The Buddhist Councils

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INTRODUCTORY

THE discoveries and the researches of recent year have, at least partially, confirmed the views that Messrs. Oldenberg, Rhys Davids, and Windisch, not to mention others, had expressed concerning the antiquity of the Buddhist Canons; they have, to a large extent, invalidated several of the objections of Minayeff. I am all the more bound in candour to recognise this, as I reproach myself with having formerly adhered on certain points to the scepticism, or, if the expression is preferred, to the agnosticism of the great Russian savant, one of the most penetrating intellects which have done honour to our studies, who, however, in his short and fruitful career, evidently had not the time to point and bring to maturity all his ideas, and who has given us in his Researches merely the outline or the first edition of the book to which his life was consecrated.¹

The moment seems to us to have arrived for resuming, in order to recapitulate it and perhaps advance it a little, a discussion which, at times, was almost impassioned; to examine under what conditions and on what terrain it must be pursued at the present time; to determine what remains of the criticisms formulated by Minayeff. It will be seen that on some points where, according to Prof. Oldenberg, he was grievously mistaken, he sometimes was perfectly right—notably in that which concerns the Councils; and that even where he was wrong—notably about the edict of Bhabra (Bairat)—his work was useful and throws singularly clear light on some of the problems of this old story.

There is scarcely need to say that all the studies bearing on the origin of the Canons are necessarily provisional. The fault of this lies above all with the sinologues, so zealous when it is a question of problems which interest sinology only, but at times negligent when Buddhism is concerned. We ought to be the more grateful to the few scholars who have revealed to us some details concerning the literature of the sects of the Little Vehicle.²


2. Not to mention the older ones, Wassilieff, Beal. (The Vinaya of the Dhammadguptas according to the Chinese Version, Vhd. of the 5 Or. Kongr., Ostasiat. Section, p. 17, Berlin, 1881, reprinted in Abstract of four Lectures, (1882),—and the
I.—THE FIRST COUNCIL

So that the reader may have all the evidence before his eyes, let us first of all sum up the eleventh chapter of the Cullavagga, which bears the title Chapter of the Five Hundred, and, as is well known, treats of the Council of Rājagṛha, held immediately after the death of Buddha.

1. Kāśyapa suddenly appears on the scene, no one knows where, and, addressing himself to no one knows whom, he relates how during his journey he has learned the death of master; he repeats the speeches of his travelling companions. “Then the venerable Mahākassapa said to the bhikkhus. One day I was travelling on the road from Pava to Kuśinara with ...... about five hundred bhikkhus......” Along the road there comes a monk of the Ajīvika sect who announces to the travelling devotees the death of Buddha. The faithful but imperfect brethren abandon themselves to grief; those who are already perfect content themselves with saying, “Impermanent are all the elements (sāṃskāras)”. “Enough, my friends! Do not weep, nor give yourselves up to lamentation! Has not the Most Happy One declared unto us that it is even in the nature of the things near and dear to us that we must be separated from them...”

“At this moment, my friends, a certain old monk, named Subhadda was there...” Kāśyapa related how this Subhadda rejoices at the death of the Master: “Now we shall be able to do all that pleases us, and that which does not please us we shall no longer be forced to do.”

Kāśyapa does not say if he reproved this blasphemy. He continues his discourse...
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to the unnamed bhikṣus: “come, my brethren, let us chant together the Dhamma and the Vinaya before the Non-Dhamma spread, and the Dhamma be put aside.”

2. “Let the venerable Thera choose then the bhikkhus”. Manifestly, the unnamed monks pray Kāśyapa to choose the monks worthy of “chanting together the Dhamma and the Vinaya”. “Then the venerable Kassapa chooses 499 Arahats”.

The bhikṣus are not content; they demand that Ananda be admitted to the conclave. “My Lord, this venerable Ānanda, although he is still under instruction, is nevertheless incapable of falling into an impasse, through desire, hatred, ignorance, or fear, and he has well learned the Dhamma and Vinaya from the mouth of the Most Happy himself. Consequently, let your Lordship choose the venerable Ānanda”. Without hesitation Kāśyapa subscribes to this request: “And the venerable Mahākassapa chose the venerable Ānanda.”

3. The monks chosen by Kāśyapa consult as to the place where it will be suitable to hold the conclave: they think of Rājagṛha, for it will be pleasant to pass the rainy season there: “What if we were to pass the rainy season at Rājagṛha and there chant together the Dhamma and the Vinaya; and let no other bhikkhu come to Rājagṛha for the rainy season!”

5. According to M. Suzuki, the Mahīśāsaka, Dharmagupta, Mahāsaṃghika Vinayas, the Sudarśanavinayavibhāṣā (Nanjio, 1125) and the Vinayamāttṛkāsūtra give as motive of the convocation of the Council the blasphemy of Subhadra ( [ Cu ]bhananda in Sources, 1. 2, and 5; simply “Mahadlaka” in 3, and Subhadramahallaka in 4). The Dharmagupta ascribes to Kāśyapa this reason “that it is necessary to compile the law so that the heretics may not say that the law is like smoke...” [ Similarly in the Dulva (Rockhill, p. 148), Mhv. and Culla ]. No allusion to Subhadra [ according to Suzuki ] in the Sarvāstivādins, but intervention of the gods before Kāśyapa; similarly the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra and the Life of Aśoka. No allusion either to the gods, or to Subhadra in the Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka (Nanjio, 1363) (Kāśyapa says: “It is for the laymen to occupy themselves with the relics of the Tathāgata, for us to tabulate the law”) or in the Record of the Compilation of the three Piṭakas and the Miscellaneous Piṭaka.” In Mhv. 1.60 Kāśyapa spontaneously resolves to assemble the Council, “so that the law may not be like smoke”. See below, note 36.

6. Sekha = śaikṣā, from śikṣā, precept, rule, study, instruction.

7. Kin capi sekho abhabbo chanda dosa moha bhaya agatim gantum, “The four Agatis are lust, hatred, ignorance, and fear” (Childers.—Vinaya Texts: “...Although he has not yet attained (to Nirvāṇa), yet he is incapable of falling into error through partiality, or malice, or stupidity, or fear.” By Nirvāṇa the translators understand the sapphīśesanirvāṇa; see below, notes 44 and 52.

B.C. 1/a
4. Kāśyapa presents officially to the bhikṣus (=the Saṃgha) the resolutions formulated above. "...Let the Saṃgha decide that these five hundred bhikkhus shall take up their residence during the rainy season at Rajagaha in order to chant together the Dhamma and the Vinaya, and that no other bhikkhu shall spend the rainy season at Rājagaha..." The Saṃgha approves according to the rule.

5. The conclavists install themselves at Rajagṛha and spend the first month in repairing [the buildings] in ruins or in a bad state.

6. During the night preceding the day on which the assembly is to open Ānanda attains to the quality of Arhat: "To-morrow the assembly is to open; now it is not fitting that I should attend it, being still under instruction." He applies himself with success to a meditation which frees him from the passions.

7-8. The Conclave.—Kāśyapa questions Upāli on the Vinaya, Ānanda on

9. The proposition is made once, after having been defined and the assembly remains silent. It is the nattidutiya kamma; see Vin. Texts, I. p. 169.

10. Khandaphullapatisamkarana; see Culla, VI. 5, 2 (Vinaya Texts, III. p. 191), M. Vyut, § 282, 252—Assembly room, see Suzuki, the article cited, p. 281.

11. To the Kāya-smṛtyupasthāna (Kāyagatā sati).

12. According to the Sarvastivādins (Chinese source, and Dulva, ap. Rockhill, p. 149) and the Mahāsāṃghikas, according to a great number of documents of the Great Vehicle at the moment of the opening of the Council an incident happens of which Gavāmpati is the hero. At the order of Kāśyapa, Pūrṇa has just sounded the call-bell; all the arhats, except Gavāmpati, are present. Pūrṇa goes to the hermitage of the tree Sirīṣa, where dwells this holy man, begs him to accept the salutations of Kāśyapa and the Saṃgha and to come in haste for the business of the Saṃgha. Understanding that Buddha is dead, Gavāmpati gives his robes and his vase to Pūrṇa, consumes his body by his magic power, and disappears into Nirvāṇa (Dulva).

According to the Mahāsāṃghikas, two arhats are absent from the assembly: Anuruddha, who soon joins his brethren, and Gavāmpati. Anuruddha explains that Gavāmpati is "in one of the heavens." A messenger carries to him the request of the assembly. Gavāmpati is astonished that Kāśyapa should govern the Saṃgha, questions the messenger and is consumed in a divine fire.

Still, from the same source, Kāśyapa renews the same attempt, but with the same result, with regard to several other saints who are already in possession of celestial dwelling places. From that time they ceased to convene the absent saints and decided that no member of the assembly should enter the Nirvāṇa before the end of the work.

According to the Tib. Lebensbeschreibung (p. 305, n. 75), Gavāmpati was living in the cin-ca-ri-kahi gzhal-medkhan, "the Vimāna of the tree Ārīka" (?).—Observe that according to the Beschreibung, the chant begins with the Sūtras; the Vinaya follows.
They "chant" beginning with the four Pārājikas, the double Vinaya (ubhato vinaye); they chant the five Nikāyas, beginning with the Brahmajōla. Kāśyapa conducts the recitation. "Where was the first Pārājika proclaimed? Concerning what person? Relative to what subject?" And immediately Upāli answers concerning the subject, the occasion, the individual introduced, the proclamation, the repetition of the proclamation, the fault, the case of non-responsibility. For the Nikāyas (Dhamma) the interrogation only bears upon the place where the Sutta was pronounced and the person to whom it was addressed.

9. Ānanda, who had not been questioned on the Vinaya—and besides, the method adopted did not permit any initiative except to the president,—Ānanda begins to speak: "Then the venerable Ānanda said to the theras: "The Most Happy, at the moment of his death, spake thus to me: 'When I am dead, O Ānanda let the Saṅgha, if it wish, abolish the small and lesser precepts.' Then, O Ānanda, did you ask the Most Happy which were these precepts?"—"No, my friends."

Which are the small precepts? All the laws, except the four pārājikas? All, except the pārājikas and the thirteen saṅghadisesas? All, except the pārājikas, the saṅghadisesas and the two aniyatas? etc. The "Fathers" offer six different opinions.

Kāśyapa makes them accept his way of thinking: "For fear of scandalising the laymen, who know our laws of discipline, let us change nothing of what Buddha has decided."

10. The monks reproach Ānanda with a certain number of failings: "You committed a fault when you......confess this fault." Ānanda consents to confess his faults: "It was by forgetfulness that I......I did that with the intention..." And all his replies and with the formula: "I do not see the wrong in that. Nevertheless, out of deference to you, I confess this sin."

The sins of Ānanda are known to all the sources of M. Suzuki, with the exception of the Sudargama-vinaya.

13. The "Dharma must here include the Abhidharma" (Kern, Gesch. II. p. 234, n. 5). See below, note 41.

14. That is to say, the Vinaya of the monks and the nuns.

15. We shall speak of the scriptural work attributed to the Council by our different sources when we study the relations of the Canons.

16. Khuddhānukhuddaka, "the lesser and minor precepts."

17. See below, note 31.

18. Ayasmantanam Saddhaya=out of my faith in you.
Their number is sometimes six, sometimes seven, sometimes nine. As the agreement is not absolute, we may distinguish twelve heads of the accusation.\(^\text{19}\)

Here are the most important data:—

**Cullavagga**: (1) Not having informed himself concerning the lesser precepts; (2) Having stepped upon Buddha's robe for the rainy season, when wishing to sew it (*vassikasatika, varṣaṣati, M. *Vyuṭ, § 261, 92*); (3) Having first admitted the women to venerate the body of the Master, so that the body should be profaned by their tears\(^\text{20}\); (4) Not having prayed the Master to prolong his life; (5) Having obtained from Buddha the admission of the women into the order.

**Mahiśāsakas**: (1) Lesser precepts; (2) Having stepped on the Master's robe, when wishing to sew it; (3) Admission of the women into the order; (4) Prolongation of the life of Buddha; (5) Not having given to Buddha something to drink, in spite of his thrice-repeated request; (6) Having first admitted the women to venerate the remains of the Master.\(^\text{21}\)

**Dharmaguptas**\(^\text{22}\): (1) Admission of the women; (2) Buddha asked Ānanda three times to serve him as one who offers things (? ) to Buddha, but he declined him\(^\text{23}\); (3) Having stepped on the robe when wishing to sew it; (4) Prolongation of the life of Buddha; (5) Having refused to give to drink to Buddha...; (6) Lesser precepts: (7) Having shown the gilded body of Buddha to a multitude of women,\(^\text{24}\) permitting them to profane it by their tears.

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19. This is the number at which M. Suzuki arrives: One point is proper to the Sarvāstivādins: to have held useless discussions concerning the parables of Buddha. Two points are peculiar to the *Collection of the Kāśyapa*: (1) When Ananda was one time reproached by Buddha, he secretly cherished ill-will and was mischievous to others. (2) Ānanda was not yet delivered from the three passions—lust, hatred, ignorance, while the other bhikkhus at the Council were freed from them. One point (*Dharmagupta, 2*) is a duplicate of the refusal of the water. Lastly, M. Suzuki distinguishes three variants of the episode of the women: (i) Having first admitted the women to the veneration of the body, (ii) Having permitted this “gilded” body to be profaned by tears, (iii) Having uncovered it in the presence of the women.


21. Without mention of the tears that had profaned the body.

22. The order in Beal is very different.

23. This point must not be confused with No. 5 of the Mahiśāsakas, which is repeated below. According to Beal, we must understand; three times Buddha asked Ānanda to follow him and three times he refused.

24. According to Beal, only one woman was concerned.
**Mahāsāṃghikas**: (1) Admission of women into the order; (2) Prolongation of life; (3) Having walked on the robe while sewing it; (4) Having refused to give Buddha to drink...; (5) Smaller precepts; (6) "Ānanda exposed the secret parts of Buddha in the presence of women, thinking that the act would tend to a cessation of their passion; but how could he know this when he had not yet attained to the stage of Arhatship?"; (7) Having exposed the gilded body of Buddha....

According to the *Mahāvastu*, III. 48, Ānanda had authorised his disciples to eat in a group. This infringement of the rule, which we shall find again at Vaiśālī, does not appear to have been counted among the failings of Ānanda. It is to be noticed that in the recital of the First Council Ānanda is only named in passing (*Mhv*. 1, 69 sqq.). Kātyāyana and Kāśyapa are the only notable characters.

**Sarvāstivādins.** According to Rockhill (*Dulva*), like the Mahāsāṃghikas, except for No. 3, where the occasion of Ānanda's sin (sewing or washing the robe) is not determined, and for No. 6, where it speaks of men and women of ill-manners. According to M. Suzuki (*Chinese source*), we must add (2a) "When Buddha preached in parables, Ānanda made, in spite of his presence, some superfluous remarks on them," and modify (3) "Having walked on the robe when washing it", and (4) "Having given muddy water to Buddha."

11. Purana, who was travelling in the mountain of the South with five hundred bhikkhus, arrives at Rājaṁgha as the recitation of the Vinaya and of the Dharma is finished. He comes to salute the theras. The latter say to him: "The Dharma and the Vinaya, O Purana, have been chanted by the theras. Associate yourself with the choir."

Purana replies: "The Dharma and the Vinaya have been well chanted by the theras. However, in the way in which I have heard and received [the law] from the mouth of Bhagavat himself, in that manner I purpose to retain it in my memory."

The episode of Purana is more fully developed in the three Chinese sources which speak of this important personage; that is, the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptas, that of the Mahāsākās and the *Vinayamāṭṭhakāśūtra*. 87

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24A. Accordingly. Arhats only possess *abhijñās.*—According to the Tib. *Lebensbeschreibung*: "Du hast einem Ehepaare Geheimlehren mitgetheilt."

25. According to the *Dulva*, Ananda excuses himself for not having given water to the Tathāgata to drink, because five hundred chariots had disturbed the water of the river (*Kakusthana* = *Kakuttha*) in crossing it.

26. *Upehi tām saṁgitim.*—*Vinaya Texts*: "Do thou, then, thyself to and learn the text so rehearsed by them", a translation which is elegant, but somewhat long. Buddhists say: *upemi buddhaṁ sāraṇam.*

27. Besides the reports of M. Suzuki (*article cited, p. 280*), see Wassilieff ad
Purana arrives at Rājagṛha when the Council is ended. At his entreaty, Kāśyapa gathers together the assembly afresh and Upāli recommences his recitation. Purana approves of all; only he demands the insertion of eight permissions, eight “things” compatible with the law which forbids the eating of preserved foods and of which Buddha had entirely approved: these are (I reproduce the translation of M. Suzuki)

“(1) keeping food indoors; (2) cooking indoors; (3) cooking of one’s own accord; (4) taking food of one’s own accord; (5) receiving food when rising early in the morning; (6) carrying food home in compliance with the wish of the giver; (7) having miscellaneous fruits; (8) eating things grown in (or by?) a pond.”

Kāśyapa agrees that Buddha did, in truth, authorise the eight “points”; but it was only because food was scarce—in case of āpad, we should say; later, he withdrew this permission. Purana replies that Buddha, being omniscient, does not permit that which is otherwise forbidden, neither does he forbid that which is otherwise permitted. Kāśyapa explains that the omniscience of the Master enables him on the contrary to modify the laws; he concludes: “Let us, O Purana, come to this decision: that which Buddha does not forbid, shall not be forbidden, but his prohibitions shall not be transgressed. Let us exercise ourselves according to the disciplinary laws of Buddha.”

M. Suzuki did not observe that the eight points are discussed in the M. Vagga (VI. 17-19, 20; 4, 32) but, if I dare to say so, the whole episode is antedated; it was Buddha himself who, after having authorised the “keeping food indoors, etc.” withdrew this concession.

12. Ānanda begins to speak: “Bhagavt said to me at the moment of his death: ‘When I am dead, Ānanda, let the Saṅgha impose the brahmadaṇḍa on the

Tāranātha, p. 291: “the tradition of the Chinese Vinaya that already at the First Council, Purana protested against seven points that “Kāśyapa had introduced.”

We have seen that the Dūlva speaks of a Pūrṇa, bell-ringer of the Council and delegate to Gavāṃpati (above note 12).

28. The Mahāsāsakas enumerate differently the “points” of Purana; there are seven of them, “receiving food in compliance with the wish of another; (5) taking fruits of one’s own accord; (6) receiving things coming out of a pond; (7) eating fruit with its seeds (or stones) removed, when received from one who is not a regular attendant in the Saṅgha.”—The Vinayamārtkā appears to follow the Dharmaguptas’, for the two points which it explains in accord with the list of that school.

29. To make the list of the Dharmaguptas correspond with that of the Culla (seven points) it suffices to combine the 4th and the 7th of the former, “taking miscellaneous fruits of one’s own accord.”

30. Brahmadanda—“the higher penalty.” This expression is only met with here and Mahāparinibbānas, VI. 4. See Kern, Gesch. II. 118-119. Channa had already incurred severe penalties (see Culla, I. 25-31).
bhikkhu Channa." And on the demand of the theras,—Kāśyapa does not play part here any more than in the chapter on the failings of Ānanda,—the confidential disciple explains what is this punishment: "Let the bhikkhu Channa say what pleases him; the bhikkhus will not speak to him, will not exhort him, neither will they warn him." He agrees to go and announce this sentence to Channa, but accompanied by a group of brethren, of five hundred brethren, "for this bhikkhu is fierce and passionate." 8

13-14. These two paragraphs are devoted to an episode in Ānanda's journey in search of Channa: his meeting with the wives of King Udena and his conversation with this king. The recital is interesting and is not a digression in a book of Vinaya, for it is a question of the use of old garments and, in general, of all objects not in use.

15. Ānanda announces his sentence to Channa, who receives it with much humility. His grief and his remorse are such that he attains the quality of Arhat. He goes to Ānanda. "Suppress for me now, O Ānanda, the brahmādanda." "From the same moment, O Channa, that you realised the quality of Arhat, from that same moment the brahmādanda was suppressed".

16. Conclusion of the Chapter: "As five hundred bhikkhus, without one less or one more, have taken part in this choir of the Vinaya, this choir of the Vinaya is called 'of the Five Hundred'.'

What does Prof. Oldenberg think of this account? It is rather difficult to say, for his opinion seems to be wanting in that fine unity which he is pleased to recognise in the first paragraphs which composed it. 33 On the one hand, he has stated and repeated that he did not believe in the account of the Council proper [§ 7-8];—and that for reasons whose whole weight he has caused to be felt afresh by well-disposed persons, for, in truth, they affect us very little ;—moreover, he scarcely dares to attribute any historic value whatever to the discussion relative to the "small and lesser precepts and the major penance inflicted on Channa" (§ 9 and 12): "Esmag sogar an irgendwelche Uberbleibsel von historischer Erinnerung gedacht werden : das wird ebenso wenig zu beweisen wie zu widerlegen sein." On the other hand, he

31. In other sources it is Kāśyapa who takes up the word against Ānanda.

32. Wassilieff ad Tāranātha, p. 291: "According to the tradition of the Chinese Vinaya, at the time of the First Council the bhikṣu Chanda created at Kauśāmbī a division among the monks and Ānanda was sent to adjust affairs."


