DOCUMENTS
ON THE SINO-INeIAN
BOUNDARY QUESTION

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DOCUMENTS
ON THE SINO-INDIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION

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Peking, September 8, 1959

His Excellency Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of the Republic of India,
New Delhi

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have carefully read Your Excellency’s letter dated March 22, 1959. I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This has made me somewhat surprised and also made it necessary for me to take a longer period of time to consider how to reply to your letter.

The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history. In tackling this question, one cannot but, first of all, take into account the historical background of British aggression on China when India was under British rule. From the early days, Britain harboured aggressive ambition towards China’s Tibet region. It continuously instigated Tibet to separate from China, in an attempt to put under its control a
nominally independent Tibet. When this design failed, it applied all sorts of pressures on China, intending to make Tibet a British sphere of influence while allowing China to maintain so-called suzerainty over Tibet. In the meantime, using India as its base, Britain conducted extensive territorial expansion into China's Tibet region, and even the Sinkiang region. All this constitutes the fundamental reason for the long-term disputes over and non-settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

China and India are both countries which were long subjected to imperialist aggression. This common experience should have naturally caused China and India to hold an identical view of the above-said historical background and to adopt an attitude of mutual sympathy, mutual understanding and fairness and reasonableness in dealing with the boundary question. The Chinese Government originally thought the Indian Government would take such an attitude. Unexpectedly to the Chinese Government, however, the Indian Government demanded that the Chinese Government give formal recognition to the conditions created by the application of the British policy of aggression against China's Tibet region as the foundation for the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. What is more serious, the Indian Government has applied all sorts of pressures on the Chinese Government, not even scrupling the use of force, to support this demand. At this the Chinese Government cannot but feel a deep regret.

The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the
five principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing status quo of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, even less by force; as to some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning isolated places could be reached through negotiations to ensure the tranquillity of the border areas and uphold the friendship of the two countries. This is exactly the basic idea expressed in my January 23, 1959 letter to you. The Chinese Government still considers this to be the way that should be followed by our two countries in settling the boundary question. Judging from Your Excellency’s letter of March 22, 1959, it seems you are not completely against this principle.

I would like now to further explain the position of the Chinese Government in connection with the questions raised in Your Excellency’s letter and in conjunction with the recent situation along the Sino-Indian border.

I. In my letter to Your Excellency dated January 23, 1959, I pointed out that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. In your letter of March 22, 1959, Your Excellency expressed disagreement to this, and tried energetically to prove that most parts of the Sino-Indian boundary had the sanction of specific international agreements between the past government of India and Central Government of China. In order to prove that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited, I would like to furnish the following facts:

(One) Concerning the boundary separating China’s Sinkiang and Tibet regions from Ladakh
In 1842, a peace treaty was indeed concluded between the local authorities of China’s Tibet and the Kashmir authorities. However, the then Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the conclusion of this treaty, nor did it ratify the treaty afterwards. Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary. It is clear that this treaty cannot be used to prove that this section of the boundary has been formally delimited by the two sides, even less can it be used as the foundation to ask the Chinese Government to accept the unilateral claim of the Indian Government regarding this section of the boundary. As to the Chinese Government official’s statement made in 1847 to the British representative that this section of the boundary was clear, it can only show that the then Chinese Government had its own clear view regarding this section of the boundary and cannot be taken as a proof that the boundary between the two sides had already been formally delimited. As a matter of fact, down to 1899, the British Government still proposed to formally delimit this section of the boundary with the Chinese Government, but the Chinese Government did not agree. Your Excellency also said on August 28 this year in India’s Lok Sabha: “This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it.” It can thus be seen that this section of the boundary has never been delimited. Between China and Ladakh, however, there does exist a customary line derived from historical traditions, and Chinese maps have always drawn the boundary between
China and Ladakh in accordance with this line. The marking of this section of the boundary on the map of *Punjab, Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet* compiled by the British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of the East India Company (which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham's book *Ladakh* published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps. Later British and Indian maps included large tracts of Chinese territory into Ladakh. This was without any legal grounds, nor in conformity with the actual situation of administration by each side all the time.

(Two) Concerning the section of the boundary between the Ari area of China's Tibet and India

It can be seen from your letter that you also agree that this section of the boundary has not been formally delimited by the two countries. Not only so, there have in fact been historical disputes between the two sides over the right to many places in this area. For example, the area of Sang and Tsungsha, southwest of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet, which had always belonged to China, was thirty to forty years back gradually invaded and occupied by the British. The local authorities of China's Tibet took up the matter several times with Britain, without any results. It has thus become an outstanding issue left over by history.

(Three) Concerning the Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan

The Indian Government insists that this section of the boundary has long been clearly delimited, citing as its grounds that the so-called McMahon Line was jointly delineated by the representatives of the Chinese Govern-
ment, the Tibet local authorities and the British Government at the 1913-1914 Simla Conference. As I have repeatedly made clear to Your Excellency, the Simla Conference was an important step taken by Britain in its design to detach Tibet from China. At the conference were discussed the so-called boundary between outer and inner Tibet and that between Tibet and the rest of China. Contrary to what was said in your letter, the so-called McMahon Line was never discussed at the Simla Conference, but was determined by the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the representative of the Chinese Central Government through an exchange of secret notes at Delhi on March 24, 1914, that is, prior to the signing of the Simla Treaty. This line was later marked on the map attached to the Simla Treaty as part of the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China. The so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government and is therefore decidedly illegal. As to the Simla Treaty, it was not formally signed by the representative of the then Chinese Central Government, and this is explicitly noted in the treaty. For quite a long time after the exchange of secret notes between Britain and the Tibet local authorities, Britain dared not make public the related documents, nor change the traditional way of drawing this section of the boundary on maps. This illegal line aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. The Tibet local authorities themselves later also expressed their dissatisfaction with this line, and, following the independence of India in 1947, cabled Your Excellency asking India to return all
the territory of the Tibet region of China south of this illegal line. This piece of territory corresponds in size to Chekiang Province of China and is as big as 90,000 square kilometres. Mr. Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line which would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself by selling out its territory — and such a large piece of territory at that? The delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan in all traditional Chinese maps is a true reflection of the actual situation of the traditional boundary before the appearance of the so-called McMahon Line. Both the map of Tibet and Adjacent Countries published by the Indian Survey in 1917 and the map attached to the 1929 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica drew this section of the boundary in the same way as the Chinese maps. And it was only in the period around the peaceful liberation of China's Tibet region in 1951 that Indian troops advanced on a large scale into the area south of the so-called McMahon Line. Therefore, the assertion that this section of the boundary has long been clearly delimited is obviously untenable.

In Your Excellency's letter, you also referred to the boundary between China and Sikkim. Like the boundary between China and Bhutan, this question does not fall within the scope of our present discussion. I would like, however, to take this opportunity to make clear once again that China is willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression against each other, and has always respected the proper relations between them and India.

It can be seen from the above that the way the Sino-Indian boundary has always been drawn in maps pub-
lished in China is not without grounds and that at first British and Indian maps also drew the Sino-Indian boundary roughly in the same way as the Chinese maps. As a matter of fact, it was not Chinese maps, but British and Indian maps that later unilaterally altered the way the Sino-Indian boundary was drawn. Nevertheless, since China and India have not delimited their mutual boundary through friendly negotiations and joint surveys, China has not asked India to revise its maps. In 1954, I explained to Your Excellency for the same reason that it would be inappropriate for the Chinese Government to revise the old map right now. Some people in India, however, are raising a big uproar about the maps published in China, attempting to create a pressure of public opinion to force China to accept India's unilateral claims concerning the Sino-Indian boundary. Needless to say, this is neither wise nor worthy.

II. As stated above, the Chinese Government has all along adhered to a clear-cut policy on the Sino-Indian border question: On the one hand, it affirms the fact that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited, while on the other, it also faces reality, and, taking specially into consideration the friendly relationship between China and India, actively seeks for a settlement fair and reasonable to both sides, and never tries unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border between the two countries pending the settlement of the boundary question.

Regarding the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary, as I have stated above, the Chinese Government absolutely does not recognize the so-called McMahon Line, but Chinese troops have never crossed that
line. This is for the sake of maintaining amity along the border to facilitate negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, and in no way implies that the Chinese Government has recognized that line. In view of the fact that my former explanation of this point to Your Excellency is obviously misunderstood in Your Excellency’s latest two letters to me, I have deemed it necessary once again to make the above explanation clearly.

Regarding the western section of the Sino-Indian boundary, China has strictly abided by the traditional customary line, and, with regard to Indian troops’ repeated intrusions into or occupation of Chinese territory, the Chinese Government, acting always in a friendly manner, has dealt with each case in a way befitting it. For example, regarding the invasion of Wuje by Indian troops and administrative personnel, the Chinese Government has tried its best to seek a settlement with the Indian Government through negotiations and to avoid a clash. Regarding the Indian troops who invaded the southwestern part of China’s Sinkiang and the area of Lake Pangong in the Tibet region of China, the Chinese frontier guards, after disarming them according to international practice, adopted an attitude of reasoning, asking them to leave Chinese territory and returning to them their arms. Regarding the Indian troops’ successive invasion and occupation of the areas of Shipki Pass, Parigas, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Lapthal, the Chinese Government, after discovering these happenings, invariably conducted thorough and detailed investigations rather than laying charges against the Indian Government immediately and temperamentally. These measures
prove that the Chinese Government is exerting its greatest effort to uphold Sino-Indian friendship.

Despite the above-mentioned border incidents caused wholly by the trespassing of Indian troops, until the beginning of this year, the atmosphere along the Sino-Indian border had on the whole been fairly good. The fact that no armed clash had ever occurred along the two thousand or so kilometres of the Sino-Indian boundary, which is wholly undelimited, is in itself a powerful proof that, given a friendly and reasonable attitude on both sides, amity can be maintained in the border areas and tension ruled out pending the delimitation of the boundary between the two countries.

III. Since the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, however, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeing of large numbers of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary. Changing unilaterally the long-existing state of the border between the two countries, they not only overstepped the so-called McMahon Line as indicated in the map attached to the secret notes exchanged between Britain and the Tibet local authorities, but also exceeded the boundary drawn on current Indian maps which is alleged to represent the so-called McMahon Line, but which in many places actually cuts even deeper into Chinese territory than the McMahon Line. Indian troops invaded and occupied Longju, intruded into Yasher, and are still in occupation of Shatze, Khinzemane and Tamaden—all of which are Chinese territory—shielding armed Tibetan rebel bandits in this area. Indian air-
craft have also time and again violated China's territorial
air near the Sino-Indian border. What is especially re-
grettable is that, not long ago, the Indian troops unlawfully
occupying Longju launched armed attacks on the Chi-
nese frontier guards stationing at Migyitun, leaving no
room for the Chinese frontier guards but fire back in
self-defence. This was the first instance of armed clash
along the Sino-Indian border. It can be seen from the
above that the tense situation recently arising on the Sino-
Indian border was all caused by trespassing and provoca-
tions by Indian troops, and that for this the Indian side
should be held fully responsible. Nevertheless, the In-
dian Government has directed all sorts of groundless
charges against the Chinese Government, clamouring that
China has committed aggression against India and de-
scribing the Chinese frontier guards' act of self-defence in
the Migyitun area as armed provocation. Many political
figures and propaganda organs in India have seized the
occasion to make a great deal of anti-Chinese utterances,
some even openly advocating provocative actions of an
even larger scale such as bombarding Chinese territory.
Thus, a second anti-Chinese campaign has been launched
in India in six months' time. The fact that India does not
recognize the undelimited state of the Sino-Indian bound-
ary and steps up bringing pressure to bear on China mili-
tarily, diplomatically and through public opinion cannot
but make one suspect that it is the attempt of India to
impose upon China its one-sided claims on the boundary
question. It must be pointed out that this attempt will
never succeed, and such action cannot possibly yield any
results other than impairing the friendship of the two
countries, further complicating the boundary question and making it more difficult to settle.

IV. The friendly relations between China and India are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. The Chinese Government has consistently held that all differences between our two countries must and certainly can be resolved through peaceful consultations and should not be allowed to affect the friendly relationship between the two countries. China looks upon its southwestern border as a border of peace and friendship. I can assure Your Excellency that it is merely for the purpose of preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border back and forth to carry out harassing activities that the Chinese Government has in recent months dispatched guard units to be stationed in the southeastern part of the Tibet region of China. This is obviously in the interests of ensuring the tranquillity of the border and will in no way constitute a threat to India. Your Excellency is one of the initiators of the five principles and has made significant contributions to the consolidation and development of Sino-Indian friendship and constantly stressed the importance of this friendship. This has deeply impressed the Chinese Government and people. I have therefore given Your Excellency a systematic explanation of the whole picture of the Sino-Indian boundary. I hope that Your Excellency and the Indian Government will, in accordance with the Chinese Government's request, immediately adopt measures to withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long-existing state of the boundary between the two countries. Through this, the temporary tension on the Sino-Indian border would be eased at once and the
dark clouds hanging over the relations between our two countries would be speedily dispelled, setting at ease our friends who are concerned for Sino-Indian friendly relations and dealing a blow to those who are sowing discord in the Sino-Indian relations and creating tension.

With cordial regards,

(Signed)

CHOU EN-LAI

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
His Excellency Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of the Republic of India,
New Delhi

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Your Excellency’s letter dated September 26, 1959, has been received. It is most unfortunate that subsequently another unexpected border clash took place on October 21 within Chinese territory in the area south of the Kongka Pass. Regarding this clash, the Chinese and Indian Governments have already exchanged several notes, including the November 4 note of the Indian Government to the Chinese Government. Most regrettably, this note of the Indian Government not only disregards in many respects the basic facts of the question of boundary between the two countries and the truth of the border clash, but adopts an attitude which is extremely harmful to the friendly relations between the two countries. Obviously, it is in no way helpful to a settlement of the question to take such an attitude. Under the
present circumstances, I consider that the most important duty facing us is, first of all, to take effective steps, speedily and without hesitation, to earnestly improve the disquieting situation on the border between the two countries, and work for the complete elimination of the possibility of any border clash in the future.

As the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, and it is very long and very far or comparatively far from the political centres of the two countries, I am afraid that, if no fully appropriate solution is worked out by the two Governments, border clashes which both sides do not want to see may again occur in the future. And once such a clash takes place, even though a minor one, it will be made use of by people who are hostile to the friendship of our two countries to attain their ulterior objectives. There is a history of long-standing friendship but no conflict of fundamental interests between our two countries, and our Governments are initiators of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. We have no reason to allow the tension on the border between our two countries to continue.

Your Excellency's letter of September 26 contains many viewpoints to which the Chinese Government cannot agree. Regarding these, I would like to state my views on another occasion. I am glad, however, that this letter reiterates that the Indian Government attaches great importance to the maintenance of friendly relations with China and agrees to the view consistently held by the Chinese Government that the border disputes which have already arisen should be settled amicably and peacefully, and that pending a settlement the status quo should be maintained and neither side should seek to alter the status
quo by any means. In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order. This proposal is in effect an extension of the Indian Government's proposal contained in its note dated September 10 that neither side should send its armed personnel to Longju, to the entire border between China and India, and moreover a proposal to separate the troops of the two sides by as great a distance as 40 kilometres. If there is any need to increase this distance, the Chinese Government is also willing to give it consideration. In a word, both before and after the formal delimitation of the boundary between our two countries through negotiations, the Chinese Government is willing to do its utmost to create the most peaceful and most secure border zones between our two countries, so that our two countries will never again have apprehensions or come to a clash on account of border issues. If this proposal of the Chinese Government is acceptable to the Indian Government, concrete measures for its implementation can be discussed
and decided upon at once by the two Governments through diplomatic channels.

The Chinese Government has never had the intention of straining the border situation and the relations between the two countries. I believe that Your Excellency also wishes to see the present tension eased. I earnestly hope that, for the sake of the great, long-standing friendship of the more than one thousand million people of our two countries, the Chinese and Indian Governments will make joint efforts and reach a speedy agreement on the above-said proposal.

The Chinese Government proposes that in order to further discuss the boundary question and other questions in the relations between the two countries, the Prime Ministers of the two countries hold talks in the immediate future.

Respected Mr. Prime Minister! The peoples of our two countries desire that we act promptly. I think we should satisfy their desires and not let those who seek every chance to disrupt by all means the great friendship between China and India attain their sinister objective. I await an early reply from Your Excellency.

I take this opportunity to express to you my cordial regards.

(Signed)

CHOU EN-LAI

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
Peking, December 17, 1959

His Excellency Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of the Republic of India,
New Delhi

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of November 16, 1959. Although the Indian Government's opinions regarding the prevention of border clashes are still a certain distance away from the Chinese Government's proposal of November 7 and part of them obviously lack fairness, it is heartening that in your letter you have indicated the desire of trying to avoid all border clashes and to settle the boundary disputes between the two countries by peaceful methods.

The Chinese Government's proposal of November 7 for the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two countries 20 kilometres respectively along the entire border is aimed at thoroughly eliminating the risk of border clashes not wholly foreseeable, completely changing the present tense situation on the border where the two coun-
tries are facing each other in arms, and creating a favourable atmosphere of mutual confidence between the two countries. These aims are unattainable by other provisional measures. Furthermore, the adoption of this measure pending the delimitation of the boundary will in no way prejudice the advancing by each side of its claims when negotiations for the settlement of the boundary question take place. Therefore, the Chinese Government still earnestly hopes that we can reach agreement on such a measure for the sake of friendship between our two countries in the past and for hundreds of years to come. As to how far the armed forces of each country should withdraw, the Chinese Government is entirely willing to decide on a distance which will be deemed appropriate by both sides through consultation with the Indian Government.

Pending the above-mentioned agreement, the Chinese Government, in a conciliatory spirit and out of the desire to move towards the withdrawal of armed forces along the entire border, is prepared to agree first to reach a partial solution by applying the proposal you have made in your letter for the non-stationing of the armed forces of both sides at Longju to the other disputed places on the border as well. In the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel once occupied Longju and are now still in occupation of Khinzemane. In the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel are up to now in occupation of Shipki Pass, Parigas, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Lapthal. Most of these places which definitely belong to China were occupied successively by armed Indian personnel after the signing of the 1954 Agreement.
on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India in which China and India for the first time put forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Among them Puling-Sumdo is one of the ten places which the Chinese Government agreed to open as markets for trade in the Ari area of the Tibet Region of China as specified in Article II, Section 2 of the 1954 Agreement. Now since the Indian Government holds a different opinion on the ownership of these places, the Chinese Government proposes that no armed personnel of either side be stationed at any of them.

Pending a further agreement between the two sides, the Chinese Government also welcomes the Indian Government's proposal for the frontier outposts of the two sides to stop sending out patrols. The Chinese Government has, in fact, instructed the Chinese frontier guards to stop sending out patrols from all their outposts on the Sino-Indian border after the Kongka Pass incident. Now that the Indian side has also taken the same step, this is of course a happy progress in safeguarding the tranquillity of the border between the two countries. But the Chinese Government would like to ask for clarification on one point, that is: the proposal to stop patrolling should apply to the entire Sino-Indian border, and no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.

