I.

CENTRE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

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TIBET AND IMPERIAL CHINA

A Survey of Sino-Tibetan Relations up to the End of the
Manchu Dynasty in 1912

OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 7
The emblem on the cover shows the decoration on the tympanum of a bronze drum of the Dongson culture. The example illustrated, which is possibly of the 4th or 3rd century B.C., was found in Tonkin and is now in the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Stockholm.

The characters in the text are in the calligraphy of Mrs. Nobuko Gardiner, to whom the author is greatly indebted.
TIBET AND IMPERIAL CHINA

A Survey of Sino-Tibetan Relations up to the End of the Manchu Dynasty in 1912

by

Josef Kolmaš

Centre of Oriental Studies
The Australian National University
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FOR MY WIFE

stered at the G.P.O., Sydney, for transmission by post as a book
PREFACE

The idea to publish this little volume developed when the author was working as a Visiting Lecturer in the Department of Chinese in the Australian National University. It was primarily intended for students interested in China's historical relations with other parts of its empire before the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. It is hoped that the brief examination of Sino-Tibetan history and political geography, as presented herewith, will not only introduce the reader to the much discussed, but usually misrepresented, problems of Sino-Tibetan relationship, but also help him to understand better the attitudes of both China and Tibet.

The author is indebted to Professor J.W. de Jong, Head of the Department of South Asian and Buddhist Studies in the Australian National University, whose encouragement and many helpful suggestions in the initial preparation of the text have been invaluable. I should also like to thank Professor Liu Ts'un-yan, Head of the Department of Chinese, for a number of extremely helpful suggestions and comments. I wish also to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. K.H.J. Gardiner, Lecturer in Asian Civilization (Chinese History) in the same University, who read the present text to the author's advantage, suggesting several corrections and improvements, and above all willingly undertook a tiring job of looking over my somewhat unidiomatic English. For any inadequacy of fact or opinion, however, I am alone responsible.

The translation of Tibetan is as follows, in the order of the Tibetan alphabet: ka, kha, ga, nga; ca, cha, ja, ŋa; ta, tha, da na; pa, pha, ba, ma; tsa, tsha, dza, wa; ža, za, 'a, ya; ra, la, ŋa, sa; ha, a.

J. KOLMAŠ.

The Australian National University, Canberra September, 1966.


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INTRODUCTION

During the thousand or more years of official contacts between China and Tibet, the political boundaries of the latter and its administrative connection with the Empire underwent many changes. Neither the deserts of Ch'ing-hai 青海, nor the jungles of Yün-nan 雲南 and the former Hsi-k'ang 西康 province, nor the snowy mountains of Tibet proper were able to stop the continuous expansion of the homogeneous Chinese element and its cultural penetration westward and south-westward of the Great Plain, the original seat of the Han 漢 Chinese. This factor, taken together with the willingness on the part of the Tibetans in their early days to learn from their more advanced neighbours in the east, offers some explanation of why Tibet, this mountainous and unknown country somewhere to the far west of China - as it was for the Chinese in the beginning of the Christian era - happened to become in the following centuries a component, and now even an inseparable part (according to the Constitution of 1954), of the national territory of China.

The same process of absorption marked also the political and legal relationship between these two countries. Tibet, once an independent kingdom ruled for centuries by its own royal dynasty, became in the course of a millennium little more than an administrative province of the Chinese Empire, absolutely dependent on the Chinese central government.

My aim in this outline study is to indicate the major changes affecting both the political boundaries and the legal position of Tibet in relation to Imperial China, or, in other words, how the status of Tibet was formed and defined in the course of a long historical process.

The history of the relations between China and Tibet may be conveniently divided into six periods corresponding roughly with the reigns of the respective Chinese dynasties. Such a periodisation, though not quite usual in the history of Tibet proper, suggests itself spontaneously when one examines the question of Sino-Tibetan relations from the two aspects indicated above.
The highlands of Tibet with their crude climate, barren land and scanty population remained almost entirely unknown to the Chinese until at least the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. Between these highlands and the settled regions of China such as the Wei valley and the Ch'eng-tu plain lay numerous lesser mountain ranges inhabited by pastoral tribes known by the Chinese under such titles as the Jung, the Ch'iang and the Ti. These tribes, who pressed continually upon the Chinese settlements, prevented any contact between the Han Chinese and Tibet proper.

The names of both Ch'iang and Jung appear on the oracle bones of Shang times (18th - 12th Centuries B.C.); in 771 B.C. a group of Jung tribes sacked the Western Chou capital, and for several hundred years the state of Ch'in in the Wei valley had constantly to struggle against these 'barbarians'.

During the time of the two Han dynasties (206 B.C. - 8 A.D. and 23 - 220 A.D.) Chinese power began to extend further and further westward. Contact was made with the city-states of the Tarim basin (Chang Ch'ien's missions to Central Asia during the latter part of the second century B.C.) and in 4 A.D. the Chinese established a commandery -
the so-called Hsi-hai ch'un 西海郡 - in the region of the present-day Ch'ing-hai lake (Koko-nor). This advance however proved to be premature, and Hsi-hai commandery disappeared in the disorders which followed on Wang Mang's usurpation in China (9-22 A.D.)

Under the Later Han dynasty, the Ch'iang tribes, who may well have been of proto-Tibetan origin, frequently revolted against Chinese control and devastated great areas of Western China, particularly during the periods 106-118 and 140-144, and after the fall of the Han and division of China, northern nomads such as the Hsiung-nu 匈奴 and Hsien-pei 鮫卑 moved into Kan-su 甘肅 and Shen-hsi 陝西 and fought with Ch'iang, Ti and Chinese alike. During the confused epoch known as the Sixteen States Period (SHIH-LIU KUO 十六國, 304-439) there were in the Tibeto-Chinese marches in Kan-su and Shen-hsi kingdoms founded by leaders of the proto-Tibetan tribe of Ti - such as the Fu/P'u 萌 state of Former Ch'in (Ch'ien Ch'in 前秦, 351-394) and the Lu呂 state of Later Liang (Hou Liang 俊涼, 386-403); the Ch'iang state of Later Ch'in (Hou Ch'in 夷秦, 384-417); Hsien-pei states - such as the Ch'i-fu 氣伏 state of Western Ch'in (Hsi Ch'in 西秦, 385-400, 409-431), the T'u-fa 秃髮 state of Southern Liang (Nan Liang 南涼, 397-414); and a Hsiung-nu state, Northern Liang (Pei Liang 北涼, 397-439). Round about the Ch'ing-hai lake there was the kingdom of the T'u-yu-hun 吐谷渾, a Tibetanized branch of the Hsien-pei who had moved into that area at the end of the third century and established a state which lasted until the early seventh century. In contrast to the T'u-yu-hun kingdom, the dynasties set up by the Sixteen States were ephemeral and the product of disturbed conditions which effectively prevented
Chinese influence from penetrating the Tibetan plateau.

By the middle of the fifth century the last of these states, viz. Northern Liang, had been absorbed by the Hsienpei T'o-pa 拓跋 state of Northern Wei (Pei Wei 北魏, 386-534) which now controlled the whole of North China. South China, after the fall of the Eastern Chin dynasty (Tung Chin 東晉, 317-419), remained under the sway of the four successive short-lived dynasties until 589 when all China was re-united again under the Sui隋 dynasty (581/589-617).

The boundary between China proper and the unknown lands in the far southwest ran at this time as far as the Ta-tu 大渡 River, or even perhaps as far as the Ya-lung 雅隆 River in the East-Tibetan highlands. The northern and northeastern boundary of the Tibetan plateau with the adjacent parts of the Empire was formed by the Nan-shan 南山 range (present-day A-er-chin shan-mo 阿爾金山脈, or Altyn-tagh) with its southeastward continuation in the Ch'i-lien-shan 祁連山

The adoption of Buddhism, particularly patronized by some of the Sixteen States - such as Later Ch'in and Northern Liang - and from 451 also by the Northern Wei opened new horizons for the Chinese. From this time onwards Chinese Buddhist pilgrims such as Fa-hsien 法顯 (travelled 399-413) crossed the Gobi to visit India, the homeland of the new faith. Yet in spite of a considerable increase in China's knowledge of the world outside and more frequent contacts with foreign countries, Chinese penetration of the Tibetan plateau itself, even at this time, did not extend further than in previous periods. Chinese historical sources,
indeed, usually so well-informed upon the countries surrounding China, are surprisingly silent about Tibet proper until T'ang times i.e. until the seventh century A.D.

Whereas among the Han population the process of formation of the Chinese nation had evolved successfully in these periods and by the sixth century had even to certain extent already been completed, the peoples inhabiting the territory of what is now Tibet proper lived at a stage of primitive clan organisation. Since they were widely scattered over a huge area over which communications were extremely difficult, the various tribes had hardly anything in common and their chieftains fought each other almost uninterruptedly. Only in the course of the sixth century did a Tibetan tribe whose seat was in the Yar-klungs valley (southeast of Lhasa) win a hegemony over its weaker neighbours which it gradually enlarged. By the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries, Gnam-ri-srong-btsan, the ablest amongst the chieftains of this clan, became the undisputed ruler over the majority of tribes in Central Tibet (the territory around Lhasa). Thus the corner-stone was laid for the future unification of the whole country, which was achieved by Gnam-ri-srong-btsan's son and successor, the king Srong-btsan-sgam-po (605-650). With him the organisation of the Tibetan state in terms of a central government, a unified legal code, an army, official contacts with foreign countries, and a distinctive religion and culture for the first time appears upon the stage of history.

In the history of Sino-Tibetan relations all the period before the T'ang dynasty in China is really one of preliminary contacts, clashes only imperfectly recorded and cultural
contacts which belong to the realm of hypothesis rather than to that of fact. One may perhaps conjecture that the existence at this time of a rather developed and highly organised Chinese state assisted indirectly in creating preconditions for the rise of a centralized Tibetan state in the seventh century.
For re-united China, the T'ang era was one of unprecedented prosperity, both in the economic and the cultural sphere. Many foreigners, mainly from Central Asia, India, Korea and Japan, were visiting China, and the Chinese also frequently visited their neighbours. Under these circumstances there naturally came to be an increased interest in the countries bordering on China in the west, and the necessity to protect her open frontiers against devastating incursions from this direction led to the first regular contacts between T'ang China and the various peoples of the Tibetan highlands. From the word BOD which was used by the Tibetans to denote their mountainous country was perhaps also derived the original Chinese name of Tibet, viz. T'u-po 吐蕃. The seat of the Tibetan kings, Ra-sa (literally meaning "Goat's place"; later on, along with the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet in the early seventh century, re-named Lha-sa or "God's place") was known in China as Lo-hsieh 遄些 or Lo-so 遄姿.

Thanks to the numerous historical sources related to this period, Sino-Tibetan relations during the T'ang dynasty are much better documented than is the case for either the period before T'ang or that between the T'ang and the Mongols.
By T'ang times Tibet had already reached the height of its national development. The Tibetan kings, whose ancestors traced their origin back to the remote past, had become strong and successful rulers over a vast territory stretching far and wide across the whole of the Tibetan high plateau. The northern and eastern boundaries of the Tibetan state separated it from T'ang China, the boundary line on the north being formed, as previously, by the Nan-shan range, whereas in the east it ran roughly alongside the western limits of the Szu-ch'uan 四 川 lowlands. In the west, the Tibetan kingdom included the eastern part of present-day Kashmir (the so-called La-dwags area) and in the south it reached as far as the southern slopes of the Himalayas. At the time of its greatest expansion (during the reign of the king Khri-srong-lde-btsan, 755-797), the Tibetan state controlled almost the whole of Chinese Turkestan and present-day Kan-su.

