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area. But as I say I am going to be thoroughly mean, I am going to express no opinion whatsoever as to what the settlement should be. I expect after I have sat down someone will get up and ask what I think about the rights and wrongs of the Kashmir question and I shall have to invent my twentieth different reason for saying why I won't give any opinion at all.

But I would like to end on this note—I am not going to stop today to talk about the economic affairs, there is not time—but I would like to end on this note, that to us in this room both India and Pakistan matter tremendously, and because they matter tremendously I think there are few things that we want in the world more than to see them get together. They cannot afford not to get together. The issue which separates them is one which it ought to be possible to solve and the whole needs of the West democratic world, not the Western world only but the democratic world including India, demands that this cause of friction should be brought to an end. I am afraid I have talked at some considerable length. Even so I have left out many things that I would have liked to have said, but I think you will agree that I was extremely lucky to be in India and Pakistan at this particular time, and I think you will also agree with me that it was one of the most dramatic moments in history, I will end as I began by saying I wish you could have had a really first class journalistic reporter to convey this sense of drama and tension to you.

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**The Sino-Burmese Border Agreement**

*Sir.* The author of the article in the January issue of the journal on the Sino-Burmese frontiers thinks it a mystery, and a great tribute to China, that she has made a generous frontier settlement with Burma. What can be the reason, other than China’s magnanimity, is the question asked. The question is, perhaps of design, naïve.

The answer is that Peking is determined to isolate India by showing how ‘reasonable’ the Chinese can be to other neighbours with frontier questions to settle. With this in view a settlement has been made not only with Burma (along the very McMahon Line in the north that China will not accept for India), but with Nepal also along the Himalayan crest (which again China will not accept for India). Not only that, but China has it seems, now made a settlement with Pakistan west of the Karakoram
Pass when she is opposing India in the same terrain east of the Karakoram Pass. Nor is that all. China will not agree even to discuss with India the frontiers of Sikkim and Bhutan, cis-Himalayan regions whose defence is India’s treaty responsibility.

To the critic who might say, “But China’s action with these others shows that India only has to negotiate to get equal reason bestowed on her,” the reply is that, while China accepts principles of settlement with them such as the Himalayan crest, she will not accept them for India, but uses force to defeat them. And further than that: Burma, Nepal and so on have not finished with China, having agreed on a frontier. Evidence is accumulating that it is not enough to say that China has agreed on a border demarcation with the Burmese Government. There are reports of Chinese infiltration among the Kachins, for instance, and of China sending in agents to the Nagas and so on. In Nepal we know that China is building a road to Katmandu and supporting the King against popular movements. There are whispers, too, of a need for a confederation of Himalayan States advanced during the last few months, and evidently directed at Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.

It is to be expected that the next round of the Sino-Indian contest will not be a military one. It will be directed by means of subversion and infiltration of the central Himalayan region (Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan) and ostensible friendship combined with infiltration round the flanks (Burma and Pakistan).

For all those to whom Chinese overtures now appear reasonable the wise motto is: Beware the Trojan horse! (... equo ne credite, Teucrī, quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes) which may be translated:

There was a young lady of Riga
Who went for a ride on a tiger,
They came back from that ride
With the lady inside
And a smile on the face of the tiger!

Yours faithfully,
OLAF CAROE.
The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute

Sir Olaf Caroe, KCSI, KCIE, addressed a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Over-Seas League on Wednesday, 21st November, 1962, at Over-Seas House, St. James's, S.W.1. The Rt. Hon. Lord Spens presided and introducing the speaker said: As usual when I preside at these meetings of this Association, I never have to say anything about the person who is going to lecture because he is, as a rule, far better known to all of you than he is personally to me. This time I hope to be able to claim to know our lecturer as well as anybody here. I never had the advantage of serving with him in India, although I have once or twice been entertained by him there, which perhaps is better than serving with him, but Sir Olaf Caroe needs absolutely no introduction to this audience at all. We are exceedingly fortunate at this particular moment to have got someone who knows the Frontier as well as he does, and who not only knows the Frontier physically, but has been in the history of the Frontier for a large number of recent years and knows a great deal about the negotiations, and the claims, and so forth. At this particular moment a talk from Sir Olaf, I believe, would have as great value as a talk from anybody who has appeared on the B.B.C. or anywhere else, or has written to The Times or any of our great newspapers.