The Chinese Government is very much perplexed by the fact that Your Excellency put forward a separate proposal for the prevention of clashes in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh. The Chinese Government deems it necessary to point out the following: (1) There is no reason to treat this sector of
the border as a special case. The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector. Except for the Parigas area by the Shangatsangpu River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary. (2) This proposal of Your Excellency's represents a big step backward from the principle agreed upon earlier by the two countries of maintaining for the time being the state actually existing on the border. To demand a great change in this state as a pre-condition for the elimination of border clashes is not to diminish but to widen the dispute. (3) Your Excellency's proposal is unfair. Your Excellency proposes that in this sector Chinese personnel withdraw to the east of the boundary as shown on Indian maps and Indian personnel withdraw to the west of the boundary as shown on Chinese maps. This proposal may appear "equitable" to those who are ignorant about the truth. But even the most anti-Chinese part of the Indian press pointed out immediately that, under this proposal, India's "concession" would only be theoretical, because, to begin with, the area concerned does not belong to India and India has no personnel there to withdraw, while China would have to withdraw from a territory of above 33,000 square kilometres, which has long belonged to it, its military personnel guarding the frontiers and its civil administrative personnel of the Hotien County, the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and of Rudok Dzong in the Ari area of the Tibet Autonomous Region respectively.
This area has long been under Chinese jurisdiction and is of great importance to China. Since the Ching dynasty, this area has been the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang and western Tibet. As far back as in the latter half of 1950, it was along the traditional route in this area that units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered the Ari area of Tibet from Sinkiang to guard the frontiers. In the nine years since then, they have been making regular and busy use of this route to bring supplies. On the basis of this route, the motor-road over 1,200 kilometres long from Yehcheng in southwestern Sinkiang to Gartok in southwestern Tibet was built by Chinese frontier guard units together with more than 3,000 civilian builders working under extremely difficult natural conditions from March 1956 to October 1957, cutting across high mountains, throwing bridges and building culverts. For up to eight or nine years since the peaceful liberation of Sinkiang and Tibet when units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army began to be stationed in and patrol this area till September 1958 when the intrusion of the area by armed Indian personnel occurred, so many activities were carried out by the Chinese side in this area under its jurisdiction, and yet the Indian side was utterly unaware of them. This is eloquent proof that this area has indeed always been under Chinese jurisdiction and not under Indian jurisdiction. Now the Indian Government asserts that this area has all along been under Indian jurisdiction. This is absolutely unconvincing.

If the Indian Government, after being acquainted with the above viewpoints of the Chinese Government, should still insist that its demand in regard to this area is prop-
er, then the Chinese Government would like to know whether the Indian Government is prepared to apply the same principle equally to the eastern sector of the border, that is to say, to require both the Chinese and Indian sides to withdraw all their personnel from the area between the so-called McMahon Line and the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary as shown on Chinese maps (and on Indian maps too during a long period of time). The Chinese Government has not up to now made any demand in regard to the area south of the so-called McMahon Line as a pre-condition or interim measure, and what I find difficult to understand is why the Indian Government should demand that the Chinese side withdraw one-sidedly from its western frontier area.

Your Excellency and the Indian Government have repeatedly referred to the historical data concerning the Sino-Indian boundary as produced by the Indian side. The Chinese side had meant to give its detailed reply to Your Excellency’s letter of September 26 and the Note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs of November 4 in the forthcoming talks between the Prime Ministers of the two countries, and thought it more appropriate to do so. Since the talks between the two Prime Ministers have not yet taken place, however, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs will give a reply in the near future. I do not wish to go here into the details of the matter. I would only point out again the simple fact that, according to objective history, the entire boundary between our two countries has indeed never been delimited, and it is impossible to deny this. I have noticed that the Indian side has, in its account of the boundary between the two countries, purposely left out many obvious basic facts.
For example, it does not mention the fact that on the official maps compiled by the Survey of India in the past, up to the 1938 edition, the delineation of the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary still corresponded to that on Chinese maps, while the western section of the Sino-Indian boundary was not drawn at all; even in its 1950, 1951 and 1952 editions published after the founding of the People's Republic of China, both the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Indian boundary, though incorrectly drawn, were clearly indicated as undelimited. The Chinese Government cannot see on what ground the Indian Government began suddenly in recent years to change the undelimited boundary in both the eastern and western sectors on its maps into delimited boundary. I have made a detailed study of the heap of data cited in Your Excellency's letter of September 26, still I cannot find any satisfactory answer.

The Chinese Government has pointed out many times that the boundary between China and India is very long and has never been delimited by the two Governments, that there are discrepancies between the maps of the two countries, and that therefore it is natural that the two countries should hold different opinions regarding the boundary. A reasonable settlement of this outstanding historical issue should not be difficult at all to achieve provided it is sought through friendly consultations. The People's Republic of China is a socialist country of the working people, where the exploiting classes and pro-imperialist forces who attempted to profit by outward expansion and provocations against other countries have long lost for good their footing for carrying out their activities. The People's Republic of China is consistently
faithful to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence; it absolutely does not allow itself to take an attitude of big-nation chauvinism towards other countries, let alone encroach one inch upon foreign territory. Further, China has such a vast expanse of territory, more than half of which, moreover, is sparsely populated and will take great efforts to develop. It would be extremely ludicrous to think that such a country would still want to seek trouble in some desolate areas of a neighbouring country. Therefore, although there are some undelimited sections in the boundaries between China and some of its neighbouring countries in south Asia (whether they are big or small, friendly or unfriendly towards China), China has not taken and will never take advantage of this situation to make any change in the state actually existing on the border by resorting to unilateral action. China is moreover prepared, even after the settlement of the outstanding boundary issues, to work in unison and co-operation with all its neighbouring countries for the creation of a most peaceful, secure and friendly boundary. Your Excellency is aware that the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border has never been recognized by past Chinese Governments, nor by the Government of the People's Republic of China, yet the Government of the People's Republic of China has strictly abided by its statement of absolutely not allowing its armed personnel to cross this line in waiting for a friendly settlement of the boundary question. It is quite obvious that China, which has not even stepped into the vast area south of the so-called McMahon Line which, not long ago, was still under the jurisdiction of the local government of the Tibet Region of China (part of the area up to 1951), would
of course not think of stepping onto Indian territory at any place along the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. The Chinese military and civil administrative personnel over there, just as in other areas along the border, are only stationed on and guarding their own territory. However, the Indian Government has not only taken an unreasonable attitude of refusing to discuss the eastern sector of the border, but also laid territorial claim to an area in the western sector of the border, which has never been under Indian rule. This has indeed greatly surprised the Chinese Government and people. In the interest of upholding Sino-Indian friendship, the Chinese Government has always exercised the utmost self-restraint in the hope of settling these disputes with the Indian Government through friendly negotiations. Even after armed Indian personnel intruded into Chinese territory and provoked successively the incidents in the areas south of Migyitun and south of the Kongka Pass, the Chinese Government still maintained a conciliatory spirit, avoided aggravation of the situation, and dealt in a friendly manner with the armed Indian personnel captured in the Kongka Pass incident. Yet the Indian side, disregarding the objective facts, arbitrarily asserted that both incidents were provoked by China, that China maltreated the captured Indian personnel, and even unscrupulously abused China as aggressor, imperialism, etc. I must say that both our people and Government feel extreme regret at such a serious state of affairs.

Your Excellency expressed welcome to my November 7 proposal for the holding of talks between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. Here indeed lies the hope for a turn for the better in the relations between the two
countries. Although there are differences of opinion between our two countries on the boundary question, I believe that this in no way hinders the holding of talks between the two Prime Ministers; on the contrary, it precisely requires its early realization so as to reach first some agreements of principle as a guidance to concrete discussions and settlement of the boundary question by the two sides. Without such a guidance, there is a danger that concrete discussions of the boundary question by the two sides may bog down in endless and fruitless debates. I therefore make the concrete proposal that the two Prime Ministers begin talks on December 26. If you wish to suggest any other date, I am also willing to give it consideration. As to the site of the talks, if you agree, any place in China can be chosen, because there are in China no activities hostile to Sino-Indian friendship and you will be welcomed and respected by our people as a distinguished guest of the Chinese Government. Should you find it inconvenient for you to hold talks in China, Rangoon can be fixed as the site of the talks, subject to the consent of the Burmese Government.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister! Both our countries are still very backward economically and culturally. We urgently need to engross ourselves in long-term peaceful construction at home so as to free ourselves step by step from the present state of backwardness. We have no need to create tension between our two friendly nations or between us and any other country, thus dissipating and diverting our people's attention from domestic matters. The peoples of our two countries and the overwhelming majority of the people of the world are inspired by the fact that the world situation is developing in a direction
favourable to peace. But unfortunately there are still not a few influential groups in the world who obstinately oppose this trend; they are trying to poison the international atmosphere, continuing the cold war and creating tension to place barriers in the way of East-West talks; they are slandering the peace policy of the socialist countries and inciting discord between the Asian-African countries and the socialist countries, so that they may profit thereby. At present, they are obviously exerting their utmost to sow discord between China and India. Under these circumstances, the speedy holding of talks between the two Prime Ministers is our unshirkable responsibility not only to our two peoples but also to world peace.

With high respects,

(Signed)

CHOU EN-LAI

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Indian Embassy in China

(December 26, 1959)

Peking, December 26, 1959

Embassy of the Republic of India in China, Peking.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China and has the honour to make the following observations on the Sino-Indian boundary question, which the Embassy is requested to transmit to the Indian Government:

On September 8, 1959, Premier Chou En-lai wrote to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, giving an overall account of the historical background and the present actual situation of the Sino-Indian boundary question and the stand and policy of the Chinese Government. Afterwards, Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese Government received Prime Minister Nehru's letter of September 26 and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' note of November 4. In the said letter and note, the Indian Govern-
ment indicated that it could not agree to Premier Chou En-lai's account of the facts regarding the boundary.

The Chinese Government is desirous at all times of maintaining friendship with the Indian Government and people, and, on the boundary question, of holding discussions with the Indian Government calmly and amicably and with an attitude which is fair both to itself and to others so as to seek a rapprochement of the views of the two sides. In view of the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary question is rather complex and that it would be extremely difficult to bring about a settlement through the exchange of letters, the Chinese Government has always maintained that face-to-face talks should be held speedily between the representatives of the Governments, first of all between the Prime Ministers of the two countries, so as more effectively to exchange views and reach agreement. But since the talks between the two Prime Ministers are yet to be decided on through consultations between the two sides, and the Indian Government has moreover complained that the Chinese Government has given no reply to the parts of the above-mentioned letter and note concerning facts about the boundary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China is instructed to make further observations on the major questions concerning the facts about the boundary, with reference to Premier Chou En-lai's letter of September 8, Prime Minister Nehru's letter of September 26 and the note of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs of November 4.

China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not
only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia. The Chinese Government is therefore very reluctant to engage in arguments with the Indian Government over the boundary question. Unfortunately, the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited, Britain left behind in this respect a heritage of certain disputes, and moreover the Indian Government has made a series of unacceptable charges against China, thereby rendering these arguments unavoidable. Because the Indian Government has put forth a mass of detailed data on the boundary question, the Chinese Government feels sorry that, though trying its best to be brief, it cannot but refer in this reply to various details so as to clarify the true picture of the historical situation and the views of the two sides.

For convenience' sake, in the following paragraphs the section of the boundary between China’s Sinkiang and Tibet on the one hand and Ladakh on the other will be termed the western sector, the section of the boundary from the southeastern end of the western sector to the converging point of China, India and Nepal the middle sector, and the section of the boundary east of Bhutan the eastern sector.

**Question One: Has the Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?**

The reason for the present existence of certain disputes over the Sino-Indian boundary is that the two countries have never formally delimited this boundary and that there is a divergence of views between the two coun-
tries regarding the boundary. According to the Indian maps, the boundary line in the western sector cuts deep into Chinese territory, including an area of over 33,000 square kilometres in India; the boundary line in the middle sector is relatively close to the delineation on the Chinese maps, but still a number of areas which have always belonged to China are included in India; and in the eastern sector, the whole boundary line is pushed northward, including in India an area of 90,000 square kilometres which originally belonged to China. The Chinese Government, therefore, considers it necessary to conduct friendly negotiations to bring about a reasonable settlement. The Indian Government, however, holds that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary line as shown on current Indian maps is defined by international agreements and therefore sees no reason to hold overall boundary negotiations. Thus, the negotiations themselves have run up against difficulties and there is the danger of the boundary disputes remaining deadlocked for a long time. The Chinese Government considers that to say that the greater part of the Sino-Indian boundary has been formally delimited by international agreements is totally inconsistent with the facts. The Chinese Government wishes to make the following explanations:

(1) Concerning the western sector. The Indian Government holds that the boundary line it claims was fixed by a treaty concluded between the authorities of the Tibet Region of China and the Kashmir authorities in 1842.

But firstly, this treaty merely mentioned that the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet would be maintained as it had been and that both sides would hold to their confines and refrain from encroaching on each other.
The treaty contained no provision or hint whatsoever about the concrete location of the boundary. None of the arguments advanced by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 26, 1959, to Premier Chou En-lai to the effect that the location of the boundary has been long established can prove that the boundary line now claimed by the Indian Government is well founded.

Secondly, the 1842 treaty was concluded between the authorities of the Tibet Region of China and the Kashmir authorities, but the greatest part (about 80 per cent) of the area now disputed by the Indian Government is part of China’s Sinkiang which was no party to the treaty. It is obviously inconceivable to hold that, judging by this treaty, vast areas of Sinkiang have ceased to belong to China but have become part of Ladakh. The British Government proposed in 1899 to delimit the boundary between Ladakh and Kashmir on the one hand and Sinkiang on the other, but nothing came of it. It is also inconceivable to hold that the territory of another country can be annexed by a unilateral proposal.

Thirdly, there are many indisputable positive evidences to show that the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited. For instance, (a) Between 1921 and 1927, the British Indian Government made many representations to the authorities of China’s Tibet Region, asking to delimit the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet, but without any result. This is testified by many documents exchanged between the two sides at the time, and is also confirmed by Sir Arthur Lothian, the Briton who acted as the representative of India, in his letter to the London Times published on December 11, 1959. (b) According to data now available to the Chinese Government,
no boundary line was drawn at all in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border on the official map published by the Survey of India as late as 1943. On the official Indian map of the 1950 edition, the present version of the boundary line was shown in a most equivocal way, but was still marked by the words “Boundary Undefined.” It is only since 1954 that this undelimited sector of the boundary has suddenly become a delimited boundary. (c) Referring to this sector of the boundary in the Lok Sabha of India on August 28, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru declared that: “This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it.” All the above-mentioned facts are absolutely incompatible with the allegation that this sector of the boundary was delimited long ago. It is unthinkable that the Indian Government which held that this sector of the boundary had explicitly been delimited in 1842 or 1899 would, between 1921 and 1927, still ask continually for negotiations to delimit it; that it would in 1943 still admit the absence of any determined boundary; that it would in 1950 still declare the mere existence of a boundary undefined; and that it would in 1959 still proclaim that nobody had marked the boundary.

(2) Concerning the middle sector. The Indian Government considers that the specification in Article IV of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement of six passes in this area as passages for traders and pilgrims of both countries indicates that the Chinese Government has already concurred in the Indian Government’s opinion about this sector of the boundary. The Chinese Government holds that this allegation is untenable both factually and logically.

The question of the boundary between the two coun-
tries was not touched on at all in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement or during its negotiations. The Chinese side's draft wording for Article IV of the Agreement was that “The Chinese Government agrees to open the following mountain passes in the Ari district of the Tibetan Region of China for entry and exit by traders and pilgrims of both parties.” The Indian side disagreed with the Chinese draft; its own draft wording was that “Traders and pilgrims from India and western Tibet may travel by the routes traversing the following localities and passes.” Later on the two sides agreed to change the wording into: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route.” The concession made by the Chinese Government was only to adopt a wording which does not involve the ownership of these passes. Nobody can draw from this the conclusion that this sector of the boundary between the two countries has thus been fixed. On the contrary, the Chinese representative, Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu, in his talk with the Indian representative, Ambassador Mr. N. Raghavan, on April 23, 1954, clearly stated that the Chinese side did not wish, in those negotiations, to touch on the boundary question. And Ambassador N. Raghavan agreed forthwith. The Chinese Government therefore maintains that there is no ground to say that this sector of the boundary has been delimited and that there is no need to conduct negotiations for its delimitation.

(3) Concerning the eastern sector. The Indian Government holds that the so-called McMahon Line is the product of the 1914 Simla Conference jointly attended by Britain, China and the Tibet Region of China, and is therefore valid. The Chinese Government holds that the so-
called McMahon Line is wholly illegal, and the Indian Government's assertion is utterly unacceptable to the Chinese Government.

Firstly, it is known to the world that the Simla Convention itself is void of legal validity. The Chinese representative Ivan Chen attending the Simla Conference not only refused to sign the Simla Convention, but acting under instructions from the Chinese Government formally declared at the conference on July 3, 1914, that the Chinese Government would not recognize any treaty or similar document that might then or thereafter be signed between Britain and Tibet. Similar declarations were made in formal notes delivered to the British Government on July 3 and 7 the same year by Minister of the Chinese Government in Britain Lew Yuk Lin. All Chinese Governments since then persisted in this stand. Many dirty unequal treaties signed by the past Chinese Governments under imperialist oppression have already been proclaimed null and void. The Chinese Government feels perplexed why the Government of India, which has likewise won independence from under imperialist oppression, should insist that the Government of its friend China recognize an unequal treaty which the Chinese Government has not even signed.

Secondly, the Indian Government asserts that the boundary between India and Tibet was discussed at the Simla Conference, that the Chinese Government never objected at the time or afterwards to the discussion of the boundary between India and Tibet at the conference, and that therefore the agreement which resulted from the conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet must be regarded as binding on China. But
this line of argument, from beginning to end, is inconsistent with the facts. As a matter of fact, the Simla Conference only discussed the boundary between the Tibet Region and the rest of China and the boundary between so-called Outer and Inner Tibet, it never discussed the boundary between China and India. The so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India was the result of the exchange of secret letters at Delhi on March 24, 1914, between the British representative and the representative of the then Tibet local authorities. It was in no way made known to China. It also means that it was never placed on the agenda of the Simla Conference. A section of the red line shown on the map attached to the Simla Convention corresponds with the so-called McMahon Line, but that red line was presented as the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China, and it was never stated that part of the red line was the boundary between China and India. Since the so-called question of Sino-Indian boundary never existed at the Simla Conference and in the Simla Convention, the Chinese Government naturally would not refer to this question or the question of the so-called McMahon Line in its memorandum and its suggestions for the revision of the Simla Convention. The Indian Government has pointed to the fact that the Chinese Government at the time did not raise any objection to the so-called McMahon Line. But this fact only shows that the Chinese Government was completely unaware of the existence of the question of the so-called McMahon Line, and can in no way prove that the Line was legal or was accepted by the Chinese Government. It can thus be seen that the so-called McMahon Line is more unsavoury and more unpresentable than the Simla Conven-
tion, and it is indeed all the more strange to assert that it is binding on the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government would like to ask the Indian Government whether, among all the proceedings of the Simla Conference, it can point to any particular date of the conference or any particular article of the Convention when and where the Sino-Indian boundary question, and particularly the question of the so-called McMahon Line, was referred to.

