RAPE of TIBET

Nikhil Maitra
RAPE OF TIBET

A Companion Volume To Chinese Propaganda and Aggression on India

By

NIKHL MAITRA
"History can neither be made nor written without love or hate."

— Mommsen
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As Tibet is catapulted into history and the Dalai Lama deposited on Indian soil, relations between India and China seem to be losing their adjustments and balance. China talks as if India, not the Dalai Lama, were accused No. 1 and the fusillade of abuse from that quarter has not been negligible. Even after the historic and authoritative expositions of Indian policy in regard to Tibet by Prime Minister Nehru—he spoke on as many as seven occasions on Tibet in the Indian Parliament between the 17th March and the 27th April—the National People’s Congress of China warned Indians not to interfere in what was considered an internal affair and noted with regret that “certain people in Indian political circles had committed extremely unfriendly acts which interfered in China’s internal affairs”. More unkind things have been written and said since and, because freedom and diversity of political thought and discussion are not allowed in China, it is the Central
People's Government of China that has to accept responsibility.

History, always tendentious and propagandist, when not a time-table or almanac, speaks with a medley of discordant voices. Even Ancient and Mediaeval History, not excluding the history of Monasteries and Lamaserais, is being put under contribution, on the one hand, by those who would seek to disrupt China by stirring up the old historical rivalries and animosities of nationalities—a method which Hitler pioneered—and, on the other hand, by others who would refuse Tibet any political existence. But both take the name of Imperialism as the enemy. The Panchen Lama, for example, is as categorical that Tibetan “independence” or “autonomy” is nothing but K.M.T. or Anglo-American Imperialism, as Western democratic critics are categorical that the Imperialism which the “liberation” or “integration” of Tibet camouflages is Chinese. Then there are the tirades against Indian “expansionists” to add to the confusion. One may doubtless retort, though we have not noticed such a retort as yet, that there may be yet older shades waiting to be resurrected. Did not Srongtsan-sampo of Tibet lead an earlier raid into Indian territory? And was not the Tibetan country said in the later Chinese annals “to have extended to the Gulf of Bengal, than described as the Tibetan Sea” (Chambers's Encyclopaedia)? On the obelisk at the foot of the Potala one may still read inscriptions in Tibetan characters which narrate the victories of Tibetan Kings over China and Nepal.

All this, however, is neither here nor there. If there are wind-mills to be fought, the fight has gone on long enough. Even the ancient justification to throw enough mud, so that some may stick, now looks out-moded.

It is a longer way to Tibet than to Hungary and it is not for those who abandoned Czechoslovakia to Hitler and Hungary to Russia to criticize India for “appeasement” of China over Tibet. The Time tires not in criticizing, in its characteristic style, the attitude and policy of Prime Minister Nehru towards China over Tibet. But what action, one
may ask the history-rattlers and sabre-rattlers, beyond the action that India has taken, would the U.S.A. have taken, if the Dalai Lama had sought asylum there? After all, Byron’s lines come back to one who surveys the whole scene without passion:

“A man must serve his time to any trade
Save criticism; critics are ready made.”
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This book was first published in 1959 after Dalai Lama made his romantic but perilous journey to India along with a large number of his followers. The author Sri Nikhil Maitra was a brilliant student of Ancient Indian History. He had also a distinguished political career. Unfortunately he did not live to see the success of his book, the first edition of which was sold out within a very short time. He left the world in May, 1962.

To-day, in the background of Chinese aggression on India, ‘Rape of Tibet’ would serve as a very important document to understand and even interpret the philosophy and politics of the expansionist policy of China.

Never before could ‘Rape of Tibet’ be so handy a politico-historical guide to lovers of freedom, in which some of the formulations of the author proved to be prophetic indeed.

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PUBLISHERS
"I saw Khenchi Dawala (Kham General) for a few moments the next day. 'Tell the World we fought,' he whispered fiercely, 'and that we'll fight again.'" (Robert Ford's "CAPTURED IN TIBET").

In 1727, as a result of the Chinese having entered Lhasa, the boundary between China and Tibet was laid down as between the head-waters of the Mekong and Yangtse rivers, and marked by a pillar, a little to the south-west of Batang. Land to the west of this pillar was administered from Lhasa, while the Tibetan chiefs of the tribes to the east came more directly under China. This historical Sino-Tibetan boundary was used until 1910. The States Der-ge, Nyarong, Batang, Litang and the five Hor States— to name the more important districts—are known collectively in Lhasa as Kham, and the principal city of Kham is Chamdo.

It was this Kham country (roughly Eastern Tibet) which took the heaviest toll of Communist armies in 1934, when the Communist 'Long March' passed through, in course of the six-thousand-mile trek from the base in Fugien and
Kwangsi to their future capital of Yenan in Shensi. In “Red Star over China”, Edgar Snow thus describes the mobile battles between the Khambas and Mantzu and the Chinese Communists:

“A few hundred yards on either side of the road, however, it was quite unsafe. Many a Red who ventured to forage for a sheep never returned. The mountaineers hid in the thick bush and sniped at the marching ‘invaders’. They climbed the mountains and when the Reds filed through the deep, narrow rock passes, where sometimes only one or two could pass abreast, the Mantzu rolled huge boulders down to crush them and their animals. Here were no chances to explain ‘Red policy towards National minorities’, no opportunities for friendly alliances! The Mantzu queen had an implacable, traditional hatred for Chinese of any variety and recognised no distinctions between Red and White. She threatened to boil alive anyone who helped the travellers.”

The Communists lost almost half their men during this ordeal. A few years later Mao Tse-Tung told Edgar Snow humorously: “That is our only foreign debt and some day we must pay the Mantzu and the Tibetans for the provisions we were obliged to take from them”. The repayment has obviously begun!

In 1905, when General Chao Ehr-Feng was put in charge of punitive measures against Tibet, with the same object as now, namely, to reduce Tibet to the status of a non-autonomous province, with the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama, as the case might be, as a merely spiritual figure-head, great monasteries were besieged and razed to the ground, monks were killed and local Chiefs beheaded. And it was Kham that put up the stiffest fight with him. He is now remembered in Kham as the “Butcher”. But the Tibetans lacked organisation and modern methods and were, especially in Derge, torn by internal dissensions. Kham was gradually overpowered and, by the end of 1909, Batang, Derge and Chamdo were occupied by the Chinese troops.

History repeated itself early in 1956, when Tibetan resistance was slowly, but steadily, gathering against Chinese military occupation again.

Marauding Khambas from Amdo, Goluk and Derge
began ambushing isolated Chinese units. They surrounded a Chinese base at Kardeza in Eastern Tibet and forced the Chinese to supply it by air-lift. They made road-blocks, raided munition-depots and bogged down the Chinese troops. Even the postponement of Chinese reforms did not help to quell the rebellion. It flourished in spite of everything the Chinese could do. Towns of tents grew up ‘impromptu’ all over the countryside and the Indian, Bhutanese and Sikkimese passes were practically under Khamba control. The Chinese erected watch-towers along the Lhasa road and sand-bagged strategic positions around the city.

The curtain rose on March ‘59, with 25,000 Khambas concentrated forty miles north of Lhasa, at a place called Phongdo, with an auxiliary force of about 8,000 monks who had preferred to fight. General Chang Kuo-Hua, the Chinese Commander in Tibet, had, on the top of his Chinese forces, about 14,000 Tibetans trained in his philosophy and methods. The stage was set for the show-down. It started round about March 10, but events happened tumultuously. The Dalai Lama was asked to integrate his ceremonial body-guard of 5,000 with the Chinese Army in its fight with the Khambas; and when he politely, but resolutely, declined, he was summoned to appear at the Chinese Commander’s headquarters, alone. The Chinese version is that he was invited to see the performance of a play. The news of this, however, set Lhasa on fire. Some 30,000 Lhasans swarmed about the palace, begging the Dalai Lama not to go. About 5,000 Tibetan women mustered at the Indian Consulate-General and asked him to accompany them to the Chinese Commander’s headquarters, to witness the formal denunciation of the 17-point Agreement between China and Tibet. The Indian Consul-General, of course, declined to take part in all this, even as a spectator. There was “fighting in the immediate vicinity of the Consulate”, to quote from the Indian Consulate-General’s radioed message to New Delhi, “and the situation was tense and rising”. Then the radio fell silent. At Gyantse, 100 miles South-West of Lhasa, the Tibetans attacked the Chinese garrison, and, from Phongdo, the Khambas and fighting monks advanced on the capital.

The history of the next few days is most important,
but nevertheless not a little confused. Several things, however, stand out. It is certain that there was a lot of fighting in Lhasa city. The Indian Consulate-General felt pretty unsafe and asked for adequate Chinese protection. It was refused, as the Chinese garrison was obviously busy in re-"liberating" Lhasa, but the Indian Consulate-General was asked to shift to the Foreign Bureau. This, the Indian Consulate-General refused to do, preferring to remain where it was. Not only in Lhasa City, but also all over Eastern Tibet, there was hard fighting wherever there were Chinese garrisons to be fought.

It is also known that there was an exchange of six letters between March, the 10th and March the 17th, between the Dalai Lama from his Summer Palace (Norbulinghka) and General Tan Kuan-San, Acting Representative of the Central People's Government in Tibet. Of the three letters from the Dalai Lama, the last was dated, March, the 16th. On the following day (March, the 17th), the Dalai Lama, with family, left Lhasa, heavily escorted by his body-guard, but 'incognito'.

The letters of Dalai Lama received a great deal of attention and publicity lately and a lot of rigmarole was let loose. Read, however, in the context of subsequent events, they would prove only one thing, namely, that the extremely conciliatory epistolary manner of the Dalai Lama and the innocent content of the letters concealed very efficient planning and diplomatically achieved the purpose for which the letters were written, which was to put off the Chinese for a much-needed spell of a few days.