Discussion

Dr. Bramley: Referring to your remark that Canada is sending a lot of grain to China, surely it is a very good thing because if you feed the population rather than starve it they may not have an aggressive future. If you feed them and house them, then there will not be a revolution.

Sir Olaf Caroe: There has been a revolution already. I do not think I can answer that effectively. I do think it should be considered in Canada, at any rate, whether Canada should send grain.

Mr. Lionel Jardine: Is there any special significance in the date March 1962, which I think the Indian Government has adopted, rather than November, 1959.

Sir Olaf Caroe: I think it is September 8th, 1962, that was the beginning of the Chinese offensive on the McMahon Line. It started
really on September 8th, and what India said, in effect, was that the Chinese must vacate the gains made since then before India could talk. The difference is that the Indians cannot contemplate going back in what they regard as their territory, and the Chinese say that both sides must go back. As regards the McMahon Line, as I tried to show, this question does not only concern the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but also Ladakh. The two things act and interact the whole time and the Chinese would be left in occupation of even larger parts of Ladakh if the Indians were to accept this, even if it meant that the Chinese went back behind the McMahon Line.

Mr. H. H. Hood: Would Sir Olaf tell us a little more about the Ladakh area, which is featured a good deal in the newspapers? For instance, the total area and what would be the advantages to China by taking possession of that territory.

Sir Olaf Caroe: To take the last point first, the advantage to China is that the road from Sinkiang into Tibet crosses that territory. The territory itself, except for its value in communications, is almost completely valueless. If you want to know something about the history of why India is in Ladakh, it is roughly this. The Mughals, as you know, took Kashmir in the time of Akbar towards the end of the 16th century when Queen Elizabeth was on the throne here, but they never penetrated into Ladakh at that time. Ladakh appears in later local records in Aurangzeb's time a century later as paying tribute to the Governor of Kashmir, about 1690. When the Mughal Empire began to break up on Nadir Shah's capture of Delhi in 1739, the founder of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Durrani, took Kashmir in 1752. The Durrani held it over 50 years, but they never got up into Ladakh. Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, conquered Ladakh again for India through his feudatory, the ancestor of the Marajahs of Kashmir. Gulab Singh was his agent in Kashmir, and one of his generals, his name was Zorawar Singh, took Baltistan and Ladakh and made them dependencies of Kashmir. Zorawar himself was killed when he invaded Tibet. Then there was an agreement in 1842 between the Sikh Government of the Punjab in Kashmir and the Chinese and Tibetans—the Tibetans were under a vague Chinese suzerainty—which laid down the frontiers of Ladakh between Kashmir and Tibet. That was in 1842, before the Sikh wars and before Kashmir came under British suzerainty. In 1847, after the first Sikh war, when the British became the suzerains of Kashmir, they asked the Chinese "What about this frontier between Ladakh and Tibet?" And the Chinese said: "We will stand on the 1842 agreement made with Ranjit Singh's Government and the frontier is very well known and that shall be..."
the frontier.” That is roughly the position, and since then any one of you who has been in Kashmir—and some of you, no doubt, have been to Leh, the capital of Ladakh—will know that Ladakh was a dependency of Kashmir.

A Member: May I ask about a report I read in the British Press that the Chinese had an arrangement for building a road from Lhasa to Katmandu and that it was due to be completed in October. Is this a fact?