The first official contacts between China and Tibet of which historical records remain both in Chinese and Tibetan, were established during the reign of king Srong-btsan-sgam-po. The T'ang Emperor T'ai-tsung 太宗 (627-649), wishing to prevent further Tibetan invasions of his territory, resolved to send the daughter of a member of the royal family, princess Wen-ch'eng 文成, to marry the Tibetan king (in 641). A similar family connection between the two ruling houses in China and Tibet was formed later in 710, when the Emperor Chung-tsung 中宗 (707-710) gave another Chinese princess, Chin-ch'eng 金成, to the Tibetan king Khri-lde-gtsug-btsan called Mes-ag-tshoms (704-755).

The T'ang histories enumerate no less than one hundred official and semi-official missions that were exchanged
between Lhasa and Ch'ang-an, the then capital of China. Tibet at that time was frequently visited by Chinese Buddhists, and Tibetan students in search of enlightenment from now on used to study not only in India but in China as well.

As far as can be gathered from existing historical sources, both sides concluded altogether at least eight important bilateral treaties, the first of which dates from the years 705/710 and the last from the years 821/822. The Sino-Tibetan treaty of 821/822 is specially significant. Its bilingual Chinese and Tibetan text, carved on a huge stone pillar, is still well preserved near the Jo-khang temple in Lhasa. On the boundary issue and the status of Tibet, the treaty ran as follows (quoted according to the latest translation of Mr. H.E. Richardson, TIBET AND ITS HISTORY, pp. 244-245):

"The Great King of Tibet (Ral-pa-can, 817-836 - jk) ... and the Great King of China (Mu-tsung, 821-824 - jk) ... being in the relationship of nephew and uncle, have conferred together for the alliance of their kingdoms ... Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in occupation. All to the east is the country of Great China; and all to the west is, without question, the country of Great Tibet ..."

"According to the old custom, horses shall be changed at the foot of the Chiang-chün pass, the frontier between Tibet and China. At the Sui-yung barrier the Chinese shall meet Tibetan envoys and provide them with all facilities from there onwards. At Ch'ing-shui
the Tibetans shall meet Chinese envoys and provide all facilities. On both sides they shall be treated with customary honour and respect in conformity with the friendly relations between Nephew and Uncle ...

"This solemn agreement has established a great epoch when Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet, and Chinese in the land of China ...

After the murder of king Glang-dar-ma (in 842), the unified Tibetan kingdom collapsed and out of its débris emerged a whole range of petty feudal principalities. Accompanying this process of disintegration was the increased religious activity of the Tibetans, numerous Lamaist sects being founded. During the period that followed, Tibet's relations tended to develop not so much with China as with its southern neighbour, India, from whence came fresh and strong impulses to stimulate the spiritual life of the country. This state of political disunity and cultural isolation from China continued almost uninterruptedly for the whole of the following four hundred years, i.e. until 1245, when the Sa-skya-pa sect with its seat in Further Tibet, assisted by the Mongols, gained political power over the greater part of the country.

On the basis of what is available both in Chinese and Tibetan sources we may conclude that Tibet in the T'ang period was in every respect an independent state with a comparatively strong military potential and active diplomatic relations with the rest of the surrounding world (remarkably close at that time was, for example, the collaboration of the Tibetan kings with the Baghdad Khalifs). The power of
the Tibetan rulers was subject to no restrictions of interference from the outside. Thanks to the two successful marriages of Chinese princesses to the Tibetan kings, and also to the beneficent operation of the higher Chinese civilisation amongst the rude Tibetan population, the former hostility between Chinese and Tibetans gradually disappeared and friendship replaced it. The political alliance between China and Tibet, in conformity with the spirit and customs of the time, took the form of an 'uncle and nephew' or rather 'father-in-law and son-in-law' relationship [the 'uncle' or 'father-in-law' (致します in Tibetan; 舅 in Chinese) being the T'ang Emperor, and the 'nephew' or 'son-in-law' (Devon in Tibetan; Sheng Nan 生男 in Chinese) the King of Tibet].

In the T'ang period there can however be as yet no talk about Tibet's dependence, either direct or indirect, nominal or actual, upon China. On the contrary, there were many instances of Tibet inflicting heavy blows on China's military power, and in one case (in 763) their army even managed to occupy Ch'ang-an, China's capital, for fifteen days, seriously endangering the very existence of the T'ang dynasty. Relations between China and Tibet - in spite of their formal quasi-paternalistic designations - were yet in the full sense of the word, those between two sovereign states, though with a different level of state organisation and different standards of economic and cultural development.
CHAPTER III

RELATIONS WITH CHINA AFTER THE FALL OF THE UNIFIED KINGDOM
(The Wu-tai Period, 907-960, and the Sung Dynasty, 960-1279)

A. The Wu-tai 五代 Period.

By 907, when the last T'ang Emperor was deposed, China also had ceased to be a unified empire. Ten states founded by various warlords maintained themselves in Szu-ch'uan and South China, while in the Yellow River valley five short-lived dynasties held power successively: the dynasties of Later Liang (Hou Liang 后梁, 907-923), Later T'ang (Hou T'ang 后唐, 923-936), Later Chin (Hou Chin 后晋, 936-947), Later Han (Hou Han 后汉, 947-950), and Later Chou (Hou Chou 后周, 951-960), which were all exposed to the constant threat of attack from their northern neighbours, the Kitans. The Kitans were a tribe of a Tunguzic extraction, who organized a state called Liao 遼 (916-1124) north of the Great Wall. It was partly a result of a constant preoccupation with this northern danger that none of the five dynasties were able to win recognition of their authority in China south of the Yangtze.

Under these circumstances, the regions lying west of China's dismantled empire, remained comparatively aloof from the central government's main interest, and were by and large left to pursue their own way without Chinese interference. This is reflected in the much smaller space allotted to
Tibet in the Chinese Dynastic histories of the Wu-tai period. For instance, the T'U-FAN CHUAN 吐蕃傳 or Section on Tibet, which in both T'ang histories consists of two large CHUAN 卷, in the CHI" Wu-TAI-SHIH 舊五代史 or Old History of the Five Dynasties has diminished to a section of less than one thousand Chinese characters.

The frontier of Tibet or T'u-fan (a name carried over from the previous epoch) now ran only for a comparatively short distance along the territory administered by the Five dynasties; Tibet's main Chinese neighbours at this period were the two states of Former Shu (Ch'ien Shu 前蜀, 907-925) and Later Shu (Hou Shu 後蜀, 934-965) with their capital at Ch'eng-tu-fu 成都府. The westernmost frontier of these two states (virtually a continuation of the same state) reached approximately to the Ta-tu River in Eastern Tibet.

Tibet, and in particular Central Tibet, i.e. the area centred on Lhasa, was itself passing through a confused period when both political and cultural life regressed considerably. The decay of the unified state which had begun with Glang-dar-ma's murder in 842, continued and became more marked. The descendants of Glang-dar-ma's stepson, Yum-brtan, assumed power in Central and Eastern Tibet, but their political influence, handed down from generation to generation, gradually disintegrated till it disappeared entirely. In various Tibetan historical works concerned with this period only long genealogical lists were preserved, giving nothing but the names for each individual generation, and indicating the further and further splitting of the family estates.
Only in Western Tibet was there comparative stability during this period, and there a remarkable upsurge of cultural activity took place, i.e. in the Mnga'-ris district and on the territory of La-dwags. Here the descendants of Glang-dar-ma's legitimate son, 'Od-srung, founded a prosperous dynasty whose members were all devout Buddhists. Historical sources all speak of the great enthusiasm of these West-Tibetan kings for cultural contacts with India. Apart from religious impulses, the Tibetans received from the Indians at this time their system of weights and measures, the sixty-year calendrical cycle, etc.

China's lack of interest in Tibet in this period is easy to understand. A disunited Tibet bordering on a dismembered China constituted no military threat to the latter, while China at the same time, facing the menace from her northern neighbours, the Kitans, was obliged to lay aside any idea of exploiting a country so remote and economically so poor as Tibet.

b. The Sung 宋 Dynasty.

Much of what has been said about the Sino-Tibetan relations in the Wu-tai period also applies to the Sung period. The main attention of Sung China was directed not to the west as was the case with the T'ang China, for instance - but predominantly to the north, whence a foreign enemy for three successive centuries was almost uninterruptedly pressing on her territory. The northern threat hung like a sword of Damocles over Sung China influencing to a great extent both her domestic and foreign policy.
Although Chao K'uang-yin 趙匡胤 who founded the Sung dynasty reunified the greater part of China during his reign (960-975) - the last of the rival states, Northern Han 北漢 surrendering in 979 - yet the Kitan state of Liao continued to threaten Sung territory in the north, while an independent régime was established in Kan-su and the north-west by a Tangut leader, who founded the so-called Western Hsia (Hsi Hsia 西夏 ) dynasty (1032-1227). At this period in the west, the boundary of Sung China with T'u-fan continued to run along the four western 路 or provinces, viz. Ch'in-feng 秦鳳, Li-chou 利州, Ch'eng-tu-ru, and Tzu-chou 榆州.

The first changes in this arrangement occurred when the Jürjeds, another Tunguzic tribe inhabiting the basin of Sung-hua or Sungari River, began to attack the Kitans, whose kingdom they finally overran in 1124. The remaining leaders of the Liao state fled west to Chinese Turkestan and Central Asia, founding there a new kingdom called Hsi Liao 西遼 or Western Liao (also known as Kara-Kitan; 1124-1211), whose territory boarded upon the largely uninhabited northern outskirts of the Tibetan plateau.

The Jürjeds also invaded China proper and occupied the north, forcing the Chinese court to move to Lin-an 臨安, south of Yangtze River, where the Sung dynasty continued ruling under the name of Nan 南 or Southern Sung (1127-1279). Northern China as far as the Huai 淮 River was now occupied by the Jürjed kingdom of Chin 金 (1115-1234), whereas the mid-northwest (south of Gobi) continued to be in the possession of the Tangut state of Hsi Hsia. Thus Tibet, which in the T'ang period had been in contact in the north
and east almost exclusively with the Chinese Empire, now bordered in northwest and north upon the Kara-Kitan kingdom (Western Liao), in the north and northeast upon the Tangut Hsi Hsia and in east upon the Jürjed state of Chin. Only in the south and southeast did Tibet's border run along the political frontier of the Chinese Sung dynasty.

The process of disintegration within Tibet proper continued during the Sung period. Moreover, almost all public life in that country became absorbed in endless religious contentions which resulted in the foundation of numerous Lamaist sects. To a great extent, however, this growth of sectarianism in Tibet developed from the rapid decline of Buddhism in India, which brought about a break in the hitherto regular contacts between Tibetan Lamas and their Indian gurus. Between the eleventh and twelfth centuries four main Lamaist sects of the so-called post-reformation period were created, viz. Bka'-gdams-pa, Ži-byed-pa, Sa-skya-pa, and Bka'-rgyud-pa, with numerous sub-sects. Individual monasteries, enriched by influential patrons, soon became centres of all cultural, economic and political life in their respective districts. Thus the political vacuum created as a result of the fall of the former unified kingdom of Tibet (in the first half of the ninth century), was gradually filled by the Lamaist church which more than ever before pushed itself into the forefront of political life in the country. However, for any sect to gain hegemony over its rivals, the help of a strong secular power, either domestic or foreign, was needed. This condition did not materialize until the Mongol period. In Sung times most of the Lamaist sects in Tibet were simply in statu nascendi and their mutual disagreements did not yet pass beyond the framework of their dogmas and liturgy - and
to solve such problems, it was not yet necessary to call on the intervention of a secular authority.