In addition, it must also be pointed out that it is beyond doubt that Britain had no right to conduct separate negotiations with Tibet. Indeed, the Chinese Government made repeated statements to this effect; as to the British Government, it too was strictly bound by the 1907 agreement on Tibet concluded between it and the old Russian Government not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. Therefore, judging by this treaty obligation alone which was undertaken by the British Government, the secret exchange of letters in 1914 between the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the Chinese Government is void of any legal validity.

Thirdly, the assertion that China did not raise any objection to the so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India is also inconsistent with the fact. It was during the most difficult period of China’s War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression that the so-called McMahon Line gradually and unofficially appeared on Indian maps; and after 1943 the Tibet local authorities were under the firm control of British imperialism and their relations with the Chinese Central Government steadily
deteriorated. Nevertheless, on learning that Britain had gradually encroached on Chinese territory south of the so-called McMahon Line, the Kuomintang government four times protested by addressing notes to the British Embassy in China after the conclusion of the Anti-Japanese War, in July, September and November of 1946 and January of 1947. Since Britain shifted its responsibility onto India, the Kuomintang government protested by note with the Indian Embassy in China in February 1947. Even up to November 18, 1949, Lo Chia-lun, Ambassador to India of the Chiang Kai-shek clique which then still maintained diplomatic relations with the Indian Government, delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, repudiating the Simla Convention which the Indian Government held to be valid. The Government of the People’s Republic of China, since establishing diplomatic relations with the Government of India, has repeatedly stated the fact that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited. During Prime Minister Nehru’s visit in China in 1954, Premier Chou En-lai made it clear that the Sino-Indian boundary was yet to be delimited. Premier Chou also said that the reason why the delineation of old maps was followed in Chinese maps was that the Chinese Government had not yet undertaken a survey of China’s boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it would not make changes in the delineation of the boundary on its own. This was reiterated in the memorandum delivered to the Indian Embassy in China by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 3, 1958. Besides, even the local authorities of Tibet did not regard as reasonable the so-called McMahon Line, which was the product of underhand schemes;
they repeatedly objected to this line and asked for the return of occupied Chinese territory south of the Line. This fact is not denied even by the Indian Government.

Fourthly, not only the so-called McMahon Line boundary between China and India has never been recognized by the Chinese Government; its validity was for a long time questioned by the Indian and the British Governments. The so-called McMahon Line was not adopted on the official map Tibet and Adjacent Countries published by the Survey of India in 1938, nor on the map "India" in the sixth edition of the Oxford Advanced Atlas, 1940, compiled by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain. Neither was the so-called McMahon Line followed in drawing the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary on the map "India 1945" attached to the 1951 3rd edition in English of The Discovery of India, written by Prime Minister Nehru himself and first published in 1946. Although the so-called McMahon Line was drawn on the official maps of India published by the Survey of India in 1950, 1951 and 1952, it was still marked as undemarcated. Up to 1958, on the map "China West and Tibet" in the Times Atlas of the World edited by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain, the traditional Sino-Indian boundary line and the so-called McMahon Line were both drawn with the words "Disputed Area" marked between the lines. All these authoritative facts squarely refute the Indian Government's argument that this sector of the boundary has been delimited. The Indian Government contends that Britain withheld the publication of the Simla Convention for years in the hope that there would be an agreement about the status and boundary of Inner Tibet. That this assertion cannot help
the Indian Government out of its difficulties is already explained as above, the assertion moreover adds to its difficulties. What meaning can the Simla Convention have, when the British Government also admitted that no agreement was reached on it? And since the Convention itself has not acquired validity, what can be said for the so-called Sino-Indian boundary line which was never proposed to the Chinese Government and which the British unilaterally meant to smuggle into this Convention? In fact, British officials who once held posts in India, though by no means pro-Chinese, also admit that the McMahon Line is legally untenable and actually ineffective. For instance, Henry Twynam, who was Acting Governor of Assam, India, in 1939, testified in his letter to the London Times published on September 2, 1959, that this line "does not exist, and never has existed."

From what has been said in the above, the following incontestable conclusion can be drawn: The entire Sino-Indian boundary, whether in its western, middle, or eastern sector, has not been delimited. The 1842 Treaty, on which the Indian Government bases itself, did not define any boundary line for the western sector of the Sino-Indian border; and moreover, China’s Sinkiang Region, which is most concerned with this sector of the boundary, was no party to this treaty. The 1954 Agreement, on which the Indian Government bases itself, did not involve the middle or any other sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. The 1914 Convention, on which the Indian Government bases itself, is itself void of legal validity, and the Sino-Indian boundary was never discussed at the 1914 Conference. That the Sino-Indian boundary is yet to be delimited has been recognized by the Indian and British
Governments over a long period of time, and is borne out by indisputable evidences. In order to achieve a reasonable settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute satisfactory to both sides, there is no other way except the holding of friendly negotiations.

**Question Two: Where Is the Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?**

Although the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited, both sides acknowledge the existence of a traditional customary line, that is, the line formed by the extent of jurisdiction exercised historically by each side. The present question is that the two sides hold very different conceptions of the position of the traditional customary line. In drawing the boundary (mainly the eastern and western sectors) on its maps, the Indian Government has gone far beyond the extent of its original actual jurisdiction; it asserts that this is not only based on international treaties, but is the traditional customary line itself. The Chinese Government holds that the delineations of the Sino-Indian boundary on current Indian maps, which differ greatly from those on Chinese maps, are not based on any international treaty, as stated above, and, what is more, are not based on tradition and custom.

(1) Concerning the western sector. The area of over 33,000 square kilometres now disputed by India has always belonged to China. This is conclusively borne out by Chinese official documents and records. Except for the very small area of Parigas which has been occupied by India in recent years, the remaining broad area has
always been under the effective control of the Chinese Government. The major part of this area is under the jurisdiction of Hotien County of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China, while the minor part under that of Rudok Dzong of the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China. Though sparsely populated, this area has all along been a place for pasturage and salt-mining for the Uighur and Kirghiz people living in the southwestern border of Sinkiang and a part of the Tibetan people living in the northwestern border of Tibet. Many places of this area are named in the Uighur language. For instance, Aksai Chin, which is part of Hotien County of Sinkiang, means “the desert of white stones” in the Uighur language; while the Karakash River which flows through this area means “the river of the black jade” in the Uighur language.

This area is the only traffic artery linking Sinkiang and western Tibet, because to its northeast lies the great Gobi of Sinkiang through which direct traffic with Tibet is practically impossible. Therefore, since the middle of the 18th century, the Government of the Ching Dynasty of China had established Karens (check-posts) to exercise jurisdiction over and patrol this area. In the decades from the founding of the Republic of China till the liberation of China, there were troops constantly guarding this area. After the liberation of Sinkiang in 1949, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army took over the guarding of the frontier in this area from Kuomintang troops. In the latter half of 1950, it was through this area that the Chinese Government dispatched the first units of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to enter Tibet. In the nine years since then, the Chinese troops stationed in the Ari district
have regularly and frequently brought up indispensable supplies from Sinkiang through this area. From March 1956 to October 1957, the Chinese Government built along the customary route a motor-road from Yehcheng of Sinkiang to Gartok of Tibet of a total length of 1,200 kilometres, of which a section of 180 kilometres runs through this area, and over 3,000 civilian workers took part in its construction.

These unshakable facts should have been sufficient to prove beyond dispute that this area is Chinese territory.

The Indian Government asserts that this area “has been associated with India’s culture and tradition for the last two thousand years or so, and has been an intimate part of India’s life and thought.” But firstly, the Indian Government fails to give any concrete facts to support its contention. On the contrary, Prime Minister Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha of India on September 10, 1959, that this area “has not been under any kind of administration.” On November 23, 1959, he said again in the Rajya Sabha of India: “During British rule, as far as I know, this area was neither inhabited by any people nor were there any outposts.” Though Prime Minister Nehru is in no position to judge correctly the conditions prevailing on the Chinese side, his words do prove authoritatively that India has never exercised control over this area.

Secondly, the Indian Government says that it has been sending regular patrols to this area, and that this is one way India exercises its jurisdiction. According to data available to the Chinese Government, however, armed Indian personnel intruded only three times into this area to carry out reconnaissance, namely, in September 1958, July 1959 and October 1959, and on each occasion they
were promptly detained and then sent out of China by Chinese frontier guards. Apart from these three intrusions, they have never been to this area. It is precisely for this reason that the Indian Government has been so unaware of the long-term activities of the Chinese personnel in this area that it declares that it was in 1957 that Chinese personnel first entered this area.

Thirdly, the Indian Government has referred to a number of maps to corroborate what it has claimed to be the traditional customary line. But the situation in this respect is not favourable to India's arguments either. Despite slight discrepancies at some places, the delineations of the western sector of the boundary on the maps published in China in the past one to two hundred years have in the main been consistent. The Indian Government says that the delineation of the western sector of the boundary on an official Chinese map published in 1893 approximates to that of the Indian maps. The Chinese Government does not know what map is referred to here and, consequently, is unable to comment on it. As to the atlas published in 1917 by the British-owned paper, the North China Daily News and Herald, it can only represent the British view but not the Chinese, and there is no need to discuss it here.

By contrast, there have been considerable contradictions and confusion in the delineations of the boundary on maps published in Britain and India in the past century and more. This is because, after occupying Kashmir, Britain actively tried to use it as a base for aggression against China's southern Sinkiang and northwestern Tibet and, therefore, it continually made arbitrary changes in the traditional customary boundary line in the
western sector and sent surveying parties to intrude into China for this purpose. Prime Minister Nehru says that "accurate" maps, that is, maps in agreement with the current Indian maps, became possible only from 1865 after surveys. But, even so, some reputed surveyors did not wish to misrepresent the facts at will. For instance, the delineations of the boundary on the Sketch Map of Eastern Turkestan of 1870 by G. W. Hayward and on the Sketch Map of the Country North of India of 1871 by Robert Shaw — both surveyors being referred to by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 26 — are close to the traditional customary line as shown on Chinese maps. In his article in the Journal of the British Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XL, 1870, Hayward stated explicitly that the boundary ran along the main chain of the Karakoram Mountain to the passes in Changchenmo, that is to say, it is the Chinese maps, rather than the current Indian maps, that have correctly delineated this sector of the boundary. What is of special significance is the fact that no boundary line, let alone an "accurate" boundary line, was drawn at all for this sector on the official map compiled by the Survey of India as late as the 1943 edition. On its 1950 map, though the same colour for Kashmir was painted in the area disputed by India, still no boundary line was drawn, and there were marked the words "Boundary Undefined." This fact has already been pointed out above.

Fourthly, the Indian Government says that the traditional customary line claimed by it possesses, in addition, distinct geographical features, that is, it runs along the watershed. However, to begin with, the principle of watershed is not the sole or main international principle
for the delimitation of boundaries. It is particularly im-
permissible to use the watershed as a pretext for seeking
a boundary line within the territory of another country.
Next, the traditional customary line claimed by the Indian
Government, instead of separating the Hotien River sys-
tem from the Indus River system, actually cuts across the
Hotien River system. On the contrary, the traditional
customary line as shown on Chinese maps truly reflects
the geographical features of this area, that is, having no
steep slopes in the north-south direction, the area is easily
passable and, therefore, naturally forms the only route
linking Sinkiang and western Tibet. To the west, how-
ever, there lies between this region and Ladakh the tower-
ing Karakoram Mountain range which is extremely diffi-
cult to pass through. The Indian Government also
admits that this area is extremely difficult of access from
Ladakh.

It can thus be seen that judging by the actual ad-
ministrative jurisdiction at all times or by the maps and
geographical features referred to by India, the line claimed
by India to be the traditional customary boundary line in
the western sector is without any foundation; while the
traditional customary line for which China stands is truly
well founded.

(2) Concerning the middle sector. The disputed
areas involved here owing to difference of conception
between the two sides regarding the traditional custom-
ary line — Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Sang, Tsungsha,
Puling-Sumdo, Wuje, Sangcha and Lapthal—are all tradi-
tional Chinese territory. Except Sang and Tsungsha
which were invaded and occupied by Britain earlier, they
were all occupied or intruded into by India only after the signing of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement.

The local authorities of the Tibet Region have kept up to now the land-conferring documents or land deeds concerning these places issued in the past few centuries. For example, the mandate issued in the name of the 7th Dalai Lama in the 18th century stated specifically that Wuje was within the territorial limits of Daba Dzong of Tibet. Furthermore, the local authorities of the Tibet Region have all along been collecting taxes in these places, and the census record and taxation papers of some of these places have been well preserved down to the present time.

Nearly all those who have lived long in these places are of the Tibetan nationality of China. Despite foreign occupation of their places of residence, they still did not wish to be separated from their motherland. For instance, after Sang and Tsungsha were occupied by Britain, the local population still considered themselves Chinese nationals, and on more than one occasion pledged their allegiance to the local government of the Tibet Region of China in statements made to the local authorities of the Tibet Region.

It must be pointed out in particular that among the above-mentioned places, Puling-Sumdo is one of the ten places which the Chinese Government agreed to open as markets for trade in the Ari district of Tibet as specified in Article II, Section 2 of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954. It was opened together with the nine other markets in compliance with request made by Mr. N. Raghavan, representative of the Indian Government and Indian Ambassador, at the first meeting of the negotiations. Puling-
Sumdo, however, was occupied by India soon after the signing of the 1954 Agreement.

The Indian Government claims that it has all along been exercising jurisdiction over the above-mentioned places. However, in the note annexed to Prime Minister Nehru's letter of September 26, 1959, apart from some extremely strained arguments in connection with Sang and Tsungsha, there are no concrete facts whatever to show that jurisdiction has always been exercised over the seven other places.

The principle of watershed put forward by the Indian Government cannot be applied here either, as it does not conform with the jurisdiction actually exercised by each side.

The maps published by the two sides also show that it is China, not India, which has abided by the traditional customary line. The delineations of this sector of the boundary on past Chinese maps, though leaving a few very small pieces of Chinese territory outside of the Chinese boundary, on the whole reflected the correct traditional customary line. On the other hand, no boundary line was drawn for this sector on official Indian maps even as late as 1950, and only the words "Boundary Undefined" were marked.

(3) Concerning the eastern sector. The area between the so-called McMahon Line and the boundary line at the southern foot of the Himalayas as shown on Chinese maps has always belonged to China, and was until recently still under Chinese jurisdiction. This is proved by a mass of facts.

As early as the middle of the 17th century, the local government of the Tibet Region of China had begun to
exercise jurisdiction over this area comprising Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul. Take the Monyul area for example. In the middle of the 17th century, when the 5th Dalai Lama unified Tibet, he sent his disciple Mera Lama and tribal chief Namka Drukdra, Dinpon of Tsona, to the Monyul area to establish their rule there. By the beginning of the 18th century, the local government of the Tibet Region had unified the whole of Monyul and divided the area gradually into thirty-two "tso" (a few named "din"). At Tawang, the capital of Monyul, an administrative committee known as "Tawang Shidrel" and a non-permanent administrative conference of a higher level known as "Tawang Drudrel" were set up to direct the affairs of the whole area. The local government of the Tibet Region used always to appoint the officials of the administrative organs at various levels in Monyul, collect taxes (mainly grain tax, twice a year) and exercise judicial authority in all parts of the area. Monyul was included in every census conducted in Tibet in the past and was not treated as an exceptional case. The religious, economic and cultural life of the local people, the Monbas, has been deeply influenced by the Tibetan nationality; they believe in Lamaism, can speak the Tibetan language, and used Tibetan currency. It is from the Monyul area that the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsanyun Gyaltso, hailed, and his house there received for all generations the mandates conferred by successive regimes of the Tibet Region.

In addition, it must be pointed out that even after the so-called McMahon Line was defined and made public, the local government of the Tibet Region continued to exercise extensively and for a long period of time its jurisdic-
tion over this area. For instance, the Tibetan administrative institutions in Monyul had been almost kept intact until 1951. In Loyul and Lower Tsayul, up to 1946, the administrative organs of “tso” and “din” were maintained quite extensively, and the people continued to pay taxes and render corvée to the Lhasa authorities.

Therefore, the allegations of the Indian Government that “the Tibetan authorities have not exercised jurisdiction at any time in this area,” that the local “tribes have not been affected in the slightest degree by any Tibetan influence, cultural, political or other,” and so on are incredible.

The Indian Government claims that it has always exercised jurisdiction over this area. However, in Prime Minister Nehru’s own words, Indian administration had “gradually moved up” to this area; the tribes had generally been left “more or less to look after themselves” until around 1914; and British political officers only “visited these areas.” And what did the British officers who had visited this area say? The Captain Bailey referred to by Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of September 26, 1959, who was specially sent by the British Indian Government in 1913 to southeastern Tibet to conduct illegal exploration and survey for the purpose of defining the so-called McMahon Line, described the jurisdiction of the Tibet local government over the Monyul area at the time in his book No Passport to Tibet published in 1957; he further stated in his letter to the London Times published on September 7 this year that, “When we reached Tawang (i.e. capital of Monyul), we found a purely Tibetan administration in force.” Even Christoph Von Führer-Haimendorf, then Special Officer of the Indian External
Affairs Department in Subansiri, who was sent by the Indian Assam authorities in 1944, that is, thirty years after the so-called McMahon Line was defined, to explore this area, also testified in his book *Himalayan Barbary* published in 1955, that the frontier in this area was undefined and unsurveyed, and remained unadministered by the Indian authorities. It can thus be seen how untenable are the assertions that the area has belonged to India for tens and hundreds of years, that the current boundary has always been the historical boundary, etc., etc.

The Indian Government says that the British concluded a number of agreements with some of the local tribes between 1844 and 1888 and that these agreements are evidence of Indian jurisdiction. However, the 1853 agreement with the Monbas cited by Prime Minister Nehru begins with the statement by the Monbas: “We . . . being deputed by the Daba Rajas to carry letters of friendship to the Agent, Governor-General, North-East Frontier, desiring that the former friendly relations which existed between the Government of India and our Lhassa Government . . . should be again resumed. . . .” This passage proves exactly and indisputably that the Monbas belong to Tibet, not India, and that it was under the premise of recognizing them as belonging to Tibet that the Indian Government concluded the agreement with them. The Daba Rajas referred to here was the Regent of the local government of the Tibet Region. As to the agreements with the Abors and the Akas cited, it can also be seen clearly from their texts that the areas of those tribes were not British territory. Some of the agreements even stated explicitly that British territory
“extends to the foot of the hills (i.e. southern foot of the Himalayas).” And these peoples were not British subjects.

It can be seen from the above historical data provided by the Chinese and Indian sides respectively that this area always belonged to China, not to Britain or India.

