British Expansion in Tibet

BY

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Rights of Indian Princes, Is Japan
A Menace To Asia? etc.

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DEDICATED

to

The Memory of Late

Dr. Sun Yat Sen,

The First President of the Chinese Republic, and an Advocate of Asian Independence, through Indo-Chinese-Japanese Freindship.
“There are some who urge that Mongolia and Tibet should be made “neutral zones” between China and Russia and Russia and Great Britain respectively. In case that Mongolia and Tibet should remain outside of the Empire, it may be a safer way for the preservation of the balance of power. But is it not more desirable to have China restored to all her territories under her wings and see that vast empire entering upon a marvellous career of industrial development?”

MARQIS SHIGENOBU OKUMA,
(Several times Premier of Japan).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

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Taraknath Das.
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CHAPTER I.

ANGLO-TIBETAN RELATIONS FROM THE DAYS OF WARREN HASTINGS TO LORD CURZON.

Since the days of Warren Hastings, Great Britain has had relations with Tibet with the ultimate object of bringing the country under its control. But the nature of the British policy towards Tibet, to an ordinary observer, seems to be somewhat vacilating and slow. In reality, however, it has always been steady and well calculated, leading to success—"taking the opportunity, striking while the iron is hot, not letting the chance go by, knowing our mind, knowing what we want, and acting decisively when the exact occasion arises."*

In 1772, the Bhutanese attacked Kuch Behar, a part of Bengal, and the king of Kuch Behar was taken prisoner. Warren Hastings, representing the East India Company, took energetic steps to clear the enemy out of Bengal. The Lama of Tibet then interceded in favour of Bhutan and wrote to Warren Hastings to be considerate in dealing with Bhutan. Warren

Hastings was polite to the Lama, but he had his own policy.

"Warren Hastings' policy was, then, not to sit still within the borders, supremely indifferent to what occurred on the other side, and intent upon respecting not merely the independence but also the isolation of his neighbours. It was a forward policy and combined in a noteworthy manner alertness and deliberation, rapidity and persistency, assertiveness and receptivity. He sought to secure his borders by at once striking when danger threatened, but also by taking infinite pains over long periods of time to promote ordinary neighbourly intercourse with those on the other side."

Bhutanese attack on Kuch Behar and the Tibetan appearance on the scene in her favour, gave Hastings "the greatest of all the Great Governor Generals of India" (from the standpoint of extension of British imperialism) an opportunity to further his forward policy and he sent a mission to Tibet. This mission is known as Bogel's Mission (1774). Bogel was clothed with the widest possible power to negotiate with the Tibetan Government to further trade relations between Bengal and Tibet. Bogel, with bold-

ness, started his negotiations with the Tashi Lama even to the extent of establishing an alliance with Tibet.” Bogel then hinted at the advisability of the Tibetans coming into some form of alliance with the English so that the influence of the latter might be used to restrain the Gurkhas of Nepal from attacking Tibet and its feudatories”. Tashi Lama was rather willing to consider the proposition but it failed because of the opposition of the Regents at Lhasa and the Chinese authorities. “The Lama said that the Regent’s apprehensions of the English arose not only from himself, but also from his fear of giving offence to the Chinese, to whom Tibet was subject. The Regent wished, therefore, to receive an answer from the court at Peking.”

The attitude of the Regent against any relation with the British was strengthened by the attitude of the king of Nepal toward Tibet, as well as the English. The Gurkha Raja of Nepal assured the Tashi Lama and the Regent at Lhasa of his friendly attitude towards Tibet and his intention of keeping the English out of his territory, and asked the Tibetans “to have no connection with the Firingies (English) or Mohhuls and not to allow them into the country,

but to follow the ancient custom, which he has resolved likewise to do.” He even suggested that the Tibetans should send Bogel back as he was going to do with an English agent who came to him.

According to the report of Bogel, as early as that time the Tashi Lama had certain ideas about the importance of Russia and Russo-Chinese relations affecting Tibet. Bogel was told to leave the country, although Bogel’s formal petition to the Regent contained only this request: “I request, in the name of the Governor, (Warren Hastings), my master, that you will allow merchants to trade with this country and Bengal.” This request was not granted and it only became an accomplished fact after a century and a quarter when the British by armed forces entered Tibet.

From the report of Bogel’s mission it became evident that as early as 1774, the British authorities found three distinct obstacles in the way of establishing Anglo-Tibetian relations, to the interest of Great Britain; they were:—(1) the anti-English attitude of the border states like Nepal and Bhutan which wanted to draw Tibet with them; (2) the attitude of the Chinese Regent at Lhasa who represented strong Chinese
opposition to British penetration in Tibet; (3) growing Russian interest towards Tibet.

After Bogel's mission had returned to Calcutta in 1775, Warren Hastings did not give up his ideas regarding Tibet and in 1780 again appointed Bogel as a Special Envoy to proceed to Lhasa. But the death of both Bogel and the Tashi Lama in 1781 marred the progress of the mission. In 1782 Captain Samuel Turner was entrusted with the responsibility of the mission. The new Tashi Lama was rather willing to establish some commercial relation with the British, but owing to Chinese opposition no satisfactory arrangement could be reached in spite of all the British efforts. According to Turner: "The influence of the Chinese officials overawes Tibetans in all their proceedings, and produces a timidity and caution in their conduct more suited to the character of subjects than allies." At this time Tibet was really a Chinese protectorate. In 1792 when the Nepalese invaded Tibet and defeated the Tibetans, the Chinese Government sent armies to the aid of Tibet and defeated the Nepalese forces and concluded a peace treaty by which Nepal agreed to pay an annual tribute to China, and a friendly relation of co-operation was established between Tibet and Nepal.
Between the period of Turner’s mission and the Manning Mission, which was despatched in 1810, the British Government in India refrained from taking any aggressive step in the Tibetan question. In 1810 Lord Minto provided all facilities to Mr. Manning, an accomplished Chinese scholar to go to Tibet. He started with a Chinese servant, and after considerable difficulty reached Lhasa. But he could not accomplish anything of political consequence because of the opposition of the Chinese Regent, and returned to India in 1812.

It must not be supposed that the British Government showed laxity in carrying out its Tibetan policy. She was forced to postpone her forward policy in that area, because she had, at that time, to concentrate her whole strength on the solution of important problems. She had her hands full of wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The question of the conquest of India proper and the establishment of British supremacy there was much more important. The European situation, until the fall of Napoleon, perplexed England a great deal. The Anglo-French war in Southern India was not an insignificant affair. Then the British conflicts with the Marhattas (1797-1806), the Burmese
wars (1823-26; 1852), the Sikh Wars (1845; 1848-49), the Afghan Expedition (1839-1842), the Sepoy Rebellion (1856-1858), and also the Russian encroachment on the Mediterranean, resulting in the Crimean War, kept the British Government too busy to bother with Tibet. However, Britain was engaged in indirectly solving the Tibetan problem by attacking and weakening China, the overlord of Tibet (the Opium War 1839-42; the Arrow War 1857-1860). Until the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Britain was more concerned in coping with these situations and her attention could not have been seriously directed to Tibet. Statesmen, empire-builders must exercise a sense of proportion in their adventures and game of extending boundaries, and the plan of operation should be limited to tackling one problem at a time, gaining strength through acquisitions, consolidating gains already obtained while attempting to secure fresh booty; and this has consistently become the British policy in building up her world empire.

To ultimately reduce Tibet into virtually a British province, the British Government followed the path of least resistance eliminating each one of these three obstacles already cited, viz: resistance of border states, Chinese opposi-
tion, and Russian influence in a masterly fashion. The first step was to detach the border states of Bhutan, Sikim and Nepal from Tibet. The British government not only succeeded in winning the confidence of these states, she even reduced them to British protectorates, although Bhutan and Sikkim were virtually Tibetan dependencies.

It has been noted that Bhutan attacked Cooch Behar successfully and the British had to intervene. Nepal was strong enough to defeat Tibet single-handed and it was through Chinese aid that Tibet retained her position and Tibetan-Nepalese friendship was established. If all these three states had combined with Chinese support, then the British march towards Tibet might have been checked.

After the unsuccessful mission of Manning, Great Britain directed her attention to Nepal. This state situated along the northern frontiers of Bengal and Oudh for about seven hundred miles from the Sutlej to Sikkim, and running back with an average breadth of about a hundred and thirty miles up the snow-clad slopes of the Himalayas, inhabited by the war-like Gurkhas was getting stronger every day in that region. In 1814 the British Government sent an expedition of about 34,000 men, which was opposed
by a Gurkha army of about 12,000 men. The Gurkhas at first virtually routed the British,* but later, in 1815 and 1816, the British won a victory after protracted battles.

A treaty (Treaty of Sagauli) was signed in March 1816 whereby a British resident was allowed to reside in Katmandu, the capital of Nepal. The Nepalese "gave up their claims in the Tarai or lowlands along their southern border. The provinces of Kumaon and Garhwal at the extreme west were surrendered, and the site of Simla, the future hot weather capital of British India, was acquired; the northwest frontiers of the Company's possessions were carried right up to the mountains. A pathway was opened up to the regions of Central Asia."†

Nepal was virtually reduced to a semi-independent state. Since then Great Britain, instead of annexing Nepal outright followed the policy of friendly co-operation, keeping guard against her having any independent foreign relations with any other nation. Nepal's support was utilized by Britain to suppress the Sepoy Mutiny (1857); to facilitate Younghusband's expedition

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* Imperial Gazetteer of India Vol. 11 page 493-494.
† Roberts, P. E. History of British India under the Company and the Crown (Oxford University Press) 1923, page 281.
against Tibet and to fight the World War. In case of a British territorial expansion towards Chinese Turkestan or Central Asia, Nepal’s support would be invaluable, and thus a new treaty was signed in 1924 between the British Government and Nepal.

In 1826 the British march towards the eastern frontier of India reached beyond Bengal, and Assam was annexed. This brought the territories of Bhutan in contact with the British possessions and constant friction arose regarding the border. British authorities, for strategical reasons wanted to secure the control over the Duras “passes” between the two states. The Bhutanese were charged with raiding the British territories. At first the British policy was to make Bhutan a virtual protectorate, suggesting that they should pay a tribute to the British and, in return, keep possession of the Duras. When this failed, Great Britain annexed the Duras and paid the Bhutanese an annual subsidy. Later on, when the time was ripe, in 1865, to avenge the insults inflicted upon the Hon. Ashley Eden, a British official, a campaign was started against Bhutan. Bhutan was made a British protectorate and Great Britain agreed to pay an annual subsidy to the ruling prince on
condition of his maintaining tranquillity and cooperation with British authorities.*

The significance of Sikkim in relation to Tibet and the British expansion towards her cannot be over-estimated. The most important and practicable route from India to Chumbi Valley, a part of Tibet, passes through Sikkim over the Himalayas†. Thus from the standpoint of protection of the Indian frontier as well as an eastward expansion from India, it is essential that Sikkim should be brought under British Government, which as a preliminary step towards its march to Tibet, reduced this country to a British protectorate.

The method adopted by the British Government to establish a protectorate over weak nations is exemplified by Sikkim. This falls into three successive stages; (1) coming in contact with the weak nation, giving assurance of friendly relations while making plans for absorbing it; (2) making some advantageous treaties to pave the way for establishing British supremacy with some semblance of legal sanc-

* Imperial Gazetter of India, vol. 11, page 516.
tion; (3) taking steps that the responsible native high officers should be those who would best serve British interests.

The first step of the British policy towards Sikkim is clearly indicated in the following despatch of Hon. A. Eden, Envoy and Special Commissioner to Sikkim, to the Secretary of the Government of Bengal (dated 8th April 1861):

"Para. 35:—The instructions under which I acted enabled me from the very first to give the most solemn assurances that we did not wish to retain possession of any portion of Sikkim territory; and I attribute it entirely to the confidence which was placed in these assurances that the surrounding states held aloof altogether from the quarrel. Nepal is tributary to China, Tibet is tributary to China, and Sikkim and Bhutan are tributary to Tibet, and therefore secondary to China. Had these states not distinctly understood that we were not advancing with any intention of annexation, it is impossible to believe but that with such combination of interests, they would all have joined to oppose us."

But the real motive of the British was to take steps for eventual annexation of Sikkim. The following articles of the treaty concluded between Great Britain and Sikkim (April 16,
1861) will illustrate the second step of the method generally adopted by Great Britain to spread her imperial power in a peaceful way, if the poor and weak nations fail to cope with the British Empire successfully:

"Art. 17. The Government of Sikkim engages to abstain from any acts of aggression or hostility against any of the neighbouring states which are allies of the British Government. If any dispute or question arises between the people of Sikkim and those of neighbouring states, such disputes or questions shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government and the Sikkim Government agrees to abide by the decision of the British Government.

"Art. 18. The whole military force of Sikkim shall join and afford every aid and facility to British troops when employed in the hills.

"Art. 19. The Government of Sikkim engages not to give lease of any portion of its territory to any other state without the permission of the British Government.

"Art. 22. With a view to the establishment of efficient government in Sikkim, and to the better maintenance of friendly relations with the British Government, the Raja of Sikkim agrees to move the seat of his government from Tibet
to Sikkim and reside there for nine months in the year. It is further agreed that a vakeel shall be accredited by the Sikkim Government, who shall reside permanently at Darjeeling."

The third stage of having one of the high native officers to serve as a British agent was successfully carried out as shown by the following extract from the report of Hon. A. Eden April 1861:—

"In conclusion, I must place on record the great obligations under which I am to Cheeboo Lama, who supplied a large number of coolies and accompanied me throughout. He is universally respected by the Pazcha population and trusted by the Rajah. Without his aid I should have had very great difficulty in dealing with the people of the country. He is the most intelligent and enlightened native whom I have ever met. He has travelled much in Tibet. He is the most influential adviser of the present Raja and it is mainly through his good counsels that the Raja has agreed to throw the country open. He is now the Raja's Dewan (Minister) and his employment in that position is an ample proof of future good conduct of the Sikkim Government. So long as he remains in that post there is no fear
of any policy being adopted hostile to British interests.”*

This absorption of Sikkim took place after China was defeated in a war with Great Britain and France in 1857-1860, and thus Tibet could not single-handed give any effective opposition to the British in raiding Sikkim. Thus it is evident that the British methods of peaceful penetration and spreading British influence, undermining Chinese sovereignty, have been no less ingenuous and pernicious than those of Russia, Germany, France or Japan. Britain evidently had an early start in the game and she certainly surpassed others in carrying out her policy more subtly and coolly without arousing much international opposition or agitation.

It is enough here to say that the British successfully fought with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and brought them under her protecting wings before decisive efforts were made against Tibet. Before China recovered from the effects of the Taiping Rebellion, in 1873, attempts were made to open up trade with Tibet, and a good road was constructed through Sikkim to the Tibetan frontier in 1876. The British Government planned

* Das, Taraknath: Is Japan a Menace to Asia? (Shanghai 1917) pages 60-62.
that a mission to Tibet might also be sent through Peking, thus coming from the side of the Yansze region. So in the Chefoo Convention concluded between China and Great Britain a clause was inserted that China should assist in securing the protection of the mission in Tibet.

About 1886 Great Britain signed agreements with the Chinese Government regarding sending Missions to Yunan and Tibet.* The mission to Tibet was given up because it was found that the Chinese Government was not anxious to allow the British Government to undertake this work. So in the Convention between Great Britain and China relative to Burma and Tibet, in August 25, 1887, the Tibetan mission programme was abandoned. The Art. IV of this Convention reads:—

"Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances by the Chinese Government has shown the existence of many obstacles to the Mission to Tibet provided for in a separate article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission."†

After the British annexation of Burma in 1886 and the consequent temporary settlement

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* Hertslets, China Treaties, Vol. 1, pages 74-80.
† Hertslets, China Treaties, Vol. 1, page 89.
of Anglo-French rivalry, and after the failure of the proposition of sending a mission to Tibet, there arose a misunderstanding between Tibet and Sikkim. The Tibetans held that they were exercising their right in Sikkim which existed before, whereas the British held that the Tibetans were encroaching upon the right of Sikkim, a British protectorate. After considerable unsuccessful negotiations, the British started the expedition and the Tibetans refused to fight, retired and were defeated.