Sir Olaf Caroe: I would not know the details. I do not know whether any of our Indian friends here, or anyone from Nepal, can give us actual information on the state of that, but certainly the work on the road has been begun and it is part of the understanding between China and Nepal reached as a result of their frontier demarcation. The Nepal situation is very interesting because when the Ranas who ruled Nepal for over 100 years were pushed out in 1950, the watch-word was representative Government rather on the lines of India, and the King was the person under whom it was expected that this result would be attained. But as we have all seen, once the King had got his power back—during the time of the Ranas he was only a puppet—it was not very long before the King himself got rid of representative Government in Nepal and he is strongly supported by the Chinese and by the Russians. You have the very odd situation of a King being supported against his people by the Communist Powers.

Sir Cyril Jones: A big question mark which some of us feel in trying to interpret what lies behind recent Chinese actions is whether they are indicative of a deliberate policy of expansionism on the part of China, or whether it is, as the Chinese have persistently maintained, a question of frontier rectification. The encroachment into Northern Assam seems to indicate a deliberate policy of expansion. Would it be legitimate to assume from this recent Chinese withdrawal offer, which I think Sir Olaf said indicates a willingness on the part of the Chinese to trade in recognition of the McMahon Line on the East with securing a position in Ladakh on the West, that the latest of their actions is in fact frontier rectification and not a policy of expansionism?

Sir Olaf Caroe: I wish I knew China better. I spent 34 years in India and two days in China, but I think Sir Cyril Jones’s questions are so pertinent that I feel he could probably give you a much better answer than I can. I still feel that what I tried to describe as a certain atavistic attitude to history is probably at the root of Chinese minds, and it may be good tactics at the moment to persuade the world, especially India, that this is only frontier rectification and that all that the Chinese really want is the chunk of Ladakh where their road is.
But I would not put it past them, when they have won the first round, to work for a resuscitation of all the shaded areas on the map—all the shaded areas together are about the size of England—that surely must be termed expansionism.

Mr. W. E. R. Gurney: You told us that China may well be playing a diplomatic game in attacking India through Assam, and she might well be willing to recognize the McMahon Line in exchange for the chunk of Ladakh which includes Aksai Chin. Apart from that, you have also said that this is a much greater question, which it obviously is, and I would like to ask: If you get a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, would Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s suggestion that Pakistan and India have a common defence policy for the Northern Frontier help things along? In that case medical supplies could go through Pakistan, and so on. Also the question arises whether this part of Ladakh is of very much use to India. The United Nations proposal is that there should be a plebiscite in Kashmir. If there was a plebiscite it is quite possible that the Ladakhis who, I gather, are ethnically Tibetans, Buddhist by religion and speak Tibetan, might very well elect almost unanimously—if they were allowed to make the choice—to go to Tibet, in which case Mr. Nehru would not have to give a portion of India away to China, but would make a virtue of self-determination.

Sir Olaf Caroe: I have never heard anyone else suggest that there should be a plebiscite in any part of Kashmir to allow any part of Kashmir to go out of the Sub-Continent altogether. It is quite a new idea, and I would have said it was an idea which neither India nor Pakistan would look at for a moment. If you will forgive me, I do not propose to get into a discussion on the Kashmir question or a settlement of it. I would like to put forward one constructive idea, if I may, on the frontiers generally which springs out of this premise that any assault on the perimeter of the Sub-Continent is a matter of equal interest to both States. That is that. If India could say that the frontiers on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line are as vital to India as they are to Pakistan, in fact vital to the security and survival of both States, and Pakistan in return could say that the McMahon Line is of equal importance to them as it is to India, then they could be as one absolutely on the sacrosanctity of the frontiers of the Sub-Continent. I believe that is an approach which would be really constructive.

Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Hutton: I have only two points to make, on one of which I feel rather strongly. I have met a few people—I am sure there are none of them here today—who have been very critical of India in regard to its policy in the past of non-alignment, neutrality or whatever you like to call it. They
have said almost, in so many words, "It serves them right!" I would ask if you meet any people like that to ask them to read certain memoirs which are now appearing in The Times, to visit, if they like, Grosvenor Square and see the 'Ban the Bomb' people, or else, if they are of my age, to cast their minds back to the peace campaign which was so fervent in this country between the wars. We have also gone through our period of neutrality and non-alignment and we paid the penalty, and we ought not be critical of other people with similar ideals.