The Dalai Lama's departure from Lhasa was not noticed until March 19; and when it was, it became the signal for the beginning of full-scale, all-out repression. The Chinese Press says, the rebellion was only a 3-day affair; it was smashed up almost as soon as it flared up. But it is a different tale, as told by the Tibetans themselves. It is that of a country-wide, protracted and ruthless struggle between two most unevenly matched combatants, which not only was not put down within three days, but continues to this day. The Indian Consul-General and his staff were not allowed, until nearly a month later, to stir out of their
premises to see things for themselves and to look after the safety of Indian nationals.

The incident of Sonam Puntso which happened in 1951 may not be without some interest in this context. He was associated with the Tibetan wireless station at Dengko, when the Chinese came in. In December, 1951, he was taken to Lhasa by the Chinese, where he succeeded in escaping. He was hidden by friends in the town for three weeks, but at last he had to seek sanctuary in the Indian Mission at Lhasa. He was recaptured by Chinese soldiers on the way, but he again managed to slip away and reach the Indian Mission. He was given sanctuary, "but the next day a party of about 100 Chinese soldiers went and took him by force." (Robert Ford's "Captured in Tibet"). Ultimately he was deported to India. International etiquette has obviously never been too strong a point with the Chinese.

Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama and his party arrived in India on March 31 and, to a Lok Sabha seething with indignation, Prime Minister Nehru announced it on April 2. A tremor went round the world, the Communist world not excluded; for even though the Chinese knew that the Dalai Lama was heading towards Tawang in India, his actual arrival and the formal, official reception accorded to him by the Government of India, preparatory to the granting of the asylum, were of a long-term significance, which they could not miss.

The mid-twentieth century epic of the Dalai Lama's Odyssey from Lhasa to Tawang and of the devoted Khambas who defied death to take him to safety has not been sung yet. Possibly it never will be. But let History pause awhile to record its eternal homage to these brave men.

The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, controlling the Indian upsurge rather than being controlled by it, from superb heights which even his great political stature had not reached before, made the historic statement in the Rajya Sabha on May 4: "Now the question came before us of the possibility of the Dalai Lama coming to India. And we decided we should receive him. He came. I was asked repeatedly: 'Are you going to throw your door open to any number of refugees from Tibet'? I know that I could
not refuse asylum to people who were in real difficulty.”

One has to travel back a great deal up the stream of
time to find a parallel to this magnanimous gesture. And,
paradoxically enough, it is in the spacious days of Chinese
history that one finds it.

It was in 1771 that the whole population of the Kalmuck
Tartars (the Torgot) started on their march across Asia,
leaving the Russia of Catherine II behind and heading
towards the China of Emperor Kien-Lung. The trek lasted
nearly eight months. Emperor Kien-Lung received them
 hospitably and settled them in Chinese districts—inspite
of the fact that, by reason of a treaty between China and
Russia, each of the countries was pledged not to receive
fugitives from the other, but to send them back at once,
or at least punish them.

The Emperor said: 
“What I have said here I have already told the Russians,
down to last detail, and I have brought them to such a point
that they could not answer me.”

“How could I, for a reason that I do not even approve,
bring myself to let so many thousands of people perish,
when they arrived at our border half-dead with hunger and
misery? People complain that they carried off food and
cattle. May be they did. How could they have saved their
lives, if they had not done so? Would they not, driven
to despair, have committed still wilder excesses? The Torgot
have come. I have received them. They
soured through
the lack of even the most essential means of existence. I
have provided them with an abundance of everything. With-
out food, without clothes, utterly destitute, the Torgot
reached Ili. I had foreseen that and I ordered the Governor
of Ili and others to have every kind of food in readiness so
that they could have immediate succour”. (Quoted in Dr.
Sven Hedin’s “Jehol”)

After all, is “political asylum” so utterly unknown to
China? Not too long ago, no less a man than Dr. Sun
Yat Sen, the father of the Chinese Revolution, sought asylum
in America, Japan and England and got it, without in the
least disturbing the political relations between Imperial
China and these Powers. Then how could the Dalai Lama’s
political asylum" in India now disturb Sino-Indian political relations to this extent? Perhaps, because, the boot is on the other leg this time and what was "sauce" for Dr. Sun Yat Sen is not considered to be "sauce" for the Dalai Lama.
"Warre consisteth not in Battel only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by Battel is sufficiently known; and therefore, the notion of Time is to be considereth in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of the weather. For, as the nature of Foule Weather Iyeth not in a showre or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of warre consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary." (Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan"—Chapter XIII)

For centuries, Tibet has been a part of China, with, however, an important difference. It has been one of the two main "Autonomous Regions" of China (the other being Inner Mongolia), not just a Chinese district or Province. This difference has also been there for centuries and China, it must be said, has never failed to recognize or re-affirm it. If the precedents and canons of Confederacy and Federalism were to be applied, taking, of course, the basic justiciable issue for granted that Tibet, that is to say, the majority of Tibetans, along with the Autonomous Government, prefer independence to "regional autonomy",

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Tibet may have perhaps a somewhat stronger juristic right to secede than the Southern States had, when they precipitated the American Civil War. For, quite apart from the unimportant point that Tibet belongs to a different race from the Hans (the Chinese)—in fact, no State now is uni-racial—Tibet through the centuries, has evolved a compact national organisation of her own, which may be, by modern standards, extremely backward and Mediaeval and is certainly more backward, by these standards, than Chinese society was until the Liberation, but has yet succeeded in producing a highly differentiated pattern of culture which is as hard and cast-iron as any that history can show. Art and Architecture and Philosophy are probably its highlights, but there are many minor good features as well. A contradiction by no means peculiar to Tibet or to China, but common to all countries with an ancient background including India.

"As early as in the 8th century, a treaty was signed between the then rulers of Tibet and China uniting their Kingdoms.

"In the 13th century, Kublai Khan, the Mongol Emperor of China, entrusted the administration of Tibet to the Head Lama of the Monastery of Sakya. In those days, the Central Chinese Government controlled the collection of taxes in Tibet through its local Governors and sanctioned the appointment of the Dalai Lama."

(K. M. Panikkar)

The treaty of peace which ended the Lhasa Expedition of 1904 was concluded between the Tibetan Government and the British Government of India; and neither China nor even the Dalai Lama was a signatory to it. China confirmed it later—on April the 27th, 1906. But the following contemporary account of one who actually took part in the Lhasa Expedition is significant.

"Then the day came when we were told that negotiations were at an end. The Council of Regency had obtained permission from the Chinese Government to make a treaty, and were prepared to do so. There was a hitch for a few days, because the Council did not want the treaty to be signed in the Potala, but Younghusband insisted on that. Finally the Tibetans gave in on the condition that the party
that was to witness the ceremony and the members of the Mission themselves were not to enter the Potala by the Grand Staircase. When asked why not, they replied that a portrait of the Empress Dowager of China hung on the staircase and it was not meet that people of other races should gaze on the portrait. Younghusband laughed at this, but said that he would not worry about the matter (Henry Newman’s “A Roving Commission”). The War Indemnity to Britain was paid not by Tibet, but by China for Tibet.

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 confirmed not only Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but also Tibetan autonomy within the accepted frontiers of Tibet. When the Dalai Lama of 1910 had to take asylum in India as a result of differences with the Chinese Resident and Chinese highhandedness, the Chinese Government by proclamation dethroned the Dalai Lama; and the British Government had to remind China that, under the Treaty of 1906, China had no authority over the internal administration of Tibet. In 1912, after the Chinese Revolution had ended the Manchu Dynasty, China sent back troops which had been withdrawn during the Revolution to Tibet. The British Government lodged a strong protest at this, pointing out that China could not claim to interfere with the internal affairs of Tibet and Tibet was an ally of Great Britain. This stopped the Chinese Expedition and strengthened the position of the Dalai Lama.

In 1913 Russia concluded an agreement with China, whereby the former recognised China’s suzerainty over Mongolia, but Russia was allowed privileges which would give her a large measure of economic and political control over the country. Tibet had always been on very friendly terms with Mongolia, and now that that State was controlled by Russia, it became all the more necessary for the Government of India to insist upon a strong and autonomous Tibet. Dorjieff had become active again, and, using the authority of a letter given to him years before by the Dalai Lama, he engineered a “treaty” between Tibet and Mongolia. The Kalon Lama was sent to Kham to drive back the Chinese, and from now on the border skirmishes developed into a frontier war between China and Tibet.
In order to settle various differences a conference was arranged in 1913 at Simla between representatives of Great Britain, China and Tibet. The Dalai Lama wanted for Tibet complete control of internal and external affairs; to consult with the British only on more important external relations; to have no Chinese representatives or soldiers in Tibet; and for Nyarong, Der-ge, Batang, Litang and the country up to Tachienlu—that is, all the regions inhabited by persons of Tibetan race—to be included in Tibet. The National Assembly, and later the Dalai Lama, also desired a British representative at Lhasa. The Chinese entered the conference with the hope of recovering the position they had held in Tibet at the conclusion of Chao Erh Feng’s conquests. The object of Great Britain was to restore Tibet to the position of an autonomous State under Chinese suzerainty; to establish at Lhasa a stable and friendly Tibetan Government free from all outside interference, and to restore peace between China and Tibet.

The Simla Convention was initialled in April 1914 by the three parties. The British representative at the conference was Sir Henry McMahon who delineated the frontier between India and Tibet for about 850 miles eastward from Bhutan. The McMahon line was incorporated in the Simla Convention, but not ratified by the Chinese authorities. It stands unaccepted by China to this day. Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was recognised, on condition that China did not convert Tibet into a Chinese Province. A Chinese Amban with a suitable escort was to be re-established at Lhasa, and the British Agent at Gyantse was authorized to visit the city, if necessary. The British Government promised the Tibetans diplomatic support, and reasonable help in securing munitions. But as regards the boundary question, the Chinese and Tibetan points of view were so divergent as to make agreement seem impossible. Both sides ignored the 1727 Manchu boundary and, while the Tibetans claimed all the States up to Tachienlu, the Chinese wanted to push the boundary to within a few marches from Lhasa. Eventually Tibet was divided into two zones, “Outer Tibet” (as visualized from China) and “Inner Tibet”. The autonomy of Outer Tibet, which included Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo,
was recognised. Inner Tibet, including Batang, Litang, Tachienlu and a large portion of Eastern Tibet, was to remain under the nominal control of Lhasa, but the Chinese were to be allowed to send troops and officials there and to plant colonies.