The Sung Emperors, in general, being busy with their northern neighbours, maintained a laissez-faire policy towards Tibet, and Sino-Tibetan contacts during both the Wu-tai and the Sung periods - judging from the paucity of preserved documents - gradually sank to little more than they had been during the period before the seventh century.
Before discussing Tibet's relations with the Mongol rulers of China it would seem desirable to glance briefly at its relationship with Old Mongolia in general.

According to the late Professor G.N. Roerich ("Mongolotibetskie otnošenija v XIII i XIV vv.", p.334 et seq.), the history of Mongol-Tibetan relations can be traced back as far as the eighth century A.D., when the Tibetans held and administered large tracts of territory in Chinese Turkestan, thus becoming the immediate neighbours of various proto-Mongol tribes then leading a nomadic existence on the western and southern outskirts of the Gobi. When, at the beginning of the Sung period, a Tangut kingdom of Hsi Hsia (called Mi-nag in Tibetan) was founded in the Mongol-Tibetan marches, the Tibetans maintained both economic and cultural contacts with the new state, and it was mostly through the Tanguts that they received information about the affairs of Mongolia proper. The unification of the Mongol tribes under Jenghiz Khan (1206-1227) brought the latter into collision with the Hsi Hsia state, and thus information about the new phenomenon of a unified Mongolia was passed on to Tibet.

The repeated attacks of Jenghiz Khan's armies on the Tangut kingdom which started as early as 1205, evidently
caused considerable unrest in Tibet, so much so that later Tibetan annalists (e.g. Sum-pa mkhan-po in the eighteenth century) even believed that in ME-STAG (fire-tiger) year, i.e. 1206, the Mongols occupied the whole of Central Tibet, although in fact Mongol armies had not penetrated nearly so far at that time. Nevertheless, the year 1206 can be considered as the time when the Tibetans had their first chance to realize the potential strength of the Mongol armies - even if only indirectly - and this stimulated certain of the contending sects in Tibet to attempt to establish relations with the newly emerging power in the north.

After the annihilation of the Hsi Hsia by the Mongols in 1227 their lands were incorporated into Mongol territory as far as the border of northern Tibet, and were administered by Jenghiz Khan's grandson, prince Godan, who was the second son of the then ruling khagan Ogodai (1229-1241). Godan set up his headquarters in the vicinity of the present-day Lan-chou in Kan-su province. One of the duties of feudal princes such as Godan was to collect information about neighbouring and not yet conquered countries, sending it to the Mongol khagan in Karakorum. To attain this goal, Godan used special military intelligence units, penetrating sometimes quite deeply into the territory of his neighbours.

In one such expedition in 1239, a Mongol cavalry detachment commanded by one Dorda-darkhan, rode into Tibet, penetrating as far as Rwa-sgreng, about sixty miles north of Lhasa, and routing a Tibetan army. Of more significance than the victory itself was information which Dorda-darkhan brought back concerning the political, cultural and economic
situation in Tibet. The Mongols thus learnt that Tibet had long ago ceased to be a unified country, that its lands had been for centuries divided, and that all political power, economic strength and cultural influence were centered around the numerous monasteries belonging to various Lamaist sects. The most powerful among them was the Sa-skya-pa sect (founded in 1073) headed at that time by the famous Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan, generally styled as Sa-skya pandita (1182-1251). Hearing this, Godan sent Sa-skya pandita an invitation to visit his court, which the latter accepted and in 1245 arrived in Mongolia together with his nephew and eventual successor, Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan, called 'Phags-pa or the Saint.

The motives which led Godan to invite the Pandita, and the latter to accept Godan's invitation, though diametrically opposite in character, in fact combined to produce the same result. It seems that the illiterate Mongol prince wished primarily to get a learned Tibetan lama for his court, who would invent a writing system for the Mongols and initiate them into the higher culture of the Tibetans. The Pandita in his turn saw in the invitation an excellent opportunity for strengthening his own position by winning Godan's support, as well as securing the hegemony over the other sects for the Sa-skya-pa. Thus between the feudal Mongol prince Godan and the Pandita, a superior of one of the many religious sects in Central Tibet, a special type of relationship was formed, defined in Tibetan as MCHOD (-gnas dang) YON (-bdag) or relationship between 'the priest and the patron'. According to G.N. Roerich (OP. CIT., p.338), it was understood as: 'to accept the head of a suzerain state as disciple and alms-giver of a theocratic ruler ...
underline the supremacy of a chaplain over his patron'. However, since neither party entering into this relationship represented the supreme power in his country, the MCHOD-YON relationship between the Sa-skya pandita and prince Godan did not necessarily determine the character of Tibeto-Mongol relations. Moreover, the arrangement between Godan and Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan was a purely private one, predominantly cultural and religious in character, though it must be admitted that in the case of the Pandita it had some repercussions in the political sphere.

While Godan and the Sa-skya pandita cemented their new alliance, the Mongols continued their conquest of China. After overrunning the Tangut kingdom of Hsi Hsia, the Mongols liquidated, in 1234, the Chin Empire of the Jürjeds. Having thus cleared the way to the south, they started their conquest of Southern Sung in 1235. The campaigns against the Sung were long-drawn out and went on for several decades; not until 1279 did Jenghiz Khan's grandson, Kublai Khan (1260-1294) complete the annexation of South China.

With the reign of Kublai Khan Tibeto-Mongol relations entered a new phase. Already in 1253, when Kublai was still commanding Mongol troops in Ho-nan 河南, he had sent an invitation to the celebrated lama 'Phags-pa (1235-1280) who after the death of his uncle the Sa-skya pandita (in Mongolia in 1251) had continued to stay at Godan's court. On his arrival in China, 'Phags-pa was made Kublai's 'Spiritual Tutor' (BLA-MCHOD in Tibetan), and when Kublai was proclaimed khagan in the kurultai at Karakorum (in 1260), he nominated 'Phags-pa his 'State Preceptor' (kuo-shih 国師) and made Lamaism the official religion of the whole eastern part of
the Mongol world empire.

After the transference, in 1263, of the imperial residence from Karakorum to Peking (called Khan-baliq in Mongolian and Ta-tu 大都 in Chinese), 'Phags-pa returned to Tibet for a while to take up his duties as a head of the Sa-skya-pa sect. However, in 1268 he received another invitation from Kublai Khan to come to his court to finish the work of creating a new, so-called 'quadratic' Mongol script, based on the Tibetan alphabet. This time 'Phags-pa spent another eight years in China, where honours were lavished upon him and he was treated as the recognized head of the state religion - Lamaism. When he returned to Tibet, in 1276, he was given the title of 'King of the Great and Precious Law' - TA PAO FA WANG 大贊法王 - which was associated with the exercise of the highest spiritual power in the country. This privilege remained thence-forward in the hands of the Sa-skya-pa priests for almost the whole period of Mongol rule. Thus the Sa-skya-pa sect was given priority over all other sects and its superiors automatically became the spiritual leaders of Tibet. Through them Tibet also came more and more under the direction of the Khan-baliq court. An officer called DPON-CHEN or 'great minister', nominated and regularly recalled by the Mongol central government, was entrusted with the administration of civil and military affairs in Tibet. The first DPON-CHEN appointed was Sakyabzang-po (around 1276).

Thanks to these measures Tibet became a vassal of the Mongol Empire. In the Mongol strategy of world conquest a special place had been reserved for Tibet, not so much on account of its presumed military and economic importance,
but rather because of the political and ideological role its religion could play. Kublai Khan adopted Lamaism and strongly supported it, since it provided an efficient ideological weapon to maintain and intensify his rule over China and other conquered nations. Claims that Chinese sovereignty over Tibet dates from this period, or that Tibet became a part of China's territory at this time, are clearly unfounded when viewed in the light of the historical facts as given above. The Mongols were conquering Tibet in the first place for themselves and certainly not for the future benefit of any Han-Chinese Empire! It should be also remembered that the Mongols had already effectively controlled Tibet through the Sa-skya-pa sect and their regularly appointed Dpon-Chens (at least from 1276, if not earlier), while South China was still under the rule of the Southern Sung dynasty, from the Chinese point of view the only legitimate power in the country (Sung emperors Tuan-tsung, 1276-1278, and Ti Ping, 1278-1279).

Kublai's victory in 1279 marked the end of independent China. For the next eighty-nine years the power in that country passed to the Mongol Yuan dynasty and China became a part of Kublai's Empire, which also comprised at one time or another Tibet and the whole of Mongolia, parts of Korea and Siberia (from the Amur estuary to the Irtych), and portions of Annam and Upper Burma.

Tibet, now called either T'u-fan or Hsi-fan, was during the period of the Mongol or Yuan dynasty ruled through the 'Ministry for the Spread of Government' - Hsüan-Cheng-Yüan 宣政院. This Ministry, which controlled both the Buddhist religion and Tibetan affairs, was created in 1288
by reorganising a similar older institution called **Tsung-Chih-Yüan** (founded in 1264). At its head was the State Preceptor (**Kuo-Shih**) who as a rule was a high Lamaist dignitary, and one of its duties was to select and recommend officers suitable for the post of **Dpon-Chen**, i.e. to function as local administrators in Tibet for the Ministry. Directly responsible to the Ministry were also the four garrison-officers, all laymen, two of whom were stationed in Western Tibet and two in Central Tibet.

No major changes in the area under the political jurisdiction of Tibet or T'u-fan occurred during the Yüan period. As before, Tibet as a politico-geographical concept corresponded roughly with ethnic Tibet, i.e. that all territory southwest of the Yüan Empire inhabited by non-Han population continued to be designated as T'u-fan or Hsi-fan. In the east and southeast T'u-fan (Hsi-fan) bordered on the Yüan provinces of Kan-su, Shen-hsi (boundary not delimited), Szu-ch'uan and Yün-nan.

As far as Tibet's internal affairs are concerned, the excessive favour which the Yüan emperors conferred upon the Sa-skya-pa sect soon proved disastrous. The great concentration of wealth and secular power in the hands of this privileged sect damaged considerably the morals and that good reputation of its members for which it had once been celebrated. In the mid-fourteenth century, as the supremacy of the Sa-skya monastery deteriorated, dissidents gathered around the 'Bri-gung monastery (some sixty miles northeast of Lhasa) which was the centre of a sect bearing the same name ('Bri-gung pa, the branch of an older sect Bka'-rgyud-pa, founded in the mid-twelfth century). This sect was especially
persecuted by Sa-skya-pa, and hence was the most antagonistic to Sa-skya-pa domination. In its opposition to the ruling sect it was soon joined by secular feudal lords, amongst whom was Byang-chub-rgyal-mtshan of the Phag-mo-gru family in southeastern Tibet. 'Bri-gung soon became a bastion of increasing agitation not only against Sa-skya-pa but also against Mongol rule.

