. The Ameer's not unnatural dread of our interference in his internal affairs and the difficulties of his position, as described in our despatch of the 7th of June last, combined, perhaps, with the conviction that if ever a struggle for the independence of Afghanistan should come, we must in our own interest help him, may have induced him to assume a colder attitude towards us than we should desire. But we have no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other Powers. We believe convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the Ameer on a satisfactory footing; and we deplore, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch."

30. In April, 1876, I was succeeded by Lord Lytton in the office of Governor-General. It appears from the despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State of the 23rd of March, 1877,* on the affairs of Khelat, that Lord Lytton

"Having had the advantage, before leaving England, of personal communication with Lord Salisbury on the general subject of our frontier relations, was strongly impressed with the importance of endeavouring to deal with them simultaneously, as indivisible parts of a single Imperial question, mainly dependent for its solution on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government, which is the ultimate guardian of the whole British Empire, rather than as isolated local matters."

When I saw him at Calcutta Lord Lytton did not consult me upon the subject of our relations with Afghanistan, and in the account which I shall proceed to give of what I believe to have taken place since I left India, I have derived my information for the most part from Lord Cranbrook's despatch to Lord Lytton of the 18th of November.

31. Lord Lytton brought out with him instructions to negotiate with Shere Ali for the reception of British Residents in certain places in Afghanistan. In return for this he was authorised to concede to the Ameer

"Substantial pecuniary aid, a formal recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and an explicit pledge of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression."

In May, 1876, Lord Lytton requested the Ameer to receive Sir Lewis Pelly at Kabul, not as a Resident Envoy, but for the purpose of entering into negotiations. The Ameer declined to receive Sir Lewis Pelly, and until his letter is made public I can offer no opinion as to his reasons. On the refusal of the Ameer to receive Sir Lewis Pelly, Lord Lytton addressed to him

a second letter in July." The contents of that letter are important, and it is essential, in order to form a right opinion of the present position of affairs, that it should be produced. My impression is that it was written in terms which must have led the Ameer to suppose that our policy had been changed with regard to him. The description of it given by Lord Cranbrook is that Lord Lytton

"Exhorted the Ameer to consider seriously the consequences of an attitude which might end in compelling the British Government to look upon him as a Prince who voluntarily desired to isolate his interests from those of the British Government,"

and this was nothing less than a threat. At the suggestion of the Ameer, the Native British Agent at his Court was then summoned to Simla, and he afterwards returned to Cabul. It is essential to know what instructions he carried back with him. Lord Cranbrook's despatch gives a short account of the instructions, but they ought to be published together with the "clearly worded "mémoire" with which he was furnished. The result of his communications with Shere Ali was that, in the winter of 1876-77, negotiations took place between the Prime Minister of the Ameer and Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshaun.

32. In the meantime other circumstances occurred which must have had a very considerable influence upon the mind of the Ameer and upon the result of the negotiations, but to which no allusion is made in Lord Cranbrook's despatch. Lord Lytton, after leaving Simla in the autumn of 1876, had an interview with the Maharajah of Cashmere, and it has been asserted by Lord Lawrence, and I believe truly, that arms were supplied to the Maharajah, "with instructions to push forward troops for the occupation of the passes leading to Chitral," upon the North-Eastern frontier of Afghanistan. In October, 1876, Lord Lytton determined to occupy the post of Quetta, "an important strategical position commanding the richest and most important valleys of Upper Beloochistan, as well as the great trade routes both through the Bolan and to Khelat." Quetta is situated on the borders of Afghanistan, and is admirably calculated to form a base of any hostile operations which the British Government might desire to take against that country. In the same winter of 1876 preparations were made for the movement of troops from Rawuliwala, and a bridge was thrown across the River Indus at Kooshalghur, the most direct line by which an advance might be made against Cabul.

33. On the 1st of January, 1877, the announcement of the assumption by the Queen of the title of Empress of India was made in great state at Delhi, and I believe that the Ameer of Cabul was invited to attend at that ceremony. This is not mentioned by Lord Cranbrook, and, if true, was, in my opinion, most injudicious, for it would, under the circumstances, have been interpreted by the Ameer as a desire to place him in the position of the Native Subordinate to the British Government. Neither he nor his Prime Minister, however, actually attended, and the negotiations between the latter and Sir Lewis Pelly commenced on the 27th of January, 1877, at Peshaun, and lasted for about six weeks.

The sine qua non of the negotiations was the acceptance by the Ameer, before the discussion of any other matters, of British officers to be stationed at Herat, and in other places in Afghanistan. It appears from Lord Cranbrook's despatch that a
treaty was to be negotiated, and the draft of it should be produced, in order to shew what demands were to be made upon the Ameer, and what he was to receive in return. After a few weeks it became known that the negotiations at Peshawur had failed. I believe that the Prime Minister, after much hesitation, and having at last been driven into a corner, told Sir Lewis Pelly that the Ameer would not agree to the location of British officers in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister died shortly afterwards, but Lord Cranbrook states that the bases of the negotiations had previously "been practically rejected." The Native British Agent who had hitherto been stationed at the Court of the Ameer was then withdrawn," and neither he nor any other Native Agent has since been sent to Cabul. It has been stated in the newspapers that about that time, or after the receipt of Lord Lytton's letter of July, Shere Ali shewed great hostility to the British Government, and that he proclaimed a "Jehad," or religious war, against us.

34. Between the transactions of which I have given what I believe to be a correct account, but which cannot be fully known until authentic accounts are produced, and the reception of a Russian Mission by Shere Ali, there was an interval of more than a year. The negotiations at Peshawur were concluded in February, 1877, and the Russian Mission arrived at Cabul on the 22nd of July, 1878. During that time, so far as I know, no communications passed between the Government of India and the Ameer. The British Government maintained, in Lord Cranbrook's words, "an attitude of vigilant reserve." We had, in fact, suspended diplomatic relations with the Ameer, and were on the verge of war with him before the incident of the reception of the Russian Mission and the refusal to receive our Mission occurred. Lord Lawrence has stated that after the withdrawal of our Agent from Cabul the Government of India prohibited the export of arms into Afghanistan.

35. To sum up shortly my opinion of what has taken place, I should say that from the year 1868 to 1876 a policy of friendship and forbearance was shewn by the British Government to Shere Ali; but that after 1876 that policy was changed for a policy of menace and interference. The whole course of proceedings must have led the Ameer to suppose, and not without good reason, that it was the intention of the British Government to change the policy which had hitherto been pursued towards him, if not to attack him. For this change I do not consider Lord Lytton is responsible. Lord Lytton has stated that he received his instructions upon the subject before he left England. The responsibility seems to me to rest, not upon the Viceroy, but upon Lord Salisbury and the British Cabinet. Lord Salisbury, as I have shewn in this memorandum, urged the Government of India when I was Viceroy to press Shere Ali to receive British officers in Afghanistan. The Government of India represented to him that in their opinion, and in the opinion of every one whom they had consulted who was competent to form an opinion upon the subject, such a course would be unwise and likely to endanger the friendship between us and the Ameer. He, however, contrary to these opinions, instructed Lord Lytton to do the very thing which the Government of India had protested against. The result, accompanied by other injudicious
proceedings, has been thoroughly to alarm Shere Ali, and to make him believe that instead of supporting him it was our desire to reduce Afghanistan to the position of one of the protected States of British India.

36. It has been said that the present estrangement of the Amee from our interests has not arisen from what has taken place since the year 1876, but that if Lord Mayo in 1869, or if I in 1873 had shown greater cordiality to him; if we had granted him the unconditional guarantee of protection for which he wished; if Lord Mayo had given to his heir the guarantee of British support for which he was especially anxious, affairs would have been in a different state; the Amee would have been our friend instead of suspending our intentions, and the present difficulties would not have arisen. I am not prepared to say that the feeling of Shere Ali towards the British Government was satisfactory when I left India in 1876; on the contrary, it had occasioned me some anxiety. The opinion of the Government of India of his situation and feelings is fully described in our despatch to Lord Salisbury of June, 1875, which, as expressing our view at a time long before the present difficulties arose, seems to me to be of sufficient importance to be quoted at length. We said:—*

* Government of India to Secretary of State, No. 19, of June 7th, 1875.

33. It is difficult to appreciate the feelings which influence the conduct of the Amee, Shere Ali, subject as he is to the risk of a revolution at home and apprehensions of attack from abroad. He cannot be expected to comprehend the language of European diplomacy, and his Ministers are imperfectly educated, of limited experience, and doubtful integrity. We believe, however, that he understands that the British Government have no designs of encroaching upon Afghan territory, and that the interests of British India and his own are identical, that he is seriously alarmed at the progress of Russia, and that his main reliance is placed upon British support. His language, after the return of his Envoy, Noor Mahomed Shah, from Simla, in 1873, was certainly far from satisfactory, but we are disposed to attribute it either to his impression that we were so anxious for his support that by assuming an attitude of dissatisfaction he might obtain further assistance from us; or to his disappointment that we had not given him the distinct pledge he asked, that the British Government would protect him under all circumstances against external attack, coupled, perhaps, with his discontent at the result of the Seistan arbitration.

34. Sir Richard Pollock, whose intimate acquaintance with Noor Mahomed Shah had given him the best means of forming a correct judgment of the Simla negotiations, and who, on his return to Peshawar in the beginning of 1874, obtained confidential information as to the sentiments of the Amee, stated his 'conviction that no unfavourable change whatever had occurred in the disposition of His Highness; that he leaned as much as ever on the British Government; and that he (Sir Richard Pollock) could find no symptoms whatever of an inclination on the part of the Amee, or on the part of those about him, to seek assistance from any other quarter. On the contrary,' (Sir Richard Pollock adds) 'it would appear that he looks with increasing distrust and suspicion on his northern neighbours; while Persia, his only other neighbour worth writing of, is his natural enemy.' Similar information has been received by us from other sources. We attach but little value to the vague rumours which have reached us from time to time that communications, unknown to the British Government, have passed between the Amee and Russian officers, or that Russian agents have penetrated Afghanistan. It must not be forgotten that such rumours are frequent in regard to those countries. Similar rumours prevailed with respect to our own communications with Bokhara, and are current even now as to our dealings with the Turkoman tribes, without any foundation in fact.

35. Since the Umballa Conferences the Amee has never shown any disposition to neglect our advice as to the external relations of Afghanistan. He accepted fully, although with great reluctance, the decision of the British Government in the Seistan arbitration, and we have no reason to doubt that he intends loyally to abide by it.

37. I believe that our opinion was correct; certainly it was founded upon that of those who were best able to form an accurate
opinion upon the subject, and we expressed a similar opinion in January, 1876. But for the purpose of argument I will assume that we were mistaken, and that Shere Ali entertained greater suspicions of the intentions of the British Government than we supposed. I will admit, moreover, although my opinion is directly to the contrary, that it would have been wise for the Government to have directed Lord Mayo or me to give to Shere Ali all the unconditional guarantee he required; but after all these admissions I hold that the policy which has been pursued since 1876 was most injudicious. I have already shewn that the Governments of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli did not offer to Shere Ali the unconditional guarantee of protection for which he wished. If Shere Ali was more suspicious of us than the Government of India imagined, if mistakes had been made before the year 1876, it appears to me that no course could have been followed more certain to increase that suspicion and to turn it into hostility than to urge Shere Ali to receive British officers in Afghanistan, when the Government knew that in the opinion of every one who was most competent to form a judgment upon the subject, such demands upon him were likely to be resented and refused. To accompany those demands by menacing language, by the occupation of Quetta, by pushing the Maharajah of Cashmere to advance towards Afghan territory, and by preparing a force which Shere Ali could hardly have supposed had any other object than to attack him, seems to me to have been a course which could have had no other result than to make him believe that an entire change had taken place in our policy towards him, and that he could no longer rely on the assurances of our good-will and of our desire to see Afghanistan strong and independent, which he had received from Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and myself.

November 23, 1878.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DESPATCH
OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Of the 10th of May, 1877.