The British version of the case has been admirably summed up in the following way:

"It was in the autumn of 1886 that a party of Tibetans crossed the Jelap La and dug themselves in—walled themselves in would be the more accurate description—at Lingtu. By so doing they violated the sanctity of Sikkim and challenged our authority as the suzerain power. He referred the matter to the Chinese and waited patiently for a year for redress, which never came. Then we took action. We wrote a letter to the leader of the raiders ordering the evacuation of Lingtu. This was towards the close of the year 1887. We were precise—almost meticulous—in our language. We said that the evacuation must be effected by the fifteenth day of the following
March. Immediate developments were not promising. The letter was returned whence it had come—unopened. A representation to the Dalai Lama likewise remained unanswered; and on March the 20th, a British force advanced upon Lingtu. The Tibetans retired without fighting, and the punitive force took up a position at Gnatong. Twice more during the year 1888, in May and in September, did the Tibetans return; and twice more they were driven back over the Jelap La.

"This seemed to the authorities to be suitable occasion for setting in motion once more the complex apparatus of diplomacy and another year of desultory negotiations with the Chinese rolled by. And then an unexpected thing happened—the stock of British patience was exhausted. This not only surprised, but alarmed the Chinese, who with characteristic perverseness and with an altogether alacrity, pressed for a diplomatic settlement on the points at issue. Out of this new-born enthusiasm for agreement came the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the subsequent trade regulations of 1893."

The above passage shows great magnanimity

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instead of any spirit of opportunism on the part of the British Government. But a careful analysis of the situation will throw a different light on the subject. There is no doubt about the fact that Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal as well as Tibet, were parts of the Chinese Empire, and Tibet directly exercised jurisdiction over Bhutan and Sikkim. The establishment of the British protectorate over Sikkim is a clear usurpation of Tibetan rights. Tibetans knew that they were acting in Sikkim within their rights as a sovereign power, and did not want to have anything to do with the British authorities in matters pertaining to Sikkim. It was, therefore, necessary for Britain to go slowly. For it would have been a very poor diplomacy on the part of Britain to start an expedition against the Tibetan Government without asking China to remedy the situation, because Tibet at that time was undisputedly within the Chinese jurisdiction. It would have wounded the Chinese pride and would have hurt British interests. About this time Russian influence was gaining preponderance in the court of Peking trying to replace British ascendancy there. Britain, by giving China an opportunity to settle the Tibetan question not only tried to please China, but wanted to thwart
any possible move of China to co-operate with Russia. Britain about that time had to face French rivalry in Siam and Burmese borders and was busily engaged in Egypt. It was also good diplomacy on the part of Britain to make an attempt to see China committed one way or the other regarding the Tibetan question. If China refused to take action, then it would strengthen the position of Britain to take dependent action, and if China agreed to stop Tibet from asserting her rights in Sikkim, then it would mean alienating Tibet from China and, at the same time, would result in Chinese recognition of the right of the British to establish independent treaty relations with Sikkim, which, according to the Chinese understanding, was remotely a Chinese dependency.

The result of the Anglo-Tibetan war was the defeat of the Tibetans; and in 1889 the Chinese Resident at Lhassa appeared on the scene to make a settlement. The Indian Government was not anxious to press the question of settlement, except asserting supremacy in Sikkim and securing rights for the British traders in Tibet. But the Chinese pressed the matter and asserted "China will be quite able to enforce in Tibet the terms of the Treaty," and thus an Agreement
was signed in 1890 by Lord Lansdowne and the Chinese Resident in Calcutta on March 17, 1890 by which, among other things, the British protectorate over Sikkim was recognized.

The terms of the Agreement are as follows:—

Article I. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier and follows the above mentioned waterparting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

Article III. It is admitted that the British Government whose protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither Ruler of the State, nor any of its officers, shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.

Article III. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I., and to prevent acts of
aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.

Article IV. The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to mutually satisfactory arrangement.

Article V. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

Article VI. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.”*

Regarding the unsettled questions mentioned in the articles 4, 5, and 6, quoted above, further negotiations went on, and on the 16th of January Mr. J. H. Hart, Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador, on behalf of the Chinese Government, agreed to the British point of view. The Outline was worded as follows:—

“First: Pasturage:—Such privileges as Tibet enjoys on the Sikkim side of the Frontier will be enjoyed by Sikkim on the Tibetan side.

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* Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers Relating to Tibet (1889-1904) pages 6-7.
“Second: Communication:—Communication shall be between the Chinese Resident in Tibet and India, and shall be transmitted through the medium of officer in charge of trade in the Chumbi Valley.

“Third: Trade:—Place of Trade or trade mart yet to be designated shall be opened under regulations and with tariff yet to be arranged.

The final agreement on these disputed points was not arrived at until the 5th of December 1893, the terms of which are:—

“Regulations regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage to be appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890.

“I. A trade-mart shall be established at Yantung on the Tibetan side of the frontier and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the first day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send officers to reside at Yantung to watch the condition of British trade at the mart.

“II. British subjects trading at Yantung shall be at liberty to travel to and fro between the frontier and Yantung, to reside at Yantung, and to rent houses and godowns for their accommodations and the storage of their goods.
The Chinese Government undertake that suitable buildings for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects and also that a special and fitting residence be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Regulation I., to reside at Yantung. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and, in general, to conduct their business transactions in conformity with local usages, and without any vexatious restrictions. Such British subjects shall receive efficient protection for their person and property. At Lanh-jo and Ta-chun, between the frontier and Yantung, where rest houses have been built by Tibetan authorities, British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a daily rent.

"III. Import and export trade in the following articles—arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors and intoxicating or narcotic drugs, may at the option of either government be entirely prohibited or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their side may think fit to impose.

"IV. Goods, other than goods of the descriptions enumerated in the Regulation III,
entering Tibet from British India across Sikkim-Tibet frontier or vice versa, whatever their origin, shall be exempt from duty for a period of five years commencing from the date of the opening of Yantung to trade, but after the expiration of this term, if found desirable, a tariff may be mutually agreed upon and enforced.

"V. All goods on arrival at Yantung, whether from British India or from Tibet, must be reported at the Custom Station there for examination, and the report must give full particulars of the description, quantity and the value of goods.

"VI. In the event of trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan-subjects in Tibet, they shall be inquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political officer for Sikkim and the Chinese frontier officer. The object of personal conference being to ascertain facts and do justice; where there is a divergence of views the law of the country to which the defendant belongs, shall guide."

"VII. Despatches from the Government of India to the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet shall be handed over by the Political officer for Sikkim to the Chinese frontier officer, who will forward them by special courier."
“Despatches between the Chinese Imperial Resident in Tibet to the Government of India will be handed over by the Chinese frontier officer to the Political Officer for Sikkim, who will forward them as quickly as possible.

“VIII. Despatches between the Chinese and Indian officials must be treated with due respect, and couriers will be assisted in passing to and fro by the officers of each Government.”

“IX. After the expiration of one year from the date of the opening of Yantung, such Tibetans as continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim will be subject to such regulations as the British Government may from time to time enact for the general conduct of grazing in Sikkim. Due notice will be given to such regulations.”*

These articles of the Convention are of supreme importance in view of the fact that at a later date the British Government contended that the agreements were not acted up to by the Tibetans. It may be said in fairness, that by enacting the free trade clause the Tibetans lost revenue, and it seems that the Tibetans had to make everything agreeable so that British subjects could trade in Tibet. By Article VI.,

the theory and practice of extra-territorial jurisdiction and the idea of mixed courts was established. By Article IX, it was expressly stipulated that the Tibetans would not enjoy similar privileges in Sikkim, even in the case of the privilege of pasture, but they will have to abide by the regulations that will be inaugurated by the British authorities from time to time.

During the period of 1894-1899 there were constant irritations between the British officials and the Chinese and the Tibetans on the other side.

In 1895 the British Government approached the Chinese Government regarding the demarcation of the border between Tibet and India. British, Chinese and Tibetan envoys assembled for the purpose but the Tibetans as a matter of protest, destroyed many of the pillars erected on the border, because they thought them to be an intrusion in their territory. The British Government did not take any decisive action at that time. But with the advent of Lord Curzon, the attitude of the Government of India changed considerably. Indeed, it may be said that the Government of India from the time of Warren Hastings to 1895, was anxious to extend India’s boundary lines towards Tibet. But the Downing Street
which had to look after the interests of a far-flung Empire acted only in opportune moments, to avoid intentional complications, and exerted moderating influence upon these energetic British empire builders in India.
CHAPTER II.

LORD CURZON'S FORWARD POLICY TOWARDS TIBET BEFORE THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

In 1895, the British Government made a settlement of the border disputes between India and Tibet through the co-operation of China. During this period and the year 1899, when Lord Curzon came to India as the Viceroy, many momentous things happened in the field of world politics in all parts of the world, and particularly in the Far East. The supposedly enormous power of China was proved to be a mere Myth when Japan inflicted a crushing defeat on the former in the Sino-Japanese War. This gave conclusive evidence of Chinese helplessness, and the scramble for partitioning China into spheres of influence by the powers began. It was at this time when Russia, France and Germany, co-operating amongst themselves, humiliated Japan and forced her to give up the continental gains conceded to her by the first Treaty of Semonosaki. This concerted action on the part of Russia, France and Germany threatened British influence in Pekin. This was also the time when Great Britain had to give
up her idea of having an alliance with China against Russia;* because Li Hung Chang, the great Chinese Statesman, was dealing with Russia to establish an offensive and defensive alliance.† Great Britain was alarmed to such an extent that she considered an alliance with Germany and Japan highly expedient.‡ It was about this time the South African situation was leading to a tension. Thus England felt the imperative necessity of strengthening her influence in China at all costs.

Lord Curzon, Governor General of India, sent a despatch to the India Office, London, outlining the policy of direct negotiation with Tibet and disregarding Chinese Sovereignty. This policy was later approved by the Foreign Office. This Curzon despatch dated the 30th of March, 1899, shows the impatience of the British authorities in India. The despatch in part reads:—

"We do not desire to conceal from your

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Lordship, our opinion that negotiations with the Chinese Resident (regarding the access of Indian Traders in Phari and the question of boundary marking)...although they have the sanction of long usage, and although the attempts that have so far been made to open direct communications with the Tibetan authorities have resulted in failure are not likely to be productive of any serious result. We seem, in fact, in respect of our policy towards Tibet to be moving in a vicious circle. If we apply to Tibet, we either receive no reply, or are referred to the Chinese Resident. If we apply to the latter, he excuses his failure by his inability to put any pressure on Tibet. As a policy this appears to us to be unproductive and inglorious. We shall be grateful for your Lordship's opinion as to the advisability of any modification of it in the near future.*

The instruction of the British Foreign Office to the India Office, sent on May 19, reads in part as follows:—

"With reference to Lord George Hamilton's inquiry as to whether diplomatic pressure could be exercised at Peking to secure a binding pledge from the Chinese Government, with regard to

free access to Phari, and freedom of trade, there is an event of rectification of frontier being conceded, I am to observe that it is at present practically non-existent.

"In these circumstances Lord Salisbury considers it very improbable that any representations at Peking on the subject would lead to a good result, but he will take an opportunity of consulting Sir Claude Macdonald, who is expected to arrive in England towards the end of this month.

"It would certainly be preferable to open direct communication with the Government of India and the Tibetan authorities, although the Viceroy states in his despatch that the attempts which have so far been made in this direction have resulted in failure.

"As, however, the Tibetans have attempted to repudiate the convention as regards the frontier on the ground that the Chinese have no authority to act for them, it is reasonable to suppose that they might be induced to enter into negotiations, especially as the Government of India are prepared to allow them to remain in possession of the territory surrendered under the boundary agreement."*

The Secretary of State for India, in conformity with the policy of the British Foreign Office, authorized the Governor General of India, Lord Curzon, on the 8th of December, 1899, to carry on direct negotiations with Tibet. The despatch in part reads:—

"Her Majesty's Government approves the course of action adopted by your Government. In regard to the establishment of direct correspondence with the Tibetans, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has instructed her Majesty's Minister at Peking by telegram to endeavour to obtain assistance of the Chinese Government in securing for native traders from India access to and freedom for, trade in Phari."

This really marks the beginning of the elimination of the Chinese factor in the Tibetan controversy. It will be later seen that the British Government would sign a treaty with Tibet bringing Tibet within its virtual control. From now on the third factor—the Russian attitude in Tibet—will begin to play an important part. However, it is interesting to see that the British Indian Government wanted to send a mission to Tibet through Nepal and also through Yunnan. Both missions failed and as a last resort a letter to Dalai Lama was sent through Ugyen Kazi,
who as an agent of the Dalai Lama came to India to buy two elephants for him.

The following extract from the letter from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to the Right Hon'ble Lord George F. Hamilton, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated Simla, the 25th of July, 1901, reads in part:

"Enquiries were accordingly instituted as to the possibility of despatching a suitable emissary to the Tibetan capital either through Yunan or through Nepal, or by way of Ladakh. Our Resident in Nepal, who was verbally consulted, advised against any attempt being made to reach Lhassa via Nepal, except with the knowledge and consent of the Nepalese Durbar, to whom we were not prepared to refer. The agent whom we suggested to the Government of Burma as a possible emissary for the mission through Yunan, was reported to be unsuitable. The proposal to communicate through Ladakh, however, seemed to offer some prospect of success......This prospect having failed, we determined to make one more effort to procure the delivery of a letter to the Dalai Lama through Ugyen Kazi......As to the exact form which our altered policy should assume, we shall, if necessary, address your

Lordship at a later date. But we may add, that before long, steps may be required to be taken for the adequate safeguarding of British interests upon a part of the frontier where they have never hitherto been impugned.

This expression of altered policy and intimation of taking steps to protect British interests later on developed into Col. Younghusband's expedition to Tibet. The south African war and also the Boxer outbreak made it imperative for Britian to be cautious in the forward march to Lhassa.

Russo-Tibetan Negotiations.