This conclusion is further confirmed forcefully by the authoritative maps published in the two countries. The maps published in China as a rule include this area in Chinese territory, that is, marking the boundary line along the true traditional boundary at the southern foot of the Himalayas. According to material now available to the Chinese Government, the same delineation was followed on the official maps published by the Survey of India up to and including the 1938 edition. After 1938 and up to 1952, the Survey of India changed its delineation by marking the boundary in accordance with the so-called McMahon Line, but still using the marking for undemarcated boundary. Since 1954, it has again changed the undemarcated boundary into demarcated boundary. By these successive changes, it shifted from its original position of recognizing this area as Chinese territory to that of claiming this area as India’s lawful territory at all times. Nevertheless, the delineation on current Indian maps has not been accepted internationally. As stated above, the atlas edited by John Bartholomew, cartographer to the King of Britain, and published in 1958 still considered it a disputed area, while the delineation on the map “India 1945,” attached to Prime Minister Nehru’s book The Discovery of India, was still the same as that on Chinese maps.

In the face of these authoritative facts, the Atlas of the Chinese Empire published in London in 1906 by the
China Inland Mission, a British church organization, to which the Indian Government referred, is obviously without significance.

It can be seen from what has been said in the above that the Chinese Government's view of the traditional customary line is based on objective facts and confirmed by a mass of factual data in all its sectors, western, middle and eastern. On the other hand, the boundary line marked on Indian maps, with the exception of the middle sector which for the most part conforms to reality, does not represent at all the traditional customary line. The eastern and western sectors of this boundary line, it can in particular be seen beyond any shadow of doubt, are the product of the British policy of aggression and expansion in modern history.

It should not have been necessary to discuss the British policy of aggression and expansion in modern history, as the history of India itself, the history of India's adjacent countries which had once been a part of British India or its dependency, the history of China, and, in particular, the history of China's Tibet Region adjoining India, all bear witness to this policy. While embarking on armed aggression against Tibet and conspiring to cause Tibet to break away from China, Britain also nibbled at the frontiers of Tibet both on the maps and in deed, which resulted in this boundary line that was later inherited by India and is marked on current Indian maps. Of course, the great Indian people, who treasure peace, can in no way be held responsible for all the acts of aggression committed by Britain with India as its base. It is, however, surprising that the Indian Government should claim the boundary line which Britain unlawfully created
through aggression against Tibet and which even includes areas to which British authority had not extended as the traditional customary boundary line, while perversely describing the true traditional customary boundary line pointed out by the Chinese Government on the basis of objective facts as laying claim to large tracts of Indian territory. How would the Indian Government feel, if it were in the position of the Chinese Government? If this assertion is maintained, the inevitable conclusion to be derived would be that the British colonialists were most fair-minded while oppressed China was full of undisguised ambitions; that the powerful British imperialism was, for the past one hundred years and more, invariably upholding the traditional Sino-Indian boundary, while the weak China was ceaselessly encroaching upon British territory! The Chinese Government believes that no one would accept this conclusion.

Question Three: What Is the Proper Way to Settle the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The Chinese Government, starting from the above-mentioned facts that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited and that there is difference of conception between the two sides regarding the boundary, has consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should be sought by the Chinese and Indian sides, taking into account the historical background and present actual situation, in accordance with the Five Principles and through friendly consultations; that pending this, as a
provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the status quo of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, let alone by force; and that as to some of the disputes, partial and provisional agreements could be reached through negotiations.

The Indian Government disagrees with the Chinese Government’s statement that the boundary has not been delimitated and an overall settlement of the question should be sought through negotiations, and only acknowledges that certain minor, partial adjustments could be made. Yet the Indian Government agrees that the two sides should maintain the status quo of the border, avoid the use of force and settle the disputes through negotiations. Thus, although there are differences between the two sides, the tranquillity of the border and the friendship of the two countries could have been ensured. Contrary to the expectations of the Chinese Government, the Indian Government has time and again asserted that the Chinese Government had previously agreed that the boundary had been delimitated and accepted the Indian Government’s claim regarding the boundary and that the Chinese Government changed its stand only recently. At the same time, the Indian Government has also made incorrect interpretations of the status quo of the border, repeatedly violated the status quo in actual deeds and even resorted to force, thus creating tension on the border. In these circumstances, the Indian Government has perversely charged that the Chinese Government should be held responsible for all this and said that China harboured ambitions of “aggression” and “expansion.” The above-mentioned attitude of the Indian Government has
made the boundary question all the more difficult and complicated.

Therefore, the Chinese Government deems it necessary to clarify the following points:

(1) Whether the Chinese Government has ever agreed that the boundary was delimited and accepted the Indian Government’s claim regarding the boundary and changed its stand afterwards.

The Indian Government has referred to the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, holding that this agreement has dealt with all the outstanding issues between India and the Tibet Region, and that therefore the boundary question should be considered settled.

As a matter of fact, the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 is an agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India and has nothing to do with the boundary question and no provision concerning the boundary can be found in any article of the Agreement. It may be recalled that at that time, the question which the two countries were most concerned about and which called for urgent solution was the establishment of normal relations between India and the Tibet Region of China on a new basis. During the negotiations, neither side asked to discuss the boundary question; this was intended to avoid affecting the settlement of the most urgent question at the time. Both sides were clear on this point. At the very beginning of the negotiations, Premier Chou En-lai made it clear to the Indian Government Delegation that the task of the negotiations was “to settle those outstanding questions between the two countries which are ripe for settlement.” Afterwards, at the fourth meeting held on January 8, 1954, the two
sides jointly defined the task of the negotiations as settling those outstanding questions between the two countries which were ripe for settlement in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. On April 23 of the same year, the Chinese representative further pointed out that the negotiations would not touch on the boundary question. The Indian representative agreed to this view of the Chinese side. There was, therefore, no fact whatever to show that the Chinese Government agreed to the Indian Government’s conception of the boundary or that it would not bring up the boundary question for discussion afterwards.

The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai’s remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government’s claim regarding the boundary.

The fact is that at that time Prime Minister Nehru took exception to the delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary line on Chinese maps and therefore Premier Chou En-lai explained that the delineation of the boundary on Chinese maps followed that of the old maps and that it would not be fitting for the Chinese Government, on its own, to change the delineation of the boundary before conducting surveys and consulting with the countries concerned. In particular, Premier Chou En-lai pointed out at the time that China has undelimited boundaries with India and some other southwestern neighbouring countries. Prime Minister Nehru said, however,
that he considered that no boundary question existed between China and India. It can be seen from this conversation that there was an obvious difference of views between the two sides regarding the boundary, and that Premier Chou En-lai clearly expressed his disagreement to any unilateral revision of maps.

The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers held in India at the end of 1956, considering that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks made at the time about the so-called McMahon Line implied that the Chinese Government recognized this line.

In fact, when Premier Chou En-lai referred to the so-called McMahon Line, he said that it was illegal and had never been recognized by the Chinese Government. He explained at the same time that despite this, in order to ensure the tranquillity of the border and out of consideration for the friendship of the two countries, Chinese military and administrative personnel would strictly refrain from crossing this line and expressed the hope that a proper way to settle the eastern sector of the boundary might be found at a later date. This statement of Premier Chou En-lai can by no means be interpreted as recognition of this line by the Chinese Government.

It can thus be seen that the Chinese Government has been consistent in its attitude that the boundary has not been delimited and is yet to be settled through negotiations between the two countries. The Indian Government's implication that the Chinese Government has changed its original stand does not accord with the facts.

(2) Whether the Chinese Government scrupulously respects the status quo of the border.
It is a principle agreed upon by both sides that pending an overall settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, the status quo of the border should be maintained.

The Chinese Government has faithfully abided by this principle. In the ten years since liberation, Chinese military and administrative personnel have been under orders not to go beyond the areas which have always been under Chinese jurisdiction, and even not to cross the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector.

The Indian Government's interpretation of the status quo of the border, however, is based not on the actual scope of jurisdiction of the two sides, but on the unilaterally fixed boundary line shown on Indian maps that includes large areas where Indian jurisdiction has never reached. Thus armed Indian personnel have repeatedly violated the status quo of the border and, step by step, extended the scope of its occupation by encroaching on Parigas, Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Puling-Sumdo, Sangcha and Lapthal, and intruded into Aksai Chin, Lake Pangong, Kongka Pass and Wuje. But the Indian Government describes all these actions as maintenance of the status quo. In the eastern sector, after the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet in March this year, armed Indian personnel even overstepped the so-called McMahon Line, at one time occupied Longju and Tamaden, and is now still in occupation of Khinzemane, all of which are situated north of that line.

Although the Indian side has occupied Puling-Sumdo, one of the Chinese markets specified in the 1954 Agreement and once occupied Tamaden which India itself admits to be Chinese territory, yet the Indian Government has all along denied having violated the status quo of
the border. Moreover, basing itself on the boundary line shown on its own maps, the Indian Government accused China of violating the status quo of the border. To this the Chinese Government cannot agree.

(3) Whether the Chinese Government has earnestly avoided using force.

Recently, two armed clashes which neither side wished to see occurred in the Migyitun area and the Kongka Pass area. This was extremely unfortunate. But it is not China that should be held responsible for them. The Migyitun area incident of August 25 was caused by the action of the armed Indian personnel who had invaded and occupied Longju in advancing further to the southern vicinity of Migyitun and attacking a Chinese patrol. Armed Chinese personnel never attacked the outpost established illegally by India at Longju; on the contrary, it was the armed Indian personnel from the Longju outpost who opened fire on an even larger scale on the following day, but the Chinese troops stationed at Migyitun never returned fire. The allegation that Chinese troops drove armed Indian personnel out of their outpost at Longju by superior force is not true. Armed Chinese personnel entered Longju only on September 1, that is, the sixth day counting from August 27 when the armed Indian personnel withdrew.

The case of the Kongka Pass incident of October 21 is even more obvious. On the day after three armed Indian personnel were detained on their intrusion into Chinese territory more than 60 armed Indian personnel carrying light and heavy machine guns and other weapons intruded further into Chinese territory, and launched an armed attack on a Chinese patrol numbering fourteen
only and carrying light arms alone. Both before and after the Indian party opened fire, the Chinese patrol gave repeated warnings not to shoot. The Chinese deputy squad leader, Wu Ching-kuo, waved his hands to the Indian personnel and called on them not to shoot, but this esteemed comrade was the first man to be hit and killed. Only after this was the Chinese patrol forced to return fire.

That China has consistently refused to use force is further borne out by the following facts:

a. When a situation of the armed forces of the two sides facing each other first appeared on the Chinese territory of Wuje in 1955, the Chinese Government took the initiative in proposing that neither side should station troops in Wuje pending a settlement through negotiations.

b. With regard to Chinese territories of Parigas, Chuva, Chuje, Shipki Pass, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Sangcha, Lapthal and Khinzemane, which have been occupied by the Indian side, the Chinese Government has never tried compelling the armed Indian personnel to withdraw by force of arms. Even in regard to such an area as Tamaden, which the Indian Government itself admits to be Chinese territory, the Chinese Government also patiently waited for the Indian troops to withdraw of their own accord and did not resort to force.

c. With regard to armed Indian personnel who intruded into the garrison areas of Chinese frontier outposts, the Chinese frontier guard units first of all invariably advised them to leave Chinese territory and it was only when they refused to listen to such advice were they disarmed and afterwards sent out of Chinese territory together with their arms.
d. All the Chinese frontier guards are under strict orders absolutely to refrain from using their arms unless they are already subjected to armed attack.

e. After the occurrence of the unfortunate Kongka Pass incident, the Chinese Government immediately ordered its troops guarding the Sino-Indian border to stop patrolling the entire border.

f. In order completely and effectively to prevent any border clashes, the Chinese Government has recently proposed time and again that the armed personnel of the two sides on the border respectively withdraw 20 kilometres or some other appropriate distance.

The above-mentioned facts prove that the Chinese Government has adopted all possible measures to maintain the tranquillity of the border and to prevent the use of force and the occurrence of armed clashes.

After the Kongka Pass incident, the Indian Government also instructed its frontier guards to stop patrolling and indicated to the Chinese Government that in any event neither side should resort to force except as a last resort in self-defence. This is undoubtedly worthy of welcome. Prior to the occurrence of these two clashes, however, the Indian Government in its note dated August 11 this year had informed the Chinese Government to the effect that Indian frontier guards had instructions “to resist trespassers and to use minimum force necessary for this purpose if warning given by them remains unheeded.” The Indian Government’s note also stated that “if any Chinese troops are still within Indian territory, they should be immediately withdrawn as otherwise this may lead to avoidable clash.” Even after the occurrence of the first clash, the Indian frontier guards, according to the
note sent by the Indian Government to China on August 27, 1959, still had instructions to “use force on the trespassers if necessary.” It must be pointed out that since there are divergences both between the two countries’ conceptions of the boundary and between their maps, and since the Indian Government regards large tracts of Chinese territory which have always been under Chinese jurisdiction as Indian territory, Chinese military and administrative personnel stationed on the soil of their own country would inevitably be called “trespassers” by the Indian side. In this way, Indian subordinates in carrying out these instructions could use force more or less freely according to their own judgement. Obviously, it cannot be said that the occurrence of the two unfortunate border incidents was unrelated to such instructions.

(4) Whether China wants to engage in “aggression” and “expansion.”

Centring around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as “imperialism,” “expanding into India” and “committing aggression.” The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts.

The Chinese Government has noted that there is at present in India a rather prevalent observation that China has now grown strong and, like certain Chinese rulers in history or modern imperialists, would seek expansion abroad. Apart from those who are obviously hostile to China, the great majority of those who spread this observation probably do so because they lack an accurate understanding of New China. In these circumstances,
the Chinese Government deems it useful to explain China's stand once more to the Government and people of India.

Although the Chinese people have begun to score some achievements, China is still very backward economically and culturally and it will still take the Chinese people decades or even over a hundred years of arduous efforts to overcome such backwardness. But at no time in future will China become a threat to its neighbouring countries, just as China does not believe that India, after it has grown strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China. To say that the growth of China's population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbours is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people. China's social system is a socialist one under which political and economic powers are in the hands of the working people and the people and Government of socialist China have not, nor can they have, nor should they have, any intention of threatening others. Moreover, the following facts must be taken note of: Firstly, although China's population has increased at a higher rate since liberation, yet the average annual rate of increase is only 2 per cent, while the average annual rate of increase in China's grain output has reached 9.8 per cent, the highest annual rate of increase being 35 per cent. In the future, the per unit area grain output and agricultural labour productivity in China will still be greatly raised. Apart from that, China has a vast territory, more than half of which is sparsely populated and will take great efforts to develop. Therefore the Chinese people absolutely do not need to seize the territory of other countries to feed themselves. Secondly,
although China's industry has undergone some development, it still by far cannot satisfy the needs of the people at home. China is rich in natural resources and has a huge domestic market; its industry neither needs to grab raw materials from abroad nor needs to dump its products in foreign countries. Thirdly, the development of China's industry and agriculture has led to a shortage, not surplus, of labour power in China. Therefore, China has no surplus population to send abroad.

In order to attain their great goals in peaceful construction, the Chinese people are in urgent need of a long-term peaceful international environment. Therefore, in conducting its foreign relations the Chinese Government has consistently pursued a policy of peace and is desirous of living in friendship with all countries, big and small, on the basis of the Five Principles. With regard to the outstanding issues between China and other countries, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for their fair and reasonable settlement by peaceful methods without resorting to force. It is not only impossible, improper and unnecessary for China to commit 'aggression against its neighbours, rather it is its earnest hope that they would all grow prosperous and strong rapidly. Because only thus can we altogether more effectively prevent imperialist war and aggression and maintain peace in this area; only thus can we better meet each other's needs and help each other in construction work.

So far as the question of boundary is concerned, China absolutely does not want one inch of another country's territory. There are undelimited boundaries between China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China
has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action. Whether or not the boundary has been delimited, China is always prepared to work in close co-operation with its neighbours for the creation of the most peaceful, secure and friendly border zones so that there will be no mutual misgivings or clashes over the border questions.

With regard to Bhutan and Sikkim, some explanation may be given in passing. China has no other intentions than that of living with them in friendship without committing aggression against each other. Concerning the boundary between China and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy between the delineations on the maps of the two sides in the sector south of the so-called McMahon Line. But it has always been tranquil along the border between the two countries. The boundary between China and Sikkim has long been formally delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any disputes in practice. All allegations that China wants to “encroach on” Bhutan and Sikkim, just like the allegations that China wants to commit aggression against India and other southwestern neighbouring countries, are sheer nonsense.

This basic stand of the Chinese Government towards its neighbours has long been defined time and again and there should have been no need to deal with it at length. It is, however, unfortunate that recently, particularly since the putting down of the rebellion of the reactionary serf-owners in the Tibet Region of China, India has in various ways distorted and attacked the Chinese attitude. In the interest of friendship of the two countries, the
Chinese Government does not wish to answer attack with
attack, but would rather assume that the Indian Govern-
ment really has some misunderstandings about China’s
intentions. It may be that, for certain reasons, the cam-
paign against China would still continue. Even if unfortu-
nately that should be the case, the Chinese Government
absolutely refuses to think that the misunderstand-
ings about China of those who harbour no ill will would
likewise continue for long. Because, if China were really
committing aggression against and posing threat to India
or any other country, ten thousand denials would not
alter the fact; if it is otherwise, although ten thousand
propaganda machines tell the whole world about China’s
“aggression” and “threat,” they will only discredit the
propagandists themselves. “The strength of a horse is
known by the distance travelled, and the heart of a man
is seen with the passage of time.” China’s peaceful and
friendly attitude towards India will stand the test of
time. The Chinese Government is convinced that, though
the truth of a matter may be hidden for a while, it is im-
possible to hide it up for long.

(5) Where lies the key to the settlement of the Sino-
Indian boundary question?

There exist important differences between the Govern-
ments of China and India in their stand on the boundary
question and there is still tension between the two coun-
tries on the border. But the Chinese Government has
never had any doubt that the tension will eventually
pass away and a reasonable settlement of the boundary
question will be reached through friendly consultations.

The confidence of the Chinese Government is based
on the following: There is friendship of thousands of
years' duration but no irreconcilable conflict between the two countries; both sides urgently need to devote themselves to long-term peaceful construction at home and are willing to work for the defence of world peace; and it is uncalled for as well as unthinkable to go on arguing like this without end. On the boundary question, both sides have indicated their willingness to maintain the status quo of the border and to settle the boundary dispute by peaceful means. This shows that a basis exists for China and India to live together in friendship and that the boundary question could be settled in a reasonable way. Besides, looking at it the other way round, there is no alternative. It is impossible for the two sides to change the geographical reality of their being neighbours or to break off all contacts along the lengthy boundary line. It is particularly impossible to entertain the absurd idea that our two great friendly neighbours with a combined population of more than one thousand million might start a war over such temporary and local disputes. Therefore, a friendly settlement of the boundary disputes by peaceful means is the only logical answer.