Finally, I want to do my duty quickly and to pay a tribute—with which I am sure you will all agree—to our speaker's amazing knowledge of this subject. I do not think I could stand up and remember even one of those names, let alone numbers of them. He has made the whole thing extremely clear to us, he has shown that he has an encyclopedic knowledge of it, and I am sure we have enjoyed his talk today as much, if not more, than anything we have ever heard.

A Visit to India after the Chinese Invasion

Mr. John Tilney, MP, TD, spoke at a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Overseas League on Tuesday, 8th January, 1963, at Over-Seas House.

St. James's, s.w.1. The Rt. Hon. Lord Spens, KBE, presided.

DISCUSSION

Dr. Bramley: You passed through Russia. Now all this is very serious not only for the West, but I think for Russia. Do you think that the Russian Government will acquiesce if the Chinese Government think it fit to do what they like to do? Do you not think that perhaps the great Comintern of Russia will help in the freedom of the world?

Mr. Tilney: I wish I knew. But I am reminded that when I was in Moscow, when I was asking questions about China, the conversation was immediately turned to something else, and when I was in Peking and asking about Russia, again the conversation was immediately altered.

Dr. Bramley: It seems extraordinary that the Indian Government did not have enough military intelligence to know what the Chinese were about to do, and they seek aid and arms at the last moment, when it is almost too late nearly. Why did they not fortify themselves a year before to be ready for this catastrophe?

Mr. Tilney: I imagine that it is not all that easy to know what is going on in China and certainly up in Tibet. There had, of course, been the Tibetan refugees, but that was a little time ago, and that is the
great strength unfortunately of Communist tyranny; they stop people from finding out. I know in our Embassy in Peking, if anyone wanted to go anywhere—outside the great Wall, the Ming Tombs, Tienbin or more than about eight miles outside Peking—they had to give about three weeks or a month’s notice as to where they wanted to go, so everyone is aware of exactly where they go. It is not all that easy. Whereas in India anyone can go wherever they like. It is one of the disadvantages of democracy.

Mr. Radcliff: I would like to ask Mr. Tilney how he thinks India could improve her public image in certain countries that feel that they have been victims of Indian military attack. For example, how can India convince the Portuguese that she is a victim of military force and a friend in Rhodesia tells me that India has a very bad public image and also in Katanga. How can India improve her public image in those countries?

Mr. Tilney: I would not like to comment on that. I think that there are many in India who may now regret what happened in Goa, but it is not for me to comment or even to give advice.

Mrs. Zinkin: When you were in Delhi did you get the impression that the people in command, perhaps the President more than the other people, or the Defence Minister were considering the problems that face India on two borders: the possible Pakistani aggression in Kashmir and that forces would therefore not be available for defence in Ladakh. How seriously were they looking at it?

Mr. Tilney: I think they are well aware of that problem, and I think a lot of troops have been moved from the frontier south of Kashmir. Everyone is very well aware of the cost, in terms of military might and of actual economics, of what it means to be fighting on two fronts. The prizes of an agreement over Kashmir are very big indeed.

Dr. Bramley: Do you think it a good idea to send arms to Pakistan now that they seem to be worried that only India is getting arms?

Mr. Tilney: Surely what one wants really to do is eliminate the causes of friction between the two countries rather than to arm both, possibly against each other. That must be wrong. It is the causes of that friction that, I think, one wants to eliminate. But we have got to be awfully careful in giving advice. It is rather like interfering in a row between one’s own family; they may turn ultimately on you. It really is not our job to interfere unless we are asked by both sides to do so. I remember in my first election, if I may tell a short story, that there were a number of spoilt votes. One of the voting papers had noughts for all three candidates,
and another one in my favour had not one cross but two crosses against my name, and underneath my name was "Love from Olga." Unfortunately, that was disallowed too. The crosses showed that she wanted to do something badly, but you have got to be very careful how you do it!