While the Anglo-Tibetan relations were coming to a head because of the altered policy approved by the British Foreign Office, Russo-Tibetan negotiations were going on with great rapidity. It was, because Russia began to take active interest in Tibetan matters that the British Foreign Office and India Office in London agreed to the forward policy of Lord Curzon. Mr. Percival Langdon, in his "Opening of Tibet" gives a vivid description of this phase of Tibetan affairs and says:—

"I do not wish to suggest that Russia in attempting to gain influence in Lhassa, was guilty
of anything which reflects the least discredit upon
her statesmen. On the other hand, it was far-
sighted and, from many points of view, an entire-
ly laudable attempt to consolidate the Central
Asian Empire which she believes to be her right-
ful heritage. The only reason the British found
it necessary to intervene was that the equally
justifiable policy which they had themselves
deliberately adopted, and their own vastly greater
interests in Tibet, clashed all along the line with
those of the Moscovites. We happen to have
been the better placed to achieve our end......”*

Regarding the mission of Dorjieff from
Lhassa to St. Petersburg (1898) and his later
actions at Lhassa, the same author remarks:—

“Precisely what took place in Russia has not
been made public......All that is known is that
when he returned to Tibet, Ghomang Lobzang
(Tibetan name of Dorjieff, who was born in
Siberia and Mongolian Buriat, and Buddhist by
religion and belonged to the Monastic order
Debung Monastery) found himself in the
unofficial position of Russian agent in Lhassa.
He brought with him a large number of exceed-
ingly valuable presents, and he lost no time in
trying to persuade the Lhassan hierarchy that it

was to their interest to secure the informal protection of the Tzar of Russia. Briefly stated, his arguments were these; You have no strength in the country to resist invaders; your natural protector and suzerain, China, is a broken reed; even at this moment she is entirely under the domination of the British. If you remain any longer trusting to her support, you will find that she throws you as a sop to the Indian Government. The English are a rapacious and heretical nation; they will not respect your religion; they will bring you into servitude, and the ancient and honourable rule of the priests in this country will surely be put an end to. On the other hand, if you will ask the aid of Russia you will secure the most powerful protector in the world. You will have gained on your side the only military power that is able to crush the English nation. More than that, you may be able to induce the great Monarch of that nation to embrace your faith. Another Emperor as great as he, has in past ages been converted to our great faith, and if you can convince Nicholas, whose sympathies with Buddhism are universally admitted, it will not be long before the whole Russian race are obedient servants and loyal disciples of your Holiness.
Such, in rough outline, was Dorjieff’s policy. It produced an almost immediate effect upon the Dalai Lama himself. Impetuously, without consulting his national council, he accepted the suggestion, and even proposed to visit St. Petersburg in person. But the Dalai Lama had reckoned too hastily; Tsong-du had still to be consulted, and here the Dalai Lama received a check. The Tsong-du replied diplomatically that it was very nice of the Russian Emperor, but that they required no protection and that the Dalai Lama had exceeded his authority in committing the country to a consideration of Dorjieff’s offer. The grand Lama did all in his power to induce them to accept his scheme, but without avail, and the next year another ruse was adopted by Dorjieff to further the interests of his patrons.

“He went again to St. Petersburg, and there was received in audience by the Emperor himself; he returned after a short stay, the bearer of two interesting things. One was a letter, asking that the Dalai Lama should despatch an Envoy to Russia to discuss the matter more fully. The other was a complete set of vestments appertaining to a Bishop of the Russian Church. In spite of the recent declarations of the Tsong-du,
the Dalai Lama on his own responsibility, sent in response Tsan-nyid, an Abbot of high rank, to accompany Dorjieff, who a month after his arrival at Lhassa, was again on his road to Europe. Upon their arrival in Russia they were received with the highest consideration, and a second audience with the Tzar was granted them. Ultimately they set off on their return journey and reached Lhassa in December 1901. They there laid before the Dalai Lama a proposal from the Russian Government, that a Prince of the Royal house should take up residence in Lhassa for the purpose of promoting friendly relations. The other document which the returning Abbot laid before his Master was the hotly discussed agreement between Russia and Tibet.*

British authorities in Russia were keeping close watch on these missions, and the British Foreign Office was kept informed about the visit paid to the Emperor and the two following extracts from the "Journal de Saint Petersburg," verify certain phases of the Russo-Tibetan transactions:

"Sa Majeste L' Empereur a recu le Samdi, 30, September au Palais de Livadia, Aharamba-

Agvan Dorjiew, premier tsanit-hamba près le Dalai-Lama du Thibet.* Great Britain, papers relating to Tibet (1899-1904) page 113.

"Extract from the "Messenger Official" June 25th (July 8th) 1907.

"Sa Majesté L' Empereur a recu le Samdi, 23 Juni, au grand Palais de Peterhof, les Envoyes Extraordinaries du Dalai-Lama du Thibet, Hambo Akhvan Dorgiew et Kaitthhock Hambo Donir.

Aprés la reception des Envoyes, a eu l'honneur d, etre presente a Sa Majeste L' Empereur le Secretairie de la Mission Djantsan Zombon Taitong Puntack, Chef de l' Arrondis- sment du Thibet.

"En mème temps a eu l'honneur d'etre pre- sente a Sa Majeste L' Empereur le Capitaine en second Oulanov, du 1er Regiment de Cosaqhes du Don, attache a, la Mission Thibetaine comme interpretre.

"Le même jour, la Mission Thibetaine a eté recu par Sa Majesté L' Emperatrice Marie Fedorovna."†

Sir G. Scott, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, inquired about the character of the
Tibetan mission from Count Lamsdorff, who assured "although the Tibetan visitors had been described as Envoys Extraordinary of Dalai-Lama, their mission could not be regarded as having any political or diplomatic character,.* But this assurance was not regarded sufficient by India Foreign Office and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Marquess of Lansdowne in a despatch to Sir G. Scott, dated, Foreign Office, August 16, 1901, while expressing satisfaction at the announcement that the Tibetan Mission did not have any political character, recorded that "His Majesty's Government could not regard with indifference any proceedings that might have a tendency to alter or disturb the existing status of Tibet." †

Writing in 1900, Sir Archibald Colquhoun gives a picture of the then existing Anglo-Russian rivalry from the British point of view:—

"The expansion of the Northern Colossus—more Oriental than European, whose heart of Empire lies in Central Asia—into China and towards the natural zone of influence of Europe; her determination to control commerce, religion, and communication, are grave dangers

† Ibid page 124.
for all other nations, more especially the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Unchecked, they would lead to the subjugation of Europe by Asia. The danger is clear to any one who will take up the map. Russia is already becoming a paramount Power in Northern China; Russia with a Port on the Persian Gulf of Indian Ocean treated as a right beyond question; Russia connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf by railways, from Askaband southwards, and from Tiflis by Kars and the Turko-Persian frontier, thus making herself independent of the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal, and cutting into the direct Indo-European line of the overland communication. A conflict between East and West for the domination of the old world is imminent. Slav and Saxon must contend for supremacy, even for equality, and upon the skill and determination of the two opponents hangs the future of Asia, and not only of Asia but of Europe”*

It is generally held that Russia intrigued against Britian in Tibet, and it is due to the bribing of the Tibetan statesmen that Russia secured such a stronghold there. There may

* Colquhoun, Sir Archibald; Russia against India. New York. Harpers Brothers, 1900, pp. 229-230.
be some truth about the bribing of the so-called Tibetan statesmen. But one must not forget that the rise of Russian influence in Tibet, was due to the weakening of the Chinese influence in Tibet, also due to the Tibetan dread of the British, who conquered India through means well known to the world as well as the Tibetans:—

"China's loss of prestige in Tibet since the Japanese-Chinese war, owing to her inability to assert her power over the vassal state has much to do with this pro-Russian leaning. Previous to that war, and before China's internal incompetence had been laid bare by Japan, relations like those between master and vassal existed between Tibet and China. The latter interfered with the internal affairs of Tibet and meted out punishment freely to Tibetan dignitaries and even to the grand Lama. Now she is entirely helpless. They know that their former Suzerain has fallen and is therefore no longer to be depended upon. They are prejudiced against England on account of the subjugation of India, and so they naturally concluded that they should establish friendly relations with Russia, which they knew was England's bitter foe."
“It is evident that the Dalai-Lama himself favours this view, and it may be safely presumed that unless he was favourably disposed towards Russia he would never have accepted the Bishop’s garment from the Tzar. He is too intelligent a man to accept any present from a foreign Sovereign as a mere compliment. The Dalai-Lama’s friendly inclination was clearly established when in December, 1900, he sent to Russia his grand Chamberlain as Envoy with three followers. The party was received with warm welcome by that court, to which it offered presents brought from Tibet. It is said that on that occasion a secret understanding was reached between the two Governments.”

Mr. Kawaguchi points out that the British intrigue under the guidance of Surat Chandra Das who entered Tibet as a Sikimese priest and which led to trouble at the frontier, created a revulsion of feeling of the Tibetans towards Indians and other foreigners. The Tibetans were suspicious of the motive of the British when they started to build a fort at the frontier between Tibet and Sikim, and this gave an excuse for the British to construe that the Tibetans were in-

triguing with the Russians, and the British Indian Government started its forward policy,”*  

The British method created fear in the minds of the Tibetans. Mr. Oscar T. Crosby in his valuable study on Tibet and Turkestan, says: “Remove the fear of you in Tibetan hearts, and you thus remove the fear of Russia in yours.”†  

According to the despatch sent by Sir E. Satow, to the Marquis of Lansdowne on August 5, 1902, from Peking, it was intimated that there is some rumour that a secret compact between China and Russia was agreed upon regarding Tibet, China renouncing the sovereignty over Tibet to Russia to secure an alliance.‡ This was hotly denied by the Chinese Foreign Office. But the continued Russian occupation of Manchuria after the Boxer trouble and the persistent refusal of the Tibetans to treat with the British officials regarding the treaty of 1890, which was according to the British contention, violated by the Tibetans, led the

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† Crosby, Oscar T. Tibet and Turkestan. (C. P. Putnam, etc.) 1905, p. 253.  
‡ “In April, 1899, the Chinese Amban was rash enough to hint to our (British) political officer that the Tibetans might appeal to Russia if we pressed for our rights too strictly”.  

Indian Government to send an expedition to Lhassa. A few weeks earlier the British Indian Government ordered Mr. White to proceed with a band of escort to the Tibetan frontier. On August 30, 1902, the Chinese Government asked the British Government, through Sir E. Satow, "That the Officer Commanding the troops may be instructed to refrain from taking any action pending the arrival of the Chinese Officer, when matters can be amicably discussed. He fears that proceedings of the British Resident are likely to be misunderstood by the Tibetans."

Of course the Russian Government took notice of the British forward movement towards Tibet and intimated to the British Foreign Office, that "in the present state of unrest and excitement, measures of this kind were dangerous and might produce a renewal of the Boxer Agitation."†

This aggressive policy of England in Tibet was followed by the Russo-Chinese Commercial Agreement regarding Tibet in 1902. The principal articles of which are as follows:—

"Article, 1. Tibet being a country situated between Central Asia and Western Siberia,

*British Parliamentary Papers regarding Tibet, 1895-1904. P. 141.
† Ibid. P. 146.
Russia and China are mutually obliged to care for the maintenance of peace in that country. In case trouble should arise in Tibet, China, in order to preserve this district, and Russia, in order to protect her frontiers, shall despatch thither military forces on mutual notification.

“Article, 2. In case of a third power’s contriving directly or indirectly, troubles in Tibet, Russia and China oblige themselves to concur in taking such measures as may seem advisable for repressing such troubles.

“Article, 3. Entire liberty in what concerns Russian orthodoxy as well as Lamist worship, will be introduced in Tibet, but all other religions will be absolutely prohibited.

“Article 4. Tibet shall be made gradually a country with an independent inner administration. In order to accomplish this task, Russia and China are to be sharers of the work. Russia takes upon herself the re-organisation of the Tibetan military forces on the European model and obliges herself to carry into effect this reform in good spirit and without incurring blame from the native population. China, for her part, is to take care of the development of the economic situation in Tibet, and her progress abroad.”

*Tibet, Russia and England On The International Chess Board, by, Prof. Edwin Maxey. The Arena (Boston, July 1904, pages 28-31.)
The treaty makes it clear that China and Russia were apprehensive of Great Britain's designs in Tibet and pledged for joint action. Article 3 shows the possibility of Russia using the Russian Church and Lamist faith in her favour. Article 4 foreshadows Russian preponderance in Tibet. Not only that, although it is mentioned that China will have the final control over the industrial development of Tibet, the fact that China was not in a position to carry on any project of industrial development of Tibet would mean that China would eventually ask Russia to co-operate with her to exploit Tibetan mineral resources.

*No other Power can intervene between Russia and China in this matter, nor can any of these stipulations be modified owing to the interference of other Powers. The Russo-Chinese Bank will defray all the expenses of prosecuting for mines in Tibet. A royalty of ten per cent shall be paid to China upon all coal and metal extracted. Mining Proprietors, whether Chinese or Russian, must not extract in any year to a greater value than 200,000 taela. All recently discovered veins must be clearly marked out and defined, so as to avoid future disputes. All imports of machinery and tools, if they come via Russia, shall be free of duty. Unauthorized understandings, whether by Chinese or Russians, to be severely dealt with. Mines opened by Russians to be reported to the Russian Minister at Peking for the information of the Chinese Foreign Office: if there be no objection, the Foreign Office will then instruct the assistant Resident in Tibet to take action accordingly.

Parke's article on "The Bottom-Rock of the Tibetan Question."

The treaty, if true, does throw some light on the possibility of economic penetration of Tibet by Russia. But when we compare it with the present British economic control of Tibet, we find it to be favourable to China and her sovereign rights in Tibet.
In fact there is evidence that a commercial agreement was made between China and Russia for that purpose.

Great Britain wanted to test the strength of the agreement by sending an expedition to Tibetan soil at an opportune moment. Failure of Russia, the British Foreign Office thought, to act according to the agreement, would destroy the Russian prestige among the Tibetan and Chinese Politicians, which would be a great success for British diplomacy. She waited for a decisive move till the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded.
CHAPTER III.

ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE; RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, AND YOUNGHUSBAND'S EXPEDITION TO TIBET.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on January 30th, 1902. The spirit and the motive of the Alliance are set forth in the preamble of the famous document.

"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace of the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for commerce and industry in all nations, hereby agree etc."

This shows that the prime motive of the Alliance is to keep Russia out of Korea and at the same time not to allow Russia to secure any further foothold in any part of the Empire of China. Indeed the possibility of Russian occupation in Manchuria, after the Boxer trouble, was one of the most important factors of the Russo-Japanese trouble; and Great Britain and America
also were most vitally interested in trade there. The German Government, through the pronouncement of Prince Von Bülow, made it clear that she was not anxious to uphold the hand of Great Britain in Manchuria against Russia. Indeed Great Britain herself made an agreement with Russia in 1899 by which parts of Manchuria and Mongolia fell in the spheres of influence of Russia. The Russo-Chinese agreement conferring on Russia the right of building railroads in that very region, gave her certain privileges. It is also to be remembered that Mr. Hay’s Open Door Policy as enunciated by his famous declaration (July 3, 1900) did recognise the spheres of influence; * and it is fully evident also that in pursuance of the very policy, the United States never made a formal protest against any special spheres of influence of any nation. Thus preser-

* The following extract from the circular telegram sent to the Power by John Hay shows conclusively that he recognised the “sphere of influence” of other nations. “The policy of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative unity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law and safeguard for the world, the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire—(Italics are mine) (a) U. S. Foreign Relations, 1900 p. 299, (b) Bau M. J. “THE OPEN DOOR DOCTRINE”. N. Y. 1923. p. 28, (c) Hornbeck, S. K. Contemporary Politics In the Far East. New York 1916. p. 236.
vation of the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire meant opposition to further encroachment by Russia." and that encroachment in the British mind had certainly some reference to Tibet, where Russia was attempting to secure some foothold through the Sino-Russian Commercial treaty mentioned before.

The most important provision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was that, if any one of the contracting parties be at war with a third party and the third party be aided by any other nation then the other contracting party of the alliance would come to the aid of the ally and they would not conclude peace until both parties agreed to it.

From Chamberlain and even King Edward we have it † that France was willing to settle all outstanding disputes on colonial matters, even before the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Britain was indifferent to this; for she was not at all afraid of fighting France single-handed, in case of necessity Russia could be taken care of by Japan. It was also certain that Germany was not going to aid Russia, against England in case of a war. If she had

† Baron von Eckardstein: 'Ten years at the Court of St. James' 1895-1905 New York. 1922.
that intention she could have accepted the partnership in the Anglo-Japanese-German Alliance which was definitely proposed in 1901. Thus Britain's position became more secure.