What are the key questions which demand an urgent solution right now? The Chinese Government has the honour to present the following opinions to the Indian Government:

a. The Chinese Government is of the opinion that no matter what views the two sides may hold about any specific matter concerning the boundary, there should no longer be any difference of opinion about the most basic fact known to the whole world, that is, the entire boundary between the two countries has indeed never been delimited, and is therefore yet to be settled through
negotiations. Recognition of this simple fact should not create any difficulties for either side, because it would neither impair the present interests of either side, nor in any way prevent both sides from making their own claims at the boundary negotiations. Once agreement is reached on this point, it could be said that the way has been opened to the settlement of the boundary question. Although up to now each side has persisted in its own views on the concrete disputes concerning the different sectors of the boundary, provided both sides attach importance to the fundamental interest of friendship of the two countries and adopt an unprejudiced attitude and one of mutual understanding and accommodation, it would not be difficult to settle these disputes. If India’s opinions prove to be more reasonable and more in the interest of friendship of the two countries, they should be accepted by China; if China’s opinions prove to be more reasonable and more in the interest of friendship of the two countries, they should be accepted by India. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that the forthcoming meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two countries will first of all reach agreement on some principles on the boundary question so as to provide guidance and basis for the future discussion and the working out of a solution by the two sides.

b. Pending the formal delimitation of the boundary, the status quo of the border between the two countries must be effectively maintained and the tranquillity of the border ensured. For this purpose, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of the two sides along the border respectively withdraw 20 kilometres or some other distance considered appropriate by the
two sides, and that, as a step preliminary to this basic measure, the armed personnel of both sides stop patrolling along the entire border.

The Chinese Government believes that if agreement can be reached on the two points mentioned above, the situation on the Sino-Indian border will undergo an immediate change and the dark clouds hanging over the relations between the two countries will quickly vanish.

The Chinese Government earnestly hopes that the views it has set forth here at great length on the past, present and future of the Sino-Indian boundary question would receive the most good-willed understanding of the Indian Government, thereby helping to bring about a settlement of this question satisfactory to both sides and a turn for the better in the relations between the two countries. Although some arguing cannot be helped in order to make reply to unfair charges, the intention and aim of the Chinese Government is not to argue, but to bring arguing to an end.

China and India are two great countries each with its great past and future. Guided by the great ideal of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the two countries have over the past few years joined hands and cooperated closely in defence of world peace. Today, history again issues a call to the peoples of the two countries asking them to make still greater contributions internationally to the cause of peace and human progress, while accomplishing tremendous changes at home. The task falling on the shoulders of the Chinese and Indian peoples of the present generation is both arduous and glorious. The Chinese Government wishes to reiterate here its ardent desire that the two countries stop quar-
relling, quickly bring about a reasonable settlement of
the boundary question, and on this basis consolidate and
develop the great friendship of the two peoples in their
common cause.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Re-
public of China avails itself of this opportunity to renew
to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China the
assurances of its highest consideration.
Sketch Map of the Sino-Indian Boundary

SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

CHINGHAI PROVINCE

TIBET REGION

LEGEND

- Boundary line in maps currently published in China
- Boundary line in maps currently published in India
February 26, 1960

His Excellency Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of the Republic of India,
New Delhi.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I thank Your Excellency for your letter of February 5, 1960, which was brought here on February 12 by Indian Ambassador to China Mr. Parthasarathi. At the same time, the reply to the note of December 26, 1959 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China made by the Indian Embassy in China on the instructions of the Indian Government was also delivered by Mr. Parthasarathi to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reply note of the Indian Embassy will be answered by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs after studying it.

You have in your letter agreed to the suggestion of the Chinese Government and myself for the holding of a meeting between the Premiers of China and India in the immediate future so as to explore avenues which may lead to a peaceful settlement of the boundary issue, and invited me to visit Delhi in the latter half of March.
I express to you my deep gratitude for your friendly invitation. The Chinese Government has consistently held that the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples is eternal, that it is necessary and entirely possible to settle the boundary issue between the two countries in a friendly and peaceful manner, and that the two countries must not waver in their common desire for a peaceful settlement of the boundary issue on account of temporary differences of opinion and certain unfortunate and unexpected incidents. The Chinese Government, therefore, takes a positive attitude towards the forthcoming meeting and has confidence in it. As to myself, needless to say, I am very glad of the opportunity of once again visiting the capital of great India, meeting the great Indian people fighting for the prosperity, strength and progress of their motherland and for world peace, and seeing you as well as other friends whose acquaintance I had the honour of making during my last visits. I particularly hope to see the dark clouds hovering between our two countries dispersed through our joint efforts, so that the long-standing friendly relations between the two countries may be consolidated and develop.

Owing to reasons in connection with state affairs, I shall come to your country in April. The specific date will be discussed and decided upon through diplomatic channels. With kind regards,

(Signed)

CHOU EN-LAI

Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China
APPENDICES
Prime Minister Nehru’s Letter to Premier Chou En-lai

(September 26, 1959)

New Delhi, September 26, 1959

His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China,
Peking.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of September 8, 1959. I must say that I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India. As you know, the boundary in the eastern sector is loosely referred to as the McMahon Line. I do not like this description, but for convenience I propose to refer to it as such. When I discussed this with you, I thought that we were confronted with the problem of reaching an agreement on where exactly the so-called McMahon Line in the eastern sector of the boundary lay. Even when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People’s Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian
territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century. In your latest letter you have sought to make out a claim to large tracts of Indian territory and have even suggested that the independent Government of India are seeking to reap a benefit from the British aggression against China. Our Parliament and our people deeply resent this allegation. The struggle of the Indian people against any form of imperialism both at home and abroad is known and recognised all over the world and we had thought that China also appreciated and recognised our struggle. It is true that the British occupied and ruled the Indian sub-continent against the wishes of the Indian people. The boundaries of India were, however, settled for centuries by history, geography, custom and tradition. Nowhere indeed has India's dislike of imperialist policies been more clearly shown than in her attitude towards Tibet. The Government of India voluntarily renounced all the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by Britain in Tibet before 1947 and recognised by Treaty that Tibet is a region of China. In the course of the long talks that we had during your last visit to India, you had told me that Tibet had been and was a part of China but that it was an autonomous region.

2. You have suggested in your letter that the Government of India have applied all sorts of pressure on the Chinese Government, including the use of force, to make the Chinese Government accept the Indian demand. This is the reverse of what the Government of India did. We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions
into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides. In fact our failure to do so has now resulted in sharp but legitimate criticism of the Government both in Parliament and in the press in our country. Far from using force, we sought a peaceful settlement of the disputes. You must be aware of the prolonged negotiations between the Indian and Chinese representatives over Bara Hoti in 1958 and of the notes exchanged between our two Governments on the other disputes. I need hardly tell you that there is great resentment in India at the action of your troops in overpowering our outpost in Longju on our side of the McMahon Line, and although you have up till now not withdrawn your troops, we have not sought to reoccupy the post.

3. You have referred to the maintenance of the long existing status quo on the border. The Government of India have always been in favour of it. It is the Chinese Government who have violated it repeatedly in recent years. I can refer, for example, to the construction of a 100-mile road across what has traditionally been Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area, the entry of Chinese survey parties in the Lohit Frontier Division in 1957, the establishment of a camp at Spanggur in 1959, the despatch of armed personnel to Bara Hoti in 1958 and stationing them there in winter against customary
practice and last, but not least, the use of force in Longju.

4. It is true that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited along its entire length. Indeed the terrain of the Sino-Indian border in many places makes such physical demarcation on the ground impossible. But the entire length of the border has been either defined by treaty or recognised by custom or by both and until now the Chinese Government have not protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government of India upto the customary border. You have yourself acknowledged the fact that no armed clash ever occurred along our border until the beginning of this year. All Chinese Governments have respected the Indian border. The fact that previous Chinese Governments were weak is no answer. Not even a protest was registered in accordance with established state practice in this regard, as was done in the case of Burma between 1906 and 1937.

5. Concerning the boundary between Tibet and Ladakh, it is incorrect to say that the then Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the conclusion of the treaty between Tibet and Kashmir in 1842. The treaty was signed by the representatives of both the Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China. Kalon Sokon, one of the signatories, though by birth a Tibetan, had Chinese rank. Even the Tibetan version of the treaty makes it clear that China was a party to it. Thus, it asserts that "there will never be on any account in future till the world lasts, any deviation even by the hair's breadth and any breach in
the alliance friendship and unity between the King of the world Siri Khalsaji Sahib and Siri Maharaj Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur, and the Khagan of China and the Lama Guru Sahib of Lhassa.

6. It is true that the 1842 treaty referred merely to the "old established frontiers". This was because these frontiers were well-known and did not require any formal delimitation. Even the treaty of 1684 between Ladakh and Tibet stated that "the boundaries fixed in the beginning, when Skyid-Ida-ingeema-gon gave a kingdom to each of his three sons, shall still be maintained." References in the Ladakhi chronicles of the 17th century indicate that the boundary was well-established. Cunningham, whom Your Excellency has referred to with approval, toured the area in 1846. He stated in 1854 that the eastern boundary of Ladakh "is well defined by piles of stones, which were set up after the last expulsion of the Sokpo or Mongol hordes in A.D. 1687 when the Ladakhis received considerable assistance from Kashmir." (Ladakh, 1854, page 261). Thus it is clear that for nearly two centuries the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was well-known and recognized by both sides. There was a constant flow of trade between Ladakh and Tibet during these centuries as provided for by these treaties, and no boundary conflicts ever arose.

7. It has been stated in your letter that China never ratified the 1842 treaty. That China recognized the treaty is clear from the fact that the Chinese official in 1847 informed the British Government: "Respecting the frontiers I beg to remark that the borders of those
territories have been sufficiently and distinctly fixed, so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them.” There was no suggestion that the Chinese Government regarded the treaty as invalid. It is also clear from the statement quoted that not merely was the boundary known, but the boundary was distinctly and sufficiently fixed and there was no divergence of opinion as to where it lay.

8. Further evidence of Chinese acceptance of the 1842 treaty is provided by the fact that the other provisions of the treaty regarding exchange of goods and presents were in operation right up to 1946 without any hindrance from the Chinese Government.

9. It is incorrect to say that down to 1899 the British Government proposed formally to delimit this section of the boundary but that the Chinese Government did not agree. No proposals were made between 1847 and 1899 for any such formal delimitation. The proposal made in 1899 by the British Government referred not to the eastern frontier of Ladakh with Tibet but to the northern frontier of Ladakh and Kashmir with Sinkiang. It was stated in that context that the northern boundary ran along the Kuen Lun range to a point east of 80° east longitude, where it met the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This signified beyond doubt that the whole of Aksai Chin area lay in Indian territory. The Government of China did not object to this proposal.
10. So Ladakh, Tibet and China had all accepted that the frontier between Ladakh and Tibet was the customary boundary. You have stated that the boundary as shown in the Chinese maps follows, more or less, that shown in the map of “Punjab, Western Himalaya and adjoining parts of Tibet” compiled by Walker and attached to Cunningham’s book published in 1854. Walker’s Map states in the Compilation Index that the document used for this sector is the “Map of Ladakh and Nari Khorsum by Capt. H. Strachey”. Now, Strachey toured only a part of Ladakh in 1847-48. He knew little or nothing about Aksai Chin, having never visited the area, and drew the boundary where he thought the main water-parting, which was the natural and established frontier in this area, lay. Thereafter a number of exploration and survey parties were sent by the Government of India to this region. These parties ascertained the customary frontier on the basis of natural features and such local evidence as was available. Johnson visited the area in 1865 and Frederick Drew, an Englishman in the employ of the Maharaja of Kashmir as Governor of Ladakh, in 1869. Other survey parties in the nineteenth century were those of Hayward, Shaw and Cayley in 1868, Carey in 1885-87, Hamilton Bower in 1891, Littledale in 1895, Welby and Malcolm in 1896, Deasy and Pike in 1896, and Aurel Stein in 1900. Accurate maps of the whole Ladakh area thus became possible only from 1865, after the aforementioned surveys had ascertained the exact lie of the watershed; and it is significant that most of the maps since that date show the customary boundary in accordance with the line shown by us in our map rather than
that claimed by China. The later Map of Turkestan of Walker himself published in 1867-68, Drew’s map attached to his book Jammoo & Kashmir Territories (1875), Johnston’s Atlas (1882), and maps attached to the Gazetteers of Kashmir published from 1890 onwards all showed boundary lines more or less similar to our present frontier. Even official Chinese maps of the late nineteenth century showed a boundary approximating to our line. It is only in official Chinese maps of the twentieth century that the Chinese Government included large parts of our territory. On the other hand, The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China, published in Shanghai sometime after 1917 by the North China Daily News and Herald on the basis of authoritative surveys, shows a boundary in the north-west similar to our alignment and a boundary in the north-east which approximates to what later became known as the McMahon Line. I may add that the Chinese maps do not follow even Walker’s Map of 1854 where it does not support the assertion made on behalf of China. Thus Walker shows the areas north of Demchok and north of Pangong in India but recent Chinese maps have not followed Walker’s map in regard to these areas.

11. You have referred to the sector of the boundary between what is known as the Ari area of Tibet and India. We are told that Ari, which is an abbreviated form of Ngari Khorsum, is south-western Tibet. This is the sector of the boundary between the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh in India and the Tibet region. You have stated that the boundary in this
sector has never been formally delimited. In fact, there should be little doubt about the boundary in this sector. Article IV of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement specifies six passes in this area. There was discussion of these passes between the Chinese and Indian representatives before the Agreement was concluded. Your original draft contained the following: “The Chinese Government agrees to open the following passes.” On behalf of India Mr. Kaul then said that these were Indian passes. After some discussion both sides agreed on the following text: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes”. Your Vice Foreign Minister remarked in that context: “This was the fifth concession on our part”. This was recognition of the passes as border passes. In fact the Government of India have always been in control of the Indian ends of the passes.

12. I am particularly surprised by your statement that “the so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China”. You further state that the agreement in regard to the frontier between India and Tibet was concluded between the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities and that it has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government. From this you draw the conclusion that the agreement is illegal. The facts, however, are otherwise. The arrangements for the Simla Conference were made with the full knowledge and consent of the Government of China. The Foreign Minister of China wrote to the British representative on the 7th August 1913 that the
Chinese plenipotentiary would proceed to India “to open negotiations for a treaty jointly” with the Tibetan and British plenipotentiaries. It is clear from the proceedings of the conference that not only did the Chinese representative fully participate in the conference but that the Tibetan representative took part in the discussions on an equal footing with the Chinese and the then British Indian representatives. Not only were the frontiers of India with Tibet discussed at the conference, but also the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China, and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. At no stage, either then or subsequently, did the Chinese Government object to the discussions on the boundary between India and Tibet at the conference. In the circumstances the agreement which resulted from the conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet must, in accordance with accepted international practice, be regarded as binding on both China and Tibet. In fact this was not the first occasion when Tibet concluded an agreement with other countries. In 1856 Tibet concluded an agreement on its own with Nepal. The Convention signed by Britain and Tibet in 1904 was negotiated by the British and Tibetan representatives with the assistance of the Chinese Amban in Tibet.

13. You have stated that for a long time after the exchange of so-called secret notes between Britain and Tibet Britain did not dare to make public the related documents. You have also contended that the McMahon Line “was later marked on the map attached to the Simla Treaty”. I am afraid I cannot agree either with your facts or your conclusion. The Chinese represen-
tative at the Simla Conference was fully aware of the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet. This particular line was discussed between the Tibetan and British Indian representatives, but when the draft convention emerging from the conference was presented on the 22nd April 1914 for signature by the British Indian, Tibetan and Chinese representatives, it had attached to it a map showing the McMahon Line boundary as well as the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China, and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Later, the Chinese Foreign Office in a memorandum dated the 25th April 1914 listed a number of objections to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet and China. It did not raise any objection to the boundary between Tibet and India as shown in the map attached to the tripartite Simla Convention. Thereafter, on the 27th April, the Chinese representative initialled both the convention and the map without any objection. Subsequently, in their memorandum dated the 13th June 1914, the Chinese made fresh proposals regarding the boundaries of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. It is significant that no mention was at all made in this memorandum of the boundary between Tibet and India. Almost five years later, on the 30th May 1919, the Government of China again suggested some modifications of the Simla Convention with a view to reaching a final settlement. These modifications related only to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. No reference at all was made to the boundary between Tibet and India (McMahon Line). Looking into the old papers, we find that the British Government withheld the publica-
tion of the Simla Convention for several years in the hope that there would be an agreement about the status and boundary of Inner Tibet. The Simla Convention was published in the 1929 edition of Aitchison’s *Treaties* and the McMahon Line was shown in the official maps from 1937 onwards. These maps were circulated widely but neither then nor subsequently was any objection raised by the Chinese authorities.

14. I entirely disagree with the inference drawn by you from the exchange of two communications between the Tibetan Bureau in Lhasa and the new Government of India in 1947. The facts are that our Mission in Lhasa forwarded to us a telegram dated the 16th October 1947 from the Tibetan Bureau. The telegram asked for the return of alleged Tibetan territories on boundaries of India and Tibet “such as Sayul and Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of river Ganges and Lowo, Ladakh etc. upto boundary of Yarkhim.” It will be seen that the areas claimed by Tibet had not been defined. If they were to be taken literally, the Tibetan boundary would come down to the line of the river Ganges. The Government of India could not possibly have entertained such a fantastic claim. If they had the faintest idea that this telegram would be made the basis of a subsequent claim to large areas of Indian territory, they would of course have immediately and unequivocally rejected the claim. Not having had such an impression, they sent a reply to the following effect: “The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan Gov-
ernment to continue relations on the existing basis until new agreements are reached on matters that either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from His Majesty's Government”. It would be unfair to deduce from this reply that India undertook to negotiate fresh agreements with Tibet on the frontier question. When the British relinquished power and India attained freedom on the 15th August 1947, the new Government of India inherited the treaty obligations of undivided India. They wished to assure all countries with which the British Government of undivided India had treaties and agreements that the new Government of India would abide by the obligations arising from them. All that the Government of India intended to do in the telegram mentioned in Your Excellency’s letter was to convey an assurance to that effect to the Tibetan authorities. There could be no question, so far as India was concerned, of reopening old treaties with Tibet with a view to entertaining, even for purposes of discussion, claims to large areas of Indian territory.