A Member: Has Mr. Tilney any comments to make on the Colombo proposals, particularly with regard to Mrs. Bandaranaike's mission in relation to the Chinese and Indian agreement. And secondly would he like to make any comments on the historical background of the McMahon Line which does give a certain measure of support to perhaps the Chinese case or perhaps more a matter of argument than sometimes thought.

Mr. Tilney: In front of this audience, who must know far more about the McMahon Line than I do, I really do hesitate to make any comment on the second part. As regards Mrs. Bandaranaike's mission and the proposals, these are not really yet known, and so one cannot make a comment on them.

Sir Olaf Caroe: I think we are agreed that we have had an extraordinary deep and far reaching talk from Mr. John Tilney. When I saw the picture of him and that he was going out to India, I said to my wife: "Good Lord! John Tilney will have a time, and he will have an awful lot of homework to do." It is fright-

fully difficult to even understand the beginnings of these lines, but I think that we are all agreed that we have heard reason to believe and think that this is far more than a border dispute. It is a tremendous thing, it is probably the biggest thing that has happened since 1950. this rivalry between India and China and whether, as Mr. Tilney said. India and indeed the sub-Continent can remain in the free world is really the issue. And I think that we all rise to the challenge of his last remarks: That this is a matter which demands statesmanship of the very highest order on the parts of everybody, in India, Pakistan, Gt. Britain in the United States and elsewhere. I think we will also agree that he has shown us the line to statesmanship.

Crisis in South Asia

Sir Percival Griffiths, CIE, addressed a joint-meeting of the East India Association, Pakistan Society, and the Royal Over-Seas League at Over-Seas House, St. James's, s.w.1. on Tuesday, 22nd January, 1963.

Sir John Woodhead presided and introducing the speaker said: Sir Percival Griffiths is well known to you all and no introduction by me is necessary, but I would like to say one thing that this his last visit to India was the forty-eighth visit he has made to India to the sub-Continent since Independence: so
he should know something about India and Pakistan should he not? And Sir Percival I am rather glad to be in the Chair today because it will be the last occasion in which I shall be able to keep you in order. I was up to the 1st of January this year President of the India, Pakistan, Burma Association and Sir Percival has succeeded me, so I shall be able to keep him in order today, but I shall not be able to keep him in order in future; but Sir Percival's knowledge of India and Pakistan is quite astounding. He went out to India, to the sub-Continent in October last year and was there until the end of December. He visited many parts of India and Pakistan. He went up to the Assam and saw the tea garden areas, and I am sure he will be able to give us a most interesting account of what happened in India during those two months. When he went out I do not suppose that he ever expected that there would be a crisis such as has happened—he arrived out there in October, but soon after he got there of course the invasion of India by China took place and he spent a very active time between India and Pakistan.

You know Sir Percival well enough, I am sure he will give you a most lucid account of what has happened.

DISCUSSION

Mrs. Zinkin: How much would the Third Five Year Plan have to be cut?

Sir Percival Griffiths: I am afraid I cannot even guess that yet because I do not know the starting point. I have no idea what the Budget of defence would have to be for India until the strategists, or whatever the right word is, have worked out what they are going to need in the way of defence one does not know where to begin to start guessing about that; you will get perhaps a better idea in a few months time. I am sorry I cannot give an intelligent answer at the moment.

Mr. Zaman: You have said that China has already achieved its objective and that is why she stopped the war. Do you think that in view of this situation during the next Spring there will be no war?

Sir Percival Griffiths: I said that China had achieved her immediate objective. I have very little doubt that China's long term objective is to be the boss of Asia, but there may be many things to be done in the process of becoming that before a massive attack on India—she may find it necessary to get a position in Burma, she may find it necessary to occupy many parts of South Asia before she is ready to try any real crossing of swords with India. Well now if I were China that would be my line, but I am not China and I do not know. If you make me guess I would guess that there will not be a fresh attack in the Spring because I do not see what China has to gain by it yet,
but that is a very wild guess and I may have to confess to you next year that I was wrong. My guess would be no, not next Spring.