On January 8th, 1903, Lord Curzon sent a lengthy despatch to the Secretary of State for India, and only a few extracts of this clear statement of policy appear in the published papers on Tibet, and the following quotation from this document will clearly explain the factors involved in the situation:

"If we (Government of India) therefore now enter upon negotiations with no other vantage ground than the successful reassertion of our authority on a very inconspicuous section of the border, it does not appear that there is much reason for anticipating a more favourable solution of the Tibetan problem than has attended our previous efforts, unless, indeed, we are prepared to assume a minatory tone and to threaten Tibet with further advance if the political and commercial relations between us are allowed any longer to be reduced to a nullity by her policy of obstinate inaction. The second combination of circumstances that has materially affected the situation is the rumored conclusion of a secret agreement by which the Russian
Government has acquired certain powers of interference in Tibet. We have ourselves reported to your Lordship circumstantial evidence derived from a variety of quarters all pointing to the same direction and tending to show the existence of an arrangement of some sort between Russia and Tibet. This then is the situation with which we are confronted at the moment when we are asked by your Lordship to advise as to the answer that should be returned to the Chinese proposals for the reopening of negotiations with our Political Officer on the Tibetan frontier. It is obvious that any such negotiations are thereby invested with a far more than local importance, and that what we are concerned to examine is not the mere settlement of border dispute or even the amelioration of our future trading relations with Tibet but the question of our entire future political relations with that country, and the degree to which we can permit the influence of another great power to be exercised for the first time in Tibetan affairs. It is unnecessary for us to remind your Lordship that the Russian border nowhere even touches that of Tibet, and the nearest point of the Russian territory is considerably more than a thousand miles short
of the Tibetan capital, which is situated in the extreme south and in close proximity to the northern frontier of the Indian Empire. Neither need we point to the historical fact that no other States or Powers have, during the time that the British Dominion has been established in India, had any connection with Tibet, but firstly China who possesses a nominal suzerainty over the country; secondly Nepal, a State in close political connection with India; and, thirdly, the British Government itself. The policy of exclusiveness to which the Tibetan Government has during the last century become increasingly addicted has only been tolerated by us, because anomalous and unfriendly as it has been, it carried with it no element of political or military danger. At no time during that century do we imagine that Great Britain would have permitted the creation of a rival and hostile influence in a position so close to the Indian border and so pregnant with possibilities of mischief. We are of the opinion that the only way in which we can counteract the danger by which we regard that British interest as directly threatened in Tibet, is to assume the initiative ourselves, and we regard the Chinese proposals for a conference as affording an excellent opportunity for pressing
forward and carrying out this policy. We are in favour, subject to qualification that we shall presently mention, not only of acceptance of the Chinese proposals but of attaching to them the condition that the conference shall take place not upon our frontier, but at Lhassa, and it shall be attended by a representative of the Tibetan Government, who will participate in the proceedings. In our view, the attempt to come to terms with Tibet through the agency of China has invariably proved a failure in the past, because of the intervention of this third party between Tibet and ourselves. We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction, a political affectation which has been maintained because of its convenience to both parties. Our views, as his Majesty is aware, have been for some time in favour of dealing with Tibet alone; and it is upon these lines that we have proceeded with the consent of his Majesty's government, in attempting to open up direct communication with the Dalai Lama. In our view, any country or Government, or Empire has a right to protect its own interests; and if those interests are seriously imperilled, as we hold ours to be in Tibet, we hold that the first law of national existence, which is self-preservation, compels us
to take such steps as will avert these dangers and place our security upon an assured and impregnable footing. In view of the contingency of opposition, we think that the mission, if decided upon, should be accompanied by an armed escort, sufficient to overawe any opposition that might be encountered on the way, to insure its safety while in Lhassa. The military strength of the Tibetans is beneath contempt and serious resistance is not to be contemplated. At the same time the most emphatic assurance might be given to the Chinese and Tibetan Governments that the mission was of an exclusively commercial character, that we repudiate all designs of a political nature upon Tibet, that we have no desire either to declare a protectorate or permanently to occupy any portion of the country, but that our intentions were confined to the removing of the embargo that at present rests upon all trade between Tibet and India and to establishing those amicable relations and means of communication that ought to subsist between adjacent and friendly powers. We believe that the policy of frank discussion and co-operation with the Nepalese Durbar would find them prepared to take part in our mission. If some such steps be not taken as we have
advocated, a serious danger will grow up in Tibet, which may in one day, and perhaps at no very distant date, attain to menacing dimensions. We believe that our territorial position and our indubitable rights, enhanced as they are by complete disrespect shown by the Tibetans for existing stipulations, place it in our power to nip any such danger in the bud before it has developed; and we earnestly hope that the opportunity be not lost. We regard the situation as one affecting the frontiers, which we are called upon to defend with Indian resources, which is entitled to carry weight with his Majesty’s Government; and we entertain a sincere alarm that if nothing is done and matters are allowed to slide, we may before long have occasion gravely to regret that action was not taken while it was still relatively free from difficulty.*

The above despatch which became the cornerstone of the British policy towards Tibet, makes clear a good many things, and those that are worth consideration are;—(1) So far as the British Government was concerned, the question of Chinese suzerainty was a mere “constitutional fiction and political affectation;” (2) For the sake

* British Parliamentary Papers on Tibet, 1895-1904, pp. 150-156.
of India, Great Britain would never allow any powerful nation to have political influence in Tibet. The British Government did not interfere in Tibet aggressively because there was no such menace. As soon as Russia appeared on the scene the British attitude changed. (3) Although the whole motive of the British Government was to carry on negotiations to bring Tibet within the political influence of Britain, it was made clear to the Tibetan and Chinese Governments that no design of a political nature was ever intended thus revealing the true nature of British diplomacy. (4) Tibet must be controlled as soon as possible so that Russian influence might be nipped in the bud. (5) The policy was even to see Nepal as an instrument against Tibet.

Although a forward policy towards Tibet had been decided upon, the Secretary of State for India was very cautious about the move recommended by the Governor-General in Council, headed by Lord Curzon. On February 27th, 1903, the Secretary of State for India, among other things, instructed Lord Curzon in the following way:

"...Your Excellency's proposal to send an armed mission to enter Lhasa, by force if necessary and establish a Resident, might no doubt, if
the issue were simply one between India and Tibet, be justified as a legitimate reply to the action of the Tibetan Government......But His Majesty's Government cannot regard the question as one concerning India and Tibet alone. The position of China, in its relations to the Powers of Europe, has been so modified in recent years that it is necessary to take into account those altered conditions in deciding on action affecting what must still be regarded as a province of China. It is true as stated in your Excellency's letter that we have no desire either to declare a protectorate or permanently to occupy any part of the country. Measures of this kind might, however, become inevitable if we were once to find ourselves committed to armed intervention in Tibet, and it is almost certain that were the British Mission to encounter opposition, questions would be raised which would have to be considered, not as local ones concerning Tibet and India exclusively, but from an international point of view, as involving the status of the Chinese Empire. For these reasons His Majesty's Government thinks it necessary, before sanctioning a course which might be regarded as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese Empire, to be sure that each
action can be justified by the previous action of Tibet, and they have accordingly come to the conclusion that it would be premature to adopt measures so likely to precipitate a crisis in the affairs of Tibet as those which your Excellency has proposed. In their opinion it would have been unwise not to use the Russian memorandum of the 2nd of February as an occasion for pressing the Russian Government to make a distinct statement of their policy and for warning them of our intention to meet any action on their part by more than counter-balancing measures of our own. After the explanations of the Russian Government have been received, His Majesty's Government will be in a better position to decide the scope to be given to the negotiations with China, and on the steps to be taken to protect India against any danger from the establishment of foreign influence in Tibet.”

The Anglo-Russian controversy regarding Tibet from now on took the shape of giving an excuse for British action, and a few extracts from the correspondence exchanged between the various parties will give an adequate idea of the

development. In a despatch from the Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir G. Scott, dated February 18, the British Government's position has been made absolutely clear. The despatch in part reads:—

"During my conversation with the Russian Ambassador today I referred to the question of Tibet, which we had discussed on the 11th Instant. The interest of India in Tibet was said, of a very special character. With the map of Central Asia before me, I pointed out to his Excellency that Lhassa was within a comparatively short distance of the northern frontier of India. It was, on the other hand, considerably over 1,000 miles distant from Asiatic possessions of Russia, and any sudden display of Russian interest or activity in the regions immediately adjoining the possessions of Great Britain would scarcely fail to have a disturbing effect upon the population or to create the impression that British influence was receding and that of Russia making rapid advances into regions which had hitherto been regarded as altogether outside of her sphere of influence. Should there be any display of Russian activity in that country we should be obliged to reply by a display of activity, not only equivalent to, but exceeding that made by Russia. If they sent a Mission or an
expedition we should have to do the same, but in greater strength...” *

The attitude of the Russian Government can be measured from the following despatch from the Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir G. Scott covering the substance of the conversation between the Marquis of Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador Count Benkendorff;

"Count Benkendorff went on to say that although the Russian Government had no designs whatever upon Tibet, they could not remain indifferent to any serious disturbance of the status quo in that country. Such a disturbance might render it necessary for them to safeguard their interests in Asia, not that, even in this case, they would desire to interfere in the affairs of Tibet as their policy is "Ne viserait le Thibet en aucun cas" but they might be obliged to take measures elsewhere. They regarded Tibet as forming a part of the Chinese Empire, in the integrity of which they took an interest. His Excellency went on to say that he hoped that there was no question of any action on our part in regard to Tibet which might have the effect of raising questions of this kind......”†

† Ibid page 187.
While the discussions between the Governments of Russia and China on one side and the British Government on the other were in progress, the British Indian Government, under the direction of Lord Curzon, authorized Col. Younghusband to present a plan regarding the proposed expedition, and ordered the march of the expedition. The following extract from the despatch of the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, dated the 26th October, 1903, will give an idea:—"After consideration and upon Col. Younghusband's advice, we unhesitatingly recommend that the advance should extend to Gyangtse and should not be confined to the Chumbi Valley......We do not anticipate any serious resistance."

The policy of sending a British expedition to Tibet took a definite shape when the British and Japanese Governments felt that the Russo-Japanese war was inevitable. The details of the operation are immaterial; the British entered Lhassa and in the process, many Tibetans were killed, British superiority was impressed on them by looting of Monasteries and Churches, certainly an action indefensible and against the sanction of International Law.

The progress of the British soldiers on the
sacred soil was not confined to the killing of a few thousand Tibetans, but was followed with rapine and plunder of the treasure-houses of the Monasteries. A correspondent of the London "Daily Chronicle" says:

"The expedition has looted Monasteries, and for weeks past bales of plunder have been coming over the passes into India. Their contents have brought joy to the officers' wives and friends, whose houses in the hill stations began to look as some of them looked after the sack of Peking four years ago (during the Boxer uprising). An Indian vernacular paper depicts the deeds more graphically, and by the way, gives vent to the feelings of the Hindoos on the subject:

"The Dalai Lama has made himself scarce from Lhassa, and there are no early prospects of a settlement. In the meantime syndicates are being formed in England to plunder the wealth of Tibet. Before this systematic spoliation has had an opportunity to begin, informal loot has been going on, and Tibetan curios are already displayed in Darjeeling drawing-rooms. The English have such a special knack of looting, and they do it in such an adroit manner that no one can venture to call it by its true name."*

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Col. Younghusband and others were for virtual annexation of Tibet, and to accomplish this he entered into a treaty with the Dalai Lama after the latter’s complete defeat. The provisions of the treaty would, if accepted as drawn have made Tibet a British protectorate in the true sense of the word.

The most important clauses of the Anglo-Tibetan agreement signed by Sir Francis Younghusband on the 7th of September 1904 are the following:

“Article VI. As an indemnity to the British Government for the expenses incurred in the despatch of armed troops to Lhassa, the Tibetan Government engages to pay a sum of pounds five hundred thousand—equivalent to rupees seventy-five lahks—to the British Government, the indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate, whether in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of rupees one Lakh each on the 1st. of January in each year, beginning from the 1st. of January, 1906.

“Article VII. As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade
marts in Articles ii, iii, iv, and v. the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

"Article VIII. The Tibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhassa.

"Article IX. The Government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government, no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any Foreign Power; (b) no such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibet's affairs; (c) no representatives or agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet; (d) no concession for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government; (e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall
be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power. *

On the 11th November, however, the Viceroy and Governor General of India, Lord Ampthill, who was acting in the absence of Lord Curzon in England, modified the treaty with a declaration by which the sum of indemnity was reduced to 2,500,000 rupees and the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley would cease after the payment of three instalments of the indemnity and the opening of the marts. †

Col. Younghusband expressed his views about the rejection of his treaty in the following terms:

"If after a day like this the Government at home throws away the chance we now have of strengthening Tibet as a buffer state, why, they will be guilty of retrospective murder."

Sir Francis Younghusband's great desire was to bring the Chumbi Valley under British control, and for that very reason he arranged the treaty with Tibet in such a way that it would at least remain under British control for seventy-five years. However, others suggested that it must be annexed under the pretext of leasing.

† Ibid—page 208.
"In any case and whatever else is done, the Chumbi Valley should be retained permanently in British possession. This can be effected with due regard, if desirable, to Tibetan susceptibilities, under the name of lease or by treating it as an equivalent to compensation or indemnity. Neither geographically nor historically does it form part of Tibet. It was conquered in 1888 and abandoned in defiance of reason and advice. As a source of revenue it is worth nothing, but strategically and commercially it is of high importance, being the one open gateway from the Tibetan plateau to the plains of India, only some 800 miles from Calcutta. It cannot be allowed to pass again into the hands of the people who might permit its occupation by a rival Power which already threatens our Indian frontier in other places. *

Demand for the annexation of the Chumbi Valley, after the Younghusband expedition, was persistent. But Lord Lansdowne did not want to take an immediate aggressive measure, while the Russo-Japanese War was going on; and held to the same view when Russia met with a defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. But, some of the British Imperialists urged for immediate annexe-

The Hon. Ian Malcolm, M. P. in an article gives the following view:—

"The Chumbi Valley, which lies on the Indian side of the watershed, has never been claimed by Tibet as the Kingdom of Dalai Lama. It is too late for the suzerainty of China to be claimed as a reason for not disturbing the status quo in the Chumbi Valley. If suzerainty is to be respected it must be effective, and we have learned at least the lesson that the Chinese suzerainty in these regions is a protection pour rire. Nor can the terms of the pledge, so explicitly referring to Tibet alone, have been extended solely for the pleasure of Russia, whose desire for the integrity of China is manifest in Manchuria; unless, indeed, we hold some reciprocal guarantee from her that she will respect for all time the Chinese Kingdom of Mongolia and Turkestan."*

If the Government of India were free to act, then undoubtedly Tibet would have been annexed; but because of the world situation, and very possibly not willing to act with hostility towards China and Russia unnecessarily, Britain did not formally annex Tibet. †

* The Nineteenth Century and After, April 1905. p. 583.
All this happened during the Russo-Japanese War, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had a good deal to do with the Tibetan affair. Russia could not intervene in Tibet; and China was incapable of doing anything against Great Britain at that time; and thus Great Britain virtually extended her power over Tibet.

In connection with the British expedition to Tibet, Col. Younghusband makes some interesting remarks. "That strange force which has so often driven the English forward against their will appears to be in operation once more. It is certain that neither the British Government nor the British people wish to go to Lhassa. Then he pertinently remarks:—" These quotations are not applicable to the Tibetan affair alone, but to the British Empire generally; and not only to the British Empire, but to the Russian Empire, the Chinese Empire, the Japanese Empire; to the French in Tonquin and Annam, Algeria and Tunis; to the Americans in the Phillipines, the Germans in Asia Minor, the Austrians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are of fundamental importance and go to the very root of things. They are therefore worth examination by so practical a people as ourselves." [British]. He then with all solemnity and sincerity and altruistic profes-
sion of the cause of freedom and order, goes to the root of the thing with the following answer:—

"It is when we have found ourselves in contact with disorder or repugnance to association that we have been so often compelled to intervene. We have intended, and we have publicly and solemnly declared our intention, not to intervene; somehow we have to intervene; somehow we have to stay. Not only we find this, but other great nations find the same. Practical statesmen find nothing so disturbing to their wishes and intentions as contact with a weak unorderly people. They try for years to disregard their existence, but in the end, from one cause or another they find they have to intervene, to establish order and set up regular relations; they are in fact driven to establish eventual harmony, even if it may be from the use of force at the moment."