The despatch from the Government of India to Lord Salisbury, of the 10th May, 1877, which will be found at page 160 of the Parliamentary papers on Afghanistan, contains in the first 21 paragraphs what is called a "brief recapitulation of our past relations" with Shere Ali, so far as they affect the more recent dealings with him. There is a good deal contained in this account with which I do not concur, and which I cannot accept as presenting an accurate history of the transactions with Shere Ali before Lord Lytton arrived in India. I, therefore, think it will be useful to reprint the paragraphs which are, in my view, calculated to convey inaccurate impressions, and to place, side by side, my remarks upon them. This will show in what points I think the historical review, given by Lord Lytton, is incorrect.

"Paragraph 3. The only formal obligation still extant between the British Government and the Bazarzai Rulers of Afghanistan is the Treaty of the 30th of March, 1855. This Treaty comprises three short articles. The first article established perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and Dost Mahomed Khan and his heirs; the second pledged the British Government to respect the territories then in His Highness's possession, and never to interfere therein; the third pledged the Dost, his heirs and successors, similarly to respect the territories of the British Government, and to be the friend of its friends, and enemy of its enemies, without any such corresponding obligation on our part. It did not take long to prove the somewhat imperfect character of the Treaty thus contracted. Two years afterwards, on the first occurrence of a crisis affecting British interests in Afghanistan, a much more complete engagement, stipulating for British Agencies in Ablul, Cundahar, and Balkh, and granting aid to the Ameer in money and arms, was entered into by Sir John Lawrence and Dost Mahomed. That engagement, though limited to the duration of the war then being waged between the British Government and the Shah of Persia, was declared by Lord Canning to be sound in principle, liberal, and simple; tending to redress the somewhat one-sided character of the Treaty of 1855, in which we appeared to take more than we gave; and His Excellency expressed an earnest hope that, independently of the war in which we were then engaged, the relations of the British Power with Afghanistan might remain upon a permanent footing, similar to that upon which the above-mentioned engagement had placed them."

The reference to Lord Canning appears to imply that he was in favour of establishing British Officers as
Residents in Afghanistan. If this was intended, it is by no means a correct account of Lord Canning's views upon the subject. Mr. Laing, who was a member of Lord Canning's Council, wrote a letter on the subject on 4th November last, which was published in the Daily News of the 5th November. He says that "Lord Canning's policy entirely coincided with that which had been advocated by Lord Lawrence in his recent letters to the Times," and adds:—"I recollect hearing Lord Canning explain fully the reasons which led him to prefer a Native to an English Resident at Cabul, even supposing that the Ameer did not object to receive one. They were, shortly, these: that the presence of an English Resident must necessarily tend to involve us in complications with Afghan affairs, which would inevitably lead us on to further interference, and end in our having to withdraw our Envoy, after having alienated the Afghans, or to establish a Protectorate supported by an army, a result which Lord Canning considered would be ruinous to the finances, and most detrimental to the true political interests of our Indian Empire." In the last paragraph of the despatch of the Government of India, dated January 28th, 1876 (page 155), we referred to the opinion of Lord Canning, and we supported our reference in a marginal note by giving the date of the Minute, the 6th of February, 1857, in which he expressed that opinion. The marginal note, however, has not been inserted in the papers printed by the Government. Lord Canning's words, in that Minute, were as follows:—"It would be an object to convince that" (the Afghan) "Government, and the people of Afghanistan, that they have nothing to fear from us unless when injury has been done to us, that we are ready to help them whenever they are attacked from without, just as we are now helping them, and that we have no desire to send a single Englishman, armed or unarmed, into their country, except with their own good will."

"Paragraph 4. Dost Mahomed Khan was informed, during the course of the negotiations of 1857, that the British Government's support and assistance of him would be conditional on its officers being received in Afghanistan with the countenance and protection of His Highness. They were not, however, to exercise authority, or command, on Afghan territory: their duty (in the performance of which the Ameer was expected to afford them every facility) being simply to give advice when required, and to obtain all the information needed by our Government. The readiness with which the Ameer and his Sirdars perceived the propriety of this condition was, it is said, remarkable; and the measure, although not unattended by risk, met with reasonable success. This, at any rate, may be assumed from a careful review of past records, and from the views entertained by the experienced Head of the Mission, then stationed at Candahar, in favour of a renewal, at the present moment, of the policy then adopted."

The opinion expressed that the residence of British Officers in Afghanistan in 1857 met with reasonable
success is diametrically opposed to the opinion expressed by the Government of India, when I was Viceroy, on the 28th January, 1876. In paragraph 26 of that despatch (page 155 of the Parliamentary papers), we quoted the experience of Major Todd, at Herat, in 1839, and of Colonel Lumsden, at Candahar, in 1857, to shew that the position of British Agents in Afghanistan, unless placed there with the cordial and hearty consent of the Ameer, would be both humiliating and useless. Lord Lawrence in the House of Lords, on the 15th of June, 1877, gave the following account of Colonel Lumsden's position at Candahar, in 1857:—"The old Ameer, Dost Mahommed, received two British officers, and allowed them to go to Candahar, where they remained so long as they could do so with safety. But the elder of them, the present Sir Harry Lumsden, assured him (Lord Lawrence) that owing to the espionage practised on him at Candahar, less information was obtainable there than could be got without difficulty at Peshawur"; and there is no man who knows so much of the history and position of that Mission as Lord Lawrence.

"Paragraph 5. It must, however, be observed that, although the residence of a British Mission at Cabul formed part of the stipulations agreed to in 1857, this step was not enforced by the British Government. The Dost urged that the Afghan people would view it with dislike; but Sir John Lawrence deemed it more probable that the real motive of this representation was the disinclination of His Highness to let British officers discover the weakness of his rule, or come in contact with disaffected chiefs at his capital. Provision was therefore made in the Treaty that, whenever the subsidy should cease, and the British officers have been withdrawn from the Ameer's country, a Vakil, not an European officer, should remain at Cabul on the part of the British Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Cabul. The stipulation thus agreed upon has, so far as the British Government is concerned, been tacitly observed, for convenience sake, from that day to this; but it is worthy of remark that the Government of Cabul withdrew its Vakil from Peshawur in 1858, and has never replaced him by another. With the exception of this last-mentioned provision, the obligations of the Treaty of 1857 were contracted for a special and limited purpose which has long since lapsed with the lapse of time; it fixed the relations of the British Government with the Ruler of Cabul, and their reciprocal obligations, for the duration of the war with Persia; and our only object in referring to it now is to bring to recollection the good feeling of the Afghan Ruler and people, some twenty years ago, in regard to the stationing of British missions in their territory, elsewhere than at Cabul."

I do not think that the account given in this paragraph of the Agreement of 1857 is a correct one. The seventh section of the Agreement is in the following words:—"Whenever the subsidy shall cease, the British Officers shall be withdrawn from the Ameer's country; but at the pleasure of the British Government a Vakil, not a European Officer, shall remain at Cabul." This seems to me to be tantamount to an agreement, on the part of the British Government, that European Officers should not be placed in Afghanistan after

* Afghanistan Papers, page 2.
the subsidy had ceased, excepting as the result of some future arrangement with the Ameer.

"Paragraph 7. That meeting was, however, carried out at Umballa, in March, 1869, by Lord Lawrence's successor, in a manner which laid the foundation of closer relations between the two neighbouring Powers, and enabled Shere Ali to consolidate his authority on his return to Cabul. The Ameer, in his conferences with the Viceroy, bitterly complained of the one-sided character of the existing treaty relations—those of 1855—between the two Governments, and earnestly solicited an amendment of them. Lord Mayo, however, was precluded, not only by the orders of Her Majesty's Government, but by his own convictions, from acceding to the wishes of His Highness. The policy of the Viceroy was, in his own words, an 'intermediate' one, susceptible of development in proportion to the subsequent consolidation of the Ameer's authority, and the continued good conduct of His Highness in his dealings with the British Government. In order, however, to meet, in some measure, the wishes of the Ameer, and to give him a tangible proof of the friendship of the British Government, Lord Mayo added a large gift of arms to that of the money already presented to His Highness; he, moreover, handed the Ameer a written assurance that the British Government would assist His Highness in strengthening his Government as circumstances might require, and would view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of His Highness's rivals to disturb his position as Ruler of Cabul. This document was in no way intended to have the force of a treaty; it was given to the Ameer in compliance with the earnest representations of His Highness that, without such an assurance, he would be unable to return to Cabul; and it is needless to observe that it did not commit the British Government to any unconditional protection of the Ameer, or to any liabilities which were not dependent on his future conduct towards us."

The version given in this paragraph of the negotiations between Lord Mayo and Shere Ali at Umballa, appears to me to omit the most essential feature of those negotiations, which was that the Ameer went away from the Umballa Conference satisfied with the assurances he had received, although he did not obtain all the assurances he desired. It was the general impression when I was in India that the Ameer returned with a feeling of satisfaction on the whole. Sir John Strachey, than whom no one knew more of Lord Mayo's views, has distinctly said so in his Minute giving an account of Lord Mayo's Administration, in the following language:—"The Ameer had come hoping for a fixed annual subsidy; for assistance to be given, not when the British Government might think fit to grant, but when he might think it needful to solicit it; and for a treaty laying the British Government under obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency, and not only the Afghan Government generally, but that Government as vested in himself and his direct descendants, and in no others. These hopes he was obliged to abandon; yet he went back to his dominions a contented man. For he carried back with him not only material assistance in money and arms, but an assurance of warm countenance and support such as had never before been given to any ruler in Afghanistan." When Sir Lewis Pelly, in his negotiations with the Prime Minister of Shere Ali at Peshawur in February, 1877,
endeavoured to make the latter admit that the Ameer was dissatisfied with the result of the Umballa Conference, he entirely failed in doing so, and the long discussion upon the subject which took place on the 5th February, and which will be found on page 199 in the Parliamentary papers, ended with these words from the Prime Minister: "In my opinion the Ameer returned from Umballa without anxiety."

Towards the end of this 7th paragraph it is stated that the document given by Lord Mayo to Shere Ali was in no way intended to have the force of a treaty. Such language appears to be exceedingly dangerous, especially as it is confirmed by similar language used by Lord Lytton in the letter written under his instructions by Sir Lewis Pelly to the Prime Minister of the Ameer on the 15th March, 1877. In that letter (at page 219 of the Parliamentary papers), after quoting an assurance given by me to the Ameer, Sir Lewis Pelly uses the words, "personal assurance." An inference might be drawn from the use of this expression, which would be a very dangerous inference indeed in India, namely, that the solemn assurances given by one Viceroy to an Indian Prince are not binding on his successor.

"Paragraph 8. We may here mention that there are undoubted grounds for the conviction expressed to your Lordship in our despatch, No. 19, of the 7th of June, 1875—a conviction since strengthened by reference to persons in Lord Mayo's confidence, who conversed frequently at Umballa with Shere Ali and his confidential Minister—that a readiness was then manifested on behalf of His Highness to agree to the presence of British Agents at any places in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself, on condition of more substantial assistance, and open support, than the British Government was willing to afford him in 1869."