With the decline of the Mongols in China, the power of their protégé in Tibet, the Sa-skya-pa sect, also came to an end, in 1359. By that time the Phag-mo-gru family had attained power in Central Tibet (1359?-1436) and the spiritual primacy was temporarily vested in the 'Bri-gung-pa sect. Thus after several centuries of political disunity and almost one hundred years of Sa-skya-pa theocracy, at least the central part of the country was again united under the sway of secular rulers.

The Yuan period on the whole marked the first turning point in Tibet's political status. This country, which up to the mid-thirteenth century was in all practical respects fully independent of its more powerful neighbours, came with the ascendancy of the Mongol khagans, later on Yuan emperors, more and more into the orbit of the Mongol government based on Peking. However, the administrative structure of Tibet's vassalage to the Mongol rulers is not yet well enough known for definite conclusions to be reached about its character. Tibetan dependence of a sort on the central government in Peking, seems, however, to be confirmed by the following circumstances: (a) the establishment of the HSÜAN-CHENG-YÜAN institution to govern the administration of Tibet; (b) the assignment of DPON-CHENS to Tibet by the Mongol government
in Peking; (c) the close collaboration of the Mongol ruling house with the Sa-skya-pa hierachs; (d) the frequent and prolonged visits of Tibetan supreme Lamaist dignitaries in Peking; (e) the official favour and support of Lamaism as the state religion of Mongol Empire in China and the surrounding countries. If Tibet is today commonly considered as traditionally an administrative part of China, then this tradition certainly dates back to the Mongol period, and the Mongols are first (chronologically) to whom the credit for this should go. The following generations in China only continued the work they had begun, developing it with a lesser or greater degree of success.
AN INTERLUDE OF SELF-RULE
(The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644)

As the Yuan dynasty declined in China, nationalist risings on the part of the Chinese people aimed at throwing off Mongolian rule became increasingly frequent and widespread, culminating in 1368, when Chu Yuan-chang, a former Buddhist novice, drove out the Mongols and founded his own dynasty, the Ming. The Mongols were expelled from the whole country, and the Chinese Empire restored, roughly with the boundaries it possessed in Northern Sung times. The control over Tibet also passed nominally from the Mongol Yuan emperors to the Chinese Ming emperors, and the old practice of inviting leading Tibetan lamas to the Imperial court to renew their appointments and confer on them new titles, was preserved.

Tibet by this time was no longer called T'u-fan or Hsi-fan, but Wu-szu Tsang and this change of name alone tells us that Chinese knowledge of Tibet had become more detailed. According to traditional Tibetan geographical works, Tibet was divided into five parts: Mnga'-ris in the remotest west; A-mdo in the northeast (present Ch'ing-hai); Khams in the east, and Dbus (with Lhasa as its centre) and Gtsang (with Gāis-ka-rtse as its centre) in the middle. From the last two names, the Ming designation of Tibet was derived, viz. Wu-szu Tsang or 'Dbus
The new rulers of China maintained substantially the same policy with regard to Tibet as their Mongol predecessors, although in general Tibet aroused less interest in the Chinese court during the Ming than it had done during the previous dynasty. The office for Tibetan affairs in the capital discontinued its activities and the DPON-CHENS ceased to be nominated. On the other hand, however, the Ming appreciated the importance of official support for the religious sects in Tibet, a policy which had proved so successful from the time that it had been first adopted by the Mongols. Under the Ming emperors it was Karma-pa sect (founded in the twelfth century, with its seat at Mtshur-phug monastery west of Lhasa) which was singled out for special imperial favour and support. However, while the Karma-pa monks were by far the most frequent visitors to the Ming court, monks from the other sects were also invited to come on tribute embassies. These constant comings and goings were so frequent and involved so many people that they sometimes caused considerable embarrassment to local administrations. In 1569 an imperial decree had to be issued to reduce the tribute missions to every three years, to limit the numbers of their retinue, and to specify the routes to be followed. Thus, the Ming emperors, who were busy with grandiose architectural projects, largely unsuccessful attempts at the overseas expansion and the first contacts with European Christianity and trade, practiced rather a laissez-faire policy in regard to Tibet, which was after all remote and inaccessible as far as they were concerned. On the contrary, it was the Tibetans themselves who, through their various sects bringing tribute, vied in
getting temporal power and wealth through imperial patronage.

In keeping with its attitude of benign unconcern, the Ming court allowed events in Tibet itself to pursue their own course. The Phag-mo-gru family, since the fall of the Mongol administration the undisputed rulers of Central Tibet, declined towards the middle of the fifteenth century owing to internal dissension, and were replaced by the Rin-spungs family (1436-1565) based in Gtsang, who were supported by the spiritual authorities of the Karma-pa sect. The Rin-spungs family in turn was overthrown in 1565 by its own minister, who became the ancestor of the so-called Gtsang-pa kings (1565-1642) who also patronized the Karma-pa. However, the actual power of these 'royal' families mostly did not pass beyond the boundaries of Central (Dbus) and eventually Further Tibet (Gtsang). According to H.E. Richardson (TIBET AND ITS HISTORY, p. 38), the Ming dynasty exercised neither authority nor influence over these rulers, whence the author concludes that there are no grounds for claiming that Tibet was in any real sense tributary to China during the Ming period.

The struggle among the various Lamaist sects, artificially stirred up by the Mongols' preference of one sect to another, went on with an undiminished vigour. Against this background of profound moral decay and religious intolerance, much resembling Europe at the same period, emerged the celebrated monk Btsong-kha-pa (1357-1419) with his reform of Tibetan monasticism. The new sect he formed, the Dge-lugs-pa (sometimes called the Yellow Church because its members wore yellow hats to distinguish them from the older sects which wore red), stressed strict discipline, pure and undefiled
conduct and profound philosophical education. The Dge-lugs-pa was destined to assume in the following centuries the position of dominance once held by the Sa-skya-pa sect, both in the religious and the political sphere. After Btsong-kha-pa's death, the sect was controlled by two supreme spiritual authorities, viz. the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama (although both these titles, as well as the definition of their spiritual and secular powers, are of later date). This system of dual spiritual authority in the sect survived with only minor modifications until modern times.

In the early period of its existence (from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century) the Dhe-lugs-pa sect led a precarious existence, being dwarfed in numerical strength and political influence by the firmly entrenched red-cap sects. Its influence was limited almost exclusively to the religious sphere, and that mostly in Dbus. Though the Yung-lo Emperor of Ming (1403-1424) took an interest in the new sect and in the person of its founder, inviting him twice to Peking (in 1408 and 1413), the sect never won the Imperial court's full favour and support.

It was thanks to the patronage of various Mongol rulers that the sect owed its political rise. In the circumstances, when both Chinese emperors and Tibetan kings were lukewarm in their attitude to the Dge-lugs-pa (the Phag-mo-gru family, comparatively friendly to the sect, was then in decay, and the Gtsang-pa kings patronized the Karma-pa), Bsod-nams-rgya-mtsho (1543-1588), Btsong-kha-pa's fourth successor as one of the heads of the Yellow Church, entered into friendly collaboration with the Ordos Mongols whose khan Altan (1543-
1583) had sent to 'Bras-spungs monastery, the seat of the first Dalai Lamas, to invite him to visit the Ordos. On his arrival in 1578, Bsod-nams-rgya-mtsho converted the Mongol chieftain to the Dge-lugs-pa sect and in return Altan Khan awarded him the title of 'Dalai Lama Vajradhara' (VAJRADHARA is a Sanskrit word, meaning the Holder of the Thunder-Bolt; DALAI in Mongolian means 'ocean' and LAMA is Tibetan for 'priest'). This was the first time that an incarnation of this series came to bear the name of Dalai Lama and this title was granted posthumously to his two predecessors, so he is officially recognized as the 'Third Dalai Lama'. Thus in new circumstances and in a new form the former Tibetan-Mongol alliance, spiritual and secular, which had existed in the middle of the thirteenth century, was renewed. Relations between the 'Bras-spungs monastery and the house of Altan Khan grew even more intimate when the Fourth Dalai Lama, Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho (1589-1616), was born in the Altan family.

However, in spite of all prestige the Dge-lugs-pa won from the patronage of Altan Khan and his successors, its supreme lamas did not yet become the sovereigns of Tibet, ruling from Lhasa. This happened only with the ascension of the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho (1617-1682), called popularly the 'Great Fifth' (LNGA-PA CHEN-PO) by the Tibetans. He asked in 1642 the aid of Gusri Khan (1636?-1656), the ruler of the Qosot Mongols in A-mdo, to defeat the Gtsang-pa kings, and break the power of the Karma-pa sect. Following a successful coup d'etat in 1642, the Fifth Dalai Lama became an unchallenged head, both spiritual and secular, in Dbus and Gtsang, the spiritual power being shared with him only by the Panchen Lama (abbreviation of
Pandita Chen-po or 'Great Scholar'), controlling over Further Tibet from his monastery Bkra-sis-lhun-po near Gzis-ka-rtse. For the services he had rendered, the hereditary title of 'King of Tibet' was conferred upon Gušri Khan's posterity and a part of Qosot army was stationed permanently in the vicinity of the Gnam-mtsho (Tengri-nor) lake north of Lhasa. The Ming emperors, whose days by that time in China were already numbered, viewed with apparent unconcern these developments in Tibet.

On the whole we may say that the Ming emperors have never exercised any direct political control over Tibet and were content to maintain the traditional 'tribute' relations, almost entirely of a religious character. If that position which the central government enjoyed in Tibet under the Yuan dynasty had been achieved by Chinese rather than Mongols, it would be then appropriate to designate the Ming policy towards Tibet as a conscious retreat from gained positions. For the Mongols, carefully watching every new development in the territory of their former vassal, the lack of concern shown by the Ming court towards Tibet was a signal to suggest that it might be possible for them to fill once more the political vacuum in that country.
In the Ch'ing period a one-thousand year old tradition of Sino-Tibetan relations underwent several radical changes. It was in this period that developments took place on the basis of which Tibet came to be considered an organic part of China, both practically and theoretically subject to the Chinese central government.

In view of the comparative length and complexity of historical developments in this period, as well as the importance of individual facts and events for the definite formation of the character of the modern relationship between China and Tibet, the Ch'ing period may be conveniently divided into five subdivisions, each of them constituting an independent chapter in the modern political history of Tibet.

A. Before 1717

The Manchus, remote descendants of the Jürjeds, had harassed the Ming through the greater part of the sixteenth century and began to conquer China proper after the transference of their capital from the banks of Sung-hua-chiang (Sungari River) to Mukden in 1636. In that year also the name of their dynasty, Chin ('Golden'; 1616-1636), was changed to
Ch'ing ('Pure') and all territory east of the Liaoa River was taken from the Chinese. The capture of Peking from the Ming, which followed shortly after (in 1644), was made possible partly because of Li Tzu-ch'eng's anti-Ming rebellion in China, and partly because of the favourable attitude of the Ming general Wu San-kuei, who was stationed on the Great Wall at Shan-hai-kuan and sought Manchu help against Li Tzu-ch'eng's rebels. Once in Peking, the Manchus refused to leave, and established their own dynasty on the Chinese throne. The last Ming pretender was eliminated in 1661, but the conquest of China was not completed until an anti-Manchu revolt in the southern and southwestern provinces (1674-1681) had been put down.