All the great nations are moving in the same direction to establish international harmony! This is another irony of fate, because this spirit of bringing about harmony through imperialism and expansion at the cost of other weak nations has produced wars. Since the classic division of Poland by the great powers to the present-

* Younghusband; India and Tibet, pp. 430-437.
day punitive expeditions of the twentieth century the theory of establishing order and harmony has played a great part; and force has been used to establish harmony among nations by depriving peoples of the enjoyment of their own freedom. But the reflex of this use of force has inevitably generated another force which has even destroyed mighty empires of the world. Imperialism is its own justification to the Imperialists, and to others no justification will ever make imperialism sanctified and acceptable.

Regarding Tibet, the question of harmony and order may be the justification of the conquest by Britain, but Article IX of the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement shows that Tibet is rich in mineral resources, and the economic imperialism demands the control of the raw materials for material gain of "the practical people" of Great Britain. Tibet is not strong, as Lord Curzon pointed out, in military strength; and thus she is a victim of "the great nation" which wishes to establish "harmony" there. It may be brought to home those in the West, who are really looking for world peace, that the people of the East are beginning to understand the argument the West values most; that is, force is the only means of attaining peace and harmony.
With regard to British expansion in Tibet there cannot be any justification. It has been a gross violation of justice, and it was a reflex of rivalry between European nations on the one hand, and the military weakness of China and Tibet on the other. Lord Rosebery, in defence of the action of the British Government in Tibet, made it a question of prestige rather than justice, and I shall let him speak for British statesmanship and its imperial motives.

"As regards the question of justification for Lord Curzon's policy, it was noticed by Lord Rosebery in the House of Lords in 1904, that the situation of 1903 in regard to Tibet presented some rather sinister points of semblance to that of 1878 in regard to Afghanistan. At both dates an independent state on our borders was showing a strong inclination to enter into relations with Russia. In both cases we had the doubtful ethical or legal right to interfere, but in both, too, there existed a strong feeling, in many respects no doubt well justified, that our prestige would seriously suffer if we were excluded and Russia's representatives were admitted. Once more a vigorous policy was pressed on reluctant home authorities by the Indian Government." *

* Roberts, Paul E. History of British India under the Company and the Crown 1923, page 537.
As early as 1904, Mr. Crosby in an article in the North American Review, (May) remarked:—"The practical destruction of the Tibetan independence, which may be assumed as the object of the present Younghusband Expedition, will serve Russia admirably as authorising the conquest of Chinese Turkestan. For such is the accepted code of balance generally adopted by the nations who believe themselves commissioned to benevolently assimilate certain other nations. Recognising then that the status quo is now rudely shaken in Tibet, and may at any time be destroyed in Turkestan, let us note that in both cases there will result a partial disintegration of the Chinese Empire, for whose integrity the world may well be concerned. European and American diplomats in China should endeavour to watch the back door as well as the front door of the great mansion which all desire to enter."

German opinion regarding the Tibetan expedition was bitter, suggesting that Great Britain was taking advantage of Tibet and even playing Russia against Japan, while she was taking the rich territory belonging to the Tibetan people under the pretext of violation of Treaty obligations.

Mr. Dillon says:—"Russia and Germany are especially indignant at the land greed of England, to which neither human nor divine laws would seem to have set any bounds, and at the shamelessness with which she robs weak nations of their independence with no avowed motive and without even a plausible pretext. The German Press has discovered... that the raids complained of by the Indian Government are imaginary, that the trade between India and Tibet is almost nominal, and the treaties broken were violently thrust upon the Government of the Dalai Lama, who therefore naturally is not keen to further English trade. An influential Berlin Press organ informs its numerous readers that in order to seize Tibet, Lord Lansdowne cunningly provided funds necessary for Japan's war preparations and induced the Mikado to keep that danger hanging over Russia's head without actually letting it fall. In this way Japan and Russia are being hoodwinked at one and the same time; for friends and foes are all one to the perfidious enemy of the human race."—The Mission to Tibet by E. J. Dillon. The Contemporary Review, January 1904, pages 123-142.
CHAPTER IV.

MOTIVE FOR BRITISH EXPANSION IN TIBET.

We have already noted that British expansion in Tibet was actuated by the political motive of keeping away from there and at the same time strengthening her position on the northern border of India.* Annexation of Bhutan,

* 1. Mr. Colquohon, writes of British fear of Russia in India:—

"The year of 1902 or 1903 at the latest, will see European Russia connected by the iron rod with Vladivostok and Port Arthur; and the New Siberia, which he held to include Manchuria, will have fully entered on its great career as the coming country of the twentieth century. Russia will be enabled to prosecute her plan; Corea and northern China will be acquired and gradually step by step, by means of railways (favored always by France in the South, and probably covertly, if not openly, by Germany in the North), she will extend her influence southward until the Yangtsze is reached, and there a connection made with the sphere of French influence.

"Russia, whose strength has hitherto been entirely on land, now aspires to be a Sea Power. And in Manchuria she has a coast, coal and a maritime population, excellent material for making sailors—and her presence on the Pacific Ocean and the Chinese Sea must give a great impetus to the aspiration for a navy. It may be taken for granted that having so much, she will want more ports in other quarters and in many quarters of the globe.

"Russia, once on the upper Yangtsze, would involve a second and eastern Indian frontier problem for Britain of an infinitely more serious character than the western, for the utilization of the greater part of the resources of China would mean Russia hanging over India on the north-east, as she is now on the north-west by sheer weight able to shake to its foundations British rule in India. And in the Far East she would be supported by European Allies."
Sikim and Burma and partition of Siam, have had the same motive of keeping France away from the southeastern border of India. British expansion in Tibet in an opportune moment, was nothing less than an expression of British imperialism.†

"And what will the effect of this process be if continued until one day Russia is mistress of China as well as paramount in Afghanistan and Persia? On the north-eastern frontier the British can only defend India by introducing a counter-balance in China itself, by developing the Yangtsze basin, which contains the greater part of the resources of the empire and half its population, and by controlling south-west China, where lies the access to Burma, and through Burma to India. This would afford Britain a proper base and line of defence on the upper Yangtsze, which combined with her sea-power and control of the great Chinese railway would enable her to hold her own.

"How to oppose by means of diplomacy, and if necessary by force of arms, the policy of Russia and France, not improbably supported covertly by Germany—that is the problem that faces Britain and must be of immense consequence to the United States. There is no disguising the fact that a period of intense energy is about to begin and must be met by preparedness. It is time therefore, that Britain and the United States should interest themselves and decide on some common plan."—Colquhoun, Archibald; Overland to China (New York Harper and Brothers) 1900, page 457-459.

† (a) "It is to be hoped that Lord Curzon will not be contented as his predecessors were, with half-way measures. Unless Tibet be placed in the same relation to the Indian Government as is Sikim, the whole question is certain to crop up again in a more threatening way for a less opportune moment, and the men and money to be sacrificed now or next spring will have been thrown away to no purpose;"

Mission to Tibet by E. J. Dillon, the Contemporary Review, January 1904, pages 123-142.

(b) "We cannot leave Tibet as it stands. We must be in a position
It was England’s policy that Tibet, Russia and China must not form a combination; For by securing control over Tibet the influence of the Buddhist world could be used through the
to make arrangements with its rulers and to compel them to abide by such arrangements. A frontier state with which we have many relations, which is the Holy Land to many of our Indian subjects, and which is the buffer between us and the great power of Russia, must be brought within our policy. And at the same time there must not be any conquest, nothing which could be interpreted as interfering with that delicate and evasive thing, the integrity of China. Our rights are so clear that there can be no shrinking from their enforcement.”

Spectator, February 13th, 1904, page 247.

(c) “Perhaps the best hope of peace is that exaggerated report of Russian defeats will float up to Lhassa and will influence the governing Council to promise that in the future they will keep the treaties.”

Ibid—page 438.

(d) “The internal politics of Tibet have for us only an intellectual interest; but if Russia began exercising influence—as she seems to have admitted to Lord Lansdowne that she was doing—we should instantly know the facts and should be in a position whenever necessary to strike hard at Lhassa. The situation, it must be remembered, is not exactly what it was when the expedition was first organised. Russia will not be very active at Lhassa for the next ten years. She is a long way off even if she keeps Manchuria. Her only object in going there must be to menace India, and we have many means of striking back without entering upon an unknown world. The two things indispensable are that we should know, and know accurately, all that occurs at Lhassa, and should convey to St. Petersburg a clear assurance that we regard the seclusion and independence of Tibet as indispensable to the safety of the Indian Empire.”

(e) The situation is a most embarrassing one. All the more because the immediate course to be pursued is so peremptory that we must go to Lhassa whatever may be the consequences.”

Spectator, June 18th, 1904, page 946.
Dalai Lama in favour of Great Britain against Russia and China.*

The expansion of British power in Tibet, became a significant part of British diplomacy in the Orient not only to check the Russian advance towards India; but also to control the Yangtsze Valley completely, to counteract Russian and French designs in China and "for the stability of the Indian Empire."

Sir Claude Mc. Donald, the British Minister at Peking, took definite steps for this purpose, on February 9th 1898, by an exchange of notes with the Tsung-Li-Yamen. In the note he says:

"...I shall be glad to be in a position to communicate to Her Majesty's Government a definite assurance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtsze to any other power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation. Such an assurance is in full harmony with the observations made to me by Your Highness and your Excellencies."

* It is an imperative necessity to consolidate the success obtained in Tibet, and to make strenuous efforts in order to prevent in the Far East, another successful coalition of the three oppressive Powers—the Tsar, the Dalai Lama, and at their command, the Son of Heaven."

—The policy of the Dalai Lama, by Alexander Ular.


† Herstell's China Treaties, Vol. 1, pages 119-120.
This assurance was provided for on the 11th. of February by the Chinese Government. But further demands came from the British Government in the form of extension of her Hongkong territory, and also of the extension of the lease for 99 years. An understanding was reached by the Convention between Great Britain and China on June 9th. 1898, the terms of which, in part are:

"Whereas it has for many years past been recognised that an extension of Hongkong territory is necessary for the proper defence and protection of the colony, it has been now agreed between the Governments of Great Britain and China that the limits of British territory shall be enlarged under lease to the extent indicated generally on the annexed map. The exact boundaries shall be hereafter fixed when proper surveys have been made by officials appointed by the two Governments. The term of this lease shall be (99) ninty-nine years."

It was the time when struggle among Powers, for establishing Spheres of Influence in China was in full swing. The theory of special sphere of influence in Asian countries, particularly in China, by the dominant countries, in violation of sovereign rights of nations, was accepted by
many scholars in the West as inevitable. The real meaning of the establishment of spheres of influence in China was nothing less than partition of China in the course of time. As an eminent American historian puts it:

“Great Britain would take the broad valley of the Yangtsze-Kiang for British Capitalists to develop; France would take Kwangtung; Germany part of Shantung; Russia and Japan would divide the north between them. Within its own sphere of influence each nation would maintain order and protect and encourage its industrial capitalists in operating railways, mines and mills. Perhaps the Powers would thus one day politically divide their spheres of influence in China among them.”*

We find that some of Great Britain’s statesmen are advocating the policy of reducing the Yangtsze valley to the position of the Nile valley. To Mr. Colquhoun “it seems clear, in view of the Russian advance southward, that, if British influence is to be asserted in the Yangtsze region, the connection of the Upper Yangtsze by rail with Burma must be undertaken and carried through without delay. And the assertion

of British influence in the Upper Yangtsze is a vital necessity for the preservation of India. To allow Russian influence to grow up in the Upper Yangtsze would add another and infinitely more serious frontier and endanger the stability of the Indian Empire." He further adds, "There is no reason why she (Great Britain) should be more afraid of dealing with the Yangtsze basin than the Nile basin."†

The actual step taken by Great Britain during and since the Opium War seems to indicate the correctness of Mr. Colquhoun's statement. The Westward march from the side of Hongkong, the Northward march from the side in Upper Burma, and southern and westward economic penetration from the side of Shanghai and the control of means of transportation in the Yangtsze region by way of river communications and railroads were progressing; and also we see in the British march towards Tibet a step to realize the same objective. The expansion of British power in Tibet is then a necessary consequence towards the control of India and a march towards south western China.

† Colquhoun, Archibald: Overland to China (New York, Harper and Brothers) 1900, pages 415; 341.
Though political motives dominated the British expansion towards Tibet, economic motives were no mean factor. Such authorities as Rockhill, Waddell, O’Conor all agree as to the immense riches of Tibet. She is rich in gold deposits. “For thousands of years, gold has been washed out of her surface soil by the crudest processes. From every river which has its source in the Tibetan Plateau, gold is washed. Every traveller refers to the vast extent of the abandoned mines,...from which probably not even one-half of the gold upturned has ever been extracted.”

There is an abundance of pine, silver fir and other valuable timber in the Chumbi valley. The lakes and rivers of Tibet contain plenty of fish which are caught with the line and net. The Tsanpo is full of fish, and the existence of the fishing villages on the shores of Yamdonk lake seems to imply a regular industry. The fish are preserved by being split, cleaned, and then dried in the sun.

“The Chumbi valley, for instance,” says Mr. Fraser, “possesses a warm, dry climate and produces barley, corn, apricots, and apples in abundance. At an elevation of 15,000 feet above

* Holdrich; Tibet the Mysterious, p. 329.
the sea level, round about the Lake Dangra, there are well-built villages and richly cultivated barley fields. The fauna, too, is varied and abundant, but the mineral wealth of the country is said to be literally inexhaustible. Gold which will attract workmen and traces up men to the North Pole or South Pole, abounds in such quantities and so widely distributed as to attract a large population as soon as it can be worked. Among other minerals found in Tibet are, iron, borax, salt, quick-silver, and lapsi lazuli.

* Fraser, David: Marches of Hindustan. London, 1907, p. 75.

The real motive of the Tibet Expedition, according to Mr. Barkatulla is as follows:—

"The real reason for England's advance on Tibet is the influence of high finance on colonial policy of Great Britain. Travellers and explorers, in spite of the strict vigilance on the part of the Tibetan authorities, have succeeded during the last decade in discovering the mineral wealth on the roof of the world." Sathol and Thok-Jalung in south-western Tibet possess rich gold deposits in considerable quantities. These places lie, roughly speaking, some three hundred miles east of Simla in British India. The yellow metal is found in the hill ranges lying between the thirty second degrees of east longitude. Thok-Jalung is only some sixty-three feet above sea-level, and not far from the source of the river Indus, which cleaves the Himalayas in its course through Ladakh and Kashmir into the plains of western India.

"Some two hundred miles to the eastward of Thok-Jalung, in the lake-region in the chain of hills just north of the thirty-second parallel, there are also several gold fields. These are the Thok Amar, Thok Marshura, and Thok Daurakpa deposits. About a hundred miles still farther to the eastward are the Sarka Shyar gold
Such a country as Tibet which is politically so important and economically so lucrative, and herself too weak to maintain her sovereign rights, according to the present practices of international morality, must fall under the domination of "a strong Power. England was most favorably situated to grasp the problem and act on it. For a Tibet which is closed to England and open to Russia, which is a vassal estate of China when-

fields, lying right across an explored tract from the north-west that joins a route running nearly due south from Lob-nor to Lhassa, across ranges of mountains, a pass over one of which is 19,600 feet above the sea-level. Again, to the north of this region, among the northern spurs of the Kuon-Lun range, which forms the dividing line between Tibet proper and Chinese Turkestan, there are several important gold fields, chief among these are those of Akka Togh, at the head of the Guikerma river, one of the tributaries of the Cherchen that flows into Lobnor; the Bapa gold fields, between the Mist and Moldja rivers, which lose themselves in the Tarim basin; and the Sorgak mines on the Nia river, which also ends in the Tarim basin. The last two of these lie in the neighborhood of route from Kaskar, near the Russian frontier, through the Yarkand and Khotan to Lobnor, at an average altitude of less than five thousand feet where it meets the route south to Lhassa and others in western China.