There is no "conviction," to the effect stated in this paragraph, expressed in our despatch of 7th June, 1875 (par. 19), which will be found at page 131. After examining into the evidence of the statement that the Ameer, at the Umballa conference, had expressed willingness to receive British Agents anywhere but at Cabul, we reported our conclusion that "on the whole we thought that either the Ameer or his Minister did, in confidential conversations with Captain Grey (the Interpreter), express a readiness to accept the presence of British Agents." But I am not sure that a comparison of the two conversations of the Ameer's Minister with Captain Grey (page 173) even justifies the guarded inference at which we then arrived. For although in the first conversation, Captain Grey reports that the Minister said that the Ameer would gladly see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, in the second conversation,
when he was asked whether the Ameer would sanction Native Agents in Afghanistan, he replied that he did not wish to commit himself, and asked, rather anxiously, whether European Agents were intended. A comparison of the conversations leads to the inference that on the first day the Minister said more than he intended or was authorised to say, and that he shewed anxiety to withdraw what he then said, on the following day. The memoranda of Colonel Burne, Dr. Bellew, and Captain Grey himself written years afterwards (p. 173), are of no authority as against the note recorded at the time. But, however this may be, it is certain that the alleged evidence of a feeling on Shere Ali’s part in favour of receiving British Agents, is based on confidential conversations, and that it would be improper to base any official communication to the Ameer on such grounds. We pointed this out in paragraph 20 of our despatch of the 7th of June, 1875 (page 132). The discussion of this question would be unnecessary if it had not been raised in the instructions given to Sir Lewis Pelly. Those instructions (par. 7, page 187) contain distinct reference to the incorrect assumption as to the readiness of the Ameer to receive a British Agent in 1869; and Sir Lewis Pelly is actually directed to make use of this alleged readiness in his negotiation. I have since received the best possible evidence of the facts of the case. Mr. Seton Karr was Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in 1869, at the time of the Umballa Durbar. He states that he was the bearer of every confidential communication between Lord Mayo and the Ameer, and was present at every interview between them. He gave Lord Lawrence an account of what occurred in a letter dated the 5th of April, 1869, which he has authorised Lord Lawrence to use. In that letter there is the following paragraph:—“He” (Shere Ali) “is told that we don’t want British Officers as Residents at Cabul or anywhere else, and he says they would do him harm in the eyes of his people.”

"Paragraph 12. With these thoughts in his mind, His Highness deputed Syud Noor Mahomel Shah, in the summer of 1873, to wait upon Lord Northbrook, and submit this and other matters to the consideration of the Viceroy. The Envoy’s object appeared to be the establishment of an assumption on the part of the Ameer that both Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo had given His Highness unconditional promises of aid in money and arms—an assumption which Lord Northbrook at once refuted, reminding the Envoy that the British Government alone was to be the judge of the propriety of any request for assistance preferred by his master. The Viceroy, finding that the Envoy was instructed by Shere Ali to apply to the British Government for assistance, both present and prospective—the former for the purpose of strengthening the Government of Afghanistan, the latter with the view of meeting the contingency of actual aggression by a foreign power—and learning, moreover, that he was not satisfied with general assurances, telegraphed to Her Majesty’s Government for further instructions. On receipt of these he informed Syud Noor Mahomel that it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of actual or threatened
aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, which
would endeavour, by negotiation and by every means in its power, to
settle the matter and avert hostilities; but that, should these
endeavours prove fruitless, the British Government was prepared
to assure the Ameer that it would afford him assistance in the shape
of money and arms, and, in case of necessity, aid him with troops.
Lord Northbrook, however, deemed it advisable to avoid giving
Syed Noor Mahomed any more definite pledge than this, or to comply
with the request preferred by him for a distinct statement by the
British Government that, in the event of any aggression on the
Ameer's territories, it would consider the aggressor as an enemy to
itself.*

The impression conveyed in this paragraph, coupled
with the preceding one, is that the negotiations of
1873 were originated by the Ameer, and that the sole
object of his Prime Minister's coming to Simla in
that year was to represent Shere Ali's fears of
attack from Russia, and his desire of some specific
assurances of support. The same mistake has been
made by Lord Cranbrook, in the 8th paragraph of his
despatch to Lord Lytton, of the 18th November, 1878
(page 262). The fact is that I commenced the proceed-
ings by requesting Shere Ali to receive a British
Officer at Cabul. He, on the other hand, preferred
that his Prime Minister should come to Simla in the
first instance, and I agreed to his suggestion. The
subjects on which I wished to communicate with Shere
Ali were: the Seistan arbitration, and the acceptance
by Russia of the Northern boundary of Afghanistan.
The representation which the Ameer desired his Prime
Minister to make of his fears of Russian attack was
not the direct object of his journey. It is obvious
that there is a very great distinction between a special
mission being sent by the Ameer for a particular
object, and that object being added to the transaction
of other business, the discussion of which was originated
by me. The account in the 12th paragraph of the
assurances given by me to the Prime Minister is correct,
but it conveys a very different impression from that
given by Lord Cranbrook, in the 9th paragraph of his despatch of the 18th November (page 262).

* Paragraph 13. During the presence at Simla of the Afghan Env-
voy the subject of the location of British Agents in Afghanistan became, as
in 1865, a topic of discussion. Our Foreign Secretary suggested the
deputation of a British officer, of high standing and in the full con-
denance of the British Government, to the Court of the
Ameer, as the best preventive of the danger apprehended by
His Highness; this officer could advise Shere Ali as to the cir-
stances of each case, and the action which, in cases of
emergency, it might be necessary to take till the Government of
India could be communicated with; whilst such a measure need not
be followed by the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, which
would be incompatible with the pledges given by Prince Gorchakov to
Her Majesty's Government. The object of the location of British
Agents in Afghanistan would, Mr. Aitchison said, be primarily to
obtain accurate information on all matters affecting the external
relations of Afghanistan, whilst in no way exercising interference in
its internal affairs. The Envoy expressed his general concurrence in
the principle of some such arrangement, but declined to recommend to
the Ameer any specific proposal for giving effect to it, on the ground
that it might occasion mistrust and misapprehension. He suggested, as an alternative, the deputation of a British officer to inspect the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan, who could enter by Candahar and return by Cabul, and be again deputed to the capital, if necessary, at a later period. Such a course would, he said, familiarise the Ameer and the people of Afghanistan with the idea of receiving a permanent British representative, and eventually effect the desired object."

It is here stated that the Afghan Envoy declined to recommend to the Ameer any specific proposal for the location of British Agents in Afghanistan. The words he used were, that "speaking as a friend, and in the interests both of his own and of the British Government, he could not recommend that a specific request should be preferred to the Ameer for British Officers to be stationed at certain given places." It was a distinct opinion, expressed by him, that it would be unwise for the British Government to press the Ameer to receive those Officers, and as such the Government of India referred to it in the 22nd paragraph of our despatch of the 7th June (page 132).

"Paragraph 15. The Envoy left Simla without having obtained the avowed object of his mission. On bidding farewell to those members and officers of the Government of India with whom he had been associated during the course of it, the Syed was profuse in his expressions of personal gratitude for the hospitality of his entertainment, and the courtesy with which he had been treated. But no sooner had he returned to Cabul than it became apparent that his feelings towards the British Government were most unfriendly; and from that time forward his influence in the Cabul Durbar, which we believe to have been considerable, was exerted on every occasion to the prejudice of our relations with the Ameer."

The first line of this paragraph conveys, as before, the incorrect impression that the Mission of the Ameer's Prime Minister to Simla was for the purpose only of representing the desire of the Ameer for further assurances. The statement that the Prime Minister, after his return to Cabul, shewed unfriendly feelings towards the British Government, and that his influence was exerted on every occasion to the prejudice of our relations with the Ameer, appears to me to rest upon very slight authority. So far as I can gather from the papers, it depends entirely upon the statement of our British Native Agent, as recorded in a conversation held at Simla, on the 27th October, 1876 (page 181). The whole tenor of the Conference between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Prime Minister, in 1877, seems to me to shew that he was desirous, if possible, of preserving the British alliance. With regard to the negotiations of 1873, although strongly pressed by Sir Lewis Pelly to admit that the Ameer was dissatisfied with the result of those negotiations, the Prime Minister entirely declined to make any such admission. He gave a fairly accurate account of the negotiations. He said that, at first, the assurances given by me were left obscure as to the nature of the assistance to be afforded to the Ameer,
but that, after certain conferences with the Foreign Secretary, at last “all the subjects were thoroughly discussed, and nothing was left unconsidered.” He said, on more than one occasion, that the friendship between the British Government and the Ameeर was left undisturbed when I left India, in 1876. The conversations will be found in the Afghanistan papers (pages 203-6).

“Paragraph 16. At the close of the Simla conferences the Viceroy presented the Ameeर with £100,000 and 20,000 rifles. But, notwithstanding His Excellency’s gifts and assurances, the attitude of the Ameeर became increasingly frigid, sullen, and discourteous. His Highness evinced deep disappointment at the result of his Envoy’s interviews with the Viceroy. To all appearance, whilst mistrusting our repeated assurances that he had nothing to fear from the rapid and unchecked advance of Russia towards his Asiatic frontier, he had nevertheless persuaded himself that, in any emergency, the British Government would be compelled, by its own interests, to afford him unconditional assistance. Under this impression he seemed to believe that, in the meanwhile, he might with impunity disregard its advice, and reject its offers of conditional protection.

In the last two lines it is said that the Ameeर believed that he might, with impunity, disregard the advice of the British Government, and reject its offers of conditional protection. This state of mind on the part of Shere Ali must have arisen since I left India, for there is ample proof in the papers laid before Parliament that he complied with the advice given him by me upon several occasions since the date of the negotiations of 1873, particularly as regards his relations with the Turkomans; and I received no intimation whatever of any inclination on his part to reject the assurances of protection which I had given to him.

“Paragraph 17. The fallacy of these views lay in their erroneous estimate of the political necessities of this Government, which are as adverse to the wholly uncontrolled personal action of any Afghan ruler as they are favourable to the territorial independence of Afghanistan. It may, however, be admitted that the Ameeर was at this time led, not altogether without cause, to hope and seek from the British Government evidence more conclusive than he had yet received of its professed regard for his interests. The arms and money denied to His Highness at a time when they might, perhaps, have saved his country and himself from prolonged civil war, were subsequently given to him when his need of them was infinitely less, and his cause for gratitude proportionally small. But the particular form of support which, as the established legitimate Ruler of Afghanistan, he then most needed was again refused him, at the time when, if given, it would have been best appreciated. On the part of the British Government he had seen nothing but extreme caution in committing itself to his support, whilst it lost no opportunity of assuring His Highness of its friendship with Russia and its reliance on her promises. On the part of Russia he saw nothing but a system of aggression on territories neighbouring his border, and a series of pledges unfulfilled. He had been officially informed in 1869 by Lord Mayo that the Government of the Czar would not intervene in Afghanistan, and would recognise as his all the territories then in his possession; and yet he was shortly afterwards bent with communications from General Kaufman which seemed to him inconsistent with this assurance; nor was it till nearly three years afterwards that Russia finally withdrew her strong opposition to the recognition of his authority over a most important portion of his territories. Again the promised restoration of Samarcand by Russia to the Ameeर of Bokhara had been formerly announced to him by us, and yet evaded; whilst he found the pledge of the Russian
Government not to annex Khiva virtually disregarded, and the Russian forces firmly established on the Oxus, close to his own frontier."

The statement at the conclusion of this paragraph does not give a correct account of the case. I have drawn up, in a separate paper, an account of the correspondence between General Kauffmann and Shere Ali. I found that General Kauffmann was in the habit of sending, from time to time, letters to the Ameer, and when I was in India there was nothing in these letters inconsistent with the opinion which Lord Mayo had entertained, that they were unobjectionable. Neither he nor I entertained so great a fear of Russia as to be alarmed at friendly letters thus passing between General Kauffmann and the Ameer, and to have taken offence at them would have been altogether inconsistent with what I knew of the relations between England and Russia up to the time when I left India in April, 1876. The reference to the opposition made by Russia to the authority of the Ameer, "over a most important portion of his territories," is not fair to the Russian Government. There was very considerable doubt as to the exact boundary of Afghanistan to the north-east, and I consider that the Russian Government were justified in raising a discussion upon the point. The British Government, on the conclusion of the negotiations, expressed their satisfaction at the acceptance by the Russian Government of the boundary proposed by them. The assertion that the pledge of the Russian Government not to annex Khiva was thoroughly disregarded does not seem to me to be consistent with the facts of the case, and the Russian fort on the Oxus, Petro Alexandrovsk, opposite Khiva, is at least 350 miles from the Afghan frontier. In fact, its establishment cannot have any direct reference to a possible future design on Afghanistan.