China objected to the frontier which had been established between herself and Tibet, but otherwise agreed to accept the Convention in all respects. At this stage, the Great War broke out, and there was an armed truce pending the resumption of mediation by Great Britain. During this truce the Tibetans had time to increase and modernize their army, but the worn-out Chinese forces, owing to internal dissensions, were neglected and left to live off the country, so that they deteriorated into brigands and military adventurers.

A Chinese General broke the truce and made a sudden attack while the Tibetans were celebrating one of their many religious festivities. The Tibetans, however, soon rallied and drove the Chinese practically back to Tachienlu and thus recovered the greater part of Eastern Tibet. At this stage the British Consular Agent at Tachienlu, Eric Teichman (later Knighted), was called in to mediate and the truce was re-established in 1918, with a provisional boundary through Batang, and one therefore much more favourable to the Tibetans. (F. Spencer Chapman)

This was followed by a Chinese Political Mission to Lhasa in 1920 and Sir Charles Bell’s Political Mission sponsored by the then Government of India, also in 1920.

Even under the rule of Chiang Kai-Shek, Tibet remained a part of China. The present Dalai Lama was actually appointed by the Chinese Government. He arrived in Lhasa in 1940 accompanied by a Chinese escort. In 1945, the British Foreign Minister in a letter to the Chinese Government recognised in clear terms that “in international law, Tibet was a part of China”. When the People’s Republic of New China was established in 1949, representatives of Tibet were present at all functions in Peking and took part in drawing up New China’s ‘Common Programme’. Thus the Liberation of Tibet by the Chinese Liberation Army was part of the task of “liberating all the territory of
China and of unifying China”, as mentioned in the Common Programme. (K. M. Panikkar—“China Today”—Sundarlal)

Early in 1950, five separate goodwill missions were due to leave Tibet—for Britain, U.S.A., India, Nepal and Communist China. The members were selected, but China stepped in to prevent. She said, the proposed missions were illegal, because Tibet was not an independent State, but a part of the People’s Republic of China. The Tibetans were asked to send a mission only to China for “the peaceful solution of the question of Tibet”. A warning was issued obviously aimed at India, that any country entertaining one of the “illegal” missions would be considered as “entertaining hostile intentions” against China.

On October 7, 1950, the People’s Liberation Army began its advance into Tibet, attacking the Tibetan frontier at six points simultaneously. The assertion is too often repeated by the Chinese Press that the Liberation was entirely peaceful, but to this, one can only say: “Yes, as peaceful perhaps as the Massacre of Glencoe, though not as peaceful as the Massacre of St. Bartholomew”. The main forces of the official Tibetan Army were deployed against the “liberators” on the plains of Chamdo, just as, forty-six years back, they had been deployed against British Imperialist forces from India—the Francis Younghusband Expedition—on the plains of Guru. Results were the same in both encounters—the Tibetan resistance was wiped out.

But, apart from military resistance, Tibet resisted also diplomatically—through India. There was a Tibetan delegation to India, which refused the invitation to go to Peking. The leaders of it said, they would meet China on neutral ground. They also urged the desirability of having a non-aggression treaty with China based on China’s recognition of Tibet’s independence.

Gyalo Thondup, a brother of the present Dalai Lama, went to Formosa to confer with Chiang Kai-Shek. The Tibetan delegation repeated their refusal to go to Peking, but was preparing to go to Hong Kong to negotiate a Sino-Tibetan agreement on neutral territory, but the invasion of Tibet stopped it.
The Government of India delivered three notes to the Chinese Government—on October 21, October 28 and November 1, 1950—not, however, as the Tibetans wanted, but as was consistent with India’s policy of peace, pointing out in substance that the Liberation of Tibet might have been truly peaceful and the clash of arms on the root of the world might raise unfriendly echoes across the seas. Above all things else, the emphasis was on peace—peace first, peace second and peace always—and Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was accepted without reservations or conditions. On China’s reactions to the notes, the most authoritative comments naturally are from Shri K. M. Panikkar, the then Indian Ambassador in Peking.

“I received instructions to lodge a strong protest. The Chinese reply was equally strong. It practically accused India of having been influenced by the Imperialists and claimed that China had not taken any military action, but was determined to liberate Tibet by peaceful means. Our rejoinder, though couched in equally strong words, recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and disclaimed all desire to intervene in its affairs, and emphasized once again our desire that the issue between the Tibetans and Chinese should be decided peacefully and not by the use of force. Both parties had made their point of view clear and were content to let it rest there.” ("In Two Chinas"). Other comments from India less authoritative perhaps, but more candid, were that the Chinese replies to India’s overtures were the low-water-mark of diplomatic discourtesy. China not only insinuated and suggested, but actually said that Prime Minister Nehru, in protesting against the Chinese invasion of Tibet, was acting on instructions from Western Imperialist Powers—Great Britain and the U.S.A. It is amusing to recall that precisely this line was taken by the Chinese interrogator when he was “brain-washing” Robert Ford, the British wireless-operator, captured near Chamdo during the ‘Liberation’. He made the sage observation that power had not been transferred to the Indian people and Nehru was “a running dog of Whitehall and a lackey of Wall Street” (’Captured in Tibet”—by Robert Ford). The official diplomatic reply from China and this undiplomatic Chinese observa-
tion off the record look uncannily the same.

There was an appeal to the UNO on behalf of Tibet, but it was not pursued. The Chinese Army did not advance much further than Chamdo to pursue the Dalai Lama who had fled to Chumbi. For the Tibetan troops not only did not surrender, but still barred the only two routes to Lhasa. The Chinese Government called upon the Tibetan Government to come to Peking to negotiate a settlement. Since resistance would have been senseless, the Dalai Lama and the Government at Chumbi decided that it would be wise to accept the invitation and a delegation with plenary powers was despatched to Peking. As Heinrich Harrer observes in his famous book—he was in Chumbi at this time—that delegates drawn from all classes of population kept arriving in Chumbi to beg the ruler to return. “The whole of Tibet was sunk in depression and I now realised to the full how closely the people and their King were bound to one another. Without the blessing of his presence, the country could never prosper.” (Seven Years in Tibet)

After long negotiations, the 17-Point Agreement on Tibet was concluded in May 1951. The text is given in the Appendix.

Articles 4, 5 and 6 are significant. For though it is with the accredited representatives of the Dalai Lama that the representatives of the Chinese Government draw up the Agreement, the position of the Dalai Lama is recognised negatively, while that of Panchen Lama is recognised positively. The motivation becomes clear that, right from the beginning, the policy of “divide et impero” was being pursued between the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, the authority of the Dalai Lama was sought to be undermined by enhancing that of the Panchen Lama, so that, if the Dalai Lama could not be cured, he could not be endured either and then the Panchen Lama would be ready to take over. This actually happened only a year after, i.e. 1952, when the first inroad on the Dalai Lama’s position was made. By this, Tibet was cut up into three administrative zones: the Shigatze area was put under the Panchen Lama, the Eastern region under a Chinese General and the Dalai Lama was reduced to a ‘residuary legatee’ with only the
central and western portions of Tibet, that is to say, with barely one-fourth of his original secular dominion.

Article 11 is important, for it provides for the progressive introduction of reforms and Article 15, for it ensures the garrisoning of the country.

It is necessary at this point to look back and ask whether the protests of the Government of India against Chinese occupation of Tibet amount, as the Chinese say, to “intervention”.

To do this adequately, one has to look at the wood, not merely at the trees, for otherwise history is bound to cause confusion.

A fragment of early Tibetan verse dating from the 8th century A.D. (for which we are indebted to Mr. Hugh Richardson, C.I.E.) describes Tibet as KANG RI THON PO NI U, CHHU BO CHHEN PO NI GO; YU THO SA TSANG: “The centre of high snow mountains; the head of great waters, a lofty country, a pure land”. That is an apt description of a country bounded by the Himalayan Karakoram and Kuenhun mountains, and containing the sources of many of the greatest rivers of Asia: The Indus and the Sutlej, the Ganges and Brahmaputra, the Yellow River, the Yangtse, the Suleveen and the Mekong. But it is also an important expression of the idea that Tibet is a Holy Land, not merely as a form of words, but in theocratic reality, the State and Religion being one and the same. This idea has dominated Tibet for about 900 years and, since 16th century, has unified the country under the present line of Dalai Lamas. In political matters, Tibet has always been more closely involved with China than with her other neighbour—India, but the Tibetans have at no time been willing to be swallowed up by the Chinese empire. They had a common platform with China, as long as the Chinese Emperors were Buddhists or at least were the friends of Buddhism. It was for centuries a political theory convenient to both sides that the Chinese Emperors were the disciples of the great Tibetan Lamas and that their interest in Tibet was in the role of Defenders of the Faith.

There was also point in what the Govt. of British India used to urge, namely, that the suzerainty of China over
Tibet was “a constitutional fiction” and “a political affectation”, which had been maintained only on account of its convenience to both parties. China was “willing, nay, anxious, to adopt an enlightened policy, but her desire was always defeated by the Lamas”. Tibet, on her part, desired to open her country to trade, “but was prevented from doing so by the ‘despotic veto of the suzerain’.” Lord Curzon, in his despatch from the Govt. of India to the Secretary of State, 1899, described the whole thing as a “solemn farce”.