"When expedition after expedition, which had explored some region of the Hermit Kingdom, returned to India with exciting stories of fresh discoveries of gold fields, the imagination of men of high finance—the natural collaborators of the British Foreign Office—was wrought to the highest pitch. There was, therefore, at the return of every exploring expedition, an outburst of agitation, "On to Lhassa," in the Anglo-Indian press. In order to justify the British forward policy in the eyes of the civilized world, there were
ever our (English) people chance to have concessions to demand or rights to enforce, but is quite free and independent when it is dealing with Moscovy, cannot be tolerated so long as politics is not conducted on principles of the Sermon on the Mount."

invented, and widely circulated, wild stories of broken treaties, of Tibetan incursions and outrages of British subjects captured and tortured, of Nepalese Yaks carried off, of studied insults devised by Russian emmissaries in Lhassa and directed at the Indian Government through the witless person the Dalai Lama, etc. In 1898 the agitation for the conquest of Tibet, had already attained sufficient importance; but the British Government was at that time occupied in the conquest of the Egyptian Soudan, and, consequently, could not well take up a fresh enterprise. Nor did the agitation of 1900 lead to any practical results, owing to the South African War.

"In 1903, however, the long sought opportunity arrived. Russia, the only Power in Asia whose diplomatic protest in reference to the integrity of the Chinese Empire could be effective, was herself embroiled in a war with Japan over the question of Corea and Manchuria. And China, whose territory, both on the East and in the West, was the object to two great European Powers, was powerless.

"The treaty (the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement) which is invalid in the eyes of international law, fully discloses by its terms the real motives which were at the bottom of the British invasion of Tibet. The mineral wealth of the forbidden land, just like that of the Transvaal, has been the dominant factor, as pointed out before, in all the dealings of Great Britain with Tibet. What wonder is it, then, that no fewer than nine mining companies were formed in London to work and exploit the gold fields of the north-western Tibet, even before the British army made its entry into the Lama's capital?"

The British Invasion of Tibet—by Mohammad Barkatulla; The Forum (N. Y.) July—September, 1903, pp. 128 140.

CHAPTER V.

TIBET SINCE YOUNGHBUSAND'S EXPEDITION.

Great Britain would have annexed Tibet in 1904 but she had to postpone the plan for the interest of the Empire and to placate Russia, to give her assurance that it was not to Britain’s interest to annex Tibet. This view was clearly expressed by Sir J. D. Rees in his discussion with Sir Francis Younghusband.*

There is not the least doubt that the signing of the Article IX of the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of 1904 made Tibet a real protectorate or dependency of Britain. Yet Britain did her best to preserve the fiction of Chinese sovereignty there. The reason is not far to seek. By doing so, she disarmed Russia as to the question of violating the territorial integrity of China in Tibet. In fact this also created a situation that made it impossible for Russia to claim any rights in Tibet, without coming in conflict with Great Britain. Secondly, outright annexation of Tibet would have created a great deal of ill-feeling between Britain and China, and the

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whole world would have accused the British, for annexing a vast territory from a weak nation and charged them as a nation "that systematically oppresses the weak." There was also a possibility that the so-called liberal Government of Great Britain did not want to have the unnecessary military expenditure of having an army of occupation in Tibet, when it was possible to reap the economic and political harvest of controlling the country through an agreement with China. So the fiction of Chinese sovereignty was allowed to exist, and China was asked to affix a signature of ratification of the Anglo-Tibetan agreement, making an explicit declaration that China herself would not have the right to interfere in Tibetan affairs. What was necessary for Britain to acquire, was the legal authority from China, agreeing on the Article IX of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904. If that could be gotten, then the British control of Tibet would not be a conquest by force but as a matter of right, achieved through a commercial convention. Furthermore, any agreement with China, regarding Tibet, upholding the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement would destroy the pretensions of Russia or any other Power there. It would afford Britain a stepping-stone to interfere in the
affairs of China with greater prestige than was the case before the Russo-Japanese war. Thus Great Britain bent all her energies to secure China's consent on the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement.

**Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1906.**

When the text of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904 reached Peking, the Chinese Government refused to ratify it, and through the Chinese Press, made this fact known to the civilized world. The Chinese contention was that Tibet was a province of the Celestial Empire, being a vassal state of China, and that the British action in Tibet had been tantamount to an infringement of the sovereign rights of the suzerain power. Chinese statesmen well knew that the occupation of Tibet by England would ultimately lead the latter country to the acquisition of the Chinese western province, and that it was England's aim to reach the Yangtzse Valley, assigned to her by an agreement of the European Powers, from the west, i. e., Tibet.

British activities for some time past in constructing railway lines through Upper Burmah towards the south western frontier of China had been viewed in the same light by many a far-
seeing Chinese statesmen. But owing to the hopeless weakness of the Central Government in the past, the patriotic Chinese could not adequately provide safe-guards against these impending dangers.*

His Excellency Tong Shao-yi, the Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs of China wanted to pay to the British Government the indemnity for Tibet and to act in such a way that China’s suzerainty in Tibet be not impaired. The British Government absolutely refused to negotiate with the Chinese authorities, unless China would acknowledge the validity of the Anglo-Tibetan agreement concluded on September 7th, 1904. The real motive of this stand of the British Government was to force China actually to acknowledge that Tibet was a British “Sphere of influence” and thus Great Britain would have monopolistic, economic privileges and political preponderance there. China had to choose between absolutely losing hold over Tibet, in any form or other, and the acknowledgment of the establishment of British “sphere of influence” in Tibet, and thus partial impairment of her sovereignty in that region.

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chose the course of signing the Anglo-Chinese Agreement concerning Tibet on April 27th, 1906, the principal articles of which are as follows:—

Art. 1. The Convention concluded on September 7th, 1904 by Great Britain and Tibet is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of terms specified therein.

Art. 2. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex territory or interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

Art. 3. The concessions which are mentioned in the Art. IX. (d) of the convention concluded on September 7th, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any State or to the subject of any State other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in the Art. 11, of the aforesaid Convention, Great Britain shall be entitled
Anglo-Russian Entente and Tibet.

After securing the Anglo-Chinese agreement concerning Tibet, Britain moved to secure Russian consent regarding her status there. In 1907 Great Britain and Russia made a general settlement of all outstanding questions, so far as possible to enter into an entente. The question of partitioning Persia, establishment of a British sphere of influence in Afghanistan as well as in Tibet, and the extension of the Russian sphere of influence in Mongolia, were agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties. The following is the text of the agreement arrived at regarding Tibet.

"The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Tibet, have made the following arrangements:

"Art. 1. The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of
Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

"Art. II. In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. The engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided in Art V. of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of the 7th, of September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th of April 1906, nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain in Art. I. of the said Convention of 1906.

"It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama, and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet. The Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present Arrangement.

"Art. III. The British and Russian Gov-
ernments respectively engage not to send repre-
sentatives to Lhassa.

"Art. IV. The two High Contracting Par-
ties engage neither to seek, nor to obtain,
whether for themselves or for their subjects any
concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and
mines or other rights in Tibet.

"Art V. The two Governments agree that
no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind
or cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great
Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.*

The real motive of the convention is to make
Russia agree to acknowledge the British sphere
of influence in Tibet and thus come to an agree-

* McMurray's Treaties on China.

Annex to the arrangement between Great Britain and Russia
concerning Tibet :—"Great Britain re-affirms the Declaration, signed
by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and
appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th of Septem-
ber 1904 to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by
the British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual
instalments of the indemnity of 2,500,000 rupees, provided that the
trade marts mentioned in the Art 11 of the Convention have been
effectively open for three years, and that in the meantime the
Tibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the
terms of the said Convention in 1904. It is clearly understood that
if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has,
for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the
above declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter
upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject."
ment about the future plan of action. The so-called Chinese suzerainty was kept up as a matter of fiction and to save the face of the Chinese, who would not recognise the validity of any document which would eliminate China from Tibet in theory. This fact was fully understood by all responsible statesmen. The late Marquis Okuma, former Premier of Japan made the following pertinent remark on this subject:

"Tibet has long been considered as a "British sphere of interest", though under the Convention of August 31st, 1907, Great Britain and Russia agreed not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the Chinese Government, nor to send representatives to Lhassa."*

This makes it clear that by the common agreement between Russia and Great Britain, China remained the titular head and Great Britain became the real controller of Tibet; because, the Art. IX of the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement which remained in force.

After the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement there was a temporary lull in British activities towards Tibet; and this was due to the revolution in Turkey, a serious and most deli-

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5 The Chinese Revolution and World Peace by Marquis Okuma.
The Independent, New York, July 25, 1912.
cate situation in the Persian Gulf and Persia, and the grave situation in North Africa involving interests of all great Powers. The British March towards Tibet had to wait for a while until these problems were solved.

**Chinese Efforts to Re-assert Chinese Sovereignty in Tibet.**

“The British expedition to Tibet in 1903-4 turned the attention of the Chinese Government to those remote high lands; and in 1905 a determined effort was commenced to bring Szechwan marshes, and eventually Tibet itself under direct Chinese administration.” In order to accomplish this, the Chinese Government took elaborate measures to re-organise the government of the province of Szechwan. Chao Erh-haun was made the Governor of Szechwan and his brother who was an energetic and able military leader, was made Amban for Tibet. From 1905 to 1910 the work of consolidating Chinese sovereignty in Szechwan border and Tibet, was carried on with great vigour. He not only subjugated the Chinese border tribes, but “Chinese settlers were imported, military posts were carried all the way to Lhassa, and in 1910 a force of 1,000 men were stationed at Lhassa itself.”
The Chinese Government did not take kindly to the Dalai Lama, who fled from Lhassa when the British were about to enter Lhassa. The Dalai Lama took refuge in Mongolia.* The Peking Government, by decree of July 19th, 1907, summoned him to Peking; and he reached Peking

General reform and modern improvement for Tibet. The Dalai Lama, after returning to Tibet, "invoked assistance of the British Government" and later on fled to India taking refuge at Darjeeling. This happened about the 18th, of February and on the 5th, of February China deposed the Dailai Lama and "informed Great Britain that this step did not affect the arrangement (the Anglo-Chinese treaty) of 1906." Under the pretext that the Chinese

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* The Dalai Lama of Tibet took refuge in Mongolia in 1905, during the expedition of Younghusband to Lhassa. He resided near Urga; and M. Louba was the bearer of a telegram to him from the Tsar, conveying his good wishes. After reading the telegram, or rather the translation, he was very anxious to know if the Tsar had written his name himself on the telegram; and when told this was not the case, he was very disappointed. On this occasion the Russian Minister at Peking, M. Pokotill brought the congratulations of the Tsar and presents, and had several audiences with the Dalai Lama. Perryayscough, H. G. C. and Otter-Barry, (Capt. R. B. "With the Russians in Mongolia" (London, John Lane) 1914 pp. 224-225.
activity is dangerous to the safety of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, which were formerly Chinese dependencies before the establishment of the British protectorate, Great Britain protested against the Chinese advance in Tibet and any pretensions in these Provinces.

The Chinese revolution brought about a serious change in Tibet, so far as the Chinese sovereignty was concerned. Tibetans rose against the authority of the Chinese Amban and the Chinese were massacred and Chao Erhfeng was executed. The British Government took advantage of the situation and refused to acknowledge actual sovereignty of China in Tibet. However, on April 21st, 1912, President Yaun issued a Mandate declaring that Tibet with Mongolia and Turkestan would henceforth be regarded as provinces and integral parts of China. The British Government on May 24th, not only protested against it, but demanded status quo to be maintained in Tibet.

The Chinese Government however, did not pay prompt attention to the British protest; but the Governor of Szechwan fitted out an expedition towards Tibet. The British Government again protested against this on August 17th, 1912. China replied to this protest on December
pointing out to the British that the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1906 did not preclude China from intervening in Tibet, and to preserve order she must maintain sufficient force in that country.

In the meantime the Chinese Government concluded peace with Tibet on August 12th, 1912, and fifteen hundred troops were allowed to leave the country via India, leaving only a guard of 200 men for the Chinese Representative Chang Ying. To mend matters with the Dalai Lama, a decree was issued by the President of China on October 28th, 1912 restoring his title. In January 23, 1913 the Dalai Lama, who up to that time was in India negotiating with the British authorities to secure support for his restoration, returned to Lhassa and turned all his energies towards arriving at an understanding with China through British support.

It is well to remember that the third Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on July 13, 1911 at the wake of which, secret understanding between Japan and Russia followed. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Russo-Japanese understandings of 1907 and 1910 were

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by-products of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Because of these alliances, Japan opposed the principle of internationalizing the railroads in Manchuria, as advocated by the U. S. Secretary of State Mr. Knox, and Russia joined with Japan in protesting against the Knox plan. The British Government supported Japan and Russia in this project of partitioning Manchuria into two spheres of influence between Russia and Japan, because, it was conceded to the British by Russia “freedom of action and her (British) privileged position in Tibet. This happened in 1912.”

The Chinese Revolution and British Expansion in Tibet.

The Chinese revolution was, as if providential for the British Government to make her hold on Tibet firmer than ever. The fear of the British Government was, should there be a powerful and centralized government in China, and should the Chinese organise an effective army, then China might offset British aggression from the side of Burma and Tibet. (The fear of Great Britain was, exactly of similar nature with that

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of Austria and Italy, after the Turkish revolution. Austria with the tacit consent of the European Powers, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Italy annexed Tripoli, with the support of the Triple Entente, particularly Great Britain and France, in violation of all solemn agreements to uphold territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was also similar to what happened to Persia after the the Persian revolution, when Great Britain, Russia and Germany were anxious to extend their territorial and political control over that country.) After the Chinese revolution, when Yuan Shi Kai, the President of the Chinese Republic with the support of the National Assembly, started to assert Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, the British Government showed

* "On March 16th, 1912 Yuan Shi Kai was inaugurated as President of the Chinese Republic. He promised to develop a Republic and create the nation from the five races—Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, Mohamedan, (Sic) and Tibetan—symbolised in the colors of the Republican flag. Russian and British foreign offices were highly indignant because the new government refused to admit the thesis that Mongolia and Tibet were practically independent—which meant that these two provinces were sufficiently detached from China to be attached to the Russian and British Empires."


"The situation after the Chinese revolution was a serious one for the new Republic. International pressure was used against the
its hand and did its work in opposing the Chinese claim in a masterly way. The Government gave an ultimatum to the Chinese Government to the effect that, China had her suzerainty in Tibet but she would not be allowed to send any large force to enforce Chinese sovereignty there.