"Paragraph 18. In such circumstances it is, perhaps, hardly to be wondered at that the assurances given to His Highness by Lord Northbrook in 1872 failed to satisfy the Ameer, or to restore that confidence and good feeling which, for some time previously, had been upon the wane. His reply to Lord Northbrook’s letter, submitted to him through his Envoy, was ungracious and evasive. He accorded no further notice to the Viceroy’s proposals for sending an officer to inspect his boundaries than the curt statement that he had read and understood them; he hesitated for some time to receive the arms that were sent for his acceptance; and the subsidy of ten lakhs of rupees, lodged to his credit at the Kohat Treasury, he contumaciously rejected. Moreover, in terms positively offensive, he refused to permit any English officer to enter his territories; and peremptorily prohibited Sir D. Forsyth from passing through Cabul on the return of that officer, in the capacity of British Envoy, from Kashgar to India. In his recent interesting narrative of the journey of Syud Yakooob Khan to Russia, Captain Molley reports, and comments on, the prejudicial effect of this unfriendly act upon our position in Kashgar, and our prestige throughout Central Asia. Of such conduct, on the part of the Ameer, the reports received from our Native Agent at Cabul afforded no intelligible explanation. Of the actual condition of affairs in Afghanistan, of the projects and
The whole of this paragraph, written in May, 1877, and describing events that occurred in 1873 and 1874, when I was Governor-General, does not represent the opinion of the Government of India at the time with respect to the conduct or disposition of the Ameer. Doubtless it represents the opinion of Lord Lytton in May, 1877, but it is probable, at least, that opinions formed and expressed by the Government of India, at the time, are more likely to be accurate than those formed and expressed by their successors at a subsequent period. We considered that we could not fairly object to the refusal of the Ameer to permit Sir Douglas Forsyth to return from Kashgar, through Afghanistan. See paragraph 25 of our despatch of the 7th June (page 132). We gave our opinion of the motives and state of mind of the Ameer in the same despatch, in the 33rd and 34th paragraphs (page 134), and again in our despatch of the 28th January, 1876. We had, what we believed to be, sufficient information of the condition of affairs in Afghanistan, of the projects and proceedings of Shere Ali, of his military forces, of the sentiments of his advisers, and of the circumstances of his subjects. Our opinion upon this, again, was given in our despatch of 7th June, 1875 (page 130), in the tenth and following paragraphs; and as the Secretary of State did not fully understand our opinion, as was shown in his despatch of the 19th November, 1875, paragraph 2 (page 147), we again expressed it in our despatch of the 28th January, 1876, paragraphs 3 and 4, giving references in the margin to the diaries of our Native Agent, which shewed to our mind conclusively that his reports could not have been seen by the Ameer. The Agent, so far as appears from any evidence that has yet been produced, never failed to supply us with information respecting all events of importance that occurred in Afghanistan. The reference to these diaries is not given in the
despatch as printed in the papers (page 150, paragraph 24).

"Paragraphs 19, 20, and 21. Such was the condition of our relations with Afghanistan when we received your Lordship's despatch [No. 3, 23rd January, 1875], conveying to us the instructions of Her Majesty's Government to take an early opportunity for improving them, if possible, by endeavouring to secure the Ammir's assent to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. We informed your Lordship that, whilst fully appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from such an arrangement, we could not disguise from ourselves the practical difficulties of carrying it out; and that, for any immediate attempt to overcome them, the time and circumstances appeared to us inopportune. In fact, the late Viceroy was of opinion that precautionary measures in regard to Afghanistan might be advantageously deferred till the Russian frontier had been pushed on to Merv. It would then, in the opinion of his Excellency, be necessary to give more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan, and be probably desirable to enter into a treaty engagement with him, followed by the natural consequence of the establishment of British Agencies upon his frontier.

"Your Lordship informed us in reply [No. 34, 19th November, 1875] that it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to concur in this opinion. If the Russians advanced their frontier to Merv the time would probably have passed when representations to the Ammir could be made with any useful result. The Ammir's reported and very probable disinclination to the establishment of a British Agency in his country might possibly be overcome if His Highness could be convinced of the inability of the British Government to maintain the integrity of his dominions without this precautionary condition. At any rate, the attempt was, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, well worth making without further delay, since such delay was unjustified by any prospect of spontaneous change for the better in the ascendant tendency of Central Asian affairs, or any initiative on the part of the Ammir for the improvement of his relations with the British Government. Your Lordship, therefore, renewed the injunction, previously made on the subject of a special mission to Cabul, for the above-mentioned purpose.

"On receipt of the despatch conveying to us this expression of the views of Her Majesty's Government, we asked [No. 10 of 28th January, 1876] your Lordship for further instructions, pointing out that any overtures to Shere Ali, of the kind commended to our adoption, would probably provoke from His Highness counter demands which could not be satisfied without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government. All the recent conduct and language of this Prince had pointed to the conclusion that he cared little, or not at all, for such eventual protection of his country as political necessities might oblige us, in any case, to afford it against foreign aggression; and that what he really did care to obtain from us was some unconditional pledge of personal and dynastic support to himself and family. On this point we desired to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government before proceeding further. Those views [No. 33, of 28th February, 1876] were received by us at the hands of the present Viceroy, and immediately commanded our careful consideration. In the main they removed the chief ground of our objection to any step which might have the effect of bringing to a crisis the relations of this Government with the present Ruler of Afghanistan, by informing us that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to enter into a more definite, equilateral, and practical alliance with His Highness. Our consideration of your Lordship's above-mentioned instructions was also influenced to some extent by the information which the present Viceroy was enabled to place before us, after personal conference, not only with Her Majesty's Government, but also with the Russian Ambassador in England on the general circumstances of the situation we were now called upon to deal with. Whilst still alive to the difficulties and risks inseparable from any attempt to enter into closer and more侦察able intercourse with a barbarous and often suspicious, discontented, and untrustworthy as Shere Ali, we certainly could not regard with unconcern the increasing inconvenience, and possible peril, of the extremely ambiguous and uncertain character of our existing relations with him. It was impossible to deny that the practical results of the Afghan policy, patiently pursued by us for several years, were far from satisfactory."

These paragraphs which purport to represent the opinions of the Government of India, as given in our
despatches of the 7th June, 1875, and 20th January, 1876, with reference to the wisdom of entering into negotiations with Shere Ali for the establishment of British Agencies in Afghanistan, altogether fail to convey the opinions which we held upon the subject. More especially, the language of paragraph 21 is calculated to give an entirely incorrect impression of our views. It would appear from that paragraph that we thought that the Ameer would be prepared to accept British Officers in Afghanistan, if he received in return some unconditional pledge of personal and dynastic support for himself and his family. Our despatches, on the contrary, represented our strong opinion that the Ameer could not be induced willingly to agree to the proposal, and we asked for the instructions of Her Majesty's Government in respect to pledges of support, not because we recommended that they should be given, nor because we believed that if they were offered the negotiations would be successful, but because we could not embark in the negotiations without those instructions.

It is quite incorrect to infer, as is done in the paragraph, that the views communicated by the Secretary of State to the Government of India, of 28th February, 1876, would have "removed the chief ground of our objection to any step which might have the effect of bringing to a crisis the relations of this Government with the present Ruler of Afghanistan." Of course I have no pretension to explain what the views of Lord Lytton were, but I can say, without the slightest hesitation, that the objections unanimously entertained by the Government of India in June, 1875, and in January, 1876, were not objections founded upon any minor points, but objections to the policy of endeavouring to force upon the Ameer a measure which, the opinions of every one who had a knowledge of his character, and the evidence afforded by antecedent events, convinced us would be received by him with mistrust and be most probably rejected.

December 5, 1878.

NORTHBROOK.
AFGHANISTAN, No. 3.

FURTHER PAPERS

RELATING TO THE

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CORRESPONDENCE.

No. 1.

Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Send Home full text of conversations of 1869 between Amir and Mayo, and between Kabul Minister and others, and record of Amir's secret Council; also text of conversations of 1873 between Kabul Minister and Aitchison.

No. 2.

Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, dated Lahore, 5th December 1878.

Your telegram, 5th December, requiring papers, conversations of 1869. Have telegraphed Calcutta for records; will send whatever papers are found.

No. 3.

Foreign Department.—Secret, No. 147.

To the Right Honourable Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord,

Camp, Lahore, 12th December 1878.

I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's telegram, dated 5th December 1878, calling for copies of various papers connected with Kabul affairs. I enclose duplicates of all the papers which it has been possible to collect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lytton.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Secret Council held by the Amir in the Fort of Lahore in the Samman Burj on the 17th March 1869.

His Highness the Amir of Kabul - President.
1. Syad Nūr Muhammad Shah - -
2. Ishak Akasi Sherdil Khan - - Members.
3. Mirza Muhammad Hussan, Mir Munshi -

Question put by the Amir.

Should the British inquire what is your object and desire, what reply should be given?

Reply given by No. 1 Member.

"As far as possible, nothing should be said which would indicate want or covetousness. But only this should be said, that regarding the house of the British as your own house, it was necessary that you should have expressed your desire to meet the British authorities, and evinced your good-will and friendship towards the British Government; therefore, your Highness first intimated your desire to do so, and having been asked to come over, you have come down; that your Highness has been much pleased, and has no other object than that the British Government should treat you with patronizing kindness."
The Amir and the second and third Members:—"Yes; this would be the proper reply."

Ishak Akasi Sherdil, the second Member, said:—"Notwithstanding this, if the British authorities should insist and say that your Highness should nevertheless say what your desires are, and the Government would accede to them, then your Highness should say that you are much obliged for the assistance which Her Majesty has given you, without any wish to interfere with your Government. Your Highness should then go on to say that the British authorities should, in the first instance, inform you of their sentiments, and you would then give a reply."

The Amir and the other Members approved of this suggestion.

Syad Nūr Muhammad Shah said:—"Should the opening of the Khasbar route and the chastisement of the Afridi, Momand and Shanwari tribes be urged on you here also, as the Commissioner of Peshawar at the first interview said to some of our men, that the Amir should be persuaded to open out the Khasbar route and to make a road, it should be replied that these are matters of minor importance; the most important matter of all should be attended to, which is this: that Russia is daily extending its conquests and has come up to the confines of Balkh and Herāt. The British Government should take measures openly for the protection of those borders; and you were prepared with your heart and property to oppose the Russians for the sake of protecting your country and in deference to the wishes of the British Government. Lastly, that your Highness would in no way fall short of evincing your good-will and friendship towards the British Government. Let the British Government state the measures they propose to take in this matter; the external enemy should be first attended to."

The Amir and the other Members concurred in, and approved of, this suggestion.

The Amir then said:—"Should the British authorities propose that a European Agent be stationed at Kabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such arrangement, but the people of Kabul are turbulent and mischievous. Should such European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Amir, my father, on these very considerations, refused to have a European Agent at his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior, at places like Kaudahr, or Balkh, or Herat, there would be no objection. Such an arrangement would be advantageous to both the Governments; for instance, at the present time the people of Lower Seistan have commenced encroachments on the Kaudahr boundaries. Lower Seistan was formerly always attached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by Persia only since a short time. We are not aware what agreement exists between the British and Persian Governments regarding Lower Seistan. If there should be a European Agent on the border, he would be possessed of the necessary information, and would be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to territories beyond the borders."

All the Members approved of what the Amir had said.

The first and second Members said:—"Doubtless, the reply to be given to the requests of the British authorities should be to the effect, that the object is to maintain cordial and sincere alliance between the two States. Your Highness can accede to the wishes of the British Government only so far as is compatible with the wishes of your people, your religion, and your authority, so that nothing may happen at any time opposed to the mutual friendly relations."

"The policy of your Highness should be in the first instance to ascertain the sentiments of the British Government. Should the authorities express themselves verbally; they should be asked to reduce them to writing, so that we may discuss them in our own Councils, and then your Highness could state your views after due deliberation."

After this the Amir sent for the treaties entered into between the late Amir and the British Government, and perused them.

His Highness then said that he approved of the determination come to in the Council.

I expect that the Amir will express himself to the above effect to the Government. I have ascertained the result of the discussion, and submit the same for the information of the Government.

His Highness individually is a sincere friend of the Government; but in regard to some matters he is suspicious of his brothers and the tribes."

(Sd.) X. Y.

The 18th March 1869.
Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Notes of the First Meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and His Highness the Amir of Kabul, at 4 p.m., 29th March 1869.