15. It is wrong to say that the frontier east of Bhutan as shown on Chinese maps is the traditional frontier. On the contrary, it is the McMahon Line which correctly represents the customary boundary in this area. The water-parting formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples on both sides. The tribes inhabiting the area south of the McMahon Line — the Monbas, Akas, Daflas, Miris, Abors, and Mishmis — are of the same ethnic stock as the other
hill tribes of Assam and have no kinship with the Tibetans. The Tibetans themselves regard these tribes with contempt and group them all together as “Lopas”. It is true that the boundary of two adjacent countries is not determined by the ethnic affiliations of the people living in these countries. Some sort of cultural intercourse between the peoples living on both sides of the frontier is also not uncommon. All the same it is significant that the tribes mentioned above have not been affected in the slightest degree by any Tibetan influence, cultural, political or other, and this can only be due to the fact that the Tibetan authorities have not exercised jurisdiction at any time in this area. On the other hand, Indian administration gradually moved up to these areas. Agreements were signed with the Akas in 1844 and 1888, the Abors in 1862-63 and 1866, and with the Monbas in 1844 and 1853, extending the authority of the Government of India over them. It was the British Government’s policy generally to leave the tribes more or less to look after themselves and not seek to establish any detailed administration of these areas such as was to be found in the rest of British Indian territory. All the same British Political Officers visited these areas for settling disputes and such like purposes. Finally, the Sadiya Frontier Tract, approximately 10,000 square miles in area, was formed in 1912, and the Balipara Frontier Tract, also comprising about 10,000 square miles, was formed in 1913, i.e. before the Simla Conference met. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire, published in London by the Chinese Inland Mission in 1906, shows as the frontier in this area an alignment which is almost identical with what was settled at Simla.
in 1914. The area was extensively surveyed in 1911-13. The Lohit area was surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12, the Dibang Valley was surveyed in 1912-13, and the Abor area in 1913. Captain Bailey carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction in the whole area in 1913-14. It was on the basis of all this detailed information that the boundary was settled between India and Tibet in 1914. It is clear, therefore, that the McMahon Line was not an arbitrary imposition on a weak Tibet by the Government of India. It formalized the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area.

16. Your Excellency has referred to a map published by the Survey of India in 1917 and a map in the 1929 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The Survey of India map shows the line claimed by China but on the same sheet, in the index map, the McMahon Line is also shown. The reason for this is that the British Indian Government were reluctant to issue new maps of India showing only the McMahon Line in the hope that China would accept the Simla Convention as a whole. As for the map in the 1929 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, it is true that in the eastern sector it shows roughly the line now claimed by China. But the same map shows the whole of Aksai Chin as a part of Ladakh. It would therefore be unfair to quote the authority of the Encyclopaedia Britannica in support of the Chinese claim in one sector of the boundary and to reject it in respect of the other. In fact, if maps published privately in other countries are to be cited as evidence, we can refer to a large number of such maps in our support.
For example, the map of *Asie Meridionale* published by Andriveau-Coujon in Paris in 1876 and the map of *Asie Orientale* published by the same firm in 1881 show the whole tribal area as outside Tibet. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire published by the China Inland Mission in 1906 shows a boundary which approximates to the McMahon Line. The British War Office Map of the Chinese Empire published in October 1907 shows almost the entire tribal territory in India. The map in Sir Francis Younghusband’s volume *India and Tibet* published in London in 1910 shows the tribal area in India; and so does the map in Sir Charles Bell’s book *Tibet Past & Present* (Oxford 1924).

17. It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as parts of Tibet. Under treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan’s external relations, and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government. The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector. As regards Sikkim, the Chinese Government recognized as far back as 1890 that the Government of India “has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State”. This Con-
vention of 1890 also defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet; and the boundary was later, in 1895, demarcated. There is thus no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with the Tibet region.

18. You have stated that the Sino-Indian boundary is about 2000 kilometres in length, is wholly undelimited, and that it is not Chinese maps but British and Indian maps that have been unilaterally altering the Sino-Indian boundary. In fact, the Sino-Indian boundary (apart from the boundary of Sikkim and Bhutan with Tibet) extends over 3520 kilometres. It is wrong to say that this long boundary is wholly undelimited. The frontier east of Bhutan has been explicitly delineated on the 1914 treaty map. The frontier of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh has been clarified by implication by the mention of six passes in the 1954 Agreement. As for the charge that British and Indian maps have been unilaterally altering the boundary, the fact is that early British maps showed the boundary roughly where the British thought the water-parting was at the time. Later, as more topographical as well as local information about the water-parting was obtained, the boundary was shown with greater precision on the subsequent maps. The discrepancies between the earlier and later maps are also explained in part by the fact that British cartographers as a rule showed in their maps the administrative boundaries irrespective of the actual alignment of the frontier. Therefore, as administration was gradually extended in the frontier areas, corresponding changes were made in the boundaries on the later maps. Thus the map of India published by the
Survey of India in 1895 (1''=128 miles) showed the unadministered areas of northern Burma and northeastern India up to what subsequently came to be known as the McMahon Line by a light orange colour wash as distinct from the deeper colours used for the rest of the Indian territory. The Memorandum on Native States in India published by the Government of India in 1909 has a map in Volume II showing this whole tribal area as a part of India. The fact is that the present frontiers of India have always been the historic frontiers, but administration in the British period was only gradually extended up to these frontiers. Shortly after India attained independence in 1947 the Government of India decided, as a matter of policy, to bring these frontier areas under more direct administrative control to enable them to share in the benefits of a welfare state subject to the protection of their distinct social and cultural patterns. It is not true to say that it was only after the recent Tibetan crisis and the entry into India of a large number of Tibetans that Indian troops started advancing steadily in the North-East Frontier Agency. In fact administrative personnel, civil and police, had been functioning in these areas right up to the McMahon frontier for several years before the recent disturbances broke out in Tibet. However, we did not have any military force anywhere in the border areas. There was only an armed constabulary in support of the civil personnel and even the frontier posts were manned by this constabulary. It was only when our outpost at Longju was overpowered by superior Chinese military force and our personnel elsewhere along the frontier were being intimidated by Chinese forces that we decided to place
the responsibility for the protection of the frontier on our army.

19. It should be clear from what has been stated in previous paragraphs that it is the Chinese maps that have altered the boundary alignments through the years to include large areas of Indian territory in China. It should also be stated that Chinese maps published even after 1949 have not adhered to any definite frontier. Different maps show different alignments in the same sector.

20. I am sorry to have to say that it is the Chinese Government who have been trying unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border. There is no other explanation for the presence of Chinese personnel in Bara Hoti and of Chinese troops in the Aksai Chin area, Khurnak Fort, Mandal, Spanggur, Khinzemane and Longju, and for Chinese intrusions in the Spiti area, Shipki Pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area, Sangcha, Lapthal, and the Dichu Valley. Nor is it correct to say that Chinese troops have never crossed the McMahon Line. Both Khinzemane and Longju are south of this line.

21. The Government of India emphatically repudiate the allegation that in recent times they have "invaded and occupied" a number of places in the middle sector of the boundary. In fact it is the Chinese forces which have made persistent efforts in recent times to come into and occupy indisputably Indian territory. Details of intrusions and attempted intrusions by Chinese forces have been given in the attached note. These intrusions have been particularly marked in the Spanggur area,
where Chinese forces have been pushing forward in an aggressive manner during the last year or two in disregard of the traditional frontier. The Chinese have only recently established a new camp near the western extremity of the Spanggur lake at a point which even according to some official Chinese maps is in Indian territory. It is not for us to comment on the reports of large-scale movements of Chinese forces in the Tibetan frontier areas. We hope that these moves do not signify a new policy of actively probing into Indian territory along the whole length of the Sino-Indian frontier.

22. Reports have reached us that some Chinese officers in Tibet have repeatedly proclaimed that the Chinese authorities will before long take possession of Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh and our North-East Frontier Agency. I do not know what authority they had to make these remarks but I would like to draw Your Excellency’s attention to them as these remarks have naturally added to the tension on the frontier.

23. Your Excellency has spoken of Indian parties having trespassed into Chinese territory. Nowhere have our personnel done so. Even if they had done so through an error of judgment at any point in the barren wastes of some far-flung frontier region, we would have expected that a friendly Government would promptly bring it to our notice for remedial action. Instead, last year when an Indian party was engaged on routine administrative patrol near Haji Langar in Ladakh, your forces arrested them and did not inform us of the arrest until we had enquired of you almost five weeks later. In the meantime our personnel were
subjected to threats, harsh treatment and severe interrogation. Surely this is not the manner in which the personnel of a friendly Government should have been treated.

24. The charge that India has been shielding armed Tibetan rebels in the frontier area in the north-east is wholly unfounded and we firmly reject it. On the contrary, our personnel disarmed the Tibetan rebels as soon as they crossed the frontier into Indian territory and insisted on their moving well away from the frontier areas. The few who showed disinclination to do so were told that they would not get asylum in India and made to leave our territory finally.

25. There is no truth in the allegation that Indian aircraft have repeatedly violated Chinese territorial air in this area. We have issued definite instruction to all our aircraft to avoid trespass into Chinese air space and we are assured that this instruction has been carefully observed. You will appreciate, however, that aircraft engaged in supply dropping missions to a frontier outpost may accidentally cross the international frontier or appear to do so even though it has not actually crossed the frontier. Our anxiety to respect the Chinese territorial air space would be clear from the fact that when in July last the officer in charge of our outpost at Longju fell seriously ill we informed your Government that we would be para-dropping a doctor. The object of our giving the information to your Government was to ensure that you would not misunderstand it if by error of judgment our aircraft should cross into Chinese territory in flying over a frontier outpost. For the same
reason we also gave you information in advance that survey operations would be carried out from the air on our side of the border during the months from November 1959 to February 1960. Incidentally, the information that we gave you about Longju would disprove any suggestion that we had surreptitiously started an outpost on Chinese territory. Had we done so, we would not have given its location to your Government.

26. I have looked into the allegation that the boundary drawn on Indian maps includes in many places even more territory than the McMahon Line, but have been unable to discover any basis for it. If you have in mind the Sino-Indian frontier shown in the Indian maps in the Migyitun area which differs slightly from the boundary shown in the Treaty map, the position can be easily explained. As settled between the British and the Chinese representatives at the time of the Simla Conference, the boundary was to follow the natural features, but a reservation was made that Migyitun (and a few other places) would be within Tibetan territory. This was done in order to leave within Tibet the two sacred lakes of Tsari Sarpa and Tso Karpo which were places of pilgrimage for Tibetans and the village of Migyitun from which the pilgrimage started. At the time of the Simla Convention, the exact topographical features in this area were not known. Later, after the topography of the area had been definitely ascertained, the actual boundary followed the geographical features except where a departure was necessary to leave Migyitun within Tibetan territory. The actual boundary as shown in the Indian maps, therefore, merely gave effect to
the treaty map in the area based on definite topography. This was in accordance with established international practice.

27. I entirely disagree with your view that the tense situation that has arisen on the border has been caused by Indian trespassing and provocation. In fact, as the attached note will show, it is the Chinese who have trespassed into Indian territory across the traditional border at a number of places in recent years. You have mentioned that we in India have staged a second so-called anti-Chinese campaign. This, if I may say so, is the reverse of the actual position. Despite the regrettable happenings on the frontier of our two countries, we in India have conducted ourselves with great restraint and moderation. At a number of places your forces assumed a threatening attitude; at others they actually came into our territory. Such incidents concerning as they did the integrity of India, were very serious, but in our anxiety not to create feelings against your Government we deliberately avoided giving publicity to them. Questions in Parliament had, however, to be answered and the facts could not be withheld. When the facts thus became known, the reaction both in Parliament and among the public was one of dismay and great resentment. There was criticism of our Government both in Parliament and the press for our failure to give publicity to these developments at an earlier stage. Under the Indian Constitution Parliament is supreme. India has also a free press and the Government could not restrain public criticism. In the circumstances, to allege that the Government of India built up pressure on China in any
manner is a complete misreading of the facts of the situation. It is also based on complete misunderstanding of the constitutional procedures under which the Government, Parliament and the press function in India. Needless to say, such an allegation is entirely baseless.

28. I have stated before and wish to affirm once again that the Government of India attach great importance to the maintenance of friendly relations with China. They have hitherto sought to conduct their relations with China, as with other countries, in the spirit of Panch Sheel. This indeed had always been India's policy even before the five principles were enunciated. It is therefore all the more a matter of regret and surprise to us that China should now have put forth claims to large areas of Indian territory inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Indian nationals, which have been under the administrative jurisdiction of India for many years. No Government could possibly discuss the future of such large areas which are an integral part of their territory. We however recognise that the India-China frontier which extends over more than 3500 kilometres has not been demarcated on the ground and disputes may therefore arise at some places along the traditional frontier as to whether these places lie on the Indian or the Tibetan side of this traditional frontier. We agree therefore that the border disputes which have already arisen should be amicably and peacefully settled. We also agree that until a settlement has been reached the status quo should be maintained. In the meantime both sides should respect the traditional
frontier and neither party should seek to alter the status quo in any manner. Further, if any party has trespassed into the other's territory across the traditional frontier, it should immediately withdraw to its side of the frontier. So far as the Government of India are concerned, at no place at present have they any personnel, civil, police or military, on the Tibetan side of the traditional frontier. There was only one outpost, that at Tamadem, established some months ago, which, subsequent enquiries showed, was somewhat north of the McMahon Line. In keeping with our earlier promise we have already withdrawn it to a point south of the Line. There can therefore be no question of withdrawing any Indian personnel at any other place. We would now request that in the same spirit your Government should withdraw their personnel from a number of posts which you have opened in recent months at Spanggur, Mandal and one or two other places in eastern Ladakh. Similarly, your forces should also withdraw from Longju which they forcibly occupied on the 26th August and which they still continue to occupy. No discussions can be fruitful unless the posts on the Indian side of the traditional frontier now held by the Chinese forces are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidations immediately cease.

29. Mr. Prime Minister, I regret that I have had to write to you at this length and in such detail. But I must frankly say that your letter of the 8th September has come as a great shock to us. India was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China and for the last ten years we have con-
sistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two countries signed the 1954 Agreement in regard to the Tibet region I hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to us in the relations between India and China had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all insistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have discussed in recent years and, I thought, settled. I appreciate your statement that China looks upon her south-western border as a border of peace and friendship. This hope and this promise could be fulfilled only if China would not bring within the scope of what should essentially be a border dispute, claims to thousands of square miles of territory which have been and are integral part of the territory of India.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Sd. Jawaharlal Nehru

A NOTE ON THE BORDER DISPUTES

A. Aksai Chin

As shown in the text of the letter, Aksai Chin is a part of Ladakh. The Chinese Government have now admitted that in 1956 they built a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang, running for about a hundred miles through this territory. In September 1957 it was announced
that this road had been completed. The next year Indian personnel carrying out routine patrol duties were arrested near Hagi Langar in north-east Aksai Chin, taken to Suget Karol and detained for five weeks. The leader of the Indian patrol was placed in solitary confinement, and all documents were seized. When the Government of India protested at the serious and continuous occupation of our territory which road-building implied, and enquired whether the Chinese authorities had any knowledge of the Indian patrol, they admitted that they had detained the Indian party. Later the party was released at the Karakoram pass.

B. The Pangong Area

The customary boundary between Ladakh and Tibet in this region lies from Lanak La (34°24' North and 79°34' East) along the eastern and southern watershed of the Changchenmo and the southern watershed of the Chumensang, and then along the southern bank of the Chumensang and the eastern bank of the Changlung Lungpa. Skirting the western extremity of the eastern half of Pangong Tso, the boundary thereafter follows the Ang watershed and cutting across Spanggur Tso, follows the north-eastern and northern watershed of the Indus. In recent years Chinese armed personnel have crossed this border in several places, fanned out and occupied Indian territory illegally. In July 1958 the Government of India protested against the Chinese occupation of Khurnak Fort, about 1½ miles within the Indian frontier. This fort has from time immemorial been within Ladakh, and has never been the subject of dispute. Even at a conference on certain pasture grounds in this area,
attended by the representatives of Tibet and Kashmir and a British Commissioner in 1924, the jurisdiction of India over this fort was not disputed. However, there has been no reply as yet to the note of the Government of India.

In July 1959 it was learnt that a Chinese armed detachment had entered Indian territory in the Spanggur area south of the Pangong Lake, and had established a camp at Spanggur. When an Indian police party on its way to Khurnak approached them, it was overpowered. The Government of India protested, but the Chinese Government in their reply asserted that this was Chinese territory. This statement is contradicted even by the boundary alignment in this sector shown on Chinese maps, for example, the Map of the Administrative Areas of the Chinese Republic (1948), in which the boundary cuts across the eastern extremity of the Spanggur Lake. Spanggur stands on the western edge of the lake. Though the Government of India would have been justified in dislodging this Chinese camp, they have refrained from doing so in the hope that the Chinese would themselves withdraw.

C. Demchok

Demchok, or Parigas, is another area which India is supposed to have "invaded and occupied". This is part of the Hanle region in south-eastern Ladakh. Ladakhi chronicles of the 17th century and accounts of travellers of the 18th and 19th centuries all state that Demchok was a part of Ladakh. The Kailash range, which is the eastern watershed of the Indus, lies east of Demchok. Strachey, who visited this area in 1847, confirmed this
position, and Walker, on the authority of Strachey, showed the boundary in this region as running east of Demchok village. The pasture grounds between Demchok and the Kailash range have been used by Indian villagers for a long time past. All revenue records of this century prove that taxes were collected in this area by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, and a checkpost has been maintained in this area for several decades.

D. The Spiti Area

Premier Chou En-lai's letter alleges Indian "invasion" of Chuva and Chu-je, i.e., the Spiti area in the Punjab State. The Spiti valley is, however, traditional Indian territory. The frontier in this area is the major watershed between the Pare Chu and the Spiti systems. As far back as 1879 the "Map of Hundes or Ngari Khorsum and Monyol" issued by the Trigonometrical Survey of India showed the boundary along this watershed. In 1956 a Chinese survey party visited this area and sought to place boundary stones on Indian territory, and in 1957 a Chinese patrol party was noticed there. The Government of India drew the attention of the Chinese Government to these violations of Indian territory. The Chinese authorities neither denied the charge nor claimed this territory to be a part of Tibet. They did not appear even to have an exact knowledge of this terrain, for they asked India for details of latitude and longitude. A wall map of the People's Republic of China published in November 1953 (Ya Kuang Publishing Society) shows this area within India. To speak of Indian aggression in this area is therefore, to say the least, astonishing.
E. Shipki Pass

Shipki pass is the first of the six border passes mentioned in the 1954 Agreement. This has always been the limit of Indian territory. All old maps indicated this as the border pass. The Government of India have constructed a road up to this point and have been maintaining it for many years; and in 1954 the words “Hindustan-Tibet” were engraved on a rock flanking the pass on the left. In the summer of 1956 a Chinese patrol was found on the Indian side of the pass and well within Indian territory. On being asked to withdraw the Chinese personnel threw stones and threatened to use hand grenades. The commander of the Chinese patrol contended that he had received instructions to patrol the area up to Hupsang Khud and if the Indian party went beyond Hupsang Khud he “would oppose it with arms”. Hupsang Khud is four miles from Shipki pass on the Indian side. Indian protests to the Government of China against this incursion remain unanswered.

F. The Nilang-Jadhang Area

Premier Chou En-lai states that there have been historical disputes regarding many places in the sector of the boundary between Ladakh and Nepal, and gives as an example the area of Sang and Tsungsha, south-west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet. In fact this is the only area in regard to which the Chinese authorities have raised a dispute. Sang is Jadhang village, Tsungsha is Nilang village and Tsaparang Dzong is the district headquarters in this part of Tibet. The Chinese Premier ac-
cuses India of having invaded and occupied Puling-Sumdo, that is Pulam Sumda, a village in the Nilang-Jadhang area.