Mr. Percival Langdon lucidly explains how this ultimatum solved the question in favor of Great Britain. He says:

"This (British) ultimatum, courteously worded as it is, amounts to declaration to the Chinese Ministry that the maintenance of the status quo in Tibet, in which India is directly interested, is newly born Republic to sell her interest to please other nations. Yuan Shi Kai as the President, had a very hard job to preserve the integrity of China. If he refused to continue to sell the interests of China, as the old Imperial Government had done, the Foreign Ministers were ready to combine to prevent him from getting money to carry on his government. The British had tried to get him admit the virtual independence of Tibet and the Russians of Mongolia while the Russians and Japanese were acting as if Manchuria was altogether lost to China. The Powers backed their financiers in opposing a large loan under onerous conditions, from a consortium of bankers, which was secured by mortgaging the salt revenues and the future surplus of the maritime customs. One of its stipulations was that foreign interests should have inspectors and advisors in various departments of the Ministry of Finance, and one more step toward bringing the country under foreign control."

inconsistent with the despatch of a large armed force from China to Lhassa. England readily admits Chinese suzerainty, but sees no reason why more than a Resident with a small escort should be needed to maintain the dignity of the Celestials in Lhassa. And to bring home the seriousness of her intentions, she is compelled to decline to recognise the new Republic until she has definite assurances on these points. At first it was reported that China had refused to give them, but this appears to have been merely an *obiter dictum* of the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was promptly snubbed by Yaun Shi Kai for expressing his opinions. England's request, no doubt places China in a considerable difficulty, as she has already allotted to Tibet ten seats in the National Assembly. To cancel them will seem much like acquiescing in the relinquishment of a Province at the bidding of a foreign nation, and newly formed democracies are always unusually touchy upon such points. On the other hand, the certainty of serious trouble and the probable establishment of a permanent North Eastern question have been definitely postponed by the recreation of Tibet as an insulating force along the northern frontier, and those who have their best interests at heart
will seriously congratulate the (British) Foreign Secretary upon the use that has been made of the opportunity thus unexpectedly offered to him by the Chinese revolution.

**The Abohr Expedition and Its Motive.**

In the autumn of 1911 the Government of India sent an expedition to the region inhabited by the Abohrs, the tribesmen, occupying the frontier regions of Burma and Tibet. This was generally spoken as a minor operation entered into solely for punishing the murderers of an Indian official, Mr. Williamson, and an accompanying doctor, who were there *in the mission to study the frontier conditions*. But the real motive of the Government of India in undertaking the Abohr Expedition, was to check Chinese efforts to have any secure footing in this

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From these, two most interesting lessons can be learned by the students of Chinese political history and intrigue. Because, Yuan Shi Kai, knowing that China was not in a position to fight Great Britain on the Tibetan question, was ready to allow the British to assert diplomatically. Sir John Jordan, the then British Minister at Peking, Dr. Morrison, the then British advisor to the Chinese Government, and all the lesser lights of the British propaganda machine in China, and all other parts of the world became ardent chapiions of Yuan, and at the same time denouncing Dr. Sun Yat Sen and other leaders of South China who did not approve of British encroachment in China through Tibet to be allowed to continue unchecked. The most ardent of the Chinese Statesmen who took lively interest for the preservation of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet was the Rt. Hon. Tong Shao Yi, who was regarded by the
region. Chinese immigration was steadily flowing towards Burma and even to the borders of Assam, and the Government of India was apprehensive of growing Chinese strength. The real trend of British policy can be fully appreciated from the following remarks of a British observer:—

“This (The Abohr Expedition), as has been said, was ostensibly a mission sent to punish one or two villages for the murder of a British official. In reality, it was part of a much greater scheme; it covered an intention to get some accurate knowledge of this totally unknown frontier of Burma and Tibet, which rapidly threatened to become the scene of some difficulty with the Chinese.”

“Fully alive as he was to the advantages of taking action, Lord Hardinge determined that

British Government as their sworn enemy. The second fact that should be remembered is, that the British Government fished in troubled waters with great dexterity. If in place of Tibet, a similar situation happened in Manchuria or in Yuanan, what would have the other nations, especially the British Foreign Office said to Japan or France? If the British idea of creating a British Buffer State in Tibet for the sake of the protection of India is alright, then Japan might as well legitimately work for establishing a buffer state in Manchuria on the ground of the protection of Korea and her possessions on the mainland of Asia; France can press a similar claim in Yuanan to protect her interests in Indo China. Great Britain, the supposed friend of the Chinese democracy, which sees in Japan a menace to China has detached a province of China, and it was done by giving a polite ultimatum. This action of Great Britain is no less pernicious, if not more dangerous than the much condemned Japanese Twenty One Demands.
the district must be surveyed and the frontier demarkated. Orders were therefore issued that besides two parties in Burma, three or four surveying sections should take advantage of the protection afforded by the presence of an effective Indian force in the neighbourhood to arrive at some knowledge of the life of this unknown land. But it is the beginning, and for those who had ears there was a hint in the famous Proclamation at the Delhi Durbar last December (1911), that that this quarter of the frontier will in the future receive the special attention of the Indian Government. Lord Hardinge may at least congratulate himself upon turning Assam into a North Eastern Frontier Province in such a way that those who heard or read the Imperial Proclamation last December (1911) not one in a million realized that the thing was done. Under the cover of the dust that was being raised by changes of vast romantic and controversial interest, the direct supervision of the area that seemed likely to give trouble in the near future was almost surreptitiously transferred to the Central Government; and Lord Hardinge deserves the full credit for having made this.*

* Tibet, China and India by Percival Langdon, In the Fortnightly Review. October 1912; pp 655-662.
This is the real nature of the Abohr Expedition of the British Government in India, which under the cover of a punitive expedition or a surveying of the frontier, extends its interests for the protection of India, and strengthening its position against China for the future march of British expansion into the heart of the Chinese Republic, the Yangtse region.

**British Policy of Partitioning Tibet in Outer and Inner Tibet.**

When the world’s attention was directed towards the Balkan Question, it afforded a splendid opportunity for Russia and England, in agreement with each other, to march in and dispoil China for her territories of Mongolia and Tibet in a systematic way. China was just getting out of the serious situation of the revolution, and she did not have the strength to check this polite and diplomatic method of robbing her of her territories. In 1912 Russia recognized the independence of Mongolia, which virtually became a Russian protectorate.* With

* Although the Soviet Russian authorities profess to be a sincere friend of the Chinese Republic, they are following exactly the same policy of making Mongolia a Russian protectorate, as was carried on by the Tsar’s Government. Forms of Government change, but almost in all cases national ambition continues to play its part under different disguises.
Russian assistance to Mongolia and British support to Tibet, both Mongolia and Tibet entered into an alliance which was directed against China. Although (as we have already noted) according to the Anglo-Russian Agreement regarding Tibet, Russia and Britain agreed not to carry on any negotiations with Tibet, without the intermediary of China, the suzerain power, the Mongol-Tibetan Alliance was concluded in 1912 through the connivance of these two great Powers of Europe.

Through the initiative of Agban Dordjef, a Buriat, on the 29th of December 1912, the Mongol Tibetan Treaty was signed at Urga to the effect that the Mongols and Tibetans would be free from the Chinese Republic and co-operate with one another for their own safety. The four principal articles of the above treaty as as follows:

“Art. 1. The Dalai Lama Sovereign of Tibet, approves of and acknowledges the formation of an independent Mongolian State, and the proclamation of the 9th day of the 11th month of the Year of the Swine, of the master of the Yellow Faith Jetsun Dampa Lama as sovereign of the land.

Art. 2. The sovereign of the Mongolian
people Jetsun Dampa Lama approves and acknowledges the formation of an independent State of Tibet and proclamation of the Dalai Lama as Sovereign of Tibet.

Art. 3. Both states shall take measures, after mutual consideration, for the prosperity of the Buddhist faith.

Art 4. Both states, the Mongolian and Tibetans, shall henceforth, for all time, afford each other aid against dangers from without and from within.”*

After the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of Alliance was concluded, the British Government conceived the plan of dividing Tibet into Outer and Inner Tibet. (This policy was exactly in line with the Russian policy of dividing Mongolia into Inner and Outer Mongolia.) This plan was devised to bring the most populous, fertile and rich part of Tibet under British control, under the cover of establishing a ‘special sphere of interest’ in Tibet. On October 13, 1913, a tripartite negotiation began in Simla, The boundary of Tibet was one of the important questions for discussion. The Chinese representative at first

tenaciously held that there should be status quo on the basis of the existing condition after the success of the Chinese Revolution of 1911. This proposition, if accepted by Tibet and Great Britain, would have secured for the Chinese the advantage of asserting their sovereignty over Tibet, because by 1910 Chao Erh-feng’s forces were in control of Tibet, Dalai Lama was later deposed and Tibet was actually governed as a province of the Chinese Empire. It was impossible to come to any agreement on the basis of the above-mentioned Chinese proposition; and the British representative who was apparently acting as an arbitrator between Tibetan and Chinese representatives made a compromise proposition which was provisionally accepted by the three parties and was signed on April 27, 1914. But the Chinese Government very promptly on the 29th of April repudiated the agreement, on the ground that the Chinese representative had no authority to sign an agreement which would deprive China of her sovereignty over Tibet and some of her own territories. Although China refused to be bound by the action of her representative, the British Government through its Minister at Peking, informed the Chinese Government by a
note of June 6th 1914, that Great Britain and Tibet regarded the agreement signed as binding.

China had legitimate grounds for refusing to be bound by the convention based upon the British Compromise proposition. The following statement from a publication of the British Foreign Office throws interesting light on the British intention of dividing Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet, and China's refusal to accept any such proposal.

"Under this Convention Tibet was divided into Outer and Inner Tibet, after the example of Outer and Inner Mongolia. Outer Tibet was drawn to include a larger extent of territory than China had previously conceded to Lhasa authorities; and to Inner Tibet were added portions of West Szechwan and the Mongol Tsaidom country of Koko-nor, which had been under direct control of China for a long period. China's refusal to sign was based on objections to these boundaries. The whole of Tibet, Inner and Outer, was recognized as being under Chinese suzerainty; China was not to convert it into a Chinese province, and Great Britain was not to annex it or any portion of it; China and Tibet were not to enter into any agreement regarding Tibet with one another or with any other power (the
Lhassa Convention of 1904 and the Adhesion Convention of 1906 excepted). Recognizing the special interest of Great Britain into Outer Tibet, China was not to send troops into Outer Tibet, or to station troops or officials or establish colonies there; Great Britain was to make similar engagement as regards Tibet; but these arrangements were not to preclude the continuance of Chinese High official at Lhassa with a suitable escort, and the British agent at Gyantse was to be allowed to visit Lhassa with his escort whenever necessary. Nothing in the convention was to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet; and new regulations for the Indian trade were to be negotiated with Outer Tibet. By these arrangements there would be a buffer state, Inner Tibet, comprising the Marsh country from Singkiang to Yunan, in which China would be at liberty to re-establish such a measure of control as would safe-guard her historic position, without infringing the integrity of Tibet geographically or politically; and Outer Tibet would become an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty and British protection."*

Thus the real motive of the British compromise proposal was the increase of British influence in Tibet and other parts of China by dividing Tibet into two regions of Inner and Outer Tibet. It also involved that certain parts of the Chinese territory of Szechwan—such as Tachienlu, Batang region—which heretofore was under full Chinese authority, (this region is rich in mineral wealth, as “gold is found in the rivers on the Chinese frontier between Chiamdo and Tachienlu”) be included in the Inner Tibet. The method suggested for the protection of the Inner Tibet by the British Government is exactly the same which she adopted in certain stages of absorption of the territory of the Indian Princes in India proper. Inner Tibet, the richer and more prosperous part of Tibet, and a part of Szechwan, would form a British sphere of influence. This involved a more serious thing so far as China was concerned, because it would mean British encroachment from the side of Tibet towards the east to make that region as a British belt. The inclusion of Koko-nor “which had been under direct Chinese control for a long period” in Inner Tibet, was no less objectionable to China. No Chinese Government which believed in territorial integrity of China could
but refuse to sign an agreement which would mean willingly giving away Chinese territory to Great Britain, and also deprive her of her sovereignty over Tibet. The Chinese Government refused to agree to this benevolent compromise proposition of the British Government, and thus was regarded as following obstructionist tactics with reference to the solution of the Tibetan question. There is certainly a double standard of international justice—one for China and the weak states of Asia and other parts of the world, and the other for Great Britain and other nations which can wield the big stick effectively against the helpless nations, less adequately armed to protect their national sovereignty and legitimate rights from the aggression of the strong.

British Demands Regarding Tibet During the World War.

In March 1917, the British Government, after a period of inaction in Tibet due to Britain's life and death struggle against Germany, presented Twelve Demands regarding Tibet to China. This was regarded as an opportune moment for Britain to force the Tibetan issue in Chinese politics, and to secure a settlement when China was facing the most difficult ques-
tion of her entering the World War against Germany. We have pointed out that the previous negotiations of 1913 and 1914 had failed to secure unanimity of action. In 1917 Britain urged China to be more reasonable (?) and made the following demands which were first published in the Japanese press:

"1. Great Britain shall have the right to construct railways between Tibet and India.
2. The Chinese Government shall contract loans from the British Government for the improvement of the administration of Tibet.
3. British experts shall be engaged for industrial enterprises of Tibet.
4. The treaty obligation between Tibet and Great Britain shall be considered valid as heretofore.
5. China shall secure the redemption of loans contracted from the British people by the Tibetans.
6. Neither China nor Great Britain shall send troops to Tibet without reason.
7. The Chinese Government shall not appoint or dismiss officials in Tibet on its responsibility.
8. The British Government shall be allowed to establish telegraph lines in Lhassa, Chianghu, Chamutao etc.
9. British postal service shall be introduced in Lhassa and other places.
11. No privileges or
interests in Tibet shall be granted to other nations. 12. All mines in Tibet shall be worked by the British and Chinese Governments”.*

Chinese attitude on the British demands was well expressed by Dr. C. C. Wu, the then Acting Foreign Minister of China, in a Memorandum on the subject:—

“China wants nothing more than the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, with recognition of the autonomy of the territory immediately under the control of the Lhassa Government. She is agreeable to the British idea to establish an effective buffer territory, in so far as it is consistent with equity and justice; she is anxious that her trade interest should be looked after by her trade agents, as do the British, a point which is agreeable even to the Tibetans, though apparently not to the British; in other words, she expects that Great Britain would at least make with her an arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be more advantageous to her than that made with Russia respecting Outer Mongolia” †

It is clear that according to the Chinese point

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* Reid, Gilbert: China, Captive or Free. (New York, Dodd, Mead & Co) 1921 pages 124-125.
† Wealc, Putnam: Fight For the Republic in China. P. 479.
of view the British demands were more exacting than the Russian control in Outer Mongolia. The British demands were more objectionable than those of the Japanese in Manchuria or any other part of China. Japan was opposed to British demands in Tibet. The following remarks of an American observer on the British demands on China regarding Tibet in 1917 may be of some interest, as it presents entirely a new point of view for occidental scholars and public:—

"Remember, over here it is not customary to think of anything but 'Japanese aggression'. Japan, you see, offers the only stumbling block to the complete domination of the Orient by Europe. But for Japan, China might possibly become another India."

In the past British efforts have been consistently to reduce Tibet to a British dependency, if not incorporating it as part of the British Empire. However the Tibetan situation remains still unsettled,† although it is the concensus of opinion among many students of world politics

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that in all probability Tibet will share the fate of Burma.

* "Great Britain on the southwest completed the circle of foreign aggression upon the Chinese soil. Step by step the British had established their supremacy in India, and until late in the nineteenth century they began to look eastward and northward for further conquests. To the east of India lay the kingdom of Burma, rich in forests, in fertility, in minerals. To be sure, Burma was a tributary state of China; but no such consideration weighed upon the British when in 1885 they invaded the country, deposed King Theabow, and annexed his dominions to the British Crown. To the north of India lay the independent states of Nepal and Bhutan; they naturally became quasi-independent protectes of the British. In Tibet, however, the British encountered obstinate opposition on the part of the Chinese, who were determined not to let Tibet slip out of their grasp. Nevertheless, China was unable to prevent the British, in 1904 from negotiating directly with the Tibetan Government at Lhassa for concessions to British Indian traders, and when in 1912 the Chinese Government attempted to treat Tibet as a Chinese province, Great Britain insisted that China was no more than a nominal suzerain of Tibet. Encouraged by Great Britain, the Tibetans rose in rebellion against China, expelled all Chinese soldiers and officials from their country, and defeated the small expeditionary armies sent out from China. Diplomatic negotiations led to the formation of a convention in 1914, whereby Tibet was divided into Outer and Inner Tibet, China retaining a mere fiction of suzerainty over the whole territory and engaging not to interfere at all in the affairs of Outer Tibet. Upon the refusal of the Chinese Government to ratify this convention, Great Britain gave notice that China would be deprived of whatever advantages remained to her in Tibet. The ultimate fate of Tibet could hardly be in doubt; China would find her nominal suzerainty but the thread whereby to secure Tibet against the mighty attraction which had drawn Burma into the British Empire."—Hayes, Carlton, J H: A Political and Social History of Modern Europe. Vol 2. New York. 1917, pp. 569-570.
CHAPTER VI.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND TIBET.