This state of things in Tibet survived the Muslim rule in India and the Muslim conquests in other parts of Asia, also the Jesuit Missions in Tibet in the 18th century, and the heretical break-through into Tibet by the Younghusband expedition of 1904, but the Republican Revolution in China in 1911 carried off Tibet’s last spiritual ally against modernism and the disappearance of the Divine Emperor, the Protector of Buddhism, removed the one bond with China which Tibetans had been prepared to accept. It had always been distasteful to Tibetans and they never lost opportunities of taking advantage of confusion in China to try to shake off Chinese control and of cultivating closer relations with the Government of India. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama, whom everybody who knew him at first-hand describes as a man of strong will, who had been an exile, first in China, when he fled from the British expeditions, and then in India, when he had no escape again, this time from the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1910, was largely responsible for the reorientation of Tibetan policy. The other most important man in the shaping of it was Sir Charles Bell, an officer of the Political Service of the India Government who was then in charge of Tibetan affairs and with whom the Thirteenth Dalai Lama was in close friendly contact. The political gravitation of Tibet towards India increased during the War of 1939-45, as all other approaches of China were blocked and Tibet found itself a busy high-way of trade between India and China. Tibetans are keen traders and all classes—monks, yak-keepers, farmers and noblemen turned to trade with enthusiasm. The number of Tibetan visitors to India increased greatly and the range of their
visits extended beyond Calcutta and the places of religious pilgrimage, to Delhi and Bombay.

The exit of British Imperialism from India abruptly changed the continuity of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's policy, which the War had so much accelerated. New India repudiated all "political or ulterior ambitions in Tibet" (Prime Minister Nehru) and accepted New China's historic position in that country. Not only that, India concluded with China in 1954 the Agreement on Trade based on the Five Principles, and later withdrew its troops from Tibet and handed over its Post and Telegraph installations and rest-houses to China. A course of action which would be normally incomprehensible, if the Indian protests of 1950 at the Tibetan invasion were truly "interventionist" in character. All that India had told China when her "peaceful", well-equipped Army of Liberation was getting too "peaceful" in winning battles over ill-equipped Tibetan armies was that the "Liberation" might just as well have been less sanguinary, a peaceful process of gradual infiltration rather than what it actually was, namely, an armed invasion. The all-out emphasis on non-violence and peace was the great lesson the Mahatma had taught India and, since what was happening in Tibet was a Nasmyth hammer versus an egg, it was a piece of elementary international courtesy on the part of the other great neighbour of Tibet to address China about it. If, as China now argues, the Indian protests revealed threats of intervention and China felt threatened, one has to accept the argument. It is China's privilege.

China and her Army of Liberation were threatened by peace indeed! If India's notes to China in 1950 were "intervention", what about the following? In reply to the greetings from the Communist Party of India, Mao-Tse-Tung stated on October 19, 1949 (the date is important): "I firmly believe that, relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of Imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the Socialist and Peoples Democratic family".

Is not this "intervention"? And should we not take
it as a gentle incitement to the C.P.I. to try to change India's form of Government?

But perhaps China's "sound and fury", her truculence and unexpected intransigence, her propaganda against Indian "expansionists" and "interventionists" and her tirades against "imperialist intrigues" in Tibet are all parts of a composite pattern—a "blind" or "red herring" across the trail, while the subjugation or flattening-up of Tibet is going on silently and ruthlessly all the time there.

In between the Chinese military occupation of Tibet in 1950 and the beginning of the present troubles, several notable events happened in regard to that country. One was the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 about Indo-Tibetan pilgrims and trade; another was the Dalai Lama's Indian tour in 1956, with Chinese escort, another, the setting up of the Preparatory Committee for the administration of Tibet with the Dalai Lama as the Chairman and the Chinese General in Tibet on it and yet another was the Chinese declaration in 1956 that Communist "reforms" in Tibet were to be put off for another six years, an effect of growing unrest in Tibet and a cause of yet more unrest to follow.

The doctrine of "Pancha Sila" was for the first time enunciated as a preamble to the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954; and Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was also, for the first time, recognised by independent India. It may appear rather curious 'prima facie' that an ordinary pilgrim and trade agreement between two neighbouring, friendly countries should open with the broadest declarations of general policies. Read between the lines, however, the reasons should not be far to seek and, read in the light of all that has happened since, the declarations ring prophetic. If, anywhere in the world, there has been authentic, long-sighted statesmanship in recent times, it is here.

In December '55, the Chinese decided to introduce 'land reforms' in Tibet and launched a drive for the collectivisation of the land by transferring the farms and livestock which had belonged to lamaserais and monasteries to farm co-operatives.

These measures, apart from the organised inroad on the
Dalai Lama’s authority begun in 1952, set off the first major revolt in Tibet during the spring of 1956. This was reported in numerous despatches from correspondents of Western newspapers and Press Agencies in Nepal and India during May and June, 1956. In August, 1956, a Peking news despatch of the New China News Agency admitted that “military measures against the rebels were necessary”.

The second revolt occurred during the spring of 1957, which was later reported in the “Work Report of the People’s Council of the Tibetan Autonomous Chou of Kanza”, published in 1958. This revolt also, China admitted, “compelled” the Communist Army to wage armed struggle against the counter-revolutionary leaders”.

A fresh considerable cause for Tibetan discontent was provided, when, in 1956, China initiated the Tibetan colonisation policy. The Chinese Governor of Tibet declared in that year: “Tibet is a huge area, but it is too thinly populated. Effort must be made to raise its population from its present level of three millions to more than a ten million.” Since then, the transplantation of Chinese populations from China into Tibet began to assume alarming proportions. A whole propaganda-organisation was set working to induce large-scale Chinese migration to Tibet, to proclaim to the world that Tibet was welcoming the Chinese into Tibet and fraternising with them and to outshout the truth that the Tibetans and the Chinese (Han) belonged to different races and cultures. In December, 1958, the ‘Changhow Honan Jahapao’ carried an account of an impassioned appeal by the vice-Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Marshal Chu-Teh, to the youth of China to go and colonise the frontier areas. As a result of all this, the Chinese are now to be found in large numbers in Tibet, where they hold responsible posts and own land and other property, sometimes to the exclusion of the Tibetans themselves. The “transplantation of races” and the garrisoning of Tibet went on, even though the communisation of land and other approved radical operations were somewhat braked upon by the decree of 1956.

News has always been blacked out from Tibet, but the
spear-head of the present rebellion in its initial stages appears to have been 8,000 Khambas in a 200-square mile area in Eastern Tibet—most of the basin of the Brahmaputra River (Tsan-Po) south of Lhasa. Their methods of warfare and weapons were primitive, though picturesque, but the nature of the Tibetan terrain and other local conditions helped to make them quite effective and the rebellion spread, until, at the close of the winter of 1958-59, virtually the whole of Tibet was an armed rebel camp and both Tibet and China decided to change the pace.
"The chief function of propaganda is to convince the masses, whose slowness of understanding needs to be given time in order that they may absorb information, and only constant repetition will finally succeed in imprinting an idea on the memory of the crowd". ("Hitler's Mein Kampf")

As a spectre, "imperialist intrigue" is easy enough to raise, but so difficult to exercise. It is a sort of cloak that may be used to cover a variety of "inferiority complexes" and, of course, a multitude of sins. A theme on which dissertation may go on indefinitely (in fact, has gone on beyond space and time), but of which nobody knows anything and everybody knows next to nothing (like ethno-
logical and socio-anthropological disquisitions on race and “influences”) it is the proverbial hat to talk through.

As long as British Imperialism was in India, “imperialist” attitudes inevitably and invincibly played an important part in moulding the policies of the Government of India towards Tibet—just as Chinese Imperialism, as long as it was real, had to play a significant part in shaping Tibet’s policies. To be convinced of this, one has only to recall 18th century history, when George Bogle, the envoy of Warren Hastings from India was received by the Tashi Lama (the same as Panchen Lama) of Tibet and the Chinese Emperor Kien Lung, on hearing of it, sent for the Tashi Lama from Peking with a great deal of mock-humility, received him in Peking with pomp and ceremony and then ultimately had him poisoned to death. There is a description in Dr. Sven Hedin’s “Jehol” of the whole affair, including the long funeral march with the Tashi Lama’s body from Peking back to Tashilumpo in Tibet.

After the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933, the Chinese clique in Lhasa under Hutuktu Rabchen formed the Regency. In 1943 another clique took over, headed by Tageha, which the Chinese love to describe as consisting of “the most reactionary henchmen of the Imperialists of the ruling clique in Tibet”, the assumption obviously being that any Tibetan of importance, not a henchman of China, is bound to be a henchman of Imperialism, unprogressive and reactionary.

This is said (as a result of “imperialist intrigue”, of course), to have led to the Civil War in Tibet of 1947 in which the ex-Regent was killed. If Heinrich Harrer’s eyewitness story of the incident is to be believed, it was the ex-Regent’s party that was conspiring to contrive a return to power and it was they who cast the first stone.

“In 1947, Lhasa had a minor civil war. The former Regent, Reting Rimpoche, who had voluntarily resigned his office, seemed once more ambitious for power. Reting had many adherents among the people and the officials, who stirred up ill-feeling against his successor. They wanted to see Reting back at the helm. They decided on action. The coup d’état was to be effected by the modern expedient
of a bomb. This was delivered as a present from an unknown admirer in the house of a high monastic official, but before the parcel reached the Regent, the infernal machine exploded. Luckily no one was killed. It was through this unsuccessful outrage that the conspiracy was disclosed. The energetic Tageha Rimpoche acted with speed and decision. A small army led by one of the Ministers marched to Reting's monastery and arrested the former Regent. The monks of the monastery of Sera revolted against this action and panic broke out in the town. The dealers barricaded their shops and took away their goods for safety. The Nepalese took refuge in their Legation, carrying with them all their valuables. The nobles shut the gates of their homes and armed their servants.