It is not true that this area had always belonged to China and that the British occupied it only thirty to forty years ago. By the middle of the seventeenth century Nilang formed part of Bushahr state (now in Himachal Pradesh of India). A copper-plate inscription of 1667 A.D. records a treaty of mutual defence between Bushahr and Tehri and the cession to Tehri of Nilang. So clearly Nilang was then in India. Documents of the 18th century show that Tehri was administering the area. The inhabitants of this area are Garhwali by stock and not Tibetan.

In 1804 Nepalese troops are said to have destroyed Nilang village but in 1850 the Tehri Durbar re-established the village of Nilang and a hamlet named Jadhang further north. In 1914 the Tibetans tried to set up a boundary pillar at Gum Gum Nala south of Nilang, and four years later the Tehri Durbar in its turn erected three boundary pillars at the border pass of Tsangchok La.

In 1926 a boundary commission consisting of Tibetan, Tehri and British representatives met at Nilang. Considerable evidence was produced by the Tehri Government in their own favour. It included ownership rights in land, proof of construction of roads and buildings and collection of land revenues for centuries. The only evidence the Tibetans could produce was that their agents had occasionally collected a tax levied on trade with Tibet. The territory continued under the administration of the Tehri Durbar and, after the merger of
Tehri state in Uttar Pradesh (India) in 1948, under the administration of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Since 1951 no taxes at all have been paid by these villagers to Tibetans, as they have discontinued the practice of visiting Tibet for trade.

The area of Nilang-Jadhang is situated south of the main watershed in this region, along which the six border passes mentioned in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement are situated. In April 1956 it was found that some armed Chinese personnel had intruded into this area without securing the permission of the Indian authorities. A protest was lodged by the Government of India on 2nd May 1956, but till now there has been no reply to this protest from the Chinese Government.

G. Bara Hoti

Bara Hoti, which the Chinese call Wu-je and accuse the Government of India of having occupied, is a small area (about 1½ square miles) in the State of Uttar Pradesh (India). The area lies between the main watershed of the Sutlej and the Alakhnanda, which is the boundary in this sector, and the highest range of the Himalayas further south. Revenue records and other official documents of the 19th century establish that the watershed is the traditional frontier between India and Tibet in this region. It has been shown in Indian maps since 1850, when maps of this region based on surveys were first drawn. Even Chinese maps upto 1958 show the watershed as the frontier. Bara Hoti which is south of the watershed must therefore be regarded as within India. Till 1954 neither the Tibetans nor the Chinese seriously challenged this position, but since then Chinese
personnel have persistently visited this area. There was a conference in Delhi to consider this question in April-May 1958. The Indian representatives proposed that pending a settlement of the dispute no armed personnel should be sent to the area. The Chinese Government agreed to this, but rejected the further proposal that neither side should send civilian personnel to the area. The Government of India, therefore, have continued to send civilian personnel to the area to exercise their long-established civil jurisdiction in this area. Bara Hoti has for centuries been under a patwari, and officials of Garhwal district have been touring it regularly. To describe the continuation of this administration as “aggression” is therefore a distortion of facts. The accusation is more applicable to the Chinese Government, who sent not merely civilian officials but an armed party to the area in 1958 in contravention of the agreement at the Delhi conference. The Government of India have scrupulously adhered to the interim agreement not to send armed personnel and have not allowed even the revenue officials to carry arms for self-protection. Furthermore, the Chinese personnel stayed at Bara Hoti in 1958 for part of the winter also, contrary to normal practice.

India’s proposal at the conference that even civilian personnel should not be sent to the area shows the extent to which she was willing to go in the interest of a peaceful settlement. The only major argument that the Chinese side brought forward was that certain Tibetan agents called Sarjis came occasionally to this area to collect imposts. These men, however, were not regular officials of the Chinese Government but merely pro-
moters of trade who came to declare Indo-Tibetan trade open and to inspect the cattle which was coming from or going to Tibet to see if it was diseased. They collected taxes only from Tibetans who had come down to trade and not from the local villagers. And even against these visits of the Tibetan Sarjis, the Government of India had always been making repeated protests.

Indeed, it was revealed at the Conference at Delhi in 1958 that the Chinese did not even know what area they meant by Wu-je. They therefore pressed for a local enquiry as that would enable them to know what area they were claiming.

Two other places south-east of Bara Hoti also mentioned in Premier Chou En-lai's letter as "invaded and occupied" by India are Sangcha or Sangcha Malla, and Lapthal. They are situated in Almora District in Uttar Pradesh, on the Indian side of the Balcha Dhura pass. This pass is located on the water-parting which is the traditional boundary in this area between India and Tibet. This is confirmed by Edwin Atkinson in his volume The Himalayan Districts of North-Western Provinces of India (1886). Sangcha Malla is two miles south of the border and Lapthal six miles south. No Chinese map has ever shown these places within Tibet, and they have never before been claimed by either Tibet or China. It was only in October 1958, when the Indian checkposts retired as usual because of the onset of winter, that Chinese personnel entered Indian territory and established outposts at these two places. A protest of the Government of India on 10th December 1958 has elicited no reply.
H. Yasher, Khinzemane and Shatze

Premier Chou En-lai alleges that Indian troops intruded into Yasher and are still in occupation of Shatze and Khinzemane. The Government of India are aware of no such place or area as Yasher. Judging from its location on the small-scale maps recently published in Chinese newspapers, it is presumably a small area northeast of Height 15721 in the Simla Convention Map. Here the boundary runs due north and the territory that is marked as Yasher is inside India. Indian personnel in this area have been given strict orders not to cross the boundary and they have scrupulously observed these orders. If the village Lung is being referred to as Yasher, then it can be categorically stated that Indian troops have never occupied it.

Khinzemane is south of the Thangla range which forms the international boundary in this area. In fact Chinese troops intruded into Khinzemane and tried to overawe Indian personnel there. Khinzemane and the Droksar pastures near it in the North East Frontier Agency of India have for years belonged to the Indian village of Lumpo. The villages of Le and Timang in Tibet have been allowed to use these pastures on payment for pasture rights to the Indian village of Lumpo. There is no record of the Tibetan authorities ever having exercised jurisdiction in the region south of the Thangla range. As for Shatze, it is south of Khinzemane and well within Indian territory.

I. Longju and Migyitun

Premier Chou En-lai says that Indian troops have not only overstepped the McMahon Line as indicated in the
map attached to the notes exchanged between Britain and Tibet, but have also advanced across the boundary drawn on current Indian maps, and these maps are alleged in many places to cut even deeper into Chinese territory than the McMahon Line. It is alleged that Indian troops "invaded and occupied" Longju and launched armed attacks on Chinese frontier guards stationed at Migyitun, leaving no option to the Chinese frontier guards but to fire back in self-defence.

It has been stated in the text of the letter that the representation of the McMahon Line on Indian maps strictly conforms to the line shown in the Simla Convention Map. Indian troops have not crossed the boundary as drawn on current Indian maps. The Indo-Tibetan boundary drawn at the Simla Conference departed from the watershed in the Subansiri area in order to leave in Tibet the sacred lakes of Tso Karpo and Tsari Tsarpa, the village of Migyitun to which Tibetans attach importance as the starting point of the twelve-year pilgrimage, the route from Migyitun to the lakes, and another shorter pilgrimage route known as Tsari Myingpa. The boundary alignment on current Indian maps carefully leaves these territories in Tibet. The international boundary here runs just south of the village of Migyitun. Longju which is entirely distinct from Migyitun lies 1½ miles further south of the border. It cannot be a part of Migyitun, which was a decaying village of twelve huts in 1913 and had further deteriorated to six huts and a monastic inn in 1935. The lands attached to Migyitun village were few and extended to a very short distance from the village.
Until Chinese troops recently trespassed into Longju no administrative control was ever exercised over this village by the Tibetan authorities. The detachment of Indian armed constabulary was instructed only to resist trespassers and to use force only in self-defence. It was the Chinese who first fired at the Indian forward picket and later overwhelmed by force the Indian outpost at Longju. This deliberate attack in superior numbers on an Indian outpost could have no justification at all. However, even though Lonju is undoubtedly Indian territory, the Government of India are prepared to discuss with the Chinese Government the exact alignment of the McMahon Line in the Longju area. The Government of India have also offered not to send their personnel back to Longju provided that the Chinese Government also would withdraw their forces. The Chinese Government have not so far replied to this offer.

New Delhi,
September 26, 1959
The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, New Delhi.

The Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India present their compliments to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China and have the honour to refer to the note which the Chinese Vice-Minister handed to the Indian Ambassador in Peking on October 25. The Government of India have also seen the statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at Peking on October 26. They have to state with regret that the account of the incidents given in the Chinese Government’s note to the Indian Ambassador, and repeated in greater detail in the statement published by the Chinese Foreign Office, is completely at variance with facts and is a travesty of truth. The Government of India have enquired into this matter fully and have received a detailed account of the events of October 20 and 21 from the officer who was second-in-command of the Indian
police party when it was attacked by Chinese forces and who later returned to the nearest Indian outpost. The account of the officer is appended to this note. The gallant officer who was in command of the party lost his life during the clash.

2. The Government of India not only reject the factual account given by the Chinese Government of this incident, but also repudiate certain assumptions underlying it. The suggestion made that the Indian police party armed with rifles only and in a disadvantageous position would attack a heavily armed Chinese force strongly entrenched on a hill top above them and equipped with mortars and hand-grenades, cannot be accepted by any reasonable person. All the circumstances concerning this incident as well as the detailed information that we possess contradict the version which has been supplied by the Chinese Government.

3. The attached note about the tragic incident in the Chang Chenmo Valley which gives a first-hand account by a responsible officer, clearly indicates that at no time on the 20th or 21st October did the Indian personnel take any aggressive attitude. While they were engaged on patrol duty, they were suddenly subjected to ruthless attack by Chinese forces with rifles, mortar and hand-grenades. One contingent of the attacking force was apparently entrenched on a hill top and the other was across the Chang Chenmo river on the right. Although the Indian party fired in self-defence, they had no chance against the superior strength of the Chinese force which was aided by its strategic situation and the superior arms that it possessed. The Chinese Govern-
have not stated the exact casualties suffered by the attacking Chinese force, but have indicated that their casualties were much less than those of the Indian party. The Government of India entirely disagree with the extraordinary conclusion drawn by the Chinese Government from the heavy casualties suffered by the Indian personnel that the Indian party had taken the offensive. The obvious conclusion would be the opposite of this and would indicate that the Chinese forces were the attacking party as they were entrenched on a hill top and used mortars and hand-grenades.

4. This incident has to be viewed also in the context of other events preceding it, as well as of the correspondence that has taken place between the Government of India and the Chinese Government. The Indian frontier, throughout its long extent, has been well known as a traditional frontier and has been shown with precision in official maps published by the Survey of India. There has been no doubt about this frontier. Repeatedly during the past few years, the Prime Minister of India has declared firmly and clearly what this frontier is. The Government of the People's Republic of China said nothing about this frontier for a number of years. When their attention was drawn to some vague Chinese maps appearing in magazines and showing large areas, without any precision, as part of the Chinese State, objection was taken to these by the Government of India. The answer given was that these maps were old maps produced by the previous regime in China and the present Government of China had been too busy with other activities to consider a revision of these maps. That answer
itself indicated that the Chinese Government had no serious doubt about the correctness of the Indian maps, except perhaps for some minor disputes. As has been previously brought to the notice of the Chinese Government, the Premier of the People’s Republic of China himself stated to the Prime Minister of India that the Chinese Government was prepared to accept the north eastern frontier of India which has been referred to as the McMahon Line. No question of the frontier of the Tibet region with Ladakh was ever raised during all these years, although the Chinese Government must have known very well, both from Indian maps and statements made on behalf of India as well as from the facts of the situation, where this frontier is. The Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 purported to deal with all outstanding issues between India and the Tibet region of China inherited from the British days. But neither during the long and detailed discussions preceding the Agreement nor in the Agreement itself was any mention made by the Chinese Government of their claim to such large areas of Indian territory. It was only in the letter addressed by Premier Chou En-lai to the Prime Minister of India dated 8th September 1959 that for the first time the Chinese Government laid claim to the territories vaguely included in their maps. This statement was at variance with the previous statements on the subject of the Chinese maps. It is to be observed that at no time up till now has any precise statement been made by the Chinese Government as to where, according to them, their frontier is. Even their own maps give completely different and varying frontiers.
5. So far as the Government of India are concerned, their position has been clear and precise from the beginning and, indeed, for a long period of years and there has been no doubt about it. That position was described in detail in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Indian Prime Minister's letter of September 26 to Premier Chou En-lai. In this letter, the Prime Minister of India has given the historical background of the traditional Sino-Indian boundary and the basis of its delineation in different sectors in official Indian maps. Indeed, any person with a knowledge of history not only of recent events, but of the past hundreds of years and more, would appreciate that this traditional and historical frontier of India, has been associated with India's culture and tradition for the last two thousand years or so, and has been an intimate part of India's life and thought.

6. The Government of India, therefore, reject and repudiate the assumptions underlying the note of the Chinese Government in regard to this long frontier. They reiterate that the area where the clash took place is not only a part of Indian territory but is well within it. They cannot accept the statement made by the Chinese Government that the entire area, including the places east, south and north of Kongka Pass "has always been Chinese territory and under the respective jurisdiction of the local authorities of Sinkiang and Tibet region." This statement is contrary to history and facts. The maps published by the Survey of India since 1867-68 have been showing the boundary between Ladakh on the one hand, and Sinkiang and the Tibet region on the other, as in the present day official maps published by
the Survey of India. From the Karakoram Pass this boundary proceeds north-east via the Qara Tagh Pass and then follows the Kuen Lun range from a point 15 miles north of Haji Langar to peak 21250 (Survey of India map) which lies east of longitude 80 east. This line constitutes the watershed between the Indus system in India and the Khotan system in China. From point 21250 the boundary runs south down to Lanak La along the western watershed of streams flowing into lakes in the Chinese territory. The boundary further south from Lanak La to Chang La has been described in the note presented by the Indian Embassy in Peking to the Chinese Foreign Office on the 13th August 1959. As stated in that note, the international boundary follows the eastern and southern watershed of Chang Chenmo and the southern watershed of Chumesang and thence the southern bank of Chumesang and the eastern bank of Changlung Lungpa. Skirting the western extremity of the eastern half of Pangong Tso (which is called Yaerhmu in Chinese maps), the boundary then follows the Ang watershed and cutting across Spanggur Tso, follows the north-eastern and northern watershed of the Indus.

7. It will thus be seen that the international boundary has been shown for nearly a century in official Indian maps as it is today. In fact, detailed surveys of the area were undertaken from 1867-68, and the boundary as shown in our maps is not only in accordance with tradition and custom but is also based on the results of these surveys. The area on the Indian side of this boundary was surveyed by Hayward, Shaw and Cayley
in 1868, Bower in 1891 and Aurel Stein in 1900. Drew, who was Governor of Ladakh under the Maharaja of Kashmir, officially inspected the area up to its northern border in 1871, and the maps appended to his book on 'Jammu and Kashmir territories, 1875', as also the maps attached to the Gazetteers of Jammu and Kashmir published from 1890 onwards and the Imperial Gazetteer of India of 1908, show the boundary more or less similar to the frontier shown in official Indian maps today. It is the Chinese maps of the area which have shown different lines at different times. An official Chinese map of 1893 shows the Aksai Chin area as in India. The new Atlas of China published by Shun Pao, 1935, shows a great part of the Chang Chenmo region in India. In fact the place where the recent clash took place is in Indian territory according to this map. This map and the subsequent Chinese maps until 1951 showed the international boundary as running 30 to 60 miles east of and parallel to Shyok river. It is only in 1951 that a few Chinese maps took the boundary within 10 to 30 miles east of and parallel to the Shyok river. Most of the Chinese maps as late as 1954, and one as late as 1956, depict the boundary in the Pangong lake as cutting the western extremity of the eastern half of Pangong Tso called Yaerhmu in Chinese maps. The few Chinese maps of 1951 referred to above show the line as cutting the western half of Pangong lake at its bend and thus include the Spanggur area and a part of Pangong area in Tibet.

8. It is true that the Government of India did not open any border outposts right along the traditional
frontier. This was because the area was inhabited very sparsely, if at all, and they had no reason to anticipate any aggressive intention on the part of the Chinese Government. They were therefore content with sending regular police patrol parties to these areas in previous years. The Government of India cannot accept the statement in the press note issued by the Chinese Government on the 26th October that “the frontier guards of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have all along been stationed and patrolled this entire area.” Indian survey and reconnaissance parties, which went from Leh to Lanak La in 1954 and 1956, did not come across any evidence of Chinese occupation. For the first time in 1957 signs of intrusion by outsiders were noticed at Shinglung and some places further north. Obviously, such intrusion must have occurred in these places for the first time in 1957. Other Indian reconnaissance parties went as far as Karakoram Pass without coming across any Chinese personnel. No Indian reconnaissance party was sent to the area in Aksai Chin where the Chinese authorities had built a new road. No adverse conclusion can however be drawn from the mere fact that the Chinese had constructed this road. This was done without the knowledge of the Government of India. As early as 1899, the then Government of India communicated to the authorities in Peking the international boundary in this area, which then was more or less as it is today. And as stated above, official Indian maps have shown the Aksai Chin area as part of India for nearly a century. This area is extremely difficult of access from inhabited areas in western and southern Ladakh, and the Government of India had no reason to
suspect that the Government of China, with whom they had friendly relations, would trespass into the area and construct a road.

9. No answer has been received yet by the Government of India to the long and detailed letter of the Prime Minister of India to Premier Chou En-lai of September 26, 1959. Regardless of the facts stated in this letter, the forces of the Chinese Government have not only committed further aggression, but have attacked an Indian police party engaged in its normal patrol duty. This was the second armed attack on an Indian party, the previous one taking place at Longju, where Chinese forces crossed the Indian frontier forcibly. These facts, taken together with a continuance of aggressive attitudes in various parts of the frontier and the type of propaganda that is being conducted on behalf of the Chinese Government, are reminiscent of the activities of the old imperialist powers against whom both India and China struggled in the past. It is a matter of deep regret that the Chinese Government, which has so often condemned imperialism, should act in a manner which is so contrary to their own assertions. It is a matter of even greater regret that the Five Principles as well as the Declaration of the Bandung Conference should thus be flouted by the Chinese Government.

10. The Government of India are surprised at the complaint in the Chinese Government's note about the publication of an official Indian communique on this incident. The Government of India would not have been justified in keeping the Indian people in the dark about such a serious incident. The Chinese Government must
be aware not only of the strong feelings in India on the question of Indian frontiers, but also, and more especially, about this incident. As a matter of fact, the Government of India published their communique only after they found from the Chinese Government's note handed to the Indian Ambassador on October 25, that the account given in that note was at complete variance with the facts.

11. The Government of India do not propose to discuss in detail other matters referred to in the statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Office on the 26th October. They repudiate emphatically the allegation that the Indian forces have violated the status quo in several places on the Sino-Indian frontier or that they have occupied any place inside Chinese territory. The facts about the frontier have been given in detail in the Indian Prime Minister's letter of September 26. Paragraphs 12 to 16 of that letter deal with the traditional frontier in the north-east, which is sometimes referred to as the McMahon Line. It will be seen from these paragraphs that the Chinese claim to any territory south of this line is entirely baseless. Any trespass into this area by Chinese personnel would amount to deliberate violation of the territory of India.