Mr. Islam: Does the Speaker think that the West should now bring more pressure to bear on India so that the negotiations will not fail?

Sir Percival Griffiths: Well, I would disapprove of pressure being brought to bear on India and not on Pakistan, or on Pakistan and not on India. The job of the West is to say to both countries “You have jolly well got to find a settlement.”

Mr. H. A. Medd: There was one thing that Sir Percival said that surprised me and I think may have surprised several other people and that was that in the Government of India as organized at present the fifteen or sixteen people who were extremely good at their own individual jobs, but they were not under any unitary rule from anybody. Now we have always been given to understand that is for some years that if ever there was a Prime Minister who has led pre-eminently that country it was Mr. Nehru, it seems then that this failure if it is a failure being evident does it date from before the time when you said that his reputation possibly suffered a setback due to the Chinese business or was it evident before that?

Sir Percival Griffiths: It was not very evident before that Sir, it began to be evident really when the China thing began to be the dominant factor, and I suspect that there are perhaps two reasons for it. One is that Mr. Nehru all his life has striven for peace with China and has had to see the collapse of his foreign policy. That by itself must have been a very undermining factor for him, and on top of that I think that it is over and over again the case in international affairs that the man who is pretty good at directing people in peace has not got quite the militant drive for directing them in war; I doubt whether Mr. Nehru could ever make a great war leader, could take quick decisions about the kind of thing that have to be decided in times of war.

Mr. Brander: Would Sir Percival tell us something about that quarrel between Pakistan and Afghanistan, whether they settled it in any way because their trade was altogether stopped so perhaps they have come to some practical decision to let it go on again; it was stopping all the imports and exports.

Sir Percival Griffiths: No, there has been no settlement so the quarrel continues and in a general way the embargo continues; there have been certain exceptions made with regard to cargoes of particular kinds, but there is no general resumption of trade there yet at all and feeling is still quite bad.
Mr. A. Reid: Does Sir Percival think that the proposals that Mrs. Banderanaik has brought to Delhi recently will succeed?

Sir Percival Griffiths: May we put it this way. If I were India I don't think I would be very unhappy about them. They differ from what India had in mind in that they would not allow India to occupy the areas from which the Chinese had withdrawn. I think that if I were India I would say that does not really matter very much, that the areas are of no importance to anybody at all and what really matters to India is to buy time, and personally if I were the Prime Minister of India I would not be too unhappy about accepting them because that would give me time to build up my defences. What China's reaction will be I have no idea at all, but I would not be worried about accepting them if I were the Prime Minister of India—I am very glad I am not!

Lady Stokes: Could Sir Percival tell us why India was so ill prepared for this Chinese invasion?

Sir Percival Griffiths: Well, I think there were several reasons for it. I do not think that until a relatively short time ago anybody took the Chinese danger seriously. Mr. Krishna Menon has been the scapegoat and I think perhaps rightly so, but in the same way in this country when we were not prepared either in the first or second war we had to find scapegoats. Really the fault here was the lack of will on the part of the people to be ready, and I think the same thing was true in India. That people were not willing to face up to the fact that there might in fact be a war. For one thing that many people in India had an entirely false idea of the protection afforded by the great Himalayan barrier. I remember talking to a very senior official about that as far back as 1951 or 1952 and telling him some of my anxieties and he brushed them all aside and said the Himalayas were a tremendous barrier, and no army could really operate across it. Well, of course, it is nonsense when you have seen thousands of mule men—I have said this in this room before—when you have seen thousands of mule men come down over those hills year by year you realize that where mule men can come armies can come too. A false idea of security was built up. Secondly, there is no doubt at all that Mr. Krishna Menon was to a great extent responsible by his political promotions in the Army, by his failure to provide the necessary equipment—it is a shocking thing that the Indian Army was sent to fight in those hills with no warm clothing of any kind at all. There were terrible failures of preparation for which you must blame entirely Mr. Krishna Menon; I suppose that Mr. Nehru must take some of the blame too, because he for a long time refused to recognize that China might be belicose in her
intentions so you have to share the blame I think between Mr. Nehru, Mr. Krishna Menon and the public, just as we in this country had to take a great share of the blame for not being prepared for the last two wars.