34. P. 628. note. These reasons are, firstly that the Mahāparinibbāṇa does not breathe a word of the Council. See the Introduction to the text of the Mahāvagga, p. xxvi and following, and the remarks of Mr. Rhys Davids—Buddhist Suttas, p. xiii.
protests himself with great vigour against the observations of Minayeff. The latter, retaining as historic or semi-historic all the episodes (Subhadra, small rules, faults of Ānanda, etc.), puts aside as apocryphal or tendencious the history of the Council in its official convocation (§ 3-4), in its literary labours (§ 7-8), and tries to show, on the one hand, the incoherence of § 1-2 and § 3-4; on the other hand, the contradiction between the episodes and the solemn drawing-up of a complete canon.

Our Chapter of the Cullavagga, says Prof. Oldenberg, opens with the textual reproduction of an episode of the Mahāparinibbānasutta (Culla XI., § 1 = Mahāparinibbāna, VI., 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 40); next it gives us a legendary reconstruction of the First Council, inspired by the narrative, authentic and historical in this case, of the Second Council; finally it makes use of Buddha's discourses relative to the secondary precepts and to the "boycotting" of Channa, discourses reproduced in this same Mahāparinibbhāna. "The point of view of Minayeff, who claims to recognise in these episodes [and those of the "failings" of Ānanda] an old kernel of authentic tradition (einen alten kern guter Uberlieferung) and to separate them from the rest of the account due to a much younger time, this point of view is illusory." In fact, "Der Culla, wenn er jene Andeutungen seinerseits ergriffen und daraufhin die Geschichte von dem Konzil mit den in Rede stehenden Episoden ausstattete, beging damit nicht in mindesten, wie Minayeff will, einen Selbstwiderspruch."

Minayeff has not put on his spectacles when he maintains that the Culla identifies Kāśyapa's five hundred companions, among whom were Subhadra and many of the faithful but imperfect bhikṣus with the five hundred Arhats (except one) whom Kāśyapa elected for the conclave. The § 1 of the Culla contains the account of his journey, given by Kāśyapa before a numerous assembly probably at Kuśināra; this assembly is the one convoked by Kāśyapa to chant the choir and in which he is going to choose the members of the choir.

Minayeff saw a contradictory repetition in the designation of the future conclavists by Kāśyapa at the prayer of the Saṃgha, and the official decision following on a "double proposition" (and not quadruple, as the Russian savant says) which delegates to these same conclavists the power and the mission to hold their sessions at Rājaγṛha. wrongly, for, adds Prof. Oldenberg, "Nothing can be more probable, nor more conformable to the habits made known to us by the literature." There is here (§ 1-5) neither incoherence nor contradiction.

35. Minayeff believed that we have to do with two accounts: according to the first, "perhaps the nearer to the truth," Kāśyapa chooses the members of the Council and to them he adds Ānanda; the second, of later origin, introduced in order to give to the Council a character of authenticity, admits of our § 4, the approbation by the Saṃgha of the measures it has itself instigated.

36. M. Oldengerg is in the right. It is all the same certain that if this part of the account, deftly interpreted, can be made to agree, the author has certainly not taken
At the most we can only speak, in one sense, of a certain Discrepanz,—for we must never lose the feeling for nuances: Von einer Discrepanz kann meines Erachtens nur in dem Sinne gesprochen werden, dass die Konzilierzahlen [§ 1-5, 7-8, 16] offenbar, wie ich eben gesprochen habe, an den Hauptvorgang ein paar dem Mahap. S. entnommene Daten resp. auf Grund dieser Datei hergestellte Konstruktionen herangeschoben hat”. That is, “at the most we may speak of a want of harmony, in this sense that the Culla has joined to the principal account [that is, to the account otherwise legendary or tendentious of the Council] a certain number of data borrowed from M.P.S., or rather reconstructions suggested by these data.” But what does it matter that these reconstructions and these data are contradictory to the principal account? This principal account is innocent of all contradiction: “Jene Erzählung ist—das werden wir nach allem hier erorterten gegen Min. fest halten durften von inneren Widersprüchen frei”.

much trouble to make himself clear. To what monks does Kāśyapa relate his encounter with the parivṛjaka, bearer of the sad news, and his journey with Subhadra? The same, evidently, who beg him to choose the member of the future Council. Where does this scene take place? “The Culla does not say formally,” says M. Oldenberg, “but decidedly we cannot hesitate about the way in which the editor of the Culla has represented the matter. The modern Sinhalese sources, as also those of the North, place the scene at Kuśinara ...... The account of the Culla, which joins on to ( anschliesst ) the Mahūparinibbūnasutta, long passages of which it reproduces textually, has certainly no intention of making Kassapa appear in any other place than that to which the M.P. S. conducts him and where all the other sources quoted make him appear.” I quite agree; I should be more sure of it, if I were certain that the Culla has really interpolated the paragraphs M. P. S., VI., 36-39, 40, 41;—which, as M. Oldenberg has remarked many times, lead to nothing in the M. P. S.; if I understood why Kāśyapa gives no answer to Subhadra, any more than the other monks whose piety is manifested by untimely weeping. Prof. Oldenberg, apparently, does not see any difficulty in this last detail.

But Buddhists have not understood it any better than Minayeff, as is proved by the variants of the episode. Only the Mahūparinibbūnasutta, translated by Fa-hien (Nanjio, 118) imitates the reserve of the Pali text. But in the Sarvastivādavinaya (Nanjio, 11:5)e “An old, bad and stupid bhikṣu ...... Kāśyapa heard his words, but others did not perceive them, because through deva’s miraculous power they were kept secret.” In the Mūlasarvastivādanikāyāsamyuktiavastu (Nanjio 1:21) which, I may say in passing, makes the M. P. S. followed by the account of the Council,—this suits very well; “An old bhikṣu ......; many gods in the sky hearing his unjust utterance kept his voice secret by their miraculous power and let nobody hear it except Kāśyapa. Kāśyapa understood his words. Then the Venerable One, to exhort him, stood for a

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Wishing to set forth the primitive compilation of the Scriptures, postulated by orthodoxy, the compiler of *Culla XI.* has naturally brought forward Kāśyapa, Ānanda and Upāli. He has added the story of Kāśyapa’s journey and the episode of the lesser precepts, has grouped and developed several other souvenirs relative to this period: almost all were known to him through the *M.P.S.* At the most can we notice that the adoration of the remains of Buddha by the women is not mentioned in this venerable *Sutta.*

In one word, M. Oldenberg believes that all our chapter of the *Culla* is a “forgery,” but a forgery very well done and that the analysis does not permit us to draw from it the conclusions formulated by Minayeff.

The Russian savant did not read with sufficient attention the proofs of his admirable book; he would have avoided some mistakes over which his adversary triumphs. On the other hand, the chapters which he devotes to the Councils are composed in a mediocre manner; the thought often is merely indicated, and the author

little at the wayside and addressed the assembly saying, *Sabbeh’ eva piyehi manapehi ... ... n’etam thanam vijjatiti (M. P. S. VI. 41).”*

In other sources, the words of Subhadra (whose name varies) are, at least, mentioned by the narrator: Nanjio, 119: “Ban-do of Śākya-clan ...... Kāśyapa was displeased”; Nanjio, 545, 2: “A Śakyaputra called Ba-nan-da ...... ; Kāśyapa hearing this was sad.” Similarly the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptas (Nanjio, 1117). In the Nanjio 552 (which would be, it is said, a translation anterior to 118, 119 and 545, 2), things happen less simply: “One bhikṣu ...... all other bhikṣus disagreed with him and they complained to a deva, who, seizing that old bhikṣu, threw him outside of the assembly”; and in the *Mahāśāṃghika Vinaya* (Nanjio 1119); “Kāśyapa was sad, and as he snapped his right hand finger, fire came out of it, and he stamped the ground with his right foot.”

Kern very usefully recalls the Bhadra, incarnation of the devil, whom we shall find again in discussing the Council of Pāṭaliputra.

It seems that the disconnectedness of our report (*M. P. S. VI. I = Nanjio 118 = Culla XI.*) is mark of authenticity, and it is not without some reservations that I assent to M. Oldenberg’s thought. “Wie sich sein (*Culla’s*) Verfasser die Sache gedacht hat, kann, doch schlechterdings nicht zweifelhaft sein.” It seems that this editor has not taken any care to picture the things to himself.


38. See above, the confusion of the *natticatuttha* and the *nattidutiya*; below, note 55, the interpretation of *ubhato vinaye* and p. 13, inexact expression “in the canon.” These are not serious faults.
does not draw all the desirable advantages possible from the positions that he occupies and the weapons which he has at his command. Lastly, his manner may repel a reader who sees himself, from the first line, treated somewhat "cavalierly,"—as the case with Prof. Oldenberg—and who sees the venerable Suttôntas treated with even still less respect. In fact, and this is the main point, Prof. Oldenberg was mistaken concerning the thought of Minayeff on the historical value of the Council and the episodes, and it is the fault neither entirely of Minayeff nor of Prof. Oldenberg: the latter does not believe in the Council, but he is very near it! The former seems to claim to make history with the Culla, although he believes neither in the Sūtras nor in the Culla.

These attempts at internal criticism are extremely delicate, especially for those who resign themselves to being ignorant of many things and who have not the faith of the coal-heaver in the texts. They are afraid, for subjective reasons, to distinguish that which can be historical from that which has not the slightest chance of being so; never, and the mere thought of it disconcerts them, never will they believe that the silence of a Sūtra about a dogma or an ecclesiastical event can furnish anything but an hypothesis. They read again two or three times Prof. Oldenberg's remarks about the absence of allusion to the First Council in the Mahāparinibbāṇa: "This silence is as valuable as the most direct testimony. It shows that the author of the Mahāparinibbāṇasutta did not know anything of the First Council"; still they are not quite sure they have read correctly. For very little they would desert a discussion without issue, because it is without possible control and without any known principle. But if, like Minayeff, they think it necessary to take part in it, nobody shall be able to reproach them with relying upon data which they themselves do not accept without reserve, for their adversaries admit them. And it is a principle formulated by Dignaga in his controversy with the Brahmins, that in a dialectical tournament, every argument is of value, as soon as the adversary cannot refuse to accept it: it matters little what the arguer himself may think of it. Either I am mistaken, or Minayeff was too good a Buddhist to remain a stranger to this state of mind, and it is one of the reasons why he so often provokes his erudite and convinced antagonist.

I am, however, persuaded, as he was himself, that the Culla can furnish something better than a pretext for clevernesses. It will suffice to establish that the want of harmony between the account of the conclave and the episodic data is still more radical than Prof. Oldenberg thinks; and perhaps the reader will admitted that Minayeff judged rightly when he recognised in these episodes, not historical data properly speaking, but

39. See Intr. to the Mahāvagga, loc. land. above, note 34.—There is a very simple and attractive idea I owe to my friend M. Louis Finot: the history of the Council was formerly the end of the Sutta dealing with Buddha's nirvāṇa, i.e., the M. P.S. When the Scriptures were tabulated in the Piṭakas, it seemed more approprios to have the Council in the Vinaya (see above, note 36, 2nd Stanza).
an old fund of authentic tradition of inappreciable value for a right understanding of ancient Buddhism.

Let us once again consider in its different parts the study of Minayeff, taking advantage, as it is right to do, of the indications and materials furnished by Prof. Oldenberg.

1. The § 16 of Culla XI recalls that "five hundred bhikkhus took part in this recitation of the Vinaya; in consequence this recitation of the Vinaya is called that of the Five Hundred".

Now § 8 sets forth the recitation of the Dharma, that is to say, of the five Nikāyas. Why does the final paragraph ignore the work of Ānanda? Does it mean that the Council was occupied exclusively with discipline, and that § 8 has been interpolated after Chapter XI had received its title? Minayeff did not judge this little remark worthy of him; however, it borrows a certain interest from the fact that the Culla does not breathe a word of a recitation of the Abhidharma (a proof of antiquity, as M. Oldenberg very rightly observes), whilst the Vinayas of several sects, Dharmaguptas, Sarvāstivādins, speak of the Abhidharma in their chapters corresponding to Culla XI. The Mahāsāsakas and the Mahāsāmghikas, on the contrary, imitate the reserve of the Culla in that which concerns the books of "scholastic nomenclature": it would be curious if the Culla XI., in the edition which its title supposes, should, in omitting the five Nikāyas, have possessed over the Mahāsāsakas the advantage which it shares with the Mahāsāsakas over the Dharmaguptas and the Sarvāstivādins by omitting the Abhidharma.

2. The sentence against Channa (§ 12-15)—Of this procedure against Channa, the brahmadaṇḍa, the Vinaya, according to the authoritative opinion of M. Oldenberg, knows nothing; the monks to whom Ānanda addresses himself are no better informed, since he is forced to explain it to them. Only the Mahīparinibbōna makes mention of it (VI. 4) and furnishes us with the conversation which Ānanda repeats word for word to the bhiksus of the conclave. (Culla, XI. 12.)

This shows, at least, that Ānanda did not make the members of the Council chant the integrity of the Mahīparinibbōna; for he would not have had to repeat to them this injunction of the dead Master.

This shows, to argue a silentio, that the Vinayas, with their Vibhaṅgas, are anterior to the Mahaparinibbōna, since they do not speak of the brahmadaṇḍa.

3. Failings of Ānanda (§ 16)—The recital is finished. The monks charge Ānanda with a certain number of faults and Ānanda replies as we have seen.

42. For other remarks on this episode, see note 70.
I.—Before entering into the detail of the sins, a few observations are necessary.

A.—How can any charge whatever be brought against Ananda, who is an Arhat?

"Ananda had already become an impeccable saint, that is, an *arhat*, and yet he submits to a trial; the assembly calls upon him to do penitence for some sins: Buddhaghosa, in his account of the First Council, has left aside all this episode. Perhaps he thought it would scandalise the faithful to read of the sins of an Arhat, impeccable according to the later dogmas; at any rate, it is a fact that the most ancient accounts have, in spite of their late redaction, preserved the vagueness of the primitive ideas with regard to the saint. We can hardly consider even the fact of the trial as an invention of the legend, and even in the VIIth century, at the place where Ananda was judged, there stood, if we must believe Hiouen-Thsang on this matter, a stupa in memory of this event."43

Here are Prof. Oldenberg's remarks on this point: "Does the trial of Ananda allow us to oppose to the definite dogmas concerning the Arhat, the vagueness of the primitive ideas with regard to the saint? Have we really any reason for believing in this primitive uncertainty? Everything seems to me to indicate that the "circle of ideas" of ancient Buddhism has endeavoured from its origin to establish the conception of the Impeccable, the Delivered.44 And the tradition, northern as well as southern, seems to me to be unanimous in guaranteeing this conception as very ancient: the divergences of view concerning the Arhat, which were met with in the later systematic theologians, do not, in my opinion, change anything on this point. But, in fact, it is useless to occupy myself with this problem here: it is sufficient to point out that Ananda becomes Arhat immediately before the operations of the Council. The account emphasises the point that he was not Arhat before. As regards the *dukkata* that he has committed, he committed them during the Master's lifetime, before being Arhat. Now, whoever is, in a certain measure, familiar with the statement of the disciplinary proceedings, such as the Vinaya gives

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43. Minayeff. *Researches*, p. 31. This last phrase revolt M. Oldenberg (p. 626). Perhaps Minayeff does not carry credulity as far as Prof. O. believes: We may see here a notable example of his irony. The story of the sins of Ananda bears in itself a character of authenticity: the monument of which the Chinese pilgrim speaks is only a subsidiary proof. Not a few centuries have passed, in fact, between the trial of Ananda and the time of Hiouen-Thsang. But there are many people who believe in the birth of Buddha in the garden of Lumbini on the faith of an inscription of Asoka. Now who will say when the Cakravartin was born under the tree of the clouds?

44. It is well known that the books of Abhidharma (*Dhammasangani Kathavatthu*) distinguish very clearly between the *nirvâna* which alone is *asaṃskṛta* and the *arhattva*, which is nothing else than the disappearance of the *āsravas*, of the *rāga* (*vitarāgatva*). The impeccable is not delivered from the *skandhas.*
them, will see without difficulty that every fault once committed must find its disciplinary sanction without taking account of the point as to whether the guilty person has in the meantime attained to some degree of spiritual perfection."

I am not, alas! at home (*zu Hause*) in the disciplinary proceedings of the Vinaya: I may say, almost without affection, that I have studied chiefly eleventh chapter of the *Culla*. Fortune wills that I find in it an important detail relative to the problem which occupies us: we know that Channa, when Ānanda informed him of the "boycotting" pronounced against him by Buddha, fell into such repentance that he at once became Arhat. Thereupon, as we have already said, but this is worthy of repetition, he goes to implore Ānanda to remove the excommunication: he is then of the same opinion as Prof. Oldenberg. A fault committed before the acquisition of the "Arhatship" must find its disciplinary sanction. Ānanda who, we believe, understands the matter better than anyone, answers him in suitable words: "From the very moment, friend Channa, that you acquired the quality of Arhat, from that moment penance ceased."—"Whatever he may say, no one will speak to him, will exhort or admonish him": thus had Buddha spoken on his death-bed concerning Channa. But by the fact that one becomes Arhat, the penance falls to the ground, although it had been pronounced as decisive.—It is true that the Vinaya knows nothing of this penance styled "of Brahma", and that in consequence familiarity with the Vinayas is here without importance.

Let us notice again that Channa finds himself absolved from the excommunication when it is no longer harmful to him. We know that, according to the orthodox argument, not only the Arhat cannot fall, but also that the assistance of others, counsel or instruction, is perfectly useless to him.

The story of an Arhat culpable and subject to penance against his will is contrary to the orthodoxy of the "non-mahāsāṃghikas". When it was composed, the scholastic had not yet made use of the scriptural data and spiritual experience to develop the dogma in all its details. I believe, with Prof. Oldenberg, that the two traditions are in agreement in attributing great antiquity to the conception of the saint; but I add that they seem to me to put beyond all question the very ancient divergences of the doctors on this dogma. One cannot, in fact, consider these divergences as differences of opinion which appeared "unter den spätern theologischen Systematikern". The heretical "inventors" of the *five points* (four of which are relative to the Arhat) are neither systematic theologians nor persons of late date. Buddhists cannot associate with their names the

46. What right does Ānanda possess to take away an excommunication pronounced by Buddha and approved by the Samgha?
47. See our remarks on the Third Council.
memory of the first division of the Saṃgha. But, were they as ancient as I believe, it seems that before the period when the Buddhists divided themselves into affirmers and deniers of the possibility of the fall and ignorance of the Arhat, there was one in which the question had not been dogmatically propounded. That is what Minayeff saw here, and, in my opinion, with much reason.48

B.—According to the Culla, the Vinayas of the Mahīśāsakas and of the Mahāsaṃghikas and several other sources whose independent authority is doubtful, Ānanda's examination of conscience, instituted by the conclave or by Kāśyapa, took place after the operations of the Council and had not any connection with his qualification as Arhat or as member of the aforesaid Council.49

This is strange, it seems, and suspect; and one can only approve of the Dharma-guptas for having placed the trial of Ānanda before the Council, and the Sarvāstivādins as well as two other Chinese sources for having made Ānanda's admission subordinate to his justification and to the acquisition of sanctity ( arhattva ). But this absence of order and propriety in three sources of the first rank, compared with the greater harmony which rules in the others, permits us to assert with Minayeff “the entire independence of the accounts, united by our diaskeuasts into one single whole.” In the oldest account, we believe, there was no question of a Council: they reprimand Ānanda. If one adds to this first nucleus the legend of a Council, the reprimand of Ānanda will at first not change its character; and if orthodoxy, just about to be formed, exacts that all the members of the conclave should be Arhats, there will be no difficulty in assigning to the reprimand the place of second rank which is suitable to it after the narration of an event of so great importance as the redaction of the Scriptures. Orthodoxy is not yet sufficiently sensitive to feel the contradiction of this chronological arrangement; it is not sufficiently rigid to exclude the precise mention of the “non-sanctity” of Ānanda at the time of a gathering the object of which was to punish him.50 All that the orthodox tendency can obtain is to promote Ānanda to sanctity during the night of the Council.

48. See Childers, 53 b ad. fin.: “Araht properly means only a venerable man and in Dh. 240 [25] we find it applied by a non-Buddhist to Acelakas or naked ascetics.”