12. The Government of India have always been willing to respect the traditional frontier between India and China and have indeed done so. They cannot, however, recognise any boundary in the Ladakh region or elsewhere, which includes in China areas on the Indian side of the traditional frontier. For a long period of years this frontier has been peaceful. Trouble and con-
Conflict have arisen there recently because the Chinese forces, having advanced up to the frontier in many places, committed aggression by crossing it at some places.

13. The Chinese Government have rightly stressed the importance of maintaining the status quo. An essential prerequisite to the maintenance of the status quo is that neither side should seek to extend its occupation in assertion of a supposed right in disregard of the traditional frontier, and that, in any event, there should be no resort to force except as a last resort in self-defence. The deplorable incident, which has resulted in such heavy casualties to the Indian personnel, would have been avoided if the Chinese force had paid regard to this basic fact.

14. It is recognised the world over that India stands for peace and is entirely opposed to the use of warlike methods for the settlement of international disputes. Even in their struggle for independence, the Indian people adhered to peaceful methods. In regard to the Government and people of China, India's attitude has always been friendly. This was not only in consonance with India's well known policy, but was due to the desire of the people and the Government of India that it was essential in the interests of India and China as well as of peace in Asia and the world, that these two great countries of Asia should have friendly relations, even though they might differ in their internal structure of Government. To that end, the Government of India have laboured through these years. It is a matter, therefore, of great sorrow to them that their hopes have been be-
lied, and a situation created which endangers the peaceful and friendly relations which have existed and which, they hoped, would continue to exist, between these two great countries.

15. It is a matter of special regret to the Government of India that at a time when the world appears at last to be moving towards a peaceful settlement of the grave problems which have afflicted it during the last twelve years and when the two great nations, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, are striving to their utmost ability to put an end to the cold war, there should be this relapse into violence and aggression on the frontiers of India. The countries of Asia have ardently advocated peace and have played not an insignificant part in the work for peace. At this critical moment in the history of the world, it would have been fitting for all the nations of Asia not only to stand for peace, but to further it by their own attitudes and activities.

16. In accordance with her firm policy, India will continue to endeavour to resolve all disputes by peaceful methods. But where aggression takes place, the people of India inevitably have to resist by all means available to them. The independence and integrity of India are what the Indian people laboured for during their long struggle for freedom, and they cannot permit any injury to or infringement of them. The Government of India, therefore, trust that the Chinese Government will remove their forces from Indian territory and seek to resolve minor frontier disputes by peaceful methods.

17. The Ministry of External Affairs take this opportunity of renewing to the Embassy of the People’s
Republic of China the assurances of their highest consideration.

ANNEXURE

Account Received from
the Second-in-Command of the
Indian Police Patrol Party

On the 19th October, the party reached Hot Springs and established a temporary camp there. Before proceeding further north the next morning (20th) the officer in charge, Karam Singh, sent two police constables and a porter on reconnaissance towards the east. Neither the constables nor the porter returned to the camp at the appointed time. A small patrol party was therefore sent out in the evening in search of the missing persons but it returned at 11 o’clock at night without being able to find any of the missing personnel.

On the 21st morning, the officer in charge decided to go out himself in search of the missing persons as it was possible that they had lost their way in these trackless hills. Accompanied by Tyagi, who was his second in command, some members of his staff and some police constables making a total of about 20, the officer in charge left the camp at about 10 o’clock in the morning on ponies. He left instruction for the rest of the party to follow behind on foot.

At six miles east of Hot Springs, at a place overlooked by a hill to the left, Karam Singh noticed some hoof-
prints. So he halted and waited for the main party to come up. When the main party arrived, he and Tyagi decided that the main party under Tyagi should halt at that place whilst Karam Singh with a small party would follow the tracks to find if there were any intruders in the vicinity.

Karam Singh passed by this hill feature to the left without noticing anything unusual and went out of sight of the main party. A little later, Tyagi went forward to see how far Karam Singh’s party had gone, but he could not find them apparently because Karam Singh’s party had by then gone down the river bed. At this time, suddenly, fire was opened on Tyagi’s party by a Chinese force which was entrenched on the hill feature. Karam Singh’s party was also simultaneously fired upon by another Chinese party entrenched on the other side of the river as well as by the party on the hill-top. The attackers fired with mortars and automatic weapons.

Subjected to this attack, members of both Karam Singh’s party and Tyagi’s party tried to take cover and fire back, but they were in a very disadvantageous position having no proper cover and, therefore, their firing was not effective. The Chinese on the hill-top effectively stopped Tyagi’s party from going to the aid of Karam Singh’s party which was being attacked from both sides.

After some time, the Chinese who were apparently in some strength on the other side of the Chang Chenmo river and some of whom were mounted on horses, advanced forward and overwhelmed Karam Singh’s party with automatic fire and mortar. They moved further forward to attack Tyagi’s party, which then had no other alternative but to retreat. Karam Singh’s party was,
therefore, decimated either by killing or by capture except for a few survivors who escaped along the river bed and over the high hills in the dark.

At night, Tyagi's party made an attempt to go forward to recover the dead and the injured, but the Chinese were still in position on the hill feature and maintained that position even on the 22nd. Tyagi then withdrew his entire force to Tsogstsalu.

17 persons including Karam Singh were missing after the clash. Out of these, five including the officer in charge and the Jamadar were seen by the survivors to have been killed by Chinese fire.
November 16, 1959

His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China,
Peking.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of November 7, for which I thank you. We have also received a report from our Ambassador, Shri Parthasarathy, on the talk which you had with him the same day.

2. In the note which was handed over to your Ambassador in Delhi on November 4, we have given full details, supported by factual data, of the international boundary in Ladakh. We also attached to the note a first-hand account of the incident at Chang Chenmo Valley on October 21 which resulted in the death or capture of a large number of Indian personnel. Earlier, in my letter of September 26 to you, we gave you full facts in support of our statement in regard to the Sino-Indian border along its entire length. I have not had any reply yet to my letter of September 26 or any de-
tailed reply to our subsequent note of November 4. I notice with regret that you have not taken any account of the facts as given by us in these two communications and have dismissed them with the remark that our note "disregards in many respects the basic facts of the question of the boundary between our two countries and the truth of the border clash". I am wholly unable to agree with this observation. We should certainly explore all avenues to reduce the present tension between our two countries, but our efforts will not succeed if we ignore facts.

3. I should like to repeat, what I have said in a previous communication, that this entire frontier was a peaceful one for a long time and there was no conflict or trouble there. It is only recently that conflicts and difficulties have arisen in regard to the frontier. These difficulties have not arisen because of any action that we have taken. The cause of the recent troubles is action taken from your side of the frontier.

4. We are anxious that there should be a clear understanding about this frontier and that such border disputes as there are between our two countries should be settled by peaceful methods. In the immediate present, we think it is important to avoid all border clashes so as to assure tranquillity in the border regions and thereby create an atmosphere favourable for friendly settlement. We agree, therefore, that the two Governments should come to an arrangement without delay, which would eliminate risks of border clashes.

5. The Government of India have given close and careful consideration to your suggestions in this regard.
But, before I proceed to discuss them, I must inform you of the resentment aroused in India by the delay which took place in the release of the Indian personnel whom your forces had captured in the Chang Chenmo Valley on October 20 and 21 after inflicting casualties on our police patrol party. You will recall that on October 24 we received your offer to hand over to us the captured personnel and the dead bodies of those who were killed during the clash. On October 26 our Ambassador in Peking informed your Government of our concern about the prisoners and our anxiety to receive them back as well as the dead bodies. We wished to know the time and place at which the transfer was to take place. In order to avoid delay, we sent a forward party immediately to receive the prisoners and the dead bodies. This party waited at a place about five miles from the scene of the incident and, in spite of repeated reminders to your Government, no indication was given by your Government about the date and time of release until November 12. We are now relieved to know that the prisoners and the dead bodies were handed over to our forward party on November 14. In your talk with our Ambassador in Peking, you told him that the first-hand account of the incident which was attached to our note of November 4 was contradicted by the statements which the captured Indian personnel had made to you. We have since seen the official memorandum on the subject which your Vice-Minister handed to our Ambassador on November 14. We have not yet had any report from the released prisoners as to the course of events on October 20 and 21 and the circumstances in which they made their statements to their
captors. It is clear from your letter that they have been subjected to repeated interrogation. Such interrogation of prisoners is deplorable.

6. In your letter, you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes. Before I discuss this suggestion further, I should like to state categorically that the Government of India had not posted any army personnel anywhere at or near the international border. Our border check-posts were manned by civil constabulary, equipped with light arms. The main purpose of these check-posts was to deal with traders or others going along the recognised routes and to prevent any undesirable or unauthorised persons crossing the border. This itself indicates that these border check-posts were not intended for any aggressive purpose or for any armed conflict. It was only after the recent unfortunate incidents that we asked our Army to take over responsibility for the protection of our border.

7. A proper understanding of the facts in regard to the Sino-Indian boundary is essential to the consideration of any proposal that is made for the avoidance of border clashes. The facts are that on our North-East frontier, the entire territory up to the border (which is referred to as the McMahon Line) has been for long years part of India. Our civil administration has been functioning there, and there are important civil divisional headquarters not far from the border. At no point, except at Longju, are Chinese forces in occupation
of any area south of the Indian border. The boundary in this area passes over a terrain, the height of which varies from 14,000 to 20,000 feet above sea-level. In this extremely difficult terrain, almost all our border check-posts are situated on high hill features. We do not know where the Chinese posts are, but I understand that at no point along the length of this sector are posts on the two sides situated within sight of each other. In view of the difficult mountainous terrain, even where the distance between two posts is short in the map or as the crow flies, the actual journey from one place to another might take several days.

8. In view of these facts, we think that there should not be the slightest risk of any border clash if each Government instructs its outposts not to send out patrols. It is only when armed patrols go out in these difficult mountainous areas that there is likelihood of clashes taking place. We have, in fact, instructed our border outposts not to send out any forward patrols for the present. It would be extremely difficult in practice to establish a new line of outposts in the rear whether they are to be ten or twenty kilometers from the international boundary. The risk of border clashes will be completely eliminated if our suggestion is accepted by your Government.

9. Longju stands on a different footing altogether. As we have repeatedly stated earlier, we disagree with your statement that it is on your side of the so-called McMahon Line. We have no doubt that it is on our side. But whether it is on your side or ours, the facts are that your armed forces attacked and ousted our personnel
from Longju, inflicting casualties on them, and forcibly occupied our outpost. We cannot, therefore, agree to any arrangement, even as an interim measure, which would keep your forcible possession intact. The proper course, which we have already suggested to you, would be for you to withdraw from Longju. We on our part will not re-occupy it. This suggestion, if accepted, will immediately result in a lowering of tension.

10. At no point on this border or elsewhere, have we taken over any post from you. In your talk with our Ambassador, you have stated that Khinzemane is north of the international boundary. I do not agree with this statement. As we have informed your Government previously, Khinzemane lies clearly south of this boundary and within our territory. It has throughout been in our possession.

11. I presume that your suggestion for a zone of withdrawal is intended also to apply to the Sino-Indian border in the middle areas, that is, where it touches our states of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab. In these sectors also, there is no ambiguity about our border and at no point do the Chinese authorities occupy any area below the boundary. This would apply to the border of Sikkim also. If, therefore, we observe the precaution which I have mentioned above, all risk of border clashes will be eliminated in this sector of the frontier also.

12. I shall now deal with the international frontier in the Ladakh area of our state of Jammu and Kashmir. In my letter to you of September 26 and in our note of November 4, we have described in detail the inter-
national boundary in this sector, supported by factual
data. Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any
precision where the frontier line lies according to the
claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for
surmise based on small scale maps published in China.
These maps themselves have not always been consistent,
and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.

13. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you
have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier
line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Govern-
ment of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the fron-
tier line specified by them. The nature of this possession
has inevitably been different from that of an inhabited
area. This area is uninhabited, mountainous territory
of an altitude varying from 14,000 to 20,000 feet above
sea-level, with the mountain peaks going up much high-
er. Because of this, and because we did not expect any
kind of aggression across our frontier, we did not think
it necessary to establish check-posts right on the inter-
national boundary. But, as stated in my letter of Septem-
ber 26 and the note of November 4, we exercised
jurisdiction over this area by sending regular patrols up
to the international boundary. Certain police check-
posts were established some distance from the boundary
to control the trade routes, etc. Since this statement
is controverted by you, it is obvious that there is com-
plete disagreement between the two Governments even
about the facts of possession. An agreement about the
observance of the status quo would, therefore, be mean-
ingless as the facts concerning the status quo are them-
selves disputed. As we are at present discussing a short-
term interim measure to avoid border clashes, it is essential that we do not get involved in interminable discussions on the status quo at this stage.

14. I suggest, therefore, that in the Ladakh area, both our Governments should agree on the following as an interim measure. The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware, are their latest maps. Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier notes and correspondence and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.

15. Mr. Prime Minister, I share Your Excellency's sentiments of friendship between our two countries. I have earnestly striven for this during the past ten years, but you will no doubt appreciate that mere expressions of friendship will not repair the breach that has already occurred. We have to face the realities of a situation, and the present situation is such that unless active efforts are made by the Governments of China and India, relations between our two countries are likely to grow worse. I am anxious that this should not happen as any such development will do incalculable harm not only
to our two countries, but also to the cause of world peace in general.

16. Your Excellency has been good enough to suggest that in order to discuss the boundary question and other outstanding issues between the two countries, the Prime Ministers of the two countries should hold talks in the immediate future. I welcome your suggestion and, as I have previously stated, I am always ready to meet and discuss with Your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore avenues of friendly settlement. It is our common desire that such a meeting should bear fruit. The nature of the discussion at our meeting should, therefore, be such that we do not lose ourselves in a forest of data. Our correspondence has shown that the issues involve a mass of historical data, maps, etc. It is necessary, therefore, that some preliminary steps are taken and the foundation for our discussions laid. Unless this is done, there is danger of the meeting not leading to a successful result, which we so much desire, and disappointing the hopes of millions of people in our two countries.

17. While, therefore, I am ready to meet you at a suitable time and place, I feel that we should concentrate our immediate efforts on reaching interim understanding, which will help in easing the present tension and will prevent the situation getting worse. Thereafter, the necessary preliminary steps might be taken and the time and place of meeting, convenient and suitable to Your Excellency and to me, could be fixed. I need not assure Your Excellency of my earnest desire, as it is the desire
of my people, to restore friendship between India and China on a firm basis.

With my expression of high regard,

I am,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi, 21st December, 1959.

His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China,
Peking.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of December 17 the text of which our Ambassador in Peking has telegraphed to us. I deeply regret that you have not accepted the very reasonable proposals contained in my letter of 16th November. They were intended to secure an immediate lessening of tension along the Sino-Indian border by eliminating any risk of border clashes and to create the necessary atmosphere for a peaceful settlement of the border problem.

Your present letter once again reiterates claims to extensive areas which by history, by custom or by agreement have long been integral parts of India. I am particularly sorry to find that you have based your claim on recent intrusions by Chinese personnel into parts of Indian territory. It is these intrusions which have
brought about the present situation and created apprehensions. You have not sent any reply to my letter of September 26 to you and our note of November 4 in which some salient facts bearing on the situation had been mentioned.

I only wish to say that I cannot accept your allegation that Indian forces have occupied any part of Chinese territory, or committed aggression at Kongka Pass or at Longju where our established checkpost was attacked by Chinese troops.

Your letter also speaks of the 'friendly manner' in which Indian personnel who were captured in the Chang Chenmo valley were treated. Shri Karam Singh whom you returned to us has made his statement of the treatment that he and his colleagues received while they were prisoners in the custody of the Chinese border forces. This statement will show you the deplorable treatment to which the Indian prisoners were subjected by the Chinese forces.

Your Excellency has suggested that you and I should meet on December 26 so as to reach an agreement on the principles which are presumably to guide the officials on both sides in the discussion of details. As I informed you in my letter of November 16 and earlier, I am always ready to meet and discuss with Your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts? I would therefore prefer to wait for your promised reply to my letter of September 26 and our note of November 4, before we discuss what should be the next step. I wish
to add that it is entirely impossible for me to proceed to Rangoon or any other place within the next few days.

I would not like to end this letter to you without referring to the sentiments which you have expressed in your last paragraph. I am in entire agreement with you that the principal concern of our two countries should be "with the programme of long-term peaceful construction to lift ourselves from our present state of backwardness", to which you have referred. I equally agree with you that we should not be parties to the increasing of tension between our two countries or in the world. India has welcomed the fact that there is some lowering of world tensions and that "the world situation is developing in a direction favourable to peace". It is for this last reason, even apart from the imperative need to improve the relations between our two countries, that in spite of all recent events I have continually stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of our problems.

With kind regards,

I am,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru
New Delhi, February 5, 1960.

His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China,
Peking.

My dear Prime Minister,

My Government is sending you separately, through our Ambassador in Peking, a reply to the note of the Chinese Government which was handed to the Indian Embassy on the 26th December 1959.

I confess that I do not particularly like this long distance correspondence which consists of a reaffirmation of our respective views, and yet there is no escape from this when questions of far-reaching importance are raised between Governments and statements made which cannot be accepted.

You were good enough to suggest that we should meet to discuss these matters and, so far as we are concerned, it has been our consistent policy to welcome such meetings and informal approaches which sometimes lead to helpful results. But I found that the respective view-
points of our two Governments, in regard to the matters under discussion, were so wide apart and opposed to each other that there was little ground left for useful talks. I suggested in my letter of November 16, 1959, certain preliminary steps which would have eased the situation and facilitated further discussions. Unfortunately you have not found yourself able to accept those proposals. I still hope that you will reconsider your decision in this matter.

In the latest note from the Government of the People’s Republic of China, emphasis has been laid on our entire boundary never having been delimited. That is a statement which appears to us to be wholly incorrect, and we cannot accept it. On that basis there can be no negotiations.

It has pained me deeply that the relations between India and China which have in the past been so friendly and which we had endeavoured so much to strengthen, should have deteriorated rapidly and led to bitterness and resentment. That is a tragedy for both our countries as well as for the larger issues in the world. For my part, I have endeavoured and shall continue to endeavour to find a way to a peaceful settlement and for restoration of friendly relations. But for the moment, I do not see any common ground between our respective viewpoints.

Nevertheless I think that we should make every effort to explore avenues which might lead to a peaceful settlement. Although any negotiations on the basis you have suggested are not possible, still I think it might be helpful for us to meet. I am afraid it is not possible for me to leave India during the next few months. The budget
session of our Parliament is beginning on February 8 and this will require my presence here. I would, however, be glad if you could take the trouble to come to Delhi for this purpose at a time convenient to you and us. You will be our honoured guest when you come here. I would suggest that some time in the second half of March might be fixed for this meeting, if it is convenient to you.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru
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