"The whole town was in a state of alert. Aufschnaiter had seen the columns marching towards Reting and came at top speed from his country home into the town, where he and I organised the defence of Tsarong's mansion. People were less preoccupied with the political crisis than with the fear that the monks of Sera, who numbered many thousands, would break into Lhasa and pillage the town. And there were others who had no confidence in the army, which was to some extent equipped with modern weapons. Military revolutions were not unknown in the history of Lhasa.

"The arrival of Retig as a prisoner was awaited with excitement, but in the meantime he had been conveyed secretly to the Potala. The monks who had planned to set him free were deceived by this action, but, in fact, from the moment that their leader was arrested, their cause was lost. Strong in their fanaticism, they refused to surrender and wild shooting soon began. It was not until the Government bombarded the town and monastery of Sera with howitzers and knocked down a few houses that the resistance ceased. The troops succeeded in over-powering the monks and peace returned to the capital. For weeks the authorities were occupied in bringing the culprits to justice and many severe floggings were inflicted. "Most of the monks of Sera fled to China", obviously the "command-centre" of the rebellion.
“While the bullets were still pinging towards the town the news of the death of the rebellious ex-Regent spread like wild fire among the people.

“The Government refused to confirm or deny the rumours. Probably few people knew what had really happened. The Late Regent had made many enemies during his term of office. On one occasion he caused a Minister who was plotting a rebellion to have his eyes put out. Now he had paid for this crime.” (Heinrich Harrer’s “Seven Years in Tibet”). This account is corroborated by all impartial observers including Amaury de Riencourt and Fosco Maraini.

The present Dalai Lama’s father is said in the Chinese Press to have been murdered, as a punishment for his pro-Chinese feelings. But here is a straightforward account of it from Heinrich Harrer’s book:

“During the New Year Celebrations, the father of the Dalai Lama died. Everything conceivable had been done to keep him alive. Monks and medicine men had tried every kind of remedy. They had even prepared a doll into which they charmed the patient’s sickness and then burnt it with great solemnity on the river bank. It was all to no purpose. To my way of thinking they would have done better to call in the English doctor, but of course the family of the Dalai Lama must always be a model of orthodoxy and must not swerve from traditional practice in time of crisis.

“The body was taken, as usual, to a consecrated plot outside the town where it was dismembered and given to the birds to dispose of. The Tibetans do not mourn for the dead in our sense of the word. Sorrow for the parting is relieved by the prospect of rebirth, and death has no terrors for the Budhist. Butter-lamps are kept burning for forty-nine days, after which there is a service of prayer in the house of the deceased. And that is the end of the story. Widows or widowers can marry after a short time and life resumes its wonted course.”

This should dispose of the propaganda that the present Dalai Lama’s father was murdered by the Imperialist clique in Lhasa. But, in any case, another story, related
by Lhalu, the Governor of Kham, about his own father is relevant and interesting. "When the Great Thirteenth departed to the Heavenly fields", said Lhalu, "some men of power wanted to betray Tibet to the Chinese. My father (who had been Commander-in-Chief under the Thirteenth Dalai Lama) opposed them and sent defiant messages to Chiang-Kai-Shek telling him to leave us alone. Then he was lured by his enemies to the Potala, where they arrested him. They said afterwards that they found two pieces of paper in his boots. They said that he managed to swallow one, but they seized the other and found the name of a Cabinet Minister written on it. Then, of course, my father was convicted of trying to kill him by witchcraft and his eyes were put out." (Robert Ford’s “Captured in Tibet”). Fosco Maraini corroborates the story in his “Secret Tibet”. He was in the dungeon cellars of the Potala for sometime and died after release. Unsuccessful attempts were made also on Lhalu’s life, because of his anti-Chinese attitude.

A name frequently used in Chinese propaganda is Living Buddha Geda, described as a “Tibetan Patriot”. He was Vice-Chairman of the Sikang Provincial People’s Government and, sent by China, arrived in Chamdo on July 24, 1950. There he is said to have been detained and then poisoned by the British special agent Robert Ford. The details are lacking and how far Robert Ford was responsible for the killing has to be left to conjecture. What is not conjecture, however, is the following about Robert Ford himself, given in the post-script to Heinrich Harrer’s “Seven Years in Tibet”.

“Last year I found myself in London, working on the completion of the film version of ‘Seven Years in Tibet’; and it was at this time that I again met Bob Ford, who was brought into Tibet to Reginald Fox as wireless operator at Chamdo for the Tibetan Government. Captured by the invading Chinese and accused of espionage and other ‘crimes’, Bob was imprisoned for five years and subjected to that terrible process known as ‘brain-washing’. But with great courage and endurance he survived long periods of solitary confinement and was finally released. When I saw him he was planning, after a long rest, to write a book on his
experiences. Fox himself succumbed to numerous illnesses and died at Kalimpong in 1953."

"Robert Ford in short was a victim of the wildest accusations." His book 'Captured in Tibet' (Published in 1957) gives the whole story of the Red Lama and his death, also of the invasion of Tibet of 1950.

Another name bandied about in the Chinese Press is that of Lowell Thomas. He is said to have been a militant American spy. The fact is that, on the 1st August 1949, this American gentleman and his father, Mr. Lowell Thomas, Senior, who had long been well-known as a traveller in many lands and as an author and radio commentator, arrived at the foot of the Himalayas armed with an invitation from the Tibetan Government to visit Lhasa. They were, in fact, the last Westerners to make the journey to Lhasa before China took over.

Some ten weeks later, they were back in India. A similar journey had been undertaken by another American, Mr. Arch Steele, who contributed a series of articles on Tibet to the Chicago Daily News. Mr. Lowell Thomas expressed certain opinions which have been made good use of by Chinese propaganda, though, in reality, they were nothing but just personal reaction. Lowell Thomas said during his radio-commentary, on October 17, 1949: "What the rulers of Tibet want to know is whether they can get help from U.S.A. now, or in the event of a communist invasion. If they can get help, they want two things —advisers on guerilla warfare and more modern weapons."

When, however, the communist invasion actually took place, a year after, there was neither any adviser on guerilla warfare nor any modern weapon from America; there was only the then U.S. Secretary Dean Acheson's protest that the 'Liberation' was flagrant aggression. Spoken words fly away, but the written word remains, and this protest has remained. Far from being of earth-shaking importance, the observations of Euro-American tourists did not produce any appreciable effect whatsoever. Giuseppe Tucci, the Italian scholar, also spent the spring and summer of 1948 in Tibet; and so did Peter Aufschnaiter and Heinrich Harrer.
Heinrich Harrer somewhere says, the number of Euro-Americans he met in Lhasa during all the time he was there did not exceed seven. Tibet was still the forbidden land, policy had not changed.

By the end of September, 1950, Reginald Fox, the English wireless operator of the Tibetan Government (at Lhasa) had left for India. Mr. Richardson of the British Political Mission in Lhasa made over to an Indian Officer and left. Thus Bull, an English missionary and Robert Ford, the other English wireless operator of the Tibetan Government (at Chamdo) were the only two Britons left in Tibet, when the Chinese “liberated” Tibet from them. Of non-Imperialist Europeans, there appeared to have been only three. Harrer, Aufschnaiter (German) and Nebdailoff (White Russian).

One swallow does not make a summer, nor one starring, a winter. The bogey of “imperialist espionage” seems to fade out, as the scales are balanced evenly. But since the number of Chinese spies operating on Tibetan soil will perhaps never be told, the question of striking a balance hardly arises at all.

It is not perhaps so easy to accuse the great 13th Dalai Lama of having been a British spy. Yet it was he who wrote to the Viceroy of India: “All the people of Tibet and myself have become of one mind, and the British and Tibetans have become one family.” And, to Sir Charles Bell, the leader of the Political Mission of the British-Indian Government his last words were: “We have known each other for a long time and I have complete confidence in you, for we two are men of like mind. I pray continually that you may return to Lhasa.” As F. Spencer Chapman aptly observes:

“Tibet could not stand alone, unless she was left alone. It became increasingly clear that, surrounded by Russia, China and India, and carefully watched by Japan, Tibet must rely on a stronger Power. If we (England) could not guarantee her peace, she must arm herself and if we could not supply her with munitions, she must turn elsewhere. The Tibetan reception of Sir Charles Bell’s Mission was her final effort to secure our assistance.”
This was the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's summing up also, when he wrote the Political Testament which he drew up a year before his death. "The Government of India is near to us and has a large army. The Government of China also has a large army. We should therefore maintain firm friendship with these two; both are powerful". (Quoted in Sir B. J. Gould—"The Jewel in the Lotus")

To describe Sir Charles Bell’s Political Mission of 1920 as "imperialist intrigue" would be a misuse of dictionary terms. For it came just after the Chinese Mission to Lhasa of the same year and one was as much "imperialist intrigue" as the other. So also the British Mission went to Lhasa in 1936, because China had sent a Mission in 1934 and was trying to bring Tibet under Chinese control.

The emergence of Indian independence and the end of British Imperialism in India changed the whole position radically. Whatever vestige of "imperialist intrigue" there might have been in the past, it was all swept away, when Prime Minister Nehru set a new pace in Asiatic relation by returning all the British-maintained Postal and Telegraphic installations in Tibet to Tibet, along with the rest-houses, and withdrawing all Indian military and quasi-military units and personnel. When New China emerged out of the Civil War, Prime Minister Nehru was one of the earliest to greet her and India pioneered her international recognition.

The doctrine of Panch Sil, of which Prime Minister Nehru was the leading exponent, recognised Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet, but also recognised Tibet's "regional autonomy". This should be self-evident, as one reads it with care. It was farthest from Prime Minister Nehru's intention to barter away Tibetan independence for the sake of China's good will, in other words, for "appeasement". China's "suzerainty" and Tibetan independence were integrally and organically associated, one with the other. In fact, one was treated as exactly complementary to the other. The Bandung Conference which both China and India attended re-emphasized the principles of "Panch Sil".