49. The trial of Ānanda takes place either before the compilation of the Scriptures (Dharmaguptas, Sarvāstivādins, Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, The Collection of Kāśyapa, [Nanjio 1363], Hiouen-Thsang, I. 156), or after (Mahīśāsakas, Mahāsaṃghikas, Vinayamāṭṛkāśāstra, Life of Ashoka). Sometimes there is no connection between the faults of Ānanda and his quality of member of the Council (sources of the second group and Dharmaguptas); sometimes, on the contrary, the aim of the trial is to show that Ānanda is not Arhat and ought to be excluded from the conclave.

50. The Karuṇapūndarika knows an Ānandāsaiṅka.—See also Sukhāvatī, 1.
With the Sarvāstivādins, on the contrary, the reprimand of Ānanda has become a trial. Kāśyapa asserts that the presence of the pious friend of Buddha mars the general sanctity of the whole assembly; he sees that Ānanda is still subject to the passions, anger, lust, ignorance, attachment. He excludes him. Ānanda replies: “I have not sinned, says the text, either against morality, or the doctrine, or against good conduct: I have done nothing unseemly nor harmful to the community”! Kāśyapa returns: “Immediate disciple of Buddha, what is there astonishing in that you have not committed the sins of which you speak? But, as for having done nothing harmful to the community, did you not pray Buddha to receive the women into the Order, the women whom Buddha declared as dangerous, as serpents and noxious to the Order ...

We see that the idea of the Arhat is still very inchoate here and as an accessory.

Also the text entitled Collection [of the Scripture] under Kāśyapa adds to the reproaches addressed to Ānanda the only one which is of importance and which, up till now, did not figure among the faults, although it had slipped into the Sarvāstivādin context: “Ānanda is not freed from lust, hatred, and ignorance”. Then he is not Arhat, then he is not one of us! It is well to oppose to this version the text of the Culla: “Although he may still be a student, say the monks to Kāśyapa, choose Ānanda, for he is incapable of lust, hatred, ignorance, or fear.”

II.—Among the sins of Ānanda especially interesting are the fifth, the fourth, and the first.

A.—Fifth fault: “Again you did wrong, O Ānanda, when you exerted yourself to obtain the admission of the women into the Dhamma and the Vinaya proclaimed by the Tathāgata.” Ānanda replies that he was thinking of Mahāpajāpati, the Gotami, sister of the mother of Bhagavat. The Sarvāstivādins add, according to Rockhill (Life, p 152): “I asked only that the women who were [my] relations and friends might enter into the Order.”

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52. This is to say, he has laid aside the passions which the Arhats have laid aside. See note 24a, the confusion of the abhijñās and of the arhattva.
53. With regard to the second sin (having stepped upon the robe) and similar faults (having refused water) Minayeff expressed himself thus: “This conduct on the part of Ānanda was not only a transgression of the rules of the Vinaya which determined in the sequel the relations of the disciple and the master, but it implied something more monstrous still—contempt for the supreme saint, for Buddha.” To me the observation does not seem conclusive.
54. We must connect with this datum those pointed out by Minayeff, p. 41, on the role of the family of the Śākyas in the Community, Mahāvagga, p. 71, and the recent archaeological discoveries.
Here we are treading upon very unstable ground. Minayeff asks himself if there is not in this accusation "an echo of the very modern prophecies and ideas concerning the end of Buddhism in consequence of the admission of women into the monastic community."

I believe, on the contrary, that here we hear an echo, very weak and indistinct, of a "prehistoric" controversy relative to the admission of the women.  

B.—The fourth sin, says Minayeff, deserves to be noticed. "In this also, O Ānanda, have you committed a fault: when Bhagavat made to you a suggestion, an invitation so plain, so evident, you did not supplicate him, saying, 'let Bhagavat remain during the age (kalpa) ..., out of compassion for the world.'" We do not know, continues Minayeff, if the author of the account that we are examining attributed to Buddha this power [of prolonging his life during a kalpa]: but it is very evident from these words that the holy members of the Council who were judging Ānanda did not doubt that Buddha could, if he had wished or if he had been properly asked, have continued to live for an entire kalpa; they shared a conviction which, in the canon, is attributed to the Mahāsāṃghikas and declared heretical. The teaching of the Mahāyānikas on this possibility of prolonging human life was also the same.

Prof. Oldenberg observes, with good reason, that the words which we have underlined in the canon, constitute an inaccuracy. The Kathāvatthu condemns, it is true, the above opinion,—the Kathāvatthu, the youngest of the books of Abhidhamma, which orthodox tradition only makes go back to Tissa Moggaliputta, to the Third Council. and which Minayeff himself considers as much later, so that we may, "if we wish", say that the above doctrine is condemned in the canon, but that it is best to be a little more precise. But it is not in the Kathāvatthu, it is in the commentary of the Kathāvatthu that the Mahāsāṃghikas are designated as holding the heresy in question: "The Kathāvatthu

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55. See note 106, at the end.

I do not insist on the absurdity of the reproach addressed to Ānanda of having made himself the instigator of a measure taken by Buddha himself. And the monks have just "chanted," without objection, the 'double Vinaya' (ubhāto vinaye), that is to say, the Vinaya of the bhikṣuṇīs as well as that of the bhikṣus! I may say in passing that Minayeff seems to have been mistaken about the meaning of this expression (=, according to him, Vibhaṅga and Khandakas). See Buddh. Studien, p. 618, n. 1.

56. The Tathāgata may remain alive for the kalpa or for the remainder of the kalpa, for an "age of the world" (many millions of human centuries), or for the residue remaining of the present "age of the world." See M.P.S. III. 3, 45, and Milinda, p. 140 = Rhys Davids, I. p. 198.


B. C.—3/a
informs us concerning the activity of a generation of theologians who hold with the text of the *Suttas* a relationship analogous to that of the Christian scholastic with the text of the New Testament. The *Suttas* constitute firm data; more or less lengthy fragments of them are often quoted; they enjoy an unlimited authority. But it is necessary to interpret them properly and to find a solution when they seem to contradict each other. It is thus that in the passage of the *Kathāvatthu* with which we are concerned there is examined the contradiction between the scriptural datum on the power of prolonging life which the *iddhi* [magic virtue] procures and that other scriptural datum which declares it impossible that he who can grow old should not do so, and that he who is mortal should not die. The conclusion is that in fact such a power could not have been attributed to the *iddhibala*; and the commentary, rich in exegetic devices, as frequent among the pious Buddhist dialecticians as among their Christian confess-gets rid of the Scriptural testimony which in truth is perfectly clear, by an [ingenious] distinction between the different meanings of the word *kappa*.

I have made a point of reproducing the whole of this page because it is very happy and very instructive; but it scarcely modifies the form which must be given to Minayeff's argument.

It is granted that, according to the redactor of the *Mahāparinibbāṇa* (III. 3, etc.), Buddha attributed to himself, as he attributed to all the possessors of the *idddhibalas*, the power of "remaining" until the end of the "age". Hence, the opinion of the Elders and of Ānanda is in agreement with a text canonical in the highest degree. It is contradicted by the *Kathāvatthu*, as also by the *Milinda*. This proves, as Prof. Oldenberg very rightly observes, that from the moment that the Buddhists tried to construct a "dogmatism" they came into collision with sacred texts irreconcilable one with another, or irreconcilable with theoretical dogmatic views formed of information. But at what epoch did dogmatic preoccupation become concerned with the question of the virtues conferred by the *iddhibala*? Very early, in our opinion, for this question, like that of the impeccability of the Arhat, is in close connection with that of Buddha considered as *iddhiman*; besides, it is connected with the attitude which the community will take up with regard to the Yoga. It seems that orthodoxies must have, or may have, been formed on these points long before the time of the *Kathāvatthu*.

I easily believe the commentary of the *Kathāvatthu* when it names on this subject the Mahāsāṁghikas; for the Northern sources attribute to the group of the Mahāsāṁghikas, Lokottaravādins, etc. the opinion that the life of the Buddhas has no limit;

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59. *Kappa* would here mean the normal duration of human life. In other words, Buddha would have boasted of the power of escaping a premature death (*akālamaraṇa*). The problem of the *akālamaraṇa* of the Arhat has been much discussed. The cleverness of Buddhaghosa is therefore not solely his achievement.
as also, that there is nothing "mundane", or, if one prefers, "terrestrial" in them. This doctrine, which exalts the Master and extols the magic virtues, the passage cited from the M.P.S. and our "legend of the trial of Ānanda prove to belong to the oldest tradition—to the tradition of the Elders". The Kathāvatthu and the Milinda deviate from it, and although Buddhaghoso recognises clearly the sectarian views of the Kathāvatthu,—"Buddha", he makes Tissa say, "is Vibhajyavādin",—it is not superfluous to state it in passing. The tendency of "Southern" tradition is if I may so express myself, euhemerist. Further, it is characterised by great sobriety in that which concerns Yogism and all its forms. Some Indianists, as celebrated as authoritative, like to surpass the Suttas and construct a reasonable "Ultra-Hīnayānist," Buddhism, reasonable, purged as much as possible from magic and the supernatural. It is interesting to observe that the conflict which divides us to-day is only the reflection of the dissension, which, we believe, separated into sects the believers of the early ages. Is the historic Buddha, that is to say, the Buddha of the first Buddhist generations, merely a "saint", or is he a superior being, divine, lokottara? And, without questioning the sincerity of the old Singhalese theras of Vattagamani, the definitive compilers of the Nikāyas, one notices, in spite of oneself, that the school which has preserved for us the canon in the Pali language is the same that has given us the Kathāvatthu and the Milinda in their complete redaction. The men who play with the words of Bhagavat, as do Buddhaghosa and Nāgasena, are they not to be suspected of having made sad mutilations in the old legend? Cannot we suppose, without too great credulity, that they have, more or less unconsciously, dropped a part of the "common tradition" of old Buddhism?

At least we must notice all the indications which throw light upon this old and problematic history. And, from this point of view, the observation of Minayeff on the fourth sin of Ānanda seems to us as precious as it is well-founded.

C.—The abolition of the small and lesser rules.—See Culla XI., § 9 and 10 initio (first sin of Ānanda, according to the Pali reckoning).

Compare Mahāparinibbanasutta VI. 3. "When I am no more, O Ānanda, let the Order, if it so desire, abolish the lesser and minor rules"; and Pācittiya lxxii: "If a bhikkhu at the time of the recitation of the Pātimokkha should speak thus: 'what is the

60. On the ancient parts of the Kathāvatthu, see our remarks on the Third Council.

61. In any case, they have preserved for us many precious things; see the Akankeyyasutta and the remarks of Mr. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Suttas, p. 207, also the Mahasudossanasutta (ibid. p. 237). I can only call attention in passing to this question, on which it is easy to be lengthy, but difficult to be demonstrative.

good of the recitation of the lesser and minor rules, except to engender doubt, weariness and perplexity?; this bhikkhu is guilty of contemning the rules.  

"The hypothesis forces itself upon us (drangt sich von selbst auf),” says Prof. Oldenberg, “that the redactor of our chapter of the Culla spoke of these things (that is to say, of Channa and of the lesser precepts) because the Mahāparinibbāṇa had spoken of them.”

"Buddha had given orders to be executed after his death: ought one not, when one had to speak of what happened in the community after the death of Buddha, to explain how these orders had been executed? The tradition of the Mahāparinibbāṇa speaks in the sense which we know of the khuddakānukhuddakas; on the other hand Buddhists did not know that the community had supposed any of the intended rules. Hence, what is more simple than to suppose that the community had resolved to keep to the established laws?“

That is what the compiler of the Culla will have done, and the same reasoning holds good for the history of Channa and his penance: certainly, it is not bad; but it is not conclusive. Several other explanations may be given, if we wish, and all as good, on the question with which we are now occupied.

The observation of Minayeff remains entire. Let us take into account the allusion of the M.P.S. to the abrogation of the lesser rules, or the discussion recounted in the Culla or the indication furnished by Pāc. lxxii., or the three documents all at once; the remains that we have to do with a datum “bearing the mark of a remote antiquity,”—difficult doubtless to restore to the historical context to which it belongs,—but “rather” irreconcilable with a rigorous constitution already fixed by discipline. It gives us pleasure, a somewhat cruel pleasure I confess, to see the poor theras seek in their sacred Pātimokkha, where Buddha has formally condemned the contemners of the lesser laws (Pāc. lxxii.), for the minor and very minor laws which this excellent Buddha, with the most annoying inconsequence, gave them permission to repeal. To adopt one of the six interpretations of the Fathers, there is hardly anything but assassination which is forbidden to the sons of Śākya! If the Most Happy One were still living, say the six bhiksus of the Mahāsāṃghikavinaya, he would abolish all the laws!"

The word of Buddha which authorises the Order to modify the laws fixed by the

63. This text has escaped Kāśyapa, Ānanda, and the Elders,

64. "Dis Uberlieferung des M.P.S. gab jenes Wort über die Khuddakānukhuddakañi:

Man wusste andererseits nichts davon, dass eine Aufhebung irgend welcher derartiger Satzungen erforst sei; was war einfacher, als sich hier zu helfen, in dem man die Gemeinde einen Beschluss fassen liess wie den im Culla § 9. berichteten?"

65. The discussion about the lesser rules is there very elaborate. Suzuki, article quoted, p. 277.
Omniscient is very extraordinary. Has he not, before making this confidence to Ananda, just declared solemnly that "the truths and the laws of the Order which I have promulgated and established for you all, let them hold the place of Master to you I shall be no more?" 66

We are, in truth, in darkness so profound that it is difficult, when not to formulate hypothesis, for they present themselves in crowds, but to attach oneself to one definite hypothesis. The thought of Minayeff, and we shall see in examining the history of Vaisali, that this thought appears very wise and judicious, is that the disciplinary rules at the death of the Master were very far from being fixed as we know them. To be a Buddhist monk it was necessary, first of all, to be an ascetic, a sramana, that is, to conform to the general laws of religious life already determined under diverse forms, Jaina or brahmanic; it was necessary also to be a "son of Sakya," by submitting to the particular form of religious life that the ever-increasing experience of the Master, then of the community, shall deem it well to formulate; by forming part of the Samgha, presided over by Buddha and constituted of friendly brotherhoods.

Now Buddha himself has recognised the inutility and the harmfulness of penance (tapas); the picture which he draws of the "fruits of the religious life" has nothing terrible in it; his first official word is to announce—he is addressing ascetics, Yogins—a middle course between austerity and "laxity." 67

From that a truly seductive solution presents itself and one which we may recommend to the conservative school. When Buddha allows the khuddakanukhudakas to be suppressed, he does not mean principles proclaimed by himself, laws of the "honest ascetic", who can live and walk with great strides, following the Eightfold Way, towards Nirvana. He is speaking of the minor and very minor rules with which heretical disciplinarians encumber themselves and which overwhelm all spiritual vigour. 68

The First Council was not what a vain people thinks. The codification of the

66. M.P.S. VI. 1. It is strange also that Ananda should reveal to the Council the delegation of power the Master made to the community, after the Vinaya has been chanted by Upali, after Ananda himself has chanted the Dharma. Is it still time to discuss the alteration of rules when they are already canonical?

67. See the remarks of Mr. Rhys Davids (Dialogues of the Buddha, p. 208), on the Kassapasihananda.

68. See Rhys Davids, loc. cit.: "So hard, so very hard, was the struggle that the Arhat, or the man striving towards Arhatship, should be always sufficiently clothed, and take regular baths, regular exercise, regular food. He was to avoid not what was necessary to maintain himself in full bodily vigour and power, but all undue luxury and all worry about personal comfort."
Scripture did not hold the position in it that has been stated by ecclesiastical tradition. But, as Minayeff remarks, in our accounts we must not "confound the statements which do not deserve the same belief ... the assemblies were instituted quite naturally and were a necessary consequence of a given state of things." These assemblies, partial, as Culla XI., § 11 (absence of Purana) indicates, were organised, perhaps, under the "already" classical from of the conferences held during the rainy season by all the monks, without exception, belonging to the same centre. Perhaps they are a little more solemn; they are provoked by difference of opinion among the monks, by accusations brought against one or another. The Master is no longer living: it was necessary that some authority should be organised or affirmed to formally contradict Subhadra, who believed himself freed from all rule by the disappearance of Buddha, to attain Channa, whose sentence the Master did not have time to pronounce, to reprimand Ānanda himself, who is no longer protected by the affection of Buddha against the jealousies it has aroused. Now the Master, as Purana will say, if we are to believe two respectable traditions, and as the texts sufficiently prove, the Master did not always express the same opinion on all the points of discipline. His omniscience allowed him to seize the essential part in everything and to accommodate his precepts, like his doctrine, to the needs of each. But he is no longer there to soothe the conflicts (vivāda), and the community, widowed of its infallible chief, must have rules. Ānanda will recall that the Master condemned disciplinary futilities; but not everyone can hear or understand in the same way this word of freedom.

"Even in the Vinaya, it seems to me", says M. Barth, "that there are several conceptions of the devout life. At one time the bhikṣu is a solitary wanderer, without fire or resting-place; two of them may not follow the same road; at another time they

69. According to our texts, if there was in the quarters for the rainy season one monk who did not take part in the assembly, it would have no authority. I believe this disposition ancient, at least in its origin, for it springs from the solidarity which the Master wished to establish between the scattered elements of his Saṃgha. (See p. 3, 1. 4, and the avasā and the anumatikappa (Vaiśālī).

70. Kern has remarked that Buddha always remains a stranger to disciplinary proceedings. See Oldenberg, Buddha, 5th edit., p. 398, how the Saṃgha is raised itself to the dignity of 'jewel'.

71. See p. 5.

72. See M. Barth's article on M. Vastu, p. 28. J. des Savants, 1899. M. Barth quotes Mhv. III., 415-420 (415, caratha bhikṣavah śarikam ma ca duve ekena agamittha, and 421, pravivikta viharanti bhikṣavah) and M. Vagga, I. 11. Cf. the note of the Vinaya Texts, I. p. 112, on the phrase: "Let not two of you go the same way". "This cannot be understood as a general rule, for it is repeated nowhere where precepts for wandering bhikkus are given, and, on the contrary ... —The precept given here is intended to refer only to the earliest period in the spread of the new doctrine ..."
wander in numerous troops, ordinarily five hundred, in the train of the Master or of an eminent disciple; sometimes they form sedentary groups: there are the bhikṣus of Kosāmī, of Vesali, of Savatthi [āvāsika = naivāsika, M. Vyut, § 270] they are authorised to possess personal property, absolutely incompatible with a wandering life; the Patimokkha, the oldest nucleous, supposes the life of the convent.\(^7\)

Let us be sure that there are many later developments here, especially in the sense of the cenobitic life; but do not let us doubt, either, the primitive diversity of the Buddhist groups.\(^7\) Sometimes Buddha rallied to his banner of salvation communities of hermits, sometimes Yogins “solitary as the rhinoceros”, the future pratyekabuddhas\(^7\) often he rescued from the world sons of good families, merchants and women. Thus, when Ānanda, representative of the “worldly” elements, partisan of the broader ways, the man of the Eight-fold Way, as Upāli is the man of the Vinayas, when Ānanda wishes to cause an easy Pratimokṣa to triumph, then Kāśyapa, the man of the Dhūtāṅgas\(^7\) “ascetic attracted from outside into the community”, rises to answer him. “We must not scandalise the laity; the sons of Śākya must not be less Śramāṇas than the heretical priests; we must suppress nothing of the lesser and minor laws.”

He made sufficiently great concessions to Buddha when he clothed his ascetic nudity with the triple robe: before becoming the follower of the lion who roars out the way of Nirvāṇa, he assured himself that Gotama does not condemn all penance, that he does not reprove ascetics who lead a hard life, and only then did he consent to moderate his own roaring. But he will not slip further than is necessary down the slope of “laxity”.

If we understand a certain passage of the Milinda as an apologue, we shall find there the confirmation of this manner of regarding the matter. “Why,” asks Milinda, “did the Most Happy authorise the abrogation of the minor rules? And, does he not, by this deed, enter into contradiction with himself?”—“No,” replies Nāgasena; “Bhagavat only authorised the abrogation of the lesser rules in order to prove his bhikkhus. Just so a king will counsel his children to abandon the frontier districts, ‘for the kingdom is great and difficult to protect with the forces we have at our disposal.’ But at the death of the king, will the princes abandon the frontier districts which they

\(^{73}\) Bulletin des Religions de l'Inde, 1899-1902, III. i. p. 29.

\(^{74}\) We shall return to this problem after having examined the legend of Vaiśāli.

\(^{75}\) See Kern, Manual, p. 75, note 6 (Sutta. Mp. 1. 3 and 12; Therag. 518-526) and 61, n. 7 (d. Mhv. I. 301); M. Vyut.

\(^{76}\) See Kern, Manual, p. 75, note 5 (Dipav. IV. 3, V. 7; Sam. N. II. 156, Div. 61, 3 infra, 395), Beal, Latena p. 256, ap. Kern, Gesch. II. 15, Cullavagga, V, 10, 3. Cf. below, our remarks on Devadatta (notes 100 and 104).