Present:
1. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.
2. Sir Donald Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor.
3. His Highness the Amir.
4. The Minister of His Highness, Nur Muhammad, Syad.
5. The Foreign Secretary, W. S. Seton-Karr, Esq.

After compliments, and an expression of His Excellency's hope that the Amir had been satisfied with his reception, the Viceroy intimated to him that it was the firm desire of the British Government to see established at Kabul a just, strong, and independent government, in whose administration the Government of India would exercise no interference, and which should not bear the appearance of being maintained mainly by extraneous aid. His Excellency added that this would, in a great measure, depend on the Amir himself.

The Amir, for some time, could not apprehend the exact force of His Excellency's words, and he kept on repeating that a great deal depended on the Government of India, and on the line of policy which it proposed for itself in future; that he was disposed to look to that Government in all things; and that assistance and support must be open in order to be useful.

After the views of the Viceroy had been fully and clearly explained to His Highness, His Excellency told him in pointed language that he must now state distinctly by what particular acts of ours we could help him to establish a strong and independent rule at Kabul.

To this the Amir replied that he had already committed his sentiments to writing; that he had explained his views both to Sir John Lawrence and to the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab; and that the friendship with his father was a "dry friendship" and one-sided; he seemed unwilling, though rather pressed on the subject, to give any more distinct or decided expression to his feelings and wishes, though his Minister at last explained that they were—first, guarantee of Amir and family against all comers whilst in actual possession of the throne; second, such present assistance in money and arms as could be given.

His Excellency again pressed the Amir to state distinctly the precise mode in which he thought we could help him, but he replied in general terms. At last he broke out, and with great vehemence declared that the premature recognition of Azim Khan in November 1867 had been the main cause of all the bloodshed and misery which had since occurred; that Azim Khan at that time did not hold the whole of Afghanistan; that he was not the lawful ruler; and that it was our recognition which enabled the usurper to hold his position for two years. The tardy recognition of himself in 1863 seemed also to rankle in his mind; and in regard to the treaty with the Dost in 1855 he said it was a one-sided treaty and a "dry friendship."

Sir Donald MacLeod here observed to me, in English, that he was extremely surprised at this statement; that he had been on most confidential terms with the Amir since his arrival, and that he had never in any way referred to the subject.

From this Lord Mayo at once saw the real object of his visit, which was to obtain from us a promise that in no case would we repeat the policy of 1867, and acknowledge a de facto ruler while any part of Afghanistan remained in his hands. He declared at great length on this point, and became very excited. His Excellency told him that they were not there to discuss past events; that their business was with the present, and to provide against evils for the future.

At length, after some hesitation and conversation in Pushtu with his Minister, Nur Muhammad, he declared that it was his earnest wish that the Government of India should recognize and acknowledge not only himself but his lineal successors, or successors in blood (man-wa-aalad-i-man*), and this phrase he repeated several times with great earnestness and emphasis. He explained again, and at some length, that to acknowledge the ruler pro tem, and de facto was to invite competition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts of candidates; that if the British Government would recognize him and his dynasty there was nothing that he would not do in order to evince his gratitude, and to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular and support them with his means and his life, it being understood that the slightest failure on his or his descendants' part should vitiate all engagements on ours.

* Nuskan bi'd Nuskan, or generation to generation.
The Viceroy here remarked that it was impossible to prophesy or to anticipate events, that we must deal with the present, and that His Highness could not expect him to enter into engagements as to a state of circumstances which might never occur.

At another period of the discussion he urged that friendship between nations and states could not remain hidden; and that a man might just as well try to extinguish the sun by putting his hand before his face; that whatever assistance was afforded to him by the British Government could not remain concealed, and would lose its value if it could, but must be known to all States in India and Asia.

To this His Excellency replied that mystery or concealment was the last course he should ever take; that the acts of the British Government must have shown His Highness that our friendship for him was open and warm; that his predecessor had, at a most critical moment, supplied him with money and arms; and that he himself had publicly admitted that to those acts he mainly owed his throne; that the splendour and consideration with which he had been received at Umballa would show to the world the estimation in which he was held; and that we had no intention to deviate from the course which we had adopted since he had last regained his throne; that we desired to see him firmly established as Ruler of Kabul; and that he should speedily establish tranquillity and good government throughout all his territories.

The Amir then said that the tranquillity of the country, which the Viceroy had so much at heart, would be the natural consequence of the security of his power and dynasty, and that all things, including the increase of trade (which results from the prosperity and wealth of a nation), which the British Government might desire, would follow from the establishment of a firm and permanent government.

After much conversation of this character, it was arranged that the Viceroy should send the Amir a letter the next day, in which the desire of the Government for a strong and independent rule would be set forth, as well as its deep interest in the affairs of Afghanistan, and its personal recognition of, and friendship for, himself; and he was informed that the Government, as circumstances would permit, would consider his attention to trade and commerce, and raising it to what it had been in the past, and that all things, including the increase of trade (which results from the prosperity and wealth of a nation), which the British Government might desire, would follow from the establishment of a firm and permanent government.

This assurance seemed partly to satisfy him; and he was altogether, at this part of the conference, in a different frame of mind after the above incident than he was at first, when he seemed suspicious that our expressions meant more than appeared or than he understood.

His Excellency then directed his attention to trade and commerce, and the facilities of intercourse between India and Afghanistan, the Amir always replying that trade had been much impaired and interrupted by intestine wars, and that, with order and harmony, trade and commerce would flourish again.

As regards routes into India, he announced his determination of reviving the subsidy paid to the Khaibaris, and raising it to what it had been in the time of his father. He said that besides the route into India by the Khaibar Pass there are two other routes in the same range which turned off before the locality where the Khaibaris had the power of stopping the traffic; and there was also a road through the Kurram Valley, and another one into the Derajat; "Tatima" and "Kurappa" through the Momunds, whose chief was connected with him by marriage, and under his entire influence, and which had always been safe; the "Peiwar," which he hoped to render practicable; the "Gwaleyri," which he could not do much in, but which was only the Povindah Pass, and always had been, and would be, traversed by those merchants with the strong right hand.

He spoke of the roads leading to Turkestan, generally recommending that via Kandahar and Herat as safe and easy throughout its length. All routes through the Paropamisus were safe, but very difficult till they reached the plains of Balkh. The Khulum or Tāshkurgān (Big stone) route, however, was habitually traversed, and, as being the shortest from Kabul and Peshāwar, would receive his attention.

All these would be kept open. He added that the custom dues had fallen off immensely since the time of his father, owing to these commotions and this warfare, and that he hoped they might again be raised to their ancient figure, which he put at 28 or 30 lakhs.

He was then told that the Government of India wished to present him with some artillery, and he was asked whether he would prefer a field battery or two siege guns and a howitzer. He expressed a great desire for breech-loading guns as striking terror into his enemies.

His Excellency told him that the Government would consider the matter.

The interview ended.
Enclosure 3 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM ON CONVERSATIONS held with the Confidential Minister of His Highness the Amir Sher Ali by Captain Grey, on Special Duty with His Excellency the Viceroy, on the 31st March 1869.

The Amir is prepared to act on what he may see is the nature of the friendship the British propose to afford him—if, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the ruler of Kabul de facto, well and good; but if prepared to acknowledge and support him and the heir he may point out (acknowledges that any such must be distinctly brought forward now, the contrary having produced the present troubles), there is nothing he will not accede to.

He is open to any proposition for securing his northern border; while doubtful of any Russian Power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part, or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an Agent or engineer superintendent there* (in Bakh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Kabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger for such, did they respect the Afghans and themselves, and Afghan enmity is far more bitter against Persians and their friends than ever it was against us at the bitterest; and, with us acting as their friends, they will co-operate with a hearty friendship and energy in the field which we can little imagine. Our troops would have no work save in the actual shock of battle; every other military duty would be performed, and requisites supplied so effectually that no thought or precaution on the part of columns or garrisons of ours would be required.

With regard to the western frontier he leaves it to our sense of our own dignity and his to oppose this infraction of the treaties of 1856-7, and rectify the border between Ghain and Lash Jowain to twenty farsangs (a farsang is three and a half miles) west of the latter, as it has been since the days that Dost Mahomed recaptured Kandahar and its appanages from Kohlen Dil Khan. He would require nothing but arms and treasure, and would himself act against the Persians, thus showing his sincerity and the non-existence of relations between himself and them; he merely would ask that, under the terms of the treaty, we would, on reference to us, support him in objecting to its infraction by the Persians. The aggression is formidable from the commanding positions assumed on the communications, not from the value of the tract itself.

With regard to the eastern border, he would undertake to manage all the Berdoon tribes. He proposes to introduce a thorough reform into his administration, whereby his sons will not be independent princes as under the Dost, but governors of provinces;‡ and being more directly subordinate and weaker, will merely collect and remit his revenues and carry out his amelioration policy of direct collection and cash payments; the effects of this will eventually extend to the tribes; meanwhile he will make their principal men his own by allowances, and will also, by force if necessary, check every further attempt to give us trouble.

With regard to trade, he will undertake to make the principal routes safe; those of the Paropamisus are so; the Herat route always was so; and though the Khulum one is at present closed, his troops will clear Tukhtapoori on his return. Through the Sulimance Range he will secure the Khailbar, Tata and the Gwaleyri route by "Mowajibs" (allowances). He recalls to the mind of the Government how that when Yakoob Khan’s mother's brother, Siaudit Khan, was complained against merely by the Commissioner of Peshawar he removed him, confined him, and he died in confinement, and the substitution of a safe man kept many thousand Mohmunus out of the fray (Ambela). He appeals to this specimen of what he was willing to and could do when not bound to the Government in any way, as a proof of the friendship he can now display.

When the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab sent him written questions, he did not know his ground, and answered evasively; he now speaks openly and specifically; his wish is to return hearty friendship with entire confidence, and puts himself at the disposal of the Government. He himself has throughout sought our friendship; had it been extended three years ago, when the reasons which hold good now were equally strong, when his own case was better, and his cause stronger, three years' affliction would have been spared. When the Wazir recommended him, after the refusal of 1867, to try once again, he determined he would not till he had recovered Kabul for himself, he did so, and then he wrote; now it is afforded he will show himself worthy of it. He will, with our help, arrange the country somewhat, and then commence any internal measures we may wish and receive any officers we may desire.

(Signed) H. Grey.

(True Copy.)

(Signed) W. S. Seton-Karr.

* On the northern border.

† This he has done.
The Minister began the conversation with saying that he thought we wished him to commit himself. The Commissioner and the Foreign Secretary took considerable pains to re-assure him. The Minister then said—"You have given us guns, treasure, &c., &c. You would not do so without some special motive. What is your motive?" The Secretary answered—"In order that the Government on our borders may be independent and strong, just as Kashmir and Nepal are." As a proof of our good intentions, the late policy with respect to the Kashmir succession was explained to the Minister. Upon this the Minister said that he accepted the explanation, and would not credit us with ulterior motives. He hoped we should have a good understanding, and the advantage of it to us would be that were the Russians or other enemy to come, even though the Afghans of themselves could not successfully keep them out of their country, they could harass them in every way. The fact of the good understanding will spread fast over Asia. Ten thousand will know it this year; twenty-thousand next year, and then a lakh, and so on. "We know the Russians," he continued, "to be great tyrants, and not so trustworthy as you. In old days in Afghanistan you showed a want of consideration to those who were most entitled to it." From the public reception at which he was present the other night he saw that this policy had been put aside, and that little Native princes of the Punjab, such as he had met, were fairly and honourably treated. "You do not want our country, and, were you to get it, there would be no "profit to you."

Referring to the first question, the Minister said that kingcraft belongs to Kings, and trade to traders; but still the more trade prospers the greater will be the customs due of the Kings. Any road by which we wish traders to pass to and fro into his country shall be maintained and be kept safe. The horses of Afghanistan go mostly to Bombay and Bangalore; they are passed by Committees into the Government service, and command prices from Rs. 500 to Rs. 600. The horse trade with Peshawar has fallen off considerably owing to a less demand. If the merchants in one year sell a thousand at Government prices, a second year they would probably send fifteen hundred; and on the contrary, if no remounts were required for a year or two, merchants would have to sell their horses to private individuals for smaller sums.