Two years before the Manchu occupation of Peking, the Mongols assisted the Fifth Dalai Lama of Lhasa to effect the coup d'état which overthrew the Gtsang-pa dynasty and its protégé, the Karma-pa sect. Henceforth the Dalai Lama and his Dge-lugs-pa sect were firmly in control of Tibetan affairs. Quick to appraise the turning political tide in China, the Fifth Dalai Lama, an able and far-sighted politician, established relations with the rising Manchu power. In the traditional context of Tibetan foreign policy his decision represented nothing unusual - the Dalai Lama in new circumstances merely continued the older policy of bolstering up the leading domestic hierarchy with a foreign secular power (cf. the Sa-skya-pa - Yuan alliance or the Karma-pa - Ming partnership). However, we must not be misled by this protector-protégé relationship into thinking that the lamas in Tibet were the sole beneficiaries of this bargain. Perhaps the Manchus themselves had an equal, if not greater,
interest in maintaining a Manchu-Tibetan alliance. For them the Tibetan people, with their religious role, represented a powerful ideological weapon to prevent the martial qualities of their rivals, the Mongols, from reviving.

Even before the Manchus had conquered China, the Ch'ing Emperors had established relations with the Dalai Lama. As early as 1640 an invitation was sent to the Dalai Lama and the temporal king of Tibet to come to visit the Emperor T'ai-tsung 太宗 (1627-1643), in response to which a mission from Tibet arrived at Mukden, then the Manchu capital, in 1642, bearing letters and presents.

A new invitation, this time to visit the Shun-chih 順治 Emperor (1644-1661) in Peking, was sent to both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in 1648. The Panchen Lama, owing to his great age (the Fourth Panchen Lama Blo-bzang-chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, lived 1569-1662), had to decline, but the Dalai Lama accepted the invitation and came to Peking in the Autumn of 1652 to visit the new Manchu monarch. After his arrival he was lodged in the Hsi-huang 西黃 monastery built specially for this occasion north of the city. During his nearly six-month stay in the capital, where he was warmly received and treated with great respect and courtesy, the Dalai Lama was granted by the Emperor two special audiences, and before he left for Tibet (in spring 1653) he was proclaimed Dalai Lama by imperial edict. There are as yet no proofs of any official negotiations conducted between the two parties which defined the character of the relationship between Tibet and the Manchu rulers of China at this time. W.W. Rockhill, the noted American diplomat and scholar, giving an account of this visit, based primarily on
Chinese sources, says ("The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644-1908", p.18):-

"He (i.e. the Fifth Dalai Lama) had been treated with all the ceremony which could have been accorded to any independent sovereign, and nothing can be found in Chinese works to indicate that he was looked upon in any other light; at this period of China's relations with Tibet, the temporal power of the Lama, backed by the arms of Gushi Khan and the devotion of all Mongolia, was not a thing for the Emperor of China to question."

Although the first official contact between the supreme heads of Manchu China and Tibet had been established, this in fact had only a relatively minor effect on relations between the two in practice. Judging from subsequent developments in Tibet, it would rather appear that anti-Manchu tendencies became stronger for a time. Military power in Tibet remained even now in the hands of the Mongol 'kings', descendents of Gušri Khan, whereas the Dalai Lama's secular power was shared with him by the 'regent' (SDE-SRID, a newly established office under the Fifth Dalai Lama), Sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho (1679-1705), whose attitude towards the second Manchu ruler of China, the Emperor K'ang-hsi (1662-1722), was openly hostile. This was shown clearly by the fact that the regent sided with the opposition to the Manchus in China led by their former ally, General Wu San-kuei; it was also suggested by his actions in hiding from the Manchu court for fourteen years the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama in 1682. His ambiguous attitude was revealed especially when he refused in 1689 to support the Emperor in
his struggle against the leader of the Oirat Dzungars, Galdan, who aspired to reunite the Mongols and establish a new Mongol Empire.

The military commander of Tibet, the Mongol Lha-bzang Khan, Gušri Khan's fifth successor as the 'king of Tibet' (1697-1717), rendered great services to the Emperor K'ang-hsi by killing the regent Sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho, the absolute ruler of Tibet during the minority of the Sixth Dalai Lama Tshangs-dbyangs-rgya-mtsho (1683-1706). He then deposed the Sixth Dalai Lama (presumably for misconduct - love-songs written by this Dalai Lama still survive) and proclaimed himself regent, setting up as Dalai Lama a candidate of his own choice, the puppet Ye-šes-rgya-mtsho (1707-1717). The deposed Dalai Lama died soon after on his way to Peking where he was escorted by the Mongols.

The interference of Lha-bzang Khan was immediately resented in all Central Tibet as well as in neighbouring A-mdo, and complaints reached Peking denouncing the regent's arbitrary conduct. The Emperor sent in 1708 a commission under the Manchu La-tu-hun 拉都浑 to Lhasa to investigate the situation. In his report of Lha-bzang Khan's activities in Tibet it was suggested (quoted according to W.W. Rockhill's translation, see OP. CIT., p. 37):-

"... considering that the Princes of the Koko-nor are dissatisfied with Latsang and his management of affairs in Tibet, the latter should not be left to manage them alone and an official should be sent to Lhasa to assist him."

La-tu-hun's recommendation was promptly realised. In the following year (1709), the Emperor despatched the first
Manchu commissioner, the vice-minister (SHIH-LANG 侍郎) Ho-shou 赫壽, to Lhasa 'to assist [LHA-BZANG KHAN] in managing Tibetan affairs' (HSIEH LI TSANG WU 協理藏務). The CH'ING-SHIH-KAO 清史稿 reports this appointment with the comment: SHIH WEI HSI-TSANG SHE KUAN PAN SHIH CHIH SHIH 是為西藏設官辦事之始 'this marks the beginning of setting up in Tibet of an office to manage (Tibetan) affairs' (see vol. 530, FAN-PU 潘部 VIII, fol. 5b).

Although the chief goal of Ho-shou's mission to Lhasa (1709-1711) was primarily to strengthen Lha-bzang Khan's somewhat unstable position and force through the acceptance of Ye-ses-rgya-mtsho as the new Dalai Lama, and although the establishment of a permanent Resident in Lhasa did not yet take place, this mission should be considered as the first successful attempt of the Manchu court at direct intervention in Tibetan affairs, rendered possible, however, by Lha-bzang Khan's pro-Manchu policy.

However, Lha-bzang Khan's real position in Tibet was already so weak that the Emperor's support, rather moral than actual, could not save him. In 1714 his opponents, the Koko-nor Mongols and the lamas from the 'Three Seats of Learning', viz. 'Bras-spungs, Dga'-ldan and Se-ra, and the Bkra-sis-lhun-po monastery turned to Tshe-dbang-rab-btsan 伊犁 district of northwest Chinese Turkestan, for help. Although the chief of the Dzungars was related to Lha-bzang Khan, he seized this opportunity. A Dzungar army, composed of about six thousand men, crossed the vast uninhabited land of north Tibet, be-
siegèd Lhasa for ten days, finally capturing it by the end of November, 1717. Lha-bzang Khan who, with a handful of his soldiers had taken refuge in the Dalai Lama's palace, the Potala, was killed and his puppet Dalai Lama deposed. Thus the Mongol dynasty of 'Kings of Tibet' (1642-1717) was overthrown and the Dsungars for a while gained control over the country.

B. From 1717 to 1750

The coup d'état by the Dsungars in Lhasa to which the pro-Manchu régime of the Mongol Lha-bzang Khan fell victim, was the first time the strength of the Ch'ing - Dge-lugs-pa partnership was put to the test. The Dsungars had already gained great power in Central Asia, and the addition of Tibet to their domain threatened to make them strong enough to found a new Mongol Empire which could challenge the Manchus and invade China. Consequently two successive punitive expeditions were despatched from China to restore order in Lhasa.

The first expedition (spring 1718 - autumn 1719), insufficiently equipped and largely without support from the hinterland, was trapped by the Dsungars in the Tibetan highlands near the town of Nag-chu-kha, and badly defeated. The second expedition (in 1720), consisting of two armies - one from Szu-ch'uan and the other from Ch'ing-hai - numbering some ten thousand men in all, was more successful. Lhasa was captured, the Dsungars driven out and order quickly restored. This was the first time in Tibetan history that an army from China had ever entered Lhasa. The presence of this army made it possible to introduce reforms favourable
to the Manchus in the civil and military administration of Tibet.

First of all, a provisional military junta was established for the period 1720-1721, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the second expeditionary force, the Manchu general Yen-hsin. All instigators of the Dsungar invasion as well as all those who openly collaborated with the Dsungars during the period 1717-1720 were arrested and executed publicly. Furthermore, a new Dalai Lama was enthroned in the Potala palace: this was Skal-bzang-rgya-mtsho (1720-1757) who had been born in the Eastern Tibetan town of Li-thang in 1708, and had been recognized as the legitimate successor of the Sixth Dalai Lama (died in 1706) by refugees fleeing from Lha-bzang Khan's régime in Lhasa in the same year. The puppet Dalai Lama Ye-ses-rgya-mtsho chosen by Lha-bzang Khan was later executed.

After these initial measures of stabilization, further administrative reforms were undertaken: the office of SDE-SRID (regent) was abolished and replaced by a four-man Ministerial Council (BKA'-GŠAGS) headed by the First Minister Bsod-nams-rgyal-po, called Kang-chen-nas or 'Of Kang-chen' (in Further Tibet), who had held a somewhat similar post already under Lha-bzang Khan's régime. This Ministerial Council functioned under the supreme supervision of the Manchu commandant of the imperial troops in Lhasa. At the same time, the higher posts in local administration were filled, for the most part by supporters of the former régime of Lha-bzang Khan and members of the anti-Dsungar faction. To secure the orderly functioning of the new authorities after the Manchu punitive armies returned to China, a strong
garrison was left behind in Lhasa, consisting of about three thousand men—Manchu, Mongol and Chinese—and smaller units were also stationed along the Szu-ch'uan—Tibet road (from Ta-chien-lu, via 'Ba'-thang and Chab-mdo to Lhasa).

The Tibetan policy of the next Manchu Emperor, Yung-cheng, though inconsistent, brought many important changes in Sino-Tibetan relations. The financial difficulty of maintaining numerous government troops in so remote an area as Tibet led the Emperor to order the withdrawal of the imperial troops from Tibet in the first year of his reign (in 1723). It also proved expensive and inefficient to attempt to control Eastern Tibet by maintaining Manchu-Chinese civil magistrates as had been done sporadically after 1720. For this reason in 1725 it was decided to replace the cumbersome and unwieldy direct control of the border zone by a sensible and flexible form of protectorate (see L. Petech, CHINA AND TIBET IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY, p. 90).