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already hold." "No", replies Milinda, "kings love to take; the princes will perhaps conquer new territories, two or three times greater than their heritage, but they will not give up an atom of what they hold." "In the same way, O King," replies Nāgasena, "the sons of Buddha, in their love for the law, will be able to keep 250 rules, but they will never abandon one law which has been regularly established."

Like kings, the ascetics are very covetous (lubhdatara). It is their successive conquests which have consecrated the 227 rules of the Pali Pratimokṣa and the 250 rules of which Nāgasena speaks.

I fear that the "Vengeance" of Minayeff carries my zeal a little too far, for I am reasoning as a believer would do! But at least the position of the author of the Researches is excellent from a strictly negative point of view, and I do not at all understand why Prof. Oldenberg refuses to follow,—if not quite to the end, for I myself shall have to make some reservations, at least in that which is evident in itself,—the interpretation of Minayeff, as he himself very well sums it up:

"The episode [of the Khuddakānukhuddakas], transports us to a time when no (Buddhist) code of religious discipline could exist; when one could not as yet know what was important or not in the rules of the monastic life. When the Culla, before relating this episode to us, makes the assembled saints recite the entire Vinaya, it contradicts itself."

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77. This number recalls the Chinese Pratimokṣa (Dharmaguptas, 250 articles) or the Tibetan Pratimokṣa (253 articles); but see Rockhill, R.H.R. IX. p. 9. According to M. Kern (Man. p. 752) there are 259 articles in M. Vyut, of which 106 are quoted; M. Vyut, § 263. It seems to be that we must deduct No. 1 of this last list.

78. Se below, the remarks on the Second Council.


80. That is too strong. There existed at this time only too great a number of disciplinary "codes".

81. Or better: in the different conceptions of religious life.

82. Reply of Prof. Oldenberg, Buddh. Studien, p. 622, l. 9, infra. "Denn darin leicht doch nichts ungereimtes, dass eine Monchversammlung zuerst feststellte, was fur Anordnungen der Meister getroffen, und denn erwog, ob man—nicht etwa aus eigener Machtvollkommenheit, sondern gestutzt auf eine ausdruckliche dahin gehende Autorisation des Buddha—von diesen Anordnungen irgend einen Teil authoben sollte ... Ich bin weit davon entfernt diesen ganzen Vorgang meinerseits fur geschichtlich zu hatten. ..." Nor I, either, but also, I consider it absolutely improbable.

If we take into account the narrative of the episode of Purana as the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsāṃghikas give it, and also this detail related in the Dulva, that Ānanda had for disciple a certain Vṛjiputra (Rockhill, Life, p. 155) we shall be led to
Does Prof. Oldenberg believe that the Vinaya was chanted at Rājagṛha, immediately after the death of Buddha? No, it seems; and hence, why not admit that the discussion of the *khuddakas* takes us to a time when the Vinaya was not canonically codified? Does he believe in the authenticity of the words pronounced by Buddha on the *khuddakas* and on Channa, words preserved in the *M.P.S.*? Yes, doubtless;—certainly, much more than Minayeff or myself. Why then suppose that the redactor of the *Culla* has invented the above discussions in the bosom of the Samgha in order to follow out the suggestions of the *M.P.S.* instead of admitting that the events themselves have followed out in the same way the Master's words? The only time that Minayeff believes in the tradition, Prof. Oldenberg calls it in question. That is really unfortunate.

In vain will he tell us that the community was otherwise aware of not having changed anything in the rules fixed by the Omniscient; for it is too natural, in fact, that it should be persuaded of this, and the decision to abolish nothing, attributed to Kāśyapa, is the only one which could triumph officially in the chronicle and in the ecclesiastical formulary.

It is not without utility that Prof. Oldenberg took up again this question; he has corrected several *lapses* of Minayeff; he has, above all, brought to it useful material, by expressing his views on the progressive elaboration of orthodoxy, by pointing out the the points of agreement between the *Culla* and the *M.P.S.* and several other references. It seems to us that he has not disturbed Minayeff's ruling thought. Without fearing to betray the latter too seriously, we arrive at the following conclusions.

It seems evident that the account of the *Culla*, in that which concerns the Council and its (properly speaking) scriptural deliberations, is not historic. We put aside the idea of a solemn recitation of the Nikāyas and of the Vinaya, without, however, according any value whatsoever to the celebrated argument a *silention*. On the other hand, the episodes of Channa, and of Purana, the failings of Ānanda, the discussion about the *ksudrakas*, bear the mark of a high antiquity; and without fear of being too credulous we may admit as possible, indeed probable, not only that after the disappearance of Buddha assemblies did take place in which the ecclesiastical power was affirmed by the settling of questions of discipline,—of that we consider ourselves almost certain—but also that the cause of the existence of these assemblies was the discussion of our "episodes".

But the misfortune is that in researches of this kind "to give or to withhold are worth nothing". If we admit the deliberations and the disciplinary discussions, can we gracefully deny the possibility of deliberations and decisions doctrinal or scriptural?

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establish a close relationship between the events of Rājagṛha, the quarrel about the lesser precepts, and the Vajji-puttakas whom the Council of Vaiśāli will bring forward, great 'overreachers' in small matters of discipline.

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Why not accord some belief to the tradition, though it may be late and tendencious? It is impossible for the Sūtras and the Nikāyas to have made themselves, that is, that, like Minerva, having come out of the head of the Omniscient, they should have preserved and grouped themselves spontaneously. The agreement between the different sects—here, a little too soon, we touch upon a subject which it will be necessary to examine in detail—supposes the collective activity whose existence Minayeff has affirmed in the discussion of the points of discipline.

We believe that the account of the First Council has a historic value from a double point of view: as containing an ancient nucleus of authentic tradition, that is, “discussions on points of discipline”, which are not necessarily anterior to all canonical codification; and as resuming under the symbolical aspect of a regular Council, of a complete recitation, the work of compilation and arrangement which must have occupied the first centuries, work of which the assembly at Rājagṛha constituted the germ and which tradition places at Rājagṛh, at Pāṭaliputra and in Ceylon (Vattagamani).

The scriptural question easily joins on to the question of discipline. Not only because the problems of discipline suppose laws or texts of Vinaya; but also because the question will arise if a certain monk or a certain group should be admitted, or should remain in the communion of the Saṁgha. It will be necessary to know if this monk or this group is not heretical, if it recognises such and such a doctrine, if it believes in the karman or if it does not, and the community will be more exacting than was a Saint, who, at will, transformed tirthikas into Arhats and Jaṭilas, into bhikkhus.

They have “sacred words” (subhaṣitas ityuktakas), authentic histories (itiyṛttakas); soon they will class them in nikāyas (āgamas) and the question of books will be most important: “any one is Mahāyānist,” says I-tsing, “when he reads the Mahāyānasūtras.” They could not but feel the necessity for drawing up the canon of the approved Sūtras in order to distinguish the true word of Buddha (?) among the apocrypha which abounded: for it was an amusement to pour forth in the classical form, no matter what idea, disciplinary, legendary, or dogmatic. It is much more easy to make a good Sūtra than a bad Upaniṣad. And we must consider this detail, that the questioning of Ānanda bears only on the place and the interrogator of the Sūtra, and that it does not allow, as does the interrogation of Upāli on the Vinaya, precise details of the contents of the work.

Thus we are to adopt a much more conservative manner of thinking than the one Minayeff seems to have patronised, and this by the simple fact that with him we

83. We deviate from Minayeff. See our remarks on the Second Council.

84. M. Vagga, VI. 31, is remarkable for the contempt of Buddha which affects for questions of doctrine. This contempt goes even so far as to become impertinence. “Do you teach.” they ask him, “annihilation (uccheda) [that is to say, the doctrine of non-survival]?—“I teach,” the Master replies, “the annihilation of desire ...” The same contempt for speculation, M.P.S. V. 61 foll., ap. Kern, I. 225-6.
distinguish in the *Culla* between the elements which are authentic or nearly so, those which represent the Saṅgha as constituted as a "tribunal", elements certainly anterior to the data which give to the Council "the aspect of a conclave, met together with a theological and literary aim"; the latter not being nevertheless, exempt from all value, at least symbolical, and not having necessarily been invented, as Minayeff believes, to establish against the Mahāyānist the authority of the canon of the Hīnayāna,—or, as Prof. Oldenberg thinks, according to the events of the Second Council.

I do not know that the Mahāyānists have ever contested as a whole the authenticity of the *Suttāntas*; their polemic is quite different; and the Second Council is a stranger, according to the tradition, to all questions of Scriptures.\(^8^5\)

85. See, however, note 88.


b. Corresponds to the Śuvṛkṣa-palace (?) of M. Suzuki.

c. Is the translation exact? A note tells us that the text speaks of the Śrīdeva-palace.

d. According to Suzuki, the *Sarvāstivādivinaya*, the *Prajñāpāramitāśāstra* and the *Compilation of Kāśyapa* say that four rivers flow from the transfigured body, proclaiming appropriate gāthās.

e. This quotation, as well as those which follow, are, according to a kind communication, from M N. Wogihara.
II.—THE SECOND COUNCIL

THE account of the Council of Vaiśāli (Culla XII.) is one of the finest pages of ancient Indian literature. In spite, or perhaps even because of the clumsiness of the style and composition—"breakings-off," repetitions, brusque transitions, episodes badly connected with the general course of the story—the writer pictures to us with a greyish back-ground, in the half light of a legend which aims at being history, or of a history which "the Buddhist style unique in the world" cannot fail render legendary, a wide plan, full of suggestive details, and one seems agreed on this point, more or less susceptible of historical criticism.

We will give first of all, as we did above, an outline of the Pali document.

I., §1. "At Vesali, a hundred years after the Nibbana of Bhagavat the Bhikkhus (named) sons of Vajji, established at Vesali, proclaimed it lawful to practise the ten

86. Sources: Culla (Minayeff, Pratimokṣa, p. xxxix., translated in Tūr. note, p. 289); Chronicles Buddhaghoṣa.—Rhys Davids, Buddhism, p. 212.

Vinayakṣudraka (Dulva, XI. 323-330) pointed out by Tāranātha, p. 41; "Da das Wesentliche dieser Geschichte aus dem Vinayakṣudraka vollstanding sehr bekannt ist, ist es hier nicht auf geschrie ben". This history has been translated by Rockhill, Life, 171-180 (see Schiefner's note, Tūr. p. 41); nevertheless we think it will be of utility to give below in an appendix the Tibetan text and the translation of the paragraph consecrated to the definition of the six infractions.

Mahiśāsakavinaya, according to Wassilieff, note to Tāranātha, pp. 288 and 290.
Hiouen-thsang, II. 397; Kern, II. 263.
Dharmaguptas, Nanjio 1117, according to Beal, Four Lectures, p. 83.
87. According to Messrs. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, these figures must be taken as round numbers.
88. Or: '[forming the community] of Vesali'.

It must not be forgotten that five hundred bhikṣus of Vaiśālī, Vajjiputtakas, are represented, Culla VII. 4, 1, as having adhered to the five rigorist propositions of Devadatta.—A notable contradiction.

According to Tāranātha (p. 40) the brothers from Vaiśāli profited by the sickness of the venerable Dhītika to practice the ten "points". They were reproved by 700 arhats, with the Arhat Yaśas at their head and in the Vihāra Kusmapurī (=Pāṭaliputra), under the reign of Nanda (dga-byed) as patron (dānapati) the second collection of the Scripture took place. The Arhats are said to be Bahuṣrutīyas (?) and from the region of Vaiśālī, or to have come from the "six towns". (Kern, II. 263).
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At this time Yasa, son of Kakandaka, travelling in the country of the Vajjis, came to Vesali; he took up his lodging in the Great Wood (Mahāvana), in the hall of the Belvedere (Kutagarasala). Now the Bhikkhu Vajjiputtakas of Vesali, on the day of the Uposatha, having filled a copper basin with water, and having placed it in the midst of the circle formed by the monks, say to the laymen who come: “Give to the community a kāhapana, a half, a quarter, a sixth of a kāhapana! The community will have need of diverse things.” In vain Yasa protests: “Do not give! Gold and silver are not allowed to the ascetics, sons of Śākya...”

When the night was ended, the monks shared the money between them, and also offered his portion to Yasa, who refused it.

§2. The monks bring against Yasa the act of “reconciliation (pratisaraniya kamma)” as ask pardon from the laymen.

Accompanied by a brother, whom who he has demanded as attendant (anudūta) in conformity with the rule, Yasa goes into the town and speaks to the laymen: “I acknowledge that I blamed you, you who are, nevertheless, laymen, pious and of good intention; it is true. But why? Because I call illegal (adhamma) that which is illegal, the law, the law; because I call disorder (avinaya) disorder, and discipline, discipline.”

§3-5. And he proves his right by citing discourses of Buddha, which are absolutely decisive on the question of the monks being forbidden gold and silver.

§6. The laymen are convinced and decide to break with the lapsed brethren: “There is none but Yasa who is an ascetic and a son of Śākya; all the others are neither ascetics, nor sons of Śākya.”

§7. The attendant relates to the monks the unexpected issue of the “reconciliation” of Yasa. “Yasa, without being deputed by us, has preached to laymen: “Let us bring against him the act of suspension (ukkhepaniya kamma!” The Vajjiputtakas meet together to put this project into execution.

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89. Vatthu=vastu=Tib: gzhi.
90. These technical terms are merely enumerated here; they will be explained later on, in the actual body of the account.
91. We shall not discuss the personality of this Yasas; see Kern, II. 234, and Man. p. 105, 8, and Oldenberg, Buddh St., p. 624.
93. See Kern, II. 118.
94. Amhehi asammato gihinam pakasesi = ‘Without being deputed by us has proclaimed to laymen [a false doctrine].’ The sin referred to is that of asammata avadāna.
However, Yasa rises into the air and descends at Kośambī; he sends messengers to the brethren of the West, to those of Avanti, and of the Deccan, saying: “Come! Let us take this question in hand before the non-Dhamma spreads and the Dhamma be put aside ....” (The same terms as in Kāśyapa’s speech before the First Council.)

§8. Yasa pays a visit to Sambhūta Sanavāsin; he enumerates the ten points to him without furnishing any explanation and invites him in the same terms as above: “Let us take this question ...” Sanavāsin accepts.

There arrive on the mountain Ahoganga sixty ascetics from Patheyya (western), all arhats and observers of the Dhūtāṅgas, eighty-eight ascetics from Avanti and the Dekkan all arhats, but of whom some only practise the extreme austerity of the Occidentals.

§9. The Bhikkhus (thoras) deliberate: “This question is hard and troublesome. How can we obtain partisans so that we may be the stronger in this question?”—They think of summoning Revata,—contemporary of Bhagavat, if we are to believe M. Vagga (VIII. 31)—who was dwelling at Soreyya. Revata, thanks to his celestial hearing, hears their discourse; thinks: “This question is hard troublesome and

95. Patheyyakas.—“Patheya is one of the four divisions into which India was divided and includes the great westerly kingdoms of Kuru, Pañcāla, Maccha, Surasena, Assaka, Avanti, Gandhāra, Kamboja (Mahāvagga, VII. i. 1; Milinda, 331).” E. Muller, J.P.T.S. 1888, p. 54 (cited by Kern, Manual p. 104).

96. M. Vyūt, § 275, 11 āvantakas.

97. Imам adhikaranam adiyissama: “let us take in charge this legal question ...” M. Vyūt, § 276; 16, 281, 208.

98. Elsewhere Sanasambhūta; in the northern sources Śanavāsa, Śanavāsika (Kern, II. 251, n. 1; 271) Sonovāsin.

99. imam adhikaranam: “let us take in charge this last question ...” (Vinaya Texts, III., 195). As if it was here a question of the tenth point only (gold and silver) and not of the nine others. Perhaps the original account was only concerned with the question of gold and silver.

100. Sabbe arannaka, sabbe pindapatikā, sabbe pamsukkulika, sabbe teivarika. Dhūtāṅgas 8, 3, 1, 2. See below 101, no. 6.

101. On the laws promulgated in favour of the monks of the South and from Avanti, see M. Vagga, v. 13.

102. idam kho adhikaranam kakkalan ca valan ca.—“Kakkata=hard=difficult. Vala is doubtful: although the substantive vyala may be represented by vali, I am inclined to believe that vala corresponds to the adjective vyala, bad.” [Communication from M. Kern.]—Vinaya Texts: “This legal question now is hard and subtle.”
surely [it is not or it would not be] seemly for me to mix myself up with such a question. Now the Bhikkhus will come and, surrounded by them, I shall not easily get away. What if I took the precaution of leaving.” Revata goes to Samkassa. The theras, not finding him at Soreyya, hasten to Samkassa; but the saint is no longer there, and they are obliged to pursue him from place to place—Kanna, Kujja, Udambara, Aggalapura. Finally, at Sahajati, where they finally arrive, they learn that Revata is still in the town.

§ 10. Sanavāsin makes Yasa observe that Revata will probably be occupied in giving a lesson to his pupil. When the lesson is finished, Yasa questions Revata on

103. na kho me tam patirupam yo’ ham evarupe adhikarne osakkeyyam. idani ca pana te bhikkhu agacchissanti. so’ ham tehi akinno na phasum gamissami. Yan nunaham patigacc’ eva gaccheyyam ti.

On csakkhati, see Childers and Mhv. I. 389 ( avasakkati ; sakk representing svask ) = “withdraw from.”

patigaccha and elsewhere patikacca = pratikṛtya—means ‘by way of precaution.’ See M. Vagga, I. 31 ( "kacca" ); C. Vagga, VI. 11 ; Suttavibh. II. p. 44 ; Theragāthā, 547 ; Jāt. III. 208, 25 ( "kan ca" ). [ Communicated by M. Kern. ]

In order to follow M. Kern I depart from the version of Messrs. R. D. and O. : “This legal question is both hard and subtle, it would not become me to hold back therefrom. But even now those Bhikkhus [ the Vajjians ] will be coming. It would be unpleasant travelling for me were I to fall in with them. Let me go on before them”. This version seem to me to be reconcilable neither with the text nor with the context. “These Bhikkhus” ( te bhikkhu ) can only be the thera bhikkhus whose deliberations Revata has just heard and who are, in fact, coming to Soreyya, as the Saint had foreseen.

104. idani ca panayasma Revato antevasikan sarabhanakam bhikkhum ajjhessissati, so tvam tassa bhikkhuno sarabhanapariyosane ayasmantam Revatam ... puccheyyasiti.— Vinaya Texts : “And even now Revata will call upon a Bhikkhu who is an intoner, and a pupil of his. Do you, therefore, when the Bhikkhu has concluded ... ”.—“agghessissati” provided that the reading is correct, can only mean “will invite” [ see Morris, J.P.T.S. 1886 ]. The Master will invite ( polite expression instead of “will command” ) his disciple ( his pupil ) to recite his lesson. Ajjhapessati would be more natural. The exact sense of sarabhanaka is not determined. Without doubt, a recitation of some nature or other”. [ Communicated by M. Kern. ]

Buddha having forbidden the “intoned recital” of the Dharma ( ayatakena gitassarena dhammam gayanti ), the monks abstain from the sarabhanna. The Master corrects them with regard to this ( C. Vagga, V. 3, and the translators’ note ).
the ten points; "Is the practice of the Singilona lawful?" etc. The saint does not understand the formulas: "What" he asks, "is Singilona, etc.?" After Yasas' explanations Revata replies that the ten practices are prohibited, except the sixth, which is sometimes lawful, sometimes not. Formulas 9 and 10 seem to have been sufficiently clear for them to have been condemned upon a mere hearing without Yasa having to take trouble to explain them.

"Such are, concludes Yasa, the ten point that the ascetics (called) Vajjiputtakas, from Vesali, have proclaimed. Come, let us take this question......" Revata accepts.

II. § 1. The Vajjiputtaks learn the steps taken by Yasa. They also seek for allies: "This question is hard and troublesome......" They think to seduce Revata and repair to Sahajati armed with all kinds of utensils for monastic life to give him.

§ 2. Episode. The venerable Satha asks himself who is in accord with the Dhamma (dhammavādīn), the Orientals or the Occidentals. Considering the Dhamma and the Vinaya, he resolves the problem in favour of the second. A divinity comes to confirm him in this view. All the same, the sage decides not to show his opinion before being "chosen for this question".