The Conference on the Limitation of Armaments held in Washington in 1921-1922, devoted a large portion of its time to the solution of the Chinese question. Its results have been hailed as a great success towards the preservation of territorial and administrative integrity of China. The Nine Power Pact is one of its great achievements. The Nine Power Treaty on Chinese Integrity signed by the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, at Washington, on February 4, 1922, contains the following provisions:

Article I. The contracting Powers, other than China agree (1) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of
all nations throughout the territory of China.

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

Article II. The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding, either with one another or individually or collectively with any power or powers which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I.

Article III. With a view to apply more effectually the principles of the open door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the contracting powers, other than China, agree they will not seek, nor support their respective nations in seeking: (A) Any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region in China: (B) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or
participating with the Chinese Government or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to conduct of a peculiar commercial, industrial or financial undertaking or to the engagement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this article, in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present treaty or not.

Article IV. The Contracting Powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other, designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

Article V. China agrees that, throughout the whole of railways in China, she will not exer-
cise or permit unfair discriminations of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned or the nationality or the ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on Chinese railways.

The Contracting Powers, other than China, assume a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.

Article VI. The Contracting Parties, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

Article VII. The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which, in the opinion of any one of them, involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and
renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned.

Article VIII. Powers not signatory to the present treaty which have governments recognized by the signatory powers and which have treaty relations with China, shall be invited to adhere to the present treaty. To this end the Government of the United States will make the necessary communications to the non-signatory powers and will inform the Contracting Powers of the replies received. Adherence by any Power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

The section 3 of the Article I. of the Nine Power Treaty was a subject of considerable discussion and deliberation. The provision of the section 3 is the contribution of Mr. Balfour (now Lord) of the British delegation, in the form of an amendment to the original proposition of Mr. Root of the United States delegation. Mr. Root's original proposition was: "To safeguard for the world, so far as it is within our power, the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China." Mr. Balfour presented his amendment, after the discussions of Senator
Schanzer of Italy who wanted to have a clear distinction made between "demands which might abridge rights already existing, and demands for new concessions." Senator Schanzer also expressed himself to the effect that the phrase "so far as it is within our power" weakened the expression of the will of the Powers for perfect, equal opportunity, and suggested that it be omitted.

"Mr. Root answered that the expression "so far as it is within our power" was intended to limit the expression of intention strictly to individual competency of each of the Powers; to make it certain that no nation was attempting to do anything outside its competency. Continuing, he stated that the series of declarations began with different Powers having spheres of influence in China, in response to the appeal of Secretary Hay, in 1899, asking these Powers having spheres of influence to agree (1) that each Power having spheres of interest would not interfere with the treaty rights of others on leased territory; (2) that the Chinese tariff for the time being should apply to all ports within such spheres, and to all commodities; (3) that each Power should agree to equality of harbour dues and railroad rates in all such spheres of interest.
The phrase questioned by Senator Schanzer did limit the expression, according to Mr. Root but he believed rightly so, and approved of it.”* To this explanation Mr. Balfour added to the effect that, “he also gathered that the idea was to prevent any Power from interfering with any rights already given to individuals or States. If it were so the language was accurate and adequate.”† However on the fourteenth meeting of the Washington Conference, on December 8 1921, after making necessary provisions for preserving special interests already acquired, Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the British Empire Delegation, made the following pronouncement:—

“The British Government had not the slightest wish to prolong a situation which, so far as they were concerned, had been explicitly abandoned. A better way of dealing with the matter was to make it clear what had already been implicitly if not explicitly indicated; namely, to declare that no one wished to perpetuate either the system of spheres of interest or the international understandings on which they depended.”‡
On January 16, 1922, at the eighteenth session of the Washington Conference, Mr. Balfour made a further declaration to the following effect:—

"The British Empire Delegation understood that there was no representative of any Power around the table who thought that the old practice of 'sphere of influence' was either advocated by any Government or would be tolerable to this Conference. So far as the British Government were concerned, they had in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation."

In spite of flattering declarations, quoted above, regarding the abolition of the spheres of influence in China, because the Nine Power Agreement does not apply to territories ceded or leased or the interests already acquired, Great Britain has not in any way relaxed her hold in Tibet. However it is interesting to note that an American authority in Far Eastern affairs Prof. Edward Thomas Williams, formerly American Charge d'Affaires at Peking, recently Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, has, in his discussions

on "What is China?" raised the question of the actual status of Tibet after the Washington Conference. He writes:

"The Nine Power Treaty signed at the Conference on Limitation of Armaments in its first article stipulates that the Powers other than China shall respect the sovereignty, the independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. . . . Does it mean that these Powers recognize Tibet as an integral part of China? The question is important, for, although Tibet has belonged to China for many centuries, during the recent years both Russia and Great Britain have manœuvred for the position to control the future of this forbidden land, which a British writer describes as "rich in gold, enormously rich, possibly far richer than any other country in the world."*

Today Tibet is a closed country. Britain enjoys her special rights which she has succeeded in imposing.† Chinese sovereignty in Tibet is the

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† As early as 1899 when the question of Open Door and Spheres of Influence was being discussed and applied in practical politics in China, Tibet was marked for British occupation and control in the true sense of the expression. A well-known American authority writes:—"
acid test of the Nine Power Treaty. If its provisions are not applied to Tibet as a part of China, then it will mean that they are not to be applied in those parts of China which are regarded as spheres of influence or interests of some of the Great Powers. In that case the Nine Power Treaty has done more harm than good to China. Because China will be forced to recognise that she has lost her sovereignty in such regions as Tibet, and Great Britain claiming "special interests in Tibet" has become the real beneficiary of the benevolent treaty executed at Washington.

"It is interesting, in this connection, to recall the situation in China at that time. It was generally agreed that should dismemberment take place, Russia expected to get Manchuria, Pechili province and the greater part of Mongolia; Germany laid claim to Shantung and territory directly westward, including Shansi, Shensi and that part of Mongolia adjoining Tibet on the north; France had staked out the provinces contiguous to her Tongking possessions and probably would have been contented with Yunan, Kwansi and Kweichau and the island of Hianan. Japan had her desires fixed on Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces. This left for England Tibet and the provinces of Kiangsu, Nganhwui, Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung and Szechuan, embracing the entire Yangtse Valley, and an outlet from it to the south through Hunan and Kwangtung to Canton."—Millard, Thomas, F: The New Far East (New York, Scribner's Sons) 1906 pp. 182-183.

Sir Valentine Chirol gives the British view on the need of British control of Tibet. He says:—

"What would be impossible to view without some concern, would be the ascendance of a foreign and possibly hostile Power at Lhassa,
One of the real achievements of the Washington Conference was that, China recovered Shantung from Japanese control by the Sino-Japanese Agreement on Shantung, signed at Washington on February 1, 1922. By this China fully recovered her territorial sovereignty over this region. In this connection, it would not be out of place to emphasise that, China sought the aid of the United States and Great Britain to oust Japan from Shantung which was given to her by the Verssailes Treaty. In one sense controlling the policy of a great political-religious organization whose influence can and does make itself apparently felt all along the northwestern borderland of India. Lhassa is the stronghold of Lamastic Buddhism, a debased form of Buddhism, and the many-storied Po-to-la on the hill to the west of the city is its Vatican, whence its influence radiates throughout innumerable Lamaseries or Buddhist monastaries, not only into Turkestan and Mongolia and Western China, but across the Himalayas into the frontier states of our Indian Empire. Corrupt and degraded as it is, it is still unquestionably a power, and just because it is corrupt and degraded it might lend itself more readily to become, for a consideration, the tool of Russian ambitions. Tibet as a Russian dependency would no longer be a quantita negligeable, and our northeastern frontier, naturally formidable as it is, would require watching, just as every civilised country has to watch its frontiers, whatever they may be, where they march with a powerful neighbour, and most of all in India, where our frontier is fringed with semi-independent Native States, over which our authority is conditioned mainly on the hitherto unrivalled prestige of our Imperial Power in Asia."—India Year Book 1922 p. 178.
Japan was brought before the bar of international justice in the Washington Conference. The Governments of the United States and Great Britain put polite but effective pressure on Japan on the matter and allowed Japan to save her face by settling the question through direct negotiations between China and Japan. But who is going to ask Great Britain to disgorge all that she has taken from China?

According to the Article VII of the Nine Power Pact, any one of the signatories has the

"The assault against the Chinese sovereignty was made by Great Britain in 1904, when the British Government despatched an expedition to Lhassa, the capital of Tibet, under Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband. Yielding to the pressure thus brought to bear upon him, the Dalai Lama was forced to sign a treaty which provides (1) that no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold or leased or mortgaged to any other Power without the previous consent of the British Government; (2) that no representative of any other country may be admitted; (3) that no concessions for railways, telegraphs, mining or other rights shall be granted to any other Power; and (4) no Tibetan revenue shall be pledged or assigned to any other Government.

This treaty which the Tibetans were forced to sign literally at the mouths of British guns, constituted a flagrant infringement of Chinese sovereignty, for from time beyond reckoning Tibet had formed an integral part of the Chinese Empire, and its rulers had acknowledged the suzerainty of Peking. Under the circumstances, however, there was nothing for Peking to do but submit with the best grace possible, the Chinese Government confirming the treaty in exchange for Great Britain’s pledge not to annex Tibet or to
right to call for frank discussion of any point involving the applications of the treaty by all the signatories of the treaty. The existing Anglo-Tibetan agreement confers on Great Britain exclusive economic, diplomatic and territorial control over the country in contravention of the equal opportunity for all nations. China has the right, according to the sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article 1 of the Chinese Integrity treaty to call upon the United States and other Powers to use their influence to make the obligations of the treaty effective. If China, America and other nations fail to make effective protests against virtual control of Tibet by Britain, then it would mean that they agree to the fact that the Spheres of Influence may at any time become spheres of domination and there is nothing to encroach upon its internal autonomy. Since then Great Britain has steadily strengthened her position in Tibet, demanding and obtaining new privileges and pursuing a policy which has for its object, apparently, the eventual alienation of Tibetan territory. For example, a recent agreement provides that China may not dismiss officials in Tibet, or appoint new ones, without first obtaining British permission. In short, the Chinese Government was warned by Great Britain that the acknowledged sovereignty of China in Tibet must not be allowed to lead to the exercise of actual sovereignty.

Yet Tibet is represented by five deputies in the Chinese Parliament."

stop it but the strength of the sword of the nation whose territory is being diplomatically exploited. Unless there is a double standard of international morality, one to be applied for the Asiatic nations and the other for Europeans, the United States Government which took a definite and defiant stand against Japanese encroachment in Shantung, should take the leadership to aid China to regain her sovereignty in Tibet from British encroachment.

The Washington Conference has also gone on record and signed a treaty to the effect that the Chinese should not be supplied with arms. The professed purpose of it is to see that there be peace in China and the civil war be stopped; But the real motive behind it is to disarm China indirectly as much as possible, so that she would not be able to assert her strength. The plan is urgently advocated by the British side of the League of Nations regarding the control of the sale of arms, for no other purpose than to preserve the status quo in all parts of the world where Britain keeps millions under subjection. However it is very interesting to note that, according to the latest information, while Great Britain is very anxious that China, particularly South China, does not secure any arms from
outside, Britain is supplying arms to Tibetans and training Tibetans so that they would be able to oppose China in her efforts to reassert her sovereignty in Tibet.

If Great Britain is allowed to detach Tibet from China, and all other Powers remain as passive observers, then the natural result of this British expansion in Tibet will be, (on the ground of seeking a secure frontier for the British Empire in India and Tibet), that Britain will move on towards Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia and also the Chinese provinces adjoining Tibet, and make them as parts and parcels of the British Empire. This is not imagination on the part of the writer, but is the conclusion that should forcefully appeal to all who know the history of British expansion in India and Southern Asia. In fact today there is a movement for British expansion towards Turkestan, and because it is a remote region, very little attention is paid to British activities there by the outside world. The political and economic imperialism of Britain increases its scope in Asia, supported by the conspiracy of silence of the Great Powers of the world.

It is natural to expect that the policy which the rejuvenated China should follow is the policy
of recovering all territories that she has lost and at the same time assert her sovereign position, with equality and dignity among all nations. Although the question of Tibet seems to be kept in the background and from the public eye and discussion, for some special purpose, by western scholars, particularly by the apologists of British Imperialism, there is not the least doubt that it will be a vital factor in Chinese foreign policy, leading to Chinese territorial sovereignty.

The signatory Powers of the Chinese Territorial Integrity Treaty (except China) are nations which are holding other peoples in subjection. It is too much to expect that they would take the initiative to aid China to regain all her lost territories, unless they can gain something by doing so. The United States and other nations will not fight for China, but they will aid China, if by doing so they can gain a better advantage in winning the good will of the Chinese people and thus a fair share of the Chinese market. In this connection it may be noted that virtual annexation of Tibet, which is as rich in mineral wealth as Mexico, by Great Britain, will not be to the interest of the United States and other nations which have surplus capital to invest, and which seek world markets.
So it is imperative that China should seek the co-operation of the United States and other interested nations to recover her own territory of Tibet.

Although Japan is generally accused, by Western scholars and some Chinese scholars, of deliberately plotting to make China her dependency the fact is, Japan is not in a position to alienate the good will of the Chinese people. Any attempt to extend Japanese supremacy in Chinese territory would mean that Japan will incur the displeasure of China, the United States of America and other nations, which may mean political suicide for Japan. Impartial scholars of Far Eastern politics will agree to the fact that the policy of Japan has been the elimination of western domination from China and the neighbouring region. To Japan, Siam and India, any loss of territorial integrity of China should mean a step further towards the extinction of that of their own. A free strong China would be a source of security for all Asia from unjust European domination; therefore all the Asian Powers should be directly interested in China's recovering her sovereignty in Tibet.

Whether China succeeds in recovering her sovereignty in Tibet, in near future or not,
Chinese immigration in Southern Asia will be a source of strength to her. The Chinese are already spreading in the Malaya peninsula and the islands of the East Indies. "The natural outlet for Chinese expansion (population) is in Tibet, Burmah, Coachin China and Siam." In the history of all nations the population movement has a tremendous bearing on international relations and national expansion. There is not the least doubt that the Chinese people will migrate into territories touching China's borders; and this expansion will proceed in the north as well as in the south, although the southward march is more possible because of climatic and economic reasons.

In conclusion it is my conviction that Tibet as well as Mongolia are bound to be significant factors of larger aspects of Chinese politics. The future of China is intimately bound up with the rest of Asia. All Chinese statesmen of vision realise that Asian Independence is the surest guarantee of Chinese Independence. In the solution of the vast problem of Asian Independence the Eastern Asia—the vast region of India, Burma, Siam, China and Japan—with the

* Ireland, Alleyene: China and the Powers (Boston) 1902, page 18.
vast population of more than 800,000,000 souls will play the most important part. Thus those who believe in Asian Independence, will be forced to formulate a policy which will lead to Indo-Chinese-Japanese understanding, guaranteeing mutual territorial sovereignty. In that case it will be the duty of India to support China to regain her sovereignty in Tibet.

THE END.