In this connection also a new boundary was drawn between Szu-ch'uan and Tibet (in 1727), formed by the Ning-ching-shan range dividing the waters of the Chin-sha River (the headwaters of the Yangtze) from those of the Lan-ts'ang River (Mekong). According to this settlement, the territory east of Ning-ching-shan was to be incorporated in China proper, but the administration was to be carried on by the local chieftains (T'U-SZU) under the nominal supervision of the Szu-ch'uan provincial authorities, whereas all the territory westwards was to be administered by the Lhasa government.
Thus the territory of Tibet, handed down almost unaltered through the previous centuries, underwent for the first time a drastic reduction in area. If we add the territory of A-mdo (Ch'ing-hai), separated from Tibet in 1724, then the original size of Tibet as a politico-geographical unit has been reduced almost by half. From now on also Tibet began to be called in Chinese either Wei Tsang (new Chinese transcription of the Tibetan geographical names Dbus and Gtsang; see above p. 27) or Hsi-tsang ('Gtsang on the West'). It was now divided into the following parts: Mngal-ris (A-li in Chinese) in the west; Gtsang (Hou Tsang, or 'Further Gtsang', sometimes only Tsang, with Gzis-ka-rtse as its centre) and Dbus (Ch'ien Tsang, or 'Nearer Gtsang', sometimes only Wei, with Lhasa as its centre) in the middle; and Khams (K'a-mu or K'ang in Chinese) in the east.

During the period of Yung-cheng's policy of retrenchment in Tibet proper (1723-1727), the dissensions between the pro-Manchu members of the Ministerial Council (Khang-chen-nas and Bsod-nams-stobs-rgyas, called Pho-lha-nas or 'Of Pho-lha' - near the town of Rgyal-rtse in Southern Tibet) and their nationalist adversaries (the father of the Seventh Dalai Lama and the remaining two ministers of the BKA'-GSGS) increased to such an extent that civil war broke out which cost the First Minister Khang-chen-nas his life in 1727. Before open hostilities developed, two imperial envoys, Seng-ke and Ma-la, were despatched to Lhasa to arbitrate between the two factions; however, all their efforts were in vain. The civil war in Tibet dragged on for two years (1727-1728) and brought victory to Pho-lha-nas who won both support of the majority of the Tibetan population
and the trust of the Emperor who lent him military aid.

It was only after these events that the Manchu government came to realize how detrimental to their position in the west had been the previous withdrawal of their troops from Tibet. Consequently a new army - perhaps fifteen thousand men in all - was sent to Tibet under a Manchu general Ch'a-lang-a, and new reforms were put into practice affecting the whole country. The Dalai Lama, around whom the nationalist elements centered, was exiled to Eastern Tibet; temporal power in Lhasa was turned over to Po-lhanas, a Manchu ally, who was promoted to the rank of BEISE (PEI-TZU 貝子 in Chinese; the 4th class of the princes of the ruling house). Supreme control over the local administration was placed in the hands of General Ch'a-lang-a, commander of the expeditionary force, and after the latter's departure (by the autumn of 1728) in those of envoy Seng-ke and his new assistant Mai-lu. 

In the persons of Seng-ke and Mai-lu was established in 1728 (for the first time) the institution of Imperial Resident and Vice-Resident in Lhasa (called AMBAN in Manchu, and CHU TSANG PAN SHIH TA CH'EN 駐藏辦事大臣 and CHU TSANG PANG PAN TA CH'EN 駐藏帮辦大臣 respectively in Chinese). They were supported by a garrison of two thousand men stationed permanently in the capital. The establishment of the Ambanate - a distinctive agency in Tibet of the Manchu central government - may not yet be identified with the introduction of Manchu-Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in any form. The powers of the Tibetan local administration remained, even after 1728, basically unaffected by these measures, though we have to admit that
the presence in the seat of government of two Ambans (who were traditionally Manchus or Mongols, not Chinese), and especially of the strong garrison they commanded, must have had a certain influence on the final decisions of Tibetan authorities. But in general at this stage, the Ambans were, in fact, 'little more than observers with the duty of reporting to Peking on events in Lhasa' (see H.E. Richardson, TIBET AND ITS HISTORY, p.52).

Soon after these major changes were introduced, the country returned to its normal life. Pho-lha-nas thanks to his firm pro-Manchu attitude during the years of the Dzungar occupation of Tibet and especially during the civil war, enjoyed now the great confidence of the Ch'ing Emperor and his representatives in Lhasa. His political reliability combined with his undisputed diplomatic capabilities enabled him to become the DE FACTO ruler of the country, the position of the two Imperial Residents being gradually reduced to purely formal and mostly ceremonial functions. In 1733 he succeeded in getting three-fourths of the Chinese troops in Lhasa withdrawn, leaving a garrison of only about five hundred men. Pho-lha-nas' able administration was duly appreciated even by the new Manchu Emperor, Ch'ien-lung 乾隆 (1736-1795), who promoted him in 1749, by an extraordinary decree, to the rank of the CHUN-WANG or the prince of the 2nd class, a privilege hitherto reserved exclusively for members of the Manchu ruling family.

The history of Tibet remained comparatively uneventful until 1747, when Pho-lha-nas died. His son and successor as 'king of Tibet' (MI-DBANG in Tibetan, TSANG-WANG in Chinese), 'Gyur-med-rnam-rgyal (1747-1750), maintained
ostensibly good relations with the Ambans, Fu-ch'ing 傅 清 and La-pu-tun 拉布敦; however, in fact he sought secretly an alliance with the Dsungars against the Manchus. In 1747 he gave such a striking account of the stability of his régime in Tibet that he managed to persuade the Manchu government to reduce the number of imperial troops in Lhasa from five hundred to one hundred. But no sooner had this been done than a new anti-Manchu uprising was provoked. During the troubles, 'Gyur-med-rnam-rgyal was decoyed into the Ambans' Residence and murdered. His death, however, was soon revenged, and the dead king's followers killed the Residents and slaughtered a half of their guards. As before, the Emperor sent a punitive expedition of eight hundred men from China to take charge of Lhasa; a new Amban was appointed and Tibet came once more under Chinese control.

C. From 1750 - 1793

Under the Ch'ien-lung Emperor the Ch'ing empire reached its greatest extent. To the dependencies acquired under his predecessors were further added Dsungaria (in 1757) and Kashgaria (in 1760), both in the westernmost part of Chinese Turkestan.

In Tibet the Ch'ien-lung era was marked by stricter measures of control which, in extent and efficiency, can only be compared to those taken two centuries later by the government of the Chinese People's Republic (in 1951 and 1959). It was as a result of the Manchu government's reforms in the Tibetan administration at this period that Tibet lost its virtually independent sovereignty, as exercised by the
Dalai Lama and the 'king' respectively, and became a dependency of Manchu China.

The main administrative changes following the events of 1750 can be summarized as follows:

(1) The institution of a hereditary 'kingship' in Tibet, i.e. the office of the CHÜN-WANG (vulgo TSANG-WANG or 'King of Tibet') was abolished, and similarly titles such as KHAN, WANG, BEISE, etc. were no longer conferred on the high dignitaries of the country.

(2) The Dalai Lama was made nominal head, spiritual and temporal, of Tibet, and the Ministerial Council, the chief executive organ in the country, was subordinated to him.

(3) The former system of a four-member Ministerial Council which obtained during the period from 1721 to 1727 was restored. The BKA'-GŚAGS had henceforward to consist of four ministers (BKA'-BLON), of whom three were secular and one a monk.

(4) The powers of the Ambans were enlarged. Apart from commanding the Chinese garrison of Lhasa (which was brought up to 1,500 troops) and being responsible for the mail service between Ch'eng-tu and Lhasa, they were given a 'limited right to take part in the government of the country' (see W.W. Rockhill, op.cit., p.46) - mostly as advisors to the BKA'-GŚAGS. This provided them with the opportunity to influence the day to day policy of the Tibetan government.
The abovementioned measures were later supplemented, after the death of the Seventh Dalai Lama (in 1757), by the creation of the office of Regent (RGYAL-TSHAB), now no longer a 'king' but a Tibetan lama, who regularly carried out the Dalai Lama's religious functions during the latter's minority.

This reorganisation of Tibetan local administration remained basically unchanged until the Tibeto-Gurkha war in 1788-1792, which made the Manchu position in Tibet even stronger.

In 1788 the warlike Gurkhas south of the Himalayas invaded Tibet under the pretext that the Tibetans were conducting the export of goods from Tibet in a fraudulent manner, and levying taxes on Gurkha merchandise. The Tibetans were quickly defeated, and were forced to promise to pay the Gurkha government a huge sum of money annually. Provoked by the Tibetans' failure to pay the promised amount, the Gurkhas attacked Tibet once more in 1791, sacking Bkra-sis-lhun-po and occupying the whole of western Gtsang. The Chinese Emperor then sent a strong army of over ten thousand men, under General Fu K'ang-an 福康安, which defeated the Gurkhas and drove them to the very neighbourhood of Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal.

A thorough political reform in Tibet was decreed by the Emperor at the conclusion of the campaign (in 1792-1793). Their chief aim was to create in Tibet a situation which would preclude an occurrence of any unwanted change of internal conditions in the future, and at the same time protect the country against any foreign intervention. These goals could only be achieved by placing all responsibility for the military, political, economic and administrative
control over Tibet upon the Chinese central government acting through the Ambans as its intermediaries.

The measures taken, on the recommendation of General Fu K'ang-an, were as follows:

1. The Imperial Residents (Ambans) were empowered to take part in the administration of Tibet, conferring with the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama on all matters affecting Tibet, on a perfect footing of equality.

2. All Tibetan lay and clerical officials were to submit all questions of importance to the Ambans' decision, including high appointment, judicial, financial and other matters.

3. The Ambans were made responsible for the frontier defences, the efficiency of the native levies, the administration of the finances, and took control of all foreign intercourse and trade.

4. The Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama were deprived of their right 'to memorialize the Throne' (TSOU 奏), and were authorised only 'to report [to the Ambans] and ask their orders' (PIN-MING 筹命).

It may well appear to students of Sino-Tibetan relations that only since 1793 are we entitled to use more or less freely the expression 'Chinese (or rather Manchu-Chinese) sovereignty over Tibet'—on condition, however, that the phrase be understood rather in a broad sense, and above all
in the context of the time and specific circumstances. Undoubtedly, the establishment of supreme Amban control over the local administration marked, in its practical consequences, the abolition of the last remnants of Tibetan autonomy, and was tantamount to the actual submission of the Tibetan local government in all vital spheres of its activity to the Chinese central government.

The general management of Tibetan affairs in Peking was entrusted to the LI-FAN-YÜAN 理藩院 or 'Ministry for Administering Dependencies'. This office, which was principally concerned with the administration of Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, was created in 1638 by reorganising a similar older institution called the MENG-KU YA-MEN 蒙古衙門 or 'The Mongol Office'. Among its duties with regard to Tibet were: (a) to supervise the regular payment of tribute; (b) to recommend the conferment of titles on local nobility, and to propose the amount of their income from the State treasury; (c) to arrange audiences with the Throne for various Tibetan envoys, both secular and ecclesiastic; and (d) to take care of smooth trade relations of Tibet with other dependencies as well as with China proper. Whereas the nomination of officers of the lower echelons in the Chinese administration in Dependencies rested with the LI-FAN-YÜAN, all major decisions both of military and administrative character (including appointments of Imperial Residents and Vice-Residents) were made by the CHÜN-CH'I-CH'U 軍機處 or 'The Supreme State Council' (established in 1729). Economically and from the point of view of transport and communications, the Ambans' office in Lhasa was administered, and financially supported, by the provincial authorities in neighbouring Szu-ch'uan.
The central management of Tibetan affairs thus set up remained basically unchanged till the end of Manchu dynasty in 1912.