§ 3. The Vajjiputtakas offer Revata the presents they have brought: "No," replies Revata, "I have the three robes." Not regarding themselves as beaten, they turn to Uttara, a monk attached to the person of Revata and having twenty years [of ordination]. He refuses at first; but a little delicate flattery shakes his resolution. He accepts a robe, saying: "Tell me what do you wish?"— "Nothing but this, that the venerable Uttara say to the therā 'that the therā should announce in the midst of the Saṃgha that the Buddhas rise in the countries of the East, that the Orientals agree with the Dhamma and the Occidentals are against the Dhamma.'" Uttara transmitted the request to his master, who, being indignant, dismissed him. "What did the therā say?" ask the Vajjiputtakas. "We have done wrong", replied Uttara; "the therā dismissed me, saying that I was pledging him to non-dhamma." "Are you not old, and have you not twenty years' ordination?" "Yes," replies Uttara. "Ought we, perhaps, to put ourselves under the guidance of a master?"

105. Explanations which we shall examine below.
106. pacinakas and patheyakas.
107. We shall meet with an Uttara, a fomenter of schisms.
108. By comparing Revata to Buddha, Uttara to Ānanda, who often accepted presents in his master's place and stead.
109. purathimesu janapadesu.
110. papikam no avuso katam = "It is an evil you have wrought me, Sirs."
111. opi nu ca mayam garunissayam ganhama ti. "Then we take the nissaya under you as your pupils." M. Kern had translated (Gesch. II. p. 255): "the brothers
§ 4. The Samgha meets to decide the question. Revata presides, and formally, in accordance with the rules, remarks: "If we were to settle this affair here, it might happen that the Bhikkhus who inaugurated it would be able to renew it; therefore the Samgha must make its decision at the place where the affair happened." Thereupon, the theras go to Vesali.

A new episode. At Vesali lived the old Sabbakamin, "Father of the church for the [whole] earth," who had Ānanda as upādhyāya, who counted a hundred and twenty years of devout life. Revata, after having taken the advice of Sonavāsi, goes to this venerable old man. Couches are placed for the two saints. It is late, but Revata does not go to bed, for he thinks: "This therā is old, but he does not think of sleeping"; and Sabbakamin does not go to bed, for he thinks: "This Bhikkhu, although wearied by his journey, does not think of sleeping."

§ 5. And, as the night advances, a delightful dialogue ensues in which the two friends, to their edification and ours, forget the question of discipline.

of Vaiśāli ... tried to console him (Yaśas) and promised to take him under their protection." He is willing to allow me to make use of the following remark: api nu always introduces a question; under you is not represented in the text. "We ought, perhaps, to put ourselves under the guidance of a master?", that is to say: "We (you and ourselves) are wise enough to know how we ought to conduct ourselves; we have no need of reprimands from Revata."—It is not sure that guru = master.

112. Messrs. R. D. and O. refer the reader to Cullavagga IV. 14, where is fixed, with great fullness of detail, the procedure relative to the settlement of difficulties of all kinds. See also Pacittiya lxiii. and lxxix.


114. saddhiviharika of Ānanda. We have seen (n. 82 at the end) that Vṛjiputra was also a disciple of Ānanda.

115. Katamena tvam bhumi viharena etarahi behulam viharasiti. mettaviharena kho aham etarahi bahulam viharamiti. kullakaviharena kira tvam bhumi etarahi bahulam viharasi, kullakaviharo yad idam metta ti ... The English translation is less faithful than elegant: "By what manner of life, beloved one, have you lived these so many years?"—"By continuing in the sense of love, honoured friend, have I continued thus so many years." "They say that you have continued thus, beloved one, by easiness of life, and that indeed, beloved one, is an easy life, [I mean] the continuing in love." See Kern, Gesch. III. p. 256: "To what thing, honoured Lord, do you apply yourself before all at the present time?"—"To benevolence," replied Revata—"It is a fine thing to apply oneself to benevolence." "Yes." replied Revata, "already previously, when I had a family ... ."

B.C.—5/a
§ 6. There arrives Sanavāsin who questions the disciple of Ananda upon the ten points: "You have, O therī, much studied Dhamma and Vinaya at the feet of your teacher; what then is your opinion when you consider the Dhamma and the Vinaya ... ." Very politely, the centenarian begs Sanavāsin in the same tears to say himself, first, what is his way of thinking. The two sages are in favour of the Occidentals, but, before speaking, they will wait to be charged with the affair.

§ 7. The council begins. "But as they examined the affair many speeches were made, "away from the point", and the sense of not one single speech was understood [by the whole of the assembly]." 116

Confirmably to a rule established by Buddha, 17 Revata proposes to refer the matter to a jury; he chooses four Bhikkhus from the East (Sabbakamin, Salha, Kujjasobhita, Vasabhagamika); four from the West (Revata, Sanavāsin, Yasa, and Sumana) and has this choice formally approved by the Samgha. There is added to the arbitrators, as regulator of the sittings,118 a monk named Ajita, who counted ten years seniority and who, at this moment, was charged with the recitation of the Pratimokṣa.

§ 8. Revata, as president, proposes to the Saṃgha, this time composed of the eight delegates, to hear the opinion of Sabbakamin on each of the ten points; he questions the old man who successively condemns the propositions of the Vajjiputtakas by appealing to the rules of the Vinaya, sometimes to the Patimokkha, sometimes to the Vaggas. As was just, Sabbakamin, except for the two last points, demanded the explanations that Revata himself had solicited from Yasa: "Pardon! Salt in a horn (singilana), is it permitted?" "What is salt in a horn?" asked Sabbakamin in his turn. "Is it permitted to preserve salt in a horn in order to be able to use it later on when one has no salt under one's hand?"—"No, that is not permitted." "Where was that forbidden?"—"At Savatthi, [at is stated] in the Suttaviṭṭha." "Of what does one render oneself guilty then?"—"Of the use of food put aside."119

Similarly for the other points.120

116. anaggani ca' eva bhassani jayanti na ca' ekassa bhasitassa attho vinnayati: "both was much pointless speaking brought forth and also the sense in no single speech was clear." The same formula, Culla IV. 14, 19, where is indicated the procedure to be followed in such occurrences, proceedings which Revata will propose here.

117. Culla IV. 14, 19.

118. asanapannapaka, 'seat regulator.' This duty is unknown elsewhere: it should have been mentioned (Culla VI. 21, 3): there are good reasons to justify this omission (Vinaya Texts, III. p. 408, note ).


120. As regards the sixth point, in which the treatment is somewhat different, see below.
The assembly agrees, by a unanimous vote, with the opinion of Sabbakamin, who concludes: “This question is decided, settled once for all. However, question me on these ten points in the midst of the assembly, with a view to persuading these Bhikkhus.”

And thus it was done.

§9. “And as in this recitation of the Vinaya seven hundred Bhikkhus, not one less and not one more, took part; this recital of the Vinaya is called the recital of the Seven Hundred.”

At first sight, it seems that the hesitation of the theras; the care with which the holders of the just cause, first Yaśas and then Raivata, seek for light and patrons; the profound knowledge necessary for the examination of a problem declared by the good as by the evil ones, by the “foresters” as well as by the “monastics”, “to be hard and troublesome”;—all this mise en scene which precedes the meeting, so interesting, so amusing when we have placed before us intrigues of the Vajjiputtakas with Raivata and Uttara,—it seems, we say, that all these preparations fall short and that even the least important of the Bhikkhus, as well as the centenarian, pupil of Ānanda, “Father of the church for the whole earth” might have found in the Patimokkha or in the Mahāvagga, the formal articles, drawn up by Buddha, which condemn the innovators. Nevertheless, we are told that Raivata tries in vain to avoid so obscure a case, and that the sages, cleverly circumvented, while communicating their way of thinking to the “leader” of the Occidentals, are agreed to keep it secret until the great day of the assizes.

What! there exists a formal text, a rule numbered xviii, in the collection of the Nissaggiya Pacittiya, which forbids the Saṅgha to receive money; and the monks of Vaissāli, not content with violating it, dare to decree against Yaśas, who reproves them, the act of reconciliation and the act of suspension! Further, they form a cabal, try to seduce Raivata and do seduce Uttara, who, a faithful disciple of a holy man, becomes the accomplice of the dissolute. This is strange and we conclude—at first sight—that the Vinaya did not exist at the time of Vaissāli: if we must believe the Culla with regard to this, when it defines the nature of the “Points of discipline” practised and defended by the Vajjiputtakas and when it narrates these pious debates to us, we could not admit that the Vinayas were known to the embarrassed theras and heretical Vajjiputtakas, “Of the ten abuses which must have provoked the meeting of the Council, seven, at least, violate formal decisions of the Pratimokṣa. How could the Bhikkhus of Vaissāli have hoped for a moment that they would be overlooked if they had known the formulary, if they had recited it twice a month?”

Without observing this difficulty, Prof. Oldenberg, in his Introduction to the Mahāvagga, so meritorious otherwise in so many respects, Messrs. Oldenberg and Rhys Davids, in the preface to the Vinaya Texts, have built up on the recital of the Culla

122. S. B. XIII. p. xxii.
a very curious combination, one very characteristic of the expedients to which we are reduced in the study of Buddhist origins. This combination Prof. Oldenberg has not abandoned in his *Buddhistische Studien*. Here, as shortly as possible, are the broad outlines of it.

The general dispositions of the *Pratimokṣa* are opposed to the innovations of Vaisālī; but the Vinayas know nothing of these innovations in so much as they are designated by the laconic formulae of which we have spoken; consequently, the Vinaya was drawn up before the events of Vaisālī, since the innovations are not specially contemplated in it; a long time before, since these innovations are not contemplated in some interpolated passages. And to quote the original: "Is it possible that in a collection of works like the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Khaṇḍakas*, which seek to set forth, down to the minutest detail, and even with hair-splitting diffuseness, all that has any relation to the daily life of the Brethren, and the regulations of the Buddhist Order,—is it possible that in such a collection, if, when it was compiled, the struggle on the Ten Points had already burst into flame there should be no reference at all even in interpolations, to any one of these ten disputes?"  

The argument is very subtle and very hard to tackle. The conclusion is, assuredly, somewhat heavy; but it furnishes a plausible explanation of the difficulty we have pointed out above. The innovations of Vaisālī are indeed innovations; the legislator did not foresee them: the problem is truly "hard and subtle". However, on examining them, we perceive that they fall under general rules; and we condemn them by urging authentic texts. As advocate of the Pali tradition, Prof. Oldenberg deserves our congratulations: we shall not refuse them to him.

Minayeff, whose powerful attention was strangely quickened in the critical sense, could not fail to consider this solution somewhat naive, or, to express his thought more exactly, almost frivolous. By this is explained why he treats the problems of Vaisālī with a very fine but disconcerting ease of manner, sustaining, as he does, at a distance of two pages, two opinions which apparently are contradictory. In truth, a firmly bound system is hidden under this outward disorder.

Minayeff proves in fact, that the greater part of the derogations of Vaiśālī are condemned by the existing text of the Vinaya— which is absolutely unmistakable, if the derogations are faithfully defined in the Culla; but he believes that "even if one admits that in the Vinaya there is no special interdiction for all the innovations of Vaiśālī," this hypothetical assertion can, nevertheless, not serve as a proof of the age of the Vinaya, for "in the present text, there are a number of concessions and prescriptions which perfectly justify, in principle, all the guilty inclinations of the brethren of Vaiśālī." There is not a strict tribunal, having before it the present text of the Vinaya which could affirm the culpability of many of the innovations of Vaiśālī, or resolve to reject them as practices irreconcilable with the spirit of the Vinaya.

In other words, either the innovations of Vaiśālī are condemned, at least, the greater number of them, in the actual text of the Vinaya, or they are not. If they are, Prof. Oldenberg's argument falls to the ground; for we shall be able to maintain that the dispositions of the Vinaya which condemn them were compiled after Vaiśālī. Minayeff will show, then, that they are condemned. For example: the rule which forbids all provision. (Pac. xxxviii.) forbids the provision of salt (first innovation of Vaiśālī) and, "if the rule of the Pratimokṣa does not mention salt, does it follow from that the Pratimokṣa was already in existence before the appearance of the innovations of Vaiśālī and that it is for this reason that the rules do not mention salt?" But if you

124. Researches, p. 53.

125. Has Minayeff the right to consider as 'risky' the thesis according to which the absence from the Vinaya of the formulae which sum up the innovations, the non-mention of these "warcries" (except jātarūpa), or, to speak more correctly, the complete ignorance in which the compilers of the Vinaya would be of the objects of this discussion, peremptorily proves the seniority of the Vinaya in relation to the innovations of Vaiśālī?

In principle, the argument a silentio is only conclusive if we know in full detail the context of the events, the psychology of the writers, the history of the books.

The Mahaparinibbānasutta and Culla XI. cite the proceedings of the Brahmadunḍa, which the Vinaya ignores; shall we say from this that the Vinaya is anterior to the Mahāparinibbāna?

Besides, it is always easy to oppose reasoning to reasoning. The community thinks it knows (Culla XIII. is the proof of it) that the Vajjiputtakas thought to make provision of salt and maintained the opinion of the "salt in the horn". The whole community, occidentals, orientals, and meridionals, was shaken by this controversy. And Prof. Oldenberg argues: If the Vinaya in its present state and in its entirety (except the Parivāra), were not anterior to the events of Vaiśālī by a sufficient number of years to assure its sacred character, certainly some forgers would have been found to insert into it some allusion to the salt in the horn. But we shall say, the Vinaya, in the eyes of everyone, is proto-canonical and "pre-Vesalian"; every allusion to the salt in the
judge of it otherwise and answer: "Yes, in our opinion, for if the *Suttavibhaṅga* were later than the discussion on salt, there would have been mention made in it of the salt;—this controversy, the origin of a capital schism, and "as important for the history of Buddhism as the controversy of Arianism was for Christian history," was certainly worthy of being mentioned";—then, not only will Minayeff recognise that in the Vinaya there is no special interdiction for all the innovations of Vaiśāli, but he will adopt the second branch of the dilemma. The innovations of Vaiśāli are not condemned in the present Vinaya in this sense that, if there are in it rules which touch upon them, there are also dispositions which betray the same spirit of non-asceticism and confirm my impression that the rules contrary to the innovations were compiled after Vaiśāli: "The spirit of the existing Vinaya [although modified by the later triumph of asceticism] is not irreconcilable with many of the innovations of Vaiśāli... In the Vinaya, diverse usages are established in the community to receive as a present, to preserve and to share clothes as well as food. The community has the right to possess property, both movable and immovable; the movable property may also belong to one single monk," which is, at least, in opposition to the communist customs one has been pleased to ascribe to the ancient fraternity.

By this change of front, and this contradiction, at least apparent, Minayeff furnishes Prof. Oldenberg with an opportunity for an easy success.

I say 'apparent,' because the contradiction is not the act of Minayeff, but of the Vinaya. The *Patimokkha* forbids the provision of food, but the *Mahāvagga* allows all kinds of provision, medicines of all kinds, beginning with medicinal roots. The ascetic may not accept money, but he may have a deposit of money with a layman, "who renders acceptable to him" (*kappiyakaraka*) the things bought with this money. So. also, the convent possess halls for provision, "store house", which are *kappiyabhūmis, kappiyakutiṇis* and make lawful the food preserved, salt, oil, and rice.

It is the same thing for many other points on which the vigour of the *Patimokkha* is weakened or enervated. We know, also, that the *Pat.* itself tolerates exceptions; horn would have constituted a flagrant anachronism, and we must certainly credit the compilers of the Vinaya with some minimum of the critical spirit.

But this discussion *ad hominem* does not seem suitable to decide the question, far from it.

126. We shall return to this appreciation of *Vin. T.*, I. p. xxii.
129. *M. Vagga*, VI. 34, 1.
130. *M. Vagga*, VI, 33.
one of the most notable is that of Nissaggiya xxiii., by which it is allowable to keep for seven days the principal medicines, ghi, butter, oil, honey, and molasses.

Do not let us be astonished, then, to read in the *Researches* p. 53, the contrary of what we read, in p. 55. In the first passage, Minayeff places himself at the point of view of the Fathers of the Council, armed with the *Pratimokṣa*, and, not without a pleasantly simulated reprobation, he condemns with them this abominable practice of the provision of salt, "flagrant violation of the vows of poverty." In the second he observes, that, for the reader of the *Mahāvagga*, the provision of salt is only one of the manifold and permissible derogations from the laws of rigid asceticism.

An examination of the "innovations" will, perhaps, enable us to form a personal opinion on the problem. What precedes suffices, we hope, to clear Minayeff from the reproach of inconsistency.

The points of Vaiśāli may be grouped into two categories:—


I. 4. *Avasakappa* or "practice of the dwelling-place." "Several convents (or dwellings) which are in the same 'parish' are allowed to hold separate uposathas." Compare *M. Vagga* II. 8, 3: "At this time two halls of Uposatha had been instituted in a certain parish. The Bhikkhus assembled in both halls, because [some] thought: 'The Uposatha will be held here', and [the others]: 'The Uposatha will be held there'. This was reported to Bhagavat, who said: 'Let no one establish two halls of Uposatha in the same parish......I order the suppression of one of the two and I desire that the Uposatha be held [only] in one place.'"

131. "Wer dessen Ausführungen S. 53 liest, wird doch das Gegenteil von dem finden, was derselbe Gelehrte zwei Seiten später sagt." — Oldenberg, *loc. cit.*

132. According to Kern (Gesch. II. p. 252), *Culla: Kappati sambahula avasa samanasima nanuposatham katunti—Vinaya Texts*: "Circuit-license: It is allowable for a number of Bhikkhus who dwell within the same circuit, within the same boundary, to hold separate uposathas."

The Uposatha is the bi-monthly ceremony, in the course of which, all the monks of the "parish", having met together, the *Pratimokṣa* is read. The boundaries of the "parish" are fixed by a solemn decision of the brethren resident in such or such a place. (See Kern, *Gesch.* II. p. p. 49-53). They must number at least two to hold Uposatha.

B.C. — 5
Did the *M. Vagga* designate here the heretical thesis by its technical name, it could not more clearly keep in view the fourth innovation of Vaiśālī, at least such as the *Culla* defines it.183

5. *Anumalikappā*, or “practice of approbation.” “It is permitted to a Saṃgha, which is not sufficiently numerous, to accomplish an ecclesiastical act, by saying: we will make the [other] Bhikkhus consent when they come.”184 The Fathers condemn the proposition, according to *M. Vagga* IX. 3, 5, which defines the act of an “incomplete Saṃgha”. The rule demands, not only that the absent Bhikkhus should have sent their adhesion, but also that no member present required them to be waited for. Not only does it touch upon the innovation in question, but it foresees a more complicated case.

The same conclusion as for the preceding paragraph.

6. *Acinnakappā* “It is allowable to follow the precedent of the preceptor and the instructor.”185 “Yes,” replies the Thera, “the practice of the precedent is permitted in certain cases; in others it is forbidden.” The proposition of the Vajjiputtakas is rejected, without any text being alleged, as contrary to the Dharma-Vinaya.

Messrs. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg explain how the *acinnakappā* is sometimes admitted, sometimes forbidden; “That is, of course, according as the thing enjoined is, or is not, lawful”.

Minayeff recalls, very appropriately, “this rule of Apastamba according to which the *brahmācārin* must submit to the preceptor everything, except in actions which lead to excommunication.” Perhaps the question is really, to know if the authority of the Master, of the *upādhyāya* upon whom depends the doctrine, of the *ācārya* who regulates the discipline,186 will be as prevailing in the Saṃgha as among the crowd of

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133. The interpretation of the Dharmaguptas differs: “In the Temple, besides the regulation acts, the innovators accomplished other (?)” (We know that temple = vihāra = convent). See minayeff, p. 49. The Mahīśāsakas, it seems, do not mention the *Avasakappā*. For the Sarvāstivādins, see the Appendix.

134. *Kappali vaggena samghena kammam katum agate bhikku anujanessama ti.* “Is it allowable for a Saṃgha, which is not legally constituted, to perform an official act on the ground that they will afterwards obtain the sanction of such Bhikkhus as may subsequently arrive?” The confession may be begun before the Saṃgha is sufficiently numerous.

For the Sarvāstivādins, see the Appendix; the Dharmaguptas agree with the *Cula*; the Mahīśāsakas: “Nach Vollziehung des Karma andere herbeirufen um die Entscheidung zu horen” (Schiefner) or perhaps: In the accomplishment of the Karma, to call the others one by one afterwards to hear.

135. *kappati idam me upajjhayena ajjhacinnam idam me acariyena ajjhacinnam tam ajjhacaritum.*

136. Our gloss is, perhaps, somewhat venturesome. See *Vinaya Texts*, I. p. 178 11. p. 18; Chavanues *Religieux Eminents*, p. 140, n. 3; Barth, *Itising*, p. 7. (J. des Sāvants,
heretical ascetics. At first sight, this question can only be put if the community is ignorant of the lesser and minor rules, and of the subtleties of doctrine. The history of the sects proves, however, the importance attached to the opinion of the immediate master, even at the historic time, when there exist Vinayas and Abhidharmas.\(^{187}\)

According to the Dharmaguptas, the Vajjiputtakas think their conduct may be justified by alleging that “this has been done from time immemorial.”