At Mr. Thornton’s request, under instructions from the Lieutenant-Governor, the question was put whether the Amir would object to the establishment of a public post for the benefit of traders and others. The Minister answered that there would be no objection whatever.

It is the wish of the British Government that on his return to Kabul the Amir, as soon as circumstances will permit, should indicate the passes which might be most adapted for trade, and should consider how he could make them safe and practicable, and the British Government, on receiving intimation to the above effect, will give general publicity to the same for the trading public. "In the way of friendliness, and not in the way of enmity, I dread one thing," he said, "so very parti-
cular and exacting. I make a promise, and then, supposing I do not perform it to the day and hour, you are down upon me at once, and keep on writing letters to spur me on. I may have been breaking my heart probably to keep to my word, but you will allow nothing for change of circumstances."

The Minister referred to his answer already given to the Punjab Government, that when the Amir returned he would do all in his power to conciliate the tribes and keep the people in order, and said he considered this the best answer which could be given. By forbearance with the tribes confidence will be instilled amongst them, "but it is of no use for you to take a stick on one side and we on the other." The Amir is ready to encourage his subjects to resort to the fair at Peshawar.

The Minister was told that if presently the Amir liked to send any of his great Ministers in a private capacity to England, every facility should be shown, so that they might see everything of interest. It was quite possible, he was told, that the British Government would appoint an officer in attendance, if men of rank went, and might contribute something towards the cost of the visit. There would be no fear that religious influence would be brought to bear on any persons going. Also the British Government would
forward the education of any young Afghans whom the Amir might wish to send for the purpose of learning our military system, our manufactures, the science of telegraphy, railways, &c. The Minister said he would speak to the Amir. This, he said, might perfect our “Amezish” or intercourse, and those who had visited England would come back, comprehending the benefits of our civilization; and so there would be a greater binding of the two nations. But he would take the Amir’s views clearly on this, as the above were his own sentiments only.

The Minister remarked that he did not wish to commit himself, and asked rather anxiously whether European Agents were intended, observing, at the same time, that it was no use to send any but Muhammadans; Hindus were of no good at all. He begged that his reply might not be put on paper. He said that he first distinctly wished to ascertain the Amir’s sentiments. He mentioned that there was now a man named “Unwar” at Kandahar, who supplied information to the officer (Sir H. Green was the name he gave) on the Scinde frontier. But he added he was looking far forward, and the day might come when the “Russ” would arrive and the Amir would be glad not only of British Officers as Agents, but of arms and troops to back them.

The Minister, on being told that the British Government would allow Afghans to come into India, to Rurki, Lahore, Calcutta, &c., to learn our arts and trades, answered that he would consult the Amir.

The Secretary remarked that in this morning’s conversation he had reserved nothing, and had nothing to reserve, to which the Minister answered that he was in precisely the same condition, and that in fact, since the interchange of civilities, he felt as a man might feel who had changed his religion.

(Signed) C. GIRDLESTONE,
Under Foreign Secretary.

[Note.—In the Government of India Enclosure of 10th May 1877, sending home an Extract of above, Captain Grey was mentioned as having been present at this conversation, but this was apparently a clerical error.]

Enclosure 5 in No. 3.
MEMORANDUM of a Conversation held at Umballa on April 3rd 1869.

Present:
W. S. Seton-Karr, Esquire, Foreign Secretary.
Syad Nur Muhammad Shah, Minister of the Amir.
T. H. Thornton, Esquire, Secretary to Government, Punjab.
Major Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawar.
Charles Girdlestone, Esquire, Under Foreign Secretary.

Referring to the points which were reserved in the conversation of April 1st, 1869, the Minister said that there was no occasion to include Ghazni as a place of residence for a British Agent, as Ghazni was included in Kabul. The Amir was ready to have a writer to accompany him wherever he moved, and to allow of men in Turkistan and Balkh, when the country was more settled. The Minister himself considered Unwar, the present news-writer at Kandahar, to be “a thorough rascal.” Any Agents so sent were to be merely for the sake of sending intelligence. The great danger of these Agents was, unless they were treated as they wished, they vilified the Government in their reports. As an instance, he quoted that when the Amir was defeated at Kandahar, Azim Khan sent to Unwar khillats, money, &c., and in return Unwar wrote false accounts of Shere Ali’s proceedings, and flaming reports of Azim Khan’s power and success. “If you do not believe me,” he urged, “send for the diaries of that period from Jacobabad.” As long as the Amir gave the news-writer dilaisa (smoothed him down) it was all very well. With these reservations the British Government has full power to send news-writers. If any news-writer was personally offensive to the Amir, the Secretary explained, of course the Government would not continue him in his post or insist on his retention.

The Minister, on being asked whether the Amir wished to send Afghans to learn trades and so forth at Rurki and other places in our territory, answered curtly, “It cannot be done, you might write a whole book of objections about it, but if ever we change our minds on this subject we will let you know. The Amir has personally no objection, but fears the interpretation his people might put on the arrangements. The fruits of the Amir’s visit to the Viceroy cannot be properly understood yet by...
Afgáns. They would understand the aid given to their Sovereign to be conditional on Afghan youths being Anglicised.” The same reasons apply to sending Afgáns to Europe. After a few years, as suspicion gets dissipated, the Amir, if he thinks fit, will intimate his desire for men being sent. “Just think,” he said, “a short time ago such an interview as has taken place would never have entered into any one’s imagination. It has happened, what more can be said? And who could have expected, a year since, that I should have been sitting here alone, talking in a friendly manner to four English Officers.”

(Signed) Charles Girdlestone,
Under Foreign Secretary.

At the close of the interview the Foreign Secretary took the Minister apart and clearly explained to him His Excellency’s instructions, that under no circumstances was the Amir to expect that British troops would cross the border to put down civil war or domestic contention.

This intimation was repeated to the Minister by the Foreign Secretary at a subsequent interview, and the Minister’s reply on both occasions was clear and satisfactory as to the Amir’s full understanding on this point.

(Signed) W. S. Seton-Karr,
Foreign Secretary.

Enclosure 6 in No. 3.

Notes of the Second Meeting between His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General and the Amir of Kabul, held at 4 o’clock p.m. on the 3rd of April 1869, after which the Amir took his final leave of His Excellency.

Present:
His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General.
The Amir Shere Ali Khan.
The Honourable Sir D. Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor.
Syad Núr Muhammad Shah.
W. S. Seton-Karr, Esquire, Foreign Secretary.
Major F. R. Pollock, Commissioner, Pesháwar.
Captain Grey, Interpreter.

The Governor-General commenced by expressing his satisfaction at finding that his letter had gratified the Amir; to this he entirely assented, and expressed much gratitude.

The Governor-General then said that he trusted that the Amir would, when he had established himself in his Government, be able to assist in promoting the peace of the frontier, which the Amir promised he would do, sooner or later, according to his ability. As regarded the publication of my letter, he said he would, on reaching Kabul, or about a month hence, make it generally known, and explained that it would be impossible and undesirable to keep it secret from all in Afghánistán, high or low. He thought that we had better wait till then, which the Governor-General agreed to do, observing that it was most desirable that at some very early period the exact truth should be known to all States. He then said that the Afgáns, though suspicious at first of relations with the British, must now be pleased, but that they were a stupid race; but, any way, he would “drive if he could not lead them.” He observed that “you could not take in wisdom (akhl) as you could sustenance—by eating a loaf of bread;” also he said that his neighbours, Persians and Russians, who had not hitherto interfered with him, might become the aggressors on learning that he had attached himself to us,—this was the first time he had mentioned either Russian or Persian to the Governor-General,—when the Governor-General expressed his hope that he would strive to spread civilisation among a people so distinguished for courage, high spirit, and sagacity; and quoted ourselves as an example of how a nation, by cultivating the arts of both war and peace, might rise from barbarism to the utmost heights of civilisation. The Amir replied that it rested with Providence; that God had indeed fitted us thus to improve, but had made the Afgáns, notwithstanding their many good qualities, crassly stupid; but that he was one himself, and knew how to manage them. The Viceroy explained to the Amir that, powerful as the British Government was in India, it had to regard the wishes of the Queen and Her Ministers at home, as well as the will of the nation, as expressed in
Parliament. After some explanation he seemed to take this in. It was therefore most desirable that His Highness should evince an interest in maintaining peace and encouraging trade, both of which would be gratifying to the British people. His Excellency also explained that, at this moment, England was on most friendly terms with all European Powers, and that there was no probability of any misunderstanding which could result in war. He then very shrewdly remarked that, with such terrible engines of war as were now invented, nations would not engage hastily in hostilities.

The Governor-General then pointed out Major Pollock as the channel for communication, which he trusted would be frequent; and the Amir said he regarded him as a near neighbour (hansissiya).

His Excellency introduced the subject of the succession, and said it would afford the British Government much satisfaction to be made aware of the heir whom the Amir might nominate, so as to avoid contentions for the future; to which the Amir pointedly replied that he would inform him on that head by letter on reaching Kabul.

The Governor-General then dismissed the Amir with best wishes for his return journey and success.

The 4th April 1869.

(Signed) W. S. Seton-Karr.

Enclosure 7 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM of CONVERSATIONS between the FOREIGN SECRETARY and KABUL ENVOY on the 19th and 20th July 1873.

The Envoy was requested to state specifically the various points on which he wanted information or an explanation. His remarks, with the Secretary’s replies, are given below—

1. The Envoy drew attention to the passage marginally quoted, in Earl Granville’s Despatch of the 17th October 1872, and observed that, the object of the correspondence between Russia and England being to secure “peace and tranquillity,” he would wish it to be distinctly stated that the expression referred merely to external relations and not to the internal affairs of Afghanistan. That, for instance, the absence of security of life and property in Afghanistan itself would not be held to constitute a condition of affairs that would invalidate the arrangement entered into between Russia and England. The Envoy wished it to be clearly understood that the condition of affairs alluded to by the expression in question should be held to be first, that the countries on both sides of the recognized frontier should abstain from interference with each other either in the way of actual aggression or by proceedings liable to cause each other annoyance; secondly, that the Afghans should be allowed to follow their own laws and customs in their own territories; thirdly, that the internal administration of the States on both sides of the frontier should be free from interference.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that in his opinion the expression alluded to embraced all these things and had no reference to the internal condition of the countries on both sides of the border. In all communications however that may take place with Russian officials or subjects, the Secretary added that it would be advisable for the Amir so to frame his communications and proceedings as to promote mutual trust and confidence.

2. Alluding to a further passage in the same despatch from Earl Granville, the Envoy observed that His Lordship used the word claims, which is not applicable to an assertion of rights over territory of which the Amir has actual possession, and further went on to say that Bokhâra admits these claims. In the event of Bokhâra or any other country questioning the right of the Amir at any future time, the Envoy wished it to be understood that the settlement of the boundary is final, and that any future objection which might be made to it should not afford an opening for a reconsideration of the question.

Answer.—The territories referred to were now recognized by England and Russia as being in the actual possession of the Amir of Afghanistan. The admission of Bokhâra as to the claim was quoted as evidence in the Amir’s favor, and as strengthening his case. Now that the boundary has been actually accepted by Russia, no objections on the part of Bokhâra or any other country can be entertained.
3. The Envoy observed that the recent correspondence between the English and Russian Governments regarding the northern boundaries of Afghanistan contained no assurances on the part of Russia against aggression on Afghanistan.

Answer.—The recent correspondence referred to related only to the particular question as to what territories actually belonged to Afghanistan. The Russian assurances as to non-aggression have already been fully quoted in the letters from Lord Mayo to the Amir, and are, moreover, contained in the letters which are printed at length in the collection of papers laid before Parliament, a complete copy of which will be furnished to the Envoy if he wished it.