D. From 1793 to 1890

In China the eighteenth century was one of successful expansion under the Emperors K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung; it was followed by the 'black' nineteenth century when China experienced both internal unrest and many humiliating defeats at the hands of Western nations. The corrupt and tottering Manchu régime lay prostrate before the onslaughts of imperialist expansion.

In contradistinction to the stormy events of the nineteenth century in China proper, and along the Chinese coast, the political development in Tibet was comparatively quiet and orderly. Evidently, the reforms of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor in 1792-93 had stabilized the political situation in Tibet so firmly that no disturbances in China proper could affect it. The supreme control over Tibetan local administration remained entirely in the hands of the Imperial Residents who from now on were changed at regular three-year intervals. The Chinese garrison in Lhasa continued to number 1,500 men much better trained and equipped than any Tibetan local militia. At the same time contacts with the neighbouring Szu-ch'uan province, the military and financial pivot of the Manchu power in Tibet, became fairly regular.

The only major incident in Sino-Tibetan relations during this period occurred in connection with the Na-rong (Chan-
tui 瞻對 in Chinese; present-day Hsin-lung 新龍) question. As already seen, from the time of the Emperor Yung-cheng, Eastern Tibet or Khams was divided into two parts separated by the Ning-ching-shan range (see above, p.41). The western part was placed under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa government and the Chinese Amban, whereas the eastern part, smaller in extent but more densely populated, became in 1727 a portion of the Szu-ch'uan province and was consequently also administered from Ch'eng-tu. Ña-rong with a predominantly Tibetan population, being situated on the Ya-lung River near Ta-chien-lu (present-day K'ang-t'ing 善定) formed a Tibetan enclave within the Chinese administered territory. In 1860 a quarrel broke out between the Ña-rong Tibetans and their neighbours, and communications between Szu-ch'uan and Tibet were temporarily cut off. China, being at that time preoccupied with her domestic problems (the T'ai-p'ing 太平 uprising and foreign intervention) was unable to settle this dispute. Eventually in 1863 the Lhasa government intervened, and Tibetan troops occupied Ña-rong which henceforth was placed under the regular administration of Lhasa. This new state of affairs, which soon afterwards became a source of constant friction between the local Chinese and Tibetans, continued until 1911 when the Ña-rong territory was re-annexed by the Chinese to Szu-ch'uan.

However, much more important for the further development of Sino-Tibetan relations and the history of Tibet itself than this and other similar incidents, was the appearance of Great Britain, which in the name of securing trade and defence of her Indian empire tried for the first time in Tibetan history to make a thrust into China's southwest
Following the first official and semi-official missions to Tibet of her subjects, G. Bogle (1774), S. Turner (1783), T. Manning (1811) and T. Moorcroft (1826-1838), Britain launched more systematic efforts to penetrate into the 'forbidden' and 'mysterious' land to the north of the Himalayas. First she had taken La-dwags from Tibet (1846), then followed the annexation of Southern Sikkim (1850) and Bhutan (1865), both countries traditionally in the Tibetan sphere of influence. By the final article of the Ch'e-fu Convention with China (1876), Britain had obtained the right to send a mission of exploration to Tibet 'by way of Peking through Kan-su and Koko-nor, or by way of Szech'uan'. Though this plan for various reasons was never realized, the Ch'e-fu Convention remains the first treaty concluded between China and a foreign power in which a mention was made of Tibet. The Convention between Great Britain and China 'relative to Burmah and Thibet', signed on 24th July 1886, was - as far as Tibet is concerned - mainly designed to promote and develop trade between India and Tibet.

The dispute over Sikkim (1888-1890) transferred Anglo-Tibetan relations for the first time to the field of an armed clash. As a result, Tibet lost its position in Sikkim, its traditional dependency, the Tibetans being driven out of the country and China being made to sign a treaty at Calcutta on 17th March 1890 which fixed the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet (article I) and recognized Britain's protectorate over Sikkim (article II).
The year 1890 brings to a close a long period in the history of Tibet. From this time on the economic, political and military isolation of the country from the outside world, created as a result of Ch'ien-lung's measures in 1792-93 and to some extent also by Tibet's geographical environment, was finally broken down and the 'hermit kingdom' was gradually dragged into the arena of international politics. This was inevitable in the epoch of the new territorial and economic division of the world, and the further investment of European capital in Asia. Tibet owing to its paramount strategic position on the dividing lines between three rival powers - China, British India and Tsarist Russia - could not long stay aloof, safe and secure.

E. From 1890 to 1912

The last phase in this outline of the history of Sino-Tibetan relations, though the shortest one in terms of chronology, is filled with events which had a far-reaching importance for the further political development of Tibet. Hardly any other period in the whole of Tibetan history witnessed such swift changes.

While the other outer ramparts of China's far-flung empire were being battered down one after another in the nineteenth century, the mainland itself being carved up into so-called 'spheres of interest', Tibet together with Outer Mongolia (the present-day Mongolian People's Republic) were the last of China's former dependencies to survive in union with the Empire, as they did till the time of the Hsin-hai
revolution in 1911. From the historical point of view, there are many similarities between the position of Tibet and that of Outer Mongolia in the framework of the Chinese Empire. Both countries were attached to China relatively recently (in the Ch'ing period) and both were similarly neglected by the Chinese central government. Nevertheless, it would seem that the Manchus showed more sympathy towards the Mongols than towards the Tibetans, conferring for example more privileges on the Mongol nobility and employing more Mongols in the central administration and in the army (even several Ambans in Lhasa were of the Mongol origin). Mongolia, in general, was nearer to the Manchus, geographically, ethnically, and culturally, than Tibet which in all these aspects was more remote, not to say alien. If nevertheless the Manchus, and later on the Republicans as well, were ready to wage a tough diplomatic and military struggle for Tibet - a struggle harder and more protracted than that for Mongolia - this was primarily for political and prestige reasons. For, to lose Tibet which had been finally taken over only after such a long period of manoeuvring, would mean for China not only 'to lose face' but, worse still, to open the back door to the penetration of Tibet and perhaps eventually China by undesirable foreign elements. It would also mean withdrawal from what was strategically one of the most important points on the whole Asian continent for China. However, at the same time, the strategic value of Tibet and its traditional influence in other Lamaist countries were similarly realised even in Britain and Rissia, two rival powers both interested in exploiting Tibet. Their diplomatic manoeuvres carried on in and around Tibet at that time complicated even further the whole problem of Sino-Tibetan relations and made its solution even more difficult.
The Anglo-Chinese Calcutta Convention of 1890 started the first round in the notorious diplomatic chess-game over Tibet. One important feature of this convention is the fact that though related exclusively to Tibet, without any direct Chinese interest being involved, it was concluded on the part of the Tibetans not by any Tibetan plenipotentiary, but only by the Representative of the Chinese central government in Lhasa, the Amban Sheng T'ai (1890-1892). This seems to prove, better than anything else, that China's sovereignty in Tibet was a commonly recognized and accepted reality, which nobody, not even Great Britain, was prepared to question.

Exactly the same procedure was followed in 1893 when the British and Chinese governments signed at Darjeeling a set of Regulations governing trade, communication, and pasturage. The main points of these Regulations were: an undertaking by China to establish a trade-mart at Gro-mo (better known under its Chinese name Ya-tung to be opened to all British subjects for purposes of trade (article I); all despatches from the Government of India to the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to be handed over by the Political Officer for Sikkim to the Chinese Frontier Officer (article VII); and the Tibetans grazing their cattle in Sikkim to be subject to British authority (article IX).

However, British attempts at economic and political penetration into Tibet still encountered several difficulties. These were basically of two kinds. First, when the time arrived to carry out the abovementioned treaties, it was found that the Tibetans, under the pretext that these treaties were not signed by them, refused to countenance the
delimitation of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier, mutilating and destroying boundary pillars already erected, and paralyzing all attempts to develop trade with Ya-tung. All British complaints about Tibetan obstructiveness met with an unfavourable response, letters from the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon (1898-1905), to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-thub-bstan-rgya-mtsho (1876-1933), being consistently returned unopened.

Secondly, it would seem that even the British government itself, during these years, was opposed to too hasty an advance into Tibet, and some of Curzon's proposals to open direct negotiations with the Dalai Lama and to establish a permanent British Representative at Lhasa seemed to the home government rather rash, at least for the moment. Undoubtedly, this cautious attitude was dictated to some extent by the then still prevailing view that it was only possible to deal with Lhasa through Peking.

However, the whole situation changed when the British government began to see a threat in Russian policy towards Tibet, which in these years entered a new and more active phase. For years, Tsarist Russia had been regarded by the British as the main threat to their interests on the Asian continent, particularly to the safety of the borders of India. It was with this in mind that their constant policy towards Russia in Asia was to prevent any direct contacts between the territories subject to the British rule and those subject to the Russian domination. One of the most effective means to achieve this goal was the creation of buffer states within which all unwanted foreign influence could be checked or neutralized before reaching British
territory itself. Britain had such plans, for example, with Afghanistan, and similarly with Tibet.

Russia was indeed far away from Tibet, but its prestige stood very high in that country. A Russian subject, a Buriat lama Agvan Dorjiev, who had come to Lhasa about 1880, had managed to establish himself as the unofficial representative of the Russian government. He was several times entrusted with secret missions from the Dalai Lama to the Tsar Nicholas (in 1898, 1900, and 1901), and rumors were also spread that Russia was considering establishing a consulate in the East-Tibetan town of Ta-chien-lu (in 1901). Another cause of apprehension on the part of British government developed in connection with the secret agreement alleged to exist between Russia and China (made in 1902?) by which the former would guarantee the integrity of China, while the latter in turn would transfer to Russia all her interests in Tibet. Though both Russia and China officially denied such rumors, the British fear of the establishment of Russian influence in Tibet was not wholly removed. Well-founded or not, these developments or fears led the British government to reconsider its policy toward Tibet and take more active measures.

A signal for a change in policy was given by Lord Curzon's long despatch to the Secretary of State for India dated 8th January 1903, in which, amongst other things, he proposed direct talks in Lhasa to discuss 'the entire question of our future relations commercial and otherwise, with Tibet' aimed at establishing a permanent consular or diplomatic representative in Lhasa. It was said that the British mission to Lhasa should be provided with an escort to defend it in case
of attack by the Tibetans (see e.g. A. Lamb, BRITAIN AND
CHINESE CENTRAL ASIA, p. 280 et seq.).

Subsequently events developed with a speed which might
perhaps have been anticipated. In the circumstances, when
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war (1903-1905) was
imminent, and when China was still recovering from the Boxer
rebellion and the intervention of the eight foreign powers
(in 1900), the British government agreed to Lord Curzon's
suggestions, and the latter ordered an armed force under
Colonel Younghusband to march into Tibet (1903-1904). The
Tibetans were able to offer no effective opposition to the
British expedition, and the British troops entered Lhasa
triumphantly on 3rd August 1904. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama
and his entourage fled to Urga, the chief town in Mongolia,
and the victorious British dictated terms. A treaty, known
as Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, was signed at
Lhasa on 7th September 1904 and constituted the first and
virtually the only international treaty instrument directly
negotiated and concluded with Tibet without China as an
intermediary (and in fact directed against China's interests
in Tibet).