According to the Mahīśāsakas: “To continue to occupy themselves with what they had been in the habit of doing before becoming ascetics; certain occupations were declared lawful, others were forbidden.”

II. 1. Singilonakappa (ṣṛṅgī-lavaṇa), or “practice of salt in the horn.” “It is lawful to keep salt in the horn by saying: ‘I will eat [it] when there is no more salt.’”\(^{188}\)

The proposition is condemned by virtue of Pācittiya xxxviii. : “Whoever takes food which has been kept (saṃnidhikāraka),\(^{189}\) whether this food be khādaniyas or bhojaniyas,\(^{140}\) is guilty......”

The problem is here presented under an appreciably different aspect.

On the faith of Prof. Oldenberg, who does not call attention to the matter,\(^{141}\)

“Two masters, one to inculcate the theoretical teaching of the truths of the faith and to watch over his religious instruction (upādhyāya), the other to teach him the rules which he must observe in practice and to be the director of his conscience (ācārya).” But see Kern, Man. p. 84, tutor, professor. Divers functions, pāṭhacaryā, etc., M. Vyut, § 270.

137. I believe that Minayeff is wrong in formally connecting with the acinnakappa one of the five points (vastu) with the discussion of which Vasumitra and Bhavya connect the origin of the great schism. It should, however, be observed that the Mahābodhivāṃsa, p. 96, on the occasion of the Second Council, opposes the doctrine of the “Presbyters” (theravāda) to the doctrine of the Masters (ācāryavāda).

138. Kappati singina lonam pariharitum yalga alonakam bhavissati tattha paribhunjissamiti. Kern ....“in order to use it later when we shall have no salt at hand.” “Horn-salt-license: ....... with the intention of putting it into food which has not been salted.”

139. M. Vyut, § 260, 34, saṃnidhikārāḥ and saṃnidhikākārāḥ, 245, 363, read saṃnidhikārāḥ. The more abridged and, as Minayeff thinks, the older form of Pāc. xxxviii. is furnished by M. Vyut, § 261, 42 : saṃnihitavarjana (see below,).

140. Hard and soft foods. On the value of these two terms, see Vinaya Texts, I. p. 39, no 5.

141. We see how dangerous is the argument a silentio! “Eine Pacittiyaregel (38) beispielsweise verbietet vorratsweise aufbewahrte Speisen zu geniessen. Nun wurde von Einigen behauptet, dass doch die Aufbewahrung von Salz zulassig sei, und dies war B.C.—6/a
I believed that the Pali Vinaya did not treat of the provision of salt; and, turning to the Tibetan sources, I have found a few interesting details. "Buddha", says M. Rockhill, "allows salt to be kept in certain cases: for this, a box furnished with a lid must be used." When Pāc, lxv. condemns the monk who hides the dish used for alms...the drinking-cup (phor-bu) from one of his brethren, the Vibhaṅga (ad. loc.) substitutes for the word phor-bu the expression tshvakhug, which Mr. Rockhill translates: "Salt-horn."  

According to the Tibetan and Sarvāstivādin data, we might conclude that the verdict of the Vaiśālī had remained a dead letter, at least in one part of the community, and thus explain the silence of the Pali Vinaya on the provision of salt.

Happily, the M. Vagga, in default of the Pātimokkha, is very circumstantial on the question which concerns us, and it seems to decide so perfectly in favour of the Vajjiputtakas that we remain amazed.

The M. Vagga VI, 3, enumerates a series of medicinal roots (ginger, hellebore, etc.) of which one may make provision for life in order to render more digestible the hard and soft foods. Otherwise, they may only be used when one is ill.

In § VI, 8, are enumerated, under the title of medicines, five kinds of salt: "sea salt, black salt, rock salt, cooking salt, and any other kind of salt which can be used as medicine". One may make provision of it "for life" and it may be used as was said of the roots.

Finally, § VI, 40, specifies that the "foods" of which one may make provision for life, literally "which one may eat, at no matter what moment during life," do not


143. Cf. Revue de l' Histoire des Religions, 1884, IX. p. 175 (Bhikṣuṇī-Pratimokṣa, Pāc. 52=60). Unfortunately, I do not see that Khug signifies horn; it is rather any receptacle easy to carry, whatever it may be otherwise; may then be lavanapatalikā, Salzbeutel (M. Vyut. 273, 68.). See Candra Das, p. 146.

144. The translators of the Vinaya Texts (II. p. 144) remark: "What this refers to is unknown to us." I believe we must connect the law, allowing provision to be made of salt, etc., for life, with that which authorises the use of the five bhaiṣajjas (ghi, butter, oil, honey, molasses) beyond the time (M. Vagga, VI. 1, 5).

The bhaiṣajjas may be taken at any hour of the day, when one is ill and when one is not. Bhagavat, having allowed the meal time to pass, has prepared for him foods
render allowable the foods with which they are mixed beyond the term fixed for these same foods.\textsuperscript{148}

The Tibetan \textit{Vinayakṣudraka}, defining the heresy of the Vajjiputtakas, speaks of salt “consecrated for life”; but the Sanskrit word which corresponds to “consecrated” (\textit{byin gyisbrlabspa}), that is \textit{adhiṣṭhita}, may have a less precise meaning: in any case, it is a question of a provision \textit{yāvajjivikam}.\textsuperscript{146}

On the other hand, boxes of bone, ivory, \textit{horn}, etc., are authorised for the preservation of unguents (\textit{aṅjana}).\textsuperscript{147}

Therefore it is allowable to keep salt, and we cannot see that the “horn”, permitted for unguents, can compromise the sanctity of this practice.\textsuperscript{148} At the most, we may wonder if it is allowable to make use of it when one is well. But nothing indicates that the \textit{theras} put this rather subtle question. Who is ill, who is well?

We arrive then at this statement, so strange at first sight, that the first innovation \textit{singilona}, implicitly forbidden by the \textit{Pātimokkha},\textsuperscript{149} is authorised by the \textit{Khandakas}.

The explanation of the Dharmaguptas (7th innovation) and of Mahīśāsakas (1st innovation) presents this peculiarity that it ignores the horn: “Mix [the food] with salt and ginger (=\textit{Śṛṅgavera}) has the effect of circumventing the law which declares impure stale foods or those kept until the next day.”\textsuperscript{140} “To employ salt in order to preserve foods during the night and to eat them next day.”


145. \textit{Ghi}, butter, etc. (the five \textit{patisayaniya} \textit{bhesajja} (may be preserved for 7 days; by mixing hellebore (which) may be kept in provision all one’s life) one does not render the ‘\textit{ghi}’ lawful on the eighth day.

See \textit{M. Vyut}, § 230, 75, and following.

146. See Appendix. Cp. the \textit{nātyaka} of \textit{M. Vyut}, 230,80.

147. \textit{M. Vagga}, VI. 12, I.


149. We remember that salt, forbidden to the \textit{brahmacārins}, allowed to the \textit{vānaprasthas}, was prohibited in one of the five theses of Devadatta (according to the \textit{Dulva}, Rockhill, \textit{Life}, p. 87; \textit{Udānavarga}, p. 204; and Wassilieff, p. 56).

150. The translator tells us: “Salz mit Ingwer Mischend.” But it is certain that the ginger here plays the same part as the salt. It is among the “Medicines” which may be kept all one’s life.—\textit{M. Vagga}, VI. 3.
These practices are formally forbidden, as we have seen, by the M. Vagga. They are not contemplated by the explanation of the Culla, as is indicated by the expression yada alonakam bhavissati. But, it is not impossible that they correspond to the first notion of the singilona, 'the question of ginger and salt'?

2. Dvangelakappa, practice of the two fingers. "It is allowable to take food beyond the time, the moment being passed when there is a two-fingers-shadow."

Thesis condemned in virtue of Pāc. xxxvii. by which it is forbidden to the monks, as to ascetics in general, to eat beyond the time. It remains for us to know what is the legal time. If I understand correctly the gloss of the Culla, the Vajjiputtakas do not believe they sin against the rule of akālabhojana by eating after mid-day, but according to the Vibhaṅga, vikāta="Since mid-day is past, until the rising of the sun."

It is remarkable that the Pali source should be quite alone in this interpretation of the "practice of the two fingers." It is only possible to submit to the reader

151. Above, p. 91, n. 44.

152. kappati dvangulaya chayaya vitivattaya vikale bhojanam bhunjitum. Kern: "To take food after the hour permitted (after mid-day) when the shadow is more than two inches long." Minaoeff "The Bhikṣu might take his meal at certain moments determined by the measure of the shadow thrown by him that is to say, these moments were indicated by a kind of sun-dial. The heretics said that if this shadow were longer by the length of two fingers than the length fixed by law, one could, nevertheless, accept food."—Vinaya Texts..... "to eat the mid-day meal beyond the right time, provided only that the shadow has not yet turned two inches."

The shadow of two inches is perhaps the shadow cast by a man, at mid-day, at the summer solstice, in the 25° of latitude. Then we should have dvangulayā chayaya vitivattaya=majjhantike vitivatte=[the moment] when the shadow is two fingers [being] past=mid-day being past.

153. Vikale..... — akalabhojana, M. Vyut, § 261, 41 ; vikalabhojanavirati, ibid. § 268, 8.

154. Mahīśasakas : Die Speise mit zwei Fingern ruhen, d. h. wenn nach beendigten Mahl, dass nur einmal täglich statt finden darf, Speise noch sich darbietet, diese genessen, indem man, dieselbe mit zwei Fingern umruhrt, dadurch wird das Verbot die Speise zu verderben ubertreten" (Tār. p. 268). This prohibition of spoiling food must be understood from the prohibition of eating preserved food. see Pāc. xxxviii. of Beal, Catena, p. 224 : "eat spoiled or sour food," corresponding to the sannidhikāraka of the Pali.

Sarvāstivādins : "Make two fingers of foods of two kinds," anatiriktas (akṛṭātiriktakhādana, M. Vyut, § 261, 38). [The syntax of the Tibetan phrase is very obscure=akṛṭātiriktabhojāni yakhādaniyadvangulam kṛtvā].
a few references difficult to utilise. It seems at any rate that it may be a question here of a small quantity of food.

3. Gāmantarakappa, practice of another village. “It is allowable, after having eaten, to take foods (bhojaniya) which are not the remains [of the meal] (anatirikta), by saying: ‘I go into another village.’”

This was condemned in virtue of Pāc. xxxv.: “The Bhikkhu who, after having eaten, shall take foods bhojaniya or khādaniya………”

Dharmaguptas: “derogation from sobriety, as if, for example, a monk, after an ample repast, forgetting the rule of good conduct, began to take with two fingers and to eat the food remaining.” (Minayeff, p. 45).

Comp. the use of caturaṅgula, karunapunḍarika, 120, 34, nāsti………Caturaṅgula-pramāṇam yat tathāgatakāyena na sputam……… 100, 27, ye kasayam abhilaseyur antacac caturangulam apid sarve te ‘ünapanasampannah………

The ‘practice of the two fingers’ may also refer to some position of the hands in begging for food. See Pet. Wort. Kapota.

155. Mahābhāṣya ad Pan. 3, 4, 51, dvyāṅgulotkarṣam khoṇḍikān chinati = he cuts pieces of the length of two fingers—dvyāṅgulaprajñā stri, a woman who is an idiot or having very little intelligence, Therīgāthā 60, Mhv. III. 391, 19. According to the commentary of the Therīg, the women are such idiots that, though passing their life from childhood in cooking rice, if they wish to know if the rice is cooked, they have to take it out of the water and crush it between their fingers. (Windisch, Mara and Buddha, p 136 ; reference indicated by Senart). The explanation is ingenious.

156. The law, Pāc. xxxv., according to the Vibhaṅga, is divided “historically” into two parts. First text: “yo pana bhikkhu bhuttavi pavarito khadaniyan va bhojaniyam va khadeyya va bhunjeyya va pacittiyaṃ ti”: “It is forbidden to eat after having satisfied one’s hunger.” No mention of anatiritta. Second text, complete: “I allow those who are ill and those who are well to eat [the foods] anatiritta,” that which remains in the dish; and the law was completed by the addition of the word anatiritta, which restricts its application.

I believe I have faithfully rendered the text by translating the two words bhuttavi pavarito by the single expression “after having eaten.” As M. Kern has pointed out to me, pavareti = sampavareti (badly translated by Childers: ‘to cause to refuse,’ as is stated Vinaya Texts ad M. Vagga, I. 8, 4) which is near to samtappeti. See M. Vagga, I. 22, 15; Lalita, 66, 16, khoṇḍaniyena samprāvīrya; also Mhv. III., 142, 3, 14; Ram. II. 75, 15: bhojyesu………vastresu………pravarayati.

Pavareti does not mean invite, nimanteti; see Vibh. ad Pac. xxxv……nimantetva bhojesi……bhuttavi pavarita……bhikkhu (XXXV. I., I. 3); pavarito does not mean “having been invited and having refused” (as Vinaya Texts, I. p. 39: “When he has once
The foods *khādaniya* would not be contemplated in *gāmantarakappa*.

From the explanations of the *Vibhaṅga* it follows that as soon as one has eaten, were it with the tip of a blade of grass, of the foods offered in a house, or if the host has invited one to eat, it is forbidden to go to seek fresh foods (*anatirikta*) in another house: it is only permitted to eat the remainder (*atirikta*) of the first offering.\(^{157}\)

What must we understand by the word: *gāmantaram gamissamiti*? The *Vinaya Texts* translate: “On the ground that he is about to proceed into the village.” This interpretation, although it may be that of Childers\(^{158}\) does not seem very coherent.

Mr. Kern and Minayeff seem to us to have understood more correctly: “because of the journey from one village to another.” But, for the rest, Minayeff seems to be wanting in precision.\(^{159}\)

The Mahīśāsakas and the Sarvāstivādins diverge.

According to the reckoning of the former, the third innovation is formulated thus: “to eat a second time after having risen before taking a sufficient meal” (and hence, according to the *Vibhaṅga*, the food is *anatirikta*; consequently forbidden by *Pāc. xxv*).\(^{160}\)

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157. According to *Vinaya Texts*, I. p. 39, n. 4. The Bhikkhu who is well, when he has finished a meal, cannot eat what remains in the dish. But see above, n. 53.

158. Childers, s. vcc.: “*gamantram gacchati* seems to mean merely to go as far as the village”; but “*gamantram* seems to mean the distance between a monastery and the nearest village or between two adjacent villages.”

159. Minayeff “......to consider as permissible a superfluity of food because of the journey”. It seems that he has mistaken the word *atirikta*—Derogation from the law of *anatirikta* (nourishment brought from the house where one has eaten) VI. 18, 4 (because of *āpad*, repeated, VI. 32; and again, VI. 24 (honey and milk with rice allowed before a “dinner in the town”; rice with milk forbidden).

160. *bhuttavina pavaritena asana vutthitena katam hoti*...... *etam anatirittam nama*; ...... *bhuttavina pavaritena asana avutthitena katam hoti*...... *etam atirittam nama*. 
and the fourth: “to eat on leaving the village.” According to Wassilieff, the condemnation of these points is found in the explanation of the terms *akṣṭantriklakādana* and *ganabhojana.*

The Sarvāstivādins have a proposition which may be called of the ‘road’ (*addhāno gamana*), and which allows the “meal in a group.” It is their fifth innovation. “To eat,” having proceeded a yojana and a half [from the convent] and having met together, is allowable in virtue of the road.” It is to take advantage, by a fictitious journey, of the law, *Pāc. xxxii.* which allows the *ganabhojana* on the occasion of a journey.

It results, it seems, from this comparison, that the Pali explanation of *gūmantara* rests on the contamination of two theses, which the Mahāsāsakas distinguish from one another, for the formula supposes a “journey” whatever it may be otherwise, and the *Pāc. xxxv.* essentially concerns the *anatirikta.*

7. *Amathitakappa,* or “unchurned milk.”—“It is allowable, after having eaten, to take milk which is no longer in the state of milk and is not yet in a state of curd, and which is not the remains [of the meal].” A thesis condemned by virtue of *Pāc. xxxv.,* which forbids, as we have seen, all *anatirikta.*

According to the Mahāsāsakas, “to beyond the time allowed a mixture of cream, butter, honey, and honey in the form of a stone [= sugar].” Almost identical herewith is the explanation of the Dharmaguptas. The Sarvāstivādins come very near to the *Culla* in what concerns the nature of the milky compound (sweet milk, mixed with sour milk); but, in agreement with the Mahāsāsakas, they indicate also as characteristic of the innovation the fact of eating “beyond the allotted time.”

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162. *M. Vyut,* § 261, 38, 40.

163. *bhojaniya.* See below, Appendix.

164. M. Barth has drawn attention to the curious conversation in which Kāśyapa, whose affection for the Dhūtāṅgas we know, reproaches Ānanda with “the bad habit of eating in a group”; the *trikabhojana* is opposed to the *ganabhojana* (*Mahāvastu,* III. 48, 6; Barth, article on the *Mhv. in J. des Savants,* 1899, reprint, p. 28). According to *Pāc. xxxii.*; *Culla,* VII., 3, 13: there is a *gaṇa* as soon as they number more than three. On the provisions of the journey, *M. Vagga,* VI. 34, 21.

165. *kappati yam tam khiram khirabhavam vijahitam asampattam dadhibhavam bhuttavina pavaritena anatirittam patunti* [read: *khirabhave rijahite*].—Churn-license: Is it allowable for one who has once finished his meal and has refused any more, to drink milk not left over from the meal, on the ground that it has left the condition of milk and has not yet reached the condition of curds.” (That is, which is neither liquid nor solid; something apparently like buttermilk).
According to a tradition of the Sarvāstivādins, Devadatta forbade the brethren to use milk and its derivatives.\textsuperscript{166} Buddha, on the contrary, allows the five products of the cow: milk, curds, ghī, “buttermilk,” and butter (M. \textit{Vagga}, VI. 34, 21);\textsuperscript{167} he authorises, also, “milk with rice” (\textit{yagu}) with blocks of honey, which the brethren thought they ought to refuse (VI. 24), and which if taken in the morning, does not render \textit{anatirikta} a dinner accepted later on in the town.

It, certainly, is difficult to form an opinion on this seventh innovation; but one has the impression that the indices \textit{anatirikta} and \textit{akāla}, which make it culpable in the eyes of the \textit{theras} of the \textit{Culla} and the \textit{Dulva}, are artificial: the tradition no longer knew that unchurned milk had passed for illicit.

8. \textit{Jalogi patum}. “It is allowable to drink of the \textit{Surā} which, [starting] from the nature of the \textit{non-surā}, has not attained to the quality of being intoxicating.”\textsuperscript{168} A thesis condemned by virtue of \textit{Pāc. li.}, which forbids the drinking of \textit{surā} and \textit{meraya}.\textsuperscript{169}

According to the \textit{Mahāsāsakas} it is a question of an intoxicating which had fallen back into fermentation.

According to the \textit{Dulva}, “to drink like a leech intoxicating liquors, while making the excuse of sickness.”\textsuperscript{170}

Prof. Oldenberg argues: “The \textit{Vibhaṅga} treats of the different kinds of \textit{surā} and \textit{meraya}, speaks of the case where one would only drink the intoxicating liquor with a blade of grass, speaks of an intoxicating drink which the drinker considers to be non-intoxicating, and, reciprocally, and of a series of subtleties of this nature:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Culla}: \textit{kappati ya sa surā asurāta asampatta majjabhavam sa patum}. Commentary (Ap. Minayeff \textit{Pratimokṣa}, p. xxxix): \textit{tarunasurayam majjasambharam ekato katam majjabhavam asampattam [read \textit{sambhare ekato kate}]. Kern}: “May one drink new wine of the palm-tree? That is to say: May one drink that kind of strong drink which has not the character of strong drink and which has not yet acquired the nature of an intoxicant.” “\textit{Churn-license}: Is it allowable to drink spirits which have left the condition of not being spirits [\textit{asurāta=asurātvāt}] and yet have not acquired intoxicating properties.”
\item \textit{M. Vyut}, § 261, 83, \textit{surāmaireyamadyāpāna—ibid.} § 230, fermented drinks, of which 33 \textit{surā}, 37 \textit{maīrya}.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{166} Rockhill, \textit{Life} p. 87. “Not to make use of curds and milk, because by so doing one harms calves.”

\textsuperscript{167} The context appears to indicate that it is a question of monks when travelling.

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Culla}: \textit{kappati ya sa surā asurāta asampatta majjabhavam sa patum}. Commentary (Ap. Minayeff \textit{Pratimokṣa}, p. xxxix): \textit{tarunasurayam majjasambharam ekato katam majjabhavam asampattam [read \textit{sambhare ekato kate}]. Kern}: “May one drink new wine of the palm-tree? That is to say: May one drink that kind of strong drink which has not the character of strong drink and which has not yet acquired the nature of an intoxicant.” “\textit{Churn-license}: Is it allowable to drink spirits which have left the condition of not being spirits [\textit{asurāta=asurātvāt}] and yet have not acquired intoxicating properties.”