4. The Envoy continued that whatever assurances the Russians might give the Amir would rely only on definite promises of assistance given by the British Government. He proceeded to explain the dangers which were apprehended by Afghanistan in consequence of the rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia. In a year or two, he said, it was certain they would take possession of Merv, whereupon the Turkoman tribes would take refuge in the district of Badghies and the neighbourhood of Herat. When in Afghan territory the Turkomans, who know no other avocation but that of plunder, would certainly not forsake their predatory habits and would thus afford the Russians an excuse for calling on the Amir to restrain them. No proper control can be exercised by the Amir on these wandering tribes, and a demand would then be made by Russia to allow a force to be cantoned in Badghies for the purpose of controlling them. Again, the Russians will certainly advance beyond Bokhara and establish cantonments in Kerk, Charjoee, and other places near the Afghan frontier; and their next step will be to call upon the Kabul Government to enter into engagements for facilitating trade, and for the establishment of a Russian mission and agents as in other countries. It would be impossible for the Amir to accede to these requests, compliance with which would certainly lead to complications and troubles. In view then of these apprehended dangers, the Envoy said it was the expectation of the people of Afghanistan that the British Government will attentively consider their situation and suggest what reply should be made to the overtures of Russia, and at the same time that the British Government will state definitely what assistance would be given to Afghanistan in such an emergency.

Answer.—With regard to the fear of Russian interference with Afghanistan, the explicit assurances already given should quiet the Amir's apprehensions. The other matters referred to are all events in the unknown future and may never occur. In regard to them, therefore, no general directions could be laid down. If any of them were to occur, the advice to be given and the action to be taken would very much depend on the particular circumstances of the case. The best preventive which the Secretary could suggest against the apprehended dangers was that there should be at the Court of the Amir a British Officer of high standing, and in the full confidence of the Government of India, who could advise His Highness as to the circumstances of each case, and give advice with regard to the action which, in cases of emergency, it might be necessary to take till the Government of India could be communicated with. With regard to the location of Russian Agents in Afghanistan, the Envoy would learn from the printed papers that Prince Gortschakoff had expressed an opinion that, while he saw no objection to English Officers going to Kabul, he agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian Agents should not do so.

5. The Envoy said that the Russians have annexed territories close up to the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the Amir, believing the attitude they have assumed to be threatening to the peace of his territories, expects that the British Government will render him large present assistance in money and arms so as to enable him to strengthen his frontier. This request of His Highness is grounded, moreover, on the promises made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that, in the absence of instructions from His Excellency the Viceroy, he was unable to reply to the specific request preferred by the Envoy. Lord Mayo, in his letter to the Amir, dated 31st March 1869, had said:—

"It is my wish, therefore, that Your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its Officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure Your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect."

Any requests preferred by the Envoy would, therefore, certainly be treated with consideration and respect by His Excellency the Viceroy, but the Secretary was not in a position to state what view would be taken of this particular request.
6. The Envoy next observed that, in Lord Granville's letter of the 17th October 1872, His Lordship had said, with reference to the territories within the boundary now accepted, that the Amir "would have a right to defend these territories if invaded." This recognition of the Amir's right to defend his territories appeared, said the Envoy, to be qualified by what the Viceroy said in the course of the conversation of the 12th July with regard to the necessity for a reference to the Government of India in case of invasion. The Envoy, therefore, asked for an explicit explanation as to whether, in the event of a sudden invasion, the Amir would be authorized to repel it at once.

Answer.—Hostilities seldom, if ever, break out without some misunderstanding, which, before resort is had to arms, is generally the subject of explanation. If such misunderstanding were to arise, it would certainly be the duty of the Amir to seek the advice of the British Government; but if, during the course of negotiations, or at any other time, an actual invasion of His Highness' territories were to take place, the Amir would assuredly be at liberty to adopt such lawful measures as might be necessary for repelling it at once.

7. The Envoy asked that a written assurance might be given to him to the effect that if Russia or any State of Turkestan or elsewhere under Russian influence should commit an aggression on the Amir's territories, or should otherwise annoy the Amir, the British Government would consider such aggressor an enemy, and that they would promise to afford to the Amir promptly such assistance in money and arms as might be required until the danger should be past or invasion repelled. Also, that if the Amir should be unable to cope single-handed with the invader, that the British Government should promptly despatch a force to his assistance by whatever route the Amir might require the same, the said force to be employed against the invader and to return to British territory when the invasion was repelled. No return for the assistance above-mentioned to be required by the British Government from Afghanistan. Such assistance to be rendered solely out of friendship to Afghanistan, and with the view of protecting the integrity of the frontier, so that the existing friendship of both countries should be maintained.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that he felt sure the British Government would never agree to assert in general terms that any one interfering with Afghanistan would be declared an enemy. Government must hold itself quite free to decide what the circumstances of each case might require. In regard to the question of assistance to Afghanistan he was unable to add anything to the expressions used by His Excellency the Viceroy, by whom alone further explanation on the subject could be afforded to the Envoy. Doubtless, added the Secretary, much would depend upon two considerations, viz., (1st) that the Amir should fully and unreservedly have accepted and acted upon the advice of the British Government in his foreign relations; and (2ndly) the circumstances and extent of the invasion or interference. If assistance were given by the British Government it would doubtless be such as, in their opinion, would be sufficient to meet the circumstances of the case.

8. The Envoy represented that in the conversation of the 12th July with His Excellency the Viceroy, invasion or aggression on the part of the Turkomans, Khiva, Bokhara, and other countries under Russian influence, had been alluded to, but Russia had not been specifically mentioned.

Answer.—There seems no objection to specify the case of an invasion by Russia in the paper to be eventually given to the Envoy.

9. The Envoy read out a letter just received from Kabul, stating that the son of Koshid Khan of Merv had presented himself before the Amir on the part of all the Turkomans and represented that the Russians had sent a message to the Tekke tribe to say that the Turkomans were an independent people and had no recognized head, and all that they (the Russians) required of them was an unmolested passage for their troops, in return for which they would undertake to leave the tribes alone. The Turkomans had replied that they considered the Amir of Afghanistan as their head, and through the son of Koshid Khan they now professed their allegiance to the Amir, and asked his advice as to whether they should attack the Russians or allow them a free passage. The Turkomán Envoy required an early answer, and the Amir was therefore desirous of ascertaining the views of the British Government before replying to him.

Answer.—The Secretary replied that the matter would be submitted for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy. The country of the Turkomans lies beyond the recognized limits of Afghanistan. The Russians have a just and legitimate quarrel with the Khan of Khiva, to punish whom their troops were marching through the Tekkeh country. If the Amir thinks it necessary to give them advice it should be to
the effect that the Turkománs should allow an unmolested passage to the Russians, and in no way whatever interfere with their operations. The Russian expedition to Khiva, however, was probably by this time over, and the circumstances were probably passed and gone under which the letter referred to had been written. It would be advisable for the Amir to abstain as far as possible from interference in the affairs of the Turkománs beyond his frontier and to disclaim the proffered allegiance. While maintaining with them relations of peace, he should on no account assist the Turkománs, or in any way countenance them in opposing the Russians.

The Envoy then said (in answer to the Secretary's question) that he had no other explanations to ask or representations to make on the question of the boundary and the general relations between the British Government and Afghanistan. In regard to Seistan he wished for further time to consider the matter. Accordingly Tuesday, the 22nd, was fixed as the date for discussing Seistan matters.

21-7-73. (Signed) P. D. H.
21-7-73. (Signed) C. U. A.

Enclosure 8 in No. 3.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS between the KABUL ENVOY AND FOREIGN SECRETARY on the 31st July and 1st August 1873.

At the interview of the 30th of July, His Excellency the Viceroy requested the Envoy to discuss with Mr. Aitchison the following subjects:—

1.) The location in certain towns of Afghanistan of British officers as representatives of their Government.

2.) The expectations of the Amir with regard to the present assistance to be rendered to Afghanistan for the purpose of strengthening that country against foreign aggression.

3.) The measures that should be taken for strengthening the Seistan frontier, and the expectations of the Amir in connection therewith.

As regards the first, the Envoy observed that without enquiring what are the motives of the British Government in desiring to locate their representatives in Afghanistan, he would, if required, state plainly what were his views on the subject. As the question had not previously been alluded to before his departure from Kabul, he had received no instructions on the subject, and could therefore only speak in his private capacity.

The Secretary observed here, that before going any further, it would be as well that the Envoy should clearly understand what is the object of the British Government in wishing to locate their representatives in Afghanistan. In the first place, there is absolutely no intention whatever of exercising any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, though, of course, if consulted, the British representative would be always ready to offer his advice to the Amir. The first object in view was to obtain accurate information on all matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan. In the recent correspondence regarding Seistan, for example, very contradictory accounts regarding occurrences in that province were received from Persia and Afghanistan. It is very important, looking to the responsibilities which England has now undertaken, that accurate information should be obtained by the British Government, and in many cases a British officer on the spot could settle differences which might otherwise give rise to serious complications and difficulties. Again, neither the British nor Russian Governments are in possession of very accurate information regarding the recently defined northern boundaries of Afghanistan. This was exemplified only the other day when a question arose regarding the Mir of Shignan. It is therefore very desirable that a British officer should visit those boundaries, so that Government may be in a position to reply authoritatively to any reference that may arise on the subject. It must also, added the Secretary, be obvious that if a British officer of high rank, and well acquainted with the views and policy of the British Government, was deputed to Kabul, the Amir would be able, in the event of any emergency arising, and when a reference to India was impossible, to consult the officer, and feel assured that he was not acting in opposition to the wishes of the British Government.

The Envoy replied that he understood the object of the British Government, and, personally, was well aware of the advantages that would accrue to Afghanistan from the presence of their representatives. Speaking, however, as a friend, and in the interests both of his own and the British Government, he could not recommend that a specific request should be preferred to the Amir for British officers to be stationed at certain
given places. His reasons were the following:—*First*, the Afghans are deplorably ignorant, and entertain an idea that the deputation of British Agents is always a precursor to annexation. *Secondly*, many proceedings of the Amir are such as would be disapproved by the British Government. Those who encourage the Amir in these would be only too ready to suggest to him that a British Agent would interfere to put a stop to such proceedings. *Thirdly*, there is a strong party at Kabul composed of the members of Dost Mahomed Khan's family, and of others in the confidence of the Amir, who are strongly opposed to His Highness entering into intimate relations with the British Government, which would have the effect of strengthening the Amir's hands in the administration of his country. The opportunity of these men is of course during a weak administration and in unsettled times.

Under the circumstances above mentioned, therefore, the Envoy was of opinion that to prefer a specific request to the Amir would give rise to mistrust and misapprehension. He would, therefore, recommend that in a separate letter, of which he would be the bearer, it should be suggested to the Amir that in view of the arrangements recently completed it would be highly desirable that a British Officer should inspect the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan. That this Officer would proceed from Kandahar to the eastern extremity of the Northern Frontier, and, returning *via* Kabul, would communicate with the Amir regarding frontier matters. This Officer might, when at Kabul, have an opportunity of ascertaining the sentiments of the Amir with regard to the location of representatives, and might perhaps find that all difficulty had been removed. If necessary, however, the British Government might, on the return of such an Officer to India, again depute the same or another Officer to confer with the Amir regarding the results of the examination of the frontier. The visits of these Officers would familiarise the Amir and the people of Afghanistan with the idea of receiving a permanent British representative, and eventually the desired object might thus be attained.

The Secretary replied that the plan suggested by the Envoy appeared highly judicious, and he continued that the approaching deputation of a Mission to Yarkand afforded a favourable opportunity for carrying out the suggestion. It had previously been in contemplation by Government to direct Mr. Forsyth to return to India *via* Badakshan and Kabul, provided, of course, that the Amir had no objection to the measure.

The Envoy observed that as Mr. Forsyth's arrival in Afghanistan would probably not be for 18 months or two years, it would be advisable for the British Government in their own interests to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded by the recent boundary negotiations to suggest that an Officer should proceed at once *via* Kandahar to visit the eastern and northern frontier, returning by Kabul.