Some people, however, would take the written principles of 'Panch Sil' too literally and urge that the emphasis should be on the 'territorial integrity' of China rather than
of Tibet, as if one rules out the other. The reality, however, is that the “suzerainty” of China is perfectly compatible with the “regional autonomy” of Tibet and, if the Panch Sil guarantees anything, it guarantees the co-existence of both. They have co-existed during long periods in the past and there was nothing now that had to compel China to be the hammer and Tibet, the anvil.

It is amusing, if not ridiculous, that the vassal Press of China has been referring to India, after the Tibetan rebellion, not as “imperialist”, but as “expansionist”, as if the expressions were not synonymous. And it is also curious that the policy of the Government of India has been (or is being) adversely criticized, on the one hand, by Euro-America (such men as Prince Peter of Greece) for having sent arms and ammunitions to help the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 and also for not having done enough for Tibet in her present agony and, on the other hand, by China for having been more pro-Tibetan than pro-Chinese during the revolt and after. The accusation of having helped China in her conquest of Tibet is as fantastic, absurd and malicious as the latter accusation of being more pro-Tibetan than pro-Chinese in the Chinese reconquest of Tibet is unreal; and the accusation of not having done enough is Quixotic, for no Power in the world could do more.

The tragedy, however, is slightly relieved with a touch of melodrama—a Chinese contribution, which has been amplified and even excelled by the Communist Party of India. It is the touch about Kalimpong being the “command centre” of the Tibetan Rebellion. Though repeatedly repudiated by the Prime Minister of India, the cloak-and-dagger atmosphere which the accusation created nevertheless lingers.

It has been seriously asked in self-righteous indignation whether a Government committed to Panch Sil could justifiably “give a portion of its territory” for carrying on subversive propaganda against a friendly neighbour. Noble sentiments nobly expressed, indeed! But would China be good enough to let the world know how many Chinese “nationals” were in Kalimpong as “spies”, doing counter-espionage? Also how many Indian, Sikkimese and also
Tibetan residents of Kalimpong, was China employing for this purpose, during the period under review? It is all so much like a game of fives that one has to think of the recoil too.*

As early as 1944, Pangda Rapga, the youngest of the Pangda Tsang brothers, had been expelled by the British from Kalimpong, after it was rumoured that he had been distributing bulletins with the "hammer and sickle" represented on them. He had obviously been running some sort of organisation opposed to the Lhasa Government and "was reported to have been getting money from the Chinese." (Robert Ford's "Captured in Tibet")

It was made abundantly clear most authoritatively that the allegations of espionage in Kalimpong, which China put up to the Government of India, were all inquired into and not one of them was substantiated. All non-Indians in Kalimpong used to be observed closely and their activities checked up. They were strictly enjoined not to indulge in unauthorised political activity; and it was made sure that the orders were obeyed.**

Robert Ford calls Kalimpong a "political gossip factory" and not without reason. For it so happens that Kalimpong is just off the great high-way between India and Tibet through Sikkim. Both the Nathu-La and the Jalep-La, the most important passes into Eastern Tibet, may be taken most conveniently from here. And if Indo-Tibetan contact through the centuries has centred round this area (Kalimpong town may be of British origin, but the area is not) and ever so many Tibetans have been either residents of Kalimpong for a long time or go up and down through Kalimpong for trade, blame geography for it.

One other argument, over-stressed and over-exploited, is that, due to "Imperialist intrigue", Tibet used to be treat-

*The curious may find Rene Von Nebesky-Wojkowitz's eyewitness description of the Chinese Military Governor's reception at Kalimpong given in his book entitled "Where the Gods are Mountains" (published in Great Britain in 1956) not only interesting but apposite to the point about Chinese espionage in Kalimpong.

**The White Paper, published lately by the Govt. of India, is interesting reading about Kalimpong.
ed as a "buffer state" between China and the British Empire in India and Tibet would no longer be that. Some observations of Mr. Basil Gould (later Knighted), the British Political Officer in Lhasa, dating back to the thirties of this century provide propaganda-fodder for this argument. To this, one can only say that there have been too many political changes between that time and this, not the least important of them being the rise of India as a non-Imperialist Power. In the quicksands of international politics, one who would repeat ancient conundrums uncritically would inevitably get lost. With the Himalayas as the Great Divide, there is hardly any need for a "buffer", if, by "buffer State" is meant what the Oxford Dictionary defines it to be, namely, "small State between two large ones diminishing chance of hostilities." Besides, with the extraordinary development of the Air Arm in our own times and of nuclear weapons—atomic bombs and atomic artillery—the phrase "buffer state", one would have supposed, had lost its meaning. There is hardly any buffer state anywhere in the world today. If England's frontier, as Stanley Baldwin observed, was on the Rhine, China's or India's frontier may be anywhere and everywhere now.

As it is, Tibet happens to be a significant illustration of what that school of historians, of which Huntingdon and Dickinson have been exponents in our time called the "geographical interpretation of History". China may feel dissatisfied with it, but she can hardly alter it. The geographical position of Tibet, in the midst of Russia, China and India, remains unalterable. If the political implications of a "buffer state" are too unsavoury for China, she may please herself by calling Tibet what she has now become, namely, a "dependency". The terminological exactitude would hardly do China credit.

The conclusion is borne in on one who examines the whole controversy objectively—in fact, it is inescapable—that China knows at least as much as any other country in the world and very much more than many countries that "imperialist intrigue" was not responsible for the present Tibetan Rebellion. It was an organised, large-scale attempt—not for the first time in history either—at the national
self-expression and self-assertion of Tibet.

To know all this and yet to continue propaganda against "imperialist intrigue" in Tibet are somewhat unreal. They do not ring sincere and true. If the truth is to be told, it looks uncannily like the proverbial "red herring" to mislead. And what could be the real purpose of it all? The answer is clear.

Large tracts of Indian territory are splashed Chinese on the maps and China persists in not changing them to correspond with reality, inspite of India's protests. This seems to be a favourite Chinese method. It may be called "annexation by cartography". Chinese maps, circulated all the world over, were showing Chamdo, the principal town in Kham, as being in China—even before the "liberation" made it a reality and Robert Ford was hauled over live coals for spreading the "error" that Chamdo was in Tibet. As Prime Minister Nehru said to a Press Conference recently, "Chinese troops are already in possession of small pockets of Indian territory on the border."* It is this, above all things else, that makes necessary the world-wide Chinese propaganda about "imperialist intrigue" and 'Indian expansionism'.

China has not made too many mistakes so far, but of those she has made, two are of capital importance: (i) she allowed the Dalai Lama to visit India in 1956, and (ii) she failed to prevent his egress out of Tibet.

* The position has very much worsened since the above was written.
“Besides, the Etruscans were vicious. We know it, because their enemies and exterminators said so. Just as we knew the unspeakable depths of our enemies in the last War. Who isn’t vicious to his enemy? To my detractors I am a very effigy of vice.

“However, those pure, clean-living, sweet-souled Romans, who smashed nation after nation and crushed the free soul in people after people, and were ruled by Messalina and Heliogabalus and such-like snowdrops, they said the Etruscans were vicious. The only vicious people on the face of the earth, presumably. You and I, dear reader, we are two unsullied snowflakes, aren’t we? We have every right to judge.” (D. H. Lawrence in his “Etruscan Places”)

China has always been extremely good at striking
attitudes, but the latest, her Messianic pose, seems to be quite the best so far. The quantity, quality and variety of propaganda she has unleashed to clinch it are enormous, indeed; but it has been on the whole, more demonstrative than useful. It has convinced nobody beyond the Communist countries, to whom, converted as they are, it is superfluous to preach.

The propaganda is concentrated on three fronts: (1) Tibet is so backward, primitive and serf-ridden that it is a blot on the civilisation of the world and it is the duty of China, ordained by historical determinism, to reform and bring her into line with civilisation; (2) it is not the “people” who have rebelled against Chinese “reforms”, but only a handful of “upper-strata Tibetan reactionaries”, whose vested feudal interests had already indelibly marked them as enemies of the “people”, and the Khambas, a barbarous tribe with hardly any political sense at all and (3) whoever abets or supports not the rape of Tibet is an accomplice of Imperialism.

Taking the propaganda items seriatim and beginning at the beginning, Tibet is admitted to be primitive, backward and serf-ridden, but there is no common yardstick to measure culture or civilization by and possession of a superior civilization (whatever that might mean) would not ‘ipso-facto’ entitle any nation to invade and civilize another on a lower plane. Who judges the “superiority” or “inferiority” is a puzzle. If it were conceded that China, because of the make-believe of her superior culture, has a right to attack Tibet at six places on the frontier and to contrive the downfall of the Dalai Lama, the head of the State, we would be opening the gate to international anarchy. Any country with certain pretensions to superiority in culture would then automatically have the right to invade, occupy and civilize other countries less pretentious or obstreperous. The liberation of Tibet, in this respect, bears an analogy to the Opium War of the 19th century, of which China herself was the victim. The opening-up of China by the Imperialists at the mouth of the gun was justified on the assumption that China had, before the opening up, been a closed country, rather
peculiar and barbarous, and it was Europe's duty to open her up.

Article 11 of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951 provided for reform but not for armed interference or revolution. It reads as follows:

"In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet."

Not even the Chinese have said, the Dalai Lama was unprogressive. He was a virtual prisoner, they say, in the hands of a reactionary clique. But the composition of the Administrative Committee, as fixed by Article 15, of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement was a matter in which the Chinese had a say, perhaps the final say, 'de jure' and 'de facto'. Thus there was nothing to prevent the elimination of the reactionaries from the Committee and the introduction of progressives. It would have been a gradual process, but perhaps, that exactly was the trouble. China could not afford to bear with 'gradualness', so it was not tried at all. If the "reforms" had to be put off officially for sometime, subsequent events, as they were contrived, more than made up for the lee-way. The classic manoeuvre of setting up the Panchen Lama against the Dalai Lama lay handy and it was used.