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{M. Vyut}, § 261, 83, \textit{surāmaireyamadyāpāna—ibid.} § 230, fermented drinks, of which 33 \textit{surā}, 37 \textit{maīrya}.

now it does not speak of *jalogi.* Then the *Vibhaṅga* is previous to Vaiśālī.

The *Pratimokṣa* forbids the drinking of intoxicating drinks. It is a very old law of asceticism, as old as the palm-wine or the rice-water. But what is drinking? What is an intoxicating drink?

Drinking is bringing, in any way whatever, the drink in contact with the mouth, were it only with a blade of grass: so that the *jalogi,* as the Tibetan source (*Sarvāstivādin*) understands it "to drink in the manner of a leech," is condemned by the *Vibhaṅga.*

What is an intoxicating drink? Every substance which intoxicates, according to the account recorded in the *Vibhaṅga* (*Pāc. li.*); but, according to the definitions with which the paragraph ends, every substance capable of fermenting (*sambharasamyutta*). The *jalogi,* therefore, according to the intepretation that the *Culla* and the Dharmaguptas give of it, is contemplated in the *Vibhaṅga.*

But the severe and just tribunal, which Minayeff in imagination substitutes for the theras presided over by Revata, will not fail to study the chapter of the *M. Vagga* (VI. 35, 6) consecrated to the drinks allowable or forbidden. Whilst the *Vibhaṅga* enumerates as *merayas* and prohibits the juice (*āsava*) or flowers, of fruits, of honey, of the sugar-cane (*gula*), because it is *sambharasamyutta,* the *M. Vagga* allows the juice (*rasa*) of fruits, grains excepted; the drink prepared with leaves and flowers, except the *daka* ("potherb") and the *madhukapuppha* (*Bassia latifolia*), and the juice of the sugar-cane.

9. *Adasakam nisidanam,* "a mat without fringes to sit upon." Neither Revata, nor Sabbakāmi, claim for exact information; but the thesis is condemned in virtue

173. *antamaso kusaggena pi pibati.* The same formula to explain what is eating.
174. Childer's remarks: *majjasambharo,* the elements of intoxication (in newly drawn toddy), opposed to *majjabhavo,* intoxicating property (in fermented toddy or palm-wine).
175. See also, *M. Vagga,* VI. 14, on the oil mixed with strong drink.—It must be added that, as a technical term, *āsrava*=alcoholic liquor made without decoction, at a low temperature; *ariṣṭa* is made by decoction.
176. Kern (*Manual*): "the use of a mat without fringes (not conform with the model prescribed)," "a mat which has not a fringe [of the prescribed dimensions]." *Vinaya Texts*: "Is a rug or mat (when it is beyond the prescribed size) lawful because it is unfringed?" The translation "unfringed seat" may lead to confusion. *Pāc. lxxxvii.* treats of *mañcas* and *pīthas,* the *Pāc. lxxxix.* of *niṣidanas.*

B. C. 7/a
of Pāc. Ixxxix., which indicates the legal dimensions of the mat. Therefore, according to the interpretation of the Culla, the heretics maintained that "the fact of not being ornamented with a fringe makes legal act untenable."

According to the Mahāśāsakas, to make for oneself a mat of undetermined dimensions; there is no question of fringe.

According to the Sarvāstivādins, the innovation consists in the contempt of the law Nis. Pāc. xv., which ordains that for a new mat a piece of about a cubit should be cut from the old one. There is no question of a fringe.

It seems that these two different interpretations of the ninth innovation were conceived in view, of the rules of the Vinaya which may be brought forward to condemn it. The M. Vagga VIII., 16, 4, which ought to throw some light on the question, permits a covering as wide as one wishes, for this unexpected reason that the niśidana was too narrow. Should we be imprudent if we sought an element of appreciation in the Tibetan tradition relative to the five laws of Devadatta: "Gautama wears robes whose fringes are cut, we will wear robes with long fringes?"

10. Jātarūparajata, "gold and silver." "According to all appearances," remarks Prof. Oldenberg, "at the Council of Vesali (said to be a century after the death of Buddha), the question of accepting gold and silver was the essential point of the debate, in the midst of secondary and subtle differences. In our opinion, it would, perhaps, be better to say that this question is the only one of which we may believe with relative security that it brought into conflict Yaśas and the Vajjiputtakas. In any case, it is admitted that the jātarūparajata is here of the utmost importance.

We recall the interesting episode whose principal details we have indicated. Are the innovations in any way excusable? Can any one maintain that they know and respect the law, since they circumvent it? Or perhaps, on the contrary, do we find here

177. "Two cubits of Sugata" (Rockhill, R. H. R. IX. 178) in length, one in width, one for the border. According to the Dharmaguptas, Pāc. lxxxvii. (there are only 90 pāc. in this list), two in length, one and a half in width; but it may be made half a cubic longer and wider. (Beal, Catena, p. 231).

178. According to Wass. related to [Nis.] Pāc. xv.

179. See Appendix.

180. See Rockhill, Life, p. 87; Udānavarga, p. 204. This "law" is missing from the corresponding Singalese list (Culla, VII. 3, 14). There is, besides, a positive mistake, whether in the Dulva, or in M. Rockhill's translation, in what concerns the fifth law of Devadatta. It is the latter who forbids the brethren to live in villages, and not Buddha. Vinaya Texts, III. p. 252, last line, read: fish [and meat]..... maccha-māmsa.

proof that, not only the Vibhaṅga, but also the Pratimokṣa, were not, at the time of Vaiśāli, constituted as they are to-day?  

When Yaśas points out to Revata the "enormities" of the supporters of heresy and when he finally arrives at the question of gold and silver, Revata does not ask for any explanations, as he did for the eight previous points. It suffices for him to hear that word, tabooed beyond all other, "gold and silver"; and in fact, from the point of view of Revata, which is that of a doctor familiar with the Vinaya, is not the question of a remarkable simplicity?

The Nissaggiya xviii., invoked by Sabbakāmin, is formal: "Every Bhikkhu who shall receive gold or silver, or shall make any one receive any, or shall cause it to be kept in deposit . . . ." The Nis. xix. and xx. forbid all connection with money, buying and selling. Nis. x. is still more precise. It specifies that, if money is offered to a monk to buy robes, he shall point out a faithful layman, "the man who keeps the ārāma in order," for example, "to whom the money may be given and who will attend to the buying and making of the robes." For whatever motive it may be, the monk must not receive money.

Truly, what a "hard and troublesome" question and how probable it is that the monks of Vaiśāli had knowledge of the Nissaggiyas and repeated them piously at each phase of the moon. Now, not only do they accept gold and silver, but they do not regard the coins as the undivided property of the community; they share them among themselves.

Everything becomes clear, things at least follow each other with an appearance of logic, when we examine this history from Minayeff's point of view. If the community, for reasons that it is not our business to explain, had not yet formulated an exact law about money, the error of the Vajjiputtakas, their arrogant attitude, their manoeuvres, their struggle, their condemnation, and the importance which it seems to have had, all this would be less extraordinary.

"Gold and silver are contrary to the spirit of detachment of ascetics in general." Thus Yaśas denounces the Vajjiputtakas to the pious laymen, as much because they are refractory to religious discipline as because they are violators of the code.

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183. Just so Sabbakāmin questioned by Revata.
of Śākyā: “They are neither Samanas, nor sons of Śākya, these pretended monks who accept money.”

We may, in the same spirit, attribute a precise import to one of the discourses which Yaśas holds with the laymen to justify his remonstrances (XII. 1, 4). It is a question of a conversation otherwise unknown in the other sources, which Buddha is supposed to have had with Mañicūḍaka. This fictitious personage is only a double of Yaśas. The latter relates that one day Mañicūḍaka protested against the royal officers, who said: “Gold and silver are allowable to the devotees, sons of Śākya”; then, going to find Buddha, he told him what he had heard of the congregation and what he himself had answered: “In maintaining what I did maintain, he asked the Master, did I speak according to the word of Bhagavat, far from incorrectly making him responsible for [a doctrine he does not teach]? Did I speak in accordance with the Dharma, without anything to be blamed in my words, in my principal, and accessory theses relative to the duties of the brethren?” The answer which Yaśas ascribes to Bhagavat may be imagined.

186. M. Vyut, § 278, abhikṣu, aśramaṇa, aśākyaputriya.

187. kacc’ aham bhante evam vyakaramano vyttavādi c’eva bhagavato homi [ , ] na ca bhagavantam abhutenā abbhacikkhami [ ; ] dhammassa va anudhammam vyakaromī na ca koci sahadhammiko vadantuva garayham thanam agaccatī. (See the strictly parallel passage, M. Vagga, VI. 31, 4. The only difference is that the subject is in the plural, and that we read dhammassa ca instead of va. See also Sam. N. IV. 381).

It is with regret that I differ from the translation of the Vinaya Texts: “Now am I, Lord, in maintaining as I did, one who speaks according to the word of the Blessed One, one who does not falsely represent the Blessed One, one who does not put forth minor matters in the place of the true Dhamma? And is there anything that leads to blame in such discussion, this way and that, as touching the observance of the rules of the Order?” We read VI. 31 4: “Do they say the truth of the Blessed One and do they not bear false witness against the Blessed One and pass off a spurious Dhamma as your Dhamma? And there is nothing blameworthy in a dispute like this, regarding matters of Dhamma?”

M. Kern, to whom I submit this passage, thinks that the word anudhammam is adverbial. Compare passages like Su. Nip., stanza 69, dhammesu niccam anudhammacari; Dh. pada., stanza 20, dhammassa hoti anudhammacari, and expressions like akatanuthamme=who is not treated as by right [cf. M. Vyut, § 48, 49-50, anudharmapraticāri dharmānudharmapratipanna]. sahadhammiko seems generally to have the meaning which Childers gives to it, “relating to the ordinances which bind all the
Yaśas, Revata, Sarvakāmin did not condemn the propositions of Vaiśāli, notably the jātarpurajata, by invoking as the Culla relates, the text of the Pratimokṣa supported by the exegesis contained in the Vibhaṅgas. They condemned them, and rightly so, in the name of the “Dharma”, speaking and explaining conformably to the Dharma, as did Mānicūḍaka. Rightly so, we say, for “every good word is the word of Buddha;”' and if Buddha may have left out some detail, he no less forbids all that is bad.188

But Minayeff calls upon us to examine the facts a little more closely.

“In the special, technical terms which designate the innovations of Vaiśāli and in other similar ones which are to be met with, for example, in the Mahāvyutpatti, there is, perhaps, preserved the most ancient form of the rules of the Vinaya, a form which, in the course of time, developed by various explanations into commandments (sīkṣāpada), into the rules of the Pratimokṣa, etc.” As a matter of fact, to the koppati jātarpurajatam of the Vajjiputtakas is opposed the principle which forbids the jātarpurajatasparśana.”

Minayeff regards it as assured that the whole of the legislation on gold and silver, legislation in which “the spirit even of the community seems to be at stake,”191 certainly is not anterior to Vaiśāli. But there was, perhaps, a law forbidding them to touch money, to receive silver in their own hands, a law which we

priests,” anuvūda=an addition, corroborative or of detail, of a thesis, proposition or rule [anuvūda in the sense of blame, see M. Vagga, index].

In this way we obtain a phrase whose two parts are parallel: “Is it not the fact that speak in accordance with Bhagavat, and not travesty his thought? Is it not the fact that speak according to the Dhamma and not travesty the Dhamma?”

I had proposed the following translation to M. Kern: “Have I proclaimed the corollary of the Law (anudhamma).” He thinks it may be possible. However, it can only rest upon the glosses of the Dhp. and of Sam Pas. interpreted by Childers (dhamman anvaya dhammanudhammapatipanna, Dhp. p. 378). I do not know what to make of the six anudharmas of M. Vyut, § 281, 120; see, ibid. § 126, 81, dharmopadharma.

188. See J. R. A. S. 1902, p. 375.
189. M. Vagga, VI. 40: “What I have not forbidden in direct terms is permitted or forbidden according as it is conformable to the law or not; what I have not permitted........”
190. M. Vyut. § 260, 21, jātarpurajatasparśana; § 261, 63, ratnasamparśa. This conjecture of Minayeff is certainly not exact for all the terms contemplated by M. Vyut.
191. Oldenberg, Buddha trans. Foucher, p. 239.
read in the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptas: "If a Bhikṣu with his own hand takes gold, silver or even copper........"\textsuperscript{192}

The Nis. x., where there is an evident purpose of avoiding contact with the money, is the natural result of the principle thus conceived. So with the precept relative to the journey, \textit{M. Vagga}, VI. 34, 2.\textsuperscript{193}

The Vajjiputtakas do not receive the money from hand to hand: so we have seen, they placed a copper vase filled with water in the midst of the circle of the brethren.

One then is inclined to believe that the Vajjiputtakas evade a law too special, to have the scope that it has acquired in the sequel.

But, for everything is strange in this affair of Vaiśālī, this impression is suddenly destroyed by a brutal matter of fact: it seems, in truth, that the practice of the Vajjiputtakas is conformable if not to the Dharma, at least to the spirit of the community. This vase, of which, as far as I know, we find no information in the Pali Vinaya\textsuperscript{194} and "which excited Yaśas' indignation to such a high degree, is used regularly in the church of the theras, in the Holy Singalese Church:' Spence Hardy bears witness to this: "In some conspicuous place there is a large copper-pan, into which the alms of the people are thrown."\textsuperscript{195}

I do not wish to leave this "monetary" question without observing that the \textit{Suttavibhaṅga} also, with a mixture of hypocrisy and naivete, distorts the dispositions of the \textit{Pratimoksa}. One can see, \textit{Vibhaṅga Nis.} xviii,\textsuperscript{196} the use that has to be made of the money unduly received by a monk; how the \textit{Sangha}, while condemning the monk, knows how to profit by the good windfall;\textsuperscript{197} how they go as far as inventing a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{192} \textit{Nis. Pac.} xviii., ap. Beal, \textit{Catena}. The Pali text says perhaps the same thing, \textit{ugganheyya} in opposition to \textit{ugganhapeyya}, cause to be taken by another, and to \textit{upanikkhittam sadiyeyya}, cause to be kept in deposit;—but it is less clear.
\item \textsuperscript{193} The brethren will remit the money to a \textit{kappiyakaraka}, who will make the purchases necessary to the monk.
\item \textsuperscript{194} The Sarvāstivādins are more detailed than the \textit{Culla}. The \textit{pātra} is rubbed with ointments, perfumed, ornamented with flowers; it is placed on the head of one of the brethren who traverses the streets and squares, crying: "Give, inhabitants of the town and strangers; this \textit{pātra} is a \textit{bhadrapātra} : to give into this \textit{pātra} is to give infinitely.........." We cannot help thinking of the \textit{bhadrakumbhas} of Hinduism.
\item \textsuperscript{195} A savoury detail which the translators of the \textit{Vinaya Texts} could have mentioned. Sp. Hardy does not say that the vase is filled with water. See \textit{East. Mon.} p. 233; quoted by Kern, \textit{Gesch} I. p. 248, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{196} \textit{Vinaya Texts}, I. p. 26, and Oldenberg, \textit{Buddha}, trans. Foucher, \textit{p. 319}
\item \textsuperscript{197} The punishment for the guilty monk consists especially in not having his share in the things the money buys—\textit{Sic vos non vobis.........}
special and delicate function, that of "gold thrower," which supposes fixed moral qualities, for the improbable hypothesis that a layman would not accept the duty of buying, with cursed money, ghi or oil for the Saṅgha. Prof. Oldenberg, who loves, as I also love, the Buddhist monks, sees in this a "scruple in which there is something touching." Doubtless; but this scruple being combatted by considerations in themselves legitimate, the whole of the dispositions may pass for very ingenious.

Having reached the end of this examination we shall affirm first of all that the question of the innovations—are they new or are they not?—does not present itself to the disciples of M. Kern and Minayeff in the same terms as to Prof. Oldenberg.

The latter, given the date and authority that he attributes to the Culla, cannot but know in what consisted the theses of the Vajjiputtakas, when the Pali text consents to say it with sufficient clearness. We have followed him on this ground and we have examined if these theses are, or are not, contemplated in the Vinaya. It is certain that they are, since the theras condemn them. We have shown that the innovations 4 and 5 (arasakappa, anumati") are prohibited in precise terms by the Mahāvagga; we believe we saw that innovation 8 (jalogi) is attacked by the Vibhaṅga. The points 1, 2, 3, 9, 10 are in violation of fixed laws on food (atirikta, akāla, saṃnidhikāra), on the dimensions of beds, on money. As to innovation 6, it may be regarded as ruinous to every disciplinary canon, as an attack on the authority of Buddha and the community.

But, in fact, even when the Culla is clear, even when the three other sources (Sarvāstivādins, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptas) confirm its interpretation of the "points" of Vaiśālī, we are very far from knowing anything but traditions, often suspicious. It is not doubtful that the theses are defined by authors who, rightly or wrongly, consider them heretical and who know the prohibitive resources of the pratimokṣa; hence, are we sure of the exactness of the definition? Or, rather, what do we know with certainty of the innovations?

The avasakappa and the anumati are defined in the Culla by people who have under their eyes the ecclesiastical rules that Sabbakāmin invokes in kind. The words abhuttavina pavaritena anatirittam are introduced into the definition of amathita and of gāmantara to make them fall under the formula of "non-remaining" food. The same for the note "akāla" in the case of the two fingers. Perhaps, also for the gāṇabhojana brought forward by the Sarvāstivādins a propos of "the village".

Add that the pseudo-historic context of the Council is more than subject to caution.\footnote{198. On this point See M. Kern’s observations and those of Prof. Oldenberg. I doubt if the second has convinced the first. The relations of the Vajjiputtakas with Devadatta on the one hand, with Vṛjiputra, pupil of Ānanda, on the other, add nothing to the probability of the account. B.C.—8}
The argumentation of Prof. Oldenberg, not very strong even when one places oneself at his point of view, which necessarily nearly approaches that of the compiler of the Culla, when one recognises the authority of the Culla and the unlawful character of the innovations of Vaiśāli, loses all authority if we abandon these postulates.

We have some little information about the way in which the Vajjiputtakas collected the money from the faithful; and it happens that the Singalese have recourse to the same copper-vase.

If the "salt in the horn" is preserved salt, the Vinayas authorise the provision of salt for life. If it is a question of ginger, ginger also is allowed. The gāmantara is, perhaps, only this form of the "repast in a group," which Pāc. xxxii. authorises on a journey, as in several other circumstances, but which was abominable to the ascetics of the school of Kāśyapa, to those āranyakabhikṣus who come to the help of Yaśas: it would be a proof of an excessive good will to admit, with the Dulva, that the heresy of the Vajjiputtakas consisted in making a journey the pretext. The amathila, rendered unlawful by a vain pretext of anatirikta, is permitted in principle to the brethren; but we know that certain heretics prohibited it: "the school of Devadatta," among whom were the monks of Vesali (Culla, VII. 4), condemned preparations made of milk. The same Devadatta forbids convents (āvāsa ?), "roofs" (channa), the vicinity of villages (gāmanta); he allows only the forest and "the foot of a tree". He forbids the adasaka; he forbids salt.\footnote{I admire those who dare to take part in such conditions.}

Perhaps the "innovations" of Vaiśāli are unknown, with their specific names, in our Vinayas, not because the compiling of the Vinaya is previous to Vaiśāli, but because the community which compiled the Vinaya itself practised the unlawful innovations introduced and sanctioned by the cousin of Devadatta. There is nothing absurd in the hypothesis itself; and in a certain measure it is confirmed by the vague indications we possess on the primitive state of the community.

We do not believe that the Pātimokkha, as it is, with the Vibhaṅgas and the Khaṇḍhakas, certainly existed before Vaiśāli:\footnote{This is poetry, although it may be 199. Wass. p. 56.} 

\footnote{200. Can one make use of the information furnished by M. Rockhill (Life, p. 50): "The Dulva informs us that the most important rules of the code, which was afterwards called the Pratimokṣa were only formulated when Devadatta commenced sowing strife among the brethren, some ten or twelve years before the Buddha's death. At all events our texts lead us to suppose that until after the conversion of Prasenajit, the mendicants of the Order did not live together, and that the only rules laid down for their guidance were that they were obliged to beg their food, that they must observe the ordinary rules of morality (the šīla precepts), that they must own no property, and that they must preach to all classes of people."}

\footnote{201. Vinaya Texts, I. p. xxii: "That the difference of opinion on the Ten Points remains altogether unnoticed in those parts of the collection where, in the}
written in prose.” But the antiquity of the books of discipline is none the less more than probable.