The Secretary then enquired whether, in the event of Mr. Forsyth's Mission returning *via* Badakshan, the Amir would be able to make the necessary arrangements for supplies, &c., in the north-east extremity of his territories. To this the Envoy replied that in the absence of any precise information regarding that portion of Afghanistan he could give no specific assurance, but there would be plenty of time before the return of the Mission to make all necessary enquiries.

The Secretary then suggested that the Amir might be asked to allow a British Officer to proceed to that portion of the frontier *via* Kabul, in anticipation of the arrival of the Mission, in order to make the necessary arrangements for them.

On the whole the Envoy thought it better that his previous suggestion of an Officer going round by Kandahar should be carried out. If, on arrival at Kabul, this Officer found that the Amir entertained no objection to the location of an Envoy there or elsewhere, there would of course be equally no objection to the Mission returning *via* Badakshan. On the other hand, if there were difficulties about the appointment of an Envoy, it would still be open to Government to allude to the return of the Yarkand Mission *via* Badakshan. He would suggest that in that case the Amir should be addressed on this subject in such a manner as neither to imply the possibility of refusal of permission, nor, on the other hand, as if the Mission would take that route without permission. At the same time the advantages of defining the Yarkand frontier in prolongation of that of Afghanistan should be pointed out to the Amir.

The Envoy professed himself anxious and willing, both in the interest of his own country and of the British Government, to secure compliance with the wishes of the latter in this respect. He would, after ascertaining the sentiments of the Amir, communicate, if required, with or without the cognizance of the Vakil at Kabul.

The next point discussed was that of the assistance to be given to the Amir, and first, with respect to the arms asked for by His Highness, the Envoy repeated the request...
contained in the Kabul diaries, that the British Government should supply the Amir with 20,000 stand of arms, and he laid particular stress on 5,000 Sniders being included in the number. As regards pecuniary assistance, the Envoy was unable to name any specific sum, and he could only say that the Amir entertained hopes of being very largely assisted in this respect.

Next, with respect to the measures necessary for the defence of the Seistan frontier, the Envoy said that he was not in a position to do more than give a very rough estimate of the expenditure required. He had already mentioned the necessity for planting a colony at Tarakoo, and garrisoning that place, as well as Nad Ali, Killa Fath. For the irrigation of the lands destined to support that colony and the garrisons it would be necessary to excavate three canals leading from the Helmund to Tarakoo, Killa Fath, and towards Chuckunsoor. These would cost say ten lakhs. Then again the Tarakoo colonists would have to be paid their expenses to the colony, and for some time be supported by the Amir. They would also require advances to build houses, and to purchase agricultural implements and seed-grain. Altogether, perhaps, the measures necessary for the proper defence of the Seistan frontier would cost probably some 30 or 40 lakhs.

The Secretary explained to the Envoy that, of course, the British Government could not undertake to find the amount necessary for carrying out these measures. With reference also to the proposed excavation of canals he reminded the Envoy that by the arbitration no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmund. The Envoy, however, remarked, with reference to this point, that the water for 20 such canals could be spared from the Helmund without decreasing the supply derived by Persia.

The Secretary then proceeded to say that Government were unable to share the apprehensions of aggression entertained by the Amir, and would not encourage him to launch out into any large expenditure for the purpose of guarding against this contingency. At the same time they were desirous to see the Amir strong, and were inclined to give him any reasonable assistance with this object. He invited the Envoy to state specifically his views in regard to the amount of assistance expected by the Amir. After considerable discussion, the Secretary informed the Envoy that Government was prepared to give the Amir, in addition to the arms which he had asked for, a present of ten lakhs in cash; this amount to include the five lakhs promised in Poona for indemnifying the sufferers from the Seistan raids. Five thousand stand of Enfield rifles would be given at once, and the remaining arms, including 5,000 Sniders, would be ordered from England.

The Envoy expressed an opinion that the Amir would not be satisfied with a present of 10 lakhs, which was so much below his expectations. Being pressed to state what amount would fulfil those expectations, he named 20 lakhs, adding at the same time that he had no authority for naming this figure, which was his own idea of the amount required.

The Secretary could hold out no hope of this amount being granted, but added that he would submit the matter for the orders of His Excellency the Viceroy. On the 1st August the Secretary informed the Envoy that he had taken the orders of the Viceroy on the question of the pecuniary assistance to Afghanistan, and that His Excellency had expressed inability to offer a larger sum than 15 lakhs in all, including the value of the arms to be presented to the Amir. The question had been considered by His Excellency in a spirit of the utmost friendliness towards Afghanistan, and, looking both to the necessities of that country and the condition of the Indian finances, it was not considered necessary to fix a higher amount.

The Envoy was then informed in reply to his inquiries that 5 lakhs of the 10 was to be considered as a contribution towards the amount to be paid to the Seistan sufferers, and another 5 lakhs was to be considered as a contribution towards the general expenses of the Amir, which the Amir might, if he thought fit, expend in arrangements for the settlement of Seistan, or otherwise as he thought best. It was probable that the value of the arms would be about 4 lakhs, and any balance, therefore, that might remain from the other 5 lakhs would be sent to Afghanistan with the arms. If the Envoy considered it advisable orders would be at once given to have 10 lakhs ready at Peshawar to be forwarded to Kabul.

At the conclusion of the second interview the Secretary brought to the notice of Syad Nur Muhammad the conduct of Nowroz Khan, of Lalpura, in the matter of Arjan Khan, who in the year 1852 had attacked the Hushtnuggur Tahsil and murdered the Tahsildar and other officials. Since that event Arjan Khan had been an outlaw, and was only
heard of at intervals as a wanderer between Jellalabad and Swat, until the beginning of
last year, 1872, when he made an attempt to settle himself at a place called Spinkwari,
in the Ranizai country. The men of Totai and other Ranizai villages turned out and
threw up for him the walls of two towers and several houses. The settlement of such
a character on the British border being highly objectionable and dangerous to the peace
of the border, the Ranizai Jirga were called to account by the British authorities, and
shortly after the settlement was, in consequence, attacked and destroyed by the Uthman
Khels of Prangar. It had recently been reported to Government that Nowroz Khan had
called on the Uthman Khels to pay blood-money for the men killed in the attack on
Spinkwari and to rebuild the fort and hamlet. The Secretary, therefore, requested that
the matter might be enquired into on the Envoy's return.

The Envoy replied that he knew something of the facts of the case, and would make
such arrangements on his return to Afghanistan as would in all probability insure a
prompt and satisfactory settlement in future of all frontier matters between the British
authorities and Nowroz Khan.

The Envoy made a special request that the present conversations should be considered
as absolutely confidential.

P. D. H.
C. U. A.
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ADDRESS

OF

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERTS

TO THE

CHIEFS OF KURRAM,

ON THE

26th DECEMBER 1878.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.
ADDRESS.

COPY of an ADDRESS to JAJI and TORI MALIKS, dated KURAM, 26th December 1878.

KHANS and MALIKS.—Since the arrival of the British force in this valley, many of you have received rewards for services rendered; I wished, however, to see you again before I leave Kuram for Khost in order to recognize those services publicly in Durbar.

Generally, I am satisfied with the reception I have met with in the valley; it was natural you should hesitate to believe we intended to afford you permanent protection so long as any vestige of the Amir's authority was before your eyes; you have seen the last trace of that authority swept away, and I have assembled you here to-day to tell you that neither Sher Ali Khan nor any other Amir of Kabul will ever again be permitted to reign over Kuram. Depend upon it you will never have cause to regret exchanging the Durani for British rule. I am not prepared to state what form of Government it may please the Viceroy and Governor-General to establish, but it will be such a Government as is best suited to your habits and customs. You have a right to expect protection to life and property, peace and prosperity, and I think you will all admit that you have a better chance of enjoying these advantages under the British than under the Duranis.

In return for these advantages, the British Government will demand from you implicit obedience to all orders that may, from time to time, be issued; you will be required to live peaceably, at the same time to retain the many qualities of your race, and assist, as heretofore, to protect your homes and property from neighbouring tribes who are less civilized. The headmen of villages have large responsibilities; so long as they work for the welfare of the people, and in the interests of Government, they will be supported, and everything in reason will be done to increase their influence and power. They will be expected to control the bad characters in villages, and to prevent the escape of criminals; should they be unable to do so, it will be their duty to represent the same to the Government officials in order that assistance, if necessary, may be afforded to them. They will be made available for the collection of the Government revenue, and will receive remunerations for their services.

I wish to impress upon you all who are unaccustomed perhaps to good rule, that the British Government only issues orders which it intends should be obeyed; your religion will never be interfered with; your prejudices will be respected, and you will be allowed as much liberty as is compatible with good order, new roads will be made, existing roads will be improved, markets will be established for the sale of grain produce, and whatever you may be able to provide for the use of the troops will be liberally paid for. Many of you are already reaping the benefit of our advent; on the Paiwar Kotal, at Habeebikilla, and here at Kuram, considerable sums of money are paid daily as wages for labour, or in purchase of wood, matting, &c. &c. From no other Government could you expect such considerate treatment; during the few days which intervened between the flight of the Durani Government and the arrival of the British troops, the Turis and Bangashes plundered and dismantled both the forts at Kuram and to a certain extent the huts at the Paiwar Cantonment; I feel angry with the Malik every time I enter the forts for not preventing the wilful destruction of property, and instead of punishing the offenders as we might have done, we are paying them for labouring at the restoration of the forts at Kuram. The Jaji Malik's of Lehwane behaved differently and have reaped the benefit; believing what I told them before the capture of the Kotal, they preserved for our use the stores collected by the Amir for his army; for their service they have been well rewarded, and I am not likely to forget the good work they have done. The Malik of Ali Kheyal either did not believe what they were told, or do not possess real influence over their villages, or they would have prevented the Amir's grain from being plundered, and would have been proportionately rewarded. The people of Ali Kheyal and Shamu Kheyal are further distant from Kuram, and have consequently come less in contact with us than the other Jajis, and for this reason perhaps feel more uncertain about their future than the Lehwane Jajjs and the Toris: I can only repeat to them the assurance I have already given, that from Thull
to the Shutar Gurdan, not a village, nay, not a yard of land, will be allowed again to come under the control of the Amir of Kabul; neither will the British Government ever again permit the Kabul Government to interfere in any way with the independent tribes bordering on British territory. I hope to see you again in a few weeks; during my absence I hope you will do all in your power to support the officers placed at the Kotal, at Habeebkilla, and at Kuram, and to gain for yourselves the good will of the Government. As a warning to those who are not inclined to listen to my advice I will remind them of the punishment which has recently overtaken two villages at no great distance from Kuram. The entry of the British force into the valley was necessarily rapid, and as being more convenient the road by the right bank of the river was taken; some few villages on the left bank of the Kuram have not yet been visited by our troops; owing to this, the Maliks of Sudda and Ibrahimzai apparently thought we could not exact obedience to our authority, and permitted the line of telegraph running through their lands to be frequently interfered with. The people of Ibrahimzai even allowed a cavalry post to be attacked in the village itself, when a horse and a camel were killed; they gave no information and rendered no assistance; an example was necessary, and fines were inflicted; on Ibrahimzai Rupees 400, and on Sudda Rupees 500, and until these sums are paid, the headmen will remain in confinement; all will understand this warning. Summary punishment will follow any such offences and neglect of duty.

As I have said before, the British Government does not interfere with the religion of any of its subjects, but when Moollas and religious advisers leave religion and preach politics and oppose the ruling power, Government must interfere politically, and prevent the ignorant from being misled. Thus, one Moolla, formerly a Malik, is now in confinement to prevent his doing harm, and another Moolla, who was notorious as an ill-wisher to the British Government, who failed to pay his respects when called upon to do so, and who left his house, has had his house burnt as a warning to others.

I am extremely sorry that I should have been compelled to interfere with either of these men, and hope never to have to exercise my authority in a similar manner again. Moollas, who are dissatisfied with the British rule, should leave the country. Many of you are grey-beards, and have experience and wisdom; you should judge for yourselves whether what I am saying is not such as you would yourselves give to your children.

(Signed) Fred. Roberts, Major-General.