By the treaty provisions the Tibetan government undertook
to open fresh trade marts at Rgyal-rtse (Gyantse) and Sgar-
'brog (Gartok), as well as at Ya-tung (article II); to levy
no dues of any kind on trade to and from India (article IV);
to pay as an indemnity to the British government for expenses
incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhasa a sum of
£500,000 in seventy-five annual instalments beginning from
the 1st January 1906 (article VI). The agreement also pro-
vided that 'the British Government shall continue to occupy
the Chumbi (Chu-'bi) Valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later' (article VII).

The political parts of the agreement were: (a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power; (b) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs; (c) no Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet; (d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government; (e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power (article IX; see e.g. C.A. Bell, TIBET PAST AND PRESENT, p. 286).

China, busy with foreign threats and domestic difficulties, was not in a position to halt the British, consequently also the Lhasa Convention made no pretense of respecting her sovereign rights in Tibet, and China in her relation with Tibet was regarded (for the first time) as a 'Foreign Power' to whom Article IX of the Convention would be applicable.

As with the Dzungar occupation of Tibet in 1717-1720 and the Gurkha invasion in 1788-1792, the foreign threat presented by the British intervention alarmed China, and the Manchu government began to pay more attention to develop-
ments in Tibet, where its power had already declined considerably. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who in 1904 fled to Mongolia on the approach of the British, and since 1906 resided in Sku-'bum (T'a-er-szu 塔爾寺) monastery near Ch'ing-hai Lake, was summoned to Peking (in autumn 1908) where he was received with great splendour. The Empress Dowager determined to confer on him a title of "The Sincerely Obedient, Reincarnation, Most Excellent, Self-Existent Buddha of the Western Heaven" and also an annual stipend was accorded him (see W.W. Rockhill, op.cit. pp.84-85). At the same time also the former Amban Yu T'ai 有泰 (1903-1906), a man much disliked by the Tibetans, was removed from office and replaced by an able administrator, Amban Lien Yu 聯豫 (1906-1912), with Wen Tsung-yao 温宗堯 as Vice-Amban (1908-1910; Wen Tsung-yao was the first Han-Chinese to hold this position). The whole range of the various hasty but comparatively minor improvements of Chinese administration in Tibet which followed were primarily designed to revive the decaying prestige of the Manchu court amongst the Tibetan population.

To the same goal was directed also the intense diplomatic activity of T'ang Shao-i 唐紹儀 and Chang Yin-t'ang 張蔭棠 who, first in Calcutta and then in Peking, tried to revise the Lhasa Convention, so that all its provisions detrimental to China's sovereign rights in Tibet could be finally annulled. The new treaty, a Convention between Great Britain and China, signed at Peking on 27th April 1906 and ratified at London in the same year, though confirming the Anglo-Tibetan treaty of 1904 EN BLOC (article I), nevertheless secured to the Chinese a provision that the preservation of Tibet's integrity and internal administration
should rest with China (article II) and that China, but no other Power, should have the rights to the concessions in Tibet which were mentioned in Article IX(d) of the Lhasa Convention (article III). To China this in fact meant Britain's admission of her sovereign rights in Tibet, and consequently China was also willing to undertake the payment of the entire war indemnity for Tibet as provided for in the Convention of 1904 (the last instalment was paid in January 1908).

The conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 in this form was largely a result of the need felt in Foreign Office circles in London to take into account the attitude of the Russian government towards the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan agreement. In fact, the need for a rapprochement between Russia and Great Britain, in view of the growing military might of Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany, tended to cancel out the earlier rivalry of these two powers, not only in Tibet, but also in other areas where their interests clashed - such as Persia and Afghanistan. With regard to Tibet, the Russian objection - even after the 1906 treaty between Britain and China - consisted in the fact that Great Britain had still preserved her favourable economic position in Tibet (chiefly as a result of her previous agreements of 1893 and 1904), whereas Russian influence in Tibet had been almost eliminated from the time of Younghusband's armed mission. Naturally, any concessions that Persia was ready to make to Britain in the questions of Persia and Afghanistan, necessitated that Britain in her turn should also make concessions in Tibet to compensate her ally. The complicated Anglo-Russian negotiations - which resulted in the so-called Anglo-Russian entente of 1907, in fact an
agreement on the questions of Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet - were intended (as far as Tibet was concerned) to reach a certain balance between the respective rights and obligations of the two powers.

The two contracting parties engaged: to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration (article I); 'In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty (sic) of China over Tibet...' not to enter into negotiations with the latter except through the intermediary of the Chinese government (article II); not to send representatives to Lhasa (article III); not to seek or obtain concessions for roads, mines, etc. in Tibet (article IV); and not to appropriate any part of the revenues of Tibet (article V).

The salient features of this agreement is that Chinese sovereignty in Tibet - fully respected by the British in 1890 and 1893, but defied by them in 1904 and again rehabilitated DE FACTO by the 1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention - was for the first time in an official international document replaced by the rather vague word 'suzerainty', so that for the absolute subordination of Tibet to China, as understood by 'sovereignty', was substituted the partial subjection of a vassal state towards its overlord, as understood by the term 'suzereignty'. However, this new designation of China's relationship to Tibet could not PER SE alter or modify the actual contents and character of Sino-Tibetan relations as understood by the Chinese and Tibetans themselves, for neither China nor Tibet was participating in Anglo-Russian negotiations, the results of which were therefore irrelevant to them, and which could certainly not be considered as binding
upon them.

The last international agreement on Tibet which the Imperial China concluded with a Foreign Power was the so-called Tibet Trade Regulations of 1908 renewable every ten years. This was also the first instrument which had been negotiated on a tripartite basis - between China, Great Britain, and Tibet (thus setting a precedent which was followed by the Simla Conference of 1913-1914). However, in 1908 the Tibetan 'fully authorized Representative' (not Plenipotentiary) was allowed only 'to act under the directions of Chang Tachen (i.e. Chang Yin-t'ang) and take part in the negotiations' (Preamble). The general result of these Regulations was a full restoration of China's effective rôle in Tibetan affairs.

Again, as in the case of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, the British government showed that with regard to Tibet they were prepared to adhere to earlier practice according to which any negotiation with Tibet could be carried on only through China: Thus China's position as sovereign power in Tibet, considerably damaged by the Lhasa Convention of 1904 (and in consequence of this perhaps designated as 'suzerain' in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907), was on the eve of the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty once again fully restored and recognized.

The increasing interest of the Chinese government in Tibet proper, an understandable reaction to the attempts at foreign intervention in that area, was also accompanied by renewed Chinese activity in Eastern Tibet, an unstable zone bordering on China's three inland provinces, Ch'ing-hai, Szechwan and Yun-nan. As soon as British troops had left
Central Tibet, the Chinese, determined to lose no time, proceeded to consolidate their positions in the Sino-Tibetan marches - a difficult operation in view of the disordered and delicate political situation in the area. This exacting task was entrusted to a capable administrator and soldier, the Manchu General Chao Er-feng (趙爾豐), who began, in 1905-1906, by introducing reforms which reinforced the Chinese position in that part of Eastern Tibet which had been under nominal Chinese control for two centuries as far as the Ning-ching-shan range, established as the boundary of Szu-ch'uan province in 1727. In this newly pacified territory he was appointed, in 1906, 'High Commissioner for Frontier Affairs' (PIEN-WU TA-CH'EN (邊務大臣) with his headquarters in 'Ba'-thang.

The second phase of Chao Er-feng's operations in Eastern Tibet commenced in 1908 and lasted till the first half of 1911 (between 1907-1908, during the absence of the Governor-General of Szu-ch'uan, Hsi Liang (錫良), he was appointed Acting Governor-General in Ch'eng-tu). During the years 1908-1911 Chao Er-feng extended his activities beyond the Ning-ching-shan range into the area formerly controlled by the Lhasa government. All this vast country over which the collapsing government in Lhasa obviously had no control - the Dalai Lama having left Tibet in 1904 - was now occupied by Chinese troops. The authority of the local chieftains (T'U-SZU) was taken away and handed over to regular Chinese officials (this kind of administrative reform is generally described by the phrase KAI-T'U KUEI-LIU (改土歸流). Many of the East-Tibetan towns received with their new magistrates also new, Chinese, names.
In 1910, Chao Er-feng's troops crossed the territory west of the Tan-ta 丹達 mountains and penetrated as far as Rgya-mda' (Chiang-ta 江達 in Chinese, the present-day T'ai-chao 太昭; about one hundred miles east of Lhasa). In his subsequent memorial to the Throne, Chao Er-feng requested that the demarcation line marking the Sino-Tibetan frontier should be advanced to Rgya-mda'.

In the spring of the following year (1911), when the pacification of all Eastern Tibet had been effected, Chao Er-feng was appointed Governor-General of Szu-ch'uan and his former assistant, General Fu Sung-mu 傅嵩煑, replaced him as PIEN-WU TA-CH'EN. In his new capacity, Fu Sung-mu made a proposal to create out of the territory which extends from Ta-chien-lu (K'ang-ting) in the east to Rgya-mda' in the west, and from Wei-hsi 維西 and Chung-tien 中甸 in the south to Hsi-ning 西寧 in the north, a new province called Hsi-k'ang 西康 or 'Khams on the West' (cf. the analogous Chinese name for Tibet proper, viz. Hsi-tsang or 'Gtsang on the West'; see above p.42). However, soon after this proposal was presented to the Emperor, the Chinese revolution broke out, which overthrew the Manchu dynasty, and Fu Sung-mu's proposal sank into oblivion and was not carried out (the later Hsi-k'ang province was officially proclaimed in 1939 and again abolished in 1955).

Let us review the political and administrative situation in Tibet on the eve of the Chinese revolution. - The Thirteenth Dalai Lama returned from a long exile in Mongolia and Peking in December 1909, only to see a Chinese army two thousand strong enter Lhasa on February 12th 1910. Finding his position untenable, the Dalai Lama together with several
other leading officials decided to escape to India, where he passed a second period of exile (February 1910 – January 1913). Having previously sought refuge with the Chinese from British intervention, he now sought refuge in the territory of his former enemies to avoid the Chinese army. When the Court in Peking received Amban Lien Yu's report on the Dalai Lama's flight to India, it issued orders cancelling his title and deposing him. The Lhasa government being thus deprived of their anti-Chinese elements (the Dalai Lama and his party), became virtually an obedient tool in the hands of the Amban and General Chung Yin 鍾穎, the commander of the new expeditionary force.

However, the situation in Tibet further deteriorated when the first news of the anti-Manchu revolution in China began to reach Lhasa. The Chinese garrison started to mutiny, Amban Lien Yu, who was a Manchu, was deposed and arrested by the soldiers, who chose their commander Chung Ying, a Chinese, to replace him as Amban. However, the long unpaid and demoralized troops soon subjected Lhasa to a reign of terror and this situation lasted almost a year, until the Tibetans managed to expel Chung Ying and his troops. The Dalai Lama seized the opportunity to return to Lhasa and issue a 'declaration of independence'. All Chinese troops and their officers were disarmed and packed off home via India. On the 6th January 1913, Chung Ying, the last Amban, and the remnant of his troops, marched out of Lhasa.

The Hsin-hai revolution, which ended the long history of Imperial China, brought also a sudden rupture in Sino-Tibetan relations which had slowly begun to stabilize from 1906. In the subsequent decades, the period of the First Republic of
China (1912-1949), China lost in Tibet the greater part of what she had built there in the course of many previous centuries. However, she recovered all she had lost and in addition considerably enlarged her position in Tibet forty years later, in 1951, under the present régime of the People's Republic of China.
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