Indian Democratic Nationalism was born to the great traditions of Liberal Humanism; and of this, there is hardly any greater exponent in all the world today than Prime Minister Nehru. It is now well-known that Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai promised Nehru that Tibetan "autonomy", as it then was, would be respected. It meant, even if it was not spoken in so many words, that military forces would not be deployed to this extent to "civilize" Tibet, also that internal conditions would not be created, which would force the exit of the head of the Tibetan State and the greater number of his Ministers from that country.
One cannot help feeling that, in this context, "perjury", is too weak a word to describe all that has been done in Tibet, also all that China is now saying against Nehru. For the White Man’s Burden, we have now the Yellow Man’s Burden—and Tibet is the first poisonous fruit of it. China’s “pledges” sound familiar, probably too obviously reminiscent of Hitler’s.

Next comes the old, ramshackle trick trotted out by Imperialism through the ages and all the world over—the quibble about “people”.

Who actually rebelled, whether it was the “people” or just a cross-section of them (the “upper-strata reactionaries”, the feudal serf-owners and the Khambas), is writ large all over, for everybody to see, for there is plenty of independent evidence in the Tibetan refugee camps of Misamari and Buxa. It is putting too great a strain on the credulity of the world to ask it to believe that an insurrection which took the massive strength of China nearly a month to quell (putting aside the many previous years of skirmishing) and which convulsed the whole of Eastern Tibet was confined to a handful of people. It was after all the metropolitan Lhasans who tore up the 17-point Sino-Tibetan Agreement and the Khambas were their sword-arm.

Photographs have been circulated, on the one hand, of Tibetans welcoming the Chinese Army of Liberation and, on the other hand, of Khamba atrocities. The Khambas are doubtless barbarous, for they have had no opportunity of being trained in the Chinese art of exquisite cruelty, but where are the photographs of Tibetans fighting (not welcoming) the Chinese and of Chinese atrocities? One wonders whether the next canard to be circulated would be that there was no Tibetan rebellion at all, except against the Dalai Lama, whom the Tibetans themselves threw out.

It is increasingly evident, as time passes, that New China is ominously going Japan’s way. Yet, not so long ago, New China, like Japan at one time, was looked upon as the rising hope of Asia and New India, under Nehru, was among the first to hail the New World. How rapidly
and how cruelly these hopes have been shattered is common knowledge and the pity is that power-drunk China herself blazes the trail in shattering them. Perhaps this was historically inevitable, for Nationalism, unless properly controlled and mitigated by Liberal Humanism, invincibly transforms itself into Imperialism. But New China exhibits not Imperialism only, but Chauvinism and Jingoism also. She is actually parading them.

When old China bled, a cry of anguish went out from the soul of India. It was the voice of Rabindra Nath. New China now is making Tibet bleed. The Indian soul cries out again. It is the voice of Prime Minister Nehru.
"Go now, and tell the world that we are fighting. You are the only one who knows. Tell them we are not Chinese, but an independent nation and want to remain independent and free. We may lose this war; I know we are not likely to get help now, or even in the spring. I know that without help we are bound to lose in the end. If they could cross the upper Yangtse, they can cross the Salween. They may occupy the whole of our land. But, even if they do, our struggle will not have been in vain. This is a war worth fighting to win and even worth fighting and losing; for defeat is not final when the fighting stops—Next time, it may be ten or fifteen, twenty, fifty years or more; but so long as we remember that they came by force, our will to be free will survive. We shall become free again because the gods are on our side. But tell the world, Phodo Kusho, that we did not turn away."

—Khenchi Dawala (Kham General) to Robert Ford; quoted from Robert Ford’s “Captured in Tibet”.

"History," said Mommsen, "has a Nemesis for every
sin—for an impotent craving for freedom, as also for an
injudicious generosity.” Of any generosity to Tibet, judi-
cicious or injudicious, we do not know whether China has
ever been guilty; but, for the former, Tibet pays the toll.
Every national “craving for freedom” is, however, potent
or impotent, exactly as other Powers help to make it and
every national independence is ultimately a resultant of
a sort of parallelogram of forces. If other Powers could
have sustained her, Tibet’s passion for independence
might conceivably have been satisfied. As it turns out,
however, the case for Tibet’s independence is that it no
longer exists.

For many centuries now, Tibet has yearned for inde-
pendence. When China has been weak, her “suzerainty”
over Tibet has been nominal, but when China has been
strong, it has been real. China’s ‘de jure’ sovereignty
over Tibet is as true an historical fact as the ‘de facto’ in-
dependence of Tibet. Except for two short periods of
Chinese rule, both of which were ended by a national re-
volt, Tibet had been an autonomous State for centuries.

The last time before the present rebellion, Tibet
demonstratively asserted her independence in July, 1949,
when, taking advantage of the Civil War in China (the
K.M.T. was passing out and New China coming in) she
expelled all Chinese officials and residents from Lhasa.
The narrative is given in Harrer’s book.

“The Civil War in China assumed a more and more
disquieting aspect, and it was feared that trouble might
arise among the Chinese residents in Lhasa. In order to
show that Tibet considered itself independent of Chinese
politics, the Government decided one day to give Chinese
Minister his ‘conge’. About a hundred persons were
affected by this decision, against which there was no
appeal.

“The Tibetan authorities acted with typical craft.
They chose a moment when the Chinese radio-operator
was playing tennis to go to his home and take possession
of his transmitting set. When he heard about the order
to leave that his Chief had received, he could no longer
communicate with the Chinese Government. The post
and telegraph offices in the city were closed for a fortnight and the world thought that Tibet was having another civil war.

"The expelled Chinese diplomats were treated with exquisite courtesy and invited to farewell parties. They were allowed to change their Tibetan money for rupees at a favourable rate and were given free transport to the Indian frontier. They did not understand exactly what had happened to them, but all were sorry to go. Most of them returned to China or Formosa. Some travelled direct to Peking, where Mao-Tse-Tung had already established his seat of Government.

"Thus the century-old quarrel between China and Tibet broke out again. Communist China interpreted the expulsion of the Minister and his staff as an affront, not as a gesture of neutrality, which the Tibetans meant it to be. In Lhasa, it was fully realised that a Red China would constitute a grave threat to the independence of Tibet and to the Tibetan religion. People quoted utterances of the Oracle and pointed to various natural phenomena which seemed to confirm their fears. The great comet of 1948 was regarded as a portent of danger and freak births among domestic animals were held to be ominous." ('Seven Years in Tibet')

There seems to be nothing to carp at in Tibet's movement for independence. For, before her eyes and almost next-door, Burma, India and Ceylon became independent and independent Pakistan was born. It was therefore perfectly natural, in this environment, that Tibet's desire for independence, which had always been there, should become a sacred cause. In fact, Tibet had been, for a long time, more independent than India, Burma and Ceylon of pre-'47 days.

Shri Sundarlal, the leader of the Indian Good Will Mission to China (September-October, 1951) writes in his "China To-day": "Yet in November, 1947, some foreign imperialists instigated the Tibetans to send out to America and Great Britain a so-called 'Trade Mission' which was made to move about in the United States and in Great Britain with an aura of independent status."
Shri Sundarlal was probably not told that India was the first country this “so-called” Trade Mission visited and China was the next. From China, it passed on to other countries. The account of the Mission is given in Harrer’s book. There is nothing laughable in the “aura of independent status” the Trade Mission assumed, for, in 1947, the whole atmosphere of Asia was surcharged with talks and hopes of independence. If Shri Sundarlal himself was moving about China in 1951, with “an aura of independent status”, it was due to India’s independence, which was born in August 1947. In November 1947, the Tibetan Trade Mission had the independence of India, Burma and Ceylon as shining examples to inspire. He repeats, perhaps unconsciously, what the Kuomintang Ambassador in Washington urged of the Tibetan Trade Mission at that time, when he protested against their admission to the U.S., namely, that they were Chinese “subjects” with “false passports”.

Some Indian historians chose to make themselves a laughing stock of the world recently, when they set about debunking the Indian Sepoy Mutiny from the status Savarkar, the first nationalist historian of the Mutiny, had given it, namely, that of the War of Indian Independence. It was solemnly argued over vast tracts of printed paper that it was not a “national” movement at all, but a sectional affair confined to only the feudal nobility and certain dissatisfied elements among the Indian Sepoys and it should be more accurately described as the last kick of dying feudalism in India.

A controversy, not intrinsically dissimilar, seems to have arisen over the question whether the Tibetan rebellion was truly national in character.

Nobody, however, seems to ask what percentage of a country’s population participating in a rebellion would entitle it to be considered to be “national”? Is there or can there be any such fixed percentage? It would be interesting, indeed, if our historians would survey all past and present rebellions and revolutions from this point of view, but for such a task only an itch for notoriety is by no means enough. Common sense, if it were not really so
uncommon, might however tell them the truth, which is that there has never been any rebellion or revolution, in any country in the world, in which every citizen, on a house-to-house census basis, has taken part. The French Revolution by no means affected the whole country—there were large areas in France, predominantly royalist—nor could the Russian Revolution rope in every Russian. The Tibetan rebellion is certainly not an exception to this general rule. If the Dalai Lama, the head of the State, and the greater number of his Cabinet Ministers rebelled, the official Tibetan Army fought the Chinese and practically the whole of Eastern Tibet was in active ferment, there is no getting away from the fact that it was truly national in scope and character.

The curtain now falls, for Tibetan nationalism passes out. The death was mercifully quick. For whom does the bell toll? Not for Tibet only, but for every country which has a tradition of Liberal Humanism and Nationalism. It tolls for us all.
There were some whose conduct can be explained by their innate stupidity and incompetence; but there are others who have a definite ulterior purpose in view. Often it is difficult to distinguish between the two classes." (Hitler's "Mein Kampf")

"Foolishness repeated by thirty-six million mouths is nevertheless foolishness" (Anatole France), but the pity is that the bigger it is, the further it will go. Probably, that is why the propaganda by the Communists of India against Tibet is so all-pervasive. If it is not the pay-master of the piper calling the tune, these marionettes dancing to the tune of Chinese propaganda would, indeed, be difficult to explain. But not too difficult perhaps, for they bear a sort of family resemblance to those most estimable and amiable Spanish gentlemen, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.