Mr. Zaman: Do you not agree Sir Percival that they were prepared for the war. That they were prepared and were arming, but they thought that the fighting would be in the plains against some country in the plains—not China?

Sir Percival Griffiths: I would answer that by saying that I think if they had not been hypnotized by these fallacies and these false ideas they could not have failed to see that their fighting would have to be in the hills. China was obviously the enemy, and fighting China was going to be very, very largely in the hills, and I think they were blind just as we were blind in this country.

Mr. Alam: Did India take advantage of border clashes to cover up internal troubles?

Sir Percival Griffiths: With very great respect sir, I think that that is quite an unrealistic idea. I think to suggest that India can have arranged that the Chinese could have been in a position where they could have wiped out the North Indian tea industry, they could have wiped out Digboi, they could have taken away some of the biggest sources of India’s wealth, I think it is with very great respect utterly and completely unrealistic.

Mr. Alam: I suggest the whole took place at a time when, if you go back, it was at such a time that a large scale invasion was impossible. It was also at a time when the question of the United Nations was coming up, so in that respect, keeping in view, the question of military aid and keeping in view that they would have more aid for the Third Five Year Plan the whole incident was bolstered up to make it an international issue.

Sir Percival Griffiths: I am sorry but I can only repeat that that in my judgment is quite fantastic. A large scale military invasion at that time was impossible, but a complete annexation of Assam was a very, very practicable possibility indeed. And do you really seriously think that India would assist her Third Five Year Plan by losing the whole of her North Indian tea industry, by losing her Digboi oil, by losing some of the most fertile land in the country? With very great respect sir, I think that you are being led astray by your feelings into an error of judgment.

Sir Cyril Jones: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is just as unnecessary to propose a vote of thanks to Sir Percival Griffiths for his address as it is for our Chairman to introduce him to this audience, nonetheless it is a very pleasant
duty that falls to me because as you all know there is no person or very few people who by knowledge, experience access to people that matter out in South East Asia who can speak with a greater breadth of experience and authority than Sir Percival Griffiths. I think the East India Association and the Pakistan Society are extremely fortunate in having the benefit of Sir Percival’s periodical addresses to us and the interest that they arouse is evident every time he comes by the size of the audience who comes to hear him. It is a very great pleasure for me to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Sir Percival for his most interesting, penetrating and informative address to us.

The Objects of the East India Association

(INDIA PAKISTAN AND BURMA)

In 1866, eight years after the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, the East India Association was formed with the object of “the promotion of the public interest and welfare of the inhabitants of India generally.” This object was steadfastly pursued during the ensuing eighty-one years. The Independence of India and Pakistan attained in 1947, while modifying the original conception, has increased the need for strengthening the bonds of friendship and the importance of mutual understanding between the people of Britain and the inhabitants of the countries formerly comprising the India Empire—namely, India, Pakistan, and Burma. The Association therefore is continuing its work, with the assistance of all those who are interested in the welfare and progress of these countries, by the methods which have proved so helpful in the past, namely:

1. By lectures on current questions affecting those countries and publication of the same.
2. By providing opportunities for the free discussion of important questions affecting India, Pakistan, and Burma.
3. By promoting friendly contact between the peoples of these countries and of Britain through the medium of social and other gatherings.
4. Generally by the promulgation of reliable information regarding the countries named.

The Association is essentially non-official in character and has no connexion with any political party. It seeks to provide an open platform for the consideration of current problems relating to India, Pakistan, and Burma. It welcomes as members all those who are interested in their welfare and progress.

Papers are read and discussed throughout the year, except in the months of August and September. Members are entitled to invite friends to these meetings.