M. Kern has shown, in fact, that in many of its parts the Vinaya is nothing but the transposition of the Brahmanic or Jaina rules. On the other hand, we know, or we think we know, that Buddha was rather “loquacious” and it is not impossible that Buddha himself and the Saṁgha, from its dawn and in the great trouble which followed upon the death of the Master, exerted itself to assure the Buddhist originality as compared with other sects.

And we must go further. The community, we have already said, comprises two classes of monks who took their refuge in the Buddha. the āryyakabhisas, of whom Devadatta, father of the Dhūtāngas, was with Kāśyapa, the legendary patron; and the bhikṣus who constitute the centre of the community and whose disciplinary organisation Buddha confided to Upāli. The divergence of the views of the two groups could only hasten the codification of two sets of rules.

natural order of things, it would be obviously referred to, and that it is only mentioned in an Appendix where the Council held on its account is described, shows clearly, in our opinion, that the Vibhaṅga and the Khaṇḍakas (save the two last) are older than the Council of Vesali.”

It is sometime since M. Kern cited “certain proofs of the ignorance of the authors of the two Vaggas and of the Suttavibhaṅga, so strong that they can only be explained by the supposition that these two works are of a date much more recent than the rule itself.” (Gesch. II. p. 10).

202. Brahmaćārins, bhikṣus, vānaprasthas, vaikānasas, jaṭilas, aguikas. This demonstration was made for the first time in a complete manner in Gesch. Vol. II., first chapters. See Minayeff and Oldenberg (Foucher, p. 328) who calls attention to the comparative remarks of Jacobi, Sacred Books, XXII. p. xxiv. and following. On the development of disciplinary rule, consult Oldenberg, loc. cit. In our opinion, the author spoils by the rigidity of his orthodoxy the most ingenious views in the world.

203. Kern, Manual, p. 74 ; “In general it may be said that the whole organisation of the Saṁgha and a good deal of the rules for monks and nuns,—if we may trust the canonical writings,—were introduced by imitation or by accident. The Master is less a legislator than an upholder of the law.............”


Fa-hien relates that the disciples of Devadatta, his contemporaries, honour the three last but one Buddhas, but not Śākyamuni (Beal, p. 82, quoted by Rockhill, Udāna, p. 204).

205. On the role of Upāli see the texts (note Culla, VI. 13, 1) quoted in Vinaya Texts, I. pp. xii. and xiii. The documents which go even so far as to substitute Upāli for Buddha in what concerns the promulgation of the Vinaya are as B. C.—8/a
We possess these two sets of rules, and if it is difficult to fix their distant antecedents their history in Buddhism and their reciprocal relations, it is easy to recognise the two tendencies which dominate them. On the one hand, the four "resources", or "points of support" (nissaya, niśraya) of the monastic life; in the matter of food, the mouthfuls received as alms; as regards clothes, the robe consisting of rags; for a house, the foot of a tree; for medicines, decomposed urine. And Buddha declares that all the rest, meals in the town, clothes made on purpose, monasteries and grottoes, ghī, butter or oil are superfluities (atriekalōbha), that is to say, if you like, dispensations (extra allowances). These are, for certain, derogations from śramaṇa.

On the other hand,—I have in view the rule rather than the organisation of the fraternity—the Pratimokṣa itself, it seems, is only a translation of the essential axioms of Hindoo asceticism, but a translation much less integral. One is a śramaṇa only on the condition of conforming to the immemorial principles of chastity, of poverty, of temperance, of obedience also, at least for the novices and within certain limits. But there is a way of understanding these principles. Now it seems indeed that the Pratimokṣa not only is unacquainted with the rigorous nigrayas, but also brings numerous mitigations to the prohibitions of food

suggestive as the conclusion of the translators is prudent: "There may well be some truth in this very ancient tradition that Upāli was specially conversant with the Rules of the Order; but it would be hazardous on that account to ascribe to Upāli a share, not only in the handing down of existing rules, but in the composition of the Pātimokkhā itself."

206. The Nissayas are declared to all the monks immediately after ordination: if they were declared to them beforehand, no one would wish to be a monk: (M. Vagga, I. 30); they constitute the ideal of the ascetic life. The Bhikṣus are free to follow or to slight the Dhūtas. Among the Arhats of Vaiśāli (Southern and Āvantakas), some only, as we have seen, n. 100, practise the dhūtas 8, 3, 1, 2. It is clear, however, says M. Kern, that the first six dhūtas have nothing special to the nigrayas.

207. Perhaps there is in fact a more personal element in the organisation of the Saṅgha than in the rule of discipline?

208. The law of the three civaras, which is one of the dhūtas (No. 2), is, at the bottom, contradictory to dhūta No. 1 (clothing made of rags). This first dhūti is Hindoo; the tricivara is Buddhist by definition. Nis. xiii., which orders to sew a piece of the old civara to a new one, clearly shows the opposition of the Pratimokṣa and the Dhūtas.
anatirikta\(^{109}\) or saṃniddhikara, of gañabhojana, and doubtless also to several others.

In its turn, the discipline, such as it appears in the Khāṇḍakas, is constructed in the margin of the rules of the Pratimokṣa, made up of diverse and sometimes incongruous accommodation.\(^{110}\)

It is not unreasonable, not only to believe that the greater number of the elements of these two codes of discipline are ancient, even though they are in moderate agreement with each other, but also to carry back very far the time of the compilation of these codes. Who knows if the ancient Tathāgatas did not collaborate in it?

In any case, Buddha did not speak in vain when he allowed the Saṃgha to determine in the absence of rules emanating from himself, what is lawful or unlawful: when he left to this same Saṃgha the care of putting aside the lesser and minor rules; when he congratulated Mañjicūḍaka on having reasoned in conformity with the Dharma. His own life furnished two opposite images of the ascetic life śramanya). The legend claims that he was a naked monk and an ascetic before discovering the middle road between senseless asceticism and the life of the world. The point of discipline on which the texts are most formal is the condemnation of nakedness.\(^{211}\) For the rest and the detail, the Master refers to the interpretation which the Church will give of the Eight-fold Path. Let Sona, so delicately reared that hairs have grown under the soles of his feet, come to terms with Kāśyapa, who still shudders at having renounced the great tapas.

There will be before and after Vaiśālī, whatever may be the time of Vaiśālī, heads of schools, innovators if you like, some lax, others rigorous, “whose memory

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209. The anatirikta appears to be a variant of khalupaccadbhaklika (Dhūta 7); see Kern, p. 76, and Childers.

The provision of “medicines”, allowed Nis. xxiii. ; the gañabhojana authorised, Pāc. xxxii.

210. Compara Pāc. xxxix., prohibition of taking what is not given and the authorisation to take fruits.

Pāc. xxxix. forbids, except in case of sickness, ghi, butter oil, honey, molasses, fish, meat, milk and curds, M. Vagga, VI. 31, allows meat and fish “unheard, unseen, unsuspected.” See Kern, Man. p. 84, and his note: “The Buddha himself is represented as eating the pork expressly prepared for him by Cunda and thus proved, ipso facto, that he was no Buddhist.”!

On the question of the meat in the Great Vehicle, see Chavannes, Religieux Eminents, p. 48. Ibid. p. 49, the note on bhojaniya—also Śikṣās, 132, 14 foll.

211. M. Vagga, VIII. 15, 7 ; 28, 1.
is not even preserved in the Buddhist Saṅgha." There are some, however, who could be named, especially among the latter. And, in this sense, we may say with Minayeff without imprudence that the diverse prohibitions of the Vinayas sum up, in a concise and condensed form, the history of a series of conflicts.

The mistake would consist in thinking that the Pratimokṣa is nothing else than the focussing of the solutions successively adopted. As a theoretic construction, destined to be legally violated before as well as after its compilation, the Pratimokṣa is, perhaps, contemporaneous with the first Vinayadharas. This does not mean, for instance that the keeping of salt, allowed in the Mahāvagga, was forbidden at the time when the Pratimokṣa, which does not recognise it, was compiled. The weekly provision of bhaiṣajyas, permitted in the Pratimokṣa (Nis. xxiii.), although all provision was forbidden, is not necessarily a later interpolation: when repeating an axiom of the śramaṇa, in order to clear their conscience, they may very well have noticed an alleviation, solemnly authorised by Buddha or the Saṅgha.

It seems that the episode of the Vajjiputtakas and Yasas-Revata-Sarvakāmin, however hard put to we may be to characterise it, belongs to that obscure history of the ancient disciplinary conflicts. We decidedly refuse to recognise in the ten points derogations from the Vinaya of Vattagamani or from the Tibetan Vinaya. Perhaps we should make a less grave mistake by seeking to discover underneath this motley tradition, uncertain in itself, full of gaps, altered, perhaps transposed as a whole, an ancient stock of authentic remembrances relative to the struggle of the āranyakas with the bhikṣus or to the conflicts of the bhikṣus and the āranyakas among themselves. One last word. The prohibitions of the Pratimokṣa are one thing, the ordinances relative to the constitution of the Order another. Minayeff recognises this, although in places he seems to forget it. Messrs. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg have well said "that Gotama’s disciples, from the very beginning, were much more than a free and

212. Minayeff, p. 51: "A certain monk, after having freely submitted to the ascetic regime, common in all its fundamental features to the Buddhists and the solitaries or to the forest ascetics of Brahmanism, could begin to preach the legality, the piety of actions contrary to the spirit and to real meaning of the commandments which he had agreed to fulfil, but whose interdiction was not yet formulated in precise terms in any code”; probable consequence “of a certain demoralisation produced by the life in common of the monks”; he might also, we will add, tax his ingenuity to elude the precise terms of a code.

“How can we explain how these deviations arose in the brotherhood of Vaiśālī? Were they the result of demoralization? Or perhaps these innovations, at the bottom, were neither innovations, nor derogations to any code whatever of disciplinary rules, for this reason that no such code existed in the community…….. We may even believe that the appearance among the ascetics of this repugnance to detachment and austerity were due to the two causes at once………"
unformal union of men held together merely through their common reverence for their Master and through a common spiritual aim. They formed, rather, and from the first, an organised Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{213} The history of Buddhism becomes very obscure if this point is contested,\textsuperscript{214} if, according to Minayeff, we picture the Samgha, at the death of the Master, as “a group of ascetics having neither clear doctrines, nor definite disciplinary institutions.”\textsuperscript{215} The doctrine is not clear, nor the discipline definite; but there is something more than a group, there is a brotherhood, or rather, for the plural is necessary,\textsuperscript{216} there are brotherhoods of which Kāśyapa, Upāli, Purana, etc., will be the heads.

These fraternities are independent, but they do not remain without relations. The sons of Śākya constitute only one family. The history of Vaiśālī tells us of the intervention of a saint in the affairs of a community to which he does not belong, concerning the control by the āranyakabhikṣus over the customs and usages of a sedentary community; it puts beyond all doubt the solidarity of the diverse groups, always open to visitors. The whole Buddhist world, we are told, was represented at Vaiśālī: it is indeed necessary, in order to explain the relative unity of the Scriptures, to admit the efficacy of the centralizing efforts.

213. Vinaya Texts. I. p. xii. (It seems to us that Gotama’s disciples...........) This appreciation is not absolutely exact, first, because the reverence due to the Master was not understood by every one in the same way, nor was the spiritual aim that Buddha preached. It is wrong to ignore the Lokottaravādins and the laymen, disciples also of Buddha; second, because the elements grouped together by Buddha are many and diverse: Among the monks clothed in the triple robe, there were recluses, bands of wandering ascetics, sedentary brotherhoods. The organization of the Samgha never comprised all the Buddhist monks under uniform rules.

214. But one may ask if it is necessary to bring to it a clearness of which it scarcely admits. Renan was very wrong when he said that an explanation is as good as a document.


216. As Prof. Oldenberg very well says, transl. Foucher, \textsuperscript{2} p. 234.
APPENDIX
The Ten "Points" of Vaisālī.

[ Kanjur. Sūtra Vol. 102, fol. 306 (red edition) ]

One hundred and ten years after the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, the sun of the Jina declined, and among the monks of Vaisālī there arose ten illegal practices, contrary to the Sūtra and the Vinaya, divergent from the teaching of the Master, foreign to the Sūtra, unknown in the Vinaya, contradictory of the Dharma. These illegal practices, the monks of Vaisālī enjoined as legal, practised, and followed.

What were those ten practices?

The monks of Vaisālī having rendered legal the exclamation "Aho!" performed an ecclesiastical act, illegally in an incomplete Saṃgha, illegally in a complete Saṃgha, legally in an incomplete Saṃgha. This was the first practice, contrary to the Sūtra and the Vinaya, divergent from the teaching of the Master, foreign to the Sūtra, unknown in the Vinaya, contradictory of the Dharma, that the monks of Vaisālī, illegal as it was, enjoined as legal, practised, and followed !(1).

Again, the monks of Vaisālī, saying 'The venerable ones [absent Brothers] having approved, do ye count it as approved', caused [the resolutions of the incomplete Saṃgha] to be approved by the monks of the parish and rendering the approval legal, performed an ecclesiastical act........ This was the second practice, contrary to the Sūtra...... (2).

Again, the monks of Vaisālī, turning up the soil with their own hands, rendered legal the practice of turning up the soil. This was the third practice, contrary to the Sūtra......(3).

Again, the monks of Vaisālī, mixing salt consecrated for life-time with the [food] appropriate at the moment, declared the salt legal and so acted. This was the fourth practice, contrary to the Sūtra......(4).

Again, the monks of Vaisālī, having gone a yojana and a half-yojana and having eaten food in troop, rendered [the meal in troop] legal by reason of the journey. This was the fifth practice, contrary to the Sūtra......(5).

B. C.—9/a
Again, the monks of Vaiśālī, eating foods of both kinds, not leaving ‘remainder’ (akṣatāvikīrtā), while ‘making two fingers’ (?), rendered legal [the practice of the] two fingers. This was the sixth practice, contrary to the Sūtra ... (6).

Again, the monks of Vaiśālī, drinking fermented liquor with a sucking action like leeches, rendered [the fermented liquor] legal by reason of illness. This was the seventh practice, contrary to the Sūtra ... (7).

Again, the monks of Vaiśālī, having agitated a full measure (drona) of milk and a full measure of curds, eating [this preparation] out of time, rendered [this practice] legal by reason of the mixture. This was the eighth practice, contrary to the Sūtra ... (8).

Again, the monks of Vaiśālī, not having patched their new mats with a border, a Sugata’s cubit broad, from the old mat and so indulging in luxury rendered [the practice] legal because of the mat. This was the ninth practice, contrary to the Sūtra ... (9).

Again, the monks of Vaiśālī, taking alms-bowls such as were round, pure, and suitable for ritual; having anointed them with perfumes, fumigated them in sweet incense, adorned them with various fragrant flowers; having placed them on the head of monk (or of monks) protected by a cushion: perambulated the highways, streets, and cross roads, crying as follows: “Hear, ye multitudes who have come from various towns and countries and ye wise people of Vaiśālī! This pātra is a ‘lucky’ (bhadra) pātra. To give in it is to give much: or whoever shall fill it will obtain a great fruit, a great advantage, a great activity, a great development. And receiving therein precious stones, gold, and other valuables, enjoyed themselves therewith, and rendered gold and silver legal.” This was the tenth practice, contrary to the Sūtra ... (10).

(1) The Tibetan presupposes a text: vyagreṣa [saṃghena] adhārmikam, saṃgrena adhārmikam ca, vyagreṣa dhārmikam ca karma karoti.
A comparison with M. Vagga, II. 14, 2, and IX. 2, 1, leaves little doubt as to the sense of this passage, which has without result exercised the sagacity of Mr. Rockhill (Life, p. 171 and note). It is a question of an ecclesiastical act (kamma =las). Upasatha or otherwise, which, in the Pali, is termed complete or incomplete (vagga, samagga) according as the assembly is complete or incomplete, legal or illegal (dhammena, adhammena) according to the observance or non-observance of the rules relating to the āatti, putting of the resolution, etc. IX. 3, 1. Of the four categories adhammena vagga, adhammena samagga, dhammena vagga, dhammena samagga—the fourth alone is authorized.

The monks of Vaiśālī practise the first three, imitating therein the monks of Campā (IX. 2) and the famous six (Chabbaggiya, IX. 3). The redactor of the Dulva is not unaware of the fact; for, when Yaśas demands of Sarvakāmin where that practice has been prohibited, the old man replies: ‘In the village of Campā”—‘A propos of what?’—‘On account of the acts of the six’—‘What kind of offence is it?’—A duḥkṛta. The same passage of the Mahāvagga (campeyyaka vinoyavatthu) is contemplated in the Culla with a view to the condemnation of the fifth practice (anumati).

Compare Abhidharmakośavākyākhyā, Soc. As., fol. 329 b. 5: manḍalasimayam ekasyam hi simayam prthakkarmakaraṇāt samghadvaidham bhavati.—Simabandha, Div. 150, 21; M. Vyut, 245, 420.

It remains to ascertain what relation may exist between this practice, bordering upon the avasakappa, and the interjection aho.

(2) It is, we believe, a question of anumati, as is proved by the repetition of the formulas concerning the incomplete Samgha. The word anumodana throws light upon the relation between approbation and “enjoyment”, “to amuse oneself”, in Rockhill. The text contemplated with a view to the condemnation is the same as before.

(3) Condemned by Pāc. x (LXXIII. in the Dulva). According to Sarvakāmin the proposition had been condemned at Śrāvastī a propos of the six. In the Pali Vibhaṅga, the
Alavikas are concerned. This practice is wanting in the other sources. It is replaced by the acinnakappa, one of the most obscure points of this obscure tradition, against which, as we have seen, no text is adduced.

(4) According to Sarvakāmin condemned at Rājagṛha a propos of Śāriputra. If Tibetan scholars could, without some degree of shamelessness, rely upon the principle of the Latinists: “to us both reason and fact are preferable to a hundred manuscripts, we should like to read: dus. su. ma. run. ba. dan.........=yāvajjivikam adhiṣṭhitena lavanena saha akālakāni......... = adding salt laid by to foods for which the time has passed, with the result of rendering legal those forbidden foods. The explanation of the Sarvāstivādins would agree with that of the Dharmaguptas and of the Mahāśāsakas. For akālika “the time being disregarded,” see M. Vyut, 63, 15 (and the locus classicus concerning the characteristics of the Dharma); for akalāka in a sense precisely the opposite of that which we here attribute to the word, Div. Av., 130, 22 akalakūni sajjikṛtāni = there were prepared foods (bhaisajyas) that could not be taken outside the time. Both by reason of the samādhi and by reason of the sense and of the variants akōlika and akalāka (from a-kāla), we can explain the reading due. su. run. ba. for dus. su. ma. run. ba.

(5) Condemned at Rājagṛha, a propos of Devadatta (h dus. cin za. ba=gaṇabhojana, M. Vyut, 261, 40—Dr. P. Cordier).

(6) Condemned at Śrāvastī a propos of a great number of monks (lhag. ma. byas. pahi. bzah. ba=akṛtātiriktakhādana, M. Vyut, 261, 28,—Dr. P. C.).

(7) Condemned at Śrāvastī a propos of the venerable Svagata (legs. ons; Suratha, according to Rockhill). Compare the Sagata of Vibh. Pāc. li.; but the scene is not at Śrāvastī.

(8) Condemned at Śrāvastī a propos of several monks.

(9) Condemned at Śravasti a propos of several monks. According to the text: “...........rendered legal [this practice] by reason of the mat.”

(10) Condemned as Naiḥṣargika in a great number of texts (Vinaya, Dīrgha, Madhyama, etc.).

Here the difficulties abound: (1) It is at first a question
of several vases (gan.dag............de.dag), later of "this vase" (hdi); (2) the epithets of the vases are curiously accumulated: (3) the red text has: dge.slon.gi.mgo.bo.la.khrihu.stan.dan. ohas.pahi.sten.du.bzhag.nas; khrihu=seat=(mañca, pīṭha, pīṭ-hika, M. Vyut, 273, 92), stan=mat (āsana), khri.stan=āsana, mañca-pīṭha, chas=garment (chas.gos) and in general, utensils "things, tools, requisites"—mgo.sten.de.bzhag=alicui opus imponere (Desgodins). If sten.du=ched.du, we have: "placing the vase at the head of the Saṃgha with a view to obtaining chairs and mats and utensils" (?) It is better to make khrihu.stan a cushion and read dan.bcas.pahi with the black edition, thus: "furnished with a cushion"="then they put a mat on a Śramaṇa's head and on it (the bowl)" (Rockhill), "to place a round begging-bowl.........on the head of a Śra- maṇa" (Schiefner Tār., p. 41); and (4) the instrumental gser. dnu.l.gyis is analogous to that cited note 9 "by reason of the mat".

We may usefully compare M. Vyut, 239, 25, and following gandha-mālyena mahiyate, abhyarhitam, dhūpanirdhūpitam, sampūjitam, pūjyapūjitam, mahitam, abhiprakiranti sma, jīvī-topakaraṇam, glānapratyayabhaiṣajyam, sukhopadhānam.