Half-truths from Sino-Tibetan history have been culled and collected with meticulous care to "prove" that Tibet has always been Chinese property, it is the reaction-
ary group among Tibetans which has been responsible for the denunciation of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951 and that the Tibetan rebellion was supported by only a fragment of the population. The plot to kidnap the Dalai Lama, related in detail with gusto, reads like a Guy Boothby novel. The patriotic role, with the cry that Sino-Indian friendship is imperilled, if Tibetan nationalism is supported, is, of course, there, played, one must say, extremely well. One wonders if Sir Alec Guinness could have done better.

Nobody would deny that the Chinese have always claimed "suzerainty" over Tibet. But the manner of it has also always varied. When China has been stronger than Tibet, she has sent down garrisons to enforce the "suzerainty"; and when Tibet has been stronger, she has repudiated the "suzerainty" and thrown the garrison out.

There have always been in Tibet—it happens in every country which has the misfortune of being placed between two mile-stones (or shall we say three—China, India and Russia?) two main political parties, one with Chinese affiliations, the other with Indo-Russian affiliations. As long as British Imperialism was in India, Indian affiliations meant of course British affiliations. When the 13th Dalai Lama was leaning so heavily on the British in India, China was courting the Panchen Lama, who went to China and remained there a "precarious" guest, until his death. Chinese support to the Panchen Lama, as against the Dalai Lama, is by no means a new thing.

The Dalai Lama was by no means a puppet in the hands of a reactionary clique, as the Indian Communists would have the world believe. "Give the Dalai Lama the power" was the demand of the people even before he came of age, when there were accusations against the favourites of the Regent who was ruling Tibet during his minority. And since the day that he was officially recognised as having attained majority, the Dalai Lama has not been exactly a puppet. He was profoundly dissatisfied at the turn and drift of current events and, since the remedy lay beyond Tibet's strength, he decided to leave. His secret departure from Lhasa and Tibet involved doubtless a good deal of planning in advance, but where is the evidence that the reactionary clique did it
for him, without his being privy to it? Nothing indicates that he was anybody's prisoner. With a sureness and deftness of touch which might well be the envy and despair of many an illusionist, this young priest-King quickly decided what to do and put his decision through. That should be the most natural and obvious conclusion from the facts at our disposal. His three letters to the Chinese General prove nothing, they were just a camouflage. No doubt, he had his helpers and advisers, every one of his rank and status has.

The Indian Communists have been trying yet another angle for propaganda. It is that the Tibetan refugees in India have been eating up a lot of food and since food is already scarce here, relief to Tibetan refugees should stop. They may be reminded—since it seems that they have forgotten it—that India sent out her famous Medical Mission to China at a time when India could ill afford to spare it and it is absurd that India should now refuse food and shelter to people from a neighbouring country who are in obvious distress, just because the beneficiaries do not happen to be Chinese. Such conduct would also be a breach of elementary international courtesy.

The Chinese Press has lately been slinging a lot of mud against respected leaders of Indian public opinion, particularly Shri J. P. Narain, Ashok Mehta and J. B. Kripalani. Even Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mrs. V. Pandit have not been spared. India's political life is not monolithic like China's and the Chinese Press would be well-advised not to forget that all the various cross-sections of public opinion which these leaders represent constitute the common, composite pattern of indivisible Indian Nationalism. One cannot cut up the fabric, to admire one part of it at the expense of another.

A veiled threat also seems to be on parade that, if, India supports Tibet, China may support demands for "autonomy" or "independence" in the constituent States of the Indian Union. She may help to set up Committees for Uttar Pradesh or Assam.

The threat may be a good gambit for debate, but, outside the Communist Party, doctrinaire debating societies
are rare in this country. And it will take a long time for the C.P.I. to muster enough strength to be anything better.

It is admitted on all hands, by India no less than by China, that Indo-Chinese friendship is of sovereign importance. The road to it, however, may not be strewn with “roses, roses, all the way”. In order to be real, the friendship should be strong enough to absorb shocks and survive them. Only then would it prove itself.

"After Tibet—What?"—is a question to which Indian opinion, beguiled by sentimental gush, cannot be indifferent. It does not forget that false friendships may sometimes be even more deadly than open enemies. Having entered this ‘caveat’, India hopes that Indo-Chinese friendship will prove more real than the Tibetan shock has revealed it to be—also that it will not only abide, but grow from more to more.
The statement of the Dalai Lama from Indian territory have been before the world for sometime and are now public property. The hospitality of the Government of India extends only to the granting of the asylum and by no means beyond. The recognition of Tibet’s belligerency under International Law or of her independence is not a matter which India can unilaterally dispose of. Her peculiar diplomatic position obviously forbids the recognition of the Dalai Lama and his Cabinet as the Government of Tibet. It rules out, in fact, any deviation from the policy of strict neutrality to the Tibetan crisis or assumption of any positive political bias against China. It is for the U.N.O. to take the lead in evolving an abiding policy for Tibet, which will be respected by all the Powers concerned. Diplomacy, unbacked by armed force, has always been useless and will be, if synthesis is not reached on a higher plan. It is the duty of the premier International political organisation, the U.N.O. to address itself to this task. And it is to the U.N.O. that this expression of Indian opinion is dedicated.

To the Tibetans themselves, India responds with their own message of hope:

“Dewa tentu thoppar sho”.

(Success be yours in all your endeavours)

June, ’59.
Calcutta.
The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has performed its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of our great Motherland. But over the last 100 years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China, and in consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary governments, the Kuomintang reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppressing and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. And the Local Government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deceptions and provocations, and adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards our great Motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering.

In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese People's War of Liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary government—was overthrown; and the common foreign enemy of all the nationalities—the aggressive imperialist forces—was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and of the Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's...
Government declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People’s Republic of China will become a big fraternal and co-operative family, composed of all its nationalities; that within the big family of all nationalities of the People’s Republic of China, national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs, while the Central People’s Government shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central People’s Government and the direct leadership of higher levels of People’s Governments, all national minorities are fully enjoying the right of national equality and have established, or are establishing, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the People’s Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all the other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural and educational work, the Central People’s Government, when it ordered the People’s Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the Local Government of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

In the latter part of April 1951, the delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People’s Government appointed representatives
with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet. As a result of these talks, both parties agreed to conclude this agreement and guarantee that it will be carried into effect.

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland—the People’s Republic of China.

2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People’s Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defence.

3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People’s Government.

4. The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

5. The established status, functions and powers of the Panchen Erdeni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Erdeni are meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th Panchen Erdeni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

8. Tibetan troops shall be reorganised by stages into the People’s Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the People’s Republic of China.
9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce shall be developed step by step, and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take single needle or thread from the people.

14. The Central People's Government shall conduct the centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work.

Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local Government of Tibet, various districts and leading monasteries; the name-list shall be drawn up
after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's Government and the various quarters concerned, and shall be submitted to the Central People's Government for appointment.

16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall be provided by the Central People's Government. The Local Government of Tibet will assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, fodder and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it. Signed and sealed by:

Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet:

Chief Delegate:
Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme

Delegates:
Dzasak Khemey Chang Ching-wu
Sonam Wangdi Chang Kuo-hua
Khentrung Thupten Tenthar Sun Chih-yuan
Trenchung Thupten Peking, May 23, 1951
Lekmuun
Khenthan Thupert
Rimshi Sumposey Tenzin Thundup
APPENDIX II

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA ON TRADE AND INTERCOURSE BETWEEN TIBET REGION OF CHINA AND INDIA

April 29, 1954

The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India, being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India, have resolved to enter into the present agreement based on the following principles:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,

2. Mutual non-aggression,

3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,

4. Equality and mutual benefit, and

5. Peaceful co-existence,

and for this purpose have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries:

The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, His Excellency Han-fu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People’s Government; the Government of the Republic of India, His Excellency Nediyam Raghavan, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India accredited to the People’s Republic of China, who, having examined each other’s credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:
ARTICLE I

The high contracting parties mutually agree to establish trade agencies:

1. The Government of India agrees that the Government of China may establish trade agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.

2. The Government of China agrees that the Government of India may establish trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The trade agencies of both parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The trade agents of both parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their function, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The trade agencies of both parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail-bags and communications in code.

ARTICLE II

The high contracting parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet region of China and India may trade at the following places:

1. The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse and (3) Phari as markets for trade.

The Government of India agrees that trade may be carried on in India, including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.

2. The Government of China agrees to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung, (Taklakot), (3) Gyanima-Kharga, (4) Gyanti Chakra, (5) Ramura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Puling-Sumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade; the Government of India agrees that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari District of Tibet region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for
trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari District of Tibet region of China, it will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

ARTICLE III

The high contracting parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar) in Tibet region of China in accordance with custom.

2. Pilgrims from Tibet region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.

3. Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE IV

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route: (1) Shipki La Pass, (2) Mana Pass, (3) Niti Pass, (4) Kungri Bingri Pass, (5) Darma Pass and (6) Lipu Likh Pass.

Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE V

For travelling across the border, the high contracting parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other party except as provided in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this Article.

1. Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Tibet region of China and India, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be

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allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or Tibet region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border checkposts of the other party.

2. Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article 4 above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.

3. Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registration at the border checkposts of the other party.

4. Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkposts of the other party and receive a permit of pilgrimage.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.

6. Persons who enter the territory of the other party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other party.

ARTICLE VI

The present agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two parties if either party requests for six months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other party.
Done in duplicate in Peking on the 29th day of April, 1954, in the Chinese, Hindi and English languages, all texts being equally valid.

Chang Han-fu,
Plenipotentiary of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China.

Nedyam Raghavan
Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of India.

THE END